HUMANISM IN COUNSELLING: THE GROWTH OF A
DOMINANT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
COUNSELLING AND A RECONSIDERATION
OF A DISPLACED ALTERNATIVE

by

Ronald Ian MacKillop
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APPROVAL.

Name: Ronald I. MacKillop

Degree: Master of Arts (Education)

Title of Thesis: Humanism in Counselling: The Growth of a Dominant Theoretical Framework for Counselling and a Reconsideration of a Displaced Alternative

Examining Committee:

Chairman: M. Manley-Casimir

K. Egan
Senior Supervisor

B. Cooke
Associate Professor

D. Cochrane
External Examiner
Visiting Associate Professor
Faculty of Education
Simon Fraser University

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Author:

(signature)

RONALD I. MACKILLOP

(name)

June 29, 1977

(date)
ABSTRACT

In attempting to integrate theory and practice, the school counsellor usually adopts one of three philosophical/psychological models. In this study these are referred to as Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism and Humanistic Psychology. Each model presents its own view of the nature of man, with its implicit directions and goals for counselling theory. The counselling literature abounds with discussion, debate and research either critiquing, promoting or attempting to reconcile these conflicting models. The counsellor is often left with the impression that these three models exhaust the possibilities for a truly "scientific" approach to counselling theory. It is the purpose of this study to examine modern humanism, to trace its historical roots, and to investigate the nature of its influence on counselling psychology as well as to reconsider the Christian approach as the displaced alternative.

Part I presents a brief historical survey of the development of Humanism since the Renaissance. The focus here is on the development of the humanistic world-view and its eventual displacement of the Christian world-view as the dominant mode of describing human behavior.

Part II examines the relationship between humanism and the counselling theory of Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers, as representative of the three major philosophical/psychological models for counselling. To facilitate
a comparison, each theory is examined in the context of the following questions:

1. What is man? (The Client)
2. How can his aberrations be accounted for? (The Problem)
3. How can they be overcome? (The Solution)

This is followed by a critical summary of the theories and their relationship to humanism. This critical summary provides a rationale for reconsidering a Christian approach to counselling theory.

Part III is an outline for a Christian approach to counselling. It is intended to provide the theoretical underpinning for practice rather than to elaborate a series of techniques as such. The Christian world-view is described so as to parallel as closely as possible the description of the humanistic view. Some implications of the Christian view for counselling are examined by considering the same three questions addressed to Freud, Skinner and Rogers.

In summary, this study finds that the theories of Freud, Skinner and Rogers are more similar than commonly supposed. They all adopt the humanistic world-view as the context in which their theories are developed. All of the theories are strictly deterministic, though they couch the problem in various terminologies. Their empirical findings can be fit into a different presuppositional framework, such as Christianity. In the interests of his science it would appear to be essential that the counsellor learn to
distinguish clearly that which he holds by objective evidence and that which he must extrapolate and hold by faith. The Christian counsellor need be no less "scientific" in his integration of theory and practice than the humanistic counsellor. The realization of this fact can only encourage a more creative dialogue between them.
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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this study to examine modern humanism, to trace its historical roots, and to investigate the nature of its influence on counselling psychology. My intention is to first define Humanism and to outline some of its central tenets. This will be followed by a brief historical survey of the development of humanism in Part I. Part II will deal specifically with the influence of humanism on counselling psychology (to be studied through major theorists). Part III will offer a short critical summary of humanism and will present a non-humanistic counselling model.

I should like to make clear from the beginning that it is my contention that Humanism as a philosophy can be traced as a specific set of presuppositions. Whether one is discussing the Scientific Humanism of Skinner, the Evolutionary Humanism of Huxley, the Marxist Humanism of Marcuse, the Existential Humanism of Sartre, or even the Christian Humanism of Marcel and Tillich, whatever the varieties of modern Humanism they share a common set of presuppositions. It is these presuppositions which will be used to define Humanism and whose development will be traced. First, the term will be defined.

Erich Fromm (1965) defined humanism:

Humanism in simplest terms, the belief in the unity of the human race and man's
potential to perfect himself by his own efforts.¹

Corliss Lamont, more boldly states:

Humanism is the viewpoint that men have but one life to lead....that human happiness is its own justification and requires no support or sanction from supernatural sources; that in any case that supernatural,...does not exist and that human beings, using their own intelligence and cooperating liberally with one another can build an enduring citadel of peace and beauty upon this earth.²

A noted humanist, H. J. Blackham (1968) begins by listing his assumptions:

Humanism proceeds from an assumption that man is on his own and this life is all and an assumption of responsibility for one's own life and for the life of mankind.³

Sir Julian Huxley outlines his own particular brand of Humanism, Evolutionary Humanism,

Such a Humanism is necessarily unitary instead of dualistic, affirming the unity of mind and body; universal instead of particularist, affirming the continuity of man with the rest of life, and of life with the rest of the universe; naturalistic instead of supernaturalistic, affirming the unity of the spiritual and the material....It will have nothing to do with Absolutes, including absolute truth, absolute


morality, absolute perfection and absolute authority.  

To even the most naive observer, it is apparent that modern Humanism stands diametrically opposed to the Christian world-view. For this reason it is useful to place the two positions side by side from time to time. It does not seem presumptuous to note that in Western culture Humanism has always viewed itself in relation to the Christian world-view. H. J. Blackham has commented:

It would be perfectly possible to write about humanism without a mention of Christianity, but in this country with centuries of Christian tradition and a Christian establishment, that would be irresponsible. Humanism in Europe or America has to be in a preliminary way justification of a rejection of Christianity... Indeed, humanism is the permanent alternative to religion, an essentially different way of taking and tackling human life in the world.  

Christian philosopher Francis Schaeffer (1968) commenting from the opposite point of view states:

There is a real unity in non-Christian thought, as well as differences within that unity. The unifying factor can be called rationalism or if you prefer, humanism, though if we use the latter term we must be careful to distinguish its meaning in the more limited sense of such a book as The Humanist Frame edited by Sir Julian Huxley. This latter kind of humanism has become a technical term within the larger meaning of the word. Humanism in the inclusive

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sense is the system whereby man, beginning absolutely by himself tries rationally to build out from himself, having only man as his integration point, to find all knowledge, meaning and value... So rationalism or humanism is the unity within non-Christian thought. 

It is precisely Schaeffer's humanism in the inclusive sense to which this study refers. I will therefore define the term as the world-view or system which makes the following assumptions.

1. There is no power transcending man to which man is subordinate.

As Bertrand Russell puts it:

The whole conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms. It is a conception quite unworthy of free men. 

Erich Fromm states the point simply as:

The humanistic position is that there is nothing higher and nothing more dignified than human existence.

As may be deduced from the preceding quotations as well as those statements already quoted by Huxley, Lamont, Blackham and Fromm, this is indeed a fundamental maxim of every humanism.

2. Man's nature is not fundamentally evil but is

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either neutral or positive. He is thus capable of solving his own problems.

If the first presupposition inclines to despair, it is the second which saves man from despair. It is the humanist's optimistic hope that man can work toward perfection in this life through his own capabilities and potentialities. Lamont states that:

Humanism, having its ultimate faith in man, believes that human beings possess the power or potentiality of solving their own problems, through reliance upon reason and scientific method...9

Fromm, Rogers, Maslow and others representing the "Humanistic Psychologies" tend to see man as possessing an inherent drive toward self-actualization.

All organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities. The aim of man's life therefore is to be understood as the unfolding of his powers according to the laws of his nature.10

This assumption should be viewed in the context of its Christian counterpart, the conception of man's nature as sinful (opposed to God's will).

3. Reason is the only ultimate authority.

T. M. Kitwood states:

After the great clash between religion and authority that occurred in the time of the


10 Erich Fromm, Man For Himself (Greenwich: Fawcett Pub. Inc., 1947), p.29
Renaissance, it was inevitable that sooner or later doubt should be cast on all that was called knowledge and all ways of knowing. This was a destructive process, but on the debris were erected the new intellectual structures of rationalism, based as far as possible on reason alone. 11

Blackham states the point clearly:

The faith of the humanist is first of all in reason, in the reliability of tested evidence. The humanist is a rationalist. He feels that all is lost if he lets go his faith in reason. This is his choice; he is anchored in reason and he navigates by reason. 12

4. The purpose of man's life is to actualize his potentialities by the unfolding of his true powers.

Jean-Paul Sartre in defending his existential humanism states:

There is no sense in life a priori. Life is nothing until it is lived; but it is your to make sense of and the value of it is nothing else but the sense that you choose. 13

In 1933 a document entitled A Humanist Manifesto was published in the New Humanist magazine. Each of the preceding assumptions is clearly seen in this document, as for example in its eighth article:

Religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the


13 J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), p. 54
end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and now. 14

These assumptions or postulates then, appear to contain the irreducible core of modern humanist thought. The many varieties of humanism would appear to have originated largely as a result of extrapolating upon one or more of these assumptions. I would hold that it is fundamentally the sharing of this common basis which categorizes a given outlook as humanistic. As Schaeffer has pointed out, some humanists have tended to reject as anti-humanistic others who hold the same set of basic assumptions but elaborate them differently. One such case to be investigated later is the controversy between the so called "deterministic" and "Humanistic" psychologies. I also intend to show that such philosophies as materialism, determinism, rationalism, existentialism, and others, follow from the acceptance of those more fundamental assumptions identified as basic Humanism.

Having defined Humanism as a philosophy which is naturalistic, rationalistic and optimistic, the next step is to survey the historical development of Humanism.

PART I

Renaissance

In a search for the roots of modern humanism, one might well return to the "golden era" of Greece in the fifth century B.C. It is more common however to search for its origins in the Renaissance, which most historians place in the mid fourteenth to the mid sixteenth centuries. In surveying the literature, however, it strikes one that this is in fact one of the few points of agreement among historians. The past 50 or 60 years have seen a growing controversy over the interpretation of the Renaissance. Most historians seem comfortable with the notion that whatever the relationship between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the coupling of the Renaissance with the humanist movement is safe. William J. Bouwsma states:

The problems presented by Renaissance humanism can only be understood, however, in the context of the larger problem of interpreting the Renaissance itself, of which the humanist movement is often considered the central cultural expression.  

Since this study concerns itself with Humanism and not the Renaissance per se, definitions and interpretations of the Renaissance will be ignored except where they have direct bearing on an attempt to describe Renaissance humanism.  

Humanism in the Renaissance was a movement to restore the classical culture of antiquity. The humanists were

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responsible for not only popularizing the classics of Greece and Rome but for recovering, preserving and translating the works of the ancients. The humanists were not content merely to recover these ancient writings or to learn of classical culture, but in fact to imitate it, to erect a new classical culture of their own. Artz has described their achievement:

In the end, the Humanists restored the whole surviving heritage of Greek and Latin literature, edited all of it, and later brought out printed editions of the whole. ²

And Dresden adds:

For humanism is concerned not so much with reviving the ancient world as with absorbing the SPIRIT of the ancient culture. ³

During the Renaissance, Humanism was in competition with Scholasticism, the prevailing philosophy of the Middle Ages. Whereas the Scholastics hoped to educate and perfect a man through an emphasis on logic, science and theology, the Humanists relied on the classical model of rhetoric as displayed for example by Cicero. Artz (1966) and Kristeller (1961) have both pointed out that the term "Humanist" came to mean one who was devoted to the study of a clearly defined set of studies, namely grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy.

²Frederick B. Artz, Renaissance Humanism 1300-1550 (Kent State University Press, 1966) p.87

At this time, there was no apparent conflict between Humanism and Christianity. In fact most of the early humanists were themselves Christians. If there was a change in the humanist's view of religion, it was perhaps his realization of non-religious or secular interests. The humanists' focus on man and this world was in contrast to the church-centered society of the Middle Ages. Kristeller has stated:

If an age where the non-religious concerns that had been growing for centuries attained a kind of equilibrium with religious and theological thought or even began to surpass it in vitality and appeal, must be called pagan, the Renaissance was pagan, at least in certain places and phases. Yet since the religious convictions of Christianity were either retained or transformed, but never really challenged, it seems more appropriate to call the Renaissance a fundamentally Christian age.

Having made this point, however, it is a relatively simple matter to find the seeds of modern humanism in the Renaissance. While it is not true that humanism was in open rebellion against Christianity in the Renaissance it would perhaps be true to say that it was eyed with suspicion by the Church. The humanists, preoccupied as they were with the revival and restoration of classical literature also applied their energies to reviving and restoring ancient Christian sources as well. The Church by this time, largely under the intellectual influence of Thomas Aquinas, had absorbed much of Aristotle into its theology creating a rationalistic system to

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4Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago Press, 1948), p.73
which the humanists were opposed. To quote one of the earliest humanists, Petrarch, the so-called "father of humanism":

We accept in humble faith the secrets of nature and the mysteries of God, which are higher still; they attempt to seize them in haughty arrogance. They do not manage to reach them, not even to approach them but in their insanity they believe that they have reached them and strike heaven with their fists.5

Thus the humanist's rhetoric was at first aimed at what they considered to be antagonistic to true Christianity. In this sense they helped to set the stage for Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation. Their teaching and emphasis was not designed to oppose Christian thought, but rather was viewed as independent of it. The humanist movement was basically a lay movement and developed a lay morality which again were independent of the Church rather than necessarily in opposition to it.

One of the services which the humanists performed in their capacity as moral guides to the urban society of Italy in this transitional age was to erect a secular ideal of virtue and the virtuous life alongside the Christian, a lay morality alongside the clerical and monastic, an ideal not so much in conflict with Christianity as independent of it.6

The Renaissance saw the unfolding of secularism, a growing interest in and involvement with the pleasures of this

5 Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kriteller, and John H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 76

They did not develop a view of life contrary to that of the Church, but they opened up the possibility of developing a culture independent of Christian ideas.  

It was an era of transition from a theocentric civilization to one which was anthrocentric. As has been noted elsewhere, no sooner did Copernicus remove man from the center of the universe than the humanists returned him to the central position. This world and this life became much more of interest so that slowly the grip of Medieval supernaturalism was broken. As human interests began to dominate life, a natural consequence was less reliance on God and so a decline of faith. Whereas Petrarch and the early humanists were devoutly Christian and even "defenders of the Faith", later humanists such as Erasmus of Rotterdam began to criticize and satirize the Church. Erasmus appears to have chosen not to be openly skeptical in public but his writings show him to be more concerned with living the good life than with dogma. In this sense, Erasmus stands between the early humanists like Petrarch and Pico and the later secular humanists. H. E. Barnes (1960) states:

Almost everywhere, humanism began as a rather pious, timid, and conservative drift away from Medieval Christianity and ended in bold independence of medieval tradition. Erasmus of Rotterdam,

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7Frederick B. Artz, Renaissance Humanism 1300-1550 (Kent State University Press, 1966), p. 68-69
one of the greatest of humanists occupied a position midway between extreme piety and frank secularism. Petrarch represented conservative Italian humanism. Robust secularism and intellectual independence appeared in the writings of Pomponazzi, Bembo, Machiavelli and Guicciardini.8

Thus it is evident that Renaissance humanism evolved from a classical movement which viewed itself as sympathetic to religion to a growing secularist temper, a freeing of man from the Church-dominated society of an earlier age. Man had become truly "the measure of all things." This was a crucial step in the evolution of modern man and in viewing the Renaissance in historical perspective, appears to be its most significant contribution. Man had become free, free to direct his own life and to develop his own human interests and potentialities. An accompanying product of Renaissance humanism is a recovery of individualism. Barnes points out:

Another humanist trend which cannot be ignored was the rebirth of individualism which, developed by Greece and Rome to a remarkable degree, had been suppressed by the rise of a caste system in the later Roman Empire, by the church and feudalism in the Middle Ages.9

Ferguson (1963) argues that individualism was not truly a product of humanism but rather of the economic, social and political development of the age. He does agree, however,


that the humanists both used the trend to develop their own thought and furthered its development in Renaissance society by supplying authoritative models from antiquity.

Perhaps the best expression of the Renaissance spirit is still the often quoted passage by Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola. Addressing Adam, God is speaking:

He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: 'Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the world's center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment to be reborn into the higher forms which are divine.'10

In drawing a comparison between Renaissance Humanism and Modern Humanism, it should be noted that the most obvious difference lies in the fact that in the Renaissance, humanism was a specific social movement articulating a new quality

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10Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John H. Randall Jr., The Renaissance Philosophy of Man (University of Chicago Press, 1948) p. 224
of life. It was not primarily a philosophy or a way of thinking. It held no particular world-view of its own, lacking both the biblical system of Christianity and the scientific world view which was soon to enable rationalism to push the Renaissance humanists once again into obscurity. The humanists had succeeded however, in breaking the hold of religion on European culture and had opened the way for a pagan philosophy and metaphysics. Whereas once theology had held center stage in the thought of Medieval thinkers, secular philosophy now began to compete for the attention of scholars. The Humanists' role in this transformation is the true link between Renaissance Humanism and its modern forms. From this point onward, Humanism as a classical lay movement declined and Humanism as philosophy began to sprout wings. Following the impact of Renaissance Humanism the next important phase of the historical development of Modern Humanism is the growth of Rationalism, which will be considered next.
Rationalism

Rationalism, like Humanism, is elusive of definition. It does, like Humanism, have a technical definition, but is commonly used in a much broader sense. In the technical sense Rationalism refers to the attempt to arrive at reliable knowledge entirely by the use of reason or logic. That is, it is a deductive epistemology expressed perhaps most clearly in the system of Descartes. Descartes rejected all authority as a source of knowledge and developed his method of doubt associated with the famous "cogito ergo sum". From this point he developed an entire philosophical system based on reason alone. However, there is good reason to broaden the definition of Rationalism so as to include not only the deductive epistemology but also to include the inductive method of science which became a powerful force in the eighteenth century. Modern Rationalism is thus a synthesis of Cartesian Rationalism and empiricism as set forth by Newton and Locke in particular.

