GEORGE HERBERT MEAD'S CONCEPTION
OF SOCIAL ORDER AND COMMUNICATION

by

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This thesis is concerned with George Herbert Mead's attempts to locate what we are disposed to call "mind" in the natural world, and with the philosophical problems stemming from this attempt. Mead's relativistic treatment of time and space, and its bearing upon the relation of organic perspectives to the "physical things" which are their focus is examined. The thesis explores some aspects of the problem in Mead's work of determining a logical continuity of experience between the "object" of physical science and the "act" of the organism. For this purpose the ramifications of Mead's statement that "social beings are things as definitely as physical things are social" are explored along with his handling of the "mind-body" problem as a relation of organism-environment. From these considerations the thesis moves to the question of how physical objects come to be represented to the organism as objects of its experience. Mead's treatment of the evolution of the gesture, the significant symbol and the social roles as they are developed in human communication, is therefore examined in some detail.

The purpose of the thesis is to show, through Mead's work, how the goal of "social order" is realized as a manifestation of the processes by which the organic individual reaches self-consciousness, i.e. those of communication both with himself and others, and of deliberate manipulation of the acts in which he is engaged as a social self.
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INTRODUCTION

Part I:

George Herbert Mead, philosopher and social psychologist, judging from the recorded assessments of those who have had personal contact with him, seemed certainly to be one of the most enigmatic figures of the Pragmatist movement. Though his way of thinking was often not well understood he evoked the deepest admiration from many of the more popular thinkers of his day, including Dewey and Whitehead. Among his acquaintances, there was a complete conviction about his personal integrity as well as a dedicated curiosity about his ideas. How could a man, who, according to Dewey had difficulty in making himself understood, inspire such a certain and positive reaction. Here, in the 20th century scientific world, which tried to reduce human behavior to a common biological or mental denominator, and which ignored individual uniqueness, an individual emerged, who by strictly self-imposed application of the method of science, created a mode of thinking so unique and so compelling as to defy, by example, the persistent pressures of determinism and absolutism that so easily attached themselves to the accomplishments of Science. One factor that at least partially explains his genius was his awareness that the scientific method was as much an organization of human activity as it was of the problems that it abstracted from this activity. He saw that the meaning of the perceptual object, i.e. the "physical thing" of science, the value system of society, was intrinsic to any future outcome of whatever perceptual act it evoked from the perceiver in relation to it. For this reason, Mead was able to take seriously the role of the perceiver in determining the nature of the object. He was certainly aware of his own thought that way, as is attested to by Dewey; in his introduction to Philosophy of the Present: "he experienced within himself the struggle of
ideas, hypotheses, presentments, at first wholly private, a matter of intimate personal self-hood, to find and take their place in an objective shared world."

The influences upon him in this quest were indeed many. Relativism, Romantic Idealism, and Realism were seriously considered by him as conditions by which his Pragmatic viewpoint should be explained. But, like Dewey and James, his ultimate frame of reference was that of the interrelationship of conduct and experience, of hypothesis and experiment. His attention was, therefore, on thought as a bio-social process, rather than on a set of principles governed by some Absolute All-knowing Mind. Of particular importance to him in this were Darwinism, Bergsonianism, and the philosophy of Samuel Alexander. One can't help remarking the similarity of terminology of Mead's and these philosophies. But Mead, unlike the others, was scrupulously scientific, and his vocabulary kept in mind the observed fact, not as a rationale for metaphysical assertion, but as a test of the meaning of hypotheses, and as a dimension of conduct.

Mead also kept in mind the problem of rooting in a sound technique of empirical thinking, the importance of conduct to the outcome of experienced events. In fact, for Mead, the explanation of such events including data on the behaviors of the most finely determined physical particles lay in the possibilities they afforded for conduct. To account for the origin of such possibilities Mead resorted to a theory of perspectives, whereby the observer of an object is observing himself or responding to his conduct from the point of view of that object as it exists in his experience. The fruitful results of this doctrine led to Mead to assert the sociality of the mind and the self – the placing one-
self in the role of the other. In this area he was influenced by the sociologist Charles H. Cooley's "sympathetic imaginations", although he did not entirely identify with him. However, sociality provided Mead with a point of view that enabled him to explain individuality, selves, or minds, as they existed from their own perspectives.

In developing a behavioral account of sociality Mead found extremely useful the notion of the gesture - the signalling of organism between each other to coordinate cooperative action, the most sophisticated form of which he termed the significant symbol. The gesture was the means by which the individuals own activities acquired their individuality, i.e. they came into what the individual perceived as the other. This aspect of Meads thought gave rise to the "symbolic interactionist" movement in modern sociology and social psychology, headed by Herbert Blumer, Irving Goffman, E.L. Faris and others.

The contribution that Mead has made to social thought is staggering to say the least, and it will be some time yet before its full significance will be realized. It is the opinion of this writer that the map of human conduct that he has drawn will prove a reliable resource for the evolution of a truly human community.
Part II:

Social science in the past few centuries, has as an offshoot from the momentum of Newtonian science, sought to systematize and correlate what might be called "patterns of social behavior." In so far as there was a problem of determining such patterns it could only manifest itself as a discrepancy in awareness between "individuals" in some "society" in which they participated where their actions as individuals could be measured as aspects of a composite whole in which they meaningfully co-operated. But such a composite whole had to refer to what in fact "individuals" in their own activities were doing from the point of view of what was of common concern to them as "individuals". The farmer who tilled the fields and took his produce to the village market had no idea of the kinds of cultivation and marketing procedures that were to grow out of his activities. But as they were developed he had to reckon with them in terms of what he himself had to do in so far as his own enterprise was significant to the changing conditions of transportation and marketing techniques. His actions were tied into the actions of others.

Thus when social science in attempting to initiate formal procedures of inquiry began to designate as unquestionable facts the existence of "individuals", "societies" or "objects" (physical or social) it was forced eventually to explain these terms as outgrowths of a living, "doing" historical process evolving in a present. In other words the definitive forms of expression of these terms could be justified only as they facilitated socio-historical processes already underway in the same sense that the oxcart facilitated the development of village markets for the farmers produce. It was this task that George Herbert Mead consciously undertook to complete and it led him to express, on no uncertain terms,
the movement or development of at least the idea of a living process, historical, biological or otherwise, in all the patterns of his thought. What this idea consisted of will be examined in Chapter I in the context of a comparison of the notions of "animacy" and "inanimacy" as well as those of "the act" of living forms and "motion" of physical bodies.

If there was to be a social process in the doings of individuals in some present then the acts of others would in some sense have to be there in what the individual himself would undertake to do. How this coordination of action arises in the form of communication was another preoccupation of Mead and will be dealt with in Chapters II and III.

I should point out that this thesis in no way intends to finalize Mead's work or exhaustively categorize the many influences on his thought. Rather, an attempt is made to filter out and crystallize in simple terms some of his more important ideas, and perhaps present to the reader some examples of his method of thought in the conviction that this will bear precious fruit for further study.
CHAPTER I
THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE AS A LIFE PROCESS

A good portion of the work of George Herbert Mead is concerned with the social and philosophical implications of the emergence of the life process in the physical world and of the evolution of communicative behavior out of this process. Unlike many thinkers, Mead did not use these primary problems to arrive at some cosmological formulation, the validity of which would reside in some intuitive resemblance to fact that could neither be proved nor disproved. Rather, he saw these questions as necessary starting points in locating a natural continuity between the objects and ideas of the methods of physical, biological and social inquiries. The issue wherein Mead's deepest preoccupations lay was how to locate, in what were the self-evident workings of nature, the basis for the reflective mind common to them. This required, among other things, isolating the perceptual object of physical science with a view to determining the role it occupied as a constituent in the development of living processes.

