COTTON GROWING IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA:
MISSIONARY, MERCANTILE, IMPERIAL AND
COLONIAL GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT
VERSUS AFRICAN REALITIES c. 1845 TO 1939.

by

BRIAN BEN VINCENT

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in the Department
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History

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NAME: Brian Ben Vincent

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EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Chairman: J. M. Kitchen

______________________________

Peter Kup
Senior Supervisor

______________________________

Kenji Okuda

______________________________

Philip Slagge

______________________________

Edgar Efrat
External Examiner
Associate Professor
University of Victoria,
British Columbia

DATE APPROVED: 10/18/87
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Author:

(signature)
BRIAN B. VINCENT
(name)
November 12th, 1976
(date)
ABSTRACT

The thesis is a study of cotton growing in Southern Nigeria for purposes of export mainly to the British cotton industry. During the period covered a surprising variety of British organisations and institutions interested themselves in cotton-growing programs which extended to a wide range of areas outside the United States, but which were mainly concerned with the British Empire and showed a special interest in West Africa. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate these programs so far as they concerned Southern Nigeria, to discover why they were undertaken, the obstacles they had to overcome, and how far they succeeded.

The methods followed included the study of primary sources - the earliest being the 1850's when the Church Missionary Society, with the assistance of some Manchester merchants, tried to promote large-scale cotton export in Southern Nigeria. The archives of the Church Missionary Society in London and Lagos Governors' dispatches during the 1860's were examined. In addition the various publications of the Society - "The Intelligencer" and "The Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society", as well as contemporary pamphlets and books by, for example, Sir Richard Burton, were read. From the 1880's the miscellaneous reports and correspondence on Lagos and Southern Nigeria at Kew Gardens were studied, and after 1900 mainly the Colonial Office files in the Public Record Office, London, the official gazettes for Lagos and Southern Nigeria, and the minute books and published reports of the British Cotton Growing Association. During the last section, from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, the annual reports of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, and its journal "The Empire Cotton Growing Review", were referred to. The annual reports of the Nigerian Agricultural Department and the Annual Bulletin which it began to publish in 1922 on its research work were of particular value.

During the nineteenth century the British cotton industry expanded rapidly. About one third of its exports were sent to tropical countries like India and hence it was essential for the industry to have ample supplies of cheap cotton. Most of this came from the slave states of America, where frosts often caused short crops. Thus there was a desire for alternative supplies of cotton from both "abolitionist" and commercial interests.
Africa appeared one possible source, especially as it was desired to introduce "legitimate" commerce there to put a final end to the slave trade. With the support of some Manchester manufacturers, the Church Missionary Society undertook a program of "Native Agency" designed to train Africans both in industrial and managerial skills, including the export of raw cotton. The need for alternative sources of supply was underlined by the American Civil War.

The West African Cotton program was eventually taken over by Manchester merchants owing to managerial and financial problems. The fall in prices of tropical raw materials from the mid-1870's led to attempts to widen the export products of the West African colonies and botanical stations were established, but cotton prices remained too low for profitable trade. From 1900 prices began to rise - cotton among them - and owing to high and unreliable American prices, the British Cotton Growing Association was formed to extend cotton growing throughout the British Empire. A new program was undertaken in Southern Nigeria, which achieved only limited success by World War I. A fresh approach was begun in 1920 with the formation of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, which was given the status of a government department as well as ample funds.

The initiative in the cotton export programs in Southern Nigeria came from outside and was inspired by exaggerated hopes arising from the large quantities of cotton grown in the region. All but a small quantity of this, however, was used for the local African spinning and weaving industry and only the limited surplus was available for export, the local market frequently offering the farmer a better price than the export one. The farmer naturally gave priority to food crops, which were readily saleable as well as vital for his own needs, and in the rainforest area could grow other export crops like cocoa which were more profitable than cotton. Local farming conditions, with rapid tropical growth and heavy rain, made clearing extra land very difficult and cotton had to take its place as a "mixed" crop on the same piece of land as that on which other crops were grown. These factors taken together acted against any really considerable increase in cotton growing for export and it remained a marginal undertaking.
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The writer wishes to express his thanks for valuable assistance in writing this thesis to the librarian, (Mr. Donald Simpson) and staff of the Royal Commonwealth Society; to the librarians, Miss Keane and Miss Wood at the Church Missionary Society; to the staff, especially Mr. Minns, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library; - all of London, England; also to those former members of the Agricultural Department, Nigeria, who granted him interviews, including J. R. Mackie, a former Director of Agriculture, J. West and A. V. Gibberd; and H. S. King, formerly working in Nigeria for the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation; to the British Cotton Growing Association for allowing him to study their written records; to Mr. Thomas of Lacre's Ltd., St. Albans, England, for his assistance; and to Mr. K. R. M. Anthony of the Cotton Research Association. Dr. P. Kup and Professor P. Stigger have criticised the first draft and made valuable suggestions, and Professor Stigger has taken further trouble in reading and criticising the final draft. Finally Miss Fiona Henderson has made a special effort in completing the typing in less than normal time.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the history of cotton growing for export in Southern Nigeria during the period 1845-1939. Cotton had been grown there for the local market, and for the local spinning and weaving industries for centuries, but was not regarded as a staple for export, even after the ending of the slave trade; palm-oil, ivory, shea-butter, and gums being the articles in which Africans were usually ready to trade with Europe. The trade in cotton was essentially a development from the outside, the result of pressures and interests in Britain arising from the rapid growth of the cotton industry there. From the early nineteenth century this industry became overwhelmingly dependent on the United States for its cotton supplies, and found markets for about one-third of its goods in tropical countries like India where only the cheaper ranges of its piece-goods could be sold. Supplies from the United States, however, were subject to "short" crops usually resulting from frosts, which were liable to occur both at the beginning and at the end of the growing season. In addition the "free trade" merchants of Lancashire disliked their dependence on slave-grown cotton until the emancipation of 1862. Hence in 1857 the Cotton Supply Association was formed in Manchester to develop alternative sources of supply and the theme of this thesis is the effect which this search had on development in Southern Nigeria and the problems encountered there.

The missionaries, especially those of the Church Missionary Society in London, were also interested in developing cotton growing in Southern Nigeria. Their interest arose from the effects of the abolition of the slave trade, and the need to replace the slave trade in West Africa by a "legitimate" commerce which would still enable Africans to buy goods, and British manufacturers to find markets in the area. The Missionaries accompanied the freed slaves back to their homes, mostly to the former "Slave Coast", stretching from Lagos to the Niger Delta. The Church Missionary Society undertook, mainly through the exertions of the Honorary Clerical Secretary, Henry Venn, the
training of Africans in commercial and similar subjects, and set up an Industrial Institution in Abeokuta not only to train Africans in the industrial arts but also to prepare cotton for export on a commercial scale. The thesis follows the history of the experiment, which received the assistance of some Manchester merchants, until unsatisfactory relationships between Manchester and the African managers brought it to an end, and the "cotton business" passed from the hands of the Society into those of the Manchester-controlled West Africa Company. Soon after unsettled political conditions in Yoruba country turned the West Africa Company's attention to the Niger.

From 1875 there was a recession and the price of tropical raw materials fell. This led to the amalgamation of British interests in the Niger under Sir George Goldie, and a program inspired by Royal Gardens, Kew, London, with the encouragement of the Colonial Office, to establish botanical stations in West Africa to develop new commercial crops. The program met with limited success, and for several years Lagos suffered from an excess of expenditure over revenue. To relieve the position and develop the hinterland, a railway was begun from Lagos in 1896.

The turn of the century brought an increase in prices, and as this included a rise of cotton prices, resulting in part from increased consumption in America, a fresh crisis hit the Lancashire industry. To overcome the problem a new organization, the British Cotton Growing Association, was formed to grow cotton within the Empire, and received the full encouragement of the Colonial Office. The thesis deals with the development of its program in Southern Nigeria, which included the construction of efficient ginneries along the railway. The progress it made in the South was limited, however, partly by climatic conditions, but even more by the competition of other crops, such as yams and cocoa, and the economic preferences of African growers. The Association undertook a wide range of activities - by no means confined to Nigeria -
including the development of new varieties of cotton, but the establishment of an Agricultural Department in Southern Nigeria in 1910 confined its work to ginning and marketing. World War I brought its development work to an end - it had always had problems in finding capital for what it called its "philanthropic" work.

The needs of a fully scientific program of cotton development were brought out at the meetings of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee which recommended the formation of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, incorporated in 1920. It was generously financed and set itself, not only to develop communications in the cotton areas, but to train specialists in cotton growing who would work with the local Agricultural Departments. The status of the Corporation was enhanced into that of a department of state under the superintendence of the President of the Board of Trade, and it was supervised by a Council containing representatives both from the "Dominions" where cotton could be grown, India, and from the industry. An organization had been finally set up with sufficient capital, prestige and authority to carry through a program in the colonies at large which would be able to pursue an all-round development combining research and practical work in the field. While it achieved marked success elsewhere, it did not succeed to any great extent in Southern Nigeria because of competition from other crops and the narrow margin of profit obtained by the farmer.

The archives of the Church Missionary Society, of the Colonial Office in the Public Record Office, London, of the records and publications of the British Cotton Growing Association, originally in Manchester but now in Liverpool, and of the relevant section of the records of the Board of Trade in the Public Record Office for the establishment of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation have been examined. In addition printed sources relating to the work of the Church Missionary Society during the nineteenth century, and Colonial Gazettes, as well as other secondary printed sources, have been studied. Finally some helpful personal interviews have been obtained in England with several retired members of the Nigerian Department of Agriculture, including a former Director, J. R. Mackie, and a former member of the staff of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, H. S. King.
INTRODUCTION-FOOTNOTES

1. Most of the British Cotton Growing Association's records have recently been handed over to the University of Birmingham, England.
CHAPTER 1
THE WEST AFRICAN BACKGROUND AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE MISSIONARY SOLUTION.

During the eighteenth century Great Britain was the leading power in the West African slave trade to the plantations of the West Indies and the Southern Colonies of North America, a trade which was sometimes, although not always, "triangular" - involving the export of British manufactures to West Africa, the transport of slaves to the British West Indies or Southern Colonies, and the return to Britain with sugar, tobacco or cotton. During the years 1700 to 1800 it has been estimated that over six million slaves were transported across the Atlantic, most of them purchased from African traders along what was called the "Slave Coast", corresponding approximately to the coastline of the Bight of Benin or of modern Nigeria from its western boundary to the Niger Delta. These years, especially those from 1714 to 1833, were also the golden age of the West Indian plantations, and the wealthy planter, usually an absentee from his estate and living grandly in Britain, became a symbol of display typified by the eccentric Beckford family of Fonthill.

Despite the importance of the trade to the British West Indies, together with the exports to West Africa of British manufactures and of sugar and other products to British and American refineries and factories, the slave trade itself was becoming of less importance to Britain. By the 1770's there were estimated to be some 3,000 British vessels engaged in the American and West Indian trade alone, while in 1790 the number of slave ships operating out of the three slaving ports of Liverpool, Bristol and London was just 184. After 1780 it has been estimated that some £100,000 was invested annually in British industry; of this total probably around £14,000 was received from the slave trade. The great growth of British commerce, and its expansion into Europe, the Americas, India and the East, had reduced the human traffic to a limited importance in relation to the whole.

This growth was the outcome of the combined processes of development known as the Industrial Revolution, involving a whole series of inventions in the spinning and weaving of cotton, and the widespread replacement of machinery worked by hand or water-wheel by steam-power, the development of the steam-engine being itself an important part of the Revolution. These changes were accompanied by an unprecedented increase of population, which rose from about five and a half million around 1700 to over nine million a century later. This brought about a
further change - Britain ceased to be self-sufficient in food and from the 1770's and 1780's she became a regular importer - on balance - of corn. As a result economic considerations entered more than ever before into national policy, a change which was marked by the first commercial treaty signed by Britain on "free trade" principles with France in 1786 by which British manufactures entered France at rates of 10 and 12%. The treaty demonstrated the conversion of British manufacturers to the doctrines of Adam Smith.

Although Britain was the pioneer in industrial development and maintained a lead for the greater part of the nineteenth century, her progress was very soon followed by similar changes in France and Germany. France was the victim of her own immense efforts in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which channelled her resources into the production of armaments to the neglect of commerce. But when the restoration of the Bourbon Dynasty took place, the need for political support from the manufacturers led to the adoption of high tariffs and the development of a textile industry under their protection. French ingenuity had already produced the Jacquard Loom during Napoleon's rule and from early in the nineteenth century both the spinning jenny and the flying shuttle, brought from England, were being put to use. Mills, each employing some sixty to seventy workers, were to be found in the area of Lille, near the Belgian border. But the most striking advance was in the East of the country, in Alsace, where the water power provided by the Vosges Mountains had earlier helped to establish a spinning and weaving industry. Despite this it was in Alsace that steam was first adopted on any considerable scale, and by 1830 some two thousand power looms were operating there.

Farther east still, in the as yet divided Germany, development was also taking place in the textile industry, although on a lesser scale than in France. In Prussia in 1818 a policy of moderate tariffs, except on imported "colonial wares" like sugar, was adopted, but followed in 1834 by the Zollverein which aimed at uniting much of Germany under the leadership of Prussia by means of high tariffs and taxes on goods in transit between other parts of Germany. Although the textile industry was widely spread, power-driven machinery in 1846 in Prussian Rhineland - one of the most developed areas - was limited to less than 1%. But the high tariffs virtually reserved the home market to the local industry. France and Germany were thus increasing effective competition with Britain, both by meeting the demands of their own home markets in manufactured
goods and by taking their share of the limited supply of raw cotton. Belgium made rapid industrial progress during the same period. Her tariffs were lower than in France or Germany, so that British yarn was available at lower cost. Belgian spinners succeeded in meeting the competition, but the availability of cheap British yarns favoured the weaving section of the industry which had some 3,500 power looms at work in 1845-1846.\(^\text{12}\)

The Industrial Revolution in Britain led to a change in outlook in commercial matters. The increase in population led to the consumer occupying a more important position in the national economy and policy being modified accordingly. The new outlook was set out in Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" in 1776, and remained the classic statement of the doctrine of "free trade". It demonstrated the economic advantages of specialisation and thence of exchange, so that the consumer could buy in the cheapest market. Such a doctrine was totally opposed to the old mercantilism and the protection of areas like the British West Indies and the artificial direction of trade. But it was in keeping with the needs of the growing cotton industry in Lancashire which found its best overseas markets in Europe at large, in North America, and in India, besides the steadily growing home market. Cotton was a fabric which satisfied the demand of both rich and poor - and the main "bread-and-butter" export market came to be in India. This was an important factor in Lancashire's attitude to trade, since it was a poor man's market, and it was necessary for her to obtain cheap supplies of raw cotton or lint.\(^\text{13}\) Most of this now came from the South of the newly independent United States, where Eli Whitney's cotton gin, invented in 1794, had enabled production of cheap cotton to be greatly increased. In future more growth could be made outside a carefully restricted area of empire than inside it.

With the growth of an industrialized consumer society came a shift in the balance of political forces. In the past there had been a combination of agricultural interests demanding a high price for corn at home, the commercial interests trading overseas who wanted a home market protected against foreign rivals, especially in tropical products like sugar, and the shipping interest who were given the monopoly of the carrying trade between the colonies and Britain. The justification was felt to lie in the national interest of keeping a large merchant fleet at work whose sailors were a vital naval reserve in time of war. Now all those with an interest in the new industrial age - manufacturers, consumers and bankers - demanded free access to new and developing markets like the United States and South
America, and a greater share in Britain's economic and political direction. The way was being prepared for the transfer of power from the old landed classes, the planters and their allies, to the growing "middle classes" interested in manufacture, whose interests in cheap food and raw materials coincided with those of their work-people. These middle classes were to a large extent excluded from the House of Commons, but their demands were met by the Reform Act of 1832 by which political power passed very largely into their hands.

Along with this change in political and economic power went a change in human values, which had in part preceded it. It involved a religious revival called the Evangelical Movement which took place partly within and partly without the Established Church of England, and was in part a protest against the indifference of that Church - described as "the praying section of the Tory party" - to the spiritual condition of the growing urban population. The Evangelicals believed in salvation through faith, in practice this meant bringing the Christian message to all regardless of rank and colour. The main leader of the "Movement" was John Wesley, who eventually - and reluctantly - broke with the Church of England to found Methodism, but a strong Evangelical section was found within the Church itself. Its chief and most famous members were a remarkable group who lived around Clapham Common to the south of London and were to be christened "the Clapham Sect." Their spiritual centre was the parish church under the care of the Reverend John Venn, himself one of the leaders of the Evangelicals, the rest being laymen. They included most of the British leaders of the struggle against slavery and the slave trade - William Wilberforce, Henry Thornton, Zachary Macaulay, Charles Grant, James Stephens, and a younger member, Thomas Buxton, married to Hannah, a sister of Elizabeth Fry, a leading prison reformer.

The reforming energies of this group and their associates contained in modern eyes striking contradictions. Their primary aim was religious and charitable, rather than social, although there was no clear dividing line. They accepted the divine ordering of society into rich and poor and believed with Jesus that "the poor will be with us always"; nevertheless, they detested cruelty and thereby in practice developed into social reformers, and, like John Wesley himself, were totally opposed to slavery.

The pioneer in the final British fight against slavery and the slave trade was Granville Sharp, although both had been opposed by the Quakers in Britain
and America since the days of their founder, George Fox, in the seventeenth century. The extent of the slave trade and the number of wealthy West Indian planters living in Britain led to slaves and coloured people being employed there as servants. They were freely advertised in the journals and in the slaving ports where manacles, fetters and other necessary equipment of the trade were openly sold. But the status of "slaves" in Britain opened up profound questions of law and morality. During the earlier years of the eighteenth century legal opinion had been given favouring their continued slave status even though resident in Britain, but the position involved underlying contradictions. Could the forces of law and order be invoked by an American or West Indian master to recapture a runaway slave whom he had treated with brutality? It was this factor which brought Granville Sharp to the fore as a protector of the runaway's freedom from recapture.

By the 1770's there were fourteen or fifteen thousand "slaves" in England; in 1772 Sharp obtained the reluctant decision of Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in the case of James Somerset dismissing his master's right to claim him under Virginian law. Some thousands of former slaves were thus freed, most of whom became servants of their former masters, while others remained without employment as paupers, mostly in London. The independence of the United States in 1784 led to a further inflow of former slaves or freedmen who had fought on the loyalist side during the War. A Committee was formed to assist the "Black Poor", and an amateur botanist, Henry Smeathman, who had visited the Banana Islands in 1771, suggested a settlement on the nearby West African mainland by the Sierra Leone River. He evidently contemplated plantations worked by slaves and two London merchants wanted cotton growing to be undertaken there. Despite the Committee's misgivings, the former slaves wished to undertake the settlement which was made in 1787 and known as "The Province of Freedom", an independent settlement, although under the British flag, based on regulations drawn up by Sharp himself. But the settlers were rapidly reduced by disease and fever, and their centre, Granville Town, attacked by a neighbouring chief, and burnt to the ground. Efforts were made to reestablish the settlement, but now under the control of the Sierra Leone Company formed in 1791 with Henry Thornton as Chairman, and Wilberforce, Sharp and Clarkson as Directors. Capital was acquired by promises to develop legitimate trade and nearly one quarter of a million pounds subscribed. Revenue was to be obtained by a land tax and a
tax on goods marketed by the Company for export. Further settlers were sent out and a new headquarters built on the present site of Freetown (two miles from the former site). In 1792 reinforcements arrived, Empire Loyalists, former slaves and freedmen from the American Colonies who had been settled in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick by the Imperial Government. Despite a heavy death-rate from disease the settlement began to prosper, but it was bombarded by French warships and looted. The long war with France from 1793 ended the Company's profit from trade and a quarrel arose over judges and members of the Council. Under the Company the Colony was placed under the direction of the Governor. As a result rebellion broke out in 1800 but ended with the fortunate arrival of Maroons or free men from Jamaica, who had been independent of the government there ever since Britain had captured the island from Spain in 1655, and who had assisted the Jamaican authorities in capturing runaway slaves. They proved equally ready to assist the Sierra Leone authorities in suppressing an outbreak by former slaves. In return for accepting the Maroons the Colony was provided with a charter, a grant of £7,000 and an annuity of £4,000.27

In the same year as Sharp founded his Province of Freedom, the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was formed in London under his chairmanship. The Society's Committee was mainly composed of Quakers but included the Reverend Thomas Clarkson, indefatigable in obtaining evidence of the trade's cruelties. Wilberforce undertook to promote the cause in Parliament, where he introduced Bills for the abolition of the trade from 1789 until final success came in 1807.28

The Sierra Leone Company had been promoted partly to open up a trade with West Africa under British control. Europe at this time was largely cut off from the interior African trade in the northern hemisphere because of the Moorish occupation of the northern coastline, especially along the Mediterranean. In 1788 another organization was formed with similar aims, but with greater emphasis on exploration and scientific research. This was "The Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa" - known as "The African Association" - and was very largely directed by Sir Joseph Banks, who had accompanied Captain Cook on his second voyage to the Pacific from 1768 to 1771, was President of the Royal Society for forty-two years and became virtual unpaid Director of the Royal Gardens at Kew, near London, in 1772.29 Most of the Association's members were prominent in London's social life - Edward Gibbon, the historian, was a member - but contained a strong Evangelical element including
including Wilberforce, Henry Thornton, Lord Harrowby, Samuel Hoare Junior, and Joseph Hardcastle, a Methodist abolitionist. The Association probably achieved its greatest success when it employed the Scottish doctor, Mungo Park, in 1795-1796, to travel inland by way of the River Gambia, and Park confirmed that part of the mysterious River Niger's course lay to the East. But the Association also had much wider commercial ambitions and on Park's second expedition in 1805-1806 he was accompanied in the earlier stages by some fifty soldiers whose ultimate purpose was to control the middle Niger and seize the gold trade carried on along it from the Moors. The rivalry with France, who had previously occupied posts on the upper Senegal, had already begun.

During the last decade of the century the Evangelical movement with its growing humanitarian outlook itself led to the formation of new missionary societies which, among the Protestant Churches, were left mainly to voluntary societies of dedicated laymen. It was inevitable that those who worked to bring the slave trade to an end, and who detested the conditions of the slaves in the West Indies and in the Southern States of America, should seek to convert them to Christianity and to establish Christian communities in their own homelands. In 1792 a "Baptist Society for Propagating the Gospel among the Heathen" had been founded as a result of suggestions by William Carey, the missionary to India. Its aim was to work within British Colonies and attend mainly to the needs of Europeans. 30 The London Missionary Society, to which David Livingstone belonged, followed in 1795. The Church Missionary Society grew out of the Sierra Leone Company and was founded in 1799 - the chairman of the committee set up to form it being the Reverend John Venn. Its purpose was to convert the heathen wherever they were found. It became a national institution in 1812 when Admiral Lord Gambier was appointed President with sixteen supporting Vice-Presidents including Wilberforce, Henry Thornton and Granville Sharp. 31 Naturally enough the new Society devoted part of its early efforts to Sierra Leone and its neighbourhood - the first missionaries from the Society arriving in 1804, the settlers having brought their own pastors from Nova Scotia who had previously served their needs.

Meanwhile changes had taken place in the status of the settlement. The financial difficulties from which the Company were suffering had led to its offering to hand over the administration of the Colony to the British
Government. The offer was finally accepted at the beginning of 1808, and the settlement was thenceforth used as a port for disembarking slaves 'recaptured' by the navy. The promoters of the Company and their allies had formed the African Institution to see that abolition was properly carried out, and it was mainly at the instance of this body that a Vice-Admiralty Court was established in Sierra Leone in March 1808.32

The establishment of the Vice-Admiralty Court in Sierra Leone led to a fundamental change in the population of the Colony. The freed slaves - known as "Saros" - soon outnumbered the earlier settlers. The extent of land which had been ceded to the Colony by the chief Naimbana was limited and some of poor quality. Many of the freed slaves set up as traders and rented out property in the town - occupations which were to become the mainstay of the "Creole" population as the colonists came to be called. Trading naturally included voyages along the nearby shores and rivers by canoe and in due course by schooners, and other small sailing vessels, some of which were sold-off slave ships.

In 1816 Edward Bickersteth, the C.M.S. Assistant-Secretary,33 suggested that the freed slaves should return to their own homes - a suggestion made as a result of a supervisory visit he paid to the Colony during that year. The Saros would thus help to spread the Gospel and to introduce some of the useful arts learned from Europe into the interior besides encouraging legitimate commerce. No doubt the project was based on the natural desire of the majority of the freed slaves to return to their own homes provided they were not re-enslaved. The plan was encouraged by the terrible mortality among Europeans in West Africa and in Sierra Leone itself.

"... Between 1826 and 1830 (Governor) McCarthy's three successors died in three successive years." 34 and 

"... in 1826 out of a total of 79 persons, missionaries, school masters and their wives who had gone out to Sierra Leone for the Church Missionary Society in twenty-two years, only 14 remained." 35.

Some saw in the mortality among Europeans the hand of Divine Providence, and the Church Missionary Society was thus encouraged to adopt Bickersteth's suggestion. It was also hoped that the policy would help to bring the slave trade itself to a final end. After the formal stopping of the trade the reformers had turned to the abolition of slavery itself, and they finally triumphed in 1833 when the status of slavery in the British Empire was abolished. Wilberforce lived long enough to be assured that slavery itself would be ended, but he had handed over the parliamentary leadership of the campaign to Thomas
Buxton a number of years before, offering to give up the position in 1821. Buxton soon realized that even after 1833 the trade was far from ended, mainly owing to the development of new sugar plantations in Cuba and Brazil. Two squadrons of the British navy were helping to enforce the abolition, the West African and the South American, but their powers against foreign slavers were insufficient. In consequence an equipment clause was added in 1835 to the treaty made with Spain and similar powers given to the British navy in relation to Portuguese vessels by the Equipment Act of 1830. During the years before the American Civil War only limited assistance was obtained from the United States.

The difficulties which the navy faced in ending the trade helped to bring Buxton to similar conclusions to those reached by Bickersteth. And a further argument for this policy was brought about by the emancipation of the slaves in the British Empire, which mainly affected the British West Indies. Emancipation in 1834 had been followed by a period of "apprenticeship" which ended in 1838 when the former slaves became completely free, and they began to leave the estates and obtain land for themselves. As a result wages rose and with them the price of West Indian sugar. Inevitably the planters demanded alternative sources of labour, and by a terrible irony an "emigration" scheme was undertaken of liberated Africans from Sierra Leone and St. Helena. Naturally this scheme was repugnant to most of the abolitionists, who regarded it as little more than a cynical adaption to the law, and it encouraged the missionaries in their policy of returning the Saros to their own lands. Buxton therefore published "The African Slave Trade and its Remedy" in 1839, in which he claimed to prove the increase of the overseas slave trade, largely from the reports of the British Consuls at Rio de Janeiro and Havana, and other "reliable sources." His famous solution was summarized in the phrase: "We must elevate the minds of the (African) people and call for the capabilities of her soil", a combined aim which was given the name of "The Bible and the Plough". In many respects it was similar to the policy of using the Saros, although Buxton - himself a Vice-President of the Church Missionary Society - placed more weight on European agency in the early stages. The similarity of both policies lay in their combination of Christian doctrine and the practical benefits of "civilization" - by which was meant the role of commerce in raising standards of living as had happened to the more fortunate in Britain. The adoption of similar working habits in Africa - which were assumed to exist there in a more limited form - would enable legitimate trade to flourish and Africans would be able to continue to
satisfy their demand for manufactured goods from Britain and elsewhere.

To assist the plan of encouraging commerce and agriculture in West Africa, "The Society for the Extinction of the Slave Trade and for the Civilisation of Africa" was formed in 1839. It included several members of the Church Missionary Society, including among its Vice-Chairmen the Earl of Chichester, President of the C.M.S., and Lord Ashley, a C.M.S. Vice-President and a famous industrial and social reformer.

Another approach towards the defeat of the continuing slave trade lay in a change of tactics by the West African naval squadron. This was brought into effect during the 1840's. It consisted in attacking the "factories" and the "barracoons" of the slave dealers on shore. It was in an attack of this kind that Commander the Hon. Joseph Denman, a member of the C.M.S. Committee, had distinguished himself. After this particular raid he signed a treaty to abolish the slave trade with the local ruler. This action received the approval of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, and was regarded as essential from a legal standpoint by Palmerston's successor, Lord Aberdeen. Anti-slave treaties thus became standard practice.

The work of actually introducing commerce into the interior of Africa lay principally with "The Society ... for the Civilisation of Africa." It obtained the support of the Whig government of the day with Lord Palmerston as Foreign Secretary and Lord John Russell as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. Largely through Buxton's driving force an expedition was planned to ascend the Niger, the government built three iron steamers, and plans were made to set up a model farm, to be largely devoted to cotton, at the confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers.

But the government expedition of 1841 was a disaster, although not quite the total disaster that public reaction of the time seemed to think. All reasonable precautions were taken, including the use of mosquito-nets, the filtering of both water and "miasma" from the river, and the taking of tincture of chinchona bark laced with wine, and the heavy casualties from fever which caused the disruption of the whole expedition, were a crushing blow. Of the Europeans fifty-five died out of one hundred and fifty-nine; yet, terrible as these figures were, they represented a considerable improvement statistically on the earlier MacGregor Laird and Oldfield expedition of 1832-1833 when forty out of forty-nine Europeans had died. The next Niger expedition was
not to be undertaken until 1854 and triumphantly proved the value of the prophylactic use of quinine, there being no deaths. But in the meantime the old message of "Divine Providence" had been repeated - Africa for the African. This was the policy taken up by the far-sighted Honorary Clerical Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Henry Venn, who had already been a member of the Society's General Committee since 1822, and had become Honorary Permanent Secretary in 1845 - the year when Buxton had died and when few Exeter Hall men liked to be reminded of the Niger Expedition about which Dickens wrote when he portrayed Mrs. Jellyby shedding tears over Boorio-Boola-Gha!

The essence of Benn's policy was "Native Agency". Venn's outlook, however, went far beyond the question of health and the supplanting of Europeans by Africans to prevent casualities. There were two sides to missionary thought at the time, one of which believed in the overwhelming importance of individual conversion: the other in the reformation of a society into one in which a Christian life could be most profitably developed. Venn believed in the latter, and with it the creation of a skilled African "middle-class", which would itself support Christian values in the everyday world. Hence there was a need for middlemen profits in African trade to accrue to Africans. The reformed society would also solve the underlying financial problem which faced missionary societies. The mid-nineteenth century was one of the greatest periods of missionary expansion and the Church Missionary Society, along with other missions, found its activities spreading to the farthest corners of the earth; India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Rupert's Land in Canada with British Columbia, South and East as well as West Africa, New Zealand - all had stations. And both the labourers in the vineyards who proved acceptable to the selection committee, and the financial resources, were limited. The solution adopted was but an extension of the policy of Native Agency. Once a class of fairly prosperous African traders, teachers and farmers had been built up, they would be the main support of their own Church with its own African Clergymen. Meanwhile the European missionaries would be removed from established areas where the work could be better carried on by African clergymen and where Europeans in any case were in many ways innately unsuited to give pastoral leadership, and transferred to continue their work afresh among the unconverted on the new missionary "frontier", which would be steadily moving inland until a chain of pastorates and stations had been built right across the African continent.
LAGOS AND ABEOKUTA IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY SHOWING MAIN ROUTES INLAND. THE EGBA AND IJEBU CLOSED THE THREE CENTRAL ROUTES TO IBADAN.

Sketch Map taken from S.O. Biobaku, "The Egbas and Their Neighbours 1842 - 1872"
Map 4, based on Commander Glover's Plan in C.O. 147/21 1872
This was the vision arising out of a foundation of practical common-sense and financial prudence. It was a clear scheme which did not subordinate African interests to British ones, although it was certainly designed to benefit British trade and was a prototype religious Dual Mandate.\textsuperscript{54} But Venn's beliefs led him to a full acceptance of the logical outcome:

"Let a native church be organized as a national institution. As the native church assumes a national character it will ultimately supersede the denominational distinctions which are now introduced by Foreign Missionary Societies. Every National church is at liberty to change its ceremonies, and to adapt itself to the national taste."\textsuperscript{55}

The implications of Venn's attitude were clearly independent nationhood, so in practice he tended to defend African agents against the criticisms of European supervisors. This proved to be a standing difference between him and some of the C.M.S. missionaries, in particular Henry Townsend,\textsuperscript{56} who believed in the European setting standards of behaviour and exercising pastoral leadership for some time to come. Broadly Venn's views were shared by other liberal thinkers of the period - i.e. by Earl Grey, Colonial Secretary in Lord John Russell's administration of 1846-1852,\textsuperscript{57} who wrote: "The real interest of this Country is gradually to train the inhabitants of (West) Africa in the arts of civilization and government until they shall grow into a nation capable of ... managing their own affairs."\textsuperscript{58}

This also implied a nation engaged in trade, one that received British and other manufacturers and exported raw materials, although the missionaries stopped short of encouraging sugar-growing thus affronting West Indian interests.\textsuperscript{59} Venn encouraged his Society's missionaries to send him samples of various African products such as peppers, coffee, ivory, ebony, palm-oil, groundnuts, arrowroot and natural dyes like indigo.\textsuperscript{60} Palm-oil was already a staple of West African exports and groundnuts had been established as an export crop in Gambia. Most other products however found only a limited market, especially the fibres. In theory there was one crop which fulfilled all the requirements - cotton.

Both Venn and Earl Grey thought of West Africa as a possible cotton-growing region to replace the slave-grown cotton of the United States. After discussing the suitability of West Africa, Grey remarked: "... a short crop of cotton in the United States is become to us almost as great a national calamity as a deficient harvest at home."\textsuperscript{61} Venn put it more graphically:
"Cotton must be to Africa its gold-diggings." The best means of developing a cotton export trade was through the agency of the Saros. Venn wrote later:

"The influence and aid of government may be most beneficially applied to promote the emigration of large bodies of liberated Africans, now at Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, who are already traders on their own account." 63

Many of these traders had shown an interest in returning to their homelands by means of small trading vessels which they had purchased. Most came from the area known as "The Slave Coast", and the number coming from there and freed in Sierra Leone increased after the first decade of the nineteenth century owing to prolonged strife in their homeland. From around 1810 the proportion of Yoruba recaptives at Sierra Leone grew steadily; in a sample taken in 1848 63.7% of all recaptives had come from the Bight of Benin and in this group Yoruba were roughly seven to one. 64 This followed the breakdown of their principal kingdom of Oyo.

Once the policy of returning the Saros to their homelands had been adopted therefore, it was evident that the Bight of Benin would become an important area in the carrying-out of the plan. In 1839 the first Saros said to have reached the area arrived at Badagry, the port that lay to the west of, and near to, Lagos. They asked for missionaries who soon followed, the first being the Wesleyan, T.B. Freeman, and his assistant, William de Graft, who together visited the inland city of Abeokuta, capital of the Egba people, in 1842, where they were welcomed by chief Shodeke. A year later the C.M.S. missionary, Henry Townsend, who had been working in Sierra Leone, also visited Abeokuta. He wished to survey missionary prospects there and assess the value of the route into the interior by the River Ogun which joined Abeokuta to the lagoon near Lagos. 66 In 1846 Townsend came back to stay, although by this time the helpful Shodeke had died. With him was a Saro Anglican clergyman, the Reverend Samuel Crowther, 67 who was later to achieve wide fame both in Britain and in West Africa as the Church Missionary Society's first African missionary bishop.
4. Ibid, p. 49.
10. Ibid, p. 94.
13. The distinction is between seed-cotton before ginning, which removes the seeds, and raw cotton or lint after ginning.
14. Thornton, Henry (1760-1815), a prominent banker and Member of Parliament for Southwark, part of London.
15. Macaulay, Zachary, (1768-1838), a Governor of the Sierra Leone Company 1793-1799 and father of British historian, T.B. Macauley.
17. Stephens, James (1758-1832), barrister and Member of Parliament for Tralee and East Grinstead. Father of Sir James Stephens, Permanent Under-Secretary Colonial Office 1836-1847. The Colonial Office was attached to the War Office 1801-1854.
18. Wesley published "Thoughts upon Slavery" in 1774.
19. Sharp, Granville (1735-1813), took up reform of many abuses including the Press-gang used for recruiting. He lived in Fulham, another part of London, but can be regarded as a member of the Clapham Sect.
20. This was the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General in 1729. See E.C.P. Lascelles, Granville Sharp, Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 21.
21. Ibid, pp. 30-32, quoting Mansfield's judgement in the Somerset (or "Somersett" at the time) case.


24. Gustavus Vasa (Olaudah Equiano) a former slave, was made Commissary to the Expedition. The recognized legal treaty establishing the settlement was not made till 1788 with Naimbana, ruler of the Koya Temne, and overlord of the land bought for settlement.

25. The chief was King Jimmy.

26. Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, p.30

27. See Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, pp.80-87

28. Britain was not the first country to abolish the slave trade since it was abolished in Danish possessions after 1802. See D. Mannix and M. Cowley, Black Carcass: A History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1518-1865, New York, 1962, p.192.

29. Sir Joseph Banks (1743-1820). Kew Gardens were handed over to the nation in 1841.


31. The Reverend Thomas Scott was Secretary. Many of the same group founded The British and Foreign Bible Society in 1804.

32. The Court of Mixed Commission, including a representative of the country to which the captured ship belonged, was not set up until 1819.


37. The campaign in Britain to end foreign sugar duties, which finally succeeded in 1846, contributed to the increase. Duties on all imported raw cotton had been abolished the previous year.

38. These changes enabled the navy to detain vessels which were equipped for slaving but not at the time carrying slaves.
39. Between 1841 and 1867 some 36,000 were taken to the West Indies under this scheme. Afterwards some 100,000 were brought from the East Indies and from India itself. See W.A. Green, "The West Indies and British West African Policy in the Nineteenth Century - a Corrective Comment", Journal of African History, Vol. XV, 1974, pp.247-259.

40. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, Table 77 estimates totals of 6,051,700 - annual average 53,000 - from 1701 to 1810; and 1,898,400 - annual average 31,600 - from 1811 to 1870.


42. Later the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury (1801-1885). He was Lady Palmerston's son-in-law by her first marriage, and the leading philanthropist in nineteenth century Britain, especially in reducing abuses in the employment of women and children.

43. Factories were stores for goods; barracoons enclosures for slaves awaiting shipment.


45. Under Lord Melbourne 1835-1841.

46. Two of the ships were ventilated between decks by ducts, air being driven by fans operated both by the engines and the current. On deck was a large iron chest through which air was passed over charcoal and other substances, thus filtering off particles possessing "noxious properties". See Curtin, The Image of Africa, pp.350-351.

47. Idem.


50. Ibid., p.357 - there were only twelve Europeans out of a total of sixty-six. See P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, London, 1973, p.17.

51. Venn, Henry (1796-1873). Son of John Venn, Rector of Clapham; he was Honorary Clerical Secretary of the C.M.S. 1841-1872.

52. In "Bleak House", Exeter Hall, meeting place for the missions, was opened in the Strand, London, 1831.

53. This was defined as "promoting the growth of cotton in Africa, and of other exportable products, by means of Native African Agency itself.", H. Venn, Memorandum on the Encouragement of Native Agriculture, especially the Cultivation of Cotton, on the West Coast of Africa, London, 1856, p.12.


56. Townsend, Henry (1815-1886) Sent by the C.M.S. in 1836 to Sierra Leone, Ordained 1841. Spent most of his working life in Abeokuta, obtaining great influence as an advisor of the Akure or ruler and chiefs. A Native of Exeter, England, where he was when all Europeans were driven out of Abeokuta in 1867. His last visit to the Egba capital was in 1875-1876. C.M.S. List 1, No. 231.

57. Grey, Henry, Third Earl (1802-1894) Succeeded 1845, formerly Viscount Howick. His father was Prime Minister at the time of the Reform Act of 1832. He had objected to the slowness of slave emancipation. A brother-in-law of Lord Durham.


59. Thomas Clegg, the Manchester manufacturer connected with the cotton-growing program in West Africa, was quite ready to grow sugar. See M. R. Delaney and R. Campbell, Search for a Place, Black Separation and Africa 1860, University of Michigan, 1969, pp. 132-133.

60. Reverend Wm. Knight, The Missionary Secretariat of Henry Venn, B.D., London, 1880, p.540. In general as slave trading ceased, the other articles of trade changed too - gold, gums, spices, and ivory gradually giving way to palm products, groundnuts, timber - and cotton.


63. H. Venn, Memorandum on the Encouragement of Native Agriculture, p.6.

64. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, Table 71, p.245.

65. Freeman, Thomas Birch, (1809-1890). Born in England of an African father and an English mother; ordained a Methodist clergyman 1837. Mission superintendent at Cape Coast, Ghana, and visited Ashanti twice. In 1857 he was removed as superintendent but rejoined the Mission in 1873.

66. Townsend volunteered for the 1841 Niger expedition but was not accepted.

Whatever importance he attached to Native Agency Venn was fully aware that the Church Missionary Society had to be kept out of the actual trading itself. As he wrote to Thomas Clegg:—

"...I am persuaded that no one who is connected with the Church Missionary Society must be the ostensible person in bartering goods. It would stir a hornet's nest. Besides which, if we can bring forward trustworthy native commission agents we do a double service to Africans." 2

The manufacturers, therefore, would be left "to barter the goods" with the native agents, while the actual direction of the program in England was placed outside the immediate control of the society, in the hands of "The African Native Agency Committee", established in 1845 to assist Venn in carrying out the program. Its purpose was to bring selected Africans to Britain for training in industrial, botanical and other skills, and to send out Europeans as industrial instructors to Africa. The Committee's separation from the Society was in fact very largely a technical matter as its members were a selection of the Society's General Committee. They included such men as Lord Shaftesbury, 3 Sir Robert Inglis, 4 and Sir Thomas Acland, 5 as well as Venn himself. In addition there was a strong naval flavour which included members with distinguished service in the West African squadron and thus a close knowledge of local conditions. Among the naval men were Admiral Sir Henry Hope, 6 Captain the Hon. F. Maude, Captain the Hon. Joseph Denman and Captain Henry Dundas Trotter. 7

The Committee began by advancing sums to buy equipment needed for processing African raw materials, most of this being given by philanthropic supporters of the Mission. Miss - later Baroness - Burdett-Coutts, 8 paid for the first cotton-gin ever to be used at Abeokuta; further sums came from the Quaker Gurney family, and such sources as the Buxton Testimonial Fund which had been opened after Sir Thomas's death in 1845. Preparations were also made to send "industrial instructors" to West Africa and to bring suitable Saros and others to England for training. 9

The mid-nineteenth century appeared to be favourable to plans for undertaking Native Agency in West Africa, especially as a result of improvements
in the means of transport, for not only did steam-power change methods of production in the cotton, and other industries, but it also brought about a revolution in transport on land, through the building of railways, and on sea by the use of the steamship. The steamship had the advantage of the sailing ship in almost all practical matters of importance - not being dependent on the wind it could advertise voyages of a definite duration with regular times of departure and arrival; overall it was much faster; and it could carry a far greater tonnage of cargo. Only in appearances did the early steamships take a clear second place to their predecessors.

These advantages were especially useful in furthering British interests in West Africa. In the 1850's even steamships took a month to reach Lagos but the voyages of sailing vessels were often indeterminate - the voyage could take up to eight months both ways. In 1852 MacGregor Laird undertook the first regular service between Britain and West Africa, with the founding of the African Steamship Company, based - after 1856 - on the port of Liverpool. Henry Venn wrote to the Reverend C.A. Gollmer, one of the C.M.S. missionaries then at Lagos, warmly approving the new arrangements.

The ships of the African Steamship Company were not, of course, the first steamships to see service on the "coast", although Laird had been the pioneer in the employment of the steamship there from the beginning. He had himself taken part in the expedition of 1832-33 when so large a number of those taking part had lost their lives, with serious effects on his own health. The unfortunate 1841 expedition had been undertaken by three steamships and although these expeditions had been reduced to near-failure by the severity of attacks of fever, they had demonstrated that the Niger could be successfully navigated by steamship. The fever problem itself was soon to be reduced to an acceptable level; Laird sponsored the further voyage undertaken by the "Pleiad" in 1854 which successfully explored a large part of the Tchadda (or Benue) River as well as the Niger itself. Death removed the original commander appointed, John Beecroft, then British Consul for the Bight of Biafra, and the second-in-command, Dr. Baikie, took over. Previous experience had led to the proportion of Europeans taking part being much reduced, but owing to the use of quinine as a prophylactic or preventive, all twelve who did so returned.

On both the 1841 and 1854 expeditions attempts were made to establish a cotton "farm" at Lokoja, lying at the confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers,
but both attempts failed, largely due to the inability to establish regular communications, partly owing to difficulties of navigation between Onitsha and Lokoja in April and May when the river is low. The steamship thus played a leading part in the opening of the Niger to commerce. It also played an important role in ending the slave trade. Just as the steamship had been successful in navigating the shoals and currents of the Niger, so it was successfully used for entering the hazardous bays and inlets along the coastline where the slaving ships had hidden themselves while waiting for, and taking on board their human cargo. Thus the steamship proved of vital assistance in carrying out the policy, begun by Commander Denman in 1840 during his attacks on the Gallinas, of persuading local rulers to sign treaties giving up the slave trade. Between 1842 and 1850 forty-two anti-slave trade treaties were signed in West Africa. By the 1840's the Commodore of the West African squadron was flying his flag in a steamship and had six other steamships under his command against fourteen under sail. Meanwhile the slave traders continued to use sailing vessels and their chances of escaping the squadron were greatly reduced.

Most of the squadron's attentions were naturally directed to that part of West Africa called "The Slave Coast". As more accessible outlets were closed, the trade grew in Lagos where the vigorous slave-trading chief, Kosoko, was in control. His presence there had caused the early missionary parties and accompanying Saros to land at Badagry, which lay some thirty miles west of Lagos, and from there to make their way to Abeokuta by an inland route mainly under Egba control. Kosoko also interfered with the development of legitimate commerce by Native Agency from Abeokuta as he controlled the exit of the River Ogun through the Lagos lagoon to the Atlantic. Besides his own hostile activities, Kosoko was an ally of the great slave-trading state of Dahomey, which launched a determined, though unsuccessful, attack on Abeokuta in the early part of 1851. Partly as a result of this, and partly because of Kosoko's decided refusal to sign a treaty agreeing to end the slave trade, the West African squadron attacked Lagos at the end of the year, and after an initial repulse, the town was taken and Kosoko driven out. Ten years later Lagos was formally annexed as a Colony and the alliance with Abeokuta began to break down as the British administration tried to open up trade with the interior as a whole against the interests of the Egba and other middlemen.
The raids and disruption to trade caused by Lagos and Dahomey reflected the general disorder which then reigned in Central Yorubaland, a disorder which was revealed by the high proportion of Yorubas among the re captives landed at Sierra Leone. Until the last quarter of the eighteenth century the largest single group of Yoruba had been loosely united in allegiance to the Alafin, ruler of the Oyo Empire, who received tribute from Dahomey in the west and included Ilorin in his domain to the east, Oyo itself lying not far south of the Niger. His authority did not extend to the coast, the area directly to the south belonging to the Awujale of Ijebu. The Alafin's power was gradually reduced — about 1780 the Egba, whose towns lay in the forest to the south between Ijebu and the Alafin's territory, became independent under their leader, Lishabi, and from the 1820's Dahomey ceased to pay tribute. Even more serious was the growing threat from the north of the Niger, where lay the Sokoto Empire which had grown out of the "jihad" or holy war of Uthman dan Fodio and his mainly Fulani followers during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Sokoto hoped to extend its authority to the coast where it could dip the Koran in the waters of the Atlantic and obtain the guns and ammunition and articles of trade which it needed increasingly to do battle with its neighbours, those in the south being in a more favourable position to import guns from Europe. The main obstacle to this ambition was Oyo which came under stronger attack after the fall of Ilorin to the Fulani in 1832. Shortly after, about 1835, Oyo itself fell and Alafin Atiba transferred his capital to "new" Oyo, south of Ogbomosho and Ilorin.

The transfer did little to restore order. Fighting broke out among the sections of the old empire and bands of Oyo warriors roamed the countryside. The Egba, then living in their forest settlements, were driven out and forced to seek security in the rocky fortress of Abeokuta, where they remained to be threatened by Dahomey. Groups of warriors founded other settlements — two of which grew into powerful states in their own right — Ibadan and Ijaiye. In 1862 Ijaiye, in alliance with Abeokuta, was destroyed by the Ibadan army, and a long period of war began in which Ibadan stood opposed to the Egba and Ijebu-Ode, who cut its direct lines of communication with the coast to prevent its obtaining arms and other supplies from the British Colony of Lagos and the other ports.
This was the difficult background against which Native Agency was to be put to the test. In 1846 when the missionaries came to stay, the welcome the Saros received from Abeokuta was enough to mark it out, as the immediate purpose of the missionaries was to accompany those going home who were converts. Not only did Abeokuta renounce the slave trade, but it also signed a treaty agreeing to receive both European missionaries and European merchants. On the other hand it refused a British Consul who would have been resident in the city as, according to traditional Yoruba practice, this would have amounted to acknowledgement of British suzerainty.

Venn's theory of a self-supporting "national" church, conducted according to the "national taste", and supported by a commercially active "middle" class, seemed to have found a suitable testing-ground in the conditions of mid-century Abeokuta. His own conception of Native Agency had some fundamental assets — it was clear in principle, apparently not very difficult to put into practice, and, above all, in conformity with African wishes. It would involve the support of a "class" of African managers and traders, some with European training, who existed in small numbers already, and of a "class" of free agriculturists who would grow produce for export. In practice, however, a number of problems arose: how far the missionaries themselves would be concerned with the commercial interests of the Mission; how much the Mission might be compromised by the agents falling away from Christian standards of behaviour — as conceived in nineteenth century Victorian terms; and the general time range in which the desired changes might be expected to take place. The latter was important as it implied the period during which some kind of European leadership would be exercised.

Venn's weakness was that he had never visited Africa and the Africans he met and who visited him at his London home in Highgate, North London, were much more orientated to European modes of thought and customs than the vast majority of their compatriots. Some were clergymen who could be indirectly valuable to the African Native Agency Committee and its program by providing it with publicity. In 1851 the Reverend Samuel Crowther, in England on a visit with his family, was reported to be "delighting the British clergy" "who flock to hear him preach." But in England the difficult questions of polygamy and the role of the chiefs in the new-born Christian society did not obtrude themselves unduly. The missionaries, like Henry Townsend, who spent long years in Abeokuta, were brought face to face with these problems. As
Townsend was to write:—

"We have had a constant source of trouble in the immoral conduct of a certain class of Sierra Leone young men, by education and position in society they claim influence over the natives and that influence they have used to the basest purposes." 29

Townsend was right in that a proper example would have to be shown for a considerable time to come if the community were to achieve Christian standards and in particular of monogamy. The difficulty was only too apparent when Ogunbonna, one of Abeokuta's principal Ologun or war-leaders, who was exceptionally friendly to the Mission, enjoyed the comfort of ninety-five wives! 30

The missionaries, both European and African, treated the chiefs with respect, a respect which must have suggested some acceptance of their general standards of behaviour and affluence. It was not perhaps altogether reasonable for Townsend to complain that among the younger Saros: "There is an increasing demand for an increase of salary and better houses that is very unpleasant." 31

And his general attitude towards the time factor needed to build up a Christian community can be gauged from his remark:—

"I have a great doubt of young black clergymen they want years of experience to give stability to their characters; we would rather have them as schoolmasters and catechists." 32

Similar problems arose with respect to Native Agency. Where was the "trading frontier" to be drawn between Africans and Europeans? Were all managers to be Africans? And what particular products were to be traded? Although Venn had shown a wide interest in the products available in West Africa, cotton was the most favoured. 33 Palm-oil and kernels were already being traded in West Africa in ever-growing quantities, but were discouraged as a Native Agency commodity as experience had shown that the trade did not lead to social change, and indeed co-existed with the slave trade, and the palm trade was centred in Liverpool, the former slave-trading port. As investigations later in the century were to show, most of the other products did not command a sufficient market in Britain to justify extended production on the scale required, and this applied to the pepper and ginger offered by the Egba themselves. Meanwhile it was known that several species or varieties of cotton - called "owu" - were cultivated on a large scale by the Yoruba, especially around Abeokuta where the soil was excellent and the cotton fields laid out with extreme neatness. 34 Cotton seems to have been sometimes grown as a sole crop but also
a perennial — being replanted once every seven years — giving two crops a year. In the United States and elsewhere cotton was grown as an annual.