In Rationalism in the 1970's, D. J. Stewart discusses the need for a broader definition of Rationalism and outlines several ways of using the term.

My argument will be that our use of the label 'rationalism' is related to all these ideas and that it is possible to build up a consistent structure of thought which incorporates all these notions, and which provides a uniquely hopeful basis for tackling all the problems which face us.¹

Stewart's "consistent structure of thought" refers to the same systematic approach to the conditions of life inherent in Schaeffer's definition of rationalism (humanism) noted in the introduction to this study. Borrowing from Schaeffer then, henceforth in this study, rationalism will refer to that system whereby man, beginning absolutely by himself tries by use of reason alone to build out from himself, having only man as his integration point, to find all knowledge meaning and value. The term "reason" in this sense refers to both deductive and inductive reasoning.

Also like humanism, rationalism could be traced back to the ancient Greeks but a more useful starting point is the medieval system of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas was responsible for a unique synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Augustinian theology. His system became the dominant outlook of the Catholic Church for centuries. Formerly, the Church made no true distinction between theology and philosophy, since Augustine's doctrine of the divine illumination of the intellect rendered the two inseparable. Aquinas, however, significantly altered the relationship of theology and philosophy with his teaching that the unaided human intellect can discover divine or absolute truth. Aquinas did, however, stop short by allowing that not all truth could be discovered by the intellect or by reason alone. Aquinas then set up two relatively independent ways of knowing, supernatural theology based on revelation alone and natural theology based on reason. By this single act, philosophy would soon emerge as a separate, totally
independent mode of thought. It should be noted however, that Aquinas was not a rationalist in the sense of the preceding definition since he would not allow that man can discover all truth through the employment of reason.

Modern rationalism, however, began with Descartes. Descartes assumed the independence of natural theology, which he referred to as "metaphysics" or "philosophy" from supernatural theology, which he designated "theology". In Descartes, the separation of the two is complete, with any Thomist limitations obliterated. It was Descartes' intent to develop a system of thought based solely on deductive reasoning or the mathematical method of argument and proof from a few self-evident a priori axioms. It was Descartes contention that all truth can be discovered and proved by his method. Keeling describes Descartes' separation of theology and philosophy or metaphysics:

Both theology and metaphysics contain propositions about God and his relation to the world. What decides which of such propositions belong to theology and which to metaphysics is the mode of their certification. Those belong to metaphysics which have been demonstrated by reason and their acceptance enjoined by reason, those belong to theology which have been disclosed through revelation and their acceptance enjoined by faith and authority.2

Such a statement at first glance appears to conform to Aquinas' two independent ways of knowing except that for

2S. V. Keeling, Descartes (Oxford University Press, 1968), p.57
Descartes, that which could not be proved by reason was to be doubted, for in fact such was the very basis of his method. Thus, where in Aquinas' synthesis two equally reliable sources of truth exist, for Descartes there is but one. One result of Cartesian philosophy is the autonomy of reason with respect to authority and the consequent separation of theology and philosophy.

The second result of Cartesian philosophy is the mechanistic world-view. If secularism is the legacy of the sixteenth century, then surely mechanism is the legacy of the seventeenth. Barnes has made this point:

He (Descartes) thought that he created, with the help of mathematics and logic, a completely mechanistic world.....From the mechanistic world he exempted but two things, God and the soul of man. Man is the only being in nature who possesses a soul, and the latter is the only part of man which escapes mechanistic necessity.  

It would be inaccurate to credit Descartes alone with the development of the mechanistic world-view, for he merely supplied a metaphysic to a movement begun before his time in the scientific revolution of Galileo, Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon and later solidified by Newton. Discussing Bacon's views on natural objects, Keeling has pointed out:

Such a view of the constitution of natural objects is evidently already mechanistic in essentials: it awaits only the advent of Descartes to extend and geometrize the conception in order

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to reach that full form of mechanism which continues through Newton and is conserved in present mathematical physics.  

If Descartes felt moved to brush away the limitations of philosophy or natural theology as posited by Aquinas, there were others who questioned the timidity of Descartes. Descartes himself could not carry his rationalism to its logical result, namely a materialistic world-view in which not only nature but man himself is part of the machine. Hobbes, a contemporary of Descartes, questioned the logical basis of excluding man's soul from the machine. Hobbes authored metaphysical materialism in which all that is is matter in motion and whatever is not matter does not exist.

The Universe, that is the whole mass of things that are, is corporeal, that is to say body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, length, breadth and depth. Also every part of body is likewise body, and hath the dimensions. And consequently, every part of the Universe is body, and that which is not body is not part of the Universe. And because the Universe is all, that which is not part of it is nothing, and, consequently, nowhere.  

Most authors point out however, that Hobbes still stops short of a total naturalism in that he does not deny the existence of God but states that it is impossible, even ludicrous for human reason to fathom that which is spirit

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4 S. V. Keeling, *Descartes* (Oxford University Press, 1968), p.50

and not matter.

Rationalism was altered significantly in the ideas of John Locke. If the place of reason in the scheme of things was now secure, its definition was to be altered. Since Descartes, reason was employed in the classical deductive sense, arguing from axioms which were a priori. Locke was an empiricist and unlike many before him specialized in epistemology rather than the erecting of philosophical systems. Locke argued that at birth the mind is a blank slate, written upon only by the pen of experience. All knowledge is obtained through the senses, i.e. experience provides the data upon which reason operates. If Locke's epistemology conflicted with that of earlier rationalists, his faith in reason did not. Locke's empiricism was to become a vital force along with Newton's mechanics in the molding of modern man. Thus reason, in the empiricist view is not the source of data but rather the means by which such data are developed. Consider Locke's definition:

Reason...I take to be the discovery of the certainty of probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties; viz by sensation or reflection.  

Just as the Cartesian rationalists had moved from mechanism to materialism, this movement was reflected by the empiricists and in fact stretched to its limits. In Locke, man

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existed in the midst of two worlds, that of material substance on the one hand and spiritual substance on the other. Barnes states:

It remained for Berkeley and Hume to clear away this dualistic world. Berkeley destroyed the concept of material substance, and Hume that of spiritual substance.7

Hume seems to sum up the ultimate extent of rationalism, extending rationalist doctrine to its logical limits by his skeptical empiricism. Hume the ultimate empiricist, showed that man cannot defend the existence of either the material or spiritual world on the basis of reason and that in fact all that existed was ideas, ideas which are received by the senses. Hume, felt by his contemporaries to be an atheist is more accurately described as a naturalist. He tended to identify God as whatever principle operated in nature, but stressed that human intellect or reason could never perceive it. His reputation as an atheist likely resulted from his ridicule of the concept of a personal God.

You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamored of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget that his superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least without

any foundation in reason. 8

It is necessary at this time to draw our study of rationalism to a close that attention might be diverted to what Os Guinness has called "the third great milestone on the road to modern humanism." (The first two being the 5th Century B.C. Greek culture and the classical revival of the Renaissance.) This third milestone is the eighteenth century phenomenon known as the Enlightenment. The history of rationalism as traced so far is the necessary background of this crucial stage in the development of modern man. The Enlightenment like the Renaissance will be studied as a period, rather than as a succession of theorists or philosophers since the latter approach seems more appropriate to the study of a century like the seventeenth. Before leaving the seventeenth century, however, it is necessary to summarize the changes which took place in the humanist world-view.

As has been shown already it was the Renaissance humanists who opened the door to secularism and placed man rather than God in the center of things. Renaissance humanism, however, lacked a cohesive world-view. It was the seventeenth century philosophers and scientists who developed humanism from a cultural movement of classical revival to the dominant world-view of the Western World. The personal God of Christian

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revelation had given way to the Great Mechanic of Newtonian physics and the Christian world-view was increasingly challenged and overwhelmed by the new humanistic view. If, however, the humanists' secularism had been enhanced, its rather lofty view of man had suffered considerably. The rationalists had found man to be in possession of a world which was totally determined, a machine. At first both man and God were held exempt from the machine, but eventually man succumbed and God was abandoned as superfluous. Accompanying the rationalist's expanding world-view was an essential change in the view of man. The battle had been waged between reason and authority and reason was clearly the victor. In examining the legacy of seventeenth century rationalism, G. R. Cragg has stated:

That faith which Locke expounded was the one which Newton commended. But the emphasis on reason's place in religion implied a reassessment of man's inherent capacities. Perhaps the corruption wrought by the Fall had been exaggerated; a growing confidence in man's powers suggested that he should rely more exclusively on his native capacities.9

Perhaps for purposes of this study, the connection between the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment is summed up best by Leonard M. Marsak:

Skepticism and relativism were strengthened for the philosophers by the methodological concerns of the preceding century. The scientific spokesman of that century--Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes,

John Locke and Isaac Newton—all appealed for a rational standard of truth that subsequently in the work of the eighteenth century, would do away with metaphysics and miracles, declare nature uniform, and knowledge provisional, contingent upon man and the way he goes about securing it, and resounding it to his benefit. What emerged from this intellectual activity were the words nature, reason, man and progress which became a medium of exchange among thinking men and which were used to forge a scientific humanism.10

In the development of modern humanism few eras have made so deep an impression as the 18th century phenomenon of the Enlightenment. It is a period, unlike the seventeenth century, in which few great philosophical systems were constructed, few giants of intellect emerged and few truly novel steps were taken. This is not to say that no gifted men lived or wrote (for there were many) but only to state that one cannot reduce the Enlightenment to the work of one man or even one system. It was rather a time of strengthening, consolidating, broadening and extending the work already begun by the Renaissance humanists and the seventeenth century rationalists. It is not the purpose of this study to present a complete history of the Enlightenment but to trace the development of humanistic thought. Recall the postulates of modern humanism as outlined earlier:

1. There is no power transcending man to which he is subordinate.

2. Man's nature is not fundamentally evil but is either neutral or positive. He is thus capable of working out his own salvation.

3. Reason is the only ultimate authority.

4. The purpose of life is to actualize man's potentialities by the unfolding of his true powers.

This period will be studied against the backdrop of these statements. To begin, an introductory comment by Leonard Marsak in the introduction to *The Enlightenment*:

The Enlightenment was perhaps the end of the Renaissance or of the Middle Ages, or else the beginning of modern times, as some have argued,
but there can be no doubt about its essential character, it was an age of secular or scientific humanism. 1

The conflict between philosophy (natural theology) and theology which began with the synthesis of Aquinas, culminated in this Enlightenment period. In orthodox Christian theology, neither intellect nor nature are autonomous, but are dependent upon grace, or God's initiative. The seventeenth century, as previously noted, made not only intellect or reason autonomous, but nature as well. The Enlightenment brought to fruition the seeds of this struggle. In the 18th century, nature has devoured grace, or as Crocker puts it, "The supernatural is submerged by the natural." 2 The implications of such a phenomenon are clearly drawn by Cassirer (1951).

Thus the autonomy of the intellect corresponds to the pure autonomy of nature. In one and the same intellectual process of emancipation the philosophy of the Enlightenment attempts to show the self-sufficiency of both nature and intellect. Both are now to be recognized as elemental and to be firmly connected with one another. Thus any mediation between the two which is based on a transcendent power or a transcendent being is superfluous. 3

The door was now opened to do away not only with revelation as an authority but with God himself if one so


desired. That many so desired is evident throughout the writings of many Enlightenment thinkers. Atheism became not only permissible, but common. Such a situation would of course have been quite impossible 100 years earlier. The skepticism of Hume did much to make atheism respectable if not popular. D'Holbach a thorough-going materialist and atheist, was well known among the French philosophes.

But the universe is a cause, it is not an effect it is not a work; it has not been made because it is impossible that it should have been made....Nature, whose essence is visible to act and produce, requires not, to discharge her functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than herself. Matter moves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence of its own heterogeneity.\(^4\)

Even Voltaire, who could not accept D'Holbach's atheism because of its moral implications, nevertheless sees atheism as a more viable alternative than Christianity whose adherents he describes as fanatics.

Fanaticism is certainly a thousand times the more to be dreaded; for atheism inspires no sanguinary passion but fanaticism does; atheism does not oppose crime but fanaticism prompts to its commission.\(^5\)

In Voltaire, is seen another central feature of the Enlightenment, the attack on revealed religion, and Christianity in particular. This, however, was no subtle cautious questioning


of particular doctrines, but a new phenomenon, an attack from the outside which drove straight to the heart. It is plain that this struggle was begun in the Renaissance and the 17th century, but it took on new dimensions for the eighteenth century. It is perhaps the central issue of the first half of the century. Alfred Cobben makes the point:

If the sensational psychology constituted the basic theoretical element in the eighteenth century, its most immediately obvious practical object was the attack on religion. To reduce the whole movement to this would be a gross oversimplification, but it is justifiable to see this as its keynote.6

Hazard, (1963) sharpens the focus in his European Thought in the Eighteenth Century.

Now it was a case of striking at the roots of the tree itself. It was not a matter of an isolated revolt, here or there, of the insurgence of an individual, or a group, of a controversy between rival theologians; it was nothing short of an attempt to achieve the total defeat, the complete annihilation of religion that was now the object of the campaign, backed by a firm determination to see it through. The onslaught took place in the open, in broad daylight, for the multitude to see, for the multitude to applaud.7

If the rationalists and empiricists had delivered man from God the Father and left God the Great Mechanic, the rationalists of the Enlightenment only carried such a movement to its materialistic conclusion--no God at all. Earlier


rationalists had posited the existence of a uniformity of natural causes, a law-conforming universe, the legacy of Locke and Newton. However, as Schaeffer points out:

What they did not believe in was the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system. That little phrase makes all the difference in the world. It makes the difference between natural science and a science that is rooted in naturalistic philosophy....Under the influence of the presupposition of the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system, the machine does not merely embrace the sphere of physics, it now encompasses everything. 8

Thus the French philosophes of the Enlightenment were largely mechanistic materialists. Indeed the new epistemology contributed by Locke and Newton provided them the means to remove metaphysical elements from philosophy entirely. For empiricism held that only that data which impresses itself upon the senses can be called true knowledge, and since supernatural phenomenon are not accessible to our senses, they need be accorded no validity.

Another victim of the assault on religion, besides revelation, is man's free will. For if uniformity of natural causes in a closed system is assumed, then not only is such a view materialistic, but also deterministic. For if man is but a complex manifestation of nature his behavior, as the rest of nature, must be governed by uniform law. Barnes speaks to...

Above all, the assumption of a spiritual principle is not required in explaining the universe and its operations. The latter can be adequately accounted for on the basis of materialistic determinism, a system in which God has no logical place. Everything from the cosmos to human conduct is a product of casual necessity. There is no room for the notion of arbitrary freewill.  

It is to this point that the humanists' victory over revealed authority had brought man. It is not that the humanist held a low view of man (for certainly the opposite was true) but his unrelenting rationalism had driven out not only God, but free will and even significance for man. It remained for philosophers of the nineteenth century to fully appreciate this point and to attempt to reconstruct metaphysics.  

Perhaps more insight could be gained into the Enlightenment if the motivation for the assault on religion is examined. In what sense was revealed religion the enemy? Why did it need destroying?  

Christian orthodoxy was attacked for three distinct reasons. First, the authority of Christian teaching resides not primarily in reason, but rather in the revealed authority of Scripture. Thus it was incumbent upon the Church to adhere to doctrine not necessarily because it was based on reason but because it had been revealed. Accompanying this, the Christian church claims to possess truth, eternal truth, gained not by

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the power of human reason but revealed by God. Since the source of this revealed truth is God himself, it then follows that any propositions contrary to it are false. This then places the Christian in the position of holding that opposing doctrines or religions are false. It is this lack of "tolerance" which appears to be the first point of contention, for the humanists holds tolerance as a cardinal virtue, a doctrine popularized by Erasmus and other Renaissance humanists. Some philosophes attacked what they called Christian dogmatism as though their adversary were the devil himself, focussing on the cruel and inhumane practices carried out in the name of religion.

Voltaire's treatment of religion also centers, and even more persistently, on the point of intolerance. It should be remembered that ceremonial burnings of heretics were still common in the Iberian Peninsula, that Protestant ministers were still being hanged in France...10

The second objection of the philosophes to Christianity had to do with the long-standing conflict between reason and authority or natural theology and theology as described earlier. The humanists' position has been that nature and reason are both autonomous and have no need of revelation to be their guide or tutor. It was in fact the Christian denial of man's self-sufficiency which formed the core of this issue. The Christian claim to the authority of revelation implied that man

was not capable of his own perfection but needed God to help him. The view of man as emancipated from the bondage of "superstition" had been a humanistic ideal since the Renaissance and in fact the very term "Enlightenment" often came to be associated with a denial of the authority of revealed religion and of tradition as well. As Carl Becker has stated:

Renunciation of the traditional revelation was the very condition of being truly enlightened.11

The humanists had shed light on some of the long-standing mysteries of the universe, especially in the realm of physics and the lawful order of the universe. They had developed a naturalistic philosophy of science which gave them the hope of finding all knowledge through the use of reason alone. Small wonder that they desired once and for all to rid men of the albatross of revealed authority which for so long had opposed a true naturalism. Had not both science and philosophy clearly demonstrated the ability of naturalism to explain phenomena without the need of revelation or an interfering God? Hazard supports this view:

Religion, revealed religion, that was what stood in the way; that was the major adversary. Once make it clear that, from the nature of the case, there could be no such thing; once make it clear that, it point of historical fact, there had been no such thing, then the philosophers could go ahead....The strictly religious element in religion, that is to say religion in the strictest sense of the word, is based on superstition,

11Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (Yale University Press, 1932), p. 50
must be attacked and eradicated.  

