FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF HIS LINGUISTIC THEORY
IN WESTERN STUDIES OF LANGUAGE.
A Critical Evaluation
of the Evolution of Saussurean Principles
and Their Relevance to Contemporary Linguistic Theories
by
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Philosophicum, Freie Universität Berlin, 1965
Staatsexamen, Justus Liebig Universität Giessen, 1968
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A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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of
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Name: Ernst Frideryk Konrad Koerner

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ABSTRACT

The present study constitutes a contribution to general linguistic theory and to the history of linguistics. The choice of Ferdinand de Saussure as the central figure of the investigation is based on the following traditional assumptions: 1) Saussure has been almost unanimously regarded as the founder of modern structural linguistics; 2) his posthumous *Cours de linguistique générale* has generally been interpreted as a complete break with previous theories of language, in particular those of the *Junggrammatiker*, and 3) modern linguists have tended to regard his achievements as the creative act of a genius who was completely independent of the intellectual atmosphere of his time. Since these views have been expressed in all histories of linguistics up to the present date, and particularly because our own findings do not confirm this, we have found sufficient reason to question the manner in which the history of linguistics has been written.

Histories of linguistics 1) have been almost exclusively concerned with relating ideas about language and its study in a merely chronological manner (suggesting at the same time that contemporary ideas are much more sophisticated, adequate, and naturally superior); 2) are frequently based on earlier accounts relying heavily on secondary sources; 3) have regarded developments in linguistic thought almost completely in isolation and have not taken into account their socio-political and cultural background, and 4) have not to date seriously attempted to construct a theory of how the history of linguistics should be written.

In view of the distorted picture of Saussure's position in the history of linguistics and the inadequacy of the work of previous historians of linguistics, the first part of our study attempts to illustrate, by restricting our attention to a specific period of time and a particular cultural and historical area, the manner in which the account of linguistic thought of the past should be presented. In this part the concept of *paradigm* is introduced in the sense of intellectual
atmosphere prevailing at a given time within a specific socio-political and cultural setting. Linguistic thought reflects *mutatis mutandis* the paradigm of its time and indeed we would argue that the history of linguistics represents the history of ideas *par excellence*. Saussure's ideas about the nature of language constitute an example of how the paradigm of his time had an impact on his theory. While we deny that Saussure was directly influenced by sociological, economic, psychological or philosophical concepts of the 19th century, his argument reveals that he belonged to the paradigm of the late 19th century and the turn of this century; his most immediate sources of inspiration were the linguistic studies of his own time.

After having outlined, in the first part, how Saussure's linguistic thought evolved from the paradigm of his time and also the way in which he surpassed his predecessors and contemporaries by creating a new frame of reference within which linguistics should operate, the second part devotes particular attention to the manner in which subsequent generations of linguists have succeeded or failed to work out the proposals laid down in the *Cours*. After an analysis of the four main aspects of Saussure's theory, i.e. 1) the distinctions between *langue* and *parole*, 2) synchrony and diachrony, 3) syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations and 4) his ideas about the semiological nature of language, in the light of 20th-century developments, we have concluded that the new paradigm put forward by Saussure has not yet been welded into an overall general theory of language as envisaged by Saussure some fifty years ago.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I should like to take the opportunity of expressing my gratitude and indebtedness towards the following persons and institutions: Firstly, I wish to thank the Government of Canada, represented by the Canada Council in Ottawa, for its financial support during the years 1968 to 1971 which enabled me to concentrate most of my efforts on research work and completion of my dissertation. Secondly, and this has certainly not been of less importance to me, though my indebtedness cannot be expressed in material terms, I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to my senior supervisor, Professor G. L. Bursill-Hall, for his continued interest in my work, his encouragement at various stages of its writing, and particularly for his careful, critical, and always very helpful supervision.

Last but not least two persons deserve to be mentioned whose assistance has been very valuable to me: Mrs. Hilary Jones who helped me in proof-reading and suggested many stylistic improvements, and Mrs. Heather Troche who prepared the final draft of the manuscript with great care. It goes without saying that the remaining weaknesses of the thesis are all my own responsibility.

Vancouver, November 8th, 1971

E. F. K. Koerner
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MASTER LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF PERIODICALS AND SERIES


AES  Archives Européennes de Sociologie. Paris 1960-

AfdA  Anzeiger für deutsches Altertum und deutsche (Lit(t)-
eratur. Leipzig, later on Berlin & Wiesbaden 1876- ; supplement to → ZfdA.

AfGPhon  Archiv für die gesamte Phonetik. Berlin 1937-1943/44; superseded → Vox. This journal consisted of two parallel publications: I. Archiv für vergleichende Phonetik (s. → AfVPhon), and II. Archiv für Sprach- und Stimmphysiologie und Sprach- und Stimmheilkunde. Berlin 1937-42 [= 6 vols.].

AfVPhon  Archiv für vergleichende Phonetik. Berlin 1937-44 [= 7 vols.]. superseded by → ZPhon. [S. also → AfGPhon].

AGI  Archivio Glottologico Italiano. Torino-Firenze-Roma 1873-

AKAWB  see → A(P)AWB

AION-L  Annali dell'Instituto (Universitario) Orientale. Sezione Linguistica. Napoli 1958-

AJP = AJPh  The American Journal of Philology. Baltimore, Md. 1880-

AJutlandica  Acta Jutlandica. Aarskrift for Aarhus Universitet. Aarhus & København 1929-

AL = ALH  Acta Linguistica (Hafniensia). International Journal of Structural Linguistics. Copenhagen 1939-
ALHung  Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. Budapest 1951-
ANF  Arkiv för Nordisk Filologi. Lund 1893-
AnnEPHE  École Pratique des Hautes Études. Annuaire. IVe Section: Sciences historiques et philologiques. Paris 1893-
ANFE  Archives Néerlandaises de Phonétique Expérimentale. Association néerlandaise des Sciences phonétiques. La Haye 1926-35 [= 12 vols.].
ANT  Altalános Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok. [Studies in general linguistics]. Budapest 1963-
AnthrL = AnL  Anthropological Linguistics. Bloomington, Ind. 1959-
AO  Archiv Orientalní. Journal of the Czechoslovak Oriental Institut. Prague 1931-
ArchL  Archivum Linguisticum. A Review of Comparative Philology and General Linguistics. Glasgow 1949-
A(K)SGWL = ASAW  Abhandlungen der (Königlichen) Sächsischen Gesellschaft/ Akademie der Wissenschaften. Leipzig 1846-1918.
ASLU = AUU  Acta Societas Linguisticae Upsaliensis. Uppsala, N.S. 1962-
ASNS  Archiv für das Studium der neueren Sprachen und Literaturen. Elberfeld, then Braunschweig and later on Berlin 1846-; also referred to as "Herrigs Archiv".
A(K)WAW  Anzeiger der (Kaiserlichen) Wiener Academie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Wien 1864-
ÅVsLund  Vetenskaps-societeten i Lund. Årsbok. Lund 1920-
BB = BKIS  (Bezzenbergers) Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen. Göttingen 1877-1906 [= 30 vols.]. Merged into → KZ.
BCLC  Bulletin du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague.  
Copenhague 1934-41 [= 6 vols.].

BFCL  Bolletino di Filologia Classica.  Torino 1894-1942  
[= 49 vols.].

BIFR  Bulletinul Institutului de Filologie Română "Alexandru  
Philippide".  Iași [= Jassy]/Rumania 1933-.

BJR  Bulletin des Jeunes Romanistes.  Strasbourg 1960-.

B(K)SGWL  Berichte der (Königlichen) Sächsischen Gesellschaft  
der Wissenschaften.  Leipzig 1846-48; N.S. 1849- 
1918.

BPhWs  Berliner philologische Wochenschrift.  S. —— PhWs

BPTJ  Biuletyń Polskiego Towarzystwa Językowniczego.  
Bulletin de la Société polonaise de Linguistique.  
Wrocław & Kraków 1927-.

BRPh  Beiträge zur Romanischen Philologie.  Berlin 1961-.

BSHA  Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de  
Genève.  Genève 1902-.

BSI = BLI  Beiträge zur Sprachkunde [since 1966: Linguistik]  
und zur Informationsverarbeitung.  München & Wien  
1963-.

Paris 1869-.

BÜRJL  Bulletin Ústavu Ruského Jazyka a Literatury.  Praha  
1956.

BVSAW  Berichte über die Verhandlungen [since 1849: Abhand-  
lungen] der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften  
zu Leipzig.  Philologisch-historische Klasse.  
Leipzig 1846-48; N.S. 1849-1918.  S. also —— B(K)SGWL.

BVSGW  Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesells-  
schaft der Wissenschaften.  S. —— BVSAW.

BVSpr  Beiträge zur vergleichenden Sprachforschung auf dem  
Gebiete der arischen, celtischen und slavischen  
Sprachen.  Berlin 1858-76; merged into ——  
(ZfVSp =) KZ.
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<td>CFS</td>
<td>Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure. Publiés par la Société genevoise de Linguistique. Genève 1941-</td>
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<td>CILUP</td>
<td>Conférences de l'Institut de Linguistique de l'Université de Paris. Paris 1934-</td>
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<td>CIL = RCL</td>
<td>Canadian Journal of Linguistics/Revue Canadienne de Linguistique. [Formerly: Journal of the Canadian Linguistic Association/Revue de l'Association canadienne de Linguistique]. Toronto 1955-</td>
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<td>CLS</td>
<td>Cahiers de Linguistique Structurale. Publiés sous les auspices de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université Laval. Laval, Québec 1952- [irreg.].</td>
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<td>CLITA</td>
<td>Cahiers de Linguistique Théorique et Appliquée. Bucharest 1962-</td>
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<td>Colle</td>
<td>College English. An Official Organ of the National Council of Teachers of English. Champaign, Ill. 1939-</td>
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<td>CRAI</td>
<td>Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Paris 1857-64, 1865-71; 1872; 1873-</td>
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<td>CSIP = RCSL</td>
<td>Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des Slavistes. The Canadian Association of Slavists/L'Association canadienne des Slavistes. Toronto 1959-</td>
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<td>CultN</td>
<td>Cultura Neolitana. Bollettino dell'Intituto di Filologia romanza della Università di Roma. Modena 1940-</td>
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<td>Cultura</td>
<td>La Cultura. Rivista mensile de filosofia, lettere, arte. Roma &amp; Firenze 1921-35 [= 14 vols.]; N.S., subtitled 'Il saggiatore', Milano 1959-</td>
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<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>The Classical Weekly, [later on: The Classical World]. New York 1907-</td>
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<td>ČMF</td>
<td>Časopis pro Moderní Filologii. Praha 1914-; during the years 1963-66 incorporated in — PhP.</td>
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<td>Cluj Universitatea. Cluj/Rumania 1920-21-</td>
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<td>Diogène</td>
<td>Diogène. Revue internationale des Sciences humaines.</td>
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<td>Paris 1952-</td>
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<td>DLZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Literaturzeitung für Kritik der internationalen Wissenschaft. Berlin 1880-</td>
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<td>DU</td>
<td>Der Deutschunterricht. Beiträge zu seiner Praxis und wissenschaftlichen Grundlegung. Stuttgart 1949-</td>
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<td>DVJS</td>
<td>Deutsche Vierteljährsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte. Stuttgart 1923-</td>
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<td>EL</td>
<td>Ezik i Literatura. Sofija 1945-</td>
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<td>FL</td>
<td>Foundations of Language. International Journal of Language and Philosophy. Dordrecht/The Netherlands 1965-</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Le Français Moderne. Revue de linguistique française.</td>
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<td>FoL</td>
<td><em>Folia Linguistica. Acta Societatis Linguisticae Europaeae.</em> The Hague 1967-</td>
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<td>GCFI</td>
<td><em>Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana.</em> Roma 1921-</td>
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<td>GGA</td>
<td><em>Germanistik. Internationales Referatenorgan mit bibliographischen Hinweisen.</em> Tübingen 1960-</td>
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<td>GFFNS</td>
<td><em>Godišnjak Filozofskog Fakulteta u Novom Sadu. Annuaire de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences à Novi Sad.</em> Novi Sad/Yugoslavia 1958-</td>
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<td><em>Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen. Unter der Aufsicht der Akademie der Wissenschaften.</em> Göttingen 1739 [sic] -</td>
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<td>GK</td>
<td><em>Gengo Kenkyū. Journal of the Linguistic Society of Japan.</em> Tokyo 1939-</td>
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<td><em>The German Review. Columbia University. Department of Germanic Languages.</em> New York 1926-</td>
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<td>GW</td>
<td><em>Germanica Wratislaviensia.</em> Wrocław [Breslau] 1958-</td>
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<td>HandNFC</td>
<td><em>Handelingen van het Nederlands Filologencongress.</em> Groningen 1898-</td>
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<td>IBK</td>
<td><em>Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturwissenschaft. Sprachwissenschaftliches Seminar der Universität Innsbruck.</em> Innsbruck 1953?-</td>
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<td>IF</td>
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Indian Linguistics. Journal of the Linguistic Society of India. Lahore, later on Poona 1931-

Inzvestija po russkomu jazyku i slovesnosti. Moskva 1928-


Izraz. Casopis za knjizennu i umjetnicka kritiku. Sarajevo/Yugoslavia 1956-

Izvestija Akademii Nauk SSSR. Otdelenije literatury i jazyka. Moskva & Leningrad 1942-


Jazykovědné Aktuality. Zpravokaj Jazykovědněhosdružení při Československé akademii věd. Praha 1964-

Jazykovedný Časopis. Bratislava 1951-

The Journal of English and Germanic Philology. Bloomington, Ind., later on Urbana, Ill. 1897-


Janua Linguarum. Series maior. Studia memoriae Nicolai van Wijk dedicata. The Hague 1962-
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td><strong>JL-SMin</strong></td>
<td><em>Janua Linguarum. Series minor.</em> Studia . . . , etc. The Hague 1956-</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>JP</strong></td>
<td><em>Język Polski.</em> Organ Towarzystwa Miłośników Języka Polskiego. Kraków 1931-</td>
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<td><strong>JsIF</strong></td>
<td><em>Južnoslovenski Filolog.</em> Povremeni spis sa slovensku filologiju i lingvistiku. Belgrad 1913- <em>[Suspended 1914-20].</em></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>KanashHB</strong></td>
<td><em>Kanazawa Daigaku Hobungakubu Ronshu.</em> Bungakuhen [Studies and essays by the faculty of Law and Literature, Kanazawa University: Literature]. Kanazawa 1953-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kratylos</strong></td>
<td><em>Kratylos.</em> Kritisches Berichts- und Rezensionsorgan für indogermanische und allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Wiesbaden 1956-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KSISI</strong></td>
<td><em>Kratkie Soobščenija Instituta Slavjanovedeniya.</em> Akademija Nauk SSSR. Moskva 1951-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KZ = ZfVSp</strong></td>
<td><em>(Kuhn's) Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete des Deutschen, Griechischen und Lateinischen</em> [after 1874: . . . auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen]. Berlin 1852-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Langages</strong></td>
<td><em>Langages.</em> [Subtitle varies]. Paris 1966-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Language = Lg</strong></td>
<td><em>Language.</em> Journal of the Linguistic Society of America. Baltimore, Md. 1925-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LAnt</strong></td>
<td><em>Linguistica Antverpiensia.</em> Antwerpen 1967-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LB</strong></td>
<td><em>Leuwensche Bijdragen op het gebied van de Germaansche philologie in't bijzonder van de Nederlandsche dialektkunde.</em> [Later on subtitled: Tijdschrift voor moderne philologie]. Leuven 1896-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ling. Berichte</strong></td>
<td><em>Linguistische Berichte.</em> Forschung-Information-Diskussion. Braunschweig 1969-</td>
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</table>
Lexis
[= 4 vols.].

Listy Filologické (i Paedagogické). Praha 1874-

Washington, D.C. 1959-

Lingua. International Review of General Linguistics/
Revue internationale de Linguistique générale.
Haarlem, later on Amsterdam 1947/48-

Linguistics. An International Review. The Hague 1963-

Litera. Studies in Language and Literature. Published by the English Department, Istanbul University.
Istanbul 1954-; supersedes → Dergi.

Language and Language Behavior Abstracts. Ann Arbor, Mich. 1967-

Linguistik und Didaktik. München 1970-

Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland. Leipzig 1850-1944. [N.B. Vol. 51 (1900) is the first numbered copy].

[= 7 vols.].

Medede(e)lingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Afdeling Letterkunde (Series A & B). Amsterdam 1855-; Nieuwe Reeks 1938-

<table>
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<tr>
<td>PhFrag = PhP</td>
<td>Philologica Pragensia. [Formerly called: Philologica]. Prague 1958-; s. also → CMF.</td>
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<td>PJ</td>
<td>Poradnik Językowy. Warszawa 1901-; N.S. 1948- [Suspended 1917-18].</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLG</td>
<td>Probleme de Linguistica Generală. București 1963-</td>
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<td>PMLA</td>
<td>Publications of the Modern Language Association of America. Baltimore, later on Menasha, Wisc., and finally New York 1884-</td>
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<td>FWS = PhWs</td>
<td>(Berliner) Philologische Wochenschrift. Berlin &amp; Leipzig 1880-1944 [= 64 vols.] [N.B.: during 1884-1920 the journal appeared as → BPhWs.].</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBF</td>
<td>Revista Brasiliéra di Filologia. Río de Janeiro 1955-</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBPHe</td>
<td>Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire. Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenes. [Earlier subtitle: La Société pour le progrès des études philologues et histoires]. Bruxelles 1922-</td>
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<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Revue des Etudes Anciennes. Bordeaux &amp; Paris 1897-</td>
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<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Revue des Etudes Latines. Paris 1922-</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Rivista di Filologia Classica. Torino 1872- [N.B. The 'Nuova Serie' is entitled → RFIC].</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFHC</td>
<td>Revista de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Montevideo 1944-</td>
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<td>RIL</td>
<td>Rendiconti dell'Intituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere. Classe di lettere e scienze morali e politiche. Milano 1864-67; N.S. 1868-</td>
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<tr>
<td>RILA</td>
<td>Rassegna Italiana di Linguistica Applicata. Roma 1969-</td>
</tr>
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MNy

*Magyar Nyelv.* [Originally: Külöleuyomat a . . . ]

Budapest, 1905-

MNyelvőr

*Magyar Nyelvőr.* [Hungarian Purist].

Budapest, 1872-

Monatshefte

*Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht.* A Journal devoted to the Study of German Language and Literature.

Madison, Wisc. 1899-

MorphUnters

*Morphologische Untersuchungen.* (By Hermann Osthoff and Karl Brugmann).

Leipzig, 1878-1910 [= 6 vols.].

MPh


Chicago, 1903-

MSLL


Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 1951-

MSLP

*Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris.*


MSpråk

*Moderna Språk.* Tidskrift for språkundervising.

Malmö, later on Stockholm 1907-

NAA

*Narody Azii i Afriki.* Istorija, ëkonomika, kul'tura.

Moskva 1959-

NAR

*North American Review.*

New York, 1815-1940; N.S. Cornell College, Mount Vernon, Iowa, 1964-

NDVŠ-F

*Naučnye Doklady Vysšej Školy.* Filologičeskie nauki.

Moskva 1958-

NK

*Nyelvtudomány: Közlemények.* S. → *NyK.*

Nph

*Neophilologus.* A Modern Language Quarterly. [Sub-
titles vary; since 1966: A Quarterly Devoted to the Study of the Modern Languages and Their Literatures and the Classical Languages and Literatures in so far as they bear to the former (!)].

Groningen, 1916-

NphMitt

*Neophilologische Mitteilungen.* Bulletin de la Société néophilologique de Helsinki. [Helsingfors =]

Helsinki, 1899-
NSpr = NS  
**Die Neueren Sprachen.** Zeitschrift für den neusprachlichen Unterricht [later on subtitled: Zeitschrift für Erforschung und Unterricht auf dem Gebiete der modernen Fremdsprachen]. Marburg 1893-1943 [= 51 vols.]; superseded → **PhonSt.**  N.S. Frankfurt-Berlin-Bonn-München 1951-

NTF  
**Nordisk Tidsskrift for Filologi.** København 1861-1922.

NTg  
**De Nieuwe Taalgids.** Tweenmaandelijksch tijdschrift. Groningen 1907-

NTS  
**Norsk Tidsskrift for Sprogvidenskap.** Oslo 1928-

NTTS  
**Nordisk Tidsskrift for Tale og Stemme.** København 1936-

Nyk  
**Nyelvtudományi Közlemények.** A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia nyelvtudományi bizottságának megbízásából. Budapest 1862- [Suspended 1944-47].

OGK  
**Onsei Gakkai Kaiho.** The Bulletin of the Phonetic Society of Japan. Tokyo 1926-

Paideia  
**Paideia.** Rivista letteraria di informazione bibliografica. Arona-Brescia-Genova- etc./Italy 1946-

PAPA  
**Proceedings of the American Philological Association.** Hartford, then Middletown, Conn. later on Ithaca, N.Y. 1871- ; s. also → **TAPA.**

PBB  
(Paul und Braunes) **Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur.** Halle 1874-1954, after 1955: There are two parallel editions published in Halle and Tübingen.

PBML  
**The Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics.** Prague 1963-

Philologica  

Philost  
**Philosophische Studien.** Leipzig 1883-1903 [= 20 vols.].

Phonetica  
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<td>RIS</td>
<td>Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie. Bruxelles 1928-</td>
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<td>RJäś</td>
<td>Russkij Jazyk v Škole. Moskva 1936-</td>
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<td>RJb</td>
<td>Romanistisches Jahrbuch. Universität Hamburg, Seminar für romanische Sprachen. Hamburg 1947/48-</td>
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<td>RKJN</td>
<td>Rozprawy Komisji Językowej. Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe. Wrocław 1960-</td>
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<td>RLaR</td>
<td>Revue des Langues Romanes. Montpellier (later also) Paris 1870-</td>
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<td>RLaV = TLT</td>
<td>Revue des Langues Vivantes/Tijdschrift voor Levende Talen. Fondation universitaire de Belgique.</td>
<td>Bruxelles 1932-</td>
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<tr>
<td>RLB</td>
<td>Recueil Linguistique de Bratislava. Bratislava 1948-</td>
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<td>RLR</td>
<td>Revue de Linguistique Romane. Société de Linguistique romane. Strasbourg, later on Lyon &amp; Paris 1925-</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Romania. Recueil trimestriel consacré à l'étude des langues et des littératures romanes. Paris 1872-</td>
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<td>RPH</td>
<td>Romance Philology. Berkeley &amp; Los Angeles, Calif. 1946/7-</td>
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<td>RPhilos = RPFE</td>
<td>Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger. Paris 1876-</td>
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<td>RRLing</td>
<td>Revue Romane de Linguistique. [= Continuation of → R Ling]. Bucharest 1956-</td>
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<td>RSlav</td>
<td>Ricercbe Slavistiche. Roma 1953-</td>
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<td>RUM</td>
<td>Revista de la Universidad de Madrid. Madrid 1940-</td>
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<td>SaS</td>
<td>Slovo a Slovesnost. Praha 1935-</td>
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<td>SbSAW</td>
<td>Sitzungsberichte der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig. Philologisch-historische Klasse. Berlin 1919- [Supersedes → B(K)SGWL].</td>
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<td>Scientia</td>
<td>Scientia. Rivista di Scienzia. Bologna 1907- [Vols. 1907-09 appeared as 'Rivista di Scienzia'].</td>
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<td>SCL</td>
<td>Studii și Cercetări Linguistice. București 1950-</td>
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SCR

Strumenti Critici. Torino 1966/67-

Semiotica

Semiotica. Journal of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. The Hague 1969-

SFFB(U) J

Sborník Filozofickej Fakulty Brněnské University. Čada Jazykovědná. Brno 1953-

SG

Studium Generale. Zeitschrift für die Einheit der Wissenschaften im Zusammenhang ihrer Begriffsbildungen und Forschungsmethoden. Berlin & New York 1947-

SL

Studia Linguistica. Revue de la linguistique générale et comparée. Lund 1947-

SIEEJ

Slavic and East European Journal. Madison, Wisc. 1957-

SNph = StNph

Studia Neophilologica. A Journal of Germanic & Romanic philology. Uppsala 1927-28-

Sprache

Sprache. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft. Wiener Sprachgesellschaft. Wien & Wiesbaden 1949-

SSI = ISS

Social Science Information/Information sur les sciences sociales. Amsterdam 1962-

SSL

Studi e Saggi Linguistici. Supplemento alla rivista "L'Italia Dialettale". Pisa 1961-

StGen

Studium Generale. s. → SG.

StGram = Stud. Grammatica


Studii Baltici

Studii Baltici. Roma 1931-

STZ

Sprache im technischen Zeitalter. Stuttgart 1961-

TA


TAPA

Transactions (and Proceedings) of the American Philological Association. Hartford, then Middletown, Conn., later on Ithaca, N.Y. 1871-; s. also → PAPA.
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<td>TCLC</td>
<td>Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague. Copenhagen 1944- [Irreg.].</td>
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<td>TCLP</td>
<td>Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague/Pražský</td>
<td>Linvistický Kroužek. Prague/Praha 1929-39 [= 8 vols.].</td>
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<td>TempsModernes</td>
<td>Les Temps Modernes. Paris 1945- ; supersedes 'Nouvelle Revue française'.</td>
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<td>Teuthonista</td>
<td>Teuthonista. Zeitschrift fur deutsche Dialektforschung und Sprachgeschichte. Leipzig &amp; Bonn 1924/25-1934 supersedes → ZfDMa; superseded by → ZfMaF.</td>
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<td>TIJa</td>
<td>Trudy Instituta Jazykoznanija. Moskva, Akademija Nauk SSSR. Moskva 1952-</td>
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<td>TIL</td>
<td>Travaux de l'Institut de Linguistique. Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris. Paris 1956-</td>
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<td>TLL</td>
<td>Travaux de Linguistique et de Littérature. Publié par le Centre de Philologie et de Littératures romanes de l'Université de Strasbourg. Strasbourg 1963-</td>
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<td>TLP</td>
<td>Travaux Linguistiques de Prague. Prague &amp; Alabama/U.S.A. 1964-</td>
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<td>TPS = TPPhS</td>
<td>Transactions of the Philological Society. Oxford 1854- [Supersedes → PPS].</td>
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<td>Universitas</td>
<td>Universitas. Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur. Stuttgart 1946-</td>
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<td>UZBařU</td>
<td>Učený Zapiski Baškirskeho gosudarstvennego Universitetata. Serija filologicheskix nauk. Ufa/USSR 1956-</td>
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<td>UZIJaL</td>
<td>Učenye Zapisky Instituta Jazyka i Literatury. Moskva 1926-</td>
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<td>UZKasU = UZKananU</td>
<td>(Izvestija i) Učenye Zapiski imperatorskogo Kazanskogo Universiteta. Section &quot;Učenye Zapiski&quot;. Kazan' 1834-1861; 1862-4 [divided into sections]; 1865-83 [S. also → IKU]; 1884-1917. N.S. 'Učenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Universiteta imeni V. I. Ul'janova-Lenina'. Ibid. 1961-</td>
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UZKazU. Учёные Zapiski folologičeskogo fakulteta, Kirgizskij gosudarstvennyj Universitet. Frunze 1952-

UZKU See → UZKazU.

Veltro Il Velcro. Revista della civilta italiana. (Societa Dante Alighieri). Roma 1957-

Verri Il Verri. Rivista di Letteratura. Milano 1944-

VFilos Voprosy Filosofii. Insitut filosofii, Akademija Nauk/SSSR. Moskva 1947-

WA Voprosy Jazykoznanija. Moskva 1951/52-

VMU Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Serija VII: Filologija. Moskva 1946-


VR Vox Romanica. Annales helvetici explorandis linguis romanicis destinati. Bern 1936-

VsWPhilos Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie. Leipzig 1876-1916 [= 40 vols.].


WSlav Die Welt der Slaven. Vierteljahrsschrift für Slavistik. Wiesbaden 1956-


WW Wirkendes Wort. Deutsches Sprachschaffen in Lehre und Leben. [Subtitled since 1969: Deutsche Sprache in Forschung und Lehre]. Düsseldorf 1950-

WZKM Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes. Wien 1897-1917/18 [= 30 vols.].

WZUB Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universität Berlin. Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe. Berlin 1951/52-
WZUG  Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Ernst Moritz Arndt-Universität Greifswald. Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe. Greifswald 1952-

WZUH  Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe. Halle 1951/52-


WZUL  Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl Marx-Universität Leipzig. Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe. Leipzig 1954-

ZAA  Zeitschrift für Anglistik und Amerikanistik. VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. Berlin 1952/53-

ZbFiL - ZbFL  Zbornik za Filologiju i Lingvistiku. Matica srpska. Knjizevno odeljenje. Lingvistika sekcija. Novi Sad/Yugoslavia 1957-

ZDL  Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik. Wiesbaden 1969-

ZDMG  Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden 1847-

ZfDP = ZDFh  Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie. Halle, later on Berlin 1869-


Z(N)FSL  Zeitschrift für neufranzösische (since vol. 11 [1889]: ... für französische) Sprache und Literatur. Wiesbaden 1879- [Suspended 1945-55].

ZfVSpr  Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete des Deutschen, Lateinischen und Griechischen [Since 1876: ... auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen]. Berlin 1852- [Suspended 1945-47]. Absorbed → BVSpr (in 1876), and → BB (vol. 30, 1907). Frequently referred to as → KZ.
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung. Wurzach/Germany later on Meisenheim/Glan (Switzerland) 1947-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie. Halle, later on Tübingen 1877- (also referred to as &quot;Gröber's Zeitschrift&quot;).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeitschrift für Slavistik. Berlin 1956-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Žurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosvečenija. St. Petersburg (S. Peterburg) 1846-1905; N.S. 1906-17?</td>
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</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS FOR FESTSCHRIFTEN, COLLECTIONS OF ARTICLES BY
VARIOUS AUTHORS, AND PROCEEDINGS OF LINGUISTIC AND OTHER RELEVANT
CONGRESSES OR CONFERENCES.

A[1]CIL

Actes du Premier Congrès International de Linguistes. [The Hague, April 10-15,


Actes du Deuxième Congrès International de Linguistes. [Geneva, August 25-29,


Atti di Terzo Congresso Internazionale dei Linguisti. [Rome, September 19-26,
1933]. Ed. by Bruno Migliorini and Vittore Pisani. Florence: F. Lemonnier,


Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Linguistes. [Copenhagen, August 27-


[The Congress planned to take place in Brussels, August 28-September 2, 1939,
was not held because of the deterioration of the international situation. However,
the following preliminary material was published in Brugge: Impr. Sainte Cathe-
rine, 1939: 1) Réponses au Questionnaire, 104 pp. 2) Supplement to 1),
53 pp. 3) Rapports, 147 pp., and 4) Résumés des Communications, 66 pp.].
Actes du Sixième Congrès International des

A[7,8,9]CIL
See ➔ P[7,8,9]ICPS.

A[10]CIL
Actes du Dixième Congrès International des
Linguistes. [Bucharest, August 28-
September 2, 1967]. 4 vols. Bucharest:
Ed. de l'Acad. de la RSR, 1969-70.

(Actes du) Onzième Congrès International de
Psychologie (Paris, 25-31 juillet 1937):
Rapports et comptes rendus. Ed. by

A[1]CISP
Actes du Premier Congrès International
des Sciences Phonétiques. First Meeting
of the Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft
für Phonologie. [Amsterdam, July 3-8,
1932]. (= ANPE, 8-9). The Hague:
Association néerlandaise des Sciences
phonétiques, 1933.

See ➔ P[2]ICPS.

Actes du Troisième Congrès International
des Sciences Phonétiques. [Ghent, July
18-22, 1938]. Ed. by Edgard Blancquaert
and Willem Pee. Ghent: Univ. Laboratory
of Phonetics, 1939, xi + 536 pp.

A[4,5]CISP
See ➔ P[4,5]ICPS.

Album Baader
Album philologicum voor Prof. Dr. Th[eodor]
Baader. Ed. by C[ornelis] C[hris tiaan]
Berg, et al. Tilburg/Holland: Redaction
Album Baader, 1939, xii + 224 pp.

Bloomfield Anthology
A Leonard Bloomfield Anthology. Ed. by
Charles F[ranscis] Hockett. Bloomington
Current Trends III

Encyclopaedia of Linguistics

Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)

Festschr. Meinhof

Festschr. Meyer-Lübke I,II

Festschr. Steinitz

Festschr. Streitberg

For Roman Jakobson

Geneva School Reader

Hommage Buyssens

Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier

Jazyk i myšlenie

Le Langage

La Linguistique

Mélanges Bally
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<th>Details</th>
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**P[5]ICPS**  

**Portraits of Linguists I,II**  

**Prague School Reader**  
*A Prague School Reader in Linguistics.*  

**Problem der Sprache**  

**Problemas y principios**  

**Problem yazykosnanija**  

**RC[10]CIL**  

**Reader in 19th c. Ling.**  


Trends in European and American Linguistics 1930-1960: On the Occasion . . . , etc.
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# FURTHER ABBREVIATIONS AND SIGLA USED IN THIS STUDY

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<td>Acad./Accad.</td>
<td>Academia, Académie, Academy, etc./Accademia</td>
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<td>Akad.</td>
<td>Akademija, Akademia, etc.</td>
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ed./eds. edition, editor, edited [by]/editors
enl. enlarged [edition]
esp. especially
et al. et alii: "and others"
fasc. fascicle(s), fascicule(s)
FdS Ferdinand de Saussure
Fr. French
G. German
gosud. gosudarstvennyj, gosudarstvennoe, etc.
Hung. Hungarian
idg. indogermanisch; s. also IE
IE Indo-European
Inst. Institute, Institut, etc.
introd. introduced, introduction
It. Italian
izd. izdatel'stvo
Jap. Japanese
LGL Life and Growth of Language: An Outline of Linguistic Science. By William Dwight Whitney
LGLF Linguistique Générale et Linguistique Française.
LHMG I/II Linguistique Historique et Linguistique Générale.
Libr. Library, Librairie, etc.
LSA Linguistic Society of America. Washington, D.C.
LSL Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic

new series, nova serie, neue serie, etc.

New Series, Nova Serie, Neue Serie, etc.


Spanish


Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik. Tübingen 1969 - translated, translation

University, Université, Universität, Universidad, etc.


Addenda:


Neue Deutsche Biographie. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1953 -
0.0 INTRODUCTION: OUTLINE OF THE GOAL OF THE INVESTIGATION

... mehr als die schwierigste Rechnung, die mit Hilfe alter Operationen ausgeführt wird, bedeutet die Ermittlung einer neuen Operationsart.

Hugo Schuchardt in 1905 (ZRPh 29:622)

In his programmatic article of 1938, "The Historiography of Ideas", Arthur O. Lovejoy (1873-1962) listed a dozen disciplines in which the historical study of ideas has been pursued, among them the histories of philosophy, science, political economy, and sociology as well as comparative literature and the history of art.¹ It is regrettable to note that Lovejoy made no mention of linguistics except for a reference to "some parts of the history of language, especially semantics",² a statement which would suggest the author's unfamiliarity with the subject as a whole, an impression which is reinforced by the absence of any further allusion to this area of scholarly activity in the remainder of his argument. While we believe that this omission of the general study of language from the field of research devoted to the development of human thought, culture or socio-political setting within a given period, does not represent an isolated case - on the contrary, it appears that for at least one-hundred-and-fifty years philological studies and those dealing with the investigation of language have tended to diverge from each other to their mutual detriment -, our concern is not with dissecting the various reasons for this neglect but with trying to make our own position clear and to suggest a program which is more satisfactory.

We are convinced that the history of linguistics as such (in contrast to the historical study of isolated (catch) words, as Lovejoy suggested) represents the field within the historiography of ideas par excellence and could perhaps take pride of place. It has been maintained that
etymology, for example, does not reveal very much about a people's way of thinking in a general sense, although there may well be striking instances to be discovered in which a single word form may yield a whole concept of thought; nor do we believe that the history of philosophy for instance can provide an adequate picture of the main traits of intellectual activity of a given epoch unless it is also concerned with contemporary opinions about language.

It is a common-place statement to affirm that language is the most important tool of man; in contrast to this the fact that language is not only the carrier of our cultural heritage but equally well the best possible access to the results of the human mind has not been accorded comparable consideration. It is our conviction that human reflection upon this tool of self-expression and social intercourse as it has been transmitted to us through writing (which in itself constitutes the first means of synthesis) is a most important source of information, to the extent that a historiography of ideas has to be based on all primary documents which contain, in a systematic manner or not, views about language, its function and mechanism.

To achieve such a preliminary goal of investigating original sources for the purpose of presenting a synthesis of the general trends of thought in a given era of the cultural, political and economic development of mankind is certainly no easy task for a single student even if he decides to limit himself to a restricted period and geographical area. Lovejoy suggested the following means of diminishing the difficulties: 1) the preparation of scholars for competent investigation in more than one field (which is admittedly the *condicio sine qua non*); 2) the rediscernment of percussions of certain ideas outside the given area of study; and 3) close collaboration between all the branches of historiography. While nobody would seriously question the validity of these suggestions the simple fact remains that since then nowhere, to our knowledge, has there been established a department or institute in which these necessary skills are taught, nor does it seem likely that collaboration between historians of philosophy, sociology or any other discipline is to become
something quite normal in the near future within the humanities; the publications in the Journal of the History of Ideas which have appeared since 1940 seem to support this impression. This regrettable résumé of the 'state of the art' is certainly not very encouraging, and the step from diagnosis to therapy is probably much bigger than in medicine for instance since the object of remedy is not of a physical but of an abstract and mental nature and probably much more persistent in character.

It appears to us that what is lacking is not so much intellectual flexibility among scholars and a willingness to cooperate in an enterprise such as the investigation of general trends in human thought as some kind of guidance, directional markers, so to speak, which safeguard the searcher in the terra incognita against losing his way. There is an abundance of primary material available to anyone willing to venture on such a journey of human curiosity. In short, what is still missing, in particular in the field of the history of linguistic thought, is a frame of reference, a theory. Before attempting an outline of the nature and content of such a theory, it seems indispensable to justify our claim that the history of linguistics does constitute that branch of the history of ideas in a manner unequalled by any other discipline. We have already pointed to the simple truth that language is the human means of expression kate xočen and, at the same time, the best medium for the transmission of cultural values through its written derivative. Another equally important feature seems less generally accepted and requires illustration. It is our claim that linguistic thought or, more adequately, the analysis of the origin and nature of language is closely related to the general cultural and socio-political atmosphere, the intellectual paradigm, of its time. In fact, we believe that ideas and opinions about language reflect, to a large extent, what a given society or cultural community regard as the most significant achievements of its epoch. J. P. Süßmilch's treatise of 1756, in which he attempted to prove his conviction that the perfection and organisation of language could only be "the work of a very great and perfect mind", and Herder's famous Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache
(Berlin 1772), in which the author deduced from the intellectual ingenuity ("Besonnenheit") of man the necessity of language and its development, may be cited as examples of contrasting views regarding the origin of language and, at the same time, as revealing instances of the paradigm of Western European thought in the second half of the 18th century. On the other hand, we may also understand why Cuvier's voluminous work on comparative anatomy which appeared after 1817 should have given rise to a number of suggestions concerning the structure of language and the means of describing it as the work of Grimm, Bopp, and other contemporary linguists demonstrate. Similarly Lyell's Principles of Geology of the early 1830s provided 19th century linguists with methodological principles encouraging them to explain earlier and no longer verifiable changes of language with the help of forces still active in the languages spoken in their own time. Much has been said about Schleicher's "Darwinism" for instance; the reiteration of the received opinion, however, does not change the fable convene into a statement of fact. Yet it is true that Schleicher hailed Darwin when the Origin of Species of 1859 appeared in German translation in the subsequent year. But, as J. P. Maher has recently shown, Schleicher viewed in Darwin a kindred spirit only after most of Schleicher's theoretical credo had been developed in a fashion similar to the principles of evolution outlined in Darwin's work, which in fact was not without its antecedents as Wilhelm Scherer noted almost one hundred years ago. We are therefore much more safe in saying that these ideas were 'in the air' at the time and that both were influenced by the nature of the current paradigm. Darwin was (as was mutatis mutandis Schleicher in linguistic theory) in the final analysis really nothing more than a synthesizer and popularizer of ideas prevailing in the natural sciences of his time, and the work of the linguists of the same period exhibits much of these ideas and principles as can be demonstrated in the work of Whitney or Hermann Paul.

However, not only are achievements of the natural sciences partly absorbed and many of their underlying concepts reflected in the linguistic methodology and theories of the time but also those of the social sciences,
in particular psychology, sociology or philosophy, as can be shown in the work of 19th century investigators of language, e.g. Steinthal's adaptation of Herbartian psychology, Whitney's emphasis on the social nature of language deriving its insights from Spencerian sociology (cf. Terracini, 1949:120) or Kantian influences on Humboldt's linguistic thought. The impact of Hegel's system of philosophy for example needs re-assessment; that his philosophy was very influential during the 19th century is not only manifested in the use Karl Marx made of his theories but also for instance in the linguistic theory of August Schleicher as was convincingly demonstrated by Delbrück in his Einleitung of 1880. There is, for example, Hegel's voluminous Wissenschaft der Logik which appeared in 1812-16, and which was translated into French in 1859. We mention this publication since we hope later on to demonstrate that there is a likelihood that Hegel anticipated Saussure's ideas concerning questions of opposition, negative, differences, and identity in language (cf. 2.2.5.1). It appears also quite likely that Saussure, like many other intellectuals of his time, was well acquainted with Hegel's Encyclopädie of 1817 which ran through two further editions during the author's lifetime (1827 and 1830) and was frequently re-edited thereafter. The re-issue of this influential volume in 1870, the year which is frequently interpreted as marking the beginning of a new era in linguistics, may well be significant for several reasons. Firstly, it suggests a revival of interest in Hegel's system of philosophy, an interest which was certainly motivated also by nationalistic tendencies in Germany originating in the Romanticist movement of the early 19th century. Secondly, the invigorated interest in Hegel's attempt at an encyclopedic approach to science suggests the existence of a widely spread feeling of parallelism between developments in the various branches of the social sciences which in turn are matched with advances in the natural sciences but probably also reinforced by the economic, social, and political conditions. Again, we hope to be able to show that Hegel expressed ideas which seem to have forstalled concepts which we now regard as "Saussurean" (cf. 2.2.1).

That social conditions as well as political developments have their impact on advances in all kinds of human enterprise is an undeniable fact.
The high regard the scholar or the scientist enjoys within his social environment has an important influence on his endeavours, with the result that within the nation in which he finds acknowledgement of his work, the outcome of his work will be much greater than under less favorable conditions. The recognition of the intellectual in 19th century Germany, notably in Prussia, and Humboldt's influence on the educational system in that country since 1810 serves as a good illustration of this fact - together with the rise of nationalism account for the strength and, quite frequently, the pre-eminence of German scholarship and science in the past century. We would even maintain (and this is something which appears to have been overlooked in the history of science as well as in the history of ideas) that the foundation of the German empire in 1871, the final achievement of national unity, gave rise to a concentration of human energy and industry which resulted in social, economic, and scientific progress in the following years perhaps only equalled by the achievements of the Renaissance in Italy. To conclude, we wish to point out that all these factors have to be accounted for in writing the history of ideas, and, ipso facto, the history of linguistic thought.

The latter claim, it appears, needs further comment. It is our conviction that the opinions expressed about the nature of language, its origin, and its functioning, from a social, biological, philosophical and purely linguistic point of view, reflect, more than any other human science, the ideas current at a given period. It is probably true to say that an appreciation of the intellectual as well as scientific developments of one's own time requires considerable sophistication, and few will ever really understand them; but it is also true that society as a whole, and intellectual life in particular, has always been shaped by a comparatively small number of men, those who constitute, whether acknowledged or not, the élite of a given society, an observation which would seem to justify a statement ascribed to Alex Comfort that it is not so much that the genius is ahead of his time but much more that most people are behind theirs.
On the occasion of the 1968 Newberry Conference on the History of Linguistics Henry M. Hoenigswald expressed his conviction that the achievements of 19th century linguistics have to be reassessed and, in fact, the history of linguistics ought to be thoroughly revised. Hoenigswald criticized in particular the general reliance of "historians" of linguistic science on earlier accounts, from Theodor Benfey's (1809-81) Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft of 1869, Delbrück's Einleitung of 1880 and its many editions, Vilhelm Thomsen's overview of 1902 and its various translations, to Holger Pedersen's influential book of 1924 and its 1931 English version, at the expense of first-hand study of primary sources. However, Hoenigswald rejects, with some justification, the idea that M. Joos' commentary in the Readings of 1957 or the Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure (Geneva 1941ff.) can be regarded as such sources; he is also reserved on "another accepted picture", namely that the general European history of the 19th century, particularly the rule of Napoleon and the early period after his defeat at Waterloo, had a significant share in the development of linguistic studies. Instead Hoenigswald favours an attempt at recapturing the atmosphere in which the linguist's work was done in a given period, the best source for which being writings "essentially (though not always directly) autobiographical in nature".

While we believe that Hoenigswald's suggestions cannot be fully rejected, we wish to maintain that autobiography, though this would depend on how this autobiography has been written, can only be regarded as an additional source of information and not a primary one. Of course, Hoenigswald himself knows only too well that the member of any given movement tends to interpret his predecessors in a rather subjective manner writing the 'history' essentially pro domo. Emmon Bach's paper of 1965, in which he puts forward the "Keplerian" view of science (read: linguistics), as upheld by Chomsky and his adherents, in contrast to the "Baconian" structuralist view of the Bloomfieldian tradition, has to be taken with a grain of salt; Chomsky's paper of the same year, and his Cartesian Linguistics of 1966, must be seen as a bold attempt at salvaging one's own theory with the help of a re-interpretation of the history of linguistics.
By contrast with Hoenigswald, a scholar who is certainly well aware of the inadequacy of the manner in which the history of linguistics has hitherto been written, but who gives insufficient methodological guidelines as to how such a problem should be dealt with in future, we wish to emphasize the necessity of taking extra-linguistic developments and events of social and political nature into appropriate account in order to establish the general intellectual paradigm of a given period.

This ultimate goal of establishing a historiography of linguistic science necessitates a first-hand knowledge of the "capital of ideas" (Whitehead) of the period under investigation, i.e. a good acquaintance with the literature of the time in all the fields of human activity which are relevant to the establishment of a given paradigm taking into account the general social, political, and cultural situation as well. Therefore, especially because there seems little likelihood of close cooperation between the various branches of historical research in the near future, an unfortunate situation which will not change unless there develops a trend away from specialization towards a more wholistic approach to the objects of human curiosity, the historiographer will be asked to read extensively the literature outside his main field of investigation. Even in the case that the prevailing symptoms of scholarship change direction towards a more general outlook, the history of linguistics for example could not be appropriate written by a larger "Autorenkollektiv", as G. Helbig (1970:9) has recently suggested, in the sense that everybody writes about the developments and prospects of his own restricted field with a view to a final compilation. Such a procedure can only be adequate if the investigator of a given epoch takes into account all the prevailing aspects of the period in question which in one way or another have actually influenced human thought, the next step being an arrangement and organization of the accounts of various epochs in some sort of order, including chronological progression.

It should be pointed out, however, that chronology is not necessarily a prime factor in writing the history of linguistics; in the history of ideas in general, as in the history of linguistic thought in particular, one can frequently, and almost systematically, note an alternating pattern
of emphasis: periods of a general predilection for data collection and compilation are generally being replaced by periods of strong emphasis on theory. The development of 19th century linguistics affords an impressive picture of this kind of fluctuation, and it is in this sense that Chomsky for example is safe in arguing that his own linguistic theory "is much closer to traditional grammar" (1964:11).

Our present study represents, we hope, a first step towards a model for a general approach to linguistic historiography. It is fairly limited both in scope and extension of time, covering roughly the period between 1810 and 1910 in Western Europe in the first part, and various aspects of the development of linguistic theory between 1910 and 1970 in the second. Both parts are mainly viewed from one specific angle: the first is concerned with mapping out the paradigm of the ideas prevailing in the 19th century and attempts to establish the epistemology of the 1870s until the turn of the century in order to trace various possible influences on Saussure during his formative years; the second pursues a triple goal: 1) the establishment of antecedents of aspects of Saussure's linguistic theory, 2) a reassessment of Saussure's actual linguistic argument (on the basis of recent findings), and 3) an account of the development of influential concepts following the publication of the *Cours* in 1916.

The selection of a single person for the outline of the principles of historiography is both indispensable and justified. Indispensable insofar as it is impossible for the individual researcher to account for the linguistic development of a number of important scholars of the same period, and justified because of the fact that the genius of Ferdinand de Saussure exemplifies to an overwhelming degree what Pieter A. Verburg called a striking example of an almost "Copernican revolution" in the study of language. 

In fact there appears to be general agreement on attributing to Saussure the historical fact of having provided linguistic theory with a new paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of the term, with the result that H. Arens could suggest that one may divide the development of linguistics
into a period before Saussure and a period thereafter (cf. Arens, 1969: 573). In fact the Cours fully meets the two criteria for a paradigm as characterized by T. S. Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions of 1962 and which are shared by works such as Aristotle's Physica, Ptolemy's Almagest, Newton's Principia, and Lavoisier's Chemistry, to mention only these few. Like them Saussure's achievement "was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined practitioners to resolve." (Kuhn, 1970:10).

In order to be able to adequately judge Saussure's accomplishment it will be necessary to re-establish the general "intellectosphere" (Bursill-Hall) of his time. An attempt to assess Saussure's attainments in the light of our present epistemology, something which we are only too easily tempted to do, would not only do Saussure an injustice but also distort the historical picture of the late 19th century, its general achievements (many of which still await a reassessment) and pitfalls. Personal limitations and restrictions both of time and space have obliged us to treat only some aspects, although very important ones, we believe, of the pre-Saussurean paradigm, to stretch the meaning of Kuhn's term. In particular, special attention has been paid to ideas in the fields of sociology, political economy, and psychology, all of which were of great importance in shaping the opinions of the people living in the last third of the past century. Philosophy, it appears, was then considered to be less important, at least by the majority of linguists working between 1870 and 1900. The turn of the century brought about a change of attitude towards philosophical problems and a renewed emphasis on general linguistic conceptions. This mutation took place not only in the social sciences (cf. 1.2.1) but also in the field of science; thus it is imperative to view Wundt's voluminous Völkerpsychologie (1900ff.) synoptically with F. Mauthner's Kritik der Sprache (1901-2), K. Vossler's Positivismus und Idealismus in der Sprachwissenschaft (1904), to mention only a few significant publications from the beginning of the century, together with Einstein's formulation of his relativity theory in 1905.
The transformation of the paradigm created by the neogrammarians in the last three decades of the 19th century by Saussure's teachings at the beginning of this century well deserves to be called a scientific revolution in Kuhn's definition of the term (1970:12) comparable to the revolution of traditional doctrines in physics by Einstein during roughly the same period. We are inclined to disagree with T. A. Sebeok's contentions that 1) during the first half of this century "normal linguistic research was directed, more or less, to the iterative articulation of those phenomena, theory and application, that were inspired by the Saussurean paradigm", and 2) that it is being replaced by the Chomskyian paradigm which began to emerge with the appearance of his Syntactic Structures in 1957. Resistance among linguists from many quarters to the Saussurean paradigm was great; the reviews of the first edition of the Cours in 1916, in particular those by Schuchardt, Meillet, and Jespersen, were far from being favorable to a variety of suggestions that Saussure had made. As an instance of the opposition to descriptive linguistics we may refer to the opening statement in Jespersen's Language of 1922 in which the great Danish scholar affirms that the historical approach to language is the only one he recognizes, a view which appears to have been widely shared by scholars in Europe until the 1950s, i.e. "The distinctive feature of the science of language as conceived nowadays is its historical character" (s. Jespersen, 1964:7). Apart from the members of the "Geneva School", notably Bally and Sechehaye, those of the Prague and the Copenhagen Linguistic Circles have to be singled out as having assimilated Saussurean ideas from the late 1920s onwards. From the present point of view, these linguists, in particular R. Jakobson and N. S. Trubeckoj, Hjelmslev and Brøndal, and also a few other independent scholars, such as Iorgu Iordan in Rumania, represent precisely those who gained a prominent place in the development of modern linguistics. As a rule, however, it appears that the observation of F. Sander and H. Volkelt of some years ago holds true in the case of Saussure, namely that it takes a whole generation for fertile dispositions in research to be accepted outside as well as inside the country of their discovery.
The translations of the *Cours* into German (1931), Russian (1933), and Spanish (1945) were almost without any immediate consequences in the development of linguistics in the respective countries; we believe that political reasons, especially where Germany is concerned, do not fully explain this phenomenon. 33

On the other hand, if translations reveal manifestations of an invigorated interest in Saussure, they would support our claim that Saussure's ideas are in many respects still far from having become obsolete, viz. following the English translation of the *Cours* in 1959, there have appeared Polish (1961), Italian and Hungarian (both in 1967), Serbo-Croatian (1969) and Swedish (1970) translations of the same work.

In addition, the year 1957 marked a new era in Saussurean linguistics. R. Godel's *Sources manuscrites* of the *Cours* and, following his suggestion (cf. SM, 98), R. Engler's critical edition (1967ff.) have provided the material for a more adequate re-assessment of Saussure's achievements, the result of which is still not measurable but may eventually give new impulse to the further reception of the Saussurean paradigm. Where Chomsky's contribution is concerned, we hesitate to attribute to his work a position comparable to that of Saussure, although this statement may by now appear anachronistic since there are many, particularly among his immediate followers and associates, who speak of another new paradigm in linguistics. 34

G. Helbig has recently distinguished between three phases in the development of transformational-generative theory: 1) 1957-1961 which showed a close relation with the procedures put forward by the advocates of immediate constituent analysis; 2) 1962-1966 in which Chomsky recognized the importance of semantics and the principle of "deep structure", and 3) since 1966 the attempt, now no longer directed by Chomsky himself, to develop an adequate semantic theory to replace earlier suggestions especially those formulated in the *Aspects* of 1965 (cf. Helbig, 1970:314). 35 In fact, as has been pointed out by H. G. Wittmann (1966:83), there appears to be sufficient evidence from Chomsky's writings to support our claim that the second phase of Chomsky's theory was triggered by the appearance of the English translation of the *Cours* in 1959.
and therefore owes much to Saussure's work, and it matters not whether Chomsky agrees with his ideas or opposes (what he believes to be) Saussure's understanding of the nature of language. In view of this fact, and taking into account the special situation and development of linguistics in North America between 1925 and 1957, it may well be asked whether Chomsky's work is not in its essence a modified continuation of the Saussurean paradigm.

Indeed, to decide this would mean to assess Chomsky's contribution to linguistics in a manner quite similar to our present study on Saussure, and, therefore, would go much beyond the scope of this work. Our main concern which is in fact twofold is the genesis of the Saussurean paradigm and its acceptance during the past five and a half decades, the "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn, 1970:182) set up by Saussure in the Cours and its later diffusion among the practitioners of linguistic science.

After having established, in a number of respects at least, the evolution of the Saussurean paradigm in the first part of the dissertation, the second part is designed to delineate post-Saussurean developments. This will be done in such a way that each of the most influential concepts of Saussure's doctrine receives special attention; this perhaps not completely satisfactory procedure is imposed on us in particular, as G. C. Lepschy (1970:43) has recently pointed out, by virtue of the fact that Saussure's influence on modern linguistics acted within the "by now traditional framework of these isolated points." As far as Lepschy's second reason is concerned, namely that "a satisfactory account of Saussure's intellectual development is still wanting", we have set out to provide a fairly informative account in the first part of our study.

The second part of the study is subdivided into several sections each dealing with a particular aspect of Saussure's theory. Although we shall try to suggest how these individual components are interconnected within Saussure's system of linguistic argument, each individual concept will be treated separately insofar as it is feasible under three different headings: 1) a brief discussion of (suggested and actual) antecedents of the given Saussurean principle which serves at least two purposes:
(a) it bridges the two main parts of the study through the historical treatment of the given concept, and (b) exemplifies Saussure's intellectual strength in turning to account ideas from diversified sources into a well-defined system of linguistic thought; 2) Saussure's concepts will be re-assessed in the light of the work of Godel and Engler, our aim being to elaborate particularly on those points which were not developed consistently in the *Cours* by its compilers and which have been frequently issues of debate; 3) the main lines of the post-Saussurean development of the concepts under discussion will be traced in European and American linguistic scholarship thus showing the relevance of Saussurean notions to crucial aspects of general linguistic theory down to the present day.

It is in this sense that M. Joos' statement of 1957, the year of F. de Saussure's 100th anniversary, the publication of Godel's *Sources manuscrites*, and Noam Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures*, should become legitimate, namely that Saussure's contribution is a "whole mode of thought, a whole structure of interests and values, within which all the central discussions of linguistics remain today" (*RiL* I, 18).


Cf. loc. cit., 8-11 (passim).

There is no indication that the recently established *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* (Brandon, Vermont, 1965ff.), though perhaps more restricted in scope, has led to closer ties between the various branches of investigation devoted to the history of ideas.

For some very recent suggestions on the subject of a historiography of linguistic science, see now G. L. Bursill-Hall's review articles on the histories of linguistics of Leroy (1963), Ivič (1965), and Robins (1967) in *Gloesa* 4.2:229-43 (1970[1971]) and, in particular, the opening statements to the same scholar's review of Mounin (1967) in *CJL* 15.2:143-50 (1970[1971]).


For full references to the work of Cuvier, Lyell, and other 19th century scientists we refer to Part II of E. F. K. Koerner, *Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970*, "Background Sources of F. de Saussure's Linguistic Theory, 1816-1916", in particular section 3.


That certain traits of Darwinism have recently been revived and critically redefined in some quarters of American linguistic anthropology has been shown in Harry Spitzbardt's paper, "Neo-Darwinian Tendencies in Modern Linguistics", *A[10]CIL* II, 313-9 (1970), in particular pp. 315ff.

12 See Einleitung in das Sprachstudium (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880), 40-42. A cursory reading of the chapter on Hegel in Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), 730-46, in particular pp. 731-3, suggests a striking parallel with Hegel's concept of the "whole" as a complex system of relations and ideas in which language was regarded as (at times a living) organism, a view which later on gave rise to the idea of language as a system of interdependent elements.


14 La logique de Hegel, 2 vols. (Paris: Ladrange, 1859); the translator, Augusto Véra (1813-85), had earlier published an Introduction à la philosophie de Hegel (Paris: A. Franck, 1855) of more than 300 pp.


16 Cf. W. D. Whitney's closing remarks on German linguistic scholarship in his Life and Growth of Language (New York: Appleton; London: King, 1875), 318-9, and also A. Meillet's article of 1923, "Ce que la linguistique doit aux savants allemands", repr. in LHLG II, 152-9, esp. pp. 156ff.


19 Delbrück, Einleitung in das Sprachstudium: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Methodik der vergleichenden Sprachforschung (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880); 2nd ed., 1884; 3rd ed. 1893; 4th, much revised and enl. ed. under the title Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen (Ibíd., 1904); 5th ed., 1908; 6th ed., 1919. The 1st ed. was translated into It. (1881) and E. (1882).

21 Pedersen, *Sprogvidenskaben i det nittende Aarhundrede: Metoder og Resultater* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1924); for E. transl. see Pedersen, 1962. This study was preceded by another account by Pedersen, *Et Blik paa Sprogvidenskabens Historie* (Copenhagen: Universitetsbogtrykkeriet, 1916).

22 For two particularly striking examples of the excessive reliance on secondary and tertiary sources and an almost total lack of acquaintance with the primary literature, see the studies of Waterman (1970) and Leroy (1963; 2nd rev. ed., 1971), and our forthcoming reviews of these in *GL*.

23 We base our account on a pre-final draft of Hoenigwald's paper, a copy of which we received through the kind offices of the author.


27 It is true, however, that there are always students with a preference for general linguistic theory alongside with other, no less ardent students who favour the analysis of a specific language or group of languages, but we are safe in saying that one category of researchers is frequently ignored at times when the work of the other is prevailing.

28 Verburg, "The Background for the Linguistic Conceptions of Franz Bopp", *Lingua* 2:438-68 (1950); repr. in *Portraits of Linguists* I, 221-50 at p. 225. For similar and somewhat more positive statements to this effect cf. those by Ullmann in 1958 (quoted as motto to 2.2.2), Lèvi-Strauss of 1963, and Lepschy in 1965 (both listed in note 3 of section 2.0).


30 Schuchardt, another scholar who cannot be said to be an adherent of the neogrammarian doctrine, affirmed much the same in his 1917 review of CLG (cf. *Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier*, 330) as did Meillet (cf. *LHLG* I, 48),
and others. Cf. also Eugen Lerch's revealing article, "Die neue Sprachwissenschaft: Sprachgeschichte und Nationenkunde", NSpr 42:375ff. (1934). It is of historical interest to note that Whitney affirmed, as early as 1875: "As linguistics is a historical science, so its evidences are historical, and its methods of proof of the same character." (s. LGL, at page 312). This affirmation, we believe, would underscore Whitney's impact on the linguistics of his time, in particular the neogrammarians, contrary to Leroy's (1967:29) contention that Whitney's work "had no immediate repercussions".


32 Cf. the "Vorwort" by Friedrich Sander and Hans Volkelt to their collection of papers, Ganzheitspsychologie (Munich: A Beck, 1962), where they state: "Es scheint beinahe die Regel zu sein, dass fruchtbare Forschungsansätze ausserhalb und auch innerhalb ihres Ursprungslandes erst eine Generation später zur Wirkung kommen." (p. ixf.).

33 We are not sufficiently familiar with the reception of Fds's doctrine in Japan following the Jap. transl. of the CLG in 1928 to be able to comment for this country. According to Hisanosuke Izui, Fds's influence in Japan was "immense" (cf. his paper, "Recent Trends in Japanese Linguistics", Trends II, 38-55 [1963], esp. pp. 54-5), and if the fact that there has been a 23rd printing of this transl. in 1970 is an adequate criterion, Izui's claim may well be justified.


35 Hellbig (1970:265-324) treats these three phases extensively.


37 Initially (cf. the summary of our dissertation in progress in Lинг. Berichte 9:52-4 [1970], at pp. 53-4), we intended to give, in the second part of the dissertation, a description of the various 'schools' which have developed during the past fifty years following the publication of the Cours. We later abandoned this idea for several reasons: 1) a description of the various linguistic schools, e.g. those of Prague,
Copenhagen, Geneva, etc., has been done in the literature quite frequently, and our own endeavours would not have amounted to much more than a rehash of the information provided there; 2) these 'schools' have taken certain aspects from the *Cours* and developed them further, often disregarding the original context, into theories far removed from what Saussure had had in mind; 3) a re-assessment of Saussure's original intentions with the help of the recently published documentation provided by R. Godel and R. Engler is urgently needed. Even the most recent "histories" of (modern) linguistics either ignore the existence of Godel's *Sources manuscrites* and Engler's critical edition of the *Cours* (e.g. Waterman, 1970) or shy away from such an undertaking (cf. Helbig, 1970:33; Lepschy, 1970:43-4); M. Leroy has at least made use of the critical edition (cf. Leroy, 1971: 62ff.) and explicitly drawn attention to these two works (1971:77-8), but he did not feel the necessity for changing his previous position regarding the interpretation of the *Cours* in any notable sense.
1.0 F. DE SAUSSURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS LINGUISTIC THEORY

En fait il n'y a pas eu des structuralistes parce que Saussure en Europe, Bloomfield en Amérique, ont composé des œuvres qui font date; Saussure et Bloomfield sont devenus des points de références parce qu'il y avait des structuralistes avant eux, et des non-structuralistes.

Robert-Léon Wagner in 1966 *

1.1 A Biographical Sketch of Ferdinand de Saussure

In a recent bibliographical record of the "Geneva School of Linguistics" M. Mourelle-Lema observed that concerning the life of Ferdinand de Saussure "there is little to be said" (1969:4). Everyone who is familiar with Saussure's work will contest this affirmation, and follow the observation of G. Mounin that, by contrast with the biography of many other scientists and scholars, Saussure's curriculum vitae constitutes a problem in itself, especially since it is intrinsically connected with a true understanding of his work.¹ Mounin bases his statement on the recent findings of T. De Mauro in his "Notizie biografiche e critiche su F. de Saussure", which he attached to the 1967 Italian translation of the Cours (s. De Mauro, 1968:283-334). De Mauro's study, it should be noted, represents the first serious attempt to evaluate Saussure's life in the light of his educational background and the prevailing intellectual activities of his time, in particular those which concern the investigation of linguistic phenomena. De Mauro, however, falls short of providing a complete picture of the general trends of the second half of the 19th century, not only in the fields of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and (political) economy, but also in the general history and
politics of the seventies and eighties which may well have had an impact on the revitalization of scholarly activities in that period, and not least in the field of linguistic science. It should, therefore, be borne in mind that F. de Saussure (1857-1913) was not only the contemporary of linguists such as Franz Boas (1858-1942), Otto Jespersen (1860-1943), Paul Passy (1859-1940), to name only a few, but also of the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (1858-1939), the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), the philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and a number of other well-known contributors to the advancement of science and general knowledge of man. To outline the intellectual scene of Western Europe in the late 19th century would go far beyond the scope of the present study; in this chapter only those stages of Saussure's academic career will be sketched out which we believe necessary for a more adequate understanding of his work.

Mongin-Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913)² was born into a distinguished Geneva family with a long tradition of scholarly activity.³ Surrounded as he was by scientific quest for knowledge and a variety of intellectual endeavours, it is not surprising that Saussure should have himself chosen an academic career. After completion of his secondary education which did not offer him much of a challenge, he entered Geneva University in 1875 at the age of seventeen, in order to pursue studies in the natural sciences which had been the traditional subject of interest and thorough investigation in his family. It was about the same time, however, that Saussure was initiated, through a friend of his family, Adolphe Pictet (1799-1875), author of the voluminous Origines indo-européennes (Paris 1859-61),⁴ into linguistic studies. Saussure reports (CFS 17:17) that even at the age of twelve he had read a number of chapters from this book and that he had ventured to outline "un système général du language" which he presented to Pictet. The latter praised him for his efforts, but warned him against such overambitious attempts, with the result that Saussure abandoned his ideas "sur tout système universel du langage". Still at Geneva, Saussure decided to attend courses in Indo-European, especially the classic languages. But since he had familiarized himself with Curtius' Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie
(Leipzig 1858-62), there was not very much he could add to his knowledge and indeed Saussure felt, as he stated later on, that his stay at Geneva University (1875-6) had cost him yet another year; in his view, he had already lost one year at college before being admitted to the Geneva Gymnasium. Precocity, as in the case of his famous great-grandfather Horace Benedicte de Saussure (1740-99) who was appointed as professor at the age of twenty-two, was a noticeable characteristic of Ferdinand de Saussure's. In the fall of 1876 he went to Leipzig University; this was pure accident, but a number of his Geneva friends had already studied there and his parents were anxious, because of his youth, that he should be surrounded by his country-men when living in a foreign city. This decision, however, to study Indo-European linguistics at Leipzig was to become a very fortunate one for Saussure, despite some of the personal drawbacks he had to encounter.

Prior to his arrival at Leipzig, Saussure had already become, on May 13, 1876, a member of the Société de Linguistique de Paris through the intercession of a friend of his family, Leopold Favre, and in 1903 he noted: "... j'envoyai de Genève un article inépte 'sur le suffixe -t-', où je tremblais, à chaque ligne, de dire quelque chose qui ne fût pas d'accord avec Bopp, devenu mon unique maître." This paper was accepted and appeared in the Mémoires of the Society (MSLP 3:197-209). Two more articles were written in the same year plus a few notes on historical phonology. The first important article, however, was his "Essai d'une distinction des différents a indo-européens," which was read at the January 13th, 1877 meeting of the Paris Linguistic Society. Even at this early stage Saussure attempted to solve the problem of the Proto-Indo-European vowel system which was then thought to be essentially the same as the Sanskrit system which shows only three cardinal vowels. Saussure argued that this could not hold true for the original state of the P.I.E. language, though he could not yet offer a satisfactory solution. In the concluding paragraph of this paper (MSLP 3:369) Saussure reported that he had found that the alternation k / c in the Indo-Aryan languages was caused by the presence or absence of an original Indo-European A which followed the consonant, thus making himself one of the discoverers of the "Law of Palatals."
The first German professor the young student met at Leipzig University was the Indo-Europeanist Heinrich Hübschmann (1848-1908) who offered a seminar on Old Persian which Saussure followed with interest. It was through him that he heard that a study which had just appeared in Curtius' Studien had aroused much apprehension: Karl Brugmann (1849-1919), then a Privatdozent, published an article entitled "Nasalis sonans in der indogermanischen Grundsprache", in which he asserted that in the parent language of the Germanic language family there must have been syllables without vowels, syllables in which nasals had syllabic function, and in which he assumed that this should have applied to liquids as well. Saussure, who had made the same discovery while still attending school in Geneva (cf. Pedersen, 1962:284, n.1), was quite baffled to understand that this was considered as something novel and could never forget for the remainder of his life, that this discovery was always connected with the name of Brugmann.\footnote{Saussure stayed at Leipzig for four semesters (1876-77, 1877-78) and regularly followed courses in comparative grammar by Georg Curtius (1820-85) (CFS 17:22), also courses in Slavonic and Lithuanian by August Leskien (1840-1916), a part of a course on Celtic by Ernst Windisch (1844-1918), an elementary course on Sanskrit by Hermann Osthoff (1847-1909), and audited Wilhelm Braune's (1850-1926) course on the history of the German language (CFS 17:21). Saussure also reports (ibid., 22-3) that he had particular ties with Brugmann, the leading figure of the Young Turks at Leipzig.}

In 1876, when the young Saussure came to Leipzig University, Karl Verner was 30, Brugmann was 27, Osthoff was 29, Sievers and Braune were 26 (cf. Hockett, 1965:186). He soon was to join these linguists in support of their major tenets, perhaps even going far beyond them; in December 1878, while still a student, his Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européennes appeared in Leipzig. Saussure had then moved to Berlin University for two semesters (1878-79) to pursue the study of Sanskrit with Heinrich Zimmer (1851-1910) and Heinrich Oldenberg (1854-1920).

The Mémoire which appeared when Saussure was 21 is a phenomenal achievement, both in general scholarship and methodological rigour.\footnote{The Mémoire which appeared when Saussure was 21 is a phenomenal achievement, both in general scholarship and methodological rigour.}
In this monograph of considerable length Saussure devoted his efforts to the establishment of a firm basis for the original IE vowels, employing the notion of system in a far more rigorous sense than it had ever been used before. M. Leroy notes that Saussure went far beyond what the title of his Mémoire implies, since he built up a theory of the root which was to serve as the basis for subsequent studies in IE morphology:

This was the pattern consonant + vowel + consonant (Type *ten-*) which, as a result of the flexible system of alternations of vowels and sonants, can take extremely varied forms, so that some that had hitherto been thought aberrant now found a rational explanation. Finally, confronted with the apparently insoluble case of alternations which, in certain roots, seemed to fall outside the normal pattern e/o/zero (such as the Latin type feci/factus), Saussure imagined, for purely theoretical reasons, the existence in Indo-European of a phoneme (later called ehwa and represented by ø) which had been an integral part of the very flexible system of sonants but had disappeared in the historically attested languages. (Leroy, 1967:33).

Saussure's seemingly daring hypotheses were not quickly understood by his fellow-linguists and much of his insight could not be proved until after his death; e.g. he claimed that the long vowels of PIE had developed from short vowels plus sonant coefficients, a hypothesis which could not be confirmed until 1927 when Jerzy Kuryłowicz (1895- ) pointed out that the Hittite consonants transcribed with h correspond in some cognates to those which Saussure had assumed on theoretical grounds (cf. SM, 23, n.1). The sonants Saussure proposed were interpreted by Hermann Møller (1850-1923), as early as 1879 (cf. ES 3:151, n.1), as supporting his claim that Semitic and Indo-European were cognate families, and have subsequently become known as laryngals.

Streitberg affirmed in 1914 that Saussure's contemporaries had hailed the Mémoire as a major achievement in IE phonology, but had been unable to understand its principal theoretical implications. The results of his investigations were soon integrated into the textbooks which were published soon afterwards, but only a generation later Saussure received the wide recognition he deserved. It is significant that R. Godel, who is surely the best informed scholar as regards the
life and work of F. de Saussure, noted in 1957 that, comparing the Mémoire with the Cours, one might be led to believe that there was quite a natural development, supported by various circumstances, which conducted Saussure from comparative grammar to the theory of language (cf. SM, 24). Godel provides much evidence to support this conjecture to the extent that G. C. Lepschy could, about ten years later, state that "Saussure's discoveries [in the Mémoire] depend on an analysis which today we would not hesitate to call structural. Taking into account the whole system, he postulates elements of an abstract character which are defined on the basis of their structural function rather than their phonetic shape". (1970:42).

For our present study it is important to note that Saussure did not actually switch from traditional historical linguistics and comparative IE investigations to general considerations of the nature of language towards the end of his life, but that there was rather a steady progression from (what appears to be) diachronic linguistics to the synchronic approach to language. In fact, in his Mémoire, Saussure did not follow the traditional historical and "atomistic" approach which was so characteristic of the linguistics of his time, but was concerned with establishing a given language state. As late as in 1909, in an interview with Albert Riedlinger, Saussure held that one should start with historical linguistics before dealing with synchronic linguistics (cf. SM, 29), and George Déguillier, another of Saussure's students, noted from Saussure's lectures on general linguistics (1908-09) that Saussure regarded static linguistics as difficult and that, by comparison, "la linguistique évolutive est amusante" (s. SM, 88). This is paralleled by students' notes which confirm that during even the third and last of Saussure's courses on general linguistics Saussure dealt mainly with les langues almost during the whole first semester before the second aspect, la langue, was introduced (cf. SM, 35).

As we have already stated, the impact of the Mémoire on IE linguistics was not at first fully understood and in addition Saussure was exposed to various, at times rather personal attacks particularly from Osthoff who had left Leipzig in 1877 to assume a professorship at
Saussure returned to Leipzig for the Winter semester 1879/80 to take his doctoral examination in February 1880 which he passed summa cum laude. His dissertation, De l'emploi du genitif absolu en sanscrit (Geneva: Fick, 1881) appears to have disappointed his contemporaries; it was felt that it contrasted sharply with the Mémoire. Streitberg, though crediting Saussure for his excellent philological training and his thorough acquaintance with Indian literature, called it a "fleissige Kleinarbeit, einem wenig ergiebigem Thema gewidmet" (IJb 2:107), and Meillet termed it "un simple article technique" (LHLG II, 177). During the years which followed his stay at Leipzig and Berlin Saussure published little, but it is generally agreed that his articles were always precise, well-judged, informative and philologically sound. G. C. Lepschy suspects that the "exacting methodological requirements of his theoretical rigour, which had produced such extraordinary results in the Mémoire, afterwards seemed to paralyse Saussure's scientific production" (1970:42), but we shall see later on that this is only one (possible) reason for Saussure's reduced flow of publications. It seems to be very likely, though there is no direct evidence, that between his departure from Leipzig in March and his arrival in Paris in September 1880, Saussure travelled to Lithuania in order to study Lithuanian dialects in loco (cf. De Mauro, 1968:298-9). Saussure had not only taken a course in this language offered by Leskien, but had proved himself to be a linguist with thorough knowledge of and profound training in Indo-European.

In his publications on Lithuanian which he prepared while a professor at Geneva University, Saussure never made reference to any other but written sources. It is interesting to note however that his observations on Lithuanian intonation and accent, particularly in his papers "A propos
de l'accentuation lituanienne" (MSLP 8:425-46) and "Accentuation lituanienne" (IFAnz 6:157-66), were discussed and tested with the help of five native informants by Robert Gauthiot (1876-1916) in the Phonetic Laboratory directed by Pierre Jean Rousselot (1846-1924) at the Collège de France in Paris in 1900 (s. Gauthiot's report, "De l'accent et de la quantité en lituanien", Parole 10:143-57, and Meillet's comments, ibid., 193-200; esp. 195, 196, 198) and verified in a field trip to Lithuania in the same year. Mourelle-Lema (1969:4), as was Sechehaye (IF 44:117) before him, is wrong when he states that Gauthiot was a pupil of de Saussure although it is true that Gauthiot notes in his monograph Le parler de Bulvidze: Essai de description d'un dialecte lituanien oriental (Paris 1903) that his research was "tout entière dominée par les idées de M. F. de Saussure" (p. 4). Only during the year 1901/02 did Saussure offer another course on Lithuanian, but he appears to have already said in his writings of the mid-nineties what was essential, findings which were still found worthy of much consideration in 1931, when Giuliano Bonfate (1904 - ) published his article entitled "Un nuova formulazione della legge di F. de Saussure" (Studi Baltici 1:73-91; cf. also LHLG II, 181-2).

There appear to be a number of reasons why Saussure did not stay in Leipzig after completion of his doctorate. We mentioned earlier that notably Osthoff carried on a controversy with him. The general impression prevails that Saussure did not feel at home in Germany; he surely felt himself unappreciated and not understood in his linguistic work, and German was not his mother tongue. Mounin's claim, however, seems to be somewhat exaggerated: "Certainement la froideur des Allemands vis-à-vis de ses travaux compte dans la décision qu'il prend de venir se fixer à Paris en décembre 1880. Ce geste doit quelque chose aux déceptions qu'il avait éprouvée à Leipzig" (1968:15). Mounin overlooks 1) the amiable personal ties that Saussure had with Brugmann, 2) that Saussure had decided, before going to Leipzig, to become a member of the Société Linguistique de Paris, and 3) the fact that his articles had until then all been printed in the Mémoires of that Society; besides, Saussure was never to publish anything in German, the language which played a prominent
rôle in the scholarship of that period. There is no indication that Saussure ever thought of establishing himself in Germany; his move to Leipzig, as previously stated, was motivated by the simple fact that Geneva friends of his had already been at the university.

By late 1880 Saussure was in Paris, took an active part in the regular meetings of the Linguistic Society, and if E. Benveniste's assumptions are correct (s. *AnnEPHE* 1964:23), appears to have audited courses offered by Michel Bréal (1832-1915) and also lectures given by Abel Bergaigne (1838-88), Louis Havet (1849-1925), and James Darmesteter (1849-94). Benveniste's assertions were in fact only partly substantiated by M. Fleury's report (*ibid.*, 39-40). In the following year Saussure was appointed lecturer at the Ecole pratique des Hautes Études to teach Germanic languages, in particular Gothic and Old High German, to which later on Sanskrit, Latin, Persian, and Lithuanian were added. Saussure held this position until 1891 when Geneva University offered him the professorship of the history and comparison of Indo-European languages, and in 1896 the chair of Sanskrit and Indo-European.

During his nine years of teaching at Paris (1881-91, with an interruption of one year in 1889/90, for reasons of health) Saussure attracted a fair number of students; among them were Antoine Meillet (1866-1936), who substituted for him in 1889/90, Louis Duveau (1864-1903), who became Saussure's successor in Paris, Henri Georges Dottin (1863-1928), Maurice Grammont (1866-1946), Paul Passy (1859-1940), Paul Boyer (1864-1949), and Jean Psichari (1854-1929). Even Arsène Darmesteter (1848-88), though about ten years his senior, attended Saussure's course in 1881/82. Saussure appears to have fascinated his students in his lectures, but he was not fully understood by any of his students at Paris including Meillet (cf. Mounin, 1968:48-9), when his *Cours* appeared in 1916.

When Saussure, a Swiss protestant, who declined to become a Frenchman, left Paris for Geneva in 1891, he was nominated by his superiors, notably Gaston Paris (1839-1903), for the "Croix de la Légion d'honneur à titre étranger", which he received the same year, a distinction which he reportedly revealed only in 1908 when his pupils celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of his *Mémoire* and presented him with a collection of articles
in his honour. Discretion and modesty were prominent features of Saussure's character.

There seems to be sufficient evidence that soon after his appointment to the professorship of IE historical and comparative linguistics at Geneva, Saussure revived his one-time interest in general linguistic theory. One might well ask whether this endeavour was triggered by the appearance of the book entitled *Die Sprachwissenschaft* by Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–93) in Leipzig in 1891. However, posing this question now may perhaps be overestimating Gabelentz's possible influence on Saussure and underestimating at the same time the impact the works of others, notably Whitney, Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski, and the *Junggrammatiker*, might have had. These questions will be dealt with in the following chapters (cf. 1.3). It should be borne in mind, however, that Saussure developed his ideas pertaining to general linguistics comparatively early and was not unprepared when, in December 1906, he was asked to lecture on "linguistique générale et d'histoire et comparaison des langues indo-européennes" (SM, 34), an assignment which Saussure accepted reluctantly because of the excessive demands on his time and, perhaps more significantly, because he had many doubts as to whether he was capable of teaching the subject-matter. As late as in 1911 Saussure confessed his misgivings with regard to his teachings on general linguistics.19 In the same private conversation with Leopold Gautier, one of his students at Geneva, Saussure was asked whether he had been engaged in this field prior to his special appointment and replied: "Au contraire, je ne crois pas avoir rien ajouté depuis lors. Ce sont des sujets qui m'ont occupé surtout avant 1900" (SM, 30). An interview Saussure had with Albert Riedlinger in 1909 suggests the year 1894.20 In fact, the year 1894 seems to have been a crucial one, as the discussion of these reports by his Geneva students may imply. This same year Whitney died, and Saussure was asked by the Secretary of the American Philological Society to give an account of this eminent linguist "as a comparative philologist". However Saussure did not complete his essay; this is a further example of the doubts which prayed constantly on Saussure's mind, since he could not bring himself to consider Whitney as a comparatist.21 Even his reply to the Secretary was never finished.
In September of the same year, on the occasion of the 10th Congress of Orientalists held in Geneva, Saussure read a paper on Lithuanian accentuation "en fonction de l'intonation", and Meillet stated in 1913:
"Le livre [on Lithuanian?] annoncé n'a pas paru, et l'on n'a un aperçu du système que F. de Saussure avait constitué" and that only two articles were published instead in 1894 and 1896 (cf. LHLG II, 181-2). In a letter of January 1894 to A. Meillet Saussure expressed his doubts and disappointment about linguistic studies, one of the rare incidents during which the discreet scholar 'unlocks his heart':

Mais je suis bien dégoûté de tout cela, et de la difficulté qu'il y a en général à écrire seulement dix lignes ayant le sens commun en matière de faits de langage. Préoccupé surtout depuis longtemps de la classification logique de ces faits, de la classification des points de vue sous lesquels nous les traitons, je vois de plus en plus à la fois l'immensité de travail qu'il faudrait pour montrer au linguiste ce qu'il fait [cf. CFS 12:59], en reduisant chaque opération à sa catégorie prévue; et en même temps l'assez grande [vanité, corrected by Benveniste] de tout ce qu'on peut faire finalement en linguistique.

Sans cesse, added by Godel], cette ineptie de la terminologie courante, la nécessité de la reformer, et de montrer pour cela quelle espèce d'objet est la langue en général, vient gâter mon plaisir historique, quoique je n'aie pas de plus cher voeu que de ne pas avoir à m'occuper de la langue en général.


During the years at Geneva University Saussure published little; each year he gave a course on Sanskrit (as his chair obliged him to do) in addition to a variety of other courses, Greek and Latin phonology and morphology, the history of the IE verb, various Greek dialects and inscriptions, studies of Homer, but later also, as he had done two decades earlier at Paris, courses in Gothic and various Germanic dialects and a course on Lithuanian. It is also interesting to note that during the academic year 1902/03 Saussure taught a course on "Linguistique géographique de l'Europe (ancienne et moderne), avec une introduction sur les object de la linguistique géographique" (SM, 26), When, in 1904, Saussure was entrusted with the course on German language and literature he lectured on the Nibelungen; he had been fascinated by Germanic legends for many years, but no one would have known (since Saussure kept most
things to himself) had he not been asked to offer a course in this field (cf. the vast number of mss., SM, 14; CFS 17:11).

In 1897 Saussure gave three lectures on the theory of the syllable in the Cours de vacances under the auspices of the University. Their contents appeared to be quite original, and Bally, who had kept shorthand notes of the lectures, approached Saussure later on suggesting that he publish his findings, and Saussure tentatively agreed. But, according to Bally, soon afterwards "sur quelques détails, des scrupules lui [FdS] vinrent, et . . . les conférences ne furent jamais publiées"22 (FdS (1857-1913), 56). However, through the services of Bally, who preserved his notes, it was possible to incorporate Saussure's lectures as an appendix to the "Principes de phonologie" in the Cours (CLG, 63-95).

In addition to his interest in Germanic legends, Saussure investigated those of Theseus and Orion and a number of other characters of antique mythology (cf. SM, 28), but in particular he became very much absorbed during his later years in research of anagrams and hypograms in classic, medieval and contemporary 19th century poetry,23 a fact which was passed over in silence for almost fifty years after Saussure's death. It would seem that these activities were found incompatible with the rest of Saussure's teachings by his Geneva pupils, since he was first visualized as the author of the Mémoire, and since 1916 as the founder of modern linguistics.

There are indications that Saussure intended, as early as in 1894, to write a book concerning "le problème de la nature de la langue et des fondements de la linguistique" (SM, 32; cf. CFS 21:95). Regrettably, this book was never written nor would we ever have come to know about his linguistic theories had he not been asked on December 8, 1906 to succeed Joseph Wertheimer (1833-1908) in giving a course on general linguistics and the history and comparison of Indo-European languages (SM, 34), which he began in January 1907.24 The fact that Saussure did not consider publishing his lectures on general linguistics and that they were compiled after his death with the help of students' notes constitutes a problem which will be dealt with in the section devoted to an analysis of the most influential aspects of Saussurean linguistic theory (cf. 2.1).
FOOTNOTES - 1.0/1.1


1 Mounin maintains that FdS's life only "peut sans doute expliquer [Saussure's work] en profondeur, non pas dans ses motivations historiques, sociologiques ou personnelles, mais dans sa teneur et dans sa forme mêmes" (Mounin, 1968:12-3). For further information on Saussure see E. F. K. Koerner, *Bibliographia Saussureana*, 1870-1970, Part I, § 1, "Biographical sources on FdS", in particular the obituaries by Gauthiot, Meillet, and Streitberg, all of which have been reprinted in *Portraits of Linguists* II, 87-110, as well as the inaugural address by Bally of 1913 (repr. in Bally, 1952:147-60); s. also the notes by FdS himself edited by R. Godel, "Souvenirs de F. de Saussure concernant sa jeunesse et ses études", *CFS* 17:12-25 (1960), and "La place de la linguistique générale dans la vie de F. de Saussure", SM, 23-35.

2 S. *BSLP* 3, no. 16:xxix (1876) for Saussure's full name, as against Mourelle-Lema, 1969:4.

3 FdS was born on November 26th, 1857, eldest son of the zoologist and entomologist Henri de Saussure (1829-1905) and the Countess de Pourtalès, both of old aristocratic Geneva families. His father had travelled widely and in particular to Central America; see his *Biología central-americana* written with the assistance of Leo Zehntner, Adolphe Pictet, and others, an English version of which also appeared ed. by F. Du Cane Godman and Osbert Salvin (London: P. H. Porter, 1893-1909). For further of his works, s. the British Museum General Catalogue, vol. 213, coll. 623, and *Library of Congress Catalogue*, vol. 132, 102-3. FdS's uncle, Theodore de Saussure (1824-1903), mayor of the city of Genthod for half a century (1850-1900), and an important figure in the social and political life of the French speaking part of Switzerland of his time, was founder and president of the Société Suisse des Monuments Historiques, but also wrote an *Étude sur la langue française: De l'orthographie des noms propres et des noms étrangers introduits dans la langue* (Geneva: A. Cherbuliez, 1885), 125 pp. As president of the Société Suisse des Arts he wrote reports of international exhibitions, for instance *Exposition universelle 1878: Groupe I, Classes 1 et 2* (Zürich: O. Füssli, 1879), 21 pp., and *Rapport sur le groupe XXV: Beaux-arts* (Schaffhausen: C. Baader, 1874), 14 pp. FdS had three younger brothers: Horace (1859-1926), an aquarellist and painter - cf. the photograph of a portrait he made of FdS in *AnnEPHE* 1964/65, opposite p. 35; Léopold (1866-1925), one-time naval officer
and later on a sinologist and specialist in ancient Chinese astronomy; - cf. his paper, "La cosmologie religieuse en Chine, dans l'Iran et chez les prophètes hébreux", *Actes du Congrès international d'Histoire des religions* (Paris: Champion, 1925), II, 79-92, and his article, "L'origine des noms de mer Rouge, mer Blanche et mer Noire", *Le Globe* 63:24-36 (1925); the third and youngest brother appears to be the most interesting with regard to FdS's linguistic interests: René (1868-1943), associate professor of mathematics at the Catholic University of Washington, D.C. (1895-8) and later privat-docent and professor at Geneva and Berne Universities, published extensively, besides a few books on natural science, on problems concerning the development and establishment of an international language (frequently under the pseudonym of Antido in an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of other constructed languages such as Esperanto and Ido); for information on his work on artificial languages see *Enciklopedio de Esperanto* (Budapest: Literatura Mondo, 1934/35), vol. II, p. 479, and Maurice Monnerot-Dumaine, *Précis d'interlinguistique* (Paris: Maloine, 1960), pp. 62, 69, 109-10. Since nobody appears to have drawn attention to this fact, some of René's earlier publications on international languages should be mentioned here. (In fact, as Mr. R. Haupenthal of Saarbrücken University informed me recently in private correspondence, René's production in this field of research was enormous). According to Ernest K. Drezen (*Historio de la Mondolíngvo* [Oosaka: Pirato, 1967], 189-90) and other writings on the subject, the best known of René's studies were *Elementala gramatiko de la lingvo internaciona kun exercaro* and *Teoria ekzameno de la lingvo Esperanto kun fonetika internacia alfabeto* (Geneva 1907 and 1910 respectively) both of which propose modified versions of already existing systems together with exercises for their study. Two other writings, *Kia estas la logika de l'vorto 'grando'?* of 1911 and *Fundamentaj reguloj de la vortteorio de Esperanto* of 1915 have recently been reprinted (Saarbrücken: A. E. Iltis, 1969). See also René's studies, *La construction logique des mots en Esperanto* (Geneva 1910), and *La structure logique des mots dans les langues naturelles*, considérée au point de vue de son application aux langues artificielles (Berne: Impr. de Bücheler, 1918). The relation between FdS's linguistic ideas and those of René will be the subject of a separate study. - It also appears worth mentioning that René wrote, at the age of 22, a *Théorie des phénomènes physiques et chimiques* (Geneva: Bureau des 'Archives des Sciences physiques et naturelles', 1891), 47 pp., and that he took his doctorate at John Hopkins University in 1894 with a thesis entitled *Sur la génération des cobbes par roulement* (Geneva: Imp. Aubert-Schuchardt, 1895), 94 pp. For further biographical information on FdS and his family, s. E.-L. Burnet's account in the *Dictionnaire historique et biographique de la Suisse* (Neuchâtel 1930) V, 730-1; the *Larousse du XXe siècle* (Paris 1933) VI, 209; De Mauro, 1968:285-6, n.1, and 288, n.2.

