MORAL JUDGMENT DEVELOPMENT IN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS:  
THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF A UNIVERSITY COURSE RELATIVE TO STUDENTS' STAGE OF MORAL REASONING

by

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ABSTRACT 

Research in the area of moral judgment development has determined that the most effective model for inducing growth in moral reasoning in school children is that in which the individual is exposed to reasoning at a level directly above his own. The present study was designed to investigate whether this model would correctly predict development of moral reasoning when the subjects were university students and the treatment was a learning environment, not specifically designed to promote moral judgment development. 

The present study also considered the effect of differential student environment relationships, based on moral judgment stage, on success as measured by grades achieved. On the basis of developmental theory it was predicted that success would occur most frequently when student and learning environment were at the same developmental level. 

Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development, which
defines six stages of moral reasoning, was used to determine the level of moral reasoning of a university course concerning the nature of man, and of the students exposed to this course. The course, which involved two, fifty minute lectures per week over a three month period, was assessed as having a post-conventional, or Stage V, orientation. The subjects were eighty-three first and second year university students, of whom forty-one were female and forty-two male. They were classified using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Questionnaire into three groups at the beginning of the semester; the Stage III, or approval oriented group, which was two stages below that of the course; the Stage IV, or authority oriented group which was at the stage just below that of the course; and the Stage V Group who were at the same level as the course. A post-test was administered at the end of the semester.

An analysis of the pre-test and post-test scores did not provide evidence that exposure to a university course one stage above the students' stage of moral judgment development was effective in inducing advances in moral reasoning; exposure to the Stage V university course did not result in greater advances in moral reasoning in the Stage IV Group in comparison to the Stage III and V Groups. Nor did an analysis of pre-test scores and grades support the prediction that the highest grades would be obtained by students whose level of moral development was the same as that of the university course; the Stage V Group did not
achieve more grades above the median course grade than did the Stage III and IV Groups.

A post hoc analysis of the data showed that between the beginning and the end of the course, the Stage III Group advanced, the Stage V Group regressed and the Stage IV Group did not change significantly in moral judgment development. The post hoc analysis also showed a significant relationship between Stage IV pre-test moral judgment development and above median grades.

The unpredicted results were discussed first in relation to the indirect nature of the treatment. It was suggested that moral judgment development might be better evaluated in the long term.

Secondly, the possibility was considered that the results indicated that either the course or the university environment was experienced as having an authority orientation.

The major part of the discussion dealt with the limitations of a hierarchical, cognitive model of moral judgment development when applied to university students. Since changes in emphasis rather than structural change were responsible for the results of the present study, it was proposed that different emphases on acquired structures occurred as a reaction to the university environment and were determined, to some extent, by the students' level of ego development.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Introduction to the Problem

Consider the following statements:

"The course has had a very subtle effect on my ideas and outlook on life and in such a way that I find it very difficult to explain. It has caused me to question my motives for doing certain things as well as helping me to understand myself better..."

"I was disappointed in the course as it did not meet my expectations... Often the lectures were too abstract... The views and outlook I had on the world when I enrolled in the course have not changed any and I think they probably were the reason I couldn't accept many ideas raised."¹

Both students are describing the same university course. It is apparent that each has experienced this learning environment differently and that one student considers that he has been changed by it while the other does not. It is also possible that their statements indicate that each student held, when he began the course, a different view of the socio-moral world. Indeed, it may be these different views which underly the students' reactions to, and the effects of, the course.

The present study is an attempt to understand to what extent, if any, the students' socio-moral maturity, as reflected by the developmental level of his moral reasoning upon commencing a university course involving human nature, determines

¹ Excerpts from written course assessments of Education 201 at Simon Fraser University, 1970.
the consequences of the educational experience. It is primarily concerned with the effect of the course on the students' level of moral judgment development.

Theoretical Background

Moral Judgments as Part of a Developmental Process

The fundamental assumption of the present study is that the making of moral judgments is one aspect of a more general developmental process. This process has been referred to by psychologists as the growth toward psychological maturity (Rogers, 1964), the growth toward self-actualization (Maslow, 1962) and ego development (Ausubel, 1952; Loevinger, 1964). It begins with the unsocialized infant who does not understand the meanings and values in his world and is only concerned with the satisfaction of his own needs. As he develops, immediate physical satisfactions become less important than the approval of others upon whom he is dependent. Gradually he learns to behave consistent with the concepts and values of those whose approval he sought. Thus he learns to control his behavior in terms of his society's expectations. Many, perhaps most, individuals remain at this level, conforming to their society. Development beyond this point to a post-conformity perspective entails acquiring an objective awareness of internalized values and the acceptance of responsibility for one's own choices. Finally, an individual
may reach, though few do, a level at which he conceptualizes and experiences himself as part of all humanity and his choices and actions reflect this awareness.

The above summarizes a developmental sequence of egocentricity, conformity and autonomy which occurs as the biologically growing individual is changed through interaction with his socio-moral environment. Dewey (1916, p 49,50) referred to this interaction when he wrote: "Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life" and described this growth as involving "continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming".

The relationship between this general developmental process and the values, moral judgments, and actions of an individual has been recognized since at least the time of the Greek philosophers. Socrates implied that sophisticated moral judgments were an outcome of development when he said that a man can only tell what is good or right by seeing directly for himself, but that to see clearly what is right one must become perfect in self-knowledge (Cornford, 1932).

Among the contemporary psychologists who consider that the values an individual holds are the result of his level of development, is Carl Rogers (1964). He refers to universal values emerging from the experiencing of the human being which are not the result of any one culture. He considers that there are changes in approach to values as the individual grows from
infancy to adulthood and that there are further changes which occur if the individual continues to grow toward "psychological maturity". He describes how values change as the child gives up valuing physically in order to gain approval and esteem, thereby learning to experience his world in terms of the values of others. Further development toward psychological maturity, according to Rogers, is associated with the acceptance of universal values such as "sincerity, independence, self-direction, self-knowledge, social responsibility, social responsivity, and loving interpersonal relationships".

A somewhat similar perspective toward moral development is that of Maslow (1962), who refers to a "hierarchical developmental system of values" which are dependent upon a hierarchy of biological and social needs. The satisfaction of these needs, which is necessary for developmental growth, involves dependency upon others and consequently concern with the approval of others and acceptance of their values. The highest level of development, that of "self-actualization", can be reached only when these needs have been satisfied. At this level the individual's values are those which are universally considered to be "good" values: honesty, love, unselfishness, etc. Self-actualized individuals act in accordance with these values because that is what they approve of doing and want to do.