In their attempt to discredit revealed authority, the philosophes were successful beyond their wildest dream. At first the attack came from the Deists, those philosophes who rejected Christianity but clung to a belief in a God, a benevolent, non-interfering God. The Deists attempted to formulate a religion whose doctrines were based on reason alone. As such, they of course joined in the attack on revealed religion. Some, like Voltaire, appeared to cling to Deism only since the alternative, atheism, was encumbered by several moral difficulties. In the end, as Barnes has pointed out, Deism became less popular since to many it became an unacceptable compromise. It was too conservative for the atheists and too radical for the Christians. Apparently it too was a victim of the attack on Christianity.

If intolerance and obligation to revealed authority injured the sensibilities of the humanists, it was the third objection which lay at the heart of the differences with Christianity. This was a fundamental disagreement as to the nature of man. The biblical view of man holds that man was created in the image of God but has since fallen. By nature he is now hopelessly self-centered and evil, in need of redemption. This view is contrary to one of the most cherished beliefs of the philosophes, the improvability of man. It would

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be an oversimplification to state that the philosophes viewed man as inherently good. Rather they seem to have accepted man's shortcomings but had great faith in the power of reason to forge new tools to improve his state. Coates, White and Schapiro in their Emergence of Liberal Humanism have described the issue:

The conflict shifted from man's evil nature and his good conscience to that between man who was by nature good and society which had become bad. A secular concept of salvation emerged. Instead of corrupt man saved from his heritage of sin, virtuous man was to be saved from his heritage of an evil environment.13

Thus the mood of the times was one of optimism and the belief in progress became common. The breaking of the hold of religion on man was viewed as a vital step in his emancipation and maturity. Perfectability and the achievement of utopian society now fell into the realm of the possible. It was felt that the past had demonstrated what progress could be made when man applied his reason to the mysteries before him. Crocker has captured the essence of this optimism:

The optimism of the Age of Enlightenment was, for the most part, not about human nature, but about what could be done with human beings, through the progress of science, through education and government, and in general, through the rational reconstruction of society. Its confidence was less in man's reasonableness, than in the power of reason to devise ways of coping with such a creature.14


It should be noted here the vital role that the concept of human nature plays in the belief in progress, since only if man can be perfected by his own efforts is such a view tenable. The focal point of this particular issue was Jean Jacques Rousseau. By Rousseau's time the real battle was no longer between nature and grace, since grace had long since given up the ground, but rather now between nature and freedom. He wrote at a time in the eighteenth century when the philosophes assumed the battle with revealed religion to be essentially over and they were turning to other considerations. Having destroyed the traditional basis for morality, how were they to replace it? Also, having shed the bonds of revealed religion, how to go about constructing the new society which would produce the new man? Moreover, the skepticism of Hume and others was now being used to challenge the validity of reason itself. As Cassirer has noted:

The attempt to eliminate all metaphysical elements from empirical philosophy finally gains so much ground that it casts doubt upon the logical foundations of this philosophy as well.15

Becker has pointed out that the philosophes began to turn from considering the questions of metaphysics to studying more practical, questions especially political and social reform questions.

15 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 64
Rousseau, held that man was by nature innocent and good but that every work of man, social institutions, government, education, the church and society itself conspired to corrupt him. The evil in the world did not spring from man's nature but from outside forces. As Rousseau puts it, "When I give myself up to any temptation, I act from the impulse of external objects." Rousseau's faith was not ultimately in reason as guide but rather in conscience.

Reason deceives us but too often, and has given us a right to distrust her conclusions; but conscience never deceives us. She is to the soul what instinct is to the body--she is man's truest and safest guide.

In this sense, Rousseau appears out of step with the philosophes, for he has challenged the vital concept of Locke's empiricism, the absence of innate principles. However, viewed in perspective, Rousseau is a figure of the Enlightenment, for he too believed in the perfectability of man and in fact made an impressive contribution toward social reform in his Social Contract a major work of political theory. Speaking of Locke, Hume and Rousseau, Charles Frankel (1955) has stated that:

...if there is anything that unites these men, it is not a psychological theory, nor even a common set of value judgments; it is only a common disposition to place whatever value judgments they make in a humanistic setting, to refuse to impose standards on man which are

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irrelevant to what he wants and what he can do.\textsuperscript{18}

Having merely sketched a few of the major currents in the eighteenth century it is time to summarize some of the results of the ferment of thought in that era. First, the necessity of a transcendent being was removed, for naturalism had provided a system which began and ended with man himself. Second, man's nature had come to be viewed as either basically good or at least capable of perfection by man's own efforts. Third, in the battle of authority, reason had triumphed and revelation was vanquished; this was truly the Age of Reason. Fourth, the purpose of man's life was to find happiness and the good life here on earth and to contribute to the progressive improvement of man's lot. It is clear that modern humanism as described in this paper is now formed in its essence. With the skepticism and Romanticism of the latter part of the eighteenth century, the humanistic horizon broadened further and the nineteenth century philosophers varied its form from the purely naturalistic materialism of the Enlightenment to several new expressions of humanism.

19th Century

Having examined the genesis and development of several defining postulates of modern humanism, further historical study may appear unnecessary. Further discussion of nineteenth-century thought is warranted, however, since the purpose of this study is not merely to examine the history of humanism, but rather to examine its influence on counseling psychology. Certain movements and developments in post-Enlightenment humanistic thought have made significant contributions to counseling psychology. (The most obvious example is the phenomenological-existentialist movement which has undergirded so called "third force psychology.")

Philosophers from the Renaissance to the time of the Enlightenment had concerned themselves with epistemology and the relationship between reason and revelation, or authority. By the latter part of the eighteenth century this conflict was assumed by many to be settled. Materialism and mechanistic determinism were commonly held assumptions. As the implications of such a victory began to be realized, many were uncomfortable with the view of man and his significance implied in such a philosophy. It was Rousseau who began to raise the issue of the relationship, not of grace and nature, but of freedom and nature. If man is determined as a part of nature, what is the meaning of freedom? Rousseau's reaction against the materialism of the Enlightenment was supported by Hume who had questioned the validity of reason itself. Hume's skepticism, originally aimed at showing the futility of metaphysical speculation,
at the same time called into question the validity of science. Hence, by the close of the eighteenth century there had arisen a "crisis of rationalism."

It was Immanuel Kant, who was to resolve the crisis. Kant sought to save science and indeed rationalism itself from the skepticism of Hume. He was also influenced by Rousseau and the question of freedom and nature. In this regard his aim was to establish a rational basis for freedom which would then provide a means to accomplish his major goal, a rational justification of morality.

For Kant, as for Rousseau, morality was impossible if man was totally determined in nature. A necessary presupposition of morality is freedom, since only an undetermined, free act has moral worth. Thus for Kant, morality required that man be in some way transcendent of nature. His contention was that before any metaphysical statements could be made, first an analysis of the limitations of reason was required.

For the dogmatism of metaphysic, that is the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason is the source of all that unbelief, which is always very dogmatical, and wars against all morality. ¹

One of Kant's major contributions to Enlightenment thought was his unique synthesis of empiricism and Cartesian

rationalism. Kant argued, with the empiricists that all know-
ledge begins with experience, but he denies that all knowledge
necessarily arises from experience. Against the empiricists,
he argued for an a priori component of knowledge. However,
for Kant the a priori is no set of innate principles as posited
by Descartes but rather the structure of mind itself. Kant
held that all knowledge gained through experience is of
necessity shaped and formed according to his a priori categories
of mind. This is the basis of the Kantian "Copernican Revolu-
tion of Philosophy" for now knowledge is created through the
interplay of experience and mind. Man's role in the accumu-
lation of knowledge is thus creative and active, not that of a
passive spectator. It is the mind itself which gives structure
to experience and laws to nature itself. The mind is thus a
rational structure in that it is the giver of laws and form.
Time and space thus become merely two modes of perception used
by the mind to impose its order on experience. Kant then states
that we never know things-in-themselves (noumena) but rather as
they are determined and conditioned by the mind. Such objects
Kant calls "phenomena" since they exist only in time and space
and are mere appearances of reality. Kant stresses the fact
that the noumena are unknowable, that all we can know are
phenomena which are determined by the rational structure of
mind acting upon experience. This is Kant's means of escape
from Hume's skepticism and his answer to Rousseau's dilemma.

For if phenomena are things by themselves, freedom
cannot be saved. Nature in that case is the
complete and sufficient cause determining every event
and its condition is always contained in that series of phenomena only which, together with their effect, are necessary under the laws of nature. If on the contrary, phenomena are taken for nothing except what they are in reality, namely not things by themselves, but representations only which are connected with each other according to empirical laws, they must themselves have causes which are not phenomenal.... it would necessarily destroy all freedom, if we were to defend obstinately the reality of phenomena. Those, therefore, who follow the common opinion on this subject, have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.\(^2\)

Since phenomena are related by empirical laws, Kant thus provides an objective validity for science, since science is the study of phenomena and their inter-relationships. At the same time science is denied access to the noumenal world and thus shown incapable of metaphysical speculation. However, Kant shows that the self, like any other object has both phenomenal and noumenal aspect, demonstrating that in this sense man transcends nature. Kant's postulating of a noumenal self permits a notion of freedom since the self can never be fully determined in nature. It is this freedom which allows Kant to assert that man is a moral agent, capable of freely willed action. However, if man is free in this sense it means he can choose whether or not he will act in a moral way. Kant postulated a moral law, the categorical imperative:

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\text{There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou}
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canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law. 3

This means that man is to see himself in his actions as transcending nature and therefore he is to act in a manner which transcends not only himself but nature too. That is, a man ought to act as he would if he were a noumenal self, free and immortal. Thus Kant saw two aspects of humanity, nature determined in the phenomenal world and culture, a product of man's moral efforts to transcend nature.

Here Kant claims to establish the validity of morality on rationalistic rather than religious grounds. This sometimes overlooked feature of his work is of central importance to the study of humanism, for this rationalistic justification of morality independent of God had also been a goal of earlier Enlightenment rationalists, particularly the philosophes.

Before leaving Kant, two criticisms of his thought need to be considered. First, there is no clear reason to assume, as does Kant, that the noumenal self is itself subject to the morality Kant postulates, nor in fact is there reason to assume that this noumenal self is subject to the demands of reason, since he has already shown the inability of reason to penetrate the noumenal realm. (He did believe reason to be unconfined by time and space, i.e. non-phenomenal, but his description of reason at this point could perhaps be called the

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The second point to be noted is that in no way has Kant established the objective validity of either freedom or its subsequent corollary, morality. In fact he began his work with the assertion that such a goal was impossible. Kant himself reminds us of this shortcoming:

> It should be clearly understood that, in what we have said, we had no intention of establishing the reality of freedom... For not only would this have been no transcendental consideration at all... but it could never have succeeded... 4

It is perhaps ironic that Kant the rationalist should provide the basis for later idealism and several anti-rationalistic movements. His thought has led in three directions. For some, it led to the conclusion that metaphysics was a dead issue and that philosophy must concern itself with the less significant questions henceforth. For the Romantics, there was the hope that if reality could not be known cognitively, then it would be grasped mystically or aesthetically.

The third direction is that represented by German Idealism, perhaps summed up best in the system of George W. F. Hegel. Hegel's idealism springs from his assumption that Kant's noumenal world or reality is nothing but thought in motion. This ideal reality Hegel assumed to be Logic itself, which he usually called the Idea, the Absolute, or Spirit. Hegel's idealism, however, is not subjective, but objective. For

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Hegel, Spirit is "out there", independently existing, not a product of our minds. Spirit underlies and determines all phenomena, and nature is one stage in the movement of Spirit toward self-realization. Hegel sees history as the unfolding of the Spirit or Idea in dialectical progression. All events thus have significance and rationality since they are the products of an absolutely rational process, the unfolding or becoming of dialectical reason. This is not to say that any event viewed independently is necessarily rational, but when viewed in context of the self-revelation of the Idea it has its logical place. Thus for Hegel, history is a totally rational process.

Hegel sought to overcome the difficulty bequeathed by Kant in terms of the inability of reason (and therefore philosophy) to give insight into ultimate reality. For Kant, every attempt to think the thing-in-itself resulted in logical contradiction, thus demonstrating the impossibility of the task. Hegel's solution to the problem was to refuse to be bound by the principle of formal logic that A is not non-A. For Hegel, if reality is contradictory, then it can be grasped only by a logic which holds this at its primary assumption. Such a logic is Hegel's dialectic. In Hegel's view, the world was not the machine of Newtonian physics but was rather to be viewed as organism or process. Any statement or event (Thesis) generates its own opposite (Antithesis) which is subsequently resolved in the movement of thought to a synthesis. Thus reality is the dialectical development of the Idea. Not only
is nature dynamic rather than static, but so is truth itself. In Hegel's thought any given truth can only be truth for that particular time, place and situation. For no sooner is such a truth stated, than reality or the world such a truth seeks to comprehend has proceeded through the dialectic to a new stage requiring a new truth. Thus truth is a relative concept unless it is seen in total context of the development of the Idea. Absolute truth for Hegel is the fact of world self-consciousness, a fact to which all individual truths contribute.

Hegel's system exerted a tremendous influence on nineteenth century thought. As Stromberg has pointed out:

Hegelianism so far triumphed in academic circles that by the end of the century even in Great Britain and the United States (where there was a certain resistance to this kind of thought), the leading philosophers were largely of this school, while in very unacademic circles it had also spread widely, especially through the theories of Karl Marx and other socialists who owed much to Hegel.5

There were many reasons for the popularity of Hegel's views. Not the least was the fact that his work represented a total system of thought. Since the seventeenth century, philosophers in general, had abandoned attempts to build a total, all encompassing system of thought, preferring instead to concentrate on such issues as epistemology or ethics. With the nineteenth century however, came the return of system-building to philosophy, the first and most influential of which

5Roland N. Stromberg, European Intellectual History Since 1789 (New York: Meredith Corp., 1966), p.64
was Hegel's Dialectical Idealism. As Coates and White have pointed out:

Hegel may be seen as the consummation of the critical, Romantic, and idealist movements in Germany. It was his aim to fuse them all in a great comprehensive system. 6

Stromberg supports this view and further explains Hegel's popularity:

Hegel's remarkable system of rational metaphysics based on historicism and dialectical evolution was hard to overlook; some have hated it, regarding it more as the scandal than the glory of the century, but like Marxism, its lineal descendant, it demanded attention and commanded allegiance because of the boldness of its stance as a complete reconstruction of human knowledge. 7

Here Stromberg alludes to several other reasons for Hegel's popularity. For many, Kant had convincingly closed the door to metaphysical speculation as a proper concern of philosophy. In his system, Hegel had attempted to rectify this situation and restore metaphysics to philosophy. As Stromberg has pointed out, Hegel's was a rational metaphysics, an attempt to overcome the "impossible" dualism of Kantian thought. This return of metaphysics to philosophy was an attractive quality of Hegelianism. Whereas Hegel's metaphysical rationalism


7 Roland N. Stromberg, European Intellectual History Since 1789 (New York: Meredith Corp. 1966), p. 70
(as it was also called) appealed to the rationalist segment of humanistic thought he would likely have gained little acceptance had he not also reached an accord with empiricism, the dominant outlook of nineteenth century academics. As Harry Prosch has noted:

Hegelianism was able to thrive, therefore, despite its "metaphysical" rationalism, because of Hegel's insistence upon the "phenomenological" approach—upon the notion of developing the categories of mind, and so of "being," simply and directly upon the basis of what appeared in experience. For phenomenology is the philosophic counterpart of "scientific" empirical methods. 8

Not only had the phenomenological method gained a degree of "scientific" acceptance for Hegel's philosophy, but this same method as developed by Husserl and Heidegger would later do the same for "humanistic" psychology.

Another reason for the appeal of Hegel's system was his contention that it was mind, not matter which formed the basis of reality. This fact appealed to the Romantics and others who had been unable to accept the materialism of the Enlightenment. Not only had Hegel provided an alternative to materialism (idealism) but he had also resolved the mind—body dualism which had bedeviled philosophy for centuries. Hegel accepted no such dualism,

stating that nature (matter) was to be seen as merely one stage in the dialectical development of mind.

Also attractive in Hegel's thought was his historicism. For Hegel, history was the evolution of mind or the Idea and as we have seen, he viewed history as a totally rational process which was progressing toward its purposed end, self-realization. Hegel's historicism necessarily implied a teleological order of things, a notion of purpose in the world and in history. A teleological order also implied a God who supplied the order. The teleological argument for the existence, even necessity of God, remained powerful even after Kant's refuting of its validity. It was used in biology, for example, to account for the amazing adaptations of organisms to their particular environments.