4 The 2nd ed., consisting of 3 vols. (Paris: Sandoz & Fischbacher, 1877) was reviewed by FdS in 1878; s. *Recueil*, 391-402; cf. also the references to Pictet in CLG, 297, and 306-7, and *CFS* 17:16 (1960).
Horace-Benedict was professor of philosophy and natural sciences at the Geneva Academy [since 1876: University] (1762-86), which was founded by Calvin in 1559, rector of the same institution (1774/75), and had distinguished himself in the fields of physics and geology, and also botany, mineralogy, and other areas of scientific research. Cf. esp. his Voyages dans les Alpes précédées d’un Essai sur l’histoire naturelle des environs de Genève, 4 vols. (Neuchâtel-Geneva-Paris 1779-96). He became a member of the Royal British Society in 1788 and was a member of many other learned societies throughout Europe.

S. CFS 17:19 (1960) in contrast to De Mauro (1968:292) who believes that this paper was written in Leipzig.

According to Pedersen (1962:281-2) FdS shared this discovery with a number of linguists who had quite independently come to similar conclusions: Karl Verner (1846-96), Vilhelm Thomsen (1842-1927), Esaias Tégner (1843-1928), Johannes Schmidt (1843-1901), all of whom were more than ten years older than FdS, and Hermann Collitz (1855-1935). We are inclined to believe Osthoff's affirmation that K. Verner acquainted the Leipzig Circle (which included FdS) in Fall 1876 with his findings concerning the Indo-Iranian palatals, and that FdS and all German scholars took their information from him; s. Osthoff's rather more polemic than informative pamphlet, Die neueste Sprachforschung und die Erklärung des indoeuropäischen Ablauts: Antwort auf ... Hermann Collitz (Heidelberg: O. Petters, 1886), 14-20; Osthoff proposed that this "law" be called the "Tegner-Thomsen-Verner'sche Palatalgesetz", since it appeared impossible to decide which of the three Scandinavians should be given priority as none of them had published his findings (p. 20).

FdS related his misgivings to Meillet (cf. LHLG II, 175), L. Gautier (cf. Bally, 1952:147), and in his "Souvenirs" of 1903 (s. CFS 17:22-4 [1960]).

Even in 1914 the great Indo-Europeanist Wilhelm Streitberg could note: "Das Buch ist de Saussures Meisterwerk: noch heute, nach einem Menschenalter, wirken Inhalt und Form mit derselben bezwingenden Macht wie am Tage des Erscheinens - von wieviel sprachwissenschaftlichen Werken, auch solchem höchsten Ranges, kann man das Gleiche sagen?" (IJB 2:206).

The notion of system was already implicit in the works of Bopp (1816) and J. Grimm (1822) as E. Buyssens has pointed out (CFS 18:18-9), though not in the strict mathematical sense which underlies FdS's Mémoire. For a fine statement of the theoretical implications of this work see now Hjelmslev's Language: An Introduction, transl. by Francis J. Whithfield (Madison: Wisconsin Univ. Press, 1970), 123-7.

Those interested in an analysis of the main assumptions and deductions in the Mémoire may refer to A. Meillet, LHLG II, 176-7 (= Portraits of Linguists II, 93-4), and particularly to W. Streitberg in IJB 2:103-7 (=Op. cit., 205-10). See also Robert Schmidt-Brandt,


Streitberg was full of praise for Saussure's Mémoire and observed: "Nicht einzelnen Entdeckungen verdankt er [FdS] seinen Ruhm - seine wahre, seine einzigartige Bedeutung liegt in der systematischen Kraft seines Geistes. Seine unvergleichliche Stärke ist die Synthese; alle Einzelbeobachtungen sind ihm nur Bausteine zu dem planvoll gefügten Gebäude des Systems; er ruht und rastet nicht, bis sich alle Tatsachen, aus ihrer Vereinzelung erlöst, zu einem harmonischen Ganzen zusammen-schliessen." (IJb 2:101). Could this not well have applied to Saussure's posthumous Cours?

FdS noted himself (CFS 17:23) that Gustav Meyer (1850-1900) copied his series of the IE ablaut for his Griechische Grammatik (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880), without acknowledging his source.

It is interesting to note that reviews of the Mémoire are scarce; the only two we are aware of are those by Mikołaj Kruszewski in RFV 4:33-45 (1880) and Louis Havet in Journal de Genève (Febr. 25, 1879). Later inquiries in a similar direction were: Heinrich Hübschmann, Das indogermanische Vokalsystem (Strassburg: Trübner, 1885) [cf. IZAS 3: 335-6]; Friedrich Bechtel, Die Hauptprobleme der indogermanischen Lautlehre seit Schleicher (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck Ruprecht, 1892), s. esp. 217ff.; Johannes Schmidt, Kritik der Sonantentheorie (Weimar: Böhlau, 1895) [cf. FdS's review in IFAnz 7:216-8 (1897)]; Herman Hirt, Der indogermanische Ablaut (Strassburg: Trübner, 1900).

Hermann Möller who was attacked, together with FdS, by Osthoff reported that he became temporarily discouraged in his scholarly work as a linguist (cf. the "Vorwort" to his Semitisch und Indogermanisch, Part I [Kopenhagen: Hagerup, 1906], esp. viii), but it has not yet been established whether this was FdS's reaction as well; cf. Godel in CFS 17:14, and n.9-11, and De Mauro, 1968:295-6.


However, it is curious to note that neither Meillet nor Streitberg make any reference to this voyage, and the three informants who hint at Saussure's stay in Lithuania, Ernest Muret, Edouard Favre, and
Charles Bally, were all students at Geneva or friends of his. It was also not until the academic year 1888/89 (not 1890/91 as Godel, SM, 24, holds) that Saussure offered an introductory seminar on Lithuanian attended by five students, the best known of whom were Georges Dottin (1863-1928) and Paul Boyer (1864-1949).

19 Gautier reports Saussure's reply: "Je me trouve placé devant un dilemme: ou bien exposer le sujet dans toute sa complexité et avouer mes doutes, . . . . Ou bien faire quelque chose de simplifié, mieux adapté à un auditoire d'étudiants qui ne sont pas linguistes. Mais à chaque fois, je me trouve arrêté par des scrupules." (SM, 30).

20 In the interview with Riedlinger Saussure states that this subject had occupied him in particular 15 years earlier (cf. SM, 29).

21 Some 70 pages of Saussure's manuscript have been preserved; cf. SM 32; Godel has analysed its contents in SM, 43-6. The full text is scheduled to appear in Notes inédites personnelles de FdS compiled by R. Engler (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1972); through the kind offices of the editor we have been able to consult the proofs for the chapter on Whitney (see 1.3.1).

22 Altogether 99 exercise books in FdS's own handwriting have been preserved; cf. SM, 13-5, which do not include these manuscripts, as against the reference in CFS 17:11 (1960).

23 It was not until 1964 that the linguistic public was informed that FdS had devoted much time to the search for anagrams in poetry. Besides the publication of letters by FdS to Meillet which have been preserved and which contain a number of passages dealing with this subject (s. CFS 21 [1964], 190-14, 117, 118-9), there was especially Jean Starobinski's presentation of a selection from FdS's manuscripts in an attempt to interpret FdS's endeavours within the framework of poetic theory. S. his articles, "Les anagrammes de FdS", Mercure de France 350:243-62 (Febr. 1964); id., "Les mots sous les mots: Textes inédits de FdS", To Honor Roman Jakobson III, 1906-17 (1967); id., "Le texte dans le texte: Extraits inédits des Cahiers d'anagrammes de FdS", Tel Quel No. 37, 3-33 (Spring 1969), and "La puissance de l'Aphrodite et le mensonge des couoisses: FdS lecteur de Lucrèce", La poétique, la mémoire (= Change, 6) (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1970), 89-90 [Introduction], 91-117; s. also Mitsou Ronat's article, "Vers une lecture des anagrammes par la théorie saussurienne", loc. cit., 119-26. Starobinski's publications have been followed by a number of further writings; s. for instance Aldo Rossi's paper, "Gli anagrammi de Saussure: Poliziano, Bach, Pascoli", Paragone 218:113-27 (April 1968), and Giuseppe Nava's presentation "Lettres de FdS à Giovanni Pascoli", CFS 24:73-81 (1968), esp. 80-1. In 1969, Julia Kristeva published her essay, "Pour une semiologie des paragrammes", in Kristeva, 1969:174-207, in which she attempts an analysis of these poetic devices in view of FdS's suggestions concerning semiotics; s. esp. 174-5.

24 Mourelle-Lema's (1969:4) dates are wrong as is much of his information; s. our forthcoming review of the Geneva School Reader in VR 30.
1.2 The Intellectual Paradigm of Saussure's Formative Years

The intellectual life of the nineteenth century was more complex than that of any previous age. This was due to several causes. First: the area concerned was larger than ever before; America and Russia made important contributions, and Europe became more aware than formerly of Indian philosophies, both ancient and modern. Second: science, which had been a chief source of novelty since the seventeenth century, made new conquests, especially in geology, biology, and organic chemistry. . . .

Bertrand Russell in 1945 *

1.2.1 The Question of Extra-Linguistic Influences on Saussure

In der Geschichte der Wissenschaft kommt es wohl vor, dass Einer so nebenher einen wichtigen, folgenreichen Gedanken aus- spricht, den erst viel später ein Anderer ausbeutet. Und dieser Andere kann eben- so gut selbständiger Entdecker, als von Jenem angeregt gewesen sein.

Georg von der Gabelentz in 1891 +

Leonard Bloomfield noted in 1924 in his review of the second edition of the Cours that most of what Saussure had put forward had long been 'in the air' but only fragmentarily expressed until then, giving him full credit for the rigorous systematization of fundamental principles of language investigation (Bloomfield, 1970:106). He stated in the same review that "in lecturing on 'general linguistics' he [FdS] stood very nearly alone, for, strange as it may seem, the nineteenth century, which studied intensively the history of one family of languages, took little or no interest in the general aspects of human speech" (ibid.). To be
sure Bloomfield is referring to the second half of the 19th century and in particular to the work in Indo-European linguistics done after the 1870s; he affirmed about ten years later that the "first great book on general linguistics was a treatise on the varieties of human speech by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), which appeared in 1836" (1933:18). But Bloomfield noted also that there had been a definite decline of emphasis on general language theory from Humboldt to Heymann Steinthal (1823-99), George von der Gabelentz (1840-93) and the work of the philosopher and psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), an observation which was made more explicit by Franz Specht fifteen years later: "Die allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft, die ihren Blick über das Indogermanische hinaus auch auf den Bau der übrigen Sprachen der Erde richtet, ist in der Frühzeit der indogermanischen Sprachwissenschaft weit stärker gepflegt worden als in den Jahren nach 1870", adding that the "grossen Umwälzungen, die damals eintraten, haben auch diesen Wissenszweig verkümmer lassen". (1948:260). Specht adds the names of a few linguists of that period who continued the Humboldtian tradition with its particular interest in general linguistics: Franz Misteli (1841-1903), Steinthal's pupil, Franz Nikolaus Finck (1867-1910), and Hugo Schuchardt (1842-1927).

What Bloomfield did not indicate, apart from an unspecified reference to the psychologism of that time (1933:16-8) in which he saw the major weakness of Hermann Paul's treatment of historical linguistics, and which can only rarely be found in writings on this period dealing with the history of linguistics (cf. Pedersen, 1962 or Strunk, 1965), has at least been hinted at by Specht. He states: "Überblickt man den Zeitabschnitt von den Junggrammatikern bis zum Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges, so ist er in seinen Anschauungen völlig zeitgebunden. Die Vorherrschaft der Naturwissenschaften zeigt sich sowohl in dem Begriffe wie auch in dem reinen Positivismus und Historismus der Zeit". (1948:260). Specht believed this temporary onesidedness was most successful at that time, but he was also aware that the main lines of language investigation had been narrowed down to (historical) phonology and morphological analysis.

This emphasis on the analytical description of language data independent of the original meaning of the formal properties under investigation - which was paralleled in synchronic linguistics by American structuralism
between 1926 (Bloomfield's *Postulates*) and the publication of Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* in 1957 - appears to have been very characteristic of the period between 1876 and 1916, e.g. the statements of Verner concerning 'exceptions' of the Germanic consonant shift, of Brugmann pertaining to the existence of nasals with syllabic function in IE, and Leskien's claim that 'sound laws' allow for no exception (all of 1876) and the completion of the second edition of Brugmann and Delbrück's voluminous *Grundriss* in 1916. Wolfgang Putschke has recently restated the main reason for particular developments in 19th century linguistics pointing out that throughout this time language investigators used to follow with special interest the findings of the natural sciences in order to view language study within the framework of their methods and results. It is well known that Friedrich von Schlegel (cf. Arens, 1969:162), J. Grimm (198), Humboldt (179), and more notably Bopp (219), paid much attention to comparative anatomy, and Putschke believes that the characterization of language as a (living) organism had its source in this interest (1969: 22). It appears that there were two diverging interpretations of the organism concept: the humanistic ("geisteswissenschaftliche") advocated by Humboldt, and the scientific ("naturwissenschaftliche") put forward by Bopp who noted, as early as in 1836: "Die Sprachen sind als organische Naturkörper anzusehen, die nach bestimmten Gesetzen sich bilden" (s. Putschke, 1969:23). The evolution of the neogrammarian position of the seventies, however, had its source in the discovery of the first Germanic consonant shift by Rask and Grimm which led Bopp and his followers to the ever growing belief that linguistic change must obey laws similar to those which govern natural phenomena.

From about the middle of the century onwards psychology (e.g. Steinthal) made its influence felt on linguistic study, and soon afterwards Darwin's theory of evolution was hailed by August Schleicher (1821-68) as a major breakthrough which had its impact on the explanation of language change. The emphasis on the vocal side of language, characteristic of the whole of 19th century linguistics, led, together, we believe, with the interest in comparative anatomy (and later also biology), to physiological investigations of language. Putschke does not seem
aware of the existence of a voluminous study by Karl Moritz Rapp (1803-1883) which appeared during the years 1836-41, and which Jesperson praised for its phonetic observations and its thorough comprehension of the mutual relations of sounds and writing (1922:70), and thus he tends to believe (1969:23-4) that in this respect Rudolf von Raumer's study Aspiration und Lautverschiebung (1837) marked the first important step towards physiological explanation of language change which reached its first culminating point in Grundzüge der Physiologie und Systematik der Sprachlaute (1856) by the Viennese physiologist Ernst Wilhelm Ritter von Brücke (1819-92). Brücke's study was followed by Carl Merkel's (1812-76) voluminous book Anatomie und Physiologie des menschlichen Stimm- und Sprachorgans (1857). Similar studies pertaining to physiological, physical and acoustic investigations of the human voice were published extensively during the second half of the 19th century, and even in 1909 Hermann Gutzmann (1865-1922) wrote a Physiologie der Stimme und Sprache. Of major importance appear to have been the experiments by the physicist Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz (1821-94) whose Lehre von den Tonempfindungen appeared in 1863 and which was translated into English by Alexander John Ellis (1814-90) in 1875 from the third German edition. About the same time Paul Broca (1824-80) localized the speech centre in the third left frontal convolution of the human brain (cf. CLG, 26), a discovery which neurolinguists of today still find valuable in many respects.

Another science which constituted a further component of the intellectual paradigm of the 19th century was psychology. Victor Egger published his essay of descriptive psychology La Parole intérieure in 1881, investigating the relation between thought and language, and phenomena connected with subvocalisation almost a decade before the appearance of The Principles of Psychology (1890) by William James (1842-1910) which became very influential about 1900 when much attention was given to various aspects of language acquisition. Psycho-linguistic studies aroused continued interest in the years following the publication of Wundt's first volume of his Völkerpsychologie entitled Die Sprache in 1900: Albert Thumb (1865-1915) published, together with Karl Marbe,
a psychologist, experimental researches to substantiate formations by analogy in language (1901),


Apart from the natural sciences which had much influence on linguistics in the 19th century (as they do today), the growth of the social sciences and philosophical speculations should not be overlooked. There is in particular Auguste Comte (1798-1857) whose voluminous *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830-42; 5th ed. 1893) has been reprinted during more than fifty years and has had a definite influence on the development of the human sciences of the 19th century, in particular philosophy, sociology, history, and thus on linguistics as well since it has always been a reflection of the intellectual trends of contemporary ideas. Positivism— which Karl Vossler (1872-1949) attacked so violently in 1904— was closely linked to historicism, another feature of the late 19th century. Significantly, the first three volumes of *Revue de linguistique et de philologie comparée* (Paris 1867-70) were subtitled "Recueil trimestriel de documents pour servir à la science positive des langues, à l'ethnologie, à la mythologie et à l'histoire".

Apart from Vossler's reaction against positivist philosophy and its application to linguistics, opposition to the principal 19th century tenets grew during the early years of the 20th century, after many years of incubation which saw Gottlob Frege's (1848-1925) *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (1884), Henri Adrien Naville's (1845-1930) first logical study *De la Classification des sciences* (1888), Wilhelm Windelband's (1848-1915) *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1892; 13th ed., 1935) and Benjamin Bourdon's (1860-193?) book *L'Expression des émotions et des tendances dans le langage* (1892). Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) made the important distinction between the social and the natural sciences showing that linguistics belonged to the former in his monograph *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (1899; 7th ed., 1926), and new trends were announced
in the writings of Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim (1853-1920), Fritz Mauthner's (1849-1923) *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* (1901-2; 2nd ed., 1906-13), and others, but also in Benedetto Croce's (1866-1952) famous *Estetica come scienza dell' espressione e linguistica generale* (1902) which led to the formation of the idealistic school of the "Neolinguists" in Italy and a parallel neo-Humboldtian movement in Germany during the twenties and thirties. The *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* (1908) by Anton Marty (1847-1914) and volume two of Heinrich Gomperz' (1873-1942) *Weltanschauungslehre* entitled *Neologie* of the same year might be added, in particular because of Roman Jakobson's recent suggestion (1965:22) that the latter could have directly influenced Saussure's concept of the language sign.

Since the mapping out of the cultural climate in which F. de Saussure grew up is only one part of our present study, the above sketch which does not amount to much more than a listing of bibliographical data cannot be regarded as very satisfactory. It suggests, however, something which is still absent from modern "histories" of linguistic science such as presented by Mounin, Lepschy, Leroy, Graur/Wald, Ivic, and many others: that a serious presentation of the development of linguistics during the past centuries has to take into account the social, cultural, and scientific, and probably also the political and economic circumstances and evolutions of a given period. Robins' *Short History of Linguistics* of 1967 appears to be the only notable exception in this respect; it attempts to integrate some of the considerations which Thomas S. Kuhn put forward in his *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962; 2nd ed., 1970) for the explanation of the evolution of linguistic thought. In order to establish a more complete picture of the intellectual atmosphere of the period between 1870 and 1910 which is vital to the explanation of influences on Saussure's ideas about the nature of language it will be necessary for the historiographer of linguistic science to learn from the historian whose domain is the history of ideas.
FOOTNOTES - 1.2/1.2.1


1 Versuch einer Physiologie der Sprache nebst historischer Entwicklung der abendländischen Idiome nach physiologischen Grundsätzen (Stuttgart & Tübingen: Cotta), vols. I (1836), II (1839), III (1840), and IV (1841).

2 Putschke does not mention that this study by Raumer (1815-76) was much ahead of his time and that many of his observations had to be rediscovered in the 60s and 70s of the 19th century. The monograph *Die Aspiration und die Lautverschiebung: Eine sprachgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, has been reprinted (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1970), xvi + 104 pp.

3 See Merkel's review of Brücke, 1856 in Schmidt's *Jahrbücher der in- und ausländischen gesamten Medizin* 95: 108-15 (1857), and Brücke's reply, "Phonetische Bemerkungen", *ZfOG* 8:749-68 of the same year.

4 "Remarques sur le siège de la faculté du langage articulé suivant une observation d'aphémie (perte de la parole)", *Bulletin de la Société anatomique* (Paris) vol. 36, N.S. 6, 331-57 (Aug. 1861), and "Nouvelles observations d'aphémie produites par une lésion des 2e et 3e circonvolutions frontales", *ibid.*, 398-407 (Nov. 1861).


10 In this respect it appears expedient to consult studies such as Friedrich Heer's Intellectual History of Europe, transl. by Jonathan Steinberg (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), esp. 449-76 (on the 19th century); Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945) is much too brief in its account of the "Currents of Thought in the Nineteenth Century" (719-29) to yield a comparable benefit. Cf. also the Introduction of this study (0.0) for suggestions on how a historiography of linguistic thought should be established.
1.2.1.1 Durkheim's Principles of Sociology, Tarde's Sociological and Economic Theories, and Saussure's Alleged Sociologism

Auguste Comte is the originator of the term "sociology"; he devoted the fourth volume of his *Cours de philosophie positive* to sociological philosophy outlining the principles according to which sociological investigations should proceed. However, his encyclopedic approach which made sociology a part of his positivist philosophy but not a subject in its own right could not satisfy Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) who is rightly called the founder of sociology as a science. In France especially much attention was given to sociological issues towards the end of the 19th century, to the extent that Durkheim was induced to record that sociology enjoyed much popular interest. With his *Règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris 1895), Durkheim laid the foundation for sociological theory distinct from other social sciences such as psychology and anthropology.

The student of Saussure's *Cours* who received his initiation into the linguistic concepts outlined in this book from the histories of linguistics which have appeared during the past decade or so will find his affirmations confirmed that Saussure was much exposed to Durkheim's theory of sociology when he developed his principles of language description. In fact there are a number of statements in the *Cours* which seem to point to such a contention. It is however the aim of this chapter to contest such a generally held view. The procedure we shall follow is, first to locate the passages in the *Cours* which treat social aspects of language and
assess their meaning and theoretical value, and second to compare Saussure's statements with Durkheim's sociological concepts.

In the chapter which deals with the object of linguistic science a number of formulations of the following kind can be found: "... la langue est une institution sociale" (CLG, 33); langage, embracing langue and parole, "a un côté individuel et un côté social" (24); langue representing "la partie sociale du langage" (31) is opposed to parole which is said to be "toujours individuelle" (30). Apart from this opposition langue: parole = individual: social which we can deduce from the passages quoted above, there are a number of further instances where Saussure employed the notion of "socio", though in a more concrete sense, i.e. no longer merely in terminological contrast with "individual", but in respect to the mechanism of language evolution. For instance, when he deals with the immutability of the language sign, he notes: "La langue -- . . . -- est à chaque moment l'affaire de tout le monde", and "une chose [!] dont tous les individus se servent toute la journée" (107). Since language is in constant use by the members of a speech community, it is exposed to unceasing influence on the part of all of them. This fact, Saussure maintains, suffices to show that no revolution in language is possible, emphasizing that language is of all social institutions least amenable to individual initiative since it is tied up with the life of society ("masse sociale") which itself appears to be a particularly conservative force owing to the natural inertia of its members (cf. CLG, 107-8).

To the impartial reader these observations concerning the social character of language do not amount to much more than common-place statements about the nature of language. Similarly, the following short quotations appear to contain nothing particularly striking. Thus Saussure speaks at one time of the "fait social [!] de la langue" (29), of the "lien social que constitue la langue" (30); he further insists that language is independent of the individual speaker (37), and that it exists only "en vertu d'une sorte de contrat passé entre les membres de la communauté" (31). Saussure emphasizes that language never exists, contrary to its appearance, outside what he terms the "fait social" (112),
adding that language is a semiological phenomenon, and concludes that social forces, in particular, affect language and cause linguistic changes (113).

In order to support our contention that Saussure's observations regarding the social nature of language were common knowledge among linguists of his time, we may simply look to Bloomfield's *Introduction to the Study of Language* of 1914. In his early work Bloomfield affirms that language is learned and that, consequently, the individual's language "is not his creation, but consists of habits adopted in his expressive intercourse with other members of the community" (17). Bloomfield concludes from this fact that the individual is unable to use language except in the form in which the community as a whole uses it; "moreover the individual speaker must speak as the others do, or he will not be understood" (*ibid.*). As for the change which occurs in language, he holds that it is "never a conscious alteration by individuals, but an unconscious, gradual change in the habits of the entire community" (*ibid.*). Apart from the psychological terms in which Bloomfield used to express his ideas during the early part of his academic career, we detect striking similarities between the statements of someone strongly influenced by Wundtian psychology (cf. Bloomfield, 1914:vi; 1933:vii) and those of Saussure who allegedly was under the noticeable influence of Durkheimian sociology.

Thus the following passage from the *Cours*, whose factual information does not amount to much more than that which we have found in the quotation from Bloomfield, has been taken traditionally as an indication of Saussure's dependence on Durkheim's conception of "contrainte sociale" which imposes itself on the individual user of a given language: "... si l'on veut démontrer que la loi admise dans une collectivité est une chose que l'on subit, et non une règle librement consentie, c'est bien la langue qui en offre la preuve la plus éclatante" (CLG, 104; cf. CLG(E), 159). 3

These quotations and possibly a few more scattered throughout the *Cours* have led a number of linguists in the post-Saussurean era to express their belief that Saussurean linguistics was essentially sociological in nature and that Durkheim's sociological theorizing was Saussure's
main source of inspiration. Joseph Vendryes (1875-1960), a pupil of Meillet, summarized his impression in 1921 in the following way: "De la lecture de son livre [i.e. the Cours], on emporte la forte impression que la linguistique [saussurienne] est essentiellement sociologique."\(^4\)

Vendryes claimed to have found evidence in the Cours for his contention that sociological notions underlay Saussure's famous dichotomies of langue/parole and synchrony/diachrony (s. Vendryes, 1952:19 resp. 22) without, however, giving any quotation to support his views. For Vendryes however the phenomenon of analogy, for instance, "est réglée par des causes sociales" (1952:24), an assertion he could not have taken from the Cours which clearly states: "L'analogie est d'ordre psychologique" (CLG, 226). It appears that Vendryes, a pupil of Meillet, had not read the Cours very closely but had interpreted his findings in the light of Meillet's teachings which showed a marked Durkheimian influence.\(^5\)

Vendryes, it should be noted, did not mention Durkheim in his 1921 paper; this was done ten years later by Witold Doroszewski (1899 - ) in a paper entitled "Sociologie et Linguistique: Durkheim et Saussure" which he read on the occasion of the Second International Congress of Linguists held in Geneva in 1931.\(^6\) There Doroszewski put forward his conviction that Saussure had been under the noticeable influence of Durkheimian sociology and that Saussurean ideas were "de provenance extralinguistique", a contention which, interestingly enough, was rejected by Meillet (A[2]CIL, 147) in the discussion which followed Doroszewski's lecture. It should be recalled that Meillet himself, a former student of Saussure at Paris (1881-91) and later temporary collaborator of Durkheim (1902ff.), was much influenced by Durkheimian notions. This fact is evident from Meillet's own writings,\(^7\) and also from those of his pupils, in particular Vendryes, Marcel Cohen (1884 - ), Alf Sommerfelt (1892-1965), and Emile Benveniste (1902 - ).\(^8\)

On the other hand, it would seem that Doroszewski's findings concerning Durkheim's influence have been accepted as established fact by the majority of authors of books related to the history of linguistics and therefore cannot easily be rejected. Louis Kukenheim maintains that the influence of Durkheim on Meillet and Saussure is undeniable (1966:99);
according to R. H. Robins, Saussure was much influenced by Durkheim's sociological theory to the extent that he "perhaps exaggerated the supra-personal reality of langue over and above the individual, more especially as he recognized the changes in langue proceed from changes made by the individuals in their parole, while he yet declared that langue was not subject to the individual's power of change". (1967:200f.). F. P. Dinneen, taking Saussure's dependence on Durkheimian concepts for granted, states explicitly that Saussure, dissatisfied with the argument that only historical linguistics was regarded by contemporary linguists as scientific, "did not see how a study that does not take the historical development of language into consideration could be made more accurate until he became acquainted with the work of Emile Durkheim". (1967:192). In other words, Dinneen holds  1) that Saussure developed his concept of synchrony only after he had come to know Durkheimian sociology, and  2) that his source of information lay outside the field of linguistics. Our claim is that we can, at the present stage of our study, at least refute the first contention; the second will be dealt with more explicitly in chap. 1.3.1. Suffice it to note that the opposition descriptive vs. historical linguistics had been common knowledge since the 1860s and 70s, though it had not been taken to its logical conclusion (cf. Telegdi, 1967). This distinction was clearly made by Saussure in his early teachings as Meillet stressed in 1913 in his obituary of Saussure - and it should be emphasized that Meillet was not acquainted with the contents of Saussure's lectures on general linguistics - stating that he "voulait surtout bien marquer le contraste entre deux manières de considérer les faits linguistiques: l'étude de la langue à un moment donné, et l'étude du développement linguistique à travers le temps". (LHLG II, 183). Although Saussure left Paris in 1891 to assume the professorship of Indo-European linguistics at Geneva University without ever having published anything related specifically to general linguistic theory, there are indications that he developed this distinction as early as in the 1880s, and in any case prior to the publication of Durkheim's Règles de la méthode sociologique in 1895.
Dinneen, however, tries at some length (1967:192-5) to relate certain principles of Durkheim's doctriné in order to suggest Saussure's dependence, concluding: "When we examine some of de Saussure's distinctive contributions to the structural approach to language we can appreciate how much these ideas of Durkheim's influenced him". (195). Dinneen fails in the subsequent chapter devoted to Saussure (195-210) to provide any evidence for his claim; he quotes no passage from the Cours to support his contention, and as result he is led to make assertions of the following kind: "In summary . . . de Saussure saw as the sole object of linguistic science that aspect of language which corresponds to a social fact" (199), an argument which we believe is without foundation. In fact, Dinneen suggests that langue is that abstraction which conforms with the Durkheimian notion of "fait social", but again does not underscore his contention with a passage from the Cours. 10

However, in view of the fact that a number of strong claims have been made by historians of linguistic science which maintain the dependence of Saussure's linguistic theory on Durkheim's principles of sociology, it appears to be necessary to have a closer look at Durkheim's influential treatise Les Règles de la méthode sociologique which first appeared in 1895 and has ever since been regarded as a classic in the area of sociology. 12

Durkheim, who is generally held to be the founder of sociology, expressed in the Preface to the second edition that he wished to establish sociology as a science which could be placed "dans l'esprit où sont physiciens, chimistes, physiologistes, quand ils s'engagent dans une région, encore inexplorée, de leur domaine scientifique" (p. xix), adding that the investigator should be aware of the fact that entering the social world means to explore the unknown. The objective of sociological science would be to assess social facts.

Interestingly Durkheim defined the fait social in the following manner: Est fait social tout manière, fixée ou non, susceptible d'exercer sur l'individu une contrainte extérieure; ou bien encore, [une chose] qui est générale dans l'étendu d'une société donnée toute ayant une existence propre, indépendente de ses manifestations individuelles" (14). Durkheim added to his initial definition, in which he does not
speak of concepts but of choses, that the fait social actually enunciates as a thing something which is nothing but "une vue d'esprit" (19).

An important element of Durkheim's theory is the notion of social constraint; social factors exercise a particular kind of pressure on the individual member of a given social community which, Durkheim observes, is not due to the "rigidité de certaines arrangements moléculaires, mais au prestige dont sont investies certaines représentations" (p. xxi), a statement with the help of which Durkheim wishes to make it clear that sociology does not deal with things in the materialistic sense (such as the natural sciences are concerned with) but with abstractions which are only verifiable and noticeable insofar as they exercise constraint. In this connection it is significant that Durkheim emphasized that all kinds of (social) behaviour (including language), or thinking are, though outside the individual himself, nevertheless endowed with an imperative and coercive power and thrust themselves on him whether he likes it or not, exemplifying it in the following manner:

Le système de signes dont je me sers pour exprimer ma pensée, le système de monnaies que j'emploie pour payer mes dettes, les instruments de crédit que j'utilise dans mes relations commerciales, les pratiques suivis dans ma profession, etc. etc., fonctionnent indépendamment des usages que j'en fais (4).  

For the individual, the monetary system or the linguistic code is something which exists independently of him, but which restricts his liberty when he wishes to use these systems in commercial enterprise or communication.

It should be emphasized that Durkheimian sociology does not deal with things in the material sense, but with representations, i.e. things as mental conceptions (cf. German "Vorstellung"). Therefore Durkheim cannot but place the social facts in the collective consciousness ("conscience collective") which should not be confused with the consciousness of the individual which is a representation of another kind (cf. Règles . . . , xvii). The collective consciousness, he concedes, may be regarded as having a psychic existence (128); this collective consciousness, Durkheim explained in 1898, however, can only make itself felt or become active through the medium of the particular consciousness of individuals.
As we have shown at the beginning of this chapter, the reader of the *Cours* will find that apparently Saussure did make in his lectures a number of statements (among many others, of course) about the nature of language which seem to make use of certain Durkheimian notions:

1) Language is once defined as "un produit social de la faculté du langage" (CLG, 25); *langage* as such (and, at times, *langue*) is characterized as a "fait social" (CLG, 29 as against 112);

2) language is said to be "un système de signes distincts correspondant à des idées distincts" (26), and more particularly a "système de signes arbitraires" (106), and further, something which may appear even more "Durkheimian";

3) language is said to exist "indépendante de l'individu" (37) and "extérieure à l'individu" (31).

From these and other quotations from the *Cours* which we cited in the first half of this chapter most historians of linguistic science have concluded that Saussure's linguistic theory is essentially Durkheimian in nature. We contest this, and shall attempt to prove our point in the following paragraphs.

The first observation that should be made is concerned with terminological matters. In Durkheim's sociological theory at least two terms are of prime importance: 1) "contrainte sociale" - the notion by means of which he defines the social fact - and 2) the concept of "représentation". There is no textual indication that Saussure developed a theory based on either the notion of constraint or the concept of representation. We may assume that Saussure was quite aware of the fact that the individual speaker was restricted to the (linguistic) code of the speech community in order to be understood, since he characterized *langue* as "l'ensemble des habitudes linguistiques qui permettent à un sujet de comprendre et de se faire comprendre" (CLG, 112), but there is no indication that he envisaged a linguistic principle based on the notion of constraint. On the contrary, he noted on several occasions the individual's liberty in the speech act (*parole*; cf. CLG, 172). We have found only two instances where Saussure used the word 'représentation' (CLG, 32 and 98). In both cases representation has no particular technical meaning attached to it,
though it appears to imply what is meant by the German expression "Vorstellung"; in addition, there are no sources for either of the two occurrences of the term (cf. CLG(E), 44 and 149). The best example is perhaps Saussure's affirmation that a phoneme or an "image acoustique" is not identical with sound (which is purely physical), but its "empreinte psychique". This observation, however, would not lead back to Durkheim's concept but to statements made by Baudouin de Courtenay during the 1890s (cf. 1.3.3.2).

Our second observation is that statements concerning the social nature of language, langue as a fait social, etc. do not constitute, anywhere in the whole of the Cours, an integral part of Saussure's theory, but that passing references can be found only in the following chapters: "Objet de la linguistique" (CLG, 23-35), "Linguistique de la langue et linguistique de la parole" (36-9), and "Immutabilité et mutabilité du signe" (104-13); the only exception appears to be on p. 21 (though the CLG(E), p. 21 does not confirm this), where the author asks whether linguistics should be incorporated into sociology, since language (langage) is a social fact, but proposes to answer it in the chapters to follow.

This fact has been stressed, because it is in the introductory as well as in the central parts that Saussure makes explicit references to W. D. Whitney: he notes that Whitney had assimilated langue with a social institution (CLG, 26), but criticizes him for his contention that it was purely accidental that language is vocal (since, for Saussure, this is precisely its specific characteristic in contrast to other sign systems), agreeing with him however on another issue: "Mais sur le point essentiel, le linguiste americain [= Whitney] nous semble avoir raison: la langue est une convention" (CLG, 26; cf. also SM, 143-8 [passim]). Whitney is moreover praised for his insistence on the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, but is also criticized for not having seen that it is this fact that separates language from all other human institutions (CLG, 110). In particular, in view of the fact that references to other authors are scarce in the Cours, these quotations are surely not accidental but suggest that Saussure may have received his inspiration concerning the social character of language more probably from Whitney (s. 1.3.1)
than from any other source, an aspect which we should like to emphasize already at this point at the risk of anticipating an important feature of our argument that extralinguistic influences which have frequently been suggested are at best marginal in Saussure's theoretical framework.

Third, there are not more than about two dozen occurrences of the term 'social' in the *Cours* as against 138 occurrences of the expression 'system'. This ratio may suggest that, as far as Saussure was concerned, the social aspect of language remained comparatively marginal if compared with its systematic character.

In addition, it should be noted that most of the passages quoted from the *Cours* containing the expression "social" have been taken out of context, a procedure which may well lead to a false impression or at least permit various interpretations. When Saussure states that language is a social institution he makes explicit reference to the fact that language is based on a "consentement collectif" (CLG, 32), has its source in the "ésprit collectif" (19) of a given community, and enjoys a "usage collectif" (173). This characteristic is also shared by institutions other than language, and Saussure explains: "En effet tout moyen d'expression reçu dans une société repose en principe sur une habitude collective ou, ce qui revient au même, sur la convention" (CLG, 100f.). In other words, language is learned and conventional (25). Interestingly, the term 'collective' appears often in contexts where 'social' might well be expected, since 'collective' pertains to *langue* (s. 38, as 'social', cf. 24, 30) as 'individual' refers to *parole* (24, 27, 29-31, 27, 28, 138).

Fourth, the equation *langue: parole* = *individual: social* does not consistently hold true in Saussure's teachings on general linguistics. It may well be that this equation has been complicated by the fact that Saussure employed three distinct terms: *langage, langue* and *parole*. As for the first term, he noted: "Le langage a un côté individuel et un côté social, et l'on ne peut concevoir l'un sans l'autre" (CLG, 23), but does not seem to have drawn the conclusion from this statement that would mean a) that *langue* has its existence only in the "masse parlante", and b) that *parole* is limited by the code of language (cf. CLG, 31). On the other hand, Saussure did not always characterize *langue* as the
social aspect, and indeed he observed on occasion that "le langage est social, il est vrai, mais pour nombre de faits, il est plus commode de le rencontrer dans l'individu" (LTS, 30), but also "la langue est forcement sociale; le langage ne l'est pas forcement" (ibid.). At times Saussure himself identified langage and langue (s. LTS, 30-1; SM, 157-8) and complicated matters further by attaching different meanings to all three expressions in the course of his teachings between 1891 and 1911, as Godel has shown (cf. SM, 142-59 [passim]). In fact, Godel affirms that Saussure, at the time of his first course on general linguistics (in 1907), characterized parole as the eminently social side of language (SM, 146-7). This apparent vacillation in the use of 'social' may be explained by the simple fact that Saussure never wrote a coherent system of linguistic theory himself; it may also indicate that he, faithful to his dictum: "c'est le point de vue qui crée l'objet" (CLG, 23), never used 'social' and 'individual' as technical terms but attached a rather general meaning to them which would change with the angle from which he viewed linguistic phenomena.

Fifth, apart from the fact that Saussure employed the expressions 'social' and 'individual' in a rather general everyday sense using them as opposite terms to clarify his langue/parole distinction, a distinction he did not introduce before 1907 (cf. Godel, 1966:489), the general use of 'social' should be explored. We have already noted that Saussure made use of 'social' in contexts where he wished to express that language had its existence only by virtue of a given speech community (hence the frequent collocations of langue with 'collectivité', 'conscience collective', 'usage collectif', 'esprit collectif', 'consentement collectif', and similar expressions). The other expression Saussure collocates 'social' with is 'convention'; language is for Saussure (as for Whitney before him) "une chose acquise at conventionnelle" (CLG, 25). Finally, when discussing the phenomenon of linguistic change, Saussure observes that language blends with the life of society and is subjected to its inertia which appears as a prime conservative force (cf. CLG, 108). He rightly asserts that language evolution starts with parole (s. CLG, 37 and 138), but modifications to be established in the language system introduced by
the individual speaker have to be adopted by the speech community. In this respect, Saussure holds, 'langue and parole are interdependent, although they can nevertheless be regarded as separate entities (s. CLG, 37-8).

Sixth, there is a further aspect of Saussure's use of 'social' which requires attention, in particular since it leads more directly to his linguistic theorizing. Language is social not only because it is set up by a given community, a "masse sociale" (CLG, 104), and because it exists only in the collectivity of the "masse parlante" (112), but also owing to its communicative nature (s. FdS's special use of the English word "intercourse", CLG, 281ff.). Saussure therefore emphasizes the systemic character of langue defining it as a system of arbitrary signs (s. CLG, 106; cf. also pp. 24, 32, 33, 43, 116, 182; SM, 278, and LTS, 50 ['système (de signes')]\), a code (CLG, 31, 47, and 107; LTS. 16), and a semiological phenomenon (CLG, 33-4, 100-1, 111-2). It is with the latter aspect of language that we are particularly concerned in the present discussion. Saussure appears to have claimed that language is a social fact just because of its semiological character (CLG, 112).

It is apparent from the Cours that Saussure envisaged a science which was to study all kinds of sign systems (CLG, 33) not only writing systems, artificial languages, and the language of deaf-mutes (111), but also rites, customs (35), forms of politeness, military signs (33), and similar conventional codes. It would be the task of the linguist to define "ce qui fait de la langue un système special dans l'ensemble des faits semiologiques" (ibid.). When Saussure calls language a social institution it is especially because he defines langue as a system of arbitrary or conventional signs, signs which originate in human convention (cf. CLG, 100-1).

The concept of semiology or semiotics (as it is more often called today), which has become very fashionable in recent years (s. the works by Barthes, Merleau-Ponty, Kristeva, and Prieto, for instance), appears to have been developed rather early in Saussure's theorizing about the nature of language, although no evidence can be produced that he believed in the early stages of his linguistic thought that "le problème linguistique
est avant tout semiologique" (CLG, 34). However, as early as 1894 Saussure did speak about a "semiologie particulière dite langage" (SM, 46), and manuscripts which appear to represent sketches for a book on linguistics which Saussure contemplated writing during the same year show that he intended to devote a full chapter to semiology (cf. SM, 37, and esp. 49).

Apart from these unpublished notes there is another important piece of evidence showing that Saussure regarded language as a semiological system. Henri Adrien Naville (1845-1930), a relative of Saussure (cf. CFS 21:105) and Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences during Saussure's academic career at Geneva, published in 1901 a monograph entitled *Nouvelle classification des sciences* in which he classifies sociology under what he terms psychological sciences (cf. 90), and makes an explicit reference to Saussure which merits quotation at length, at this point, because it constitutes the only document on this topic which appeared during Saussure's lifetime. It not only bears witness to Saussure's emphasis on the semiological over and above the sociological aspect of language and its study, but may also suggest that Saussure adopted general sociological notions through his exchange of ideas with Naville who related Saussure's views in the following manner:

M. Ferdinand de Saussure insiste sur l'importance d'une science très générale, qu'il appelle semiologie et dont l'objet serait les lois de la création et de la transformation des signes et de leurs sens. La semiologie est une partie essentielle de la sociologie. Comme le plus important des systèmes de signes c'est le langage conventionnel des hommes, la science semiologique la plus avancée c'est la linguistique ou sciences des lois de la vie du langage. La phonologie et la morphologie traitent surtout des mots, la sémantique du sens des mots. Mais il y a certainement action réciproque des mots sur leur sens et du sens sur les mots; vouloir séparer ces études l'une de l'autre ce serait mal comprendre leurs objets. Les linguistes actuels ont renoncé aux explications purement biologiques (physiologiques) en phonologie [read: phonetics/historical phonology, cf. CLG, 55-6], et considèrent avec raison la linguistique tout entière comme une science psychologique.

La linguistique est, ou du moins tend à devenir de plus en plus, une science de lois; elle se distingue toujours plus nettement de l'histoire du langage et de la grammaire [comparée?]. 23
A comparison between this quotation and certain passages in the *Cours* (notably p. 33) would show that the contents are very much alike. 24 Saussure's second course in general linguistics (1908/09), the long introductory part of which was re-established by Godel in 1957 (*CFS* 15:6-103), offers some clarification of previous statements regarding the relation between social and semiological considerations in language to be found in the *Cours*. The following statement seems to allow for a rather straightforward interpretation: "Toutes les formes, tous les rites, toutes les coutumes ont un caractère semiologique par leur caractère social". (*CFS* 15:19). This means that all these conventions have their origin in social groups, 25 in human realizations of arbitrary signs of (social) behaviour; 'collective' and 'social' are synonymous expressions (cf. *CFS* 15:26), and it is in this respect that Saussure could observe:

Nous voyons immédiatement beaucoup mieux qu'avant que c'est uniquement le fait social qui créera ce qui existe dans un système semiologique. Où existe-t-il, dans un ordre quelconque, un système de valeurs si ce n'est de par la collectivité? Un individu tout seul est incapable d'en fixer aucune. (*CFS* 15:27). 26

Without ignoring the social basis of language as well as other systems of communicative behaviour, Saussure developed a theory which in its essence is not based on sociological notions and which he called semiology (cf. *CLG*, 33-4, 100-1, 107, 112, 149). Since Saussure wished to make linguistics a science in its own right and with a frame of reference of its own, sociological explanations of linguistic behaviour were of only secondary or even tertiary importance to him. That is why we do not find a single passage where he makes a clear statement concerning social constraints exercised on the individual user within a given linguistic community. 27 For the same reason, expressions like 'social' versus 'individual' are never taken up as technical terms, but used in a comparatively unspecified sense; the distinction between *langue*, the linguistic code, and *parole*, the speech act in which features of *langue* are activated or realized, is of prime importance. Language as a system of signs and its mechanism constitute the central aspects of Saussurean
theory, and social aspects of language are referred to whenever necessary (e.g. for the explanation of certain features of language change), but hardly amount to much more than commonplace observations and appear to be used as superficial coating of matters which are intrinsically linguistic in nature.

It is not surprising therefore that W. Doroszewski who attempted to show Saussure's dependence on Durkheimian sociology has been quite unable to offer convincing textual parallels between passages from the Cours and those taken from Durkheim's writings. Instead of giving at least some suggestive quotations from Durkheim's own work (as we have done at the beginning of this chapter), Doroszewski tries to illustrate Durkheimian principles with the help of quotations from Durkheim's article "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives" of 1898 which emphasizes just those aspects (i.e. representation and coercion) which do not play any tangible rôle in Saussure's theory, and by referring to secondary sources. Doroszewski contends that Saussure's concept of langue corresponds to Durkheim's fait social, since both appear to be a psycho-social phenomenon which exists in the collective conscience of a given community and outside the individual on whom it exercises a constraint. He does not state, of course, that, for Saussure, language is above all a signalling system of communication, something which cannot be paralleled by the Durkheimian concept of fait social which has its sole existence in the minds of members of a social group inasmuch as it exercises constraint on the individual member of the community. Furthermore, Doroszewski, convinced that Saussure received his insights into the nature of language from sociological principles and from other considerations which are basically foreign to linguistics, pushed his argument a step further by suggesting that Saussure's concept of parole had its source in the writings of an opponent of Durkheim's sociological theory, Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904). Surprisingly, Doroszewski provides to all intents and purposes no documentation pertaining to Tarde, and fails to name even one single item of Tarde's writings. In addition, we are astonished to note that the Durkheimian distinction between social and individual should have
been taken up by Saussure in the first place, if he had been so deeply
influenced by Durkheim's ideas, as H. M. Gauger (1970:5) has recently
reiterated. The Saussurean distinction between langue and parole (as
will be shown in chap. 2.2.1) has surely been of pivotal importance for
linguistic theory; it has its source in perennial questions pertaining
to the "inquiry into the mechanism and causes of the still puzzling
phenomenon of language change" (Chomsky, 1966:x). Saussure's influential
dichotomy, we contend, was necessitated by specific linguistic problems
and not by concepts alien to the nature of language and its evolution.
In order to hint at at least a possible source of Saussure's distinction,
we draw attention to the fact that Hermann Paul, whose famous Principles
of the History of Language appeared in 1880 in Leipzig for the first
time, distinguished between "Sprachusus" (langue) and "individuelle
Sprechtätigkeit" (parole) as both De Mauro (1968:350) and, following
him, Mounin (1968:38) have pointed out.

Doroszewski's later disclosure (1958:544; n.3) that he had
received support for his arguments from Louis Caille, a former student
of Saussure's in Geneva, in 1931, who had told him that Saussure followed
with profound interest the philosophical debate between Durkheim and
Tarde, led Godel (SM, 282) to suggest that Saussure's concept of valeur
linguistique and the definition he attributed to it in his final course
on general linguistics (cf. CLG, 159-60) should be compared with the
forms of exchange that Tarde had described in his Psychologie économique
of 1902. In fact, when speaking of money and its value, Tarde refers
to exchangeability as the principal characteristic of the former, and it
appears that Saussure may well have derived some of his insights into
the nature of the language sign from his economic theory. By comparing
these two passages our suggestion may become somewhat more valid:

Tarde observed: "... Quant à l'échange d'une espèce de monnaie
contre une autre espèce de monnaie, de dollars contre des roubles ou
de billets de banque, d'un écu de 5 francs contre des
pièces divisionnaires, il a un caractère tout à fait à part, qui
n'a de commun que le nom avec Saussure, trying to illustrate
how value and signification can
be confused with each other, states:

"Pour répondre à cette question, conстатons d'abord que même en
dehors de la langue, toutes les valeurs semblent régies par ce
l'échange d'une marchandise contre une autre marchandise. L'échange d'une monnaie contre une autre monnaie (d'égale valeur, bien entendu) est un passage du même au même, puisque les deux choses sont identiques en ce qu'elles ont d'essentiel, leur valeur. Mais l'échange d'un tableau contre un piano, ou d'un boeuf contre une armure, est le remplacement d'un genre d'utilité par une utilité tout autre, absolument et essentiellement dissemblable.

(Psychologie économique I, pp. 285-6).

principe paradoxal. Elles sont toujours constituées:
1° par une chose dissemblable susceptible d'être échangée contre celle dont la valeur est à déterminer;
2° par des choses similaires qu'on peut comparer avec celle dont la valeur est en cause.

Ces deux facteurs sont nécessaires pour l'existence d'une valeur. Ainsi pour déterminer ce que vaut une pièce de cinq francs, il faut savoir: 1° qu'on peut l'échanger contre une quantité déterminée d'une chose différente, par exemple du pain; 2° qu'on peut la comparer avec une valeur similaire du même système, par exemple une pièce d'un franc, ou avec une monnaie d'un autre système (un dollar, etc.). (CLG, 159f.; s. CLG(E), 259f.).

Saussure continues that a word can also be exchanged for something dissimilar (dissemblable), an idea, for instance, or another word. The comparison between these two texts evokes at first sight striking similarities, though upon further examination they will turn out to be quite superficial, particularly since a number of the expressions used are the same (e.g. échange(r), valeur, 5 (cinq) francs, dollar(s), monnaie, dissemblable) and since certain examples are similar (e.g. the exchange of franc(s) for dollar(s)). We must point out however, that Saussure specifically used the term 'system' which one might expect to find in Tarde, but in fact the word system does not occur even once in the whole chapter entitled "La monnaie" (281-329), whereas Saussure noted in the paragraph preceding the above quotation that language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results only from the simultaneous presence of the others (CLG, 159). In short, a comparison between these two texts does not allow us to deny that Saussure derived certain terms from social economy; the lexical similarity between the two quotations might even suggest that Saussure actually took them from Tarde, but we are quite safe in arguing that Saussurean linguistic theory does not owe major insights to economics. It is interesting to note how certain myths persist as a result of uncritical acceptance.
1 S. La Partie dogmatique de la philosophie sociale (Paris: Société positiviste d'enseignement populaire supérieur, 1893 = 1st ed., 1839). In this volume Comte appears to have distinguished for the first time between the 'static' and 'dynamic' aspects of sociological matters; s. pp. 254-60 [passim], and also the paper by Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, "'Static' and 'Dynamic' in Sociological Categories", Diogenes 33:28-49 (1961). The question of whether FdS derived his dichotomy of synchrony vs. diachrony from this Comtean distinction will be dealt with in a later chapter (cf. 2.2.2.1).

2 S. the preface to his influential book, Le Suicide (Paris: Alcan, 1897), in which he stated: "Depuis quelque temps la sociologie est à la mode" (p. v).

3 It may well be asked whether this impression has been reinforced by subsequent writings by Saussure's Genevan disciples; e.g. A. Sechehaye noted similar constraints in his paper "La pensée et la langue ou comment concevoir le rapport organique de l'individuel et du social dans la langue", JPs 20, 57-81 (1933), esp. 63-4; repr. in CFS 4, 26-52 (1944). S. also Ch. Bally, "La contrainte sociale dans le langage", RIS 35, 209-29; repr. in his Le Langage et la vie, 3rd ed. (Geneva: Dorz, 1952), 115-32.

4 This is the concluding sentence of his article "Le caractère social du langage et la doctrine de F. de Saussure", JPs 18; 617-24; repr. in Vendryes, 1952:18-25.

5 This apparent lack of understanding of the main tenets outlined in the CLG (which is also characteristic of Meillet; cf. Mounin, 1968: 48-9) can be seen from Vendryes' depreciative remark: "... cet ouvrage posthume, malgré l'abondance de vues qu'il présente, n'est pas un exposé méthodique et complet de linguistique générale" (Vendryes, 1921:4, n.1). See also the remarks of Mounin, 1968:162, note and 176, note, which reveal very similar attitudes expressed by Meillet and Antoine Grégoire.


Cf. Vendryes, 1921:13 where he calls language "le fait social par excellence"; Cohen, *Pour une Sociologie du langage* (Paris: Michel, 1956); Sommerfelt, "Linguistic Structures and the Structure of Social Groups," *Diogène* 51, 186-92 (1965); Benveniste, "Nature du signe linguistique", *AL* 1, 23-9 (1939); repr. in Venveniste, 1966:49-55. For further reference, s. M. Cohen's paper "Structure sociale et structure linguistique," *Diogène* 15, 46-57 (1956). Thus it is also interesting to note that the Russian linguist Mixail Nikolaevič Peterson who had been to Paris in 1925 published a paper "Jazyk kak socialnoe javlenie" [Language as a social phenomenon] the following year in which he drew attention to the apparent relation between the sociological concepts of Durkheim and Tarde and Saussure, as N. A. Sljusareva reports (*CFS* 20:34 [1963]). Similar observations were made by D. N. Vvedenskij in his preface to the Russ. transl. of the CLG (Moscow: "Socekgiz", 1933), 5-30.

In 1894 FdS noted that he had been convinced for several years that linguistics is a double science (SM, 33 and 44-5); s. also Godel, 1968:116.

We are aware, apart from the concluding sentence of the *Cours* whose authenticity has been contested (cf. SM, 119 and 181; De Mauro, 1968:455-6), of what appeared to have been Saussure's affirmation that "la linguistique proprement dite [est] celle dont la langue est unique objet" (CLG, 38-9 in contrast to CLG(E), 58). There exists, however, no document to substantiate the claim that Saussure actually made such a statement although the simple fact that he never provided an outline for the study of parole may point to such a view.

Kukenheim (1966:99) maintains that Durkheim's influence on Meillet and FdS is undeniable; similar statements can be found in Malmberg (1968:70), Ivić (1965:123), Robins (1967:200), Gauger (1970:5), Helbig (1970:33) and others without any textual support.


Interestingly, Durkheim employs the following comparison: "Je ne suis pas obligé de parler français avec mes compatriotes, ni d'employer les monnaies légales; mais il est impossible que je fasse..."
autrement. Si j'essayais d'échapper à cette nécessité, ma tentative échouerait misérablement" (Règles . . . , 5).

14 Ideas of this kind appear to have been widely accepted during the decades following Durkheim's formulations. See, for instance, the following affirmations by his one-time pupil Lucien Levy-Bruhl:

"Les représentations appelées collectives, à ne les définir qu'en gros et sans approfondir, peuvent se reconnaître aux signes suivants: elles sont communes aux membres d'un groupe social donné; elles s'y transmettent de génération en génération; elles s'y imposent aux individus et elles éveillent chez eux, selon le cas, des sentiments de respect, de crainte, d'adoration, etc., pour leurs objets. Elles ne dépendent pas de l'individu pour exister. Non qu'elles impliquent un sujet collectif distinct des individus qui composent le groupe social, mais parce qu'elles se présentent avec des caractères dont on ne peut rendre raison par la seule considération des individus comme tels. C'est ainsi qu'une langue, bien qu'elle n'existe, à proprement parler, que dans l'esprit des individus qui la parlent, n'en est pas moins une réalité sociale indubitable, fondée sur un ensemble de représentations collectives. Car elle s'impose à chacun de ces individus, elle lui préexiste et elle lui survit." (Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures [Paris: F. Alcan, 1910], p. 1).


16 Fds appears in this respect to contradict himself since he clearly observes that linguistic change is caused by parole, the speech (act) of the individual provided that the speech community accepts this innovation changing a 'fait de parole' into a 'fait de langue' (CLG, 138). Sechehaye rejected this notion of langue when he stated (in his paper referred to in note 3): "Nous ne croyons pas que la conception socio- logique de la langue nous oblige à admettre l'existence de cette langue en soi, dont le sujet, en dehors des individus parlants, est inimaginable" (JPs 30:55 [1933]).

17 Apart from the CLG, s. also SM, 257 resp. 274, and LTS, 17 resp. 44.

18 We follow G. Mounin's count according to which there are 138 occurrences of the term 'système' in a corpus of about 100,000 words: s. his article, "La notion de système chez Antoine Meillet", Linguistique 2.1: 17-29; here: p. 24.

19 Once at least Fds makes a statement which approaches what Durkheim meant by "conscience collective", when he notes: "la langue existe dans la collectivité sous la forme d'empreintes déposées dans chaque cerveau" (CLG, 38), an expression which actually appears when Fds distinguishes between synchronic and diachronic linguistics: "La linguistique synchronique
s'occupera des rapports logiques et psychologiques reliant des termes coexistants et formant système, tels qu'ils sont aperçus par la conscience collective" (CLG, 140). Psychology, it would seem, has taken the place of sociology.

20 'Social' and 'individual' are not listed either in SM, 252-81 or the LTS; Godel (1966:482) deplored the fact that the editors had been too careful in "weeding out" every discrepancy and apparent uneveness, thus giving the impression to the reader that the CLG is a "monolithic unity".

21 This book was actually a completely revised ed. of his earlier study, De la Classification des sciences: Etude logique (Geneva & Basle: Georg, 1888), which appeared a few years prior to FdS's appointment to a professorship at Geneva University.

22 There Naville states: "J'appelle sciences psychologiques les sciences qui ont pour objet les lois de la vie psychique." It appears to us that this viewpoint is very close to the Saussurean conception of language; cf. his statement; "Au fond, tout est psychologique dans la langue" (CLG, 21). Naville deals with sociology proper on pp. 103-7.

23 Nouvelle classification . . . (Paris: F. Alcan, 1901), 104; this passage has also been quoted in a footnote by De Mauro, 1968: 318-9.

24 In the subsequent chapters of his book, Naville discusses at length the aspect of social constraint (104-5) - a notion which FdS could have found here if he had had the intention of incorporating this concept into his theory, since he knew this book (cf. LTS, 46 ['signologie']) - before referring to economics as the only, apart from linguistics, truly scientific social science (106-7).

25 Cf. FdS's statement that as a result of the neogrammarian doctrine "on ne vit plus dans la langue un organisme . . ., mais un produit de l'esprit collectif des groupes linguistiques" (CLG, 19).

26 The expression "fait social" occurs several times in the CLG (s. 21, 30, 112), but it is surely not a technical term as the co-occurrence of "fait" with other expressions would suggest, e.g. "faits humains" (33), "fait évolutif" and "fait statique" (129), "fait historique" (112), "fait de grammaire" (168), "le fait de langue" and "le fait de parole" (173), "fait de langue" (139), "fait d'évolution" (138), "faits diachroniques" and "faits synchroniques" (139), to quote only some examples.

27 There are, it is true, passages to be found in the Cours which may suggest the contrary. In the section discussing the question of synchronic and diachronic laws in linguistics Saussure appears to have raised the question of in which way social laws apply to linguistic phenomena, characterizing every social law as governed by two fundamental aspects: they are imperative and general (CLG, 130). However, we can
read in Godel (with regard to this paragraph): "Aucune des deux sources combinées ici [by Bally and Sechehaye] ne parle de lois sociales" (SM, 116; cf. also CLG(E), 203), which means that this reference to socio-logical notions was added by the editors of the CLG. On the following page (CLG, 131) an even more suggestive passage can be found: "La loi synchronique est générale, mais elle n'est pas impérative. Sans doute elle s'impose aux individus par la contrainte de l'usage collectif" (our italics). Consultation of the critical edition, however, reveals that the second half of the sentence had not been added by the editors until the 3rd ed. of the CLG in 1931 (cf. CLG(E), 206), which may also explain why Doroszewski who used the 2nd ed. was quite unable to find a passage suitable to prove his contention. It is conceivable that this emendation had been considered following Doroszewski's paper read in Geneva in August 1931, the full text of which he probably had submitted several months prior to this conference.


31 S. Doroszewski, op. cit., 90-1. He affirms: "Le rigorisme de la notion de la 'langue' est durkheimien, les concessions faites au facteur individuel, à la 'parole' tiennent des idées de Tarde. Ceci paraît digne d'être souligné" (91). Lepschy (1970:47-8) takes a mid-way position, deploring at the same time that no research has been done to explore these claims when he states: "Without necessarily subscribing to this, it may be pointed out that this distinction [between langue and parole] appears to be of a general methodological (rather than specifically linguistic) value, insofar as it represents the process of abstraction which is necessary to any scientific procedure."

32 Doroszewski (b. 1899) has not added anything during the past forty years to fill this lacuna.

33 See Doroszewski, loc. cit. (cf. n.31).

34 2 vols. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1902); Godel (SM, 282) refers to vol. I, 285-6 and 289. As for Godel, he appears to be at least partly convinced of Doroszewski's contentions: "Il est clair que l'opposition langue:parole n'est pas simplement celle du signe et du son [!], de la langue et de la phonation [!]. Mais davantage celle du fait social et du fait individuel", (SM, 146). It is quite unthinkable that FdS should ever have uttered anything similar to the first two statements.
1.2.1.2 Walras' Theories of Political Economy and the Saussurean Concept of Value

Recently, Jean Piaget (1968:17) and J.-C. Pariente (1969:20), who both claim *en passant* that Saussure was influenced by Durkheim (and Tarde), have asserted that he was definitely inspired by political economy in the development of his notion of a synchronic equilibrium of the language system (Piaget) and the dichotomy between synchrony and diachrony (Pariente). However, neither of the two has attempted to give evidence for their assertions.

It is true that Saussure did make reference to the duality between the political economy and economic history found in recently published books (CLG, 115) in his chapter "La linguistique statique et la linguistique évolutive" (CLG, 114ff). Significantly the first section of this chapter is entitled "Dualité interne de toutes les sciences opérant sur les valeurs" (114-7). However, Saussure does not expand on this parallel (cf. also SM, 230-51), and it appears that Pariente (1969:20) was the first to suggest an influence from the writings of Leon Walras (1834-1910), the head of the influential Lausanne School of Economics, whose *Eléments d'économie politique pure* ran through four editions between 1874 and 1900.1

Here too, although we would find that technical use has been made of "value",2 but not in a sense which would allow us to relate Walras' concept of 'value in exchange' (*valeur d'échange*) with the Saussurean definition of *valeur*, Saussure does seem to have derived this term from political economy as the following statements in the *Cours* would suggest. After affirming that linguistics, like political economy, is confronted with the notion of value, he emphasizes that both have to do with a system of equivalences between things of different orders, illustrating this in the following manner: "dans l'une [i.e. political economy] un travail et un salaire, dans l'autre [i.e. linguistics] un signifié et un signifiant" (CLG, 115; CLG(E), 177). In both sciences, Saussure asserts, as for all others which operate on (a system of) values, the distinction between the axis of simultaneity and the axis of succession imposes itself
on the theorist. As economic theory distinguishes between economic history and political economy, so linguistics has to distinguish between the discipline which studies the evolution of linguistic patterns and the other which analyzes language stages. It is with the latter aspect that Saussure is predominantly concerned since only from a synchronic point of view can language rightly be interpreted as a "système de pures valeurs que rien ne détermine en dehors de l'état momentane de ses termes" (CLG, 116).

Godel, though affirming that Saussure made use of the term 'valeur' from 1908 onwards (SM, 235), believes that it is not an altogether established fact that Saussure took this term from the social or economic sciences. We believe that it would be quite unrealistic not to assume that Saussure was well aware of though not necessarily influenced by findings of other fields of scientific investigation and debate outside his own particular field. 3

As for the term 'value', we are quite safe in assuming that Saussure borrowed it from economics, but the special interpretation he attaches to this expression is definitely his own. 4 It was he who suggested a new science to study systems of arbitrarily fixed (and in this respect 'social') values (signs) and for which he coined the term semiozogie (cf. CLG, 33; LTS, 47). We could, once again, quote a passage from Tarde which appears to support the contention of those who stress the influence of sociological notions on Saussurean linguistics: "Entendue dans son acceptation la plus strictement économique, l'idée de valeur comporte un sens individuel et un sens social, distincts l'un à l'autre". 5 For those who approach Saussure's Cours with preconceived ideas about the origin of the linguistic theory developed there such a quotation might seem appealing, since it contains the term of value and also the opposition of social versus individual. The continuation of this citation, however, would show that there are, besides terminological parallels, no similarities in the implication of these terms in a given theoretical framework. 6

We have until now not mentioned quite a different possible source for the term valeur in Saussure's Cours and his comparison of value (which usually pertains to words) with money (often to illustrate its
arbitrary character). There appears to be quite a long tradition of comparing words with coins of (social) exchange (cf. also Micolau, 1970: 26-7). This comparison was for instance made by the Italian philologist Lionardo Salviati (1539-89) in his *Avvertimenti della lingua sopra il Decamerone* of 1584, as R. Engler has recently shown (1970:66). Similarly, August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) employed this metaphor in his famous *Observations sur la langue et la littérature provençales* of 1818 (cf. Kruszewski in *IZAS* 3:161, n.2 [1887], and Arens, 1969:190 for two relevant quotations). We do not intend to carry this suggestion further, although there are reasons to believe that Saussure, who was familiar with European literature from the classical period until the 19th century (cf. his anagrams), was aware of this *topos*.

To conclude, we should like to emphasize that, while it cannot be seriously denied that Saussure was aware of the principles, developments and findings of other (social) sciences, no proof can be furnished, as has frequently been pointed out by historians of linguistics, that Saussure was actually exposed to and dependent on theoretical concepts derived from areas other than linguistics and extraneous to the subject matter of linguistic analysis. On the contrary, as will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapters of our study, Saussure received his insights into the nature of language almost exclusively from contemporary writings devoted to linguistic problems which his genius was able to systematize in a manner hitherto only paralleled by the linguistic theories of Pāṇini two and a half millenia ago.

In fine, we can claim that there is not a single text from either Saussure himself or from lecture notes taken by his students which mentions the names of Durkheim, Tarde, or Walras who have been suggested by historians of linguistics as having influenced Saussure.
1st ed. (Lausanne: Rouge; Paris: Pichon; Basel: Georg, 1874); 2nd part 1877; 2nd ed. (Lausanne: Rouge; Paris: Pichon; Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1889); 3rd ed. (ibid., 1896); 4th ed. (ibid., 1900); the 'édition definitive' appeared in 1926, an E. transl. of which, with annotations and collations from the previous editions, was prepared by William Jaffe, and appeared under the title Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth (Homewood, Ill.: Richard & Irwin, 1954), 620 pp. S. also the following two studies by Walras: Théorie de la monnaie (Lausanne: Corbaz, 1886), and Études d'économie politique appliquée (Lausanne: Rouge; Paris: Pichon, 1898).

2 We quote from the E. transl. listed in fn. 1: "Value in exchange is a property, which certain things possess, of not being given or taken freely, but of being bought and sold, that is, of being received and conveyed in return for other things in definite quantitative proportions" (83; s. also pp. 498, n.1; 499, n.6 [for additional explanation by the editor], and 178, n.1 [added by Walras in 1900]).

3 In this context it is interesting to note that Ernest Muret (1861-1940), a former pupil and later colleague of Saussure's, reports in his obituary of the latter that Saussure, while delivering his lectures on general linguistics (1907-11), fulfilled the functions of the librarian of the Faculty of Letters and Social Sciences at Geneva University "avec la conscience scrupuleuse qu'il mettait à toute chose" (FdS 1857-1913, 46) a hint which, we believe, would underscore two assertions: first, Saussure had already been exposed, through his obligations as a librarian, to writings dealing with the social sciences; and second, Saussure, scrupulous as he was, would have acknowledged his debt to anybody from whom he had derived particular insights into his own linguistic theory (as he did in the case of Whitney and a number of other scholars), an aspect of FdS's character which has recently been stressed by Godel (1968:116-7).

4 In this connection it is interesting to note that A. Naville stated in his Nouvelle classification of 1901 (already referred to earlier in chap. 1.2.2: "Des innobrables sciences sociologiques desirables, une seule, outre la linguistique, semble s'approcher d'une constitution vraiment scientifique - c'est l'économique" (106).

5 This quotation is taken from the chapter entitled "Les prix (théorie de la valeur)" in Tarde's Psychologie économique (Paris: F. Alcan, 1902) II, 11-56; here p. 12.
In fact, the quotation continues as follows: "... et, dans chacun de ces sens, il faut distinguer deux aspects opposés et juxtaposés de cette idée, suivant qu'elle suppose une lutte ou une alliance de désirs et de jugements" (ibid.). A certain number of other writings by Tarde could invite further research into possible parallels between social theory and Saussurean linguistic terminology: s., for instance, his book *Les Lois sociales*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1902). Passages from Tarde's treatise, *L'Opposition universelle: Essai d'une théorie des contraires* (ibid., 1897), esp. 304-12 (where he cites from the works of Raoul de la Grasserie [1839-1914], Archibald Henry Sayce [1846-1933], and others) or from his *Lois de l'imitation*, 2nd ed. (ibid., 1895), esp. 277-87 (in which he stresses the importance of the individual or the family in bringing about linguistic changes), may suggest the reverse picture, i.e. that Tarde drew much information from linguistics.
1.3 The Question of Linguistic Influences on Saussure

Es ist ... schon schwer geworden, im einzelnen Fälle immer die Stelle anzugeben, von wo neue Anregungen ausgingen oder neue Einsichten zuerst verbreitet worden sind.

Gustav Gröber in 1904
(quoted from Kukenheim, 1966:247)

La meilleure manière de procéder serait de prendre les expositions dont se servent les bons linguistes quand ils parlent de phénomènes statiques, et de voir les erreurs et les illusions qu'elles contiennent.

Saussure in an interview with Albert Riedlinger in January 1909 (cf. SM, 29)

Jusqu'à présent on a considéré Saussure surtout d'une façon ahistorique, c'est-à-dire, dans ses rapports avec la linguistique ultérieure, en tant que point de départ d'une nouvelle linguistique, et non pas en tant que point final d'une tradition, c'est-à-dire, dans ses rapports avec la linguistique antérieure.

Eugenio Coseriu (1967b:100)

The present section of this study, devoted to the discussion of linguistic influences on Saussure, is intended to substantiate two of our principal claims regarding the genesis of Saussure's linguistic theory. First, we believe that it is much more valid to trace linguistic influences on Saussure than to investigate extra-linguistic sources. The latter appear to have made their impact on Saussure rather through linguistic studies which had absorbed ideas from outside linguistics proper. We may recall Schleicher's adaption of Hegelian philosophy and Darwinian principles of evolution in the formation of his linguistic theory or Steinthal's psychologism which had its main source in Herbart. Secondly, we maintain that the immediate sources of Saussure's inspiration are
to be found in the linguistic work of his predecessors and his contemporaries in the second half of the 19th century rather than in the theories put forward in previous centuries as Jakobson (1965), Robins (1967), Coseriu (1967a), and others have suggested. This does not mean that those influences can be denied. There are in fact indications that certain aspects of Saussure's linguistic theory owe some insights to the Greeks, perhaps not so much to the modistae (who were almost completely ignored during the 19th century), but possibly to the ideas of the 17th and 18th century philosophers of language and the theories of the Indian grammarians, notably Pāṇini, which were rediscovered towards the end of the 18th century.

The chapters of this section are arranged in mutatis mutandis, a chronological order which suggests, at the same time, a certain dependence by the neogrammarians on the principles of language study put forward by Whitney, the influence on the linguists working at Kazan, of the Junggrammatiker, notably Paul and Sievers but also Delbrück, Leskien, Brugmann and Osthoff, Karl Verner and Saussure (who, except for Saussure, are only mentioned in passing in the present investigation), and finally the fact that principles advocated by Gabelentz and Finck, for instance, had been largely anticipated in the writings of Whitney, the neogrammarians, Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski, and, of course, by linguists following the Humboldtian tradition.
1.3.1 Whitney and the Consideration of General Linguistic Problems

"... des différentes tentatives qui pour la première fois tendaient entre les années 1860 et 1870 à dégager < de la somme des > résultats accumulés < par > la grammaire comparée [ ] quelque chose de général < sur le langage >, toutes étaient avortées < ou sans valeur d'ensemble >, sauf celle de Whitney, qui au premier coup était dans la direction juste, et n'a besoin aujourd'hui que d'être patiemment suivi. Il est en date le premier qui < ait su > pas tirer des conclusions absurdes sur le Langage de l'oeuvre de la gram[maire]."

F. de Saussure in 1894
(from a hitherto unpublished ms. [N 10, p. 4 (cf. SM, 37)])

"The first American book on general linguistics, William Dwight Whitney's Language and the Study of Language (1867), may fairly be regarded as marking the dawn of a new era. It probably succeeded better than any earlier European book on the subject in basing itself on real linguistic data rather than abstract speculations."

Franklin Edgerton in 1943 (PAPA 87:25)

It is curious to observe that many historians of linguistics have overlooked something which appears to be most obvious. There are three explicit references in the *Cours* to the great American 19th century linguist Whitney (CLG, 18, 26, 110), but, by contrast, not a single reference to Durkheim. Nevertheless, the list of those who claim that Durkheim influenced Saussure is far longer than the number of suggestions that Whitney might have had some impact on Saussure's linguistic thought. Since Doroszewski's first statement of 1931 it has almost become an opinio communis not needing to be checked or proved that Saussure was deeply influenced by Durkheimian sociology (cf. Kacnel'son, 1941:67; Graur/Wald, 1965:111; Kukenheim, 1966:99; Robins, 1967:200; Dinneen, 1967:192-5; Malmberg, 1968:70, and others).¹ Some linguists maintain that Saussure was influenced by Durkheim as well as by Whitney (e.g. Ivić, 1965:122-3; Mounin, 1968:21-4); Mounin made a number of allusions pertaining to Whitney's importance on Saussure in an earlier study (1967: 6, 15, 216, 220-1), but did not attempt to give evidence for his contention.
When preparing his monograph of 1968 he consulted De Mauro's 1967 study which for the first time attempted to present all external and textual facts available with regard to Saussure's acquaintance with Whitney's work (s. De Mauro, 1968:299-301, 323-4, 327-9, 352-3). But although he generally based his study on De Mauro's findings, Mounin did not make any serious attempt to supply more concrete references to Whitney, whom he mentioned quite frequently in his work on Saussure (1968:17, 22, 24, 52, 114), also reproducing the passage from the Cours (110-1) which shows Whitney's impact on Saussure's reasoning (1968:113) without any comment, perhaps simply because De Mauro does not give any quotation from Whitney's writings either.

This state of affairs is all the more surprising if we note that Godel's dissertation appeared in 1957, in other words many years before the 'histories' of linguistics by Kukenheim, Malmberg, Mounin and others and similar monographs were written, a study in which Durkheim is only mentioned in an addendum (SM, 282). Mounin for example, who does not seem to have ever seriously consulted this work, takes just this reference to state that Godel was right in stressing particularly the rôle which Saussure attributed to the notion of value in semantics (!) having in mind those forms of exchange which Tarde had described in his Psychologie économique of 1902 (Mounin, 1968:26). Had Mounin looked inside the Sources Manuscrites, he would have found that on those occasions when Godel deals with the social aspect of language (SM, 142-59), Whitney is mentioned quite frequently (s. SM, 143, 144, 147, 148, 152, 158), but passages treating the problem of value (SM 167, 172, 235-45 [passim]) do not name Tarde or any other sociologist.

It is therefore gratifying to see that, more recently, linguists have tended to be more cautious when relating the traditional claim that Saussure is said to have developed the distinction between langue and parole in his attempt to reconcile the contrasting views of Durkheim and Tarde (cf. De Mauro, 1969:116; Lepschy, 1970:47-8). But it is even more important to find in Arens the clear statement that Saussure was not dependent on Durkheim though he acknowledges similarities between their theories (1969:467). This affirmation appears to be indirectly
supported by R. Engler's recent article on Saussure in which he analyzes not only various aspects of Saussure's semiological theory but also passages in the three monographs by A. Naville devoted to a classification of the sciences (already referred to in the previous chapter; s. 1.2.2). Engler points out that the third version of Naville's *Classification des sciences*\(^2\) of 1920 contained for the first time an explicit reference to Durkheim (Engler, 1970:63). In fact, the passage on semiology, which was contained in the *Nouvelle classification des sciences* (1901:104), had been eliminated and apparently replaced by a reference to Durkheim whose conception of language however Naville rejects (1920:139). Barilli's recent reaffirmation of the traditional view that Saussure's *langue* is in perfect correspondence with Durkheim (1968:238), it would seem, makes it necessary to show in detail in which way Saussure was inspired by Whitney's ideas by providing textual evidence of their relationship which regrettably has not been attempted in any work hitherto published. Godel's 1957 monograph, it is true, makes frequent reference to Whitney's writings (s. note 20) without, however, quoting the relevant passages; Godel's 1966 paper on Saussure again stresses Whitney's importance in the development of Saussurean linguistics, but fails to provide convincing support of his contention (s. Godel, 1966:479-80).

This regrettable state of affairs is all the more surprising when we note that Sechehaye drew attention to Saussure's early acquaintance with Whitney's work as early as in 1917 in an extensive analysis of the *Cours*.\(^3\) Forty years later Godel, having Sechehaye's assertions in mind, contends: "... il n'est pas sûr que les livres de Whitney aient fait grand bruit à Leipzig: Saussure a pu ne les connaître qu'un peu plus tard" (SM, 33). Godel adds that Sechehaye's use of "sans doute" in his statement constitutes a conjecture and an assumption rather than an affirmation of something he had learned from Saussure himself (SM, 33, n.35), as has recently been assumed by De Mauro (1968:299). However, in view of the fact that Godel has reiterated his contention (1966:479), we shall give what we believe to be external evidence for our assertion that Saussure had already come to know Whitney's publications at Leipzig, where he had moved in 1876. Whitney's first book appeared in 1867;
his *Language and the Study of Language* ran through five editions until 1885, was reviewed by Wilhelm Clemm in 1869 (*KZ* 18:119-25), and German and English adaptations were published in 1874 followed by a Dutch translation of two volumes in 1877-81. In 1874 Julius Jolly (1849-1932), who prepared the German adaptation, wrote an article devoted to Whitney as a Sanskritist and general linguist (*GGA*, 205-18), and in 1875 Wilhelm Scherer (1841-86), who was familiar with Whitney's study of 1867 when he wrote his influential *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache* (Berlin 1868), published a review of *Die Sprachwissenschaft* in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (35:106-11). But Whitney's second book on general linguistic problems had already appeared in 1875, in New York and London under the title of *The Life and Growth of Language* and in Paris in a French version, *La Vie du langage*. In the same year Whitney published a lengthy article, apparently the only one he was ever to write in German, "Streitfragen der heutigen Sprachphilosophie", in which, after having outlined his own views, he severely criticized the attitude of the linguistic public in accepting without question the erroneous theories about the nature of language put forward by the "authorities", i.e. Schleicher, Steinthal, Renan, and Max Müller. In 1876, when Saussure arrived at Leipzig University, his teacher August Leskien, whose courses on Slavonic and Lithuanian he attended regularly (s. *CFS* 17:21), had just prepared the German translation of Whitney's *Life and Growth of Language*, a book which was soon translated into Italian (1876), Dutch (1879), Swedish (1880), and apparently also Russian. The "Bibliographische Notizen für die Jahre, 1875-1877", published in the same volume, in which Verner's famous paper on exceptions to the First Germanic Consonant Shift appeared (*KZ* 23:602-22), carried so many items by Whitney that they could not have escaped Saussure's notice, and if we add that his friend Brugmann (as well as a number of other young scholars at Leipzig) acknowledged later his indebtedness to Whitney and the support he drew from his writings in the seventies, we believe that it can be sufficiently established that Saussure had read Whitney quite early in his academic career.

Incidentally, when Saussure studied Sanskrit and Indian philology at the University of Berlin (1878/79) with Hermann Oldenberg (1854-1920)
and Heinrich Zimmer (1851-1910), the latter of the two scholars was engaged in preparing the German translation of Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar both of which appeared in Leipzig in 1879. Since his Mémoire had appeared in December 1878, Saussure was free to start on his doctoral dissertation, De l'emploi du génitif absolu en sanscrit, during his stay at Berlin University, a study in which he made an explicit reference to Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar in the "Note Bibliographique" (Cf. Recueil, 272), and which he defended in February 1880.

In 1964, Emile Benveniste noted that Saussure had commented in his course on Gothic at the University of Paris (1885/86) that he had carried the scientific study of this language further than had generally been done and that he had also offered "quelques leçons consacrées à des généralités sur la méthode linguistique et la vie du langage" (AnnEPHE 1964/65, p. 62), and Benveniste observed that the last expression is the title of Whitney's book whose third edition, we may add, appeared in 1880 when Saussure arrived in Paris. While others analyze Whitney's major work as emphasizing the importance "de l'élément individuel, social et économique, trois facteurs qui régissent la langue, moyen de communication" (Kukenheim, 1966:84) without drawing any relation between Whitney and Saussure, a number of linguists content themselves to note that Saussure was acquainted with La Vie du langage (e.g. Iordan/Alvar, 1967:540, n.38; Loja, 1968:103). Similarly, we are surprised to note that M. Leroy gives the following characterization of Whitney's work without being aware of the rapport between him and Saussure, to whom he devotes much space (1963:63-74, and elsewhere):

Whitney, opposé à tout mysticisme, considérerait le langage (dont la fonction répond à un besoin de communication) comme une institution humaine et les mots comme des signes conventionnels. (1963:39)

This apparent lack of familiarity with Saussure's (and/or Whitney's) work or want of awareness of the all too obvious similarities between their doctrines is characteristic of many historians of linguistics. Others, however, feel themselves free to claim the dependence of Saussure on Whitney in the development of a number of his linguistic concepts.
without feeling at the same time the need for any textual evidence (e.g. Mounin, 1967:6, 15, 177, 216, 220-1; 1968: 17, 22, 24, 52, 57, and elsewhere), a procedure which culminates in T. Bolelli's assertions apparently based on findings put forward by A. B. Terracini many years before him and not his own. His contentions may be summarized as follows: 1) The development of language poses a question about the relationship between the individual and the speech community, the innovating force of the individual and the conservative force of the community. Besides this observation about the nature of language which was important to Saussure other aspects of Whitney's doctrine come to mind; 2) the affirmation that language is a system; 3) his view of morphological opposition in language, and 4) as a result of the implications of a naturalistic and positivistic viewpoint, the attempt to study language for itself as an autonomous entity. Since Bolelli does not supply sufficient evidence for his claims nor offer any reference to the Saussurean Cours or other more recently published texts from Saussure's pen, it will be the task of the subsequent paragraphs of this chapter to demonstrate Whitney's influence on Saussurean linguistic thought. By contrast with other linguists of his time whose work might have had some impact on Saussure his relationship with and high regard for Whitney is comparatively well documented, i.e. there exist manuscripts from Saussure himself and notes from his students taken during his lectures on general linguistics which give sufficient evidence for the fact that Saussure was well acquainted with Whitney's work.

A number of references to Whitney can be found in Saussure's own papers. The most important document in this respect is a manuscript which Saussure wrote in November/December 1894 in response to an invitation by the American Philological Association to give an appreciation of Whitney "as a comparative philologist" for a congress which was to take place in Philadelphia on December 28th of that same year in commemoration of Whitney who had died on June 7, 1894 (cf. SM, 32). This request appears to have given Saussure ample opportunity to give an account of Whitney's contribution to linguistic science and at the same time to clarify his own standpoint concerning the nature of language.
Regrettably, (as mentioned previously) Saussure never completed his article probably because, meticulous as he was, 1) he could not support the idea that Whitney actually had been a comparative philologist, and 2) he did not have enough time for completion of this task (he had received the invitation on November 10, 1894). This manuscript of some seventy pages has not yet been published, although excerpts appeared in 1954 (CFS 12:59-65) and a tentative analysis has been made by Godel (SM, 43-6, and elsewhere). 18

Another explicit reference to Whitney can be found in another hitherto unpublished manuscript of seven pages of an uncomplete review of Sechehaye's *Programme et méthodes de la linguistique théorique* of 1908 which has also been analyzed by Godel (SM, 51-2). On the first page of this manuscript Saussure had noted: "L'Americain Whitney, que je révère, n'a jamais dit un seul mot, sur les mêmes sujets [i.e. the theory and method of linguistic science], qui ne fût juste", adding, "mais comme tous les autres [linguists past and present], il ne songe pas que la langue ait besoin d'une systématique" (SM, 51). This quotation summarizes well Saussure's attitude towards Whitney: on the one hand Saussure acknowledges Whitney's contributions to linguistics, and on the other he states clearly his reserve and criticism.

The third source is, of course, the *Cours* (18, 26, 110), and especially Engler's critical edition (cf. CLG(E), 14-6, 33-4, 168-9 and elsewhere); the last mentioned reference to Whitney in the *Cours* reveals that Bally and Sechehaye must have based the published text of CLG, 110 almost exclusively on Saussure's manuscript on Whitney of 1894, a fact which appears to have escaped Godel's notice (cf. SM, 116). 19

The most valuable secondary source is unquestionably Godel's 1957 dissertation, and though he hardly ever quotes from Whitney, he has provided a number of suggestions which we cannot ignore. 20 In fact, Whitney appears to be the only predecessor of Saussure whom Godel had studied closely; linguists such as Brugmann, Delbrück, Paul, G. von der Gabelentz, and others have been passed over in silence. But we cannot reproach Godel for these lacunae, since the objective of his monograph was a reassessment of Saussure's original thought and not a history of
linguistic ideas. Interestingly, Gödel makes no reference to the French version of Whitney's *Life and Growth of Language* (LGL), but only to the English original and the earlier *Language and the Study of Language* (LSL), a procedure which we shall not always follow although it appears that Saussure used the English texts in class quoting from them for illustration of his own views. In a number of cases in which we shall attempt to relate Whitney's statements to formulations by Saussure *La Vie du langage* (*Vie*) is referred to.

In his notes on Whitney of 1894, Saussure expressed his approval of a number of suggestions put forward by the American linguist and also made several criticisms. Since this article, which was intended as an appreciation of Whitney's views, was never completed and contains many erasures, incomplete sentences, lacunae, and lacks organisation, we cannot follow the text too closely but have to structure the contents according to what we believe to be the major issues. Despite their somewhat fragmentary nature we can nevertheless extract from these notes a number of ideas and statements which are very germane to our present discussion.

Firstly, there is a favorable general view of Whitney's work. Saussure notes that the impersonal and broad approach characteristic of Whitney's work gives the impression that the ideas expressed in it were already common knowledge (1894:1a), but stresses that his ideas were influential on the younger generation of linguists (p. 2a). Indeed Saussure believes that Whitney was the first generalizer of linguistic facts who did not draw absurd conclusions regarding language from the work of (comparative?) grammar (p. 4), and he praises two aspects of Whitney's work: good generalizations concerning language and a sound method (p. 5). Unfortunately Saussure never expatiated on this very interesting aspect of Whitney's linguistic thought. Saussure - as Whitney had done before him - ridicules particularly the views of Schleicher according to whom language was a living organism (p. 6; cf. *CFS* 12:59) and praises Whitney for his matter-of-fact approach. However, Saussure notes his reserves vis-à-vis Whitney:

*L'impression générale qui se dégage des ouvrages <linguistiques [crossed out]> de Whitney est qu'il suffit du <bon [crossed out]>
changed, by free human action" (LSL, 152), and that "speech is strictly a social institution" (437). In another section of his book Whitney is even more explicit on the social aspect of language:

Language is an institution founded in man's social nature, wrought out for the satisfaction of his social wants; and hence, while individuals are the sole ultimate agents in the formation and modification of every word and meaning of a word, it is still the community that makes and changes its language. (LSL, 177)

It should be added that Whitney employs speech and language as synonymous terms; the following quotation might otherwise be easily misunderstood: "Speech is not a personal possession, but a social; it belongs not to the individual but to the member of society" (LSL, 404). The driving force of human expression is a person's social needs and instincts; a solitary man would never "frame a language" (ibid.). In fact, Whitney (rightly) observes, exclusion from "the ordinary intercourse of man with man" (405) would ultimately lead to loss of speech. The social aspect of language is in fact a crucial element in Whitney's work (cf. also LSL, 48, 400; LGL, 280, 309), but Saussure (CLG, 26) criticized him in that he did not see the special character of language which makes it distinct from other social institutions, excluding writing (FdS, 1894:17 = CFS 12:60), since there is no such relation between the nature of things and their expression, so to speak:

Les autres institutions, en effet, < sont toutes > fondées < à des degrés divers > sur les rapports NATURELS, < sur une convenance entre > des choses comme principe < final > . Par exemple, le droit d'une nation, ou le système politique, ou même la mode de son costume, ... (1894:17 = CFS 12:60 = CLG(E), 168).

