A NUANCE OF EXPOSURE:
AN EXAMINATION OF WUTHERING HEIGHS AND THE IDIOT IN THE LIGHT
OF E. M. FORSTER'S THEORY OF THE "PROPHETIC" IN ART

by

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ABSTRACT

E. M. Forster's definition of the artistic prophetic vision in Aspects of the Novel illustrates the difficulty in explaining in a rational, conscious framework, the prophetic tone in art as a function of the irrational and unconscious motives in human nature. Words fail, as do previously established approaches to literature which attempt to categorize a "type" rather than the essential significance of the impact of prophecy as a whole work of art, to define the prophetic tone. Forster does conclude that the prophetic tone in art has definite, recognizable characteristics, yet he simultaneously emphasizes the need to experience the prophetic tone before beginning to clarify its existence as a conceptual phenomenon. An objective explanation of the unconscious world of thought fails to reach a conclusive determination of its nature; art remains, in its hold on the unconscious, the primary stepping stone to a reconciliation between the rational and irrational motives within the human
being. The unconscious persists in making itself felt in the everyday life of the individual; its force depends upon an earlier undiluted emotional relationship of self to the surrounding world.

Forster attributes a "roughness of surface"\(^1\) to the prophetic work of art. Logical thought and surface detail fall behind incoherently as the prophetic author "reaches back."\(^2\) The artistic prophetic vision presents the "mere raising of human love and hatred to such a power that their normal receptacles no longer contain them."\(^3\)

In the sense that the prophetic tone is a source of revelation, art may illuminate the underworld of the unconscious which we cannot reach nor understand consciously and rationally. This thesis represents an attempt to explore the prophetic tone in two novels, Emily Bronte's *Wuthering Heights* and Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*. The basic outline of the prophetic tone offered by Forster is relied on throughout the study, which turns also to the implications of the unconscious forces within the human psyche. Freud's early study of man's inherent primality in *Totem and Taboo* as well as his later study of the power of the twentieth century superego discussed in *Civilization and its*
Discontents provide a basis of theory with which to examine the prophetic vision as insight into human behavior itself. Within this area of study, the psychological concepts of ambivalence are examined; their presence in the prophetic tone of each novel is shown to be crucial to the novel's final impact. The basis of the argument for the prophetic tone lies within the opposing forces of the primal beginnings of man and his sense of guilt, yet various theories differ with the definition of the unconscious as necessarily harbouring opposing forces at all. De Rougemont, the eminent Catholic philosopher, offers an explanation of man's fall into primality and his consequent possibility of attaining a "workable" perfection in this world. In contrast, Norman O. Brown's theory of a mystical unity of the underlying drives of the unconscious proposes a state of living in which there is no anxiety. An examination and refutation of some part of each of these theories is offered in this study, always with recourse to the initial textual material of Dostoyevsky and Bronte.
The conclusion of this study underlines the necessity of the struggle between the urge to emotional expression and emotional repression in view of its own innate destructiveness. The prophetic vision offers an illumination of self in its portrayal of the irrational forces of the mind locked in a continuous struggle with man's sense of guilt.


For
Frederick
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>THE SINGLE VISION OF PROPHECY</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>PRIMALITY, AMBIVALENCE AND GUILT IN THE IDIOT AND WUTHERING HEIGHTS</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>OVER REPRESSION AND UNREPRESSION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPHETIC THEORIES OF DENIS DE ROUGEMONT AND NORMAN O. BROWN WITH A VIEW TO &quot;TESTING&quot; THESE AS READINGS OF THE NOVELS, AND AS SUPPORT FOR THE PROPHETIC</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>CONCLUSION: MEMORY AND CONNECTION</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE: THE SINGLE VISION OF PROPHECY

The *Idiot* by Dostoyevsky, and *Wuthering Heights* by Emily Bronte may be approached as novels similar to each other in matters of content, character, and theory. Literary criticism offers various prescribed and conventional literary angles with which to approach the novel. This paper attempts to do a comparison of the two novels from a unique approach found within E. M. Forster's description of the genre of the Novel. In his *Aspects of the Novels* Forster pursues the approaches of "Story," "People," "Fantasy," and finally, "Prophecy," as genuine aspects of the literary value of a particular novel. From his starting point of fantasy as the "unreal"¹, he distinguishes both fantasy and prophecy from the methodologies of character, plot and story, which are supported by most literary standards as the concrete elements of the Novel's makeup. When Forster examines fantasy, and then prophecy, he recognizes immediately their dissimilarity from the more external, recognizable approaches to literature in so far as these aspects are neither "human beings and a bundle of various
things not human beings"², rather something in between or outside of these two essentials. Thus, he states that

Criticism, especially a critical course, is so misleading. However lofty its intentions and sound its method, its subject slides away from beneath it, imperceptibly away, and lecturer and audience may awake with a start to find that they are carrying on in a distinguished and intelligent manner, but in regions which have nothing to do with anything they have read.³

The regions which Forster refers to here are the approaches of fantasy and prophecy, which he takes great care to distinguish between:

They are alike in having gods, and unlike in the gods they have. There is in both the sense of mythology which differentiates them from other aspects of our subject. An invocation is again possible, therefore on behalf of fantasy let us now invoke all beings who inhabit the lower air, the shallow water, and the smaller hills, all Fauns and Dryads and slips of the memory, all verbal coincidences, Pans and puns, all that is medieval this side of the grave. When we come to prophecy we shall utter no invocation, but it will have been to whatever transcends our abilities, even when it is human passion that transcends them, to the deities of India, Greece, Scandinavia, and Judea, to all that is medieval beyond the grave and to Lucifer son of the morning. By their mythologies we shall distinguish these two sorts of novels.⁴
The final conclusion one may draw from this definition of the prophetic element lies in his phrase quoted above—"to whatever transcends our abilities, even when it is human passion that transcends them". Forster is seeing the unconscious role which the prophetic element plays in art, and prophecy, by being subliminal and unconscious, reveals the creative process at its limits. It exposes the intensities of emotional ambivalence that actual life and conventional art keep hidden. The prophetic is able to go where conventional approaches cannot go, and its ability to reveal lies in its unconscious perception of human behavior and feeling.

Freud states in his essay on "Dostoyevsky and Parracide" that "before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." From this insight, we can assume the necessity of keeping a "sense" of art as inviolate, and unapproachable from a psychoanalytical viewpoint. Freud is saying, finally, that if the novel works, no amount of psychoanalytic diagnosis, or moral consternation over what it reveals, can finally deny its value as an
artistic experience. Yet there remains a part of the criticism by Freud that is conjectur...
There is, however, one question which touches our subject, and which only a psychologist could answer. But let us ask it. Will the creative process itself alter? Will the mirror get a new coat of quicksilver? In other words, can human nature change?  

Forster is pointing here to the direct relationship of the portrayal of human behavior and thought in art and its effect on the reader, and consequently, on life itself. His mention of psychology asserts the indisputable hold which art, especially unconsciously revealed through the prophetic mode, has upon the individual's sense of inner emotional reality. By introducing the question that the form of the novel, and the creative process itself, may induce change within philosophical and psychological thought and behavior, Forster is recognizing the greatest depth and breadth of extended meaningfulness which art brings to life. Forster goes on to say:

All I will do is to state a possibility. If human nature does alter it will be because individuals manage to look at themselves in a new way. Here and there people—a very few people, but a few novelists among them—are trying to do this. Every institution and vested interest is against such a search: organized
religion, the State, the family in its economic aspect, have nothing to gain, and it is only when outward prohibitions weaken that it can proceed: history conditions it to that extent. Perhaps the searchers will fail, perhaps it is impossible for the instrument of contemplation to contemplate itself, perhaps if it is possible it means the end of imaginative literature—which if I understand him rightly is the view of that acute inquirer, Mr. I. A. Richards. Anyhow—that way lies movement and even combustion for the novel, for if the novelist sees himself differently he will see his characters differently and a new system of lighting will result.

I do not know on the verge of which philosophy or what rival philosophies the above remarks are wavering, but as I look back at my own scraps of knowledge and into my own heart, I see these two movements of the human mind: the great tedious onrush known as history, and a shy, crablike sideways movement. Both movements have been neglected in these lectures: history because it only carries people on, it is just a train full of passengers; and the crablike movement because it is too slow and cautious to be visible over our tiny period of two hundred years. So we laid it down as an axiom when we started that human nature is unchangeable, and that it produces in rapid succession prose fictions, which fictions, when they contain 50,000 words or more, are called novels. If we had the power or licence to take a wider view, and survey all human and pre-human activity,
we might not conclude like this; the crablike movement, the shiftings of the passengers, might be visible, and the phrase "the development of the novel" might cease to be a pseudo-scholarly tag or a technical triviality, and become important, because it implied the development of humanity.

Forster strongly suggests throughout this passage, that human nature must change if "the great tedious onrush known as history" is not to dominate life completely. The past has been vertical movement, and has thus accumulated a juvenile emotional awareness with a burdensome sense of constant guilt. Forster seems to recognize the moving and growing sideways in the "crablike movement" he suggests, and thus recognizes that we achieve greater rational understanding of what we are like and why we think, or act, in the ways we do. For human nature to change, the "instrument of contemplation"—the novelist, reader, or researcher—must be able to "contemplate itself" and examine its own behavior. Prophecy, as revealed in Wuthering Heights and The Idiot, represents a non-rational, or irrational portrayal of human behavior. When the prophetic element in art is experienced, it can be consciously interpreted,
and then, Forster seems to say, human nature may grow to a finer understanding of itself and all life.

E. M. Forster's definition of the artistic prophetic vision illustrates, thus, the difficulty in explaining in a rational, conscious framework the prophetic tone in art as a function of the irrational and unconscious motives of the human mind. Words fail to define the prophetic vision, as do previously established approaches to literature; the prophetic tone cannot in any way be categorized. Forster concludes that the prophetic tone in art does have definite recognizable characteristics, but at the same time he emphasizes the need to experience the prophetic tone before beginning to clarify its existence as a conceptual phenomenon. Any objective explanation of the unconscious world of thought fails to reach a conclusive determination of its nature; art remains, in its hold on the unconscious, the primary stepping stone to a reconciliation between the rational and irrational motives within the human being. The unconscious makes
itself felt in everyday living; its force depends upon an earlier undiluted emotional relationship of self to the surrounding world.

While the prophetic vision cannot be categorized as an entity in conventional literary genres, Forster does recognize definite elements of its presence in a novel. The unconscious expression of an underlying meaning which is greater than the story or any one character is the basis of the prophetic mode. All prophetic novels which Forster deals with share this same direct expression of the unconscious. Forster goes to George Eliot and Dostoyevsky in order to find a contrast of the ordinary world of fiction to that of the prophetic:

Now the difference between these passages is that the first writer is a preacher, and the second a prophet. George Eliot talks about God, but never alters her focus; God and the tables and chairs are all in the same plane, and in consequence we have not for a moment the feeling that the whole universe needs pity and love—they are only needed in Hetty's cell. In Dostoyevsky the characters and situations always stand for more than themselves; infinity attends them; one can apply to them the saying of St. Catherine of Siena that God is in the fish and the fish is
in the sea. Every sentence he writes implies this extension, and the implication is the dominant aspect of his work. He is a great novelist in the ordinary sense—that is to say his characters have relation to ordinary life and also live in their own surroundings, there are incidents which keep us excited, and so on; he has also the greatness of a prophet, to which our ordinary standards are inapplicable.

If the first and most basic characteristic of the prophetic novel is the expression of the unconscious, the next most noticeable quality that each prophetic novel illustrates is the active denunciation of the social voice—of moral and cultural calm—which holds little direct power over the unconscious voice expressed in the writing. Here again, Forster shows how the prophetic writer

has not got that tiresome little receptacle, a conscience, which is often such a nuisance in serious writers and so contracts their effects.

In retrospect, the reader feels the power exerted by conscience, but in the experience of the novel, the social voice of rational and moral civilization escapes the major feelings or, perhaps nearer the
truth, is transcended by them. Society in the prophetic novel often takes a back seat to the individuality of the major characters; its role is not a direct threat to the characters' magnified apartness. The reality belonging to the social realm is part of the conscious realm of thought, and is thus forced into the background when the unconscious portrayal of strong, individual struggles of a single soul against society does occur.

The final trait that characterizes all prophetic novels lies in the realm of a steady, disintegrating process, on the surface, towards some kind of death, and the inner need, expressed most strongly as the disintegration nears completion, of a liberation through death. The writer combines the realistic portrayal of an impulse to die and to be done with, together with the immense promise of freedom and relief which awaits the character once the self-destruction is complete. The death instinct is a partner to the visionary transcendental quality that the prophetic novel achieves.
The choice of Dostoyevsky and Emily Bronte as prophetic novelists to be examined in this thesis is supported by Forster's own recognition of them as prophetic:

So, though I believe this lecture is on a genuine aspect of the novel, not a fake aspect, I can only think of four writers to illustrate it---Dostoyevsky, Melville, D. H. Lawrence, and Emily Bronte. Emily Bronte shall be left to the last, Dostoyevsky I have alluded to, Melville is the centre of our picture, and the centre of Melville is *Moby Dick*.

In both Dostoyevsky and Emily Bronte, the artistic prophetic vision, as interpreted by E. M. Forster, is characterized by the writer's stance toward revelation. Forster's definition of the prophetic novel, with regard to Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot* and Emily Bronte's *Wuthering Heights*, distinguishes between the conventional social approach which relies on definite characters, plot and literary form, and the almost unconscious intuitive awareness underlying the external form of the prophetic writer. Because "prophecy" is an unconscious element in the artist's writing,
the novel may conform to various external frameworks in which literary genres claim some categorization of the "type" of story the novel presents. Emily Bronte utilizes the Gothic romance as a superficial setting for *Wuthering Heights* while Dostoyevsky in *The Idiot* allows for a Dickensian flavor of variety and diversity in characters and action, making this novel resemble Dickens' comedy-adventure novels. Yet the final result of the prophetic novel escapes categorization in so far as the essence of the novel appears to lie outside the story form, and is not part of the conscious storytelling in the writer. The more superficial frameworks help Bronte and Dostoyevsky to tell a story, to construct a specific line of action into plot. To accuse an author of double-intent is beside the point; what the writer has striven for consciously has unconsciously reached greater depth and, Forster says, truth. The prophetic vision, then, is the final reality that the novel offers.

Thus the prophetic tone is distinguished by the disparity between what the author tries consciously to tell as his story, what Forster calls his
"machinery", the "tables and chairs" of external plot and action; and the greater meaningfulness of a subliminal reality, created by an unconscious exposure of emotion. Forster defines the unconscious element in prophetic writing as coming "out of the atmosphere in which the process occurs." Consiously, the author prepares incidents and characters, and draws his plot accordingly. Bronte, the perfectionist in such external form, works out a chronology of several generations for the Earnshaws and Lintons in her book. Both Bronte and Dostoyevsky, although complex in surface construction of character and plot, are prophetic in the sense of the greater reality and awareness, the unintentional but indisputable presence of a greater truth than the novel's plot can afford.

Forster's idea of prophecy subordinates the conscious effort of such novelists to the unconscious result of the creation itself:

We are not concerned with the prophet's message, or rather (if matter and manner cannot be separated), we are concerned with it as little as possible. What matters is the accent of his voice, his song.
Forster explains that because the prophetic author "does not reflect", there follows in the finished work a "roughness of surface", a quality that repels simultaneously as it intrigues the reader. Thus, the incoherence of Emily Bronte's otherworldly love—the sphere of esoteric eternal oneness that is believed to exist—is almost required to be vague on principle. A rationalist viewpoint would deny the prospect of the annihilation of self or others as the only answer to intense loving, as it would also deny the necessity of death as the only mode of liberation, yet the forces of the bare emotions of the novels cannot be disowned nor denied existence in the reader. So, vagueness leaves a definition elusive to the rational mind, or at least, lack of definition allows the novel to work before it can be thrown aside in commonsensical disdain. Forster again pinpoints the futility of rational definition when he states that "the prophetic song ... lies outside words." The apparent roughness of surface is rather evidence that the artist is unaware of what he perceives and reveals in his writing.
Because the glimpse of a greater meaningfulness is intuited, yet remains in his actual writing in an unpolished state, the significance of the greater reality in the writing is something he at best can only sense, and not fully account for.

Forster himself can be seen as one of the greatest contrasts to the prophetic author. His definition of prophecy in writing, although incomplete, illustrates the fact of his being able to recognize the prophetic element as a concept; he has some distance and objectivity to what he experiences unconsciously in the reading of prophetic writing. Yet by the same token he is not a prophetic author in the sense that Bronte and Dostoyevsky are, since with the necessary distance, the prophetic process becomes "real" in a secondary sense only. A perception of the primary emotional life is displaced by a fragmented, rational and external recognition of what may exist, but which, after all, belongs to the unknown sphere of the mind that is difficult to locate in experience itself. Forster is viewing the prophetic element objectively on the outside, and like Mr. Ramsey in To The Lighthouse, he can in this
way only reach "r" on his imaginary scale of inner development. Dostoyevsky, by unconsciously unfolding truth which he does not know that he possesses, is Mrs. Ramsey, reaching the end goal of the completed circle in a moment's flash of insight. Forster's merit as both an author and critic is simply that he will not deny the necessity of the prophetic experience, and that he refuses to rationally shelve an area of intuition into the various categories which traditional literary periods and genres provide. He says, instead, that

we have indeed to lay aside the single vision which we bring to most of literature and life and have been trying to use through most of our inquiry, and take up a different set of tools. This time . . . we have had to lay them down. Next time we shall take them up again, but with no certainty that they are the best equipment for a critic or that there is such a thing as a critical equipment.¹⁹

Yet as a rational, civilized thinker, Forster does not submit to the irrational recourse toward primality as the sole answer; he is able to find a balance somewhere between the necessary emotional instinctual
life inherent in the human being and the implicit need for rational knowledge of the human mind. In his essay "To Simply Feel" in Albergo Empedocle and other writings, Forster makes a determined effort to describe such equilibrium between thought and feeling. He criticizes the writer who uses emotion without "feeling it" and without understanding its implications, stating that a writer must not "eulogize the heart or decry reason."

He has not got that tiresome little receptacle, a conscience, which is often such a nuisance in serious writers, and so contracts their effect.

Forster's definition of prophecy is consequently a gateway into an instinctual field of human behavior and thought that has usually been ignored in literature, yet at the same time he cautions the need for awareness of the limitations of the primal base on
which prophetic writing rests. The peril of unconscious life in the extreme equals the danger of our civilized "cool web of language," our over-rationalized lack of feeling. Robert Graves' poem "The Cool Web" summarizes the extremes of either force in twentieth century living:

There's a cool web of language winds us in,  
Retreat from too much joy or too much fear;  
We grow sea-green at last and coldly die  
In brininess and volubility.

But if we let our tongues lose self-possession,  
Throwing off language and its watery clasp  
Before our death, instead of when death comes,  
Facing the wide glare of the children's day,  
Facing the rose, the dark sky, and the drums  
We shall go mad no doubt and die that way.  

Forster's recognition of the value and simultaneous malignancy of the primal instinctual base on which the prophetic vision rests is finally insight into the primality underlying all human behavior.