The final reason to be considered for the popularity of Hegel's system concerns his view of the world as organism rather than machine. Hegel did not disagree with the materialists in their view that nature itself was mechanistic rather than organismic, he rather viewed nature as merely one stage in the evolution of mind. Man, however, was not seen as part of the mechanism since each man contained a part of the total mind, so that man was not contained in nature, but transcended it as he did in Kant's view. Thus man's mind, like Mind itself was to be viewed as an organism, constantly evolving. This is the source of optimism in Heglian philosophy, as it was for the philosophes, for it implies the concept of progress of culture and of mind. This view of progress was
widely held, inherited from the Enlightenment.

It was, in fact, this "dialectical development" or evolution of Mind which seemed to connect Hegel with the growing acceptance of geological and biological evolutionary theories. Inseparable from the idea of progress, these theories were rapidly gaining acceptance as new concepts of geological time were developed by geologists Hutton and later Lyell. Their uniformitarianism provided a basis to develop evolutionary theories since it assumed a geological time scale of earth history sufficient for the evolution of species to occur. Throughout the early nineteenth century new discoveries in chemistry and physics (eg. Dalton's Atomic Theory) served to confirm the mechanistic view of nature already widely held. Following the acceptance of the uniformitarian hypothesis, geology also became an acceptable area for the empirical method, since it was now possible to study the earth objectively and "scientifically." The only science which had not succumbed to the Newtonian mechanism was biology. Theories on the evolution of species were common, but lacked empirical support. They also held in common a need to postulate some concept of God or a vitalist conception of Nature as a causal agent.

This situation changed drastically after 1859 when Charles Darwin published his work, "The Origin of Species". Darwin is often viewed as the "discoverer" or author of the theory of evolution. As has been pointed out, however, the
theory of evolution was by 1859, already well established and widely held. Darwin's contribution was to provide empirical evidence for the theory and, most notably, to supply the causal mechanism to account for it.

Two things were still lacking: detailed investigation of the living forms of life and a verifiable theory that would provide a causal explanation of the process by which they had evolved. Both were provided by Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882) in "The Origin of the Species" (1859).

Darwin postulated that variability of species occurred through Natural Selection:

...can we doubt (remembering that many more individuals are born than can possibly survive) that individuals having any advantage, however slight, over others, would have the best chance of surviving and of procreating their kind? On the other hand we may feel sure that any variation in the least injurious would be rigidly destroyed. This preservation of favorable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest.

In considering some of the implications of Darwin's theory and of the work of later "Darwinists" like T. H. Huxley, the most popular is the blow to Christianity. Darwin's theory denied the doctrine of creation, of the world,

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of species, and of man. As such his theory repudiated the literal interpretation of the Genesis account of creation and eventually cast doubt on the historical and scientific validity of Scripture as a whole.

While this was undoubtedly the most popularized result of Darwin's theory, it is by no means the most significant. In terms of the development of humanistic thought his conclusions were much more devastating to the prevailing Hegelian Idealism. As noted previously, earlier theories of evolution remained bound to an idealism of sorts to account for the causal agency of evolution. Darwin's Natural Selection removed the need for any transcendent agent and therefore the need for an idealistic basis of reality.

As Prosch has noted:

Evolutionary doctrine becalmed these philosophies because, although someone could somehow still slip "Mind" in behind "evolution" (if he was of a mind to), the plain fact evident to anybody who cared to look was that one did not need to do so. The doctrine was a bona fide material or naturalistic alternative to idealism.11

Darwin had thus brought biology, the final hold-out to empirical science into the materialist camp.

The last refuge of anti-Newtonianism in science was biology, but the triumph of Darwinism soon reduced that bastion and permitted the

description of living matter in purely objective, scientific terms.\footnote{12}

Another important implication of Darwinism was its effect on the teleological view of the world. Darwin argued that there was no such thing as design or purpose in the universe, but that evolution operated through chance, guided by Natural Selection. Darwin's denial of teleology was a blow to Hegel's Dialectical Idealism as well as to the belief in a God, since, as noted earlier the teleological argument had long been a powerful support for man's belief in the existence of God.

With Darwin, the humanistic world-view is essentially complete. With his contribution of a naturalistic mechanism for evolution, the hypothesis of a transcendent God was no longer needed to account for natural phenomena. The historical survey of humanism will be concluded at this point since consideration of the historical development of existentialist humanism is beyond the scope of this study. Existentialism will be treated briefly later in the study where appropriate.

\footnote{12} W. H. Coates and H. V. White, The Ordeal of Liberal Humanism (McGraw-Hill, 1970), p.113
This section of the study will deal with the counselling theory of Sigmund Freud, representing the psychoanalytic movement, B. F. Skinner, the behaviorist movement, and Carl Rogers the "Humanistic" movement. In the counselling field, it is of course possible to isolate many counselling therapies or methods besides the three mentioned above. Freud, Skinner and Rogers form the basis of this study not because of their particular forms of therapy but rather for their individual comprehensive theories of personality, i.e. their views of man. It is also true that these are three of the best known theorists and for that reason have been most often used by counsellors as role models, both in counsellor education and practice. In the case of the Humanistic movement there is some question as to whether or not Rogers is the best representative, other possibilities being Rollo May and Abraham Maslow. Maslow in particular is usually identified with the Third Force psychology which is a varied blend of phenomenology and existentialism. However, as noted above, it is desirable to study those theorists who are both representative of their particular movement, and widely accepted as role models by counsellors. In this latter sense Rogers is certainly the most appropriate choice. In the preface to his Toward A Psychology of Being (1968), Maslow states:

The two comprehensive theories of human nature
most influencing psychology until recently have been the Freudian and the experimental-positivistic-behavioristic. All other theories were less comprehensive and their adherents formed many splinter groups. In the past few years, however, these various groups have rapidly been coalescing into a third, increasingly comprehensive theory of human nature, into what might be called a "Third Force." \(^1\)

He then goes on to mention the individuals which make up this group, naming Rogers among them.

As noted by Maslow, it is their comprehensive view of human nature which distinguishes these theorists. In the preface to his "Three Views of Man" (1975) Robert D. Nye comments briefly on the views of Freud, Skinner and Rogers, then states:

> From the brief comments it can be seen that these are three different views of man. Each view has its merits, and each has gained a large following. There is currently a great amount of controversy--about the relative "truth" of each of these views. \(^2\)

This portion of the study then, will develop the view of man posited by each theorist. For the sake of clarity I propose to deal with each theory under the following guidelines: Any theory of human nature must provide each of the following:

1. An answer to the question "Who or what is man? (the client)"


b) An account for the aberration of man (the problem)

c) A means by which man's aberrations are overcome to achieve his true potential. (the therapy)

Also each theory will be examined to show its relationship to the postulates of modern humanism.

Since it is counselling theory and practice which forms the basis of this study, it is appropriate to define counselling, especially as applied to school counselling. C. H. Patterson, (1967) surveys the literature on definitions of counselling and concludes:

We may thus define counselling or psychotherapy as the relationship and the process developing out of the relationship, between an individual or individuals who are not functioning at adequately or up to their potentials and who face problems which they feel unable to resolve alone and a trained professional who provides the kind of relationship in which the individual is able to change in ways which lead to the development of his potentials and ability to resolve his problems.  

This definition will be adopted in this study for two reasons. By this definition, counselling as a process, transcends any attempt to equate it with a particular view of man or a particular method or therapy. It is also general enough to include academic, vocational and emotional counselling as experienced in the school setting.

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Before discussing Freud's view of man it is important that his theory be viewed in the context of his times. The three major forces molding his thought were the Victorian morality of which he was a bitter critic, Darwinism and its accompanying materialism, and Humanism as outlined in this study. Freud's reaction to Victorian morality is clearly seen in all his writings and in his choice of sexuality as the underlying substrate for the drives. Fromm has pointed out that Freud,

in search of the roots of psychic disturbances had to look for a physiological substrate for the drives; to find this in sexuality was an ideal solution, since it corresponded both to the requirements of mechanistic-materialistic thought and to certain clinical findings in patients of his time and social class.

He then suggests that had Freud lived in different times he might well have discovered a different basis for his drives theory. The influence of Darwinism on Freud is evident from his many references to Darwin and, in fact, his identification with Darwin in terms of historical stature. Shakow and Rapaport (1964) have noted:

Freud made the comparison of psychoanalysis with Copernican and Darwinian theory in terms of the three historical blows which human 

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narcissism had to undergo: the cosmological blow administered by Copernicus, the biological blow administered by Darwin and his group and the psychological blow administered by psychoanalysis.2

The relationship between Freud and Darwin is developed in detail by Ritvo (1972) in a paper entitled "The Impact of Darwin on Freud." The impact of Humanism on Freud's theory is of course to be examined in this study.

Fundamentally, Freud was a scientist in a time when science was still revolutionizing man's conceptions of his world and himself. By Freud's time, Darwinian evolution had revolutionized biology making of it an objective science, allowing man to be studied within the natural realm like any other phenomenon. Freud's earliest scientific endeavors were in biology and the initial motivation of his work appears to be an attempt to demonstrate the physiological basis of psychical phenomena; a theme he apparently abandoned after realizing man's lack of scientific knowledge in the area of neurophysiology. It is clear however that throughout his life he felt he had done for psychology what Darwin had done for biology, made it a field for empirical study.

....whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond this broken sequence of events which was obviously dependent upon something else, the other view which held that what is mental is in itself unconsciouse, enabled

psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. 3

In terms of Freud's contribution to our understanding of human nature, it might be described as a "science of the irrational", namely his theory of the unconscious. To quote Fromm again:

He showed that most of what we are conscious of is not real and that most of what is real is not in consciousness. 4

His early theory stated that man was driven by two conflicting forces, self-preservation (ego) and the sexual drives (libido). Man's primary interest was the optimal satisfaction of these opposing drives. The libido (sexual energy) demands satisfaction, but the ego must mediate with the real world and decide when libido satisfaction is to be allowed. At this stage of his theory, Freud postulated that the fundamental mechanism of the ego was repression and that this accounted for neurotic symptoms. At this point Freud was a thoroughgoing determinist in that he would not allow that man's behavior was in any sense free, but was in fact determined by unconscious processes. In his view that all psychical phenomena are rooted in physiological processes he was clearly a materialist, proposing a basically mechanistic model of


behavior. This point of view Freud seems to have held throughout his life, although he did later alter his theory to account for the darker side of human nature. To this point in his thinking, Freud views man as unavoidably frustrated. Man is driven by his desires but their satisfaction is thwarted by the process of ego repression. Society's harsh restrictions cause conflict, tension and ultimately neurosis. It appears that Freud viewed human nature as fundamentally positive yet restricted and confined by social mores. This would be Freud's inheritance from the optimism and humanism of the Enlightenment. "As for Rousseau—"man is basically good, it is society which corrupts.

In the early 1920's, however, Freud's theory underwent a transition due to a change in his conception of human nature. Perhaps it was the horror of the First World War which motivated him, perhaps it was the failure of his model of man to answer all the questions. In any case, like many of his contemporaries, especially Nietzsche who influenced Freud, the optimism of the Enlightenment was challenged by a growing pessimism and an interest in the irrational. Now Freud saw man as a more complex being, stretching the limits of mechanistic, deterministic thinking. His now familiar tripartite structure of Id, Ego and Super-ego emerged at this point. Freud postulated that the Id contained two primary instincts which were at war with one another, eros and the death instinct. It was through the death instinct that
Freud was able to account for the destructiveness of man, for the darker side of his nature. He still viewed the Id as operating on the "pleasure principle", seeking satisfaction. The Ego, which at birth is undifferentiated from the Id, gradually emerges as a separate function, whose task is to deal with the real world, to ward off anxiety producing situations.

Freud replaced the concept of Ego repression with the concept of Ego defence. Repression was now only one of several defence mechanisms at the disposal of the Ego. He had now shifted his emphasis from Id psychology to Ego psychology. Freud regarded the Ego as being either weak or strong, its relative strength being a measure of its ability to handle reality.

The only truly new aspect of Freud's psychical apparatus was the Superego. If the drive of the Id is instinctual and the drive of the Ego is toward realism, then it can be said that the drive of the superego (roughly equivalent to conscience) is to moralism. Freud viewed its content as derived from parental edicts and commands. Illustrating Freud's psychical structure in a simplistic way, one might say that the Id pressures the Ego which must decide how to respond to the pressure. If the Ego makes a wrong decision, then the Superego punishes the Ego through guilt feelings.

Summarizing Freud's altered view of human nature then, it might be said that he came to see man in a pessimistic
light, viewing him as fundamentally aggressive or destructive, a fact substantiated by the individual's death, which is proof of the final supremacy of the destructive instincts over the life instincts of Eros. The idealism of his earlier views is gone and he began to perceive that man was truly in a dilemma. Whereas Freud began as a rationalist, believing in the power of reason and will, he shifted later in recognition of the strength of human irrationality and the seeming impotence of human reason and will. Freud postulated that the only hope of liberation from the dominance of unconscious strivings lay in his psychoanalytic therapy which concentrated on making the unconscious conscious and thus under the control of reason and the will, the weapons of consciousness. It is certainly his dialectical synthesis of rationality and irrationality in psychoanalytic theory which has contributed to Freud's influence in twentieth century thought. Freud not only developed a more realistic view of man but at the same time provided himself with a possible escape from his earlier determinism, for man was only determined to the extent that he was controlled by his unconscious.

To place Freud's views within the structure outlined in the introduction to this section three questions will be dealt with separately, followed by a summary.

a) Who is Man? (The Client)

For Freud, man is basically a part of nature like any other animal. All his psychological functions have their roots
in physiological processes. Man, in a sense, is a battleground for two opposing instincts, the unifying and integrating Eros and the disintegrating and destructive drive. Freud's theory provides a synthesis of rationality and irrationality, for man has the potential for either. The dialectic of rationality is realized in the concept of the unconscious. Man has reason and will, but these are the weapons of consciousness alone. As for man's relationship to the cosmos, Freud is only too clear as to his view of the existence of God and a religious outlook:

The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to anyone with a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majority of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life.⁵

Concerning the purpose of life, Freud again is clear as to his view. He rejects the concept of external purpose or meaning, equating it with the religious outlook:

Once again, only religion can answer the question of the purpose of life. One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system. We will therefore turn to the less ambitious question of what men themselves show by their behavior to be the purpose and intention of their lives.... They strive after happiness; they want to become happy and remain so.... As we see, what decides the purpose of life is simply the

programme of the pleasure principle. 6

b) How does Freud account for the aberrations of man? (The Problem)

In at least one important aspect, Freud's account for man's aberrations is closer to the Christian position than the traditional humanistic view. Freud, like the Christians, finds the flaw in human nature itself. In his revised theory he seems no longer to hold to Rousseau's account which places the blame on society.

In all that follows, I adopt the standpoint, therefore, that the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and I return to my view that it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilization. 7

As noted earlier, the aggressive instinct and the life instinct, Eros, both operate in the unconscious, the Id. Thus it is useless to talk of man's potential for good or growth without also considering his potential for aggression and destruction which is at least as powerful as Eros.

At the same time, the battle between the Id and the Ego is also a problem, as the Id pushes for the goal of instinctual gratification. The Ego, which is caught between the Id and the external world is gradually weakened to the


the point where the individual can no longer cope rationally with life. Thus, the client's only real ally, the Ego, is no longer effectual.

That ego is no longer able to fulfill the task set to it by the external world (including human society). It has not access to all of its experiences, a large portion of its funds of memories have escaped it. Its activity is inhibited by the strict prohibitions of the superego, its energy is consumed in vain attempts at fending off the demands of the Id. Beyond this, as a result of the constant inroads of the id, its organization is impaired, it is internally split apart, it is no longer capable of any proper synthesis, it is torn by discordant impulses, unappeased conflicts and unsolved doubts. 8

Thus in Freud's system the problem is not simply a flaw in human nature, for he believed firmly in the power of reason to correct this flaw. Rather the problem lies in the fact that reason (or the ego) is incapacitated by the moral demands of the superego and the demands of the external world. Of the three forces pressuring the ego, only one, the instinctual drives, is a basic, biologically determined part of man's nature. The other two sources of conflict for the ego are culturally or environmentally determined.

c) The means by which man's aberrations are overcome. (The Therapy)

Freud's solution to the problem as he has outlined

it is in his Psychoanalytic Therapy. The purpose of psychoanalytic therapy is to strengthen the client's ego so that it may once more be in control of mental life. The psychoanalyst will assist the client in delving into his unconscious by providing informed interpretations and thus making the unconscious strivings conscious. This brings them under the control of the ego which, as stated earlier, is a weapon of consciousness. The more of the unconscious which the client is able to make conscious the stronger his ego becomes.

The method by which we strengthen the patient's weakened ego has as its starting point an increase in the ego's self knowledge... The loss of such knowledge means for the ego a surrender of power and influence; it is the first tangible sign that the ego is being restricted and hampered by the demands of the id and of the superego. 9

Thus the unconscious strivings of the id can be brought under the control of the ego with help from the therapist. Freud has noted that when client and therapist probe deeper into the client's mental life that still another aspect of the problem presents itself, namely the confining effect of the superego. The superego or internalized cultural and parental authority places numerous restrictions on the ego.

The superego applies the strictest moral standard to helpless ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality, and we realize all at once.

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that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the superego.  

When the therapist encounters a sense of guilt in the client he is in fact observing the effects of the superego's punishment of the ego. It is important to note that Freud considers feelings or experiences of guilt to be a product of an overly harsh superego.

