

**CVE Programs and Initiatives through the Ages:  
A snapshot of the past, present, and future**

**by**

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## **Abstract**

We have now reached the stage where there are many countering violent extremism (CVE) programs and initiatives in existence. Each program leaves a unique imprint, making it possible to trace these efforts through the ages, as well as give some indication as to what is working and not working. An extensive literature review surveying academic publications and independent/government reports regarding radicalization theory, and more specifically, deradicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and prevention efforts is used to build the framework for this study's database. A content analysis utilizing data triangulation is then conducted on 67 existing or previously existing CVE programs/initiatives. The information drawn from these programs is used to develop a timeline of where CVE efforts have been, where they are now, and provides an idea of where they might be going. Some impressions made by these efforts have been marked – good and bad, lending pertinent information to the development of these types of programs. This study is intended to inform and improve the next generation of CVE programming.

**Keywords:** Countering Violent Extremism; P/CVE programming; Counter-terrorism; Disengagement; Deradicalization

## Dedication

*To the loving memory of my father. As you look down from heaven, I hope you are proud of your little princess.*

&

*To my amazing mother, who is my best friend forever and always.*

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## List of Acronyms

AVE	Against Violent Extremism
AWWS	Aagahi Women Welfare Society
CAVE	Campaign Against Violent Extremism
CCMW	Canadian Council of Muslim Women
CEP	Counter Extremism Project
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CVE-P	Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons
DMAP Lab	The Digital Mass Atrocity Prevention Lab
EU	European Union
FATE	Families Against Terrorism and Extremism
GIRDS	German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies
GSN	Global Survivors Network
HOPE	Hopeful Operation to Prevent Extremism
ICSR	International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence
ISD	Institute for Strategic Dialogue
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MPAC	Muslim Public Affairs Council
NAVIT	Network of Associations of Victims of Terrorism
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCCI	Online Civil Courage Initiative
OP 250	Operation 250
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism
PakTSN	Pakistan Terrorism Survivors Network
PAVE	People Against Violent Extremism
PaVE	People Against Violent Extremism
PPN	European Policy Planners' Network on Countering Polarisation and Radicalisation
RAN	Radicalization Awareness Network
SAVE <sup>1</sup>	Sisters Against Violent Extremism or Schools Against Violent Extremism
SAVE <sup>2</sup>	Schools Against Violent Extremism
SCN	Strong Cities Network

SFC	Samputo Forgiveness Campaign
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism
TerRA	Terrorism and Radicalization
WWB	Women Without Borders
YouthCAN	Youth Civil Activism Network
UN	United Nations

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## Introduction

Radicalization and the recruitment to extremist organizations has rapidly become regarded as an international issue that requires a solution. One solution that has found itself at the forefront is Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs. In fact, governments' and non-profit organizations filter millions of dollars into the creation and maintenance of CVE programs. CVE programs provide several different types of intervention as evidenced by the multitude of programs available. Broadly speaking, the target population of these programs are those individuals who have begun the radicalization process but who have not travelled so far down the path that they cannot be brought back. The short-term goal is the prevention of involvement in extremist organizations, while the ultimate goal is to have an overall reduction in violent extremist activities. Given the lack of consistency amongst CVE programs structures, evaluations are needed to begin to decipher what does and does not work.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, currently favored by western governments, are well ingrained within nations' counter-terrorism policies to halt or slow the radicalization process of those at risk of involvement with violent extremist/terrorist organizations. Since the major influx of CVE specific programming in the mid-2000s there have been a multitude of programs that have come and, in some cases, gone. Given the failed trajectory that several programs have unwittingly found themselves on, the practice and sustainability of CVE programming is questionable.

### ***Herein Lies the Problem***

Experts blame several factors for the failure of CVE programs, such as: lack of funding, low staffing, poor practices, uninformed/unrealized goals, credibility of messengers, and counter-narrative techniques and delivery methods (Helmus, York & Chalk, 2013; Berger, 2016; Braddock & Horgan, 2016). These issues have sparked calls for reform, and new programs have been created to correct the perceived faults of past efforts. While some programs likely do just that, Berger (2016) suggests that others take the form of "pet projects": programs built on anecdotal evidence that have little to no theoretical underpinnings. These 'fixes', while taking action against a perceived problem,

can actually be more problematic because they may perpetuate unsound or ineffective practices. More specifically, this cyclical process of program development creates a feedback loop by which new programs are criticized and labeled with the same problems as their predecessors, as well as any newfound issues.

All of these perceived issues with CVE programming have many clamoring for the development of more rigorous evaluative measures (Berger, 2016). But while evaluation is clearly needed, it is fraught with its own complications. Evaluation measures and efforts risk entering the same problematic feedback loop as we have seen with the creation of CVE programs: what is to be measured and how this is to be done are largely ambiguous. Assessments of individual programs have already begun to occur. USAID (2013), for example, has offered an evaluation of their CVE ventures in Africa. However, the evaluative measures they use are unique to their programs. This means that these measures may or may not be transferable for use in measuring other programs. Further, a potentially bigger issue is the fact that there is no universal acceptance as to what measure(s) should be used to determine whether or not a program is successful (Berger, 2016). This is largely because of the vastness of the spectrum of CVE programming: each program combines varying tactics to combat the terrorist threat, often creating a unique 'calling card' of its own. Given the complications that come with preparing for and conducting evaluations, we are left in the same bind as before – not knowing what does and does not work for CVE programs.

### ***Is the end near for CVE Programming?***

The search for what is and is not working in these programs is an ongoing source of frustration for both governments and CVE practitioners. This then begs the question: can these programs continue to survive when they are shrouded with such ambivalence? CVE programs already account for a significantly smaller portion of counter-terrorism budgets than other measures. Romaniuk (2015) suggests that the budgets for CVE initiatives are disproportionate to the hype they cause. With finite budgets available for the fight against extremist organizations, money is likely to be funneled to those policies that are proven to be most effective. One has to wonder if this is what happens to those programs that fade out of existence after not being re-funded by their respective governments: Is the money diverted to initiatives thought to be more effective? Or does the budget simply not allow for further allocation of funds?

Regardless of the reasoning, the fact that CVE programs are allocated less money would seem to indicate that less confidence exists towards them than to other initiatives. While governments always want (and often need) to be seen as doing something to combat an issue, it is far better if that something works. It seems probable, then, that the death of CVE programs could come if methods to address these issues are not taken.

### ***Looking to the Life of CVE Programming to Stop the Death of Them***

With evaluation efforts and qualms about these efforts coming to the forefront over the last year, it has become evident that we require an interim solution to provide the necessary answers for policy makers regarding what is effective in CVE programming. With dozens (if not hundreds) of programs now in existence or having existed, a solution may be to look to and analyze the lifespan of, and elements associated with, these programs – to study the life and death of CVE programs. To say that nothing works in these programs is a mistake. The longevity of many of these programs indicates that something within them is having some success. In fact, many experts have found varying aspects of these programs fruitful. For example, Braddock and Horgan (2016) maintain that proper construction and dissemination of counter-narratives is a key element of determining how successful the message can be at reaching and influencing an audience. Aiding this argument is the retirement of the U.S. State Department's 'Think Again, Turn Away' program, which was widely criticized in the media for having narratives and platforms that help to legitimize extremist organizations (Berger, 2016; Katz, 2014). Counter-narratives are just one of several methods utilized by CVE programs. There are several other elements that make up CVE programs, as well as the external factors (i.e., support, funding), that could help to determine why they live or die.

Further supporting the use of existing programs to gain valuable information that could affect the sustainability of CVE programming is the fact that many of them now belong to the second wave of programs. Romaniuk (2015, p. 39) argues these programs are more likely to be effective because they are “more focused on behavioral radicalization and better targeted across the micro-, meso-, and macrolevels”. One must also take into account that many of these programs are now being created in consultations with CVE experts, which gives some credibility to their endeavors. John Horgan assisted in the creation of the FBI's latest CVE venture “Don't be a Puppet”

(<https://cve.fbi.gov/info-discussion-leaders.html>), while Community Action for Preventing Violent Extremism (formerly known as Exit White Power) is a combined effort of CVE experts and other practitioners, maintaining close consultations with them (<http://alltogethernow.org.au/exit/>). While straightforward evaluations may be preferable to gain insight into what is and is not working for CVE programs, there is no denying that there is a wealth of valuable information to be gained through the study of the life and death of existing and past programs.

## **Current Study**

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to aid and inform in the construction of the next generation of CVE programming. More specifically, through the exploration of both the changing structure of CVE programs and the juxtaposition of successful and failed programs this study hopes to offer some insight into the trajectory of these programs and what is effective and sustainable. This will be accomplished in multiple steps. First, a thorough literature review is conducted. This will include literature connecting CVE and radicalization, and also a thorough analysis of CVE programming and its constituent elements. The second stage involves conceptualizing and operationalizing the elements of CVE programming identified in the literature review. Third, the study will compile a dataset of selected CVE programs in existence to date. Programs will be coded in a format to reveal pertinent information for evaluation, such as type of program, program structure, and tactics utilized by the program. Finally, systematic qualitative techniques are used to determine the inner workings of these programs and how they have changed through the years.

## Chapter 2. Literature Review

### Countering Violent Extremism and the Role of Radicalization

*Countering violent extremism* is a broad umbrella phrase that covers a wide array of possible approaches to dealing with radicalization and recruitment to extremist violence. P/CVE efforts can be either proactive, in that they aim to halt the process of radicalization before it begins, or reactive, seeking to reverse radicalization that has already begun to take hold. Overall, studies find that programs that have structures grounded in radicalization theory are the most effective at combatting radicalization (Ducol et al, 2015; Briggs & Feve, 2013; Brett et al, 2015; AAN Associates, 2014; Hirschfield et al, 2012; USAID, 2013). Thus, it is important to understand what radicalization is, how people become radicalized, and what factors may make radicalization more or less likely to occur in individuals.

*Radicalization* is the first step in transforming a person to having more extreme beliefs on the far/fringe sides of the spectrum that are typically associated with violent extremism (Smith, 2009). More simply put, radicalization is the requisite mental component that leads an individual to extremism. Studies show that there are four main ways by which a person can become radicalized:

1. Precursors and triggering mechanisms (ex., relative deprivation, grievances, and personal crisis)(Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2003; King & Taylor; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Silber & Bhatt, 2007);
2. Identity Issues (Kepel, 2004; Khosrokhavar, 2005; Sloodman & Tillie, 2006);
3. Social Networks (Dalgaard-Nielsoen, 2010; Nash & Bouchard, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2008) and;
4. The Internet (Neumann, 2013; Davies et al., 2015).

While there are formal mechanisms recognized as causing a person to become radicalized, there also has been an increasing interest in what it is that causes individuals to leave terrorist organizations. Much like the process of radicalization, de-radicalization requires a number of factors that play into the individual's perspective on themselves and their current situation (Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014, p. 648).

Altier et al. (2014) propose both push and pull factors that influence the individual to leave the organization. Push factors are those associated with an individual's experience within the organization, such as unmet expectations or a loss of faith in ideology, while pull factors are outside influences that lure the individual back into a more socially acceptable role, such as competing loyalties and a desire to marry/establish a family (Altier et al., p.648-651). While these factors may lead to a disengagement from the organization, that does not guarantee a departure from radicalized thought.

Disengagement is one of many steps an individual must go through to be properly integrated back into everyday society (Pressman, 2009, p. 21).

Now that the various factors at play bringing people to become radicalized are understood, it is necessary to have some insight into factors that steer individuals clear of radicalization. Cragin (2014) proposes that there are four factors that protect people from involvement in violent extremism: family obligations, logistical costs, financing, and fear (p.344-345). She argues that these factors are developed as a result of their inverse relationship to radicalization factors (Cragin, 2014). Assuming that this model holds true, any factor that aids in the radicalization process could be reversed to help explain why one may not be vulnerable to radicalization. For example, financing issues as opposed to monetary rewards, or fear of terrorism/extremist organizations or the acts they perpetrate as opposed to feeling excitement about those same things.

## **P/CVE Programming**

### **Background**

During the early to mid-2000s the threat of terrorist action(s) and the risk thereof grew, particularly as western nations became targets of such attacks. Events such as 9/11 in the United States, 7/7 in London, the 2004 Madrid train bombing, and Istanbul's bombings in 2004 solidified the need for more knowledge about terrorism, and, more specifically, regarding how an individual becomes a terrorist. Thus, radicalization theory emerged first, as the 'how' someone becomes a terrorist; and CVE emerged second, as the response to this radicalization process. Although CVE programs are relatively new, since their inception a multitude of these programs have already come and, in some cases, gone. They could be characterized as our best weapon to combat terrorism by starving terrorist/extremist organizations of recruits. Essentially, the success of a P/CVE

program can be gauged by the halting or reversing of the movement into the extremist domain.

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programs, currently favored by western governments, are now well ingrained within nations' counter-terrorism policies to halt or slow the radicalization process of those at risk of involvement with violent extremist/terrorist organizations. This favoritism seems to be justified given that studies show that not only do these programs have a positive impact on individuals engaged in them but also on the general public who feel safer knowing these programs exist (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Brett et al, 2015; AAN Associates, 2014; Hirschfield et al, 2012; USAID, 2013). Despite the popular support for these programs they have been shrouded with questions regarding both their effectiveness and sustainability.

Few CVE programs have been evaluated to date, likely as a result of how new the concept of CVE is. These evaluations have most often been done using secondary data; however, some have used primary data (Koehler, 2016). There are essentially two distinct types of evaluations. The first type present a broad overarching assessment of several programs at once, comparing and contrasting the best practices of each. This aggregate method showcases overarching 'best practices' and problems within these programs as a whole. In contrast, the second type of assessments present a more in-depth evaluation of individual programs, which in turn produces findings suitable only to that program that can later be generalized to other similar programs. So, while these programs are unique they are similar enough to other programs that these findings can then be generalized to them.

There are various reasons why so few evaluative efforts exist. It could be a sign of major flaws in CVE program construction. For example, it could indicate that program was initiated without a plan to measure effectiveness in advance. It could also be a problem more directly related to radicalization and a lack of a standardized tool to measure this phenomenon in people. Or perhaps, looking more directly at mass prevention programs, questions of how one can measure the effectiveness of something that has not happened or how you can predict how many people these prevention efforts have saved from entering violent extremism are born. Further complicating findings are "lack of available information and transparency, lack of external access, or lack of

internal methods and knowledge regarding evaluation” (Koehler, 2016). Regardless of the reason, it can be agreed upon that CVE program effectiveness and how to evaluate that effectiveness are rife with issues.

Experts blame several factors for the failure of CVE programs. These factors can affect not only long-term programs, but also those programs operating on set time frames. The sustainability of many programs is directly linked to their funding, or rather their lack thereof (Berger, 2016; Helmus et al, 2013). Other factors for failure include: low staffing, poor practices, uninformed/unrealized goals, credibility of messenger, and counter-narrative technique and delivery method (Helmus et al, 2013; Berger, 2016; Braddock & Horgan, 2016). In order to fully understand these programs they need to be broken down into their constituent parts and analyzed.

## **Types of CVE Programs**

While ‘CVE programming’ is how these programs are often generalized and referred to, distinct programs types do exist. They are often differentiated by the specific goal(s) they are trying to achieve. These goals are split into four broad types of CVE programs, including: prevention, intervention, repression, and rehabilitation.

### ***Prevention Programs***

As the name suggests, prevention programs are meant to be introduced to individuals before they have been radicalized. In some literature, prevention programs have also been referred to as “primary” programs (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, & Zammit, 2016), following the public health model wherein the program ultimately seeks to stop or decrease the number of new cases that occur. These types of programs have been described as those that “seek to prevent the radicalization process from taking hold in the first place and generally target a segment of society rather than a specific individual” (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Based on this definition, these programs are mass group prevention efforts rather than targeted at specific individuals. Programs under the ‘prevention’ umbrella include educational and/or informational types that are available to wide swaths of the public.