Mead starts with a twofold acceptance of teleological (living) and more or less mechanical (non-living) objects as empirical physical observables, and then proceeds to focus upon the relative difference in the corresponding methodological assumptions made to investigate them. In distinguishing living from non-living things, Mead states the following:

..... we find in the living form an individual thing that maintains itself through the mutual determination of the form and its environment. The surrounding world is so related to the animal or plant by their (sic) sensitivity and response that the life process continues. Over against the inanimate thing the surroundings do not exhibit characters that answer to the thing in being what it is. A boulder is a definite thing with its own mass and form, but its relations to things about it do not give rise to qualities in them which through the contacts, weight, or momentum of the boulder conserve the boulder .... The particular form of an
inanimate body is irrelevant to 'what it is'. For such bodies the environment is as unessential as the object." 1

That is, the inanimate object does not act upon the changes which it undergoes in its relation with other objects. In other words, when that by which an object is designated undergoes change it no longer is that object. Physical science has vainly tried to posit a reality for this object, over above its experienced form, at points, empirically unobservable, where the object may be so reduced (say to the atom, or sub-atomic particle) that there is no possibility of its being affected by change:

...... reality does not lie in the form - for there may be endless transformation - but in the matter, mass, or energy." 2

Thus there is a reality pertinent to a particular inanimate object but that is only because it is pertinent to all other objects with which it is involved in its transformations. It is not particular to the thing but to changes in relations between things. It is at most a transition but never an adjustment to a transition, i.e., with change the identity of the particular inanimate object is lost. All that can be indicated are fixed positions in between changes, and so all characteristics that endure are only representative of a basic law of inertia or stasis, reinforced by concepts of matter, mass and energy.

The 'boulder' is a particular combination of characteristics that distinguish it in kind from other objects. But these characteristics or their combination are defined by the action of other objects distinguishable from it. There is never anything peculiar to the boulder except as it is defined by its relation to other things. In the case of the
living organism, however, its relation to other things is defined in and by its own activity. It is a physical object, composed of "inanimate" materials, but what these materials are depends, not simply on their relationship to other things, but to the organisms response to other things. Life, Mead suggests, is a reflexive process where the organism uses an environment to sustain and extend its own process:

"Plants and animals .... present to science objects whose essential characters are found not in that which undergoes transformation but in the process itself and in the forms which the object assumes within that process. Since the process involves the interaction of animal or plant with surrounding objects, it is evident that the process of life as really confers characters upon the environment as it does upon the plant or animal." 3

The specific relationship between animacy and inanimacy is crucial in Mead's work. We may conceive of inanimate things as integral to the processes of animate things (such as water to plants), but the reverse is inconceivable, since inanimate things do not distinguish, in themselves or their surroundings an environment in which the changes they undergo are organized to sustain further their own processes. For example, the scientist who suspects that hydrogen and oxygen when combined in a certain way will produce water and who arrives through experimentation at a set of conditions wherein this process takes place, will never find in any of these conditions objects which in themselves create them. They may be the conditions but they do not have the characteristic of making them.

The consequence of this view is fundamental, for it means a reframing of the question of how life emerges out of a physical world. Until now, the question implicitly raised by science was, how does the life process answer the prevailing laws of physics which have had undeniably successful results in the exploitation of the field of inanimate objects.
The question would now have to read, does not the life process challenge the very foundations of the laws of physical science such that this body of knowledge would be unrecognizable if the life process were accepted as a legitimate manifestation of a universe presumed subject to scientific laws?

By definition physical objects if they are mechanically conceived are not in themselves animate and cannot explain animacy. Is a theory conceivable that accounts for physical events as part of a process of life? Can there be a change from one subject to another where the conditions within the field of the change are transformed by the passing of that change? If so, how does such a transformation of conditions become the focus by which the passing change may sustain itself as an emergent object of the consequences that follow in its wake. An answer would require a notion of an observable physical object whose enduring characteristics would be found in the sustenance of itself as a process of transformation of physical things. It would have to be an object that could adjust to changes in time and space such that by its occupation of one field of space and time it may occupy another perspective toward which that field is changing. The animal who feels hunger, hunts its food, eats, and then stops eating when his appetite is sated changes his relationship to what he is doing according to how the latter passes into a situation in which he is a survivor, or a continuing life-process. Thus the traits of such an object would thus be described as occupying both systems at once, as 'hunger' describes the lack of food as much as the drive to go out and get it. To state this in another form: an object, as it changes, comes to have a past in the transformation. It is something it wasn't before, and
what it was before is thus distinguished from its present form. Also, the object has a past before it transforms, a past which enables the object be characterized in the first place. The question that Mead poses is whether it is possible for an object to have two different and exclusive pasts. In other words, can the past of the object as it transforms be different before it transforms and still be the same object? How can an object be accountable to two or more different histories when one historical framework apparently excludes the possibility of the object existing in the other, as Mead suggests is the case with living forms. Mead answers this by pointing out that histories confer their meanings or their existence only on a present and their contradictions pertain to what might be the case if their pasts were present. Stated differently there is no such thing as a contradiction in space and time except as it manifests itself as an occurrent means by which expected placings of objects become only possibilities if that occurrence is accepted as fact. With the new occurrence, space and time undergo change — just so much change as would account for the novelty of the occurrence in a situation of usually high improbability of its happening. As Mead states, 

"The metaphysical question is, can a thing with changing spatio-temporal and energy dimensions be the same thing with different dimensions when we have seemingly only these dimensions by which to define the thing? It has seemed simpler to say that the real thing lies behind these experiences which are subjective and phenomenal. But let us instead accept passage as the character of reality, and recognize that in passage there is change in the structure of things, and that because of passage objects can occupy different systems." 5

Objects, if they are in any sense to have some bearing on events that are happening, as is assumed to be the case with living forms which create environments out of their surroundings must have characteristics
whose form can be stated in terms of a conditioning of the passage of these events such that they may emerge in the form of what constitutes an act for these objects as living forms. They must have the quality, therefore, of a 'now' in which events happen.

Mead suggests that it is the occurrence of a 'now' that marks the advent of life in a physical world, and that this now may be considered as the spatio-temporal location of the organism confronting itself as an occurrence over against which things or events come to have the property of 'taking place'. In terms of physical science, Mead connects this 'taking place' with the collapse, in experience, of the space and time within which probabilities of events are constructed which ensues when that construction progresses to a predictable outcome as has been accounted for in relativity theory and evidenced in the observed changes of a mass of particles approaching the velocity of light, where mass and velocity were once considered proportionally invariable in calculations of force.

This 'now', or as Mead terms it, this 'spacious present', as it exists as a trait of the organism "is an expression of relativity in terms of life". When the co-ordinates of space and time are selected from an emerging present, rather than metaphysically constructed, a 'now' becomes possible where the enduring characteristics of objects are but "consolidations of passing events" into the "fixed conditions of later occurrences". Living organisms are considered by Mead as evidence of the existence of such a 'now' as a physical presence in the world of the physical object. The evidence lies in the continual confirmation of the organism's own physical traits upon the environment in and by which it
survives. "If an animal digests, there must exist a food which the animal digests". Food, in this case, is not just a name for an object with "foody" characteristics, but is a repetitive selection of the environment which stabilizes the digestive processes. The selection of the food depends on the state of that process, the feeding habits of different species and so on. The manner (in so far as a manner can be determined) of this selection, as has been shown by the theory of natural selection, is one which attaches to the qualitative nature of the physical objects selected, and lends to those qualities a character of an "environment" of the organism, characters which would not be there without the organism but which are nevertheless present in the object as the physical organization of this "environment". It follows, then, that the objects of physical science itself are objects that acquire traits conjoined with the organization of the perceptual apparatus of the human organism, and which pertain to the environment of the organic extension of such apparatus.