While the initial training period in the industrial arts was being completed, the missionaries were expected to take a vigorous part in procuring cotton and told not to "despise it as a handmaiden of the Gospel." Venn wrote to Gollmer at Lagos:—

"We must repeat our request that you will lose no opportunity of purchasing and sending cotton. The Manchester merchants will thankfully take any quantity. Even the report of a possibility of a supply has served to interest the manufacturers and if they plead for the (West African) squadron, or for any measures of protection and encouragement to trade the government will be too glad to comply. Besides which my main hope of England becoming the Evangeliser of the world rests upon the prospect of associating missionary operations and commercial pursuits, as becomes a Christian country." 35

During their early years in Abeokuta the missionaries were effectively checked in building up any significant trade in cotton or other products by the difficulties of communication, as the route to the coast was open only by way of Badagry, the lower part of the Ogun being unsafe owing to the domination of the area by Kosoko and his slave-trading allies. This meant a considerable journey by land using head-porters whom the Society had to pay. The Reverend Samuel Crowther, while reporting that he was buying cotton with money provided by the Buxton Testimonial Fund, went on: "The evil is the disadvantage of land carriage which greatly augments the price and the need for opening the water passage which has hitherto been monopolised by the Slave Trade." 36

To market the cotton Venn had naturally turned to Lancashire, where Cotton Exchanges had been established at both Liverpool and Manchester. Manchester, with its free trade outlook, and its lack of association with the slave trade, was probably the more suitable on general grounds. Lancashire had been one of the main centres of the Evangelical Revival and most cotton manufacturers disliked their dependence on American cotton, grown by slave labour. From the late 1840's the price of American cotton did rise progressively, and spinners were especially hard hit as they found it difficult to pass on the increased cost of their raw cotton or lint in the yarn they sold to weavers. This increase was caused by a general rise in cotton consumption, but especially in Britain where the rise was phenomenal — in 1848 576.6 million lbs, in 1852 739.6 million lbs, and in 1852 976.6 million lbs. 37 To overcome the threat
to their livelihood, the Cotton Supply Association was formed in Manchester in 1857 with the object of developing alternative sources to America, and was closely supported by the Chamber of Commerce. The attention of the Association was mainly directed towards India, which already produced a large quantity of poor-quality cotton. The Association, however, was ready— in accord with free trade principles— to obtain cotton wherever it could be successfully grown, and some members showed an interest in West Africa. When Venn preached a sermon in a church near Manchester and a member of the congregation, Thomas Clegg, heard him, Clegg remarked severely: "... if Mr Venn wanted to promote Christian civilisation he had better teach the natives not to waste the products of their country." Venn and Clegg first met in Manchester in March 1850, and Venn noted in his diary, "Thomas Clegg, who has taken so much interest in Sierra Leone, breakfasted with us, a straightforward, business-like man ..." After a later meeting he described Clegg as "one of those laymen of the Church of England who form its real strength."38

At the same time Clegg seemed to be strangely ignorant of Africa—he put Sierra Leone and Abeokuta under one account marked "Africa"—and his views diverged from Venn's in certain important respects; in particular in regard to the basis on which the trading was to be carried on. Venn evidently considered that Clegg was trading in Africa on a commission basis only and that his commission would be limited to his sales of raw cotton in Manchester.39 But Clegg was to take more than that—a 20% commission on the cotton sales and another 20% on the piece-good sales in Africa—the piece-goods supposedly being sent in return for the cotton.40 The supply of piece-goods seems to have been in approximate balance to the raw cotton sent to Britain, but Clegg sent out so much machinery and equipment that it amounted to trading on the traditional trust system. In addition Clegg was ready to employ European agents in Africa if Africans were difficult to find, and he was to learn the same lesson which the missionaries had already digested.

Later at a meeting of the Cotton Supply Association Clegg announced that he had lost eleven or thirteen agents in West Africa, although these seem to have included some unfortunate members of the Mission staff and possibly some Africans.41 On the other hand Venn was completely committed to Native Agency and had a particular dread of white traders: "I have only one fear and anxiety lest whitemen should attempt to establish cotton farms in Africa to be worked
by black slaves.\textsuperscript{112}

Townsend began by showing interest in the program and announced plans for establishing a model farm for cotton and tobacco. He reported that the first saw-gin to arrive in the city was being worked by two boys and had proved "a great attraction".\textsuperscript{113} But he was soon to give a warning that the amount of time that the missionaries could give to the cotton work was limited by their other duties: "... the spiritual instruction of the people requires from us more time and attention than we can possibly give."\textsuperscript{114} In fact much more was expected of the missionaries than purely spiritual duties. They were expected to supervise the Church Missionary Society day-school, its teacher-training institution and the Industrial Institution as the establishment which included the cotton-processing was rather grandly named. They also took into their homes boys and girls, who were being either sent to the school or to local craftsmen as apprentices to learn a trade.

The African Native Agency Committee was assisting by sending out European industrial instructors to Africa. These were normally regarded as lay agents of the Mission. The first to arrive was James Huber in 1850, and he was followed shortly after by William Hensman,\textsuperscript{115} a "surgeon" who was also equipped with botanical apparatus to collect and preserve specimens. But this sector of the industrial program partly failed through ill-health, Huber returning to England in 1852 on account of illness, and Hensman dying in Africa. Despite these discouragements, at the end of 1853 Dr E.G. Irving, a former naval surgeon who had resigned his commission to work for the Society, was sent out as medical attendant and political adviser to the Mission. This was meant to avoid the pitfalls open to missionaries who dabbled in politics, and to achieve unofficially what the Egba had so far refused - a British Consul in Abeokuta. In addition to his medical and other duties, Irving was expected to report back on the conditions of the country and to promote the export of cotton. He succeeded in sending home a useful report on "A Visit to the Interior of Africa with some account of Abeokuta and the Abbeokutans", describing local methods of growing cotton,\textsuperscript{116} and made some progress towards building a cotton store at Aro, some eight miles from Abeokuta on the River Ogun, where it would await transport by canoe to the coast. But he was either affected by the climate or a rather emotional man who wrote home in excited terms of his quarrels with Gollmer and with the British Consul at Lagos, Benjamin Campbell.\textsuperscript{117}
Early in 1855 he died before he had been able to do much for the cotton trade, especially as European merchants in Lagos had told him that they considered the returns too small. Despite this Crowther persevered in the cotton program and the forests around Abeokuta were reported as being cleared "far and wide". The position had become much more hopeful since Kosoko had been driven out of Lagos and replaced by his more pliable relative, AkitoYE. In his journal to September 25th, 1852, Crowther noted that luggage had been sent up the Ogun for the first time since the missionaries' arrival in 1846.

He received assistance from his wife, who, in traditional Yoruba style, supervised the buying of cotton and kept an eye on the labourers, and from his sons, Samuel and Josiah. Samuel had just been sent to London to undertake courses in medical subjects and returned from his training to begin work in the Egba capital in 1852; while Josiah, who later underwent a period of training at Clegg's factory, was to be placed in charge of the C.M.S. wharf at Lagos, where the cotton and other products were stored until they could make their dangerous journey by canoe to the ocean-going steamship. By the summer of 1853 six or seven bales (of one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five pounds apiece) were being sent off at a time. The first sales of Abeokuta cotton at the Manchester Exchange took place in 1853 "through the spirited exertions of Mr Thomas Clegg" at prices ranging from 4d. to 7d. per pound.

But in 1854 the Reverend Samuel Crowther was called away to take part in the "Pleiad" voyage up the Niger and Benue Rivers, and the control of the "cotton business" of the Industrial Institution was handed over temporarily to his son Samuel. This helped to relieve the missionaries of worries about the program and Venn was able to assure Townsend that his connection with it would be confined to supervising its finances in committee as Secretary of the Yoruba Mission. Certainly the business now prospered without any practical help from the missionaries. A proper building had been prepared in Abeokuta where Samuel Crowther Junior was able to report a scene of bustle and activity:

"At present only four saw gins ... are at work, and the cotton room already presents a busy scene, and is much frequented by visitors who admire the incessant motion and activity of the machines." 56

Along with the gins were women who were employed in picking over the cotton, prior to the ginning, although a separate shed was being put up for them.

Samuel Crowther was lucky as the times were propitious. Communications
with Lagos were now usually open; and the 1850's overall saw a gradual rise in prices of cotton lint, reaching an average of 7 l/ld. per lb. in 1857.\textsuperscript{57} Crowther showed sound sense in his buying policy, paying 1d. per lb. for cleaner seed cotton but only 3/ld. for lots which required a good deal of picking over.\textsuperscript{58} The ginning - by hand - worked smoothly and the cotton was then made into bales by means of a screw-press. The figures given by the Cotton Supply Reporter\textsuperscript{59} for Clegg's receipts of cotton from Abeokuta show an increase from 1,548 lbs. of lint in 1854 to 3,485 in 1855.\textsuperscript{60} This, however, was nothing to compare with the increase that was to follow.

So far the cotton work in the Industrial Institution had gone forward without a properly trained Native Agent being in charge, but this deficiency was due to be remedied. While the Crowther family were slowly building up the cotton trade in Abeokuta and Lagos, the African Native Agency Committee in London had put its program of training Africans in the industrial and other arts into effect. In the summer of 1853 three young men of Saro descent arrived in England together for their training.\textsuperscript{61} They were Henry Johnson, Henry Robbin, and Moses David. Johnson's instructions included a month's intensive study at Kew Gardens, where the Director, Sir William Hooker, gave the project his full support.\textsuperscript{62} Robbin was sent to Clegg's factory\textsuperscript{63} for a thorough training in the cotton business, and Moses David was taught printing. The Committee also arranged for the training at sea in navigation of two African brothers called Davies - one of whom was to become a prominent figure in Abeokuta and Lagos as Captain J.P.L Davies,\textsuperscript{65} and to go into partnership with Robbin in the cotton and palm-oil trades. In 1865 Robbin arrived back at Lagos ready to become joint manager of the Industrial Institution with Samuel Crowther. At first it was intended that he should look after the Lagos side of the business but he insisted on returning to Abeokuta where he appears in practice to have assumed control almost at once. He brought with him not only his training in cotton but a lathe and other workshop equipment, a reminder that his duties included instruction in the other work of the Institution of training young men in the "useful arts".

Robbin's appointment marked a high point in Ven's industrial, and missionary, policies. He was a man of ability who had undergone a lengthy period of training. His performance would put the theories of the "nationalist" school to the test. In October 1856 the C.M.S. General Committee issued detailed instructions on the running of the Institution. It was hoped that work-shops
will soon be added for carpentry, turnery, sawing, a smithy for repairing machinery, means for the preparation of indigo, but cotton was, for the immediate future, to be the main undertaking and the Committee looked to it to make the whole Institution self-supporting. Henceforth the two managers were to work full-time for the Institution in return for a salary of £50 a year each, although they were to be allowed a certain amount of trading on their own. The cotton business itself was to be conducted on a commission basis for others - who would either supply the cotton or the money to buy it with. From the other end - Manchester - Clegg would provide cloth (piece-goods) and machinery which was to be paid for by sales of cotton in England, Clegg receiving his own commission. There appeared to be grounds for success as British-made piece-goods were always sold in Africa at this period with a wide margin of profit, and the whole of this profit was to be used for the purposes of the Institution - paying the Managers' and labourers' wages, for development, and for general missionary purposes. The enterprise was to be under the supervision of the Yoruba Finance Committee which included the two senior missionaries, Townsend and Gollmer.

The immediate results under the joint management were very satisfactory. Robbin reported: - "Our cotton business is in a very encouraging state." He succeeded in obtaining Townsend's approval and thus providing a contrast to Samuel Crowther: - "The difference between them is just this, one is showy, the other solid." From October 25th to December 25th, 1856 upwards of three tons of clean - ginned - cotton were delivered to the Industrial Institution by the chiefs and people of Abeokuta, and during the year the amount of cotton lint received by Clegg from the area underwent a dramatic increase to 12,750 lbs.

Despite this encouraging success there was an underlying note of disharmony. There were criticisms from Manchester about the use of the saw-gins, which it did not like, as it preferred the use of roller-gins which caused less damage to the cotton. Unfortunately the roller-gins were not liked in Abeokuta - they were very heavy "going", and the fly-wheel had to be operated by two men who had to be replaced after ten minutes. Probably more important was the fact that the output of the roller-gin was about five pounds of lint per day, while the saw-gins produced about thirty pounds. Clegg sent out machinery meant to be operated by a horse, but it seems unlikely that this apparatus had been asked for, and there is no evidence that it was used. The
area was within the tse-tse fly belt,\textsuperscript{75} and although horses were used for travelling they do not seem to have been employed in any numbers. Clegg then followed with a boat to cross the bar at Lagos but its draught was too deep and it had to be sold.

These were relatively minor considerations. More serious was the revelation that "the kind Manchester merchant" was not behaving in accordance with the Committee's instructions to the managers. It was a repeated source of complaint by both Samuel Crowther and Robbin that Clegg was sending out machinery which was "expensive" and "utterly useless and which was not ordered for".\textsuperscript{76} Crowther remarked: "Mr Clegg, I have no doubt, seeks his own interest even to the last mite."\textsuperscript{77} Clegg was adopting the policy of the traditional trust system of "capturing" his agents by placing them in debt to his own purse and thereby excluding his rivals.

Clegg may have been acting partly out of impatience seeing the urgent need of Lancashire for fresh supplies of cotton. During 1855 he had gone on a "cotton-growing" tour of the Mediterranean visiting such diverse areas as Spain, Italy, Malta - where the Governor promised to grow cotton - Tunis and Egypt, giving away small glass cases containing samples of good-quality lint.\textsuperscript{78} At Abeokuta a serious misunderstanding soon arose over the whole matter of the accounts of the Industrial Institution. When Robbin arrived there, he reported that there had been a "Mismanagement between Mr Clegg and Mr Crowther" and no accounts had been kept.\textsuperscript{79} Not long afterwards, however, Robbin himself was being criticised for not sending in regular accounts and recourse had to be made to Clegg to discover the true position. The result was a shock - both in the extent of the debt into which the Institution had fallen, and in the revelation of Clegg's business methods - he claimed that the Institution owed him £1506! The debt was increased by two 20% commissions, on cotton sold in England and on piece-goods sold in Africa. Nor did Clegg forget the price of the "useless" boat he had sent out. The bulk of the bill, however, was made up by the cost of the piece-goods and gins sent out to the Agency.\textsuperscript{80}

Campbell, the British Consul at Lagos, was asked to adjudicate the dispute and made Robbin responsible for the unsatisfactory finances at the Institution. Robbin's "snare" had been "H. Robbin and Company" - the separate business he had
set up in partnership with Captain Davies. The Institution's ginning machines had been kept working for the Company rather than for the Institution and the paying-off of Clegg's debt. 81

On the other hand the conditions on which Robbin and Samuel Crowther had been appointed managers were open to criticism. Their salaries were low in relation to the value of goods and raw cotton which they were handling and for which they bore much of the responsibility. It was not right for Clegg to burden the untried Institution with a heavy debt, and to fail in checking what was really needed. In some respects his expenditure seemed lavish, as well as unnecessary, 82 and he was held in little favour by the European missionaries. Townsend commented in his abrupt way: "I hear Mr Clegg is sending out more machinery. I see through his plans he thinks to make the Mission serve him, he is mistaken ..." 83

He was probably right, but Clegg was doing little more than reflect the current Manchester attitude towards missionaries. The Vice-President of the Cotton Supply Association said in 1860: "We find all over the world that the pioneers of industry have been the missionaries." 84 In fact Clegg's credit system had given him effective control of the Institution. The Consul's report proved decisive. After considering the matter, the C.M.S. General Committee resolved:—

"That the use and management of the Society's store at Lagos and the Industrial Institution at Abeokuta be transferred to Mr Clegg and the agents he may appoint for twelve months." 85

Soon after Clegg sent out a European agent, Thomas Lord, until "trustworthy natives can be found to do it", 86 although he was to learn soon after that Lord had died. Venn was naturally a disappointed man and wrote to Robbin:—

"It has given a triumph to many who have predicted that native agents are incapable of managing business and I am for a time at least humiliated in the praise I have bestowed upon your intelligence and ability." 87

But soon after the other side of the story was put to Venn when he was visited at his Highgate home by Captain Davies, who explained that H. Robbin and Company's accounts had been kept quite separate from those of the Institution. Venn confessed that "it never entered my mind as possible that the
whole profits of the Institution should have been so swallowed up in trans-
acting a commission business between the native chiefs and Mr Clegg of which
the Institution has been made to bear all the risk, a great part of the ex-
penses, all the losses - but has no share in the profits!" 89

The end of the year 1859 brought further unfavourable news of Robbin
concerning his involvement with one of the Alake's wives who was discovered in
his house in the middle of the night, and Venn told Townsend that Robbin must
be "publicly separated from all connection with the Society." 90

Fortunately this was not the end of the relationship. In 1862 "The West
Africa Company" was "set-a-going" in Manchester, largely through the efforts
of Clegg, and with aims similar to those of the Cotton Supply Association it-
self - "to correct the speculative character of the supply and to impart cer-
tainty as well as extension to it, by opening fresh fields of cotton produc-
tion." 91 Clegg sensibly announced, however, that it would trade in other pro-
ducts as well so that it would not be ruined when American supplies resumed.
He became its first managing director and his various investments in West
Africa were turned over to it. It also took over the former Native Agents
of the Industrial Institution - Robbin, and Samuel and Josiah Crowther.92

The arrangement proved a satisfactory one for all concerned. Owing in part,
no doubt, to the exceptional cotton prices reigning during the American Civil
War, Robbin was enabled to repay the Industrial Institution's debt to Clegg,
and Venn, forgetting Robbin's "delinquency", was able to write to him: "I
must congratulate you on this most satisfactory event." 93

Thus ended the first part of the story of Native Agency in Southern
Nigerian cotton. It had proved a limited success at a time of rising prices,
but its golden opportunity - and Manchester's nightmare - the Civil War in
America 1861-1865 was largely lost. The struggle for supremacy among the
successor states to the Oyo Empire reached a decisive stage in 1860 when
Ibadan began its war with Ijaiye supported by Abeokuta. After the fall of
Ijaiye, Abeokuta and Ijebu-Ode closed the "roads" between the coast and Ibadan;
traders became soldiers and the cotton exports down the River Ogun were reduced
from a regular to an exceptional undertaking. In one form or another the wars
went on till 1892 when they were finally ended by the assertion of British
hegemony.94
The long period of confusion turned commercial attention away from the Ogun as a means of promoting trade in the interior and back to the Niger, and the fall in cotton prices from 1869, when production in the United States was back to normal, encouraged the process. The Church Missionary Society began to turn its attention away from Abeokuta in 1857 when the Niger Mission, an African enterprise under the Reverend Samuel Crowther's leadership, was begun. It received assistance from the West Africa Company, which made the Niger its main area of trade, but the times were not propitious for any revival of the cotton trade there either. Crowther reported: "But (cotton) is not as remunerative as ivory, palm-oil, shea-butter, this is the secret." After 1875 when a general fall in prices of tropical products began, including palm-oil, more traders began to move into the Niger in search of extra trade. The conditions on the river with the rival traders' jetties alongside one another pointed to amalgamation, and a new era, unfriendly to Native Agency, began in 1879 when George Goldie Taubman formed the United African Company from four existing companies, including the West African Company. But by this time both Venn and Clegg were dead.

The chief people to benefit from the high cotton prices were the traders, who did well while the European shortage lasted. In 1865 Adekolu, Prince of Ilamo, Abeokuta, paid his first visit to Lagos, and looking back in 1903, he wrote:

"At Abeokuta thousands of pounds sterling have been made by cotton traders who went there from Lagos, and, on their return, some of them built large and magnificent houses. A native was said to have brought with him to Lagos more than £20,000 and he is now the proprietor of "Manchester House" in the Marina ... Those were golden days indeed; and many of them became "thousandaires" as they love to call themselves."

The cotton program at Abeokuta thus achieved a limited success when prices were high and conditions more than usually promising. It had been dependent for its limited success not only on high prices but on relative political stability in the interior. Cotton had shown itself to be an alternative or secondary interest to nearly all of those who were concerned in developing its export. The Mission were mainly concerned with their spiritual duties, as well as their extensive educational program which included a day school, a teacher-training institution (or "normal school") besides the Industrial Institution, and the missionaries also took young people into their homes who were pupils at the schools or apprentices being
instructed by local craftsmen who were probably Saros - they had enough on their hands. Most of those who were engaged in trading did not make cotton their main article of export except for a limited period. The West Africa Company traded in other products, as did the African traders at Abeokuta. Even the managers of the Industrial Institution were not mainly interested in it, but in trading on their own, and they dealt in palm and other products besides cotton. The cotton program was a projection from England, a reflection of her interests and preoccupations, to which the conditions of nineteenth century Abeokuta only allowed her to make a limited response.

2. Church Missionary Society G/AC1/10 December 11th, 1852, Venn to Clegg.

3. Previously Lord Ashley who had now succeeded to his father's title.

4. Inglis, Sir Robert (1786-1855) A Vice-President of the C.M.S. and an "exceptionally popular" Member of Parliament for many years. He opposed almost every progressive measure, including those providing for increased religious toleration, but supported Shaftesbury in changing the factory laws.

5. Acland, Sir Thomas (1787-1871) Another Vice-President of the C.M.S., a progressive churchman and a long-time Member of Parliament for Devon and North Devon in southwest England.

6. Hope, Admiral Sir Henry (1787-1863) He achieved fame as commander of the frigate "Endymion" which successfully brought the American frigate "President" to action in 1815 just after the formal ending of the 1812-1814 War.

7. Trotter, Captain Henry Dundas (1802-1859) Was commander of the "Albert" one of the steamers used in the government Niger expedition of 1841.


9. C.M.S. Pamphlets, Africa Miscellaneous, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 16fn £100 was provided by the Committee "towards the expense of bringing to this country a young African educated in the college at Fourah Bay to be perfected in some useful art which may prove beneficial to his own Country."


12. The first ships were the "Faith", "Hope" and "Charity", and the voyages began from London and called at Plymouth. The service was reduced by the Crimean War when two of the Company's ships were requisitioned as transports. See P.N. Davies, Trade Makers, pp. 45-48.

13. Gollmer, Charles Andrew (1812-1887) Born in Wurtemburg, Germany. At Basle Seminary, Switzerland, and C.M.S. College, London. Ordained 1841 and sent to Sierra Leone. Went to Badagry with the Yoruba Mission 1845 and to Abeokuta 1857. In 1878 his son, C.H.V. Gollmer, went to Lagos as head of the C.M.S. Teacher Training Institution there.

14. C.M.S. CA2/L1 February 24th, 1852. "I have also seen MacGregor Laird who has taken the monthly mail to West Africa. How wonderful a change when you will be within a month's communication with us."
15. The ships were the "Alburkah" and the "Quorrah" - the latter being the old name for the Niger. Of the 49 Europeans on board the vessels, 40 died.

16. Most were Africans - the total, including the 12 Europeans, was 66.


19. The flagship was the "Penelope", Ibid., p. 101.

20. See above, Chapter 1, p. 18.


23. The Kakanfo or Commander-in-Chief of the Oyo army sent to attack Ilorin, Afonja, defected in 1817 and Ilorin was virtually independent from then until Afonja was killed by the Fulani in 1832.

24. Where they arrived about 1830.

25. With Commander Forbes in 1852.


27. In 1850 Commander Forbes estimated that there were 3,000 Saros in Abeokuta - and the majority were not Christians. In 1856-1857 the C.M.S. gave the whole population of the capital as 100,000. See J.H. Kopytoff, Preface to *Modern Nigeria*, University of Wisconsin, 1965, p. 51, and *Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society*, 1856-1858, p. 38. In 1865 the whole Yoruba Mission (Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta and smaller centres) was said to have four to five thousand 'native Christians', 1054 Communicants, and 895 school pupils. See Report from the Select Committee on Africa (Western Coast) 1865, (412) V., 1, par. 5853 Evidence of Rev. C.A. Gollmer.

28. C.M.S. CA2/085 March 5th, 1851, Townsend to Gollmer.

29. C.M.S. CA2/1104 October 4th, 1851, Venning to Gollmer.


32. C.M.S. CA2/085 August 5th, 1854, Townsend to Major Straith, Secretary.

33. Cotton had been chosen by Buxton during the 1841 expedition when a cotton farm was briefly established at the confluence of the Niger and Benue, and again during Baikie's "Pleiad" voyage in 1854.

34. C.M.S. *Intelligencer*, 1853, p. 125.

35. C.M.S. CA2/085 March 4th, 1851, Secretaries to Gollmer. The interest of the merchants was probably prompted by the short (by 40%) crop in the United States in 1849, prices reaching 8 1/4d. in August 1850. See J.A. Mann, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain*, London & Manchester, 1860, table 29.
36. C.M.S. CA2/031 b Crowther's journal to March 25th, 1851.
37. J.A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, Table 1, p. 94.
39. C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 27th, 1856, Venn to Samuel Crowther Junior.
40. C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 21st, 1858, Secretaries to Yoruba Finance Committee.
41. Cotton Supply Reporter, June 15th, 1861, p. 530, reporting a recent meeting.
42. C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 23rd, 1856, Venn to Robbin.
43. C.M.S. CA1/O85 November 8th, 1850, Townsend to Secretaries.
44. C.M.S. CA2/O85b Addendum to Townsend's journal dated July 3rd, 1851.
   Hensman, Wm. D., d. 1853. On 1841 Niger expedition. Arrived Abeokuta 1851. The term "surgeon" did not then indicate more than a practical knowledge of the "trade". C.M.S. List 1, no. 433.
46. C.M.S. Intelligencer, 1853, p. 125.
47. A letter from Gollmer to the Wesleyan missionary, Gardiner, was "the most awful philippic that I ever remember as having passed between Christian ministers." Campbell, Benjamin, Consul for the Bight of Benin (Lagos) from 1853 till his death in 1859.
48. C.M.S. CA2/052 June 1st, 1854, Irving to Venn.
49. C.M.S. CA2/031a March 6th, 1854, Crowther to Venn.
50. C.M.S. CA2/031b Samuel Crowther's journal to Sept. 25th, 1852.
51. C.M.S. CA2/031a September 22nd 1852 and August 23rd, 1853, Crowther to Venn.
   Crowther, Josiah. Sent to Clegg for training in cotton 1855. After 1861 he traded on the Niger and later worked for the West Africa Company but was dismissed when Goldie took over the West African Company to form the United African Company 1879.
53. In 1855.
54. C.M.S. CA2/031a Sept. 22nd 1852, and August 23rd 1853, Rev. S. Crowther to Venn.
56. C.M.S. CA2/032 Samuel Crowther journal to Sept. 25th, 1855.
57. J.A. Mann, *The Cotton Trade of Great Britain*, Table 2, p.96.
58. C.M.S. CA2/032 Samuel Crowther, journal for quarter to Sept. 25th, 1855.
60. *Cotton Supply Reporter*, February 15th, 1861. The figures given by T. Ellison in *A Handbook of the Cotton Trade*, London 1858, pp.98-99 while similar (1,588 lbs) for 1854 are only 1631 lbs for 1855.
62. Robbin, Henry (1835-1887) *At Clegg's factory* 1853-55. Settled in Abeokuta and supervised the Industrial Institution. Known as "the rich man of Ake", the central section of Abeokuta. He remained a strong supporter of the C.M.S. His daughter married Dr. Carr, Director of Education, S. Nigeria.
63. Henry Johnson does not seem to have made much use of his training, but he produced a remarkable family - Archdeacon Johnson (Eloquent Johnson), who was educated at the C.M.S. College in London and worked in Palestine for the Society. He became Rector of St. Paul's Breadfruit, Lagos, and Archdeacon of the Upper Niger 1878 but ended his connection with the Society in 1891; the Reverend Samuel Johnson who wrote "The History of the Yoruba"; and Dr Obadiah Johnson, educated at London and Edinburgh Universities, and appointed Assistant Colonial Surgeon but resigned over "race prejudice". He was a member of Lagos, and from May 1906, Southern Nigeria's Legislative Council 1901-1914.
64. Hope Mill near Tyldesley, Manchester.
65. Davies, Captain James P.L. d, 1906, settled at Lagos 1856 as a trader and had an estate at Ijan where he grew cocoa. Member of Legislative Council 1872-1874. Married Sarah Bonetta Forbes, a Yoruba girl who had been captured by Dahomey, at a ceremony performed by Henry Venn. Their daughter was a godchild of Queen Victoria.
66. C.M.S. CA2/L2 October 21st, 1856, Secretaries to Crowther and Robbin.
67. C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 27th, 1856, Venn to Samuel Crowther. Venn said all profit on the piece-goods was to go to the Institution.
68. C.M.S. CA2/L2 October 21st, 1856, Secretaries to Crowther and Robbin.
69. C.M.S. CA2/085 October 1st, 1857, Townsend to Secretaries, Robbin took over sole control of the cotton work from the end of 1857 - see C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 23rd, 1857, Venn to S. Crowther.
70. C.M.S. CA2/032 S. Crowther's journal for quarter to December 25th, 1856.
72. C.M.S. CA2/032 September 29th, year, Samuel Crowther to Venn.
73. Foreign Office, London, 8h/1031 May 16th 1857, Consul Campbell to Foreign Secretary, Clarendon.
75. **Abeokuta** is in the belt for *glossina palpalis* and just inside that of *glossina longipalpis*.

76. *C.M.S. CA2/080* February 15th 1861, pp.411-412.

77. *C.M.S. CA2/032* May 28th 1859, Samuel Crowther to Venn.


79. *C.M.S. CA2/080* May 26th, 1856, Robbin to Venn.

80. Clegg's Account was (C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 21st 1858, Secretaries to Yoruba Finance Committee):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dr.</th>
<th>Amount of goods sent to Abeokuta:--</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>s.</th>
<th>d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton gins</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>19s</td>
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(£523 for packing also sent, but not included.)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cr.</th>
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<td>Insurance received:</td>
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<td>0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£ 186</td>
<td>3s</td>
<td>9d</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Add:</th>
<th>Profit on goods sold in Abeokuta -- say 20%</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>232</th>
<th>0s</th>
<th>0d</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profit on cotton sold in England (20% of £438)</td>
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<td>0s</td>
<td>0d</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Drawn by C.M.S. Finance Committee in England</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td>0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price of boat</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td>0d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£ 826</td>
<td>0s</td>
<td>0d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

826 | 0s | 0d

|      | £ 1,506| 16s | 0d |

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75. **Abeokuta** is in the belt for *glossina palpalis* and just inside that of *glossina longipalpis*.

76. *C.M.S. CA2/080* February 15th 1861, pp.411-412.

77. *C.M.S. CA2/032* May 28th 1859, Samuel Crowther to Venn.


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<td>0d</td>
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</table>

826 | 0s | 0d

|      | £ 1,506| 16s | 0d |
81. C.M.S. CA2/0h3a September 2nd 1859, Gollmer to Venn.

82. Clegg spent £3,230 to establish a store at Aro. Venn advised him to "sell off the whole."

83. C.M.S. CA2/085 October 29th 1858, Townsend to Secretaries.


85. C.M.S. G AC1/1h October 21st, 1858, Venn to Clegg.

86. C.M.S. G AC3 March 9th 1859, Clegg to Venn.

87. C.M.S. CA2/L2 March 23rd, 1859, Venn to Robbin.

88. C.M.S. CA2/L2 September 23rd 1859, Venn to Robbin.

89. C.M.S. CA2/L2 September 23rd 1859, Venn to Gollmer.

90. C.M.S. CA2/L2 December 23rd 1859, Venn to Townsend.


93. C.M.S. CA2/L3 April 23rd 1863, Venn to Robbin.

94. In 1892 Governor Carter of Lagos attacked the Ijebu and forced them to open the roads into the interior.


96. It became the West African Company in 1877. The other companies in the amalgamation were Alexander Miller Brother & Company, the Central African Trading Company Ltd., and "James Pinnock".


By the 1850's Manchester was conducting an active search for alternative supplies of cotton to the United States. Ever since the 1820's Britain had become heavily dependent on American supplies and the upward tendency of prices during succeeding years reflected the fact that consumption, not only in Britain but also in Europe and the United States itself, was increasing at a rate about 50% faster than supplies from America. Besides this underlying cause for concern, there were occasional sharp reminders of British dependence on a single source in price increases arising from seasonal variations in the Southern States. "Late" frosts occurred at intervals in April and "early" frosts in October, while the growing period averaged about six months and twenty days, making it very difficult to avoid occasional "short" crops followed by a damaging rise in price. The extra money which had to be paid out as a result of these factors went to slave-owners, and indirectly amounted to a premium on the price of slaves - a fact which Manchester, itself lying in a centre of the Evangelical Revival, could scarcely ignore.

Britain's demand for increased supplies of cotton was the result of the expansion of her own piece-goods markets. Despite the increase of population in Britain itself, and the consequent rise in consumption, productive capacity far outstripped demand and the industry became dependent on its exports at an early stage of its development. The tariff walls which were being erected in Europe prevented expansion there except in "quality" goods, and cheaper ranges found markets further overseas, one of the most important being India.

The Indian market, however, had special characteristics. India had a weaving tradition of its own, based on skilled handiwork, which concentrated on producing materials of high quality. The overseas market was therefore confined to the cheaper goods, but it was large and by 1859 sales to India amounted to 30.6% of all Britain's piece-goods exports. The important factor in this concentration on the cheaper ranges was that it made sales elastic in matters of price - increases in the price of raw cotton could not be simply passed on to the customer, as the customer could not afford to buy and "made do" without. The weaving manufacturer, however, had to have his profit, and
could pay only so much for yarn. Thus the spinner was "caught", and it was
the spinners who were the driving-force behind the search for alternative
sources of cotton to the United States.  

British imports from the United States during the years 1856-1860
averaged over two million bales a year. In seeking alternative sources of
supply Manchester was therefore mainly interested in areas which could produce
very large quantities of cotton at a price similar to that of American cotton.
This implied conditions where communications with the sea were good, or at
least fair, and where some control could be exercised over the growing and
cleaning (ginning) of the cotton, so that the quality of the local crop could
be kept on a level similar to that of the American.

In 1857 the Cotton Supply Association was formed in Manchester and
directed most of its attention to India, already one of its most important custom-
ers. India met in some degree at least two of Manchester's main supply require-
ments - it produced large quantities of cotton - some 2 1/2 million bales of
400 lbs. each per year, and was administered by the British-controlled East India
Company. As a result of the Mutiny of 1857 India come under the control of the
British Government from the beginning of 1858 with a Secretary of State for
India in London and a Viceroy in India. British control over much of India,
including some important cotton-growing districts, was recent, and by
the mid-nineteenth century the sub-continent was regarded by many as "the
country of the future". One of the main problems was transport, but railway
building was pushed on vigorously after the shock of the Mutiny.

The best-known Indian cotton came from Gujerat in the north-west of
Bombay Presidency, and was exported mainly from the port of Surat after which
the cotton was named. But its quality was generally regarded as low and the
staple was too short for most of Lancashire's needs, and its condition notorious-
dy dirty. Any real improvement would depend on a social and commercial
transformation of the established order in the rural areas. The grower was
the peasant or ryot, but he had little control over the situation as he was
usually heavily in debt to middlemen or moneylenders, while the government held
a general claim or "lien" over the land and its products. It was difficult,
therefore, to interest the ryot in commercial crops from which he expected no
direct benefit and he was principally interested in the production of food.
Despite these difficulties, Lancashire's imports of Indian cotton during the American Civil War rose to nearly one and a quarter million bales, about half the amount obtained from the United States in 1860. More significant, Indian imports after the end of the War remained at a higher level than that reached before the conflict began. But the larger part of India's cotton remained short-stapled — mainly the result of climatic factors — and attempts to introduce or grow American types met with limited success.

Another promising area, where exports to Britain were steadily rising, was Egypt. The export of cotton had been begun by Mohammed Ali, the modernising despot, during the 1820's. At least one of his successors, Said, continued to show interest and visited Manchester. Waste land in Upper Egypt was made tax-free if used for growing cotton, while Egypt had considerable advantages in her transport facilities. Besides the great waterway of the Nile, the flatness of the land made carriage and the building of railways comparatively easy. Two-thirds of the cotton grown in Lower Egypt was by means of irrigation, a method which experience elsewhere was to show brought better crops than those grown by rainfall, and the quality, based on a long staple variety called Jumel, was high. British imports rose sharply to nearly half a million bales (of 400 lbs) in 1864-1865, and the imports continued to grow after a brief interval during the following years. This reflected the part played by Egyptian cotton in producing the finer types of yarn, but the demand for this type was limited, and supplies sent to Britain stabilised from the mid-1870's.

Other sources also sent more cotton to Britain during the years 1861-1865, among them Brazil and Turkey, which remained important suppliers to British manufacturers during succeeding years.

It is against this background that the efforts of the Church Missionary Society and its friends and supporters in Southern Nigeria must be judged. It may be asked why West Africa aroused as much interest as it did, limited though that was to a comparatively few spinners, although they included the influential Thomas Bazley, for fourteen years chairman of Manchester Chamber of Commerce. One reason was the optimistic reports received from British Consuls and administrators on the West African Coast who were looking for improved trade and hoping finally to end the slave trade. The reports were sent on by the Government to the Cotton Supply Association. A further reason which encouraged some spinning manufacturers was the comparatively high value of native West African cotton, which almost equalled that of "New
Orleans Middling", and as Clegg pointed out in a published letter to MacGregor Laird, West African cotton "will invariably fetch in the Liverpool market from 2d. to 3d. per lb. more than East Indian cotton under similar circumstances." But Clegg's main interest seems to have been based on wider hopes, hopes which would have made West Africa a rival to India, not only in quality but in quantity too. At a meeting which led to the formation of the West Africa Company he declared that it would become a second East India Company and promised a 25% dividend at the end of the first year! In all this he was clearly something of a visionary - or ignorant optimist - and his expenditure on one of the stores, and on equipment generally, in West Africa, can only be explained on a basis of building for the future.

Cotton men who were strongly opposed to slavery were in a difficult position during the 1850's. Slavery in the Southern States was by then being maintained by natural increase, and the most effective way Britain had of ending it was by buying her cotton elsewhere. More compelling than this line of reasoning was the widespread fear that slavery and cotton-growing in America were bound together, and that when slavery was finally ended, cotton production would be greatly reduced or virtually cease. This approach favoured West Africa as the new source of supply and a body had been formed - the African Aid Society - for the purpose of settling free American negroes in West Africa. Clegg was an active supporter of this organisation. It had a practical advantage - many American negroes could be regarded as already trained in the cotton "business", and this appeared to be a quicker method of bringing Native Agents in cotton to West Africa than that chosen by the Church Missionary Society and the African Native Agency Committee.

Great hopes for West Africa seem to have been widely entertained at the time, although only a comparatively few manufacturers showed a practical interest. An author on the industry wrote: "There is no question but that Africa is the most hopeful source of future supply." The Rivers Niger and Ogun appeared to provide means of transport to prospective cotton fields, and it was known that cotton was produced in the area on a large scale for local needs. Unfortunately these hopes were not based on firm knowledge of local conditions. At one stage Clegg had "mixed up" Sierra Leone and Abeokuta; his sending-out European agents seems to show an ignorance or disregard of the "climate", and this is also suggested by his dispatch of equipment for horses to work ginning
machines at Abeokuta. Probably little or nothing was known about the tsetse fly at the time, and horses — usually of a broken-down kind — were in use in the early 1860's at Abeokuta. Possibly the difficulties of communication were discounted unduly because it was thought that some form of animal transport would be available. Certainly there was no prospect of railways being built for many years and without them or animal transport, the rivers, difficult to navigate during the dry season, gave little promise of really large-scale development.

Communications were of fundamental importance and held a significant place in the question of costs. But first of all came the price paid for one pound of seed cotton — cotton before it had been ginned — at the Industrial Institution at Abeokuta. This varied — often the least needy were paid most — from 1d. to 1/2d., and usually four or three and a half pounds of seed cotton were needed to produce a single pound of lint. This was the largest item of cost, and thus amounted to anything from 4d. to 1 3/4d. to begin with.

Next came the ginning or cleaning, and pressing of the lint into bales, usually of from 100 to 125 lbs apiece, for which the charges were 12s.6d. per bale, or rather over 1d. per lb. On the outgoing part of the trade this was the Institution's main source of profit, but it had to cover the costs of canvas, twine etc. for wrapping the bales for transport as well as the labour. High charges at the ginnery, however, made it difficult for Clegg to obtain much profit in the Manchester Exchange when prices were normal. After the ginning and baling came the problems of transport: the principal was the number of trans-shipments which occurred in the cotton bale's journey from Abeokuta to Liverpool or Manchester. They added considerably to the expense because they involved the building of stores at the places of trans-shipment to hold the cotton in readiness for the next stage. There was a store at Ake, Abeokuta, the Mission's centre of operations, both spiritual and commercial. From Ake the bales had to be carried by porters through the Aro Gate, where a toll of 3 1/2% on the first cost of the goods was charged by the Parakoyi or Traders' Guild, to one of two ports on the river below Abeokuta — one, Aro, the wet-season port was some five miles distant; the other, Agbamaya, the dry-weather port, being some eight miles. Both had to have their stores. According to an American agent of a negro resettlement scheme, who visited Lagos and Abeokuta in 1860, steamers with a draught of five feet and under could use the river.
from a fortnight after the May rains began until a month after the late rains ended in December. Presumably the dry-weather port of Agbamaya was used between December and May.

The journey downriver was usually fairly speedy, at least in the rainy season, taking about two days as compared with five days upstream. But during the dry season the journey could be a difficult one, as the canoes often had to be dragged through shallows and over sandbags. At these times canoe charges naturally increased.

On arrival at Lagos the bales were usually deposited at the Church Missionary Society wharf which also had its store, and where the bales could be kept until they were ready to be taken out to the ocean-going steamship which would carry them to Liverpool. The journey to the ship was perhaps the most hazardous of all in the cotton bale's odyssey. The bales had to be carried in special canoes through the roaring surf and over the bar to the anchored vessel. A Genoese named Scala, who was Sardinian Consul in Lagos, was the African Steamship Company's agent and charged one dollar (or 4s, 6d.) per bale for the service.

The profits of the Industrial Institution during the years up to 1860 cannot have been high. The prices for African cotton are infrequently given—but over the years 1856-1858 it averaged 7.13d. in England, while the average price in Liverpool for American Middling during the years 1855-1860 was 6.69d. But the break-even price, including Clegg's commission of 20%, was 6.525d. If the program of the Cotton Supply Association had succeeded, it is evident that prices would have tended to fall and the return to the cotton seller in England dropped further, possibly involving the Institution in an overall deficit.

The problem of communications involved questions not only of cost, but also of control. One of the difficulties was that neither "end" of the business could exercise overall control since each knew too little of the other "end". Thus there could be little relationship between changes of price at Liverpool and Manchester, and the prices paid for seed cotton in Abeokuta. More serious than this, each party pursued its own policy, the managers doing a great deal of business on their own (as they were allowed to a limited but undefined extent) and Clegg sending out more equipment than the Institution could properly cope with. From the point of view of running the Institution successfully—and on a moderate scale—it is evident that Venn's advice that Clegg should only send piece-goods in return for cotton received in Manchester was sound, but for a man of Clegg's temperament, too slow.
The result was that Venn assumed the position of intermediary in matters of detail largely outside his ken.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus the question of management was a crucial one. It may have been impossible to have a single direction in the 1850's, but the question of costs made it desirable that those responsible in Abeokuta should be sub-managers. Africans who belonged to the "middle classes" of Victorian times were regarded as, and regarded themselves as of a similar status to Europeans.\textsuperscript{16} It was a measure of Clegg's optimism that he sent out Europeans who would have been even more expensive. European traders in Lagos normally would not handle cotton as the profits were too small, but they were jealous of Africans taking over the trade - as a dispute over the Church Missionary Society's wharf at Lagos demonstrated.\textsuperscript{47} Presumably they feared African Middlemen making inroads into their palm-oil exports. Cotton was "a poor man's crop" and the trade in "normal" times would be taken up mainly by the smaller traders and the cotton grown by ordinary farmers.

Traditionally African traders had been two-way traders, making a profit both on imports and exports. Cotton was best traded on this pattern as, although there was but a bare profit on its export in ordinary times, there was a considerable profit to be gained on the sale of piece-goods in Africa - as there was elsewhere. This was probably why Clegg traded on the "trust" system, because he wanted a profit at both ends. In addition he was putting money in his customers' pockets by buying the cotton. If trade was to develop with areas too dry for the oil-palm some such system had to be organised.\textsuperscript{48} The chief attraction to Manchester in West Africa lay in its fast-expanding market for manufactured cloth. This aspect must have interested many more men than its limited supply of raw cotton.

Apart from the problems of production and transport, the political and social situation in nineteenth century Abeokuta provided special problems of its own. The Yoruba State was organised on the basis of a balance of authorities. The ruler or Oba had his Council, there were secret societies such as the important Ogboni Society which was responsible for the execution of the law, and several hierarchies of chiefs including the Ologun or warriors, the Seriki or younger warriors, the Parakoyi or traders, and others. The position in Abeokuta had been exacerbated by the migration from the forest where the Egba had been divided into three Provinces, each under its own ruler.\textsuperscript{49} All of them, together with the Owu, a people uprooted by the civil wars, took refuge in Abeokuta. The problem of negotiating with such a variety of authorities
was a difficult one for the missionaries and it was largely through their efforts that the supremacy of the Alake, in theory at least, was recognised in 1854. 50

Although an agreement allowing European merchants to trade in Abeokuta had been signed, in practice there was opposition, especially from the Parakoyi who claimed rights over the whole of the River Ogun, and when Scala set up a ginning factory in the capital he was soon driven out. 51 Yet the Parakoyi would have found it difficult to carry on a direct cotton trade with the European market. If Yoruba was to remain independent and trade with Europe as part of its development the influence of the Saros, who better understood European methods, needed to increase.

But when the Saros did join with the chiefs in 1865 to form the Egba United Board of Management, it was as part of a move to drive out all Europeans. This was a reflection of the general situation which developed after Britain had established the Colony of Lagos in 1861. African suspicions were immediately aroused, and Britain found it difficult to maintain the finances of the Colony - which relied on customs duties - without extensive trade with the hinterland. But the Egba and the Ijebu limited the trade to themselves; otherwise guns and ammunition would reach their powerful enemy of Ibadan. This conflict of interest greatly reduced British influence in the Egba capital, and the renewal of the wars in 1860 destroyed much of the cotton trade at the very time that prices rose to un-dreamt-of heights. No successful two-way trade could develop until there was political stability and the presence of a British foothold on the coast, controlling the outlets of trade but having limited influence in the interior, did little to provide it.

The valuable service provided by the African Steamship Company between Britain and West Africa could not by itself make cotton export a viable business in Yoruba country. The difficulties of communication with an inland city like Abeokuta were still formidable, and they brought problems of control. Control could not be effectively exercised from Britain, and the missionaries were unwilling to exercise it on the spot. In practice, therefore, there was little relationship between prices and management policy in England and in Abeokuta. Each "end" proceeded to make its own profit. Costs in Yoruba were too high for normal market levels in England, but as cotton was already growing in West Africa on a large scale, increased price was able to call forth larger supplies at the expense of the local African market. But the success of the West African cotton export trade depended on a marginal factor of price which was likely to disappear altogether when there were successful harvests in America.
CHAPTER 3 FOOTNOTES

1. From 1826-1830 592,270 bales (of 400 lbs) were imported into Britain - 433,800 - about 74.5% from the United States and 12,900 from the British West Indies. T. Ellison, A Handbook of the Cotton Trade, London and Manchester, 1856, p.86.


3. In 1849 the crop had been short by 40% - see Chapter 2, footnote 35.

4. By the 1830's exports already exceeded home consumption (1835/36 22.1 million against £18.1 million); by 1859 exports were more than double the home market (£48.2 million against £23.2 million) J.A. Mann, Cotton Trade of Great Britain, Table 8, p.106.

5. See above Chapter 1.

6. Britain's quality piece-goods went to the home market as well as to Europe.


8. The pressure of prices on spinning manufacturers is shown:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lint, average price per lb.</th>
<th>Piece-goods, average price per yard</th>
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<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>4 7/8</td>
<td>6 1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>3 3/4</td>
<td>3 7/16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cotton Supply Reporter, March 31st, 1860, p.78.


10. The exact quantity was in doubt, some estimates going up to ten millions see T. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, London, 1886, p.91.

11. Both the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were advised by Councils.

12. The River Sutlej was crossed and the Punjab occupied in the 1840's, and the cotton-growing regions of the Berars and Nagpur annexed under Lord Auckland's Governor-Generalship 1847-1856.

13. Up to 1854 only 3/4 miles of railway had been built in Madras and Bombay Presidencies - and nowhere else. By 1868 over 4,000 miles were open. See A. Silver, Manchester Men and Indian Cotton, p.53; and N. Sanyal, Development of Indian Railways, University of Calcutta, 1930, p.35.

14. Surat's recovery began during the cotton boom caused by the American Civil War.

15. Short staple was not just more awkward to handle - it required a substantial number of extra workers compared with long staple cotton.
16. 1,218,370 (400 lb) bales from 1866-1870. American imports averaged 1,140,860 bales during the same period. In 1883 India sent 1,520,000 bales to Britain. See T. Ellison, Cotton Trade of Great Britain, pp.86 and 91.


18. 1854-1863.

19. The first railway, running from Alexandria to Cairo, was opened in 1855.


22. Imports from Brazil rose from 48,000 (400 lb) bales in 1860 to 220,000 in 1866 and 620,000 in 1883. See T. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, p.91.

23. Basley, Sir Thomas (1797-1885) Member of Council of the Anti-Corn Law League; chairman, Manchester Chamber of Commerce 1845-1859, one of the Members of Parliament for Manchester 1858-1860. John Bright, the great free trader, had been defeated in the election of 1857.


26. For example see Chapter 2 fn. 82.

27. Of about 3% per year. In 1850 the cotton fields were said to employ 787,500 slaves out of a total 1,979,000 slaves in the cotton-growing states except Texas and N. Carolina - the figures presumably include women and children. See J.A. Mann, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, pp.53-55.

28. On the basis of West Indian experience it seemed that former slaves would leave the fields to try to find land of their own. Instead they became share-croppers.

29. There were around 250,000 according to Basley. Cotton Supply Reporter, May 15th, 1860, p.116.


31. Cotton Supply Reporter, Feb. 15th, 1861, pp.428-429. Clegg's figures of receipts for West African cotton during the 1850's reached a high point in 1859 at 417,078 lbs or about one thousand bales - virtually all came from Lagos and Abeokuta so far as is known.

