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Abstract

A wealth of literature examines terrorism and its relationship with political participation, often concerning legitimate opportunities to effect political change. Overall, these studies support the notion that a democratic system is an effective bulwark against terrorism. There is, however, a paucity of research that evaluates societal activism from the citizen’s perspective and its effects on political violence. When a disgruntled public lacks proper avenues to be heard and engage meaningfully in the political process, terrorist events may arise. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database, World Values Survey, World Bank, and Freedom House, a multilevel negative binomial analysis is conducted to assess terrorist events in relation to political activism across 18 countries from 1990 to 2012, while considering factors often cited as catalysts for political violence. The findings suggest that terrorism is significantly more likely to occur when frustrated citizens do not perceive peaceful political activism as a viable alternative.

Keywords: steam-valve theory; terrorism; political violence; political efficacy; multilevel analysis; negative binomial regression
To the big man upstairs,

to my parents, bro, Olivia, Courtney, grams (婆 婆 仔), and Aunt Mary (EE),

and

... in memory of Aunt Joanne.

Ephesians 2:8-9
If the prospect of living in a world where trying to respect the basic rights of those around you and valuing each other simply because we exist are such daunting, impossible tasks then what sort of world are we left with? And what sort of world do you want to live in?

- Princess Diana of Themyscira
  (Wonder Woman, Volume 2, Issue 170)
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¹ The brain to my heart, Willow to my Buffy, hippo to my rhino, frack to my frick, Ms. Me to my Agent Muffet, mini to my little, Holmes to my Watson, and Taystee to my Poussey
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1. Introduction

Terrorism is a form of social malaise; it is the ultimate manifestation of public discontent. First introduced during the French Revolution, terrorism is used by Burke to describe Robespierre’s Reign of Terror from 1793 to 1794 (McMahon, 2005). Although the earliest form of terrorism is the Zealot Sicarii in 66-73 AD (Hoffman, 2013), the word terror did not formally enter into Western vernacular until the Reign of Terror (Tilly, 2004). The evolving nature of terrorism – its perpetrators, motivations, and victimology – makes it difficult to establish a universally accepted definition (Martin, 2013; Weinberg, 2005). In part, this task is compounded by the implications of labelling which acts constitute terrorism and which individuals are considered terrorists. At a minimum, many would agree that terrorism is the use, or threat, of violence with the intent to generate fear in a particular population for political ends (Davies, 1994; Tompkins, 1992).

Overtime, there have been a number of theorists who have offered explanations as to why people convey political discontents through violence (i.e., anti-state domestic terrorism). The gamut of these explanatory models address notions of psychological dispositions (Post, 1998), religious zealotry (Juergensmeyer, 2000), cultural indifferences (Huntington, 1996), and economic frustrations (Gurr, 1970). While their contributions to the discourse on terrorism and its epistemology are unquestionably invaluable, there remains a gap in the literature. This thesis suggests that a possible explanation for terrorism is evident in its definition. Given that anti-state terrorism is an aggressive means to send a political message to the government and public at large (Davies, 1994; Tompkins, 1992), however ill-advised, political violence serves a clear function – communication. These are individuals who cannot imagine simpler or more effective means of attaining political change; arguably, terrorism is the result of people who perceive a dearth of political efficacy. Departing from previous theories, the nature of people’s discontent and frustration – religious, social, economic, or political – are not the foci, but rather their inability to voice any concerns in an effective way. In other words, the theory hinges upon the citizen’s perspective. Accordingly, this thesis proposes the steam-valve theory, which places people’s perceptions of their political efficacy and ability to meaningfully engage with their governments at the forefront.
The steam-valve theory is presented in relation to political activism because these acts are methods of expression. If the public believes peaceful, cogent dialog can be established with the polity, then it stands to reason that violence can be prevented. The next chapter explores the scholarly work on political activism – both with regards to governing bodies and its relevance to terrorism. Accordingly, this section also outlines the conceptual framework of the steam-valve theory. Literature on other factors oft cited as antecedents to terrorism is then presented in the latter portion of chapter 2 to provide a proper basis to assess the use of the theory.