It is thus through the organism manipulation of its environment that objects arise which have the "insides", to use a favorite expression of Meads, of the physical acts with which the organism is engaged, for in the manipulatory process, objects have as their content the stresses and strains of 'resistance' that the organism experiences 'inside' itself in 'handling' the objects"

"... the individual has called out in the mechanism of his organism the sort of resistance response he is seeking in the physical thing with the sense of effort which accompanies his own response. He asks of the thing to reply in terms of his own conduct. This placing one's self within the object and thus giving it an inside belongs to the formation of the hypothesis, and therefore, to the extension of the space and time of the manipulatory area
... genuinely as to the alternative plans of action which belong to the reflective attitude. The extension involves the occupation of the distant object (which belongs in unreflective experience to the future) by a physical object which exists now, that is, at the moment of the manipulatory experience." 9

The essential precondition for such a creation of an 'inside' is that there exists a possible structure either constructed by hypothesis or by simple physical adjustment which to some extent answers as a whole to the change in relations with objects that ensue from organic manipulatory contact. In so far as it answers as a whole it represents an event or an object by which all parts of the manipulatory experience have the same property of 'happening'. As Mead suggests, in the physical world, it occurs in the moment of extension of distant objects from the organism's location of like objects in his own physical being. The organism sees a tree at a distance whose reality in some sense depends upon its solidity upon contact with the organism. Such a solidity requires the organism to experience himself as solid against it, and its spatial-temporal distance is measured in terms of the manipulations necessary for this experience to be 'contemporaneous' with the organism as a perceiving individual—contemporaneity meaning, in Mead's terms, the location of immediate objects of contact in a distant space-time, so that the tree at a distance persists as an object in the organism's experience of what it manipulates in its 'here and now' as it approaches a point of immediate contact with the tree. The animal and the tree are said to be contemporaneous when the here and now of the animal's immediate field of action becomes identical with what he experiences of the here and now of the distant tree if he were in contact with it. This presupposes that the condition for a manipulatory experience is that it extends toward a distant space-time. I.e., an object at a distance, to the extent of being...
a stimulus, has the property of existing at the same moment as the organism and its processes. This 'moment' or 'now' amounts to a statement of reliability or promise that spatial-temporal properties of what is a distant tree will remain consistent with events ensuing from the organism's approach to it. It will have a character of 'here' in the manipulatory area that approximates to some extent the character of 'here' it would experience in approaching and touching it. But such a reliability is hypothetical and its reference is to what is a continuing experience of a promise of fulfilment, of reaching the distant goal through manipulation. As such, it is actualized only at the moment of contact.

In a mechanical universe, there is no place for the organism to select coordinates for a spatio-temporal distribution of objects which would allow for a manipulatory experience at all, whether visual, tactile or whatever, since space and time are absolute for all objects. Action disappears into mere motion which is random without a frame of reference by which it may be determined. The determination of relative motion of bodies, i.e., motion with regard to an effective frame of reference, requires a selection of such a frame of reference, however, and this selection Mead points out, is one which must allow for a perceptual experience in the first place. This is to say it must allow the organism to locate its own processes and actions in the distant objects which stimulate them. Through its orientation to what is 'there' the organism addresses itself to what comes later in its manipulatory sphere in the context of any goal to be attained that is called out in its actions by this experience of what is 'there'. As has been already stated, such goals arise not only out of the effective occupation of space by physical
objects in relation to the organism but also in their character of resist-
ing an avoided response by the organism toward it that is identical with
the organism's own resistance toward itself in exacting the response.
The result is that the organism, in reaching toward a distant stimulus
finds in subsequent experience the conditions which enable this manipula-
tion to continue toward what was initially aroused as its distant "aim".
With the positioning of the object as 'there' the organism locates it as
a later phase of a manipulatory act in which it is now engaged, so that
the distance it anticipates of the object from itself will coincide to
some extent with what actualizes in its experience of distance in its
approach or avoidance of the object.

This coincidence which leads singles out, of what comes later in the
responses of the here and now with the distance of a far away stimulus is
what lies behind the organism's identification of its effort in the act:

"There is in the experience which is organized about the individual
and the environment a content of effort in the organism of the
individual which is aroused by the pressure of the individual upon
the object and which goes into the object. Because this content is
in the organism, the individual may identify himself with the object,
and act toward his own physical organism by way of resistance to
his own pressure, and thus become a physical object over against
the first object." 10

The experience of resistance by which the organism identifies itself as
a physical thing over against an environing physical object is realized
only in the fact that the organism selects a frame of reference, which
constitutes an environment, physiological or otherwise, by which the
spatio-temporal properties of objects take the form of a perspective of
the organism in its surroundings. In selecting a frame of reference, the
organism adjusts or adapts to changes in its environment until a sequence
of actions arises in these adjustments which constitute for it a future
in which its balance with its environment is located in what it anticipates as a later experience.

This future is one which 'answers' to the effects on the completion of the act of a distant or novel stimulus called on by the organism's own activities. In so far as it 'answers' it has the temporal character of the organism's experience of now reaching towards the distant stimulus and now adjusting to the changes in its manipulatory conditions that follow upon this reaching. The selection of an end therefore is for the organism a step in reaching it insofar as it locates his processes in a distant object the approach towards which lies in his own manipulations. The condition for this selection is that the distant object must in some sense be identifiable with some experience of continued resistance against it:

"It is only when the fact that the same thing is continually in experience is itself in experience that there appears persistence and a possible object. It is in so far as the organism in grasping or embracing the thing passes on its own effort of pushing against its own expenditure of effort into the thing that the continued expenditure of effort appears in experience." 11

Mead is in effect saying that there is a world lying outside the organism and its processes that would in so far as it intersects with the latter at all, only hypothetically take the form of what the organism specifies to itself as being outside, its reality lying in the continued persistence throughout the organism's experience that answers to this specification. In short, it is a condition of the universe of which living beings are part, that it is intelligible, that it emerges in the form of what Mead calls 'perspectives' or organism-environment. The organism grows into its own involvements with its surroundings which, in the characteristic
'persistence' of these involvements are a perspective wherein its growth may be directed or responded to. It is of the nature of these organic-environmental involvements in so far as they are living processes that they exist only in the evolution and development of the organism as a whole and that they allow the continuation of the organism's location in them of the act as a whole. As Head states:

"Beyond this mediate field of perceptual physical things lies the ultimate completion of the act in consummation, which is an experience that is referred to the perceptual object but transcends its physical perceptual character. The perceptual object is there over against the organism as a physical object. This situation is referred to as a perspective. The relationship of the perceptual field and the organism in the perspective is social, i.e., there has been excited in the organism that response of the object which the act of the organism tends to call out." 12

The physical object, in its being an object of perception from Head's standpoint, is one that is already involved in an act, the perceptual contents of which are but promises of its completion in a here and now. Aside from this situation there is no perspective. Now we may, according to Head, abstract from the act its 'physical' element, e.g., objects of motion and rest, and state the relative positions of bodies occupying space, but such an abstraction would amount to a hypothesis concerning the expectation of events of an ongoing series of manipulatory activities that would follow if the observer effectively occupied the spatial positions of distant objects which he records. The same would hold for motion where calculations of velocity employ numerical configurations correlating the rate of change of position of a distant object or object of measurement in terms of the rates of changes of sequences of events anticipated in a manipulatory experience upon its projection to the measured object.
"In so far as we adjust ourselves to those objects that are changing about us, either by the movement of the eye or actual or possible movements of the body, they have the future value of possible acts. They have the value of possible contacts determining action and producing certain results. The experience depends upon what action is taken, not simply upon past positions and relative present positions."

