# Approval

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Tomas Hatala</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Degree:</td>
<td>Master of Arts (Communication)</td>
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<td>Title:</td>
<td>The Pink Tide: A Survey of Research on the Rise of the Left in Latin America</td>
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<tr>
<td>Examining Committee:</td>
<td>Chair: J. Adam Holbrook</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adjunct Professor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rick Gruneau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enda Brophy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Associate Professor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Shane Gunster</td>
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<td>Examiner</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Associate Professor</td>
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<td>Date Defended/Approved:</td>
<td>May 25, 2018</td>
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Abstract

The reframing of international relations over the past three decades, from the nation-state to regional blocs, such as NAFTA or the European Union, was an attempt by analysts to better understand the interconnected globalized world. However, more recently, there has been a notable upsurge in nativist feeling in many parts of the world, accompanied by a renewed sense of nationalism in many nation-states. Still, regional blocs continue to be important players on the world stage in respect to trade, defence alliances, and patterns of international investment. In this regard, the importance of the supranational region is far from eclipsed and becomes an ever more present feature in international configurations.

The rise of Leftist governments in Latin America over the past 19 years has led to a wave of research, not only into the reasons why so many leftist parties have been successful in the region, but also how much such successes at the state level have translated into a relatively coherent bloc of leftist policies. Some have argued that a greater cohesiveness within Latin America has resulted in a comparatively new spatial layer where the whole is more significant than the sum of its parts. Notably, a leftist turn across much of Latin America since the late 1990s has been interpreted as the attempt to deviate from (neo)liberal tendencies of the late 20th century ‘Washington Consensus’ toward more socialist policies.

This thesis examines 20 of the key studies on the rise of the Left in Latin America since 1998 and analyzes the reasons they posit as being the key causes of the shift to the Left across the region. This analytical breakdown then allows for an overview of the factors that social scientists have used to examine regional political shifts, and highlights what is missing.
Keywords: latin america; left; pink tide; regionalism; liberalism; post-liberalism
I would like to dedicate this work to my parents, who have supported me throughout the process in every way.

I am grateful to them for inspiring in me the desire to be critical, thorough, and compassionate in everything I do.
Acknowledgements

This thesis was a long project, and ultimately, without the people who supported me on the way, it might have never been realized.

I would like to acknowledge my wonderful partner, Mirjam Gollmitzer, for supporting me, as well as inspiring me, during this process. She reignited the passion I had for research by her own example, and through sharp reflection and insightful comments helped me truly pinpoint what mattered and what did not. Her support in the times of need was a buttress against the challenges writing a major work creates. I could not have wished for a better partner on this journey.

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Katherine Reilly, who inspired in me the passion for Latin America as a research region, and gave me a thorough understanding of global power flows and what influences them. It was with this critical lens that I was able to recognize that global political change, in Latin America and elsewhere, is a very complex web, which, with effort, can be unravelled one question at a time.

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Enda Brophy, whose critical edge and nuanced interpretation of resistance and debt made me look at Latin America from below as well as above. Finding the sites of struggle in a region fighting for democratic representation was essential for understanding why the voices of the marginalized matter more and more, and need to be heard in every analysis.

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Rick Gruneau, whose tactful supervision and sharp insights have led to this thesis being a well-rounded, considerate work. Supervision is a balancing act, and Dr. Gruneau found the right approach with me. His depth and breadth of historical understanding of human thought helped guide me to consider the issues facing Latin America more deeply and thoroughly than I could have ever done by myself. But ultimately, it was Dr. Gruneau’s supportive calm that made me feel like I could finish this work, and on my own terms. I am truly grateful to his guidance.

Ultimately, I would like to thank my best friends Peter, Chester, and Cassandra, whose emotional support allowed me to make it this far with a smile on my face.
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Chapter 1.

Introduction

Political success of the ‘new left’ in Latin America during the past nineteen years has resulted in a unique shift in sociopolitical policy in the political turbulence following the neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 90s across the region. This shift to the Left has been examined in earnest, resulting in a significant body of literature. The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the most significant of these studies, analyze the various explanations offered on the rise of the Left in the region, and offer insights into the patterns of research taking place in the social sciences on transitioning political regimes in Latin America. The contributions of this thesis are three-fold: 1) to create a comprehensive literature and conceptual overview of factors involved in regional political change in Latin America since 1998 until present, and the various methodologies employed in these studies; 2) to highlight gaps in the analysis of regional political change; and 3) to reveal the importance of intersections between media and ideology in the regional paradigm, thereby revealing the significance of communication studies in critical political analysis.

Context: Rise of the Left in Latin America as Research Area

The growth of the Left in Latin America after 1998 (starting with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela) is a useful scenario for examining interdisciplinary research patterns. The shift toward the Left was significant enough, cohesive enough, and unique enough comparatively to global patterns that it generated much discussion, in academic as well as non-academic circles. In a highly globalized capitalist paradigm that shapes most of the northern hemisphere, to suddenly witness ten nations elect, in some cases extreme, left wing governments generated much discussion about the future of market liberalism and neoliberal public policy around the world. Further, the cohesiveness of this shift, as well as the rhetoric of socialism that accompanied the leftist administrations that were elected, led to the moniker “Pink Tide” named so for being a modified, or ‘light’ version of socialism (Rohter, 2005), attached to what seemed to be an aberration to expectations of Latin American development. Lastly, given Latin America’s history of
neoliberalism and the reforms it underwent in the 1980s and 1990s, after democratizing and adopting the Washington Consensus\(^1\) region-wide, this sudden shift to the Left put traditional developmental models of market integration and opening to question for the rest of the world as well. Table 1 summarizes the growth of left wing movements and administrations between 1998 and 2010.

Table 1: Leftist governments in Latin America during the Pink Tide: Information based on Levitsky & Roberts (2011, p. 2), Panizza (2005, p. 717), Queirolo (2013, pp. 1–2), and Sankey (2016)

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ricardo Lagos</td>
<td>Partido Socialista de Chile (PSCh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Michelle Bachelet</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Dilma Rousseff</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Néstor Kirchner</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Evo Morales</td>
<td>Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (MAS)</td>
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\(^1\) The Washington Consensus is a defacto name assigned to policies emerging from the United States during the Reagan administration era. These policies followed neoliberal prescriptions of market regulation of both economic, political, and social spheres. John Williamson (1990), the creator of the term, describes it in terms of ten policies: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights. This policy was adopted in Latin America as a solution to the fiscal problems which were the results of the debt crisis of the 1980s, both by authoritarian and democratic governments. For its neoliberal underpinnings see Peck and Tickell (2002), for literature on how the Washington Consensus was implemented in the Latin American region see Arrighi (1990), and Roberts (1995); for its (lack of) performance in the region see Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997), Portes and Hoffman (2003), Paus (2004), Huber and Solt (2004), Arze and Kruse (2004), and Corrales (2008); and for voter views on neoliberalism (apart from the literature covered in this thesis), see Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011).
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<tr>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>Alianza Patria Alta i Soberana (Alliancia PAIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Mauricio Funes</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN)</td>
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Academics who are not often confronted with such obvious global shifts have found ample reason to gather data, test hypotheses, and propose theories to explain such a sudden shift. *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006 Volume 85), the *Journal of Democracy* (2006 Volume 17, Number 4), the Woodrow Wilson Center’s “The ‘New Left’ and Democratic Governance in Latin America” colloquium in 2006, and Harvard University’s conference in 2008 “Latin America’s Left Turn: Causes and Consequences” are just some of the examples of the discussions that emerged around the topic. Work on the subject has continued throughout the last decade, at which point some of the newer developments within the region, of a possible return to the Right, reignited the discussion anew. The recent general elections of 2015 in Argentina, where the non-Peronist right wing Mauricio Macri won over the legacy of the Kirchners, and the legislative elections in Venezuela in December 2015 where the Democratic Unity opposition coalition won 99 of the 167 seats of the National Assembly, unseating the United Socialist Party of Venezuela for the first time in 17 years also signify a potential reversion to a regime that is both neoliberal and politically conservative (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, & Dawson, 2016). Such developments, and their potential cohesion across the region, highlight the importance of Latin America as a study of shifts of political ideology, particularly within the context of new democracies.

A further consideration that highlights the importance of such political developments in Latin America is the paradigm shift from globalization to regionalism. In social science research - where academic literature often works within either the realist paradigm of state sovereignty, or the globalization paradigm, which works with the tenets of global market liberalism - regional studies have been more and more prescient in helping us understand developments across the world. As the number of regions across the world increases at a rapid pace (Fawn, 2009), finding the analytical tools to understand state changes in the space in-between the state and the global system,
namely the region, becomes crucial, and potentially yields insight into such transitions that neither of the other two paradigms offer. In Latin America such political shifts seem to occur on a regional level, and therefore the analysis of the region shifting as a whole becomes a reasonable endeavor. However, many of the approaches to such inquiry still operate in either realist or globalist paradigms, and a part of this thesis is to ask why this might be the case, and potentially argue that maybe regional analysis might be more perceptive in answering questions such as “why did the Left arise in Latin America since 1998”. An additional goal of this thesis is to offer some speculative consideration on the range of methodologies employed in the ‘rise of the Left in Latin America’ studies that have emerged over the past decade. I am interested in the extent to which the methodologies prescribed and used tend to reflect the biases and views of regions and how these fit, in the global scheme of political change.

**Defining the “Left”: Ideology, Political Strategies, and Populism**

To answer the question of why the Left arose in Latin America, many scholars have begun by revisiting the basic unit of analysis – the Left itself. For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to outline some of the conceptual understandings of what the Left is, and what the tensions around its definition have been, and whether we can treat all the cases as the same, and therefore view the region as shifting to the left at all. Ultimately, I argue that there is more similarity than difference in Left wing movements across Latin America, and suggest that perhaps the reason why the Left arose was because of the desire to find a new kind of “Left” that goes beyond historically defined categories such as populist, liberal, or communist, amongst others. Further, an understanding of the Left and what it means in Latin America requires a discussion between how it is represented in the region – and how it is measured by researchers.

Much of the methodological discussion in the case-studies discussed in later chapters highlights nuanced discussions of executive power and political orientation; that is, what counts as left and what does not on the political spectrum. Intermeshed in these dimensions is the question whether the mass populace has also shifted ideologically in alignment with the leftist parties and administrations that have been elected. Whereas the question of heterogeneity versus the homogeneity of the Lefts in Latin America is a topic of intense discussion, I will only briefly highlight some of the tensions present in this
discussion. Given the academic positioning of some of these Lefts as “populist,” a brief discussion of this political mode will help frame the rest of the discussion of the politics of the new Left.

Francisco Panizza (2005) focuses on outlining the Left in terms of the Left-of-Centre strategies on redistribution and suggests that rather than being defined collectively by any ideology, these strategies are defined by their collective rejection of, and “a persuasive critique of, the failures of democracy and neoliberalism in Latin America” (p. 729). He, like many of the other researchers, highlights a lack of a core ideology of communism and a movement toward moderation and coalition building. Ultimately, in Panizza’s view, the Left coheres by negation of the policies of the 1990s, despite the internal divisions between the populist, participatory, and liberal democracy models’ lack of compatibility with political institutions in Latin America (Panizza, 2005, p. 730). The broadness of this definition, and its lack of teleological direction, set the debate about the nature of the Left for the subsequent scholars.

One of the first taxonomies of the Left offered is by Jorge Castañeda (1993, 2006, 2007, 2008), which gained much traction in the research on the Latin American Left, because of his influential 1993 book which discussed and predicted the fortunes of the Latin American Left as neoliberalism was sweeping the region. Castañeda’s frame offers four main groups of the Left historically: communist, populist, military and the reformist Lefts (1993), and when discussing the Pink Tide, he eliminates the military and communist categories to create a binary system of the populist and the liberal reformist/reconstructed Lefts (2006). In this division, he groups Evo Morales’s Bolivia with Rafael Correa’s Ecuador and Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela in opposition to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Brazil, Ricardo Lagos’s/Michelle Bachelet’s Chile, and Tabaré Vázquez’s Uruguay. Castañeda argues vehemently that the populist Left is a problem to be surpassed by the rational, pro-market Left (2006, pp. 42–43). Kurt Weyland (2009) is equally uncritical in his evaluation and adoption of this dichotomy, and seems to bear similar condescension toward Morales’s and Chavez’s categorizations as does Castañeda (p. 146). Raul L. Madrid (2009) follows a similar dichotomy, but without the normative chastising, terming the divisions the “liberal left” and the “interventionist” left (p. 587).

Mathew Cleary (2006), in turn, argues that despite the differences highlighted, there is much more cohesion among the Latin American Left than difference. He rejects
the idea that the “heterogeneity of the left has also contributed to the common view that each case is unique” (Cleary, 2006, p. 36). Instead, he suggests that the fear of populism is exaggerated, and most of the left-wing governments in power are moderate. Ultimately, in Cleary’s view, “the contemporary Latin American left is more homogenous, and more moderate, than many would argue” (Cleary, 2006, p. 36). In this respect we can see the leftward shift in Latin America as a comparatively moderate “regional wave” (Cleary, 2006, p. 36) rather than a revolutionary insurrection. Rosario Queirolo (2013) agrees with this assessment, as the core tenets of the Left tend to be shared in the region despite the movement’s inherent varieties (p. 7).

Levitsky and Roberts (2011) bring together the preceding scholars’ notions, recognizing the differences embedded in these governments are both historical but also operational, with a view on how they govern in the present. Their taxonomy is particularly useful in highlighting difference between the so-called populists and the more “traditional” Left, as well as resolving differences between cases like Brazil and Chile. For Levitsky and Roberts (2011), the “Left refers to political actors who seek, as a central programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic inequalities” and argue that despite the internal differences, this tenet applies across the board to all the Lefts post 1998 in Latin America (p. 5). What “distinguishes left from nonleft forces is the programmatic centrality of redistributive policies” which they see all the Leftist governments since 1998 as sharing, thus allowing for the shift to be seen as regional (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011, p. 5). However, they trace the origins and operations of the Left to four main categories, which are useful not only in understanding the individual national cases, but where there is overlap on a regional scale. The typology they offer is “based on parties’ organizational characteristics” and distinguishes between new and old party organizations or movements (“level of institutionalization”), and on the other axis, between concentrated and dispersed power (“locus of political authority”) (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011, p. 12). The consequent categorization is very useful for our understanding that the Lefts, despite having the same goal and focus on redistribution, are ultimately different beasts and originate in different places.

In addition to recognizing that there are possibly divisions amongst the Lefts that arose in Latin America, it is important to assess whether the election of Leftist executives (the most common measure which tracks “the rise of the Left”) is a result of a public shift in opinion toward the Left. If the political orientations of the populace do not reflect the
executive shifts electorally, this complicates the notion that democracy in the region is a
direct response of the will of the people – and complicates the answer to why the Left
arose in Latin America as a whole. Mitchell Seligson’s (2007) detailed analysis first
highlights that “Latin Americans are actually slightly to the right of most respondents
world-wide,” both before and after the shift to the Left (p. 83). There has been a “shift to
the left… and the trend is regionwide” despite it being small, highlighting a connection
between the executive changes and the populace, despite significant variation amongst
the national contexts (Seligson, 2007, p. 84). This is an important point, because a
regional view somewhat hides the historical electoral patterns available in some nations.
For example, in Chile, the Michelle Bachelet presidency aligned with the political
orientations of the median voter, whereas no such option in Nicaragua’s political party
landscape meant the voters had to choose between two diametrically different and
polarized executive “ideologies” (Seligson, 2007, pp. 84–86).

In the political science literature, the word “ideology” is often used simply to refer
to political orientations or world views (although sometimes this is given a negative
connotation, suggesting that certain views are somehow more “normative” – or
“ideological” -- and less “objective” or rational than other views). This contrasts to the
more critical view often used in sociology or communications studies, where ideology
typically references the way that symbolic forms are used to sustain or enhance relations
or modes of domination (e.g. Thompson (1990)). When using the word “ideology” in the
passages below I follow the conventional use of the term in the political science
literature.

Marco A. Morales (2008) is typical of the understanding of ideology as political
world-view when he notes that while there was indeed a shift to the Left after 2001,
contrary to a shift toward the right in the 1990s, one cannot be sure if it was a result of
electoral victories of the Left, or a cause leading to them (pp. 20-22). He also argues
strongly for an individual-level analysis, framed on a national basis, to clarify why there is
a discrepancy among Latin American’s “ideological” preferences (M. A. Morales, 2008,
p. 20). One pattern he notes in the rise of the Left after 2001 is that the shift was toward
the center or center-Left from the Right, rather than a movement toward the extreme Left
– in fact, extreme positions on both the Left and the Right have decreased in favor of the
center for the majority of the nations (M. A. Morales, 2008, pp. 24–27). This implies that
“it might be the case that Latin Americans are not becoming more leftist, but are simply
becoming less conservative”, which still leaves the question of where the new Leftist
governments find their support (M. A. Morales, 2008, p. 30).

Arnold and Samuels (2011), working with an updated Latinobarómetro dataset,
confirm the rightward-tilt hypothesis. While they concur that there was a slight shift to the
left, in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century, they suggest this is so slight
that it cannot be explained by an ideological shift among voters (p. 35). Karen Remmer
(2012) retests this data and concurs. Further, Arnold and Samuels (2011) suggest, just
as Seligson, the national changes do not reflect the regional changes: “only Honduras,
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela appear to exhibit both consistent and large shifts leftward”
which are “mirrored by large decreases in Brazil and Mexico” (p. 35).

Using a “new measure called vote-revealed leftism (VRL)” Baker and Greene
(2011) account for previously ignored subtleties on ideology by highlighting ideology as a
continuum rather than Left-vs-Right divides, or even the more commonly seen five-split
division (radical-left, center-Left, center, center-right, Right), offered by Blanco and Grier
(2013) (p. 47). Further, by accounting not only for the winners (and potentially second
runners up) as many other case-studies have done, and accounting for all electoral
votes, the VRL measure becomes one of the most accurate present in the up-to-date
research on electoral choices. The results in most cases reflect those of Seligson
(2007), Arnold and Samuels (2011), and Remmer (2012), but offer a more thorough
reflection on the Left with regards other parties. Baker and Greene (2011) argue that
there has been a real underlying leftward shift among voters across the region” but that it
was a shift “toward the left but not to the left” (p. 48, 50). Further, the shift happened,
much like Seligson points out, from center-Right to the center, and was moderate (Baker
& Greene, 2011, p. 50). The most interesting conclusion, however, was that the vote
increases on the Left came from centrist parties, rather than from the Right, which
actually had increased its vote share even during the regional transition toward the Left.
Thus, much like Madrid (2009) discusses in his case-study, the Left that arose was not a
radical swing away from the Right, but rather an electoral battle fought amongst the
center and center-Left parties, between reformism and radicalism. Baker and Greene’s
(2011) conclusion reflects that of Arnold and Samuels (2011) – the shift ideologically
leftward was not the cause of the rise of the executive Left – and as such, “the left turn in
Latin America has been a strictly presidential phenomenon” (p. 50). Such national
variation suggests that speaking of a regional ideological shift is impossible, and one cannot consider ideological orientation of the voters to be the major causal factor.

Rosario Quierolo (2013) argues that a leftward shift in executive ideology is “not a novelty” and that “ideological cycles have always existed in Latin America” (p. 15). The existence of such ideological cycles occurs in many western democracies (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Stimson, 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995), yet due to the belief that Latin American politics is a haphazard, and often arbitrary, mess, analysts have not systematically researched such swings. Democratic swings between liberalism and conservatism are therefore a regular feature of developed democracies when, despite only slight ideological shifts, the public swings back and forth in several-election cycles between the Right and the Left. If Latin America is also prone to such cycles, the emergence of the Left could truly be interpreted as simply as voters feeling it is time for a change, and elect something different from the neoliberal Right of the 1990s. Quierolo (2013) finds that Latin America does indeed have such cycles, and they are often between the Right and the Left, with the Center never being more than 20 percent of the vote (p. 27). She finds four main ideological cycles: 1946-1956 Right, 1969-1976 Left, 1979-2000 Right, 2001-present Left (Quierolo, 2013, pp. 28–29):


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
<td>1945-1956</td>
<td>1969-1976</td>
<td>1979 – 2000</td>
<td>2001-&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>-Right</td>
<td>-Left</td>
<td>-Right</td>
<td>-Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>-Liberal democracy -Populism</td>
<td>-Center gains votes -Military dictatorships</td>
<td>-Military dictatorships -Conservatism -3rd wave democracy</td>
<td>-Liberal democracy -Populism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Politics</strong></td>
<td>-Cold War</td>
<td>-Cold War -Socialist threat</td>
<td>-IMF Conditionality</td>
<td>-Regional autonomy -South to south</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are several features of these cycles which are relevant to this thesis. First, the Left being in power is not new, and has happened region-wide before. Whether the current Left is different and here to stay is something for time to tell, but the presence of populism and strong redistributive qualities, just as had happened in the 2nd cycle outlined above, does not seem to indicate this current trend is different from the previous one. Second, there is a continuing oscillation with regards to both the relationship to the United States and external vs internal focus in the region’s economics. The current cycle (4) seems to be the most balanced, with features of an open market while a strong state redistributes the benefits. Third, the feature of populism seems to be a continuing part of Latin America throughout all the cycles, types of economic models, and forms of governance.

Much of the discourse of the West, particularly in the mass media, revolves around interpreting and analyzing the new Latin American Left as populist, and any analysis of the new Left cannot be conducted without first problematizing the concept. This concept has been historically applied to the region numerous times, and often with negative connotation. However, I am persuaded that this interpretation is far too narrow. Populism, while certainly present in Latin America, does not constitute an aberration or movement away from democracy. Rather, as Arnold and Samuels (2011) suggest, populism is a nexus of a leadership style combined with an attempt to move dramatically away from the developmental status quo. In their view, if perceived as a movement away from democracy and toward authoritarianism, populism is not widely “popular” in Latin America. They argue, persuasively in my view, that “the overall proportion of Latin Americans who define democracy in “populist” terms is quite low compared to those who define it in terms of more liberal ideals of individual rights and civil liberties" and that “contemporary leftists in Latin America are not more “populist” than their nonleftist compatriots” (Arnold & Samuels, 2011, pp. 45, 44). Nevertheless, this kind of interpretation still posits populism as antagonistic toward democracy, or rather, as a problem, along the veins of Jorge Castañeda’s (2006) critique of the new Left being the “bad” left (p. 42).

In the conventional interpretation, populism is posited as antagonistic to social democracy, and ultimately liberalism. Seligson (2007) argues that populism views institutions as “anachronistic, inefficient, and inconsistent with the true expression of “the
people’s will” and ultimately disregards them at the price of “fundamental democratic guarantees of civil liberties” (p. 82). In opposition to Arnold and Samuels (2011), he finds populism rising in the Latin American region and views this as greatly troubling (Seligson, 2007, p. 91). Kenneth M. Roberts (2007a) offers a more nuanced view, suggesting that populism rises during times of crisis and uncertainty, when “established political institutions lose their capacity to contain or channel popular political mobilization” (p. 4). For Roberts (2007a) the current wave of “populism” has seized the space created by the discontent of the masses at the crisis neoliberalism has brought about. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008) highlight this narrative: as a discourse, populism “pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice” (p. 3), and thus such leaders can undermine the corrupt political status quo. The example of leaders who attempt to bypass institutional structures in the name of ‘the people’, as well as the programmatic character of populist movements, has created the worry that populism shows a disregard for democracy, and is pathway to authoritarianism in disguise.