....the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else but a topographical variety of anxiety; in its later phases it coincides with fear of the super-ego..... The sense of guilt, the harshness of the superego is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience.

Here Freud reveals his debt to the Enlightenment as he is seen to view the moral demands of the superego as culturally and environmentally determined as a relativistic value structure. As for the philosophes, any pretension of absolutes is contrary to the claims and stature of Reason itself. Thus the ego (reason) must be strengthened and made independent of the moral confines of the super-ego. Freud, in discussing psychoanalytic therapy states:

Its intention is, indeed, to strengthen the ego, to make it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the Id.

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The psychoanalytical therapist is thus compelled to challenge the moral demands of the superego and to "re-program" the superego through the process of transference. Again Freud states:

The analytical physician and the weakened ego of the patient, basing themselves upon the real external world, are to combine against the enemies, the instinctual demands of the Id, and the moral demands of the superego.13

and also:

Consequently we are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the superego, and we endeavor to lower its demands.14

The superego is the villain in the sense that its demands are based not on reason but rather on external authority and tradition. Freud's opposition to the superego thus closely parallels the rationalistic outlook of the Enlightenment.

To summarize the humanistic orientation of Freud's view of man, this portion of the study has demonstrated the relationship of his views with the postulates of humanism. His attitude toward a power higher than man has been clearly shown, as has his powerful faith in reason. His belief that life's purpose is expressed in the pleasure principle is not


contradictory to the concept of self-actualization. Also his view of human nature, while superficially negative, is in the final analysis positive, since it is possible for man to overcome the flaw in his nature without recourse to the supernatural. Hence Freud is clearly a humanist in the best tradition of the Enlightenment and the post-Kantian scientific world view. Freud’s continuity with the development of this world view is clearly seen in the following description of the scientific Weltanschauung (world view):

It asserts that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe other than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations— in other words, what we call research—and alongside of it no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or divination. It seems as though this view came very near to being generally recognized in the course of the last few centuries that have passed;...Psychoanalysis has a special right to speak for the scientific Weltanschauung at this point, since it cannot be reproached with having neglected what is mental in the picture of the universe.15

And finally:

Our best hope for the future is that intellect—the scientific spirit, reason—may in process of time establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man.16

B. F. Skinner and Radical Behaviorism

In "Humanistic Theory: The Third Revolution in Psychology", Floyd Matson has stated that:

...psychoanalysis and behaviorism made their appearance at roughly the same time, give or take a decade, and that both of them emerged in reaction against the accent on consciousness in traditional psychology. Apart from these coincidences, however, there was little in common between these two movements and there was a great deal that put them at opposite poles.1

It will be the purpose of this section of the study to demonstrate that Matson's final conclusion is incorrect. In fact these movements have more in common than is usually supposed.

It would be difficult to identify a figure in modern psychology as likely to elicit as highly emotional a response as B. F. Skinner. His views on the nature of man and the need for control speak to what must be considered a highly sensitive area of human concern, the questions of freedom and dignity. This point would be largely irrelevant were it not for the fact that one of the results is that many commentaries or critiques of Skinner's views have a strongly emotional bias and tend to over-simplify the issues. The most obvious example of this is the controversy between behaviorists and adherents of third-force or humanistic psychology. It is

often assumed that humanistic psychology is concerned with the welfare of man whereas Skinner is for, as C. S. Lewis terms it, the "abolition of man". Before dealing further with this point, some of the components of Skinner's thought will be examined.

In the introduction to *About Behaviorism* (1974), Skinner states:

> Behaviorism is not the science of human behavior; it is the philosophy of that science.\(^2\)

He later adds that:

> Much of the argument goes beyond the established facts. I am concerned with interpretation rather than prediction and control. Every scientific field has a boundary beyond which discussion, though necessary, cannot be as precise as one might wish.\(^3\)

It is of course Skinner's activity as philosopher and interpreter of his scientific research to which skeptics react, not so much his research findings *per se*. In examining the presuppositional structure of Skinner's views, it is apparent that, like Freud, he is a strict determinist. Unlike Freud, however, he is content to live with a complete determinism. In the case of both, it is clear that the assumption of determinism is the fundamental starting point for a scientific study of behavior. Traditionally the difference between


\(^3\)Ibid., p.19
Freud's and Skinner's views have centered on the issue of internal or external determinism, although as pointed out in the previous section Freud's determinism was both. In a sense this is also true of Skinner:

In what we may call the prescientific view...a person's behavior is at least to some extent his own achievement. He is free to deliberate, decide, and act, possibly in original ways, and he is to be given credit for his successes and blamed for his failures. In the scientific view...a person's behavior is determined by a genetic endowment traceable to the evolutionary history of the species and by the environmental circumstances to which as an individual he has been exposed. Neither view can be proved, but it is in the nature of scientific inquiry that the evidence should shift in favor of the second. 4

It is Skinner's contention that for the past 2500 years we have operated on the belief that man is free in the sense that his behavior can be the result of free choice or will, and is not necessarily controlled by external factors. It is this "autonomous man" which Skinner views as the cause of man's troubles and his abolition is the first step toward their solution.

His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from our ignorance and as our understanding increases, the very stuff of which he is made vanishes...To man qua man we readily say good riddance. 5

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5Ibid., p.191
Skinner's view is of course a clear and concise summary of the post-Darwinian stance of humanism in its mechanistic, reductive materialism. Skinner, more than Freud, is the heir of Darwinism in psychology, and, like Freud, seems to view his role with respect to psychology much as Darwin viewed his role in biology.

Almost all our major problems involve human behavior, and they cannot be solved by physical and biological technology alone. What is needed is a technology of behavior, but we have been slow to develop the science from which such a technology might be drawn. One difficulty is that almost all of what is called behavioral science continues to trace behavior to states of mind, feelings, traits of character, human nature and so on. Physics and biology once followed similar practices and advanced only when they discarded them.6

It will be recalled that Darwin's major contribution was not so much a theory of evolution of species but rather a mechanism upon which the theory operated (natural selection). Similarly, Skinner is not the founder of behaviorism or the behavioristic stance, but rather he too is responsible for a mechanism upon which behavior theory can be based. Skinner's mechanism is referred to as operant conditioning. Contrary to popular belief, it is not Skinner's intent to control, condition or manipulate man directly as in the case of S-R behaviorists. Skinner himself appears to find such an approach inadequate.

...behaviorism is so often said to treat behavior simply as response to stimulus. If

that were the case, an organism would have much of the character of a puppet, robot, machine. 7

Skinner differentiates between respondent behavior and operant behavior. Respondent behavior is elicited by an external stimulus antecedent to the behavior. It is the behavior with which Stimulus-Response psychology is concerned. Radical behaviorism on the other hand, deals with operant behavior. This is behavior emitted rather than elicited, and controlled by its subsequent consequences. R. D. Nye has described operant behavior as,

behavior that operates on the environment to produce consequences. It is emitted rather than elicited behavior, and it is characteristic of an active organism. To Skinner, the study of emitted responses and their consequences constitutes the essential subject matter of psychology. 8

Operant behavior as described by Skinner is that behavior which has been traditionally viewed as voluntary or attributed to a choosing, willing autonomous man, as opposed to respondent or reflexive behavior.

The standard distinction between operant and reflex behavior is that one is voluntary and the other involuntary. Operant behavior is felt to be under the control of the behaving person

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and has traditionally been attributed to an act of will.\textsuperscript{9}

Skinner's mechanism of operant conditioning achieves the same purpose as did Darwin's natural selection. It eliminated the need for an "inner man", a non-physical "self" to explain behavior. A totally mechanistic, naturalistic and materialistic view of behavior is now possible. As Skinner put it:

The stimulus-response model was never very convincing...and it did not solve the basic problem, because something like an inner man had to be invented to convert a stimulus into a response.\textsuperscript{10}

It is Skinner's contention that there is no "I" or inner "self" which determines behavior. Rather, man's behavior is a function of environmental contingencies which have operated in the evolutionary history of the species and which operate in the individual's present environment. Skinner believes that the behavior operates on the environment to produce a consequence. If the consequence is rewarding to the individual, the emitted behavior is reinforced and is more likely to recur. Behavior which is not followed by a reinforcing consequence is not likely to recur. Reinforcing consequences then become "responsible" for the behavior, not


the behaving person.

Through the process of operant conditioning, behavior having this kind of consequence becomes more likely to occur. The behavior is said to be strengthened by its consequences and for that reason the consequences themselves are called reinforcers. 11

With these preliminary remarks on Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism, his view will now be examined according to the three questions outlined in the introduction to this section of the study.

a) Who is man? (The Client)

For Skinner, man is basically a behaving organism, not significantly different, either psychologically or biologically from any other species. To refer to man as a person or indeed to personality is simply to describe the organism in terms of its repertoire of behavior.

The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a body with a person inside, but a body which is a person in the sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behavior. 12 and,

A self or personality is at best a repertoire of behavior imparted by an organized set of contengencies. 13


Since Skinner rejects the traditional view of personality, he obviously rejects the concept of a personal, and/or transcendent God.

A god is the archetypal pattern of an explanatory fiction, of a miracle-working mind, of the metaphysical.14

Thus it is no inner quality of man which distinguishes him from other species. This is not to suggest that Skinner does not distinguish between man and the other species. He contends that a man is described by his behavior which is in turn determined by environmental contingencies. Thus man cannot be held responsible for his behavior since its control lies in the environment. Man is a goal-directed organism whose behavior is aimed toward its likely consequences. He behaves in a certain way not because he chooses to, but because that behavior has generally been reinforced in the past by reward (positive reinforcer) or removal of an aversive stimulus (negative reinforcer). Since Skinner rejects all such "human" attributes as consciousness, personality, freedom, and will, it is appropriate to examine just how Skinner does differentiate between man and the other species. He is quite clear on this point.

What distinguishes the human species is the development of a culture, a social environment that contains the contingencies generating

self-knowledge and self-control. 15

He differs from the other animals not in possessing a moral or ethical sense but in having been able to generate a moral or ethical social environment. 16

Since it is man's ability to generate a moral culture which distinguishes him from the animals then it is this ability which Skinner comes to see as the "purpose" or goal of man's life. This is the Skinnerian equivalent or self-actualization. Man (generic term) is to realize his full (cultural) potential.

b) How does Skinner account for the aberrations of man? (The Problem)

Skinner does not view the human predicament in terms of human nature. To discuss human nature presupposes an inner man who can be said to hold this nature. Rather, Skinner views the problem in terms of man's increasing disability to use technology for his own good as well as to control its side effects. He sees man as becoming in danger of extinction.

But things grow steadily worse and it is disheartening to find that Technology itself is increasingly at fault. Sanitation and medicine have made the problems of population more acute, was has aquired a new horror with the invention of nuclear weapons, and the affluent persuit of


happiness is largely responsible for pollution. As Darlington has said, every new source from which man has increased his power on the earth has been used to diminish the prospects of his successors....Whether or not he could have foreseen the damage, man must repair it or all is lost.17

Skinner lays the blame for this state of affairs squarely upon the notion of the autonomous man. He contends that the repair is possible only through a new technology of behavior. Such a technology is impossible however, so long as man clings to a view of himself as free, willing and choosing. Indeed, Skinner contends that if such an autonomous man were real, then all hope for the future would be lost, since autonomous man proves extremely resistant to change. However, it is the environment, not man which is responsible for the state of man and, as Skinner points out, the environment is capable of manipulation.

If it were true that an even greater danger than nuclear war arises from within man himself in the form of smouldering fears, contagious panics, primitive needs for cruel violence, and raging suicidal destructiveness, then we should be lost. Fortunately, the point of attack is more readily accessible. It is the environment which must be changed.18

Man is not able to control his own behavior as such, but he can learn to control the environment. The environment


determines how man will behave and if man will only give up
the image of himself as free, choosing or willing then a
technology of behavior is well within our grasp. As Skinner
states:

A scientific view of man offers exciting
possibilities. We have not yet seen what
man can make of man.19

c) What does Skinner present as the solution to
the problem? (The Therapy).

Skinner, as noted earlier, believes that man's continuation
as a species is in doubt.

There is much to be done and done quickly,
and nothing less than the active prosecu-
tion of a science of behavior will suffice.20

and,

We have the physical, biological and
behavioral technologies needed "to save
ourselves", the problem is how to get
people to use them.21

It is clear that Skinner advocates a technology of
behavior, yet it is not entirely clear as to what this means.
It should be noted that Skinner's ultimate aim is not to design
a therapy which deals only with individuals as did Freud.
Rather he is concerned with no less than the design of a

19B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity

20Floyd W. Matson, ed., Without/Within: Behaviorism
and Humanism (Montery, Calif., Brooks/Cole Publishing Co.,
1973), p.53

21B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity
culture. His method of therapy, usually referred to as "behavior modification" can be applied to individual's but only to the extent that his environment can be manipulated. Whether it is the behavior of an individual or a culture which is in question, Skinner's approach is basically the same. The behaviors which are to be produced or modified are first specified. The behavioral technologist then develops the appropriate set of contingencies and builds them into the environment.

The outlines of a technology are already clear. An assignment is stated as behavior to be produced or modified, and relevant contingencies are then arranged.22

Consider the example of a school student who emits negative attention-seeking behaviors. These behaviors are reinforced by the teacher who ceases his activity with other students to deal with this behavior. The behavioral counselor in this situation might teach the teacher to ignore, as much as possible, the negative behavior which will lead to its extinction. At the same time he might counsel the teacher to reinforce even the smallest positive behaviors and to gradually reinforce more and more significant positive behaviors. In this rather simplistic example, it should be noted that the behavior modification process is present as outlined earlier. The behavior to be modified is isolated and steps are taken

to develop contingencies of reinforcement in line with the desired behavior. The behavioral counsellor did not need to consider the feelings, perceptions or intentions of the student; he required only a knowledge of the desired behavior change to which he then applied the appropriate contingencies. If this appears an impersonal approach, certainly Skinner makes no apology for that fact. He sees no reason to differentiate between human behavior and animal behavior. Both are merely the product of environmental contingencies and are within the grasp of a technology of behavior.

A culture is very much like the experimental space used in the analysis of behavior. Both are sets of contingencies of reinforcement. A child is born into a culture as an organism is placed in an experimental space. Designing a culture is like designing an experiment we are interested in what happens, in designing a culture, with whether it will work.23

In summarizing Skinner's personality theory it seems appropriate to comment further on what Matson has called the "controversy that is surely one of the most persistent and potent in psychology today." By this, he is referring to the dispute between behaviorists and adherents of "humanistic" psychology. It is supposed that Skinner is anti-humanistic in his position, a view Skinner himself obviously does not share. In Humanism and Behaviorism (1971) he defines a

humanist as:

One of those who, because of the environment to which he has been exposed, is concerned for the future of mankind.24

A concern he obviously holds. In the same article he elaborates:

We can now more effectively work for the good of the individual, for the greatest good of the greatest number, and for the good of the culture or of mankind as a whole. These are certainly humanistic concerns, and no one who calls himself a humanist can afford to neglect them.25

The above noted article appeared in the Humanist Magazine (March, 1971). The editor of the Humanist introduces the article by pointing out that Skinner was that year's recipient of the Humanist of the Year award. In a supporting article, W. F. Day argues that contrary to popular belief, Skinner's behaviorism is in no way antithetical to a genuinely humanistic outlook.

While in fairly recent times people have often attempted to redefine humanism so that its relevance to one or another issue of interest is made more apparent, affinities clearly exist between behaviorism and the humanism of the Renaissance.26

In a further article, MacCorquondale (1971), extends the point, arguing that far from attempting to strip


25 Ibid., p. 53

26 Ibid., p. 26
man of his freedom, behaviorism attempts to provide man with the information and technology he needs to shape his own destiny:

As a scientist, the behaviorist is himself in the humanistic traditions of inquiry, reason and understanding. But oddly, now he is—and seemingly for the behavioral nonce—the black sheep of the family.27

Those who attack Skinner often imply that he has something against man, that he is out to destroy humanness. MacCorquondale, questioning the basis of such a charge states:

Simply looking at a man, especially with the detailment and distance of science and reporting only what can be seen does not alter him in any way. It does not detract from his essence, nor deny his uniqueness, nor destroy his integrity. The scientist cannot place man's behavior securely within the natural order, he can only look for it there. Man's distaste at finding himself so located is probably something he will simply have to get used to, since it seems unlikely he can talk his way out of it.28

So it will not do to charge Skinner with being antihumanistic, for such a charge merely reveals a faulty understanding of humanism. As humanism has evolved over the past five centuries, it is clearly Skinner who stands in its mainstream. He is consistent in his views with the postulates of modern humanism. He is truly the heir of Darwin, 


28 Ibid., p.23
Hume, Locke and Descartes in the realm of psychology. It is Skinner's refusal to view man as basically good and self-actualizing which is the focal point of the disagreement. If man is basically good, then control is a distasteful concept. R. Brinkerhoff has pointed out:

But very often it seems third-force psychologists work the naturalistic fallacy in reverse. From how it ought to be, they tend to assume how it is. Not only ought man be good, but man is good--and anyone contradicting this pillar of 'humanistic' belief is not only antihumanistic but is suffering a failure of nerve as well. On the contrary, I believe that if we have any hope of realizing our humanist ideals, we must not fail to take a careful look at the darker side of man's nature and at the struggle that this view entails for all men of good faith.29

Finally to quote Skinner:

As MacCorquondale and Day point out, behaviorism is humanism. It has the distinction of being effective humanism.30


30 Ibid., p. 45
Carl Rogers

In terms of counselling practice and theory, it is doubtful that any figure more clearly influences today's practitioners than Carl Rogers. Concepts such as "client-centered", "empathy", and "unconditional positive regard" have become hallowed norms for which the counsellor strives. Unfortunately, the popularity of Roger's views is such that his position is often interpreted in superficial terms. Too often Rogers' appears to stand for "doing your own thing", "not laying your trip on someone" and individual freedom. To those opposed to pop culture ethics, Rogers appears an easy target. There is, however, much more to Carl Rogers than simple hedonism.