Saussure explains that all changes and innovations in these institutions have their source in the human mind, whereas he emphasizes that language and writing are not based on a natural relation between things (cf. 1894:18 = loc. cit.). For Saussure language is not only "une institution pure" (as Whitney pointed out frequently), but more particularly an institution sans analogue (ibid.; cf. Chomsky, 1968:59ff.).

These observations are relevant to another aspect of (the nature of) language which Saussure mentions, but does not seem to attribute to Whitney:
Although we are, at the present point, more particularly concerned with Whitney, and Saussure's reactions to his ideas, it is important to note even en passant how advanced Saussure's own ideas were at that time on the nature of general linguistic theory. In his notes he 1) stressed the necessity for refraining from any analogy outside the field of language when discussing its real nature, 2) envisaged, on the other hand, language as representing nothing but "un cas particulier de la Théorie des Signes" (1894:38a = CFS 12:64) - even the term 'sémio logie' is used in a familiar sense ("la si complexe nature de la sémio logie particuliè re dite langage" [1894:31]), 3) pointed out that he had fostered "depuis bien des années cette conviction que la linguistique est une science double" (p. 14a),23 4) expressed his conviction that relationships between linguistic elements would one day be described "par des formules mathématiques" (1894:9).24

Secondly, we believe that there are in particular three aspects of Whitney's observations about the nature of language which deserve lengthier discussion: 1) language as a social institution, 2) the nature of the language sign, and 3) the relation between the individual and the linguistic community. Finally, a number of further notions and terms to be found in Whitney's work will be discussed in view of their possible influence on Saussure's linguistic terminology and theoretical arguments, e.g. "[social] intercourse", langue vs. langage, system, value, zéro.

Saussure, when relating these views on the nature of language generally held in the 19th century, was struck by Whitney's affirmation that language is an institution, a statement which "a changé l'axe de la linguistique" (1894:17 = CFS 12:60). It is not necessary to recall the opinions profounded by Max Müller, Schleicher, Steínhal and others to indicate that Whitney's views on language deviated essentially from the vistas of his time. As early as in 1867 he pointed out that language "is not a physical product, but a human institution, preserved, perpetuated, and
language as a system of signs (1894:38) and a particular semiology (31). In fact, Whitney had observed that "the true nature of language [is to be seen] as a system of arbitrary signs for thought" (LSL, 410), and that even "the most perfect system of signs, the most richly developed language, leads only to partial comprehension" (LSL, 111).

It is because the Cours (110) records a particular mention of Whitney in connection with the arbitrariness of the language sign (a reference which is actually based on Saussure's unfinished article of 1894, cf. CLG(E), 168-9), that the nature of the linguistic sign has to be discussed here. According to the Cours, Whitney made a connection between the nature of language as a social institution and the arbitrary character of the linguistic sign. It is worth pointing out that Whitney emphasized repeatedly that the signs are arbitrary (cf. LSL, 14, 32, 71, 102, 410, 438; LGL, 19, 24, 48, 77, 282; Vie 15, 20, 40-1, 65, 232) in the sense that there exists no natural tie between the word and the object it signifies. Characteristically, in most of Whitney's formulations we find that "arbitrary" and "conventional" occur in the same extended collocation (e.g. LSL, 14, 32); the conventionality of words is simply explained by the fact that they are made up by the speakers and are not inherent in the things they denote. In the process of language acquisition Whitney holds, "every vocable was to us an arbitrary and conventional sign; arbitrary because any one of the thousand other vocables could have been just as easily learned by us and associated with the same idea; conventional, because the one we acquired had its sole ground and sanction in the consenting usage of the community of which we formed a part" (LSL, 14; cf. LGL, 19; Vie, 15). The only bond connecting words with their meanings are mental associations which are established when learning a given language (LSL, 14, 71, 128, 409-10). It is interesting to note that Saussure appears to summarize Whitney's ideas when he wrote in 1894: "< Il suffit de dire que la force des signes est de sa nature conventionnelle, de sa nature arbitraire, de sa nature indépendante des réalités qu'ils désignent, pour voir que ce n'est pas du tout là, dans le bagage de l'humanité, un article comparable à d'autres [ ]" (p. 13a). In fact Saussure here draws rigorous conclusions from ideas
put forward quite unsystematically in Whitney's work in anticipation of his lectures on general linguistics in which he established the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign as an important principle of synchronic linguistics (cf. CLG, 100f.).

In the same manuscript, Saussure frequently uses the term "symbol" (cf. CLG, 101) for what he later consistently called "sign" (1894:13) and seems to have distinguished between idea and sign (12), as did Whitney who characterized words as "not exact models of ideas" but "merely signs for ideas" (LSL, 20; s. also 32, 70-1, 111; cf. Firth's "substitution-counters" [PiL, 20f.]). At first sight it appears as if Whitney was suggesting the Saussurean dichotomy between signifié and signifiant (CLG, 99, 144), and indeed Saussure's early distinction between image acoustique and concept (CLG, 28, 98) is rather close to the contrast made by Whitney; Saussure did not introduce the signifié/signifiant distinction before his third course (1910/11) which makes up the language sign (s. SM, 105; CLG, 99). As for the semantics of the arbitraire we can observe a similar evolution in Saussure's terminology. For Whitney the arbitrary nature of the sign ( = word, vocable) was seen in the fact that (at its origin at least) any such sign could designate a given object or express a given idea.27 In his final understanding of the arbitraire Saussure was no longer concerned with the object designated by the sign, but with the relation between the meaning ("signification") of a language sign and the combination of sounds to which it is attached (cf. CLG, 100).

Both concepts, however, the bilateral character and the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, have their source in Whitney, though Saussure developed his ideas further towards a theory of signs, a semiology, already hinted at in 1894, then outlined in 1901 (in Naville's Nouvelle Classification), and ultimately put forward in his lectures on general linguistics (cf. CLG, 33-5, 100ff., 107, 111).

The third major point in Whitney's understanding of the nature of language is the relation between the individual (speaker) and the (speech) community. On this subject, Godel makes frequent references to Whitney in his lengthy discussion of Saussure's langue/parole dichotomy (SM, 142-159). According to Whitney all changes within language have their
ultimate source in the 'work' of individuals (cf. LSL, 36ff., 123-4, 125, 148, 154-5, 404); however, the individual's influence is generally rather weak, and nothing will be incorporated in the language unless the speech community approves of it and accepts it. The manner in which individual and community interact in bringing about language development is explained by Whitney as follows:

Speech and the changes of speech are the work of the community; but the community cannot act except through the initiative of its individual members, which it follows or rejects. (LSL, 45; cf. also ibid., 123, 148, 404)

In his book of 1875 Whitney stated explicitly that the "community's share in the work [of language-making] is dependent on and conditioned by the simple fact that language is not an individual possession, but a social" (LGL, 149). Here we note the opposition of social versus individual which Saussure was to use in order to make a distinction between langue and parole (cf. CLG, 30), and which in the history of linguistics is traditionally traced back to sociological theories or their originators, in particular Durkheim and Tarde. It is doubtful, however, whether Whitney, in spite of this use of the dichotomy, in some way anticipated Saussure's concept of parole (which he did not introduce before 1908), and we say this despite Terracini's (1949:108) suggestion. Strangely enough, Whitney never distinguished clearly between speech and language but employed these terms synonymously (cf. LSL, 400 vs. 437). On the other hand, however, Whitney appears to have been quite close to Saussure's interpretation of langue when he defined language as "a system of sounds with intelligible content" (LSL, 49) and this is reinforced by Whitney's claim that language "has, in fact, no existence save in the minds and mouths of those who use it" (LSL, 35). In this context it would perhaps be relevant to refer to Saussure's definitions (of which incidentally there are several) of language to be found in the Cours to support our claim, and we would draw particular attention to his frequent affirmation that language is a system of (arbitrary) signs (cf. CLG, 33, 106, 116), that it is a social fact (21), something learned and conventional (25) created and furnished by the collectivity (27), etc. On the other hand,
we note that he stated that basically "tout est psychologique dans la langue" (CLG, 21) and that linguistic signs are essentially psychical in nature (32).

The above argument concerning the influence on Saussure of these three major aspects of Whitney's linguistic views (i.e. 1) language as a social institution, 2) the nature of the language sign, and 3) the relation between the individual and the community in language) does touch upon other questions raised in connection with Whitney's influence on Saussure, in particular the distinction between la langage and la langue and the systematic character of language. As far as the first of these questions is concerned, Whitney did in fact note the double sense of the term (LGL, 324) and believed that the two meanings have generally been confused by students of language. He gave the following explanation:

"Man possesses, as one of his most marked and distinctive characteristics, a faculty or capacity of speech —, or, more accurately, various faculties and capacities which lead inevitably to the production of speech: but the faculties are one thing, and their elaborated products are another and very different one." Here, we believe, is the direct source of Saussure's distinction between langage and faculté du langage (cf. CLG, 25; CLG(E), 32); Whitney's distinction between langue and langue has already been referred to above (cf. our quotation, n.29).

As for the systematic nature of language, a number of references can be found in Whitney to suggest that he was one of Saussure's sources of inspiration (cf. LSL, 49, 111, 410; LGL, 76). When attempting to list the sounds of English, Whitney, following Richard Lepsius' (1810-1835) well-known programme,30 and stated that a "spoken alphabet, . . . , in order to be understood, must be arranged upon a physiological plan." And he adds: "It is no chaos, but an orderly system of articulations, with ties of relationship running through it in every direction" (LSL, 91). Similar ideas are expressed elsewhere (cf. LSL, 265, 464; LGL, 62, 67). It must be said, however, that these observations never did become axiomatic in Whitney's studies of language but remained marginal, especially when compared to the manner in which Saussure developed his theory of language, the main foundation of which was constructed on the
assumption that language is a system of interdependent terms (to use Saussure's own expression which however has not been recognized as a technical term by the editors of the Cours). 31

There are in addition a certain number of statements made by Whitney en passant which appear to have been taken up by Saussure (though other sources could be envisaged), 32 but three more 'Saussurean' terms in particular merit special discussion: intercourse, valeur, and zéro.

With regard to the first expression, Godel (SM, 265) listing it in his "Lexique de la terminologie [saussurienne]" (SM, 252-81), makes reference to Whitney's use of the expression 'cohesive force' (represented by culture and enlightenment, LSL, 159), which gives unity to a given language and checks all the diversifying tendencies in speech, and also to Whitney's later use of the opposing forces in language development, the centrifugal and the centripetal forces (LGL, 163-4; cf. LSL, 154-5).

In the Cours, when discussing the same phenomenon, we find that Saussure distinguished between the "esprit particulariste" or "esprit de clocher" on the one hand and the "force d'intercourse", qui crée les communications entre les hommes" (CLG, 281) on the other. The critical edition of the Cours shows that Saussure did not use the expression "esprit", but spoke of opposing forces, "la force du clocher", and "la force de l'intercourse" (CLG(E), 465). The use of the word force in both instances as well as the emphasis on the communicational drive in man's nature suggests Whitney as the immediate source of Saussure's dichotomy, in particular when we note in Whitney that "communication is the leading determinative force throughout" (LGL, 286; cf. LSL, 155) in the development and the acquisition of language and that this force "determines the unity of a language, and puts a restraint upon its dialect variation", an observation which is paralleled in the Cours (s. CLG, 282; CLG(E), 467-8).

On another occasion Godel, in addition to noting that this concept of opposing forces was not introduced by Saussure until his third course (1910/11), states that 1) the word "intercourse" was employed by Saussure as early as in 1891 in his third lecture at Geneva University, and that 2) this word was listed in Emile Littré's (1801-81) voluminous Dictionnaire de la langue française (cf. SM, 78, n.83) whose first edition
appeared in Paris during the years 1863-72, i.e. roughly about the same time as Whitney's books appeared.\textsuperscript{33} Godel does not, however, mention Whitney in this connection (cf. also SM, 265), although in fact, after having outlined the two opposing forces which account for the growth of language and dialects (LSL, 154-5), Whitney, in his book of 1867, had already used the term 'intercourse' quite explicitly in conjunction with its balancing and speech standardizing function.\textsuperscript{34} It seems safe to say therefore that the term could not have escaped Saussure's notice and particularly for two reasons: 1) the expression is found in a familiar context (Saussure derived the concept of opposing forces in language and their mechanism and development from Whitney), and 2) there are indications that this term was frequently used in Whitney's writings (cf. LSL, 405; LGL, 10), despite the fact that it does not seem to have been used by Whitney as a technical term (since neither of the indices of Whitney's books [cf. LSL, 497; LGL, 324] lists this expression).

The second expression, \textit{valeur}, pertains to the concept of value in language which plays an important rôle in Saussure's theory (CLG, 155-69 \textit{[passim]}), in particular in connection with the problem of the linguistic sign. Godel on this topic (SM, 280-1) makes no reference to Whitney, and the indices of Whitney's books on general principles of language have no entry which would suggest that he ever used the expression "value" as a technical term. Interestingly, Saussure uses \textit{valeur} in his unfinished paper on Whitney of 1894 albeit in a typical Saussurean sense.\textsuperscript{35} However, Whitney did employ the term on occasions, for instance he noted that language "would be half spoiled for our use by the necessity of bearing in mind why and how its constituents have the value we give them", his argument being that the internal (semantic) development of language could be very seriously interfered with by an immoderate consciousness of the etymology of words (LSL, 132). In the same paragraph Whitney criticizes those who believe that \textit{Sprachsinn} implies a "disposition to retain in memory the original \textit{status} and value [sic] of formative elements [in language]" (ibid.). It should be pointed out that Whitney does not use the expression "meaning" in this context which would seem the most usual expression at hand. However this particular use of "value" by
Whitney does not prove that Saussure took it from him. Passages we have come across while perusing the French translation of *Life and Growth* appear to be much closer to Saussure's later use of the term *valeur*. In this chapter devoted to semantic change (*Vie*, 64-82) Whitney employed this expression on several occasions distinguishing, though not axiomatically, between signification, sign, and value (*Vie*, 79), using it in the sense of word meaning (65), and, towards the end of the chapter, in the sense of function when he explained that the "signes démonstratifs et interrogatifs", for instance *who, which*, etc. received "leur valeur comme pronoms relatifs" (81) much later in the development of English. However, nowhere does Whitney attempt any definition of the term.

Another instance in which Whitney employed the expression of value is in connection with the concept of zero in linguistics. Saussure had used this term already in his *Mémoire* on two occasions, a term which we believe he took over from mathematics. Gödel (SM, 281) reproduces a note taken by a student during Saussure's lectures on general linguistics which runs as follows: "Il y a toujours le signe concret à la base, même quand le signe arrive à être zéro." This interesting quotation, which appears to anticipate Chomsky's distinction between surface and deep structure, is illustrated by the English sentence "the man I have seen", and the note concludes: "Il y a là une unité rendue par zéro" (*ibid.*). Surprisingly, Gödel, who has made frequent reference to Whitney in the discussion of various other items in his glossary of Saussurean linguistic terminology, does not refer to Whitney on this occasion. However, when discussing the problem of zero elements in language at some length (SM, 218-20), Gödel makes explicit reference to Whitney (218-9, and note 303). With reference to the passage quoted above (which Gödel has reproduced more fully), he states that Whitney had made a similar observation when discussing morphological notations. In fact Whitney rejected the idea that a sentence such as "fish like water" consists of words which are roots, adding: "... nor can it be said that, even as they stand, they are altogether formless; for each is defined in certain relations by the absence of formative elements which it would otherwise exhibit: *water* is shown to be singular by lacking an *s, fish*
and like to be plural by the absence of s from like" (LSL, 365, n.).

Godel concedes that Whitney had observed this fact before Saussure but does not believe that this would have had any bearing on Saussure's theorizing (SM, 220) because Saussure's theory was much more powerful. We can at least quote a more suggestive passage from Whitney than that related by Godel (SM, 219). After pointing out that the distinction between material and form in language whose interrelationship had been discussed on several occasions, Whitney illustrates his views in the following manner:

The s of brooks, for example, is formal in relation to brook as material; the added letter indicates something subordinate, a modification of the conception of brook, the existence of it in more than one individual: it turns a singular into a plural. Men has the like value [!] as regards man, the means of making the same formal distinction having come to be of a different kind from the other, as an internal change instead of an external. Brooks and men are not mere material; they are 'formed' material, signs for conceptions with one important characteristic, number, added. But then, by simple contrast with them, brook and man are also 'formed'; each implies, not by a sign, but by the absence of an otherwise necessary sign to the contrary, restriction to a single article of the kind named. (LGL, 214).

What is most important to note from the above quotation is the fact that we find the word "value" being used in a way similar to that in which Saussure employed it, namely as a function or meaning of a given element within a specific paradigm or system (cf. SM, 280-1; LTS, 52-3; CLG, 159-61). On the other hand one might well ask whether in fact the term "opposition" as it is to be found in the French translation of Whitney's Life and Growth of Language (cf. n.40) as well as the use of the opposing terms of absence versus presence of formal distinction did not indeed lead Saussure to clarify his ideas concerning the particular use of the term "zero" in linguistic analysis although the term itself was never employed by Whitney. The similarity between Whitney's notion of the absence of a formal sign as against its presence and Saussure's concept of "signe zéro" is very striking indeed. Speaking of the Czech paradigm regarding the word "žena" "woman", Saussure observes that the genitive plural form "žen" has zero as exposant adding: "On voit donc
qu'un signe matériel n'est pas nécessaire pour exprimer une idée; la langue peut se contenter de l'opposition de quelque chose avec rien" (CLG, 123-4), a "signe zéro". 41

In summing up we can say that Whitney was in many respects an important source, if not the most important one, of Saussure's linguistic inspiration. Bolelli's claims (1965:152) referred to at the beginning of this chapter can now be substantiated: 1) Whitney did illustrate convincingly the opposing factors in the life and development of language, the innovating force of the individual and the conservative force of the community, but although he anticipated the individual/social dichotomy, we cannot support Devoto's (1949:4) contention that Whitney forestalled the Saussurean dichotomy of langue versus parole; 42 2) the systematic character of language was stressed by Whitney quite frequently, but he was surely not alone; Schleicher had put forward this aspect prior to Whitney (cf. LSL, 364; LGL, 76); nor did Whitney ever draw from his observations conclusions similar to those of Saussure; 3) Whitney did anticipate the concept of morphological opposition in language, and 4) argued for the study of language for itself (cf. LSL, 46ff.) freeing linguistic science from the tutelage of other sciences, notably biology, physiology, and psychology. But a number of other points should be added in which Whitney seems to have played an important rôle in the development of Saussurean linguistic theory; 5) the distinction between langue and faculté du langage (and also setting aside language as the property of a given linguistic community, e.g. a nation); 6) the terms of "(social) intercourse" and "valeur" and 7) the notion of the zero sign (though not the term itself). A number of further observations could be added to suggest the important impact of Whitney on Saussure. 43

Altogether they confirm, along with Saussure's frequent references to Whitney during the last two decades of his life (the earlier period cannot be documented sufficiently in this respect), our contention that Saussure's principal source of inspiration is not to be found outside the study of language but in the linguistic theories of his own time. Whitney is Saussure's forerunner par excellence; as Saussure stated in 1908, Whitney never said anything regarding a sound methodology of language study which was not correct, but, Saussure added, he never came up with a systematisation of his ideas (cf. SM, 51): to have done this is the merit and greatness of Saussure's genius.
1 Kukenheim (1966:110), for example, suggests the influence of Karl Vossler and Hugo Schuchardt on FdS; he is not even aware of the fact that the author of *Life and Growth of Language* (84) is identical with the writer of *A Practical French Grammar* (96) as the index (280) reveals.


3 Sechehaye wrote: "A cette époque [i.e. during FdS's stay in Leipzig 1876/78, 1879/80], un livre avait déjà sans doute exercé une profonde influence sur sa [i.e. FdS's] pensée et l'avait orientée dans une bonne direction: nous voulons parler de l'ouvrage du sanscritiste américain Whitney, *La vie du langage* (publié en 1875)" (*RPhilos* 44:9 [1917]).

4 *Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic Science* (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1867), xi + 505 pp. Subsequent editions are unchanged reprints — a procedure already noted by J. Jolly in his preface to the G. transl. (1874:x), except for an "Analysis" added to the 3rd ed. of 1870 (pp. 475-90); last repr. in 1902.

5 *Die Sprachwissenschaft: W. D. Whitney's Vorlesungen über die Principien der vergleichenden Sprachforschung* [note the last part of the G. title!], adapted for the German public by Julius Jolly (Munich: Th. Ackermann, 1874), xxix + 713; "Vorrede des Bearbeiters", iii-xvii.

6 We exclude here the two volumes of *Oriental and Linguistic Studies* (New York: Scribner & Armstrong, 1873-74) which consist of a collection of papers written between 1853 and 1873 and contain articles which were directed against the theoretical views of Steinthal and Schleicher. We shall revert to these in chap. 1.3.2.

7 *The Life and Growth of Language: An Outline of Linguistic Science* (New York: D. Appleton; London: H. S. King, 1875), ix + 327; in the following years a number of re-editions of this volume appeared both in America and England, the latest ed. being in 1901. This book should not be confused with the E. adaption of Whitney's first book on this topic entitled *Language and Its Study*, prepared by Richard Morris (London: Trübner, 1876), xxii + 317 pp., which reproduces only the first seven lectures of the original. Morris' curious introduction (vi-xxii) can be ignored.


This latter information has been taken from Whitney's autobiography, "William Dwight Whitney", *Forty Years' Record of the Class of 1845 Williams College, New Haven*, ed. by W. D. Whitney (New Haven, Conn.: Printed by Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1885), 175-82; here p. 179.

The bibliographical overview of the years 1875-77 lists and comments upon the following of Whitney's writings: *Life and Growth of Language* mentioned together with the Fr., G., and It. transl. (*KZ* 23:602), i.e. on the first page; an offprint of his paper "Fae**1 or Fae**1 - Natural or Conventional?" which appeared in *TAPA* in 1874; references to Whitney in connection with publications by Max Müller and Rudolf von Raumer (604); *Language and Its Study* (605); textbooks for the study of Sanskrit (611), a criticism of Max Müller which appeared in *PAOS* (1875/76: xx-xxiii) noted on p. 612, and two further articles mentioned on the subsequent page.

S. Brugmann's commemorative article, "Zum Gedächtnis W.D. Whitney's", *JAOS* 19:74-81 (1897), written in 1894, esp. 75, 78-80. We believe we can overcome Godel's doubts that "il n'est pas sur que les livres de Whitney aient fait grand bruit à Leipzig" (SM, 33), for they certainly have.

Sanskrit Grammar: Including Both the Classical Language and the other Dialects, of Veda and Brähmana (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1879), xxiv + 486 pp.; Indische Grammatik, umfassend die klassische Sprache und die älteren Dialekte (= Bibliothek idg. Grammatiken, 2) (*ibid.*), xxviii + 520 pp. In 1885, a supplement was published, the G. version of which was also prepared by H. Zimmer, and in 1889 a revised version of the *Sanskrit Grammar* appeared, the tenth issue of which was printed in 1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press; London: Oxford Univ. Press). S. also Alfred Hillebrandt's review of this book in *BB* 5:338-45 (1879).


Cf. the chap., "Le origini della linguistica generale: Whitney", in Terracini, 1949:73-115, 117-21; esp. 74, 83, 87, 93, 97, 100-1, 104, 106, 108-9, 111; Terracini, however, is mainly concerned with tracing
the various influences on Whitney, the main sources of which he sees in 19th century English philosophy and sociology, notably the work of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).

17 Bolelli affirms: "Inserando [referring to his selection from La vita e lo sviluppo del linguaggio, here pp. 152-9] il linguaggio nell'ambito storico, egli [i.e. Whitney] pose anche il problema del rapporto fra individuo e comunità linguistica, fra forza individuale d'innovazione e forza comunitaria di conservazione. E proprio per quest'aspetto sarà sembrato particolarmente notevole a F. de Saussure, al quale fanno pensare anche altri lati della dottrina del Whitney: l'affermazione, sia pure in nuce, della lingua come sistema, l'affacciarsi delle opposizioni morfologiche, il tentativo, sia pure non ancora, del tutto riuscito per le implicazioni più concretamente naturalistiche e positivistiche, di studiare la lingua in sé, come fatto autonomo" (1965:152).

18 On January 14, 1971, however, we received, through the kind offices of Dr. Rudolf Engler, a Xerox copy of his typed copy of FdS's ms., which he is engaged in preparing for publication. However, a key to the excerpts can be found in SM, 37 which refers to "des extraits publiés en 1954". Since the published excerpts are not always accurate and do not give the page references of the ms., we shall always quote from this copy though we shall refer to the published excerpts whenever possible.

19 It is true, however, that FdS who quoted from Whitney's work in all three of his courses on general linguistics (s. SM, 32, n.31) noted similar ideas elsewhere. Cf. the collation of students' notes of the second course on general linguistics (1908/09) prepared by Godel (CPS 15:6-103; here p. 9) for an explicit reference to Whitney.

20 Since Godel's dissertation does not provide an index, the pages on which he refers to Whitney and/or his work will be listed in the following. Square brackets indicate that a reference has been made to N 10, the manuscript in which FdS outlined his appreciation and criticism of Whitney, without naming Whitney and/or his ideas about the nature of language and linguistics: [13], 19, 31, no.28, [37], 43, n.16, 43-6, 47, n.26, 51, 75, [114], 136, [142], 143, 144, 147, 148, 152, 158, 164, n.117, 182, n.173, [184, n.179], 185, and nn.184-5, 186, and n.191, 190, 194, and nn.214-7, 195 and nn.219-20, [196, n.224], 213, and n.279, 218-9, and no.303, 220, [222,n.313, 223, n.317, 226, 252, 255, 257, 260, 265, 266, 279, [281].

21 At the beginning of his "Lexique de la terminologie [saussurienne]", SM, 252-81, Godel notes that "l'histoire antérieure et surtout ultérieure des termes n'a pas été systématiquement étudiée: on a cité surtout Whitney et, d'autre part, les linguistes genevois, disciples directs ou indirects de Saussure" (SM, 252).
Cf. his article, "Strictures on the Views of August Schleicher Respecting the Nature of Language and Kindred Subjects", TAPA for 1871; repr. in Whitney, Oriental and Linguistic Studies (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Sons, 1873), First Series, 298-331 (under the new title of "Schleicher and the Physical Theory of Language"). The same vol. also contains a paper entitled "Steinthal and the Psychological Theory of Language", op. cit., 332-75. Whitney's life-time controversy with the famous popularizer of linguistic studies, Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900), is well known in the history of linguistics (cf. Malmberg, 1964: 124; Lepschy, 1970:74, but not noted by Ivic, 1965 and Robins, 1967, for example). Whitney's last expression of disagreement with Müller's views is his Max Müller and the Science of Language (New York: D. Appleton, 1892), iii + 79 pp., in which Müller "was assailed with somewhat unbecoming acerbity by an author also more distinguished as a Sanskritist than as a linguist, W. D. Whitney", if we are to believe the opinion of L. H. Gray (1939:441-2). A very informative article is Whitney's "Strieffragen der heutigen Sprachphilosophie" of 1875 (cf. location given in n.9 of this chapter), in which he chastises erroneous ideas and "theories" of language put forward by Max Müller, Schleicher, and Steinthal.

In this article on Whitney FdS discusses at some length the necessity of distinguishing between the historical and the anti-historical approach to language (1894:9-33 [passim]), but he does not mention the terms synchronie or diachronie. However, these terms had already been coined by FdS during roughly the same period (cf. SM, 37) in preserved notes which were designated for a book on general principles of language study (cf. CFS 21:95), extracts of which have been published (CFS 12: 68-70) and analyzed (SM, 46-50).

It has been held by Ivic (1965:125) that FdS's "enthusiasm for a mathematical approach to language is quite insufficiently represented" in the CLG; cf. also Mounin, 1968:26-8. In private correspondence of January 13, 1971, Prof. W. P. Lehmann suggested that there might have been some influence from the Vergleichende Betrachtungen über neuere geometrische Forschungen (Erlangen: Deichert, 1872) by the well-known Göttingen professor of mathematics Felix Klein (1849-1925) on FdS when he prepared his Mémoire. A verification of this suggestion would go beyond the scope of our inquiry; suffice it to note that a comparison between a game of chess and état de langue as well as the term valeur played already at that time an important rôle in FdS's argument (cf. 1894:9-11, 15-6); s. CLG, 43, 125-7, 153-4, 185.

Godel (SM, 257) appears to have overlooked the entry pertaining to this last-mentioned expression (cf. LSL, 494), since he refers to pp. 132, 134, 400, on which the word 'conventional' is mentioned (with no specific intent), but ignores the references on pp. 14, 32, 71, 128, 148, 409-10, 438. On the other hand, Godel gives various references to LGL whose short index (321-7) does not include the expressions 'arbitrary', 'conventional', 'sign', 'system', etc. The French adaption of the latter, La vie du langage, contains no index at all.
In speaking of signs or words Whitney refers to the traditional classic opposition of ΘΕΩΣΙ vs. ΦΩΣΙ (LGL, 19). He explicitly stated: "There is not in a known language a single item which can be truly claimed to exist ΦΩΣΙ, 'by nature'; each stands in its accepted use ΘΕΩΣΙ, 'by an act of attribution', . . . (ibid., 282). S. also his paper, "ΘΕΩΣΙ or ΦΩΣΙ - Natural or Conventional", TAPA for 1874, 95-116.

It is true that Whitney employed the term 'sign' also in the sense of morpheme, e.g. E. s designating plural, etc. He observed: "Off [sic] was changed to a (virtual) sign of the genitive case, and to an infinitive sign, . . ." (LGL, 138). Similarly, FdS employed at times the term 'sign' in the sense of "signifiant" (SM, 246).

We tend to believe that Whitney's sociologism has its origin in the theories put forward by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) as Terracini (1949:120-1) suggested. However, Saussure's immediate source of inspiration (with regard to the social character of language) was Whitney and hardly anybody else; but s. also 2.2.1.2 for a later influence.

La langue in the sense of the language of a people (= FdS's langue, s. LTS, 32) is defined by Whitney as "the immense aggregate of the articulated signs for thought accepted by, and current among, a certain vast community which [in the case of English] we call English-speaking people . . . It is the sum of the separate languages of all members of this community. Or - since each one says some things, or says them in one way, not to be accepted as in the highest sense English - it is their average rather than their sum; it is that part of the aggregate which is supported by the usage of the majority; . . ." (LSL, 22).


Cf. the index of the CLG (319-26) which does not list 'terme' as one of the termini technici as against SM, 279 which gives a number of locations in the Cours (e.g. 121-2, 124, 137, 158, 159, 163, 170, 177). We committed the same error in our recent review of LTS in Language 47:447-50 (1971), in which we expressed our surprise about the fact that the G. transl. of the CLG rendered 'terme' in three different ways and the Russ. version showed even five translations (cf. LTS, 57).

We mean for example Whitney's rejection of the idea that linguistics is a branch of psychology (LGL, 303-4; cf. CLG, 33), and his apparent view that phonetics (FdS calls it "phonologie") is an auxiliary science to linguistics (cf. FdS, 1894:7; CLG, 21).
33 Since Godel contents himself with noting that the term 'intercourse' "est d'ailleurs dans Littré" (SM, 78, n.83) the full quotation and location shall be given here. Littré gives the following etymology of the word: "Anglais, intercourse, de inter (voy. entre), et course. Le mot anglais a été fait, comme on voit, sur le français entrecours qui a péné dans notre langue et que nous reprenons dans celle des Anglais" (Dictionnaire de la langue française, vol. 2 [Paris: Hachette, 1863], p. 129).

34 Cf. Whitney's observation: "The idiosyncrasies, the sharp angles and jutting corners, of every man's idiom must be worn off by attrition against those with which it comes in contact in the ordinary intercourse of life, that the common tongue may become a rounded unit". (LSL, 156).

35 FdS states: "< Comme il n'y a pour le langage aucune comparaison juste, ni même grossièrement juste (...), il est évident qu'on pourra relever dans celle-ci, entre autre, ce défaut frappant que la valeur des pièces aux échecs repose uniquement sur leur utilité et leur sort probable dans la suite, (...)." (p. 10a; italics in the original).

36 There Whitney asserts: "To (à) conserve en général, en anglais, son ancienne signification d'approche; mais, comme signe de l'infinitif to est purement formel comme of; dans to have, par exemple, il n'est qu'une espèce de substitut moderne pour la vieille terminaison an de haban. Nous avons complètement perdu le souvenir de sa valeur réelle, en tant que préposition gouvernant un nom verbal."

37 On one occasion he observed that it would be erroneous to believe that, in a vocalic alternation, "a est une étape entre a et zéro." (Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européennes; repr. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1968, p. 217). And speaking of an Indo-European paradigm, he noted that "les désinences sont -s, -i et zéro" (p. 194).

38 E.g. 'arbitraire' (SM, 255), 'articulus' (ibid.), 'conventionnel' (257), 'entité' (260; with ref. to LSL, 54, 56, 65, 390 where Whitney employed the term "entity"), 'intercourse' (265, although no ref. to the term in Whitney is given), 'langue' (266, both interpretations), 'système' (279).

39 Cf. also Whitney's paper, "On Material and Form in Language", TAPA 2:77-96 (1872).

40 We reproduce the Fr. rendering of this passage in footnote because it exhibits a far more rigorous picture of the theoretical implications than the original, both in actual formulation and terminology: "Nous avons déjà fait plus d'une fois la distinction entre les éléments matériels et les éléments formels du langage. L's de brooks (ruisseaux), par exemple, est formel dans son rapport avec brook (ruisseau), qui est matériel; la lettre ajoutée indique quelque chose de subordonné, une modification du concept de brook, l'existence de la même chose dans
plusieurs individus; en un mot, il fait un pluriel d'un singulier.

*Men* (*hommes*) a la même valeur [!] par rapport à *man* (*homme*); le moyen de faire la même distinction diffère seulement, le signe est intercalé au lieu d'être ajouté. *Brooks* and *men* ne sont pas de purs matériaux; ils sont des matériaux façonnés, des signes de conceptions simples auxquels est joint un caractère important, le nombre. Cependant, l'opposition avec *brooks* et *men*, suffit à rendre *brook* et *man* des mots formels aussi. Chacun contient, non par la présence d'un signe mais par l'absence d'un signe, l'affirmation du singulier" (*La Vie du langage*, 175-6).

Note, for instance, the use of "opposition" in the Fr. transl. where the E. original shows "contrast", or the word "présence" (to be contrasted with "absence") which is not contained in the original or the reformulation of the concluding sentence which shows more precision and formality of statement. This may also underscore our belief that Whitney did not prepare the Fr. transl. himself, but that a possibly more theoretically inclined linguist executed this job. (Interestingly, the subsequent sentence in the original text contains the expression "signified", which, however, was not translated into signifié as one might have expected).

41 Two students noted that it is sufficient to have a contrast between *x* and zero; cf. CLG(E), 192. S. also CLG, 191 for another example, this time from the domain of syntax. FdS appears to have used the term *zero* quite frequently in his lectures, more often than the index of the CLG suggests: pp. 71, 123, 124, [not 163, as indicated on p. 325], but pp. 249, 254, 256, 257, 302.

42 G. Devoto refers to LSL, 154ff. to support his views: "Questa basi di partenza nasce da una distinzione fondamentale, intuita sin da tempi lontani, formulata sommariamente della Whitney, e modificata in modo rigoroso du Ferdinand de Saussure attraverso la opposizione della *lingue* (collettiva) e della *parole* (individuale)." This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that FdS found substantial support for his dichotomy in Whitney. The Fr. transl. of LGL speaks of "apprentissage de la parole" (*Vie*, 16), "langue maternelle" (17), and uses the three relevant expressions in a short paragraph as follows: "Il y a, ..., dans l'acquisition du langage, un élément de nécessité. Quelle que soit la langue que l'homme s'aproprie elle devient son mode nécessaire de pensée, aussi bien que de parole" (18). There is, however, no indication that Whitney (and/or the translator) used the terms consistently (cf. *Vie*, 18-9, 21, 24-5, 27, and elsewhere).

43 We cannot find sufficient evidence, however, to prove whether Whitney influenced FdS concerning the dichotomy of synchrony vs. diachrony. Interestingly, Brugmann noted in 1894 in his account of Whitney's work (in particular referring to his work as a Sanskritist): "Als Sanskritist hat sich Whitney von dem Boden der statistischen [N.B. = Brugmann's term for "statisch", EFK] und descriptiven Sprachbehandlung kaum je entfernt, und so hat er selber hier die praktischen Folgerungen seiner allgemeinen Lehren über Sprachentwicklung nicht gezogen" (*JAOS* 19:80).
Alfred Hillebrandt (1853-1927) made a similar, still more interesting remark in his review of Whitney's Sanscrit Grammar (Leipzig, 1879), *BB* 5:338-45 (1880), when he characterized the work not only as a "Markstein in der Geschichte der altindischen Grammatik" (cf. Georg Bühler's [1837-98] quite similar praise in *JAOS* 19:81 [1897]), but also as an approach devoted to the "Erforschung eines Sprachzustandes" (338; cf. De Mauro, 1968:300). This would invite an additional study of Whitney's writings on Sanskrit with which FdS was familiar. S. also James D. McCawley's interesting paper, "The Phonological Theory Behind Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar", *Languages and Areas: Studies Presented to George V. Bobrinskoy* (Chicago: Dept. of Linguistics, Univ. of Chicago, 1967), 77-85.
1.3.2 Neogrammarian Tenets concerning the Principles of Language Study (with special reference to Paul and Sievers)

[It is] the latter part of the nineteenth century, a period in which the history of linguistics has hitherto been illuminated by intense but narrow beams, and now urgently needs bringing to the general light of day.

Barbara H. M. Strang in 1970 (FL 6:438)

1.3.2.1 The Position of the Neogrammarians in Contemporary Histories of Linguistics

Neben der rein historischen Deutung der Sprachgegebenheiten wurde die physische und psychische Seite der Sprache niemals ganz aus dem Auge gelassen. Für jene schrieb E. Sievers seine 'Grundzüge der Phonetik . . .', für diese Hermann Paul seine 'Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte'. Beide Bücher haben, wie schon die mehrfachen Auflagen zeigen, für ihre Zeit eine grosse Bedeutung erlangt und haben die Forschung in ihrer Weise massgebend beeinflusst.

Franz Specht (1948:243)

Structural linguistics has almost completely superseded historical work in the description and comparison of languages during the past two decades. Subsequently the interest in the contributions of the neogrammarians has become marginal and, regrettably, the picture of their work has become more and more distorted since it appears that many linguists base their judgements on secondary and tertiary sources, the so-called histories of linguistics, instead of bothering themselves with reading the original texts. Thus the neogrammarians have become the scapegoats for all apparent vices of historical linguistics, and it has become an habitual attitude to accuse them of their "atomism" in the treatment of linguistic phenomena.
(cf. Helbig, 1970:17, and for a more cautious judgement, Lepschy, 1970:34). To suggest that these accusations are not necessarily true and, in addition, to claim that Saussure, the father of structural linguistics, was markedly influenced by some of their principles of language description may appear, for that reason, almost blasphemous, since it is generally held that Saussure usually developed his ideas by opposing neogrammarian views (cf. Malmberg, 1964:39; Leroy, 1971:69). It seems therefore necessary to outline essential tenets of the neogrammarian doctrine before approaching the question of how they relate to Saussure's linguistic theories.

In the preceding chapter we have given what we believe to be sufficient evidence for our claim that Whitney and his work, both in the area of Sanskrit studies and general linguistics, were well known in Leipzig and other centres of historical and comparative linguistic research, for instance in Berlin and Göttingen, to name only two other important 'schools' in the seventies of the 19th century. One may refer, once again, to Brugmann's commemorative article in 1894 in which he acknowledges the debt owed by himself as well as the debt of other contemporary linguists to Whitney who was regarded as an authority and a guide during the early period of the neogrammarian movement. It should be noted that Brugmann emphasized in this article the importance of Whitney with regard to "Prinzipienfragen der Sprachgeschichte" and saw reason to expatiate on this matter because he believed that a number of his contemporaries would deny the impact of Whitney's theoretical works ("sprachtheoretische Werke") on Indo-European linguistic studies (JAOS 19:76-7). Brugmann criticized contemporary interpretations of Humboldtian ideas, although he conceded the value of some of Steinhthal's findings, and stressed the far more matter-of-fact statements found in Whitney concerning the nature of historical linguistics ("Wesen der Sprachgeschichte"). A longer passage may be quoted in which Brugmann outlines his understanding of Whitney's contributions to general aspects of language study, since it reveals to some extent the views held not only by Brugmann himself but apparently also by most of his colleagues at Leipzig. Brugmann states that the most important of Whitney's doctrines were the following:
If one attributes to language an existence of its own, certain activities, certain inclinations or moods, a capacity for accommodating itself to the needs of man and similar qualifications, these can only be regarded as figurative expressions. They do not denote the subject-matter itself, and nobody should be deluded by them. In reality language exists only in the minds and on the lips of those who speak it. All changes in the development of language serve to meet the necessities of the human mind. However, a conscious intent hardly ever governs [such changes], and therefore language is not an artificial product. It is not a natural product either. Since everything which constitutes the language of a nation originates in mental activity and is based on a long chain of preceding processes in which the human mind itself, influenced as it may be by external factors, has always been the true moving force, language is nothing but a human institution. And therefore linguistic science is an historical or moral science (.. .)" (JAOS 19:78-9; my translation).

When Brugmann continues that only a superficial view of language could have called linguistics a discipline which belongs to the natural sciences, he indicates at least indirectly how important Whitney's affirmations about the nature of language had been to him and the Junggrammatiker in the 70s and 80s in their fight against erroneous views concerning language and its study put forward by Schleicher, Max Müller, and others (cf. Brugmann and Osthoff's criticism of 1878 in Lehmann, 1967:198-209 [passim]). In addition Whitney's statements concerning the mechanisms of linguistic change, according to which individual modifications proceed gradually and very slowly and without the speaker's notice, are summed up in the following manner: Individual changes "cannot succeed if they deviate too strongly from the existing usage ['Sprachgebrauch']; only those which recommend themselves to the linguistic instinct of everybody ['dem Sprachgefühl aller'] can be successful and receive general acceptance." Brugmann's concluding affirmation that these ideas of Whitney's laid the foundation for an adequate treatment of the "sprachgeschichtliche Prinzipienlehre" exhibits clearly the neogrammarian predilection for an historical approach to linguistic analysis and, at the same time, the difference between the interpretation of Whitney by members of the "Leipzig School" and its temporary associate F. de Saussure. In fact Brugmann uses the expression 'historical' very frequently in this article of about half a dozen pages and even goes so
far as to accuse Whitney of having practised a predominantly static and descriptive approach thus failing to follow his general principles! 4

Despite his claim that he was much interested in general questions of linguistics (JAOS 19:76) Brugmann did little to contribute to this aspect of linguistic activity during the 19th century, and it was only after completion of the second edition of the Grundriss in 1916 that he wrote on general linguistic themes. 5 It is true that Brugmann's "Nasalis sonans" marked an important step in the history of Indo-European linguistics in 1876, a year in which far more important publications appeared than historians of linguistics appear to be aware of, 6 but the synthesizer of the ideas and principles advocated by the Junggrammatiker was the Germanist Hermann Paul (1846-1921) whose Principien der Sprachgeschichte was first published in 1880 and ran through five editions during the author's lifetime, 7 and which was soon regarded as "the bible of the junggrammatiker school" (Malmberg, 1964:12).
1 Cf. the following of Brugmann's acknowledgements: "War doch in jenen Jahren, da man im Mutterlande der Indogermanistik [i.e. Germany] auf eine gründliche Revision der Forschungsmethode und auf die Herstellung einer angemessenen Wechselwirkung zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Specialforschung [!] drang, mir wie anderen jüngeren Gelehrten Whitney im Streit der Meinungen ein Wegweiser, dessen Zuverlässigkeit ausser Frage stand und dessen Winken man stets mit reichem Nutzen folgte, ..." (JAOS 19: 74-5 [1897]; cf. also pp. 80-1).

2 In the original text Brugmann adds Whitney's terms for "menschliche Einrichtung" and "eine historische oder Geisteswissenschaft" in brackets.

3 JAOS 19:79; Brugmann appears to forestall the modern emphasis on and the current interest in linguistic universals when he states in the subsequent sentence: "Bei noch so grosser Verschiedenheit aber der äusseren Verhältnisse beruhen die Veränderungen der Sprachen allenthalben auf den gleichen Gesetzen und der gleichen Art ihrer Wirksamkeit". (Ibid.) We emphasize this terminological usage because Paul makes frequent use of these terms in his Prinzipien.

4 Ibid., 80; Brugmann speaks in connection with Whitney of "Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte", (loc. cit., 76), "geschichtliche [ ] Prinzipienlehre", and "wenn man sich die Sprache immer als etwas in der Geschichte sich entwickelndes . . . vorstellt" (79), "Lehren über Sprachentwicklung" (80).

5 Cf. his essay, Der Ursprung des Scheinsubjets 'es' in den germanischen und romanischen Sprachen (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1917), 57 pp., his study, Über die Verschiedenheit der Satzgestaltung nach Massgabe der seelischen Grundfunktion in den indogermanischen Sprachen (Ibid., 1918), and his posthumous monograph, Die Syntax des einfachen Satzes im Indogermanischen, ed. by Wilhelm Streitberg [1964-1925] (Berlin & Leipzig: W. de Gruyter, 1925), vii + 229 pp. which show Brugmann's increasing interest in syntax and theoretical problems of language study.


1.3.2.2 Hermann Paul and His Principles of Language Study

It has been forgotten that Paul's Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte contains some excellent observations which directly hint at many innovations which were to come after his time. He is mainly remembered as a tireless apostle of historicism."

Milka Ivić (1965:61)

It is worth noting that the observations Brugmann made in his article on Whitney mentioned above (cf. 1.3.2.1) concerning general methodology ("Prinzipienlehre") and historical linguistics ("Sprachgeschichte") are much the same as those put forward in Paul's Prinzipien, notably in the second (1886) and subsequent editions, in which he replied to criticisms made of his book from various sides, in particular by Ludwig Tobler (1827-95) and Franz Misteli (1841-1903). As early as 1863 Schleicher had claimed that we do not know a thing if we cannot tell how it has evolved, and, acknowledged or not, this view became one of the prime convictions of the neogrammarian doctrine, according to which historical linguistics was the sole scientific kind of language study. In fact Paul made his famous explicit statement to this effect in the second edition of his influential book after Misteli had contested this view already inherent in the Prinzipien of 1880. It has become a rather unfortunate attitude among historians of linguistics (which in most cases can probably be traced back to Pedersen's account of 19th century linguistics) to ignore Paul almost completely (e.g. Specht, 1948: Dinneen, 1967; Lehmann, 1967; Tagliavini, 1968; Puttschke, 1969; Lepschuy, 1970) or to cite just this (now ill-) famed passage (cf. Malmberg, 1964:14-5; Tagliavini, 1965:304; Mounin, 1967:210; Robins, 1967:185) but ignore the rest of Paul's teaching. Some noteworthy exceptions are Ivić (1965:60-3), Arens (1969:346-59), Helbig (1970:15-9), and particularly the recent account which Uriel Weinreich(1926-67) gave during the last months of his life.
Weinreich, it is true, is concerned with Paul's theory of language change which cannot be our main concern since we are not so much interested in historical linguistic problems but in synchronic principles and notions in Paul which might have influenced Saussure's linguistic thought. That Paul himself derived some of his insights from Whitney (and, of course, from his own teacher Steinthal) is quite obvious and does not concern us in the present discussion. In fact it appears as if Paul attempted to reconcile the opposing views of Whitney and Steinthal when he affirmed on the one hand that linguistics as a moral science ("Kulturwissenschaft") has its prime basis in psychology (1909:6) and on the other that all Kulturwissenschaft is always a social science ("Gesellschaftswissenschaft", p. 7).  

Paul's psychologism, however, is not as misleading as Bloomfield (1933:17) tended to suggest and surely not as rigorous as Kruszewski (1881, 1883) in his application of the principles of mental association in the formulation of linguistic laws, but his psychological explanations are generally backed up and often surpassed by the large amount of empirical linguistic data which he accumulates to illustrate his point. Paul, it should be conceded, was not as much of a theoretician as perhaps Steinthal or Kruszewski and, more significantly, Saussure was, as is obvious from his argument, much subjected and exposed to the historicism and positivism of his time. As we shall see in the following paragraphs, Paul anticipated a number of linguistic concepts and contrasting terms which are now associated with Saussure's linguistic theory, but he appears never to have taken them to the conclusion which the Cours exhibits so beautifully.

1.3.2.2.1 Paul's Distinction between Descriptive and Historical Linguistics, and the Aspect of Language State

Paul's opposition to any approach other than historical in linguistics (1909:20) has become notorious in the history of linguistics, as we have
noted above. He showed himself to be aware of the fundamental differences between the synchronic and the diachronic method when he stated that historical grammar had its source in the much older descriptive grammar and that the former had "only arranged a number of descriptive grammars in parallel form one after another." Paul criticizes descriptive grammar for 1) recording only the grammatical forms and relations within a given linguistic community of a given period and 2) for basing its results not on facts "but on an abstraction of the facts observed." (1909:24). He concedes that the comparison of various stages of a given language described in this manner would reveal that changes had taken place and would probably also show a certain regularity, but he maintains that no causal connection between these abstractions (as he terms them) and the actual facts of language change can be shown. Paul's empiricism and general data orientation, it would seem, does not permit him to abstract from the data in order to formulate general rules of linguistic change.

Paul's position appears to become even more confusing when we note that he postulates the necessity for a "Prinzipienwissenschaft" which "is occupied with the general conditions of life of the historically evolving object" and which "investigates the nature and effects of factors constantly prevailing during all changes." (1909:1). Paul posits that this general science is an auxiliary science to historical linguistics and denies strongly the assumption that historical and empirical viewpoints oppose each other. In his view both are empirical in nature (ibid.). In fact, Paul attempts to bridge what he believes to be the opposing standpoints of the historical (i.e. also empirical) and the pure sciences which attempt to formulate laws (Paul calls them) by introducing a "Prinzipienlehre" which is capable of demonstrating the interaction of the various forces in the life of language (1909:2). Paul hopes to deduce these principles from the nature of historic development itself where they are not of purely logical origin (p. 5). Whatever the confusions in Paul's argument may be, there can be no doubt that his ideas could easily have given rise to a number of suggestions to anyone with a definite training in logic or a general theoretical inclination, such as, for instance, Saussure and Dittrich. We believe that the following equation can tentatively
be paralleled by Saussurean terms:

allgemeine Prinzipienwissenschaft = deskriptive Grammatik + historische Grammatik (or Sprachgeschichte) whereby historical linguistics has been derived from descriptive studies.

In Saussure we find: linguistique générale = linguistique statique (synchrony) + linguistique évolutif (diachrony) whereby the primacy of synchronic linguistics is emphasized (cf. CLG, 114-7).

It should be added that Paul was well aware of the possibility of considering linguistic states (cf. 1909:vi, where he speaks of the "Betrachtung von Sprachzuständen"). In fact he admits that it is the task of the historian of language to state the sequence of particular language states, but his emphasis on the empirical approach (the object of which can only be the individual speaker) makes the description of a language state quite unattainable and obliges the investigator to content himself with a rather imperfect picture. However, Paul hopes that the close observation of a number of individuals belonging to the same speech community and the comparison of their 'idiolects' could permit the deduction of a kind of linguistic average which could be established the better the more individuals are investigated and the more completely each investigation is carried out (1909:29).

Saussure took the opposite stand when he stated that the first thing which strikes us in the study of the facts of language is that their succession in time does not exist insofar as the individual speaker is concerned: he is confronted with a state (état). According to Saussure (and Paul appears to have, unwittingly perhaps, anticipated him in this respect) the investigator can enter the mind of speakers only by completely suppressing the past and discarding all knowledge of everything that produced it. Saussure appears in some sense to echo Paul, who wished to achieve the linguistic average which determines "das eigentlich Normale in der Sprache", i.e. the "Sprachusus" (1909:29), when stating that one cannot either describe or draw up norms of (linguistic) usage except by concentrating on a given state (CLG, 117).

It appears that Saussure drew his conclusions regarding the analysis of language states and the necessity for synchronic linguistics from the
apparent contradictions in Paul's linguistic theorizing. Since there is no direct evidence available to support our contention, we shall illustrate our point with the help of the argument put forward by Ottmar Dittrich (1865-1951), a language philosopher at Leipzig and pupil of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), although we do not wish to imply that it was Dittrich's account of Paul that exercised a direct influence on Saussure. Dittrich, who wrote a review article on the third edition of Paul's *Prinzipien* (1898), deals at some length with Paul's linguistic theories in the introductory part of his *Grundzüge der Sprachpsychologie* of 1903. In fact almost all the chapter entitled "Sprachpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft" (5-63) is devoted to a critical discussion of Paul's contentions about the scientific investigation of language. Dittrich maintains that linguistic science should be based on Wundt's general theory of psychology as outlined in the two volumes of *Die Sprache* of 1900 - a view which was still held by Bloomfield in 1914 - and attacks Paul's views on practical as well as on philosophical grounds. In particular he rejects Paul's contention that linguistic science is identical with historical linguistics. Dittrich, after having dissected Paul's ideas, argues that 1) Paul was quite unable to prove his point and that in fact his book constitutes "a flaming protest against this narrow definition of linguistic science," and 2) that reasons of a general philosophical nature ("erkenntnistheoretische Grunde allgemeiner Art") could be brought forward against Paul's views (1903:6-7).

Dittrich then goes on to show at length the faulty logic of Paul's argument (1903:8-50) - he also discusses on occasion Berthold Delbrück's (1842-1922) objections to Wundt's psychology of language - finally summarizing his views concerning the various disciplines which make up the system of linguistic science: the history of language and linguistic geography (as though following an external chronological-spatial order) on the one hand, and the mathematical discipline of language statistics on the other which, however, Dittrich intends to subordinate to the other two aspects. But he then continues to elucidate his views, since he believes it necessary to give reasons for his subdivision of the science of language in general and the disciplines of the history of language in particular. Dittrich holds that he believes it to be imperative:
to distinguish as a rule the co-existence or the chronological order of phenomena at a given place (syn- or metachronism) as well as the autonomy or dependency (auto- or heteronomy) of the totality of historical phenomena of language. In this way, through the synchronistic treatment of phenomena which are regarded as autonomous we attain cross-sections of the idiolects and groups of speech . . . (1903:50)

However, Dittrich argues in the subsequent sentences that the traditional descriptive grammar as well as stylistics, poetics, rhetoric, metrics and lexical studies confined to a given period have ignored their status as historical grammar with regard to their systematic character because, he holds, the metachronic grammar has been interpreted, in contrast to the synchronistic presentation of longitudinal intersections of individual languages, as historical grammar.

From the preceding arguments there is every reason to claim that Paul's emphasis on the historical approach to language analysis, together with the objection, clarification and renewed confusion by Dittrich, could not have been overlooked by Saussure (despite many statements to the contrary which can be found throughout the *Prinzipien*) when he set out to lecture on the principles of general linguistics between 1907 and 1911. However, this does not mean that Saussure developed his distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics after the publication of Dittrich's book in 1903 as Eberhard Zwirner has recently alleged. In fact the terms in question were used by Saussure as early as in 1894, and possibly earlier. The use of 'metachronistic' vs. 'synchronistic' in the sense in which Saussure introduced the terms of 'diachronic' vs. 'synchronic' are interesting historical coincidents. What is more important, however, is that Paul's statements concerning historical linguistics as the only scientific approach to language description could not have failed to arouse Saussure's opposition, in particular, since Paul was contradicting himself on various occasions. It is therefore not unreasonable to think that Saussure's incessant emphasis on synchronic linguistics in contrast to diachronic linguistics may well have had its source in his over-reaction to the views upheld in Paul's *Prinzipien* which ran through four editions during Saussure's lifetime and appear to have been provocative to Saussure.
because of their lack of theoretical consistency (cf. SM, 51). To reinforce our claim it should be pointed out that the actual trichotomy of synchronic linguistics, diachronic linguistics and linguistic geography (to which parts 2 to 4 of the Cours are devoted) is anticipated in Paul's Prinzipien (cf. esp. chaps. 22 and 23) though more clearly pointed out on theoretical grounds by Dittrich (op. cit.).

1.3.2.2.2 Language Usage versus Individual Expression

Another distinction in Paul's Prinzipien which we believe to have been influential where Saussure's linguistic theorizing is concerned is the opposition between "Sprachusus" and "individuelle Sprechätigkeit" (1909:33) which is paralleled by the distinction between "Gemeinsprache" and "individuelle Sprachen" (p. 413) as well as by the social contrast between the "Sprachgenossenschaft" (also "Verkehrsgenossenschaft") and the "Individuum" (cf. 418-21 [passim]). Paul opposes Wundt's conception of national psychology ("Völkerpsychologie") strongly on several occasions. Although he states in the preface to the fourth edition of the Prinzipien (1909:v) that he follows the principles (though not the metaphysical outlook) of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841), he does not always agree with the national psychology put forward by Heyman Steinthal (1823-99) and Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) since 1860 in their Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft and other publications either, despite the fact that they too adhered to Herbart's psychology. Wundt's approach is rejected on the grounds that Wundt believes that linguistic changes have their origin in the collective conscience ("Volksseele") and not in the individual ("Einzelseele"), that he deals with language only from the point of view of the speaker and not also from that of the listener, and finally that he wishes to draw his conclusions from observations of language to the benefit of national psychology and not vice versa (cf. Paul, 1909: v-vi). Paul's basic objection, besides a number of others (cf. 1909: 8-13), to Lazarus and Steinthal is his conviction that only the individual
can be the subject of scientific observation and that general notions can be deduced only from the investigation of a large number of individuals (12-3). Paul stresses his conviction that every "linguistic creation is always the work of an individual" (18), and therefore asserts that the true object of the linguist is "the totality of manifestations of speech activity in all individuals in their mutual interaction." For this reason, in order to serve as a useful foundation for the historical treatment of language, the description of a language, Paul argues, must not only list all its individual constituents but depict "the relation of the elements to each other, their relative strengths, the connections into which they enter, the degree of closeness and strength of these connections" (29).

Since, as has been noted, Paul favours the individual psychology as against national psychology on empirical grounds, all these linguistically crucial relationships can be found, according to him, in the language of the individual in whose mind are embedded the interlocking groups of representation ("Vorstellungsgruppen") with their multiple interlaced relationships which are relevant to speech activity (cf. 27-31 [passim]). However, to relate the observed physical facts to mental ones is, according to Paul, "possible only through analogical inferences based on what we have observed in our own minds" (30); this means that the linguist is his best informant, a belief which is held again by Chomsky in our time.

Viewing the individual psyche as the place of the associations and connections between language components Paul brings his argument to its logical conclusion when he asserts that we have to distinguish as many languages as there are individuals. There can be no doubt that this empirical point of view, which obliges Paul to attest that even the idiolect is subject to change and cannot be regarded as a constant quantity (cf. 1909:39-40), creates not only an irreconcilable opposition between the individual and society but destroys any basis for a general theory of language. Paul, however, attempts to bridge this opposition by positing a kind of interaction between the individual speakers and, in consequence, between the language of the individual and the language of the speech community. The latter, by contrast with the former, is nothing but an artifact of the linguist. The language custom ("Sprachusus") is arrived
at by the comparison of a number of idiolects, is an abstraction and has no existence of its own (37-8); to call it 'linguistic average' ("Durchschnitt"; cf. 1909:29) does not make it less hypothetical. In fact language custom, as against the theoretical significance which Paul claims for the language of the individual, is derivative, vague and does not seem to yield to a given structure.\textsuperscript{22}

As he did in his stand regarding synchrony versus diachrony in language study, Saussure once again took the opposite side when he introduced his influential distinction between \textit{langue} and \textit{parole} in his second course on general linguistics in 1908. According to Saussure language is not complete in the individual but exists perfectly only in the multitude ("masse" [CLG, 30]). He admits that it is \textit{parole} which makes the language evolve (CLG, 37), but believes that these two aspects can be separated from each other, to the extent that one can make both an independent subject of linguistic investigation, and suggests the first "bifurcation" necessary if one wishes to theorize: the distinction between a linguistics of \textit{la parole} and a linguistics of \textit{la langue} (38), adding that linguistics proper can only be concerned with the latter (39). Saussure could see the difficulties into which Paul had run with his intention to make the 'idiolect' the sole object proper of linguistic investigation; it is therefore not surprising that he never provided a linguistics of \textit{la parole} as the editors noted with some regret (CLG, 197, note; cf. also 2.2.1). Van Hamel (1945: 79) believed that Saussure's \textit{langue/parole} dichotomy had been developed in parallel to the contrast between sociology and psychology. This is certainly false as we have tried to explain at some length earlier in this study (cf. 1.2); Paul, on the other hand, may have been influenced by the opposition between individual psychology and national psychology when formulating his distinction between "Sprachusus" and "individuelle Sprech- tätigkeit". Saussure's distinction, as we have attempted to illustrate (cf. 1.2.2), is certainly not a derivative from considerations outside linguistics proper but has sprung from an inner theoretical necessity (s. 2.2.1.2) making his dichotomy of synchrony versus diachrony a valid one. It owes much, we believe, to the theoretical difficulties Paul encountered with this positivist and empirical approach to the facts of
language. In fact, when Saussure affirms that *langue* is independent of the individual (cf. CLG, 37; CLG(E), 56) and external to him (CLG, 30, though not supported by CLG(E), 42), it seems that these affirmations constitute in some way an over-reaction against Paul's contention that language can only be observed in the individual speaker.

1.3.2.2.3 Formal and Material Connections of Words

Paul's *Prinzipien* may well have been, as W. K. Percival has recently suggested, a source of inspiration with regard to Saussure's concept of *rapports associatifs* in language (CLG, 170-5). Arens (1969:347) too refers to the similarity between the views of Paul and Saussure in this respect and draws attention to Kruszewski's distinction between "Angrenzungsassoziationen" and "Ähnlichkeitsassoziationen", a point which we shall take up in a later chapter (cf. 1.3.3.3).

Humboldt appears to have introduced the somewhat unfortunate distinction between *Stoff* and *Form* (cf. G. F. Meier, 1961:16) which, particularly owing to his various interpretations, has caused much confusion among later generations of linguists. Paul appears to have contributed his share to this questionable tradition by distinguishing between "stoffliche" and "formale Gruppen", i.e. material and formal groups, of linguistic organisation (1909:106-20). As an adherent of Herbart's psychology of association (cf. 25-8) developed by Lazarus, Misteli, and Steinthal, Paul maintains that individual words attract each other in the human mind ("Seele") forming a number of smaller or larger groups. This reciprocal attraction, Paul asserts, "is always based on partial agreement between sound[s] or meaning[s] or sound and meaning together." (106). These groups of association do not necessarily remain separated from each other but may combine to form further groups or amalgamate. Paul exemplifies his formal and material groups in the following manner: 1) Material groups are for instance a) the various cases of a noun, b) groups of words which show a correspondence in meaning which may at times be paralleled by formal
similarities since an etymological relation is often their basis, (c) those which are semantically opposite only, e.g. *man* vs. *woman*, *girl* vs. *boy*, *sister* vs. *brother*, *little* vs. *big*, and d) finally words which are related by their content, e.g. *sterben* : *Tod*; *gut* : *besser*; *bin* : *ist* : *war*. 2) Formal groups are, according to Paul, "the sum of all Nomina actionis, all comparatives, nominatives, all first persons of verbs etc." (1909:107). Paul does not give reasons for his classifications nor attempt any grouping of his examples (as we have tried to do above). He appears to see more interrelations and crossings of groups, noting that the material groups "are as a rule crossed by the formal ones" (*ibid.*), than any order of any specific kind. Formal groups, Paul observes, can be held together by phonetic agreement, e.g. *libro* : *anno*; *mensae* : *rosae*, but also *gab* : *nahm*; *bot* : *log*, etc. Although he is concerned with different cases and tenses expressed by the verb, Paul does not speak of paradigmatic relations as one might have expected. In the subsequent paragraphs Paul introduces further distinctions. Thus he speaks of material-formal groups of proportions ("Proportionengruppen") and gives the following examples: *Tag* : *Tages* : *Tage* = *Arm* : *Armes* : *Arme* = *Fisch* : *Fisches* : *Fische*; *führen* : *Führer* : *Führung* = *erziehen* : *Erzieher* : *Erziehung*, etc. (1909:107).

Paul later on adds what he calls material-phonetic or etymological-phonetic groups as well as certain syntactic associations (cf. 1909:108-9). He lists all these various kinds of relations in order to demonstrate that there must be a combinatory activity in the human mind which furnishes these kinds of groupings, since it cannot be expected that we reproduce every individual word or group of words. Paul calls the underlying principle, which permits these various combinations and associations, an analogic formation or analogy (1909:110), a principle to which he devotes ample space (pp. 110-20) since it appears to be one of his main explanations for linguistic change.

Saussure (CLG, 173-5) appears to have made similar observations. Mental association, Saussure observes, does not limit itself to comparing those terms which have something in common but tends also to connect diverse things in each individual case, establishing as many associative series as there are diverse relations (cf. CLG(E), 287). Saussure does not attempt
a classification of associative relations, but contents himself with a number of examples, some of which have been left out by the editors of the Cours. Saussure for instance observed that the two words chapeau and hôtel have no connection whereas a relation can be established when we derive from them chapelier and hôteliér respectively (CLG(E), 286). In this case formal properties provide a possibility for association (although Saussure admitted that "dans toute association de formes, le sens y joue son rôle" [ibid.]).

Similarly the word enseignement can be associated in our mind with enseigner, enseignons, etc. since they share the same root (CLG, 173); but enseignement could also be connected with armement, changement, etc. because of the suffix they have in common (CLG, 174). In addition a mental association may spring from the analogy of the signifiés, e.g. enseignement, instruction, apprentissage, éducation (ibid.; cf. CLG(E), 287). These few examples already demonstrate that one can compare the views of Saussure with those put forward by Paul. By contrast with syntagmatic relations which, in Saussure's words, suggest immediately the idea of an order of succession, associative relations appear quite undetermined and less predictable as to the kind of order in which they may arise (cf. CLG, 174). It is therefore not surprising that neither Saussure nor Paul can formulate, from a linguistic point of view, the categories involved in associative relations as they operate almost incessantly in the human mind.

Saussure, as Paul did before him, distinguished tentatively between formal kinds of associative relations, e.g. chapeau : chapelier = hôtel : hôteliér, words which share the same root or suffix (s. above), and relations which have their origin in semantic similarities, e.g. enseignement, instruction, etc. In addition, Saussure does not fail to mention that there can be simultaneously a similarity of form and meaning as well (CLG, 174). This tripartite division corresponds clearly to Paul's distinction between formale, stoffliche-formale, and stoffliche Gruppen; thus substantiating Percival's suggestion (cf. fn. 24).

What remains to be traced in the linguistic literature of the late 19th century is the source of Saussure's ideas concerning syntagmatic
relations in language for which Paul, as far as we can see, does not pro-
vide a model; for the mechanism of language is based on relations along the
syntagmatic string as well as on the less easily accessible associative re-
lations (cf. CLG, 177-80). The relations which are established by the *suite
linéaire* of speech will be compared in the subsequent chapter (cf. 1.3.3.3)
with Kruszewski's suggestions concerning associations of contiguity.

After Whitney, it would seem therefore that an important source of
Saussure's inspiration (as well as criticism) was Paul's *Prinzipien.*
Three major concepts of Saussure's linguistic theory have been anticipated
or at least suggested in Paul's outline of historical linguistics: 1)
The distinction between *langue* and *parole* (cf. Paul's dichotomies "Sprach-
usus": "individuelle Sprechfähigkeit" = "usuellt[e]": "okasionsn[el[e]
Bedeutung]" = "Gemeinsprache": "Individuumsprache" ["idiolect"] = "Ver-
kehrsgemeinschaft": "der Einzelne"); 26 2) the distinction between syn-
chronic and diachronic linguistics (cf. Paul's distinction between "des-
kriptive" and "historische Sprachwissenschaft", and also his distinction
between "Prinzipienwissenschaft" and "Sprachgeschichte", the former being
the basis for the latter); and 3) the concept of associative relations
in language (cf. Paul's "formale" and "stoffliche Gruppen"). 27

We have already pointed out that Paul showed himself to be aware of
the concept of 'language state' (FdS: "état de langue"; Paul: "Sprachzustand")
which was to become an important principle of Saussure's theory (cf. Lieb,
1968 and 1970), and also that Paul did not neglect the social aspect of
language although he emphasized the importance of the individual in language
and its evolution. In short, Paul's *Prinzipien* certainly did play an impor-
tant rôle in the development of Saussure's linguistic thought, not only
ex negativo but also quite frequently in a positive sense, although the
notes from Saussure as well as from his pupils which have been recovered
so far do not make any explicit acknowledgement of this undeniable fact. 28

G. Helbig has recently pointed out that Paul's *Prinzipien* contained
"bereits den Keim zur Selbstüberwindung mancher junggrammatischer Axiome" 
(1970:18), and we may appropriately conclude our discussion on the relation
between Paul and Saussure with a statement to the effect that, as M. Ivić
noted a few years ago (1965:62), much of what Paul had said in a somewhat
verbose and inchoate fashion appeared in a far more systematic manner as a
basic tenet of Saussure's theory. 29
1 Both reviewed at length the first ed. of Paul (1880), Tobler in *LGRP* 2.4, coll. 121-6 (1881), and Misteli in *ZfVS* 13:382-409 (1882); s. also Franz Techmer's (1843-91) review of the first and second editions of Paul's *Prinzipien* in *IZAS* 3:356-61 (1887). We expound this fact because we wish to stress that Paul's emphasis on historical linguistics as the sole scientific approach to language was opposed, as early as in the 1880s, by a number of his contemporaries in Germany and not only by Fds in his Paris and Geneva lectures.

2 Cf. *Die Darwin'sche Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaft* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1863); 2nd ed. 1873, p. 10.

3 The passage in which Paul defended his standpoint is on p. 19 of the 2nd ed. (1886) and p. 20 of the 3rd and subsequent editions of the *Prinzipien*. We point out this fact to counteract the suggestion made by Tagliavini (1963:304-5) and others which misleadingly interprets Paul's insistence on the historical treatment of language as a reaction against Fds's affirmations in the *Cours* of 1916. Note that we shall quote from the final version of the *Prinzipien* which appeared in 1920 and has been reprinted frequently ever since; the last edition appeared in 1970 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer). We believe that the procedure to quote from the last version is justified on the following grounds, though we shall - for reasons cited above - refer to the 4th ed. of 1909: 1) the 5th ed. is practically identical with the 4th (cf. *Prinzipien* of 1970, p. viii); 2) the 3rd (1898) and 4th (1909) editions follow the 2nd rev. and enl. ed. of 1886 very closely adding mainly new data and bibliographical references; 3) in fact we have compared the 1st ed. of 1880 with the 5th of 1920 and can affirm that the following passages are almost identical: 1920:1-20 = 1880:1-23; 1920:20-2 were rewritten in 1886; 1920:23-8 = 1880:26-33; 1920:29-36, esp. pp. 29-31 were revised in 1886; 1920:37-48 = 1880:231-44 with changes of emphasis on p. 40; 1920:49-73 = 1880:40-60, with the exception of pp. 62-7 which were added in 1886 as well as the last three paragraphs on p. 73; 1920:106-15 = 1880:61-76, with some changes and minor additions; 1920: 115-20 was added in 1886; 1920:404-22 = 1880:266-88. The same applies to 1920:174-88 = 1880:183-99; 1920:189-216 = 1880:78-99; 1920:242-50 = 1880:145-53; 1920:251-62 = 1880:131-44; 1920:352-72 = 1880:200-30, and 1920:373-89 = 1880:245-65, chapters which do not concern us here as they do not relate to synchronic concepts or methods. In cases where questions of priority are involved earlier editions of the *Prinzipien* will be consulted as well.

4 S. the chaps., "The Theories of Hermann Paul" and "The Neogrammian Heritage: Saussure", which constitute the bulk of the introductory part.

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5 We quote from the 4th ed. of Paul's Prinzipien which is essentially identical with the 2nd of 1886; cf. note 3.

6 Prinzipien, 23; Paul's expression "parallel aneinander gefügt" exhibits the faulty logic of his at times rather clumsy and diffuse style. Since descriptive grammar describes one language from a synchronic point of view only, Paul would have done better to say "zeitlich nacheinander", i.e. in chronological order, or something similar.

7 The passage reads: "Sehen wir nun, wie sich bei dieser Natur des Objekts die Aufgabe des Geschichtsschreibers stellt. Der Beschreibung von Zuständen wird er nicht entraten können, da er es mit grossen Komplexen von gleichzeitig neben einander liegenden Elementen zu tun hat." (1909:29). The ultimate goal of linguistic research must be, according to Paul, to describe the mechanism of the Sprachgefühl.

8 S. ZRPh 23:538-53 (1899).

9 Part I [the only part published]: Einleitung und allgemeine Grundlegung (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1903), xv + 786 + 95 [Bilderatlas].

10 Cf. Wundt, Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte. Vol. I, Parts I and II: Die Sprache (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1900), 3rd ed., 1911-12, xv + 627, and x + 644 pp.; Delbrück, Grundfragen der Sprachforschung, mit Rücksicht auf W. Wundt's Sprachpsychologie erörtert (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1901), vii + 180 pp., and Wundt's reply, Sprachgeschichte und Sprachpsychologie, mit Rücksicht auf B. Delbrück's "Grundfragen der Sprachforschung" (Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1901), 100 pp. S. also Dittrich, 1903:75-6 (note), and his review of Wundt's writings in ZRPh 27:198-216 (1903). Another, though less convincing, criticism of Wundt is the book by Ludwig Sütterlin (1863-1934), Das Wesen der sprachlichen Gebilde: Kritische Bemerkungen zu W. Wundts Sprachpsychologie (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1902), vii + 192 pp. There can be no doubt that Saussure followed this debate with much interest; his own psychologism reveals how much he himself was influenced by the ideas prevailing at this time.

11 We quote the passage from the C. original in full because we believe it to be an important document for the history of linguistic thought, both in its apparent theoretical rigour and its final confusion: "... gewisse Beziehungen der Sprachgeschichte zu den übrigen von uns behaupteten notwendigen Teilen der Sprachwissenschaft lassen uns doch als wünschenswert erscheinen, hier wenigstens die nächsten Unterteilungsgründe und darauf ruhenden Unterdisziplinen der Sprachgeschichte anzugeben,

12 Zur Herkunft und Funktion des Begriffspaares Synchronie - Diachronie", Sprache der Gegenwart V, 30-51; here p. 38.

13 In the index FdS prepared for a book which he intended to write in 1894 or thereabout (cf. SM, 37), he defined "diachronique" as "opposé à synchronique ou idiosynchronique" (SM, 49).

14 Cf. also Paul's statement that a "Beschreibung eines Sprachzustandes zu liefern, die im stande ist eine durchaus brauchbare Unterlage für die geschichtliche Forschung zu liefern, ist ... keine leichte, unter Umständen eine höchst schwierige Aufgabe, zu deren Lösung bereits Klarheit über das Wesen des Sprachlebens gehört." (Prinzipien, p. 31).

15 As for the synchrony/diachrony distinction, we can add that Paul did in fact distinguish between Lautwandel (= a diachronic process) and Lautwechsel (= the synchronic counterpart which, according to Paul, "ist nicht mit dem Lautwandel identisch, sondern ... nur eine Nachwirkung desselben"). S. Prinzipien, p. 68. U. Weinreich (in his article referred to in note 4, here pp. 115-6) believes that Paul's moderate views concerning sound laws were illuminated by Kruszewski's criticism, and the distinction between historically asserted sound changes and synchronically active vocalic alternations was derived from his monograph Über die Lautabweichung of 1881 (the reference op. cit., p. 192, is incidentally incorrect), an assertion which he attempts to substantiate by the fact that Paul referred to Kruszewski's writings which appeared in vols. I-III, and V of IZAS (1884-90). Although this is an unconvincing argument since Paul's distinction was introduced in the 2nd ed. of the Prinzipien (1886), and the reference to Kruszewski was not added before the 4th ed. of 1909! (Cf. Paul, 1909:xiv in contrast to the 3rd ed. of 1898, p. xi). The only two references to Kruszewski (IZAS 2:260-8 [1885] and 3:145-70 [1887]) and
IZAS 5:133-44), 339-48 [1890]) are found on p. 49, n.1, and p. 189, n.1 respectively. There is a serious possibility of such an influence: Brugmann wrote a review of Kruszewski's Lautabwechslung which appeared in LC 32, coll. 400-1 (1882). Brugmann, however, did not grasp the meaning of Kruszewski's term "Lautabwechslung"!

16 See his books, Lehrbuch der Psychologie (Königsberg: Unzer, 1816), and the 2 vols. of his Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik (ibid., 1824-25).


18 Cf. also Ivić (1965:52-5) and, in particular, Arens (1969:415-6).

19 Cf. his statement: "Alles dreht sich mir darum die Sprachentwicklung aus der Wechselwirkung abzuleiten, welche die Individuen auf einander ausuben." (p. 12, n.1).


21 "In Wirklichkeit werden in jedem Augenblicke innerhalb einer Volksgemeinschaft so viele Dialekte geredet als redende Individuen vorhanden sind" (Prinzipien, 38).

22 This appears somewhat contradicted by Paul's fine terminological distinction between "usuell" and "okkasionell" when dealing with semantic change (Prinzipien, 74ff.).

23 FdS surely echoes Paul when he states: "Entre tous les individus ainsi reliés par le langage [i.e. by the social nature of language], il s'établira une sorte de moyenne: tous reproduiront, non exactement sans doute, mais approximativement - les mêmes signes unis aux mêmes concepts." (CLG, 29). FdS regards heterogenity within the "Sprachusus", it would seem, not as a subject of systematic description, but as a kind of imprecision of performance in conformity with Paul's view: "Die grosse Gleichmässigkeit aller sprachlichen Vorgänge in den verschiedenen Individuen ist die wesentliche Basis für eine exakt wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis derselben." (Prinzipien, 19 [spaced in the original]).

24 In private correspondence (of Dec. 10, 1970), Percival, who has been engaged in preparing a reedition of H. A. Strong, W. S. Logeman, and B. I. Wheeler's E. adaption of Paul's Prinzipien, Introduction to the History of Language (London: Longmans, 1891), stated: "I have always been struck by the similarity between Saussure's concept of associative
relations and Hermann Paul's notion of stoffliche und formale Gruppen (Prinzipien, chapter 5)."

25 FdS separating synchrony and diachrony from each other in his exposition fails to draw attention to his discussion of the *rapports associatifs* when he treats analogy (CLG, 221-30, 231-7) although he clearly states that this phenomenon "est d'ordre psychologique" (CLG, 226).

26 After completion of this section we came across Piero Meriggi's paper, "Die Junggrammatiker und die heutige Sprachwissenschaft", *Sprache* 12:1-15 (1966) in which the author stresses this parallel adding that not only the distinction was forestalled by Paul but also the causal relation between these two opposing factors in language and its development; s. *loc. cit.*, 1, n.1, and cf. also *ICPS*, 23 (1965).

27 Saussure's underlying psychology is very similar to Paul's when he states that the organisation of language as a system (within the mind of the individual) depends on the existence of a "faculté d'association et de coordination" (CLG, 29).

28 A number of other expressions in Paul's Prinzipien apart from those mentioned above could be compared with terms in the Cours; cf. "Verkehr" (Prinzipien, 39) : "intercourse" (CLG, 281); "Lautbild" (op. *cit.*, 52, 58) : "image acoustique" (CLG, 28, 32, 98-9); Paul speaks of the "urafängliche Zusammenknüpfung von Laut und Bedeutung" (op. *cit.*, 35) in contrast to FdS's 'arbitraire'; in Paul's book the expression of system is used quite frequently, e.g. "Lautsystem der Sprache" (53; cf. also 106) or his statement: "Es besteht in allen Sprachen eine gewisse Harmonie des Lautsystems." (57; cf. Kruszewski in *IZAS* 2:264 [1885] who makes the same affirmation referring at the same time to Sievers' *Grundzüge der Phonetik* of 1881); s. also Paul's distinction between "Lautwandel" (FdS's changement phonétique [CLG, 199]) and "Lautwechsel" (FdS's alternance [CLG, 216]), Prinzipien, 68 (already mentioned above). Further parallels could probably be detected.

29 For a more explicit and in parts more coherent statement to this effect, see now E. F. K. Koerner, "Hermann Paul and Synchronic Linguistics", to appear in *Lingua*. 
Although Saussure's temporary association with the neogrammarians has not been contested by anybody, the influence of ideas expressed by members of the "Leipzig School" on him are generally minimized or completely ignored in the histories of linguistics. The neogrammarians have been criticized for their "atomism" and data-orientation and little attention has been paid to those members of the *Junggrammatische Richtung* who displayed a pronounced interest in formulating general principles of language analysis. We believe that, second to Paul, it is Eduard Sievers who deserves our attention with regard to his systematic approach to the phonetic aspect of language.

In the history of linguistics it is the period regarding the *Junggrammatiker* particularly which needs to be rewritten; books hitherto available on this subject are at best sketchy, mostly contradictory and full of serious omissions. There is not even unanimity to be found among them as to who actually belonged to the first generation of neo-grammarians. We believe that the original groups of linguists at Leipzig around Friedrich Zarncke (1825-91) and Georg Curtius (1820-85) were Brugmann and Osthoff who were associated with Karl Verner (1846-96), August Leskien (1840-1916), and probably also with Heinrich Hübschmann (1848-1908); Wilhelm Scherer (1841-86) appears to have played a germinal rôle similar to Whitney's. At the age of twenty Sievers (1850-1932) translated Vilhelm Thomsen's (1842-1927) study of 1869 on the influence of Germanic on the language of the Lapps and Finnish. According to Pedersen (1962:305) he was "very close to the circle of young Leipzigers" at the time, and his *Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie* of 1876, which is generally accepted as marking a turning point in phonetics (cf. Ivić, 1965:108; Malmberg, 1964:99; Kukenheim, 1966:83; for an opposite view, s. Häusler, 1968:42) stood sponsor in a way, as Pedersen points out, to Brugmann's famous theory of "Nasalis sonans" of the same year, in which Brugmann refers to Sievers' book.

Sievers, probably the most brilliant of the neogrammarians, as W. P. Lehmann (1967:210f.) points out, became professor of German philology
at Jena University at the age of twenty-one, and in 1876 the first chair
of this subject was established for him at the same university, the
same year that his Grundzüge appeared in Leipzig. It will be recalled
that Saussure as a young man had arrived at Leipzig in Fall 1876 to pursue
linguistic studies, and had no doubt acquainted himself fairly early
with Sievers' book as he certainly did with Die Kerenzer Mundart des
Kantons Glarus by Jost Winteler (1846-1929) which also appeared in 1876.
Judging from the frequent re-editions of Sievers' Grundzüge this book
was not only regarded as replacing Brücke's book devoted to the same
subject, but as the leading authority on articulatory phonetics for
at least a generation.

Lehmann, in his Reader of 19th century historical linguistics (1967:
257) has stressed the modernity of the views put forward by Sievers with
regard to the definition of sounds as members of a system and the view
that individual sounds are abstractions whose value is dependent on the
linguist's viewpoint. Sievers' insistence that the sentence is to be
taken as the minimum linguistic unit has been characterized by Lehmann
as possibly the "most notable" of Sievers' views; it should, however,
be added that this statement is not to be found in Sievers' Grundzüge
prior to the third edition (s. 1885:8), a fact which may suggest that
Sievers took this idea from elsewhere, possibly from similar works by
Sweet from whose Handbook of 1887 he appears to have adopted the term
'Phonetik'. It is to be regretted that Lehmann (1967:258-66) translated
important sections from the fifth edition of Sievers' Grundzüge (1901)
instead of portions from the first or the second edition, since it is to
be suspected that Sievers revised his views considerably during this
lapse of 25 years. We shall refer to Sievers' earlier editions, i.e.,
the first (1876) and the second (1881), in order to give an historically
more accurate picture of tenets held during the crucial period of Saussure's
formative years.

In the preface to his Grundzüge (1876:v-viii, which should be read
together with the one that Winteler wrote to his book, 1876:iii-x),
Sievers emphasizes that each isolated phonetic fact remains dead and
fruitless and can produce confusion unless a systematic approach is
undertaken (pp. vi-vii). Sievers places the physiology of sounds or phonetics as somewhere between (a) physics, in that it is concerned with acoustic analysis of individual sounds, (b) physiology, insofar as it investigates the functions of the organs which become active in the production and perception of speech sounds, and (c) linguistics, insofar as phonetics provides information about the nature of one of its important aspects, i.e. everything which concerns the vocal part of speech, the combination and function of sounds as well as their evolution (cf. 1876:1). When Sievers stresses in the subsequent paragraph of the introduction that the study of isolated sounds (in contrast to physics and physiology) cannot be an aim in itself and that phonetics to the linguist is nothing but an auxiliary science, he appears to have anticipated Saussure's view expressed in 1894 (s. CLG(E), 92) and ultimately in the Cours, a position which has been maintained by a number of Western linguists until today.

But what is more important here is the fact that Sievers states in the next sentence (which surprisingly has been eliminated in the third and subsequent editions of the Grundzüge) that for the linguist it is not the individual sound but the sound systems of the individual linguistic units, their relation and gradual displacement which are of value. This emphasis on the investigation of the sound system in contrast to the isolated speech sound is repeated in the subsequent passages of the introductory statement. In fact Sievers finds it necessary even at this point (i.e. before summing up his observations concerning individual sounds in § 8 of his outline) to stress in the general introduction "most emphatically that the tasks of sound physiology cannot be solved by a mere statistical consideration of individual sounds and their evolutions. For in general it is not the individual sound undergoing change which follows universally valid laws, but rather there is usually a corresponding development of a corresponding series of sounds in corresponding positions (cf. for example the uniform transformation of the series of tenues, mediae and aspiratae in the Germanic consonant shift, . . .") etc. (1881:3-4). In the following paragraph Sievers asks the linguist to seek an exact insight into the structure of every
phonological system of the language under investigation, pointing out that one always has to keep in mind that it is not so much the number of sounds by themselves that is relevant but their interrelationships (1876:4).

It will be noted that these observations are strikingly similar, though far less rigorously stated, to Saussure's claim that there are nothing but differences in language (cf. CLG(E), 270), and that ultimately language is a system of terms which are defined by mutual contrast. It is not unreasonable to claim that, although the term 'phoneme' cannot be found in Sievers, his statement points to a phonemic principle (similar to Sweet's "broad Romic" transcription in 1877) which Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski and also Winteler developed during roughly the same time.

It appears that Sievers' observations played an important rôle in Saussure's phonological theorizing. However, it is somewhat difficult to give a clear account of this matter because the notes which Bally made from three lectures devoted to the syllable which Saussure gave in 1897 (cf. CLG, 63 [ed.]) have not been recovered. If one can rely on the editors' indication (CLG 66, n.1) Saussure used the fifth edition of Sievers' Grundzüge when he lectured on phonetic principles in his courses on general linguistics.13 But, as H. G. Schogt (1966:18) has recently pointed out, phonological analysis is probably the weakest part in the Saussurean Cours; nor is Saussure's theory of the syllable as advanced as had been thought, as is shown in Gyula Laczicius' Lehrbuch der Phonetik.14 What we believe to be the most important aspect of Sievers' work in terms of the development of Saussure's linguistic theory is Sievers' frequent emphasis on the importance of the systematic character of language, a concept which Saussure employed rigorously and so successfully even as early as in his Mémoire of 1878 (cf. C. Vallini, 1969:24), as we have pointed out earlier in this chapter.15 Once again, however, a suggestion has been taken up by Saussure and developed to an extent which had not been thought of before in linguistic studies. Buyssens is certainly not correct when he claims that since the Mémoire "le terme système était entré dans l'usage" (CFS 18:21 [1961]),
for the notion of language as an organism and as a system was fairly common throughout the 19th century (cf. Lepschy, 1970:34) –, but Buysens is right when he states that earlier uses of this term did not imply a coherent concept of mutually defined terms comparable to that which Saussure proposed for it (cf. CLG, 1959-62).
FOOTNOTES - 1.3.2.3

1 Arens, 1969:316, and Putschke, 1969:19-20, the most recent accounts we are aware of, contradict each other on various points; Lepschy and Waterman, both of 1970, do not mention Sievers at all.

2 Rudolf Kögel (1855-99) and the young Saussure were associated for some time with the neogrammarians. Paul, Wilhelm Braune (1850-1926), Gustav Meyer (1850-1900), Otto Behaghel (1854-1936), Berthold Delbrück (1842-1922), and Ernst Windisch (1844-1918) joined the Jung-grammatiker fairly early; Wilhelm Meyer-Lübke (1861-1936), Wilhelm Streitberg (1864-1925), Holger Pedersen (1867-1953), and many other linguists followed them towards the end of the 19th century. The Göttingen circle around August Fick (1833-1916), notably Adalbert Bezzenberger (1851-1922) and Hermann Collitz (1855-1935), as well as to a considerable extent members of the Kazan school, followed suit, methodologically at least. Hermann Ziemer (1845-1910), a Gymnastallehrer at Colberg on the Baltic Sea, associated himself rather early with the neogrammarian movement (cf. Brugmann, LC 33:402 [1882]).


4 The importance of Sievers' Grundzüge for Brugmann's findings in 1876 is paralleled by the support which Jost Winteler's monograph of the same year was to Osthoff and Brugmann's postulate of exceptionless sound laws in their Morphologische Untersuchungen of 1878. Winterler's synchronic description of a Swiss-German dialect provided the strongest evidence available to these two 'Young Turks' for their claim.

5 For pertinent information, s. Dietrich Germann's accounts, "Die Berufung von Eduard Sievers als ausserordentlichen Professor der deutschen Philologie nach Jena (1871)", WZUJ 5:699-701 (1955/56), and "Eduard, Sievers und die Gründung des Ordinariats für deutsche Philologie an der Universität Jena 1876", Wissenschaftliche Anmälen (Berlin) 6:485-93 (1957). For a detailed account of Sievers s. Theodor Frings' obituary, "Eduard Sievers", BvSAW 85.1:1[3]-56 (1933), followed by a bibliography of Sievers' writings, ibid., 57-92, comp. by Elisabeth Karg-Gasterstädt. Sievers was a professor at Jena (1871-83), Tübingen (1883-7), Halle (1887-92), and finally Leipzig (1892-1932).
It has been established (cf. De Mauro, 1968:361) that FdS owned the 2nd ed. of Sievers' Grundzüge (1881) as well as Winteler's dialect study. It is perhaps worth noting that Sievers and Winteler worked together very closely; cf. Sievers (1876:vi), and Winteler (1876:x) who mentions Delbrück's teachings as well which he followed at Jena.


Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie zur Einführung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1876), x + 150 pp.; 2nd rev. & enl. ed., which also replaces "Lautphysiologie" by "Phone

Cf. CLG, 56 in which FdS stated emphatically that phonetics is nothing but "une discipline auxiliaire" and is concerned with parole, the individual speech act only and not with langue, the system of meaningful vocal signs (cf. also CLG, 37, and CLG(E), 91-2). It should be noted that FdS used the terms "phonologie" and "phonetics" (CLG, 55-7) in the reverse sense of modern usage, but which was still maintained by Maurice Grammont in his Traité de phonétique (Paris: Delagrave, 1933; 4th rev. ed., 1950).

The passage, which is identical in the 2nd ed. of 1881, runs as follows: "Für ihn [i.e. the linguist] hat nicht der einzelne Laut einen Werth, sondern die Lautsysteme der einzelnen Spracheinheiten, deren Verhältnis zu einander und ihre allmäßliche Verschiebung." (1876 = 1881:1). One should remember that Sievers' book was written for the use of the historical linguist as its subtitle (cf. n.8) indicates.

Cf. the frequent use of "Lautsystem" (1876:2, 3[three times!], 4, and 5); "Schriftsystem" (1876:2); "System" (p. 4, [twice]).

We quote from the 2nd ed. here (which was owned by FdS) because this statement has been made somewhat more explicit than in the 1st ed. (cf. 1876:3-4). It is interesting to note that the term "Lautphysiologie" in the 1st ed. (which was replaced by "Phonetik" in the 2nd ed.) has been replaced by "historische Phonetik" in the 3rd and subsequent editions in this specific context (cf. Grundzüge, 3rd ed., 1885:6). We are unable to determine whether Sievers, like Brugmann, meant to say "statisch" when he wrote "statistisch". Cf. however Lieb, 1967:22, and note 11.

According to the same note (CLG, 66) Otto Jespersen's Lehrbuch der Phonetik (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1904), 2nd ed., 1913, and Léonce Roudet's Eléments de phonétique générale (Paris: H. Welter, 1910) were both consulted as well. In fact the editors (CLG, 66-7, n.2) acknowledge that they filled in the gaps in the notes with the help of Jespersen's...
book. A comparison between the *Cours* of 1916 and the critical ed. reveals that (at least as far as the students’ notes of 1907-11 are concerned) Sievers was not mentioned on those occasions where the CLG suggests it; cf. CLG, 88 as against CLG(E), 139 or CLG, 94 as against CLG(E), 145, although in this case the passage referred to can easily be traced to Sievers’ *Grundzüge* (1876:27). As for CLG, 92 and CLG(E), 144, where syllabic vs. non-syllabic sounds are discussed, the students’ notes mention Brugmann (cf. his "Nasalis sonans" of 1876 which certainly owes some insights to Sievers) but not Sievers, although this may not be very important here, since both dealt with this problem at length (cf. Sievers, 1876:25-8, 55-7).


15 Cf. also the chap., "Vom Lautwandel", in Sievers’ *Grundzüge* (1876:124ff.) in which Sievers notes the possibility of "vollständige Verschiebungen ganzer Lautsysteme" (p. 127) and that spontaneous phonetic change (by contrast with those changes which are dependent on the phonetic environment) effects "beliebige Systemtheile ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Lautumgebung" (p. 128).
1.3.3 Baudouin de Courtenay, Kruszewski, and Their Ideas about
Language Study in General and Their Theories of Phonological
Analysis in Particular

Ce ne sont pas les linguistes comme Friedrich Müller, de l'Université de Vienne, qui embrassent à peu près tous les idiomes du globe, qui on jamais fait faire un pas à la connaissance du langage; mais les noms qu'on aurait à citer dans ce sens seraient les noms de romanistes comme M. Gaston Paris, M. Paul Meyer et M. Schuchardt, des noms de germanistes comme M. Hermann Paul, des noms de l'école russe s'occupant spécialement de russe et de slave, comme M. N. Baudouin de Courtenay et M. Kruszewski.

F. de Saussure in 1891 (CFS 12:66)

1.3.3.1 Saussure's Acquaintance with the Work of the 'Kazan School', and the Importance of His Earlier Work on Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski

V. V. Vinogradov, an adherent of the 'Petersburg School' founded by Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929) at the turn of this century, pointed out in 1962 that "the conviction is spreading and becoming stronger that F. de Saussure was acquainted with the works of Baudouin de Courtenay and not free of Baudouin's theories when working on his Cours de linguistique générale."¹ This still rather unspecified statement has since been substantiated at least as far as extra-linguistic matters are concerned. In 1963, Natalija A. Sljusareva drew attention to the existence of a letter from Saussure addressed to Baudouin in October 1889 in which the young Assistant Secretary of the Société de Linguistique de Paris referred to their meeting seven years earlier,² and in 1964 E. Benveniste established (with the help of the annual Bulletin of the Society) the fact that these two linguists had met on the occasion of several sessions
of this Society held in Paris in December 1881, January 1882, and probably twice more in the same year.\(^3\)

In addition to these indications two instances have recently been made available to the general linguistic public when some of Saussure's unpublished manuscripts were printed in which Baudouin de Courtenay and his pupil Mikołaj Kruszewski are mentioned. The one reference is contained in Saussure's first lectures held at the University of Geneva in November 1891, in which Saussure singles out these two linguists, together with a number of other Western scholars, as those who had put forward ideas concerned with general problems of language study.\(^4\) The other explicit mention of these two linguists which Saussure made on the occasion of his (never completed) review of A. Sechehaye's *Programme et méthodes* of 1908 is more specific and should be quoted in full since the statement characterizes aptly Saussure's attitude towards their achievements. In this note, Saussure states that undertakings of a kind similar to Sechehaye's attempted previously by Humboldt, Paul and Wundt had been quite unsuccessful (they had mainly provided material), but he goes on to observe:

\[
\text{Baudouin de Courtenay et Kruszewski ont été plus près que personne d'une vue théorique de la langue, cela sans sortir des considérations linguistiques pures; ils sont d'ailleurs ignorés de la généralité des savants occidentaux. (SM, 51).}
\]

We believe that we can draw the following hypotheses from the above information: 1) Saussure had been acquainted with the work of both Baudouin and Kruszewski since 1881; 2) he regarded their writings as attempts at a general view of language, but 3) noted at the same time that they had not been totally successful in their endeavours, and finally 4) that they had been ignored by most western scholars of his time. The first two assertions can be quite easily substantiated; Baudouin himself presented a number of his and Kruszewski's publications which had appeared during the years 1879 and 1881 in Kazan and Warsaw to the Linguistic Society of Paris during his visit,\(^5\) and Saussure not only attended some of these meetings when Baudouin handed them over, but appears to have had the function of cataloguing them for the Library
of the Society, since most secretarial work was done by Saussure.  

As for the fourth observation, there is no satisfactory evidence to the contrary, but it is the third that will have to be the main subject of this chapter, since it is the topic of this part of the study to investigate the potential sources of Saussure's linguistic inspiration.

However, for the sake of historical justice, we should first report the extent to which Saussure for his part had an impact on these two Polish linguists. Although Baudouin appears to have been aware, as early as in 1868, of the fact that sound features were employed to distinguish meanings (cf. Ivic, 1965:133; Hauser, 1968:91-2), it was not before 1881 that his writings contained the term 'fonema' (phoneme) to denote the individual abstract sound unit (cf. Grauer/Wald, 1965:77), and in fact it was Kruszewski who suggested the use of this term in contrast to 'sound' the acoustic-articulatory ("anthropophonic") unit, as Baudouin himself attested on several occasions.

In 1880 Kruszewski had reviewed Brugmann's "Nasalis sonans" (1876) together with Saussure's Mémoire (1878), and spoke very enthusiastically of the latter's accomplishments. Saussure employed the term 'phonème' about forty or fifty times in his Mémoire (cf. pp. 2, 5 [bis], 6 [bis], 7, etc.), and also other terms which Kruszewski and Baudouin appear to have adopted from Saussure's monograph, e.g. 'zéro' (1943, 217), 'alternance' (12, and elsewhere), probably 'sonante' (although SM, 276 and LTS, 47 do not mention it), and possibly also the notion of system (which Saussure used in the title of his work and as a principle underlying his investigations).


See the note, "Saussure et Baudouin de Courtenay", *CFS* 21:129-30 (1964). In fact BDC was elected as a member of the Society on December 3rd, 1881 in Fds's presence (cf. *BSLP* 4.21:ii).

See the "Notes inédites de Fds", *CFS* 12:49-71 (1954), at p. 66 (cf. the motto to section 1.3.3). For the exact date of the manuscript, s. SM, 36 (N 1).

Vol. 4, No. 21 of *BSLP* lists, among others, Kruszewski's *K voprosu o gume* (xxix), the C. version of the theoretical part of this monograph, *Über die Lautabweschlung* (li; both had appeared in 1881), and the same author's "Lingvistischen zametki" of 1880 (xxxv); it also lists Baudouin's *Nekotorye otdeley 'sraniteln'noj grammatiki' slavjanskih jazykov* (Warsaw: M. Zemkevič), 82 pp. (ili).

Saussure's colleague L. Havet wrote a review of Kruszewski's *Über die Lautabwechslung* which appeared in *RCHL* 12.42:278-9 (1881), in which he criticized Kruszewski for treating language development as "un devenir rigoureusement continu" (279), but praised him for his analysis of the phonemes (!) of Russian.

This is particularly true for Bdc's writings of his Kazan period (1875-83) of which we have been unable to trace a single review; by contrast, Kruszewski's publications of the same time have received some attention at least. Aleksander Brückner (1856-1939) criticized his *K voprosu o gume* severely in *ASP* 5:685-6 (1881); (cf. Kruszewski's reply, "Otvet g. Brückner'u", *RFV* 7:135-9 [1882]). Vatroslav Jagic (1838-1923) reviewed his *Ocerk nauki o jazyke* (Kazan 1883) in *ASP* 7:480-2, a study which Schuchardt quoted on occasion in his famous *Über die Lautgesetze* (Berlin: Oppenheim, 1885), v, 5, 31 (= Hugo Schuchardt-
Brugmann wrote a short review of Über die Lautab-  
wechslung (Kazan 1881) in LC 32, coll. 400-1 (1882). H. Paul took note  
of the G. transl. of Kruszewski's 1883 monograph, Prinzipien der Sprach-  
entwicklung (which appeared in instalments in vols. 1-3 and 5 of IZAS  
[1884-90]) in the 4th ed. of his Prinzipien (1909), xiv, 49, n.1, 189,  
n.1, perhaps because he could find support for his own assumptions in  
Kruszewski's outline which in fact had been conceived of under the strong  

8 S. BdC's note, "Wechsel des s (š, ĺ) mit ch in der polnischen  
Sprache", BVSpr 6:221-2 (1868) [1870].

9 Cf. RFV 5:339 (1881), and also BdC's Versuch einer Theorie pho-  
ettischer Alternationen (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1895), p. 7, n. 1,  
where he states explicitly: "Der Vorschlag, den Namen Phonem, im Unter-  
schiede von Laut, zu gebrauchen, rührt von Kruszewski her."

10 "Novejšija otkrytija v. oblasti ario-evropejskogo vokalizma",  
RFV 4:33-45 (1880). It is therefore surprising to note that Godel  
(SM, 272) maintains that BdC had created the term phoneme independently  
from the French phonetician A. Dufriche-Desgenettes who suggested  
'phonème' to replace the somewhat awkward expression 'son du langage'  
in 1873 (cf. SM, 160). L.Havet began to use this term from 1876 on,  

11 The most handy publication by a member of the Kazan school which  
we may use to trace these terms appears to be Kruszewski's Über die  
Lautabwechslung of 1881 (an English translation of which prepared by  
Robert Austerlitz is to be published soon). K. uses the expression  
'Null' twice (7, 9) and as a mathematical sign '0' (35), the expressions  
'System' (e.g. 24) and 'Abwechslung' for Russ.オーレドオヴァニィ "alternation"  
(e.g. 7) throughout his treatise, and also 'Sonante' [sic] (9). For the  
term 'Phonem', s. ibid., note 1 (14-5).
The term "phoneme" has proved to be particularly successful in linguistics, and Baudouin as well as Kruszewski had an important share in this development. Henry G. Schogt has stated that Baudouin's "most outstanding contribution to the development of modern theories is the introduction of an abstract sound-unit" into linguistic studies. Baudouin had in fact observed, as early as 1881, that "we ought to generalize the 'divergenty' [i.e. phonetic manifestations of one and the same distinctive phonematic element] into 'fonemy' [i.e. phonologically-conditioned alternations]. The necessity may then arise that certain 'fonemy' be generalized into more general 'fonemy' - 'fonemy' of a higher order." (RPV 5.3:336). Schogt also considers the works of Baudouin and Saussure to be complementary with regard to their anticipation of modern structural linguistics, pointing out that phonological analysis, which he regards as the weakest part of the Course, is precisely the area in which Baudouin excels. We believe that this is not the only aspect in which the two linguists complement each other or deviate clearly in their interests. Baudouin was a pupil of Schleicher at Jena University in 1867/68. Schleicher was himself an ardent field worker, emphasizing the value of the study of living languages (cf. Dietze, 1966:31-2, 54); Baudouin too was generally speaking data-orientated and, although he did not completely neglect historical linguistics, he presented a study on dialects of Italian Slovenes for his Russian doctoral dissertation in 1875. He had investigated this subject during the preceding year, and during his lifetime he accumulated vast amounts of data on Slavonic dialects, as he reported himself in 1929. It is therefore not surprising that even Baudouin's most gifted pupil, who had received a formal education in philosophy, particularly logic, and in psychology at Warsaw University before joining Baudouin at Kazan in 1878 to specialize in linguistics, emphasizes minute phonetic analysis ("microskopische Forschungen") in the determination of phenomena of linguistic change.
in his 1881 publication. Stanisław Szober (1871-1938), a later pupil of Baudouin, reports in his obituary that the work of Heymann Steinthal (1823-99) had made a deep impression on Baudouin, and Häusler believes that a number of Baudouin's theses about the nature of language can be traced to Steinthal's *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (Berlin: Dümmler, 1871), in particular his assumption that language is always reproduced from the human soul in which it has its origin, and a number of further psychological views (1968:34, and 135, n.83-4). This emphasis on the psychological interpretation of linguistic facts can already be observed in Baudouin's Leipzig doctoral dissertation of 1868 which deals with what was to become one of the main pillars of the neogrammician doctrine almost a decade later: analogy.

In fact, only the language of the individual was regarded by Baudouin (as by Paul and the neogrammarians) as having a psychic existence. In 1903 Baudouin defined language in the following manner: "Language does not exist except in the brains of individuals, in their souls, and in the psyche of individuals or individual persons who form a given language community." (Cf. BdC, 1963 II, 71). This does not mean that Baudouin denied the social aspect of language, but he subordinated the social side to the psychological. Häusler shows that Baudouin was aware of the fact that linguistic communication was only possible owing to the existence of a speech community to which he attributed the physical (or external) aspect of language (1968:36-7). As early as in 1889 Baudouin had introduced the distinction between speaking (govorenie) and language (reč') which appears to have anticipated in some way Saussure's later *langue*/*parole* distinction (BdC, 1963 I, 212). However, Baudouin set up this dichotomy in view of his distinction between 'anthropophonics', i.e. the field of acoustic and articulatory phonetics (which he regarded as an auxiliary science to linguistics proper as did Sievers and others), and 'psychophonetics', i.e. the analysis of the psychic impressions left by the actual speech-sounds in the minds of both the hearer and the speaker, since his main concern was with what could tentatively be called *parole* and not language as a social fact or a system of interdependent elements of linguistic organization. Baudouin's statements concerning the nature
of language have led A. S. Čikobava to observe that "Baudouin's psychologism is associated with his sociologism, his recognition of the social aspect of language, and not less definitely than in Ferdinand de Saussure." (1959:87).

Such a statement, however, is quite misleading, since it suggests that the linguistic concepts of Baudouin and Saussure were quite similar (because they employ the same terms), whereas in fact they deviate substantially. We have said earlier that Baudouin and Saussure's ideas about language are complementary, and we believe we can substantiate this claim: Baudouin not only emphasized the importance of the spoken and living languages as against the traditional dead or written languages, but also practiced his views by collecting linguistic data in various places in Europe. He stressed the importance of minute phonetic analysis and, despite psychological overtones in his often somewhat diffuse theorizing, his phonological descriptions were essentially sound (cf. Häusler, 1968:41-4; Schogt, 1966:19-29). It was particularly in the field of phonological analysis that Baudouin was generally recognized as an innovator. Schogt (1966:29) is in error however if he believes that Baudouin "was indeed the first scholar to incorporate the study of sound in the realm of the 'langue' (used in opposition to 'parole')." In fact there is no indication that Baudouin ever conceived of language as a system in the manner in which Saussure formulated it (cf. Häusler, 1968:40); his main concern was never with the social, but with the individual and psychological aspect of language, in contrast to Saussure who never developed a linguistics of parole, although he conceded its possibility (cf. CLG, 38), but emphasized that linguistics proper was concerned with langue exclusively (CLG, 39).

For Saussure, the individual speech act was of no particular interest, since it was nothing but the execution of what was embedded in the linguistic code (cf. SM, 261; CLG, 34, 36).

This does not mean that Saussure never made an accurate phonetic analysis, comparable to one by Baudouin; on the contrary, his observations about Lithuanian accentuation which he published in 1894 and 1896 have been regarded as essentially correct. But these investigations
were surely marginal in Saussure's work; his general orientation towards theory placed practical linguistic analysis on the periphery of his interests. In comparing Baudouin's conceptions of the social and individual aspects of language with those of Saussure, we may summarize as follows: In Saussure's conception of language 'social' excludes the co-existence of the physical; langue is in the final analysis a purely psychic phenomenon whereas the psycho-physical mechanism of language pertains to parole only (cf. CLG, 31). For Baudouin the social aspect is something which exists only during the moments of linguistic communication, whereas the basic aspect appears to be the psycho-physiological reality of speech. We disagree, however, with Häusler (1968:40) who quotes the following statement by Baudouin to support his contention that Saussure had employed 'social' in places where Baudouin used 'individual' and vice versa: "The articulatory and auditive representations [of language] become manifest by means of phonetic phenomena which do not exist at all, since they are nothing but transition periods of social intercourse."¹²

We find, on the other hand, striking similarities between Baudouin's (alleged) psychologism and some of Saussure's affirmations, particularly with regard to Baudouin's later definition of the phoneme as "a uniform representation [he uses the term 'Vorstellung'] which belongs to the phonetic world, [and] which arises in the mind by means of psychic fusion of the impressions caused by the pronunciation of one and the same sound = psychic equivalent of the speech sound" (BdC, 1895:9).¹³ Apart from the fact that Saussure observed in his Cours that everything in language is psychological (CLG, 21), a statement which seems to contradict his frequent observations that language is a social fact (if Häusler is correct), he also stated explicitly: "La langue existe dans la collectivité sous la forme d'une somme d'empreintes déposées dans chaque cerveau" (CLG, 38, our italics); this was not a passing remark but appears to have represented at one time a fundamental tenet of his theory (cf. CLG, 27-32 [passim]). Thus Saussure pointed out, when proposing his definition of the linguistic sign which consists, in his terms, of the union of a concept and an acoustic image: "Cette dernière [i.e. the acoustic image] n'est pas le
son matériel, chose purement physique, mais l'empreinte psychique de ce son, la représentation que nous en donne le témoignage de nos sens" (CLG, 98; cf. CLG(E), 149). We are inclined to believe that Saussure followed Baudouin's concept of the phoneme, under the influence of the general psychologism of his time (represented not only by Steinthal and Moritz Lazarus [1824-1903], but also by Wundt as well as by the neo-grammarians, in particular Paul). Milka Ivić appears to be correct when she notes that Saussure had used the term phoneme in his early writings (we believe that she refers to the Mémoire in particular) "to designate the sound element which, whatever its actual articulation, was clearly distinguished from the other elements of the same phonological system" (1965:133), the introduction of psychological criteria belonging (as it was in Baudouin's own development, we may add) to Saussure's later period. It appears, however, that Saussure attempted to free himself from the latent psychologism of some of his linguistic concepts in his last course on general linguistics in which he introduced the much more abstract terms of signifié and signifiant to replace the expressions of concept and acoustic image (see 2.2.3.1).

As for Saussure's langue/pароле distinction (to which his concept of langage should be added), no convincing parallelism between these two scholars can be established although it might have been that Saussure was inspired by Baudouin's apparent difficulties and lack of clarity, ex negativo so to speak. But this can only remain speculation where proofs are needed. However, it has been suggested on occasion that Baudouin anticipated Saussure's influential dichotomy of synchrony versus diachrony in linguistics. It is true that in his inaugural lecture at St. Petersburg University as early as in 1870, Baudouin not only made a distinction between scientific and practical studies of language, and an early attempt at linguistic typology, but also distinguished between dynamic and static phonology. In particular he conceived of "sound statics to investigate the "laws and conditions of the life of sounds in a state of language at a given moment" whereas 'sound dynamics' was to analyze "the laws and conditions of the evolution of sounds through time", a statement similar to that of his 1877/78 Kazan lectures.
Later, in an article published in 1899, Baudouin distinguished further between the dynamic and the historical aspects of phonetic research. The dynamic as well as the static viewpoints were both to be employed in descriptive phonetics, under which Baudouin included anthropophonics and psycho-phonetics; statics was defined as the "investigation and description of existing matters, excluding the aspect of evolution", whereas dynamics was envisaged as the "investigation and definition of the conditions of [phonetic] change". Finally, historical phonetics was to describe phonetic changes through time in the manner which Saussure defined as the diachronic or evolutionary aspect of language analysis.

As for Saussure's conception of synchrony, it is well known that he insisted that synchrony was concerned with the language state exclusively (cf. CLG, 142: SM, 260, and, with some deviating indications, LTS, 22), a viewpoint maintained by the "Geneva School", but contested by R. Jakobson in 1928. There are reasons to believe that Saussure, who was acquainted with Baudouin as well as with his work,19 had not seen the above mentioned article by Baudouin written in Polish for an encyclopaedia; otherwise he might well have followed Baudouin's distinction between a dynamic and static aspect of language within linguistic synchrony — how else could ablaut, umlaut, and syncope which do not only occur in diachronic linguistics be adequately described?20 L. V. Ščerba (1880-1944), one of Baudouin's most important pupils, pointed out in his obituary of Baudouin that he had "insisted on the scientific analysis of the present [state of language], in which he distinguished between layers of the past as well as those for future [developments]. In this respect Baudouin's synchronism was quite distinct from the extremely static synchronism in de Saussure."21

To conclude our investigation into possible sources of Saussurean inspiration through Baudouin's writings, we can say that Saussure's early distinction between historical and descriptive linguistics may have had its initial stimulus in Baudouin's statements of the seventies. However, other possible influences cannot be ruled out. It should be borne in mind for example that Saussure started teaching at Paris in Fall 1881, more than one year after the first appearance of Paul's
influential *Prinzipien*, a book which was certainly at least as easily accessible to him as Baudouin's publications (some of which Baudouin had presented to the Linguistic Society of Paris, as we have mentioned earlier). We are inclined to believe that Saussure's psychological conception of the phonetic aspect of the linguistic sign owes much to Baudouin's conception of the phoneme as a psychic impression on the mind of the individual.²² Any actual profound direct influence by Baudouin on Saussure has to be denied; Baudouin's writings make generally difficult reading owing to the diffuseness of his style (and probably also thought) and excessive use of newly coined technical terminology with vacillating semantics (cf. Häusler, 1968:8 and 139, n.179).²³

2 Op. cit., 18. Since we are not concerned with BdC's phonological conceptions nor FdS's influence on him and Kruszewski, we may simply refer to sections 2, "Baudouin as empiricist and as theoretician: The phoneme idea", and 3, "The relation between Baudouin de Courtenay, M. Kruszewski, and F. de Saussure", in our paper, "Reflections on Jan Baudouin de Courtenay and his Place in the History of Linguistic Science", to appear in CSIP.


4 Opity fonetiki razjanskix govorov (St. Petersburg & Warsaw, 1875), a revised version of which appeared under the title "Neskolk'ko slov o sravitel'noj grammatike indoevropejskix jazykov", ŽMNP 213:269-321 (1881).

5 "Fakultative Sprachlaute", Donum Natalicum Schrijnen, 38-43; esp. p. 43 where he chastises himself for having wasted his time on data collecting (the results of which had perished during the revolution of 1917 in Russia).

6 Über die Lautabwechslung (Kazan: Universitätsbuchdruckerei, 1881), 36.

7 "Jan, Ignacy, Nieciszław Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929)", PF 15.1:vii-xxii (1930); here p. viii.

8 In his contribution "Językoznawstwo" to the Polish encyclopaedia, Wielka Encyklopedya Powszechnej Ilustrowa (Warsaw 1903), vol. 33, 278-96, Baudouin was quite explicit on this point: "The originally metaphysical character of this branch of science [i.e. linguistics] has receded more and more behind the psychological treatment of language (Steinthal, Lazarus, and others), which today receives more and more adherents and which will gradually, in agreement with the psychic basis of the human language, become the sole trend in linguistics." (284).
"Einige Fälle der Wirkung der Analogie in der polnischen Deklation", BVSp 6:19-88 [1870]; Schleicher, editor of this journal, together with Adalbert Kuhn (1812-81), was not pleased with BdC's theoretical introduction (because of its psychologism) and deleted it from the article. BdC (1904:177) restored this introduction (in Pol. transl.).

It is generally held that BdC's ideas about the psychological nature of language can be traced back to Johann Friedrich Herbart's Psychologie als Wissenschaft of 1824/25 (as many of his insights into linguistic matters can be seen as having their ultimate source in Humboldt). In 1904, BdC stated himself: "Wilhelm von Humboldt's philosophical system and the application of Herbart's psychology to the investigation of linguistic representations (for instance) have given to linguistics its particular character as a true science which is based on the use of psychology for [the analysis of] language." (BdC, 1963 II, 4).


BdC, "O 'prawach glosowych'", RSL 3:1-57 (1910); our E. version follows Häsuler's G. rendering of the Fr. summary, "Les lois phonétiques", ibid., 57-82; here p. 62.

This is BdC's most frequently quoted definition of the phoneme, and, although under attack from various sides, was influential in the early years of Prague phonological theory; cf. the work of Trubeckoj (cf. Häsuler, 1968:70-3).

We have to admit, however, that no textual basis has been found for the term représentation in the CLG (cf. pp. 28, 98); see CLG(E), 37 and 149 respectively. It is curious to note that the recent 19th rev. ed. of Siebe-Deutsche Aussprache, ed. by Helmut de Boor, et al. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1969) defines the relation between sound and phoneme in the following manner: "Im Unterschied zum Laut, der physiologisch-akustischen Charakter hat, ist das Phonem eine psychologische Größe, eine Lautvorstellung, die zu anderen Lautvorstellungen im Gegensatz steht und damit das Phonem zum Bedeutungsträger macht; dieselbe lautliche Erscheinung kann als 'Laut' und 'Phonem' auftreten." (17-8).

M. Ivić does not specify what she means by "later" (we may assume that she meant Fds's lectures on general linguistics); she fails to substantiate her claim that from the "later [i.e. psychological] interpretation the French school ( ... ) took the idea of the phoneme as a linguistic unit in the sense of an auditory-physiological, psychological and functional complex" (1965:133); nor does her reference to § 158 (pp. 84-5) turn up anything in support of her contention; Bréal and Rousselot both of whom were a generation older than Fds would hardly seem to have been influenced by him during his lecturership at Paris (1881-91).


19 That FdS was well acquainted with BdC's work has recently been emphasized by Aleksej Alekseevič Leont'ev, an authority on Baudouin, in his note "Boduën i francuzskaja lingvistika", *IzvAN* 25.4:329-32 (1966).


22 It should be noted however that another definition in the *Cours* of the phoneme became crucial for the Prague phonologists as can be seen from the following passage taken from Trubeckoj's article "La phonologie actuelle", *JPs* 30:227-246 (1933), p. 228, n.1: "Les phonèmes sont avant tout des entités oppositives, relatives et négatives." (CLG, 164). Godel (SM, 272), however, disapproves of the editors' use of the term phoneme in this statement; s. CLG(E), 268, which gives the student's note of FdS's statement.

23 This can also be seen in Häusler's thorough monograph on BdC and his linguistic theories which mentions FdS quite frequently (1968: 8, 39-41, 64, 70, 72, 74, 76-8, 111; and notes, 132 [No. 33], 136 [Nos. 108 to 110]), but does not see any striking parallelism between their linguistic concepts. S. also our detailed review article on Häusler's study which is to appear in *Linguistics* (1971). In his article, "Foneticeskaja terminologija v trudax I. A. Boduëna de Kurtenè", *Lingvisticeskaja terminologija i prikladnaja toponomastika*, comp. by A. A. Reformatskij (Moscow: Izd. "Nauka", 1964), 7-30, V. S. Minavicev lists 67 terms which BdC used in his phonetic and phonological treatises, many of which he had invented himself.
1.3.3.3 Mikolaj Kruszewski's Linguistic Theories

Since Baudouin de Courtenay's extensive obituary of his former student constitutes almost the only source of our knowledge of Mikolaj Habdank-Kruszewski's (1851-87) life and work, the relation between these two linguists seems to remain a puzzle in the history of linguistics. 1 Baudouin's at times almost sarcastic remarks about Kruszewski and his affirmation that he had put all his knowledge at Kruszewski's disposal and that his pupil's writings were much less original than their author believed, 2 have persuaded a number of scholars to minimize Kruszewski's importance in the development of modern linguistic thought. 3 A. A. Leont'ev went so far as to argue that the 'Kazan School' had not only been overestimated by international linguists but that such a school never existed 4 and even went a step further in his somewhat curious foreword to Berezin (1968:3-24) by averring that Kruszewski as well as V. A. Bogorodickij (1857-1941), another of Baudouin's outstanding Kazan students, were no more than second-rate linguists who for the most part reworked some of their master's ideas while fundamentally misunderstanding others.

It is almost needless to say that Kruszewski's contribution to linguistic thought has been even more ignored by western linguists and historians than Baudouin's work. 5 Since 1967, however, there has been available in the West a paper by R. Jakobson which is devoted to Kruszewski's importance in the development of pivotal issues in modern linguistic theory and in which Jakobson makes a number of interesting and somewhat provoking claims: 1) Kruszewski's ideas had a profound and beneficial influence on the theoretical thought of Saussure; 2) the Polish linguist's original tenet of the complete harmony of the linguistic
system and of its parts has not only become a principle of structuralism but also closely corresponds to Saussure's concept of *langue*; 3) the essential part of Saussure's *Cours* which deals with synchronic linguistics owes much to Kruszewski's synthesis, in particular (a) Saussure's *rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs* vis-à-vis Kruszewski's distinction between (intra-lingual) relations of similarity and relations of contiguity, and (b) further ideas connected with this dichotomy, e.g. Saussure's 'suite linéaire' and 'groupement par familles' in the case of paradigmatic associations.

Jakobson even goes so far as to attribute more adequate statements about the relationship between the synchronic and the diachronic aspect of language, and more systematic treatment of linguistic problems to Kruszewski than to both Baudouin and Saussure (!); in particular, he attaches much importance to Kruszewski's observations concerning (what Jakobson claims to be) the "creative aspect of language". These latter contentions, however, can only be of marginal concern in our present discussion since the potential influence of Kruszewski on Saussure is its topic. Incidentally, Kruszewski's theoretical works of 1881 and 1883 have both been translated into German; as for the little treatise *Über die Lautabwechslung* we have already established sufficient evidence that Saussure had seen it during his stay in Paris (1880-91). Where the German version of *Oчерк nauki o jazyke* is concerned, which Friedrich Techmer (1843-91) prepared, including it in sequences in his *Internationale Zeitschrift für allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft*, we now know that Saussure owned the complete set of five volumes which appeared during 1884 and 1890.

There is not much of interest to the present discussion to be found in the first part of Kruszewski's *Über die Lautabwechslung* (1881:7-28), in which he expounds his theory of vocalic alternation. However, following the acknowledgements (1881:1-2) there is a general introductory part which deserves some attention. Kruszewski starts, quite provokingly we believe (if one considers the time at which this monograph appeared), with the following statement: "Nobody will deny that those phenomena whose totality is called *language*, have to be the object of linguistics
and that the ultimate goal of this science must consist of the *discovery of laws* which govern these phenomena." (1881:3). Kruszewski then goes on to criticize the traditional concept and aims of linguistic study which are exclusively concerned with the genetic relationship of languages and the reconstruction of their protolanguages adding: "It is quite unnecessary to prove that all these matters cannot be recognized as science" (*ibid.*). He proposes instead the establishment of a linguistic science which can be envisaged as having two distinct goals: 1) To discover the (general) laws of linguistic phenomena, and 2) to deal with traditional problems among other things, claiming that such a general science would better handle those questions pertaining to the genealogy of languages and the reconstruction of older forms (which Kruszewski terms the archeological trend in linguistics). 12

Kruszewski goes on to accuse contemporary linguistics for its obvious neglect of modern languages; in particular, he holds that the spoken languages of today should be the prime object of linguistic investigation and points out that, only if these languages have been analyzed (and the laws governing their mechanisms), can conjectures be made about dead languages since: "Im Vergangenen, im Leblosen ist es entweder sehr schwer oder völlig unmöglich die Gesetze der Erscheinungen zu entdecken." (1881:4). 13 Kruszewski then introduces his own generalisations, first about morphological change (4-5) and then more explicitly on phonetic explanations of language evolution (5-26) and finally makes a remark on semantic differentiation of two parallel forms (26-7) followed by a concluding generalization (27-8). 14

We may conclude that this short treatise of not more than forty pages would not satisfy someone who was looking for a general theory of language, but it nevertheless could have offered some encouragement to Saussure since 1) it put forward the desirability and necessity of a general(izing) approach to linguistic phenomena, 2) it made an attempt at formalizing general laws of linguistic mechanism, and 3) by emphasizing the validity and primacy of the investigation of existing and spoken languages over the historically transmitted and written languages, Kruszewski may have laid the foundation for Saussure's development of
his synchrony/diachrony distinction. Direct influences, however, cannot be deduced from these observations, but it can hardly be denied that this monograph contains a number of suggestions which could not have failed to arouse interest in Kruszewski's main work *Prinzipien der Sprachentwicklung* which we shall deal with in the subsequent pages of this chapter.

When working on his outline of a linguistic science, Kruszewski gave the following summary of the aims of his forthcoming study in a letter to Baudouin of May 3rd, 1882:

Something like this will be the subject of my work; the general argument is as follows: 1) Besidesthe actual[ly existing, i.e. historical-comparative] science of language another much more general [science], something similar to a phenomenology of language, is necessary. 2) A certain (unconscious) foreboding of such a science can be asserted in parts, from a few writings by the neogrammarians. Their principles however are still either unfit to build a science of this kind on or are insufficient. 3) It is possible to find in language itself solid elements for such a science. 15

This résumé appears to contain *in nuce* Kruszewski's main theses which in fact he had already put forward in his work of 1881, but only exemplified mainly in the area of morphophonemics. Here, in his treatise of 1883, Kruszewski developed his ideas further and is more explicit about his general principles of linguistic theory. It should be borne in mind that Kruszewski (by contrast with Baudouin) had been a student of logic and psychology at Warsaw University before becoming more and more involved in the study of language. His teacher, M. M. Troickij (1835-99), was a "fanatico cultore del pensiero inglese" (Jakobson), and it is thus not surprising to find in Kruszewski's treatise a number of explicit references to British philosophers of the 19th century who were in the empiricist tradition of Locke and Hume. 16 He also appears to follow in a number of respects Steinthal's psychology of language which also had considerable impact on Paul (cf. Jespersen, 1964:87), 17 and, interestingly enough, Kruszewski maintained that linguistics belongs to the natural sciences as Schleicher and Max Müller had argued, a point of view which was not shared by Baudouin and which was rejected by the neogrammarians with whom Kruszewski otherwise felt the strongest affinity
It is therefore not surprising to see Kruszewski quoting from Darwin on several occasions in support of his own assumptions about the nature of language (cf. 1885:262, n.2; 1887:146, n.1, 150-1, n.2, 167, n.1). The main principles (Kruszewski speaks of axioms) of his argument seem to rest on two pillars: 1) psychological phenomenology, including Humean notions of association (of ideas), and 2) philosophical induction, i.e. the methodological procedure of studying particular facts in order to support general laws which have been claimed to exist (cf. Kruszewski, 1884:297). On the other hand he notes that a number of his ideas are similar to those put forward by Paul in his Prinzipien of 1880, but maintains that he had developed his theory of associations independently of Paul's 'Organismen von Vorstellungsgruppen', pointing out that their studies are generally different in emphasis (Kruszewski is very much more concerned with the genesis of linguistic elements which Paul seems to ignore) and in fact complementary (1884:300). We shall, therefore, point out particularly those aspects of Kruszewski's theorizing which appear novel and seem to deviate from traditional views.

Despite its title which would suggest that Kruszewski is primarily concerned with phenomena of language evolution (as is true for Paul), Prinzipien der Sprachentwicklung puts a good deal of emphasis on what Kruszewski terms 'static laws'. He proposes to formulate these laws since he wishes to show general linguistic conditions for language development which he believes could be deduced from his investigations (1884:297). When dealing with the sounds of language and the laws which he believes underly their behaviour (1884:301-2; 1885:260-8), Kruszewski assumes 1) that the sound of a given dialect at a given time is almost identical among all individual speakers of the particular dialect; 2) the existence of a certain harmony in the sound system of the individual or the dialect (1884:301, 303).

Kruszewski cites a number of physiological and acoustic explanations in support of his affirmation (1885:260-2) that under the same conditions a given sound will always be approximately identical adding that individual deviations or modifications have no bearing on the language in general.
an observation similar to Saussure's contention that *langue* is social in nature and (essentially) independent of the individual (cf. CLG, 37). Kruszewski believes that there is biological and genetic evidence for his claim that the articulatory side of language, the speech habits, are inherited, including not only static but also to a certain extent dynamic characteristics of the organism (1885:262). However, he deals with the static aspect of the sound system only, and declares that it is manifest that 1) the whole sound system of a certain individual will always be similar ("ungefähr gleichartig"), and 2) that the sound system of all individuals belonging to a given dialect will be similar at a given time. These two assumptions together with his postulate that a general harmony prevails in a given sound system are conjoined for his formulation of the 'static law of the sound system' which is characterized by its homogeneity and its harmony (p. 263). One could ask whether this statement constituted a source for Saussure's development of synchrony and his concept of *état de langue* (CLG, 142).

In the same chapter, Kruszewski treats combinations of sounds ("Laut-komplexe"), after having discussed individual sounds (which he said earlier had no existence of their own). He first admits the possibility that a certain sound in combination with another can be identical or deviate only insensibly from the norm, but in the subsequent paragraph he deals with the word which appears to be the 'sound complex' *par excellence* (1885:263). From the physiological point of view, Kruszewski observes, the word has no particular use: "it is a symbol, a substitute for an idea, and a member of this symbolic series, such as the sound, never appears by itself." (*Ibid.*) Without giving any definition of what he understands by 'symbol', he goes on to state:


It is doubtful whether we could draw from this quotation the conclusion that Kruszewski has here tentatively formulated something similar to
Saussure's *arbitraire*. At least we can conclude that a word for him is characterized by two components: an idea and a carrier; the vocal aspect is secondary in contrast to Saussure's emphasis on the 'acoustic image'. In a later chapter of his treatise, in which he analyses words into morphological components (1887:174-87), he appears to have come to a slightly different view. In the meantime Kruszewski introduced his most crucial principle of linguistic analysis: the laws of association have the same significance for linguistics as for psychology, since: "Das Wort existiert nur im menschlichen Geiste" (1887:174), and is, therefore, subjected to the same laws as any mental entity. In fact, he argues, the word owes its existence exclusively to the laws of association (1885:264). Kruszewski singles out onomatopoetic formations in which he detects something like a more necessary combination of an idea with a sound complex (*ibid.*). He emphasizes that he regards the reduction of Paul's ideas about 'Produktion' and 'Reproduktion' of words to two distinct laws of association as his own stressing at the same time that they play a highly important rôle in language (1884:300). In view of this affirmation as well as Jakobson's claim that this is an area in which Kruszewski was not only creative but also influential as far as Saussure's linguistic theorizing is concerned, Kruszewski's two principles of association of ideas ("Ideenassoziation") will first be expounded and then analyzed.

With reference to J. St. Mill's *Logic*, Kruszewski expresses his credo in the following manner:


Kruszewski thus makes a number of important assumptions about the nature of language: Firstly, language is not a collection of words, but a set of interrelated units; secondly, they are related (in the human mind) by virtue of two laws of association: (a) the law of similarity ("Ähnlichkeitsassoziation"), and (b) the law of contiguity
("Angrenzungsassoziation"), the first connecting words by means of formal and/or semantic similarity, the second by frequent co-occurrence in a syntactic string; thirdly, language consists of families or systems of words and of successions of words. Kruszewski is more explicit on this in chapter 5 of his treatise, entitled "Die Wörter" (1887:171-4). There he rejects, on empirical grounds, the idea that language can be visualized as a "Wörtervorrat" which is memorized by the individual; if this were true, he argues, it would be inconceivable how man manages to find the necessary word within such a short time and assigns the correct phonetic shape to it when he wishes to express himself.

The two kinds of association are explained in detail: Every word is connected with other words through associations of similarity. Kruszewski emphasizes that this similarity "is not only an exterior one, i.e. phonetic or morphological, but also an internal one, a semantic one." (1887:171). If we want to remember the word vedet "he goes, guides", this procedure is facilitated through the existence of other words, such as vedes, vedu, vedenie (which belong to the same word family). There is also though a less close connection between vedet, idet, neset, etc. due to the fact that the second component -et (= 3rd person singular) is the same in all these words. Still less strong, but nevertheless existent on grammatical or morphological grounds, is the connection between vedet and forms such as govorit "he speaks" or stoit "he stands".

The other kind of association, which Kruszewski terms the law of contiguity, calls forth other types of words which do not belong to the first category; for instance in a phrase such as er . . . das Pferd am Zügel die Strasse entlang "he . . . the horse by the bridle along the street", our mind will recall the word führt "guides". Similarly, the expression "wear out" calls forth words such as "garment", "dress", "trousers", etc. Kruszewski explains that we get used to employing a certain word more often with one word than with another (1887:172).

As a counter-example Kruszewski cites those instances where we find it difficult to remember certain words, such as particular proper names, foreign expressions or technical terms which are dissociated within the language and can only be retained with the help of the association
of contiguity: "Es bedarf einer oft wiederholten Angrenzungsassociation (d.h. eines sehr häufigen Gebrauches), damit ein Mann aus dem Volke [who does not know Latin for example] sich ein fremdes Wort einpräge, das keinem Worte seiner eigenen Sprache ähnlich sieht." (1887:172).

It may, however, happen that the speaker will subconsciously connect certain words with certain others, a procedure which is (according to Kruszewski though quite erroneously) called analogy (!) and folk etymology (172-3). But these are marginal aspects, and do not invalidate the principal ties by which words are interrelated: coexistence ("Koexistenz") owing to similarity, and consequence ("Konsequenz") due to their occurrence in a linear fashion (1887:173; cf. also 1887:156, 159).

It should be emphasized that Kruszewski points out that though they can be formulated as two distinct categories of psychological operations of the mind, both laws of association work together: a word is always a member of a given family or system of words and at the same time a member of a given syntactic sequence ("syntaktische Reihe", cf. 1887:172).

If we compare Kruszewski's formulations with those made by Saussure concerning the 'rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs' in language, we can observe striking similarities. First there is the duality of relations of linguistic elements. Saussure affirms that they correspond to two forms of our mental activity both of which are indispensable to the functioning of the linguistic mechanism (cf. CLG, 170). Secondly, we can observe a similarity between these two exponents: what Kruszewski called contiguity or consequence is paralleled by Saussure's concept of syntagmatic relations of linguistic units; what Kruszewski termed similarity or coexistence (of terms in the mind of the speaker) is mutatis mutandis covered by Saussure's idea of associative relations (CLG, 170f.).

However, there are differences too. Saussure does not seem to relate both relationships back to psychic processes. As for the syntagmatic relations, Saussure is concerned with the execution of syntactic units in a linear fashion, with formal properties of the language mechanism; it is only with the associative relations that he states that outside discourse "words offering something [which they have] in common are associated in the memory" (CLG, 171). And Saussure adds that they
result in groups which are governed by very different relations giving
the following example: "Thus the word enseignement will unconsciously
call to mind a host of other words (einsignier, renseigner, etc., or
also armement, changement, etc., or éducation, apprentissage)" adding
that in one way or another they have something in common (ibid.; cf.
CLG(E), 276 ff.). It is therefore the latter category which is almost
identical with Kruszewski's affirmation, but less so the former one.

It is interesting to note that Saussure speaks of syntagms in con-
nection with his first category of relations and that he deals with
words and, in particular, groups of words, since the phrase is the type
par excellence of the syntagm; his examples are either phrases or com-
ounds (e.g. contremaitre) or derivational constructions (e.g. infati-
gable). They all appear to underline the impression that Saussure is
concerned with formal and structural considerations only. It is there-
fore somewhat surprising to note that these general types have their
support in language "sous forme de souvenirs concrets" (CLG, 173). 29
Saussure, it seems, has not been able to rely exclusively on strictly
formal matters in his explanation of syntagmatic relations.

Contrasting these relations with the 'rapports associatifs', Saus-
sure argues that whereas a syntagm immediately suggests an order of
succession and a definite number of elements, terms in an associative
family ("famille associative") occur neither in fixed numbers nor in
a definite order (cf. CLG, 174). One could perhaps speak of an open
versus a closed set of items. To our surprise, Saussure calls inflec-
tional paradigms, e.g. Latin dominus, dominī, dominō, etc., "bien un
groupe associatif formé par un élément commun, le thème nominal domin-" (CLG, 175). This is certainly a kind of formal patterning and contains
a limited number of combinations, and we might argue that this example
ought to belong to another category. However, Saussure's example shows
the affinity of his concept of associative relations with Kruszewski's
formulation of the law of contiguity operating in language, but also
(sows the seed) for a further abstraction of his findings by Hjelmslev
who introduced the term 'paradigmatic' to replace the less formal but
surely more adequate (in terms of the nature of language) Saussurean
expression 'associative'.
In conclusion, we may say that Saussure was certainly aware of Kruszewski's distinction, but he aimed at something which he believed he could not find in either Baudouin or Kruszewski: "considérations linguistiques pures" (SM, 51). Kruszewski derived his insights into linguistic mechanism from psychology and by induction; his general view was that of an empiricist in the philosophical sense. It is therefore inconsequential that he does not speak in the affirmative about language as a system of signs, but prefers to speak of systems which can be uncovered in language (cf. 1884:304; 1887:172). Saussure, on the other hand, attempted to approach language from a strictly linguistic point of view whenever possible. His formulations tend to be more abstract, more removed from empirical considerations. Arens may be correct in noting that Kruszewski's terminology concerning the two-fold connexion of words was a happier one (1969:359); we could add that Kruszewski was in some way closer to the actual facts of language, but in terms of linguistic theory Saussure is definitely more powerful. This observation does not only hold true for the distinction between syntagmatic and associative (paradigmatic) relations in language, but for Kruszewski's theorizing in general. If we accept Jakobson's claim that Kruszewski was "one of the greatest or even the greatest theoretician in world linguistics of the late nineteenth century" then we could only do so by excluding Paul's Prinzipien and by terming Saussure a twentieth century linguist.

Kruszewski's influence on Saussure's theorizing, however, can by no means be underestimated. A number of notions which we are familiar with through the Cours are in some way or other anticipated in Kruszewski. Thus we find a number of references to the distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic' laws of language (cf. 1885:262; 1887:149), but we have to admit that Kruszewski does not come close to Saussure's strict distinction between synchrony and diachrony. The term system is used quite frequently in Kruszewski's argument, but it never becomes something like a clé de voûte in his theories as in Saussure's. Kruszewski's frequent usage of the concept of harmony within a given linguistic system (cf. 1884:301, n.2; 303, 305; 1885:263; 1890:134 [bis];
137, 138, 139, 140, 347) at times comes quite close to Saussure's concept of état de langue, for instance when he speaks about a "Ein-
förmigkeit des Zustandes" (1887:152; cf. 1890:343) of a linguistic system. In addition, Kruszewski made interesting observations concerning the language sign; for instance he stated that the word does not exist except in the human mind (1887:174), and appears to have in some way been aware of its two-fold character (cf. 1884:307; 1887:173), and particularly when he denied the necessity of the vocal aspect of language, viz. the gestures used by deaf-mutes, but he interpreted the word as the sign for the object, whereas Saussure does not seem to have been concerned with the thing the sign designates.

In view of these and a few other concepts or hints which a close reading of Kruszewski's writings reveal, we can conclude that Kruszewski's statements about the nature of language and its various mechanisms, thought at times less clear and rigorous than it appears at first sight, have certainly helped Saussure in shaping his own ideas; it is in this sense that we tend to agree with T. A. Sebeok's recent affirmation that the "germinal rôle of Kruszewski is now eminently clear" as far as his influence on Saussure is concerned.
* E. transl.: "As early as in his "Očerk", over three decades before [the publication of] the "Cours" of Saussure, Kruszewski claimed that 'the word is a sign of an object' and that 'language is nothing else but a system of signs'." (Loja, 1968:237).

1 "Mikolaj Kruszewski, jego życie i prace naukowe", PF 2.3:837-49, and 3.1:116-75 (1888-89); repr. in BdC, 1904:96-175, and in Russ. transl. but in an abridged form in BdC, 1963 I, 146-201. This question, among others, will be discussed in our forthcoming article, "Mikołaj Habdank-Kruszewski (1851-87): A Bio-Bibliographical Survey on the Occasion of his 120th Birthday", in Linguistics.


3 Regrettably, this applies particularly to the two otherwise very useful studies which appeared in the West during the past few years, H. G. Schogt's paper, "Baudouin de Courtenay and Phonological Analysis", Linguistique 2.1:15-29 (1966), pp. 16-7, and Häusler's monograph on Baudouin in which he makes only passing references to Kruszewski (1968: 10, 11, 48-9, 51) and does not include a single publication of this linguist in his extensive bibliography of almost 300 items (1968:148-61).

4 "I. A. Boduèen de Kurtenè i ego učenie o jazyke", RJaš 29.2:87-93 (1965), at p. 87. Leont'ev's contention contrasts sharply with recent histories of linguistics, e.g. Ivic and Graur/Wald (both of 1965), and Loja and Berezin (both of 1968).

5 A noteworthy exception is Arens (1969) who reproduces a few excerpts from Kruszewski's writings (pp. 359-61), but not from BdC, and makes a few explicit references to him (s. pp. 329, 347, 362, and 458), whereas BdC is only mentioned en passant (pp. 316, 329, 630 and 638).

6 Cf. "L'importanza di Kruszewski per lo sviluppo della linguistica generale", RSlav 13:3-23 (1965, but published in 1967), in particular pp. 21-2; it is apparently an It. adaption of his "Znaczenie Kruszewskiego w rozwój jezkoznawstwa ogólnego" which appeared in Kruszewski, 1967: x-xxv.

7 RSlav 13:22 (1965[1967]); as for the latter aspect, s. esp., loc. cit., 12.
In addition, Dr. R. Engler informed me in private correspondence (July 29, 1971) that there exists a copy of Kruszewski's Über die Lautabwechslung with the dedication "A Mr le professeur Ferdinand de Saussure" and notes by FdS himself on pp. 10f. of the monograph. It is hoped that a Xerox copy of these pages can be received in time to consider this information for the paper referred to in note 1 of this chap.

The individual sections of the G. transl., revised by the author and later, after Kruszewski's mortal illness and death (in 1887), by BdC and A. I. Aleksandrov, can be found in the following locations: 1:295-307 (1884), 2:258-68 (1885), 3:145-87 (1887), and 5:133-44, 339 to 360 (1890). We shall refer to the year plus page in the following.


The Turkologist Wilhelm Radloff, a colleague and friend of Kruszewski, who helped him in the preparation of the G. version of this treatise (s. Kruszewski, 1881:1), did not only apply Kruszewski's theory of alternation on the occasion of the Fifth Intern. Congress of Orientalists held in Sept. 1881, but reports also the following interesting background story about the fate of this treatise: "... der Verfasser [i.e. Kruszewski] war ... leider gezwungen, die Abhandlung auf eigene Kosten in Kasan zu drucken, denn er verzweifelte, sie in einer deutschen Zeitschrift veröffentlichcn zu können, da sie ihm aus Leipzig und Königsberg mit dem Bemerken zurückgestellt wurde, dass die Abhandlung sich mehr mit Methodologie als mit Sprachwissenschaft beschäftigte." (Our italics). S. Radloff's paper, "Die Lautalternation und ihre Bedeutung für die Sprachentwicklung, belegt durch Beispiele aus den Türkischen", Abhandlungen des Fünften Internationalen Orientalisten-Congresses (Berlin: Asher, 1882) III, 54-70; here p. 58. BdC confirms this when he noted in 1881: "For the sake of curiosity, I consider it not excessive to mention here that the foreword [i.e. the theoretical introduction of his Квопрос о гуне] to this work of Krusevskij in its German version could not be accommodated in the special German journals, probably because the expression of new ideas in the area of several sciences is there considered the privilege of people belonging to certain circles. Incidentally, in the opinion of several scholars, from such generalisations nothing is gained ('gewonnen wird') (Archiv f. Slavische Philologie V. 331)." (REV 5:339-40, n.1).

Characteristically, Kruszewski has chosen the following motto from Leibniz for his Outline of 1883 (i.e. the Russ. original): "Das Studium der Sprachen darf keineswegs von anderen Grundsätzen geleitet werden, als die Studien der Wissenschaft überhaupt. Warum mit dem Unbekannten statt mit dem Bekannten anfangen? Wir halten uns doch an die
Vernunft, wenn wir mit dem Studium der neuern Sprachen anheben." This quotation reveals Kruszewski's principles in nuce: 1) the study of language is a [for Kruszewski: natural] science, 2) the investigator has to use induction, and 3) logic is the governing principle for generalisations. (The term 'Logik' appears in Kruszewski, 1881:7).

14 Pp. 28-37 are taken up by Kruszewski's discussion of the neo-grammian doctrines of analogy and the "Lautgesetz" - hypothesis, comparing and contrasting them with his own ideas and principles. In an appendix (38-41) he discusses particular phonetic phenomena in Old Slavonic.

15 Translated from the Polish original in BdC, 1904:134-5.


17 Kruszewski refers to Steinhalt's Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, 2nd ed. (Berlin: F. Dümler, 1881), a book which first appeared under the title Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft in 1871, but also (as Paul did) to Studien über die Sprachvorstellungen (Wien: Braumüller, 1880) by Salomon Stricker (1834-98), a physiologist who attempted to prove that human speech is accompanied by the individual's awareness of muscular movements which help him to retain the articulations of the sounds of a given language. (Cf. Kruszewski, 1884:301-2; for a ref., s. Kruszewski, 1885:261, n.2).

18 Cf. the following affirmation by Kruszewski: "Die Sprachgesetze sind nur mit den biologischen Gesetzen, d.h. mit den Gesetzen alles dessen, was sich entwickelt oder lebt, vergleichbar." (1885: 262, n. 2 [spaced in the original]).


20 Kruszewski refers explicitly to Mill's Logic for his principles of association (1884:304, n.1); Arens (1969:360, n.) is correct in arguing that these principles were first formulated by David Hume (1748) and David Hartley (1749).

21 Apart from references to Brugmann, Osthoff, Delbrück, Sievers and others, Kruszewski makes frequent references to Paul's Prinzipien (1885:262, n.1, 268, n.1; 1887:145, n.2, 147, n.2, 161, n.1, 165, n. 1-2, 169, n.1, 175, n.1; 1890:139, n.1, 143, n.1, 344, n.1, 354, n.3, 358, n.3).
Kruszewski's empiricism obliges him to use the qualifiers "ungefähr" (1884:301) and "annähernd" (1885:262, and esp. n.2).

Kruszewski adds: "Ich gebrauche das Wort [i.e. Harmonie] nicht im musikalischen Sinne, sondern in der Bedeutung von gegenseitiger Anpassung und Ausgleichung." (1884:301, n.2). On p. 303 he uses "Sprache" (instead of "Dialekt") in the same context; apparently Kruszewski employed them as synonymous terms.

"Der Laut wird an und für sich in der Sprache nicht angetroffen, hat weder eine eigene beständige Funktion, noch irgend einen psychischen Inhalt." (1884:259).

Kruszewski adds in a fn. that he understands both laws in the sense of the English philosophy quoting the following passage from Mill: "... ideas, or secondary mental states, are excited by our impressions, or by other ideas, according to certain laws which are called Laws of Association. Of these laws the first is, that similar ideas tend to excite one another [Ähnlichkeitsassociation]. The second is, that when two impressions have been frequently experienced (or even thought of) either simultaneously or in immediate succession, then whenever one of these impressions, or the idea of it occurs, it tends to excite the idea of the other [Angrenzungsassociation, ... ]. The third law is, that greater intensity in either or both of the impressions is equivalent, in rendering them excitable by one another, to a greater frequency of conjunction." (1884:304, n.1; G. terms appear to have been added by Techmer). Kruszewski does not give a page reference; the quotation can be found in Mill's System of Logic, new impression (New York & London: Longmans, 1959, p. 557).

It would be interesting to know whether J. R. Firth who was familiar with Kruszewski's Über die Lautabwechslung (cf. Firth, 1957:1-2) had read the other of Kruszewski's German publications as well and derived his concept of "collocation" from the Polish linguist.

These somewhat curious views had been expressed by Kruszewski as early as 1879 in a paper entitled "Ob 'analogii' i 'narodnoj etimologii' ('Volksystemologie')", RFV 2.3/4:109-22; Pol. transl. in Kruszewski, 1967:3-12. BdC criticized them in his obituary of 1888 (cf. BdC, 1904:111f.).

Kruszewski's most explicit statement, which has also been included by Arens in his anthology (1969:360-1), runs as follows: Wenn die Wörter nach dem Gesetz der Ähnlichkeitsassociation Systeme oder Familien in unserem Geiste bilden, so ordnen sie sich nach dem Gesetz der Angrenzungsassociation in Reihen. Jedes Wort ist also mit zweierlei Art von Banden verknüpft: es ist nämlich 1. mit unzähligen Banden der Ähnlichkeit mit Wörtern verbunden, welche den Lauten, der Struktur und der Bedeutung nach mit ihm verwandt sind, und 2. mit ebenso unzähligen Banden der Angrenzung mit seinen verschiedenen Begleitern in verschiedenen Redeweisen verbunden; ... " (1887:172).
29 In fact the CLG(E), 285 reveals that there is no textual basis for this statement quite similar to the other affirmation in the same paragraph (CLG, 173) that "il n'y a rien d'abstrait dans la langue", a contention quite similar to CLG, 32 that "langue n'est pas moins que la parole un objet de nature concrète" (cf. CLG(E), 44) which, however, is well documented by students' notes.

30 Kruszewski observed in his earlier study: "... uns [ist] eigentlich keine Thatsache der alten Phonetik unmittelbar zugänglich: jede Thatsache muss inductiv festgestellt werden." (1881:6).

31 Cf. his statement: "Und wirklich, wenn die Sprache nichts andres als ein Zeichensystem ist, so wird ihr idealer Zustand nur dann entstehen, wenn zwischen dem System von Zeichen und dem, was dieselben bezeichnen sollen, eine vollkommene Entsprechung stattfindet." (1887:174; our italics; also quoted in Arens, 1969:601).

32 He stated for instance: "Es gibt Worttypen und den Vorstellungs- systemen entsprechende Systeme dieser Typen. Die hervorragendsten Systeme, die Deklination und Konjugation, sind schon lange beobachtet." (1884:306). Similarly, he spoke of irregular developments of word systems (1890:134), affirmed that morphology "bietet uns ... eine Menge von anderen Systemen dar" (1890:340) or referred to "Splittern von Systemen" (357-8) thus suggesting what contemporary linguists (e.g. J. Vachek) maintain: language is a system of systems.

33 That Kruszewski confused these two views of language can be gathered from the fact that he did not consistently use "Lautabwechslung", i.e. alternation as a synchronic term (as his 1881 study may have suggested), but also in the sense of "Lautwandel", sound change, as he emphasized himself by suggesting their equation and interchangeable use (s. 1887:164, 165).


35 On occasion, however, one may find an affirmation of the following kind: "... aller Abweichungen ungeachtet, bildet die Spr. [ache] ein harmonisches Ganze." (1890:347). It should be pointed out, however, that Sievers made similar remarks as early as in 1876 in his Grundzüge der Lautphysiologie (cf. 1.1.3.2.3).

36 Cf. FdS's affirmation: "Le signe linguistique est donc une entité psychique à deux faces" (CLG, 99).

37 Kruszewski stated: "Das Wort hat an und für sich im allgemeinen keinen Zweck; es ist ein Symbol, ein Substitut für eine Idee, und ein Glied dieser symbolischen Reihe, wie es der Laut ist, tritt nie selbständig auf. Dieses Paaren der Idee mit dem Lautkomplex ist nichts
absolut notwendiges, primäres; in der Sprache der Taubstummen verbindet sich dieselbe Idee mit der Gebärd (Gestus), in der chinesischen Sprache mit dem schriftlichen Zeichen, endlich verbindet sich in verschiedenen Sprachen ein und dieselbe Idee mit verschiedenen Lautköpfen. Das Wort verdankt seine Bedeutung also nur den Gesetzen der Association!" (1885:263-4). This statement contains a number of interesting points. The second sentence shows K.'s awareness of the possible union of sound (complex) and idea (concept), and he appears to have formulated indirectly the arbitrary nature of their combination.

38 Cf. Kruszewski's use of "Motivation" (1890:142, n.1) with ref. to §67, pp. 140-1, and FdS's concept of "motivation" (CLG, 180-4).

1.3.4 The Humboldtian Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Linguistics

Wilhelm von Humboldt was one of the profoundest thinkers on general linguistic questions in the nineteenth century, and one wonders whether, if his style had been less diffuse and his ideas more worked out and exemplified than they were, and his voluminous works were better known and more widely read, he would not be accorded a position nearer to that given to de Saussure as one of the founders of modern linguistic thought.

Robert H. Robins (1967:174)

1.3.4.1 A Brief Survey of Humboldtian Trends at the Turn of the Century

In 1894 Brugmann complained that "die von W. von Humboldt inaugurierte Sprachphilosophie war in der Hand einiger hervorragender Indo-germanisten nicht in glücklicher Pflege." (JAOS 19:77). Brugmann's complaint appears to be curious if not unjustified to anyone who is somewhat more acquainted with the various trends of linguistic thought in the 19th century, an insight which contemporary histories of linguistics do not provide. Indeed there has been throughout the second half of the 19th century to the present time an uninterrupted tradition deriving from Humboldt's ideas, and this can be most readily perceived in German linguistic scholarship.¹

In 1847 Max Schasler (1819-1903)² ventured to publish a quite misleading and spurious account of Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) posthumous Einleitung to the voluminous treatise on the Kawi language of Java,³ only to be met by a sharp reply from Heymann Steinthal (1823-99) who was then twenty-five years old.⁴ As early as 1850 Steinthal had published a monograph on language classification in the Humboldtian spirit which was the first important step towards his well-known Charakteristik der hauptsächlichen Typen des Sprachbaues of 1860 and which appeared
in a much revised and enlarged edition, prepared by his pupil and younger colleague Franz Misteli (1841-1903), about a generation later. In 1882 Steinthal outlined in his *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* the manner in which he intended to publish the theoretical ("sprachphilosophisch") works of Humboldt, some of which had not been published before; and in 1884 an impressive volume of about 700 pages appeared.

Apart from Steinthal and his collaborators, Misteli and in particular, Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903), another important figure in 19th century linguistics deserves to be mentioned (whom Brugmann might have had in mind when he referred to "some excellent Indo-Europeanists"): August Friedrich Pott (1802-87), "auteur d'immenses travaux étymologiques que personne ne lit plus, bien à tort" as a student noted in 1908 from Saussure's lectures (CLG(E), 7). Pott, who published a long introduction to general linguistics from 1884 onwards in F. Techmer's *Internationale Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft*, edited Humboldt's famous *Einleitung* forty years after it had appeared in print for the first time together with a very extensive analysis of Humboldt's linguistic thought. It should be pointed out that Pott, whose *Etymologische Forschungen* of 10 volumes in all in the second edition were completed in 1876 and provided material for the young linguists at Leipzig, was soon ignored by them, a fate he shared with a number of other linguists at Leipzig and other centres of linguistic activity in Western Europe during the last quarter of the 19th century. In this connection mention should be made of the activities centred around Friedrich Techmer (1843-91) and his *Zeitschrift* which regrettably (owing to the Editor's premature death) appeared only from 1884 to 1890. This journal which was published in Leipzig (a fact which might be of some significance) not only constituted, as would appear now, a forum for dissent and opposition to the neogrammarian movement with an international appeal (many articles being written in French and English) and for linguists from outside Germany who might otherwise not always have been heard there (e.g. Jespersen, Kruszewski, La Grasserie, and others), but also a place which fostered Humboldtian ideas together with the investigation of non-Indo-European languages, viz. the publications
of Pott, Misteli, G. von der Gabelentz; these constituted an obvious counter-movement to the predilections of the Junggrammatiker.

It might be of some interest to the history of linguistics to demonstrate the influence Humboldt's ideas had outside Germany in the 19th century. Daniel Garrison Brinton (1837-99), for example, tried to propagate Humboldtian philosophy of language in America, and James Byrne (1820-97) developed Humboldtian linguistic theory further in his voluminous *General Principles of the Structure of Language* which appeared in England in the same year. Baudouin de Courtenay and A. A. Potebnja (1835-91) contributed to the diffusion of Humboldtian linguistic thought in Eastern Europe as Lucien Adam (1833-1918), Raoul de La Grasserie (1839-1914), and others did in France. These are only a few examples, and many more could be added to the list, but the few mentioned above, along with the current revival of interest in Humboldt, suggest that a re-assessment of his views would constitute an important part in the history of 19th century linguistic thought. In addition, it should be pointed out that Max Müller (1823-1900), Whitney, and Franz Boas (1858-1942) were familiar with and indeed taught Humboldt's "Weltanschauungstheorie", Boas being the mediator and immediate source of the so-called "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis".

For the present purpose it is sufficient to refer to Germany to suggest that there has been a continuity in the exploitation of ideas concerning the nature of language put forward by Humboldt, and this even during the time when the neogrammarian doctrine was exerting its strongest impact. We would therefore draw attention to, besides the work of Steinthal, Misteli, Pott, and others which have already been mentioned, the contributions to psycho-linguistics by Kurt Bruchmann (1851-1928) who published an appreciation of Humboldt in 1887; in addition the work of Wundt, who from 1883 onwards edited the newly founded journal *Philosophische Studien*, played an important rôle in the propagation of Humboldt's concept of "innere Sprachform" which Wundt tried to analyze on various occasions, in particular in his voluminous *Völkerpsychologie* (1900ff.). Early at the beginning of this century Albert Leitzmann edited Humboldt's work, the first seven volumes of which constituted Humboldt's linguistic and philosophical writings; articles discussing in particular Humboldt's
philosophical views, including his ideas about language, followed soon thereafter. Although it may not be quite correct to argue that the work of Humboldt "had provided Indo-European comparative grammar with its philosophical bases" (Lepschy, 1970:21), there is every reason to believe that Humboldt's ideas concerning the general nature of language, his attempts at language typology and classification as well as his search for the dynamic source of speech, the "Sprachgeist", did not fail to make their impression on the minds of the neogrammarians and indeed on no less a person than H. Paul, as could be shown from his *Prinzipien*. Contrary to many suggestions from various sides which De Mauro has listed recently (1968:354) there is no indication of a direct influence by Humboldt on Saussure. That neither Saussure's *langue*/*parole* dichotomy nor his contrast between synchrony and diachrony can be fitted into Humboldt's distinction between *ergon* and *energeia* seems to have now been clearly demonstrated once and for all by Hugo Mueller.

All this does not mean that Humboldtian ideas could have had *mutatis mutandis*, entered Saussure's linguistic thought. In fact the work of both Georg von der Gabelentz (1840-93) and Franz Nikolaus Finck (1867-1910), not so much that part dealing with exotic languages and linguistic typology but more so that concerned with general linguistic problems, with which Saussure was familiar, may well have been influential in transmitting Humboldtian ideas within the domain of general linguistics. It is moreover with regard to the possible influence of their work on Saussure that their general principles of linguistics will be dissected in the following sections.

Recently, Robert Lee Miller sketched out the principal ideas of Humboldt's philosophy of language, and from what we gather from his monograph, he is suggesting that there are a number of Humboldtian tenets which appear to have been adopted by Saussure. According to Miller, Saussure "expressly reaffirmed some of Humboldt's conceptions of language" (1968:38) when he stated that from a psychological point of view human thought constitutes a shapeless and indistinct mass and that nothing is distinct prior to the appearance of language (cf. CLG, 155-7); this is demonstrated by Saussure's comparison of language with a sheet of paper,
one side of which represents thought and the other sound, thus advocating
the inseparability of these two entities (CLG, 157). Miller quotes
the relevant passages from the *Course* at some length and envisages simi-
larities (which simply do not exist) between Humboldt's views and those
of Saussure, especially where Saussure suggests that language could be
called the domain of articulations (CLG, 156). He fails to see that
Saussure had something quite different in mind when he stated that the
characteristic rôle of language with respect to thought is to serve as a
link between thought and sound and not to create a material phonic means
for the expression of ideas (*ibid.*). For Humboldt language is the for-
mative organ of thought and identical with it because it renders the
internal and psychic activity of the mind external and perceptible through
the sounds of speech. Miller ignores Saussure's concept of the arbi-
trary nature of the connection between *signifiant* and *signifié* to note:
"As Humboldt before him had done, Saussure stresses the systematic charac-
ter of linguistic signs; in doing so he [*FdS*] introduces the concept of
value" (1968:40) thus suggesting that Saussure owes his insights to Hum-
boldt without really providing any convincing textual evidence. We shall
see in the following chapters similar attempts to prove Saussure's depen-
dence upon and marked influence by other linguists of the Humboldtian
tradition which are frequently very misleading because the advocates
conclude from certain superficial similarities "evidence" for their pre-
conceived convictions and base their assumptions on passages taken out
of context, both historically and epistemologically.
Since our concern is with the linguistics prior to the appearance
of the CLG in 1916 it may suffice to list a number of the neo-Humboldtians
of the older generation, e.g. Hermann Güntert (1886-1948), Eugen Lerch
Leo Weisgerber (1899- ), and Walther von Wartburg (1888- ), as well as
of the younger generation, e.g. Hennig Brinkmann, Helmut Gipper, Hans
Glinz, Ernst Leisi, and others.

Die Elemente der philosophischen Sprachwissenschaft Wilhelm von
Humboldts (Berlin: Trautwein, 1847).

Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren
Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschen-Geschlechts (Berlin:
F. Dümmler, 1836); facsimile repr. ibid., 1960; another ed., prepared by Herbert Nette, appeared in 1949 (Darmstadt: Claassen & Roether).

Die Sprachwissenschaft Wilh. v. Humboldts und die Hegelsche Philo-
sophie (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1848).


"Programm zu einer neuen Ausgabe der sprachphilosophischen Werke
Wilhems von Humboldts", ZfVPs 13:201-32; pp. 211-32 print for the first
time an unfinished essay of Humboldt's.

Die Sprachphilosophischen Werke Wilhelm's von Humboldt (Berlin:
F. Dümmler, 1884). After a short preface (1-5) and a description of
the manuscripts (7-11) Steinthal gives a general introduction to Humboldt's
philosophical ideas about language (13-21) and analyzes his style (23-34)
before reproducing the most important of Humboldt's treatises published
between 1820 and 1836 together with an introduction to each individual
work.

"Einleitung in die allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft", IZAS 1:1-29,
329-54 (1884); 2:54-115, 209-51 (1885); 3:110-26, 249-75 (1887); 4:67-96
(1889), and 5:3-18 (1890). See also Pott's Zur Litteratur der Sprach-
kunde Europas (= Supplement to IZAS, 1) (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1887),
esp. pp. 95-111 in which he attacks the neogrammarians.

Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues . . . von
Wilh. von Humboldt, ed. and with an introduction, "Wilhelm von Humboldt
und die Sprachwissenschaft", by A. F. Pott (Berlin: S. Calvary, 1876),
ccccxx + 544 pp.
Statements of the following kind which still seem to be characteristic of contemporary histories of linguistics would then have to be rejected as utterly misleading: "... Humboldt n'a pas eu de disciple et l'oeuvre de linguistique générale qu'il avait ébauchée ne fut reprise que trois quarts de siècle plus tard. Et puis Saussure est venu et avec lui l'esprit de synthèse, la rigueur du raisonnement, la clarté des vues ... ", etc. - thus M. Leroy on three [sic.] occasions: 1) "Réflexions sur l'histoire de la linguistique", Omagiu Rosetti, 471-3 (1965), at p. 472; 2) "Le binarisme, concept moteur de la linguistique", Mélanges de linguistique ... offerts à René Fohalle (Gembloux: Duculot, 1969), 3-18, at pp. 8-9, and 3) Leroy, 1971:37; cf. our forthcoming review of the latter in GL.


Wilhelm von Humboldt's Gesammelte Schriften, 12 vols. (Berlin: B. Behr, 1903-14), vols. 13-17 appeared until 1936; all 17 vols. have been reprinted (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1967-68).

Cf. for example Eduard Spranger, "Wilhelm von Humboldt und Kant", Kantstudien 13:57ff. (1908), and Adolf Harnack, "Leibniz und Wilhelm von Humboldt", Preussische Jahrbücher, No. 140 (1910). It may be added that Humboldt's ideas about the nature of language have attracted many non-linguists with a specific philosophical interest as is illustrated for instance by Ernst Cassirer's (1874-1945) work. It is of some historical significance that Berthold Delbrück who had devoted only a few paragraphs to Humboldt's personality in the 1st ed. of his Einleitung in das Sprachstudium (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880) ignoring Humboldt's linguistic ideas completely (op. cit., 26-7), added, since he believed it to be appropriate (cf. preface, vi), a large section of Humboldt's views about language in the 4th ed. of his Einleitung (1904:41-55).

See his Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (Halle/S.: Niemeyer, 1880), pp. 68f. where Paul refers explicitly to Humboldt's assertion that speaking is "ein immerwährendes Schaffen". (This passage is printed on pp. 109f. of the 4th and subsequent editions). However, Humboldt's influence on Paul is fairly marginal as Leonhard Jost had to concede; cf. his Sprache als Werk und wirkende Kraft: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der energetischen Sprachauffassung seit Wilhelm von Humboldt (Berne: P. Haupt,
1960), 94-100 (on Paul), and, after his attempt at interpreting Paul's use of the term "Sprechtätigkeit" as indicating his indebtedness to Humboldt's energeia conception of language, Jost's meagre conclusion (p. 99).

Humboldt was mentioned by Fds only in passing (cf. CLG(E) 3) in his lectures on general linguistics. R. Engler kindly provided us (through private correspondence) with a note taken by Louis Caille in 1907 in Fds's course which has not been included in the CLG(E) (cf. p. 21): "G. de Humboldt. C'est presque à ce point de vue ethnologique que G. de Humboldt se place dans ses idées philosophiques sur la structure des langues du globe. Le fond de ses travaux a pour but d'établir les rapports de la linguistique avec la logique. Mais l'impulsion a été donnée par ses études ethnologiques."


Cf. Miller's brief outline of (what he believes to be the relevant) aspects of Humboldt's linguistic philosophy, op. cit., 26-34, but also the meagre account of Fds, ibid., 38-41.


See the statement in Humboldt's Einleitung quoted in Miller, p. 26.
1.3.4.2 Georg von der Gabelentz and His Suggestions Concerning the General Study of Language.

... Hans Georg Conon von der GABELENTZ ... fu specialmente sinologo ...; ma fu anche glottologo generale di grande valore ed il suo volume: Die Sprachwissenschat, ... , ad onta del tempo passato, è ancora uno dei migliori testi di linguistica generale.

Carlo Tagliavini (1963:163)

Il est difficile en effet, quand on relit aujourd'hui la linguistique du passé, d'échapper à l'éclairage que les connaissances actuelles projettent à revers sur les formulations d' autre- fois; difficile de résister à cette impression saisissante des vieux textes apparaissant comme 'prémonitoires', difficile de combattre le sentiment qu'on aperçoit partout des précurseurs.

Georges Mounin in 1959 (TIL 4:8)

1.3.4.2.1 Gabelentz's Limited Recognition in the History of Linguistics

Georg von der Gabelentz (1840-93), son of the important investigator of various Indonesian and Polynesian languages, Hans Conon von der Gabelentz (1807-74), affords a striking example of a linguist whose ideas merit attention and yet has been ignored by many of his contemporaries and almost completely by subsequent generations of linguists. Thus he is still not included in many recent studies devoted to the history of linguistic thought, mentioned en passant in some, and only tentatively recognized by a few others. That he has only recently been rediscovered and recognized as a forerunner of modern structuralism,
e.g. Coseriu (1958ff.), Zwirner (1964ff.), and Rensch (1966f.), is surprising if we note that Leo Spitzer stated in 1918 that Saussure's *langue*/*parole* distinction had been anticipated in Gabelentz (1901:59), that Jespersen acknowledged in his famous *Language* of 1922 (cf. Jespersen, 1964:98) that he owed more to the work on general linguistics of Gabelentz than to any other linguist, and that Hjelmslev referred to Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* as frequently as to the works of Sapir (1921) and Saussure in his *Principes de linguistique générale*. In 1948 A. Reichling suggested that Saussure might well have been influenced by Gabelentz, and four years later L. C. Michels called Gabelentz a forerunner of structural linguistics, including phonology.

A few reasons may be cited which we believe would explain the lack of recognition Gabelentz received from his contemporaries in Germany. Gabelentz had studied linguistics and law at the universities of Jena and Leipzig and first turned toward the latter subject. However, he dropped his career as a lawyer in 1878 when he was invited to fill the newly established chair of East-Asian languages at Leipzig where he taught until his appointment to the chair of East-Asian languages and general linguistics (!) at Berlin in 1889. Contrary to what E. Zwirner has recently claimed, there is no evidence that Gabelentz took an active part in the *junggrammatische Richtung* which came to world-wide recognition during his tenure at Leipzig. Gabelentz, who first distinguished himself through his *Chinesische Grammatik* (Leipzig, 1881), concentrated his efforts on non-Indo-European languages in sharp contrast to the neogrammarians and their adherents. In addition Gabelentz was very interested in general linguistic problems deriving from ideas outlined in Humboldt's work (cf. 1.3.4), an endeavour which must have appeared anachronistic in the "unphilosophisches Zeitalter", as Paul aptly characterized the general intellectual trend of that time in the opening paragraph of his *Prinzipien* in 1880. The recent interest in the general linguistic work of Gabelentz is certainly due to a change in attitude towards language study which has resulted in the emphasis being on theory rather than on data and which has taken place during the sixties largely due to Chomsky's work. One notes with surprise that the recent rediscovery
of Gabelentz has occurred principally in Germany where his work in general linguistics was ignored for almost three generations of linguists.

1.3.4.2.2 Gabelentz's Principles of General Linguistics

In view of the various claims that have been made by Reichling, Michels, Coseriu, Zwirner, Rensch, and others regarding Gabelentz's influence on Saussure, it is imperative to go back to this alleged source of Saussurean inspiration, namely Gabelentz's work, *Die Sprachwissenschaft: Ihre Aufgaben, Methoden und bisherigen Ergebnisse*, which appeared in Leipzig in 1891. It should be pointed out even at this stage of our inquiry that, when Gabelentz was engaged in writing his book, the most influential writings of the 19th century, for instance the books by Paul, Sievers, Steinhal, and Whitney, were available to him. 1891 is also the year when Saussure assumed his professorship at Geneva indicating even in his first lectures his occupation with general problems of language study. Furthermore it should be added that it has now been established (cf. De Mauro, 1970:xxxv) that Saussure owned a copy of Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft*, a fact which will exclude any doubt that Saussure was acquainted with Gabelentz's ideas.

According to recent studies published by E. Zwirner, K. H. Rensch, and E. Coseriu, the following claims are made regarding the importance of Gabelentz on the development of Saussurean principles: 1) the distinction between langue/parole as well as the concept of faculté du langage had been anticipated by Gabelentz's distinction between "Einzel- sprache", "Rede", and "Sprachvermögen" which together constitute the more general concept of "Sprache". 2) Gabelentz's distinction between "historisch-genealogische Sprachforschung" and "einzelsprachliche Forschung" seems strikingly similar to the Saussurean dichotomy of synchrony and diachrony, and 3) Gabelentz's concept of "System" also appears to have anticipated Saussure's affirmation about the systematic character of language. De Mauro (1968:350) further suggests, by means of reference
to Hjelmslev (1928:112ff.), that Gabelentz's distinction between "Form" and "Stoff" (cf. Gabelentz, 1901:122-3, 324-60) could be paralleled with Saussure's distinction between form and substance (or matière), a suggestion which will not be pursued here because a discussion of this topic would go far beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Moreover, we fail to see why Gabelentz should be considered the source of this troublesome dichotomy since Humboldt had already enlarged on this topic two generations earlier (cf. Meier, 1961:16) and Paul and others had expressed their dismay about this cumbersome distinction prior to the appearance of Gabelentz's Sprachwissenschaft.

In dealing with the three aspects mentioned above, we shall devote particular attention to the study by Coseriu (1967b) for various reasons: 1) Zwirner's assertions are mostly poorly documented, erroneous in their detail, and biased on various points; 2) Rensch's paper (which is the most balanced account of the relation between Saussure and Gabelentz we are aware of) does not contain many of the positive claims which Coseriu has made, and 3) Coseriu's article is, to our knowledge, the most recent publication on this matter.

The second paragraph of the general part of Gabelentz's book is entitled "Begriff der menschlichen Sprache" (1901:2-4), and the author gives the following definition of the object of linguistic study: "Menschliche Sprache ist der gegliederte Ausdruck des Gedankens durch Laute." (p. 3). Gabelentz adds that this definition comprises various aspects distinguishing between (a) "Sprache als Erscheinung, als jeweiliges Ausdrucksmittel für den jeweiligen Gedanken, d.h. als Rede"; (b) language as "eine einheitliche Gesamtmittel solcher Ausdrucksmittel für jeden beliebigen Gedanken" adding that this is the sense we attribute to the language of a people, a social class, etc., and (c) language as a "Gemeingut der Menschen" expatiating this idea in the subsequent statement: "Gemeint ist damit das Sprachvermögen, d.h. die allen Völkern innewohnende Gabe des Gedankenausdruckes durch Sprache." (1901:3).

It should be pointed out that Gabelentz does not give his definitions at the beginning of his book and then carry on with other matters, but reiterates them on various occasions and links them to the distinction
between historical and descriptive linguistics as well as to the notion of system in language, as will be shown below.

Godel has discussed the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole* at length in his monograph (1957:142-59) and concludes that it "apporte moins de lumière que de trouble" (p. 159). To be sure Saussure introduced this dichotomy rather late in his career (in contrast to his much earlier distinction between descriptive and historical linguistics, for example) with the result that Godel asks cautiously whether this distinction has not simply been absent from Saussure's theorizing prior to his courses on general linguistics (SM, 143). The documentation provided by Godel on this point from students' notes reveals that in his first course of 1907 Saussure characterized *parole* and *langue* in quite a different manner from the one he introduced in the subsequent two courses (cf. SM, 145); there Saussure distinguished (with a reference to Whitney [cf. CLG(E), 33]) between *langue* and *faculté du langage*, *langue* as the social entity with the help of which man communicates, and *langage* as the individual's ability to speak (cf. SM, 147). Godel (SM, 148) points out that this distinction had been made by Saussure much earlier (before 1894?) though in somewhat different terms, but there is no indication that Saussure introduced it in the manner found in the *Cours* prior to 1894 when he wrote his appreciation of Whitney (with which we have dealt at some length in a previous chapter, cf. 1.3.1). The fact that the influential distinction between *langue* and *parole* was not made prior to the first course in 1907 allows us to quote those formulations of the second edition of Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* of 1901 which were added by the editor who decided, according to his own words, to emend certain passages "where progress of science urgently required it . . . ." (1901:vii). Here, the relationship between the first two aspects of language is characterized in the following manner:

* Die Rede ist eine Äusserung des einzelnen Menschen, die sie erzeugende Kraft gehört also zunächst dem Einzelnen an. Aber die Rede will verstanden sein, und sie kann nur verstanden werden, wenn die Kraft, der sie entströmt, auch in dem Hörer wirkt. Diese Kraft, - ein Apparat von Stoffen und Formen, - ist eben die Einzelsprache. (1901:59).
Rede pertains to the individual and is an activity which relies on the code, the Einzelsprache which permits mutual understanding (s. also 1901:8, 12). Together with the Sprachvermögen (cf. 1901:303-17) they form the three aspects of Sprache. Coseriu's (1967b:78) diagram which demonstrates the following relationship seems therefore quite correct:

\[
\{ \text{Sprache} \}
\begin{align*}
\text{Rede} \\
\text{Einzelsprache} \\
\text{Sprachvermögen}
\end{align*}
\]

The parallelism of Gabelentz's tripartition and that of Saussure is striking and one does not need extensive citation from the Cours to support this impression. For Saussure (though not on all occasions) parole was actualization ("exécution") of langage through the language code, i.e. langue (cf. CLG, 30f.; LTS, 38). The faculty of language, the "faculté d'association et de coordination" (CLG, 29), however, does not seem to have been used frequently in Saussure's lectures (cf. CLG(E), 39) and was of marginal interest for Saussure, probably because the ability to speak is not an object of the linguist's study. Saussure's terms may nevertheless be arranged in the same manner as those defined by Gabelentz:

\[
\{ \text{langage} \}
\begin{align*}
\text{parole} \\
\text{langue} \\
\text{faculté du langage}
\end{align*}
\]

When defining langue Saussure emphasized that it should not be confused with langage, and that langue is "à la fois un produit social de la faculté du langage et un ensemble de conventions nécessaires, adoptées par le corps social pour permettre l'exercice de cette faculté chez les individus." (CLG, 25; cf. CLG(E), 31-2). This last quotation, however, contains an aspect which has no parallel in Gabelentz's theory but which plays an important rôle in Saussure's argument; i.e. the distinction between social and individual underlying and supporting the definitions of langue and parole. This does not mean that Gabelentz ignored the social aspect of language in general for Gabelentz observed that language is a product of the community ("Erzeugnis der Gesellschaft" [1901:3]) and the property ("Gemeingut") of a smaller or larger group
of people (p. 8). But neither the social aspect of language nor the individual aspect of speech have been incorporated into Gabelentz's definition of these terms. This observation does not, of course, exclude the possibility that Saussure might have been influenced by Gabelentz's tripartition; the opposition social: individual is, we believe, of secondary importance in Saussure's theory and without rigorous consequences on his definitions of either *langue* or *parole* in actual linguistic terms. Most probably this distinction derives, as we have demonstrated earlier (cf. 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.2), from other sources, for instance the works of Whitney and Paul.

On the other hand, the linguistically pertinent definition of *langue* in Saussure's *Cours* views language as a system, a system of (arbitrary) signs (cf. CLG, 32, 33, 106, 107, 182) or a "système de pures valeurs" (CLG, 116), for example. In this respect Gabelentz appears at first sight to be close to Saussure's notion, as a comparison between Gabelentz's affirmations concerning the systematic nature of language and Saussure's definitions would suggest:

Rejecting the idea that language and a living organism are merely inventories of unrelated units Gabelentz affirms:

"Beide sind in jeder Phase ihres Lebens (relativ) vollkommene Systeme, nur von sich selbst abhängig; . . . " (1901:9).

Or, one may compare the following two statements in Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft*, and Saussure's *Cours*:


"La langue est un système dont toutes les parties peuvent et doivent être considérées dans leur solidarité synchronique." (CLG, 124; cf. CLG(E), 192).

The reader should be warned however against concluding from these instances of an undeniably striking parallelism between the views put forward by Gabelentz and Saussure that there must have been a dependence by the
latter on the former. There are in fact very few more instances (e.g. 1901:63, 76) in which Gabelentz makes comparable use of the term 'system' to that found in the *Cours* in which this term plays a predominant rôle.\footnote{21}

As for the use of the term organism which occurs with some frequency in Gabelentz's work, Saussure's lectures reveal that he too employed this expression on several occasions and, in fact, as homonymous with 'system' (cf. CLG(E), 59).\footnote{22}

In addition, contrary to what Coseriu (1967b:88) wants the reader to believe, Gabelentz does not embed his affirmations concerning the systematic nature of language in his definitions of *Einzelsprache* (i.e. *langue* in the Saussurean sense) but speaks rather generally of *Sprache*. The two passages quoted above taken out of their respective contexts suggest a similarity of views which the book as a whole does not maintain. Nowhere does Gabelentz speak of language as a system of signs or as a system of pure values as is characteristic of Saussure's affirmations nor is there any indication in Gabelentz's work that he was aware (as was H. Paul, for example) of the fact that the system as such in language reveals itself in a synchronic manner as a language state. To conclude we may state that while there seems to be an astonishing parallelism between them to be found in the distinction of *langue*, *parole*, and *Sprache* and the use of the term *faculté du langage* ('"Sprechfähigkeit"'), Gabelentz does not however provide any axiomatic system in which these terms operate.\footnote{23}

Saussure was certainly familiar with Gabelentz's book but must surely have been disappointed with what he actually found there. It is therefore surprising to read in Coseriu's paper that in Gabelentz the relationships between *langue* and *parole* (we retain Coseriu's suggestive use of these Saussurean terms for Gabelentz's distinction between *Einzelsprache* and *Rede*) "sont beaucoup plus clairs, plus cohérents et mieux fondés . . ., précisément parce qu'il [i.e. Gabelentz] justifie sa distinction uniquement par l'opposition réalisation-système" (1967b:92) since, Coseriu adds, Gabelentz did not favour the contrast social vs. individual, which, it is true, tends to render Saussure's distinction somewhat obscure and contradictory (cf. 2.2ii). It is typical of Coseriu's approach, not only that he makes use of Saussurean terms to interpret Gabelentz's
notions, a procedure which causes a subtle shifting of meaning, but that he assumes characteristics and statements about the nature of language and the manner of treating its various aspects which are not to be found in Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft*. A procedure of this kind has to be criticized on the grounds that it is based on the erroneous assumption that Gabelentz's epistemological paradigm of 1890 is substantially identical with that prevailing at the beginning of this century when Saussure taught his courses on general linguistics (for an illustration to this effect see Arens, 1969:403-4). The substitution "réalisation-système" for Gabelentz's distinction between *Rede* and *Einzelsprache* is at best an overinterpretation of what Gabelentz actually said (cf. 1901:3-4, and elsewhere); in fact, as we have already pointed out earlier in this chapter, there is no such definition of *Einzelsprache* in Gabelentz which includes the notion of system as its crucial aspect, contrary to what can be repeatedly found in Saussure's work.