While Rogers and Maslow deal with values in general terms and are primarily concerned with the characteristics and values
of the highest developmental level, Ausubel (1952) has analyzed each level of the developmental process and defined specific stages of ego-development. He understands valuing to be a part of socio-emotional development, or, in his words, "a component aspect of ego development" (1952, p. 7). His first developmental stage, called the presatellizing stage, is that during which the individual learns to control his behavior through the anticipation and avoidance of punishment. The individual at this stage submits to authority rather than accepts it. His second, or early-satellizing stage, is characterized by recognition of dependence on parents and consequent need to assimilate their values and conform to their standards. At the third, or late-satellizing stage, complete internalization and assimilation of parental values occurs. The individual has now accepted conventional moral roles. The desatellizing stage, which occurs next, is that at which he becomes aware of alternative values to those of his parents. Values are experienced on a societal basis rather than as being a function of the parent-child relationship. At this stage reciprocal obligation is recognized. The final stage, or later desatellization level, is similar to the previous one, except that the desatellization is more intense and complete. The self is differentiated from conventional rules and democratically agreed upon laws are accepted as such. Ausubel differentiates between the child who does, and who does not, experience parental acceptance. The later is classified as a nonsatellizer and his
development differs from that of the accepted child in that the primary principle governing his behavior is expedience rather than personal loyalty.

Another perspective of socio-emotional development is provided by Loevinger (1964) who has also defined a sequence of ego development stages. Like Ausubel, she considers that moral development is part of a more general developmental process. She refers to her model of ego development as "a collage, pasted together bits from many sources" (1964, p 198) and cites Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957), Peck (1968) and Issacs (1956) as being the most important influences. In Loevinger's first stage the child is preoccupied with distinguishing the self from the non-self. At the second, or impulse ridden stage, the child experiences people as sources of supply and actions as bad because they are punished. The third stage, the opportunistic one, is that at which rules are obeyed to obtain immediate advantage. Interpersonal relations are manipulative and exploitive. The fourth stage is one of conformity, at which rules are internalized and obeyed. At the fifth stage, which is called the conscientious stage, the individual is concerned with obligations, ideals and traits which are measured by inner standards. The next stage is called the autonomous stage. The main preoccupations of the individual at this stage are individuality, self-fulfillment and coping with conflicts. At the highest stage, which she names the integrated stage and compares to Maslow's
self-actualization, the person achieves an integrated identity.

**Moral Judgment Development**

While values have been considered developmentally by a number of psychologists, only two have provided a theoretical framework for the analysis of the judgmental aspects of moral development. Piaget (1932) was the first to undertake a developmental analysis of moral judgments. He investigated three areas of moral reasoning: the development of the child's conception of rules with regard to the game of marbles, his verbalizing concerning adult constraint and moral realism, and his conception of justice. He identified a sequence of egocentricity, conformity and autonomy but was unable to identify structures of moral reasoning that would satisfy the conditions he defined for cognitive stages (Piaget, 1960). These conditions, as he understands them and as accepted by other cognitive theorists, are:

1) stages are qualitatively different, 2) they form an invariant sequence, whose sequence is not changed by cultural factors, 3) they form structured wholes, and 4) each stage is a hierarchical integration with higher stages reintegrating the structures found at lower stages.

Kohlberg (1963) continued Piaget's idea but worked with a differently aged population and was successful, where Piaget had not been, in identifying universal structures of moral thought which form an invariant sequence. He was able to identify these structures or stages by means of an interview consisting of
stories which describe hypothetical moral dilemmas. Each of the stories of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Questionnaire (KMJQ) (see Appendix B) pose a conflict for which there is no "correct" solution. Responses to questions concerning these dilemmas reveal more than the subject's knowledge of moral content; they reveal the structure of his moral reasoning. These structures have been validated by numerous studies including a cross-cultural analysis (Kohlberg, 1964) and a longitudinal study (Kohlberg, 1968) involving a large number of children between ten and seventeen years.

Both Piaget and Kohlberg, in considering the judgmental aspects of moral development, have been concerned primarily with the cognitive aspects of development. Nevertheless, Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development, which follows, can be seen to closely resemble not only the general process of the development described earlier but Ausubel's and Loevinger's stages of ego development.

Kohlberg has divided moral judgment development into three levels of moral reasoning, each of which is divided into two stages. At the first, or pre-conventional level, the child does not understand the meanings or values of his environment. He interprets and responds to rules in terms of either physical or hedonistic consequences. At Stage I of this level, the physical consequences of an act determine its goodness or badness regardless of its human meaning. Obedience and avoidance of punishment
are valued for their own sake. An act is bad because it is punished: "It is bad to hit my brother on the head because my father spanked me." At Stage II, the second pre-conventional stage, the child continues to experience the world in terms of actions and consequences rather than intentions. Now, however, he recognizes elements of reciprocity and sees conformity as good when it enables him to obtain rewards. Right action is that which instrumentally satisfies his own need and occasionally the needs of others: "It is bad to hit my brother on the head because he might hit me back."

At the second, or conventional level, the child no longer confuses the physical with the social. Maintaining the family, group or society and conforming to their expectations, regardless of the consequences, is considered valuable. Stage III, the first conventional stage, is that at which to be good is to be "nice", to "mean well", to please others and gain their approval. At this stage there is conformity to stereotyped role behavior, to what is "natural" or "done by most people": "It is bad to hit my brother on the head because nice boys don't do such things and besides no one would like me if I did". Stage IV, a further development within the conventional level, has a law and order orientation. The individual at this stage accepts society's standards and makes judgments in terms of rules. Good is to respect authority, perform one's duties and generally maintain the social order for its own sake: "I would never hit my brother
on the head because the law clearly states that it is wrong to assault another person and it is essential to have law and order.

The third level is the post-conventional, autonomous or principled level. At this level there is an effort to replace rules with ideals or with moral principles that have validity apart from the authority of any group or society. At Stage V, the first post-conventional stage, the individual has a legalistic, social-contract orientation. Right is defined in terms of individual rights and in terms of agreed upon standards. These standards, although seen as necessary, are recognized as arbitrary and changeable. Both the avoidance of violating others' rights and the welfare of the majority are of primary importance: "Whether or not it is against the law to hit another person, to do so would be wrong because it would infringe on that person's rights". At Kohlberg's sixth and final stage of moral judgment development, conscience determines moral decisions. Right action is defined according to rational, abstract principles which are universal. These self-chosen ethical principles concern justice, reciprocity, equality, mutual respect and trust. The sacredness of human life is such a value: "I will not hit my brother on the head because to do so might not only destroy his trust in me but in people generally and might influence others to value human beings lightly".

Moral Judgment Development in Education

Socrates recognized that "knowledge of values does not
consist of pieces of information that can be handed from one mind to another” (Cornford, 1965, p 46). Yet, as Dewey (1916) points out, values such as the golden rule are so important to parents and teachers that they usually attempt to teach them directly. As a result these standards are understood only symbolically and not translated into realities. The structure of moral reasoning of the person who is taught to repeat values is not changed.

Since in the educational process we are dealing with developing persons, it is useful to consider moral reasoning from a developmental perspective. When moral judgment development is understood as being the result of socio-emotional reorganization, it is possible to investigate how this development occurs and to determine the conditions which are most conductive to this development.

