



Stability Under International Anarchy

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Abstract

This paper is a clear and concise comparison of the realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives in international relations (IR). The paper compares the approaches and perspectives of scholars from these three schools of thought to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy. This paper shows that scholars from the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools of thought in IR offer different approaches and perspectives to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Also, the paper shows that even within the same school of thought, there are contrasting positions on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy.

Key Words: Realist, Liberal, Constructivist, Anarchy, Stability

List of Abbreviations

IR	International Relations
Vs.	Versus
CC	Potential Mutual Cooperation
DD	Mutual Defection
DC	You do not concede the other player does
C D	You concede the other player does not
&	And
IMF	International Monetary Fund

Under What Conditions and How does Stability Emerge under International Anarchy?

1 Introduction

The term “Stability” is often contested in international politics. Stability can mean peace or the absence of conflict and war (Martin, 2005). On the other hand, stability can also mean “the endurance of a particular distribution of power regardless of how peaceful it is” (Martin, 2002: 19). The field of IR (International Relations) also referred to as International Studies, Global Studies, or International Politics is an important field of study in our contemporary society. IR is interdisciplinary (Long, 2011:31), it is the study of politics, economics, and law at the global level. Moreover, IR studies the relations among states at the international level (Schuett & Stirk, 2015:7). In the field of IR, the state is a central element; IR scholars view the state as an important actor in international politics.

Relations among states from time immemorial have been marked by conflicts and wars due to the lack of order in the international system (Clackson, 2011). The lack of order and a centralized authority in the international system has put states in a position where they have to decide for themselves whether to use force or not. Given this situation, several IR theories have been developed by scholars in the IR discipline to explain the lack of order in the international system and to shed some light on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. For instance, some of the mainstream IR theories that have been developed to explain the lack of order in the international system and the possibility of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy are “Realism”, “Liberalism”, and

“Constructivism”. Also, the concept of “Anarchy” has been one of the major concepts of these three schools of thought. Scholars from the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools of thought have come up with different perspectives and approaches to international anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy. To begin with, scholars from the realist, liberal, and constructivist schools of thought all agree that the international system is anarchic (Waltz, 1979: Grieco, 1988: Oye, 1985: Jervis, 1978: Mearsheimer, 2001: Milner, 1991: Keohane, 1982: Doyle, 1986: Owen, 1994: Glaser, 1994/1995: Mearsheimer, 2010: Wendt, 1992). In addition, they agree that certain conditions can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy.

However, scholars from these three schools of thought also offer different approaches and perspectives to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Even within the same school of thought, there are contrasting positions on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. For instance, liberals such as Robert O. Keohane, Kenneth Oye, Michael Doyle, Joseph S. Nye, and John M. Owen, emphasize the possibility of cooperation as well as peace when discussing stability under international anarchy. These liberal scholars argued that stability can be achieved under international anarchy through cooperation and peace. They argued that certain conditions such as absolute gains, the number of main actors in a negotiation, international regimes, economic interdependence, and the democratic peace thesis can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Keohane, 1982: Doyle, 1977: Owen, 1994, Oye, 1985; Keohane and Nye: 1987). On the other hand, realist scholars such as Grieco and Kenneth Waltz argue that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under

international anarchy because of relative gains (Grieco, 1988; Waltz, 1979). However, realists emphasize that under certain conditions such as bipolarity and hegemony, peace is possible (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). On the other side of the coin, constructivists argued that “anarchy is what we make of it” (Wendt, 1992). This means that the effects of anarchy are dependent upon the inter-subjective meanings we attach to it. As aforementioned, there have been a lot of debates among scholars from the realist, liberal and constructivist schools of thought on the meaning of “anarchy” and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. These scholars present contrasting perspectives and approaches to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. This paper aims to compare and contrast the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches to anarchy and their perspectives on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. I argue that certain conditions can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section of this paper is the introduction. The introduction provides a brief background of the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches to anarchy and their perspectives on how stability can emerge under international anarchy. The second section of this paper discusses in detail the realist approach to anarchy and their perspectives on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. In addition, the second section of this paper shows that even within the realist school of thought, scholars offer contrasting positions on how stability can emerge under international anarchy. The third section of this paper compares and contrasts the liberal approach to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under

international anarchy versus the realist perspectives and approaches. Moreover, the third section also shows that even within the liberal school of thought, scholars have contrasting positions on how stability can emerge under international anarchy. The fourth section of this paper compares and contrasts the constructivist approach to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the chances of stability to emerge under international anarchy versus the realist and liberal approaches. The fifth and final section of this paper is the conclusion which sums up the main discussions presented in the paper.

2. The Realist approach to Anarchy and their Perspectives on the Conditions that can increase the likelihood of Stability to emerge under International Anarchy

2.1 The Realist Approach to Anarchy

Before discussing realist perspectives on how stability can emerge under international anarchy, it may be useful to highlight key aspects of the realist approach to anarchy in international politics. Realism is considered a dominant theory in IR and as such, it seems logical to begin by highlighting the key aspects of the realist approach to anarchy. A key principle of realist theory is that of survival. As mentioned earlier, realists view anarchy as lack of order, their definitions of anarchy suggest conditions of chaos in the international system (Milner, 1991) and realists contend that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under international anarchy because of relative gains (Grieco, 1988), however, realists argue that peace is possible under certain conditions like bipolarity. Similarly, realists argue that due to a lack of order in the international system, states do everything for their survival and security and realists believe that states are the major actors in international politics (Grieco, 1988:488). In addition, realist scholars agree that

anarchy exists in the international system, but that anarchy varies. It is logical to argue that in domestic politics, governments create and enforce laws to protect citizens, thus, reducing the possibility of conflict or war to occur, however, the same cannot be said of international politics (Lebow:2007). A central assumption of the realist approach to anarchy is thus that the rules of the international system are dictated by anarchy; in this sense, anarchy is perceived as a “lack of central government to enforce rules and protect states” (Goldstein & Pevehouse: 2006: 73). Realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, link this lack of a ‘world government’ to the continued occurrence of violence among states (Cudworth & Hobden: 2010). The absence of an authority higher than nation-states, it is argued, leads to a self-help system among states (Weber: 2009; Cudworth & Hobden: 2010); Lebow cites Mearsheimer’s characterization of this anarchical, self-help, international system as a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other” (Lebow: 2007: 55). This characterization can be linked to the idea that international relations “cannot escape from a state of anarchy and will continue to be dangerous as a result” (Goldstein & Pevehouse: 2006: 74).