Another road into the definition of the prophetic tone in art may be suggested by the comparative analysis offered by Isaiah Berlin in his work *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. The fox has a range of knowledge, a large cross-section of human life and emotions which he understands and emphasizes, and in this
breadth of comprehension, his greatness lies. Thus Shakespeare encompasses a wide presentation of characters and themes which appear to cover all of life, past and present, in its variety. On the other hand, the hedgehog, knowing one large thing in life, is moving toward unity. Berlin says that we do not want the fox to know one big thing, when he knows so many little things so well. But the hedgehog, grounded in a single vision, brings with him the natural attribute of intensity—or alternatively, revelation:

This limitation has like all concentrations its positive advantages; it results in a depth and intensity generally unknown to richer and broader conceptions, a power, even a reality, beside which more diffused notions seem a little sentimental.

Yet the prophetic view has the limitation of presenting only its own view, of possessing little understanding of different viewpoints. A narrowness of vision accompanies the greater depth of vision in prophecy. Intensity results in a deeper understanding of the unconscious impulses which divide men, without
a consequent rationale of human irrationality. As a result the prophetic writer is often in a state of isolation and possible alienation from his fellows, until he is able to find another mind in accord with his vision of life. The alienation which the prophetic author experiences in his own life is displayed in the characters in his novels, who undergo a struggle of high emotional ambivalences, and whose fate is often an end in self-destruction. In the prophetic character, the alienation is cosmic in so far as it is total isolation of the individual's thoughts, feelings and behavior from the world around him. Where other characters, and society itself, do make some impression on the alienated individual's life, it is only as a repressive, and thus, more alienating force on him. The smug morality of middle class society in Wuthering Heights is most effectively portrayed in Nelly Dean. Nelly's presence in the novel accentuates the repressive character of the conscience of the society at that time, and at the same time illustrates the huge breach between this voice of morality and Heathcliff's thoughts and actions. Nelly's
attempts to inhibit his wild character infuriate Heathcliff while he is a child; there seems little communication between the two once Heathcliff has become independent. He has become oblivious to the repression inherent in Nelly's code of conventional morality at a cost, and has achieved a total alienated position in which no admonitions from Nelly may reach him. Nelly's demands have throughout pushed him into his alienation.

Similarly, the position of isolation which Heathcliff, and in The Idiot, Rogozhin, find themselves, is so cut off from the ordinary reality of daily life around them that their disintegration of self appears to welcome the relief and eternal blackness of death. In prophetic writing, however, death is portrayed in a highly positive manner; the reader may sense the idea of a kind of "freedom" or liberation awaiting beyond the abyss, which rationally he might deny the existence of. Heathcliff is alienated, cursed and embittered in the position of living he is almost forced to dwell in—one may feel that such a reality is almost "unnatural" to him.
Emily Bronte ends with a promise of release from the captivity which life has built around Heathcliff, and that the release lies in death does not faze the reader as it might in a rational philosophical view of life. Emily Bronte, especially, embues the idea of death with the hidden longings of life, and at the same time she shows how Heathcliff's steady inclination toward his own death is almost an unconscious impulse, gathering momentum as it nears the end. Her almost mystical intonation of Heathcliff and Catherine walking on the moors, happy, carefree, and liberated from the repressive captivity of life on earth represents a death instinct toward a final peace, quitting finally all the movement and anxiety which we experience in life. Such a representation of death carries as its highest and most desirable trait the belief of happiness—total and complete rest. The death instinct, whether psychologically defined as biological or culturally induced, assumes the same unwillingness toward movement, tension or progressive development. What is felt as instinctual is seen as a promise of eternal peace.
Although the repressive social voice of pious morality is not openly denied by the novelist, its power is felt by the reader to be repressive. The cultural and social morality is after all that element in human behavior which the prophetic novelist is most acutely aware of in his unconscious impulses, yet he offers no open, direct denial of its existence because he does not see it as the threat it is in his own unconscious. His portrayal of death, however, illustrates the repressive character of life on earth, for his major characters in the novel essentially "die" in their "liberation". Thus, prophecy may be said to be the universal song of transcendental life in so far as it promises a greater peace, happiness, and contentment in death than death can rationally be said to possess.

Similarly, the limitation of the prophetic vision is incumbent upon its place in a rationalistic world--where many visions not only do count, but must count for survival which entails an awareness of one's fellows. Every individual possesses a hidden intensity of instinctual motivation; obviously, every individual's
unconscious instinctual life may express itself in widely varying ways in his behavior. The necessity of understanding our own unconscious irrationality is evident for maintaining contact and recognition of the reality outside of our individual "self"; more important, though, is the need to comprehend the irrational in the world around us. Often such perverse irrational impulses are appealing and with some rational comprehension of their underlying origins and implications, we insure the existence of our own life along with that of civilization's survival. The appeal of the primality uncovered in the prophetic vision is the major area of exploration in this thesis; such an appeal uncovers the ignorance of all human individuals of the irrational in behavior which they assume to be normal. Such an exploration of the perverse in human makeup denies, finally, the idea "of modern man's vain sense of a self-made Self." 27

Yet the narrow vision of prophecy, while often perverse in civilized terms, carries a higher degree
of perception than a clumsy accumulation of factual definitions of human motivation. What the prophetic vision reveals becomes perverse, indeed fatal, as a code of behavior, yet as artistic portrayals of the human struggle, prophecy is able to illustrate in an experiential mode what need not occur in actual behavior. The prophetic tone reveals the perverse in the way that

The more we study man the more the striking realization dawns that what we call perversity is really an impoverished poetry, a creative ingenuity from a desperate position. And this is, after all, a definition of even the best poetry: a cry, a reaching out, an attempt to make sense, with patterns of words, of the confines of the human condition.28

Thus, the prophetic tone is able to define the perverse in the human makeup as an enriched or insightful limitation. G. K. Chesterton is cited to say:

Indeed, the common phrase for insanity is . . . a misleading one. The madman is not the man who has lost his reason. The madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.29

Finally, the prophetic author himself is an illustration of the relationship between insanity
in the sense of perverse holds on an inner reality and the ability to establish contact through art in a rational world. Their inner recognition of intense and often uncontrollable forces in their own behavior are attained at a cost; they lose at least partially their holds on the "normal" realities around them. Ronald Laing comments that

many schizoid writers and artists who are relatively isolated from the other succeed in establishing a creative relationship with things in the world, which are made up to embody the figures of their fantasy. 30

The prophetic writer cannot be defined strictly as "mad" since his perversity is wrought in his art; his lack of contact with an outside reality may or may not affect his life. As an artist, he is able to carry the mind further into its primal fears and darknesses than all rationalist philosophy has dared to. The reader unconsciously participates in the unconscious stream of reality presented in the work of art. Forster's advice at this point is that after the experiential participation in the art, the human mind must come to a realization of the
experience which it has undergone.

In the sense that the prophetic tone is a source of revelation, art may illuminate the underworld of the unconscious which we cannot reach nor understand consciously and rationally. This thesis represents an attempt to explore the prophetic tone in the two novels, Emily Bronte's *Wuthering Heights* and Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot*. The basic outline of the prophetic tone offered by Forster is relied on throughout the study, which turns also to the implications of the unconscious forces within the human mind. Freud's early study of man's inherited primality in *Totem and Taboo* provides the definition of ambivalence which becomes the basis of an examination of ambivalence in human behavior.

Emotional ambivalence in the proper sense of the term---that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object---lies at the root of many important cultural institutions. We know nothing of the origin of this ambivalence. One possible assumption is that it is a fundamental phenomenon of our emotional life. But it seems to me quite worth considering another possibility, namely that originally it formed no part of our emotional life but was acquired by the human race in connection with their father-complex, precisely where the psychoanalytic examination of modern individuals still finds it revealed at its strongest.
His later study, *Civilization and its Discontents*, comprises an examination of the power of the twentieth century superego as well as a bleak recognition of the self-destructive urge or "instinct" in man and his civilization. Freud describes the theory of a death instinct at length in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* where he describes it as

The dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the 'Nirvana principle', to borrow a term from Barbara Low)---a tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle; and our recognition of that fact is one of our strongest reasons for believing in the existence of death instincts.32

The "Nirvana principle" then, becomes the inverted self-destructive instinct in civilization, as well as a sadistic destruction in the form of aggression. Freud's basis here lies in the theory of a dualistic nature of human psychology, much as ambivalence consists of an opposition of love and hate toward the same object:
Our argument had as its point of departure a sharp distinction between ego instincts, which we equated with death instincts, and sexual instincts, which we equated with life instincts. 

Our views have from the very first been dualistic, and to-day they are even more definitely dualistic than before—now that we describe the opposition as being, not between ego instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and death instincts. Jung's libido theory is on the contrary monistic; the fact that he has called his one instinctual force 'libido' is bound to cause confusion, but need not affect us otherwise. We suspect that instincts other than those of self-preservation operate in the ego, and it ought to be possible for us to point to them.33

Within this area of exploration, the psychological concepts of ambivalence and guilt as inherent elements in the human unconscious are examined; their presence in the prophetic novel is shown to be crucial to the novel's final impact.

The basis of the argument for the "prophetic tone" lies within the opposing forces of the primal beginnings of man and his sense of guilt, yet various theories differ with the definition of the unconscious as necessarily harbouring opposing forces at all.
De Rougemont, the eminent Catholic philosopher, offers an explanation of man's fall into primality and his consequent possibility of attaining a "workable" perfection in this world. De Rougemont's theory of the illusion of romantic-passionate love illustrates how civilization has built around the death-headed myth of doomed love an illusory contentment and peace. De Rougemont traces the beginnings of the myth of romantic love to the Cathartic sect within the church in early France, and he shows how the myth has persisted in its strength to the present day. De Rougemont extends his theory to the necessity of refusing to believe in an illusion which constitutes finally a denial of life, and his argument against the illusion of romantic-passionate love is justified up to this point. He turns to the moral side of man's nature, however, when he pleads for a strengthening of the conscience, or superego, rather than for a rational understanding of the workings of the myth itself. De Rougemont's treatment of the illusion as being the total causal force behind man's self-destruction, and aggressive
behavior toward his fellows, is also too simplistic in its attempt to overtly correct the ills of civilization. Because he turns to the superego, the twentieth century's most domineering power, he is not attempting to lessen the guilt that encourages self-destruction in the human being. Also, because he is consciously advising a moralistic answer to a psychoanalytical phenomenon, he is unconsciously more able to breed guilt in his readers. His theory, which is examined in great detail, is perhaps the greater threat when compared to Norman O. Brown's idea of Nirvana as a plausible escape from anxiety, because the former's has a greater hold on the individual's unconscious in its appeal to the individual's conscience and his sense of wrong and right. In this last sense, De Rougemont is more subtle and more destructive in the hold he might exert on the already over-loaded conscience of the modern individual.

In contrast, Norman O. Brown's theory of a mystical unity of the underlying drives of the unconscious proposes a state of life in which there is
no anxiety. Brown's ideal lies in the Nirvana principle; he wishes for a return to the early anxiety-free narcissism of childhood. Such a theory carries with it, as the presentation of doomed love and irrevocable passion does in the characters of Emily Bronte and Dostoyevsky, an appeal to the promise of final peace and happiness that doesn't exist on earth. Finally, Brown's theory cannot exist on earth, for a lack of the necessary tension and ambivalence to cause even minimal anxiety is the end of life as we know it. An examination and refutation of some part of each of these theories is offered in greater depth in this thesis, always with recourse to the initial textual material of Dostoyevsky and Emily Bronte.

If, however, one were to read each novel to be studied, The Idiot and Wuthering Heights, from the viewpoints of either De Rougemont or Norman O. Brown, the resulting views of the novel would be exactly opposed to each other. Where De Rougemont would inevitably agree with Nelly Dean, and see her as a good woman, "sensible" and modest, Brown would be
against this portrayal of tight control on emotional and instinctual life, as Nelly Dean exemplifies the conventional standard of the social morality which Brown attacks. Similarly, De Rougemont would find Heathcliff entirely immoral in his belief in what De Rougemont has shown to be the romantic illusion of doomed love. Heathcliff and Rogozhin as well, may be called immoral, but such a term can take us no further in an examination of why some individuals are self-destructive, or why we may find the same irrational forces or behavior in ourselves. Brown might well endorse the actions of Heathcliff in his total narcissism and welcome the vision of a Nirvana which Emily Bronte appears to offer Heathcliff.

The conclusion of the thesis underlines how the struggle between the urge to emotional expression and emotional repression exists in the light of innate destructiveness. As far as a "thesis approach" is concerned, the direction of this thesis is not one which explicates whole novels; rather, the study will explore an idea of the prophetic in art in a context which might be able to explain and clarify what such a philosophical idea could mean finally in its relation
to human life on earth. Because the prophetic mode is centred in the major characters whom the prophetic author has chosen to illustrate his own unconscious emotional impulses, the thesis as a whole concentrates on character. Thus, many of the minor characters go unexplained in so far as their portrayals of an inner struggle are often echoes of the major struggle of a Heathcliff or a Rogozhin. Many of the minor characters come to symbolize a certain kind of "impulse" or drive within the greater ambivalence felt in the major character; surely there is a requisite demand for "love" and need for expiation in their portrayals. The younger Hareton Earnshaw recalls a Heathcliff of the same age, and his relative naivite in comparison to Heathcliff illustrates the slight but different vein of exposure which his life has absorbed in its struggle to become his own person. Finally, then, the prophetic vision offers an illumination of self in its portrayal of the irrational forces of the mind locked in a continuous struggle with man's sense of guilt.
NOTES


2  Forster, Aspects, p. 111.

3  Forster, Aspects, p. 112.

4  Forster, Aspects, p. 115.


6  Freud, Parricide, p. 99.

7  Forster, Aspects, p. 172.

8  Forster, Aspects, p. 172-3.


10  Forster, Aspects, p. 146.

11  Forster, Aspects, p. 141.

12  Forster, Aspects, p. 131.

13  Forster, Aspects, p. 130.
14 Forster, Aspects, p. 131.
15 Forster, Aspects, p. 138.
16 Forster, Aspects, p. 141.
17 Forster, Aspects, p. 139.
18 Forster, Aspects, p. 142.
19 Forster, Aspects, p. 150.
21 Forster, Aspects, p. 146. CR to #10, same chapter.


29  G. K. Chesterton quoted by Ernest Becker, in *Angel in Armor*.


33  Freud, *Beyond*, p. 93.
Definitions of primality, ambivalence and guilt relevant to the characters in \textit{The Idiot} and \textit{Wuthering Heights} are not only a mode of simplifying the meaningfulness of the individual personalities; for the backbone of such definitions of character lies in psychoanalytical criticism, and the final import of such a definition is to explain and understand the human personality. To suggest that the human personality is explicated by presentations of it in literature is reasonable; to believe that literature has no relation to life, then, is to deny the human imagination which feeds on human memory and experience and to resist understanding what Forster means by "only connect." Doheny, in his paper "From PMLA to \textit{Wuthering Heights}", says that

The notion that literature has some bearing on human experience is an old truism, but so many of these professional analyzers either never knew it or have forgotten it in their rush for survival and promotion that it can't be repeated too often.\footnote{1}
He underlines the "novel's bearing on life",\(^2\) the "significance" of the work of art. To label a novel emotively, \textit{i.e.} the novel's emotional effect on the whole, is to not carry the final significance of that novel far enough.\(^3\) What it says in the context of literature has developed from both experiential and introspective living and has necessarily occurred in conscious and subconscious human awareness. The portrayal of the conflicts of human nature in art illuminates that same struggle in life.

If the novel is approached with its ultimate significance foremost in view, the definitions of ambivalence and primality, and the roles of guilt and conscience carry their greatest significance in the elements of the work which clarify the irrational kinds of behavior, the more esoteric insights of intuition displayed by major characters, or the subconscious understanding between the reader and character where what has been written seems inadequate to explain such understanding.

When Freud states, in \textit{Totem and Taboo}, that neurotics, who are obliged to reproduce the struggle [ambivalence] and the taboo resulting from it, may be said to have
inherited an archaic constitution as an atavistic vestige; the need to compensate for this at the behest of civilization is what drives them to their immense expenditure of mental energy.

He is pinpointing the essential struggle for a balance between the irrational and rational forces within the human mind; yet, he is illustrating at the same time the difficulty of reasserting ambivalence itself in a pure form in a world that has endowed its individuals with a cultural and social moral conscience. The archaic primal forces are repressed not only by the inherent rationale of the individual superego; instead, by trying to reach back to a more emotionally simple state of life, the individual must discard social and cultural moralities for which reason itself has no explanation:

This creative sense of guilt still persists among us. We find it operating in an asocial manner in neurotics, and producing new moral precepts and persistent restrictions, as an atonement for crimes that have been committed and as a precaution against the committing of new ones. If, however, we inquire among these neurotics to discover what were the deeds which provoked these reactions, we shall be disappointed. We find no deeds, but only impulses and emotions, set upon evil
ends but held back from their achieve-
ment. What lie behind the sense of
guilt of neurotics are always *psychical*
realities and never *factual* ones.

Modern man encompasses both ambivalence and over-re-
pression in various areas of his life which results
in gross fragmentation of his sense of identity and
worth. Such social fragmentation through pressures
upon the individuals of a particular society is illus-
trated in the social worlds of both Emily Bronte and
Dostoyevsky in each of their novels. Dostoyevsky,
in *The Idiot*, has the socially conscious and refined
Ypanchin family; with its petty internal pressures
of class and morality. Yet Dostoyevsky offers us one
of the most brilliant portraits of ambivalence in
modern literature in Paryfon Rogozhin. Bronte sets
a singular emotional position, in the personality of
Heathcliff, amidst the rigid puritanical world of
nineteenth century culture in the English countryside.
Nelly Dean exemplifies the cultural standard of the
day in her modest piety and reasoned control of emo-
tion. One critic, John K. Mathison states that

For Nelly to control "fits of passion"
and "manage to control herself while
under their influence" have never re-
quired a struggle. She is too ruddy,
healthy, physically busy and emotionally placid to know what such a struggle would be. When a few pages later she confidently announces that "the Grange had but one sensible soul in its walls, and that lodged in my body", we agree, but the value we place on being "sensible" is far lower than hers.6

Presented as Bronte's standard character of rational control and conventional morality, Nelly is the greatest contrast of all to Heathcliff.

The Idiot, as a novel, shows the process of high ambivalence distorted and driven into the absolute—where Rogozhin's disintegrating balance resembles finally the earliest primality in man. Rogozhin, exchanging crosses with Prince Myshkin seems unlike the man who attempts to murder Myshkin, yet the high state of ambivalence throughout is obvious, the continuous cornering and extortion of one impulse only, the steady disintegration toward a definite form of death. The suggestibility of Rogozhin's Superego, personified at times in Myshkin himself, towards the impulse of murder, reaches the absolute stance in Rogozhin in the finale, with the murder of Nastasya, and erases the tension of former ambivalence in him. Rogozhin at the end of the novel, is conscious, sane, but in
only the narrowest definition of a rationality necessary to human functioning. The struggle between images of good and evil, or life and death, is resolved finally in the tragic impulse towards death alone. The struggle is highly ambivalent throughout, supporting Freud's idea that the conflict between these two currents cannot be promptly settled because—there is no other way of putting it—they are localized in the subject's mind in such a manner that they cannot come up against each other.7

Freud's thesis that the conflicting forces cannot come up against each other qualifies the process of capitulation toward a single psychological position in Rogozhin. The end of the novel presents both a man whose outer form of normality is a sham and a man whose performance as a murderer has completed his self-destruction. There no longer exists in this personality an essential balance or agreement between the impulses of life and death. The possibility of one ambivalent attitude winning out exists, and is found in Rogozhin's surrender to his unconscious desire to murder. In this sense Rogozhin, though not totally nor necessarily ever absolute in his unconscious
feelings, commits an absolute act which allows him to define himself according to only one side of his personality which results in a negation of his personality altogether. A comment by R. D. Laing supports this:

The withdrawal from reality results in the 'self's' own impoverishment. Its omnipotence is based on impotence. Its freedom operates in a vacuum. Its activity is without life. The self becomes desiccated and dead.

