Toward an Understanding of Dreams as Mythological and Cultural-Political Communication

by

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Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the
School of Communication
Faculty of Communication, Art and Technology

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Spring 2020

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Abstract

The central argument of this dissertation is that the significance of both myths and dreams, as framed by cultural politics, is not reducible to polarities of truth or falsehood, or superstition in opposition to science. It is the socio-political webs that myths and dreams often weave that this dissertation explores. Along the way, it addresses an absence of literature that unburdens myths and dreams of the conventional requirement of being true. The dissertation ultimately contributes to a more complete comprehension of the capacity of these phenomena to act as largely unconscious catalysts for cultural political developments.

To support my argument, I tell a story about the relationships between dreams and myth as they affect cultural politics. This story can be told in many different ways; in fact I found that multiple iterations were required to demonstrate the connection. The narrative also needs supporting elements to tell it coherently. In this spirit, the introduction and opening chapter sketch historical approaches to the study of dreams and myth, before providing an overview of these phenomena as they affected people living in Berlin during the Nazi seizure of power. Also included are adumbrations of psychological frameworks required to make sense of this process.

With the table thus set, the method of telling the story involves several steps. The first is to show a relationship between dreams and cultural politics. Chapter Two does this from the perspectives of Holy Grail literature, shamanism, Nazism, and psychoanalysis. The next step requires demonstrations of cultural political connections to myth; Chapter Three accomplishes this in its examination of the Thousand Year Reich, Voodoo, and digital technology. The diversity of these examples is deliberate, setting the stage for Chapter Four, which shows that, even in the opposing keys of religion and science, dreams have connected to myth and this connection has, in turn, influenced cultural politics.

Having established the link between dreams, myth and cultural politics, the last portion of the dissertation details the apparently prognostic dreams of Germans living under Nazi oppression, connecting their visions to Nazi myth and subsequent political developments. I then refer these dreams to the psychological frameworks introduced in the first chapter as a means of analyzing the visions, and of answering the question of the dreams’ ability to prognosticate. The dissertation concludes with a review of evidence and establishes the value of understanding dreams and myths in upholding prevailing culture patterns.

Key Words: Dream; Myth; Culture; Prognostication; Nazi; Ideology; Psychology; Beradt
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to acknowledge everyone who has dreamed and wondered what their dreams mean. History is full of these dreamers and I say thanks to all of them. Without this universal interest my work on dreams—and their associated myths—would be meaningless. My indebtedness here is boundless, from dreamers of past ages powerless to act on their dreams to those whose dreams became expressions of unbridled power—my hope is that this work may serve as some small recompense. Thanks to those whose dreams expressed desperate plights, religious ecstasy and political prognostication. Your night visions made it possible to create a work whose scope spans thousands of years.

I would like to thank three family members in particular for their encouragement over many years. My mother, Roberta Fischer, offered support through my misspent youth when things went so seriously astray that completing high school, never mind a doctorate, seemed unlikely. I would also like to thank my uncle, Jim Skinner, for his sage advice, patience, and spiritual teachings that he has offered me since I was a boy. And all the love and support from my sister, Jayna Carter, helped me through numerous rough patches. All of this was crucial in surviving a stretch of challenging years. I would never have made it this far without you Mom, Jayna and Uncle Jim!

Of course, none of this would have been possible without the unwavering support of my supervisory team: Gary McCarron, Jerry Zaslove and Martin Laba. It took me a year to settle on a topic for this dissertation; the guidance you provided in formative stages of this project, Gary, was invaluable. Without your advice in the directed study course that you worked through with me, formulating the ideas so foundational to this work would have bordered on the impossible. Jerry, as the project progressed, the direction that you and Gary provided widened the scope of my thinking while keeping things on track. Thank you so much for that, as well as the extensive reading list that you provided for me. I would also like to thank my colleagues, Alberto Lusoli and the late Peter Zuurbier; working on academic projects with you guys was so important in putting my ideas to the test.

Finally, my love, Cathy Morgan, back in my life after a long absence, I knew all those years ago that you saw in me the potential for a work such as this one. Thanks for believing in me and thanks for being here just when things are about to get interesting.
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“Black Dream, you come when sleep comes, sweet god, truly dreadful agony.”

-Sappho
Myth, Mystery and Political Dreams: Setting the Stage

Starting the Conversation about Dreams

Dreams are exotic natural phenomena. Bizarre, terrifying and delightful, they have remained a puzzle throughout history. Yet the subject of dreams has waxed and waned as a field of serious exploration over the centuries. The topic appears to have gained momentum in recent years, with publications devoted to various aspects of dreaming currently in vogue. Concerns such as the dreams of famous authors, lucid dreaming (the awareness of being in a dream state) and the cultural importance of dreams have crept out of the umbra cast by a tacit, centuries-old understanding that dreams have nothing important to tell us. The publication of such works has re-opened the door to various ways of asking questions about long-forgotten dreams. For example, in 2014, historians Ann Marie Plane and Leslie Tuttle reviewed literature indicating that dreams could have influenced political developments in early modern England (pp. 926). And, in his work, *Irrationality: A history of the dark side of reason*, historian Justin Smith (2019) scours decades-old scholarship debating whether dreams are best consigned to social peripheries, as they arguably have been in the West since Descartes, or if they are meant to play a larger role in shaping a society’s “culture-pattern” (pp. 94-98), or shared myth. Contesting this point is of crucial importance, as it sets up additional questions and arguments about how we live our lives. The inquiry is potentially an eternal one, and related queries such as the four that follow provide an idea about the nature of the dispute: Can a culture exist without dreams? Is there such a thing as culture without myth? Can dreams and myth become political? What does science tell us about dreams?

All of these questions are pivotal. But before approaching them, a short description of the relationship between dreams and myth is required. Frequently, the connection is tight enough that separating the two phenomena strikes us as an exercise in futility. Questions about where the myth ends and the dream begins might be raised with legitimacy; tales we consider mythical often embrace a dreamlike feeling. For instance, the myth might involve a suspension of physical reality by granting flight to human beings, such as the ambitious Icarus, or introduce terrifying monsters like the banshee, or vengeful gods such as Shiva.
These figures inspire wonder, horror and religious awe. Their origins remain a matter of debate, but their dominance and prestige tell a compelling story. At various historical points reverence for these entities has attained powerful heights. Whether describing a legal code, explaining the existence of the universe or emphasizing a moral point, the beings that inhabit these tales command, or have commanded, respect and obedience. In some cases, such as the god of the Pentateuch, their word was absolute.

As faith gave way to reason, the power of these figures greatly diminished. The notion of power, of course, did not diminish—nor did its representation in fantastic guises. The dream has kept alive mythical monsters, gods and heroes. We still conjure mystical scenes and end up in situations in night visions that are shocking, pleasant and confusing. These visions have the ability to evoke heightened emotion, the ‘unreal’ dimension of dreams possessing the power to slip past our rational minds. The demon we see in our nightmare disappears as soon as we wake up, but the terror lingers for a while. Is the demon solely a nonsensical image that tells us nothing that we need to know? Or does it represent a mysterious part of our personality that we would rather not decode? Whatever the answer, a powerful narrative exists. We can tell ourselves that we are not really at risk from a Minotaur or cyclops devouring us once we know that the scene is ‘only’ a dream. Still, the myth has found its place in our dreams. And the sway that mythical creatures hold over us in those torturous moments of our dreamlives cannot be denied.

Does the power narrative end once we have woken up? Political history might offer some clues, as politics in ancient cultures often merged with the myths of the day. The idea that the political ruler could be divine found purchase in Egypt (Callender, 2003, pp. 140-141) and Rome (Suetonius, 1979, p. 1), for example. But this connection is not restricted to the ancient world. Qualities normally associated with gods, such as the power to be free from error, remain connected to Catholic popes in the form of papal infallibility (Cheetham, 1983, pp. 265-266). More generally, the actions of various powerful actors have shown the world both waking dreams and nightmares. And it is critical to highlight the dynamics of power as dreams and myth bleed into one another. In simplest terms, the following pages describe a shift from the metaphor of dreams and myth into concrete political reality.

Because dreams are irrational and easily forgotten, it is rare that we take a close look at them. Rarer still is insight into the power of another dreamer’s dream. To attribute to
dreams the commencement of political developments perhaps seems naïve, with such dreamy ascription better suited to artistic pursuits. But if we can recall our own most vivid nightscapes and the way they made us feel, it represents no stretch to connect these potent visions to the most influential actors in history. To the extent that dreams are universal, humanity has not become fully rational; indeed irrationality rules much of our sleeping hours. Again, the question arises: does the irrational dream conclude upon waking? The mythological bearing so many world-altering figures have displayed allows us to answer ‘no,’ with confidence. This fact obtains not only for idiosyncratic political figures, but for many dedicated to scientific reason.

Such an assertion about scientists might appear preposterous. Yet the connection of dreams to the scientific mind is an intimate one. But before considering that link, it is important to examine what current science tells us about dreams. The most important scientific dream discovery came at the hands of Eugene Aserinsky and his University of Chicago supervisor, Nathaniel Kleitman, with their revelation of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep in 1953. That year, the 30 year-old Aserinsky, then a struggling graduate student, attached electrodes to the head of his sleeping eight year-old son, Armond. With the boy’s head wired to a polygraph machine, a connected printout showed only slight undulations. The youngster’s eyes were still. Suddenly, the readout scribbled the fluctuating marks indicative of someone in a waking state. Aserinsky soon recruited additional test subjects, noting that the pattern of polygraph motion repeated itself several times a night for each sleeper. Moreover, just as the sleepers’ printouts became active, the test subjects’ eyes would begin to move. When Aserinsky woke his volunteers from REM sleep and asked them whether they were dreaming, they reported that, yes, they were (Robb, 2018, pp. 41-46). Knowing when we dream, along with the basic mechanics of the process, opened doors for other discoveries such as the fact that dreams do not occur solely during REM sleep; this state merely provides the best circumstances for our night visions to take shape (Hobson, 2002, p. 35).

As impressive as these revelations are, some tend, prematurely, to describe the dream in absolute terms. In the words of dream scientist Alan Hobson, “dreaming has no particular function in and of itself. As conscious experience, dreaming is nothing but an occasional awareness of brain activation in sleep” (p. 45). Hobson also holds that “the most
radical assertion of modern dream science” is that dreaming and waking states are different forms of consciousness dependent on changes in brain chemistry (p. 58). Such a claim links to broader changes in scientific understanding of dreams, specifically that the most important aspect of studying dreams is their form, rather than their content (pp. 1-2). And, while a dream’s content maintains a legitimate place, the scientist’s approach rejects any understanding of a dream not anchored in physiology (p. 30). Most important for Hobson are his conclusions that dreams are connected to shifts in activation of the brain, that we process sensory motor functions and emotional information when we dream, and that this process involves chemical changes in the brain (pp. 142-143).

We have known for decades that dreaming is crucial to memory storage in most species of mammals (Stevens, 1995, pp. 93-96). The process involves brain components, known as hippocampi, which, during sleep, “probably” serve as the constituent part that allows us to form long-term memories (Hobson, 2002, pp. 117-118). The procedure our brains use to select which memories to keep and which to discard, however, remains obscure (Windt, 2018, p. 25). Yet the connection between dreams and memory has continued to reveal itself over the past twenty years. Research published in 2000 shows that dreams can help us recall old information to master new skills (Robb, 2018, p. 65); dreams can also help us to identify patterns (pp. 84-85), and to foster original lines of thought (p. 87). Moreover, science has linked the dream process to acting as a sort of rehearsal space for tackling unpleasant waking realities. The most commonplace emotional states dreamers encounter are guilt, fear, anxiety and helplessness; dreams offer us a low-stakes framework in which to prepare for the worst. According to this evolutionary psychological approach, dreams set up trial runs of life and death situations for dreamers in prehistoric times; the aggressive and primeval images that still populate our dreams support the theory (Robb, pp. 103-104).

Connections between dreams and mental health also have been made. The link between sleep and a healthy emotional bearing is not fully understood, but studies of both children and elderly people have shown that the risk of suicide rises in the absence of proper sleep. Moreover, some scientists insist that a relationship exists between the degeneration of sleeping and dreaming patterns and depression. And depressed dreamers experience as much as a forty percent drop in dream recall, with the dreams they do remember characterized by dullness of colour, low emotional content, and a small number of people
in each dream frame. REM patterns of depressed people differ from those in healthy states of mind, tending toward over-activity in the rational sectors of the brain and potentially causing harm to the dream process. Further, the dreams of those who are depressed move in a pattern of low emotional intensity toward more nightmare-like scenarios with each REM cycle; the pattern is reversed for those enjoying favourable mental health states (pp. 112-114). Dream science also shows that dreams can be instrumental in helping those who have had traumatic experiences recover from them by contextualizing the trauma with survival-based images or storylines (p. 122).

Some scientific observation of dream processes defy neat cause and effect narratives. For example, a study of the dreams of those who suffer from migraine headaches showed that the night visions that the headache-sufferers beheld prior to the onset of their respective migraines depicted violence, fear, and anger, often placing the dreamers in unmanageable situations. These themes were less likely to arise in the dreams of those who did not suffer from migraines. Still, researchers were unable to determine whether the nightmares that took place ahead of the headaches were associated with the cause or effect of the migraines (p. 135). A tighter connection between cause and effect has been revealed in studies that examine the dreams of people who often repress unfavourable emotions. Such people exhibit a tendency to connect emotive states to memories when they dream; avoiding negative emotional states during the day is linked to experiencing these very states in sleep. The psychological term for this process is the dream-rebound effect (p. 149).

Recent scientific advances in relation to dreams could owe a share of their progress to the wide availability of the Internet. As science journalist Alice Robb (2018) writes, research on dreams in the 20th Century generally featured Caucasian university students as subjects. Increasing online access over the last decade-and-a-half has seen “people of all ages from around the world…uploading their dreams to websites like Dreamboard and DreamCloud, and scientists are beginning to unpack the treasure-troves of data within” (p. 7). This scientific beginning stands in stark contrast to the declaration that Hobson (2002) made at the outset of the 21st Century that “the study of dreaming can be seen as a crucial part of a much larger project, one that will shake the foundations of philosophy, psychology and psychiatry” (emphasis in original) (p. 142). As valuable as many of the recent discoveries listed above surely are, it seems that a wide chasm remains between those
disclosures and the mastery that Hobson asserted that neurobiology was set to exert over the study of dreams nearly two decades ago (p. 142). Science, as yet, does not dominate the dream.

As the pages below demonstrate, the bond between dreams and culture remains strong. Poets, novelists, religious figures, musicians and scientists have all depended upon dreams. Paul McCartney and Beethoven are examples. McCartney credited dream inspiration as the impetus for the renowned song, *Yesterday* (Robb, 2018, p. 93), and in a letter dated September 10, 1821, Beethoven explains to fellow composer Tobias Haslinger that a dream had inspired the religious images associated with a canon he was writing (Solomon, 1975, pp.122-123). Of course, this is something of a romantic notion; much that is significant in any culture stems not from the ethereal magic of a dream, but from the dedication of a writer, musician or scientist to their craft and the task at hand. McCartney (2019) himself still discusses the hard work of writing songs, emphasizing the importance of a partnership with the late John Lennon, rather than crediting night visions for the Beatles’ catalogue. Still, the present work assumes a historical perspective in assessing the dream’s value to a given culture; in many cases the dream’s power is immense. And, in examining various histories, dreams quickly butt up against the cultural myth. The reader’s acceptance or refusal to accept this relationship perhaps can be deferred to a place further ahead in the work.

**The Ubiquitous Myth**

For the moment, I am going to suggest that the myth is a cultural pillar in its own right. Myths frame our every move. To make a start on establishing my meaning, the work of anthropologist I. M. Lewis will be useful. In the West, the idea of myth is associated with that which rejects rationality and frequently equals untruth. Often mystical approaches become linked to myth. In his book, *Ecstatic Religion*, Lewis (1975) writes that “mystical experience, like any other experience, is grounded in and must relate to the social environment in which it is achieved. It inevitably bears the stamp of the culture and society in which it arises” (p. 16). Whether one approaches a given phenomenon anthropologically, as Lewis does, or considers the same thing through mythological lenses as in the present
work, society remains the arbiter of what is believable. Today myths become believable when garbed in the latest scientific approach. For example, in the instance of religion, the “dreary progress of secularism” has rendered the application of many belief systems obsolete, especially as they have been eclipsed by psychology (p. 20). Right away in our discussion of myth, then, we see a trade-off: religion fades in the face of the ascendant myth of secularism (that secularism is a myth is discussed below). Such a payoff implies power relations; Lewis offers the case of Scientologists competing with psychiatric narratives over dominion of conscience, personality and thought (p. 20).

Of course, questions of power relative to myth often materialize in socio-economic terms. In the Zambesi Valley of Zambia, men of Tonga ethnicity had, for decades, worked for European Colonialists. With a British socio-economic system forced upon them (“Encyclopedia Britannica,” n. d.), male Tonga valley-dwellers often sold their labour after long migrations to urban centres, while women remained in the valley. City luxuries became items of desire for women confined to rural dwellings. Spirit possession of the valley women soon became common, with the spirits demanding gifts from the city, like stylish clothing and sophisticated food, as the price for peaceably departing. Such was not the case with highland Tonga women. The men of that society did not venture from home for long stretches; men and women otherwise lived on an essentially equal socio-economic footing. In this society, possession at the hands of marginal spirits seldom occurred; when it did happen, the spirits seemed to prefer men and women equally (Lewis, pp. 97-98). Here we see that power and myth here are obvious bedfellows: spirits intercede where commodities are missing.

Such a relationship should not be considered a primitive or an ill-informed approach. For centuries, the myth of magic spells, charms and amulets served throughout Europe as protection against catastrophe. The Enlightenment era saw marked changes to these beliefs, but not without a replacement for magic. And this process took place only to the extent that the world submitted to greater predictability and control. Developing in 14th Century Italy, and spreading to England two hundred years later, marine insurance helped protect merchants’ investments against the dangers of travel by sea. The insurance system had become more streamlined by 1720, when two London-based marine underwriting firms formed; other forms of insurance coverage also developed at that time (Thomas, 1973, pp.
Cultural historian, Keith Thomas (1973) writes that, in England, the 18th Century “saw the launching of pioneer insurance schemes by industrial firms for their employees and the proliferation of working-class friendly societies. Nothing did more to reduce the sphere in which magical remedies were the only form of protection against misfortune” (p. 782). In a dynamic of similar structure to the spirit-demands associated with Tonga women from the Zambesi Valley, a mythical talisman had to be invoked to ensure the safe transfer of goods. That the need was underscored by a shift in modes of security is of little importance. Despite policies grounded in statistical certainty, insurance policy holders have regularly been disappointed by spotty coverage and poor payouts just as surely as those who depended upon magic for their security were disappointed.

Examples of myth as being interwoven with society can be multiplied; indeed, the pages below exhibit their share. At this point then, a marker is laid down that culture cannot exist without supporting myths. Perhaps the examples just given will convince the reader. Or the case may be that even the work’s discussions regarding science and myth will have the opposite effect, motivating the reader reject the connection as unfounded. Still, I think that even the most determined skeptic will be hard pressed to reject the relationship wholesale. But the web is still more intricate, and the links throughout this work prod repeatedly at situations that postulate a connection between dreams, myth and politics. An ancient example sets the tone.

In Herodotus’ (1972) great volume, The Histories, we learn that the Persian king Cyrus dreamed, while on a military campaign, that Darius—the eldest son of one of his generals, Hystaspes—had grown wings: one wing casting a shadow over Europe, the other over Asia. Cyrus interpreted the dream to mean that Darius was plotting against him. Cyrus interrogated Hystaspes and demanded that he bring Darius to him from Persia at the conclusion of the war. Herodotus tells us, however, that Cyrus was grievously wrong in his understanding of the dream, writing that “the real meaning of the dream was not as he supposed: rather it was sent by God to warn him of his death then and there, and of the ultimate succession of Darius to the throne” (pp. 82-83). Setting aside questions of what possible good it could have done Cyrus to know what was about to happen if he was powerless to change it, as presumably the hand of god would have ordained, more pressing questions of dreams, myth and politics assail us here.
Shortly after the dream, Cyrus’ twenty-nine-year reign ended when he was killed in battle (p. 84). Cyrus’ son, Cambyses, held the throne for seven-and-a-half-years (p. 181) before Darius took it over. Prior to this eventuality, five other contestants vied with Darius for the kingship, and “they proposed to mount their horses on the outskirts of the city, and he whose horse neighed first after the sun was up should have the throne” (p. 189). Perhaps in a prelude to the underhanded reputation Darius would soon acquire, two accounts exist referring to the unfair tricks employed by one of Darius’ confederates in sexually manipulating the future ruler’s horse to ensure that he won the contest. We also learn from Herodotus that, despite a clear sky, at the moment of Darius’ ascendancy, “there was a flash of lightning and a clap of thunder, as if it were a sign from heaven; the election of Darius was assured” (pp. 189-190). The dream and the divine signal worked to form Darius’ personal myth, providing a narrative within which to weave the king’s frailties. The king ruled for thirty-six years (p. 373), his armies invaded Egypt (p. 190), then captured Samos (pp. 208-210) and Babylon, and then sent an expedition into Scythia (pp. 215-217). But it was not the foreign wars for which Darius became best known. Following consolidation of power, the ruler erected statues memorializing the deceit by which he became king and then insisted on subject lands paying him fixed tributes—a practice that his predecessors eschewed. In connection with these actions and other financial irregularities, Darius earned himself the reputation among his subjects as a profiteer (p. 191). The reputation seems well-earned, as Herodotus goes to some length in describing the extensive taxes that the various jurisdictions paid to Darius’ coffers (pp. 191-193).

How widely known Cyrus’ dream of Darius was and how Persians themselves might have interpreted it remains unclear. But Darius’ father Hystaspes knew about it, so did Herodotus; that it could have been understood generally as a metaphor for a power grab, as Cyrus originally viewed it, seems reasonable. A myth, then, begins to emerge of Darius’ association with the dream, his subsequent deception in gaining the throne and later aggrandizement of the act, coupled with the apparent divine sanction indicated by the thunderclap at his selection as monarch. Critical mythical elements were present; indeed, as Albert Camus (1991) avers, “[m]yths are made for the imagination to breathe life into them” (p. 120). A dream, always fuzzy in occurrence, recollection, and interpretation, was understood by the dreamer in this case to refer to a future political act—though one that
took place further in the future and under different circumstances than initially imagined. Here the link between dream, myth and politics is joined by a relationship to time. The idea that dreams might look ahead stretches the boundaries of logic, though the notion has rarely been absent from considerations of dreams. Even today, many people suspect that such a connection is possible.

The existence of such a phenomenon can be tested only with supporting evidence. It is my hope that, in instances where the present work suggests a relationship between dreams, time, myth and their political ramifications, that the evidence supports the claim. Without revealing too much prematurely, this connection features most prominently in dreams of people living in Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Here I do not wish to occupy an unnecessarily large space in discussing my methods of evidence gathering and analysis. Again, to defer to Camus: “methods imply metaphysics; unconsciously they disclose conclusions that they often claim not to know yet” (p. 11). For the record, the project includes no field research segment; with the exception of a few conversations, all of the texts have come from the library. The process has been methodical. Research has included focused efforts in turning up specific theoretical works in the fields of dreams, mythology, history and psychology. Selection of appropriate works has depended upon a process of developing an understanding of the links between dreams and myth and their relationship to the political sphere. A central research question is posed in the opening chapter, followed by two more questions in subsequent chapters. A complete set of dream analyses, as comprehended by differing theories, rounds out the methodological approach.

Synopsis of Chapters

Chapter I— The Story Begins: History, Politics and Psychology Converge on Dreams and Myth

The histories of both dreams and myth are so enormous that they defy description. To tell a complete story about either phenomenon lies beyond the capability of the present work. Yet a narrative must emerge and, to develop even the most basic storyline, a connection between these experiences must be posited. To achieve this, the opening
chapter poses the following question: *What is the relationship between two phenomena of esoteric knowledge: dreams and myth?* To begin, the chapter dives into the oldest known dreams, historicizing them and connecting them to various cultures. The narrative then explores dreams in later historical periods before turning to a similar historical examination of mythical literature. Dreams connect with myth in various places throughout the chapter, and link directly in a bleak political statement about Nazism. Before being forced to flee Germany because of her Jewish heritage, journalist Charlotte Beradt interviewed hundreds of Germans about their dreams as the Nazis forced their stranglehold on the country during the 1930s. It is in this place that a lethal ideological connection between dreams and myth emerges. Finally, the chapter offers an overview of Freudian and Jungian approaches to understanding the psychology of both dreams and myth.

**Chapter II—The Dream's Cultural and Political Horizon**

The present work’s attempt to discover a political link between dreams and myth will, in large measure, hinge on the set of dreams that Charlotte Beradt collected through the interview process. But “dream” must be defined before tackling Beradt’s files. An examination of dreams as cultural phenomena also must be made, and the assertions made above about dreams’ connection to ideology require further demonstration. To this end, Chapter 2 will examine a diverse set of dreams. Beginning with dreams as narrated in a segment of the Holy Grail cycle, the chapter will show that powerful institutions can use dreams to achieve ideological ends. The theme gains support from research on visions associated with Amazonian shamanism, an overview of different sorts of dreams present in Nazi Germany, and the role of the psychoanalytic profession in managing dreams. Primary volumes will include *The Quest of the Holy Grail* (1986), Hall and Nordby’s (1972) *The Individual and his Dreams*, and Beradt’s (1968) *Third Reich of Dreams*.

**Chapter III—I Always Tell the Truth, Even when I Lie**

This section will define myth, describing it as a guiding social principle connected to a power structure. This specification is crucial for this work, as convoluted mythical patterns
defined the formation of the Nazi myth of the Thousand Year Reich. The Nazi myth drew upon an eschatology that was “a debased imitation of pagan traditions that allowed the possibility of a final disaster without any prospect of future renewal” (Gray, 2008, p. 67). For the purpose of maintaining the myth of the Thousand Year Reich, Nazi gestures and symbols functioned to engender a process of Fascist sense-making. Such tactics underscore the notion that imperatives of social coherence often motivate people to orient themselves toward the predominant myth of the times (Aldwinckle, 1996, p. 2) (Dardel, 1996, p. 85) (Priest, 1970, pp. 49-50). Myth as a governing ideological reality extracted horrific costs during the time of Nazi ascendency, the despotic power of fascism propping up the myth of the Thousand Year Reich for more than a decade.

But a cultural analysis of myth requires more than a direct look at the ways in which it was manipulated in Nazi Germany. Additional cultural-political myths will include those that underpinned the Voodoo Revolution in Haiti, as well as the myth of digital technology. Both highlight the idea of a foundational myth as necessary to achieve certain ideological ends. In all of these cases the myth presents as truth, even as it lies. Crucial texts in this chapter are Norman Cohn’s (1961) *Pursuit of the Millennium*, Vincent Mosco’s (2004) *The Digital Sublime*, and M.S. Laguerre’s (1989). *Voodoo and Politics in Haiti*.

**Chapter IV—Dream and Myth: The Nocturnal Vision Merges with Living Legend**

Description of any relationships between dreams and myth will require a solid frame of reference. That contextualization takes place in Chapter 4, with the following question serving to guide the process: *how does the relationship between dreams and myth concretize itself politically?* The section begins with examples taken from various religious traditions as a means of historicizing the wide-ranging circumstances in which this relationship obtains. The chapter’s main focus, however, aims at the powerful workings of Rene Descartes’ mind. I assert in Chapter 1 that Descartes’ dreams of November 10, 1619 helped usher in a secular era, despite the philosopher’s conviction that the dreams were messages derived from a divine source (Maritain, 1946, p. 20). The change represented more than a cultural shift from an age of faith to one of science; it represented a sweeping
ideological transformation (p. 23). Developed at length in this chapter, Descartes’ example serves to illustrate the relationship between dreams, myth and cultural-political change.

Because of their demonstrative nature, Descartes’ visions will play a central role in setting up an examination of Beradt’s study. My 2017 article, *Dreams, Myth and Power* will also serve to underpin this discussion, as it details the dream/myth nexus as a guiding political force since archaic times. Demonstration of links between social processes of eras often seen as contrasting rather than displaying overlap will be of critical importance; in spite of enormous cultural shifts, a bedrock belief in the functional capabilities of dreams has persisted, or resurfaced at important junctures. Other crucial texts in this portion of the chapter will include Carl Jung’s (1974) *Dreams*, Jacques Maritain’s (1946) *The Dream of Descartes* and Freud’s (2008) *Interpretation of Dreams*, as well as Descartes’ (1986) *Discourse on Method*.

**Chapter V—Dreams’ Political Compass and an Ideological Myth’s Future**

Having established the link between dreams, myth, and politics in Chapter 4, we now have a platform on which to base a critical analysis. As the work’s research question—along with its main theoretical applications—gravitate toward Beradt’s records as a focal point, this is a critical portion of the work. The chapter features historian Reinhart Koselleck’s (1985) analysis of the dreams. That the dreams appeared to prefigure future crimes against humanity while seeming to possess historical validity is discussed in Chapter 1. To demonstrate the powerful trajectory of Beradt’s dream interviews, examination of about 20 dreams will follow. As important as all of the dream interviews are to Beradt’s work as a whole, the most poignant visions will be foregrounded here—especially as they relate to psychological approaches to dreams, detailed in the following chapter. Significantly, Beradt declines to refer the visions to psychoanalysis (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226). Because of this fact, external psychological approaches to Beradt’s interviews and Koselleck’s historical analysis of them will ultimately assume the greatest importance. The main texts considered in this section will be Beradt’s (1968) *Third Reich of Dreams* and Koselleck’s (1985) *Futures Past*. 
The chapter poses the following question: *Can psychological theory show that the dreams Beradt identifies influenced emerging political reality through prognosis?* Prior to any psychological assessment of Beradt’s dream interviews an exposition of relevant psychological theory and method will be necessary. Freud’s (2008) approach to dreams leads off the discussion in this portion of the work. Explanation of the psychoanalyst’s understanding of dreams as wish-fulfilling visions (p. 98) and as frames guided by a four-step process (Robertson, 2008, p. xiv) stand as important theoretical planks in his methodological platform for interpreting dreams. In a comparable vein, clarification of Carl Jung’s (1964), (1974) dream theories will make plain their methodological value. Jung (1974) concurs with Freud that segments of humanity’s unconscious pertain solely to individual dreamers (p. 77), while simultaneously asserting that critical archetypal visions derive from the collective unconscious (pp. 77-78). As noted above, Jung (1964) also holds that dreams sometimes possess prognostic qualities, writing that “the unconscious seems already informed and to have come to a conclusion that is expressed in the dream” (p. 66). After gauging the measures of both analysts, the work will apply them to Koselleck’s analysis of Beradt’s dream study. This means that Koselleck’s historical conclusions of Beradt’s work will undergo theoretical scrutiny through both Freudian and Jungian lenses. The operation will serve two main purposes. First, it will allow judgment as to whether one system offers a stronger understanding of the matter. More importantly, it will orient the chapter closer to the work’s research question, posed in Chapter 1. Critical texts in this section will consist of Beradt’s (1968) *Third Reich of Dreams* and Koselleck’s (1985) *Futures Past*, as well as Freud’s (2008) *Interpretation of Dreams*, Jung’s (1964) *Man and His Symbols* along with his 1974 volume, *Dreams*. 
Chapter VII— Dreams, Myth, Politics and Time Reconsidered

The concluding chapter will summarize the arguments made throughout the dissertation and then assess the research question’s outcomes. This process will include a recapitulation of some of the work’s prominent historical examples as they pertain to its central argument. Other considerations in this section include an examination of time, the concept of culture patterns, and an assessment of Beradt’s dream frames. This section will be conclusive only in the sense that the work requires an endpoint. I hope that any responses the research question produces will bring about still more inquiry, as I intend to persevere with this line of study. Additional consideration of the research question could define lines of debate within communication study, with the work’s focus on dreams’ relationship to mythology and their political ramifications. Such consideration also relates to new perspectives now developing along psychological lines, as detailed in the conclusion.
Chapter 1.

The Story Begins: History, Politics and Psychology Converge on Dreams and Myth

Everybody dreams. Dreams mean different things to different people; their meanings also range widely across cultures and over centuries. Because they arise within individual dreamers, dreams often appear to have relevance only to the individual. At least this is the case in developed societies of today’s Western world. The present work goes to some length to demonstrate that this has not always been so. It should come as no surprise that, as diverse as dream-frames are for individual dreamers, they have taken on limitless meanings in various times and places. It is the search for understanding of these meanings that will occupy much of this dissertation’s focus. Yet, a target of ‘dream-meaning’ might seem too wide a spotlight for a single research project. This is granted. To winnow down the area of attention, ‘dream-meaning’ will be connected to certain social, historical and psychological processes. A crucial link in the connection dreams make in discovering meaning is in their association with myth. Those familiar with the work of Carl Jung (1974) and Joseph Campbell (2008) will recognize this point of confluence: that the dream has an important role to play in motivating the cultural myth is by now an old theoretical saw.

Yet the link remains an important one. Just as dreaming is an inherently human process, so is our connection to myth. All societies are myth-bound; they give meaning to culture. It is possible to provide support for the dream-as-motivation-for-cultural-myth framework by producing examples that plausibly demonstrate the theory in action. Some of these cases are discussed in the present work. Again, an endless array of illustrations, while they could demonstrate ‘meaning’ in many senses, would create too wide a focus for this project. For a connection between dreams and myth to matter, concrete consequences must arise from the link. It is here that the present work’s focus becomes tangible. A collection of disturbing dreams that appears linked to a Nazi myth, along with the historical and political consequences of the connection, will direct a significant portion of this study’s efforts.

In brief, a meticulously recorded set of dreams describing the first years of the Nazi regime appears to anticipate verifiable shifts in the era’s politics, mythology, and psychology. Nazi political history relative to changing mythology, and to psychological
theory, will bear directly on the following research question as a means of examining the dreams: *What is the relationship between two phenomena of esoteric knowledge: dreams and myth?* The question aims to draw out meaning concerned with these relationships. But the work attempts to jump over a wider chasm of meaning than the gap represented by political nightmares in Nazi Germany and associated deterioration of social conditions. In its broadest capacity, this project aims to discover facts about connections between these esoteric phenomena by applying records of political history to psychological and ideological approaches. Simply put, the goal is to describe political connections between dreams and myth—empirical results that arise from elements not bound by a true/false binary. A key word that arises throughout this project is *prognostication*. The Cambridge Dictionary (n.d.) defines the word as “to give judgment about what is likely to happen in the future, especially in connection with a particular situation.” This definition is one that should be borne in mind for the purpose of this dissertation, as the notion of “likely” outcomes arises throughout multiple discussions of dreams. This concept differs from a much more confident look toward the future, such as that contained in a word like “prediction,” which emphasizes experience as a basis for foretelling events.

*Dream Stories*

Our earliest stories are full of dreams. One of the most ancient surviving tales—that of *Gilgamesh*—is, in significant measure, a dream narrative (Sandars, 1981). The Sumerian/Babylonian epic demonstrates that dreams are multifaceted forms of communication; they serve as prophecies (pp. 66-67), messages from the gods (p. 70), realms of mysterious terror (pp. 77-78), forums for justice (p. 89) and visions of the underworld (p. 92). The dream integrates with waking moments of this mythical narrative; contrary to present day distinctions between waking and dreaming life, the *Gilgamesh* story offers little separation between the two. The epic was composed in a pre-literate age, five thousand years in the past. Even with these facts in mind, the tight relationship between night vision and daily routine might seem strange in the present-day. Yet much of the historical record reflects a closer relationship between dreaming and waking life than has
been evident since Rene Descartes reimagined the scientific method in the first half of the 17th Century.

It is not certain, however, that this has always been the case. The Chinese philosopher Chuang-tzu made the claim *ca.* 350 BCE that “dreamlessly the true men of earlier times slept” (Gebser, 1985, p. 44). Theorist Jean Gebser (1985) construes Chuang-tzu’s words as a sign that archaic humanity had yet to learn to dream (p. 44). This interpretation could be correct, but our paucity of records from that era limits our ability to understand ancient humanity’s nighttime visions—or lack of them. The subsequent written record is much clearer. And, while various cultures have assigned multiple purposes to dreams (Lohman, 2010, pp. 230-232), their most widely noted functions have been distilled into three distinct categories: dreams as communication from divine agents, dreams as conduits that convey souls away from the sleeping body, and dreams as regular mental processes (Stevens, 1995, p. 10). Because of their greater influence in dream literature, visions that adhere to the first and third classifications will serve as the main areas of attention. To be sure, these groupings are of the most general sort, and include incalculable numbers of dream frames. Still, dreams as directives from divine beings along with dreams as a normal part of the psychological process offer a fertile range of political, historical, religious, and mythological study.

The idea of dreams as communication from a supreme being centers on religious literature. Examination of selections from the holy books of Judaism (Priest, 1970, p. 60), Christianity (Matt: 1:18-25, NRSV), Islam (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 4), and Hinduism (Pelikan, 1992, p. 645), (Mascaro, 1987, p. 83) demonstrate this fact. But canonical religious texts do not possess a monopoly on dreams as divine communication. As shown in the *Gilgamesh* example, certain mythological traditions rely on dreams as godly transmissions (Sandars, 1981, p. 70). Indeed, these transmissions occurred frequently in societies in which they were anticipated (Hughes, 2000, p. 8). And yet, despite such frequency, complexity characterized many of these communications. For example, the Greek tragedian Aeschylus held that the Titan Prometheus had to teach people how to interpret dreams so that they could understand them as sacred expressions (p. 12). Of all ancient cultures, the Greek tradition considered dreams most frequently, often holding them to be divine communications. Homer tells us that “dream people” inhabited a place
adjacent to that of the shades of the dead (p. 11); the deceased Patroclus’ visit to a dreaming Achilles is an example (Homer, 1950, pp. 413-414). Still, divine sources for dreams were not universally accepted; the Greek philosophical tradition sought more rational explanations for dreams (Dreisbach, 2000, pp. 31-32). And the most important dream interpreter in the Roman tradition—Artemidorus (1975)—declined to say whether dreams were communications from the gods or originated with some other agency (p. 190). Yet, despite his skepticism, Artemidorus cautions that, should a god’s words appear in a dream, the dreamer must heed them “for it is contrary to the nature of a god to tell lies” (p. 153). The Roman dream heritage also displayed a political bent, as shown in Cicero’s (1998) *Dream of Scipio*, which served as a literary device to postulate a celestial connection to civic duty (pp. 86-94), and in the night vision of Julius Caesar’s wife, Calpurnia, which foresaw the ruler’s murder (Bradford, 1984, p. 217).

Divergent from sacred direction as Roman dreams might have been, the concept of the dream as divine communication strengthened in early medieval Europe. Nighttime visions in this era “supposed a concept of the individual defined in reference to invisible divine might” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 275) which served to oppress the sleeper, even as the biblical god directed his or her dreamscapes. The broad narrative of the era held that dreams adhered to a ‘good versus evil’ schematic. Men enjoying high ecclesiastical positions were generally understood also to enjoy ‘good’ dreams; non-clergy and women were more likely to produce ‘evil’ dreams (p. 276). For centuries, dreams of the medieval West remained demonic pathways (p. 279), and so other sorts of visions found favour with the church (p. 280), especially the waking visions such as those seen by saints and high-ranking clergy (p. 281). Manuscripts of both dreams and daytime visions were catalogued; the 9th Century monastic collection at the Reichenau library is an example (Peden, 85, p. 61). Such recording of dreams in this era allowed for their classification and judgment (Schmitt, 1999, p. 275). And, whether written or as the subject of informal conversation, dreams in this epoch found purchase with the individual dreamer as well as with the “social group that recounted, transmitted and adapted them” (p. 282) in accordance with its value system.

But this collective characteristic started to change in the 11th and 12th Centuries, when autobiographical dreams began to depict “the deepening of Christian subjectivity”—as opposed to the beginnings of individuality (p. 283). Dreams also served Christianity during
this era as communications that facilitated singular conversions to the faith (pp. 283-284). Yet the medieval movement away from collective dreams was not limited to Christians. By the 13th Century some Jewish Kabbalists were performing rituals aimed at understanding “the intersection between the astral order and private life” (Idel, 1999, p. 236). A document known as the Bodleian manuscript, details an incantation that appeals to the stars for a dream which will fulfill an individual practitioner’s deepest desire (p. 238). Other Kabbalistic practices held that dream sacraments could facilitate an individual’s comprehending “a revelation in his own private temple” (p. 242). Aligned with the move toward a more intimate understanding of dreams in late medieval times is the work of the 13th Century Muslim historian, Abu Shama. While dreams pertaining to the individual were known in Islam before this time (Von Grunebaum, 1966, pp. 11-14), fully a quarter of Shama’s autobiography is comprised of a personal dream narrative. As it represents an apparent innovation, Shama needs to justify “his indulging in these ultra-private reports” with recourse to Koranic verse (p. 11).

Thematically, then, the personalized dream continued to hold its sacredness throughout the medieval era. And, while night visions eventually turned toward a subjective space, autobiographical dreams in the Christian world did not expand their artistic representation until the 1500s (Schmitt, 1999, p. 284). And by the Renaissance the dream had extended to secular matters. This development was not lost on William Shakespeare, in whose work dreams of many varieties enjoy an entrenched place (Rupprecht, 1993, p. 211). Prior to the Bard’s time, the dreaming European mind remained linked to faith. Personal understanding could expand through dreams, but “until the advent of profane literature, this understanding was inconceivable except in the context of the individual’s relation to its source: God” (Schmitt, 1999, p. 285). Still, even as the collective dreamscape began to secularize, god would take some time to fade from even the most prominent of night visions.

At the dawn of the modern age, one particular series of dreams had profound consequences for Western history. The three crucial visions seen during the night hours of November 10, 1619 belonged to rationalist philosopher and innovator of scientific methods, Rene Descartes. The first image conjured a forceful wind that almost knocked him down into the road. The gust nearly kept the philosopher from his destination—the College of La Fleche church. Descartes spun round to greet someone he had rudely passed
by, but the storm blew “him violently against the church.” A voice then proclaimed that “an acquaintance” wanted to give a melon to him (Maritain, 1946, pp. 9-10). Descartes felt discomfort on awakening, turned his body to the right, and prayed for divine sanctuary against any evil the dream might have brought about. The next dream terrified him. Peals of thunder and lightning gave way to “thousands of sparks in his room” (p. 10)—though philosopher Gregor Sebba (1987) argues that the second vision was not a dream, but sensory information producing a dream-like effect (p. 21). Descartes’ final dream featured “a dictionary and a Corpus poetarum, open at a passage of Ausonius: *quod vitae sectabor iter?* (what path shall I follow in life?)” An unknown hand then passed to him a sheet of verse and “the words ‘*Est et Non*’ [caught] his eye” (Maritain, 1946, p. 10). Descartes commenced interpretation of the dreams even as he slumbered. He concluded that the dictionary signified “all the various sciences grouped together.” The vision of the Corpus poetarum was an expression of “philosophy and wisdom linked together” (p. 10). The contrast ‘*Est et Non*’ indicated the “Yes and No of Pythagoras,” demonstrating “Truth and Falsity in human attainment in secular sciences.” The query of ‘what path in life should I follow?’ “marks the good advice of a wise person or even moral theology” (p. 10). The wind represented an “evil genius” that “was trying to throw him by force into a place [the church] where it was his design to go voluntarily.” The melon represented Descartes’ fondness for solitude (p. 10).

Descartes took the first and second dreams to mean he that should change past practices and held the final dream to be “a revelation bearing upon the future. It was the Spirit of Truth, he knew beyond all doubt, that wanted to open for him, by this dream, the treasure of all the sciences” (p. 11). Whatever the source of these visions, they generated the thinking which ultimately saw certain bedrock principles support deductive insights in “metaphysics, physics, mathematics, morals and politics” (Matthews, 1989, pp. 87-88). Indeed, history’s most dynamic scientific age had begun with Descartes’ dreams (Stevens, 1995, p. 317); the revolution in science facilitated a new way of understanding the world (Shapin, 1996, p. 5) that relegated the Aristotelianism of Medieval Schoolmen to obsolescence (Matthews, 1989, p. 88). The irony that a dreamscape motivated as committed a rationalist as Descartes is undeniable (Stevens, 1995, p. 305). Descartes’ best known position on dreams is his suspicion that they render obscure the “clear and distinct”
impressions of sober, lucid and waking individuals (Descartes, 1986, pp. 96-97). Crucially, Descartes’ geometrical design of reducing the various Aristotelian methods of study to a “doctrine of a single, all-embracing method” influenced the philosopher’s conviction that the world was divided into mental and corporeal categories (Matthews, 1989, p. 88). Descartes honed these dualistic ideas in his final major work, the 1644 treatise, *The Principles of Philosophy* (p. 89). This Cartesian separation of mind and body, originally launched by dreams, continues to function; treating mental illnesses solely with drugs while ignoring underlying causes, and viewing resource extraction as an economic abstraction devoid of environmental costs are current applications of this dualism.

And reason would usurp the enchanted world of dreamers. The years that followed saw a growing host of rationalist thinkers distance themselves from Descartes’ embarrassing night visions (Maritain, 1946, p. 11). The move away from the dream became general among societies inclined toward Cartesian thought. This fact has not escaped certain dream historians who have observed that modernity, as influenced by Descartes’ guiding principles, has relegated the dream to a place of reduced importance (Von Grunebaum, 1966, pp. 5, 20-21). It is worth noting, however, that cultural dream theorists David Shulman and Guy Stroumsa (1999) are aware of this claim but take no position on it (p. 4). Still, the scarce record of dreams among theorists in the early modern and Enlightenment eras lends support to the assertion that the dream, as legitimate communication, faded after Descartes. This is not to say that dreams entirely disappeared from general conversation during this time. Dream interpreters fanned across the United States in its formative years, and American newspapers reported on dreams. Even certain educated elites, including 18th Century Yale College president Ezra Stiles and U.S. President John Adams recorded dream accounts (Robb, 2018, pp 14-15). Additionally, letters from Civil War soldiers to their families were strewn with dream accounts (p. 125).

Still, the idea of the dream as a possible aid for scientific discovery took a long hiatus before resurfacing in the 19th Century. German chemist August Kekule is credited with discovering the benzene molecule’s ring-like hexagonal structure (Rothenberg, 1995). The story of the discovery is often related as originating in a dream. Several versions of the dream story exist, including one which depicts an ancient symbol of natural unity—that of a snake with its tail in its mouth—as the basis of the inspiration for the ring. Psychologist
Carl Jung cited another version of the dream—one that included the medieval alchemical symbol of a dancing king and queen as an indication of unity—that influenced the vision. Kekule is supposed to have had this dream in 1861; a less well-known dream featuring dancing atoms is said to have taken place in 1854 or 1855 (Browne, 1988). Whether Kekule ever dreamed with the effect of aiding the discovery of the benzene ring is in doubt for reasons of the poetic license Kekule might have taken in describing the process, along with a decades-long lag in the chemist’s reporting of it (Rothenberg, 1995, pp. 435-426).

Whether Kekule’s dreams occurred as they are popularly recounted, or indeed if they occurred at all is of little importance. The crucial point relates to the perceptual shift regarding dreams that had been more or less in place since Descartes’ visions. As shown above, from the most ancient records until the scientific age, dreams often held cultural cachet as legitimate sources of information. From the time of the Scientific Revolution onward, dreams were to be jettisoned, and intelligible communication via dreams into the scientific sphere was denied. That serious attention was given to Kekule’s dreams centuries after Descartes’ visions indicates the beginnings of another shift; one that maneuvered away from totalizing rationality.

This change is palpable in the analysis of a dream Albert Einstein had following a stressful time in which he developed the General Theory of Relativity and separated from his first wife. Sometime during the autumn of 1915, the physicist dreamed that he had slit his own throat with a razor (Katz, 1990, pp. 353-354). Posthumous discussion of the dream assumes the character of a visit to the psychoanalyst’s couch, in which emotional connections to an upset mother and an overbearing father are invoked as compounding factors in an already strained life (p. 360). Such elements, anxiety-producing as they must have been, nevertheless locate this dream in the place of an understandable psychological process: the jugular-slashing vision apparently requires no explanation other than stressful events culminating in a disturbing dream. But this interpretation is not the only one possible. Analyst Joseph Katz (1990) writes that the “ultimate, deep meaning of cutting his throat with a razor may be reflected in these lines from Genesis (22:10) ‘Abraham reached out and took the slaughter knife to slit his son’s throat’” (pp. 360-361). The biblical story served as a means of combining representations of both Abraham and Isaac; Einstein could menace his own life and then back away from killing the blameless son (p. 361) by
dreaming the episode rather than physically harming himself. Further, the interpretation of the dream as a representation of the “universal conflicts of all people” regarding ambiguous relationships with parents (p. 351) set against the background of ancient Hebrew text is plausible, as Einstein’s family possessed secular Jewish roots (p. 356).