Such perceptions demonstrate that realists have a largely pessimistic view of the international system (Grieco: 1988). Overall, all realists appear to accept that states are the only relevant actors in international politics, and as there is no central authority to regulate or govern nation-states, a state of anarchy exists, where conflict and war is a constant threat as each state seeks to ensure its survival at the expense of others. However, there exist internal divisions within the IR theory of realism between classical realism and structural neo-realism. While both agree that war is unavoidable in an anarchic international system, they disagree over how anarchy will cause war in the international system. While classical realists contend that the inevitability of war in an

anarchical system is due to the destructive tendency of human nature, structural realists argue that this has little to do with why states engage in the struggle for power (Mearsheimer, 2007).

Structural or neo-realism, often associated with the work of Waltz, argues that “internationally, states operate in a context of anarchy which dictates certain kinds of priorities and behavior to ensure international order and relative advantage within it” (Hutchings, 1999). In this sense Waltz appears to be arguing against Morgenthau’s notion that there is little distinction between domestic and international politics and that as states operate in an international context of anarchy that their behavior and relationships at an international level will be very different from those at a domestic level. Structural realism thus concentrates on the structure of international society to explain why states behave in the “often conflicting” manner that they do. In seeking to explain the causes of war, Waltz argues that not even the growth in numbers of democratic states can override the structure of international politics to creating an increasingly peaceful international system (Waltz, 2000).

Whereas classical realism assumes war to be a constant threat, neo-realists argue that, although there is no automatic harmony in anarchy, it is possible to create a sense of order within anarchy through the balance of power (Weber, 2009). For neo-realists, it is not only states that are relevant actors in international politics, but great power states who are crucial to the balance of power in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2007). It is argued that power ratios among great powers, such as the US or China, affect the prospects for peace, demonstrating that the structure of the international system in terms of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multi-polarity and any resulting power shifts can increase or reduce the likelihood of international conflict (Ibid.). In

this case, structural realism suggests that anarchy is still the “permissive cause of war”, however elements of anarchy can be overcome by structuring the balance of power in a way that reduces the chance of conflict (Weber: 2009: 14). Having discussed the key features of the realist approach to anarchy, I will now move on to discuss in detail, perspectives put forth by realist scholars on conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international Anarchy. These perspectives will be discussed under the following themes: Defensive vs. offensive realism on polarity, game theory approach, power, relative and absolute gains.

2.2 Defensive vs. Offensive realism on Polarity

Polarity in international relations focuses on the different ways in which power is distributed within the international system. Polarity distinguishes three types of system (1) **Unipolarity** (one powerful state) (2) **Bipolarity** (two powerful states), (3) **Multipolarity** (Three or more powerful states). Many international relations theorists believe that the cold post-war international system is unipolar due to the rise of the U. S as the sole superpower of the world. For instance, Krauthammer developed a theory which he called “the unipolar moment”, he argued that the U.S emerged as the only great power from the cold war (Varisco, 2013).

Defensive and offensive realism presents different views on the causal relations between polarity and international stability. Defensive realism led by Kenneth Waltz gave polarity a normative assessment as early as 1964 when he argued for the stability of bipolarity (Waltz, 1994). In his 1979 book “ Theory of International Politics”, Waltz argued that stability is more likely to emerge under international anarchy in a bipolar system where two main world powers are dominating the international system economically, militarily, and culturally (Waltz, 1979).

Similarly, Waltz argued that self-help systems make cooperation among states difficult. He explained that in a bipolar world, there are only two main powers and there are no peripheries, which increases the prospects for peace or stability. According to Waltz, this is because the two main powers are aware that they would lose heavily if they were to engage in a major war against each other, thereby increasing the chances for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Moreover, Waltz argued that an increased number of actors (great powers) increases the level of uncertainty and reduce the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy (Waltz, 1979). He argued that unipolar and multipolar systems reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Waltz, 1979: 136). According to Waltz, a bipolar system would lead to the formation of alliances between the two great powers, which will make the world to be peaceful, thus, increasing the prospects for stability to emerge under international anarchy.

On the other hand, offensive realism led by Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz that a bipolar system is a system that has two great powers dominating the world and that this type of system increases the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Mearsheimer bipolar system is the first system that can increase the chances of stability to emerge under international anarchy and the second-best system is multipolarity (Mearsheimer, 2001). Mearsheimer contends that a bipolar system is more peaceful and increases the chances of stability to emerge under anarchy because under a bipolar system only two major powers are in contention and these two great powers generally demand allegiance from the minor powers in the international system. For Mearsheimer, these alliances make the smaller states to be secure from each other as well as from attacks from great powers. Moreover, Mearsheimer explains that a

bipolar system offers more chances for stability to emerge under international anarchy because since only two great powers are dominating the international system, it is impossible to produce the power asymmetries that result in ganging up and bullying (Mearsheimer, 2001). Furthermore, Mearsheimer contends that deterrence is more problematic under multipolar systems which make it more unlikely for stability to emerge under international anarchy.

