

# **Input-Output Factors and its Effects on Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy**

**by**

**Muriel Animwaa Adarkwa**

M.A (Development Studies), University of the Western Cape, 2017

B.A. (Hons), University of Ghana, 2013

Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

in the

Department of Political Science  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

© Muriel Animwaa Adarkwa 2020

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2020

# Approval

**Name:** Muriel Animwaa Adarkwa

**Degree:** Master of Arts

**Title:** Input-Output Factors and its Effects on Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy

**Examining Committee:** **Chair:** Steven Weldon  
Associate Professor

**Steven Weldon**  
Senior Supervisor  
Associate Professor

**Eline de Rooij**  
Supervisor  
Associate Professor

**Sanjay Jeram**  
External Examiner  
Senior Lecturer

**Date Defended/Approved:** July 31, 2020

## **Abstract**

In recent times, citizen support for democracy and its liberal principles appears to have stagnated and is possibly in decline. This research sets out to investigate the causes of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy. Drawing on the literature on democratic deficits and using data from the United States and Germany, two competing arguments are investigated. The first argument is that support for and satisfaction with democracy stem from feelings of being represented by the government - the input side of the political system. The opposing view is that support for and satisfaction with democracy stems from government performance - the output side. In general, the results reveal that both factors are important but are largely conditioned by the kind of electoral system being operated in the country

**Keywords:** government performance; representation; quality of government; satisfaction with democracy; support for democracy

## **Dedication**

To my parents, Mr. Kwaku Adarkwa Dwamena and Mrs Christiana Danquah Adarkwa and siblings Mayfair and Michelle for their unconditional love and moulding me into the individual I am today.

To everyone who encouraged me and said I could do this! When I felt like giving up, THANK YOU

## **Acknowledgements**

My heartfelt gratitude and appreciation goes to the Almighty God, for sustaining my life and granting me strength and understanding throughout this research. It's being an honour to be chosen and loved by You. I would also like to thank my supervisors, Assoc Prof Steven Weldon and Assoc. Prof Eline de Rooij who guided me through the completion of this thesis. Their understanding, support and commitment in supervising this research is well- appreciated. Their timely response and feedbacks to all questions as well as drafts made the completion of this research possible.

My appreciation also goes to Prof David Laycock for his encouragement and helping to fan the flame of academic research in me. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to my friends and colleagues of the research group- Politics of Extremism and Democracy. You guys are awesome!

Special thanks goes to Mr Emmanuel Ayedzi- Thank you for always being there for me. Words cannot describe my debt of gratitude. Finally, my friends- Anna Parvin, Federica Cogoni, Zhina Joubeh, Max Muratov, Irene Yang, Monica Petek and all others whose names could not be mentioned, I would like to say thank you. Many of you were not present physically, but not a day went by without you reminding me of how capable I am and of your willingness to always be there for me. God richly bless you all.

# Table of Contents

Approval.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
Table of Contents.....	vi
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
<b>Chapter 1.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Introduction.....	1
Research Questions:.....	2
<b>Chapter 2.....</b>	<b>4</b>
2.1. Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy.....	4
2.2. Support for Democracy and Performance of a Democratic Government.....	7
<b>Chapter 3.....</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1. Explaining Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy.....	11
3.1.1. Input factors.....	11
Voting.....	12
Interest in Politics.....	12
Party Identification.....	13
Subjective Representation.....	14
3.1.2. Output factors.....	15
Government Performance, State of the Economy, Corruption.....	15
<b>Chapter 4.....</b>	<b>17</b>
4.1. Data and Methods.....	17
4.1.1. Independent variables:.....	17
Input Factors.....	18
Output Factors.....	19
4.1.2. Control variables.....	19
4.1.3. The Dependent variable.....	20
4.2. Results and Discussion.....	24
4.2.1. Discussion on Support for Democracy.....	24
4.2.2. Discussion on Satisfaction with Democracy.....	28
4.2.3. Predicted Probabilities for Support and Satisfaction with Democracy.....	32
4.2.4. Limitations of the study.....	36
<b>Chapter 5.....</b>	<b>38</b>
5.1. Conclusion.....	38
<b>References.....</b>	<b>40</b>

<b>Appendix A. Countries.....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics .....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Appendix C- Question Wording .....</b>	<b>45</b>

## List of Tables

Table 2.1.	Categories of citizens in democratic states and their support for and satisfaction with democracy .....	8
Table 3.1.	Hypotheses to be analysed: .....	16
Table 4.1.	Relative Risk Ratio for the Binomial Logistic Regression (United States & Germany) .....	27
Table 4.2.	Relative Risk Ratio for the Binomial logistic Regression Results (United States & Germany).....	30
Table 4.3.	Overview of Hypotheses Tested.....	37

## List of Figures

Figure 2.1.	Trend showing the level of Satisfaction with Democracy around the world 1996-2020.....	5
Figure 4.1.	Diagram showing Respondents who Support and are Satisfied with Democracy in the US and Germany.....	22
Figure 4.2.	Predicted Probabilities for Support for Democracy in the US.....	32
Figure 4.3.	Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Democracy in the US.....	33
Figure 4.4.	Predicted Probabilities for Support for Democracy in Germany.....	34
Figure 4.5.	Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Democracy in Germany.....	35

# Chapter 1.

## 1.1. Introduction

The main aim of this research is to investigate the disparity between citizens' strong support for democratic values and the widespread discontent with the way democracy works in practice. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union left democracy as the prevailing form of governance in the world (Dalton, 2004). Already well-established in Western Europe and North America, democracy quickly took root in the late 1980s across Eastern Europe, South America, Asia and Africa as part of the "Third Wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991). Certain scholars even speculated that this period represented the end of an ideological evolution with liberal democracy as the highest and final form of human government (Fukuyama 1992).

The euphoria surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall and the expansion of democracy, however, has proven short-lived. New democracies like countries that emerged from the Arab Spring, have reverted back to authoritarian regimes. While it is true that democracy remains the dominant institutional form of governance around the globe, we have seen an alarming rise in support for politicians and parties that espouse authoritarian, illiberal rhetoric and policies. This includes the rise of radical right parties across Europe and the election of leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and more recently, Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

At the same time, there is growing evidence that citizen support for democracy and its liberal principles has stagnated and is possibly in decline (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2015; Fuks, Paulino & Casalecchi, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Foa and Mounk (2016) have been among the most vocal scholars in recent years raising the alarm about a crisis of liberal democracy. Central to their argument is their finding that support for democracy is declining even in the oldest, most established democracies, and that this decline is particularly acute among the youngest generations. While certainly concerning if true, several prominent scholars have recently challenged Foa and Mounk's key findings and questioned their most dire warnings (Alexander &

Welzel, 2017; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017). This has sparked a lively debate about the difference between support for democracy as an ideal and support for the way it functions, and a renewed effort to understand the relationship between the two and the sources of both.

My study contributes to these efforts by investigating the factors that influence citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy. Using the Comparative Studies on Electoral Systems (CSES) module 5 data, I test the hypotheses related to the expected effects of input and output factors on citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy in Germany and the United States. These two cases were selected because of the differences in representation of citizens in majoritarian and PR systems and their presumed effects on support for and satisfaction with democracy despite having similar performance/output indicators.

Overall, the results indicate that losers' consent (whether the respondent voted for the outgoing government or not) and government performance (perceptions about the level of corruption and government performance) are the most important determinants of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy. Interestingly, however, the impact of these factors may be mitigated by whether one lives in a majoritarian system (e.g. US) or a proportional system (e.g. Germany). The results also indicate that support for democracy does not necessarily translate into satisfaction with democracy. This is because individuals weigh and tap into input and output factors differently when asked about these issues.

## Research Questions:

*What are the causes of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy?*

*Which of the factors (input and output) has more impact on support for and satisfaction with democracy?*

In the following section, I begin with an overview of the patterns and implications of support for and satisfaction with democracy. Next, I develop a theoretical framework highlighting my expectations regarding how different input and output factors affect citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy. In the data and methods section, I discuss the data used and the specific measurements for the variables included in this


study. I then present a univariate and bivariate analysis for each of the country models. I conclude by summarizing the key findings of the study and suggesting possible areas for future research.

## **Chapter 2.**

### **2.1. Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy: Patterns and Implications**

About two decades ago, nearly two-thirds of individuals living in North America, Europe, Australasia and Northeast Asia expressed strong support for and satisfaction with democracy (Foa et al., 2020). However, in recent times many citizens living under democratic governments have grown increasingly hostile to it. After the end of the Cold war in the 1990s, most countries and their citizens were united in their support and advocacy for democratic practices and norms, yet now, representatives who openly violate democratic principles and incite divisiveness and intolerance have gained power and influence (Foa & Mounk, 2016). The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 amidst his divisive rhetoric focused on ethnic and social identities, the Brexit vote, the growing support for Marine Le Pen in France among others signify the dawn of a new era where most citizens living in democratic states have become tolerant to undemocratic alternatives. Drawing on data from Waves 3 through 6 of the World Values Surveys (1995–2014) and analyzing indicators for regime legitimacy, Foa and Mounk (2016) found that across Europe and the United States, citizens have grown more cynical about democratic governance as an ideal and are increasingly willing to express their support for undemocratic alternatives.