Yet, Carlos de la Torre (2007) notes that populism has both positive and negative aspects for citizens: it can be inclusive of those previously ignored, while also potentially setting them up for exclusion if they do not join the bandwagon of the populist leader. For instance, Gabriel Leon’s (2014) research on the connection between neoliberalism and its support of the rich, which consequently leads to the dissatisfaction of the masses and resulting populism, emphasizes that populism can act as a buffer against the forces of the market. De la Torre (2007) also argues populism is a “form of protest and resistance to modernization projects” (p. 394), something that Juan Pablo Luna (2010) argues can be “characterized by its [the populist left] willingness to seek alternatives for political and economic inclusion that might go beyond liberal democracy and a market economy” (p. 29). Benjamin Arditi (2008) views this as a movement away from liberalism altogether, and terms the new populist directions as “post-liberal.” Echoing this critical stance against the populist authoritarianism view, versus support for a more conventional liberal democratic interpretation, Jon Beasley-Murray, Maxwell A. Cameron, and Eric Hershberg (2009) view the new Left as being radical (Venezuela) and constituent (Bolivia), suggesting they are empowering rather than destructive of democracy.
Reflecting de la Torre’s (2013) more recent interpretations of the “populist” Lefts, as originating in different patterns, John D. French (2010) heavily critiques dichotomous interpretations of the left in Latin America as something that opposes social democracy. French (2010) offers a genuine insight that the continuing declaration of the populist Left in opposition to social democracy “originates in the policing efforts by the neoliberal establishment in Latin America” (p. 44). However, he goes on to critique political scientists who have willingly adopted this dichotomy in an attempt to preserve the (neo)liberal presence in Latin America. We see this through the way that Jorge Castañeda’s, Ernesto Zedillo’s, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s theories reflecting their eventual liberal political careers, which they in part obtained through their academic stances. The existence of “populism” in the region is due to the threat of the abandonment of the liberal model, which the West has so carefully sown throughout the 20th century. The emergence of negative interpretations of Latin American populism is fully contingent on the desire to preserve the liberal status quo in which much of Western academia has been raised. This is in contrast to more critical scholarship that posits the rise of a new post-liberal order through populist movements, rather than a re-emerging form of authoritarian rule.

Much of the tension between aggregating national cases and analyzing them as a regional trend (as most of the studies examined do), as opposed to looking at the region as a whole, potentially originates in the different ways the researchers categorize the Left in Latin America. Thus, the question in part becomes, did many Lefts arise in great coincidence? Or did the Left arise, with differences within the region due to the historical trajectories from which they emerged? I shall argue that despite the differences in the Left’s origins, as highlighted by Levitsky and Roberts (2011), the Left really arose at the end of the twentieth century because Latin America was forging its own path, as a region, in moving toward redistribution, but on terms no longer dictated by the hegemony of Western (neo)liberal and developmental models.

**Contribution to Communications Studies**

In an effort to answer the question ‘Why the Left arose’ in Latin America when it did I conducted a literature review of studies that my preliminary research revealed were relevant to this issue. An overview of my rationales, methods of selection, and summary of the studies I reviewed is included in the Appendix. In conducting this review one of the
things that stood out is the diversity of answers to “why the left arose.” In some ways I felt this diversity of responses was more revealing than the subject matter of any one individual study and so I sought to highlight major themes, and map the different explanations for the rise of the left in the region, to see what patterns might emerge.

The majority of the studies examined in this thesis come from the field of political studies and have several dominant foci. First, macroeconomic factors are often attributed as causal factors in a political shift of a region (supposedly) to the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. Econometric analyses, combined with theoretical underpinnings of voter preferences often highlight how voters treat incumbents and prospective presidents, in combination with macroeconomic markers (inequality, growth, inflation, etc.) and can offer compelling accounts on why voters switch their preferences. Such methodologies, typically using empirical methods, employ statistical regressions, as well as newer techniques of strategic choice amongst others. Second, theories derived from contemporary political science about democratic behavior - often also involving voters, but adding elements of institutional stability, democratic maturation, and impacts of crisis - offer predictions of behaviour that are ultimately tested, most often through statistical analysis as well.

In such studies on the rise of the Latin American left, there seems to be a lack of what could be collectively termed the ‘cultural’ element, with a more critical and theoretically developed focus on ideology, hegemony, and historical legacies, manifested in cultural forms. There is considerable theoretical work that highlights the importance of ideology to national and regional politics, and the analysis of culture and history are often suggested as critical factors in instigating change. But, few of such works on the Latin American left also highlight the importance of ideology and history in detail. With its acknowledgement of the importance of symbolic forms and ideology, communication studies, and its methodologies (particularly qualitative approaches), can act as a complement to the more traditionally empirical analysis that tend to downplay the representational or interpretive dimensions of culture.

The analysis that follows is divided into two main parts: first, a survey of the studies on the rise of the Left in Latin America to identify and map determining factors that scholars have identified; and second, an analysis of the studies including a critical discussion of what they offered. The first part of the discussion occurs in Chapters 2 and 3 which I have written as a purely descriptive mapping of major themes in the studies.
under review. Because one of the major theses on why the Left arose describes the shift as a result of the rejection of the Washington Consensus, or the desire to adopt alternative policies, this chapter mostly deals with economic factors that condition voter choices. Each subsection offers a theoretical overview of why such factors might influence voters before turning to the case of the Latin American Left post-1998.

I undertook the mapping exercise in Chapters 2 and 3 expecting to find significant commonalities in the literature. What I found instead, was a surprisingly dispersed set of approaches and explanations. Reading through the descriptive survey of key variables and explanations noted in these chapters can admittedly be rather tedious. However, I felt it necessary to grasp and summarize this material prior to conducting a more critical discussion. I turn to that analysis in Chapter 4. My objective here both to classify and critically analyze both the main factors that scholars have offered to the rise of the Left, offer a preliminary critique of the methodology these case studies employed, and suggest some alternative interpretations based on adopting a broader, more regionalist approach. Chapter 5 provides a brief summary and conclusion to the thesis.
Chapter 2.

Research on the Rise of the Left in Latin America: Macroeconomic Factors and Issues

The justification for the splitting of the reasons, or factors, given for the rise of the Left in Latin America since 1998 into macroeconomic, political, and social factors is explained in the methodological appendix, as well as the difficulties associated with this process. However, as many of these factors are aspects of each other, cross-referencing is necessary especially when considering complex concepts such as globalization, neoliberalism, or debt, which potentially fit under different categories. These possible factors and the larger frames they fall under involve economic, political, and social impacts, and splitting them apart is an analytical process with the researcher creating the categories, rather than them existing independently. Therefore, the framework posited here and interpretations of which factor fits where, even though often accompanying convention in academic circles, is my own construction. Table 3 is an aggregate overview of the macroeconomic factors I discovered in the literature and provide a framework for this chapter.

Table 3  Overview of macroeconomic factors influencing the rise of the Left in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroeconomic</th>
<th>Washington Consensus</th>
<th>As A Whole</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Inflation</td>
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<td>Promarket Policy/Neoliberalism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capital Openness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fiscal Resources</td>
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<td>Capital Availability/Commodity Boom</td>
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<td>Government Spending</td>
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<td>Debt</td>
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<td>Debt Service Costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IMF Interaction/Debt Conditionality</td>
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The rest of the chapter provides a detailed account of each of these factors including a theoretical understanding of how each factor influences democratic political
shifts, as well as a discussion of what the studies on the rise of the Left in Latin America attributed to them.

**Macroeconomic Factors**

**The “Washington Consensus”**

Much literature in political science deals with analyzing and predicting election successes and failures with regards to past governments’ performances. There is good justification for this, as the theory of economic voting (“people base their electoral decisions on cost-benefit calculations” (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 4)) has been not only theoretically well-rounded (Arcelus & Meltzer, 1975; Downs, 1957; Kramer, 1971; Meltzer & Vellrath, 1975) but also quantitatively validated numerous times, in many contexts around the world (Stokes (2001b) has an overview of the extensive literature available). In the shift toward the Left in Latin America, this literature is some of the most fruitful, as one of the key explanations posited is that the Left arose because of failures that occurred during the tenure of the conservative Right – which are often associated with the neoliberal market model. In the case of Latin America specifically, the cohesive adoption and presence of market liberalism throughout the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, seems to have led to a collective rejection of these values (the Washington Consensus, and perhaps neoliberalism in general) when they proved to not be as successful as expected. There is a general consensus amongst scholars that the Washington Consensus did indeed fail in the region as demonstrated by Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997), Portes and Hoffman (2003), Paus (2004), Huber and Solt (2004), and Arze and Kruse (2004).

Two major frameworks of analysis can explain a rejection of a particular model of development such as the Washington Consensus: 1) outcome-oriented, also termed a performance-mandate, and 2) policy-oriented, also termed a policy-mandate. The two are distinct, and yet both potentially offer an explanation why Latin Americans turned away from the Washington Consensus and the Right. Outcome-oriented, or performance mandate voting views voters as punishing bad performance, economic especially, and rejects them at the polls in the consequent election. Policy-oriented voters in turn choose policies during elections that they want to see enacted in the future. This divide has also been discussed in terms of retrospective (looking back) voting and prospective (looking
forward) voting. Given that the Washington Consensus brought many policy changes as well as weak economic outcomes, one of the two, or both, could be the cause for Leftist governments being elected in the region.

The central notion of much research on electoral voting is that rather than voting for a particular ideal or goal, voters are evaluating (and potentially punishing or rewarding) the past performance of governments. This is termed retrospective economic voting, where “policies play no direct role, since voters decide entirely on the base of past outcomes” (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 4). If the voters view the performance favorably then incumbents will be re-elected and if they do not, they will be ousted (Fiorina, 1981). In addition, further research conflated this theory to show that economic performance was based on “aggregate (or “sociotropic”) economic outcomes such as growth, inflation, and unemployment” rather than any single one of these (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 4). Critics of prospective (policy-mandate/policy based) voting urge emphasis on retrospective (outcome-oriented/performance based) voting, as opposed to prospective (for the future) voting, based on the difficulty for voters to be aware of, understand, and utilize the data, policy, and their possible consequence with enough detail to make accurate predictions – in other words, making conscious policy voting is simply beyond the scope of the layman-voters’ understanding (Duch & Stevenson, 2011; Keech, 1995; Lewis-Beck, 1988).

The turn toward neoliberalism from the failing import substitution industrialization model in Latin America in the 1980s inspired a lot of research testing these very theories (Collier & Collier, 1991; Halperin Donghi, 1994). The methods, and the patterns of behaviour being empirically tested in Latin America created a groundwork for very similar tests done with the current turn toward the Left. A few basic concepts and assumptions about outcome-oriented voting help understand why some factors might have potentially led to the rise of the Left in Latin America. For example, Karen Remmer’s (1991, 2003) work suggests that crisis increases electoral volatility, and macroeconomic performance does influence a subsequent election, particularly inflation and growth. Logically, inflation tends to punish incumbents, while economic growth rewards them. Michael Coppedge’s (1999) research reflects these results, adding the nuance that inflation only affects oppositional parties if there is an increase in inflation (whereas incumbents are affected both with increases and decreases). Kenneth Roberts and Erik Wibbels (1999), in another major econometric analysis, compound this analysis
by highlighting that “short-term inflation influences support for incumbent presidents, but
growth changes have only a weak effect on the vote for incumbents” meaning that voters
are more concerned about stability than growth (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 7). Another
useful addition Roberts and Wibbels (1999) offer and verify is that the economic
influences such as growth and inflation are tempered by the structure of institutions,
parties, political regimes, and class.

Another contribution to this literature which helps understand the impact of the
Washington Consensus on the Latin American electorate is that of policy-switching. This
perspective is evident in the work of Susan Stokes, who examined the impact of policy
redirection during an incumbent’s reign. This research is particularly relevant in Latin
America, where numerous governments and executives preached leftist redistribution
and ultimately converted to market liberalism immediately after being elected in the
1990s. Stokes’s (2001a) conclusions highlight that growth and inflation affect both those
who redirect and those who do not, but that people pay more attention to economic
results when the policy is redirected. Thus, the political orientation of the incumbent
might have a real impact on the way voters perceive policy change, and whether they
are punished for it or not. In their analysis, Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav (2010)
theorize that the Left will only benefit if the incumbent is from the Right and presides
over a bad economic outcome (p. 94).

With these assumptions and cases in hand, one might wonder why one needs to
counter into the impact of the Washington Consensus at all, as one could simply
drive the conclusion that since most of the continent had turned Right in the 1980s and
1990s, and the failures of the neoliberal model were significant (Arze & Kruse, 2004;
Paus, 2004; Portes & Hoffman, 2003), this resulted in a punishment of the incumbents
(pro-market/Right) presidencies, and consequently led to the rise of Leftist governments.
If retrospective voting punishes incumbents due to dissatisfaction with their economic
performance, it is important to establish there indeed was dissatisfaction with the state of
affairs in the late 1990s, after most of the neoliberal policies had been enacted.
Research by Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997) highlights the high levels of
disappointment across the region, and that it was fairly consistently wide-spread.
Analysis by Alcañiz and Hellwig (2011) also shows that Latin American’s were
dissatisfied, but they further show that this unhappiness was blamed on government
policy. However, to assume such a conclusion a priori would be hasty, as voters may not
have punished incumbents but rather chosen policy alternatives, following the policy
mandate theories. Thus, though the research conducted on the rise of neoliberalism in
the region is useful, a shift to the free-market model should be viewed as a critical
juncture, which requires a re-analysis of any following political developments. Much like
the import substitution industrialization to neoliberalism transition, such a shift is a
permanent critical juncture (Collier & Collier, 1991) and therefore theoretical
assumptions, such as the ones derived from the studies above for the neoliberal turn,
have to be retested.

Therefore, in evaluating whether the rise of the Left in Latin America is due to
past economic factors, it is useful to discuss each of the key influencing factors, such as
inflation, growth, unemployment, and pro-market/neoliberal policy perception in separate
subsections. Whereas some of the studies examined break apart the macroeconomic
factors and how they related to the market liberal Washington Consensus model, some
authors consider the adoption of the model, and its impact, as a whole. Ultimately, the
overarching question of policy-oriented versus outcome-oriented is discussed in the
conclusion to this section.

The Washington Consensus and the Latin American Left

As A Whole

Arguing about the impact of the Washington Consensus as a whole, Albert
Fishlow (2006) suggests in his non-academic, yet influential editorial piece that the cut
backs experienced during the “fiscal responsibility” era of the neoliberal reforms led to
populist politicians highlighting the lack of benefits (p. 11). Fishlow (2006) suggests that
“economic disappointment with the meager fruits of free market reforms brought
populists to power in much of South America as the 21st century began” which argues for
outcome-oriented/performance based voting (p. 12). He continues the argument by
suggesting that it was the rise in Asian demand for Latin American exports which then
validated the populist with successful boosts to the economy (Fishlow, 2006, p. 12).
Therefore, the failures of market liberalism, aligned with an increase in commodity prices
have resulted in the advent of the Left. Fishlow does not test or theoretically justify his
hypothesis. Matthew R. Cleary (2006) also argues for the performance thesis, and
suggests that the ideological switch, although in his view caused by inequality for the
most part, was “augmented by the fact that the first generation of center-right administrations generally failed to perform well in office” (p. 42).

Carlos M. Vilas (2006) views the Washington Consensus as only the tip of the iceberg, where the late 1990s brought about an expression of “a dissatisfaction with the kind of capitalism prevalent in Latin America” which was a “combined outcome of colonial imposition, the subordinate articulation of pre-existing social formations, the subsequent modifications of national and regional economic structures, and accelerated processes of urbanization” throughout the latter 20th century (p. 237). Those, like the labour classes and marginalized groups like women and ethnic voters, “all lost ground within the new designs [of the Washington Consensus] as governmental commitment to social well-being was subordinated to the accomplishment of the new macroeconomic concerns” (Vilas, 2006, p. 237). This ultimately erupted in “explosive effects” such as “mass protests” and “unscheduled government changes”, and therefore, the “subsequent political changes that have taken place [the election of the Leftist governments]… are clear by-products of people’s rage and persistent mass protest” (Vilas, 2006, pp. 238–239). This eloquent formulation describes the sentiment inherent in this reform – the Washington Consensus brought true hardship to the region, and the Left was seen as a true release from it.

Raul L. Madrid (2009) also suggests it was “the economic problems and the declining support for market policies [which] fueled left electoral victories throughout Latin America” (p. 597). He does not differentiate between the individual factors (such as growth, inflation, unemployment, or policy changes) and does not test for them – instead, he argues that a particular variation within each nation of lackluster performance led to a disillusionment with the incumbent who had promoted these reforms (Madrid, 2009). However, going beyond Fishlow, Madrid sees the emergence of the “two Lefts” (aligned with Castañeda’s thesis outlined in the introduction) as being rooted in which government adopted neoliberalism and at what time. He argues that if a government was Leftist, and adopted market reforms in the 1990s, it moved toward the center and as such was punished by voters who elected the consequently more radical, anti-market governments that sprang up in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (Madrid, 2009, p. 588), which resonates with Queirolo’s (2013) ultimate conclusion that it is “untainted” parties that won in the early 2000s. Where Leftist governments were in opposition, the market reforms became associated with the right, and therefore the Left could still move toward
the center and not be associated with the fallout, which was the case in Brazil and Uruguay, and to a small extent in Chile (Madrid, 2009, p. 603).

This dynamic of electoral incumbent punishment for failing to perform economically fits well with the theory of retrospective voting outlined above, and Madrid’s distinction between Left and Right incumbents, and how this leads to a rejection of their policy platforms (in the Left’s case here we mean the centre-Lefts that have adopted neoliberalism during the 1990s) was verified by Murillo et al. (2010) as discussed in the following section on inflation. Also arguing without specifying aspects of the Washington Consensus, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) highlight that in general, bad performance hurts incumbents, and therefore the shift to the Left could be a simple consequence of Rightist parties being in power while a bad economic downturn happened, which “could be expected to benefit the Left” (p. 10). This reiterates the general theory of retrospective voting; Levitsky and Roberts do not offer any testing of this theory. Arnold and Samuels (2011) equally support the retrospective voting thesis. They argue that since ideology of the voters has not radically changed, the swing left has to be ascribed to a displeasure with the performance of the Right (p. 33), and that in many ways, this highlights the normal workings of democracy (pp. 49-50). Other studies examining the impact of the Washington Consensus break down the elements of market reforms into the various factors in this section.

Inflation

Inflation is significant to voters as it reflects a rise in prices of everyday goods, which has a direct impact on the livelihoods of the electorate (Remmer, 2002). Lora and Olivera (2005) find that the “electorate is highly sensitive to one economic outcome – inflation - and strongly rejects the adoption of promarket policies” to a statistically significant level (p. 23). Thus, this explains the punishment of the leaders who posited such reforms, and explains why they were not elected at the end of the reform process. Therefore, they follow the reasoning that if the incumbent manages to bring down inflation, they will be rewarded in the next electoral office (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 42). The incumbent (Right) presidents did not manage, for the most part, to control inflation throughout the region in the 1990s, and in extreme cases such as Argentina, it spiraled out of control (Rodrik, 2001). Therefore, they were punished at the voting box. Arguing at least rhetorically against promarket reforms, the left (particularly in the
populist/nationalization rhetoric of Hugo Chavez and Nestor Kirchner), was rewarded by electoral support.

Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav (2010), using the most up-to-date dataset of elections until 2008, find that the link between higher levels of inflation during a right-wing incumbent’s presidency will lead to the Left receiving a higher proportion of the vote (p. 100). Inversely, they found that if the incumbent is already on the Left, high inflation will lead to an even stronger rejection of the incumbent, which highlights a sharp insight that Left-wing voters strongly prefer low inflation, as it “has a large, negative impact on the poor” (Murillo et al., 2010, p. 100). Susan Stokes’s (2009) research results confirm both Murillo et al.’s (2010) and Lora and Olivera’s (2005) findings in that “inflation does appear to play a role. Low inflation under the right helps the left, but inflation under the left has no electoral effect” (p. 21). In contrast to Murillo et al.’s result on a Left incumbent being punished Stokes’s argument that is perhaps partially due to the way the different studies counted the “left” share of votes. Whereas Stokes (2009) focused on the ideological factors and focuses on relative left and relative right winners and successes, Murillo et al. (2010) focus on vote share and use a different ideological coding scheme. Therefore, the limited number of times the “left” was in power in their data sets might arguably skew the results.

Yet, through their empirical tests, Debs and Helmke (2010) find that there is “no evidence for the economic voting hypothesis”, and contrary to both Lora and Olivera (2005) and Murillo et al. (2010), they also find inflation to be insignificant in punishing incumbents and leading the Left to electoral victories (p. 231). Baker and Greene (2011) find no support that inflation had any impact on the electoral fortunes of the Left, which generally fits into their theory that performance voting has little merit (pp. 64-65). Karen Remmer (2012) finds inflation to be insignificant, but does not speculate or extrapolate on the subject beyond noting that in general, her research does not validate the theory of retrospective voting (punishing incumbents), and finds that prospective voting (policy-mandate) is a stronger driver of electoral behavior (p. 957). With an updated dataset, Blanco and Grier (2013) confirm the previous positive assertions (that high inflation punished the incumbent and led to helping the Left rise in Latin America) through their regression to a significant degree, and find that “a higher inflation rate in the previous presidential terms is correlated with an increased probability that the next president will be from a left-wing party” (p. 81). Although they argue this makes little sense in a
situation with already high-inflation, as leftist policies tend to increase inflation, as noted with the theoretical assumptions of retrospective voting, the voters tend to think more about punishment of the incumbent rather than paying attention to future policy considerations. Blanco and Grier (2013) confirm this in their robustness tests in an ordered logit model: “higher levels of inflation in a previous presidential term matter when the incumbent was conservative” showing that the hypothesis, that the mostly Right-wing governments of the 1990s have underperformed economically and are now being punished, has much merit (p. 84). Queirolo (2013) finds inflation insignificant, but also notes that unlike Murillo et al. (2011), the incumbent’s ideological orientation did not have any impact either way.

**Growth**

Economic growth, often calculated as changes to GDP per capita, highlights the increasing fortunes of a national economy. Voters may reward benefits when they are redistributed by the state, or if such growth is non-existent, by punishing the incumbents.

Lora and Olivera (2005), despite the theoretical background that suggests growth should have an impact, find that “changes in growth rates are seldom significant and when included in a regression with inflation show the wrong sign” (p. 27). However, in legislative elections, as opposed to presidential elections, they find that growth is significant, when other economic variables are considered (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 27). This analysis would help explain why despite there being some growth due to the Washington Consensus, there was little to no reward for this in electoral office for the Right, especially in the presidential elections. Debs and Helmke (2010) use a different data set to empirically test the same hypothesis and find that “it does not appear that the left reaps any noticeable benefits when non-left incumbents fail to deliver growth” (p. 231). This seems to echo Lora and Olivera’s conclusions and reinforce that growth is perhaps too nebulous to translate directly to the voting base.

In a similar finding, Murillo et al. (2010) find that there is no correlation between growth and voters swaying away from right-wing incumbents or toward the Left, and suggest that this is because inflation is felt immediately, whereas growth is something amorphous takes longer to translate to benefits for the people (p. 101). Stokes (2009) also finds no correlation between GDP per capita levels, nor its changes, and the voters choosing the electoral Left in consequent elections (p. 21). Remmer’s (2012) analysis
reflects similar results and finds growth’s impact insignificant (p. 957). Baker and Greene (2011) also find no correlation between growth and the rise of the Left (pp. 64-65). In their updated dataset, Blanco and Grier’s (2013) regression also finds absolutely no correlation between growth and a rise in the Left vote share, echoing all the results previous to theirs (p. 79). Queirolo (2013), in perhaps the most nuanced analysis, also finds no correlation between growth and the rise of the Left (p. 58). Therefore, it seems growth, or its lack, has little impact on voters, and most likely did not affect the electoral fortunes of the Left one way or another.