However, Mearsheimer also differs from Waltz because He argues that the prospects for peace are not simply a function of the number of great powers in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001). He explained that the prospects for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy are also affected by the relative military strength of those states (Ibid). Mearsheimer explains that bipolar and multipolar systems are both likely to be more peaceful if power is distributed equally between them. He argues that power inequalities invite war and instability because it increases an aggressor's prospect for victory on the battlefield (Mearsheimer, 2001). In sum, Mearsheimer's argument that bipolar and multi-polar systems can both increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy if power is distributed equally among states differs from Waltz's argument that two powerful states dominating the international scene in a bipolar system is more likely to increase the possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Waltz, 1979).

2.3 Game Theory Approach

Robert Jervis in his 1978 article "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" contends that cooperation is difficult to sustain and achieved under international anarchy. He acknowledges that cooperation is difficult to achieve under international anarchy but not impossible. Jervis explained that one condition under which cooperation and stability are likely to emerge under international anarchy is through the game theory approach. Jervis uses three games in his game theory approach to explain how cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy. The three games that he used to explain the likelihood of cooperation and stability under international anarchy are (1) Prisoner's Dilemma, (2) Stag Hunt, and (3) Chicken. In-game 1 which is "Prisoner's Dilemma", Jervis explained that both players have the incentive to defect no matter whether the other player cooperates or defects. Jervis argued that if the other player decides to cooperate, the first player prefers to defect ($DC > CC$). Contrarily, if the other player defects, the first player still prefers to defect ($DD > CD$). Both players will do worse if they both defects than if they have both cooperated: $CC > DD$. Thus, each player's preference order in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is $DC > CC > DD > CD$ (Jervis, 1978:173-174).

Jervis explained that since each player pursues DC (You do not concede, but the other player does) they will, as a group end up reaching DD (Both players do not concede), which ranked 3rd in the preference rank. The two players could end up reaching CC (Potential mutual cooperation) which is the 2nd best choice under Prisoner's Dilemma for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Jervis, the best order for cooperation to emerge under international anarchy is $DC > CC > DD > CD$. With DC (You do not concede, the other player

does) being the best condition for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy in his "Prisoner's Dilemma" game and CC (Potential mutual cooperation) is the second-best situation in which cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy. In the second game "Stag Hunt", Jervis explained that if both players believe that mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection the game will become a deadlock. He explained that each player's preference order in the Stag Hunt game is $CC > DC > DD > CD$. Hence, according to Jervis, the best condition under which cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under anarchy in his Stag Hunt game is CC (potential mutual cooperation) followed by DC (you do not concede but the other player does), then DD (both players do not concede) and CD (You concede and the other player does not concede), this order is very similar to Prisoner's Dilemma.

In both Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt game, CD is the most unlikely scenario under which stability can emerge under international anarchy because cooperation is highly unlikely to occur under this situation. Jervis argued in the Stag Hunt game that both players understand that CC is the best option as a group, but each player does not know if the other player understands this. Jervis noted that if the other side defects each will end up obtaining the 4th ranked situation CD which is the worst scenario for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Jervis, because the dominant strategy of each player is to defect, the likely outcome is DD. Unlike in Prisoner's Dilemma, players in a deadlock in the Stag Hunt game will not benefit if the play is repeated because mutual cooperation is not preferred to mutual defection (Jervis, 1978:178).

In the third game “Chicken”, Jervis explained that the players will still have to cooperate even if they think that the other side is going to defect because though being exploited is bad (CD) it is not as bad as when both do not concede (DD). The main player must try to convince his adversary that he is going to defect and that the only way that the other player can avoid disaster is to cooperate (Jervis, 1978:178). According to Jervis, this will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Jervis argued in the “Chicken” game that there are high prospects for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy if the main player can convince his adversary that he is going to pull out of the negotiation if the other player does not cooperate. Further, Jervis argued that the preference order in “Chicken” game for each player is $DC > CC > CD > DD$.

Just like in the prisoner’s dilemma, DC is the best scenario for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy in the chicken game and CC (Mutual cooperation) is the second-best. Under this game, if you keep defecting, you will encounter the best or worst scenario and if you cooperate you will get the second (CC) or the third-best scenario (CD).

Jervis explained in “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” that states use all means to maximize their security which can decrease the security of other states. When this happens, states that feel threatened take countermeasures to secure themselves as well, which can lead to a security dilemma. Overall, Jervis argued in his game theory approach that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy if the net of $CC - DD$ increases and the net of $DC - CD$ decreases.

2.7 Absolute and Relative Gains

Unlike Jervis, who uses the game theory to explain how stability can emerge under international anarchy, and Kenneth Waltz, who emphasizes bipolar systems as a condition for peace, Joseph M. Grieco in his article "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation" agrees with other realists like Waltz and Jervis that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under international anarchy. However, Grieco disagrees with new liberals that states seek to maximize their absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others (Grieco, 1988:487). Grieco contends that cooperation is difficult to emerge under international anarchy, not only because states are worried about their absolute gains as the liberals contend, but because states are also worried that their partners might gain more from cooperation than they do (Ibid).

Hence, Grieco's main argument is that a state will focus more on both its absolute and relative gain to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Grieco, 1988). He argued that a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance with an arrangement might still decide to exit from the arrangement if it realizes that the other partner is achieving relatively greater gains which will make it difficult to achieve cooperation and stability under international anarchy (Grieco, 1998:487). Thus, Grieco believes that two major obstacles make cooperation difficult to achieve under international anarchy. The first major obstacle that makes cooperation difficult to achieve in an anarchical international system is states' concern about cheating and the second major obstacle to cooperation, according to Grieco is states' concerns about relative achievements of gains. All in all, Grieco emphasize relative gains, he criticized Kenneth Oye and other liberals for underestimating relative gain concerns and thus

overestimate the possibility of cooperation to emerge under anarchy because these liberals focus mainly on absolute gains. This point by Grieco is agreed by Kenneth Waltz, like Grieco, Waltz also argued that liberals overestimate the possibility of cooperation to emerge under international anarchy by focusing solely on absolute gains and ignoring the relative gains of cooperation (Waltz, 1979).