The determination of an act involves the "construction of a world within which it can be completed." Such a construction necessitates a selection of objects, in which the moment of selection advances the act to what had been anticipated as its next phases. As this next phase actually arrives, to what has hitherto been an anticipation of it, an element of what Mead calls 'novelty' which embodies the changing relations between present and future that accompany every advent of the act, is introduced into the situation. This element of novelty is not to be confused with mere differentiation although it may certainly include the latter. Rather, the term pertains to a change of circumstances in the anticipation of an end of the act that is brought about in the selection of the objects that realize the act. It is thus integral to these selective processes in so far as they call out of the object a response that coincides with a later stage of the act, and circumscribes the world that is held fast by the organism wherein he locates his ends. It bears upon a sustained experience lasting throughout changes in the conditions of its occurrence that is realized in its adjustments to these changes. Any such adjustments are of necessity, hypothetical, in Mead's view, for they are extensions of what appears to the organism as a tension between conflicting anticipations of what is about to take place in its relations with its environment. Such conflicting anticipations endure for each other according to Mead's logic, as long as there is an environment for the organism in its activities as a whole which sustains them. It is because
of this that the organism is able to experience, through reference to the whole of its activities, what are contradictions in its various parts. Also, it is because the organism requires an environment to exist that what we are disposed to call "the forces of nature" may be identified in the arrestation of an experience of its adjustmental activities. This statement would apply, for Mead, to all living processes; physiological, behavioral or whatever.

If conflicting tendencies called out by a supporting environment, or what Mead calls "mutually exclusive systems", may be said to endure even though they may occupy one another and apparently nullify one another from the standpoint of each, all adjustments to such a situation would have to involve to some extent objects whose conditions for existence for the organism would reside in an unfractured relation between what it anticipates of its own conflicting tendencies in calling them up as a response to the environment, and what actualizes as the environing stimulus-object in relation to its enactment of the response toward it. Such a coordination extends to a future in what is taking place that is common to what would take place in the organisms acting upon each of its conflicting responses. Its reality then would lie in a future that is over above any anticipated future in any particular instant of the act, that would arise for the next response at the moment of enactment of any part of the act. It is, in Mead's words, in terms of its spatial contents,

"a distant whole (which)...constitutes a continued structural whole whose analysis allows of positions that can give a positive content to the point which cannot be found in that which effectively occupies space from within, however far we carry the subdivision." 14

This is what Mead refers to as the "organism-environment in the perspective"
and the condition for its emergence lies in the capacity of the organism to call up, by its own conduct of realizing an act in which its life process is allowed to continue, an identical response as that given by objects that constitute an environment for it.
CHAPTER II
THE REPRESENTATION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS IN ORGANIC
ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSACTION

The uniformities that physical science attains in its inquiries bring into realization the capacity for varying perceptual qualities of objects to represent one another in terms of their outcomes in experimentation. In this capacity for the organism to represent to itself the basic physical contact with which it is continuously involved we have the grounds for the emergence of language and the more complex 'behavioral' processes. The physicist's mathematical formulae, hypotheses, and the machinery of his observation and data accumulation enable him to organize the conduct of his organic relation to the immediate perceptual objects of his inquiries. As well, in the field of ethology, recent studies have shown how non-human animals use sounds and bodily movements in organizing their activities. The basic unit of such intermediary behavior Mead terms 'the gesture'. Before examining Mead's account of the gesture, his generalized discussion of the organism's relation to physical objects will be reintroduced. We have seen how such objects attain their characteristics through their effects on the organization of the act. These effects are experienced in the adjustments of the organism's responses to it as an object.

The principle behind such adjustmental activity, according to Mead, is that with the initiation of the act there is a gap of uncertainty because of the object's mediation of the organism's attempts at consummation. This applies to the more rudimentary behaviors of animals such as the search for food as well as in human behavior, for instance, in the conflicts of interest in controlling objects held in common between different groups of people. The consummation is not there and yet promises
to be there. The response of the organism is to both parts of the situation. Mead emphasizes that these two elements of the act belong to the nature of the object as it is found in the organism's experience. It is the character of the object as distinct from the organism that serves as the focus for the organism's adjustment and modification.

On the physiological level this adjustmental activity takes place in terms of the interactions of immediate spatial structures of organisms. But with the evolution of distance organs such as the eye, ear, hand (or even the innervation of skin covering which indicate to the insides of the body the presence of objects outside its surfaces), as well as their integration via a central nervous system, it becomes possible for objects spatially distant to enter into active relation with the organism before actual manipulatory contact.

"What we actually come into contact with is there over against the organism, but by far the larger part of what surrounds us we do not rest upon or manipulate. It is distant from us in space and time, yet it has an inner content that is a continuation of what lies under our feet and within our grasp. These distant objects not only call out in us direct responses of moving toward or away from and manipulating them, but they also arouse in us the object's that act upon us from within ourselves." 3

The eagle and its prey, for example, are spatially distant. The prey may not be within the eagle's vision. The eagle responds to this situation in the hunt. Where it spots its prey, the spatial distance is translated into the swoop. In all stages of its behavior distance in space and time are integrated by the eagle's responses to the spatial-temporal changes that its actions bring about in the hunt. In these inhibitions and accelerations of action, the organism is continually answering its encounter with the object. Their relationship is indirect relative to the consummation of the act in immediate contact. It is such 'indirection of
action that the rudiments of what Mead calls the gesture may be isolated. The 'gesture', as Mead defines it is that part of the social act which serves as a stimulus to other forms involved in the same social act.

Insofar as an organism is a composite being, in which many of its parts are stimulated by environing objects, it is possible, using Mead's hypothesis, to arrive at a theory of the evolution of gesture behavior out of the complex intermediary sensitivities called out from developed physiological processes by the environment. In fact, Mead outlines briefly the major steps in such a progression:

I have assumed that a certain systematic psycho-chemical process arises which no selects what it rests upon so as to maintain the process, and that this process, appearing within the physical world, emerges as life. Into this situation there now comes a form that not only lives, but makes its own organic conditions, favorable or unfavorable to life, part of the field to which it reacts or within which it lives. A conscious form is one which can make phases of its own life process parts of its environment. An animal that selects certain of its own living states, as the rootless of a plant select water then the plant needs water, not only lives, as does the plant but is also thirsty. Feeling is the term we use for this added element in life, when the animal enters in some degree into its own environment.

The importance of feeling in the development of gesture can be seen if we consider it as part and parcel, but not identifiable with, the organized responses in which feelings are expressed. When the lion becomes hungry, he responds to this inner state with his hunting activities. Thus, rather than just being hungry and roaring in discomfort, this inner state becomes representative or indicative of a whole set of other responses that will locate objects in the environment to satisfy his hunger. In this representation by inner states of the organism of acts in the environment which involve the whole organism in various forms of mobility, attention, etc., by which external objects are increasingly brought into play, immediate
processes are adjusted so that they stimulate possibilities of responding to the promise that distant objects present to them. Feelings, in Mead's presentation, are not mere reactions but stimuli as well, and when they refer to responses which the organism might make to objects distant from it, i.e., to changes external to its own physical boundaries, (such as the movements of fish after changes in water temperature, or of birds with changes in season) it is easy to conceive of actions taking on intermediary significance and becoming gestures in the full sense of the term. Feelings or sensitivities may be representative insofar as there are objects which sustain or negate them in the organism's responses to its environment.