## ***Intervention Programs***

Intervention programs are those that seek to disrupt an individual's journey into violent extremism. Secondary and tertiary programs fall into this category type. Secondary programs involving targeted intervention and tertiary programs taking place after radicalization has occurred (Harris-Hogan et al, 2016). There has long been contention surrounding intervention, as it seeks to disrupt two distinct ideas: engagement in organizations and extreme thinking. One implies action while the other is only the requisite thinking that can, potentially, lead to action but is not necessarily required. Koehler (2016) explains intervention programs as having two sub-branches of programs within it: disengagement and deradicalization.

### **Disengagement**

Horgan (2008) defines disengagement as a process of leaving terrorist involvement. Therefore, engagement would imply that an individual is an active, radicalized member of a terrorist or extremist cause or organization. Disengagement programs seek only to halt a person from partaking in terrorist or extremist activities. Thus, it is often the first step intervention programs. An individual cannot become engaged without first being radicalized; that is, coming to hold extremist views and later leading to extremism (Davies et al, 2016). Radicalization seemingly prepares an individual for recruitment or engagement in terrorist activities.

### **Deradicalization**

Radicalization is the first step in transforming a person from having, theoretically, moderate center political beliefs to the more extreme beliefs on the far/fringe sides of the spectrum that are typically associated with violent extremism (Smith, 2009). Logically then, deradicalization is the last step needed to bring an individual back from extremism. Deradicalization is distinct from disengagement in that it seeks to change behaviour by changing the thought processes of individuals. Dechesne (2011) found that a proper deradicalization program “involves consideration of goals and assessment and evaluation of a situation, the identification of problem areas that need to be addressed, and a plan for how to address the problem areas” (p. 291).

## ***Repression Programs***

Repression initiatives or programs are those that occur in an official governmental capacity. Koehler (2016) finds that these programs are the easiest to identify given this official capacity. These programs seek only to halt extremist and terrorist activities. Examples of repression programs include: law enforcement surrounding terrorist acts, community policing, and incarceration (Koehler, 2016). Like the other types of programs, repression programs can be used in coordination with any of the other types. Thus, if an individual is incarcerated they may also be put in a rehabilitation program.

## ***Rehabilitation Programs***

As previously mentioned, rehabilitation programs follow repression programs because of their inherent relationship. Some studies refer to intervention programs as being rehabilitative programs (Gunaratna, 2011). While it is true that rehabilitation programs are intervention programs, the context in which they are delivered differentiates them. For the purposes of this study, rehabilitation programs will refer to intervention programs that are either mandated or voluntarily pursued within prison. Prison rehabilitation programs generally adhere to a Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model (Andrews, Bonta, & Wormwith, 2011). Essentially, this model allows for the fullest assessment of an individual to place them in an environment that they will have the most success in becoming rehabilitated. First, an individual's risk to reoffend is assessed, followed by an account of their specific needs. This results in a plan tailored to each individual, as opposed to having a 'one program fit all approach'.

## **Program Contextualization**

### ***Micro-, Meso-, and Macro-Social Impact Levels***

CVE programs are available at three distinct impact levels: micro-social, meso-social, and macro-social. Programs can have elements that exist at one or all impact levels. In fact, it has been found that programs that focus efforts at multiple impact levels have marked success (Brett et al, 2012). Micro-social programs are meant to target at the individual level (Koehler, 2016). An example of this might be one-on-one counseling services. Meso-social programs target "affective social environments", such as work, school, family, and community (Koehler, 2016, p. 111). Community campaigns and

educational programs fall under this impact level. Finally, macro-social programming target large swaths of people at city or nation levels (Koehler, 2016). This could include national counter-terrorism laws, and mass educational or informational programming, to name a few. While some tactics may be available at only one impact level, such is the case with counter-terrorism laws, most can be formatted to fit any of the three levels.

### ***Governing Body of Program***

Programs are created and governed by either governmental organizations, non-government organizations, or a combination of the two. Some studies have shown that non-government programs may be more effective than government run projects, which have been found to be less effective or not effective at all (Briggs & Feve, 2013; USAID, 2013; Hirschfield et al, 2012). One reason for this findings is that extremist organizations distrust the government and are thus, easily able to undermine counter-narratives derived from them (USAID, 2013, Briggs & Feve, 2013). This does not mean that there is no role for government programs in CVE. In fact, this should be taken with a grain of salt because so little evaluative work has been done on these types of programs. It may be that it is only certain tactics within programs or a specific program type that are ineffective when operated by government organizations.

### ***Online versus Offline Delivery Methods***

Several key distinctions must be made when considering CVE programs. First, CVE efforts may take place offline, online, or involve some combination of the two (Davies et al, 2016). Both environments are able to offer a platform by which individuals can become informed/educated and/or engage in a one-on-one or group environment. There is nothing that indicates that one type of program delivery method is better than the other, in fact, each build resilience in their own ways.

Given how expansive the Internet is, online delivery has the advantage of being able to reach more people than offline delivery methods. This becomes helpful when we consider that terrorism is not always a localized issue and foreign fighters have become a significant global threat. The United Nations (UN) estimates that there are approximately 30,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries (Foreign terrorist fighters, 2015). Some countries may not have a counter-terrorism plans or programs, can't afford to maintain programs they have, or perhaps, the programs they have aren't applicable to

individuals becoming radicalized (Berger, 2016). An online delivery method bridges these gaps in accessibility, meeting global demands. Online delivery can span over countries and nations, allowing for financial collaborations that may not be available as part of offline delivery methods. For example, the *Online Civil Courage Initiative* operates in concertation with four platforms: Institute Strategic Dialogue, Facebook, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, and Amadeu Antonio Foundation (OCCI, 2017). It is important to note that this is largely dependent on the specific connections that each program has and it is possible for offline delivery programs to have high support. Another advantage of the online environment is the anonymity that it offers. This may allow for more open discussions as opposed to offline because the individual stigma could be lessened.

Offline delivery methods also have advantages. While in theory the Internet may be able to reach vast number of people, it cannot reach everyone. In many war torn and third world countries the Internet is not readily available. This is where offline delivery methods are the gold standard. US Aid claims to have great success via this delivery method of programs in Africa (US Aid, 2013; Aldrich, 2014). Other areas where offline delivery methods are preferable to online is in rehabilitative programs within prisons. In particular, Saudi Arabia's *Re-education Prison* has shown this to be a successful and effective delivery method. (Hubbard, 2016; Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016).

### ***Negative versus Positive Measures***

CVE programs use *positive* and *negative* measures to combat radicalization. In general terms, positive CVE strategies are those that “seek to challenge extremist narratives and propaganda by producing counter-content,” while negative strategies are designed to “block, filter, take-down or censor extremist content” (Hussain & Saltman, 2014, p. 10). Negative measures generally refer to online contexts, however, these could be used offline if one includes removal of extremist propaganda from telephone poles and advertisement boards as a filtering process. Western governments have tended to be more concerned with negative measures, technological “solutions” aimed at restricting the supply of extremist content on the Internet (Stevens & Neumann, 2009). The potential effectiveness of these negative measures has been subject to a number of practical (Briggs & Feve, 2013) and political (Hussain & Saltman, 2014) limitations. This

is largely due to the difficulties in tracking extremist content on the Internet; for every site that is shut down there are many others still in operation or being set up daily. Of greater concern is the fact that removing content does nothing to change a radicalized mind, which is the greater threat (Briggs and Feve, 2013). Positive measures, then, were only recently popularized, after negative measures fell out of favor as the main combatant of radicalization (Hussain & Saltman, 2014; Briggs and Feve, 2013).

## **P/CVE Tactics**

To date, there has been little work done to identify the specific tactics used by programs or the combinations therein that are effective. What is known, however, is that programs that use several different tactics (i.e., media, Internet, social media, in-person meetings) are most successful (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Brett et al, 2012). Despite the lack of research in this area, four main tactics are prevalent in literature: counter-narratives, education/information, voices, and social media.

### ***Counter-narratives***

Counter-narratives are the main positive measures utilized within CVE programs, representing attempts to directly or indirectly challenge violent extremist messages (Briggs & Feve, 2013). These programs can function both online and offline, and many initiatives utilize both platforms. This approach is premised on trying to win the 'battle of ideas.' Counter-narratives highlight what is wrong with extremist ideologies, challenge assumptions, expose fallacies, and dismantle associated conspiracy theories (Schmid, 2014). It involves creating and promoting narratives that stand in opposition to those presented by extremists and is intended to undermine extremist ideologies and compete for the 'hearts and minds' of potential recruits (Aldrich, 2014; Berger & Strathearn, 2013). The idea behind counter-narratives is relatively straightforward, but its application in practice is much more complicated. Much of the literature on counter-narratives is currently centered on understanding how best to construct effective counter-narrative programs.

To the extent that narratives form the foundation of the appeal of extremism, and if counter-narratives are to serve as a vital element in CVE strategies, it is important to understand what constitutes a strong narrative. Schmid (2014, p. 29) has identified the following as the ingredients of an effective narrative: 1. It has to articulate a clear,

realistic and compelling mission purpose without getting entangled in sub-goals and details, while simultaneously keeping the focus on long-term, overarching goals that have to be related to cultural norms and values as well as interests; 2. It has to have legitimacy, in that it matches cultural and public norms and values and is seen by relevant audiences as justified; 3. It has to hold the prospect of success and provide a feeling of progress towards its goals; 4. The narrative has to be presented in a consistent manner in order to be effective and withstand the attacks of counter-narratives that might cost it public support; and 5. The narrative must fit within an overall communication plan that reflects major themes of our own identity.

### ***Education/Information***

It has been argued that educational tactics should be used to counter ‘soft power’ with ‘soft power’ (Ghosh, Chan, Manuel, & Dilimulati, 2016). Ghosh et al (2016) explain *soft power* as being the “psychological, emotional and intellectual appeal of narratives”, whereas as *hard power* is “military action and surveillance measures” (p. 117). They argue that education is the ultimate weapon and suggest four ways in which education can build resilient communities: 1. Promoting values of citizenship and diversity, 2. Developing an understanding of history and power relations in society, 3. Religious literacy, and 4. Media literacy (Ghosh et al, 2016, pp. 126-127). The main goal behind this tactic is to provide enough education/information to an individual so that if and when extremists should beckon that individual will have the knowledge to make an informed decision.

### ***Voices***

Voices of credible messengers are effective tactics utilized in programs to counter violent extremism (Briggs & Feve, 2013). Credible messengers can come in the form of former extremists, survivors of terrorist actions, religious scholars/clerics/muftis<sup>1</sup>, and women (specifically female family members). Governmental entities are not considered to be credible messengers. “Formers” provide key voices against extremism because of their intimate knowledge surrounding extremism and the specific organizations to which they belonged. While there is no denying the power of their accounts, lending strength to their credibility is the fact that they are speaking out

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<sup>1</sup> A mufti is considered to be a Muslim legal expert or Islamic scholar

against powers with which that they once stood united (Briggs & Feve, 2013). Survivors' voices are also important tools. The power coming from their narratives, centered on what they endured at the hands of extremists, can relay a message that education cannot offer. This is not to say that education has no place only that narratives offer a divergent voice that may speak to individuals more clearly than others. Religious scholars' voices also offer a unique narrative, that of truth, tolerance, and understanding. Extremists' often use their perverted interpretation of religious scripture to entice people into thinking like them. Religious scholars can counter this with their knowledge and voice. Finally, the amplification of women's voices and narratives, particularly mothers' voices, is prevalent in the fight against extremism (Briggs & Feve, 2013). A mother's position as head of households affords them a unique voice to counter extremism, one that programs hope will 'hit home' for those they hope to prevent from becoming radicalized and those that already are.

### ***Social Media***

Social media has rapidly taken over much of the world. While this could simply be referred to as a delivery method, the utility that social media has makes it a viable tactic as well. Studies have found support for the role of social media in combatting extremism (Davies et al, 2016; Avis, 2016). It offers an unparalleled service in the form of spreading messages and building global connections. Given the need for CVE programs to reach many people, social media is an ideal medium to do so. Popular social media platforms include Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Global campaigns and videos are commonly shared on these sites (Davies et al, 2016). Like the other tactics, social media is often used in coordination with other tactics such as voices and providing educational or informational products.

## **Chapter 3. Methodology**

### **Methods and Database Creation**

This chapter addresses the methodological approach used in this study. A qualitative content analysis of CVE programs was employed to take an in-depth look at their trajectory from inception to present day. Analyzing programs from the past and present was intended to offer a better idea of what is working in these programs and provide some insight as to where they are going and, possibly where they should be going if this differs. It is also meant to determine to what extent, if any, these programs adhere to 'best practices'.

This study begins by employing a case study analysis approach, which allows for an in-depth exploration of each program individually. The specific structure of each program as well as the goals associated with them are recorded in chronological order to provide a more holistic picture of the CVE landscape. These descriptions were then used as a starting point for developing a database of the programs and coding the data. Once the data was coded it could then be analyzed as an aggregate, as well as individual, level. Taken together, themes emerged, ultimately providing the answers to the aforementioned research objectives.

### **Data and Sample**

In order to gain the necessary information for this study, data triangulation was employed. The Internet, independent reports, and academic articles supplied the information for the program descriptions and analysis. This method helped to improve the reliability and validity of this study by ensuring that the initiative/campaign/ program exists and that the information found could be corroborated. It should be noted that from here on out the words program, initiative, and campaign will be used interchangeably in this study. All data was open-source, and gathered during the time period from fall 2015 to spring 2017.

Programs were selected using non-probability and quasi-snowball sampling strategies. Initially, Google's search engine, the Google Scholar database, and web of science database were used to search key terms such as "CVE program", "CVE

initiative”, “CVE campaign”, “terrorism program”, “preventing violent extremism programs”, “stop violent extremism”, and “Rehabilitation AND Terrorism”. These key terms revealed 29 programs. The rest of the sample was obtained through their associations with the original 29 programs. For example, *Against Violent Extremism* provides links to several other programs – some CVE related and others not. Other times, the program’s social media accounts led to lists of “followers” or suggested other pages an individual may like. Academic articles and independent reports also contributed information on various programs.

In order for the program to be added to the database it had to meet various criteria. These criteria included that: 1. It must be a program, initiative, or campaign with a goal of countering violent extremism or otherwise aiding in the battle against violent extremism. 2. Programs must have at least two data sources attesting to its presence and goals. 3. Programs should not fall under the ‘repression’ typology. Repression programs involve official government sanctioning through prison sentences and laws, thus are inherently different from other CVE initiatives. This type of program requires its own study to fully research and understand them. Ultimately, the final sample consisted of 67 programs. These programs began between the years 1998-2017. It is necessary to mention that this study is not intended to include an exhaustive list of all CVE programs, but a sampling of those that exist.

## **Data Coding and Analysis**

In order to code the data a database was created using SPSS. To start, the program name, any platforms that it operates under, country of origin, year of inception, and program status were recorded. It should be noted that often programs belonged to several countries and thus, could not be assigned one country as their originating geography. If a program belonged to more than one country within one continent then it was assigned that continent’s name as its origin. For example, if a program was jointly shared between France, the United Kingdom, and Germany then its origination would be ‘Europe’. If a program belonged to more than one country and one of those countries was on a different continent then it was assigned the origination of ‘international’. For example, a program that is joint between Canada and the United Kingdom is international. The program status variable was coded as ‘ongoing’, ‘pre-determined time frame’, ‘inactive’, and ‘failed’. Inactive programs were those who had little to no activity in

the past six months; this had to be confirmed by multiple sources. Failed programs were deemed to be unacceptable programs and shut down.