Thus, standard definitions of ambivalence given by Freud,

emotional ambivalence in the proper sense of the term—that is, the simultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object

and Bettelheim,

and beneath most hate is love, because we only hate if we care, otherwise we are simply indifferent.

no longer apply to Rogozhin's personality. The process of unravelling layers of guilt, "built in" by the social consciousness of his age and society, and presented as models of such morality in the Ypanchins, and the equally strong conscience of Myshkin's superego-
like existence in his life, is shown devastatingly throughout the work. Rogozhin begins as an excitable gambler, living wildly and ecstatically, and gradually becomes more macabre, isolated, meditative and finally morbid in his total alienation from reality. The young consumptive student Ippolit describes the key to Rogozhin's undoing:

There is a limit to disgrace in the consciousness of one's own worthlessness and powerlessness beyond which a man cannot go, and after which he begins to feel a tremendous satisfaction in his own disgrace. 11

Reality is finally built around the inhuman perception of self, which clings to its degradation—a degradation which is only intensified by a more positive glimpse of life such as Rogozhin finds in Myshkin's compassionate character. Nastasya's treatment of Rogozhin is obviously extreme and conscious humiliation, yet she has chosen her object well, as she herself realizes:

You've got powerful passions, Parfyon... such passions as might have landed you in Siberia if you weren't intelligent as well, for... you've got a lot of intelligence. 12

Myshkin himself points out Rogozhin's obsessional and neurotic grasp on life:
It occurred to me that if this misfortune had not befallen you, if this love hadn't happened, you'd perhaps have become just like your father, and in a very short time too. You'd have settled down quietly in this house alone with your mute and obedient wife, hardly ever opening your mouth even to utter a stern word, trusting no man and having no need to, and merely making money in gloomy silence.13

The novel offers the dilemma of the potentially absolute stand in Rogozhin, echoed in Dostoyevsky's explanation of him:

If there was a certain awkwardness in his speech and gestures, it was only on the surfaces; deep down this man was always the same.14

Thus, the characters who know Rogozhin sense the underlying absolute position his emotion will take; yet he struggles throughout the novel with a high intensity of ambivalence, with the impulse towards life and the impulse towards death. In this sense, Rogozhin reaches a definition of the primal unparalleled elsewhere in the novel, for the strength of the conflicting tendencies within his soul surpass what is defined as normal. Lebedev, as a buffoon-type prophet, summarizes the conflict as
the law of destruction and the law of self-preservation are equally strong in humanity.15

Rogozhin's struggle towards life is portrayed minutely throughout the novel. Prince Myshkin states evidence of Rogozhin's agony in his conflict at the beginning:

Rogozhin was not just a passionate soul; he was a fighter for all that he wanted to regain his lost faith by force. He had a tormenting need of it now.16

Rogozhin's "better self" comes through continuously. His earliest portrayal of conscience is illustrated by his outrage at his brother's act of sacrilege in removing the gold tassels from their father's coffin.

No use wasting them, he thinks; cost a fortune they does. Why, damn him, I could send him to Siberia for that, so help me, for its a sacrilege, it is! 17

When Nastasya enters Ganya's home and causes a scene resulting in Myshkin having his face slapped by Ganya, Rogozhin feels quick compassion for the "sheep-like" Myshkin:

He'll be sorry for this ... you'll be ashamed, Ganya, of having insulted such
a—sheep ... Prince, my dear fellow, leave them. Send them all to the devil. Come along with me. You'll see how much Rogozhin loves you:18

Rogozhin's other side is evident in his near-stabbing of Myshkin, but there is great remorse in his soul afterward. He has a conscience, a sense of guilt far out of proportion to his ability to reason or understand his own motives. Dostoyevsky appears to hint that the mystical quality of the Prince's epileptic fit prevents Rogozhin's assault. More reasonable perhaps, is the fact that the hated person's shriek of utter terror preceding the fit brings forth Rogozhin's inherent humanity and compassion to his consciousness, and he pities, and forgets to hate. Myshkin learns of the shame and remorse which Rogozhin feels following the incident when Lebedev tells him how Rogozhin, "that monster",19 comes to inquire about his health every day.

The idea that Rogozhin is bent on Nastasya's murder throughout is similarly refuted by his obvious protection of her. As she whips the officer who insults her across the face and he turns to strike her, it is Rogozhin, "pale and shaken",20 who rushes
forward and leads her away. Such an act on Rogozhin's part is ironic for he must identify with the officer's humiliation at the hands of this woman in retrospect. In any immediate sense, however, his impulse to save what he will later destroy is strongest.

Rogozhin himself is able to define the difference between himself and Myshkin, and consequently, his great ambivalence in contrast to the Prince's positive rationality:

We love in different ways too. There's a difference in everything... You say you love her with pity. There's no sort of pity for her in me. And she hates me too, more than anything. I dream of her every night now, always that she is laughing at me with other men. And that's what she is doing, brother.

If Myshkin plays the role of the "superego" in Rogozhin's life as well as in the lives of Nastasya and all of the characters in the novel, he symbolizes for Rogozhin all that is finest in men—in human sensitivity and most important, in their own goodness. Such a realization of the possibility of positive worth is their kernel of destruction. Myshkin says to himself, at one point, "am I to blame for everything?" He sees all that makes the human being
real, and earth-bound. But as the epitome of goodness and belief in all humanity, he alienates the people he tries to save. He increases, ironically, the ambivalence and intensity in the human souls he touches—and alienates such souls from him. By reminding them of their own goodness and impulses toward life, he demands too much, perhaps more than the human situation can give, because he will not, or cannot, admit to what he sees, i.e. that they are also driven, self-abnegating creatures of egoistic, impossible illusions. Myshkin sees, but cannot accept the human situation as final. When he fears Nastasya's personality has become totally destructive, self-willed in a conscious and determined pattern, he denies any love for her: "I cannot love her anymore and she knows it."23

Further, Myshkin states that "in her pride, she'll never forgive me for my love—and we shall both perish."24 In this sense, she cannot forgive the Prince for showing her that she can be, or is, "fine, good, pure," for she clings to what she feels will revenge herself with life, her "bad, awful"
image. Such hopelessness has a taint of enjoyment in it, and the Prince exposes her facade by openly expressing love and compassion for her. The gesture by the Prince to save her is not enough; compassion at this point robs her of an established self-image with which to meet all external circumstances in the world around her. In this case belief, so long denied in life, becomes too threatening, all too nearly impossible to be counted on. The Prince's sensitive compassion for Nastasya clips the wings of her self-imposed martyrdom, and aggravates the beginnings of insanity. By revealing the individual's ability to care to themselves, he brings forth their worst. Myshkin's rational decision to turn away from Nastasya at this point is out of necessity. He must, for his own life's sake, ignore the conscious determined egoism or will bent on destruction of life in Nastasya. He is to be compared, finally, with the psychiatrist, R. D. Laing, in so far as Myshkin realizes that to go down into the patient's hell is to perish, and yet is the only thing that will possibly save the patient. Dostoyevsky's own religious impulse is evident here in so far as Myshkin assumes that
his descent into hell will purify him. Again there exists the parallel between the figure of Myshkin and Christ—both taking the burden of another's agony upon themselves. Myshkin finally perishes in another's hell, along with the "patient", in his agonized awareness of the final despair in which Rogozhin murders and still continues to breathe and endure. Rogozhin, in this last state, is more terrifying to Myshkin than any previous impulse toward self-destruction revealed in Rogozhin has struck him, and aside from the fact of the murder itself, the Prince loses any precious distance, or "clinical" space from the agony in front of him. True compassion, such as he possesses, cannot refute Laing's statement that

the sense of identity requires the existence of another by whom one is known, and a conjunction of this other person's recognition of one's self with self-recognition.26

The close identification of Rogozhin with Myshkin throughout the novel parallels the idea of the theory of double identities found throughout Dostoyevsky's work. Laing's presentation of the divided self also relates to the theory that Myshkin and Rogozhin are
are halves of the same personality. Rogozhin recognizes the "pity" that Myshkin claims to feel for Nastasya, although he does not feel such compassion himself. He also knows that Myshkin's compassionate nature must necessarily result from an impotence which is a denial of Rogozhin's own obsessed desire for Nastasya. Yet they are, in a sense, different sides of the same coin, or representatives of the two impulses of life and death which constitute the basic struggle in human existence. By seeing in each other the repressed side of their own personalities, Rogozhin and Myshkin are in an unconscious way imprisoned within each other's self-image. Thus, in the last scene, following Nastasya's murder, Rogozhin knows Myshkin, although not much else, and his grasp on this reality and self-possession cannot be denied. He cannot be left alone in his broken awareness, consciously talking trivialities, and unconsciously horrified with his act and with no alternative nor escape to be had:

He was still talking in a whisper, and without hurrying, slowly and as before,
with the same queer, dreamy expression. Even while he told him about the curtain, he seemed to wish to tell him something else, in spite of the glibness with which he spoke.

Earlier, however, the superego, personified by Myshkin, demands only the rational "good" side of Rogozhin. The Rogozhin who exchanges crosses is embraced, but the Rogozhin who raised his knife is ignored. In this sense, Myshkin must deny the human predicament, which is ambivalence. A good example of the heightening of this same ambivalence as a cause of Myshkin's role in Rogozhin's life is illustrated when Myshkin wishes to embrace Rogozhin after having exchanged crosses with him:

No sooner did Rogozhin raise his arms than he let them fall again. He could not bring himself to do it; he turned away so as not to look at the prince. He did not want to embrace him.

"Never you fear! I may have taken your cross, but I shan't cut your throat for your watch!" he muttered thickly and suddenly broke into a sort of strange laugh. A moment later his face became completely transformed; he grew terribly pale, his lips trembled, his eyes blazed. He raised his arms, and embraced the prince warmly, and said breathlessly:

"Well, take her, if that's how it is to be! She's yours. I give her to you. Remember Rogozhin!"
And leaving the Prince, he went hurriedly in without looking at him, and slammed the door behind him.28

The constant leaps and plunges of feeling which Rogozhin is victim to at this point carry an intensity too great to maintain a "normal" balance. The process of disintegration which follows is a result of the extreme conflict between a life and death impulse, and his increasing bent towards death alleviates the tension in this respect.

Primal emotion, upon which ambivalence draws its intensity, is a conceptual state of mind so unfettered and pure that it is difficult to imagine its presence in the modern human consciousness. Yet Freud says that the demonic or irrational is a basic motive in human relationships: "The primitive stages can always be re-established; the primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable."29 Much of passion in the complex, highly ambivalent personality may colloquially be called "primal" and may, in fact, highly resemble such feeling, yet one must regard Freud's explanation of the "inheritance of an archaic constitution as an atavistic vestige"30
as the "more real" state of mind. The passionate feelings found in Rogozhin are emphasizing the extreme ambivalence he feels toward the Prince and Nastasya; the two facets of his ambivalence reach intensities that can only be defined as psychologically insane. The final state of mind he reaches is an absolute, or static one, in so far as he has stopped the conflict of the contrary currents of life and death that had previously wrenched him apart. Nastasya is dead and can now be passively encountered. Such a position is a terrible judgement on human life, for Rogozhin, like Heathcliff who loves Cathy "dead", is able to endure the woman he has desired only after she is "undesirable", *i.e.* beyond desire. One may well wonder whether Rogozhin will, even with supreme guidance, ever leave this present state of somnambulance to arrive at a state where he could feel remorse.

Rogozhin is a study of the intensities of ambivalence and the portrayal of the conflict which he undergoes is relevant and relatable to modern sensibility. More difficult perhaps is the study of unparalleled emotional paralysis in Heathcliff who
exemplifies the absolute throughout *Wuthering Heights*. We may surmise the causal and environmental factors which have forced Heathcliff into his frozen emotional position which he adheres to throughout the novel. He is a Liverpool orphan with a ghetto background, and he has never received any sufficient amount of love or affection with which to evolve emotionally into boyhood. He arrives at Wuthering Heights as a

sullen, patient child; hardened, perhaps, to ill-treatment: he would stand Hindley's blows without winking or shedding a tear, and my pinches moved him only to draw in a breath and open his eyes, as if he had hurt himself by accident and nobody was to blame.

Pain inflicted upon his person does not reach him because he has so early withdrawn response or any positive expectation in human contact. Nelly's description of him during his illness does not attempt to deny his need of her, and here he does have a will to live, but she notes the passive manner in which he reacts at so early an age to the misery and discomfort of sickness:
However, I will say this, he was the quietest child that ever nurse watched over. The difference between him and the others forced me to be less partial. Cathy and her brother harassed me terribly; he was as uncomplaining as a lamb; though hardness not gentleness, made him give little trouble. 32

The need to survive is in some part Heathcliff's only guiding principle at this stage of his life; Mr. Earnshaw's thoughtful perception of Heathcliff's emotional retardation is translated into a simple tool of survival. Nelly again notes that "he was not insolent to his benefactor, he was simply insensible." 33 But there is a definite process of psychological "unravelling" in Heathcliff as well as in Rogozhin; the difference lies in its direction in so far as Rogozhin's struggle evinced a better side whereas Heathcliff's emotional absolutism steadily disintegrates into death. There is an impulse toward self-destruction and destruction of life in Heathcliff which appears at times purely primal and that is found nowhere else in English literature. 34 Ironically, because Heathcliff has a more narrow emotional hold on life, because he does not experience the constant play of ambivalences in his soul that plague Rogozhin,
he never reaches a peak of emotion to murder—he never has to. He procrastinates the action of murder contained both in his multiple curses against all those around him and life itself; he almost appears to lack the necessary energy to care enough to act. Bettelheim's description of autism in children and concentration camp prisoners suggests the paralysing absolute in the passion of Heathcliff, who could be said to exist in a position of despair where even the requisite energy to end it all is lacking, or else where all doing is avoided precisely to defend against a passive dying, as in death by marasmus, for example.35

To say that Heathcliff is absolute, then, is to infer his difference from Rogozhin who is still refracted and indecisive and open to suggestion. Heathcliff cannot murder for the same reasons that he cannot prevent himself from dying. His death is brought on primarily by malnutrition and exposure to endless damp, cold nights in the rain, but the simple act of survival has escaped his grasp by this time. Erikson offers an explanation of this kind of willful indifference:
This sounds dangerously like common sense; like all health, however, it is a matter of course only to those who possess it, and appears as a most complex achievement to those who have tasted its absence.36

Bettelheim's definition, again, has relevance to Heathcliff's emotional paralysis:

His trouble is that more than any human being, he [the autistic child] carries everything back to one, and only one set of experiences, to which he connects or associates all things.37

Heathcliff's strong identification with Catherine is fixated, as Doheșy suggests,38 to the childhood paradisal relationship that was interrupted by Catherine's realization of adulthood and the external world around her. She has only a superficial grasp of the outside reality, but she exhibits the potential to develop other facets of living, relating, perceiving by her willingness to enter another social position. Heathcliff cannot follow, and as Catherine is leading the way only superficially—she remains grounded in their infantile existence as well, and yearns for her childhood—both are destroyed. When Bettelheim speaks of the rarity of the "perfect positive attachment", and doubts
that such "a flawless love is available to man", he is qualifying the portrait of Heathcliff only slightly, for his definitions of autism describe Heathcliff's development unusually well:

Because of the one single relation that propelled him out of a position of love and ambivalence with overwhelming force he became, so to say, glued to hate. (It is our task to help him move from this position of extreme hate and dejection toward that human ambivalence in which normal relations exist.)

Heathcliff remains without self-realization, or any sense of identity that maturity connotes, throughout the story. The grown man whose sadistic mental cruelty undermines all the individuals around him is the child simultaneously who

got on to the bed, and wrenched open the lattice, bursting, as he pulled at it, into an uncontrollable passion of tears. "Come in! come in!" he sobbed. "Cathy, do come. Oh, do—once more! Oh! my heart's darling! hear me this time, Catherine, at last!"

His reality is immovable, set in the past childhood in which he felt his sole and total identification in another human being, and which, consequently, never allows a necessary and much needed growth of self-recognition or identity.
Forster, commenting on his early novel, recently published, *Maurice*, mentions sadly that love does not, and cannot change the individual, or the human situation. Love is not something that decides anything finally. But this opinion can be made only by a lover who has self-realization, and whose loving is not destructive nor annihilating of his identity. Thus when, in *Aspects of the Novel*, he says of Catherine and Heathcliff that "even when they were alive their love and hate transcended them," he is speaking only of life lost in a belief of transcendence. He realizes the rational caution which must be exercised over all our emotions, and which consequently deprives us of such transcendental intensity. Yet the two forces of rationality and primal emotion must struggle together to insure life; transcendence is just another word for death on earth. Forster states finally that "It is a pity that Man cannot be at the same time impressive and truthful." The most important distinction to be made at this point between the states of mental existence exemplified in Rogozhin and Heathcliff, and so far patterned as ambivalence and absolutism, can be
essentially explained in an examination of guilt--
its presence in the cultural and individual positions
of each man's personality. Where higher reason exists,
even to a fairly illiterate or unlearned degree,
guilt can be somewhat understood, or "handled" by
the individual; this is in varying degrees of self-
knowledge. Much of it is "below the surface," much
is irrational fear in everyday living, much of the
self's superego remains, thus, unconscious. The
distinction that may be drawn rests in the ways that
guilt permeates the lives of Rogozhin and Heathcliff,
and their inability to reason it out, and yet their
constant effort to come to terms with it. Rogozhin's
attempts to rid himself of his involvement with
Nastasya, and his guilt resulting both from his high
ambivalence to Myshkin and his desire of Nastasya
echo Forster's words that man cannot be entirely im-
pressive and truthful simultaneously. Rogozhin,
unlike Heathcliff's literal belief in the soul's
transcending power, is more modern, more human, and
more realistic in his pathetic attempts at honesty in
both emotional and moral behavior. He fails to be
impressive at all, even in his final display of
passionate capitulation to his desire to murder; Dostoyevsky presents in his portrait of Rogozhin no belief in the soul's transcendence and immortality. Thus, Rogozhin is the more realistic portrayal of the attempt to be entirely impressive and truthful at once, and the result is rational horror at both the need "to feel" carried to its furthest extreme, and at the power that guilt plays in the actual consciousness of the individual.

Ernest Becker pinpoints the conceptual conscience in human psychology:

Guilt means that one's action is bound, that one is inhibited by an object without knowing why. And the most direct and unfathomable source of such inhibition is the existential priority and awesomeness of the concrete parental organism. It is this superordinancy of the parent that takes root well before the child learns symbols: hence, it is not subject to conscious scrutiny (therefore, it is "unconscious"). Furthermore, and this is important—even if the miraculousness of the parental organism were subject to symbolic scrutiny, there would still be no way of explaining the primary miracle of the created organism. Hence, this is a natural and symbolically unresolvable guilt, that is, a deep feeling that one's own existence is hopelessly transcended by the priority of all creation.