Thus far, we have mentioned the special instance of an isolated organism in an environment, where it is able to identify the same potentialities or reactions among a variety of objects and responses through intermediary representation. In actual fact, animals develop most of their behavior in contact with other animals of the same or different species. In species where sight, hearing, vocal chords, a central nervous system and other like receptors have evolved, movements and sounds at a distance play important roles in directing immediate activities. When these roles are recognized in the physical or physiological likenesses and common behaviors of animals in their environments and can be evoked by some discriminable action on the part of an individual organism, then we have, according to Mead, the development of the 'gesture', which occurs in situations in which certain phases of the act become stimuli to the forms involved in it to carry out their part in the act. Now these parts of the act which are stimuli for the other forms in their social activity are gestures. Gestures are then that part of the act which is responsible for its influence upon other forms. The
gesture in some sense stands for the act as it affects the other form." 7

With this interpretation of the gesture it is possible to imagine how organisms may direct their own responses to stimuli by their evocation of responses of other organisms which enable them to complete complex acts which demand the combined responses of many participants. The act becomes not only an immediate fulfillment of a single organism's responses, but a conjoined partaking of a single act by many organisms where the actions of other organisms are stages of the responses of the individuals.

The movements which constitute this field of conduct are themselves not the complete acts which they set out to become. 8

They are acts of separate organisms which are common to each others co-ordination. The gesture occurs when one organism indicates to another by some indirect response the next stage in the act which the other is about to execute. For instance, terns patrolling the shoreline of a lake in search for food will emit a type of cry just before swooping down on their food that will immediately stimulate others nearby to swoop as well. Such a cry could have originated as an ejaculatory sound associated with the eating of food and could have been selected from a variety of responses as one which coincides more nearly with the consummation of these patrolling activities. As is well known ethological studies reveal that there are many different types of sounds and motions to correspond with different habitual actions, but the gesture as Mead describes it is not merely a movement or a sound, but a direction of an act, and cannot therefore be severed from the activities in which its significance is functional. This becomes evident in Mead's account of the imitative processes of young animals. He rejects the 'copy' theory where gestures are acquired simply
by physical proximity of the parent. He points out that this theory does not account for the animal's apparent capacity to use these gestures in guiding his social conduct. An accurate explanation would have to consider the fact that in imitation not only does the animal 'copy' but he enters situations in the environment with the parent in which his imitative actions are important in answering the demands of his survival.

The gesture, then, is an outcome and an integral part of the sequence of the more fundamental activities in which it operates. It is not simply a means for controlling life processes, but rather, it is a control, and has definite consequences in these processes, social or physiological, which cannot be lodged in the gesture alone:

They are acts which go beyond the organism taken by itself, but they belong to cooperative processes in which groups of animals act together, and they are the fulfillment of the processes which are essential to the life of the forms. \(^7\)

It is understandable that types of acts such as vocalization which are highly variable in their own forms and which do not disrupt major biological processes can come to play a significant role in the development of gestural behaviors. Insofar as many organisms are cooperatively involved it is immensely advantageous to develop gestures which respond to many types of situations in many more ways, than affording a greater flexibility of conduct—manipulation of limbs, for instance, may be used to direct visual attention, but are cumbersome if they have to continuously rely on eyesight. For this reason, Mead emphasizes the importance of the development of vocal gestures where the organism can hear what the other hears at the time the gesture is made without being visually present, thus arousing common tendencies to act that visual gestures could not arouse.
The basic vocal gesture for "head" consists of a signalling act where the uttered sound of one animal leads to the execution of an act by another which would not take place without the sound but which has no further significance to the animal that uttered it. When, however, the act resulting from the uttered sound does evoke a definite response from the one who utters it, then the vocal gesture comes to be representative of coordinated actions. They acquire significance. A further development occurs in the use of sounds to evoke like sounds to indicate common predispositions to partake in cooperative acts—e.g., the use of mating calls in courtship. In this case sounds made by an animal are accompanied by various movements of approach or withdrawal that are either inhibited or carried out depending on the response of the other animal involved. Thus the gesture of the other animal occurs as a coordination of the initiator's act. This requires the response of the other to be identical to that of the initiator when he utters his sounds. But this type of gesture which is common to most higher animals is to be distinguished from what Mead calls the significant symbol, which is peculiar to human behavior. In the significant symbol, the individual gesture not only stimulates the other to respond in a like manner to his own subsequent action, but stimulates himself and the other to respond in a like manner in the subsequent action to the evocative powers the gesture itself may have in the direction of the act in which he is engaged. The term, significant symbol makes clear that not only are objects indicated by gestures as a stimulus for others to respond (as in the case of birds warning calls indicating possible danger) but the gestures themselves, in their power to engage the actor in the completion of his act, stimulate the individual who makes
them in the same way as the other to whom it is addressed. With such animal behaviors warning calls this does not apply, since the cry of the animal in spotting danger, while indicating this danger to other animals, does not evidently bear on any further stimulation of the animal who utters it. It does not add anything more to his action than the original spotting of danger. To quote Mead:

It is, of course, the relationship of this symbol, this vocal gesture, to such a set of responses in the individual himself as well as in the other that makes of that vocal gesture what I call a significant symbol. A symbol does tend to call out in the individual a group of reactions such as it calls out in the other, but there is something further that is involved in its being a significant symbol: this response within one's self to such a word as 'chain' or 'dog' is one which is a stimulus to the individual, as well as a response. 10

Such responding to one's own and other's responses to one's gesture is recognizable only in language -- symbols. It seems from Mead's slightly unclear account, to be the very act of language itself, the emergence of meaning in living processes, for, to respond in the above manner, the gesture becomes the object by which organic activity itself forms part of the environment of the organism. It becomes significant to the control of action and it obstructs or furthers the act in the same sense as 'physical' things do.

Mead's argument that the organism in its physiological and rudimentary behavioral activities confers characters upon the surrounding world as much as that world modifies the organism may be usefully applied to understanding further the mechanism of the significant symbol. This view, coincidentally, was taken by the American poet Wallace Stevens. In describing the situation of poetic meaning, Stevens remarks, "the word is of a thing that does not exist without the word". This statement reflects the
nature of the symboling act which H e a d described. The word is an act of the mind's organism signalling to itself when and where its responses may be located in its perceptual environment. The organism moves in a universe in which its own actions are extended. The patterns of action which we term its past, are, in the organism's movement through this universe, the landscape of a future into which its own sentence in all its complexity, ventures forth by that medium with which it is most intricately bound, the medium of the symbol, the threshold from which sentence steps from its organic structure into the fleeting events of nature that form and re-form its perceptual field, and finds their meaning in its own recorded past.

