

**Gender Gap and Gender Differences in  
National Party Choices in Indian General  
Election, 2014**

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## **Abstract**

Traditionally, Indian women have been more likely to vote for the Indian National Congress (INC) compared to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) than men. In this paper, I draw from the Developmental Theory of Modern Gender Gap on party choices to formulate hypotheses about the socio-demographic factors and gender differences in attitudes that could have led to the gender gap in party choices in the 2014 election. I test these hypotheses by conducting statistical analysis of data from Wave 6 of the World Value Survey. My research shows that contrary to the modern gender gap theory, the gender advantage of India's centre-left party comes from states with low levels of human development in comparison to more developed states. I also find that the Developmental theory cannot explain this gender gap as Indian women are still overwhelmingly represented in categories that lead to the traditional gender gap.

Keywords: Gender Advantage, The Modern Gender Gap, Indian Politics, Vote, INC, BJP

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## List of Acronyms

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
HDI	Human Development Index
INC	Indian National Congress
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
OBC	Other Backward Castes
SC	Scheduled Castes
ST	Scheduled Tribes
UPA	United Progressive Alliance

# Chapter 1.

## Introduction

Traditionally, women in India have been more likely to vote for the Indian National Congress (INC) compared to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) than men (Yadav Y. , 2003), even though neither party campaigns on specific women-centric policies. Yadav (2003) and Deshpande (2009) have recognized this preference, as the INC's gender advantage. Although, this gender gap<sup>1</sup> has been narrowing in the national elections since 2004 (Deshpande, 2009) and in the 2014 Indian General Election the BJP removed the INC as the chief political force of Indian political competition, gaining a clear majority in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) (Vaishnav, 2015), the INC continued to receive the electoral gender advantage. In this paper, I draw from the development theory of Modern Gender Gap on party choices to formulate hypotheses about the socio-demographic factors and gender differences in attitudes that could have led to the gender gap in party choices in the 2014 election.

To investigate the topic, I will look into the extent to which there is a significant gender gap in party choices in India, and whether this gender gap is significantly present at an all-India level or stems from particular regions. Next, I ask to what extent this gender gap can be explained by socio-demographic factors, and/or attitudes and values, and examine whether specific socio-demographic factors and attitudes differentially predict party choice for men and women.

The Development theory explains the modern gender gap, or women's de-alignment from right wing parties to the left, as unique to developed democracies in

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<sup>1</sup> The Gender Gap in voting is commonly defined as the percentage of women who support a given candidate or party minus the percentage of men who support that same candidate or party. For instance, if 55% of all women voted for the INC and 45% of men voted for the INC, the gender gap would be 10 percentage-points. But in my analysis and further discussion, I refer to the gender gap in terms of the probability of women voting for the INC versus the BJP compared to the probability of men voting for the INC versus the BJP. Accordingly, my analyses rely on odds ratios to express the association between gender and party choice. The odds ratio is a commonly used measure in understanding voting preferences, especially in a two-party system. Specifically, the odds ratio of interest is defined as: (Probability of women voting INC/ probability of women voting BJP) / (Probability of men voting INC/ probability of men voting BJP).

North America and Western Europe. Inglehart and Norris (2000) claimed that the same trend did not apply to post-communist societies and developing nations, including India. However, recent studies by Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014), Morgan (2015) and Quick (2014) have found evidence of the modern gender gap in post-communist societies and developing countries, opening up the scope for reapplying the modern gender gap theory to other developing nations.

In India, the INC is regarded as a secular, catch-all, left of centre party that has almost always received a gender advantage over the BJP, which is a Hindu Nationalist party. A gender-based cleavage in party preference, like the INC's gender advantage, can greatly impact citizen's political attitudes and help identify why voters decide on one party over the other on election day (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Also, the gender gap we see in India is similar to a modern gender gap in developed democracies. So, examining the gender gap in party preference in India through the lens of the modern gender gap theory can help look for any potential variation in social attitudes and values leading to the INC's gender advantage.

To trace the values that could lead to differing party preferences between women and men in India, I use the latest World Value Survey (WVS) Wave 6, 2012 to maintain continuity with the study by Norris and Inglehart.

This research contributes to the field of gender and party choices in India. In her research on the elections of 2004 and 2009, Deshpande (2009) concluded that women do not vote as a gender-based identity group. As the 2014 election is a more recent general election in India, which also saw historically the highest female voter turnout, this research will be an updated and timely addition in the literature on whether gender-based considerations affect Indian women's party choices (Deshpande, 2009). Furthermore, the theory of modern gender gap has not received much scholarly attention in the developing world, until recently. By using this theory, my research will also help identify if the gender gap in Indian party preference is tied to the same attributing sociodemographic factors and attitudes as in western developed democracies.

## Chapter 2.

### **Parties in Focus: The Indian National Congress (INC) and The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)**

India has a multi-party system with national, state and district level parties. The INC and the BJP are two of the most prominent national parties that have alternated as the leaders of coalition-based national governments over the last two decades. The INC is a secular, catch-all party with centre-left perspective and social democratic platform (Thachil, 2014). The INC's constitution (2010) repeatedly stresses on upholding the principles of democracy, socialism and secularism (The Indian National Congress, 2010). The party also emphasizes on the importance of individual liberty, welfare, and social justice. The BJP, on the other hand, is well-known as a Hindu nationalist party with a centre-right policy perspective and a traditional support base of upper-caste, upper-class Hindus (Malik & Singh, 1992). In the recent past the BJP has been associated with communally polarized, hardline right-wing Hindu campaigns like Ram temple building in Ayodhya also known as the 'Ramjanmabhoomi' campaign (Katju, 2018). This campaign pushed for the construction of a temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Ram at the site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, which is regarded as Ram's birthplace (Guha, 2008). The campaign eventually led to the destruction of the mosque in 1992, followed by violence between Hindus and Muslims. Guha (2008) states that the BJP had capitalized on the communal polarization generated in this incident in the following election of 1996. The party is presently connected to Hindu nationalist volunteer organizations Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Hindu Sena (Katju, 2018).

The BJP's position on fomenting nationalism, on defense policy and terrorism is also known to be more aggressive than that of the INC (Ganguly, 1999). For instance, even though the INC government originally led the development on Nuclear weapons in India, it was the PM Vajpayee-led BJP-headed NDA government of 1998 that tested the weapon to showcase India's military strength to the world. This act is also regarded as a reflection of the BJP's anti-Pakistan sentiment (Ganguly, 1999). However, the BJP in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has contested elections with a focus on liberal economic policies, placing globalization and economic growth over social welfare. In the 2014 election the

BJP had also expanded their traditional support-base and attracted the votes of the middle-class, lower-castes (Dalits and OBCs) and previously immobilized voters (Sridharan, 2014).

The expanded support base of the BJP and the loss of public confidence in the INC due to charges of corruption are believed to be some of the key determinants of the 2014 election (Vaishnav, 2015; Sridharan, 2014). In this election, the BJP gained a clear majority in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Parliament), a feat that had so far been achieved only once before by a single party, the INC, prior to 1984 (Vaishnav, 2015). While the BJP strengthened its position in Indian politics in the 2014 election, the INC took a debilitating blow to its political standing with its total seat count in the Lok Sabha dropping from 206 in the last election of 2009 to 44, in 2014. The party failed to reach even the minimum ten percent seats needed to nominate one of its members as leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha (Vaishnav, 2015).

It is noteworthy that neither the INC nor the BJP is completely left-wing or right-wing party. The INC is more to the left on the ideological spectrum, while the BJP is more to the right (Hasan, 2006). The INC promotes itself as definitely more secular, tolerant, and socialist in its approach than the BJP. However, neither parties have used specific women-centric policies or policy promises to attract women voters (Deshpande, 2009; Yadav Y. , 2003). This makes the gender-advantage of the INC over the BJP somewhat puzzling. Deshpande (2009) indicated that women's party preference might be determined more by the gender disadvantage for the BJP than gender advantage for the INC. Singh (2015) mentioned this might be due to the BJP's reputation as a party that restricts the social status and mobility of women. Therefore, the individual attitudes and motivations as observed from the WVS data are helpful in identifying which kind of values, if any, can motivate women to prefer the INC over the BJP.

## **2.1. Indian parties, women candidates and voters**

While there are some observable ideological and value-based differences between the INC and the BJP, their treatment of women candidates and voters have not been vastly dissimilar from each other. In the immediate elections following independence, the INC, having worked with women in the freedom movement, intentionally targeted 15 percent of their tickets to women candidates (despite not

meeting the mark often). However, this policy was abandoned by the party after the 1962 election, once it realized that women did not necessarily vote for women candidates (Singer, 2007). Even the BJP, founded in 1980, did not make it a practice of fielding women candidates to attract women voters. This has led to a gender-based representational gap in Indian national politics with very few women making their way to the Indian parliament.

Recent research in other contexts show that voters have begun to factor in descriptive or social representation when making an electoral choice. For example, research on the US has shown that women are more likely than men to vote for female candidates (Plutzer & Zipp, 1996). However, in India, research still shows that although caste and religion-based voting exists (Heath, Verniers, & Kumar, 2015), a woman's vote, based on the gender of the candidate, does not exist. That is, women are still not more likely to vote for women candidates than men. In fact, research has revealed that there is evidence of gender discrimination against new female candidates for village council seats by both men and women (Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande, & Topalova, 2009). The research showed that even though exposure to female candidates weakens the gender bias against the effectiveness of female candidates, especially in men who are more prejudiced than women, it does not alter the electorate's preference for male candidates. This makes the gender advantage of the INC more intriguing as one could question if the INC's past of fielding women candidates, and history of strong female leaders, and the current presence of Sonia Gandhi, has somehow led to its present gender advantage?