2.8 Power

Mearsheimer in his article “The Tragedy of Great Power politics” provides a contrasting position from Jervis, Grieco, and Waltz, on how stability can emerge under international anarchy. He argued that “the best way for a state to survive in anarchy is to take advantage of other states and gain power at their expense, according to him, “the best defense is a good offense” (Mearsheimer, 2001: 36). Mearsheimer explained that stability can emerge under international anarchy when states are powerful. He argued that if states are powerful they will not be scared of being attacked by other states and this can increase the chances of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy.

For Mearsheimer, the best way for states to survive in the international system that is anarchy and for stability to exist under international anarchy is for states to be very powerful (Mearsheimer, 2001:36). Mearsheimer believes that power ratios among great powers such as the U.S. and China, affect the prospects for peace or stability, demonstrating that the structure of the international system in terms of unipolarity, bipolarity, or multi-polarity and any resulting power shifts can increase or reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. He believes that the best way for states to achieve security and stability in an anarchic international

system is to pursue hegemony. Mearsheimer's explanations on how hegemony can cause stability to emerge under international anarchy differ from Jervis' game theory approach discussed above and it also differs from the relative gains of cooperation that Grieco and Waltz emphasize. For Mearsheimer, hegemony, and states becoming powerful is the best condition that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy.

Furthermore, both Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz agree that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under anarchy. However, Mearsheimer differs from Waltz because he believes that peace or stability can emerge under international anarchy if several states become powerful. This contrasts Waltz's perspective that stability is more likely to emerge under international anarchy under a bipolar system where there are only two great powers like the United States and China and other weaker states forming alliances under these two great powers (Waltz, 1979). Likewise, Glaser disagrees with Mearsheimer's perspective that order can be achieved in the international system through hegemony. He argued that cooperation should be states preferred option for order (Glaser, 1994:58); Glaser also contends that cooperative policies are an important type of self- help.

3. Liberal vs. Realist Approaches to Anarchy and their Perspectives on the Conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under International Anarchy

3.1 Liberal vs. Realist Approaches to Anarchy

Moving on to liberalism, "Liberalism" is a theory based on the belief that individuals are the basis of law and society. Liberalism focuses on society as a collection of individuals rather than the state. It focuses on society as the ultimate source of state behavior and preferences in

international politics (Moravcsik, 2011:2). There are different types of liberalism, such as “Republican Liberalism”, “Commercial Liberalism”, and “Institutional Liberalism”. While Liberals agree with realists that international anarchy does exist, they differ with realists in several ways. To start with, Liberals disagree with realists that there is no centralized authority in the international system. Liberals argued that international institutions play a vital role in the cooperation among states at the international level. Hence, Liberals believe that international institutions can act as a centralized authority in an anarchical international system. Moreover, liberal scholars argued that the right international institutions and an increased interdependence will provide states the opportunity to reduce conflicts in international anarchy (Keohane, 1982:346-347). Similarly, scholars from the Liberal school of thought believe that state and non-state actors can come together to establish institutions and rules which can help bring peace and stability in the world.

Also, liberals believe that through joint cooperation, states can work together on a series of issues, and because of this, they can increase their absolute power (International Relations. Org, 2016). Powell in his 1994 article, argued that the main difference between realist and liberal approaches to international anarchy is the manner in which both camps look at how actors will behave in an anarchical international system (Powell, 1994). Realists argue that anarchy leads to violence and distrust in the international system. Contrarily, liberals disagree with realists on this, rather, liberals argue that anarchy is not something that will lead to violence and distrust among states in the international system, but rather, anarchy is merely a condition that people living in the world can overcome through cooperation and joint ventures (Ibid).

Additionally, unlike realists that worry about relative power under international anarchy, liberals do not worry about relative power, rather, they argue for absolute power. Liberals believe that as long as states have mutual benefits of cooperation, they do not need to worry about relative power with each other. Overall, liberals argued that the following conditions can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy: democratic peace, complex interdependence, international regimes, game matrix, the number of main actors involved in a negotiation, and increase interaction among states at the international level (Keohane, 1982; Doyle, 1977; Oye, 1985; Keohane and Nye: 1987). In the remainder of this section, I will compare and contrast in detail, these conditions put forth by liberal and realist scholars.

2.3 Game Matrix/Payoff Structure

Unlike Waltz and Grieco, who emphasize relative gains as a condition that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye a liberal scholar argued in his article 'Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy' that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy through Payoffs. He uses his game matrix or payoff structure to explain how cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy. Just like Jervis in his Stag Hunt game, Oye agreed with Jervis that one of the best scenarios for cooperation and stability to emerge under anarchy is when both sides realized the mutual benefits of cooperation (CC). Kenneth Oye explains that payoff structure can actually determine the significance of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (1985:6).

According to Oye, for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy, both actors must realize that cooperation is beneficial to both of them in order to engage. Oye argued that the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under anarchy becomes more unlikely when both actors cannot realize any mutual benefit of cooperation. And for mutual benefits to exist the main actors or states involved must prefer mutual cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD) (Oye, 1985:6). This means that for stability to emerge under international anarchy, states must be prepared to cooperate rather than defect. They must prefer unilateral defection (DC) to unrequited cooperation (CD). For instance, a state will be less likely to cooperate with another state for stability to emerge under international anarchy if it sees that state as a threat to its security.