Rogers stands clearly in the historical stream of humanism. He differs from Freud and Skinner in that his influences are from the anti-materialistic or romantic stream of humanism characterized by Rousseau. Whereas scientific determinism clearly forms the basis for the views of Freud and Skinner, Rogers is influenced by Rousseau's concepts of the basic goodness of human nature and man's basic need for freedom to combat the corrupting influences of society.

There is no beast in man. There is only man in man, and this we have been able to release.... when he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his
behavior is constructive.  

and

...there is a flavor of existentialism developing which is definitely positive in its view of man, and I would certainly have to place myself there.

If Rogers does not seem to adopt the scientific determinism of Freud and Skinner, he is clearly a proponent of science and the scientific method. Like Freud and Skinner he is an empiricist.

Experience is, for me, the highest authority. Neither the Bible nor the prophets—neither Freud nor research—neither the revelations of God or man—can take precedence over my own direct experience.

Like Skinner, Rogers is fundamentally a scientist, seeking to use science to achieve human goals.

It seems to me quite incontrovertibly true that the scientific method is an excellent way to discover the means by which to achieve our goals.

Though Rogers shares Rousseau's view of human nature, he in no way shares in a Romanticism or anti-rationalism. He does not dispute Skinner's claim that a technology of behavior


4Ibid., p.24
is possible, rather he disagrees as to the ends such a technology would serve, for Rogers views man as capable of responsible choice.

Behavior when it is examined scientifically, is surely best understood as determined by prior causation. This is one great fact of science. But responsible personal choice... which exists prior to any scientific endeavor is an equally prominent fact in our lives. To deny the experience of responsible choice is, to me, as restricted a view as to deny the possibility of a behavioral science. 5

Philosophically, Rogers justifies his use of terms such as "choice", "freedom" and "responsibility" by espousing phenomenology. It would be more accurate to say that as Rogers began to search out a theoretical base for his work he found himself "at home" with phenomenological concepts. Phenomenology, which has its earliest roots in the phenomenal-noumenal dichotomy of Kant, is a movement in philosophy and psychology which is opposed to the scientific realism of the Enlightenment. It is an attempt to make of man more than a mere machine, an attempt to give worth to the subjective realm of experience. Its focus is on description of phenomena rather than explanation. As Spiegelberg (1972) has pointed out, it entered psychology through the Gestalt psychologists, who were in tension with both the introspectionists and

stimulus--response behaviorists. They had shown that there was no strict one-to-one correspondence between phenomena and stimuli.

For Rogers, his adoption of the phenomenological approach implies that man's behavior is determined not by biological drives or environmental consequences, but rather by his perceptual or phenomenal field. In a dialogue between Rogers and author Richard Evans, Rogers' relationship to phenomenology is explored.

Evans:...This phenomenological approach of the study of the total, naive, immediate experience of the individual is more interesting to many psychologists today than very precise reactions to specific stimuli. Is this movement to phenomenology in line with your own interests?

Rogers:...Yes, very definitely. I think I am really characteristic of the trend you mentioned....For me, the perception is reality as far as the individual is concerned. I don't even know whether there is an objective reality....All we know is what we perceive....The world of reality for the individual is his own field of perception, with the meanings he has attached to those various aspects.7

Through his link with phenomenology, Rogers posits an inner man, the self, which exists in the midst of the phenomenal field. The individual's behavior is to be seen


as the response of the self to its phenomenal field. It is important to note here that Rogers, like Freud and Skinner is a complete determinist. The major difference in Rogers theory at this point is his belief that it is the person's concept of self (or phenomenal field) which determines the behavior. Rogers, for reasons to be examined later, is never explicit on this point. Carlton Beck, in examining Rogers' relationship to phenomenology in psychology quotes from the views of Snygg and Combs who most clearly adopt the phenomenological model in psychology. He then summarizes their views:

This quotation spells out clearly the phenomenological contentions of Snygg and Combs. Choice to them is merely the resultant action which is a direct function of the phenomenal field at a given time. The presupposition is that all behavior is determined; choice is inevitably a meaningless word in all forms of behavior.⁸

As noted earlier, Rogers himself is considerably less explicit in his comments. In the dialogue with Evans mentioned earlier, Rogers is asked how he himself resolves the determinism issue.

Rogers: I suppose I would say that I am not an extremist along those lines, but it's true that I focus on the self-deterministic, rather than the social-environmental or genetic-deterministic values.⁹

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Rogers is committed to the defence of two contradictory concepts. In his debates with Skinner, he has become a champion of freedom and dignity including the notions of choice and personal responsibility. However, he has also committed himself to the scientific study of behavior and has clearly stated his contention that behavior is determined by prior causation. That Rogers himself was aware of this contradiction can be clearly seen in the following comments:

For some time I have been perplexed over the living paradox which exists in psychotherapy between freedom and determinism. In the therapeutic relationship some of the most compelling subjective experiences are those in which the client feels within himself the power of naked choice. He is free—to become himself or to hide behind a facade; to move forward or to retrogress,...Yet as we enter this field of psychotherapy with objective research methods, we are, like any other scientist, committed to a complete determinism. From this point of view, every thought, feeling and action of the client is determined by what preceded it. There can be no such thing as freedom. 10

Rogers then summarizes the situation in an even more astonishing statement:

The fully functioning person,...not only experiences but utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined. 11


11 Ibid., p.193
Rogers in fact does not believe in the concept of free will in the sense that a person can make an undetermined choice. The freedom Rogers describes, is in fact the capacity to become one's true self, to act in self-enhancing ways. This is the one true choice each person can make, and yet it is not truly a choice. Rogers believes that if a man can be freed from his defensiveness, his inaccurate view of self, then he will act according to his true nature.

...the basic nature of the human being, when functioning freely, is constructive and trustworthy...When we are able to free the individual from defensiveness...his reactions may be trusted to be positive, forward, moving, constructive. 

In a 1971 interview with Willard B. Frick, Rogers states the position explicitly:

Frick:...If conditions are ripe or adequate for the human organism there seems to be the idea that man will automatically do those good things in life as a part of his inherent nature. That is, he really doesn't choose between good and evil. He is on a kind of automatic pilot if conditions are good. Is that a fair evaluation?

Rogers: Yes, I think I would go along with that but I would certainly underscore the final phrase you use 'if conditions are good' by which I would mean if the conditions are such as to promote healthy growth....


13 Willard B. Frick, Humanistic Psychology: Interviews with Maslow, Murphy, and Rogers, (New York: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), pp.88-89
Now that some of the theoretical bases of Rogers views have been examined, it is appropriate to view his counselling theory itself according to the structure used with the preceding theorists.

a) What is man? (The Client)

In Rogers' view, man is an organism whose behavior is determined by genetic and social-environmental factors and especially by his present perception of reality, his phenomenal field. There exists an inner man or core, called the self, which can be said to reflect the true nature of man. This self or nature is fundamentally good or positive, and when man acts according to this true nature or self he behaves constructively, in ways which enhance the self. Rogers clearly adopts a naturalistic viewpoint and so any discussion of God is irrelevant. As he puts it:

I have very little use for the institution of religion or for religious institutions. 14

Free will, as such, does not exist and man's major "choice" in fact is whether or not to move toward the goal of self-actualization, of being one's true self.

To will to be that self which one truly is, is indeed the opposite of despair, and this choice is the deepest responsibility of man. 15


When a person's view of himself is consistent with his real self, then he will, of necessity, act in ways which are self-actualizing. This is merely another way of stating that a person's behavior will always be consistent with his view of self or his self-concept. A person's view of self is determined by the phenomenal field. Since each person's experiences are different, it follows that so is each phenomenal field. It is thus nonsensical to attempt to predict, explain or interpret another's behavior, since to do so presupposes a common phenomenal field. Finally, man is to be viewed as a process of becoming rather than an entity fixed at any stage.

Life at its best, is a flowing, changing process in which nothing is fixed....When I am thus able to be in process, it is clear that there can be no closed systems of beliefs, no unchanging set of principles which I hold. Life is guided by a changing understanding of and interpretation of my experience. It is always in process of becoming.16

b) How does Rogers account for the aberrations of man? (The Problem)

As noted earlier, Rogers is committed to the view that man is basically good. He believes that an individual has an inherent tendency toward "good" or constructive behavior. Free of any restraints or defences, man's behavior is to be trusted.

It will be clear that my experience provides

no evidence of believing that if the deepest elements in man's nature were released we would have an uncontrolled or destructive id unleashed in the world. 17

Problems arise, in Rogers' view, because men have been led not to trust in their own organism. First, we are not in touch with our organism and second, we have been encouraged to view our organism as essentially evil or destructive.

...so that consciously we are moving in one direction, while organismically we are moving in another. 18

It is this lack of contact with the true self which causes the individual to deny certain feelings and experiences to awareness. This results in inner fear and defensiveness which accounts for the "evil" men do.

I am quite aware that out of defensiveness and inner fear, individuals can and do behave in ways which are incredibly cruel, horribly destructive, immature, regressive, antisocial and hurtful. 19

Individuals spend too much time conforming to the commands, injunctions and evaluations of others and do not experience a trust in their own organism. Rogers has described the person he sees man desiring to become. He

19 Ibid., p.27
suggests that such a person should be guided not be a sense of what he ought to do, since "ought" is an externally determined concept, but rather by what "feels right" that is, what one's inner nature or self is desiring.

...Such individuals are able to trust their total organismic reaction to a new situation because they discover to an ever increasing degree that, if they are open to their experience, doing what "feels right" proves to be a competent and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly satisfying.  

Thus, for Rogers the purpose or goal of life is for an individual to become self-actualized, to escape from the external determinants of behavior into the freedom of self-determined action.

The best way I can state this aim of life, as I see it coming to light in my relationship with my clients, is to use the words of Soren Kierkegaard--to be that self which one truly is!  

c) What is Rogers solution to the problem? (The Therapy)

The goal of therapy in Rogers view is to assist the client in becoming the self which he truly is. Since he is committed to the view that externals such as advising, interpreting, explaining and evaluating are in fact the source of the individual's difficulties, it is clear that these

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21 Ibid., p.213
elements cannot be present in Rogers' counselling. The logic of such a "non-directive" approach results in what Rogers calls Client-Centered Therapy. The basic tenets of the client-centered approach are:

i) Each individual lives in the center of his unique phenomenal field, and is alone capable of interpreting it.

ii) Each individual possesses a natural or inherent drive or tendency toward self-actualization.

Each person has a natural tendency toward self-actualization (becoming oneself), and each individual's inner world is unique and beyond explanation, prediction and interpretation. Thus it seems logical that the therapeutic process would consist of assisting the client to harness his drive toward self-actualization and to alter his own phenomenal field or view of self until he has truly become his organism. Such an approach is client-centered in two ways. First, it is the client's phenomenal field which must change i.e. the world of which the client is the center; and secondly the client has within himself the required resources for such changes.

It is thus the role of the counsellor to create the kind of situation which the client can effectively use. For Rogers, the central dynamic of the counselling process is the relationship provided by the counsellor.

If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth,
and change and personal development will occur.\textsuperscript{22}

The counsellor develops this relationship through a transparency or openness to his own experience, an acceptance of, or unconditional positive regard for the client, and the willingness to gain an empathetic view of the client's world as he views it. The counsellor is able to enter the phenomenal world of the client (as observer and companion) through his ability to listen and empathize as the client describes his world.

The counsellor provides an environment free from threat or evaluation so that the client can come to terms with his true self without the employment of defenses. In this permissive relationship the client then begins to channel his inherent drive toward self-determination and so come to a new, truer concept of self. At the point where the client becomes his true self, his behavior is then necessarily positive, constructive and self-actualizing. To state that he has "become his true self" is not to suggest that his nature is in any sense fixed or static for in Rogers' view to be one's true self is to view self as a constant process of becoming.

To summarize, Rogers' theory contains many of the elements of Rousseau's romantic naturalism and tends to view feelings as a truer guide than reason. There is a definite

emphasis on the concept of freedom, although in reality for Rogers it is a pseudo-freedom. Epistemologically, Rogers is a strict empiricist and will accept no authority beyond experience. Ontologically, Rogers views the "good life" or "true living" as a process of self-actualization. This concept bears a remarkable likeness, on the individual level, to Hegel's dialectical progression of Mind toward self-actualization. Thus, self-actualization is viewed as the fundamental goal or purpose of life, and each experience is to be handled according to:

What makes sense, what would enhance me, what would actualize me, and what would unactualize me by the experience?  

Finally, Rogers views man's nature as fundamentally positive in the absence of threat. His approach to counselling is thus a permissive approach based on his belief in man's inherent goodness and his capacity to work out his own solutions in every area of life.

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Summary

In summary, the following conclusions are warranted.

1) Modern humanism is characterized, though not definitively so, by the four postulates outlined earlier in this study.

Since the Renaissance, humanism has evolved from a classical revival of culture to a relatively coherent worldview which has for the most part displaced the Judeo-Christian view in Western culture. The four postulates reveal that the humanistic view is naturalistic, rationalistic, progressive and optimistic.

2) The three major movements in counselling theory share the above noted postulates and may thus be termed humanistic.

This is to suggest that these movements are to be viewed as more similar than dissimilar. They represent in fact three different emphases within a humanistic approach to counselling or personality. Besides their common presuppositional basis, each theory is clearly deterministic. Determinism in this sense implies the element of necessity as well as that of causality. That is to say that each theory rejects the concept of free-will. Beginning with the naturalism of modern humanism, this is of course the only logical conclusion, for if nothing exists beyond nature, then clearly man himself does not transcend nature. Further implications of determinism will be examined shortly.

3) The Christian worldview has been displaced not because it has been shown to be false, but rather because it has become increasingly less compatible with the humanistic view.
This issue was examined in relation to the 18th century attack on revealed religion by the philosophes. As the humanistic view came to terms with the major life-concerns such as the nature of man, the nature of the cosmos, the source of evil, the source of knowledge, the source of freedom, and questions of worth and meaning, its responses to these issues were consistently opposed to the answers provided by the Christian view. The Christian beliefs in man's sinfulness, dependency and utter helplessness seem presumptuous to the modern humanist in whose view man is autonomous, positively directed and self-sufficient. As Clark Pinnock puts it:

The 'foolishness' of the gospel is not the offense it renders to the ratio (reason) of man, but to the hubris (presumptious pride).  

4) The humanistic world-view, like the Christian view is seen to be ultimately a faith.

Here, faith should not be thought of in terms of the existentialist view of faith as an absurd or irrational "leap". As R. N. Williams states:

In some circles today, faith is defined as 'believing without evidence'. This cannot, however, be the meaning faith has in the New Testament. Believing without evidence would be a leap into darkness, a reliance on pot-luck. And since one patch of darkness is no different from any other, such a faith would be devoid of moral and spiritual experience.

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Faith is rather to be viewed as the conviction gained after examining the evidence of history, science and personal experience (and the Christian would include revelation).

By this is meant simply that a man's presuppositions are not readily deducible from empirical data. Like Kant's categories of mind one's presupposition are a filter through which such data flow. This is not to dismiss the possibility of objectivity but rather to suggest that the use one makes of the data depends to a large extent on his own presuppositions. Clearly each person is entitled to adopt his own particular set of presuppositions. However, this is not to imply that each man's set of presuppositions or "faith" need be accorded equal validity. Rather, the standard of measurement must always be the "fit" of one's presuppositions with reality, with things as they truly are. (Unless of course one denies the self-world dualism in favor of an Eastern monism, which is itself another presupposition).

5) The humanistic world-view if held consistently robs man of freedom, responsibility, values and meaning.

Admittedly this is a grave charge, but difficult to refute. This is in no way to suggest that the humanist himself knows and cares nothing about these issues, but rather to suggest that his presuppositions do not provide the necessary basis for such concerns. That such a difficulty is clearly recognized by leading humanist writers is apparent from the following quotations:
Bertrand Russell:

That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms: that no fire, no heroism, no intensity or thought, feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built. 3

Somerset Maugham:

There is no reason for life, and life has no meaning. 4

J. P. Sartre:

I was just thinking....that here we are, all of us, eating and drinking, to preserve our precious existence, and that there's nothing, nothing, absolutely no reason for existing. 5

Albert Camus:

When man submits God to moral judgment, he kills Him in his own heart. And then what is the basis


of morality? God is denied in the name of justice, but can the idea of justice be understood without the idea of God?  

and

The certainty of the existence of a God who would give meaning to life has a far greater attraction than the knowledge that without him one could do evil without being punished. The choice between these alternative would not be difficult. But there is no choice, and that is where the bitterness begins.

H. J. Blackham:

On humanist assumptions, life leads to nothing and every pretense that it does not is a deceit.

J. W. Krutch:

The universe revealed by science, especially the sciences of biology and psychology, is one in which the human spirit cannot find a comfortable home.