Not all students are equally affected by a given environment and not all environments are equally effective in stimulating change. A developmental approach explains this in terms of interaction. "The fundamental factors in the educative process are an immature, undeveloped being; and certain social aims, meaning, values incarnate in the matured experience of the adult. The educative process is the due interaction of these forces". (Dewey, 1901, p 4). Dewey also considered that the educator has the "duty of determining that environment which will interact with the existing capacities and needs of those taught" (Dewey,
When development is conceived of in stages, the student-educational environment can be conceptualized and studied in a precise way. Piaget (1964, p 13) points out that "the child can receive valuable information via language or via education directed by an adult only if he is in a state where he can understand this information. That is, to receive the information he must have a structure which enables him to assimilate this information". He considers that this growth occurs as the individual reconciles the discrepancies between his point of view and that to which he is exposed. Should the educational environment fail to create this disequilibrium because it is no more complex than the individual's capacity to understand, growth will not result. On the other hand should the environment contain a point of view too developmentally advanced, the individual will be incapable of reconciling the discrepancy and achieving a new equilibrium. In this case growth will also fail to occur. A similar point of view is expressed by Hunt (1968) when he makes the observation that models whose aim is to induce developmental change, whether in the area of moral judgment development or some other area, usually define the student-environment relationship in terms of a "specified degree of disparity between person and environment" (p 17), and the consequences of too complex or too simple an environment may vary from "a mild worsening of performance and boredom to
structural regression" (p 18-19). He also observes that when immediate functional objectives are desired the match is usually defined in terms of congruence between person and environment.

Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development makes it possible to study moral reasoning by asking very specific questions. Instead of asking, "What kind of an environment will promote moral development?", it is possible to ask such questions as: "What will be the effect of this environment on the moral judgment development of students who are at the same stage of moral judgment development as the environment?"; "What will be the effect on students who are one stage below that of the environment?"; "How will students be affected who are two or more stages below the stage of moral judgment development of the environment?" etc. In other words, Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development provides a precise means of considering the differential consequences of student-environment interaction.

Related Empirical Studies

There have been no studies published which consider the differential consequences on moral judgment development of a given educational environment at one level of moral reasoning on students at the same or other levels. There are, however, studies which are relevant to this area.

Turiel (1966) and Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1968) have provided evidence that the degree of disparity required to promote moral judgment growth most effectively is that in which the
individual is exposed to reasoning one stage above his own.

In Turiel's first study (1966), a group of grade seven boys were classified by means of KMJQ according to their dominant stage and then exposed to role playing and discussion concerning dilemmas which were one stage above, one stage below, and two stages above their dominant stage. On retesting, it was found that exposure to stimulation one stage above the child's initial stage produced the greatest advances in moral judgment development.

The above findings were replicated by a different method by Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1968). In this study subjects were presented with moral advice at stages one above, two above and one below their own stage of moral reasoning. They were asked to select their preferences for the advice given, to reproduce this advice and to give their own advice. Turiel's previous finding was supported in that the children assimilated thinking directly above their own stage more readily than thinking that was either one stage below or two stages above their own. It was also concluded that children prefer concepts that are above their predominant stage to concepts that are below, that children find thinking two stages above their own more difficult to comprehend than reasoning one stage above their own and that thinking one stage above their own is more difficult than one stage below their own.

Another study in the area of moral judgment development involving developmental change is that of Lorimer (1968). This
study indicates that moral judgment development can be induced by means of group treatment as well as by the individual treatment used by Turiel (1966) and Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1968). It also provides evidence that to be effective in raising the level of moral reasoning of students, the treatment need not deal directly with the dilemmas of Kohlberg's questionnaire. In Lorimer's study a group of high school students, eighty percent of whom were primarily at a Stage IV level on the KMJQ, were randomly divided into two experimental and one control group. The experimental groups were exposed to different post-conventional level treatments, one of a cognitive nature and one involving both cognitive and affective elements. Both treatments induced immediate moral judgment development advances compared to a control group. These advances were only retained by the group who had been exposed to the treatment involving both affective and cognitive aspects.

Another group study which deals with the developmental consequences of interaction between student and environment is that of Hunt (1968). This study shows that an educational environment in which the reasoning is one stage above that of the student is most effective in promoting developmental growth. While his research was in the area of concept development, rather than moral judgment development, Hunt considers that his developmental model should be applicable to models in other domains, and the developmental theory considered suggests that this is so.
Hunt used a conceptual change model to match students with an educational setting whose structure was at the stage above theirs. The prescribed environment for the lowest stage (Sub I) who were poorly socialized and egocentric, was a clearly organized (Stage I) environment. For students who had reached Stage I and consequently were dependent on authority and concerned with rules, the environment expected to induce growth was one which encouraged independence with a normative structure, etc. Students in matched group programs showed significantly greater change than did those in the mismatched program.

The Present Study

The present study differs from the research described, first, in that the subjects are university students rather than school children and, secondly, in that a moral judgment development model is used to assess the effects of an educational environment not specifically designed to promote growth in terms of that model.

The present study was designed to investigate the differential effects on students' moral judgment development of being exposed to a given university course which was at a post-conventional level. This course dealt with the nature of man. It was designed to create in students an awareness of the Oedipal transition and its importance in understanding human behavior. The Oedipal transition was interpreted as the manner in which the human being is shaped by his early relationships or, in other words, how the child learns to conform and function symbolically.
with the values of his parents and his society. Ernest Becker, the lecturer for this course writes that "courses on human development will be courses in the brainwashing that takes place in each society; they will give the person the knowledge and the impetus he needs to take his own life into his own hands - if this is what he wants". (Becker, 1967, p 260).

The dominant stage of moral judgment development expressed in this course was Kohlberg's Stage V. For some students (Stage V) this course was at the same level as their own; for others (Stage IV) at one stage above theirs; and for others (Stage III) it was two stages above their own moral judgment development stage. The theory and research considered suggests that there will be more developmental change in those students whose stage of moral development is one stage below that of the educational environment than in those who are two stages below or at the same stage as the educational environment. Therefore it is hypothesized that:

In comparison to the Stage III Group and the Stage V Group, the developmental level of moral judgments of the Stage IV Group will be advanced as measured by the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Questionnaire.

While the primary goal of this study is to determine the effect on the students' moral reasoning of exposure to the course described, another, more immediate consequence, will also be considered. The differential effects in terms of course success will be investigated. It is expected that students whose
reasoning level is the same as that of the course will achieve higher grades than students at lower levels since developmental theory suggests that these students will learn the concepts of the course more readily. Therefore a second hypothesis is that:

In comparison to the Stage III Group and the Stage IV Group, the Stage V Group will obtain more grades above the median course grade.
Subjects

The subjects for the present study consisted of eighty-three students, forty-one female and forty-two male, who were enrolled in Education 201 at Simon Fraser University during the January-May semester, 1970. Students were randomly selected and only those having accumulated less than sixty semester hours were included. The age range was between seventeen years and forty-nine years, with eighty percent of the students being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two.

Test Materials

The course, Education 201, which has previously been described, consisted of two, fifty minute lectures per week over a three month period. The post-conformity (predominantly Stage V) orientation was determined by assessing the level of moral reasoning of the lectures and the assigned readings (see Appendix A for course reading list).

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Questionnaire (KMQ) (see Appendix B) was administered at the beginning and the end of the course. This questionnaire consists of eight hypothetical moral dilemmas to which students were asked to give written responses. The responses to six of these dilemmas were used in the present study.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Answers to the last two dilemmas were excluded in the analysis of the data. These dilemmas concern the Korean War and evoked responses that were at the same level of moral judgment development for almost all students.
The following is one of the dilemmas included:

"Joe is a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40. it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money."

The questions following are:

"Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?"

"Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?"

"Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?"

"Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father?"

"Why should a promise be kept?"

Students' responses to the KMJQ were scored using Kohlberg's Global Rating Guide (1968) (The scoring guide for the dilemma given is provided in Appendix B). This yielded an overall moral judgment score, the predominant stage of moral development and a profile showing the amount of reasoning at each level. (See Appendix B for sample scoring sheet.)

Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Questionnaire has not been
published, but has been used extensively by Kohlberg who has found it reliable both in a longitudinal study (1964) and a cross sectional age study (1968). It has also been used in a large number of other research studies including those of Turiel (1966), Rest et al (1968), Lorimer (1968), Haan, Brewster, Smith & Block (1968). Interrater reliabilities have been reported as being between .71 and .96.

Two papers were required of each student, one in the middle and one at the end of the semester. The assigned topic for both papers was, "What is the Oedipus Complex, and what is its significance for educators?". The course grade consisted of the marks given for these papers, ten percent for the first paper and ninety percent for the final one. Marking was done by two graduate student teaching assistants, each of whom marked fifty percent of the papers.¹

At the end of the semester students were also asked to write a report describing their reactions to the course.

Procedure

During the first two weeks of the spring semester (Jan. 19 - 30, 1970), Kohlberg's Questionnaire was administered by the two teaching assistants to the students in their Education tutorials. The students were informed about the research as follows:

"The students in this tutorial are being asked to participate in a research program as part of the course requirements. The questions you will

¹ It is recognized that grades may not be valid assessments of comprehension, nor will their reliability be high when assigned by different persons, but they are, nevertheless, the measurement of success accepted by the university.
be asked concern your opinions and ideas. Your answers which will be read only by the researchers, will be considered confidential and in no way affect your grade for this course. Most people find the questions interesting. If you become curious about the results of the research, I will be happy to explain the program more fully and share the results with you after the semester is completed."

Students' responses to the KMJQ were used to determine their predominant stage of moral judgment development. This predominant stage was defined as being that stage at which the largest number of responses occurred (see Appendix B for description and example of scoring method.) Students were classified into three stage groups according to their predominant stage. These groups are as follows:

1) Stage III: twenty-two students; eight male and fourteen female.

2) Stage IV: twenty-two students; fourteen male and eight female.

3) Stage V: thirty-nine students; twenty male and nineteen female.

During the last two weeks of the spring semester (March 30 - April 10, 1970), the KMJQ was re-administered by the teaching assistants who had originally administered the questionnaire.

Experimental Design

A 2x2 factorial analysis of variance (Winer, 1962, p 377) was applied to the pre-test and post-test KMJQ scores for the Stage IV Group and the combined Stage III and V Groups.

After first determining the median course grade, a chi square
test (Ferguson, 1959, p 169) was applied to the grades occurring above, and not above, the median for the combined Stage III and IV Groups and the Stage V Group.

A random sample of 23 percent of the protocols, which included both pre-tests and post-tests, were scored by a second rater for the purpose of obtaining an estimate of the reliability of the scoring procedures. The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was .95.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS

To test the hypothesis, "In comparison to the Stage III Group and the Stage V Group, the developmental level of moral judgments of the Stage IV Group will be advanced as measured by the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Questionnaire", the Stage III and V Groups were combined. A 2x2 factorial analysis of variance, least square solution, (Winer, 1962, p 377) was applied to the pre-test and post-test scores for the combined Stage III and V Group and the Stage IV Group. (See Table I). An F-test did not show a significant groups by KMJQ scores interaction. In view of this analysis the first hypothesis was not accepted. There is no evidence that exposure to the Stage V course affected the level of moral reasoning of the Stage IV Group to a greater extent than it affected the other groups.

To test the hypothesis, "In comparison to the Stage III Group and the Stage IV Group, the Stage V Group will obtain more grades above the median course grade" the median course grade, B-, was determined. The grades of all students were classified as above median or not above median. The Stage III and Stage IV Groups were combined. A chi square test (Ferguson, 1959, p 169) was applied to the grades as classified for the combined Stage III and IV Group and the Stage V Group (see Table II). Chi square did not show a significant relationship between grade and group. In
TABLE I

Summary of Analysis of Variance Applied to Pre-Test and Post-Test KMJQ Scores
Classified Stage Group + by Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects within groups</td>
<td>9497.25</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>128.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group by Treatment Interaction</td>
<td>36.55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36.55</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment X Subjects within groups</td>
<td>3369.09</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Combined Stage III Group and Stage V Group vs. Stage IV Group
TABLE II

Relationship Between Pre-Test Moral Reasoning and Course Grade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>B &amp; Higher</th>
<th>Below B</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III &amp; IV</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 1

$X^2 = 0.62$
view of this analysis the second hypothesis was not accepted. There is no evidence that students, who at the beginning of a university course, are at the same level of moral judgment development as the course, will achieve higher grades than will other students whose level of moral reasoning is not at the course level.

To determine whether there was significant relationship between moral judgment development during the course and membership in any one of the three stage groups, a post hoc analysis considered each stage group separately. A 2X3 factorial analysis of variance (Winer, 1962, p 377) was applied to the pre-test and post-test KMJQ scores for the three stage groups (see Table III). An F-test showed a significant groups by treatment interaction ($F = 12.32, df = 2,72, p<.01$). F ratios (Winer, 1962, p 378) were used to test individual comparisons between pre-test and post-test means for each stage group. These were significant for both the Stage III Group ($F = 18.34, df = 1,72, p<.01$) and the Stage V Group ($F = 6.23, df = 1,72, p<.05$). The difference was not significant for the Stage IV Group. Figure 1 shows the mean KMJQ pre-test and post-test scores for each of the three stage groups. This analysis indicates that between the beginning and the end of the course, the Stage III Group advanced, the Stage V Group regressed and the Stage IV Group did not change significantly in moral judgment development as measured by KMJQ scores.

A more detailed description of the data concerning moral
### TABLE III

Summary of Analysis of Variance Applied to Pre-test and Post-test KMJQ Scores Classified Stage Group † by Treatment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>2,101.61</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,050.30</td>
<td>10.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects within groups</td>
<td>7,395.68</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>102.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatments</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group by Treatment Interaction</td>
<td>868.16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>434.09</td>
<td>12.32*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment X subjects within groups</td>
<td>2,537.48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>35.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .01

† Stage III Group, Stage IV Group, Stage V Group
Figure 1. Pre-test and post-test mean KMJQ scores for each stage group.
judgment development is shown in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the movement which occurred in the various types of reasoning for each group during the course. From this figure it can be observed that: the Stage III Group declined in the amount of Stage III reasoning produced and increased in the amount of Stage V reasoning; the Stage V Group showed a decline in Stage V reasoning and an increase in Stage II reasoning; the Stage IV Group declined in Stage IV reasoning and increased in both Stage III and Stage V reasoning.