Considering the steam-valve theory and the literature on factors that precede terrorism, the analytical approaches used in this thesis are developed in chapter 3, which describes the methodological framework, measures, and statistical techniques. Subsequently, a description of the sample, their respective terrorist organizations (with particular attention to those with the highest counts of domestic terrorism), and the findings of these analyses are revealed in chapter 4. The multilevel negative binomial analysis of 18 countries, spanning the course of 23 years, shows that political efficacy has a significant inverse relationship with terrorism. This effect remains constant even when factoring in social, economic, and political conditions. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of these results in relation to the relevant body of literature. The steam-valve theory and its relevance is then evaluated holistically in chapter 6. An assessment of the limitations and possible directions for future studies are presented as well. Finally, the chapter concludes this thesis with a brief summary of steam-valve theory by reflecting on its use within the terrorism discourse.
2. Literature Review

As a small-N phenomenon, terrorism is committed by individuals and groups at the fringes of society. When citizens are dissatisfied with the political system, the discontent with their government can be expressed peacefully or violently (Tompkins, 1992). Examples of the former include participating in protests, elections, and hunger strikes, while the latter consist of more aggressive methods such as riots and terrorism (Wilson, 1973). Attention should be focused on the reasons certain methods are seen as more desirable than others given that the common factor in social movements, regardless of their grievances, is the people's decision to choose peaceful versus violent modes of communication. With respect to political efficacy, non-violent social movements are more likely to be adopted when people have faith in their governing institutions and believe they can effect political change. Public opinion on political efficacy is the crux of this thesis.

This thesis argues that people are more likely to engage in political violence when they do not perceive legitimate avenues to be heard in the political arena (Choi, 2010; Satana, Inman & Birnir, 2013). In other words, terrorism can be the result of a perceived dearth of political efficacy. There is a substantial amount of research on the relationship between political activism and governing entities. Some of this attention is focused on social activist movements. According to Giddens (1997), a social movement is a collective attempt to achieve a shared goal through actions that are external to established institutions. The majority of this literature, however, does not directly attend to the issue of terrorism, but rather the effectiveness of communication between the people and their governing institutions.

2.1. Civil Participation and Political Efficacy

Conflict is an inescapable part of any society. According to Wilson (1973), tensions arise because “societies are … volatile wholes, seething with discordant ideas, opposing interest, and competing social groups” (p. 4). In light of these differences, social systems provide stability and coherence; arguably, this is achieved for the benefit and/or at the cost of the people in their social system. Depending on the structure of the
political system, governing entities provide various legal venues for their citizens to engage with the state (Brodie & Rein, 2005). These activities can range from being very limited or even non-existent (in the case, for example, of authoritarian regimes), to having the ability to elect political leaders (i.e., democratic regimes). External to these formal methods, people may choose to communicate with their governments through social movements (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). Citizens' willingness to participate in these political actions is one of the primary foci of this thesis. When an existing social order does not satisfy, or is no longer relevant to, its people's needs, social movements challenge the political system by introducing novel ideas and practices into the social fabric (Wilson, 1973). In essence, the term social movement is synonymous with political activism (Inglehart, 1990), political participation (Della Porta & Diani, 2006), and collective action (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012), because their goals are the same: to effect change in the current polity through the collaborative efforts of individuals who share similar views of the world. Within the political milieu, Welzel (2013) asserts that collective action is the primary expression of people power.

Social movements come in many forms and can range from peaceful to violent, small to capacious, and passive to active. While acknowledging variations between different types of collective political struggles, McAdam et al. (2001) draw parallels among them. The desire for political reform can stem from religious conflicts, ethnic mobilizations, nationalism, worker-capitalist struggles, or other forms of discontent that are frequently espoused by social movements. McAdam et al. (2001) argue that, within their respective fields, researchers independently discover the political salience of rituals where supporters use symbols, people, commitment, and claims to public space that are customized to their relevant cause and ideology. So although the inspirations for, and goals of, political struggles differ, they nonetheless share similar qualities. The tactics used by social movements fall under two umbrella categories: campaigns that abstain from and those that engage in violence. Wilson (1973) distinguishes politics of order, politics of disorder, and politics of violence. The first two classifications are peaceful approaches, while the latter is not. Petitions, lobbies, and campaigns are examples of politics of order, whereas politics of disorder refer to direct actions such as sit-ins, public demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. People who reject socially acceptable ways to
effect change, however, engage in politics of violence through destructive acts, such as mob demonstrations and bombings (Wilson, 1973).