Unemployment

The only case-study to examine the effects of unemployment on voting behaviour statistically was Queirolo (2013), who feels that markers such as growth and inflation are not as directly translatable to the voter as is unemployment, which therefore serves as a better gage of economic performance (Bingham, Powell & Whitten, 1993). The theory offers that if unemployment is high during an incumbent’s term, they will be punished in the electoral polls (performance-mandate). However, individual-level characteristics, in this case risk-taking versus risk-aversion, influence such decisions. For instance, if unemployment is high, risk-averse voters might choose to select a more conservative (political Right) set of policies, no matter the ideological orientation of the incumbent, as this has the greatest chance of alleviating this hardship (policy-mandate). Therefore, the tension between these two motivations between voting (retrospective/outcome/performance versus prospective/policy) is part of Queirolo’s fundamental question with regards to Latin America: are the voters punishing or are they choosing? Queirolo (2013) finds only unemployment significant as a measure of economic performance, where “more unemployment leads to an increase in the vote for leftist parties in Latin America” where voters are paying attention to unemployment consistently throughout the term (p. 58). However, the benefit is lost if the incumbent is already on the Left (Queirolo, 2013, p. 59).

Promarket/Neoliberal Policies

The adoption of the Washington Consensus was the introduction of neoliberalism into the Latin American region. Its impact goes beyond the economic, and created new path dependencies within the politics of the region as well. By this, I mean that apart from the Washington Consensus potentially impacting the electoral victories of the left
through retrospective attitudes toward voting, it has also brought about a new relationship with the market, and changed the role of the Left (and the Right), and what they stand for in the face of market liberalism. Thus, the Washington Consensus might be rejected not only because of the bad outcomes it has brought, leading to bad performance, but also because of the set of policies which are potentially unfavorable by the populace (policy-mandate).

On a political level, Francisco Panizza (2005) argues that the failure of neoliberal economics “opened a way for a ‘post-Washington Consensus era’ in which the former overriding opposition between the advocates of neoliberal reform and their LOC [Left-of-Center] critics have been substituted for a more complex game of convergence and differentiations” (p. 718). Panizza (2005) suggests that “it has become evident that the democratic reforms and the so-called ‘neoliberal’ economic reform programmes have failed to live up to their promises to deliver a better life for the majority of the Latin American people” (p. 720). He argues that in the vacuum created by the cohesive rejection of the Washington Consensus, as a particular iteration of neoliberalism, the Left is struggling to embrace power with something new and different to offer, in an attempt to recreate its own identity. While this new identity may be elusive to the Left, what binds the old Leftists, including unions, public sector workers, with the only thing binding them together being “their opposition to neoliberalism” (Panizza, 2005, p. 725). In essence, the opposition to the Washington Consensus constitutes the leftist parties’ identities.

Thus, not only did the Washington Consensus promarket policy create a sense of disillusionment with the Right that brought it into the region in the 1990s, it also gave sense to a new Left that, at least in theory, is constituted by everything not neoliberal (Panizza, 2009).

After considering the economic indicators, Lora and Olivera (2005) consider the perceptions of policies, particularly those associated with the Washington Consensus. As they have noted in their theoretical background, based on the work of Carlos Gervasoni, it seems that many of the Washington Consensus policies have no negative impact on the electoral choices of voters (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 9). Javier Corrales’s (2000) analysis of the cases of Argentina and Venezuela also suggests that the perception of policies is limited by party loyalty and institutional factors. After testing empirically, Lora and Olivera (2005) note that “apart from promarket reforms, the other Washington Consensus policies do not affect the electorate’s behavior” (p. 24). Since
this is the main tenet of the Washington Consensus, and indeed neoliberalism, such policy could lead to the rise of the Left in Latin America – the 1990s were markedly promarket years which eventually backfired in most nations, except for Chile. The strength of the impact of promarket policy reform is consistent and seems to be negative irrespective of the macroeconomic outcomes (such as a greater growth or a lower inflation rate) (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 34). This highlights a policy-mandate, and that the voters are actively choosing to avoid further pro-market policy. There are, therefore, “very large electoral costs” of adopting the Washington Consensus (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 44), which can also explain why the incumbent Right was punished so heavily after the 1990s (bad performance in addition to unfavorable policy).

In testing this theory through a regression, Stokes (2009) creates hypothetical conditions where neoliberal policy measures are implemented (by modelling them through trade and capital openness in various levels) and finds that “neoliberalism, then, is hazardous for the right. For the left, not neoliberalism in general, but more narrowly, trade liberalization is hazardous” (p. 21). In turn, testing whether previous reform policies help or hinder Left-wing elections, Blanco and Grier (2013) find them “marginally significant”, noting that “previous reform efforts are associated with more left-wing presidents in the current period” (p. 85). Much in the same vein, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) echo the conclusions that “the downturn eroded public support for the economic status quo embodied in the Washington Consensus” and see the governments connected to these policies falling out of favor, although it is not clear if they imply the policy itself or the overall consequences of neoliberal reforms (p. 10). However, they carefully note, reflecting Stokes (2001b), that it was not “necessarily neoliberalism per se that drove voters to the Left” (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011, p. 9).

According to Baker and Green (2011), Latin Americans do not view the market itself as bad. It was rather the combination of right incumbents, debt recession, and market policy that led to an intermeshing of neoliberalism with a particular instance in history (the implementation of the Washington Consensus, and the consequent hardships, of the 1990s) that ultimately led to the support of the Lefts. This is arguably more aligned with the performance/outcome-mandate thesis than the policy-mandate thesis. The most detailed test of pro-market policy is done by Baker and Greene (2011), who find it to be the only and key cause of the rise of the Left (p. 64). They find this result to be statistically significant to a great degree not only in retrospective analysis but
also in predicting proportional voter responses – the bigger the dislike of markets, the higher the chance in Latin America the Left will be voted into office (Baker & Greene, 2011, p. 64). Baker and Greene (2011) are thus convincingly arguing for a policy-mandate voting behavior in Latin America (pp. 44-46). One test that most of the case-studies omit is whether the depth of reforms, or how they were implemented, impacts their reception. Queirolo (2013) did not find this to be the case, and therefore the extent and level of the reforms is in no way correlated with the Left arising (pp. 55-56), regardless of the “ideology” of the incumbent who implemented them (p. 61).

**Summarizing the Research**

At the end of the 1990s, Latin America was faced with significantly opposing ideologies, both of which posited promarket reforms as key to their policy agendas: for the incumbent Right, pushing the Washington Consensus further, for the populist Left, reforming it and moving away from neoliberalism, at least externally. Those espousing promarket reforms were punished electorally. Though most case-studies agree that this was the case, there is disagreement about the mechanism of why voters rejected the Washington Consensus. Was it because it had performed badly, and the Right (and a few Lefts) that brought it along should be punished? Or was it because voters wanted a different policy set, and were instead looking forward, rather than backward?

The many analyses done on the various aspects of the Washington Consensus do not find agreement. Whereas Lora and Olivera (2005), Stokes (2009), Murillo et al. (2010, 2011), and Blanco and Grier (2013) find inflation to be significant, and punished by the voters, helping the Left get elected, Debs and Helmke (2010), Baker and Greene (2011), Remmer (2012), and Queirolo (2013) find it insignificant in every case. Such differences cannot be easily explained, especially since these studies run statistical sets on inherently similar datasets. However, it is interesting to note that the former group tends to side on the performance-mandate line of reasoning, and the latter on the policy-mandate, as described in the next paragraph. Growth seems to consistently not matter in any of the tests, which resonates with the theory that it is difficult for voters to gauge as they do not see its impact on their life. Unemployment, unfortunately only studied by Queirolo (2013), was found to matter, and should have been examined more thoroughly as perhaps the closest marker of economic wellbeing for the people. In terms of neoliberal/promarket policies, the picture is complicated. Despite early academic rhetoric, the markets are not hated in Latin America. Yet, many of the neoliberal reforms
were disliked, especially privatization and fiscal conservatism, as these struck the people the hardest and most directly (Corrales, 2008). However, despite almost all the case-studies finding support for the argument that neoliberal reforms led to the rise of the Left a decade later, it is unclear whether this is due to the lack of performance and outcomes, or due to the voters choosing alternative policies and the next ideological cycle.

It is worth outlining the case-studies which, in my view, have emphasized the Washington Consensus as the cause for the rise of the Left, in terms of their split on perceptions of voter behaviour. Table 4 shows the conclusions the case-studies arrive at in terms of the mechanism in which the Washington Consensus influenced the electoral rise of the Left.

### Table 4 Performance-Mandate versus Policy-Mandate in case-studies on the rise of the Left

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance/Outcome/Retrospective Mandate</th>
<th>Policy/Prospective Mandate</th>
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<tr>
<td>Levitsky and Roberts (2011)</td>
<td>Levitsky and Roberts (2011)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queirolo (2013)</td>
<td>Queirolo (2013)</td>
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Like many of the researchers, the author suggests that both dynamics are at play, but temporally staggered. Allyson Benton (2005) highlights how in Latin America, voters have deep memories and punish not only incumbents but also those preceding them, for bad economic performance. The author argues that the combination of the disappointing outcomes of the neoliberal reforms were reinforced by strong leftist ideologies being offered, complemented by the sudden increases in states’ capabilities to spend money (as described in the Fiscal Resources section). This combination reminded voters what the government could do – neither the harsh dictatorships of the 1980s, nor the fiscal austerity of the 1990s needed to be the only two options. Thus, as Queirolo (2013) notes, her analysis “depicts a sophisticated image of Latin Americans”
as voters, who not only choose to punish bad performance but also focus on the policies they feel will work (p. 65).

Globalization

Given the potential impact of the Washington Consensus on Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the possible impact of global markets and pressures on the region has also been explored as a potential causal factor in the rise of the Left. Whereas political factors such as international pressure or relationship to a hegemon are also aspects of globalization, in this section I try to unravel the research which suggests that economic integration might have an impact on elements which favor the Left. In a comprehensive account on the impact of globalization on regime change, Susan Stokes (2009) argues that viewing the Latin American swing to the Left as a backlash against the neoliberal turn alone is too simplistic. Her main concern is that the Left and neoliberalism are not exclusive, and that despite there being a political shift, the framework of market liberalism remains present in the region – thus understanding the left as a rejection of everything the 1990s brought is simply not fully adequate. Given the growing literature on the continuity of neoliberalism in the region (Flores-Macías, 2010; Weyland, 2003, 2011), some of the reforms that had led to greater integration into global markets are still relevant now, after the shift to the Left. In order to resolve the possible aspects of globalization that might have had an impact in contributing the Left to rise, it is important to delineate how globalism enacts its doctrine.

Seminal research in globalization highlights a correlation between the amount of integration a nation has in the global markets and the size of their public sector (D. R. Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985). Despite the benefits to the national economies, the instability associated with open markets can be offset by having a larger redistributive state and consequently balance out some of the consequences of globalization (such as the lower class being left without work due to outsourcing) (Rodrik, 1998). Stokes (2009) notes that it is not the trade openness itself that leads to the larger public sector, but rather the consequences of trade openness, which include elements such as “increased volatility” and “deindustrialization” (p. 3 – Footnote 3). In most contexts, “the opening of markets in developing countries to goods and services produced abroad increases the
volatility of wages and employment opportunities” which leads to people seeking “the left as an instrument against globalization” (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). However, the support for the Left is dependent on whether it promises, and then realizes, increases in government spending, or potentially punishes governments which did not spend adequately enough. In Latin America’s case, Avelino, Brown, and Hunter (2005) note that this pattern holds generally true, except in that the advent of democracy did not necessarily make government spending more responsive to globalization. Stokes cites Garrett (1998) who sharply observes that “globalization has provided new and fertile ground for the social democratic agenda (and for more populist and xenophobic appeals for economic closure) (2009, pp. 5–6). Even though speaking of the European context, Garrett’s prescience suggests that the rise of the Leftists in Latin America is correlated with the increases in trade openness in the 1990s neoliberal reforms, as people looked for governments who offered more protection from the vagrancies of globalization, and found them in the offers of the Left and the populists.

**Globalization and the Latin American Left**

In Latin America, the patterns of development of globalization seem to differ from this pattern at times. While there was an increase in trade openness historically, it has not been always correlated with an increase in the size of the state. Evidence on this is mixed: Segura-Ubiergo (2007) finds that in Latin America public sector has decreased as a result of increased trade-openness, Huber, Mustillo and Stephens (2008) find no correlation, and as mentioned above Avelino, Brown and Hunter (2005) find that trade openness increased the public sector. Such conflating accounts in general question whether Latin America follows the patterns elsewhere in the world. If indeed globalization generally does lead toward the public electing representatives on the Left who promise to protect them from its dangers, then the consistent opening of the Latin American region through neoliberalism could have led to the rise of the Left. The markers of trade openness and capital openness are standard indicators of the extent of globalization.

**Trade Openness**

Stokes (2009) finds that more trade openness has a negative impact on the electoral chances of the Left, which is unexpected and goes against the theoretical model outlined above (pp. 18-19). However, when she tests this by including the
ideology of the incumbent government, the result suggests that only when the Left is incumbent, and trade openness increases, will the Right have more chances electorally in the next voting round (Stokes, 2009, p. 19). This result is particularly interesting, as it posits Leftist or populist governments as antagonistic toward trade, something which is contested by many theorists, who highlight that trade openness is a popular policy in the region (Armijo & Faucher, 2002; Baker, 2003, 2009, Weyland, 2003, 2011).

Nevertheless, in the voters’ perceptions the Left might act as a symbol against global pressure, markets, and in the case of Latin America, the hegemony of the United States from whence the market liberal model of the Washington Consensus came. Then, it logically follows that if a government promises to increase redistribution, opening up the markets instead is considered a betrayal of these beliefs by the voters and they punish the incumbent. Stokes’ (2001a) earlier seminal work on policy switching highlights how during the earlier 1990s, Latin American voters elected ‘leftist’ and populist presidents on such promises who ultimately turned to market liberalism as a way out of the economic downturn, despite electoral promises.

After a decade of disillusionment, being wary of such switches has made voters particularly responsive in punishing Left incumbents. Thus, it is more the switching, rather than the policy itself, that rewards Rightist governments if the trade openness increased under a Left government. Rightist governments do not seem to be as impacted, which reflects on the idea that this is a popular policy in general (unlike privatization for instance (Corrales, 2008)). Murillo et al. (2010) find that there is “weak support” for trade and capital openness in being helpful to the Left arising, but that this was not statistically significant (p. 103). Baker and Greene (2011) also find that there is no support for the hypothesis that the Left vote share increases alongside increased trade-openness (pp. 64-65). Karen Remmer (2012) tests explicitly for terms of trade and finds that “the greater the improvement”, “the greater the likelihood of a leftist electoral victory” (p. 966). With their updated dataset, however, Blanco and Grier (2013) find that “trade openness is positive and significant” and “as trade (as a percentage of GDP) increases in the previous period, so does the probability that the current president's ideology will be more conservative” which reflects Stokes’s result (p. 79). Nevertheless, they find upon running a logit model test for robustness this result does not stand up, and ultimately the “effect of lagged trade openness on the ideology of the current president no longer matters” (Blanco & Grier, 2013, p. 84).
These conflicting results highlight the complex mechanics in place regarding trade. The most likely explanation is that the Right, most often associated with trade, is not punished by increasing trade openness, which has historically brought benefits for Latin Americans. It is when promises, offered by the Left, of moving away from the models of the 1990s, which is traditionally associated with the Right, are replaced by a sudden move toward trade openness do we see a backlash against the Left. Thus, it seems that voters follow the policy-mandate, where they view trade as a positive policy they see benefiting them in the future. Nevertheless, if a government promises to move away from the overall harsh package of the Washington Consensus, which brought about much hardship, and suddenly reverses, the voters perceive trade openness as a signal of a return to the Washington Consensus, and punish the incumbents. As was seen in the previous section, promarket/Washington Consensus policies were punished heavily by Latin American voters at the end of the twentieth century, and yet trade openness, which is one of the elements of the neoliberal reforms has seemed less volatile. I would argue that a historical element is at play here: since Latin American countries have always been commodity exporters, trade openness is traditionally associated with prosperity and development, rather than explicitly with neoliberalism itself. Thus, it is potentially the perception of trade as something inherently Latin American that dissociates this for the Latin American voters from promarket/Washington Consensus policies.

**Capital Openness**

Out of the case studies I reviewed, only Stokes tests specifically for capital openness (as opposed to trade openness, thus focusing on the financialization aspect of neoliberalism), and finds that “the greater its degree in the year before an election, the better on average the left does in the election” (2009, p. 18). When she retests this based on the ideology of the incumbent, it seems it matters to voters more if a Right-wing government was in power and increased capital financialization, and therefore resulted in a stronger victory for the Left. If the Left was an incumbent, capital openness had little to no effect (Stokes, 2009, p. 18). Murillo et al. (2010) also find a weak positive correlation between increasing trade openness and a vote for the Left (p. 103). These results suggest an explanation of why trade and capital openness are different from each other. Whereas capital openness might be associated with a promarket/Washington Consensus, trade is something that precedes it. Further,
financialization and capital openness have often connected to debt and lending, a sore point for the Latin Americans ever since the 1980s, and particularly around the early 2000s. Consequently, the research suggests that it has been (increases in) financialization within neoliberalism that resulted in preferential voting for the Left.

**Summarizing the Research**

The consistent connection between trade openness and the importance of exports to Latin America seems to have led to the incumbent Right being often rewarded for implementing such policy, and the Left gaining no electoral benefits because of it. Inversely, when the Left has brought this policy to the table suddenly and unexpectedly, despite its positive benefits, the voters often punish them in the polls. Capital openness, though, always bears too much of the stigma of the promarket/Washington Consensus, and most likely reminds the voters of the “reforms” of the 1990s, along with their disastrous effects and the resulting debts they accrued across the region. Globalization, therefore, is treated by the voters in a sophisticated way: they take what policies they like and have worked (both policy and performance mandates), but they punish what they see as damaging to them in the past. Thus, whereas increasing trade openness has not led to electoral successes for the Left, capital openness policies have, but the limited number of explorations in the research make this conclusion somewhat tentative.

**Fiscal Resources**

Much of literature on economic voting (unlike that of retrospective voting which focuses on punishing or rewarding the incumbent) focuses on the current performance of the economy, and how this affects the voters’ perceptions, who weigh their prospects when considering their future executives. The division between evaluating the past economic model and its markers, and how this impacts the choices of voters (retrospective voting/performance or outcome-mandate) as opposed to analyzing the shifting economic markers and how they support the ability of the presidents to govern Leftist policy (prospective voting) is a difficult and nuanced one. The temporal factor conflates the issue: low commodity prices, for instance, can be the cause of bad governance, which may lead to a rejection of the incumbents (retrospective voting) but if these persist, then even the new Leftist governments will not be able to benefit from
them, failing in their policy promises, and thus leading to another vote for the Right. Thus, time matters. If the narrative offered in many of these case-studies is that the Washington Consensus, associated with low growth, low commodity prices, high inflation and pro-market policy, led to the Left being elected, it is necessary to highlight that increased global commodity prices were rising and allowed the governments to fulfill their redistributive (or populist in some cases) policies which satisfied the voters. The reason why these current economic markers effects matter is in predicting future trends in Latin America or highlighting why the Left continues to succeed – if, for instance, commodity export prices fare differently in the future, will there be a reversal of the ideologies being elected?

**Fiscal Resources and the Latin American Left**

Following up on their previous work (Murillo et al., 2010), Murillo et al. (2011) focus on the ability of presidents to promise and execute policies which tend to favor redistribution and reducing inequality – those of the Left. Therefore, in part they not only address what could have been the causal factors in leading the Left to rise in Latin America, but what preconditions need to be met for the Left to succeed (and perhaps stay in power). The historical view they offer is that “the global commodity boom of the 2000s reduced the need for countries in the region to resort to external financing, which came with policy conditionality that constrained executives; presidents were thus free to pursue their preferred domestic policies on the leftward end of the ideological spectrum” (Murillo et al., 2011, p. 53).

This analysis is historically situated – because the 1990s were so tough financially for many of the Latin American nations, promises of redistribution and government payouts to voters were neither realistic, or realized if the Left did get elected. Much research backs the inverse relationship – that tight financial constraints led to the rise of Right wing presidents who promised fiscal austerity (through neoliberal policies) (Murillo, 2009; Remmer, 1998; Teichman, 2001; Weyland, 2002). In reviewing the 1980s and particularly the 1990s, Sebastian Edwards (1995) highlights that the restriction of fiscal policy, the lack of capital availability, and the resulting conditionality associated with debt borrowing creates an environment where the financial restriction of neoliberalism became the only viable option for governments to adopt. Thus, in the same manner that the fiscal crunch of the 1990s created presidents who had to preach fiscal conservation, the windfall of extra spending improved the Leftists’ ability to sway
the electorate in the early 2000s. As Blanco and Grier (2013) eloquently put it, “commodity windfalls might be especially beneficial for politicians from the left, who can represent a break from the painful past” (p. 76).

In my view, the reader has to be careful in accepting causality of macroeconomic factors that are temporally tied to political shifts, rather than the factors inherent to a political-economic system (such as the Washington Consensus, which is an integrated ideology), because in some cases factors, such as government policies, cannot adequately explain why the Left came into power, but rather explain why it successfully staid in power in certain places. One view of why such factors still must be included in such an overview as this is that they might potentially enable the Left to make promises which seem more plausible than had there been no backing for such promises at all. However, as mentioned above, the temporality of these factors, that they have an effect after the Left already won (due to the many other factors described in this thesis), means that they cannot be truly considered causal factors in the rise of the Left. Apart from commodity prices, these are very useful for outlining why the Left continues to succeed in the region.

**Capital Availability/Commodity Boom**

Commodity exports have been the traditional foundation of the Latin American economies since their colonial independence (Camacho & Perez-Quiros, 2014; J. G. Williamson, 2015). Much of the booms and recessions in the region have been dependent on global needs for commodities and their consequent valuing. Given the radical increase in commodity prices in the world as a result of the Asian development in the mid-1990s (Bräutigam & Gallagher, 2014; Gruss, 2014; Saylor, 2012), Latin America’s fortunes rose, and some theorists have suggested this new windfall was the cause why Leftist governments suddenly could make promises, and enact them, swaying voters to elect them in the early 2000s. Albert Fishlow (2006) notes that the increasing demand for commodities in Asia during the late 1990s has led to an increase demand for Latin American exports (raw commodities) and therefore, allowed more government spending, a relief for people who had to tighten their belts under the fiscal conservative measures of neoliberalism/the Washington Consensus (p. 12). This resulted in a “growth spurt” for the region and as such, “the continent no longer had to rely on external financing to cover external trade deficits” (Murillo et al., 2011, p. 56). Jose Antonio Ocampo (2008) also highlights the improving fortunes of the region in the
2000s as a result of the combined benefits of a mineral commodity price demand as well as a stronger global economy. The reader cannot be sure if Fishlow means this as a causal link – that increasing commodity prices have led to Leftist politicians being elected, or whether he is implying that this came coincidentally alongside discontent with market liberalism.

Kurt Weyland’s (2009) case-study on the rise of the Left also revolves around the commodity booms and the windfalls they provide by using rentier state theory to highlight how left came into power, or at least its radical variant. Rentier State Theory argues that “rents accruing from natural resources, particularly in natural gas and oil, allow governments to provide essential public goods, or side payments to potential dissidents, without having to make concessions” (Spruyt, 2007, p. 226) and how governments increase government spending when commodity resources promise high returns. Weyland (2009) argues that after the fiscal constraint of the neoliberal era, the “natural resource bonanza” throughout Latin America in the late 1990s and early 2000s helped “discredit the neoliberal insistence on constraints, suggest the availability of great opportunities, and stimulate radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the established socioeconomic and political order” (p. 146). He highlights it is not neoliberalism itself or market policy that caused a backlash (for instance, he notes that Venezuela had the fewest market reforms implemented and the backlash there was the strongest), but rather the promise of a positive spending that drew the voters to the Left (Weyland, 2009, p. 146). For Weyland, the radical Left (mainly Chavez and Morales and Correa) is nothing new, but a recreation of the petrol boom spending of the 1970s (for Venezuela), now present in the new demand for petrol (Venezuela) and natural gas (Bolivia). The people, who are fearful of losing such new bonanzas (Weyland cites cognitive psychology research here), vote to elect radical leaders who offer to protect such resources within state by nationalizing them (Weyland, 2009, p. 155).