32. See R.F. Burton, Abeokuta and the Cameron Mountains, London, 1863, Vol.1; and Wm. Clarke, Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland 1854-1858. Ibadan University Press, 1972. Only dwarf Mururu cattle are found in the area.

33. Even the careful Reverend Samuel Crowther paid 4 3/4d. per lb. of lint, and 5d to Ogunbonna, on which "no profit could be expected." C.H.S. CA2/LL August 31st, 1855, Venn to Crowther.
During the American Civil War the charges for cleaning and the use of the gins still equalled 1d., but Lagos traders paid the Abeokuta Commercial Association 1 1/2d. over all costs. Townsend remarked: "The cotton cleaner gets a large profit." C.M.S. CA2/085 November 2nd, 1861, Townsend to Secretary.

References make it clear that the loads were usually taken by porters.

With cotton this presumably meant the original price of the seed cotton.


The journey downstream could be reduced to a day and a half. See Reverend Samuel Crowther's journal to Sept. 30th, 1855. C.M.S. CA2/031b. African canoes are made of hollowed tree trunks and cannot be portaged.

Sardinia or Piedmont was an ally of Britain and France in the Crimean War 1853-1855.

C.M.S. CA2/032 May 9th 1856, S. Crowther to Venn.

A rough estimate of costs is given based on sources from the C.M.S. correspondence, but the figures come from different times when costs and prices varied. The following table covers 1856-1858 except for the proportion of seed cotton to lint, and the price of canvas which may have been cheaper in 1856-1858. Canvas was used to wrap the pressed bales before porterage and shipment. Three estimates are given: 1. when all costs and variables are high; 2. medium, and 3. low. They represent costs for buying, preparing and delivering to Liverpool one pound of ginned cotton or lint.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seed cotton at; (1)</th>
<th>1d. per lb. (2)</th>
<th>3/4d. per lb. (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 lbs to 1 lb. lint</td>
<td>1 1/2 lbs to 1 lb. lint</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d.</td>
<td>2.625d.</td>
<td>1.75d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginning and pressing. (3)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas (4)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conveyance to Agbamaya or Aro (5)</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canoe to Lagos, (6)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer to ship - at 1.0 per bale (7)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss at bar (15%) (8)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried forward Maximum</td>
<td>5.735</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>5.724</td>
<td>4.349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add:

| Freight to England (9) | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Maximum | 6.735 | 5.36 | 4.485 |
| Minimum | 6.724 | 5.349 | 3.974 |

Insurance and Liverpool dock charges would add a further sum — say 0.25d. Bales are estimated at 125 lbs each.

Continued over.
(1) Proportion of seed cotton to lint: C.M.S. CA2/085 November 2nd 1861 Townsend to Secretaries; and Colonial Office 14/7/172/41652 November 16th 1904, Egerton to C.O.

(2) C.M.S. CA1/032 S. Crowther Jun. Journal to Sept. 25th, 1855.

(3) " CA2/080 Feb. 2nd 1858, Robbin to Venn.

(4) " CA2/080 Feb. 8th 1860, Robbin to Venn.

(5) " CA2/032 Oct. 25th, 1856, S. Crowther Jun. to Venn.

(6) " CA2/032 Nov. 3rd 1857, Josiah Crowther to Venn.

(7) " CA2/032 May 9th 1856, S. Crowther Jun. to Venn. One dollar then equalled 4s. 4d.

(8) " CA2/085 July 28th, 1858, Townsend to Venn.

(9) " CA2/085 Oct. 1st 1857, Townsend to Venn.

It is of obvious interest to compare Clegg's figures as given in the Cotton Supply Reporter of Feb. 15th 1861 pp.428-429 with those of the Mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Fence (f s. d.)</th>
<th>1/2d. per lb.</th>
<th>3/ld. per lb.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>2d.</td>
<td>3d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressing and packing</td>
<td>3/16d.</td>
<td>3/16d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>1/ld.</td>
<td>1/ld.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 11/16d.</td>
<td>4 11/16d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or 3.7d.</td>
<td>or 4.7d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T. Ellison, Handbook of the Cotton Trade, pp.98 and 99. Based on Abeokuta figures 1855-1860, the overall cost to Liverpool was 5.22d.

During the years 1855-1860 prices of Upland Middling (from all sources) in Liverpool ranged from 5 5/8d. to 7 3/ld., Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1858, pp.306-311, but there were times when prices went much higher, at least for Fair Upland Bowed which reached 9 1/ld. in the fall of 1857, and 10 1/ld. during 1859. See T. Ellison, Handbook of the Cotton Trade, Table 29, p.128.

At the C.M.S. Venn showed marked business ability. "The other clerical secretaries, able men as they no doubt were, seem to have been virtually only assistants to Venn." E. Stock, The History of the Church Missionary Society, (3 vols.) London, 1899, 2:36.

"... all who come from Sierra Leone are looked upon with a respect almost equal, if not altogether so, to that of the white man." C.M.S. CA2/032 September 25th 1852, Samuel Crowther Jun. to Venn.
47. The European traders in Lagos objected to the "free" wharf for Africans, and this led to a long haggle over the exact position of the wharf. The C.M.S. were in a difficult position since Consul Campbell supported the traders, as did Acting-Consul McCoskery who was himself a merchant. See C.M.S. CA2/052 June 1st 1854, Irving to Venn.

48. A possible solution was for the cotton to be bought by a non-profit-making organisation.

49. The Provinces were Ake, Gbagura and Ona-Oke.

50. He was Okukenu who was Alake 1854-1862.

CHAPTER 4
AFRICAN REALITIES: CROPS AND LAND

Since Yoruba cotton growing was incidental to the main interests of both the C.M.S. and Manchester during the period from 1846 to 1872, no attention had been paid to its position in the Yoruba economy, and the problem of crop competition was not seriously examined. It is questionable how far the extent of crop competition was appreciated in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or how far the position of cotton in the agricultural cycle was known – or even how far the extent of local demand was realised. These three obstacles to the development of an export trade came to the fore in the period 1902-1929 when a number of attempts were made to find satisfactory solutions.

Yoruba country produces a wide variety of tropical crops including yams, cassava, maize (Indian corn), millet, sweet potato, groundnuts, bananas and plantains, citrus fruits, as well as cotton. In addition cocoa and kola can be grown within the rainforest area. The kinds of crops which can be grown depend mainly on the rainfall which varies roughly according to the latitude or distance from the coast. The moisture is brought in from the Atlantic by the south-west trades which blow towards the north until they encounter winds moving south from across the low-pressure area of the Sahara. The encounter of the two air masses usually produces rain. The movement of these air masses is subject to considerable variations and thus, in inland areas, rainfall is not only limited but irregular. The irregularity is the bane of much of Africa's agriculture and makes it essential that priority should be given to food crops.

Farming conditions change therefore – in general – as one moves north from the coast. Root crops – yams or cassava – are dominant up to around 8 30' degrees north, above which cereals – sorghum (guinea-corn), millet and some maize are the principal crops. Just as important as the type of crops is the type of fallows. Up to 7 degrees North fallows are woody or bushy; thereafter they change to grass and the amount of work given to this part of the farming schedule therefore much reduced.

Another fundamental factor is soil – the soil in Southern Nigeria is subject to important variations. Around Ibadan are the clay loams which are equal to the best in the whole country. The Ibadan loams reach to the Abeokuta area and much of the cotton grown there during the nineteenth century was probably grown on these loams. This soil, however, is also well suited to cocoa and as most of the loams lie within the rainforest or 45 degree isohyet, cocoa has superseded other crops over much of the area. On the other hand the soil more immediately to the north of Lagos is not favourable for cotton as it is too sandy.
S.W. NIGERIA - RAIN - FOREST
Shaded area shows rainforest - having at least 45" of rain (the northern boundary is close to the 60" isohyet). Not more than 3 months of one inch or less of rain (in general the shaded area has only two months) and a mean relative humidity of at least 40% at 1 p.m.

B.G.G.A. GINNERS IN MID-1907 UNDERLINED
BRITISH COTTON GROWING ASSOCIATION R.J. Harrison - Church, 'WEST AFRICA', London 1957 pp 67 & 449
losing its moisture rapidly under the drying effects of the sun.

Rainfall, temperature, and soil provide the basic geographical conditions for farming; its organisation depends on human factors. Although there have been changes in recent years, especially in the cocoa and kola-growing areas, ownership and management of the land is basically communal. The land was originally allotted to descent groups by the local ruler - oba or bale - and it was in turn given to the lineages whose chiefs\textsuperscript{8} assign it to individual farmers who, with their families, enjoy full usufructuary rights, and continue to do so while they or their sons farm their portion. The actual size of each unit controlled by the "elementary family" in the past must have been small, around one half to two acres,\textsuperscript{9} although depending on the type of fallow or virgin land which would have to be cleared, and even in the 1960's the average farm unit in the Western Region\textsuperscript{10} including the cocoa areas, was only 2.7 acres.\textsuperscript{11} But in addition each farming unit might have as many as fifteen acres left in fallow - the plots were broken up and a distance of five or more miles might exist between them.

Labour, like land, was organised on both a communal and individual basis. Until recent times, labour was the limiting factor in farming as land was plentiful. To overcome difficulties arising from labour shortages, group labour was used, especially in the heavy work of clearing, involving the removal of stumps and roots, and sometimes of other work like hoeing. This could take the form of the descent group working together as a team throughout the year, or involved bringing in workers from nearby farms which were usually occupied by members of the same lineage. Thus the aro, a kind of mutual assistance group, was a lineage organisation, giving its assistance on each farm in turn,\textsuperscript{12} and the oye was similar, although more of an occasion for a feast with the workers being rewarded with food and drink.

During the nineteenth century other sources of labour were also available including slaves, both common and domestic. For the chiefs, especially the warriors, this was the main source of labour. Ordinary farmers must have had little opportunity of employing slaves who could always escape, but they probably managed with 'pledged' labour, that is people who worked to pay off a debt. If pressed too hard, these people usually ran away, while hired labour was scarce, men disliking work associated with slavery.\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile women had their place mainly in the processing and marketing of farm and other produce, although they carried out light work on the farms when needed. The boiling and skimming of palm fruit to obtain the oil, preparation of butter from shea-nuts, and the ginning and spinning of cloth from cotton were left entirely to female hands.
The farmer thus usually had available only the assistance of his own family except during the special occasions when the aro or owe came to his aid. Probably the position during the nineteenth century was not very different from that in the Abeokuta area in the 1950's when it was found that each farmer had two wives, four children and a relative in his usual household. The tools used were well suited to the difficult and painstaking work of 'bush fallow' and in cultivation - a short hoe held in one hand while the other picked up weeds - the head being of iron made by a local smith, a cutlass or machete, which might have either a locally made iron blade or an imported steel one, and a digging stick. Well-suited as these tools were, their use involved considerable labour, while the work facing the family was challenging.

Much therefore depended on careful use of the land to reduce unnecessary labour. One answer was the use of rotations. The Yoruba farmer was using rotations long before western ideas reached him. In the wetter areas of the south maize, yams, cassava, or cocoyams might follow one another before the land was returned to fallow. Crops were planted at intervals on the same plots and grew together in "mixed cropping"; one crop being harvested as it ripened while another was sown on the same ground. One rotation in the Ibadan area in the 1930's was: late maize planted in September, growing with the late rains, and yams in November to grow with the main rains beginning in March to April. The late maize would be harvested in January to February, and early maize planted "through" the yams in March. Then cotton would follow, planted "through" the yams and the early maize. Towards the end of August the maize would be harvested, and the yams from the end of the year onward; the cotton usually being picked from January to March or April. During the following year only early maize and cassava would be grown, with cassava as a sole crop the year after. In northern Yorubaland yams were followed by maize, sorghum, (guinea-corn), and bulrush millet, with beans or peas with cassava the third year.

The greater part of the work was given up to the preparation of the yam plots, as a new plot was prepared every year. The basic farmland plot for yams covered one-third of an acre containing fifty rows of twenty yams in each row. Every yam had its own mound about 2 feet 6 inches high. When the yams were lifted, the mounds were hoed into ridges for the following crops. Weeding involved a great deal of work, as weeds are far more prolific in the rainy season of a tropical climate than in temperate zones.

In such a crowded schedule, the needs of individual crops were subordinated to the demands of the farming year as a whole. But the farmer did have a choice
in the kind of farming he undertook. He could grow "tree" crops like cocoa or kola in the rainforest, or he could give most attention to the collection of palm-nuts, often growing wild, or to the planting of groves of palm trees; on the other hand he could grow crops in rotation. His choice would depend partly on the local conditions and partly on the cash returns he might expect from the various crops.\(^1\)

A crop which became more popular as a result of its export value in the early 1900's was maize.\(^2\) It had the great advantage of being valuable as food and as an export or for sale in the local market - to the farmer exports were marginal, and in the event of a crop failure or a very short crop, there was the chance that something might be left for food. Maize is quick-growing and matures over a wide range of 75 to 150 days, and as a sole crop can be grown twice a year in Southern Nigeria, where there are nine months of rain, producing some 1500 lbs; or 900 lbs when only one crop is grown. As a mixed crop with two yields during the year about 1,000 lbs would be harvested. At market prices in 1906 these yields would have produced some 33s6d, 20s3d and 22s6d respectively.\(^3\)

One of the most widely grown food crops was yams which are a staple of Yoruba diet and grown extensively for sale. As many as 8,500 lbs can be produced per acre, but after providing for seed yams for the next crop, some 5,750 lbs are left for consumption or market.\(^4\) Crops naturally vary considerably and in the early 1960's over 15,000 lbs per acre were obtained from Ilorin Province. Taking the white yam (Dioscorea Rotundata) as an example, at 3s0d per dozen in 1906,\(^5\) 5,750 lbs would bring a return of £12 gross. In practice farmers and their families consumed most of their own yam crop; and if sent for sale, transport charges for yams were heavier than for other crops.\(^6\) The farmer is said by a reliable authority to have got £8-10 an acre.\(^7\) The disadvantages were that yams are slow-growing, needing two to three hundred days and forty inches of rain spread over seven months, thus confining their cultivation mainly to the south.

Groundnuts did not begin to be grown widely for export until 1912 - the date the railway to Kano was completed - and their cultivation was mainly in the North where they were best suited to the poorer soils and thus not a direct threat to cotton grown in the loam areas, such as those around Zaria. An average crop was about 600 lbs\(^8\) which would have brought the farmer around
Groundnuts, however, required more work than cotton and it was reckoned that cotton produced a higher return per man-hour than groundnuts. On the other hand groundnuts had a value, which the farmer recognised, of replenishing the soil with valuable nitrogen.

In terms of exports by far the most important crops were palm-oil and kernels — palm-oil being obtained from the pulp of the fruit and the kernels being pressed to give approximately 50% kernel-oil. Most of the palm fruit picked grew wild in forest areas or on trees allowed to grow on land cleared for crops. Sometimes the trees were specially planted in groves near villages. The palm is distinctly a species of the Southern and coastal districts as it needs 50-60 inches and over of rain during the year. The tree is very valuable to the Yoruba as it produces the widely favoured palm wine and is used as a sauce or relish with cereals, being rich in Vitamin A. But the palm is characteristic of a tree crop in that it needs about five years after planting before it begins to bear fruit, although the amount of labour would be limited. The output of an acre of fruit and kernels would have been some 2,000 lbs, bringing in £4.5 in 1907.

The other tree crops of the rainforest area were cocoa and the kola nut. Although Nigerian cocoa-growing lagged behind that of Ghana, it became increasingly cultivated from the beginning of the century, finding suitable conditions of soil and rainfall on the Ibadan loams. The bean as first produced is "wet" and has to be dried leading to a considerable loss in weight — between 350 and 500 lbs per acre being produced when dry. In the 1950's the average yield throughout the Western Region was put at 387.5 lbs — an amount in 1907 valued at £5.13s.0d, the farmer no doubt receiving less from the middlemen who usually bought the crop. The prices from cocoa varied but there is no doubt that in recent years when prices have risen that cocoa has become a highly profitable crop:

In Ibadan and Ile-Ife Divisions of Oyo Province and in parts of Ondo, Abeokuta, and Ijebu Provinces where cocoa production is concentrated, per capita income is more than double the national average and the high standard of living is obvious from the expensive houses and dresses of the local people.

Cocoa, however, was limited to the Ibadan loam soil and rainforest area, so that only a limited number of the farmers in the whole country could grow it.
The kola is a tree crop which has the great advantage of not needing such good soils as the Ibadan loams, but it does require some 50 inches of rainfall a year and a high humidity, thus confining its growth to the rainforest. At the prices ruling in 1910-11 a return of something over £8 per acre would have been obtained at the market. There has always been a good demand for kola nuts in the north where they are used as thirst-quenchers and stimulants, but the kola, like cocoa, has the disadvantage that it takes a number of years to grow before it bears.

The farmer had, therefore, a wide variety of cash crops from which to choose, although the heavy rainfall in most of Southern Yorubaland was suited to kola, cocoa, palm crops, citrus fruits and root crops; while the northern part (from 8 degrees north) grew more millet and the lighter grains. This distinction assisted in a high state of development in the exchange and marketing system, which was - and is - divided into weekly, and periodic, markets. The periodic markets operated on a "two-week" principle with a rest period every eighth day, and were organised so that there was a market available in every part of the region concerned every third day, although distances were up to ten and sometimes fifteen miles. Produce could thus be taken in small amounts as it was ready, the women being the chief carriers. The markets were closely organised and since they represented a particular locality must have been largely gatherings of kin-folk. The women formed the majority of the traders and their livelihood came in part from their trading, the profits of which they traditionally kept for themselves. There was a communal element in the marketing; for instance women gave their spun cotton to a member of the extended family in turn - to take to the market and sell. At the market traders in any one commodity were placed together, so that most of the sellers in the market must have been known to one another.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries neither Europeans nor their clerks were normally allowed in Yoruba markets. Thus, to some extent, "strangers" were excluded although the middlemen and women were present. Some would be local men, some from the larger "principal" markets or even from Lagos. They often operated on a credit basis, so that the farmer's crop was committed to them in advance. The arrangement worked because of the low profit margin - 2 1/2 - 5% - taken by each of the train of traders. Apart from general sale and exchange produce was bought by middlemen for taking away to the larger "principal" markets where bigger buyers - probably Europeans among them or their representatives - were to be found.
Naturally such large gatherings were used for other purposes than trade. Homes among the Yoruba are usually patrilocals, and the women are surrounded to a great extent by their husband's kin. The market is the recognised centre for meeting not only "business contacts", but for women to meet their own kin — neutral ground between husbands' and wives' families, although wives also regularly visit their own family homes. Besides being places for seeing members of one's family, markets also serve as centres for the exchange of news and as places where loans can be obtained in the presence of witnesses and — sometimes — collected.

In this system of mixed cropping and marketing cotton had to find its place. It had grown in Africa for centuries, and almost the whole of the continent is capable of producing it except such desert areas as the Sahara, the coastal plains around the horn of East Africa and the Kalahari Desert in the South. It was probably first cultivated for making cloth in the Indus Valley and from there found its way back into Africa where it had already begun growing as a lintless species. It was used in ancient Meroe, near Khartoum, and spread through the Sudan to West Africa and southwards into Zambia and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) where it was being used for making cloth in the 16th century.

Cotton growing for the making of cloth also reached the American continent via the Pacific centuries before Eric the Red or Columbus arrived on the east coast. In America the cotton was crossed with a native lintless species producing a new section of the genus called hirsutum, which includes all the modern Upland varieties, which are varieties of either the species hirsutum or of the species barbadense. The so-called native cottons of Nigeria belong to one or other of these species — Gossypium peruvianum in the southwest, G. vitifolium in the southeast and G. punctatum in the north. The ideal range of rainfall is from 20-55 inches; if there is too much rain cotton will run to shoots and leaves. It flourishes in the Ibadan and Zaria loams since after the growing period of rain, it needs a sunny ripening period of around four weeks before being picked. During this period the loams retain sufficient moisture to keep the cotton healthy. Since cotton was traditionally grown as a perennial, some of the conditions did not need to be too strictly observed, but they were important if cotton growing as an annual crop was to be introduced.

The price paid for one pound of seed cotton in Southern Nigeria until 1911,
was 1/2d, 3/4d, or 1d. The yield of lint in Nigeria as a whole was said to be 80 lbs of lint or 300 lbs of seed cotton per acre, which at 1d. per pound would have brought in 25s. But in the south yield could be much more, up to 600 lbs of seed cotton being obtained, which would bring in £2.10s.0d. - but these figures are for sole crops. They compare with the previous totals per acre given of palm-crops (oil and kernels together) of £4-5; cocoa £5; kola £8; yams £8-10; maize £1.13s.6d; and groundnuts, mainly a northern crop, of £1.7s.6d. It was said in the South that cotton did not pay for the "enormous labour" that had to be spent on the work involved. Since the return was low financially the farmer would not prepare the ground for sole crops of cotton as he would for other crops. In the south it was generally concluded that July was the best month for sowing cotton. A report in 1901 made it clear that successful cotton-growing involved a lot of work, whether grown as a sole or as a mixed crop. After the plants appeared weeding was necessary, then the plants had to be thinned. In order to produce more bolls (or pods), plants were to be cut back - or "ratooned" - to produce more shoots. When the bolls ripened and burst open, the cotton became discoloured by dust unless picked soon, and this meant more than one picking. Finally the seed cotton had to be dried in the sun before being ginned to help rid it of one of its most persistent enemies - Dysdercus Superstitiosus, the red cotton-stainer.

This work was intended for growing cotton as a sole crop, but even when grown in traditional Yoruba fashion as a "mixed" crop, being planted in July or August "through" yams and/or maize, the work was by no means light. Often the cotton was not picked till March or April as it helped to give some shade to growing yams being planted on the sides of the Yam mounds. But it was grown almost everywhere because the women's work included ginning, spinning and weaving cotton to produce the family's clothes. As a mixed crop the output was lower than as a sole crop. Experiments by the Nigerian Agricultural Department made the total return when mixed as about 17s.6d an acre only. But when growing it "mixed", on the sides of the yam mounds or elsewhere, the farmer could include it without great extra work, and maximise his returns as a whole. During the first year of rotation with a full range of crops - yams, two maize crops and cotton - and possibly other crops like gourds and calabashes - he could obtain at least £10.7s.6d per acre; more than from any single crop.
In addition he assured himself of his food. "Mixed" and "inter-cropped" in this fashion cotton fitted in well - "times of harvesting and planting are distinct from those of any other crop, so that cotton has a useful place in the farming calendar."54

It was therefore sound commercial sense which induced the Nigerian farmer to continue planting cotton in traditional fashion, although this had some disadvantages with imported types of cotton, such as varieties of American Upland which proved vulnerable to insect attack. The continuance of the traditional methods was thus also an argument for continuing the growth of traditional types of African cottons or a related variety. The larger market which the farmer looked to for such cotton as he would sell was the local one, not that for export. And the cotton which was in demand for local spinning and weaving was the local varieties. If the export market insisted on American, which was difficult to "intercrop", then it would pay less for the African cottons, which made it all the more likely that the farmer would seek an outlet for them in the local market.

In Yoruba country spinning is the work of the women; while weaving is undertaken by both women and men. Women weave as a home industry, using a vertical loom producing a cloth from 16 to 22 inches wide, the sale of both yarn and cloth being a long-established part of the whole marketing system. Meanwhile the male weavers are professionals who work wholetime and specialise in the production of cloths suited for "best-wear". They use a horizontal loom making narrow strips of cloth, usually four to five inches wide but sometimes extending to nine inches, and produce about three yards per day.56 The weaving in turn leads on to a further, and very widespread, industry, that of dyeing, usually of lengths of yarn dyed dark blue with indigo. The plant producing the dye grows wild and it is part of the women's work to pick it. A famous method of using the dye is that which forms the patterns of the "adire" cloth.

The local industry showed itself capable of meeting the competition for cotton from the export trade and its buyers could normally offer as good, if not better, prices. It had the advantage of working through established channels of trade, especially through the local market system. In addition it avoided many of the costs - such as transport - which the export trade had to meet. In certain respects the local industry "cornered the market" for cloth for "best wear" and ceremonial occasions, such as the festivals for the orisa...
or local deities. As the garments used for these ceremonies were decorative and expensive, this industry could survive outside competition and pay more, if necessary, for the cotton. In 1913 the Director of Agriculture for Northern Nigeria was told that local agents were offering 1d. more for cotton than the export buyers.57

The local industry produced an entirely distinctive range of cloths which were often highly embroidered - the "agbada" or gown for men and the "iro" or wrapper, and "gele" or headscarf for the women. Yellows and greens were often used with the basically blue patterns for the women's clothes. These clothes were expensive, ranging up to as much as £15 for a gown in the early 1900's, but in the 1960's the usual range of prices was said to be from 15s. to £3, which required 4 2/3 days work: which would have brought the weavers roughly from one to five shillings per day.59

The men's work thus included a specialised trade outside the field of competition of cheaper imported cloths from Britain. The sale of cloth was linked with the export of the raw cotton since interest had been aroused in West Africa largely as a growing market for export cloths and the purchase there of raw cotton was regarded as in part justifying itself as a means of putting money into the pockets of potential customers. This was a similar pattern of trading to that undertaken by Thomas Clegg, and in later years most of the profit was to be found in the sale of piece-goods, as the profit margins on these goods were very large, despite the cheapness of the price.60 Manchester's vision of West Africa as a great centre of cotton production was in part a reflection of their interest in it as a market. And they seem to have met a need in their exports - in providing a wider range and variety of cheaper cloths for everyday wear than could be easily made by the Nigerian industry. When the women went to market they would not wear best, but still wanted to be well dressed in bright garments suited to the brilliant sunlight. This kind of cloth Manchester was well able to produce. But as regards the "hard core" of locally made cloths, this was part of the people's way of life and it would have been extremely difficult, as well as totally wrongheaded, to break into it. When the women did make cheaper cloths for sale, Manchester could as a rule compete. In 1907 women on the borders of North and South Nigeria were selling cloth at 10d. per lb.61 If the women had done the ginning, spinning and weaving themselves this would have meant a net return of 8 3/4d. or roughly 1d. per day, while if the weight is converted into length - 2d. per yard.62 In the same year Kano women were selling
cloth 27 inches wide at 3d. per yard. The average price of a yard of British made piece-goods in 1907 was 3.09d. The African cloth was thus competitive in price but only at a low rate of return for hours worked. The work, however, was done as a home industry to augment family "income", and thus not measured by "market" rates.

Manchester was not likely to obtain "millions of bales" of cotton from Southern Nigeria; but it was likely to attract a certain surplus of African-type cotton after the demand of the local market had been met. In the northern areas of Yoruba country, there was less crop-competition and rainforest crops could not be grown, and as a former Director of Agriculture has said, cotton does well where guinea-corn grows. Here, however, transport problems became more serious in their effect on costs, and the question of successful production would remain open until new forms of transport came into use.

Nevertheless there were opportunities for outside merchants. The Industrial Institution at Abeokuta had shown that a profit could be made at the ginnery at near-normal prices, and the market for piece-goods in West Africa continued to grow. It was probably the best way to "harness" the middleman by giving him a two-way trade - piece-goods going out from Britain to the markets and raw cotton coming in - and this trade cycle brought in profits at the end whatever the results of the individual parts. But just as the nineteenth century pointed the way towards Native Agency on grounds of health, so did the conditions of crop competition and the presence of the local industry point the way towards cotton growing continuing as a "native industry" during colonial times. Individual family units following an agricultural cycle needed cotton for their clothing requirements. Whatever the world price, there would be some surplus out of the total cotton grown, and this would find its way to market. It was for this marketable surplus that the local African buyers and the Europeans or their agents were competing. Once he had grown sufficient cotton for his family's needs the African farmer cannot have been much concerned about the disposal of this surplus - his essential needs had been catered for and this surplus was of marginal significance in his overall farming activities.
CHAPTER 4 FOOTNOTES

1. Including the yellow indigenous variety Dioscorea Cayenensis and the white indigenous Dioscorea Rotundata.

2. See map. Cocoa was said to be growing at Bonny in 1879 (C.A. Krug and E. Quartey-Papafio, *World Cocoa Survey*, Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations Studies No.63, Rome 1964, p.138) Captain J.P.L. Davies was growing good cacao on his Itele estate north of Lagos in 1890, and plants were regularly distributed from Lagos Botanical Station. Cocoa exports passed the £1,000 mark in 1897. See Sir Wm. Geary, *Nigeria under British Rule*, London 1927, p.60.


Temperature is fairly constant varying roughly between 70 and 90 degrees Fahrenheit (21.1 to 32.2 Centigrade) The best temperature for growing cotton is 21-22 degrees Centigrade. See *African Maps and Statistics* 1965, Africa Institute, Pretoria, pp.116-117.


5. Conditions vary as a stretch of coast in Southern Ghana is ecologically equivalent to 8 1/2 to 9 degrees North in Southern Nigeria.

6. See map.

7. Another area with good heavy loams is Zaria, the main cotton-producing region in the north.

8. Usually the eldest men.

9. Average units in Irun and Owo were between half an acre and two acres at the beginning of the century, although there were a few up to six acres in Ekiti. G.J. Afolabi Ojo, *Yoruba Culture; a Geographical Analysis*, Ife University, University of London Press, 1971 (first edn. 1966), p.52 fn.

10. Corresponding to Western State until early 1976.


13. This was called the Iwarefa system, in which a brother, sister, child or sometimes a nephew could be a pawn for debt. See N.A. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, Ibadan University Press, 1970, Chapter 5.


17. The prices taken as a basis are from the Bluebooks of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Their main purpose is to show the comparative values of crops.

18. Lagos Annual Report 1901, p.9. Its exports grew from 600 tons in 1903 to 4,600 tons in 1904.


20. Morgan and Pugh, West Africa, pp.85-87. 8,500 lbs per acre can be produced but somewhere between 1500 and 4000 lbs are used as seed.


22. Lagos Gazette, March 1st, 1902, No.11, p.163.


27. Up to 1914 Germany took most of the kernels and Britain the palm-oil. In 1905 palm products amounted to 86.5% of the total exports of Lagos (Lagos Gazette, March 14, 1906, p.2), and 76.4% of the total goods carried down to Yardo (Lagos) by the railway. (Annual Report, S. Nigeria, 1906, p.79).

28. The oil content of the commoner trees was about 22% (see G.C. Dudgeon, The Agricultural and Forest Products of British West Africa, London, 1911, p.65) but the extraction was about half (W.B. Morgan and J.C. Pugh, op.cit. p.186). R.E. Dennett, Agricultural Progress in Nigeria, Journal of the African Society, 1918-1919, vol.18, pp.266-289, gives the yield of an acre of wild palms as 261 lbs of palm-oil. Dudgeon (p.65) gives output of kernels per acre as 20% of total yield or 400 lbs. Dennett says 197 lbs. In the S. Nigeria Bluebook for 1907 local prices are given as £12 a ton for kernels and 1s.7d. per gallon for palm-oil. Calculations from the 1910 and 1911 Bluebooks (p.Y4) show that an Imperial gallon of oil weighed 9.1 lbs.
29. Kola acuminata is the kind traditionally used in divination and for offering as hospitality. Kola Nitida is a later introduction.


31. S. Nigeria Bluebook, 1907, Y3. Much depends on quality. G.C. Dudgeon, Superintendent of Agriculture for British West Africa from 1905-1910, stated that cocoa from Ajege sometimes fetched 6 1/2d. per lb. (C.O. 520/47/25814 June 28, 1907, Thorburn to C.O. Enclosure) In 1907 the local cocoa price was 3 1/2d. per lb. of $32.13s.1d. per ton. S. Nigeria Bluebook, 1907, Y3.


34. Some seven years for kola and six for cocoa.

35. The traditional four-day Yoruba week with a market day every third day.

36. In the 1950's over 80% of the traders and sales workers in Lagos were women. See B.W. Hodder and U.I. Ukwu, *Markets in West Africa*, Ibadan University Press, 1969, Chapter 4, on which this section is largely based.

37. G.J. Afolabi Ojo, *Yoruba Culture*, p.84.


41. Cotton belongs to the order of Bombacaceae which includes the hibiscus, and produces a large white or yellow flower. The original types are found in all the tropical continents - Africa, North and South America, Australia and Asia. The area in latitudes is from 45 degrees North to 34 degrees South between the isothermal lines of 15.5 Centigrade or 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

42. The earlier cotton had thirteen chromosomes, the hirsutum all have twenty-six.

43. Gm Peruvianum and gm. vitifolium belong to the species barbadense; gm. punctatum to the hirsutum species (part of the hirsutum section). Gm. Peruvianum is said to have been introduced by the Portuguese and Gm. vitifolium by the Spanish.

44. F.J. Afolabi Ojo, *Yoruba Culture*, p.83.


47. See Annual Report, Moor Park 1926, p.155, in Agricultural Bulletin of the Nigerian Agricultural Dept. 1927; and B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book, No.1, May 27, 1921, for remark of O.T. Faulkner that the yield in the south was some six times that of the north.


52. P.R. Irvine, A Textbook of West African Agriculture, Soils and Crops, Oxford University Press, 1934, p.151. This is taken as referring to a rotation in which cotton has been planted before the seed yams.

53. Bulletin of the Imperial Institute, Vol.29, No.2, July 1931, p.215. This was based on 1d per lb seed cotton.

54. J.B. Morgan and J.C. Pugh, op. cit., p.91.


59. P.C. Lloyd, A.L. Mabogunje and B. Awe, City of Ibadan, pp.157-158. Adjusted to 1907 price levels these would be equivalent to 5s.3d. and £1.3s.0d. (Price index Whitaker's Almanac 1974 p.1194 and Chamber's Encyclopedia 1959 Edition)

60. J.A. Hutton, "We estimate £100,000 of (goods imported into West Africa) pay for £150,000 of cotton." Empire Cotton Growing Committee, Minutes of Evidence No.3, Board of Trade, 55/25, October 31, 1917.


62. The time taken is based partly on "Cotton in Northern Nigeria," Bulletin of the Imperial Institute, Vol.3, 1905, pp.49-55 - itself taken from a report by Lugard. According to this 1.6 lbs seed cotton can be ginned in one day and the resulting (about 0.5 lbs) lint spin in 3 days. For 3 1/2 lbs seed cotton ginning would take about 2 1/4 days and spinning 6 days. For weaving reference has been made to D. Forde and R. Scott, (ed. M. Perham), The Native Economies of Nigeria, London, 1916, p.79. During the 1910s cloth of 1600 sq. inches was woven locally in 2 1/2 days. According to an accepted equivalent for producing "drills" or "ducks" 2.3026 lbs lint produce 3,280 sq. feet of cloth. (Information from K.R.M. Anthony of the British Cotton Research Association). Thus 1 lb
lint would produce some 675 sq. inches, taking about one day, making 9 1/4 days in all.

The gross return of 10d would be reduced by 3 1/2d, for buying seed cotton, but the seed could be sold as food for 2 1/2d. A further 1/4d. has been deducted for wastage which is about 10% in British factories. (Letter from the Shirley Institute, Manchester, Sept. 26th, 1974).

Labour among Africans at the beginning of the century was about 2d. per day. See C.A. Birtwistle, "Cotton Growing and Nigeria," Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. 39, 1907, pp. 80-104.

63. B.C.G.A. Minute Book, No.1, Oct. 16th, 1907, special meeting - talk by C.A. Birtwistle.


65. Interview with J.R. Mackie.

66. For Nigeria the market was about 40 million square yards per year from 1895-1906; by 1912 the total had reached 100 million, although it fell after 1917. See M. Johnston, Cotton Imperialism in West Africa, African Affairs, Vol.73, April 1974, pp. 178-187.
CHAPTER 5

COLONIAL REALITIES: ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The second half of the nineteenth century saw a conflict in British policy towards the West Coast. On the one hand the taking of Lagos and the setting up of a Crown Colony there, led to a desire to increase commerce in order to obtain more revenue to develop the Colony, and thus to an interest in promoting peace in the interior. On the other hand the expenses of the West African Colonies and settlements, which had to be subsidised from Britain, provoked a demand to withdraw from as many of the settlements as possible, except Sierra Leone - a movement which was supported by the Select Committee of Parliament which sat to consider the position and reported in 1865. Both policies towards the coast arose from the need for more revenue but for the time being those advocating economy had their way. "Forward" policies were discouraged and changes were brought about to economise on costs of administration - the West African Colonies being placed under the Governor of the West African Settlements in Sierra Leone in 1866. The need for more revenue, even after these restrictions, became much more serious with the general economic depression in Europe, and the price of the West African staple, palm-oil, underwent a very serious decline. One result was to drive traders into the interior to seek more trade and thus make up on lost profits; another was to seek for alternative exports by promoting other crops as exports which would help to replace the lost trade and thus refill the depleted coffers of the colonial treasuries.

The establishment of the British administration in Lagos in 1861 and the continuation of the civil wars among the Yoruba "successor" states to the Oyo Empire combined to bring about a change in British policy, especially in regard to Abeokuta. The position in the interior was marked by the growing power of Ibadan, who usurped much of the real authority of the Alafin in New Oyo, although his titular position remained. The Alafin divided his defence between the new states of Ibadan and Ijaiye, but quarrels between the two soon developed into war, Yorubaland as a whole showing increasing fears of the hegemony of Ibadan. Abeokuta went to Ijaiye's aid but that city fell in 1862. Ijebu-Ode now joined forces with Abeokuta to deny Ibadan access to the coast where she obtained her guns and powder.

These events were not to the liking of the new British administration in Lagos under the Governor, Commander Glover, R.N., and he followed a policy of
opening up trade with Ibadan, if necessary by using "roundabout" routes to the West - via Ketu - or in the East via Makun, Ondo and Ife. But when the town of Ikorodu near the mouth of the River Ogun showed a desire to open up trade, it was attacked by the Egba. In 1865 a direct clash between the British and the Egba occurred and the latter were driven from Ikorodu. In return the European missionaries were expelled from Abeokuta in the "Ifole" of 1867 and a new government, the Egba United Board of Management - part traditional part Saro - was established.5 In these circumstances the administration in Lagos under the control of the Governor in Sierra Leone could do little more than mark time.

The position was different on the Niger where the river remained an artery of trade. In 1857 the philanthropist and shipbuilder, MacGregor Laird, began annual voyages up the river supported by a subsidy from the British Government. The development of the C.M.S.'s Niger Mission was dependent on these voyages under the leadership of the Rev. Samuel Crowther.6 When Laird died in 1861, the West Africa Company assisted in transporting the missionaries along the river, and Samuel and Josiah Crowther worked on the river as agents of the Company.7 The difficulty of carrying trade into the interior was emphasised by the continual attacks on the ships by the Delta middleman, and gunboats had to be sent to give protection. Crowther, faithful to Venn's doctrines, set up Industrial Institutions where cotton was to be ginned and baled at a few centres on the lower reaches of the river, but the problem of supervision proved very difficult as navigation was restricted by the seasons above Onitsha.8 The 1870's saw a rapid development of the situation following the general trade depression in Europe and the heavy fall in palm-oil prices. The need to increase turnover caused Delta firms to move further up the river and competition became intense. In 1878 a French firm, the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Equatoriale made its appearance on the Niger. The British firms were sufficiently alarmed to amalgamate - including the West African Company - as the United African Company9 in 1879 under the directing influence of George Goldie Taubman.10 This marked the end of Native Agency on the river, as Goldie was strongly opposed to Saro traders except in subordinate positions; and the Church Missionary Society itself accepted the primacy of the European in mission work.11

Conflicting international interests brought about the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, which recognised "spheres of influence" in Africa provided they were justified by effective occupation. It led Britain to take a greater
interest both in the control of the Lagos hinterland and the region of the Niger, although it was unwilling to shoulder more than the absolute minimum of expenses needed for administration. In 1886 Goldie was given a charter to establish the Royal Niger Company which became responsible for the administration of the river and adjoining areas as far as Lokoja and Ibi. At the same time a separate Protectorate was established on both sides of the Niger Delta, called the Oil Rivers Protectorate, whose western boundaries extended to Lagos Colony and eastern to the Camerouns. In the Lagos hinterland efforts were made to procure peace by mediation, and a Protectorate Treaty was signed with Oyo in 1886.

Little, however, was achieved - the war of Ibadan against the neighbouring Yoruba states rumbled on, and the blocking of the trade routes to the interior became more serious as the depression continued. Sir Alfred Moloney who took over the Governorship of the Colony when it became "independent" in 1886 had been ready to mediate. The succeeding Governor, Sir Gilbert Carter, took stronger measures. In 1892 the Ijebu were bombarded and forced to open up the routes to the interior under their control. Carter made a tour of the hinterland states the following year signing treaties of protection with the Alafin, and with Abeokuta, the latter expressly preserving "the independence" of the Egba. A treaty with Ibadan was signed later the same year. Opposition continued from the Emirates of Nupe and Ilorin, parts or the whole of which lay south of the Niger. Their objections were ended by a campaign in 1896-97 conducted by Sir George Goldie in person with the forces of the Royal Niger Company and other forces recruited specially for the operation. The result was unfortunate in that it divided the administration of Yoruba country between Lagos and the Royal Niger Company. Meanwhile to the east of Lagos lay the Niger Coast Protectorate (formerly called the Oil Rivers Protectorate) which was still under the supervision of the Foreign rather than the Colonial Office.

Changes were made in these arrangements in 1900. The British Government was under considerable financial and political pressure during these years - it found itself in a position of diplomatic isolation until agreements in 1904 revived the Anglo-French Entente. The German Naval Laws were taking effect and the unsettled situation in South Africa had broken out into the Boer War in 1899. Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 had alienated the French, who brought pressure to bear on Britain by continual incursions into disputed border areas in
West Africa. A treaty in 1890 had marked out the northern limits of British influence in Nigeria - from Say on the Niger to Barrawa on Lake Chad (lying generally between 13 and 14 degrees North), but the western frontier was ill-defined. In 1894 Captain Lugard \(^{16}\) succeeded in signing a treaty which gave Britain control of Borgu, on Nigeria's west frontier, and in 1898 the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, \(^{17}\) decided on the formation of the West African Frontier Force to defend British interests in the area. The entire region to the north of the Niger, besides Ilorin and part of Nupe to the south, was in the control of the Royal Niger Company, which lacked the strength to oppose a major power, such as France. Changes of administration therefore became necessary and in 1900 new arrangements were made which came into force after the Charter of the Royal Niger Company had been withdrawn subject to generous compensation. The Company's former territories were divided - north of Idah they became part of the new Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which stretched north to include Sokoto, Katsina and to touch the waters of Lake Chad, and included Borgu, Ilorin and Kabba Provinces, and further east the part of Benue Province which lay south of the Benue River. To the south of Idah the former Royal Niger Company's territories became part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria \(^{18}\), which had already been administering the districts of Benin and Warri which border on Lagos Protectorate.

The Governor of Lagos in 1900 was Sir William MacGregor, \(^{19}\) a man of considerable ability and imposing stature, with wide colonial experience. His chief claim to the position was his doctorate of medicine. The death-rate among Europeans in Lagos was still a matter of great concern, and it was only in 1899 that (Sir) Ronald Ross \(^{20}\) definitely identified the anopheles mosquito as transmitting malaria. MacGregor had been chosen by Chamberlain largely for his sympathetic approach towards the people in his charge, a quality which was badly needed at a time when Britain was being threatened on so many sides. \(^{21}\) The Boer War was in progress and all reserves of troops were being sent to South Africa. At the same time the extension of British authority into the interior in compliance with the conditions agreed on at Berlin in 1884-1885, was only then taking place. Troops had to be available both to contend with possible incursions by French or German forces into areas claimed by Britain, and to deal with uprisings by African powers who objected to the occupation. The lack of general reserves in the Empire at the time meant that the British West African Colonies and Protectorates had to back one another up. Trouble occurred in Ashanti where Prempeh,
the Asantehene, had been exiled in 1896, and a revolt against British protection broke out in 1900, the Governor of the Gold Coast being besieged in Kumasi. In May Lagos dispatched 377 officers and men of its "Hausa Force" to assist. A further call on her military forces came at the end of 1901 - this time from Lagos's eastern neighbour, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, where a campaign was undertaken against the mysterious "Long Juju" of Aro-Chuku. On this occasion 259 officers and men, together with 150 carriers, were sent to the Protectorate leaving the Lagos Battalion in the Colony at little more than half strength.

Apart from these forays outside the area of Lagos's own immediate responsibility, there were security problems within the Colony and Protectorate itself. In the Colony MacGregor found problems in obtaining the confidence of the African population of Lagos, especially that of the educated members of the community. The constitution of the Colony at this time consisted of the Governor as head of the administration advised and assisted by the Executive and Legislative Councils - whose combined authority had been extended to Lagos Protectorate by the Order-in-Council of 1887. These formed the typical structure of a Crown Colony. It contained little to arouse the interest or confidence of the local inhabitants. The Executive Council consisted of officials and the Governor; the Legislative Council contained not only officials, but several representatives from the community at large - including Europeans - selected by the Governor. In 1901 two were from the European commercial community and there were three Africans.

This body was not an effective means of "selling" policy to the inhabitants of Lagos in general who were kept in step with developments by a critical press. To involve the Lagos African, MacGregor established "The Lagos Institute" which would give government an opportunity to sound out local opinion on forthcoming legislation and other developments. It was announced in a manner designed to awaken the interest of the educated minority - its aims being described as "the study of Literature, Science and Art." From a security viewpoint the Protectorate was of more concern, as it had only recently been taken over, and unless the British presence was made real could become a field for foreign intrigue. MacGregor took an early opportunity to tour the main Protectorate areas. He was angered to find educated young men from Lagos acting as correspondents in the interior for the Lagos newspapers. Equally disturbing he found an atmosphere of insubordination towards the more important chiefs. This was in part the result of the British Protectorate which
made the protection of other "powers" superfluous. Ibadan was allowed to keep her overlordship of over ninety-one dependent towns and villages, in the more important of which she stationed her own residents or "ajeles". But she was herself made dependent on the Alafin of Oyo, a position which was formalised in 1917. Many of the Ekiti towns wished to throw off their allegiance to the Owa of Ilesha. British rule was to be through the great chiefs and, if necessary, forces had to be available to back them up.

Relations with the Alake of Abeokuta were happier than those with Ibadan. When Sir Gilbert Carter had visited the city to obtain the Treaty of 1893, he had found the Alake in a powerless position with other officials conducting the Government. The succeeding Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, corrected the situation by establishing the Egba United Government in 1898 which included the four ruling kings under the Alake, leading chiefs and an efficient secretary in J.H. Samuel (later A. Edun). In 1899 the railway being built from Lagos reached Abeokuta bringing it more closely under British influence. MacGregor's relationship with the Alake, Gbadebo, became so close that it gave rise to criticism in the Colonial Office, and an official minuted "... it is even rumoured that (the Governor) once held the Regal umbrella over the Alake's head." It was owing to MacGregor's efforts that Gbadebo visited Britain in 1904 and was received by Edward VII.

MacGregor thus warmly supported government by the provincial chiefs, acting in practice very much as his own agents. He took two steps which were designed to buttress this system of administration. The first was the Native Councils Ordinance, finally promulgated at the end of 1901 after very considerable opposition, especially from two of the three African members of the Legislative Council. The Ordinance gave the Governor the legal authority both to appoint and dismiss the chiefs and members of all the "Native Councils" if he wished. The basis of their authority was thus removed from the section of their own society who had made the choice of chief to the Governor who could henceforth deal with them as a senior official in a bureaucracy. The governor was also given the power to extend the system of provincial, town and other Councils throughout the Colony and Protectorate as he considered desirable. The chiefs were to preside at meetings of their Councils but would be assisted by the Residents.

The Native Councils Ordinance contained a further provision which gravely
affronted the African community in Lagos. Under Governor McCallum a Native Advisory Board had been set up in 1897 containing both representative chiefs and educated men. Now MacGregor was to replace the Board with his Central Native Council, which was to consist of chiefs from the Colony area and any chiefs from the Protectorate who were available. But the educated Lagos community was no longer to be represented as such, although prominent men who were not chiefs could be included. 36

The Native Councils Ordinance was widely criticised in certain circles in Britain, especially by the Aboriginees Protection Society. MacGregor gave the Society an interview when he was on leave in which he was obliged to define his conception of government in the Protectorate. He was taxed by the Secretary with the fact that the Egba Government was described as "independent" in the treaty signed in 1893 by Sir Gilbert Carter. MacGregor replied: "That was a mere phrase; they are deprived of the position of an independent state in the same article." He acknowledged only their "autonomy" to handle their internal affairs. This was a realistic view but one which was not shared at the time by the Alake and his people. 37 MacGregor's "indirect rule", although successful on a purely personal level, was thus based on a deliberate misunderstanding, which must be accounted a serious flaw. In carrying it out, however, he was acting in the spirit of Chamberlain's instructions to "keep the peace". This was essential, not only because of the strains on imperial resources at the turn of the century, but because of the precarious economic position of the Colony during a time of recession. Disturbances in the interior would cause a very serious disruption of trade which Lagos could not afford. 38

Apart from the political problems the result of the expansion into the interior was to put pressure on to the revenue of the Colonies and Protectorates concerned, as any kind of expedition meant additional expenses, especially in the use of porters. Expenditure in Lagos rose noticeably in 1886, 1887, and in 1892 to 1894 and on to 1899. 39 Revenue also rose, but in 1887, 1892 and 1899, for instance, fell well below expenditure. And for all five of Britain's West African colonies 40 expenditure rose at a faster rate between 1895 and 1900 than exports. 41 Expansion of revenue was difficult because of the trade depression and generally falling prices of primary products, in particular of palm products. 42

The Colonial Office disliked deficits which could quickly lead to parliamentary grants involving control from the Treasury, and the traditional British policy was to make each Colony or Protectorate pay its own way.
During these years Africa was becoming of increasing importance to Britain in matters of trade. During 1880-1889 5.5% of British exports went to Africa (including South Africa); by 1911-1913 the proportion had risen to 10.3% and the increase of cotton piece-goods to Lagos showed an increase of no less than 81% in 1900 over those of 1890.

International agreements had laid down certain safeguards for trade in Africa. The Act of Berlin had enjoined that the trade of all nations should "enjoy complete freedom" in the Conventional Basin of the (River) Congo. And the Anglo-French Convention had been signed in 1898 which had agreed on reciprocity. Within the Ivory Coast, Gold Coast, Dahomey and Nigeria, persons and goods of both countries and of their colonies shall for thirty years enjoy the same treatment in all matters.

Africa was thus not only a market of growing importance, especially for cotton goods, but one in which the underlying conditions for future expansion had already been laid down. India continued to be a substantial importer of British piece-goods. In Europe and the United States the tariff walls were being pushed up faster than ever, and the relative importance of West Africa thus increased.

The recession of trade brought about increased pressure on the Colonial Office to take whatever remedial measures were available. In 1886 when Lagos was finally established as a Colony on its own, a Governor was appointed who took a close interest in its natural history and in the commercial possibilities of as yet undeveloped crops. This was Sir Alfred Moloney. He had already acted as Lieutenant-Governor in Lagos and had formed a Botanic Station on the island in 1883. His immediate aim had been to combat the evil effects of forest clearing in the Colony. Moloney's enthusiasm was shown by his book, "Sketch of the Forestry of West Africa, with Particular Reference to its Principal Commercial Products." His interests naturally brought him into correspondence with Kew, where Sir Wm. Hooker, who had corresponded with Henry Venn on West African commercial products, was still Director.