Due to these patterns, it would be presumptuous to assume that the stability of democratic governance is sure to persist. The assumption that free and fair elections will facilitate the endurance of democratic governance especially in older democracies may not be the case after all. According to Plattner (2010) and Mounk (2018), the widespread support for democracy in the early 1990s was because of the belief that liberal democracy contained checks and balances that ensured that while everyone could have their say, no group of individuals could amass power for itself to the detriment of other groups. The will of the people was mediated to ensure that the rights of the minority are protected. Mounk (2018) concluded that democracy and liberalism- albeit distinct, needed to co-exist together to ensure the system's stability. However, Foa and Mounk (2019) argue that in many democracies around the world today, support for and satisfaction with democracy has been on the decline.



**Figure 2.1. Trend showing the level of Satisfaction with Democracy around the world 1996-2020**

Source: Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Collins. 2020. "The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020." Cambridge, United Kingdom. p. 9<sup>1</sup>

According to the Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report, 2020, after a brief dip in satisfaction with democracy after the Asian financial crisis, citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy has continued to increase since 2015. This has been fuelled by specific political and economic events such as the European refugee crisis in 2015. Although research indicates that satisfaction with and support for democracy has been on the rise

<sup>1</sup> "Rising dissatisfaction with democracy across the world, in democracies representing 2.43 billion individuals across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, North America, East Asia, and Australasia. Based on 3,218 separate individual country surveys, classified by date of fieldwork and grouped on a quarterly annual basis, with the total averaged on a population-weighted basis. A constant country sample is maintained in all periods by rolling forward observations in country quarters lacking new data, to prevent sample bias from affecting the changes".

for a selected group of high-income democracies including Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands; these countries- also known as 'islands of contentment' only contain about two percent of the world's population and pales in comparison to the rest of the world which is exhibiting a downward trend in satisfaction (Foa et al, 2020).

In Figure 2.1, the mean of the trend appears to be a bit over 50% and the maximum is around 57%. Although the percentage change in dissatisfaction is very small- +10% points increase between 2005 and 2020, a clear majority of citizens (above 50%) around the globe are no longer satisfied with democracy. The declining levels of satisfaction with democracy if not addressed become a concern because it might pose a problem for democratic consolidation. As Linz and Stepan (1996) argue democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of citizens despite economic hardships and dissatisfaction with politicians believe that democratic institutions and procedures are the most acceptable way of governance. However, with the declining degree of expressed commitment to democracy as a form of government, the fall in the number of citizens who reject undemocratic alternatives and the rise in the share of the political power held by anti-system parties and politicians, there is concern about democracy's stability (Foa & Mounk, 2019).

According to Foa and his colleagues (2020), the rising share of votes for populist leaders, economic frustrations caused by the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis and increased political polarisation have helped to erode trust and the belief in democratic governance across many Western democracies. In developing countries, the authors argue that rising levels of bribery and corruption, nepotism, intergroup conflict coupled with the fading away of the euphoria of democracy's appeal in the early 1990s has helped to widen this gap. The legitimacy of democratic governance is founded on the consent of the people and declining levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy can affect the relationship between political elites and the masses. If citizens accept political authority without coercion, democracy will thrive; however, if a large proportion of the populace does not support and/or are dissatisfied with democracy, legitimacy becomes a problem (Pennings, 2017). When citizens support democracy, it is expected that they demonstrate this through voting- if they are dissatisfied, they can protest or sign a petition. But with the rising number of citizens who do not take part in elections and their apathetic attitude towards politics, declining levels

of support for and satisfaction with democracy can have far-reaching consequences on its stability.

## **2.2. Support for Democracy and Performance of a Democratic Government**

In this section, I provide an overview of how scholars have conceptualized democratic support and how it might matter for the political system.

As a concept, democracy is quite complex and empirical analysis has shown that citizens have different conception of its meaning and what they expect from it (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Linde & Ekman, 2003; Booth & Seligson, 2009). This differentiated meaning of democracy does not only vary across context but also across individuals (Almond & Verba, 1963). One scholar that pioneered studies on citizens' support for democracy was David Easton in the 1960s. According to Easton (1975), political support was a multidimensional concept that entailed two distinct meaning- specific support and diffuse support. Specific support is associated with the various outcomes and satisfaction members obtain from the political system- mainly as a response to political outcomes whereas diffuse support entails generalised attachment to democracy as a form of government- here support stems from what democracy is, not what it does (ibid). In the literature, Easton's differentiation has been closely linked to support for democracy (diffuse support) and satisfaction with democracy (specific support). Diffuse support includes the assurance citizens' have in the democratic process because they believe that it was put in place by them and for their benefit. Democracy becomes part of their culture. Specific support entails the tangible outcome of government policies and actions that help individuals determine their overall satisfaction with the substantive workings of government institutions.

Diffuse support can be seen as more robust- showing less fluctuations than specific support as it is not dependent on performance indicators in the short-term. Diffuse support deals with the core values upon which democracy is built. Easton (1975, p. 444) describes these as a store of "favorable attitudes" that enables individuals living under democratic governance to accept policy outcomes they might be against while upholding democratic principles and values. It should be noted that diffuse support is not stable all the time. It can be affected by crisis (economic/financial), sudden shocks or a

prolong malfunctioning of the system such as religious or ethnic polarisation, government stalemate among others (Pennings, 2017). Specific support deals with the satisfaction that individuals feel as a result of obtaining specific outcomes from the political system. Specific support tends to be volatile and transient as it is shaped by people’s experiences (Easton, 1975).

By distinguishing between the two types, Easton acknowledges that support is multidimensional in nature. He illustrates this when he describes a scenario where an individual can be dissatisfied with democracy but still accept the basic principles upon which the political system is built. For example, an economic crisis may lead to austerity measures being put in place by the government which its citizens may not find desirable. In this instance, although citizens’ may be dissatisfied with the performance of their government, their belief in democratic institutions may still be resolute. Consequently, dissatisfaction with democracy does not necessarily signify regime change. Individuals can be dissatisfied with policy outcomes and/or the government in power without necessarily withdrawing their support for the democratic order. Conversely, although satisfaction with democracy may be dependent on short-term performance indicators, if discontent is allowed to persist overtime without it being addressed, then there is a probability of an erosion of citizens’ support for the democratic regime (diffuse support).

Table 1 illustrates the possible categories of citizens that can exist in democratic states when trying to analyse citizens’ support for and satisfaction with democracy.

**Table 2.1. Categories of citizens in democratic states and their support for and satisfaction with democracy**

		Democratic Satisfaction (Specific Support)	
		High	Low
Democratic Value Support (Diffuse Support)	High	<i>Satisfied democrats</i>	<i>Dissatisfied democrats</i>
	Low	<i>Utility Seekers</i>	<i>Autocrats</i>

Table 2.1 illustrates the categories of citizens living under democratic governance and their support for and satisfaction with democracy. It can be observed that there can be four possibilities of citizens living in democratic states when their level of support for and satisfaction with democracy is evaluated. The first category can be termed satisfied democrats. Satisfied democrats are individuals who do not only support

democracy as an ideal but are also satisfied with the way democracy works in practice. These individuals exhibit high levels of democratic value support and democratic satisfaction.

The second category of individuals are those termed dissatisfied democrats. These are individuals who support democracy but are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in practice. These individuals exhibit high levels of support for democracy but low levels of satisfaction with democracy. Literature on satisfaction with democracy term citizens who support the principles of democracy but are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in practice as dissatisfied democrats (Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2015).

The third category of individuals are those termed utility seekers. These are individuals who appreciate the benefits of democracy but do not support the principles and procedures of the democratic regime. Utility seekers exhibit high levels of satisfaction with democracy but low level of support for democracy. Here, because a given government policy outcome or institutional set-up favors them, utility seekers tend to exhibit high levels of satisfaction with democracy; however, their commitment to democratic processes and procedures is low since they tend to see democracy as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. For example, utility seekers might be people who do not support democratic principles such as minority rights, but are happy living under the current system precisely because minorities are not given equal opportunity and the system favours them. Utility seekers' support for democracy tends to be unstable as their support is contingent upon particular benefits and compensations rather than a firm belief that democracy is the only acceptable way to govern.

