

**Molding Lumps of Clay: Political Education through
Extracurricular Activities for Primary Schoolchildren in
Yangzhou, February 1949–June 1952**

by
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Abstract

In 1950, Guo Moruo, then vice premier of China in charge of education, likened children to lumps of clay. In Yangzhou, the work of molding them began soon after the Chinese Communist Party took over this southeastern city in January 1949, through political education permeating not only curricula but also extracurricular activities in primary schools. Teachers, new students who were children of the Party's rural cadres, and the Children's Brigade all contributed to urban children's rapid absorption of the new style, which consisted of behavior patterns and language desired by the Party. As for promoting the new ideal, which required children to hate enemies, the results were at best mixed. Abstract hatred toward Americans was ignited among children in the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign. For those from merchant families, their family members became targets in the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns. Only in some schools, such children were pressured to turn against their families. But concrete hatred was hardly generated.

Keywords: China; Yangzhou; political education; hatred; children; the new style; the new ideal; Children's Brigade; the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign; the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns

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List of Acronyms

Erxiao	Second Dongguanjie Primary School
Fuxiao	Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School
JPA	Jiangsu Provincial Archives
PRC	People's Republic of China
YMA	Yangzhou Municipal Archives

Introduction

In April 1950, only half a year after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League organized the First National Conference of Cadres on Children's Work. On April 23, Guo Moruo, who oversaw culture and education in the central government, delivered a speech. As a prestigious poet, his description of children was metaphorical: "Everyone in childhood has a great deal of plasticity. Like a lump of clay, they can be molded into whatever we want them to be. This plasticity shrinks with age, as the saying goes: 'A genius child at ten, a gifted person at twenty, an ordinary one at thirty, and someone who is old but yet to die at forty.'"¹ What did the new communist regime want to mold the "lumps of clay" into? Feng Wenbin, the secretary of the League Centre who was supervising children's work, provided a concise answer: "Our purpose of education is to cultivate the new generation into people who have correct ideological awareness and revolutionary temperament, basic knowledge of culture and science, and a healthy physique. They should be future masters of this new society who fare well in the moral, the intellectual, and the physical. They should be good sons and daughters of new China."² How to mold the "lumps of clay" into desirable products? Feng emphasized the necessity of "a kind of correct and appropriate political education."³ Senior cadres in Beijing regarded political education as central to the molding project.

Who implemented the molding work at the grassroots? How did they do it? Was their work effective? The answers partly lie in the extracurricular school life of primary school students in Yangzhou between February 1949 and June 1952. Teachers, especially form teachers (*banzhuren*) and Children's Brigade tutors (*fudaoyuan*), were primarily responsible for conducting political education outside the academic realm.⁴ But most of them were not competent or enthusiastic to do this job. The Chinese Communist Party expected them to help children adopt the new style, which consisted of behaviour patterns and language desired by the Party.

¹ Guo Moruo, "Zai chuntian qiangzhe lai bozhong" [Seizing Every Minute and Second to Sow in Spring], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 8–9.

² Feng Wenbin, "Peiyang jiaoyu xinde yidai" [Cultivating and Educating the New Generation], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 20.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Each class, which usually consisted of about fifty students, had one form teacher. The form teacher not only taught at least one subject to the class but also took care of the students when they were at school.

Moreover, they were further expected to make children internalize the new ideal, which was “perfectly” patriotic and manifested in hatred toward “enemies.” While dissemination of the new style was largely smooth, that of the new ideal was not.

My distinction between the new style and the new ideal is crucial, as the chapters that follow will show. By “new style,” I mean behaviour patterns that could be characterized in terms of collectivism and discipline, and language such as “liberation” and “democracy.” They were endorsed by the Party. People with this style would create a comprehensive impression through which they distinguished themselves from Chinese people in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other regions of the world. In contrast, the new ideal was a “perfectly” patriotic person. Its patriotism was perfect in that its overriding motivation was always to benefit the country. This was possible only if people had correct emotions. Among them was hatred toward enemies, namely those who were harming the country. Such emotions would inevitably be expressed in observable behaviours. While dissemination of the new style is like molding lumps of clay into products that look like bunnies to outside observers, that of the new ideal is like molding them into real bunnies.

The region I call “Yangzhou” in this thesis is much smaller than the city in Jiangsu Province with the same name today. It is part of the current Guangling District. To the north of the Yangtze River and adjacent to the Grand Canal, Yangzhou used to be an economic centre in Southeast China. But in the late 1940s, it was a small city with most of its residents working as small business owners or employees. Before its “liberation” in early 1949, it had only a handful of underground Party members and a few high school students working for them, so the Party’s influence over its residents was initially very limited. The People’s Liberation Army took over Yangzhou with little resistance on January 25, 1949, four days before the Spring Festival and, for teachers and students, during winter vacation. Party cadres wanted a transition free from disruption, so the new semester began in February smoothly in most schools and political education took place immediately. Yangzhou was similar to other “newly liberated” cities shortly after 1949 in that primary school teachers mostly came from the Republican era, having little prior knowledge about the new style and the new ideal. By taking Yangzhou as a case, I hope to shed light on political education among primary school children in “newly liberated” cities during the early years of the PRC, which previously received little attention from scholars.



Figure 0.1. Location of Yangzhou

Note: This is my licensed adaptation of Ian Kiu's work *Modern Course of Grand Canal of China*, which can be found at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Modern_Course_of_Grand_Canal_of_China.png.

February 1949 is the natural starting point since dissemination of both the new style and the new ideal started through political education as soon as the first post-“liberation” semester began. But dissemination of the new ideal, especially cultivation of hatred toward enemies, was not prominent until the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign took place in late 1950. In Yangzhou, this process soon culminated during the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns in the first half of 1952 and was manifested in pressuring some schoolchildren to turn against their merchant families. But the tide ebbed quickly. As the 1952 fall semester began in early September, the focus of political education for schoolchildren shifted. In a word, political education for primary schoolchildren took place and soon went radical in Yangzhou between February 1949 and June 1952. Although dissemination of the new style was more noticeable before late 1950 while that of the new ideal was more so after it, both were under way throughout.

In “The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction,” Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz warn us that “it is unwise to generalize about China during the early 1950s” because of “the extraordinary diversity and complexity of how individuals, families, and

social groups experienced the 1949–1953 years.”⁵ Moreover, they argue that “[t]he party was most effective when it focused its full attention and resources on a given task,” and that it “postponed, ignored, or bungled less pressing tasks.”⁶ I will illustrate the former point and elaborate on the latter. First, whether a form teacher or a Brigade tutor was enthusiastic in political education largely determined what children’s extracurricular school life would be like. And how children experienced political campaigns, such as the Three and Five Antis, differed because of their distinct family backgrounds. Second, although cadres claim children’s work to be important, it did not have a high priority as the new regime was establishing the new order. Political education in primary schools often lacked resources, such as competent educators. But the work was sometimes effective: dissemination of the new style between February 1949 and September 1952 was quite successful. The ineffectiveness of disseminating the new ideal in the Three and Five Antis Campaigns was not simply due to lack of resources. The new ideal itself had unrealistic elements.

In Mao’s China, political activism was always a criterion by which students were evaluated. In *Competitive Comrades*, Susan Shirk proposes that, between 1949 and 1966, “[c]areer success depended on three factors: political record, academic (or professional) achievement, and family class label.”⁷ Anita Chan in the first chapter of *Children of Mao* explores how conformity that was associated with political activism contradicted creativity among primary schoolchildren in the late 1950s.⁸ This structure did not exist before 1949. I will trace it to the starting point, when political activism was still alien to most children and some of them were even afraid to join the Children’s Brigade. Political education between February 1949 and June 1952 was also part of the process in which the structure summarized by Shirk and explored by Chan was quickly established.

Political education was a pervasive phenomenon in communist China. Suzanne Pepper in *Radicalism and Education Reform in Twentieth-Century China* points out that new China, following the Soviet Union, dismissed the idea that “study and the curriculum could be divorced

⁵ Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz, “The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction,” in *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.

⁶ Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz, “The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction,” 8.

⁷ Susan Shirk, *Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 17.

⁸ Anita Chan, *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation* (London: Macmillan, 1985), 18–51.

from politics.” In contrast, “learning and politics could not be separated.”⁹ This thesis will take a step further. On the one hand, in primary schools, ideological elements permeated not only curricular design but also the whole extracurricular school life. On the other hand, political education sometimes was not merely propaganda. In *The Birth of the Propaganda State*, Peter Kenez provides a classic description of Soviet propaganda: “First the people came to speak a strange idiom and adopt the behavior patterns expected of them, and only then did the inherent ideological message seep in. The process of convincing proceeded not from inside out but from outside in.”¹⁰ This also occurred among primary school students in Yangzhou. However, we also see how students, by participating in those ideology-laden activities, learned how to cooperate with each other and got a sense of being a contributing community member. Political education mingled propaganda with socialization of children.

It was teachers who carried out political education. In the early years of the PRC, most teachers had been educated in the Republican era and they themselves needed political education. In the sixth chapter of *Raising China’s Revolutionaries*, Margaret Mih Tillman describes how kindergarten teachers were politically educated and how they taught politics to small children. Tillman mentions two cases of teachers politically educating children. The teacher in the first case organized other children to criticize a naughty boy. This was a new form adopted after 1949. In the second case, the teacher told stories about Chairman Mao to children. This was an old form infused with new content.¹¹ Since primary school students are more mature than children in kindergartens, political education for them could have more forms. I will not only explore many of these forms but also show that teachers were not as enthusiastic as expected in conducting political education.