Becker's theory that guilt is based on the despair of "knowing that one's own existence is hopelessly
transcended by the priority of all creation," reiterates Dostoyevsky's portrayal of Rogozhin, who comes to realize

a limit to disgrace in the consciousness of one's own worthlessness and powerlessness beyond which a man cannot go, and after which he begins to feel a tremendous satisfaction in his own disgrace. 45

The loss of any adequate feeling or worthy identity or selfhood in Rogozhin is accomplished gradually throughout The Idiot; the contributing factors are Nastasya's inhumanity toward him and Myshkin's underlying reproach. Rogozhin is transcended by his own sense of worthlessness and impotence. His sense of guilt is obvious and is pushed to a high degree throughout by Myshkin acting as the "superego" within Rogozhin's unconscious. Dostoyevsky is aware, at least indirectly, of the role which unconscious guilt plays in the individual soul, for he portrays Myshkin as the "superego" of Rogozhin's personality, and Myshkin himself recognizes the fact that he has increased the ambivalence and intensity of Rogozhin's emotional struggle by making Rogozhin aware of guilt, and by suggesting the idea of murder openly to him.
Dostoyevsky is able to expose the role which guilt plays in the human makeup by showing the effect that the entirely "good" Myshkin has on the lives around him. Erikson's comment that both Freud and Luther illustrate "a grim willingness to do the dirty work of their respective ages: for each kept human conscience in focus," might describe in some sense the prophetic writer, in this case, Dostoyevsky. By unconsciously revealing the control which unconscious guilt has over the individual, he reveals simultaneously the "dirty work" of his age and society, which so often supports the inherent guilt of past ages.

Lebedev, for example, presents the concept of conscience--and thus, the sense of guilt--what he calls "qualms of conscience," and he does so in the light of early Christian idealism. But it is also a keen portrayal of psychological guilt--a human force, as the "superego" in any age:

The criminal ends up by going and laying information against himself with the clergy and by giving himself up to the authorities. Now one cannot help asking oneself what tortures awaited him in that age--the wheel, the stake, and the fire! Who induced him to go and inform against himself?
Why not simply stop at the figure of sixty murders and keep the secret till his dying day? Why not simply leave the monks alone and live in penance as a hermit? Or why not finally become a monk himself? Well, here is the solution. There must have therefore been something stronger than the stake, and even the habits of twenty years! There must have been an idea stronger than any calamity, famine, torture, plague, leprosy, and all that Hell which mankind could not have endured without that idea that bound and guided men's hearts and fructified the waters of life! 47

The idea is not so much inspirational as a search for expiation of guilt—more dramatic in his portrayal of it, but existing in all psychological conflicts. Rogozhin's informing on himself, in this sense, is just far more indirect, complex and without an overt guiding principle as is witnessed in his repugnance toward Myshkin on occasion, and his total honesty and submissiveness toward him at other times.

The element of conscience is almost non-existent in an overt way in the major characters of Wuthering Heights; as a study of guilt this novel deceives in the immediate sense when it appears to deny guilt in the human psychological portrayal of
Catherine and Heathcliff. Because the social culture of the puritanical world in which Heathcliff and Catherine have evolved uses religion as punishment rather than an affirmative spirituality, neither child escapes the pressured rigidity of it. Only their reaction against such pressure is evident. Catherine's notebook evinces the desperation of a typical Sunday morning:

Joseph must needs get up a congregation in the garret; . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Heathcliff, myself, and the unhappy ploughboy were commanded to take our Prayer-books, and mount; we were ranged in a row, on a sack of corn, groaning and shivering, and hoping that Joseph would shiver too, so that he might give us a short homily for his own sake. A vain idea! The service lasted precisely three hours; and yet my brother had the face to exclaim, when he saw us descending, "What, done already?" 48

The cruelty of such punishment is not the immediate effect of bigotry on Joseph's part, for he might easily have instilled a life-long conscious piety as pretentious and self-righteous as his own in a weaker child. But both Catherine and Heathcliff maintain their strongest identification in themselves; thus, their only escape is in their own imaginative
world. The damage that such hypocritical piety does is to give strength to their alienation. That they are damned and convinced of their utter worthlessness, their evil character, becomes at this early stage the one great tie between them. They may dare the world because they are both proclaimed wicked, and no knowledge of goodness in themselves could possibly appeal. They begin to act in spite of fear, and guilt, on a juvenile level, and carry the behavior into an adult world of life and death. Possibly guilt does not have the more metaphysical connotations in children, like Heathcliff and Catherine, as it does in the adult Rogozhin, and in this sense the enormity of a fully developed conscience is not really at play in them at this stage.

The image of wickedness which forms so strong a bond between the two children is instilled by the three "parental" figures that consciously play a role in their lives directly. Joseph is the most extreme and cruel form of such sadistic manipulation in their lives, and might easily have caused the initial reaction to righteousness which they undergo. Nelly Dean's
fondness for both children is never stronger than her almost superstitious belief of their waywardness—
they are "changelings"\textsuperscript{49}, an early Anglo-Saxon term for

any ugly, queer, idiotic, or bad-tempered child, superstitiously explained away as
being a substitute left by the fairies for a child stolen by them.\textsuperscript{50}

Nelly exhibits the complacent modesty and control that is far more subtle than Joseph's wild incanta-
tions, in so far as she is lacking in any real fear for her own soul. She views herself as rare amongst
the inhabitants of the early Earnshaw family because of her command of her emotions and her quick summing
up of the wrongs and failings of the people around her. She too, like Joseph, punishes the children
with the threat of damnation, but it contains the underlying tone of social ridicule—something which
she fears perhaps even more. She incorporates a martyr-like existence as a faithful, loyal servant trying, for past generations to get the Earnshaws back into shape, but her self-righteousness causes petty misunderstandings throughout. Catherine I's own death is, if not in part caused by Nelly, aggra-
vated by her interference. Heathcliff's arrival after Catherine and Linton's marriage causes a break in their relationship, and a deliberate succumbing to death on Catherine's part. Because she is in earnest, and because Nelly Dean's world cannot comprehend a willful suicide, Nelly misconstrues the illness to Catherine's husband as minor. To Catherine she gives the impression that Edgar is too busy to worry about her:

His studies occupy him rather more than they ought; he is continually among his books, since he has no other society.\(^{51}\)

Throughout the estrangement of the two people, Nelly seems to experience some self-satisfaction at the pain which she causes both:

Her brother Linton shut himself up among books that he never opened—wearying, I guessed, with a continual vague expectation that Catherine, repenting her conduct, would come of her own accord to ask pardon, and seek a reconciliation—she fasted pertinaciously, under the idea, probably, that at every meal Edgar was ready to choke for her absence, and pride alone held him from running to cast himself at her feet.\(^{52}\)

She sees herself at this time as the "one sensible soul in"\(^{53}\) the Grange. When Edgar does find his wife,
who has lost partial consciousness and is in a weakened, highly psychotic state, he informs her of Nelly's deception of the truth, and both turn to condemn her. Nelly hurries away, unashamed, rather more indignant than anything:

I began to defend myself, thinking it too bad to be blamed for another's wicked waywardness.54

Nelly's manipulation of the truth is consciously an attempt to correct the ills of the people around her, yet there exists something malevolent in her fearless assumption that punishment will cure.

Nelly's incomprehension of Catherine's deliberate capitulation to death is a total lack of understanding on her part of the wide and broad ranges in which human emotion can be defined and enacted. Nelly's world is a simplistic channel of control and restraint; she has learned to cherish the repression of feeling within her own life in so far as she has the greatest terror of all of emotion. She lacks any resemblance to Freud's archaic constitution, for she values her projection of self-righteousness far more than to challenge the void within her own self. She is the
ordinary of the nineteenth century English world, yet she exemplifies the nearest standard of it with the possible exception of the urbanized Lockwood.

Catherine's own self-imposed death is a deluded attempt at reprieve. She has tip-toed into an adult world of relationships that must cater to her in order to keep her there, yet she has enough self-recognition to realize that she has destroyed some part of her husband's world. Her greatest guilt lies in the realm of her deluded falsity to Heathcliff, to her one whole relationship, "parental" in its more far-reaching implications. She, as Edgar's wife, has denied an essential part of her being, and Heathcliff's appearance is living proof of the treachery. Had he never returned, Nelly feels that Catherine, with Linton, was "in possession of deep and growing happiness." Yet Nelly also notes her deep moods during this more stable time, her introspective periods of gloom which pertained to her lost childhood, her dream-world with her secure identification with Heathcliff. In this sense, Catherine never arrives at a true feeling of individuality—she skims the surface, and remains tied to the earliest
infantile identification. It is only conjecturable whether or not she would have developed into some mature self-recognition without Heathcliff's second appearance in her life. But his arrival into her life at this point brings about a renewal of the fatal illness, and she dies willingly. She is false to her idea of her own "basic emotion" and thus tries to sacrifice herself for both incompatible loves. Seeing herself as a sacrifice, she admits to her sense of guilt when she begs Heathcliff not to reproach her because

If I've done wrong, I'm dying for it.
It is enough.56

The tragedy lies not in her death, which strong emotions might have caused at any time, but in her misconceived idea of its necessity for atonement. She is egoistic enough to leave Heathcliff with a sense of utter alienation on earth, yet had Heathcliff not returned her misguided love with his own, she might have left a narcissistic world and developed a maturity which most of us seem to recognize as necessary for the abolition of our suffering. Thus, a major quality of the "prophetic" is in the way it "destroys"
the world and seems to take for granted the destruction of the "self" and even encourages that same self-destruction. Catherine accomplishes her revenge on a life that in her eyes was a denial of her identity; she also turns to death with a belief in a promise of peace and contentment which life has not offered. Finally, her guilt, however misdirected, is expiated by her death, for she is a sacrifice to Heathcliff's irrevocable remorse at her betrayal of him.
NOTES


2. Doheny, "From PMLA," p. 34.

3. When referring to "the novel's emotional effect on the whole", the point which is being made does not refer to a kind of "cosmic oneness"—such as Freud describes as the "oceanic" feeling or a "feeling as of something limitless, unbounded—" in Civilization and its Discontents, p.11. (W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1961). The idea under discussion is rather an evident and objective recognition of an emotional result of the novel's impact in so far as the effects remain after the experience of the emotional involvement with the work is over.


5. Sigmund Freud, Totem, p. 159.


7. Sigmund Freud, Totem, p. 29.


17 Dostoyevsky, *Idiot*, p. 34.


Myshkin's affect on the individuals around him here is to be compared to Bruno Bettelheim's study of the autistic child, Laurie. The child appeared to make definite progress toward a greater degree of maturity and became very attached to her counsellor very quickly. Yet one day she inexplicably slapped the counsellor's face, and several days later, bit her counsellor's finger while the counsellor was feeding her chocolate. p. 102. The Empty Fortress (New York, The Free Press, 1967), pp. 102-103.

26 R. D. Laing, Divided Self, p. 139.

27 Dostoyevsky, Idiot, p. 650.

28 Dostoyevsky, Idiot, p. 255.


30 Sigmund Freud, Totem, p. 66. CF to #4.


32 Bronte, Heights, p. 56.

33 Bronte, Heights, p. 57.

34 Another possible character in English literature might be Gerald Crich in D. H. Lawrence's Women in Love.

35 Bettelheim, Fortress, p. 90.

37  Bettelheim, *Fortress*, p. 91.

38  Doheny, "From *PMLA*", p. 33.


40  Bettelheim, *Fortress*, p. 91.

41  Bronte, *Wuthering Heights*, p. 46.


43  Forster, *Aspects*, p. 150.


45  Dostoyevsky, *Idiot*, p. 452. CF to #11, same chapter.

46  Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, p. 9.


CHAPTER III: OVER-REPRESSION AND UNREPRESSION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROPHETIC THEORIES OF DENIS DE ROUGEMONT AND NORMAN O. BROWN WITH A VIEW TO "TESTING" THESE AS READINGS OF THE NOVELS, AND AS A SUPPORT FOR THE PROPHETIC

The primality uncovered in the two novels, Wuthering Heights and The Idiot, especially in the characters of Heathcliff and Rogozhin, is a terrible tribute to the proposed necessity of "reaching back." The outcome of each novel in question is so pessimistic, that the reader is left desperately wanting some conventional mode in which to translate such darkness. The understanding of the prophetic novel demands an unconventional point of view as Forster has pointed out, which is the element that perhaps most providentially provides for the process of returning to an earlier, more primal state. Forster in Aspects of the Novel cites the necessary qualities in prophetic writing:

It [prophetic fiction] demands humility and the absence of the sense of humour. It reaches back . . . . . . . . . . also the prophet--one imagines--has gone "off" more completely than the fantasist, he is in a remoter emotional state while he composes.²

Without distance, which the necessity of humility negates in the reader, and without the relief of
humour, which Freud's essay "Wit and its relation to the Unconscious" illuminates as a result of repression, or "from an economy of expenditure of feeling," which childhood did not need, the prophetic reader is thrown upon his own bare resources and is intimidated by being carried back into the state of irrational fears and desires which lie below his and all human consciousness. The humility which Forster demands would deny the objectivity with which the reader views the characters found in one of Jane Austin's novels. The corresponding fact that we are able to judge her characters and their actions because we have distance from them is not possible in the participation of prophetic writing. The quick relief that humour brings when the tension or emotionality of a literary scene becomes too great is also denied in the prophetic mode, where the criterion of involvement makes humour, even when Dostoyevsky tries to include it, a clumsy device. Thus, the prophetic novelist upsets the "normal" equilibrium of the reader's rational vision by demanding a momentary lapse of the repressive rationalities covering his irrational feelings. One interpretation
or function of repression in adult life is given in a work of collected essays, The Impact of Freudian Psychiatry:

The obstacle which one's own repressions constitutes against understanding others can be appreciated if one realizes that the uniformity and harmony of the conscious mind are guaranteed by repressions. To become an adult, it is necessary to "forget" infantile ways of thinking. The latter is to a much higher degree subject to the pleasure principle than is adult mentality which has to adjust itself to reality. The difficulty in understanding children, savages, neurotics, and psychotics, is therefore due not only to the difference between their mentality and ours but also to the repressing forces within ourselves. In order to become a rational adult, the primitive functions of the mind must be transformed into co-ordinated rational processes. The phenomenon of dreams alone shows most clearly, however, that the substitution of rational functions for more primitive processes is not complete.

This analysis of human repression and rationality emphasizes the discrepancy between the adult rational world and the pleasure-seeking, primal world of childhood. It fails as a definition of repression to give any explanation of the extremes and abnormalities in repression. Heathcliff preserves a childhood grasp
of realities, and thereby, remains fixed at an internally absolute state in his emotion. Rogozhin regresses to the absolute, where the intense emotion of his ambivalence solidifies into a single, death-headed impulse; and thus, he resembles the primal state, which would be finally a distorted "unforgetting" of infantile ways of thinking. The above definition explains the normal process of evolving Superego—that is, in adulthood, the Id should make itself felt comfortably, upon only certain occasions, such as in dreaming. Real life contains the aberrations of such definitive naturalness or normality; such are the savages, neurotics, psychotics, and perhaps the phenomenon of recurring childhood in the rational world—in one's self fearfully repressed, and in others, totally incomprehensible. Normality is itself an indecipherable formula for the most part inapplicable to any of us; we just take different roads to the repression of our instinctual life. Freud's last conclusions in Civilization and its Discontents evoke a pessimism comparable to the presentation of such characters as Heathcliff and Rogozhin. Within his dialectic of the opposites of the life
and death instincts, he presents a damning portrait of human culture when he views a culmination in an inevitable defeat of life in the death-headed aggression of twentieth-century society. He pleads for a sublimation of Eros, the life-giving instinct, into a rational affection between men, but he is unable to find evidence in the surrounding civilization of such compassion at work. This final conclusion of Freud's is still a basis for much discourse, argumentation and refutation of so total a pessimism. Few Freudian critics will grant Freud his last virtue: a reluctance to turn away from the truth which reality itself holds.

Yet the forerunner of psychoanalysis left the skeptical view of man's ability to save himself from himself; Freud might wish to believe differently, but his realism hesitated to confirm the rational "goodness" of men. Psychoanalytical, philosophical and religious thinkers have struggled for some answer to the apparent destructiveness of civilization. Some of their views derive directly from Freud, either as an extension of his theories, or as a refutation of his dualistic interpretation of the life and death drives which he felt comprised human instinctual life. One extension
of Freud's theoretical bias toward dualism arises in Marcuse, who accepts the opposites of Freud's theory of instincts in his "Philosophical Inquiry into Freud," Eros and Civilization. One critic, Paul A. Robinson, however, feels that Marcuse, a purported antidualist, does this in order to carry his theory of the kinds of repression caused by a conflict of two forces further:

The dualism of Eros and Thanatos was thus constantly threatening to turn into a "monism of death." This notion of the underlying unity of the instincts naturally appealed to Marcuse the inveterate antidualist. Yet in the last analysis he stressed that despite this monistic tendency Freud continued to insist on the fundamental antagonism of the two instincts:5

"The primacy of the Nirvana principle the terrifying convergence of pleasure and death, is dissolved as soon as it is established. No matter how universal the regressive inertia of organic life, the instincts strive to attain their objective in fundamentally different modes. The difference is tantamount to that of sustaining and destroying life. Out of the common nature of instinc-tual life develop two antagonistic instincts."6

Marcuse adopted Freud's instinctual dualism in order to argue that the future of humanity depended on man's ability to reverse the basically repressive trend of modern civilization.7
Yet the example of Marcuse's choice of Freudian dualism as a convenient base on which to build his own theories of repression illustrates the fact that thinkers from every quarter are attempting to find some reasonable solution which will also have the attribute of hope rather than the inherent despair found in modern civilization.

The two philosophical approaches under examination here are offered by De Rougemont and Norman O. Brown. Because they are finally the sharpest contrasts to each other, their ideas present the possibilities into which two extremes of the same question may fall into. De Rougemont is a rather liberal intellectual religious in so far as he is unincumbered by the more stringent and orthodox definitions of his faith. Yet his intellectuality is grounded in the final necessity of belief, and of faith in what cannot be immediately understood. Because he derives his thought from a traditional and conservative body of a priori philosophical-religious formula, he consistently turns toward man's ability to choose, to decide, or to deny his fate. In this sense, his recognition of man's moral position
in life is indelibly tied in with man's reason for being here on earth at all. Thus, when De Rougemont recognizes man's fall into aggression, and self-destruction, he can only appeal to the inner conscience. His idea of change must necessarily come from the inside of every individual. Yet he is not appealing for a spiritual transformation in so far as man might view his world in a new way; he appeals to rational will, to increased moral toughness, and finally, to total self-denial of questioning, knowing, understanding of one's own desires and earthly sexuality. He does not, even after a lengthy and intelligent study of the rise of the passionate-romantic illusion of love, want any further examination and skepticism. He wants an imposed will and a greater willingness to deny what is, as he is proving, "wrong" for us.

De Rougemont's approach is relevant to this study which is poised between the struggle to live both rationally and sensitively. He emphasizes the conscience of man; such an approach ultimately in turn will expose the guilt deposited by the conscience--
but the conscience is not the individual's own product in so far as it is the moral voice of centuries and civilizations long past away. Guilt in this last capacity has an inbred quality which, for a greater recourse to increased repression, could assume deadly proportions. The modern man might conceivably be frozen in his sense of guilt, without rational knowledge or remorse of why it even exists as a force in his life. Thus, De Rougemont would perhaps be, at least symbolically, the archenemy of the prophetic revelation of human primality in art. He would not be able to endorse the presentation, even unconsciously wrought though it is, because it would be supercilious, or a temptation in the dilemma which he feels man must face. He would not want such things as basic life instincts carried to their furthest extremes on a printed page because he does not, of course, want them to occur in life. But he will not recognize that the individual might understand himself and his world with far greater clarity once he has confronted what is worst in himself and in all men. De Rougemont's theories cannot be patronized,
nor passed off too lightly; the dominance of the social-cultural and archetypal conscience in man's makeup is too enormous a force to be ignored. But before his theory is refuted, one must recognize the necessity of disagreeing with a philosopher who proposes an increased dominance of conscience, and thus, repression.