Figure 3 shows the pre-test and post-test mean KMJQ scores for each group according to the number of semesters of university attendance. Observation of these data indicates that: in the Stage III Group advances in KMJQ scores increase with the number of semesters of university attendance; the scores of the Stage V Group decreased markedly among first semester students and only slightly for students in subsequent semesters; the Stage IV Group tended to show a decrease in scores in the first and second semester and increase slightly for third and fourth semester students.
Stage VI Moral Reasoning
Stage V Moral Reasoning
Stage IV Moral Reasoning
Stage III Moral Reasoning
Stage II Moral Reasoning
Stage I Moral Reasoning

Figure 2. Percent of total moral statements at each of Kohlberg's six stages of moral judgment development for each stage group at beginning and end of course.
Figure 3. Pre-test and post-test KMG mean scores for each group according to semester.

Stage V
Stage IV
Stage III

Semester
3rd & 4th
1st & 2nd
3rd & 4th
1st & 2nd
3rd & 4th
1st & 2nd

Scores
KMG
Mean

Pre-test
Post-test
To determine if there was a significant relationship between above median grades and membership in any of the three stage groups, each stage group was also considered separately in relation to grade. A 2X3 chi square test (Guilford, 1942, p 230 - 232) showed a significant relationship between pre-test stage and above median grades ($X^2 = 9.90$, df = 2, $p < .01$) (see Table IV). This relationship was due primarily to a significant relationship between Stage IV pre-test moral judgment development and above median grades ($X^2 = 6.641$, df = 1, $p < .01$). The relationships between stage and grade for the Stage III Group and the Stage V Group were not significant. There is, however, a tendency for the stage III Group to achieve more grades in the median or below category. Figure 4 shows the percent of above median grades for each stage group. This analysis indicates that in comparison to the Stage III and the Stage V Groups, the Stage IV Group obtained more grades above the median course grade.
### TABLE IV

Summary of Chi Square: Grades and Stage Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>$\chi^2$ IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above median</td>
<td>1.515</td>
<td>3.447</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>5.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not above median</td>
<td>1.413</td>
<td>3.194</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>4.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.928</td>
<td>6.641*</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>9.901*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$p < .01$
Figure 4: The percent of grades at each stage above the median grade of B-.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

The Hypotheses of the Present Study

The hypotheses of the present study were not confirmed by the data. Neither the pattern of change of moral judgment development nor the relationship between pre-test stage and course grade supported the hypotheses; students one stage below that of the course did not show a greater increase in moral reasoning scores than did other students, and students whose level of moral judgment development was the same as that of the course were not the most successful in terms of grades. In other words, exposure to a post-conformity course did not result in greater advances in moral reasoning in the authority oriented group than it did in other students, some of whom were approval oriented and some of whom were at a post-conventional level of moral judgment development. Nor did exposure to this post-conventional course result in post-conventional students obtaining more above median grades than were obtained by students at either of the conventional stages of moral judgment development.

The failure of the data to confirm the hypotheses will be discussed first with respect to the measurement of indirect treatments such as that used in the present study. Secondly, the nature of the treatment will be re-examined. Finally, the results will be interpreted as indicating that moral judgment development in university students is non-hierarchial.
Measurement of Indirect Treatment

One way in which the present study differs from the research reviewed is that a moral judgment development model was used to determine the effects of an educational environment not designed specifically to promote growth in terms of that model. The treatment environment in the present study, unlike the individual treatment to which the subjects were exposed in the studies of Turiel (1966) and Rest, Turiel & Kohlberg (1968), did not deal with the specific dilemmas of Kohlberg's questionnaire. Further, unlike the indirect group treatment of Lorimer's study (1968), the purpose of the course was not to determine whether KMJQ scores could be advanced. The lecturer was not familiar with Kohlberg's levels of moral judgment development and, therefore, was not concerned with inducing change in terms of this model. His concern, rather, was to provide an understanding of both how, and the extent to which, socialization requires replacing biological satisfactions with the symbolic values of the culture. In doing so, his purpose was less to provoke a post-conventional orientation than to enable the student to evaluate the conventional aspects of his present orientation and thereby free him to accept an individualistic or post-conventional perspective if he should choose to do so.

While in the studies considered the treatment had been introduced in order to evaluate its effect, rather than being part of an educational environment as in the present study, Kohlberg's model of moral judgment development should be
applicable to the general as well as the specific treatment. Kohlberg's theory of moral judgment development (1963, 1968) considers growth of moral reasoning to be the result of interaction between the structures of the organism and those of the environment. This interaction occurs whether or not the environment is designed to investigate moral reasoning and whether or not the conflicts and language of Kohlberg's questionnaire are utilized.

Although moral judgment development theory does not require an experimental treatment using particular dilemmas and a specific vocabulary to promote advance in moral reasoning, when individuals are exposed to reasoning involving a different set of words and concepts from those needed to answer the questionnaire, more time may be required to assimilate this reasoning since there is a translation process involved. The failure of the Stage IV Group of the present study to advance may indicate that insufficient time has elapsed before retesting for these students to have integrated a new perspective. Lorimer's study (1968) indicates the importance of considering long term effects when evaluating the consequences of an indirect treatment on moral judgment development. He reasoned that a treatment which did not provide the specific language or structure with which to answer the questionnaire was potentially more effective in inducing long term growth in moral reasoning than a treatment which did provide this language and structure. Evidence that the effect on moral reasoning of any university experience would be best evaluated over a
period of time, is provided by Kramer's longitudinal study (1968). In this study students who regressed in predominant stage while attending university were found later to be above their pre-regression level of reasoning in almost every case.

The best time to assess the effects on moral reasoning of a given experience is difficult to determine. It is possible that a course of the same nature as the treatment used in the present study, could promote development or facilitate a change in moral reasoning orientation, at any period in an individual's subsequent life. It is not uncommon for someone, years after being exposed to a learning environment, to find insight into what had been retained as irrelevant concepts. Subjective evidence of long term benefits has been provided by several students who have volunteered to the investigator in conversation that the course concepts had more meaning for them a year after completing the course than they did at the time of the post-test. They have reported that time was required for the course to “sink in”.

In short, because of the indirect nature of the treatment used in the present study, it is possible that although the authority oriented group did not show significant advances in KMJQ scores, in the long term changes in moral orientation would be accounted for by this course.

The Treatment as Authority Oriented

Although the predicted change pattern and grade distribution did not occur in the present study, changes in moral reasoning and
a distribution of grades did occur which are related to the students' initial stage of moral judgment development. While the authority maintaining (Stage IV) group showed no significant change in KMQ scores, the approval oriented (Stage III) group advanced, and the post-conventional (Stage V) group showed a significant decrease in moral judgment development scores. Further, a significantly larger number of high grades was obtained by the authority oriented students.

The converging of the KMQ scores of the Stage III Group and the Stage V Group toward a Stage IV range and the relative academic success of the Stage IV Group could be interpreted to indicate that either the course or the environment generally was experienced as having an authority orientation. This interpretation is consistent with the developmental theory of Kohlberg (1963, 1969) and Hunt (1966) and the evidence of Turiel (1966) and Rest, Turiel, & Kohlberg (1968). A Stage IV environment would be expected to induce greatest advances in the Stage III Group since it would be one level above that of this group. Being a level below the Stage V Group, it could induce regression in this group, and being at the same level as the Stage IV Group, would not be expected to induce significant advances in this group. Further, in a Stage IV environment Stage IV students might be expected to be most successful.