Whether the abundant correspondence between Einstein and those close to him (pp. 352-353) provides enough evidence for such an analysis is beside the point. For a host of reasons, Western cultural bias toward a purely rational bearing had begun to fade in the years before Einstein’s dream; the focus on the great scientist’s disturbing vision seems possible only in such a setting. And, as will become plain in this work, the separation of the categories that refer dreams to normal mental processes and that of divine expressions is not always complete. Further blurring this distinction is the fact that mythologies of the divine—so often tied to dreams—have assumed various forms, periodically shading from the religious into the secular (Gray, 2008, p. 207). Sometimes the categories become a debate between scientific and cultural understandings of dreams. Scientists Francis Crick and Graeme Mitchison (1983) held that dreams are part of the brain’s natural work but possess no meaning and should be forgotten (p. 114). Beat writer William Burroughs (1996) acerbically countered that:

‘[d]reams mean nothing’ Crick croaks, ‘just neural housecleaning. The quicker we forget our dreams the better.’ He’s telling me my dreams, where I get my best sets and characters, are meaningless. Meaningless to whom, exactly? . . . As if ‘meaning’ floats about in a vacuum, with no relation to time, place or person (p. 104).

Burroughs’ question about meaning simultaneously rejects a single understanding of dreams while opening limitless paths of inquiry for the seeker.

Yet the writer’s complaint fits into an older debate. The difference between Burroughs’ and Crick’s understanding of dreams shows a divide in place since the middle of the 20th Century. Psychiatrist Montague Ullman (1962) conceptualizes the problem in the following way: “Two significant contemporary movements are to be noted in regard to our knowledge of dreams, one experimental, physiological, and concerned with the process of dreaming itself, the other psychological, theoretical, clinical, and concerned primarily with dream meaning” (p. vii). This split remains. In an article published in 2017, psychologist Kelley Bulkeley examines three areas of dream research: neurological understanding of dream processes, large-scale analysis of dream logs, and dream meaning as assessed by
psychotherapists (p. 68). Bulkeley holds that a meaningful connection between dream science and the depth psychology of dreams lies ahead, writing that the “most prosperous future for scientific dream research will involve drawing together the findings of all these areas and integrating them with the insights of anthropology, religious studies, and the humanities” (p. 69). Indeed, as the science of dream processes advances, ties between dreams’ physiological applications with those of the meaning of dreams could conceivably strengthen. For the present time, the gulf between the views of Crick and Burroughs remains wide.

**On the Trail of Myth**

Like dreams, myth signifies cultural meanings, yet colloquial understanding regards myth as untruth. This is too narrow a conception; myth is a fluid, lived reality. It is a “unique way” of understanding social sensibility (Aldwinckle, 1996, p. 2), and “a way of living in the world, of orienting oneself” (Dardel, 1996, p. 85). As classical scholar Robert Graves (1992) characterizes the phenomenon, “[t]rue myth may be defined as the reduction to narrative shorthand of ritual mime performed on public festivals, and in many cases recorded pictorially” (p. 12). An example familiar to most is the story of the Holy Grail. The Grail Quest began as a ritual with roots buried at least as deep in time as ancient India’s Vedic era (Weston, 1997, pp. 27-31). Since the middle ages, the tale has been told in terms of a knight’s journey and mission to restore wastelands to health (p. 21); the quest’s ultimate purpose is to guide initiates into “the secret of the sources of Life, physical and spiritual” (p. 191). Distorted by time, the Grail story itself first appeared in literary form in the 12th Century (p. 179); continuing on its ancient journey, the tale finds comparatively recent expression in T.S. Eliot’s 20th Century poem “The Wasteland” (Hopper, 1970, p. 125).

Myth began to shift from performed ritual to written forms in the centuries BCE. One setting in which this development gained currency was in Greece during the sixth and fifth centuries, when the social critic Xenophanes censured the mythical style of both Hesiod and Homer. This process stripped these expressions of their metaphysical value, clearing the path for history as a written expression to replace this mode of communication (Eliade,
1963, pp. 1-2). The alteration from myth and ritual into history is perhaps best exemplified in ancient Hebrew culture, which gave birth to “genuine historical consciousness” (Priest, 1970, p. 53). All of Judaism’s major festivals, for example, originated as celebrations of nature and its cycles; these have since been assimilated into the writings of the Pentateuch, removed from their origins, and reassembled as part of the Hebrew historical record (pp. 53-54). This innovative displacement into historical thought influenced the ways in which people in every culture that made this shift understood their lives. As archaeologist Nancy Sandars (1981) writes, “once a myth has crystalized into a literary form it is already dead” (p. 49); myth scholar Eric Dardel (1996) concurs, writing that when “the myth has lost its force, the symbol will dry away into allegory or formalism” (p. 97). Still, even as the old myths faded from daily life and were relegated to the pages of books with the emergence of alphabetic technology, new myths developed (p. 88).

Mythical vicissitudes connect to the dynamism of human consciousness; still care must be taken to arrive at the right sense of any changes in consciousness. In his research on the interplay between rationality and irrationality, history professor Justin Smith (2019) cautions against the conflation of cultural shifts with evolutionary ones (p. 91). Jean Gebser (1985) advances a similar approach, rejecting terms such as ‘development’ or ‘progress’ with regard to changing states of consciousness, preferring instead concepts of ‘mutation’ and ‘unfolding’ (pp. 37-38). Gebser is clear that such shifts in consciousness are not biological, calling them instead “spiritual” (p. 37); Smith (2019) classifies such changes as “cultural” (p. 91). For Gebser (1985), broadly, since earliest humanity, consciousness has moved from archaic, to magical, mythical, mental, and integral worldviews (pp. 36-115). Each state of consciousness has originated myths, full of cultural meaning appropriate to its era. Perhaps the first thinker to recognize this in a historical sense was Enlightenment jurist Giambattista Vico—though Gebser takes issue with Vico’s notions of historical progress (p. 37). Vico (2001), for his part, argued that all pagan traditions are rooted in myth, and that studying these myths was the way to discover the origins of nations, along with their institutions and sciences (p. 44).

Still, even to understand correctly changes in consciousness as cultural leaps, rather than the wrongly-conceived evolutionary (or historical) progress, we are still some distance from making sense of related mythical shifts. Myth is difficult to grasp; it is not
true, and it is not false (Dardel, 1996, p. 88). It was perhaps this observation that led Plato (1997) to have Socrates pose the question: “Don’t you know that a true falsehood…is hated by all gods and humans?” (p. 1020). Socrates quickly turned the discussion toward the utility of “making a falsehood as much like the truth as we can” (p. 1021) as a means to set up the so-called noble lie, expressed as a myth later in the Republic for reasons of political expediency (p. 1050). Socrates’ question about “true falsehood” (p. 1020) should be understood as something of a test. Plato has an ideological goal for the mythic story he makes Socrates tell (pp. 1050-1052) but knows he can go only so far with it, as mythmakers are constrained by cultural limits. These limits can be pushed, but societal blessing of mythical innovation is of critical importance (Boyer, 1996, p. 31). Acceptance of myths is gained by discussion. As Roland Barthes (2013) notes in his work, Mythologies, a myth does not deny things…its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural, eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but a statement of fact (p. 255).

Such a tactic opens multiple pathways for the myth; dependent as they are upon social consent, myths yet differ in cultural specifics. Still, they adhere to general principles which obtain even today. As mythographer Joseph Campbell (1970) writes, a mythology’s effectiveness is “based on a concept of the universe that is current, accepted and convincing;” even science can be a mechanism for naturalizing myth (p. 144). Myth does not stand still; it continually fuses innovations with cultural norms (Barr, 1996, pp. 17-18).

This means that technological innovation is, in part, responsible for mythological change. From the printing press to the internal combustion engine, from atom bombs to digital technologies, all are associated with myths specific to their time. Theorist Mary Midgley (2004) contends that dominant technological innovations configure “our symbolism and thereby our metaphysics” (p. 2). The philosopher identifies the automated clockwork imagery of the 17th Century as the origin of this mythological template. By the 18th Century these representations had become blueprints for reworked Western conceptions of the world based on mechanical schematics. This ideology held that an understanding of the world-machine could be gained by locating the mechanical driver that made it tick. So entrenched became the metaphor that scientists resisted efforts to move away from it, even at the end of the 19th Century (pp. 166-167). Such embeddedness in
scientific myth prompted the philosopher R.A. Underwood (1970) to ask whether the trappings of science and technology-based ideology in place since the 17th Century “now stand for us as the Homeric myths stood for those at the time of philosophy’s origins?” (p. 243). The answer is a resounding ‘yes.’

Technological augurs have since aimed to rework “their whole vision of the world...on the pattern of what was going on in their workshops” (Midgley, 2004, p. 167). This arrangement represents no mystery. Technological control is linked to power; successfully controlling new technologies requires mythical associations. Midgley’s investigation of clockwork as a key technological metaphor demonstrates this fact. The scientific use of metaphor and myth has continued with developments such as Niels Bohr’s atomic model, as represented by numerical symbols intended to depict literal phenomena (Aldwinckle, 1996, p. 3). Mythical symbols have kept pace in the digital age, extending their tendrils into ever-expanding areas of people’s lives. Communication professor Vincent Mosco (2004) avers that the Internet is largely responsible for bringing about three defining myths of the early cyberspace era: “the end of history, the end of geography and the end of politics” (p. 13). Much of the dynamism needed to foster these myths originated within the field of online activity. This virtual-field served as a liminal zone—one that defined the structure of the cyberspace narrative. Crucially, it is exactly this sort of in-between realm that is known to spawn myths; just as important is the fact that liminality tends to bring about a “sense of power and possibility” of liberation from institutionalized power complexes (p. 32).

Understood as a release from these burdensome influences, the path became clear for advancement of the cyber-myth’s fluid structure. Politicians and business titans bolstered the myth; advertisements and trade shows aimed to display it favourably to the public (pp. 39-45). In the way that Enlightenment-era ideologues depicted the cosmic systems as clockwork, the early Internet universe saw increasing portrayal as a cyber-tech model (p. 50). Yet, it is fair to link the Internet’s mythological retroactivity to a point further in the past than the Enlightenment. As Mosco points out:

The thorny questions arising from all the limitations that make us human were once addressed by myths that featured gods, goddesses and the variety of beings and rituals that for many provided satisfactory answers. Today it is the spiritual machines
and their world of cyberspace that hold out the hope of overcoming life’s limitations (Mosco, 2004, p. 78).

This observation makes clear the psychological use of digital technologies. Yet, like many technological advances, they required additional mythical support to achieve their ends. Mosco writes that the original myth of the Internet included a tale about cheaper, faster digital technologies breathing life into “those seemingly impossible dreams of democracy and community with practically no pressure on the natural environment” (p. 30).

These ideas presuppose technological ‘naturalization.’ Technology theorist Andrew Feenberg (2001) writes that assumed cultural beliefs form a traditional, social basis comprising what he terms a “horizon” (p. 86), and that the “legitimating effectiveness of technology depends on unconsciousness of the cultural-political horizon under which it was designed” (p. 87). This observation complements Mosco’s (2004) view, which points out that technologies tend to lose their mythical aura as they themselves fade into the cultural backdrop (p. 6). It is at this juncture that technologies attain the height of their power; that is, at the point that they become stripped of their roles as “utopian visions” (Mosco, 2004, p. 6). Writing in 2004, Mosco held that “cyberspace is becoming a banal space” (p. 74). In 2019 this transition is now complete. Myths draw power from their inherent ambiguity and “elasticity” (p. 10); static, literal explanations are not the myth’s purview. Mythical fanfare about the possibilities of cyberspace thus faltered with the near total commodification of the Internet and social media, though Donald Trump’s vapid use of Twitter has fostered new mythological flourishes along these lines—a subject to which we shall return in Chapter 3. Meantime, it will suffice to say that this innovation represents a power-shift that underscores the connection between myth and technological ideology.

Critical in developing the link is understanding the central place myth has held since our earliest social life. Archaic civilizations regarded time as a sacred record, preserved and imparted via myths. These myths communicated tales of immeasurable power, depicting “tremendous events that occurred at the beginning of time;” their periodic ritual re-enactment worked to reproduce society, as well as the entire cosmos (Eliade, 2005, p. xxviii). The process was ahistorical and involved repeated restoration of “Great Time” (p. xxiii). The revival of power associated with Great Time served to recreate primordial actions performed by the gods (pp. 4-5). Everyday time and space were transcended by
sacred rite (p. 21)—equivalent to the “once upon a time” notion that begins a fairy-tale and eclipses rational temporality (Dardel, 1996, p. 90). By returning to Great Time, profane time was annulled; the eternal ways were revivified and guides for practical living were renewed. Divine exemplars for everything from sailing, hunting, sculpture and sex were reinforced through the ritualized return to eternity (Eliade, 2005, p. 35).

Linear, historical time has now all but swallowed up Great Time. But vestiges of these archaic sensibilities remain in the form of religious ritual where faith traditions consecrate localized variations of such rites with the goal of preserving them (Jennings, 1982, p. 122). Ancient remnants of these rituals also remain in ceremonial folk traditions around the world (Weston, 1997, p. 191). The consecration of ritual variation is an old pattern; even in ancient societies changes to the structure of rites and myth were known. And modernity has embraced this arrangement. As demonstrated above, the modern age saw the emergence of a relationship between myth and science (Midgely, 2004, p. 1). This connection turns on the ancient mythical power to constrain time. The rituals of Great Time served to annul history through seasonal reenactments of divine renewal; myth in modern times aims to control history’s political context. In the way that ancient civilizations returned to mythical time through a process of “abolishing history” (Eliade, 2005, p. 76), present day scientific societies ideologically grasp the notion that “myth is constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things” (Barthes, 2013, p. 255). Vincent Mosco (2004) agrees, writing that the “denial of history is central to understand myth as depoliticized speech,” as it is this denial of history that controls conversation about participation in social processes (p. 35). A present day example is Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s often-invoked mythical declaration that a renovated pipeline from Alberta to the British Columbia coast is “in the national interest” (Zimonjic, 2018), devoid of accompanying references to historical complexities concerning the rights of the First Nations whose land is on the path of the proposed project. In this way, the federal government attempts to control discussion of the pipeline’s related environmental costs, stripping the discussion of its political character, while real political costs are exacted. Still, the practice of depoliticizing speech and repurposing it as ‘fact’ has been used for deadlier political purposes than those Justin Trudeau intends. The Nazis used their own version of the mythical technique for murderous ends in the 20th Century.
Nazi Myths and Dreams

Myth’s relationship to time remains unpredictable. Even in an age when scientific myths had been pervasive for centuries, ancient forms of mythology once again saw the light of day. The limitless shapes that socially constructed myth can take assumed one of genocidal madness in the 1930s and 1940s. In brutal fashion, the myth of the Nazis’ Thousand Year Reich seized German citizens in the years that followed the destruction of the Weimar Republic (Gerwarth, 2006, p. 19). Centuries in development, this myth took as its power source a deranged ideology, which paid off in short-lived political gains, as well as in the coin of human disaster. In September of 1930, the National Socialist Party’s percentage of the popular vote had leaped from an earlier 2.5% share to 18.3%. By 1933 Hitler had become chancellor, destroying opponents and playing upon German citizens’ worst impulses: “resentment, intolerance, arrogance and, most dangerous of all, a sense of racial superiority” (Beevor, 2012, p. 3). In the words of political philosopher John Gray (2008) Nazism became “a modern political religion, and while it made use of pseudo-science it also drew heavily on myth. The Volk was not just the biological unit of racist ideology. It was a mystical entity” (p. 66). Already embedded culturally, the myth took its official name on May 4, 1941, when Hitler declared that the Nazi regime would stand for a thousand years (Beevor, 2012, p. 187).

Philosopher Mircea Eliade (1963) held that the Nazi rise to power was a 20th Century variant of the Millennial myth, closely related to that which certain religious sects have embraced. Millennialist doctrine clings to the idea that the world is debased, with no hope of salvation in its current state. A New World Order is, however, is on the horizon and slated to surge from the ruined old society, bringing hope and new life to the faithful (pp. 68-69). Just this sort of myth thrived in Nazi ideology. In the most dehumanizing manner, the Nazis were “inspired by phantasies which are downright archaic,” like the tenet that a chosen people walk the earth (Cohn, 1961, p. 309). The Nazi myth drew upon ancient millenarian doctrine, so prevalent in 20th Century politics, that cataclysm was at hand, evil encroached, and that short apocalyptic battles along with subsequent utopian rewards awaited the faithful (Gray, 2008, p. 66). These qualities were still apparent among Nazi supporters in Berlin in 1943, even as the war on the Eastern front dragged on and Allied
victory drew ever closer. In February of that year propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels drove home the point of “Total War—Short War” at a mass rally. Bellowing from the dais “Do you want Total War?” Throngs of fanatics leaped from their seats and shrieked that they did want this very thing (Beevor, 2012, p. 400).

The mythological focal point of this work will turn on the Nazi regime’s manipulation of ideas, ritual and symbols. This focus sets up more than an exploration of the bloodthirsty mythology of Fascist Germany. Dreams were tied closely to Nazi myth, and to events as they happened or, more precisely, as they would happen. Dreams, communicating terror of the present moment, as changes to Versailles-bound Germany seemed imminent, also pointed to “the disturbing prospect of a threatening future” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 219). The ascent of Nazi power saw the provisions of the hated treaty broken (Beevor, 2012, p. 4). Alongside the industrialization and re-militarization that accompanied the consolidation of Nazi political might, journalist Charlotte Beradt (1968) annotated over three hundred night visions of civilian Germans. These dreams were “often realistic” in their anticipation of the murderous era of fascism (Koselleck, 1985, p. 219). Beradt’s (1968) dream narratives are terrifying, especially as they precede paranoid wiretapping (pp. 45-47), savage cruelty (pp. 62-64) and anti-Semitic legislation (pp. 67-68), among an array of hundreds more nightmares. Proliferating state terror served to configure those nightmares—seemingly anticipatory frames that worked in close proximity to the formulation of the horrific mythology of the Thousand Year Reich.

The prognostic quality of the dreams Beradt logged is of crucial importance for this work. Moreover, examining dreams as frames held to possess anticipatory potential has attracted a historical gaze. Here a brief index of historian Reinhardt Koselleck’s theoretical approach will be helpful. Koselleck (1985) became interested in Beradt’s dream accounts as historical, in that they “testify to a past reality in a manner which could not be surpassed by any other source” (p. 218). The historian seeks an understanding of “the linguistic organization of temporal experience wherever this surfaces in past reality” as a means of comprehending transformative events. To this end, Koselleck adopts a “historical-anthropological dimension” in his assessment of the dreams—frames “in which language is reduced to silence and the time dimension appears to become reversed” (p. xxv). As part of his historical project, Koselleck distinguishes between narrative history, or history as
story, and general history (pp. 200-201), characterizing Beradt’s dream interviews as “recounted stories” (pp. 219-220). And these dreamed narratives trod an intricate path. Koselleck writes that

the perspective of the dream fully opens up all three temporal directions. The dimensions of contemporaries of the period—marked by the heritage of Wilhelmine Germany and disposed toward Weimar, and the shock of the present and the disturbing prospect of a threatening future—all these are captured in the dream images (p. 219).

He asserts further that the visions in Beradt’s record detailed an intrinsic veracity “which was not only realized, but was immeasurably outbid by the later reality of the Third Reich. Consequently, these dreamed stories do not only testify to terror and its victims, but they had at the time a prognostic content” (p. 218). The historian expands on this line of thought, asserting that these nightmares “testify to an initially open, then later insidious, terror, and anticipate its violent intensification” (p. 219).

With these dramatic images as criteria, Koselleck (1985) avers that dreams can serve as important segments of the historical archive, with the possibility in the present case, of “tracing inferences for historical reality after 1933” (pp. 219-220). Still, Koselleck’s position assumes another layer of complexity. The visions that Beradt recorded offer a view into a certain “world of experience” common to dreamers in 1930s Berlin. These dreamed images combine to depict “a menacing proximity to reality in which the disposition of personal background and a dreamlike capacity for reaction come together in the everyday and release prognostic potential” (p. 221). In Koselleck’s words, events at that time made available “a conceivable space of action,” potentially engendering a feeling among the dreamers that their dreams looked ahead (p. 221). But a qualification presents itself with regard to the notion of prognostication. Koselleck writes of the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous,” which refers to “the prognostic structure of historical time, for each prognosis anticipates events which are certainly rooted in the present and in this respect are already existent, although they have not actually occurred” (p. 94). As Koselleck also notes, the dreams’ past focus is on the tragic end of WWI, with the finish of the era of the Kaiser, and the insecurity of the interwar years. People lived with traumatic memories of the “humiliation and penury of defeat,” along with those of internal rebellions after the war, the collapse of governments in Eastern Europe and the associated rise of
Bolshevism. This “cycle of fear and hatred risked turning inflammatory rhetoric into a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Beevor, 2012, pp. 2-3). With this reality, the dreams’ appearance of looking ahead related to unresolved trauma, even as new horrors lurked. To this point, Koselleck (1985) writes that “all history contains formal structures of possible recurrence and repetition, long-term conditions which assist in the construction of similar constellations, among which, as we know, is terror” (p. 228). Further to this end, Koselleck describes “an irreversible process” that relieved the German people of these traumas through the blind transference of responsibility to the Nazi regime, and the horror that this would entail (p. 229). Koselleck is not alone in understanding the historical value of these dreams. Beradt (1968) herself sees them as narratives that could assist in telling a more comprehensive story about the Third Reich, writing that these dreams “might one day serve as evidence when the time [comes] to pass judgment on National Socialism as a historical phenomenon, for they seemed to reveal a great deal about people’s deepest feelings” as they became subsumed by totalitarianism (p. 9). Observations about what these dreams have to say about the possibility of prognostication will be the focus of Chapters 5 and 6.

**Psychologies of Dreams and Myths**

Considered in this way, Beradt’s dream records stand as legitimate pieces of a historical framework, bearing “witness to terror that was often only silent at first, but whose open escalation they anticipate” (Koselleck, 2018, p. 15). Still, such apparent historical approbation does not certify dreams as predictive frames. If validation of this sort is indeed possible, the dreams would first need to maneuver through psychological theory. Beradt herself did not view the nightmares through a psychoanalytic lens (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226), while Koselleck puts forth a nuanced approach to the phenomena. He writes that, if biographies of the dreamers had been available, the visions would invite “individual psychological analysis” (p. 220); still, even absent such information, in certain instances social and historical generalizations are possible (p. 229), as some psychic information is revealed in these dreams (p. 226). An interplay between historical dreams and psychoanalytic theory arises when Sigmund Freud’s dream psychology is introduced. Freud (2008) rejects the idea that dreams look to the future (p. 79). He explains that the
dream’s gaze is backward, not forward (p. 169), and that a dream’s effect is on the individual in the present (pp. 94-95). Further, Freud avers that dreams are to be viewed as wish fulfillments (pp. 94-97), though he later amends this claim in cases of dreamers suffering from trauma. In such instances, dreams often bring about anxiety, and have failed in their wish fulfillment function; dreams are thus “an attempt at the fulfillment of a wish” (Freud, 1973, pp. 58-59). Dreams’ method of configuration must be understood through a four-step process (Robertson, 2008, p. xiv). Close examination of Freud’s psychology of dreams, as a means of scrutinizing Koselleck’s approach, will lay groundwork for a theoretical link between psychological investigation and historical analysis. Full development of the consequences of applying Freudian theory to Koselleck’s conclusions is demonstrated in Chapter 6.

Standing apart from any theoretical framework advanced through implementation of the abovementioned process will be the dream theories of Carl Jung. Following a period of study under Freud, Jung advanced his own ideas on dreams, eventually becoming estranged from the ground-breaking psychoanalyst. While agreeing with Freud that a dreamer’s personal unconscious remains an important contributor to a dream’s formulation, Jung (1974) held that universal psychic structures, which he called the collective unconscious (p. 77), served as a backdrop for archaic dreamscapes occupied by what he termed archetypes (1964, pp. 56-58) (Freud referred to them as “archaic remnants” [Jung, 1964, p. 32]). Archetypes are “without known origin” (p.58) and exist as “a tendency to form” (p. 58) “mythological motifs” (Jung, 1974, p. 77). They remain as “innate, and inherited shapes of the human mind,” persisting as relics of our mental evolutionary process (Jung, 1964, p. 57).

Jung also made the case in his work, Man and His Symbols, that “dreams may sometimes announce certain situations before they actually happen” (p. 36). He argued further that dreams provided compensatory navigation to a dreamer whose waking life was out of balance (p. 34), foreshadowing the harmful effects of present actions (pp. 34-35) via the unconscious’ ability to understand suggestions that consciousness cannot (pp. 35-36). But Jung made no claim to be the first dream analyst to put forward the notion that dreams perform an anticipatory function. Our oldest intact dream compendium comes down to us from Artemidorus (1975). The Lydian dream interpreter traveled extensively through the
Roman Empire in the 2nd Century, C.E., annotating people’s night visions for his five-volume book, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. His main interest was in dreams that held prognostic power. Such visions were known as *oneiros*, the kind of dream that “operates after sleep and…comes true either for good or for bad” (p. 185). Aristotle also took the position that dreams could foretell events insofar as they prompted dreamers to perform them, as well as through the vision’s recognition of an impending illness, and via coincidence (Hughes, 2000, p. 15). Variations of the future-fixated dream persist. For example, psychoanalyst Paul Lippmann (2003), frames the dream’s capacity to look to the future as a “broadly prophetic function of dreams—its capacity to anticipate what is ahead—[which] far exceeds the narrowly predictive function often debated and usually debunked” (p. 231).

At this juncture some development of the link between dreams and myth will be important. For Jung (1974) it is the collective unconscious that can link dreamers to archetypal images (pp. 77-78). This connection has important ramifications for prospective changes. Jung (1964) writes that “archetypes create myths, religions and philosophies and characterize whole nations and epochs of history” (p. 68). Jung’s point of view is that this archetypal power is evident in many societies—a view supported by documentation of forward-looking dreams. Dreams of this sort assume prominence in the ancient mythical tale, *Gilgamesh*. From beginning to end, the story features dreams portending future acts. Two night visions presage the arrival of Gilgamesh’s feral partner, Enkidu (Sandars, 1981, pp. 66-67). Another looks ahead to the death of Enkidu (pp. 91-93), yet another anticipates that Gilgamesh will enjoy divinely guaranteed safety (pp. 77-78), and the last dream in the story reveals that a flood will destroy everything, except for the “seed of all living creatures,” which were to be spirited away on a purpose-built boat (p. 108).

That such a pervasive myth as the catastrophic deluge and related rescue of beasts—comparable adaptations appear in the Book of Genesis (Genesis 6:13–9:17) and in the Hindu *Mahabharata* (Smith, 2009, p. 200)—is revealed in a prognostic dream is important, as it shows the immense cultural value placed on such visions. This appreciation extended far beyond the societies acquainted with the tale of *Gilgamesh*. Ancient Hebrew culture often linked dreams to mythical divine messages that acted “either as direct manifestations of the deity or as predictive devices” (Priest, 1970, p. 63). Illustrative is the case of Jacob’s
son Joseph, who interpreted the Egyptian Pharaoh’s dreams of plump and lean cattle as coming years of feast and famine (Genesis 41:1–7), along with that of Daniel, the seer who viewed King Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of a statue comprised of four kinds metal and clay as god’s message that a divine kingdom would establish itself (Daniel 2:24–45). Christian texts favour instructive dreams, with no place for dream interpretation (Wilder, 1970, p. 70), yet revelation dreams are woven throughout the myths of early Christianity (p. 73). The forward-looking story of Saul of Tarsus’ all-important conversion vision as he traveled the road to Damascus is the best-known (Acts 9:3–9).

This conception of dreams as both prognostic and myth-producing possesses a longer reach than even the above examples indicate. As noted, Jung (1964) contended that certain historical eras have been defined by archetypal dreams (pp. 67-68). The psychologist held that these archetypes were transformable phenomena which “manifest themselves in impulses, just as spontaneously as the instincts” (pp. 65-66). Our consciousness does not align with this schematic. The unconscious, however, may observe it in future-oriented dreams (p. 66).

No less a genius than William Shakespeare recognized this, as well as the capacity for such visions to foster change. It is thus not surprising that figures in his corpus sometimes assigned prognostic value to their dreams. The first dream episode Shakespeare created appears in Act I of Henry VI, Part II. Eleanor of Cobham and her husband, the Duke of Gloucester, each dreamed of a palace coup—the visions taking place at different times of night. For the Duke, the dreams portended doom; Eleanor viewed them as the successful ouster of political rivals. Gloucester’s explanation hits on the truth; he is murdered, and Eleanor is exiled (Rupprecht, 1993, pp. 213-215). Shakespeare created those secular dreams. And yet their placement squares with a wider cultural shift away from medieval views which held that the hour of night that dreams took place increased or diminished their spiritual value. The Bard’s innovative understanding of dreams corresponded with those of contemporary thinkers who repudiated the idea of rating a dreams’ importance based on its timing. The old ordering of a dreams’ worth linked to when it was dreamed no longer stood (p. 217); here the changes to cultural myths that Jung attributes to certain dreams are afforded a toehold.
Examples like the ones just given, however, do not serve to demonstrate some vague higher ‘truth’ of night visions interpreted as possessing the power to prognosticate or to alter political trajectories. In psychological terms, such a position lacks proof and is relegated to points of interpretation. Still, dreams viewed in this manner possess undeniable cultural value. Over thousands of years, woven throughout innumerable societies, including the most inhuman moments of the last century, dreams that have since been observed as communications that anticipate events have found purchase in the collective imagination. This point of view is, to reiterate, a matter of perception. Yet the cultural belief that dreams are endowed with foresight often interacts with a society’s mythical structures and these societies then change. The formula of ‘dream fosters myth, which brings about societal shift’ will be discussed at length in Chapter 4.

Yet the assertion of a collective, forward-looking perspective related to the crossroads of dreams, myth and various cultural trajectories encounters formidable theoretical resistance. In Freud’s pursuit of depth psychology, he saw psychoanalysis as “historical science” (emphasis in original) (Roth, 87, p. 17). This means that individuals can achieve relief from psychological pain by working through their past; this includes an understanding of the present but stops at that point and does not edge into speculation about the future. The technique of psychoanalysis ceases to be “a depth psychology if it becomes predictive” (p. 17). Regarding dreams, Freud (2008) held that the personal history of desire was paramount, claiming that

the dream frequently appears to have several meanings; not only can several wish-fulfillments be united in it alongside one another . . . ; but one meaning/wish-fulfillment can overlay another until right at bottom we come upon the fulfillment of a wish from earliest childhood; and here again we are bound to wonder whether in this sentence ‘frequently’ should not be replaced by ‘invariably’ (p. 169).

In the strongest sense, Freud’s understanding of mental process roots itself in the individual’s past as it relates to the present.

Freud also saw the importance of myth in historical terms. The psychoanalyst considers the ancient mythical story of Oedipus, which he terms a “legend” (p. 203), that sees the unfortunate man kill his father and marry his mother without first knowing the truth of either act (pp. 201-202). Freud holds that the tale is relatable to personal histories, writing that it “was perhaps ordained that we should all of us turn our first sexual impulses toward
our mother, our first hatred and violent wishes against our father. Our dreams convince us of it” (p. 202). The idea of dreams and myth are linked in Freud’s approach; the connection is historical rather than oriented toward the future. His psychology holds that the story of Oedipus as told by Sophocles “sprang from that ancient dream material,” producing turmoil in the earliest relationships with mothers and fathers via the infant’s initial burst of sexuality (p. 203).

Freud’s historical portrayal of the link between dreams and myth finds purchase in the work of Sophocles. In the estimation of classical scholar Bernard Knox (1984), Oedipus’ mother Jocasta held that chaos ruled, that there “was no order or design in the world, that dreams and prophecies had no validity…nothing made sense” (p. 153). On the subject of the worthlessness of prophecies, Freud would no doubt agree; of course, his position on the meaning of dreams could not have differed more sharply from Jocasta’s. As Sophocles’ (1984) play nears its climax, Oedipus begins to fear the prophecy he received at Delphi that he would kill his father and marry his mother (p. 205) might come true insofar as he had to fear his “mother’s bed” (p. 215), Jocasta dismisses his worry:

Fear? It’s all chance, chance rules our lives. Not a man on earth can see a day ahead, groping through the dark. Better to live at random, as best we can. And for this marriage with your mother—have no fear. Many a man before you, in his dreams, has shared his mother’s bed. Take such things for shadows, nothing at all. Live Oedipus as if there’s no tomorrow! (p. 215).

Of course, Jocasta misread the most important cues. There was meaning in the fate prophesied at Delphi and once she recognized this, she consigned herself to the noose (Knox, 1984, p. 153).

Still, Freud’s understanding of the dream’s historical interpretation remains intact even as Jocasta’s view of it is misconceived. Set before the reader here is the idea that fearing one’s “mother’s bed” (p. 215) is a retroactive worry, as the crime of incest had already been committed. This assessment fits whether in fact, as in the case of Oedipus, cryptically described to him by the seer Tiresias (p. 183), or in the form of childhood wishes, as Freud (2008) asserts are repressed in the healthy adult mind (p. 202). And yet the Delphic oracle’s warning to Oedipus (Sophocles, 1984, p. 205) cannot be ignored; his fate then still lay ahead. Oedipus says he came to know of his destiny when the god Apollo “flashed before [his] eyes a future great with pain, terror, disaster” (p. 205). Classical scholar Robert
Graves (1992) writes of this interaction that, rather than receiving a direct vision from Apollo, the priestess at Delphi said to Oedipus “[a]way from the shrine, wretch! . . . You will kill your father and marry your mother!” (p. 371). Fanning the flames of the debate is Hegel’s (1991) observation that the Delphic priestesses communicated with spirits through dreams or delirious states, which then required further analysis (p. 236). Thus, the specific means by which Oedipus came to know what was to come must remain a matter of interpretation. A potential defense of Freud’s historical position is that, while Oedipus could have learned of his fate through an oracular dream, such a vision might have represented the suppressed crime of incest, wishfully committed by Oedipus in early childhood.

With this postulate in view, characterizing this communication either as an interpretive vision of a childhood wish or a dream revealing a tragic future remain viable explanations. The point, however, is not to quibble over the way in which Oedipus came to know of this terrible prophecy, or to learn of his suppressed wish. Having been characterized as a legend (Freud, 2008, p. 203), a coherent version of a jumble of archaic mythic rituals (Graves, 1992, pp. 374-375) and a “primordial experience” (Kochar-Lindgren, 2000, p. 258) with “no point of discernible origin” (p. 257), a literal understanding of the Oedipus story fails to garner unanimous support. Remaining at issue is the lack of agreement over whether dreams look ahead or serve historical purposes. This concern sets the stage for a later encounter between Freud’s dream theory and Jung’s point of view.

Here, then, we have set before us the main elements of our problem. In declining to frame topics of dreams or myth within a dichotomy of truth or falsity, we must alternately make sense of these phenomena in connection with associated aspects of history, cultural politics and psychology. As sense-making processes go, these components offer the possibility of structural coherence. Without referring to actual historical and political developments, discussions of dreams and myth run the risk of joining psychological assessments in an ethereal realm devoid of physical contact. That is, the review of dreams, myth, and their intersection in psychological analysis requires a historical anchor to make any empirical claims about them. And yet, this connection will not be enough to render such a discussion relevant. Working within the political realm is crucial to demonstrate the human vagaries and impulses behind our historical examples. The present work abounds
with such illustrations; that the central case centers on dreams and myth in the culturally and politically volatile era of Nazism is deliberate. Connecting history’s starkest example of evil with phenomena not definable as true or false in their cultural applications offers new perspective on the workings of ambiguous processes as they shape our political histories. In the last analysis, we will evaluate these lessons through opposing psychological lenses. But before we can perform this analysis, the immense range of dreams’ cultural-political applications must be demonstrated; it is such a demonstration to which we now turn.
Chapter 2.

The Dream's Cultural and Political Horizon

As we have seen, the dream’s prestige fluctuates in connection with cultural standards; its status also rises or falls over the course of history. One reason for these changes is that the understanding of what a dream is shifts across time and space. Accordingly, various conceptions of ‘dream’ abound. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (2018) defines it as a “series of thoughts, images, and sensations occurring in a person’s mind during sleep.” Multiple alternate definitions follow this initial characterization: delusion, daydreaming and aspiration populate the list. Still, the idea of the dream as confined to nocturnal slumber seems well-suited to present-day Western culture.

In Chapter 1 a variation on the OED definition allowed daytime visions as dreams. For reasons that will become clear below, such an addition holds good. To this list could be included the mythical American Dream, as well as the rhetorical thunder of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, along with sarcastic reproaches of “in your dreams, man!” These last three examples all have their applications but fall outside of the stated theoretical purview of understanding dreams as perceived communications from a divine being, or as part of a normal psychological process. But even if the work were confined to a look at dreams as mental processes, the dictionary definition would fall short of the possibilities of a dream. And such a shortfall would not account for the cultural disparity of dream concepts.

The examples provided in Chapter 1 show that dreams display greater range than the OED’s initial definition offers. ‘Dream,’ in this case, must comprehend political culture. The operational definition of ‘dream’ for this work, then, is the following: The dream is a vision seen while asleep, awake, or in an altered psychological state; it is comprehensible in the cultural, political and ideological terms most relevant to the dreamer. Such a definitions achieves two objectives. First, it frees the dream from sleep; as seen in the Gilgamesh example, it is possible to form a narrative that structurally combines waking and dreaming visions. Second, the definition creates room for the cultural and political effects of the dream. The availability of such a space facilitated the free-range of cultural
and ideological expression demonstrated in Chapter 1, and it is this definitional scope that makes possible the remainder of the thesis.

**Cultural Analysis of Dreams and Dream Symbols**

Perhaps an endless array of cultural dream characterizations exists; what is more, the dream as a political and ideological frame continually assumes new forms. The fluid cultural expression of the dream detailed in Chapter 1 depicts power narratives. From the cuneiform authors of the dream segments in the *Gilgamesh* epic, to the writings of the Roman dream interpreter Artemidorus, or the sacerdotal orders that have overseen multitudes of dreams in the service of faith, keepers of dreams have the power to manipulate them. This practice has often served naked political ends. But closer study reveals that ideological preferences connect to dream histories. Here the power of the dream occupies a philosophical position with greater reach than that of narrowly directed political action. Working within our definition, support for this assertion reveals itself in dream patterns as disparate as the visions associated with the medieval quest for the Holy Grail, the dreams of shamanic ritual, those that German citizens experienced during the Nazi rise to power, along with dreams as reported during therapy. This cultural range might, at first glance, appear more random than disparate. But the scope of inquiry is by design. The point is to demonstrate that, although every culture analyzes dreams through its prevailing social lens, the resulting vision is ultimately ideological.

No ideological framework functions without symbols. Governmental politics and associated institutions provide examples of flags, ministerial insignia, and anthems. Dream symbols are far subtler than bureaucratic ones; they lack the high-definition clarity and unmistakable authoritative meaning of officialdom. Symbols in dreams are, in general, fuzzy and open to interpretation. As Hall and Nordby (1972) noted following their examination of tens of thousands of dreams, a dream’s metaphorical symbol exercises the same ambiguous tension commonly found in poetry (pp. 64-65). Yet, the “relation of a metaphorical symbol to its referent is not arbitrary” (p. 65). For instance, if a dreamer envisions a chicken, it might refer to cowardice; a sparrow could indicate flighty behaviour. Metaphorical dream images can also have murkier associations. For example, a group of
dreamers was asked to use a technique of interpretive free association to identify what the male stranger in their dreams symbolized; more than half said it was either their father or another authority figure (pp. 68-70). These images barely scratch the surface of the possible applications of dream symbolism. A detailed examination of dream symbols will be addressed in Chapter 6, in the discussion of the theoretical approaches of Freud and Jung.

With the present section’s focus on dream ideology and dream symbols, crucial phenomena to watch for are the ways in which dreams show political and ideological convergence. This might seem an overly fine distinction, and one somewhat misplaced, given the wide latitude of metaphoric meaning allowed by the dream symbol. Yet this potential overlap matters for the purposes of this work; the ideological framing of a symbol can inform its political purpose. For example, Christian ideology shapes Saul of Tarsus’ symbolic vision of light and its accompanying voice on the Road to Damascus (Acts 9:3–9). Subsequent to the revelation, the future St. Paul changes his political action from the persecution of Christians to indoctrinating people into ideals of the faith.

The examples listed above and those examined below evince a similar schematic, offering several viewpoints from which to discuss the ideological framing of dream symbols. Briefly, the key symbolic image in the Grail quest is the Holy Grail itself. Pious in tone, the Grail legend’s pursuit of religious treasure seeps into the visions of the questers; the faith-based symbol coexists with religious ideology. In a different context, Amazonian shamans embark on vision-based journeys that depend upon symbols to bolster an ontology which represents an ideological challenge to other worldviews. Disturbingly, the night visions of people living under Nazi terror brimmed with ideological symbols filled with political purpose. Finally, the ideology of control brought to bear on dream symbols used in psychoanalytic culture rounds out the chapter. Throughout, ideology and dream symbols remain constant; the key moving part, however, is their politics.

**The Quest of the Holy Grail**

Understanding the Holy Grail’s background helps to demonstrate this connection. Multiple versions of the Grail Quest exist, making a coherent telling of the tale a tall task; compounding the problem is the fact that, as noted in Chapter 1, the Grail Quest finds its
roots in Vedic-era India as a ritualized myth. In basic medieval terms, the myth features a life-giving vessel which proves difficult to locate, as it is kept in an obscure castle. Once found, the lord of the castle is seen to be wounded or otherwise in poor health; often the land around the fortress is parched and desolate. The lord can regain his health only if a knight locates the fortress and, following the march of a mystical cortege, poses a specific question. Should the knight fail short of completing these requirements, the lord will continue in ill health and the countryside remain a wasteland; the quest must then start again from the beginning. Integral to the quest are various adventures whose connections initially baffle the inexperienced knight. Ultimately, the knight finds his way back to the fortress to pose the correct question, which heals the lord, or king—generally called the ‘Fisher King,’ and simultaneously rehabilitates the land. It is at this point that the heroic knight takes the place of the Fisher King, along with the responsibility for guarding the castle and the Holy Grail (Wood, 2000, p. 170).

Other symbolic elements appear in different versions of the Grail story. Of significance to an early variant is the bleeding lance that the 12th Century poet, Chretien de Troyes, introduced as an accompanying piece to the mysterious procession accorded the Grail itself (Chretien de Troyes, 1985, pp. 88-89), though the symbol of the lance is downplayed in a later rendering of the tale. The articles of faith so prevalent in the Arthurian Grail Quest reveal the doctrinal standpoint of the chronicle. This is clear in the early 13th Century adaptation, The Quest of the Holy Grail, which begins with a collective dream. Much in the same visual and ideological key as the Roman Emperor Constantine and his army, who are said to have taken inspiration from a fiery cross emblazoned on the sky the day before the decisive Battle of Milvian Bridge in 312 CE (Nicholson, 2000, 309-310), King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table together beheld the mystical (though veiled) Holy Grail following a peal of thunder and the appearance of a brilliant light, courtesy of the Holy Ghost (Matarasso, 1986, pp. 43-44). The short-lived vision touches off the storied Quest. But dreams later in the tale move away from this collective character, and toward more personalized and political ones, which perform a larger ideological task. Lancelot’s dream of the Holy Grail, which the famous knight saw “as though in a trance” (p. 83), along with two of Perceval’s religious dreams, serve as useful examples.
Lancelot’s vision occurs following a ride long into the nighttime hours and concludes at an ancient and crumbling chapel in the woods. The knight peers inside to see an altar set with candles, but is barred entrance by an iron gate, and so sleeps on his shield next to a stone cross outside the church. When Lancelot dozes “as one who lies between sleeping and waking” (p. 82), a knight in ill-health appears, carried in a litter. Following prayers and prostrations, the newcomer conjures the Holy Grail from the impassable gate and is healed by the Grail’s power. The now healthy knight makes off with Lancelot’s sword and horse, traveling some distance before Lancelot rose “like a man first waking out of a deep sleep. He pondered awhile whether what he had seen were real or fruit of fancy, not knowing if he had beheld the Holy Grail or had but dreamed it.” When apparently fully awake, Lancelot discovers his belongings gone, making plain to him that the visit by the sick knight was not a dream; the status of his vision of the Grail is less clear (pp. 83-85).

Perceval, also on the sacred Quest, finds himself trapped on an island through the devil’s machinations, and is forced to contend with “wild beasts, bears and lions and leopards and winged beasts” (p. 114). Fortunately for the knight, his Christian faith enables him to slay a dragon, befriend a lion, and have a guiding dream (pp. 114-118). Perceval’s vision features two women: one old, riding a serpent, one young, mounted on a lion. Again, the knight’s piety comes in handy, as a priest arrives by boat to interpret the dream when Perceval awakes. The lion serves as an allegory for Christian law, the serpent for the older Hebrew code; the priest also foretells a fight against demonic forces that Perceval will have to face (pp. 119-123).

The dreams of each knight are tied to lust. Hearing a disembodied (dreamed) voice that reproaches him for past misdeeds as well as his attempt to advance toward the Holy Grail though unworthy, Lancelot weeps. After some time, the knight wanders through the forest until he encounters a hermit, who encourages the knight to unburden himself of his guilt. Lancelot admits to having “sinned unto death with my lady…Queen Guinevere.” The fallen knight recounts to the hermit his vision of the Holy Grail “and how neither reverence for the vessel nor the love of Our Lord had stirred him from his torpor” (p. 89). Lancelot vows to mend his ways (p. 94), but the link between his lustful behaviour and his dream cannot be erased.
Perceval’s dream features different symbols but connects to the same problem. As indicated above, the priest who interpreted Perceval’s dream told the knight that he would soon have to battle the devil, who promptly comes ashore in the form of a beautiful woman. The devil, so disguised, contrives to feed Perceval wine and bring him “so swiftly to the brink of losing what is irredeemable, namely virginity” (p. 130). Whether still drunk, under a devilish spell, or dreaming in a conventional sense, Perceval’s recognition of the evil manipulations happened only after “he came to his senses” and “opened his eyes” (p. 129). The leap from dream to lust remains a short one.

That the attribute of virginity was so highly prized can be seen in a contrasting character. One of the questing knights, Galahad, is described as having been created and reared for a more arduous task than mere victory in a tourney or in a lady’s bower like his father Lancelot. His eye is kept single upon the great Quest; where others falter and lose heart, he knows no discouragement. His eye is clear, his sword is keen, his heart is pure. Galahad is always in training. He will reach his goal. He will see God, and then gladly die (Comfort, 2000, p. 5).

This lionizing of Galahad’s character bears significance beyond the fact that such praise finds no focus on Lancelot or Perceval. Tellingly, the narrative features no instance of Galahad dreaming. His purpose and associated exploits are pure and his aim is true. In line with Western medieval ideology, which generally saw dreams as dangerous frameworks that risked forging a pathway to the devil (Schmitt, 1999, p. 279), Galahad’s lack of night visions works to consolidate his image as a perfect religious warrior.

Both Lancelot’s and Perceval’s dreams make use of religious images. Lancelot, waking alone, is confused by his Holy Grail dream; Perceval, in the company of a knowledgeable coreligionist, has his first vision explained to him and finds himself clashing with the devil in another. Dream, symbol, and ideology connect at this juncture. The Holy Grail, inaccessible to Lancelot because of his affair with Guinevere, served as a touchstone for the knight’s angst. In the context of Lancelot’s quest and his dream, the Grail holds the key to the confusion of his own dissoluteness, as well as the secret of a way of a return to upright living (pp. 85-93). For Perceval, the symbols of religious dogma regarding Mosaic Law and Christian faith are given to him by the priestly dream interpreter; the subsequent transgression of lust finds representation in the shape of a woman who is actually the devil. The first association is a biased representation of Christian ideology over the ideology of
Judaism (represented by the Garden of Eden’s serpent); the second a symbol of the value of chastity in the face of temptation.

One of the era’s dominant monastic dogmas—Cistercian ideology—bears out this connection to lust, as well as dictating the personal politics (and dreams) of Lancelot and Perceval. *The Quest of the Holy Grail* dates from about 1220, written by an unknown author who was either a Cistercian monk (Campbell, 1968, p. 541) or had ties to the order (Comfort, 2000, p. 2). Originating in 1098 (Matarasso, 1986, p. 20), the Cistercian system drew upon the ancient Benedictine rule (Hoffman Berman, 2010, p. 98) and aimed to follow it to the letter (Matarasso, 1986, p. 20). In the chapter on ‘The Instruments of Good Works’ in the *The Rule of St. Benedict* (1966), seventy-two rules are set forth. Among them are rule number four: “Not to commit adultery” (p. 17), rule number fifty-nine: “Not to give way to the desires of the flesh” (p. 20) and rule number sixty-three: “To love chastity” (p. 21). These principles establish the ascendant Cistercian order’s focus on sexual abstinence.