Among the range of collective activities are peaceful means of communication, such as petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations. Recent examples of these movements include the 2014 student led pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong (BBC, 2014b), Emma Watson’s global He for She campaign with the United Nations (UN Women, 2014), and the recent nationwide anti-government demonstrations occurring in Brazil (Flynn & Soto, 2016; Lehman, 2015). Conversely, instances where individuals challenge power holders by partaking in aggressive actions include the Arab Revolt initiated by Sharif Hussein bin Ali in early twentieth century (Gerolymatos, 2015, p. 15), the bombing of EnCana Corporation’s pipelines in Western Canada (Nguyen, 2009), and segments of the Arab Spring in the Middle East (Al-Rawi, 2015; Blight, Pulham & Torpey, 2012). It is important to acknowledge that while social movements may be easily and neatly categorized in theory, grouping political actions in practice is another matter. Since societies are volatile wholes (Wilson, 1973), it is not uncommon for social movements to evolve, use different methods, and even engage in both peaceful and violent strategies. To maintain conceptual clarity, however, collective actions in this thesis are separated into peaceful and violent categories.

2.1.1. Conditions for Movements

Collective actions are borne from particular social and political conditions. In the literature on peaceful political activism, scholars notice patterns among the participants. Exploring the concept of emancipative values within societies, Welzel (2013) discovers that people who engage in nonviolent movement activities are rarely from disadvantaged groups. Emancipative values emphasize individual autonomy, gender equality, freedom of speech, and other attributes related to democracy (Welzel, 2013). Since societies with higher emancipative values also tend to advocate and are concerned with issues related to social justice, Welzel (2013) believes that the prevalence of these values fuels social movement activities. Specifically, Welzel (2013) states that “emancipative values have a strongly expressive impulse, encouraging people to take action with others to voice shared claims” (p. 11). The three main influences necessary for collective action to occur are social norms, group interests, and shared values. According to Welzel
(2013), shared values that are embraced by society are the impetus of social movements because they are internalized. Unlike social norms or group interests, where the former is external to the individual and the effectiveness of the latter is highly dependent on the instrumental purpose of the group, shared values are intrinsic and serve an expressive utility. In more concrete terms, emancipative values are the strongest motivator for social movement activities because they are a part of an individual’s identity (Welzel, 2013).

Moving down from the societal level, individuals who tend to engage in collective actions also share particular characteristics. Consistent with Welzel’s (2013) finding, Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch (2005) note that societies with the least to criticize raise their voices more. In particular, social movement activities are more likely to occur in flourishing societies (Welzel, Inglehart & Deutsch, 2005). In an assessment of intergenerational change, Inglehart (1990) examines political activism with respect to materialists and postmaterialists. Inglehart (1990) defines materialists as individuals who place a great emphasis on security and economic stability, whereas postmaterialists appreciate self-determination and efficacy. People who are prone to adopting postmaterialist values have relatively affluent families and thus, higher formative security. This is also the group more inclined to partake in political protests (Inglehart, 1990). However, Inglehart (1990) acknowledges that self-actualization is not exclusive to social action and can also be done by improving oneself. A parallel can be drawn between Inglehart’s (1990) findings on postmaterialists and Welzel’s (2013) emancipative values as they are both reflections of empowered individuals and empowering conditions.