Using this research further, Weyland (2009) highlights the tendencies of governments, just as gamblers, to take more risks the more abundant the windfall is – such as “ultra-cheap gasoline for Venezuelan drivers, subsidized food for the poor barrios of Caracas, and free health care for all Bolivians” (pp. 151-152). Murillo et al. (2011) test this hypothesis, arguing that “as the value of exports increases… the freedom to support redistributive policies also increases. Therefore, the availability of domestic sources of currency will increase the likelihood that the president will govern on
the left” (p. 57). Accounting for the other features of the fiscal state of nations, they find strong statistical support that with the boon of higher commodity prices, the higher the availability of money for presidents to dispense with, and consequently, “as the current account balance improves, the probability of observing a left president increases” (Murillo et al., 2011, pp. 61–62). Levitsky and Roberts (2011) also use this line of reasoning to suggest the continuing re-election of the Leftist governments after the initial wave, suggesting a combined “reduced governments’ dependence on the United States and international financial institutions” for capital allowed for “resources to invest in the types of social welfare policies traditionally associated with the Left” (p. 11). As this increase in the commodity prices continued after the initial wave of elections, especially with regards to Venezuela, they do not consider commodity prices to be a causal factor of a shift to the Left, but much like the other case-studies argue, in validating the legitimacy of the Left (populist and liberal) in executing their promises.

Karen Remmer’s (2012) analysis also posits economic wealth, in combination with ever-favorable anti-US sentiment, are what helped lead “statist, nationalist, and redistributive political projects” to victory (p. 953). Important to note, Remmer’s analysis goes against the grain of performance-based voting discussed in the previous section – it was prospective performance (potentially manifested in the redistributive policy-mandate the Leftist platforms offered) that led to the Left’s electoral victory. Her testing suggests that if “the level of citizen dissatisfaction played a significant role” it “tended to work against leftist-populism” rather than for it (Remmer, 2012, p. 961). Since she is examining the changes that happened after the initial elections of the Left, by focusing on the period 2004 until 2007, one wonders whether her argument, that prospective voting is more explanatory of the shift than retrospective voting, is valid.

In one of the most nuanced accounts of commodity influences, Blanco and Grier (2013) “find significant support for the argument that natural resources exports are positively related to the probability of having a left-wing president” and show that agricultural and oil exports are not as significant as minerals with an increase in either leading to leftist governance (p. 81). The distinction between export increases and commodity prices is slight – for following basic economic tenets, an increase in commodity prices will incentivize higher exports, if such resources are available. However, upon testing for further robustness, Blanco and Grier (2013) suggest that it seems oil exports matter only to Venezuela, who is a large exporter. Without Venezuela
in the regression, the export of oil and its price become insignificant (Blanco & Grier, 2013, p. 87). Given their earlier work highlighting that petroleum exports are directly tied to the availability of capital, we can see that the lower prices of oil globally in the past several years could have been linked to the difficulties facing Venezuela today (Blanco & Grier, 2012).

**Government Spending**

The availability of the government resources for redistribution to the people might motivate voters to reward those incumbents who choose to spend more (or promise to spend more) for social welfare projects. This would then have the potential impact of mobilizing the poor voters. Indeed, given the particularly history of populism in the region, and its resurgence since 1998, redistribution and public payouts are a strong motivation for voters. Given that the ideological underpinnings of the Washington Consensus are neoliberal ideologies, where state power is relegated to the markets (although Stokes (2009) shows that neoliberalism does not actually lead to a smaller state), the lack of government spending can be tied to the policies presented by the Washington Consensus, and therefore an examination of government spending merits a discussion here. A potentially theoretical concern is that the payouts by populists are not unlike those of Leftists parties which redistribute money in more controlled, and perhaps institutionalized ways.

In one of the key analysis on the subject, Stokes (2009) finds “strong evidence that, in the context of a contracting public sector, the electorate turns to the left” and if accounting for the ideological orientation of the incumbent, “the smaller the public sector, the more the electorate punishes the right at the next election” (p. 19). This matches the theoretical model where an electorate is highly sensitive to the need for protection and redistribution. Baker and Greene (2011) test for the size of the state being correlated with the Left vote share but they find no statistical support for this (pp. 64-65). Blanco and Grier (2013), also find government spending and expenditure insignificant statistically (p. 79), which clashes directly with Stokes’s results. However, this can be explained through the different measure Blanco and Grier utilized – government spending as a percentage of GDP – rather than focusing on social spending. Stokes (2009) outlines the difficulty of accurately finding the levels of social spending, as this value is usually available only for presidential governments and does not include sub-national bodies, as well as simply the small sample size (pp. 15-16). Thus, whereas this
nuance does not validate Stokes’s results over Blanco and Grier’s, given the long history of economic theory on social spending and its influences on the public (Brown & Hunter, 1999), the conclusion is uncertain and this factor is underexamined in the literature on the rise of the Left in Latin America.

Summarizing the Research

The current (now ending) global commodity boom had a significant impact on Latin American politics. The narrative of more money, more redistribution resonated among the case-studies and most likely the voters. For example, higher commodity prices have helped Venezuela use oil to subsidize public spending (Fishlow, 2006), and Chile to build up long term reserves through exporting minerals and ore (Rehner, Baeza, & Barton, 2014), and Argentina to benefit from increasing soy demand (Richardson, 2009), all of which allow the governments to promise more and deliver on it. In turn, the influx of this wealth has led to grand promises, which have allowed the state to increase in size, scope, and spending, whether in the institutionalized strain of the Left or the populist one. Thus, government spending might have had a direct impact on the electoral chances of the Left, as increasing trade openness implemented in the 1990s, during a commodity boom, might have been a key to its ability to boost public spending, and the consequent success, in the 2000s.

Debt

During the 1980s and 1990s, through a series of various loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many of Latin American nations found themselves embroiled in debt with large servicing costs. The hardships caused by such obligations, and the resentment felt by the people (Argentina’s 2001 debt default being an example), has been analyzed as one of the explaining factors in the rejection of neoliberal market models. The election of populist leaders who spoke out harshly against such debt obligations seems a natural response. The conditioning effect of debt on regime change is not a new phenomenon. Two streams of analysis permeate the impact of debt on outcome: one ideational and one more material.
The work of Maurizio Lazzarato, particularly in his synthesis of his theory on debt and its impacts on class relations in *The Making of the Indebted Man* (2012) offers a few insights into how debt disenfranchises people, and thus results in feelings of powerlessness. Lazzarato (2012) views debt as something that removes choice:

“"The debt economy has deprived the immense majority of Europeans of political power, which had already been diminished through the concessions of representative democracy. It has deprived them of a growing share of the wealth that past struggles had wrested from capitalist accumulation. And, above all, it has deprived them of the future, that is, of time, time as decision-making, choice, and possibility." (p. 8)

This changed subjectivity of the debtor's perception of the self worked in Latin America both on the individual as well as the state level. If the Latin American people, as a result of large debt loads enacted by western powers (through the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank), in what is historically an already strained relationship (Skidmore, Smith, & Green, 2010, p. 358), are made to feel continually powerless, working to escape from such debt relations is to be expected. Populist leaders offering a move away from the policies that are attached with such loans and offering a strong rejection of any international bodies will sway electoral votes toward the Left. However, much like individuals, this subjectivity is recreated on the state level, and the slander of the IMF by populist leaders foregrounds this for the voters. The populist Left, in particular, offers a space for agency, something that debt removes. The subjugated stance of the debtor who is "at once responsible and guilty for his particular fate" (Lazzarato, 2012, pp. 8–9) leaves the populists offering a way out of the guilt that Latin American voters feel for adopting the neoliberal/Western model in the first place.

In the material sense, debt has the power to create political change because it creates constraints which then limit the available choices of policies, and consequently the political spectrum that represents such policies. In arguing the rise of the neoliberal shift, Stephany Griffith Jones’s and Osvaldo Sunkel’s *Debt and Development Crises in Latin America: The End of an Illusion* (1986) suggests that the debt crises that ran rampant through Latin America in the 1980s and eventually led to neoliberalization of the markets alongside IMF help were not internal in making (although aided by failures such as the import substitution industrialization model in Latin America) – but rather a result of a globally integrated (and hegemonically dominated by the West) world economic
Manuel Pastor’s (1989) analysis of IMF relations show how the origin and consequence of debt has been misunderstood by conventional, “Right” analyses. Inversely, he suggests critical scholarship from the Left is more thorough due to “their attempt to go beyond the proximate causes of Latin America’s debt problems and instead to link together the various external and internal factors in a general theory of capitalist crisis” (Pastor, 1989, p. 83). He is reiterating Jones and Sunkel’s thesis – that the structural external forces enacted by the global financial and trade capitalist systems helped push Latin America toward a debt crisis. Pastor’s approach to understanding the role of the IMF, and the way Latin America interacted with the institution, is a valid way of evaluating the subjectivity of a region toward the global system. Pastor considers three aspects – availability of global capital, external credit, and healthiness of balance of trade. In the 1970s, when Latin America did not rely on the IMF, Pastor (1989) suggests that “Latin America’s new independent access to private credit eroded the institutional power of the Fund and forced it to make certain policy changes” (p. 86). Because of the drying up of the US economy in the 1980s, however, “the IMF’s power was ascendant in a capital-scarce world” (Pastor, 1989, p. 86). The policy work of the previous decade was unwound and IMF became the sole source of capital. During the 1980s debt crisis, Pastor (1989) notes that Latin America found that the "lender of last resort" was now the negotiator of first resort” (p. 90). Which gave the IMF the ability to dictate conditions such as bringing in the Washington Consensus policies. Thus, for Latin Americans, the debt from international bodies is associated with neoliberalism and the failures of the 1990s.

It is not difficult to apply the same logic to the debt-crunch and lack of fiscal availability in the late 1990s, where commodity prices were low and growth fairly stagnant – Latin America was truly at the behest of the IMF which again was one of the few sources of capital available. The impact that borrowing from such a source in such desperate times of need creates a particular subjectivity of indebtedness and powerlessness. Just as with the fiscal conservatism due to bad account balances, obligations of debt service payments and the need for external capital have led to the need for neoliberal reforms upon which the IMF loans were conditioned. Henisz et al. (2005) highlight the international pressures and coercion associated with market reforms
through bodies like the IMF. In turn, Vreeland (2003) describes how in tough times, governments give in to IMF conditionality as it allows them to adopt unpopular (usually fiscally conservative) reform. Thus, the attitude that is created as a result of a loan, as happened in the debt-crisis loans of the 1980s, can explain the subjectivity of oppression by debt – which in turn could have resulted in the Left, anti-Washington Consensus lean of Latin America since the 2000s.

**Debt and the Latin American Left**

Latin America in the late 1990s was facing a similar, if not worse situation than the debt crisis in 1982. Loans from the IMF were due, governments were close to defaulting, and growth was stagnant (Blackwell, 2002; Öniş, 2004). Therefore, as highlighted above, a similar subjectivity of indebtedness and powerlessness was potentially at work as had been during the early 1980s, and as such, possibly resulted in voters desiring to liberate themselves from such yokes. The macroeconomic interpretation asked whether the presence of such a debt mechanism might be influencing the ability of Leftist presidents to execute their preferred policies. Murillo et al. (2011) note that external constraints on the current economic situation in a nation include “the impact of debt service payments and the need for funding from international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund” and obligations of debt service payments “restrain the agency of executives from adopting left-wing policies” (p. 57).

**Debt Service Cost**

Murillo et al (2011) find that “the higher the debt service, the more likely the president is to govern on the left” but that this is not a statistically robust result (p. 63). In their updated data set, Blanco and Grier (2013) find equally that debt-service is insignificant in correlation with the rise of the Left (p. 79). Murillo et al.’s (2011) results could highlight the connection between indebtedness and a desire to escape the incumbents who had brought it about (the Right), or reflect the appeal of the rhetoric, anti-US sentiment often espoused by Chavez, Morales, and Correa. However, no such examination is undertaken.
**IMF Interaction/Debt Conditionality**

Murillo et al. (2011) statistically check for the impact of IMF leverage on the probability of a Leftist government to be elected. They find that “when a country enters into more IMF agreements during a presidential term, the ruling president is more likely to govern on the right” (p. 63). Though this seems contradictory, all this result highlights is that Right governments are more permissive of entering into IMF loans. There is unfortunately no examination of the voters’ behavior as a consequence of this.

**Summarizing the Research**

Given the significant effect of debt in the rhetoric of the populist leaders in Latin America, as well as its consistency across the region, it is astonishing there are no more studies conducted on its effects, or theories espoused as to how it affects electoral tidings in the case-studies considered. Even though the weak results outlined above show that maybe debt is not as significant, the reader must ask why it took such a prominence in the cultural representations of the various leaders. Particularly in Argentina, where the debt default was a significant social breaking point away from neoliberalism toward Kirchnerism, we see how rhetoric was used to justify an increasingly populist governance (Blackwell, 2002; Öniş, 2004). Perhaps debt is too intersectional and its mechanisms go beyond simple politics or economics, and involves a careful consideration of global power dynamics and hierarchies. For instance, the IMF, though representative of a global effort, is still primarily directed by the United States, and part of this connection emerged during the resistance against the debt in Latin America, where a rejection of the IMF debt, was a rejection of the global order imposed by the United States. Therefore, it is potentially because of this mechanism’s complexity that this issue remains quite unexplored at this point. This intersectionality highlights the benefits of a more regionalist analysis as presented in the analysis chapter.
Chapter 3.

Research on the Rise of the Left in Latin America: Sociopolitical Factors and Issues

This chapter focuses on the social and political factors which researchers identify as having influenced voters during the rise of the Left in Latin America. Even though many of these factors are connected to the presence of the Washington Consensus in the region throughout the 1990s, they more often are directly tied to an early 21st century wave of democratization in Latin America, as well as enduring issues throughout the region, such as inequality, which transcend governments, policies, and nations. Table 5 is an aggregate overview of the social and political factors outlined in the literature, and resembles the structure of this chapter.

Table 5 Overview of social and political factors influencing the rise of the Left in Latin America

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Social Factors

Social factors, such as inequality, ethnic fractionalization and discrimination are significant features in the scholarly literature on the recent rise of the Left in Latin
America. Among these, researchers have often highlighted the impact of inequality on the behaviour of voters during Latin America’s Left turn.

**Inequality**

On this point, Lora and Olivera (2005), Castañeda (2006), Cleary (2006), Vilas (2006), Murillo et al. (2010), Debs and Helmke (2010), Baker and Greene (2011), Levitsky and Roberts (2011), and Blanco and Grier (2013) all consider, and some attribute, the rise of the Left to inequality. Much of this research is prompted by the recognition that Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world (Karl, 2003). The question is of importance beyond Latin America, as the key theoretical issue of inequality – whether the Left causes voters to choose redistributive policies associated with the Left or whether the very rich avoid redistribution by supporting, and often enforcing right-wing regimes – has impact on other regions where inequality is also thought to be a causal factor.

Though much research has been conducted into the role of inequality in bringing about democratic transitions, fewer have been conducted on the impact of inequality once democracy has been already consolidated. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2008) argue that inequality creates an inverse effect on the rise of the Left: that the bigger the stakes for the elites (the bigger the inequality) the lower the chance the Left will come into power, as the elites adopt more power through both legitimate and illegitimate means. This contrasts with statements by Jorge Castañeda, who since his 1993 opus *Utopia Unarmed* has claimed that “the combination of inequality and democracy tends to cause a movement to the left everywhere” (1993, 2006, p. 30). Filipe Campante (2011) in turn theorizes and tests the argument that the higher the inequality, the lower the amount of redistribution, as elites are catered to through campaign policy promises. However, he finds that this only occurs after a certain point of inequality, before which inequality increases do indeed result in more redistribution, which results in an inverted “U” distribution (Campante, 2011).

The importance of the illegitimate means of gaining electoral support is noted by Debs and Helmke (2010) who argue that Latin America has a “relatively weak rule of law, which makes such countries vulnerable to vote-buying” (p. 213). Therefore, particularly with the rich history of clientelism in Latin America (Teichman, 1997, 2013),
elements of lobbying and vote-buying must be considered as key determinants influencing the electoral choices while under inequality. Discussion on who is able to execute more vote-buying is still ongoing. Calvo and Murillo (2004, 2009, 2013) posit that in Latin America even the Left can form large clientelist networks in Argentina or in Uruguay (Luna, 2007) for instance, whereas others suggest that vote-buying is less feasible for the Left, such as in Venezuela or Brazil (Lyne, 2007). However, Debs and Helmke (2010) conclude that the Right can continue to provide clientelist benefits, whether in or out of power, more so than the Left (p. 221).

These tensions have no apparent resolution at this point: the inference in this research is that increases in inequality will in no way simply correlate with rise of the Left. Yet, elsewhere in the research literature one finds countervailing arguments suggesting that Latin American inequality since 1998 has been (Arnold & Samuels, 2011, p. 37), and continues to be, a relevant and driving cause of voter behavior.

**Inequality and the Latin American Left**

Matthew Cleary (2006) was one of the first scholars to argue that in Latin America’s case, consistent inequality created a “natural support base” that resonated with the impoverished masses (p. 37), and then led to the victories of the Leftist throughout the region. He suggests this is a structural problem in Latin America, where unlike in most nations, development did not bring greater equality between the classes. Given that the left promises to redistribute wealth, and “most Latin Americans are poor and a small minority is quite wealthy”, it is natural the masses would act through the institutions toward redistribution (Cleary, 2006, p. 37). Jorge Castañeda, writing from a sociological perspective, echoes this assumption and finds inequality to be the key culprit for the rise of the Left, and in particular the populist Left. He is unabashedly clear: “Latin America’s extreme inequality (Latin America is the world’s most unequal region), poverty, and concentration of wealth, income, power, and opportunity meant that it would have to be governed from the left of center” (Castañeda, 2006, p. 30).

With such broad strokes of opinion not resonating with significant counter arguments in the literature, Castañeda adds a bit more nuance in his following publication the following year, where he concedes that since poverty and inequality were “not new features in the continent” another factor must be present to explain the sudden change at the polling stations (Castañeda & Morales, 2007, p. 206). He remains
committed to the idea of inequality being a causal factor, but now suggests institutionalization of the Left, and its ability to act as a mature party which builds coalitions, has been the extra push which tipped the scales toward the left. Vilas (2006) argues it was the “accentuated social vulnerability,” measured through poverty and inequality, both of which were rising despite growth increases and inflation stabilization during the period of the neoliberal reforms, which resulted in the voters distrusting and rejecting the government policy (pp. 237-238). There was a general “erosion of the legitimacy of [any] political system” that preached the “neoliberal hypothesis of the “spillover” of the fruits of growth” to the now-disillusioned voters, who saw the opposite being the case (inequality and poverty increasing) (Vilas, 2006, p. 238). Lora and Olivera (2005), during their empirical testing of the impacts of the Washington Consensus, find no significant correlation between inequality and preferential economic voting for parties to the Left (p. 27).

Again, this conclusion is somewhat contradictory to the ones offered elsewhere in the literature. An example is Debs and Helmke’s (2010) game theoretical model which they empirically test against Latin American data sets. Debs and Helmke (2010) first use their theoretical model to show that without enough incentive (low levels of inequality), the elite do not find it cost-effective to bribe and vote-buy the poor, and therefore, more redistribution does occur as the Left fares better electorally (p. 219). When Debs and Helmke test higher levels of inequality, they observe that the cost of redistribution to the Right “is greater than the benefit of redistribution for the poor. Therefore wealthy voters’ resistance to inequality dominates… as a result, inequality increases, the probability of the left candidate is elected decreases” (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 220). This results in a similar pattern to that described by Campante (2011), an inverted “U” curve, albeit for different reasons. When testing for this empirically, Debs and Helmke (2010) observe that inequality in the region, for the most part, converged and rose in the late 1990s (p. 225). After checking how this correlates to the election patterns they find that “the model shows that the probability of electing a pure leftist president rises in inequality up to a Gini of 52 and then declines as inequality continues to rise”, thus showing how empirically inequality supports Leftist governments in the inverted “U” shape they predicted in their game theoretical model (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 229).

This is a significant contribution to the analysis of inequality’s impact – inequality does help the Left, but only until the costs and possible losses become too great, at
which point the Right steps in and vote-buys electoral victories. Ultimately, “inequality under democracy shapes the electoral fortunes of the left” (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 232). Even though this model may be more nuanced than anticipated by the theories of Cleary (2006) and Castañeda (2006), in my view, it provides a convincing narrative of why the region experienced such a radical swing to the Left (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 232).

In running their empirical regression, Murillo et al. (2010) do “not find statistical support for either hypothesis on income inequality” which goes directly opposite to Debs and Helmke (2010) but does echo Kaufman’s (2009) critique about viewing inequality as causal factor rather than a correlation (p. 102). For Levitsky and Roberts (2011), inequality does not necessarily cause the voters to shift to the Left but rather, following Roberts’ earlier work (2008), is a precondition which enables a “large pool of voters who are likely to be receptive to redistributive appeals”, which then “allowed left parties and movements to “re-politicize” inequality” after the failures of the 1990s (p. 8). There is no empirical testing of this hypothesis, nor is there a discussion of what extent a precondition translates into a causal factor and instigates change.

In a slightly alternative examination of inequality, Arnold and Samuels (2011) focus on Latin American’s perceptions of wealth distribution, and find that even though these perceptions had not changed since the Left arose, Latin Americans view their situation as “very unfair” with regards to wealth distribution (p. 37). Much like Levitsky and Roberts (2011), therefore, Arnold and Samuels (2011) argue that “Left politicians might still be able to tap into voters’ frustrations about inequality” (p. 37). Baker and Greene (2011) test for both high and low levels of inequality but find no correlation between inequality and Left vote-share (pp. 64-65). In their regression analysis, Blanco and Grier (2013) do not find any support that inequality is in any way associated with the Left (or Right) being elected and has little to no impact (p. 82). Interestingly though, they do confirm that “the probability of a president from the left being elected is maximized at medium levels of inequality”, which they recognize as being very similar, and supportive of, the arguments of Debs and Helmke (2010) (2013, p. 82–Footnote 31).
Summarizing the Research

Though the evidence is inconclusive, it seems that inequality has played a role in leading to the rise of the Left in Latin America, albeit not in a consistent fashion. Keeping in mind that considerable research does not identify inequality being a significant factor, it is important to maintain a nuanced view of this conclusion. Debs and Helmke’s (2010) suggestion that it is at middle levels of inequality that the Left benefits the most is an example of this sort of nuanced. Furthermore, it is likely that, the role of inequality in prompting left-wing responses has varied for particular cases within Latin America, making undermining the efficacy of broad scale generalizations across the region as a whole. Further, because inequality and vote-buying have been tied to clientelist models of governance Latin America for so long, these should not be completely dismissed as potential causal factors. I am persuaded by Levitsky and Roberts (2011) who view inequality as a precondition rather than a determining causal factor of the shift to the left. From this perspective, inequality does not create Leftist victories, but it makes them possible if other causal factors are present.

Political Discrimination/Ethnic Diversity

Not many accounts on the literature on the rise of the Left in Latin America consider the impact ethnic diversity has had on the rise of the Left. However, since there is a significant body of literature tying marginalized groups to Leftists politics (Terwindt, 2009), and the continuing division and struggle within Latin America of indigenous communities (Kowalczyk, 2013; Richards, 2010; Ross, 2010; Terwindt, 2009), ethnic voices are possibly a source of popular mobilization as a source of support for the Left. Blanco and Grier (2013) are the only study to theorize this and test for it within the Latin American context, where they argue that historically, the large populations of indigenous (language) minorities have “traditionally been excluded from national policy making” (p. 72). Thus, checking for the effects of political discrimination and ethnic diversity, and potentially seeing intersections between these two factors, is useful in seeing the impact of ethnicity on the rise of the Left.
**Political Discrimination/Ethnic Diversity and the Latin American Left**

Blanco and Grier (2013) find that “political discrimination is negative and significant” suggesting that an increase in discrimination will lead toward a leftist governments (p. 82). Inherently, this makes sense as the Left, in its search for equality and redistribution, tends to stand for the marginalized and oppressed. With the long history of Latin American tensions between original inhabitants and their colonial oppressors, the Left may be seen as a way to bridge these divides. In terms of ethnic fractionalization or language differences, Blanco and Grier (2013) find this factor insignificant and find no correlation between it and the rise of the Left (p. 82).