Fostering hatred toward the country’s enemies was an essential element of the new ideal. In “Moving the Masses: The Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution,” Elizabeth Perry argues that a major difference between the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party lies in “emotion work,” which she defines as “the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or

⁹ Suzanne Pepper, *Radicalism and Education Reform in Twentieth-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162.

¹⁰ Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 255.

¹¹ Margaret Mih Tillman, *Raising China’s Revolutionaries: Modernizing Childhood for Cosmopolitan Nationalists and Liberated Comrades, 1920s–1950s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 182–188.

feeling.”¹² According to Perry, the Communist Party did a much better job in producing “the dedication born of this ‘emotion-raising’ (*tigao qingxu*).”¹³ I will not only detail emotion work among children during the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign, but also explore its limits in the Three and Five Antis Campaigns. While teachers successfully aroused abstract hatred of remote Americans among children, they failed to foster concrete hatred of one’s bourgeois family members. This difference existed whether teachers’ techniques were sophisticated or simple.

The new ideal exposed its own weakness when it required children in the Three and Five Antis Campaigns to turn against their families, who had been labeled as bourgeois. What role did family bonds play in the post-revolution era? In *The House of Government*, Yuri Slezkine argues that the persistence of family life contributed to the demise of the Russian revolution: “By having children at all, they were digging the grave of their revolution. The house of socialism—as a residential building with family apartments—was a contradiction in terms. The problem with Bolshevism was that it was not totalitarian enough.”¹⁴ So it was with the Chinese revolution: family bonds are rooted so deeply in human nature that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible at all, for any human beings to embrace the new ideal, which might demand hatred of one’s own parents.

Yangzhou was like Hangzhou in many aspects although it was smaller and attracted less attention. For example, both were commercial cities with very few industrial workers in the late 1940s, had only a few underground Party members before “liberation,” and were taken over and administered by cadres from rural areas. In *The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou*, James Gao identifies “two interwoven processes: the Communist attempt to transform the urban culture in order to facilitate the legitimization of the new regime and the countervailing change in the Communist mentality caused by the resistance and reaction of a resilient urban culture.”¹⁵ Both trends were also present in Yangzhou. I touch on the first trend from a different perspective. While Gao focuses on the world of adult rural cadres, I will pay attention to their children, exploring how these new students from the countryside contributed to disseminating the new style to their urban classmates.

¹² Elizabeth J. Perry, “Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution,” *Mobilization* 7, no. 2: 112.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Yuri Slezkine, *The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 953.

¹⁵ James Gao, *The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou: The Transformation of City and Cadres* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), 5.

My argument relies on three categories of primary sources. The first are archival documents from the Yangzhou Municipal Archives and Jiangsu Provincial Archives. The second category consists of printed materials. Among them, the most important for my project are the newspaper *North Jiangsu Daily (Subei ribao)*, the magazine *North Jiangsu Education (Subei jiaoyu)*, and the pamphlet *Work Report (Gongzuo huibao)* edited by the Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School. The pamphlet is a rare source. I did not know it existed before I found a hard copy in an online flea market. The third category of my primary sources is oral history interviews. In Yangzhou, I interviewed twenty-two people who were primary school students between 1949 and 1952, three who were primary school teachers at that time, and one who was a Brigade cadre at Yangzhou Normal School and who later became a teacher and principal.

Because I asked my interviewees about their memories of what happened more than sixty years ago, I often have to make judgments about the truth and accuracy of their accounts. Sometimes this is not very difficult, especially when one person's memory echoes other sources. For example, Wu Dan's descriptions of new students from the countryside matches Cheng Yuxiang's memoir. However, one interviewee sometimes might elaborate on something no one else could remember. Should I believe it? This question becomes particularly urgent when it is potentially what Gail Hershatter calls a "good-enough story," which "surprises and engenders thought, unspooling in different directions depending on which thread the listener picks up."¹⁶ For instance, Wu Dan provided a fascinating description of how he was elected as a Brigade cadre. But Tong Aisha, one of his fellow students, could remember nothing about the election, although he said Wu was an activist at school. Should I include Wu's story in my thesis or discard it as an unfounded anecdote? I chose to include it for many reasons: I trust his sincerity in telling me about his childhood; I could figure out that he considered the election one of the most treasured memories about his childhood; for Tong, an ordinary Brigade member rather than a Brigade cadre, the election, if it did exist, must have been less significant; and since their school was supposed to be a model for how to establish a Brigade branch, it is unlikely that no election, which was an important component of the nominal protocol, had been held. In fact, many good-enough stories, including most of those about primary school life over sixty years ago, can only be retrieved by oral history interviews, perhaps because they were usually deemed as unworthy of recording in archival documents or detailing in publications.

¹⁶ Gail Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China's Collective Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018), 5.

This thesis consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 covers the period between February 1949 and September 1950, focusing on dissemination of the new style. Teachers, though most of them were not competent or enthusiastic, started to conduct political education very early, following their superiors' instructions. Some students from "old liberated areas" transferred to Yangzhou. As an incarnation of the new style, they influenced their urban counterparts in various ways. The founding of local Brigade branches was not smooth in the beginning. Scrutinized individually, results of the collective activities organized by the Brigade were mixed. But dissemination of the new style, taken as a whole, was quite effective.

Chapter 2 covers the period between October 1950 and June 1952, focusing on dissemination of the new ideal. Teachers educated children about the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign and the Three and Five Antis Campaigns. Senior cadres expected children to be cultivated into "perfect" patriots who always had correct emotions that would motivate all their behaviours. Specifically, teachers taught children to hate Americans and the bourgeoisie. However, while it was easy to abstractly hate remote Americans, it was extremely difficult to concretely hate one's own family members who supposedly belonged to the bourgeoisie. Dissemination of the new ideal was unsatisfactory. This problem was rooted in the ideal itself.

Chapter 1.

Disseminating the New Style, February 1949–September 1950

On June 1, 1950, Hui Guixun, a grade three student, participated in a ceremony to join the Children’s Brigade. He and his fellow Brigade members all had a red paper flower attached on the front of their chest. He was so happy and proud. However, after the ceremony, a rumour went around that these children would be taken away. Hui was so scared that he took off the flower and threw it off.¹⁷ This illustrates how, sixteen months after the takeover of Yangzhou, its primary schoolchildren received behaviour patterns and language endorsed by the Party, what I call “the new style”: they saw them in a positive light, were affected by them in various ways, but did not yet fully identify with them.

Based on data primarily about the Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School (“Fuxiao” for short), this chapter will shed light on two specific questions. First, what were the various ways the new style reached and affected children in their extracurricular school life? Second, were they effective? As we will see, teachers, new students from “old liberated areas,” and the Children’s Brigade all made their contributions. Although some tasks were fulfilled better than others, political education in primary schools as a whole was effective in disseminating the new style.

The New Style

What kind of behaviour patterns and language were endorsed by the Party? How to characterize them? I call them “the new style” because they constituted a reliable identifier: Chinese people with such behaviour patterns and language could be easily spotted as coming from communist China rather than Hong Kong or Taiwan. We could define the behaviour patterns using labels such as “collectivism” and “discipline,” and the new language included terms such as “liberation,” “democracy,” and “the people.” The new style composed of these elements could be seen everywhere: when you see a child standing like a soldier in a ceremony,

¹⁷ Hui Guixun, interviewed by the author, September 15, 2017. This name, and all names of interviewees hereafter, are pseudonyms.

or when you hear a teacher telling her students to “make self-criticisms,” you are experiencing the new style. It is impossible to list all its manifestations. But one would hardly miss it when they actually encounter it.

Teachers

On the first day of the 1949 Spring Term, students who returned to Fuxiao found some familiar teachers had disappeared, including their principal Jin Yingyuan. In fact, they had fled. Before the city of Yangzhou was “liberated” during the winter break, people who feared their connections with the old regime might get them into trouble had chosen to leave. Among them were some teachers at Fuxiao. Since Fuxiao was the most prestigious school in the region, to be a teacher there was not easy.¹⁸ Sometimes an influential reference was necessary. However, such networks, which had been an advantage before 1949, became a major disadvantage after “liberation,” indicating a problem of “complicated social relations” (*shehui guanxi fuza*). Hence, some teachers at Fuxiao chose to leave.¹⁹

Remaining teachers mostly had little knowledge of the new style. They were classified into three categories: the advanced, the medium, and the backward. The majority were labelled the medium.²⁰ But even the advanced might have only limited knowledge of the Party. To

¹⁸ Teachers at Fuxiao earned much more than those at other primary schools did. The following table was compiled from an untitled archival document: Yangzhou Municipal Archives, hereafter abbreviated as YMA, A59-3-1-1.

Table 1.1. Teacher Salary Comparison between Fuxiao and Other Primary Schools

Time	Lowest Salary at Fuxiao (<i>jin</i> of rice)	Highest Salary at other primary schools (<i>jin</i> of rice)
November 1948	311	234
December 1948	197	208
January 1949	225	102

¹⁹ Song Huimao, interviewed by the author, October 21, 2017.