But those questions can be laid to rest as Indian politics has always witnessed the presence of prominent female politicians, who were and are not limited to the INC. Such leaders include BJP's Sushma Swaraj, who came onto the Indian political stage during the movement against the Emergency (1975-77) (Chandra, 2016), much before Sonia Gandhi became prominent in politics following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. If Sonia Gandhi capitalized on her status as a widow, Sushma Swaraj matched it with her image of an ideal Hindu wife. She was India's daughter as opposed to Gandhi who was the foreign-born daughter-in-law of India (Chandra, 2016). In addition to Swaraj and Gandhi, Indian politics also has other formidable female leaders from regional parties like TMC leader Mamata Banerjee, BSP leader Mayawati and the late Jayalalitha from AIADMK to name a few.

Additionally, all of these women were elected by both men and women. Even in reserved constituents (for SC/ST), where women candidates are more successful than their counterparts in the open constituents, there is no evidence of a unanimous women's vote in favour of women candidates (Vaishnav & Hinton, 2019). Finally, although the number of female candidates have been modestly increasing over the years and female turnout reached a record high in the 2014 election, research shows that these two are not related (Vaishnav & Hinton, 2019). In fact, as Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo Pande and Topalova (2009) showed, women candidates still suffer from gender discrimination at the hands of both men and women when they run for the first time. Thus, in the absence of any indication from Indian electoral studies of a women's vote for women, I draw from the modernization theory to see if socio-demographic factors, broader party policies, ideological affiliations, attitudes and values determine the INC's gender advantage.

## Chapter 3.

### The Modern Gender Gap and Recent Findings

Historically, in western democracies, women voted more conservatively than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2000). But by the 1980s, women moved away from the conservative parties, showing greater preference for left-wing parties. The greater preference for left wing parties by women in developed democracies, in comparison to men, is termed as the 'Modern Gender Gap' (Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002; Whitaker, 2008).

The development theory states that modernization led to key changes in sociodemographic factors creating a process of socialization, which drastically changed women's role in the private and public, leading to the modern gender gap. These sociodemographic factors include greater participation of women in the labor force and the transformation of gender roles.<sup>2</sup> These changes brought a corresponding process of value change in postindustrial societies leading women to align with the left over the right (Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002; Manza & Brooks, 1998; Randall, 1987).

In the mid-90s, Inglehart and Norris (2000) stressed that the modern gender gap would not occur in developing nations and post-communist societies as the forces of modernization had not yet transformed gender roles in these societies. But, recent scholarship on voting behavior in Latin-American countries (Morgan, 2015) and on other developing countries including India (Quick, 2014) highlight changing sociodemographic factors like greater spread of literacy and employment, under modernization, as responsible for creating a socialization context leading to a phenomena similar to the modern gender gap. (Kumar & Gupta, 2015; Morgan, 2015).

Morgan (2015), in her research on the modern gender gap in Latin American countries, found small but significant traditional gender gap present in some countries, while many others had no significant gender gap. She identified this difference as an indication of a transition towards a modern gender gap. Morgan (2015) attributes this

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<sup>2</sup> The transformation refers to women becoming economically less dependent on men and consequently more autonomous in material and life choices.

transition to higher literacy rates among women and their greater participation in labour force. She also highlighted a possible relationship between support for left-wing parties and women being divorced or single. Additionally, Abendschön and Steinmetz (2014) and Quick (2014) also found some evidence of the modern gender gap in post-communist countries in 2008. With regards to India, Quick found that although women seem to be leaning more towards the right, the results were modest and not significant. Therefore, there is reason for believing that the development theory could help identify if the Indian gender gap in party preference is similar to that witnessed in western democracies. This belief can be further substantiated by recent scholarship on voter turnout and voter behavior from India.

Recently, the voter turnout in Indian elections have become fairly equally distributed among men and women with 67 percent male and 66 percent female turnout in the 2014 election (Deshpande, 2014). Kapoor and Ravi (2014) reason that as there are no top down policy approaches targeted at increasing female turnout, the present increase in turnout of female voters signal greater empowerment of these women. They also state in their research, focused on Bihar in 2005, that women voters can vote differently from men and be agents of change by affecting re-election prospects significantly. Kumar and Gupta (2015) explain that the increasing turnout of women voters could imply an increase in “self-consciousness and deeper understanding of political issues” (p. 11). Morgan (2015) had linked differences in key socio-demographic factors (like differences in levels of education) with increased self-consciousness of women that led to the modern gender gap. Kumar and Gupta (2015) do not detail how “self-consciousness” is raised among these female voters. But, they stress on socio-developmental factors like spread of literacy, access to information and greater political participation which could have led to a deeper understanding of political issues consequently increasing turnout. These factors were also highlighted by Carroll (1988) and Hill (2003) for explaining empowerment of women as a precursor to the modern gender gap in western democracies and will be further discussed in the next section.

Kumar and Gupta (2015) argue that due to the increase in literacy rate of women and the rapid spread of information that has naturally occurred as an outcome of the post-liberalization development process, Indian women’s position in their households have relatively improved as the hold of patriarchal norms have somewhat loosened (Kumar & Gupta, Changing Patterns of Women’s Turnout in Indian Elections, 2015).

This has helped a substantial number of women to move into the public sphere and participate in its activities, including voting. Thus, the present research on Indian voters highlight the same modernization driven developmental factors, which are used to explain the modern gender gap in post-industrial western democracies. With the presence of key socio-developmental changes in India and evidence of the modern gender gap on its way under similar circumstances in Latin American countries, I aim to re-apply the theory of modern gender gap in party choices in India.

### **3.1. Sources of the Modern Gender Gap**

Inglehart and Norris (2000) observe that greater educational opportunities for women increased their participation in the paid labour forces. But employment opportunities are not equally distributed between women and men. Women are often overrepresented in low-paid jobs, experience adverse pay disparities, and are subjected to lower socioeconomic status. Prior to entering the public sphere, women were less likely to go through the uncertainties of the labour market as homemakers. These new experiences and risks led women to support equal opportunity policies endorsed by the left-wing parties (Inglehart & Norris, *The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective*, 2000; Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2006; Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014). Thus, there is a relationship between greater education attainment, overrepresentation in low-income jobs, lower socio-economic status and realignment with the left ideological spectrum.

Welfare Services - Inglehart and Norris (2000) also highlighted support for government services as a reason for which women prefer left-wing parties more. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) and Randall (1987) explain that provision of government services for child and elder care are more likely to be supported by working women, as these services had been traditionally offered by women as unpaid forms of labour. Also, a significant number of employed women work in public sectors and act as service providers in education, health care, and welfare services which orients them to favour left-wing political attitudes, as they are more likely to depend on expansion of state welfare (Inglehart & Norris, *The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective*, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002; Manza & Brooks, 1998). Giger (2009) and Knutsen (2001) confirm the greater likelihood of women supporting left-wing parties, based on the greater chance of women working in public

sector professions, which increases their dependence on a large range of social services. So, women have vested interests in pro-welfare governments. Basu and Donnelly (2017) state that in comparison to men, as women are less likely to be in supervisory positions and more at risk of unemployment and low-income, this increases the likelihood of women supporting the expansion of state services and consequently voting for left-wing parties. Thus, there is a connection between the socio-economic status of women and their support for welfare measures, which ultimately influences their party choices.

Education and Employment - Employment opportunities, labor market engagement and the future of women's careers are all connected to their level of education. Box-Steffenmeier, De Boef and Lin (2004) state that attainment of higher levels of education increases women's employment opportunities, helping women gain economic and political independence from men. So, higher levels of education are also related to their preference for left parties. Thus, I will look into the impact of education and employment on party preference in India. However, in 2009 the incumbent INC-led government rolled out the National Rural Employment Guarantee program which created work opportunities for those with low levels of education (Kumar Y. , 2014). This could lead to a positive relationship between low levels of education and preference for the INC, due to a growth in the number of employment opportunities for all. Therefore, education remains a factor of interest in my analysis and I will categorize them to reflect both India's contextual reality and the theory's stipulations.

Changes in Marital Status- The modern gender gap theory also lists changes in traditional family units as another important sociodemographic factor. Hill (2003) identifies a relationship between the modern gender gap and the historically changing relationship between women and men, specifically between the marital status of women and their party choices. She explained that with increased participation in the labour forces and greater spread of education, the life opportunities of women have expanded. Using Carroll's (1988) autonomy theory, Hill (2003) stressed that although the modern gender gap was always present in a latent form, the growing life opportunities led to greater autonomy of women, manifesting in their political independence. Thus, over time, as women continued to grow psychologically and economically independent from men, more women began choosing to remain single or become divorced and these

choices interrelated with the de-alignment of women's party preference from the right to the left.

Although divorce rates in India are still among the lowest in the world and the act is considered culturally unacceptable, Kumari (2004) contends that the number of divorces in India are increasing, indicating greater economic and psychological independence of Indian women (Kumari, 2004). Therefore, I expect to see a possible link between being unmarried or divorced and supporting the left of centre INC.


Religion and Religiosity- Religion and religiosity are also linked with women's party preference (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Traditionally, higher level of religiosity among women had significantly driven their support of conservative and religious parties. For instance, being a staunch Catholic led to valuing strong traditional values, leading to a preference for conservative parties. But expanding educational opportunities for women and weakening church-party linkages catalyzed the process of religious secularization over time. This process helped spread liberal attitudes in post-industrialized societies ultimately facilitating the modern gender gap (Coffé, 2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2000).

Religious secularism has been a defining political goal for the INC, especially since the 1976, when the 42nd Amendment Act introduced the term in the Preamble to the constitution of India (Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, n.d.), thereby establishing a clear separation between the state and religion, and giving equal recognition to all religions socially. In contrast, the BJP is identified as a Hindu nationalist party which has a history of being associated with communally polarized, hardline right-wing Hindu campaigns. Thus, I expect low religiosity to be positively related with a preference for the INC over the BJP.

Age groups- Finally, age is a key factor that can compound the impact of the modern gender gap in younger women. Inglehart and Norris (2000) state that given how long-term secular trends and lifestyle changes affected the lives of different generations of women, the modern gender gap would be stronger among younger women. Younger women are more likely to have experienced increased educational and employment opportunities, and greater independence from men. But, as they did not clearly identify

the exact ages that should be considered as young and old, I expect to see a general trend of liking the BJP over the INC with increasing age, especially among women.