Every university course can be considered to be authority oriented to the extent that the university student is expected to
play a role in which he is required to learn and reproduce, or apply, certain concepts and rewarded with grades for doing so. Although the pattern of change of moral reasoning which occurred can be explained as a result of the students' interacting with authoritarian structures in the environment, this explanation raises the question as to why a similar result did not occur among the high school students of Lorimer's study (1968). Even though the treatment of that study was experimental rather than part of total educational environment, the subjects would have presumably been exposed to at least as great conformity pressures in the school environment.

A more important reason to question this explanation of the results of the present study is that it fails to explain the changes in the different types of reasoning which occurred within each of the three groups. When the change in percentage of total moral statements at each of the six stages for each stage group is observed (Fig. 2), it is apparent that increased Stage IV reasoning was not marked in either the Stage III Group or the Stage V Group. Advances in the Stage III Group were mainly the result of more Stage V reasoning, and the backward movement of the Stage V Group resulted from Stage II reasoning replacing some Stage V reasoning. Further Stage IV reasoning did not increase in the Stage IV Group as might have been expected in an authority oriented environment. Therefore, even though students may have been influenced to some extent by the conformity aspects of the
university environment, a more complex explanation of the results is required.

Non-Hierarchical Moral Judgment Development

When the changes in the different types of reasoning shown in Figure 2 are examined, it can be seen that in each of the groups change was the result of increased use of structures of moral reasoning which had been used on the pre-test. The advances which occurred in the moral reasoning of the Stage III students occurred because of more extensive use of reasoning which the students could produce at the time of the pre-test and a corresponding decrease in Stage III reasoning. The backward movement in KMJQ scores of the Stage V Group resulted from immature reasoning having been produced more frequently on the post-test and a decrease in, but not a failure to produce, Stage V reasoning. Changes in the pattern of reasoning of the Stage IV Group also reflect different emphases on reasoning with which the students were already familiar. An examination of the individual protocols showed that only one student produced reasoning on the post-test at a stage above his pre-test reasoning and none failed to give reasoning of his predominant stage.

Since the changes in predominant stage and KMJQ scores which occurred within each of the groups resulted from different emphases rather than the acquisition of new structures, it may be necessary to consider whether a hierarchical model of moral reasoning above Stage III on the pre-test, produced a small amount of Stage IV and Stage V reasoning on the post-test.
Judgment development is sufficient to understand moral reasoning of university students. The subjects who participated in the present study, being university students, were older than those of the studies reviewed and, therefore, the possibility exists that for many the re-structuring of new levels of moral reasoning had been completed.

Although most of these students had developed the cognitive structures necessary to reason at a post-conformity level, they had not become stabilized at this orientation. They appear to have had both the capacity and the flexibility to reason from different perspectives. The KMs scores and the predominant stages of moral reasoning found in the present study, rather than indicating the highest level at which students were capable of making moral judgments, may reflect the impact of the university environment on students and their levels of ego maturity.

Change as a Response to Environment

An important factor influencing changes of emphasis in moral reasoning may be the extent to which the total environment stimulates and permits the individual to use different perspectives. The new, and often conflicting, experiences, concepts and expectations of university life could be expected to provoke changes in the students' value orientations. Further, the university, in contrast to many high schools and homes, provides an environment in which the expression of different types of moral reasoning is possible.
Each of the three groups of the present study would be expected to make different changes in their pattern of moral reasoning in response to the stimulation and relative freedom of university life. The significant increase in Stage V reasoning among the Stage III Group suggests that these students chose to utilize Stage V reasoning to a greater extent than previously because it was the model provided by the particular course and the university environment facilitated this orientation. While the approval oriented reasoning of the Stage III Group may have been encouraged or acceptable in the home or school, it was criticized in the course and discouraged generally by the university environment. As Kramer (1968) points out, the "good boy" orientation is an untenable adult perspective and therefore unlikely to remain unaltered in young adults.

While, unlike a "good boy" orientation, post-conventional reasoning is appropriate in a university environment, this type of reasoning may be subject to backward change when exposed to new or conflicting perspectives because, as Kramer (1968) suggests, when the Stage V person experiences the inadequacy of his relativistic perspective and becomes aware of the necessity to judge, he frequently resorts to a hedonistic position. The increased Stage II reasoning of the Stage V Group in the present study suggests that this group sometimes avoided judging by producing reasoning of a hedonistic nature. For example, one student wrote, "Again we get down to that idiotic question of
right or wrong. Nothing is right nor is it wrong", followed by a statement recommending choosing in terms of the best "maneuver".

Not only would the increased expression of Stage II reasoning among Stage V students have been provoked by the university experience but it would have been facilitated by the university environment allowing these students to "act out" hedonistic drives which had previously been discouraged in the home or school.

The hedonism expressed in the Stage V Group's answers to KMJQ, may have contributed to the lower than predicted grades of these students. Just as the Stage V students gave answers to the questionnaire which were sometimes below their predominant developmental level, they may have produced papers which were not an accurate indication of their comprehension of the course material. In some instances it was apparent that the student had not taken the essay topic seriously. One Stage V student, for example, began his paper on "The Oedipus Complex and its Relevance for Educators" as follows:

"The process of education is, or should be, the process of illumination, of spreading the truth. No one knows the whole truth, and thus the truth that is spread is relative to the knowledge of he who is spreading it, that is to say, relative to the educator. The same can be said for the manner in which the truth is spread. The educator may choose to force it down the throat of he-who-is-to-be-educated like bitter cough medicine, or he may prepare it in the manner of a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, which the educatee will greedily grab. The truth to be discussed in this essay is the Oedipus Complex. Its Meaning to Educators is, of course, relative in the manner described above. To this writer it appears that the major importance of the Oedipus Complex lies in the shedding of light on the objective truth of What Really Happened to Oedipus and his Complex."
Changes in the pattern of reasoning of the Stage IV Group suggest that this group, like the other two groups had not become stabilized at one stage of moral judgment development. While this group did not lose their predominantly Stage IV orientation, and while pre-test and post-test scores showed neither forward nor backward movement, the students in this group did become less authority oriented, utilizing other types of reasoning more frequently. This suggests that the course and/or university life caused these students to question, if not relinquish, their authority perspective.

Even though the Stage IV Group does not appear to have had a stable authority orientation, the predominantly Stage IV reasoning of these students, is likely to have contributed to their success in achieving grades. These students would take reproducing the course content as their responsibility. The higher grades of this group indicates that they have successfully done so.