²⁰ Subei xingshu wenjiaochu, *Jiaoshi de tuanjie gaizao gongzuo* [Work of Uniting and Reforming Teachers], 1949, Jiangsu Provincial Archives, hereafter abbreviated as JPA, 7011-001-0093. The Education Bureau in the city of Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province was much more pessimistic and claimed that primary education was subject to “domination of feudal bureaucrats,” James Gao, *The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou*, 113.

illustrate, Huang Erying, a graduate of the prestigious Yangzhou Secondary School in the 1930s, had been a housewife before 1949. Sun Weimin, who was her acquaintance and the vice mayor in charge of education immediately after “liberation,” found her a teaching job. Being passionate about her work, she soon stood out and was appointed as the principal of Qionghuaguan Primary School, a prestigious one in Yangzhou.²¹ Huang must have been one of the most advanced teachers. However, given her previous experience, even she could not know much about the Party in 1949. So early in that year, the local Party branch quickly made a plan to provide political education to primary teachers, who were required to spend half a day per week hearing and discussing political reports.²²

At the same time, the same teachers, under instruction, started conducting political education among children. Prominent changes in primary schools did take place. As early as the 1949 spring semester, the idea of democratic management (*minzhu guanli*) was implemented among primary schoolchildren. Cadres expected teachers to let students take initiative. However, they soon found classrooms risked disorder.²³ This was confirmed by Tong Aisha, who was a grade five student at that time. He said teachers became less strict after “liberation.”²⁴ Understandably, teachers turned stricter in the next semester. However, cadres in the Education Section were still dissatisfied because the practice of democratic management existed in name only. From their point of view, the idea of democratic management was unquestionably correct but had not been properly implemented.²⁵

There were also changes to posters on the walls. At Fuxiao, the school had a bulletin board and each classroom had a wall newspaper. Before 1949, the bulletin board was filled with propaganda against the Party. As expected, its content became propaganda in favor of the Party after “liberation.”²⁶ However, the change to wall newspapers was much more drastic. Before 1949, they only had materials about children’s life, such as an essay depicting the coming of spring. But since the 1949 spring semester, wall newspapers became all about the “revolutionary

²¹ Wu Dan, interviewed by the author, July 6, 2017.

²² Er diwei xuanchuanbu, *Guanyu youzhou chengzhong xuesheng ji xiaoxuejiaoshi zhengzhi jiaoyu de jihua* [Plan on Political Education of Secondary School Students and Primary School Teachers in the City of Yangzhou], March 22, 1949, YMA, 203-1-243.

²³ Yangzhou shi renmin zhengfu wenjiaoke, *Yi jiu si jiu nian shi shiyi liangyue gongzuo baogao* [Work Report for October and November in 1949], December 1940, YMA, A59-1-1-1.

²⁴ Tong Aisha, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

²⁵ Yangzhou shi renmin zhengfu wenjiaoke, *Yi jiu si jiu nian shi shiyi liangyue gongzuo baogao*.

²⁶ Gou Huaisha, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

situation” (*geming xingshi*).²⁷ While the children manually made the wall newspapers, this practice was supervised by form teachers, who usually had the final say over the content. So the change in wall newspapers could only be initiated by form teachers, who could only get this idea from local cadres in charge of education.

Sometimes, teachers even led students to go outside the campus and participate in mass gatherings in the city. This must have been required by cadres, but it was teachers who implemented the idea. The most prominent example was the parade celebrating the founding of the People’s Republic of China. On October 3, 1949, 2,000 primary school students participated. Among them was Gou Huaisha, who was a grade four student at Fuxiao at that time. He was a member of the drum and bugle corps that performed in front of the parade. He and his peers had been selected one month earlier and taken training every day.²⁸ This must have been an unforgettable experience for Gou. But even for other children who only walked in the parade, this kind of experience helped to produce in their minds an impression about how to behave as part of a magnificent cause.

“Advanced” teachers also influenced students through the new terms they uttered. In 1949, Ding Chunzi was a grade three student at Fuxiao. A young teacher with the surname Jiang always said, “Our country is liberated and democratic! We are free now!” Influenced by Mr. Jiang, Ding often talked back to his parents in terms of democracy and freedom.²⁹ At that time, Ding understood democracy and freedom as implying that “you should not mind my business.” He definitely misunderstood the Party’s ideology. However, this was still progress since children at least became familiar with such terms. They knew these terms referred to something positive and tried to apply them in their daily lives.

In primary schools, teachers became practitioners of political education as early as in 1949. Most of them did the work in ways that did not require a lot of effort. They simply followed their superiors’ instructions, such as those to let children take initiative, to change the content of wall newspapers, and to prepare students for the parade. Even if some teachers did something extra, such as disseminating the new language endorsed by the Party, they could not

²⁷ Tong, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

²⁸ Gou, interviewed by the author, October 22, 2017.

²⁹ Ding Chunzi, “Zhi jiaoshi” [To Teachers], *Ding Chunzi de boke* (blog), *Xinlang boke*, September 9, 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20171210053124/http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4912dfdd010005i3.html.

always ensure that students would receive it correctly. Nevertheless, children began accepting the authority of the Party, feeling like they were part of a great cause, and absorbing the new style.

New Students from Old Liberated Areas

At the end of the 1949 spring semester, more than 100 new students, all in grey uniforms of the New Fourth Army, were seen on the campus of Fuxiao.³⁰ They looked three to five years older and spoke dialects of the northernmost regions of Jiangsu.³¹ They were sons and daughters of cadres and martyrs from old liberated areas. Their school, the Primary School Affiliated to the Second Sub-Region Normal School in Gaoyou County, had recently been merged with Fuxiao.³² So they also moved to Yangzhou, an urban area they had never been to before.

Different from their urban classmates, they were boarding on campus. There were people taking care of them who came from their old school. These new students were used to collective life and highly militarized. Children in the city of Yangzhou had never seen peers like this and were really impressed. Even after more than sixty years, one of them could still recall a typical morning for his new fellow students:

Every day, as the morning dawned, all the boarders, hearing the reveille, quickly got up, made the bed, and cleaned themselves. They dressed up and run to the playground for formation training. The “little solders” produced a uniform sound of footsteps and barked out the drill command of “one-two-three-four.” These made the old Meihua Academy young and vigorous. After the morning exercise, the group of innocent and lively teenagers marched to the front of the cafeteria. The one who was on duty led all others to sing songs popular in the old liberated area, such as *The Sky in the Liberated Area Is Serene*, *Fight Well*, *Get Grenades Ready*, *A Brother and A Sister Reclaim the Wasteland*, *Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention*, and *You Are the Lighthouse*. Then they went into

³⁰ Ibid.; Wu, interviewed by the author, July 6, 2017; Tong, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

³¹ People in Yangzhou and those who spoke such dialects could understand each other well. However, children of cadres who came from the north could not understand Shanghai dialect. This became a big problem when they entered primary schools in Shanghai; see Li Yanyan, “Jianguo chuqi Shanghai ganbu zidi xuexiao yanjiu” [Study of Shanghai Senior Cadre Children Schools in the Initial Stage of the People’s Republic of China] (master’s thesis, East China Normal University, 2009), 32, <http://cdmd.cnki.com.cn/Article/CDMD-10269-2009188158.htm>.

³² In big cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, schools only for children of senior cadres were built from scratch; see Li Yanyan, “Jianguo chuqi Shanghai ganbu zidi xuexiao yanjiu;” Zhang Fang, “Zhonggong ganbu zidi xiaoxue lishi chutan” [Preliminary Exploration about the History of the Primary Schools for Children of Cadres of the Chinese Communist Party], *Shilin*, no. 2 (2016): 190–201.

the cafeteria in turn to eat. After breakfast, they cleaned their bowls and chopsticks and then put them into the cupboard properly.³³

The same person who depicted this scene also recalled his reaction at that time was “curiosity and admiration.”³⁴ For urban children, these boarders represented the new style. They generally received it with respect. Some of them even thought it was fashionable.

These new students integrated into Fuxiao without difficulty. To be sure, they could not go to the homes of their urban classmates who often studied and played in each other’s homes, and the boarders’ academic performance was generally not as good as their classmates’. Nevertheless, they soon became leaders for several reasons. First, they were older and more mature. Second, they were more disciplined. In fact, some of them had already been League members while most of their teachers were not. Understandably, they were often assigned the task of assisting teachers to maintain order. Third, they were very friendly to their urban classmates, treating them as younger brothers and sisters. After more than sixty years, Wu Dan could still remember how he had been fascinated by the revolutionary stories told by an “elder sister.”³⁵

These newcomers influenced urban students at Fuxiao in various ways. They introduced new songs, stories, and practices. For example, when all students were gathered on the playground, boarders in one class would lead their classmates to sing revolutionary songs. Then they would ask students in another class to sing another song.³⁶ This practice was common in the People’s Liberation Army but new to urban children. Those boarders served as an incarnation of collectivism, an essential element of the new style. For urban children, mere description became direct experience.

³³ Cheng Yuxiang, “Yangzhou jiefang qianhou de jiyi” [Memories of Yangzhou before and after Liberation], *Yangzhou wenshi ziliao*, no. 29 (2009): 31.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Wu, interviewed by the author, July 16, 2017.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

The Children's Brigade

Founding

On November 9, 1949, cadres in charge of education in Yangzhou asked their superiors a question. “The Children’s Brigade is children’s core organization. What name should we give to their peripheral organization?” The answer they got was that the Brigade, “open to all children,” should not be interpreted as a “narrow core organization.”³⁷ The Brigade was a nationwide children’s organization founded by the Youth League on October 13, 1949. The resolution on founding the Brigade formulated its purpose as “to unite and educate children in study and various collective activities, making them good sons and daughters of the new China who love the motherland and the people, like labouring, and take care of public property.”³⁸ The League Centre originally planned to call the organization-to-be The Young Pioneers but later changed their mind.³⁹ The new name was intended to “unite and organize children more broadly, avoiding misunderstanding this children’s organization, via the literal meaning of ‘Pioneers,’ as a narrow organization for a few children.”⁴⁰ However, the question from Yangzhou cadres indicates the new name was far from enough to rid the grassroots of that misunderstanding.