Figure 3.1.1 provides a layout for understanding the key sociodemographic factors that lead to certain attitudes and values that finally lead to preferring either the INC or the BJP.



**Figure 3.1.1. Relationship between factors influencing the modern gender gap leading to party choice**

### **3.2. Attitudes and values leading to the modern gender gap**

Inglehart and Norris (2000) argue that the changes in sociodemographic factors and their interactions with particular cultural attitudes and social values cause the modern gender gap. The theory particularly focuses on post-materialist values and feminist concerns. A shift towards post-materialism means a shift from prioritizing economic and physical security to prioritizing quality of life and self-expression.<sup>3</sup> As societies develop and women experience pivotal changes in their socioeconomic status,

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<sup>3</sup> Specifically, materialist concerns imply prioritizing economic growth, a strong defense force, maintenance of order in the country and fighting crime. In contrast, post-materialist values indicate a support for freedom of speech and expression, building a more humane society, greater self-expression and attaining both intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction

they tend to become more post-materialist and feminist in their attitudes than men, leading to the modern gender gap.

Feminist and Post- Materialist Concerns - Rising concern about women's condition in society directly leads to the modern gender gap (Coffé, 2013; Inglehart & Norris, 2000; Kaufmann, 2002). Growing awareness about women's traditional and socially unequal and disadvantageous status has led to the spread of feminist consciousness among women. The greater likelihood of women being vulnerable to a lower economic status and their growing autonomy, made women push for equal opportunity policies and the de-familialization of welfare. All of these gendered experiences have helped spread feminist consciousness among women ultimately leading to the modern gender gap. Thus, I expect to see a positive relationship between preference for the INC and being post-materialist and showing high concern about women's condition in the society, especially among women.

Secularism - The development theory also talks about secularization as a force that has fostered gender equality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Although secularization and religiosity are related, secularization is not limited to an increase or decrease in visible acts of religiosity like that of temple or church attendance (Wilson, 2016). Secularization is also a fundamental shift away from religious beliefs and devoutness towards rationalization. It helps individuals to become critical and shift away from conservative values. Secularization leads to growing disbelief in religions, questioning authority and diminishing blind nationalism (Inglehart & Welzel, The WVS Cultural Map of the World , 2011). These are also issues that set the INC and the BJP apart. The BJP being a Hindu nationalist party advocates the religious and cultural supremacy of Hinduism and pushes for the glorification of the nation. The INC, although has courted symbols of Hindu religion and culture for electoral advantage since the 1980s, is still identified as the pro minority party that is secular and appeals to all religious and cultural groups. Thus, following the theory I expect to see a positive effect of secular values on the preference for the INC.

Ideological Preferences - Women are also supposed to be naturally predisposed to the left of the ideological spectrum compared to men. This natural inclination is attributed to women's biological function of childbearing and traditional role of care-giver (Downing, 2018). Due to these functions, women are said to be innately inclined towards

consensus-building, working for the betterment of groups and building collectives (Sawer, 2002; Spierings & Zaslove, 2017), all of which are attributes of left-wing politics. As opposed to the conflictual politics of men, most women inherently opt for consensus-seeking politics (Fish, 2002). While this theory fails to explain women leaders and supporters of right wing parties from Margaret Thatcher to Marine Le Pen, it implies that most women are supposed to align themselves naturally with the left. Following this theory of gender-based ideology, I expect to see more women self-report themselves as left-wing and a positive impact of left-wing ideological identification on the preference for the INC.

Pacifism - Another attitude associated with women's innate nature of consensus-seeking is pacifism. Historically women have been opposed to war, which has also been linked to their nature as compassionate nurturers who try to seek consensus (Conover & Sapiro, 1993). However, Randall (1987) and de Sève (2019) argue that women's pacifist nature comes from their self-interest and a survival reflex.

War and nationalism have exploited gender stereotypes, favoring and calling upon the services of men, the dominant gender, who became the fighters and protectors, bonding under a sense of brotherhood fostered by the armed forces (Iveković, 1993). But, war left women in a precarious position. On the one hand, they were vulnerable to physical attacks from victorious forces, on the other they were also expected to become providers while continuing with their roles of care-givers to children and the elderly. So, while men responded to a higher cause during wars and perished as heroes or emerged victorious, women faced more anxiety, shouldered additional responsibilities, provided more labour and incurred losses devoid of any glory (Iveković, 1993; de Sève, 2019). Hence, women oppose wars out of their need for self-preservation and survival instinct.

The theory of modern gender gap agrees that women harbor a more pacifist attitude than men, especially when it comes to the use of the military in foreign policy (Brooks & Valentino, 2011; Conover & Sapiro, 1993; Randall, *Women's Political Behaviour*, 1987; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986) and identifies pacifism as an attitude leading to the modern gender gap. Pacifism is relevant in Indian voter behavior studies as the BJP has a stronger stance on defense and anti-terrorism policies, and uses the army's image regularly to evoke nationalism. As the BJP has a more pro-defense

position than the INC, I expect to see a connection between the support for military and the preference of the INC over the BJP.

Most researches on Indian women's electoral choices do not identify post-materialist concerns or an innate preference for left-wing ideology as possible explanations of the INC's gender advantage. As there is a lack of women-centric policy promises from both parties, the literature also does not link growing feminist consciousness as a contributory factor. Singh (2015) alludes to the possibility of feminist concerns working in the electoral choices of women by stating that the BJP's gender disadvantage might result because the BJP is known to inhibit the social mobility and status of women. However, to update the literature on Indian voter behaviour, I will be looking into gender-based differences on post-materialism, ideology and feminist values to explain the gender advantage of the INC.

**Contextual Factors** – Deshpande (2014) stated that Indian women still do not vote based on gender. While the lack of major women-centric policies from the national parties might lead to this, the fact that Indian women's movements were not truly intersectional till recently could also explain the lack of a women's vote.<sup>4</sup> Women's movements began in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in India, but they started representing the intersection of a multitude of interests at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Patel, 2012; Subramaniam, 2004). The movement's efforts to represent overlapping interests of caste, class, religion, ethnicity and region is still very new and faces challenges in creating a unified identity of Indian women. Nonetheless, the movement has made substantial progress in setting the process of women's economic empowerment and independence in motion. Thus, laying ground for investigating if the gender gap in the preference of INC is related to similar conditions of women's emancipation as in the western democracies.

Additionally, the spate of developmental changes in the 1990s brought along with it socio-economic betterment of the country with improved information technology, channels of communication, and effective management practices. This helped organize the women's movement further and make women visible in debates about the states and markets. But, these developmental changes spread asymmetrically through the country

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix section A. Brief note on Indian Women's movement

and coupled with the delayed intersectionality of the movement, it means that women from different regions have experienced development and progress differently. Morgan (2015) stressed on the importance of considering different contextual factors when studying the impact of development on women's party preference. In addition to individual level differences, she highlighted how varying levels of development in different Latin American countries can lead to different kinds of gender gaps in regions that might seem similar.

As there is a lot of development-based regional diversity in India with life expectancy, education, and per capita income varying widely between states (UNDP, 2018), I expect to see a difference in gender-based voting preferences between differently developed states. Therefore, while I will investigate the gender gap at the all India level, to account for the asymmetrical spread of development, I will also look into the existence of gender gap in high and low human development states. Thus, I will test the following nine hypotheses in my analysis:

- 1.a. Women are relatively more likely to vote for INC than BJP in comparison to men at the all-India level.
- 1.b. Women are relatively more likely to vote for INC than BJP in comparison to men in the High HDI score states.
- 2.a. This effect is explained by adding socio-demographic factors like age, first time voter status, education, employment, marital status, town size, religion, religiosity, income, class and caste.
- 2.b. This effect is explained by adding concerns about women's condition, ideological leanings, pacifism, secularism and post-materialist values.
3. This effect is moderated by age (a), marital status (b), ideology (c), concern with women's condition (d) and materialist/post-materialist values (e).

## Chapter 4.

### Data and Methodology

To test these hypotheses, I use the 6<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey, which was conducted in 2012.<sup>5</sup> The survey had a targeted sample of 19,444 and expected completion of around 11,000 to 13,000. The total sample for the survey finally included 4078 respondents. The sample is representative of the national population including individuals of both sexes, and aged 18 and above. Here a few limitations of the WVS must be addressed. The survey has been criticized for having a culturally limited understanding and Eurocentric viewpoint, especially with regards to key definitions of concepts like democracy and modernization (Hurtienne & Kaufmann, 2015). This limited understanding has led to confusion in understanding local attitudes from non-western countries like Pakistan, Vietnam and Indonesia (Kurzman, 2014). The survey has also been criticized for using a static institutional structure, which hinders data collection by people from countries being surveyed, thereby eliminating chances of local input (Hurtienne & Kaufmann, 2015). Although the survey questionnaires used in the 6<sup>th</sup> wave were translated from and to English to verify their accuracy, translation of language might not be able to address issues with regards to key definitions of terms and concepts like Gender equality over Patriarchy, Tolerance over Conformity, Autonomy over Authority, to name a few (Hurtienne & Kaufmann, 2015). However, in order to maintain consistency with the application of the modern gender gap theory, I use the WVS survey in my research, acknowledging its limitations.

The survey was conducted by the Centre for Research in Social Sciences & Education (CERRSE), which is a research centre in the Jain University. The respondent sample was drawn by using multi-stage stratified random sampling. The four-stage stratified random sampling was based on the Parliamentary constituencies (PC) present

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<sup>5</sup> Although the WVS Wave 6 dataset predates the 2014 general election, it includes extensive information on sociodemographic status, moral attitudes and values, gathered closest to the 2014 election. 2012 also saw significant national political developments that affected the general election of 2014. For instance, by 2012 the incumbent INC-led UPA II was well past the mid-point of their second consecutive term in power giving people time to assess the incumbent's performance.