Manifest and latent content analyses techniques were exercised as a way to fully develop the data. Pre-set codes and emergent codes became the basis for the study. Because this study sought to determine how programs have changed through time an extensive literature review was done to determine what the defining characteristics of these programs were. Initially, five main areas of interest were developed, including: type of program, governing body of the program, target of the program, program delivery methods and measures, and tactics used by these programs. As information was gathered each of these five categories was expanded to include codes, in some cases multiple codes. All variables were dichotomously coded with a zero if the variable was not present and a one if it was.

#### *Type of Program*

Type of program was originally divided into three core types: prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation. As previously mentioned, repression programs were omitted. It was possible for programs to fall into more than one program type as some had elements of more than one.

#### *Governing Body of Program*

Governing body of the program refers to who created the program. Initially, programs were coded as being created by governments or non-government entities. It was determined early on that some programs had elements of both, making another code for this necessary. A variable for a program being 'government funded' was also included in this category.

#### *Program Delivery Methods and Measures*

Programs were coded as being delivered online, offline, or having elements of both. Once specifics were gained surrounding online and offline it was intended to code for specific delivery platforms of each. For example, it was assumed that online programs may have their own personal websites and/or use social media as platforms to get their messages across. Programs were also coded as having used positive measures, negative measures, or both.

#### *Tactics Used by Program*

Given the highly variable nature of these programs it was expected that this area would have the most emergent codes. To begin, programs were coded for using counter-narratives, educational tactics, and guidance or counselling.

## Chapter 4. Overview of CVE Programs through the Ages

This chapter serves to chronologically illustrate descriptions of the CVE program/initiatives in the study. Each description includes the program's name, online and offline platform types, a full description of the goals and efforts put forth by the program, and conclusions on how active or inactive the program is. These descriptions serve as the basis for how they were coded in the database. Program descriptions vary in the depth to which they are covered, determined by the amount and quality of sources available.

### 1998

#### Exit Fryshuset (Sweden)

##### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube

Offline: Seminars, workshops, counseling to individuals and/or their family members

Description: Exit Fryshuset is a non-profit organization. It aims to support those individuals that are looking to disengage from a nationalistic/racist/nazi/neo-nazi/right-wing movement organizations. Support is offered in both reality and virtual reality. Exit believes that individuals join extremist movements for social reasons such as searching for status, identity, belonging (Exit Fryshuset, 2017). Therefore, their strategies for disengagement focus more on the social cohesion aspect than ideology or countering narrative approaches. Staff members are former extremists, however they also cooperate with local government authorities, social services, housing corporations, the legal system, and individual's families to provide them with a unique pathway out of extremism – one that is suited perfectly to their needs. Exit also works to educate other organizations on how to recognize the signs of and deal with people that are affiliated with these extreme right-wing movements. Exit is still active on all accounts.

## **2000**

### **EXIT Deutschland (Germany)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, myspace

Offline: Counselling and educational services

Description: EXIT Deutschland is best described as a primarily reactionary non-governmental program in Germany combatting right-wing terrorism. It was formed by the hand of a criminologist and a former extremist and boasts high success rates. With over 500 individuals entering their program since 2000 only three percent have recidivated (EXIT Deutschland, 2017). It aids individuals after they have already become radicalized and/or recruited by the right-wing. Some ways in which they facilitate deradicalization and disengagement is by “arranging contacts, providing practical aid and answering questions regarding personal safety, social problems and individual reappraisal” (EXIT Deutschland, 2017). Counter-narratives are prominent on all platforms, often used as tools to bring individuals back from the right. This program also serves to educate and inform the public about right-wing extremism as well as counsel those affected by it. They also act as an aid and supporter to other programs worldwide building similar programs. EXIT is currently active on all platforms.

## **2003**

### **Re-education Prison for Jihadists**

#### Platform(s):

Offline: Rehabilitation Center for persons convicted of extremist behaviour/activity.

Description: There are currently five counter-terrorism facilities in Saudi Arabia holding approximately 5,000 prisoners (Mallonee, 2017). These facilities take a comfort and knowledge approach to rehabilitate the offenders within them. The comfort comes in the form of queen size beds, minibars, swimming pools, and conjugal visits for some (Mallonee, 2017). The knowledge is given by Islamic scholars who work with the

inmates to guide and educate them in Islam and the Koran. It is through this method that they hope to dispel any extremist thoughts and behaviour, to deradicalize them so they may return as productive members of society that pose zero terrorist risk.

## **2008**

### **Sakinah Campaign**

#### Platform(s):

Online: personal website

Description: The Sakinah Campaign is an independent, non-governmental organization in Saudi Arabia created to engage in dialogue online as a way to combat internet radicalization. It uses a one-to-one engagement strategy. Volunteers include religious personnel/scholars, academics, practicing psychologists and psychiatrists. A separate women's section exists alongside the main platform to create a stronger initiative; this is one of the earliest proponents of this. The campaign seeks to target individuals who are seeking religious knowledge and attempts to inform them in this area and guide them away from any extremist beliefs that may or may not be attractive. This is mainly considered to be preventative, however could serve as an intervention program dependent on an individual's circumstances. The site also serves as a repository for many self-learning materials.

### **Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE<sup>1</sup>)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: part of a larger website (Women Without Borders), Twitter, YouTube

Offline: Training to recognize and combat radicalization and extremism

Description: Women Without Borders is an NGO that was developed in 2008 by Edit Schlaffer, a social scientist and activist who holds a PhD from University of Vienna. This platform is headquartered out of Vienna, Austria. Purported to be the first female counter-terrorism platform in the world, SAVE was developed to get women into the security arena. It encourages women to rise up and take action against violent

extremism. Their mission is to use “women as the first line of defense” with a particular emphasis on the role of mothers in the battle against extremism (<http://www.women-without-borders.org/aboutus/>). SAVE has developed the Mothers School Model. This model’s curriculum and workshops offer mothers training so that they may recognize early warning signs of radicalization and offer methods of combatting this, i.e., counter-narratives, communication and parenting skills. Ultimately, SAVE would like to take this model onto a global scale. SAVE is active both online on social media (Twitter) and offline – training mothers.

## **2009**

### **Global Survivors Network (GSN)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, YouTube

Offline: Public events, Documentary “Killing in the Name”

Description: GSN is a non-profit organization that developed out of the United Nations Symposium on Supporting Victims of Terrorism in 2008. It is a network of people who have survived terrorist attacks around the globe that hope to end terrorism with their voices through story. Their documentary, “Killing in the Name”, was nominated for an Academy Award for ‘Best Documentary Short Subject’. Efforts can be thought of as both preventative and reactionary. Their webpage has become defunct, Facebook page has not been active since 2015, and their newest YouTube video was posted five years ago, and is unclear whether or not they are still active offline.

### **LIFE AFTER HATE**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google Plus

Description: LIFE AFTER HATE is a non-profit organization that provides services in research, outreach, education, and consulting. Their mission centers on the idea of forgiveness. Their website states, "LIFE AFTER HATE is dedicated to inspiring individuals to a place of compassion and forgiveness for everyone, including themselves" (<https://www.lifeafterhate.org/about>). It is founded by former members of the American violent far-right. They draw upon their collective experience to counter the right-wing ideology and extremism they once believed in. LIFE AFTER HATE began as a movement in 2009 when it opened a Facebook page and later became an incorporation in 2011. This organization is currently and consistently active on Facebook and Twitter only.

### **Pakistan Terrorism Survivors Network (PakTSN)**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook

Description: The PakTSN is a nonprofit organization that came to be after a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the office of the United Nations World Food Program in Islamabad, Pakistan. This incident resulted in the deaths of five employees and injuries to four others. This network is meant to bring survivors and victims of terrorism in Pakistan together. Together they are a strong preventative front against extremist ideologies. The organization recognized the post-traumatic stress that follows incidents such as terrorist events and acted to create an environment where people could share their stories with others who could understand what they had been through and how it impacted their lives. The Facebook page is still active with posts made regularly.

### **SAVE Blog**

Platform(s):

Online: Women Without Borders website

Description: SAVE's blog is operated under the Women Without Borders platform. It is a way for women to share their voices on extremism with other sisters and the rest of the world. It can be described as a preventative effort against violent extremism. It came online in 2009 and became dormant as of 2013, though its archives can still be found on

the website. This blog posted “messages from SAVE sisters, activity updates, as well as any news concerning CVE” (WWB, 2017).

## **2010**

### **Eretz Shalom (Land of Peace)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Twitter, Facebook, Personal website (has gone defunct since this database was formed)

Offline: In person meetings, focus groups

Description: Eretz Shalom, also known as Land of Peace in English, is a social movement with the goal of furthering peace and dialogue between the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Judea and Samaria. This program is more heavily involved online than offline. Since beginning this database in 2015, the organizations main web page has become defunct. The Eretz Shalom Twitter account has not been used since 2011. The Facebook account, however, is still very active with posts updated daily.

### **Muflehun**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Muflehun personal website

Description: Muflehun is an independent think tank that specializes in preventing radicalization and countering violent extremism. Its initial focus is to first, understand the nature of the threat of violent extremism, and second, develop effective, innovative, and research-driven preventative programs within a religious paradigm. Initiated by the Muslim American community, Muflehun believes that preventing radicalization, violent extremism and other threats from taking root is the first step for ensuring a safe civic society. The word muflehun is based in Quranic verse (Q3:104) and means “those who will be successful.”

Let there be a group (community) from amongst you that invites towards good, enjoins what is right (reasonable & just), and forbids what is wrong; and they will be the successful ones (muflehun, 2017).

Muflehun's stated vision is to help establish a community that promotes good work and justice, while peacefully working against wrongs and injustice. Its mission is to conduct independent research and provide recommendations to policymakers and the American Muslim community, as well as develop programs that directly and indirectly use faith-based values to: Promote the continued integration of the community within the larger society; enable civic engagement through awareness and promotion of available resources; and facilitate the fulfillment of social responsibilities by utilization and expansion of service channels

Muflehun is a non-profit organization. Financed by contributions from individuals, foundations, and corporations, it is an independent and strictly non-partisan organization. It does not have any government funding; rather, it relies entirely on support from private sources. Muflehun purports to offer programs in several countries covering the Countering Violent Extremism landscape (although there are no specific programs listed on its website). Muflehun's CVE Programming Landscape is presented in Figure 4. Muflehun primarily engages through its website, <http://muflehun.org/>, which includes information on CVE News, CVE-related events, and a blog.

### **Samputu Forgiveness Campaign (SFC)**

#### Platform(s):

Offline: Gathering of Forgiveness meetings, speaking engagements, workshops, Jean Paul Samputu's own music, Mizero Children of Rwanda music.

Description: SFC is built and promoted by Jean Paul Samputo, a prominent African artist who can sing in six languages including soukous, rumba, traditional Rwandan 5/8, Afrobeat, pygmy, and gospel. Samputo believes that forgiveness was an underutilized tool in the fight against extremism. SFC's motto was "Forgiveness, a step to reconciliation and sustainable peace" (SFC, 2014). Objectives of this program include: education, empowering, and creating a "culture of forgiveness" within youth. This program is still active with Samputo performing and sharing his message wherever he is asked to go.

## **Mothers MOVE!**

### Platform(s):

Offline: Women's working groups, conferences

Description: This is a campaign offered through the Women Without Borders platform that takes place in Yemen, Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Nigeria, the UK and Ireland. This campaign takes advantage of a mother's placement in the family; a mother being thought of as the "key" because of the closeness that she shares with each individual family member. This strategic placement of mothers allows them to notice any changes within family members, enabling them to combat extremism from the front lines of the family. Mothers MOVE encourages active engagement among mothers of the aforementioned countries while providing tools to help protect their children from violent extremism. Manuals that are created and distributed by SAVE to gain a comfort level among the mothers before delving into the educational portion of the program to ready them for mobilization against extremism.

## **Schools Against Violent Extremism (SAVE<sup>2</sup>)**

### Platform(s):

Online: part of a larger websites (Women Without Borders and Global Counterterrorism Forum), YouTube

Offline: School programs (during and after school), speaking engagements, community outreach events.

Description: An initiative of Sisters Against Violent Extremism that utilizes the power of students and teachers to combat violent extremism within their communities. Efforts include: workshops, school curricula, afterschool programs, speaking engagements, community outreach efforts, letter-writing and signature campaigns (<http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/films/4/>). Many of these efforts seek to dismantle and disprove extremist ideology. This is largely a preventative approach to countering violent extremism that is still operating today.

## **The Women's Dialogue**

Platform(s):

Offline: face-to-face meetings

Description: The Women's dialogue is meant to support and encourage conversation surrounding radicalization and recruitment. The goal is to create community strategies to combat these issues within the local communities. The project, piloted in Mumbai, hoped to address the growing tension between India and Pakistan. These two countries are considered to be nuclear powers and have repeatedly been close to war. Women from both countries gathered at a meeting in 2010. It is unclear what the outcome of this meeting was and whether this program has been used since this time. The Women's dialogue is funded by Women Without Borders/SAVE and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection.

## **2011**

### **HAYAT-Deutschland (Germany)**

Platform(s):

Online: Email hotline

Offline: Telephone hotline

Description: HAYAT is a preventative and reactionary, non-governmental program in Germany. It is, however, financed by the Federal Office for Immigration and Refugee Affairs. It offers counselling services to individuals either radicalized and/or currently recruited by violent Jihadist groups; these services are also available to relatives and others who have a relationship/connection with the aforementioned individuals. Counseling provided is touted to be "systematic, situational, problematic, and solution-oriented" (Hayat-Deutschland, 2017). It is an anonymous telephone/email hotline. First contact involves a full assessment of the individual. Once a general idea of the situation can be determined a step-by-step counseling plan be implemented. Services are available in German, English, and Arabic.

### **Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, YouTube

Offline: Focus groups, conferences/symposiums

Description: RAN is a network of frontline workers and practitioners from around Europe that use their collective knowledge and experience to prevent radicalization. This network of people is made up of people such as: police, corrections officers, prison authorities, teachers, youth workers, civil society representatives, local authorities, and health care workers (RAN, 2017). These practitioners work first-hand with people who have been or are vulnerable to radicalization, making their inputs invaluable in the fight against extremism. The practitioners act as a check on one another to maintain the best practices for preventing radicalization. They are funded by the Internal Security Fund – Police (RAN, 2017). They also support the EU and individual countries upon request, making their knowledge available to those with a common goal. This network is still active on all platforms.

**Against Violent Extremism (AVE)**

Platform(s):

Online: AVE personal website

Description: AVE was originally launched at the 2011 Summit Against Violent Extremism in Dublin. It is a unique private sector partnership between the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), Google Ideas, the Gen Next Foundation and rehab studio, and is currently being managed by ISD in London. AVE is a global network of former extremists and survivors of extremism that leverages the lessons, experiences and networks of individuals who have dealt first-hand with extremism. Its official aims are “to prevent the recruitment of ‘at risk’ youth and encouraging the disengagement of those already involved.” AVE uses technology to connect, exchange, and disseminate information and perspectives on violent extremism. The network does not focus on any particular extremist narrative or ideology; instead, it is dedicated to countering all types of violent extremism (from far right and far left to AQ-linked and inspired and gangs).

AVE is a private sector venture with no government assistance. Members – subject to approval from management – join this network from all over the globe to interact and converse with former extremists and each other to combat extremist narratives. AVE is designed to be inclusive. Members have the option of adding their own counter-narrative project to the wide array already available. Through its various media platforms, members can stay in touch, share ideas, collaborate, find investment and partners, and project their messages to wider audiences.