In fact, people who oversaw launching local branches of the Brigade made it at first very difficult for children to be admitted. This, half a year after the founding of the Brigade, was criticized as a major shortcoming. “Universally in various regions, the bar was set too high, and the capability of the Brigade was exaggerated. The admission criteria were too strict and the procedure for joining the Brigade too complicated.”⁴¹ To be fair, the job description issued by the League Centre might not have been clear enough for practitioners at the grassroots. On the one

³⁷ Yangzhou shi wenjiaoke and Subei xingshu wenjiaochu, [no title], November 1949, JPA, 7011-003-0277.

³⁸ Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jianli Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui de jueyi [Resolution on Founding the Children’s Brigade of China], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 2–3.

³⁹ Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan diyi jie quanguo daibiao dahui, “Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan gongzuo gangling” [The Work Program of the New Democratic Youth League of China], *Renmin ribao*, May 6, 1949.

⁴⁰ Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, “Guanyu jianli shaonian ertong dui de jige wenti de shuoming” [Explanation of Several Issues About Founding the Children’s Brigade], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 4–5.

⁴¹ He Li, “Zai diyi ci quanguo shaonian ertong gongzuo ganbu huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao” [Work Report in the First National Meeting of Cadres in Charge of Children’s Work], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 12–18.

hand, the admission criteria seemed quite loose. “To be a Brigade member, one only needs to be a nine-to-fifteen-year-old child who is willing to join the Brigade, abide by the Brigade Charter, and participate into the Brigade’s activities.”⁴² But on the other hand, everyone knew there must be some kind of selection; it was unimaginable that any child who said they wanted to join the Brigade would be automatically admitted. So for people who were actually in charge of recruiting Brigade members, this amounted to a guidance that was not quite useful: admit those children who were “better” than others in some sense, but do not expect them to be “too good.”

Most recruiters chose to strictly implement the guidance. This was also the case in Yangzhou. Fuxiao was among the local schools where Brigade branches were first established. “To join the Brigade, students at Fuxiao had to go through the steps of application, review by the form teacher, democratic appraisal, and review by the League branch.”⁴³ Applicants would be evaluated with respect to two requirements. One was summarized as Three Dare’s and Four Be-Willing-To’s (*san gan si ken*): dare to speak, ask, and struggle; be willing to take initiative, help others, endure hardships, and accept criticisms. The other requirement was to score no less than 80 percent in moral conduct (*caoxing*).⁴⁴ The procedure and requirements must have been intimidating to children. Fuxiao had 1,145 students, but only 300 applied and 120 were admitted by the Brigade.⁴⁵ Gou, a member of the drum and bugle corps, was not admitted because he was too naughty.⁴⁶ Qi Huji was a shy boy and not naughty at all. But he was not admitted, either. His family was poor, so his grandfather always told him that he had to study hard to change his fate.⁴⁷

⁴² Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, “Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui zhangcheng cao’an” [Draft Charter of the Children’s Brigade of China], in *Quanguo shaoxiandui gongzuo huiyi ji daibiao dahui gailan* (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 2016), 3–4.

⁴³ Qingniantuan Subei gongzuo weiyuanhui, “Sange yue lai Subei jianli shaonian ertong dui de zongjie” [Summary of Founding the Children’s Brigade in Northern Jiangsu in Recent Three Months], *Subei tuanxun*, no. 4 (1950): 4.

⁴⁴ “Jiandui jianxun” [Briefing on Founding the Brigade], *Subei qingnian*, January 1, 1950.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Gou, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

⁴⁷ Qi Huji, interviewed by the author, September 17, 2017. As late as the early 1960s, many Chinese parents still shared a similar idea adopted by Qi’s grandfather in early 1950s. This was observed by Shirk: “Chinese parents—middle class parents in particular—continue to believe that academic study is the central purpose of schooling; they tend to encourage their children to strive for intellectual excellence, and pay less attention to political accomplishments;” Shirk, *Competitive Comrades*, 71. “To make these political lessons more concrete to the pupils, the schools promoted a wide range of highly organized activities, and it was based on their enthusiastic participation in these activities that the children’s political activism was to be judged;” Chan, *Children of Mao*, 15. Note that Chan’s interviewees were five to eight years younger than Qi.

Perhaps he concentrated on study to the extent that, for the recruiters, he failed to spend enough time participating in collective activities.

Even if the criteria had not been so strict, recruiters still might not be able to find as many applicants as they desired. In newly liberated areas such as Yangzhou, some parents and children made sense of the Brigade in light of their very limited knowledge of the Party. The most common worry was “fear of being a soldier;” some parents and children were afraid that joining the Brigade was the first step to being enlisted.⁴⁸ Other worries included “fear of standing sentry, affecting study, attending too many meetings, returning home late at night, being transferred to the countryside, and lifting stretchers.”⁴⁹ At Fuxiao, since there were boarders, some parents were afraid that their children would be forced to board on campus so their connection to their families would be cut off.⁵⁰ Hence, recruiters spent a lot of time explaining why the worries were groundless.

But it was not an easy job. A partial explanation was simply that there were not enough recruiters. The Brigade was subject to the League, so League members should dominate the recruiting work. However, there were very few League members in primary schools in newly liberated areas. In Yangzhou, while there were more than fifty primary schools, there were no more than thirty League members among primary school teachers.⁵¹ At Fuxiao, Yan Hezhong, a twenty-year-old teacher and the would-be Brigade tutor, was probably the only League member. So the recruiting and explaining work could not be done without the help of other teachers.⁵² Although some teachers, especially young ones who wanted to be League members, would be very active in this work, others might not be so since the League had no say over their careers and lives. Understandably, fears among students could not be eliminated completely. As depicted in the scenario in the beginning of this chapter, Hui, even after joining the Brigade, still could not help being affected by rumours.

⁴⁸ Subei xingshu wenjiaochu, [no title], 1949, JPA, 7011-003-0277; Qingniantuan Subei gongzuo weiyuanhui, “Sange yue lai Subei jianli shaonian ertong dui de zongjie,” 11.

⁴⁹ Qingniantuan Subei gongzuo weiyuanhui, “Sange yue lai Subei jianli shaonian ertong dui de zongjie,” 11.

⁵⁰ Subei xingshu wenjiaochu, [no title].

⁵¹ Yangzhou shi renmin zhengfu wenjiaoke, *Yi jiu si jiu nian shi shiyi liangyue gongzuo baogao*.

⁵² Qingniantuan Subei gongzuo weiyuanhui, “Sange yue lai Subei jianli shaonian ertong dui de zongjie,” 11.

Nevertheless, as recruiters kept working, more and more students joined the Brigade. There were fewer than 2,000 Brigade members in Yangzhou in April 1950, half a year after the Brigade was founded.⁵³ In June, only two months later, the figure rose to 3,322.⁵⁴ Gou and Qi were finally admitted. Qi said, “I was very delighted because I became the same as other students.”⁵⁵

The process of founding basic level organizations of the Brigade was not smooth in the beginning. But hardworking recruiters should not be blamed. Their numbers were inadequate. Their superiors failed to provide clear guidance. Ordinary people in Yangzhou had too many inaccurate presuppositions about the Brigade. Because of these recruiters’ work, the Brigade was established in Yangzhou and children in general became willing to join it.

Collective Activities

Brigade members were supposed to participate in various activities. They were summarized in five categories in the Draft Brigade Charter: “diligent study, participation in labor, entertainment and games, sports and hygiene, and active work.”⁵⁶ This list covered all aspects of school life one can imagine. These were all collective activities. They were intended to “make children realize the joint tasks they have and the congruence in their interests, make them be prepared to devote themselves to one and the same revolutionary cause.” “They were to love and help each other, be unanimous in action, make efforts for the collective, and have the spirit of ‘one for all and all for one.’”⁵⁷

One such example was an artistic performance for famine relief at Fuxiao. In the second half of 1949, floods affected northern Jiangsu. 310,000 people were short of food. The next year the figure rose to 800,000.⁵⁸ Yan, the highest-ranking Brigade tutor at Fuxiao, planned an artistic

⁵³ Qingniantuan Yangzhou shi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *1950 nian chunji gongzuo baogao* [Working Report of 1950 Spring], June 1950, YMA, A42-2-1-1.

⁵⁴ Qingniantuan Yangzhou shi gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Lingdao jiancha* [Inspection of Leadership], June 1950, YMA, A42-1-1-21.

⁵⁵ Gou, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

⁵⁶ Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, “Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui zhangcheng caoan.”

⁵⁷ Feng Wenbin, “Peiyang jiaoyu xinde yidai,” 7–8.

⁵⁸ 310,000 people were short of food that year, and the figure rose to 800,000 before the wheat harvest the next year; see Yangzhou shi difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, *Yangzhou shi zhi* [Yangzhou Municipal Gazetteer] (Shanghai: Zhongguo da baike chubanshe, 1997), 251.

performance which he expected adults to buy tickets to see. Then Fuxiao would donate the money for famine relief. So Brigade members needed to sell the tickets. After class, they went to restaurants, teahouses, and bathhouses, peddling tickets. In the end, they sold more than two hundred tickets, which was a big success. Wu can still remember one brief stage play in the performance. A boy played the role of Jiang Jieshi, the defeated enemy of the Party, with a patch attached to his forehead. A girl played the role of Jiang's wife, Song Meiling, behaving like a witch. They were first surrounded by soldiers of the People's Liberation Army and then executed.

Activities like this had mixed effects on children. On the one hand, they were instances of propaganda. In the above case, a negative attitude toward the Party's enemies and a disregard for their lives were disseminated to children. And by following Yan's directives, they learned what discipline was. On the other hand, they gained the experience of working together to achieve something relatively big. They felt they were community members who could help others. So political education in such cases was both propaganda and socialization; the two mingled with each other.