United Progressive Alliance (UPA) is a coalition of centre-left political parties in India formed after the 2004 general election, with the INC at its head. UPA II refers to the coalition forming government following the 2009 election. The INC is also the largest party in the coalition.

in all 29 states. The Union Territories, except for Delhi, were left out of the survey. In each state, the PCs were selected by simple circular sampling. In the next two steps the Assembly Constituencies (AC) from the PCs were selected, and then the Polling Stations (PS) from within the sampled ACs were selected. Finally, the respondents were selected from the electoral rolls of each sampled PS. The respondents were met at their residence for face-to-face interviews.

## 4.1. Dependent Variable

**Party Preference:** The dependent variable is party preference between the INC and the BJP. I have used preference instead of actual voting behavior as the World Value Survey 6 did not ask the respondents which party they had voted for in the last election.<sup>6</sup> As both the INC and the BJP are principle parties that contested in alliance with other parties, as the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), for my research I will consider preference for all regional parties that are members of INC-led UPA<sup>7</sup> (post-poll alliance from 2009) and BJP-led NDA<sup>8</sup> (post-poll alliance, 2009) as preference for INC and BJP, respectively. I adjusted each alliance membership by removing members who had defected from their respective alliances by the time of the survey in 2012.

As my focus is on the gender advantage of the INC over the BJP, I have dropped the parties falling outside either alliance. I coded responses indicating preference for the BJP and its alliance members as '0' and preference for the INC and its alliance members as '1'. The absolute number and percentage of respondents who preferred the INC were

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<sup>6</sup> The question asked was, 'If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? If "Don't know": Which party appeals to you most? Respondents were given options to choose between the INC, the BJP and other regional parties.

<sup>7</sup> UPA includes the following parties Indian National Congress (National Party), Nationalist Congress Party, Rashtriya Janata Dal, Rashtriya Lok Dal, National Conference, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, Mahan Dal, Indian Union Muslim League, Socialist Janata (Democratic), Kerala Congress (M), and Revolutionary Socialist Party, Bodoland People's Front, Communist Party of India.

<sup>8</sup> The members of NDA includes Telugu Desam Party, Shiv Sena, Shiromani Akali Dal, Janata dal united (JDU), Lok Janshakti Party, Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam, Pattali Makkal Katchi, Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Rashtriya Lok Samata Party, Haryana Janhit Congress, Apna Dal, Swabhimani Paksha, Republican Party of India (Athvale), Rashtriya Samaj Paksha, Kongunadu Makkal Desia Katchi, Indhiya Jananayaga Katchi, Kerala Congress (Nationalist), Revolutionary Socialist Party (Bolshevik), Naga People's Front, United Democratic Front, National People's Party, and All India N.R. Congress.

1033 (25.3%) with another 192 (4.7%) preferring their alliance members. 1040 (25.5) respondents preferred the BJP, 235 (5.8%) their alliance members, and 914 (22.4) preferred other parties.

I also identified all respondents with one or more “Don’t Know” and “Missing” responses on the independent variables and excluded them from the dataset. After dropping the missing data, and respondents who did not mention a preference for either the INC or the BJP and their respective coalitions, the total sample for my analysis was 1881, with INC preference at 915 (49%) and BJP at 966(51%).<sup>9</sup>

## 4.2. Independent Variables

**Gender:** The primary independent variable is “Gender”, a dichotomous variable, with two categories for male and female respondents. The dichotomous nature of the gender variable is a limitation of this research as gender is not a binary classification. But, at the time the survey was conducted, the Indian Judiciary officially recognized only two genders. On April 2014, the Supreme Court of India officially recognized hijras, transgenders, eunuchs, and intersex people as a 'third gender' by law (Mahapatra, 2014). As my data predates the ruling of the Supreme Court, it is limited to the previous conception of gender as a binary.

I have coded the gender variable by ascribing ‘0’ to every male respondent and 1 to every female respondent. The total number of male respondents is 1087 (58 percent) and total number of female respondents is 794 (42 percent).

## 4.3. Existence of a Gender Gap

To test the effect of gender on the preference of the INC over the BJP, I started with the analysis of the effect of gender on the dependent variable of party preference

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<sup>9</sup> The percentage of male respondents dropped is 53 percent (1203) and the percentage of female respondents dropped is 56 percent (991). The t-test analysis of Missing/DK responses by gender showed that there is compositional difference between the gender groups based on the DK or missing responses given by either male or female groups. The p-value of the result is 0.06 and significant at 0.1 level. The total number of respondents who showed either no party preference or one outside of either the INC or BJP coalition is 1575 with 40 percent (913) men and 37 percent (662) women. The t-test analysis showed more men were likely to show either no or a party preference outside the INC and BJP coalition than women and this result is significant at 0.1 level.

with fixed effects for states. As shown in Table 3.3.1, there is no significant gender gap in party preference at the all India level. So, I can reject hypothesis 1.a, which is “Women are relatively more likely to vote for INC than BJP in comparison to men at the all-India level”. Next, I looked into the impact of gender on party choice in the groups of states based on their development level.

**Table 4.3.1. Binomial Logistic Regression of Gender on Party Preference at all-India level with fixed effects for States**

	Coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	-0.01	0.13
Female	0.07	0.10
N	1881	
-2 LogLikelihood	2355.54	


Source: WVS 6

<sup>^</sup>p ≤ .10, \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01, \*\*\*p ≤ .001

**Regions** – The Human Development Index provides a general parameter for evaluating states based on their overall prosperity. The Human Development Index (HDI) includes indicators of life expectancy, education, and per capita income, which are factors that feed into the modern gender gap (UNDP, 2018). The summary report on gendering human indices by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Govt. of India, also observed that states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and others, which were low on the HDI scale, were also low on the gender development scale (2009). As the performance of the Indian states overlap in both gender and overall human development, I categorized the Indian states by their HDI ranking in the country, using the sub-national human development index from 2012 into two groups – (a) High HDI states (0) - States that scored more than the HDI national average in 2012, and (b) Low HDI states (1) – States that scored lower than the national average. India’s HDI national average for 2012 was 0.599.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix Section B: Independent Variables: Regions

I ran a logistic regression with the dependent variable for party choice, the independent variables for gender and regions, an interaction effect between gender and regions with the High HDI states as the reference category and fixed effects for all states. The impact of gender in the Low HDI states is significant at 0.05 level.<sup>11</sup> Figure 4.3.2 shows the predicted probabilities of preferring the INC over the BJP is the highest for women from the low HDI states at 88% approximately, followed by the men from the low HDI states.



Source: WVS 6

**Figure 4.3.2. Predicted probabilities of respondents preferring the INC by Gender and Region**

In the High HDI states the impact of gender is not significant, so I can reject hypothesis 1.b. The only significant gender gap is in the Low HDI states. This is an

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix Table D.1

interesting result as the modernization theory predicts the modern gender gap in more developed regions. Here, we see the contrary case. The regression output for High HDI states shows a negative preference for the INC over the BJP by women in comparison to Low HDI states, but the finding is not significant. But, women in the Low HDI states show a stronger preference for the centre-left INC over the centre-right BJP than men.

Although low HDI score does not entail absence of development, in fact some key low development states (known as BIMARU states) have shown rapid development between 2002 to 2010 turning them into bigger contributors of the nation's overall development (Yadav & Radhakrishnan, 2017), but still the evidence of a modern gender gap from comparatively low development states is interesting and raises questions about the impact of the modernization theory in developing societies. I will note this outcome further in the conclusion, but as the focus of my research is the gender advantage of the INC over the BJP, from hereon I will focus my analysis on the Low HDI states. There are 949 respondents in the Low HDI state group, with 586 (62%) men and 363(38%) women.<sup>12</sup> I will also include results of the same statistical tests on the High HDI states in the appendix.

#### **4.4. Sociodemographic Factors and Attitudes for Low HDI States**

Following the theory of modern gender gap, I have selected the following sociodemographic variables, attitudes and values for my analysis.<sup>13</sup>

**Sociodemographic Variables** – Age, First Time Voters, Education Levels, Employment Status, Income, Social Class, Caste, Marital Status, Religion, Religiosity and Town Size.

**Attitudes and Values** – Ideology (Left or Right-wing leanings), Secularism, Materialist/Post-Materialist Values, Concern with Women's Condition and Pacifism.

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<sup>12</sup> Respondents with one or more missing/don't know responses were dropped from the data set except for those with missing responses on variables representing concern with women's condition. The missing responses on the questions related to the women's condition variable were imputed. For more information see Appendix Section B: Independent Variable- Women's Condition.

<sup>13</sup> See appendix section B for details on how variables were constructed and coded.

In Table 4.4.1 I have included the descriptive statistics based on the sociodemographic factors and attitudes. I expect to see that respondents with education, employment, who live in larger sized towns, have higher income, lower levels of religiosity, are from lower class and/or lower castes, have a minority religion, and are of younger age and have a single marital status, are of left-leaning ideological orientation, have secular values, and who display post-materialist values, who are concerned with women's condition and are pacifist are more likely to support the INC over the BJP.<sup>14</sup>

**Table 4.4.1. Descriptive statistics for Binary and Continuous Variables**

<b>Binary Variables</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>S. D</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<i>INC Preference</i>	949	0.42	0.49	0	1
<i>Gender (Female)</i>	949	0.38	0.49	0	1
<i>First Timer Voter</i>	949	0.06	0.24	0	1
<i>Marital Status (Not Married)</i>	949	0.13	0.33	0	1
<i>Religiosity (Less Religious)</i>	949	0.53	0.50	0	1
<b>Continuous Variables</b>					
<i>Age</i>	949	-1.39	13.48	-22.45	48.55
<i>Income</i>	949	-0.01	2.09	-3.49	5.51
<i>Town Size</i>	949	-0.37	1.14	-1.38	5.62
<i>Ideology</i>	949	-0.25	2.12	-4.96	4.04
<i>Secularism</i>	949	0.02	0.12	-0.25	0.45
<i>Concern with women's condition</i>	949	-0.04	0.25	-0.37	0.63

Source: WVS 6, Low HDI States

<sup>14</sup> In Low HDI states, the percentage of male respondents dropped is 58 percent (795) and the percentage of female respondents dropped is 63 percent (624). The t-test analysis of Missing/DK responses by gender showed that there is compositional difference between the gender groups based on the DK or missing responses given by either male or female groups. The p-value of the result is 0.01. Therefore, the results show that more women than men are likely to be left out of the dataset due to missing or unavailable responses.