Norman O. Brown offers an examination of Freud in which he finally disagrees with the dialectic of opposites in the instinctual life of the human being. Brown feels that man need not be defined along the lines of internal, and continuous conflict between the life and death holds on his unconscious; rather Brown argues for a development into a single harmonious instinct. Brown's attempt to relieve life of its pain, suffering, anxiety harbours a development of a lack of consciousness. Brown finds a "way out" of the repressive demands that society has made upon its members in a return to the early form of sensuous narcissism. The burden that a history of intellectual development has forced on man can, Brown feels, be erased by a reversal of human rationality; man will become content only when he has ceased to worry and finally, to think. But very
much part of his hypothesis is Brown's idealization of death, for it is the death instinct that propels a descent toward unconsciousness on earth. What is disguised as a glorious triumph over the rational fear of death, real or symbolically—as in a "death-in-life" position, is really a simple annihilation of life in reality. When everything ceases to matter, which is the goal Brown appears to head toward, everything ceases to be. But Brown's theory is revealed through the language of a poet, much like that of the prophetic writer, and the death instinct is disguised in its appeal of peace, and liberation. Brown, as a philosophical theorist, is the other extreme to the "superego" of De Rougemont's ideal for he embodies the death instinct in radical, exciting poetry without ever directly realizing the final portent of his message. In this last sense, Brown would oppose the prophetic artist in so far as art reveals feeling along with the experience of it; but it carries in its portrayal of the human struggle the illustration of how death and self-destruction comes about. Brown would very probably like to keep,
at least unconsciously, the chance for a rational assessment of what has happened in the prophetic portrayal of death out of the picture. In any event, his ascent into "nothingness" is pure eschewal from reality and all that constitutes human life. Brown's appeal as a philosopher is to the younger generation; his image of liberation lies in the denial of a past that has contributed to its own self-destruction by its over-loaded intellect. Brown justly recognizes that man is incomplete in such a structure, but his solution becomes a death sentence under the guise of self-contentment. With total recourse to the Dionysian spirit of complete sensuous self-involvement, man and the civilization he has built regresses to the point of a death of awareness. Thus, Brown would applaud the ideal of other-worldly narcissism that Emily Bronte presents in *Wuthering Heights*. But he would ignore the consequent suffering which such an idealism imparts to its characters. Catherine's sense of guilt and final madness leave no doubt that life itself cannot offer a complete denial of awareness; Heathcliff's death
is objectively a position of paralysis so dreadful to contemplate that no amount of idealistic peace to follow seems to justify it. From a rational point of view, Emily Bronte does not present, even unconsciously, the worst aspects of self-disintegration by accident; such elements are in her own mind as much part of the belief in an impossible illusion as the illusion itself may appear "real" to her.

Thus, the two approaches of Norman O. Brown and De Rougemont discussed above illustrate the two extreme positions which the prophetic mode can be approached from. Brown offers us the purest form of primal narcissism with which to defeat centuries of repression and over-bearing guilt. De Rougemont turns to the other side of the coin by demanding a greater control of the conscience, both personal and cultural in its extension, and by doing so, attempts to insure the breakage of an illusion of passion that has led people astray for centuries. In the final analysis, however, the two approaches lead ironically to equally devastating deaths of the self and reality. The superego in control of human consciousness is a
form of death-in-life equal only to the total lack of consciousness found in complete narcissism.

De Rougemont, like Freud, deals with opposite movements in culture—tendencies then in the individual—but remains grafted to an older tree. The old morality of brotherly love poised against a dark background of passion on earth reasserts itself in his study *Love in the Western World*. De Rougemont's "dualism" is the battle of good and evil, of the moral and immoral. Such a dualistic definition of man is a surface structure which parallels the inner dualistic forces of guilt and compassion found within Dostoyevsky's character Rogozhin. The prophetic author is able to get below the standardized symbols of man's conflict to the more essential components of his very real suffering. Thus, De Rougemont's idea of passion differs remarkably from anything meant by Freud or even, Brown. In fact, it would be difficult to point to a definition of passion in De Rougemont's terms as anything else than a "not-agape" kind of drive or love. In the Christian tradition the philosopher finds a heretical strain of repressive pessimism in the Cathartic sect which purports
that the individual contains two forces, the dark as well as the light. For example, the rise of the Cathar sect within the church in early France demanded the purity of the body as well as the soul. Their restrictions on sexuality, De Rougemont illustrates, show how they in reality placed a greater premium on it:

"they unquestionably encourage the sexual instinct by the very fact that they seek to transcend it." The troubadours, De Rougemont states, carried the religion into the lives of the ordinary people, and in this way, repression of daily life under the guise of passionate and romantic love still asserts itself. In this almost too simplistic analysis of human repression and its consequent end in death, De Rougemont offers a way out through brotherly love or Agape. But in line with his thought, the positive side of his assertions weaken when he turns to them for support. Agape cannot be both spontaneous awareness of related sympathies and a rational adult and dutiful caring or understanding of others. It would seem that it can be, in De Rougemont's terms, one or the other, but not both.
To clarify the point where Freud leaves us in *Civilization and its Discontents* with his final indictment of our sublimations, a closer look at the work of two of these critical philosophers, De Rougemont and Norman O. Brown will encompass the directions that their views in contrast to a Freudian viewpoint can lead. Both De Rougemont and Brown represent in their most general sense, cultural tendencies found readily around us in the present age. Neither are able, however, to incorporate their study of man into a larger scheme of change, in the sense of a truly historic study of man, as for example Marcuse does with his welding of Freudian and Marxist theories. Robinson points out the pretentiousness of Brown's subtitle to his study of *Life Against Death* as "the psychoanalytical meaning of history":

He was unable to account for the historical rise of repressive civilization (the subtitle of *Life Against Death* as the "psychoanalytical meaning of history" was both pompous and misleading), and equally incapable of envisioning any historical escape from the dilemma of modern unhappiness.
Similarly De Rougemont's study of western civilization assumes that some sort of better world existed before the Cathar rise in early France, that his heretical sect can somehow be blamed for the deviousness of human desires and irrationality, but that man can be "moderated" into a better world. With a huge lack of moderation, De Rougemont ends on a prophetic note of "beyond tragedy another happiness waits"11, without clarifying whether it is in this world or in another. Thus, both men remain in a purely psychological interpretation of man without really being sure of how such an interpretation is carried outside to the masses of individuals concerned. The theories of both Brown and De Rougemont depend on inner change only, without the necessary alterations in social and cultural institutions which form human behavior.

The interpretation that each philosopher offers underlies a great need for a kind of attitude or form of love, or ideal human stance in the face of whatever is meant in each case as the death instinct or drive. De Rougemont's interpretation of the passionate-romantic element so prevalent in western life is its final
culmination in death. Begun as a rebellion against the inhibitions placed upon individuals by strict codes of anti-sexuality, the passionate aspect of loving remains in the mind, and as De Rougemont shows throughout literary history so far, develops into a negating narcissism which denies the development of compassion. He seems to feel, moreover, that the orthodox church held no illusions about sexual needs and drives in their individuals before the Catharist movement began an unhealthy suppression of sexuality. He does not suggest, however, a return to this more healthful free state of behavior, and one wonders why, since it is the suppression and consequent repression of sexuality into passionate-romanticism which he is arguing against. His conclusion rests on the necessity of climbing out of the death-headed impulse, which he calls "Eros", which in turn is narcissism. His ideal would probably be approximate to the impotent Myshkin. Although he appears ready to accept the earthly makeup of man, it somehow always seems a denial of man as he is in reality. Why such constant repression and denial of passion? De Rougemont appears at times to view it as an inherent element of spontaneous
although destructive proportions. He seems to either confuse, or simply not recognize the distinction between the passionate illusion of impossible love and the irrational drive of man's instincts. That the passionate illusion rests on the primality which forms a base on which civilization rests is ignored in *Love in the Western World* in so far as De Rougemont attempts to deny the inherent existence of primality at all in men.

By love, De Rougemont designates the rather wide and at times incongruous growth of romanticism and repressed sexuality with the spontaneous, primal behavior of the emotions. He is careful to avoid psychoanalytical interpretations of such loving, going so far at one point to state that to recite at this point the formulas of "sublimation" and "inhibition" is simply to refuse to understand what one is talking about.\(^\text{12}\)

Such emotion described by the title "love" is the outcome of an early narcissism retained, and becomes finally death-headed. Whether it is possible to parallel De Rougemont's terms and meanings with the critical
framework this study has been employing is questionable, but for the sake of better understanding the theories of each side, some attempt must be made.

De Rougemont does not speak of passion as a solely spontaneous, primal Eros, not as, in Freud's concept or even Brown's idea of a pleasure-principle or life instinct. Eros, in De Rougemont's theory, is the selfish involvement of one's life with baser and yet, more repressed sexuality. De Rougemont feels that

Everything possible—and indeed rather more than everything possible—has been attributed to a "deflexion" of sexual instincts.13

The sexual basis of twentieth century psychological theory is reduced to the "lower" realm of human sensations and drives. De Rougemont states that

It is impossible for anybody who thinks that the physical came first to give reasons for his opinion. Nobody has found out that the "material" meaning of every word has actually preceded the "mental" meaning. The opinion that it has is merely based on a presumption—that the physical is more true and more real than the mental, and hence that the physical is at the foundation of all things, and is the principle of all explanation.14

Only the "physical" in the narrowest sense can be construed as "lower", as for example the evolutionary
scale illustrates the scheme of life evolving from the lower rungs of its ladder as the purely primal or animalistic stages. But all stages, as Freud's "archaic inheritance"\textsuperscript{15} shows, remain—even in the over-repressed and over-civilized individuals of twentieth century life. What De Rougemont seems to ignore consistently throughout his argument is the necessity of an awareness of physical being and physical life in one's self and in all human beings. Physical being must balance or correlate to mental life if such a division must be made. But the physical in the sense that it is only thought of as "lower" denies reality and prejudges the issue. By drawing such a keen distinction between the sexual and mental or imaginative worlds, De Rougemont does not understand the fuller connotations of the word "sexual"—in Freud's sense, a life-giving force, "Eros", or life itself, all that connotes creativity and imagination in the human world. By criticizing only a very superficial and narrow psychological vein, and this was certainly not Freud's meaning, which attempts to explain human existence in terms only of conditioned need and response, De Rougemont illustrates ignorance of psychology in general and in particular, of Freudian theories.
Freud would never discount nor "resent" human imagination and creativity. But De Rougemont's statement that psychology is resentful of the imagination:

But I may remark that its propensity in this direction may well testify to some deep resentment of poetry and indeed of all creative--and hence venturesome--activity of the mind.¹⁶

denies any real understanding of psychological knowledge. He appears, rather, to fear a systematic field of theory which might turn toward his own spiritual framework for explanations of human behavior.

De Rougemont's argument with the "materialistic superstition" which he finds present in psychology lies in the fact that such a theoretical approach attempts to define the higher by the lower, or the "superior by the inferior"¹⁷, as, for example, Emily Bronte and Dostoyevsky would do if they would write philosophy instead of novels. Yet everything is materialist, which is concerned with the world, and part of human earthly existence. Religious fervour, with its own use of erotic language and imagery, is otherworldly in its nature, and therefore, is uncontaminated by the use of worldly rhetoric. De Rougemont is
inconsistent when he insists that religious "other-worldliness" is good, when the "other-worldliness" of the romantic-passionate state, because it is neither happy nor religious, is argued to be death-headed. There is no argument with his basic beliefs, yet he argues on a clearly rational basis against other mythical structure, and remains with some poor circular reasoning in his own field.

De Rougemont's theoretical approach bases its beginning premises on the "ought" or spiritual conclusions he believes to exist in truth. He argues from an a priori standpoint that the studies in psycho-analysis of human behavior are presumptuous in their application of behavior to general theory. He says that

Once the mysteries had been forgotten, it was inevitable that readers of the Romance should interpret its too skillful allegories as applying to profane life. The modern mind has supposed that the transposition thus effected—after the twelfth century—could serve as a primary datum. It had supposed that it could "explain" the higher by the lower—unalloyed mysticism by human passion.
De Rougemont states further that

where the science speaks of mysticism as having resulted from a sublimation of instinct, it is enough to change the direction of the relation stated, and to write: The "instinct" in question is the result of the profanation of an early form of mysticism.19

Such a statement might be so, but it offers no proof that mysticism came "first." De Rougemont inverts the human makeup so that instinct becomes a result rather than a cause of a mystic state of mind. Thus, sexuality, sublimated and inhibited, is not the cause of mystical states, or "souls" but is a direct result of such a state. Thus his statement that

all this kind of thing has led the materialistic psychologist--from Voltaire to Freud--to declare with odd assurance, and purely on verbal grounds, that mystics are the victims of a sexual aberration. . . . the views put forth by the learned in the nineteenth century have now become the prepossessions of the vulgar. However, not only is the materialistic attitude to mysticism clearly more indicative of an obsession in those who cling to it than enlightening about mysticism itself, but also it is an attitude based upon an error at once historical and psychological.20
Because the saints of past ages have used similar romantic-erotic courtly rhetoric, De Rougemont attempts to defend their use of such language on the assumption that the language of poetry at the time was that of courtly love, and no new kinds of expression were at their disposal. But he draws a distinction between the use of the rhetoric and the analogous feelings which the rhetoric embodies. Thus, he says that

the language of passion, as the mystics employ it, has not been to begin with the language of the senses and nature, but the rhetoric of a kind of askesis exemplified by the twelfth century heresy of Southern France.21

He assumes finally that these particular saints "save" the rhetoric by incorporating it into the realm of religious expression:

What an extraordinary return and incorporation of heresy by means of a rhetoric devised by heretics for use against the Church, and which the Church, thanks to the saints, eventually wrested from them!22

De Rougemont distorts the obvious misconception of the saints' erotic rhetoric addressed to the divine. The
saints cannot save the "rhetoric" simply by employing it in divine prayer or poetry. The language remains erotic in its conception and imagery. Again, De Rougemont works from the divine natures of the saints themselves, down to the "materialistic superstition" when he assumes the language to be cleansed and purified by the kinds of people who used it. He is willing to overlook all psychological definition of repression and inhibition in the saints' personalities, and he assumes that because they showed themselves aware of neurotic states of mind, they were not subject to them:

Geniuses such as Saint John of the Cross and Saint Teresa must have been more alive than any one else to the perils of "spiritual luxuricousness" (the expression is Saint John's), and both speak of it so freely that in their case the usual suspicion of an "inhibition" must be meaningless.24

In this sense, Dostoyevsky might portray states of mental suffering which clearly border on the insane and psychotic in his novels. Consciously, he will not necessarily recognize the definition of insanity inherent in Rogozhin's behavior and perhaps, because
of his subjective involvement with his character, he would be affronted or disgusted by such an objective analysis of what he is presenting as a very real inner conflict. Yet in both *Wuthering Heights* and *The Idiot*, the novelists' unconscious awareness of their characters' abnormality and perversity is revealed through the novel's unfolding. Nothing at all, including the authors' protestations if we had them to go by, can deny what the novel has exposed in the mental suffering of Rogozhin and Heathcliff. Thus, by revealing what the author believes to be a "mystical" case of isolated suffering, the novel finally succeeds in "discrediting" mysticism altogether. Thus, De Rougemont's narrow interpretation of sainthood, which he sees as having divine rather than human origins, is unrealistic. While it would be erroneous to explain a holy or spiritual nature as mad, it is equally wrong to suppose that any human makeup exists without some expenditure of neurotic energy. It would be even more wrong to assume that the saint, existing in the material world, while attempting to live in the spiritually "other-world"
is free from neurotic attempts at adjustments to a correlation of both worlds within his life. One interpreter of Freud states that

To Freud the epithet, "mystic", was an expression of opprobrium, and yet it was Freud who stated that saints were saved from severe neuroses by their sainthood, their faith; he mentioned in this connection St. Francis of Assisi. He who studies the lives of the saints would not easily issue to all of them, and without reservation, a certificate of psychological health. They were saints because they were able to stand the pressure of their respective neurosis rather than because they did not suffer from them. The lives of St. Ignatius Loyola, or San Francisco Xavier, or St. Augustine for that matter, offer ample confirmation of my viewpoint.25

Such an insistence of the neurotic character of many saints is not meant to be an overall argument against the religious views held by De Rougemont or the saints themselves. Faith, in one sense as Freud asserts, is a preventive measure against madness. By providing a strong framework and set of values within which the world takes on a coherent and at times, profound order, the saint and believer alike are not disoriented so
easily as the foot-loose modern without a framework with which to fight a sense of alienation and loneliness.

Throughout De Rougemont's study of passion runs the repeated maxim of moderation and self-control. The line drawn between passionate and compassionate love is also the line drawn between the will to die and the will to live. Only by imposing a control on one's emotions in the face of the romantic-passionate illusion of love can the institution of marriage, and life itself, be preserved. De Rougemont finds the illusion of passion in western culture to be death-headed in its narcissitic essence. He attributes the passionate aspect of love to the Eros drive; all manifestations, in fact, of love between the sexes is defined within the realm of Eros. In contrast, Agape, as brotherly or compassionate love, is the rational and dutiful caring for one's neighbour. Therefore, a marriage based upon Agape is one in which

another life . . . wills my good as much as its own, because it is united with mine.26
The relationship between Heathcliff and Catherine echoes De Rougemont's theory that passion is death-headed in its final direction. The narcissism displayed in both these characters' lives in their need for identification in each other is a lack of maturity and personality-development; yet their relationship, although not nearly approaching an adult sexuality, is just as mistaken in its direction as the believers of the romantic love illusion to which De Rougemont points. Catherine and Heathcliff are almost more at fault in their deep involvement with childhood states of being than the adult who falls for an illusion that after all, as De Rougemont asserts, is supported by the culture at large. Yet De Rougemont's final ideal of marriage, of a relationship of total compassion without the Eros drive present in it, is unrealistic and deceptive. Both Wuthering Heights and The Idiot illustrate how impossible and perhaps, even superficial such an enactment of principle would be. Linton and Catherine enjoy the first months of their marriage in relative peace, although the male is forced to cater to his
wife's moods, which are proof of her inner dissatisfaction. Linton is not willing to recognize the cause or seriousness of such despair; in this sense, he would have to admit to the failure of his own rational hold on life. His consistent display of compassion is misplaced, and it cannot recommend his finer insight of the need for compassion to have his own wife acknowledge about him that

... I have such faith in Linton's love, that I believe I might kill him, and he wouldn't wish to retaliate.27

His compassionate love for his wife blinds him to her more narcissistic makeup, and perhaps, to all human irrationality. Such a "virtue" in Linton is a weakness that destroys him finally; De Rougemont's ideal of "willing another's good as much as my own" carries with it a faint hint of imposed martyrdom.