Being a Brigade Cadre

One day in the 1990s, Wu met the man whose son was to marry his daughter. Although Wu had no impression of him, the man said they used to study in the same primary school. "You were a battalion cadre. What a celebrity you were at that time!"⁵⁹ Wu was among those who were the first Brigade cadres at Fuxiao. The hierarchy of the Brigade was like the army. "Eight to fifteen children constitute a squad. Three to five squads form a squadron. And three to five squadrons yield a battalion. Each squad has one chief and one deputy. Each squadron or battalion has one chief and two deputies."⁶⁰ In practice, Brigade members at one school formed a battalion. At big schools such as Fuxiao, the number of battalion cadres often exceeded the stipulated three.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Wu, interviewed by the author, July 6, 2017.

⁶⁰ Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, "Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui zhangcheng caoan."

⁶¹ Wu, interviewed by the author, July 6, 2017.

According to the Draft Brigade Charter, all Brigade cadres should be elected by its members.⁶² When interviewed, Wu was very delighted to recall the scene in which he and his colleagues were elected:

We sat in front of all Brigade members. Each of us had one bowl. It was covered by a piece of paper which had a hole in the middle. Each Brigade member was assigned red beans whose number equaled that of the would-be cadres. They voted by casting beans into bowls. After calculation, I was declared to be elected.⁶³

But the election was not genuinely democratic. Before being elected, one should first become a candidate. How was the list of candidates determined? According to Wu's memory, it was largely determined by one person: Yan, the young teacher, battalion tutor and League member. Wu depicted himself as "not outstanding in study and so-so in work ability."⁶⁴ How could he become a candidate? As a primary school student, Wu was enthusiastic in participating in various collective activities. Tong, as a seventy-nine-year-old man, could still remember Wu even though they were not in the same grade at Fuxiao. "Like now, Wu was not slim at that time. He was very active."⁶⁵ This must have been relevant to his candidacy. But Wu himself proposed another explanation. His mother was the principal of another primary school. Yan knew her. This personal relationship must also be relevant. However, from Wu's perspective, this still was not the whole story. Although she was not even a League member, his mother was passionate to work for the Party. "At that time, it was risky to be active. My mother even participated in the arrest of counterrevolutionaries, which was very dangerous."⁶⁶ Wu regarded his candidacy primarily as a reward to his mother for her wholehearted collaboration with the Party.

What job should a battalion cadre do? In other words, how did a battalion cadre work with the battalion tutor, who was an adult and a League member? There were two models. First, battalion cadres did their work, such as organizing collective activities, largely on their own while tutors only showed their hands when it was necessary. Second, battalion cadres simply followed step-by-step tutors' directives. In theory, the first model was desirable. "Tutors should be good at cultivating initiative, activism, and creativity in Brigade members, enabling them to reach the

⁶² Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingniantuan zhongyang weiyuanhui, "Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui zhangcheng caoan."

⁶³ Wu, interviewed by the author, July 6, 2017.

⁶⁴ Wu Dan, interviewed by the author, July 12, 2017.

⁶⁵ Tong, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

⁶⁶ Wu, interviewed by the author, July 12, 2017.

expected goal on their own.”⁶⁷ But in reality, the second model was prevalent. Wu called himself a “puppet” as a battalion cadre. He would conduct a choir when Yan told him to do so. He would speak in front of all Brigade members after Yan gave him the script.

However, Yan was not regarded as a poor tutor. In fact, he was excellent from the perspective of his superiors: he represented all tutors in Yangzhou to attend a meeting in Beijing and later was promoted to head the Children’s Section in the League’s Yangzhou committee. It is unfair to criticize Yan and his colleagues. An ideal battalion cadre would be able to explain the political significance of their collective activities smoothly to all Brigade members. However, this was probably mission impossible for primary schoolchildren who had access to the new style for only one year.

Conclusion

Teachers, new students from “old liberated areas,” and the Children’s Brigade constituted various ways for the new style to reach and affect primary school students in the city of Yangzhou. Scrutinized individually, some tasks were fulfilled successfully, such as the artistic performance, while others were not, such as the practice of democratic management. Lack of experience and a shortage of competent and enthusiastic educators might account for some failures. For example, if each school could have a couple of sent-down cadres, teachers might have been pushed to work more diligently. However, other failures had deeper roots. There was something problematic in the guidance from senior cadres in Beijing or even in their conception of the project. For example, Brigade cadres, no matter how experienced their tutors were, could hardly organize a collective activity on their own and be able to understand and explain clearly its political significance, because they were still children. The expectation was unreasonably high.

Nevertheless, children’s work between February 1949 and September 1950, taken as a whole, was largely effective. Primary school students became acquainted with the new style. Although they were still yet to fully understand and embrace it, they adopted a positive attitude toward it. At the very least, the Party could reasonably believe those children were already on its side.

⁶⁷ He Li, “Zai diyi ci quanguo shaonian ertong gongzuo ganbu huiyi shang de gongzuo baogao.”

Chapter 2.

Disseminating the New Ideal, October 1950–June 1952

Patriotism was the first of the five public virtues listed by the Common Program, which was the de facto constitution between 1949 and 1954.⁶⁸ Xu Teli, the Party's authoritative figure on educational theory, explained why patriotism was of supreme importance:

Our motherland is a piece of land where our ancestors and their descendants were born and died since ancient times. Since the imperialist invasion, we have been slaves to imperialism and its running dogs in China (feudal compradors) for a hundred years. Today we are liberated and can no longer live as slaves as we used to. We can't lose this territory. If we lose it, we'll have no place to flee between heaven and earth. Our territory and people of all ethnic groups must not be separated, or we shall be defeated one by one by the enemy and our sovereignty will be lost.⁶⁹

This account has two elements. The first one is a narrative depicting how Chinese people turned from slaves to masters. As masters, "people have fully acquired the right and freedom to love their motherland." The second one was a corresponding demand that Chinese people should not return to slavery. To avoid being slaves again, "patriotism must be a duty and an honor." It was so stringent a requirement that "[i]t is illegal, or even traitorous, to be unpatriotic, and this is subject to supervision by the people and punishment by the government."⁷⁰ Although the Party was not mentioned in the quote, it is easy to figure out how essential it was to patriotism. It was the Party that led the liberation of Chinese people. To remain liberated, the Party's leadership must be obeyed.

This chapter will show that patriotism was the umbrella concept that defines what I call "the new ideal," namely the model personality the Party wanted to disseminate among people, including primary schoolchildren. By focusing on the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign and the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns, I will explore how patriotic education was conducted among primary school students in their extracurricular school lives between October 1950 and June 1952. Specifically, hating enemies was an essential element of the new ideal. While abstract

⁶⁸ Xu Teli, "Lun guomin gongde (shang)" [On Citizens' Public Virtues (Part One)], *Renmin jiaoyu*, no. 7 (1950): 19.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

hatred of Americans was successfully cultivated among children in the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign, concrete hatred of bourgeois parents did not take hold during the Three-Antis and Five-Antis Campaigns. Although teachers' lack of enthusiasm contributed to difficulties in fostering hatred, problems internal to the new ideal played a more significant role.

The New Ideal: Patriotism and Hatred of Enemies

By definition, patriots love their country. As the Party always emphasizes, the country has enemies. Loving the country necessitates hating its enemies. In other words, someone who cannot genuinely hate the enemies cannot genuinely love the country. Love and hatred are emotions, sets of psychological properties. But emotions must be expressed in behaviours. In fact, people almost always infer someone's emotions from their behaviours. So a patriot is expected to behave in certain ways. "Every family and every department loves its country in its own way....Patriotism should not only be ideological, we should use patriotic thinking to promote action."⁷¹ Being a "perfect" patriot, whose patriotism is diluted by nothing, means behaving well in every aspect: ideally, someone who genuinely loves the country will always say and do things beneficial to the country or harmful to its enemies. To cultivate people, including primary school children, into perfect patriots living up to this "new ideal," patriotic education, especially instilling hatred, understandably became "the main content of political education" after the Korean War broke out.⁷²

The Resist America Aid Korea Campaign

On October 5, 1950, Mao Zedong decided to participate in the Korean War. Two weeks later, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army went to North Korea. Domestically, Party Centre launched the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign, which soon dominated social life. In northern Jiangsu, a directive about the campaign in primary schools was published in the following month. It had two emphases. First, "Our country cannot ignore the invasion of Korea by the United States; we should make all teachers and students realize that China and North Korea are mutually dependent, and that the invasion of Korea by the United States is inseparable from the invasion of China." This was a justification in terms of the liberation narrative: America would invade China

⁷¹ Ibid., 18-19.

⁷² Li Junmin, "Aiguo zhuyi de sixiang jiaoyu wenti" [The Issue of Patriotic Ideological Education], *Subei jiaoyu*, no. 3 (1951): 1.

after occupying North Korea and push Chinese people back to slavery. Second, “We should have a correct understanding of the ferocious features of the United States, thoroughly criticize the wrong idea of being close to and worshiping the United States as well as the emotion of fearing it, and establish hatred and contempt of it.”⁷³ Hatred was necessary to see America as an enemy while contempt was aimed to instill confidence that China would win. Not only teachers but also students were expected to have these thoughts and emotions. Cadres required corresponding education to be accessible for children. “In educational activities, our tutors and teachers should refrain from abstract explanations, make more accurate and simple metaphors, tell more stories, and make more use of recreational games, so that children can really be affected.”⁷⁴

Metaphor was important in this educating process. Primary school teachers in northern Jiangsu were advised to begin discussion sessions among children by asking questions such as “What is the wolf doing?” and “Would a rooster be afraid of a centipede?”⁷⁵ A wolf was often the major evil character in a short story, so children already felt hatred toward it. By dehumanizing American soldiers and equating them with wolves, children’s hatred toward the wolves was expected to be automatically redirected to Americans. The metaphor of the centipede was less common. The rooster stood for China since the contour of China was said to look like a rooster. The centipede, as the rooster’s prey, stood for American soldiers. This metaphor emphasized contempt. However, educators were also warned not to make bad metaphors, which could only raise confusion. “A teacher likened the United States to a wolf, North Korea to a chicken, and China to a bee. The children wondered, ‘how can a bee help a chicken beat a wolf?’”⁷⁶

Donation

The most effective way to cultivate hatred and contempt of American wolves among children was probably to let them be part of the war. They were too young to be enlisted, but they could make donations. At Fuxiao, a One Hundred Bullets Campaign was launched among

⁷³ “Kaizhan kang Mei yuan Chao de zhengzhi jiaoyu” [Undertaking the Political Education of the Resist America Aid Korea], *Subei jiaoyu*, no. 11 (1950): 9–10.