On the other hand, the state will be more willing to cooperate with another state if it sees that state as an ally that they both share a common interest or benefit. In sum, Kenneth Oye in his game matrix approach argued that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy in situations where both states share mutual benefits or interests. This argument by Kenneth Oye is similar to the one made by Jervis in his Stag Hunt game where he explained that mutual cooperation (CC) is the best situation where cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy (Jervis, 1978:178). Similarly, Kenneth Oye in his article "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy" also agrees with Jervis that if the cost of exploitation is high, states will be less likely to cooperate because they feel that they will be exploited by others and this will reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, cooperation, and stability will be more likely to emerge under international anarchy if there is a low risk that states to be exploited by others (Oye, 1985, Jervis, 1978:171-

172). Hence, both Kenneth Oye (a liberal) and Jervis (a realist) believe that it is more likely for stability to emerge under international anarchy in situations where states have mutual benefits or interests. Moreover, Oye and Jervis agree that it is easier for stability to emerge under anarchy when large and powerful states who can protect themselves in times of war deal with each other because they are aware that their cooperation is for their mutual benefit. On the other, if one state is more powerful than another it is difficult for stability to emerge under international anarchy because the security of the powerful state provides a base from which it can exploit the weaker state (Oye, 1985, Jervis, 1978).

Furthermore, both Oye and Jervis agree that smaller or weaker states who feel that they might be exploited by a large powerful state will buy arms to protect themselves against the large powerful state. According to Kenneth Oye, the acquisition of arms by the smaller state to protect itself will anger the large, powerful state and reduces the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Jervis seems to agree with Oye on this, he explained that such a situation will lead to a "Security Dilemma" (Jervis, 1978:175). However, Oye differs from other realists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer here because Oye believes that cooperation can easily increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. On the contrary, Waltz and Mearsheimer argued that cooperation is difficult to achieve and maintain under international anarchy (Waltz:1979, Mearsheimer: 2001).

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2.4 Number of Actors

Unlike realists such as Kenneth Waltz, who argued for bipolarity as a condition that can increase the possibility of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye again offers a different perspective from Waltz on how stability can emerge under international anarchy. Oye goes further to argue that the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy is not only affected by bipolarity as Waltz posits, but also by the number of main actors or players involved in a negotiation (Oye, 1985). Kenneth Oye explained that the prospect for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy reduces as the number of significant actors or players increases (Oye, 1985: 18). He explains that the number of actors can actually affect states' cooperation under international anarchy in several ways.

For instance, Oye noted that a large number of significant actors involved in a negotiation makes it difficult for states to identify and recognize their common interests and it makes it difficult for states to anticipate the behavior of other actors which can hinder cooperation among them (Ibid). Kenneth Waltz seems to agree with Oye on the need for a small number of main actors in the international scene when argued that a "small number of great powers" under a bipolar system will increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy (Waltz, 1979). Moreover, Oye believes the lack of cooperation among states at the international level will reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Overall, Kenneth Oye believes that one condition under which cooperation and stability can emerge under international anarchy is to reduce the number of main actors involved in a negotiation. A lesser number of main actors or players involved in a negotiation according to him

will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, Oye also believes that the greater the number of main actors involved in a negotiation at the international level, the lesser the chances of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. On top of that, Kenneth Oye believes that cooperation in international politics requires some form of recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual interest and policy once those opportunities have been identified (Oye, 1985: 18).

Furthermore, Oye explains that one difficulty in having a large number of main actors or players involved in a negotiation at the international level is that it diminishes the ability to sanction defectors, and strategies of reciprocity become even more difficult for states to implement without triggering a collapse of cooperation (Ibid). Oye argued that when the ability to punish or sanction defectors decreases more actors or states will have a free ride to defect from international agreements. He noted that a strategy of defection can easily spread among the actors causing more actors to defect, which will hinder the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy.

2.5 Modifying Payoffs

Again, Kenneth Oye also explains that one condition under which stability can emerge under international anarchy is by modifying payoffs. He noted that since payoffs or mutual benefits affect the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy, states can use several unilateral strategies to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Oye, 1985:10). For instance, he suggested that one unilateral strategy that states can use to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under

international anarchy is to acquire defensive weapons rather than offensive weapons (Oye, 1985). According to Oye, if a superpower state chooses to acquire defensive weapons rather than offensive weapons, it will reduce the chances of this superpower state being exploited by other states and it will reduce its adversary's fear of exploitation thereby increasing the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Similarly, Oye also states that another unilateral strategy that can be used to modify payoffs to increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy is for states to publicize decisions or unilateral agreements that they reached with each other. Kenneth Oye explains that publicizing these unilateral decisions or agreements will help to diminish the payoffs link with defection from the agreement (Oye, 1985:10). According to him, states will be forced to respect and keep the agreement if the payoffs link with the defection from the agreement is diminished and this will make it more likely for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy.

Also, Oye explains that cooperation or stability is more likely to emerge under international anarchy if states promote strategies of reciprocity. He explained that strategies of reciprocity can help promote cooperation by establishing a direct connection between an actor's present behavior and anticipated future benefits (Oye, 1985: 14). According to Oye an example of a strategy of reciprocity that states can use to can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy is the Tit-For-Tat strategy (Ibid). He argued that this strategy increases the likelihood of cooperation among states by shaping the future consequences of defecting from present cooperation. Under the Tit –For Tat strategy states will be punished or sanction if they go against or defect from unilateral agreements. Oye believes that strategies of reciprocity such as Tit-For Tat will reduce the number of defectors from

international agreements and thereby increases the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge in an anarchic international system. On the other hand, Oye argued that if sanctions are severe, it becomes difficult for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. He believes that one way to solve this problem is to restructure the situation so that sanctioning for defectors becomes more feasible (Oye, 1985). Both Oye and Jervis agree that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy if the main players involved have mutual benefits of cooperation. However, Kenneth Oye differs with Jervis on this issue of mutual benefits as a condition for cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy because Oye goes further to explain how unilateral strategies could be used at the international level to modify payoffs or mutual benefits in order to increase the likelihood of cooperate and stability to emerge under international anarchy, something that Jervis does not emphasize.