The last category of individuals are those termed autocrats. These are individuals who exhibit low levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy. These individuals are neither happy with the benefits of democracy nor support the principles and procedures of democratic governance. They are termed autocrats because they are more likely to support undemocratic alternatives. Autocrats are more likely to keep quiet and support actions such as the state control of information, using independent political institutions such as the courts for political control and targeting political dissidents and "the other"- minorities, outsiders. Autocrats are identical to utility seekers in their uncertainty in the efficacy of democracy as a form of governance but differ from utility

seekers in their dissatisfaction with democracy as their support is not contingent on performance, compensation or their preferred party in office. An autocrat may also differs from a utility seeker who is currently dissatisfied in that whereas a dissatisfied utility seeker maybe optimistic that an incoming government or a policy change could appease their current dissatisfaction, autocrats are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with democracy. It should be noted that because the support of utility seekers is volatile, if their dissatisfaction persists overtime, there is a probability that they might become autocrats.

## **Chapter 3.**

### **3.1. Explaining Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy**

Focusing on causes/sources of support for and satisfaction with democracy, Norris (2011) argues that citizens' strong support for democratic principles and their dissatisfaction with democracy can be viewed as a form of democratic deficit that can be explained either from the input or the output side of the political system. From the input side, democratic deficit that results from strong support for the principles of democracy while simultaneously being dis/satisfied with the way democracy works in practice stems from feelings of being represented within the political community. The solution then is to improve representative institutions. On the output side of the political system, strong support for democracy while being dis/satisfied with the way democracy works in practice results from outcomes from the political system such as the quality of health care system, economic growth, decrease in bribery, corruption and nepotism. The solution is to aim at non-corrupting practices (such as making policies that favour a selected group of individuals), creation of viable economic goals (such as job creation) and the impartial implementation of public policies. It should be noted that input and output factors despite being different are not in logical conflict with each other as both deal with citizens' appraisal of democratic institutions, processes and outcomes.

#### **3.1.1. Input factors**

One of the classical statements made by Abraham Lincoln is the fact that democracy entails "government by the people". Consequently, input factors will entail all the acceptable ways through which individuals living in a democratic country can effectively engage and participate in the formation of their government (Scharpf, 1999). Engagement can be measured as a behaviour (e.g., voting, party identification) or as an attitude (e.g., interest in politics, subjective representation). The assumption is that individuals are more likely to accept political authority because of their ability to participate in the democratic process.

## Voting

In most democratic countries, participation and engagement occurs through voting. As Hobolt (2012) asserts, the participatory aspect of democracy “provides input legitimacy”. Voting serves as the foundation of democratic governance. Without voting, the entire system comes to a halt- no one is elected to govern on the behalf of others. By voting, individuals affirm their belief in the procedures under which one yields political power in a democracy. Thus, when individuals participate in governance through voting in an election, they are more likely to support democracy. Depending upon the electoral system in place, when citizens exercise their right to vote in an election, two outcomes ensue- either they become the winners or losers of the election. As citizens usually prefer to win an election rather than lose one, election outcomes usually influence their attitude towards holders of political power and the democratic process as a whole. When one votes for the winning candidate or party, their confidence in the government is bolstered and this in turn increases their satisfaction with democracy and vice versa. This is because winning an election does not only make winners happy but also makes them more inclined to believe that the holders of political power will make decisions and policies in their favour (Anderson et al, 2005). Thus, individuals who support those who won the election (winners) are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than whose parties lost the election or are in opposition (losers).

*H1: Voting in an election positively impacts support for and satisfaction with democracy.*

*H2: Voting for a political party that lost the election negatively affects satisfaction with democracy.*

## Interest in Politics

Another factor on the input side that might affect citizens' satisfaction with and support for democracy is their cognitive awareness of political issues. The input side of the political system usually entails demands and support (Easton, 1965) and in order for citizens to effectively do this, they need to exhibit a high level of interest in politics and be aware of public issues in order to effectively participate and engage in governance. When citizens are interested and well-informed about politics, it becomes very easy for

them to channel their demands and concerns into the system as well as enhance their understanding of how democratic processes work. This study argues that because individuals with high interest in politics are more aware of the workings of government, they are less likely to feel disappointed and/or withdraw their support for democratic principles and processes when their concerns are not addressed within a short timeframe. There may be instances where increased knowledge and sophistication makes some citizens aware of the lack of responsiveness and extent of corruption and nepotism in the system. However, this is more likely to affect satisfaction with democracy rather than support for democracy. This is because when citizens are aware of what goes on in governance, they are more likely to know that democracy provides them with avenues to channel their dissatisfaction with the way the system works. This could be through protest, signing of petitions, electing new leaders, among others.

*H3: As interest in politics increases, support for democracy increases.*

## **Party Identification**

Although democracy requires that individuals participate in the process, it is often difficult for one to assert their choices when many democratic systems are structured to favour the will of the majority. Hence, it becomes important for individuals to feel that they are not alone in their political choices and goals. One of the ways through which representative democracy foster a sense of belonging to the political system is by allowing individuals with similar political views to band together through the formation of political parties. By aggregating the preferences of different individuals into a coherent program for governance, political parties have become indispensable in modern democracies (Norris, 2017). Through mobilization, political parties allows individuals who might otherwise feel ignored to develop a sense of belonging (we-feeling) to their governing systems and thus, serving as important instruments for social justice and change (Dalton, 2016).

In recent times, there has been a decline in the level of affiliation citizens have towards the various political parties within their countries (Dalton, 2004). This has been attributed to individual and systemic factors. On the individual level, Dalton (2004) argues that due to the rising educational level of individuals, their cognitive capacity and resources have increased which has enabled them to engage in self- sufficient politics

rather than looking to political parties for references and cues. On the systemic level, the author argues that due to the widespread and growth of the mass media and other interest groups, the information and interest articulation function of political parties has been negatively affected. Thus, although the current political landscape may have facilitated party dealignment, political parties still have normative value. By identifying with a political party, citizens do not only get low-cost cues for their voting choices but also indirectly affirm their support and satisfaction with the system (democratic governance) that created these parties.

*H4: Individuals who identify with political parties are more likely to support and be satisfied with democracy.*

## **Subjective Representation**

With the decline in party affiliation in recent times, another indicator of how citizens' demands and preferences are reflected in governance is their perception of the representativeness of the political system. The degree to which democracy performs its representation function (either substantive or descriptive) has been linked to public attitude towards support for and satisfaction with democracy (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). Subjective feelings of being represented plays a key role in support for and satisfaction with democracy because as affective attachment and partisan loyalties weakens, it is important for individuals to feel that their views are being reflected in governance. As Dalton (2016) asserts, in highly politicized countries such as the United States, issue appeals and candidate images can play an important role of making independent voters feel a sense of belonging to the political system as it has the ability to offset partisan preferences. As such I propose that:

*H5: Subjective feelings of being represented increases support for and satisfaction with democracy*

*Among the engagement indicators highlighted in the input side, I expect voting to be the most important factor for predicting support for and satisfaction with democracy. This is because with high levels of party dealignment and declining levels of interest in politics, voting during elections ensures system stability by reaffirming citizens' consent to the procedures under which one yields political power in a democracy.*

### 3.1.2. Output factors

#### **Government Performance, State of the Economy, Corruption**

An opposing framework for understanding the root causes of support for and satisfaction with democracy can be found on the output side of the political system. The output side of the political system is important for democratic support and satisfaction because it entails the decisions and actions the political system produces (Easton, 1965). Here, political support and satisfaction is generated from the actual performance of government policies and what it refrains from doing. These performance indicators could include increase in economic growth, low cost of living, high standard of living, low levels of bribery and corruption among others. Some scholars (Linde & Ekman, 2003) have argued that output factors do not really capture democratic value support because satisfaction with democracy usually entails a rational assessment of the performance of the government by its citizens. Although this may be true, Easton (1975) emphasizes that negative evaluations of government performance overtime can affect democratic value support.

In addition, Dalberg, Linde and Holmberg (2014) argue that government performance need not be only evaluated by material or economic outcomes. According to the authors, citizens' evaluations of government processes plays an important role when analyzing citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Citizens' perceptions about how good or bad they rate government performance, their perception about levels of corruption and how good or bad they rate the economy can affect their levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy. It should be noted that quality of government and government performance are two different indicators despite the fact that they both constitute part of the output side of the political system. Whereas government performance deals with political and economic outcomes such as good health care system, distribution of welfare and job creation, quality of government refers to the unbiased implementation of government decisions (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). In this research, I use corruption as an indicator for the quality of government

*H6: Positive perceptions about government performance and the state of the economy increases support for and satisfaction with democracy*

*H7: As corruption increases, support for and satisfaction with democracy decreases*

**Table 3.1. Hypotheses to be analysed:**

Hypotheses	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	
		Support for Democracy	Satisfaction with Democracy
		Direction of Expected Effect	
H1	Voting	+	+
H2	Voting for the party that the lost elections	-	-
H3	Interest in Politics	+	
H4	Party Identification	+	+
H5	Subjective feelings	+	+
H6	Government Performance & State of the Economy	+	+
H7	Corruption	-	-

## Chapter 4.

### 4.1. Data and Methods

This research examines the causes of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy in the United States and Germany. To analyze this question, I use the Comparative Studies on Electoral Systems (CSES) module 5 (2016-2021). The Comparative Electoral System data is appropriate for this purpose because the data contains substantial contextual variation on liberal democracies that makes comparative analysis possible. Further, the CSES data contains survey items that can be used to construct a valid cross-national variable on the extent to which individuals in democratic states support and are satisfied with liberal democracies. The US and Germany were chosen because of the presumed effects of their electoral system on support for and satisfaction with democracy despite having similar performance indicators such as having a good welfare system, a good track record of the state of the economy and similar level of technological advancement. The data for Germany<sup>2</sup> was collected between September 25<sup>th</sup> and November 30<sup>th</sup> 2017 using face-to-face interviews with 2032 respondents and that of the US<sup>3</sup> was collected between November 9<sup>th</sup> and January 9<sup>th</sup> 2016 from 3648 respondents using a combination of face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews and mail back. Both surveys were conducted using a standardized questionnaire. All missing data was coded as NA.