⁷⁴ Qing Zi, “Zai xuexiao shaonain ertong zhong ruhe kaizhan kang Mei yuan Chao de jiaoyu” [How to Conduct the Resist America Aid Korea Education among School Children], *Subei ribao*, November 17, 1950.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ “Guanyu chudeng jiaoyu fangmian ruhe jinxing kang Mei yuan Chao de shishi jiaoyu de wenti” [On the Issue of How to Conduct the Education of Facts of the Resist America Aid Korea in Primary Education], *Renmin jiaoyu*, no. 1 (1951): 37.

children only one month after China joined the war. Students were encouraged to make donations and the targeted amount set by the school was worth 100 bullets. Each form teacher was in charge of students in their class, which also had a targeted amount. A report depicted children as enthusiastic. For example, a child called Fang Xiaoping said, “I saved money originally for candies to buy a bullet to kill an American bandit. I will contribute another bullet next week.” The targeted amount was easily met in the first day. In fact, the donations received amounted to over 300,000 yuan, which could buy more than 200 bullets.⁷⁷ Similar scenarios were seen at other schools. A child called Hua Ruixue and her three siblings were students at Chengnan Central Primary School (“Chengnan” for short). They donated their silver bracelets. The school collected 585,900 yuan in total within one year. Another form of boosting morale was weaving comfort bags (*weiwen dai*). Children bought goods useful for soldiers and put them into small bags sent to the front. In the winter of 1950, students at Chengnan “saved money originally for candies and rushed out sixty-four comfort bags, most of which contained hand cream and gloves.”⁷⁸

For any child, it was possible to donate only if their parents could afford it and were willing to do so. Most children, especially boys, could not do needle work, so they could not weave their own comfort bags. Gou Huaisha, a student at Fuxiao at that time, was among those who handed in comfort bags. Over sixty years later, asked whether it was weaved by himself, he said, “If I did this, I would stab my hand.”⁷⁹ In fact, some parents were really supportive. At Fuxiao, Student Wang Pulin’s father said to the teachers, “I hear you will buy bullets for the Volunteer Army. This is a special donation of five thousand yuan for Pulin.”⁸⁰ However, many families could not afford the donation. Gong Guanghu, a student at Chengzhong Central Primary School at that time, recalled, “We could hardly feed ourselves at home. How could I donate?”⁸¹ Some cadres understood this risk of burdening students from poor families. In northern Jiangsu, authorities issued a warning. “Some schools improperly put forward the slogan of ‘donation contest,’ causing children to forcibly demand money from their parents and save money originally for breakfast. Some children even did immoral things. This not only blurs children’s perception of donation and creates negative political influence among some parents, but also

⁷⁷ Zhou Yizhong, “Yangshi diyi fuxiao kaizhan baike zidan yundong” [The First Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School Launched the One Hundred Bullets Campaign], *Subei ribao*, November 30, 1950.

⁷⁸ Gou, interviewed by the author, October 12, 2017.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Zhou, “Yangshi diyi fuxiao kaizhan baike zidan yundong.”

⁸¹ Gong Guanghu, interviewed by the author, September 19, 2017.

directly hinders children's health and character development, which is clearly a harmful practice."⁸² This problem seemed impossible to solve. Suppose one child made a donation. It was inevitable that teachers would praise him. Then this student would be imitated by other children whose families could afford donations. Poor ones could not help but feel pressured. Once cadres or educators decided to accept donations, this unintended consequence could hardly be avoided.

Artistic Performance

Artistic performance was also a major form of the Resist America Aid Korea education. The economic conditions of families had much less influence on participation. Whether a child was from a poor or rich family, he or she could go on stage if selected by teachers or Brigade tutors. For those not selected, being in the audience was also a way to participate. Performances were often fanciful for and almost always welcomed by children, so infusing performance with teachings must have been effective in affecting their thoughts and emotions.

In the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign, most performances took place within primary schools; their audience was fellow students and teachers. For example, children at Fuxiao and Chengnan once performed short plays such as *Zhongshan Wolves*, a traditional story about an ungrateful wolf, and *Liberating Taiwan*, a new theme about liberating an island still occupied by the Party's enemies sponsored by the United States.⁸³ Such performances were usually small-scale; only several performers participated. But in January 1951, a large-scale one took place at Fuxiao. Teachers draw a huge map of the Korean Peninsula on the playground, which served as the stage. They also prepared a script that covered all major events of the war. Once a teacher introduced an event to the large audience, performers would act out the event in the corresponding region on the map. Seventy-eight students participated in this performance:

Five students played the roles of General Kim Il Sung, Syngman Rhee, Truman, Dulles, and MacArthur respectively, eight were soldiers of the People's Army, ten were soldiers of the Volunteer Army, six were soldiers of the South Korean puppet troops, ten were American soldiers, three were American marines, four were mothers, five were nurses, and the rest were Korean and Chinese people.

⁸² Wang Yamei, "Dui fadong xiaoxuesheng juanxian wuqi de yijian" [Comments on Mobilizing Primary School Student to Donate Weapons], *Subei ribao*, July 5, 1951.

⁸³ Qing Zi, "Zai xuexiao shaonian ertong zhong ruhe kaizhan kang Mei yuan Chao de jiaoyu."

Tian Shoutang, the vice principal, called this performance “extremely effective.”⁸⁴ It was effective not only in cultivating hatred and contempt of American wolves but also in other aspects. For example, only Chinese leaders were so unique that no one played the role of them. This exception helped to accustom children to the idea that top leaders of the Party were so sublime that no one was permitted to imitate them on the stage.

Primary school students also performed off campus. A briefing mentioned that Ximenjie Primary School “was stepping up rehearsal of the one-act play Cross the Yalu River and preparing to perform it on Saturday for the public.”⁸⁵ Children from the same school also performed the play Defending Peace in a mass gathering.⁸⁶



Figure 2.1. Defending Peace by Ximenjie Primary School

Photo: *Subei ribao*, November 5, 1950. Its copyright has expired because the photographer was anonymous and sixty-eight years have passed since its publication.

⁸⁴ Tian Shoutang, “Yige xingxianghua de huodong” [A Vivid Activity], *Subei jiaoyu*, no. 1 (1951): 20–21.

⁸⁵ Zhao Jiren, “Yangshi Gaoyou bufen xiaoxue jiaqiang ertong shishi jiaoyu” [Some Primary Schools in the City of Yangzhou and Gaoyou Strengthened Education of the Current Situation to Children], *Subei ribao*, December 7, 1950.

⁸⁶ “Yangzhou ximenjie xiaoxue de baowei heping cao” [The Exercise of Defending Peace by Ximenjie Primary School in Yangzhou], *Subei ribao*, November 5, 1950.

As the war went on, wounded soldiers returned from the front. Children also went to perform for them. Shao Judou, a junior student at the Second Dongguanjie Primary School (“Erxiao” for short) at that time, often sang and danced with her fellow students for returning soldiers. They were warmly welcomed. The soldiers often asked them “to perform one more” and gave them candies and cookies supplied by the government.⁸⁷

Because some performances took place in the evening, family wealth affected children’s participation in a curious way. Shao was from one of the richest families in Yangzhou, so she had a maid. The maid would take her home after the performance finished late in the evening. When it was cold outside, the maid stayed with her during the entire performance. As soon as Shao finished her own program, the maid would cover her with a cotton-padded jacket immediately.⁸⁸ But most families did not have maids. For other children, if they performed for wounded soldiers in the evening, their parents had to pick them up and take them home. This was a burden for parents who were busy working or doing housework in the daytime. Having rich parents would make it easier for children to participate in such performances. This fact, if pointed out, must have been unwelcome or even embarrassing to cadres who encouraged children to perform for soldiers. It betrays an interesting continuity: advantages in old China often remained advantages in new China, at least in the early years of PRC, even with respect to political activism.

Letters of Support

Teachers also organized primary school children to write letters of support to soldiers. Sometimes, all children at one school would jointly “write” such a letter. In January 1951, some junior middle school graduates in Yangzhou were permitted to join the army. They received a supporting letter on behalf of all the students at Fuxiao. But it was unlikely that most of the over 1,000 children actually took part in shaping the letter. Its prose style also suggested that it was written by their Brigade tutors:

You will fly high in the sky of the motherland riding the Mao Zedong eagle; you will ride the majestic tanks in the plains of the motherland; you will sail fearless

⁸⁷ Shao Judou, interviewed by the author, January 6, 2018.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

ships in the sea of the motherland, navigating from the Bohai Sea to the Yellow Sea, to the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.⁸⁹

“Jointly-written” letters like this could hardly affect children’s thoughts and emotions because children might have had nothing to do with producing them, although this practice did portray primary school students as a social force to the public.⁹⁰ Children were also encouraged to write their own letters of support. During the winter of 1950, students at Chengnan wrote 467 letters.⁹¹ By August 1951, students at Fuxiao produced 912.⁹² For example, Gu Zhaokun, a grade five student, wrote, “What the United States is doing now is totally against the people, and we can unite to bring it down.” Some children were so enthusiastic that they each wrote two or three.⁹³ This practice had an indispensable function in political education. To be sure, it must have been initiated by teachers and Brigade tutors, and they might have instructed students what and how to write and helped them revise their drafts. Nevertheless, children played a substantial role; they at least made their first drafts. In this process, they had to try their best to assemble the new words, such as “American wolves,” to properly express the ideas they got from teachers as well as other activities, such as the liberation narrative. So this was a process that reinforced internalization of the language they had learned in the campaign.