### **Youth Online and at Risk: Radicalization facilitated by the Internet**

#### Platform(s):

Online: RCMP personal website

Offline: Parent to child or teacher to student

Description: Youth online and at risk: Radicalization facilitated by the Internet is a program delivered as a report produced by the RCMP. While it is targeting online behaviours the actual training and conversations occur in person, often between family members. It is a four-step program targeting parents, caregivers, and teachers of youth who are active online (RCMP-GRC, 2011). This first step encourages two-way conversation between an adult and youth concerning online content appropriateness and expectations of behavior when content is found to be inappropriate. The second step is to leverage existing programs. This step involves developing ways to keep youth safe from Internet threats. Some examples that are stated in the report are software controls, monitoring download activity, keeping the computer in an open space/community area, developing “what if” scenarios, and consulting website reviews. The third step is to reach out to their space, emphasizing the importance of genuine connections. The fourth step is reporting material of concern. This highlights the importance of avoiding inappropriate content as well as reporting this content when it is found.

### **Mothers for Change**

#### Platform(s):

Offline: In person women’s group gatherings for research gathering and empowerment.

Description: An ongoing research project offered under the Women Without Borders platform. It is slated to operate for 3 years. The idea is to utilize the information that a mother – the center of families – can offer to help recognize and combat extremism. This project has been implemented in five countries: Israel, Palestine, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Northern Ireland. This program has two tiers. The first is to identify the role that women perceive themselves as having in extremism and how they think the threat of extremism can be combatted. The second tier is to taking advantage of these newly formed women's groups to help them have a stronger impact “within the family, within politics, and within society at large” (<http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/38/>).

## **2012**

### **Terrorism and Radicalization (TerRa)**

Platform(s):

Online: Toolkit

Description: TerRa has four objectives: support frontline workers, support victims of terrorism, integrate their radicalization and disengagement research into the European Citizenship Program, and delivering policy advice to European governments (TerRa, 2017). This program is supported by the European Commission DG Home Affairs. It is comprised of two phases involving the development and evolution of their signature toolkit. The first phase created the TerRa toolkit, a resource for professionals who work with individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization. The toolkit is made up of manuals, guidelines, and fact sheets that contain pertinent information about radicalization, how to identify when it is happening, and possible solutions for it. The second phase continued to build on these foundations and expanding the toolkit to include UCARE, a curriculum to “foster citizenship and social skills” in youth to prevent radicalization (TerRa, 2017).

### **The Channel Programme**

Platform(s):

Offline: Early intervention assessment and support package

Description: Channel is an early intervention program to stop radicalization and recruitment into extremist organizations. This program protects at risk, vulnerable individuals of all ages. It is a multi-agency collective that works together to assess the individual. If the individual is found to be in need of assistance this multi-agency then creates a support package tailored to their specific needs. Support focuses on, but is not limited to, a person's vulnerabilities around health, education, employment or housing, and faith guidance. This program is completely voluntary, an individual must give their consent before the process can begin. Individuals may ask for assistance themselves or be referred to the program through outside sources.

### **Community Action for Preventing Extremism (CAPE)**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter

Offline: Education/informational pamphlets and training for frontline workers

Description: Community Action for Preventing Extremism (CAPE) (formerly known as EXIT White Power) was launched in October 2012. It is one of several initiatives offered by All Together Now, a national, independent, not-for-profit organization dedicated to erasing racism in Australia. CAPE was developed to combat the growing concerns surrounding the extreme far right movement in Australia. Specifically, the radicalization and recruitment of youths in the nation. The main goal of CAPE is to challenge recruitment efforts of white extremist organizations to prevent more young people from becoming involved in white nationalism and white supremacy (part of the extreme far right). Ultimately, white supremacist organizations will become starved of recruits with less far right extremism and hate occurring as a result of this. CAPE has both online and offline elements. Counter-narratives, education, and spread of information are the main tools utilized in the online components while the offline component tends to focus on just the latter two of these with a special focus on delivery to frontline workers. They also employ the use of former white supremacists to share their stories in hopes of averting others from the same journey. CAPE is still active today on all platforms.

### **SAVE Witness of History Project**

Platform(s):

Online: Women Without Borders website, YouTube

Description: The Witness of History Project is implemented by the Women Without Borders platform as part of the SAVE initiatives. This project takes the voices of those people who witnessed extremist/terrorist attacks, creating a network of eyewitnesses, and relays their stories to the broader public via YouTube. It is the goal of this project to act swiftly by showing the eyewitness statements soon after the incidents so as to share another perspective, to offer a narrative other than the news or extremists. The purpose of this program is to promote “reconciliation rather than revenge” (WWB, 2017). By highlighting the real dangers and reality of terrorism this project seeks to provide another pathway for those heading down the extremist path. This project is listed on the WWB website as being underway, however activity can only be found for the year 2012, appearing dormant since that time.

### **STOP Violence! Hotline**

Platform(s):

Offline: Telephone hotline

Description: The STOP Violence hotline is a WWB initiative that has since finished. Created to provide support and counselling to callers, this hotline is toll free and anonymous. This hotline is meant to combat all types of violence through prevention and intervention methods and is not extremism/terrorism specific. It is unclear as to whether or not this hotline is still in existence, though there is no trace of it online.

## **2013**

### **People Against Violent Extremism (PaVE)**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube

Description: PaVE is an independent, non-government organization in Australia. This program works to combat all forms of violent extremism – ideological, political, religious, etc. There are three main goals of this program: 1. Combat violent extremism through

programs and projects, 2. Assist policy makers, 3. Increase awareness about violent extremism in communities. Given these goals, it is acting as both a prevention and intervention program PaVE is sporadically active on all accounts, with only two Facebook posts and retweets this year.

### **Digital Mass Atrocity Prevention Lab (DMAP Lab)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube

Description: DMAP Lab seeks to understand the impact of social media on preventing mass atrocities – extremism included. It is owned and operated by Concordia University within the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. There are five goals outlined on their website:

- Research and analyze key actors and drivers of online extremism and radicalization
- Develop tools and strategies to counter extremists who use social media and other digital technologies as a weapon of war
- Propose policy recommendations to governments, NGOs, UN agencies and other stakeholders
- Provide specialized training and policy advice
- Bring together policymakers, journalists, academics, tech experts, human rights activists and community leaders to create a global network as a force for good (DMAP Lab, 2017).

Their Twitter account is the only online account that is active, posting recent news stories related to extremism in the world. Their personal website, Facebook and YouTube accounts haven't been active since 2016.

### **Think Again, Turn Away**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Tumblr, askfm

Description: The Think Again, Turn Away campaign was developed and launched by the USA State Department in December 2013 (Katz, 2014). According to its Facebook page, Think Again, Turn Away's "... mission is to expose the facts about terrorists and their propaganda. Don't be misled by those who break up families and destroy their true heritage." This program utilizes a broad spectrum of social media platforms in attempts to dispute and undermine extremist information in various ways. One way in which they do this is by engaging extremists in debates (Katz, 2014). More controversially, extremist narratives are also challenged through the posting of satirical mock recruitment videos. One video featured the phrases such as, "Travel is inexpensive because you won't need a return ticket", "useful new skills such as blowing up mosques and crucifying and executing Muslims" (Hansen, 2014). The debut video released by the campaign featured graphic images of the Islamic State (IS) committing atrocities, including beheadings. By highlighting the brutality of IS, the videos was intended to dissuade potential jihadists from joining IS. Think again, turn away was available in English, Arabic, Urdu, and Somali. This program is no longer active under this handle and instead redirect users to the Global Engagement Center's (GEC) website and handles.

## **ViralPeace**

### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook

Offline: Workshops

Description: This program is structured to counteract the appeal of violent extremism on the Internet and social media through the use of counter-narratives. It is a non-governmental program that operates under Muflehun's platform, however it is supported financially by the US State Department. It is marketed as being an "interactive workshop for youth activists, change-makers and young leaders to learn strategies to push back against hate, extremism and violence" (Muflehun, 2017). Participants in this workshop are encouraged to develop their own CVE initiatives online and/or offline, taking advantage of social media platforms and their unique communities that they hail from. Activity for this program has stagnated, the last Facebook post being from fall 2016.

## **Mothers Schools**

Platform(s):

Offline: Workshop and school settings

Description: This initiative is led by WWB who strongly believe mothers are the strongest ally against violent extremism (WWB, 2017). The curriculum trains women to recognize the early signs of radicalization and how to combat them. The Mothers school is set in workshop and/or school settings where mothers come together to share and learn.

Mothers Schools piloted in Kujand, Tajikstan in 2013 and has since been expanded to India (Kashmir), Nigeria, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Zanzibar.

## **2014**

### **Counter Extremism Project (CEP)**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube

Description: CEP combats extremism in three core areas: financial exposure and pressure activities, countering narratives of extremists, and advocating for smart laws, policies, and regulations (CEP, 2017). This indicates that the project is focused both on prevention and intervention of violent extremism. They also provide a current news service, 'Eye on Extremism', that is kept up to date with the most recent information regarding CVE and extremism more generally. It is a non-profit, non-partisan, international organization ran by former world leaders and diplomats. CEP is still active today.

### **Counter Narrative Program**

Platform(s):

Online: Data mining

Description: The Counter Narrative Program is a data mining resource that operates as part of CEP's broader nonprofit organization. Extremist narratives are widely perceived to be strong contributing factors to the radicalization of individuals. These narratives are

widely available on the Internet and social media platforms. CEP's Counter Narrative Program is developing tools to locate and track such narratives and online conversations with extremists. They have also managed to identify formers and others affected by extremist activities through their tracking efforts. Their experts use this information to create proper counter-narratives and to form effective disruption techniques.

### **Project Communitas**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Training webinars

Offline: Resilience training

Description: Project Communitas is a Canada-wide resilience project operated by the larger not-for-profit Canadian Council of Muslim Women and funded for two years by Public Safety Canada. For a period of six months the program engaged seven cities: Montreal, Ottawa, the Greater Toronto Area, London, Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver. The program delivers cross-cultural and cross-religious initiatives, referred to as "resilience training" for youth, that are intended to build community resilience, which in turn combats extremism and radicalization into it. Advisors were selected to attend to and advise on the specific needs of each city. This program ended in 2015 culminating in a final report that is unavailable on their website.

### **#CEP Digital Disruption**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, askfm

Description: This program is part of Counter Extremism Project's larger framework. This is a non-governmental program that is currently active on a daily basis. It identifies, exposes, and reports accounts of extremists to social media authorities to have them shut down. Languages they monitor include: English, Arabic, French, Italian, German, and Turkish. It appears to still be active on all fronts.

### **Abdullah-X**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,

Description: This is an independent, non-governmental program. It targets youth with the use of cartoon character Abdullah-X who can be found on personal website, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and in comics available for purchase online. This male cartoon figure combats extremism. The motto of this character: “Mind of a scholar, heart of a warrior”. The creator of this character is a former extremist who wanted to mirror his own journey from extremist to someone who now hopes to fight the radicalization of youth. Counter-narratives are offered to encourage youth to critically think about contentious issues in today’s world, as well as to dispel myths and prejudices that non-Muslims may have about Islam. The mission is “to safeguard the lives of young people from harm and those who seek to harm them”. The cartoon character explores reasons why youth become involved in extremist activities abroad, eventually deciding that extremism is not the path for him (Simpson, July 14 2014).

**Making a Stand Campaign**

Platform(s):

Online: Hashtag #MakingAStand used on social media platforms

Offline: Charity work, individual projects, roadshow

Description: The Making a Stand campaign is a push for British Muslim women to reclaim their faith by showing resilience against extremism. It was created and operated by Inspire, a human rights awareness organization that was “empowering women, strengthening societies” (Inspire, 2017). They vow to stand against the radicalization and recruitment of their youth into organizations that pervert and twist their religion into something that it is not. This campaign took a roadshow to nine areas in the United Kingdom to start to inspire Muslim women to rise up to the cause, to fight back against extremism. Five goals listed on their website include:

1. Challenge all hatred and extremism and spread the word across social media with #makingastand.
2. Seek to exert our influence in our Mosques and communities.

3. Create local support networks.
4. Help parents identify the signs of radicalization.
5. Defend women's rights, which are always eroded by extremists (Inspire, 2017).

A quick search on the Internet revealed that this campaign is still active as evidenced by the use of the hashtag, #makingastand, on sites such as Twitter and Facebook. While the travelling roadshow promoting this campaign has long since ended, it is clear that the idea and the power behind it has had a lasting effect.

### **CounterExtremism.org**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Data mining resource, Data disseminator

Description: This program is managed by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and funded through support from the Prevention of and Fight Against Crime Programme of the European Union European Commission – Directorate-General Home Affairs. It is meant to operate as a “vehicle for the exchange and dissemination of information among members of the European Policy Planners’ Network on Countering Polarisation and Radicalisation (PPN) as well as other EU and North American ministries” (CounterExtremism.org, 2017). Data available here includes: a repository of government policy and programs, case studies, and best practices as it relates to combatting radicalization. It is currently still active as evidenced by the continuous additions to the website.

### **Safe Spaces Initiative**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Toolkit available for download

Offline: Toolkit, interventions

Description: Muslim Public Affairs Council's Safe Spaces initiative takes a bottom-up community strengthening and public health approach. MPAC is a non-governmental non-profit organization. The Safe Spaces initiative is made up of a toolkit that can be

used within American Muslim communities to help prevent and intervene in radicalization, recruitments, and/or disengagement. It can be utilized as an informative/educational tool that provides background knowledge about extremism, more specifically, the divisive ideologies that play into it. It also provides suggestions on how to aid those that need their help while explaining that it is not always possible to help everyone. MPAC recognizes Muslim communities' resistance to government involvement and provide reasoning for why it is practical as well as a guideline detailing when it is time to involve them. Safe Spaces is a creation done in consultations with CVE and policy experts and is still active today.

## **2015**

### **Sons and Daughters of the World**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Twitter, Facebook

Description: This program's main purpose is to act as an informational and educational tool for parents in the fight against extremism. Their website firmly states that this is not a deradicalization program. It offers an environment where families who have been touched by violent extremist radicalization and/or recruitment can come together. One of their main focuses is to "put pressure on the politicians and authorities to bring awareness on getting the right deradicalization programs out there" (Sons and Daughters of the World, 2017). This is a non-governmental program that appears to be funded through donations on their website. They are also affiliated with Mothers4Life, not to be confused with the aforementioned group, this group is an anti-abortion crusaders organization.

### **Strong Cities Network (SCN)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website

Offline: Conferences/symposiums, working groups

Description: The SCN is a network of mayors, municipal or sub-national level policy makers and practitioners combatting extremism through social cohesion and community resilience (SCN, 2017). This is an ISD initiative. Membership to this network is free, however, they must be one of the aforementioned groupings. There is approximately 85 cities currently enrolled as members with a forecast for this to raise to 200 by the end of 2017 (SCN, 2017)<sup>2</sup>. SCN ascribes to three main fundamental principles:

1. A commitment to address violent extremism in all of its forms
2. A recognition that violent extremism and prevention efforts should not be associated with any particular religion, nationality or ethnic group
3. A commitment to work in partnership with local communities, on an inclusive, collaborative, and non-discriminatory basis and in compliance with international human rights standards (<http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/about/>, 2017).

By connecting cities together, SCN forms a connectedness that facilitates knowledge sharing. It provides an archive of all policy and programs put forth by all members while aiding and empowering them to build their own. It is active today and has been funded, initially by the U.S Department of State, and additionally with funds from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## **One95**

### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube

Description: ONE95 is an online CVE program that operates to provide networking opportunities, education, and funding opportunities for youth. The One95 Youth Innovation fund awards grants to youth who have new and innovative ideas to build a CVE program of their own. The program's reach is far, as their apt name suggests, including all 195 countries in the world today; their slogan is "195 countries, one goal" (ONE95, 2017). Programs can be both prevention and intervention oriented. It is a CEP initiative, making it non-profit and non-governmental. Activity on all sites appears dormant with the newest Facebook post from 2015 and Twitter post from 2016.

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<sup>2</sup> A full list of all members can be found on their website (<http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/strong-cities/>).