2.6 Continued Interaction

Furthermore, in contrast to realist perspectives on the condition that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye also argued that continued interaction among states is another condition that can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. According to Oye, it is illogical to think that states will adhere to international agreements under a single –play condition in an international system where there is no centralized authority (Oye, 1985). Here Oye seems to agree with other realists such as Grieco, Waltz, and Mearsheimer that there is no central authority in the

international system. However, he differs from other liberals such as Keohane who believes that international institutions can act as a central authority under international anarchy.

Kenneth Oye argued that defection will become a dominant strategy if there is a lack of continuing interactions among states in the international system because states will be unable to rely on a centralized authority for enforcement of an agreement to cooperate. Likewise, Oye noted that states will be unable to rely on a centralized authority to dissuade defection. He argued that the absence of a centralized authority in the international system would make states to be tempted to defect in order to protect themselves against the possibilities of defection from others (Oye, 1985:13). According to Oye, when a state defects from an international agreement, it dissuades other states and makes it more difficult for them to cooperate in the future; hence, this hinders the possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Therefore, continuing interaction among states, according to him is vital in international politics to avoid defection and to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy.

2.7 International Regimes

Neoliberal scholar Robert Keohane in his article “The Demand for International Regimes” argues that one condition under which stability can emerge under international anarchy is through membership in international regimes or institutions. According to Keohane, membership in international regimes can help to increase the possibility of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy by providing information about the behaviors of others, by monitoring the behavior of members, and by reporting members' compliance (1982:346-347). He argued that international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation among members at the

international level by providing norms, rules, principles, and procedures that can help states to overcome barriers to cooperation (Ibid). According to Keohane international regimes makes it easier for actors to realize their mutual interests (1982:354), he believes that realizing mutual benefits through international regimes or institutions can increase the cooperation among actors. Keohane argues that an increase in cooperation among actors who have mutual interests will increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Furthermore, Keohane contends that regimes can clearly define what constitutes a defection and help prescribe punishment for defection which reduces the fear that a state will be exploited by other members of the regime; this according to Keohane can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under anarchy.

Keohane's argument that cooperation through membership in international institutions will increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy is similar to the arguments made by other liberal scholars Kenneth Oye. Both Keohane and Oye agree that cooperation is needed between states at the international level to increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. While realists predict that conflict should be the norm in international politics, liberals such as Keohane believe that there is cooperation in the international scene despite anarchy. These liberal scholars often cite cooperation in trade, human rights, collective security among other issues as evidence that cooperation exists internationally even under anarchy. Moreover, the difference between Keohane and Kenneth Oye for example, is that Keohane argued that international regimes are vital in promoting cooperation among actors. He places more emphasis on the importance of international regimes to increase the possibility for states to cooperate and for stability to emerge under international anarchy. In

Contrast, Kenneth Oye does not emphasize the importance of international regimes when he discusses cooperation among states as a condition under which stability can emerge in international anarchy. For liberals like Kenneth Oye, the number of main actors involved in a negotiation is more important to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy than membership in international regimes like Keohane emphasizes. For Kenneth Oye, the lesser number of states involved in a negotiation, the easier it is for states to cooperate at the international level and the easier it is for stability to emerge under international anarchy. On the other hand, Keohane disagrees with Oye on this, for Keohane membership in international regimes is more important. He believes that it increases the likelihood for states to cooperate at the international level and that it increases the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Keohane believes that international regimes or institutions can act as a central authority under international anarchy; realists do not seem to agree with Keohane on this. For realists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, there is no central authority in the international system that is anarchic, and not even international regimes cannot take the place of a central authority in an anarchical international system.

2.8 Complex Interdependence

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S, Nye in “Power and Interdependence Revisited” explain that peace can emerge under international anarchy through complex interdependence among states. They encourage the use of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to promote cooperation and peace among states that have mutual benefits (Keohane & Nye, 1987:73). Keohane and Nye believe that international organizations like the IMF can

influence states to be more focused on the gains of complex interdependence while neglecting the idea of power. Keohane and Nye noted that peace might be achieved through complex relationships because states will neglect the idea of power and focus more on the benefits of economic interdependence.

Keohane and Nye argue that such cooperation among states will increase the likelihood of peace and stability to emerge under international anarchy. They explain that economic gains through trade and foreign investment will increase cooperation among states and encourages them to keep aside other struggles which will increase the possibility for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Keohane and Nye explain that increasingly complex interdependence among states, especially economically will help increase the chances for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, they argued that decreasing complex interdependence among states will increase the chances of war, which will, in turn, destabilize peace among states, disrupt world peace and reduce the chances for peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy (Keohane & Nye, 1987).

All in all, Keohane and Nye argued that economic interdependence reduces international conflict and enhances opportunities for peace and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Their argument on how cooperation through complex interdependence can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy is quite similar to the cooperation that Keohane emphasized in his article "The Demand for International Regimes". However, in the "The Demand for International Regimes" as aforementioned Keohane placed more emphasis on how states'

membership in international regimes can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy while in “Power and Interdependence Revisited” Keohane and Nye placed more emphasis on the strategic economic interdependence among states as a condition that can increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy.

Furthermore, Keohane and Nye’s emphasize peace in their explanations of how economic inter-dependence among states at the international level can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. This shows that Keohane and Nye differ from realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, who argued that peace is only possible in international anarchy under certain conditions like bipolarity. However, Keohane and Nye agree with other liberal scholars like Kenneth Oye that cooperation and stability are more likely to emerge under international anarchy if states have “mutual benefits” from cooperation. On the other hand, they disagree on how mutual benefits among states can actually increase the likelihood of cooperation and peace to emerge under international anarchy. While Keohane and Nye argued that the gains from complex interdependence will increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Other liberals like Kenneth Oye argued that modifying payoffs or mutual benefits are the conditions that will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Oye, 1985:10).