**Table 4.4.2. Categorical Variables with the total number and percentage of total respondents in each category (N=949)**

<b>Categorical Variables</b>	<b>Total Number (N)</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
<b>Religion</b>		
Hindu	825	87
Muslim	92	10
Others	32	3
<b>Social Class</b>		
Upper Class	44	5
Middle Class	536	57
Lower Class	369	39
<b>Education</b>		
No or Low education	611	64
Secondary Education	222	24
University Education	116	12
<b>Employment</b>		
Private	46	5
Public	47	5
Others	323	34
Self employed	156	16
Housewife	294	31
Unemployed	83	9
<b>Caste</b>		
Upper Castes	314	33
Scheduled Castes	134	14
Scheduled Tribes	75	8
Other Backward Castes	426	45
<b>Materialist/Post Materialist</b>		
Materialist	434	46
Mixed	448	47
Post-Materialist	67	7
<b>Pacifism</b>		
Support for Army: Low	299	32
Support for Army: Medium	381	40
Support for Army: High	269	28

Source: WVS 6, Low HDI States

## 4.5. Methods

I have carried out t-test analysis of each continuous variable and chi-square analysis for the binary and categorical variables to spot any gender-based compositional differences in the relevant categories. Next, I have tested eight logistic regression models.

I have carried out multivariate analysis to identify the impact of gender with the other variables simultaneously. The first model will show the logistic regression of gender on party preference in the Low HDI states with fixed effects for states. In the second model, I add sociodemographic variables along with the independent variable of gender. In the third model, I add the attitudinal variables to the second model. By adding the other variables, we can observe what happens to the effect of gender when sociodemographic factors and attitudes comes in to play.

The fourth to eight model adds one interaction at a time to the third model. Before presenting the regression output I will present the results for of bivariate analyses of gender with all key independent variables used in my analysis.

## 4.6. Bivariate Analyses of Gender and Key Independent Variables

To check if there is any significant relationship between gender and the other independent variables with more than two categories I conducted chi-square analysis.<sup>15</sup> Table 4.6.1 shows the categorical variables that gender has a significant or non-significant relationship with. The table also indicates which sub-category of each variable represents more (+) or less (-) women than men. The Pearson Chi-square tests showed no significant relationship between gender and class or pacifism.

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<sup>15</sup> See Appendix (Section C) for detailed full tables on each variable.

**Table 4.6.1. Bivariate Analyses Results (Chi-square Tests)**

Independent Variables	Women
Religion	Not significant
Education	***
Low Education	+
Secondary Education	-
University	-
Employment	***
Private	-
Public	-
Self-Employed	-
Housewife	+
Others	-
Unemployed	-
Caste	*
Upper Castes	-
Scheduled Castes (SC)	+
Scheduled Tribes (ST)	+
Other Backward Castes (OBC)	+
Class	Not Significant
Post-Materialism	**
Materialist	+
Mixed Values	-
Post- Materialist	+
Pacifism	Not Significant

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample) ^p < 0.1, \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01

The Pearson chi-square tests shows that there is a significant relationship between both gender and levels of education and between gender and employment. Women are disproportionately over-represented in the low education category, thus showing a gender gap in educational levels. Similarly, with regards to employment, a high number of women are housewives (65%) while men are mostly represented in different employment categories (Appendix C.2). This shows that although Indian women have begun moving from the private to the public, this movement is still at its initial stage. Also, only 2.2% of women are employed in the public jobs, which does not align with the modern gender gap theory's finding that women are mostly concentrated in the public sector.

In terms of caste, while both women and men are closely represented in each group, there are notably more men than women in the upper caste category. Additionally, gender is significantly related to materialist/post-materialist values. Only about 7 percent of the whole sample displayed post-materialist values with the rest being almost evenly distributed in the materialist and mixed categories (Appendix C.5). Half the sample of male respondents showed mixed values, while more women than men were materialist or post-materialist. However, while only 3 percent of women are more materialist than men, almost 5 percent more women are post-materialist, making the percentage of post-materialist women almost twice as large as the percentage of post-materialist men. Thus, there are notably more post-materialist women than men.

Table 4.6.2 shows the result of the T-test analysis for all binary and continuous variables. There are significant compositional differences in the variables of town size and concern with women’s condition. With regards to all other variables there are no compositional differences based on gender.

**Table 4.6.2. T-test results of binary and continuous variables by Gender**

Variables	Men (Mean)	Women (Mean)	Difference
Age	0.02	0.06	-0.04
First Time Voter	0.06	0.06	0.00
Marital Status	0.14	0.10	0.04
Religiosity	0.52	0.54	-0.02
Income	0.03	-0.09	0.12
Town Size	-0.32	-0.47	0.15*
Ideology	-0.17	-0.38	0.21
Secularism	0.02	0.02	0.00
Concern with women's condition	-0.07	0.00	-0.07**

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

<sup>^</sup>p ≤.10, \*p ≤.05, \*\*p ≤.01, \*\*\*p ≤.001

To summarize, gender is significantly related to education, employment, caste, materialism/post-materialism, town size and being concerned with women’s condition. These tests also show that the women in Low HDI states are still largely represented in those educational and employment categories which lead to the traditional gender gap.

## 4.7. Gender and Party Preference in the Low HDI states

As pointed out in the section 3.3, the Low HDI states are where we find the gender gap in party preference in India, with more women favouring the INC over the BJP than men (0.29\*, Table 4.7.1). The odds for women preferring the INC over the BJP are 1.3 times greater than the odds for men.

**Table 4.7.1. Binomial Logistic Regression of Gender on Party Preference in Low HDI level States with fixed effects for States (Model 1)**

	Coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	0.01	0.16
Female	0.29*	0.14
N	949	
-2 LogLikelihood	1212.92	

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

<sup>^</sup>p ≤ .10, \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01, \*\*\*p ≤ .001

In the second model, I have added the sociodemographic variables to the first model (Table 4.7.2). The effect of gender has exacerbated from the previous model (0.35) and is significant at 0.1 level. So, the socio-demographic variables fail to explain away the association between gender and party preference. The odds for women preferring the INC over the BJP in this model are 1.4 times greater than the odds for men.

Muslims are more likely to prefer the INC than Hindus and other religious denominations and the effect of Muslim denomination is significant at 0.01 level. Belonging to Muslim religious denomination makes a respondent six times more likely to prefer the INC over the BJP, than a Hindu. One explanation of the likelihood of Muslims preferring the INC over the BJP can be the secular status of the INC. However, lower levels of religiosity did not have a significant effect on the party preference of the INC.

Upper and lower social classes did not have a significant impact on party preference. Belonging to SC, ST or OBC caste groups, in comparison to the Upper

Caste reference group, led to a positive impact on the preference for the INC over the BJP. The BJP is known as an upper class, upper-caste party, which could have also contributed to this outcome. This image of the party in comparison to the catch-all status of the INC could explain the INC's popularity with the other caste categories. The ST caste category had the strongest effect on preference of the INC over the BJP in comparison to the Upper Caste category. At 0.01 significance level, a respondent from the ST caste category is 6 times more likely to vote for the INC than an upper caste voter. The INC has been traditionally more successful in attracting votes from the tribal communities than the BJP, prior to the 2014 election. In the 2009 general election the INC had won seats from 20 constituencies reserved for ST communities. At the time of the survey, it seems like the popularity of the INC over the BJP was still holding strong in the ST community. The odds of preferring the INC over the BJP is 1.8 times for the OBC caste category and 1.9 times for the SC category in comparison to Upper Castes.

Those with secondary and university level education show a negative preference for the INC in comparison to those with low-level education (reference category). The negative effect of secondary level education on the preference for the INC is significant at 0.01 level. The development theory states that higher levels of education lead to greater support for left-wing parties generally, and even more so for women. However, here we see a reverse trend. It can be argued that the positive support from those with low level of education comes from the implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. The rural employment guarantee scheme had benefitted those with no or minimum level of education, while those with higher level struggled to find employment that suited their qualifications (Kumar Y. , 2014).

The second model showed that socioeconomic factors like employment, lower religiosity, age, belonging to the first-time voter category, and marital status did not have any significant effect on increasing or decreasing the likelihood for preferring the INC over the BJP.

In the third model, I added attitudes, ideology-positions and values that impact party preferences. The effect of gender is significant at 0.1 level in this model as well and has not changed from the previous model (0.35). The odds of women preferring the INC over the BJP is still positive and 1.4 times that of men. Thus, adding the attitudes

and values to the sociodemographic variables did not impact the effect of gender on party preference.

Secularism has a significant and positive effect on preference for the INC over the BJP (0.02 level). The model shows that the odds of preferring the INC over the BJP is 8 times for a 1 unit increase on the secularism scale. The secularism variable taps into a variety of attitudes that differentiate the two parties like nationalism, religious tolerance, respect for authority, police forces and defense and more. Hence, higher levels of secular values had a clear and significant impact on the preference of the INC over the BJP. The effect of education has been moderated by the addition of the new variables and it is not significant in this model. The effect of size of town, caste groups and Muslim religion still had a significant and similar effect as in the second model. Additionally, employment in the public sector had a significant (0.05) and negative impact on the preference of INC in this model. However, none of the other attitudes and issue positions like ideological leaning, materialist/post-materialist values, concern with women's condition and pacifism, had any significant impact on party preference.