Resist America Aid Korea education was largely successful. By participating in collective activities, children identified with the Campaign and began to adopt negative attitudes toward the United States. Although students from poor families might feel pressured to donate, the liberation narrative was especially convincing to them. Qi Huji, who was perhaps the poorest in his class, enjoyed a tuition waiver after “liberation.” Over sixty years later, he was still firm in the belief that the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign was necessary: “Resist America and aid

⁸⁹ “Yangshi diyi Fuxiao quanti xiaopengyou huansong canjia junxiao de gege jiejie men” [All Children at the First Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School Saw off Elder Brothers and Sisters Who Will Join in the Military School], *Subei ribao*, January 14, 1951.

⁹⁰ For a detailed explanation and illustration of this idea, see Zhang Fang, “Zhongguo shaoxiandai rongyu wenhua xingcheng de lishi kaocha (1949-1955)” [Historical Research on the Formation of the Honor Culture of Chinese Young Pioneers (1949-1955)], *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, no. 11 (2014): 31–33.

⁹¹ Cao Yucheng, “Yangzhou shi chengnanqu zhongxin xiaoxue yinian yilai shaonian ertong de aiguo huodong” [Patriotic Activities by Children at Chengnan Central Primary School in the City of Yangzhou in the Recent Year], *Subei ribao*, October 31, 1951.

⁹² “Guanyu aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu de jige wenti” [Several Issues about Patriotic Education], *Subei jiaoyu*, no. 8 (1951): 29–30.

⁹³ Zhou Yizhong, “Yangshi diyifuxiao xie weiwenxin babaifeng” [The First Primary School Affiliated to Yangzhou Normal School Completed Eight Hundred Comfort Letters], *Subei ribao*, December 12, 1950.

Korea, or we would have to return to the wretched past.”⁹⁴ However, the success of the Resist America Aid Korea education was not difficult to achieve. The targets of hatred were Americans, with whom most children in Yangzhou had no direct experience; they were simply strangers in a remote place. To show hatred toward them, a child only needed to be able to associate them with wolves and utter condemnations. It would be much more difficult to cultivate hatred toward enemies who were much more concrete and closer to those children.

The Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns

In December 1951 and January 1952, Party Centre launched the Three Antis Campaign and the Five Antis Campaign respectively, although the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign was still under way.⁹⁵ This time, the targets were corrupt officials and the bourgeoisie. On January 22, 1952, Party Centre made it clear that the Three Antis Campaign should be taught in primary schools. There was no reason to treat the Five Antis Campaign differently. However, there was a tension about confession and accusation in the directive. On the one hand, “[t]o avoid deviation, students generally should refrain from the practice of confession and accusation.” On the other hand, “[t]hey should confess or report to the government if they themselves have committed corruption or if they know that their parents have committed acts of corruption.”⁹⁶

About two months later, Chen Lian, who was in charge of children’s work in the League Centre, defined Three and Five Antis education as “the most concrete and vivid patriotic education at present.” She claimed that, because bourgeois thoughts and their human embodiments were harming the nation, which the Party was serving, hatred of the bourgeoisie and love of the Party should be cultivated among children. These two emotions should be fortified and confirmed by children’s participation in the Campaigns and obedience to a code of conduct. Instances of participation included “advising all those with illegal practices such as

⁹⁴ Qi, interviewed by the author, September 17, 2017.

⁹⁵ “With a few exceptions dating back to the early 1950s, Chinese media sources do not give termination dates for *yundong*. Likewise, refugees report that they rarely think of a movement as over since its tasks continue. Nevertheless, other movements soon come forward to nudge the older tasks from their place of priority, even though they may still remain formally in force.” Gordon Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1976), 44.

⁹⁶ Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui, “Guanyu xuanchuan wenjiao bumen ying wu liwai de jinxing sanfan yunodng de zhishi” [Directive That Departments of Propaganda and Education Should Conduct the Three Antis Campaign without Exception], in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyao jiaoyu wenxian* (Haikou: Hainan chubanshe, 1998), 137.

corruption and bribery to confess” and “reporting to the authorities what they know.” The code of conduct was labelled “Three Do’s and Three Don’ts” (*sanyao sanbuyao*): “do take good care of public property, do treasure time, and do live a plain life; don’t harm public interests to serve oneself, don’t waste anything, and don’t covet little advantages or commit theft.”⁹⁷ A perfectly patriotic child, who genuinely hated the bourgeoisie and loved the Party, would automatically participate in the Campaigns and follow the Three Do’s and Three Don’ts. This depiction actually characterized a child who instantiated the new ideal.

Primary school students in rural areas, who mostly came from peasant families, could hardly participate because it was difficult for them to find a human embodiment of bourgeois thoughts to advise to confess or report to authorities. Yangzhou, however, was quite different. Of the 16,354 primary school students in Yangzhou, 1,601 were from merchant families (*gongshangye zhe*), which were potential targets of the Campaigns.⁹⁸ Before Three and Five Antis education, these children’s perception of the Campaigns was shaped by their parents, whose attitudes were often understandably negative. For example, some children said, “Because of the burst of the Three-Antis and Five-Antis, business became bad.”⁹⁹ As for other students, many of them actually envied their classmates who were from merchant families, “hoping their own families can also have businesses or planning to launch a shop or a factory in the future.”¹⁰⁰ Hence, Yangzhou was a place where many children were expected to participate in the Campaigns by turning against their families.

Local cadres and teachers emphasized hatred and participation from the beginning. To be fair, the Three Do’s and Three Don’ts were not totally neglected. For example, in a document about Three and Five Antis education compiled in mid-April, League cadres did mention that “phenomena of wasting money and time such as eating snacks and wandering on the street had decreased.”¹⁰¹ However, in the same document, officials assessed the previous month’s work

⁹⁷ Chen Lian, “Zai fan tanwu fan daoqie yundong zhong ruhe jiaoyu shaonian ertong” [How to Educate Children in the Anti-Embezzlement and the Anti-Theft Campaigns], *Subei jiaoyu*, no. 3 (1952): 8–9.

⁹⁸ Subei xingshu wenjiaochu, *Subei ge zhuanqu xian (shi) xiaoxue xuesheng shu tongji biao* [Statistics of the numbers of primary school students in each commissioner's office and county (city) in northern Jiangsu], July 1952, JPA, 7011-003-0277.

⁹⁹ Qingniantuan yangzhou gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Zai xiaoxue shaonian ertong zhong jinxing sanfan wufan jiaoyu de qingkuang huibao (1952.2.20-1952.4.20)* [Report on the Three-Antis and Five-Antis Education among Elementary Schoolchildren (February 20, 1952–April 20, 1952)], 25 April 1952, YMA, A42-2-3-66.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

primarily in terms of how well education of hatred fared. It divided squadrons of the Brigade into the “poorly implementing,” of which members failed to “hate the bourgeoisie,” and the “well educated,” of which members managed to do so.¹⁰² Turning against their bourgeois families was regarded as a reliable indication of genuine hatred.

Turning Against One’s Family

It was difficult to turn against one’s family. Even after the education had been under way for more than one month, many children were still found to only “hate unscrupulous merchants without hating their own fathers.”¹⁰³ Some managed to turn against their families and this must have been due to great pressure. A work report compiled by League cadres briefly described one such case:

There is a student in Ximenjie Primary school whose father is an unscrupulous merchant. He was fined more than one hundred million yuan. This student could not understand why his father, after confession, still should be fined. At first, other students also sympathized with him. Then their squadron performed a short play about reporting unscrupulous merchants to the authorities. Students finally understood why this student’s father should be fined.¹⁰⁴

The initial sympathy from classmates must have been an important form of psychological support for this student. As the sympathy seemed to disappear after the collective activity organized by the Brigade tutor, peer support turned into peer pressure. Another case was mentioned in a report about Three and Five Antis education at Fuxiao:

We selected Brigade members and students who performed well and those who performed poorly from each class to attend this symposium. Attendees of different types could greatly inspire each other.¹⁰⁵

The well-performing must have been students who had already turned against their families while the poorly-performing were those who had not. It is not difficult to imagine how they would “inspire” each other in front of a large audience. The well-performing needed to prove

¹⁰² Qingniantuan yangzhou gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Guanyu Shaonian ertong zhong jinxing sanfan wufan jiaoyu de gongzuo yijian* [Comments on the Three Antis and Five Antis Education among Children], April 1952, YMA, A42-2-3-69.

¹⁰³ Qingniantuan yangzhou gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Qingkuang huibao*.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Zhou Yizhong, “Women shi zenyang zai xuexiao zhong kaizhan sanfan yundong de” [How we conducted the Three-Antis Campaigns in school], *Gongzuo huibao*, no. 4 (1952): 5. This journal is in the author’s collection.

they deserved the title, so they might repeat what they had said against their families, perhaps in an even harsher tone. As for the poorly-performing, this shameful label must have imposed more pressure on them to turn against their bourgeois families.