2.9 Democratic Peace Thesis

Next, building on Immanuel Kant, Michael Doyle in “Liberalism and World Politics” argued that the formation of an alliance between democratic states in world politics can increase the

likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. He argued that the existence of liberal democratic states such as the U.S.A, Japan, and other European countries can increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy because democracies are more peaceful in their foreign relations (Doyle. 1986:1151). According to Doyle, democracies are hesitant to go to war with other democracies which will increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. In other words, he argues that democracies do not attack each other and democracies behave differently towards each other than towards non-democracies (Doyle, 1986).

Besides, Doyle argued that democratic states are reluctant to go to war with each other because they must answer to their citizens. According to him, citizens pay the price of war in “blood and treasure; if the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to the electorate” (Doyle, 1986:1162-1163). Doyle explains that in democratic states, foreign policy decisions carrying the risk of war are debated openly and not made behind closed doors, which means that both the public and policymakers are sensitized to the costs of fighting which makes democracies to be hesitant to go to war which increases the possibility of stability to emerge under an anarchical international system. John M. Owen under liberal scholar agrees with Doyle that democratic states do not go to war with each other. He noted that most democratic states in our contemporary society have adopted the democratic peace thesis as an important part of their foreign policy, for example, the democratic peace theory constitutes an important part of U.S foreign policy (Owen, 1994: 87).

Doyle and supporters of the Democratic Peace Thesis believe that peace and stability will be more likely to emerge under international anarchy if more states in the world practice democracy or include democratic peace thesis in their foreign policies because democratic states are naturally peaceful and they are hesitant to go to war with each other which will increase the possibility of world peace and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Moreover, Doyle believes that peace will increase in international politics if more states practice democracy because democratic states cooperate more with each other than they do with non-democratic states. This position by Doyle contrast with the perspective of realist scholars like Mearsheimer, who believe that power and hegemony can better increase the chances of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy (Mearsheimer, 2001).

In addition, realist like Waltz also disagrees with Doyle that alliances between democratic states can increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Rather Waltz argued that not even the growth in numbers of democratic states can override the structure of international politics to creating an increasingly peaceful international system (Waltz, 2000). Overall, Doyle and supporters of the Democratic Peace Thesis argued that domestic systems not international systems matter. In contrast, Keohane as a neoliberal institutionalist, Oye (a liberal), and Jervis (a defensive realist), all agree with structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer that the international anarchical international system, not domestic systems, drives state behavior.

4 The Constructivist vs. Realists and Liberals Approaches to Anarchy and their Perspectives on the Conditions that can increase the likelihood of Stability to emerge under Anarchy.

4.1 The Constructivist vs. Realists and Liberals Approaches to Anarchy

Moving on to constructivism, the constructivist approach to anarchy is different from both realist and liberal approaches. The constructivist approach to anarchy is often summed up by Alexander Wendt's assertion that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt: 1992: 391). That is to say that anarchy is not inherent in the international system in the manner in which other IR schools of thought such as realism and liberalism envision it, but rather it is socially constructed by states in the system. Wendt claims that anarchy is what we make of it also suggests that anarchy has multiple meanings for different actors or states. In this sense, Wendt suggests that our approach to anarchy is dependent upon the meaning that we attach to anarchy. Adem clarifies this by stating that things only exist because we believe them to and that "if states, as well as non-state actors, interact with the 'belief' that they are in an anarchic environment, we would be bound to witness a particular set of behavior" (Adem: 2002: 20). This appears to suggest that a state or non-state actor's understanding of anarchy will lead them to behave in particular ways in the social context of international politics. While constructivists agree with realists and liberals that anarchy exists, constructivists dispute that anarchy is the fundamental condition of the international system. While realists view the international system as static and war as unavoidable, constructivists would dispute this, arguing that interests and identities change throughout history, allowing cooperation between states that had previously had conflicts

(Fierke: 2007). An example of this would be the states within the EU who were former enemies but have now learned to cooperate. In terms of how states will behave under international anarchy, constructivists take more of a middle position between realist and liberal schools of thought because constructivists believe that international anarchy is neither bad nor good (International Relations.Org, 2016), Hence, constructivists disagree with realists ideas that international anarchy drive states to act in certain ways (Wendt,1992). For constructivists, anarchy does not lead to a particular type of state behavior, rather, constructivist argued that anarchy in international politics has no set of behavioral responses; states can make what they want from anarchy (Wendt, 1992). Wendt explains that it is not the notion of anarchy that can cause actors to behave in a particular way in the international system, but rather, actors in the international system can make of anarchy what they will. In sum, though constructivists agree with realists and liberals that anarchy does exist in the international system; they argue that the effects of anarchy are dependent upon the inter-subjective meanings we attach to it.

Constructivists, such as Hopf, argue that anarchy can be perceived as an “imagined community” where a “continuum of anarchies is possible” (Hopf: 1998: 174).

4.2 Cooperation

While realists view the international system as static and war as unavoidable, Wendt argued that interest and identities change throughout history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to cooperate under international anarchy. Wendt contends that more direct forms of cooperation among states at the international level can actually increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992: 416). He explains that a necessary condition for such direct forms of cooperation to occur among states for stability to emerge under international anarchy is that outcomes be positively interdependent in the sense that

potential gains exist which cannot be realized by unilateral actions (Ibid). Here Wendt seems to agree with Grieco (a realist) and other liberal scholars like Kenneth Oye that stability can emerge under international anarchy through cooperation among states at the international level.

Moreover, Wendt noted that states such as Brazil and Botswana may recognize each other's sovereignty, but they need further incentives to cooperate at the international level (Ibid).