Prior to drawing the interest of the Cistercians in the opening decades of the 13th Century, the earlier knights of the Grail Quest had been shown to possess miscellaneous character traits, noble and otherwise, but none had been portrayed “as impeccably chaste, as pure, as ‘virgin”’ (Comfort, 2000, p. 3). The anonymous writer of *The Quest of the Holy Grail* sought to change this fact with the introduction to prominence of the abstinent and upright Galahad (p. 3). So, while the chaste knight does not dream, the more sensual Lancelot and Perceval are drawn toward carnal pleasure in their night visions. Each is shown a dear price to be paid for failing to adhere to the strictures of celibacy; Lancelot is denied the mystery of the Grail in his dream and chastised for his intemperance in waking life, while Perceval nearly gives in to the lustful trap set by the devil. Such are the peculiarities that weave *The Quest of the Holy Grail’s* most poignant dreams into the ideological web of a particular period of Christian cultural history.

**Amazonian Shamanism**

At first glance, the connections between the Holy Grail and Shamanic power might seem tenuous. The contrast, however, is the point of the comparison. Relationships
between dreams, ideology, and political power inhere in each case. In his magnum opus, *Shamanism*, Mircea Eliade (1992) describes shamanic authority as sovereign, holding that shamans’ transcendent “experiences have exercised, and still exercise, a powerful influence on the stratification of religious ideology, on mythology, on ritualism” (p. 7). In strictest terms, shamanism refers to the cosmology understood by masters of ecstatic technique—the ultimate religious experience—of peoples native to Central Asia and Siberia (p. 4). This designation has been subsequently applied to religious and magical adepts indigenous to many other parts of the world (p. 5). The shaman is a magician and a healer, but “specializes in a trance during which his soul is believed to leave his body and ascend to the sky or descend to the underworld” (p. 5). And the shaman is no stranger to other influential visions. The dreams experienced during the initiatory phase of becoming a shaman are of crucial importance (pp. 13-14), as is the interpretation of dreams of prospective shamans (p. 109). The shaman, in dreams, embarks upon the sacred life, establishing “direct relations with the gods, spirits and ancestral souls.” The dream world acquaints the future healer with mythical beginnings of his or her culture (p. 103). Thus trained, it is this “small mystical elite” (p. 6) that directs the religious life of the communities it leads, serving to protect the souls of the locals. Shamans, however, often find themselves in conflict with other religious ideologies (p. 8), such as the early 20th Century clash between Amazonian shamans and Catholic missionaries (Taussig, 1987, p. 81).

Yet shamanic conflict is not restricted to religion. The use and prescription by South American shamans of a vision-producing sacrament known as *ayahuasca* has clashed with modern Western legal frameworks that restrict its use. In the 1960s, the use of psychedelic drugs was at the root of a moral hysteria. Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin-based mushrooms and other hallucinogens were associated with hippie counterculture. Their use was viewed as a “threat to the existing sociopolitical order” (Blainey, 2015, p. 290). Pushback against these mind-altering drugs came in many forms but culminated in the 1971 United Nations’ Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which provided a legal basis for the prohibition of these intoxicants in 184 signatory countries. Worldwide, the International Narcotics Control Board now regulates global bans on these substances (pp.
The active ingredient in ayahuasca is \textit{N, N-Dimethyltryptamine} (DMT), and it is prohibited in most nation states.

Known in the Quechua language as “Vine of the Soul,” \textit{ayahuasca} is a mixture of plants grown in the Amazon jungle, whose use predates European contact (p. 288), later noted disapprovingly by Catholic missionaries (Taussig, 1987, pp. 307-308). In his book \textit{Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man}, Anthropologist Michael Taussig (1987) traces an ideological application of \textit{ayahuasca} to the industrialist race for rubber in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries. Focusing on the plight of indigenous groups in the Putumayo region of the Amazonian expanse, Taussig details the violence of the region’s political economy, characterized by rubber traders’ practice of compelling indigenous people to harvest rubber through forced labour, sexual assault, and human trafficking (p. 60). In short, turning people from the Putumayo district into slaves to reap financial gain became routine (p. 62). Yet, Western contempt for the people forced to gather rubber was not total. Rubber traders and missionaries alike saw the value in shamanic curative practices, occasionally availing themselves of their benefits (pp. 81-82).

This dichotomy of condescension and esteem for the work of the shamans of the region has persisted. But this division emphasizes political strength relative to dreams and their ideological significance. Taussig writes of his time in the Putumayo forests in the 1970s, that an Ingano shaman employed the vision-inducing \textit{ayahuasca} to heal non-indigenous settlers in the region. In so doing, Taussig argues, connections between indigenous people and colonists, brutalized by centuries of slavery and abuse, have embarked upon a healing process with the aim of simultaneously curing individuals and damaged social relationships (p. 99). To this end, Ingano shamanic techniques of producing \textit{ayahuasca} have been shared with settlers (pp. 140-148). A search for the roots of such a concord finds a tenuous connection in an isolated softening of Western religious ideology. Certain Catholic missionaries, toward the end of the rubber-boom, sympathized with the Ingano people and other indigenous groups regarding their use of the hallucinogen. One particular churchman, a Father Bartolome, went so far as to give his blessing to the use of it, calling on other ecclesiastics to cease their persecution of locals who imbibed in sacramental drink. Still, these sympathetic clerics could not have foreseen that Christian settlers would ultimately
gravitate toward the *ayahuasca* dream, rather than Christian ideas becoming fully institutionalized among the indigenous people of the Amazon (p. 386).

Of greater significance in this case is the evidence that shamanic ideology has withstood and absorbed Westernizing efforts. Perhaps light can be shed on this fact with a look at the views of the Shipibo-Conibo society regarding colonial occupation. Making their home in the Western Amazon, the Shipibo-Conibo have striven to include innovation in their worldview. Western contact, with its technology and religion, has not been viewed as completely detrimental to this civilization. In this vein, Shipibo-Conibo shamans work to “incorporate difference and feed on alterity” (Colpron, 2013, pp. 375). And, because of this propensity to accept change, their comprehension of Western contact does not represent an irreparable rupture with the past. The Shipibo-Conibo worldview encompasses this reality in a mythical understanding—an understanding which sees that, what looks to Western eyes as radical modernizing shifts, have actually always existed within the culture (pp. 375-376). This ideology finds expanded purchase in the use of *ayahuasca*.

To comprehend a politicized use of the vision-inducing tea, a broad understanding of the Amazonian shamanic ideology is required. Cultural critic Neil Postman (2012) writes that built into any technology is “an ideological bias, a predisposition to construct the world as one thing rather than another” (p. 21). Anthropologist Marc Blainey (2015) takes a similar position in the context of *ayahuasca* use, writing that the purpose for which such a medicine is used depends upon the intention of the user (pp. 298-299). This is to say that, just as the resistance to *ayahuasca* use has been and remains ideological—whether religious or legal—so are the medicinal uses to which it is put. This worldview holds with respect to the dreamlike states that the potion produces. Further, when considering that Shipibo-Conibo shamans employ the drink as part of an ontological formulation, it is useful to recall that the present work includes in its definition of the dream altered psychological states. To begin, these shamans see not “a single, shared world, but rather a multiplicity of worlds and subjectivities” (Colpron, 2013, p. 374). Moreover, the Shipibo-Conibo concept of time is cyclical and mythical rather than historical and linear (p. 374). Such ontological views entail an impermanent epistemology: in the same way that the Shipibo-Conibo perceive life and death, or day and night as alternating, rather than permanently separate.
states, people in this society comprehend the shift between dreaming and waking life as diverse worlds succeeding one another. Further, dreams are not fantasies or false states, they are “other lived realities, other enactments of people and temporalities” (p. 376). The Shipibo-Conibo shamans have mastered the technique of transformation from one circumstance to the next, moving between what are seen in the Western tradition as opposites of life and death, or waking reality and the dream-world, without assuming the permanent existence of one or the other.

That the use of ayahuasca is key to bringing about this flexible ontology is shown in a drawing by a Shipibo-Conibo shaman produced while under the influence of the brew. The image depicts two people (the artist and his shaman wife) traveling on the backs of a canoe constructed of serpents. The pair enter into an array of tree worlds, individuated by various shades of green and purple, which the shamans hold to be populated with complete societies. The arcane vision of such a journey might appear to render ‘ideology’ too blunt an instrument to describe the shamans’ experience after having taken ayahuasca. Yet, these worlds are bound together by the natural surroundings the shamans have established through a created perception. And, with no permanent natural forms in the Shipibo-Conibo ontology, the natural entities and the worlds that they comprise exist only so long as the shamans relate to them; the mystics are thus “literally incarnating these worlds” (p. 376).

Anthropologist and shaman Michael Harner first took ayahuasca with the Conibo in 1961 (Harner, Walsh and Grob, 2012, p. 82). Harner says that the “shaman is an empirical pragmatist. The worlds are wherever the shaman sees them” (p. 85). So, this process is, to follow Postman’s (2012) line of thought, a construction of “the world as one thing rather than another” (p. 21). The shamanic ontology, as enhanced by the ayahuasca vision, is difficult for Western minds to view as credible, as it inverts modern European thought by trading concrete existence for shifting, relational worlds (Colpron, 2013, p. 377). Whether the serpents and other images present in the shaman’s dream-inspired drawing constitute symbols in a Western sense, or serve as representations of a literal reality, is a matter of cultural difference. Power nevertheless inheres in the shamans’ technologically-induced vision. The ideological bias embedded in the Shipibo-Conibo worldview can be seen as being bound up with their use of the ayahuasca mixture, which is “the basic instrument of shamanic technology” (Colpron, 2013, p. 378).
Such perspectives of the dream as induced visions are widespread among Amazonian shamans. And, as Canadian anthropologist Wade Davis (2009) discovered during time spent in the Amazon with different indigenous groups collectively known as “the Peoples of the Anaconda” (p. 94), ideological applications for ayahuasca are also common. Davis introduces the sacrament in the context of an ontology at odds with a Western worldview, writing that such differences became clear to him after he tracked down the Latvian zoologist, Federico Medem, on an excursion to the Northwest region of the Amazon in Colombia, in 1975. Dear to the scientist was a crystal bequeathed to him by a local shaman. The jewel was “both the penis and crystallized semen of Father Sun,” comprised of thirty distinct energies and connected colours, which had to be ritually balanced. Curiously, the necklace was also the shaman’s house, the place to which he went when he took yage, the hallucinogenic potion also known as ayahuasca. Once inside, the shaman looks out at the world, over the territory of his people and the sacred sites – the forests, waterfalls, mountainous escarpments, and black water rivers – watching and watching the ways of the animals” (p. 95).

Similar to the ayahuasca vision of the Shipibo-Conibo shamans, the varying cosmologies of the Peoples of the Anaconda have in common serpent canoes, which brought from the east the first people, along with manioc, coca and the ayahuasca mixture (p. 96).

One of the indigenous groups Davis stayed with, the Barasana, use ayahuasca under the auspices of tribal shamans (p. 101). The social consumption of the plant-drink gains traction within their ontology: trading on a metaphysics similar to that of the Shipibo-Conibo, the Barsana do not possess a concept of the continuous march of time, and their worldview sees that all events are connected. Further, “any number of ideas can coexist in parallel levels of perception and meaning. Scale succumbs to intention. Every object must be understood…at various levels of analysis.” For example, a set of rapids in a river stands not only as a hurdle to be overcome when canoeing, it also serves to house the souls of previous generations and is possessed of both front and rear entrances (p. 102).

None of these perceptions comes with an obvious place for the newcomer to begin to try and understand a way of looking at life so distinct from Western ideas. Compounding the difference between the worldviews is the ideological discrepancy over whether the images seen while under the influence of ayahuasca are symbolic or literal. Yet the trend toward use of the plant-based drink among Westerners has proliferated. And, despite the
perceived healing properties of *ayahuasca*, the vision-producing sacrament remains an ideological battleground. It has been used in Canada to treat addictions to cocaine and heroin. Vancouver doctor Gabor Mate prescribed *ayahuasca* and supervised its use for patients whose drug addiction had resisted other treatments. One patient described her recovery from addiction via Mate’s administering of the sacred vine, saying that “*ayahuasca* saved my life” (Blainey, 2015, p. 293); the patient averred that the plant concoction forced her to examine the buried psychological pain that drove her drug addiction.

Mate characterizes *ayahuasca*’s beneficial agency as a key to facilitating new perspectives on stored emotional pain (p. 294). Yet, Health Canada shut down Mate’s nascent program in 2011, threatening to send police to arrest him if he did not desist (p. 293). UCLA psychiatry professor, Charles Grob, has done field research with *ayahuasca* and says that in “the right context, with the right intention, with the right support system, *ayahuasca* can be remarkably therapeutic” (Anderson, CBC, p. 1). This assessment of the sacred drink now lures many Westerners to the Amazon region in search of its curative properties. And the search for the dream-inducing tea has become a major source of income for the Peruvian Shipibo, with a two-week course of ritualistic drinking of *ayahuasca* priced at several thousand dollars (Anderson, CBC, p. 1). Over the last century, then, spiritual healing associated with the shamanic worldview, which previously ran afoul of Western religious ideology and now clashes with a legal-bureaucratic dogma, has culminated in a political economy of *ayahuasca*-based dreams.

**Dreamers under Nazi Rule**

The question of dreams as frames of ideologically-driven cultural forms is visible at the beginning of humanity’s bleakest chapter. Politics were built into the night visions of dreamers in the Nazi regime. As reflected in hundreds of recorded dreams, the culture of the times was one of fear. And, as noted in the opening chapter, the beginning of the 1930s saw a cross-section of German citizens begin to have nightmares when Hitler’s regime of terror began to reveal a reality of cancelled liberties and anticipating further terror. Writer Charlotte Beradt conducted interviews with these dreamers between 1933 and 1939. By
the 1940s, Beradt had escaped to the United States, settling in New York, where the dream records were eventually smuggled to her (Stein, 2010, p. 126). Of the roughly three hundred transcripts that she recorded, all centred on the dominance of the Nazi government.

The control was so thorough that the dreams focused not only on the oppression the Nazis brought to bear on their own citizens, these visions displayed a near complete abdication of resistance to the Fascists. In the words of psychologist Bruno Bettelheim (1968), anxiety forced citizens to

kill off their own dreams before they could gain the emotional relief that, in fantasy, at least, we can do as we wish. Thus the regime was successful in forcing even its enemies to dream the kinds of dreams it wanted them to dream: those warning the dreamer that resistance was impossible, that safety lay only in compliance (p. 151).

The influence of terror was so pervasive that the tactics of Hitler’s government maintained a stranglehold on dreams for decades after the Nazis had been defeated (p. 152).

The dreams that Beradt discovered during the interview tended thematically toward anxiety, powerlessness, and an absence of any wish to resist (pp. 154-155). A code of fear was written into the dreams that Beradt uncovered; in the words of Reinhart Koselleck (2018), “these dreams [were] modes of implementing the terror” (p. 16). A near complete identification with persecution and a void of dreams in which the dreamer is the victor is evident. The Nazi police state, with its anti-Semitic terror took such a hold on the dreamers that the visions of Beradt’s interviewees cancelled “the healthy balance between submission and self-assertion” (p. 155). This psychological imbalance removed even dreamed defiance because the only security inhered in total capitulation (p. 156).

Bettelheim contrasts the dreams of German citizens with those whose fate had been sealed in the death camps. Prisoners enduring the horrors of the camps did not allow their night visions to wander into the Nazi nightmare so common among those still outside the barbed-wire fences. The inmates had already lost everything and had nothing left to fear; the worst had already happened. Those who still feared the camps, summary execution, or some other horror had hopes of regaining a place of safety, yet their dreams represented the failure of these hopes (p. 157). Auschwitz survivor and psychiatrist, Victor Frankl (1992), confirms Bettelheim’s characterization of camp dreams, writing that one night he saw a fellow prisoner in the throes of what must have been a nightmare. The man moaned and thrashed in his sleep and Frankl made a move to wake him up but stopped short,
thinking that, no matter how bad the man’s dream, it could not match the reality of the death camp (p. 17). By way of contrast to this nightmare, Frankl writes that inmates most often dreamed of “bread, cake, cigarettes and nice warm baths. The lack of having these simple desires satisfied led [them] to seek wish fulfillment in dreams” (p. 18). If there can be an ideology of survival, dreams such as these demonstrate it. The visions that Frankl lists above were tailored toward a time when such dreams had been (or might again become) part of waking reality. Perhaps more clearly ideological were dreams that featured visions of vengeance or escaping from the camps (Bettelheim, 1968, p. 158). The dreams of escape could also come in the form of death. Frankl (1992) writes of one instance in which a friend dreamed that he would be released on a certain date. When the day came and went without freedom, the man died (p. 37).

Other dreams noted during the course of the war took on different characteristics. Resistance fighters in Denmark—those who helped Jewish people find safety—often dreamed of defeating the SS terrorists, alongside visions of being tortured or killed by Nazis. These dreams differed from an attitude based on fears of trying to salvage something from an already endangered life, as in the night visions of the German citizens whose dreams were motivated by the unconscious surrender to Nazi dogma (Bettelheim, p. 160). These resisters’ dreams, while often fearful, contrast sharply with those whose thoughts had been stolen by terror. For example, one of Beradt’s interviewees intimated that her dream of Hitler as Satan resulted in her arrest within the dream, suggesting that even pondering insurgent thoughts crossed the line into perilous territory and must be averted (p. 161).

More of Beradt’s interviews confirm this line of thinking. One interviewee describes a dream in which he is speaking with a relative on the telephone; in the course of the conversation he makes a statement in support of the Nazi regime as a ruse to deceive anyone eavesdropping on the conversation into believing that he favoured Hitler’s politics. Yet panic kicked into the dream as he came to see that his stratagem would be exposed (p. 163). Bettelheim concludes that the Nazis’ success in occupying the dreams of average Germans is best explained by the nature of the authoritarian state, an entity so inhuman that it aggravated every fear and subconscious insecurity. This scheme “saps away whatever inner strength one may have to fight back” (p. 168). Those few who managed to avoid total
domination of their thoughts were inclined to dream of rebellion against the Nazi terror; the waking mental resistance and the dreamed visions tended to reinforce one another, even if the resistance was solely a mental or dreamed construct (p. 168).

But the reality for millions in Nazi Germany was of a death-grip on waking reality, with no respite during dreamtime. Psychologist Abby Stein (2010) writes that “dreaming is an intermediary between political reality and personal defense, plus a shared social metaphor, symptomatic of indoctrination in both its banal and despotic forms” (p. 127). The ideological domination and associated political connections in the examples just given are clear, yet their effectiveness as defenses changes with the degree to which the political realities have become the complete experience of the individual dreamer. The varied dreams common to the terrified ordinary citizen, death camp inmate, and resistance member crystalize this notion. The idea of the dream as a “shared social metaphor” (p, 127) and its power to inculcate gets closer to the heart of the subject matter treated by Beradt’s interviewees in the visions that they describe, as do the dreams of resistance fighters. The two sets of dreams offer a contrast of dream symbols: for example, the motif of Hitler as Satan versus the theme of victory are opposites. The appearance of such cultural emblems mirrors psychiatrist Montague Ullman’s (2001) position on dreams’ political linkages. Ullman holds that social images “seep into our unconsciousness, find their way into our dreams and expose the personal problematic aspects of current society” (p. 2). Ullman asserts that people maintain a blind-spot with regard to their political institutions—a lack of vision that can be exposed in dreams (p. 3). Exposure of this blind spot in dreams is a focus we will explore at length in Chapter 5.

Psychoanalysis and Dreams

A discussion about dreams as ideological representations probably would not have been possible without the advances of Sigmund Freud. Philosopher Jean Gebser (1985) called Freud’s decision to approach dreams as legitimate and important phenomena a courageous one (p. 396). This willingness to study the dream challenged an established stratum of thought, in place since the Enlightenment, which viewed dreams as belonging to “the realm of mere fiction” (Koselleck, 2018, p. 12). Freud’s publication in 1900 of *The Interpretation*
of Dreams provided a point of departure for thinkers looking for a dream framework. Freud’s clinical approach to dreams will be treated at length in Chapter 6.

Freud’s (2008) influence on public perception of the dream in Western culture is immeasurable. His work affected the perspectives of patients who submitted their dreams for interpretation (pp. 140-144). Freud also influenced the views of dream analysts such as Alfred Adler, who went on to formulate ideas about dreams as being supportive of the dreamer’s lifestyle, and helping dreamers strive “towards the goal of superiority” (Stevens, 1995, pp. 69-70). Freud’s dream theory also influenced Otto Rank’s major work, The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, with regard to the book’s “assumptions about neurosis and typical dreams” (Obiad, 2012, p. 697). Additionally, Freud’s theories had an impact on Carl Jung’s notions about dreams, as detailed below (Jung, 1989, pp. 146-147). Yet the legitimization of the dream as a subject worthy of professional analysis has fostered a culture that has almost wholly occupied the dream at the expense of public engagement. This specialization is rooted in the rocky relationship between two major psychoanalytic figures.

Professional control of the dream by an insular circle of upper-echelon psychologists gathered speed in the aftermath of Jung’s break with Freud. Jung (1989) writes that, during a trip with Freud to the United States in 1909, the senior analyst expressed suspicion about Jung’s line of questioning regarding a dream of Freud’s that Jung was attempting to interpret (p. 158). The following year, in Vienna, Freud demanded of Jung that he assist in making “a dogma” of his sexual theory (p. 150). Jung’s grasp of the approach saw that “all neuroses were caused by sexual repression or sexual traumata” (p. 148). The argument, of course, finds a well-known place in Freud’s (2008) approach to incestuous wish fulfilment in dreams (p. 202). In 1912, Jung (1989) published a book which posited a theory of the libido at odds with Freud’s conception of it (p. 167); once the volume hit the shelves all ties between the two psychologists were sundered (p. 206).

Other than an early-career association with Freud, Jung (1974) is best known for his dream theory pertaining to the collective unconscious (p. 77), and its associated “mythological motifs” or “archetypes” (Jung, 1964, p. 57), as outlined in Chapter 1. A full treatment of these ideas is presented in Chapter 6. Jung’s theoretical approach to dreams has enjoyed academic attention and remains established in the professional realm. But his ideas have also found a public niche, illustrated, for example, by the activity of the Jung
Society of Vancouver. Founded in 1981 as a non-profit association, the society works to communicate Jung’s ideas to a broad audience. More than one hundred associates comprise the membership, which assembles about once a month to take in lectures by Jungian scholars. The association is organized through a board of directors and is equipped with a library service. Thus composed, the society perseveres as a modest but vigorous community. And, buoyed by the study of Jung’s work, conversations about dreams as part of a cultural process fuel the greater part of the gatherings (C. G. Jung Society of Vancouver, personal communication, February 27, 2015).

The society has succeeded in drawing attention to Jung’s ideas. Most of the society’s gatherings constitute a standing-room only crowd, replete with members and non-members alike. Communication at the meetings tends to take on an academic tone. The general public are welcome to attend (although it costs non-members extra to observe the lectures), and a question and answer session takes up most of the time after the lecture. A disadvantage to this set-up is that, to make full use of the talk, it is beneficial to have some understanding of Jung’s theories. Such familiarity is not universal among attendees.

A similar unevenness in conceptual understanding of dreams dots the social landscape. Yet, despite a theoretical gap that varies from person to person, the broad cultural appeal of dreams remains. Books purporting to interpret dreams remain on the market, and a cursory online scan turns up hundreds of websites dedicated to the practice. More difficult to bring to the fore is an informed view of the dream, whether in an interpretive sense, a historical understanding, or as a cultural expression. It is perhaps for this reason that in Western societies the dream—other than in private musings—remains confined in large measure to the analyst’s office. Even with Freud’s reintroduction of the dream to Western culture, dream culture has been slow to build. This is not to say that public dream culture is absent; examples of a gradual resurgence will be discussed toward the end of the work.

Meantime, the divide between public and professional dream culture remains unbridged, while professional dream analysis has produced a body of literature over the past century. Multiple analytical schools of thought pertaining to understanding dreams have developed since Freud and Jung. Those of Alfred Adler, Samuel Lowy, Erica Fromm and Charles Rycroft offer a handful of examples (Stevens, 1995, pp. 69-78). The study of dreams has, of course, extended beyond the confines of mental health patient and analyst.
For example, in their massive content analysis of more than 50,000 dreams, researchers Calvin Hall and Vernon Nordby (1972) found that, in a series of an individual’s dreams, certain themes begin to recur (p. 80). Hall and Nordby provide an example of a woman whose dream diary, which spanned from 1912 to 1965, exhibited an even consistency of characters and themes throughout a half-century of reporting (p. 82). Based on their overall analysis of tens of thousands of dreams, the researchers favour the idea that dreams serve as a continuous link with our waking lives; our waking motivations move seamlessly into our dreams. The main difference between the two states, of course, is that the dream is unbounded by the limiting factors of waking life (p. 104), yet, while embarking on intense flights of fancy, the dream does not mislead (p. 127).

Hall and Nordby view the dream as moving beyond the individual to the extent that dream motifs often find a reflection in the organizational systems people establish (p. 148). Moreover, the researchers hold that, while no evidence exists linking dreams to social development, dreams

and the social order, dreams and actions, and dreams and thoughts, are all expressions of the same basic wishes and fears of mankind. The dynamics of dreams are also the dynamics of society. Consequently, when we study dreams, we are not only studying the individual but we are also studying his social behaviour and the institutions he creates (p. 151).

This observation raises an important point about the public expression of dreams: the dream and culture mirror one another—two phenomena expressing the same thing in different ways—yet one does not motivate the other to change. This is, however, a debatable assertion.

Regarding the relationship between the dream and its social character, Montague Ullman (2001) holds that society informs our dreams which, so informed, provide new perspectives on facets of personal connections to societal organization (p. 2). The relationship, as well as the individual phenomena of dreams and culture, are dynamic. Advocating for a strengthened social connection to dreams (p. 3), Ullman avers that dreams, communicated in a group setting have the power to “fill an unmet social need[s],” such as improved connectivity, fulfilment of dreamers and dream groups, while fostering a “sense of communion” (p. 4). Yet, dream culture in the West, if it can be spoken of as such, is more likely to find expression with an analyst’s interpretation than within a
community. Even with a proclamation such as psychologist Paul Lippmann’s (2003) dictum that a “culture that disregards dreams…is a culture that is ready to disavow inner life” (p. 228), it is plain that mental health professionals remain in control of the dream. Lippmann understands that “dreams and psychoanalysis were made for each other” (p. 229). And the current psychoanalytic approach to dreams, while lacking the place of primacy it held in the days of Freud and Jung, trains its focus on “aspects of the therapist-patient interaction,” while remaining “alienated” from community (p. 229).

This cultural ideology of psychoanalytic dominance persists. From Freud’s (2008) early forays into the dream realm, to the mid-20th Century analyses of psychiatrist Walter Bonime (1962), along with the efforts of multi-media immersed professionals of the 21st Century (Lippmann, 2003, pp. 229-230), the monopolization of the night vision by an educated elite has guided and continues to guide the fate of the dream in the West. A clear example from the earliest days of modern dream analysis is Freud’s famous vision of the night of July 23/24, 1895, which concerns a patient named Anna Hammerschlag (Fichtner, 2009, p. 1149). Highlighted in the dream is the idea that blame for the incomplete medical care given to the woman in the vision, a patient with the pseudonym “Irma,” is shifted from Freud to one of his colleagues. The dream, in exonerating Freud (2008), thus demonstrates the wish-fulfilling function of the dream (pp. 94-95). In this instance, the psychoanalyst ensures that the now famous vision establishes, if not a definitive understanding of a dream’s purpose, ideological authority for control of the dream.

Professional dominance of the dream remained decades into the 20th Century. For instance, Walter Bonime’s (1962) book, The Clinical Use of Dreams, bears the subtitle A Practical Handbook for Analyst and Patient. The publication is full of examples of dreams that could be of service to someone wanting to understand the dynamic between psychiatrist and patient in analyzing dreams. The text also places the narrative under the ideological control of the analyst. Bonime pursues an interactional model of dreams, following the work of analysts Karen Horney and Bernard Robbins, who emphasized the importance of the lives people lead over that of their dreams (pp. x-xi). In so doing, Bonime diverges from a Jungian focus on a collective unconscious (p. x). He also critiques Freudian theory, rejecting sexual connections to anxiety and, moreover, holding that anxiety, “whether reflected in dreams or in waking circumstances, is…always to be taken as a signal
for more determined therapeutic pursuit, rather than withdrawal, which would be an abandonment of the patient” (p. 180). The power relations outlined in this claim are visible in cases in which Bonime, as he contextualizes human relations within dreams, ultimately highlights the analyst’s role, rather than that of the dreamer. For example, we learn that a patient seeking help to overcome a drinking problem communicated several dreams to the psychoanalyst. In short, they featured a drinking binge in the company of another drinker, a conflict with an animal, and a visit to church with his wife. Bonime endeavored to show the man that the dreams indicated a need to examine his closest relationships, and that the visions “represented his ways of dealing with people, including his analyst” (pp. 104-105). The psychoanalyst’s interactional interpretation of his patient’s dream might be correct. Yet the connections in the dreams stand as a function of a professional approach—Bonime writes of his response to the patient’s manner of acting that “it was necessary for us to watch for these elements in his behavior in the analytic relationship” (p. 105). Any changes in the patient were to be made in the context of analysis rather than in the social connections they were said to represent.

Other than an ideology of professional control, the worldview of mental health professionals with respect to the dream remains an open question. And as Lippmann (2003) notes, the current power narrative is not guaranteed, writing that if “our system learns to market dreams, they will gain in official value” (p. 230). The dream, should it gain the same public exposure as plastic surgery or vasectomies, would open a new world of dream politics. Yet, in examining the dream symbols that psychoanalysts and other professionals have attempted to interpret, a proprietary sense has already emerged—one in which political applications persist. For example, Jung’s theory of archetypal symbols has become established as a form of dream interpretation therapy (Stevens, 1995, pp. 56-57)—therapy for which people pay. Archetypal theory has also directed the actions of people who attend meetings at the Vancouver Jung Society. The power of Jungian dream symbols to move people is at its most compelling when one considers that they defy empirical verification. In the words of psychiatrist C. A. Meier (1984), we “cannot experience the unconscious as such. This would involve a contradiction in terms. We can only experience its effects” (p. 8). The payment required to discuss archetypes within the confines of the Jung Society demonstrates the political effects of such a theory. Yet, the politics of dream symbols has
never been settled. Significantly, Freud (2008) saw that dreams required “no universal key, no system of symbols” to derive their meaning (p. xxxii). Hall and Nordby (1972) agree, writing that “[n]o one has discovered an infallible rule or method” for discerning different types of dream symbols (p. 66). That ambiguous political direction prevails over the dream’s opacity is unsurprising,

**Dreams’ Cultural Power**

To employ ideology as a doctrinal framework means to use power in a particular way. In all the examples given in this chapter, dream symbols have been manipulated to set an ideological stage, provoking the cultural conditions necessary for political action. The Holy Grail legend—with its dream narratives—became a politicized literary form as the ascetic monasticism of the Cistercian order reached its height (Matarasso, 1986, pp. 20-21), and the ideological visions of the ayahuasca masters held political sway before the first missionaries arrived with their crucifixes. The bloodthirsty Nazi ideology brought about and controlled the political nightmares of people in Germany, while psychological ideology has dominated dreams in the West for more than a century. And yet, while originating in far-flung regions and historical periods, the cultural commonalities pertaining to all four of these illustrations reveal an order. The cases analyzed in this chapter evince the fact that dream symbols and ideology are bound together, cultural expression is generated from this relationship, and politics are enmeshed in the process.

Hence we can say that the significance of dreams (and myth), when applied to the cultural politics of waking life, cannot be scaled down to opposing stances of fact and fiction. In each example discussed in this chapter the ideological position concerning dreams, along with the associated political action, tells a culturally specific story about power. Yet, any number of possible narratives could have arisen instead. A rival monastic organization might have established a different worldview in the *The Quest of the Holy Grail* had it been more powerful than the Cistercians. The various ontologies connected to ayahuasca dreams have adjusted to Western incursions, healed the addicted, and provided guidance to Amazon societies. But current development of ayahuasca’s political-economic potential indicates an emergent cultural story about power—one whose ramifications are
too nascent to describe with accuracy. Nazi ideology was reinforced in dreams that were already waking nightmares and threatening worse—the dreams’ political currency establishing itself in lockstep with the terror that consumed Germany. Still, Nazi Germany’s nightmare did not have to happen—its horrors avoidable if confronted with a more powerful story about the world. Similarly, the mental health profession’s control over dreams represents a single possibility regarding the direction of people’s dreams in the developed world. An alternative course, for example, could have advocated for the cultural dominance of an exchange system in which people made sense of their dreams in collective settings. The point is that each of the dream narratives examined in this chapter succeeded not because of some inner truth, but because of their connection to power.

Yet this explanation leaves us cold. The possibility of alternative histories does nothing to alter cases as they actually unfolded. And to speak of ideological power as though it emerges from a vacuum tells us little; that ideology plays out in dreams and can become political action evinces a system of sorts but stops short of a complete description. It is here that myth enters the equation. That the dream influences the myth has been noted; the myth’s influence on the dream is equally as powerful—the two can reinforce one another. Historian Peter Burke (1997) sees the problem in the following way:

if people in a given culture dream the myths of that culture, then their dreaming in turn supports belief in the myths, particularly in cultures in which dreaming is interpreted as ‘seeing’ another world. Myths shape dreams, but dreams in turn authenticate myths, in a circle which facilitates cultural reproduction or continuity (p. 27)

Vital in grasping the power inherent in this relationship is first understanding the ways in which the myth functions. Similar to the enormous cultural-political scope of dreams, myth’s cultural-political reach is extensive. Our attention now turns to an outline of the range of myth’s influence, with a focus on myths pertaining to Nazism, Haitian Voodoo, and digital technology.
Chapter 3.

I Always Tell the Truth, Even When I Lie

The word ‘myth’ is overused in everyday conversation. As shown in Chapter 1, the word generally indicates something that cannot be true; myth, of course, signals more than inaccuracy or deception. Further, the word’s meaning has changed over time. And, as demonstrated above, myth’s trajectory from a performed ritual to allegory or a collection of fairy tales has played itself out in cultural expressions as diverse as the poetry of Homeric Greece and the scientific projects of Enlightenment-era Western Europe. Yet, culturally specific as these changes are, a broad structure undergirds the process. The shift that a given myth undergoes from lived reality to storage in library books is an ideological one. This statement represents no great revelation; the previous chapters have connected dream, myth and ideology. Just as dreams possess an ideological component, myths are connected with prevailing worldviews. Societies live their myths. Moreover, the process of myth formation is fluid and non-linear; it is this fluidity that makes the establishment of a definition a thorny task. Yet, these vagaries render formal elucidation a crucial undertaking.

Crystallization of ‘myth’ for the purposes of this work becomes still more difficult when considering that various definitions have long been legitimized. Chapter 2 quoted the OED in its attempt to operationalize ‘dream.’ That definition fell short of the needs of the present work, in part, because too many definitions were given, and also because the dictionary’s characterization and purpose differ from those of the task at hand. The OED’s initial definition of myth is that of a “traditional story, especially one concerning the early history of a people or explaining a natural or social phenomenon, and typically involving supernatural beings or events” (2018). Multiple alternate definitions follow this one.

As with the definition of the dream, then, an alternate construction for that of myth is required. Factors to consider when delimiting the term include comprehension of cultural, historical, and ideological turns which have bent the word to its own use. Put another way, the trick here is to allow for generalities that pertain to social aspects of the word without getting tripped up by associated specifics. In that spirit, the definition must provide enough room for myths separated by thousands of years, along with space for disparate ideologies
and cultural expressions that bear little resemblance to one another, while fixing the conception tightly enough to navigate all of these facets. The definition of ‘myth’ for this work, then, is the following: The myth is a lived, sense-making narrative that expresses a cultural or an ideological worldview. The myth depends on a relationship to power, rather than truth or falsity, to exist as a viable narrative. Operationalizing in this way encompasses numerous forms of myth: mythologies of religion, politics, technology, history and aesthetics can all fit under this umbrella. With its emphasis on the far-reaching authority of myth, this definition highlights narratives that encompass a broad social scope. Further, it locates itself within the framework established by Peter Burke (2019), which holds that myths are symbolic, rather than true or false (p. 1) and that one of their key functions is to tell a story about the past that legitimizes or delegitimates some present phenomenon. Such stories are considered sacred, and questioning them is taboo (p. 10). These mythical stories, writes Burke, are not relics of the past, but are still told to “justify ourselves and our institutions” (p. 28).

Cultural Analysis of Myth

As with the previous chapter, the central purpose of the present phase of the thesis is to test its operational definition with an array of examples. And, similar to Chapter 2, a list of choices is available for analysis. Again, the selection of cases has an arbitrary ring to it, with the exception of the myth associated with the rise of the Third Reich. As it was treated above in connection with dreams, interrogation of the era’s prevailing myth will serve the dual purposes of providing a trial for the definition, as well as setting up a theoretical framework for Chapters 5 and 6, which deal with Charlotte Beradt’s dream records from historical and psychological perspectives. The other cases that will be examined at this stage are the politics of Haitian Voodoo and the myth of digital technology.

These examples afford varied perspectives on the tension between culture and power. The mythical framework sets boundaries for this relationship and ideology weaves itself into the structure. Myth’s relationship to power is never static—an assertion demonstrable in academia’s connection to myth. For example, English professor Marjorie Garber (2013) explains that, from about 1950 to 1980, a universalist interpretation of myth was in vogue
among scholars. The understanding of myths as deriving from universal principles helped popularize Jungian archetypes and commentary by Joseph Campbell (p. 142). This pursuit slowed down when questions of localized specifics supplanted notions of universal practices, beliefs, and symbols as being overly simple or hierarchical (p. 142). In recent years the concept of mythical universals has risen again in the discipline of neuroscience. Garber holds that all “evolutionary psychologists want to insist that there is such a thing as universal human nature, constructed everywhere out of the workings of natural selection” (p. 147). Aligning with the definition of myth given above, we learn that the evolutionary narrative is itself a myth; “a powerful and convincing story” (p. 154). Literal and mythical applications of evolutionary approaches no doubt will continue to spill ink until the nature of the debate shifts. Meantime, Garber’s assertion about the evolutionary story’s power and credibility remains a bedrock statement about myth. In the same spirit, the pages below outline three more convincing stories.

Myth of the Thousand Year Reich

So many elements folded into the insidious myth of the Thousand Year Reich, doing so over so many centuries that it is impossible to engage with all of them here. Space restrictions prohibit considering all important factors in reconstructing the Nazi account, such as misuse of Nietzsche’s philosophy, eugenics theory, or references to Mein Kampf. As amorphous as the myth of the Thousand Year Reich was, other mythological narratives paralleled it. For example, variants on the myth of “Blood and Soil” appeared in Nazi publications, which philosopher Piers Stephens characterizes as paranoia about “threats from ‘foreign and Jewish exploiters, who held Germany down and sucked the substance from her economy’” (as cited in Dominick, 1992, pp. 87, 94). Still, to provide clear aim, social and historical components of the Nazi regime’s mythical narrative, culminating in the widespread belief that Germans were an elect people—the Volk—occupy the focus here. The consequences of such a belief included the vilification of another ethnic group (Gray, 2008, pp. 66-67), a process of demonization also hundreds of years in the making. Persecution of Jewish people preceded medieval times. Yet it was the aftermath of the ideologically-based massacres prefacing the Crusades that would echo through Europe
until being savagely reignited in full force in the 20th Century (Cohn, 1961, pp. 49-52), with the industrial murder of millions of Jewish people (pp. 310-311). This medieval bloodlust awoke after centuries of dormancy. Aside from violent anti-Semitic action in Visigothic Iberia in the 6th–8th Centuries CE, Jews living in Europe were left relatively unmolested until the last years of the 11th Century (Ben-Sasson, 1976, pp. 409-413).

But in 1096, European Jews were in terrible danger. The year before, Pope Urban II had proclaimed a Crusade in a political maneuver aimed at Byzantine Christianity (Cohn, 1961, p. 40), along with a tacked-on appeal for the plight of pilgrims to Jerusalem (Runciman, 1964, pp. 107-108). As the mobilizing faithful marched eastward, slaughters of people in Jewish communities became common. The encroaching terror included massacres at Mainz, where 1,000 people were killed (p. 139), and at Worms, in which 800 locals were slain. All told, the Crusaders killed between four thousand and eight thousand Jewish people in the spring of 1096 (Cohn, 1961, p. 50). Yet the killings were not only a European phenomenon. On conquering Jerusalem in 1099, Crusaders torched the synagogue, incinerating the congregation (Ben-Sasson, 1976, p. 414), along with almost every Muslim inhabitant in the city (Cohn, 1961, p. 48). Ideologically, these attacks found their traction in the Jewish refusal to convert to Christianity. A popular convention soon developed in which any Crusader who killed a Jew who had refused to become a Christian would be cleansed of sin (p. 52). Intensifying the hate was the invaders’ widely held perception that the Jewish people were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. (Runciman, 1964, p. 135). Critically, these massacres were features of popular, as opposed to official, knightly crusades. The common soldier and other impoverished Crusaders perpetrated these crimes in the face of opposition from clergy and the high command (Cohn, 1961, pp. 48-52). Yet, regardless of the perpetrators’ social status, these conditions put in place a “new, persecuting attitude that soon established itself at the heart of western culture” (Riley-Smith, 2001, p. 64). This reality became institutionalized with anti-Semitic pronouncements at the Lateran Council of 1215, the Council of Nogaret in 1290 and the Council of Marciac in 1330 (Ginzburg, 1992, p. 38). Massacres of Jewish people in Germany followed in 1298, 1348 (Ben-Sasson, 1976, pp.486-487), and in Eastern Europe in 1648-49 (pp. 656-657). Such oppression persisted at varying pitches until the genocide of the mid-20th Century.
While generally avoiding violence until the Crusades, Jews had been reviled in Catholic doctrine since the Second Century CE for the supposed inherited crime of the murder of Christ, and a subsequent refusal to accept the Saviour. Jewish people were later indicted in a bizarre mythology that combined Satan and the Antichrist into one, with Jews being identified as demonic servants of this devilish beast (Cohn, 1961, pp. 61-62). This demonology prepared a future anti-Semitic platform, directly informing the genocide of the 20th Century (p. 60). And it worked in tandem with a weird historical conception contrived by the 12th Century hermit, Joachim of Fiore, whose influential biblical exegesis conceptualized history as assuming three stages: The Old Testament period, the New Testament stage, and a final phase known as the “Age of the Spirit” in which humanity would be perfected and institutions abolished (pp. 99-100). These exegetical writings held sway for centuries, even ensuring that

the phrase ‘The Third Reich’, as a name for that ‘new order’ which was to last a thousand years, would have had but little emotional significance if the phantasy of a third and most glorious dispensation had not, over the centuries, entered into the common stock of European social mythology (p. 101).

This mythological stock became more specialized in the early 15th Century. Disseminated manifestoes told of a German Emperor who would gain supreme power in Western Europe, subduing the papacy, the French monarchy, and destroying the Jewish people “while the Germans will be exalted above all peoples” (p. 113).

Such documents circulated throughout Europe. By the early part of the 16th Century, an anonymous paper called the Book of a Hundred Chapters made its rounds. Composed in German (and still untranslated into English), the document foretells the reappearance of the German Emperor, Frederick II, who “will reign for a thousand years” (p. 115), during which time a merciless justice will be enacted against corrupt clergy, along with usurers and moneylenders (pp. 115-117). Making clear that an egalitarian, nationalist agenda lay behind this elimination of outgroups, the pages of the Book of a Hundred Chapters take a turn that would have an impact five centuries later. The Old Testament was denounced as useless. From earth’s creation to the present time, Jews were not the chosen people; that mantle fell upon the Germans. From the time of Adam until that of his descendant, Japhet, this lineage was of German ethnicity and language; Japhet and his clan came to Europe,
settling in Alsace. The Hebrew language, according to the *Book of a Hundred Chapters*, did not come to be until construction of the Tower of Babel (p. 119).

Though cloaked in the shadows of the ages, these connections to the myth of the Thousand Year Reich are chillingly familiar in their nationalistic stance. And, like the centuries following the Crusades, the 19th Century provided its share of influences for the mythical thought of the Nazis. It is debatable whether the work of the Brothers Grimm provided a platform for the manipulative techniques of National Socialism. What is clear, however, is that Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm worked tirelessly in various areas of cultural studies with an aim of uniting the German people by creating a coherent understanding of national laws and customs (Zipes, 1992, p. xx). Their efforts extended beyond developing continuity in cultural forms; the brothers viewed their labours as a social exercise aimed to foster integrity “among the German people and to create pride in the folk tradition” (p. xxiii). So devoted to this ideal were the siblings that they envisioned the “childhood of humankind” as interwoven with German custom (p. xxvi). The brothers’ famous collection of fairy tales has become a point of contention. Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm knew that many of the stories had French origins (p. xxiv). Yet during the Nazi rise to power, many German folklorists interpreted the fables along racist lines, ascribing a German, Aryan lineage to the tales, which then served to illustrate ancient German ritual and custom. Folklorists from other traditions have disputed this interpretation, holding that the collection of the Grimms’ tales belonged to larger historical processes of oral and literary communication (p. xxix). Yet the charge of anti-Semitism in the Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm has been alleged again as recently as 2017, complete with a reminder that none other than Adolf Hitler esteemed the stories for their connection to a foundation of German *volk* ideology (Kurlander, 2017, p. 6).

The connection between German custom, anti-Semitism and Nazi use of myth is unambiguous with respect to the work of Richard Wagner. Wagner himself was a manipulator of myth. The composer, in seeking a mythical underpinning for his *Der Ring des Nibelungen* operatic cycle, combed the Icelandic sagas, *the Eddas*, for beings such as the Valkyries and the location of Valhalla. In so doing, Wagner created the impression that these and other mythical phenomena sprang from ancient German culture. Other images intended to appear Norse or ‘pan-German’ include the headgear of the Valkyrie
Brunnhilde; the cow-horned helmet is a fabrication, perpetuated by Wagner’s costume designer (Frank, 2005, pp. 671-672). But Wagner’s mythical associations would ultimately dovetail with a far more sinister turn. From the time he was a young man, Adolph Hitler admired Wagner’s music; the composer’s work also often received air time during Nazi ceremonies, such as at the hyper-nationalized winter solstice festival in 1922 (Koehne, 2015, p. 783). Significantly, Wagner’s music reverberates with the “desire for a pure German race.” (Ticker, 2016, p. 55). This was Hitler’s pet ideological stance, one held even as the future dictator fumbled through the composition of his own opera grounded in Norse myth and components of Faust’s work (Kurlander, 2017, p. 56).

As for Wagner, his avocation was in the political realm; one of his polemics is entitled Judaism in Music, in which he spews anti-Semitic vitriol, casting doubt on whether Jewish people had a right to engage in German culture (pp. 56-57). Other examples of his work focus on the idea of “degeneration” in which Jewish people, conceived of as possessing inferior physical traits, threaten German heritage with a swarming horde from the east (p. 58). In this vein, Wagner’s Die Meistersinger is often regarded as his most anti-Semitic opera. The composition portrays a central Jewish character as an incompetent, awkward outsider (pp. 57-58). Die Meistersinger personifies the ‘swarming horde’ fear in a scene featuring the Jewish Beckmesser stopping just short of consummating a love scene with “the purest of German maidens,” Eva (p. 59). Such a union would, in Wagner’s eyes, “signify the end of the pure German race” (p. 59).

The anti-Semitic link to the composer’s fanatical pro-German stance was clear to Jewish leaders. The rabbi of Bayreuth, in 1924, told Wagner’s son, Siegfried, that his congregation refused to support a Wagnerian festival, writing that:

There is a widespread view that your house is a stronghold of this völkisch movement . . . Members of your family wear swastikas. Your family . . . is said to support the völkisch parties with substantial funding. Is it any surprise that decent men and women of the Jewish faith here and abroad exercise caution regarding things Wagnerian, and are not willing to offer contributions that they fear may indirectly go to benefit the völkisch movement? (p. 60).

Such fears of encroaching German nationalism were well-founded.

Wagner’s pagan Germanic heroism represented a singular but crucial influence in developing Nazi mythology (Shirer, 1960, pp. 100-102). The pseudo-intellectual ideas of
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (pp. 103-109) along with those of Alfred Rosenberg (p. 149) also contributed to mythical notions of the ‘purity’ of the ‘Aryan’ race. Historian Eric Kurlander (2017) argues that, more than any other political movement, the Nazis drew upon “folklore, mythology and many other supernatural doctrines” to captivate the imaginations of German citizens searching for a new account of global processes. Such beliefs were granted institutional status and used as a basis for “culture and social policy . . . the drive toward war, empire and ethnic cleansing” (xi). To obtain broad social license for such institutionalization, the Nazis wove multiple streams of supernatural thought into an ideological system that held sway across the political spectrum, whether by force, contradiction or elision (p. xvii). Above all, National Socialist doctrinaires saw “the utility, indeed, the necessity, of appealing to post-war Germany’s longing for myth and desire for transcendence in making their amorphous racial and imperial visions a reality” (xxii). Crucially, this desire, with its long history of influences, became enmeshed with German culture, which was then ripe for the Nazis’ manipulation of it; it did not exist merely as an enclave of the reactionary, anti-Semitic far right (xxii). Many of these influences stemmed from the volkisch ideology that focused on anti-Semitic and racist views, along with “the revival of a specifically ‘Germanic’ religiosity,” (Koehne, 2014, p. 764).