## **Campaign Against Violent Extremism (CAVE)**

### Platform(s):

Online: YouTube and BC Muslim Association website

Offline: Group informational sessions that are open to the public

Description: CAVE is a project jointly created by the BC Muslim Association and the RCMP (The BC Muslim Association, 2015). The program is premised on the notion that the misunderstanding of Islam and improper interpretation of religious Islamic texts are key drivers in today's conflicts. In response, the principal goal of this program is to increase the awareness and knowledge of 'mainstream' Islam, offer correct interpretations of Islamic texts, and counter those voices that are offering radical interpretations of Islamic religious doctrine. CAVE delivered three community forums in Surrey and Burnaby, BC, in 2014. Advertised with the tagline "Dare to be Informed" these forums are designed as community educational experiences, as opportunities for members of the public to ask questions and raise their concerns. (The BC Muslim Association, 2015). According to Mufti Assim Rashid, the objectives of CAVE are to deal with the radicalization of youth, to create a preventive campaign to educate Muslims and non-Muslims, and to tackle how non-Muslims feel about Muslims. One of these forums has been made available on Youtube (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgwCXsoWzOQ>). This program is no longer active.

## **Centre for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV)**

### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website

Offline: Conferences, training programs, prevention activities, guides, tools, counselling, telephone help line, psychosocial intervention

Description: CPRLV is a non-profit organization that is supported by the Quebec Government. It consists of a multi-disciplinary team of experts who seek to prevent and intervene upon violent extremism and the radicalization into it. Prevention methods

include several methods. The first is giving presentations on their own research related to the prevention of radicalization. Second, CPRLV offers training programs for frontline workers and administrators with the following objectives in mind:

- To enable participants to understand the characteristics of different types of violent radicalization (right-wing, left-wing, religious and single-cause extremism);
- To permit participants to recognize and understand behaviours and situations contributing to violent radicalization;
- To enable participants to identify risk and protection factors for violent radicalization;
- To teach participants appropriate attitudes, forms of intervention or administrative procedures for dealing with situations involving radicalization (CPRLV, 2017).

Third, prevention activities are offered in the form of public awareness workshops and the continuous updating of the information given. Also available on their website are several guides to help educate and inform on a variety of topics including radicalization, reporting hate crimes, and how to intervene to prevent radicalization. Finally, CPRLV offers a variety of tools to help people recognize and measure the signs of radicalization, including a comic book, 'Radicalishow'. Intervention tactics involve counselling through two methods: an anonymous telephone hotline and psychosocial intervention.

### **Mothers for Life**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, Twitter, Thunderclap

Offline: Not clear if events are coordinated in this manner.

Description: Mothers for Life is a network of mothers who have “experienced violent jihadist radicalization in their own families” (GIRDS, 2017). Children of these mothers have often left for Syria and Iraq, however memberships can include others cases. Mothers of this network hail from Canada, The United States of America, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands, Sweden, and France. It is coordinated by Christianne Boudreau, a mother whose son (Damian Clairmont) died while fighting for the Islamic State in Syria, and Daniel Koehler, a well-known academic who is renowned

for his expertise in countering violent extremism and terrorism. Essentially, this program acts as a support system for these mothers by coordinating activities and counseling members (GIRDS, 2017). This program also allows for the creation of counter-narratives such as 'Open Letter Campaign' and 'Second Open Letter' to combat extremism.

### **Lifecycle Initiative**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Offered as a toolkit and educational resource.

Description: This is an initiative offered by the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Essentially, this initiative exists as a toolkit for use by everyone from the general public to the government and everyone in between. It is a resource to learn more about three main areas on interest or the way to break the "lifecycle" of extremism: prevention of radicalization, detection and intervention against radicalized individuals, and rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalized individuals. It purports to continuously build upon these good practices in countering violent extremism, always providing an up-to-date resource.

### **The Redirect Method**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Redirection of Internet searches

Description: Essentially, the Redirect Method is a way to direct online traffic to multiple advertisements that counter information that is thought to contribute to the radicalization and recruitment of individuals into extremist organizations. When a user types specific pre-determined words into a browser they are temporarily redirected from their intended search. This program, piloted in 2015, used ISIS to test their method, however they note that you could do this with any extremist or terrorist organization. The research phase involves interviewing defectors of the target group, mapping the major narratives, and surveying YouTube for existing videos that are effective in countering those narratives (The Redirect Method, 2017). Next, the selected videos are organized in a manner that would tell a story, so that the advertisement would match with the key word searched. Key words being those that are positive in sentiment towards an extremist/terrorist

organization. The piloted project had two organizations, Moonshot CVE (English version) and Quantum Communications (Arabic version), creating the ads. The ad campaigns have three formats: text, image, and video. During the eight week pilot the Redirect Method reached 320,906 individuals (The Redirect Method, 2017). Reaching meaning that the individual pressed on the advertisement to learn more. This indicates that the method is a good for reaching large masses of people. Whether or not it stops a person from becoming radicalized is not known.

## **Extreme Dialogue**

### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube

Description: Extreme Dialogue falls under the umbrella of being a preventative program because it is looking to build resilience in communities against extremism. It does this by providing educational materials and fostering an environment that encourages healthy discussions regarding extremism. The ultimate aim is to reduce the appeal of extremism to youth. Its various sites provide several short films telling the stories of Canadians who have been affected by violent extremism in some form. Some films tell the story of family members affected by their sons, daughters, sisters, and/or brothers leaving to become an extremist, others tell the stories of victims of violent extremism. This program is active in the UK, Canada, Germany, and Hungary. Resources are available in four languages: English, French, German, and Hungarian. It is co-funded by Public Safety Canada and the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union. Extreme Dialogue is active across all sites and has a strong contingent of followers.

## **Innovation Hub**

### Platform(s):

Online: Counter-narrative product experimenting, measuring, learning and applying

Description: This ISD program aims to produce counter-narrative products for “experimenting, measuring, learning and applying” (ISD, 2017). Products are created through collaborations with activists, former extremists, survivors of extremism, and frontline workers. The ultimate goal of this program is to drown, disrupt and/or

delegitimize extremist messaging. The program is only a pilot and it is not clear if it was continued after this point.

### **One2One Initiative**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Communication between former extremists and people at risk to become radicalized or recruited

Description: The Institute for Strategic Dialogue's One2One initiative facilitates online conversation between former extremists and people at risk to becoming radicalized or recruited. This is meant to be applicable across all ideologies. The pilot initiative was deemed so successful that ISD is now developing a mobile app to serve the same purpose. As of yet there is no such app in existence and the program appears to have been a limited term project.

### **Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter

Offline: Workshops

Description: YouthCAN is an ISD initiative which has brought together over 900 youths from 102 countries to combat violent extremism of all forms through grassroots efforts (YouthCAN, 2017). The program calls for the exchange and sharing of information, allowing for collaborations amongst members to prevent and counter violent extremism. Youth can partake in Innovation Labs wherein they learn how to target audiences, build counter-narratives/persuasive messaging. These two day workshops take place in various countries in the world, most recently in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and is open to young activists between the ages of 18-30. YouthCAN also routinely holds social media campaign contests. Policy reports and toolkits can be found on their main website. All affiliated sites are active.

### **ExitUSA**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube

Offline: Text/telephone hotline

Description: ExitUSA is a CVE program ran under the LIFE AFTER HATE platform. It seeks to disengage people from the white power movement. The team is made up of former white supremacist/far-right movement followers. Given each team member's unique experiences and journeys out of the white power movement, they are aptly placed to be able to offer guidance to those who seek to follow the same path or seek enlightenment. Strategies of this organization include: public awareness campaigns, individualized education and job training, and leveraging community partnerships (ExitUSA, 2017). Their slogan is "No judgement. Just help." (ExitUSA, 2017). ExitUSA is currently active on their Facebook and Twitter accounts, but have not posted on YouTube in over one year.

**Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq**

Platform(s):

Online: Letter distributed in digital form across several social media platforms, Facebook being the most prevalent.

Description:

The 'Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq' campaign launched in June 2015 under the 'Mothers for Life' platform. Essentially, it is an open letter to the "Islamic State" that utilizes counter-narratives to combat the radicalization process. The original letter's structure was designed by the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS) in conjunction with mothers from seven different countries. The letter was distributed across many different media platforms, including the social media giant, Facebook and a PDF version of it is available on the GIRDS website.

**RampOff**

Platform(s):

Online: Email, Facebook, Twitter

Offline: Telephone hotline (1-8555-RAMPOFF)

Description: RampOff runs under the Muflehun platform. It is an alternative to police involvement for friends and family members who suspect a loved one is either becoming radicalized or recruited by an extremist organization. It is purported to be an information and early intervention support service (Muflehun, 2017). There are four key services offered. The first is to listen. At this stage staff is simply listening to what the concerned caller has to say and answering any questions they may have. The second service is to understand and assess the situation involving both the person accessing Rampoff and the Person of Concern. Third is the action plan that involves referrals, intervention strategies, education, or a mixture of all three. Finally, RampOff is there to offer their full support to person accessing them. There has been no activity by this program on Twitter or Facebook accounts since fall 2016.

## **MyHack**

Platform(s):

Offline: 3 day annual conference

Description: MyHack is a PAVE event that brings youth together for three days to actively participate in creating solutions that counter radicalization. The three days are broken into three stages. The first day/stage is “LOOP”, wherein participants learn about radicalization and violent extremism, more broadly. The second day/stage is “HACK”, which involves teams creating and testing their products/solutions. The third day/stage is called “CRACK”. This stage takes place at a fundraiser gala where all teams pitch their products/solutions that are later voted on for the win. MyHack is a preliminary event that first appeared in Perth, Australia in 2015 and second at Monash, Australia in 2016.

## **Countering Extremism Together**

Platform(s):

Online: Quilliam International website, Indigogo

Description: Countering Extremism Together is a campaign that ran for a limited term with the goal of creating a counter-narrative video as the final product. The counter-narrative had three goals: building resilience to extremism, raising awareness of radicalization, and promoting the best way to counter extremism. The campaign ran on a crowd source funding engine, 'Indiegogo' with the goal of raising 25,000 pounds. With 236 backers they managed to raise 17, 324 pounds, 69 percent of their goal (<https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/countering-extremism--2#/>).

### **Peer to Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism Together**

Platform(s):

Offline: Competition for university students

Description: This is a competition for university youth wherein finalists are expected to present their program, campaign, or initiative at a conference at the end of their school term. This initiative is ran by the US State department, managed by EdVenture Partners, and partly supported by Facebook. The rationale behind P2P takes advantage of the fact that propaganda by extremist organizations often target youth, making their unique perspective a valuable resource to more effectively combat the radicalization and recruitment processes. Universities from across the globe partake in this competition. Student teams are expected to work in coordination with a faculty advisor to research and develop an initiative. Each team receives \$2000 USD to produce an initiative. Three team finalists are selected to present their final product to the State Department. These finalists are awarded with scholarships ranging from \$1000 - \$5000 USD and the first prize winner is featured on their website.

## **2016**

### **Moonshot CVE**

Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Twitter

Description: Moonshot CVE is a private sector platform that agencies/governments can hire to create an effective CVE program/campaign/initiative for them using data-proven

techniques. It is made up of a team of experts, each specializing in some area of the countering violent extremism/counter-terrorism realm. These specializations include: digital capacity building, counter-narratives, gender, online radicalization, race, hate groups, law, human rights, marketing, social media, policing, community partnerships, data handling, and mobilizing global networks of former extremists.

### **Solidarity Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) Campaign**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Countering narratives on social media sites with hashtag #SaveCampaign

Offline: Countering Narratives in meetings and workshops

Description: The SAVE campaign was an initiative that ran for a six month duration. It is a joint effort through AWWWS and EdVenture Partners. It utilized the efforts of active girls who stood against violent extremism in their communities. These members were encouraged to share on social media and in person: messages, pictures, videos, posters. They were also encouraged to collaborate with other members to increase awareness of their fight against violent extremism. The campaign had seven goals, including: research, creation of informational videos, hold awareness sessions and workshops, organize competitions for youth to compete in to show support against violent extremism, create and get signatures on an awareness pledge, and promote all activities online (AWWS, 2017). The SAVE campaign operated as a preventative measure against extremism that has now been completed.

### **Operation 250 (OP 250)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal Website, Facebook, Twitter

Description: OP 250 is an online program that seeks to educate children, parents, and teachers on violent extremism, the dangers of online rhetoric, and online safety. It acts as a preventative measure, countering extremism by safeguarding youth against extremist radicalization/recruitment tactics. The program's name comes from an estimation that more than 250 Americans left to become foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria

(OP 250, 2017). OP 250 is routinely active on all platforms. The program is non-profit and a part of the larger FATE network.

### **Don't be a Puppet**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website

Description: Don't be a Puppet is an initiative developed and launched by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in consultation with community leaders and other partners. Utilizing a website, the aim of the program is to engage and educate youth on the often deceptive realities of violent extremism. The site has five main sections that utilize quizzes and videos amongst other interactive materials: 1. What is Violent Extremism 2. Why do people become violent extremists? 3. What are known violent extremist groups? 4. How do violent extremists make contact? 5. Who do violent extremists affect? Once youths have worked through these sections they are prompted to a final section – Where to get help – where upon completion they receive an FBI certificate that they can sign and keep. These certificates are then used as a metric to determine how many people the program has reached. Parents and community leaders are also encouraged to use the cite to both learn and be a role model to youth, so they may be encouraged to engage with the program.

### **Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Personal website, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube

Description: FATE is a community of organizations from across Europe and North Africa whose ultimate aim is “to be there for each other” (findfate, 2017). By keeping families together they are putting up a stronghold against hateful ideologies. FATE hosts events and helps to build and run CVE campaigns. This community works with any charity or organization wanting to start their own fight against extremism. Their sites also serve as informational and educational tools for those wishing to learn more about the radicalization process and spotting the signs thereof. There is a focus on Daesh,

otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, however they do not claim exclusivity to this particular hateful ideology. This program is fully active and shows no signs of stagnation.

### **Online Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI)**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook

Description: OCCI is a program available online that is challenging hate speech and extremism. The main tenet of this program is strong engagement. Without engagement you have a shell of a program, but with engagement you have a powerful force with which to combat extremism. OCCI joins people from the broader public, academia, and politics together to combine all of their experiences into this multifaceted weapon. With hopes of reforming extremist views OCCI is committed to: providing online support for NGO's working towards similar goals, developing best practices for responding to extremism online, and assisting in research efforts looking to better understand counter-narratives (OCCI, 2017). OCCI is founded by ISD, ICSR, the Amadeau Antonio Foundation, and Facebook. This effort is still active, showing no signs of losing momentum.

### **Second Open Letter**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Letter distributed in digital form across several social media platforms, Facebook being the most prevalent.

Description: This letter is a follow-up to the previously distributed "Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq". As a result of the first letter, it is purported that many mothers were threatened, attacked, and murdered in extreme cases for trying to extricate their children from ISIS' grasp or prohibit them from joining the organization. The Mothers for Life Network retaliated with another letter addressed to the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This letter is available in English, Arabic, French, Urdu, Russian, and Turkish. Like the first letter, it too can be found on various social media platforms and the GIRDS website.

## **The Stories Campaign**

### Platform(s):

Online: YouTube

Description: The Stories Campaign is part of a larger initiative called 'Own Your Brain'. Own Your Brain focuses on "exposing the how, when, where and why we can be manipulated" (Own Your Brain, 2017). Ex-Moonie<sup>3</sup>, Diane Benscoter, created the 'Stories Campaign' to take away the power of extremists. This campaign harnesses the power of former extremists' stories by filming interviews with them and posting them to YouTube for viewers. The hope is that these stories may inspire others to disengage from extremist organizations. This campaign sporadically adds new interviews.

## **Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program**

### Platform(s):

Offline: Frontline prison personnel, such as prison wardens, officers, assessment and intervention staff, counselors, and religious leaders are given a series of targeted trainings, capacity building, and ongoing support.