Coseriu adds to the distortion of the picture when he affirms:

Aussi, Gabelentz perçoit-il mieux que Saussure que, dans un certain sens, la linguistique descriptive a pour objet la parole - c'est-à-dire, le fonctionnement de la langue - , que la langue se déduit de la parole et que, à proprement parler, il n'y a pas conflit entre la linguistique descriptive et la linguistique historique, puisque cette dernière se propose d'expliquer la langue, non pas la parole. (1967b: 92).

It cannot be sufficiently stressed that these ideas are neither those of Gabelentz nor Saussure but Coseriu's own conceptions. Saussure did not think that *parole* is the proper object of synchronic study of language - his use of 'mechanism' (cf. CLG, 107) pertains to *langue* and not to *parole* and is synonymous with *fonction* (cf. LTS, 34) -, nor did he ever argue that *langue* could be deduced from the speech act. Gabelentz, on the other hand, never referred to a notion which could be rendered by "fonctionnement de la langue", and if he actually made the observations concerning the relation between descriptive and historical linguistics in the manner expounded by Coseriu, the hypothesis which Coseriu tries to prove, namely that Gabelentz had a profound influence on Saussure, can be invalidated in many respects. Discussion of this point, i.e. the second
main contention that Gabelentz anticipated Saussure's distinction between synchrony and diachrony (cf. Coseriu, in *ZFSL* 77:30 [1967], Zwirner, 1969:32, and elsewhere, and, more cautiously, Rensch, 1966:36-9), will take place later at some length.

According to his tripartition of *Rede, Einzelsprache* and *Sprachvermögen* Gabelentz distinguishes between three objects of linguistic investigation to which one part of the volume is devoted: 1) *Die einzelsprachliche Forschung* (1901:54-135); 2) *Die genealogisch-historische Sprachforschung* (136-301, and 3) *Die allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft* (302-484).

In 1891 Gabelentz distinguished the historical-genealogical treatment from the investigation of the *Einzelsprache* by characterizing the latter as "ein Vermögen, das aus seinen Äusserungen begriffen, in diesen nachgewiesen werden will." (1901:139). To recognize, describe and analyze this capacity and deduce from it the manifestations of the *Einzelsprache* should be the goal of the investigator. These somewhat vague ideas have been made more explicit in the second edition of Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* in which it is said that it is neither the tools nor the object of investigation which differ but the goals that the investigator has in mind. In this latter respect Gabelentz (read: Schülenburg) states with regard to the relation between the descriptive and the historical approach: *"Beide Forschungszweige verhalten sich zu einander gegensätzlich und sich ergänzend"* adding that one method of research may just attain what the other could not (1901:140). The object of the descriptive approach is defined in the following manner:

* Die einzelsprachliche Forschung erklärt die Sprachäußerungen aus dem jeweiligen Sprachvermögen und thut sich genug, wenn sie dieses Vermögen, wie es derzeit in der Seele des Volkes ist oder war, in seinem inneren Zusammenhange systematisch begreift. (1901:140).

Coseriu (1967b:80) is in error when he concludes from the following statement in Gabelentz that the *einzelsprachliche Forschung* deduces language from actual speech utterances and explains speech with the help of language: *"Wir lernen und lehren die Rede [sic!] aufbauen aus ihren Stoffen und nach ihren Gesetzen, nachdem wir diese Stoffe und Gesetze
inductiv, aus der Rede, ermittelt haben." (1901:59). In fact the reader of today might expect that Gabelentz had meant that descriptive linguistics attempts to deduce *language* from the observation of a large quantity of speech utterances; however, as this quotation reveals, Gabelentz's statement does not make explicit what Coseriu is anxious to see, and an earlier quotation has to be referred to in order to justify Coseriu's interpretation (cf. p. 13). It appears rather that *einzelsprachliche Forschung* is concerned with speech and the historical-genealogical linguistics with language when it is maintained:

* Die einzelsprachliche Forschung erklärt die Rede aus dem Wesen der Einzelsprache. Die genealogisch-historische erklärt die Einzelsprache, wie sie sich nach Raum und Zeit gespalten und gewandelt hat. (1901:12)

On the other hand it cannot be held that *Rede* is in fact the object of the *einzelsprachliche Forschung* when the "Sprachgefühl" at a given time appears to be the proper goal of research as seems clear from another statement pertaining to the distinction between the "beschreibende Wissenschaft" (1901:59) and historical linguistics:

* Wie und warum jenes Vermögen und dieses Gefühl so geworden, begreift sie [i.e. the descriptive linguistics] nicht. Dagegen will die Sprachgeschichte als solche eben weiter nichts als dieses erklären. Das heisst: die Lebensäußerungen der Sprache, die Rede, begreift sie [i.e. the historical linguistics] gar nicht. Will sie sie begreifen, so muss sie eben auf den einzelsprachlichen Standpunkt übertreten. (1901:140).

At least it can be observed that Gabelentz was aware that descriptive linguistics is concerned with a given language state, ("Zustand") when he attempted to define the object of a 'synchronic' approach, although he notes at the same time the dynamic character of language in the post-Humboldtian fashion:

Thatsächlich ist nun aber jenes Vermögen ein gewordenes und immer weiter werdendes, sich veränderndes und verschiebendes, und auch das will erklärt werden . . . (1901:139). To explain this change is, he adds, the object of the "Sprachgeschichte".

Gabelentz adds a third linguistics to the other two whose object is, according to his tripartition of *Rede-Einzelsprache-Sprachvermögen,*
the faculty of speech:

Diese Wissenschaft hat das menschliche Sprachvermögen selbst zum Gegenstande. Sie will dies Vermögen begreifen, nicht nur in Rücksicht auf die geistleiblichen Kräfte und Anlagen, aus denen es sich zusammensetzt, sondern auch, soweit dies erreichbar ist, dem ganzen Umfange seiner Entfaltungen. (1901:302).

However, this branch of linguistics which Gabelentz calls "allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft" is not only concerned with analyzing the underlying mechanism of human speech, so to speak, but embraces at the same time all statements which have been made concerning the object and the findings of descriptive as well as historical linguistics (cf. loc. cit. and p. 479). In the second edition the object of each individual aspect of the branches of linguistics has been defined together in the following manner:

* Der Gegenstand der einzelnsprachlichen Forschung ist die Sprache als Rede: die soll aus dem nationalen Sprachvermögen erklärt werden, nachdem dieses, inductiv, aus ihr [i.e. the Rede] ermittelt worden ist. Sie hat nicht den Ursprung dieses Vermögens zu erklären, - das ist Sache der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft - auch nicht dessen zeitliche Wandelungen zu verfolgen, - das gehört der Sprachgeschichte an, - sondern sie soll dies Vermögen, wie es jeweilig ist, entdecken, beschreiben und bis in die letzten seiner Windungen hinein verfolgen. (1901:76).

Coseriu (1967b:81ff.) quotes a number of passages from Gabelentz's book which attempt to show that its author has developed a notion strikingly similar to Saussure's concept of synchrony: the einzelnsprachliche Forschung is concerned with a language state (1901:60), the functioning of language at a given moment (p. 8); the descriptive linguist's task is to describe only "was im Sprachgefühl des Volkes vorhanden ist." (p. 124; cf. also pp. 25, 28); the "einzelsprachliche Forscher" assumes the standpoint of the native speaker: "... was diesem in seinem Sprachbewusstsein gegeben ist, das darf er [i.e. the descriptive linguist] als gegeben betrachten." (1901:92). In fact it can be shown that Gabelentz clearly distinguished between the descriptive approach to linguistic analysis and the historical-etymological one; furthermore, Coseriu (1967b:85-6) compares a number of quotations from both the Cours and Gabelentz's Sprachwissenschaft to suggest that Saussure
must have derived his insights from Gabelentz. Coseriu avers that Saus-
sure's term 'synchronic' not only corresponds to Gabelentz's expression
"gleichzeitig" but also that the latter has simply been translated by
Saussure into 'termes successifs'. By the same token Saussure's term
'idiosynchronique' is said to correspond to Gabelentz's use of the ex-
pression of 'gleichzeitig und gleichsprachlich'. However, although the
similarity between these terms cannot be denied, Coseriu's claim has
to be rejected on the following grounds: 1) Gabelentz did not employ
"gleichzeitig" as a technical term in a manner similar to Saussure's
use of "synchronique" throughout the Cours; 2) the only instance which
Coseriu cites in which Gabelentz's book notes the expression "gleich-
zeitig und gleichsprachlich" is contained in the second edition of the
Sprachwissenschaft (p. 61) but not in the first of 1891; 3) Saussure,
besides noting in 1894 that he had conceived of linguistics as a double
science "depuis bien des années" (cf. SM, 45), not only defined these
two aspects diachronic and synchronic probably as early as in the same
year but also used the term "idiosynchronique" (cf. SM, 49). In addition
Coseriu does not seem aware of the fact that "terme" in Saussure's use
of the word does not simply mean term in a general and unspecified sense
but signifies a technical term in Saussure's theory, a fact which escaped
the notice of the editors of the Cours (cf. SM, 279).

All this does not imply that Saussure could not well have been in-
fluenced by Gabelentz's work but it should be stressed that Saussure
did not simply adopt certain notions he found in the writings of others
as Coseriu's findings tend to suggest; Saussure's greatness, it cannot
be sufficiently stressed, lies in the fact that he worked ideas which
were expressed during his life-time into one whole. Similarly, Saussure
might well have found in Gabelentz's book a model for his distinction
between the internal and external elements of language (CLG, 40-3);
there Gabelentz pointed out, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that
it is desirable to distinguish between an external and an internal lan-
guage history by defining the terms as follows:

Die äussere Geschichte einer Sprache ist die Geschichte
ihrer räumlichen und zeitlichen Verbreitung und etwaigen
Mischungen (Genealogie). Die innere Sprachgeschichte erzählt und sucht zu erklären, wie sich die Sprache in Rückicht auf Stoff und Form allmählich verändert hat. (1901:141-2).

A comparison with Saussure's definitions of a *linguistique interne* as opposed to a *linguistique externe*, however, does not prove that Saussure's distinction is connected with language history in a way similar to Gabelentz's affirmation, as Coseriu (1967b:87) maintains, but Saussure has something entirely different in mind by emphasizing that language is a system of mutually related signs which he exemplifies by introducing the analogy between language and a game of chess (cf. CLG, 43). Here, as on many other occasions, Gabelentz does not make use of the notion of system in language an aspect which, as we have pointed out above, constitutes one of the most crucial elements of Saussure's theory.

Too easily, it seems, Coseriu has succumbed to the temptation to assume from terminological similarities and parallels in concepts that there was some direct influence from Gabelentz on Saussure, an assumption which Coseriu (1967b:97) wants to underscore by setting up a list of terms from Gabelentz which are paralleled by expressions in the Cours. In doing so Coseriu takes the surface standpoint without investigating the epistemological basis of Gabelentz's as opposed to Saussure's much advanced linguistic thought. In a number of instances a close examination reveals that some expressions found in Gabelentz (e.g. "Wechselwirkung" or "Spielraum") are not employed as technical terms as are the alleged Saussurean counterparts (e.g. "solidarité" and "latitude"; cf. LTS, 32 and 47 respectively). It also appears highly questionable to view Gabelentz's frequent use of the post-Humboldtian notion of "Volksgeist" or "Bewusstsein des Volkes" (cf. 1901:387) as an equivalent to Saussure's term of "conscience collective" (cf. CLG(E), 227); this latter notion in fact plays no important rôle in Saussure's theorizing and is rarely used in his lectures on general linguistics (neither Godel, SM nor Engler, LTS includes this expression).

On the other hand Coseriu has convincingly demonstrated that there are, apart from the distinctions already discussed in this chapter, a number of notions found in the Cours which can be paralleled by strikingly
similar ones in Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* (cf. Coseriu, 1967:98-9) to the extent that it might no longer be maintained that the similarities are merely accidental. However, as we have pointed out already at the beginning of this chapter, Gabelentz's observations were often made *en passant* and rarely taken to their conclusion as far as a methodology or, what is more, a general theory of language is concerned. Taken out of context the quotations from Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* are bound to suggest, to the post-Saussurean investigator, many more affinities of view, parallelism of linguistic concepts, and a 'structural' outlook on language than Gabelentz's work as a whole contains. A typical example for instance of a misleading comparison of isolated texts is to be found in Coseriu's article (e.g. 1967b:99) in which the object of linguistics appears to be defined both by Gabelentz and Saussure in the same manner, i.e. as comprising all manifestations of human speech (CLG, 20: Gabelentz, 1901:7-8). Those who read further in the actual texts will find that Saussure emphasizes the necessity for linguistics to define itself (including its relation to other sciences, in particular psychology [cf. CLG(E), p. 20]), whereas nothing of the kind is to be found in Gabelentz's work (cf. 1901:1ff.). However, these counter-arguments which we have tried to bring forward against Coseriu's bold attempt to prove that Saussure was in fact deeply influenced by Gabelentz's work are not strong enough to invalidate Coseriu's argument as a whole. In fact it has to be acknowledged that some of the ideas outlined in Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft* could not have failed to arouse Saussure's interest, in particular Gabelentz's tripartition between *Rede*, *Einzelsprache*, and *Sprachvermögen*, and possibly other concepts as well which have been referred to earlier in this chapter. Coseriu, in his attempt to attribute to Gabelentz a place comparable to that of Whitney and Durkheim (sic.), who both are often referred to as predecessors of Saussure's linguistic thought (1967b:100), ignores for instance the work of Paul whose *Prinzipien*, particularly in their second edition of 1886 (five years prior to the publication of Gabelentz's *Sprachwissenschaft, nota benissime*), contains many of the ideas which Coseriu wishes to attribute to Gabelentz: the distinction between descriptive and historical linguistics,
the description of language states as a prerequisite for historical linguistics, and many other ideas (cf. 1.3.2.2).

Coseriu's claim that Saussure used Gabelentz's book (among others) as a textbook while he was preparing his courses on general linguistics (1967b:99f.) is certainly exaggerated. In conclusion we believe we must emphasize those points in Coseriu's study in which he concedes the superiority of Saussure's linguistic views over those put forward by Gabelentz: 1) Saussure "est beaucoup plus systématique que Gabelentz. ... . Aussi n'arrive-t-il [i.e. Gabelentz] pas aux conclusions que Saussure tire de certaines prémisses identiques ou presque [our italics]."
2) Saussure "emploie une terminologie beaucoup plus précise et il définit presque toujours explicitement les notions essentielles de son système."
3) "Mais, surtout, il manque à Gabelentz la notion précise de fonctionalité et d'opposition. ... . . . il ne parvient pas à la notion d'opposition distinctive. On ne trouvera rien chez Gabelentz qui puisse être comparé à la seconde partie du CLG (linguistique synchronique) et, en particulier, au chapitre sur les identités et les valeurs linguistiques." (1967b:91).

If and only if we accept the hypothesis that Gabelentz's Sprachwissenschafter was a major source of Saussure's linguistic inspiration, may we conclude our discussion regarding the relationship between these two linguists with a final quotation from Coseriu: "On concédera que les idées de Gabelentz ne restent pas sans modifications chez Saussure. Ce qui en Gabelentz n'était souvent qu'intuition ou même, parfois, observation marginale devient chez Saussure thèse explicitement formulée, partie d'une système." (1967b:99). One may be safe to argue that Gabelentz's influence on Saussure was probably much stronger than contemporary histories of linguistics recognize but much less than Coseriu, Rensch, and Zwirner have tried to prove. Again, Saussure has not only shown himself much superior to another theoretician of language of his time but, what is more, as somebody who developed from ideas often expressed en passant by his contemporaries a general theory of language quite dissimilar from those put forward previously and much more coherent than had hitherto been conceived of in Western linguistic tradition. To argue, as Coseriu and others do, that Saussure derived particular insights from
Gabelentz and did nothing else but formulate these ideas somewhat more rigorously would mean not only distorting Gabelentz's proposals concerning a general consideration of linguistic phenomena but also minimizing Saussure's linguistic genius.\textsuperscript{27}
1 On him, s. the articles by A. Leskien in ADB 8:286 (1878), and particularly by Walter Böttger in NDB 6:2-3 (1964). Pedersen who ignores G. von der Gabelentz makes at least mention of Hans Conon (1962:130). The best-known work of H. C. von der Gabelentz is his monograph, Über das Passivum (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1860), 98 pp., in which he consulted some 200 languages from all over the world in order to analyze this category in post-Humboldtian terms.


3 Cf. M. Ivić (1965:55), and Robins (1967:180) who, however, refers to Gabelentz in his chap. devoted to comparative and historical linguistics, and not in the concluding chap. dealing with structural linguistics.


5 This statement can be found towards the end of his paper, "Ein Ersatzwort für 'Syntax'", in his collection, Aufsätze zur romanischen Syntax und Stilistik (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1918), p. 345. An observation to the same effect was later made by Iordan/Or (1937:283, n.1), and with a slight revision in Iordan/Bahner (1962:287), and also by Coseriu on several occasions (cf. Coseriu, 1958:13; 1962:282).

6 Copenhagen: A. F. Høst & Søn, 1928; repr. 1968; see esp. 112-3; this important document has been ignored by Coseriu, 1967b.

7 See Reichling, "What is General Linguistics?", Lingua 1:8-24; Michels, "Georg von der Gabelentz als voorloper van de structurele taalkunde en de fonologie", NTg 45:17-9, and "Verbetering", ibid., p. 114 (1952).


9 There are no indications that FdS took note of Gabelentz when he studied at Leipzig (1876-78, 1879/80); it is therefore misleading when Zwirner (1969:38) speaks of Gabelentz as "seines [i.e. FdS's] Leipziger und Berliner Lehrers", a contention repeated by Georg Stötzel in 1970 (Poetica 3:17).
One could add a number of linguists who were contemporaries of Gabelentz who did not enjoy the recognition they deserved; Baudouin de Courtenay, Kruszewski, Friedrich Techmer (1843-91), and F. N. Finck (1867-1910) may be cited as the most striking examples. However, it is not the task of our present study to present a counter-history of linguistic science of the 19th century.

Leipzig: T. O. Weigel, 1891, xx + 502 pp.; 2nd ed., prepared by Albrecht Graf von der Schulenburg (ibid.: C. H. Tauchnitz, 1901), xxi + 520 pp. We shall quote from the 2nd slightly emended and updated ed. of 1901 which was repr. in 1969 (Tübingen: Verlag Tübinger Beiträge zur Linguistik). A comparison of the 2nd ed. with the first of 1891 shows that the sections dealing with principles of language study did not remain unchanged. In fact Schulenburg (1865-1902), then "Privat-docent für ostasiatische Sprachen" at the University of Munich, not only updated linguistic material from his own area of research but also, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, made essential components of Gabelentz's linguistic argument much more explicit. Since we use the 2nd rev. ed. of 1901, which has recently been reprinted (Tübingen: TBL, 1969), we shall follow Coseriu's (1967b:76) practice by marking with an asterisk immediately preceding the quotation those passages which were not contained in the 1891 edition. A comparison between the 1891 and the 1901 ed. reveals that about the equivalent of close to 80 printed pages (if the layout of the 1st ed. is taken as a basis) have been added by Schulenburg. Substantial additions have been made on the following pages: 10, 11-3, 15-6, 17, 28-9, 30, 31, 32, 39, 46, 49, 51, 53, 59, 60-61, 63, 64, 75-7, 80, 84, 109, 135, 136, 140-41, [ . . . ], 303-4, 313, 327, 328-34 [1], 338-34 [1], 344, [ . . . ], 386-7, [ . . . ], 439, 446, [ . . . ], 478-9, 481, 484. Note that not all additions have been listed here; the square brackets indicate that a number of passages have not been scrutinized. Two observations are worth pointing out: 1) Schulenburg retained almost every sentence of the original; minor stylistic revisions have been made on pp. 52 and 113, and on p. 387 five lines of the 1891 ed. have been omitted. 2) Large additions were made especially on occasions where Humboldtian ideas are dealt with (cf. pp. 76, 328-34, 338-43, 439).

Cf. the excerpts of FdS's ms. of 1891 (cf. SM, 36) made in CES 12:65-7 (1954); it is interesting to note that FdS then maintained the following: "Langue et langage ne sont qu'une même chose; l'un est la généralisation de l'autre." (p. 65).

Godel (who must be criticized for having misrepresented in form [partly corrected by De Mauro, 1970:xxxiii] and substance the suggestions put forward by K. H. Rensch in 1966) has recently made the following statement regarding Gabelentz's Sprachwissenschaft and ideas expressed in the CLG: "On peut d'ailleurs signaler d'autres [i.e. apart from the synchrony/diachrony dichotomy] concordances. Saussure possédait dans sa bibliothèque un exemplaire de l'ouvrage. Il a du le lire, ou au moins parcourir. Mais il ne l'a jamais cité; . . . " (1968:116-7), and Godel goes on to refer to FdS's affirmation of 1894 that he had held for many
years that linguistics is a double science - to which a reference was explicitly made by Rensch in *Phonetica* 15:39, n.14 (1966)! - adding that FdS would have acknowledged his indebtedness to Gabelentz had he owed him pertinent ideas as he did in the case of Whitney, BdC, and Kruszewski. We believe that the latter argument cannot be seriously upheld in view of the fact that only a limited number of notes from FdS himself have been preserved.


17 We may note *en passant* that FdS (CLG, 26) speaks of "gegliederte Sprache" when he discusses language as the object of linguistics (CLG, 23-7); the critical ed. reveals that FdS said in fact "gegliederte Sprache ou *Rede*" (CLG(E), 35).

18 Gabelentz adds: "Sprache in diesem Sinne ist nicht sowohl die Gesammttheit aller Reden des Volkes, der Classe oder des Einzelnren, - als vielmehr die Gesammttheit derjenigen Fähigkeiten und Neigungen, welche die Form, derjenigen sächlichen Vorstellungen, welche den Stoff der Rede bestimmen." He thus relates language to speech in the sense that speech (*Rede*) is the actualization of language (which Gabelentz terms somewhat misleadingly "Einzelsprache").

19 Godel's glossary (SM, 252-81) does not contain a special entry referring to 'faculté du langage' as opposed to Engler's (LTS, 24), but cites students' notes to the same effect under 'langage' (SM, 266). Riedlinger had noted from the second course: "La faculté du langage est un fait distinct de la langue, mais qui ne peut s'exercer sans elle".

20 Coseriu (1967b:79) points out that *langue* as a social institution does not always correspond to *langue* as a system (of signs) in FdS's theories and he refers to a study of his own in which he discusses this problem (cf. Coseriu, 1962:43-62). We shall treat this topic in Part II of our study (cf. 2.2.1.2).

21 G. Mounin reports that there are 138 occurrences of 'system' in the CLG; cf. his article, "La notion de système chez Antoine Meillet",
We believe that Gabelentz's use of "analytisches" and "synthetisches System" (1901:84-104 [passim]) has nothing to do with the semantics of FdS's use of the term. (For a definition of these expressions, see Gabelentz, 1901:93).

According to Mounin, *op. cit.*, p. 25, there are 11 occurrences of the term 'organism' in the CLG.

This similarity was noticed by Friedrich Kainz as early as in 1941 in vol. 1 of his *Psychologie der Sprache* (3rd ed., Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1962) — another publication overlooked by Coseriu (1967b) — who believes it to be "ein Akt geschichtlicher Gerechtigkeit darauf hinzuweisen, dass 'eine sehr ähnliche Spaltung [as FdS's distinction between langage, langue, and parole] schon vorher bei Gabelentz anzutreffen ist" (p. 20).

Significantly the very extensive index of Gabelentz's *Sprachwisenschaft* (1901:487-520) does not list "gleichzeitig" though a number of etymologically related terms, e.g. "Gleichartigkeit", "Gleichheit", "Gleichklanggefühl", etc., are included (p. 498).

Cf. Gabelentz: "der Lauf der Rede ist bekanntlich geradlinig" (1961:85) - Saussure: "[les] éléments... forment un chaîne" (CLG, 103) and "la chaîne phonique a pour premier caractère d'être linéaire" (CLG, 145); the comparison of language with money (Gabelentz, 1901:55, 98 - CLG, 164); both linguists affirm that the speaker applies the rules of language unconsciously (Gabelentz, 1901:31, 33 - CLG, 106, 107), etc.

K. H. Rensch's statement that FdS's distinction between synchronic and diachronic linguistics "findet sich bereits" in Gabelentz's work of 1891 (cf. *Phonetica* 15:36 [1966]) is misleading for at least two reasons: (a) it suggests (we believe wrongly) that FdS derived this concept from Gabelentz, and (b) that Gabelentz was the first to make such a distinction.

1.3.4.3 F. N. Finck and Some General Considerations Concerning Language Description

Frans Nikolaus Finck (1867-1910), both in a theoretical essay (1905) and in a little volume (1910) in which he analyzed descriptively eight unrelated languages, insisted upon descriptive study as a basis for both historical research and philosophical generalization. Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) had for years expounded this matter in his university lectures . . .

Leonard Bloomfield (1933:19)

It appears to have been Bloomfield, himself a pupil of A. Leskien at Leipzig in 1913, who in the introductory chapter of his principal work first linked the Berlin professor of general linguistics, F. N. Finck, with Saussure. However, a number of linguists have since suggested that Finck and other scholars anticipated certain ideas Saussure taught in his courses on general linguistics. It is for this reason that Finck has been included in the present investigation. Yet the inclusion of Finck is much more for the sake of completeness and because of his association with the Humboldtian tradition. We do not believe that Finck's work has played an important rôle in the development of Saussure's theory. Finck's influence was at best remote although it has recently been established that Saussure owned a copy of Finck's last book Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus (s. De Mauro, 1968:361) and might well have been acquainted with earlier writings by the same scholar.¹

In the preface of his Haupttypen of 1910 Finck stated that he had at first intended to provide an introduction to the approach to language inaugurated by Humboldt and developed by others such as Steinthal, Misteli, Byrne, but that he soon felt he had formed ideas of his own which merited presentation to an audience larger than that of his students.² The goal of his study was to suggest a way of explaining the characteristics of a given language by elucidating the mental qualities ("geistige Eigenart")
peculiar to its native speakers. Finck chose eight totally unrelated languages to prove that a classification of the languages of the world along these lines is possible. There can be no doubt that he was trying to demonstrate the correctness of Humboldt's suggestions concerning the "innere Sprachform", a problem which had occupied Finck for more than the last ten years of his short life. 3

The most valuable source of Finck's general linguistic views is his outline, Die Aufgabe und Gliederung der Sprachwissenschaft, which appeared in 1905. 4 In this programmatic book Finck's search for the 'inner form' of language constitutes the central question of the inquiry, a goal which, as Finck (1905:35-6) recognizes himself, cannot be attained by the linguist alone but needs the assistance of ethnology. Finck who proposed a clarification of this Humboldtian notion (1905:33) declared at the same time that the principal task of linguistics should be the investigation and description of languages in order to ultimately explain the peculiarity of all utterances by means of the intellectual particularity of the people who speak the language in question. 5 Such an aim, we believe, which is based on the erroneous (Humboldtian) assumption that language and thought are epistemologically identical, tends to regard linguistics as an ancillary science to anthropology, and this is in sharp contrast to what Saussure attempted to do, i.e. the definition of linguistics as having the investigation of language for the language's sake as its proper object.

On the other hand Finck showed himself very much aware of the shortcomings of the methodology of historical grammar as it was put forward by his contemporaries. Thus he criticizes historical linguistics for tracing back certain forms of speech by putting two or more forms of speech one beside the other instead of offering an explanation of how forms of stage A of a given language have developed to forms of a given stage B; distinguishing clearly between historical grammar and descriptive linguistics Finck states:

... Die historische Grammatik, wie sie Mode ist, unterscheidet sich also von der sogenannten rein beschreibenden dadurch, dass sie einen unmöglichen Kausalzusammenhang vortäuscht, [adding that prehistorical linguists adds to this confusion by introducing a number of unknown quantities ], (1905:16).
But this observation was only to be of marginal interest to Finck since he in fact defined the task of general linguistics to be that of explaining the specific formation of the speech of each approximately uniform linguistic community. Finck's use of the term "Rede" as well as his request for the investigation of a kind of linguistic average of a given speech community does not, as De Mauro (1968:350) and Coseriu (1962:282) suggested, in any respect anticipate Saussure's concept of parole which may be explained with the help of the description of langue. Finck's proposals lead to a field of research outside linguistics proper or, perhaps more correctly, to an overall science of human mental activity in which linguistics constitutes nothing but a province (cf. n.6).

What may be worth mentioning, in addition to the general emphasis on the mental character of linguistic investigation, is Finck's contrast between a linguistics which is confined to individual parts of language and its mechanism and what he calls general linguistics. Once again, we fail to see a parallel between his conception of general linguistics and that of Saussure. Finck (1905:19) stresses the necessity of establishing a survey of the sum total of linguistic expressions before a particular language can be analyzed according to its special characteristics; Saussure noted on the other hand, as early as 1891, that just those linguists such as Friedrich Müller (1834-98) who were familiar with a great number of languages, including many exotic ones, never did propose a general theory of language, whereas others who specialized in a particular branch of languages of the Indo-European family were much closer to setting up the general principles of language study (cf. CFS 12:66). As the Cours reveals Saussure did not deduce general principles of linguistic description from a vast amount of data but proposed theoretical concepts which might apply to the mechanism of language in general. The emphasis on langue which is conceived of as an abstract system underlying verbal expression and the communicational process (cf. CLG, 27-32 [passim]) rather than the investigation of large quantities of speech utterances is characteristic of Saussure's approach to linguistics.

Another major feature of Finck's linguistic activity is concerned with language classification. This is another important component of
Humboldt's general theory of language description which played an important part in the linguistic theories of his followers from Steinthal to Ernst Lewy (1881-1966), but which did not attract Saussure's interest to a large extent as his work reveals. In accordance with the procedures advocated in his 1905 treatise Finck starts with the accumulation and ordering of his data before setting out to present pertinent aspects of his findings. In *Die Sprachstämme des Erdkreises* of 1909 Finck arranges the languages of the world according to genealogical principles; in his monograph of the following year, *Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus*, he exemplifies his views concerning the structural diversity of languages with the help of morphological classification and a comparison of eight completely unrelated languages. However, what Finck intends to find out eventually, namely that the linguistic type of a given language reflects the minds of the social group who speaks it, is clearly rejected by Saussure who argues that psychological causes do not necessarily underlie linguistic procedures (CLG, 310-1). In fact Saussure cites a number of examples to refute his idea; he concedes that it would not be without interest to determine the grammatical type of languages and to classify languages according to the manner in which they express thought but Saussure points out that these determinations and classifications do not permit accurate conclusions outside the domain of linguistics proper (CLG, 312; cf. also (CLG(E), 506).

These observations show clearly how far away from the Humboldtian tradition Saussure actually was. While never rejecting the intrinsic mental character of language he always attempted to draw a line between the object of linguistic science and the function of language outside the strictly linguistic sphere of the communicational process. Saussure's rejection of principal tenets of Humboldtian ideas on the grounds that they tend to assume much more than linguistics can provide evidence for, it should be noted, dates back to 1894 and probably much earlier and prior to any of Finck's linguistic publications. Saussure's attitude is evident from his remarks concerning the linguistic work of Humboldt in 1908 (cf. SM, 51) and the eloquent absence of references to Humboldt's work in his courses on general linguistics.
neo-Humboldtians, in particular Trier and Weisgerber, owe some of their insights regarding the semantic side of language to Saussure; to argue that Saussure in turn derived specific ideas concerning the nature of language from Finck, for example, is certainly beyond the point.
FOOTNOTES - 1.3.4.3


3 Cf. the collection of eight papers delivered at Marburg University where Finck had become "Privatdozent" of Indo-European and general linguistics in 1896, Der deutsche Sprachbau als Ausdruck deutscher Welt-
anschauung (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1899); Die Klassifikation der Sprachen (ibid., 1901), both of which were reviewed by Schuchardt in LGRP, coll. 274-9 (1902) and, much more positively, by Heinrich Winkler in AfdA 27:288-305.


6 The relevant passage from Finck (1905:19) runs as follows: "Die Aufgabe der Sprachwissenschaft ist also, die besondere Gestaltung der Rede jeder annähernd gleichmässig sprechenden Gemeinschaft aus deren geistiger Eigenart zu erklären, und im Gegensatz zu der auf einzelne Teile des Sprachlebens beschränkten Forschung mag diese, die zwecks Feststellung des Eigenartigen notwendig einen Überblick über die Gesamtheit voraussetzt, allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft heissen."

7 De Mauro is wrong when he points out that Karl Jaberg had sug-
gested that Finck anticipated FdS's langue/parole dichotomy; nor is De Mauro's page reference correct. Cf. Jaberg's Sprachwissenschaft-

8 Cf. his study, Der Bau der europäischen Sprachen, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1964).


10 See also Heinrich Winkler's review article, "Die Hauptstypen des Sprachbaus", Memnon (Leipzig) 6:59-80 (1912).
Cf. CLG(E), 505-6; it appears that CLG, 310-2 is mainly based on FdS's observations of 1894.

Finck's earliest linguistic (he published literary writings of his own in 1891 and 1893) work is, to our knowledge, a short monograph, *Über das Verhältnis des baltisch-slavischen Nominalaccents zum Urindo-germanischen* (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1895).

Both linguists acknowledged their debt to FdS, Trier in writing (cf. his *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes: Die Geschichte eines sprachlichen Feldes* [Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1931], p. 11) and Weisgerber orally (cf. Peter Hartmann, *Wesen und Wirkung der Sprache im Spiegel der Theorie Leo Weisgerbers* [ibid., 1958], p. 20).
1.4 Concluding Remarks on the First Part of the Investigation

In the preceding chapters of our study we have attempted to set out the paradigm of investigation which relates to the following aims: 1) To point to the important relationship between Saussure's work and his biography (1.1); 2) to suggest the necessity of establishing the general epistemological situation of Saussure's time in order to evaluate appropriately the various potential influences on his theorizing (1.2); 3) to discuss, taking into account the intellectual paradigm of the late 19th century, the possibility of extra-linguistic influences on Saussure (1.2.2 and 1.2.3), and 4) to demonstrate various important linguistic sources of Saussure's inspiration (1.3). With reference to the first aim, not much needs to be added except for the fact that still too little is known about Saussure's life and his extra-curricular activities to give a fully satisfying account of his non-linguistic interests and how they related to his outlook on language and its study. It is in this connection, but also with respect to the establishment of an epistemological paradigm of the period between 1870 and 1910 in Western Europe, that it appears desirable to establish which was the catholic nature of the books Saussure had in his library, in particular those many volumes which apparently treated subjects other than linguistics.¹

The second goal of our inquiry, i.e. to sketch out in which way the intellectual atmosphere prevailing during the last three decades of the past century and the first of the 20th century ought to be presented, has been a much more difficult task. Not even now is there anything in linguistic science comparable to Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* of 1962 for the natural sciences.² Linguistics, a science belonging to the much more verbal and therefore less easily accessible of the human arts, but much more prone to at times almost unnoticeable changes, reflects to a certain degree the accomplishments of the sciences insofar as they have some immediate bearing on the social, economic or political climate. Anybody who endeavours to map out something like the intellectual paradigm of a given period may easily be drowned in the primary material available unless he has first developed
a theory of how such a problem should be approached or has been fortunate enough to be endowed with the enviable talent which permits him to make the appropriate selections. The present study has expatiated only on certain pertinent aspects of the intellectual scene of Saussure's formative years, in particular those concerning sociology and political economy. Other probably not less important components of the paradigm, philosophy and psychology, have been treated only in passing; we regret that the research needed to explore and assess the main trends in these areas would exceed the scope of the present investigation. We have at least pointed to a number of publications concerning philosophy and psychology (cf. 1.2.1), treated some aspects of various psychological considerations of linguistic phenomena in the work of H. Paul and his acknowledged predecessors (1.3.2.2) as well as in the theoretical argument both of Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski (1.3.3.1-3), and have also attempted to trace Humboldtian language philosophy in the work of G. von der Gabelentz (1.3.4.1) and Finck (1.3.4.2) in order to find out whether some of Humboldt's ideas were absorbed by Saussure. We have not taken up Jakobson's (1965:22) suggestion that Saussure's theory of the linguistic sign might have been influenced by Heinrich Gomperz's (1873-1942) *Weltanschauungslehre* (1906-08), in particular by the theory of signs outlined in the second volume. This question will be dealt with in a later chapter (s. 2.2.3.1) when the origin and development of Saussure's concept of the language sign is discussed. Similarly, the possible influence of Anton Marty's (1847-1914) *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* on Saussure's linguistic thought has not been referred to. As De Mauro (1968:351) demonstrates, this volume of almost 800 pages which appeared in Halle in 1908 contained a number of ideas which might suggest similarities between Marty's distinction between a general descriptive and a genetic approach to language analysis, the primacy of form in language and other aspects, and those proposed in the *Cours*. We believe that it is not so much the question of influence which is relevant here — there is no indication that Saussure knew this work by Marty — but the fact that Marty's *Untersuchungen* constitute a good example of what was 'in the air' at the beginning of this century when Saussure set out to
lecture on general linguistic theory. As far as the work in the field
of psychology of language carried out during the last decades of the
19th century is concerned, a host of publications could be listed to
illustrate the importance of bibliographical data to underscore our argu-
ment; it suffices to relate a few examples. In the chapter on H. Paul
(1.3.2.2) Dittrich's *Grundzüge der Psychologie* of 1903 has been referred
to at some length; Fritz Mauthner's (1849-1923) voluminous *Beiträge zu
einer Kritik der Sprache* could be cited as another example of the 'state
of the art' at the beginning of this century. However, much more re-
vealing appears to be a statement which can be found in William James'
(1842-1910) *Principles of Psychology* which appeared in 1890 and ran
through several re-edicitions during the author's (and Saussure's) life-
time. Out of close to 1,400 pages devoted to all possible aspects of
psychology (apperception, association, cognition, etc.) only two-and-
a-half pages (sic!) deal with language "as human function." However the
first affirmation of his regarding the nature of language is quite signi-
ficant: "Language is a system of signs, different from the things signi-
ified, but able to suggest them." In the subsequent paragraph James dis-
cusses the difference between man and animal with respect to signs. He
points out that animals too have a number of signs to express certain
feelings; a dog, for example, may learn a number of signs from his master.
But there is nothing in the animal kingdom comparable to what James calls
the deliberate intention of man "to apply a sign to everything" adding
that the "linguistic impulse is with him generalized and systematic."
James further points out that man feels in himself a drive to name things,
the absence of a sign irritating him to the extent that "he ends by in-
vventing it", and concludes: "This general purpose constitutes, I take it,
the peculiarity of human speech, and explains its prodigious development." Here, in these observations of James' there is surely an interesting anti-
cipation of "Saussurean" ideas concerning the nature of the language
sign and the unique character of human speech.

As a third point in our argument we wished to demonstrate that
extra-linguistic influences on Saussure's theory of language exist or
that at least parallels and similarities can be traced between ideas
expounded in the *Cours* and those found in general outlines of sociology, political economy, and other fields of investigation. We have followed, in a few cases, the suggestions of others regarding the possible influence of Durkheim, Tarde, Walras, and others on Saussure's linguistic thought. In all instances we have rejected the idea of a direct influence but the impression prevails - and with much justification, we believe - that Saussure could not have escaped taking notice of the ideas current during his lifetime.

The fourth major point which we were trying to make in the first part of this inquiry is probably the most important part of our argument. Following a number of suggestions made *en passant* in the histories of linguistics available to the present day (which are generally more content to relate a *fable convenue* than to carry out individual research in the *terra incognita* of primary sources) and, what is more important, convinced of the desirability to deal with what Coseriu (1967b:100) termed the "rapports avec la linguistique ultérieure", we have gone directly *ad fontes* in order to establish what we believe to be the principal linguistic sources of Saussure's theoretical impetus: the work of Whitney and, often *ex negativo*, H. Paul's *Prinzipien*, the writings of Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski (though probably much less than has recently been suggested), and certainly also the work of other contemporary linguists such as for instance Sievers and (perhaps with more reserve) G. von der Gabelentz.

We have not discussed the question of influences from a number of other prominent linguists of the late 19th century which have also been suggested because we do not think them to be of comparable importance. Thus G. Mounin believed that the rôle of Saussure's master in Paris, Michel Bréal (1832-1915), the well-known author of the *Essai de sémantique* (Paris 1897), has generally been underestimated. 9 B. Collinder (1962: 6, 13; 1968:183-5, 189, 196-7, 203-5) claims that Adolf Noreen (1854-1925) influenced Saussure, - and this has to be considered in comparison with Malmberg's observation (1964:35) that his *Vårt Språk* (Lund 1903-23) remained essentially unknown outside Sweden - , and De Mauro (1968:356-60) who devoted a particular appendix to this question without however coming
up with a convincing argument to substantiate Collinder's contention. Similarly Jost Winteler's *Kerenzer Mundart* of 1876 has frequently been referred to in the history of linguistics (cf. Trubekkoj, 1933:288; Malmberg, 1964:34; Lepschy, 1970:59f.) as precursor of Saussure's theory of the phoneme; Saussure owned a copy of this study (cf. De Mauro, 1968:361) and there is every reason to believe that he had already familiarized himself with its contents during his stay in Leipzig (1876-78). However, there is no indication in Saussure's work that Winteler's findings were of a revealing nature comparable to what they had been to Brugmann and Osthoff in their linguistic argument in the *Morphologische Untersuchungen* of 1878.

One wonders, and this is an instance of the problem one faces in trying to assess the contemporary influences on Saussure, whether Saussure was familiar with the work of a Swedish linguist who was almost completely ignored in his home country (cf. Malmberg, 1968:53) and who has been totally ignored in the history of linguistics until today: Carl Svedelius. In 1891 (six years before the appearance of Bréal's *Essai de sémantique*) this young scholar published an *Etude sur la sémantique* of some fifty pages, and in 1897 his doctoral thesis appeared which received an insightful review by the then champion of Romance linguists Wilhelm Meyer-Lübke (1861-1936). According to Meyer-Lübke the *L'analyse du langage appliquée à la langue française*10 constitutes a methodologically sound piece of work in which the author attempted to develop a kind of 'Algebra der Grammatik', a systematic approach to contemporary French syntax, "ohne jede Rücksicht auf die historische Entwicklung".11

We are convinced that anyone working in the area of linguistic production in Western and Central Europe between 1870 and 1910 will inevitably find a number of further "striking" parallels and apparent anticipatory remarks relating to ideas expressed in the *Cours*. I. Iordan and J. Orr for instance point to the writings of Victor Henry (1850-1907), in particular his *Antinomies linguistiques* (Paris 1896),12 and Arsène Darmesteter (1846-88)13 - in addition to Bréal - stating that one might be tempted to speak of Saussure as their debtor since all of these were his seniors. "But, their argument is that, as a similar kinship is to
be detected between certain of Saussure's doctrines and the teachings of the neo-grammarians, it is more appropriate to consider him as having focused a number of ideas which were taking shape in the linguistic world, and which were, in a sense, common property." And these two scholars continue their bold and perceptive argument by saying that Saussure's "originality, which is indisputable, would thus consist in having evolved a complete and coherent system, all his own, irrespective of the source of any particular ingredient." (Iordan/Orr, 1937[1970]:294, n.1).

The aptness of such a summary statement is in this context singularly appropriate.
According to De Mauro (1968:361-2) out of a number of 465 items belonging to Fds's library which were handed over by Jacques and Raymond de Saussure in 1921 to the Geneva Public Library only about a dozen were related to linguistic studies.


Cf. the study prepared by Eugene Garfield and others, The Use of Citation Data in Writing the History of Science (Philadelphia, Pa.: Inst. for Scientific Information, Inc., Dec. 31, 1964), for a recent attempt at making use of the computer for the establishment of a bibliographical citation network which permits elucidation of chronological relationships between scientific discoveries. It is doubtful, however, that comparable exactness can be achieved in tracing ideas within various branches of the human sciences, in particular in philosophy and linguistic theory.

Nooologie: Einleitung und Semasiologie (Jena: E. Diederich, 1908).

We may simply refer to the section II. 3. (b), "Writings in the Domain of Philosophy and Psychology", in our forthcoming Bibliographia Saussureana 1870-1970 which contains some one hundred titles most of which appeared during the period 1870-1910.


Loc. cit.; italics and boldface in the original.

Cf. his "Une illusion d'optique en histoire de la linguistique", TIL 4:7-13 (1959).


Cf. LGRP 20, coll. 49-52 (1899); s. esp. coll. 49f. Meyer-Lübke develops at the same time some of his own ideas which are hardly less informative. In the first paragraph of his review, M.-L. speaks five times of "System" in language and theory of language. After having asked
whether the linguist is not over-inclined to infer a system into linguistic phenomea where it is not justified he states: "Zumal die biologische Betrachtung gerade der Sprache zeigt uns, dass πάντα ρεί; je weiter in horizontaler oder in vertikaler Richtung der Blick sich ausdehnt, um so mannigfaltigere Vorgänge stellen sich uns dar, um so weniger leicht wird es sein, ein alle [i.e. linguistic process] umfassendes System zu errich-
ten, . . . . [And further:] . . . ; man wird dann aber zunächst gut thun, einzelne Sprachen und Sprachperioden für sich zu studieren, ohne damit Anspruch auf Allgemeingültigkeit der dabei gefundenen Formeln zu machen." (coll. 49; our italics). We are inclined to believe that this statement reveals Meyer-Lübke's awareness of the necessary discrimination between synchrony and diachrony.

12 Cf. Schuchardt's review of this study of some 80 pages in LGRP 18, coll. 238-47 (1897).

13 Since Iordan/Orr (1937:294, n.1) do not mention any particular work by Darmesteter (in fact, they do not even seem aware of the fact that Arsène had a brother, James (1849-94), who also was a linguist at Paris); we refer to nos. 1582-6 in our Bibliographia Saussureana for a select list of his writings.
2.0 THE EVOLUTION OF SAUSSUREAN PRINCIPLES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LANGUAGE

Es wäre eine Geschichte der Auswirkung Saussures in der Sprachwissenschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts zu schreiben; denn man könnte die Entwicklung dieser Disziplin sehr wohl in eine Periode vor und in eine Periode nach Saussure einteilen, so weitreichend und tiefgehend war die Wirkung seiner Lehre.

Hans Arens (1969:573)

... Saussure's posthumous Cours (1916) invites and richly deserves assessment on the strength of its splendors and accomplishments, its instantaneous impact, especially outside Central Europe ...

Yakov Malkiel in 1969 (RPh 22:537)

Le structuralisme, loin d'être un mouvement homogène, se présente sous des formes diverses, qu'on cite la phonologie de Trubetzkoy, la glossématicque de Hjelmslev, les conceptions de Kuryłowicz ou la grammaire générative de Chomsky. Etant donné que peut-être la seule chose qui unisse les structuralistes est qu'ils se réclament tous, dans une mesure plus ou moins grande, de Saussure comme de leur maître ou tout au moins précurseur, le mieux sera de consacrer le présent article au Cours de linguistique générale qui est probablement l'ouvrage linguistique le plus souvent cité parmi tous ceux qui ont paru au vingtième siècle.

Witold Mańczak in 1969

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In the general introduction to our study outlining the principles and goals of the present inquiry use has been made of a certain set of notions first put forward by T. S. Kuhn in his now famous *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, in particular the concept of 'paradigm' (cf. Kuhn, 1970:10ff., 23ff., 43ff., and elsewhere). M. Masterman has recently subjected Kuhn's book to close scrutiny, and according to her findings the author used the term in no less than twenty-one different senses.\(^2\) While we believe that Masterman's findings are somewhat exaggerated and are at times the result of an over-interpretation of certain passages in Kuhn or even mere misunderstanding on her part, the fact remains that Kuhn did not employ the term 'paradigm' consistently. Kuhn (1970:181) later admitted to "stylistic inconsistencies" at least where his earlier use of 'paradigm' is concerned but emphasized that "two very different usages of the term would remain, and . . . require separation" (Kuhn, 1970:182). We must admit to failure to see the subtle difference between 1) paradigms as the constellation of group commitments, i.e. the "disciplinary matrix" by which Kuhn means what constitutes "the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline" (p. 182), and 2) paradigms as shared examples, i.e. theories and rules to which each member of a given discipline has been initiated in the course of his apprenticeship (pp. 187ff.). However, we do not think that Kuhn's latest suggestions are very helpful for the present purpose, except for his insistence on characterizing a given paradigm as a general epistemological viewpoint (cf. Kuhn, 1970:120) and as a social phenomenon (s. p. 184).

For our purpose we would like to distinguish between the following two kinds of paradigms: firstly, and this is in general agreement with Kuhn, the intellectual paradigm of a given cultural and social group at a given period which is shared or has been absorbed by its individual members and, secondly, the (and again in the Kuhnian sense) "revolutionary" act of setting up the framework for the development of a new paradigm to replace the old one. In this context we agree with the observations of John Watkins (which are on many other points quite misleading) on Kuhn's ideas, namely that it takes years "to develop a potential new paradigm to the point where it may challenge an entrenched paradigm"
and that "heretical thinking must have been going on for a long time before paradigm-change can occur." 3  Saussure, in our case, can be said to have shared the epistemology of the late nineteenth century, but it was out of his growing dissatisfaction and his feeling for the incommensurability of the tools it offered for the solution of the problems he encountered that Saussure developed step by step his theory of how language should be treated, the result of which has frequently been termed a 'Copernican revolution'. 4

Saussure, as we will document in the subsequent discussion, did not immediately put forward a fully-fledged theory which could solve, without modification and improvements, all the problems previous methods had been incapable of handling but invited later generations of scholars to engage in what Kuhn terms "mopping-up operations" (cf. Kuhn, 1970:24). The question raised in the introduction (0.0), as to whether Chomsky has in fact proposed a new paradigm (to replace the Saussurean one) or whether his work constitutes the phenomenon of a late mopping-up phase of the one initiated by the Cours, must remain partly unanswered and perhaps presents a problem to be discussed at a later stage in the development of normal (linguistic) science.
2.1 The Compilation of the *Cours* and the Problems of Interpretation


Gerhard Helbig (1970:33)

M. Joos' acknowledgement of over a decade ago that almost one half of the "Bloomfieldian" linguists of the forties and fifties in North America had not read the *Cours* but had acquired their information about its contents second-hand appears to apply to many other linguists throughout the Western World past and present. Indicative of this resultant misinformation is that there have been linguists who set the date of the first edition of the *Cours* as 1915 instead of 1916,\(^5\) or those who still maintain that it appeared in Geneva instead of Lausanne and Paris,\(^6\) but it is more readily apparent in those cases in which the author maintains that the *Cours* was based on the compilers' own notes taken during Saussure's lectures on general linguistics in contrast to the affirmations of Bally and Saussure himself (cf. CLG, 8).\(^7\)

These observations appear at first sight to amount to nothing but petty pedantry but are in fact of some significance for the history of the *Cours* itself. Firstly, it is conceivable that Bally and Sechehaye may have wished to publish the posthumous work of their revered master in 1916, exactly one hundred years after the appearance of Bopp's *Compendium* which has been regarded by the general linguistic public as marking the beginning of linguistic science in order to announce a new paradigm of thought.\(^8\) In addition, the wrong date of publication may well be taken as
indicative of the small response the first edition enjoyed. J. Vachek (1966:18) reports that it was only by the second edition of the *Cours* that members of the Prague School were influenced, and similar observations could be made with regard to other groups not to speak of the delayed reception of Saussure in Germany where scholars had been too confident about their achievements in the 19th century to abandon important aspects of the neogrammariant doctrine.

Secondly, it is perhaps significant and not without some irony at least that the *Cours* was never printed in Geneva, Saussure's home-town, where his Leipzig dissertation (1881) and later on the *Recueil* (1922) appeared in which the bulk of Saussure's published work had been collected. The third point is, of course, the most important one. Both Charles Bally (1865-1947) and Albert Sechehaye (1870-1946) were scholars who had already distinguished themselves through a number of publications when they set out to compile the *Cours* with the help of extensive notes taken by students and some of Saussure's own manuscripts. Bally and Sechehaye were at the time both lecturers at the University, and, as they report in the preface to the *Cours*, were unable to attend Saussure's lectures on general linguistics. The consequences of this simple fact should not be underestimated as we hope to demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs.

In accordance with his contract of December 8, 1906, Saussure was required to teach a course on general linguistics and the history and comparison of the Indo-European languages (*SM*, 34), a task which he accepted reluctantly. Saussure thought it to be too demanding in terms of time (he had to teach a number of other courses) and mental effort (he felt he could never find satisfactory answers to the many questions surrounding the foundation of a general linguistic theory). In addition, Saussure, whose pedagogical qualifications have frequently been referred to with praise by his most eminent pupils (e.g. Bally and Meillet), admitted as late as May 6, 1911, in an interview with Leopold Gautier, that he found himself in a dilemma: whether to expound the problem in its entire complexity and admit his doubts or whether to simplify the matter making it more easy for the (more or less uninitiated) student to understand (cf. *SM*, 30). Saussure, it seems, frequently choose a *via media* though
he was always concerned with presenting his ideas in a manner which permitted his students to follow. Thus, in his first course (January 16, - July 3rd, 1907), Saussure introduced very few new terms and dealt almost exclusively with diachronic linguistics, the principles of which were more or less known to his students. 12 By contrast he began his second course (November 1908 - June 24, 1909) with a discussion of the general problems of language study. In fact his introduction to these problems was surprisingly bold and explicit but was not completed before January 21, 1909; however, the text of this first coherent outline of general principles was not published until 1957 when Godel edited it with the help of extensive notes taken by students of Saussure (cf. CFS 15:6-103). The remainder of the course was again mainly concerned with an "aperçu de la linguistique indo-européenne comme introduction à la linguistique générale" which constituted about three-quarters of the lectures (cf. SM, 35; s. also pp. 66-75).

Finally, the third course (October 28, 1910 - July 4, 1911) was again mainly concerned with diachronic aspects of language study, including linguistic geography, the relation between writing and phonetic representation, and the arrangement of the main language families. Saussure divided his course into two main parts; following his extensive treatment of "Les langues", he finally dealt with "La langue" (cf. SM, 77-92 for an analysis), devoting hardly more than half a dozen hours to problems of static linguistics (cf. SM, 86-92). 13

Bally and Sechehaye report in the preface to the first edition of the *Cours* that initially they had hoped to find among Saussure's papers sufficient material to construct an outline of his principles and methods of linguistic analysis. However, since Saussure had not preserved most of his lecture notes, the editors were obliged to attempt their compilation mainly with the help of notes taken by students. About half a dozen students had regularly attended Saussure's lectures on general linguistics, and the editors received notes, at times quite complete and faithful of all three courses. 14 In any case, Bally and Sechehaye must have felt encouraged by the fair number of extensive notes taken by these students during Saussure's lectures and frequently compared and completed by each
of them thereafter with the help of the notes taken by the others, with the result that the editors decided to venture a synthesis of Saussure's teachings on the basis of the third course (cf. CLG, 9).

The editors collated the lecture notes of each individual course before they compiled the final version which is the result of very close collaboration between the two scholars to the extent that it is quite impossible to discern which of the two prepared one section or the other. Godel (SM, 100) has shown that the third course was also used as the basis for the re-establishment of the Introduction (CLG, 13-61), whereas the notes from the second course, though much more explicit, were merely employed to complement it and fill in the gaps. Godel has also shown quite clearly that a number of new technical terms and concepts were introduced by Saussure for the first time in his last course (cf. SM, 112); as a result Bally and Sechehaye must have felt obliged to make particular use of the contents of these lectures to recreate their master's original views. This procedure, together with a number of textual insertions for which there seems to be no direct source, succeeded in making the Cours look at first sight like a complete book (which it was not) without however eliminating all the contradictions.

Godel subjected the editors' work to a close analysis (SM, 95-121) before trying to re-evaluate Saussure's teachings in the light of all the students' notes and Saussure's own manuscripts which have been recovered (SM, 130-251). Not only did he re-establish the manner in which Bally and Sechehaye compiled the Cours but also the material which was used and the way it was arranged. This has allowed Godel to point out that Sechehaye's interpretations of the material had an important impact on the final wording of the text (SM, 97), that older manuscripts of Saussure himself (SM, 95-6) and notes from other courses were made use of, to the extent that a section on "Linguistique géographique" was sandwiched in between the two linguistics, i.e. the static or sychronic and the evolutive or diachronic (SM, 99). Godel also notes that the editors, while avoiding terms not used by Saussure himself, substituted a certain number of expressions, e.g. "face" (CLG, 99 and 145) for "côté".
"simultanéités" (CLG, 115) for "contemporanéités", "esprit de clocher" for "force du clocher" (CLG, 281ff., which Saussure had derived from Whitney; cf. 1.3.1); these cannot be regarded as falsifying Saussure's doctrine but as mainly "retouches de style" (SM, 113-4). On the other hand, it may well be asked whether it is sufficient to regard the replacement of "sens" by "signification" (CLG, 159) or the insertion of "modes (moyens, systèmes) d'expression" in place of the semiological facts of the arbitraire in language (CLG, 100ff.), and the excessive use of the term "distinct" (CLG, 26, 167, and elsewhere) to the same extent as a correction of stylistic infelicities, as Godel seems to imply (SM, 113-4).

As Godel demonstrates (SM, 114-5) the editors' interpretation of the (at times incomplete) material was not always in conformity with what Saussure had indeed said, thus leading the reader of the Cours to false conclusions regarding the nature of the language sign, the synchrony/diachrony distinction, and other issues of importance (cf. each second chapter of the subsections of this part for a discussion of these). In addition, Godel gives quite a long list of passages which were added by the editors (SM, 115-9; cf. footnote 16); a number of further passages could be found (cf. CLG(E) [passim]). These additions include the puzzling remark regarding the system of language as "naturellement chaotique" (CLG, 183), and the famous concluding sentence of the Cours (CLG, 317; cf. SM, 181). 18

These remarks will perhaps serve to explain some of the traditional misinterpretations of Saussure's doctrine, and indeed draw attention to the problems of appreciation of his original thought. These difficulties have been analyzed in extenso by Godel (SM, 130ff.) but also by Engler (1959ff.), and have been incorporated by De Mauro in his work on Saussure (cf. De Mauro, 1968ff.). The critical edition of the Cours which Godel (SM, 98) had called for as the only reliable way of resolving a number of inconsistencies within the compiled text has been in the hands of the Romance scholar Rudolf Engler (b. 1930), of Berne University, since 1958 (cf. CFS 19:7, n. 4); its first volume was completed in 1968, and the publication of Saussure's own manuscripts which were previously unknown is scheduled to appear in 1972. 19 In fact Godel thought it inappropriate
to separate these manuscripts from the critical edition which tends to select only those passages which served Bally and Sechehaye as sources (SM, 102). Recently the same scholar has aptly summarized the editors' work in the following manner:

Bally and Sechehaye deserve unqualified approval for their accuracy and insight: one can only admire their skill in assembling a variety of material into a clear and consistent exposition. Yet they may have been too careful in 'weeding out' every discrepancy and unevenness, and setting out the absolute coherence of the theory, its - so to speak - monolithic unity. The consequence was that every criticism directed against one particular item apparently entailed the rejection of the whole theory. (1966: 482).

The reader alerted to the actual situation might be disinclined to agree with Godel's praise, of the editors' generally very successful compilation and with Engler's statement that his critical edition constitutes an indirect hommage to Bally and Sechehaye. We have had to point out on occasion in the first part of our study a few instances in which the editors' emendations tended to be misleading (cf. 1.2.2, and 1.3.1). It may be that some of the apparent contradictions in the Cours have proven fruitful (cf. the discussion about the question whether language in its essence is 'form' or 'substance'); on the other hand, they might, as Godel suggested, have led a number of linguists to criticize and perhaps even discard Saussure's theory only too quickly (cf. Chomsky, 1964ff.; Collinder, 1968).

This part of our study pursues three principal goals within the discussion of the various influential concepts of Saussure's linguistic theory: 1) it will treat the question of antecedents, suggested and actual, of the specific Saussurean concept (its purpose being partly to link the second part closer with the first); 2) it will attempt to re-establish Saussure's views in the light of the critical edition and other recent findings by Godel and Engler; 3) it will outline major lines of post-Saussurean developments of the concept in question. It should be emphasized at this point that we are of the opinion that each individual
concept merits monograph treatment similar to F. G. Meier's discussion of the problem of the zero in linguistics (s. Meier, 1961), Engler's presentation of diverging views on the arbitraire (s. Engler, 1962 and 1964)\(^{20}\) and De Mauro's attempt at a re-interpretation of Saussure's semantic theory (s. De Mauro, 1969) or P. Miscău's study of the language sign and the problem of motivation (s. Miscău, 1970). Such monograph treatments appear particularly desirable with reference to the whole question of post Saussurean developments. In our *Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970* (Part I, Section 4) we have attempted to give an exhaustive list of all secondary literature dealing with these most influential concepts; well over a hundred items dealing with the langue/parole distinction, almost 150 items devoted to the synchrony/diachrony dichotomy, and more than 400 articles, notes and chapters in books discussing various aspects of the language sign, all serve to underscore this desirability. In this respect the bibliographical data collected and our present account can be regarded only as a preliminary discussion of the problems involved, not only concerning the sources of Saussure's linguistic inspiration and his own (gradually evolving) formulations but also with regard to modern interpretations of his more influential concepts.


3 S. J. Watkins' at times rather polemic paper, "Against 'Normal Science'", in the volume listed in note 2, pp. 25-37, at p. 37.

4 Claude Lévi-Strauss, for example, replied to L.-A. Zbinden's interview question "Quand vous parlez de révolution saussurienne . . .": "Je l'entends au sens de révolution copernicienne. Les deux me paraissent d'égale importance." (Gazette de Lausanne: Gazette littéraire of Febr. 16/17, 1963; we owe this reference to Dr. R. Engler). For a similar statement, s. G. C. Lepschy in SSL 5:21 (1965).

5 Cf. B. Trnka in 1929 (TCLP 1:33, note where he also gives the year 1923 instead of 1922 for the publication of the 2nd ed. of the CLG); Bloomfield (1933:18, whom a number of American linguists followed); Spang-Hanssen (1954:142); Tagliavini (1963:305); Dinneen (1967:19, 212, and 196, note 2); Lyons (1968:38); Frédéric François in Le Langage comp. by A. Martinet (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 45, and P. H. Salus (1969:3, note 1).


7 Cf. Robins (1967:200); this affirmation was made despite an explicit reference to the introduction of the first ed. (CLG, 7-11) and the Sources manuscrites on p. 234, note 3. Robins' recent review of CLG(E) in JL 6:302-4 (1970) does not disprove the impression that he is only superficially acquainted with the Cours. A similar judgement must be passed on Mounin (1968:20) who should by now have known better. This erroneous view is still held by Helbig (1970:33).
Characteristic, A. Sechehaye noted in his review article on the CLG, "Les problèmes de la langue à la lumière d'une nouvelle théorie", RPhilos 74:1-30 (1917) at p. 1: "Franz Bopp est le premier qui, dans un ouvrage publié en 1816, étudia ces rapports avec une exacte méthode ...".

This is true despite the fair number of reviews the first ed. of the CLG received (cf. Koerner, Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970, Part I, Section 3 (b)), among them by scholars such as Meillet, Jacob Wackernagel, Jespersen, Karl Jaberg, Grammont, and Schuchardt.

A number of their writings are listed in Koerner, Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970, Part II, Section 2 (a).

According to Max Niedermann (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, No. 200 [July 20th, 1908], n.p.) Bally reported, on the occasion of the Geneva celebration of the 25th anniversary of Saussure's Mémorie in 1908, "Wie die in seinen [i.e. FdS's] Vorlesungen angelegten Kollegienhefte von Hand zur Hand wandern, wie reife Gelehrte dieselben von jungen Studenten borgen und welche nicht zu ahnende Fülle von Anregungen, von genialen Ideen aus dieser Quelle geflossen ist."

For an analysis of the contents of the first course see SM, 53-65.

Godel has recently re-established these last lectures of Saussure in Geneva School Reader (1969), 39-52.

After completion of the SM (cf. Godel's remarks on p. 53), Godel's attention was drawn to the existence of a list of the students who attended these courses prepared by Léopold Gautier in June 1949 (cf. Godel's remark in CFS 16:23 [1958/59]). Through the kind intervention of R. Engler (in August 1969), we have been able to receive the contents of the list now in R. Godel's possession and are thus able to give the following breakdown of the number of students who attended these courses and the names of those whose notes have been preserved:

1) Cours I (1907): 6 students enrolled; the editors had notes from Louis Caille (whose shorthand notes were not listed by Godel [SM, 15] but were handed over to Engler by A. Riedlinger [personal communication]); Caille's notes were used by Riedlinger, the most important source for the first and second course, for the composition of his manuscript of over 250 pages (cf. SM, 130). 2) Cours II (1908/09): 12 students enrolled for the winter semester and, we assume, went on in the summer semester which was attended by five more students. Among them were Léopold Gautier, Albert Riedlinger, and François Bouchardy (cf. CLG(E), xi) whose notes were available to the editors, probably also those of Paul F. Regard which have not been recovered but which were used by Reidlinger to complete his notes (cf. SM, 130), and finally Emile Constantin whose very valuable notes were found only after completion of Godel's dissertation of 1957 (cf. CFS 16:23-32). 3) Cours III (1910/11): 12 students
attended, among them Constantin, the only student who had also attended the second course, and two more students who joined during the summer semester. The notes taken by Mme. Marguerite Sechehaye, George Dégal-lier, and Francis Joseph were made available to the editors. Cf. also the list of students' notes of other courses taught by Saussure (SM, 16-7, and CFS 17:5-11 [1960]).

15 This procedure, though the editors thought it justified because Saussure's ideas evolved during his lectures, was criticized by one of Saussure's students a few years after the publication of the Coire. See Paul-F. Regard in the preface to his thesis, Contribution à l'étude des prépositions dans la langue du Nouveau Testament (Paris: E. Leroux, 1919), 3-12 at pp. 11-2. Regard argues that it would have been more valuable to have published the long introduction of the second course to give an idea of Saussure's forceful mind.

16 Cf. CLG(E), 21, 58, 63, 99, 108, 116, 118, 132, 134, 135, 136-7, 139-40, 142-3, 145-6, 198, 246, 247, 266, 273, 290, 291-2, 316, 337, 386, 393, 397, 417, 420, 430, 458, 459, 467, 477-8, 481, 482, 483, 504, and 505 for those passages which appear to have been added by the editors of the Coire.

17 The distribution of the individual sources for the CLG has been outlined by Godel (SM, 103-12); of course the CLG(E) gives the complete sources in columns 2 to 6.

18 Bally quoted this very sentence on one occasion as if it had been formulated by Saussure himself; see his LGLF, p. 17: "En face de ces difficultés, une seule méthode paraît raisonnable, celle que F. de Saussure a resumée dans la dernière phrase de son Coire . . . : 'La linguistique a pour unique et véritable objet la langue envisagée en elle-même et pour elle-même'." This statement has frequently been quoted, with approval, in the literature, most recently by Helbig (1970:35).

19 Notes inédites personnelles de Ferdinand de Saussure ed. by R. Engler (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz [in press]); vol II of CLG(E), containing indices and other texts will not appear before this one.

20 De Mauro (1969:125ff.) is one of the few scholars who makes explicit use of the re-established introduction of Saussure's second course of 1908/09 in CFS 15:6-103 (1957).
2.2 Discussion of the Fundamental Concepts of Saussure's Linguistic Theory and Their Post-Saussurean Evolution

The Cours did not bear the imprimatur of the author: it was a posthumous compilation based on students' notes. As a result, the book's influence is derived from single passages - often detached from the rest of the work - which appeared to the reader to contain specially stimulating insights. For several decades after the publication of the Cours it seemed as if Saussure's conceptions were best summarized by a series of dichotomies . . . and by notions such as the arbitrary character of the linguistic sign. These were often starting-points for theoretical excursions which moved far away from Saussure's thought.

Giulio C. Lepschy (1970:43)

Chaque siècle a la grammaire de sa philosophie. Le moyen âge a essayé de fonder la grammaire sur la logique, et, jusqu'au XVIIIème siècle, la grammaire générale n'a été qu'un prolongement de la logique. Le XIXème siècle en étendant aux faits psychiques et sociaux la méthode d'observation des faits qui est en usage dans les sciences physiques et naturelles depuis la Renaissance, a conduit à présenter la grammaire de chaque langue comme un ensemble de faits. Mais jusqu'ici ces faits ne sont guère coordonnés. Les notes de cours de F. de Saussure, éditées sous le titre de Cours de linguistique générale, ont indiqué comment on y pourrait mettre un commencement d'ordre. Mais il reste à faire un grand travail pour ordonner les faits linguistiques au point de vue de la langue même.

Antoine Meillet in 1921 (LHLG I, p. viii)
2.2.1 The Distinction between *langue* and *parole* and its Relation to *langage*

In any linguistic study, it is necessary to distinguish between *language* and *speech*. Although this distinction has been classic in linguistics at least since the time of F. de Saussure, modern linguistics, influenced by behavioristic and positivistic ideas, has often confused the two. Because of this confusion, the importance of this classic distinction must be re-emphasized.

J. J. Katz and P. M. Postal in 1964

2.2.1.1 Precursors of the *langue*/parole Dichotomy or the *langue*/parole/langage Trichotomy

Es sind die greifbarsten and anscheinend trivialsten Erkenntnisse, an die sich de Saussure mit Vorliebe hält. Wo wäre z.B. in seinem Buche ein Aufstieg zu finden zu Perspektiven eines W. von Humboldt ... Und doch ging de Saussure den Humboldt-schen Aspekten von ergon und energia aus eigener Arbeitserfahrung nach und hat die Angelegenheit einer 'linguistique de la langue' in Abhebung von einer 'linguis-tique de la parole' uns fast entscheidungsreif vordiskutiert.

Karl Bühler in 1934 (s. Bühler, 1965:7)

As so often happens in human affairs, our curiosity about the origin of the author's ideas is easily aroused, particularly when faced with such a plethora of seemingly original views; and indeed many have wondered what the sources of Saussure's inspiration might have been. Among the many concepts expounded in the first half of the
Corns (CLG, 13-192), much attention has been devoted to the langue/parole distinction, and a number of scholars even suggested that it must have been Humboldt's famous ergon/energeia contrast which had anticipated Saussure's influential dichotomy.¹ This contention, however, was seriously questioned by John V. M. Verhaar in 1962,² and convincingly refuted by Hugo Mueller in 1966,³ with the result that no comment needs to be added (cf. also 1.3.4.1).

It has been noted on occasion that Saussure distinguished between three terms, langue, parole, and langage (cf. CLG, 112), and therefore a number of scholars have readily accepted the view that Georg von der Gabelentz, a linguist of the Humboldtian tradition who was largely ignored by his contemporaries, must have furnished this trichotomy. It is correct that Gabelentz did distinguish, as early as 1891, between "Einzelsprache", "Rede", and "Sprachvermögen", but in addition to the fact that Gabelentz's epistemology is quite distinct from that of Saussure (which accounts for the dissimilar notions behind the concepts proposed), Saussure rarely used the term faculté du langage and then as a rule in its every-day sense (cf. CLG, 25-7), and never thought of making it the object of linguistics as Gabelentz proposed to do (cf. 1.3.4.1.2). Even if we concede that the tripartite division in the Cours (cf. CLG(E), 41) owes something to Gabelentz's trichotomy, it cannot be sufficiently stressed that the contents of each term in question are quite dissimilar.⁴ By the same token, Coseriu's suggestion (1962:282) that F. N. Finck forstalled Saussure's dichotomy in his book of 1905 (cf. 1.3.4.3) must be rejected.⁵

By contrast with Humboldt and those linguists who accepted his views, it appears more likely that a philosopher with a more rigorous system of thought (than Humboldt and his followers) could well have had an impact on Saussure: Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel (1770-1831), probably the most influential 19th century thinker who influenced (inter alia) Victor Henry (1850-1907) with whose work Saussure was certainly familiar and who wrote a monograph entitled Antinomies linguistiques (Paris: Alcan, 1896) which clearly reveals the Hegelian antithetical manner of argument.⁶ Furthermore Hegel, in the third revised edition of his Encyclopädie of 1830, devoted a number of paragraphs to discussion
of the sign concept and language. Hegel criticized the generally held view that signs and language had to be thought of as an appendix to psychology or as something to be inserted into logic without recognizing that they are necessarily correlated within the system of the activity of the intellect. Although Hegel was concerned primarily with questions concerning the human mind in general and problems connected with the (individual) psychology of representation and recognition, he refers to Humboldt's famous essay of 1827, "Über den Dualismus," and clearly points out the primacy of the spoken language in contrast to the written form. Hegel distinguished, though only en passant yet not without emphasis, between language and speech, between "die Rede, und ihr System, die Sprache".

Hegel can hardly be regarded as having forestalled Saussure's langue/parole distinction in its very substance (and indeed he may well have been of importance for other ideas of Saussure's, cf. 2.2.5). The scholar who anticipated this dichotomy was without doubt Hermann Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2); Paul's distinction between "Sprachusus" and "individuelle Sprechtheit" (cf. 1.3.2.2.2, and also De Mauro, 1968:350) comes very close to Saussure's concepts in a number of respects. However, Paul stressed the individual aspect of language analysis rather than the social and normative side of language. In addition, Paul did not make any particular use of the ideas which emphasize the systematic nature of language as did Saussure. In conclusion, we are safe in saying that, while there are clear indications that Saussure's principles were conceived as a result of influence from other linguists of his time, there can be no doubt that without Saussure's reformulation of this distinction the langue/parole contrast would never have received the status in general linguistic theory it has enjoyed since the publication of the Cours.

Finally, we wish to emphasize once again that we have found no evidence to support the conjecture frequently made in the "histories" of linguistics that Saussure was under the direct and in fact vigorous influence of Durkheim's sociological theories (cf. 1.2.2). Meillet, himself a one-time collaborator of Durkheim and once a pupil of Saussure,
strongly opposed W. Doroszewski's contention that Saussure had received his insight into the nature of language and his conviction of a necessary distinction between language as a system and the individual speech act in which the system or part of it is activated from extra-linguistic sources (cf. *A[CIL], 147*). If there was such an influence, and there are indications that Saussure was aware of developments in disciplines other than linguistics, it might well have been an indirect one through Meillet's inaugural address at the Collège de France in February 1906, "L'État actuel des études de linguistique générale", with which Saussure was certainly familiar. 12 To reinforce our argument further, we would point out that from this paper it would appear that Bréal had stressed the social character of language in his *Essai de sémantique* of 1897. 13 Bréal observed, for instance, with reference to individual liberty concerning the modification of language that it "tient au besoin d'être compris, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est de même sorte que les autres lois qui regissent notre vie sociale" (quoted from *LHLG I, 17*). However, Bréal's sociologism can, as we believe, be traced to Whitney's *Vie du langage* (Paris 1875), and thus it is conceivable that the sociological tradition in linguistics was initiated by the American linguist who was the first to incorporate sociological notions (probably under the influence of Spencerian ideas) into the study of language. Whitney's important influence on Saussure has been demonstrated earlier in this study (cf. 1.3.1); however, he never distinguished clearly between language and speech, and therefore cannot be cited as having anticipated Saussure's *langue*/parole dichotomy.

Durkheimian ideas, on the other hand, were certainly current at the turn of the century and have to be reckoned with in establishing the intellectual paradigm of that period. Our denial of any direct influence of Durkheim on Saussure is supported by H. Arens (1969:583) and H. Hörmann's statement of 1967 with which we may conclude this section.

Die bei Durkheim anklingende Gegenüberstellung von überindividueller Tatsache einerseits, individueller Manifestation und Auswirkung andererseits, wird denn – allerdings wohl unabhängig von Durkheim – präzise gefasst bei dem Genfer Linguisten De Saussure . . . . 14
2.2.1.2 The Development and Place of the *langue*/parole/ *langage* Distinction in Saussure's Theory of Language

... la langue est un ensemble de conventions nécessaires adoptées par le corps social pour permettre l'usage de la faculté du langage chez les individus. La faculté du langage est un fait distinct de la langue, mais qui ne peut s'exercer sans elle. Par la parole, on désigne l'acte de l'individu réalisant sa faculté au moyen de la convention sociale, qui est la langue.

F. de Saussure in 1908 (CFS 15:10)

Apart from R. Godel, it is certainly R. Engler who is the best-informed scholar about the evolution of Saussure's thought, since in addition to his publication of the critical edition of the *Cours* (1967-68) and the very useful *Lexique de la terminologie saussurienne* (LTS) in 1968, Engler has devoted his scholarly activity almost exclusively to the elucidation of Saussure's original ideas (cf. Engler, 1959ff.). Furthermore, Engler has been engaged for some time in preparing an edition of the hitherto unpublished papers on general linguistic problems from Saussure's own pen, the *Notes inédites personnelles* scheduled to appear in 1972. Engler's recent statement that Saussure's system of linguistic thought did not spring in one fell swoop from his mind (as Aphrodite is said to have sprung from the head of Zeus in Greek mythology) and that therefore Saussure's use of particular terminology warrants a careful evaluation, cannot be sufficiently stressed in order to point out the problem of interpretation of Saussure's ideas with which the analyst is confronted. The distinction between *langue* and *parole* and its relation to *langage* or, at times, *la faculté de langage* represents one of the most puzzling components of Saussure's doctrine and has been aptly characterized by N. C. W. Spence in 1957, the 100th anniversary of Saussure's birth, as a 'hardy perennial' (cf. *ArchL* 9:1ff.).
In fact the evolution and almost continuous modification of the \textit{langue}/\textit{parole} dichotomy and the threefold distinction (which includes the faculty of speech) can be traced over a period of more than twenty years in Saussure's academic career. In his first lectures at the University of Geneva in November 1891 (cf. SM, 36), Saussure observed about the nature of language and the manner in which it ought to be studied:

\begin{quote}
langue et langage ne sont qu'une même chose; l'un est la généralisation de l'autre. Vouloir étudier le langage sans se donner la peine d'en étudier les diverses manifestations qu'évidemment sont les langues, est une entreprise absolument vaine, et chimérique; d'un autre côté, vouloir étudier les langues en oubliant que ces langues sont primordialement régies par certains principes qui sont résumés dans l'idée de langage, est un travail encore plus dénué de toute signification sérieuse, de toute base scientifique véritable. (CFS 12:65, with corrections from CLG(E), 515).
\end{quote}

In this early pronouncement Saussure not only thought that \textit{langue} and \textit{langage} were epistemologically identical but also took the latter term as the more abstract concept of the two. In addition, generalizations about language could only be deduced from the results of analyses of more than one language (Saussure then argued) thus showing himself fully in line with contemporary linguistic thinking (e.g. the argument of Paul \[1.3.2.2.2\] and Gabelentz \[1.3.4.2.2\]). In his unfinished appraisal drafted in 1894 of Whitney's contribution to linguistics (cf. SM, 43-6), which was used by the editors in their compilation of the \textit{Cours} (cf. CLG(E), 155, 162, 168f., 197, 265f., 505f., and 514), Saussure spoke of the particular system "de symboles indépendants qui est le langage" (1894:13), and about "cette semiologie particulière qui est le langage" (p. 31; cf. Godel's formulation SM, 142). From these two quotations it appears that \textit{langage} was then used as the overall term in contrast with later usage. However, on the same page Saussure also noted: "Il n'y a de 'langue' et de science de la langue qu'à la condition initiale de faire abstraction de ce qui a précédé . . . " (p. 31a?). From this co-occurrence of \textit{langue} and \textit{langage} we may conclude that Saussure did not envisage a clear distinction between these two terms. In fact it is attested by students' notes (cf. SM, 132) that even in his second course
Saussure did not rigorously differentiate between these terms speaking of *langage* as having "fondamentalement le caractère d'une système".

A similar situation prevailed for a long period in the development of Saussure's concept of *parole*. In his early lectures of 1891 Saussure employed this expression in conformity with ordinary usage (cf. SM, 142); *parole* is viewed as (the ability of) speech. Godel (SM, 143) points out that one could well ask whether the *langue*/*parole* distinction was simply absent from Saussure's linguistic argument until 1907. On the other hand, Godel speaks of Whitney's "formule révélatrice" insisting that language is a social institution (LSL, 48, 152, 177, etc.; LGL, 280, 309), and, probably inspired by Whitney's claim, Saussure formulated as early as 1894 and possibly for the first time his ideas about "cette sémiologie particulière qui est le langage" (CLG(E), 197), introducing his famous comparison of a language state with the position of chessmen (1894: 10 = CLG(E), 198; cf. CLG, 43, 125-7, 153-4, 185). However, these considerations had, as far as we can see at present, no direct result on the *langue*/*parole* distinction, although we admit that ideas pertaining to Saussure's concept of *langue* may first have been conceived in the mid-1890s and possibly earlier.

We claim that observations made by Meillet in his 1906 paper mentioned above (cf. 2.2.1.1) did play the decisive and revealing rôle in matters concerning the social nature of language. It should be recalled that in December of that year Saussure was entrusted with the course on general linguistics which he started teaching in January 1907. In the meantime, i.e. between roughly 1894 and 1906, Saussure appears to have abandoned the idea of putting together a general theory of language since he was discouraged about achieving his goal (cf. SM, 31). In his inaugural address Meillet made a number of statements which sound surprisingly "Saussurean" (cf. also note 12), as we will demonstrate by setting Meillet's formulations side by side with those found in the *Cours*:

\begin{verbatim}
Meillet in 1906

. . . le langage est éminemment un fait social.
. . . une langue constitue un système complexe de moyens d'expression . . .

Saussure (after 1907)

. . . le langage est un fait social (CLG, 21).
La langue est un système de signes . . . (CLG, 33; cf. also pp. 32, 106, 116, 182).
\end{verbatim}
La langue est un système où tout se tient... (cf. also LHLG II, 158).

Le langage est une institution ayant son autonomie...

... le langage est une institution sociale... (LHLG I, 16-7).

... la langue... est de nature homogène: c'est un système de signes... (p. 32).

... la langue est une institution pure... (p. 110).

... la langue est une institution sociale... (p. 33; cf. CLG(E), 45).

In his paper Meillet not only stressed the social nature of language (cf. the above quotations) but also stated that "une innovation individuelle ne peut que difficilement trouver place si... elle n'est pas exactement adaptée à ce système [de la langue], c'est-à-dire si elle n'est pas en harmonie avec les règles générales de la langue." (LHLG I, 16). If W. Doroszewski is correct in saying that Saussure introduced the factor of parole as "la partie individuelle" in order to cope with the problem of language evolution, it would support our claim that Meillet's article may well have given rise to Saussure's dichotomy. Where the nature of language is concerned, Meillet emphasized that language is social in the way that it belongs to a given linguistic community as a means of communication and does not depend on any of its members for its modification (loc. cit., 16f.). In fact the individual speaker is obliged to follow linguistic usage and thus contributes to the maintenance of the highest possible degree of identity of a given language (p. 17). Meillet carries his ideas about the social character of language even further arguing that linguistic changes are conditioned by changes in the structure of the society, but for the present purpose the observations paraphrased here should suffice to make our point.

Saussure affirmed that language as a social institution is independent of the individual (CLG, 37; CLG(E), 56), and that all innovations of parole remain individual expressions unless they are accepted by the collectivity and thus become part of langue (CLG, 138; CLG(E), 224). In his personal notes prepared for the third course Saussure had actually written: "La langue est consacrée socialement et ne dépend pas de l'individu" (CLG(E). This affirmation appears to echo Meillet's statement of several years earlier. However, we must point out that though Meillet may have suggested the distinction individual versus social to
Saussure, he made no mention of the term parole; and furthermore Meillet used langage and langue synonymously so that his famous statement about language as a system "où tout se tient" has rightly been interpreted as "expressing a commonplace idea rather than an original view" (Lepschy, 1970:34), particularly since Meillet never took this notion to its theoretical conclusion. Without minimizing the value of Meillet's suggestions, we are convinced that the contrast between langue and parole (and Saussure did think of them as a "paire de choses" (CLG(E) 41) was at least partly conceived under the influence of Paul's distinction between Sprachusus and individuelle Sprechtätigkeit (cf. 1.3.2.2.2).27

We said "at least partly", and this Saussure may have done more in opposition than in agreement with Paul's doctrine, since Godel (1966: 483ff.) emphasized the theoretical necessity which Saussure felt in distinguishing between these two aspects of language analysis. In his course of 1907 Saussure spoke of language as a system on the one hand and the language as an endowment of the individual on the other assigning the term langue to the former and langage to the latter (which he later on termed more clearly "faculté du langage").28 When dealing with questions of language change, in particular analogical formation, Saussure introduced for the first time the distinction between langue and parole (cf. SM, 57-8). Saussure then affirmed that langue is what has been acquired by the individual and has thus been stored in his mind, whereas parole was conceived of as the more social sphere since speech is the active and the socially relevant aspect of language (cf. SM, 145-6).

Two impressions arise from these affirmations: firstly, that Saussure felt the necessity of distinguishing between langue and parole in order to back up his distinction between synchrony and diachrony in explaining the phenomenon of analogy (cf. CLG, 223ff., and 231ff.), and secondly, that Saussure's dichotomy in fact evolved step by step, the social/individual contrast first being conceived in inverse order before it found its now well-known parallel.

Godel (SM, 147) notes a number of correspondences between the second (1908/09) and third course (1910/11) with regard to the distinction under
discussion: 1) Saussure recognized the difficulty of defining the object of linguistics; 2) he emphasized the necessity of separating *langue* from the *faculté du langage*; 3) he believed that the nature of language cannot be adequately assessed unless what happens between two interlocutors has been analyzed; 4) *langue* and *parole* have to be distinguished.

Before treating this latter distinction Saussure separates *langage*, "*langue* considéré chez l'individu", as a faculty, the basis of human speech, from *langue* which he (now) characterizes as "une chose éminément sociale" (cf. SM, 147) adding that only those things become linguistically relevant which have turned into facts of everyone belonging to a given speech community. It should be emphasized that the faculty of speech is, in Saussure's view, not primarily concerned with articulation, the aspects of speech production from a physiological point of view, but with the psychical factors which permit man to organize language signs in order to express himself. However, the investigation of this faculty is the object of psychology and not of linguistics. *Langue*, as a social institution, owes its existence to this faculty, Saussure repeated frequently, but *langue* is the object proper of linguistics (cf. also CLG, 38f.) even if the faculty of speech presupposes it (cf. SM, 148).

Saussure, in trying to define the object of linguistics, did not follow the empirical argument which asserts the primacy of speech (cf. Paul), though the *Cours* reads: "... historiquement, le fait de parole précède toujours" (CLG, 37). In fact Saussure acknowledged that *langue* was not the "phénomène initial" (CLG(E), 57) but for the theorist of language *langue* precedes *parole*, an argument which Godel (SM, 149) attempted to illustrate by the following diagram:

![Diagram](image)

(etc de l'individu réalisant sa faculté au moyen de la convention sociale)
However, we believe that Godel's diagram does not show convincingly the precedence Saussure claimed for his concept of *langue* but tends instead to focus attention on *parole*. Statements made by Saussure in the second course (cf. *CFS* 15:9ff. and the quotation at the beginning of this chap.) reveal a different understanding of the terms and their relationship, in particular concerning the faculty of speech which is, according to Saussure (s. *CFS* 15:10), the *conditio sine qua non* of language though not an object of linguistics. We therefore would like to suggest a different graphic presentation of what Saussure appears to have had in mind:

```
faculté du langage
(= prerequisite of the existence of language and the production of speech, but outside linguistics proper)

parole ----- langue
(= 1) individual realization of *langue* and 2) source of linguistic innovation)

langage
(= the totality of linguistic expression, not directly accessible to the investigator)
```

Since *parole* exhibits the properties of *langue* only imperfectly (cf. *CLG*, 38), it becomes secondary to the linguist (partly reversing the original concept of this phenomenon in Saussure's first course), and of no particular interest to Saussure (cf. *CLG*, 197, note). This fact is clearly indicated by Saussure's plan of the general divisions of his third course: 1° *les langues*; 2° *la langue*; 3° *faculté et exercice du langage chez les individus* (s. Engler, 1967:119).\(^{31}\) No particular mention is made of *parole*.

However, *parole* was regarded by Saussure as the individual's realization of the language system, the speech act. Godel noted that Saussure spoke of *exécution* of linguistic signs by the individual (1966:489; cf.
CLG, 30) but he also characterized it as *discours* in the second course (cf. SM, 158, 259; and LTS, 20); though apparently only once. Saussure arrived at the distinction between *langue* and *parole* at a very late stage in the development of his linguistic theory, a fact which may account for the difficulties and apparent contradictions to be found in the definitions of these terms and their relationship. Saussure attempted to solve these problems in the third course by presenting the following diagram (not included in the CLG):

![Diagram showing the tripartite division of *langage* into *langue* and *parole*]

Together with the description of the characteristics of the two constituents: 1) *Langue* as "passive et résidant dans la collectivité", and as "code social, organisant le langage et formant l'outil nécessaire à l'exercice de la faculté du langage", and 2) *parole* as both "active et individuelle" (CLG(E), 41f.; SM, 153). In addition, as late as in Spring 1911, Saussure envisaged for the first time the possibility of distinguishing between a linguistics of *parole* and a linguistics of *langue* (cf. CLG(E), 42; CLG, 38f.). *Langage*, which in earlier uses was thought of as being identical with *langue* and which shifted later to the meaning of "faculty of speech", is now being conceived of as not clearly definable and not directly accessible to the linguist, since it is "multiforme et hétéroclite" (CLG, 25) but as comprising both the social system of language and its individual actualization thus allowing for the tripartition and definition of *langage = langue + parole* (CLG, 112; CLG(E), 172).