The criterion of revival was crucial to the construction of the myth of the Thousand Year Reich. The materialist and democratic values associated with the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution came to be viewed as an affront to the philosophical tradition of German idealism and needed to be reversed. In its political appeal, National Socialism also appeared to be locked in a battle in which spiritual forces combatted worldly foes. “The very term ‘Third Reich,’ besides putting the Nazis in the line of succession to the Holy Roman and Bismarckian empires, evoked mystical connotations of a spiritual realm in which the sordid conflicts of material existence would be overcome” (Stackelberg, 1981, pp. 1-2). Yet, typical of Nazi thought, discord ran through the ideological strands that formed its myth. From its earliest days, elements of volkisch thinking combined and conflicted with idealism. For example, Hegel’s (1953) idealist conception “that Reason is the law of the world and that, therefore, in world history, things have come about rationally” (p. 11) raised suspicion with conservative 19th Century volkisch thinkers.
(Stackelberg, 1981, pp. 2-3). And conservatives even balked at progressive Hegelian sentiments, such as the philosopher’s declaration that the German Spirit is the Spirit of the new World. Its aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of Freedom—that Freedom which has its own absolute form itself as its purport. The destiny of the German peoples is, to be bearers of the Christian principle (Hegel, 1991, p. 341).

In practice, what the reactionary, volkisch distrust of progress meant was the preservation of the position of social elites.

Ultimately, corrupt versions of idealism blended with elements of volkisch anti-Semitism, which were tied to the age-old Christian prejudice against Judaism as a supposedly materialistic religion (Stackelberg, 1981, pp. 3-4). The degraded form of idealism that mutated into volkisch thought became linked to political motives which highlighted anti-Semitism, emerging in the last decades of the 19th Century as a reactionary response to competing democratizing movements. Conservatives viewed social concerns as racial ones. Rejecting social progress, the “Volk stood for a unified people linked not merely by a common culture but by the mystical bonds of blood” (p. 4). Without materially closing the gap between rich and poor, volkisch ideologues sought to unite the German nation with ideas of racial purity, moral uprightness and physical health. Bound along these lines, the volkisch movement aimed at consolidating national sensibilities and eliminating class struggle. Ultimately, the volkisch ideology joined nationalism with idealism, resulting in the veneration of the state (pp. 4-6). And the simmering political cauldron that characterized Germany following World War I became fertile ground for volkisch thinkers. Reactionary loathing for the Weimar Republic and the Treaty of Versailles, exemplified by the writings of ideologues such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, motivated the antidemocratic push that assisted the Nazi power grab (pp. 13-14).

And yet volkisch thought defies efforts to box it into a neat ideological package. The long history of anti-Semitism slotted in beside notions of volkisch thinkers, and elements of idealism were added where convenient. The religious beliefs linked to volkisch ideas also formed an important line of thought. An ‘Aryan’ form of Christianity, along with a pre-Christian, pagan form of worship, as well as sundry combinations of the two liturgies have been identified as major strands of faith associated with the movement. Yet these categories are broad, with the sole common denominator among the array of belief systems
being the mythical notion of German national rebirth (Koehne, 2015, p. 760). And it is this breadth of religious definition that the Nazi party incorporated into its foundation (p. 763). As with so much of Nazi doctrine, anti-Semitism found its way into volkisch representations of religion. Nazi dogmatist, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, held that a hallmark of Aryan religious thought was that of the noble spiritual quest, while the Jewish faith was bound to an unsavory materialism (p. 764). Bizarrely, Chamberlain, along with fellow influential volkisch writers Theodor Fritsch and Artur Dinter, all held that Jesus Christ was not Jewish, but “Aryan” (p. 765).

The *Volkischer Beobachter*, which became the official National Socialist newspaper in late 1920, that year favourably reviewed works which depicted Germanic religion as based on pagan, Norse myth. Emergent themes were the establishment of a German religion, complete with new liturgies, as well as links to the Icelandic *Eddas* and its pantheon (p. 766). Still other volkisch religious arguments held that the Israelites of the Old Testament were not Jewish but, in fact, Aryan, thus transforming segments of the Old Testament “into Aryan myth” (p. 769). Such a view found favour with Fritsch and Chamberlain. Other writers, holding to the ‘Jesus-as-Aryan’ idea concluded that, with such a racial connection to Aryan and Germanic roots, Christianity and paganism were one and the same (p. 770). Crucially, Adolf Hitler looked approvingly on the volkisch idea of Christianity as an Aryan expression (p. 776). An important ritualistic consequence of this connection was the reporting in the *Volkischer Beobachter* of the Nazi winter celebration in 1920. The festival was held on December 22 and no references to Christ were made; rather, it was called ‘Yule Festival”—the winter solstice celebration of German pagans. The paper injected themes of party loyalty and a vision for Germany’s future (p. 777). Nazi party members observed a similarly pagan view of the summer solstice in 1921, complete with references to the party and a plethora of anti-Semitic remarks (p. 782). And, in December of 1922, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg made a point of conflating the Christian cross with the Nazi swastika in conjunction with Yule observances (p. 785). The volkisch movement had found traction in the party and its ideas about spirituality.

This mixed bag of influences that worked to form the myth of the Thousand Year Reich served as a basis for political propaganda. Ideologically, the messages displayed obscure reasoning, which allowed for a broad outlook geared less to a specific dogma and more to
Hitler’s personality cult. The equivocal ideals stirred up emotion (Kurlander, 2017, p. 60). In the words of sociologist Siegfried Kracauer (1966), the German capitulation to Nazi ideology as the Weimar years wore on with little hope for economic renewal “was based on emotional fixations rather than on any facing of facts” (p. 11). The appeal of National Socialism inhered in the metaphysical key it appeared to offer in unlocking crises in social, economic and political realms. And the name of the ‘Third Reich’ provided the party and its supporters with magical and biblical connotations, as well as a view to the future (Kurlander, 2017, p. 94).

A myth is of little use unless it gains popular acceptance and guides action. Indeed, citizens cooperated in shaping the rites that would become the German national myth. Nazi enthusiasm for anti-Semitism became clear during book burnings in 1933. In an act that portended a resurgent violence reminiscent of medieval times, propaganda director Joseph Goebbels coordinated a midnight blaze adjacent to the University of Berlin at which students torched tens of thousands of volumes. The archive of immolated books included works by prominent Jewish thinkers such as Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud; similar torchlight processions soon plagued cities throughout Germany (Shirer, 1960, p. 241) (Vasey, 2006, p. 14). The act of putting to flame Jewish books was demonstrative; with terrifying prescience, Goebbels announced to those who had incinerated the books, “The soul of the German people can again express itself. These flames not only illuminate the final end of an old era; they also light up the new” (Shirer, 1960, p. 241). Overnight, the linking of official power with a general public demand for anti-Semitic liturgy conspired to create conditions for popular acceptance of the myth of the Thousand Year Reich.

The book burning prefaces further anti-Semitic activity. In operation even before breaching Polish borders in 1939, the Nazis’ terrifying Einsatzgruppen, bloodthirsty SS death squads that skulked to the rear of advancing forces murdering Jewish people and political opponents (Dwork and van Pelt, 2002, p. 147) was, by 1941, working in Eastern Europe with brutal efficiency (pp.274-315). And in early 1942 the SS opened the Belzec death camp, the first facility to install fixed gas chambers (prior to March 1942 mobile gas vans were the site of such murders). The process was straightforward. Prisoners, hauled in freight-cars, were moved onto the site and forced to surrender all possessions. Officials deceived the prisoners, announcing that the stop was only a way station before a
resettlement destination further east. Disrobed, the inmates walked down a path, constrained by barbed wire fences. Gas chambers disguised as showers awaited to asphyxiate the captives with carbon monoxide. Corpses were tossed into pits and incinerated (Dwork and van Pelt, 2002, p. 287) (Edelheit and Edelheit, 1994, pp. 60-61).

This tragic ritual reinforced the idea of the Thousand Year Third Reich; for the Nazis, this murderous ceremony mythologized the differences between Germans and Jews. Hitler saw that keeping ‘Aryan’ blood ‘pure’ was “a holy obligation which he discussed in specifically religious terms” (Dwork and van Pelt, 2002, p. 22), stating that adulteration of German blood was tantamount to “original sin” (p. 22), which fostered “racial degeneration, cultural decline and individual misery” (p. 22). To prevent such a decline, sacrificial ritual was reproduced six million times at the Nazi altar. SS officer Reinhard Heydrich held that the mass murder of Jewish people to be an important effort, ordering the design remain “strictly secret” (Shirer, 1960, p. 661). But the secret turned into an open one before long. Death camps like Dachau and Buchenwald stood adjacent to German cities (Shirer, 1960, p. 272). Claims that locals knew nothing of Jewish inmates being worked into their graves, or that the regular train transports moving tens of thousands from those slave labour camps to the gas chambers at Auschwitz (Friedlander, 2007, pp. 647-647, p. 650-651) make a mockery of common sense. Further, Germans living in occupied Polish territories objected to the stench of burned bodies in adjacent death camps but showed little concern for those who had been killed (Friedlander, 2007, p. 510). The common people understood what was going on, supporting the process with silence. Such complicity illustrates the mythical notion that people create their reality, live within the boundaries of the mythical construction, take no position on facts, and defer to power.

In sum, the history of anti-Semitism, along with perverse doctrines emphasizing German superiority, combined with volkisch ideology, merged into a platform for the myth of the Thousand Year Reich. According to political philosopher John Gray (2008), the myth also depended upon the Nazi regime’s own distorted view of history. He writes that if “the Holy Roman Empire was the first Reich and the united German Empire ruled by the Hohenzollerns (1871-1918) the second, the third would be the Nazi state that would last for a thousand years” (p. 68). The Nazi myth, then, interpreted history such that a renewed German people, mystically united by blood and bolstered by a revivified Aryan faith,
would overcome Jewish materialism and international liberal democratic tendencies in a violent way that would sustain it for a millennium. Ironically, the term “The Third Reich” had existed only since 1923, with the publication of Moeller van den Bruck’s book of the same name (67). It is the predisposition of myth, then, to adapt elements of any age to its purposes. Myth cannot, however, survive without close connections to power, as demonstrated in the case of the Nazi demise.

**Haitian Voodoo**

Ideology and myth are faithful partners, and they are bound up in the context of the Haitian Revolution. The primary means of communication slaves employed in their battle for freedom during the long revolt, violence and Voodoo, evince this link. The slaves’ motivating spiritual beliefs in their fight for liberty evolved from elements of African faiths and local innovations. So dynamic were these emergent creeds that they connected diverse members of the insurgency, assisting them in outthinking and out battling the colonial slavers. Developing within view of French farmstead owners, Voodoo prepared the oppressed for rebellion. Frequently, leaders of the revolt were Voodoo holy men, while the rebellion’s soldiers were almost all Voodoo worshipers. Examining the faith’s advance is vital to obtaining insight into the patchwork of traditions that comprise Voodoo. These beliefs, often specific to single plantations, assumed key responsibilities in launching the revolt that would result in the freefall of colonial dominance in Haiti. In the process, a new myth would arise.

Just as diverse Voodoo traditions supported the rebellion, ethnic diversity was also of critical importance to this uprising. Stuart Hall (1980) notes that Caribbean populations in colonial times were a blend of peoples enduring slavery. Hall’s view dovetails with that of sociologist John Rex who holds that “the dynamics of the society turn upon the involvement of men of differing ethnic backgrounds in the same social institutions, viz., the slave plantation” (as cited in Hall, 1980, p. 310). In Saint-Domingue, as Haiti was known before independence, a mix of cultural and ethnic lineages helped develop the medium that aided enslaved people in their fight from bondage. The revolt also brought into disrepute the colonial account of Enlightenment thinking which characterized freedom.
as a privilege reserved for white European men. Enlightenment ideals suffered general discredit when the French Revolution bloodied the closing decade of the 18th Century. Further, even with the Revolution’s Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen—its assertions of freedom and equality notwithstanding—French law maintained that slaves were property and would never taste freedom (Ott, 1973, p. 30). Yet, for a time, Voodoo mythology overpowered colonial narratives.

The new myth responded to political need: for those oppressed by the whip of French plantation owners on Haitian sugar cane fields, opposition assumed ritualized forms specific to the new communion. Indeed, “Voodoo was the medium of the conspiracy” (James, 1989, p. 86). This fact is unsurprising, as the Haitian fight for independence stands as only one example in a long line of conflicts that have drawn upon elements of religion in organizing for war. As we have seen earlier in this work, the Roman Emperor Constantine borrowed Christian imagery to motivate troops in battle (Nicholson, 2000, pp. 309-323), while mobilization of the Crusades depended upon religious prejudices (Runciman, 1964). A more recent example is the 1979 Iranian revolution, which combined political objectives with religion (Viorst, 2001, pp. 189-200). Still, Haiti’s rebellion, however ephemerally, possessed the rare ability to focus the energies of a population through a hodgepodge of devotional practices instead of obedience to a unified dogma as is found in Islam or Christianity. Voodoo was so elemental, so far-reaching and so versatile that it supported military and political requirements for the extent of the thirteen-year long war. The formation of its larger myth depended on contributions from many African cultures.

The Voodoo Faith

The religious customs of the long-vanished West African kingdom of Dahomey undergird much of the Voodoo structure. The Dahomean tongue of Fon gives us the word *vodoun*, indicating spirit, deity (Laguerre, 1989, pp. 24-25), or “sacred object” (Metraux, 1959, p. 27). Alternate renderings include *voudoun, vodun* and *vodu* (Davis, 1985, p. 11). Voodoo has suffered misunderstanding, the word being reduced to a generic term for Haitian spiritual traditions. *Vodoun*, for believers, refers to specialized ceremonies
involving spirits, rather than a complete religious framework. In strictest terms, the faith includes people who attend to the loa (spirits), while excluding those who recuse themselves from such obligations (pp. 11-12). Unwieldy translations and clumsy usage of the word necessitate a working definition for Voodoo, henceforth comprehended as the cultural and religious customs created by Haitian slaves and their forebears.

The new faith incorporated Islamic symbols (Khan, 2012, p. 33), Catholic icons and, in its earliest years, aboriginal artifacts and healing practices. Diverse liturgy defined the religious practice of Haitian slaves from the beginning; this heterogeneity set a spiritual course for generations of slaves, even as they founded Creole societies of individuals born in Haiti. Despite the differences, every Haitian slave cult emphasized the following:

1) Monotheistic belief.
2) A ceremonial purpose of spirit possession.
3) Importance of a “centre post”—oftentimes a tree—serving as a locus of communication with the spirit-world.
4) A ceremonial focus of dance.
5) Sketching the loas’ symbols.
6) Leaving food as an offering to the loas (Laguerre, 1989, pp. 28-32).

Most of those compelled to labour in Haiti originated from Benin, yet many were kidnapped from Angola, Congo, Guinea and Senegal (Metraux, 1959, p. 26). No African faiths withstood slavery intact because the African religions’ original home environments differed completely from those found at Haitian slave plantations (Laguerre, 1989, p. 37). Yet, in obliterating certain religions, the slave-drivers unwittingly seeded the elements of a restored faith that would form the backbone of a new myth. And the mythical upsurge preserved sundry links to the slaves’ former homelands. Vital positions in Voodoo’s roster of gods are held by Legba (spirit of the crossroad and of communication), Damballah-wedo (a supernatural snake) (Davis, 1985, p. 270), along with Ezili and Agassu, Zaka—divine beings worshipped in Nigeria, Benin and Togo in the 20th Century (Metraux, 1959, p. 28). Also with their place in Voodoo are Mary, Christ and Catholic Saints. Rounding out the objects of Voodoo worship are the Twins’ mystery cult— instituted through the view that twins hold divine powers (p. 146), as well as the honoring of subordinate loa, along with devotion to one’s ancestors (p. 82). The discrepancy between monotheism and a long line of lesser deities represents no complication to Voodoo worshipers, or to its priests [hungan] (p. 27). To quote one 20th Century Voodoo theologian, “God taught them [the
loa] what He taught the angels, but they revolted. Now when they enter into people, they ‘possess’ them just as the Holy Ghost enters into the cure when he sings Mass” (pp. 82-83). To comprehend the connection of the principal god to the loa in Voodoo is to characterize the omnipotent god as fate or nature, which dominates the profusion of spirits (p. 83).

For all its spiritual variety Voodoo is practical, far more concerned with worldly pursuits than affairs of the ethereal dimension. This inclination is catalogued throughout Voodoo lore; thematically, those who honour the loa gain reward, those who do not are chastised. Advancing this idea are the hungan, who tell stories that reinforce Voodoo mythology. And embodied rewards for appropriate devotion come in the form of spirit possession. Community based loa ceremonies focus on possession by the spirits of certain devotees, with the enchanted person mixing with others attending the liturgy. The spellbound worshipper assumes the possessing loa’s temperament, “imitating their general appearance, their walk and their voice.” Haitian custom avers that to understand the loa, one must observe the possessed (pp. 92-93). Traditionally, these loa-produced trance-like conditions, assumed in full view of those attending the ceremony, demonstrate mystical status. With such states occurring continually in Haitian communities, “Voodoo mythology is constantly being enriched by the narration of divine intervention in human affairs” (p. 93).

Voodoo Politics

The Voodoo faith has always been a local practice (Lageuerre, 1989, p. 22). Religious provincialism reinforces outward contradictions that appear to plague the faith with incoherence, but Voodoo’s essential spirits find refuge and representation everywhere the faith is practiced. And the regional indexes of the loa pantheon ensure that Voodoo assumes a fluid form. Yet stability of liturgy remains important; district-area ritual innovations are safeguarded where broader frameworks of ritualized possession are preserved (Metraux, 1959, p. 94). Spiritually, Voodoo was a source of power for people enslaved in Haiti, and it became fundamental to the pending revolution. Anthropologist Michel Lageuerre (1989) holds that the forms of communication Voodoo made possible were manifold.
It is impossible to understand colonial Voodoo without seeing its political kinship to the demands of the masses. Voodoo was for the slaves a language, a way of expressing and resisting their cultural and religious assimilation. It was the collective memory of the slaves, as far as it preserved and perpetuated the African religious traditions. It was the focus for the development of political consciousness so far as it allowed the slaves to be aware that their values were different from those of the whites (Laguerre, p. 70).

The Spanish had begun taking slaves to Hispaniola in 1510, and the practice continued unabated. But the number of people the French enslaved from 1775 to 1791, when the revolution began, was a staggering 375,000 people forced from Africa onto the French sector of the partitioned colony. Despite their dissimilar backgrounds, people kidnapped from African shores “shared an oral tradition that was unassailable—a rich repository of religious belief, knowledge of music, dance, medicine, agriculture, and patterns of social organization” (Davis, 1995, pp. 69-70). Yet the slavers did not take much interest in their captives. Such ignorance worked, ultimately, toward the trafficker’s demise; significant numbers of the people chained in the slave ships were priests in possession of ancient rites which would support the Voodoo revolution (Metraux, 1959, p. 30).

On the eve of the French Revolution, Haiti’s slave population had ballooned to 465,429 people—against 27,548 free people of colour and 30,836 white colonists. This imbalance made possible the development of localized Voodoo practices throughout Haiti. The contours of each liturgy depended on the following: location, size and kind of plantation in which people were compelled to labour, the blend of Creoles and Africans enslaved on the farmstead, and the presence or absence of African priests as spiritual guides in nurturing Voodoo cells. The availability of political leaders from other Caribbean islands also served to determine regional Voodoo developmental patterns, as did the proximity of escaped slave settlements. Finally, the various slave populations’ recognition or rejection of Catholic rites swayed Voodoo’s neighborhood-level development (pp. 29-30).

These facets of the growing practice culminated in the birth of a unified Haitian political consciousness and the conviction to fight for slavery’s abolition. That this objective was brewing did not escape the notice of the oppressors, who banned Voodoo dances as they stood as communications of protest. As such, “Voodoo cults became the first organized foci of open resistance to slavery” (p. 33). And, as the Revolution in France occupied most
of the colonial masters’ resources, Voodoo assemblies evolved into hotbeds of revolt (p. 33). From these congregations the revolution sprang forth.

Voodoo established a belief system that not only communicated a means of resistance, it resolved certain cultural outcomes. As the Enlightenment era declined, the idea of freedom as belonging solely to white, European men clashed with the Haitian rebels’ developing “concepts of blackness and freedom” as an ideal that paralleled their spirituality (Jean-Marie, 2013, p. 248). Voodoo lent psychological support to those preparing for the revolt by encouraging participation in rites that other slaves shared. These organic connections strengthened confidence in the feasibility of a Creole ideology and language; a culture built from shards of an obliterated African life matured into a fountainhead of strength (p. 252). The Voodoo liturgies, along with the basic human desire for liberty, conspired to destroy the colonial chokehold on Haiti, foster parish culture, and entrench Voodoo mythology.

The slavers rejected these processes, as did most Europeans. The idea of liberty for people torn from Africa and sold into slavery registered not only as abhorrent to the colonial bosses, it was, in the words of Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1995), “unthinkable” (p. 72). Trouillot holds that a proclivity to ignore unpalatable truths, then recoding and slotting them into tolerable belief structures, could well have determined the French colonial mindset in the lead up to the 1791 slave revolt. Before that time a plantation owner’s major concerns were individual slaves’ solitary gestures of resistance, or occasional turbulence among small groups of captives. Complete revolt had not yet entered slaveholders’ conversations; such a consequence was beyond their grasp (pp. 72-73). Without any inclination to learn about the mindset of the people they enslaved, the St. Domingue plantation bosses went about their exploitive practices in ignorance of those they had chained to a life of forced labour (p. 75). Contextualized in the framework of Enlightenment era thought, which subjected people to a ranking schematic, an individual’s human status was qualified on “ontological, ethical, political, scientific, cultural, or simply pragmatic grounds…ultimately, some humans were more so than others.” This blueprint saw white Europeans perched at the peak of the human scale—people of Asian and Jewish ethnicities were extended far less respect, and Africans sat at the bottom of Enlightenment-era estimation (p. 76).
Trouillot holds that, owing to this ranking of human value, Enlightenment minds could not conceptualize universal human rights. Absent a category for the human rights of Africans or their Creole descendants, the idea of a revolution in Haiti dealt a shock to European sensibilities for which none could have prepared. The upheaval produced results that took shape beyond the European psychological “range of possible alternatives” (p. 82). Plantation life had previously seen resistance take the shape of desertion, labour abatements and riots. These actions generated a split-personality reaction in slaveholders. As slaves lacked humanity, crediting them with the ideas necessary to foster resistance was impossible. Yet, when riots or work stoppages did occur, legal penalties and corporeal punishments were assigned to culprits. Moreover, because slave-drivers dismissed the notion that defiance was weaving itself into the collective thought of people living in chains, every act of resistance “was treated separately and drained of its political content” (p. 83). Said to be particularly jealous, greedy or tending to run away, slaves had each of these traits attributed to them, each characteristic separate from the others, thus displaying a general deviance, rather than evincing the basic human need for freedom.

The institution of slavery, like any unjust system, rationalizes its oppressive tendencies; assigning merit to the idea that isolated cases of slave defiance could become anything more significant would amount to an admission systemic flaws (p. 84). And Trouillot avers that the notion of an organized, all-out revolt did not register either with slaves or with their oppressors. This was, in part, because of illiteracy among slaves. Equally important was the fact “that the claims of the revolution were too radical to be formulated in advance of its deeds.” In other words, the revolution had to happen before conceptual thought could embrace it, with every stage of the long war further radicalizing the goals and ideas of the ex-slaves; “discourse always lagged behind practice” (pp. 88-89). Action without subservience to a theoretical approach meant that the revolutionaries were unconstrained by ideological blueprints so often the hobbyhorse of political leaders (p. 89).

Trouillot himself neither ascribes nor denies a function to Voodoo in the revolution. But considering his argument that impromptu actions—not theory—motivated the revolt, the multiple plantation cultures and their unique Voodoo expressions appear the likeliest candidates to have embraced revolutionary methods specific to localized oppression. With no colony-wide doctrines in place, the always regional, always practical tactics of the
evolving Voodoo myth stood available to slaves prepared to break their chains. Yet, the plight of being unthinkable remained with the new nation state well after the completion of the revolution. Not until decades following the war’s end did Haitian independence gain international recognition. And, with colonialism in full operation during the 19th century, that the revolution had truly happened was rejected by many thinkers as an insignificant occurrence (p. 95). So total was the disavowal that the United States declined for sixty years to officially recognize Haiti. Not until 1862 did Abraham Lincoln admit the existence of the republic (Danner, 2010, p. 1).

**Voodoo Revolt**

The slaves’ life of terror under the French shifted into open revolt as the nascent Creole language intersected with religion at a Voodoo ritual at Bois-Caiman on the night of August 14, 1791 (Jean-Marie, 2013, p. 254). Eight days before the revolutionary hostilities began, slave delegations from every farmstead on the northern grasslands checked in at an assembly that revolutionary commander Boukman Dutty had arranged. A traditional tale accompanies the revolutionary council’s gathering—that of a grey-haired woman shaking in the grip of the spirits against a Haitian nightscape, as hundreds of Voodoo faithful worshipped Ogoun, god of fire, war and metal, while a black pig was gutted in sacrifice. Shouted curses of vengeance and oaths of resistance against slaveholders signaled the ritual beginning of the war. Uncounted hundreds of soon-to-be-free slaves swore fealty to Boukman and the rest of the revolution’s high command (pp. 201-202). A later account of the gathering chronicles Boukman as having invoked divine sanction for the rebellion under the auspices of Voodoo loa during the blood sacrifice (Popkin, 2012, p. 37).

Little of the exact events of the night of the revolutionary council is known through written documentation. It is, however, definite that the rebels gathered on a plantation belonging to Lenormand de Mezy, a five-mile trek from the town of Cap Francais. Such a location made strategic sense because new members of the Colonial Assembly had planned to convene at Cap Francais not long afterward and targeting the French leaders would have been a logical tactic with which to begin the war. The assembly also gave the slaves an opportunity to rework their strategy should their plot be discovered (Popkin, 2012, pp. 35-
38) while providing safe haven for the high command to contrive their attack. Officially
beginning as night fell on August 22, 1791, the rebels of the Voodoo revolution
overwhelmed the adjacent farmstead of Gallifet, with the prisoners now free and on a
rampage of rape and murder. Whatever the tactics actually discussed at Bois-Caiman, they
succeeded. Just three days after the initial attack, half of the Haitian northern plain was
ablaze (James, 1989, pp. 87-88).

The war that began in August 1791 blazed until January of 1804, when the only
successful mass-scale slave rebellion in the Western Hemisphere concluded. With battles
against colonial oppressors raging, Voodoo ritual, dances and chants served as a way for
holy men, fighters, and their family members to communicate (pp. 116-117). A popular
myth connecting freedom and Voodoo was thus forged in the fire of war. The battles, alas,
did not terminate with a mix of good government and a lively spiritual channel for the
newly free Haitian citizens. By the war’s end, the new nation state had suffered the fire of
Spanish and English guns and witnessed the revolution’s leaders, Henri Christophe, J. J.
Dessalines and Toussaint L’Ouverture work for the French in various functions. Haiti had
also borne Napoleon’s fury and grieved at forced labour’s reestablishment (Rotberg, 1971,
pp. 44-53). By the first years of the 19th Century, cash crop tilling had recovered two thirds
of the production levels known before the war. This economic imperative came about on
the command of rebel leaders who strong-armed freed slaves into returning to the
plantations, now under control of revolutionary elites. Tortures and beatings much like
those the French had previously meted out once again became common (pp. 49-50).

The myth that served Haitians in their war against slavery could not ensure permanent
freedom. And yet Voodoo remained a political force. In the time immediately following
the revolution, thousands fled Haiti to Louisiana, bringing along their Voodoo customs
(Anderson, 2005, p. 34). In 1809 and 1810 alone three thousand Haitians immigrated to
Louisiana (Gehman, 1994, pp. 50-51). New Orleans served as the main port; slaves there
had started to create their own Voodoo liturgy prior the Haitian influx. Nevertheless, for
twenty years before the Louisiana Purchase laws had been in force forbidding the traffic of
Haitian slaves because Louisiana’s European rulers chafed against bringing to the territory
slaves knowledgeable in the politically explosive Voodoo rite (Anderson, 2005, p. 34). The
arrival of thousands of Haitians did in fact instill new political ambition into New Orleans’
Voodoo practices (Tallant, 1974, p. 11). In the three decades prior to the Civil War in the United States, the city was America’s largest slave trading hub; reciprocal anti-slavery movements also took root. Within those subversive networks, the most highly regarded leadership figure was Marie Laveau, known in history and lore as the Voodoo Queen of New Orleans. Born in 1801 in New Orleans, Laveau was a free woman of colour (Ward, 2004, p. 10); who, along with co-conspirators in a city-wide Voodoo network, were suspected of using their stature and reliable contacts to help runaway slaves escape (pp. 80-81).

Voodoo’s flexibility has also enabled it to maintain political dynamism within Haiti. Catholicism was instituted as the state religion despite Haiti’s declaration of formal independence, yet Voodoo persists, in spite of attempts by elite groups to eradicate it. The faith’s versatility has made it possible for adherents to employ Voodoo tactics to fight elite appropriation of peasant farms following the revolutionary war, and to mobilize guerilla action to combat the two-decade-long American occupation in the early 20th Century; Voodoo tactics were also retrieved to help coordinate a political movement inside the Duvalier regimes (Laguerre, 1989, pp. 19-21).

The resilience of the Voodoo myth enables it to persist in confronting counter-narratives. Commentators have characterized Voodoo as an undermining force in contrasting it with an account of progress. After a catastrophic earthquake struck Haiti in 2010, killing 50,000 people, journalist David Brooks (2010) wrote in the New York Times that, further exacerbating the endemic poverty and absence of qualified emergency workers that had already worsened the calamity, Voodoo’s “progress-resistant” doctrine of life as unpredictable, with forethought a fruitless endeavor, ensured the cultural paralysis that rendered the tragedy inevitable (p. 1). Brooks’ assessment betrays a dearth of understanding of Voodoo history and its cultural myth. In the words of linguist Benjamin Hebblethwaite (2014), the “scapegoating of Vodou by Brooks and others perpetuates a racist colonial legacy, and it betrays an ignorance of the community and the abundant research about it” (p. 1). Hebblethwaite points out that Voodoo has always embraced progress, continually adapting to assist Haitians facing persecution. This fact remained as Haiti’s most destitute made use of timeworn Voodoo networks in mitigating the worst
effects of the tremor, with the Voodoo myth once again clashing with antagonistic Western narratives.

**Myth of Digital Technology**

Mythical associations often connect with more than ideas in altering political conditions. Technology has long motivated mythological shifts. The process entails changes to a given myth as well as to any technology driving its transformation. Gunpowder, television and the Internet, for example, are all technologies that developed along with transformative myths. The basis for this connection is easily understood. Mastery of technology brings power, and such control makes necessary the establishment of an affiliated myth. For example, in Plato’s (1997) *Phaedrus* dialogue, Socrates tells the mythical story of Thamus and Thoth. The Egyptian god Thoth exhibits various new techniques and technologies for King Thamus, the king praising or criticizing each one as merited. When Thoth shows Thamus the new technology of writing, the king balks. He says that it will fall into the hands of a special class of experts and have the general effect of decreasing memory (pp. 551-552). The myth, while appearing cautionary, has more the feel of ‘forbidden fruit’ about it, all but ensuring development and exploitation of writing. Technologies have, of course, developed at an accelerated pace since Plato’s day, with their underlying myths keeping up to speed, whether by fading into the background or assuming brash new garb. This remains the case in the age of cyberspace. Myths blended with the technologies that produce fake news and facilitate Donald Trump’s use of Twitter demonstrate this fact.

The origins of these 21st Century practices can be traced to an approximate point. Roland Barthes (2013) contends that, by the mid-20th Century, mythical structures had become express means of communication; myth was now a message. Barthes says that myth’s scope of communication is all but unlimited; “since myth is a type of speech, everything can be a myth provided it is conveyed by a discourse” (p. 217). The present ‘post-truth’ epoch embraces Barthes’ notion, doing so with the latest technology. The New York Times characterizes fake news as “a neologism to describe stories that are just not true” (Ember, 2017, p.1). Such reports are readily produced and circulated with digital-
speed gadgets; state of the art smartphones immediately receive the bogus news feeds. Examples abound. One of the more prominent reports claimed that Pope Francis supported Donald Trump’s presidential bid (Swain, 2016, p.1). Posted on social media accounts 100,000 times, this dispatch fattened its creator’s bank account while boosting Trump’s credibility (p. 1). Another report alleged that a Washington pizzeria doubled as a hideout in which Trump’s electoral opponent, Hilary Clinton, abused children (CBC, 2016, p. 1).

In both examples myth and message become indistinguishable in the way Barthes describes. With myths now circuiting through high-tech contrivances, the President himself is able to up the ante sending mythical messages via his favourite technology: Twitter. Nineteen days after the 2016 election, for example, the then President-Elect Tweeted that he “won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally” – a claim since proven false (Fandos, 2017, p. 1). And in a twist on the fake news concept, a number of Trump’s Tweets accuse the New York Times of disseminating fake news (Lee and Quealy, 2017, p. 1), most often as a rejoinder to journalism that shows him in an unfavourable light (Zhou, 2017, p. 1). The President’s May 18, 2018 Tweet that reported on Russian involvement in his electoral victory “when the phony Russia Hoax became a ‘hot’ Fake News Story” (BBC, 2018, p. 1) illustrates the general tenor of expression. With millions of Twitter followers, Trump’s mythical communication techniques have increased his political prestige in the eyes of his supporters.

Use of the expression ‘fake news’ became common as politicking ramped up in the United States’ 2016 electoral campaign. It was then that the term took on a polemical and politicized definition, proliferating on “self reinforcing” digital newsfeeds (p. 1). In instances where citizens took part in the campaign, social media often played a considerable role, with participants circulating reports unburdened with factual weight. The line between myth and falsity is not always clear. But, sparked by devotion to “a larger Truth” (Zhou, 2017, p. 1), many citizens concerned to affect election results, in addition to their ballots, distributed news stories not grounded in fact because they held that elitist corruption ruled political outcomes. For Trump supporters, these stories repudiated the “lies” peddled via mainstream journalism while serving the “larger Truth” (p. 1) by portraying as accurate made up stories that unmasked elitist crimes. Disseminated across social media, fake news represents “a function of the same kind of backlash culture that
has fueled political demagoguery throughout the West” (p. 1)—a 21st Century application of Plato’s mythical “noble lie.” In a similar way, it is significant that the current holder of the United States’ highest political office frequently employed the concept of fake news as a condemnation when the election campaign hit its stride. Fake news became increasingly important politically when Trump invoked it time and again to disparage journalism that did not serve his interests. Conceptually, then, fake news has seen two important uses: 1) its creation and circulation by those opposing elite liberal interests and seeking to champion a “larger Truth” (p. 1); 2) Donald Trump’s invocation of the talisman of fake news to rebuff reportage antithetical to his aims.

Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (1996) argues that politics have, for the most part, taken the place of myth in today’s societies (p. 120). Indeed, the world today looks much more political than mythical. And yet this work has accounted for a widespread political framing of myth. It has also underscored myth’s relationship to technical advancements; whether in the change from ritually performed myth to literary myth, Enlightenment-age scientific myth, or the present deployment of digital technologies, each has helped shape era-specific political myths. Theorist Vincent Mosco (2004) argues that myths are practicable only in conjunction with politics (p. 39). As noted above, when technologies are new, they often come cloaked in a mythical aura prior to declining in prominence. Their time of apparent decline is the precise moment that such technologies attain the apex of power (p. 6). Radio and television have had their mythical moments in just this way (pp. 118-119). And now, clad in mundanity, digital technology is flexing its muscles while providing space for the new myth of fake news. The age-old template of technology driving the myth is borne out once more.

While global politics spin into ever more outlandish turns at the speed of digital technology, online space becomes home to novel applications of seasoned myths, such as the “larger Truth” (Zhou, 2017, p. 1). Meantime, the sources of digital power conceal themselves as multitudes grasping for political advantage are lured to the cyber-tech altar. For Mosco (2004), in accordance with its myth, “the Information Age transcends politics because it makes power available to everyone in great abundance,” and such “myths create a new history” (p. 35). These pages of history are being logged at breathtaking speed, while their supporting political structures have not achieved anything like transcendence; they
are wired straight into the digital technology which facilitates these proceedings. Observed “from a political economic perspective, cyberspace results from the mutual constitution of digitization and commodification” (p. 156). Powerful corporations own the digital platforms. And, similar to the way in which the primal cyber-myth proclaiming a new age of democratic politics has faltered as it clashed with corporate wealth, Donald Trump’s Twitter-myth of “draining the swamp” of established interests has also miscarried. The bank accounts of those who comprised the earliest version of his ever-changing cabinet were the wealthiest in American history (Harrington, 2017, p. 1). In the same way that digital spaces have reneged on their mythic promises of democratic expansion and fizzled to an economic space (Mosco, 2004, pp. 160-161), Trump’s meta-Tweet-myth of Making America Great Again has instead witnessed the President oversee power consolidation with the spoils going to the wealthiest. Yet both myths linger, while preserving the liminal zone required for producers of fake news to spin their narratives.

Psychotherapist Robert Romanyshyn (1989) takes a different position on technology, viewing it as “the working out of a shared cultural dream” (p. 10). Burrowing into mental process, Romanyshyn maintains that descriptions of technological developments that do not connect to human dreams and to dreamers themselves represent incomplete accounts (pp. 10-11). Dreams of advances in technology before their actual production are common; airplanes and submarines are examples (Lippmann, 2003, p. 231). And Romanyshyn (1989) cautions of dire results when technology’s origins are avoided: “in tending to the surface of technology only as an event while forgetting its imaginal lining, dreams can become a nightmare of destruction” (p. 14). The psychologist notes the link of non-linear dreams to linear, logical technologies (p. 10), asserting that our thought processes must adhere to a non-linear path if we are to stand any chance of understanding all facets of a technology (p. 14). In other words, to apprehend a technology with regard only to its stated, straightforward application neglects its totality. Unintended consequences arise, much in the way that Plato’s Thamus predicted writing would deliver something other than what it promised.

Our transit from a dreamlike view of the world toward an understanding of our surroundings as constructed by a technological myth is rooted in a historical moment. The late middle ages saw the Italian artist Filippo Brunelleschi develop a new method of
presenting the world called Linear Perspective Vision (LPV). This technique facilitated a means of viewing our surroundings in three dimensions, with depth represented as a measurable extension from the point of observation, and the apparent diminishing of an object’s size the further its representation relative to the viewer, ultimately disappearing at a vanishing point on the horizon (Romanyshyn, 1989, p. 33). This shift reformulated our view of the world, fitting it to visual cues and establishing the groundwork necessary to chart and map the planet, exposing it to the proliferation of print and, ultimately, to the camera eye. LPV has, according to Romanyshyn, come with a cost, mutating “the self into a spectator, the world into a spectacle and the body into a specimen” (p. 33). As counterintuitive as it might seem to those of us living in the 21st Century, this view of the world was invented. It does not represent an objective view, and those living before the technique’s inauguration did not observe their surroundings in this manner. (p. 40).

LPV constructs its myth by connoting a window-like barrier separating viewer and object (p. 42). Exhibited as a discovery of the ‘correct’ view of the world (p. 38), the new vision charted a course for humanity’s withdrawal from its physical environment and set the stage for the “dawn of the modern age” (p. 42). People became spectators as the world beyond the window-barrier was prepared to transform from a dynamic, lived environment to one of information (p. 42). Scientific abstraction and mapping of the world surged with the implementation of electric grids. Digital era technologies completed our separation from the world. Locked into this ideological orientation, Romanyshyn contends that humanity established the computer with its very image in mind, understanding too late that this sort of efficiency “wedded to indifference is a cold abstraction of a human being” (p. 91). With laser-focused scrutiny, we now see a world of detachment, specialization and emotional alienation from our environment (p. 93).

Fear of the imagination accompanies cultural devotion to reason and to progress (p. 181). But by the 20th Century, psychoanalytic exploration of the mind and pursuit of artistic advances such as surrealism showed that the LPV myth is no longer total (pp 182-183), and that other worldviews are emerging. Despite such hints of a shift away from this rational ideology (p. 174), nothing ensures that that any myth succeeding that of LPV will improve upon it. In Romanyshyn’s words, “moments of breakdown and breakthrough are filled with danger because old visions die hard and new ones struggle to be born” (p. 183).
Still, the era of LPV remains. Ideologically, it has propelled another mythical frame via technology based on the LPV mindset. Looking at the world on a digital feed seen on a smartphone and routing information exchanges through these gadgets could represent the pinnacle of this vision. Yet Romanyszyn’s warning that times of shifting worldview are perilous indeed is well-taken. LPV’s most influential application in recent times has been the dissemination of baffling Tweets from the most powerful office in the world, along with supporting expressions of fake news. Such is the danger of which Romanyszyn warns. If the psychologist is right and a powerful new myth is emerging, now would be an advantageous time for its appearance as a possible means of blunting the damage from lies embedded in Trump’s Tweets and in fake news reports. As BBC Chief Correspondent, Gavin Hewitt (2017) writes, “[d]emocracy can’t function without facts that are widely accepted” (p. 1).

But such a change is not guaranteed. Mosco (2004) observes that myths refute history, and that they accomplish this in cyberspace (p. 35). In 2016, for Trump’s Tweets to succeed, it was important that they rework the cyber-myth to propound the idea that, with enough history-denying wizardry built into these online communications, they would then breathe life into the related myth of Making America Great Again. With this in mind, it has become clear “that computer communication makes up and is made up by technological and political practices as well as by mythic and cultural ones” (p. 10). In this way, the myth that it is possible to Make America Great Again pulls people into a political and cultural quagmire with reference to its own technical code.

For Mosco (2004) “myths persist in the face of powerful evidence that they do not accurately embody an underlying reality” (p. 49). Trump’s myth thus operates in the prescribed way. In the estimation of Roland Barthes (2004), a myth’s “function is to distort, not to make disappear” (p. 231). This understanding comprehends the efforts of the Tweeter-in-chief, along with those who disseminate fake news reports. Yet, it still falls short of explaining all we need to uncover about such myths. Continued discussion is required in the debate over whether the tales we presently tell ourselves, as well as the devices we employ in telling them, take inspiration from dreams as Romanyszyn claims, or if current myths derive from technology and language, as Mosco and Barthes insist is the case.
Both stances have worth. Romanyshyn (1989) presses the idea that dreams format technology because technological advances originate with a dreamed “psychological reality” (p. 10). Rejection of this position assumes the peril of twisting technological benefits into nightmares (p. 14), as shown with the more brutalizing aspects of digital and nuclear technologies. Romanyshyn sees a future complete with new cultural expressions that are “dreamlike and mythical in addition to logical and rational…whose landscape is multi-perspectival” (p. 226). In this view, a foundation of myth and dreams supports an emergent era of reason and technology. Such is one hope for the future. Still, Romanyshyn’s assertion that LPV cleared the path for computer technology, reducing the world to informational ciphers nudges closer to current reality. The psychologist claims that, since its outset, the myth of LPV has striven to cut us off from nature (p. 42). This disengagement also impairs our ability to use technology in modes that are not informational and surface based. Because of this fact, new technological mythologies soon disconnect themselves from our dreams.

On the other hand, Barthes’ intense focus on mythical language takes up a simpler position. Commonplace communication, despite employing mythical conventions, conveys its message devoid of a need for dreams to explain its meaning. This analysis moves us nearer to the mythical realms of Trump-Tweets and fake news than Romanyshyn’s future dream does. Advancing Barthes’ understanding of myth as communication that obfuscates, Mosco (2004) writes that digital communication technologies provide “us with the very basis of politics” (pp. 111-112). Indeed, mythical fake news along with Trump’s post-truth Tweets could not have assumed their political forms in the absence of state-of-the-art communication technologies. And no reach of the imagination is required to envision the speedy development of a technology purpose-built for screening out responsible journalism and specializing in the spread of Trump Tweet-myths, if such things do not already exist. Still, both Mosco’s and Romanyshyn’s views of the current state of technology’s relationship to myth are borne out in the Trump era. Mosco’s approach describes current circumstances, while Romanyshyn’s gaze into the future offers hope for better things to come.
Myth as Power

Scattered over more than two centuries, the myths of Haitian Voodoo, the Thousand Year Third Reich and digitized fake news display their ideological bents. This association is unavoidable. As indicated, the myth survives in its lived ritual form only so long as it connects to a live power source. Haitian Voodoo lives on in its ritualized expression, while being erroneously mythologized in much of the rest of the world. The Nazi myth lies dormant, with disturbing versions of it flaring up from time to time. The online myth of fake news, along with Donald Trump’s Twitter myths survives in robust form; the mythical power narrative remains as an unbroken link.

The present chapter offers cases that support the dissertation’s principal argument that a cultural-political framing of dreams and myth renders both phenomena unbound by determinations of real and unreal. Political thought depends upon the flexibility of myth to establish a power base. The boundless lies of the Nazi regime relied on the dire socio-political reality of post WWI Germany to construct its mythology; Haitian Voodoo forged its religious myth alongside the politics of slavery, and Donald Trump’s techno-politics have driven the mythology of Making America Great Again. In each case, a cultural-political reality parallels a pliable myth; in each case, inviting discussion of the myth brings it to life. To summon Roland Barthes’ (2013) understanding of the matter, we recall that a myth’s task is to provide a sanitized space in which the “eternal justification” of a subject becomes possible (p. 255). The Nazi example fits with this explanation—the regimes’ tactic of justifying its lies has lain exposed for decades. Less clear is the Voodoo example, as its cause of fighting for freedom from slavery is one everyone can comprehend. But the Voodoo deference to unseen spiritual entities takes us to the heart of the matter: loa and their associated gods defy the comprehension of those uninitiated in the myth. Still, the faithful used the sanctified space of mythical Voodoo ritual to politicize their cause. Finally, the myth of Making America Great Again availed itself of digitized space to discuss and bring about its “larger Truth” (Zhou, 2017, p. 1). All three of these cases might be summed up by the words of the silver screen gangster, Scarface, who says “I always tell the truth, even when I lie” (Bregman and De Palma, 1983).
At this point, a picture is emerging of the ambiguous—yet practical—applications of two esoteric phenomena, dreams and myth. Despite the complications in making sense of myth’s vagueness, the examples shown in the present chapter demonstrate cultural and political means of working through such an impasse. As shown previously, the dream also works as an ideological frame. Further political and social consequences will concern much of the rest of the dissertation. The direction to which we now turn observes that the link between dreams and myth has been evident throughout history and across cultures. We shall examine the ancient trajectory of this relationship before focusing on examples of the connection that have left their mark on present day socio-political structures. Of importance here is the demonstration that cultural-political connections between dreams and myth transcend borders of religion and science. From the earliest religious records, through early Christianity and Islam, to the dawn of modern science and beyond, these connections have been present.
Chapter 4.

Dream and Myth: The Nocturnal Vision Merges with Living Legend

This dissertation has attempted to establish an ancient link between myth and dreams. The 5000-year-old *Gilgamesh* myth and its extensive dream narrative represents our oldest known example of this phenomenon; it is possible that the association of the two is even older. Perhaps speculation on the origins of their affiliation is the best that can be achieved. Yet philosopher Jean Gebser (1985) suggests that as myths arose, consciousness of the human soul emerged (p. 69). This development is exemplified in the mythical tale of Narcissus. The seer Tiresias foretells that the young and handsome Narcissus would “live to a ripe old age provided that he never knows himself” (Graves, 1992, p. 286). Alas Narcissus was doomed, through the caprice of the hunter goddess Artemis, to fall hopelessly in love with himself. Encountering a reflecting pool, the now enraptured Narcissus gazed at his own likeness for hours at a stretch. Understanding the futility of loving a reflection, he took comfort in the notion that “at least his other self would remain true to him, whatever happened” (p. 287). Early recognition of human duality is at play in this myth. Moreover, Gebser (1985) links this changing consciousness to myth and dream, contending that some archaic mythical themes blurred with dreams, but were ultimately “shaped into an account and expressed in myth, [becoming] recollections of dreams” (p. 70). Support for Gebser’s theory can be found in the myths of peoples indigenous to Australia. Their mythic record reveals the supernatural feats occurring within the confines of “Dream Time.” It was Dream Time actions which guided the people in reproducing the Gods’ primal gestures via ceremony (lived myth), establishing the cultural significance necessary for meaningful social life (Eliade, 1963, p. 14). In both examples dream and myth are linked, and each case requires recognition of this process.

Myth in ancient civilization set parameters for quotidian pursuits like hunting, officiating weddings and overseeing childbirth. Any endeavor aimed at societal preservation was held to rely upon remaining in the good graces of mythical beings. These forces had to be accommodated for the protection of the clan, and associated rituals were thus performed (Priest, 1970, p. 50). Clerics such as the Egyptian priests who reproduced
the primeval creation of the deity Thoth exemplify this kind of ceremonial performance. And such ritual displays communicated dominance. In the event, this fraternity of holy men controlled “the rite and word” (Eliade, 2005, p. 22) that conferred upon it political power. Thoth devised the world through the force of divine word; the officiants, on the strength of ceremonial imitation of Thoth’s work, centralized priestly authority (p. 22). Eventually, holy men solidified their socio-political mastery with a technological advance: thirty-five centuries ago spoken language began to give way to writing. This transformation saw the sacerdotal orders dominate alphabetic systems, which strengthened their control over laws and ritual (Gleick, 2012, p. 259).