Description: CVE-P is a program designed to educate and aid frontline workers in identifying signs of radicalization/recruitment and giving them tools to be able to combat this. Frontline workers undergo four days of intense training that has three main goals, including: 1. Identifying challenges in the management of terrorist prisoners, complete with an understanding how what radicalization and recruitment are as well as how to address it; 2. Sharing of "good practices", i.e., what does and does not work, in managing these cases; 3. Changing processes, practices, and policies to deal with these inmates. The Global Center aims to provide ongoing support as needed. A pre/post test is administered as an effort evaluate their efforts. This program is currently funded by Australia, United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It is being piloted in Kenya and Indonesia, with hope to move into several other countries.

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<sup>3</sup> A Moonie is a member of the Unification Church.

## 2017

### **Hopeful Operation to Prevent Extremism (HOPE) Campaign**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Facebook, raising awareness of their goals on social media sites using the hashtag #HOPECampaign

Offline: Workshops

Description: The HOPE campaign is an initiative that is running for a six month duration, ending in July, 2017. This is a joint venture between AWWWS and EdVenture Partners. This campaign is meant to capture the active efforts of girls who stand against violent extremism. The target audience for this initiative are the “silent majority”, those who are illiterate or reside in a “backward area”, and at risk youth (AWWS, 2017). Workshops tackle a different topic every day in an effort to increase awareness surrounding violent extremism. It is the mission of this campaign to prevent the radicalization and recruitment of these persons. Other goals include: conducting awareness of violent extremism to the general population, organizing a picture competition to combat extremism, taking pledges to encourage people to counter extremism, and interview people about opinions relating to their findings on violent extremism.

### **Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program A Community-Led Local Framework**

#### Platform(s):

Online: Social media campaigns.

Offline: Youth programming, mentoring opportunities, higher education scholarships, school and community-based intervention models, youth/Imam engagement, employment opportunities, and enhanced community engagement.

Description: This program, still in its infancy, is currently in the implementation stage – thus, is not fully active. It is meant to combat potential recruitment efforts of the youth in the growing Somali community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. This framework is born of

several meetings with the community members such as religious leaders, elders, women, mothers, business leaders, attorneys, law enforcement, youth, social workers, and victims of recruiting. These meetings identified eight key root causes for radicalization/recruitments as: disaffected youth, lack of connection to religious leaders, difficulties in school, lack of economic opportunity, identity crisis, lack of ties to broader Minnesota community, generational divide, and lack of social opportunity. This led to an action plan including offline and online efforts (as listed above) that are now being implemented.

## Chapter 5. Results

This chapter is intended to show the findings at an aggregate level. It begins by giving a snapshot of the overall CVE landscape for the study. Program status, type of program, governing body of programs, targets of programs, program delivery methods and measures, and programs tactics used are explored. Next, active and inactive programs are juxtaposed and compared on the aforementioned descriptives. Together, the analysis of the overall CVE landscape and the juxtaposition of the active and inactive programs, allow for themes to develop that are more fully expanded upon in the chapter that follows.

### A Snapshot of the Overall CVE Landscape 1998-2017

Overall, this study consists of 67 programs, campaigns, and initiatives from around the globe. The inception periods range from 1998 to April 2017 (Table 1). CVE programs within this study begin to appear in the 1990s, however, it is not until the mid to late 2000s that a real influx of these programs can be seen (Figure 1). From 2000 to 2006 a steady rise occurs before plateauing for a few years (Figure 1). Finally, a steep incline is found, peaking in 2015 (Figure 1). While this study only includes data into the first quarter of 2017, two new programs are already present at this time. It is interesting to note that many of these programs have an international origination (N=27), meaning that they do not belong to any one particular country but have strong affiliations across multiple countries on at least two continents. The next largest contingency of programs occurs in the United States of America (N=11), followed by Canada and the United Kingdom (N=5).


**Table 1: CVE Program Summary**

Program	Year of Inception	Country
Exit Sweden	1998	Sweden
EXIT Deutschland	2000	Germany
Re-education Prison for Jihadists	2003	Saudi Arabia
Sakinah Campaign	2008	Saudi Arabia
Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)	2008	International
Global Survivors Network	2009	International

Life After Hate	2009	USA
Pakistan Terrorism Survivors Network	2009	Pakistan
SAVE Blog	2009	International
Eretz Shalom	2010	West Bank
Muflehan	2010	United States of America
Samputo Forgiveness Campaign	2010	Rwanda
Mothers MOVE!	2010	International
Schools Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)	2010	India
The Women's Dialogue	2010	International
HAYAT-Deutschland	2011	Germany
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)	2011	Europe
Against Violent Extremism	2011	International
Youth Online and at Risk	2011	Canada
Mothers for Change	2011	International
Terrorism and Radicalization (TerRa)	2012	Europe
The Channel Program	2012	United Kingdom
Community Action Preventing Extremism (CAPE)	2012	Australia
SAVE Witness of History Project	2012	International
STOP Violence! Hotline	2012	Yemen
People Against Violent Extremism (PAVE)	2013	Australia
Digital Mass Atrocity Prevention Lab	2013	Canada
Think Again Turn Away	2013	United States of America
Viral Peace	2013	United States of America
Mothers Schools	2013	International
Counter Extremism Project	2014	International
Counter Narrative Program	2014	International
Project Communitas	2014	Canada
#CEP Digital Disruption	2014	International
Abdullah-X	2014	United Kingdom
Making A Stand	2014	United Kingdom
CounterExtremism.org	2014	International
Safe Spaces Initiative	2014	USA
Sons and Daughters of the World	2015	International
Strong Cities Network	2015	International
ONE95	2015	International
Campaign Against Violent Extremism (CAVE)	2015	Canada
Centre for prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence	2015	Canada
Mothers for Life	2015	International
Lifecycle Initiative	2015	International
The Redirect Method	2015	International
Extreme Dialogue	2015	International
Innovation Hub	2015	International
One to One Initiative	2015	International
Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN)	2015	International
Exit USA	2015	United States of America
Open Letter to our sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq	2015	International
Ramp Off	2015	United States of America
My Hack	2015	Australia

Countering Extremism Together	2015	United Kingdom
Peer to Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism Together	2015	International
Moonshot CVE	2016	United Kingdom
Solidarity Against Violent Extremism Campaign	2016	Pakistan
Operation 250	2016	United States of America
Don't be a puppet	2016	United States of America
Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE)	2016	International
Online Civil Courage Initiative	2016	Europe
Second Open Letter	2016	International
The Stories Campaign	2016	United States of America
Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program	2016	International
Hopeful Operation to Prevent Extremism	2017	Pakistan
Building Community Resilience	2017	United States of America

**Figure 1: CVE Programs 1998 - 2017**



Programs in this study have fairly consistent longevity. Of the 67 programs in the sample, 50 of those, or 73 percent, are still active today (Table 2). The other 27 percent have either been discontinued, operating on a heavily reduced basis, are completely dormant, or operated on a predetermined time frame that has since ended (Table 2).

**Table 2: CVE Program Status**

Program Status	Frequency	Percent (%)
Active	50	73.1
Reduced Activity	1	1.5
Operated on a predetermined time frame that has since ended	6	9
Dormant, but not officially discontinued	6	10.4
Discontinued	4	6
Total	67	100

Three of the four main streams or types of CVE programs are found in this study, as well as evidence of a fifth new stream (Table 3) (Figure 2). As previously mentioned, repression programs are not represented in this sample. For those types that are represented, many programs do not fall exclusively into one of them. In fact, many have elements of one or more of these types. As such, these program types should be considered fluid. For example, 25 programs in this sample have elements of both prevention and intervention programs present simultaneously. This intermingling or fluidity of the types is becoming more prevalent through the years. Of the 18 programs created in 2015 nearly half of those have elements of both prevention and intervention occurring at once.

Prevention elements are found in approximately 84 percent of the sample programs, indicating a clear preference around the globe for this type of programming. Intervention elements, having a disengagement or deradicalization focus, are present in approximately half of the sample. Rehabilitation programs are not new, but are relatively rare in this sample. These programs also fall under the auspices of intervention programs, the difference being that these are intervention programs that are administered after they have been arrested or imprisoned. Although these are rare in this sample, two of the three have only recently been created.


Finally, a new breed of program is developing. This program type doesn't fit neatly into any of the other types, though it does specialize in building them. This program type is the 'Program for Hire'. The Program for Hire boasts the ability to build programs that are both effective and evaluable. They have staff specializing in various areas of CVE such as building counter-narratives, educational/informational resources, and training regiments, to name a few. Governments and non-government organizations

that are in need or want of developing a program can simply hire these programs to do it for them. While not a traditional type of CVE program, i.e., working directly with at risk or radicalized individualized, they offer a potential solution to much of the problems or pitfalls associated with CVE programming today.

**Table 3: Type of CVE Program**

Type of Program	Frequency	Percent (%)
Prevention	56	83.6
Intervention	35	52.2
Rehabilitation	3	4.5
Prevention & Intervention	25	37.3
Program for Hire	3	4.5

**Figure 2: Types of CVE Programs 1998-2017**




In terms of governing bodies, an overwhelming majority of the sample programs (88%) were created and run by non-government entities (Table 4) (Figure 3).

Governments created or assisted in the creation of only 12 of the programs in the sample, while four of the programs were joint creations by governments and non-governments. While few of the programs have been directly created by governments, just over one quarter of them have been backed by government funding.

**Table 4: Governing Body of Program**

Governing Body	Frequency	Percent (%)
Government	12	17.9
Non-Government	59	88.1
Both Government & Non-Government	4	6
Government Funded	18	26.9

**Figure 3: Governing Body of Program 1998-2017**




Much of the literature surrounding radicalization tends to discuss the ‘at risk youth’ factor, so we would expect to see more of these programs geared specifically towards this category of individuals. Surprisingly, however, the majority of this sample does not have any particular target focus (Table 5). In fact, as the data climbs to its peak in 2015, a clear trend can be seen wherein no target is the preferred approach.

However, supporting this recent movement concerning ‘at risk youth’, the climb to the peak in 2015 also shows that favor is building towards youth oriented programs. Seven programs having a youth focus occur in the peak year alone. This suggests that programs are hoping to target the general public en masse rather than cater to one age group over the other.

**Table 5: Targets of Program**

Targets	Frequency	Percent (%)
Youth	22	32.8
Adult	7	10.4
No Target	44	65.7

**Figure 4: Targets of CVE Programs 1998-2017**



Program delivery methods are not widely varied. Over three quarters of the sample employs online methods and just over half of the sample employs offline methods (Table 6). This is interesting in and of itself because it justifies the utility of both of these programs in combatting this issue. Also interesting to note is that 24 of those programs are a hybrid of the two, meaning they have elements available in both online and offline forms. Offline delivery methods are highly varied including: focus groups,

conferences, concerts, competitions, education camps, to name a few. The offline methods are almost never listed explicitly and are often presupposed from the contextual circumstances found in their descriptions.


Online delivery methods are much more streamlined and easier to document than offline efforts. The online delivery method most widely utilized is social media, which can be found in 37 of the programs. Of the social media platforms, Facebook is the most popular choice at 41.8 percent of the sample. However, more times than not programs will utilize multiple social media platforms. The three largest (Facebook, Youtube, Twitter) are documented in this study, but others such as Pinterest, askfm, LinkedIN, and Tumblr are also present in some programs. Personal websites also hold a formidable presence here at 47.8 percent of the sample. This is hardly surprising given the far reach social media and the Internet hold in today’s world. Given the relatively small portion of people that will become radicalized and/or recruited into terrorist organizations, the Internet offers resources to those areas that may not have offline programming available to them.

Finally, while the study shows that 91 percent of the sample uses positive measures as their primary resource, negative measures continue to be present. Some of these negative measures are still focusing on the find, report, shut down method; however, others are using a filtering method that redirects to a positive measure. One has to wonder if the effectiveness of negative measures can be improved upon if they are used in concertation with positive measures.

**Table 6: Program Delivery Methods and Measures**

Delivery Methods & Measures	Frequency	Percent (%)
Online	56	83.6
• Social Media	37	55.2
➤ Facebook	28	41.8
➤ Twitter	25	37.3
➤ YouTube	19	28.4
• Personal Website	32	47.8
Offline	35	52.2
Both Online & Offline	24	35.8
Positive	61	91
Negative	5	7.5

**Figure 5: Online Delivery Methods of CVE Programs**



There are 16 distinct tactics within this sample (Table 7) (Figure 6). These tactics are present in programs from 3 to 55 percent of the time (Table 7). Figure 6 reveals that programs begin using very few of these tactics, but as the programs mature a steady increase in the addition of these tactics is noticeable. Further, many of these programs utilize several of these tactics at once, taking a ‘hit them with everything we’ve got’ approach, which is particularly evident since 2014. Some tactics may appear to be used only minimally, but that may be because they have only recently become a CVE tactic, or because they are unique and require mentioning. For instance, forgiveness is not a traditional tactic that is seen in counter-terrorism efforts but it is present in two programs within this sample. Another is the use of anonymous email and phone hotlines (Figure 9). This use of anonymous lines has only recently entered the CVE arena in 2011 and has only gained support since its inception.

A tactic that is present in the majority of programs is social media. This is the only delivery method that can also be considered as a tactic. It is because of social


media’s viral nature and its ability to engage individuals across various platforms and walks of life that it can be conceived of as a tactic. Social media can be used with many of the other tactics. For example, to disseminate informational pamphlets (the next widely used tactic) or personal knowledge.

Voices make up a prominent portion of the tactics found, including: narratives, use of formers, use of survivors, and use of females. Figures 7 through 9 indicate the varying degrees to which these voices have been present throughout the years. While use of formers and survivors appear to be used intermittently, female voices and narratives hold a relatively steady presence. Voices, while sometimes used alone, are often used in connection with community involvement to strengthen resolve against extremism. Community involvement is present in nearly half of the programs and is the most commonly used tactic, outside of social media, in the peak years from 2014-2017. This indicates a movement towards community resilience and understanding.


**Table 7: Program Tactics**

Program Tactic	Frequency	Percent (%)
Social Media	37	55.2
Email/Telephone Hotline	5	7.5
Educational	27	40.3
Informational	34	50.7
Counter-Narratives	21	31.3
Narratives	13	19.4
Counselling	15	22.4
Use of Formers	8	11.9
Use of Survivors	6	9
Community Involvement	30	44.8
Training to Frontline Workers	13	19.4
Research & Data Mining	22	32.8
Family Involvement	14	20.9
Forgiveness	2	3
Female Voices / Empowerment	14	20.9
Competition	6	9


**Figure 6: A Collective Look at the Tactics used by CVE Programs at Inception**




**Figure 7: Part I: Tactics used by CVE Programs at Inception**



**Figure 8: Part II: Tactics used by CVE Programs at Inception**



**Figure 9: Part III: Tactics used by CVE Programs at Inception**



### Active Programs versus Failed, Inactive and Discontinued Programs

The majority of the sample, 50 programs, are considered active today (Appendix A). Active programs span the entire time span of the study, as well as several countries. This is in contrast to 11 programs declared as failed, inactive, or discontinued (Appendix B). For the purposes of this section all failed, inactive, and discontinued programs are aggregated and referred to as inactive. All of these inactive programs came into inception after 2009, with the largest exodus occurring between the years 2014-2015. Although many of the programs have an international origin, the United States and Canada also share a substantial portion of these programs.

The types of programs (i.e., prevention, intervention, rehabilitation, and repression) in active versus inactive programs are distinct from each other in various ways, however only a couple of these findings are of interest. First, all of the rehabilitation programs and programs for hire are currently considered active. While this

is thought-provoking, it should be noted that there are very few of these programs (N=6) in the entire sample. Further, the programs for hire are all relatively new, so moving forward they should be continuously observed and analyzed for any changes or failure. Another finding requiring attention is that all failed programs are found to have elements of prevention in them, whereas only 72 percent have intervention elements (Table 8). Curiously, six of those eight programs with intervention elements are actually part of the joint prevention and intervention efforts. This suggests that only two of the programs with pure intervention elements have been declared failed, become inactive, or discontinued.