**Summarizing the Research**

Given that that I could only find a single study that found ethnic political discrimination significant, it is impossible to offer any conclusions. However, the fact that the research is so scant, and the issue of ethnicity is so large in Latin America, makes one wonder why such a blind spot exists in the research on the rise of the Left. Daniel E. Moreno Morales (2015), in a detailed study of the impact of ethnicity on the Latin American vote, notes that ethnicity does not overshadow other determinants of the vote, but is a significant “stable political referent” meaning political cleavages, and their impacts, are more and more relevant across the region (p. 137). This suggests that integrating ethnicity into the study of political shifts is becoming more pressing.
Political Factors

Age of Democracy

Though the impact of the Washington Consensus, whether through a performance or a policy mandate, was often posited as the main argument leading to the rise of the Left, alongside inequality, the other sets of arguments tied the rise of the Left in Latin America to the maturation of democracy in the region. The main vein of these arguments is that as democracy matures, voters are less worried about voting in more extreme ideologies away from the center, and consequently, they might elect more Leftists or more Rightist governments. The relative instability of democracy in the region, as exemplified through the harsh dictatorships, conditions voters to fear for its survival and vote for its stability – and avoid tipping the precarious balance toward authoritarianism (Cleary, 2006, p. 42). As the strength of institutions and oversight of the international democratic watchdogs increases, and the presence of radical left groups decreases, this may become a less relevant factor in voting behavior, but at the end of the 1990s, with the region’s dictatorships not yet a decade old, the fear for democracy’s survival was still strong. Part of the process of the maturation of democracy are elements such as the strength of democratic institutions, the availability of the radical Left as a viable voting option, and the presence and absence of party politics.

Age of Democracy and the Latin American Left

As A Whole

Some of the case-studies consider the age of democracy as an aggregate that they examine without specifying which aspects are the causal driving factors. Murillo et al. (2011) summarize that “the longer the democratic experience of a country and the more accustomed its political elites are to alternation in power, the less afraid left-wing incumbents should be of the polarizing reactions often provoked by redistributive policies” (p. 58). They argue that as time goes on and democracy matures, the “easier it is for voters to resort to democratic alternation... without fear of weakening the regime” (Murillo et al., 2010, p. 95). Thus, polarization, a destabilizing element in party systems, is no longer the threat that it once was. Jorge Castañeda (2006), in his typically general and sweeping narrative, writes (apart from the end of the Cold War and inequality), “the advent of widespread democratization and the consolidation of democratic elections as
the only road to power would, sooner or later, lead to victories for the left” (p. 30). For him, such a swing occurs in any transitioning democracy, a point argued by Panizza (2005) and Roberts (2007b, 2007a) as well.

When testing this argument, Stokes (2009) does not find any correlation between age of democracy and the electoral rise of the left, but suggests that “if anything voters in younger democracies, not older ones, tended to favor left-leaning politicians” but this result is in no way robust (p. 22). Stokes speculates that it is newer democracies which are inspired by the Leftist successes and tend to piggy-back off of them, bypassing the previously mentioned age of democracy argument. In other words, if the Left has worked elsewhere in the region, voters in other newer democracies see there is little harm in implementing it. In their empirical tests, Debs and Helmke (2010) construct an “Age of Democracy” variable which tests the number of years a country has been under democratic rule against the elections of the Left (p. 228). They find no significant correlation that this had any impact on the elections of the Left, even though they state that “older democracies are more likely to elect pure left presidents (Debs & Helmke, 2010, pp. 230–231), a contradiction which they do not resolve. Perhaps, as they note, the combination of a post-Cold War change in the global order and the advent of Leftist governments “confound” each other, and therefore do not provide a clear result (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 231).

Murillo et al. (2011) find that “the effect of Age of Democracy is significant and negative, suggesting that as a country has experienced more years of democracy, it is more likely that the president will adopt left-wing policies (p. 64). Given that rejecting a policy platform because of past failures and choosing an alternative for the next election is a basic democratic foundational principle, Murillo et al. (2010) are positively enthused about Latin America’s fortunes. In their view, the “electoral ascendance of the left in recent years can be perceived as a healthy sign of democratic institutionalization and the result of the broadest and most sustained democratic experience in the region’s history” (p. 94). Baker and Greene (2011) test the age of democracy and electoral volatility, in essence highlighting the institutionalization of the radical left as a possible causal mechanism for why it has been elected. They do not check for the level of institutionalization, but in any case, their results are statistically insignificant, and do not find that the age of democracy has any impact on the rise of the Left (pp. 64-65).
**Strength of Democratic Institutions**

Emerging from the theory of the maturation of democracy, strength of democratic institutions can be directly correlated with two streams of the Left. Murillo et al. (2010) suggest that it was the “institutionalization of democracy [which] has initiated a process by which the left re-integrated into political society”, thus suggesting the ability of the voter to make genuine choices at the ballot box leads to the Left’s ability to be a viable option (p. 94). Reid (2007) notes that Latin American nations are now more democratic and open to politics than ever before. This interpretation of institutional strength as being greater than ever before is discussed in the next section. In the other vein of reasoning which sees democratic institutions in the region still as very weak despite improvement, Roberts (2007a) argues that weak political institutions allowed the discontent resulting from the tensions of democratization in combination with market liberalism (neoliberalism/the Washington Consensus) to pave way for strong populist figures. Thus, the weakness of institutions allowed populism to resurge through a “the decline of established representative institutions” which was enhanced by the populists’ “verbal attacks on parties and, in some cases, labor movements for being undemocratic, corrupt, and self-interested bastions of a failed status quo” (Roberts, 2007a, p. 11). Castañeda (2006) also follows this argument.

Scott Mainwaring (2006) echoes this interpretation, and interprets the political changes in the Andean region as a failure of democratic representation. He uses the Latinobarómetro data to show that “both the attitudinal and behavioral indicators today show widespread disenchantment with and rejection of parties and legislatures” (Mainwaring, 2006, p. 15). Further, high rates of electoral volatility indicate the instability of the institutions which tend to help traditional parties retain their position, and in general encourage stability. Mainwaring (2006) argues that this “decline of traditional parties and the rise of political outsiders occur in a weakened institutional landscape” which inadvertently creates space for more personalistic and clientelist (populist in other words) parties to push through (p. 18). Mainwaring (2006) views the institutional weakness as originating from state deficiencies, with issues such as “poverty, corruption, crime, and education” all eroding the public’s trust in the state being able to represent and improve their lot (p. 22). Therefore, for Mainwaring (2006), the inability of the state to maintain strong representative institutions creates space for outsiders, in this case the Left, to come into power.
Despite Roberts’s and Castañeda’s concerns, the populist Left is indeed the Left, and therefore it is potentially the remaining weakness of democratic institutions, rather than their historically-relative increasing strength, which permitted the new wave of Leftist leaders to arise. Baker and Greene (2011) test for the “impact of mass support for democracy”, which reflects the concerns Arnold and Samuels (2011) highlight citizens have regarding democracy and its ability to function representatively (p. 59). Echoing Roberts (2007a), the argument both make is the lack of accountability in democratic representativeness, in essence translated through weak institutions, might lead to the rise of a more radical Left. Nevertheless, Baker and Greene (2011) do not find any statistical support for a correlation between mass dissatisfaction with democracy and the Left being voted into power (pp. 64-65). In turn, Blanco and Grier (2013) do not find any significant correlation between the strength of democracy and either the Left or Right being elected (p. 82).

**Institutionalization of Radical Left**

Hagopian (2003) theorizes that the elites, and not only the voters, have to accept platforms which offer Leftist redistributive policies in order to make them a feasible option in the polls. Noting that this has happened, Murillo et al. (2010) state that since “left-wing parties have accepted the rules of competitive elections” the rest of the political parties have also accepted them in turn (p. 95). This theory creates the argument that as the Left becomes more embedded in the democratic process, it becomes less threatening to voters. Francisco Panizza (2005) makes the argument that the left-of-center parties in Latin America have matured to the extent that parties which historically were either liberal-republican, populist, or grass-roots (using O’Donnell’s (1998) taxonomy) now tend to give up some of their ideological roots and focus more on the electoral process. He suggests that elections tend to be “fought on the political centre ground” and that “the new politics is more pragmatic and less ideological” (Panizza, 2005, p. 725). This suggests, following some of Weyland’s (2003) arguments, that there are few purely populist or grass-roots leftist parties which do not consolidate their ideology with some vestigial market values.

Therefore, following the need to moderate and create bigger coalitions to be viable at the ballot box, resonates with a post-socialist order, where labour and lower class parties are not necessarily attached any more to Marxist ideology (Panizza, 2005,
p. 725). This resulting pragmatism makes Left-Of-Center (LOC) parties a viable option, as they gain more representation, who are also sensitive to the needs to entertain market forces. With the important exception of Chávez’s Venezuela, successful left and LOC forces are those which have broadened their appeal by moderating their policies and entering into pragmatic alliances with centrist and even right-of-centre forces (Panizza, 2005, p. 729). Therefore, for Panizza, the rise of the Left is due to its ability to capture some of the centrist vote, which is seen as a reasonable middle-ground throughout Latin America. Conducting an individual-level analysis, Marco A. Morales (2008) shows support for this thesis – most of the voters who supported the Left post-2000 came from center, center-left, and center-right orientations (p. 37). This is not to say they were leftists themselves ideologically, but rather the Leftist parties became “skilled at broadening their appeal beyond those that identify with the left” and consequently were able to “attract a large ideological base of support” (M. A. Morales, 2008, p. 37).

Matthew Cleary (2006) echoes this sentiment and argues that the cohesion due to which the parties in Latin America with a labor-mobilization background all were elected in a proximal wave is due to “a gradual tactical shift in the left’s approach to electoral politics” (p. 40). This reflects Panizza’s statements about the abandonment of ideological values for strategic coalition building – the Left consciously matured and desired to be in power at the price of curtailing extremist tendencies of “violence, revolution, or other antisystematic approaches” (Cleary, 2006, p. 41). For Jorge Castañeda, the success is built in two different mechanisms, which apply to his categorization of the two Lefts outlined in the Introduction (the populist/bad left, and the reformist/good left). He envisions these Lefts as distinct and conflicting: one the result of populist appeal, which has “remained true to itself” while the “communist, socialist, and Castroist left, with a few exceptions, has been able to reconstruct itself, thanks largely to an acknowledgment of its failures” (Castañeda, 2006, p. 34).

Consequently, the success of the Left has to do, in part, with the rise of populism, but perhaps even more so with the leftist parties becoming a viable option for voters. Castañeda emphasizes his point in a paper published a year later, where he stridently proves that populism will not last, even if the “modern reformist, and internationalist version” will (Castañeda & Morales, 2007, p. 205). He highlights the defeat of Ollanta Humala (Chavez’s champion) by Alan García in Peru, as well as Rafael Correa’s choice
to “reinvent himself as a moderate candidate” instead of a Chavez supporter, as well as Daniel Ortega’s self re-invention in Nicaragua as a moderate candidate all as indicative of the voters choosing a more mature, institutionalized version of the left (Castañeda & Morales, 2007, p. 203). Thus, ignoring the continual support for Chavez, Kirchner and Morales, and their populist tendencies, Castañeda draws some connections between the perception of voters and democratic security. Ultimately, though admitting there is no causal link necessarily present, he concludes that in the countries governed by the left, especially the “modern” Left, people have a greater faith in democracy and its institutions (Castañeda & Morales, 2007, pp. 205–206).

Similar to arguments made by Panizza (2005) and Cleary (2006), much of this success is because the left is focused on building coalitions “that extend beyond the left and usually reach to the right as well” (Castañeda & Morales, 2007, p. 207) showing that the Left is indeed institutionalized and focused on electoral politics more so than communist ideologies. Levitsky and Roberts (2011) also view the institutionalization of the left as a necessary precondition for the rise of the Left, and to some extent, conducive toward it. The movement away from radicalization and the disappearance of the threat of the radical left destabilizing the democracy allowed for local support for the parties, but also for the international community (particularly the United States) to cease its continual interventions boosting military regimes (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011, p. 8).

Weak Political Parties

The lack of a strong party structure can lead to radical parties, such as the populist platforms of Chavez, Correa, and Morales, wedging their way through to seize power. Weak political parties can lower partisanship attachments and create vacuums in the ideological space. Consequently, Roberts (2007a) and Murillo et al. (2011) attribute the space for the emergence of the more populist strains of the Left to the high turnover of parties in those particular nations (as opposed to Brazil, or Argentina, or Chile with more established party systems. More is not examined on this issue, albeit partisanship does play a significant role in certain contexts. Mainwaring (2006) argues that the collective state deficiencies of being unable to resolve issues such as crime and corruption has undermined the legitimacy of traditional party systems. Therefore, weakened by their inability to be representative, traditional parties were replaced by the new, radical Left ones, which offered to resolve the issues of democratic representation
through ameliorating state deficiencies. Weyland (2009) also highlights that a weak political system can allow for the ingress of outsiders, but he does not offer a an analysis of where in Latin America this has occurred (pp. 149-150). At best, the idea of weak political parties can be seen as a precondition for a particular Left to emerge, but it seems to bear no causal weight.

**Availability of Parties**

Baker and Greene (2011) theorize that the availability of ideologies, as represented by parties, on the voter menu might influence electoral behavior, and consequently measures of presidential ideology ($VRL_{pres}$ in their case-study) (p. 61). This argument makes logical sense – if, for instance, Right-of-Center parties disappear, and the only available option for the voters is a very conservative one, voters might opt for a Left-of-Center party instead. This is not reflected in the reality of Latin America, where “all elections in the data set feature right-of-center parties” but “six lack left-of-center parties,” which they then model for (Baker & Greene, 2011, p. 61). The lack of a Center-Left, or its negative association with market reforms has already been highlighted by Madrid (2009), which perhaps gives Baker and Greene’s point more salience. Interestingly, they do find a statistical correlation, but not a causal one, leading them to conclude that “the menu of available parties across countries and over time affects the ideological balance of voters’ choices”, but not enough to create a marked shift one way or another (Baker & Greene, 2011, p. 64).

**Passage of Time/Size of Country**

Only Stokes (2009) considers these factors, as potential measures of democracy in the region, but she finds them insignificant on all levels.

**Summarizing the Research**

Though the argument of democratic consolidation and maturation is logical in nature, as is the idea that the Left has become more vote-oriented and is moderating its mandate, the statistical tests conducted do not verify that this had any impact on the electoral choices in Latin America. This does not dismiss these as important factors: perhaps the best way to understand the impact of these factors is to see them as necessary preconditions, much like Levitsky and Roberts (2011) do, that enable the Left to be considered a viable option at the electoral booth.
Mass Mobilization

As outlined in the introduction, the Left tends to fight for equality and representation for all. In Latin America, some of the Lefts that have emerged bear populist features, where the connection between appealing to the masses by offering direct benefits to them is the norm (Acemoglu, Egorov, & Sonin, 2013; de la Torre, 2007; Leon, 2014; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Reis & Vieira, 2009; Richardson, 2009; Weyland, 2001). One of the explanations for the rise of the Left was that such populist appeals created mass mobilizing bases which then propelled the governments to electoral victories. Another element of mass mobilization is the deeply embedded labour parties throughout the region, which often represent the working/lower classes – which, through the spectre of inequality, can be also motivated to vote for those who promise more redistribution, mainly the Left.

Mass Mobilization and the Latin American Left

Matthew Cleary (2006) connects inequality and the success for the electoral Left through the mechanism of mass mobilization. He suggests that the left’s rise is only possible alongside an “organizational basis for mass mobilization”, usually through strong labour parties (Cleary, 2006, p. 38). For Cleary, these can be based in both party mechanics or social movements. He builds off of Kenneth Roberts’s (2002) earlier work, suggesting the presence of elitist (as opposed to labor-mobilizing) parties “inhibit[s] the ability of leftist groups to mobilize voters around a socioeconomic cleavage, even in conditions of extreme inequality”, as they tend to be organized “across lines of socioeconomic class” (Cleary, 2006, p. 38). Comparatively, labour-mobilizing parties are able to capitalize on the collective goals of the unions, labour movements, and social movements (along ethnic lines as in Bolivia, for instance), to “translate latent and diffuse support into electoral success” (Cleary, 2006, p. 39).

In turn, Roberts (2007a) argues that mass mobilization played a role in getting the populist parties elected, especially in Bolivia, and to some extent Venezuela. Whereas the equivalency between populism and the left has been problematized in the introduction chapter, we can follow Roberts in agreeing that there has been a consistent rise in populism with the waning of neoliberalism, thus constituting a partial regional shift.
However, the mass mobilization of the Pink Tide is a vestige and re-emergence of the mass mobilization of the first populist wave, after the failure of the ISI economic model and the transition to neoliberalism (Roberts, 2007a, pp. 6–7). This first populist wave bore the hallmarks of a developmental phase in much of Latin America (with the exceptions of Uruguay and Colombia, where the elitist parties absorbed the working classes), where new parties integrated the lower classes with a populist political strategy (Roberts, 2007a, p. 8). Populism and party politics were not exclusionary. This resulted in the emergence of Juan Peron’s party machine in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, and Haya de la Torre in Peru (Roberts, 2007a, p. 8).

For Roberts, the destabilization of the region - first with the transition to and then due to the failures of market liberalism and a weak democracy - led to a hollowing out of institutions, which paved the way for the current waves of populism, to some extent bringing back the old bottom-up party structures in Argentina and Bolivia and Peru, and a more top-down approach in Venezuela and Ecuador. In more institutionalized democracies, such as Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay, the effect of re-emergent populism is lessened, because the parties there managed to mediate the dual tensions of “the extension of democratic political rights and the retraction of social citizenship rights” (Roberts, 2007a, p. 11) that came along with democratization and the adoption of neoliberal values of the Washington consensus. In places lacking these mediating institutions, or with very weak ones, dominant leaders filled the void by recruiting directly from the discontented labour and marginalized masses. Hence, mass mobilization allowed populism (and its version of the Left) to come to power. By extension, we can read that for Roberts, neoliberalism and weak institutions were also causal factors.

The empirical tests that Debs and Helmke (2010) conduct seem to confirm the influence of mass mobilization on the probability of a Leftist government being elected. They note that “countries with a history of mass mobilization do seem to be more conducive to the election of left candidates” (p. 230). Still, they problematize their result by stating causality is difficult to prove, as anomalies such as Ecuador suddenly formed into mass mobilizing systems where they have not been previously. Indeed, even in cases where there were no class cleavages the Left still managed to win electoral victories (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 230).
Summarizing the Research

The extent of mass mobilization in the rise of Bolivia’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party (Anria, 2010), as well as the importance of class cleavages to Leftist voting (Almeida, 2007; Mainwaring, Torcal, & Somma, 2015) in places like Argentina highlight its importance in bringing the less well-off to the electoral booth. Certainly, this mechanism cannot be said to be responsible for all the electoral successes in the region, but it offers an insight into how certain leaders and parties can capitalize on discontented groups to support the Leftist agenda and succeed. The importance of ethnic voting (as outlined above), alongside the Latin American’s relative affection for populism (Arnold & Samuels, 2011), makes mass mobilization a potential explanatory factor for the rise of at least some Lefts in the region.

Political Turbulence

Political turbulence is a less studied aspect of established democracies than ones in transition, but upsets to the status quo can both reflect and instigate political change, as they have done so during the previous major shifts in Latin America (Reyes, 2012; Wickham-Crowley, 1991; Zoumaras, 1995). Because the studies that examine such turbulence are few, and there is perhaps no genuine political turbulence in the late 1990s beyond the failure of the Washington Consensus reforms, there is arguably little theoretical justification for viewing political turbulence as a causal factor in the rise of the left. However, I believe it remains important to mention some of the studies that identify political turbulence as a factor that that can influence the way voters behave.

Political Turbulence and the Latin American Left

Deep economic reform can be understood in terms of crisis, an inversion of the status quo which impacts the sociopolitical. Lora and Olivera (2005) state that “normal economic voting is not the only pattern, especially in the process of deep economic reform” (p. 7), and therefore, in the debt-crisis crippling Argentina in 2001 and equally tense situation in Brazil, re-nationalization process in Venezuela in 1998, and the rising tensions amongst the unions of coca growers in Bolivia, the analyst has to be careful in establishing whether “normal” rules apply, and therefore, whether voters are rewarding and punishing economic performance as they would if there was no crisis. Destabilizing
conditions, such as bad economic performance, can help reform mined political parties, to gain popularity, at least initially. Once the reform has been completed, voters might elect more conservative changes (Lora & Olivera, 2005, p. 10). In instances of destabilization, such as revolutions or crisis, Lora and Olivera (2005) argue that even less favorable policies are treated more tolerantly as long as they deviate from the those of the past (p. 10). Blanco and Grier (2013) in turn theorize that how voters react to unstable conditions depends on whether they are risk-averse or risk-seeking (p. 78). Therefore, the impact of revolutions or crisis may alter the behavior and perceptions of voters, and lean them toward electing either more revolutionary Leftist parties, inversely toward more conservative parties.

**Government Crises**

I could find only two studies that test these theories. Murillo et al. (2010) find little to no support for the argument that a growing volatility (which they proxy for crisis) has any impact on the left-vote increasing (p.103). In contrast, Blanco and Grier (2013) find government crisis to be significant in their statistical regression, in that “this type of political instability decreases the probability of a conservative government being elected” (pp. 81-82). In tests of statistical robustness, they point out that the ideology of the incumbent matters, and that Right-wing presidencies are more punished than Left-wing presidencies. This potentially reinforces the argument that the Right is associated with market liberal reforms, which are thought of as a cause for the crises (Blanco & Grier, 2013, p. 84). More study on whether such economic reforms do indeed cause changes in voter behaviour would clarify if the results throughout the study concerning voters need to account for such deviations, or whether this is an exaggerated concern.

**Revolutions**

Blanco and Grier (2013) are the only authors I could find who test this particular factor. They find revolutions significant, which “increase the probability of a left-wing president being elected” independent of the ideological orientation of the incumbent (p. 84). However, since no revolutions occurred during this period this point remains insignificant, although some feel that Venezuela has been undergoing a sometimes-violent period of quasi revolutionary conflict.
Crime

Though crime could be attributed to the maturation of democracy, it is a factor that destabilizes political process and privileges particular concerns (such as safety and security) over others, if pressing enough. For example, Mainwaring (2006) argues that the high levels of crime decreased the ability of the Andean states to be sufficiently representative, and that this eroded the trust of the voters, who then voted for newcomers who “present themselves as champions of fresh ideas and efficient and ethical government (and in most cases, of popular causes). They claim to be more democratic than the old system” – riding on this wave, the Leftist governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru came into power (p. 18).

Baker and Greene (2011) are the only ones who statistically test for the impact of the presence of crime in the incumbents’ presidencies, connecting increased worries about crime while the Right is in power with a shift to the Left, and vice versa. Di Tella, Donna and MacCulloch (2008) highlight that crime was one of the key issues in Latin America consistently throughout history and therefore might have a significant impact on evaluating incumbent performance. Baker and Greene (2011) predict that elevated concerns about crime might “help the right” as “rightist parties are often considered to be more focused on law and order” (p. 59). However, they find no correlation between crime and the Left’s performance in the polls (Baker & Greene, 2011, pp. 64–65).