There is evidence that this framework of ancient power relations remains unchanged. Historical narratives always raise questions of power; a history of dreams and myth is no different. In that spirit, this chapter asks the question, how does the relationship between dreams and myth concretize itself politically? The mythic process relative to dreams was conspicuous when priests in pre-Hindu India arrogated a “monopoly on ritual technology” connected to Vedic dogma (Donniger, 1991, p. xxxix). This monopoly was rooted in a perceived priestly “poetic insight, [obtained] from a close relationship with the gods” (Patton, 2005, p. 8). Expressive of this relationship are sections of the Rig Veda, now recognized as Hinduism’s oldest document. Formulated in Sanskrit in the remote centuries BCE (Sen, 1961, P. 47), the text was “composed orally and transmitted orally long before being set down in written form” (Pelikan, 1992, pp. ix-x). The Rig Veda’s “Dream-Charm” verse follows here:

Avaunt (sic), thou Master of the mind! Depart and vanish far away, Look on Destruction far from hence. The live man’s mind is manifold. A happy boon do men elect, a mighty blessing they obtain. Bliss with Vaivasvata they see. The live man’s mind seeks many a place. If by address, by blame, by imprecation we have committed sin, awake or sleeping. All (sic) hateful acts of ours, all evil may Agni bear away to distant places. When Indra, Brahmanaspati, our deeds are wrongful and unjust, May (sic) provident Angirasa prevent our foes from troubling us. We have prevailed this day and won: we are made free from sin and guilt. Ill thoughts, that visit us awake or sleeping, seize the man we hate, yea seize the man who hateth us (Pelikan, 1992, p. 645).

The hymn takes on a poetic lyricism, petitioning the gods to guide dreamers, as well as those going about the business of the day.
The late Vedic period saw decreasing public application of ritual elements, ultimately diminishing to “the secrecy of Vedic study and, more importantly, the secrecy of recitation itself” (Patton, 2005, pp. 35-36). And the tone of religious expression shifts when the Upanishads begin to appear in written form around 800 BCE, developing some themes undertaken in the antecedent Vedas (Mascaro, 1987, pp. 9-10). The Mandukya Upanishad speaks to dreams:

Brahman is All and Atman is Brahman. Atman, the Self, has four conditions. The first condition is the waking life of outward moving consciousness, enjoying the seven outer gross elements. The second condition is the dreaming life of inner-moving consciousness, enjoying the seven subtle inner elements in its own light and solitude. The third condition is the sleeping life of silent consciousness when a person has no desires and beholds no dreams. That condition of deep sleep is one of oneness, a mass of silent consciousness made of peace and enjoying peace. This silent consciousness is all-powerful, all-knowing, the inner ruler, the source of all, the beginning and end of all beings. The fourth condition is Atman in his own pure state: the awakened life of supreme consciousness (Mascaro, 1987, p. 83).

The Upanishadic composition resolves all ambiguity regarding dreams. Gods are not required for liberation from a mysterious vision state, the condition of dreaming serves merely as the second step of four on the way to cosmic consciousness. Dream discourse, in this way, alters from the oral prayers in the pre-literate Rig Veda as a petition to the gods for guidance, to written priestly fiat that controls the myth and, in this case, the dream (Hughes, 2017, p. 164).

Dream, myth and power became even more closely tethered in the Christian narrative. The New Testament hews to a mythic cosmology: heaven, hell and earth comprise the three-way split of domains. Miracles are common; angels and demonic entities hearten people or produce anguish. Such celestial forces proliferate and individuals tremble before their power. Of greater importance, the last days are around the corner and judgment awaits; devout Christians will ascend to the heavens and miscreants will be consigned to the flames of hell (Bultmann, 1996, pp. 29-30). The era’s dreams were influential in this system. Multiple narratives see angels address figures of the nascent Christian epoch, often transmissions that advanced gains for the new religion. The faith avoided bearing witness to its savior’s progenitor giving birth absent matrimonial bonds when Joseph, the man who would become Mary’s husband, dreamed that an angel told him that she carried a divinely conceived child, further advising that he was to marry her (Matt: 1:18-25). The dream
accords with the New Testament myth that angels reveal miraculous tidings; disbelief entails damnation. Additional early Christian dreams furthered the terrestrial reach of Church institutions. This tendency is plain in the case of the visionary St. Paul. Unable to decide which direction to spread the word of the Savior, Paul dreamed of a shadowy man who persuaded him to maneuver his cluster of missionaries to evangelize in Macedonia (Acts 16:6-10). This new religious mythology, along with the influence of dreams, took root and the history of the world would change in accordance with these facts (Hughes, 2017, p. 166).

Early Christian political developments demonstrate the power of the new myth and its reliance on dreams. In October 312 CE a battle for the future of the Roman Empire was underway. Constantine ruled Gaul and Spain in the West. His adversary was the Emperor Maxentius, whose forces clashed with Constantine’s army at Milvian Bridge in what became a struggle not only for the city of Rome, but for dominion over the balance of the Western empire. One version of events holds that, one day prior to the decisive combat, Constantine and all of his troops saw overhead a cross glowing with flame, along with a directive that read “By this, conquer” (Nicholson, 2000, pp. 309-310). While dreaming that night, the Emperor envisioned Jesus Christ communicating an identical sign, ordering him to use it as symbol of victory against his rival. An alternate report claims no collective vision in daylight hours but recounts a dream that sees Constantine ordered to instruct his army to inscribe its shields with the devotional message (pp. 310-311). His soldiers won the battle and, in another twelve years, Constantine had reconciled the eastern and western portions of the Empire under one banner (Gibbon, 1909, p. 149), eventually founding the eastern political capital of Byzantium on the strength of another sacred dream (Chadwick, 1993, p. 127).

The tale of the pre-battle vision advances the notion that Constantine employed dreams and myth to manipulate military and political outcomes. This skill ultimately extended to church politics. The year 325 CE saw the Emperor’s patience end with regard to doctrinal quarreling among ecclesiastics, and he oversaw the Council of Nicaea as a means of sorting out church ideology. That assembly produced the Nicene Creed, dogmatizing the Christian confession of Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Ayres, 2006, p. 19). The tenet has endured
through the centuries, remaining until the present time an article of faith for Catholics worldwide.

Around the time of the creed’s adoption Constantine’s dream assumed an upgraded status, though the precise date that the emperor first mentioned his dream remains obscure. The battle at Milvian Bridge itself, however, seems to have been an important talking point. Historian H. A. Drake (2000) writes that Constantine “never tired of talking, or hearing, about it” (p. 173). Yet classicist Raymond Van Dam (2011) holds that the emperor remained closemouthed with regard to the now traditional stories of the visions “until long after the battle” (p. 7). Their first known chronicling originated with the rhetorician Lactantius in approximately 315 CE (Drake, 2000, pp. 179-180), while the bloodshed at Milvian Bridge was commonly known within a decade of its occurrence (Van Dam, 2011, p. 6). Accounts of the emperor’s receipt of the divine word prior to the battle had thus expanded their reach well before the synod at Nicaea. Constantine’s sway over the theological approach to the Nicene Creed itself was probably minimal (Elliott, 1996, pp. 204-205), but the prestige of the visions could have affected the proceedings of the Council. Here again, the exact timing of communications about the vision is uncertain, (Van Dam, 2011, p. 62). But after Constantine told it, the “story about his dream of Jesus Christ was hence most useful in helping establish his spiritual authority” (Van Dam, 2011, p. 76) over squabbling bishops (pp. 75-76), because it affirmed his “direct access to Christ” (p. 76). As he assembled the most influential clerics of the era, ultimately bringing them into agreement, Constantine’s exploitation of his own dream’s mythology must be viewed as a principal component in the machinations required to establish a binding creed that is foundational to Catholic ideology (Hughes, 2017, p. 167).

The dream-myth nexus that carried such weight in establishing the worldview integral to Catholicism is not an isolated instance. Moreover, dreams of certain cultural origins have influenced other culture’s myths. Exemplifying this connection are the texts of Artemidorus. The ancient dream interpreter’s work informed early Islamic perspectives on dreams (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 8). The 2nd Century CE (1975) Oneirocritica (Interpretation of Dreams) is comprised of five books that draw on the now lost texts of older dream critics from Asia and Imperial Rome (pp. 6-7). Penned in Greek, the visions depicted in the Oneirocritica cover an extensive range. Dreams about stars falling from the sky (p. 117),
gladiatorial combat (p. 111), along with visions of partridges (p. 125) offer a small sample of the tome’s variety. And the nature of the book’s interpretations attracted a crowd of readers.

Introduction of the *Oneirocritica* to Islam came at the hands of Hunayn Ishaq, a Christian doctor who lived in the 8th Century. His Arabic rendering of Artemidorus’ dream catalogue became a manual for Islamic dream interpreters. Hunayn adapted the text to Muslim sensibilities, reworking passages that pertained to Greek gods and pagan tastes (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 8). Also of appeal to Islamic dream sages was the absence within the *Oneirocritica*’s pages of any insistence that night visions emanated from a plurality of gods (p. 7). Moreover, Artemidorus sorted dreams thematically instead of interpreting the random dreams of individuals (p. 8). And seventeen hundred years prior to Freud’s (2008) linkage of the importance of activities from the previous day to an individual’s dream (p. 138), Artemidorus (1975) argued that dreams often depict parts of the dreamer’s waking day (pp. 7-8).

Hunayn’s adaptation of the *Oneirocritica* affected Muslim ideology. The first shift related to the general understanding of dreams. The faith’s earliest records of interpreted dreams employed an anecdotal technique (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 40). By the 9th century Artemidorus’ structured method became the favored approach and the popularity of dream interpretation in the Islamic world soared. This change connected to concurrent Muslim political innovation. The governing body of Islamic religious and legal authority, known as the *ulama*, established a concept called *ijtihad*. *Ijtihad* was introduced as a means of compiling and codifying *hadith*—the sayings and traditions ascribed to the Prophet Muhammed—into what would become Sharia Law (Viorst, 2001, pp. 164-166). *Ijtihad*, however, has assumed interpretations broader than serving as a method of discovering Muhammed’s communications. The concept is also held to mean “independent reasoning” (Browers, 2012, p. 30) and viewed in some circles as a “process of engaging the human mind in pondering and reflecting on God’s plan and intention in the Universe” (Hallaq, 2014, p. 21). For two hundred years, *ijtihad* was the foundation undergirding the creation of Sharia Law; prior to its official conclusion, when completion of the legal code had been achieved, *ijtihad* also served as a source of intellectual flourishing among Muslim thinkers (Viorst, 2001, p. 166). Many of Islam’s dream interpreters in the 9th and 10th centuries were
none other than the scholars who assembled the hadith so vital to the composition of Sharia Law (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 16).

A popular dream hadith was codified in this time period following its initial expression by Abu Hurayrah—a confidant of Muhammed’s. The saying runs as follows:

In the end times, the dream of the Muslim will scarcely be able to be false. Those of them who have the truest dreams are likewise those who speak most truly. There are three types of dreams: the good dream that is “a glad tiding from God” (Q 10:64), the dream in which man’s own soul speaks, and the dream that Satan sends to make him sad. If one of you sees a dream he dislikes, let him not talk to anyone about it; instead, let him stand up and spit. To see neck-irons in a dream signifies resoluteness in religion, whereas to see leg-irons is worse than that (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 20).

This tradition remains doctrinally prominent, having been authorized by the pen of hadith jurist, Ibn Sirin, and subsequently incorporated into Muslim dogma (pp. 19-21).

Ijtihad, then, became linked to dream interpretation by members of the ulama. Enthusiasm for dreams likely stemmed from a hadith in which Muhammed explains that “when I am gone there shall remain naught of the glad tidings of prophecy, except for true dreams” (p. 4). As it features sacred prophecy, this tradition emphasizes the divinity of dreams. Yet the concept of divine visions offers flexibility in interpretation. Artemidorus’ original work, which Hunayn later sanitized of polytheism for a Muslim readership (p. 48), nevertheless preserves dreamed references to Greek mythical beings. Further, Hunayn’s edited work institutes only the shift from Greek ‘gods’ to the Koranic ‘god.’ Instead of expunging all mythical beings within the text, Hunayn’s tactic indicates a willingness to maintain the ancient continuity between myth and dreams. Mythographer Bruce Boyer (1996) argues that dreams can be amended into narratives that are “thus altered in manners which make them culturally acceptable” (p. 27). With this program in mind, we can understand why the first Muslim interpreters of dreams aimed at orthodoxy in their commentary, yet the guidebook of Artemidorus/Hunayn set up an orientation informed by mythological conceptions, rather than fostering dogmatic alignment. Of greater importance is the demonstration that scholars from the ijtihad era possessed enough political clout to control myth and dreams in the developmental stages of Islamic culture (Hughes, 2017, p. 168).
Descartes’ Dreamscape and its Influence on Modern Myth

As noted in Chapter 1 and underscored in the present section, control over the dream remained with organized religion for centuries prior to the scientific age (Lamoreaux, 2002, p. 70) (Oberhelman, 1991, pp. 11-12) (Schmitt, 1999, pp. 274-287). The connection between myth and dreams would again shift with the rise of modernity, the descent of faith, and the espousal of revamped epistemologies. Devotion to the scientific method spurred a redesign of our understanding of the world, ultimately rendering older ideas obsolete (Shapin, 1996, p. 5). But history could well have taken a different course had Rene Descartes’ abovementioned dreams of November 10, 1619 not taken place. These visions motivated the philosopher to aim at a complete reworking of Western concepts of knowledge (Matthews, 1989, pp. 87-88), kicking off a massive ideological change.

For Descartes the third (and final dream) of the fateful series, which featured the dictionary, the volume of poetry, and the reference to Pythagoras was a rational, god-sent map designed to overhaul scientific knowledge (Maritain, 1946, pp. 20-21). Because of their influence on the philosopher’s thought, 18th century thinkers studied Descartes’ visions (Maritain, 1946, p. 10), but the dreams turned out to be nowhere near as attractive to those scholars as the ideas that sprang from them. The science was the thing. For centuries afterward, the Western scientific record falls all but silent on the subject of dreams. Still, the tenacious link between dreams and myth remained: Descartes’ visions connected to one of his time’s guiding myths, one that the philosopher worked to establish.

In describing his quest for true knowledge, the philosopher presents the movement from antiquated, disorganized and faulty means of understanding as a metaphor. Knowledge became a city. Outmoded city plans had rendered the urban layout obsolete, with haphazard designs leading down ancient blind alleys. These defective habitations, built with the imprecision of superstitious thought, required revamping by rational thinkers who would create a new civic domain, built on the bedrock of logic. Such was the metaphor that launched and maintained the “instant ideological change” myth (Midgley, 2004, p. 6). A popular myth even before Descartes linked it to the metaphor of the city. Francis Bacon decried ancient knowledge, urging that thinkers of substance “try the whole thing anew.
upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all human
knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations” (Shapin, 1996, p. 66).

Bacon’s thoughts here parallel those of Descartes. The former, of course, was an
empiricist, the latter a rationalist. Cultural scholar Morris Berman (1981) writes that “there
was no real clash between rationalism and empiricism;” rationalism gives primacy to
thought in organizing laws of phenomena, while empiricism applies experience of
phenomena to the process of thought (p. 28). These approaches dovetailed in a power
narrative. Bacon associated knowledge with power—power that ultimately accrued to
those conversant in Cartesian mathematical certainty. This combination allowed ideas to
be turned into technologies, representing a break from the ancient and medieval
Aristotelean model, which saw the world as appropriate for contemplation, rather than
manipulation. In Berman’s words, “Greek thought is static, modern science is dynamic”
(p. 29). As science replaced scholasticism, conditions became optimal for the introduction
of the scientific myth.

As with any myth, that of science was characterized by ambiguity. In philosopher
Jacques Maritain’s (1946) conceptualization of the shift, Descartes’

    science plays in the mythology of modern times a role as majestic and as formidable
    as Progress itself, this Science that promised everything and denied everything, that
    raised above all things the absolute independence, the divine aseity of the human
    mind, and which has made so many men, led astray by it from the eternal verities,
    into sorrowful beings (p. 23).

Dramatic words, but whether through the application of Descartes’ deductive methods,
Bacon’s empirical ones, or their ultimate combination, the scientific myth attempted to
jettison the fault-ridden past and reconstruct it along the true lines of modern thought.
Doing so would expose the errors of the past to an updated truth and change a culture along
the way (Hughes, 2017, p. 166).

While keeping in mind Bacon’s vital contributions to the project of modernity, the focus
will remain on Descartes’ inputs, for the reason that the thinker’s additions can be traced
to the series of dreams he had on November 10, 1619. Descartes’ love of methodical
approaches originated in his days at school. Educated at the Jesuit college of La Fleche
from the age of 10 to 18 (other accounts say he was 8 when he enrolled [Stevens, 1995, p.
302]), the school emphasized method above all else. From its pedagogical practices
through the way to present oneself socially, the school’s fathers aimed at methodical precision. Two of Descartes’ early works, now lost, testify to such attention to method in their detailing of proper practice in fencing and in a mathematical exposition of harmony (Sutcliffe, 1986, pp.7-8).

Philosopher Bertrand Russell (1945) adds to Descartes’ love of method his being drawn to the era’s rising “new self-confidence of science,” which resulted in an originality of approach not seen since Plato (p. 558). The confidence was such that Descartes wanted to convince readers that he was the only one able to effect the creation of a new scientific method. Proceeding from a linkage of geometry and algebra in which mathematical relationships are described spatially, along with a necessary mathematical order, the unification of all scientific expression becomes possible (Sutcliffe, 1986, pp.15-16). Put another way, all scientific study so performed is thus covered by mathematical certainty. This assurance allowed Descartes to establish a four-fold scientific method, as scholar F.E. Sutcliffe (1986) explains:

The first [rule of method] implies the operation which Descartes knows as ‘intuition’, that is to say the use of pure light of the mind as opposed to the evidence of the senses or the imagination. It is by ‘intuition’ that each man knows that he is, he thinks, that a triangle has three sides. This first rule therefore may be paraphrased thus: in the study of any problem, start by embracing intuitively the fundamental truths of which there can be no doubt. The second, often known as the rule of analysis, enjoins to decompose complex problems into problems as simple as possible. The third, known as the rule of synthesis, applies to the truths reached by the two preceding rules. Put them in order, says Descartes, starting with the simplest, those reached by application of the first rule, followed by the truths deduced from them, going from the simpler to the more complex. It is obvious that there is here a direct application of the principle of the formation of equations, of the movement from equations of the first degree to those of a higher degree. Lastly, the fourth rule takes account of the fact that deduction, unlike intuition, depends to some extent on memory. In order to guarantee oneself against any defect of memory, one should, says Descartes in this rule, attempt to give deduction the character of intuition by exercising oneself to see immediately, in a deductive reasoning, the link between the first principles and their ultimate consequences (pp.16-17).

To streamline the process, then, Descartes’ scientific method proposes the use of intuitive thought, simplification, reassembly of a problem’s constituent elements in ascending order of complexity, and applying a learned deductive memory technique to the first three rules and their results. Innovative and ingenious, but what purpose was this method to be put?
Add to the method Descartes’ belief that the bodies of animals and human beings are machines (the key difference being that people have souls, whereas animals do not) (Russell, 1945, p. 561), along with the certainty of mind vouchsafed by the philosopher’s famous deduction that “I think therefore I am” (p. 564) and the stage was set for radical shifts in Western culture.

One of the most important steps Descartes took was the establishment of new applications for a religious notion—a step later incorporated in the development of science and technology. As noted at the beginning of the present chapter, the idea that the soul is separate from the body is an old one. Having gained traction with Plato’s dualistic approach to matter and mind and later honed through the lens of Christian theology, “the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other” (p. 567). Descartes viewed this disconnection as a license to swallow reality whole. Armed with method and a mechanical cosmos in which matter and motion comprised physical existence, the philosopher wished “to reconstruct the whole universe” (Sutcliffe, 1986, p. 17). And, employing the metaphor of the mechanical clock as the means by which nature operated, Descartes and other philosophers of his day, such as Robert Boyle, broke with medieval ideas of natural philosophy (Shapin, 1996, pp. 33-37). This use of the clock “metaphor for nature meant, as all metaphors accepted as legitimate do, that our understanding of both terms changes through their juxtaposition. The rightness of a metaphor is not subject to proof” (p. 37).

Though starting with the creation story provided in Genesis, Descartes offers a mechanical narrative of how nature might have progressed from that point (Russell, 1945, p. 562). While the Cartesian account would be replaced by Newtonian physics, Descartes’ abridgement of matter to numerical expression established the era’s most complete cutting of ties with Aristotelean physics, ushering in a worldview focused on matter and motion (Sutcliffe, 1986, pp. 20-21). Descartes’ separation of these phenomena, along with the division of body and soul, conduced to a description of the mind as a controlling entity and nature as something to be dominated, with a goal of man’s shift toward assuming the dual roles of “master and possessor of Nature.” In this aspiration, Descartes’ words reached many who sought to be rid of irrationality and chance, as well as extending Cartesian control to political, scientific and military outcomes (p. 21).
While educated by the Catholic order of Jesuits, Descartes’ ideas about method caught on in the Protestant sphere. Sociologist Max Weber (1964) writes that only the most austere branches of Protestantism eliminated magic and metaphysics from the religious search for salvation, replacing the spiritual quest with self-realization through one’s work. This process amounted to a “methodically rationalized fulfilment of one’s vocational responsibility” while, for those of other faiths, “the world remained a great enchanted garden” (pp. 269-270). Such methods trace themselves to Descartes, though he was not the only 17th Century thinker to reduce nature to matter and motion (Shapin, 1996, p. 46). Apocryphal scriptures also legitimized this view; the Wisdom of Solomon holds that god “arranged all things by measure and number and weight” (11:20). Moreover, Johannes Kepler asserted that all in nature adheres to laws of mathematics because god had rendered the universe according to mathematical laws (Shapin, 1996, pp. 59-60). Even though religion continued to play a role in the science of the 17th Century, and in spite of the fact that he served in the Catholic Bavarian army during the religious conflict that would become the Thirty Years War (Russell 1945, p. 558), the scope of Descartes’ project suggests that the philosopher was bound less by theological niceties than by absolute progress. In his 1644 treatise The Principles of Philosophy, Descartes hits upon such diverse subjects as planetary trajectory, divine attributes, free will, physical laws, celestial bodies, gravity and geology (Matthews, 1989, pp. 89-90). In fact, he writes that “there is no phenomenon of nature whose explanation has been omitted in this treatise” (Descartes, 2003, para. 199). To all physical phenomena and their effects, coherent, material and mechanical causes were to be assigned.

Such a revamped understanding of creation first shook ancient myths, then replaced them with new ones. The 17th Century scientific view held that, if you want to know about the natural world, explore it yourself and apply reason to your findings rather than relying on the authority of official explanations. This thought process connects early scientific thinkers with those living in present day Western societies through its prioritization of individual intellectualism and the rejection of traditional authority (Shapin, 1996, pp. 69-72). Still, such a quest for knowledge had to be pursued with the correct method. Agreement on method, however, escaped the era’s thinkers (p. 90); further, the push for
scientific understanding had to be restricted to those qualified to fathom such learning—thinkers from the higher social classes (p. 94).

The fixation on method—the what, the how, the people connected to proper scientific procedure—is tied to myth. Science historian and sociologist Steven Shapin (1996) argues that “formal methodology is to be understood as a set of rhetorical tools for positioning practices in the culture and for specifying how those practices were to be valued” (p. 95). He writes further that methodology did occupy a formal place in the science of the 17th Century, despite the ambiguity that surrounded the techniques. Both rationalists and empiricists employed methodology, in part to validate their practices’ value and identity, as a “practice without an attendant myth is likely to be weak, hard to justify, hard even to make visible as a distinct kind of activity” (p. 95). And so methodological myths of rationalism and empiricism guided the work of the era’s philosophers.

The social context for acceptance and application of such mythical methodologies was one of change and crisis. In continual flux since the first signs of the medieval order’s breakdown, Europe’s political regimes had connections to the new methodologies and associated knowledge, along with links to shifts in the social hierarchy (p. 123). The cultural, technological, and geo-political changes, along with the wars of religion associated with the modern age, were related to shifts in “views of knowledge and its role in ensuring or subverting order” (p. 124). Perceived unassailability of political structures tends to extend to their associated knowledge bases, while successful political challenges tend also to reach related institutional knowledge bases because accepted understandings are shaken. Questions about what actually constitutes knowledge, its veracity and the qualifications of the keepers of such knowledge abound. Further, uncertainties about whether systems of knowledge can garner belief from the public body become important, as social accord requires broad participation in a belief system (p. 124). And the problems of scientific and philosophical method are thrown into relief because the question of how a thing can be known also affects the maintenance of social order (p. 125). One need only consult the record of the present era of ‘fake news’ to conclude that epistemological concerns undermine agreement on facts, and that philosophical efforts are important in remaking a shared system of belief and restoring societal cohesion.
In the 17th Century questions about knowledge of the natural world were loaded with biblical understanding; correct conduct was derived from pious belief about the world. Such right conduct could be turned on its head via improper readings of divinely created nature (p. 125). This premise served as the nexus of debate about control of innovative ideas. Religious institutions maintained a hold on those generating new knowledge, but the 17th Century also saw other branches of authority backing the new thinkers. Various princely courts engaged in patronage schemes; Galileo’s connections to the Medici family, for example, are well known. The consequences of this relationship are also important. One of Galileo’s areas of study was projectiles—a project of interest (with its potential warlike applications) to the scientist’s boss, the Duke of Tuscany (Russell, 1945, p. 532). And while the militarization of knowledge is an ancient practice, its application to guns and navigation in the 16th and 17th Centuries among warring European armies and in expeditions of conquest took on renewed importance regarding political control. And thinkers such as Francis Bacon endorsed changes to knowledge accumulation for the purpose of institutionalizing it in the service of government power (Shapin, 1996, p. 127). For Bacon, learning “was to be effectively brought under the administrative competence of the state” (p. 129). Such control allowed for properly trained intellectuals to make advances from the old ways of the schoolmen, while not straying from governmental regulation (pp. 129-130). Bacon sums up his project of bureaucratizing knowledge with the adage that human “knowledge and human power meet in one” (p. 130). While the presence or absence of technological and economic returns on modern knowledge has been debated without concord, it is plain that skills, information and changed attitudes all sprang from the new scientific methods. Many of the 17th Century’s thinkers employed these abilities in the economic sphere, and the changed relationships between the era’s scholars and artisans reflected new understandings of natural philosophy (p. 141).

To return to Descartes, the dualistic notion of humanity remains at issue. While in his view, the mechanistic account of the world could possess explanatory power, people are more complex than the world in which they live. Our bodies, like the world, are matter in motion—yet we, as human beings, are more than that, having been endowed with a soul by god. Yet the soul occupies no space, coming into contact with the body only in the brain’s pineal gland. This unique gift of the soul, as an entity without extension, cemented
humanity’s distinguished place in god’s schematic. A key scientific result of this Cartesian mind/body split “is the depersonalization of nature and the attendant practices of producing knowledge that is understood to be disinterested” (emphasis in original) (pp. 156-162). Such a mythical blueprint removes passion and is descriptive rather than prescriptive; social and political concerns are not to intrude on the process (p. 162). This objectivity has broadened our knowledge of the natural world, while blunting understanding of our place in it—knowledge of human nature has diminished (p. 163). Indeed, good “order and certainty in science have been produced at the price of disorder and uncertainty elsewhere in our culture” (p. 164). Another questionable development concerning scientific method is that it is its very objectivity that increases its value in the field of political action; its ability to make political changes stems from the understanding that such knowledge avoided the trappings of human interests. This belief persists insofar as science, as humanity’s greatest source of knowledge and power, we regard as stripped of moral valuation (p. 164). The mythological narratives we have thus perpetuated about scientific objectivity have had social and political consequences.

Perhaps chief among these narratives is the perceived separation of body and mind—a split that has informed so many of the divisions in our perceptions of the world. Descartes (1986) wrote that he was a “substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and no material thing; so that this ‘I’…the mind by which I am, is entirely distinct from the body” (p. 54). This is an unusual claim to make. As philosopher Mary Midgley (2004) argues, human life is not split into categories of mind and matter, and that the idea that such a division exists is part of the myth that Descartes created about human existence (p. 34). The reasons for having made such a distinction assume a degree of clarity when one examines certain aspects of the philosopher’s life. Descartes lost his mother when he was just a boy and was subsequently sent to the Jesuit boarding school at La Fleche. The experience of losing one’s mother and being sent from home at a young age would be traumatic for any child. Descartes responded to his circumstances by retreating inward at the college, spending long periods each day in isolation from his schoolmates. Solitary pursuits of intellectual activity characterized his days; he did not develop close relationships, later avoiding even his siblings’ weddings (Stevens. 1995, p. 302).
Descartes’ behavior became more sinister as he grew older. He cut open live animals for purposes of experimentation, his justification being that, unlike human beings, animals had no soul and their shrieks mattered no more than rusty mechanical apparatus operating without lubricant (p. 303). This is pathological behavior; avoiding human contact and acting without empathy can indicate a schizoid personality (pp. 302-303). Others have similarly assessed Descartes’ mindset. For example, Morris Berman (1981) writes that people with schizophrenia often dissociate from their bodies and seek isolation. Descartes’ own schematic sees a separate observer—the mind, which truly “is”—viewing the mechanical operations of the body; such a “schizoid duality lies at the heart of the Cartesian paradigm” (p. 35). This separation was so complete that god—the eternal watchmaker—gazed at his creation ticking along according to mathematical laws without inclination to further intervene in the outcome (Stevens, 1995, p. 305).

Odd as this understanding seems when examined as an isolated concept, the methodological constructs of the 17th Century did offer social-psychological supports that had been stripped away by encroaching rationalist and empirical thought. As Midgley (2004) explains, the era’s devotion to methods fostered a culture of scientific communication that worked to banish customary approaches to everyday life through the apparent magic of experimental and mathematical precision. The bias toward scientific “literal truth” began to proliferate (xiv). By the 20th Century scientific method had come to be seen “as a moral sign-post that could take the place of religion” (p. 21). Here the Cartesian schizoid split cannot be avoided, and the dream returns to the myth. As noted in Chapter 1, Descartes’ most widely known position on dreams is that they obfuscate clear and distinct ideas and are thus suspect. Yet the philosopher was profoundly affected by the dreams of November 10, 1619. Psychologist Anthony Stevens (1995) writes of that impact that people who struggle with schizophrenia often feel that their sole true connection to anything important lies in their dreams. It is only when experiencing such visions that emotions based on a full connection with life occur; it is a moment when distinctions between body and soul disappear (p. 305). The view at this juncture reveals the nature of the split in Descartes’ thinking: dreams are not to be trusted except when sent expressly to him by god. Meantime, the rest of us are left to struggle with the problems that such a position engenders. For Descartes, nature operates through static, rational and
mathematical laws. Life, of course, does not work this way. Just about every adult understands the idea of a love-hate relationship or has experienced the ambiguous communication of dreams that are nevertheless of value (Berman, 1981, p. 36). Because these aspects of life defy Cartesian logic, they must be avoided. Such a prescription has become integral to a myth of present times, which holds that if life becomes too contradictory or too difficult, the anodynes of alcohol, drugs or other excesses may be used to avoid the peril of emotional struggle (p. 20).

The results of the Cartesian myth have produced mixed results. Descartes’ final stroke in completing the mind/body split set the stage for a general detachment from society. Yet people have become more innovative than their medieval counterparts, engaging in projects of invention and exploration. The other side of the split has seen environmental and military disasters at the hands of those in control of technological advances. It is this dark side of Descartes’ divide which motivated Anthony Stevens to opine that our “whole culture is still suffering from this dream and his failure to understand it” (p. 318). Another assessment of the dream’s effect might emphasize relief from superstitious shadows, dispelled by the dynamism of science and its attendant myths.

*Science Returns to an Ancient Myth (and Dreams)*

Ensconced in the West’s socio-political powerbase over several centuries, science itself became an institution and its myths proliferated. In 1859 Charles Darwin’s landmark volume *The Origin of Species* first circulated. Advancing the concept of natural selection as Alfred Russel Wallace and Darwin himself developed it, the naturalist depicts the ways in which organisms evolve (Darwin, 1958, ix). Immensely important in knocking off its foundations the biblical dogma of a fixed, created natural environment, the effects of the work would reach beyond physical surroundings. Darwin expanded evolutionary ideas to the spheres of psychology and behavioral characteristics. The biologist argued that baby mammals thrashed and tore into their way into life fighting for breath, desperate to communicate. Both of these forms of animation Darwin understood as being linked to the struggle for life, calling them “social instincts;” developing the theory further, he held that the “language of emotions…is certainly of importance for the welfare of mankind”
The outcome of Darwin’s project is still being tallied. Creationists and evolutionists continue their ideological battle. And Darwin’s findings have influenced professionals in diverse fields. Sigmund Freud is an example. Freud was inspired by the science of natural selection (Freud, 2008, p. xiii). But he contradicted Darwin’s conviction that people and other mammals socialize as a matter of constitution. In place of this idea, Freud took the approach that, at birth, humans possess no awareness of their environment and that we are completely asocial, learning sociality only after experiencing it (Freud, 1962, p. 3). Freud held that it was impossible to know infants’ thoughts, but he argued that approximating their thought processes could be done by analyzing information provided by adults suffering from neurosis.

Dreams could procure a solution. For Freud (2008), dreams disclosed the pathway to the unconscious of a sleeping neurotic, as well as revealing waking thoughts of such patients as experienced in their infancy. Freud also argued that dreams were the key to examining anyone’s childhood wishes—neurotic or otherwise—as desires locked in the mind’s depths decades in the past (p. 386). In a neurotic mind Freud sees a dynamic relationship to childhood wishes:

Following indications from the psychoanalysis of neuroses, I consider that these unconscious wishes are always alive, ready at all times to seek out expression if opportunity offers, always ready to ally themselves with some impulse from the conscious, and to transfer their own great intensity to the less intense charge of the conscious impulse (p. 362).

Further, the fulfilment of childhood desires within the framework of a dream is an enduring process. In infancy, a child’s desires are without moral boundary; children thus try to obtain anything they please. As they mature, people suppress forbidden desires, believing that such wishes have been abandoned. These thoughts have instead entrenched themselves within the unconscious, poised to reoccur in later years, symbolically represented in dreams (Furfey, 1919, p. 355).

In Freud’s estimation, the most forceful variety of wish fulfilment ultimately linked to the mythical narrative of Oedipus, as noted in Chapter 1. Freud, however, did not pioneer this connection. Artemidorus (1975), whose work Freud (2008) knew (p. 79), wrote of dreams depicting sons and mothers having sexual intercourse, along with the related enmity and death of associated father figures seventeen hundred years ahead of Freud.
(Artemidorus, 1975, pp. 82-83). And we have seen how the Greek tragedian Sophocles (1984) connected such visions to archaic myths almost seven hundred years before Artemidorus, in his work, *Oedipus Rex*. The resurrection of the Oedipus tale in Freud’s work remains a controversial aspect of the psychoanalyst’s approach. And yet the myth persists in dreams. Freud insisted that his patients often reported having Oedipal visions—as well as dreams of patricide (p. 203). Moreover, comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell (2008) recounts the more recent incident of reading a report in a newspaper of a young man who dreams of killing his father by mistake; his mother subsequently tries to calm him with a sexual embrace (p. 2). This myth, as it links to the human dream-world, remains important. Freud (2008) writes that Oedipus’ destiny “moves us only because it could have been ours as well” (p. 202). And, no matter one’s position on Freud’s interpretation of the archaic myth, its continual resurfacing testifies to it vigor. Moreover, while there exists a plenitude of scholarly objections pertaining to Freud’s conclusions (Levin, 1996, pp. 255-271), academic works have also projected the Oedipus complex onto various cultural myths (Tang, N. M. and Smith, B. L., 1966, pp. 562-579), filmmakers have represented the Oedipus tragedy onscreen (Urbano, 2000, pp. 177-191), and *Oedipus Rex* is still performed as a play.

It is ironic to consider Freud’s ardor for science alongside the recognition that a component of his account of the dream structure connects to a myth. And, the significance of Freud’s theories notwithstanding, his restoration of this primal myth, now hidden and again revived in the interplay between human consciousness and unconsciousness, augurs another change in the connection of to dream and myth. Freud’s onetime associate, Carl Jung, noted the delusions of schizophrenic shut-ins under his care, connecting their hallucinated visions to myths. This experience served as the psychologist’s initial step in developing the theory of the collective unconscious (Stevens, 1995, pp. 51-52). Also important in this context is Jung’s idea that dreams link people to archetypes (Jung, 1974, p. 77).

Jung (1974) held that a stratification process can attend dreams, exemplified as “little” dreams and “big” dreams (p. 76). The dream’s point of origin determines the classification. Although they parted company in 1913, Jung held, alongside Freud, that a dream often indicates the day’s events. Freud (2008) writes that “the dream clearly prefers the
impressions of the days immediately past” (p. 126); Jung (1974) says that “little dreams are the nightly fragments of fantasy coming from the subjective and personal sphere, and their meaning is limited to the affairs of everyday” (p. 76). Their agreement on the sources of such dreams, however, ended there. Jung’s admittance of archetypal, or “big” dreams betokened the psychologists’ parting of ways. It is these “big” dreams which arise from the collective unconscious and display mythic figures (Jung, 1974, p. 77). For Jung, these motifs must “be understood as specific forms and groups of images which occur not only at all times and all places but also in individual dreams, fantasies, visions and delusional ideas” (p. 77). Insofar as these patterns emerge in people undergoing psychoanalysis, along with their dissemination in myths worldwide, they signal to us that our psychological process is solely individual in one aspect, while what remains of the unconscious assumes a collective and objective form, seen in in the minds of individuals. And, although archetypes occur universally, the “big” dreams in which they are prominent tend to gravitate toward discernible life stages: adolescence, middle age and as death draws near (p. 77).

An imaginable outcome of the course that Jung argues mythical motifs take in their engagement with the collective unconscious is demonstrable in a process of comparative mythology. An association of the myths that follow was noted in Chapter 1. In the Book of Genesis, we learn that Noah receives divine instruction to assemble an ark, and that he is to corral breeding pairs of every animal on the boat ahead of the deluge that Yahweh was about send (Genesis 6:14-22). The epic Hindu tale, the Mahabharata, tells of a hermit named Manu Vaivasvata who learns from a fish (who is, in fact, the god Brahma in a fishy masquerade) that a massive flood is on the way. The disguised Brahma tells Manu to build a boat big enough for “the seeds of all creatures,” and to keep them safe when the waters rise (Smith, 2009, pp. 199-200). Strikingly comparable, the written versions of the tales adhere to an approximate timeline. The Mahabharata materialized about 500 BCE (p. xi), while the edited texts of the Pentateuch emerged in Babylon roughly 600 BCE (Vanderkam, 1978, pp. 45-46). These coincidences do not amount to proof of Jung’s doctrine that mythical images—like floods and buoyant zoos—can be approached via the collective unconscious. The tale could have trod along the commercial and military avenues connecting ancient Babylon and northern India. Still, its establishment in the holy
books of two ancient religions could require consideration of the collective unconscious as a factor in the decision the books’ editors took in designating the story as sacred. Adding fuel to the fire in this debate is the fact that the Sumerian *Gilgamesh* epic concludes with the same story. In it, the priest-king Utnapishtim, is warned in a dream of an impending flood; the god Ea tells him to construct a ship upon which he is to store “the seed of all living creatures” (Sandars, 1981, p. 108). The story could have been a traveler’s tale that remained popular enough to merit inclusion in scripture, but it is hard to imagine a mundane account enjoying such cross-cultural longevity. That variations of the tale appeared in three important texts in diverse cultures makes it difficult to eliminate the theory of the collective unconscious from serious discussion.

**A Final Break between Scientific and Archaic Ideas about Myth and Dreams?**

Wherever those myths came from, if Jung is right about the collective unconscious our link to it is fragile, as Jung himself demonstrates with the following anecdote. While in Kenya in the 1920s, an Elgonyi shaman told Jung that his people, until recently, had paid attention to archetypal dreams because of their value in helping to make decisions concerning life events. The medicine man intimated gloomily that his society was finished with dreams because Europeans had conquered the world, knew everything, and had consequently superannuated the dream (Stevens, 1995, p. 13). A statement of Freud’s (1962) epitomizes the prevailing mythological framework that had disillusioned the shaman. The psychologist writes that civilization needs to “protect everything that contributes to the conquest of nature and the production of wealth against men’s hostile impulses” (p. 6). Freud’s remark reiterates Descartes’ 17th Century notion that humanity is to dominate nature (Sutcliffe, 1986, p. 21); that the scientific myths that originated with Descartes’ dreams of November 10, 1619 are upheld here is plain to see. Along the way, Western societies have become divorced from the value of dreams and “mystical participation” in its technological rush into modernity (Jung, 1964, pp. 31-32).

As noted above, in his 1637 work, *Discourse on Method*, Descartes postulates a split between mind and body (Descartes. 1986, p. 54), which influenced our scientific approach to the world (Sutcliffe, 1986, pp. 21). This split is visible in Jung’s (1964) assessment of
the Western denial of dreams’ power (pp. 31-32). A current development in the field of mental health, known as narrative—or post-modern—psychology, offers a useful parallel to Jung’s evaluation. Procured from social constructionist roots, the technique views social connections as being established in psychical advances occurring as a result of spoken exchanges. The process also focuses on a person’s “narrative self” in connection with our privately constructed accounts (Jones, 2003, p. 619). Such a specialized method could relegate to obsolescence Jung’s collectivist mythical approach (p. 620), as the digital age has sanctified the “personal myth”—an account which forms from individuals’ storylines, the backdrop of locale, and an interactive supporting cast (p. 625). It is possible that the personal, or “little” dream could claim space in this framework if it could be determined whether dreams of this sort affect one’s narrative self.

Thus abridged to little dreams, the historically broad nexus of dreams and myth would be reduced. This diminished connection to Jung’s collective unconscious finds its character in Joseph Campbell’s (2008) words: “[i]solated societies, dream bounded within a mythologically charged horizon, no longer exist except as areas to be exploited” (p. 334). Campbell urges rehabilitation, advocating for an overhaul of the progress myth and attention to mythological developments. The thinker argues that consciousness cannot create such awareness, and that the “whole thing is being worked out on another level” (p. 335), drawing in emergent symbols that will usher in a new era. Campbell’s assertion is unprovable. Yet this chapter has answered the question posed at its beginning with regard to concrete applications of the dream/myth nexus in a political context. In short, dreams have shown that they can influence cultural myths in specific ways—whether providing the impetus for political theologies, inspiring changes to scientific thought and its resulting worldview, or furnishing a basis for the ideological control of psychoanalysis. That dreams interact with myth in ways that can produce political results is thus clear. The means by which dreams accomplish this remains unsettled, as competing theories of dream process persist in opposition to one another.

Still, these now established connections return us to the work’s main point—that the cultural-political significance of dreams and myth cannot be slotted into divisions of certainty and uncertainty. This fact is evident in all of the examples covered in the present chapter. The case of Constantine’s pre-battle vision is instructive. The story of the fiery
cross vision—itself unclear owing to its multiple versions—was retold in in hazy exaggerations, which conduced to the myth that cemented the emperor’s status as a general, ruler, and theological administrator. In a different vein, Rene Descartes’ mystical, self-interpreted dreams inspired the philosopher to foster changes to the scientific method—as science itself shifted, related ideological myths transformed. But neither instance is exempt from criticism. Other causes for Constantine’s mythical status, and for the subsequent changes to cultural-political and theological myths can be proposed. The assertion of Descartes’ dreams as the stimulus for his world-changing scientific method can be challenged. But such criticism misses the mark: the sequences emphasized in the present chapter cannot be defined in an empirical cause and effect schematic because dreams are not empirical in the everyday sense, and myths are empirical in that they are lived, but simultaneously defy this categorization insofar as they are ideological. Still, the connection claims empirical results.

For critics this claim will represent a standstill. The work’s interpretation of particular historical moments has rendered itself impervious to attack in the same way the existence of god cannot be disproved. To shield invisible processes from judgment so that they can gain a foothold is not fair play. Part of the problem is that the examples given in this chapter are beyond living memory, perhaps adding an unearned, almost magical aura to them. Still, they were necessary to establish the groundwork for what is to come. Closer to the present day and foregrounded in Chapters 1 and 2 is a look at dreams in Nazi Germany. The political reality of Nazi Germany is still being felt, as exemplified in the case of a man about to be deported from Canada for Nazi involvement in WWII; his expulsion was being finalized in December of 2019 (Harris, 2019, p. 1). The awful deeds of the Third Reich remain within living memory. And the evidence brought to bear in the study of dreams in that totalitarian state tells a cautionary and malevolent tale, verifying the human costs the Fascists exacted when they controlled both dream and myth. At this time, cultural politics, dreams, and myth blended into history’s most horrific chapter.
Chapter 5.

“The Dream Police—they’re coming to arrest me.”
- Cheap Trick

Dreams’ Political Compass and an Ideological Myth’s Future.

We have seen that dreams link to myth, and that this relationship can outline ideological narratives. The present chapter explores this theme in depth while setting the stage for a debate in Chapter 6, which contests whether dreams can be interpreted as looking to the future while serving their mythical function. Examination of a compilation of dreams will make possible such consideration. As indicated, the dreams that Charlotte Beradt collected in interviews conducted in Berlin in the 1930s will be important. The fruit of the writer’s efforts in gathering the night visions of hundreds of dreamers, as Nazi politics became ever more dangerous, forms the body of a historical record. Chapter 2 depicted subject matter from the dreams of people living under the Nazi regime. As a means of preparing for the debate about forward-looking dreams, the current chapter examines about two dozen complete dreams from Beradt’s interview subjects that depict Third Reich ideology, violence, and above all, terror.

The idea that institutions can control dreams is not a fanciful one. The present work has shown that religious establishments have successfully endeavored to put their stamp on the dream, as have techno-political systems. It would be inaccurate, however, to assert that the ideas about state control of the dream have never entered the realm of fiction. For example, Ismail Kadare’s (1993) novel, The Palace of Dreams, imagines a bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire that serves as

one of the pillars of the State. It is here, better than in any surveys, statements, or reports compiled by inspectors, policemen or governors of pashaliks, that the true state of the Empire may be assessed. For in the nocturnal realm of sleep are to be found both the light and the darkness of humanity, its honey and its poison, its greatness and its vulnerability. All that is murky and harmful, or that will become so in a few years or centuries makes its first appearance in men’s dreams. Every passion or wicked thought, every affliction or crime, every rebellion or catastrophe necessarily casts its shadow before it long before it manifests itself in real life (pp. 19-20).
The bureaucracy’s task was to collect dreams from the four corners of the empire, interpret them, assess the dreams for importance and act on what its inspectors deemed the most pressing ones. Kadare conceptualizes the imaginary institution’s work as exploiting the dream as a mechanism of strength, as the vizier in his pages remarks “that whoever controls the Palace of Dreams possesses the keys of the State” (p. 113). The lines from Kadare’s novel pull together associations of power and prediction embedded in dreams.

It was perhaps a similar connection that motivated the secret police (NKVD) to execute a poor worker in Russia’s Ural region in 1937. Andrei Stepanovich Arzhilovsksy was a social activist and deemed a political agitator by the Soviet state. He was arrested three times between 1919 and 1937. Part of what made Arzhilovsksy an offensive figure in the eyes of the secret police was his proclivity for writing political satire, both during his long stretches of incarceration and on release. Alongside his political writings, Arzhilovsksy kept a journal. This private document listed complaints against injustices of the Soviet regime. When he was arrested for the final time in July 1937, during the height of Stalin’s Terror, state thugs seized his journal in which 20 dreams were detailed. Arzhilovsksy was executed in early September of that year—a few weeks after his arrest and the seizure of his belongings. His diary was preserved and published when the KGB turned it over to a writer in the early 1990s (Paperno, 2009, p. 166).

The journal revealed that the NKVD had marked passages of his dreams in red pen (p. 166). Political content in the dreams is apparent. Visions of the misery, fear and powerless life of poor Russians populate the record. One of Arzhilovsksy’s dreams sees Joseph Stalin drunk and committing a sexual assault (though this vision, strangely, did not merit a red flag at the hands of the NKVD investigator who examined the journal) (pp. 166-168). Other dreams in the diary invited closer scrutiny. One passage, dated April 19, 1937, drew the officer’s attention: “I had a dream about travelling; I can see mountains and a river. On the right is a beautiful church. Could it be a prison? I am afraid of it” (emphasis Paperno’s) (p. 170). Arzhilovsksy wrote on May 1, 1937 that his dreams were becoming a source of dread. He writes that he hid his journal until the day of the May 1 entry, when he tried to convince himself that the dreams represented nothing sinister, that they were “just ordinary fantasies after all” (p. 170). The poor labourer was wrong in his assessment, and “when he was arrested again, this dream would be used as criminal evidence against him” (p. 170).
As noted in the previous chapter, dream narratives are sometimes adjusted to fit cultural specifics (Boyer, 1996, p. 27). In the instance of the dream listed above, we see an interpretation that invokes Russian folk wisdom identifying a dreamed church as a prison. Yet the cultural specifics appear translatable into a broader conceptualization. Arzhilovsksy was imprisoned prior to his execution, plausibly attributing a prognostic quality to the vision, and the links to the Stalinist legal bureaucracy which used dreams to convict people of political crimes are plain to see (Paperno, 2009, p. 170). We shall examine below the ways in which similar circumstances imposed themselves onto the bleak reality of Nazi politics.