This tripartite division, Engler (1966:37, and LTS, 30) observed, however, is readily reduced to the two opposing terms of *langue* and *parole* which both deserve the linguist's attention. However, as we have pointed out earlier in this chapter, Saussure's sympathies were clearly in favour of a linguistics of *langue*, and it is with this term that many difficulties raised by later generations of linguists are
connected. But the term of parole which is usually seen in opposition with langue is not unequivocal either. Saussure himself pointed out that in dealing with parole, the active, creative, and individual aspect of language, two functions would have to be differentiated: 1) the general use of the faculties of speech (hinting at the acoustic and articulatory aspects), and 2) the individual use of the language code "selon la pensée individuelle" (CLG(E), 42).

Although their interrelation could not have been completely denied by Saussure, langue and parole can be seen in opposition to each other in the following manner:

langue 1) represents the social fact, 2) is passive (depending on the collective), and 3) constitutes a code (agreed upon by the speech community), whereas

parole 1) designates the individual (speech) act, 2) is active (depending on the will of the individual), and 3) realizes the code (in the individual act).

The notes of two students in Saussure's second course confirm the interdependence of these two aspects as the Cours (24) implies: in language, Saussure had argued, there are always the two sides which correspond to each other;

language is \begin{equation*}
\begin{cases}
\text{social} \\
\text{individual}
\end{cases}
\end{equation*}

(cf. CFS 15:9). These two aspects have to be taken together in order to account for "la sphère où la langue vit", Saussure maintained, adding that forms and grammar have a social existence only (and therefore belong to langue) though linguistic change starts from the individual (cf. (CLG(E), 28). On the other hand Saussure admitted, though he also claimed that langue is a concrete object of linguistic investigation (cf. SM, 157), that we know langue only through the manifestations of language in parole (cf. SM, 155). This concession would seem to contradict Saussure's generally much more "rationalistic" position which claims that langue is independent of parole (cf. CLG(E), 56). But two things should be kept in mind when one attempts to resolve
apparent contradictions in Saussure's teachings: Firstly, Saussure's ideas evolved considerably with regard to the *langue*/*parole*/*langage* trichotomy; his ideas about this distinction were developed fairly late in his life (by contrast with the diachrony/synchrony distinction, for example) and must have struck Saussure by their revealing character when he realized their importance, with the result that he might not have found the time necessary to resolve all the vital questions surrounding this distinction. Secondly, in accordance with his view that it is "le point de vue qui crée l'objet" (CLG, 24), Saussure worked out so many fine distinctions between and aspects of the various features of language that it is quite impossible to relate a single definition of *langue* to the (equally ambivalent) concept of *parole*. As an illustration of the difficulties the interpreter of Saussure is faced with, we may cite Godel who has devoted a very informative chapter to this distinction (SM, 142-59), concluding his discussion with the following remark:

Il se peut que dans certains ordres de recherches, la distinc
tion saussurienne apporte moins de lumière que de trouble, mais on ne peut plus concevoir de véritable linguistique qui ne se fonde sur une définition de la langue. (SM, 159).

To the linguist of today, particularly since the reinforcement which the *langue*/*parole* distinction has received as one of the major points d'appui of Chomsky's *Aspects* (cf. Chomsky, 1965:4), the view that linguistics proper is concerned with *langue*, the social code and the underlying operational system of speech (cf. note 35), has become almost unanimously accepted. The fact that Saussure has made more suggestions concerning the manner in which language should be studied than he could solve himself has been one of the most valuable characteristics of the *Cours*. 37
FOOTNOTES - 2.2.1/2.2.1.1/2.2.1.2


4 Cf. also our forthcoming review article on the 1969 re-ed. of Gabelentz's Die Sprachwissenschaft (Tübingen: TBL) and the article of E. Coseriu (1967b) which has been reprinted there, in Lingua, vol. 28.

5 De Mauro's (1968:350) reference to Karl Jaberg's review of the CLG of 1916 (repr. in Jaberg, 1965:123-36) on that topic does not provide the suggested information.


Hegel op. cit., p. 369 (§ 459); this observation was already made in the first ed. of the Encyclopädie (Heidelberg: A. Osswald, 1817), § 380. Rather misleadingly K. Müllner stated concerning the langue/parole dichotomy: "Diese Unterscheidung wurde von Ferdinand de Saussure . . . vulgarisiert [], erschien aber schon früher bei F. Hegel [] und W. von Humboldt [], in der Sprachwissenschaft" [the latter two claims follow suggestions by Coseriu] (LuD 5: [81] [1971]).

This paper was published in Revue des idées (Paris) 3:296-308 (1906), and also separately, Chartres: Impr. Durand, 1906, and was repr. in 1921 in LHLG I, 1-18. In this inaugural lecture Meillet makes two explicit references to Michel Bréal (1833-1915), his former teacher, whose functions he then took over (cf. LHLG I, 1 and 17), but none to Durkheim. In this paper Meillet stated: "Or, le langage est éminemment un fait social. On a souvent répété que les langues n'existent pas en dehors des sujets qui les parlent, . . . . Cette réalité [de la langue] est à la fois linguistique et sociale. Elle est linguistique: car une langue constitue un système complexe de moyens d'expression, système où tout se tient et où une innovation individuelle ne peut que difficilement trouver place si . . . elle n'est pas exactement adaptée à ce système, . . . . A un autre égard, la réalité de la langue est sociale: elle résulte de ce qu'une langue appartient à un ensemble défini de sujets parlants, de ce qu'elle est le moyen de communication entre les membres d'une même groupe et de ce qu'il ne dépend d'aucun des membres du groupe de la modifier" (LHLG I, 16-7; our italics). In fact we believe that this passage is a very striking document in the development of Saussure's distinction between the social and the individual aspects of language. Cf. also Meillet's paper of roughly the same period, "Comment les mots changent de sens", repr. in LHLG I, 230-71.


Hans Hörmann, Psychologie der Sprache (Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer, 1967), p. 15. As early as 1939, V. Brøndal observed in his programmatic article, "Linguistique structurale", that FdS had developed his distinction independently of Durkheim (AL 1:5 = Brøndal, 1943:90).

Cf. also the reviews of Engler's edition of the LTS by E. F. K. Koerner in Language 47:447-50 (1971) as well as of the CLG(E), prepared by the same author, to appear ibid., 48, fasc. 2 (1972) for an appreciation of Engler's work on FdS.
Engler wrote: "Le 'système' n'est pas né tout armé de la tête de Saussure. Il faut se rappeler pour garder dans toute interprétation une certaine latitude aux termes." (1966:35).

There is no clear indication whether this manuscript was used on other occasions as well; cf. CLG(E), 8f., 33f., 62f., 91, 186f., 188, 189, 198, 264, 507.

We quote from a pre-final draft of the text which is scheduled to appear in Engler's edition of the Notes personnelles inédites de FdS (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1972) which the editor was kind enough to provide for the present study. Godel's transcriptions in SM, CFS 12: 59-65 (1954), and elsewhere are not always accurate.

In a letter to Meillet dated January 4, 1894, Saussure spoke of "faits de langage" on the one hand and "la langue en général" on the other; see SM, 31 = CFS 20:13 = CFS 21:95 (1964).

The indications of the index (CLG, 321) are neither always correct nor complete. In her article, "Introduction à un cours de linguistique générale", Nph 27:21-30 (1942), Bartina Harmina Wind attributes this comparison to Jespersen (at p. 24) who made use of this analogy in his Mankind, Nation, and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View of 1925 (Oslo, H. Aschehoug & Co.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), p. 84.

FdS occupied himself instead with Germanic legends (for instance the Nibelungen) and anagrams in various epochs of European literature in his spare time (cf. De Mauro, 1968:315-6).

CLG(E), 21 prints "langue" for CLG, 21; in fact the sources read "langue" instead of "langage" as in the above quotation, the editors having changed this in the 3rd ed. of the CLG in 1931.

This phrase defining language as "un système [...] où tout se tient" was frequently employed by Meillet and can also be found in the writings of his pupils, notable in J. Vendryes'. Cf. Meillet's pamphlet, La Linguistique (Paris: Larousse, 1916 [1915], p. 7: "Toute langue est un système rigoureusement articulé ..., tout se tient dans le système d'une langue". It is interesting to note that Meillet uses this formulation in connection with Saussure's teachings at Paris (1881-91); Meillet then was apparently not aware of the fact that Saussure's lectures on general linguistics were about to be published.


Towards the end of his programmatic paper Meillet stated: "Le XIXe siècle a été le siècle de l'histoire ... ; les sciences sociales se constituent maintenant, et la linguistique y doit prendre la place
que se nature lui assigne. Le moment est donc venu de marquer la position des problèmes linguistiques au point de vue social" (LHLG I. 18). Meillet's doctrine gave rise to a generation of linguists, among them Joseph Vendryes, Alf Sommerfelt, and Marcel Cohen, who paid much attention to the social aspect of language. In this context it is of historical interest to refer to a book which Vendryes referred to frequently in his *Langage* of 1921, Eugène-Bernard Leroy, *Le langage: Essai sur la psychologie normale et psychologique de cette fonction* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1905). In the introduction of his study Leroy suggested the following way to approach the problem of the origin of language according to two distinct 'points de vues': "... l'origine du langage peut être envisagée soit comme fait individuel, soit comme fait social. Si l'on considère le langage sous son aspect de phénomène social, la question de son origine implique l'étude des rapports des individus entre eux comparativement, avant et après son apparition; ... Si l'on considère le langage sous son aspect de phénomène individuel, ..., on fait au contraire évidemment de la psychologie" (op. cit., 6; our italics).

26 The phrase, "c'est la parole qui fait évoluer la langue" (CLG, 37) was added by the editors (cf. CLG(E), 57).

27 FdS never mentioned Paul in connection with this distinction; however he referred explicitly to Paul in his unfinished review of Sechehaye's *Programme et méthode* of 1908 (cf. SM, 51), and also, critically, in his interview with A. Riedlinger of January 19, 1909 (cf. SM, 29), and in his second course (Spring 1909; cf. SM, 75; CLG(E), 16).

28 Cf. also Engler, 1967:119-20 on Saussure's vacillation between these two terms.

29 Godel (SM, 148) quotes a passage from a note by FdS written in the early 1890s in which FdS stated that a) everyone is endowed with the possibility of speech but that b) the individual can only learn to make use of this faculty if he is surrounded by a speech community (cf. SM, 40). In this manuscript written several years before the appearance of Durkheim's *Règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895) FdS affirmed: "La langue est un fait social."

30 Godel (SM, 149, b. 68) asserts that this statement was added by the editors; however, CLG(E), 57 shows that there was a textual basis for this passage, although the emphasis is certainly the editors.

31 FdS did not have time to execute this plan completely; he discussed the existence of various languages, and the general characteristics of language but not the individual's application of the speech code (cf. Godel, 1966:492).

32 Engler (LTS, 31) noted also: "La localisation de la langue dans la 'partie réceptive et coordinative' du circuit de la parole..."
corrige en un certain sens la formule 'langage [=] langue [+] parole' ... qui, à en croire le schéma, revient à une juxtaposition."

33 There are indications that FdS not only meant "phonation" when he referred to "usage des facultés en général" but probably also the "faculté de coordination" (SM, 154) and perhaps also, as the editors suggested, the faculty of association (CLG, 29).

34 FdS affirmed, however, in a note of 1910/11: "La langue est consacrée socialement et ne dépend pas de l'individu" (cf. CLG(E), 41). This contention appears to be in contradiction with the agreed fact that linguistic change is triggered by parole before it becomes or may become a fact of langue (cf. CLG, 138). It is curious to note that the statement "c'est la parole qui fait évoluer la langue" (CLG, 37) as well as the conclusion that there is "donc interdépendance de la langue et de la parole" (ibid.) — quoted in support of his argument by Bally in 1926 (JP 23:694, n. 2) — were added by the editors (cf. CLG(E), 57), a procedure similar to that noted in 2.2, note 13. We believe that this apparent contradiction can only be resolved if the synchrony/diachrony distinction is considered as well. FdS had in fact asserted: "Tout ce qui est diachronique dans la langue ne l'est que par la parole" (CLG(E), 223). See also chap. 2.2.2.2 of the present study.

35 It is in this respect that we interpret FdS's emphasis made in an interview with Léopold Gautier on May 6, 1911: "Première vérité [about the nature of language study]: la langue est distincte de la parole." (SM, 30).

36 Engler (LTS, 31f.) gives (apart from the other usage of the term in the sense of "tongue" or "speech" of a given nation) the following classification of the various interpretations of langue: 1) as abstraction from languages, 2) as the essential part of language, 3) as secretion from parole, 4) as individual [sic.] fact (cf. FdS's early use of "aspect individuel de la langue" for "parole"), 5) as a social fact, 6) as a product of the time (factor), 7) as a semiological product, and finally 8) as the (place of the) combination of thought and sound.

37 Cf. also T. Pavel, "Une question terminologique: la paire 'langue' - 'parole'", RRLing 12:443-52 (1967), at p. 443 (cf. the introductory quotations to 2.2).
2.2.1.3 Post-Saussurean Developments of the Concepts of langue, parole, and langage

To Ferdinand de Saussure belongs the merit of having drawn attention to the distinction between "speech" and "language", a distinction so far-reaching in its consequences that in my opinion it can hardly fail, sooner or later, to become the indispensable basis of all scientific treatment of grammar.


Common to all modern linguistic theory is the view that a distinction must be made between language in its abstract aspect and language in its physical aspect. Some such dichotomy is implied in such pairs of terms as code-message, langue-parole, language-speech, system-process, and metalanguage-object language. The abstract aspect is a system of habits, described in terms of a set of signs and rules; the physical aspect consists of some finite corpus of utterances actually produced by one or more informants over a given period of time.

Sol Saporta in 1961 *

We take it that de Saussure's classic distinction between 'langue' and 'parole' is necessary if any sense is to be made of an area as complex as language functioning.

R. J. Wales and J. C. Marshall in 1966 †

Saussure's langue/parole distinction, despite a number of problems associated with it which he himself never resolved, has proved to be
one of the most influential concepts of Saussure's doctrine. There is sufficient evidence in the *Cours* to lead one to believe that Saussure's whole theory of language rests upon his conception of *langue*, and the fact that the concept of *parole* and all its various aspects are closely related (though generally subordinated) to *langue* is the main reason for the attention this distinction has received since the publication of the *Cours*.

In the early 1890s Saussure noted something about the object of linguistics which remained characteristic of his approach right to the end of his academic career: "... il y a d'abord des points de vue, justes ou faux, mais uniquement des points de vue à l'aide desquels on crée secondairement les choses." (*CFS* 12:57f.; cf. *SM*, 36). The discussion of the topic is complicated by virtue of the fact that, faithful to his philosophical standpoint, Saussure made numerous statements about the nature of language which cannot be brought together into a coherent whole. In addition to his claims about the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, i.e. the distinction between 1) the social fact and the individual act, 2) the passive nature of the former based on the collectivity and the active nature of the latter which is dependent on the individual will, and 3) the code agreed upon by a given community and the individual realization of (parts of) this code, there are in particular Saussure's repeated statements about the systematic character of language, especially Saussure's definition of language as a system of interdependent terms.

Furthermore, the relation between *langue* and *langage* does not appear to have ever been clarified by Saussure. R. S. Wells, in his attempt of 1947, which remains in many respects still unsurpassed, to analyze the *Cours* with a view to establishing a coherent picture of Saussure's theory, was satisfied with asserting (with reference to *CLG*, 36f., 112) that "by definition" *langue* and *parole* together "exhaust le langage" (*RIL* I, 9) leaving it to others to resolve what *langage* does represent. This problem we believe does not arise so much from the terminological vagueness of *langage* (cf. *LTS*, 30f.) - the theorist may after all be
satisfied with the dismissal of *langage* as "multiforme et hétéroclite" (CLG, 25) and therefore not accessible to the investigator in any systematic manner — as from Saussure's affirmation that *langue* constitutes an object of research which is no less concrete in its nature than *parole* (CLG, 32; cf. SM, 157). This apparent hesitation to attribute to the concept of *langue* an abstractness appears to be in contradiction to other claims about its nature in which *langue* is defined as a system of mutually (inter)related signs:

As a result, readers of the *Cours* have had not only to choose between *langage*, *langue* and *parole* or the *langue*/parole dichotomy (while ignoring *langage*) but also to decide whether they should interpret *langue* as an abstract system underlying human speech or as a concrete material available to the researcher in the way of a sum total of all speech utterances.4

As a rule, we are safe in stating that the real impact of the *Cours* has been on those scholars in Western linguistics who have been concerned with theory rather than with what T. S. Kuhn has termed the puzzle-solving operations of normal science (cf. Kuhn, 1970:35ff.). In other words, Saussure's teaching has had more of a superficial impact on what we may loosely call descriptive linguists and language practitioners.5 By and large, it can be said that scholars with a preference for a general theory of language (like Saussure) have tended to emphasize the importance of *langue* and to neglect *parole*, defining the former as "une entité purement abstraite" and "norme supérieure aux individus" (Brøndal, 1943:93).6

(More pragmatically-inclined linguists, on the other hand, have indeed accepted the distinction between *langue* and *parole* but at the same time have tended to stress speech at the expense of language. This is particularly evident from the work of Bloomfield, although he echoed Saussure's views in his earlier writings (cf. Hockett, 1968:11ff.), and those of his followers.7 A similar observation can be made of the linguists associated with the "Prague school" who generally accepted this dichotomy making often uncritical use of this distinction.8 N. S. Trubeckoj, in particular, who replaced the Saussurean terms by "Sprachgebilde" and "Sprechakt" (which he took from K. Bühler [cf. Bühler,
1965:48ff.), attempted to delineate clearly two sciences: phonology whose object is *langue* (he suggested the term "Sprachgebildelautelehre") and phonetics which is concerned with the acoustic as well as articulatory aspects of speech ("Sprechaklautlehre") (cf. Trubekkoj, 1967:12ff.). It can be argued, however, that Trubekkoj over-emphasized this distinction in order to detach himself from traditional (historical) phonology and to lay stress on his systematic and functional approach to phonology.

In addition to descriptive linguists, and we have mentioned Bloomfield and Trubekkoj as two prominent examples of the more data-orientated type of scholar, there are psycholinguists who also have accepted the Saussurean distinction in one form or another, e.g. language in its abstract and physical aspects, or system versus process, or, with respect to its communicative function, *message* versus *code*. In 1966 R. J. Wales and J. C. Marshall pointed out once more the necessity of distinguishing between these two concepts, and T. Slama-Cazacu, for example, has recently emphasized the particular importance of analyzing *parole* for psycholinguistic purposes. The same linguist also tried to approach Saussure's trichotomy from the point of view of communication. In his introductory volume on general language psychology, published in 1941, F. Kainz interpreted Saussure's threefold distinction, to which he added a fourth term, in the following manner: 1) *langage* in the sense of faculty of speech; 2) *langue* denoting French, English or any given language (Kainz makes use of Gabelentz's term "Einzelsprache"); 3) *parole* as signifying the psycho-physical activity of speaking, and 4) *parler* meaning a given individual style of linguistic expression (cf. Kainz, 1962:22f.). However, since the German word "Sprache" has four distinct meanings, it appears that Kainz postulated the existence of a fourfold division of terms for which there is no clear theoretical basis. By and large, Kainz's far-fetched distinctions lead far away from what Saussure had in mind, an observation which can be made in a number of other cases.

It was perhaps under the influence of Kainz's fourfold distinction that L. Jost distinguished four forms of existence ("Seinsformen") for language. Although he approaches the problem from a Humboldtian concept
of language based on the *ergon* versus *energeia* dichotomy, Jost comes much closer to Saussure's definitions. In this instance, *langage* is defined as faculty of speech but with a "virtual psychic power" ("virtuelle psychische Potenz"), and *parole* stands for the individual realization of *langage* (!) which contains, in Jost's interpretation of the term, the given code. *Parler* in contrast to *langage* is regarded as the individual possession of speech ("Sprachbesitz") whereas *langue* is defined as "the historically developed collective linguistic property as a system of formal carriers of purport and means of relations"; *langue* is a social fact and the sum of individual actualizations (*parlers*). In contrast to his seemingly static definition of *parler*, Jost adds that the true manifestation of language is represented by *parler*. 16

As is the case with Kainz's theorizing Jost is satisfied with offering definitions of the various aspects of language without attempting to apply them to the analysis of linguistic phenomena. Kainz commits the error of deriving his distinctions from the divergent potential uses the speaker of German makes of the term "Sprache" and overlooks one crucial aspect of language, namely its systematic organization. Jost, on the other hand, defines *langue* as representing such a system, but he erroneously maintains that individual speech actualizes *langage*.

It must be understood that both scholars were strongly influenced by Humboldtian ideas to the extent that they attempted to integrate Humboldt's well-known *ergon/energeia* distinction into the Saussurean frame of thought. In this instance, however, it would appear that Humboldt's concepts have been more misleading than useful, unless they can be re-interpreted in a non-Humboldtian sense. 17

As was the case with other linguists we have discussed in this section, it can be shown that language statisticians too have made use of Saussure's trichotomy in the construction of their theoretical foundation. N. D. Andreev and L. R. Zinder, for example, distinguished between language (*langue*), speech act (*parole*), and speech (*langage*) to which they thought it appropriate to add a fourth notion, i.e. that of speech probability, distinctions they appear to have been the first to suggest. 18 In their system *langage* is also called speech activity
(in accordance with Šcerba's suggestions)\(^{19}\) in order to contrast the individual speech act with the recorded or written speech material. The latter, as opposed to the individual speech act, can be subject to observation and analysis by different people at various times. Andreev and Zinder's attempt to segregate speech probability as a fourth category from \textit{langue} was criticized by G. Herdan in the following year. Herdan argued that firstly probabilities of occurrence are in fact inherent in the concept of \textit{langue}, secondly, that in Saussure's theory only \textit{langue} and \textit{parole} are members of the basic dichotomy, and finally, that the (third) concept of \textit{langage} could be added to designate the sum total of samples (\textit{parole}) which can be drawn from the statistical universe (\textit{langue}).\(^{20}\) Herdan himself has emphasized the validity of Saussure's dichotomy for the language statistician in his probability studies published since 1956.\(^ {21}\) In 1960 Herdan adopted, in addition, C. S. Peirce's logical distinction of \textit{type} versus \textit{token} to linguistic study, \textit{token} being defined as representing the instance of occurrence of a given unit whereas \textit{type} designates the element of the system.\(^{22}\) However, this kind of interpretation of the \textit{langue}/\textit{parole} dichotomy is very narrow and restricted to the use of the statistician whose major interest is in word or morpheme frequency lists and similar activities in the field of mathematical linguistics and in fact leads far away from Saussure's intentions.

The majority of post-Saussurean linguists whose prime concern has been with theory have in fact chosen to neglect Saussure's concept of \textit{langage} and to direct their attention to the \textit{langue}/\textit{parole} dichotomy exclusively. However, some scholars have attempted to redefine the tri-chotomy by introducing another concept which in some way is inherent in Saussure's theory yet nowhere overtly defined. E. Buyssens, for example, introduced the concept of \textit{discours} which he defined as "la partie fonctionelle de la parole" and which he wished to place between \textit{parole} and \textit{langue} which is "le systême qui régit la parole" and which constitutes a more or less coherent totality of rules followed by the speaker.\(^{23}\) In Buyssens' understanding of the term, \textit{parole} is the only
truly concrete part of speech, *discours* and *langue* being abstractions by degrees. *Parole* represents, in a way similar to Saussure's conception, the active side of speech; we may call it utterance (Buyssens gives no clear definition of the term), whereas *discours* designates the communicative (or semiological) realization of *parole*. Both are interdependent and can function only by virtue of the existence of *langue*. *Parole* without its functional aspect is not an object of linguistics; *langue* on the other hand appears to be too abstract to be readily accessible to the investigator. Therefore, Buyssens seems to conclude, the only true object of study can be *discours* which conjoins the other two contrasting factors, and as a consequence the idea of a linguistics of *parole* alongside with a linguistics of *langue* is to be rejected. There is no mention of *langage* (cf. Buyssens, 1967:40ff.).

We have implied more than once that linguists in the post-Saussurean era have placed different interpretations upon and have made different uses of concepts deriving from the *Cours*, and a noteworthy example is E. Coseriu. It is perhaps the result of a suggestion made by V. Brøndal in 1939, but possibly also in conjunction with Hjelmslev's distinction *schéma* (earlier: *système*), *usage*, and *acte* made in 1943, that Coseriu suggested in 1952 the distinction between *langue*, *parole* and *norm* in his essay "Sistema, norma y habla" (= Coseriu, 1962:11ff.), and he has reiterated his views on several occasions since that time. In fact he rejects the term *langue* as an historical concept (although we believe that he has confused the language of a given community with the Saussurean concept of *langue*) and replaces it by *system* (cf. Coseriu, 1970:211). Coseriu rightly notices that the social/individual contrast which Saussure appears to have frequently used to clarify his *langue/parole* dichotomy is misleading and obscures the relevant linguistic aspects of this distinction. In addition, it can be argued that (and this is something that others have observed) *parole* is probably as social as is *langue*, with the result that in fact this opposition is untenable (cf. Coseriu, 1970: 195-9).

Indeed Coseriu argues that the Saussurean dualistic concept should be discarded in favour of a monistic one (and this is echoed by J. R. Firth,
cf. PiL, 220) which is to be based on the concrete fact of speech activity, the speech acts of the individuals. Language is essentially interindividual and can be abstracted by the linguist from the 'system of isoglosses' (cf. Coseriu, 1970:200 and 210 respectively). Coseriu however does not reject the langue/parole distinction entirely but seeks to link these two divergent concepts by introducing the concept of norm. If in his scheme langue is to be regarded as the functional (and "ideal") system which permits the individual speaker the concrete realization of speech, norm represents the actual realization of the socially, historically and culturally-motivated conventions irrespective of whether they are linguistically functional, parole representing the (individual) speech activity (Coseriu, 1970:79). In fact it appears that norm is much less flexible than the functional system (i.e. langue), thus allowing the individual a certain amount of liberty. However, Coseriu claims that langue contains all the essential and necessary functional oppositions and this on a higher level of abstraction (pp. 207-8).

On the other hand Coseriu also perceives the possibility that a distinction between individual and subjective and a more general social norm should be made, and concedes that norm is also subject to change depending on the manner in which the community is viewed (p. 208). Coseriu believes that his distinction between (the functional) system and (the conventional) norm solves the problem raised by the Saussurean langue/parole dichotomy. Distinguishing between a) concrete speech activity, b) individual norm, c) social norm, and d) the functional system of language, Coseriu envisages the following solution for the traditional langue/parole distinction which he expresses in the following diagram (slightly modified for the present purpose):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a) konkretes</th>
<th>b) individuelle-</th>
<th>c) soziale</th>
<th>d) funktionelle-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sprechen</td>
<td>le Norm</td>
<td>Norm</td>
<td>les System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coseriu's scheme allows for the following 'points de vues': 1) If 'system' is to be contrasted with 'realization' then parole covers a) to c) and
 langue only d); 2) if 'concrete' is to be contrasted with 'abstract', the picture is reversed, a) pertains to parole and b) to d) are covered by langue; 3) if the social aspect of language is to be distinguished from its individual counterpart, parole would include the individual norm whereas langue the social norm (together with the 'functional system') (cf. Coseriu, 1970:209f.). Again, we notice that the Saussurean notion of langage has been ignored.

Where the trichotomy of langage/langue/parole is concerned, there are only a very limited number of articles, all of them written over thirty years ago, in which this threefold distinction or the distinction between langue and langage has been discussed at some length. 29 Engler (1967:124, n. 3) noted with regret that this trichotomy has so frequently been overlooked by the linguistic public; Sechehaye, in his essay "Les trois linguistiques saussuriennes" of 1940, did suggest a "linguistique de la parole organisée ou du fonctionnement de la langue" (apart from a "linguistique statique" and a "linguistique évolutif") but not, for example, a linguistics of langage. 30

It is true that the large majority of linguists who have ever ventured to discuss Saussure's distinction have confined their analysis to the dichotomy of langue versus parole. Their results have nevertheless been far from identical; this may be partly due to certain unreconcilable positions taken in the Cours but mainly, we believe, to the divergent backgrounds, interests, and persuasions of the scholars in question. It is perhaps not without a certain wry humour that, in 1957, N. C. W. Spence called this dichotomy "a hardy perennial", 31 and there are various indications that this dictum still applies to the present state of affairs.

Another linguist who has exploited Saussurean concepts somewhat differently is the late Louis Hjelmslev; in his article written early in 1943, Hjelmslev subjected divers passages in the Cours dealing with this particular dichotomy to a close analysis. 32 Hjelmslev envisaged the possibility of distinguishing between three conceptions of langue: 1) as a forme pure, independent of its social realization and its material manifestation, which he calls schéma; 2) as a forme matérielle, i.e. actualization of the social aspect of language but still independent of
the details of its manifestation, which he calls norme, and 3) as a simple ensemble des habitudes, adopted by a given speech community and defined through the manifestations as observed, and this he terms usage. Hjelmslev argued that most of the definitions of langue in the Cours point towards interpreting it in the sense of schéma; this is evident from those passages in which langue is characterized as an entity to which the material aspect is totally secondary (cf. CLG(E), 21, 53, 91-2, 266-7). And it is precisely because of his theoretical bias that Hjelmslev was looking for a highly formalized concept of langue. In this respect Saussure's frequent comparison of langue and its mechanism with a game of chess (cf. CLG(E), 64, 195-8, 249, 303) as well as his comparison of a linguistic unit with a piece of money which is exchangeable with another unit of the same 'value' (cf. CLG(E), 260, 267) served to underscore the formal nature of this concept which was in fact expressed by Saussure in his affirmation that langue is, in its essence, a form and not a substance (cf. CLG(E), 254, 276). Moreover, Hjelmslev was aware of the fact that other passages in the Cours might permit other interpretations of the concept thereby rendering it more concrete in nature (cf. CLG(E), 44, 92), passages which Hjelmslev wished to associate with terms such as norm and usage. He pointed out, on the other hand, that all definitions (except probably the one which calls language a social institution and a social fact) agree on the designation of language as a system of signs. In the subsequent paragraphs of his discussion Hjelmslev confronted the three interpretations of langue with parole, the individual speech act. After having argued that usage and parole are interdependent but norme nothing but an artificial construction derived from these two, he dismisses the concept of norm as a fiction and as redundant. The 'exécution' of the schéma, however, finds its expression in usage which may be of either individual or social usage. The essential and (in Hjelmslev's views) new aspect of langue lies in what he termed schéma, and usage is to replace the Saussurean term of parole. In his Prolegomena, Hjelmslev maintained his views (cf. PTL, 75-84) that langue is a form, the constant
in a manifestation, i.e. the linguistic schema, and called a substance which manifests such a linguistic schema a linguistic usage (PTL, 106). As is characteristic of Hjelmslev's view of language, not only is the concept of parole formalized in a more rigorous manner than in the Cours and the Saussurean term deleted from his linguistic terminology, but it is also applied to the treatment of langue. 

38 Langue, in his system, in contrast to Saussure's teaching (cf. CLG, 32), tends to become a completely abstract and formal system of relations, and, in agreement with Saussure's linguistic thought, the central object of linguistic theory (cf. PTL, 101-16). 

39 The most influential re-interpretation of Saussure's langue/parole distinction has been N. Chomsky's proposal within the framework of transformational-generative grammar. On earlier occasions we have denied the influence on Saussure of Humboldtian ideas about the nature of language (cf. 1.3.4, and its subsections, and 2.2.1.1), since we believe that Saussure followed the Cartesian tradition of grammaire générale with its underlying rationalism and probably Hegelian philosophy as well as a number of particular linguistic trends current at the end of the 19th century. Chomsky, on the other hand, has attempted to revitalize Humboldtian linguistic thought, but we are inclined to think that the appearance of the English translation of the Cours in 1959 induced him to familiarize himself with Saussure's concepts, as a result of which a second stage in Chomsky's linguistic argument was announced at the Ninth International Congress of Linguists in 1962.

40 It was then that Chomsky asserted that the generative grammar "internalized by someone who has acquired a language defines what in Saussurian terms we may call langue" (s. Chomsky, 1964:10) adding that Saussure (like Sapir for instance) had emphasized the distinction between what Chomsky terms man's intrinsic linguistic competence and the actual performance in a given speech act. Furthermore, Chomsky pointed out that Saussure's assumption of the logical priority of the study of langue "seems quite inescapable" (1964:11). However, in Chomsky's views, Saussure's approach to language analysis with its apparent emphasis on
classification and its reliance on procedures of segmentation has to be criticized as "taxonomic" and essentially "atomistic" (ibid.). Moreover, Chomsky has stressed since that time the creative aspect of language. This property of language however is not something which he had derived from Saussure but, as is well known in the literature, the main source of Chomsky's inspiration is (by his own admission) Humboldt's dictum that language is not so much an *ergon* but a "generative" activity, *energeia*.

Chomsky's claim, however, that Saussure regarded *langue* "as basically a store of signs with their grammatical properties" and "as an inventory of elements" (Chomsky, 1964:23) is not completely justified although he is correct in saying that 'modern linguistics' has been much more preoccupied with systems of elements than with systems of rules (ibid.).

Again, when, in his *Aspects* of 1965, Chomsky emphasized the importance of the fundamental distinction between "competence (the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)"), he acknowledges that this distinction is related to Saussure's *langue*/*parole* dichotomy emphasizing, however, the necessity of regarding *langue* in the light of "the Humboldtian conception of underlying competence as a system of generative processes." (Chomsky, 1964:4). We are convinced that history will show that the success of Chomsky's theories can only partly be explained by his effective fusion of Humboldtian language philosophy with Saussurean linguistic concepts and that surely Chomsky like Saussure has to be treated as a social phenomenon.

In our above account we have tried to show what we consider to be the main lines of the post-Saussurean development of the *langue*/*parole* distinction and the *langue*/*parole*/*langage* trichotomy. One of Saussure's characteristics was undoubtedly his predilection for dichotomies, and it is not without significance that most of his successors in the various branches of language study who are themselves theoretically inclined have chosen to distinguish between two fundamental aspects of language. Apart from the dichotomies mentioned in this chapter (e.g.
Schéma and usage, 'language of chance' vs. 'language of choice', code vs. message, type vs. token, and competence vs. performance) and a number of trichotomies (e.g. discours or norm added to the Saussurean dichotomy) several further distinctions which have been suggested in recent years could be added to the list (e.g. habits vs. behaviour, sign-design vs. sign-event). It is therefore not surprising that, in view of the various interpretations of Saussure's langue/parole contrast, G. Bès has recently distinguished between four kinds of langue and as many concepts of parole.46 These are some of the reasons which will serve to account for our belief that Saussure's distinction has become so deeply rooted in modern linguistics that it is virtually impossible to theorize without reference in some way to the dichotomy of langue versus parole.47


1 Cf. the following definitions: *langue* as "un système de signes" (CLG, 32; CLG(E), 43); "la langue est un système de signes reposant sur l'image acoustique/des images acoustiques" (CLG(E), 46); language as a "système qui n'admet/ne connaît que son ordre propre" (CLG, 43/CLG(E), 64), "un système [de signes] arbitraire[s]" (CLG, 106/CLG(E), 163), "un système de pures valeurs" (CLG, 116; CLG(E), 178), etc. See also CLG, 124/CLG(E), 192; CLG, 182/CLG(E), 301, and CLG, 185/CLG(E), 304.


3 The passage in the CLG follows the students' notes very closely which state: "Dans la langue (on a)/nous avons un objet (fait) de nature concrète . . . " (CLG(E), 44).

4 R. S. Wells' suggestion that FdS's emphasis on the concrete nature of *langue* has to be viewed as a reaction against (Wells speaks only of "a critique of") the neogrammarians who tended to regard linguistic elements as nothing but abstractions (cf. CLG, 252-3) is probably correct. As the CLG(E), 44 reveals FdS did not mean 'concrete' in any material sense; linguistic signs, he held, are not abstract for they have a psychical reality.

5 For a recent discussion of these terms and the various linguistic disciplines, see Hans J. Vermeer's (at times rather idiosyncratic) Einführung in die linguistische Terminologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 23ff.

Cf. Bloomfield's dictum: "In principle, the student of language is concerned only with the actual speech" (1933:74). For an overview of linguistic development in North America from 1925 to the early 1960s with regard to this dichotomy, see S. R. Levin, "Langue and parole in American Linguistics", FL 1:83-94 (1965).

This occurred despite the warning of one of its members who found the Saussurean definitions quite unsatisfactory and misleading; s. J. M. Kořínek, "Einige Betrachtungen über Sprache und Sprechen", TCLP 6:23-8 (1936).


V. Skalička, another member of the Prague Circle, attempted as early as 1937 to grant to parole a status comparable to that of langue (cf. his article, "Promluva jako linguistický pojem", SaS 3:163-6 [1937]), views which he reiterated many years later; cf. his paper, "The Need for a Linguistics of la parole", Prague School Reader, 375-90.

cf. the quotation at the beginning of this chapter (2.2.1.3).


In a similar way, E. Winkler, in his article, "Vom sprachwissenschaftlichen Denken der Franzosen: Zur Frage der Voraussetzungslosigkeit der Wissenschaft", WuS 19:45-51, 81-93 (1938), at p. 48, thought that FdS felt the necessity for distinguishing three terms since the French language furnishes langue, parole, and langage, terms for which most other languages have no exact equivalents (cf. De Mauro, 1968:389-92, for transl. into a dozen foreign languages).

Kainz (1962:22-3) illustrated his quadruple distinction with the following examples: 1) "Die Sprache ist ein ausgezeichnetes Merkmal des Menschen" ([faculté du] langage); 2) "... die deutsche, englische oder französische Sprache" (langue); 3) "Er hat infolge eines Schlaganfalls die Sprache verloren" (parole) - we believe that "Sprache" in this example could also be interpreted as langage (1); 4) "Lessing führt als Kritiker eine scharfe Sprache" (parler). The fact that Kainz did not make theoretical use of this fourfold division of terms in his subsequent argument underscores, we believe, the artificiality of his distinction.

It is doubtful that H. G. Koll's suggestions concerning the establishment of langue would lead to any linguistically verifiable and useful results; s. his paper, "Comment parvenir à une caractérisation intégrale d'une langue, en tant que système 'où tout se tient'?", A[10]CIL III, 521-9 (1970); discussion ibid., 329f.


S. Type - Token Mathematics (The Hague: Mouton, 1960), but also Herdan's final expression of his theory as a whole in The Advanced Theory of Language as Choice and Chance (Berlin & New York: Springer, 1966), esp. pp. 3-4, 7, 13, 27-8, and 322. On p. 7 Herdan affirmed: "The 'language as choice' - 'language as chance' dichotomy will be found equally useful as were the 'langue - parole' and [sic.] the 'signifiant' - 'signifié' dichotomies." In fact Herdan hopes to bridge these two Saussurean dichotomies by interpreting 'language as chance' as the aspect which distinguishes between "statistical universe" and "sample" and 'language as choice' "refers to the signifiant - signifié dichotomy in its interpretation as being subject to the law of duality." (Ibid.). Cf. also L. Heilmann, "Considerazioni statistico-matematiche e contenuto semantico", QUCC 7:35-45 (1962/63), and G. Herdan, "The Jig-Saw Puzzle of Saussurian and Quantitative Linguistics", LeSt 4:69-76 (1969), esp. pp. 73-4.

"De l'abstrait et du concret dans les faits linguistiques: La parole - les discours - la langue", AL 3:17-23 (1942/43), at p. 21. The definition of discours was included in Buysens' Les langages et le discours (Brussels: Office de la Publicité, 1943), p. 30. In his book of 1967 Buysens distinguished between parole and discours as follows: "Si par parole on entend le flot sonore sortant de la bouche du locuteur,
il est évident qu'il faut un autre terme pour désigner la succession des phonèmes ainsi que de tous les autres éléments qui assurent la communication; nous l'appellerons *discours*" (1967:40). He then reiterates his earlier definition of discourse (Buyssens, 1967:42).

24 "A propos de la distinction entre langue et parole on se demande souvent quelle est, sous ce rapport, la position de l'Usage [sic.]. On peut admettre cette notion comme en quelque sorte intermédiaire entre langue et parole ..." (Brøndal, 1943:96).


26 Cf. the following definitions of his terms in *Sincronía, diacronía e historia*: "El sistema es 'sistema de posibilidades, de coordinades que indican los caminos abiertos y los caminos cerrados' de un hablar 'comprendible' en una comunidad; la norma, en cambio, es un sistema de realizaciones obligadas ... , consagradas social y culturalmente: no corresponde a lo que 'puede decirse' sino a lo que 'se ha dicho' y tradicionalmente 'se dice' en la comunidad considerada." (Coseriu, 1958:31).


"usage" (which he takes as the best solution to the problem and superior to G. Guillaume's distinction between langue, parole, and discours) has made a surprising claim when he states that Saussure distinguished only between "NORME (langue sociale) et USAGE (langue individuelle)", a contention which suggests the author's limited familiarity with the Course, major components of which his treatise sets out to criticize.

30 VR 5:1-48 (1940); repr. in Geneva School Reader, 138-81 (1969). Engler's formulation "neben parole organisée und langue" seems misleading (1967:124, n. 3) if it is meant to indicate two separate linguistics (as FdS suggested) and not a single one (as Sechehaye envisaged in this context).


32 See reference in note 7; Hjelmslev (CFS 2:44) gave the date as "Mars 1943". We note with surprise that H. Frei, in his attempt at reconciliation of apparent contradictory or mutually exclusive definitions of these terms in the CLG, makes no mention of Hjelmslev's paper; see Frei's "Langue, parole et différentiation", JPs 45:137-57 (1952), esp. pp. 146ff.

33 Quoted from Hjelmslev, 1959:72ff.; Hjelmslev reiterated his views concerning the threefold distinction between norme, usage, and schéma in his article, "La stratification du langage", Word 10:163-88 (1954), at pp. 187-8. Hjelmslev's reference to the CLG have been replaced by those in the CLG(E) wherever FdS's authorship has been established. On other occasions a number of references will be added or their authenticity challenged.

34 This conception of langue was developed by A. Sechehaye who emphasized the algebraic nature of langue in his Programme et méthodes de la linguistique théorique (Paris: Champion; Leipzig: Harrassowitz; Geneva: Eggimann, 1908), pp. 111, 133, 151.

35 We agree with Hjelmslev's observation that FdS avoided the use of norme in his lectures but (as Hjelmslev could not know) we find no evidence for FdS's use of the term usage (CLG, 131, 138, 173, 227 in contrast to CLG(E), 206, 223, 285, 376) which was added by the editors on all four occasions.

36 Again the expression "habitude(s) linguistique(s)" to which Hjelmslev refers is not FdS's but the editors' (cf. CLG(E), 57, 172).

37 Hjelmslev (1959:81, note 1) suggests the following translations of these two terms: E. 'pattern' and 'usage'; G. 'Sprachbau' and 'Sprachgebrauch' or 'Usus', etc. ('Pattern' and 'Usage' have probably been derived from Sapir's Language of 1921, in which the author stated: "Wherever we go we are impressed by the fact that pattern is one thing, the utilization of pattern quite another" [S. Sapir, 1949:59], whereas 'Sprachgebrauch' has been taken from Paul's Prinzipien).
38 This term is used once (PTL, 114) but not listed in the index (cf. PTL, 141).

39 It may, however, be worth investigating to what extent FdS did in fact reintroduce a linguistics of parole under the disguise of syntax-matics (cf. CLG, 172ff.), the analysis of the chaîne parlée (CLG, 64-6, 77-9) or other notions, for instance the linearity of the signifiant (CLG, 103, 170).

40 We are not aware of an explicit reference to FdS in Chomsky's work prior to this 1962 paper (cf. Chomsky, 1964:10f., 21, 23, 26, 67, 68, 108, and 111, note, for references to FdS). Note that R. S. Wells' important analysis of the Cours appeared in Word 3:1-31 (1947) and not in Language, the organ of the Linguistic Society of America of which Wells has been a member since 1944. J. T. Waterman's insignificant note on FdS in MJ 40:307-9 (1956) could, of course, not arouse the interest in the CLG Wells' study failed to achieve. We believe that Chomsky's Syntactic Structures of 1957, except for its emphasis on syntax in contrast to the levels of morphology and phonology which were studied almost exclusively during the period of the "Bloomfieldian" era of linguistics, did not lead to a linguistic theory significantly dissimilar to the IC analysis procedures suggested by R. S. Wells in his essay of 1947, "Immediate Constituents", Language 23:81-117, and subsequent exploitations of these ideas by Z. S. Harris, and others. Quite in accordance with our claim C. F. Hockett disregarded the Syntactic Structures and based his critical dissection of Chomsky's views on the Aspects of 1965 (cf. Hockett, 1968:38ff.).

41 H. Birnbaum's statement should be kept in mind when comparing FdS's concept with Chomsky's distinction, though with some reserves regarding FdS's alleged sociologism: "It was perhaps not entirely coincidental that Saussure never worked out the details of a syntactic theory within the framework of langue. He was very much oriented toward sociology while Chomsky is a psychologist and logician of linguistics. There seems to exist a certain discrepancy between langue and parole and 'competence' and 'performance'" (Phonologie der Gegenwart, p. 351 [1967]).

42 The key sentence in Humboldt's doctrine which had its impact on Chomsky's argument was that language "muss ... von endlichen Mitteln unendlichen Gebrauch machen" (quoted in Chomsky, 1964:17).

43 That Chomsky had been led to this conclusion by the E. transl. of the CLG was put forward by H. G. Wittmann, "Two Models of Linguistic Mechanism", CIL 11.2:83-93 (1966), esp. pp. 85f. Wittmann also tried, in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner, to reinterpret Saussure's theory in the light of the three components of syntax, phonology, and semantics of Chomskyan linguistic theory.
It would be interesting to investigate how Chomsky's ideas concerning "deep" and "surface" grammar (cf. Chomsky, 1964:10; 1965:16-8 (notes, 220-22), and elsewhere; 1968:15) are in fact related to the distinction between competence (langue) and performance (parole), a question which would exceed the scope of the present overview. Cf. also the somewhat curious account, "Kompetenz und Performanz (Langue und Parole)" in H. Glinz, *Linguistische Grundbegriffe und Methodenübersicht* (Frankfurt: Athenäum, 1970; 2nd ed., 1971), 92-119, esp. pp. 92-100.

This aspect of FdS's linguistic thought was pointed out by E. Benveniste, "Saussure après un demi-siècle", *CFS* 20:7-21 (1963), at p. 16. Cf. also Engler, 1966:37.


2.2.2 The Dichotomy of Synchrony versus Diachrony in Language Description

In the early years of the present century, linguistics underwent what has been rightly described as a 'Copernican revolution'. This revolution, which was ushered in by the posthumous publication, in 1916, of Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale, showed itself in two main ways. Firstly, the historical bias of nineteenth-century philology gave way to a broader view which admitted the existence of two approaches to language, one descriptive or 'synchronic', the other historical or 'diachronic', and boldly proclaimed the primacy of the descriptive method because it is more akin to the attitude of the ordinary speaker. The second great change concerned the way in which the tasks of descriptive linguistics were conceived. Language came to be viewed, not as an aggregate of discrete elements but as an organized totality, a Gestalt, which has a pattern of its own and whose components are interdependent and derive their significance from the system as a whole. In Saussure's famous simile, language is like a game of chess: you cannot add, remove or displace any element without affecting the entire field of force.

Stephen Ullman in 1958*

2.2.2.1 A Brief Survey of the Pre-Saussurean Distinction between Descriptive and Historical Grammar

S. Ullman's statement quoted above can be regarded as a typical expression of the modern structuralist who has concentrated his scholarly activity on synchronic aspects of language at the expense of historical perspective. Significantly, this observation was made not in the twenties...
but in the fifties of our century, some forty years after the publication
of the *Course*. A number of reasons may account for this. Firstly,
in the 1920s, and partly also in the two subsequent decades, only a
limited number of linguists appreciated the importance of Saussure's
theoretical pronouncements; especially in Central Europe historical
linguistics was then still regarded as the queen of linguistic science,
a fact which was generally true of Germany and the German-speaking
countries until the mid-fifties and probably also of Eastern Europe,
though perhaps for different reasons. Secondly, few scholars have
ventured to read again the statements made by linguists working between
1870 and 1910 relying heavily instead on secondary sources, and many
have been content to quote in particular from Pedersen's account of
19th-century historical linguistics (which totally ignores the achieve-
ments in general linguistics of Humboldt, Steinthal, G. von der Gabe-
lentz, Baudouin de Courtenay, Paul, and others). Thirdly, Ullman's
affirmation that Saussure "proclaimed the primacy of the descriptive
method because it is more akin to the attitude of the ordinary speaker"
invites at least three criticisms: 1) Saussure never claimed the primacy
of synchronic linguistics over the historical approach to language,
although it may well have been the impression gained by the reader in
the 1950s who (a) had absorbed the re-interpretations of Saussurean
ideas by the Prague and Copenhagen Schools, (b) contented himself with
an acquaintance with the first (and smaller) half of of the *Course*,
and (c) perhaps only indirectly familiarized himself with its contents;
2) Saussure never attempted to underscore the importance of synchronic
linguistics simply "because it is more akin to the attitude of the
ordinary speaker", although he made a statement to this effect (cf.
CLG(E), 181), but more so because the system of language can be established
only after a language state has been established (cf. CLG, 115ff.).
3) The 'ordinary speaker' or the 'sujet parlant' (CLG, 117), to use
Saussure's term, never became a concept within Saussure's linguistic
theory in contrast to Bloomfield's and the procedures of his followers.

The gravest errors, however, committed by the majority of 20th-
century linguists when judging Saussure's achievements can be characterized
as follows: 1) because of their lack of first-hand acquaintance with the literature of the time before the appearance of the Cours, Saussure is regarded by them as someone who has come up with completely novel ideas; 2) their general lack of historical perspective which followed an over-simplified adoption of the synchronic treatment of language frequently combined with a disregard for work in adjacent areas of research. Saussure's proposals concerning the distinction between anhistorical approach to linguistic phenomena and a 'static' consideration of linguistic functioning is a good illustration of our contention as we shall see.

Three articles devoted to the elucidation of the background of the 19th-century conception of history and its implications for linguistics which we consider to be important appeared in 1967. S. Heinimann, in his study "Zur Auffassung des Geschichtlichen in der historischen Grammatik des 19. Jahrhunderts", pays particular attention to the fact that the terms "historisch" or "geschichtlich" were interpreted quite differently in 19th-century linguistics, starting with Grimm's Deutsche Grammatik (1819ff.) to Meyer-Lübke's Grammatik der romanischen Sprachen at the turn of the century. Zs. Telegdi (1967:226), in a similarly orientated paper, draws attention to the fact that "historisch" during the time of Grimm was synonymous with "empirisch", while Heinimann (1967:799ff.) shows that, since Schleicher's adoption of (pre-) Darwinian principles in the explanation of linguistic development, the concept of history in linguistics has been markedly different from that in the other sciences. Telegdi (1967:225) demonstrates that 'historical' during the time of Grimm and even before, was contrasted with 'philosophical', a term which was used to replace the earlier term of rational and was connected with the tradition of the grammaire générale (cf. Telegdi, 1967:228ff.), a concept which was better known in the German-speaking countries as "allgemeine Grammatik" or "philosophische Grammatik".

The identification of historical with empirical, Telegdi (p. 226) points out, can be traced back to Aristotle, and an interesting passage, which was overlooked by Telegdi, Heinimann, and Lieb (1967), in which Hermann Paul re-affirmed this curious point of view is strikingly relevant:
Am allerwenigsten darf man diesem allgemeinen Teile der Sprachwissenschaft [whose objective it should be to investigate the general conditions of the historical development of language] den historischen als den empirischen gegenübersetzen. Der eine ist gerade so empirisch wie der andere. 9

We believe that the contrast between 'historical' ('empirical') and 'philosophical' ('rational') has to be viewed along with the particular use of history in the 19th century as practised within linguistic science. Earlier periods had adopted the more philosophical treatment of matters linguistic, probably under the influence of Descartes, and expressions such as "bloss historisch" in the sense of not formally organized and accidental were in current use until the mid-19th century. It was Grimm who took up the traditional opposition of historical versus philosophical emphasizing however the importance of the "historical" over the "philosophical" approach, thus laying the foundation for the 'historical' treatment of language as the only adequate and truly scientific approach to language description (cf. Telegdi, 1967:226f.).

Another pair of terms which has became important in the subsequent development of linguistic science appears to have emerged during the 19th-century soon after the 'philosophical' or 'rational' treatment of language had been discarded as an inadequate approach. It is not clear whether or not 'philosophical' has in some way furnished the expression 'descriptive' but the latter term (which aptly characterizes the work of Bopp and his followers) emerged as a device to be contrasted with the 'historical' approach although, curiously enough, empiricism was at the basis of both procedures. Paul's dictum, which has raised much opposition in the 20th century, that historical linguistics provides the only truly scientific treatment of language and his rejection of the "bloss deskriptiveGrammatik" represents the final conclusion of the linguistic argument initiated by Grimm.

Telegdi (1967:230) makes mention of August Friedrich Bernhardi (1770-1820) whose linguistic work influenced Humboldt considerably. In his Anfangsgründe der Sprachwissenschaft (Berlin: Fröhlich, 1805), Bernhardi regarded general grammar as identical with linguistics tout
court defining "Sprachwissenschaft oder Sprachlehre, philosophische Grammatik" as "die Wissenschaft von der unbedingten [i.e. necessary and ideal] Form der Sprache" (p. 7). The emphasis on the 'empirical' or 'historical' treatment of linguistic phenomena by the scholars of the next generation, viz. Grimm and Rask and also Bopp, explains why Bernhardi's 'philosophical' approach fell into oblivion and was recognized only by those, in particular Humboldt, who were especially interested in the solution of general linguistic problems and who therefore referred back to 17th and 18th century linguistic thought. On the other hand, Bernhardi, as Delbrück pointed out in 1904, clearly distinguished between this philosophical approach to language, which deals with a given and complete object in an a-historical fashion, and the historical one. It appears that there have always been two kinds of approaches to language though the emphasis alternated between them; a period of predilection for theoretical discussion is generally followed by a period of data accumulation and more practical considerations of linguistic problems, and vice versa. Paul, in his "Geschichte der germanischen Philologie", distinguished between practical and philosophical grammars which have co-existed at least since the Renaissance; however, we must clearly distinguish between these two kinds of diverging interests and reckon with the alternating pattern of emphasis, e.g. Alexander of Villedieu's Doctrinale of 1199 which served for almost four centuries as a standard manual for the teaching of Latin on the one hand, and Peter Helias' Summa grammaticae written in the middle of the 12th century which explicitly sought philosophical explanations for the grammatical rules laid down in Priscian's voluminous grammar of Latin (which Alexander of Villedieu had merely tried to simplify and make more digestible for pedagogical purposes).

Where the neogrammarian use of the expression 'historical' is concerned, it is interesting to note that their views did not essentially differ from Schleicher's. Their tacit acceptance of Schleicher's evolutionalist theories, in contrast to their official opposition to his theory as a whole, is particularly evident from their concept of the "Lautgesetze" proclaiming the necessity and regularity of linguistic
change (cf. Heinimann, 1967:800). It must be remembered that the work of historians of the calibre of Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) and Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) and their positivistic attitude towards history (which placed particular emphasis on careful collection of facts at the expense of an overall consideration of their study and interpretation) could not have failed to have had its impact on linguistics, notably in Germany. 13 Saussure's dependence on ideas current in his time is obvious from the fact that he spoke of 'linguistique évolutive' (CLG, 117; CLG(E), 180; SM, 80), which he later replaced by 'linguistique cinématique' or 'diachronique' (CLG(E), 181),14 and indeed he appears to have spoken of "une évolution aveugle" (CLG, 317; cf. however CLG(E), 514), thus echoing Leskien's famous statement of 1876 (cf. Robins, 1967: 183). Characteristic of certain but not all trends of the junggrammatische Richtung appear to have been the statements made by the Romance scholar W. Meyer-Lübke (1861-1936) in his Einführung in das Studium der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft of 1901 where he distinguished between a "biologische Forschung" which is "eine durchaus entwicklungsgeschichtliche" (i.e. dealing with the history of development of linguistic forms) and a "paläontologische Forschung" the explicit goal of which is "verschwundene Sprachzustände wiederherzustellen".15 Several paragraphs earlier Meyer-Lübke had defined the task of Romance linguistics as that of tracing the development of the languages of the Romania from their early beginnings to their present stage, to record these changes, delineate them with regard to time and space, and to describe the results of the changes at a given point of time. When he states that it is a question of "vertikale und um horizontale Darstellung" of the facts of language, he seems to echo Hugo Schuchardt's (1842-1927) observation of 1874 in which the same simile was employed,16 and to anticipate Saussure's diagram illustrating his distinction between the axe des simultanéités and the axe des successivités (CLG, 115; CLG(E), 117). In contrast to Schuchardt, where the distinction between the horizontal and the vertical aspect of language remains a remark made en passant and without any consequences for the subsequent argument, Meyer-Lübke points out that one should designate
"die horizontale Darstellung als Systematik", and it is its goal to summarize characteristics as the basis for language classification. This is contrasted with the tasks of the 'vertical' treatment of languages where Meyer-Lübke distinguishes between the downward approach (which he calls "Biologie") and the upward approach ("Paläontologie"), both of which take up the bulk of his Einführung.

In a passage from the first edition of this book quoted by Lieb (1967:24), Meyer-Lübke showed himself critical of what he called "Systematik", but this attitude changed in principle of this concept in his second edition of 1909. This was probably due to the influence of O. Dittrich's Grundzüge der Sprachpsychologie of 1903, a book which scrutinized Paul's Prinzipien and suggested a number of emendations of Paul's linguistic argument (cf. 1.3.2.2.2). At roughly the same time Rudolf Meringer (1859-1931) distinguished between an historical and a descriptive task of linguistics, and we are rather safe in saying that there was, at the turn of this century, a general awareness among linguists of different persuasions about a twofold approach to the treatment of linguistic phenomena.

With regard to questions concerning the antecedents of Saussure's influential distinction between 'synchronic' or 'idiosynchronic' (cf. SM, 278) and 'diachronic' or 'cinématicque' (cf. LTS, 16) in linguistics it is inevitable that the possibility of extra-linguistic influences will be raised, and it is therefore appropriate that the matter should be discussed in view of the number of suggestions which have been made since the appearance of the Cours in 1916. Schuchardt, for instance, in his review of Saussure's posthumous work in 1917, drew attention to A. Comte's distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic' aspects of social phenomena; we have quoted some of the relevant passages from the fourth volume of Comte's Cours de philosophie positive of 1839 earlier in this study (cf. 1.2.1.2) in order to illustrate this idea, the first component of which seems particularly suggestive because Saussure did employ 'static' as being synonymous with 'synchronic' (cf. CLG, 117, 141; SM, 277). Lieb (1967:19) quotes two passages from a later publication
by Comte in which this distinction was taken up again. In the preliminary paragraphs of his *Système de politique positive* of 1852, Comte pointed out:

L'étude positive de l'Humanité doit être décomposée en deux parties essentielles: l'une, statique, concerne la nature fondamentale du grand organisme; l'autre, dynamique, se rapporte à son évolution nécessaire. 23

This passage is quite interesting for a number of reasons, in particular when we note that Comte speaks, in the subsequent page, of "l'identité fondamentale des divers états successifs", both quotations containing terms if not conceptions which remind us of ideas proposed in the *Cours*. 24 Saussure employed the traditional term of 'organism' on several occasions in the sense of 'system' (cf. CLG, 40, 41, 42; LTS, 38) and spoke no less frequently of 'evolution' (cf. CLG, 24, 193; LTS, 23). Furthermore, as we will see in the subsequent chapter (2.2.2.2), the concept of état plays an important rôle in Saussure's synchrony/diachrony distinction as well as in the notion of identity (s. 2.2.5.2; cf. Godel, 1966:484). However, as on previous occasions (cf. 1.2.1), a close analysis of Comte's theoretical argument reveals that there is no direct line which could be drawn from him to Saussure. But there exist sufficient reasons to believe that he was acquainted with Comte's work which was very influential in 19th century thought. It could even be imagined that Saussure adopted, as he did in the case of 'valeur' and certain other related terms which he derived from economic theory (cf. 1.2.1.3), expressions found outside linguistic studies, for instance from Comte's work. The particular meaning Saussure attached to terms such as 'static', 'état', 'successivité', 'identité', however, are the result of his reflection on eminently linguistic problems.

In connection with the distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic', someone who however has been ignored in the literature except for a reference by V. Mathesius in 1911, 25 and who made statements which we think come much closer to the Saussurean concept of synchronic vs. diachronic than anyone else in the literature outside linguistics in the 19th century is worthy of mention. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937)
published his *Versuch einer concreten Logik* in 1887, a book which, as its subtitle indicates,26 was an attempt at a classification and organization of the sciences from a logical and methodological point of view.27 Significantly, and we refer to this point particularly because we believe that there is a certain affinity between his views and Saussure's, Masaryk starts his outline with a definition of science:

Unter Wissenschaft verstehen wir ein bestimmtes System von Erkenntnissen, die sich auf einen Gegenstand oder auf Gegenstände bestimmter Art beziehen. Ein solches System ist keine bloße Zusammenstellung von einzelnen Erkenntnissen, sondern eine durchdachte Anordnung derselben [i.e. of findings] . . . Unter Wissenschaft in diesem strengen Sinn des Wortes verstehen wir aber das verständige Erfassen der Dinge und die Erklärung derselben *in ihrer Coexistenz und Succession*, sofern uns diese Erklärung überhaupt möglich ist. (1887:13; our italics).

This bold statement is important for several reasons. Firstly, Masaryk emphasizes (and this is also characteristic of Saussure) the primacy of theory, i.e. of knowing what one is doing (cf. *CFS* 20:13); together with this prerequisite, there is the necessity of systematization of the *membra disiecta* in order to turn one's activity into something which could rightly be named science. Thirdly, and this is of particular interest to the present discussion, Masaryk requests that the object of investigation should be approached from two distinct angles, i.e. the coexistence and succession of its data. It must be pointed out that this opening statement does not represent a remark *en passant* but a principle by means of which Masaryk scrutinizes and analyzes the various branches of the social and natural sciences. Indeed, in the first footnote of his theoretical outline, immediately following the distinction between the aspects of co-existence and succession, the author refers to the contrast between static and dynamic, a distinction which he admittedly took from Comte (cf. *op. cit.*, 139 and 146) and which he refers to frequently in his argument (*ibid.*, 88, 191f., 228, and elsewhere).

We should recall that Saussure struggled with the problem of making linguistics a science independent of other sciences, notably sociology.
and psychology (cf. CLG, 21 and 33), and that his attempts were not wholly successful despite his claims that linguistics was to be regarded as an autonomous subject of study (cf. CLG(E), 515). Masaryk too notes that (apart from physiology which posed no particular problem to either Saussure or the neogrammarians since they regarded phonetics as an auxiliary science only), psychology and sociology have furnished most of the principles of language study (cf. Versuch, 189), but he argues that linguistics should be regarded as a separate science (p. 187), in particular since it too has its proper object (p. 190). Nevertheless the twofold aspects under which psychology studies its phenomena, namely their co-existence and succession (cf. p. 117), and the complementary approaches by which sociology attempts to exhaust its object of investigation, namely those of statics and dynamics (s. pp. 139ff.), do have their impact on linguistic methodology. As far as sociology is concerned, and we believe that this is significant for linguistic theory as well, Masaryk states:


But Masaryk does not content himself with pointing to the fact that linguistics exhibits methodological affinities with sociology and also with history (cf. ibid., 173), but he demands explicitly, in the section devoted to linguistics, that both theoretical and practical linguistics (Masaryk speaks of "abstracte Sprachlehre" and, under the influence of Paul [cf. pp. 190ff.], of "concrete Sprachgeschichte") deal with two tasks which correspond to statics and dynamics in sociology, calling the first simply "Grammatik" (cf. Saussure's tentative identification of grammar with synchrony; CLG, 185) and the second "die sogenannte historische Grammatik" (Versuch, 191f.).

If, and only if, Saussure had ventured to look outside linguistics for inspiration and support of his own theoretical argument, he might
have found both in Masaryk's *Versuch* of 1887. However, it should not be forgotten that Kruszewski had, as early as 1883, made very similar observations. In fact Saussure owned a copy of Techmer's *Zeitschrift* (cf. De Mauro, 1968:361f.) in which the German version of Kruszewski's treatise appeared (1884ff.) in which we find, as we have demonstrated earlier (cf. 1.3.3.3), the distinction between dynamic and static laws governing the sound system of a given language (cf. Kruszewski, 1885:262-3; 1887:149) as well as the distinction between "Koexistenz" and "Konsequenz" (1884:303; 1887:156, 159) being made. As is probably true in the case of Whitney who derived his sociological argument from Spencer (cf. 1.3.1), Kruszewski adopted certain principles from social sciences other than linguistics, in particular from the work of Mill (cf. Kruszewski, 1884:304, n. 1). If Masaryk's work offers a striking example of our claim that linguistics reflects to a large extent the intellectual trends of its time and that many of Saussure's ideas were 'in the air' during the period in which he developed, the works of the psychologist Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and the language philosopher Anton Marty (1847-1914) which appeared during roughly the same period do not, contrary to what has been claimed in the literature, offer any statements which could be compared with those in Masaryk's *Versuch*.

However, we must insist that Saussure's principal and direct sources (and this has been our conviction all along) have mainly been the work of his fellow-linguists, as he suggested himself in an interview with A. Riedlinger in January 1909 (s. SM, 29), and therefore, as there are many more convincing sources to be found in a number of linguistic studies of the last third of the 19th century in which Saussure's distinction is, in one way or another, anticipated, we shall turn out attention to these.

First of all, it is necessary to emphasize that Saussure developed his distinction between synchrony and diachrony fairly early in his life. In his hitherto unpublished appreciation of Whitney's work of 1894 (cf. 1.3.1), Saussure noted:

Nous nourrissons depuis bien des années cette conviction que la linguistique est une science *double*, et si < profondément,
irréémédiatement > double, qu'on peut < à vrai dire > se demander s'il y a une raison suffisante pour main-
tenir sous ce nom de *linguistique* une unité < illusoire [crossed out] factice, > génératrice < précisément > de toutes les erreurs, de tous les inextricables pièges contre lesquels nous nous débattons chaque jour, avec le sentiment [...]. *Avant que cette dualité fonimen-
tale ait été < reconnue, au moins discutée > nous admettons qu'il peut y avoir < d'une part des > opinions < simplement > chimériques, et d'autres qui ont < le > mérite de ne pas contredire la réalité des faits . . . . 33

We may conclude from this passage that Saussure had conceived of the necessity for distinguishing between the descriptive or 'static' and the historical or 'dynamic' treatment of linguistic facts prior to his acceptance of the professorship in Geneva in 1891. This would, from a chronological point of view, exclude Brentano, Marty, Gabelentz (cf. 1.3.4.2.2), and others as Saussure's source of inspiration. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to go back to the ancient Indian grammarians, as S. Al-George has recently done, to trace the origins of 'structuralism' and to suggest their influence on Saussure, particularly since there are several immediate possible sources which were directly available to the Western European theoretician of language of the last two decades of the 19th century.

Earlier in this chapter we illustrated that there was a general awareness of the distinction between descriptive and historical methods of language analysis at the turn of this century. In the following paragraphs we will refer to a number of linguists who, between 1868 and 1886 made explicit statements to this effect.

First there is a clear statement and procedure which follows the descriptive approach to linguistic phenomena in J. Baudouin de Cour-
tenay's dissertation of 1868, to which his pupil made a direct refer-
ence in 1883 (s. Kruszewski, 1884:299) when he contrasted the "historischen
Standpunkt" with the "jetzigen Sprache" (cf. Lieb, 1967:23 for a full quotation). However, apart from the fact that Baudouin's thesis was generally ignored by his contemporaries although it was devoted to the phenomenon of analogy in language, a principle which became one of the corner-stones of the neogrammarian doctrine ten years later, Baudouin's
later distinction between 'static' and 'dynamic' was expounded in studies written in Russian or Polish and published in places which were hardly accessible to Western linguists. 

Kruszewski's acquaintance with the theories of the neogrammarians (cf. Kruszewski, 1881:28-37), and his affirmation that there was a close affinity between the principles held at Kazan and those put forward by the Junggrammatiker (cf. Lieb, 1967:23), immediately suggest the work of Paul which could not have failed to arouse the interest of Baudouin and, in particular, Kruszewski who entitled his dissertation of 1883 'Outline of linguistic science', probably following the example of Paul's Prinzipien (and possibly also Steinthal's Abriss). Since we have demonstrated in an earlier chapter (s. 1.3.2.2.2) that Paul's theoretical work was probably a prime source of Saussure's linguistic ideas, including the distinction between descriptive and historical treatment of language, little needs to be added here (cf. also the presentation by Lieb, 1967:20-22). However, most of the statements concerning 'descriptive grammar', 'language state', the contrast between 'Lautwandel' and 'Lautwechsel', and related concepts were made explicit in the second edition of Paul's Prinzipien in 1886, although many of these ideas had been inherent in his argument of 1880. Kruszewski's source, however, insofar as the 'static'/'dynamic' dichotomy is concerned, was certainly Baudouin and possibly also 19th century philosophers and sociologists but hardly Paul. 

In his 1883 treatise Kruszewski distinguished, as we noted earlier in this chapter, between the 'static law' of a sound by which he meant that a sound is approximately homogeneous ('annähernd gleichartig') with all individuals of a given dialect and at a given time (s. Kruszewski, 1885:262), and dynamic features without, however, expatiating on these terms to make them linguistically more relevant. Suffice it to note that Kruszewski not only suggested but adhered to principles of 'synchronic' linguistics as can be demonstrated from his frequent use of the notion of system in language, his critical attitude towards the concept of the "Einförmigkeit des Zustandes" (1887:152) and his query whether a "Zustand der Spr.[ache]"
could be permanent (1890:134).\textsuperscript{41} Saussure must have found at least a number of his own views confirmed in this volume (cf. also 1.3.3.3).

In his inaugural lecture of 1885, Brugmann, the most important spokesman of the \textit{junggrammatische Richtung}, observed the following about the relation of philology and linguistics:

Früher konnte man oft hören, der Philologie komme auf Grund ihres Begriffes die Pflege der \textit{deskriptiven} oder statistischen Grammatik zu, der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft dagegen die \textit{entwicklungsgeschichtliche} Forschung.\textsuperscript{42}

This passage reveals that Brugmann was, prior to the publication of Paul's revised and much enlarged edition of the \textit{Prinzipien}, quite aware of the terminological and methodological difference between the 'descriptive' or 'static' and the 'historical' or 'evolutionistic' treatment of linguistic phenomena. In the subsequent year Paul advised the student to follow careful procedures in his analysis of language states (the establishment of which Paul regards as a prerequisite to an adequate treatment of the historical facts of language) since:

Sehr leicht wird das Bild eines bestimmten Sprachzustandes getrübt, wenn dem Betrachter eine nahe verwandte Sprache oder eine ältere oder jüngere Entwicklungsstufe bekannt ist. Da ist die grösste Sorgfalt erforderlich, dass sich nichts Fremdartiges einmische. Nach dieser Seite hin hat gerade die historische Sprachforschung viel gesündigt, indem sie das, was sie aus der Erforschung des älteren Sprachzustandes abstrahiert hat, einfach auf den jüngeren übertragen hat. (Paul, 1909[=1886]:31).

One can hardly think of a clearer statement concerning the concept of the language state and the problems of its description; Saussure's famous demand could hardly have been anticipated more explicitly:

Aussi le linguiste qui veut comprendre cet état [de langue] doit-il faire table rase de tout ce qui l'a produit et ignorer la diachronie. (CLG, 117; CLG(E), 181).

In view of our findings O. Dittrich's complaint of 1905 (with reference to Paul) that the identification of linguistics with historical linguistics had by now become a kind of dogma appears to be exaggerated, and is an indication of the fact that even a careful reader like Dittrich must have overlooked a number of those statements by Paul (and many of his contemporaries) which permit a different interpretation.
In 1910, when Saussure was preparing his most decisive third course on general linguistics, K. von Ettemayer, a pupil of Meyer-Lübke, devoted an article to the problem of whether a scientific descriptive grammar is necessary, a question which he answered in the affirmative, and in the subsequent year V. Mathesius outlined the procedures for a descriptive in contrast to an historical approach to language. All these facts point to what we have been trying to demonstrate, namely that the concept of 'synchrony' was very much 'in the air' during Saussure's lifetime, and that the only thing which was needed was a synthesis and a rigorous formulation of how the other principles, such as the language state, the systematic nature of language, and the character of the linguistic sign, fitted into the theory which is rightly called Saussurean. The following chapter is an attempt in this direction.
FOOTNOTES 2.2.2/2.2.2.1

1 The only earlier statement in which the author speaks of "the almost 'Copernican revolution' in linguistics since de Saussure's Cours" appears to be that by P. A. Verburg in Lingua 2:441 (1950).

2 In private conversation W. K. Percival suggested that the recognition of FdS as 'father of modern linguistics' and the association of his name with structuralism (although he did not attach any significant importance to the term 'structure') may well be due to specific historical (including political, we presume) and social causes. The fact that FdS gained world-wide recognition only after the Second World War seems to support this claim. We may also refer to E. Haugen's Presidential address of 1950, in which he advised the American linguistic public to seriously acquaint themselves with the work of European scholars, notably Saussure; cf. "Directions in Modern Linguistics", Language 27:211-22 (1951); repr. in RiL I, 357-63.

3 We would draw attention to the fact that Steinthal, G. von der Gabelentz, Bdc, Kruszewski, Lazarus, Misteli, Potebnja, and many more are not even mentioned once in Pedersen's Linguistic Science in the 19th Century (cf. the index of Pedersen, 1962:343-52). Although published for the first time in 1924, Pedersen makes no mention of either Paul's Prinzipien (which had its 5th ed. in 1920) or the Cours (which had its second ed. in 1922), major portions of which treat historical problems of language study.

4 See CLG, 193-260 ('Linguistique diachronique'), 261-89 ('Linguistique géographique'), and 291-312 ('Linguistique rétrospective'). In addition, the editors used only a limited portion of FdS's lectures on these matters.

5 Cf. M. Joos' observation of 1957 (RiL I, 18). As a typical example of rather superficial acquaintance with FdS and the impact of his theory note H. A. Gleason's account of 1965: "Ferdinand de Saussure was a leading figure in the French-speaking [!] countries in the early years of this century. Though he published little, he was a very provocative and inspiring teacher. In 1911 [!] he delivered a [!] course of lectures on general linguistics which particularly
fired the imagination of his hearers. Shortly thereafter, he died. A group of his students reconstructed his lectures from their class notes and published them in 1916... De Saussure's lectures are certainly the most important single European publication in linguistics in this century. (The qualification 'European' may be only a bit of American provincialism!). Every subsequent worker on the Continent has been influenced by them, some very heavily." (linguistics and English Grammar [New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965], 45-6).

Gleason notes that the CLG "is obscure at some very important places" without giving any examples and ignores the influence of the Cours on Bloomfield which was not negligible as we have recently pointed out (cf. Language 47:449f., note [1971]).

6 We refer to the papers by Heinimann, Telegdi and Lieb, all of 1967.


9 Cf. Paul, 1909:1. This passage from the opening paragraph of the Prinzipien is identical with that of the 1st ed. of 1880 and was never changed.

10 It is therefore not surprising that the voluminous compilation of linguistic literature from its early beginnings to the start of the 1840s, Litteratur der Grammatiken, Lexika und Wörterammlungen der Erde by Johann Severin Vater (1771-1826), 2nd completely rev. and much enl. ed., prepared by Bernhard Jülg (1825-86), which appeared in 1847 (Berlin: Nicolai; repr. Graz: Akad. Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1970) does not mention Bernhardi's theoretical work in linguistics among the some six thousand titles but only his grammars of Greek (p. 148) and Latin (p. 220).

11 Cf. Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen Sprachen, 4th rev. ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1904). Delbrück's formulations in this connection are very revealing and support the specific kind of history in "historical linguistics": "Als Prinzip der historischen Ansicht kann man hinstellen, dass die Sprache... sich nach notwendigen Gesetzen entwickelt, aber bewusstlos, und nach eben solchen blüht und wieder vergeht. Die philosophische dagegen hat es mit etwas Genenem und Fertigen zu tun." (P. 29; this passage is not included in earlier editions of Delbrück's Einleitung.) Delbrück does not merely relate pronouncements of Bernhardi but interprets them in his own neo-grammarians understanding of Bernhardi.


14 See also CLG(E), 357 (notes by Riedlinger from Fds's first course), in which the term 'linguistique évolutive' occurs explicitly.


16 Schuchardt made the following statement in the opening paragraph of his paper, "Phonétique comparée. I. Les modifications syntaxiques de la consonne initiale dans les dialectes de la Sardaigne, du centre et du sud de l'Italie", Romania 3:1-30 (1874): "Rien ne contribuerait plus, suivant moi, aux progrès des études linguistiques que de poursuivre séparément chacune des directions dans lesquelles elles s'étaient, d'examiner à part, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, la coupe verticale et la coupe horizontale de la langue." (Also reprinted in Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier, p. 328).

17 Einführung in das Studium der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1901; 2nd rev. ed., 1909), 55 (= 59 in 2nd ed.). Note that this statement is made in the first paragraph of the second part entitled "Die Aufgaben der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft".

18 "Biologische Aufgaben" and "Paläontologische Aufgaben", op. cit., 2nd ed., 63-94, and 95-225 respectively. Meyer-Lübke's statements in the preface to the 2nd ed. of 1909 concerning the "doppelte Betrachtung" of linguistic phenomena should not be interpreted as an indication of his plea for a historical and a descriptive approach.

19 On p. 1 of the "Literaturangaben" this book is listed together with the works of Delbrück, Paul, and others which are concerned with general questions of language study, among them Philipp Wegener's (1848-1916) Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens (Halle/ S.: M. Niemeyer, 1885), a book which was largely ignored by his contemporaries but highly esteemed by A. H. Gardiner and J. R. Firth (cf. PiL, 181f.) in our century.


21 Apart from Paul and Gabelentz (cf. 1.3.4.2.2), there is Bruno Liebich's statement of 1899 to this effect in IF 10:364-5 as M. Scheller suggested in his paper, "'Linguistique synchronique' und 'linguistique
diachronique' avant la lettre: Zur Geschichte der neueren Sprachwissen-
schaft", *KZ* 82:221-6 (1968). Similar statements were also made in
1903 by Adolf Noreen (cf. Lieb, 1967:23f.), and in 1908 by Anton Marty
who made the distinction between 'descriptive' and 'genetic' questions
as early as 1891 without, however, applying it to linguistics (cf. Lieb,
1967:19).

22 *LGRP* 38, coll. 1 = Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier, p. 329.

23 See *Système de politique positive, ou traité de sociologie,
instituant la religion de l'humanité*, vol. II: *Statique sociale, ou
traité abstrait de l'ordre humain* (Paris: L. Mathias, 1852; repr. 1892),
p. 1.

24 Lieb (1967:19) notes that no antinomy between these two aspects
is established in Comte quoting another passage from the same source to
substantiate his observation. We shall demonstrate in the next chap.
2.2.2.2 that FdS's dichotomy was not intended to represent such a sharp
contrast as the CLG suggests in a number of places.


26 T. G. Masaryk, *Versuch einer concreten Logik: Classification
und Organisation der Wissenschaften* (Vienna: C. Konegen, 1887; repr.

27 In his preface, Masaryk explains that he means by "concrete Logik"
what is generally referred to as "Methodenlehre", and that his study
is simply meant to be a program of how such a classification and or-
ganization of all sciences should be done, he himself having attempted
only the systematization of the 'abstract sciences' (in his view philo-
sophy, mathematics, psychology, sociology and, to a certain extent,
linguistics, as well as poetics and other verbal arts).

28 Cf. the notes taken by Mme. M. Sechehaye in FdS's last course of
1910/11 in which he listed the various other social sciences (among
them ethnography, anthropology, and prehistory) before delineating the
relation between linguistics on the one hand and sociology and psychology
on the other: "... sociologie (on pourrait faire entrer la linguis-
tique dedans); psychologie: très difficile de marquer la séparation de
la langue avec elle: tout est psychologique dans la linguistique, y
compris ce qui est mécanique et matériel" (*CLG(E)*, 21; our italics).

29 As is characteristic of the period, Masaryk affirms that in the
hierarchy of the "Geisteslehre bildet die Psychologie die Grundwissen-

30 Cf. Masaryk's definition of statics in sociology: "... die
sociale Statik sucht den Gesammtzustand der Gesellschaft zu begreifen,
der alle einzelnen Zustände und sozialen Kräfte in sich fasst." (*Versuch*,
p. 141).
Cf. *Versuch*, 188-94. Masaryk contrasts linguistics ("Sprachforschung") with philology ("Philologie"), whose main concern is with literature and civilization, treating it separately under the main heading of "Die historisch und kunstlich organisierten Wissenschaften", pp. 238-46.


Notes inédites de FdS, No. 10, p. 14a; cf. SM, 34 and 45, and Godel, 1968:117. Note that < > include corrections and marginal notes made by FdS in the manuscript (cf. CLG(E), xii).


See BdC, "Einige Fälle der Wirkung der Analogie in der polnischen Deklination", *BVSp* 6:19-88 (1870), signed "Jena, Februar 1868", where BdC was a pupil of Schleicher, a fact which explains at least partly the topic and BdC's predilection for the living languages. Häusler's dictum: "Baudouins Vorliebe für die lebenden Sprachen führte nicht wie bei de Saussure zu einer Vernachlässigung des historischen Aspekts der Sprache" (1968:44) is very misleading, since there can be no doubt that FdS devoted much more attention to historical linguistics than BdC ever did.

Häusler (1968:63) reports that Baudouin distinguished further, in an article for the Polish Encyclopedia of 1899, between dynamic and historical aspects of language, a very useful distinction indeed, which appears never to have reached Saussure who insisted so much on the 'static' interpretation of synchrony and does not seem to have allowed for a dynamic principle within descriptive linguistics (cf. Koerner, 1971:30).
37 Techmer transl. Kruszewski's Oêerk nauki o jazyke as 'Prinzipien der Sprachentwicklung' (s. Kruszewski, 1884-90).

38 Kruszewski studied particularly psychology and philosophy at Warsaw before joining BdC at Kazan to work in linguistics. In his principal study of 1883 Kruszewski refers to Bain, Leibniz, Mill, Taine, and other scholars.

39 Kruszewski posits the existence of "dynamische Gesetze des Lautes, des Lautsystems und der Lautkomplexe" (1887:149; spaced in the original); he also distinguished between "Thatsachen der Ordnung der Koexistenz" and "Thatsachen der Reihe der Konsequenz" (1887:159), a distinction which merits attention.

40 Cf. Kruszewski, 1884:301-307 [passim]; 1885:262f., 268; 1887:148f., 157, 160f., 172; 1890:134, 135, 137, 138, 139 ["Formensysteme"], 140, 339-47 [passim], 358, and 360. See also Kruszewski's observation about the "einheitliche Umgestaltung des Lautsystems" (1887:161). Note that Kruszewski used the term "Struktur" on several occasions, e.g. 1885:262 ["Struktureigenschaften"], 1887:174 [twice], 1890:134.

41 Cf. also 1890:136 ["Zustand der Sprache"], and Kruszewski's remark about the "gegenwärtige Gestalt" of a given language (1890:143).

42 S. his address, "Sprachwissenschaft und Philologie: Eine akademische Antrittsvorlesung", in K. Brugmann, Zum heutigen Stand der Sprachwissenschaft (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1885), 3-41, at p. 18. Note that "statistisch" means 'static' (cf. Lieb, 1967:22, n. 11 for examples of this usage in 18th century G.).

43 Cf. our attempt to restore Paul's theory of language to its proper place, "Hermann Paul and Synchronic Linguistics", to appear in Lingua. For Dittrich's observation, s. his essay, Die Grenzen der Sprachwissenschaft (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1905), p. 5.


45 Cf. the E. transl., "On the Potentiality of the Phenomena of Language", Prague School Reader, 1-32 (1964). J. Vachek, the transl. of the article, must be criticized for adding "synchronistic" and "diachronistic" in brackets to Mathesius' terms of static and dynamic (cf. loc. cit., pp. 1, 8, 30, 31), since these terms are by no means identical.
2.2.2.2 The Interpretation of Saussure's Distinction between Synchronic and Diachronic Linguistics

... quand on fera pour la première fois une théorie vraie de la langue, un des tout premiers principes qu'on y inscrira est que jamais, en aucun cas, une règle qui a pour caractère de se mouvoir dans un état de langue (= entre 2 termes contemporains), et non dans un événement phonétique (= 2 termes successifs) ne peut avoir plus qu'une validité de hasard.

F. de Saussure in 1897 (IFAnz 7:217)

F. de Saussure voulait surtout bien marquer le contraste entre deux manières de considérer les faits linguistiques: l'étude de la langue à un moment donné, et l'étude du développement linguistique à travers le temps.

Antoine Meillet in 1913 (LHLG II, 183)

To the astonishment of the analyst perhaps (cf. SM, 157) but not necessarily to the historian of linguistic science Saussure developed his distinction between a descriptive approach and the historical treatment of language much earlier than his distinction between langue and parole (cf. 2.2.1.2), despite the fact that, from a strictly theoretical point of view, the definition of language as the proper object of linguistics is the condicio sine qua non for a rigorous discrimination between the two manners of dealing with linguistic phenomena. The theoretician of today tends to forget, however, that Saussure was an heir of the linguistic tradition prevailing in his own time and could not see all the ramifications of his theory in the way the post-Saussurean, who has witnessed the discussion of the problems raised in the
Courts during the past fifty years, is able to do. In much the same way, Copernicus who set the cornerstone for the new edifice on which modern understanding of the solar system rests, did not solve many of the problems created by his rejection of the geocentric view of the universe, and it was left to Kepler, Galilei, and other scientists to prove, by the way of observation and experiment, the correctness of his claims (cf. Kuhn, 1970:68-9). By the same token the concept of 'paradigm' reveals itself as at least ambivalent in its implication. The first meaning of paradigm may be termed the "shared example", as Kuhn (1970:187) suggests; this is particularly true for Saussure's synchrony/diachrony distinction which, as we have illustrated above (2.2.2.1), was a notion current among linguists between 1880 and 1910. The other sense in which 'paradigm' appears singularly appropriate is concerned with the creative act of codification of what was felt, half-consciously practised, and more casually than stricto sensu referred to, in order to present an ultimately new approach, a new frame of reference, so to speak.

Saussure's association with the neogrammarian movement is a well-known fact, but it has frequently been forgotten that Saussure taught most of the languages of the Indo-European branch throughout his academic career. In addition, he published nothing on problems related to general linguistics, although, for the greater part of his life, these ideas occupied his mind. The first preserved letter of Saussure from a correspondence with his former pupil Meillet, which covered the period from 1894 to 1911, is revealing in a number of respects (cf. also 1.1). In this letter of January 4, 1894, Saussure expressed the "Leitmotiv in der Methodenklage". But in addition to Saussure's complaint about the membra disiecta and the "ineptie absolue de la terminologie courante", there are two aspects which are of particular interest to the present discussion: 1) Saussure recognizes the immense work that would have to be done to show what the linguist is actually doing, and 2) he expresses his "plaisir historique" which he feels has been spoiled by the fact that no one has clarified the nature of language in general.
Both observations are of importance for the understanding of Saussure and the appreciation of his contribution to linguistic theory. Firstly, Saussure emphasizes the importance of the linguist's awareness of the procedures to be employed in analyzing language. In another manuscript of 1894 he reiterated the necessity for abstraction to determine "ce qu'on fait". We have seen in the preceding chapter (s. 2.2.2.1) that the synchrony/diachrony distinction was a notion current in Saussure's time; we have also pointed out, particularly in the chapter on Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2.1), that linguists of the time did underrate the value of descriptive linguistics and tended to reject this approach as unscientific admitting it to be mainly a heuristic device which will facilitate the work of the historical linguist. Secondly, Saussure makes his predilection for the historical treatment of language dependent on the clear definition of language as the object of linguistic investigation. Saussure was at that time discouraged about the prospects of success for such clarifications and solutions of the problems he envisaged, and there are indications that he abandoned reflection on general linguistic problems soon thereafter, and did not take them up again before he was commissioned to teach on general linguistics in December 1906.

It is curious to note that Godel's Sources manuscrites, the bulk of which is devoted to the discussion and interpretation of Saussure's general linguistic theory based on notes by Saussure himself and on those taken by students during his lectures, does not treat the synchrony/diachrony distinction in a separate chapter as they do for a number of other topics. References to this dichotomy, however, can be found on several occasions throughout the study, but nowhere does Godel appear to have seen particular problems involved in its interpretation. Nevertheless he does analyze Saussure's early pronouncements on this distinction which can be dated back to the year 1894 as far as textual documentation is available. In a paper, entitled somewhat misleadingly "Origine de la linguistique synchronique de Saussure", E. Buysens has pointed out that Saussure conceived of a synchronic linguistics as being based entirely on the notion of system in language (CFS 18:21). If this is true we could follow his suggestion and the observations of
C. Vallini (1969:66ff.) to conclude that Saussure conceived of a synchronic approach to language as early as 1878 when he completed his famous Mémoire. The question remains, however, whether Saussure was at that time aware of the consequences and implications of his step towards establishing the vocalic system of the Indo-European proto-language. But, as Buyssens (CFS 18:18ff.) has demonstrated, the concept of system is as old as the study of grammar, and it appears doubtful whether Saussure had, in 1878, reached conclusions comparable to those made by Paul two years later in his Prinzipien:


Paul himself did not conclude from this surprisingly explicit statement that descriptive grammar should have a status comparable to historical linguistics (cf. 1.3.2.2) but one may well ask whether Saussure had not been induced to draw this conclusion after having read this statement.

At any rate, in his first lectures of 1891 at the University of Geneva, Saussure grappled with the problem of language and its relation to the other (social) sciences (s. SM, 37), but he still continues to affirm:

Tout dans la langue est histoire, c'est-à-dire elle est un objet d'analyse historique, et non d'analyse abstraite, qu'elle se compose de faits, et non de lois, que tout ce qui semble organique [i.e. systématique] dans la langue est en réalité contingent et complètement accidentel (SM, 38).