**Method:** I employ a binomial logistic regression to examine the relationship between my independent variables and my dependent variables: support for and satisfaction with democracy.

#### 4.1.1. Independent variables:

The independent variables in this research are grouped into two factors: input and output factors. Input factors include: whether or not respondents' participated in the elections (voting), whether or not the respondent voted for the outgoing government (loser's consent), level of interest in politics, party id and subjective representation. The

---

<sup>2</sup> The data on Germany was weighted by sample and demographic weight.

<sup>3</sup> The data on US was weighted by a combination of sample and demographic weight.

output factors include: respondents perception about government performance, the state of the economy and their assessment of the level of corruption.

## **Input Factors**

The literature indicates that citizens who voted and are interested in politics are more likely to support and be satisfied with democracy. This is because by casting a vote, one indirectly ratifies the electoral process as the legitimate way to yield political power. For citizens to effectively evaluate the performance of politicians and political parties, they need to be interested in politics. To create the vote variable, citizens who cast their vote are coded as 1 for Yes and those who did not vote was recoded as 0 for No. For ease of interpretation, the interest in politics variable was rescaled with citizens who rated their interest in politics as “very interested” and “somewhat interested” were recorded as high (1) and those who rated their interest as “not very interested” and “not at all interested” were recorded as low (0). From Appendix A, it can be observed that more respondents in Germany (84%) voted in their elections in comparison to respondents in the US (76%). Germans (80%) also exhibit a high level of interest in politics in comparison to their American counterparts (71%).

To create the remaining input variables- subjective feelings of being represented and whether or not respondents belong to a political party (party id), two variables were constructed. The representation argument was tested using an indicator that measures the extent to which individuals think that their views are being represented in the political system. Here, I coded 1 for those who believed that their views were being represented and 0 otherwise. Concerning party identification, respondents were asked if they were close to any political party. Those who responded that they were close to a political party were coded as 1 and 0 for otherwise. From Appendix A, a little over 50% of respondents in both datasets feel subjectively represented (59% for the US and 57% for Germany). More Americans (55%) identify with a political party than Germans (41%). To determine whether a respondent was part of the winners/losers of the election (losers' consent), all respondents who voted were asked whether they voted for the outgoing government. Here, I coded 1 for those who voted for the outgoing government and 0 for those who did not. From Appendix A, 49% of Americans voted for the party that lost power while about 59% of Germans voted for the losing party.

## **Output Factors**

Research shows that perceptions of government performance are a very good predictor of political support and satisfaction in democratic states (Doorenspleet, 2012). This is because in most circumstances, support for and satisfaction with democracy is largely dependent on the actual (tangible) policy performance of the government (Norris, 2011).

To create the government performance variable, I coded all responses of the government as having done a very good job or good job as 1 and all responses of having done a bad job or a very bad job as 0. From Appendix A, it can be seen that whereas majority of Germans (68%) rated their government as doing a very good job, many Americans (64%) believe that their government is doing a very bad job. To create the state of the economy variable, I coded responses of the economy gotten somewhat worse and much worse as 0, gotten much better and somewhat better as 2 and stayed the same as 1. From Appendix A, it can be observed that among Americans, there is no substantial difference between those who argued that the economy remained the same and those who argued that the economy got better (approximately 37% respectively). Contrastingly, about 52% of Germans rated their state of the economy as having remained the same over the past twelve months.

Lastly, to test the quality of government argument, I use an indicator that taps into the performance of government institution-corruption assessments. Here, I code responses of corruption being very or quite widespread as 1 and responses of corruption hardly ever happening or not very widespread as 0. From Appendix A, it can be observed that more Americans (73%) believe that corruption is very high and/or quite widespread in their country than Germans (57%).

### **4.1.2. Control variables**

In order to test and understand better the relationship between the drivers of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy, I controlled for certain variables. Research has shown that income relates to support for and satisfaction with democracy (Ceka & Maghales 2019). It has been argued that depending on where an individual falls within the income bracket of a country, their support for and satisfaction with democracy

can alter. As such, I control for income in the analysis. Age has also been found as an indicator that influences support and satisfaction for democracy with the older generation displaying high levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy than the younger generation (Moreno & Lagos 2016, Mounk, 2018). Thus, I control for the age of respondents. Gender has been linked to support for and satisfaction with democracy. Research shows that due to the changing nature of the social and economic sphere, more women and minority groups are getting economically emancipated and this has threaten the dominant status of most males- predominantly White males in most Western societies who feel threaten by this ( Mounk, 2018). As such, it is more likely that men are more dissatisfied with democracy than women. Thus, I control for gender. Research (Owen, Videras & Willemsen, 2008) has shown that individuals tend to corroborate the reporting of their significant others, as such, I control for the marital status of respondents. Lastly belonging to a trade union can affect citizens' satisfaction with democracy. This is because trade unions provide their members with certain benefits that the general populace may not be preview to thus, I control for trade union membership.

#### **4.1.3. The Dependent variable<sup>4</sup>**

The dependent variable in this research is constructed using two variables that the literature views as standard operationalisation of citizens' support for regime performance and principles (Dalberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2014). The first variable measures support for democracy as the best system of government and the second variable measures satisfaction with democracy.

Consistent with the definition of liberal democracy from Yascha Mounk, I use a multi-item composite indicator of support for democratic principles. I use the following four questions in the CSES module 5:

---

<sup>4</sup> My dependent variable- support for and satisfaction with democracy differs from political trust in the sense that political trust has to deal with citizens' attitudes towards the political system - that is, their normative expectations (Warren, 1999). While support for democracy deals with a more reflective assessment of the tenants upon which democratic governance is built irrespective of citizens' normative expectations. Whereas questions of political trust deals with the extent to which citizens' have these normative expectations met by political institutions (Warren, 1999), satisfaction with democracy mainly pertains to the actual policy output of political institutions. Thus, although political trust, support for and satisfaction with democracy are related, the three are not the same.

*(Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement?)*

*Q04A. What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles?*

*Q04E. Having a strong leader in government is good for [COUNTRY] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.*

*Q04F. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions<sup>5</sup>.*

*Q05B. The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.*


By using these questions to construct the variable “support for democracy”, this research is able to distinguish between individuals who support democracy because of its tenets and those individuals who just pay lip service to it. These four identified measures of support for democracy- 1) compromise, 2) rule of law, 3) political power residing in the people and 4) tolerance was used to construct a scale where a respondent who strongly supported democracy scored 0 and those who did not scored 1. In order to first differentiate the various categories of respondents in the political system, I used the cut-point of 0.60, with all respondents scoring 0.60 and above termed as those with high support for democracy and all respondents scoring below 0.60 termed as those with low support for democracy. The 0.60 cut-off point was selected because of the argument put forward by Linz and Stepan (1996) that democracy is consolidated when a strong majority of citizens believe that democratic institutions and procedures are the most acceptable way of governance. Consequently, support for democracy takes on the average score of the questions Q04A, Q04E, Q04F and Q05B. In computing the dependent variable, if a respondent did not answer any of the four questions, they were

---

<sup>5</sup> The use of Q4F seems a little ambiguous as it contains some elements of direct democracy that has the probability of becoming illiberal in nature. As such, upon my attention being drawn to this by one of my supervisors, I constructed a modified dependent variable omitting this item. The findings from the modified dependent variable were almost identical with little change to the conclusions drawn. Hence, I decided to keep the four original questions used to construct my dependent variable- support for democracy.

omitted from the study. As a results, 78 and 189 observations were lost from the USA and Germany dataset respectively.

To construct the second dependent variable (satisfaction with democracy), respondents were asked ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?’ Here, respondents being ‘very’ or ‘fairly satisfied’ are regarded as ‘satisfied’ democrats, while those responding ‘not very’ and ‘not at all satisfied’ are classified as ‘dissatisfied’ democrats. The delineation of respondents into satisfied and dissatisfied democrats is important because it makes it easy for me to investigate how individuals with different democratic orientations exhibit their satisfaction with the way democracy works in practice.