Some of the well-performing would be picked out as exemplars, who marked a major achievement of the education. A report on the Campaigns at Fuxiao compiled in mid-May 1952, listed eight students and their stated deeds as exemplars:

Table 2.1. The May List of Exemplars

Number	Name	Performance
1	Li Fulin (Grade Three)	“Trying to persuade his mother and urging his father to confess.”
2	Chen Bangxing (Grade Five)	“Saying: I hate my father and uncle, who often write fake cheques and evade tax.”
3	Cai Ziheng (Grade Six)	“Saying, ‘My family used to waste things, all of which were gained through exploitation.’”
4	Qiu Hong (Grade Four)	“Struggling with my father who is guilty of corruption.”
5	Luo Pei (twelve years old)	“Writing such a slogan on the door of his grandfather’s bedroom, ‘You old diehard! You must confess immediately, or you will be sent to the police station!’”
6	Wu Wenxiang (Grade Three)	“Returning sneakers taken from another student in last term.”
7	Yang Shuyuan (Grade Six)	“Mobilizing her father to confess.”
8	Zhu Zhilong (Grade Six)	“As the son of a merchant family, changing his attitude to some extent.”

Note: This table is compiled from Zhou’s “Women shi zenyang zai xuexiao zhong kaizhan sanfan yundong de.”

At least six of the eight exemplars were instances of turning against one’s family: the only exceptions were number 6, which was about following the Three Do’s and Three Don’ts, and number 8, whose exemplary deed was unclear.

Interestingly, another list of exemplars was compiled more than one month earlier at the same school.¹⁰⁶ The April list provided seven names without their exemplary deeds. Only three of

¹⁰⁶ Wu Yaoming, “San yuefen jiaodao gongzuo” [The Work of Teaching and Guiding in March], *Gongzuo huibao*, no. 4 (1952): 7–9.

them also appeared on the May list. Regarding their absence and appearance, we could divide all the names that appeared on at least one list into three groups:

Table 2.2. Analysis of the April and May Lists

Group	Description	Members
1	Those who appeared on both lists	Qiu Hong, Yang Shuyuan, Wu Wenxiang
2	Those who appeared only on the April list	Gong Bi, Li Hongzhong, Lu Housheng, Xiao Jikang
3	Those who appeared only on the May list	Cai Ziheng, Chen Bangxing, Li Fulin, Luo Pei, Zhu Zhilong

Note: This table is compiled from Wu's "San yuefen jiaodao gongzuo" and Zhou's "Women shi zenyang zai xuexiao zhong kaizhan sanfan yundong de."

Group 1 is the overlap of the two lists. The question we may ask is: why did the May list replace Group 2 with Group 3? The natural explanation is that students in Group 3 were even more exemplary than those in Group 2. Among the five students in Group 3, four appeared on the May list because they turned against their families: the only exception was Zhu Zhilong, whose exemplary deed was unclear. In other words, some unspecified instances were regarded as exemplary in April, but several instances of turning against families occurred later and were regarded as even more exemplary. This reveals an intensification of hatred education.

Behavior is an indication of emotion but not emotion itself, so there is often a gap. Turning against one's family was regarded as an indication of hatred. But did such children genuinely hate their bourgeois families? It seemed not. League cadres mentioned one case:

You Fubin used to be quite active in the phase of confession, advising his father to confess. However, because of the loosening of the education, he became worried about "how the family could survive after returning filthy lucre." He began to have compassion for his "poor" father.¹⁰⁷

In hindsight, this result is totally predictable. Family ties were extremely firm. Only by keeping children under pressure could they continue behaving in such a way that they were seen by teachers and classmates as turning against their families. However, teachers and tutors had a lot of other things to do, so the great pressure could not subsist for a long time.

¹⁰⁷ Qingniantuan yangzhou gongzuo weiyuanhui, *Qingkuang huibao*.

Uneven Implementation

In general, Brigade tutors were more enthusiastic about ideological education than other teachers. Brigade tutors often played the most active role in Three and Five Antis education. However, the form teacher of each class interacted with students most frequently. Although some form teachers were enthusiastic about the education, many of them were not. Some might be too busy. Others might think “the Three and Five Antis are hardly relevant to primary education.”¹⁰⁸ Still others might be dissatisfied with their jobs as teachers. For example, a senior form teacher in Fuxiao with the family name “Dang” often said, “With three *dou* of grains at home, never serve as a king for monkeys.”¹⁰⁹ So within a primary school, Three and Five Antis education would have been conducted unevenly across different classes. At Fuxiao, three of the eight exemplars came from Class 2, Grade 6, while some other form teachers failed to do the job wholeheartedly:

Some form teachers thought the campaign would succeed at one stroke. In the beginning, they conducted education sketchily, so there were few accomplishments and children had no clear idea about whom to love and whom to hate. In some classes, the education lacked any plan.¹¹⁰

Hence, even for students from merchant families in 1952, there still was a substantial chance that they would not be pressured to turn against their families because their form teachers might not have a lot of interest in Three and Five Antis education.

Even Brigade tutors might not be as enthusiastic as their counterparts at Fuxiao. In 1952, Shi Wu was twenty-two years old. She retired from the army and became a battalion tutor of the Brigade at Chengzhong Primary School in Yangzhou. Sixty-five years later, she recalled that her primary duty as a tutor was to organize collective activities. But the content and timing of the activities were at her discretion. Sometimes, even if she had not organized any activities for weeks, no one would blame her.¹¹¹ This means a battalion tutor who was not that active might still manage to survive well. Since most schools in Yangzhou were less prestigious than Shi’s and got even less attention from higher levels, some of their Brigade tutors might be less enthusiastic in Three and Five Antis education than they were expected to be.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ding Chunzi, “Zhi jiaoshi.”

¹¹⁰ Zhou, “Women shi zenyang zai xuexiao zhong kaizhan sanfan yundong de,” 7.

¹¹¹ Shi Wu, interviewed by the author, October 14, 2017.

Among the less prestigious schools was Erxiao. However, it got a special newcomer in 1950. She was Shao Judou, the eldest granddaughter of the owner of CFX, which was one of the wealthiest enterprises in Yangzhou then.¹¹² Shao's grandfather had already had a couple of grandsons before her birth, so he was especially fond of this little girl. She was smart, so the grandfather decided to send her for primary education when she was merely five years old. She went to Erxiao rather than more prestigious schools because it was the nearest to her home. A maid took her to school and brought her back every day. This was very rare at that time; most children walked between school and home without any adult escort. Because Shao was younger than all her classmates, her grandfather was not sure whether she could catch up with them. But she soon became a top student. The form teacher even appointed her as a student cadre.

The first half of 1952 was sad for Shao's family. In the Five Antis Campaign, their enterprise became a major target. Her grandfather was taken away and was returned as a corpse a year later. Her father and uncles were not allowed to leave their factory. But surprisingly, she said she was untouched at school. When some students whose families were less rich than hers were pressured to turn against their parents at Fuxiao, she was still a student cadre in her own school. This was also confirmed by Ling Hemin, who was Shao's classmate at Erxiao and from a poor family.¹¹³ It is improbable that Three and Five Antis education never took place at Erxiao, although neither Shao nor Ling could remember anything about it sixty-five years later. But Shao's story indicates that educators in that school, including Brigade tutors, did not do their jobs in the expected way. In fact, their superiors might go mad if they could hear the following dialogue:

Me: How did you think of Shao at that time?

Ling: Her academic performance was excellent. She came from the family of a big capitalist. We were admiring and envying her.

Me: But she was from the family of a big capitalist. When you graduated from Erxiao, with all the political education you had, did you still envy her?

Ling: Yes!¹¹⁴

¹¹² Shao, interviewed by the author, January 6, 2018. The whole story about her is from this interview.

¹¹³ Ling Hemin, interviewed by the author, September 29, 2017.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

Conclusion

Three and Five Antis education for primary schoolchildren in Yangzhou only lasted for three months and came to an end when the 1952 spring semester ended. Dissemination of the new ideal was largely unsuccessful. Although children could abstractly hate remote Americans as a result of the Resist America Aid Korea Campaign, they failed to make their hatred concrete in the Three Antis and Five Antis Campaigns: even though some of them were once pressured to behave as if they hated their bourgeois families, they were far from genuinely hating them. To be sure, lack of enthusiasm on the part of many teachers and Brigade tutors did play a role. But suppose all of them were enthusiastic. Would concrete hatred be successfully generated? It was unlikely because the new ideal was against human nature in that it required patriotic emotions to always smash family bonds whenever the two were in competition.

Epilogue

To stick to Guo's metaphor of clay, dissemination of the new style and that of the new ideal were like molding lumps of clay into two products which look similar but are different in kind. Disseminating the new style is like molding clay into something that looks like a bunny. This is easy; it is done if you make sure the lump has some obvious features of a bunny's shape, no matter how imperfect other details are. In contrast, disseminating the new ideal is like molding clay into a real bunny. This is difficult; in fact, the job is mission impossible. Even if you make the lump perfectly resemble a bunny in every detail, it is at best a perfect sculpture of bunny rather than a real bunny. Without magic, you cannot turn a lump of clay into a living bunny. Taken seriously, Guo's claim that lumps of clay "can be molded into whatever we want them to be" is not true. Children as human beings have a specific nature that makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible at all, for them to fully embrace the new ideal. They might be pressured to behave as if they hate their families and maintain this behaviour for some time. But it is extremely difficult, if not totally impossible, to smash family bonds with patriotism. Political education in primary schools in Yangzhou between February 1949 and June 1952 was merely an early and small-scale attempt to mold lumps of clay. With the new style and the new ideal basically unchanged, what happened later in the Cultural Revolution could be anticipated.

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