**Table 4.7.2. Logistic Regression models of party preference for the INC in Low HDI States**


		Model 2			Model 3		
		b	s.e.	exp(b)	b	s.e.	exp(b)
	<i>Intercept</i>	-0.42	0.43	0.66	-0.50	0.46	0.61
	<i>Female</i>	0.35 <sup>^</sup>	0.19	1.42	0.35 <sup>^</sup>	0.19	1.43
	<i>Age</i>	0.01	0.01	1.01	0.01	0.01	1.01
	<i>First Time Voter</i>	-0.29	0.35	0.75	-0.28	0.36	0.75
	<i>Not Married</i>	0.02	0.26	1.02	0.08	0.26	1.08
(Ref: Hindu)	<i>Muslim</i>	1.75 <sup>***</sup>	0.29	5.74	1.74 <sup>***</sup>	0.29	5.72
	<i>Others</i>	0.68	0.44	1.97	0.68	0.44	1.97
	<i>Less Religious</i>	-0.07	0.16	0.93	-0.17	0.16	0.84
	<i>Income</i>	0.01	0.04	1.01	0.03	0.04	1.01
(Ref: Middle Class)	<i>Upper Class</i>	-0.59	0.42	0.56	-0.52	0.43	0.59
	<i>Lower Class</i>	-0.05	0.18	0.95	-0.02	0.18	0.98
(Ref: Low Education)	<i>Secondary</i>	-0.33 <sup>^</sup>	0.20	0.72	-0.25	0.20	0.78
	<i>University</i>	-0.21	0.29	0.81	-0.14	0.29	0.87
(Ref: Private Sector)	<i>Public Sector</i>	-1.06 <sup>*</sup>	0.51	0.35	-1.01 <sup>*</sup>	0.52	0.36
	<i>Self employed</i>	0.06	0.39	1.06	0.15	0.40	1.17
	<i>Housewife</i>	-0.32	0.4	0.72	-0.27	0.41	0.76
	<i>Unemployed</i>	0.29	0.43	1.34	0.24	0.43	1.28
	<i>Others</i>	-0.05	0.37	0.96	0.02	0.38	1.02
	<i>Town Size</i>	-0.19 <sup>*</sup>	0.08	0.83	-0.21 <sup>*</sup>	0.09	0.81
(Ref: Upper Caste)	<i>Caste SC</i>	0.56 <sup>*</sup>	0.26	1.75	0.58 <sup>*</sup>	0.26	1.78
	<i>Caste ST</i>	1.75 <sup>***</sup>	0.33	5.75	1.72 <sup>***</sup>	0.33	5.58
	<i>Caste OBC</i>	0.64 <sup>***</sup>	0.19	1.90	0.65 <sup>***</sup>	0.19	1.91
	<i>Ideology left to right</i>				-0.06	0.04	0.94
	<i>Secular</i>				2.09 <sup>**</sup>	0.68	8.10
(Ref: Materialist Values)	<i>Mixed Values</i>				-0.04	0.17	0.96
	<i>Post-materialist</i>				0.22	0.31	1.24
	<i>Concern with Women's Condition</i>				-0.14	0.32	0.87
(Ref: High Support for Army)	<i>Medium Support</i>				-0.17	0.19	0.84
	<i>Low Support</i>				-0.14	0.20	0.87
	<i>N</i>	949			949		
	<i>X2</i>	-103.95 <sup>***</sup>			-15.82 <sup>*</sup>		

Source: World Value Survey 6 (Restricted Sample)

<sup>^</sup>p ≤ .10, <sup>\*</sup>p ≤ .05, <sup>\*\*</sup>p ≤ .01, <sup>\*\*\*</sup>p ≤ .001

From the fourth model onwards, I have added one interaction at a time to the third model. For the full table on the effects of interaction see appendix D.2. Most of the effects were similar for men and women with only a few having significant results. One of the most notable differences is with regards to the interaction between marital status and

gender (Model 5). The interaction effect is positive and significant at 0.05 level for women, but it is negative and not significant for men (-0.24). While the odds for preferring the INC over the BJP is less than 1 (0.8) for unmarried men, the odds for unmarried women to prefer the INC is 2.7 times over the BJP. This result is in-tune with the development theory which stresses on the economic, social and psychological emancipation of women from men, as a key cause leading to the modern gender gap. Figure 4.7.3 shows that the predicted probabilities of preferring the INC over the BJP. The predicted probability of voting for the INC over the BJP is highest for unmarried women at 65% approximately in comparison to the predicted probability for married women at 48 % approximately, married men at 42% and unmarried men at 38%, approximately.




Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

**Figure 4.7.3. Marginal effects of Gender and Marital Status on Party Preference**

In Model 6, the interaction between ideology and gender also showed an interesting outcome. The ideology scale was set from left (0) to right (1). The coefficient of the interaction effect between gender and ideology was -0.18 and significant at 0.05 level for women, thus the direction of the relation between ideology and party preference

was as expected for women. However, ideology did not have a significant effect on party preference for men. So, the men who self-reported themselves to be right-wing in their ideological leanings were just as likely to prefer the INC over the BJP as men who reported themselves to be left-wing. But women aligned their party preference with their ideological affiliation. As neither party campaigns on women-centric policy promises, this could explain why ideology is a stronger driver of party preference for women than men. As there are no women-specific contextual factors, women are able to translate their ideological preferences to their party preference based on broader party policies more explicitly than men. Figure 4.7.4 shows that the predicted probability of voting for INC in comparison to BJP is highest (approximately 70%) for women who self-scored themselves lower (-2.22) on the ideology scale in comparison to 32% for women who scored themselves higher or aligned with the rightwing (2.02). Men who scored themselves at -2.22 have a probability of 39% approximately for voting for the INC over the BJP in comparison to 42% probability for men who scored themselves at 2.02 on the ideology scale.



Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

**Figure 4.7.4. Marginal Effects between Gender and Ideology**

The interaction effects between age and gender (Model 4), and concern with women's condition and gender (Model 7) were not significant. Following the development theory, I had expected younger people to prefer the INC more than their older counterparts. Specifically, I expected the positive effect of age on party choice to be stronger among young women. But the results from this model does not meet my expectations. It shows that the effect of age on preferring the INC over the BJP is no different between men and women. Additionally, my analysis does not support the research findings of first time voter dividends for the BJP. One explanation of this maybe that demographic dividend was a result of successful pre-poll campaigning for the 2014 election, which was yet to take off at the time of the survey.

Model 8, includes the interaction between gender and materialist/post-materialist values (reference: materialist values). My analysis showed a negative preference for the INC for women with mixed and post-materialist values, in comparison to women with materialist values. Additionally, the effect was significant at 0.1 level for women who showed mixed values. While, the results were not significant for men in any category, the effect of mixed and post-materialist values on the preference for the INC over the BJP for men was positive. The bivariate analysis had shown more women displayed post-materialist values than men and more men had displayed mixed values than women.<sup>16</sup> As per the development theory, I had expected post-materialism to have a positive and significant effect on the preference for the INC. However, my research not only showed post-materialist values to have no significant impact on the party.

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<sup>16</sup> See Appendix Table C.5

## Chapter 5.

### Discussion and Conclusion

In this research, I have reapplied the modern gender gap theory to explain the gender advantage of the INC over the BJP, leading up to the Indian General Election of 2014.

I found no significant gender gap in party preference at the all India level, leading up to the election. This contrasts with research conducted after the election. In Deshpande's work on Women's vote in India, research based on Lokniti-CSDS's 2014 post-election National Election Study (NES 2014), it was found that the way men and women voted in India was the same in aggregate terms – with the INC getting 19% of both men's and women's votes. However, the BJP's gender disadvantage persisted as 33% of men voted for the party in comparison to only 29% of women (Rukmini, 2018).

While considering the states with high and low levels of development (compared to the national average), I found a significant gender gap in favour of the INC only in the low developed states. Reports from NES 2014 also showed that the BJP faced an acute gender gap in many major states in the 2014 election. These states include a number of low HDI states from my analysis like Assam, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Jharkhand (Kumar & Gupta, 2017). In high developed states, women were just as likely to vote for the INC as men. This outcome is inconsistent with the development theory. As per the theory, the gender advantage of the INC should have come from the more developed states on account of those states being more politically and economically advanced. Although, lower levels of development do not mean the absence of development, it is still noteworthy that higher levels of development alone do not determine the gender advantage for the centre-left party in India. This raises the question of how far modernization alone can be the driver of ideological realignment in developing countries like India?

This question further arises because as I focused on the low development states and analysed the gender gap in them, I found no explanation of the gap through the development theory. Most of the socio-demographic factors like age, education, employment and attitudes like pacifism, post-materialism and feminist concerns, that are

upheld by the theory as causes of the modern gender gap, could not explain the association between women and their preference for the INC.

In my analysis, the gender gap in party preference in low HDI Indian states was moderated by the marital status of women and their ideological leanings. Non-married women showed a significant and positive correlation with the preference for the INC over the BJP. Although, this is in consonance with the modern gender gap theory, it is hard to say if this effect is driven by the spread of modernization and will continue in future.

I found that key sociodemographic factors like high education, employment and religiosity did not show any significant relationship with party preference of the INC over the BJP. In fact, secondary education had a negative and significant relationship with the preference for the INC. Additionally, I found that Indian women are extremely underrepresented in the key sociodemographic categories that lead to the modern gender gap. For instance, higher education and broadened occupational opportunities are supposed to increase the likelihood of women to prefer left-wing parties. However, in my restricted sample from the WVS 6, more than 70 percent of the female respondents had either no formal education or only primary level education.

Since independence women's literacy rate has gone up from 8.86% (1951) to 65.46% (2011). The national and state governments, national and international organizations have been deeply involved in increasing literacy among women through state sponsored programs and social awareness. The Indian Human Development Report of 2011 stated that poorer states were converging with the overall literacy rates of the richer and more developed states. However, from the WVS 6 data sample it seems that most women got included only up to the level of enrollment or primary education.

In terms of employment women were most underrepresented in the public sector, with the majority of female respondents making up the housewives' category. This might indicate that Indian women still have a long way to go in order to crossover from the private and domestic to the public domain (in terms of occupation). However, Indian women workers, especially those from low economic class, are overwhelmingly represented in the unorganized sector. Indian labour force statistics does not even take these employment engagements into account (Banerjee, 2019). Some of these unpaid

labour forms are essential activities like collection of water and goods like vegetables, firewood, cattle feed and sewing, tailoring and others. Each of these works help the household in numerous ways, but they leave women out of the purview of formal employment (Chakraborty, 2019). These work patterns also show that women's decision to be involved in paid work is deeply controlled by patriarchal and religious norms. On one hand, women help out the household through the income from these allied activities, on the other, once done with these works they shoulder the bulk of the chores at home. In fact, the share of domestic chores seems to be higher on women in urban areas. The National Sample Survey Organization reported in 2014 that 64% of urban women, as compared to 60% rural women, were responsible for most domestic chores (National Sample Survey Office, 2014). The survey was conducted between 2011-2012, and most urban women stated that they engaged in these unpaid household chores as there was no one else to do it. Thus, for many women, employment has still not led them to the public sphere, and neither has it emancipated them from depending on men.