**Figure 4.1. Diagram showing Respondents who Support and are Satisfied with Democracy in the US and Germany**

Source: Author's computation with CSES module 5 (N=3570-US; 1843-Germany)

The first clear finding from figure 4.1 indicates that the majority of Germans are much more satisfied with democracy than Americans- so called ‘satisfied democrats’ (about 55% and 48% respectively). Less than 20% (19% for the US and 18% for Germany) of respondents in both datasets are utility seekers with 8% and 9% of respondents in the US and Germany constituting autocrats respectively. There seems to be more dissatisfied democrats in the US than in Germany (25% and 18% respectively).

The high level of satisfied democrats in both datasets can help explain the relative stability of democracy in these countries despite facing social and economic problems. Perhaps one explanation for the high levels of support for and satisfaction

with democracy among Germans and Americans could be the fact that most of them defined democracy in intrinsic terms rather than instrumental terms. The majority of Germans and Americans define democracy as a system that: called for compromise when necessary, followed the rules and procedures despite who held the position of the highest office, respected minority rights and lastly, believed that power ultimately resided with the people. Thus, among Germans and Americans, democratic governance meant liberal democracy.

The US seems to have more dissatisfied democrats than Germany and this could stem from the electoral and welfare system in both countries. Different electoral systems provide different compensation to winners and losers of elections and this can affect the extent to which individuals are satisfied with democracy (Anderson et al, 2005). Germany's PR system provides an opportunity for losers of elections to have an influence on government policies due to coalition governments in comparison to the US' winner-takes-all approach. Further, the tightly woven and "generous" welfare system in Germany (such as state-wide healthcare and pension) helps to 'cushion' its citizens from the impact of shocks to the political system in comparison to the US (Pennings, 2017).

A concerning pattern in both datasets is the high number of utility seekers. Utility seekers are individuals who despite not supporting democracy, like the benefits they derive from it. Their high number is a cause for concern because there is a possibility that when they are no longer happy with the benefits they derive from the system, they might support any form of government that promises to meet their needs when they become dissatisfied with what the current democratic government is providing. Due to rapid technological, social and economic change, many political institutions are not equipped to meet the growing complex demands of its citizenry. As Huntington (1968, p.4) argues, the main problem with politics is "the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change". Consequently, for democracy to endure, there is the need for citizens to value democracy in and of itself rather than as a means to an end. Because the data collected is representative of the general population in each country, this could perhaps explains the rise in the vote share of extremist parties which promise quick fixes to the problems of the citizenry.

Another concerning issue is the percentage of autocrats in both dataset. Research reveals that over the years there is a growing number of individuals who do

not support democracy and are dissatisfied with the way it works in practice in many democratic states. According to Mounk (2018), in the last two decades there has been a growing number of citizens living in democratic states (such as the US, Germany, UK) who have become open to undemocratic alternatives. This include: their preference for a strong leader who does not need to be bothered by the legislature and elections. Although citizens may not subscribe to authoritarian rule, their preference for anti-democratic alternatives such as these become a little problematic. In a country such as Germany, the growing number of autocrats may lead to the election of parties and individuals who may not necessarily uphold democratic principles. Due to the nature of their electoral system, this can consequently lead to these politicians and parties having greater influence on key decisions. In contrast, although the growing number of autocrats in the US might be less likely to result in the election of an authoritarian leader, the most likely outcome can be a situation where the general public becomes indifferent to how political power is wielded in the highest office and checks and balances within the system become eroded.

## **4.2. Results and Discussion**

### **4.2.1. Discussion on Support for Democracy**

Table 4.1 shows the binomial logistic regression results for support for democracy in Germany and the US using input and output factors as predictors. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between whether or not a respondent voted for the outgoing government, the state of the economy and support for democracy for respondents in the US whereas there is a positive relationship between having voted, political interest, government performance and support for democracy among Germans. As citizens' perception of the state of the economy moves from bad to good, the odds of an American respondent supporting democracy increases by 15% (odds ratio of 1.15  $p < 0.05$ ).

Further, as Germans' interest in politics increases, the odds of them supporting democracy also increases by 51% (odds ratio of 1.51  $p < 0.05$ ). This provides support for H3. As Germans evaluate the performance of their government as positive, their support for democracy increases by 37% (odds ratio of 1.37  $p < 0.05$ ), thereby lending support for H6. Studies have shown that in most democratic systems, citizens' support for

democracy can be viewed as a means to an end (Hobolt, 2012; Dorenspleet, 2012). Thus, it is likely that positive government performance assessment might positively impact support for democracy. If a German cast a vote in the election, the odds of supporting democracy increases by 109% (odds of 2.10  $p < 0.01$ ). This provides support for H1.

One unexpected finding illustrated by the binomial logistic regression in Table 4.1 is the fact that if a respondent cast a ballot for the outgoing government, the odds of them supporting democracy increases by 141% in the US (odds ratio of 2.41  $p < 0.01$ ), which disputes H2. Although this large increase in probability may seem surprising, it should be noted that in most democratic countries, the act of voting is habitual (Holmberg, 2014). Thus, it is not surprising that even though one's party or candidate may have lost an election, their support for the democratic process is still resolute. This finding may also indicate the trust losers have in the electoral process- if they have been in power before, there is a probability that they might be in power again despite the current lost. Consequently, it may not serve them well to abandon the system that might warrant them that opportunity again.

The results also show that in both the US and Germany, corruption assessment affects levels of support for democracy. As respondents' assessment of the level of corruption in the country increases (deem as high), the odds of the respondent supporting democracy decreases by 36% respectively for the US and Germany (odds ratio of 0.64 and 0.64  $p < 0.01$ ). This provides evidence for H7. One of the ways by which citizens living in democratic states evaluate the functioning of their institutions is to use the levels of corruption in their country (Doorenspleet, 2012). As such, when levels of corruption are high, support for democracy is more likely to fall. Results also indicated a negative relationship between whether or not a respondent feels subjectively represented in government and their support for democracy in the US. As respondents' feelings of being represented in the political system increases, their support for democracy decreases by 20% (odds ratio of 0.79  $p < 0.05$ ). This result was unexpected because although the theory predicts that subjective representation does affect support for democracy (H5), the direction of the relationship was expected to be positive rather than negative. This means that H5 needs to be rejected. An explanation for this negative relationship between subjective representation and support for democracy could stem from the fact the US is a majoritarian system. As such, it is not surprising that citizens

who feel represented in governance are less likely to support democracy as when elections are held, everything is at stake for these parties and for their members. A win or lose could highly influence who ultimately holds political power and consequently, affect the morale of party members.

**Table 4.1. Relative Risk Ratio for the Binomial Logistic Regression (United States & Germany)**

	<i>Support for Democracy:</i>	
	United States	Germany
<b><u>Independent variables: Input factors</u></b>		
Subjective Representation	0.798** (0.109)	0.910 (0.139)
Voted <sup>6</sup>	1.191 (0.136)	2.095*** (0.223)
Voted for outgoing government	2.411*** (0.120)	1.167 (0.139)
Party identification	1.149 (0.108)	1.197 (0.142)
Political interest	1.115 (0.115)	1.515** (0.174)
<b><u>Independent variables: Output factors</u></b>		
State of economy	1.156** (0.069)	1.117 (0.102)
Government performance	0.899 (0.118)	1.373** (0.142)
Corruption assessment	0.640*** (0.115)	0.644*** (0.135)
<b><u>Control Variables:</u></b>		
Age	0.990*** (0.003)	0.971*** (0.004)
Income	1.139*** (0.037)	1.123** (0.059)
Union Membership	0.767 (0.160)	0.950 (0.191)
Marital Status	0.953 (0.043)	1.093 (0.067)
Gender (ref: Men)	1.235** (0.096)	1.284 (0.130)
Constant	1.868 (0.326)	1.500 (0.534)
Observations	2,546	1,426
Log Likelihood	-1,366.763	-764.352
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,761.526	1,555.704

Note: \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

<sup>6</sup> Initial analysis of the German dataset showed evidence of collinearity. Upon further investigation and trying to omit the vote variable, I had a close look at the notes in the codebook upon supervisor's suggestion. Here, I realized that for the German vote for the outgoing government variable, the question was only asked to respondents who had voted in the election. Thus, I constructed a new variable in the dataset for the vote for the outgoing government variable and imputed data into that column where non-voters was also coded as did not vote for the outgoing government.