Despite this affirmation we find that Saussure stated in the subsequent lesson that, although he denies the existence of permanent characteristics in language, he recognizes that "il n'y a que des états de langue qui sont perpétuellement la transition entre l'état de la veille et celui
du lendemain" (our italics), and not much later that not only the explanation but in fact the existence of a phonetic fact presupposes two epochs (SM, 39). These observations however remain marginal in Saussure's work of the early 1890s and do not seem to differ from the accepted views expounded in Paul's Prinzipien.

In his appreciation of Whitney's work written late in 1894, a number of changes in Saussure's argument can be noticed. In dealing with linguistic change Saussure introduced his now famous simile of the game of chess. He charged that earlier language theoreticians and language practitioners after Bopp had never ceased to consider language "comme UNE POSITION d'êchecs" which had neither beginning nor continuation, whereas historical grammar had discovered that "DES COUPS d'êchecs" do take place but regarded them exclusively as such. The result was that it distorted the true nature of language which meant that the comparison with a game of chess is only partly adequate since in language there are at the same time both 'positions' and 'moves', 'changes' and 'states' (1894:10 = CLG(E), 198). Saussure also recognizes, while acknowledging the fact that language is at any given moment an historical product, that the communicational mechanism cannot be explained simply by considerations of history but necessitates the creation of a science of a different sort which he calls semiology. Before this "dualité fondamentale" can be understood the facts of language remain chimerical (cf. 1894:14a). Speaking of 'states' Saussure contends that it would be a misconception to believe that one state precedes the other or that the explanation of a given state would be facilitated by the knowledge of the previous stage (p. 16). The independence of one state (of language) from the other is postulated, and in a section entitled "De l'anti-historicité du langage" (p. 29), Saussure expatiates on this idea in the following manner:

Dans une partie d'êchecs, n'importe quelle position donnée a pour caractère < singulier > d'être affranchie des antécédents, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'est pas 'plus ou moins' indifférent, mais totalement indifférent qu'on < en < soit arrivé à < telle > position par une voie ou par une autre; . . . (p. 30; cf. SM, 45f.; CLG(E), 197).
Saussure adds that nobody would think of describing a position by mixing what is with what was, even if there had been only ten seconds of difference between the two. In Saussure's views the same applies to language, and the question remaining is in which way could such an object of investigation be historical. He does not resolve the problem but points instead to language as a "sémiologie particulière" and emphasizes that the nature of language would not be adequately understood unless this "irritante duplicité" was recognized (p. 31 = CLG(E), 197).

It is worth noting that Saussure is very much concerned in this unfinished essay of 1894 with "synchronic" aspects of language; the term itself appears to have been coined a year later (cf. SM, 49). In fact Saussure devotes so much attention to the non-historical problems of language, including the concept of the linguistic sign and the establishment of a semiology, that he seems to find it difficult to salvage anything of the historical point of view. In addition, as is so often characteristic of new discoveries, Saussure's formulations tend to be overstated and somewhat removed from actual linguistic facts; however, it does not seem that Saussure changed his views substantially where the contrast between the synchronic and diachronic aspects of language is concerned. 12

It is therefore safe to say that the essential ingredients of Saussure's concept of 'static' linguistics can be found in this article of 1894. Firstly, there is (though still undefined) the concept of langue which he links with the anti-historical view of language when he affirms: "il n'y a de 'langue' et de science de la langue qu'a la condition initiale de faire abstraction de ce qui a précédé, de ce qui relie entre elles les époques." (31a; s. SM, 46). His affirmation therefore that language is nothing but "un cas particulier de la Théorie des Signes" (38 = CLG(E), 169) anticipates his later definition of language as a system of signs and a particular semiology. Secondly, the concept of language state is for the first time presented (as the use of 'époque' in the above quotation suggests); Saussure holds that abstraction of preceding events is the absolute prerequisite for establishing "ce qui est dans un état" (31a). Thirdly, Saussure envisages the distinction
between historical and non-historical viewpoints by suggesting the metaphor of vertical and horizontal facts of language (33). Saussure believed that any generalization about language is impossible unless aspects of 'state' are clearly separated from those belonging to 'events' (cf. SM, 46 and 180, n. 161).

Additional clarifications were made by Saussure in notes entitled "status et motus" of about 1895 (cf. SM, 37), where he criticizes the confusion of 'état' and 'événement' in linguistic argument. He thinks the distinction between these two aspects to be "si capitale qu'on peut se demander si elle ne nécessite pas deux sciences." (SM, 47). An interesting and momentous aspect (apart from the new terminology) is thus added when Saussure affirms:

Tout fait statique est, par opposition aux faits diachroniques, accompagne de signification (et par là, d'un autre caractère fondamental). Tout ce qui concourt à la signification d'une manière quelconque est statique, réciproquement. (SM, 48).

Godel (SM, 184) suggests that the term 'statique' is a natural outcome of Saussure's use of 'status'; it may well have been the other way round, since 'static' was an expression current in the social sciences during the 1880s at the latest (cf. 2.2.2.1). He correctly points out that the notion of system implies the static viewpoint (SM, 183); it should be added that Saussure's ideas about semiology presuppose the same point of view.

The remaining question of this chapter concerns the relation between linguistique diachronique, cinématique, évolutive, historique (all of which were employed by Saussure as synonymous terms), on the one hand, and linguistique statique, synchronique (or better: idiosynchronique) or anti-historique, on the other. It appears that the accepted view is that Saussure regarded the distinction between synchrony and diachrony as an "opposition radicale" (cf. SM, 184), and this view has been criticized by scholars since the late 1920s (s. 2.2.2.3). Recently Engler (1967:126) saw reason to believe that Saussure himself was not as sure about this distinction as it might have appeared to the reader of the Cours. Saussure had noted, after having introduced the notion
of time as the historical factor, that one could hesitate about the exact moment when this concept of time should be introduced (s. CLG(E), 174f.). Indeed, we believe that Saussure had many doubts about various aspects of his theories at various stages of his academic career. Schuchardt appears to have been the first to sense this when he wrote his review of the *Cours*.

Saussure recognized the difficulties in establishing a firm basis for the distinction between *langue* and *parole* (cf. 2.2.1.2), *signifié* and *signifiant* (cf. 2.2.3.2), or synchrony and diachrony for that matter, but he knew at the same time that these distinctions are necessary for a general theory of language.

At times it appears that the editors of the *Cours* have been to blame for some of the overstatements which are usually ascribed to Saussure. Thus the affirmation that the "opposition entre le diachronique et le synchronique éclate sur tous les points" (CLG, 127) is the editors', as the critical edition (CLG(E), 198) reveals. On another occasion, the *Cours* states that there is an "antinomie radicale entre le fait évolutif et le fait statique" (CLG, 129) where the students' notes speak simply of a "différence" (CLG(E), 201). In fact Saussure conceived of the possibility of studying language from a panchronic viewpoint, although he thought that it admitted general statements only and could not treat the concrete facts of language (CLG, 134f.; CLG(E), 212f.). In the subsequent chapter Saussure refutes the idea that the "vérité synchronique" constitutes the negation of the "vérité diachronique" and that these two were mutually exclusive (CLG(E), 214f.). He emphasizes that these two aspects complement each other; in fact, they produce at times quite similar results to the extent that they can easily be confused (CLG(E), 216).

These observations did not prevent Saussure from suggesting on several occasions that these two aspects have to be clearly distinguished: 1) 'static' or 'synchronic' linguistics deals with the logical and psychological relations between coexisting terms which form a system, whereas 2) 'evolutive' or 'diachronic' linguistics studies the relationships of terms in succession, terms which substitute for each other and do not form a system (CLG(E), 227). The concept of system is the crucial
prerequisite of synchrony or, the other way round, the system of language can only be revealed through a synchronic approach to language. Synchronic linguistics is concerned with the analysis of a given language state, and draws its generalizations from data as manifested in langue and not parole. This view was underscored by Saussure with the help of the following diagram which the editors of the Cours distorted: 

\[ \text{Langue} \quad \text{Parole} \]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Langue} & \quad \text{Langue} \\
\text{statique} & \quad \text{évolutive}
\end{align*}
\]

(s. CLG(E), 224)

and not

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Langage} & \quad \{ \text{Synchronie} & \quad \text{Diachronie} \} \\
\text{Langue} & \quad \text{Parole}
\end{align*}
\]

(CLG, 139).

Saussure conceded that whatever is diachronic in language has its origin in parole (CLG(E), 223) but he affirms that his distinction confirms that the facts of parole remain in the individual (224). It therefore appears that there are two conflicting viewpoints in Saussure's argument: on the one hand he takes the position of the empiricist acknowledging the fact that linguistic evolution originates in the speech of the individual, and on the other he proclaims in the manner of a rationalist that the form which linguistics takes, is, from a theoretical point of view, independent of the practice (CLG(E), 225). Both synchronic and diachronic linguistics are concerned with the same object, namely langue, only the approach is different. 

As Saussure's frequent use of 'static' (in the sense of 'synchronic') implies, synchronic linguistics is concerned with language states, 'états de langue'. In order to describe such a state (and the system of language) the time factor must be set aside (CLG(E), 181). Saussure admits that it is difficult to define precisely what état means. First of all a
language state constitutes "un espace de temps" and not a point of time. The main prerequisite is that there is a space of time during which "la somme des modifications survenues est presque [!] nulle" (CLG(E), 229). This could mean a decade, fifty years or even a longer period of time (cf. CLG, 142); a language state cannot be defined other than by absence of change (CLG(E), 230). He suggests the term *epoch* which he prefers to *period* to indicate what he means; in fact he believes that period signifies for the historian a space of time suggesting, however, change at the same time. In the Port Royal Grammar, for instance, Arnault and Lancelot intended to describe the state of the French language in the mid-17th century without mixing it with earlier stages (CLG(E), 183). Saussure points to the grammarians of earlier centuries (he speaks of the "grammaire traditionnelle") which represent "un point de vue irréprochable" (ibid.) as far as 'synchronic' linguistics is concerned. He adds that this traditional view needs not only revival but revision. In this respect it may be useful to know some historical linguistics since it makes it easier to understand the notion of language state (p. 184). 16

It must be emphasized that inadequate reading of the *Cours* has led many linguists to believe that Saussure stressed the validity and importance of synchronic linguistics over and above the diachronic treatment of language. Quite the contrary is true however. The editors arranged the material at their disposal quite differently from Saussure's approach to the topic because they wished to put emphasis on what they regarded as particularly novel and important. In his second course, for instance, Saussure stated:

*Après avoir bien étudié ce qui est historique, il faut oublier le passé pour étudier le synchronique.* (CFS 15:66; our italics).

Probably for pedagogical reasons - Saussure thought synchronic linguistics to be much more difficult to deal with than diachronic linguistics (cf. CLG, 141; SM, 88) - the historical treatment of language was regarded as facilitating the introduction into the static aspect of language study (cf. SM, 35, 55, 77, 181, 186). In an interview with A. Riedlinger in January 1909, Saussure stated that one must begin with diachronic
linguistics and that synchrony should be dealt with separately. However, he added, without continuous contrast with diachrony synchronic studies would lead to nowhere (s. SM, 29). But it appears that Saussure also thought a good knowledge of the Indo-European languages to be a necessary prerequisite for a course dealing with general questions of language (cf. SM, 35). This would explain why the bulk of his second course consisted of an "Aperçu de la linguistique indo-européenne comme introduction à la linguistique générale" (ibid.).

In conclusion, it can be said that Saussure stressed the importance of distinguishing between synchrony and diachrony in linguistics as imposed on us by the nature of things and as the condicio sine qua non so as not to introduce confusion into the study of language (CLG(E), 179). However, he did not sacrifice the historical approach in favour of the non-historical one, although he laid the foundation for such an interpretation or shift of emphasis which has become one of the post-Saussurean developments of linguistics. Many aspects of Saussure's theory not only presuppose the distinction between synchrony and diachrony but are in the final analysis applicable only to the non-historical treatment of linguistic phenomena, e.g. the analysis of the system of language, its semiological nature, and the concept of the sign (cf. 2.2.3).
2.2.2.3 Post-Saussurean Discussions of the Distinction between
Synchrony and Diachrony in Linguistics

Le problème des relations exactes entre
le diachronique et le synchronique sub-
siste tout entier, personne n'en a en-
core dominé tous les éléments pour en
donner une solution intégrale vraiment
satisfaisante.

A. Sechehaye in 1939 (Mélanges Bally, 23)

The unity of linguistics is to be found
in the overcoming of the Saussurian an-
tinomy between diachrony and synchrony.

André Martinet in 1954 (Word 10:125)

Ever since Saussure, much has been made
of a dichotomy that is sometimes regarded
as very stern and strict between the two.
It is becoming increasingly apparent
from different sources that there is
no clear-cut and well-defined dichotomy.
In fact, it may not even be fruitful to
think of it as a dichotomy at all. It
is quite clear that we still need to talk
about the history of things.

Eric P. Hamp in an interview in 1970

These three quotations from three scholars belonging to three
different generations and three distinct theoretical persuasions and
made at intervals of roughly fifteen years illustrate nicely the 'state
of the art' concerning the Saussurean distinction between synchrony
and diachrony. In 1939, a generation after the publication of the
Cours, one of its editors complained that the problem of the relation
between synchrony and diachrony had not yet been solved although since
the late 1920s this question had been discussed. We may recall that
in 1928, at the First International Congress of Linguists, R. Jakobson (with the endorsement of Trubeckoj and Karcevskij) proclaimed that the antinomy between synchronic and diachronic aspects of phonological investigation should be eliminated in order to recognize the systematic and functional nature of linguistic change (s. SW I, 3),18 and also that in the subsequent year Max Kuttner termed Saussure's concept of synchrony a *contradictio in adiecto* (ZFSL 53:476).

The Prague school which generally accepted (though not in all its consequences) the *langue*/*parole* distinction rejected the synchrony/diachrony dichotomy, and this for two reasons. It was argued that phonological change could not be adequately analyzed unless the phonological system had been taken into appropriate account; Saussure's tentative equation of synchronic : diachronic = systematic : non-systematic, the linguists felt, had to be opposed. Martinet, himself a younger member of the Prague movement, later criticized Jakobson's endeavours in the field of diachronic phonology for lack of clarity and the teleological bias underlying the argument (cf. Martinet, 1964:46). As early as 1938, Martinet had discussed Saussure's dichotomy,19 and in 1955 he presented his *Economie des changements phonétiques* which is now regarded as a classic example of how the notion of system in language can be successfully applied to diachronic analysis and thus overcome the apparent disparity between the two aspects.20 It must be pointed out, however, that Martinet has not offered anything which to any noticeable degree, could rightly be termed a theoretical framework within which the relation between the two aspects put forward by Saussure could be appropriately defined. Martinet's phonological work has certainly been methodologically sound and the principles he followed in his analyses are without doubt acceptable to the practitioner but this does not permit him to escape from the primacy of theory. Indeed Martinet's suggestions immediately following the above quotation of 1954 support our claim that his empirical bias precludes a theory of language,21 a claim which we may illustrate with the following statement:

*Il faut répéter, une fois de plus, que ce n'est pas à la langue de se conformer aux édits des linguistes, mais aux linguistes*
In other words, the primacy of empirical investigation is maintained to the extent that, in the final analysis, the linguist becomes subjected to the overwhelming facts of language. Nobody will be surprised to find so little theory (though much terminological expertise) in Martinet's work, an observation which does not apply by any means exclusively to this scholar but to all linguists of the Praguian mould, including R. Jakobson, and J. Vachek who never tires of reiterating his view that Saussure's apparent identification of synchronic with static is unacceptable. 22

Not many linguists familiar with the Cours adopted as pragmatic a position regarding the synchrony/diachrony distinction as did Bloomfield who divided his Language into a descriptive part (Bloomfield, 1933:21-280) and an historical one (1933:281-509). 23 It is true, that a number of scholars, particularly in Continental Europe, continued favouring the traditional approach to linguistic problems and disregarded descriptive studies of language. On the other hand, American linguists of the Bloomfieldian mould especially and also, until recently, transformationalists concentrated their efforts exclusively on descriptive matters. Characteristically, the Saussurean dichotomy was little disputed in North America, though it should be noted that C. F. Hockett expressed himself to be against the strict segregation of the two viewpoints arguing that it would be a mistake to treat "descriptive and historical linguistics as two separate compartments, each bit of information belonging exclusively in the one or the other." (Hockett, 1958:303f.). 24

However, in his The State of the Art of 1968, Hockett admitted that the problem of the relation between the way language works at a given time and the way it changes through time "had been not so much settled [in the 1950s] as swept under the rug." (Hockett, 1968:9).
implications was published in Europe, and it was there that symposia were held on the problems connected with this dichotomy. A closer analysis of the writings on this topic which have appeared during the five-and-a-half decades following the publication of the Cours in 1916, however, reveals that Hockett's criticism applies to European linguistics too. Indeed, the impression prevails that until recently no serious attempt had been made to resolve the problem of the relation between historical and descriptive linguistics. It is true, as B. Malmberg pointed out at the Tenth International Congress of Linguists, that one looks in vain in the Cours for an outline of the technique of synchronic description, but this applies to diachronic study as well and one should not expect to find this type of codification in a book by the "homme des fondements" (E. Buysens in CPS 20:8; cf. Robins, 1967:4f.). Malmberg's complaint suggests an apparently widely shared view that Saussure ought to be criticized for having left posterity with many problems to resolve and for having failed to offer a complete theory of how linguistics should deal with its object of investigation; but in fact they should be told that they missed the whole point and failed to carry out the duty of the scientist who has been given a new paradigm, namely to engage in what T. S. Kuhn termed "mopping-up" operations. It is certainly correct to argue that Saussure's distinction provided the basis for analysis rather than synthesis and that his statements must be understood as an attempt, "die Reinigungsprüfung der Descartesschen Meditationen am Befunde der Linguisten noch einmal vorzunehmen", as K. Bühler wisely observed some thirty-five years ago (s. Bühler, 1965:6f.), i.e. to make the linguist aware of what he is doing. It is in this respect that G. Mihăilă is correct in saying that the initial dissociation of the historical approach from the non-historical was absolutely necessary for the creation of a new synthesis, but we hasten to add that no theorist of language can be completely satisfied with the attitude of those who, like Hjelmslev and many of his followers, have contented themselves with treating synchronic problems of language analysis almost exclusively. This is the more surprising since we
regard Hjelmslev as one of the most prominent linguists to have striven for a *theory* of language. In view of this unsatisfactory state of affairs, namely that until the late 1960s no adequate solution had been presented, it is regrettable to note that as recently as in 1968 linguists could affirm that a "topic such as synchrony vs. diachrony seems hardly capable of leading to important new insights some fifty years after De Saussure's *Cours", because it heightens our impression that hardly any linguist appears to have recognized the fact that the synchrony/diachrony distinction represents a problem of theoretical importance and not one of merely heuristic and methodological value.

As pointed out on earlier occasions, Saussure's ideas evolved considerably on various points and he himself never resolved many difficulties. At times they were compounded by the editors. It is correct that Saussure equated diachronic with non-grammatical and synchronic with grammatical (CLG(E), 321) and that he denied the systematic character of linguistic change (318) attributing to them an accidental character (197). He tended to attribute to diachrony the study of (historical) phonology as the domaine *par excellence* and maintained that there exists no synchronic counter-part (CLG(E), 320). On the other hand, Saussure made statements (not incorporated in the *Cours*) which seem to point to another direction, although he does not seem to have drawn the conclusion we would consider appropriate today. In order to illustrate that the linguist should not consider one aspect exclusively, Saussure chose the German forms *Gast* / *Gäste* analyzing them successively from a synchronic and a diachronic point of view. The purely grammatical (i.e. synchronic) statement would read 'h changes to ã in the plural" adding that "plural" presents to the mind an idea of meaning. The alternation *Gast* / *Gäste*, Saussure holds, is "dans son principe fondamental" of the same nature as the alternation *capio/percipio* (CLG(E), 219). Although he notes that the alternation is significant in the first example but not in the second he is satisfied that "un certain hasard" favours or may not favour such meaningful opposition of terms (*ibid.*). He obviously failed to observe that the opposition *Gaste/Gäste* derives from the historically earlier
(meaningful) opposition gast/gasti which is systematic and not merely phonetic as in the case of capio/percipio.

Saussure spoke on several occasions of déplacement of one form by another (cf. CLG(E), 196, 197), but he held that the displacement of a system "se fait par la succession de faits isolés" (CLG(E), 212). It cannot be denied that Saussure's views are rather 'atomistic', despite the fact that "déplacement" evokes the notion of a systematic kind of change. It almost appears that Saussure was misled by his diagram of the axe des simultanéités (or contemporanéités, as Saussure suggested) which abstracts the time factor (AB) and the axe des successivités (CD):

![Diagram](image)

(CLG, 115; CLG(E), 177).

By replacing the two-dimensional diagram by a three-dimensional one, and the quite misleading co-ordinate cross by the image of a cylinder, the systematic nature of linguistic changes is underscored and the expression of "displacement of a system" becomes meaningful:

![Diagram](image)

Each slice denotes what Saussure called a "tranche horizontale" to which he attributed the primacy over the vertical cut, because the native speaker
is only aware of the first whereas only the linguist recognizes the existence of the second (CLG(E), 198). \(^{33}\) Saussure himself spoke at times of "déplacement d'un système" (CLG, 134; CLG(E), 212) which, in his view however, is caused by events foreign to it and devoid of any systematic character. On the other hand, the affirmation in the subsequent paragraph that diachronic facts imposed on the language are in no way of a general nature, has no convincing basis in the critical edition of the *Cours*; we believe that Saussure's findings in his *Mémoire* would have guarded him against such an extreme statement.

During the post-war period E. Coseriu attempted a solution of what Saussure regarded at times as the "antinomie du diachronique et du synchronique" (cf. CFS 15:66). In his *Sincronía, diacronía e historia* of 1958 Coseriu subjected the Saussurean dichotomy to close analysis in discussing the various phenomena involved in linguistic change. Coseriu felt that Saussure's concept of synchrony as a static entity represents nothing but a *transitus ab intellectu ad rem* (1958:9), and argued that language is, as Humboldt had maintained, an *energeta* and not an *ergon*. \(^{34}\) He also rejected the identification of history with diachrony, since, in the final analysis, everything is history in language (cf. Coseriu, 1958:135ff.). Linguistic change, Coseriu reiterated ten years later, is a modality of language functioning; in a certain sense, all changes are internal (cf. Coseriu, 1958:121f.), and what appears to be a change from the point of view of a strict linguistic norm represents nothing but an application of the underlying system of language (Coseriu, 1970: 84). \(^{35}\) Coseriu's endeavours however do not seem to have had any noticeable impact on subsequent discussions of this dichotomy, probably because his major work was written in Spanish and has not yet been translated into any of the three major languages of Western scholarship (s. Coseriu, 1958).

Much more recently Saussure's ideas have attracted the attention of the transformational-generative linguists, and it would appear that it was M. Halle's paper of 1962 on the place of phonology in generative grammar that revived the discussion of the validity of the distinction
between synchrony and diachrony in linguistic analysis; and in subsequent years the question of whether the synchronic order of rules (of "competence") reflect a relative chronology of their occurrence in language or not has become a hotly debated issue (cf. Chomsky/Halle, 1968:252ff.; King, 1969). We have given a presentation of this discussion elsewhere (s. Koerner, 1971),\(^{36}\) which need not be repeated here. Suffice it to note that the problem introduced by Saussure is not merely solved by simply rejecting the dichotomy of synchrony versus diachrony and by a redefinition of the implications of its two components as Coseriu (1970:87) appears to suggest but that the goal of the analysis should be formulated more explicitly by the linguist concerned.

In general, apart from recent developments in France regarding structuralism, the main currents of which however do not concern linguistics proper,\(^{37}\) it can be said that structuralism in its traditionally accepted sense of favouring an exclusively synchronic treatment of language, has been more and more opposed by a number of linguists; this can be attributed at least in part to the increased theory orientation characteristic of transformational grammar in its second phase following Chomsky's *Aspects* in 1965. Saussure's dichotomy between a static synchrony and a dynamic diachrony will certainly remain on the agenda and continue to occupy the minds of language theoreticians.\(^{38}\) Ungeheuer (1969) attempts to clarify the relation between synchrony and diachrony within the framework of Saussure's theory of the *arbitraire*, and Lieb (1968, 1970) has gone a step further by embedding the dichotomy within an overall theory of language with particular emphasis on their temporal (cf. CLG(E), 164f.) and systematic aspects, setting up an axiomatic theory which is based on a theory of communication and, in its final analysis, a comprehensive semiology. It is to be regretted that Saussure's distinction between synchrony and diachrony will probably continue to be accepted mainly for its heuristic value and that more theoretically inclined linguists will merely contend that Saussure's "antinomy" should be more relaxed but requiring an additional or almost exclusive dynamic interpretation of synchrony (which members of the Prague school had
already called for in the late 1920s)\textsuperscript{39} and a structural outlook of synchrony in contrast to a merely 'atomistic' one.\textsuperscript{40} In view of this traditional underestimation of the importance and potential impact of Saussure's suggestions, it is therefore hoped that Lieb's *Sprachstadium und Sprachsystem* of 1970 (which he modestly subtitled "Umriffe einer Sprachtheorie") will be one of many studies which function as a catalyst and encourage linguists to draw forth the problem which has been 'swept under the rug' (as Hockett recently noted) and place it in the centre of a theory of language.

2 See K. Bühler, 1965[1934]:8; note that Bühler wrote this as a result of his very attentive readings of the CLG in 1934; FdS's statement of 1894 was not printed before 1957 (s. SM, 31).

3 This passage has been printed in several places, first in 1957 (SM, 31) then in Engler, 1959:119f. (in parts and with a tacit textual emendation), and finally in CFS 20:13, and 21:95 (1963 and 1964 respectively), ed. by E. Benveniste. Cf. De Mauro, 1969:120f.; SW I, 744.


5 Cf. the two relevant passages of FdS (both of which were written in 1894): "Sans cesse l'ineptie absolue de la terminologie courante, la nécessité de la réforme, et de montrer pour cela quelle espèce d'objet est la langue en général, vient gâter mon plaisir historique, . . . " (CFS 21:95 [1964]), and: "Ce sera un sujet de réflexion philosophique pour tous les temps, que pendant une période de cinquante ans, la science linguistique, . . . ., n'ait jamais eu même la veillée de s'élever à ce degré d'abstraction qui est nécessaire pour dominer d'une part ce qu'on fait, d'autre part en quoi ce qu'on fait a une légitimité et une raison d'être dans l'ensemble des sciences." (CFS 12:59 [1954]).

6 Cf. SM, 36-7 for the relative chronology of the manuscripts Nos. 1-10; Notes personnelles 15 and 16 of about 1897 are of marginal importance with the result that FdS's silence on matters related to general linguistics extended from 1895 to 1907. Cf. however SW I, 743-50.

7 E.g., "Langue et parole" (SM, 142-59), "Le phonème" (159-68), "La phrase et le syntagme" (168-79), etc.

8 It is in this respect that FdS's statement at the outset of his Mémoire merits quotation: "Etudier les formes multiples sous lesquelles se manifeste ce qu'on appelle l'a indo-européen, tel est l'objet immédiat de cet opuscule: le reste des voyelles ne sera pris en considération qu'autant que les phénomènes relatifs à l'a en fourniront l'occasion. Mais si, arrivés au bout du champ ainsi circonscrit, le tableau
du vocalisme indo-européen s'est modifié peu à peu sous nos yeux et que nous le voyons se grouper tout entier autour de l'a, prendre vis-à-vis de lui une attitude nouvelle, il est clair qu'en fait c'est le système des voyelles dans son ensemble qui sera entré dans le rayon de notre observation et dont le nom doit être inscrit à la première page. (Recueil, 3).

9 Lieb (1967:25) maintains that the essentially new factor introduced by FdS into the discussion of validity of descriptive linguistics was the "systematic conception of the language stage" (our italics), an idea which would put doubt on the early development of FdS's concept of synchrony.

10 We are surprised to read in Bartina Harmina Wind's article, "Introduction a un cours de linguistique générale", Nph 27:21-30 (1942), which makes explicit reference to FdS and the CLG (pp. 23f.): "Jespersen, le linguiste danois renommé, a comparé l'ensemble des procédés linguistiques à un jeu d'échecs." (24). Wind refers to Jespersen's Mankind, Nation, and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View which first appeared in 1925.

11 We quote, as we did earlier in this study (cf. 1.3.1), from a copy of the proofs which Dr. R. Engler kindly furnished us with, the final text of which is to appear in Notes personnelles inédites de FdS (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz). Cf. also the extracts published in CFS 12:59-65 (1954), and the analysis of some passages in SM, 43-6.

12 The editors of the CLG could therefore make frequent use of FdS's 1894 paper on several occasions, in particular CLG(E), 155, 162, 168f., 197, 266, 505ff., and elsewhere.

13 The relevant passage from Schuchardt's review (not reprinted in Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier) runs: "Dazu die Form der Darstellung: der eindringliche, gebieterische Vortrag des Lehrers, der jeden Widerspruch überstößen will, auch den eignen. Die übergrosse Sicherheit des Ausdrucks verrät eine halbbewusste Unsicherheit in der Sache. Saussure übersieht nichts, was man einwenden könnte; er hebt das Schwierige, Auffällige, Paradoxe hervor; schiebt aber dann mit einer starken Handbewegung die Hemmnisse beiseite. Die in zahlreichen Varianten auftretende Grundformel lautet: die beiden Dinge sind schwer voneinander zu trennen, aber es ist unmöglich sie nicht voneinander zu trennen." (LGRP 38, coll. 7 [1917]).

14 Lieb (1968:22-3) concluded this from the CLG (without having seen the CLG(E)) but perhaps under the influence of Coseriu (1958:27) who distinguished between "lengua sincrónica" and "lengua diacrónica".

15 Schuchardt (LGRP 38, coll. 6) made the following interesting observations concerning the relation between synchrony and diachrony. on the one hand, and langue and parole on the other: "... da überall bei Saussure synchronie und langue einerseits, diachronie und parole
It appears that FdS distinguished at one time between état historique and état statique; in addition he employed état together with a number of other modifiers (cf. LTS, 22).

Cf. LSA, Bulletin No. 18 (Febr. 1971), p. 36.

In 1929, Jakobson, Trubetzkoy, and Kacevskij formulated the principal goals of the Circle, one of the first of their well-known "Thèses" being their particular view on this dichotomy: "... la conception de la langue comme système fonctionnel est à envisager également dans l'étude des états de langue passée, qu'il s'agisse de les reconstruire ou d'en constater l'évolution. On ne saurait poser de barrières infranchissables entre les méthodes synchronique et diachronique comme le fait l'école de Genève." (TCLP 1:7-8). In the same year Jakobson presented his Remarques sur l'évolution phonologique du russe (= TCLP 2); repr. in SW I, 7-116 in which he tried to exemplify his ideas of how this "antinomy" should be bridged, a study which was followed by a more general statement on the matter, "Principien der historischen Phonologie", TCLP 4:247-67 (1931); F. transl. in Trubetzkoy, 1949:315-36, and SW I,202-20. The main source of Jakobson's inspiration appears to have been BdeC who added, in 1899, to his earlier distinction between static and dynamic phonology, the further discrimination between dynamic and historical (cf. Häusler, 1968:63).

Cf. "La phonologie synchronique et diachronique", CILUP 6:41-58; repr. in Martinet, 1968:44-59 (under the title "Classification et hiérarchisation des faits phoniques"). For Martinet's latest opinions on this topic, s. his paper, "La phonologie synchronique et diachronique", Phonologie der Gegenwart, 64-74 (1967); discussion, pp. 74-8.

Similar attempts, not only in historical phonology, to overcome the Saussurean dichotomy were made particularly by W. von Wartburg; cf. his articles, "Das Ineinandergreifen von deskriptiver und historischer Sprachwissenschaft", BVSAW 83:3-23 (1931), and "Betrachtungen über das Verhältnis von historischer und deskriptiver Sprachwissenschaft", Mélanges Bally, 3-18 (1939). He does not seem to have changed his views since (cf. Wartburg, 1970:137ff.). Cf. also E. Lerch, "Die neue Sprachwissenschaft: Sprachgeschichte und Nationenkunde", NSpr 42:375-83 (1934), for an early statement on this issue.

Cf. Martinet's proposals: "The unity of linguistics is to be found in the overcoming of the Saussurian antinomy [!] between diachrony and synchrony. In simpler and more specific [?] terms, it will result..."
from the recognition that a real understanding of what a language is at a certain period, of how and why it changes from one age to another, can only be gained through a careful observation of how it serves the needs of all the sections of the community . . . ", etc. (Word 10:125 [1954]; our italics).


23 As a result it was possible to publish the second part separately under the title Language History, ed. by Harry Hoijer (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965) without textual changes except for amplified notes and an updated bibliography.

24 For an overview of the discussion of the Saussurean dichotomy in North America during the period of 1924-1965, s. Hockett, 1968:10-18. It is curious to note that as late as 1954 Fritjof A. Raven speculates about the origin of the term 'diachron(ist)ic' and wonders whether Iordan/Orr, 1937:283ff. were the first to use it or not and concludes "It would appear to be an analogical formation on the basis of anachronistic. Professor R.-M. S. Heffner, . . . , suggests diachronic as a better word [than diachronistic]." Cf. his article (which incidentally mentions Fds), though only for his work in historical linguistics, pp. 96, 99), "An Evaluation of the Position of the Neo-Grammarians", Monatshefte 46:95-101 (1954), at p. 98, n. 16.

25 More than 50% of a total of close to 150 items dealing with this dichotomy were published between 1965-70, and only half a dozen written by American scholars; cf. E. F. K. Koerner, Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970, Part I, Section 4. (a).


27 Cf. Malmberg, "Synchronie et diachronie", A[10]CIL I, 13-25 (1969), at p. 13; cf. also the discussion following the presentation, op. cit., 25-36. Malmberg's presentation and particularly the various interventions made by a number of scholars of different persuasions seem quite instructive and indeed indicative of the generally unsophisticated attitude of linguists towards the synchrony/diachrony distinction. Malmberg did not add further aspects to the distinction but rather expressed what appear to be generally accepted views. He emphasized the synchronic aspect over and above the diachronic one, pointed out that the delineation of a language state is arbitrarily decided upon by the analyst, and cited C. Lévi-Strauss as an example of those scholars who
object to the Saussurean division. Only Malmberg's affirmation that
the factor of time is extra-linguistic (A[10]CIL I, 17, and 23, where
he also contends the same for the social factor) was criticized by several
participants in the discussion (cf. V. I. Georgiev [26], T. Slama-Cazacu
[27], A. S. Mel'ničuk [30], H. B. Rosén [33]). W. P. Lehmann (29) pointed
to the superficial similarity between the rules traditionally set up by
the language historian and those formulated by the transformationalist
warning against the danger of not clearly distinguishing these substan-
tially different operations, in particular since the generative grammarian
does not give any consideration to time. Georgiev (26) noted that many
synchronic studies ignore the historical aspect altogether and tend
to confine their studies to an inventory of linguistic facts, and there
was almost unanimous consent among the participants that the antinomy
ought to be overcome (cf. V. G. Admoni [28], J. Vachek [30], I. B.
Xlebnikova [31]). H. Krenn (34f.) questioned the theoretical status
of synchrony, while B. Havránek emphasized its dynamic aspect (34).
O. S. Axmanova (33) argued that ontological and heuristic aspects should
be kept separate when dealing with the distinction, and H. Glinz (32)
made a similar observation when he maintained that diachrony precedes
synchrony from a factual point of view, whereas the methodological view-
point requires a reversal of this order.

28 We resort to this circumlocution because we are not as sure as
Lieb (1970:22) appears to be, namely that the question of how diachrony
and synchrony relate to each other belongs to the theory of linguistics
and not to the theory of language as well.

29 Cf. "Cu privire la evoluția conceptului saussurian de 'sincronie'
și 'diacronie' in lingvistică", PLG 5:49-68 (1967), at p. 68.

30 It appears in this respect that a passage in the Cours contends:
"C'est à la synchronie qu'appartient tout ce qu'on appelle la 'grammaire
générale'" (CLG, 141; but cf. CLG(E), 228), as Hjelmslev's quotation of
this passage in his Principes de grammaire générale (Copenhagen: A. F.

31 It is therefore revealing to note that Hjelmslev's Sproget, which
appeared in 1963 and which is almost exclusively concerned with diachronic
linguistics (s. Hjelmslev, 1970), dates back to radio talks held in 1943,
the same year that his Prolegomena (s. OSG) appeared, in which this dicho-
tomy is passed over in silence. Earlier, on 1936, Hjelmslev had main-
tained: "Les études synchroniques ne constituent pas un domaine à part
et qui peut être négligé par la théorie évolutive, comme on l'a cru quel-
quefois. A côté de l'intérêt théorique et intrinsèque qu'elles présen-
tent pour la structure générale du langage les études synchroniques pré-
sentent un intérêt éminemment pratique: elles jetten les bases indis-
pensables à tout hypothèse évolutive." (Studii Baltici 6:41).

32 Cf. S. C. Dik, J. G. Kooij, and E. M. Uhlenbeck, "Some Impressions
of the Tenth International Congress of Linguists", Lingua 19:225-32
(1968), at p. 227. It appears that they mainly refer to Malmberg's
quite uninspiring lecture (s. fn. 27) which hardly contained anything
which the author had not said already in his study of 1945, Système et
métode (Lund: L. W. K. Gleerup), 22-32.
The diagram was not FdS's own creation but was, in its essence, suggested to me by my friend Matsuji Tajima some years ago; he then told me that he had learned it during his studies at Kyushu University in the early 1960s but could not recall its exact source.


Other linguists who have associated themselves with Humboldtian ideas have rejected the synchrony/diachrony distinction as an antinomy, admitting its heuristic value only. Cf., as an example of the more 'traditional' scholars, W. von Wartburg's conviction that the dichotomy is more concealing the facts of language than revealing them (cf. Wartburg, 1970:10ff., 181ff.), and, among the more 'modern' linguists, H. Glinz who recently stated (thus approaching a viewpoint strikingly reminiscent of H. Paul): "Synchronie ist ... keineswegs ein Gegensatz zu 'Geschichte'; jeder Sprachzustand enthält ein Stück Entwicklung, ein Stück Geschichte ... . Dabei kann es sein, dass die einen Sprachteilhaber sprachliche Einheiten und Strukturen benutzen, die historisch gesehen 'älter' sind, andere solche, die 'neuer' sind; es kann auch in der Sprache ein und desselben Sprachteilhabers 'Älteres' und 'Neueres' nebeneinander liegen und nebeneinander benutzt werden; ... (Glinz, 1970:17). This would mean that it is practically impossible to detect an "état de langue in which language exhibits a more or less rigorous 'système où tout se tient', as Meillet termed it. A position of this kind not only negates the validity of theory but also reduces methodological principles to questionable value, an observation which inspired Glinz's Linguistische Grundbegriffe (s. Glinz, 1970) and which makes this ill-conceived book a reductio ad absurdum of linguistic science.

An important paper which we overlooked at that time, Hans Isenberg's "Diachronische Syntax und die logische Struktur einer Theorie des Sprachwandels", Stud. Grammatica 5:133-68 (1965), has now been analyzed by Henri Wittmann in Linguistics 65:90-101 (1971).


We have in mind particularly scholars such as G. Ungeheuer, K. Heger, H.-H. Lieb, and also H. Schnelle, although we have to note
with regret that his Habilitationsschrift of 1960, Prolegomena zur Formalisierung in der Sprachwissenschaft, is still unpublished.


The Saussurean concept of the linguistic sign is still a very useful one, but it needs some clarification, because several of its possible interpretations lead to contradictions.

J.W.F. Mulder in 1971 (Linguistique 7:93)

A recent attempt at an exhaustive bibliography of writings devoted to the discussion of the linguistic sign and notions connected with this concept has brought to light at least three major insights pertaining to the language sign, all of which require extensive treatment in a separate chapter: 1) The naïve idea that Saussure stood at the beginning of a conception of language as a system of signs has to be abandoned; on the other hand, recent claims that all individual ingredients of Saussure's concept of the language sign were anticipated in philosophical and linguistic work from antiquity to the late 19th century (cf. Ortigues, 1962:56-8; Coseriu, 1967a:112; Luther, 1970:15) cannot be completely substantiated. 2) Saussure's concept of the language sign and particularly his affirmations about the arbitrariness of the sign and the question of relative motivation have frequently been misinterpreted; this is partly due to the fact that the Cours was compiled with the help of sources of divergent origin but probably also because of either a superficial familiarity on the part of the reader with the text or personal preconceptions of the idea, or both; a re-interpretation of Saussure's views is therefore indispensable in order to evaluate the various post-Saussurean developments concerning the linguistic sign. 3) The abundance of publications during the past two decades devoted to the language sign and related notions makes it impossible to discuss all aspects of this concept within the framework of the present study; however, the fact that none of Saussure's ideas has received so much attention, criticism and re-appraisal, suggests the fruitfulness of his doctrine and its continuous impact on contemporary linguistic theory.
2.2.3.1 The Question of the Sources of Saussure's Semiological Theory

In der Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft verhält es sich, wie mir scheint, in noch höherem Masse ebenso [as in literary history], da hier die Neuorientierungen oft dazu führen, dass das schon einmal Entdeckte oder gute Ideen und Formulierungen einfach aufgegeben und vergessen werden. So z.B. entspricht die Saussuresche Theorie des Zeichens mit ihrer Unterscheidung zwischen signifiant, signifié und chose fast genau der der Stoiker, die auch zwischen σημαίνουσα και σημαίνομενου (oder λεκτον) und πρᾶγμα (oder τυγκάνου) unterschieden, und derjenigen von Augustinus, die den genannten stoischen Begriffen verbum, dicibile und res entsprechen liess.


The Signifier and the Signified of the Stoics are called "strikingly reminiscent of de Saussure's signifiant and signifié" [in Robins, 1967](16); but is this really fair to de Saussure who no doubt simply meant to quote and who, after all, has more profound concepts to his credit?

Henry M. Hoenigswald in 1971 (JHBS 7:207)

In a recent article devoted to the origin and development of the concept of the "arbitraire du signe", E. Coseriu concluded, after having traced similar statements in linguistic and philosophical literature from the Greeks to the late nineteenth century:

This affirmation, particularly when taken out of context, must appear a very bold statement indeed, and the reader might wonder whether Saussure was ever as inventive and original as many modern linguists have taken him to be. Coseriu's suggestions, however, are not an isolated contention among scholars who have devoted much attention to the history of linguistic thought. Thus L. Kukenheim (1966:13) noted that the word, as defined by Aristotle (De Interpretatione 16a 19) as φωνή σημαντική "vox significativa", "annonce très loin de 'signe linguistique' de Saussure." Kukenheim, who deals with the speculations of the Stoics about the nature of language in the subsequent paragraphs, does not draw any parallels between their ideas and those put forward by Saussure. This has been done by H. R. Robins who holds that the Stoics "formalized the dichotomy between form and meaning, distinguishing in language 'the signifier' and 'the signified', in terms strikingly reminiscent of de Saussure's signifiant and signifié." (Robins, 1967:16). Some twenty years ago Robins (1951:26, n. 2) drew attention to the similarity between the distinction made by Saussure and that made by the Stoics between τὸ σημανομενόν ("signifié") and τὸ σηματωμένον ("signifiant") and has repeated this idea on a number of occasions (cf. Robins, 1970:139), but the reader ought to have been warned by Robins' (1967:16) concession that the relevant texts of the Stoics "are hard to interpret", with the result that one might suspect a misleading interpretation of Stoic concepts in the light of our present body of knowledge.²

Bearing this danger in mind, it would be of historical interest at least to consider the traditional discussion of the word in Western philosophy of language from antiquity to the time when Saussure formulated his ideas about the language sign. There is first of all the aspect of the bilateral nature of the sign which can be traced back to Greek philosophy of language. In his Handbuch der Semasiologie of 1951 (a book ignored by Coseriu together with those of Robins'), H. Kronasser pointed to Apollonius Dyscolus (c. 200 A.D.) who argued that the word ought to be assessed from the two distinct viewpoints of its content and its sound structure.³ This conception, however, can at least be traced
back to Dionysius Thrax (c. 150 B.C.), as might be inferred from Robins (1967:36; 1970:139), and probably to Aristotle and the Stoics (cf. Coseriu, 1967a:88, and 1970:153). Arens (1969:17f.) and Jacob (1969:26) quote brief passages from Sextus Empiricus' treatise **Adversus mathematicos** (written about 240 A.D.) and Arens expresses his astonishment at the terminological agreement between the use of the two components of the language sign ("the signified" and "the signifier") in addition to the object designated by the sign, and Saussure's concept of the language sign. Arens could have gathered from Robins (s. above) that the Greek Skeptic philosopher followed directly, and without any significant modification, the ideas put forward by the Stoics (cf. Kristeva, 1969:65) — ideas which have recently been analyzed in detail by Coseriu (1969:101ff.) — and which ultimately lead back to Platon's **Cratylus** (cf. Coseriu, 1969: 40).

One could imagine that Saussure, whose at times rather rationalist approach to language has been pointed out on occasion (cf. 2.2.1.2), was well aware of the traditional twofold division of the sign. By the same token, there appears to be some justification for the claim that Saussure, who, as may be recalled, wrote his doctoral dissertation on the genitive absolute in Sanskrit, was also acquainted with the theories of the Indian grammarians, including Pāṇini's notion of the *sphota*, and also his concept of *varṇasājādaśānām lopah*, an "imperceptibility of sound", or *lopa* "loss" *tout court* (cf. Meier, 1961:143; Collinder, 1962:15).

Similarly, it has been pointed out by a number of scholars, most recently by W. Luther (1970:15), that the characterization (not to say definition) of language as a system of signs has a very long tradition leading from the Greek philosopher Parmenides (c. 600 B.C.) through Aristotle, St. Augustine, Francis Bacon, Locke, Leibniz, and Kant to Hegel and a number of 19th-century philosophers of language.

In 1967 Coseriu pointed in particular to St. Augustine (354-430) who in his early work **De Dialectica** (cf. Coseriu, 1969:105-7) coined the terms *dictio, dicibile, and res* to conform with the Stoic tripartition
of Signifier, Signified, and Thing (s. ZFSL 77:30). In university lectures held during the subsequent years, Coseriu substantiates his earlier claim concerning the importance of St. Augustine as a philosopher of language calling his De Magistro (389) the greatest semiotics of antiquity (1969: 108). Coseriu (1969:105-23) treats St. Augustine's ideas in detail but, although his concern is to show that there is a continuity from antique philosophy to modern linguistic thought, he fails to trace these ideas within medieval philosophy and theology in the chapters devoted to the middle ages (1969:124-9, 130-36). Coseriu's treatment of the Modistae in particular, as already evident in his earlier account (cf. Coseriu, 1967a), is singularly inadequate, and though we cannot attempt an outline of their theories of the sign we wish to point out the desirability of such research being undertaken.

William James' affirmation of 1890 that language is 'a system of signs, different from the things signified, but able to suggest them' appears therefore not to represent an ingenious observation by an individual but the quintessence of a traditional conception.

Moreover, Saussure himself did not claim his insistence on the arbitrariness of language as his own original idea (cf. CLG, 100; CLG(E), 153). This apparent concession of the Geneva master, however, does not preclude different interpretations of traditional concepts and, ultimately a rather radical shift from an almost accidental notion to an axiom of an overall theory (cf. 2.2.3.2). It is quite misleading to argue, as was first suggested by Robins (1951:10, n. 2), then by Fonagy, and most recently by Coseriu (1969:64) and Luther (1970:16), that Saussure's concept of the arbitraire has its original source in the famous physis or norm versus theseis debate of antiquity, and that he merely took the Stoic viewpoint and that of their followers when he affirmed the conventional nature of the language sign.

Coseriu (1967a) has demonstrated that there have been many scholars in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries who noted the arbitrary or conventional character of the words within the language. Thus Leibniz, in his Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain of 1703, wrote:
Je say qu’on a coustume de dire dans les écoles et par tout ailleurs que les significations des mots sont arbitraire (ex instituto) et il est vray qu’elles ne sont point déterminées par une nécessité naturelle. (Quoted from Coseriu, 1967a:86).

Leibniz's statement attests that the arbitrariness of lexical meanings was opinio communis in his time, and his addition of the Latin term "ex instituto" can be taken as an indication of the awareness of a long tradition which, as Coseriu (1967a:87ff.) shows, not only dates back to the scholastics but eventually to Aristotle. Coseriu (1967a:94ff.) also illustrates the tradition of the arbitrary and conventional character of the language sign in French linguistic thought, in particular the works of the Masters of Port-Royal, Antoine Arnauld (1612-94), Claude Lancelot (1615-95), and Pierre Nicole (1625-95), their Grammaire générale (1660) and Logique (1662), Etienne Bonnot de Condillac's (1715-80) Essai of 1746, and others. Suffice it to quote two interesting passages from an uncompleted and in 1842 posthumously published essay "Faits et pensées sur les signes" by Théodore Jouffroy (1796-1842) to suggest an affinity between Saussurean ideas and those of the Aristotelian tradition in the philosophy of language which could hardly be closer. After distinguishing (in agreement with the traditional division) between natural signs (e.g. cries) and artificial signs (i.e. those pertaining to language), Jouffroy states:

Le rapport qui associe les uns [i.e. the artificial signs] à la chose signifiée est arbitraire et de pure convention ... De plus, cette association des signes à la chose signifiée étant arbitraire, elle n'a rien d'universal.

It should be added that Jouffroy speaks explicitly of "tous ces systèmes de signes qui composent les langages" and "ces systèmes de signes qu'on appelle les langues" and that he takes just this systematic nature of language as a proof of its arbitrary character. Furthermore, Jouffroy argues that even the 'natural' association of the signifier and the thing signified is, in its final analysis, conventional and "entièrement arbitraire". For instance, there is no similarity between the cry and the pain (the cry is signalling), and Jouffroy concludes that the arbitrary nature of the relation between the sign and the object signified is
Coseriu (1967a:97) concludes from Jouffroy's affirmations about the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the sign and the thing designated by it that they constitute a turning point in the theory of signs which had its influence on Saussure's ideas on this matter.

Strangely enough, it would seem, Saussure makes no mention of either Jouffroy or any of his predecessors in the philosophy of language, but refers explicitly to the linguist Whitney (who, for his part, appears to follow the tradition of the English empiricist thinkers). In his two principal books devoted to general problems of linguistics of 1867 and 1875, Whitney pointed out repeatedly that words are arbitrary or conventional signs (for thought). But it was also he who brought up once again the classic opposition between ἰθεσι and θέσι in his argument for the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs, thus diverting attention from the very linguistic implications of the arbitraire. Whitney attacks the view of "many of those who reason and write about language" and who cannot rid themselves of the opinion "that there is somehow a real internal connection between at least part of our words and the ideas which they represent". (LGL, 283). For him (as for Herder and others) the origin of the spoken language is to be found in cries which have eventually been adopted and modified (to allow distinctions of expression) by a given community, and Whitney affirms:

There is no plausibility in the suggestion that he [i.e. man] should have begun social life with a naturally implanted capital of the means of social communication — and any more in the form of words. (LGL, 289).

Saussure strongly opposes (cf. CLG, 26; CLG(E), 33) Whitney's argument that it is "a blunder of our educated habit to regard the voice as the specific instrument of expression" and that voice "is only one of several instruments". Whitney's subsequent statements on the subject do not fully justify Saussure's criticism (cf. note 21); Whitney's claim, on the other
hand, that language is a social institution was extended by Saussure to "une institution pure" and in fact an institution "sans analogue" (FdS, 1894:18 = CLG(E), 169). We have, in the chapter devoted to Whitney and his impact on Saussure (s. 1.3.1), given much attention to the relationship between these two scholars, and no further proof is needed to illustrate Saussure's indebtedness to the American linguist. Suffice it to point out that Saussure, if we take his 1894 analysis of Whitney's contribution to general linguistics as our guide as well as his lectures of 1907-11, could not possibly have drawn his insights into the semiotic nature of language from Whitney exclusively, as Engler (1962:35) appears to suggest.

Saussure's conception of the arbitraire is quite distinct from that of Whitney and also, as cannot be sufficiently stressed, from the ideas put forward by philosophers of language of earlier periods. As we shall try to show in the following chapter (2.2.3.2), the main reason for the difference between their conception of the arbitrary nature of the sign and Saussure's is to be found in the specific Saussurean definition of the sign itself and its relation to extra-linguistic reality. In Whitney's terms, language "is a body of arbitrary and conventional signs for thought" (s. LSL, 32 and 410), and he does not seem to visualize the bilateral character of the sign in a manner comparable to Saussure, if he recognized this at all; his apparent distinction between "word" or "vocable" and "thought" remains obscure in this respect.

It is for this reason that we must cast doubt (as did Coseriu) on the belief that Whitney ought to be regarded as the exclusive source of Saussure's concept of the arbitraire (cf. Schaff, 1969:187), and reckon with other influences, possibly with ideas which have their source in Hegelian philosophy (cf. Coseriu, 1967a:100ff.)22 Thus it appears worth pointing to the work of the Danish philologist Johan Nikolai Madvig (1804-86) who expressed ideas about the arbitrary nature of the language sign which we believe to be closer to Saussure's than those of Whitney. In his essay of 1842, translated by the author into German and published in 1875 in Leipzig, "Über Wesen, Entwicklung und
Leben der Sprache", Madvig characterized the word as a 'sign without imitation', and denies expressly the necessary relationship between sound and concept in language:

Der Laut der Wörter steht also in keinem natürlichen und nothwendigen Verhältniss zur Vorstellung und ihrem Gegenstand. Madvig adds a few pages later: "So ist das Wort Zeichen einer Vorstellung, die ein anderes Zeichen erhalten haben könnte ..., wie dieser Laut das Zeichen einer anderen Vorstellung geworden sein könnte. 24

In Madvig's formulations we can discern a threefold distinction between sound, concept, and object, similar in some way to Saussure's (in particular his earlier) views about the language sign. Madvig's double use of the term "Zeichen" appears singularly instructive since a similar oscillation can be detected in Saussure's Cours. 25

Where the origin of Saussure's concept and term sémio logie, which Saussure appears to have coined at the turn of the century, are concerned, there are possible terminological antecedents in 18th century German philosophy where "Semiotik" and "semiotica" can be found (cf. De Mauro, 1968:349, and n. 11), but there are no indications that Saussure's understanding of the term (which he derived from Greek "semeion" 'sign') had been forestalled by these or later philosophers. We also doubt whether Saussure was acquainted with Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and his semiotic theories or with the work of those scholars who followed him (cf. Miclau, 1970:6), in particular Lady Victoria Welby (1837 or 1838-1912) who published a lengthy study in an attempt to acquaint the intellectual public with Peirce's ideas in 1903. 26 However, to trace and analyze all those potential sources of Saussure's linguistic inspiration, even if it is restricted to his theory of the language sign only, would require a book-length study of its own; our present observations have to remain inconclusive until, as Coseriu (1967a:112) suggests, we know more about his personal library, the studies he consulted and his other interests. However, whatever the particular sources of Saussure's inspiration might have been, whether we can or cannot specify which source may or may not have exercised some influence on him, the fact
remains that Saussure, as we shall see in the following chapter (s.2.2.3.2), did make a number of important suggestions on how a comprehensive general theory of language based on semiological principles should be created, a task which, as the subsequent chapter (cf. 2.2.3.3) reveals, has not yet been performed some sixty years after its foundation was laid by Saussure.

2 It is curious to note that Robins, like other British linguists, e.g. J. R. Firth (cf. Pil, and Firth, 1968) and J. Lyons (1968; cf. also the review in Language 47:429-47 [1971]), tends to ignore modern discussion of the language sign almost completely (s. Robins, 1964 [2nd ed., 1971] and 1967).


4 Coseriu, however, must be criticized for his unqualified use of FdS's terms of signifié and signifiant when explicating the concepts of the linguistic sign proposed by the Greeks (cf. Coseriu, 1969:40, 65, and elsewhere) instead of presenting them in the framework of his own terminology only, thus avoiding subtle shifts in meaning, and preserving historical veracity and philosophical exactness and objectivity.


It appears that until today no such study exists; at least there is an article by U. Saarnio on the 12th century which deals with the sign concept, "Betrachtungen über die scholastische Lehre der Wörter als Zeichen", Acta Acad. Paedagogicae Jyväskyläensis (Jyväskylä/Finland) 17:215-49 (1959).


We have argued elsewhere that it would much more fruitful to consider more immediate sources of Saussure's inspiration than those which appear to have been, though in a rather unspecified manner, common property among language theoreticians and philosophers alike. Cf. the chapter, "Le signe linguistique chez F. de Saussure et son origine", in the forthcoming work referred to in note 1.

As Coseriu (loc. cit.) points out, "ex instituto" or "ad placitum" are the expressions which Boethius employed in his translation of Aristotle's κατο ςυνφήκτην. Joseph Engels, in his article "Origine, sens et surviv du terme boécien 'secundum placitum', Vivarium (Assen/Netherlands) 1:87-114 (1963), rejects the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's term as either "conventional" or "arbitrary", objections which have been refuted by Coseriu (1969:66-7). It is worth pointing out (with Coseriu, 1967a:87-8, and 1969:65ff.) that Aristotle did not make use of the then already generally established opposition of thése vs. phýsei.


Op. cit., 371 and 373 respectively. Cf. also: "Le signe artificiel a cela de spécial, que le rapport qui l'unit à la chose signifiée n'a point été établi par la nature, mais par l'homme, qui a arbitrairement choisi ce signe pour signifier cette chose." (Ibid., 398).

17 *Ibid.*, 393. All quotations from Jouffroy have been taken from Coseriu (1967a:96-7), where further citations pertaining to the theory of the sign as developed by Jouffroy can be found.

18 The relevant passage dates back to 1894 when FdS wrote his appraisal of Whitney's work (cf. CLG(E), 169).


20 Cf. Whitney's programmatic statement, "θΈςεt or θΈςετ - Natural or Conventional?", TAPA 5:95-116 (1874). In his *Life and Growth of Language* Whitney affirmed, after having stated that "every word ... in every human language is an arbitrary and conventional sign", that the word "exists θΈςετ, 'by attribution', and not θΈςελ, 'by nature'" (p. 19). Whitney extended this idea later on interpreting θέσεt as "by an act of attribution" and rejecting the argument that onomatopoeia constitutes an exception to this fact (p. 282).

21 There is, however, no indication that FdS is correct when he attributes to Whitney the belief that man had chosen the voice as the prime means of communication because it was "plus commode" than other means. In fact Whitney stated that in the course of man's experience "it has come to light that the voice is, on the whole, the most available means of communication" in particular because voice "most easily compels attention from any direction" and because of its apparent economy: "Only the smallest part of its capacities are laid under contribution for the uses of speech; of the indefinite number of distinguishable sounds which it can produce, only a fraction, of twelve to fifty, are put to use in any one language" (LGL, 293).

22 FdS could have absorbed Hegel's ideas through Victor Henry's (1850-1907) monograph, *Antinomies linguistiques* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1896), - cf. H. Schuchardt's review in LGRP 18, coll. 238-47 (1897) - in which Henry called language "une convention aussi arbitraire qu'un répertoire de signaux internationaux" (p. 39), summarizing his argument by saying that "tout langage est conventionnel, et pourtant le langage est un fait naturel" (p. 43). Note that FdS, in a postscript to his letter of Sept. 23rd, 1907 to Meillet, wrote: "J'avais appris avec chagrin la mort de M. Victor Henry. Quoique je ne fusse pas particulièrement lié avec lui, nous avions plus d'une fois correspondu." (CFS 21:115 [1964]).

24 *Op. cit.*, pp. 59 and 62 respectively. On the same page Madvig stated that the specific, i.e. formative, articulations of sound are not necessarily related to the specific structure of the content of the concept. Cf. Coseriu (1967a:103) for further quotations.

25 In our account of the post-Saussurean discussion of the language sign (referred to in notes 1 and 9 of this chap.), we suggested that the works of other contemporary linguists, such as those by M. Bréal, C. Svedelius, K. O. Erdmann, K. Nyrop, and others which were published between 1891 and 1904, could also have had an impact on FdS. Cf. Paul Valéry's review of Bréal's *Essai de sémantique* reproduced in *CFS* 21:132-3 (1964).

2.2.3.2 Saussure's Theory of the Language Sign and the Semiological Nature of Language

As we have mentioned on occasion (cf. 1.1) and illustrated in an earlier chapter devoted to the distinction between historical and descriptive aspects of language study (s. 2.2.2.2), one can almost speak of a line of steady progression in the evolution of Saussure's linguistic thought, an impression which Cristina Vallini has recently tried to substantiate, though mainly with regard to diachronic problems in language study (cf. Vallini, 1969:49ff.; cf. also SM, 24). Moreover, the reader of today will be struck by the formal clarity of exposition and the forcefulness which the ingenious work of the twenty-year-old Saussure exhibits, impressions which remain characteristic of Saussure's whole work.

Thus the young student of linguistics at Leipzig not only proposed in his Mémoire to establish "le système des voyelles dans son ensemble"
Recueil, 3), a suggested goal which should not be confused with the almost popular use Saussure's contemporaries had of the term 'système', but he also made rigorous use of 'system' as a concept underlying his argument and in a manner hitherto unknown in the linguistic literature of the period. In addition, Saussure either introduced new terms or extended their previous meaning (as in the case of 'system', for instance), and this is indicative of his own linguistic creativity and dissatisfaction with traditional concepts, methods and terminology, and these aspects of his character seem to have been the most predominant in his teaching. A single passage from the Mémoire may be quoted to illustrate our point. Rejecting the views of his predecessors concerning the original vowel system inherent in the European languages Saussure outlined the purpose of his investigation as follows:

Notre tâche sera de mettre en lumière le fait qu'il s'agit en réalité de quatre termes différents, et non trois; que les idiomes du nord ont laissé se confondre deux phonèmes fondamentalement distincts et encore distingués au sud de l'Europe: a, voyelle simple, opposée à l'é; . . . (Recueil, 6-7; our italics). 5

Although we are very much aware of the danger of overinterpreting or even misinterpreting the intended meaning of the expressions in the above citation in the light of current usage, the strong impression remains that Saussure did not treat the Indo-European vowels as physical entities (to be reconstructed or postulated by the linguist as if they had an existence at an earlier stage in language development) but as formal terms which have existence only as a result of their interrelation with and contrast to other terms of the same system (cf. 2.2.5.2; cf. Lepschy, 1970:42). In his first course on general linguistics, Saussure made an explicit statement to this effect when he suggested that, in dealing with a particular phoneme, "on pourrait, sans spécifier sa nature phonique, le cataloguer et le représenter par son numéro dans le tableau des phonèmes indo-européens." (CLG, 303; CLG(E), 496; our italics; cf. SM, 65). In addition to Saussure's strikingly consistent use of phonème instead of sound in the Mémoire, a fact which ought to have aroused
some curiosity at least among historians of linguistics who tend to attribute the elaboration of the term to Baudouin de Courtenay and Kruszewski (cf. 1.3.3.1), the term valeur occurs on several occasions whenever Saussure wishes to point to the identity of a given phonème or to distinguish between two such entities (cf. Recueil, 111 but also 114).

There are even indications that, in his "enfantillage" of 1872 (cf. CFS 17:17), Saussure envisaged some kind of fundamental system of signs from which all other languages have derived, when as a boy of fifteen he attempted to reconstruct what he then imagined to be the original roots of three chosen Indo-European languages, attributing to the basic consonants p, t, and k a particular meaning. Suffice it to note that the concept of the language sign, the topic of this chapter, may well have had its statu nascendi in Saussure's early attempts at constructing a "système universel du langage" (ibid.). It cannot be sufficiently stressed that Saussure's concept of the language sign cannot be divorced from his general theory of language as a system of interdependent, distinctive and contrasting terms and as a particular form within the whole body of semiological facts. Godel, who discussed the concept of the apparently various conceptions of the phoneme in Saussure at some length (s. SM, 158-68), seems to be somewhat puzzled by the numerous and divergent views expressed in Saussure's teachings at different times and in different contexts. We note with surprise however that Godel bases his analysis almost exclusively on students' notes from the last few years of Saussure's academic career, quoting only from one of Saussure's manuscripts of the mid-nineties in which the phoneme is envisaged as a complex unit combining acoustic and articulatory features (cf. SM, 161), although there exist a number of other papers from Saussure's own pen, many of them still unpublished, which would lead to quite different conclusions.

Saussure's repeated use of "image acoustique" and "impression acoustique" in his psychological approach to identify the phoneme as a basic linguistic unit (cf. SM, 161-3 [passim]), ought to have suggested to
Godel that the seemingly diverging uses of the term can be explained by the various contexts in which Saussure speaks of the phoneme. Since Saussure did not think that phonetics constituted a proper object of linguistics but only an auxiliary discipline (cf. CLG(E), 91f.), both the physiological and acoustic aspects of the phoneme were of no particular interest to him (cf. SM, 164). To a certain extent Godel is correct in arguing that Saussure, in employing the term 'phoneme', wished to distinguish it from the mere sound, the basic unit of phonetics (SM, 165), but we tend to disagree with his claim that the phoneme was regarded by Saussure as only one part of the linguistic sign, i.e. the signifiant (cf. SM, 162 and 165). Godel himself (unwittingly perhaps) quotes passages from students' notes taken during Saussure's first course on general linguistics which would suggest the following development of Saussure's thought: Firstly, the isolated phoneme as an acoustic or physiological entity is of no interest to the linguist (cf. SM, 162); secondly, the phoneme in the manner Saussure envisaged it can be relevant if one can attribute to it a value \((\textit{valeur})\), i.e. identify it as an "unité significative" which can be contrasted with other units belonging to the same system (cf. SM, 165); finally, Saussure felt that he had to discard the term 'phoneme' with reference to the sign because it contained "l' idée d'action vocale" (cf. SM, 162), a term which he then replaced by "image acoustique".

Godel (SM, 152, 162, 192) points out that "image acoustique" meant on occasion not merely the "partie matérielle" of the sign but the sign in its totality. This fact would support our claim that Saussure had seriously toyed with the idea of attributing to the phoneme the value of the basic unit of the system of language, i.e. the sign, a contention which would appear to be substantiated by his hitherto unpublished papers devoted to phonetic considerations of language in which "phoneme" has been equated with "valeur sémiologique". Moreover, it is important to note that, if we ignore his exemplification of the concept of syntagmatic relations in language (cf. CLG, 170ff.; cf. 2.2.4.2), Saussure demonstrated consistently the systematic character of language on the
level of phonology, from the Mémoire down to his final course on general linguistics, except for those (rare) occasions when examples from morphology were chosen. Since Saussure neither fully developed a theory of signs based on the phoneme nor explained why he abandoned this concept in favour of the much more vague concept of the word, one can only speculate about his motives. Suffice it to note that these early ideas concerning the phoneme, which he modified but never completely abandoned, and which take up major portions of the chapters on the "valeur linguistique considérée dans son aspect matériel" and the "signe considéré dans sa totalité" (CLG, 163-9), have proved fruitful in the development of structural phonology as created by Trubekoj, R. Jakobson, A. Martinet, and many other members of the Prague school (cf. 2.3).

If the phoneme continued to play an important rôle in Saussure's theory of the language sign, it was in its interpretation as an 'acoustic image', language being defined as "un système de signes reposant sur les images acoustiques, où les deux parties du signe sont psychiques" (SM, 162). Godel, who subjected both students' notes and papers from Saussure himself to a close analysis in order to elucidate Saussure's concept of the language sign (s. SM, 190-203), observed that the double acceptance of the word 'signe' never ceased to embarrass him (SM, 192). In his unfinished paper on Whitney of 1894 (cf. 1.3.1), Saussure outlined, for the first time it would seem, his ideas about the semiological nature of language, and spoke of a "contrat fondamental entre l'esprit et le signe" (1894:9); the example he offered in the subsequent paragraphs shows that he employed the term 'signe' in its traditional (grammatical) sense. Significantly, Saussure argued, in notes he prepared for a course on morphology of roughly the same period (1894/95), that the true name of morphology would be: "la théorie des signes, et non des formes", adding that the speaker "n'a conscience du son que comme signe." (Geneva School Reader, 28). As Saussure's frequent use of the game of chess as an illustration of the mechanism of language would suggest, he was clearly inclined towards a fairly abstract sign theory. But the concept of the sign, despite the fact that it was conceived of in a
formalized manner, appears to retain its meaning of "signifiant", since Saussure speaks of the "relation intérieure du signe avec l'idée" (1894:12). However, Saussure's position on this issue is not at all clear; his additional use of the term 'symbole' in the place of 'signe' obscures his argument. Moreover, his characterization of language as "ce système particulier de symboles indépendants" (p. 13) suggests that Saussure implied both the "signifiant" and the "signifié", terms he did not introduce before the last course on general linguistics (1910/11).

Whatever Saussure's early conception of the linguistic sign may have been, two observations which Saussure made in connection with the sign in his 1894 paper deserve special attention, for both of them have had an impact on 20th century discussions of the theory of signs, one positive, the other mainly negative. Firstly, there is Saussure's claim that language is not more (but not less) than "un cas particulier du signe" (1894:26a) and a "sémiologie particulière" (p. 31) whose complexity cannot be sufficiently stressed. Secondly, inspired by similar claims made by Whitney to this effect (cf. 1.3.1), Saussure possibly made his first attempts to formulate the principle of the arbitraire.

Where the semiological nature of language in general is concerned, we are not yet in a position to give an adequate picture of the evolution of this idea in Saussure's linguistic thought. In his 1894 notes Saussure only hints at a semiology, its conventional and social characteristics, but does not attempt a theoretical outline. The few pages from other notes written during the same period which have been published so far (s. CFS 12:68-70) do not permit further conclusions, and other statements, except for a few quotations in Godel (SM, 48-9), have not yet been made available. Later affirmations of Saussure's are limited to 1) an indirect statement about the importance "d'une science très générale" which he called sémiologie and about the place of linguistics within this semiology, as related by A. Naville in his Nouvelle classification des sciences of 1901, 2) a few passages in the reconstructed Introduction to Saussure's second course of 1908/9 (cf. CFS 15:24-30), and 3) the few relevant observations made in the Cours
of 1916 (cf. CLG, 33-5, 100f., 107f., 111). A brief quotation from Naville's book, though a fuller quotation has already been made towards the end of chapter 1.2.1.1, appears quite informative because it indicates an apparent shift from the phonological and morphological entities to the word as the linguistic sign proper in Saussure's later understanding. Claiming that linguistics constitutes the most advanced component of semiological science, the following quotation from Naville will reveal Saussure's argument:

La phonologie et la morphologie traitent surtout des mots, la sémantique du sens des mots. Mais il y a certainement action réciproque des mots sur leur sens et du sens sur les mots; vouloir séparer ces études l'une à l'autre ce serait mal comprendre leurs objets. (1901:104).

The semiological nature of language has its main source in the fact that language is a social institution making use of a system of conventional signs. The collective or, what amounts to the same, social aspect represents the condicio sine qua non for all other semiological systems, e.g. the international signs used in navigation, the sign language of the deaf-mutes, and other codes (cf. CFS 15:24ff.). It is as a result of comparing language with other sign systems that Saussure dismisses the vocal aspect of language as an essential component of its nature (cf. CFS 15:25), and indeed Saussure points out that he regards (articulatory) phonetics not only as an auxiliary science of linguistics but "absolument dehors de la linguistique" because it has no place in his definition of language as a semiological system (ibid., 30).

The second important aspect already put forward in Saussure's notes of 1894, namely the principle of the arbitrary nature of the language sign, is closely related to his view of language as a semiological system. Since the signs used by the community have previously been set up by its members and agreed upon, they are conventional and thus arbitrary. This appears to be the essence of Saussure's argument in 1894 when he discussed the contributions made by Whitney to general considerations of language study, and, as we have demonstrated earlier in this work (cf. 1.3.1), Saussure then was strongly influenced by Whitney's contentions
about the arbitrary and conventional nature of the word. It was however Saussure's extension of these claims which has proved unfortunate and in fact damaging to his theory of the arbitraire especially since the editors decided to integrate this misleading notion into the Cours (cf. CLG, 101 and 107). The reader of the Cours, at least until the appearance of Godel's Sources manuscrites in 1957, could not have known that Saussure's claim, that the force of the signs was in the fact that they were independent of the realia they signified (cf. 1894:13a), did not truly reflect his views concerning the arbitraire put forward when teaching general linguistic problems (1907-11), and, as a result, this has invited undue attacks against the principle of the arbitraire. As the critical edition reveals (cf. CLG(E), 155 and 162), Bally and Sechehaye, in a serious misunderstanding of Saussure's intentions, made use of his one-time statement that language and (its derivative) writing "ne sont PAS FONDÉS < sur un rapport naturel des choses > ." (1894:18).

We believe that the above claim by Saussure is not utterly false; it surely helps to separate human speech from other institutions and semiological systems in which a rapport naturel may not only underlie the particular code but in fact is generally the best support of its operation, as Saussure himself suggested (1894:17). However, the insertion of this idea into quite a different kind of argument, namely that of (structural) motivation, could only lead to contradictions. That the editors did not understand the Saussurean concept of the arbitraire is evident from at least two misinterpretations of his ideas. Firstly, they thought it necessary to draw the figure of a tree (s. CLG, 99) where in the original "concept" was written, adding a textual description which distorts what the students' notes actually say (cf. CLG(E), 150). Secondly, in a joint statement drafted by Sechehaye and countersigned by Bally and H. Frei in reply to criticisms of the arbitraire by scholars of different persuasions in the late 1930s, the misunderstanding was compounded by unwarranted reference to the traditional phýsei/thései dichotomy. It is significant to note that although subsequently the members of the "Geneva School" devoted much attention to Saussure's
concept of the language sign and its various implications, both theoretical and practical, they failed, even after publication of Godel's *Sources manuscrites* in 1957, to produce a serious attempt to re-establish Saussure's views concerning the *arbitraire*. We suspect that the main reason for this lacuna is to be found in the nature of Godel's book itself, a study filled with quotations from various sources (many of them still unpublished), interesting observations and, at times, penetrating interpretations, which however makes difficult reading, partly because it is badly organized and partly because it has no index. Significantly, while Godel devotes a separate chapter to the question of the *linéarité (du signifié)* (cf. SM, 203-7), he discusses the problem of arbitraire only *en passant* (s. SM, 194-6, and 242-3), spending almost more space on Whitney's views than on those of Saussure.

It is therefore not surprising that linguists discussing this Saussurean principle continued to refer exclusively to the *Cours*, until the most comprehensive, detailed and authoritative study by R. Engler appeared in 1963. Indeed Engler has devoted much attention to the problem of the language sign and, in particular, to its arbitrary nature. This interest in re-establishing Saussure's original thought is fairly evident from Engler's first paper in which he confronts the text of the *Cours* with its sources (s. Engler, 1959:127-32) trying to substantiate the claims of those scholars who had defended Saussure's concept of the *arbitraire*; Engler's most recent paper touches upon questions of Saussure's semiological theory and its relation to sociology and psychology (s. Engler, 1970:63-5). His major study on the *arbitraire* of some seventy pages altogether (Engler, 1962 and 1964) however, though certainly the most penetrating work on this crucial aspect of Saussure's theory to date, has not yet received the attention it deserves. According to Engler (1962:7) it still appears as though the *Cours* has been neither well read nor well understood, and a major portion of his efforts are devoted to establishing the place of the *arbitraire* within Saussure's theory making use of the critical edition and the sources of the published *Cours*.
Engler points out that the concept of the arbitraire is discussed on various occasions in the Cours, and in different contexts. Indeed, the notion is first included in the definition of langue (CLG, 26) in the Introduction; secondly, it is termed the "premier principe" in Part I of the Cours outlining the general principles of linguistics (CLG, 100-102); it also appears in the chapters devoted to the immutability (CLG, 104f. and 106f.) and mutability (110f., 112f.) of the sign and as an important component of semiological theory (116); thirdly, the arbitraire figures in prominent places in Part II devoted to synchronic linguistics (s. CLG, 157, 163, 165f.), in particular in the chapter dealing with the question of motivation (180-84); fourthly, and this fact cannot be sufficiently stressed, the concept plays a significant rôle in Part III which treats problems of historical linguistics, where it is asserted that 1) the arbitrariness of the sign is the reason why phonetic changes are unlimited (CLG, 208), 2) phonetic change and analogy counterbalance each other owing to the absolute arbitrariness of phonetic change and the (relative) motivation of analogy (221), and 3) the distinction between productive and unproductive words and the formation of new elements according to the calculus of the fourth proportional confirm the distinction between arbitraire absolu and arbitraire relatif (228-30).

Engler (1962:10f.) quotes a number of relevant passages to demonstrate the apparent difficulty of clearing up all the problems surrounding this important principle which, as he demonstrates in his subsequent analysis of writings on this topic between 1916 and 1962 (s. Engler, 1962:12-40, 1964 [passim]), have aroused controversy and misunderstanding. His analysis of the sources of the Cours once again shows that the work of the editors must be criticized. Not only have they failed to account for the fact that Saussure's ideas evolved considerably - his statements on the semiological nature of language cover a period of twenty years (1891-1911; s. Engler, 1962:42f.) - but also they ventured to give their own (not always very clear) views wherever they felt that the sources did not sufficiently demonstrate a given point (cf. CLG(E), 301 coll. 6); this is something the critical edition reveals.
Engler's subsequent interpretation of the various aspects of the *arbitraire* within Saussure's theories (1962:41ff.) demonstrates the importance of this concept. In his last course of 1910/11 Saussure refers to it in connection with three vital components of his theory of language: 1) semiology, 2) the synchronic mechanism, and 3) the (differentiating principle of) value. Engler points out that these three aspects of the *arbitraire* permit the following classification: 1) the synchronic mechanism of motivation limits the principle of the *arbitraire*; 2) the same principle accounts for the contrasting operations of phonetic change and analogy, and, as a logical conclusion from 1) and 2), the *arbitraire* reveals itself as 3) a panchronic and semiological principle (cf. Engler, 1962:41).

These few observations about Saussure's concept of the *arbitraire*, and we have by no means discussed all of its implications, suggest that, though it is not the *first* principle of Saussure's theory (something that certain scholars have tended to argue), it certainly represents one of its crucial elements. Recently Engler has made an explicit statement (summarizing what he was trying to show in his study of 1962) according to which one has to reckon with two distinct interpretations of the *arbitraire*, not to speak of Saussure's earlier misleading views relating the sign to the thing it signifies. The impact of this argument may well be much more momentous than De Mauro (1969:115-9) for instance seems to imply. Following Engler's statement of 1970, two concepts have to be distinguished: 1) the semiological model within which the *relation* between the *signifiant* and the *signifié* is arbitrary, and 2) within the model of a given language (seen from the synchronic point of view) a tendency to minimize the arbitrariness of the *lien* in favour of an *arbitraire du signifiant* (s. VR 29:131). These observations also suggest that the procedure of treating particular ingredients of Saussure teachings in isolation, outside the theoretical "context of situation" so to speak, leads more easily to confusion than to an elucidation of Saussure's original thought. Indeed, it appears that in the final analysis, the problems which Saussure has been faced with have their source in Saussure's concept of *langue* (cf. 2.2.2.2) and his concern over making linguistics an autonomous science.
Once it has been recognized that Saussure suggested a science which is a *theory of signs*, i.e. semiology, in which language plays a particular rôle, other aspects of Saussure's argument will surely become much more clear than they have previously appeared to most readers of the *Cours*. To go into this further would require a longer study devoted to the re-interpretation and re-ordering of Saussure's thoughts, a work which would have to analyze a large amount of Saussure's still unpublished papers, in particular those dealing with phonetics with a view to establishing *valeurs sémiologiques* (cf. SW I, 743ff.) and especially those pertaining to anagrams.30

Engler's analyses certainly constitute a praiseworthy effort to work in this direction; his preparation of the critical edition of the *Cours* has provided him with insights into Saussure's doctrine no one else could claim to possess; until the index to this work appears the *Lexique de la terminologie saussurienne* can be used with equally satisfying results. However, Engler's untiring work on clarifying Saussure's original thought by following Sechehaye's advice that "la vraie critique du *Cours* consiste à collaborer avec son auteur" (*VR* 5:3), and a number of Engler's critiques of post-Saussurean writings by his fellow-linguists,31 cannot prevent the serious student of linguistics as a science from coming to terms with Saussure's many suggestions, a large number of which, more than half a century after the publication of the *Cours*, still await a re-evaluation and, what is more important, exploitation and further development.

The discussion in the present chapter concerning a number of concepts surrounding Saussure's ideas about the semiological nature of language cannot claim to be complete. The *Lexique* of the terms Saussure either did introduce to linguistics or redefined for his particular purpose contains interesting information about the linguistic sign, for example, which highlight the necessity for a reworking of basic principles of Saussure's doctrine.32 Similarly, Saussure's distinction between *signification* and *valeur* (cf. LTS, 46 and 52f.), which A. Burger exemplified with regard to the French verbal suffix "-e" in his paper of 1961,33 has not been taken up as a valuable component for a theory of semantics,
and surely deserves further assessment. Saussure's genius produced indeed a variety of ideas, and those on the sign nature of language may well prove to be the most important of his suggestions. The creation of the semiology he envisaged, a science within which linguistics could take pride of place, and his indirect proposals on how the problem of semantics in linguistic description could possibly be solved (cf. his concept of valence), constitute a challenge to the scholar who has realized that linguistics can become a mature science only if theory is placed over and above all the other activities devoted to the study of language. It will be the purpose of the next chapter to investigate to what degree linguists have met these requirements.
FOOTNOTES - 2.2.3.2

1 FdS referred himself to "le système de M. Curtius" (Recueil 4), "le système de Schleicher" (ibid., 5), "le système d'Amelung" (p. 110), etc. in the rather unsophisticated sense of the term, a term which figured in the title of Bopp's epoch-making study of 1816,


3 Cf. FdS's introduction of coefficient sonantique (Recueil, 9f., 47, 118, and 127) and of zéro (ibid., 182, and 203[bis]).

4 Cf. FdS's replacement of the Sanskrit term "gouna" (which he used with quotation marks, s. Recueil, 118 [bis]) by alternance (Recueil, 13, 49 [bis], 204, and 207); cf. also ibid., 209, 223, and elsewhere for derivatives of this term. We give these locations since SM and LTS are incomplete and, at times, incorrect on this matter.

5 LTS, 37 ('opposition') refers to a passage of an article which FdS wrote in 1877 (s. Recueil, 381) in which he stated that a and o in the classic languages preceding liquids may be forming together "un groupe opposé à e". Where the term terme is concerned, LTS, 50 cites a phrase from a paper drafted in the same year in which FdS spoke of "terme [not termes] de l'altération" (Recueil, 372). The term distinct is barely hinted at in the LTS, 20 although it deserves attention (cf. Recueil, 114 for a location).

6 The only passages we are aware of in which FdS makes a tentative distinction between son and phonème are pp. 115 and 240 of the Recueil.

7 FdS employed the term phonème (invented by A. Dufriche-Desgenettes in 1873; cf. SM, 160) much more frequently in his Mémoire than "une vingtaine de fois" (Godel, loc. cit.).

8 Godel (SM, 280f.) and Engler (LTS, 52f.) ignore these instances.

9 The manuscript of this early attempt (reputedly lost; cf. Godel, CFS 17:13) has been recovered and recently been donated by Raymond and Jacques de Saussure to the Houghton Library of Harvard University, cf. R. Jakobson, SW I, 743f. (1971).
FdS's use of *valeur* in connection with a phoneme in opposition with other phonemes "dans un système fermé [sic]" and his affirmation (made in the third course) that the syntagm is composed of "unités significatives" (cf. SM, 167) may also underscore this impression.

Cf. the first tentative analysis of some of FdS's theories of the phoneme probably developed in the mid-1890s from manuscripts which Raymond and Jacques de Saussure have recently donated to the Houghton Library of Harvard University, "Saussure's Unpublished Reflections on Phonemes" by R. Jakobson to appear in CFS 26 (1971) and repr. in SW I, 2nd enl. ed., 1971, 743-50, esp. 747ff.

Cf. FdS's lectures on morphology dating back to the academic year 1894/95 which have been ed. by R. Godel in *Geneva School Reader*, 26-38.

Cf. A. Sechehaye's article on this matter, "De la définition du phonème à la définition de l'entité de langue", CFS 2:45-55 (1942); repr. in *Geneva School Reader*, 182-90.


This observation is underscored by FdS's statement following the comparison between language and chess that each position of the chess game "comporte une description et une appreciation mathématique" (1894: 9a; ibid., 16, and 22; SM, 44). Cf. also FdS's dictum of roughly the same period: "L'expression simple sera algébrique ou elle ne sera pas." (SM, 49).

For a more ample documentation of FdS's ideas concerning semiology, s. CLG(E), 45-52, 153-4, 162-4, and 169-71.

It would be interesting to know whether FdS was familiar with Rudolf Kleinpaul's (1845-1918) *Sprache ohne Worte: Idee einer allgemeinen Wissenschaft der Sprache* (Leipzig: W. Friedrich, 1888), a work in which a number of observations have been made which pertain to semiological theory.

FdS adds a further argument "entre parenthèses": Somebody who does not speak has nevertheless "tout le système de valeurs en lui" (CFS 15:31; cf. CLG, 31).

The most prominent of these criticisms of FdS's *arbitraire* has been E. Benveniste's paper, "Nature du signe linguistique", *AL* 1:23-9 (1939), which has been frequently reprinted during the last few years; e.g. Benveniste, 1966:49-55; *RiL* II, 104-8 (1966); Rey, 1970:97-102, and, in Russ. transl., in Zvegincev, 1964:459-64.
The text the editors made up is quite revealing. Where Saussure had spoken of a "rapprochement de termes", i.e. the signifié and the signifiant, the CLG reads: "Que nous cherchions le sens du mot latin arbor ou le mot par lequel le latin désigne le concept "arbre", il est clair que seuls les rapprochements consacrés par la langue nous apparaissent conformes à la réalité [sic.]" (CLG, 99). FdS did not speak of reality at all in this context (cf. CLG(E), 150). On another occasion in which the students' notes reported that FdS had argued that values remain relative because the connection between the two components of a sign is arbitrary, the editors changed the statement to read as follows: "Mais en fait, les valeurs restent entièrement relatives, et voilà pourquoi le lien de l'idée et du son est radicalement arbitraire." (CLG, 157; our italics; cf. CLG(E), 254).


Cf. the following locations of articles by Bally, JPs 36:161-74 (1939); BSLP 41:75-88 (1940); repr. LGLF, 127-39; FM 8:173-206; LGLF 341-62 and 160-64; Sechehaye, AL 2:165-9 (1940/41), and CFS 2:45-55 (1942); H. Frei, CFS 2:15-27 (1942); ZPhon 4:161-91; E. Sollberger, CFS ff:45-6, and Godel, ibid., 31-41 (1953). Many of these papers have been repr. in Geneva School Reader, 87-100, 182-90, 191-5, 331-40, and 357-9.

Cf. the polemics between H. Frei and E. Buysens on the language sign in Língua 11:128-40 (Frei); Língua 12:66-8 (Buysens), and 423-8 (Frei) of 1962-63. This applies to Godel himself who visibly avoids the question of the arbitraire; cf. his paper, "De la théorie du signe aux termes du système", CFS 22:53-68 (1966); repr. in Geneva School Reader, 341-56.

Godel (SM, 194, n. 218) refers to N. Ege's paper, "Le signe est arbitraire", TCLC 5:11-29 (1949), as "l'interprétation correcte du mot arbitraire".


Exceptions to this general trend, for instance the works by Derossi (1965) and De Mauro (1969[1965]), will be dealt with in the next chap. (2.2.3.3).
28 Cf. the table established in Engler, 1962:8-9 which gives visual support to the many contexts in which the *arbitraire* occurs; the index of CLG, 319 does not give a clear picture of this fact.

29 S. CLG(E), 34, 152-7, 158-60, 162, 167-70, 173, 178, 254-5, 265, 269-70, 297-303, 344, 365, 379-83 (ref. not given by Engler) where the editors added their own interpretation or used the sources misleadingly, in particular on pp. 155, 162, 178, 254, 301, 365 (?), and 379 of CLG(E).


32 LTS, 45-6 reveal that FDS used 'signe' in at least three different senses: 1) sign in the conventional non-vocal and non-linguistic sense; 2) sign in the sense of *image acoustique* or *signifiant* (e.g. *signe* zéro, graphic sign, vocal sign, etc.) - cf. CLG, 26, 28, 33, 163, 164, 166, and elsewhere -, and 3) (arbitrary) association of a *signifiant* with a *signifié*.


34 This distinction is strikingly absent from A.-J. Greimas' *Sémantique structurale* which is very much indebted to FDS's suggestions and in which the author distinguishes between a semiological and a semantic level in language (s. Greimas, 1966:103).
2.2.3.3 Post-Saussurean Developments in Semiological Theory

Psychologues, philosophes et linguistes s'accordent pour reconnaître l'importance du signe. L'importance du signe est devenue plus grande encore après la découverte, établie par F. de Saussure et approfondie par la linguistique de nos jours, du caractère à la fois purement formel (et par conséquent arbitraire, conventionnel) et bilatéral du signe linguistique.

Louis Hjelmslev in 1950 (JPs 47:54)

On a tant écrit sur le signe linguistique qu'il est difficile à l'heure actuelle de préciser exactement où en est le problème. C'est pourquoi il est important d'envisager dès le début la place du signe dans l'ensemble des faits de langue . . . .

Paul Miclau (1970:vi)

No other aspect of Saussure's linguistic theory has received so much attention in the literature as that of the linguistic sign. This may not be a surprising fact, if one considers that every linguist must decide what element he will treat as the basic unit of analysis prior to his investigation or, in cases where the language has not yet been described, soon after the characteristic entities of the language under investigation have been identified. However, the relationship between description and other technical procedures of analysis and statements of theory is perhaps not as easy to perceive as it appears to those somewhat removed from the actual collection, ordering, and (tentative) assessment of the data, and many scholars have been satisfied with a set of procedural principles and have not ventured beyond an approved methodology (which they often have been tempted to mistake for theory). Despite the apparent predilection for descriptive problems it is none the less surprising to note that a recent bibliographical account of
publications between 1916 and 1970 on the topic of the language sign reported some five hundred items.1

Our astonishment is further increased since a closer analysis of the material reveals roughly the following picture: 1) The majority of the writers make (explicit or indirect) reference to Saussure but even the most recent works ignore almost exclusively the pertinent information provided in Godel's *Sources manuscrites* (1957) and the various publications by Engler (1959ff.); 2) except for the writings of Engler himself there appears to be only Derossi's study of 1965 which has attempted to interpret Saussure's sign theory in the light of his theory of language as a whole, and perhaps also De Mauro's *Introduzione alla semantica* of the same year (cf. De Mauro, 1969) but certainly with much less success in his rapprochement to Saussure's linguistic thought; the rest, it would appear, have contented themselves with discussing a particular aspect of Saussure's theory of the sign, e.g. the arbitraire, the linéarité du signifiant, the principle of (relative) motivation, the bilateral nature of the sign, and this generally by taking the concept in question out of its context and discussing it in the light of their own preconceived ideas; 3) those scholars who have shown a particular interest in Saussure's ideas about the sign character of language turn out frequently to be logicians and philosophers of language, e.g. E. Ortigues (1962), N. E. Christensen (1965), A. Schaff (1969), and also De Mauro (1969), psychologists, e.g. F. Kainz (1961), K. Bühler (1965), and H. Hörmann (1967), or critics and theorists of literature, e.g. R. Barthes (1967), T. Todorov,2 Julia Kristeva (1969) and J. Trabant,3 to name only these few.4 Unfortunately, the aspect of linguistics which we believe to be crucial has not received from linguists the kind of attention we consider appropriate.