Moral Reasoning and Ego Maturity

Since neither the capacity for post-conventional moral reasoning nor exposure to an environment which stimulates and permits this reasoning are sufficient conditions to produce a predominantly Stage V orientation, the writer questions whether moral judgment development can function independent of the general developmental level of the individual, or what Loevinger (1964) and Ausubel (1952) refer to as the level of ego development and Kohlberg (1963) calls "ego maturity". While Kohlberg (1963),
like many psychologists, considers that values and moral judgments are an expression of an overall developmental process which includes both cognitive and affective aspects, his model is primarily concerned with cognitive structures. Although he suggests (1963) that there should be an empirical correlation between affective and cognitive development, the possibility exists that the cognitive aspect of moral development could develop beyond the affective aspect. Should this occur, it is expected that the individual who is able to reason morally at a level above his level of ego maturity, would be prone to internal conflict or disequilibrium. Conflict of this nature could prevent him from consistently using the highest level of moral reasoning of which he is capable, particularly in situations where external stresses exist. Kramer's longitudinal study (1968) of adolescents and young adults resulted in a similar theoretical conclusion concerning the consequences of unequal development. He writes:

"Successful hierarchical development of moral judgment is contingent upon continuing ego development without which an individual cannot be expected to put into meaningful use his nascent high level of cognitive-judgmental structures, i.e., he will not have a stabilized orientation at a given stage of development however much he is capable of making judgments at that level." (p 169)

A discrepancy between ego maturity and moral reasoning could occur at early developmental levels but when this discrepancy is between Stage V moral reasoning and a lower level of general development, the resulting instability may be greatest.
Maintaining a stabilized post-conventional orientation of moral reasoning without comparable ego development would be extremely difficult, since to maintain this perspective requires independence and trust in one's own judgment.

In the present study, a conflict between a post-conventional level of reasoning and a conventional level of general development may have existed in many students in each of the three groups. In other words, since most of the students who participated were capable of producing Stage V reasoning yet not all had a predominantly Stage V orientation, it is expected that these students lacked the general level of development to function at a post-conventional level of moral judgment development. Both the Stage III and the Stage IV students who failed to develop a Stage V orientation when exposed to the course and the university environment, and the Stage V students who decreased in Stage V reasoning, may have done so because of conflicting levels of cognitive and affective development. It is interesting to note that when KMJQ score changes are considered in relation to semesters of university attendance (Fig. 3), it can be observed that the Stage III Group advances were least among first semester students. Also, it can be observed that the Stage V Group decrease in scores occurred primarily among first semester students. Since these score changes mainly reflect increased or decreased post-conventional reasoning, the tendencies observed could indicate that during the first semester of university life, students did
not have, to the extent that students in subsequent semesters had, the overall level of development necessary to utilize a post-conventional orientation. The tendency for first semester students to use less Stage V reasoning than students in other semesters might also suggest that the stress of starting university, interfered with the use of post-conventional reasoning among students whose orientation was unstable due to unequal affective and cognitive development.

Conclusions and Implications

The major finding of the present study was that a hierarchical model which involved solely the cognitive aspects of moral judgment development did not accurately predict the changes in moral reasoning which occurred when first and second year university students were exposed to a post-conventional course which dealt with the nature of man.

In the present study changes in the patterns of moral reasoning resulted from different emphases rather than the acquisition of new structures or the loss of previously acquired ones. This suggests that moral judgment among university students cannot be explained completely by an hierarchical sequence. It is possible that the acquisition of new structures is not a major factor in changes in moral judgment orientation among individuals beyond adolescence.

It is proposed that the changes in emphasis in orientation
of moral reasoning indicate that during late adolescence and early adulthood, moral judgment orientation, at least among university students, has not become stabilized. These changes can be understood as a response to the environment and are, at least partly, determined by the level of general or ego development. For example, an individual may have the capacity for post-conventional moral reasoning but fail to utilize this level of reasoning either because of an environment which discourages its use or a level of ego development which conflicts with its use.

While the results of the present study do not contradict Kohlberg's theory concerning hierarchical developmental stages of moral judgment, they indicate the need for more sophisticated techniques to investigate the relationship of these stages to ego maturity and environmental changes. Longitudinal studies of moral reasoning beyond adolescence are required to investigate:

a) the unstabilized moral judgment orientations of university students in relation to earlier and later moral reasoning development;

b) the conditions which promote the use of the higher stages of moral reasoning;

c) the role of ego development in maintaining a stable post-conventional level of moral judgment development.

Another finding of the present study is that there was a relationship between authority oriented students and good grades. Since marks are usually considered as indicative of university success and frequently determine future opportunities, achieving
high grades can be of genuine importance. There is, then, an advantage to being an authority oriented university student. Further study is required to determine whether this group of students maintain this advantage as long as they maintain their conventional orientation, continuing to be more successful throughout and after university life.
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EDUCATION 201

Spring, 1970

ASSIGNMENTS

1st Week Rousseau, J.J., *Emile*, first few chapters

2nd Week La Barre, W. *The Human Animal*, Chapters 1 to 6

3rd Week La Barre, W. *The Human Animal*, Chapters 8 to 11

4th Week Becker, E., *The Birth & Death of Meaning*, Chapters 1 to 5
La Barre, W. reprint "The Cultural Basis of Emotion and Gesture"

5th Week La Barre, W. *The Human Animal*, Chapter 12
Erikson, E., *Childhood and Society*, Chapters 1 to 5

6th Week Erikson, E. *Childhood and Society*, Chapters 6 to 8

7th Week Becker, E. *The Birth & Death of Meaning*, Chapter 6

8th Week Frieden, B. *The Feminine Mystique*, whole book

9th Week Freud Essay

10th Week Becker, E. *The Birth & Death of Meaning*, Chapter 7

11th Week Becker, E. *The Birth & Death of Meaning*, Chapter 8

12th Week Becker, E. *The Birth & Death of Meaning*, Chapter 9

Orienting Question for Course

"What is the Oedipus Complex, and what is its significance for educators?"
Date___________________
Tutorial Time___________________

Student #___________________

Sex    Male ( )    Female ( )

Age    Years___    Months___

Instructions

The purpose of these stories and questions is to find out your opinions and ideas. Please write down as legibly as possible all the ideas and feelings they bring to mind rather than giving "yes" or "no" answers. Each story is printed on a separate page followed by questions. You can answer each question in the space following the question. If necessary you can continue the answer over the page but make sure that it is numbered. The reason you are being asked these questions is to find out what university students think about these kinds of situations. So make sure you put down what you think. The answers that you write will be seen only by the researchers and will not influence your course grade in any way.
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her: it was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

1. Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually wrong or right? Why?
2. Is it a husband's duty to steal the drug for his wife if he can get it no other way? Would a good husband do it?

3. Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there was no law actually setting a limit to the price? Why?
Answer the next two questions only if you think he should steal the drug.

4. If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he still steal the drug?

5. Suppose it wasn't Heinz's wife who was dying of cancer but it was Heinz's best friend. His friend didn't have any money and there was no one in his family willing to steal the drug. Should Heinz steal the drug for his friend in that case? Why?
Answer the next two questions only if you think Heinz should not steal the drug.

6. Would you steal the drug to save your wife's life?

7. If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you steal the drug to save your own life?
8. Heinz broke in the store and stole the drug and gave it to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. Should the judge send Heinz to jail for stealing, or should he let him go free? Why?
The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of a pain-killer like ether or morphia would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the Dr. to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway.

9. Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that will make her die? Why?
10. When a pet animal is badly wounded and will die, it is killed to put it out of its pain. Does the same thing apply here? Why?

Answer the following questions only if you think the doctor should not give her the drug.

11. Would you blame the doctor for giving her the drug?
12. What would have been the best for the woman herself, to have had her live for six months in great pain or have died sooner? Why?

13. Some countries have a law that doctors could put away a suffering person who will die anyway. Should the doctor do it in that case?
Everyone should answer the remaining questions.