#### 4.2.2. Discussion on Satisfaction with Democracy

Table 4.2 shows the binomial logistic regression results for satisfaction with democracy in Germany and the US. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between being subjectively represented, whether or not a respondent voted, government performance, state of the economy and satisfaction with democracy. The results indicate that when respondents feel subjectively represented, they are 86% and 75% (odds ratio of 1.86 and 1.75  $p < 0.01$ ) more likely to be satisfied with democracy in the US and Germany respectively, this provides evidence for H5. When respondents' assessment of government performance becomes increasingly positive, the odds of them being satisfied with democracy increases by 52% and 446% (odds ratio of 1.52, 5.47  $p < 0.01$ ) for Americans and Germans respectively. In relation to the state of the economy, the analysis reveals that as respondents' perception of the state of the economy becomes increasingly positive, the odds of respondents being satisfied with democracy in Germany increases by 38% (odds ratio of 1.38%  $p < 0.01$ ). The results for government performance and state of the economy provides support for H6.

An explanation for the high impact of subjective representation on satisfaction with democracy could stem from the fact that having one's political views represented in the political system provides a sense of belonging to the political system. The presence of political parties with different platforms in both countries makes it relatively easy for citizens in both countries to identify and see their political views being reflected in governance. This fosters a sense of belonging and ultimately affects their satisfaction with democracy. Although government performance is important for satisfaction with democracy in both countries, it exhibits the largest impact in Germany (around 446%). Scholars such as Wegrich and Hammerschmid (2018) have argued that the nature of the German system with its high consensus requirements often obscures the ability of the political executive to obtain results. Thus, in this instance, it is fairly accurate to expect that when citizens view the performance of government as being good and/or getting better, their satisfaction with democracy would increase.

Contrarily, the results in Table 4.2 also illustrated that as citizens' perceive the country as having high levels of corruption, the odds of them being satisfied with democracy decreases by 41% (odds of 0.59  $p < 0.01$ ) for Germany and by 60% (odds ratio of 0.40  $p < 0.01$ ) for the US. This provides evidence for H7. Research has shown

that widespread perception of high levels of corruption among the citizenry affects their satisfaction with democracy. This is because corruption can hinder the economic and social welfare of a country (Doorenspleet, 2012). For example, if governmental projects go to companies and individuals who pay the highest bribes rather than the most efficient bidder, it can deprive the government of much-needed tax revenue. This can ultimately lead to a situation where citizens' satisfaction with democracy falls as their level of trust in the government erodes due to its inability to deliver public goods and services in a fair manner.

The results of the analysis also reveals that there is a negative relationship between casting a vote for the outgoing government and satisfaction with democracy in the US and Germany. If an American cast a ballot for the outgoing government, the odds of them being satisfied with democracy decreases by 52% (odds ratio of 0.47  $p < 0.05$ ). However, if a respondent in Germany voted for the outgoing government, the odds of them being satisfied with democracy decreases by 46% (odds ratio of 0.54  $p < 0.05$ ) that the respondent is satisfied with democracy. This provides support for H2. Research (Anderson et al, 2005) has shown that citizens who vote for the winning candidate/party of an election are more satisfied with democracy than those who voted for the candidate/party that lost the election. Winners of the election are usually satisfied with democracy because of the belief that because their preferred party/candidate is in office, there is a high probability that their policy preferences will be enacted. Losers of election in contrast become distrustful of the government as the candidate/party in office does not represent their views. Thus, they are more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy.

**Table 4.2. Relative Risk Ratio for the Binomial logistic Regression Results (United States & Germany)**

	<i>Satisfaction with Democracy:</i>	
	United States	Germany
<b><u>Independent variables: Input factors</u></b>		
Subjective Representation	1.836*** (0.102)	1.749*** (0.147)
Voted	1.238* (0.129)	1.154 (0.231)
Voted for outgoing government	0.471*** (0.112)	0.540*** (0.157)
Party identification	0.911 (0.103)	0.994 (0.157)
Political interest	0.981 (0.111)	1.259 (0.184)
<b><u>Independent variables : Output factors</u></b>		
State of the economy	0.970 (0.067)	1.380*** (0.109)
Government performance	1.521*** (0.109)	5.468*** (0.140)
Corruption assessment	0.592*** (0.110)	0.404*** (0.151)
<b><u>Control Variables:</u></b>		
Age	1.017*** (0.003)	1.004 (0.005)
Income	1.145*** (0.035)	1.397*** (0.063)
Union Membership	0.731 (0.148)	0.783 (0.207)
Marital Status	1.018 (0.040)	1.090 (0.068)
Gender (ref: Men)	0.999 (0.091)	1.186 (0.142)
Constant	0.727 (0.309)	0.189*** (0.565)
Observations	2,555	1,492
Log Likelihood	-1,470.831	-658.003
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,969.662	1,344.006

Note: \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Overall, the analyses presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2 illustrated the importance of input and output factors in determining the levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy among respondents in the United States and Germany. The results showed that both input and output variables are important albeit not all variables are statistically significant. For the United States, Table 4.1 and 4.2 shows that input factors appear to be strong predictors of support for and satisfaction with democracy. Among the input factors, whether or not the respondent cast a ballot for the outgoing government (loser's consent) shows by far the largest effect on support for democracy. This is followed by corruption assessment, subjective representation and the state of the economy. Subjective representation exhibits the largest effect on satisfaction with democracy in the United States. This is closely followed by whether or not the respondent voted for the outgoing government, government performance, corruption assessment and whether or not the individual voted in the elections or not.


The fact that losers' consent has a relatively strong effect on both support for and satisfaction with democracy among Americans is not surprising. Indeed, previous research has shown that the foundation of democratic governance is not whether individuals are allowed to vote during elections but rests on how winners and losers are treated after the elections end (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Losers of elections usually have to accept not only the distasteful outcome but also ratify the electoral process that produced that outcome when they consent to the results. Depending on the type of electoral system within which one resides, one may be treated differently based on the outcome of an election. Scholars (Anderson et al., 2005; Dalberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2014), argue that losers living in majoritarian systems are less supportive of democracy than losers living in mixed or proportional systems. This is because majoritarian systems usually do not make any concessions to losers unlike mixed or proportional systems. Hence, it is not surprising that losers' consent has a strong and statistically significant effect on support for democracy in the US but not in Germany. Furthermore, becoming part of the ruling party or the minority after the conduct of an election usually influences the way citizens view political life. Consequently, it is typical to expect that losers' consent will have a statistically significant effect on citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy.

In Table 4.1 and 4.2, it can be seen that output factors --specifically government performance-- appears to have the most impact on support for and satisfaction with

democracy among respondents from Germany. This is followed by whether or not the respondent voted for the outgoing government, subjective representation and corruption assessment. Oftentimes, individuals living in democratic systems take cues from government performance to evaluate their satisfaction with democracy and studies (Easton, 1975) have shown that long-term dissatisfaction with the performance of government policies can erode support for democracy. Hence, it is not surprising that government performance played a large role in citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy in Germany.

### 4.2.3. Predicted Probabilities for Support and Satisfaction with Democracy

To better understand whether input or output factors play a key role in citizens' support and satisfaction with democracy in the United States and Germany, I first plot predicted probabilities of input variables holding output variables constant at their maximum. Alternately, I do the same thing for output factors holding all input factors constant at their maximum<sup>7</sup>.




**Figure 4.2. Predicted Probabilities for Support for Democracy in the US**  
Source: Author's computation with CSES module 5

<sup>7</sup> Most variables used in this analysis were binary thus, rather than use the mean of the variables, hypothetical situations were used to find out how input and output factors affect support and satisfaction with democracy.

From the figure 4.2, it appears that whether or not a respondent voted for an outgoing government has by far the largest effect on support for democracy. The predicted probability of supporting democracy is 64% for respondents who did not vote for the outgoing government and 81% for those respondents who voted for the outgoing government holding all output predictors at values viewed by respondents as unfavourable (Corruption as high, state of the economy and government performance as bad). This result provides evidence for H1 that the act of voting and not the outcome of an election signifies that respondents support democracy.

It also appears that subjective representation and government performance does not really play a significant role in determining respondents' support for democracy, however this is not so for corruption assessment. The predicted probability of supporting democracy is 68% for respondents who think corruption is low and 57% for those who think corruption is high in the US. This provides evidence for H7. It appears that when respondent evaluate output from the political system, the conduct of elected representatives play a key role in their support for democracy in comparison to government performance.




**Figure 4.3. Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Democracy in the US**  
 Source: Author's computation with CSES module 5

Figure 4.3, continues to lend support to the representation argument. It appears that respondents who voted for the outgoing government in the US are less likely to be satisfied with democracy than those who did not. The figure also indicates that subjective representation and government performance plays a key role in determining citizens' satisfaction with democracy. This provides support to the argument that

satisfaction with democracy is usually dependent on policy outputs of government and whether citizens feel that their views are reflected in what the government does.