Dostoyevsky illustrates a similar failure of compassion as a basis for love between a man and a woman. Nastasya craves compassion as unconsciously as she wishes to evoke desire in the two men she has become involved with. Yet the final appearance of
Myshkin's offer to marry her repels her when she recognizes that it is love constituted solely of pity. Similarly, Myshkin's love for Aglaya is a compassionate feeling, which toward the end Radomsky refutes as being inadequate in its very selflessness:

No, Prince, she won't understand! Aglaya loved like a woman, like a human being, and not like ---a disembodied spirit! Do you know what I think, my poor Prince? Most likely you've never loved either of them!

Yet De Rougemont, like Freud at the end of Civilization and its Discontents, sees the necessity for a rational compassion between men, as his whole-hearted support of an Agape basis to living evinces. Underlying the emphasis which he places on realizing the need for compassion, there exists a lack of any realistic awareness of the ambivalence which is inherent in all human behavior. A strict adherence to the ideal of a dutiful and compassionate loving represents an escape from ambivalence, and appears imperative only when the tension between the life and death instincts in society becomes so unbalanced
that it threatens to destroy us. Individual emotions and narcissistic illusions do not and cannot foster understanding between men. The primal stance is a stance of isolation because, as illustrated in Heathcliff, the external world becomes merely bothersome in light of his own internal conflicts.

De Rougemont's reasons for compassionate loving are insufficient in so far as they stress a strengthening of will or conscience, rather than a real growth of human awareness and self-realization. The pattern of controlled will--dutiful loving action--seems somehow to deny any central essence in the human relationship itself. You cannot want another's good as much as your own at all times in any ultimately gratifying way, and especially by knowing that you "should" or you "ought". Thus, Myshkin's compassionate nature results in a pathetic attempt to love only the "goodness" of mankind; man must be loved more honestly than this if he is to become more than a principle to his fellow men. There exists in De Rougemont's definition of compassion a sense of martyrdom which
almost seems to be based on a self-conscious calculation of how much one has to give. "Giving", or active loving cannot occur, in the sense of recognizing individuals outside of the self, in any whole sense until the self has grown to view its own isolation and apartness from other human beings. This amount of ego is necessary for life. In De Rougemont’s terms, then, this much passion is surely allowable. By creating a basis of action and feeling centred totally on the ethical "ought", De Rougemont orders us to be compassionate, without the necessary and parallel recognition of being true to ourselves. Such a base of charitable love is desirable only when the individual becomes aware of its nature and necessity as a part of human development, not the whole of it. This kind of love must never take the form of an imperative demand on the conscience as a traditional value judgement relevant to acts of living and believing that are otherwise devoid of meaning. Charity can become an affront to a human relationship that exists without genuine sympathy toward the other's human situation. Unless a true understanding of man
is possessed by the human consciousness, in his more primal state as well as in his attempts to include a concept like moral courage in his activity, the compassion enacted towards man will be a misguided attempt to relieve the enormous pressure which the superego alone has on our behavior. Thus, Freud's idea of the superego would be the sole guide for establishing human contact, and with its repressive and anti-life giving functions, human relationships would dissolve into superficiality, and finally death. Such a dominance of the superego provides no rational insight on which the workings of compassion depend. Therefore, a statement such as the following by De Rougemont repudiates our using this as an aid to prophecy:

What denies both the individual and his natural egotism is what constructs a person. 31

He says further that "it would be altogether absurd to demand of a man a state of sentiment." 32 Such a demand cannot perhaps be ordered on the basis of obedience which a higher order calls for, but the
necessity of discovering an integrity in one's emotional makeup and responses to life evokes a process of "reaching back". Forster further substantiates his concept of going back with a description of a scene from D. H. Lawrence:

The prophet is irradiating nature from within, so that every colour has a glow and every form a distinctness which could not otherwise be obtained. Take a scene that always stays in the memory: the scene in *Women in Love* where one of the characters throws stones into the water at night to shatter the image of the moon. Why he throws, what the scene symbolizes, is unimportant. But the writer could not get such a moon and water otherwise; he reaches them by his special path which stamps them as more wonderful than any we can imagine. It is the prophet back where he started from, back where the rest of us are waiting by the edge of the pool, but with a power or recreation and evocation we shall never possess.

In going backwards, a growth in self-understanding ensues, which becomes a base for human awareness of other human beings and their feelings, and isolation from the life surrounding the self. One finds similar scenes in *Wuthering Heights* and *The Idiot* which illustrate the power of the prophetic to catch the
timelessness of certain moments in life, and preserve them in memory. Catherine's announcement to Nelly Dean of her proposed marriage to Edgar Linton ends with a strange account of a dream which inexplicably appears to explain her reasons for her choice:

I was only going to say that Heaven did not seem to be my home; and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to earth; and the angels were so angry that they flung me out into the middle of the heath on the top of Wuthering Heights; where I woke sobbing for joy. That will do to explain my secret, as well as the other. I've no more business to marry Edgar Linton than I have to be in Heaven; and if the wicked man in there had not brought Heathcliff so low, I shouldn't have thought of it. It would degrade me to marry Heathcliff now; so he shall never know how I love him; and that, not because he's handsome, Nelly, but because he's more myself than I am. Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same; and Linton's is as different as a moonbeam from lightning, or frost from fire. 35

Further, in the same scene, she elaborates on her tie to Heathcliff:

I cannot express it; but surely you and everybody have a notion that there is or should be an existence of yours beyond you. What were the use of my creation, if I were entirely contained here? My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff's miseries, and I watched and felt each from the beginning; my great
thought in living is himself. If all else perished, and he remained, I should still continue to be; and if all else remained, and he were annihilated, the universe would turn to a mighty stranger: I should not seem a part of it. My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods: time will change it, I'm well aware, as winter changes the trees. My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath: a source of little visible delight, but necessary. Nelly, I am Heathcliff! He's always, always in my mind: not as a pleasure, any more than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being. So don't talk of our separation again.

The scene enacted leaves little rational understanding of Catherine's reasons for marriage with Linton; far less, it offers a strange definition of loving in her description of her feeling for Heathcliff. Yet her words at this time form the basis of the novel's power; such a scene prepares us unconsciously for Heathcliff's gnashing his head against a tree in his total and mad despair at his separation from her later.

Myshkin, in The Idiot, becomes entangled with the two women in the novel, Nastasya and Aglaya, and feels torn in his compassion toward both individuals. The end of the novel witnesses a climatic scene in which
the two women confront one another. Both are torn
with jealousy and pride because of their identifi-
cation with Myshkin, but underlying this is the more
important identification each woman feels in the other.
Myshkin symbolizes a kind of "savior" for each, and
yet each are unwilling in their pride to admit their
need for his compassion. The scene illustrates the
genuine agony such ego-driven rivalry causes the Prince:

At last a sort of ominous expression passed
over Nastasya Filippovna's face; there was an
obstinate, hard, and almost hateful look in
her eyes, which were fixed steadily on Aglaya.
Aglaya was visibly embarrassed, but she showed
no signs of fear. As she came into the room,
she threw a quick glance at her rival, but for
the time being she sat with downcast eyes,
as though sunk in meditation. Once or twice,
as though by accident, she threw a glance
round the room; there was a distinct expres-
sion of disgust on her face, as though she
were afraid of contamination in this place.
She arranged her dress mechanically, and
even changed her place uneasily once, moving
to the corner of the sofa. She was probably
unconscious of her movements; but their un-
consciousness made them still more insulting.
At last she looked firmly straight into
Nastasya Filippovna's eyes and instantly
read all the suppressed bitterness and anger
that smouldered in her rival's look. Woman
understood woman; Aglaya sighed. 37

Similar scenes occur throughout this novel. Already
referred to is the exchanging of crosses between the
Prince and Rogozhin—an act which attempts to seal their brotherhood to each other and at the same time reveals the terrible ambivalence within Rogozhin's soul. Dostoyevsky's greatness as a prophetic author shines through best in such scenes; the actions and conversations which he records are primarily ordinary accounts of human actions and reactions, but in some small nuance of illumination, he reveals the undercurrent of feeling that exists in the characters' unconscious.

Thus, De Rougemont's attempt to deny the individual's natural "egoism" is essentially impossible; the basic feelings of the ego are always present and are felt on an unconscious level even when they are denied on the surface. In attempting to argue with De Rougemont's hypothesis of passion and his analysis of the human being in terms of his religious framework, then, one must finally view his portrayal of passionate love as an illusion, in a sense a betrayal of knowledge and human awareness, in so far as his definition of passion does not include a realization of the experience of the primal underlying all civilization. He speaks of the danger of "succumbing to
passion", 36 which is only to imply that it is a legitimate part of the human being's makeup. He is correct in seeing the dilemma behind the illusions of romanticism in the form romantic love has taken in western culture, but although his argument hits on the underlying contradiction, he assumes, with Myshkin, that the erotic is dispensable, and therefore unnatural. Myshkin, whose impotence allows him to remain oblivious of all sexual desire for the women he comes in contact with, is very likely apt to discount the erotic as a necessary component in human drives. In this sense, again, Myshkin can deny in other men what he himself does not have to struggle with in his own life. But Rogozhin's desire for Nastasya is, however obsessional and perverse in its proportions, a very real element in his life, in fact, it is the only guiding instinct of his life toward the end of the novel. He is not exhibiting perverse sexual desire because he is innately an animal, as De Rougemont would perhaps relegate him to be. His desire for Nastasya is not coupled with a necessary compassion—for which an establishment of a deeper understanding of the woman he desires might foster a permanent tie between them. But he is provoked to be obsessed in his sexuality;
Nastasya taunts him with wanton and humiliating cruelty throughout. Rogozhin is essentially threatened by his own emasculation at this woman's egoistic manipulation of his will. He is forced in an instinctual way to preserve himself by annihilating himself; his total mastering of Nastasya finally results in a release of his own self-hatred for having let himself do so. He condemns himself to the "lower" of the De Rougemontian scale of development. His murder of the woman he has been so obsessed by is itself an erotic impulse which is carried to its furthest extreme in death. Thus, like Heathcliff, he can love the woman in death as he could not in a real way while she lived. Her death evokes the absent compassion he wished to summon for her while she lived and could not. Unconscious guilt now replaces the irrational eroticism of his desire and demands a gesture of tenderness that is horrific in its macabre nature.

Thus, the primal beginnings of life are a basis on which civilization rests, and being so, cannot be denied realistically. Human beings must be aware of the primal or basic passions inside of them in order to understand how to use and control them. De Rougemont pleads for
compassion wrought through rationality, yet he blinds the way that rational solutions can be had in the way of self-knowledge. Obedience to moral rules long ago established, as in Nelly Dean and Old Joseph, does not afford the human being any greater understanding of why he is like he is. Such behavior represses passion itself to a point of sterility—at its worst, a kind of automaton conformist mediocrity.

Harder to argue with is the unapproachable concept of compassion itself. Complete compassion is finally as other-worldly and death-headed as complete romantic illusion in a narcissistic self. A totally compassionate view of the "other" leaves the human being with absolutely no guard against his vulnerability; he empathizes so fully that he becomes drowned in the others around him. This is not an example of superficial charitable "doing good", but rather exemplifies the erasing or sublimating of the self in a manner that loses any grasp on self-preservation. 39 Compassion as a value in human behavior is extolled not only by De Rougemont, but by Freud, whose "sublimated affection" 40 recalls De Rougemont's own theory of a
denial of self. Myshkin, in The Idiot, illustrates the compassionate personality as an ideal, but an inadequate human being in so far as the Prince's total compassion leaves him unprepared to cope with the irrational and demonic personalities, behavior and civilization around him. Total compassion in this sense is inevitably destroyed by its very nature of the denial of the primal, for it is dragged into the abyss along with the people it spends its feelings on. But Freud does not discard the necessity of an awareness of one's own makeup— that is, in fact, where he begins his psychological theories of the Oedipus complex. There must be an awareness of another individual as human, which might be De Rougemont's Agape, but there must also exist an awareness of one's self—the feelings, sense of identity or even "finiteness" which underlie the irrational drives which confuse one's control on reality. The compassion which ensues for the other from a balance of self-realization and an awareness of surrounding mankind is honest without becoming the exploitation of a superficial emotional quality. It is honest emotionally and realistically because it is tempered and balanced by rational
knowledge of the self and consequently, all human behavior. Total agape results in a death-headed results in a death-headed impulse in so far as the "I" of the self is lost to the self of the other, and the result is death as surely as total narcissism results in a final negation of self.

Perhaps Erik Erikson provides a structure within which Forster's emphasis on experience in the prophetic work of art can be more fully appreciated. Lecturing on the "ethical implications of psychoanalytic insight," in Insight and Responsibility, Erikson emphasizes the need for self-recognition before a realization of other human beings can occur:

Yet, at any time of history, in order to lose one's identity, one must first have one; and in order to transcend, one must pass through and not bypass ethical concerns.

He echoes Freud when he outlines the two basic concepts necessary to establish contact—between a patient and the psychoanalyst in this case—applicable to the growth of compassion in any human relationship:

Thus, was established one basic principle of psychoanalysis, namely, that one can
study the human mind only by engaging
the fully motivated partnership of the
observed individual, and by entering
into a sincere contract with him. . . .

the second principle of psychoanalysis,
namely, that you will not see in another
what you have not learned to recognize
in yourself. The mental healer must
divide himself as well as the patient
into an observer and an observed.42

Total compassion in a human relationship results
in a denial of self so pervasive that the desires and
rationale which formerly made up the self are negated
by the other's feelings and irrational holds on life.
Dostoyevsky presents an all-compassionate figure of
Prince Myshkin in the light of the highest idealism of
brotherly love and devotion to humanity. At the begin-
nung Myshkin's idealism, formed through his own obser-
vations and experiences with other men, is co-ordinated
to his behavior to the people with whom he comes in
contact. For this reason, he does not turn away from
Nastasya, nor from the pettinesses and patronizing of
the Ypanchin family. He establishes a tenuous contact
with Rogozhin from the beginning, but in direct relation
to his idealism, he remains open and vulnerable to
Rogozhin's character throughout. But in this early
part of the novel, one distinction stands out sharply from the later confused portrayal of Myshkin's role in the various characters' lives. While remaining vulnerable, open and compassionate, he is able to distinguish at first a kind of justice, a balance that requires some small distance or objectivity in his attitudes. He is able to judge and measure the practicality and wisdom of the outcome of his actions toward others. His impulsive loving is tempered by the recognition of the need to preserve himself where he would impulsively act; to withdraw his support and encouragement when he realizes on a practical basis that it can no longer help the individual on whom he is spending so much effort. While he is able to maintain such a basis for his balance he effects changes in all of the people's lives in which he is involved. Where the reactions are violent and more destructive than he would have wanted as, for example, in Nastasya, the sincerity of his compassion does not cease, perhaps simply because he unconsciously intuits the enormous pressure which his loving has
caused in a destructive individual. He continues
to hope, and remain with them in spirit. His closest
position to withdrawing his compassion, when the indi-
vidual's destructive tendencies may clearly destroy
him too, occurs when he states that he can no longer
love Nastasya:

God knows, Aglaya, I'd gladly give my
life to restore her peace of mind and to
make her happy, but--I cannot love her
any more, and she knows it. 43

He explains his own withdrawal to a more objective
position with regard to Nastasya in rational terms:

I cannot sacrifice myself, though I
wanted to once and--perhaps I want to
still. But I know for a fact that with
me she will be ruined, and that's why
I am leaving her . . . In her pride,
she'll never forgive me for my love--
and we shall both perish! 44

Because Nastasya is more obvious in her self-destruc-
tiveness, Myshkin is able to keep a small distance from
her, although he returns to support her again after
this point. Circumstances set up by Nastasya herself
and Myshkin's realization of his own need to survive
his involvement with her, cause her to revolt from his care, and she courts her self-abnegation alone. Myshkin is able to see the inherent mistake of making himself, in De Rougemont's terms, a sacrifice, and with his awareness, he may foresee himself as an accomplice to her destruction. It is Rogozhin, more honestly swayed from a grasp on life to a death-headed position, that Myshkin cannot attain enough from and thus cannot save himself from. His idealism remains poignantly in line with the sincerity of his action in the final attempt to rescue Rogozhin from his own annihilation. The attempt fails when he realizes he is too late, Rogozhin has committed the fated murder, and the time for hope and recrimination is past. Myshkin becomes a sacrifice in the instant that he realizes there is no way out. It is a simultaneous recognition of what in previous living he has advocated and enacted through sympathy, but without any defence mechanisms on which to depend he remains by Rogozhin's side and returns to his former autistic, retarded position. Total vulnerability, through a compassionate orientation to individuals who are unable
to save themselves, cause his own capitulation to insanity--a symbolic death of the self.

Compassion must go hand-in-hand with knowledge of what it is to love if it intends to work in a realistic human setting. Blind compassion is a denial of self which becomes as death-headed finally, as the romantic-passionate illusion of love, which De Rougemont's study illustrates and repudiates. By refuting such an illusion, De Rougemont denies the necessity of the attraction of the violence and suffering which the image of romanticized loving encompasses. Although he denies any association with psychological definitions of primality, or with art itself which complicates his ideal, one may assume the passionate illusion to be fostered on an inhibited and natural primal sexuality which is inherent in the human makeup.

The process of inhibition begins early to work on the primal desires of the first narcissistic state of the individual, and although the inhibitions are active throughout the rest of his life, the basic primality of his drives is not entirely lost. Repression,
or inhibition, is to some extent defined by Freud as necessary for human life to continue. Primal states of thought and behavior are so totally out of contact with the human circle that some modification of this early narcissism is required and essential. De Rougemont's thesis that the passionate-romantic illusion has been the inhibiting or repressing factor is only a half-truth when one realizes that civilization, in its desire to continue, has produced other repressive inhibitions of equal power and effectiveness; and more, that civilization has had to do this in order to restrain the individual's basic impulses which conflict with society. By denying the repressive turn that sexuality has undergone throughout the centuries, De Rougemont offers a solution that trades one kind of repression for another. Denial of basic sexuality is not much worse for the continuance of life than a denial of self and all primality inherent in the self's structure. Total compassion, blinded to a realistic understanding of self and other, is finally as repressive as the most stringent code for sexual behavior. Such compassion
represses the sexual impulse of early narcissistic life further by increasing a sense of guilt with whatever is associated with the self. Morality, based on imperatives to do what is good, rather than to understand how to be what is better, increases the repression that has so effectively sterilized all basic human emotions and behavior.

The antithesis to De Rougemont's argument of a defeat of repression with another kind of repression is evidenced in Norman O. Brown's theory of "unrepression". In his study Life Against Death, Brown introduces as his beginning and basic hypothesis the theory that western culture, grounded in rationalistic doctrine and methodology, has become totally "mental" in its structures, repressing the primal pleasure of the early years completely:

But Schopenhauer, in his notion of the primacy of the will—however much he may undo his own notion by his search for an escape from the primacy of the will—is a landmark, seceding from the great, and really rather insane Western tradition that the goal of mankind is to become as contemplative as possible.45
Using Freud's terminology of the reality-principle and pleasure-principle, Brown cites the progress of western culture as characterized by the negating existence of the reality-principle, rather than the pleasure-principle, in our lives. The realm of the unconscious, through dreaming and the neuroses of its individuals, makes the drive to pleasure felt, but its consistent denial in our present system has "degraded [the pleasure-principle] to the status of a symptom." Under the reality-principle, work has repressed and alienated man to the point of a total governance of the reality-principle.