Kew's interest in West Africa had begun in the late eighteenth century when the gardens were a Royal preserve. In 1772 George III made (Sir) Joseph Banks in effect director of Kew. Banks' wide-ranging interests were concerned mainly with collecting botanical specimens. He was a correspondent of the great Swedish botanist, Linnaeus, who laid down the fundamental classification used today. Banks established botanic gardens or stations in such diverse areas as
Australia, the West Indies and West Africa. He recommended Adam Afzelius, a pupil of Linnaeus, to Wilberforce as a suitable botanist for the Sierra Leone Company and Afzelius arrived in Sierra Leone in 1792 where he established a "Garden of Experiment" and built up a considerable collection, although attempts to grow cotton - local and Brazilian varieties - failed under attacks of termites and grasshoppers. Kew sent out two gardeners but they soon died. Afzelius left Sierra Leone finally in 1796, but when interest in botanical matters revived, Kew already had a record of work in the region.

Botanic gardens were also intended as centres for the propagation of new varieties brought in from outside. During the nineteenth century Kew achieved two remarkable successes in transferring commercially valuable plants to new environments - the introduction of rubber to Malaya and of tea to Sri Lanka (Ceylon). But Kew's role was that of adviser to the British Government departments concerned, and it found that there was often little practical result - this depended on the local colonial officials, and in particular the Governor.

Sir Alfred Moloney was therefore very welcome, and early in 1887 a meeting was held at the Colonial Office to discuss the establishment of West African botanic stations. It was attended by A.H. Meade and Sidney Webb of the Colonial Office staff, Daniel Morris, Assistant Director of Kew, and Moloney. Plans were drawn up on the basis of what had been done in the West Indies. The Botanical Stations had two main aims - to produce the growth of trees and plants of likely marketable value, and to serve as a "visible means of instruction to the Natives of the Colony and of the people of the Interior Kingdoms", who would be encouraged to visit them. A further advantage was to train "the young blood" of the country in agricultural pursuits and give agriculture an attraction which it had hitherto lacked among the educated.

At the end of 1887 Lagos Botanic Station was established on the nearby mainland at Ebute Metta where the house and compound belonging to Bishop Crowther were taken over for the curator - the original area of the station being 3 3/4 acres. The curator chosen was James MacNair, who had been in charge of the Hope Nurseries in Jamaica. Attention was also given to the training of the "young blood": after considerable searching two suitable candidates were found from well-known Lagos families, T.B. Dawodu and F.G.R. Leigh. The training of young Africans was stimulated in part by the same reasons which had prompted the adoption of Native Agency in undertaking the Industrial Institution
at Abeokuta. The "climate" was still dangerous both for Europeans and West Indians, and it would be impossible to carry out the intended program of extending the Botanical Stations throughout the country unless Africans were in charge because of the death-rate and the expense that would be involved if Europeans only were employed. The two young men were sent on a three and a half year course, mostly at Hope Nurseries, Jamaica, with a final year at Kew.

A large variety of commercially valuable plants was grown at the station and sold off to applicants at modest prices ranging from 1/2d. to 1 1/2d. each. Moloney took a particular interest in the coconut for producing copra and coir, as well as an improved type of cotton. Some experimental work was done on cotton and a selection of seeds - mostly American but including some Egyptian - was sent from the Botanic Garden, Calcutta, in 1888. By the end of the year seeds of both types were available for sale but there were not many buyers. Other plants grown for sale were coffee - Arabica and Liberica, but mainly the latter, kola acuminata, rubber, cacao, red pepper, ginger and others. For the quarter to June 30th, 1895 over 18,000 plants were distributed, 15,700 being Coffee Liberica. The coffee planting, however, was faced by the same forces which had brought down the price of palm-oil and kernels - overproduction in the world as a whole of primary products, and the profits to be gained by Coffee Liberica dropped sharply.

Moloney also encouraged agricultural development at a different level. Many of the wealthier members of the Lagos community were beginning to take an increasing interest in the growing of crops which could be marketed only locally as overseas trade brought in reduced profits or worse. They were ready to take an interest in the Botanical Station. In 1888 Moloney formed the Honorary Agricultural Annual Committee to supervise and encourage the work of the station. He was himself President, and representatives of the four leading Missions and educated Africans formed the membership. It provided an interesting link with the mid-century work on cotton in Abeokuta and Lagos in which the missionaries and Saros had cooperated.

The position of the Botanic Station was consolidated by further developments in 1893. Sierra Leone was considering the establishment of a station and the question of forming a common policy with agreed standards of training and of salaries arose. Kew therefore suggested a conference in London when all the West African Governors were on leave together. The Colonial Office appears to have been thinking more widely in terms of a program of handicraft training in which agriculture would play its part, and be fitted into programs of industrial training already being undertaken by the Wesleyan and Basle Missions.
The conference took place on September 12th 1893, being attended by all four Governors, the Director of Kew, (Sir) William Thistleton-Dyer, and Daniel Morris, the Assistant-Director. It decided to establish a service for West African curators with uniform rates of pay and to continue the training of Africans who would afterwards be available both for setting up further Botanic Stations or as instructors in the schools - the two conceptions were complementary. The position thus reached marked a highlight in Kew's influence on the development of natural resources in West Africa.

The program failed to develop as had been hoped owing to the varied amount of enthusiasm displayed for it by the different Governors. There was an absence of consistent direction as Kew's role was only an advisory one, and the Colonial Office in most cases accepted the advice of the "man-on-the-spot" who knew local conditions of which the Colonial Office staff, for all their ability, remained ignorant. The interest of the Governors was in finding and developing new sources of export, not in developing a program of botanical stations as such. It was mainly a distinction between long and short-term goals, but there was a tendency on the part of the Governors to give priority to timber products which were ready for immediate export, but which also needed protection from destructive felling without regard to preservation. This was particularly true of Sir Ralph Moor in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria who refused to give much time to agricultural pursuits until problems of forestry had been looked after and a Conservator of Forests appointed.

The Governors of Lagos similarly diverted their attention to forest products - in their case mainly to rubber which enjoyed a boom during the 1890's. As soon as it was found that rubber paid well, an orgy of tapping took place throughout the Colony and the Protectorate. Rubber comes from a variety of trees and those native to Nigeria, mainly a tree, Kickxia Elastica, could not survive rough 'tapping' with the result that Lagos rapidly lost the greater part of its rubber resources. Moloney ended his service in Lagos in 1891, and with his departure the priority which Botanic Stations had been given came to an end. This was Kew's constant complaint about conditions in West Africa, and elsewhere too, that everything depended on the Governor; hence there was no continuity of policy in one Colony, let alone West Africa, as a whole. Certainly Moloney's successor, Sir Henry McCallum, showed reduced interest. The rubber position received priority, as it had begun to look as if rubber production would save West Africa from the difficulties produced by the fall in the price of palm-
oil and kernels. But the over-tapping left many trees dead or dying and Dawodu and Leigh were sent to Ibadan early in 1897 to try to prevent the destruction. The killing of the trees led to a sharp fall in rubber exports although this was recovered after two or three years. The tree which produced the best rubber, Hevea Brasiliensis, was only gradually introduced into the country.

McCallum later decided to establish an "experimental model farm" with blocks of commercial crops as an "object lesson" to the local population, as he regarded the botanic station as doing things on too small a scale. Thistleton-Dyer remarked that the "object-lesson" would be an extremely costly one for the Colony, and that the purpose of the station was to distribute plants. To underline the importance he attached to forest products, McCallum created a Forestry Department in 1897, and Cyril Punch, a local estate manager, was made Inspector of Forests.

MacGregor modified the policy again. In 1899 the newly created Forestry Department became a joint "Forestry and Agricultural Department", a forest nursery and reserve being set up at Mamu, south of Ibadan, and a model farm established at Oloke Meji, situated about thirty miles west of Ibadan and lying both beside the River Ogun and the railway. MacGregor chose the site with the possibility of growing cotton by irrigation in mind. The Botanic Station was merged with the Forestry and Agricultural Department in 1905, and an independent Agricultural Department was not created in Southern Nigeria until 1910. In the early years of the century, therefore, there was only a rudimentary and junior Agricultural Department provided for in the Protectorate.

Timber was naturally encouraged by the newly formed Forestry and Agricultural Department. Exports of mahogany reached a substantial amount but increase depended very largely on improvements in transport which would allow access to new areas, the growing period in established areas being a long one. Maize was encouraged as an export crop and underwent a dramatic increase in 1904.

Two other crops which showed considerable increases in production before 1914 were the kola nut and cocoa; the kola nut was not very important as an export crop, but cocoa certainly was, and its high value naturally appealed to the traders and farmers. It expanded well behind the growth of the industry in the Gold Coast (Ghana), but its growth as an export crop was a very rapid
one, increasing from just over one million lbs in 1905, to three million lbs in 1908, and 6 1/2 million lbs in 1910. Cocoa exports amounted to over $170,000 in value in 1914. These crops were being grown on the loam soil called after the city of Ibadan, and they therefore prevented the use of this favoured soil by many other crops, other than food crops.

The kola could be grown in poorer and more acid soils than the Ibadan loams, but cocoa with its high relative profits displaced cotton. Hence cotton was increasingly thought of as a crop which should be grown further north — outside the palm, as well as the cocoa, zone. As Captain Elgee, the Resident, wrote in his Report on Ibadan: "I do not think any great increase in the growth of (cotton) can be looked for in the Palm Zone. Outside this zone it is another matter." If cotton were to be grown further to the north, improvements in transport were essential. At the period when the Protectorate was being opened up, there was only one practicable form of transport for moving goods on a large scale — and that was a railway.

Schemes for railway building were already being canvassed in the British West African Colonies in the late 1870's. The underlying need for better transport for security reasons was shown by Sir Garnet Wolseley's request in 1873 before his campaign against Ashanti for an 18 inch gauge railway from Cape Coast to the River Prah. But for a number of years the undefined status of the hinterlands of the British colonies made it difficult for the Colonial Office to sanction any plans. British policy was changed by the economic depression which helped to make a greater volume of trade essential, while the undertaking of railway building by the French in areas adjacent to British colonies and their hinterlands, and the effect of the international conference at Brussels 1889-1890 which called on the colonial powers in Africa to construct roads and, in particular, railways, provided further stimulus.

When Sir Gilbert Carter had undertaken the Lagos Interior Expedition of 1893, he had taken with him a "surveyor of experience" who was to map out a possible route for a railway. There was some doubt about the route proposed because the Egba for a time refused a railway through their territory, and the "Western Syndicate", headed by Sir Alfred Jones, who controlled the Elder Dempster shipping line to West Africa, lobbied for a direct route to Ibadan from Ejinrin on the coast.

But the situation was changed when the Egba agreed to accept the railway through their territory. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon,
then decided on a professional survey over all the routes under discussion. Messrs Shelford and Son, a prominent firm of London consulting engineers, were instructed and two of their staff sailed to Lagos in October 1894. Their conclusions were given to the Colonial Office about a year later. By this time Joseph Chamberlain was Colonial Secretary and the chances of the report's receiving favourable consideration had thus increased. In commenting on the eight different routes which had been examined, Shelford & Son remarked:

"In considering these different routes, it appears to us that no scheme can be entertained which does not provide for the accommodation of the traffic of both Abeokuta and Ibadan. The populations of these towns are estimated at 150,000 and 200,000 respectively, and it is clearly impossible to neglect either of two centres of so much importance."

This conclusion accurately reflected the population distribution pattern in Southern Nigeria, which has been described as "the populated crescent" extending from Lagos and curving towards the north-east, and was decisive. It offset objections to the Lagos-Abeokuta route that competition would have to be faced from the River Ogun, and it was hoped that the rates on the railway would compete with the canoe traffic.

The next question was the site of the terminus - a difficult problem in view of Lagos's situation on an island. Chamberlain decided that the railway proper would start from Iddo Island between Lagos Island and the mainland (Ebutu Metta). A railway bridge (the Denton Bridge) would connect Iddo with the mainland, while another bridge, named after Governor Carter, would connect Iddo Island and Lagos, and along this bridge a light tramway was constructed. Work was begun in March 1896 on the main line. In 1901 the railway reached Ibadan, a distance of 124 miles from the coast terminus.

The Railway had to be paid for, and it was in this respect that Chamberlain's business experience proved of value. The Colonial Loans Fund Act of 1899 contained two important provisions: loans could be advanced to both colonies and protectorates by the British Treasury at rates of interest of not less than 2 3/4%; and Colonial Stock or Bonds, guaranteed by the Treasury, could be issued. In 1900 the capital available for colonial development was further increased by the inclusion of colonial stock "on the magic list of trustee securities." The financing of the railway section from Iddo to Ibadan was a combination of a Treasury Loan (£792,500), an advance from the Crown Agents (£288,524) and
payments from Lagos's own funds (£129,785)\textsuperscript{100}

The Railway rapidly proved a success - making a net profit as early as 1902.\textsuperscript{101} There was pressure for the extension beyond Ibadan to be constructed as soon as possible since the competition of traffic from the River Ogun would have then ceased, and the railway would be able to earn monopoly profits. The extension of the railway was also demanded for strategic purposes.\textsuperscript{102} A railway was needed especially in Northern Nigeria, which had come under firm British control only with Lugard's military expedition to Kano and Sokoto in 1903. Lugard had resolved to be as independent as possible of the rest of Nigeria and lobbied for a separate railway to be built to Kano and Zaria from a port called Baro on the north bank of the Niger. To reduce costs Lugard suggested a 2 foot 6 inch line instead of the 3 foot 6 inches which had been used for the Lagos line.\textsuperscript{103}

In the meantime a considerable controversy was in progress as to the route which was to be followed by the Lagos Railway after it had left Ibadan. Messrs Shelford & Son advised the westerly route via Ogbomosho, mainly because it was shorter.\textsuperscript{104} The easterly route via Iwo, Ede and Oshogbo was finally chosen as a result of a personal investigation by MacGregor, who walked over the ground, and favoured the eastern route as it would serve a larger population than the western, and passed through palm country in the rainforest area.\textsuperscript{105} The limited financial resources of Lagos must have influenced him to decide on a route which would make the railway pay its way as quickly as possible.

The overall planning of the future railway structure of Nigeria was delayed even after Chamberlain had decided to support the route which MacGregor had chosen.\textsuperscript{106} The underlying reasons were not only the limits of Lagos's resources but also the considerable work which would be necessary to improve its harbour facilities to handle the increased traffic resulting from the extension of the railway. On the other hand there were strong arguments for building effective communications between Northern Nigeria and the sea. An annual payment to the North was made by the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria for goods destined for the North whose customs dues were collected at the coast, but which probably amounted to a hidden subsidy, and Northern Nigeria was in receipt of an annual Imperial grant which virtually everyone wished to see reduced.\textsuperscript{107}

Early in 1906 a general election in Britain resulted in a sweeping victory for the Liberals, who had already taken office at the end of the previous year.
The new Colonial Secretary was the ninth Earl of Elgin, and his Parliamentary Undersecretary, Winston Churchill, who represented North-West Manchester. The railway engineers, Churchill and the Colonial Secretary were in agreement on the broad lines of development and early in May Elgin announced that the Lagos Railway would be extended to the North - the direction and management continuing from the South. At the same time the railway from Baro to Kano would also be built, but it would be constructed on the same 3 foot 6 inch gauge as the Lagos Railway which it would join at Minna. The decision was followed soon after by the announcement of Lugard's resignation as High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria, and his replacement by Sir Percy Girouard, a Canadian railway engineer who had already seen distinguished service in charge of railways during Kitchener's campaign in the Sudan to regain control of the country from the forces of the Mahdi.

The way was prepared for these decisions by the amalgamation of Lagos Colony and Protectorate with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. This was the answer to the insufficiency of Lagos's own resources for the railway extension and harbour works - Lagos being already burdened with annual payments of over £40,000 for the earlier railway construction as far as Ibadan. While the railway paid its own working expenses, interest payments had to be made in part from the general revenue of the Colony. With the amalgamation, however, the considerable financial resources of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, with its great palm-producing areas, became available for the construction of the railway into the North. The amalgamation took place from May 1st, 1906, but it was anticipated by the appointment in 1904 of Sir Walter Egerton as both Governor of Lagos and High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The arrangement made possible the raising of a further £2 million in London on the open market without guarantee for the building of the extended railway.

The first stage of the extension to Oshogbo had been completed by 1907, and the following year the railway entered Northern Nigeria and reached Ilorin. The railway finally reached Kano in 1912 with its branch to Baro. The North was at last opened as a source of raw materials for the world at large in return for manufactured goods.

The very great increase of railway traffic involved the need for considerable improvements in the harbour at Lagos. Owing to the sandbanks at the bar and the
dangerous surf which had to be crossed to reach the ocean-going steamers, the harbour had never been adequate even for the needs of Lagos Colony and Protectorate. In 1907 the official bar draught was between nine and eleven feet, and ocean-going ships either had to unload into surf-boats bound directly for Lagos, or dock at the harbour of Forcados, some 160 miles away, from which branch boats carried the goods into Lagos. It was therefore decided to undertake the dredging of the bar together with the building of two moles, each about 7,000 feet long, which would protect the entrance channel against the formation of sandbanks. The estimated cost was £897,000. In order to meet this heavy charge, as well as the further cost of the Lagos Railway beyond Ilorin and on to Minna, and the charges of the separate Baro-Minna section, a further loan of £3 million was raised in 1908, and an additional sum in 1911. In 1912 the total loan liability of Southern Nigeria was over £8 million. Lugard wrote later:

"The total debt of Nigeria amounts to about eight and one half millions. Of this about six millions has been spent on railway ... On the total sum an annual debt charge of £448,000 accrues, which is more than met by the surplus earnings of the Railway after paying off working expenses, and by receipts from harbour dues." By 1913 the draught at the bar had been deepened to 17 feet 6 inches - 18 feet 6 inches, and ocean-going vessels began to enter the harbour and carry their cargoes directly to the Lagos and Apapa wharves.

With the extension of the railway to the North, a network had been laid which made possible a great increase in exports of raw materials, especially those like cotton which grew north of the palm-belt. In itself, however, the railway could not ensure success. MacGregor had chosen extension of the Lagos Railway by the eastern route through the continuing palm-belt and this had left some promising cotton-growing areas in the north-west of Yoruba country unserviced. If these areas remained dependent on traditional means of transport an increase in export trade from this area was unlikely. Human porterage was expensive for bulk goods and prohibitive over any but the shortest distances, and animal transport on any scale not available. In 1904 Sir Walter Egerton's joint appointment as Governor of Lagos and High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria provided an opportunity to find an entirely new answer. Egerton's enthusiasm was for transport, especially the new kinds which were just coming into general use. One was the bicycle, which he helped to pioneer in Southern Nigeria, cycling in 1905 from Lagos to Calabar. The other was the motor-car which he introduced into Lagos in 1906.
After the Highways Act of 1896 abolished the "Red Flag", by which a man with a red flag had to walk ahead of any motor-car using the public highway in Britain, the general use of motor vehicles greatly increased, so that by 1904 there were 18,640 motor cars on the register of the British Isles. They were rapidly adopted by the main retailing firms for local deliveries, especially in the cities. The same development took place abroad in cities like Singapore which Egerton had known from his service in the Straits Settlements before his appointment to Southern Nigeria. He was particularly impressed by the possibility of roads:

"A road in many ways develops a country more thoroughly than a railway; for it gives access on every point of the country passed through, while a railway only taps the country adjacent to its stations ..."\(^{125}\)

And he remarked to (Lord) Trenchard\(^{126}\) when he first met him in Nigeria; "Give me roads - good, broad straight roads right through the jungle from one tribal area to the next - then we'll be able to let in the light."\(^{127}\)

Roads and motor-cars would certainly be valuable in Southern Nigeria where the tee-tee fly severely limited use of animal transport. A Roads Department was established at the end of 1904, responsible for constructing roads, while the Public Works Department were to maintain them.\(^{128}\) Egerton undertook the laying down of two kinds of road; the first, cart roads, which included trunk roads to be used by cars, were intended mainly to act as "feeders" to the railway. They were to have a width of not less than twelve feet and a ruling gradient of one in twenty. The trunk roads were to be eighteen feet wide. The second were bridle paths - embryo cart roads - which would have nine feet width but with provision for widening to twelve.\(^{129}\)

The first motor road to be used in Nigeria was from Ibadan to Oyo - a distance of about thirty-three miles, and a road service began with one small truck in September 1906. It was an example of a "feeder", bringing trade to and from the railway at Ibadan, a policy which was then followed in Britain itself. Considerable care had to be taken in the choice of vehicle as many of the early road vehicles were forms of traction engine, slow and heavy, and would soon have destroyed the surface.\(^{130}\) The road was described as "metalised" being a mixture of either quartz and clay or of "laterite disintegrate", a combination of clay and iron which bakes hard under the sun. This
surface was good in dry weather but liable to be washed away in heavy rains. The vehicle chosen was the Albion-Lacre combination, a Lacre-made van carrying twenty-four cwt (which included the driver, his assistant and up to six passengers, as well as goods) and an engine made by the Albion Motor Car Company. The cars had three forward gears and reverse; the tyres were solid and the tank carried six gallons. Maximum speed varied according to the size of the vehicle up to 16 m.p.h. The mileage was 10 miles per gallon on gas and 7.3 miles on paraffin which was used for economy. The Ibadan-Oyo road was opened for motor-traffic up to a weight of two tons in September 1906, but the public service began in the following year.

An announcement in the Gazette stated:

"On and after the first of April 1907 the Road Motor Car will, if possible, run from Ibadan to Oyo on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays and return to Ibadan on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays." F. Bedford Glasier, Lagos Government Railway.

Government officials, especially medical officers, regarded the service as a success from the beginning, and the Oyo District Report for 1906 said: "The motor-service from Ibadan limited and frequently interrupted though it has been, has proved of immense value to trade." Carriage by head porterage cost 1s.3d. per ton mile and the journey took two days, or four days if allowing for the return of the porters. Against this the usual rates by car or truck were the same for the first half-ton, but then dropped to 1s.0d. per ton mile while the journey was completed as a rule in four hours, the average speed being 8 miles per hour. The relative convenience of the service led to a gradual increase of vehicles, able to carry two or three tons apiece, so that there were twelve trucks in the service of Southern Nigeria in 1913.

There was less satisfaction with the financial results, and for a number of years the service made a loss, even excluding costs of road construction and maintenance. In the latter the road service had a considerable advantage over the railway, in Western Province at least, since the bulk of the labour was provided "free" by the towns and villages along the route - the inhabitants being "called upon to contribute unpaid labour towards the work". Consequently costs of construction were exceptionally cheap - amounting to not much more than £6,000 for the Ibadan-Oyo road. Egerton himself said £750 per mile was the average cost of a good motor road, the Ibadan-Oyo road was built for little more than £180 per mile.

Most of the receipts came from the carriage of goods - the largest item carried "up" to Oyo in 1910 was spirits. In the same year 1437 passengers were
carried (both ways), but they produced only about 10% of the revenue. The costs of the service itself were less encouraging than the costs of road-building. Many of these were unavoidable and resulted from cost of freight from Britain, which affected the cost of the trucks themselves, all spares and the price of gasoline. Some of the original costs were found to be unnecessary; for instance, two European chauffeurs were employed at salaries much higher than those of African drivers, who shortly replaced them after training in England. European fitters were also employed but their services were probably essential.

The underlying failure to "make ends meet" until 1913 was owing to the excess of expenditure over receipts on a mileage basis, except in the case of one truck which carried a three-ton load, the others carrying smaller loads. The explanation for this unsatisfactory state of affairs evidently lay in the extraordinary delays taken in completing repairs, several of the trucks taking two-ton loads being off the road for almost as many days as they were in service. In 1912 the Government (Lagos) Railway took over the motor service between Oyo and Ibadan.

Meanwhile "metalled" roads were being constructed elsewhere in Southern Nigeria - from Oshogbo to Ilesha; Oshogbo to Ogbomosho, Oyo to Ogbomosho (now part of the main north to south highway) and Oyo to Iseyin. Considerable progress was also made in building roads in the Central and Eastern Provinces. Private enterprise soon began to play its part - in 1913 the Anfani (or "Conveni-ent") Bus Service began between Lagos and Ebute Metta. A member of the Dawodu family built up a considerable business in importing, first bicycles, and then cars. After World War I private motor transport services became one of the chief expressions of African private enterprise, and trucks belonging to private firms helped to bring in the crops during bumper seasons.

The need for increased revenue in the West African colonies had thus led to a vigorous policy of development in constructing both railways and roads, and in developing Lagos harbour. Far-sighted as this was, it brought its own problems in the need for yet more revenue to carry the burdens of interest and capital repayments. At this period there was little to be done in the way of development except the increase and diversification of export crops, and the work of the botanic stations and Kew Gardens had helped towards this end. What was needed now to justify the extensive program of transport development was crop development on a scale sufficient to make use of the transport. In this timber, rubber, maize and cocoa would all have a significant part to play. The Colonial Office, therefore, especially during the Secretaryship of Joseph
Chamberlain, were in a receptive mood when any schemes of crop extension were put forward. It was thus that a welcome was given when Manchester merchants, concerned once again by the rising prices of American Cotton, decided to undertake an Empire cotton-growing program. This program, which fitted in so well with the requirements of British industry and colonial policy, was on a far greater scale than the missionary-inspired attempts to promote cotton-growing in the mid-nineteenth century, yet it still had to overcome similar problems. The depression had led to a fall in cotton prices and the exports from Southern Nigeria had almost ceased. In many respects the work had to be begun all over again. The railways were now being built and the harbour soon to be improved, but the problem of getting the cotton to the railway, and then to Liverpool and Manchester at an acceptable cost, while still paying the farmer a price sufficient to encourage him to produce the extra cotton for export, still remained to be solved. In finding the solution both to the cotton problem and to the general challenge of reviving West African trade the Chambers of Commerce were determined to play their full part. Before they could do so, however, their relationship with the Colonial Office had to be placed on a footing more satisfactory to both sides. Thus the efforts of the merchants to revive the growing of cotton for export in West Africa and elsewhere in the Empire were matched by their attempts to gain greater influence over colonial policy.
1. Lagos became a Colony under its own Governor in 1862, but in 1866 it was placed under the Governor of the West African Settlements in Sierra Leone; in 1874 under the Gold Coast; and in 1886 Lagos became an "independent" colony once again.

2. The Adderley Committee.

3. Which began about 1875.

4. In 1881 British prices of palm-oil were £30.4s.2d. per ton. In 1885, £27.17s.3d., and in 1892, £21.12s.1 1/2d. Lagos Annual Report 1892, p.25.

5. The principal figure was Saro, G.W. Johnson ("Reversible" Johnson). H. Robbin was a member of the Board.

6. He was consecrated Bishop in 1864.


8. Industrial Institutions aiming to prepare cotton for export were established at different times at Onitsha, Gbebe and Lokoja. See C.M.S. Intelligencer passim.

9. The firms amalgamating in 1879 were the West African Company, Alexander Miller Brother & Co., the Central African Trading Co. Ltd., and James Pinnock. The present day United Africa Company was formed much later - in 1929.


11. In 1890 a C.M.S. Commission of Enquiry was held into the Niger Mission which decided that it was corrupt. The powers of Bishop Crowther were reduced so that he became little more than "a sort of confirming and ordaining machine." See E.A. Ayandele, The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914. London & Ibadan, 1966, Chapter 7.

12. A General Protectorate over the area was declared in 1885; it became the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1889; and the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893.

13. Moloney, Sir Alfred, (1849-1913). Served in Ashanti campaign 1873-74; Administrator of the Gambia 1884-86; of Lagos (Governor) 1886-91; of British Honduras 1891-97; of the Windward Islands 1897-1900.

15. A previous treaty of protection had been signed in 1888.

16. Lugard, First Baron (1858-1945) Baron 1928, Knight 1901, D.S.O. Afghan Campaign 1879-80; Sudan Campaign 1885; Burma 1886-87; fighting slave traders around Lake Malawi (Nyasa) 1888; Uganda 1889-92; under Royal Niger Co, in Borgu 1894-95; Commandant of West African Frontier Force and High Commissioner, Northern Nigeria 1900-06; Governor Hong-Kong 1907-12; Governor-General, Nigeria, 1914-19. Wrote The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa, 1922.

17. Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, (1836-1914), Member of Parliament for Birmingham and Birmingham West. President of the Board of Trade 1880-1885, President of the Local Government Board 1886; Secretary of State for the Colonies 1895-1903. Was father of Austen (British Foreign Secretary) and Neville Chamberlain (Prime Minister).

18. The new name of the Niger Coast Protectorate which was to be united with Lagos Colony and Protectorate from May 1st, 1906 as the united Protectorate (or Colony) of Southern Nigeria.

19. MacGregor, Rt. Hon. Sir William (1847-1919), Knighted 1899, Surgeon and physician, Glasgow Royal Infirmary; Assistant Medical Officer, Seychelles 1873; Chief Medical Officer, Fiji 1875; Administrator and later Lt.-Governor of British New Guinea 1888; Governor of Lagos 1899-1904; Governor of Newfoundland 1904-09; Governor of Queensland 1909-11.


21. Chamberlain minuted that McCallum's successor ought to be a man 'whose personality is sympathetic to the natives and whose influence will keep the peace and settle disputes at the outset which may lead to war.' C.O. 1147/132/11917, May 5th, 1898, McCallum to C.O. Minute of July 29th, 1898.

22. In 1900 the Hausa Force, Lagos's only military force, had a total of 856 officers and men armed with Martini-Henry carbines, supported by a few seven-pounder guns, some howitzers, rocket "toughs" and maxims. See Lagos Bluebook 1900, pp.28-29. In August 1901 the Force became The Lagos Battalion of the West African Frontier Force.

23. Lagos Bluebook 1901, p.35. The number of unofficials varied slightly.

24. The leading local African papers were "The Lagos Standard" and "The Lagos Weekly Record".


27. B. Awe. The Ajele System Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol. 3, 1964-67, pp.47-60. The Ajeles held similar positions to the British Residents in the Provinces, and in many ways overshadowed the local chief or Baile, had their own law courts and sat at the local meetings of cniefs. Food supplies were sent to Ibadan twice a year and horses when available, Tolls and taxes on every compound were levied.

28. Ibadan was freed from its dependence in 1930. For Ibadan-Oyo relations see M. Perham Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford University Press, 1937,
pp. 189-194. For many years Captain C.R. Elgee, private secretary to 
MacGregor 1900-02, was Resident at Ibadan. His attitude towards Ibadan 
Council was a friendly one. He once startled the Colonial Office by begin-
ning a letter: "I am directed by the Bale and Council of Ibadan ... "
C.O. 117/166/33245, August 11th 1903, MacGregor to Colonial Office, Enclosure.

29. C. 7227 "Dispatch from Sir Gilbert T. Carter forwarding a general 
report of the Lagos Interior Expedition 1893", pp.4-5.

30. McCallum, Col. Sir Henry E. (1852-1919). Educated Royal Engineers, 
Woolwich, London; Surveyor-General Straits Settlements 1884-1897; Governor 
Lagos 1897-1899; Governor, Newfoundland, 1899-1901; of Natal 1901-1907; 
and of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1907-1913.


32. Cd. 2325, 1904, p.6.

33. C.O. 117/166/33245 August 11th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O. Enclosure. 
Minute of Oct. 8th, 1903, by P.R. Ezekiel.

34. Gbadebo was Alake 1898-1920, and was the son of Okukenu, Alake 1851-1862. 
When in London he called on the elderly Baroness Burdett-Coutts to thank her 
for the gift of two cotton-gins sent in his father's time.

35. Dr. Obadiah Johnson and the lawyer, C.A. Sapara-Williams. The Ordinance 
was also strongly opposed by the Aborigines Protection Society (Secretary 
H.R. Fox-Bourne) in Britain. See The Aborigines' Friend for July 1902, and 

36. Members were nearly all from the Colony. The Prince Eleko was Vice-
President and the Governor President. Other members included the Chief Eletu, 
Balogun Sumenma Obote, Yesufu Shitta Bey - prominent Moslem, Braimah Edu of 
Eleko, Sereke Badagry etc. Members were appointed by the Governor and could 
introduce guests. The Oni of Ifé was called in to determine whether the 
Elepe of Epe could wear a crown and decided he could not. The aim was to 
include important chiefs from the Protectorate. See C.O. 117/166/23810 
May 16th 1902, minutes of the Native Central Council meeting of Dec. 20th, 
1901, MacGregor to Colonial Office. The next Governor, Sir Walter Egerton, 
let the Council lapse. Membership of Provincial and other Councils followed 
traditional lines. Ibadan Council consisted of the Bale as President, the 
Otun Bale, the Osi Bale, the Ekerin Bale, the Maye Bale, the Akesa Bale, 
the Ashipa Bale, the Balogun, the Otun and Osi Baloguns, the Ashipa Balogun, 
the Maye Balogun - also Oyebade and Bambegbini, probably educated men. 
Lagos Gazette, April 25th, 1903.

37. Interview of June 20th, 1902; published in the July edition of The 
Aborigines' Friend, and reprinted in The Lagos Standard from August 6th to 
September 10th, 1902. The interview is reproduced in part by T.N. Tamuno, The 
Evolution of the Nigerian State, the Southern Phase 1894-1911, University of 
Ibadan, 1972, Appendix F.

38. The seriousness of the position from the British traders' viewpoint 
was shown by the rate of closures. In 1892 of twelve European Lagos firms 
only five remained, and nearly all the African firms had retired from the
export trade. See A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of Lagos 1880-1914, London Ph.D., 1964, p. 96. For the depression's effect on Lagos produce firms between 1893 and 1905 see Ch. 7, p.127.

39. See Bluebooks passim.

<table>
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<td>1898</td>
<td>206,354</td>
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</table>

(includes £10,000 telegraph (includes £11,809 spent grant from Imperial Government) on telegraph)

1900 | 211,467 | 187,124 |

40. The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

41. See Bluebooks and Annual Reports passim.

42. Palm-oil prices at Liverpool fell from £30.1s.2d. per ton in 1881 to £21.12s. 1 1/2d. in 1892. Lagos Annual Report 1892, p.25. Prices per ton averaged around £20 per ton from 1893 to 1905. See Annual Reports passim. There was a serious fall in palm-oil prices in both 1887 and 1892.


44. Lagos Bluebooks 1890, pp.61 and 62, and 1900, p.80. Imports of British cotton goods in 1890 were valued at £178,234 (out of a total of cotton goods imports of £194,322); in 1900 they were £327,920 out of a total of £330,898.


47. In 1900 the proportion of British cotton piece-good exports sent to India and measured by the yard amounted to 37% and by value 40%. Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom 1900, Vol.1, p.48, and Vol.2, p.377. The proportions remained fairly constant and were similar in 1910 - Annual Statement of Trade 1910, Vol.1, p.11, Vol.2, p.299. Egypt was another growing market.

48. France introduced the Meline Tariff in 1892 raising duties to 30% and 40%; Italy brought in a heavy tariff in 1877; and the United States increased its duties (directly and indirectly) in 1846, 1857 and in 1890 (the McKinley Tariff).

49. Governor of Lagos 1886-91.


51. He was Director of Kew from 1865-1885. Both Sir Wm. Hooker and Venn had agreed that their efforts to introduce 'useful plants' had failed owing to the want of a 'model farm and botanical garden'. See "Report from the Select Committee on Africa (Western Coast) 1865", p.245 par. 6022.
52. See Chapter 1, p.10.

53. The distinction was between a "garden", usually under a man with professional qualifications, and a "station" where a trained gardener or curator was in charge. Banks was accompanied during his voyage to the Pacific 1768-71 by D. Solander, a pupil of Linnaeus, and assisted in naming "Botany Bay" near Sydney. When the mutiny burst upon him in 1787, Bligh of the "Bounty" had been engaged in transferring breadfruit from Tahiti to the West Indies in accordance with instructions from Banks and Kew. The first government gardens which have remained in existence seem to have been at Kingston, Jamaica, from 1793. See G. B. Masefield, A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.22.


56. This, of course, coincided with a particularly bad year in Lagos's finances.


58. Morris, Sir Daniel (1844-1933), Knight 1903. Assistant Director, Botanic Gardens Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 1877; Director, Botanic Dept., Jamaica 1879-86; Assistant-Director, Kew Gardens 1886-1898; Imperial Commissioner for Agriculture in the West Indies 1898-1908.

59. The staff was inevitably small in the difficult financial circumstances of the time - a trained superintendent, a gardener and two labourers. The total yearly cost of upkeep was estimated at £300, the superintendent receiving a basic £100 with annual increments of £10. Royal Gardens Kew, Lagos Botanical Station 1883-1890, March 21st, 1887, Moloney to Morris, Enclosure.

60. McNair was of mixed blood and retired mainly for health reasons in 1890 - his wife had died. The Royal Niger Company had begun Botanical Stations in 1889 (Royal Gardens Kew, Miscellaneous 10.36 Southern Nigeria, Lagos 1888-1915; September 16th, 1902, Royal Gardens Kew to C.O.) Two men sent from Kew to the Company's stations died after short terms of duty. (See Botanical Enterprise in the Niger Province, Kew Bulletin, No.52, April 1891, pp.84-96.)


62. Lagos Botanical Station, 30th report for quarter to June 30th, 1895.


64. Royal Gardens Kew, Lagos 1888-1915, Sept.5th, 1893, C.O. to Kew.
65. Sir Gilbert Carter, Lagos; W. Brandford Griffith, Gold Coast; Sir Francis Fleming, Sierra Leone; R.B. Llewelyn, the Gambia. The Oil Rivers Protectorate was controlled by the Foreign Office, a state of affairs which made a unified policy in West Africa more difficult.


67. The scale was from £200 to £250. Royal Gardens Kew, Lagos 1888-1915, Sept. 13th, 1893, D. Morris to Thistleton-Dyer.


70. The best rubber tree is Hevea Brasiliensis which was that transferred to Malaya, but rubber in Nigeria first came from the local tree Funtumia Elastica, which was planted extensively in government plantations but was inferior to H. Brasiliensis - and to Kickxia Elastica (the "Ire" tree; it was this tree which suffered most from irresponsible tapping.) Another source of Nigerian rubber was a climbing vine, Landolphia. H. Brasiliensis was often known as "para" rubber.

71. Rubber exports from Lagos were £324 in 1894; and £269,899 in 1895; £317,721 in 1896; £160,315 in 1899; and a mere £11,749 in 1901, Lagos Annual Report 1903, p.19. These were the years when rubber was being exported in large quantities from the Congo Free State - rubber which was obtained by ruthless exploitation of the local population, and which was later to lead to an outcry in Britain and elsewhere.

72. C.O. Confidential Print 635, No.33 (Lagos 6331) Feb. 9th, 1897, Acting-Governor Denton to C.O.

73. See Sir Wm. Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule, London 1927, p.135. The enthusiasm for rubber growing was paralleled by that for growing coffee. But in 1899 the Curator of the Lagos Botanical Station wrote "Enthusiasm for planting coffee has cooled down considerably during the past two years owing to the great fall in price of this product." The fall had then been from around 75 shillings per Cwt. to 25 shillings or less. See Botanical Station Report 1899. In 1899 coffee exports from Lagos were worth only £139. See Lagos Annual Report 1903, pp.18-19.

74. C.O. Confidential Print 635 No.52 and 53 (Lagos 20505) August 19th, 1897, McCallum to C.O., and October 13th, 1897, C.O. to McCallum.
75. Ibid. No.55 (Lagos 211) Dec. 31st 1897, Royal Gardens Kew to C.O.

76. Punch, Cyril, Manager of private Ilaro Coffee Estate, in 1897 Inspector and in 1898 Superintendent of the Woods and Forests Dept. In 1903 he became Railway Commissioner at Aro, the position becoming that of District Commissioner. He retired as a first-class D.C. in 1913.

77. Mahogany exports nevertheless increased substantially being £12,945 in 1898, £58,374 in 1900 and £105,440 in 1913. See Lagos Annual Reports 1903, pp.18-19 and 1913, p.11.

78. See Chapter 4, p.73 fn.18.


82. A former Director of Agriculture, W.H. Johnson, before the Empire Cotton Growing Committee in 1918 remarked on the much greater profitability of cocoa than that of cotton - 1d. or 1 1/2d. per lb as against 1d. per lb for seed cotton. Board of Trade 55/25. Minutes of Evidence, pt.2, May 1st, 1918.


86. Mainly in Senegal inspired by the Governor, Briere de l'Isle (1876-1881). The upper Senegal and upper Niger were linked by rail in 1904.


90. A route which would have brought a good deal of extra work to Elder Dempster's branch boat services between Ejinrin and Lagos. An influential joint Chambers of Commerce deputation took place in August 1894 to the Colonial Secretary, the Marquis of Ripon.

91. C.O. Confidential Print 451, No. 9 (12277), July 19th, 1893, A.L. Jones and others to Colonial Office; and C.O. Confidential Print 461, No. 1 (5172), Feb. 23rd, 1894, Carter to C.O.
92. C.O. Confidential Print 444 Part III, No.28 (1916), October 31st, 1895, Crown Agents to C.O.

93. C.O. 4447/169/384, January 10th, 1904, MacGregor to C.O.

94. C.O. Confidential Print 444 Part III, No.29 (17756) November 26th, 1895, Colonial Office to Liverpool Chamber of Commerce.

95. Cd. 2325, 1901, p.56; Lagos Annual Report 1900, p.6.


99. Annual percentage repayments were £3.4s.0 3/4d. interest and £2.1s.2 3/4d. sinking fund (capital repayment). Annual totals were £25,386 interest and £16,385 capital repayment on the Treasury loan. The Crown Agents' advance seems to have been without interest.

100. T.N. Tamuno, Evolution of the Nigerian State, p.278.


102. The "Itorwa" crisis in Abeokuta in 1901 was rapidly brought to an end when MacGregor took two hundred Hausa troops to the support of the Alake on the same day he received the call for assistance. C.O. 4447/155/21501 May 26th, 1901, MacGregor to C.O. A further call was answered during the Kemta affair in Abeokuta in 1903. C.O. 4447/167/42509, Nov. 23rd, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

103. And in many other parts of Africa, including South Africa.


105. C.O. 4447/155/21380 May 21st 1901, MacGregor to C.O. The populations were estimated at Iwo, 50,000; Ede, 30,000; and Oshogbo, 50,000.

106. "... an old stager like Sir William MacGregor is more likely to be right than a young railway engineer unaccustomed to the country." C.O. 4447/158/2581, Dec. 23rd, 1901, MacGregor to C.O. Minute of Feb.20th, 1902 by J. Chamberlain.

107. Imperial grants to Northern Nigeria lasted from 1900 to 1913 and averaged some £250,000 a year. Sir Wm. Geary, op cit. p.232. Afterwards grants were continued on a reduced scale to united Nigeria until the last payment in 1918. See Bluebooks passim. United Southern Nigeria paid an average of about £70,000 per year to Northern Nigeria from 1906 to 1912 in settlement of customs dues. The sum was probably too large and amounted to a hidden subsidy.

108. Elgin, Ninth Earl (1849-1917). Previously Viceroy of India (1894-1899). Son of the eighth Earl who was Governor-General of Canada 1848-1854, and
who assented to the Rebellion Losses Bill. His mother was the daughter of the Earl of Durham. The ninth Earl was born at Monklands near Montreal, Colonial Secretary 1905-08. His father was also Viceroy of India 1862-63 - the only case of father and son being Viceroys.


110. Churchill showed little sympathy for Lugard's plan to build a narrow 2 feet 6 inch railway from Baro to Zaria in Northern Nigeria; pointing out the difficulties of navigation in reaching Baro. During only two months of the year could steamers drawing twelve feet reach Baro and for the rest of the year the river could not be depended on. (See Sir Wm. Geary, Nigeria Under British Rule, p.143). Churchill also claimed that the light railway would not even be able to carry the bales of cotton which seemed likely to be its main export. (See B.C.G.A. Pamphlet No.20, p.11)


112. Lagos financial figures for 1905 are for nine months only. The 1905 figures are: Revenue, £338,124; Expenditure £335,188 (Annual Report pp.4 & 7). The figures include railway income and expenditure. In 1906 the figures for the combined Southern Nigeria were £1,088,717 revenue and £1,056,290 expenditure. Annual Report, pp.4 and 8.

113. The £2 million Southern Nigeria Stock was raised at £97 with 3 1/2% interest. It was used in part to redeem the previous loan from the Treasury of £792,500. Working expenses were covered in 1902 and 1903, and net profits reached over £24,000 in 1906. See Lagos Annual Reports 1902, p.37, 1903, p.10, and Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1906, p.78.


115. Stone for the moles was brought from a quarry near Aro.


117. The 1908 loan was raised at £94 in 4% Bonds convertible into 3 1/2% Stock by the Crown Agents. See Bluebook 1908, G 1. £5 million was issued in 1911 of Southern Nigeria Government 4% five year debentures convertible into 3 1/2% stock.


120. Lagos Annual Report 1913, p.29. During the 1920's it was deepened to 23 feet. See Sir Wm. Geary, p.254.
122. After May 1st Governor of the united Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

123. *West African Review*, Sept. 1933, pp.22-24. Egerton was accompanied by four hundred carriers and fifty soldiers who had to walk. Egerton, Sir Walter (1858-1947) entered the Colonial Service in the Straits Settlements and Malaya 1880. Magistrate Singapore 1881 and Penang 1897; Resident Malaya 1902; Governor of Lagos 1904-6; and High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1904-6; Governor of united Southern Nigeria 1906-12; Governor of British Guiana 1912-17.


130. MacGregor chose such a vehicle. See C.O. 147/172/23969, July 4th, 1904, MacGregor to C.O.


136. C.B. Scruby, December 31st, 1907 in *Annual Reports for Southern Nigeria*, 1907, pp.77-78.

137. Porters were allowed a basic 6d. per day - about fifteen miles with often an extra 3d. rations allowance. Each man usually carried 60 lbs. Thus porterage was about 40 shillings for a half-ton for thirty miles. The early rates for the trucks were 40 shillings per ton for the first half-ton, and 30 shillings per half-ton thereafter.


140. Put by Egerton for the Oyo-Ibadan Road as £6,144.14s.0d. Maintenance was put by him at £734 in 1906 and £518 in 1907. Cd. h523, 1909, No.1, June 26th, 1906. Memorandum by Egerton to C.O.

141. See Lagos Gazette, Feb. 11th, 1905, p.123. In the Central Province workers were paid 1 shilling per day. In Western Province the African overseers were paid.

142. The initial cost of construction together with trucks, garages and tools to mid-1907 was put at £8,176. C.O. 520/68/6307, Dec. 10th, 1908, Egerton to C.O.

143. Cd. h523, 1909, No.1, June 26th, 1906, Memorandum by Egerton to C.O.


146. Gas or petrol was 3s. 6d. per gallon in Nigeria against around 1s. 3d. in Britain. One result was that the trucks were converted to paraffin which cost only 11 3/4d. per gallon, although gasoline was used for starting. Paraffin was used from the fall of 1907 - the suggestion being Egerton's. Cd. h589. 1909, p.10.

147. The Europeans received £350 and £250 per year respectively. The Africans "who drive equally well" received £35-50 per year. The Africans, unlike the Europeans, were prepared to do the double journey in one day. See Annual Report, Road Transport Service 1908, p.451; and Cd.h589, p.109.

148. Cd. h589, p.25.

149. When road services all over Southern Nigeria made a profit of £1151, including depreciation but not road costs. Southern Nigeria, Annual Report 1913, p.27.

150. See Appendix B.

151. During 1910 the 24cwt oldest truck spent 160 days waiting for repairs and 39 days under repair, being in commission for only 110 days. During the same year the three two-ton load Lacres were in service for 480 days, but off the road for 145 days. Annual Report, Ibadan-Oyo Road Service 1910 in Southern Nigeria Annual Reports, p.369.

Les véhicules illustrés sur cette page, représentant quelques types en service dans les pays suivants. Les véhicules "Lacre" pour usages industriels et pour le transport des voyageurs s'exportent dans plus de trente pays différents. Un invité toutes nations vénérable, dans les pays où la société n'est pas encore représentée, à se mettre en rapport avec elle, en vue d'établir de nouvelles agences.

Les véhicules illustrés en cette página son representativos de varios modelos de servicio en ultramar. Los vehículos "Lacre" para uso de pasajeros y comercial han sido exportados a más de treinta diferentes países. Se solicitan aplicaciones de Concesionarios de importancia respecto de Agencias en países donde no existen aún representadas.

"Lacre" Commercial and Passenger Vehicles have been exported to over thirty different countries. Applications for Agencies are invited from responsible firms in those countries where not already represented.

Some model "O" Vehicles supplied to the Crown Agents for the Colonies, for the Gold Coast.

The Lacre Motor Car Company, Ltd.

Head Office: 78, York Road, King's Cross, London, N.I.


Cables: Unbaffled, London.

From the Lacre Motor Car Co. Ltd.'s 'Utility Motor Vehicles' 1907?
CHAPTER 6
THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND PRIVATE CAPITAL: THE JOINT WEST AFRICAN COMMITTEE

During earlier times of difficulty British merchants and manufacturers had organised themselves into commercial associations and Chambers of Commerce, mainly in order to press their interests on the government of the day, either by correspondence or deputations to the offices of government most closely concerned, or by pressure on Members of Parliament. During the period of rising cotton prices during the 1840's and 1850's, and throughout the critical years of the American Civil War, Manchester Chamber had been active in bringing its problems to the notice of the India Office and to the Foreign Secretary whose office controlled British policy towards West Africa as a whole. It had also played a leading part in the formation of the Cotton Supply Association in 1857-58. The recession beginning in the mid-1870's brought about renewed activity by the Chambers in bringing their affairs to the notice of the government, and the importance of commercial interests in West Africa was recognised by the presence of prominent West African business figures - including (Sir) George Goldie and (Sir) Alfred Jones at the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference. These years also saw the formation of a number of new Chambers, including that of London in 1881, and the setting-up of African "Sections" or Committees within the Chambers to deal with African, especially West African, affairs - London and Liverpool both forming their African Sections in 1881 and the Manchester "Sectional Committee" following in 1892.

Liverpool was as active as Manchester during the recession for the port was the centre of the palm-oil trade and the headquarters of the shipping lines which carried virtually all the trade between Britain and West Africa. The first regular shipping line had been that of the African Steamship Company, promoted by MacGregor Laird, which had begun a regular monthly service in 1852. After MacGregor's death in 1861, the firm was managed by his brothers, W. and H. Laird, and later passed into other hands. Two men, Elder and Dempster, who worked in the firm, later left to form their own partnership, managing the British and African Steam Navigation Company which also traded with West Africa.

In 1890 management of both shipping companies passed into the hands of
another "horse from the same stable", who had worked both for the Lairds and for Elder and Dempster - Alfred L. Jones. By 1895 the two West African firms had sixty-one ships altogether. The recession naturally threatened the prosperity of this shipping empire and Jones made energetic efforts to increase trade with the Coast. To achieve this, he was active in the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, being President from 1900 until his death. In 1894 he founded the Bank of British West Africa, besides operating coaling companies for his ships in the Canary Islands and Sierra Leone. He worked with Joseph Chamberlain, when the latter became Colonial Secretary, undertaking the Direct West India Mail Service in 1901, and after Chamberlain's retirement serving on his private Tariff Commission. His charitable activities focussed naturally enough on the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, founded in 1899. More controversially he had undertaken in 1895 to supply at first two, and later three to four, ships to Belgium to trade between Antwerp and the Congo Free State as the Cie Belge Maritime du Congo. This was to involve Jones in serious embarrassment when the "Congo atrocities" became the subject of wide condemnation leading to the founding of the Congo Reform Association in 1904.

He had already done much to press for the building of railways in West Africa, largely through the "Western Syndicate" formed ... to develop the resources of West Africa under Colonial Government." He was well-fitted to come to the fore in an age of Imperialism, and was described by a prominent Manchester cotton man as "a great Imperialist, who I place next to Cecil Rhodes."