Looking at the predicted probabilities, it appears that when respondents in the US are asked about their support for and satisfaction with democracy, different predictors are used and evaluated differently. Whereas all factors (subjective representation, whether or not one cast a vote for an outgoing government, corruption levels and government performance) does matter for support for democracy, it appears that in order to be satisfied with democracy, respondents need to see these predictors in a favourable way. The most influential predictor is whether or not an individual voted for the outgoing government. One explanation for this could be because of the highly competitive nature of the US elections and the fact that their electoral system is majoritarian. Due to this, the extent to which individuals within political systems are satisfied with democracy will somewhat be dependent upon whether or not an individuals' party wins or loses an election. This could explain why voting for the outgoing government appears to be a very influential predictor in explaining citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy in the US.



**Figure 4.4. Predicted Probabilities for Support for Democracy in Germany**  
 Source: Author's computation with CSES module 5

From Figure 4.4, it appears that output factors are the most influential factors in predicting support for democracy in Germany. Respondents' perception on corruption and government performance affects their level of support for democracy. The predicted probability of supporting democracy is 52% for respondents who think corruption is low and 48% for those who think corruption is high in Germany. In addition, the predicted probability of supporting democracy is 49% for respondent who think government is

good and 42% for those who think government performance is bad. This provides evidence for H5. This result provides evidence to buttress the fact that although support for democracy largely stems from its core values, when negative performance indicators are allowed to persist overtime, it has the probability of influencing citizens' support for democracy.



**Figure 4.5. Predicted Probabilities for Satisfaction with Democracy in Germany**  
Source: Author's computation with CSES module 5

From Figure 4.5, it appears that output factors play a significant role in determining satisfaction with democracy in Germany. The predicted probability of satisfaction with democracy is 83% for respondents who think corruption is low and 65% for those who think corruption is high. This provides evidence for H6. Additionally, the predicted probability of satisfaction with democracy is 89% for respondent's who think government performance is good and 57% for those who think government performance is bad. This provides evidence for H5.

In summary, whereas output factors (corruption and government performance) play a significant role in determining Germans support for and satisfaction with democracy. Among respondents from the US, input factors (subjective representation and vote for outgoing government) play a significant role in their support for and satisfaction with democracy. It should be noted that in terms of the somewhat greater effect of subjective representation on support and satisfaction with democracy among respondents from the US, conclusions drawn from this analysis should be interpreted cautiously. This is because the survey question used to measure subjective representation: "is there a party that represents respondent's views" is cognitively closer

to the dependent variables (support for and satisfaction with democracy) than other predictors. Thus, it will be interesting to see how a more indirect measure of subjective representation such as a respondent's self- placement on the left-right scale and their party's objective position on issues maps onto their support for and satisfaction with democracy. This can help to alternatively assess whether or not subjective representation does matter for support for and satisfaction with democracy based on a respondents' level of ideological conformity to their preferred political party. This can be a good avenue for future research and a very helpful way to further explore how subjective representation affects support for and satisfaction with democracy. Lastly it is important to acknowledge the methodological shortcomings of some of my variables which makes a strict cause and effect interpretation of my results a little problematic. For example, although casting a vote might affect support for democracy, there may be instances where respondents' support for and satisfaction with democracy can lead them to cast a vote. This has been acknowledged in some studies (Holmberg, 2014) where voting has been said to be habitual rather than as a means to an end. Future research can test the effect of support and satisfaction with democracy on the decision to vote. The association between some of my variables also makes it difficult to be precise about the cause-effect analysis of my study. For example: when people feel better represented because the elected officials are responsive to their demands and interests, there is a probability that they will support and be satisfied with democracy. Thus, rather than testing how these variables affect support for and satisfaction with democracy, an interesting avenue for future research could be an analysis of how these variables interact to produce an effect on support for and satisfaction with democracy. Example how an interaction between government performance and corruption affect support for and satisfaction with democracy.

#### **4.2.4. Limitations of the study**

There is the need to be cautious in interpreting the conclusions drawn from my research. In order to make accurate causal claims on the causes of support for and satisfaction with democracy, I have to account for omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In terms of omitted variable bias, although I included other independent and control variables in my research that I deemed important for explaining my dependent variables, I cannot be certain that I have accounted for all unobserved factors that might

be related to support for and satisfaction with democracy. Further, the causal direction between some of my independent variables and dependent variables could either run the other way or variables could simply be related but not causally. For instance, although voting in an election might increase satisfaction with democracy, there are instances where individuals do not vote because of prior dissatisfaction. In this case, it may be difficult to actually determine if voting affects satisfaction with democracy or it is the other way round. However, it should be noted that most of my decisions about the direction of causality was based on theoretical knowledge and hence, reverse causality should be minimal<sup>8</sup>.

**Table 4.3. Overview of Hypotheses Tested**

Hypothesis	United States	Germany
H1: Voting in an election positively impacts support and satisfaction with democracy.	Reject	Reject
H2: Voting for a political party that lost the election negatively affects satisfaction with democracy.	Accept <sup>9</sup>	Accept
H3: As interest in politics increases, support for democracy increases.	Reject	Accept
H4: Individuals who identify with political parties are more likely to support and be satisfied with democracy.	Reject	Reject
H5: Subjective feelings of being represented increases support for and satisfaction with democracy	Accept <sup>10</sup>	Accept
H6: Positive perceptions about government performance and the state of the economy increases support for and satisfaction with democracy	Accept <sup>11</sup>	Accept
H7: As corruption increases, support for and satisfaction with democracy decreases	Accept	Accept

---

<sup>8</sup>Quintelier, E. and Van Deth, J.W., 2014. Supporting democracy: Political participation and political attitudes. Exploring causality using panel data. *Political Studies*, 62, pp.153-171

<sup>9</sup> Hypothesis rejected for support for democracy because the relationship was reversed in the case of the US- having cast a vote for losing party increases support for democracy and this result was statistically significant at 0.05

<sup>10</sup> Reject the hypothesis for US as the direction of expected effective was positive but results indicated a negative direction between subjective representation and support for democracy in the US.

<sup>11</sup> State of the economy and government performance does not affect support for democracy in the US

## Chapter 5.

### 5.1. Conclusion

In recent times, evidence of citizens' dissatisfaction with the democracy around the world has been widespread. Although majority of citizens living in democratic countries acknowledge that democracy is the preferred system of governance, many are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in practice. This research investigated the causes of citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy using data from CSES5. The findings indicate that input and output factors do matter for support for and satisfaction with democracy. For the United States, input factors appear to be the strongest predictors of support for and satisfaction with democracy. Among the input factors, whether or not the respondent cast a ballot for the outgoing government (loser's consent) shows by far the largest effect on support for and satisfaction with democracy. Contrastingly, output factors- government performance appear to be the most influential predictor for support and satisfaction with democracy in Germany. Among the output factors, corruption and government performance play a significant role in determining support for and satisfaction with democracy in the US and Germany.

These results provide important empirical findings on the causes of support for and satisfaction with democracy and show that although both input and output factors matter, not all of the factors exhibit equal influence. What I find missing in previous discussions is the impact of the type of electoral system on input factors and how this in turn affects support for and satisfaction with democracy. In established democracies like the US and Germany, the experience of how winners and losers are treated after an election largely affects their support for and satisfaction with democracy. My results suggest that citizens generally support democracy and are satisfied with it when they feel that their representatives and parties will have the opportunity to still influence political decisions despite having lost the election. This finding is important in addressing the representation gap that most democracies face today. Future research could scrutinise my results by using survey data from citizens living under different PR voting systems to find out the extent to which losers' consent affect support for and satisfaction with democracy. This is because although proportional system does make concessions

to losers of elections, there might be a scenario where winners of elections in PR systems are rather dissatisfied with democracy because of these concessions.

My results also have some practical implications for the output side of the political system. While my results indicates that citizens' support for and satisfaction with democracy is largely dependent on the ability of the government "to get things done" - government performance, the large impact of corruption assessments tells me that citizens also care about the quality of government institutions. Although corruption may mean different things to different people, research (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008) has shown that at least among democracies corruption is perceived in similar manner. Thus, political actors and institutions should bear in mind that although citizens care about the quality of public goods and services, these should not be provided for to the detriment of democratic procedures.

The operationalisation of the dependent variables- support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy also made it possible to sieve through the respondents to find out if they knew what support and satisfaction entailed rather than the usual lip service paid to democratic questions because the word "democracy" is mentioned. The results indicated that contrary to the popular assertion, citizens had good knowledge on what democracy entailed. Rather than just supporting democracy, I found out that citizens associated support for democracy with principles such as tolerance, compromise, rule of law and the belief that power resides with the people. The association of support for democracy with these core values could explain why support for democracy in advanced countries such as US and Germany remains robust despite short to medium term challenges faced by their government.

Lastly, in relation to the recent debates about whether or not citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy is a threat or an asset to representative democracy, my analysis reveals that the conclusions may not be a one-size-fit-all approach. From my analysis, citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy may be a threat to representative democracy. This is because dissatisfied democrats tended to be those who are young, not interested in politics and do not identify with any political party which are usually the conduit upon which representative democracy revolves.