Symbols for H e a d , are a sophisticated development of the organic act. Their capacity to coordinate actions depends on their inhibition of simultaneously occurring conflicting tendencies to act. Such inhibition is reflected on the capacity for symbols to present in an indirect manner the consummation of conflicting responses in areas outside the field of their conflict. That is, the capacity for words to call up objects not immediately there in the organism's responses allows for the presentation in immediate activity of the fulfillment of initially exclusive responses in a distant space and time. If the fulfillment is there at a distance, that distance itself as it extends back to the manipulation area becomes the objective condition by which the conflicting responses are channeled to a simultaneous fulfillment in the here and now. It is thus conceivable that words may extend beyond the bounds of existing logical symbolic structures in order to co-ordinate the conflicting impulses contained within the latter, and change their enduring meaning.
It has often been noted in this connection by many thinkers that language transforms or extends the senses. The truth of this can only be appreciated if it is understood that an animal, (in his case, the human animal), senses his own tendencies to act upon an object just as he senses the object. It is continuously responding both inside and outside itself in a variety of ways to a variety of objects, and it is in these varying processes (which, in their 'mental' aspect, William James referred to as 'stream of consciousness') that any one object makes its presence felt. In the last chapter, it was pointed out how physical objects act on the organism through disrupting the latter's own processes. These disrupted processes are as much of what the organism acts upon as is the object that inhibits them. If this is kept in mind, it can be seen how in organisms with distance receptors, objects at a distance stimulate the manipulatory area without there being anything immediately there to answer such stimulation and how this actual distance is structured in the experience of the organism through its responses to the inhibited state. What goes on beyond its immediate periphery takes place as the outcome of a selection of its responses to it within this periphery:

... the relations that make of the surrounding objects the environment of the organism are active inside the organism.

Therefore the control the organism exercises over its surroundings is in a large measure identical to its future control over its own impulses or tendencies to act in relation to them. With the use of significant symbols it can indicate to itself what in its manipulatory area answers to the promises of distant stimuli to fulfil the anticipations of immediate conduct. When a coordination is struck between the element of promise and the sequences of ongoing action, we have the emergence of what Mead refers to as the 'biological individual'.
The term refers to the individual in an attitude and at a moment in which the impulses sustain an unfractured relation with the objects around him ... what is sought is the coincidence of an anticipated result with the actual event. 12

The symbol in this context discriminates not only distant objects by denotation, but also the impulses within the organism that are seeking to act. It is a tool, a means to an end. As a tool, its prime function, in relation to organic impulses, is to transform the latter from blind reflex into means for the coordination of responses. That is, the impulses themselves become tools. This is possible because they can be lodged in the coordinated responses of organized symbolic structure where other impulses may be deliberately aroused or checked to correspond to a finer determination of the stimulus-object in their interplay with those that await fulfillment:

The control exercised over the impulses is always through selections of stimulations conditioned by the sensitizing influence of various other impulses seeking expression. 13

Head seems to imply that the transformation of uncontrolled impulses into instrumentalties of determined patterns of habitual action is the main function of symbolization.

Just as the brain thrives on its functionings, so too, its symboling mechanisms for Head. They are as much a part of internal, direct processes of attention, vision, hearing, movement, etc., as they are of the distant objects that stimulate the latter. The symbol, no matter how far away in space and time, its depicted object may be from the organism, is the means by which that distance is spread before the organism's own repertoire of responses:

Objects are, in a genuine sense, constituted within the social process of experience, by the communication and mutual adjustment of behavior among the individual organisms which are involved in
that process and which carry it on. Just as in fencing, the parry is an interpretation of the thrust, so, in the social act, the adjuvantive response of one organism to the gesture of another is the interpretation of that gesture by that organism—it is the meaning of that gesture.

In other words, the content of meaning is not simply the denotation of the symbol, but what that denotation points to in ongoing conduct. As the symbol is itself part of that conduct, meaning arises in the unfractured coordination of the characters taken on by the stimulus as it is denoted in symboling action, with the impulses and habits involved in the conduct as a whole. If there is any way to describe Mead's use of the term 'meaning', it is as the soul of language, habit, and impulse as they are conjoined in the organic act. The symbols in the simplified denotative sense, as recorded in dictionaries, and taught in schools, are but the beginnings of acts as they are culturally and historically transmitted from generation to generation and between individuals in a commonly anticipated undertaking and their significance is there in the social forms of that undertaking:

...meaning arises through communication. It is to the content to which the social process gives rise that this statement refers; not to bare ideas or printed words as such, but to the social process which has been so largely responsible for the objects constituting the daily environment in which we live; a process in which communication plays the main part. That process can give rise to these new objects in nature only insofar as it makes possible communication among the individual organisms involved in it.

This idea of a special process of individuals being involved in a common undertaking "in which communication plays the main part" is a central to Mead's thinking. With the evolution of symboling action there emerged hand in hand common predispositions among individuals to respond in similar ways towards objects of a common environment. Out of these common predispositions there emerged the social role where individuals could
locate the direction of their impulses by referring to the generalized behavior of the many individuals with which his actions were implicated. This process involves, for Kard, the individuals' representation to himself and to others in the form of gesture, of the conditions of an act by which the behavior common to himself and the others is so individualized as to coincide with the direction of their biological conduct.

This statement of the biological basis of communication assumes that social organisms regardless of how variable, conflicting, or 'subjective', these biological responses are, engaged in an act that is hypothetically complete, from the standpoint of which those responses occur as fragmentations. That act is embedded in those responses in the form of attention to and anticipation of possible consequences or relations between objects calling them out in conflicting directions. It would not in fact be there as an act except as it existed in the inhibited response. This implies that there is some element of any response, no matter how co-ordinated, that involves uncertainty, anticipation, or expectation with respect to objects relied upon for the response, whether they be 'physical' objects or 'mental' objects. It is in this future, this anticipation, regardless of the degree of its probability of taking place, and the ongoing responses in relation to it, that an act can be said to be 'there' awaiting completion. It is an act not only of the organism, but about which the organism is concerned or reactive. By attaching to this future intent, symbols provide the means by which conflicting future anticipations of present responses are abstracted from this present, such that the organism has access to the contemporaneity of the responses.
The two aspects of this process singled out by Mead—the symbolic and the 'biologic'—correspond to what he calls the 'socially self-conscious' individual and, as has been already mentioned, the 'biologic' individual. The term 'socially self-conscious' emphasizes the aspect of the organic environmental process which involves reasoning, inference and reflection, while 'biologic' focuses on feeling, physical contact, and impulse. The terms are not intended to sever the activities to which they refer. Rather, Mead uses them to clarify a relation between them, namely, that the 'biologic' processes are incapable of analysis as a form of social control except as they arise as part and parcel of the development of the socially self-conscious or rational individual. However, rational conduct, which functions on the symbolic level

...appears where impulsive conduct breaks down. Where the act fails to realize its function, where the impulsive effort to get food does not bring the food—and, more especially, where conflicting impulses thwart and inhibit each other—here reasoning may come in with a new procedure which is not at the disposal of the biologic individual. The characteristic result of the reasoning procedure is that the individual secures a different set of objects to which to respond, a different field of stimulation. There has been discrimination, analysis and a reordering of the things that called out the conflicting impulses and that now call out a response in which the conflicting impulses have been adjusted to each other. If

It might be asked in this regard, if what we call the biologic world can be located in the world of things, contacts, and manipulations taken as they are, where does the world of reflection, reason, and symbolization lie in relation to this? Mead argues that an account of the biologic world in terms of its own physical and biological process can not explain the phenomena of ends, purposes and possibilities that arise for the rational individual who reflects on that world. From the perspective of the self-conscious individual biologic impulses are 'seeking expression' in the possible rearrangements of stimuli that occupy symbolic reflections
which evoke the perceptual structures of these impulses.