Arthur Koestler

In a word, the old explanations, with all their arbitrariness and patchiness, answered the question after the meaning of life, whereas the new explanations with all their precision, made the question of meaning itself meaningless.

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7 Ibid., p. 267


9 James A. Peterson, Counselling and Values: A Philosophical Examination, (Pa.: International Text Book Co., 1970), p. 1

B. F. Skinner:

What is being abolished is autonomous man—the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity. His abolition has long been overdue....To man qua man we readily say good riddance.\(^\text{11}\)

O. H. Mowrer:

By the very principles and premises that have led to the conquest of the outer world, we ourselves lose our autonomy, dignity, self-mastery, responsibility—indeed our very identity.\(^\text{12}\)

Thus, in his attempt to rationalize his own autonomy and self-sufficiency, the humanist himself has been forced into the confines of nature. Here he discovers no justification for freedom or moral responsibility since he has decreed nature uniform, a closed system. Hence it would appear that for the humanist to speak as though free-will were a reality is a contradiction, or at best, a inconsistency. Few humanists, however, are prepared to reject the concept of free choice (B. F. Skinner being an obvious exception), viewing it as a fundamentally human function, a vital factor in a humanistic view of man. Humanists, thus have tended to adopt one of three possible positions with respect to moral responsibility. Some like Skinner, refuse to draw back from the implications

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of their naturalism and totally reject the concept of moral responsibility.

Others, like Rogers, Abraham Maslow and J. P. Sartre have chosen the existentialist response. Though not dealt with earlier in this study, Existentialism is currently a popular movement within humanism. It is a movement rooted in the anti-rationalism of Soren Kierkegaard. In this sense it is truly modern humanism's answer to the loss of the human.

As T. M. Kitwood puts it:

Existentialism came about as a reaction, against optimism, against reason, and against all those forces which deprive man of his individuality and reduce him to something less than a person.13

In a sense, existentialism symbolizes modern man's realization that he cannot "have his cake and eat it too." He cannot assert his naturalism and autonomy and yet claim freedom too. The price paid to regain freedom has been the despair of ever finding a unified field of knowledge.

H. J. Blackham declares that it is the business of existentialism to:

...cure the mind of looking for illusory objective universal answers.14


and Francis Schaeffer has stated:

What is this despair? It arises from the abandonment of the hope of a unified answer for knowledge and life. Modern man continues to hang on to his rationalism and his autonomous revolt even though to do so he has had to abandon any rational hope of a unified answer. 15

Thus, moral responsibility is revived as a consequence of man's freedom. However, the existentialist response to the moral dilemma creates new problems of its own. Man is free, therefore responsible, but to what or to whom? If, as the existentialist claims, there are no universals, then how to order the particulars? J. P. Sartre clearly recognizes these difficulties:

The existentialist is strongly opposed to a certain type of secular moralism which seeks to suppress God at the least possible expense. The existentialist, on the contrary, finds it...embarrassing that God does not exist, for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must not lie. 16

The third humanistic approach to moral responsibility is perhaps the most common. This is the approach scorned by Sartre, above. In this position, the humanist rejects the


16 J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, (London: Eyre Methuen Ltd., 1973), pp.32-33
existence and hence authority of God but resorts to replacing
the Christian absolute with one of his own. It is an attempt
to rationalize Christian ethics in humanistic terms. The usual
absolutes which replace the character of God are Reason,
Happiness, Science, Love. Thus we find there are Utilitarian
ethics, Scientific or Naturalistic ethics and Situational
ethics to name but a few approaches. Nietzsche clearly
reveals the difficulty inherent in any attempt to reject
Christian authority but to retain Christian morality. In a
rebuke of English humanists he stated:

When one gives up Christian belief one there-
by deprives oneself of the right to Christian
morality. For the latter is absolutely not
self-evident: one must make this point clear
again and again....Christianity is a system,
a consistently thought out and complete view
of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental
idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the
whole thing to pieces: one has nothing of any
consequence left in one's hands. Christianity
presupposes that man does not know, cannot
know what is good for himself and what is evil:
he believes in God, who alone knows. Christian
morality is a command: its origin is transcenden-
tal; it is beyond all criticism, all right to
criticize; it possesses truth only if God is
truth--it stands or falls with the belief in
God.\textsuperscript{17}

It will be clear by now that in this study the issue
of moral responsibility and moral values is viewed as central.

It is my contention that to be a human is, to a large extent,

\textsuperscript{17} F. Nietzsche, \textit{Twilight of the Idols}, trans.
synonymous with being morally responsible. Thus the issue of moral responsibility also lies at the heart of the counselling process. If consideration of morality belongs to the philosopher and the science of human behavior to the psychologist, then it might be argued that their synthesis is truly the business of the counsellor or psychotherapist. Charlotte Buhler has stated:

One cannot live without encountering the problem of values. Certainly, one cannot go through psychotherapy without becoming involved, implicitly or explicitly, in the problem. 18

and, more to the point, Rollo May:

Every personality problem is a moral problem. That is to say, every personality problem has ultimate moral implications; for it refers to that question which is basic to all morals, 'How shall I live?' So we can expect that the healthy personality will be distinguished by its ability to negotiate the moral relations of life adequately, and we can set it down as a basic principle that a correct moral adjustment to life is the end-result of any successful counselling process. 19

The deterministic concept of mental illness has been attacked by many psychotherapists in the past few decades; Thomas Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), O. Hobart Mowrer in The Crisis of Psychiatry and Religion (1961),


William Glasser in *Reality Therapy* (1965) and Karl Menninger in *Whatever Became of Sin?* (1973) to name a few. In each book the major thesis is that much of what is represented as mental illness is in fact symptomatic of true guilt which results from irresponsible or sinful behavior. The client or patient is responsible for his actions, he is not "sick". These writers have served to strengthen the conviction that counselling indeed centers on the issue of moral responsibility.

I will end this study with an approach to counselling from the Christian perspective. Humanistic approaches clearly have left unanswered some significant questions as noted earlier. In no way have I provided justification for rejecting the humanistic view, for such was never my intent. I have, however, provided justification for presenting an alternate approach to counselling which does speak to the questions raised earlier.

In basing an approach to counselling on the Christian view of man, the counsellor:

...is not offered a choice between a scientific and an unscientific doctrine of man. Rather, the choice is among different views of man that are corollary to various philosophies. Most of today's psychotherapy is set in the context of naturalism or positivism. The empirical findings of scientific psychology are not bound inseparably to either of these basic faiths. Such a context is a psychology--plus--philosophy; there are other philosophies equally compatible with the science of man....

To quote Outler (1954) for example: 'The Christian faith is at least an equal option for the thoughtful man....It is at least as intelligible a faith, resting on at least as
much experimental evidence and exhibiting a capacity to interpret the inescapable issues of human life.  

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Before presenting the Christian view for consideration as a rational alternative for the counsellor, it is first necessary to consider some preliminary misconceptions which often arise in the Humanist-Christian dialogue. A counselling theory set in a humanistic context fails to account adequately for such human concerns as freedom, meaning and morality. What is required is a view which accounts for the natural man as well as for the transcendent, moral man. Such a view, or system, must provide a basis not only for science but also for ethics.

Naturalistic humanism cannot account rationally for transcendent concerns, and existentialist humanism abandons the search for a rational unity of nature and freedom. This was the issue with which Kant had struggled. Within a rationalistic framework, Kant concluded that we can truly know only the world of phenomena; the noumenal world being impregnable by human reason and science. Thus, knowledge of ultimate reality is impossible without revelation.

Perhaps the most common misconception in the Humanist-Christian dialogue is that while the Christian holds his view by faith, the Humanist relies on reason and science. Of course the Humanist will admit that his world-view does require a step of faith but holds that this faith is qualitatively different from that of the Christian. The Humanist contents himself with an explanation of the phenomena consistent with
the laws of nature. He does not resort to meaningless or irrelevant assumptions which go beyond an explanation of the phenomena in scientific terms. His faith is the faith of the scientist, tentative, open to change, open to new empirical evidence.

The Christian, on the other hand, may well point out that although his openness to the facts and scholarly rigor are commendable, the Humanist cannot contain reality within a naturalistic framework. The naturalistic presupposition, while a valid "working hypothesis" for the scientist, (Christian or Humanist), simply does not measure up as a comprehensive description of reality.

Examined from within a humanistic framework, the Christian system may well appear nonsensical. Its faith is bound up with a story of a God-Man and claims of an historical redemptive plan. For the Humanist, such beliefs may appear not only irrational but also totally irrelevant. He rejects the Christian claim largely on the basis of his naturalistic assumption. Clearly, such an assumption is not based upon reason, for the supernatural cannot be disposed of except by an arbitrary, subjective choice. It is no less rational to hold the supernaturalist view. In fact, in light of the difficulties noted with the naturalistic assumption it may well be the more rational view.

If the Christian is guilty of erecting a story or mythology upon his assumption of the supernatural, then
consider the Humanist. His assumption not only makes impossible a rational unity of nature and freedom but leads to a "mythological" structure of its own. Here I refer to what may be termed the "evolutionary myth" or Evolutionism (as distinct from evolutionary science.) In the Humanist's view, evolution accounts not only for the variability of species but also accounts for the origin of the cosmos and life itself. The Humanist would suggest that not only did life arise from non-life, but also the personal from the impersonal and reason from non-reason. As C. S. Lewis states:

> It is only when you are asked to believe in Reason coming from non-reason that you must cry Halt, for if you do not, all thought is discredited. It is therefore obvious that sooner or later you must admit a Reason which exists absolutely on its own. The problem is whether or not you or I can be such a self-existent Reason.\(^1\)

The Humanist's commitment to the evolutionary myth carries over into history, and, under the influence of Hegelian historicism views modern science, philosophy, and civilization as not only more sophisticated, but qualitatively superior. Thus Christianity and other more ancient modes of thought are said to be "pre-modern", as necessary stages in the dialectical progression of history. As well as being presumptuous, such thinking is clearly unsubstantiated. For example, Freud

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\(^1\)C. S. Lewis, *Miracles*, (Glasgow: Collins, 1947), p.32
contended that the evolution of religion involved a progression from totemism to polytheism to monotheism, with the implication that modern man has progressed beyond religion to a scientific world-view. In *The Religions of Mankind: Their Origins and Development*, Schoeps points out that:

All evolutionary constructs are unproved and unprovable. Nor can they help us to any conclusion, because every historical religion must obviously be understood in terms of its own tenets and its own peculiarities.

Thus, the Humanist's mythology impinges upon not only physical sciences and psychology, but also history and cultural anthropology. Brain researcher, Donald M. MacKay (1974) states:

Evolution began to be invoked in biology apparently as a substitute for God. And if in biology, why not elsewhere? From standing for a technical hypothesis in the same category as (technical) 'chance', the term was rapidly twisted to mean an atheistic metaphysical principle, whose invocation could relieve a man of any theological shivers at the spectacle of the universe. Spelt with a capital E, and dishonestly decked in the prestige of the scientific theory of evolution (which in fact gave it no shred of justification) 'Evolutionism became a name for a whole anti-religious philosophy...

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In summary, man himself is not a sufficient integration point for a system which can rationally encompass both nature and freedom. Therefore, in considering alternatives, the Christian system, integrated in the person of God, deserves a second look, if only because it does indeed account for both the "natural" and the transcendent in man, and, can accommodate the empirical data as readily as any humanistic system. It is important to view the Christian system not as some religious appendage to life, but in a very real sense, as a "separate reality". As Schoeps states, any religion, or world-view, must be examined and understood in its own terms and not from within a conflicting presuppositional framework. In the remainder of the study, the Christian world-view is examined "from within", in its own terms, for its rationality can be judged only from such a vantage point.
In examining the Christian view, it immediately becomes clear that just as there are many varieties of modern humanism, so there are many expressions of Christianity. To avoid ambiguity, I wish to make it clear that the Christian view expressed in this study relies on what is commonly termed Evangelical Theology. The shift from rationalism to existentialism, as well as the Higher Criticism movement of the nineteenth century with its reliance on naturalistic presuppositions in approaching the Bible, have helped to create a humanistic Christianity which is radically at variance with traditional or Evangelical Christian thought. As this study has shown the historical development of humanism in western culture cannot be understood apart from its relationship to Christianity. Originally, the issue was one of epistemology, the humanist relying on science and reason as the sources of knowledge and the Christian relying on revelation, particularly biblical revelation. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Christians worked out an uneasy compromise between biblical theology and the new humanism. Francis Schaeffer describes this process:

The old liberal theologians in Germany began by accepting the presupposition of the uniformity of natural causes in a closed system. Thus they rejected everything miraculous and supernatural, including that in the life of Jesus Christ. Having done that they still hoped to find an historical Jesus in a rational, objective, scholarly way by separating the supernatural
aspects of Jesus' life from the 'true history'....Their search for the historical Jesus was doomed to failure, for the supernatural was so entwined with the rest that, if they ripped out all the supernatural, there was no Jesus left!...After their failure they could have done two things in order to continue a logical and rational realm. They could have left their rationalism and returned to the biblical theology of the Reformation, which they had rejected on the basis of naturalistic presuppositions; or they could have become nihilistic concerning thought and life. But instead of choosing one of these two rational alternatives they chose a third way, just as the philosophers had already done--a way which had been unthinkable to educated man before this, and which involved the division of the concept of truth.1

He goes on to describe the two concepts as religious truth on the one hand, which is ultimately subjective, and scientific-historical truth on the other, which is objective or verifiable. Presumably, Christianity is thus "saved" by its immunity to objective evidence. Thus Rudolph Bultmann asserts:

"It is precisely its immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation against the charge of being mythological."2

Here faith is seen not as described earlier; the conviction gained after examination of the evidence, but rather, faith is a "leap" taken perhaps even in spite of the


the objective facts. "God", The Christ and "the Resurrection" often become contentless symbols, having subjective value but not historical or objective reality.

Evangelical theology, however, is strictly opposed to such "liberal" views and finds its meaning in biblical revelation, as did the church fathers and the Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century. Evangelicals accept the Bible on its own terms and contend for a unified concept of truth. Clark Pinnock states:

It is antibiblical to insulate the gospel from the acid baths of historical criticism. It can stand the investigation, providing the prejudices are left at home. This dichotomy between faith and fact is fatal to Christianity and opposed to the entire biblical witness.

Evangelicals agree that there is a non-falsifiable content to the Christian message which can be validated only in personal experience, but they deny the divided truth concept. Oz Guiness elaborates, in discussing God's revelation of Himself:

What he is towards us is his self-disclosure, and this must always be open to two questions: Is it consistent with itself? Does it square with falsifiable reality wherever it touches the phenomenal world of man, history and the space-time continuum? The Christian claims that wherever God's self-disclosure touches the world at these points, it is not only open to

falsification, but in fact is not 
falsified. 4

Having clarified something of what Evangelical 
theology is not, I will now define the term. The term 
'Evangelical theology' will be used as described below 
by Karl Barth:

The qualifying attribute 'evangelical' recalls 
both the New Testament and at the same time, the 
Reformation of the sixteenth century.... The 
expression 'evangelical', however, cannot and 
should not be intended and understood in a con-
fessional, that is, in a denominational and 
exclusive sense. This is forbidden first of all 
by the elementary fact that 'evangelical' refers 
primarily and decisively to the Bible, which is 
in some way respected by all confessions. Not all 
so-called 'Protestant' theology is evangelical 
theology; moreover there is also evangelical 
theology in the Roman Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox worlds, as well as in the many later 
variations, including deteriorations of the 
Reformation departure. What the word 'evangelical' 
will objectively designate is that theology 
which treats of the God of the Gospel. 5

Further usage of "Christian view" will imply this 
description. It is not the intention in this study to present 
the Christian view in any exhaustive sense. Rather, basic 
premises will be examined. These will then be used to consid-
er a Christian approach to counselling theory. Specifically, 
four postulates of Christian theism will be considered which

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4 Os Guiness, The Dust of Death, (Illinois: Inter 

5 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, 
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p.5
parallel as closely as possible the four postulates of Humanism discussed in this study.

Postulate 1--God exists and is transcendent, immanent and personal.

According to the Christian, God has created the universe ex nihilo with a uniformity of cause and effect in an open system. He is thus wholly other and intervenes in the system at will, yet is not part of the system. Thus naturalism is transcended, but the basic rationality of the universe is maintained. Also explicit in this postulate is the notion that ultimately, the nature of reality is personal, because God is personal.

In contrast to the humanist view, reality transcends nature. This implies that the Christian must look beyond the closed system of naturalism to understand man's nature. A given event may be adequately explained by the Humanist in naturalistic terms, but, as noted earlier, the naturalistic presupposition leads to significant difficulties in other areas. A given presupposition is only as valid as its ability to "fit" a total picture of reality. Where such a presupposition creates problems for the system as a whole, or world-view then either the presupposition or the system must be modified.

Postulate 2--The ultimate epistemological authority is the Word of God as revealed in the Bible and in Jesus Christ.

The Christian rejects the claim of man's autonomous reason as the final arbiter. The true nature of reality is not
apparent to man, nor is it accessible to him either through reason or science. If man is to have knowledge of ultimate reality, it must be revealed to him. The Christian claim is that God, as the ultimate reality, has chosen to reveal himself, though not exhaustively so, through his creation (both man and nature), through the recorded testimony of the prophets and apostles (the Bible) and finally through his incarnation (Jesus Christ).