This imposition comes to us through the lens of the Third Reich of Dreams. The importance of the dreams that Charlotte Beradt recorded cannot be overemphasized. Collectively, the record they comprise offers a glance through an aperture whose view initially could have been known only to individual dreamers. In the words of Reinhard Koselleck (1985), the dreams’ “common signature is a lucidly registered, menacing proximity to reality in which the disposition of personal background and a dreamlike capacity for reaction come together in in the everyday and release prognostic potential” (p. 221). A dangerous political reality and the possibility of looking ahead combine in the dreams of those living the Nazi nightmare. Scrutiny of excerpts from Beradt’s work also exposes dreamed connections to the myth of the Thousand Year Reich.

_Dreams Describe the Nazi Myth_

It is instructive to look first at an example of dreams as myth-making frames in Nazi Germany before delving into their alleged prognostic qualities. Beradt (1968) writes that the dream which motivated her to track people’s night visions as the Nazis rose to power came from a man she identifies as “Herr S.” (p. 8). In his waking life, Herr S. owned a factory; three days following Hitler’s seizure of power he dreamed that Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels arrived at his place of business to inspect it. All of Herr S’s employees stood in rows, while Herr S. himself was required to occupy center stage and perform a Nazi salute. The factory owner reports straining and sweating for half an hour in an effort to complete the raised arm gesture. Goebbels, all the while, gazed blankly upon
the man. Finally, after having completed the salute, the Propaganda Minister told Herr S. that he did not want his salute and walked out the door. The factory owner stood, humiliated, in front of his workers, managing to save a shred of dignity by glaring at Goebbels’ club foot as the Nazi limped out of sight in the moment before waking from the nightmare (p. 5).

After its initial occurrence, Herr S. described the dream as a crushing experience (p. 5). Plainly, it held personal significance for him, as the vision was a recurrent one, with each new episode introducing additional embarrassing details (p. 7). And Beradt writes that Herr S’s suffering within his own dreamscape reflected not an individual pathology but was “instead indicative of the atmosphere of coercion developing around him” (p. 8). This atmosphere was more pervasive than Beradt or Herr S. could have known, a mere three days after the Nazis assumed control of the German state. On reflection, however, Beradt considers the political atmosphere, as first shown in Herr S’s dream frames, as revealing “in these clear, uncannily sharp images how all the pressures brought to bear on the individual by the totalitarian regime produced alienation, isolation, loss of identity, and dislocation—terms which now have become commonplace, or subject to considerable mythmaking” (p. 6). The specifics of Herr S’s Goebbels dream worked to strip the man of his held political values, destroy his sense of self and disorient him by shaking his personal foundations (p. 6). And it was because of the discussions with Herr S. about his dreams that Beradt began her process of recording hundreds more visions, her primary reason for the project being that such a record would comprise a catalogue of testimony once the time arrived to assign a verdict to Nazi crimes (p. 9).

And yet the significance of Beradt’s process extends beyond judgment of Nazi brutality. She writes about citizens’ estrangement from their lives—as filtered through perverse dreams that bolstered an ideology. The journalist expands upon this assertion in specifically Nazi-oriented terms with the claim that the pages of dreams she recorded amounted to dreamers’ visions that were “dictated to them by the dictatorship. Dream imagery might thus help to describe the structure of a reality that was just on the verge of becoming a nightmare” (p. 9). Beradt’s subsequent collection of dreams took the shape of a representative, if somewhat random, cross-section of German citizens: textile workers, friends, relatives and neighbourhood service providers, educated professionals and blue-
collar workers (p. 10). Debate could arise over whether the roughly three hundred interviews Beradt conducted are enough from which to draw reasonable conclusions. The present chapter goes some distance to putting such a dispute to rest with the evidence drawn from the dreams; the unified themes framing these visions depict political manipulation throughout, buttressing the Nazi myth while providing clues to the horrors that were to come.

**The Terror of Nazi Nightmares**

Glimpses of the myth-making capabilities of the visions in question are available through exegesis of the dreams Beradt logged. In characterizing them, the journalist writes that these “political dreams were particularly intensive, uncomplicated . . . moreover they were clearly determinate, with elements composed in a generally coherent, anecdotal and even dramatic fashion” (p. 11). Such an outline is discernible in all of the visions examined below. The first is notable for its prescience in understanding the limitations to privacy that the Nazis would ultimately enact. A middle-aged doctor dreamed, in 1934, that private life was about to be compromised:

It was about nine o’clock in the evening. My consultations were over, and I was just stretching out on the couch to relax with a book on Matthias Grunewald, when suddenly the walls of my room and then my apartment disappeared. I looked around and discovered to my horror that as far as the eye could see no apartment had walls any more. Then I heard a loudspeaker boom, ‘According to the decree of the 17th of this month on the Abolition of Walls . . .’ (p. 21).

The doctor told Beradt that the incident which likely triggered the dream stemmed from a visit from the block warden who demanded to know why he had not hung a Nazi flag in in his window. The doctor, while attempting to distract the party deputy with liquor, recalled thinking “not in *my* four walls” (p. 22). Beradt’s own consideration of the dream holds that such a vision is emblematic in a totalitarian regime especially for one who, like the physician, has designs on resisting invasive tactics (pp. 21-22).

The dream’s aftermath persisted: as the doctor had written down the dream, he subsequently dreamed of being accused of recording his dreams (p. 21). To have had such visions in 1934, at the beginning of the Nazi reign of terror represents an accumulation of
fears to the present moment, while indicating suspicion that more terror could lay ahead. That the doctor’s dream included a book about the artist Matthias Grunewald is significant, insofar as he took it as a reference to Grunewald’s painting of the altar at Isenheim, understanding it as “a symbol for all that is purely German” (p. 22). The doctor had never read a book on Grunewald, but the dream’s symbolic inclusion of something “purely German” stands a short distance from the mythic Nazi idea of ‘German purity.’ Additional symbolism associated with the dreams links directly to Nazi mythology. The block warden, or Blockwart, was a volunteer functionary who reported neighbourhood activities to the Gestapo. Blockwarte purportedly also served the community with links to local organizations known as Hausgemeinschaften—groups created by the Nazi party for the ostensible purpose of assisting locales should they suffer bombing in wartime. Because the Blockwarte served as intermediaries between the Hausgemeinschaften and the Gestapo, they were a dreaded bunch (Schectman, 2009, p. 111). Two million Blockwarte imposed themselves on German communities; an unofficial network of neighbours, co-workers and even immediate family members supplemented the efforts of the Blockwarte, reporting to them any perceived dissident activity (p. 115). And existing essentially as curators of local information gained through privacy violations, the Hausgemeinschaften served as domestic overseers, while symbolizing the broader Nazi ideology of Volksgemeinschaft—the “community of the people” that aimed at German unity (p. 116)—a creed discussed at length in Chapter 3.

To conceptualize the doctor’s dreams (elimination of walls that ensure privacy, dreams about state intrusion on subsequent dreams) as the coming elimination of privacy at the hands of these networks is understood with the benefit of hindsight. Crucially, the doctor’s dreams connected to a community organization representative of the Volksgemeinschaft—a “community” which supported the mythical foundations of the Thousand Year Reich. In Koselleck’s (1985) words, the expectation of privacy was nullified and the loudspeaker in the dream “allows no doubt: the house is opened up to the benefit of a control in which the name of community can be exercised by each over all” (p. 220). Koselleck (2018) later confirms the directed nature of this process in connection with the Nazi myth, asserting that the broadcast informs the “dreamer that his house is being broken into in the interests
of a form of monitoring that can be carried out on any person in the name of the 
*Volksgemeinschaft*” (p. 16).

Another telling vision from Beradt’s (1968) catalogue comes from the disturbed slumbers of a sixty-year old Jewish lawyer, who dreamed, in 1935, that:

Two benches were standing side by side in Tiergarten Park, one painted the usual green and the other yellow [in those days, Jews were permitted to sit only on specially painted yellow benches]. There was a trash can between them. I sat down on the trash can and hung a sign around my neck like the ones blind beggars sometimes wear—also like those the government makes ‘race violators’ wear. It read, ‘I Make Room for Trash If Need Be’ (p. 135).

That the dream took place in 1935 is significant because the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws took place in the same year. Already hounded from the professions for the previous two years, on September 15, 1935 the Nazis stripped Jewish people of their citizenship status and forbade them from marrying “Aryans.” Beradt does not list the precise date of the lawyer’s dream. But whether it occurred before or after the enactment of the race laws of September 1935 does not detract from the apparent prescience of the man’s dream. As war correspondent and historian William Shirer (1960) writes, in “the next few years some thirteen decrees supplementing the Nuremberg Laws would outlaw the Jew completely” (p. 233). This legislation was ideological to the extent that it was part of a plan to enact a Nazi social construction, which included doctrines of racial superiority, deference to a police state, and military expansionism. Further, the laws contributed to the Nazi myth insofar as they assisted in the creation of a lived reality of Fascism that depended upon political power. Returning to the dream, here again, it seems to look ahead—this time to a crime disproportionate to any in all of history. The ‘disposal’ of Jewish people, as represented in the lawyer’s dream, must be interpreted as the genocide that killed six million people; on a personal level, Nazi ideology crushes an individual through terror. A final, sad, note on the man to whom the dream belonged sees that, while he managed to escape the death camps, he died in a foreign country, broken, and “ever prepared to ‘make room for trash’” (Beradt, 1968, p. 136).

Of these two dreams, Koselleck (1985) affirms their authenticity despite their anonymity. The historian observes that the visions did not occur in the way they appeared to the two men. They both, however, “recount a vivid inner truth” that the Third Reich
ultimately realized in brutal fashion. The waking-life specifics manifested themselves differently than they did in the dreams; the core meaning, however, took on a more murderous tone. As such, these visions, according to Koselleck, depict terror (p. 218). The terror of dreams that some could have seen as the anticipation of coming events were exploited as building blocks in constructing the Nazi myth that would assume the name of the Thousand Year Reich. As shown below, more dreams than the ones that Koselleck adds to the historical record played a role in this conspiracy of myth.

**Dreams of Surveillance & Self-Censorship**

The theme of exposed privacy as a benefit to the Nazi party, whether in individual thoughts or in intimate discussions, characterizes the dreams in the present section. The initial vision examines an episode in a series of dreams from 1933 that a self-admittedly egoistic 30-year-old woman described to Beradt:

I was sitting in a box at the opera, dressed in a new gown, and with my hair beautifully done. It was a huge opera house with many, many tiers, and I was enjoying considerable admiration. They were presenting my favorite opera, The Magic Flute. When it came to the line, 'That is the devil certainly,' a squad of policemen came stomping in and marched directly up to me. A machine had registered the fact that I had thought of Hitler on hearing the word 'devil.' I imploringly searched the festive crowd for some sign of help, but they all just sat there staring straight ahead, silent and expressionless, not one showing even pity. The old gentleman in an adjoining box looked kind and distinguished, but when I tried to catch his eye he spat at me (Beradt, 1968, p. 25).

The woman provided details on the mind-reading apparatus that had betrayed her demonic association with Hitler, calling it an electronic device, with a tangle of wires extending in multiple directions (p. 26). Beradt notes that the appearance of such a gadget in the woman’s dream predates the advent of remote control tracking devices; further, it took place 15 years ahead of Orwell’s publication of the dystopian surveillance-state masterpiece, *1984* (pp. 26-27).

Yet such visions found a place in the sleep of everyday people. The following dream threatens to rip the concept of safety and privacy from the heart of a home. A housewife describes a dream she had in 1933 that shook her sense of security:
A Storm Trooper was standing by the large, old-fashioned, blue-tiled Dutch oven that stands in the corner of our living room, where we always sit and talk in the evening. He opened the oven door and it began to talk in a harsh and penetrating voice [again the Voice, reminiscent of the one heard over the loudspeaker during the day]. It repeated every joke we had told and every word we had said against the government. I thought, 'Good Lord, what's it going to tell next—all my little snide remarks about Goebbels?' But at that moment I realized that one sentence more or less would make no difference—simply everything we have ever thought or said among ourselves is known. At the same time, I remembered how I had always scoffed at the idea that there might be built in microphones, and still didn't really believe it. Even when the Storm Trooper bound my hands with our dog's leash and was about to take me away, I still thought he was joking and even remarked, 'You can't be serious—that just can't be!' (Beradt, 1968, pp. 45-46).

In this dream, not only is the privacy of the family home violated, it is compromised by means of technology unknown to the dreamer. Such technology was, for everyday people, in Beradt’s words, “not even plausible in a work of fiction” (p. 46).

The journalist is correct in her assessment of the plausibility of the recording device at the time of the dream. Even basic tape-recording technology did not become widespread until the 1940s. The German companies Telefunken and BASF developed recordable plastic tape, which was more versatile than the grooved discs favoured by musicians. By the time Europe was ablaze with the Second World War, the Nazis used magnetic tape to pump up propaganda efforts (Garofalo, 1999, p. 333). The technology amounted to what music scholar Michael Jarrett (1991) calls “one of the spoils of World War II” (p. 806). Beradt (1968) notes that prototypes of spy-gadget recording equipment existed early in the Nazi era, before such recording technology became standard issue for espionage purposes during the second half of the 20th Century—technology that Beradt holds that most were oblivious to during the 1930s (p. 46). Yet the writer challenges the idea of people having been ignorant of microphones—as distinct from recording technology—as spy apparatus at this time. She writes that the Nazis intended that such suggestions should enter people’s thoughts. The housewife mentions that she had recently been at the dentist’s office and stopped herself from expressing any political opinion for fear that the dentist’s drill had become a “listening device” (p. 47). Beradt links this fear to a dim awareness of living under a general state of surveillance—surveillance which, as has been shown, would soon take the shape of ubiquitous informants. The journalist asks rhetorically, “What dream could better suit the purposes of a totalitarian regime?” (p. 47). It could not listen in on
every conversation, but to instill the possibility in the minds of citizens would count as a great success; transmitting such ideas into dreams would amount to a still greater measure of control.

The stroke of evil genius that emerged from the idea of surveillance came in the moment that Beradt says people began to “terrorize themselves, turning themselves unawares into voluntary participants in this systematic terrorization in that they imagined it to be more systematic than it actually was” (pp. 47-48). In this way the populace’s submission to self-scrutiny added another layer to the Nazi myth—the state was powerful, but only through the complicity of the Volk. And yet, the power of bureaucracy exacted a price in conjunction with the notion of self-surveillance. In 1934, a 40-year old legal administrator recounted the following dream:

It was about eight o’clock in the evening. As usual at that time of the day, I was talking on the telephone with my brother, my only friend and confidant. [This appraisal of the brother’s relationship was a true one.] After having taken the precaution of praising Hitler's policies and life in the National Community, I said, 'Nothing gives me pleasure anymore.' [In fact, he had said this on the telephone earlier in the evening.] In the middle of the night the telephone rang. A dull voice…said merely, 'This is the Monitoring Office.' I knew immediately that my crime lay in what I had said about not finding pleasure in anything, and I found myself arguing my case, begging and pleading that this one time I be forgiven—please just don't report anything this one time, don't pass it on, please just forget it. The voice remained absolutely silent and then hung up without a word, leaving me in agonizing uncertainty (p. 37).

Devoid of humanity, the dream demonstrates that the Fascist technique of creating the perceived need for citizens to self-regulate their communications. This means of control became an element of Nazi terror, as venturing to speak freely would ensure punishment.

This dreamscape of surveillance had more ramifications for self-censorship. Beradt writes of a conversation with a man who dreamed that he sent blind and deaf people on information gathering errands. She holds that such an action was the dream’s mode of protecting the man from seeing or hearing things that the Nazis had forbidden. Perhaps as a bizarre confirmation of this already strange, dreamed, circumstance the man remembered no details from the dream (p. 51). This conversation parallels a milliner’s vision in 1933. The woman expresses the idea of self-censorship in a most clever fashion:

I dreamt I was talking in my sleep and to be on the safe side was speaking Russian (which I don't know, and anyway I never talk in my sleep) so I'd not even understand
myself and so no one else could understand me in case I said anything about the
government, for that, of course, is not permitted and must be reported (p. 52).

In attempting to exhaust possible sources for the dream, Beradt is satisfied that the milliner
was unfamiliar with the passage in Genesis (11:7-9) that lays out the tale of the Tower of
Babel, which might have explained an unknown language appearing in the vision. That the
Inquisition persecuted people for heretical dreams is also something the woman was
unlikely to have known (Beradt, 1968, p. 52). Yet, Beradt writes that, from postwar
testimony about Auschwitz, the world learned that a version of such a dream did, in fact,
come true. An inmate who had been forced to work in the death camp’s administrative
offices asked her bunkmate, in terror, whether she talked in her sleep, as any hint of having
communicated information absorbed in the political wing amounted to a punishable
offence (p. 52).

**Ocular Dreams**

Dreams of self-censorship could be joined, in still other dreams, with the sclerosis of
self-imposed inaction. Such a paralysis afflicted an optometrist in 1934. The pair of dreams
that Beradt reports also appear connected to a Nazi crime that took place four years later.
The first dream takes the ensuing form:

> Storm Troopers were putting up barbed wire at all hospital windows. I had sworn I
wouldn't stand for having them bring their barbed wire into my ward. But I did put
up with it after all, and I stood by like a caricature of a doctor while they took out the
window panes and turned a ward into a concentration camp—but I lost my job
anyway. I was called back, however, to treat Hitler because I was the only man in
the world who could. I was ashamed of myself for feeling proud, and so I began to
cry (p. 62).

Lying awake in his bed, distraught, the optometrist tried to make sense of the dream in the
wee hours of the morning. The doctor remembered, to his consternation, the appearance
the previous day of an employee who showed up at work in Storm Trooper’s apparel.
Despite being furious about the uniform’s presence in his office, the eye doctor said nothing
about it (p. 63).

Having discerned the dream’s source, the man fell back asleep. He was to have another
nightmare:
I was in a concentration camp, but the prisoners were being very well treated—there were dinner parties and theatrical performances. I was thinking how exaggerated the reports about life in concentration camps really were, until I happened to look at myself in a mirror and saw I was wearing the uniform of a camp doctor and had on special high boots that sparkled like diamonds. I leaned up against the barbed wire and began once again to cry (p. 63).

As with most dreams, multiple interpretations are possible. In this case, Beradt observes that the initial dream in this series indicated a recognition of the risks of inaction in the face of danger. The second vision leads with an incentive to disbelieve the horrors of the camps as mere rumours, until the doctor gets a look at himself in the guise of a preening dandy in official costume. A mixture of disgrace and egotism characterize the dreams.

And yet the dreams’ significance would assume a still bleaker hue. The German word for ‘barbed wire’ is *Stacheldraht* (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.), but the doctor could not formulate the word in his dreams, despite its prominence in both visions. The word had instead emerged, after much mental strain, as “Krachelstaat, then Drachelstaat,” neither of which is a real word (Beradt, 1968, p. 64). Significantly, the passage in the first dream in which the Storm Troopers “took out the window panes” (p. 62) in their haste to transform a hospital into a concentration camp should be read as “smashing” the windows. This action provides a link to the monstrous *Kristallnacht* pogrom of November 1938: the eye doctor’s puzzling and nonsensical *Krachelstaat* thus becomes *Kristallnacht*. As an optometrist, the man’s dream formulated the difficulty a blind person would have negotiating the violence of wanton property destruction. Moreover, the doctor’s vision, with its perplexing *Drachelstaat* cipher, on waking, revealed itself as *Drachensaat*—or “dragon seed” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d). It was this word the optometrist said he struggled and failed to find in his dream, as it represented the peril the shards of glass and barbed wire would pose to those who could not see. In dehumanizing fashion, Nazi thugs actually did drag a blind man from his bed on the night of November 9, 1938, forcing him to march barefoot over the shattered glass from the windows of his shop in a western district of Berlin (Beradt, 1968, p. 64). Once more, the apparently forward-oriented dream blends brutal political action with the anti-Semitism so crucial to the myth of the Thousand Year Reich.
Dreams of Identity Crisis

Some living under the totalitarian regime suffered identity loss, their disorientation reflected in dreamscapes. Beradt spoke with a woman in her thirties about a series of dreams she had in 1936. The date is meaningful, as it marked a year since the Nazis had rammed through the race-law legislation. Beradt’s anonymous interview subject had worked as a secretary; her father—a Christian—had recently died and the woman had then moved in with her Jewish mother. The mother and daughter shared a close relationship. Yet the Nuremberg laws had a terrible effect on their lives, as the legislation impugned the citizenship status of both women. Despite being devoted to her mother, the younger woman could not help but feel resentful and distant from her. These feelings became part of her night visions. Four of them are laid out in full:

I was traveling to the mountains with my mother. She remarked that we'd all have to live in the mountains before long [mass deportations were at that time still inconceivable]. Despising her and at the same time hating myself, I replied, 'You will, but I certainly won't.'

The next in the series:
I was sitting with my mother in a restaurant beneath a sign that read, 'Parasites Keep Out.' I wanted to do something to make her happy, but all the while she was sitting there drinking her cocoa I was suffering tremendously, and I hated her…"

Her third vision:
I had to flee with my mother. We ran like crazy. When she couldn't run any more, I lifted her onto my back and continued to run. I suffered dreadfully as I struggled with the burden. After a long time I realized that I was struggling with a corpse. I was filled with a terrible sense of relief.

The final dream:
I dreamt I had a child by an Aryan whose mother wanted to take the child away from me because I was not pure-blooded Aryan. 'Now that my mother is dead,' I screamed, 'not a one of you can hold a thing against me any more' (pp. 67-68).

Importantly, the dream featuring the notice banning “parasites” occurred prior to the appearance of signboards forbidding Jewish people from entering restaurants. And yet the younger woman’s own circumstances made her painfully aware of the anti-Semitic decrees that were soon to come (p. 68). Further, as Beradt interjects in the woman’s first dream, the Nazis’ displacement of an entire race of people still lay ahead (p. 67). No matter one’s perspective on the abilities and limitations of dreams, it is all but impossible to discount
the political effect of Nazi terror on dreamscapes, even as they relate to the closest of familial relationships (p. 69).

Beradt is clear that these dreamscapes interwove with the Nazi myth, each augmenting the other. The journalist writes that “dreams are provoked not by the practices the Third Reich employed but by the total fictions—the ‘theories’—on which this Reich was founded” (p. 79). She continues this line of thought, holding that by employing such “fantastic doctrines, the whole dream thus motivated becomes a parable on the schizophrenic nature of totalitarian reality” (p. 79). Centuries’ worth of anti-Semitic writing in Germany—such as the Sixteenth Century’s anonymous Book of a Hundred Chapters, which told of the coming thousand year reign of the Emperor, Frederick II (Cohn, 1961, p. 115), and the place of Germans, rather than Jews, as the chosen people (p. 119)—maintained proximity to Nazi writings aimed at showing German superiority, such as those of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Joseph Arthur de Gobineau (Shirer, 1960, pp. 103-109). Having hit its political apex in the 1930s, the myth sought confirmation in the dream. This fact is borne out in a series of dreams that exalt the racial traits theorized as superior in Nazi institutions, which Beradt characterizes as providing “a metaphor for all that is illusory, fictitious, and synthetic in the totalitarian reality” (p. 79). The theme arises in sequence of dreams that a twenty-two-year-old woman had in the early 1930s. The young woman worried that her facial features would give the Nazis reason to believe she was Jewish. The initial vision follows below:

I went to the Bureau of Verification of Aryan Descent [which did not exist under this name, and she had nothing to do with any such office] and presented a certificate attesting to my grandmother's descent, which I had obtained after months of running around. The official looked just like a marble statue and was sitting behind a low stone wall. He reached over the wall, took my paper, tore it to bits, and threw the pieces into an oven that was built into the wall. And he remarked [condescendingly, using the familiar form of address, Du], 'Think you're still pure Aryan now?' (pp. 79-80).

Another dream in the succession:
A peaceful family outing. Mother and I had brought along some cake and the folder containing our genealogy. Suddenly a shout: they’re coming. Everyone in the garden restaurant there on the Havel River knew who ‘they’ were and what our crime was. Run, run, run. I looked about for a hiding place high up. Perhaps up the trees? Atop a cupboard in the restaurant? All at once I found myself lying at the bottom of a pile of corpses with no idea how it got there—at least I had a good hiding place. Pure bliss under my pile of bodies, clutching my papers in their folder (pp. 80-81).
These visions took place prior to the 1935 race laws. Moreover, the dreamer was not Jewish and thus would not have had to bear the brunt of the legislation (p. 80). Yet, the Nazi idea of racial superiority drilled its way into the young woman’s dreams. Further, the visions were not static; the focus on a purpose-built oven forms an image of the worst that was to come. And the gruesome scene envisioned in taking refuge underneath heaps of corpses compares chillingly with the spectacles that actually took place a decade later (p. 81).

The tie-in between those visions and the myth of the Thousand Year Third Reich, along with their connection to one’s physical appearance, found purchase in other dreams. Beradt spoke with a nineteen-year-old woman whose features contrasted with the Nazi-approved look (p. 84). Her short, fragmented dreams underscore insecurity concerned with this contrast. The visions reveal blond-haired, blue-eyed Germans looking upon her with disdain. The young woman’s dreams also demonstrate an admission that she does not “belong anywhere” despite a desire for acceptance (p. 86). Such nightscapes cropped up regularly among those whose appearance did not meet with Nazi ideals. Beradt says that people without blond hair and blue eyes “had a great wealth of stereotyped dreams involving conflicts with all that is blond—the result of a mythical quality being attributed to a particular type” (p. 87). In this way, the self-persecution and terror noted in the present chapter perpetuated itself even in the dreams of those who feared racial discrimination despite possessing a heritage in line with Fascist state ordinance. Themes of suspicion, loss of self-confidence, and segregation characterized the visions of other dreamers whose physical features were at odds with the Nazi model (pp. 87-90); here again the cycle of ideology invading the dream, further strengthening the myth, is demonstrated.

**Dreams of the Undecided**

The Nazi program of restructuring and controlling all social and political institutions—a compulsory political standardization known as *Gleichschaltung* (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.)—found its way into the dreams of those whose stance on the Fascist takeover still wavered (Beradt, 1968, p. 112). Such dreams offer a view into the inner processes of those who initially stood neither as opponents nor as supporters of the regime, but whose
indecision depicts acclimatization to a harsh political reality. Beradt’s dream record of a twenty-one-year-old woman attending a business college in 1934 is instructive:

Celebrations were going on for 'National Unity Day' [which actually was observed, although under a different name; it is quite revealing that she chose this name in her dream]. Long rows of people were sitting at long tables in the dining car of a train that was traveling along. I was sitting by myself at a small table. They were singing a political song that sounded so funny that I had to laugh. Moved to another table, but still had to laugh. There was nothing to do but stand up—I wanted to go out, but then I thought if I sang along maybe it wouldn't seem so funny—so I sang, too (pp. 116-117).

Beradt picks out the idea from the student’s dream that ‘participation’ “lies simply in the nature of things” (p. 116). Here the Nazi myth manifests itself in the idea that the dream should naturalize political control through the need to belong. Singing along provided a sense of security in fellowship and citizenship; in this way Nazi control became a reality in people’s night visions, tipping the ideological balance of those previously unsure of their convictions.

Dreams that endeavored to decide an individual’s political principles did not respect age demographics or male/female distinctions. Beradt records, also in 1934, the night vision of an elderly man who observed the Nazi takeover without first establishing his own point of view. His dream appears to depict a turning point in the decision-making process:

It was in a motion picture theater on Nollendorfplatz [Berlin], but it looked more like an assembly hall. Newsreel. Goering appeared in a brown leather jerkin, shooting a crossbow, which made me laugh out loud (all this had actually taken place that evening, but nothing had happened to me). All of a sudden I was standing there next to him, wearing the same kind of jerkin and carrying the same kind of crossbow—how I got there I don’t know—and he made me his personal archer (p. 117).

The dreamer’s ease and humor in relation to the man who would become the Nazi party’s highest ranking military officer is shown in his donning of the outdated uniform and possession of similar weaponry. Further, the reference to feeling relief at not being punished for his waking-life response to Goering’s attire indicates that Nazi terror had crept into the dreamscape. And the dream converts fear into a joke. Here again a dreamed shift in the direction of acquiescing to the power structures that supported the living myth of the Thousand Year Reich is shown.
A final dream in this category took place two years after the first two. A homemaker in her 40s relates a vision which depicts an endorsement of Nazi policy following suggestions that she should do so:

I was visiting some good friends in a small town somewhere in Brandenburg. That evening there was a party in my honor. The next morning, as we were having breakfast together in a very warm and friendly atmosphere, talking about the previous evening, a neighbor woman walked in and came right out and said, 'Your party last night was too big and too long.' (Someone who had heard this remark in a small town had reported it to me verbatim, which is probably why I dreamt the whole thing.) 'And on top of everything else there were people there who don't say Heil... I burst out, 'That wouldn't have mattered.' Whereupon my friend said, 'Oh, quite to the contrary—that would have been altogether inconceivable!' When the neighbor woman had gone, my friend gave me an awful upbraiding—she had completely forgotten all she had said ten minutes before when she was assuring me of her friendship and affection, and she forced me to leave immediately, before anyone discovered the truth about me. She literally threw me out onto the street, without even telling me when the bus ran (there was no train). I stood helplessly at the bus stop and couldn't understand what was going on—couldn't figure out how she could make such a quick transition from one attitude to another. The bus finally came and was full. I got on and, facing the passengers who were all staring at me in silence, I called out loudly, 'Heil Hitler' (pp. 117-118).

The first and third dreams in this string feature modes of transport. Each is conspicuous in detailing a direction in which the dreamer is moving: specifically toward Nazi sympathies. The second vision depicts a link to a leading military and political figure—a connection which solidifies once the dreamer recognizes his proximity to Goering (pp. 118-119). Collectively, these dreams provide a report on the ways in which the Nazi policy of *Gleichschaltung* became a part of people’s lives, instilling a belief in the party’s power base necessary to propagate its myth.

**Sexual Dreams**

Perhaps most disturbing of all is the collection of dreams which eroticizes Nazi power. Beradt interviewed women whose dreams featured intimate encounters with Hitler or other party officials. Yet where (or whether) the journalist’s interviews on the subject fit into a wider social frame is unclear. The nature of women’s participation in the Nazi regime has been the subject of debate. A study published in 2002 found that, in a random sampling
from more than 2000 wartime citizen complaints made to the Gestapo in the City of Dusseldorf, wives denounced their husbands to the secret police far more often than the reverse. The denouncing wife tended to sketch a picture of herself as being an upholder of her family, loyal to the Nazi party. Gestapo officials searched denouncing statements for politically deviant content—content that was often stated in the personal language of family life. Such dynamics assisted the Nazis in maintaining control of political and domestic spheres (Joshi, 2002, pp. 419-421).

Yet the Dusseldorf study reveals only part of the picture. Historian Claudia Koonz (1987), for example, puts forth a different argument, holding that women bolstered Nazi influence by sustaining a loving familial masquerade in a hateful environment (p. 17). Yet any depiction of women living under the Third Reich as being supportive of the regime must be considered incomplete at best, inaccurate at worst. Women suffering the most adverse effects of the anti-Semitic laws of 1935—specifically the “Blood Protection Law” and the “Reich Citizenship Law” (Czarnowski, 1996, p. 101)—cannot have approved of Nazi ideology. But disapproval also had to have been widespread among those not cast out of society by the race laws. Historian Gabrielle Czarnowski (1996) writes that the extent to which the largest Nazi women’s organization, the Deutsches Frauenwerk (pp. 96-97), was able facilitate ideological adherence to state racial policy “remains questionable” (p. 98). The 1935 “Marriage Health Law” (p. 101) appears to have had an effect on women’s reluctance to support the regime. Czarnowski notes that, in the case of marital breakdown, courts granted divorces based on “the value of marriage for the national community (Volksgemeinschaft)” (p. 105). Wives’ protests against a divorce were thus regularly dismissed, while husbands who filed to break up a marriage were granted permission to do so when no more children could be expected from a union without continued conjugal relations (p. 106). Nazi legal codes protected marriage on racial and eugenic grounds and, to the degree that those conditions were met, on the likelihood of producing children (p. 111). These policies, along with associated “bureaucratic access to the body” conduced to the “functional strengthening of and control over women’s efficiency as housewives and mothers while at the same time undermining their traditional legal status in marriage and family” (p. 112). Such tactics had to have alienated women from the regime, rather than garnering approval. Still, laying out such basic arguments in this small space cannot do
justice to the question of women’s power dynamics relative to the Third Reich; no attempt is made here to settle the topic.

With this fact in mind, Beradt’s (1968) observations of women’s dreams and their relationship to Nazi power structures cannot be taken as a complete dossier. The journalist’s findings are, nevertheless, significant. Beradt begins with the claim that women’s voting patterns reflected support for Hitler and, based on this association, a starting point of the link between women and Nazi power can be discerned (p. 124). From a small sample size of dreams, Beradt draws out themes that include seduction at the hands of Hitler or Goering. Two examples follow, the first from the dream of a young woman who worked in sales: “Goering wanted to feel me up at the movies. I told him, 'But I'm not even in the party.' He said, 'So what?'” (p. 125).

The Nazi high-command’s allure becomes more apparent in the two dreams that follow. The vision directly below comes from the slumbers of a homemaker:

On my way home from shopping I noticed there was going to be street dancing like on Bastille Day in France, because it was a holiday to commemorate the Reichstag Fire. Bonfires were blazing everywhere [what a splendid bit of parody!]—squares had been roped off, and couples were ducking under the ropes like boxers . . . I found that disgusting. All of a sudden someone with strong hands grabbed me from behind and pulled me through the ropes onto the dance area. As we began to dance I discovered it was Hitler, and I liked it very much (pp. 125-126).

Perhaps the most crucial vision in this grouping comes from another homemaker:

Many people dressed all in Nazi-brown were sitting crowded together at long tables that had been set up on the Kurfürstendamm [a main boulevard in Berlin]. I was curious, so I sat down, too, though at a distance from the others—at the end of an empty, solitary table [an image very similar to that of the woman in the dining car]. Then Hitler appeared, dressed in evening clothes to please people and carrying large bundles of leaflets which he distributed hastily and carelessly, tossing one bundle at the end of each table, and the people sitting there passed them on down the line. It looked as if I wouldn't get any, but suddenly he made a complete departure from the way he had been doing it and carefully placed one bundle in front of me. With one hand he gave me a single leaflet, while with the other he began caressing me, starting with my hair and then on down my back (pp. 126-127).

Beradt writes that this dream epitomized the Nazi method of ensuring that the right hand knew the operations of the left, here issuing propaganda with one hand and stroking with the other. The journalist says that there “can be no neater description of Hitler's influence on a large sector of Germany's female population” (p. 127). The number of dreams
adhering to such a pattern remains unknown and Beradt’s estimation of such influence could be inflated. Yet the power associated with the sexual unconscious is manifest in the visions comprising the present section, with its mixture of the political and the erotic combining to associate Hitler with seduction (p. 126) in nightscapes that uphold the Nazi myth—on however limited or widespread a scale that leverage might have been.

**Forward Looking Nightmares**

The dreams reproduced in the present chapter offer a mix of visions that took place before the outbreak of war in 1939. Most of them involve political images that offer a coded view of events to come. Beradt herself writes that the dreams served the function of fables—to teach and to provide a warning, as well as to show that the intentions of oppressive regimes must be revealed before they become reality (pp. 147-148). It is this sense of *warning* that becomes the important matter at this juncture. Warning, of course, implies a potential future negative effect which can be obviated. To attribute this function to dreams is an extraordinary claim to make. Yet, as this work has shown, the idea of dreams as frames that can look forward has arisen in multiple contexts across the centuries.

In Reinhart Koselleck’s (2018) view, the dreams of the doctor who envisioned the abolition of walls and the lawyer who pledged to make room for trash comprise texts of fiction possessed of a poetic quality. To extend their fictional bearing, the historian writes that, at the time they were dreamed—in the way Beradt outlines them—the dreams stretched beyond what would have been thought possible. Yet, they “anticipate something that seemed empirically improbable but would come to pass in the course of catastrophic demise.” But both dream tales did take place (though not in the precise way in which they were dreamed), “and for that reason were not simply fiction” (emphasis mine) (pp. 11-12). Koselleck declines to designate the visions as either texts of fiction or of historical fact (p. 12), yet asserts that the dreams evince a uniqueness tied to the era’s place in history (p. 14). Koselleck then broadens his approach, holding that all of the dreams in Beradt’s collection serve to clear the way for the observation of layers of history that other primary documents cannot (p. 15), though he qualifies the idea of dreams as valid historical frames, as opposed to fictional ones, as existing on “a sliding scale” (p. 21). Koselleck also makes a point that
will be developed in the next chapter: that the dreams, as Beradt has framed them, provide the first indication of “terror that was often only silent at first, but whose open escalation they anticipate” (p. 15). Koselleck writes further that the “historian can deduce the effects that the immanent terror of the National Socialist system had, . . . the kinds of oppressive fears generated by this terror, [and] the images anticipating the coming catastrophe to which it gave rise” (p. 15). In this sense, we can see terror as a living myth—one first lived in nightmares, driven by what Beradt (1968) calls “fantastic doctrines” (p. 79), then as terror whose application of Nazi myth destroyed Europe.

In the words of Vincent Mosco (2004), myths “are not true or false, but living or dead” (p. 3). This rings true in the case of the myth of the Thousand Year Reich. As indicated throughout this work, myths depend upon a relationship to power to survive. A housewife’s dream early in the Nazi era saw a day when Fascist power would collapse. She says that every night she “kept trying to rip the swastika off the Nazi flag, all the while feeling happy and proud of [her]self, but in the morning it was always sewn on tightly again” (Beradt, 1968, p. 96). Beradt connects the dream to an incident that took place the day following Hitler’s seizure of power, in which a band of women waited at Berlin’s police precinct waiting for information about their husbands, who had been arrested. Each time an official walked past, the women would shout that, soon enough, the swastikas would be torn from the uniforms. A friend of the woman whose dream depicts the tearing of the swastika was at the police station, demanding news of the imprisoned men. Beradt sees the dreamer’s link to the event as mythical, invoking “Penelope, simultaneously the most famous and the most obscure weaver in Greek mythology” (Papadopoulou-Belmehdi, 1994, p. 42): “by night she became a modern-day Penelope, undoing threads not for merely personal but for political ends” (Beradt, 1968, pp. 96-97). Those who dreamed of resistance were in the minority. The reasons for their opposition were various, but if a generalization can be made about them, it is that as their moral compass remained intact so their dreams reflected a conscionable position (p. 108). But, conscionable or not, ascendant mythical power did not enter these dreams.

Concerns of power return us to historical problems. As Koselleck (2018) explains with reference to Beradt’s dream catalogue, dreams’ inexact historical value (p. 21) does not detract from the value of those Beradt recorded; they can be used as historical frames to
interpret Nazi political action (p. 15). Dreams’ inexactitude, in this case, shades into the ambiguity of myth. As Beradt (1968) herself says, the dreams she writes about were incited by Nazi “theories” (p. 79). This theoretical (mythical) invasion of dreams sometimes anticipated actual events. Further, mutually reinforcing myths of Volksgemeinschaft and the Thousand Year Reich depended on power rather than truth; as long as people recognized the power of the Nazi state, its myths reigned. We have seen this connection in the dreams of those whose self-surveillance served Nazi ends (Beradt, 1968, pp. 25, 37 & 46) along with those of the eye-doctor who capitulated to Fascist ideals (pp. 62-63), as well as the young woman whose identity conflict pushed her to scream that she had had a child by an ‘Aryan’ (p. 68). Numerous meanings could be assigned to these dreams and their mythical connections, but in the way Beradt frames them, the polysemy of both dreams and myth combine in political form. The present chapter adds a layer of complexity with its emphasis on dreams’ prognostic capabilities. Here the work’s central argument—that the cultural-political implications of dreams and myth do not respond to waking life concepts of truth and falsehood—takes on the task of reinterpreting timeframes. With this new task in focus, a continued examination of the visions that Charlotte Beradt logged, along with a return to psychological thought, featuring development of both Freud’s and Jung’s approaches, will frame the debate that comprises the next chapter.
Chapter 6.

Psychology of Beradt’s Dream Catalogue: Freud and Jung

As shown, many of the dreams that Beradt recorded look, from a historical standpoint, as though they could be oriented toward the future. And, working in conjunction with the historical lens through which these dreams have been viewed, the myth of the Thousand Year Reich appears to have become more entrenched in its own prognostic agnomen, though for a much shorter period of time than the Nazis predicted. Correct historical interpretation is crucial to understanding any bygone social or political phenomenon. Absent an analytical structure that makes sense of important periods of human action we are left in ignorance and poorly positioned to properly understand like situations in the future. History, however, tells only part of this particular story, and Koselleck (1985) invokes “an anthropological dimension which goes beyond their status as written sources” (p. 220). Further, to grasp the mechanisms of the dreams in Beradt’s collection, they will require examination from another standpoint—that of psychology. Moving toward an analysis of the dreams that Koselleck classifies as rooted in terror, oriented (in Beradt’s view) toward a possible future (pp. 218-219), as well as political (p. 220) represents a difficult task. Koselleck holds that psychological analysis of dreams dreamed long ago is indeed possible, so long as biographical information of the individual dreamer is known. Yet, even without the availability of such information we read that, in the case of at least some of the dreamers,

it stands out that that the latent and the manifest contents of the dream overlap almost seamlessly. Even if private conditions are at work in these dreams, their political function is immediately apparent. To stay in the symbolic register of psychoanalysis, the political experiences and threats inundated the doorman and flooded into the so-called subconscious. They allowed for images and histories to emerge that are immediately evident in their political valence to consciousness (Koselleck, 2018, p. 16).

Koselleck exposes this connection by way of illustration. For example, in considering the cases of the doctor who dreamed of the abolition of walls and the lawyer whose dreamed image of the sign that pledged to make room for trash, Koselleck connects waking and dreamed reality, with fear impressing itself most deeply on those in the dream state (p. 16).
As discussed in Chapter 1, Beradt herself refrains from applying psychoanalysis to her dream record. Others have been just as cautious. And Koselleck (1985) holds that Freud’s “categorical framework” is not up to the task in this case. Yet Koselleck refers to the dream record as resembling “psychic X-ray images,” best interpreted by historians in anthropological terms (p. 226). Still, these images offer themselves to the present work as phenomena available for psychological analysis of a sort. Possessing these images allows for analysis that would otherwise be impossible; in Koselleck’s words, the “dreams illuminate the condition of those pursued by terror” (p. 226). As noted, the difficulty of applying analysis to dreams of a bygone age can be mitigated with access to the life history of the dreamer. Psychiatrist Anthony Stevens (1995), for example, used the biography of Rene Descartes to interpret the philosopher’s dreams of November 10, 1619 (pp. 297-318). Most of the life stories of those interviewed about their dreams in Beradt’s record, however, are lost to us. Because of this fact, the present chapter will examine, via both Freudian and Jungian approaches, the “psychic X-ray images” that Koselleck (1985, p. 226) describes—in some cases aided by the shreds known of the dreamers themselves—along with some of the historian’s conclusions about Beradt’s dream interviews. With this task in mind, the focus of this chapter is directed toward the following question: *Can psychological theory show that the dreams Beradt identifies influenced emerging political reality through prognosis?*

This inquiry uses Freudian and Jungian concepts to link to the thesis’ larger question about the connection between dreams and myth—in this case scrutinizing a possible relationship between dreams and the realpolitik of an ideological myth. But it is crucial to make clear at this point the difficulty in pursuing such a question. Koselleck notes that the dreams in Beradt’s collection appear to “release prognostic potential” (p. 221). Despite declining to classify these dreams as either fictional or historical (Koselleck, 2018, p. 12), working with the benefit of hindsight, the historian is positioned to judge the dreams’ temporal direction. The facts that comprise the Third Reich’s atrocious record are empirical and beyond dispute. Connecting Beradt’s account of the dreams to apparent foresight of Nazi crimes through the “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous”—that is, the “prognostic structure of historical time” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 94) assumes a ring of truth when stunning similarities can be shown between night vision and waking reality (p. 218).
Hindsight and hard facts work to the historian’s advantage when drawing such conclusions. Psychological processes are more difficult to assess. Dreams, memories and thoughts are not, in the everyday sense, empirical phenomena. Gauging decades-old dreams psychologically, then, is an operation performed in the absence of a firm platform. And, while the benefit of applying psychological approaches to any number of circumstances has been debated, psychology’s intellectual and cultural positions are established, in this case offering potential challenges to historical interpretation. For these reasons, Freudian and Jungian frames of reference will be used to ascertain whether another explanation is possible in place of the conclusions Koselleck has drawn with respect to Beradt’s dream collection, or if the historian’s judgment successfully withstands psychological scrutiny.

To perform such an analysis, outlines of both Freud’s and Jung’s approaches must first be mapped. As noted, in Freud’s (2008) estimation our wishes move our dreams (pp. 94-95). To expand on a passage from Chapter 2, the idea came to Freud following the nighttime hours of July 23-24, 1895 when he dreamt of a woman under his care by the name of Anna Hammerschlag. After analyzing his vision, he established it as a template for the concept of wish fulfillment. The dream has become installed in the psychoanalytic annals as “Irma’s Injection” (Fichtner, 2010, p. 1149). Before having the fateful dream, Freud (2008) had conferred with another doctor on the rehabilitation of a patient both had treated, a woman to whom Freud assigns the pseudonym, “Irma” (Anna H.). The doctors’ conversation revealed that, in the estimation of Freud’s colleague, Irma lagged in her recovery; this opinion irritated Freud, as he interpreted the discussion as the other physician blaming him for Irma’s continued illness (pp. 84-85). In Freud’s dreams that summer night, the psychoanalyst saw Irma attending a party. The patient showed signs of sickness and Freud, engrossed in dream, attempted to blame his colleague for her condition, putting forth the notion that he had administered to Irma a dirty and superfluous medical injection (pp. 85-94). When he interpreted the dream in the light of day, Freud connected the dream’s ascription of blame to his colleague’s imagined incompetence to his own wish to remove blame from himself for Irma’s persistent malady. The dream in this way depicts a fulfilled wish of things in the way he would prefer them. As Freud himself puts it, the “dream represents a certain state of affairs as being as I wish it to be: its content is thus a wish fulfillment, its motive a wish” (emphasis Freud’s) (pp. 94-95).
Explained in this way, assigning wish fulfillment to Irma’s Injection looks like a plausible motivation for the dream. Yet the principle of wish fulfillment is difficult to fix in place. Freud first distinguishes between manifest and latent content in a dream, establishing a difference between the vision the dreamer perceives and the unconscious material represented in the dream (p. 107). He then submits ideas of censorship and misrepresentation to resolve dreams whose wish fulfilling capacities are not immediately revealed, writing that where “the wish-fulfillment is unrecognizable, disguised, there must have been a tendency to defensiveness against this wish, and as a consequence of this defensiveness the wish was only able to express itself in distortion” (p. 112). Much in the same way a worker with bad news to explain to the boss will abridge his or her language and suppress certain facts in their communication, censorship governs wish fulfillment via distortion (p. 112).

Even distressing dreams are wishful “insofar as every dream does indeed come from the first agency (latent) while the second (manifest) only acts defensively, not creatively toward the dream” (p. 114). But the analyst runs into trouble in maintaining the theory’s consistency. For instance, a patient informed him that a certain dream fulfilled the opposite of what she wished. Freud had previously contended with the patient the idea that dreams served as wish fulfilling frames; the woman understood that her dream was proof of error in Freud’s theory. The psychoanalyst responded unconvincingly that the woman wished that his theory should be incorrect, and that this desire stimulated her dream, apparently discrediting his theory. But because the dream depicted Freud as being wrong, in accordance with her wish, the woman’s principal wish was executed and Freud’s argument, in his own eyes, was validated (pp. 118-119).