Meanwhile the Chambers of Commerce, having set up their independent, but essentially local organisations, found it desirable to establish a means of cooperation, so that when questions of importance to all the Chambers, or their African Committees arose, a united front could be shown to the government of the day. In 1893 a suggested Resolution for the setting-up of a Consultative Committee which would advise the Secretary for the Colonies was discussed by Manchester Sectional Committee. But the suggestion was turned down by the London Chamber, and later by those of Glasgow and Birmingham. Cooperation for particular purposes was meanwhile not excluded, and produced some desirable modifications in local West African Ordinances; one success being the amendment after representations of the Lagos Piece Goods Folding Ordinance of 1893. In the pursuit of broader goals, the Chambers used their influence to press on
the government plans for building railways in West Africa. An influential deputation to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, in 1895, was one illustration, and the decision to begin work on the Lagos Railway was taken by Chamberlain later in the same year.  

The prolonged depression in West Africa caused the Chambers to continue their pressure on the British Government, as a number of the smaller firms in West Africa were threatened with closure. But the efforts of the Chambers were not confined to trading matters alone as they were justifiably worried by the high mortality of Europeans on the Coast. There was much talk of "sanitation" although this aspect became less important after 1900 when the work of Sir Patrick Manson and Sir Ronald Ross had confirmed the role of the mosquito in transmitting malaria, and similar work by an American team in Cuba discovered that another mosquito transmitted yellow fever.  

The Chambers' main concern, however, was with costs of administration on the West Coast, which were rising steeply in comparison to exports. During the 1890's various forms of government which might be established in the African Colonies and Protectorates were being widely discussed, since tropical areas then under British rule were being administered in part by the Foreign Office, (e.g. the Niger Coast Protectorate), partly by the Colonial Office and partly by Chartered Companies like the Royal Niger Company. The tendency under Chamberlain was towards increased control by the Colonial Office and the adoption of Crown Colony government - a form of government disliked by the merchants as it was the most expensive kind, although all the systems relied for their support on taxes on trade in various guises.  

In their criticisms of Crown Colony government the merchants discovered a remarkable ally - Mary Kingsley, a woman who had paid two extensive visits to West Africa during the 1890's and published two books recording her experiences and ideas on how Britain should carry out her responsibilities in her West African colonial areas. She was a scientific collector as well as a gifted observer of African society and understood how important all aspects of those societies were to their orderly functioning. She therefore advocated that African societies should be preserved relatively intact and be subject only to a general supervision or overlordship, while they would also remain relatively inexpensive as dependencies. At the same time Kingsley lacked commercial
vision for she wrote: "I do not think there will be any dividend, immediate or remote, on railways in West Africa", although she did not claim to speak for Lagos which she had not visited.22

1898 saw the outbreak of the Hut Tax "War" in the Protectorate area of Sierra Leone, arising from a tax on the houses there imposed by Governor Sir Frederick Cardew, against the advice of the chiefs and apparently without the knowledge of the merchants.23 The tax was not imposed in the Colony where a similar proposal had failed in the 1850's. The result was a very serious outbreak in the Protectorate involving the loss of about one thousand Creole or Saro and European lives, as well as extensive damage to commercial and other property for which no compensation was paid.24 Inevitably the merchants felt that their long-held suspicions were justified and that they had been right about autocratic governors all along. The Manchester and Liverpool Chambers thereupon asked Chamberlain to agree to the setting-up of an Advisory Council, but even this champion of business interests declined.25

On March 19th, 1898, a letter from Mary Kingsley was published in "The Spectator," and the merchants recognised the ally they needed - a gifted spokeswoman with similar ideas to their own who regarded themselves as the saviours of the West Coast. John Holt at once wrote to "The Spectator" in support. Kingsley explained that if an African paid taxes on property it indicated it did not really belong to him. The chiefs of the Protectorate had not been conquered but had made treaties with the Colony. In most of Africa taxes were usually levied on trade. She stressed the importance of law in governing all societies and spoke out against the Crown Colony form of government: "It necessarily destroys native society".26 She was thinking of the small army of detribalised clerks which the system produced, and of the increased expenses which it demanded. "Clerking is the breath of life to the Crown Colony system, and customs what it feeds on."27

In March 1899 Kingsley visited Manchester and frankly told the members of the Chamber, the "trade-lords" as she called them, to pull their ideas together and decide what kind of government they wanted for West Africa. She again condemned the Crown Colony system and advocated government by the Council. It was a Council very different from the then-existing India Council, set up to advise the Secretary of State for India in Britain. The "African Council", as Kingsley called it, would also reside in Britain but there the resemblance
ceased. The members of the African Council were to be composed of representatives of the Chambers of Commerce from the more important British cities connected with the African trade. The Council would then be subject to the final approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and appoint a Governor-General for the West African Colonies with Governors under him. The Council would also be responsible for voting supplies. Under it would be another Council consisting of legal and medical representatives whose fields encompassed a large part of West Africa's problems, other than those of trade. Thus the "African Council" would be a far more powerful organ than the India Council, would bypass the permanent staff of the Colonial Office, and was highly flattering to the merchants. No wonder they welcomed her.28

But the vision did not last long. When the South African War began, Mary Kingsley went out to work there as a nurse, and died of fever caught while looking after Afrikaner prisoners-of-war. The merchants were left to press their schemes on their own, deprived of her first-hand experience of African societies and of her constructive ideas.

The Hut Tax affair, however, did induce a more cooperative attitude from Chamberlain and in June 1899 he rashly undertook that no further steps would be taken in West African affairs without first affording the merchants an opportunity of expressing their views.29 But the Hut Tax was continued and Sir Frederick returned to Sierra Leone as Governor, and a few years later, J.A. Hutton, a prominent Manchester merchant and chairman of its Chamber's African Sectional Committee, was saying of Chamberlain's undertaking to consult the Chambers, "these promises have been more honoured in the breach than in the observance."30

Despite this, progress was made towards keeping the Chambers more fully informed on proposed legislation in West Africa. Chamberlain arranged that four copies of each edition of the various Colonial Gazettes should be sent to each Chamber, and copies of each colonial bill, so that they could be examined before they became law - except when the matter was urgent. Ordinances, as finally enacted, and Bluebooks were to be sent also. Direct correspondence with the Governors was allowed provided the Colonial Office were kept informed.31 One result of these concessions was the modification of the Lagos Trade Marks and Designs Ordinance of 1902.32
Chamberlain resigned from the Conservative Government in the fall of 1903 over the question of "Protection", and his successor was the more conciliatory, Alfred Lyttleton, whose first response to requests for a West African Committee had been a refusal on the grounds that such a Committee would not be fully representative of commercial interests, that it could not represent African interests, that it would entail greater delay in administrative work and that Lyttleton could not share his responsibility to Parliament with such a body. The last reason had also been given by Chamberlain. At the same time Lyttleton showed a desire to cooperate with the Chambers and "The Sale of Palm Kernels Ordinance of 1904" was sent to them before a final decision had been taken by the Secretary of State whether to allow or disallow it.

In March 1904 Lyttleton changed his mind when he received a deputation, possibly because a similar concession had already been made to the British Cotton Growing Association, and announced his readiness to sanction the Committee. It was to consist of a maximum of three members of each of the Liverpool, Manchester and London Chambers. Thus "The Joint West African Committee" was at last brought into existence and recognised by the Colonial Office, the lineal descendant of Mary Kingsley's "African Council", although it is doubtful whether she would have recognised the weakly infant that was finally brought forth as her own offspring. Far from being independent of the Colonial Office except for the Secretary of State's final sanction, as she had proposed, the Committee could consider itself fortunate that it had been allowed to meet in the Colonial Office - a rendezvous which itself symbolised the dependence of the merchants. The arrangements for the meetings further emphasised the Committee's dependence. Lyttleton insisted on the meetings being chaired by a Colonial Office official, not by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. In due course this measure was to cause dissatisfaction, as the permanent officials thought of themselves as "neutral" in regard to policies and a need was felt for someone ready to take the responsibility for making decisions.

Despite its drawbacks the merchants welcomed the setting-up of the Joint West African Committee and Sir Alfred Jones described it as "a very great concession". Its significance in his eyes was probably owing to what he hoped it would lead to - some form of effective control over the actions of the Imperial Government in West Africa.

On the official side the representatives at the Committee's meetings were leading civil servants, usually headed by R.L. Antrobus. The first meeting
took place at the Colonial Office on February 8th, 1905 with Antrobus in the Chair and later meetings were held on a quarterly basis. The leading commercial representatives were Sir Alfred Jones for Liverpool; J.A. Hutton and G. B. Zochonis for Manchester; and Lord Harris (a former Governor of Bombay 1890-1895) and F. Swanzy for the London Chamber. The absence of the Parliamentary Undersecretary - at that time the Duke of Marlborough, the result of Lyttleton's condition, who could have acted as an umpire, and as a bridge between commerce and the civil service, each with its own traditions and loyalties, was to prove a weakness. The Parliamentary Undersecretary was "on terms" with both sides of the table and his presence would have helped to give the Committee the importance which the merchants felt it deserved. But the absence of the Parliamentary Undersecretary was to prove only a temporary one.

In the meanwhile Lyttleton tried to work with the representatives of the Chambers in the spirit of his own concessions and of those of his predecessor. But the honeymoon was brief. By 1905 the Chambers, at their usual preliminary meeting, were complaining that they were not being consulted to any serious extent.

There was in fact a difference of approach to the meetings by the two "sides" - commercial and official - which made the successful working of the Committee difficult. Basically both sides expected the other to take the initiative: the civil servants expected to be asked questions about developments in West Africa, while the merchants expected to be provided with information as to what was taking place there, information on which they wished to make comments and give advice, for they were "experts" who would supply the classically educated civil servants with the down-to-earth commercial knowledge they so evidently lacked. But their dissatisfaction lay deeper than this, for they regarded Lyttleton's concession as only a first step towards the Council advocated by Mary Kingsley. The words of this woman - now dead and when living without any kind of official status - were the underlying goal towards which the "trade-lords" were probing. Unfortunately most of their representatives lacked the fundamental recommendation which she had herself possessed, and for which her views were heard with respect - first-hand knowledge of West Africa. Hence their claim to be "experts" was limited to their knowledge of trade, which was only one section, albeit an important one, of the whole gamut of West African affairs.

The contending assumptions behind the two sides of the Committee thus focussed on the question of what information should be made available to its
commercial members. The difficulties in which this could involve the Colonial Office were shown over the matter of the Gambia wharf extension. Lyttleton wrote to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce that he "felt sure that it was impossible for the Secretary of State to give a pledge which could be construed as meaning that he would delay the sanction of necessary public works until he could consult the merchants engaged in the West African trade."

But this was just what the merchants did mean. They wished to have the opportunity of expressing their views before legislation was actually passed "on all matters affecting (our) interests". The issue was debated at a meeting of the Joint West African Committee which considered the Accra Harbour Works. Antrobus pointed out that the Colonial Office had not undertaken to send copies of all documents to the Chambers and that the merchants were represented in the various Legislative Councils in the Colonies. The latter was not a point which recommended itself to the "trade-lords", since their representatives on the Coast were their subordinates - "the principals are at the wrong end". The Committee was not fulfilling its real purpose as "the whole matter is threshed out before it comes before the Council, to which it is submitted merely as a matter of form."

The basic question which concerned the Committee was that of its status and functions, with both of which it continued to be dissatisfied. The situation was not reviewed while the Conservatives remained in office - their tenure of office becoming weaker as the wings of the party divided into those who supported Chamberlain, who was stumping the country on behalf of his program of "tariff reform", and those who accepted free trade. The Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, seemed suspended uncomfortably in mid-air and unable to define a clear policy. His final unsatisfactory compromise of "retaliation" was so obviously a policy of convenience that it led to a further loss of confidence. The government fell near the end of 1905 and a Liberal administration under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman took office. The ensuing general election early in 1906 proved a Liberal landslide and little more was heard of tariff reform. The succeeding Colonial Secretary was Lord Elgin, with Winston Churchill as his parliamentary undersecretary. Churchill was already widely known on account of his actions during the South African War, during which he had been captured and imprisoned, but had succeeded in a dramatic escape to freedom. The question of the Committee's status was taken up with Elgin shortly after his assumption of office, and the ordinary meeting of March 7th, 1906, was changed to a special deputation to the Colonial Secretary to consider the whole question.
Its importance was underlined by the attendance of the Presidents of all three Chambers, besides the accompanying representatives, who included John Holt.\(^{52}\)

At a preliminary meeting at Manchester G.B. Zochonis remarked that unless the Committee were given a slightly different constitution it would not be worthwhile to continue it.\(^{53}\)

At the Colonial Office the deputation was received by Lord Elgin, Winston Churchill, R.L. Antrobus and S. Olivier, head of the West African Department.

The merchants complained that they were given no more information than that submitted to the public, and that the matters brought before them had already been decided. Probably as a test, they asked to see a Report by C.A. Birtwistle, Southern Nigeria's Commercial Intelligence Officer, but were told it was confidential. One of the delegates from the London Chamber was Lord Harris, the former Governor of Bombay (1890-1895), while Elgin had been Viceroy during part of Harris's term of office, so it was perhaps natural that he should revert to the practices of the sub-continent. He referred to the fact that the Viceroy had usually consulted the Chambers in India as occasion demanded, and that anything beyond this would conflict with the Secretary of State's responsibility to Parliament and Country. The Colonial Office feared, as Churchill made clear when he chaired the next meeting of the Joint Committee in June, the creation of a kind of Frankenstein monster, a Board of Control or a Second Chamber to the Colonial Legislative Council.\(^{54}\)

That these fears were not unjustified is shown by the summary of the proceedings at the preliminary meeting at Manchester:

"It was understood that the Deputation should ask that when a scheme had been put forward by the Governor of a Colony to the Colonial Office, that the scheme should be submitted to the Joint Committee for consideration and report, which Committee should express an opinion on these proposals, and, if necessary, suggest amendments therein". \(^{55}\)

By "scheme" was meant both legislative and administrative changes. And at the Colonial Office meeting it was also urged that matters of policy should be submitted from time to time. Despite this preliminary flexing of muscles, Lord Harris at the interview with Elgin put the proposals in a milder form: "We ask only for a preliminary opportunity to express our opinion"\(^{56}\)
Elgin, however, refused to give an undertaking to consult on all matters, or the matters chosen by the Committee. "The selection of the points on which we are to ask your opinion must remain in our hands." 57

But in June Elgin did make a valuable concession and agreed that the meetings should be chaired by the Parliamentary Undersecretary. 58 At least this put the Committee meetings on the same general standing as those which were then taking place with the British Cotton Growing Association and dissolved one underlying current of resentment.

It did not mean that the Parliamentary Secretary was always there; it was, Churchill said, a matter of "convenience". And the intervals between his presence could be lengthy, as, for instance, when Churchill made his journey to East Africa during the last months of 1907, returning early in the following year. Governors on leave were occasional attendants, and the meetings were probably more suitable occasions for discussion and decision than the banquets and visits by officials to Manchester and Liverpool. In 1907 when Egerton was present, the question of the Benin-Warri Road was taken up - the Chambers and particularly Hutton, questioning its considerable expense (£58,000). But Egerton was able to show that the cost was less than half that of a light railway. 59 This must have shown the officials that the Committee served a useful purpose from their own point of view.

The Committee's constitutional development still had a few short stages ahead of it. One concerned the Committee's name - Joint West African Committee. Manchester considered the Committee should have an official status as a consultative body. "Until this status was granted the policy of the West African Colonies would always be of a haphazard kind, lacking continuity of purpose." 60 In June 1907, at a preliminary meeting among the Chambers only, it was decided to change the name to "Joint West African Council," apparently without informing the Colonial Office officials. The minutes of the June full meeting were headed "Council" - the preparation of agenda and minutes apparently being normally the work of the Chambers. The point did not go unnoticed and Elgin soon wrote asking for the old name to be used again. 61

1908 saw the position of the Committee more clearly defined, and may be said to mark the end of its constitutional evolution. Owing to his preoccupations with the B.C.G.A., Hutton did not attend further meetings after March.
The year witnessed a deterioration in the relationship between the Colonial Office's head civil servants and the representatives of the Chambers. In December the new Parliamentary Undersecretary, Col. "Jack" Seely (later Lord Mottistone) discussed the matter with the Committee. The civil servants, he said, had been obliged to defend the official case, although they were supposed to be impartial. They could be "threatened" by the delegates of the Chambers and friction had been caused. The following day, when the B.C.G.A. were meeting, a joint deputation of the Joint West African Committee and the British Cotton Growing Association representatives, including three North Country M.P.'s went "upstairs" to visit Elgin's successor, Lord Crewe. He took up the matters which Col. Seely had been discussing and said it would be best if there were quarterly meetings only of the Joint West African Committee and the Committee always met under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Undersecretary. On the face of the matter, this was but a confirmation of the arrangement allowed by Elgin, but now it was formalised and placed in its constitutional perspective. It was fitting, said Crewe, that the Committee should have its discussions with the political, rather than the permanent, side of the Colonial Office. If there were serious disagreements, appeal would be to Parliament, and the new arrangement was therefore the more logical one. D. Shackleton agreed and remarked that by the new arrangement the meetings would be held under some privilege, presumably meaning some access to confidential information, opinions and documents.

This was the final position at which the long-sought West African Committee arrived. It still lacked the over-riding powers of revision which some of the merchants had originally claimed under the influence of Mary Kingsley. But it gave the mercantile community an entree into the Colonial Office which enabled an influential "special relationship" to develop, provided there were no serious clash of personalities. And if the merchants never gained the right to consider all matters before decisions were taken, nor gained access to confidential Colonial Office documents as a right, they had the considerable compensation of regular meetings with the Parliamentary Undersecretary, who was almost invariably well-disposed because the welfare of the Lancashire cotton industry and prosperity of the port of Liverpool were political factors of importance to the party in power.

The Committee in no way resembled Mary Kingsley's African Council, but
it provided the merchants with the points of contact and the influence they desired. The merchants suspected that the Governors would govern without due reference to their interests, and the merchants' influence at the Colonial Office helped to make the Governors aware of the needs of commerce. There was a wide gap between the actual administration and the British interests the colonies were meant to serve. The meetings at the Colonial Office were an attempt to bridge this gap. It served the purposes of the Colonial Office as it kept control of the business interests and prevented too close a relationship of Governors and Manchester and Liverpool which might have left the Colonial Office in a position of isolation. Ultimately the channels led up to Parliament if any serious clash of interests occurred as Lord Crewe had remarked but the informal meetings dealt successfully with details that were of no interest to Parliament but concerned with trading matters in West Africa. Government in the colonies was not democratic and while paying regard to African interests it also existed to serve British ones, especially in commerce. The meetings at the Colonial Office were a reflection of the unsatisfactory nature of the colonial governments in representing the interests they existed to serve.
CHAPTER 6 FOOTNOTES

1. Although similar organisations were founded earlier, the Chambers of Manchester and Liverpool were themselves founded in 1820 and 1829.

2. Manchester Chamber of Commerce had split in 1845 over the Corn Law issue and the conservatives formed their own Manchester Commercial Association (the two "branches" were reunited into the Chamber of Commerce in 1858). In the general election of 1857 Manchester's great free trade spokesman, John Bright, lost his seat and the Cotton Supply Association was formed mainly by Chamber of Commerce - or free trade - men who wanted an organisation to replace Bright - a national figure - in pressing their interests. See A. Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, Manchester University Press, 1956, pp. 82-86. The Cotton Supply Association was dissolved in 1871.

3. Sir George Goldie was Chairman of the West African Section of the London Chamber until 1890.

4. Under the chairmanship of James Arthur Hutton (1862-1955), Chairman until 1917, and afterwards a Vice-President, of the British Cotton Growing Association; Vice-President of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation; Chairman of the African Sectional Committee, Manchester Chamber of Commerce 1892-1904. Hutton came from a family which had long traded on the West African Coast - W.B. Hutton and Sons trading there during the eighteenth century. His father, J.F. Hutton, founded a firm named after him in Manchester, was President of Manchester Chamber 1884-1885, and Member of Parliament for North Manchester 1885. He had been a director of Goldie's National African Company (formed in 1882 it replaced the United African Company of 1879), and of the Imperial British East Africa Company, as well as Belgian Consul in Manchester. The Hutton firm traded with the Congo as well as the area of the "Coast" further north.


6. Originally a Glasgow firm.

7. His shipping empire was completed when the Woermann Line of Hamburg, which traded to West Africa, agreed that Elder Dempster & Co. had the sole right of loading and unloading in British ports.

8. For the complex story of Jones's growing control of Elder Dempster and Company see P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, London 1973, Chapter 3. Jones had once served Macgregord Laird as "tea-boy" and claimed to have received many of his ideas from him.

9. C.O. Confidential Print 451, Part III, No. 19 (12,277), July 19th, 1893. A.L. Jones and Others to C.O. The Syndicate was particularly interested in mineral resources, especially in developing Gold Coast (Ghanaian) mines.


12. Monthly Record, May 1893, p.111. This may have been due in part to Sir George Goldie, then Chairman of the Royal Niger Company as well as Chairman of London Chamber's West African Section. The Liverpool merchants' "African Association" was then in embittered rivalry with the Royal Niger Company over the question of bypassing the African traders (and the Liverpool merchants) who traded in the Delta. Jones allied with the Royal Niger Company partly because the African Association was running its own ships. See P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, pp.92 and 127-128.


16. Under Major Walter Reed. Later it was found that several types of mosquito could act as carriers of yellow fever.


18. Other Chartered Companies were the Imperial British East Africa Company and the British South Africa Company which administered Rhodesia until 1923.

19. Kingsley, Mary Henrietta (1862-1900) Daughter of George Kingsley and niece of author Charles Kingsley. During 1893-4 she travelled to the Lower Congo, and in 1894-95 she made another visit to the French Congo (Ogowe River in Gabon).


21. Expenditure in Lagos grew from £62,736 in 1888 to £192,760 in 1898, mainly owing to staff increases. From 1895 to 1899 (except 1896) expenditure exceeded revenue. Annual Reports, passim.


27. Ibid., p.280. Kingsley was a close friend of Sir George Goldie and his wife, and was probably influenced by him. Goldie disliked educated Africans and Kingsley remarked: "I confess I am not an enthusiast in civilising the African." See *Travels in West Africa*, Appendix I, p.639.

28. *West African Studies*, Chapter XVII 'An Alternative Plan'. The Council members were to be nominated by the Chambers of Liverpool, Manchester, London, Bristol and Glasgow. In 1899 the Council of India consisted of ten members whose office was held for ten years each; they were mainly retired India men who were appointed by the Secretary of State. Sir Malcolm Seton, *The India Office*, London, 1926, p.26. The Council originally contained fifteen members. See N. MacLagen, * Clemency Canning*, London 1962, pp.222-223.


33. Euphemistically called "tariff reform" by Chamberlain.


35. In 1898 the British "Association of Chambers of Commerce" had ninety Chambers as members. See *Monthly Record*, December 31st, 1898, p.299.


38. Cf. below, Chapter 7.


2. Other commercial representatives were H. Cotterell and Thomas Barker (Secretary) Liverpool; Henry Wallach and K.B. Murray, Secretary, London. Minutes of the Joint West African Committee, Feb. 8th, 1905. Cotterell represented the African Association, the powerful group of Liverpool merchants of which he was chairman. Bishop Crowther had frequently stayed with him. See Sir Frederick Pedler, *The Lion and the Unicorn in Africa*, London, 1974, p.141.


5. The best-known exception is John Holt but he did not attend often.


10. 1899-1902. Before the election of January 1906 Manchester and its neighbour, Salford, had been represented by 7 Conservatives, 1 Liberal Unionist and 1 Liberal; after it by 7 Liberals and 2 Labour Members of Parliament. See McCalmont's *Parliamentary Poll-Book 1832-1968*, Brighton, England 1971. Churchill had previously represented Oldham as a Conservative but left the party when it ceased to support free trade. He represented North-West Manchester 1906-08.


15. Minutes of the special meeting of the Joint West African Committee of March 1st, 1906.
56. Ibid. Minutes of the Deputation to the Colonial Secretary, March 7th, 1906.

57. Idem.


62. See below Chapter 7.

63. D. Shackleton, Labour, Clitheroe; F. Cawley, Liberal, Prestwich; and A.H. Gill, Labour, Bolton.

The criticisms of Crown Colony government made by Mary Kingsley arose mainly because it was considered a more costly form of government than Protectorates (then under the control of the Foreign Office) or the administration of Chartered Companies at a time when trade was undergoing a prolonged recession from around 1875. Virtually all forms of British colonial government at this time relied on customs duties on imports for their revenue, and therefore the least expensive forms were those least likely to hamper trade. At the turn of the century approximately 90% of the revenue of Lagos arose from customs.1

The severe effect of the depression on the prices of tropical primary products, especially of palm products, caused firms in Lagos to go out of business, and encouraged the Colonial Office to support the program of botanical stations in West Africa. In several years expenditure in Lagos had exceeded revenue.2 Despite these measures, the outlook remained overcast and the later 1890’s revealed a similarly depressing story. Expenditure continued to rise and in several years expenditure exceeded revenue.3 Of thirteen large European produce firms between 1893 and 1905, six were forced to close their doors and four others had to curtail business.4 Some of the firms which traded with Africa made exported manufactured articles their sole business, and the more import duties were raised to meet expenditure, the smaller were the firms’ profit margins, since it was impossible to pass on costs in higher prices to African customers during a recession.5

Gloomy as the scene in West Africa was, it was surpassed elsewhere. Earlier during the nineteenth century tariffs had been adopted in Europe and overseas as a means of fostering the growth of new and undeveloped industries. When the depression came, the same corrections were brought into play on an increasing scale, at the very time when it was most important to British industry that it should develop existing markets and discover new ones. Already in 1872 France had introduced discriminatory duties on goods imported and exported in foreign vessels. In 1881 Algeria became part of the metropolitan tariff area, and soon after the Mélise tariff imposed differential duties which raised totals paid by foreign importers by up to 40%.6 Italy introduced a tariff in 1877 which
increased payments on imported yarns by 20% and on fully manufactured articles by 50%. In 1902 Germany, still a considerable market for British cotton-goods, heavily increased duties on manufactured articles.

In the meantime many overseas countries whose markets might have been expected to replace the more traditional ones, were carrying out their own programs of industrialisation and adopting similar measures to protect them. The United States steadily raised its tariffs throughout the century, culminating in the notorious McKinley tariff of 1890. Even worse, the country became an exporter in her own right and during the early 1900's was busily taking over a major share of the Chinese market for cotton goods. Other cotton-producing countries, such as Brazil, were also reducing their cotton goods imports from Britain.

Thus Britain was being driven back on areas which were mainly under her own control. Her traditional market was India, and the sub-continent continued to take one-third of British piece-good exports during the first decade of the present century. Nevertheless, there was a clear warning-signal in the continued growth of the Indian cotton-mills, ever since they had been stimulated into vigorous growth by the shortages of imported goods brought about by the American Civil War. They had since continued to increase their output and India had become the fourth largest producer of yarn in the world.

In contrast one of the most promising areas for further expansion appeared to be Africa even if this were partly a matter of elimination. Even during the depression years British exports to Africa were undergoing a remarkable increase. There were inevitably fears that tariff restrictions would be introduced there, and British efforts had helped to create certain areas where these fears had been removed.

The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 had agreed that "the trade of all nations" should "enjoy complete freedom in the Conventional Basin of the Congo", that is "all territories drained by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika and its eastern tributaries." More successful was the wider agreement on tariffs arranged by the Anglo-French Convention of 1898 which established reciprocal trading conditions. "Within the Ivory Coast, Gold Coast, Dahomey and Nigeria, persons and goods of both countries and their colonies shall for thirty years enjoy the same treatment in all matters." This agreement was generally observed with the exception of Goldie's Royal Niger Company which succeeded in establishing a monopoly on the river.
When trading opportunities in Africa were restricted alarm was expressed almost at once. One instance was in King Leopold II of Belgium's concessionary system in the Congo Free State, (at this time virtually under the king's personal rule) which effectively restricted free trade. When the French Congo began a similar policy, the matter was taken up by John Holt at Liverpool Chamber of Commerce and a protest sent to the Foreign Office. Differential tariffs were introduced in West Africa, outside the area affected by the Convention of 1898, but these were said to have little effect on trade.

Africa thus appeared one of the most promising fields for future trade expansion. At least the doors could not be closed against British goods where Imperial claims had been established. It was also held that what was happening in India and beginning in China - the development of a domestic manufacturing industry - was unlikely to take place in Africa. Even so sympathetically inclined a person as E.D. Morel, who systematically campaigned against African wrongs, could write:

"West Africa is the future China of the Dark Continent for British Commerce; ay, and better than another China, for the Celestial Empire and the countries of the Far East generally are our competitors in manufacture and trade, and will increasingly become so. Equatorial Africa, on the other hand, is virgin ground of enormous natural wealth; and the African, unlike the Asiatic, will never become a manufacturing and commercial rival of the white man on a scale sufficiently great to constitute a danger. The vast bulk of the African race is essentially agricultural and arboricultural ..." 24

The foundation of the Joint West African Committee had indicated the importance attached to West Africa by the three leading Chambers of Commerce. With Chamberlain at the Colonial Office urging a program of restrictive tariffs combined with colonial development, there was a sound basis on which progress could be made. Britain already supplied a high proportion of West African imports, especially in textiles, and the market was rapidly increasing despite the recession and the difficulties of British firms in Lagos. On the other hand Britain took a smaller percentage of West African exports, and the future of her trade might well depend on bringing the two more into balance. The position regarding the United States was also becoming increasingly one-sided, as tariffs reduced British imports while Britain had by the 1870's once more returned to a position of overwhelming dependence on this source of supply for her raw cotton. By 1895 imports of American lint amounted to 79.4% of the whole.
With this dependence grew a concern as to the total amount of cotton which could be produced in the United States altogether. World demand was rising steadily, and it was stated by J.A. Hutton in 1905 that with the claims of other crops, such as Indian corn and clovers, the total acreage available was unlikely to exceed 35 million acres. So far, however, supply was succeeding in keeping up with demand, and cotton acreage over the ten years from 1899 to 1909 increased from 24,275,000 to 32,044,000 acres, and production showed a steady growth.

But "doubting Thomases" could find ample justification for fears despite the apparently comforting nature of these figures, for American consumption of its own cotton was rapidly mounting, as its industrial production was stimulated under tariffs. American consumption between 1882 and 1902 had risen by 88.5% - and in 1902 the United States was consuming 38% of its own crop - a proportion which aroused deep misgiving in Manchester. Most of the new factories were being built in the South itself, and there were fears that the "picking force" of negroes might be reduced.

A further danger to the American crop came from insect pests, especially the Mexican boll-weevil which entered Texas in the early 1890's and spread rapidly until it had infested almost the whole of the belt, except its western extremities in Arizona and California, by 1928.

Outside America there was yet another cause for concern - the amount of cotton being taken by the growing industries of Europe, which also used American cotton. The total had gone up by 102% between 1882 and 1902 and Britain was becoming a relatively less important customer since by 1902 her consumption was less than that of Europe.

Prospective disasters, however, would not have made the industry as a whole wake up; what did so was a series of crises which were related not only to the monopolistic position of the United States and the possibility of shortage, but which were actually caused by speculators in America making profits out of an expected rise in cotton prices. Rumours were readily put about to serve their ends.

Buying of cotton for manufacturing purposes is usually called the "spot" market whether the cotton is bought for immediate or forthcoming delivery. But there is another market which is mainly used for insurance purposes or "hedging" known as the "futures" market, in which cotton is not normally intended for delivery, but money settlements are made at weekly intervals according to the
changes of price which take place. The practice is said to have begun in Liverpool when the first transatlantic cable was laid in 1866 and a cotton buyer would know at once what price he had had to pay for cotton bought in America. Before it was delivered - a lengthy process - the price might have fallen, and the buyer would insure against loss by selling an equivalent amount in the futures market. One of the less desirable aspects of the futures market was that it required little or no basic capital and the scale of operations was not proportionate to the real amounts of cotton available for trading.

Because so much of the crop was concentrated in one area, prices fluctuated according to news of the expected size of the American crop, and were given added impetus by the occasional unreliability of the official figures. The crop of 1901-02 was estimated by the United States Department of Agriculture at 9,674,000 bales but turned out to be 10,631,000. As a result American Middling rose from 4.34d. in January to 5.29d. at the end of April 1902. The Wall Street Corner then began to unload on to a crowd of small speculators, and in due course reports of a good crop began to come in and the market was taken over by "bears". "So unsatisfactory is the actual condition of affairs, that for the past three years it has hardly paid importers to ship cotton to Liverpool", wrote E.D. Morel, later editor of "The West African Mail" begun in 1903, which was the official publication of the British Cotton Growing Association. A year or so later the position was ruefully described in an editorial in "The Textile Manufacturer":

"Cotton is very difficult, for disasters are reported respecting this crop from start to finish. Sometimes the weather is too wet for an early start to the crop, and then it is too dry for the seed to germinate. Then we hear a great deal of replanting being necessary, and this is nearly always coincident with an alleged scarcity of seed for that purpose. Then there is so much rain that the plants are injured by grass, which grows faster and chokes them. Then great injury is reported from the shedding of leaves and fruitage caused by hot weather after too much rain. Then we hear of injuries by lice, caterpillars, boll-weevil, sharp shooters and the worst bug of all, the Mexican boll-weevil. If the crop should survive all these troubles - it generally does - there are yet to come the early frosts in October and November to kill the plant outright or stop all further development. These troubles should be enough to shake the reason of any planter, but unfortunately he hears very little about them except from the newspapers, while it is the cotton spinner who does the trembling and the cotton broker who takes the profits."
1903 and 1904 were especially dramatic years for the American cotton speculator and witnessed the "rocket-like rise" (in 1903) and the fall (in March 1904) of Daniel J. Sully and raw cotton prices in January 1904 reached 9d. per lb. The "very housemaids and shoeblacks of New Orleans" were said to be gambling their dollars on cotton "futures". Even after his "fall" Sully was aiming to build warehouses where cotton would be kept back to force up prices and he was widely acclaimed in the South.

The most apparent effects of speculation in Britain were both rising and fluctuating prices, both of them having serious effects on trade. After 1900 cotton prices began to rise along with the general price index, but cotton rose much faster - by 40% more than other prices averaged together. This was an anxious matter when Britain relied so heavily on customers in India and Africa, as it was generally held that a falling-off in purchases took place when raw cotton rose above 5d. per lb.

In these very unsettled conditions the chosen solution was short time, a solution which shared the hardships and showed an underlying faith in the industry's future. "In 1901 and 1902 a good many mills had run short time. In 1903 the bulk of them had run short time for four months, and the climax was reached in 1904 when the greater number of mills ran short time for eight months." The effects on the workers were drastic as most of them lived only by spending all their wages. Houses had to be shared and many had to go without the bare necessities of life and were reported to be eating potato-peelings. But however sombre the picture, it was short-time which was given the credit for bringing about Sully's fall.

Nevertheless, short-time was a negative answer. A more positive one was to seek for alternative sources of cotton, as had had to be done in the days of the Cotton Supply Association. It was no accident that the movement to do this was spearheaded by the spinners of Oldham, the great Lancashire spinning centre some seven miles from Manchester. There, in January 1901, at the annual dinner of the Chamber of Commerce, Alderman Benjamin Crapper suggested enquiring into the possibilities of widening the supply of cotton and a committee was set up at the dinner "to make enquiries into the possibilities of cotton-growing in the British Empire." This committee reported favourably, its suggestions being adopted on November 18th.
Oldham could not carry out the program on her own, and it was necessary that the interests of all the main Lancashire cotton centres be engaged, in particular of Manchester, and an organisation set up. The growth of the Chambers of Commerce since the mid-nineteenth century provided the framework on which the new association could be based, although the association made a point of its dependence on both "sides" of industry. On February 18th, 1902, a meeting was held at the Manchester Chamber to discuss the matter - it was attended by representatives of "Chambers of Commerce and other associations." The meeting formally approved "the action of the Oldham Chamber of Commerce in seeking to increase the growth of cotton particularly within the Empire", and on April 9th a committee of Oldham, Manchester, Liverpool, Blackburn, Bolton, Halifax and Bury Chambers, and leading manufacturers' and spinners' organisations, was set up, with a separate committee for West Africa.

The formal creation of the British Cotton Growing Association took place at Manchester Chamber on June 12th, 1902, when resolutions stating the aims of the Association were approved, and a General Committee set up. A guarantee fund of £50,000 - later the capital was raised to £500,000 - was provided for. Towards the end of 1902 Sir Alfred Jones was chosen as the Association's first President. As usual he was optimistic: "There is no doubt whatever that the Association is going to succeed in the cultivation of cotton in large quantities all over the British Empire."

The Colonial Office had its own good reasons for cooperating with the Association. The revenues of its colonies needed to be increased, and to do this the program of botanic stations had been undertaken, and later the building of railways. Until they were completed, the financing of these railways would be a further burden on the Colonies and Protectorates. From 1900 a grant-in-aid was being paid to Northern Nigeria, which could hardly be expected to end until the railway reached Kano and a large-scale export trade brought into operation. Large-scale cotton growing could only contribute towards a solution of these problems. The Association was dedicated to growing cotton in the colonies and in India. It was not alone in seeking new sources of supply as the speculative activities in the United States had driven others to search for new fields and not all these were ready to limit the opportunities to the British Empire. One such organisation, under the British leadership of
C.W. (later Sir Charles) Macara was "The International Federation of Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Associations" which held its first congress at Zurich, Switzerland, in May 1904. It made Manchester its headquarters, and Macara its President. The aims of the new Federation resembled those of the former Cotton Supply Association - "the expansion of the present cotton fields and ... the opening up of new ones in any part of the world in which this can be done with success." It was an influential body; its International Committee being received by King Edward VII and the German Emperor, while a series of conferences were held in the capitals of Europe before World War I. The means chosen by the Federation and the Association were in many respects different; although the President of the Federation claimed that it was "largely through the influence of the International Cotton Federation ... (that) the Indian crop was raised from 3,000,000 to 6,000,000 bales ..." But their cooperation was close, the Federation being represented on the Association's Council and Executive Committee.

The Colonial Office with Chamberlain at its head were ready to take advantage of the initiative of Oldham and on July 16th 1901 a circular was sent out to the Governors and High Commissioners of the West African Colonies and Protectorates stating that the Oldham Chamber was "engaged in studying the question of the possibilities of developing the growth of cotton in the Colonies", and enclosing copies of a letter from Sir William Thistleton-Dyer, Director of Kew, whose advice the Colonial Office treated with respect. To Kew this new move was another example of the lack of continuity of botanical policy in West Africa, as the policy of creating botanic stations, which it had earlier encouraged, would - if carried through - have been a suitable preliminary to a full-scale cotton-growing program. The Director now wrote: "It is extremely desirable to encourage agricultural industries in the West African Colonies ... the cultivation of cotton affords reasonable chances of success."

Chamberlain, a "city man" and manufacturer, was strongly influenced by Kew to give the Association his backing. In 1903 he wrote to Thistleton-Dyer that he had: "... not failed to bear in mind the favourable opinion you have several times expressed as to the prospects of cotton growing in West Africa, and have accordingly given all possible support to the Association."

His efforts had been anticipated by Sir Alfred Jones, whose ships on the West Africa run were increasing and whose interest in cotton was probably connected with the rise in its price which began in 1900. During the depression years Jones, like Kew Gardens and the Colonial Office, had been on the look-out for any new raw materials which could be profitably shipped from the Coast.
He had undertaken a banana-growing program in the Canary Islands, and in West Africa itself had tried to encourage the timber trade, the growing of the soya bean and other experiments.

The British Cotton Growing Association could thus begin with the energies of Sir Alfred Jones already harnessed in their cause, and with the support of the Conservative and Unionist Government. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office for a few months of Chamberlain's Secretaryship and for the whole of Lyttleton's was the ninth Duke of Marlborough, first cousin of Winston Churchill. In keeping with the practice of consulting colonial Governors when on leave, Marlborough took the opportunity of the presence in London of several Governors from the British West Indies - where the Association had quickly begun a campaign to grow the valuable "Sea-Island" cotton to call a meeting together with representatives of the Association and senior civil servants in September 1903. This was the beginning of a series of monthly - and later quarterly - meetings between Colonial Office civil servants and the Association with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Chair. Thus the Association's meetings preceded those of the Joint West African Committee by almost two years.

The attention paid to the Association at the Colonial Office was reflected by that paid by the government to the cotton supply problem. Worried about its support in the country and the dangers of unemployment, it gave the solution of the problem considerable prominence in its program. In his speech at the opening of Parliament on February 2nd, 1904, in which the government gave an outline of its policy the King said:

"... the insufficiency of the supply of raw cotton upon which the great cotton industry of this country depends has inspired me with a very deep concern. I trust that the efforts which are being made in various parts of my Empire to increase the area under cultivation may be attended with a large measure of success."

One result of the Association's influence among members of Parliament was the arrangement of debates on the cotton problem. One took place on April 27th, 1904, when the Resolution was passed:

"That in the opinion of this House, it is incumbent upon His Majesty's Government to use every endeavour to encourage the growth of cotton in those districts of Africa and other portions of the British Empire, and to establish ... experimental farms in suitable cotton-growing districts which are under British Government or British influence, and to cooperate as far as possible with such commercial associations as may be organised to secure this end."
The Association now decided, especially with its desire to increase its capital to £500,000, to apply for a Royal Charter. The petition for the Charter stated in part:-

"That as a consequence of the insufficiency of production great competition had arisen in the cotton market, and that a few individuals had been able from time to time to obtain the control of the whole of the existing supply of cotton, and that in consequence prices had been artificially raised to such a point and such violent fluctuations had taken place as almost to paralyse the cotton trade in Great Britain and that great losses had thereby been caused to cotton spinning manufacturers, operatives and others in Lancashire, and that the conditions which had brought about the existing crisis were such as might recur from time to time, and in all probability would do so in an aggravated form." 62

The petition naturally received favourable consideration at the Colonial Office. The Association had secured the services of Sir Ralph Moor, the former High Commissioner for the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, whose colonial service ended in 1904. He became the Association's "Official Adviser" and conducted most of the correspondence with the Colonial Office on the subject of the Charter.63 The debate in Parliament of April 27th, 1904, appears to have had a favourable effect in the Colonial Office. F.G.A. Butler64 of the West African Department minuted on May 14th "... the Charter would undoubtedly give the Association great prestige and standing." But Alfred Lyttleton himself, the Colonial Secretary, had doubts whether the Association was sufficiently representative of the Industry.65 His reservations were private; in the debate of April 27th, he had given a very favourable impression when he replied for the Government. In any case he insisted on certain safeguards in return for the granting of a Charter - all the Council members were to be British subjects, the Secretary of State could appoint an unofficial member to the Council, and to underline the Association's "philanthropic" motives, no dividends were to be paid for seven years. 66

With these precautionary clauses included, the Charter was formally granted on August 28th, 1904. The Conservative Government demonstrated its support for the Association by the attendance of the Secretary of State, and other government officials, at the formal banquet held in Manchester to celebrate the occasion and E.D. Morel could write happily in the official "organ" of the Association:-
"If the British Cotton Growing Association is not pleased with itself, it ought to be. It welcomes at its festive board Cabinet Ministers, Undersecretaries of State and Mayors by the dozen. It receives telegraphic congratulations from the King and Prime Minister. In short it is very much in favour, very much in evidence, and very much in earnest." 67

In the meantime the meetings between representatives of the Association and Colonial Office officials, under the chairmanship of the Duke of Marlborough had continued. When the Liberal Government took over at the end of 1905, Marlborough's first cousin, Winston Churchill, took over as Parliamentary Under-Secretary. He was well fitted to do so, as he then represented North-West Manchester, where the Association had its headquarters - and his candidature in the 1906 election had been endorsed by the Association. After the result it had written to enquire whether the meetings would be continued and the Colonial Office replied:-

"Mr Churchill has told (Lord Elgin, the new Colonial Secretary) it will be very gratifying to him to hold this position (of chairman), which he hopes may be considered especially appropriate in view of the interest which he takes in the prosperity of the Lancashire Cotton Trade." 68

The meetings were recorded in minutes and dealt mainly with financial, transport and technical matters, but they involved a selection of remarkable men on both sides of the table, although one of the striking aspects was the manner in which some of the participants appeared first on one side, and then on the other. It was helpful to the Association to have representatives who "knew the ropes" at the Colonial Office. Among the civil servants on the "official" side were R.L. Antrobus, G.V. Fiddes, 69 Sydney Olivier, 70 G. Strachey, F.G.A. Butler, who was the principal writer of the first "round" of minutes on the Association's affairs, and W.C. Bottomley. 72 On the Association's side were Sir Alfred Jones, J.A. Hutton, the Duke of Marlborough on a few occasions - he had become a Vice-President of the Association following his loss of government office; Sir Ralph Moor, the "Official Adviser", various Lancashire Members of Parliament, including Alfred Emmott, 73 who was himself later to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, and several regular "cotton" men. After Sir Alfred Jones's death in 1909 the seventeenth Earl of Derby 74 became the Association's President and attended a number of meetings.

In the earliest years the atmosphere in which the Association conducted
its affairs was pervaded with optimism. In February 1904, J.A. Hutton said in Manchester: "The prospects are most hopeful, and I for one am convinced that Lancashire's future salvation lies mainly in West Africa."  

But the easy mood did not last long. The change was caused in part by the failure of the plantation policy in West Africa, but also by financial problems of the Association. It was promoting cotton growing in a wide range of areas in the Empire - in West Africa where it was estimated that £25,000 alone would be needed in 1904, India, the West Indies, British Central Africa (Malawi); and pressure was being exerted on Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General in Egypt, to complete the Suakin-Berber railway in the Sudan.

To meet these needs the Association’s nominal capital had been increased to £500,000 in January 1904, and in August it received its Charter. By the end of August only £27,591 had been subscribed. During 1905 the Council expressed "much dissatisfaction" at the poor response to an appeal towards the half-million pounds goal. By the end of 1907 the total was still little more than one quarter of a million pounds, and the need for subscribed capital was giving the Council "much trouble and anxiety."

Several reasons of very different kinds were causing this problem. One was a good harvest for the 1904-05 season in the United States. By mid-January 1905 the price of American Middling spot cotton had fallen to 3.81d. per lb. of lint. Another reason was the general political situation with the Conservative Government seen to be tottering to its fall. It was unfortunate, but probably inevitable, that the Association with its Empire program should be connected by some with the ideas of tariffs. There was a yet further, and local, reason for difficulties in raising funds. In 1894 Manchester had proudly opened its Ship Canal - by-passing Liverpool - to avoid trans-shipment costs. From then on many Manchester activities were seen from Liverpool as being "tainted" by men of the Ship Canal Company. "Liverpool's apathy has, from the first, been keenly felt by the Association", wrote The Manchester Guardian. Liverpool, of course was the home of the most important Cotton Exchange in the kingdom, and it had long-established connections with the American trade.

Public hesitation in providing capital was met in two different ways. First, the Association could obtain support from either the Imperial or the local colonial governments; secondly, it could hold an interest in other
organisations, such as public companies, which were not debarred, as it was itself by Charter, from owning land and paying dividends itself.

As regards the first, there had been from the very beginning in 1902 a sharing of expenses between the Association and the colonial governments. But when Sully’s activities sent the price of lint at Liverpool up to 9d. a lb., it was decided to step up the growing program. Addressing the Manchester Statistical Society, Hutton remarked:

"In view of Lancashire’s urgent need, the (Association’s) Committee are of the opinion that it would be most advantageous to try the experiment of establishing several large plantations in the most promising districts." 86

To meet this program changes were made in the financial and other arrangements. From April 1st 1904, the Association took over virtually all the direct expenses, including the salaries of the Association’s "experts" and post-growing expenses which it had paid before. But it also undertook to buy all seed cotton at 1d. per lb. for three years up to a maximum loss of £25,000. Regarding the three large plantations which it was now proposed to set up, one each in Sierra Leone, Lagos and Southern Nigeria, the Association undertook to spend £30,000 on each of them over a period of four years.

In return the West African colonial governments involved were to make annual grants towards the work - £1,500 by Sierra Leone, £3,000 by the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and £2,000 by Lagos. 87 The Gold Coast (Ghana) began a contribution of £1,500 88 and Northern Nigeria of £1,000, in 1906. 89 Besides the grants, the railways were to continue the previous arrangement by which they carried lint freight free for the Association - which was widened to include both cotton lint and seed cotton in 1905 90 - until the further arrangement began on April 1st 1907. The free carriage of cotton for the Association was a distinct arrangement from the previous free carriage of cotton from the beginning of 1903 to January 1st, 1905, as that had included the merchants. From 1905 the concession was exclusive to the Association. 91

When the general agreement was renewed from April 1907, the grants from the colonial governments continued except from Sierra Leone where the Association had abandoned its efforts. 92 In return for the grants, the Association had to spend an equal amount (£7,500 a year) on cotton development in the colonies concerned. 93 In other respects important changes were made. The Association was relieved of its obligation to pay 1d. per lb. for seed cotton. At the same
time the concession for the free carriage of lint and seed cotton on the railway came to an end. In future rates of 1d. and 3d. per ton mile for cotton were imposed according to whether the distance was under or over one hundred and twenty-four miles. The Association's Annual Report for 1908 forecast gloomily: "The present state of the Association's finances will prevent the continuance of the present (agreement)." The accounts for the year showed a loss on all branches.94

The period witnessed a deterioration in the relations between the Association and the Colonial Office staff. The financial difficulties made the Association press for further concessions - these included a return of freight charge reductions on the Lagos Railway and a demand for a standing committee on transport on which the commercial community would be represented.95 Early in 1909 when Butler had minuted favourably on a letter from Hutton, Antrobus remarked: "But knowing as we do that it is little more than Mr Hutton's opinion and that Mr Hutton is under Sir Alfred Jones's influence, it mustn't be taken too seriously."96 Earlier Antrobus had commented with reference to similar demands and the role of the Joint West Africa Committee: "Mr Hutton has for years been trying to bind the Secretary of State not to do anything in West Africa without consulting him."97

These difficulties may have been influenced by the publicity given to the Shipping Rings Commission which sat from 1906-1909 to enquire into the arrangements made by various shipping lines in certain areas, known as "conferences". The West African Conference, consisting only of Elder Dempster's and the German Woermann Line, was regarded as one of the closest of all, controlling both outward and home-going shipping.98 It operated mainly by demanding, not only freight payment, but also a deferred rebate called "primage", which was forfeited if the shipper used any other line or chartered his own "tramp". The Governor of Southern Nigeria, Sir Walter Egerton, gave evidence and roundly condemned the system, and other critics included Sir John Roger, Governor of the Gold Coast. On the other hand the representatives of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, J.A. Hutton and G.B. Zochonis, on the whole favoured the system, and Hutton had admitted that his "precis of evidence" had been shown beforehand to Sir Alfred Jones.99

The departure of Winston Churchill from the Parliamentary Under-Secretaryship
in 1908 may also for a time have reduced mutual understanding, although he
was succeeded by his friend Colonel Jack Seeley - who showed an equal
friendliness. Probably the departure of R.L. Antrobus in 1909 from the posi-
tion of Permanent Under-Secretary, and his succession by G.V. Fiddes, helped
to improve relations, and Sir Alfred Jones's death in the same year may have
helped to reduce suspicions.

In 1910 the agreements made with the colonial governments in 1907 came
to an end. The Governors had long hankered for having their own Agricultural
Departments, independent of forestry, and in 1910 Southern Nigeria set up its
own Department.