The gender advantage of the INC is one of the interesting phenomenon of Indian elections that still needs to be conclusively explained. The modern gender gap theory does not explain it. With regards to employment and education, although modernization has opened up opportunities, it seems like the patriarchal culture of the country controls how those opportunities are availed by women. The socialization context that modernization is supposed to bring in, gets impacted by the existing culture of the country, limiting the spread of developmental changes to only outward markers like building of more schools, while leaving the intact cultural constraints leading to gender inequality like the predisposition to keep female children at home or culturally prefer a male child over a female child. This might be a reason why despite the presence of a gender gap in the low HDI states, the development theory does not explain it, as women are still underrepresented in key categories of the modern gender gap. To understand this gap further, we need to expand the modernization theory to include aspects from the Indian cultural context, including the inclusion of women working in the informal sector. Women employed in the informal sector, although are not accounted for in the public/private/self-employed employment categories, might experience the sense of autonomy that comes with formal employment. These women might be contributing to the gender gap in the low HDI states. Furthermore, the benefits from the NREGA could have led to positive support for the incumbent from those with low education and in low

developed areas as well. So, unaccounted for but real employment opportunities, positive support for the incumbent, and the reputation of the BJP as a party that restricts the social status and mobility of women (Singh, 2015) could also be leading to this gender gap.

Additionally, in High HDI states women had no significantly different party preference than men.<sup>17</sup> Here too, most of the main sociodemographic categories like higher education and employment did not have a significant and positive effect on the preference of the INC. So, I cannot say that a modern gender gap is in transition here. Furthermore, it is likely that the hold of the country's patriarchal culture would also be applicable in most of the high HDI states. A reason that could have led to a lack of any gender gap in these states is that the 2014 election was ruled by anti-incumbency feelings (K. Mitra & Schöttli, 2016), that had already started taking root in 2012. The incumbent INC was overwhelmed with multiple charges of corruption scandals that tarnished its image among the masses. In the absence of women-centric policies from either party, the party might have lost favour with the electorate, regardless of gender. The results from the 2014 election also showed that the turnout increased among middle and upper-class voters from more urbanized and developed cities, mobilized by Prime Minister Modi's campaigns based on the promises of greater development and prosperity (K. Mitra & Schöttli, 2016). Thus, the lack of a gender gap in the high HDI states leading up to the 2014 election could have been a result of a drive for more development and anti-incumbency than a result of traditional values. In sum, the development theory cannot explain the gender gap in party preference in India and it needs to account for the country's specific cultural and societal context.

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<sup>17</sup> See appendix Table D.3

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## **Appendix A.**

### **Brief Note on Indian Women's Movement**

India has a long history of women's movement beginning with the 19<sup>th</sup> century social reforms movement, followed by the 20<sup>th</sup> century's Independence movement and the late 20<sup>th</sup> century women's rights movement (Patel, 2012). The earliest women's movements mostly involved women of privilege, belonging to upper caste and upper-class families, engaging in philanthropic and social work to help underprivileged women. But these efforts did not challenge or change the existing social order. In their personal lives, activists still toed the lines of the caste system and upheld the status-quo. It was from the 1970s that the women's movement in India became particularly visible and organized (Subramaniam, 2004). By the 1980s, as the movement intensified its organization and alliance building activities, and started defining its identity and purpose, awareness grew about the lack of intersectionality in the movement as the movement was perceived to identify more with the middle-class. At this time, different groups made efforts to define their separate identities and grassroots movements brought to focus different ideological positions and issues related to ecology, poverty, caste violence among others (Subramaniam, 2004). The different perspectives and issues made it clear that the movement needed to further develop its organizational base to challenge institutionalized inequalities. By 1990s the movement expanded its networks both horizontally and vertically, and started demanding women's place in the mainstream with men (Patel, 2012). By this time, as more and more NGOs and groups came to be financed majorly by foreign aids and international organizations, the agenda of the women's movement struggled to balance the priorities of the funding agencies with that of the realities of women in India. Additionally, it led to competition within the agents of the movement for funding. However, it also led to the expansion of women-centric programs and activities geographically (Subramaniam, 2004).

It was only at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and early 21<sup>st</sup> century that the Indian women's movement truly started representing the intersection of a multitude of interests and started pushing for women's share in the state through the women's reservation bill (reservation of seats in state legislatures and national parliament), women's reproductive

and sexual rights, and challenging the use of culture to police women's sexuality (Patel, 2012; Subramaniam, 2004).

## Appendix B.

### Table B: Independent Variables

Regions	The survey includes a sample of 18 states and 1 Union territory out of the then 29 states and 7 Union territories of India. Classified into 2 groups, High HDI = Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab, Delhi and Uttarakhand
	Low HDI = Orrisa, West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Delhi, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh
Age	Age in years. Centered to -21.45 (minimum), 1.33 (mean) and 49.55 (maximum)
First Time Voter	First-time Voters (18 to 22yrs) = 1, Other Voters (23yrs and above) = 0
Education Levels	Low Education (No formal education, incomplete and complete primary school education, incomplete secondary school (technical/vocational and university-preparatory type) = 0
	Secondary Education (Completed secondary education) = 1, University (Completed University) = 2
Employment Status	Private = 0, public = 1, self-employed = 2, housewife = 3, unemployed = 4 and others = 5

Income	10-step scale beginning from 1 (lower step) to 10 (highest step). Centered to - 3.49 (minimum), -0.01 (mean) and 5.51 (maximum)
Social Class	Upper Class = 0, Middle Class (Upper middle class and Lower middle class) = 1, Lower Class (Working Class and Lower Class) = 2
Caste	Upper Castes = 0, Scheduled Castes (SC) = 1, Scheduled Tribes (ST) = 2, Other Backward Castes (OBC) = 3
Marital Status	Married = 0, Unmarried (unmarried, living together, divorced, separated, widowed and single) = 1
Religion	Hindu = 0, Muslim = 1, and Others (Christians, Buddhists and Others/Non-Specific) = 2
Religiosity	Very Religious (more than once a week and once a week) = 0, and Less Religious (once a month, only on special holidays, once a year, less often, and never/practically never) = 1
Town Size	8 steps scale from under 2000 (1st step), 2000 to 5000, 5000 to 10,000, 10,000 to 20,000, 20,000 to 50,000, 50,000 to 100,000, 100,000 to 500,000 and 500,000 and more (8th step).
Ideology	10-point scale from left (1) to right (10). Centered to -4.96 (minimum), -0.25 (mean) and 4.04 (maximum)

Secularism	Scale running from 0 (not secular) to 1 (secular) and includes attitudes regarding scepticism of the courts, government, army and police, disbelief or belief in religion and religiosity, devoutness, nationalistic feelings and overall respect for authority.
Materialism/Post-Materialism	Materialist = 0, mixed values (mix of both materialist and post-materialist values) = 1, and post-materialism = 2
Concern with Women's Condition	Variables used "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women", "If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems", "When a mother works for pay, the children suffer", "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do", "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl", "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do", "Democracy: Women have the same rights as men". The Cronbach's alpha of these seven variables is 0.685. <sup>18</sup> As some of the variables had more than 10 percent missing data, the missing values were imputed using the available responses of each of these seven variables along with the responses from the variables on 'Marital status', 'Religiosity', 'Party Preference between INC and BJP', 'Gender' and 'Post –Materialist Values'. Once all missing values were imputed, all seven variables on women's condition were added creating a new variable. The new variable was rescaled with its values ranging between 0 to 1. Here, 0 means conservative view of women's role and no concern with uplifting women's

<sup>18</sup> The Cronbach alpha ( $\alpha$ ) is a test for internal consistency and shows the extent to which a group of items are related and measures a single unidimensional construct. The higher the score the stronger the relationships between the items and the consistency within the group.

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social condition, and 1 marks progressive view of women's condition and high concern about women's position in the family and society.

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Pacifism

Three Variables used: first "Confidence in the armed forces" with the responses "A great deal, Quite a lot, Not very much and None at all". The options were recoded as 3 for 'A great deal', 2 for 'Quite a lot', 1 for 'Not very much' and 0 for 'None at all'.

Second and third variables used are the "Aims of country: first choice" and "Aims of country: second choice". The options for these variables were "A high level of economic growth; Making sure this country has strong defense forces; Seeing that people have more say about how are done at their jobs and in their communities; and Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful. These variables help identify respondents who consider defense as the top priority of the nation, displaying strong support for the defense forces. The aim of ensuring strong defense forces for the country was recoded as: first choice coded as 2, second choice as 1 and all other aims as 0.

Next, the scores of all three variables were added together into a new variable, ranging from 0 to 5 showing increasing importance of the army to the respondent. The scores were recoded as Low Support for Army (0,1,2) = 0, Medium Support (3) = 1, High Support (4, 5) = 2.

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## Appendix C.