Freud’s wish fulfilment concept, then, is complex. He avers that our night visions appear to assume various meanings, with imbricated wish fulfillments exposing themselves (p. 169). And, for Freud, our dreams can link to early childhood recollections (p. 126), affecting the types of wishes satisfied in our dreams. The psychoanalyst asserts that various understandings and wish fulfilments can accumulate and that, by working through them, it is possible to arrive at the gratification of a drive dating from infancy (p. 169). Such regress in dreams has disturbing potential. Concluding the chain of childhood wishes is the infamous Oedipus complex (p. 202).
Of greater concern for the formation of dreams, however, is what Freud calls the Dream Work. Four elements comprise this process. The first is condensation, which blends together various components of a dream (Robertson, 2008, p. xiv). To perform this function, the dream, beginning with a thought best communicated in spoken language, is then converted into dream-pictures (pp. xix-xx). Freud (2008) expounds on this difference between dream thought and dream content with the assertion that the “dream is scant, paltry, laconic in comparison to the range and abundance of the dream thoughts” (p. 212). So many dream thoughts are packed into dream content that Freud describes the elements comprising dream figuration as being “over-determined” (p. 216) in the process of condensation. He gives the example of a personal dream that created a nonsense word (dream content), which he later interpreted as having drawn from elements of a scientific discovery, as well as two actual words, along with a newspaper article about a playwright (dream thoughts) (p. 227).

Next, the dream work engages in displacement, which shifts emotional force from the dream thought’s innermost point to its peripheral elements (Robertson, 2008, p. xiv). For example, Freud (2008) writes of a dream he had concerning a botanical monograph (pp. 214-217); the central portion of the dream content is the adjective “botanical,” while the dream thoughts focus on a multiplicity of other connections (p. 232). The psychoanalyst writes that, when such dynamics occur

*a transference and displacement of the psychical intensity* (emphasis Freud’s) of the individual elements has taken place; as a consequence, the difference between the texts of the dream content and the dream thoughts makes its appearance. The process we are assuming here is the essential part of the dream-work; it has earned the name of dream displacement. Dream displacement and dream condensation are the two foremen in charge of the dream work and we may put the shaping (representation) of our dreams mainly to that activity (p. 235).

It is the two processes of displacement and condensation, then, that work toward the shifting of latent content into manifest content (p. 236).

In addition to the two “foremen” directing the dream work, Freud ascribes the duty of displaying certain changes in dream content to the function of representation. Because dream thoughts and dream content do not share a syntax, connections such as ‘if,’ ‘and’ or ‘because’ do not appear in dream content. In their place, humorous illustrations, puns and songs will make the link (Robertson, 2008, p. xiv). The resulting bizarreness is mitigated
to a degree with application of the fourth element of the dream work, that of secondary revision. This function possesses the ability to assure the dreamer that he or she is only dreaming, and serves to assemble the dream into coherent narratives when it at first appears as a jumble. Freud (2008) writes of secondary revision that “not everything contained in a dream comes from the dream thoughts, but rather that a function of the psyche indistinguishable from our waking thoughts can make some contribution to the dream content” (p. 319). In this way, the dream is rendered intelligible to our sense-making processes (pp. 319-320).

Such is my brief outline of Freudian dream theory. It perhaps seems a natural course of action to proceed next with a synopsis of the Jungian approach to dream interpretation, especially given Jung’s central position in this work and his connection to Freud. Still, the move to Jung’s interpretive frame is meant only as one possible counterpoint to Freud’s groundbreaking schematic. The comparison of these two approaches in examining the “psychic X-ray images” to which Koselleck (1985, p. 226) refers makes available only a single psychological binary. Any number of systems could be compared for this purpose; the comparative procedures advanced in the present chapter represent only a starting point for this sort of analysis.

Few parallels exist between Freud’s and Jung’s approaches to dreams. As shown in Chapter 1, each approach posits dreams’ ancient reach, as well as holding that dreams relate to the dreamer’s personal unconscious. Jung (1974) assigns additional tasks to the dreaming unconscious, averring that it functions autonomously from conscious thinking and can set itself at odds with one’s consciousness. Jung’s approach differs markedly from Freud’s at this juncture. The psychologist holds that the dream introduces compensatory elements aimed at offsetting an unbalanced consciousness (p. 73), with equilibrium-restoring dreams appearing initially as a “momentary adjustment” (p. 75). But monitored over time, these apparently unlinked compensatory dreams depict a foundation, revealing connections and possession of an objective. Long chains of visions become focused, disclosing advances in a deliberate developmental trajectory (p. 75). Jung describes this advance as the course of individuation (pp. 75-76). Such development involves differentiation between so-called “significant” and “insignificant” night visions (p. 76). Jung connects insignificant dreams to the personal unconscious, whereas significant
dreams emerge from the realm of the collective unconscious, with archetypal images dominating such visions. That they routinely surface “in individual case material, as well as their universal distribution, prove[s] that the human psyche is unique and subjective or personal only in part, and…the rest is collective” (p. 77).

Such archetypes have also inspired and supported collective philosophical, religious and mythical structures (Jung, 1964, p. 68). For instance, Christians and worshippers of the ancient Egyptian god, Horus, each depended on mythical motifs of the man-god archetype to represent and uphold their religions (pp. 68-69). The selection of an archetype connecting a religion dead for millennia and a living faith is calculated. The link shows the lifeblood of structural similarities between current and ancient myths. The nature of this relationship remains unchanged because present day dreamers who engage with the collective unconscious sustain the mythic ability to generate symbols previously communicated via ritual systems in archaic cultures (p. 98).

But Jung’s application of archetypes to dreams is not an original idea. In fact, the psychoanalyst, with this approach, designates a new scope to an ancient idea. The postulate of a non-falsifiable dimension of timeless exemplars that direct thought and action encapsulates an archaic view. Eliade (2005) avers that people in ancient societies performed actions that imitated powerful sacred gestures (p. 34). These actions assumed the form of rituals undertaken by individuals pursuing transcendent ideals by doing “what the gods did in the beginning” (p. 21). Eliade designates these ideal models with the label “archetypes” (p. xxvii), but distinguishes between his intended cosmological sense of the word from Jung’s psychological one (p. xxix). Plato’s theory of immutable forms evinces a more refined variant of Eliade’s cosmological archetype. Eliade himself describes the Platonic system as an ontological structure that afforded “philosophic currency and validity to the modes of behaviour and life of archaic humanity” (p. 34), accomplishing ontological lucidity on the strength of a philosophic dialectical system (p. 35). Others, of course, have theorized changeless spheres geared to sundry ends. These facts do not disparage Jung’s creative thought; his theory of archetypes differs markedly from Plato’s teaching insofar as Jung’s notion centers on the archaic images found in myths and dreams (Jung, 1974, p. 77) instead of quintessential frameworks of principles like justice or a political model for cities (Plato, 1997, p. 1099). Archetypes, moreover, are fluid (Jung, 1964, p. 65); Platonic
forms assume a fixed position (p. 1099).

Yet, as innovative as Jung’s advancement of archetypal theory might be, a complication arises: Jung asks the reader to accept the existence of archetypes without any means of verifying them. The lack of empirical proof is an intractable obstacle in dealing with dreams, and Jung does not solve it. Still, instances of dreams featuring archetypal heroes (Jung, 1964, p. 61) and the man-god motifs that have arisen the world over, apparently adhering to an ancient, unified structure (pp. 68-69), serve as worthwhile concepts when applied to myth. Their durability and frequency of occurrence support Jung’s theory of archetypes. Further, endless dreamed motifs, ostensibly with no grounding in personal experience, have occurred in the night visions of all sorts of people ranging from children to university professors (p. 58). Anchoring their appearance to archetypes made available through access to the collective unconscious offers an accounting for such motifs. Archetypal theory, however, is plagued with two potentially fatal problems. The first is one in which ‘archetypes’ do not exist at all, and that their associated ‘mythical motifs’ made their way overland; Jung insists, however, that there are certain instances that forbid this eventuality (p. 58). Second, dreams have always been subject to interpretation. The conscious mind is unequipped to decide for certain whether the figure it summons from a dream envisioned the night before represents a mythological hero or deals solely with matters of individual significance.

Despite their differences and their difficulties, applying both Jung’s and Freud’s approaches to the task assigned them in the present chapter could tell an important cultural tale. Freud’s theory of dreams, motivated by wishes and brought to our slumbering minds by a fourfold process of formation, is burdened with shedding light on the cultural responses to the psychic snapshots to which Koselleck refers. Use of Freudian dream work offers the prospect of clarity; wish fulfillment doctrine, with its subjective view of the exact wish being fulfilled, might obfuscate. Jung’s archetypal view, complete with the ability to propel mythical images into our dreams, bears the same responsibility as Freud’s system. An advantage to the theory is its ability to draw from the gamut of mythological symbols as a means of clarification. Despite the wide theoretical range, the question of what archetypal motifs could possibly arise in the context of Beradt’s political dream images is thrown into bold relief. Concerns about the applicability of the two psychological
approaches do not end there. How, for instance, might an analysis square the two analysts’
differences of opinion on dreams’ temporal trajectory, especially those to which Koselleck
has cautiously ascribed a direction? To what degree can either of these methods be
appropriate for understanding the myth of the Thousand Year Reich? The pages below
attempt to answer these questions.

**Dream Theory in Action**

Reinhart Koselleck’s (1985) consideration of the dreams Beradt recorded provides two
vital points of departure. The first is the historian’s understanding that, at the time they
were dreamed, these visions apparently possessed a prognostic quality (p. 221). The two
dreams that Koselleck focuses on most tightly are that of the doctor who envisioned the
decree of the abolition of walls, and the nightscape of the Jewish lawyer which saw him
agree to oblige any rubbish that needed the space he occupied. These nightmares provide
specifics within a general record that apparently foresaw still greater terror. On a similar
level of importance is Koselleck’s categorization of the dreams as pictorial representations
of inner psychic processes. It is both of these senses of the dream images, transmitted by
Beradt, to which Freudian and Jungian psychological analysis will be applied.

Pros and cons accrue to this procedure. Freud (2008) dismisses the idea of dreams
seeing future events as an incorrect understanding appropriate to bygone centuries (p. 79).
Because Koselleck’s historical point of view sees that Beradt’s dream interviews
comprehend something of future events, the analytical discussion is, seemingly, stacked
against meaningful inclusion of Freud’s approach in the conversation. By default, Jung’s
(1974) claim that the “occurrence of prospective dreams cannot be denied” (p. 41) appears
to gain an unearned boost. Such an assessment would be without foundation. Koselleck’s
observations have made plausible connections between political nightmares and what
became a political reality. As always, dreams are matters of interpretation. No objective
measure exists to determine the veracity of Koselleck’s claims; the historian’s assertions
remain open to argument. Such a circumstance can be seen as an opportunity for Freudian
theory to debunk claims of portentous visions. In the same way, Jung’s allowances that
dreams can look ahead must prove themselves in analysis of individual dreams, rather than
piggybacking on Koselleck’s findings. Each theoretical approach has a difficult task ahead of it.

An appraisal of the two approaches can take place only after each has done its work on the “psychic X-ray images” taken from Beradt’s dream interviews (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226). Apart from the two dreams listed above, these images will undergo analysis independent of commentary from Koselleck, with one important exception—the conceptualization of the visions as providing a view of the dreamer’s inner psychic state is his. It might appear a trifle to credit the historian with what could seem an obvious expression of what the dreams represent. This would be a mistaken observation. Any number of interpretations of the dreams in Beradt’s catalogue are possible. It is a credit to Koselleck’s clarity of thought and expression that the dreams can be considered in this way. In this manner, the application of the two psychological theories contend with the problems that the dreams come indirectly and without access to the dreamer, and that the framing of the dreams as psychic snapshots originates in the work of another scholar. These problems cannot be eliminated, but they ensure a level playing field for each psychological theorist.

To begin the process, it is necessary to revisit the two dreams on which Koselleck trained his sharpest focus. In these examples, Koselleck’s historical conclusions will be examined before attending to the remaining body of dreams comprising the collection. In the first, the reader is taken through the mental processes of a doctor who dreams that he looks up from a book he is reading to see that the walls of his own apartment, as well as those in buildings as far as he could see, had been eliminated. This action had taken place in accordance with a dreamed decree concerning the recent abolition of walls (Beradt, 1968, p. 21). Koselleck (1985) understands the dream indicates the stripping away of privacy in the name of community control (p. 220)—a community the Nazis were building (2018, p. 16). This short, dreamed passage offers much for psychological analysis.

Delving into Freudian theory at this juncture stops just short of demanding that Freud himself appear to offer a plausible wish that could motivate such a dream. Assuming that there is merit to Koselleck’s (1985) assessment that the doctor’s dream, along with the lawyer’s, represent a connection to the terror of Nazi politics, as they are “instrumentalisations of terror itself” (p. 220), a Freudian analysis must begin by linking
the few scraps of information about the doctor. The little we know about the man includes the fact that the dream horrified him (Beradt, 1969, p. 21), that he was apolitical, and that a subsequent dream (about which we know only that the doctor had “retreated to the bottom of the sea”) reacted to a life without privacy by a “total withdrawal from the public realm” (p. 22). If such evidence indicates anything beyond doubt, it is that the dream is one of distress. Freud’s (2008) theory, at first glance, looks like it fits here. He writes that “even distressing dreams and anxiety-dreams will be revealed as wish-fulfillments” (p. 107), asserting further that cloaked wish fulfillments indicate reluctance to recognize a wish and assume a misrepresented form (p. 112). The psychoanalyst gives the example of a young doctor who had recently filed an honest tax return for his modest income. Though the amount filed was correct, the doctor dreamed that the taxation bureau’s inspectors flagged his return as dishonest and would issue a fine. Freud calls this vision “the barely concealed fulfillment of a wish to be accounted a physician with a larger income” (p. 124). Such a dream, for Freud, illustrates the contention that even unpleasant dreams represent wish fulfillments and that such dreams aim at subject matter upon which we are not eager to dwell. The psychoanalyst amends his wish fulfillment theory with reference to troublesome dreams with the formula: “The dream is the (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed, repressed) wish” (emphasis Freud’s) (p. 124). With these qualifications in mind, analysis of the dream of the doctor Beradt interviewed can proceed.

The initial analytical pass focuses on the disturbance the dream caused the physician. On a conscious level the disquiet is easy to understand—the man had no political inclination and a street-level Nazi was forcing ideology into his home (recall the intruding block warden’s demand to know why no swastika hung in the doctor’s window). That subsequent disturbing dreams followed is also unsurprising (Beradt, 1968, pp. 21-22). Koselleck’s (1985) connection of the dream to Nazi terror and ideology is thus far maintained (p. 220). This link also appears consistent with wish fulfillment theory, as an explanation of a wish for the return to political neutrality could hold up in this case.

Such a motive requires less imagination than the dream of the young physician that Freud interprets, and yet squares with the analyst’s assertion that desires in dreams target forbidden subjects. In this case, the return to private life is forbidden. Further, while the details of the block warden’s intrusion are confined to the Nazi flunky’s demands, the
vision condenses the doctor’s thought: “not in my four walls” (Beradt, 1968, p. 22) with the political reality of all the block warden symbolized, along with elements known only to the doctor in over-determining the dream’s content. The central image—the absence of walls where walls ought to have been—can be described as adhering to the principle of dream displacement. This process, on “the one hand strips the psychically valuable elements of their intensity, and on the other creates new values by way of over-determination (emphasis Freud’s) out of elements of low value; it is the new values that then reach the dream content” (Freud, 2008, p. 235). With these steps in mind, it is possible to see the ways in which the walls (or absence of them) assumed a heightened role from their otherwise mundane place in both dream and household. The dream thoughts here are determined primarily, as far as we know, by the invasion of the Nazi home intruder. In displacing these thoughts from the dream’s center, the new central content becomes condensed and represented by the absence of walls. Given the dream’s brevity, it is unclear whether secondary revision takes place in this vision.

An understanding of this dream as a wish for a return to a life of guaranteed privacy looks clear. Such a wish, especially once we find out that the doctor is “not at all politically inclined” (Beradt, 1968, p. 22) is unsurprising. And considering Freud’s view that dreamed wishes work retroactively within the dreamer, rather than looking forward, a wish fulfillment based on the restoration of a lost freedom holds to theoretical logic. But a limitation arises. The dream offers only the most concise look back, obscuring Freud’s assertion that wish fulfillments in dreams can superimpose themselves over top of one another until hitting upon a wish from infancy (p. 169). Such an interpretation is unavailable regarding the doctor’s dream. The “psychic X-ray” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226) shown in this instance radiates intensity, but its economy, along with an all-but non-existent biography of the physician, checks its ability to offer more than the briefest look to the past.

Some directionality, then, is detected in a Freudian analysis of the doctor’s dream. Seeing the dream through a Jungian lens is, of course, a much different matter. Jung (1964) found little to recommend in wish fulfillment as a source of dreams, indicating rather that dreams “originate in a spirit that is not quite human, but is rather a breath of nature—a spirit of the beautiful and generous as well as the cruel goddess” (p. 36). The psychologist
also took issue with Freud’s belief that dreams engage in the censorship of distortion, writing instead that the subliminal state [of the dreamer] retains ideas and images at a much lower level of tension than they possess in consciousness. In the subliminal condition, they lose clarity of definition: the relations between them are less consequential and more vaguely analogous, less rational and therefore more ‘incomprehensible.’ This can also be observed in all dreamlike conditions (p. 52).

The reader will, moreover, recall Jung’s conviction that the purpose of the dream is to serve a compensatory function in the individual, reestablishing our “total psychic equilibrium” (p. 34).

As noted in Chapter 4, Jung (1974) holds that attunement to collective images is common in people in their adolescence, middle age, and in those nearing death (p. 77). He writes of a girl who created a book of dream stories as a Christmas present for her father. The journal featured a serpent-like creature, demons, angels, gods and other religious images which, according to Jung, were more likely archetypal symbols than something the girl would have read about. In any case, the girl died not long after Jung saw the images; the girl was simultaneously approaching puberty and death (Jung, 1964, pp. 58-64). With such a time-sensitive relationship to the appearance of dreamed archetypes in mind, a look at the doctor’s dream assumes a different frame.

The dreamscape moves in a manner suggestive of Jung’s dream mechanics. More importantly, the vision is collective. Koselleck (2018) writes that the dream’s elimination of privacy expresses the ideology of “Volksgemeinschaft” (p. 16). Such was the shared political terror of the day. The purpose of the Jungian dream—to restore balance—can be seen on personal and collective levels. The physician’s own life had been violated by an ideological intrusion and so had those of his fellow citizens. The dream depicts not only the vanished walls of his own quarters, but in those “as far as the eye could see” (Beradt, 1968, p. 21). The fate of the doctor is not known, but given the perils the Nazi regime imposed, to suppose his impending death would represent no overreach. Such a tragic end dovetails with Jung’s theory regarding those dreamers best adapted to connect with archetypal motifs. As discussed, the archetype’s dynamic nature does not admit a single symbol but serves as a basis for variations on a theme. In the present case, an archetypal symbol of walls is conceivable. From the Wall of Jericho, to Hadrian’s Wall, to the Great
Wall of China and the Maginot Line (unfinished at the time of the dream)—each represented a political purpose related to the fate of a people. The Great Wall of China stretches as far as the eye can see; just as the absence of walls did in the doctor’s dream.

Such an interpretation seems to fit Jung’s approach. Nevertheless, while Jung (1964) claims that archetypes possess the power to shape whole periods of history (p. 68), the archetypal connection proposed above stands as complete guesswork. Crisper aim can be taken at the dreams’ temporal direction, in line with Koselleck’s (1985) perspective that, as the dreams Beradt recorded were dreamed, they displayed a propensity to fear the future (p. 218). The loss of privacy among German citizens that unfolded as this era wore on has been demonstrated with the example of the Blockwarte and their informants. In this instance it looks as though Jung’s approach to dreams as sometimes looking ahead and Koselleck’s view of the dream frames as anticipating the brutal escalation of Nazi crimes display theoretical agreement. The imprecision of archetypes, however, makes application of Jung’s theory a troublesome task. This difficulty, especially relative to prognostication, is outlined below.

At the outset of the interpretation of Beradt’s dream records, then, the doctor’s politicized vision appears not to favour a particular chronological direction, as we have traced both past and future courses. Let us apply similar theoretical examinations to the vision of the Jewish lawyer whose dream depicts the man sitting on a garbage can with a sign hung around his neck, announcing that he would “make room for trash” (Beradt, 1968, p. 135). The ideological terror present in this dream cannot be missed. Theoretically, of greater importance in this instance than conjecturing over Freudian condensation and displacement, is locating a toehold for the idea of wish fulfillment. If such a mechanism exists in this snapshot of a dream, a case might be made for application of a Freudian interpretation.

From Beradt, we learn that the lawyer was about sixty years old and that he “had always considered a person's dignity and repute as matters of great importance” (p. 134). Plainly, associating with trash is an inversion of dignity. For the lawyer, this connection to refuse represented a blow to his self-respect. Moreover, as a lawyer, he would have been badgered from practicing his profession prior to the imprecisely dated dream of 1935. The institution of the Nuremberg laws in September of that year, in the Nazi attempt to consign Jewish
people to the ‘Trash Heap of History,’ would have formalized the continued harassment by disbarring the man. Such was the fate of two of his younger colleagues who had briefly been allowed to continue practicing law because of their service in WW I, and told Beradt of their own nightmares (pp. 133-134). For the lawyer whose dream is featured here, Freud’s (2008) notion of wish fulfillment becoming visible through the defensive process of dream distortion (p. 112) offers some insight. Just as the dream of the young physician that Freud recounts above involves distressing dream content, the sixty-year-old lawyer’s vision reveals a desire not manifest in the dream (p. 124). Applying such a theory to the lawyer’s dream would be as simple as wishing for a return to a time when he was respected. Such an interpretation gains additional support when connecting it to the September 15, 1935 Nuremberg laws; the establishment of legislation banning Jewish people from practicing their chosen professions must have been doubly galling for one whose work was the law itself. Still, resorting to dream distortion seems unnecessary to engineer this dream into a wish; that anyone in the lawyer’s position—dreaming or awake—would want to restore their professional status and dignity is easy to understand. Envisioning the nightmare disgrace the lawyer saw for himself looks like a natural consequence of the terror which Koselleck (1985, p. 218) uses to characterize these dreams. And yet, because the dream’s exact date is unknown, placing it before or after the race laws’ enactment is impossible. While life had become oppressive for Jewish people before the passage of the Nuremberg laws, their formal institution in the late summer of 1935 marked a still bleaker event. Had it been established that the lawyer’s dream had occurred after the laws were passed, interpreting it as a Freudian wish for a time in the recent past is a conclusion to which theoretical consistency might accrue.

Still, as we have seen, such a timeline is not the only available one. That the dream tenably served as a signpost for a future in which laws conspired against Jewish life was shown in Chapter 5. But the political connections in their relationship to the dreamer himself are worthy of a closer look understood by Jungian theory. The connection in dreams to archetypal images at the approach of death could hold some value in this case. As noted above, the lawyer avoided the Nazi concentration camps, but died, stripped of dignity, in a foreign country (Beradt, 1968, p. 136). The dream’s brevity makes it difficult to assess whether any archetypal pattern can be detected; for the purpose of interpretation,
it is worth looking again at the entire dream:

Two benches were standing side by side in Tiergarten Park, one painted the usual green and the other yellow [in those days, Jews were permitted to sit only on specially painted yellow benches]. There was a trash can between them. I sat down on the trash can and hung a sign around my neck like the ones blind beggars sometimes wear—also like those the government makes 'race violators' wear. It read, ‘I Make Room for Trash If Need Be.’ (p. 135).

The dream’s central image is the ostracizing and displacement of Jewish people. The lawyer inhabits a liminal zone between the forbidden green bench and the despised yellow one, finding a place only among that which is rejected. Such a depiction reflects not only the enforced identity-crisis among Jewish people in the Nazi era, it represents a centuries-old anti-Semitism.

Jung (1964) writes that dreams possess the potential to communicate something “that is of a more or less unknown nature [which] has been intuitively grasped by the unconscious and submitted to an archetypal treatment.” The psychologist holds further that, in place of conscious reasoning, “the archetypal mind has stepped in and taken over the task of prognostication” (p. 67). Jung’s phrase “more or less unknown” in relation to the place that archetypal understanding takes over from conscious thought is intentional, and it is profitably employed in the present case. That the situation was dire for Jewish people in Germany in 1935 required no archetypal intervention to comprehend the fact. Yet the symbol of the man having seated himself on a trash heap might be seen as anticipating a devastating archetype of the most ostracizing action of all: that of “Genocide.” As with any archetypal identification, conjecture is required, and whether an archetype of this sort exists cannot be proven. It is perhaps more credible to assert that, if an archetypal association does indeed fit in this case, that it would manifest itself in the universal form of “Death,” as developed below. Murky as such a connection might be, the untimely death of the dreamer and the infamy of the industrial-scale murder to come allow an intuitive in-point for the dream to have served as an archetypal prognosticator.

The lawyer’s dream, then, considered with both Freudian and Jungian theoretical approaches, concludes with a timeframe that longs for the safety or the recent past while perhaps signaling the disasters to come, as did the doctor’s dream of the abolition of walls. An examination of the nightscapes concerning surveillance might establish a more
conclusive temporal direction. The first comes from the slumbers of the 30-year-old woman who had envisioned dressing up to go to the opera. During the dreamed performance, she silently associated a lyric about the devil with Hitler, was subsequently accosted by Nazi thugs, and ignored by her fellow opera-goers when she pleaded for help (Beradt, 1968, p. 25). In the dream, the woman sees herself attired in a gown, hair styled, and receiving admiring looks from others attending the performance. As the admiration turns to avoidance once the Nazis have homed in on the woman’s thoughts, she “imploringly searched the festive crowd for some sign of help,” to no avail (p. 25). At this moment, the dream deploys a complex timeframe. The present cheery state quickly deteriorated into one of danger. The appearance of Nazi police, the suddenly apathetic crowd, along with one attendee who spat at the woman indicate that the present joyful moment is now receding irretrievably into the past. Images of the happy time remain, but the substance of the moment is replaced by terror. That the woman begs audience members for help indicates a wish to return to the time just passed. Such an interpretation presents itself easily, especially in the vision of a woman “pampered” and not required to work for a living (pp. 22-23). Desiring a return to the life of privilege so recently imperiled by the waking life reality of a police state is not difficult to comprehend.

But the dream’s timespan requires more than an application of Freudian wish fulfillment. The woman’s vision was in a sequence recorded from April to September of 1933 that Beradt describes as originating within a twentieth-century dream-Sibyl [who] saw far into the Nazi millennium, sensing trends, recognizing correlations, shedding light on the obscure, and all the while moving to and fro between the easily exposed realities of everyday life and all that lay undisclosed beneath their surface. With extremely skillful use of tragedy as well as farce, and realistic as well as surrealist elements, she in effect unconsciously extracted the essence of a development which was bound to lead to a national catastrophe as well as to the destruction of her own personal world. Time has proved the validity of her dream characters and sequences, her details and nuances (pp. 24-25).

With this description, Beradt reinforces her point of view that the dream interviews look ahead to the terror of the Third Reich.

At first glance, a Jungian view of the woman’s dream catalogue might appear to provide clear support. But the fit is not so straightforward. Even if one postulates a connection from
the dream to a future state as a prognostic frame, this foundation is shakier than might be hoped. Jung’s (1964) assertion that, in certain dreams, archetypes take over and assume the role of harbinger (p. 67) runs into the same difficulty many if not most dreams would present in this regard: the problem of which archetype to apply. Some archetypes, such as those that form as the symbols common to many religions, might reveal themselves to the trained eye. But the dream of the woman at the opera comes up short in this connection. Beradt (1968) interprets the device which read the woman’s thoughts and transmitted them to party zealots as symbolizing the perils associated with ideological manipulation of human thought (p. 26). Beradt says further that the theme of a threatening environment appears throughout the woman’s string of dreams, connoting the end to both human diversity and political engagement as hallmarks of totalitarian rule (p. 33). Beradt’s analysis of these motifs looks sound, given the political reality of the times. I cannot, however, conceive of a meaningful way to categorize these symbols as archetypes; any attempt to do so would need to improve upon Beradt’s judgment in this instance—a task beyond the capability of the present work.

Devoid of a discernible archetypal symbol, then, the opera-goer’s dream is deprived of any future-orientation in the Jungian sense. Jung (1974) himself holds that dreams are sometimes prospective, writing that it “would be wrong to call them prophetic, because at bottom they are no more prophetic than a medical diagnosis or a weather forecast” (p. 41). The psychologist suggests that the dream can map out future possibilities for the dreamer. Yet, while appearing to vacillate on the prognostic power of dreams between the 1964 publication of Man and His Symbols and his 1974 book, Dreams, Jung remains firm in the collective nature of many dreams owing to their archetypal bases (p. 77). But again, without a decided archetypal symbol to underpin the dreams of the pampered woman suffering assault by Fascists in her night visions, the collective nature of the dreamscape cannot achieve traction in a Jungian manner. And too little is known of the woman and her months-long series of dreams to reasonably assert that they accrued to a process of individuation or served a compensatory purpose. Still, the opera dream’s timeline must be navigated. Beradt (1968) observes that the dream, with its remote control thought recorder and Orwellian themes, represents phenomena that look toward a later reality and collective terror. The dream plausibly does so without reference to an unseen realm, such as the
collective unconscious. Jungian theory is further at a loss in this connection to postulate that the woman’s dream derived from archetypal roots, given her age. At 30 years old, the dreamer was some years from the threshold of middle age that Jung held to serve as one of the life stages most likely to invite archetypal dreams. It must be allowed, however, that death lurked around every corner at this time and could have, as Jung would have it, summoned such a dream. On the whole, Jung’s theory in relation to the woman’s opera dream stands on precarious ground.

In another case, the dream of the homemaker with the old-fashioned oven that doubled as a recording device, like the dream of the woman at the opera, evinces a fluid relationship to time. To recap the vision, a woman in her 40s dreamed that the oven which stood as a central gathering place in her home had stored all of her family’s anti-Nazi talk and played back the conversations in front of an intruding Storm Trooper. The woman worried that the next move would be for the oven to spew forth the comments she had made about Goebbels, realizing at that moment that “simply everything we have ever thought or said among ourselves is known” (p. 45). In this short description, the chronological pattern woven through the dream reveals itself.

That the oven served as a hub for family discussion indicates a sense of ease and security—an area of the home geared to expression of intimate thoughts. The dream took place only months after the establishment of the Nazi regime; the woman’s desire to return to a recently passed time in which her family’s safety to participate in conversation about meaningful topics is palpable. Misgivings about the home’s change from a place of sanctuary to one of betrayal and oppression condenses opposing ideas of protection and danger. For Freud (2008), although some wish fulfilments appear in dreams unobscured (p. 112) dream thoughts cannot become dream content without first being filtered through processes of potential censorship and distortion (p. 113); this dynamic is revealed in the condensation of dream elements as they proceed from latent to manifest content in dreams (p. 226). Further, the themes of danger and security in the context of 1933 Germany grew in importance proportionate to the profusion of Nazi incursions on human rights and civil liberties. That these hostile inroads should occur as thoughts serving to over-determine dream imagery can be seen in the condensation of notions of safety and peril symbolized by the Dutch-oven. The oven presents a familiar image, though it is not central to the dream.
thoughts; its appearance represents a displacement of those thoughts, repositioning them in the dream content. A ‘safety versus danger’ dichotomy reveals itself in this dream; the totality of over-determining factors cannot, however, be known. Still, Freud insists that the greater the intensity associated with dream elements, the greater the complexity of condensation (p. 251). The magnitude of the emotional connection the homemaker’s dream displays to the oven would thus indicate the condensation of multiple dream thoughts. Most intense of all is the woman’s desire for the restoration of the freedom for her family to communicate without retribution. In this sense, the dreams’ mechanics indicate a link to the past.

The dream also expresses dread about the present moment, and of the future. The dream is a nightmare from the start—the image of the Storm Trooper standing next to the oven makes the reader alive to the dreamer’s vulnerability to the Nazi menace. That the distress of living under persecuting conditions expressed itself in the dream’s present tense represents no surprise. But the dream displays a malleable timeframe, resisting any temptation to lock it into a petrified freeze-frame of political terror. Jung (1974) writes that certain dream elements originate in the “impressions, thoughts, and moods of the preceding day or days” (p. 24). In this particular, Jung agrees with Freud that dreams cast a backward gaze. Yet, this work has emphasized Jung’s future-oriented view of the dream, as well as archetypal symbols found in dreams. And, while a look-ahead is provided in the woman’s dream: “Good Lord, what’s it going to tell next—all my little snide remarks about Goebbels?” (Beradt, 1968, p. 45), the dream’s key symbol—the traitorous Dutch-oven—is difficult to conceptualize as an archetypal figure somehow driving a prognostic function. Such an assertion about chronological direction is further complicated by the woman’s recognition that all that had been spoken in that room was now known; the past had become the present, portending future menace.

Perhaps, then, this dream serves a compensatory, Jungian purpose. Jung (1974) writes that when a dreamer veers off course “in the sense that his conscious attitude is unadapted both objectively and subjectively the—under normal conditions—merely compensatory function of the unconscious becomes a guiding prospective function capable of leading the conscious attitude in a quite different direction” (p. 43). But this possibility lacks any ring of truth. The key phrase in the above quotation is “under normal conditions.” The
conditions of the housewife and her family were, by any standard, not “normal.” Further, too little is known of the woman to speculate what her dream might have been attempting to get back on course from a personal perspective. Still, even without enough evidence to make a case for the dream serving a regulatory function, or the availability of a distinct archetypal model to root the dream in the collective unconscious, the vision looks ahead (as well as to the past and the present), as seen in the terror of what the Storm Trooper would learn next. Moreover, the Storm Trooper is a collective image, rather than a personal one. It might be possible to link the Nazi thug to a Jungian motif—mythical tales and associated dreams are full of demons and evil beings—but a more common-sense view would understand this criminal as a shared misery in the waking life of Fascist Germany. With these considerations, then, the homemaker’s dream blends a personal element (Dutch-oven) with a collective one (Storm Trooper), creating an interlude in which the future is looked upon with terror and then completely cancelled with the recognition that privacy had been permanently breached, resulting in the dreamer being taken prisoner. As with the dream of the opera and its elimination of private thought, Jung’s approach seems an awkward fit.

A shift toward visions that speak to internal dilemma and confrontation with the then new reality of Nazi power offers a different look at the application of dream theory. The middle-aged optometrist’s pair of dreams, which Beradt (1968) records as an internal struggle, in some sense encapsulates the impasse that faced so many Germans living under Nazi rule. The first vision depicts the shattering of windows in the optometrist’s hospital ward, followed by the transformation of the entire sector into a concentration camp full of barbed wire, with the doctor tearfully returning to his job to treat Hitler, which he did with pride, after being fired. The next dream saw the man in a concentration camp that was far better appointed than considered by then-current discussion about such places, with prisoners being treated to lavish parties. The illusion persisted until the doctor saw his reflection in a mirror, which revealed his penchant for foppish uniforms, causing him to veer into a barbed wire fence and weep (pp. 62-64).

In the optometrist’s own account, the waking-life appearance in his office of a staff-member dressed in Storm Trooper garb infuriated him and set off the dream sequence. The fact that the eye-doctor had lacked the courage to protest the repugnant uniform’s presence
in the workplace galled him even more. A case can be made that part of the offence lay in the event that it was a subordinate who had the insolence to wear such garments to the clinic. The predicament in which the specialist finds himself is based in turmoil: his anger at the uniformed employee’s appearance is subdued, presumably for fear of political reprisal. As for the dreams themselves, images of the concentration camp appear in both, as though to confirm the threat. Further complications arise when the terror of the concentration camp in the first dream is overlaid with the dreamer’s esteem in treating Hitler, then in his position as a Nazi doctor in fancy garb—disgrace overlapping the gratification of professional ambition. Rendering the sequence still more complex is the appearance, following a torturous path of formulation in the first dream, of a word that mutated from the German word for barbed wire (Stacheldraht) into the Nazi terrorist act of Kristallnacht (Beradt, 1968, p. 64). A stiff task arises here for dream interpretation theory.

A Freudian approach will struggle to explain this case, as wish fulfilment cuts both ways, especially in the first dream with its images of despair. The transformation of the hospital ward into a concentration camp, with its broken windows and barbed wire, appalls the optometrist. The image becomes drearier still when the formerly important man of affairs is cast adrift from his work. The act of being fired from his position complicates the vision insofar as the man is soon rehired as the only specialist with the skills needed to treat Hitler. The scene is set for two wishes to compete with one another. The first being a desire to perform his work without fear of harm, the second to achieve status within the Nazi regime. The conflict represents no difficulty for Freud (2008) who, as noted, holds that dreams often signify multiple connotations, with various wish fulfilments assuming a parallel order, along with the possibility of one wish fulfilment superimposing itself over another (p. 169).

In this instance, one might postulate that the dreamscape’s wish fulfilments reconcile with one another such that the optometrist’s safety and dignity are restored within the Nazi regime, whether as mutually compatible wishes, or in the event that one of these desires assumes a place of primacy. This suggestion, however, attempts a simple solution, explaining away rather than explaining. As we know too little about the eye doctor to understand the depths of what he actually wished, the dream analysis may gain support
from the associated waking-life facts that the Storm Trooper’s attire angered him, that he probably feared that resisting the Nazis would result in his ruin, and that he was ashamed of the dream’s association with Hitler. The man’s anger in waking life shrivels into fear and this emotion then underpins the dream. Yet overweening concern with social rank pulls the dreamer in a different direction from his terror. Had the conflicting wishes provided insight into the man’s turmoil, or if their culmination in one wish that ‘overlay’ another had provided some wish fulfilling gratification, if not easing his pain, Freud’s theory might make sense in this case. As it was, the optometrist awoke despondent, showing no sign of a consoling satisfaction (Beradt, 1968, p. 62). With internal discord of pride and shame continuing to gnaw at the doctor, another account must be given, one without a contrived ending. The fact is that people are often conflicted about important concerns. Everyone knows this. There is no need for a complicating theory. Further, little can be discerned from the dream’s timeframe. The first wish looks backward, the second orients itself to a future time in which he is safely employed by Nazis, despite the associated shame. Finally, the appearance of the Stacheldraht/Kristallnacht word-teaser seems to look toward the brutality of November 9, 1938 when the pogrom of the night of broken glass took place. The dream is a study in ambivalence, looking to the future and to the past.

The optometrist’s second dream assumes a similar emotional tone. The vision’s initial imagery gives the lie to the reality of the concentration camp, as the doctor sees no ill-treated inmates. This moment of relief turns to dread with the recognition that he has joined the Nazis. Of a piece with the first dream, which Beradt characterizes as a response to the “irreconcilable” (p. 63) horror of his quietist approach to the waking-life Nazi threat, the doctor joins the party he hates in the second dream as the means by which he “fulfills his desire to belong” (p. 64). A dream overdetermined in the Freudian sense, it could also indicate a wishful drive to be free of fear. Beradt’s own understanding of the dream sequence attempts to reconcile desires: the dueling wishes of pining for a return to the safety of his formerly unchallenged status, while enduring the shame of desiring status within a Nazi institution. Again, too little is known about the eye doctor to guess what his most pressing wish might be. Perhaps Beradt knew more about the doctor’s psychological state than those of us relegated to examining the interviewees’ “psychic X-ray images.” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226) and was thus better positioned to claim that the desire to belong
framed the dream sequence. Still, the dreams capture only a fragment of the dreamer’s process. Beradt knew this. That she saw a desire for social inclusion can be regarded only as another wish, rather than one that ‘overlay’ others, assuming a position of primacy. Regarding the temporal orientation of the second dream, it looks like a muddle of the present, with its incorrect representation of the concentration camp, along with a view to a possible future of working for the Nazi regime.

Examining the optometrist’s dreams from an alternative perspective affords the possibility of advancing different interpretations. Jung (1974) holds that Freud’s conception of dreams distorting their ‘true’ meaning is too brief an explanation for their content. The psychologist writes further that dreams “are compensatory to the conscious situation of the moment” and that a “compensatory content is especially intense when it has a vital significance for conscious orientation” (p. 38). If understood in the context of compensation, an understanding of the eye doctor’s first dream might stand on stronger footing than does the Freudian approach. Viewed in this way, it is possible that that the dream is attempting to steer the optometrist back on track; the man’s waking life fury fizzling into despair perhaps indicates this need. The revelation in the first vision, depicting the terror of his professional life being turned into the Nazi nightmare of a concentration camp, coupled with the obscene pride the man felt as the only doctor who could treat Hitler’s condition offer confirmation. In the dream, association with the hated Nazis is transformed into a terror-vision of what could be if immediate adjustments were not made.

The second dream seems to confirm the warning of the first. And it achieves a greater degree of plausibility than the initial one: the concentration camp no doubt looked better through the eyes of a Nazi than through those of its inmates, and only a short leap of imagination is required to place a medical professional with ambiguous party sympathies in a Nazi uniform. To use Beradt’s (1968) characterization, the doctor’s dreams employ “a caricature…, drawn with merciless accuracy by his own unconscious mind” (p. 63). Such a vivid description stands not far from Jung’s (1974) notions about the vividness of a dream corresponding to the gravity of waking life circumstances (p. 38). It is also tempting, from a Jungian perspective, to conjecture what could have been learned had more information been available. We possess two of the optometrist’s dreams but fall short of the sequence of dreams necessary to detect certain patterns. Jung (1974) writes that “a long dream series
no longer appears as a senseless string of incoherent and isolated happenings, but resembles the successive steps in a planned and orderly process of development” (p. 75). One nearly trembles with the thought of what a concatenation of the eye specialist’s dreams might have shown, if the first two are any indicator of what came next.

To return to the idea of the dream as compensatory—in this instance attempting to warn the doctor of a perilous track—presents none of the difficulty of arranging wish fulfilments into an order that can assume only an arbitrary position. According to Jung, the conscious and unconscious minds sometimes conflict, especially when the conscious mind assumes an attitude harmful to the individual. Such conscious deviation from the individual’s interests is demonstrated in dreams (p. 39). The doctor’s unexpressed anger and terror at the Storm Trooper’s appearance in his clinic perhaps serves as an example of Jung’s claim. Yet such an observation could mark an endpoint to the application of Jung’s theory in this case. We run again into the problem of archetypes, and Jung’s assertion that big, meaningful dreams come from the collective unconscious. This realm of archetypes is not “concerned with personal experiences, but with general ideas, whose chief significance lies in their intrinsic meaning and not in any personal experience and its associations” (p. 77). Working within the theory, then, we can observe that while the eye doctor’s horror at the unfolding reality is painful for him personally, the “chief significance” (p. 77) of such dread perhaps imitates the curtain of terror dropping generally over Nazi Germany at this time. But to what are we to assign the label ‘archetype’ in these dreams? In the first we learn about a connection to Hitler—the demonic, archetypal link between dream and myth could be joined here, but the dictator is only mentioned, never shown. Other images: hospital/concentration camp, smashed windows/barbed wire, as well as a sparkling uniform are poignant, but defy characterization as archetypal symbols. In searching images of what Jung (2009) sees as archetypal: serpents (p. 111), mandalas (p. 121), and crosses (p. 125), along with images of dragons (p. 129), underworld scenes (p 135) and a list of other mystical ideas, one is hard-pressed to make the connection. Without an established archetypal link, any future orientation of the optometrist’s dreams in the manner of Jung struggles for traction. Perhaps an archetypal link can be constructed from the Stacheldraht/Kristallnacht anagrams. The apparently forward-looking nature of this dream
fragment could allow for this possibility; attribution of a specific archetype to such a symbol, however, extends beyond the reach of the present work.

Beradt’s collection of night visions from a woman of partially Jewish ancestry provides another opportunity to test dream analysis, beginning with Freudian theory. The torturous dreamscape of the young woman left to care for her Jewish mother after her Christian father had died, at a time when the race laws were in full effect, offers rare insight into the mental images available to us. In the event, the woman dreamed that her mother had commented that they would soon have to flee to the mountains; the daughter replied that her mother would need to run but that she, the daughter, would not. The next dream saw a sign forbidding the trespass of “parasites.” In each dream the young woman is torn with resentment toward her mother and self-hate for feeling the way she did. Two more dreams of this character follow (Beradt, 1968, pp. 67-68).

Freud’s wish fulfillment theory is applicable in interpreting these dreams. The psychoanalyst’s approach encapsulates both the woman’s wish to be free of the legal strictures Jewish people were forced to bear, as well as a wish to be free from her suffering with guilt for dreaming of an advantage for herself over her beloved mother; the theory thus achieves a double objective in this case. Freud (2008) explains that, while some wishes are fulfilled in dreams without disguise, in cases of the fulfillment of unknown wishes, the desire in question assumes an altered image in the dream as a means of defending against the wish (p. 112). He writes that

we would assume two psychical forces...to be the originators of dream formation in the individual; one of these forms the wish uttered by the dream, while the other imposes a censorship on the dream wish and by this censorship distorts its expression (p. 113).

With this understanding, a view of the dream as both an undisguised wish for repeal of the racist Nuremberg laws and a censored wish for absolution from guilt makes sense. The wish for freedom from Nazi persecution requires no further explanation.

The guilt over dreaming of shelter, at her mother’s expense, from the problems the Nazis caused her because of her ethnicity could represent a drive to achieve liberty from such an emotion. That the second dream includes a passage indicating that the young woman tried to think of something to make her mother happy while simultaneously hating her (Beradt, 1968, p. 68) indicates love weighted by a desire for freedom. Wishing away such guilt in
the murky depths of a dream resounds with human complexity. And it is this complexity that highlights the versatility of Freud’s theory, even as we ask irreconcilable questions: Is the woman’s wish for freedom from guilt a look to the past when, presumably, such feelings regarding her mother were absent? Or is this desire a drive toward justification, having endeavored to comfort her mother? Freud’s (2008) approach allows us to examine the wish fulfillments as being “united…alongside one another,” with a tendency to revert to early childhood wish fulfillments (p. 169), and so it is impossible, in this view, to reject such wishes as incompatible. But rather than offering a means of analysis, once again, the dearth of information about the dreamer hobbles our ability to do more than speculate on potential wish fulfillments.

In a different theoretical key, these visions of emotional conflict represent a difficult field for a Jungian approach to understanding dreams. In this instance, four dreams are available. As noted, each deals with the conflict of the young woman’s love and resentment of her mother, as well as corresponding guilt. Dreams three and four in the sequence conclude with her mother’s death, accompanied by some relief about this event. Jung’s theory of dreams as compensatory frames seems an incorrect fit at the outset of the series. The idea of these guilt-ridden visions serving as a means of restoring “psychic equilibrium” through dreams lacks purchase in this case. The psychologist gives the example of dreams serving this purpose by way of a warning to a man who was involved in disreputable business and had also taken up the pastime of scaling mountain peaks. The man told Jung of a dream in which he fell to his death from a mountaintop. Jung saw the man’s vision as a warning to correct his misdeeds and advised him to cease such activities. The man refused and six months after the dream he died plummeting from a mountain top (Jung, 1964, p. 34).

Jung’s example bestows a moralizing character upon the dream, as well one that attempts to rectify common-sense gone astray. While Jung does not offer an exhaustive list of the things for which dreams endeavor to compensate, the general sense is that the dream works to prevent the dreamer from aiming too high or too low in life. He writes that “the dream compensates for the deficiencies of their personalities, and at the same time it warns them of the dangers in their present course” (p. 34). We do know that the young woman to whom the above-listed dreams belonged spoke with her doctor about having developed
“mixed feelings” for her mother. We do not know the results of that discussion (Beradt, 1968, p. 67). That the woman intimated to Beradt that she loved her mother, taking on responsibilities as her caregiver following her father’s death, and knowing the dangers of looking after an elderly Jewish person in Nazi Germany, exposes as false any argument that self-interest trumped care for her mother. Where, then, does the notion of compensation arise if not from the woman’s actions? Perhaps Jung’s theory of compensation finds its best use in this case as a means of mitigating the resentment the dreamer felt. The imbalance in this instance locates itself in the woman’s behavior in opposition to her emotional state. Yet, in the example Jung offers, the dream’s admonition to the crooked mountaineer apparently tries to guide him back to a course of action commensurate with law-abiding common sense. There is no discussion of the dream’s working to repair an off-track emotional state. Moreover, to ascribe to the young woman’s dreams the compensatory task of ensuring a more upright mental bearing strikes a sour note. Any sane person in that woman’s position would feel unbearable strain. For her dreams to suggest otherwise is to assume the unrealistic stance that she should be a saint.

Still, the problem of the dreams existing as a progression of four remains. Perhaps rather than serving as compensatory frames, the visions took on the character of an abbreviated individuation process. Jung (1974) writes that, observed as a whole, a sequence of dreams can reveal a plan for the dreamer (p. 75). If this is in fact the case, then the grisly conclusion we are left with is that, as the penultimate and final visions in the series depict the death of the dreamer’s mother, this eventuality lines up with a plan that only the dreaming unconscious can see in its entirety. But here the wheels of conjecture begin to fall off of a theoretical application that cannot progress beyond this point. The juncture does, however, provide a legitimate platform for another stream of Jung’s approach. The two dreams that show the woman the death of her mother could be associated with archetypal symbols. “Mother” and “Death” exist as archaic symbols that arise across millennia in dreams and in myth. For example, the “Mother” symbol displays archetypal affinity in the instances of the Mahabharata’s Kunti, who divinely conceives sons (Smith, 2009, pp. 46-49), and in the Christian narrative in which Mary divinely conceives Jesus (Matthew 1:18-25). The “Death” symbol displays similar archetypal connections in the ancient Egyptian example of the deity Osiris, chief god of the dead (Van Dijk, 2003, p. 277) and in the realm of the
dead, known as the *bardo*, in Tibetan Buddhism (Freemantle and Trungpa, 1975, pp. 10-11). The symbols are opposites; ‘mother’ represents beginning, ‘death’ is the end. During the Nazi era, death was in the ascendant, rather than the rebirth associated with the mother symbol. In this way, the woman’s dreams accord with Jungian theory that sees both collective and subjective ideas run through our dreams (p. 77). With the coming displacement of Jewish people from German society, along with the mass deportations and massacre that also lay in the future, the dreams, as motivated by collective archetypal symbols, can be viewed as having revealed the catastrophic years ahead.