With the creation of Agricultural Departments, the Association no longer
needed to continue its experimental work, and the grants from the colonial
governments came to an end. But as the Association still needed more capital,
a grant was applied for from the Imperial Government. In support the rising
price of cotton was cited. According to Hutton, this had led to "an almost
complete stoppage of business in Manchester". The Imperial Government's
expenditure on grants to various dependencies in Africa - such as Northern
Nigeria, Nyasaland and Uganda - were also advanced as justifying a grant to
the Association whose work could be expected to reduce them. Cotton exports
from Uganda had already shown a "remarkable" increase and in 1910-11 the
Imperial Grant there was slightly reduced, and in 1912-13 had been halved from
the level three years before. This result was undoubtedly due to the cotton
program.

The Imperial Government agreed to grant the Association £10,000 a year,
for three years, provided it succeeded in raising an additional £150,000 capital
as a preliminary. This it did - at the end of 1909 issued capital amounted
to £261,705; twelve months later it was £421,254. This must have repre-
ented a considerable achievement as the 1909 Report had commented testily:
".. the work is much handicapped by the apathy, indifference and want of appreci-
ation on the part of Lancashire of the efforts of the Council and Staff of the
Association". Besides raising the £150,000 the Association undertook
certain obligations. It was to continue its program of instruction to African
farmers to encourage them to grow more and better cotton, set up experimental
ginneries, and keep open seven pioneering ginneries for three years (Illushi
in South-eastern Nigeria, Lokoja and - when opened, Zaria and Kano in the
North, Port Herald in Nyasaland, and Labolabo and another in the Northern
Territories of the Gold Coast.) The Governors had to report once a year on the
Association's program and say whether it had earned its grant from the Imperial Government. 109

The grant was a considerable achievement and gave the Association a further increase in standing which brought it significant benefits when dealing with bankers and shipping companies. It was also a reward for its successful relations with the Colonial Office. Butler, who had had moments of disillusion with the Association, afterwards supported it and developed some sympathy for it. In commenting on the application for an Imperial grant, he wrote:

"It would be a misfortune, both on sentimental and practical grounds if (the Association) were now compelled to suspend its operations. This is specially the case with the work which the Association is doing in marketing cotton for its growers. It seems clear that if the Association were not there to push cotton in this country, to arrange for its sale in large quantities instead of in driblets which alone would be possible to the individual growers, and generally to exercise supervision over the marketing, it would be impossible to dispose of the cotton at a remunera-tive price." 110

In March, 1911, Butler could remark: "Our relationship with the B.C.G.A. is as close as ever". 111 And the situation improved further in October 1911, when Alfred, now Lord Emmott - previously a Vice-President of the Association and an M.P. for Oldham, the Association's point of origin, became Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies. Equally in the Association's favour was the accession of the seventeenth Earl of Derby as President following the death of Sir Alfred Jones. He brought his own growing reputation as well as his considerable physical presence to its support. "A great man" was Himbury's verdict. 112 Derby attended several of the Colonial Office meetings and exerted himself on the Association's behalf among his ministerial colleagues. When the Imperial grant expired in 1916, requests were made for it to be renewed, but the government was firm. Any grant was better than none because it gave the Association increased standing, and it was only due to Derby's approaches to Bonar Law, then Colonial Secretary, that a grant of £1,000 for 1916-17 was finally obtained. 113 But it was little more than a gesture, and it was already felt that with the end of the war the Association would have to be replaced by a larger and more official organisation with considerably greater funds at its back. In some
ways 1916 was a sad year for the Association - it had to be content with a paltry grant, and the conferences at the Colonial Office came to an end.

The second method of overcoming the slowness of raising capital by public appeal was by the creation of subsidiary organisations which would themselves provide part of the requirements. Most of these were concerned with areas of the Association's activities outside West Africa - and included East and Central Africa, India, the Sudan and the West Indies. While the Association were awaiting the opening-up of Nigeria by the completion of the railway, promising results were being obtained from other areas. Sir Henry Hesketh Bell, 11th Governor of Northern Nigeria from 1909 to 1912, poured cold water on some of the hopes surrounding the "Mecca" of cotton growers:

"The country, soil, climate and everything else was poor, and he did not see how it was going to pay the natives to sell cotton at 1d per pound." 115

In a talk which he gave in 1914, Hutton placed India first (still!) among prospective areas, although this was severely qualified by the poor quality of Indian cotton then being produced; Nyasaland (Malawi) and Uganda in joint second place; West Africa, third; and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan fourth.116 The export figures for the African areas for the 1911-12 season were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Bales (400 lbs)</th>
<th>Value (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (North &amp; South)</td>
<td>10,932</td>
<td>102,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda (ginned)</td>
<td>21,764</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unginned)</td>
<td>13,591</td>
<td>254,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyasaland</td>
<td>8,094</td>
<td>80,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>25,746</td>
<td>117,309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The West Indies were very successful in terms of quality, as they produced Sea-Island long-staple cotton, providing a triumph for the application of knowledge and training. Sir Daniel Morris, previously Assistant-Director of Kew, had been appointed Imperial Commissioner of Agriculture in the West Indies by Chamberlain in 1898, and had rapidly put the industry there back on its feet. Production was mainly in the hands of European planters.

Nyasaland received the attention of the Association from an early date and an "expert" in cotton was sent there in 1904. Cotton began mainly as a European crop, but the planters tended to turn to tea and tobacco, and it
increasingly became centred among African farmers mainly in the Shire area. The Association established its own buying stations and ginneries from 1910. The totals, however, never reached really significant figures owing to difficulties of transport to the sea at Beira, Mozambique. It was only in 1935 that a railway bridge was finally completed over the River Zambezi, and the chief obstacle overridden.

Elsewhere there were chances of much greater development - mainly in India, where total production was estimated in 1905-06 at 3,24 million (400 lb.) bales. A small-scale experiment in Behar in which the Association participated failed, and there was generally difficulty owing to there being no central Board of Agriculture until 1905. During the 1840's the Punjab had come under British control and it was in the southern Punjab that the Association finally found a chance to grow improved cotton when they were invited to assist in an agricultural scheme at Khanewal by the Punjab's Director of Agriculture in 1915, where cotton was grown by irrigation. In 1921 the British Cotton Growing Association (Punjab) Ltd. was established and excellent yields obtained. The area of cotton grown by irrigation was greatly extended when the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur, Sind, began work in 1932. Unfortunately the work of the Association's ginneries was largely lost, as Indian spinners outbid British buyers in India.

One of the more successful areas of the Association's involvement was the Sudan. In early days there was some export of cotton grown by irrigation at Tokar near Port Sudan and from Kassala on the Ethiopian border. It was not possible to grow cotton by rainfall until at least one hundred miles south of Khartoum where the 20 inch level was reached. Cotton grown in southern areas was increasingly brought in for export by means of the Nile, but this was only a gradual development. The main interest centred in the Gezira area, a sloping plain lying between the Blue and White Niles, which could be irrigated by a flow from the Blue Nile draining across the Gezira. It was considered that of some five million feddans, three to four could be irrigated. Little could be done, however, until the railway outlet to the East Coast had been completed - this was achieved with the opening of the Berber-Suakin Railway in 1906.

In 1904 a New York philanthropist, Leigh Hunt, had formed a company to undertake cultivation at Zeidab in the Gezira. It was intended to settle
American negroes there. The Association was limited financially in the interest it could take but from 1911-12 bought shares. At the end of 1911 Hutton and two colleagues visited the area on behalf of the Association. In 1913 a deputation to Prime Minister Asquith was promised a £3 million loan to build a barrage on the Blue Nile which would provide the water for irrigation, but owing to the war this had to be postponed. The Sennar Dam was finally opened in 1926. By 1938 the Gezira had nearly 185,000 acres under cultivation, the land being leased to farmers who grew cotton under a system of rotation, similar to that used at Khanewal, Punjab. In that year over 300,000 bales were produced, mainly of Egyptian Sakel variety.

Uganda provided a striking example of unexpected success. Cotton was imported in the early days by the Uganda Company, but real progress had to await the establishment of an independent Agricultural Department in 1908; Allen - American-type - cotton was imported in 1909 and 1910, and proved to be well-suited to the country. Development was held up by difficulties in communications as the original "Uganda Railway", opened in 1901, only reached Kisumu on Lake Victoria, then the Eastern Province of Uganda, involving a further journey over the lake. The overland extension to Busoga Province and the link with Jinja was only completed in 1928, and the through route to Kampala in 1931. Agricultural conditions, however, were more favourable than in Nigeria. Subsistence farming was easier, the banana and plantain being the food staple which required limited cultivation, and there were difficulties of soil and climate in growing more profitable alternatives such as rubber and cocoa. The quality of Uganda cotton was described as "very much superior" to that of Lagos and exports reached 26,000 bales in 1913. Most of the ginneries were run by Asians.

The British East Africa Corporation was formed in 1906, its work covering British East Africa (Kenya) as well as Uganda and acting in both countries as the agent of the Association. The Corporation's first chairman was Sir Ralph Moor. From April 1st 1907 the Association entered into a similar arrangement with the Uganda Government as that made with the West African colonies - the Association paid £1,000 per year towards cotton development and the Uganda Government contributed an equal amount. In 1914 the Association ended the Corporation's agency and established itself in Uganda, mainly so as to offer a guaranteed price in areas where farmers had
been unable to find a market. Production rose steadily, but during World War I Ugandan cotton began to find a market in India. This pattern continued until 1939 - only a small proportion of the large output finding its way to Britain; Indian and Japanese buyers paying higher prices than Lancashire.

The Association's program in West Africa required more capital than elsewhere, as it was there the largest ginnery construction program was undertaken. To meet the need for capital the British Cotton Ginning Co. Ltd. was formed in 1907, with a capital of £100,000. In return for paying the Association a considerable part of this sum, it received the leasehold of the ginneries by which it was enabled to pay an annual dividend - from the ginning profits - of 7 1/2%. The "catch" came with the final arrangement, when the ginneries were leased back to the Association who carried out the final work! The Association was finally to buy out the Company in 1916 for the whole of its capital plus 10%, and the Company wound up. The arrangement caused considerable concern in the Colonial Office, as being contrary to the spirit of the Association's Charter and its non-profit-making character laid down for the first seven years from the granting of the Charter.

The Charter had forbidden the distribution of any profits until 1911 and government assistance had been given only on that basis. As Butler put it:

"... the scheme (for the British Cotton Ginning Company) now put forward in effect cuts away the only remunerative part of the Association's work, permits the distribution of profits on that part of the work at once, robs the unremunerative part of the work (and to the Government the valuable part) of the support which it should have had from those profits, and saddles the funds which should be devoted to the unremunerative work with a Guarantee that the profits on the ginning shall not fall below 7%".

Butler went on to point out that it only needed an infraction by the Association for the Ginning Company to take it over for default, but admitted that this was pure speculation.

Against these objections the Association pointed out that all surplus ginning profits - after the 7% interest and the final 10% bonus and repayment of capital on winding-up in 1916 - would be paid over to itself. And the rate of interest - 7% - payable was no more than would have to be paid to a bank for money borrowed for use in a tropical area like West Africa. The Association
was not distributing its own profits but financing fresh capital. Evidently there was a tussle between Winston Churchill, now Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Colonies, and Hutton. As Hutton wrote: "With reference to our conversation at the Colonial Office ... about the new company we are bringing out, I really think the Memorandum from which you were reading was drawn up under a misapprehension ..."139 What won the Colonial Office's approval for the plan finally was the acknowledged need for more capital, and Lancashire's "apathy" in refusing to subscribe fresh capital on a "philanthropic" basis. Unless the Association were able to go forward, it might find itself in financial difficulties and the grants already given would have been thrown away.

The need for increased capital arose mainly from the extensive program undertaken by the Association in West Africa, and particularly in Nigeria. By 1907, when the British Cotton Growing Company was incorporated, the basic network of ginneries in the South was already being laid along the line of railway extending slowly towards the North. So far, however, the new cotton areas still lay within the palm-belt - the railway following the direction laid down by Governor MacGregor via Oshogbo. Progress was being made in cotton exports but was by no means spectacular, and hopes of substantial returns were being increasingly transferred not only to the north of Nigeria, but also to Uganda, the Sudan and, as hitherto, to India.
CHAPTER 7 FOOTNOTES

1. In 1899 89% and in 1900-01, 92% of revenue came from customs dues. Lagos Annual Report 1901, p.10.


3. Expenditure in Lagos grew from £60,840 in 1888 (Bluebook 1888) to £203,802 in 1898.


5. Among them John Walkden & Co., G.B. Ollivant, and Rylands & Son.


7. Ibid., p.89.

8. Despite this, her imports of British piece-goods continued to grow.

9. As early as 1846 the rate had been 25% on cotton piece-goods and in 1857 a minimum valuation of 25 cents a yard was placed on cotton goods when cheap ones were only some 8 cents. C.F. Bastable, The Commerce of Nations, pp.73-74. In 1880 the United Kingdom sold America 77,915,500 yards of cotton piece-goods and a further number entered at a value which can be estimated at a complete total of 162,287,500 yards. (Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom 1880, p.209) Calculated on a similar basis the total for 1900 is 115,055,600 yards. (Annual Statement of Trade 1900, Vol.2, p.311h). The 77,915,500 yards were valued at 5½d., per yard and the amount entered at value £1,893,992 has simply been divided by 5½d., and a similar calculation made for 1900.

10. "It is a striking fact that about 50% of all exports of American cotton goods are to China." B. Taylor, Cotton and the Empire, Fortnightly Review, Dec. 1904, pp.1020-36.

11. From 233 million yards in 1880 (Annual Statement of Trade 1880, p.223) to 105 million yards in 1890. Annual Statement of Trade 1890, Table 12, p.310.


13. From 1880 to 1889, 5.5% of all British exports went to Africa (including South Africa); by 1911-13, 10.3% went there. W. Ashworth, An Economic History of England 1870-1939, London 1960, p.113. Exports to British and French
West African Dependencies increased from £1.82 million in 1891 to £2.92 million in 1900. (Annual Statement of Trade 1894, Table 5, and for 1900 Vol.2, Table 2.)

14. During the period 1860-1880 as much as 70% of Britain's trade with West Africa was in areas outside her own colonies. In 1868 a French Consul considered that Britain and France took 4/5ths of West African trade, and that 2/3rds to 3/4 of this went to Britain's share. A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973, p.130.


18. Now Zaire.


23. Morel, Edmund D. (1873-1924). Worked for Elder Dempster & Co. Founded the Congo Reform Association 1904; Member of West African Lands Committee 1912-14; Labour Member of Parliament for Dundee 1922-24. Founded a new party, the Union for Democratic Control. Imprisoned in 1917-18 for inciting a lady to send his pamphlet "Tsardom's Part in the War" to a neutral country - Switzerland.


25. He resigned from the government over the question in October 1903, and in a speech at Glasgow pointed out that British exports per head of population were falling. 1872 exports were £256 million, in 1902 £278 million, an increase of 7 1/2%. Meanwhile the population had grown by 30%. See J. Amery, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol.6, London, 1969, p.461 (earlier volumes by J.L. Garvin.)


27. British piece-good exports to Lagos in 1900 showed an 8½% increase over those of 1890, equalling £327,920 (out of a total £330,898 piece-goods in all) in 1900. See Ch.5, p.101, fn 44. Of total Lagos imports from 1893 to 1905 Britain and Germany supplied...
92%; Britain alone 74%. Of Lagos's exports during the same period Germany took 54% and Britain 41%. Lagos Bluebooks 1890, pp.61 and 62; and 1900, p.80.


29. J.A. Hutton, Address to the International Cotton Congress, Manchester, 1905, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, B.C.G.A. pamphlets, No. 6, p.7. 35 million was an estimate given the previous year by a New England cotton manufacturer.


31. Ibid - from 9,535,000 (500 lb.) bales in 1899 to 10,649,000 in 1909.


33. Only since World War II has mechanical picking begun to be used on a considerable scale. Previously it was done by hand and it was judged that one worker was needed for ten acres under cotton. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, B.C.G.A. Pamphlets (unnumbered), No.5, p.13. A hand-picker could pick 200-300 lbs per day. J.H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy, University of North Carolina, 1957, p.8. The worries must have been reduced by the knowledge that it was not customary for negroes to be employed by cotton mills indoors - Monthly Record, May 1904, pp.116-117 quoting "The Statist" of May 21st.

34. Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition. 1929, Vol.3, under 'Cotton'. The U.S. Dept. of Agriculture estimated in 1921 that the boll-weevil had reduced the crop by 6.3 million bales of 500 lbs.

35. European consumption rose from 1,752,000 bales in 1882 to 3,563,000 in 1902. Britain used 3,011,000 bales in 1902. E.D. Morel, Empire-Grown Cotton, p.10.

36. Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1958, p.301. An example of a dealer using the futures market to insure against loss is given for a 'falling' market; on any date the price of futures for several months ahead varies, usually slightly, from the spot price.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spot Market</th>
<th>Dealer buys £800 actual cotton</th>
<th>April</th>
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<tr>
<td>Futures Market</td>
<td>Dealer also sells £800 for June delivery (at January price of June Futures)</td>
<td>sells at £600 losing £200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Buys £600 of June futures to sell in June to his buyers at £800 - gains £200.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. The Times, January 8th, 1903, "Trade in 1902."


40. The Textile Manufacturer, May 15, 1904, p.146.


46. My italics.

47. B.C.G.A. Minute Book, No.1, Minutes for Feb.18th, April 9th, June 12th and Nov.25th, 1902.

48. Royal Gardens Kew, Miscellaneous Reports 10:36 Northern Nigeria 1880-1905, May 24th 1904, Jones to Thistleton-Dyer. Membership of the Association was limited to shareholders and dependent on decision of the Executive Committee of the Council. Gbadebo, the Alake of Abeokuta, was a shareholder. A number of group members existed; e.g. the Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations (employers) and the Amalgamated Association of Card and Blowing Room Operatives.

49. Macara, Sir Charles (1845-1929). President of the British "Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations from 1894; Chairman of the International Federation of the same from 1904.

50. Sir Charles Macara, Bt. Leading the World, Lancashire's Cotton Industry, Its Romantic History and Marvellous Growth, pp.12-16. B.C.G.A. Liverpool Reports 1913. Another, at least equally prestigious body, was the "International Association of Tropical Agriculture and Colonial Development" of which Prof. Wyndham Dunstan of the Imperial Institute was British Vice-President.


52. See above, Chapter 5.

53. Growth of Cotton in the Empire, 1902, pp.1 & 4, B.C.G.A. Reports 1902, Liverpool. Thistleton-Dyer had succeeded Sir William Hooker, Director 1865-1885, with whom Henry Venn had been in touch and who had taken several Saros for training.

55. See Annual Statements of Trade of the United Kingdom passim.

56. Sea-Island has the longest staple length - from 1 3/4 to 2 1/2 inches.


58. Lancashire in 1906 returned 23 county Members of Parliament and its cities a number of others e.g. Manchester 6, Salford 3, Liverpool 9, Oldham 2, Bolton 2, Blackburn 2, Preston 2, Burnley 1. See McCalmond's Parliamentary Poll-Book 1832-1918 passim.

59. Edward VII.


63. C.O. 323/449/1555 and 16727, May 2nd and May 10th, 1904, Moor to C.O.


65. C.O. 323/449/1555 May 2nd, 1904, Minutes of May 4th and May 10th.


67. West African Mail, November 18th, 1904, p. 794.

68. C.O. 325/513/449850, December 22nd, 1905, C.O. to B.C.G.A.

69. Fiddes, Sir George V. (1858-1936) Knighted 1912. Secretary to High Commissioner for South Africa (Sir Alfred Milner) 1897-1900; Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary for the Colonies (1909-1916, and Permanent Under-Secretary 1916-1921.

70. Olivier, Sydney, Lord (1859-1913), Lord 1924. Joined Colonial Office 1882; Secretary of moderate left-wing Fabian Society 1886-90; Governor of Jamaica 1907-1913; Secretary of State for India 1924 (Labour). Wrote White Capital and Coloured Labour and The Anatomy of African Misery.


73. Emmott, first Baron of Oldham (1858-1926) Liberal, one of two Members of
Parliament for Oldham 1899-1911; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies 1911-14; Commissioner of Works 1914-15; Director of War Trade Department 1915-1919.

74. Derby, Seventeenth Earl, Edward Stanley (1865-1940) A.D.C. to his father the Sixteenth Earl when he was Governor-General of Canada. Private Secretary to Field-Marshall Roberts in South Africa 1899-1901; Postmaster-General 1903-05; Secretary of State for War 1916-18; and from 1922-1924; Ambassador to France 1918-20.

75. When a future chairman of the Association visited the head office in 1904 to be interviewed for the post of Superintendent for West Africa, he was "astonished at the energy and enthusiasm displayed." Few, if any, of the Association's Council knew West Africa personally, while Himbury had worked there as Superintendent of the Cable Service. He found himself wondering how they would take what he considered to be their inevitable "disappointment", see W.H. Himbury, Empire Cotton, Journal of the African Society, Vol.17, 1918, pp.262-275.

76. See below Chapter 8, p.173 et seq.


79. West African Mail, Nov. 18th, 1904, p.79.

80. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1907, p.9. The amount was £260,632.


82. Alfred Emmott remarked that this was unjust as no one proposed to put any tariffs on cotton. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol.133, 1379, Debate of April 27th 1904.

83. February 28th, 1905, p.10.

84. See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, B.C.G.A. Pamphlets, unnumbered series, No.2, pp.50-53, Nov. 13th, 1902, C.O. to B.C.G.A. Originally the local government was to provide land, but not for permanent use, pay the salaries of the Association's "experts" together with travelling expenses of five shillings per day and provide carriers. The Association was to pay for all other expenses - seed, mechanics, gins, labour etc and buy the cotton. Lagos Railway was to carry lint free for two years from January 1st, 1903 - in return for which Elder Dempster agreed to carry free the first thousand tons of lint.

86. Ibid., p.37, and West African Mail, Feb. 19th, 1904, p.1196.


88. C.O. Confidential Print 835, No.17 (1778) April 2nd, 1906, C.O. to B.C.G.A.

89. C.O. Confidential Print 835, No.33 (13278) Nov. 23rd, 1906, C.O. to B.C.G.A.


92. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1907, p.22. The grants were £5,000 from the united Protectorate of Southern Nigeria - including Lagos, £1,500 from the Gold Coast and £1,000 from Northern Nigeria. C.O. Confidential Print 835, No.31 (10686). Nov. 20th, 1906, C.O. to Egerton, and C.O. 520/110/17060 May 24th, 1911, B.C.G.A. to C.O.

93. Lagos Gazette, April 10th, 1907, p.436.

94. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1908, pp.12 and 1h.

95. Cd. l685, pp.29-41. Two Elder Dempster ships had been lost on the Lagos bar.


99. Cds. l668, l669, l670 and l685, 1909. The primage applied to cotton (the West African system began in 1895) and the rate for cotton of 1/4d, per lb. from Lagos to Liverpool was roughly double that from America to Liverpool. See K. Dike Nworah, The West African Operations of the British Cotton Growing Association, African Historical Studies (University of Boston) Vol.IV, No.2, 1971, pp.315-330. What especially annoyed governors like Egerton was that the Crown Agents, who acted for various colonial governments, were treated by the West African Conference as principals, so that rebates were forfeited if they used any other shipping than Elder Dempster or Woermann for any of the governments. And rebate on north-bound primary products, although primage was paid, does not appear to have been given except for palm products. (Letter from Dr. P.N. Davies, October 15th, 1973). Hutton had submitted his evidence to all the members of the African section of the Manchester Chamber whom he was representing.

100. Mottistone, First Baron, (1868-1947). Baron 1933. Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies 1908-10; Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the War Office 1911; Secretary of State for War 1912-1914; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air 1919; wrote several books of personal adventures.
101. The first Director was W.H. Johnson, Curator, Botanic Station, Gold Coast 1898, Director of Agriculture, Gold Coast 1901 and for Southern Nigeria 1910-20. He began as a gardener for Lord Salisbury and also worked in Mozambique. In 1926 he published one of the classics of the cotton library, Cotton and its Production.

102. Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1958, pp.306-311. 7.86d. per lb. lint in 1909-10 for spot American Middling.


110. C.O. 323/561/36466, Nov. 5th, 1909, B.C.G.A. to Colonial Office, Minute by F.G.A. Butler, Nov. 16th.

111. C.O. 323/586/10394, March 30th, 1911, B.C.G.A. to Colonial Office, Minute of F.G.A. Butler, April 1st.


115. B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book No.1, Feb. 23rd, 111.


118. A very good crop in the West Indies amounted to 7,670 bales in 1911. Each pound of lint was worth one shilling and upwards. B.C.G.A. Annual Report, 1913, p.34, Appendix C.


120. The bridge was 2 1/3 miles long - 20,000 bales were then exported. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1935, pp.45-49. The 1935 crop of 20,485 bales (of 400 lbs) was a record.


125. One feddan is 1.1 acres.

126. A Study in Tropical Development, New York, 1961 (first edn. 1953), p. 311. Board of Trade 31/18165/91177. By the 1932 Annual Return nominal capital was £2,500,000. Much of the early capital was South African (Sir Julius Wernher, Alfred Beit, Lionel Phillips and the Consolidated Goldfields of South Africa were shareholders. Simon Fraser, 11th Lord Lovat, was a Director by 1909.)


128. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1938, p. 52. Yields were 312 lbs seed cotton per acre.

129. Some of which was supplied by the British Cotton Growing Association.


131. The then Eastern Province of Uganda, stretching from the River Sio to Naivasha, which was transferred to the East African Protectorate (Kenya) in 1902.


133. J.A. Hutton and B.C. Crapper were Directors from 1906. All the Company's crops were to be sold to the Association. By 1913 the capital was £200,000 but its assets were taken under the Association's control in 1915, although the Corporation continued until 1957. See Board of Trade 31/18165/94323.


135. The first Directors included B.C. Crapper and E. Tootal Broadhurst. See Board of Trade 31/18165/94323.

136. Idem. All the Nigerian ginneries then existing appear to have been included in the arrangement, including the store at Iddo Railway terminus, Lagos. The ginneries at Port Herald, Nyasaland, and others in East Africa were later included.
137. The earlier correspondence spoke of 7% but the agreement between the Association and the British Cotton Ginning Company dated July 27th, 1907, made it 7 1/2%. See Board of Trade, 31/18165.


139. C.O. 323/534/20789, June 10th, 1907, B.C.G.A. to C.O.
CHAPTER 8

THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE SUPPORT - THE NIGERIAN OPERATIONS

The economic position in Southern Nigeria at the turn of the century showed a general improvement over the conditions of the previous quarter century. Prices of tropical raw materials were beginning to rise, and cotton rose at a rate 40% faster than the general price index. Colonial revenues showed a new buoyancy and anxieties about deficits were reduced. After 1900 the south of the country was divided between the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in the East and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos in the west. Owing to its very large trade in palm products, and its less developed system of administration under its High Commissioner, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria brought little anxiety financially, and part of its revenues was used to reduce the Imperial grant to the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Imperial concern centred mainly on the reduction of the grant to the North, which was virtually certain to remain until railway communications between it and the ocean had been securely established. Despite the agitation to develop the North as an "independent" entity, using the waterway of the Niger, which was pursued by Sir Frederick Lugard, its High Commissioner, the unsatisfactory nature of the Niger for large-scale transport became more evident as the years passed, and attention turned increasingly to the extension of the Lagos Government Railway and its eventual crossing of the Niger.

It thus became a matter of importance that this railway should be run successfully and at a profit. When it had been decided to extend it by the "eastern" route from Ibadan it had only to reach Oshogbo and the North before the trade in palm products on which it mainly relied would have ceased. The only prospective crop in view which promised substantial returns was cotton. As the Lagos revenue was burdened with substantial capital and interest payments on the cost of building the railway, the development of new bulk crops naturally gained the attention of both Governor and Colonial Office.

To offset the fall in revenue, development of rubber and timber had previously been the main concern, and emphasis shifted from the establishment of more Botanic Stations, and the distribution of economic plants, to the setting-up of a Forestry and Agricultural Department, in Lagos, and the creation of a Forestry Department in the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in
These measures had played their part in restoring the balance between revenue and expenditure, but they were unlikely to assist substantially in providing traffic for the railway system once it had passed beyond the forest zone. Although the railway paid its working expenses almost from the beginning, during most years interest and sinking-fund repayments of capital had to be met from general revenue. Rates could not be simply put up on the line to Ibadan since as far as Aro, near Abeokuta, the railway had to meet the competition of the River Ogun and rates kept specially low. The long-term future of the railway in financial terms therefore depended on what returns were made after Ibadan and in particular after Offa, the approximate point of entry into Northern Nigeria.

Besides the Governor - now Sir William MacGregor, and the Colonial Office, the West African shipping interest under the overall direction of Sir Alfred Jones was anxious to increase the export trade of Lagos and the other colonies along the "Coast". Until prices began to increase from 1900 it had not been worthwhile to export cotton to Liverpool but, as soon as prices showed a worthwhile margin, Elder Dempster and Company sought to stimulate the trade. In December 1900, a letter to MacGregor stated:

"We are very anxious to encourage the growth of cotton in West Africa and are willing to provide either American or Egyptian seeds, free of cost, to anybody who desires to cultivate cotton. Moreover, we are agreeable to give a prize of £100 to the first shipper of fifty tons by one of our steamers in any one year."

Although the efforts to distribute cotton plants through the Botanic Station appear to have virtually ceased by this time, Lagos's embryonic Forestry and Agricultural Department tried to encourage the growth of cotton for export. Early in 1901 an article by Cyril Punch, the Superintendent of Forest, appeared in the Gazette. It described the best methods and appealed to District Officers to find out how many farmers were prepared to plant American cotton in each District.

Punch's article drew attention to certain aspects of cotton production in Lagos which were to prove of significance. Punch mentioned certain areas as being suitable for cotton - these were Abeokuta, Iseyin, Shaki and Oyo. Of these only Abeokuta was on the railway - by a short branch line from Aro. The area available in these places was reduced by the proviso "except where
the soil is exhausted by over-cropping." The instructions were for the methods of growing cotton usual in America, as far as African conditions would allow, and in particular were based on growing cotton as an annual crop. The Yoruba farmer was accustomed to growing his cotton as a perennial and to intercropping it with yams, maize and other crops. The article said that an improvement in hoes was required and that the Yoruba light one-handed hoe should be replaced by the two-handed West Indian steel hoe. These suggestions were technically sound provided American cotton would grow successfully in Lagos and provided it were possible to make basic changes in traditional farming methods to grow cotton. This was likely to happen only if very considerable advantages were to be obtained. It is not clear how much planting of cotton as a sole crop took place, but some reward was received for the efforts made and exports of lint from Lagos to the United Kingdom increased from 7,600 lbs in 1901 to 12,359 lbs in 1902.10

Owing to the undeveloped state of an agricultural department in Lagos,11 the question of how the cotton-growing program there was to be organised involved a number of difficult decisions, especially as to how far the British Cotton Growing Association were to be responsible for the work and how much was to be left to the colonial and other governments. There was a tendency among nearly all Governors to want to have everything under their own control. Colonial Government was a bureaucratic organisation which worked through "chains of command" - the "chains" being gathered together in one pair of hands at the top. Hence the criticisms heard among the members of the Chambers of Commerce that Governors were "autocrats". At the same time the bureaucratic form of organisation made it especially difficult to cooperate with other organisations, in particular those who worked among the lower levels of the "bureaucracy". If instructions came from the outside organisation i.e. the British Cotton Growing Association, where did the responsibility of its servants working in the colonies lie?

MacGregor was a man with a wide range of interests, quite apart from his duties as Governor and his training in medicine, and he took a keen interest in the promotion of cotton-growing in Lagos. During the summer of 1902 he was on leave in Britain, and had interviews during July with both Manchester and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce.12 After them he wrote to the Colonial...
Office suggesting that almost the whole of the program in Lagos should rest in the hands of the colonial government, and that the Lagos Railway should carry cotton lint free of charge for two years, provided a similar concession was given for ocean transport by Elder Dempster and Company. The Colonial Office rejected MacGregor's suggestions on organisation but accepted the one on free freight. And Sir Alfred Jones, after an original offer of free freight for two years, finally decided to carry the first one thousand tons of cotton free from the whole of British West Africa, and to take seed and implements free for two years. The understanding was carried out, although most of the cotton belonged to merchants rather than to the Association. The Colonial Office noted: "Sir Alfred Jones is hedging his offer a little, but it is a liberal one all the same."

Even if MacGregor's suggestions on organisation were not carried out, it seems likely that he put forward the fundamentals of policy in Lagos henceforth followed by the British Cotton Growing Association. MacGregor's interest was to persuade the Association to undertake work in Lagos and then to see that its program fitted in with his general policy. In the first place MacGregor affirmed that the soil and climate were suitable for cotton in the hinterland of Lagos, although not long after when he became aware of the optimistic hopes of the Association he emphasised some of the local difficulties, pointing out that much of the soil in Lagos was light and sandy - no doubt referring to the areas south of the Ibadan clay loams. A rotation would be needed if cotton were to be grown as a sole crop, as well as fertilisers. Transport was difficult owing to the tse-tse, and as farmers did not own their land, there would be difficulties in making advances. Secondly MacGregor knew that the matters which would concern the Association, such as labour and land, were those of close concern to the chiefs, with whom he was anxious to avoid any friction. At this stage the Association's members do not appear to have made up their minds as to how cotton in West Africa would be grown. In the West Indies, where their first steps had been taken, cotton was grown mainly on plantations run by Europeans and worked by local and imported labour. On this question MacGregor remarked:-

"The supply of local labour would be uncertain for European planters and the presence of the latter would cause unrest and suspicion in the country. It is on these and other grounds necessary for the cultivation of cotton to be carried on by the natives themselves on their own lands, and under the direct control of their own chiefs."
Possibly it was this which led J.A. Hutton to write: "From the very commencement, the Association decided on a line of policy which they have never abandoned viz: the ultimate establishment of cotton growing as a native industry." 19

This remark was written by Hutton in fact just when the Association had begun to implement a policy of plantations in three West African "colonies". 20

The contradiction seems to have been mainly semantic and used alternatively to "model farms", by which were meant cotton-growing farms where Africans would work for a period and then return home, using their acquired knowledge in their home surroundings where cotton growing would develop as a "native industry". In this sense the "model farm" would be a kind of extended Botanic Station whose purpose had been not only to supply growers with commercial plants, but also to attract visitors who could see and learn about the work being carried on. It resembled perhaps more closely the "experimental model farms" suggested by Governor McCallum which were to serve as an "object lesson". 21 An even closer resemblance was to the method by which Africans had learnt cocoa-growing on plantations: at Agege, north of Lagos, especially during the 1890's. The owners were African chiefs, such as J.K. Coker, and merchants who had turned aside from the export trade during the years of the recession after 1875, and the movement was connected with the establishment of independent African churches, such as the United Native African Church. The Agege system combined Christianity, and model farms, but its motive power was national feeling. Henry Venn would have approved, as he would have disapproved of the Church Missionary Society's policy which helped to give rise to it, but it is very questionable how far the system would have ever worked under European guidance. 22

"Model farms" as opposed to plantations, could therefore play a part in the Association's program from the beginning. Towards the end of 1902 the main lines of division between the Association and the colonial governments had been decided. Land for model farms would be provided, but only on lease. The governments would pay the salaries and travelling expenses of the "experts" whom the Association were sending out to carry on their program, but for not more than three years. While the Association would issue instructions to its staff, the Governor concerned might give them orders, and, in cases of necessity, could dismiss them. The experts' reports to the Secretary of State and the Association were to be sent via the Governor. The Association undertook to pay for all the seed, machinery and labour. 23
In October 1902 the Superintendent of Forests made a further tour of Abeokuta Province, and realised the significance of the price in any cotton-growing program for export. At Onibade a leading farmer "told me cotton had been tried some years ago but did not find a market, the price now being offered to farmers on their farms viz: - 3 strings per lb for seed cotton would not induce anyone to plant." The transport question made cotton useless to think of and they had no gins. Even if they had gins they had no labour to work them. If a central factory were established, at which cotton could be sold, the farmers would plant. At Aberuaga American cotton which Elder Dempster had sent had "absolutely failed", although it had done well in the Ibadan area. The farmers were taken aback by its being only an annual instead of a perennial like their own cotton which saved a great deal of labour.

The question of costs was the governing factor in much of the Association's policy. It affected the price which the Association could offer for seed cotton which was decided on at 1d. per lb. The same factor discouraged ginning by hand which cost from 1d. to 1 1/2d. per pound of lint after taking account of the sale of seed at 1d. per lb. It also limited the distance that was worthwhile bringing cotton in from beyond the railway. Up-country rates for porters were usually 6d. per day with often an extra allowance for rations, the load carried being about 60 lbs per man. Cotton carriage amounted to some 0.1d. per lb. per day, which normally covered a distance of about fifteen miles. Places like Oyo were thirty miles distant from the railway and thus the cost of porterage would amount to nearly 1/4d. per lb. Lint could probably stand this but seed cotton only as a maximum. Hence costs dictated a policy of building ginneries along the line of rail approximately sixty miles apart.

In accordance with the agreement made with the Colonial Office, the Association undertook to find a market for the cotton produced and to supply "experts". This term implied more than was justified. The Association could have supplied trained specialists in cotton growing, trained agriculturists who were to work mainly in cotton or men experienced in the cotton fields mainly as overseers - the men chosen belonged generally to the last category.

The recruiting was carried out through the firm of one of the Association's
Council members from Liverpool, A.A. Paton, which had several offices in the Southern States of America. The principal recruiting agents were Paton's son and a friend, and the interviewing area was located in and around Jefferson City, Missouri. The young Paton suggested that it might be sensible to recruit men from the Lower Mississippi area where they might, to some extent, have been acclimatised to malaria. The end of the year - 1902 - was not a good time to look for men, as it was the busiest time of the season in the American cotton fields. But even when men became available, the response was not encouraging. Paton Senior remarked: "(My son) says that the men are very hard to get, for they do not like the idea of going so far away. They all shy at the Gold Coast" - probably a reference to the heavy incidence of fever in the recent Ashanti campaign. Sir Ralph Moor had suggested coloured men, but the Colonial Office wrote to him: "In deference to the strong opinion expressed on the subject by the Association, the idea of employing coloured men as experts in cotton growing has been abandoned."

Thus the first experts chosen were white men - J.R. Prince went to the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Shelby Neely went to Sierra Leone. They were paid £300 or £350 per year according to whether they received free rations. In the early days the Association could not have offered more, since the Colonial Office laid down £400 as a maximum. But the restriction was soon modified as the following year the young Paton was authorised to pay up to £600. And the objection to employing coloured men also soon disappeared - both the experts chosen for Lagos, Professor J.W. Hoffman and his assistant, R.W. Barnes, were coloured men, but of West Indian origin. Hoffman had been an instructor at the Lincoln Institute, Jefferson City, and besides his knowledge of cotton, had experience of dairy-farming and strawberry growing. Despite these qualifications Hoffman was not paid at the same rate as white experts, his salary scale being £250 by £25 to £300 over his three-year contract, while the assistant's scale was £150 rising to £200. The advantage in recruiting coloured men at lower salaries meant that two assistants could be employed rather than a single white man. Events were to demonstrate that the rates paid to the Association's "experts" were insufficient to attract men with enough training to make a success of a program being
undertaken in novel conditions, hence requiring both research as well as practical work. No doubt this helped to explain the rise in salary to £600.

Providing the experts was only one part of the solution to immediate problems. Another was the provision of seed. There was, of course, more than enough seed in Nigeria itself, but as Lancashire intended to use West African production to replace American medium staple of approximately 1 1/8" length, her plans there were based on the growing of American Upland types or their equivalent which were known to be acceptable to British spinners. In the meantime Lancashire was also ready to buy the local cottons. For the 1903 planting Lagos received a supply of fifteen to twenty tons of American seed, but MacGregor was not satisfied, apparently basing his requirements on those prevailing in Egypt, and asked for no less than one hundred tons. The Association accordingly sent another fifty tons. Meanwhile the Alake had shown every readiness to cooperate. He promised that 3,000 acres would be put under cotton in his province. This constituted half of the projected program, and another 3,000 acres were to be sown elsewhere.

In April 1903 Hoffman and Barnes arrived at Lagos and were sent off to Abeokuta and Ibadan respectively to carry out their task of instruction. Hoffman immediately awoke memories of the years following the end of the American Civil War. "Everywhere", he wrote, "... I found among the old men ... people who suffered terrible losses from cotton growing after the close of the American Civil War." But after this his reports reflected an optimism which was not felt elsewhere. In 1904, for instance, he visited Ijebu-Ode and the farmers promised to plant cotton and Hoffman considered Sea Island could be grown on the lagoon. At Ijebu-Remo the people also wanted to plant cotton. However, the District Commissioner for Ijebu-Ode had this to say:

"... the farmers received ninety bags of seed, none of which has come up, if they are to be believed. I am convinced that they do not wish to plant cotton."

Possibly the Ijebu were still smarting from the events of 1892, when Governor Carter had bombarded them into surrender. More helpful reports came from the Alake. Early in 1904 he reported that he had visited the Egbado area - to the south-west of Abeokuta across the Ogun - and "all, to a man, have promised that they will grow cotton."
In the Ibadan area there was less cooperation, although the Resident, Captain Elgee, had shown a tendency to defer to the wishes of the Bale and Council. In his 1907 report on Ibadan he was to write: "Taken as a body the Chiefs of Yorubaland might serve as a model of politeness to any people in Europe." The Acting-Residents who took over during his periods of leave were less happy. One of them wrote in his report for the first half of 1904: "Last season the Ibadan chiefs tried to stop the extension of cotton-cultivation and if they obstruct again the dependent towns can be encouraged to come under Oyo or Ife." Elgee explained it on the ground that the city was in the palm zone: "I do not think any great increase in the growth of (cotton) can be looked for in the Palm Zone. Outside this zone it is another matter."

With Oyo it was another matter. Oyo lay on the northern edge of the palm zone and was some thirty miles distant from the Railway. The Alafin looked to the British as an ally to counter the influence of Ibadan, especially after the railway reached that city and by-passed Oyo for the extension to Oshogbo which was opened in 1907. When Hoffman visited Oyo in 1903, he was promised a house, a model farm and labourers to work it. After a talk which he gave on cotton-growing at the palace, "the people were wild with enthusiasm over the prospect of being able to make some money." MacGregor's policy of ruling through the chiefs made the Alafin an important figure in British policy apart from his pre-eminent position in Yorubaland. And the Alafin was an attractive figure - the Association's Superintendent wrote disrespectfully in 1904: "This old chap can give the Alake points in the King line."

Meanwhile arrangements had been made to gin the expected crops. Both hand and power gins were sent out to Lagos and in March 1903 a site was selected at Ibara, on the short branch line from Aro (on the main railway line from Lagos to the north), as the site of the B.C.G.A.'s first ginnery in Lagos, and a manager - William Evans - and a mechanic were sent out to look after it. This was called "The Hutton Ginnery", a name which it retained in 1905 when it was re-erected on the main line at Aro. It had a capacity of some three thousand 400 lb. bales a year, a size of bale which became the Association's standard. Another ginnery of similar capacity was built at Ibadan and named after C.H. Harley Moseley who became Acting-Governor after
MacGregor's final departure in January 1904, giving a total capacity of some 6,000 bales a year.52

But hopes of smooth progress in the Protectorate in 1903 were interrupted by the abrasive subject of tolls. MacGregor had left the chiefs in the Protectorate in charge of their own territories and treated them as "autonomous authorities". This implied that they had control of their own finances, a situation which remained unaffected by the Native Councils Ordinance. Unlike the Northern Emirates, where direct taxation had long been part of the way of life, the Yoruba states had relied largely on tolls collected either at the provincial boundaries or at the gates of the cities. Tolls were levied at Abeokuta, Ibadan, Oyo and Ilesha, but only at Abeokuta had Europeans been accustomed to pay, as their stores had not been set up elsewhere before 1900. With the growth of the railway the practice naturally drew greater attention, as it tended to undo the work of opening up the country to free trade. It also interfered with the flow of goods from the interior and from Northern Nigeria - goods from the latter were already paying 5%, to a maximum of 15%, on each Northern Province traversed, until their abolition in 1907. These were known as "caravan tolls".54

The tolls income was the main source of revenue of the Yoruba provincial governments, and in Abeokuta in particular had been the mainspring in creating a remarkable system of administration, evidently based on that of Lagos. In 1908 the Egba United Government employed about three hundred and fifty people:--

"... there was a secretariat, treasury, audit office, customs department, judicial department, public works department, medical and sanitary department, police prison, printing office, post office, forest and agricultural office, and education department, ... the annual expenditure was about £17,000 in 1908, and over £40,000 in 1911 ..."

Very good roads had been built, as well as bridges and a court-house.55 The tolls question there was an old one and had caused trouble in the nineteenth century, but the principle that Europeans should pay tolls had been accepted, and MacGregor, who opposed the outright abolition of the tolls, was able to provide evidence that all the merchants in Abeokuta had paid tolls in 1864 and earlier. But the immediate question which alarmed the merchants was the extension of the system to Ibadan where they had not hitherto been paying since
their establishments had been set up. 56

The Lagos Chamber of Commerce underwent a crisis and its African members resigned. 57 It then dutifully repeated its rote - "Free trade has been the policy of the British Nation for the last forty years and as British merchants we demand that this policy be maintained." 58 And John Holt wondered whether tolls were still part of the Parakoyi policy of keeping out European traders in favour of African ones. 59

The effects of these protests on the Colonial Office must have been limited by their knowledge that both the Liverpool shippers and the West African merchants operated in restraint of trade. Apart from the existence of the West African Conference, well-known even before the sitting of the Commission on Shipping Rings, 60 a "pool" to buy palm produce had been formed in 1898 in Lagos itself among the eight leading European firms who had accounted during the previous two years for 88% of the total purchases. 61 Jones and most of the merchants wanted the tolls replaced by government subsidies. But strong feelings in their defence were aroused among Southern Nigerians who were aware of the position, and the educated section gave its full support to the protesting chiefs. Even R.B. Blaize, 62 said to have "very English" ideas, wrote to J.A. Hutton threatening an African uprising. Calm and determined in the midst of the storm, MacGregor followed a moderate policy, supporting tolls on goods going to Abeokuta or Ibadan and their surrounding provinces, but refusing them on goods in transit and forbidding any increases without the Governor's permission. Soon after the tolls on exports, including cotton, were abolished and subsidies were agreed to in Oyo and Ilesha instead of the tolls. 63 But for the time being European interests were defeated and the merchants began to pay their dues at Ibadan, usually made up by the Railway into monthly accounts. MacGregor's successor, Sir Walter Egerton, ended the Ibadan tolls in 1907 for a subsidy of £2,500, 64 while the Abeokuta tolls continued until "the fiscal frontier" was abolished by Governor-General Lugard in 1914, along with Abeokuta's "independence". 65

The effect of the tolls question on the cotton movement was, for the time being, serious, for the controversy reached its climax during the height of the planting season. The Alake wrote to MacGregor: "I have left no stone unturned to get my people back again to interest themselves in cotton growing with the zeal and energy with which I had succeeded in getting them to take
up the Industry before the unfortunate movement of the European Merchants
tolls was started", but the planting was seriously delayed, and the
dispute was to lead to a reduction in the year's harvest.

One of the Governor's chief aims was to awaken the interest of as
many Africans as possible in the growing of exportable crops. One means
of achieving this was by the institution of a series of Agricultural Shows.
The first took place in Lagos in November 1903 and proved a great success,
being attended by many of the important chiefs, including the Alake. All
kinds of farm animals and produce were on display, and of course cotton,
a gin and press being prominently displayed and operated by the local
manager of the Association.

This provided a promising opportunity for the creation of a permanent
agricultural society called "The Yoruba Agricultural Union", which was designed
to have branches throughout the Colony and Protectorate. It was a considerably
stronger organisation than Moloney's "Honorary Agricultural Annual Committee"
set up in 1888, whose attention to the problems was evidently intended to be
on a yearly basis. The Union seems to have been designed in part with the
aim of obtaining more control over the agricultural and cotton-growing develop-
ments for the Governor. MacGregor had earlier suggested to the Colonial
Office that the Lagos Government should provide the gins, presses, seeds and
instructors, but the Colonial Office had left these functions to the B.C.C.A.67
Now MacGregor was President of the Yoruba Agricultural Union and hoped to
achieve some of his original aims through the "cotton-sub-committee" of the
Union. At the meeting called to set up the Union MacGregor suggested:--

"The great subject of cotton could advantageously
be brought under the attention of the cotton sub-
committee. They would examine the Reports of the
Cotton Experts, give attention to the introduction
of new varieties; to the production of new kinds by
crossing; to the comparative value of the different
native varieties; to the machinery required for
ginning and pressing; the utilisation of cotton seed;
tilling and manuring cotton land; transport; the best
form of implements required in its cultivation; the
growing of cotton by irrigation on the Oshun River
etc." 68

This was an extraordinarily wide program and would have had the effect
of transferring the whole of the direction of the program from the B.C.G.A. to the Colonial Government. The Union's central committee was a typically centralised colonial organisation - the Governor as President, the Colonial Secretary a member; the Secretary to the Council to be appointed by the Governor; four members (two of them merchants) to be nominated by the Governor; two members to be selected by each of the three branches then formed - Lagos, Abeokuta and Ibadan; the Resident of Ibadan, the Commissioner of Abeokuta, and one member from each new branch. 69

Although it was dominated by officials, the Union also contained African representatives outside the ranks of chiefs from centres throughout the Protectorate as well as the Colony. The Hon. C.A. Sapara Williams, member of the Legislative Council, and a Saro, was on the Committee and among other African members were R.A. Wright, Otunba Payne and J. Egerton Shyngle, a Gambian by birth. In fact two of the branches had already been formed before the parent body, the Lagos Planters Association, 70 and the Agricultural Society at Abeokuta, which had been founded through the efforts of C. Punch, the Superintendent of Forests, in 1902. 71 One that followed the Union was the branch at Agege which was formed in 1907. 72 The African members saw in the Union a means of meeting both their marketing and their labour needs. Rev. J.H. Samuel (A.Edun) remarked on the loss of slave labour which made agriculture no longer the paying occupation it had been. The Union would bring farmers into closer touch with the market and enable them to squeeze out the middleman. A similar impression of a body of local landlords is given in a report of a meeting of the Ibadan branch by the Acting-Resident, H.G. Parsons, in 1905. The branch included all the leading "landowners" and farmers of the District and their resolutions included one to make 6d. per day the maximum rate of pay on the railway. 73 The B.C.G.A. made a similar request:-

"As you are doubtless aware, acting in concert with the Railway Officials and Messrs Elder Dempster & Co., this Association has been endeavouring to establish a fixed rate of remuneration for Native labourers, viz: sixpence per day." 74

The impetus behind the Agricultural Union was much reduced when MacGregor left Lagos early in 1904, and his successor, Sir Walter Egerton, proved more interested in building up an Agricultural Department, although he too aimed
at getting control of the cotton-growing program. But the branches remained as a "country-wide" organisation which helped to unite production. In later years the Union branches formed a base on which cooperative movements could be built. 75

The underlying attitude of the Governor and administration was fundamentally an unfriendly one - they looked forward to the day when all agricultural activities would be brought under one final control. The same human reaction which made the merchants complain of Governors who failed to consult their interests when they passed Ordinances which ignored effects on trade made Governors object to outside organisations which could affect the security and well-being of their own domain. Such an instance occurred during 1903 when the question of the price to be paid for seed cotton arose. The Association had given a general undertaking to pay 1d. per lb., but there were two aspects of the question which received insufficient consideration. One was the position of the merchants who were not bound by the undertaking, but whose role might easily be confused with that of the Association by African farmers. The other was the area to which the promise applied - the expenses of portage made it impossible for the Association to pay 1d. per lb. - without suffering serious losses - at a distance over thirty miles from rail at the most.