However, even the quite numerous instances, where scholars working in areas outside linguistics proper have adopted particular aspects of Saussure's sign theory, do not reveal much superiority with regard to the reworking and integration of Saussure's ideas into a systematic whole. Ortigues, for example, approaches the problem of the sign from a post-Kantian angle and, in view of its symbolizing qualities, devotes
particular attention to the signifié/signifiant distinction (1962:54-60) without discussing the arbitraire or other notions (except for a brief mention of valeur) surrounding the bilateral nature of the sign. Christensen, on the other hand, attempts to exploit Saussurean concepts (mainly in the light of Hjelmslevian interpretations) in order to illustrate linguistic notions of meaning (1965:179-91) without offering anything conclusive for either the linguist or the philosopher of language. But it is only fair to add that Christensen, as a philosopher, has been handicapped not so much by his own limited acquaintance with linguistics but much more by the fact that linguists have until today failed to provide an adequate theoretical framework for the discussion of the language sign and the problems surrounding it. A. Schaff (1969:15) stresses the importance of the Cours in particular because of its "numerous theoretical consequences", but the remainder of his detailed study on (philosophical) semantics reveals the author's inability to come to terms with Saussure's suggestions. Similar observations can be made mutatis mutandis about the work of others who have adopted certain ingredients of Saussure's teachings, for instance the works of Kainz (1961) or Hörmann (1967), though the latter makes particular use of Bühler's (1965:33ff.) suggestions (cf. Hörmann, 1971:18ff.) containing a communicational model of the sign which, though in part inspired from certain aspects of Saussure's theory, is far removed from the ideas put forward in the Cours.

In contrast to these, it appears that there have been in recent years a number of scholars in the field of literary criticism and poetic theory whose writings depict some attempt to create a sign theory which has been inspired by suggestions made by Saussure, attempts which date back at least to Jan Mukarovsky's programmatic paper of 1936, but possibly even to the Russian Formalists of the 1920s (cf. Erlich, 1969: 156ff.). In this respect Roland Barthes' *Eléments de sémiologie* of 1964 may be said to mark a major breakthrough in the exploitation of Saussure's suggestions about the creation of a science of sign systems. Barthes however rejects Saussure's claim that linguistics constitutes a
particular form of a general semiology - Barthes ignores the fact that Saussure contrasted language with other systems of signs by emphasizing the arbitrary nature of the former in opposition to the latter which are relatively motivated (cf. CLG, 110) - and indeed he reverses the argument by saying that "every semiological system has its linguistic admixture." (Barthes, 1967:10). It is probably true that linguistic properties underlie most of the semiological systems we are aware of, especially the highway code, the signals used by ships, etc., although a distinction would have to be made (as Buysens has pointed out) between sign systems which can be understood only if one is familiar with the language underlying a specific code, e.g. the Morse code, and those which have no linguistic basis at all, e.g. fashion (cf. Barthes, 1967:33f.). In Barthes' views semiology is "perhaps destined to be absorbed into a trans-linguistics, the materials of which may be myth, narrative, journalism, or on the other hand objects of our civilization" in so far as they are transmitted orally, through press, interview, conversation, etc. (1967:11). The "performance" aspect of semiology has led Barthes in the subsequent chapter to extend linguistics to a linguistics of parole (something which Saussure envisaged but never developed on theoretical grounds) and, what is more striking, to equate semiology with this highly restricted concept of linguistics (cf. 24ff.). Barthes later takes up a number of other Saussurean suggestions, in particular the signifié/signifiant distinction (1967:35-57) and the two axes of syntagmatic and associative relations (58ff.), all of which he redefines in terms of his own conception of semiological theory, to the extent that we can acknowledge his tentative codification as a first step towards a semiology within the framework of sociology, many ingredients of which have their ultimate sources in the Cours.

However, Barthes' ideas may lead to diffusion of matters which are certainly of importance to linguistics proper, viz. Barthes' misconception of the Saussurean notion of langue (1967:23ff.) and the arbitraire (50ff.), and there is a danger that this could result in linguistics becoming ancillary to the general science of semiology, something that was certainly
not Saussure's intention and, indeed, we believe cannot be the intention of any serious student of linguistics, since this could only be to the detriment of linguistics as a science in its own right.

It is true that the *Cours* invites more than one interpretation, in particular where the language sign is concerned. In most of the passages in which the principle of the sign is outlined, Saussure appears, in agreement with traditional usage, but possibly also under the influence of Kruszewski (cf. 1.3.3.3) or F. N. Finck, to have exemplified his ideas with the help of a word in isolation (s. CLG, 98ff.), a procedure which we believe contrasts sharply with his claim that a sign does not exist by itself but only by virtue of its co-existence with others (cf. CLG, 166ff.). Again, the editors of the *Cours* appear to have misled the reader when they stated that the word "malgré la difficulté qu'on a à le définir, est une unité qui s'impose à l'esprit" (CLG, 154) whereas the sources indicate that Saussure advised his students to question the traditional (and rather arbitrary) separation of words in writing (s. CLG(E), 250). In other contexts, Saussure may have suggested that he regarded the syntagm as a sign, as E. Sollberger thought appropriate to deduce from the *Cours* (s. CFS 11:45f.), although Saussure did in fact speak of unité and not of signe in connection with the syntagm (cf. LTS, 49f.). Godel (SM, 210) suggests that Saussure might even have thought of the possibility of considering a whole phrase like "the man I have seen" as a unit of linguistic organization. Moreover, we believe that Saussure's frequently used simile of the game of chess in connection with his explanation of the systematic character of language (CLG, 43) and its change (125-7), the value of its elements (153f.), and on other occasions (cf. CLG, 185), and, in particular, his emphasis on the distinctive nature of the language sign (167) may have led a number of scholars to take the phoneme as such a unit of linguistic expression, especially since Saussure did not give any examples when he used the comparison and attributed to the phoneme such a differentiating function (cf. CLG, 83, 164, 303).

As a result of these various remarks in the *Cours*, the linguistic sign has been identified with the 1) word as Saussure suggested frequently
(cf. SM, 208f.), e.g. Bróndal (1943:119ff.), Bolinger (Lingua 12:113ff.), and Krámský (1967ff.), 11 2) morpheme, e.g. Bazell (cf. RiL II, 329ff.), Antal (1961ff.), 12 and many others, in particular "Bloomfieldian" descriptiveists, 3) monème, e.g. Frei (CFS 1:51), Sollberger (CFS 11:45f.), and Martinet (1967:15), 4) syntagm, again Sollberger and Frei (Lingua 12:426), 5) phrases and possibly also whole sentences, e.g. Frei (loc. cit.), Martinet (loc. cit.), and Kamlah, 13 and 6) the phoneme, e.g. Kollmar-Kulleschitz, Froehlich, and Belardi, to name a few more recent statements to this effect. 14 The apparent latitude of Saussure's term has led, as we have suggested, to a variety of interpretations. Perhaps it was this that caused Ullmann to propose the distinction between the following cardinal signs each of which corresponds to a particular level of analysis: phoneme (phonology), word (lexicology), and syntagm (syntax), excluding however the morpheme and the level of morphology (although Saussure designated the latter "la théorie des signes, et non des formes", cf. LTS, 35) from its rightful position (cf. Word 2:116).

Similar observations can be made about other aspects of Saussure's theory of the sign, for example the concept of the arbitraire, as we have mentioned earlier (cf. 2.2.3.2, and Engler, 1962:12-40), the concept of motivation in language, or the linearity of the signifiant, though the latter has been more generally accepted, perhaps simply because only a few have realized its theoretical implications, 15 as should by now have become evident from Godel's work (s. SM, 203-7). Where the principle of motivation is concerned (which is to be seen as limiting the operation of the arbitraire), a surprisingly large number of linguists have misunderstood Saussure's argument and, in addition, disregarded what he had to say about onomatopoetic formation of words (s. CLG, 101f.) and have consequently wasted their time in an ill-advised attempt to invalidate Saussure's claim. As an instance of such an ill-founded attempt to investigate linguistic motivation, we must mention P. Mičlău's recent monograph Le Signe linguistique, in which the author distinguishes between four kinds of loss of motivation: 1) phonetic change, 2) loss
of morphological entities or lexical suffixes, 3) semantic change, and 4) borrowing [sic] (s. Mičlău, 1970:212). Although he discusses Saussure's principles of the arbitraire and motivation at length (1970:85-95), he suggests an investigation of the problem of motivation "sous l'angle historique et comparatif [i.e. comparing statistical results of French and Romanian]" (87), although Saussure clearly pointed to structural, i.e. synchronic, forms of motivation, e.g. derivation, compounding, word families, and any other form of syntagmatic and associative relations (cf. CLG, 181ff.), as historical considerations playing a marginal rôle only (s. 184).

With regard to the creation of a semiological theory of language in the framework of Saussure's suggestions, we have to state that until the present day no such theory has been proposed by any linguist, although there have been certain attempts in the past, notably by E. Buyssens and L. Hjelmslev, as well as a notable increase in semiological or semiotic problems in general, and also in publications especially concerned with linguistic problems of the sign. It appears that Buyssens' essay of 1943 did appeal to a number of non-linguists but not to those concerned with linguistic theory; his completely reworked edition of 1967 has won merely nodding acceptance despite the author's serious attempt to outline the principles of a semiology in which linguistics plays a pre-eminent rôle (cf. Buyssens, 1967:78-166). Hjelmslev's attempt to exploit Saussure's suggestions about language as a system of signs cannot be regarded as a success (cf. PTL, 4, 41-7, 48, 57f., 65-7, etc.), despite a number of statements to the contrary (cf. Apresjan, 1971:64f.), since Hjelmslev fails to account for the diachronic aspect of language (cf. 2.2.2.3), the relative nature of valeur, and fails to convincingly relate his theory to the facts of language, requirements which were so dear to Saussure. Another important component of Saussure's doctrine has been neglected without which the semiology Saussure had called for cannot do its appropriate job: the arbitraire (which Hjelmslev mentioned only en passant [PTL, 97]).

In addition to P. Mičlău's abortive attempt to make use of proposals outlined in the Cours concerning motivation of linguistic signs, two
more studies appeared in 1970 which treat aspects of Saussure's theories about the language sign. Georg Stötzel investigates in his Ausdrucksseite und Inhaltsseite der Sprache procedures of word morphology on the basis of Saussure's emphasis on the bilateral nature of the sign and by taking up the post-Saussurean theories of dependency grammar which are based on the distinction between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations and the concept of value, e.g. the work of L. Tesnière (cf. 2.2.4.3); however he provides something in the way of a critical account of modern theories rather than an outline of a particular theory which aims to develop Saussurean concepts further. H.-M. Gauger's monograph Wort und Sprache, devoted to "sprachwissenschaftliche Grundfragen" as its subtitle indicates, is no less disappointing to someone looking for a particular attempt to establish at least a theoretical framework within which Saussure's semiological ideas can attain the status of a science.

The surely regrettable development which we have referred to at the beginning of this chapter, namely that Saussure's ideas about language as a system of signs have been taken up by non-linguists and codified in a fashion quite dissimilar from Saussure's intentions and his theory as a whole, such a development which has been to the detriment of linguistics (which Saussure wished to make into an autonomous science) could only have happened simply because linguists themselves have failed to work Saussure's suggestions about the semiological nature of language into a general theory of language. They have instead limited themselves to an exposition of apparent paradoxes and contradictions in Saussure's teachings or attempts to redefine some aspects of his theory without taking into account the whole framework within which the parts have been defined.

Our criticism, it must be conceded, does not apply to all linguistic work in the post-Saussurean paradigm, for there are some scholars who deserve special mention for having at least attempted a linguistic semiology or, perhaps more correctly, a sign theory of language. On the other hand, there are a number of ingredients of Saussure's sign theory which still await clarification; they have frequently been subject to heated debate
and controversy but not elucidated to an extent that they would gain
general acceptance. The problem of the *arbitraire* in particular, though
it received a very penetrating treatment in Engler's study of 1962, has
not yet been satisfactorily settled, and Engler's suggestions have un-
fortunately failed to have the impact the problem deserves. Yet more
basic problems appear to be surrounded by confusions and misunderstandings,
and only a few of them have been referred to in this brief overview. 22
FOOTNOTES 2.2.3.3


4 S. Koerner, op. cit., esp. note 36 for a list of two dozen further studies in semiology. An interesting book, not included in the list is that of L. O. Reznikov, Erkenntnistheoretische Fragen der Semiotik trans. from the Russ. by Werner Winkler (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968).


8 Finck (1905:30) stated: "Das Wort ist der Kleinste, nicht in bestimmter Weise an andere Lautkomplexe gebundener Bestandteil der Rede".

9 In one of his first lectures at the Univ. of Geneva in 1891, Fds noted: "Il y aura un jour un livre spécial et très intéressant
à écrire sur le rôle du mot comme principal perturbateur de la science des mots." (Quoted by Engler in GS 22:35). Cf. also SM, 208f. where Gödel discusses FdS's difficulties in taking the word as a "unité par excellence".

10 H. Frei (Lingua 12:426) fails to substantiate his claim that FdS "considérerait le syntagme comme signe".


13 Cf. Wilhem Kamlah, "Sprachliche Handlungsschemata", Problem der Sprache, 427-34 (1967); according to K. a language sign may have the form of a morpheme, word or an idiomatic expression.


15 We may recall R. Jakobson's dictum that FdS's principle of the "caractère linéaire du signifiant" is "nothing but a vicious circle" (TCLC 5:20 [1949] = SW I, 420); cf. also SW I, 304ff., 636, and 655f. However, FdS was concerned with the linguistic sign and not, as Jakobson suggests, with the differentiating character of phonemes, when he formulated the linear nature of the "signifiants acoustiques" (CLG, 103). For a recent paper on this topic, s. A. Henry, "La linéarité du signifiant", Hommage Buyssens, 87-92 (1970).

16 Cf. the proceedings of an international congress on semiotics held in Poland in 1965, Sign, Language, Culture/Signe, langage, culture/ znak, język, kultura, etc. comp. by A. J. Greimas, R. Jakobson, et al. (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), in particular the contributions by linguists, e.g. L. Zawadowski, A. J. Greimas, S. Siatkowski, and Holger S. Sørensen.

17 Cf. Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970, Part III, Sec. 4. (c) for a brief overview of the various aspects of the post-Saussurean development of the sign theory (excluding, of course, those developments which have their source in the work of the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce [1839-1914]).

18 Cf. E. Buyssens' booklet, Les Langues et le discours: Essai de linguistique fonctionnelle dans le cadre de la sémiologie (Brussels: Office de la Publicité, 1943).

This is particularly regrettable since Gauger analyzes and, at times, criticizes FdS's ideas and suggests interesting rectifications, viz. FdS's concept of language and its scientific treatment (Gauger, 1970:4-20[passim]), his ideas about the word and the language sign (48, 51f., 56, 58, 62-4, 67f., 73, 78), the problem of motivation and the arbitraire (90-108[passim], 110 and 113). Note that the text amounts to only 127 pages.

We wish to point out that we have no objections to scholars working outside linguistics proper, e.g. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-61) in philosophy or Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, taking up ideas from the CLG for the elucidation of their particular problems, but their action cannot be regarded as an excuse for linguists not to strive towards a theory of their own object of investigation.

For a somewhat more detailed survey, s. our introduction to the work mentioned in note 1 of this chapter. In a recent article on the language sign Jan W. F. Mulder (cf. quotation at the beginning of 2.2.3) has emphasized the importance of FdS's teaching in developing his ideas further. In it he also announces the publication of a book entitled Theory of the Linguistic Sign (to appear in The Hague: Mouton) which he wrote in collaboration with Sándor G. W. Hervey who shows similar theory orientation (cf. Hervey, Functional Semantics: A Linguistic Theory with Application to Pekingese (Diss., Oxford Univ., 1970). If the title of the book is an indication of the book's contents, their work could eventually fill a long-felt lacuna in the post-Saussurean development of linguistic theory.
2.2.4 Language as a System of Relations: the *rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs* and Kindred Notions

In contrast to the principles of synchrony and diachrony, *langue* and *parole*, and those concerning the language sign, concepts which can almost be treated in isolation from other Saussurean notions and which perhaps regrettably have for the most part been taken out of their original context by 20th-century linguists, Saussure's emphasis on the systematic nature of language and the various concepts associated with this claim point to the damaging effect of the procedure of abstracting isolated aspects so characteristic of the post-Saussurean development in linguistics; this gives strength to our own reiterated view, unfortunately all too frequently neglected, that Saussure's ideas about language must be taken as a whole, i.e. as an attempt to construct a complete general theory of language which will be the object of linguistic science. Our own procedure has followed these traditional lines, but not because of intellectual indolence but because of the particular perspective taken in order to account for the post-Saussurean evolution of the ideas proposed in the *Cours*. Saussure's concern to make linguistics an autonomous science independent of psychology, sociology, and other social and moral sciences, e.g. history, led him to suggest the science of sign systems, i.e. semiology. His next step was to define the proper object of this particular science of linguistics, and it has been in the definition of *langue* that the concept of system took its appropriate place.
It should be recalled and, indeed, it cannot be sufficiently stressed that Saussure was much concerned about the unity of linguistics. It was not merely his neogrammian heritage that did not allow him to abandon historical linguistics in favour of non-historical linguistics but his conviction that the linguist cannot escape the facts of language change. On the other hand, as noted earlier (cf. 2.2.1.2), Saussure frequently took a rationalist position in particular when he claimed the logical precedence of langue over parole, but, and this is an aspect of Saussure's attitude towards language and its treatment which has been overlooked by the majority of the readers of the Cours, Saussure was concerned, as a second step, to relate his theory of language to the actual facts (cf. Engler's observations about Saussure's methodological "Annäherung an die Realität der Sprache" in the case of the arbitraire and its various interpretations, VR 29:131 [1970]). This approach, so very characteristic of Saussure, and pedagogical considerations may also have played a significant rôle in Saussure's linguistic argument, can be illustrated by reference to the synchrony/diachrony distinction. Firstly, Saussure stresses the discrete nature of these two aspects to the extent that he termed on occasion this distinction an antinomy (cf. CFS 15:66; CLG(E), 199). His second step attempts to reconcile these two aspects by proposing a panchronic view of language, although it must be noted that he did not wish to attribute to this generalizing aspect a status comparable to that of the other two (cf. SM, 271; LTS, 38).

Where Saussure's concept of system in language is concerned, it is not sufficient to note that this notion is at the heart of his linguistic theory but that he approached this idea from every possible angle in order to substantiate his claim. We have pointed out earlier on several occasions (s. 1.1 and 2.2.3.2) that the concept of system was at the basis of Saussure's linguistic argument as early as in his Mémoire of 1878 and in fact already underlying the ideas of the fifteen-year old (cf. SW I, 743f.). Moreover, in his Mémoire other aspects are forecast which did later on become important features of his general linguistic theory, in particular the idea that a given item has its existence (and value) only by virtue of its interrelation with others.
As has been shown in the case of other ideas propounded in the *Cours*, we can distinguish between three steps within the development of what has generally been accepted as the Saussurean concept of language as a system of interdependent and mutually related terms: 1) Precursors of Saussure's ideas, 2) the inner development of Saussure's reflections, and 3) post-Saussurean developments of his suggestions.
2.2.4.1 Traditional Ideas about the Systematic Nature of Language

Ever since the publication of Bopp's *Conjugationssystem* in 1816, an event which has traditionally been regarded as the beginning of linguistics as a science in its own right, the term 'system' has been used in linguistic scholarship. Indeed there has hardly been any serious scholar in the two-and-a-half millenia of western linguistic thought who has denied that language is in some way structured. The notion of system as a principle of analysis however appears to have entered linguistic studies at the beginning of the 19th century when Bopp, Grimm, Rask, and their contemporaries were concerned with creating a linguistic science independent of other branches of human curiosity, including philosophy and philology. Since advances in the natural sciences, in particular (comparative) anatomy and biology, were an important feature of the intellectual paradigm of the first part of the 19th century (cf. 1.2.1), it is no surprise that the term 'organism' should have gained wide acceptance in the linguistic scholarship of the past century, a term which Saussure himself used quite frequently as synonymous with system,¹ though certainly not with Schleicherian connotations.

The view of language as an organism led to the concept of language as a system whose elements are (organically) interrelated. The above quotation from August Friedrich Pott's (1802-87) first volume of his influential *Etymologische Forschungen* of 1833 may still be regarded as an isolated *Geistesblitz* though we also suspect that this observation was the result of his extensive work in Indo-European etymology. It appears however that the notion of system in language, which Mounin (1968:59f.) seeks to establish as a well-known term in the general grammars of the mid-18th century, did not become a generally accepted
notion in linguistics until some time during the second half of the 19th century, probably under the influence of Schleicher's theories. We have pointed out earlier (cf. 1.3.4.2.2) that G. von der Gabelentz spoke of system on several occasions in his Sprachwissenschaft of 1891, a book which Saussure had in his personal library (cf. Godel, 1968:117). Gabelentz opposed the view that grammar constitutes merely an ordered collection of prescriptions and restrictions stating that he regards linguistic forms as constituting a system (1891:370 = Gabelentz, 1901:385). A more revealing statement to this effect was added by the editor of the second edition of Gabelentz's book which appeared in 1901; it reads:


In this passage (in which 'system' and 'organic' are nicely collocated) the interdependence of linguistic elements is the prime characteristic of language; absence of an element or its change would affect the whole, an observation which may call to mind Saussure's famous simile of language with a game of chess. In 1904, Karl Brugmann makes a similar statement in his preface to the Kurze vergleichende Grammatik which deserves quotation for reasons of historical justice (since it would seem to belie the traditional accusation of neogrammarian 'atomism') and as an illustration of our claim that the concept of language as a system of mutually related elements was 'in the air' at the time when Saussure formulated his linguistic theories. Though actually explaining the procedures required for the preparation of the abridged edition of the Grundriss, Brugmann made the following statement which is of much greater significance than its context seems to imply:

Weil das Objekt der Grammatik, die Sprache, eine sehr komplizierte menschliche Thätigkeit ist, bei der die verschiedenartigsten Faktoren in gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit zum Ganzen zusammenwirken, bei der im Grunde alles durch alles bedingt ist, ist auf diesem dritten Wege [i.e. that language ought to be described in more than the three traditional (and quite arbitrary) levels of phonology, morphology, and syntax] zu einem der
Although we believe that Brugmann's statement is fairly marginal, it is interesting to note that two pages prior to this passage he pointed out that the linguistic public would have to become more concerned with works such as Paul's *Prinzipien*, Sievers' *Grundzüge*, and Philipp Wegener's (1848-1916) *Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens* (Halle/S.: Niemeyer, 1885), thus giving evidence of a growing interest in more general considerations of language study.

However, neither Gabelentz nor Brugmann for that matter pursued these remarks about the systematic character of language and the interdependence of its elements, and Saussure could not have received much support from their findings for his own convictions. In contrast to these, the work of H. Paul and M. Kruszewski contained much more of interest to the theory-orientated Saussure. Saussure was by no means content with stating that language was a system of mutually related signs but tried to specify, as far as possible, the nature of these relations and the principles governing them, since both Paul and Kruszewski had made observations which Saussure could certainly not have overlooked.

As we have shown earlier (s. 1.3.2.2.3), there is much support for our claim that Paul's distinction between *stoffliche*, *formale* and *stofflich-formale* Gruppen anticipated and possibly served as a model for Saussure's associative relations (cf. CLG(E), 286-9). Moreover, we have shown that Kruszewski's observations about 'external' (i.e. phonological or morphological) similarities and 'internal' (i.e. semantic) similarities, which he based on the distinction between associations of similarity and associations of contiguity (s. 1.3.3.3), have certainly had an impact on Saussure's ideas. Kruszewski's statements (cf. Kruszewski, 1887: 171ff.) do not represent remarks *en passant* but are linked with his distinction between the *coexistence* (resulting from similarity) and *consequence* (by virtue of occurrence in a linear manner) of linguistic
elements (s. 1887:173; cf. also 1887:156, 159; 1884:303). Indeed, Kruszewski pointed out:


Where the connections of similarity are concerned, Saussure himself pointed out in his lectures that words such as désirieux, soucieux, malheureux, etc. constitute "groupes d'association" which are "purement mentaux" and called them "familles", concepts which cannot always be clearly defined (cf. CLG(E), 289; s. also p. 281). Kruszewski's ordering of words in series ("ordnen . . . in Reihen") in the case of "syntagmatic relations" is clearly paralleled in Saussure's affirmation that syntagms are only established in a one-dimensional fashion "dans la chaîne parlée" or in the form of a "suite linéaire" (s. CLG(E), 277). It would appear that the term syntagm (G. "Anreihung") was coined by Saussure (though possibly following Kruszewski's or Paul's suggestions); on the other hand, his use of associative in connection with his characterization of terms associated with each other in absentia can probably be traced back to Kruszewski.

However, both Paul and Kruszewski, though they made important observations about the manner in which linguistic elements are associated in our mind, did not attempt to work these ideas into a theory of linguistic mechanism, Paul because he felt overwhelmed by the multitude of connections he perceived, and Kruszewski because of his predilection for micro-linguistic problems, i.e. phonology and morphology. It will be the purpose of the following chapter to investigate in which way Saussure's ideas differ from those of Paul and Kruszewski and how they relate to the rest of Saussure's theory.
2.2.4.2 Saussure's Suggestions concerning the Systematic Nature of Language

The idea of the systematic nature of language had occupied Saussure's mind every since he first ventured, in 1872 as a boy of fifteen, to construct "un système général du langage" (CFS 17:17) culminating in the following formulation in his Cours, which has its source in his last period of lectures on general linguistics in 1911, and which has subsequently become the cornerstone of Saussure's doctrine:

... la langue est un système dont tous les termes sont solidaire et où la valeur de l'un ne résulte que la présence simultanée des autres ... (CLG, 159; cf. CLG(E), 259).

With the help of Saussure's own publications as well as students' notes taken from his courses between 1893 and 1911 and autograph manuscripts analyzed and partly published by Godel, it is possible to trace the evolution of Saussure's concept of system in language. In contrast to this there are no similar indications to be found with regard to Saussure's ideas about the "rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs" propounded at length in the Cours (cf. CLG, 170-80, 187-92 [passim]).

As a matter of fact neither Godel's Sources manuscrites nor the critical edition turn up anything from Saussure's own pen relating to this distinction, not even notes pertaining to his courses of 1907-11. It is therefore almost impossible to say anything about the progression of Saussure's argument. However, owing to his probably un-matched acquaint-tance with Saussure's theory and his insight into the particular development.
of its specific ingredients, Godel has provided us with two texts in order to give "a more vivid idea of de Saussure's lectures" which, though over 15 years apart, permit us to draw some tentative conclusions. In the Geneva School Reader of 1969, Godel presents excerpts from an autograph manuscript dating back to lectures on (Greek) morphology given during the academic year 1894/95 (cf. SM, 36), and a reconstruction of the last lectures of Saussure's third course in general linguistics given in June and July 1911 on the basis of students' notes.7

To a certain extent it can be said that Saussure's lectures on morphology in late 1894 reflect a number of his ideas in statu nascendi. In order to distinguish between phonology and morphology as having different purposes within linguistic investigation, Saussure set up the principle that with the former one has to consider "une même forme à des dates diverses" (i.e. diachronic axis) whereas with the latter one has to study "des formes diverses à une même date" (i.e. synchronic axis) (Reader, 27). In this context Saussure excludes etymology by virtue of the fact that it does not represent "un ordre déterminé de recherches" nor a specific ordering of linguistic facts and that its activity made use of both phonology and morphology, so that one may infer that he regarded this branch of language study not to be an essential part of linguistic science (cf. op. cit., 28). Saussure's definition of morphology in the subsequent paragraph however is quite revealing: "Le vrai nom de la morphologie serait: la théorie des signes, et non des formes." (Loc. cit.; our italics). Saussure explains that in morphology one has to consider, compare and analyze signs which belong to the same system and claims, after having stated that the speaker is conscious of the sound as a sign only (Saussure's reference to the consciousness of the speaker is not a marginal remark):

Mieux: δότος considéré par rapport à ses contemporains, est le porteur d'une certaine idée, qui n'est pas celle de δοτὴρ, qui n'est pas celle de δωσω, δοτός et de même les parties de δοτός. Il apparaît donc ici comme signe, et relève de la morphologie. (Reader, 28).
Saussure adds that the relation between these "formes contemporaines" could not be elucidated from the point of view of historical phonology. In his outline of how morphological analysis should be conducted, he first criticizes the neogrammarian view that root, theme, suffix, etc. were nothing but pure abstractions. His argument is that "dans tout état de langue, les sujets parlants ont conscience d'unités morphologiques", i.e. they are aware of meaningful units smaller than the word (Reader, 30), a claim which he tries to substantiate in the following manner: 1) The Frenchman is conscious of the fact that an element such as -eur, in certain combinations, serves to indicate the creator of an action, e.g. graveur, penseur, porteur. 2) The reality of this element can be demonstrated in the case of neologisms, e.g. os-eur, recommenc-eur, etc., (which follow the principle of analogy). 3) Along with penseur the French language possesses the form pensif, a fact from which two conclusions may be drawn: a) pens- constitutes an "unité significative" (for the same reason as -eur), and b) -if can be recognized as a meaningful element by itself (though with slightly less certainty as in the case of -eur). Saussure concludes that morphological analysis performed by the grammarian, in as much as it is in agreement with these facts, cannot be regarded as dealing with a product of abstraction.

Saussure's insistence on the fact that the linguist deals with realia is certainly worth noting since he never abandoned this idea (cf. LTS, 43), at times to the dismay of 20th-century theorists. But what is more important is Saussure's demonstration of how (he believes) the human mind operates, namely not by combining os- and -eur in order to form oseur but in the following manner:

graveur : graver : je grave = x : oser : j'ose.

In other words, the speaker forms a new word by a specific kind of analogical procedure which results, in the present example, in the creation of the word oseur.

The other aspect of morphology which deserves to be retained is Saussure's definition of it as the theory of signs, not merely of forms but meaningful forms, although he points out that the analysis can be
based on an apparent relation of forms (cf. quotation at the beginning of 2.2.4.2). In his second course (1908/9) when Saussure criticized the traditional subdivision of linguistic study into morphology, syntax, and lexicology, this aspect received its proper place when he defined what he understands by "grammar", a definition which he seems to have illustrated by the following equation:

\[
\text{Grammatical} = \text{significatif} = \text{resortissant à un système de signes} = \text{synchronique ipso facto} \quad (s. \text{CLG(E), 304}).
\]

In other words, Saussure recognized the existence of grammar only on the horizontal line of synchrony, because a system of signs, i.e. a meaningful arrangement of linguistic elements, can only be detected within a language state. Moreover, this view entailed the rejection of the traditional division between syntax and morphology as well as the separate treatment of lexicology. Neither morphology nor syntax can be adequately treated without semantic considerations and indeed these three approaches to language are interrelated and their separation is arbitrary and contradictory to the facts of language.

Therefore, Saussure proposed that everything which makes up a language state is based, in the final analysis, on the theory of syntagms and on the theory of associations (cf. CLG(E), 307). (It should be borne in mind that he views the division from the 'grammatical', i.e. 'synchronic', angle.) The syntagm of which he said earlier (cf. CLG(E), 306) that its range is undetermined (i.e. a syntagm could be a simple word, a compound or a phrase) becomes the entity \textit{par excellence} within the system of language. The syntagmatics Saussure envisages is to include syntax which requires the co-existence of at least two units, since the theory of the syntagm actually begins with groups of two elements "distributed in space" (CLG(E), 308).

Godel has recently pointed out that the concept and term of 'syntagm' are not the result of Saussure's reflections on syntax but on the question of which features make language a system. This would explain Saussure's emphasis on the solidarity both of syntagmatic and associative relations (cf. CLG, 176 and 182), relations which together account for the mechanism
of speech (s. CLG, 176ff.). Saussure points out that "tout est rapport" in language and that the unit of a word remains valid, at any given moment, only by virtue of its opposition with other units (cf. CLG(E), 276), and in this way syntagmatic and associative relations each play a particular rôle. Saussure's distinction between these two types of relationship in linguistic elements has been discussed earlier in connection with the theories of Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2.3) and Kruszewski (cf. 1.3.3.3); furthermore, these principles are well known in the linguistic literature and therefore do not require further exemplification.

In contrast to this generally accepted distinction (although its implications have not always been well understood), it must be stressed that the distinction between relations in absentia and relations in praesentia cannot be isolated from Saussure's theory of language as a whole. Indeed these two principles are the prerequisite for the systematic organization and functioning of language which is defined as a system of co-existing and mutually dependent terms. Saussure never explicitly called the syntagm a sign (though indirectly a group of signs, cf. CLG, 177) but one may infer (as has most recently been done by Godel, CFS 25:119; earlier by E. Sollberger and H. Frei) from Saussure's teaching that its nature implies the concept of the sign.

Furthermore, the concept of the sign not only implies the union of signifie and signifiant (which are paralleled by the two aspects of associative and syntagmatic relations respectively) but also the obligation to take into account the specific differentiating features of these relations which determine what Saussure termed the value of a given item (cf. CLG, 158ff.). The underlying principle of Saussure's famous statement that in language there is nothing but differences (CLG, 166) will be referred to explicitly in the concluding chapter (cf. 2.3) although we recognize that this claim is relevant in the treatment of the various kinds of relationships in language and the linguistic mechanisms resulting from them. Indeed the aspect of the inter-relationship of linguistic elements is not only an overall requirement present in language but it has to be an essential part of the theory of language as a whole.
FOOTNOTES 2.2.4.1/2.2.4.2

1 Cf. CLG, 40, 41, 42, and 263 ("organisme grammatical"). Students attending FdS's second course noted: "Si nous préférons, ne parlons pas d'organisme mais de système. Cela vaut mieux et revient au même." (CLG(E), 59).


4 See Brugmann, Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1904; repr. Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1970), p. viii, note: our italics. Our attention was drawn to this passage by Prof. W. K. Percival of Kansas Univ. (Op. cit., p. vi, note 1). We give a complete ref. of Wegener since he fell into oblivion soon thereafter (for an exception, cf. Firth in PiL, 181-2, and Firth, 1968: 203, note 30, where ref. to Sir A. H. Gardiner's recognition of Wegener is made).

5 Paul (1909:108f. = 1880:66f.), and this is something which we overlooked in earlier discussion (cf. 1.3.2.2.3, and our article "Hermann Paul and Synchronic Linguistics" to appear in Lingua, vol. 28), also spoke of "syntaktische Verbindungen" and "syntaktische Zusammenfügung", i.e. syntactic connections and, to use a modern term, concatenation, but he fails to see that combinations such as "das Haus meines Vaters" constitute quite a different kind of grouping than those he exemplified by contrasting "Knabe" and "Mädchen" or "sterben" and "Tod", "gebe": "gab" = "sage" : "sagte", or "singe" vs. "Gesang", etc. (Paul, 1909:107f.). Again, it may be asked whether Paul's lack of formal clarity did not induce FdS not only to criticize him but to establish his own contrastive views, as he did on other occasions.

6 Quoted from Geneva School Reader, p. 31 (1969).

7 Godel entitled the extracts "Morphologie" (Geneva School Reader, 26-38) and "Linguistique statique: quelques principes généraux"
We shall use the abbreviation Reader in the present discussion to refer to Geneva School Reader.

FdS's use of "phonétique" in the sense of "l'étude des évolutions des sons" (cf. CLG, 55f.) does not seem to have been a idiosyncrasy of FdS's. Henry Sweet (1845-1912) for example used the term "phonology" in the sense of "phonetics" in his 1877 Presidential address to the Philological Society and in the preface to his New English Grammar of 1891; cf. the relevant quotations in The Indispensable Foundation: A Selection from the Writings of Henry Sweet ed. by Eugénie J. A. Henderson (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), p. vii. However, in his History of Language (London: Temple, 1900), p. 12 (cf. op. cit., p. 28) he appears to have abandoned this term noting in 1911 that the "originally synonymous term, 'phonology', is now restricted to the history and theory of sound-changes." (Op. cit., 34).

FdS mentions no particular linguist but it may be recalled that B. Delbrück, in his Einleitung in das Sprachstudium (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1880), pp. 75f., 84, 90f., and elsewhere, denied the reality of stems and roots and admitted only the heuristic value of these forms, views which Kruszewski criticized in his Œrk nauki o jazyke (Kazan: Tipografia Imperatorskago Univ., 1883), 6f.; cf. Kruszewski, 1884:298f. (Note that FdS owned a copy of Kruszewski, 1884ff.).

Note that we have tried to present FdS's train of thoughts somewhat more formally and have introduced the numbering of the various steps in his argument but hope not to have distorted it in its essence; cf. Geneva School Reader, 30.

In a later section Saussure treats historical morphology when he illustrates the change of grammatical forms as substitution for old forms by newly created forms which have their source in analogy (though other forms of decomposition and recomposition may be envisaged; cf. Reader 34ff., esp. p. 37).


Of historical interest at least is the fact that A. Marty wished to call syntax the theory which deals with combinations of signs; cf. his Über den Ursprung der Sprache (Würzburg: A. Stuber, 1875), p. 107, and Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der Allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie (Halle/S.: M. Niemeyer, 1908), p. 532, note.

Godel's careful compilation of the last few lectures FdS gave in summer 1911 is singularly instructive for this purpose; s. Geneva School Reader, 39-52.

CLG(E), 280, for example, reveals that FdS spoke 1) of "un rapport de signifiant à signifié" in the case of enseignement : armement :
rendement, and 2) of an "association du signifié" in the case of enseignement : instruction : apprentissage : éducation,

16 Rey (1970:42) quotes a passage from Douchet and N. Beauzée's article on grammar in the Encyclopédie ed. by Diderot and d'Alembert, where the authors state: "La valeur des mots consiste dans la totalité des idées que l'usage a attachées à chaque mot."

17 Note that Dégallier wrote: "Il n'y a dans la langue (état de langue) que des différences." CLG(E), 270). Cf. also the notes of E. Constantin (ibid.) which indicate that FdS stressed again the synchronic viewpoint.
2.2.4.3 Post-Saussurean Developments of the Nature of Language as a System of Relations

As in previous instances, e.g. the distinction between synchrony and diachrony (cf. 2.2.2.3) and the theory of signs (cf. 2.2.3.3), Saussure's ideas about syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations have not been developed to the point where they could be incorporated into a general theory of language analysis. This does not mean that Saussure's concepts have not been ignored by the majority of linguists; indeed there have appeared during the past thirty years some one hundred articles and studies devoted to this aspect of Saussure's theory. Curiously enough, both Bally and Sechehaye, who defended and partly developed his principles further, do not seem to have ever ventured to direct their attention to these components of Saussure's theory of language which in our view are quite important. As a matter of fact linguists have only become aware of Saussure's momentous suggestions during the last two decades or so and in particular do not seem to have realized the impact of Saussure's concept of the syntagm. Despite the editors' warning that syntagmatics should not be confused with syntax (CLG, 170, note) and Saussure's argument that the latter should be regarded as constituting only a part of the former (CLG, 188), very few scholars have seriously considered this distinction and, as a result, have interpreted Saussure's concept of the syntagm in the sense of phrase or have completely abandoned
it in favour of morpheme, moneme, or some other term. Even so, in 1968, N. Chomsky, the most influential living theorist of language, could denounce Saussure's distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations by claiming that they were introduced so as to serve as what Saussure (and his followers) thought to be the only proper methods of linguistic analysis, namely segmentation and classification. While Chomsky is essentially correct insofar as the last part of his claim is concerned, his contention that Saussure created these principles merely for the purpose of language segmentation and classification and his subsequent argument that Saussure showed little interest in syntax (s. Chomsky, 1968:17) reveals that he has not understood what Saussure meant by syntagmatics. Moreover, Chomsky has chosen to ignore the fact that Saussure's principles of analysis have to be viewed within the framework of his attempt at a synthesis, an overall theory of communication systems, i.e. semiology. To characterize Saussure's proposals as "taxonomic" suggests a mono-dimensional interpretation of his ideas. 4

However, this misconception and misinterpretation of Saussure's ideas about syntagmatic and associative relations in language dates back at least to Hjelmslev's paper of 1936 read on the occasion of the Fourth International Congress of Linguists. It was there that Hjelmslev suggested that "associative" be replaced by "paradigmatic" in order to avoid Saussure's psychologism. 5 This replacement of Saussure's original term may well have contributed to the formality of Hjelmslev's statements in his Prolegomena (cf. PTL, 84f.) and has certainly led to an over-simplification of the facts of language; moreover, and this is of particular concern in the present context, it has also led to a serious distortion of what Saussure had in mind. If may be said that Saussure made a number of concessions to the paradigm of his own time and allowed for more psychological considerations in his linguistic argument than would appear necessary in the eyes of modern theorists of language. 6 We must note however that he clearly tried to free his theory from psychological notations when, in his last course, he introduced the pair signifié/signifiant to replace the terms "image acoustique" and "concept".
In his chapter on syntagmatic and associative relations, Saussure did in fact speak of "paradigmes de flexion" (CLG, 175), and there is every reason to believe that he would have made specific use of this term if he had thought that it represented adequately the mental operations underlying speech. But Saussure did not do so, as the recent reconstruction of his last lectures reveal. There he referred to coordination syntagmatique or the "sphère des rapports syntagmatiques" and coordination associative. For instance, Saussure noted that a word such as enseignement can be linked to three kinds of associative series: 1) with enseigner, enseignons, enseigne, etc.; 2) with armement, rendement, etc., and 3) with instruction, apprentissage, education, etc., and we may assume that he would have admitted to another series which associates enseignement with instructeur, école, apprendre, etc. There can be no doubt that these observations are much closer to the actual facts of language and language production than the rather impoverished concept of paradigmatic relations, a concept which, regrettably, has become generally accepted at the expense of the more productive idea of association.

We are at present not able to establish with certainty whether J. R. Firth's ideas about collocation and ordered series (cf. PiL, 196 and 228) owe certain insights to Saussure. However, his "Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-55" presented in 1957 does appear to invite such a conjecture, in particular since his suggestions about collocation and colligation appear in the context of his formulations concerning syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations (cf. Firth, 1968:186, 200f.). In contrast to Saussure who made little actual use of the term structure, Firth took up the term along with system in order to formalize the relation between syntagmatic and paradigmatic ordering of linguistic elements: structures pertain to the ('horizontal') patterning of syntagmatic relations, whereas systems are 'vertical' and refer to paradigmatic relations (s. Firth, 1968:186; cf. also Robins, 1967:214). Quite in agreement with Saussure's views, Firth states that grammatical analysis deals with both kinds of relations, i.e. structures and systems (ibid.). Although Firth is simply content with examples of typical collocations of words (from
English), post-Firthian developments show that this concept can be extended. Indeed Firth himself suggested the term *set* which might be used to account for paradigmatic relations in contrast to 'ordered' collocations (cf. Firth, 1968:180).

In his "Categories of the Theory of Grammar" of 1961, M. A. K. Halliday gave a brief outline of the theoretical prerequisites for a theory of lexis (1961:273-7). Since lexis, in contrast to grammar, represents an open system or a number of open systems, the theory of lexis must provide different categories for its description. Halliday recognizes two fundamental categories which are necessary for this purpose: *collocation* and *set*. He defines them as follows: "Collocation, like structure, accounts for a syntagmatic relation; set like class and system, for a paradigmatic one." (276).

Another neo-Firthian, John McH. Sinclair, in an article written in 1966, suggested the use of the term *collocation* for the practical investigation of lexis arguing that lexis "describes the tendencies of items to collocate with each other". Sinclair proposes an investigation of features such as 'preferred sequences', 'habitual interventions', and similar kinds of conventional co-occurrences and also the general strengths of collocations, and he is confident that statistical tests and computation will resolve many of the questions surrounding the problem of meaning. This is not the place to expatiate on the various implications of Sinclair's suggestions, but if our claim can be substantiated that the concept of collocation (and colligation) is a derivative of Saussure's ideas about syntagmatic (as well as associative) relations, we may refer to at least one trait of Firthian linguistic theory where Saussure's teaching was exploited to a fruitful extent.

However, where a syntagmatic theory is concerned which follows more obviously along Saussurean lines, we have to note with regret that the theories proposed so far have not reached a wider audience, but have remained associated with a particular linguist or restricted group of linguists. During the years 1947 to 1962, for instance, the Czech R. F. Mikuš published more than a dozen articles and studies outlining his
syntagmatics which he claimed to be truly Saussurean. Indeed he polemized against the Swiss H. Frei whom Mourelle-Lema (1969:15) called "the most orthodox" of the Genevan linguists and who, in 1948, suggested procedures of syntagmatic analysis which he developed in the subsequent years. Despite the fact that he presented his ideas in various places and languages, Mikus's suggestions did not attain recognition, partly because of his preoccupation with syntagmatic strings below the level of a phrase and partly because of the polemic tone with which he attacked the theories of others, notably Frei and Tesnière. But whereas Mikus has been sharply criticized and has fallen into oblivion, Frei's proposals, perhaps owing to the upsurge of interest in transformational-generative grammar, have not received the attention they deserve.

The posthumously published work of the late Lucien Tesnière (1893-1954) first appeared to share the fate of Frei and others when it was published in 1959, two years after Chomsky's Syntactic Structures. Tesnière took up a number of Saussurean ideas, in particular what he called the "antinomie de l'ordre structural et de l'ordre linéaire". However, despite the size of the book and the unusual manner of graphic presentation, Tesnière's Éléménts de syntaxe structurale has received more and more attention in recent years, both in Europe and in America. In 1965, when Chomsky's Aspects appeared, a second edition of Tesnière's work was published, an interesting coincidence perhaps. Because of the growing difficulties transformational-generative grammar has had to face in its attempt to solve the problem of semantic statements providing the base of the language under investigation, Tesnière's ideas have been receiving growing attention in recent years. P. Guiraud has recently noted similarities between transformational grammar and Tesnière's dependency grammar, as it has been termed, and attempts have been made to fuse these two theories. However, it may well be that Tesnière's analyses of sentences in a post-Saussurean manner with explicit statements of the various relations of the individual elements within a given syntactic string could lead towards a better understanding of the operation of language and thus mark an important exploitation of ideas proposed by Saussure more than two generations ago.
We have been able to point only to certain fruitful developments which might be taken to imply that a reconsideration of these and other suggestions made by Saussure could produce similarly productive results.

2 S. Geneva School Reader, pp. 8-10 and 21-2 (notes), for a list of Bally's writings, and pp. 10-11 and 22-3 (notes), for a list of Sechehaye's publications.

3 Rey's (1970:107) transl. of Bloomfield's "phrase" (RIL I, 27) by Fr. "syntagme" is quite misleading; in Fds's understanding of the term syntagm could mean only linear combination of two or more meaningful units.

4 It is true that Fds never spoke explicitly of "deep structure" whatever is implied by this term (cf. Chomsky, Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation [Bloomington, Ind.: reproduced by Indiana Univ. Linguistics Club, 1969], for one of his most recent statements on this topic); incidentally Fds made the following statement about the concept of zero within a syntagm: In a "syntagme" the man I have seen "le que est égal à zéro", however "il y a toujours le signe concret à la base, même quand le signe arrive a être zéro" (s. SM, 281 ['zéro']).


7 CLG(E), 289, however, supplies no source for this term; Fds, on his part, employed the term "paradigme" very frequently in his paper, "Accentuation lituanienne", IFAnz 6:157-66 (1896); repr. in Recueil, 526-38, in a sense similar to Firth's use of the term in prosodic analysis (cf. PiL, 128).

8 Cf. Geneva School Reader, 39f.

9 S. op. cit., 40f.; cf. CLG(E), 280.

10 Firth's acquaintance with Fds's doctrine can be inferred from his frequent references to the Cours (and the principles he rejects); cf. PiL 2, 8, 16, 17, 71, 121, 143, 144, 167, 179-81, 183, 186, 190 (note), 217, 218, 227, and elsewhere; cf. also Firth, 1968:127-9.
We suspect that Firth's technical use of expressions such as system, term, sequence, value, in addition to paradigmatic and syntagmatic, is quite "post-Saussurean"; unity and identity (cf. Firth, 1968: 200) could perhaps be added to the list.

Cf. CLG, 180 ("structure du mot"), 256 ("certaines règles de structure [concerning the syllable]"), and 244 where the term is rejected as misleading, together with that of "construction" (cf. CLG(E), 405).

R. A. Hudson's recent statements regarding the views of Fds and Hjelmslev on the one hand, and Firth on the other have to be questioned; Fds did not claim that "paradigmatic relations are at least independent of, and probably logical prior to, syntagmatic relations." Cf. Hudson's articles in Encyclopaedia of Linguistics, 273-80 (1969), at p. 276.

Halliday has pursued his ideas further; cf. his papers, "Class in Relation to the Axes of Chain and Choice in Language", Linguistics 2:5-15 (1963). Note that Halliday states (p. 5, note) that these two terms have been used "in place of their less self-explanatory equivalents 'syntagmatic axis' and 'paradigmatic axis'," and "Lexis as a Linguistic Level", In Memory of J. R. Firth ed. by C. E. Bazell, et al. (London: Longmans, 1966), 148-62.


As Firth argued (and Fds never denied it) J. Lyons (1968:74ff.) points out the interdependence of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations.

For a list of Mikus's publications on this topic, s. Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970, Nos. 1080-94.

For a detailed account of Frei's work in this area, s. René Amacker, "La sintagmatica saussuriana di Henri Frei", La Sintassi: Atti del III convegno internazionale di Studi della Società di Linguistica Italiana (Rome: M. Bulzoni), 45-111.

Cf. E. A. Sedel'nikov's criticisms of Mikus in VJa 7.4:51-4 (1958), and in VJa 10.1:73-82 (1961). Frei's first article on this topic appears to have been his "Note sur l'analyse des syntagmes", Word 4:65-70 (1948); Mikus's attack on Frei appeared in Lingua 3:430-70 (1953).

A. Martinet has tried in recent years to propose principles of syntactic analysis; the success of his suggestions has so far been quite limited. Major portions of his ideas have been included in the following two articles on syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations published in La Linguistique: Oswald Ducrot, "Chaîne parlée: la syntagmatique" (25-34), and "Choix du locuteur: la paradigmatic" (35-45) by Jean-René Reimen.


2.3 Concluding Remarks on the Second Part of the Inquiry

"Oberall sind heute seine [i.e. Saussure's] Scheidungen zwischen "langue" und "parole" (Sprache als System und gesprochene Rede), zwischen statischer oder "synchronischer" und evolutiver oder "diachronischer" (die Einzelheiten historisch ableitender) Sprachwissenschaft, oder seine Lehre vom Wort als sprachlichem "Zeichen" und seiner Willkürlichkeit entweder allgemein anerkannt oder Gegenstand weiterer Bemühungen.

Manu Leumann in 1944 *

... il n'est pas nécessaire que Saussure soit infaillible pour qu'on le reconnaisse comme le père de la linguistique moderne. Saussure a eu le grand mérite - entre autres - montrer la valeur relative des éléments linguistiques; et cette valeur est décrite le plus complètement dans la phrase négligée: "Le mécanisme linguistique tout entier roule sur des identités et des différences."

Eric Buysens in 1952 (CFS 10:50)

In the last paragraph of the chapter introducing the problems of interpreting the *Cours* we have outlined the three main goals of the second part of this investigation (s. 2.1). Following this statement our expressed intentions were to treat the most influential components of Saussure's general theory of language in individual sections each of them divided into three chapters. The first chapter investigated actual or potential antecedents of Saussure's linguistic principles both within the field of language study and in extra-linguistic disciplines, in particular sociology, philosophy, and psychology. It was our intention that this chapter would link the second part of the study closer to the first since we were particularly concerned about the genesis of Saussure's ideas. However, as we have already shown in the
first part of the inquiry, our claim has been, and we believe that we have been able to substantiate it, that Saussure was in no way directly influenced by any of the concepts, principles or theories outside linguistics proper. Saussure's distinction between _langue_ and _parole_ and his frequent reference to the social nature of language, its development and functioning, has been regarded as a clear indication of Durkheim's and possibly also Tarde's influence on him. While we rejected this suggestion in an earlier chapter (cf. 1.2.1.1) referring instead to Whitney (cf. 1.3.1) as Saussure's prime source of inspiration, we have set out our views concerning Saussure's alleged "sociologism" in the section dealing with _langue_, _parole_, and _langage_ (cf. 2.2.1.2) admitting that an indirect influence of Durkheimian ideas on Saussure through the intermediary of Meillet is nevertheless quite likely. This must in no way be taken as a suggestion that Saussure developed his ideas about these three aspects of language only _after_ he had been exposed to current work in sociology but indicates that sociological principles played an important part in shaping the intellectual paradigm of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. In the case of Saussure's distinction between historical and non-historical treatments of language we have been able to show similarly striking parallels between Saussure's argument and ideas put forward in works from philosophy and psychology which were published in the second half of the 19th century (cf. 2.2.2.1). Once again, however, we believe to have found sufficient evidence for our claim that Saussure did not exploit the views propounded in writings outside linguistics to any noticeable extent but that he instead adopted certain notions (which may have had their ultimate source outside linguistics proper) through linguistic publications, for example the studies by Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2.1) and Kruszewski (cf. 1.3.3.3) who, for their part, had made use of psychological and sociological criteria in their theories. A similar, though less clearly indicated, situation prevails in the chapter tracing the lines of tradition enjoyed by the concept of the language sign (cf. 2.2.3.1), although it must be conceded that this concept appears to have had its source in the philosophy of language.
rather than in 'normal' linguistic science. However, even here a direct linguistic source of Saussure's inspiration can be named: Whitney's influential works of 1867 and 1875 (cf. 1.3.1). Where Saussure's distinction between associative (paradigmatic) and syntagmatic relations are concerned, we have again been able to demonstrate his indebtedness to the work of Paul, in particular with reference to the axis of associative relations, and also of Kruszewski in whose work both concepts have clearly been anticipated (cf. 2.2.4.2). All these findings have by no means been brought forward in an attempt to minimize Saussure's accomplishments. Indeed our prime concern was to delineate some of the ideas which were 'in the air' during Saussure's lifetime in order to provide a more adequate basis for a well-judged appreciation of his proposals which may in fact be regarded as revolutionary, i.e. paradigm creating. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that the naïve conception of Saussure as a kind of deus ex machina must be completely abandoned, not only because acceptance of this view would mean a complete distortion of the history of ideas and the development of linguistic thought in particular but also in order to save Saussure from unwarranted attacks from those who, in a complete misunderstanding of the actual facts of the intellectual paradigm of a given period, have tried to discredit Saussure and to suggest that he 'merely' picked up the ideas which others had developed before him by pointing to a number of scholars, both inside and outside the field of linguistic studies. On the other hand, and this we hope to have been able to show to a certain extent in each second chapter of the four central sections of the second part, Saussure was prepared to exploit ideas put forward by his fellow-linguists or by scholars working in other areas of human curiosity; the terms 'zéro' and 'terme', for example, have been derived from mathematics, 'valeur' from economics, and the concept of identity from philosophy, for instance.

The middle chapters of each section are devoted to the second principal object of the inquiry set out in the second part of this study. In an introductory chapter (s. 2.1) we outlined the problems involved in an attempt to re-establish Saussure's original views and to trace the
particular manner in which his ideas evolved during his academic career, possibly also dating back to his attempt as a boy of 15 to construct a universal proto-language from which all existing languages have derived. These difficulties have their source not only in the manner in which Bally and Sechehaye compiled the *Cours*, although the fact that they based their reconstruction of Saussure's lectures mainly on students' notes (not their own) and only a limited number of Saussure's own papers covering the period 1891-1911 may be offered in mitigation, but also in the simple fact that Saussure never codified his views at any time to an extent which would permit us to establish particular steps in the development of his ideas. At least this impression will prevail as long as many of the rediscovered autograph manuscripts remain unpublished and the date of their composition established.

In these chapters however we believe we have been successful in our attempt to suggest the manner in which Saussure's ideas have taken shape from his early writings in the late 1870s to the last lectures on general linguistics in summer 1911. At the same time we have also tried to show that not all the particular ingredients of Saussure's linguistic theory developed during roughly the same time and in a more or less clearly delineated form of logical progression. Quite the contrary was the case and suggestions of a logical progression derived from the imposition of an order resulting from attempts to assess his theoretical argument from a post-Saussurean angle fail to recognize Saussure's partial dependence on the vistas of his own time. In fact it will be noted that contrary to what the theorist of today might expect, Saussure developed his distinction between synchrony and diachrony much earlier, in fact probably some twenty-five years earlier, than the one between *langue* and *parole*. It would be unfair, however, to accuse Saussure of lack of clarity in his argument, though it is only just to state that he developed his ideas initially mainly in opposition to neogrammarian views about language and its study. It was certainly not easy for him to formulate these ideas in a logically coherent manner since throughout his life he remained influenced by the (neogrammarian)
paradigm of which he was a part. Thus he appears to have begun to oppose
the neogrammarian views by attacking their claim that language can only
be treated scientifically from an historical point of view, whereas
when he tried much later to define the proper object of linguistics and
to specify in which way language was to be regarded as a system, a system
of signs and, in a more rigorous manner, a system of mutually related,
i.e. interdependent, terms, Saussure realized the necessity for distin-
guishing between language as 1) a code agreed upon by a given speech
community and as 2) the underlying system which permits each individual
member to speak and to understand the language, on the one hand, with the
individual speech act not necessarily susceptible to systematic analysis
on the other.

We also believe to have shown that it is somewhat exaggerated to
argue, as Godel and Engler tend to suggest (and it is from this point
of view that their compilation of a glossary of Saussurean terms must
be criticized since it fails to indicate clearly the evolution of his
views), that Saussure's ideas put forward in his lectures on general
linguistics (1907-11) were essentially identical with those he cherished
in the 1890s. Indeed there are at least two major arguments to contradict
such an opinion. Firstly, as we have noted on several occasions (cf.
1.2, 1.3.2.1, and 1.4), there was at the beginning of this century an
increased awareness of general linguistic problems (cf. the works of
Croce [1902], Vossler [1904], Finck [1905] and also of Wundt [1900ff.],
Dittrich [1903], and others), a development which was recognized not
only by a neogrammarian such as Delbrück in the fourth edition of his
Einleitung of 1904 but also by Brugmann who has generally been regarded
as the leader of the neogrammarian movement. ¹ Secondly, and this is
certainly no less important, Saussure did in fact introduce a number of
terms and distinctions which should logically have been introduced either
before the second (cf. the langue-parole distinction) or even the third
(e.g. the pair signifié/signifiant) course. Indeed many ideas which
he had envisaged in the 1890s did not receive a rigorous formulation
before these last two courses.
The third and last chapters of the four central sections of the inquiry were devoted to the discussion of post-Saussurean developments of what we believe to be the most influential components of Saussure's theory: 1) the synchrony/diachrony distinction; 2) the langue/parole dichotomy; 3) the theory of the language sign, and 4) the rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs. As is well known, Saussure's influence has been largely through a given set of terms which have been interpreted differently by linguists rather than by complete acceptance of his theory by a given group of scholars. This fact has permitted and indeed obliged us to trace various post-Saussurean developments along these lines as we have pointed out earlier (cf. 0.0, and 2.2.4). Our constant concern has been, for the larger part of our discussion, to relate a given aspect of Saussure's doctrine to the rest of his theory, e.g. we have shown how the synchrony/diachrony distinction presupposes the langue/parole dichotomy, and presented further concepts which are of importance to a given component, e.g. the concept of language stage.

We recognized that, even though we have attempted repeatedly to interrelate a particular feature of Saussure's theory with other aspects, we have by no means covered all particular ingredients of the Cours, some of which are certainly no less influential than those referred to above. We have had to omit the troublesome distinction between form and substance, a distinction which was to become very important for Hjelmslev's Prolegomena for instance (cf. PTL, 23, 49f., 76-8, etc.), because we regard this to be an epistemological rather than a linguistic problem. There are a number of other concepts pertaining to Saussure's understanding of linguistic mechanism which have not received the attention theorists of language might well require, and indeed the main reason for their neglect has been the necessity for limiting the size of the present study. We are however convinced that the four aspects of Saussure's theory selected for our discussion suffice to illustrate our argument. Indeed, important developments, particularly in phonological theory and research, have had their ultimate source in statements such as "dans la langue il n'y a que des différences ... sans termes positifs" (CLG, 166) or Saussure's concept of opposition (CLG, 167)
or his remark that he could envisage a science "qui prend pour point de départ les groupes binaires" (CLG, 78). In connection with these claims it would have been interesting to investigate to what extent Saussure might have been influenced by Hegel's philosophy (cf. 2.2.1.1), in particular since Saussure refers quite frequently to the concept of identity in his linguistic argument (cf. CLG, 150f., 154, 249f.; s. also SM, 136-41). The recent revival of interest in Hegelian philosophy among French structuralists appears to support our impression that there is a certain affinity between Hegel's ideas and Saussure's linguistic thought, an impression which would require a thorough study of Hegel's philosophy to substantiate. Our present investigation, however, cannot but suggest areas of further research (cf. 1.2.1) which may lead to a more profound and detailed account of the philosophical framework within which scholars and scientists worked during the last two or three decades of the 19th century.

We stated earlier (cf. end of 2.1) that each of the individual aspects of Saussure's theory which we have discussed in this part of the study merits extensive treatment. Indeed Saussure's suggestions are so interrelated with the intellectual paradigm of his own time and contain so many fruitful ideas that each influential concept needs to be analyzed in depth before a synthesis of his proposals as a whole can hope to be successful. Saussure's famous statement "c'est le point de vue qui crée l'objet" (CLG, 23; cf. also CLG, 38; CFS 22:57f., and elsewhere) not only indicates the nature of his particular way of approaching linguistic problems but also serves to point to the intrinsic mental character of the object of investigation as well as the necessary precedence of theoretical considerations over and above the activities of 'normal science', to use a Kuhnian term. Despite the almost sketchy treatment of the four principal components of Saussure's theory and their 20th-century development, we believe that the following general conclusions can be drawn with regard to the evolution of the Saussurean paradigm: 1) For a number of reasons, both political and cultural, Saussure's ideas did not become the general property of linguistic scholarship until the late 1950s,
and even then they were discussed as a more or less complete theory by only a comparatively small number of linguists; 2) the majority of those linguists who eventually did venture to analyze Saussurean views contented themselves with either pointing to inaccuracies or apparent contradictions in the *Cours* and tended to discredit Saussure's suggestions as a whole by concentrating their critique on a particular ingredient they disliked or could not accept; 3) it is rather safe to say that theory has played only a marginal rôle in the linguistic discussion of the post-Saussurean era; methodological procedures have frequently been mistaken for theory and some scholars have deluded themselves into mistaking the attainment of a higher level of abstraction for purely theoretical work, and 4) even theorists of the stature of Louis Hjelmslev who prided themselves on their truly Saussurean approach to language must be criticized for having failed to discuss important parts of the theory propounded in the *Cours*; they too adopted those aspects which they found attractive and in accordance with their own preconceived ideas and discarded, often without appropriate discussion, many other ingredients of Saussurean theory. We have on occasion (cf. 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.4.3) referred to this deplorable attitude which we found very obvious in Hjelmslev's *Prolegomena* and in a number of his other publications, and we have drawn attention to these shortcomings in Hjelmslev's theory especially because he has come to be regarded as the scholar in our century who has given priority to theory in his linguistic work.

The second part of the investigation has almost exclusively been concerned with linguistic matters. We referred on occasion (cf. 2.2.3.3) to the fact that particular aspects of Saussure's theory have been adopted and indeed exploited by scholars outside linguistics proper, viz. the 'structuralist' components of the *Cours* have appealed to anthropologists, in particular Claude Lévi-Strauss, the semiological proposals and other principles of Saussure's theory have found partisans in the fields of philosophy (e.g. Merleau-Ponty) and literary criticism and theory (e.g. Barthes). However, extra-linguistic developments of the period following the publication of the *Cours* are only of marginal value for the present
purpose, though they may be an indication of the far-reaching effects Saussure's ideas have generated. The explicit goal of the second part, in particular the last chapters of each major section, has been to analyze the diffusion of Saussurean ideas within linguistics. The more general acceptance of what we may call, in accordance with our second use of the term (cf. 2.0), the Saussurean paradigm, has been delayed by particular circumstances which we accounted for in earlier discussion (cf. 2.1).

Even if we take the external situation in Europe into consideration, and this may perhaps explain some of the "victoire retardée" the Cours encountered, the following facts remain: 1) Although there have already been two generations of linguists since the publication of Saussure's lectures on general linguistics, the promise inherent in the ideas laid down in the Cours has not yet been fulfilled, i.e. many of the suggestions put forward by Saussure have not yet been adequately exploited, re-interpreted and developed to conform with our present state of knowledge; 2) Saussure's theory has not been taken as a whole but instead only certain aspects, usually in complete disregard of their particular context, have been exploited (which is poor science), the Cours being regarded more as a quarry where anyone may pick up the stones which he thinks fit for his own edifice than as an over-all theory of language which has mutatis mutandis to be comprehended as a unity; 3) many linguists do not appear to have realized yet that a) it is the awareness of one's own theoretical framework and the recognition by the linguist of the precedence of theory over and above the engagement in the practical study of language which permits linguistics to be rightfully called a science, and b) that it is the obligation of the scientist to engage in what T. S. Kuhn has termed "mopping-up operations", i.e. in working out the theoretical framework which Saussure outlined; 4) present linguistic work suggests an increase of interest in and attention to the theoretical aspects of language study, and there are some indications that important components of Saussure's theory are now being tackled again, but with more theoretical rigour and a deeper understanding of the Cours as
a whole. Godel's *Sources manuscrites*, Engler's critical edition of the *Cours*, and other publications by both scholars have provided the basis for a renewed and invigorated attempt to solve the many remaining problems put forth in Saussure's work and encouragement for the concerned linguist to face up to the responsibilities of the scientist: to clear up his own backyard and sharpen his tools before engaging in the activities of normal science.
FOOTNOTES - 2.3


1 In the preface to his *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen* (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1904), Brugmann noted: "Man wird sich nämlich hier im Lauf der Jahre mehr und mehr um Bücher wie H. Paul's Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, Ph. Wegener's Grundfragen des Sprachlebens und E. Sievers' Grundzüge der Phonetik zu bekümmern gelernt haben und sieht infolge davon unsere auf die Geschichte der einzelnen Sprachen gehenden Arbeiten mit anderen Augen an als bisher." (vi, note 1).

2 S. the following two important articles on this topic: F. Hintze, "Zum Verhältnis der sprachlichen 'Form' zur 'Substanz'", *SL* 3:86-106 (1949), and Eli Fischer-Jørgensen, "Form and Substance in Glossematics", *AL* 10:1-33. For further ref., s. *Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970*, Part I, Section 4. (e).

3 Cf. the section, "Writings on Further Notions of Saussurean Origin, such as Opposition in Language, and the Distinctive, Negative, and (possibly) Binary Relations between its Elements", *Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970*, Nos. 1185-1254, for further references.

4 Thus we find the following passage in the French translation of Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* of 1812-16 which appeared in Paris in 1859: "Le négatif représente donc tout l'opposition qui, en tant qu'opposition, repose sur elle-même; il est la différence absolue, sans aucun rapport avec autre chose; en tant qu'opposition, il est exclusif d'identité et, par conséquent, de lui-même; car, en tant que rapport à soi, il se définit comme étant cette identité même qu'il exclut." We quote from G. W. F. Hegel, *Science de la logique*, vol. II (Paris: Aubier, 1947), p. 58. For the G. text, s. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, new ed., vol II (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1966), 54-5.

5 Note that the CLG appeared first in 1916, in the midst of the First World War, and that the G. and Russ. transl. of 1931 and 1933 respectively appeared at a time when G. scholarship, proud of and dependent on her heritage and also owing to particular social and political developments, isolated herself from international linguistics, and that Marxism and Stalinism in Russia had quite a similar effect; the Span. transl. appeared in 1945 in Argentina, and not in Spain.

3.0 CONCLUSION: Saussure's *Cours* and the State of Linguistic Science

Die paritätische Verbindung von Mikroskopie und Makroskopie bildet das Ideal der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit; in Wirklichkeit kommt meistens die eine gegenüber der anderen zu kurz.

Hugo Schuchardt in 1909*

Même si le Cours de linguistique générale de Ferdinand de Saussure devait un jour être vieilli dans toutes ses parties, il serait destiné à vivre encore dans le souvenir de la science du langage à cause de l'action puissante et féconde qu'il a exercée à un moment de son évolution.

Albert Sechehaye in 1940 (VR 5:1)

Nous disons ici que Saussure appartient désormais à l'histoire de la pensée européenne. Précurseur des doctrines qui ont depuis cinquante ans transformé la théorie du langage, il a jeté des vues inoubliables sur la faculté la plus haute et la plus mystérieuse de l'homme . . .

Emile Benveniste in 1963 (CFS 20:21)

Our study has been inspired above all by a twofold concern; firstly, we believe that two generations after the publication of the *Cours* general linguistic theory has not yet been accorded its proper place in linguistics, and secondly that the history of linguistic thought has not yet attained an acceptable level of maturity. While we note that in recent years, perhaps largely as a result of Chomsky's *Aspects* of 1965, more scholars have directed their attention to the discussion of general problems in linguistic theory, the history of these ideas which has occupied the human mind ever since an awareness of language developed, however, is still in leading strings.
Although linguistic theory and the history of its development can to a certain extent be treated as separate components of linguistic science, we maintain that both aspects are in many respects interrelated. First of all, the theory of language and the history of linguistics are both concerned with the results of reflection on human speech, the main distinction being that the former adopts the "synchronic" and the latter the "diachronic" viewpoint so to speak. Secondly, the theorist of today, though he may delude himself that he is starting *ab ovo* when he proposes a certain principle or theorem, cannot divest himself totally from either the intellectual environment of his own time in general or the culturally transmitted ideas about language in particular. It is not necessary to have read the so-called histories of linguistics to have knowledge of previous opinions about language; our upbringing, cultural heritage, and to a certain extent the society surrounding us inculcate us with many ideas which we eventually tend to consider as the result of our own creative capacities. Thirdly, the history of linguistics can only be adequately presented by those who engage or who have previously engaged in the activities of 'normal science'; the philosophically-minded enthusiast who has recognized that the history of linguistics may well represent the history of ideas *par excellence* might do more harm than good to this field of (potentially) scholarly activity unless he has received a formal training in linguistics in general. Finally, linguistics -- and we wish to point to its theoretical aspects in particular -- cannot be rightly regarded as a mature science unless it has established a link with and a general awareness of its past. It is our conviction that, while advances in linguistic theory may be said to precede the codification of its results within the history of linguistics, it would be naïve to believe that our present discoveries about the nature of language could have been possible without the previous endeavours of man to investigate it. The recognition of our predecessors therefore is not merely an act of reverence rendered to those whom we arrogantly regard as exponents of theories which have become obsolete and possibly irrelevant or even false but more a sign of intellectual honesty and general awareness that we owe so much to our ancestors.
whether we agree with them or oppose their suggestions.

However, the request for an appropriate recognition of our ancestors appears premature, not because of any suspicion that linguistics might not yet have reached the status of an autonomous science -- in recent years certain trends which threaten this status, both from within and without may have developed -- but simply because the epistemological basis for the history of linguistics has not yet, to any serious degree, been established. Until the theoretical framework of an historiography has been developed, one cannot expect the linguist to take very seriously those publications which pretend to be historical accounts of the way in which our forefathers thought about language but which only too frequently fall short of the basic requirements of scholarship and scientific expertise, namely a well-defined frame of reference within which they may define their activities and a thorough first-hand acquaintance with primary sources.

As far as the first basic requirement, namely that of an epistemology for the history of linguistics, is concerned, our study cannot be regarded as representing anything more than a first attempt to approach this problem seriously and to suggest ways in which further research should be conducted. The other no less important prerequisite, i.e. a firm grasp of the *res gestae*, should be discussed in conjunction with the former, but it should also be pointed out at this stage that for one thing the history of linguistics cannot be written by relying on other "histories" of linguistics.\(^1\)

It has been our conviction all along that linguistics belongs to the human and social sciences and that no serious student of language can ignore the fact that his object of investigation cannot be regarded in isolation from other phenomena associated with it, although particular forms of research may demand that such abstraction be made. If it is agreed that language is a psychical and not a physical entity, then reflections about its nature and mechanism are at least another step removed from physical verification. Indeed, it is our claim that the history of linguistics, once established as a serious discipline within the human sciences, will represent the history of ideas *par excellence*,

\(^1\)
a claim which to our knowledge has not been made so far in the literature (cf. 0.0), perhaps because one is faced with what philosophers have termed the "Problem der Selbstverständlichkeit". We have made this assumption because we believe that no other discipline within the Arts, including literature and philosophy, reflects the intellectual paradigm of a given period quite so conspicuously as the discussions about language, be it in Plato's Cratylus, Thomas of Erfurt's Grammatica speculativa, Schleicher's Compendium or Saussure's Cours.

Starting from these premisses the historian of linguistics would have to engage in research aimed at re-establishing the general intellectual atmosphere prevailing at a time when a given scholar, whose work became very important for subsequent investigations, formed his ideas. This is by no means easily achieved and much reading of extra-linguistic literature of the period in consideration must be done before a well-judged and adequate basis for the assessment of a given linguistic theory can be established. We maintain that unless such a preliminary investigation is made the achievement of a particular author cannot be placed in proper perspective and failure to do this may easily lead to unjustified criticism and hasty dismissal of his proposals. This should not be taken as an argument for the retention of a given view which, if the intellectual paradigm has undergone a noticeable change, can no longer be maintained; in fact, the linguist who rejects a particular theory does not reject the theory as such (since considering its socio-historical setting it may have been adequate at that time) but the paradigm of which the theory was a reflection.

With these general considerations in mind, we decided to choose a work with whose contents every linguist of today is familiar in one way or the other, i.e. either through individual reading of the work itself or through acquaintance with more recent linguistic publications which directly or indirectly have absorbed and reworked many of its ideas. Perhaps because of its continuing impact on contemporary debate in linguistic theory it has been difficult to view Saussure's principles in their proper historical perspective. Moreover, their history is fairly recent, and it appears less difficult to re-establish the important
currents of Saussure's own time than those of earlier periods in the development of linguistic thought. Despite these apparent advantages, i.e. the chronological proximity and wide-spread acquaintance with Saussurean ideas, it cannot be said that the Cours has been adequately treated and interpreted by the majority of scholars; in fact, most of the criticisms levelled against certain aspects of Saussure's teachings reveal a lack of historical perspective on the part of the critic, and many of those who tend to praise Saussure excessively do not show themselves to be better informed. Indeed, it appears that the Cours is generally regarded as the result of a creative act on the part of a genius who, similar to what schoolbooks relate about Copernicus, broke completely with tradition and put forward a structural view of language to replace the "atomistic" treatment of linguistic phenomena by his predecessors, in particular the neogrammarians. No doubt this tendency to regard Saussure as something like a creator ex nihilo made his theory vulnerable, whereas there are in fact definite indications that even a great man, such as Saussure undoubtedly was, could not escape the impact of the intellectual atmosphere of his own time. On the other hand, the achievements of Saussure's predecessors as well as those of his contemporaries have not only been neglected but downgraded to such an extent that many linguists of today do not think it worth while to consider their ideas seriously. It has been a part of our study to remedy these and other misleading preconceptions and to rectify a number of the biased views held by contemporary linguists and perpetuated in the "histories" of linguistics which have appeared in recent years. Indeed it is a serious misunderstanding to regard Saussure as a modern linguist in any respect and attempts to make him infallible have led to (at times unwarranted) attacks which would not have been made otherwise. Saussure's greatness cannot be established by simply acclaiming the originality of his ideas, a claim which could in most instances be easily refuted by the informed historian of linguists, but precisely by demonstrating how much Saussure was a part of the intellectual paradigm of his own time. In other words, by putting Saussure in his historical context we may appreciate both his intellectual achievement in welding the ideas of his
time together into a general theory of language and the superiority of
his theory in comparison with those put forward by his contemporaries. 3

Our present study constitutes such an attempt, i.e. to place
Saussure in proper historical perspective by trying to establish what we
have termed, following T. S. Kuhn's suggestion, a paradigm of the late
19th century in Western Europe. We discussed in particular Saussure's
alleged sociologism since it appears to have become a fable convenue in
histories of linguistics to claim that Saussure was heavily influenced
by Durkheimian sociology (cf. 1.2.1.1). We have also investigated the
possible influence of Tarde's and Walras' economic theories on Saussure
in order to establish whether certain suggestions made in recent years
can be verified (cf. 1.2.1.2), and have also considered other intellect-
ual currents of the last quarter of the 19th century, in particular
psychology.

The result of our investigations can be summed up as follows: 1) We
have found no evidence that there has been any direct influence by
Durkheim, Comte or Tarde or any other sociologist on Saussure; however,
there are two major sources through which Saussure became acquainted with
sociological notions: a) Whitney's emphasis on the social nature of
language, his distinction between the individual and the community in his
attempt to explain linguistic change, and a number of other related sug-
gestions (cf. 1.3.1), and b) Meillet's programmatic article in 1906 in
which he made use of Durkheimian ideas for the definition of language
(cf. 2.2.1.2). This means that, while direct influence of sociological
theories on Saussure's linguistic thought has to be denied, there is
sufficient evidence for our claim that Spencerian (through Whitney) and
Durkheimian (by the intermediary of Meillet) sociological notions made
their way into Saussure's argument. In any case sociology played an
important part in the late 19th century, and hardly anyone could have
escaped its pervasive influence. 2) Similar observations have been made
concerning other extra-linguistic influences, although, in the case of
political economy, we have no found any linguistic publication of the
time in which the notion of value for instance had been anticipated. It
appears that Saussure derived this idea from economic theory which became
very important in the last three decades of the 19th century (cf. 1.2.1.2); the comparison of language with money or words with pieces of money, however, has been a literary *topos* for more than two millenia. 3) Other extra-linguistic influences on Saussure, in particular psychological notions, can be traced back to *linguistic* writings of Saussure's own time, especially to the work of H. Paul (who, for his part, adopted Herbartian psychology) and Kruszewski (who made use of the psychology of Bain, James, and earlier British associationists).

On the whole our conviction has been that Saussure's ideas, though they have absorbed notions anticipated outside linguistics proper -- and we may recall that apart from *valeur*, a term from economy, other terms such as *zéro* and *terme* were derived from mathematics, for instance -- have been the result of his reflections on essentially linguistic problems. It is therefore not surprising that essential parts of Saussure's theory of language had been anticipated, in one way or the other, in earlier linguistic writings or in publications of his own time. 5

Apart from having established that Saussure was, in many respects, impregnated by the intellectual paradigm of his own time, the bulk of the first part of the inquiry was devoted to tracing the linguistic sources of Saussure's theories. We have shown, and we believe quite convincingly, that the neogrammarians, in particular Paul and Sievers, were by no means as "atomistic" in their approach to linguistic analysis as the majority of authors of "histories" of linguistics would like to have us believe. Indeed, we think that there is sufficient evidence for our claim that, next to Whitney, Paul's *Prinzipien* was a major source of Saussure's inspiration, both by suggesting certain linguistic concepts and distinctions of theoretical importance (cf. 1.3.2.1-3) and by inviting criticism of and opposition to his ideas. Some may regret that Baudouin de Courtenay never codified his views, except for those pertaining to phonological analysis in his *Versuch einer Theorie phonetischer Alternationen* of 1895; this may be of some significance because our investigation has not found much evidence for recent claims that he influenced Saussure's linguistic thought considerably (cf. 1.3.3.2). In contrast to Baudouin, his pupil, M. Kruszewski, who had received formal
training in psychology and logic before specializing in linguistic re-
search, appears to have made a more profound impact on Saussure. Indeed,
we have shown that Kruszewski, who made extensive use of the concept of
association, suggested perhaps more clearly than Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2.3) the
distinction between paradigmatic and associative relations in
language, and also, with insight comparable to Paul's (cf. 1.3.2.2.1),
the distinction between descriptive and historical aspects of language
study.

In contrast to the influence of Whitney, the neogrammarians, and
the leaders of the Kazan school, our findings cannot support other
recent claims, to wit that linguists in the Humboldtian tradition have
had an important impact on Saussure's theory of language. Furthermore,
although we have been able to establish that, contrary to what some
"histories" of linguistics suggest, there has been an uninterrupted line
in the tradition of Humboldtian ideas of the 19th century (cf. 1.3.4),
no strong evidence could be found that G. von der Gabelentz's
Sprachwissenschaft of 1891 (2nd ed., 1901) or the writings by F. N. Finck
(cf. 1.3.4.2 and 1.3.4.3 respectively) had an important impact on
Saussure's linguistic thought.

While the first part of the study was devoted to elucidating the
nature of the intellectual paradigm of Saussure's own time and to a
substantial account of how strongly it influenced his linguistic argument
(cf. 1.4), the second part constitutes a limited attempt to show how
major aspects of the new linguistic paradigm constructed by Saussure on
the plinth of the old have evolved during the fifty-five years following
the publication of the Cours in 1916. In other words, our study covers
roughly the period of 1870 to 1915 in the first part (1.0), though
earlier periods have not been completely ignored (cf. 1.2, 1.3, 1.3.4),
i.e. the span of time which we may call the paradigm of Saussure's own
time, and the period between 1916 and 1970 in the second (2.0). However,
the link between the second part and the first is the first chapter of
each of the four major sections of this part in which particular atten-
tion has been devoted to the question of precursors of Saussure's most
influential distinctions and concepts, i.e. langue vs. parole (2.2.1.1),
synchrony vs. diachrony (2.2.2.1), the language sign and its properties (2.2.3.1), and syntagmatic and associative relations between linguistic elements (2.2.4.1).

Indeed the historical perspective has been predominant in the discussions of Saussure's linguistic theory not only in each of the first chapters of the sections but also throughout our attempt to re-establish Saussure's actual concepts and their evolution during his own life-time, something which is urgently needed for contemporary debates on linguistic theory (which, we would argue, cannot escape Saussurean ideas). The publications of Saussure's own papers and students' notes by Godel (1955ff.) and Engler (1959ff.) have provided the basis for such an undertaking, but until all of Saussure's papers have appeared and the time of their composition established, a number of questions must remain unanswered.

However, it is doubtful whether these recent efforts will have a great impact on the further development of the (post-) Saussurean paradigm. After all, apart from the works of De Mauro (1965ff.), Derossi (1965), Lieb (1968, 1970), and a few others, linguists have by and large chosen to ignore the existence of the critical edition of the Cours as well as other publications intended to rectify and re-assess Saussure's original ideas. This is not the place to introduce implications of intellectual laziness, but this state of affairs does indicate, in our view, a complacency which we do not think linguistics can afford if it wishes to be looked upon as a science. Indeed self-respect which is based on one's own conviction of having achieved something worth while constitutes the first step towards mature science; however, it is of prime importance to have defined the object of one's particular field, but even more important to have articulated the theoretical framework within which one's own scientific activity should be pursued.

Saussure has given us both, the definition of the object of investigation and the axioms by which linguistic research should be carried out. Saussure's dependence on the paradigm of his own time as well as other perhaps more accidental circumstances prevented him from expounding his own theory in more detail; many of his ideas were, as far as the necessary
rigour of statement and their theoretical consequences are concerned, very much ahead of his time and will therefore explain their author's hesitation. For the linguist of today it is quite easy to find fault with a number of Saussure's suggestions; most of them can be explained by features characteristic of the paradigm prevailing in late 19th-century Western Europe, i.e. sociologism, psychologism, and positivism. However, once these aspects have been removed, Saussure's ideas will appear much more acceptable and adequate, and in fact we maintain that it is the duty of the linguist of the post-Saussurean era to sift the chaff from the proposals made in the *Cours*, to redefine the essential components of Saussure's theory, and to do so in our own terms.

In the four central sections of the second part of the inquiry, in particular in the third chapter of each section, we have discussed the way in which modern linguists have attempted to exploit or perhaps more aptly their failure to expound Saussure's linguistic theory. We noted on several occasions that Saussure's impact on 20th-century linguistics has been largely by means of isolated components of his general theory of language (cf. 2.1, 2.2.2.3, and elsewhere), an observation which we find especially deplorable in those instances where the theorist has claimed to have constructed his own theory in the true Saussurean spirit (cf. 2.3 for an explicit statement of the 'state of the art'). Our argument, however, has been that Saussure's theory has to be taken as a whole, and that the theorist following his suggestions cannot simply make use of certain components while ignoring a) the context in which they occur and b) the fact that the parts derive their appropriate meaning from their interrelation within the whole. Since we believe that it is quite impossible to reject Saussure's theory as such -- and indeed that many of the ideas put forward in the *Cours* have not been exhausted -- it becomes the task of post-Saussurean linguists to engage in what we have termed on occasion, with reference to T. S. Kuhn, "mopping-up operations", i.e. in the reworking of Saussure's theory in its complexity and totality in the light of our present understanding of the nature of things. That Saussure's general theory of language requires re-assessment and re-evaluation has been stressed again and again in the second part of the
study; that his theory deserves such an undertaking needs no further corroboration, but that it is the duty of modern linguists to engage in such an enterprise must be constantly emphasized, if linguistics is ever to attain a position in the social and human sciences which physics enjoy in the natural and exact sciences.

In a programmatic article published in 1966 in which he discussed scientific criteria in the social and human disciplines, C. Lévi-Strauss listed three principles for according to linguistics (in contrast to the other social sciences) a position comparable to the exact natural sciences: 1) Linguistics possesses an object of investigation which is of a universal nature; 2) its method is homogeneous, i.e. irrespective of the language under investigation, and 3) the method rests on a few fundamental principles whose value is generally recognized by the specialists in the given area. While we agree with the correctness of the first point made by Lévi-Strauss, we tend to disagree with the second inasmuch as the author claims that this aspect has become reality within the discipline of linguistics where in fact there are no indications that this is so (cf. the different methods of analysis put forward by Martinet, Firth, Pike, Togeby, Chomsky and many others). As for the third principle we would submit that this argument is the most unsatisfactory of the three, for the following reasons: 1) it restricts (the more or less) unanimous acceptance of the basic principles of research to the specialist, whereas we believe that such an agreement should include anyone working in linguistics and that no one could seriously consider himself a scientist without adherence to these general principles; 2) it places too much importance on methodology without specifying the principles underlying them, and 3) it ignores what we believe to be the most important argument which would serve to make linguistics a mature science comparable with physics: the necessary primacy of theory, i.e. of an over-all theory of how linguistics is to view its object of inquiry. If and only if linguists become aware not only of the fact that it is the importance of theory which has made physics an exact science par excellence but also come to realize that no one engaging in normal linguistic activities can escape this prime
requirement then we may cite with approval Lévi-Strauss' anticipatory laudatio: "dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales et humaines, la linguistique seule peut être mise de plain-pied avec les sciences exactes et naturelles."
FOOTNOTES - 3.0

* Cf. Schuchardt in Revue internationale des études basques (Paris) 3:135 (1909); repr. in Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier, p. 410.

1 For an example of how the history of linguistics should not be written, s. K. V. Teeter's review of Waterman's Perspectives in Linguistics (Chicago Univ. Press, 1963) in Language 41:512-8 (1965).

2 Exceptions to the rule have been mentioned whenever such a reference appeared justified; e.g. Ivić's and Hēlbīg's insightful observations about the theories of Hermann Paul (cf. 1.3.2.2).

3 Cf. R. Jakobson's fine distinction between the achievements of Paul's Prinzipien and FdS's Cours (SW I, 294), and also Bühler's (1965: 6f.) observations to this effect.


5 Where the influence of Hegelian philosophy on FdS is concerned, we concede that so far no particular linguistic source has been found through which FdS might have absorbed certain notions which play an important part in his linguistic argument and which we believe to be "adhésions hegelienennes" (cf. 2.2.1.1 and 2.3). V. Henry's Antinomies linguistiques (Paris: F. Alcan, 1896) do not, to any noticeable degree, exhibit Hegelian ideas which could have led to the Saussurean argument about the distinctive, oppositional, and essentially negative relations between linguistic elements and the concept of identity. We are inclined to believe that A. Naville's pamphlet, La Logique de l'identité et celle de la contradiction: Notes critiques (Geneva: Georg, 1909), might have had an influence on FdS's linguistic argument.

6 Cf. Lévi-Strauss, "Critères scientifiques dans les disciplines sociales et humaines", Aletheia (Paris) 4:189-212 (May 1966), esp. pp. 200ff. S. also B. Malmberg's comment in SL 20.2:124-6 (1966), in particular his spurious remarks on what he believes to have been "le but des grands linguistes de notre époque" (p. 126).

7 Lévi-Strauss, loc. cit.
N.B. The present list contains only those works to which reference has been made on several occasions in the study; many other bibliographical items will be found in the footnotes to each chapter in question. For a more complete bibliography on the present topic, see E. F. K. Koerner, Bibliographia Saussureana, 1870-1970: An Annotated and Classified Bibliography on the Background, Development, and Actual Relevance of Ferdinand de Saussure's General Theory of Language (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. [in press]), 406 pp. See also pp. xxxvii-xl for a number of further works which have been referred to by means of sigla, e.g. CLG, CLG(E), LGL, LGLF, LHLG, LTS, OSG, PiL, SM, SW, etc.


Bloomfield, Leonard. 1933. *Language* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), ix + 564 pp. [There have been many repr. of this book].


[Cf. also OSG and PTL in the preliminary pages].


[S. also SW I listed in the preliminary pages].


Zeller, Otto. 1967. Problemgeschichte der vergleichenden (indogermani-