Apart from these external and internal liberating circumstances, there is also evidence suggesting that people are more likely to engage in the political process when faced with external threats, high rates of unemployment for example (Platt, 2008). This indicates that citizens are more willing to participate when faced with grievances such as economic hardship. Accordingly, this suggests that the likelihood of engaging with social movements increases on the extreme ends of the continuum – societies with the least to complain about, and those with the most. This adds to the complexity of situations in which political activism is used as a means to communicate with governing structures.
In addition to social conditions, another important aspect of social movements relates to government institutions. Tarrow (1998) notes two opposing political environments: authoritarian states and representative states; these types respectively repress and facilitate collective actions. By the same token, Inglehart (1990) states that the potential for civic protests is highly contingent upon the larger political environment; for example, the installation of nuclear missiles in Western Europe or the war in Vietnam. To illustrate another case, the Occupy movement protested against social and economic inequality on a global scale. Inspired in part by the Arab Spring, the initial demonstration against Wall Street in 2011 swiftly animated people to take action (Gautney, 2011; Mason, 2013). Citizens in various countries around the world, including Australia (Campion & White, 2011), Canada (Mackrael & Hunter, 2011), Mexico (Daut, 2011), Nigeria (Busari, 2012), Spain (Beas, 2011), and Turkey (Talbi, 2013), took to the streets to voice frustrations over their respective issues. These examples show that protests can be influenced by a larger political environment as one event sets off various related events or other social movements. In essence, Hafez (2004) surmises that the broader political context facilitates or hinders collective action. It is clear that social movements — their likelihood of occurrence and their manifestations — are contingent upon a number of factors that range from the individual to the societal. A common facet, however, is the willingness of people to partake in these collective actions. The goal, to effectively convey political messages to governments and the public at large, is a major component of this.

Wilson (1973) states that social movements are animated by the injustices and suffering within respective societies. People extend beyond conventional means of political participation to instigate actions in response to perceived transgressions; in doing so, Wilson (1973) believes that ordinary individuals are inspired to carry out "acts of bravery, savagery, and selfless charity" (p. 5). Through peaceful political participation in certain societies, citizens have formal venues — letters, petitions, protests, boycotts, or peaceful demonstrations — to engage meaningfully in the civil process. Della Porta and Diani (2006) maintain that by connecting people through real and virtual spaces to garner support, protests are characterized partly by their ability to persuade public opinion and place pressure on decision-makers. In an interview about the Arab Spring,
a female Egyptian political activist describes the progress she witnessed throughout the movement:

I was so pleased and proud to see Tahrir Square and other squares all over Egypt full of protesters, and to hear the public debating political issues without fear and with real political awareness. But the most rewarding results [of our activism are] the newly formed political parties and social movements, increased participation by the public in political life, and finally, the fair elections. And of course the challenges to stereotypes about Arab women, who were earlier prevented from joining protests. Now we can lead revolutions (Pedersen & Salib, 2013, p. 238).

By appealing to the public, people who engage in various forms of political movements can garner support for the various causes. Similarly, DeNardo (1985) posits that protestors want to displace existing policies by disrupting social order; the gamut of these policies consist of those concerning the state, military, religious body, or civil government. Since emancipative values target rights that are denied by dictators or governments, as the spirit of emancipation grows, tolerance of injustice decreases while augmenting the desire to delegitimize the authority of governing bodies (Welzel, 2013). In sum, the likelihood of participation in political activism is dependent on a number of factors, including recent events, political circumstances, and governing institutions.

2.1.2. Theoretical Explanations for Political Activism

“If you have right on your side, you have no fear.”

A number of explanatory frameworks and general propositions are offered to understand political activism – its rise, its forms, and its consequences. In particular, theory has emphasized the relationship between political activism and governments. One of these explanatory approaches is social movement theory (SMT), which taps into opportunity structures and people’s grievances. According to Heidt (2011), theories express levels of explanation, often at the macro- and micro-levels. Macro-level theories focus on broad structural elements, such as environmental backcloths and social systems (e.g., social disorganization or social strain theory), whereas micro-level theories attend to individual factors, such as decision making (e.g., psychological perspectives or rationality) (Heidt, 2011. In explaining the political environment in which violent movements develop, SMT accounts for the gap between structural and rational schools.
of thought by focusing on groups as the unit of analysis (Robinson, 2004). Three primary perspectives are used in SMT to understand the rise of social movements: resource mobilization, political opportunity, and framing.