Corruption

Mainwaring (2006) also argues that prevalent corruption in the Andean region delegitimized the states’ abilities to be representative, and consequently led to the voters feeling they cannot expect the democratic institutions to represent their interests and promote equality. This perception of weakness has in turn created openings for newcomers, such as the Left, to take power. In an alternative interpretation, Baker and Greene (2011), who are the only ones to test for levels of corruption, highlight that part of the rhetoric of the Left was to “throw the bums out”, and hypothesize that if the right was perceived as corrupt then the left vote share should rise (p. 59). They find no correlation, however, between corruption and electoral shifts to the Left (Baker & Greene, 2011, pp. 64–65).
Summarizing the Research

The impact of political turbulence on voting patterns during periods of crisis or revolutions does not seem significant in the rise of the Left. Even though large market reforms, or inversely switches to socialist-like economies, are traumatic and cause unrest, researchers argue they are not significant enough to overturn voters’ choices. Further, since the period of late 1990s was not marked by any new development other than a continuing bad economic performance, the time cannot be truly characterised, at that moment, as a revolution, crisis, or upheaval. Factors such as crime and corruption, though certainly sources of political turbulence, also do not seem to have been significant in affecting voters’ choices.

International Influences

The continuing oscillation between the region’s engagement with the United States and its desire to find its own path has shaped the ideological orientation of Latin America since independence. Further, the relationship between Latin America and the global market has defined the busts and booms of the region during the 20th century, as seen in the debt crises and the commodity booms (Skidmore et al., 2010). From a political perspective, the relationship between the region and the U.S. hegemon is seen as a key conduit through which this economic policy is imparted upon the region, and when this relationship frays, the antagonism toward such values as the United States might espouse rises. Thus, the ideological cycles between the Left and the Right that Queirolo (2013) highlights (referred to in the Introduction) might be influenced by and influence the region’s relationship with the hegemon and the globe in general. Therefore, geopolitical transitions in the global arena, as well as how the region orients itself against them, have an impact on the ideological orientation of the region. A rejection of the hegemon, for instance, could have served as a rejection of the Right and neoliberalism the United States has preached in the 1990s, and led to the rise of the Left. Despite there being a strong theoretical grounding for this line of reasoning, since this section is severely understudied in the case-studies examined, I suggest a regionalist approach which includes international relations as a key part of its analysis.
International Influences and the Latin American Left

Cleary (2006) argues that the checks of international powers, and their increased accountability (United States following through with its rhetoric about the importance of democracy in Latin America instead of destabilizing it) resulted in the Left being secure from being overthrown by military coups which have plagued Latin America’s 20th century history. He suggests that even though possible (as seen with the attempted coup against Chavez in 2002), “international norms of respect for democracy (or at least for elections) are increasingly powerful in the region, making coups more costly” (Cleary, 2006, p. 43). The deepening involvement of Latin American nations within organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, all post-Cold War attempts at securing democracy within the region, have become real and more powerful deterrents of deviating from electoral democracy. Cleary (2006) notes a slew of examples where coups (Serrano in Guatemala in 1993, Fujimori in Peru in 2000, anti-Chavez elites in Venezuela in 2002) received global and regional condemnation, even if in parts lukewarm (United States’ opposition to Chavez’s policies was not enough to justify their rejection of supporting democracy in the region, at least openly) (pp. 43-44). Therefore, international influences have secured the ability of the Left to stay in power, if not bring them into power.

End of Cold War

The historical association of the Left in Latin America with communism has been contested by various authors (Madrid, 2009; Weyland, 2009); however, given ties in the region to Cuba and Castroism, the Left and its guerilla adaptations such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), or the Mexican Zapatistas, have often made it the left less feasible as a viable option for voters. Castañeda (2006) argues that often people perceived that the Left political options were radical and revolutionary, and not the stuff of stable governance that Latin Americans wanted. Therefore, he claims that the “fall of the Soviet Union would help the Latin American left by removing its geopolitical stigma” by being separated from its socialist/communist roots (Castañeda, 1993, 2006, p. 29). This can be only partially true, as many of the Lefts in Latin America were institutionalized, moderate, and most certainly not socialist (for instance Argentina’s Peronist party, Chile’s Concertación party, or Brazil’s Partido dos Trabalhadores party).
Nevertheless, the dissociation of the Left with communism and socialism, as mentioned in the Institutionalization of the Radical Left section, allowed these parties to be viewed as a viable voting option. The only statistical test done on this theory is by Debs and Helmke (2010) who do not find that the Cold War hypothesis is shown to be statistically significant in Latin America (p. 230). However, they add complexity to the puzzle by suggesting that since “pure left presidents were elected only in the second half of the post-Cold War period” the lack of significant result of the Cold War test may be due to the lack of consistent democracy in the region before the 1980s (Debs & Helmke, 2010, p. 231).

**Relationship to the U.S. Hegemon**

Latin America’s relationship with the United States has fluctuated between deep distrust and deep affection. The regional tendency to swing back and forth between engagement and adoption of the US’s guidelines for development and the opposing desire for the region to be its own contained pole of power has been a part of the history of Latin America for much of the 20th century. Nevertheless, few theorists have argued that the mood of voters toward the United States often influences policy, and the rhetoric that is associated with some of the populist platforms, especially Chavez’s, gives this notion credence. Arnold and Samuels (2011) offer key insights into the mindset of the voter through their analysis of the Latinobarómetro surveys. They first find that “leftists across the region were more likely than nonleftists to hold a bad or very bad opinion of the United States” (Arnold & Samuels, 2011, p. 46). This is one of the few trends that truly covers most of the region’s nations. The surprising exception here is Venezuela, where they find that anti-American sentiment is lower than in other nations, and continues to decrease, highlighting that perhaps Chavez’s rhetoric was not all that convincing (Arnold & Samuels, 2011, p. 46). Ultimately, Arnold and Samuels note that the region-wide anti-Americanism is perhaps less a causal factor but rather a factor that helps the new Left governments consolidate their power (Arnold & Samuels, 2011, p. 50).

Baker and Greene (2011) find that anti-American sentiment is also “statistically significant and has a positive impact on VRLpres [the Left executive ideology being elected]” (p. 64). Even though this statistical correlation does not survive the robustness tests, it is worth mentioning here, as it is the only other policy-oriented criterion that has
any impact in Baker and Greene’s analysis. Thus, much like the significance of moderate anti-market policy preference by the voters, it seems that electoral votes also determine the desire of the populace to move away from relations led by the US.

Remmer’s (2012) analysis reinforces the argument that anti-US sentiment is either conducive toward the Left rising or is a consequence of it:

Here the pattern of change is unambiguous: Consistent with the argument that the shift to the left reflects international influences, including the growing economic room for new challenges to U.S. hegemony, we see that beginning in the early 2000s, anti-U.S. sentiment in the region has increased dramatically. (p. 956)

Remmer (2012) finds that both populist and traditional Lefts benefited from the anti-US sentiment, and she finds that it “fueled leftist voting” in a direct correlation: the “higher the mean anti-U.S. orientation, the higher the probability of a leftist electoral outcome” (pp. 964-966). This is reflected in both her individual-level and aggregate level analyses, where anti-US sentiments “trump education, religion, income assessments, and even left-right ideological placement as a determinant of the leftist-populist voting” (Remmer, 2012, p. 966). This powerful conclusion leads her to highlight the importance of international relations in analysing regional shifts:

The second major implication of the preceding analysis [about anti-US sentiments] for future research concerns the direct impact of international factors on partisan alignments. Although the roots of party system change are conventionally traced back to the sociology of domestic electoral markets, both the aggregate- and individual-level evidence analyzed in this study point to the importance of the rise of anti-Americanism in the early 2000s. Economic conditions helped fuel this dynamic: Clearly, the more robust the external economy, the greater the room for rhetoric and policies challenging U.S. hegemony. (Remmer, 2012, p. 967)

**Summarizing the Research**

Thus, according to Remmer, the importance of anti-US sentiments to voters, and its impact on their electoral choices as well as maintaining the Left in power is crucial to understanding why the Left arose in Latin America. The relationship with the hegemon has historically changed Latin American economic and political policy, and the voters are acutely cued to how their governments are either welcoming or antagonistic toward the United States. Despite two studies delving into detail on the subject, this research tends not to fall in the mainstream of political science, and falls more under international
relations research. In this respect, a regionalist approach might help fully flesh out how exactly the relationship with the United States has played out in the rise of the Left, a point I develop in the next chapter.
Chapter 4.

Assessing the Research

The purpose of this chapter is to offer reflection on the analysis of the studies discussed in the preceding chapters. The purpose here is twofold – first, to consider the narratives that have been offered as causes for the rise of the Left in Latin America, and second, to look at the research from a meta-perspective and to see what patterns emerge and what might be missing. Ultimately, after cuing regionalism as a key frame of analysis for such a regional shift, I offer a concluding hypothesis on why the Left arose.

Summary Table of Studies and Factors

Table 6 shows the factors analyzed as significant in the rise of the Left for all the studies considered:
| Sphere            | Sub-Category                                      | Factor in the Rise of the Left | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Macroeconomic    | Washington Consensus (as a whole)                | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Inflation                                        | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
|                  | Economic Growth                                  | 0.5                            | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
|                  | Unemployment                                     | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Promarket Policy/Neoliberalism                   | 0.5                            | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
| Globalization    | Trade Openness                                   | 0.5                            | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
|                  | Capital Openness                                 | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Fiscal Resources | Capital Availability/Commodity Boom              | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Government Spending                              | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Social           | Inequality                                       | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Ethnicity                                        | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Political Discrimination                         | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Political        | Age of Democracy (as a whole)                    | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
|                  | Strength of Democratic Institutions              | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   | 0   |
|                  | Institutionalization of the Radical Left         | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Weak Political Parties                           | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Availability of Parties                          | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Passage of Time                                  | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Size of Country                                  | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Political        | Mass Mobilization                                | 1                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Government Crisis                                | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| Political        | Revolutions                                      | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Crime                                            | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Corruption                                       | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
| International    | End of Cold War                                  | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |
|                  | Relationship to Hegemon                          | 0                              | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   | 1   |

**Key**

1 = Significant/Causal Factor
0.5 = Weak Significance Factor
0 = Tested Empirically

**Legend**

1 - Lora and Olivera 2005
2 - Panizza 2006
3 - Cleary 2006
4 - Castañeda 2006/2007
5 - Fishlow 2008
6 - Mainwaring 2006
7 - Vlas 2006
8 - Roberts 2007
9 - Morales 2008
10 - Weyland 2009
11 - Stokes 2009
12 - Madrid 2009
13 - Murillo et al. 2010/2011
14 - Debs and Helmke 2010
15 - Baker and Greene 2011
16 - Arnold and Samuels 2011
17 - Levitsky and Roberts 2011
18 - Queirolo 2013
19 - Blanco and Citer 2013
20 - Remmer 2012
Summary of Research – Why the Left Arose

The two preceding chapters mapped and analyzed over twenty studies which address why the left arose in Latin America at the end of the twentieth century. There is a striking lack of consensus in these studies and not one clear answer remains, and I found myself negotiating between competing accounts trying to see which one is more persuasive. One true answer may not be possible, but for political science and international studies, the lack of a conclusion is highly frustrating. The research on Latin America offers several key hypotheses, with many attempts to either persuade or prove them true, but with few conclusions. If the main hypotheses were to be summarized into three grand archetypal narratives, they would be performance-mandate voting, policy-mandate voting, and maturation of democracy.

Performance-Mandate Hypothesis

The performance-mandate voting hypothesis, synonymous with retrospective voting or outcome-oriented voting, highlights how the bad performance of the neoliberal market reforms in the 1990s throughout most of Latin America failed and led the voters to punish the incumbent presidencies, which were consistently Right. Much of this literature focuses on the Washington Consensus, which as outlined above, was a particular set of neoliberal reforms that reduced social spending, privatized industry, opened markets to the world, and reduced government reach. The main problems that the Washington Consensus had been adopted to resolve were still present in the region in the late 1990s - the lack of growth, stagnation in resolving inflation and inequality. At the same time, many researchers agree that a lack of welfare spending by governments led to a rejection of the Consensus. The Right was not the only set of governments which brought in neoliberalism, as notable Leftist governments (for instance the Peronist Carlos Menem government in Argentina) occasionally switched to neoliberal policies once elected, despite campaigning on redistributive platforms, as Stokes’s (2001a) seminal work indicates, and were punished for it eventually.

The factors that were usually associated with measuring the impact of this failure were economic, and included measures of performance such as inflation, growth,
inequality, government expenditure amongst others. It is difficult to categorize precisely which of the case-studies analyzed here argued that the failure of the Washington Consensus was the sole cause, but in broad terms, Lora and Olivera (2005), Panizza (2005), Cleary (2006), Vilas (2006), Fishlow (2006), Stokes (2009), Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav (2010, 2011), Madrid (2009), Levitsky and Roberts (2011), Arnold and Samuels (2011), Blanco and Grier (2013), and Queirolo (2013) would all agree that those failures triggered a dissatisfaction with the incumbent Right and resulted in a shift to the Left.

However, the individual factors embedded in this argument, let alone the theory of performance-mandate/retrospective voting, are brought into question as the numerous analyses tested for their validity. Growth was consistently found to be inconsequential, and inflation proved to have an impact on voters only half of the time. Inequality, which has been a part of the Latin American socioeconomic mindset for much longer than just the neoliberal 1990s, also finds no consistent statistical support as a cause, even though it is the cornerstone of formational arguments on the rise of the Left, such as Castañeda’s (2006; 2007) and Cleary’s (2006). In my view, the lack of statistical support does not invalidate the hypothesis as a whole, but puts into question why it is only sporadically found significant, as discussed in the next section. The other results of the Washington Consensus reforms are a high debt load as a result of the IMF-inspired restructuring, but the research rarely acknowledges it and this remains a highly understudied aspect of the neoliberal regime. Further, the policy aspect of the Washington Consensus, mainly pro-market reforms, do not offer any conclusive answer, apart from the fact that in general, Latin Americans like some aspects of the market, such as global trade, but do not like other aspects, such as privatization (Corrales, 2008).

Other factors affect the perceptions of economic behavior by voters. Whereas Queirolo (2013) still validates the performance-based voting mandate, she highlights that in Latin America, ideology of the voters is important, while class cleavages are not. In effect, this kind of analysis is consistent with theories arguing that mass mobilization is tied to historical labour roots in nations such as Brazil or Uruguay. The only other quantitative case-study to conduct a micro-level analysis is Arnold and Samuels (2011) who come to similar conclusions about the performance-mandate hypothesis as causal in the rise of the Left, but further show that ideologically anti-Americanism also plays a
significant role in voters’ perceptions (p. 49). Therefore, the impact of other factors on economic voting is not explored adequately enough, and these two studies show that attention must be paid to such factors, as it adds nuance to the analysis. Performance voting, ultimately, despite being one of the most consistent narratives of why the Left arose in Latin America, finds scattered support, especially in empirically tested scenarios.

**Policy-Mandate Hypothesis**

The policy-mandate hypothesis focuses not on how voters punish bad performance but rather on voters as active participants in the political process who seek to elect governments that will execute policies they find favorable. Baker and Greene (2011) note that this approach takes a more optimistic view of democracy in Latin America, and highlights the role of the citizen as someone who is enacting change that is being followed by the executive. The indicators of a policy-mandate might roughly be equated with policy measures (market, globalization), but also government spending due to increased resources such as commodity booms. In this narrative, the governments blessed with more resources (from the commodity booms) find Leftist policies easier to enact, and voters choose to move toward the redistribution platforms that are offered. Governments’ abilities to spend and choose policies that help their constituents results in continuing re-election, as has been seen with the Latin American Left.

This narrative also shows mixed evidence in the research, but is more consistent with the reality and outcomes of the case-studies examined. The commodity boom, as argued by Fishlow (2006), Weyland (2009), Murillo, Vaishnav, and Olivera (2010, 2011), Levitsky and Roberts (2011), and Blanco and Grier (2013), has had a real and positive impact on the economies of Latin America, and the abilities of nations to redistribute the resources. The concern with this argument is that both the Venezuela and Brazil elections happened before the commodity boom was in full swing; potentially, Venezuela’s and Brazil’s oil and natural gas reserves respectively were not directly tied to the commodity market but rather to the OPEC mandate. Further, the statistical evidence on government spending is surprisingly mixed in the case-studies, as Stokes (2009) and Remmer (2012) find them significant in leading to the rise of the Left,
whereas Baker and Greene (2011) and Blanco and Grier (2013) do not. Nevertheless, Stokes’s argument that neoliberalism usually is accompanied with increases in government sizes (to compensate for the vagrancies of the market), and the nature of the Lefts that were elected being more “populist”, which requires spending, leads Stokes to think there is merit to this hypothesis.

With regards to globalization, trade and the markets, only Remmer (2012) finds evidence that increases in trade lead to the Left electorally – all the other case-studies confirm that increases in trade openness lead to a poorer performance of the Left. Radical opening of the markets is clearly negatively associated in the mindset of the Latin Americans with the bad 1990s, and thus choosing moderation, voters are highlighting their dislike for neoliberal policies. Baker and Greene (2011) conclude that many Latin Americans, despite their heterogeneity, are looking for moderate policies, and have no desire to throw out all of the market ideologies along with neoliberalism, and perhaps the desire for such a moderate market policy, aligned with a redistributive state which spends more on its citizens especially in plentiful times, is why the Left came to power in the late 1990s.

**Democratic Consolidation Thesis**

The narrative offered by the various aspects of the maturation of democracy highlights that in its third wave of democratization, Latin America matured enough to see the Left as a viable electoral notion. This argument is mostly political, and sees the Leftist parties move away from their radical, communist roots and into more traditional institutionalized party structures. Embedded in this argument are a multitude of factors such as institutionalization of the Left, the strength of democratic institutions and the presence and absence of viable parties for voters. Further, as democracy progressed in Latin America, mass mobilization became more possible and included the discontent labour groups as well as notable elements of ethnic minorities. As democracy moved away from its tenuous hold in the region into a more established form, issues of political revolutions and crises tested its strength, and citizens let go of old fears and potentially safe voting (such as for the Center) by following policies they found more convincing.
This narrative has been in some shape or form propagated by Panizza (2005), Cleary (2006), Castañeda (2006; 2007), Mainwaring (2006), Roberts (2007a), Morales (2008), and Roberts and Levitsky (2011). In turn, Stokes (2009), Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav (2010, 2011), Debs and Helmke (2010), Baker and Greene (2011), and Blanco and Grier (2013) all performed statistical testing on this hypothesis and found mixed results. Murillo et al. (2011) find that the Age of Democracy matters, unlike the rest of the researchers, whereas Debs and Helmke (2010) find support for the importance of mass mobilization in the region. The rest of the quantitative testing does not support any of the theories that maturation in the region had a significant impact.

The narrative should not be dismissed simply because of this, as the discrepancies in the results among the different statistical accounts of the same factor (such as inequality) show that often the differences are embedded more in the method rather than the factor itself. One example of such differences in method is the choice of how lagged the effect is from the cause. For instance, the effects of inflation might not be felt for a few years, and thus may not result in elections being affected immediately. The time the researcher chooses for the effect to manifest is a subjective call. Another choice researchers make is the categorization of what counts as the Left on the political spectrum, and consequently whether the “Left” (whatever it means for that researcher) won or not depends on this choice. Nevertheless, it is true that the brutal dictatorships experienced by many Latin Americans froze the values of democracy which are perhaps only now beginning to thaw. The notion that the electoral left only now became a viable option for voters because previously it had always been seen as too extreme and too radical, due to its socialist roots, as proposed by Castañeda (2006) and others in his anatomy of the Left, is problematic. Queirolo (2013) reminds us that the ideological cycles of Latin America show the Left being well established, mostly liberal, and certainly in power before this shift to the Left. To accept this new Left as something unique is therefore premature without distinguishing it by some other characteristics. As the next section highlights, perhaps there is an attempt to define a new Left by the region, but judging by external markers, during the early 2000s the region was mostly liberal and aligned with traditional versions of the Left.

Further, mass mobilization, which is connected in particular to Bolivia’s MAS party, is certainly emblematic of that national case, but is not seen in other contexts in the region, and thus cannot be found responsible for the shift as a whole. Party
dynamics, such as Madrid’s (2009) argument of the new Left being elected because of the perceived centeredness and consequent rejection of the ‘neoliberal’ Lefts shows that there might have been an acceptance of stronger policy platforms but does not explain why the Left succeeded in such cases as Argentina or Chile. Thus, the democratic consolidation theory offers little consistent quantitative support and ultimately seems to be more explanatory in some national cases than others. Further, it ignores the historical ideological cycles where the Left had been in power and democracy had been consolidated in two previous waves throughout the 20th century (Queirolo, 2013). Therefore, the notion that democracy maturing is responsible for the rise of the Left is exaggerated and cannot be argued to be responsible for the shift of the region as a whole toward the Left.

**What is Missing**

From the research examined, key areas are missing that require further investigation and thorough consideration. It is possible that the source of these blind-spots originates in the narrowness and quantitative emphasis often prominent in the discipline of political science. If that is the case, they can be ameliorated perhaps by pursuing more self-consciously interdisciplinary perspectives (particularly those of international relations and cultural studies). Similarly, while quantification provides a useful way of identifying and testing the statistical weight of certain variables and their interactions, this tends to underplay broader, historically interpretive, and political economic dimensions and struggles in the region. These gaps are troubling, as they tend to underplay or overlook determinants that have shaped the region in the past. Sometimes these determinants are evident in the literature, even in quantitative studies, such as international relations dynamics, the impact of debt, the presence of ethnic and class differences and the formation of policy coalitions and groups. But, in my view, what seems most lacking in the mainstream research literature are sustained analyses of cultural and ideological struggles in the history in Latin America.
International Relations

Even in the case of the relatively conventional topic of international relations, few of the case-studies examined, namely Castañeda (2006), Baker and Greene (2011), and Remmer (2012), address the region in its international context. Yet, I believe the interaction between the region and the rest of the world conditions its internal politics significantly, and therefore a regional analysis has to be at the forefront of explaining regional political changes. The crucial importance of United States-Latin America relations, as highlighted by Arnold and Samuels (2011) and Remmer (2012) and Baker and Greene (2011) show that the view of the U.S. matters to voters in the region. Logically, since the disastrous Washington Consensus is explicitly connected to the hegemony of the United States (J. Williamson, 1990), antagonism toward the United States might have been a causal factor in rejecting the conservative policies associated with U.S.-led international economic initiatives and foreign policy.

Castañeda (2006) broadens his horizons and argues that it was the end of the Cold War which redefined the view of socialism into a non-viable option for politics, but Queirolo (2013), accurately in my view, notes that socialism was never really seen as a viable choice in the first place. Thus, even though the socialist-Left idea might have died a bit further with the Cold War’s end, Queirolo rejects Castañeda’s idea that this somehow triggered a success in the Left as it moderated. While many authors view the failures of the Washington Consensus to be crucial in leading to Leftist victories, and note the relevance of anti-US sentiment to voter choices, the history of US imperialism in the region tends to be underplayed or ignored in the case-studies that I examined.

The Ongoing Problem of Debt

The issue of debt, though highly theorized after the 1982-1983 crisis as a precursor to the eventual shift to neoliberalism in the region (Jones & Sunkel, 1986), has seen little examination in the case-studies on the rise of the Left after 1998. As explained in the preceding chapter debt conditionality that comes attached with the International Monetary Fund as well as the cost of servicing debts, and the potential preferential or negative repercussions adopting or avoiding borrowing from the IMF might involve, have
all had a significant impact on nations, especially in their developmental phases. Even though two of the case-studies examine the impact of debt, namely Murillo, Olivero, and Vaishnav (2010, 2011), and Blanco and Grier (2013), only the former finds any correlation between debt and the rise of the Left.