### Bivariate Analysis of Gender and Key Independent Variables

**Table C.1. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Education Variable**

Education	Male	Female	Row Total
No or Low Education	348	263	611
	59.4%	72.5%	64.4%
Secondary level	146	76	222
	24.9%	20.9%	23.4%
University	92	24	116
	15.7%	6.6%	12.2%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0	100.0	100.0%
	%	%	

Source: WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 22.61$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.00$  \*\*\*

**Table C.2. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Employment Variable**

Employment	Male	Female	Row Total
Private	42	4	46
	7.2 %	1.1 %	4.8 %
Public	39	8	47
	6.7 %	2.2 %	5.0 %
Self Employed	130	26	156
	22.2 %	7.2 %	16.4%
Housewife	58	236	294
	9.9 %	65.0%	31.0%
Others	249	74	323
	42.5%	20.4%	34.0%
Unemployed	130	26	156
	22.2%	7.2%	16.4%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 323.0$ , df = 5, p-value = 0.00\*\*\*

**Table C.3. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Income Class Variable**

Social Class	Male	Female	Row Total
Upper Class	27	17	44
	4.6%	4.7%	4.6%
Middle Class	345	191	536
	58.9%	52.6%	56.5%
Lower Class	214	155	369
	36.5%	42.7%	38.9%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 3.8$ , df = 2, p-value = 0.15

**Table C.4. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Caste Variable**

Caste	Male	Female	Row Total
Upper Castes	213	101	314
	36.3%	27.8%	33.1%
Scheduled Caste (SC)	75	59	134
	12.8%	16.3%	14.1%
Scheduled Tribe (ST)	42	33	75
	7.2%	9.1%	7.9%
Other Backward Castes (OBC)	256	170	426
	43.7%	46.8%	44.9%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 8.36$ ,  $df = 3$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.04^*$

**Table C.5. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Materialism Vs Post-Materialism Variable**

Materialism Vs Post-Materialism	Male	Female	Row Total
Materialist	262	172	434
	44.7%	47.4%	45.7%
Mixed	293	155	448
	50.0%	42.7%	47.2%
Post-Materialist	31	36	67
	5.3%	9.9%	7.1%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 9.59$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.01^{**}$

**Table C.6. Absolute number and percentage of Male and Female respondents in sub-categories of the Pacifism Variable**

Pacifism	Male	Female	Row Total
Support for Army: Low	183	116	299
	31.2%	32.0%	31.5%
Support for Army: Medium	235	146	381
	40.1%	40.2%	40.1%
Support for Army: High	168	101	269
	28.7%	27.8%	28.3%
Column Total	586	363	949
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source WVS 6, 2012 (Restricted Sample)

$\chi^2 = 0.09$ ,  $df = 2$ ,  $p\text{-value} = 0.95$

## Appendix D.

### Regression Results and Interaction Effect Outcomes on Party Preference in High and Low HDI states

Table D.1. Binomial Logistic Regression of Gender on Party Preference in the High and Low HDI States with fixed effect for states

	Coefficient	Standard errors
Intercept	-0.03	0.14
Gender: Female	-0.15	0.14
Region: Low HDI	1.71***	0.43
Female* Low HDI	0.44*	0.20
N	1881	
-2 LogLikelihood	2350.71	

Source: World Value Survey 6

^p ≤ .10, \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01, \*\*\*p ≤ .001

**Table D.2. Interaction effect outcome of Model 4,5,6,7 and 8**

	<i>Model 4</i>		<i>Model 5</i>		<i>Model 6</i>		<i>Model 7</i>		<i>Model 8</i>	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.50	0.46	-0.47	0.46	-0.50	0.46	-0.52	0.46	-0.60	0.47
<i>Gender</i>	0.36 <sup>^</sup>	0.19	0.21	0.20	0.29	0.19	0.38*	0.19	0.66**	0.25
<i>Age</i>	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<i>Not Married</i>	0.07	0.27	-0.24	0.32	0.13	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.27
<i>Ideology</i>	-0.06	0.04	-0.06 <sup>^</sup>	0.04	0.01	0.05	-0.06	0.04	-0.06	0.04
<i>Concerned with Women's Condition</i>	-0.14	0.32	-0.16	0.32	-0.14	0.32	-0.35	0.48	-0.13	0.32
<i>(Ref:Materialist) Mixed</i>	-0.04	0.17	-0.05	0.17	-0.04	0.17	-0.04	0.17	0.17	0.21
<i>Post-Materialist</i>	0.21	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.22	0.31	0.55	0.44
<b>Interactions</b>										
<i>Female*Age</i>	0.00	0.01								
<i>Female*Not Married</i>			1.01*	0.511						
<i>Female* Ideology</i>					-0.18*	0.08				
<i>Female*Concerned with Women's Condition</i>							0.49	0.63		
<i>(Ref:Materialist)</i>										
<i>Female* Mixed Materialist</i>									-0.54 <sup>^</sup>	0.32
<i>Female*Post-Materialist</i>									-0.69	0.60
<i>All controls (+)</i>										
<i>Fixed Effects States (+)</i>										
<i>N</i>		949		949		949		949		949
<i>X2</i>		-0.15		-3.85***		-1.94***		-5.31***		-2.74 <sup>^</sup>

Source: WVS 6 (Restricted Sample)

<sup>^</sup>p ≤ .10, \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ 0.01, \*\*\*p ≤ 0.001

**Table D.3. Binomial Logistic Regression of Gender on Party Preference in High HDI level States with fixed effects for States**

	Coefficient	Standard error
Intercept	-0.03	0.14
Female	-0.15	0.14
N	932	
-2 LogLikelihood	1137.79	

Source: World Value Survey 6

<sup>^</sup>p ≤.10, \*p ≤.05, \*\*p ≤.01, \*\*\*p ≤.001

**Table D.4. Binomial Regression of Models with socio-demographic and attitudinal variables for predicting party preference for the INC in High HDI States**

	Model 2			Model 3		
	b	s.e.	exp(b)	b	s.e.	exp(b)
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.04***	0.31	0.36	-1.36***	0.34	0.26
<i>Female</i>	-0.16	0.19	0.85	-0.16	0.19	0.85
<i>Age</i>	0.00	0.01	1.00	0.00	0.01	1.00
<i>First Time Voter</i>	0.65	0.40	1.92	0.60	0.41	1.83
<i>Not Married</i>	0.01	0.26	1.01	0.07	0.27	1.07
(Ref: Hindu) <i>Muslim</i>	1.04***	0.27	2.82	1.10***	0.28	3.01
<i>Others</i>	-0.03	0.25	0.97	-0.00	0.26	1.00
<i>Less Religious</i>	-0.10	0.16	0.91	0.04	0.17	1.05
<i>Income</i>	-0.02	0.05	0.98	-0.04	0.05	0.97
(Ref: Middle Class) <i>Upper Class</i>	-0.19	0.53	0.82	-0.25	0.53	0.78
<i>Lower Class</i>	0.79***	0.19	2.21	0.75***	0.20	2.11
(Ref: Low Education) <i>Secondary</i>	-0.18	0.20	0.83	-0.20	0.21	0.82
<i>University</i>	0.26	0.29	1.30	0.23	0.29	1.26
(Ref: Private Sector) <i>Public</i>	0.77^	0.44	2.16	0.62	0.45	1.87
<i>Self employed</i>	0.41	0.27	1.50	0.32	0.28	1.38
<i>Housewife</i>	0.42	0.29	1.52	0.41	0.29	1.50
<i>Unemployed</i>	-0.02	0.44	0.98	-0.13	0.44	0.88
<i>Others</i>	0.58*	0.26	1.79	0.46^	0.26	1.58
<i>Town Size</i>	0.08^	0.05	1.09	0.09*	0.05	1.10
(Ref: Upper Caste) <i>Caste SC</i>	0.43^	0.26	1.53	0.45^	0.26	1.56
<i>Caste ST</i>	2.05***	0.35	7.75	2.02***	0.35	7.51
<i>Caste OBC</i>	0.31	0.19	1.36	0.34^	0.19	1.41
<i>Ideology left to right</i>				0.09*	0.04	1.09
<i>Secular</i>				-0.84	0.72	0.43
(Ref: Materialist Values) <i>Mixed</i>				0.29	0.18	1.33
<i>Post-materialist</i>				0.04	0.36	1.05
<i>Concern with Women's Condition</i>				-0.11	0.29	0.89
(Ref: High Army Support) <i>Medium Support</i>				0.20	0.20	1.23
<i>Low Support</i>				0.26	0.23	1.30
<i>N</i>	932			932		
<i>X2</i>	-101.36***			-13.86^		

Source: World Value Survey 6 (Restricted Sample)

^p ≤ .10, \*p ≤ .05, \*\*p ≤ .01, \*\*\*p ≤ .001

**Table D.5. Interaction effect outcomes for High HDI states**

	<i>Model 4</i>		<i>Model 5</i>		<i>Model 6</i>		<i>Model 7</i>		<i>Model 8</i>	
	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
<i>Intercept</i>	-1.36***	0.34	-1.38***	0.34	-1.36***	0.34	-1.38***	0.34	-1.42***	0.35
<i>Gender</i>	-0.16	0.19	-0.11	0.21	-0.16	0.20	-0.23	0.20	-0.03	0.26
<i>Age</i>	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
<i>Not Married</i>	0.06	0.27	0.20	0.36	0.07	0.27	0.06	0.27	0.06	0.27
<i>Ideology</i>	0.09*	0.04	0.09*	0.04	0.09^	0.05	0.09*	0.04	0.09*	0.04
<i>Concerned with Women's Condition</i>	-0.11	0.29	-0.11	0.29	-0.11	0.29	-0.57	0.39	-0.12	0.29
<i>(Ref:Materialist) Mixed</i>	0.29	0.18	0.29	0.19	0.29	0.18	0.30^	0.18	0.37	0.23
<i>Post-Materialist</i>	0.05	0.36	0.04	0.36	0.05	0.36	0.06	0.36	0.24	0.46
<b>Interactions</b>										
<i>Female*Age</i>	0.00	0.01								
<i>Female*Not Married</i>			-0.28	0.46						
<i>Female* Ideology</i>					-0.11	0.07				
<i>Female*Concerned with Women's Condition</i>							0.97^	0.56		
<i>(Ref:Materialist)</i>										
<i>Female* Mixed Materialist</i>									-0.20	0.32
<i>Female*Post-Materialist</i>									-0.44	0.66
<i>All controls (+)</i>										
<i>Fixed Effects States (+)</i>										
<i>N</i>		932		932		932		932		932
<i>X2</i>		-0.09		-0.29***		-0.36***		-3.12***		-2.36

Source: World Value Survey 6 (Restricted Sample)

^p ≤.10, \*p ≤.05, \*\*p ≤.01, \*\*\*p ≤.001