Freud sometimes identifies the reality-principle with the "struggle for existence," as if repression could be ultimately explained by some objective economic necessity to work. But man makes his own reality and various kinds of reality (and various compulsions to work) through the medium of culture or society. It is therefore more adequate to say that society imposes repression, though even this formula in Freud's early writings is connected with the inadequate idea that society, in imposing repression, is simply legislating the demands of objective economic necessity. This naive and rationalistic sociology stands, or rather falls, with Freud's earlier version of psychoanalysis. The later Freud,
as we shall see, in his doctrine of anxiety is moving toward the position that man is the animal which represses himself and which creates culture or society in order to repress himself.

For if society imposes repression, and the repression causes the universal neuroses of mankind, it follows that there is an intrinsic connection between social organization and neurosis. Man the social animal is by the same token the neurotic animal.

The alienation of the present day individual is undeniable and a large part of the isolation and fragmentation in role-playing which he is forced into is a basic attribute of the work structure in which he exists. The repression found within such a reality has become distorted and alienated from the human consciousness with which it deals. Heathcliff at this point is a good example of the individual alienated from the social world around him and yet capable of functioning in such a world in a "work" capacity in a competent manner on the surface. The "work-principle" or reality-principle has become internalized in him by the repression of his culture, and he appears, thus, more "normal" in his everyday management of household and estate affairs than his emotional makeup later reveals he really is. Although Freud sees such
alienation as caused by the work structures of western culture, he would not reduce the problem so simplistically. Freud does not advocate a total disappearance of the reality-principle itself. Work is necessary in so far as it can be intrinsically productive, and in so far as its repressive functions can be reduced radically to a minimum of interference in daily living. Brown evades the fact that the desires, imaginings, and human creativity of the unconscious, so evident in his own style of writing, come into being when repressed. The struggle between the reality-principle and the pleasure-principle is life in both its personal and social spheres. Without minimum repression or anxiety, the unconscious would be empty, or finally, dead, because the unconscious, in its purely pleasure-seeking tendency, is death-headed:

While admitting that Freud was correct in recognizing a certain minimal amount of repression as the necessary concomitant of civilization, Marcuse argued that a good deal of sexual repression was made necessary by the particular historical form of civilization.48

And further that:
The regressive tendency common to both the erotic and destructive instincts, the fact that Eros seeks to lower the level of psychic energy while Thanatos strives to return to the quiescence of the inorganic world.49

Brown is correct to criticize the present degree of repression in both work and all other realms of living. Alienation is an obvious result, and the recognition of the neurotic nature of all individuals is much the outcome of the isolation which they are forced to live with. But just as De Rougemont's theory illustrates the death-headed or annihilating direction of over-repression, Brown's theory becomes too heavily one-sided as he envisions an absence of all repression. Such a human position is also a denial of real life, which is based on a conflict between the rational and irrational forces which make it up. Brown, like De Rougemont, looks for the absolute answer to a never-ending struggle of tendencies. The denial of the necessary tension is the consequent annihilation of all life. On this basis, Brown refutes Marx in his elementary acceptance of a dialectic of opposites,
and of the human anxiety which results:

Lacking the doctrine of repression—
or rather not being able to see man as
a psychological riddle—Marx, as a sym-
pathetic critic has shown, turns to
biology and postulates an absolute law
of human biology that the satisfaction
of human needs always generates new
needs. If human discontent is thus
biologically given, it is incurable.50

Because Brown views the dissatisfaction that has
been part of human history all along as an element of
suffering and unnecessary anxiety only, he presumes
that for happiness to be attained discontent must be
eliminated. Brown does not aspire to rational theory
since this is symbolized by the sterile rational
western culture. He states that

psychoanalysis offers a theoretical frame-
work for exploring the possibility of a way
out of the nightmare of endless "progress"
and endless Faustian discontent, a way out
of the human neurosis, a way out of history.51

Brown, in his desire to remove the anxiety-causing
institutions and roles forced upon man by his western
civilization, relies on the final supremacy and overall
beneficence of the pleasure-principle as a goal. Eros, the instinctual drive underlying the pleasure-principle, can assume the dominant role which has been so long maintained by the reality-principle, and the result will be a disintegration of the bonds of anxiety and the consequent neuroses which have crippled western culture up to this point.

Many aspects of Brown's argument are fallacious. As Robinson has noted, there is little actual historical comparison and study in this so-called "psychological analytical meaning of history". Brown advocates change purely from the inside, and it is enlightenment through mysticism rather than rational theory that he so wholeheartedly accepts on a basis of belief. Brown recognizes the sterile quality of the reality-principle in western life and he moves from this realization to one that is not supported because it has not been witnessed so far in history, and certainly not in this study. By itself, the reality-principle dominates a culture through manifold and ever-increasing repression, sublimating man's will to be or to live fully to an alienating work ethic. Both Emily Bronte and Dostoyevsky illustrate in their
novels the repressive character which the work ethic assumes in the society of the time. Bronte portrays the sturdy house-keeper, Nelly Dean, whose greatest virtues are industry and competence. Nelly Dean's formula is probably along the lines of "anything worth doing is worth doing well," a formula that has assumed grotesque proportions in western culture. Heathcliff himself learns quickly that survival in such a culture depends upon coming to terms with the reality-principle of work and ambition, and he calculatingly adapts himself to such an ethic. Similarly, Heathcliff's artful adaptation to the work ethic enables him to defeat the degenerate Hindley, whose own ethic has fallen before the standard of the day. In such a society, however, a system of alienated labor increases the meaninglessness and impotency of its individuals; such repressive functions isolate Heathcliff further into himself. What is evident of the pleasure-principle, Brown asserts, in the observable life of the modern individual, is the symptomatic presence of its suppression to reality. The maladjustments, neurotic behavior and attitudes, the final isolation of man from man is
the only indication that the pleasure-principle still enjoys some small part in the human unconscious. Thus, Marcuse has come to view the "highly repressed neurotic" as the "chief social critic" in so far as

The neurotic's sickness represented an uncompromised protest against the repressive world in which he lived.52

But the pleasure-principle does not have equal hold on twentieth century living, and its presence is thus just enough to illustrate how little conscious living knows of it. Brown looks forward to an entire diminishing of the dominance of the reality-principle, and in its place, a fusion of it with Eros, in its narcissistic and primal state of pleasure. The outcome, Brown asserts, will be complete contentment, a triumph over the anxiety and suffering which centuries of humanity have given way to so unnecessarily. Yet the portrayal of utter contentment and even bliss on earth rings untrue.53 If the human consciousness has come to rest, is contentment not to be moved, to be restless, searching and anxious, how does it find a will or instinctual preservative force strong enough to wish to continue
life? By this same token, how does it create?

Life is, and must be, an endless struggle between two conflicting instincts, and if one resultant factor is anxiety, there is also, at whatever expense, creativity and a growth in the consciousness and understanding of man himself. The possibility of a fusion of the death and life instincts is inconsistent with Freud's conception of them. Robinson notes Marcus's statement that

> The primacy of the Nirvana principle, the terrifying convergence of pleasure and death, is dissolved as soon as it is established. No matter how universal the regressive inertia of organic life, the instincts strive to attain their objective in fundamentally different modes. The difference is tantamount to that of sustaining and destroying life. Out of the common nature of instinctual life develop two antagonistic instincts.\(^5^4\)

Brown bases his argument on a refutation of the "metaphysical bias toward dualism"\(^5^5\) held by Freud. The two instincts of Eros and Thanatos are not originally antagonistic in the human organism, rather

> the instinctual life of man starts from a primitive undifferentiated fusion of the
two instincts—a fusion in which they are not mutually antagonistic—and, in so far as it is fixated to childhood, seeks to restore the instinctual fusion.56

Because this first beginning holds the two instincts in an undifferentiated state, and because Brown points out the paradisal aspect of this first state, he assumes that it may be regained. The development of the human consciousness necessitates a recognition of object as well as self and at this point, the ambivalence of love and hate, or Eros and Thanatos, becomes apparent. The development of the necessary ambivalence in Heathcliff arises after his first initial inertia of the first months spent at Wuthering Heights. Then he develops a recognition of the only other person outside of himself, which he maintains as his sole identification throughout his lifetime. At Catherine’s death, his love turns to a despair bordering on revenge toward her for having stranded him in the captivity of life without her. The sole ambivalence he manifests throughout is thus, centered on one person, with the possible but fleeting recognition of the younger Hareton as someone he is
drawn to in spite of himself. Heathcliff exemplifies a juvenile hold on an emotional existence; the adult mind is more fully rationalized since its primality is buried further in its past, and the early narcissism of this first stage is sublimated to enable human interaction to progress. Brown argues that the growth to such a rationalized opposition of the hate and love tendencies is an error. Ambivalence is not an inevitable result of maturity, nor is the antagonism between love and hate the inherent relationship between these two forces. Brown states that it is not as if the ambivalence of love and hate were a fundamental fact of human nature present in the child from the start.  

Brown's conclusion that a stage of harmoniously fused instincts leading to a death of all repression in life is a desire to free man from the burden of constant anxiety which appears to increase rather than lessen in twentieth century living. He assumes that the instincts are unnecessarily antagonistic in their tendencies in so far as the fulfillment of one instinct has been thought to deprive the other instinct of its
satisfaction. Freud states that the moment of life-and death-giving instincts coincide, they dissolve; that the possibility of a fulfillment of both at the same time is not open. Brown desires to escape the final pessimism of Freud's final outlook, to "uncover the promise of a nonrepressive civilization beneath Freud's manifest historical pessimism."58 The rise of the dominance of the reality-principle has become manifest in the over-repressed character of present life, and more especially, the force of the death or aggressive instinct in man has become increasingly more apparent, denying any balance between the two instincts in reality. Freud draws such a conclusion on the evidence of the over-repressed character of the modern personality, not on the inherent strengths of the life and death drives themselves. Freud's fear of the terrifying outcome of over-repression is the imbalance it has caused in the conflict, resulting in a tension and amount of anxiety too enormous to be shouldered by the human unconscious. Thus,

the problem before us is how to get rid of the greatest hindrance to civilization—namely, the constitutional inclination of human beings to be aggressive towards one
another; and for that very reason we are especially interested in what is probably the most recent of the cultural commands of the super-ego, the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself. In our research into, and therapy of, a neurosis, we are led to make two reproaches against the super-ego of the individual. In the severity of its commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness of the ego, in that it takes insufficient account of the resistances against obeying them—of the instinctual strength of the id (in the first place), and of the difficulties presented by the real external environment (in the second.)

The over-repression of the personality is the "cultural super-ego" as well as the individual conscience working on a basis of rational thought. The fact that Marcuse divides repression into two categories, that of over-repression being the largest in the personality, and the necessary tension essential to the existence of both instincts within the unconscious comprising the lesser degree, illustrates the inhuman pressures of the cultural super-ego while at the same time clarifying the need for a necessary, although smaller amount of repression within the human makeup. Freud states early in his study *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* that the tension
caused by the conflict between the life and death instincts is essential to human life:

In the theory of psycho-analysis we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle . . . that the course of those events is inevitably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension.62

Brown does not believe that the tension is an inevitably natural nor necessary component of the mental processes, and he does not differentiate between the kinds of repression, or even the amount of repression necessary for conflict at all. Brown's goal in this last sense is for a total state of non-repression in which the pleasure-principle, affecting an early narcissistic course of egoistic involvement in the outside world, is uninterrupted by the death instinct.
Taken far enough, the pleasure-principle evolves into the death instinct:

If man could put an end to repression and obtain instinctual satisfaction, the restless pleasure-principle would return to the
Nirvana-principle, that is to say, a balanced equilibrium between tension and tension release. If therefore the Nirvana-principle "belongs to the death instincts" and the pleasure-principle belongs to Eros, their reuni-fication would be the condition of equilib-rium or rest of life that is a full life, unrepressed, and therefore sat-isfied with itself and affirming it-self rather than changing itself. 63

Brown, as a philosophical expounder of the "prophetic", offers a synthesis of the two instincts which is in-tended to create a fuller sense of "being" on the basis that neither part of the two drives of the unconscious processes are frustrated in their gratification. Such a theory, he states, eliminates the anxiety factors created by the conflict of the instincts, and by losing anxiety, man will lose, happily, the sense of time. Our mortality signifies our "separateness" 64 or individuality. 65 Thus,

If death gives life individuality and if man is the organism which represses death, then man is the organism which represses his own individuality. 66

Brown states that through an eradication of the fear and repression commonly associated with the death
instinct, man ushers in an acceptance of death and his own freedom. The anxiety-causing struggle is similarly eliminated in the social sphere of man's behavior for with the ego satisfied in both its narcissistic life and death drives, the struggle to "get outside of oneself" is also unnecessary. Brown appears to feel that the anti-social drive is the healthier one when the individual is satisfied within himself:

But if the psychoanalytical doctrine of repression means anything, man never unfolds the mode of being which is proper to his species and given in his body. Repression generates the instinctual compulsion to change the internal nature of man and the external world in which he lives, thus giving man a history and subordinating the life of the individual to the historical quest of the species. History is made not by individuals but by groups; and the cliché-mongers repeat ad nauseam that man is by nature a social animal. It is intrinsic to the psychoanalytical point of view to assert the morbidity of human sociability, not just "civilized" as opposed to "primitive" sociability or "class society" as opposed to "primitive communism," but all of human socialibity as we have known it. Freud's formulations of the Primal Father and the Primal Horde... may or may not be adequate explanations of the morbidity in group-formation. What is essential is the clinical pronouncement that sociability is a sickness. 67
Brown is essentially embracing a death-within-life as the explanation of the way out of the repressed neurotic character of our culture. He presents the culmination of the pleasure-principle in a Nirvana-principle which is actually carrying the narcissistic grasp on life to its greatest point of isolation, into finally a death of external reality as it is now unnecessary for self-definition through participation with the "other" or object world. Brown envisions an absolute stance of self-gratification which becomes alive in only a sensuous perception of reality; the intellect of two thousand years of man's attempt to relate to his outside world is destroyed in preference to the world within the boundaries of the self. Brown imagines the soul, unpressed and at peace with the instinctual drives it embodies, as being "overfull" and in such a state, the aggression of modern culture is dissolved. Brown quotes Nietzsche in saying

His word pronounced selfishness blessed, the wholesome healthy selfishness that wells from a powerful soul--from a powerful soul to which belongs the high body,
beautiful, triumphant, refreshing, around which everything becomes a mirror-the supple, persuasive body, the dancer whose parable and epitome is the self-enjoying soul.69

Because Brown relies on a mystical tone to infer rather than to clarify the message he is imparting, the "selfishness" which he admires appears to be the base of the new life. He seems to be saying very simply that self-satisfaction is contagious and grows as a medium of relating to the world and other men. But Brown infers also the necessity of relationships on some level and by this, seems to adhere to a social definition of the human individual in spite of himself. The enjoyment of childhood narcissism and selfishness is, in Catherine and Heathcliff's relationship, carried into adulthood; Brown would appear to accept this as a norm for living. The novel exposes, in this sense, what Brown's mystical theorizing is able to hide. Selfishness as a childhood world of undemarcated egoistic impulses can only result in a harsh denial of life in the later stages of the individual's development.
Brown's theory of un repression depends on the affirmation of death, and through mystical intona-
tions, he illustrates the value of losing the cons-
cious awareness of reality outside of the self. He proffers a "perfection" that is finally unable to know itself. When he speaks of the fusion of the death and life instincts, he sees their common end in the Nirvana-principle, which is really only an affirmation of death. Life loses its perceptual and cognitive rationale; compassion in a conscious and voluntary awareness is denied. Brown is presenting a glorification of death in which he finds an answer to the frightening aspect of repressive self-des-
truction in the human makeup. He attempts to erase the contradiction implicit in his theory by believing that life might continue within the self even though it has ceased to know itself by losing its hold on reality. He comes closest, perhaps, to sensing the denial of life within his theory when he says that

It is hard under conditions of general repression, to affirm the death instinct without becoming an enemy of life. 70
Yet the attraction of such a fusion of instincts persists as the goal in his study, and its malignancy lies not only in the fact that, as Marcuse states

such fusion would be the end of human life in its instinctual as well as rational, unsublimated as well as sublimated expressions.71

but Brown's theory is a presentation of an idealized way out; its own reality depends more upon a desperation than is obvious at first--for it is in actuality a giving up, a denial of any way out.

The greatest danger in Brown's prophetic criterion of nothingness lies finally in its attraction to the human mind. Presented under a veneer of mystical and prophetic language, it constitutes a threat in the very sense of its poetic beauty and comfortable appeal. To accept death in an outright manner is outrageous for the western mind to contemplate, yet dressed in the guise of poetical mysticism, the negativity and denial of life becomes an attractive excapism. Brown's study is not new; it echoes a self-denial apparent throughout history.

De Rougemont's theory of romantic-passionate love is one aspect of the death of reality presented as beautiful
in its unattainability and implicit denial of life. Both novels under study, Wuthering Heights and The Idiot, incorporate the death-headed impulse present in Brown's theory but disguised as a similar promise of beauty and peace. Dostoyevsky, as the more realistic artist and more revealing author, presents a morbid picture of a man who finds the peace he has been striving for only through murdering the woman he desires. Wuthering Heights, however, read by a Victorian lady, symbolized the greatest of all romantic ends in the death of the lovers. Even a more psychologically realistic view of the characters cannot disguise the fact that their childhood paradisal relationship has a "timeless" quality in it when it is projected into a mystical afterlife of togetherness.

All romanticized elements in western culture depend upon the image of freedom in order to gain ascendancy in human thought. In this sense, the current use of drugs, yoga, Oriental mysticism in meditation groups form the most obvious examples; the more subtle and pervasive areas exist within the mythical structures of society, and thus, the integrity of emotion itself is uninsured. The pleasure-principle, carried to its most extreme narcissistic position,
evolves into an isolation which moves finally toward the death of the self. Into this psychological position the human mind may project its desire for peace, and thus, to escape the constant tension of meeting and attempting to reconcile itself with reality.

The two theoretical positions of De Rougemont and Norman O. Brown parallel the two novels, *The Idiot* and *Wuthering Heights* in their basic visions. De Rougemont's theory of the strengthening of the power of conscience, and thereby the power of guilt as a result echoes the great dominance that conscience and guilt play in *The Idiot*, especially in the high ambivalence and indecision of Rogozhin. The novel, in this way, disproves the theory which De Rougemont offers as an answer to repression for it illustrates clearly that increased guilt and repression result in a final breakdown of all mores and in the end—in a display of aggression and self-destruction by the instigation of the inhuman weight of the guilt itself. *Wuthering Heights*, in contrast, is the childhood vision of total narcissism and self-indulgence, and in this way parallels Brown's ideal of "selfishness". Yet the novel's portrayal of such an idealism on earth results in a
huge amount of suffering where Brown prophesized peace. Again, self-destruction becomes the only answer for the individual, such as Heathcliff in the novel, whose ideal finds no place on earth for its acceptance.