While the majority of this sample's governing bodies are non-governmental organizations, there are still some notable differences between active and inactive programs. Most programs that have some government affiliation, i.e., are government run, government funded, or program run in coordination with government and non-government, are still active. In fact, nearly all of the inactive programs were run by non-governmental entities (Table 9)

There is little to note in regards to the differences between program targets other than the fact that very few of the programs that have a specific target in mind, i.e., youth or adult, later become inactive (Table 9). This could be an indication of target specific programming being more effective than those meant for the population at large. However, this could also be indicative of deeper issues within the program's contextualization and tactics.

There are no significant findings to note in relation to a program's delivery method. There is a healthy majority of active and inactive programs utilizing online methods with the highest failure being noted in those programs using social media. What is most remarkable in this section is the sustainability of those programs using negative measures. This is contrary to recent findings questioning the effectiveness of such measures (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Hussain & Saltman, 2014). What is not shown in Table 8 is that two of the four programs using these negative measures are simultaneously using positive measures.

Finally, program tactics utilized in active versus inactive programs requires some discussion. The tactics most commonly present in active programs are informational (54%), educational (50%), and community involvement (42%). This gives credence to

Ghosh et al's (2016) argument for the need and support for educational/ informational programming. Where this data sends mixed signals is when inactive program tactics are taken into consideration. In particular wherein it is found that 36.3 percent of those programs that are deemed inactive use informational tactics. Further causing some concern is the fact that community involvement is found in 45.5 percent of inactive programs. While the sample of inactive programs is relatively small compared to active programs, these findings still have merit.

**Table 8: Descriptives of Active Programs**

Type of Program	Frequency	Percent (%)
Prevention	40	80
Intervention	28	56
Prevention & Intervention	20	40
Rehabilitation	3	6
Program for Hire	3	6
<b>Governing Body of Program</b>		
Government	10	20
Non-Government	43	86
Government & Non-Government	3	6
Government Funded	14	28
<b>Target of Program</b>		
Youth	17	34
Adult	7	14
No Target	31	62
<b>Program Delivery Methods &amp; Measures</b>		
Online	41	82
• Social Media	27	54
• Facebook	21	42
• Twitter	20	40
• YouTube	14	28
• Personal Website	25	50
Offline	27	54
Both Online & Offline	18	36
Positive Measure	45	90
Negative Measure	4	8
<b>Program Tactic</b>		
Email/Telephone Hotline	3	6
Educational	25	50
Informational	27	54
Counter-Narratives	15	30
Narratives	10	20
Counselling	12	24
Use of Formers	7	14
Use of Survivors	5	10
Community Involvement	21	42
Training to Frontline Workers	12	24
Research & Data Mining	18	36
Family Involvement	13	26
Forgiveness	1	2
Female Voices / Empowerment	9	18
Competition	3	6

N=50; 74.6% of sample

**Table 9: Descriptives of Failed and Inactive Programs**

Type of Program	Frequency	Percent (%)
Prevention	11	100
Intervention	8	72.7
Prevention & Intervention	6	54.5
Rehabilitation	0	0
Program for Hire	0	0
<b>Governing Body of Program</b>		
Government	2	18.2
Non-Government	10	91
Government & Non-Government	1	9.1
Government Funded	4	36.3
<b>Target of Program</b>		
Youth	2	18.2
Adult	0	0
No Target	9	81.8
<b>Program Delivery Methods &amp; Measures</b>		
Online	10	91
• Social Media	9	81.8
• Facebook	7	63.6
• Twitter	5	45.5
• YouTube	6	54.5
• Personal Website	6	54.5
Offline	6	54.5
Both Online & Offline	4	36.3
Positive Measure	10	91
Negative Measure	0	0
<b>Program Tactic</b>		
Email/Telephone Hotline	2	18.2
Educational	1	9.1
Informational	4	36.3
Counter-Narratives	4	36.3
Narratives	2	18.2
Counselling	2	18.2
Use of Formers	0	0
Use of Survivors	1	9.1
Community Involvement	5	45.5
Training to Frontline Workers	0	0
Research & Data Mining	2	18.2
Family Involvement	1	9.1
Forgiveness	1	9.1
Female Voices / Empowerment	3	27.3
Competition	1	9.1

N= 11; 16.4% of sample

## Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter seeks to more fully explore ideas initialized in the results section and offer insights into the future directions of CVE programming. I begin by developing themes from the aggregated results section and incorporating more specific examples into these themes using the program descriptions previously discussed. From this information conclusions can be drawn as to the trajectory of CVE and predictions made regarding its future. The chapter concludes with some discussion about the study's limitations and possible future directions.

### The Changing Nature of CVE Programming

#### *Thinking twice about prevention?*

The results signal that problems may lie within the prevention elements of programs and a deeper analysis of these is required. The evidence suggests that some of these preventative programs may have been shut down in favor of newer programs, or perhaps that they did not maintain their attractiveness or support. For example, all of the inactive WWB initiatives – *SAVE blog*, *the Women's Dialogue*, and *SAVE Witness of History Project* – are some of the earliest efforts of this particular platform. All appear to have been popular at their time of inception, however, this dwindled over time as the platform introduced newer efforts. This is also true of the programs that are using social media; upon inception there is frequent posting, but over time less posts are made and less people like these posts until they stop completely.

Other inactive prevention based programs have failed in their tactical choices. For example, *Think Again, Turn Away* has been highly criticized for their misuse and improper creation of counter-narratives (Katz, 2014). Braddock and Horgan (2016) stress the importance of creating these counter-narratives properly and warn against the use of poorly constructed narratives or misusing these because of the ill effects they could have. This suggests that poor construction and utilization of tactics could be causing these programs to fail.

The data gives no indication that the popularity in prevention programs is slowing; in fact, the trajectory suggests that they are the most popular program types

and will remain so moving forward. Keeping this in mind, policy makers and program designers alike should tread carefully given the rate of failure found in this study. This is not to say that these programs have no place in CVE. On the contrary, the data from the active programs also tells us that preventative programs and the tactics used in them can be sustainable over long periods of time. Further, the literature tells us that CVE programs in general make the public feel safer (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Brett et al, 2015; AAN Associates, 2014; Hirschfield et al, 2012; USAID, 2013). What will be important is that these programs be created using proven techniques, as not all preventative efforts are made equal.

### ***The cavalry is coming: programs for hire***

The data point toward a new CVE programming type – programs for hire. These programs are equipped with teams of experts in various areas of counter-terrorism that can provide their services of building CVE programs to governmental and non-governmental organizations alike. *Moonshot CVE*, for example, boasts experts in digital capacity building, counter-narratives, gender, online radicalization, race, hate groups, law, human rights, marketing, social media, policing, community partnerships, data handling, and mobilizing global networks of former extremists (<http://moonshotcve.com/>). This means that these programs are built using the latest techniques and knowledge surrounding radicalization theory and CVE. In theory, these programs should be both effective and sustainable.

These programs come at an ideal time, following a recent clamoring for effective and measurable CVE programming. While CVE programming makes up only a small portion of counter-terrorism budgets (Romaniuk, 2015), unless these programs can be proven effective the money would likely be filtered to more proven measures. Given the expertise necessary to run one of these programs it is unlikely that an influx of these type of programs will be seen in the future. However, there is a very good chance that organizations will take advantage of the knowledge and experience afforded to them in such a program. Thus, we should expect to see more programs grounded in theory and proven practices in the future.

## ***Supporting the cause***

There is evidence that governmental projects have better sustainability than non-governmental programs. This could be a result of both power and money dynamics. Berger (2016) cited lack of funding and staff as being key reasons why programs fail. It would seem logical that governments have more resources readily available to them. Whereas non-governmental bodies often have to fundraise, ask for donations, or use crowdfunding. *Countering Extremism Together* used Indiegogo, a crowdfunding website, to fund the production of their counter-narrative film (<https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/countering-extremism-together--2#/>). Likewise *Sons and Daughters of the World* accept donations directly on their website (<http://sonsanddaughtersoftheworld.com/>).

There is evidence in our sample that governments are beginning to fund more of these non-governmentally created and run programs. Perhaps governments should continue along this path given the findings that programs delivered by non-governmental agencies have more success (Briggs & Feve, 2013; USAID, 2013; Hirschfield et al, 2012). However, this does not mean that there is no place for governmentally created programs. Thus, the status quo of a programs created separately by governmental and non-governmental agencies is expected to continue, albeit with more funding funneled to non-governmental programs from governments.

## ***The comeback or persistence of negative measures? A hybrid approach***

Despite recent findings questioning the use of negative measures and the preferred movement towards the utilization of positive measures, the persistence of programs utilizing negative measures, as well as new programs using these methods, is evident. More traditional uses of negative measures, i.e., the filtering, blocking, and/or shutting down of extremist content, are evident in programs such as *#CEP Digital Disruption*, *Counter Narrative Program*, and *Innovation Hub*. Recently, a more interesting approach to negative measures is being utilized. This approach involves the redirection of an individual's search engine to more appropriate content. For example, if an individual is searching for content considered to be pro-ISIS they would be redirected to content such as a video of a survivor's story or a counter-narrative giving evidence based knowledge surrounding the proper practices and teachings of Islam.

The *Redirect Method* is the primary program head-spearheading this approach and boast both its efficiency and effectiveness (<https://redirectmethod.org/>). *Community Action for Preventing Extremism* is a user of this method and also find it an effective service (<http://cape.alltogethernow.org.au/>). While this is ultimately a negative measure approach it is more aptly considered a hybrid approach of both negative and positive measures because of the content to which the viewer is redirected. Curiously, this method is only currently being used in one other program in our sample. This becomes not as curious once one considers that programs hoping to utilize this service must go through multiple steps, some requiring a significant amount of knowledge surrounding counter-terrorism tactics, to be able to make it operational. Because of these difficulties and restrictions it is hard to gauge whether or not this will pick up traction. However, given its acclaimed success it is likely this will become more prevalent in future.

### ***Save our youth***

There is a movement towards programs targeting specific individuals, more specifically, towards programs targeting youth. The data shows a modest progression in these programs before spiking in 2015. It is at this time that there is a big push in educational, competition, and unique informational based tactics. *Don't be a Puppet* is a prime example of an active program using educational tactics. Youth are encouraged to use the websites interactive tools to learn about extremism and the dangers therein. Information is given in videos and written format wherein a quiz is taken after each section and a printable certificate awarded upon completion of the entire program (<https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html>).

Competition-based programs encourage youth to join the fight against extremism by building CVE programs of their own. It has been acknowledged in literature that youth hold a unique position to counter extremism given that many of these organizations are targeting those individuals (Ghosh et al, 2016). These are often done in group projects and presented at a conference at the end of a school semester wherein cash prizes are awarded to the top projects. *Peer to Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism Together*, and *My Hack* are two of the most prominent examples of these programs.

The use of comic books geared towards youth as an informational tactic is also gaining traction. *Abdullah-X* is the original cartoon character used to tell a former's story to and from extremism (Simpson, July 14 2014). A recent effort includes Canada's

*Centre for Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence's* own comic titled 'Radicalishow', meant to teach youth about radicalization and extremism. Only time will tell how effective these efforts are. This only strengthens an argument for the expectation of more youth focused programs in the future.

### ***Throwing it all at the wall***

When CVE programming first showed up it utilized a smaller proportion of tactics that is currently being used today. In particular, we found an explosion surrounding the years 2014 – 2016. Not surprisingly, this occurred just as clamoring for evaluation and a need to know what is and is not working in CVE programming came about. This created a 'throw it all at the wall and see what sticks' approach in the CVE realm. This era brought with it several tactics not formerly utilized or rarely seen, such as: forgiveness, frontline worker training, counselling for at risk and radicalized individuals and their family members, narratives, phone/email hotlines, research/data mining, and competitions for youth. It is expected until a more stable CVE programming environment is formed, i.e., knowing 'best practices' that this approach of using several tactics in one program will continue.

### ***The mother load***

Holding a steady presence are programs using female roles. In particular, those using mothers to combat extremism. Women hold a special and unique positions within households, having a 'motherly bond' with children; a connection that may have unique power to halt or reverse the extremist's pull. Many mothers nowadays are speaking out with their individual stories. Christianne Boudreau lost her son to extremist's who were able to radicalize and tempt him over to Syria to fight for ISIS where he died, now dedicates herself to several of these efforts. *Extreme Dialogue* is a program that resulted out of her efforts and she is also connected to GIRDS' *Mothers for Life*. Other initiatives include the two 'Open letter' campaigns, *Open Letter to our Sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq* and *Second Open Letter*. These programs will exist for as long as extremist's continue to target sons and daughters; these programs will only continue to build momentum as the terrorist threat increases.

### ***It takes a village...or not***

Community involvement is a tactic prevalent in both active and inactive programs. This could be indicative of problems within the communities themselves or within the programs and the specifics community involvement techniques being used. Some communities may not have the resources available to them to properly integrate the community involvement part of the program, or communities may not be willing to work with individuals already radicalized because of the perceived threat. Unfortunately, there is little to no information offered about specific communities within the programs themselves, but an analysis of community efforts in inactive programs can be done.

*Campaign Against Violent Extremism* is a program jointly created by the BC Muslim Association and the RCMP that is now inactive (The BC Muslim Association, 2015). This program operated three community forums wherein discussion centered on the proper teachings and interpretations of Islam. They invited persons of all faiths and nationalities to partake in the sessions. This program faded away after these three forums and little is known as to why this occurred. *People Against Violent Extremism* is an Australian program that sought to combat extremism in communities by increasing awareness of extremism (<http://www.pave.net.au/>). It is clear that further studies are required to understand the specific dynamics that led to the failure of these programs. It is expected that community involvement will continue to be used in programs until more can be known surrounding these failures.

## **Final Thoughts**

It would appear that the end is not near for CVE programming, in fact, recent movements indicate that there is much life left in these endeavors. New life is particularly evident as we move towards more evidence-based and technique proven programming. Programs providing services from CVE experts to build programs for organizations offer assurances that future programs will not only be evaluable, but also using the most up to date, data proven techniques to combat extremism. The future of CVE programming appears bright. The fight to save our youth has now began in earnest and shows signs of continuing. A place will continue to exist for both government and non-government created and run programs in the CVE realm. Negative measures, or rather a hybrid measure using negative measures and positive measures has made it appearance and

has been found effective. Whether or not this hybrid model will continue is yet to be seen, but a best guess is 'yes'. The number of tactics used within each program as well as the types of tactics is expected to continue to grow until more is known regarding their effectiveness, which will be able to be analyzed given that newer programs are being created with evaluation in mind. Finally, programs using mothers to combat extremism are expected to remain in place until the terrorist threat minimizes significantly or stops. Overall, a revival and improvement of CVE programming is evidenced in their individual contextualization's and aggregate trajectories.

## Limitations and Future Directions

First and foremost that needs addressing is the fact that this database is not exhaustive. Related to this lack of an exhaustive list is the small sample size (N=67). While every effort was made to include as many CVE programs as possible there were specific barriers that prohibited this. The most prominent of which are data availability and language barriers. Because extremism and terrorism are global problems it should be expected that some information not be available to the public and/or not be available in English. Further contributing to this issue is the constant creation and destruction programs. New programs are especially difficult to keep track of as these efforts are not always well known when first starting out. Destructed or failed programs often disappear without a trace. For example, when program gathering initially began for this thesis there were several more programs noted, however by the time coding began they were gone. For example the *Abdullah-X* program had a female counterpart program, *Muslimah-X*, that later disappeared off of social media. It is recommended that future research should continue to add to this existing database and track any changes in existing programs.