In a different point at issue, the dreams of those whose political convictions remained ambivalent during the Nazi takeover tend to equivocate with regard to Freudian theory. While Beradt (1968) lists several such dreams, the present focus is on the vision of the woman whose dream in 1936 depicted a scene in which she was censured for having too loud a party, at which guests allegedly did not toast the dictator. The vision ends with the woman’s close friend turning on her, and the dreamer finally jumping onto a crowded bus, shouting “Heil Hitler” (pp. 117-118). The party began, for the woman, in a pleasant way, as it was held in her honour. The tables turn when a neighbor questions the woman’s loyalty to the regime. In this case the dreamer’s prevarication about the appropriateness of publicly supporting Hitler sees a trajectory from the point at which the woman says it “wouldn’t have mattered” (p. 118) if guests had not proclaimed affiliation with the Nazis, to her change of heart and declaration of her newly realized sympathies.

In this dream, the direction of chasing fast fading hope backward to the safety of the recent past is visible. Only moments prior to the denunciation at hands of the neighbor and the friend who kicked her out into the street, the dreamer enjoyed the hospitality with which her now former friend treated her. Here the wish to return to this state of affairs is easy to see. It is in the apparent resolution to the ambivalent state of mind that the notion of wish fulfilment requires further analysis. Recall that Beradt characterized the Nazi effort to compel standard, regime-approved, approaches to all aspects of life as *Gleichschaltung* (p. 112). To dwell outside this ideological prescription for civic behavior was a dangerous pursuit. Conversely, to wish for safety is a primary human desire. To see this inclination transfer from one’s conscious thought to appear in a dream is perhaps unremarkable; after all, Freud (2008) expresses the dream/wish fulfilment pattern as being “included in the
series of intelligible psychical acts of our waking life.” (p. 98). But the change in attitude from the politically unsafe pursuit of ideological independence to having achieved (apparently) safe harbor in acceptance of *Gleichschaltung* falls short of completing the wish fulfilment. The dreamer, presumably to protect her physical well-being, makes her announcement of “Heil” to passengers on a bus, who stare at her without expression (Beradt, 1968, p. 118). This final moment of the dream is devoid of a satisfactory conclusion. No congratulations, pats on the back, or even the mildest indication of having made the ‘right’ decision greet the dreamer. The woman’s wish for safety thus looks unresolved. An in-person discussion with the woman might have offered clarity in this regard. Once more the limitations of dream theory in making sense of Koselleck’s dream representations reveal themselves.

Jung’s approach perhaps offers greater clarity than Freud’s in this case. The dream of the party that ended with an expression of Nazi enthusiasm holds a parallel position to the example Jung (1964) provides about the criminal mountain-climber who plunged to his death following a dream that envisioned this very thing. For Jung, the compensatory aim of the man’s dream was to caution him of impending danger should he stay the present course; according to Jung, the man’s failure to heed the warning cost him his life. The two dreamed scenarios are not perfectly aligned. In Jung’s example, the man “was inextricably involved in a number of shady affairs” and “developed” an affinity for mountain climbing at an undisclosed point in time (p. 34). The woman who dreamed of the party and the bus remained, at the time of her vision, yet aloof from the bonds of *Gleichschaltung*. Still, as her dream indicated, time was running out to ‘get on the bus’ of Nazi ideology (Beradt, 1968, p. 119). Despite incongruities between their respective times of peril, postulating, with Jung, the ability for dreams to spur the dreamer away from a harmful course of action by revealing potentially disastrous consequences possesses, in this comparison, theoretical conformity. While we do not know what became of the woman who dreamed of the Nazi utterance (as we do of the doomed criminal-mountaineer) the warning (if the dream can indeed be taken as a caution against adopting Nazi sympathies) is borne out by later historical fact.

But Jung’s theory does not work as smoothly as the allure of such a comparison might imply. For Jung (1974), dreams can possess “an anticipatory combination of probabilities
which may coincide with the actual behaviour of things” (p. 41); it is, however, archetypes in their relationship to dreams that, theoretically, possess prognostic power (Jung, 1964, p. 67). In the instance of the woman’s dream, once more, any link to an archetypal symbol will be a tenuous one. Other than the busload of strangers and the shouted support for Hitler—which Beradt (1968) sees as a metaphor for going along with Nazism (p. 119)—none of the prominent images take on a particularly symbolic appearance: a party, a nosy neighbor, a traitorous friend. Any number of interpretations could be assigned to these dreamed figures—perhaps the archetypal symbol of demons could be attributed to the two women in the dream who condemn the dreamer. That the dream is bookended by two gatherings of people—one joyous, the other stone-faced, could symbolize changes in collective attitudes; again, it is difficult to attribute an archetypal symbol to these images. Jung’s theory in this case, then, frays at the seams without a firm archetypal anchor to designate temporal direction. In this absence, the weaker assertion that dreams sometimes arrange probabilities that can come to pass may be said to stand on solid theoretical ground in this case.

The final category of dreams to consider are the sexual visions that Beradt (1968) reports. The journalist reports six dreams of this nature, classifying them under the broad framework of “Undisguised Wishes” (p. 121). The dreams evince a narrative structure in which a high Nazi official makes a sexual advance toward a woman, which is met either receptively or without a decisive response. Some of the dreamers, in waking life, opposed Hitler and his regime. Beradt asserts that an erotic link to power contributed to the appearance of such visions (p. 124). Because of the unified theme in these dreams, the present chapter will conclude with analysis of the one vision that Beradt deemed the most clearly defined crossover between sex and ideology—the vision featuring Hitler distributing propaganda as he strokes the dreamer with his free hand.

To review, the vision begins at an outdoor dinner party, with Hitler in fancy dress and distributing bundles of propaganda, nearly failing to drop a batch with the dreamer. The dictator then reverses course, taking care to set down a packet of leaflets in front of the woman while embracing her (pp. 126-127). Such a dream cuts to the heart of a Freudian analysis, however incomplete such an investigation might turn out to be. Contours of Freud’s interpretation of the Oedipus legend appear from the shadows of the unconscious
in this instance. The paternal dictator, greeting one and all at the public gathering, then settles on the childlike figure who is concerned to receive special attention. In this dream, the male Oedipus becomes female, exchanging the mythical character’s mother for the dictatorial father figure. We can similarly substitute ‘mother’ for ‘father’ in Freud’s (2008) assertion that our dreams reveal a dynamic in which a child’s earliest sexual urges direct themselves toward its mother and its initial homicidal passions toward the father; such amount to childlike Oedipal wishes illuminated (p. 202).

In the vision that Beradt’s dreamer describes, Freudian theory is well positioned to interpret the connection between the woman and Hitler. In the tale of Oedipus, the object of the protagonist’s affections is Jocasta, Queen of Thebes, who is, of course, also his mother. The dream which Beradt relates can be viewed as updating the story. In this case, the regal Jocasta is converted to an image of the Fascist strongman; as in the story of Oedipus, the dreamer’s affections are returned. The link between political power and sexual urge is maintained in the myth and in the dream. In this way it can be shown that, what for Freud indicates the “ancient dream material which contains the painful disturbance of our relations with our parents” (p. 203), reveals itself in a sexual connection to the Nazi dictator. Most people learn, according to Freud, to suppress these infantile urges—that is unless they become psycho-neurotics in adulthood. To the infant, parents represent power and, in the Freudian analysis, sexual desire (p. 202). In the dream of the woman accepting a caress from Hitler, the normally suppressed sexual draw to the father figure finds expression.

As Beradt recorded half a dozen such dreams, it is reasonable to guess that they occurred more widely than the interview record indicates; how common such dreams actually were is not possible to say. Yet the few that Beradt discovered may be said to represent a pathology—one that could have had far-reaching consequences. A hypothesis might be crafted stating that the dream link between some female dreamers and paternal Nazi figures represented a national psychosis. With enough data, such a hypothesis might be supported. Perhaps still more chilling with regard to Freudian theory is the inclusion in the dream of bundles of propaganda sheets. We see no explicit violence to complete the Oedipal formula of patricide—or, in the case of Beradt’s female dreamers, matricide—to achieve sexual aims, but the distribution of Nazi propaganda can be seen only in the light of murderous
intent. In the dream, with the genders of the main players from the Oedipal tragedy reversed, we see the childlike impulses arise, with the ancient dream framework bringing forth images of paternal sex and violence (though not shown as directed against a mother figure). Seen in this way, Freudian theory, while imperfect in its application, displays an eerie coherence that affords a look back to earliest childhood.

A Jungian analysis of the dream is possible from the perspective of the need to restore equilibrium. Eagerly awaiting Nazi propaganda and accepting a caress from Hitler are dangerous and repulsive acts. We know nothing about the dreamer’s waking life except that she was a housewife (Beradt, 1968, p. 126). The dream’s key image of an erotic connection to Hitler, no matter what the reality of the woman’s daily life might have been, must indicate a sign of danger. We possess no concrete evidence of her political leanings but, in a Jungian approach, the dream suggests proximity to a time when the homemaker might ‘get in bed’ with Hitler. The Nazi dictator has come to symbolize so much, and it is difficult to separate the symbol of personified evil from Hitler as a man. When Hitler ceased to be a man and began to exist solely as a symbol is probably impossible to say. What the dreamer knew of this distinction is also impossible to know. Yet, Jung (1964) says that symbols hint at “something not yet known” (p. 41). A possible scenario could see the dreamer not having established a position on Nazi ideology or on Hitler himself, with the dictator’s symbolic appearance indicating that the woman would soon make a decision about her political stance.

Seen in this way, the dream employs both a symbol and a caution. The symbolic appearance of Hitler, in connection with the dream’s use of a sexual pun to indicate developing ideological leanings, offers a view of something that the dreamer will soon understand in her waking life. That this knowledge is, or could be, the adoption of Nazi sympathies can be taken only as a warning. In simplest terms, then, the homemaker’s dream employs a powerful symbol that warns her that her unfolding accord with Nazi ideology would see her soon come to grief. Indeed, the historical record bears out the misery that would befall the Nazis and their supporters. If the interpretation can be permitted to make another leap into the unknown, to view Hitler as an archetypal demon from the collective realm also becomes possible. Recall that the dreams with the strongest prognostic qualities are those that Jung sees as drawing upon archetypal energies (p. 67). To conceptualize the
housewife’s dream as connected to such an archetype indicates that the vision, according to Jung’s approach, engages in a horrifying and collective look to a future in which Nazi ideology is sexualized; this conjecture is rendered possible in connection with the six visions of this nature outlined in Beradt’s dream catalogue.

Fragmentary Evaluations

Examining Beradt’s dream record through both Freudian and Jungian lenses is useful, inconclusive and terrifying. As alternate theories will do, they contradict one another in important places. Moreover, theories are only as useful as the functions to which they are directed. And it is conceivable that another writer will run Charlotte Beradt’s dream interviews through the same theoretical approaches and arrive at more tenable conclusions. In the current analysis, the respective theories evince both strengths and weaknesses. Later in his career, Freud (1973) added nuance to his theory of dreams as wish fulfillsments, writing that, it is an “unconscious impulse [which] is the true creator of the dream.” Though objectionable to the conscious mind, in “every dream, an instinctual wish has to be represented,” which can do no other than aim at completion of “its own satisfaction” (p. 47). This revision offers some context in the cases examined here, in which wish fulfilsments are regularly directed toward a return to safety. Such an impulse offers theoretical soundness, especially when one considers that the drive for self-preservation is stronger than a wish to achieve this. That this drive emerges in dreams cloaked in Nazi garb, repugnant to the waking lives of so many of the dreamers, becomes easier to understand as an “impulse” (p. 47). Still, problems with the theory emerge. As regards the dreams in the present chapter, given their reduction to “psychic X-ray images,” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 226), the temporal regression available embraces too short a timeframe to claim with certainty that the Freudian process is effective. Regarding Jung’s approach, the main weakness can be summed up with the fact that the archetypal basis for a dream is, at best, almost always a guess. At worst, archetypes may be dismissed as fiction. Further, the theory equivocates on just how future-oriented dreams are, and whether they prognosticate without defined archetypal support. Given the awful historical trajectory that followed
these dreams, it might seem that postulating a prognostic, archetypal basis for these visions is, in retrospect, unnecessary.

But this perhaps amounts to an unfair assessment of both theoretical applications. Each has been disadvantaged from the start of the project, as neither theorist had an opportunity to examine these dreams. Despite this impediment, strengths emerge from the respective analyses, while combining to enhance our understanding of the dreams. Freud’s retrospective wish fulfilments—the simplicity of most of the interpretations in the present work aside—shows that the dream can cast a backward gaze; the sexual dreams in Beradt’s catalogue offer the longest look in this regard. Jung’s propensity to assign dreams the ability to look forward, despite sometimes uncomfortable theoretical connections, possesses an explanatory integrity, as events followed the dream catalogue. Some instances—the doctor who dreamed of the elimination of walls, for example—exhibit elements of both Freudian and Jungian theory. The wish for a return to safety combined with a horrific look to the future reveals the dream’s attention to past, present and future times. Such an integrated approach to the timeframe of dreams might best serve this sort of inquiry. The concluding chapter explores this possibility.

Both Freudian and Jungian approaches, as applied to Beradt’s dream interviews, also connect to the emerging Nazi ideological framework, mythologized as the Thousand Year Reich. To return to the case of the doctor who dreamed of a city without walls, the vision’s directional ambiguity is rooted in political terror. The idea that such a dream featured a wish for a return to the recent past when political conditions were less dire than they were at the time of the block warden’s intrusion must have been driven by ideology; the dream could not have happened the way it did without being forced into existence by Nazism. To use a Freudian schematic, then, the doctor retroactively established the Fascist ideology in a dreamscape. The Jungian interpretation has already been noted, insofar as the Volksgemeinschaft—the mythic Nazi collectivist ideology—was realized with the removal of walls and the cancellation of privacy; such terror was to be lived out in the years to come. The indeterminate dream timelines continue: similar to the doctor, the woman who dreamed of being at the opera fits her dreams into Nazi ideology by being terrorized into wishing for a return to privilege. Yet this vision’s timeline is also multi-directional in its ideological embrace of myth, as Beradt (1968) characterizes the dreamer as a seer with the
ability to prognosticate an unfolding of the Nazi worldview (pp. 24-25). In addition, the optometrist’s dreams are also driven by ideology. The eye doctor’s wish to be without the Nazi menace, as he had so recently been, also looks ahead to a time when such safety is restored through espousing Fascist sympathies, placing the dream into an unsettled chronology driven by an ideology of terror. In its occupation of these dreams and countless others, along with its insidious control of multiple chronological directions, the myth of the Thousand Year Reich was constructed out of an omnipresent terror.

As shown, neither Freud’s nor Jung’s approaches are equipped to surmount the difficulties that underlie the possession of mere glimpses of the dreamers and their dreams. Yet, certain dreams in Beradt’s record display remarkable theoretical coherence. The tormented woman of Christian and Jewish heritage twice dreamed of her mother’s death; each dream element, ‘death’ and ‘mother’ conceivably could join with archetypal precedent. Interpreting the woman’s dreams as impending death holds to Jung’s theory. Similarly, the dream detailed above with its Oedipal connection between Hitler and his female admirer outlines Freud’s approach and places it under the sway of Nazi ideology. While such theoretical consistency only occasionally shows itself in this analysis, all of the dreams in Beradt’s catalogue link in some way to Nazi ideology. This fact is transparent throughout, whether in the dream of the woman who shouted her newfound Fascist allegiance to passengers on the bus, with the vision of the disconsolate lawyer who made room for trash, or the woman terrified of the Storm Trooper’s discovery of her incriminating Dutch-oven.

At this juncture, we will revisit the chapter’s guiding question: Can psychological theory show that the dreams Beradt identifies influenced emerging political reality through prognosis? The simple answer is ‘no.’ In the strictest sense, the psychological lenses employed in this analysis do not admit a clear prognostic perspective. Two problems arise. The first is that, while a Freudian approach cannot refute Koselleck’s (1985) view that the dreams describe “what could happen,” and that some of them contained “a probability that exceeds what appeared to be empirically feasible at the time they were dreamed” (p. 219), it does qualify the assertion that the dreams might have anticipated coming events with the demonstration that they also looked backward. The second problem is that Jung’s understanding that dreams sometimes function as forward-looking frames runs into
difficulty too often in this analysis to cohere with Koselleck’s position that the dreams possessed, in Beradt’s framing of them, at the time they were dreamed, “a prognostic content” (p. 218). The first portion of the question, despite being hamstrung by the qualification of ‘prognostic frames’ is supported in the analysis. All of the dreams have been shown to have been connected to political developments; all centre on terror. In turn, the rising terror within the dreamers themselves is palpable; the anguish of the dreamers as they report their visions is spelled out in bold relief. The dreams established a culture of terror within the dreamers, linking them to emergent political reality, and reinforcing Nazi mythology. The value, then, in examining these dreams through Freudian and Jungian lenses has been to demonstrate the strengths and limitations of each approach in connection with a historical problem of cultural politics.

Of equal importance is the demonstration of congruence with the work’s main argument that the cultural-political significance of dreams and myth cannot be abridged to antithetical extremes of true and false. The Nazi rise to power paralleled nightmares that offered uncanny views of things that might come to be. That these visions did not follow exact trajectories of what did happen does not detract from their unified view that Nazi terror had the potential to destroy the lives of millions. This, of course, came to pass. Further, despite the lack of a clear theoretical fit for either Freud’s or Jung’s approach, each displays key instances that tell important stories about dreams, whether pertaining to temporal direction, symbolic associations, or sexual imagery. Mythology, too, adheres to this framework in this analysis of dreams. The dream requires a cultural myth to function politically. In this chapter, each dream analyzed has connected to Nazi politics and the emergence of the myth of the Thousand Year Reich. Like any myth, it was neither true nor false, but alive rather than dead, and dependent on power for its survival. That the myth played out in dreams, fomenting politicized fear, yet devoid of verifiable knowledge of what was to come only served to strengthen the myth, with its attendant fear of what would come next. To revisit the thought of theorist Vincent Mosco (2004) myths flourish only when they are political (p. 39). Truth and falsity are replaced with ideology, as demonstrated in the dreams and myth connected to emergent Nazism. The concluding chapter now turns to the incorporation of other approaches in making sense of dreams, myths, their ideological connections and chronological continuums.
Chapter 7.

Dreams, Myth, Politics and Time Reconsidered

At its outset, this dissertation posed the question: *What is the relationship between two phenomena of esoteric knowledge: dreams and myth?* The work has explored this question relative to political ideology. Whether in discussions of dreams and myth in isolation from one another, or in connection with each other, links to ideology arise; the fact that dreams can become politicized myths is difficult to escape. Even in the case of narrative psychological methods, with their personal focus and potential connection to “little” dreams (as opposed to collective ones), as noted in Chapter 4, an ideology of individualism is visible. Such an observation of that framework perhaps anticipates criticism from thoroughgoing Freudians who might object that dreams remain fully personal, possessing no ideological connections. Yet, Freud is politicized in the current analysis. Despite having fallen from fashion in the 1980s (Robb, 2018, p. 31), the importance of his innovations remains. No opinion on the following assessment is forthcoming here—but in the words of dream researcher, Alan Hobson (2002), Freud correctly highlighted dreams’ “primitive emotional character” including the “instinctive media of sex, aggression, and escape” (p. 132). Hobson asserts, however, that Freud’s ideas about dream censorship are wrong. The psychiatrist claims that dreams are as they appear (though often constructed from a matrix of obscure personal associations) rather than being based on latent content that must be decoded, writing that “Freud’s dream theory adopted the fatally flawed assumptions of disguise and censorship as the basis of dream bizarreness” (p. 134). Psychiatrist R.D. Laing (1990) called Freud a “hero” for his pioneering approach to the unconscious mind (p. 25). This is perhaps hyperbolic language, but Freud’s theory provided access to previously unexplored avenues of the mind, opening doors to a better understanding of it. Whether Freud would approve of such usage, his understandings of the dream work and of wish-fulfilment served to interpret many of the political dreams considered in the previous chapter. These two prongs of Freud’s dream interpretation theory, despite their originally intended use, have rendered discernible political analyses as demonstrated, for example, in the discussion of the dream of the doctor who envisioned the prohibition of walls. This
concern with politics, however, implies a stopover in the realm of myth. In this case, the dreams that Beradt recorded were instrumental in establishing terror as an ideology within the dreamers. The emerging myth of the Thousand Year Reich, whose constituent prejudices had fomented in Germany for centuries before the rise of Nazism, (Cohn, 1961, p. 101), was strengthened as a result. As shown in Chapter 6, we see the dream conspire with the myth in an ideological narrative.

Without revisiting all of the connections made between dreams and myth within the present work, it represents no stretch to say that many of history’s crucial points feature this link. From the many affiliations woven between religious myths and dream accounts, to the long ideological reach of Rene Descartes’ visions, and the horrors of Nazi Germany, much of our past is wrapped up in this relationship. As noted in Chapter 1, Carl Jung saw that archetypal dreams can sway whole eras of history. Despite the flaws in Jung’s approach in interpreting certain dreams, the connection he draws between some visions and their political histories is clear. Because the historical map of dreams is woefully incomplete, we might ask what conclusions could be drawn from the possession of everyone’s dreams. As indicated in Chapter 5, such was the task of the government ministry that novelist Ismail Kadare invented; chillingly, the Russian secret police actually used dreams for hostile purposes in the late 1930s. And an independent institution of this sort existed in London following a disaster in 1966, in which more than a hundred children were killed when debris from a coal mine slid onto school in Wales. Following the tragedy, dozens of people reported that they had seen the disaster in their dreams before it happened. Psychiatrist John Barker subsequently opened the British Premonitions Bureau in London; the Central Premonitions Registry set up shop in New York the following year. The offices closed before long, having produced few results (Robb, 2018, pp. 34-39). But the failure of Barker’s institute shows only that his office foundered, not that such information is unavailable. Yet, Baker’s primary aim was the prevention of future calamities, rather than discovering dreams’ ideological content. A well-resourced field research project with a focus on dreams’ relationship to power might generate different results. Still, given the narratives of control that this work has shown to be present in such links, an aim of this sort could generate the bleakest of questions: Is this connection doomed to exist solely as a dreary web of one power-hungry ideological dream to the next? Each new political myth
holding an ever-surer grip on the dreamer than the last? Is there a way to change the framework of this model? Perhaps, but such an inquiry goes to the heart of questions about human nature and its relationship to power.

In attempting to better understand the ideological links between dreams and myth, Chapter 4 began with the question: how does the relationship between dreams and myth concretize itself politically? These pages have gone some distance to showing that this process takes place when powerful actors institutionalize dreams and use them to fashion official myths. As noted above, ancient Hinduism’s rendering of the dream narrative changed from the Vedic era’s oral and poetic emphasis on the dream to the text-based and priest-controlled description of dreams within the broader ideological myth of Hinduism. The ‘curse’ of dreams borne by various of the Roundtable’s knights relative to their levels of promiscuousness in defiance of Cistercian dogma, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, depicts another example of the dream’s institutionalization into a mythical framework. Within spiritual bureaucracies, often equipped with explicit doctrine about dreams, the political concretization of such visions is easy to spot. This fact also follows for the psychological profession, in which ideologies of dreams have been expressed.

The relationship becomes more difficult to see in institutions that do not say much about dreams, or fail to address them at all. Officially, the Nazis had little to say about dreams. Still, Hitler himself did have two influential dreams, the first of which took place during his time as a soldier in WW I. Hitler dreamed of being buried alive; on waking from the nightmare, the future dictator moved from his trench onto the battlefield, retreating when an artillery barrage forced him back. On returning, the trench had been caved in and all of his confederates killed. From that moment forward, Hitler was convinced that “he had been entrusted with a divine mission.” Two decades later, speaking from a dais in Vienna the day following the Austrian Anschluss, the dictator envisioned Odin, the Norse god of war, pointing eastward. Hitler interpreted the image as divine sanction for his plans to invade Russia (Stevens, 1995, pp. 293-94). Yet, dramatic as these visions might seem, their importance to Nazi dogma is not explicit. Much clearer in this regard are notions of the Volksgemeinschaft. The doctrine is spelled out in Nazi ideology, but no link to dreams is made clear before being revealed in the visions that comprise Beradt’s formerly secret dream catalogue. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, this relationship is demonstrated in the
ways in which dreams, driven by an ideology of terror, can influence people’s organization of their political thoughts and behavior, as ordained by those in power.

Also requiring pains to show has been the marshalling of evidence that Descartes’ plans to rework the methods with which he aimed to change the way we understand the world and humanity’s place in it were based on the three dreams of November 10, 1619. Even as the modernizing project that the method implied unraveled, those who saw themselves as Cartesian “master[s] and possessor[s] of Nature” (Sutcliffe, 1986, p. 21) gravitated toward science and away from dreams. In the case of both the Nazi and the scientific ideologies, it has been because of a general unwillingness to discuss the relationship between dreams and their institutionalization into mythical forms that these links remained hidden. A question arises concerning whether this relationship, as a blueprint, provides structural support for other, or perhaps all, ideological myths. Such a line of inquiry must take place outside the bounds of the present work. Still, an incentive to discover other such connections is available in the context of these pages: while some connections revealed themselves with greater difficulty than others, the links always became clear. It might be argued that bias toward certain findings motivates a researcher to locate them. In quoting from the work of anthropologist Edward Tylor, historian Justin Smith (2019) reminds us that, in relation to dreams, susceptibility to a “vicious circle” arises in which the things dreamers believe, they see as a result, and they thus believe what they see (p. 95). A confirmation bias argument is a fair one; but the pursuit has only started—let the challenges begin.

We began Chapter 6 with the question: Can psychological theory show that the dreams Beradt identifies influenced emerging political reality through prognosis? The previous chapter demonstrated that dreams are entities too complex to allow for explanation by a simple look ahead. In short, while evidence has been assembled throughout these pages to demonstrate, from a historical perspective, that dreams can at least give the appearance of looking ahead, psychological theories stumble in attempts to confirm or deny such an ability. The segment of the question dealing with dreams and their influence on political structures was answered in the affirmative. Still, the lack of psychological acuity in the case of Beradt’s dream records is unsurprising; the dream reports testified to real and emergent terror, while the dream theories were applied at a distance and, after all, are only
theories. This is not to discount the value of having applied them to Beradt’s dream catalogue. Broadly, the application of Freudian and Jungian theory in this case demonstrates that the dream is anything but a static phenomenon. That is to say that the dream appears unbound by a linear timeframe. In the case of the woman whose dream saw her Dutch oven betray her to the Nazis, for example, the reader understands the dreamer’s dread that all of her family’s previously spoken (and private) anti-Nazi conversations were presently known to authorities, and that more secrets were forthcoming. The past, present and future become one.

**A Reevaluation of Time**

Such chronological direction is not restricted to the pages of Beradt’s dream chronicle. References to an obscure book by aeronautical engineer and dream theorist, John W. Dunne, crop up in the occasional book about dreams, especially in reference to time. Classical scholar E.R. Dodds (1951) invokes Dunne in his discussion about ancient Greek conceptions of dream time (p. 107), and Russian literature scholar, Gennady Barabtarlo (2018) discusses Dunne at some length in his book about Vladimir Nabokov’s dreams (pp. 1-31). Dunne (1929) conjectures that our sense of time is incomplete, blinded by the waking self’s inability to see the future. He postulates an unknown “barrier” to the waking self’s full comprehension of time, and asks whether everyone’s dreams are created from “images of past experience and images of future experience blended together in approximately equal proportions?” (emphasis Dunne’s) (p. 54). Nabokov himself became interested in Dunne’s ideas and undertook an experiment, from October 1964 to January 1965, which saw him log sixty-four dreams in search of evidence of precognition counting, among others, a vision of having eaten a sort of dirt pastry (pp. 39-43) and another of a clock that read 10:30 (p. 37) as indicating events that occurred shortly afterward in waking life. Some have attempted to dismiss Nabokov’s conclusions that his dreams looked ahead as being connected to his relentless insomnia. Journalist Alice Robb (2018) writes that this condition might have motivated him to wander into this “outlandish territory” of dreams unbound by strict rules of time (pp. 35-36).
Outlandish or not, the dream that included the clock stopped at 10:30 features an inexplicable relationship to time—one that extends beyond the possible coincidence that Nabokov read about the clock in Dunne’s book on the day he awoke from dreaming about it. The clock dream also featured a Russian woman having a conversation inside a telephone booth. Nabokov then spoke with her, and the woman asked him how he knew she was Russian—he replied that “only Russian women speak so loud on the phone.” The woman then incorrectly identified their location; Nabokov proceeded to give her the correct place name (Barabtarlo, 2018, pp. 35-37). Such a dream looks, on its surface, unremarkable. But a few months before concluding the present work, I rode Vancouver’s sky-train, reading the above passage from Barabtarlo’s book about Nabokov’s dreams as I did so. On my very next train trip, I again read from Barabtarlo’s book. At this time, a woman sitting directly in front of me spoke loudly on her cell phone in Russian! Even stranger, the woman was confused about her location—just like the woman in Nabokov’s dream—she asked the man next to her, in English, if the train we were on was bound for a certain stop. The woman even fit the physical description of the individual in Nabokov’s dream.

To summarize the above chain of events: Nabokov, in 1964, dreams of a clock that reads 10:30, some hours after waking, he reads of a clock stopped at 10:30 in Dunne’s book, originally published in 1927. Nabokov’s clock dream also features the Russian woman discussed above; in 2019 I apparently encounter the same woman Nabokov dreamed about fifty-five years earlier. I am ill-positioned to posit a theory of time that explains this chain of events. John Dunne, however, would hazard a bolder approach, holding that time has an endless supply of applications, accruing to what he calls serial time. Dunne (1929) writes that if

Time passes or grows or accumulates or expends itself or does anything whatsoever except stand rigid and changeless before a Time-fixed observer, there must be another Time which times that activity of, or along, the first Time, and another Time which times that second time, and so on, in an apparent series to infinity (p. 124).

This approach, despite the stilted tone, has the feel of an unreal whimsy to it. Applying a theoretical approach such as Dunne’s devoid, as it is, of empirical footing, to the above chain of dream and waking life events indeed seems unreal—almost as unreal as attributing the entire series of events to chance. To assert that time somehow lapped itself in this
instance, after the fashion of Dunne, stretches the interpretation no more than does insistence upon coincidence.

Nabokov himself favoured a sense of time—at least in important parts of his prose—that leaned toward the infinite structure that Dunne proposes. In the words of Barabtarlo (2018), Nabokov’s novel Ada

whose clockwork mechanism resides in the seminal part 4, “The Texture of Time,” drafted in 1959—was likely set in motion by that “dream” experiment; it “started to flow,” as he put it in his pocket diary about a year after the end of the experiment. And in the last part of the book Nabokov touches upon the question of the time vector in dream-land, cracking in passing at Freud’s hollow symbolism (“…a very amusing anti-Signy pamphlet on Time in Dreams”) (p. 19).

The passage shows Nabokov’s writing process as possessing a dream-like bearing at critical junctures; the cryptic fancy of Dunne’s temporal concept echoing through the timeframe, subject matter, and connection to Nabokov’s own dream experiment.

Yet, as matter of fact as these connections to Nabokov’s work and its temporal relationship might seem, these statements are not meant in a literal fashion. They cannot be, as the question of time is, from the point of view of this work, insoluble. From what has been shown, both Jungian and Freudian theories grovel in the dark to make sense of dreams that look ahead, now look back. John Dunne proposes a theory in which time exists in multiples of itself, with the most revelatory look at such an approach available in dreams. The whole thing spins from a connection almost within reach into fruitless navel-gazing.

Such a turn is impractical. This project began by examining the relationship between dreams and myth. Realpolitik has showed itself at every pass. Such concrete effects bear on human affairs. Still, questions of time cannot be ignored, especially in the worst of circumstances. R.D. Laing (1990) observes that dreams originating in those on the precipice of the terror of schizophrenia also look ahead. He describes two sets of dreams from people whose states of mental health soon degenerated into schizophrenic illness; the visions were nightmare scenarios that the dreamers employed to fight off impending catatonic collapse, while simultaneously indicating the inevitability of such a state. Laing writes that these are “dreams heralding psychosis” (pp. 50-51). Terror, whether broadly political or intensely personal, seems to foster prognostic dreams. Here we circle back to myth. As shown in Chapter 4, Jung saw mythical archetypes in the delusions of
schizophrenic patients. Accepting or rejecting Jung’s theory here is of little importance. Myth returns to the dream conversation as it relates to terror. Even Freud thought so, connecting the terror of the mythical Oedipus complex to the darkest recesses of our dream lives. Laing (1990) expands upon Freud’s nightmare mythic link, explaining that the psychoanalyst “descended to the ‘Underworld’ and met there stark terrors. He carried with him his theory as a Medusa’s head which turned these terrors to stone” (p. 25). Central to all of these examples is power. Whether power in the ideological schematic seen in Beradt’s dream catalogue, in the Oedipal power relations between infant and parent (horrifyingly coded in dreams) or the absolute lack of power in the deranged visions of the paranoid schizophrenic. Terror, myth, power and, yes, an orientation to the future can connect in dreams.

This work has shown the relationship in numerous ways. Perhaps an ancient case might demonstrate the link in still clearer fashion. During the Egyptian Ptolemaic era, in the 3rd Century BCE, a new deity came to life—the god Serapis. Serapis was an ideological invention, whose reason for being was to facilitate concord between Greeks and Egyptians following Alexander’s conquest of 332; the god “was invented with the object of giving a greater degree of political and religious unity” (Peacock, 2003, p. 429). Serapis also became known as a dream deity, with his temple serving as a location for healing, and as a place in which dream topics could be introduced (Luke, 2010, pp. 95-96). Revered by individuals from ranking political classes (Renberg, 2017, pp. 336-337), for centuries, the dream-god enjoyed a beloved prominence. First popular at Memphis, then at Alexandria and later at Rome (Peacock, 2003, pp. 429-430), Serapis was nevertheless unable to withstand wholesale mythological change. With Christianity in the ascendant relative to the decline of pagan gods, the bishop Theophilus of Alexandria forced the destruction of the city’s Serapeum in 391( Chadwick, 1993, p. 168) (Renberg [2017] says that this might have occurred the following year [p. 370]). By the 5th Century, many of the regions’ temples had been converted to Christian churches, the urban centres quicker to convert than rural areas whose inhabitants were more likely to want to hold onto the old sacraments (Chadwick, 1993, pp. 168-169). Demonstrable in this instance is the formula which sees ideological agents bureaucratize dreams, employing them to create or destroy
institutionalized mythologies, and doing so through the terror narratives of those powerful enough to preordain them.

Yet, all of this fails to consider the fact that people still hunger to understand all manner of dreams, as even the most casual of Internet searches will confirm. This desire to know about dreams is also re-establishing a footing in the physical world, as recent events in Vancouver substantiate. A local dream seminar provides an example. As a means of sharpening the skill sets of mental health professionals in the Vancouver area, Adlerian psychologist Chris Shelley conducts a day-long session on dream interpretation annually. The workshop on Saturday, October 28, 2017 dealt with topics such as dreams as cultural frames, stages of sleep and various dream theories (C. Shelley, personal communication, October 28, 2017). Many of the two-dozen students were mental health workers looking for ways to help their patients. Some attendees, however, took the class out of general interest, without intending to apply the lessons in an institutional setting.

This small contingent of freelance dreamers is not the only one in the city. I have created a course on dreams that I teach at a local community center. A group of students desiring to understand dreams shows up every week. Featuring lessons on the connections between dreams and myth, one of the central tenets of the class is the premise that, as long as the dreamer is fastidious about maintaining creative control of his or her dreams, the risk of their visions becoming institutionalized by the myths of powerful actors is reduced. The value of this admonition to my students is perhaps best exemplified by the work of a small group of people in Vancouver who periodically host a live production called Tell Me Your Nightmares. Held in pubs or coffee shops, organizers invite participants to write down their dreams, which are then read to the assembled contributors by a panel of three individuals attired in animal costumes. Meantime, two mimics act out the dreams. On the strength of the collective vocal response from the gallery (loudest laughs, expressions of shock, etc.) as the dreams are interpreted, one vision is chosen the winner. The gathering’s atmosphere typically reflects the tension so often present in dreams, until a punchline eases the suspense. Fittingly, past Tell Me Your Nightmares productions have been presented by Living Myth Media, purporting to return myth to the archaic conception of performed ritual, discussed in Chapter 1, and restoring its ancient connection to dreams. Collective, ritualized performances such as those seen at Tell Me Your Nightmares could hold the
possibility of wresting the dream and the myth from the institutional control detailed in these pages.

**Culture Patterns**

These observations about dreams and myth and their links to power have built a foundation upon which to address the dissertation’s main argument—that this relationship cannot be dichotomized as either true or false, especially in its political context. Responses to the research question posed in Chapter 1, along with subsidiary questions posed in Chapters 4 and 6 have offered support for this claim, but an explicit demonstration is warranted. Historian Peter Burke (1997) offers the concept of “culture pattern dreams,” which sees that “in a given culture people tend to dream particular kinds of dreams” (pp. 24-25). Burke provides the example of adolescent Ojibwa boys who, in the time before 1900, were sent on week-long “dream fasts” in the forests for the purpose of having a dream sent by a spirit-being, who would come to them in the form of a forest creature. Records of the anthropologist, Paul Radin, indicate that these visions tended to come to the questors with remarkable frequency (p. 25). Burke holds that some cultures prioritize particular symbols in dreams—Hopi, for example, have emphasized mythical water snakes as authority figures (p. 26). In these cases, we see dreams accord with cultural myths; in the first, spirit-visions connect to the coming of age process, in the second, the cultural authority of the water snake is reproduced in dreams. In each example, the power of the culture in question is reinforced through the application of myth to dreams, in all of the dreams’ layers of complexity (p. 27).

When culture patterns have turned toward realpolitik, these shifts have also been reproduced in dreams. For example, people in the Central European region of Silesia commonly dreamed of political unrest in the 17th Century, during the time of the Thirty Years War, when belief in impending apocalypse was prevalent. One such vision, from the year 1656, came from a man named Stephan Melisch who held that:

I saw red foxes come from the east, every one having a great tooth. And a gold yellowish lion stood upon a green place, about whom the foxes were leaping. Instantly after came a fiery man like a flame, with a black sword of iron; and against him a bright shining man, like the sun, with such a sword like a flash of lightning.
Betwixt these there was such a fight, that many thousands did fall in the place, and none was left remaining but very few. Between them stood a white eagle ... I saw that the bright sun-shining man had cut off the head of the white eagle, and that head was given with the crown to the North; but the body of the eagle was given to a red eagle, and the wings to the East (p. 38).

The account is religious in tone, taking on a hue of End Times, as the armies of Sweden, Prussia and Russia carved up Poland.

The question of whether this reverie—and others like it—is a dream, a waking vision or a fabrication risks becoming a polarized debate:

The assumption is that a given text must be either an accurate transcript of a dream or a literary effusion couched in the form of a dream. However, the discovery of the culture-pattern dream suggests that this dichotomy is a false one (pp. 38-39).

The dreamers in question were familiar with the apocalyptic text of Revelation, which invited criticism from Calvinist theologians who accused the visionaries of having so close an association with biblical verse that it coloured their perceptions, convincing them that their visions of End Times were real when they were not. Still, Burke writes that this sort vision was common to people such as Emmanuel Swedenbourg, who committed long periods of time to reading Revelation. Swedenbourg, like the Ojibwa, “was dreaming one of the central myths of his culture” (p. 39). In the case of the Silesian dreamers, visions related to the Thirty Years War politicized such myths. Taken together, the examples shown here stand beyond designations of true and false: that the visions of Stephan Melisch, Emmanuel Swedenbourg, and other dreamers amounted to “dream experiences, stimulated by literary sources, interpreted in terms of literary models, and finally elaborated and made more coherent for publication” (p. 39).

The idea of the culture pattern dream might be applied in cases close to the present day. Burke, however, is reluctant to do this, holding that among indigenous societies, such as Ojibwa, mythically themed dreams remained prevalent as long as the traditional way of life remained intact, but moved away from them when the culture was weakened and dreams began to focus on personal issues. The same movement away from culturally patterned dreams and toward individual frames happened in the West after the 17th Century (p. 42). But this trajectory seems to have an exception. As noted above, terror, whether it comes in the form of impending madness, or made manifest in political terms, apparently
brings about dreams that anticipate future events. Whether dreams that portend psychotic breaks in psychiatric patients (Laing, 1990, pp. 50-51) are solely individual phenomena, or perhaps relate to a broader social context, is a question that must be set aside for the moment; that such dreams must be terrifying is beyond dispute. The terror of the Nazi rise to power that permeates Beradt’s dream record, while affecting individual dreamers, was symptomatic of a cultural descent into terror. And it is this cultural unity—at least among those terrorized by their dreams—that could depict a culture pattern operating at the time of the Nazi rise to power.

If we can postulate the existence of such a culture pattern during this era, it becomes possible to use the culture patterns’ rejection of the false dichotomy that attempts to force myth and dream into opposite poles of true and false. Beradt’s framing of the dream interviews, especially when considered as representing a culture pattern of terror, refuses the distinction of truth and falsity. Perhaps Beradt herself considered the dreams a ‘true’ representation of what was to come. The writer’s insistence, for example, that the dream of the eye doctor who, in 1934, envisioned the concentration camps, with their broken glass, and then struggled to formulate the word *Kristallnacht*, in apparent anticipation of the 1938 Night of Broken Glass indicates just such a consideration. Beradt writes that an “episode during the infamous Kristallnacht seemed to have been drawn directly from the eye doctor's dream”—that of a blind shopkeeper being dragged over broken glass in bare feet (Beradt, 1968, pp. 62-64). In this case the ambiguity of the dream, in its connection to Nazi terror and linked to the emerging culture pattern of what would become the myth of the Thousand Year Reich, could possess the meaning Beradt assigns it. It is also possible to assert that the visions were only the dreams of a terrified man, with no deeper meaning than that, as the action seen in the dream did not come to pass in the exact way Beradt understood that it did.

But we have seen in Koselleck’s (1985) work that this polemical divide is impractical in this case. The historian writes of two other dreams from Beradt’s record that they “involve a narrative; they contain action with a beginning and an end which, however, never took place in the way that it was recounted,” with each vision representing terror, telling a story possessed of an “inner truth” that not only came to pass, but was surpassed “by the later reality of the Third Reich” (p. 218). The dreams’ ‘truth’ is not impugned by
the fact that their literal formulation never came about. Moreover, we see here that truth does not necessarily depend upon distinctions of opposites. As puzzling as the logic of dreams is to conscious thought—especially in conjunction with myth—no reliable mechanism exists to dismiss the dream as a frame that can guide our understanding of a given phenomenon.

Koselleck (2018) offers further support for this position, writing that “the stories told in these dreams cannot be forced to correspond to the alternatives of either ‘fictional text or historical reality’” (p. 12). The historian also refers to these dreams as fiction “that still aims at facticity” (Koselleck, 1985, p. 219). Thus freed from customary distinctions of correct and incorrect, the dreams open the door to a perspective not normally considered legitimate. This freedom is helpful when considering current relationships between dreams and myth, along with the political ramifications of the connection. For example, American psychoanalyst, Frances Lang, since reading Beradt’s dream accounts, “has noticed a widespread uneasiness following Trump’s election” in her private practice, and is working with colleagues to gather dreams that relate to the current American political climate (Juchau, 2019, p.1). The myth of Making America Great Again could thus be forced to contend with the scrutiny that the myth of the Thousand Year Reich was exposed to with the publication of Beradt’s work. Lang’s dream collection remains private. Should it be released, examining it for potential culture patterns could prove an instructive exercise, insofar as this might offer a deeper understanding of a truth that does not depend on literalism.

Operating outside the bounds of true/false frameworks still requires attention to directionality. The importance of this consideration is shown in relation to myth. As defined in Chapter 2, the thesis understands myth as a lived, sense-making narrative that expresses a cultural or an ideological worldview. The myth depends on a relationship to power, rather than truth or falsity, to exist as a viable narrative. It is impossible, then, to talk meaningfully about myth without connecting it to power. For the dream to become politicized, for instance in the case of terror, it must connect to the prevailing cultural myth. Once this condition has been satisfied, political changes might result.

This work has shown, for example in the case of Rene Descartes dreams of November 10, 1619, that dreams can establish changes to predominant myths. But the terror associated
with the Nazi myth of the Thousand Year Reich worked in the opposite direction, with the myth influencing dreams; these dreams, as has been documented, appear to have anticipated the zenith of Nazi power and its associated terror. Chapter 2 characterized the relationship between dreams and myth as a reinforcing cycle. It is worth again quoting Peter Burke’s assessment of the connection, which holds that

if people in a given culture dream the myths of that culture, then their dreaming in turn supports belief in the myths, particularly in cultures in which dreaming is interpreted as ‘seeing’ another world. Myths shape dreams, but dreams in turn authenticate myths, in a circle which facilitates cultural reproduction or continuity (p. 27).

Whether Descartes’ dreams fit the cyclical nature of the model is unclear. As it happened, the 400-year anniversary of his fateful dreams passed on November 10, 2019. In anticipation of this event, I summarized the story and posted it on social media, in hopes of attracting dream accounts related to Descartes’ visions and their effects on the Western myth of becoming masters and possessors of nature. I am still waiting for responses (Hughes, 2019). As this Cartesian myth of dominating nature is culminating in environmental disaster, it is possible that any dreams connected to it will not come about unless and until the ideology of mastering the earth fosters widespread terror. No attempt to conquer the world has ever succeeded—and the efforts to achieve this, as outlined in Descartes’ dogma, also appear doomed. In any case, the question of whether myth first influenced dreams or if dreams influenced the myth first is unanswerable—it is a classic chicken and egg scenario.

The Wisdom of Beradt’s Dream Frames

The dissertation now concludes with a note on the visions in Beradt’s dream record. Beradt herself takes the position that many of the visions depict events that took place at a future time. Koselleck (2018) grants that this how they appear, as Beradt frames them, but offers only the most qualified support for the assertion that the dreams actually did look ahead to future crimes by the Nazi regime. The historian writes that they “anticipate something that seemed empirically improbable but would later come to pass in the course
of catastrophic demise. [These] dream stories came to pass and for that reason were not simply fiction, at least they have not remained it” (pp. 11-12).

The positions of Koselleck and Beradt do not align, nor do they oppose each other. After considering both for some years, I am inclined to make the case that Beradt’s dream record did look toward future events. I take this position for the reason that Beradt held that these visions worked in conjunction with the Nazi myth of the Thousand Year Reich and exerted a powerful hold on the dreamers. At the outset of The Third Reich of Dreams, Beradt (1968) writes of the visions that the dreamers contributed mirrored processes of “considerable mythmaking” (p. 6), by offering bleak images that could be obtained in no other way. Beradt’s understanding of the dreams’ meaning through her intimate, if sometimes brief, associations with the dreamers offers an intuitive knowledge available only to those engaging in face to face encounters. Koselleck (1985) characterizes the dreams as components of terror (p. 218), and rightly so—the dreams were shot through with the terror of the trauma of the memories of WWI, along with associated terrible socio-economic consequences and fear of their possible recurrence (p. 228). Koselleck (2018) was of course aware of the relationship of Nazi mythology to the dreams, especially in its application of Volksgemeinschaft (p. 16). And, while this connection offers insight in its linking of the communal Volksgemeinschaft in connection to the doctor who dreamed of a city without walls, greater development of this relationship, as well as its affiliation with the power of Nazi myth seems warranted.

Beradt’s (1968) analysis advances this connection through observation of the dreamers themselves. Her reference to one of the dreamers in her record as being a “twentieth-century dream-Sibyl [who] saw far into the Nazi millennium” (p. 24) exemplifies this process. Beradt noted a series of this woman’s dreams, which included negation of self (p. 23), conceptualization of Hitler as Satan (p. 25), and book burnings (p. 27). Beradt holds that these visions in “effect unconsciously extracted the essence of a development which was bound to lead to a national catastrophe as well as to the destruction of her own personal world” (p. 24-25). Charlotte Beradt’s analysis of these dreams and their impending consequences embrace a truth that eschews literalism. It is perhaps because such an analysis stands outside customary evidential frameworks that depend on literal interpretations that Beradt’s book has remained all but ignored in wartime histories.
Beradt’s work nevertheless stands as perhaps the most comprehensive record we possess which does not depend on traditional poles of truth and falsity in considering the political relationship between dreams, myth and their connection to time. It is reasonable to assert, however, that inclination toward greater dependence on such a schematic could be in the offing, as the resurgence in 2019 of Beradt’s work in *The New Yorker* and its political link to members of the American psychoanalytic profession suggests.
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