Thus the activity in which self-consciousness is engaged is one which necessarily involves communication insofar as the latter refers to the social process as a whole, i.e., to what is not overtly expressed in symbols (e.g., the realm of impulse) as well as to what is denoted, so that language may sustain a co-ordination of impulse not possible otherwise. However, the reference of this sustenance is not to some abstract biological mechanism underlying language but to the issues of import and understanding which a symbolic self-conscious world confronts in the disruption of the 'biologic' activities to which it addresses itself.
CHAPTER III
COMMUNICATION, INTENTIONALITY, AND SOCIETY

Certainly an important influence in the field of behavioral science is the notion of intentionality. The thesis that "all behavior is goal-oriented" has, in the past, been a popular basis for social inquiry. Mead certainly would not have denied its importance. In fact, he carried it one step further to advance the proposition if I interpret him correctly that "all goal-oriented behavior is social". In this chapter, I would like to present a picture of what I think Mead meant by this statement.

From the point of view of intentionality, according to Mead, all objects, structures, or orders of the universe are perspectives of an act seeking to construct a "world within which it may be completed". Intention presumes action with reference to a future wherein it may be realized, to what might or will complete the act over against existing conditions. The presupposition here is that the universe is constituted for the intending organism in that it answers to those conditions which allowed for the projected future. Individuals in devising plans of action to reach some end proceed with the assumption that the world with which they operate presently is inherently this end at a later date given the procedure upon which they plan. Their conduct, then, is to them a field of adjustment wherein the world passes to this end. In so far as it passes the world responds to these adjustments and the adjustments in turn are constituted by the acting out of these responses in the form of a projected sequence of events of which the end in view is the terminal point.

Mead refers to this acting out of the responses of an environment as essentially a cooperative process in that the organism addresses its own life processes through the responses of other objects to its actions. In
the cane of human behavior such a cooperative relationship persists in the organized roles conferred upon individuals in acts of mutual participation. For the implementation of such acts there must be objects common to the experiences of each of the participants which may be indicated by gestures in which the participants are conjointly aroused to respond to these objects as phases of their own acts. In so far as they are conjointly aroused, the individuals are able to respond to their own experience in terms of those aspects of the latter which commonly affect the others. In Mead's words,

If the social object is to appear in his experience, it must be that the stimuli which set free the responses of the others involved in the act should be present in his experience, not as stimuli to his response, but as stimuli to the responses of others; and this implies that the social situation which arises after the completion of one phase of the act which serves as the stimulus for the act participant in the complex procedure, shall in some sense be in the experience of the first actor, tending to call out not his own response, but that of the succeeding actor. 1

In the use of gesture, the individual initiates an act in which himself and the others to whom it is addressed are participants. The gesture places the act in a particular temporal relationship to the experiences that presently pass between the participants. The act is presented as having passed to a certain point conditioned by the relationship between the gesture and the responses elicited by it. To the extent that it is so presented, the act exists "in the experience of the first actor, tending to call out, not his own response, but that of the succeeding actor".

The basic presumption behind the use of gesture is that the response of the individual in making it is the response of the other to whom it is addressed. Then the individual addresses his own experience with gestures, unique as it may be, he is addressing himself conjointly with others, and
he is thus placing himself in a particular temporal relationship to the
elevation of a conjoint act with another, an aspect of which is constituted
in the indicative gesture. The instant he does this he has successfully
abstracted the act from the immediate passage of events to which the
gesture responds. The act then exists for him as a non-temporal relation-
ship between these events, which Mead suggests is the content of mind or
thought. Events are abstracted in their character of passing and they may
thus be acted upon with deliberation and analysis. The individual who
does this, according to Mead, is a social individual in the sense that he
locates himself in a relationship between himself and others in which all
responses have a common character of the passage of a conjoint act. With
each response a different phase of this act may pass, and this renders
both the larger act and the individual response as amenable to reflection
upon the social whole. Mead describes this situation in the following
way:

The mechanism which can analyze the responses, take them to pieces,
and reconstrukt them, is made possible by the brain as such, and the
process of communication is the means by which this is brought
under the control of the individual himself. He can take his
response to pieces and present it to himself as a set of different
things he can do under conditions more or less controllable. The
process of communication simply puts the intelligence of the individual
at his own disposal. But the individual has this ability as a
social individual. He does not develop it by himself and then
enter into society on the basis of this capacity. He becomes such
a self and gets such control by being a social individual and it is
only in society that he can attain this sort of a self which will
make it possible for him to turn back on himself and indicate to
himself the different things he can do. 2

What this means is that insofar as the individual gestures at all he is
acting with reference to a shared response, according to Mead. Now the
direction that shared response takes is directly a function of the capa-
ccities of the individual to continue communicating with each other, i.e.,
to continue existing in the experience of one individual what is a shared response for the other. The problem of such a continuation is there in the 'resonances' to act, the attitudes, that accompany the bartering of symbols, cues, and other gestural forms in social interchange. These ongoing concerns which evolve out of this realm of what Lead calls the "conversation of gestures", even in cases of the most enduring forms of preoccupation from problems of conflicting habitual turns of mind, to long-run historical issues of a socio-cultural nature, are rooted in the responses excited within individuals, whatever the differences in their experiences, to gestures which they share in common. For example, the politician who, to the admiration of his colleagues, is engaged in productive discourse affecting the decision-making process of the community may be condemned by his wife as just "talking politics" when he should be washing the dishes. Such attitudes, incompatible as they are, never the less arise in the form of indications by commonly held gestures—the neglect to wash the dishes may indicate to the wife a high-mindedness of the political decision-maker regarding the inferior authority of the thousands of domestic households that may be influenced by his personal decisions, and she may respond 'personally' with equal authority to objects within his physical presence that are significant to his conduct as a politician. All of the ensuing responses in the situation are controlled by what the gestures significant to one individual's experience mean for another's, and this in turn is determined by reference to the shared response of common gestures that are the preconditions for any successful communicative process, for by such reference the problems as they exist for the separate individuals such as the politician and his wife, are known to them as problems of executing a shared or composite act. All
the attitudes that prevail for individuals in their use of gesture are
tained from the roles these gestures designate to them in the compo-
site act to which they refer. It is this fact which enables the wife to
indicate to herself a response that would be comprehensible to her hus-
bond as a politician. She may imagine to herself the role of the politician
as dishwasher and as she does so she will most certainly find herself
silently conversing with her husband, engaging in the problem of disc-
ourse that would follow upon taking such a role. She thus indicates to
herself her role in the sharing of the two experiences of dishwasher and
politician. Thus her objectives are formulated within the framework of
a process that is fundamentally 'social', i.e., one which involves herself
and others in the execution of acts in which they may respond conjointly.
Now the perspectives of the separate individuals regarding the conditions
necessary for conjoint responses may vary greatly and may even be opposed,
but this does not alter the fact that these perspectives occur in that
which, in so far as they are indicated by gesture, are already conjoint
responses. Thus the conflicts of interest, the different 'subjective'
individual experiences of social intercourse, and the myriad attitudes of
mind that shape a contemporary scene are but the contours of a communica-
tive process seeking to make intelligible the conditions by which those
conjunct acts which are initiated symbolically in that process may be
rooted in the world of wider experience. The conjoint act that the symbolic
response initiates within the individual enables him to analyze for him-
self conditions of such action, and thus manipulate his own and others
responses. But he can only do so as a social individual, i.e., as one
whose responses are found in the generalized activities of the group.
Perhaps it can be seen from this discussion how, if one takes Hoad's position seriously, intentionality becomes objectified, the sense of a thing to be acted upon, for the individual. As had been stated earlier in this chapter, the individual's own field of conduct is a condition wherein the act aroused in him by a stimulus is completed. Such a possibility arises only if that individual has a perspective of his conduct, or if he has an end-in-view wherein all his responses are a sequence of conditions in which it passes into his wider experience. For such an end-in-view to exist for him, the responses he makes to a stimulus, i.e., to an object wherein he is an actor, must themselves stimulate him to act in the same way as the stimulus-object, otherwise there would be nothing of his own conduct in the object and hence no stimulus. Thus, intentionality from Hoad's standpoint, is from the beginning social, in the sense that all aims or goals are of an individual who emerges by exciting in himself the responses that other objects make in arousing him to act in the same way as does the stimulus-object. The record of this emergent individuality as it is communicated within the group is what Hoad sees as society. It is only when the responses of an individual are in some sense present in what is communicated within the group that the responses of others become significant to him in the analysis or reflection upon his own activities:

The growth of the organized game out of simple play in the experience of the child, and of organized group activities in human society, placed the individual then in a variety of roles, insofar as these were parts of the social act, and the very organization of these in the whole act gave them a common character of indicating what he had to do. He is able then to become a generalized other in addressing himself in the attitude of the group or the community. 3

To what use, for social inquiry, may the position that Hoad has
taken here be put. As complex a man as Mead was, it is quite possible, and certainly more profitable, to answer this in very simple terms. Let us assume, then for our purposes, that all of what we call society, its customs, institutions and aspirations, rests in the hands of each living and thinking person, and that there are as many perspectives of what constitutes this society as there are individuals. Let us assume further that groups form out of the cooperative acts arising from the responses of different individuals to objects, let us say 'physical objects' that are common to their different perspectives. Now introduced into this situation is such a physical object which is necessary for the completion of different or conflicting acts of several of these groups. The use to which it is put represents a conflict of interest between them. Where Mead's approach is significant is in the way we view the perspectives of each group in such a situation. Firstly as had been pointed out in chapter one there is something of the nature of that physical object in each of the group perspectives in so far as it is a stimulus to them to complete an act. Secondly, as pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, in so far as the object stimulates the groups to different acts, contradictory as they may be, the acts of each of them are affected by the acts of the others towards the same object. The physical object is thus a 'social' object, i.e., it comes to represent a perspective each group has of the other. Its importance for the different acts engages each group with the others actions toward it. Now, to the extent that each group in consummating its involvement with the object can evoke a response that is consummatory for the others act as well, to that extent is that which we call a society created. Such a possibility exists only
when the different acts involving the object are communicable, i.e., they may be located in their entirety in each of the groups responses to the common object. The basis for this lies in a common field of physical perception, in common physiological differentiations, and in a common language. The necessary condition of communicability is that the object common to the different acts can be made also an object by which the acts may be delayed, which is the case with the animal who comes to respond to an environment consisting largely of possible futures of its own delayed reactions, and this inevitably emphasizes its own past responses in the form of acquired habits. These pass into the environment as the conditions of his acts. These characters of the environment constitute the stuff out of which values and meanings later arise, when these characters can be isolated through gestures in communication. 4

The gesture is the mechanism by which the act may take the form of a delayed response, for it may point to its consummatory phase in its earlier phases. One might visualize, then, Mead's 'society' as an elaborate process of communication where individuals and groups play out the ends of their acts to indicate to themselves the roles other actors occupy in relation to different phases of these acts with which they are engaged. In playing out the end of an act to another, one involves oneself in action which is conjoint, for the other's responses are the conditions for this enactment. For example, a boy sitting at home suddenly decides he wants to play baseball with his friends. The game is played out in the form of an outcome of the various intermediary responses of contacting his friends, of getting to the playing field, etc. In all of the intermediary actions necessary to commence the game, the actor points to the game as something of which all whom he engages in this enterprise are participants. It is a game, then, which exists for him as a disposi-
tion of many participants to combine their actions in a particular way. Thus in order for an individual to locate his acts in the group he must be able to respond to them as acts which stimulate those acts wherein the group is sustained. He must therefore locate in himself his responses as a social individual. In this he refers to the responses of others within the framework of his perspective of the social whole. Such a perspective is there in the process whereby he acquires the responses of others. In this process there is a passage from his own responses to those of the others that can be grouped only in terms of the temporal dimensions of the acts initiated by these responses.

Insofar as the other's responses arouse him to act all his ensuing responses place him in a relationship to the completion of his act that is continually present as a structuring of that act in experience. The end of his act at all times represents a complete sequence of possible events whose natures as individual events are found in this inter-relationship as some experience. It is a completed sequence that exists as a possible structure of the spatio-temporal relationships between different events in the experiential field. Its nature as a goal is in Mead's terms, the "patience" of the world to it, i.e., the duration of time as structured by events, in which the goal may be characterized as realizable.

In this discussion, the question lingers as to whether the processes described herein refer to consciousness, deliberation or communication themselves, or to the conditions of nature in which they arise. Mead would probably answer this with the claim that consciousness is the condi-
tion wherein nature takes the form of perspectives and that when we ask
about a cause behind consciousness we are really asking about an interpre-
tation of it in terms of the perspectives present for it. For Heidegger the
world changes irrevocably when consciousness arises and so to attempt
an explanation of consciousness in terms of a world without it would be
futile.
CONCLUSION

What seems important in Mead's work is the technique of thought which he develops out of even the simplest notions, a technique which evolved in him by his continuous reflection upon the relationship between the highest ideals of thought and how acts were constructed from them as perspectives of a 'real' world. Mead saw what was considered by conventional eyes to be 'reality' as simply a construction of experience that permitted the continuation of an intelligible universe that sought to root itself not in some unchanging ideal, but in the actual processes of nature as they took place in the form of thought. To explain this Mead turned to relativistic physics which postulated that orders of natural events actually change according to the processes of the selection of coordinates wherein these orders are determined. This meant, in effect, that these events that took place in thought, or in hypothesis and experiment, took a peculiar turn in relation to the reliances upon which thought tested itself. By the experience of different sequences of events that transpired with every test in nature of a hypothesis one arrived at objects in nature wherein one's own conduct was shaped.

Communication for Mead, elaborated this process by calling up through gesture, primarily through the significant symbol, things, acts, or attitudes involved with many organisms in the form of delayed responses to what presently demanded to be tested or answered in ongoing life processes. Acts could be completed with reference to their consequences in a larger or extended world that was continuous with, but distant from, that with which the organism was in immediate contact.

In this extension to a larger world, the spreads of space and time
that were experienced by the organism Mead termed 'social' in the sense that distant objects (and in the case of human interaction, 'other' selves) were the conditions by which the organism came to experience himself as contemporaneous with his own immediate activities. Ideally, this meant that the organism was able to arrive at his own activities as a pattern by which all he beheld as the universe unfolded before him.
LIST OF REFERENCES:

CHAPTER I

2. ibid. p. 34.
3. ibid. p. 34.
4. Meads theory of emergence and its relation to the life process may be found in its clearest form in Chapter II of Philosophy of the Present.
5. ibid. p. 79.
6. ibid. p. 38.
7. ibid. p.
10. ibid. p. 441.
11. ibid. p. 152.
12. ibid. p. 418.
14. ibid. p. 426

CHAPTER II

1. I am referring here to the work of the ethologists, e.g. Tinbergen Lorenz and others.
2. A term Mead borrowed from his teacher, K. Wundt, while studying in Germany.
3. The Philosophy of the Present, p. 128.
CHAPTER II (Continued)

6. Philosophy of the Present. p. 70.
8. ibid. p. 53.
9. ibid. p. 60.
10. ibid. p. 70.
11. Philosophy of the Present, p. 29.
13. ibid. p. 351.
14. ibid. p. 78.
15. ibid. p. 79.

CHAPTER III

1. Philosophy of the Present, p. 121.
4. ibid. p. 84.
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Comment by Robert F. Babs, ibid, 545-547; and reply, ibid, 547-548.


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