Doubts arose about the payment in the middle of the year, but MacGregor was told by the Association that 1d. would be paid and any surplus profits returned to the chiefs and people who had grown it. 76 And Hoffman aroused enthusiasm in Oyo by announcing that 1d. would be paid there. 77 This was not to the merchants' liking as they had made no promises and realised that no profit could be made at such a price away from the railway. When MacGregor visited the Hutton ginnery near Abeokuta at the end of the year, he said that the Ibadan merchants had made a poor impression by offering only 1/2d. and then 3/4d. a pound for seed cotton. Then in January 1904, he cabled the Colonial Office to say that the Association had withdrawn from the market. 78

The Association's explanation was "Information reached this Association that the merchants in Lagos were willing and anxious to buy all the cotton which was offered at the same rate as the Association, viz: 1d. per lb. in the seed" and "it was considered desirable to withdraw from unnecessary competition by interference with the usual mercantile agencies." 79 This, however, was not the true explanation, which was much more consistent with the Association's promise to pay the 1d. The Lagos manager, Evans, had failed to send
proper accounts or more than a "very small amount" of cotton, although he had spent over £900 in all on the Association's account. As a result it was decided to send out the Association's newly appointed Superintendent for West Africa, Himbury, to investigate. In the meanwhile instructions had been sent to Evans in December that he should buy no more cotton. The Association made it clear that it desired to continue its promise to pay 1d. per lb., and that it did not approve of the merchants' cutting down of the price.

Nevertheless, MacGregor laid the responsibility for the trouble firmly on the Association's shoulders, commenting in his annual report:—

"The planting of cotton received a severe check when the Cotton Association decided to cease to buy cotton, and the price was forced down to a half-penny or three farthings a pound. But the enthusiasm of the chiefs and people was restored by the subsequent undertaking of the Association to pay a minimum price of a penny a pound for unginned cotton for three years." 81.

In his report MacGregor seems to have overlooked the more serious effect of the tolls question. The Association had given an assurance in June 1903 that they would pay 1d, and that was when planting was approximately taking place. If MacGregor was referring to the Association's withdrawal much later in the year, it is difficult to see how this could have affected the planting of 1903. Hoffman put the blame on the tolls question: "...after the tolls question was settled, it was considered by the people too late to plant cotton as it was only during the months of May and June they plant their native cotton." 82

Certainly the reports of defaulting on the promise to pay 1d. per lb. produced strong reactions in African circles. During the 1904 season the Association sent the Colonial Office an extract from "The Egba Government Gazette":—

"We venture to remind all concerned that it is distinctly agreed that 1d. per lb. is to be paid for all cotton offered, and if the producers are not able to obtain this price for this year's crop, it will be a grave breach of faith which will not lightly be forgotten or forgiven." 83

The promise to pay 1d. per lb. for seed cotton required some modification and
it was finally agreed that 1d. should be paid at all "reasonably accessible" centres - seed cotton was already being bought at Ilesha, one hundred miles from rail, at 1/2d. per lb.\footnote{81}

There was some dispute between Egerton and the Association as to the sum to be paid at Oyo, some thirty miles from Ibadan and the railroad. Oyo Province had always been regarded as a promising cotton growing area as it was outside the palm-belt. Egerton, with his enthusiasm for road-building, was anxious to introduce the new system of motor transport between Oyo and Ibadan and wanted the Association to build a ginnery at Oyo which would bring goods traffic for the service. A lengthy argument followed as to the price for seed cotton to be paid at Oyo - 1d. or 3/4d. The Alafin claimed that 3/4d. was a breach of an earlier promise - probably given by Hoffman; but the Association held to their ground that the promise to pay 1d. could only be carried out within a reasonable distance of rail. It was at this stage that the Association decided that in view of Lancashire's "urgent need" it was necessary that their program should be stepped up, and three large "model farms" should be opened in the West African colonies. In return for colonial government grants, the Association formally guaranteed payment of 1d. per lb. at "reasonable" distances from rail up to a loss of £25,000.\footnote{85}

Probably the main object of the large plantations, apart from providing more cotton quickly, was to reduce expenditure against the costs on smaller "model farms", although the latter were never put completely into practice except at Moor Plantation, Ibadan. Leaving aside the wages for labourers, said to be 6d. per day up-country,\footnote{86} salaries of a model-farm - stated to be "ruinously expensive" - were compared with those of a plantation by the Secretary of the Association.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff Salaries</th>
<th>1,000 Acres</th>
<th>10,000 Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Manager</td>
<td>£ 600</td>
<td>£ 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td>£ 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashier</td>
<td>£ 300</td>
<td>£ 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashier Assistant(s)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>£ 250</td>
<td>£ 250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agricultural Superintendent (1)</td>
<td>£ 250 (10) 2,500</td>
<td>£ 2,500</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>£ 4,850</td>
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Estimating one bale (taken as 480 - the American size - rather than the 400 lbs which the Association were to make their standard) of lint from two acres, the model farms would produce five hundred bales, and the large plantations, five thousand. Unfortunately, while the comparison was conclusive as to costs, the basis of calculation for West African conditions - of 864 lbs seed cotton to the acre - was hopelessly optimistic. On the model farms costs for each pound of lint would be 2d.; on the plantation, only 1/2d. The economic case was thus very strong and Hutton indicated that they would be extended if they made a profit.

But the system had obvious drawbacks, mostly based on African fears for the security of their land. A minute written in the Colonial Office said: "It seems likely that the present proposal for model farms on as large a scale as possible may lead to large plantations run for profit with hired labour." Before giving approval, Lyttleton reminded the Association that the land was being given on the basis that it was non-profit-making, and he referred to the fifth of the Resolutions passed at the Albion Hotel, Manchester, in May 1902, by which land could not be transferred to a subsidiary company. Nor was the concession to be made a nucleus for extending European plantations elsewhere in the country.

Wisely the Colonial Office consulted MacGregor, who had then left Lagos for good. The Colonial Government, he said, should not provide labour or fix wages, but District Commissioners could give assistance. This, however, was the system which developed in Kenya after the first World War and which led to the African farmer being pressed to leave his own land to work elsewhere for wages. A fundamental difficulty was that the plantation and the African farms were in direct competition, as both needed labour during the planting seasons. Another was that the subject was being discussed at the very time when publicity was increasingly being given to the disturbing example of the Congo Free State, where the policy of concessions had gone to dangerous, some were saying disastrous, lengths. The greater part of the Congo Free State, that is "the vacant lands", had become the "domaine privé", and parts of these vacant lands had been distributed to various concessionaires, among them Leopold II, whose personal preserve, the "Domaine de la Couronne" was
around Lake Mayi Ndombe (formerly Lake Leopold II) in Bandundu Province.

The Congo situation raised the basic question of free trade. The concessions violated the guarantees of free trade in the Congo Basin in the Act of Berlin 1885. Particularly strong feelings were aroused when a similar policy of concessions was put into effect in 1898 in the French Congo, where British merchants had been trading for a considerable time. This brought some powerful free traders, including John Holt, whose firm was directly affected, into agitating for the continuation of the free trade provisions laid down at Berlin. When reports began to be received of exploitation of Africans in the Congo Free State, therefore, and then of maiming and other atrocities, strong forces were already arrayed against the whole system. The agitation then brought about a disruption within the British Cotton Growing Association.

Sir Alfred Jones had harboured a viper in his bosom - who was, nevertheless, an idealist, speaker and writer of unusual talent, E.D. Morel, who had been employed as a clerk in Elder Dempster's office from 1890 to 1900. He came to be on close terms with John Holt. During his work at Elder Dempster's Morel's attention was drawn to the Congo by one of Sir Alfred Jones's non-Imperial interests. This was the Antwerp shipping line, the Compagnie Belge Maritime du Congo, which traded to the Congo Free State, and for which Jones provided the ships, Morel describing him as "virtual owner" of the Company. Morel realised that there was something wrong with the Congo trade - it had relatively little import trade compared to its exports. Curiously enough, another employee at Elder Dempster's was (Sir) Roger Casement who later, as a British Consul, was to send back reports confirming the atrocities in the Congo. Jones was in a position where he was easily embarrassed, for not only did he have his connection with the Congo shipping trade, but he was also Honorary Consul in Liverpool for the Congo Free State.

As a result of his discoveries, Morel played a leading part in the formation of the Congo Reform Association in 1904, which received wide support among philanthropic circles in Britain. He was, however, already editor of the West African Mail, founded in 1903, which was the "official organ" both of the British Cotton Growing Association and of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. Morel began to speak about the Congo in the Mail and became openly
critical of Jones, who refused to recognise the "atrocities". Such adverse publicity for its President can have done little to help the Association raise its much needed capital.

And this year - 1904 - the year of the founding of the Congo Reform Association - was the very year that saw the beginning of the Association's plantation policy in West Africa. At this time, however, some plantations were being granted to others in Nigeria. There seems little doubt that MacGregor's departure was the signal for the new policy. Sir Walter Egerton with his great enthusiasm for communications also saw the importance of all forms of fresh trade. In 1904, he allowed Alexander Miller Brother and Co. to establish a rubber plantation of some five hundred acres in Southern Nigeria. In 1907 he refused to allow W.H. Lever, the Liverpool soap manufacturer, to set up palm plantations there - so the Colonial Government followed a cautious policy in regard to the matter.

When Lugard wrote his Amalgamation Report in 1919, he said that agricultural leases from both Crown and Native Lands were ordinarily limited to 1,200 acres for forty-five years. The amount the Association wanted was considerably more, originally 10,000 to 15,000 acres, and near the railway where the ginneries had to be. It was part of the Association's policy to combine the ginneries with plantations or model farms so that the staff could be employed in sowing and planting when there was little to be done at the ginneries. But land near the railway was becoming increasingly valuable for the growth of other export crops and for food crops intended for sale in the cities, especially within the "palm belt", and it was near the railway that the marginal attraction to the farmer of growing cotton was most apparent, since it was near the railway that he could obtain more from other crops. At first, according to Dr Obadiah Johnson, a member of Lagos's Legislative Council, the Association tried to obtain land for a plantation in Abeokuta Province, but this had met with a refusal. It was suggested that the Alake, himself illiterate, had been warned of the dangers by educated men in the Egba United Government, and in particular by its Secretary, J.H. Samuel.

At Ibadan the Association were at first more successful in obtaining land; Sir Walter Egerton, who had taken over the administration of Lagos in July 1904, wrote in the Report attached to the Estimates for 1905-06:-
"The B.C.G.A. has received a lease of 5,000 acres of land near Ibadan, where cotton growing on a large scale is to be undertaken, the natives instructed in the cultivation, experiments made as to the varieties of cotton most suitable to the climate and soil, and the best planting season ascertained. The success of this new estate depends principally on the local manager and his tact and power of interesting the chiefs and population generally in the new industry. Cheap labour is available and it is hoped that a large production of cotton may result. The rent paid for the land, 3d. per acre, and the compensation to be paid for valuable trees felled, will doubtless be equitably distributed." 103

Johnson implied that Ibadan council had been taken advantage of, and that the terms of the lease - 3d. an acre for thirty years, with an option of thirty more at 6d. an acre, were unfair and the payments insufficient. According to Johnson, the original request had been for 15,000 acres, but this had been scaled down to 5,000. That the land, which became known as Moor Park after Sir Ralph Moor, Official Adviser to the Association, was valuable to local farmers was evident from a clause which allowed owners to collect fruit and timber on the leased land. 104

Johnson sent Morel a handwritten copy of the agreement dated March 6th 1905. Perhaps it was significant that it was not signed by Captain Elgee, Resident of Ibadan, although he was in the country at the time. The previous year Elgee had written to the Colonial Office enclosing a memorandum for the Association. In his letter he stated:-

"The Association's known idea of obtaining a large acreage for their own exploitation I have endeavoured to kill. To insist on it would possibly necessitate the use of force and certainly the loss of good-will and peace of the Yoruba nation. The foundations of a great agricultural future for Lagos are now firmly laid and it would appear to me a great error of policy to upset them." 105

Hutton's comment was that he knew that Elgee "has been trying to do the Cotton Growing Association all the harm he possibly can." 106

The plantation policy, however, caused Morel some embarrassment coming as it did when he was playing a leading part in publicising the misdeeds in the Congo. "The Catholic Herald" was enabled to remark that the Association
was treating Africans as "slaves".

Moor Plantation at Ibadan provoked controversy because it was on good land a few miles from a city. The 1911 Census showed a population for Ibadan Division of 341,968 with a density of 107.10 per square mile and a revised estimate in 1912 gave the city's population as 175,000. And as far as agricultural purposes were concerned, it seemed likely that the chosen area of settlement would be fertile, and indeed for these purposes in general the plantation proved a success. When the united "Colony of Southern Nigeria" - which came into being in May 1906 - set up its own Department of Agriculture in 1910, it made Moor Park its headquarters.

But although Moor Park proved successful as an experimental centre, the plantations obtained in Sierra Leone and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria during 1904 both failed. On the Sobo Plains in Southern Nigeria six hundred acres were cleared, but only twenty bales produced. The cause of the failure appears to have been a deficiency in the soil. Hutton wrote sorrowfully to the Colonial Office...."the total failure of the crop on the Association's plantations has come as a considerable surprise and a great disappointment and may necessitate a complete change in the policy of this Association." Certainly the Association gave up its large plantations and even at Moor Park where there had been no crop failure, W.H. Himbury, the West African Superintendent, handed back 4,000 acres out of a total of 5,000 for the use of local farmers. Had he not done so, he feared a boycott of the plantation. His action followed a deputation of some two hundred farmers led by the Otun Bale and accompanied by Captain Elgee. The decision appears to have been sound as the Association do not seem to have used more than a few hundred acres. A letter was then sent to the Colonial Office stating that the establishment of cotton growing as a native industry was the right (policy), thereby raising some doubts as to the ultimate aim of the large "model-farms".

The unsatisfactory results also discredited the cotton "experts". After all they had proved themselves less successful at cotton growing than African farmers and they were usually known as agriculturists or superintendents afterwards. In the Colonial Office there was a flurry of meetings and minutes. R.L. Antrobus wrote:

"When we began, we thought that the B.C.G.A. would be able to command expert advice and assistance, but they can't, and, unless we can supply it, the growing of cotton in West Africa will be a failure."
Similar reports began to come from the growing areas. W.A. Ross, District Commissioner at Meko, wrote to the Colonial Office:

"Hitherto the representatives (of the Association) have been quarrelling among themselves and they have been a stumbling block to the government and a danger to the cause. The peregrinations of Mr Hoffman and his assistant have been of little value, and I have no hesitation in saying that the reports as to the acreage of cotton under cultivation are hopelessly inaccurate and misleading." 115

The local managers appointed by the Association in particular were criticised. F.G.A. Butler minuted in the Colonial Office:

"In Lagos ... manager succeeds manager with bewildering rapidity ... I cannot help thinking that this chaotic state of things betrays the lack of one controlling influence capable of mapping out a definite line of action. The West African experts and managers engaged by the Association are mediocre men." 117

The need for greater coordination was becoming stronger as the Association invested more capital in West Africa. The construction of ginneries was being extended and they depended on a reliable flow of seed cotton. Close cooperation with the railway was required, and a program was needed to undertake the improvement, or replacement, of local cotton so that the farmer might receive a higher price for it. The Association went a good way towards meeting the longer-term needs when it appointed W.H. Himbury its Superintendent for West Africa.

Similar conclusions had also been reached by the Colonial Office, who decided that a man was needed of suitable standing and salary who could supervise all the West African colonies. The plan was based on the West Indies where the cotton-growing program under the overall direction of Sir Daniel Morris, as Imperial Commissioner of Agriculture there, had made excellent progress. It was felt that a similar "presiding genius" could achieve success also in West Africa. There was some discussion as to the lines of responsibility as Professor Wyndham Dunstan, Director of the Imperial Institute, wished the Superintendent to be responsible to him, but it was finally agreed that reports from the "Superintendent of Agriculture for the British West African Colonies and Protectorates" would be sent through the Governors to the Colonial Office and sent on to the Imperial Institute, 118 the appointment
being made by the Colonial Office and paid for by the West African colonies.

Soon after G.C. Dudgeon was appointed to the post at a salary of £700 per year plus a duty allowance of £140. In some ways he was an unsatisfactory choice. He had no special training in cotton and, although a capable man, was not in fact a trained agriculturist. His background was tea plantation work in India. The Association may have "pushed" his appointment as it had previously offered him the superintendency of their own work in West Africa. His work for the Colonial Office was to inspect and report upon the various Agricultural, Botanical and Forestry Departments as well as the work of the Association. Almost at once "Timber" Thompson, the Southern Nigerian Conservator of Forests, protested against Dudgeon's reporting on the Forestry Department, although the practice was adopted. In fact the appointment did not fulfil expectations as Dudgeon could only find time to spend about six weeks a year in Southern Nigeria, and usually at the same time of year. Egerton in due course complained that his services were of little value.

The abandonment of plantations underlined the importance of the ginneries. They had to be sufficient in number and spaced along the Railway so that they would serve as many farmers as possible, bearing in mind the limitations of porterage and other transport. The basic policy in erecting the ginneries was that they should be placed along the railway at intervals of roughly sixty miles beginning at Aro, sixty miles from the coastal terminus at Iddo. Here was built the Hutton Ginnery equipped mainly with British-made roller or "knife" gins, which were designed to damage the cotton as little as possible. Their output was low, however, each roller gin producing about two bales per day, while the saw gins produced about four a day. But British saw gins soon after reached the market and in 1905 it was reported that the Association's ginnery at Moyamba in Sierra Leone had received the first saw gins manufactured in the United Kingdom.

The next ginnery along the line of rail was the Moseley Ginnery at Ibadan, one hundred and twenty-four miles from Iddo. It was the same size as the Hutton Ginnery, both capable of turning out about 3,000 (400 lb.) bales per year. The Hutton and the Moseley Ginneries were known as "first-generation" ginneries and were to be followed on the line of rail by bigger and more efficient kinds. At the same time there was another kind which was
built sometimes on, but more often away from, the railway. The farmers were suspicious of new schemes, they had been "had" by earlier cotton growing schemes when they had been unable to find a market, and they needed some visible sign of serious intent. This could be provided in a new district by a smaller type of ginnery, which would be put up without any immediate expectation of making profits. These were called "pioneer ginneries". If they failed to pay their way, they could be removed and the loss was small. If they succeeded, they could give way to a larger and better-equipped ginnery. A pioneer ginnery was built at Oyo in 1906, mainly as a result of the promise to Sir Walter Egerton to provide traffic for his motor service to Ibadan. Another very small one, with only two saw-gins, was erected at Agege, for the benefit of the leading African merchants and farmers there. Others were simply designed to increase the collecting centres along the line of rail rather than to act as experimental centres in newly-opened regions. One of these was at Eruwa Road, between Abeokuta and Ibadan - and was in fact the same Hutton Ginnery which had been moved from its former site at Aro; another was at Iwo, north of Ibadan on the railway line. Both were on the thirty-mile circumference of neighbouring ginneries and were designed as additional collecting centres rather than as pioneer ginneries in completely new areas, and had three saw gins each.

The larger or "second generation" ginneries which followed represented the outcome of a different line of thought. They reflected the advantages of economy of scale. They were cheaper in terms of output and yet turned out a lint which was more valuable than that produced by the smaller ginneries. As the railway extended further into the north, it was convenient to have large ginneries near the coastal terminus which could act as a reserve if a particularly large cotton crop was brought in. So the Hutton and the Moseley Ginneries were replaced after a few years by the second generation ginneries. In 1905 the Marlborough Ginnery, built on part of Moor Plantation near Ibadan, came into operation and the Moseley Ginnery closed soon after.

Of the "second-class" ginneries the Marlborough had five British-made saw gins, an hydraulic press and pneumatic feed, and an annual output of some 8,400 bales; it alone could have handled the entire Lagos crop until 1906. And in 1907, the Churchill Ginnery at Lafenwa, near Abeokuta, was opened with
an annual capacity of 6,720 bales. The following year the Association kept step with the extension of the railway from Ibadan by opening their largest ginnery to date at Oshogbo. This was a "first-class" ginnery and was appropriately named after the Association's President, Sir Alfred Jones. It was equipped with eight seventy-saw gins (British made) with an output of - as was usually stated - 12,000 bales a year. The output figures of the larger ginneries as given seem to be beneath the potential based on the daily capacity; for example, the Alfred Jones Ginnery could turn out sixty-four bales a day which would amount to some 19,000 per year, and on a similar reckoning the total annual capacity of the Marlborough Ginnery would have been 15,000 bales, and the Churchill some 12,000. It is possible that the capacities were reduced somewhat to avoid attention being drawn to the over-optimistic assumptions of cotton production made in the early years.

As the new ginneries were installed, so did the exports of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria increase, steadily if not spectacularly from a mere 725 (400 lb.) bales in 1903, to 2,371 in 1904, 6,740 in 1906 and 10,224 in 1907. The hopeful expectations aroused by the steady increase in the number of bales exported received a sharp jolt with the 1907-08 planting season when there was a serious drought. The result was a marked drop in exports for 1908 - they fell to 5,736 bales. The ginnery program immediately underwent a drastic curtailment - instead of opening more ginneries, the Association began closing them. One of the "main" ginneries could have dealt with the whole of the 1908 crop, and the Alfred Jones ginnery with two to three times as much. One result was that a number of the smaller ginneries - Oyo, Iwo and Eruwa Road - were closed, so that work could be concentrated at the three large ginneries. A second result was that an arrangement which had been suggested a good deal earlier for a buying agreement with the merchants, by which they acted as buying agents for the Association, was hastened forward. The chief obstacle to such an agreement before had been the Association's obligation to pay 1d. per pound - but this had been ended from April 1907.

On February 1st 1908 the Association thus entered into buying agreements with most of the important firms then trading in Southern Nigeria. They were
not confined to British firms and included G.L. Gaiser, Witt and Busch, Compagnie Francaise de la Cote Occidentale de l'Afrique, John Holt, Alexander Miller, Paterson Zochonis and Lagos Stores Ltd. The basic reason for the agreement was economy - to save the Association sending European buyers to outlying places like Meko and Ilesha, and to nearer places which were outside the thirty-mile radius from rail like Oyo. The need for greater buying facilities was increasing all the time as the railway found its way into the North - in April 1908 the Railway was opened as far as Ilorin.

An agreement had been suggested early in 1905 during the life of the Conservative Government but had been refused on Egerton's advice. The basic question was what price would be paid by the merchants - the Association asserted that it would be impossible for 1d. to be paid and that carriage would have to be taken off the price obtained by the farmer. In 1906 when similar suggestions had been made by the Association for it to send its own buyers to places far from rail and buy at 3/4d. per lb. to cover the extra transport, both Egerton and Elgin, the Colonial Secretary, had agreed. At the same time, however, the policy of setting up smaller ginneries had been followed. By 1908 the expense of employing its own buyers had become a serious objection, and the formal obligation to pay 1d. per pound had ended.

By the agreement merchants taking part were to pay 7/8d. per lb. for seed cotton at all railway stations to Ilorin, and 3/4d. at stations beyond, with further reductions at places more than fifteen miles from rail. In addition the Association paid the merchants a "handling charge" of 1/8d. per lb. Meanwhile the Association itself continued to pay 1d. at Lafenwa and at Moor Plantation, but only 7/8d. at Oshogbo. These were now its only buying centres. The agreement was criticised in the Colonial Office where it was feared that it would reduce the number of ginneries and make it impossible for farmers in certain areas to sell their cotton. Egerton was persistent in his criticisms of the agreement, especially the ginning monopoly which it virtually gave the Association. The merchants undertook not to erect any ginneries of their own, but the Association promised to put them in a position to meet the competition if ginneries were erected by outsiders. Egerton also criticised the failure to pay 1d. at Oyo and naturally disliked the closing of the ginnery there in 1908, although this probably left more, rather than less, goods traffic, to be carried on the Ibadan-Oyo motor service.
Soon after, he wrote to the Colonial Office, recommending an end to the arrangement by which Southern Nigeria contributed £5,000 to the experimental work of the Association, suggesting that this would be better taken over by a local Department of Agriculture (as was to be set up in 1913). Government officers would have more influence with the chiefs than the employees of an outside organisation. But Hutton succeeded in giving a satisfactory explanation of the ginning agreement with the merchants. He set aside fears that farmers might not be able to sell their cotton by promising that the Association would buy from all, and that there was nothing to prevent the Association from ginning for the farmer at its own ginneries. This, however, had never occurred as the farmers all wanted prompt payment. He revealed that the Association had lost on every pound of cotton bought during 1908 in Lagos. The past behaviour of the merchants in lowering the price showed that the agreement was of value in keeping them "in line". One reason for the suspicion that the Association was making a large profit was based on the assumption that all sale prices were "spot". They were sold at the price of "futures" for some way ahead - a difference of some 0.2d. per pound of lint. On the file a Colonial official minuted: "The two letters furnish a conclusive answer to Sir Walter Egerton". These arrangements were more flexible than the previous ones by which the Association purchased its own cotton, and helped to secure its monopoly of ginning. Its commitments could now be kept in proportion to the size of the crop, and were a move away from too great a dependence on Southern Nigeria's Western Province - the former Lagos Protectorate.

Meanwhile the program of cotton planting and limited construction of ginneries had also taken place in the Central and Eastern Provinces, in the former Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Botanical stations had been taken over from the Royal Niger Company on or near the Niger and elsewhere. The Niger Coast Protectorate had established a Botanic Station at Calabar under the program decided on at the Colonial Office Conference in 1893. American cotton sent by Elder Dempster and Company was planted in 1902 and an "expert" J.R. Prince, a white man from Greenville, Missouri, sent out the following year. Experimental work in cotton growing was mainly carried out at Nkissi, near Onitsha. The most spectacular effort made by the Association in the Protectorate was its "plantation" on the Sobo Plains, where six hundred acres were planted with cotton during 1904. Probably owing to a soil deficiency
KWALE
DELTA
IFON AND ISHAN DISTRICTS OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA
SKETCH – MAP BASED ON BRITISH WAR OFFICE MAP 1910 - PREPARED BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
SCALE: 32 MILES TO ONE INCH

IFON
AGBEDE
UGBOHA
UBIAJA
ILLUSHI
ISHAN
ASABA
AGBOR
KWALE

BENIN
SAPELE
R. ETHIOPE
FORCADOS
SOBO
DELTA

R. NIGER
R. BENUE
LOKOJA
ITOB
IDAH
NORTHERN PROVINCES BOUNDARY

SCALE: 32 MILES

0 32 64
virtually all the plants died. As a result the Association moved its activities further north - to the Uboha (or Uromi) area on the west side of the river. It was just below 7 degrees North - the line which Sir Walter Egerton said roughly marked the area above which cotton growing could successfully be undertaken. The important point about this area was that the local people, the Ishan, were expert farmers and the cotton they grew - Ishan - was superior to most other "local" Nigerian varieties. For some years the Association operated a ginnery at Onitsha, and later at Illushi to the north, and at Lokoja.

After the failure of its plantation policy, the Association's only remaining "model farm" in Southern Nigeria was at Moor Plantation where the Marlborough Ginnery was situated - and where there was good soil on the remaining one thousand acres not returned for the use of the Ibadan farmers. Meanwhile the government had its own model farm at Oloke Meji where work on cotton was also continued. Southern Nigeria had already shown that it could grow other crops - not only cocoa and kola-nuts - but food crops like yams and maize which fetched good prices in the local markets and, in the case of maize, could also be profitably exported. It was therefore important that cotton should be grown so as to produce the best possible returns, and to obtain these, the Association undertook experimental work both at Moor Plantation, and at Nkissi and Uromi.

This work concerned three main problems: the best time for planting, the question of maintaining soil fertility by rotations and manuring, and the competing characteristics of American and African cotton plants.

Bateson, the Association's Agricultural Superintendent at Moor Plantation, stated in his 1906-07 report that July was the best month for planting African cotton, August possibly for American. Owing to tse-tse fly, animal manure was unobtainable in sufficient quantity and bringing in artificial fertiliser too expensive. Attention was therefore given to discovering a good rotation. It was noted that the planting of several crops together - yams, maize and cotton - did not affect the cotton output, and the value of cow peas, pigeon peas and groundnuts as restorers of nitrogen to the soil was recognised. Where the soil contained a good proportion of loam, as in Abeokuta Province, ridging could be carried out successfully. This was also true of Moor Plantation
which "shows great variation, from low-lying, moist, deep mould to high laterite soil". Ridging had advantages because cotton is a comparatively deep-rooted plant, and since ploughs could be used only with difficulty, ridging helped to give a depth and freshness to the soil, which the short-handled African hoe could not. But it was also discovered that Africans worked better with their hoes than with spades. On the other hand later work showed that planting cotton on yam mounds could be demanding too much, as under drought conditions the tap root might fail to find water which would be reached if the plant had grown on the surface. As a result planting "on the flat" was encouraged. Norris Dent, who worked in Nigeria for the Association as an Agriculturist, remarked later that "many of our methods" were adopted by African farmers.

A considerable amount of work was done to discover the most productive rotations. Percival, the Association's manager at Uboha and Nkissi, and Bateson suggested similar ones, although Bateson described Percival's as too exhausting for the soil. Percival's suggestion was:-

Year 1. Maize and yams.
2. African cotton and cow-peas to be manured in.
5. Pigeon peas for two to three years (or fallow).

The main purpose of the research was to find the most suitable type of cotton to grow in Southern Nigeria. This could not be known quickly as the newly introduced exotic plants needed time to adjust to local conditions, and if cross-breeding were to be tried and a new variety created, "it takes from ten to fifteen years to produce a new variety of cotton and a further five to seven for sufficient seed to be multiplied for all growers." Early experiences and the failure of some American cottons on the large plantations had brought the previously unquestioned superiority of transatlantic varieties into question, and more attention was being given to African cottons whose claims had hitherto been largely ignored. In general West African cotton had a reputation of being strong but rather rough and slightly yellow. They were grown as perennials, especially in the South, but this encouraged cotton
pests which were able to survive on the plants or roots from one season to the next. The period to maturity - when picking could begin - in Nigeria was some five months for American against seven for African types. This made the introduction of American cotton more difficult, as the African farmer usually grew several different crops on the same piece of land, and their planting and cropping followed an integrated schedule. The American varieties were normally treated as annuals, which could be a further disadvantage in the farmer's eyes. The main reason for growing American cotton was the long experience Lancashire had had of it, its good colour and staple-length, and the greater percentage of seed cotton to lint - 3 to 1 for American against 3 3/5 to 1 for African. If the African were to be encouraged to grow cotton, he had to get a good return per acre, so the better lint percentage was an important factor favouring imported cotton plants.

At Moor Plantation the returns from early trials of both African and American plants grown as sole crops were fairly promising. The average for African seed cotton - as reported in 1906 - was 275.4 lbs per acre, while American Upland produced 346 lbs. Egyptian varieties were eliminated from further experiments in both West and Central Provinces as they had proved very susceptible to "blight" and "bollworms." By 1908 Bateson delivered a judgement on the relative qualities of American and African:

"The native cottons have shown their superiority as regards productivity, but the imported cottons excel in quality." American plants had a "shorter growing period, smaller plant, bigger bolls, set close together on the stem, equal yield, easier to pick with better quality of cotton etc. In fact everything is in (their) favour now that we have established several varieties which have been thoroughly acclimatised."

In contrast to the agriculturists the administrators and the Agricultural Superintendent for West Africa tended to write off American cotton. MacGregor discounted it and Egerton supported him, while G.C. Dudgeon writing in 1907 to "Timber" Thompson, the Conservator of Forests for united Southern Nigeria, advised the selection of good types of African cotton:

"It has been repeatedly shown that certain native cottons ... have obtained a higher price than Middling American ... the experimental plantings by the B.C.G.A. have not met with success and the native plant seems to be the only one which many of the native cultivators are willing to grow."
This opinion was repeated by one of the greatest contemporary authorities, Sir George Watt, at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute: 162

"There could be no manner of doubt that in Nigeria they must take the West Coast plant and develop it. If they did that, they would make West Africa one of the greatest countries for cotton production in the world." 163

The American varieties most favoured were Georgia and Upland. By 1909 Georgia had been grown at Moor Plantation for four "generations" and was giving an encouraging return of 650.6 lbs per acre over 7.35 acres with a lint percentage of 33.27 (almost three to one pound of lint). Work with African cottons mainly concerned two peruvianum varieties - Agege (a hybrid of American Peterkin and an African cotton) and Meko. 164

1910 - when Southern Nigeria set up its own Department of Agriculture marked the beginning of a new era. The Association now withdrew from experimental work, but the new Department simply stepped into the Association's old shoes when it decided to make its head-quarters at Moor Plantation (later known as Moor Park). The new Department also took over the botanical stations at Ebute Metta, Calabar, as well as part of Onitsha, and the model farm at Agege. Oloke Meji was taken over by the Forestry Department. 165 Another change, which was soon to follow, brought to an end in 1911 the position of Superintendent of Agriculture for West Africa, made at the insistence of the Association. 166 In return half-yearly reports were now sent to Manchester.

After the Department of Agriculture took over, the experimental work at Moor Plantation continued. Ishan cotton, which had been brought from Central Province and "multiplied" on a small scale by the Department, was distributed to farmers in the Ibadan area who were promised 1 1/2d. per pound for it - 1/8d. more than that paid for ordinary cotton in the locality. 167 In 1912 Johnson reported that Ishan had shown itself better in yield, lint percentage and value than Meko, producing 550.5 lbs of seed cotton per acre. 168 Meanwhile the work with the American varieties continued and after five years the results confirmed the previous results of the Association - that the most promising was Georgia - which gave an average lint production per acre of 125.8 lbs and Upland with 119.9 lbs, followed by Ishan with 112.2 lbs. An American type which was tried without much success was Allen. 169

The verdict in favour of the American plants was reinforced by the
discovery that African plants were more susceptible to leaf-curl disease. This led Johnson to conclude: "... it is probable that it will eventually prove more advantageous to encourage the general cultivation of American cotton." Soon after this the war of 1914-18 broke out and inevitably the staff of the Agricultural Department was depleted - at first to take part in the campaign against the German Kameruns and then to undertake agricultural work there. Despite these very great difficulties, the time had come to make a decision on "the most approved cotton variety". In 1915 all the available seeds of Georgia and Upland were planted so as to have enough seeds of the better plant the following year to distribute to local farmers. By a narrow margin Georgia was chosen with a lint yield of 135.4 lbs per acre.

The choice of an improved cotton was an important part of the Association's policy to encourage farmers to grow cotton rather than other crops - 1/2d more was paid per pound for Georgia and similar quality cotton in 1915 than for local varieties. The Association's policy of paying a higher price for more valuable kinds was to be followed in later years in both South and North Nigeria. From the end of the agreement with the Colonial Office in April 1907 to pay 1d. per pound for seed cotton, the Association could make its own arrangements about price. Soon after its agreement with the merchants came into force from February 1908, cotton prices generally began to rise - spot Middling American rose to 7.8½d. at Liverpool in 1910-11. Consequently prices for seed cotton in Nigeria were raised - from June 1911 1 1/8d. was being paid at the three main ginneries and from the merchants at all railway stations to Jebba. There was a general rise in all crop prices in which cotton had to have its share if it was to survive as an export crop. The percentage of cotton bought by the merchants in Southern Nigeria showed a steady increase - it amounted to 97% of the total in 1913.

These favourable changes were reflected in the exports. 1909 had produced 12,583 bales (of 400 Lbs) while the next two years were disappointing. In 1912 exports amounted to 10,932 bales and in 1914 to 14,124. The Director of Agriculture gave the main credit to the increase in price.

At the same time as this experimental achievement with Georgia had been reached, disillusionment began to envelop the area which had been the Association's original goal and inspiration in Nigeria. In 1912 a separate Department of Agriculture was set up in Northern Nigeria, and the opportunity to prove the North's
agricultural capabilities came in the same year when the railroads from Kano to Lagos and to Baro were completed. The Baro Line's value was still subject to dredging on the Niger.

The Association had pressed for a new type of cotton in Northern Nigeria where the aims of the Department of Agriculture were not clearly in line with those of the South. The Director, Northern Provinces, was P.H. Lamb, who had been Director of Agriculture in Uganda, where "Allen" - a long-stapled form of Upland - had been developed, and which he favoured in Northern Nigeria, although in some of the experimental work he carried out Georgia seemed to do better than Allen. However, the Association agreed to offer 1/2d. per lb. more for Allen than the local cotton - much as it was doing with Georgia in the South. Allen was stated to produce three times the output of the ordinary varieties.

In 1913 the new ginnery at Zaria was completed - it could handle 15,000 bales a year - but the North exported only 1,957 bales that year. At last, however, the long looked for Eldorado of West African cotton was about to come into production. And yet in one sentence of his half-yearly report at the end of 1913, Lamb virtually destroyed the hopes surrounding it: "The growing season of 1912, however, no less than that of 1913, demonstrates clearly that in the Northern Provinces, where cereals must always be the first consideration, cotton is destined to be not only a subsidiary crop, but a precarious one at that."

For years to come this marked the end of the pipe-dream of 24 million acres of cotton-growing country of the Association's early days! And apart from cereals, yet another crop now entered the lists in part-competition - groundnuts. In 1913 prices of £5-7 per ton were being paid for groundnuts and Northern Nigerian exports made a spectacular jump from 2,518 tons in 1912 to 19,228 tons in 1913. The growing of cotton around Kano was affected and the African cotton market was supplied from Zaria, prices in the local market rising to 2d. a lb., while the Association's price on the Northern Railway was 7/8d., which it increased to 1d. during the following year, to which was added the extra 1/2d., which it had agreed to pay for Allen.

The increasing likelihood of disappointment with the wilder hopes in Northern Nigeria was balanced by the steadily growing returns from Uganda and the more soundly based promise of the Sudan.
Southern Nigeria had already shown that it could grow other crops—not only cocoa and kola nuts—but food crops like yams and maize which fetched good prices in the local markets, and, in the case of maize, could also be profitably exported. In the Sudan there was promise of a vast development where cotton could be grown as a sole crop by rotation and in Uganda labour was much cheaper and the conditions quite as good as in Southern Nigeria but not so well suited to other crops. The Association's investment in ginneries in Southern Nigeria was beginning to look disproportionate in relation to bales produced for export, and the great hopes held out for the North were having to be scaled down. Investment elsewhere might well produce better returns.

2. In 1899, the Botanical Department being added in 1905. See C.O. Confidential Print 635 No. 122 (Lagos 24323) Sept. 11th, 1899, R.G. Kew to C.O., and Bluebook 1905, p. 72.


4. See Lagos Gazette, March 1st, 1902, No. 11, p. 163.

5. Governor of Lagos 1899-1904.

6. Average prices of lint imported into the United Kingdom were 3.6d. in 1898; 4.09d. in 1899, and 5.59d. in 1900. Annual Statements of Trade passim.


8. Sir William Thistleton-Dyer was writing of the misuse of the Station to grow vegetables and flowers to decorate Government House. See C.O. Confidential Print 635, No. 188.


11. The Forestry (and Agricultural) Departments of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were amalgamated in June 1905. Lagos Annual Report 1905, p. 23 prior to the amalgamation of the two administrations from May, 1906. A separate Agricultural Department for united Southern Nigeria was not set up until 1910.

12. On July 11th at Manchester and July 31st at Liverpool.

13. C.O. 117/16/311/93 July 31st 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

14. Cd. 1665 1909 Report of the Royal Commission on Shipping Rings, Minutes of Evidence Vol. IV, p. 37. The subsequent rate was 0.27d. per pound of lint from Lagos to Liverpool, apart from primeage. The rate from New York to Liverpool for one pound was about 1/8d. or about half (in 1906). See K. Dike Nworbah, The West African Operations of the British Cotton Growing Association, loc. cit.


16. C.O. 117/265/17271, April 16th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

17. The Association until the death of Sir Alfred Jones in 1909 was fairly committed to West Africa. A year before R.L. Antrobus wrote; (The Association)
"is now run chiefly by persons interested in West Africa." C.O. 520/66/37743
Sept. 26th, 1908, Egerton to C.O. Minute of Nov. 3rd, 1908.

18. C.O. 14/7/16h/31h, July 31st, 1902, MacGregor to C.O. MacGregor also
visited Egypt during 1902 partly to enquire into malaria and partly to find
out more about the country's great cotton industry. His findings were duly


20. Sierra Leone, Lagos, and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.

21. See above, Chapter 5, p. 88.

22. See J.B. Webster, The African Churches among the Yoruba 1888-1922,
Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 113; and S.S. Berry, Christianity and the
Rise of Cocoa Growing in Ibadan and Ondo, Journal of the Historical Society
changed from Venn's policy of African self-supporting churches to one of
European leadership, and this created a very strong reaction in favour of
African national churches led by Bishop James Johnson in particular.
Even old Bishop Crowther gave his approval to the independence of the Anglican
churches in the Niger Delta.

23. C.O. Confidential Print 745, No. 7 (42897) Nov. 13th, 1902, C.O. to
B.C.G.A.

24. A string then equalled about 1/6d. so the price was under 1/2d. per lb.
See West African Mail, June 26th, 1903, p. 368. The Civil Service List of
Southern Nigeria for 1907, p. 18, makes one string equal 1/75d.

"It is noteworthy that the Christians are largely farmers, and the most pro-
gressive of the farming class."

26. The average price of Uplands Middling from all countries landed at
Liverpool in 1902 was 4.8d. per lb. Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1903, pp.
306-311.

27. Lagos cotton contained only 27% lint in one pound of seed cotton,

28. C.O. Confidential Print 745, No. 6 (42897) Oct. 15th, 1902, B.C.G.A. to C.O.


30. C.O. 520/17/51623, Dec. 13th, 1902, A.A. Paton Senior to C.O.


32. C.O. 520/22/138, Jan. 1st, 1903, B.C.G.A. to C.O. (Prince) and C.O.
267/171/2106 B.C.G.A. to C.O., January 11th, 1903 (Shelby Neely).

33. C.O. Confidential Print 745 No. 7 (42897), Nov. 13th, 1902, C.O. to B.C.G.A.

34. B.C.G.A. Minute Book 1903, Finance and Correspondence Committee, March 31st.

35. And thus British subjects.

37. C.O. 147/165/8215, March 6th, 1903, and 147/168/10234, March 16th, 1903, both Paton to C.O.; and 147/168/3339 March 10th, 1903, B.C.G.A. to C.O. Hoffman's salary was comparable with that of African chief clerks in the government service which ranged from £20 to £300. According to I.F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, p.56, this represented "solid comfort and dignity" and was higher than several junior grades for European officers. In 1907 Assistant District Officers began at £300 rising to £400 Civil Service List of Southern Nigeria, London 1907, pp.180-190. As late as 1911 only seniors were allowed to bring out their wives.

38. C.O. 147/165/4654 March 13th 1903, and 147/165/17271 April 16th 1903, both MacGregor to C.O. In Egypt some 35 lbs of seed were sown for each feddan. In the United States 15-30 lbs were usual. Lugard in the North of Nigeria thought 2 to 3 lbs enough. See Cotton in Northern Nigeria (based on a report by Lugard) in Bulletin of the Imperial Institute, Vol.3, 1905, pp.49-55.

39. C.O. 147/165/17271 April 16th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

40. C.O. 147/167/45508 Nov. 30th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

41. C.O. 147/170/16510 April 13th, 1904, Moseley to C.O.

42. Lagos Gazette April 12th, 1905, Report by A.W. Butterworth.

43. C.O. 147/170/13652, March 29th, 1904, Moseley to C.O. Enclosure.

44. Civil Service List of Southern Nigeria 1907, p.30.


47. Lagos Annual Report 1907, p.3.

48. C.O. 147/167/45508, Nov. 30th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.


50. C.O. 147/165/14597 March 27th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.

51. West African Mail, Sept. 29th, 1905, p.637.

52. Ibid, Nov. 24th, 1905, p.824.

53. By 1903 the German firms of G.L. Gaiser and Witt & Busch were established at Ibadan, as well as Paterson Zochonis, John Holt and Lagos Stores. C.O. 147/166/27998 July 7th 1903, MacGregor to C.O.
54. Sir Charles Orr, *The Making of Northern Nigeria*, London 1911, p. 182. This was a toll which Manchester could scarcely be expected to regard in the same light as the Yoruba tolls, although it was just as much an interference with free trade. Its main object was to gain revenue from a class which could afford to pay - the traders. But the opportunity was apparently taken to favour British piece-goods against those manufactured locally - in 1906 Lugard "abolished tolls on imported goods of British origin to enable them to compete with local cloth still paying caravan tolls." Marion Johnson, *Cotton Imperialism in West Africa*, *African Affairs*, April 1974, Vol. 73, pp. 178-187. When Lugard was transferred in 1907, his immediate successor, Acting High Commissioner Wallace, ended the preference on British piece-goods as he feared the ruin of the local cloth industry. For this reference see G. Haworth, *Lancashire and West African Cotton*, Thesis submitted in part requirement for the B.A. Honours Degree at University of Manchester, 1975, pp. 82-83.


56. C.O. 147/166/30817, July 28th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O.


58. C.O. 147/168/21453, June 29th, 1903, African Trade Section, Liverpool Chamber of Commerce to C.O. Enclosure.

59. C.O. 147/168/26596, July 16th 1903, Jones to C.O.

60. It reported in 1909.


67. C.O. 147/168/31491 July 31st, 1902, MacGregor to C.O.


69. Ibid, January 5th, 1904, p. 3; and Ibid, May 17th 1905, *Agricultural Supplement* No. 2 p. 1. A Branch was formed at Oyo in 1905 and later elsewhere.
70. C.O. 147/162/4629 Oct. 20th, 1902, Moseley to C.O.


74. C.O. 147/173/43025, Dec. 20th, 1904, B.C.G.A. to C.O.


76. West African Mail, June 12th, 1903, p.302.

77. C.O. 147/173/35913, Oct. 15th, 1904, B.C.G.A. to C.O.

78. C.O. 147/169/1308 Jan. 11th, 1905, MacGregor to C.O.

79. C.O. 147/173/2117, Jan. 19th, 1904, B.C.G.A. to C.O.


82. C.O. 147/167/45508, Nov. 30th, 1903, MacGregor to C.O. Enclosure.


84. C.O. 147/175/21987, May 31st, 1905, Egerton to C.O., Confidential. At this stage the railway extension beyond Ibadan was not yet open.

85. See above, Chapter 7, p.139.

86. Lagos Gazette, March 8th, 1905, p.188.

87. Lagos Gazette, May 14th, 1904, pp.318-319. The figure of 86.4 lbs seed cotton to the acre is calculated at 3 3/5 lbs seed cotton to one lb. lint, a proportion used by the B.C.G.A.


90. C.O. Confidential Print 745, No.25 (4868) March 8th, 1904, C.O. to B.C.G.A.


92. This was the name until 1910 for the whole of French Equatorial Africa.

94. P.N. Davies, The Trade Makers, p.142.

95. West African Mail, Jan. 1st, 1904, p.1017.

96. Casement was executed during the first World War for spying when he worked actively for Irish independence.

97. J.A. Hutton’s father, J.F. Hutton, had held the same post in Manchester but died in 1890 long before the Congo regime was brought into question.


99. Later Lord Leverhulme and founder of the great combine of Unilever Limited which included the United Africa Company.


102. Morel Papers F 9 Miscellaneous, April 22nd 1905, Johnson to Morel.

103. Lagos Gazette March 18th, 1905, p.188.

104. Morel Papers, April 22nd, 1905, Johnson to Morel.

105. C.O. 147/173/7949, March 4th, 1904, Elgee to C.O.


107. Lagos Bluebook, 1911, F2.


110. B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1905, p.33. Here it was planned to clear 50,000 acres, but the area was virtually uninhabited, a clear warning sign. See J.A. Hutton, The Work of the British Cotton Growing Association, 1904, p.42.

111. C.O. 267/482/1208, Jan. 12th 1905, B.C.G.A. to C.O.

112. W.H. Himbury, Diary of Two Voyages 1904 and 1905, p.131.

113. C.O. 267/482/1208, Jan. 12th, 1905, B.C.G.A. to C.O.

114. Idem Minute of February 11th, 1905.

115. C.O. 147/173/29146, June 8th, 1905, Ross to C.O.

116. One manager, Martin, whose appointment was said by Ross to cause "amusement to those who know him" was also said to have built a private race-track and polo ground. He was duly dismissed by Himbury on his second visit.
(No content provided)
137. C.O. 520/73/1529 Jan. 10th, 1906, B.C.G.A. to C.O.
139. C.O. 520/61/11149 May 25th, 1908, Egerton to C.O.
140. C.O. 520/67/15318, Nov. 21st, 1908, Egerton to C.O. Confidential.
141. C.O. 520/73/16635 Dec. 18th, 1908, B.C.G.A. to C.O.
142. C.O. 520/110/10851 April 3rd, 1911, B.C.G.A. to C.O.
143. Ibid, Minute of April 12th, 1911, by C.T. Davis.
144. At Nkissi, Alpacka, Abutshi and in "the Creek" (the Anambra River).
147. See Southern Nigeria Gazette June 30th 1904, pp.182-183, and B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1904, p.10. The Association had taken the precaution of consulting the Imperial Institute beforehand, and W.G. Freeman B.Sc., a member of the staff, had reported favourably.
148. A naked black-seeded type close to gm. vitifolium, a sub-variety of brasiliense.
149. The ginnery was reported to have moved to Illushi in 1907 (B.C.G.A. Annual Report, 1907, p.25), and closed in 1915. (B.C.G.A. Annual Report 1915, p.27).
151. C.O. 520/40/23959, July 2nd, 1906, B.C.G.A. to C.O. Later experiments showed that cotton grown through yams was retarded, but that it almost caught up with sole-grown cotton after the yams had stopped growth. See C.B. Taylor, R.H.G. Smith & C.J. Lewis, The Ishan Cotton Plant under Mixed Cultivation, Bulletin of the Agricultural Dept., Nigeria, 1929, pp. 142-158.
154. Experimental Work in West Africa No. 1, B.C.G.A. No.19, p.36 et seq.
155. Ibid., p.9.
161. C.O. 520/17/25814 June 28th, 1907, Thorburn to C.O. Enclosure.
172. Idem.
173. Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1958, pp.306-311. It fell to just over 6d. the following year.
174. C.O. 520/110/17060 May 21th, 1911, B.C.G.A. to C.O.

183. C.O. Confidential Print 1018 No. 64 (L/161) October 17th, 1914, Lugard to C.O. Enclosure - Report by Director of Agriculture on Cotton Cultivation to June 30th 1914.


185. Wages in Uganda were said to be 2 1/2d. per day and yields of 800 lbs of seed cotton common. Board of Trade 55/27 Empire Cotton Growing Committee Pt.5, No.121, "Memorandum of the Proposed Development of Cotton Growing in Nigeria" by Sir Hesketh Bell dated May 16th, 1919.
CHAPTER 9

ALLIANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT

The loss of the Association's grant-in-aid in 1917 marked the end of a chapter in attempts to increase and expand sources of cotton production. As far as experimental work was concerned, it marked the end of subsidised ginneries, and without them it was scarcely possible to open up new districts. The Association's own resources had about reached their limit. Of its authorized capital of £500,000, £460,000 had been paid by 1916. The whole story of its efforts to raise capital had shown the difficulties of the undertaking, which had been circumvented for a certain period by the formation of subsidiary or allied companies that were able to pay a dividend. By 1916 even this recourse had come to an end in West Africa, when the capital of the British Cotton Ginning Company was repaid to its shareholders and the ginneries assigned as security for the Company's capital handed back to the Association.