*Wuthering Heights* exemplifies the childhood myth of romantic-passionate love which De Rougemont's study illuminates as a death-headed myth underlying western thought in the twentieth century. The novel presents an absolute narcissism in Heathcliff, whose sole identity depends on his love for Catherine. The inter-dependence formed between the two individuals in early childhood remains in its primal state of undifferentiated ego; the force of the paradisal aspect of the early relationship, which in childhood was dictated by pure pleasure instincts, remains as a reminder of the freedom which was once enjoyed. The reader is attracted quite naturally to this idealization of love in face of all social barriers, as well as the idealization of the paradisal portrayal of childhood freedom. When Heathcliff has secured his revenge on Hindley, and assumes possession of Wuthering Heights, Catherine dies, and he turns quickly away from life. His overt and often violent longing for peace in the guise of
death should be a conclusion that contradicts all rational sympathy for the man, yet the novel attracts on the very basis of its innate negation. The more romanticized version of his death might be construed to be a death for love's sake, and embodies in such a gesture, the immortality of love. When Heathcliff is questioned by Nelly about his fear of death, he replies:

"Afraid? No!" he replied. "I have neither a fear nor a presentiment, nor a hope of death --Why should I? With my hard constitution, and temperate mode of living, and unperilous occupation, I ought to, and probably shall remain above ground, till there is scarcely a black hair on my head--And yet I cannot continue in this condition!--I have to remind myself to breathe--almost to remind my heart to beat! And it is like bending back a stiff spring . . . it is by compulsion, that I do the slightest act, not prompted by one thought, and by compulsion, that I notice anything alive, or dead, which is not associated with one universal idea . . . I have a single wish, and my whole being, and faculties are yearning to attain it. They have yearned towards it so long, and so unwaveringly, that I'm convinced that it will be reached--and soon--because it has devoured my existence--I am swallowed in the anticipation of its fulfillment.72

The conventional myth of romantic, doomed love is presented and accounts for some of the attraction this novel has for its readers. Yet the passage quoted above over-reaches the
conventional imagery of stricken love; his language is
too violent, too obviously masochistic in its tone to
be fitted into an ordinary mold of broken romance. Yet
the reader is embraced with a sense of having been taken
further than he allows his own emotional impulses to go.
In this sense, the stark desire for total annihilation
in Heathcliff is not a true illumination of emotional
extremes in the character which one is sympathizing with;
rather, such a portrayal is a relief to read about in so
far as it "recalls" and purges the primality and irra-
tional impulses of our own unconsciousness.

E. M. Forster himself offers characters in his novels
emblematic of the struggle to balance existence in the
rational world without a total denial of the inner self
and sense of identity. He gives us the image of death
sought as an active renunciation of life and a final
peace of the self with reality in the characters of his
old, "prophetic" ladies, such as Mrs. Moore in A Passage
to India, and Mrs. Wilcox in Howard's End. Their appeal
to the reader is evident in their greater understanding
and foresight; he gives them a mystical quality of intui-
tive knowledge which eclipses the need in most of us for
rationally-wrought understanding of our fellow men.
Neither woman is overtly compassionate, while each
demands and attempts to preserve an isolation of their
"self" from the pettinesses and weaknesses found around
them. Forster says of Mrs. Moore in Passage to India:

She had come to that state where the horror of
the universe and its smallness are both visible
at the same time—the twilight of the double
vision in which so many elderly people are in-
volved. If this world is not to our taste, well,
at all events there is Heaven, Hell, Annihilation
— one or other of those large things, that huge
scenic background of stars, fires, blue or black
air. All heroiE endeavour, and all that is known
as art, assumes that there's such a background,
just as all practical endeavour, when the world
is to our taste, assumes that the world is all.
But in the twilight of the double vision, a spiri-
tual muddledum is set up for which no high-sounding
words can be found; we can neither act nor refrain
from action, we can neither ignore nor respect
Infinity. Mrs. Moore had always inclined to resig-
nation. As soon as she landed in India it seemed
to her good, and when she saw the water flowing
through the mosque-tank, or the Ganges, or the
moon, caught in the shawl of night with all the
other stars, it seemed a beautiful goal and an
easy one. To be one with the universe! So digni-
fied and simple. But there was always some little
duty to be performed first, some new card to be
turned up from the diminishing pack and placed,
and whilst she was pottering about, the Marabar
struck its gong.?

Forster is giving the individual character of the old
woman an omniscient perception of life itself. Such a
grasp of the final truths of the essences of human relations and living "muddledoms" implies that old age itself "arrives"—a fact we would all like to feel happens naturally. Each woman comes to life only within the borderlines of her own existence and the consequent definition of strength and strong individuality of each is evident in their isolation. Both women, too, gravitate more and more to a final position of peace. The sense of omniscience that each character is given is not sufficient to wish to continue life. Forster describes Mrs. Wilcox after her death as the all-contained being:

Cynicism—not the superficial cynicism that snarls and sneers, but the cynicism that can go with courtesy and tenderness—that was the note of Mrs. Wilcox's will. She wanted not to vex people. That accomplished, the earth might freeze over her for ever.74

Similarly, Mrs. Moore's irritability is evident when she is turned to for sympathy by her son's fiancée, Miss Quested, whose accusation of attack by Aziz she intuits to be false:

"Say, say, say," said the old lady bitterly, "As if anything can be said! I have spent
my life in saying or in listening to sayings; I have listened too much. It is time I was left in peace. Not to die," She added sourly, "No doubt you expect me to die, but when I have seen you and Ronny married, and seen the other two and whether they want to be married --I'll retire then into a cave of my own." She smiled, to bring down her remark into ordinary life and thus add to its bitterness. "Somewhere where no young people will come asking questions and expecting answers. Some shelf." 75

Such final pessimism is only partly what Brown cites in Nietzsche's statement that "what has become perfect, all that is ripe--wants to die." 76 Implicit in the wish for peace and the consequent deaths of these old ladies is Forster's sense of a final tragic renunciation of living. Life in this last portrayal is productive of death to any consciousness that can not fit into the conventional and hypocritical pathways that our culture provides. Such a renunciation is a recrimination of the "panic and emptiness" 77 which twentieth century society hides underneath a surface of rational competency and tough honesty. Yet it is important to realize that with the death of each woman, the quest for a more unified and perceptive awareness is handed on to a member of the new generation. There is no final defeat in such an action, rather the
knowledge of past defeat appears to leave with it a sense of what was lost and sacrificed in each case. Forster implies that the future leans backward to its past only to become more fully alive by having learned, painfully, at what cost life is to be preserved. Thus, in the final pages of *Howard's End*, Margeret Schlegel, the new Mrs. Wilcox, clusters the remaining lives around her in the beginning of a new life, with renewed belief that it will flourish.
NOTES


2  Forster, Aspects, p. 140.


7  Robinson, Freudian Left, p. 213.


9  Robinson, Freudian Left, pp. 224-225.


11  De Rougemont, Love, p. 338.


The "selfless" personality referred to here is best exemplified in Myshkin, but the same conscious lack of the will to live, of necessary ego, is found within the minor conscious unprophetic characters in both Wuthering
Heights and The Idiot. Ippolit, in The Idiot, is a minor character whose suicidal obsession is an echo of the unconscious suicidal tendency within Myshkin himself. The inner sublimated instincts are illustrated in an external, conscious fashion in the minor characters. Similarly, Edgar Linton, rational, sane and conventional, echoes a similar lack of the self-preservative strength that distinguishes him from, perhaps, Nelly Dean. He is, in his outward passivity, a parallel to the two major suicidal figures in the novel, Catherine and Heathcliff, but his "death instinct" is an externalized, fragmented version of the inner passionate illusions of the two major characters.


42 Erikson, Insight, p. 29.

43 Dostoyevsky, Idiot, p. 475.

44 Dostoyevsky, Idiot, p. 475.


46 Brown, Life, p. 9.

47 Brown, Life, pp. 9-10.

48 Robinson, Freudian Left, p. 203.


Zorba, in the musical recording of *Zorba the Greek*, states that "Life is suffering; only death is not."

Robinson, *Freudian Left*, p. 213.


Freud, *Civilization*, p. 89.


CONCLUSION: MEMORY AND CONNECTION

In order to reach some conclusions with regard to the proposed necessity of "going back", it is helpful to turn to Forster who, when defining the prophetic mode of writing, describes it as poetic song, and by this very characteristic, makes it incompatible with rational thought and practical living:

What will interest us today--what we must respond to, for interest now becomes an inappropriate word--is an accent in the novelist's voice, an accent for which the flutes and saxophones of fantasy may have prepared us. His the prophetic writer's theme is the universe, or something universal, but he is not necessarily going to "say" anything about the universe; he proposes to sing, and the strangeness of song arising in the halls of fiction is bound to give us a shock. How will song combine with the furniture of common sense? We shall ask ourselves, and shall have to answer "not too well."

Forster realizes that the cost involved in returning by memory to the position of our emotional beginning entails a necessary loosening of our hold on the rational world.

The characters which have been examined in both The Idiot and Wuthering Heights, especially Rogozhin and Heathcliff, illustrate the return to the primal in their
emotions, but from this position they cannot escape. Both Heathcliff and Rogozhin, as this study has shown, remain in the primality of the first state, and occupy absolute positions of emotion in a world that demands, in its very diverse nature, rationally qualified responses. Yet Forster urges us to climb all barriers of rational thought in order to join the prophetic novelist in his rediscovery of what this study calls primality in the human consciousness. Thus, through memory, we are able to recall our past emotional and instinctual life.

Because the framework of art has long ago been recognized as a creative, and often a therapeutic process, Forster presents the necessity of emotional rediscovery within its arena. The message that the prophetic writer offers is not a pessimistic message in so far as the reader manages to develop some self-awareness of its effect after his involvement and attraction to the writing has been established, and with new objectivity and insight, understood. As a criterion for human behavior, Forster does not seem to recommend recourse to the irrational of the first emotional impulses, nor does he rationally embrace the emotional positions evolved in the novel's
characters. Forster asks for participation in the prophetic novel for the obvious reasons that he states. Prophecy, in writers such as Bronte and Dostoyevsky, takes us where rationally thought-out schemata and conventional portrayals of emotion cannot go. For this reason, "a going back" in the framework of art impinges upon the therapeutic purposes of psychoanalysis. A return to the primal is in both cases a self-illumination because, with the need to go back into our past, there is a consequent necessity to return to life and become more rationally aware and understanding of the irrational impulses, desires and behavior which we find constantly working within us and around us.

Forster's own writing evinces a pattern not dissimilar to the process of prophetic awareness. He ascribes in the beginning of his novel Howard's End, the phrase "only connect" which underlies the efforts of the novel's characters to reach across social and personal barriers in order to realize one another amidst the repressive hypocrisy of the social milieu of which they are part. Forster's idea of "only connect"
corresponds to the integral value of the irrational desire for self-completion and self-recognition while recognizing the imperfections of human interchange in reality. "Only connect" is a Forster milestone to be balanced by his love of civilization, which he defends in an obituary note written for his friend, Roger Fry:

But his aesthetic achievement will be recorded by others; I have no qualifications for referring to it, and though I knew him for many years I only entered into a corner of his rich and varied life. It just seemed worth while, in this brief notice, to emphasize the belief which underlies his aesthetics and all his activity; the belief that man is, or rather can be, rational, and that the mind can and should guide the passions toward civilization.²

Thus, Forster emphasizes the need to know ourselves in so far as we identify with, and intimately understand, the tendency toward self-destruction inherent in human behavior.

The emotionally absolute position reached by Heathcliff is understandable to us in the movement of the plot of Wuthering Heights. He has loved absolutely, because he has had insufficient encouragement from parental and friendly contacts for a normal development of
the ego to take place. His final betrayal by Catherine is in some way a rationale for his destructive and suicidal behavior at the end of the novel. The image of being destroyed by a higher idealism is in this sense a relief to read about, and simultaneously provides us with a sense of peace to see him accomplish his death. In this way, the literary framework of the novel has allowed us to project our own death-headed desire for peace, for a state that, as Brown attests, is free of all anxiety and neurotic repressiveness which our living carries in its midst. But such involvement, at the level of relief and compensation alone, is insufficient—even dangerous in so far as we are attracted to human destruction itself. There must be an examination of why it is attractive to us—and with this a final realization of the destructive irrational hold such a myth has upon us.

Throughout this study, the primal forces underlying all of civilization have been defined as the life and death instincts. Freud has found them to be antagonistic in their final essences, yet a capitulation to one insures death without the antagonism of the other in equilibrium. Rogozhin's absolute state at the end of The Idiot
is the outcome of a struggle between the two instincts, and his murder of Nastasya illustrates the loss of his rational ability to decipher his emotional distortion of reality. His perception of reality is progressively loosened as he moves from a neurotic anxiety-driven position, in which he still relates to the individuals and circumstances around him, to a totally death-headed position in which he is continually obsessed with the idea of murdering Nastasya, and thereby attaining relief, or peace, from the struggle toward a balance in life. The portrayal of his insanity is an illustration of modern consciousness going back to its innate instinctual life and becoming locked within its narcissistic boundaries. Heathcliff, in contrast, personifies the absolute position of a death-headed instinctual life throughout Wuthering Heights and the disintegration of his personality is not evident in the sense that we see Rogozhin succumbing to the primality inherent in his irrational desire to murder. Heathcliff never develops the normal separation of his self from the symbols which constitute his early reality. The moors, Catherine, and the wild
freedom of childhood remain an integral part of the self throughout; the juvenile stance is never acquitted from its undemarcated egoistic state. Most evident in Rogozhin is the simultaneous pressure of a moral conscience against which his aggressive instinct towards murder struggles for expression. He loses his hold on rational insight and reality in the fight between his aggression and his self-flagellating sense of worthlessness. A capitulation to his aggressive instinct affords a final rest in a total condemnation of the self, in death itself. Similarly, the superego at work in Wuthering Heights is best personified in Nelly Dean and Old Joseph, whose self-righteous piety takes the form of sadism in its attempt to frighten the children into goodness.

Thus, Nelly Dean and Joseph form the early tribal conscience of conventional morality; the code of such morality that is "solely devoted to the welfare of the welfare of the tribe--not that of the species, nor that of an individual member of the tribe." The effects of Nelly Dean's threats of the punishment of Hell for evil is similarly revealed within the children in its
"instinctual crudeness and tribal cruelty," when the children, seeing themselves as inherently bad, forsake an outside reality that contrives only to hurt them. The superego forms the repressive element in human instinctual life, and it is the factor which most quickly facilitates a death-headed descent from consciousness. Erikson quotes Julian Huxley, who states that

the peculiar difficulties which surround our individual moral adjustment are seen to be largely due to our evolutionary history. Like our prolonged helplessness in infancy, our tendency to hernia and sinusitis, our troubles in learning to walk upright, they are a consequence of having developed from a simian ancestry. Once we realize that the primitive super-ego is merely a makeshift developmental mechanism, no more intended to be the permanent central support of our morality than is our embryonic motochord intended to be the permanent central support of our bodily frame, we shall not take its dictates so seriously (have they not often been interpreted as the authentic Voice of God?), and shall regard its supersession by some more rational and less cruel mechanism as the central ethical problem confronting every human individual. Thus, the superego, supplying unconscious guilt, forms an equally irrational hold on our behavior as the drives
of instinctual life itself do. Both areas of the human makeup are unconscious and are visible only through the neurotic or irrational symptoms in which they become apparent to the conscious ego. In this sense, the prophetic novel, and art itself, supplies a parallel in which we can uncover the instinctual and conscience-striken impulses underlying our own irrational behavior. On a metaphysical level we can describe the goal of each drive as revealing death, and the artistic portrayal of death in the characters of Rogozhin and Heathcliff illustrates the destructiveness without necessitating a consequent annihilation of the reader's own being. The illusions under which both the life of the instincts and the sense of guilt derive their impetus lie in the death-headed mythical structure surrounding early childhood, re-established throughout history as man's golden age, and viewed as the years of our greatest freedom. The idealization of the instincts themselves are present in the myth, because man is most free when uninhibited by social repressions mandatory to civilization's
survival. Similarly, the superego is idealized in the social sphere in which it all too often dictates the behavior of individuals so pervasively that self-awareness is totally lost. We have argued that De Rougemont's theory of the illusion of romantic-passionate love as death-headed is realistic insofar as it does recognize the insane desire for self-annihilation in mankind. He turns to the superego as a way to thwart such primal instincts in man, however, and thus adds impetus to an instinct that would be better understood in a rational light. Brown, in his desire to fuse the two instincts of life and death, accepts in reality only the instinct of death—thus, an arrival at the purely unrepressed state he envisions is again only another form of the death instinct in a Nirvana-like existence. By examining both theories, however, the tendency to deny either instinctual life, or its adversary, the dominating twentieth century conscience, is proved mistaken. Erikson's statement illustrates the danger of the complete power of each:

Yet is man's future were dependent on his unbridled "instincts" or his overweening
conscience alone, it could predictably end in species-wide suicide—in the name of the highest principles.⁶

In going back with the prophetic writer, the reader forsakes his rational grasp of the external reality which he knows. As Forster has specified, the face of prophecy is turned toward unity,⁷ and in each novel, The Idiot and Wuthering Heights, one feels the circle of life completed, its end in death seems an inevitable and underlying conclusion. With the demands made upon the reader of prophetic writing, including the suspension of humour, and the stance of humility, the unity felt in the novel echoes a desire for unity within ourselves. The instinctual life of the rational and irrational tendencies at work within the novel is unified, in the end, in death. The relief at such a representation of unity is felt so long as the reader does not carry the implications of the image of unity too far. The reader is under the illusion of whatever myth or guise the instinctual struggle has assumed in the novel until he is able to return to a more rational position and see the process of the novel, in this case
the process of human disintegration and death, objectively—as something outside of himself as well as inside of himself, and with distance—brought by a rational insistence that such a presentation of annihilation is a ridiculous and insane desire. Because the prophetic writer has the power to recreate the primal struggle and unconscious hold of guilt, he is able in a rational return to life, to illuminate the irrational aspects of all human behavior. Forster states that:

Regarded merely as a novelist the prophet has certain uncanny advantages, so that it is sometimes worth letting him into a drawing-room even on the furniture's account. Perhaps he will smash or distort, but perhaps he will illumine.8

Finally the question arises with regard to what the prophetic novelist illuminates for us, and what we make of our greater insight into the irrational within our own lives. By presenting the primal base of mankind as destructive, irrational thought we tend to deny its value at all in human life. Yet this study has shown how consistently twentieth century rationalized living has ushered in another kind of death by denying its primal base. The sterility, the "panic and emptiness" of the
over-rationalized individual is evident in the denial of the instincts as a part of human existence. There must exist a knowledge of both the primal base of civilization, and its over-repressing superego, for some good to emerge from each before we too quickly discard them as death-headed in their final directions. Forster accepts the imperfection and tremulousness of the "eclectic" position of which he states that

The only advice I would offer my fellow eclectics is: "Do not be proud of your inconsistency. It is a pity that we should be equipped like this. It is a pity that Man cannot be at the same time impressive and truthful."

In this last sense, man denies some part of himself, either in emotional honesty, or in rational wisdom, every time he moves forward to commit himself to life. Yet the necessity to undergo a struggle between both the urge to emotional expression and the emotional repression in view of its own inherent destructiveness, is continuous and never-ending. If man cannot be, as de Rougemont asserts, ordered to love, as he cannot finally be ordered to obey anything without losing his own self-image, he can eventually learn the value of rational compassion, and in this light, the struggle between the rational and irrational in his life is, often painfully, assured of
its continuance. Through memory, in which the unconscious emotional purity of life is retained and allowed to assert man's uniqueness and individuality, and through connection, which establishes man's ability to understand and enact with his fellows, a greater awareness of the irrational within life is at his disposal. Through the prophetic, "rational compassion" appears finally as the extension of an experiential mode which portrays the irrational and then allows man to evaluate such a vision of the primal in terms of his own life and all of civilization.
NOTES


De Rougemont, Denis. *Love in the Western World*. Greenwich: Fawcett, 1940.