14. The doctor finally decided to kill the woman to put her out of her pain, so he did it without consulting the law. The police found out and the doctor was brought up on a charge of murder. The jury decided he had done it, so they found him guilty of murder, even though they knew the woman had asked him. What punishment should the judge give the doctor? Why?

15. Would it be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence?
16. Do you believe that the death sentence should be given in some cases? Why?

17. The law prescribes the death penalty for treason against the country. Do you think the death sentence should be given for treason? Why?
While all of this is happening, Heinz was in jail for breaking in and trying to steal the medicine. He had been sentenced for 10 years. But after a couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for work in curing cancer. Twenty years had passed when a tailor recognized the factory owner as being Heinz, the escaped convict whom the police had been looking for back in his home town.

18. Should the tailor report Heinz to the police? Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?
19. Is it a citizen's duty to report Heinz? Would a good citizen?

20. If Heinz was a good friend of the tailor, would that make a difference? Why?
21. Should Heinz be sent back to jail by the judge? Why?
Joe is a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

22. Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?

23. Does his father have the right to tell Joe to give him the money?
23. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son?

24. Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father?
25. Why should a promise be kept?
Joe wanted to go to camp but he was afraid to refuse to give his father the money. So he gave his father $10 and told him that was all he made. He took the other $40 and paid for camp with it. He told his father the head of the camp said he could pay later. So he went off to camp, and the father didn't go on the fishing trip.

Before Joe went to camp, he told his older brother, Alexander that he really made $50 and that he lied to his father and said he'd made $10. Alexander wonders whether he should tell his father or not.

26. Should Alexander, the older brother, tell their father that Joe had lied about the money or should he keep quiet about what Joe had done? Why?
27. Why would a teenager think he shouldn't tell on a friend or brother?

28. Which is more important, being a loyal son or a loyal brother? Why?
29. If the father finds out, should he punish Joe for lying and going off with the money? Why?
Several years later, the grown up brothers had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Alex the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Joe the younger one went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he was very sick and needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Joe very well, he loaned him the money. So Joe and Alex skipped town, each with $500.

30. If you had to say who did worse, would you say Al did worse to break in the store and steal the $500 or Joe did worse to borrow the $500 with no intention of paying it back? Why?
31. Would you feel like a worse person stealing like Al or cheating like Joe?

32. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store anyhow?
33. Who would feel worse, the storeowner who was robbed or the man who was cheated out of the loan? Why?

34. Which should the law be more harsh or strong against, stealing like Al or cheating like Joe? Why?
In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up as the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive: there would be about a 4 to 1 chance he would be killed. The captain of the company has to decide who should go back and do the job. The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably not get back safely and he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

35. Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? Why?
36. Does the captain have the right to order a man if he thinks it best to? Why?

37. Which would be best for the survival of all the men ordering a man or the captain going himself?
38. If it were absolutely certain that many more lives would be lost if he went himself and were killed, should he order another man to go against his will?

39. Would a man have the right to refuse such an order? Why?
The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and courage but he was a bad trouble maker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up and wouldn't do his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enough to do the job.

40. Should the captain send the trouble maker or the sick man? Why?
41. Who would it be fairer to send?

42. Would it be fair to send the trouble maker as a punishment?
43. Whose life would be worth more to the company?
Situation I - Global Rating Guide

Type 1 - oriented to passive obedience and compliance.

Choice. Should give the money to father.

I. Property rules and rights. Little sense of ownership rights of the son.

G. Affection. No sense that father and son are or should be concerned about each other's welfare or feelings.

D. Authority. Simply a fact that father has power to demand money, may invoke ownership of son. Son should give to obey, comply. May invoke punishment or trouble.

F. Justice. Little sense of the injustice of the broken promise, though knows it's wrong to break promises. Some sense that if the father told the boy he could go, he should let him. But boy could go another year instead.

F. J. Promise. Worse for son to break a promise than a father because father is bigger. No sense of keeping a promise beyond something you're supposed to do.

Type 2 - oriented to keeping and using what you get. Orientation to purpose of going to camp and to holding onto own money. No evaluation of father.

Choice. May be uncertain, but favors refusing the father.

E. Son Role. No concern to be nice in son role.

D. Authority. Assumes father can't force the issue, has no authority because it's the boy's property. If father wants money, he can earn it.

I. Property. Simple fact that boy earned, it's his money.

F. Justice. Promise is seen as bad in disappointing expectation of gratification. Sees father as in better position to earn money than son, hence not fair to ask.

Type 3 - Nice boy with some sense of right.

Choice. Conflict between being nice boy and maintaining purpose and rights. Tends to say that "boy doesn't have to give the money but I would." Efforts at compromise by giving some money, insuring it will be paid back, etc.
I. Property rules. Has a right to the money. Some sense that son worked hard for the money, deserves a reward, but not categorical about it.

C. Son role. Some idea of being nice, unselfish, sacrificing, grateful for past care. May invoke belief that father is oriented to boy's own best welfare, or to family's in the situation, has an unselfish goal and knows best.

D. Authority. Cf. 1, 2, 5. Doesn't invoke authority of father but being nice. Assumes father won't really coerce or punish.

F. Justice. Some assimilation of breaking promises to not being a good son or father, not caring about other, etc.

Type 4 - Oriented to an internalized sense of the father's authority.

Choice. Conflict between reward for work and father's authority. Usually give the money to the father.

I. Property. Clear sense that boy worked hard for the money, so should have his reward or expectations maintained.

D. Authority. To show respect or not detract from, go against father's authority. Some invocation of authority of the father on a categorical basis apart from justifying compliance in this situation as nice. Subsumes father under a class of persons deserving respect and reward. Tends to distinguish father's authority to determine whether boy goes to camp (or what does with the money) and his right to take boy's money. A sense of the power of the father but no invocation of real coercion or punishment.

C. Son Role. Accepts that boy should sacrifice his interests. May be some case that to boy's long range interests to do so, or that will even out in the end. Aware of promise issue.

F. Justice. Promise assimilated to maintenance of parent-child authority system. Boy would lose respect for father if broke promise, etc. Not a categorical contractual attitude. But genuine attitude that one should keep one's word.

Type 5 - Oriented to a sense of contractual rights in the situation in terms of which the diffuse father-son relationship is irrelevant.

Choice. Refuse the money. Little uncertainty.

C. Son-father welfare. Some sense of father's obligation to maintain son's value of planning, maintaining purpose. As generally legitimate, as to be encouraged.
I. Property. Sense of the boy's right to the money because of prior agreement. Issue is, of maintaining rights rather than of keeping money, of doing what one wants.

D. Authority. Father has no right to ask in this situation, though may also mention the legal definition of a father having rights over minor's property, e.g., "he could but shouldn't in this case."

F. Justice. Not an actual focus on the injustice of the father, the fact that being a bad father. Clear focus on the promise, as giving the son rights in the situation. Refuse because father broke his word.

Type 6 - Oriented to the father's injustice but in an evaluative rather than retaliative way. Otherwise like Type 5.
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**Total**

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**Student**

**Post-Test**

**Pre-Test**

**Semester Hours**

**Tutorial Time**

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**Type Score**  

**Predominant**