Yet, given the rhetoric employed by several Latin American leaders against the debt defaults of the early 2000s (such as by Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (Blackwell, 2002)), and the connection between the debt crisis of the 1980s and the consequent borrowing from the IMF and the adoption of the Washington Consensus this entailed, the significance of debt cannot be overstated. Further, the subjectivity of debt, as mentioned in the work of Lazzarato (2012) highlights the importance of debt for the region as a whole with respect to international bodies, especially ones conditioned by the United States (such as the IMF and the World Bank). Ultimately, much like the previous issue of hegemon-relations, the lack of examination of how the region views external creditors and their own subjectivity misses crucial elements of the cultural make-up of the voters, and their desire for independence from such constraints. I believe a more regional-centered approach allows for an analysis of such interactions.

Subaltern Struggles

The large portions of voters who are of ethnic origins in Latin America (as opposed to colonial settlers) have been more and more significant throughout the region as loud voices who can shape ideas in differing political territories and shift electoral balances (McNulty, 2014). The struggles of the Mapuche in Chile (Kowalczyk, 2013; Terwindt, 2009), Kichwas in Ecuador (Oldekop et al., 2012), and Zapatistas in Mexico (Haro, 2010) are all parts of a tapestry that has historically as well as recently gained a global voice. The work of Donna Lee Van Cott (Van Cott, 2003, 2005, 2009) highlights how the pressures from this large mobilized base of protesters, local organizers and voters is changing the politics across the region, as noted by the ethnicization of presidents Chavez, Morales, and Correa. Nevertheless, despite this significant impact of ethnic and class struggles on both the social and new political arena of Latin America, only the Blanco and Grier (2013) study acknowledged possible impact on the electoral rise of the Left. Nevertheless, the theory that marginalized groups when mobilized tend
to prefer the Left is sound (Van Cott, 2005), and as such this area requires more insightful examination and research. Further, yet again, this issue requires a regional approach, as indigenous and other subaltern groups rarely conform to national boundaries within Latin America, and can be seen as having similar goals across the region (land rights, political representation, redistributive policy).

The Question of Ideology

The significance of the Bolivarian discourse in Chavez’s speeches and presentations around the world (Figueroa, 2006) highlights the extent to which the past is invoked in the ideology and formation of the new Left. Ana Margheritis and Anthony Pereira (2007), in analyzing the region’s turn toward the neoliberal, highlight the necessity for researchers to acknowledge the “role of ideas”, which has “been neglected, in comparison with the role of interests and institutions, in the literature on neoliberal reform in Latin America” (p. 25). They ask the crucial question, “why and how were neoliberal ideas accepted in the first place, and how did policy elites formulate and implement neoliberal policies?” (Margheritis & Pereira, 2007, p. 26). This also reflects the research done on Latin America’s Left – in the case-studies examined, particularly the quantitative regressions -- little to no attention has been paid to the role of ideas, and ultimately the relations of power associated with those who introduce and enact them. Therefore, examining the role of ideas, and where and how policy makers are creating them in the rise of the Left, should be of crucial importance.

Peter Hall (1989) notes that “ideas have real power in the political world, but they do not acquire political force independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there” (p. 390), which would require an examination of the rise of the Left to entail a detailed analysis of the historical junctures, as well as patterns throughout the region, and the vestiges that remained, to be examined. History seems decisive here. Further, ideology has an impact on the struggle over voter behaviour, insofar as it can be associated with the differing capacities of some groups to define agendas and win popular consent for particular interpretations of the world. Queirolo (2013) argues that “the ideological dimension is meaningful in Latin America; it represents an important methodological and analytical tool for examining politics in the
region and that “voters are highly ideological” (p. 8). But, this suggests that some voters might be more or less “ideological” than others and continues with a view of ideology as a simple manifestation of world view, rather than as a contested terrain - an area of social and political struggle. Even so, Queirolo still finds ideology to be a strong determinant of the vote toward the Left, more so than any of the individual-level factors examined, suggesting that the study of the beliefs of voters, and the struggle to shape or define them, should always accompany any macro-analysis.

**Policy Networks**

One of the most powerful images of the Left in the early twenty first century showed the “Axis of Hope:” presidents Chavez, Lula, Morales and Kirchner shaking hands, engaging in regional coalition building. The notion of them as brothers resonated throughout Latin America, just as Chavez’s and Castro’s mutual admiration (French, 2010) – such ties have had an impact on changing the politics of regions. The analysis of policy networks, and how policy is constructed, are extensive fields in international relations and sociology, which were particularly present during the analysis of why neoliberalism arose in the region in the 1990s. For example, the work of Judith Teichman, focuses on how these ideas are constructs of particular circles of power with a particular background – in the case of neoliberalism, Latin American technocrats educated abroad (Erdos, 2009; Teichman, 1997, 2001, 2013). She argues how networks are formed and composed can be much more deterministic to the policy outcomes than the policy choices themselves.

Adam Douglas Henry (2011) in turn highlights that “not only do policy elites systematically avoid networking with ideologically dissimilar actors but collaborative ties are also systematically formed among actors with shared beliefs. Power-seeking does not operate on a network-wide scale but may drive network formation among coalitions of ideologically similar agents”, showing that in the regional context there may be mutual reinforcement of ideas that eventually turn into policy (p. 361). Diane Stone’s (2004) work emphasizes that more importance needs to be paid to transnational actors in policy formation, which have a more significant impact in conditioning policy outcomes than perhaps national contexts do. None of the case-studies examined earlier in this thesis
explore the reinforcing dynamics of the new policy network and the presidential cadre that was the result of a concentrated effort by Chavez. However, this is a crucial element of the puzzle, as the successes of Lefts in one nation, alongside Chavez’s support for regional integration, benefited the Lefts elsewhere, and therefore the coincidence of the Lefts arising could be attributed to mutually reinforcing policies. In other words, the new Lefts that arose in the early 2000s, despite differences, were potentially all inspired by the connection of the same policy network, led by a new ideologue.

Methodological Issues and Questions

One of the main goals of this thesis is to see what patterns emerge from the research done on the rise of the Left, and what the research might have missed. From the analytical breakdown in Chapters 2 and 3, and the lack of a clear conclusion on why the Left arose, several key observations emerge. First, there is a tension between examining a region from individual national perspectives versus viewing it as a supranational whole, especially since a tension emerges between the similarities and the differences embedded within these transitions to the Left, leading to the debate whether this can be treated as a regional shift at all. Second, methodologically, the tension between qualitative and quantitative research, as well as between synchronic and diachronic and macro and micro level analyses creates problems in terms of finding true relationships between results, voter behaviour, and political transformations. Third, the lack of interdisciplinary methodologies in most of the case-studies examined shows the need for finding alternative approaches to quantitative methods and qualitative surveys, particularly to examine cultural aspects of political shifts, such as deploying a broader perspective on the struggle over ideology.

The first concern is whether there is a regional shift toward the Left at all, or whether this is a set of instances where the Left rose coincidentally in many nations at the same time. As the outline of the political behavior and voter preferences in the Introduction highlights, there has been a slight shift toward the Left in respect to the ideology (seen as world views) of the voters, but even more so in the executives that were elected. The Lefts that were elected were not the same, with certain strains (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) moving further away from the liberal model of
democracy and economics than others (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay). Certain
countries did not exhibit a Leftward shift at all (Colombia, Mexico). Further troubling this
analysis as a regional trend is the way that these disparate Lefts arose, and which
mechanisms created support for the Left in the first place, mainly reigniting old Left party
mechanics in Brazil and Argentina, mass mobilization in Bolivia and Venezuela,
moderate institutionalization of the Left in Uruguay and Chile. However, most of the
case-studies examined earlier do agree there has been a shift across the region – and
yet analyze them in terms of individual cases, viewed from the aggregate. Thus, the
tension emerges, if the Lefts are different, and have different mechanisms which brought
them to power, why are the analyses treating them as individual cases? Why has the
nation-state remained a point of analysis, rather than looking at the supranational factors
that connect them together? In essence, though studying a regional shift, the tools used,
such as macro-level analysis, are for studying political shifts in nations.

A second concern emerges between the quantitative and the qualitative research
sets. While theoretically grounded, many of the qualitative studies I reviewed do not offer
verification of their theories, and more often than not, the quantitative studies find no
support for such theories. As an example, the maturation of democracy has been argued
to benefit the Lefts in the region, and yet none of the quantitative studies have been able
to verify this. This does not of course dismiss the utility of the theory, but it brings into
question of how the analyst is supposed to interpret such conflicting results. The other
concern emerging from the methodological choices researchers make is often the
researchers do not explain the discontinuities between the differing results they have
from the other quantitative studies examining the same factor. For example, when
analyzing the role of inflation, some case-studies find it a significant factor whereas
others do not, and yet there is no discussion embedded in these studies as to why these
outcomes differ. In a few cases there is an acknowledgement of a difference in methods,
such as different measures of the Left, but since these questions are of essence in
answering why the Left rose in the region, such differences should always be re-
thorized at the end of the analyses.

The last issue concerning macro-level analyses of the shift concerns voting
behavior. Queirolo (2013) notes that “individuals make political decisions based on the
way they perceive reality rather than on any objective reality” (p. 6). The assumption that
democracy and others
objectively and accurately has been more and more argued as an illusion, and therefore checks have to be made on such analyses to validate their conclusions. Queirolo (2013) warns that with regards to testing the effect of the Washington Consensus by using measures such as growth or inflation or unemployment, “economic assessments can by no means be considered objective. Citizens can judge the country’s economic performance negatively even though macro indicators show that the economy is doing fine”, and that voters “are highly prone to persuasion from politicians or the media” (Queirolo, 2013, pp. 71, 148). It is for this reason that much of her work focuses on a micro-level analysis, where she examines individual-level responses with regards to their economic voting behavior. Factors such as partisanship, risk taking, political/ideological orientation and class cleavages are all important factors which may influence a voter’s decision on the individual level, and seeing how they interact with perceptions of the economy, or policy for that matter, will either validate or skew the results of the macro-analysis.

This point cannot be overstated: in good research, the inclusion of micro-level analysis allows the researchers to see the relevance of known voting influences in a particular context (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). It is telling that for the first time, due to improvements of regional data and survey collection, new quantitative interpretations are synthesizing these approaches, and attempting a cross-regional macro and micro level analysis, such as seen in the collection *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts* edited by Ryan Carlin, Matthew Singer, and Elizabeth Zechmeister (2015). This work was not included my analysis here because it does not attempt to explicitly answer why the Left rose in Latin America. Still, it offers an insight into how political science can improve its quantitative methodologies in cross-national cases.

The third methodological concern revolves around the dominant method of data collection and analysis present in the case-studies. These tend to either do a quantitative analysis of macro-level statistics such as GDP per capita, rates of inflation or inequality, and run them through either regressions or game theoretical models, all methods which have serious methodological concerns for answering social questions (Schedler & Mudde, 2010). Further, for the few instances of micro-level analysis found in these case-studies, the data used was from large-scale surveys conducted across the region and then translated into quantitative measures, analyzed statistically. In my view,
the methods used in these studies, much like the discipline of political studies, has not
realized the full value of integrating methods from other disciplines, such as historical
political economy, cultural studies or communications studies. In a seminal piece, Peter
Hall (2003) argues that the complexity of political scientific theory (in comparative politics
in particular) and the realities of the political world around us (ontology) has far
outstripped the methodological tools these researchers employ. However, new ways of
looking at political change such as ethnography, community studies, and qualitative
discourse analysis do exist, in addition to older more totalizing approaches such as
macro level historical and political economic analysis, and I believe these have the
potential to better explain the complex mechanisms of political change by virtue of their
promise to integrate a diversity of connections between variables into fuller and more
comprehensive narratives.

**Regional Research**

Despite the shift in Latin America being often termed a regional trend, only
Cleary (2006) argues that the individual nations of Latin America should be subsumed
under the study of the region as a whole. There is good rationale for this in Latin
America, as political shifts tend to happen in unison, patterns of democratization have
emerged simultaneously, inter-regional trade has been actively promoted, politicians
work in coalition, and the continent shares a common history. To truly understand the
shift to the Left in Latin America, regionalism offers insights into the continent’s
continuing cohesiveness throughout history. Cleary (2006) argues quite persuasively,
following the research on post-liberalism and post-hegemonic regionalism, the rise of the
Left is due to the rise of the desire for a regional autonomy away from the influence and
hegemony of the US. The region follows the trajectory of a new type of regionalism, one
not US led nor dictated by globalization, or indeed the wish to negate the influences of
these two factors, but a desire to actively move beyond the prescribed politics and
economics of the North. The rise of the new Left is the result of the search for a new
clean slate, and for “untainted” parties - ones with no ties to the western-led
developmental model (neoliberalism), which came into power in the late 1990s
(Queirolo, 2013) - to enact this change.
Regionalist research highlights patterns that comparative political science often misses. Moving beyond rationalist approaches which views regions as a collections of nations supporting each other through geographical and political alignments, constructivist regionalism sees regions arise “from the redefinition of norms and identities by governments, civic groups, and business firms” (Väyrynen, 2003, p. 26), which often form institutional and economic links (Adler, 1997; Murphy, 1991). Constructivist views see regions as having a function, established by agents for a particular purpose, which can be both state and non-state. Thus functionalist perspectives of regions allow the analyst to move beyond the sovereign state paradigm (states always protecting their own interests), and see the opening up of these “space[s] of flows” (Castells, 1996, p. 412) where collective desires are negotiated. Latin America has the hallmarks of a functional region, moving beyond space and geography to internally-oriented goals that are shared region wide, which is in particular finding independence from the pressures and political interventions of the United States, as well as development models which are dependent on global capital flows. Meining (1956) argues that decolonization often promotes distinctive cultural groupings and identities, and the re-emergence of the Bolivarian revolution during Chavez’s campaigning is harkening back to the moment of independence in early 1800s when the revolutionary Simon Bolivar liberated the continent (Skidmore et al., 2010). Therefore, the Latin American region, as it is being formulated now, goes beyond a political-military geographical block.

I believe the methodology/frame best suited to understanding such functional regions, and Latin America in particular with its complex mix of political, economic, and social factors and actors, is regionness, developed by Hettne and Söderbaum (Hettne, 2005; Hettne & Söderbaum, 2000). This concept is a movement beyond New Regionalism, which dominated the regional analyses since the ramping up of globalization in the 1980s (Fawn, 2009). New Regionalism still operated in the sovereign-state model and looked at regions as units wishing to maximize their safety in the international order, mainly on political and military levels (Väyrynen, 1993, 2000, 2003). One of the major new threats for states, in this view, was globalization and neoliberalization, with New Regionalists arguing that regions provide a way for nations to negotiate a balance of power and security when thrust into powerful global flows (Pelagidis & Papasotiriou, 2002) although this has been contested heavily (Bhagwati,
Still, many saw affinity between regional and global economic flows (Frankel, 1997; Mittelman, 1996, 2000; Oye, 1992).

Thus, though New Regionalism offered many insights into how globalization and regionalization interacted, the field was dominated by the omnipresent and overarching narrative of globalization, as well as continuing to view regions in terms of security and national sovereignty arguments. However, the emergence of networks and linkages beyond the political and economic has led for the need to reconceptualise New Regionalism to be more inclusive of identities. Therefore, the concept of regionness becomes a way to delineate a region’s existence in terms of the extent to which a region has integrated that is not defined in political or economic, or globalization terms. As Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) describe it:

The NRT [New Regionalism Theory] seeks to describe this process of regionalisation in terms of levels of ‘regionness’, i.e. the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region. Regionness thus implies that a region can be a region ‘more or less’. The level of regionness can both increase and decrease. ... There are no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions, but these are created and recreated in the process of global transformation. Regionness can be understood in analogy with concepts such as ‘stateness’ and ‘nationness’. The regionalisation process can be intentional or non-intentional and may proceed unevenly along the various dimensions of the ‘new regionalism’ (i.e. economics, politics, culture, security and so on). (pp. 461-462)

Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012) clarify in turn by stating:

Regionness denotes two sets of dynamics: first a sense of identity and belong of state and non-state actors to a particular region based on shared values, norms and institutions that govern their interaction and the ways they perceive themselves within a common polity (self-recognition). Second, regionness denotes cohesive action towards the outside (recognition by others) [sic]. In other words, the idea of region as defined by its level of regionness has been portrayed by who defined regionness in terms of organized social, political and economic trans-border relations (material foundations of regionalism), supported by a manifested sense of belonging, common goals and values (symbolic foundations), and institutions and regulations that enhance the region’s ability to interact autonomously in the international arena (external recognition as an actor). (p. 5)

Regionness therefore allows for studying that which is missing from an understanding of Latin America today: the impact of international institutions on a region as a whole, the
changing of perceptions and subjectivities with regards to pressures such as debt or global markets, the desire for autonomy and the collective process of building it through creating links between both state actors such as presidents, and non-state actors such as indigenous groups.

Even though the concept of regionness has been well flushed out in European Union studies, “little has been explored on what determines regional identity, sense of mission and belonging” in Latin America (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012, p. 6). Thus, Riggirozzi (2011) argues that something new is happening: “Latin America today offers alternative pathways to region building whose rationales are not restricted to reasons of trade or rhetorical opposition to US hegemony” (p. 2). Riggirozzi (2011) suggests that “we are witnessing a move from neoliberal politics to a more diverse regional political economies” (p. 4) which echoes the conclusions of both the policy-mandate and the performance-mandate arguments noting the failure of the Washington Consensus as being a reason for the new Left. However, why the Left emerged in the particular way that it did, with the populist variant as one of its hallmarks, is not answered sufficiently by the case-studies. Instead, by interweaving the regional formations into the narrative already described by the case-studies analyzed above, it is possible to suggest a more complete answer to why the Left arose in the late 1990s.

Why the Left Arose? Locating and Assessing Patterns in the Literature

From the case-studies discussed earlier, several clear patterns emerge. First, Seligson (2007), Arnold and Samuels (2011), Remmer (2012), and Queirolo (2013) note that while there was an ideological shift to the Left in the region, it was not significant to account for the rise of the Leftist governments. Further, the Washington Consensus seemed to matter both in terms of policy and performance – it had failed, which voters punished in the next elections, and the voters wanted to pursue alternative policies. The Left that was elected was unmarked by the neoliberal turn: Madrid (2009) shows that it was governments which had not been sullied by the market model that were elected, whereas the Leftist governments that had been in power and had implemented the reforms were in turn punished. This fits in well with Stokes’s (2001a) checks on policy
switching, and Lora and Olivera’s (2005) and Queirolo’s (2013) conclusions of the electoral costs of the Left being associated with market reforms. Therefore, to borrow Queirolo’s (2013) terminology, “untainted” parties were the ones which were seen to be clear and pure to pursue to enact the direction where Latin Americans wanted to go, which was a clear-cut departure from the past.

This past involved both political and economic tensions. The market model worked out well for many Latin Americans in the past, and the new commodity boom offered funding for the new direction Latin Americans wanted to go (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Weyland, 2009), except for the more restrictive conditions of the neoliberal model, such as privatization and fiscal austerity (Corrales, 2008). Therefore, there was no clear aversion to the market as exemplified by the continuing engagement with global markets. Politically, the region had suddenly new options that had not been available in the 1990s. The rising commodity prices allowed for redistributive policies to be viewed as real, rather than rhetoric, and lead the region’s nations away from the dependence of the 1980s and 1990s on external funding from debt and governmental bodies such as the IMF or the World Bank.

Further, given the significant progress in solidifying democracy across the region, voters felt free to express their voices and truly check the limits of representativeness, which made the populist as well as institutionalized Lefts a now-possible option. Old grievances were still hurting though: inequality was running still rampant throughout the region, and the voters had not forgotten the intrusive hand of the United States (Arnold & Samuels, 2011; Baker & Greene, 2011; Remmer, 2012; Skidmore et al., 2010). Post 9/11 involvement of the hegemon in the Middle East created a vacuum in Latin America were there was no clear direction or directive, further emphasized by the collective rejection of the Washington Consensus, of where to go. These factors collectively leave Latin Americans disillusioned with the western developmental model, neoliberalism and U.S. led politics on the one hand, and more resources, democratic representativeness and untainted emerging Leftist parties offering a new direction and led by strong voices on the other. The regionalist approach resolves many of the issues encountered in the case-studies analyzed, as outlined above, and helps provide a more complete answer as to why the Left arose in Latin America.
First, regionalist approaches help cases where nation-states are points of analysis do not work in a context where regional efforts sometimes supersede national ones. Beasley-Murray et al. (2009) write that “the nation-state is no longer the sole territorial or political unit of relevance to social and economic change” and to understand their decisions, we must look at the greater regional and global contexts (p. 323). Thus, analysis of the region, through examination of its key units (regional organizations), allows for insights in where there is cohesion, rather than difference – which helps understand the rise of the Left, despite its inherent varieties. The growing importance of ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the People of America/Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) and UNASUR (Union of South American Nations/Unión de Naciones Suramericanas), replacing MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market/Mercado Común del Sur) as a dominant regional organization, highlights the importance of looking beyond the nation-state. The extent of regionness was deepened by the creation of two bodies, UNASUR and ALBA, both of which are necessary pieces of the puzzle as two why Latin American Left rose why it did. They are analytical markers to view the configuration of the Left as it emerged as a post-liberal project, a deviation from the Western developmental project. The conjunction and mutual support with which nation states in Latin America help each other align their goals for a new form of governance which “represent a contemporary manifestation of the region’s perennial struggle to pursue political and socioeconomic inclusion simultaneously” (Luna, 2010, p. 28).

In detailed analyses, Pimenta and Arantes (2014) note the adjustments within MERCOSUR to reflect this new agenda were conditioned by the new leftist states (also note (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 10)), especially with the growing relevance of ALBA and UNASUR in the region, with “emphasis on development and social themes distancing of neoliberal policies characterized by open regionalism whose focus relies on trade liberalization, and the detachment of the United States and its policies directed to the continent” (p. 18). Briceño-Ruiz and Hoffmann (2015) in turn emphasize the flexibility embedded within UNASUR to accommodate the multiplicity of goals the nations both share and differ on across the region, as does Sanahuja (2012). This sentiment is echoed by Arenas-García (2012), for whom UNASUR “reflected the necessity to advance a development model that does not neglect human development” (p. 81). Chodor and McCarthy-Jones (2013) point out how ALBA, in turn, highlights the power that regional cohesion can create when moving beyond the economic realm into that of
“ideas, institutions and practices” (p. 211). In his analysis, Muhr (2010) showcases, amongst others, these elements in play within ALBA’s post-hegemonic, yet ideological projects of TELESUR and RADIOSUR (the Chavez-created regional media networks). Therefore, focusing analysis on regional bodies allows to find similarities, rather than differences, among the nation states, and looks for common purpose and directions.

Second, regional approaches address the difficulty of categorizing the “Lefts” of the Pink Tide, as exemplified by the Introduction, which highlights the limits of the political science categorizations available, as the old labels of “populist” and “social democratic” and “communist” seem to no longer apply in most cases across the region. The new Left is defined less by its features as governments, and more by its intention. This intention is a move away from liberalism, which has been found “insufficient in Latin America”, partly through the “failure of neoliberalism… combined with the precariousness of liberal institutions” (Beasley-Murray et al., 2009, pp. 327, 329), resulting in a convergence of “the resistance to neoliberalism… with efforts to move beyond the liberal framework of participation” (Arditi, 2008, p. 66). Arditi (2008) theorizes this new ideology is “more post-liberal than antiliberal” because it “tends to demand equality without necessarily seeking to abolish capitalism, international trade, or liberal citizenship” (p. 73). Clearly, in the face of traditional conceptions of political science who view the radical Left as anti-market, such divisions do not represent the reality of Latin America today.