The question thus arose of what action was to be taken for the future, which meant in practice from the time the war ended. The war itself had naturally reduced the activities of the Association "in the field", and a large proportion of its staff had taken part in the colonial campaigns.

The cotton spinners of the time assumed that the needs of the industry would continue to be at least what they were before the war began in 1914. In fact the British industry was beginning to enter a period of decline leading to a permanent reduction of its position, at least in the overall export field. During the war, however, it must have seemed that the supply position relating to the United States was becoming steadily more difficult. The war increased the range of goods needing cotton - munitions, tires, aeroplane fabrics and so on - and it was likely that the production of many of these would continue when the fighting ended. Thus the demand for cotton for America's own consumption continued to increase and began to reach proportions that caused even the easy-going to take notice. During the years 1910-1915 the United States had been using about 37% of her own crop; this proportion increased to 58% in 1917-1918, after America had herself entered the war in 1917. An additional anxiety was the activity of the Mexican boll-weevil, which meant that increased
acreage led to little or no increase in production. Apart from threats to American supply, Europe was taking more and more of the world output. During the ten years before 1914 Europe's cotton consumption had increased by 34% and Britain's by 18%. When the war ended prices rose to "famine" levels, and were said to be in excess of anything which had been reached since the cotton famine of the 1860's. During 1919-1920 there was a further rise in the average price of Upland Middling (from all countries to Britain) to 26.32d. This was the all-important medium grade which was by far the largest amount which Britain consumed, and of which she had in her own control only 2.5% of the total produced. The prophets of doom seemed to be justified. There was, however, one reaction which favoured Imperial cotton-growing schemes. During the war men from Canada and the other "Dominions", from India and Africa, had served at the "front" and feelings of unity prevailed. In addition, Lancashire with its highly concentrated population remained an important area in deciding national elections.

The British Cotton Growing Association were naturally particularly aware of the possible dangers from a forthcoming shortage of supply and at the end of 1916 a meeting of the Association and representatives of the "Lancashire Cotton Trade" took place which demanded the immediate attention of the government to the seriousness of the position. Another step continued the development which had already been begun by the meetings between the Association and civil servants of the Colonial Office, although it took place in another department of state, the Board of Trade, where a Textile Committee was appointed. This Committee in its turn advised the appointment of another Committee which would undertake a comprehensive examination of outstanding problems of cotton development in the Empire with emphasis on scientific investigation, transport, and the development of an organisation capable of coordinating the results of the work of the different branches. There was thus established in 1917 by Sir Auckland Geddes, President of the Board of Trade, the Empire Cotton Growing Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Henry Birchenough. The Committee's secretary was J.A. Todd, who was to be the author of several well-known books on cotton.

The membership of the Committee was widely based; the Foreign, India and
Colonial Offices were represented, as were the governments of India, South Africa and Australia - the latter's representation being a recognition of efforts made at cotton-growing in Queensland. J.A. Hutton and W.H. Himbury attended for the British Cotton Growing Association. The Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Association Ltd. and operatives' associations were also represented. A large number of experienced witnesses were examined by the Committee including W.H. Johnson, G.C. Dudgeon, Sir Frederick Lugard, Sir Francis Watts, then Imperial Commissioner of Agriculture for the West Indies, Sir Henry Hesketh Bell, then Governor of Mauritius and previously of Uganda and Northern Nigeria, and P.H. lamb, Director of Agriculture for Northern Nigeria.

Of all the witnesses Hutton was one of the most influential, and the Association complimented him on his evidence at the Committee's hearing. A member of the Association's Council and of the Committee "was of the opinion that the work of the Committee would depend very largely on Mr. Hutton's evidence." In a sense the hearings provided the climax to Hutton's career in the world of cotton. During them he gave up his more active work with the Association, resigning from the chairmanship of the Council early in 1918, although he continued to be a member and occasionally took the chair at later meetings.

The Empire Cotton Growing Committee produced its final report in 1920. It surveyed the general position of Britain's supply and confirmed that the dangers foreseen by the British Cotton Growing Association were drawing closer than ever before, especially in "the great medium grade" of American type cotton to which West African cotton in general belonged. A further need for getting away from American supply after the war was the immense debt which Britain owed to America for war-time assistance. Churchill, Colonial Secretary from 1921-1922, put this forward as a reason for reducing dependence on the American crop.

In its report the Empire Cotton Growing Committee laid its main emphasis on three major needs if more cotton of satisfactory quality was to be grown in the Empire. The greatest need was an increase in the staff of colonial Agricultural Departments and improvement of remuneration. It was necessary that the approach to cotton growing should be on a proper scientific basis. The initiative which the manufacturers and operatives had already taken in setting
up the British Cotton Industry Research Association with headquarters at the Shirley Institute, Manchester, was welcomed, and the need of a central institute for government research, and for more cotton scientists, made clear. The other main need emphasised was improved transport in the colonial areas, including harbour improvements as well as better transport by land, both by rail and other means. The British Cotton Growing Association was assigned the role - which it was already carrying out - of ginning and marketing agency, as well as its earlier role of setting up pioneer ginneries in developing areas. In deciding how these arrangements should be financed the Committee suggested that a levy should be made on every bale of cotton bought by British spinners. The days of private support were over.

In its survey of the areas to which most attention could be given the Committee concentrated on those where cotton growing was mainly by irrigation. Experience had shown that cotton grown by these means was more reliable than rain-grown cotton, and the Egyptian crop was undergoing a considerable reduction as a result of water-logging resulting from the construction of the first Aswan Dam and the Delta Barrage. A local variety of Bollworm, pink in colour, had invaded Egypt as its cousin was doing in the United States. Despite these problems the Committee hoped for 900,000 more bales over the pre-war total of 1,875,000. But Egyptian cotton mostly did not belong to the important 'Grade 4' of American type, being mostly Sakel.

Among other areas where cotton was grown by irrigation was the Sudan, and the Committee remarked: "The Gezira is one of the most promising districts for development that we have had to consider." As a result the Gezira Scheme was recommended and a new £6 million loan (to replace the £3 million loan authorised but not distributed before the war) arranged. Similarly in India the schemes depending on the Sukkur (Lloyd) Barrage, and another in the Sutlej Valley of the Punjab, were approved.

The report pointed out that the possibilities in these three areas - Egypt, the Sudan and India (including what is now Pakistan) - overshadowed shorter-term expectations of development in countries like Uganda and Nigeria where some 100,000 extra bales were hoped for. Within these limits, the Committee saw "reason for hope that great expansion may be possible for the growing of cotton in Nigeria." In Africa the great need and precondition was for improved transport, based on railway extensions, but confidence in
the possibilities of the motor vehicle began to grow with the widespread use in Africa of the lighter Ford models, although they carried a limited load. The Committee, therefore, suggested that in addition to the extension and full employment of railways, other means of transport should be tried.26

To carry out the intended program a new organisation was set up, the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, which came into existence by Royal Charter on November 1, 1921.27 Both its "philanthropic" and Imperial basis resembled that of the Association, as it was laid down in the Charter that no dividends were to be paid and that it must operate only within the Empire.28 Otherwise both the Corporation's structure and its financing reflected the view that it should have a higher status than the Association. Supervisory powers were given to a Board of Trustees under the presidency of the President of the Board of Trade, which included the Secretaries of State concerned with foreign and Imperial questions - the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies. Under the Board's immediate supervision was the Administrative Council with its own president and "one or more Vice-presidents". This president was none other than Lord Derby, who retained his presidency of the Association. Thus this ubiquitous office-holder symbolised by his presence the connection with the Association and a sense of continuity of its previous policies. Among the Council's Vice-Presidents were Lord Lugard and J.A. Hutton.29 There were some eighty members of the Council in all, including representatives of the Foreign, India and Colonial Offices, of Australia, South Africa and India itself; both sides of the industry, interested chambers of commerce, the B.C.G.A. and the University of Manchester.

Under this largely formal Council, and drawn from its members, was the Executive Council whose members were not to exceed twenty-one. Its first chairman was J.W. McConnell, but he died in 1922, and was succeeded by R.H. Jackson. The permanent staff was headed by the Director, the first being Sir James Currie.30

The Corporation was financed on a scale which had been beyond the wildest dreams of the Association. It was given a capital grant of a nominal one million pounds, amounting to £978,715 after deductions. The money came from control of sales of Egyptian cotton during the war and represented one quarter of the total proceeds. In addition a levy, which became law in 1923 by the first of several Cotton Industry Acts, was imposed on all spinners at
the rate of 6d. a bale. This legal obligation replaced a temporary arrangement of voluntary contributions which preceded it. The levy was reduced by successive Acts until it reached only 1d. in 1933.31

The Corporation gave priority to the training of its cotton-growing staff, who were designed to be real "experts". Studentships were offered for special studies in plant physiology and related problems in cotton, the first year being spent at a British university, usually Cambridge or London. For those who received a second year's training, advantage was taken of the Department of Imperial Agriculture for the West Indies, set up in 1898 by Joseph Chamberlain. The first Commissioner, or head of the Department, had been Sir Daniel Morris, previously Assistant Director at the Royal Gardens, Kew. It was chiefly owing to his role as a "presiding genius" there which had made a success of the Department.32 In order to accommodate the Corporation's second-year students, the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture was opened in Trinidad in 1922 as part of the Imperial Department and with the Commissioner as its first principal.33 The value of the training was demonstrated by the adoption of a similar scheme by the Colonial Office for instructing its own agricultural officers. The Corporation also established a Research Station in Trinidad in 1926, where genetics and other problems for the cotton plant were studied. The station was removed to Namulonge, Uganda, where a lease was obtained, in 1946.34

Among the staff of the E.C.G.C. was a small number of "Travelling Commissioners" whose role was to report at first-hand on the various scenes of operation. They were men of some distinction with previous experience of work overseas. While the finances and organisation of the Corporation were being decided, an opportunity occurred of obtaining preliminary information from the growing areas. Both the B.C.G.A.'s own conclusions and the evidence given before the Empire Cotton Growing Committee by P.H. Lamb, Director of Agriculture for Northern Nigeria, had agreed that cotton output in Northern Nigeria would not be substantially increased without improvements in transport. As a result the Committee decided to send a Travelling Commissioner to Nigeria "to make a thorough investigation into the question of transport."35 Sir Hector Duff, with previous experience in Nyasaland (Malawi), was selected36 and his visit took place during the earlier half of 1921.
In his report Sir Hector emphasised the necessity for an increase of staff and suggested that twelve cotton specialists be added to the two agricultural departments with ten as an "irreducible minimum". He hoped that the cotton men would work under their own Superintendent, while the overall direction of the cotton work in all Nigeria would be under a specialist "who must be first-rate". Partly on grounds of economy he also underlined the importance of an adequate corps of African assistants. Most of Duff's recommendations regarding transport concerned the North, which would also be benefited by the building of the Eastern Line from Port Harcourt which finally joined the Lagos line at Kaduna in 1926.

Railway transport alone was, of course, no complete answer, and the old problem of "feeder" roads and carriage had to be met. In 1927 the average distance between railways in Africa was said to be three hundred miles and it was estimated that fifty miles on either side could be developed. Everything depended on costs of transport if cotton was to benefit. At the time of Duff's visit, this was only one shilling per ton mile by motor transport, a charge which cotton could bear, but charges were soon expected to go up to 1s.6d. Because of these factors of cost, the British Cotton Growing Association were still hankering after light railways and calling for experimental work. But their attitude changed in due course. The motoring age had arrived and costs of gasoline (petrol) were going down - an important matter in Nigeria when fuel was being imported. In 1924 an Imperial gallon was valued on import approximately 1s.6d.; by 1934 this had been reduced to 8d. The previous year road carriage costs in Nigeria per ton mile had been given as 4 1/2d. for fifteen miles, 3 1/2d. for thirty, and only 3d. for over forty miles. Long before this the Association was converted; in 1924 the local manager was authorised to buy two motor trucks for use in the South, and in 1927 motor transport was stated to have reduced the costs of cotton seed distribution there by nearly half.

The importance of this aspect of cotton export was demonstrated by the appointment of a sub-committee of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation to investigate new methods of overcoming "feeder-road" problems. Experiments of an inconclusive nature were carried out with half-track vehicles. In 1928 the British Government took over the work with the appointment of the Overseas Mechanical Transport Committee.
An enlarged agricultural department was an essential part of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation's program and was put into effect as soon as trained men began to come forward. It was realised that agriculture had to be looked on as a unified whole, and that export crops could not be grown in isolation. With this aim in view a highly efficient Department was built up during the 1920's under a new and well qualified Director, O.T. Faulkner, who took charge when the two former departments for the south and north were amalgamated on June 30th, 1921. The staff reached a total of eighty Europeans in 1931-32, and a research section was set up including entomologists, chemists, botanists and a senior mycologist. A growing number of Africans were also being trained - in accordance with Sir Hector Duff's recommendation - for the junior grades of the Department by courses at Moor Plantation, later combined with the curriculum of Yaba Higher College, Lagos. In addition the Native Authorities employed many Africans in agricultural work who helped to carry out the Department's policy in the field: in 1921 the Northern Provinces already had about eighty cotton inspectors, mostly paid by the Native Authorities. But all this good progress had to be curtailed after a few years owing to world economic conditions which led to a disastrous fall in the prices of primary exports. The "Depression" was a tragedy, as it occurred just when recovery had been achieved from the first World War, and was followed by the second, just when the effects of the Depression were being overcome.

The Department's general policy continued to be that of encouraging the African farmer. At one stage the Empire Cotton Growing Committee had considered the possibility of introducing plantations in Nigeria, but on irrigated land, and the arrangements would have followed the general plan carried out in the Sudan where profits were shared among the farmers, the government and the company where it existed. These schemes were different in kind from plantations worked by hired labour. The whole question of the use of hired labour was brought forward shortly after the war largely as a result of the increased number of settlers, including many former soldiers, in Rhodesia, Kenya and elsewhere. During 1920 the Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, wrote letters of enquiry concerning cotton plantations to the Governors of Nigeria (Sir Hugh Clifford) and Uganda. Nigeria was already being subjected to pressure for land for palm plantations by Lord Leverhulme,
Chairman of the great British soap-manufacturing firm of Lever Brothers which took over control of the Niger Company in 1920. Clifford thereupon expressed himself on the whole question both in principle and in practice:

"I take it as the fundamental doctrine to which every practical imperialist today subscribes, is that our presence in these tropical lands finds its one and only justification in the fact that we are able by our possession and administration of them to confer upon their indigenous populations benefits which, unaided, they would be powerless to procure for themselves."

If this were right, then it followed that development must be mainly through the local people. If export crops were developed by outsiders, they would receive the main benefits therefrom instead of the local inhabitants.

Questions of doctrine apart, Clifford summarised the classic arguments against the plantations policy from his own wide and varied experience in Malaysia, Trinidad and the Gold Coast. Plantations run by Europeans were the more costly method of production, and their rate of growth compared unfavourably with that of peasant production. Their labour requirements had to be met either by increased local taxation, imported workers or migrant labour. Both Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and the West Indies showed that imported labourers left plantations as soon as possible either to settle locally on their own land, or to return to their homeland with money saved to buy their land. In 1918 Nigeria had been faced with serious disturbances in Egbaland as a result of interference with the traditional method of administration there. Implicit in the arguments, therefore, was the fear of disaffection of the West African peoples to whom land had always been a sensitive subject.

Cotton growing for export in the Southern Provinces was now confined to the western section and to the northern parts of that, Duff remarking that "the only cotton region of conspicuous present importance in the south is the province of Oyo." Many of the areas where the soil was good enough were now given up to cocoa, and at least one commentator expressed downright pessimism as to cotton's future in the South. "... No large quantity of cotton can ever be expected of (the southern provinces)." But there were two factors which indicated the South could not be written off - the size of the local cotton industry which was said to be from two to three hundred thousand bales a year, and the greater average output per acre of cotton in the South over
that in the North.\textsuperscript{59}

The emphasis was on the individual farmer and of providing him with a better return from cotton. Thus the policy of improving the quality of the local cotton was continued. The British Cotton Growing Association gave a premium for Allen cotton in the North, and for Georgia, and later Improved Ishan, in the South over local varieties.\textsuperscript{60} This premium reflected both the higher sale value of the improved varieties and their higher lint percentage in the seed cotton.\textsuperscript{61}

As soon as the introduced cottons were being grown on a significant scale, arrangements had to be made for separating them from the other ordinary cottons so that buyers would be secured from fraud, and so that the seed would not be mixed – it was needed for extending the cultivation of the new varieties during the following season. So markets were established as the authorised centres for selling American and improved cotton to traders, merchants and the Association itself.\textsuperscript{62} While the markets were valuable for raising the standard of Nigerian cotton, they demanded a considerable increase of Agricultural Department staff. African "instructors" or inspectors who examined the cotton before purchase were posted at the markets and a number of Europeans also employed. The Assistant Director of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation stated that one Senior Superintendent and one Agricultural Superintendent were required for every eight markets.\textsuperscript{63}

As Nigerian cotton became better known and found its place on the international market, so did it become apparent that a division into American or Improved types, and African types, was insufficient. Sir Hector Duff in his report had recommended the introduction of a system of grading to discourage the farmers who brought in dirty cotton.\textsuperscript{64} Grading was thus introduced in the North for the 1922-23 season.\textsuperscript{65} In the South "voluntary" grading was begun during the same season, although there were as yet no markets there. When it was found that the procedures in the South were not working well, Oyo and Abeokuta Provinces were gazetted in 1924 as cotton export areas with central markets for grading.\textsuperscript{66} At the market a certificate was issued giving both the type of cotton and the grade it had been assigned. Two or three separate grades were made both for American or Improved cotton, and for the ordinary kinds. In the South during 1923-1924 there were three grades for ordinary, the price of the middle grade varying from 2 1/2d. to 1 1/2d., the
first grade being 1/4d. more and the third grade 1/2d. less. When Ishan was marketed, it was divided into three separate grades. The arrangement could have confused the farmer as, for example, second grade ordinary normally brought a higher price than than third grade Ishan. 67

The markets, when they were fully developed, consisted of two enclosures, one where the grading took place, and the other where buyer met seller. In some areas only the Association's representative might be present, and the procedure was a quiet and leisurely one. When there were more buyers, the scene was different:

"... As soon as sellers appear, many of the buyers and their touts encourage them with shouts and gestures to bring their cotton to their plots ... the noise of the buyers can be heard for a considerable distance." 68

The farmer was reported to like the system. 69 Even when he did not take his produce to the market himself, its existence, comparatively near to his own home area, must have given him a clearer idea of what the official price was, and a greater certainty of what he could reasonably demand himself. The grading system encouraged him to aim at a higher price, and thus to pick the cotton soon after the bolls burst, and to make more than one picking so that the cotton was clean when harvested. The farmer was also encouraged to get the profit himself and to avoid the middlemen. This was important in the South with the development of the cocoa crop, and where the middlemen concentrated on the cocoa until February and only then turned their attention to the cotton. Duff spoke up for the middlemen and called them energetic, cheerful people. 70 But they were addicted to making loans to the farmers at usurious rates, often 50% per year or more. 71

The inspection system was sound policy for the Agricultural Department, apart from the practical matter of improving the crop. It was work which helped it to create a common interest with the farmers and thus to gain their confidence for various "improvements" or experiments which the Department was anxious to make. Cotton inspection was to lead on to inspection of other crops of even greater immediate importance. In 1922 Faulkner held a meeting with the African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, at which the Section urged the transfer of palm and cocoa crop inspection from the Customs Department to the Department of Agriculture, 72 and in 1926 the
latter began to carry out this inspection, leading to an increase of staff to eighty and also to a valuable income: in 1935 of the Department's £100,000 income £40,000 to £15,000 came from inspection fees. Inspection had become more important because of competition which had begun to be felt in Nigeria's staple of palm products; the period between the wars saw a remarkable growth in quality palm production on plantations in Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies) and in Zaire (the Belgian Congo).

The introduction of markets and the large increase in the numbers of the Agricultural Department helped to bring about another change. The agreement with the merchants, by which they bought cotton for the Association at places it judged too expensive to keep an agent, had continued successfully since its introduction in 1907. The rise in cotton prices after 1918 made the merchants more demanding. They asked for a higher commission, 3/8d., for 1/8d., the right to decide whether their own agents or those of the Association should be assigned to any newly opened buying station (the Association did not normally buy at stations already occupied by the merchants, but might move in ahead of them in a promising area) and that no new firms be allowed to enter the agreement. The association would not accept this and the Agreement ended in 1923, the Association agreeing to gin for the merchants, but they would no longer buy seed cotton at their ginneries as they considered that this would reduce the price to the grower. Some merchants still continued to purchase for the Association on an individual basis for the usual commission. The grower did not immediately feel any sharp effect from this change, as prices for one pound of lint remained around 10d. and over until 1930 31. Unfortunately the 1930s saw a continued depression in cotton prices.

The Association did its best to encourage the farmer by not looking for any profit in the buying and selling of its own cotton, and thus give the grower as good a price as possible. Another way was to assist him to produce a more valuable crop. This part of the work had now been taken over by the Agricultural Department whose task it was to increase the yield of lint from every acre planted in cotton. This meant the continued search for a more valuable variety, either American or "Improved".

It was in this endeavour that the war led to a really serious setback. 1919 witnessed the staff quota in the Department at a very low ebb - in the Southern Provinces of five agricultural officers present "at or near the beginning of the year", four were on duty for less than five months, the
remaining officer being the Director, W.H. Johnson, who was himself to retire
towards the end of 1920 and was on leave for the whole of that year prior to
his final departure. In this situation it is not surprising that the con-
tinuity needed for experimental work was lacking, especially as much of the
development of Georgia had been "fathered" by Johnson himself. It had been
adopted as the most promising of the American varieties in the South, and as
an improvement on the indigenous kinds. In order to produce Georgia in suf-
ficient quantities to be grown commercially, the relatively isolated Meko
area near the Dahomey border, was treated as a seed farm for its multiplica-
tion. Unfortunately, as the result of wartime strains and shortages, the
seed became mixed with the local Meko variety, and the quality of the lint
sent to Britain as "Georgia" was reduced. The B.C.G.A. stated in 1921 that
during the previous year 14. extra had been paid for Georgia although the
quality had much deteriorated. The consequence was, as Hutton put it, that
"the whole of five years' work was thrown away". Georgia was abandoned at
the end of 1921. Meanwhile, in the North, under the guidance of the separate
Director of Agriculture, P.H. Lamb, Allen cotton had been successful. The
Association thus suggested that Allen should be tried in the South, as it
was proving difficult to sell the ordinary African cotton grown there.
This suggestion was carried out under the direction of the Assistant Director
for the Southern Provinces, A.H. Kirby, in 1921, when no less than 675 tons
of Allen seed were distributed in the northern part of Oyo Province, where
conditions approximated to those in the "Zaria Belt" where Allen had grown
successfully. Faulkner described this as "a very bold stroke indeed" and
remarked that Africans were under orders to plant it. The result was an
almost total failure - only twelve bales being harvested.

The climatic conditions in the South that year were said to be poor for
all types of cotton with too much rain, which would have been especially bad
for American cotton. But during the same season Allen had done well in
the North, and it seemed likely that it was unable to adapt easily to differ-
ent situations. Like most of the exotic cottons, Allen was more susceptible
to insect attack than the local varieties, and gave smaller yields when grown
as a "catch-crop" with yams and maize. Allen's roots were said to be com-
paratively shallow and to conflict with the yams.

The failure to introduce Allen underlined the seriousness of the deterio-
ration of Georgia, which had been developed over a period of years. Hopes of
a quick substitute had vanished and a fresh start had to be made. As the new Director put it: "... it has been decided that it is necessary to regard ourselves as starting de novo on the problem of finding a cotton for the Southern Provinces which will be suitable for export." Faulkner even remarked during a visit to Manchester during September, 1922, that it still remained to be seen whether Southern Nigeria was ever going to be of much use to Lancashire.

The failure of Allen caused renewed attention to be given to Ishan, an African variety which could be easily grown along with other crops. It had already been brought to Moor Plantation for trials before the war. When it was seen that imported American types were not succeeding, the Government's Senior Botanist, C.J. Lewis, was sent to Ishan District to collect fresh samples. Trials gave encouraging results. Several strains were isolated and the most promising - "A" and "B" - developed and jointly labelled "Improved Ishan". Spinning tests reported in 1926 gave both strains values roughly double per pound of lint over that of first grade Allen from Northern Nigeria, with ginning percentages of 30% and 31% against 26% and 27% of the local cotton.

These results showed Improved Ishan in too favourable a light - its real advantages lay in its suitability and toughness in local conditions in Southern Nigeria, where it was grown as an annual crop. These made it acceptable to the Yoruba farmer - both its ability to "mix" with other crops and its comparative resistance to the cotton stainer. But Ishan proved disappointing in that the spinning test results failed to be borne out in the actual market. The trade regarded it as rather rough and the fibre somewhat harsh. This was hardly consistent with the premium that was being paid for it over other African varieties - in 1927-28 of 1d. per pound on ordinary varieties in the South, which themselves were becoming unsaleable for export. The total cost of developing Ishan was put as high as £30,000. Farmers were charged 1/2d. per pound for the seeds, and readily took them up "showing that they are ready to avail themselves of any profitable innovation". But the market was slow to respond and the outlook for the British cotton industry was becoming less favourable. Soon the Association were insisting that the premium must be an "economic" one, and in 1928-29 it dropped to 1/2d. throughout the season. Faulkner made the best of it, saying that Ishan had been an undoubted success "on the agricultural side", but this was only the first half of
the equation. In 1930 at the beginning of the Depression the price of best-grade Ishan fell to 3/4d. - 5/8d. and only on two occasions during the 1930's did it rise above 1d. Curiously enough, part of Ishan's ills was due to similar conditions to those which had led to the downfall of Georgia. Meko had been the "multiplying" centre for Ishan, as it had been for Georgia during the first World War. But during the Depression with the cut-back in revenue and reduction in staff, there was a repetition of the failure to maintain seed purity at the multiplying centre. Despite these discouragements, after an initial fall in the early 1930's, exports of Improved Ishan slowly climbed back to some 6,000 bales - the level of 1929 - in 1937 and 1938.

Fortunately the Depression had a general effect on all export crops, and at the lower level cotton continued to hold its own, especially in the areas beyond the palm belt. In the eyes of the Agricultural Department it provided a desirable diversification among export crops whose value depended on forces outside its control.

Cotton growing over the whole of Nigeria extended throughout the 1930's - exports from both North and South were just under 60,000 (400 lb) bales in 1935-36. In more recent years the early hopes of Manchester have received some measure of fulfilment, for in 1970 Nigeria - with the exception of Egypt and the Sudan - was the largest cotton-producing country in Africa, some 156,000 bales being exported. Practically all this, however, had come from the North, and the contribution of the South had been insignificant.

Although the Empire Cotton Growing Committee in its review placed most importance on Egypt, the Sudan and India as potential sources of increased cotton supply, West Africa - which now meant Nigeria - occupied a position of importance because it produced the much needed Grade 4 American Upland type of cotton at a time when American supplies were more endangered than ever before. There were, in addition, vast areas of North Eastern and North-Western Nigeria whose potential was still to be explored. Meanwhile the relative importance of the South had been much reduced - cocoa had made rapid strides in the Ibadan clay-loam areas - and cotton growing for export was mainly confined to Oyo and Abeokuta Provinces. Much more emphasis was placed between the Wars on looking at the problems from the African farmer's point of view and seeing the farming situation as a whole. There were thus hopes...
that a cotton could be produced for export in significant quantities provided its cultivation fitted in with the local methods. The main hope for increasing the quantity available for export in the South probably lay in the largely unspoken expectation that British piece-goods would replace locally woven articles, and release more of the home-grown cotton for the export market. The emphasis on research and the extension of the local Agricultural Departments indicated that the underlying problems of increasing production through improved methods of cultivation and better quality crops still remained to be solved. Ishan, while an improvement on other locally grown cottons in the South, was already outclassed by improved varieties in other areas and countries and the question arose whether any cotton of American type, of sufficient quality to be acceptable to Lancashire in a more competitive period than the early years of the century, could be grown by the traditional system of "mixed cropping" in Southern Nigeria.
CHAPTER 9. FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid. p. 13.


6. Owing to the weevil output fell markedly during the 1920-21 and 1921-22 seasons, although there was a recovery afterwards. See W.H. Johnson, Cotton and its Production, London, 1926, p. 32.


9. Cmd. 523, 1920, p. 70, Appendix 9, Table A.


11. Idem.


15. Represented by J.W. McConnell (1885-1922), Director Williams Deacon's Bank Ltd. and chairman of the Fine Cotton Spinners and Doubler's Association; and by R.H. (Sir Richard) Jackson (1869-1944), Knighted 1932, Chairman of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation and Executive member of the British Cotton Growing Association.


18. Ibid, Feb. 5th, 1918.

20. India had set up her own Cotton Committee in 1917 - see Cmd. 523, 1920, p.5.


22. "Sakellarides" in full.


25. Ibid, p.49.


30. Currie, Sir James (1868-1937) Knighted 1920. Principal of Gordon College, Khartoum, and Director of Education in the Sudan 1900-1914; training munition workers 1916-1918; Director of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation 1922-37; Chairman of Governors of Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture.


32. Its executive work was limited to Barbados, the Windward and Leeward Islands. G.B. Masefield, A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service, Oxford University Press, 1972, p.32.

33. From 1921-1950 92 studentships were awarded by the Corporation and 55 men spent a year at the College. Empire Cotton Growing Corporation 1921 to 1950, p.4.

34. Ibid, p.6.


38. Duff suggested a line from Jebba on the Niger to serve Kontagora and Southern Sokoto, but this was rejected as it would serve only a thinly-populated area, although it would probably have done much for cotton. See Cmd. 2741, 1926, Report by the Hon. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore M.P. (Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies) on his Visit to West Africa during the Year
The other route suggested by Duff was an extension to Maiduguri via the Benue Valley. This was completed in 1964, although by a different route.


40. Duff, Report ... on a Tour ... in Nigeria. pp.43-46.

41. Bluebooks, Nigeria, 1924, Table 9, p.330; 1934, T. 45. The prices are those of imported American gasoline.


44. G.H. Baillie, R.H. Brackenbury and Col. C.N. French, Memorandum ... p.16 et seq.


51. In 1930 ten of twenty Produce Inspectors were "retrenched". Agricultural Dept., Annual Report 1931, p.28.


53. Clifford, Sir Hugh (1866-1941) Knighted 1921. Cadet Malaya, Resident Pahang 1896-1899, Secretary in Trinidad and Tobago 1903-07; Secretary Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1907-1912; Governor Gold Coast (Ghana) 1912-1919; Governor Nigeria 1919-1925; Governor Ceylon 1925-1927. Governor of the Straits Settlements (adjacent to Malay States) and High Commissioner for the Malay States 1927-1929. Author of several books on colonial life.
54. The correspondence is in Nigerian Council, Sessional Paper No.1, 1920, (657/8 Public Record Office) and in C.O. Confidential Print, Miscellaneous No. 386.


59. B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book No.1, May 27th, 1924.


61. Georgia gave some 30% against 26% for local cotton. Board of Trade 55/28, Pt.2, Nov.1st, 1920, Clifford to C.O. Enclosure. But see Chapter 8, p.194, fn. 27.

62. In 1919 seventeen markets were gazetted in the Northern Provinces, Agricultural Dept., Northern Provinces, Annual Report 1919, p.2.


64. Sir Hector Duff, Report on a Tour ... in Nigeria, pp.51-52.


66. Ibid., p.8.


70. Sir Hector Duff, Report on a Tour ... in Nigeria, p.65.


76. **B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book No.4**, July 24th, 1923.

77. Ibid, October 19th, 1923.

78. For 1923-24 18.08d. per pound lint. **Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1958**, p.312.


82. **Board of Trade 55/25 Empire Cotton Growing Committee, Minutes of Evidence, October 17th, 1917**.


86. **Agricultural Dept., Annual Report 1921**, p.3.


88. H.B. Herman Hodge, **Gazetteer of Ilorin Province 1929**, p.245.


90. **B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book No.4**, Sept. 26th, 1922.

91. Information at interview with John West, former member of the Agricultural Department, and see Chapter 8, p.189.


94. Information from Mr Gibbard, formerly of the Nigerian Agricultural Dept.


99. Ibid., Nov. 6th, 1928.
100. Ibid., February 5th, 1929.
101. Ibid., Nov. 5th, 1929.
103. B.C.G.A. Minute Book No. 3, July 7th, 1931.
105. Agricultural Dept., Annual Reports passim.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

British involvement in West Africa had begun with the Slave Trade - a trade which was limited, as far as Europeans were concerned, to the Coast. When the trade in slaves was abolished, it was replaced on or near the sea by increased trade in palm products which to a large extent prevented the older trading structures from falling apart. Despite the palm trade interest grew in trade further inland - the palm belt extending only for approximately one hundred miles inland from the neighbourhood of Lagos. The independence of the United States, and the prolonged Napoleonic Wars in Europe, encouraged explorers and merchants to seek out alternative markets in Africa, where the danger of disease were not yet fully realised. West Africa provided a promising avenue, especially as it held the largely unknown River Niger, and the African Association was formed to discover the secrets of the interior and open up new markets for British manufacturers. The British role in discovering the course of the Niger, together with the movement of the Saros back to their own homes, most of which were in Yoruba, focussed attention on Southern Nigeria and the area to the north of Lagos. It was believed that malaria was mainly confined to the low-lying swamps and that Europeans would be able to play a part in the more healthy uplands of the interior. It was desirable that the region should be one served by rivers as other means of transport were likely to be difficult where slaves had previously been used to carry most goods. Yoruba with the River Niger to the north, and the Ogun joining it to the lagoons around Lagos, seemed to be well suited for the development of "legitimate commerce." And of all the crops which could be grown none appeared more suitable than cotton.

Cotton was still, until the American Civil War, a slave-grown crop, and was mainly in demand by the fast-expanding industry of Lancashire. Lancashire's export trade was largely with tropical areas where only cheaper articles could be sold, as tariff walls were being built against outside industries in most of Europe and in the United States. Thus costs had to be kept low. Thus the cotton manufacturers supported free trade which apart from their own self-interest was a doctrine which condemned slavery. The position in the United States showed clearly that the States were not united, and the possibility
of alternative sources of supply being needed had to be taken very seriously. Apart from this general anxiety arising from social problems in the United States, the frequency of frosts in America, combined with a growing period of six months, made it inevitable that there would be occasional short crops, causing a rise in price, such as occurred in 1857, the year in which the Cotton Supply Association was formed in Manchester. The most obvious area for British manufacturers to look for an alternative supply was India, while other areas of extensive production were Egypt and Brazil. India did, in fact, engage the main attention of the Association and imports from there were greatly increased during and after the period of the American Civil War. But during the 1850's the continued rule - until the beginning of 1858 - of the East India Company, a monopoly heartily disliked by the free trade City, its tendency to keep out unneeded Europeans, and its failure to develop communications, deterred some manufacturers from seeking their salvation in the subcontinent. Its cotton was notoriously short-stapled and, owing to the peasant's indebtedness, prepared carelessly for market. Then there was the shock of the Mutiny.

One of the alternatives might be West Africa. The missionaries naturally believed in it, and the manufacturers who supported them were partly guided by their dislike of slavery and its insecurity as a source of their livelihood, and partly by their belief in the superior quality of local African cotton over those of India. They do not seem to have confined their search to West Africa since Thomas Clegg, one of the readiest investors in the region, had sought cotton-growing areas throughout the Mediterranean and in such unlikely places as Malta. Some, again like Clegg, saw a relatively rapid transfer through the African Aid Society of freed negroes from America to Africa and the continued use of their acquired skills in a new field. And besides these calls from industrial interests, British Consuls and administrators on the West Coast wished to increase trade and thereby revenue and announced the suitability of West Africa for cotton production, where much was in any case already being grown for local use. These desires were reinforced after 1852 by the new ease with which communications could be maintained with the Coast after the introduction of a regular monthly steamship service from England.

The interests which decided on West Africa as a suitable area for
increased cotton production were external ones - and they looked to territo-
tories which already possessed potential as British markets. Even India had
alarmed British manufacturers when its duties on all imported piece-goods
were increased from 5 to 10% in 1859. West Africa, however, soon proved to
be extremely unhealthy for Europeans - and very often for coloured Americans
- and so a policy of cotton production by Native Agency was undertaken. This
meant employing Africans, at this time generally Saros or freed slaves, in
responsible posts of management and as trading partners rather than subordin-
ates. Thus a comparatively wealthy and responsible "middle-class" of Africans
could be created which would provide the leadership and social stability, as
well as commercial skills, which were considered by educated Victorians to be
the necessary elements of their prosperity. For this purpose Africans like
Harry Robbin were trained in England by Clegg and others, and the Industrial
Institution opened in Abeokuta, which was optimistically expected not only to
begin the fulfilment of these broader aims, but to provide funds also for
the expansion of the Mission. In due course difficulties made themselves felt:
missionaries like Henry Townsend did not like supervising small factories;
communications with the coast and Britain by the River Ogun were difficult
and subject to seasonal variations - the "dry" season when it was a problem
to use large canoes near Abeokuta being the time of cotton harvest. Thus
extensive storage was required. The most important suppliers were chiefs
and large-scale traders like Madam Tinubu who were employing much domestic
slave labour. The problem of controlling the business affairs of the Institu-
tion were not easy. Accounts were not sent to England with the regularity
which had been intended, and the salary offered to the African managers was
regarded as inadequate. The profit-margin from the raw cotton was in itself
sufficient during the 1850's and 1860's, but provided little return to the
Institution when Manchester took a 20% commission at both ends. Until the
break-even price had been reached, increased production only brought further
profits to the British cotton-broker. It was especially ironic that the
American Civil War coincided with a prolonged internal struggle - another
civil war - in Yoruba, and a growing estrangement between the newly-established
British administration at Lagos and Abeokuta, which ended any hopes of a
greatly extended cotton export. The confusion lasted until well after "normal"
American supplies had been restored - supplies produced without the stigma
of slavery.
A new interest was aroused in West Africa by the trade recession beginning about 1875. Kew succeeded in having botanical stations established and cotton was naturally among the crops considered. But prices of commodities like cotton and coffee fell during the later years of the century, and the administrators, worried by loss of revenue and increased costs, turned aside to rubber and forestry. Other "interests" concerned in the search were the Colonial Office and Elder Dempster and Company. When prices began to rise after 1900, cotton once more became a viable product, at least in prospect, and Elder Dempsters offered prizes to cotton producers and shippers.

An additional result of the recession was the speeding up of the process of tariff restrictions in Europe and the United States. This discouraged Lancashire from over-dependence on American cotton - a dependence which the activities of speculators reinforced. It was the stimulation of this situation which led the Chamber of Commerce at Oldham, a great spinning centre, to cause the formation of the British Cotton Growing Association, mainly composed of Lancashire merchants and manufacturers, many of whom had a particular interest in West Africa as an export area for their piece-goods. As President they chose the senior partner of Elder Dempster and Company, which reinforced their interest in West Africa.

The recession had already led the Chambers of Commerce, especially of Manchester and Liverpool, to press for the construction of railways in West Africa which would give them a constantly expanding market. And their pressure succeeded during the later 1890's because they found at the Colonial Office a Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, whose background and outlook was closely linked with their own. Once the railways were being built, the financing of the construction placed an additional burden on colonial revenues and both the Colonial Office and local administrators were anxious to increase trade on which the revenues of the colonies depended. The railways cut through the coastal belt of palm forest to the savannah areas beyond, and made cotton growing for export on a large-scale apparently much more practical than hitherto. The Lagos Railway reached Ibadan in 1901, and Manchester must have reflected on its foresight in pressing for the railway as it was by then faced with short-time owing to falls in demand.

The Association resembled Clegg in that it showed impatience in under-
taking its program in Africa—a continent which requires patience as much as anything. Plantations were set up, which might have developed into large-scale "model farms" or into true European-run enterprises. It was probably significant that these were only established after Governor MacGregor, who had been firm on cotton growing as an African industry, had left Lagos and been followed by Sir Walter Egerton, who approved rubber and other plantations. After the unexpected failure of the plantations, the Association reverted to the policy of promoting cotton growing for export as an African undertaking.

The Association had in theory a much more direct control over what was happening in West Africa than would have been possible during the mid-nineteenth century. European managers were employed and the telegraph from Britain to Lagos had been installed. But it was more in conflict potentially with other authorities and interest groups, such as the Governors and the European merchants who were by this time also established inland. It built up-to-date ginneries along the line of rail, although the course of the railway had been chosen by MacGregor to increase the export of palm products. The Governors suspected it as a monopolist. It was also an irritation as it interfered with the concept of an independent agricultural department—towards which all the Governors were aiming until they were established in South and Northern Nigeria in 1910 and 1912 respectively. By employing "experts"—in reality experienced overseers of labour—the Association were undertaking a much greater task than had been attempted earlier. It aimed at introducing a new variety of American-type cotton which would be more valuable on the British market than the local indigenous cottons. To do this it experimented with rotations, the introduction of which would have involved an agricultural revolution.

With the African farmer cotton growing could not take precedence over food production. As he was a grower of yams in Southern Nigeria, his time was largely taken up with this work—in digging the mounds after clearing the site—the clearing itself being very hard work. He had not time to clear other areas to grow cotton as a sole crop, but it could be usefully included in a rotation as a "mixed" crop with yams, maize or beans. Most American cotton did not fit this pattern as well as African cottons which
were still mostly grown as perennials. The greater amount of this cotton went to the local spinning and weaving industry, and since it was satisfied with the African varieties, there was little incentive to change. These "facts of farming life" in Southern Nigeria were finally accepted during the 1920's with the development of Improved Ishan - which was nevertheless grown as an annual mainly to reduce pests. The earlier work on model farms would have conflicted with these planting methods and produced more confusion than reform.

Even when it had adapted itself to these difficulties, agricultural development based on the "Ibadan loams" soon brought cocoa growing, which implied the abandonment of cotton growing on any significant scale. Almost everyone agreed that cotton flourished best outside the palm belt - where guineas-corn grew then so would cotton. But next came the problem of transport; the railway had been built through the palm belt and cocoa-growing areas, and when it emerged was not only nearing the Northern Protectorate but also found itself in an area of low population where cotton production could hardly be begun on a large scale. Nevertheless great hopes were placed on the latest pre-war ginnery at Oshogbo - but it was under-employed.

Transport was the key to crop production for export, but it automatically brought cotton into competition with other crops which could also be carried by rail not only for export but to local markets, especially this was true of food crops like yams and maize. As these crops brought in more money, cotton had to be grown further "back" from rail, involving further problems of transport, or as a mixed crop in which the extra amounts produced might be marginal. Cotton, being a secondary crop, would be given second place or grown in secondary areas.

Thus cotton was in many ways dependent on the development of a secondary form of transport which would act as a "feeder" to the railway - and this meant the motor-car or truck in one form or another. J.A. Hutton, born near the middle of the nineteenth century, had continued doubts about the possibilities of motor transport, but the Association's managers were not long in giving their approval. It was generally agreed that cotton could not profitably be brought by porterage to the ginnery over thirty miles' distance. Any means of extending this distance thus meant opening-up entirely new areas
or would give those within the limit a better price - as at Oyo which was some thirty-three miles from rail at Ibadan. The motor-truck soon cut porterage rates by half, thus in effect doubling the available area for cotton.

The Association offered African farmers a better deal than its predecessors - guaranteeing a basic 1d. per pound for seed cotton within reasonable distance of rail and taking a very modest commission on the sale of raw cotton in Britain. Its profits came from ginning which it used to finance the construction of further ginneries. This raised the "break-even" price at Liverpool for the Association to 5.76d. per lb. of lint.² Unless the ginneries' profits were to be reduced, 1d. per lb. for seed cotton remained the highest that could be paid in most pre-war years to the farmer. To augment it research was needed which would produce a cotton which would give a better lint percentage to seed, and a higher yield per acre, which necessarily took time. But 1d per pound for seed cotton for export was not enough to encourage the farmer to grow cotton as a sole crop in Southern Nigeria particularly in view of the demands from the local industry for lint.

Many of the lessons learned from experience were incorporated in the structure and functions of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, and in the report of the Empire Cotton Growing Committee in 1920. Improved transport by rail opened up new areas in undeveloped regions of Nigeria, and the light motor-truck and cheaper fuel costs at last provided a viable answer to the feeder - to - rail problem. Much more money was spent on research and on training cotton-growing specialists. Above all the Agricultural Department of Nigeria (united in 1921) looked at problems from the African Farmers' viewpoint, and cotton as a factor in the general farming program. On this basis the modest position which cotton export had reached in Southern Nigeria was roughly maintained with Improved Ishan grown as a mixed crop but as an annual. Falling prices during the 1920's and 1930's for this type made even the returns for the variety which received a premium absolutely marginal. More progress was made in areas like Oyo Province outside the palm belt and main yam-growing region. Cotton thus found its place in a mixed agricultural economy, continuing to provide limited quantities for export but showing that plans for a dramatic development were visionary except when prices rose sky-high.
Cotton-growing in Southern Nigeria showed that the problem of developing an export trade required attention to a whole series of related matters - the state of communications, the type of local farming, relative prices of other crops, soil and climatic conditions. Such a program could only be undertaken after a careful examination of these factors and would only succeed if expectations remained modest and the methods adopted were in keeping. This meant in practice that the amount of cotton produced for export would depend on a number of factors, especially that of the Liverpool price. After 1900, unless this price were above 5d. per lb. for lint, the return for seed cotton for export to the farmer could not rise above 1d. per lb. This could be sometimes bettered, and usually equalled, in the local market. It was not a price which made it worth the farmers' while to cultivate cotton as a sole crop in Southern Nigeria as he could obtain more from other crops. Consequently cotton growing for export remained a marginal product subject to Liverpool prices, both of cotton and of other crops, and to local conditions in Southern Nigeria where food crops were always given first attention.

END
1. Average price of all kinds of cotton imported into Britain jumped from 4.09d. in 1899 to 5.59d. in 1900. *Annual Statements of Trade of the United Kingdom* ... passim.

2. This was based on 3 3/5 lbs of seed cotton to 1 lb of lint at 1d. per lb. seed cotton. The costs included 0.50d. for brokerage and financing per lb. of lint and 0.75d. for ginning - the profit from which went to the Association. See B.C.G.A. Executive Committee Minute Book, No.2, Nov. 9th, 1916. (1 lb. lint to 3 3/5 lbs. seed cotton is approximately 28% lint. See Chapter 8, p.194, fn. 27; and Chapter 9, p.222, fn. 61, for slight variations in this figure.)
APPENDIX A

The figures given in M.G. Mulhall, *Dictionary of Statistics*, London, 1909, p.160, for German and French Cotton consumption over the decades 1861-70 and 1871-80 are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1861-70 Tons</th>
<th>1871-80 Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>760,000</td>
<td>950,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>1,140,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liverpool prices of the main Nigerian exports in 1905 were:

- Palm-oil: £24.10s. per ton.
- Palm kernel: £13.15s. "
- Maize: £5.5s. " (5s.3d. per cwt.)
- Cocoa: £43.0s. " (2s.4d. per lb.)
- Rubber: £261.6s.8d. " (2s.4d. per lb.)
- Cotton: £47.4s.6d. " (5.06d. per lb.)

From *Lagos Gazette*, March 14th, 1906, p.2.
**APPENDIX B**

**Figures for Receipts and Expenditure per Van-Mile 1910.**

(taken from the Annual Report for the Ibadan-Oyo Road Service 1910 in Annual Reports for the Colony of Southern Nigeria for the Year 1910, p. 369)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Lacre (2½ cwt. load)</th>
<th>3 Lacres (2 ton load each)</th>
<th>1 Thorneycroft (3 ton load)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Receipts per</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mile</td>
<td>11.40d.</td>
<td>16.21d.</td>
<td>22.89d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of fuel per mile</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including repairs,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>garages, fuel &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>depreciation per truck-mile</td>
<td>26.02</td>
<td>20.26</td>
<td>20.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written as the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenditure to receipts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- without depreciation</td>
<td>179%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- with depreciation</td>
<td>228%</td>
<td>125%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Cotton Exports from Southern Nigeria 1903-1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bales (of 400 lbs)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bales (of 400 lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>19,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>4,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>1924</td>
<td>7,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>9,750</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>9,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>4,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>9,170</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>8,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>4,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>13,750</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>3,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5,715 (5,208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ishan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>8,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5,734 (5,428)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures (up to 1924) are taken from P.H. Lamb, The Past Present and Future of Cotton Growing in Nigeria, Empire Cotton Growing Review, Vol. II, 1925, pp. 184-197, and from 1925 from British Cotton Growing Association, Annual Reports, passim. The figures from different sources vary up to some 500 bales per year, but this is probably due to use of different dates for each crop year. The general trend is agreed.
APPENDIX D (i)

Liverpool annual average prices for Uplands Middling Raw Cotton (Lint) from all countries imported into Great Britain (Liverpool Raw Cotton Annual 1958, pp. 306-311, and later Annuals passim.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>d. (Old pence)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>d. (Old pence)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>d. (Old pence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>3 9/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>5 5/8</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>7 5/8</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>3 9/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>5 7/8</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>6 7/8</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>not given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>5 3/4</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>6 3/8</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>5 7/8</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>6 7/8</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4 25/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>5 5/8</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>6 7/8</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>5 4/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>6 3/4</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>6 5/8</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>6 9/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>7 1/4</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>6 5/8</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>4 9/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>6 1/4</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>6 5/8</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>5 9/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>6 3/4</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>5 13/16</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>6 5/8/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>6 1/4</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>6 15/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>8 13/16</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>5 13/16</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>17 3/4</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>5 7/8</td>
<td>1909-1910</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>23 3/4</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>5 1/2</td>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>27 1/2</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>5 13/16</td>
<td>1911-1912</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>5 13/16</td>
<td>1912-1913</td>
<td>6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>15 3/4</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1913-1914</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>10 1/8</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>4 11/16</td>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>10 3/4</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>4 7/16</td>
<td>1915-1916</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>12 3/8</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>4 7/8</td>
<td>1916-1917</td>
<td>12.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>9 5/8</td>
<td>1894</td>
<td>3 1/2</td>
<td>1917-1918</td>
<td>22.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>8 3/4</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>3 21/32</td>
<td>1918-1919</td>
<td>20.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>10 9/16</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>4 1/2</td>
<td>1919-1920</td>
<td>26.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>3 25/32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX D (ii)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>d. (Old pence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>12.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922-23</td>
<td>15.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>18.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-25</td>
<td>13.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-26</td>
<td>10.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-27</td>
<td>8.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-28</td>
<td>11.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-29</td>
<td>10.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>9.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-31</td>
<td>5.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>4.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933-34</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-35</td>
<td>6.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-36</td>
<td>6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936-37</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937-38</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-39</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Pamphlets.

The British Cotton Growing Association published a great many; the great majority of these, including the Annual Reports, are numbered. But the earliest publications are not numbered by the Association as numbering began only in 1905. The earlier copies have been given different numbers in the collections of various libraries, and are sometimes referred to as "unnumbered," although they have been given a number by a library. The main collections are in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library, London, the Manchester Reference Library, the Association's Offices now in Liverpool, and Birmingham University. Among those used the most important are:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library -
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No 3 First Annual Report 1903.
7 J. A. Hutton, The Cotton Crisis, 1904.
and in the Association's numbered series:
6 J. A. Hutton, Cotton Growing in British Colonies.
10 Improved Transport Facilities in Northern Nigeria, Deputation to the Prime Minister May 17, 1906.

In addition the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library has its own series of cotton pamphlets of other publications, and a Nigerian series.

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