In addition to the need to keep this database up to date, future studies should look to expand the study to include specific de-radicalization and radicalization theory components. More specifically, they should seek to understand the extent, if any, these programs follow these theoretical frameworks. And because the nature of these studies is so dynamic, any new research should be followed and incorporated into this work.

Another limitation that requires mentioning is the fact that all data in this study is coded by the principal researcher. All coding categories and decisions related to those are direct results of my personal understanding of the literature and the programs. Some

decisions are highly subjective, which could cause varied results in a replication of the study. Future studies should strive to employ the use of multiple coders to limit subjectivity of one.

A final limitation of this study is that the data publicly available are often recorded in cursory forms that lack the rich, thick descriptions required to confirm some findings. For example, the trouble in determining what it is about community involvement tactics that causes these programs to fail. This requires information that cannot be gained through content analysis alone. Future studies should aim to interview creators and/or employees of now inactive programs and community members where these programs are active. Information gained in those contexts could provide a level of insight that is not currently afforded to CVE literature.

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## #CEP Digital Disruption

- <https://www.counterextremism.com/digital-disruption>

## Abdullah-X

- <http://www.abdullahx.com/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Abdullah-X/210991205755605>
- <https://twitter.com/TheAbdullahX>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/abdullahx>
- <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ce4ed632-9f8a-11e5-beba-5e33e2b79e46.html#axzz4HcrBix8H>
- <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/world/abdullah-x-cartoon/>
- <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/abdullah-x-the-new-cartoon-made-by-former-extremist-aimed-at-stopping-britain-s-young-muslims-from-9604967.html>

## Against Violent Extremism

- <http://www.againstviolentextremism.org/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/againstviolentextremism>
- [https://twitter.com/ave\\_org](https://twitter.com/ave_org)
- <https://plus.google.com/u/0/115486297935528434575>

## Building Community Resilience

- [https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Minneapolis-St%20Paul%20Building%20Community%20Resilience%20Program-Pilot%20Fact%20Sheet\\_0.pdf](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Minneapolis-St%20Paul%20Building%20Community%20Resilience%20Program-Pilot%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf)
- <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/building-community-resilience-minneapolis-st-paul-pilot-program-fact-sheet>

## Campaign Against Violent Extremism (CAVE)

## Centre for prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence

## Community Action for Preventing Extremism (CAPE)

- <http://exitwhitepower.com/>
- <https://twitter.com/exitwhitepower?lang=en>
- <http://cape.alltogethernow.org.au/>

## Counter Extremism Project

- <https://www.facebook.com/CounterExtremismProject/>
- <https://www.counterextremism.com/about>
- [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCirja\\_Dw4qkeEQTl3WEYBww](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCirja_Dw4qkeEQTl3WEYBww)
- <https://twitter.com/FightExtremism>

## Counter Narrative Program

- <https://www.counterextremism.com/projects/counter-narrative-program>

## CounterExtremism.org

- <https://www.counterextremism.org>

## Countering Extremism Together

- <https://www.quilliaminternational.com/countering-extremism-together/>
- <https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/countering-extremism-together--2#/>

## Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program

- <http://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/countering-violent-extremism-in-prisons-cve-p-program/>

## Digital Mass Atrocity Prevention Lab

- <https://www.concordia.ca/research/migs/projects/dmap.html>
- [https://twitter.com/DMAP\\_Lab?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.concordia.ca%2Fresearch%2Fmigs%2Fprojects%2Fdmap.html](https://twitter.com/DMAP_Lab?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.concordia.ca%2Fresearch%2Fmigs%2Fprojects%2Fdmap.html)
- <https://www.facebook.com/DMAPLAB/>
- [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCaW8\\_vT-uFAXmyXGU7ePueg](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCaW8_vT-uFAXmyXGU7ePueg)

## Don't be a puppet

- <https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html>
- <https://cve.fbi.gov/info-discussion-leaders.html>

## Eretz Shalom

- <https://www.facebook.com/groups/177017932397979/>
- <http://www.erezshalom.org>
- <https://twitter.com/erezshalom>
- <https://arielzellman.wordpress.com/2010/10/13/erez-shalom-interview-with-nahum-pachenik/>

## EXIT Deutschland

- <http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/ExitDeutschlandVideo>
- <https://www.facebook.com/exitdeutschland>
- <https://twitter.com/exitdeutschland>
- <https://myspace.com/exitdeutschland>

## Exit Fryshuset

- <http://exit.fryshuset.se/english/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/fryshuset>
- <https://twitter.com/fryshuset>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/FryshusetOnline>
- <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/63/exit-fryshuset>

## Exit USA

- <https://www.exitusa.org/>
- <https://twitter.com/exitusateam?lang=en>
- <https://www.facebook.com/ExitProgramUSA/>

- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLk7ltZr3r3eMdCiabUKPPw>

#### Extreme Dialogue

- <http://extremedialogue.org/>
- <https://twitter.com/ExtremeDialogue>
- <https://www.facebook.com/extremedialogue>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/extremedialogue>

#### Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE)

- [https://twitter.com/FATE\\_EN](https://twitter.com/FATE_EN)
- <http://www.findfate.org/en/the-facts/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/findFATE/>
- <https://www.instagram.com/fate.2016/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjGWdEEN8VV9Qj-noZ3bq0g>

#### Global Survivors Network

- <https://www.facebook.com/globalsurvivorsnetwork/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/GlobalSurvivors>
- [www.globalsurvivors.org](http://www.globalsurvivors.org)

#### HAYAT-Deutschland

- <http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/>

#### Hopeful Operation to Prevent Extremism

- <https://www.facebook.com/awws.agp.hope>
- <http://www.aagahiwws.org.pk/index.php/projects/edventure-partner/hopecampaign>

#### Innovation Hub

- <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/counter-narrative-campaigns/innovation-hub/>

#### Life After Hate

- <https://www.lifeafterhate.org/>
- [https://www.facebook.com/lifeafterhate/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/lifeafterhate/?ref=page_internal)
- <https://twitter.com/lifeafterhate>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/lifeafterhate>
- <https://plus.google.com/+LifeAfterHateOrg>

#### Lifecycle Initiative

- <https://toolkit.thegctf.org/>

#### Making A Stand

- <http://www.wewillinspire.com/making-a-stand-against-extremism-hatred-and-violence/>
- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIb\\_njKyMqQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIb_njKyMqQ)

#### Moonshot CVE

- <http://moonshotcve.com/>
- <https://twitter.com/moonshotcve?lang=en>

#### Mothers for Change

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/38/>
- [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy\\_8\\_jYgA](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy_8_jYgA)

#### Mothers for Life

- <http://girds.org/mothersforlife/mothers-for-life-network>
- <https://www.facebook.com/mothersandlife/>
- [https://twitter.com/mothers\\_4\\_life?lang=en](https://twitter.com/mothers_4_life?lang=en)
- <https://www.thunderclap.it/projects/29453-foreign-fighters-comehomenow>

#### Mothers MOVE!

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/35/>

#### Mothers Schools

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/42/>

#### Muflehun

- <https://www.facebook.com/muflehun/>
- <http://muflehun.org/>
- [https://twitter.com/muflehun?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor](https://twitter.com/muflehun?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor)

#### My Hack

- [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keeyalee-ayre/myhack-harnessing-creativ\\_b\\_7427984.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keeyalee-ayre/myhack-harnessing-creativ_b_7427984.html)
- <http://www.myhack.org.au/>

#### One to One Initiative

- <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/one2one-initiative/>

#### ONE95

- <https://www.one95.org/>
- [https://www.facebook.com/One95-869281029777083/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/One95-869281029777083/?ref=page_internal)
- [https://twitter.com/one95\\_](https://twitter.com/one95_)
- [https://www.instagram.com/one95\\_/](https://www.instagram.com/one95_/)
- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCyNhPPRbRrO1xu6LaqNHKJQ>

#### Online Civil Courage Initiative

- <https://www.facebook.com/OnlineCivilCourage/>
- <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/counter-narrative-campaigns/online-civil-courage-initiative/>
- <http://www.strategicdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/English-Version.pdf>

#### Open Letter to our sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq

- <http://girds.org/mothersforlife/open-letter-to-our-sons-and-daughters>

#### Operation 250

- <https://www.operation250.org/home>
- <https://www.facebook.com/operation250>
- [https://twitter.com/Operation\\_250](https://twitter.com/Operation_250)

#### Pakistan Terrorism Survivors Network

- <http://paktsn.webs.com/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/PakTSN/>

#### Peer to Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism Together

- [https://edventurepartners.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/P2P\\_Trifold.pdf](https://edventurepartners.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/P2P_Trifold.pdf)
- [https://www.edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-challenging-extremism/#student\\_work\\_anchor](https://www.edventurepartners.com/peer-to-peer-challenging-extremism/#student_work_anchor)
- <https://eca.state.gov/highlight/p2p-challenging-extremism-together>

#### People Against Violent Extremism (PAVE)

- <http://www.pave.net.au/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/pavenetau/>
- <https://twitter.com/peopleagainstVE>
- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQRGahmQ5b0pl-ay7PPGfka>

#### Project Communitas

- <http://communitas.ccmw.com/>
- <http://ccmw.com/youth/communitas/>

#### Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)

- [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en)
- <https://www.facebook.com/RadicalisationAwarenessNetwork>
- <https://twitter.com/RANEurope>
- <https://www.linkedin.com/company-beta/13173909/>

- <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCD6U5qdKiA3ObOKGEVwTQKw>

#### Ramp Off

- <https://www.facebook.com/RampOffUSA>
- <http://www.rampoff.org/>
- <https://twitter.com/rampoffusa>

#### Re-education Prison for Jihadists

- <http://www.mei.edu/content/deradicalization-programs-saudi-arabia-case-study>
- [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/world/middleeast/inside-saudi-arabias-re-education-prison-for-jihadists.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/10/world/middleeast/inside-saudi-arabias-re-education-prison-for-jihadists.html?_r=0)
- <https://www.wired.com/2017/03/david-degner-jihad-rehab/>

#### Safe Spaces Initiative

- <https://www.mpac.org/safespaces/>
- <http://www.patheos.com/blogs/altmuslim/2016/03/the-truth-about-safe-spaces-mpac-addresses-changes-and-criticisms/>

#### Sakinah Campaign

- <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-sakinah-campaign-and-internet-counter-radicalization-in-saudi-arabia>
- <http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/724756>

#### Samputo Forgiveness Campaign

- <http://www.samputufc.org/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/samputufc/>

#### SAVE Blog

- <http://womenwithoutborders-save.blogspot.ca/>

#### SAVE Witness of History Project

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/underway/37/>

### Schools Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/films/4/>
- [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy\\_8\\_jYgA](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy_8_jYgA)

### Second Open Letter

- <http://girds.org/mothersforlife/a-second-letter-to-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-from-the-mothers-for-life>

### Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/>
- <https://twitter.com/SAVEalerts>
- [https://twitter.com/wwb\\_save](https://twitter.com/wwb_save)
- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/activities/24/>
- [https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy\\_8\\_jYgA](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJQXqgLe1YxqUqsy_8_jYgA)

### Solidarity Against Violent Extremism Campaign

- <http://www.aagahiwws.org.pk/index.php/projects/edventure-partner/savecampaign>

### Sons and Daughters of the World

- <https://twitter.com/SonsDaughtersWo>
- <http://sonsanddaughtersoftheworld.com/>
- <https://da-dk.facebook.com/people/Sonsand-Daughters/100008859340913>
- <https://www.facebook.com/SonsandDaughtersoftheWorld>

### STOP Violence! Hotline

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/projects/finished/36/>

### Strong Cities Network

- <http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/>

### Terrorism and Radicalization (TerRa)

- <http://www.terra-net.eu/index.php>

#### The Channel Program

- <https://www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/sites/default/files/The%20Prevent%20Strategy%20and%20the%20Channel%20Programme%20in%20FE%20Colleges.pdf>

#### The Redirect Method

- <https://redirectmethod.org/>

#### The Stories Campaign

- <http://ownyourbrain.org/>
- <https://www.youtube.com/user/ownyourbrain>

#### The Women's Dialogue

- <http://www.women-without-borders.org/news/uptodate/228/>

#### Think Again Turn Away

- [https://twitter.com/thinkagain\\_dos?lang=en](https://twitter.com/thinkagain_dos?lang=en)
- <http://thinkagainturnaway.tumblr.com/>
- <https://ask.fm/ThinkAgainTurnAway>

#### Viral Peace

- <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/411/viral-peace>
- <http://muflehun.org/ourwork/viralpeace/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/viralpeace/>

#### Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN)

- [https://twitter.com/\\_youthcan](https://twitter.com/_youthcan)
- <http://youthcan.net/>
- <https://www.facebook.com/YouthCivilActivism/>

#### Youth Online and at Risk

- [http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\\_2011/grc-rcmp/PS64-89-2011-eng.pdf](http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2011/grc-rcmp/PS64-89-2011-eng.pdf)
- RCMP-GRC. (2011). *A national security criminal investigations program on youth online and at risk: radicalization facilitated by the internet*. Retrieved from <http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/rad-eng.htm> (Accessed November 14, 2014).

## Appendix A. Active Programs 1998 - 2017

Program	Country of Origin	Year of Inception
Exit Sweden	Sweden	1998
EXIT Deutschland	Germany	2000
Re-education Prison for Jihadists	Saudi Arabia	2003
Sakinah Campaign	Saudi Arabia	2008
Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)	International	2008
Life After Hate	United States of America	2009
Pakistan Terrorism Survivors Network	Pakistan	2009
Global Survivors Network	International	2009
Eretz Shalom	West Bank	2010
Muflehan	United States	2010
Samputo Forgiveness Campaign	Rwanda	2010
Mothers MOVE!	International	2010
Schools Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)	India	2010
HAYAT-Deutschland	Germany	2011
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)	Europe	2011
Against Violent Extremism	International	2011
Youth Online and at Risk	Canada	2011
Mothers for Change	International	2011
Community Action Preventing Extremism (CAPE)	Australia	2012
Terrorism and Radicalization (TerRa)	Europe	2012
The Channel Program	United Kingdom	2012
Mothers Schools	International	2013
Counter Narrative Program	International	2014
#CEP Digital Disruption	International	2014
Counter Extremism Project	International	2014
Abdullah-X	United Kingdom	2014
Making A Stand	United Kingdom	2014
CounterExtremism.org	International	2014
Safe Spaces Initiative	United States of America	2014
The Redirect Method	International	2015
Sons and Daughters of the World	International	2015
Strong Cities Network	International	2015
Centre for prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence	Canada	2015
Mothers for Life	International	2015
Lifecycle Initiative	International	2015

Extreme Dialogue	International	2015
Youth Civil Activism Network (YouthCAN)	International	2015
Exit USA	United States of America	2015
Open Letter to our sons and Daughters in Syria and Iraq	International	2015
My Hack	Australia	2015
Peer to Peer (P2P): Challenging Extremism Together	International	2015
Moonshot CVE	United Kingdom	2016
Operation 250	United States of America	2016
Don't be a puppet	United States of America	2016
Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE)	International	2016
Online Civil Courage Initiative	Europe	2016
Second Open Letter	International	2016
The Stories Campaign	United States of America	2016
Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons (CVE-P) Program	International	2016
Building Community Resilience	United States of America	2017

## Appendix B. Failed, Inactive, and Discontinued Programs 1998-2017

Program	Year of Inception	Country
SAVE Blog	2009	International
The Women's Dialogue	2010	International
STOP Violence! Hotline	2012	Yemen
SAVE Witness of History Project	2012	International
Digital Mass Atrocity Prevention Lab	2013	Canada
People Against Violent Extremism	2013	Australia
Think Again Turn Away	2013	United States of America
Viral Peace	2013	United States of America
Campaign Against Violent Extremism	2015	Canada
ONE95	2015	International
Ramp Off	2015	United States of America