The Christian message is historical to the core, all of its doctrines arise from God's self-disclosure in history. Its doctrine of authority, therefore, is given in the disclosure situations of redemptive history; that is, the nature of Scripture is determined from the teachings of divinely authenticated messengers, Jesus Christ and his apostles. The entire edifice of theology is built upon this epistemological foundation.  

Thus ethics or morality is grounded in the character of God as revealed to man. The "Good" is seen to be that which is consistent with the character of God. This "good" is a universal standard and transcends all ethical relativism.

The Humanist may rightly claim that science and reason may ultimately reveal all of the secrets of nature. The Christian will not deny this claim but contends that the explanation of nature is not necessarily to be equated with the explanation of reality itself. The adoption of

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the naturalistic stance leads to the Humanist's faith in reason and science just as surely as the supernaturalistic stance leads the Christian to an external, universal authority. It is not that the Christian rejects reason and science, but that he scores their inability to deal exhaustively with a transcendent view of reality. In Kantian terms science and reason may treat only of the phenomena, not of the noumena.

Postulate 3--Man, in nature, is basically sinful, or self-centered. He does not possess in himself sufficient resources to conquer this sinful nature.

Lest the Christian view be falsely labelled as pessimism or degradation, man's nature needs to be viewed in perspective. Man was created "in the image of God", to reflect his nature. Thus, in the original creation, man possessed freedom, dignity, rationality and many of the other aspects of God's character. At some point in their historical relationship man chose to disobey God, to assert his will over against the will of God. This is the phenomenon of the Fall, for in this act of autonomy, man severed his relationship with God and lost his God-given freedom. Emil Brunner states:

Man is a being who, although he has been created by God, by the fact that he has turned away from God is no longer in the state of free dependance in which he was created. Christian anthropology regards man as not only responsible but also as guilty, that is, as a being who has perverted
his nature by misusing his freedom, and thus has lost his freedom. 7

Freedom in this sense does not refer to free choice in the sense of choosing steak or chicken for dinner. It refers to a transcendent freedom whereby man determines the direction and purpose of his life and by which he brings his behavior into line with the existential "oughts". Or, in other words:

Man has no free will in spiritual matters precisely because he stands in revolt against the source of divine freedom--God. 8

Further, the Christian states that man's will is in bondage, bondage to self. In his own power, he is not able to free himself from this corruption of his nature wrought by the Fall. In his attempt to make himself the author of his own freedom, he discovers that freedom is precisely what he has lost. As Barth states:

The idea that man can conquer freedom as God's antagonist and defiantly wrench it from him is untenable.

He continues:

Man becomes free and is free by choosing, deciding and determining himself in accordance with the freedom of God....Trying to escape from being in accord with God's own

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8 What Then is Man, Symposium, (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), p.59
freedom is not human freedom....Sinful man is not free, he is a captive, a slave.9

This then is the human dilemma. Man's nature, corrupted by the Fall is now characterized by its imprisonment or bondage to self. Man cannot of his own accord, and by a free act of his will, free himself from bondage, indeed he in fact views himself as already free. Man's bondage to self is realized existentially in the following description by John Stott:

We have high ideals but weak wills. We want to live a good life, but we are chained in the prison of our self-centeredness. However, much we may boast of being free, we are in reality but slaves....It is no use giving us rules of conduct; we cannot keep them....The education of the mind is not enough without a change of heart, Man has found the secret of physical power, the power of nuclear reaction. Now he needs spiritual power to set him free from himself, to conquer and control himself, the power to give him moral character to match his scientific achievement.10

In the humanist view, man's aberrations are clearly acknowledged and are accounted for in three ways. Skinner claims that adverse effects of environment and heredity are the cause. Rogers claims it is the false view of self or poor self-image, and Freud attributes man's difficulties to the powerful effects of the unconscious, irrational aspects of

9Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, (Collins, 1961), p.73

man's nature. The Christian contends that all three are powerful determinants of behavior, but that the fundamental cause of man's aberrations is his alienation from his life-source, God. This results in a bondage of the will which then makes man a victim of the determinants of behavior noted above.

Postulate 4—Man's ultimate purpose is to exist in a relationship of love and obedience with his creator—God. Man was created for this fellowship with God.

This is not entirely at odds with the humanist's claim that the purpose of man's life is to actualize his potential. For the Christian, self-actualization is also a goal, but the term is clearly understood in a different context. Self-actualization means recognizing God's claim on our lives. It implies a recognition that we are actualized only as we apprehend reality as it truly is, in God, and ourselves as we truly are—alienated from him. Stott claims:

Man's highest destiny is to know God, to be in personal relationship with him. Our chief claim to nobility as human beings is that we were made in the image of God and are therefore capable of knowing him.11

Self-actualization is also realized only as man admits his inability to bring himself into a right relationship with God, for it is the Christian's claim that it is God and

not man who initiates the process. Man can claim no part in the means of reconciliation. From start to finish it is the work of God, a free gift, which man chooses either to accept or reject. God's redemptive plan centers in the God-Man, Jesus Christ, whose death is the sufficient atonement for man's sin. In his resurrection, he invites man back into fellowship with God through relationship with himself. Man then recovers that which was once lost to him, the nature and resources of God. He is once again free toward God and no longer bound to self. The German theologian-martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer, states:

When a man encounters Christ, everything that Christ is and has is made the property of this man; yet my life is justified solely by that which is the property of Christ and never by that which has become my own property. Thus the heaven opens over man's head the joyful tidings of God's salvation in Jesus Christ come down like a shout of rejoicing from heaven to earth, and man believes, and, in believing, he has already received Christ to himself; he possesses everything. He lives before God. 12

Having examined some of the basic postulates of the Christian world-view, it is now appropriate to consider its applications to the counsellor. This will be done according to the same format used to examine the counselling theory of Freud, Skinner and Rogers.

a) Who is Man? (The Client)

In the Christian view, man is God's special creation. He alone is created in "God's image". While theologians have debated for centuries the precise substance of that image, it is clearly the basis for viewing the client as one worthy of respect, dignity, even love. It is important to note that this worthiness is not due to a man's own efforts (or lack thereof) but simply to the fact of God's creative choice. Thus the Christian counsellor is called to view his client as God himself does.

Man is also seen to transcend nature through his likeness to God. Within nature, man is body and soul, physis and psyche. In the Christian view however, the spiritual realm is recognized, so that man is body, mind and spirit. As Reinhold Niebuhr points out, however, the Biblical view is clearly holistic or monistic rather than dualistic. It is the recognition of the spiritual in man which leads to a more complete view of personality. As Viktor Frankl puts it:

The proper diagnosis can be made only by someone who can see the spiritual side of man.  

Rollo May discusses the spiritual in man:

Man as we know him existentially is conditioned finite, imperfect, but he is essentially connected with God, and this relationship

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brings in the elements of the unconditioned, the infinite and perfect.... Therefore any picture of personality which leaves out the aspect of religious tension is incomplete. Purely naturalistic psychotherapies will always be inadequate. We can conclude that the healthy individual must have a creative adjustment to God...15

Thus the spiritual in man is but one aspect of being; it is not to be viewed as separate or distinct from body and soul.

The recognition of the spiritual in man is a vital concern for the counsellor, since it legitimates an involvement with the client on issues of meaning, purpose and values. In the Christian view, meaning, purpose and value are not created by the individual, since they are determined externally by God. This is contrary to the view of most existentialist counsellors, although Viktor Frankl has stated:

I think the meaning of our existence is not invented by ourselves, but rather detected.16

Finally, man, a physical, psychological and spiritual unity, can be said to exist in three basic relationships. These may be termed,

a) The psychological relationship

b) The social relationship

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c) The spiritual relationship

J. A. Peterson, discussing goals in counselling, calls these the three focal points of effective human functioning:

These three come into play at one time or another in all types of counselling or psychotherapy....Some focus primarily upon the internal functioning of the individual, whereas others focus more upon social aspects. The area most likely to be neglected, however, is that dealing with meaning and purpose....

Using morality as the integrating concept, C. S. Lewis writes:

It seems then that if we are to think about morality, we must think of all three departments: relations between man and man; things inside each man; and relations between man and the power that made him.

This is not to suggest, of course, that these three relationships can be examined fruitfully in isolation from one another. Clearly man exists in the context of all three simultaneously.

b) How does Christianity Account for Man's Aberrations? (The Problem)

Man is created in the "image of God". The Christian contends that the freedom which sustains man in the image of

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God was lost when man became a sinner. The concept of the Fall has been discussed earlier and will not be elaborated here. The situation is aptly summarized by Reinhold Niebuhr:

Man is a sinner. His sin is defined as rebellion against God... Man contradicts himself within the terms of his true essence. His essence is free self-determination. His sin is the wrong use of his freedom and its consequent destruction. Man is an individual but he is not self-sufficing. The law of his nature is love, a harmonious relation of life to life in obedience to the divine center and source of his life. This law is violated when man seeks to make himself the center and source of his own life. His sin is therefore spiritual and not carnal, though the infection of rebellion spreads from the spirit to the body and disturbs its harmonies also.19

The consequences of man's sin are many. Basically, man is alienated from God, the source of freedom. As such his life is determined, not by man himself, but by his instinctual urges, his environment and his self-image, for spiritually, man is reckoned dead and returned to the confines of nature.

A subsequent consequence of sin is man's alienation from himself. Rogers speaks clearly to this aspect of man's fallen nature with his description of the problem as man's failure to become his true self. Rogers' phenomenological approach in fact depends entirely upon this very concept of

man's alienation from himself since he postulates a gap between who man truly is and who he sees himself to be. This results in the condition described earlier as bondage to self. In the Christian view this condition is not the result of man's alienation from himself but is corollary to it.

Sin finally results in man's alienation from others. His loss of freedom and his self-centeredness result in conflict, envy and greed. As Freud has noted, man can mask or struggle against his selfish nature and its destructiveness but he cannot change it. It is in this sense that Freud's theory is basically pessimistic. Skinner, on the other hand, refuses to accept that man's behavior is the product of an inner nature as described by Freud, and places the blame on the environment. This, of course, deals with the pessimism of Freud's theory, but sacrifices man's capacity to choose, to will.

Thus, in the Christian view, sin alienates man in each of the three relationships described earlier; the psychological, the social and the spiritual. As Bonhoeffer notes:

In becoming like God man has become a God against God. This finds its expression in the fact that man, knowing of good and evil, has finally torn himself loose from life, that is to say from the eternal life which proceeds from the choice of God.... he is cut off from the unifying, reconciling life in God, and is delivered over to death....Man's life is now disunion with God, with men, with things, and with
c) How are Man's aberrations overcome? (The Solution)  
In terms of counselling techniques, the Christian counsellor is necessarily eclectic. No single theory can provide the Christian with both the means and the theoretical basis for his counselling. As with Freud, Skinner and Rogers, the theoretical basis of the theory is necessarily a blend of one's experience, knowledge and world-view. This study has shown that the three major forces in counselling theory are products of the Humanistic world-view. The Christian counsellor must therefore reject them as theoretical systems, but at the same time, absorb what they have discovered empirically about man, his behavior and effective counselling. Thus the Christian counsellor is scientifically eclectic but philosophically committed. This does not suggest, of course, that the Christian counsellor is limited to a single approach, any more than is the humanist. What is presented here is one possible approach for the Christian counsellor. (Henceforth, "Christian counsellor" will be replaced by "counsellor".)  

It is proposed that the counselling process be viewed in four sequential stages which I shall term Involvement and Rapport Building, Diagnosis, Problem Ownership and Remediation.  

STAGE 1: Involvement and Rapport Building  
In this stage the focal point is the establishment

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of a warm, empathetic relationship between counsellor and client. The counsellor views the client as worthy of love and respect because God has first viewed him so. This stage of the counselling process requires an essentially non-directive, permissive approach by the counsellor. Here he may make use of Rogers' client-centered methods to communicate his acceptance of the client and his willingness to commit himself openly to the client. At this stage, the process is clearly client-centered since its effectiveness depends upon the client's perception of the counsellor. Unless the client perceives the counsellor as accepting and empathetic it is doubtful that the counselling process will succeed. The time spent at this stage is largely dependent upon the counsellor's skill in communicating what Rogers terms "unconditional positive regard" which is clearly the same thing as viewing the client as God views him. The time factor is also dependent upon the emotional state, willingness to trust and courage of the client.

STAGE 2: Diagnosis

Once rapport is firmly established, the counsellor may turn his attention to the diagnosis. This stage is more counsellor-centered since its purpose is to make the counsellor aware of the various parameters of the client's problem. This process serves to strengthen the relationship as the counsellor communicates his desire to truly understand the client. He may begin with the self-report of the client, but he must also rely on other means to assess the extent to which the client is
truly aware of the problem. These may include testing procedures, directed interview techniques, active listening, observance of non-verbal client behavior or any combination of these or other validated procedures. It will also be important to relate the problem to the appropriate relationship; social, psychological or spiritual. Clearly the problem will affect all three, but it will likely be seen to emanate from only one. For example, a child who reports that he cannot get along with his parents (social) may in fact have a poor self-concept due to feeling rejected by them (psychological) or may be rebelling against a sense of meaninglessness in his life (spiritual).

STAGE 3: Problem Ownership

Once the counsellor clearly understands the problem, or supposes he does, he will feed back what he has learned to the client. Depending upon the relationship and the skill of the counsellor, the client should begin to "own" the problem. The counsellor will show him that he (the client) is responsible for his life and must be willing to change. He will help the client to confront and own underlying fears and feelings which have contributed to the problem. He will also help the client to identify the context of the problem, in terms of the three relationships. Clearly, this is a crucial stage in the counselling process since the counsellor runs the double risk of over-interpreting and over-confronting. The counsellor's commitment to the client will often require him to confront
the client with unpleasant data which the client may reject. This will often provide the test of the relationship established and nurtured through the first two stages. Most important at this stage, the client must accept the fact that, as Rollo May states:

Every personality problem is a moral problem...for it refers to that question which is basic to all morals, 'How shall I live?'

Thus the problem must ultimately be viewed as a moral failure by the client in either the social, psychological or spiritual relationship. In other words, what has been "done to" the client cannot excuse his responses to the situation. He is a morally responsible agent and must accept responsibility for his actions. Even the fact that he is, to recall Stott's phrase, in bondage, he still has available to him God's means for dealing with that condition. It is ultimately his refusal to respond to God's grace which constitutes his sin.

STAGE 4: Remediation

Once responsibility for the problem is accepted by the client, he is then exhorted to remediate it. In some cases the counselling process may terminate after stage three. In this case the client only needed assistance in

identifying and clarifying the problem. He may subsequently be quite capable of dealing effectively on his own with the problem. This is clearly not true in all cases, however, and the counsellor must be skilled enough to guide the client toward likely alternatives. It is at this stage that Behavior Modification techniques might be effectively employed as counsellor and client together design behavior changing programs. The counsellor will draw upon his own experience as well as upon his knowledge of God's revelation to supply the goals and values for any behavior change. He will not allow himself or the client to define the moral structure, but will insist that it is objectively and externally defined by God's revelation. Rollo May points out:

The only adequate structure for morality is that based upon the ultimate meaning of life. Such a structure will be universal. It will possess objectivity, for it will be outside the individual as well as within his own mind. It will be an archetype of the universe, so to speak, rather than simply that found in mankind's collective unconscious. From it we shall get norms for acting which are rooted in the ultimate meaning of life.... So the ultimate structure is the nature of God.

In some cases, the counsellor must be able to assist the client in discovering how to reconcile himself to God, thus restoring life to the spiritual relationship. As May further points out, it is only as this reconciliation

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occurs that man becomes free to act as he pleases, he transcends moral law, he is spirit-directed. He now has a powerful basis for effective living which permeates the social and psychological relationships as well.

Often, however, such a reconciliation is not sought due to the client's fear, indifference or hostility. In these cases, the counsellor must still insist on the moral principles as contained in God's revelation as the only effective basis for living. The counsellor will do whatever he can to alleviate the specific problems and possibly to teach more effective responses and life patterns. The client's refusal to accept God's lordship in no way changes the fact that all of life is underlaid with the principles of God. In other words, the Christian counsellor will contend for universal moral standards and will not encourage the client toward ethical relativism. In the Christian view this is often the cause of problems, not the solution. This does not mean, however, that the counsellor is to "preach" morality to the client. It simply implies that the counsellor clearly reveal his biases and maintain his conviction that mental health is clearly associated with moral behavior. The client is free to disagree with the counsellor since he is a responsible agent. Rogers approach is, of course, no less directive or explicit. Far from being a neutral, non-directive approach it "preaches" moral relativism. The failure of the counsellor to maintain a clear moral position simply reinforces the notion
that moral values are individually determined.

Admittedly, this presentation falls far short of a systematic treatment of the subject, yet clearly a theoretical structure has been outlined. This structure would allow the Christian counsellor to function in a secular setting without abandoning his theological commitment. It would allow him to accept the research findings of the humanistic psychologists without setting them in a humanistic context. Hopefully it might also provide a framework from which the Christian counsellor could carry out research and validation studies in order to modify, refine and complete the structure.

This study has examined the growing polarization between the Humanist and Christian doctrines of man and its effect on counselling theory. It is hoped that the study might alert the humanistic counsellor to the philosophical presuppositions which underly his theory and practice as well as induce an acceptance of the intellectual credibility of the Christian view. Should these two results ever be realized, perhaps a more creative dialogue between Christians and Humanists would occur.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