According to Wendt, one important incentive that states could use is "the growing, dynamic density of interactions among states." This suggests that interaction among states at the international level can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. Wendt's argument here that interactions among states can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy is similar to the argument made by Liberal scholars such as Kenneth Oye. Oye in "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy" argued that continuing interaction among states at the international level would increase the possibilities for states to cooperate which will increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy (Oye, 1985).

Also, Wendt argued that joint gains will increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy while interdependence also entails vulnerability and the risk of being exploited, which can reduce the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992: 416). Wendt's argument that interdependence can lead to exploitation which can reduce the likelihood of stability to emerge under anarchy differs from the position of other liberals like Keohane and Nye who contend that economic interdependence among states can actually increase the prospects of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy (Keohane & Nye, 1987).

Next, Wendt 's argument that joint gains can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy is similar to the argument made by liberals like Kenneth Oye, both Wendt and Oye agree that mutual benefits of players can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992: Oye, 1985). However, the difference between Wendt and Oye here is that Wendt emphasizes the importance of identity and interest when discussing cooperation under anarchy; He argued that interest and identities change throughout history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to cooperate under international anarchy (Wendt, 1992). This is something that Oye does not emphasize in his perspectives on the conditions that can increase the possibility of stability to emerge under international anarchy.

Furthermore, Wendt argued that a constructivist's analysis of cooperation would concentrate on how the expectations produced by behavior affect identities and interests which is different from the realist's and liberal's analysis of cooperation. He argued that the process by which egoistic states learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of a shared commitment to social norms (Wendt, 1992: 417). Hence, constructivists agree with liberals that cooperation among states at the international scene can actually increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. In contrast, realists maintain that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under international anarchy and they emphasize that peace is possible under certain conditions such as bipolarity (Waltz, 1979, Mearsheimer, 2001).

Besides, Wendt also argued that stability can emerge under international anarchy through the creation of institutions as it internalizes identities and interests, thus, creating a new understanding of self and other (Wendt 1992, 411). This suggests that institutions can help reconstruct identities. As an example, He argued that before the creation of institutions like the European Union (EU) Germany was viewed as an aggressive state, but as a member of the EU, Germany is no longer viewed in this manner. Wendt's argument that institutions can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy is in line with the liberals' belief that the right institutions can increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy (Keohane & Nye, 1987:73).

5. Conclusion

In Summation, this paper has compared and contrasted the realist, liberal, and constructivist approach to anarchy and perspectives put forth by scholars from these three schools of thought on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. As Grieco noted, realism presents a fundamentally pessimistic analysis of the prospects of international cooperation among states. While liberal scholars such as Keohane and Nye placed more emphasis on the importance of international institutions to explain the economic interdependence of states as a condition under which stability can emerge under international anarchy, Kenneth Oye another liberal discusses cooperation among states without emphasizing the importance of international institutions. Instead, Oye placed more emphasis on the need to reduce the number of actors and different strategies that can be used by states to modify mutual benefits in order to increase the likelihood of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy. This shows that even within the same school of thought, scholars offer

contrasting perspectives on the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. Moreover, this paper showed that realists, liberals, and constructivists agree that the international system is anarchic. However, realists such as Jervis, Grieco, Waltz, and Mearsheimer believe that there is no higher political authority that has power over sovereign states and that anarchy makes it difficult for states to be willing to cooperate in international politics. On the other hand, the paper showed that liberals such as Keohane and Oye agree with realists that anarchy exists in the international system, but also disagree with realist that there is no higher political authority above sovereign states. Rather, liberals like Keohane and Nye argued that international institutions play a vital role in the cooperation among states in the international arena. They believe that international institutions can help states to cooperate or work together, even under international anarchy. On the other side of the debate, constructivists agree with realists and liberals that international anarchy exists, however, constructivists contend that anarchy is what states make of it.

Next, the paper showed that Doyle and supporters of the Democratic Peace Thesis argued that domestic systems not international systems matter. In contrast, Keohane as a neoliberal institutionalist, Oye (a liberal), and Jervis (a defensive realist), all agree with structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer that the international anarchical international system, not domestic systems, drives state behavior. Similarly, this paper also showed that realists believe that cooperation is difficult to achieve and sustain under international anarchy because of relative gains. Realists like Waltz and Grieco emphasize relative gains when discussing cooperation and stability under international anarchy while liberals emphasize absolute gains of cooperation. Realist contends that cooperation is difficult to achieve under anarchy and that certain conditions

like bipolarity, game theory, and hegemony can increase the likelihood of peace or stability to emerge under international anarchy. Contrarily, liberals disagree with realists on these conditions, rather, liberals argue that cooperation is possible among states even under international anarchy and they contend that certain conditions such as international institutions, economic interdependences, and democratic peace treaties, absolute gains, game matrix, and modifying payoffs will provide states the opportunity to reduce conflict and increase the likelihood of cooperation and peace to emerge under international anarchy. On the other side of the coin, constructivists agree with liberals that certain conditions like international institutions can increase the possibility of cooperation and stability to emerge under international anarchy.

However, constructivists emphasize the importance of identity and interest when discussing cooperation under anarchy, something that realists and liberals do not emphasize in their perspectives on international anarchy. Wendt explained that interest and identities change throughout history, allowing states that had previously had conflicts to cooperate under international anarchy. As the essay suggests, it is possible to argue that realist liberal and constructivist scholars have contrasting approaches and perspectives to anarchy and the conditions that can increase the likelihood of stability to emerge under international anarchy. However, whatever their approaches and perspectives to anarchy, all three schools of thought provide solid contributions on the concept of anarchy and the conditions that can increase the possibility of stability to emerge in an anarchic international system. Therefore, realism, liberalism, and constructivism will likely remain vital theories of IR.

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