## References

- Aarts K and Thomassen J, 2008 Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter? *Electoral Studies* 27(1): 5–18.
- Alexander, A.C. and Welzel, C., 2017. *The myth of deconsolidation: Rising liberalism and the populist reaction* (No. 10). ILE Working Paper Series.
- Almond, G. and Verba, S. 1963. *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
- Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory 1997. Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. *American Political Science Review* 91(1): 66–81
- Anderson, C. J., Blais, A., Bowler, S., Donovan, T. and Listhaug, O. 2005. *Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Booth, J. A. and Seligson, M. A. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, M. and Mattes, R., 2001. Support for Democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), pp.447-4
- Ceka, B. and Magalhaes 2019. Do the Rich and the Poor Have Different Conceptions of Democracy? Socioeconomic Status, Inequality, and the Political Status Quo. *Comparative Politics* 1-18
- Dahlberg, S., Linde, J. and Holmberg, S., 2015. Democratic discontent in old and new democracies: Assessing the importance of democratic input and governmental output. *Political Studies*, 63(1\_suppl), pp.18-37
- Dalton, R. (2016, May 09). Party Identification and Its Implications. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. Retrieved 21 May. 2020, from <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-72>
- Dalton, R. J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Doorenspleet, R. 2012. Critical Citizens, Democratic Support and Satisfaction in African Democracies. *International Political Science Review*, 33 (3), 279–300
- Easton, D., 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley

- Easton, D. 1975. 'A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support', *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (4), 435–457.
- Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Collins. 2020. "The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020." Cambridge, United Kingdom: Centre for the Future of Democracy.
- Foa, R.S. and Mounk, Y., 2019. Democratic Deconsolidation in Developed Democracies, 1995–2018. In *Harvard Center for European Studies Open Forum*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
- Foa, R. S. and Mounk, Y. 2016. The danger of deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 27(3) pp. 05-17.
- Fukuyama, F. 1992. The end of history and the last man. *Op. cit*, pp.49-50.
- Fuks, M., Paulino, R.O. and Casalecchi, G.A., 2018. Socialization and Political Regimes: the Impact of Generation on Support for Democracy in Latin America. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 12(1).
- Hobolt, S.B., 2012. Citizen satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50, pp.88-105
- Holmberg, S. 2014. 'Feeling Policy Represented' Edited in J. Thomassen. *Elections and Democracy: Representation and Accountability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 132–52.
- Huntington, S.P., 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S.P., 1991. Democracy's third wave. *Journal of democracy*, 2(2), pp.12-34
- Linde, J. and Ekman, J. 2003. Satisfaction with Democracy: A Note on a Frequently Used Indicator in Comparative Politics. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (3) pp 391–408
- Linz, J.J, and Stepan, A., 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. JHU Press
- Moreno, A., and Lagos, M. 2016. *Latin America: the modest dividend of growing up democratic*. In: *Growing up democratic: does it make a difference?* Edited by Denmark, D; Mattes, R., and Niemi, R. Boulder- Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 26-63.
- Mounk, Y., 2018. *The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it*. Harvard University Press.

- Norris, P., 2017. Is Western democracy backsliding? Diagnosing the risks. *The Journal of Democracy, Web Exchange*.
- Norris, P., 2011. *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. Cambridge University Press
- Owen, A.L., Videras, J. and Willemsen, C., 2008. Democracy, participation, and life satisfaction. *Social science quarterly*, 89(4), pp.987-1005
- Pennings, P., 2017. When and where did the great recession erode the support of democracy? *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 11(1), pp.81-103.
- Plattner, M.F., 2010. Democracy's Past and Future: Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(1), pp.81-92
- Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. 2008. What is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions. *Governance*, 21 (2), 165–90.
- Scharpf, F.W., 1999. *Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic?* Oxford University Press.
- Voeten, E., 2017. Are people really turning away from democracy? *The Journal of Democracy, Web Exchange*.
- Warren, M.E., 1999. 'Democratic theory and trust', in M.E. Warren (ed.) *Democracy and trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Wegrich, K. and Hammerschmid, G., 2018. *A comparative overview of public administration characteristics in the EU28*. (pdf). Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union. Available at: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ae181e42-9601-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1> (Accessed on May 05, 2020).

## Appendix A. Countries

	USA (3570)	Germany (1848)
<b>Dependent Variable</b>		
<i>Strong democrats</i>	1723	1010
<i>Dissatisfied democrats</i>	884	329
<i>Utility satisficers</i>	663	334
<i>Autocrats</i>	300	170
<b>Independent Variables (Input)</b>		
<i>Interest in Politics</i>		
Yes	2535	1516
No	1035	332
<i>Voted</i>		
Yes	2713	1552
No	857	296
<i>Voted for losing party</i>		
Yes	1749	1090
No	1821	758
<i>Subjective feelings of being represented</i>		
Yes	2106	1053
No	1464	795
<i>Party Id</i>		
Yes	1964	758
No	1606	1090
<b>Independent Variables (Output)</b>		
<i>Government Performance</i>		
Good	1642	1257
Bad	1928	591
<i>State of the economy</i>		
Worse	928	185
Stayed the same	1321	961
Better	1321	702
<i>Corruption assessment</i>		
High	2606	1053
Low	964	795

Source: CSES Module 5 (Restricted Sample)

## Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	United States				Germany			
	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev
Support for democracy	0	1	0.729	0.445	0	1	0.73	0.450
Satisfaction with democracy	0	1	0.668	0.471	0	1	0.73	0.440
Political interest	0	1	0.713	0.453	0	1	0.796	0.403
Voted	0	1	0.762	0.426	0	1	0.837	0.370
Voted for outgoing incumbent	0	1	0.485	0.62	0	1	0.590	0.490
Subjective Representation	0	1	0.585	0.493	0	1	0.570	0.500
Party id	0	1	0.551	0.497	0	1	0.410	0.490
Government performance	0	1	0.458	0.498	0	1	0.680	0.470
State of the economy	0	2	1.1	0.79	0	2	1.290	0.630
Corruption assessment	0	1	0.73	0.444	0	1	0.570	0.50
Age	18	90	49.5	17.6	18	95	51.4	18.40
Gender	0	1	1.54	0.504	0	1	1.48	0.500
Marital status	1	4	1.96	1.23	1	4	1.81	1.22
Trade union membership	0	1	0.084	0.277	0	1	0.12	0.328

Source: CSES Module 5 (Restricted Sample)

## Appendix C- Question Wording

Support for democracy

Q04. >>> Internal efficacy

Text: Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following statements:

*Q04a. What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles?*

*Q04e. Having a strong leader in government is good for [country] even if the leader bends the rules to get things done.*

*Q04f. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.*

*Q05b. The will of the majority should always prevail, even over the rights of minorities.*

Satisfaction with Democracy

Q21. >>> Satisfaction with democratic process

Text: on the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?

Corruption Assessment

Q07. >>> How widespread is corruption

Text: how widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is among politicians in [country]: very widespread, quite widespread, not very widespread, or it hardly happens at all?

Government Performance

Q09. >>> Government performance: general

Now thinking about the performance of the [government in [capital]/president] in general, how good or bad a job do you think the [government/president in [capital]] did over the past [number of years since last government took office, before the current election] years? Has [it/he/she] done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job?

State of the Economy

Q11. >>> State of economy

Text: would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in [country] has gotten much better, gotten somewhat better, stayed about the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten much worse?

Subjective Representation

Q10a. >>> Is there a party that represents respondent's views

Text: would you say that any of the parties in [country] represent your views reasonably well? Yes/no

Interest in Politics

Q01. >>> Political interest

Text: How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, or not at all interested?

Party Identification

Q22a. >>> Are you close to any political party?

Text: do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?

1. Yes -> go to q22c

5. No

Vote

Q13a. >>> Previous election: did respondent cast a ballot? 1. Respondent cast a ballot 5. Respondent did not cast a ballot

Losers' Consent

Q13d. >>>Previous election: did respondent cast a vote for the outgoing incumbent? 0. Did not vote for the outgoing government (incumbent) 1. Voted for the outgoing government (incumbent)

Age

D01b. >>> Date of birth of respondent – year

Gender

D01c >>>Gender

1. Male
2. Female

Marital Status

D04. >>> Marital or civil union status

1. Married or living together as married
2. Widowed
3. Divorced or separated (married but separated / not living with legal spouse)
4. Single, never married
7. Volunteered: refused
8. Volunteered: don't know
9. Missing

## Union Membership

D05. >>> Union membership

Notes: this item should indicate whether or not the respondent is a member of a union.

1. R is member of a union
2. R is not a member of a union
7. Volunteered: refused
8. Volunteered: don't know
9. Missing

## Income

D09. >>> Household Income

Notes: this item should report the annual household income for the respondent's household. In previous modules of the cses, we asked that this variable be provided in quintiles.