Thus, the new Left is not uniform, nor does it have uniform goals and desires; however, the cohesion across the whole left in the region to move beyond explicit macroeconomic politics dictated by the North is something that binds them all together, and makes the Left turn a new occurrence. It is here where the spectre of populism re-emerges in some of the case-studies analyzed – the North, unable to recognize a deviancy from the liberal as valid instead terms it as radical and populist (with the negative connotation of threats to democracy), which as Luna (2010) notes are labels “too normatively biased and analytically obscuring” (p. 29). These labels simplify and reduce: Maxwell A. Cameron (2009) writes that “liberalism lurks behind” the popular “distinction between “bad” populists and “good” social democrats” which is “designed to drive home the case that “populists” are illiberal and anti-market; while “social democrats” respect markets and regulate them through representative institutions” (pp. 339, 336). Cameron (2009) sharply observes that such a thesis is popular as it is
“designed above all for consumption by foreign policy makers in the USA” and helps create simple binaries of friend/foe with the hegemon (p. 343). Thus, the understanding of Latin America is not only conditioned by limits within political science, but by the political context in which academics work (here, a comparison between Latin and Northern interpretations of the rise of the Left would be particularly fruitful). Instead, the in all its diversity, the new Left “is characterized by its willingness to seek alternatives for political and economic inclusion that might go beyond liberal democracy and a market economy” which brings the reader back to post-liberalism as a way of framing the similarities of the Lefts of the Pink Tide (Luna, 2010, p. 29).

Third, regionalist research complements the econometric heavy political sciences with a sociohistorical perspective. Andrea C. Bianculli’s (2014, 2016) interpretation of the rise of the Left is echoed by theorists such as Pía Riggiozzi, Diana Tussie, Jean Grugel, and Ben Thirkell-White (Grugel, Riggiozzi, & Thirkell-White, 2008; Riggiozzi, 2011; Riggiozzi & Tussie, 2012) who lead the field in analyzing post-liberal configurations in Latin America. While the research is now extensive, as Ruckert, Macdonald, and Proulx (2017) and Panizza (2009) outline in their conceptual overviews, these regionalist interpretations combine an analysis of the regional bodies with the historical trajectories of the individual nations within the region as well as the continent, and intermesh this with examining the social and cultural aspects of the region. In many ways, therefore, these analyses focus on the factors omitted in the political science interpretations analyzed above.

The historical interpretations understand regionalism in Latin America as having “two opposing but interdependent visions… dating back to the early years of independence but still valid today: the idea of a strong, united, and autonomous Latin America vis-à-vis a United States- (US-) led pan-Americanism” (Bianculli, 2016, p. 154). Harkening back to the ideological cycles Queirolo (2013) noted, we see the oscillation between engagement (or in other words, following) the United States (pre-War/neoliberalism), whereas at other times the region turns away from such leadership (import substitution industrialization/current Left turn). Given the invocation of Simón Bolívar by Hugo Chavez as a cornerstone of his Leftist project, this will toward a regional cohesion which allows for the region to determine its own history reflects the current turn away from the neoliberal Right sweeping the North. It is a consequence of the “increasing discrediting and delegitimization of neo-liberal policies” (Bianculli, 2016, p.
and a “partial displacement of dominant forms of US-led neoliberal governance” (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012, p. 12).

Thus, the case-studies that found anti-U.S. sentiment to be a determining factor would benefit from the contextualization of this historical oscillation between the region’s engagement and disengagement with the global hegemon, and frame it in historical terms. In the current cycle, it is clear, the anti-U.S. sentiment is the result of the failure of neoliberalism, but more importantly, the failure of U.S. as an advocate of neoliberalism, to bring benefit to the region, consequently delegitimizing its global and regional leadership role. Anti-U.S. sentiment is combined of two wills: a desire for a more inclusive society, as outlined above, but perhaps more importantly a recognition that the hegemon is no longer necessary, useful, or even beneficial. Instead of bi-lateral agreements Latin America used to favor before this delegitimization, now the inward-oriented regionalism allows it to maintain itself as a pole of power in international politics (Tussie, 2009). Thus, the region is doing something it has not done before – it is staying engaged with the world, and the markets, but on its own terms. Ultimately, “the tension between the attempt to advance or deepen the region’s autonomy to overcome dependency and resist US hegemony is still valid” (Bianculli, 2016, p. 163).

However, Riggirozzi (2011) warns that we should see this more than just a “rhetorical opposition to US hegemony” (p. 2). She finds the post-neoliberal order of the new Left goes beyond choosing the economic model: it is “regional consensus building, regional solidarity and integration, and identity formation” (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, the case-studies which interpret the rise of the Left through the performance-mandate, and see the rise of the Left as a rejection of neoliberalism, miss the point that there is an attempt here at something new, rather than just a negation of unsuccessful incumbencies and their economics. In many ways, the political science studies look backward, whereas the regionalists look forward. The policy-mandate in this case is somewhat closer to the truth, where Latin Americans are active voters who are looking for ways to enact autonomy into their lives. For Riggirozzi (2011), this will is enacted through UNASUR and ALBA, which are “redefining new boundaries (geographical and ideological) while fostering new consensuses that are defined regionally, not globally, and supported by the creation of new institutions” (p. 6). The plurality embedded within these institutions, especially UNASUR, shows not the rejection of a mode and an adoption of a new one, but rather the questioning of a direction, and an
acknowledgement of the voices which are aligned in purpose (a more equitable society), but different in approaches.

Ultimately, what does it mean that Latin America has moved in a post-liberal direction? It means the renewed focus on “ideational and institutional underpinnings of new regional agreements” rather than the simple dichotomy of autonomous-vs-US led regionalism (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 11). It means adopting “more radical models of political inclusion and citizenship and a new attitude to state building and representation in a multi-scalar way” and a renegotiation of what Latin America is and wants (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 10). It means accepting and relishing ideological diversity, such as within UNASUR and ALBA. It means going beyond traditional developmental models to look for “alternative continental strategies for growth and social justice, representative of a more political and confident “South” America, suspicious of US leadership yet still largely in tune with the need for open and competitive markets” (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 16). It means “adding social development, community action, new forms of politics and organization and a more active agenda-setting onto existing regional practices” (Riggirozzi, 2011, pp. 16–17).

Ultimately, what Riggirozzi offers is a call to arms for academics. We need to go beyond old and new regionalisms, and often historical political science perspectives. This does not only mean turning to more self-consciously historical and interdisciplinary perspectives. It also means understanding regional shifts through the lens of regionness which allows for the interpretation of very varied contexts, such as what happened in Latin America as whole post-1998. Ultimately, we cannot simplify, reduce, and politicize: we should go “beyond populist rhetoric and symbolic politics” and account for “current regional transformations as part of deeply rooted dilemmas of development, growth and inclusion, and how to effectively tackle dependency and external vulnerability” (Riggirozzi, 2011, p. 19). Such complex changes require complex analyses, ones that look beyond traditional academic fields. Ultimately, the story of the Latin American Left’s rise is not about any specific factor, but about the will and intent and desire among peoples in the region to find their own path. Having said this, it is also necessary to understand the realms of the cultural and ideology are highly contested terrains and that market-liberal and right-wing forces in the region have not gone away. There are increasing signs of new ideological struggles with right wing re-incursions into the leftists’ gains of the early 21st century.
Chapter 5.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the research that had been conducted on the rise of the Left with a view to identifying patterns of explanation in the research literature. In order to accomplish this, I have conducted an analytical breakdown of the studies conducted on the rise of the Left and organized the factors which were seen as relevant by this research into distinct categories, which allowed for cross comparison across studies. Consequently, I have offered a critical interpretation of both the factors involved, what the examined studies say about them, and where there might be gaps in the research. Ultimately, I touched upon the methodological issues and assumptions researchers face when studying regions, and offered the concept of regionness as a possible framework for studying such radically changing contexts as Latin America.

The main contributions this thesis offers are the systematic analysis and summary of the factors that studies on the Pink Tide have examined. Although this part of my analysis is less developed, I have also considered what I take to be some of the theoretical/methodological tendencies embedded within these studies. My suggestion in the last chapter, to consider macro historical and political economic regional research as a possible methodology/ontology for such inquiries in the future is consistent with what I see as growing recognition of the importance of hegemony and the critique of ideology and political economy, in Latin America. I have suggested that methodological/ontological assumptions are fundamentally structured by the paradigms that mainstream political science researchers work from, such as the predominance of economic and behavioural/statistical research. Further, as I read through the research literature I concluded that much of the work tacitly embraced neoliberal values in respect to the kinds of questions asked, the individualistic empirical focus on voting behaviours, and the tacit acceptance of the inevitability and value of market logic. It is arguable whether these methodological and ontological challenges facing Latin American research can ever be escaped. Indeed, even perceptions of regionalism in the literature
tend to have been influenced by the assumptions of neoliberalism. Having said that, I have argued that a regional focus holds greater promise than focusing, for example, on narrow topics such as voting behaviour in individual Latin American countries.

Even though research on regions is not immune to problems evident elsewhere in the literature, a regional focus demands a larger macro-historical and political economic analysis, focusing on the emergence of the late twentieth century neoliberal global order, the role of regions within it, and the struggles waged across the region by various social groups to achieve greater social equality and advances in democratic rights. To make a case for this kind of research I have tried in this thesis to identify gaps in the (mostly) political science research. Such gaps serve to reflect on the discipline itself, and on methodological assumptions and biases. As John French (2010) argues, social research, just as politics, has been, and continues to be, conditioned by neoliberalism. I believe that the predominance of an emphasis on economic variables and voting behaviour in political science, particularly in the set of case studies under review in this thesis, is one of the manifestations of this trend. Given the reduction of the social, and to some extent the political within the neoliberalizing space (Peck & Tickell, 2002), academic research is conditioned. As William Davies (2014) argues, the political and social have been conditioned by the economic, in an effort to measure, quantify, and evaluate the sociopolitical along predominantly econometric lines. In many ways, even though I have not conducted a formal discourse analysis, my review convinced me that political science research has been similarly conditioned. Most of the studies I reviewed tried to understand the sociopolitical realm through the economic, using mostly economic and related behavioural forms of analyses.

Regional analysis has also undergone this conditioning, where “New” regionalism understands regions as responses to globalization. However, I argued that the concepts of regionness, including its ontology of post-liberal/post-hegemonic regionalism, ties to escape this neoliberal privileging of the interconnected economic world, and foregrounds the roles of ideas and the social/cultural in the formation of regions. Thus, the importance of history and culture and myth is acknowledged by work that focuses on regionness. However, in terms of methodologies, there is still a lack, and often even this more nuanced understanding of political dynamics through a focus on regionalism falls back on traditional political science methods of quantitative and behavioural analysis, though these have been updated and refined in recent years to become more accepting
of qualitative research (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 2000; Blyth, 2003; Büthe, 2002; Mahoney, 2010; Munck, 2001; Przeworski & Teune, 1970; Ragin, 2008; Thelen, 1999).

It is at this juncture that communications research becomes crucial to bridging such gaps of methodology as well as focus. Just as regional organizations help understand what ties nation-states together in larger regional and global systems, and exemplify collective will, media organizations and cultural products help understand the historical and the social. Furthermore, as a field, communications methodologies are inherently interdisciplinary with a preference for posting challenging questions and productively interpretive narratives, rather than searching for conclusions that can only be partial and limited in scope.

In terms of sites of research, media policy and organizations in Latin America are a fruitful avenue to understand the ideologies, powers and struggles in play. The regional media organizations of TELESUR and RADIOSUR, for instance, exemplify the regional cohesion building throughout Latin America. New key policies regarding media, such as the Audio-Visual Law of 2009 in Argentina, can offer insights into the direction the Left wants to pursue. The regional media infrastructure itself, and the complicated networks of cooperation, also highlight regional political will. In terms of the media itself, observing the public mood and frames can help uncover the competing ideologies societies experience.

In terms of methodologies, communications research offers a way to tap into both the economic, social, and political spheres, while not eschewing the cultural. Behavioural quantitative analysis, on voting behaviour for example, is greatly enhanced by quantitative research on content analysis, as well as qualitative ethnographic work and interpretive documentary research. Content analysis allows for the uncovering of major political and ideological themes in media discourses that can play a role in shaping an electorate’s mindset, whether conducted on national or regional scale. Ethnography, almost non-existent in regional or political science studies, allows for depth insight into community sensibilities that may be unrepresented by quantitative data-collection methods. Documentary research allows for an examination of history and the mythos which shapes the paths that nations and regions have taken, and how these histories and cultures influence the present. Within contexts as diverse as regions, the
encompassing nature of communications research and its interdisciplinary methodologies allows for a thorough insight that leaves no stone unturned.

One of the main concerns resulting from the analysis of the case-studies on the rise of the Left surveyed in this thesis was the lack of an understanding of the lived experience of social life, matched with an often limited exploration on the role of the struggle over ideas and the achievement of hegemony within the region. The tools of political science do not allow for such insights readily, and regional research, though often noting the importance of such factors, also has not yet developed a methodological toolkit that adequately captures the dynamism of political and ideological struggles in the region. Ultimately, critical communications research can fill this gap by privileging the interplay of ideas, power and struggle.

My thesis suggests three potential avenues of inquiry for future research. The first, is to keep analyzing regional shifts, rather than national ones, to understand how the dynamics of supranational cooperation work. Fawn (2009) notes that the number of formal regional organizations are growing at an ever faster rate, and informal regions are equally on the rise. Therefore, regions are a unit of analyses which will become more and more present in the world. Further, comparative regional research is an emerging field which draws comparisons between different regional contexts which experience similar patterns – for instance, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Such comparative work will reveal global power dynamics and flows more clearly than an analysis of any one region alone.

Second, it is necessary to consider the methodological tools, and their underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions, of the ways we examine regions. I have argued that there is much merit in the concept of regionness as a theoretical idea for the examination of regions, yet the methodological toolset associated with regionness is not quite clearly outlined. In attempts to conduct such research, academics appear to fall back on the empirical analysis skills they are trained and comfortable with. In my view, a more reflexive practice of methodology use and a discussion of the choices one makes in conducting research are crucial elements necessary to any attempt to understand the changing political dynamics of regions better. I have argued that communication studies are a particularly fruitful source of methodological variety, mostly due to the field’s interdisciplinary nature.
Finally, the impact of neoliberalism on research and academia itself is an important line of inquiry to follow. Similar to the theories of scholars such as William Davies (2014), research should be conducted on academia itself, the policy networks which disseminate (neoliberal) ideas within it, and how factors such as data availability and sources condition the methodological choices of researchers. This is not something I have undertaken in the work at hand, but the more I worked through the mainstream studies under review in this thesis, the more I became convinced of the value of this sort of critical epistemological research. There is much concern about the influences of neoliberalism on the experience of students in the university, but systemic studies of the experiences of researchers in this regard would surely yield revealing insights.

Given the recent electoral victories throughout the region of the Right, as well as the dissolution of previously Chavez-led Venezuela into chaos in recent years, critics have been announcing that a reversal of the Pink Tide is underway. I disagree. As many of the more critical authors mentioned in this thesis have noted, there is some quality, some will, that drew the people of Latin America to the Left in the first place. Despite the situation in Venezuela, or the conservative rollback of the Lula reforms in Brazil, it is not at all clear that the momentum behind the Pink Tide has disappeared across the region. Thus, though there may not be one clear and simple answer as to why the Left arose, there are a few why it will continue to endure: notably, the strength and conviction of Latin Americans wanting more equitable societies and a stubborn belief that hard-won democracy is the path to get there.
References


Appendix

Methodology and Method

The analytical project of breaking studies apart into their constituent factors for why the rise of the Left has occurred allowed me to consider which factors and explanations are commonly explored and which ones are often left by the wayside. The purpose of this is not only to validate one factor against another, but rather to have a good understanding of how such factors have influences political, and more specifically, electoral, behaviour associated with the “Pink Tide.” I also wanted to reflect on some of the methodological, political and ideological assumptions involved in the literature.

The selection of material for my research overview was arguably more manageable than in many other major literature/research mapping studies. The field of research on Latin America is particularly small, and due to the changes in the region being particularly recent (at least the movement toward the left), academics are just beginning to catch up. Of course, it was not possible to survey every single study undertaken on politics, voter behavior, political struggles and social movements in every country in the region. Having said this, I attempted to be as exhaustive as possible, using any and all available peer-reviewed material as case-studies to create a mapping framework. Out of all the studies encountered, the current set represents the ones which analyzed at least three nations in Latin America and focused on the causes behind the shift to the Left. Further, these studies were chosen in particular because they attempted to draw conclusions about the regional shift as a whole and looked at Latin America as a whole, while potentially examining the individual nations for differences, rather than focusing on national cases individually. Lastly, though these studies were the ones which cross-referenced (or at least acknowledged) each other most consistently, leading to the assumption that they are representative of studies on “why the Left arose in Latin America” as a set. Because there are fewer than twenty in total, with fewer than five being major treatises (books) on the subject, the task was aptly appropriate for a Master's thesis. There are Spanish and Portuguese accounts of the changes that have washed over the continent in the past 19 years, but these are beyond the scope of the thesis for several reasons. First, due to my language limitations, the thesis focuses on English-language studies which were conducted for the most part in Western universities.
by Western researchers. Second, a partial purpose of this essay is to uncover research patterns and preferences of Western researchers examining political shifts. Introducing localized research would have created a complicated element leading to debate about whether the factors chosen for analysis were selected because of academic tradition or because of situational context. Though such an inquiry would be fascinating future work, it would render this thesis far too complex. Finally, as flawed as the concept may be, viewing the region as an “analytical point”, rather than “home”, might offer more distance and impartiality in my discussion of the heavily polarizing politics of the shift to the Left.

I fully accept the problems associated with being a researcher who is not from the region under analysis. Post-colonial theory has often highlighted the blindness of Western academics who rush in to analyze contexts other than their own. While in no way trying to attempt such legitimacy, my place of origin, Eastern Europe, closely resembles to context of Latin America, and has been the source to discovering Latin America as a point for analysis. Eastern Europe’s recent democratization, alongside inherent bloc mechanics and the regional integration into the EU (the local geographic hegemon, equivalent to the U.S. for Latin America) all created fascinating comparisons which ultimately led me to Latin America as a site of study. I hope this research can ultimately progress into the comparative, and compare such regional contexts. Nevertheless, the truth remains that as a Caucasian male situated in Canada, I encounter limitations in my understanding of Latin America.

The process of finding and selecting the studies under review in this thesis was two-fold and straight-forward. No current mapping studies on the topic exist (apart from Blanco and Grier’s very brief overview in their 2013 paper), and therefore exploring the relevant search terms was the most appropriate technique. These were: "latin", "america", the individual nations of the region (e.g. "bolivia", "chile", etc.), combined with the keyword "left" in various iterations. Table 7 shows a complete list of queries. These terms were then submitted to an interdisciplinary array of databases and in particular the relevant journals in regional analysis. The secondary method of finding relevant studies was by surveying in detail the references of the already consulted works. As the research area is still burgeoning, the necessity of interacting with other authors working on the same subject is apparent, and cross-referencing is bound (and did) happen. Therefore, by the combination of these two approaches, while not explicitly exhaustive, the major works in this area, at this point in time, should have all been covered.
A major concern that emerged with regards to literature selection was considering sources which are relevant to the rise of the Left of Latin America, but tangential in their approach, or “incomplete” – as in, they concern themselves with only certain nations or certain aspects of the Left turn. Given that this project aims to examine the shift of the Left in the region as a whole, studies which only deal with very small sample sizes (a few nations) were excluded from the case-study set, but often consulted for added nuance to the theory of electoral change. There are also numerous case-studies examining the rise of the Left in a particular nation – these were also excluded, as the purpose of the thesis is to examine the shift in the region as a whole. Ultimately, roughly half of the case-studies chosen tried to systematically examine all the region’s nations, and considered a variety of factors. The rest of the chosen were included because they spoke to greater changes in voter preferences across the region, and thus contributed useful insights, even if not completely comprehensive.

Table 7  Literature Search Queries

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<th>Search Query</th>
<th>Keyword - Concept</th>
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<th>Keyword – Geographic Location</th>
<th>Keyword – Decision-makers</th>
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<td>“america” OR “american”</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>SQ4</td>
<td>“left”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“chavez” OR “morales” OR “correa” OR “bachelet” OR “da silva” OR “aylwin” OR “frei” OR “kirchner” OR “vázquez” OR “morales” OR “ortega”</td>
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While these nations constitute what the West has thematically called “Latin America”, the focus of this thesis is mostly on South Latin America – a collection of states which are geographically removed from the direct influence of the United States. In other words, while Central American states, particularly Cuba and Nicaragua, have played significant roles in the development/changes to the Left, it is the recent movement of nations disconnected from the United States, which have shown very similar patterns in the last two decades, that leads the focus naturally toward considering the “Southern Cone” of the Americas more than the Central bloc.
Method

Much of the methodology of this project follows the framework found in (Mohabbati, Asadi, Gašević, Hatala, & Müller, 2013). This thorough literature overview shows a systematic attempt to organize data alongside thematic categories. While a literature review is not the purpose of this project, the attempt to find out conceptual groupings from a set of literature, and then organize them into a framework is a very similar impetus for both the Mohabbati study as well as this thesis. Therefore, following along with the methodology of has proven fruitful.

The greatest difficulty in trying to map the factors which might have contributed to the rise of the Left in Latin America is in the analytical process itself. Whereas a holistic approach would have been ideal for a discussion of any possible factor’s influence on a shift to the Left in the region, cross comparison amongst case-studies would not have been possible with such an approach. Therefore, the analytical breakdown in Chapters 2 and 3 is a necessary part of determining what factors did play a role and which did not. However, attempting to break down complex processes, such as the impact of an economic policy (such as the Washington Consensus) brought about difficulties which ultimately were only resolved selectively through my interpretive choices.

The impact of the Washington Consensus on electoral behavior illustrates this problem. At the same time, it possibly impacts voters through the performance voting mandate (where voters punish incumbents who brought about negative policy), or through a policy mandate (where voters actively choose a new policy direction), as discussed in detail further in the thesis. Thus, I had to choose whether to evaluate the
performance aspect of the policy of the Washington Consensus alongside the prospective policy mandate, or whether the two had differing bases for influencing voter behavior and thus deserved different categories. In this case, I chose the former, as one effect (punishment of policy choices) leads to the other (rewarding alternative policy choices). However, other factors were less easily resolved. For instance, the Washington Consensus brought about fiscal conservatism on the part of the government. This could potentially be analyzed as a performance and therefore subsumed under the Washington Consensus sub-category, but I opted to include it in its own category – fiscal resources – as government resources and spending had an impact temporally in the present, whereas the punishment of the incumbents works in the temporal past when discussing the shift. Therefore, the category of fiscal resources stands on its own, as it helps understand the continuing success of the electoral rise of the Left, rather than its initial success. The issue of globalization in turn was also conflated alongside the Washington Consensus. Whereas the neoliberal reforms had opened markets both in terms of trade and capital even further, since globalization had been a part of Latin America throughout much of the 20th century, the elements of the Washington Consensus were not directly responsible for the factors of trade openness and capital, and therefore I deemed they should be discussed within their own right (especially given the continuing openness to trade and capital by the current Leftist governments). Similarly, the issue of debt transcends numerous categories – it goes beyond economics to touch on politics and international relations, as well as the suffering of the people due to inequality.

Numerous other such difficulties presented themselves when attempting to create a framework of analysis of the factors which potentially led to the rise of the Left. I chose the current configuration for two reasons. First, the necessity to understand the Washington Consensus as a cohesive policy set with numerous impacts required it to have its own category rather than just slotting its constituent elements elsewhere. This reflects many of the case-studies and their analyses on this particular important factor. Second, the traditional breakdown of economic/social/political helps the analyst view where most importance is given, and where there are gaps. However, the author acknowledges such a breakdown could have many different iterations and does not claim any superiority to this particular one.
**Brief Overview of Studies**

A brief overview of the studies I consulted might be useful to the reader. As these authors are experts in the field and research area, other works might have been consulted, nevertheless, these following case-studies serve as data points for the analytical breakdown I develop in the thesis. Table 8 provides this information.

**Table 8  Overview of Studies used as Cases in Determining the Factors in the Rise of the Left in Latin America**

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<th>#</th>
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