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), resource mobilization is concerned with the capacity of groups to recruit, mobilize, fundraise, and train. This concept incorporates both structures and the people within them. Through the use of formal (e.g., political parties) to informal (e.g., informal urban networks) to illegal (e.g., terrorist cells) mobilization structures, movements are able to garner support and socialize constituents (Robinson, 2004). Hafez (2004) states that conditions that encourage mobilization include easy access to supporters, ineffective repression by its critics, and the rise of elite schisms. Political opportunity identifies social movements as extensions of civil involvement, particularly in how political spaces foster or discourage engagement (Adkins, 2008). Examples of these structures, as Robinson (2004) explains, are international structures (e.g., globalization or the fall of USSR), governments, domestic policies, and the political movement itself; changes within these structures influence the rate and speed of collective action. The last concept, framing, entails agency within the movement; it serves an interpretive function by negotiating and giving meaning to events and in turn, inspiring action (Beck, 2008; Benford & Snow, 2000; McAdam, 1996). In other words, frame analysis is the means by which experiences are organized (Goffman, 1974). In fact, when its articulation resonates with potential supporters, Hafez (2004) states that normative framing helps mobilize resources by inspiring people to sacrifice their time, money, energy, and even their lives. Frame analysis can be presented in a number of ways, one of which is cultural framing. According to Robinson (2004), cultural framing is a multi-tiered approach that appreciates the nuances within society through various interpretations held by different groups. In the United States, for instance, Black Nationalists and Christian fundamentalists interpret current and historical issues in distinct ideological contexts that are unique to their respective cultures (Robinson, 2004).

Elaborating on SMT, McAdam et al. (2001) consider a dynamic interaction component to social movements and present an analogy of a steam boiler. Like a boiler, pressure builds gradually until a critical threshold is met and explodes. In this analogy, the pressure represents people’s grievances towards their governments. While this explanation for contentious politics has its merits, McAdam et al. (2001) believe that
cognitive conversion in response to relational and environmental changes is a more probable interpretation. In other words, people have agency and will continuously adapt to their surroundings. These adaptations are largely contingent upon people’s appraisals of the situation. So when conditions are not conducive to peaceful forms of communication, people will revise their strategies and they may resort to more aggressive methods.

Another body of literature that also looks at the effect of political participation examines freedom of expression in the legal context. Among legal scholars, the term “safety valve” is used to describe laws that help prevent “frustration from turning into violence” (Fodeman, 2015, p. 2). The rights entrenched within the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are examples of safety valves (Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 1970). An unknown author in the Harvard Law Review (Steam Valve Closed, 2000) maintains that outlets, such as peaceful protests and nonviolent civil disobedience, serve as a “safety valve”. As opposed to enacting laws that prohibit or impose heavy penalties for interference, the state should use polices to help direct violent dissent toward civil actions (Steam Valve Closed, 2000); thus, channeling actions from violent to nonviolent forms of communication to be heard. In essence, laws should not infringe upon the constitutional rights that permit free speech because they function as a safety valve for society. The commonality between these perspectives is the importance of allowing individuals to effectively convey their concerns to governing bodies. While SMT focuses on the group level of analysis with an appreciation of the context and volunteerism, and the legal concept of the safety valve recognizes the impact of domestic policies, neither of these frameworks attend to the most important element of political action – the people and their willingness to engage in peaceful movements.
2.1.3. **Violent Campaigns**

We have tried several different ways to act on behalf of the people. At the beginning of the seventies we chose to live like workers and peacefully propagate our Socialist ideas. The movement was absolutely harmless. But how did it end? It was broken only because of the immense obstacles in the form of prison and banishment with which it had to contend. A movement which was unstained by blood and which repudiated violence was crushed... From metaphysics and dreams we moved to positivism... instead of a peaceful fight we applied ourselves to a fight with deeds.


The way collective action manifests in these movements is largely dependent on history and opportunity. People’s perceptions of their governments are usually informed by historical events and how previous injustices have been handled. According to Schock (2013), social movements have become less violent in recent decades, perhaps due to their effectiveness in achieving change, though this is not always the case. For example, Euromaiden in Ukraine began as peaceful protests but quickly escalated into violence, which was largely due to interactions between the police and the activists (Herszenhorn, 2013). Briggs (2010) and Pruyt and Kwakkel (2014) assert that the growth of political activism can help decrease manifestations of political violence. To help counter the marginalization of citizens, political systems should afford room for the political expression of grievances, even when that expression is extremist in nature. Despite the benefits, however, governments resist because it is difficult to satisfy, compromise, and incorporate every opinion. Policies can become incoherent and may even contradict the values of the presiding regime. The ability to raise public awareness to perceived problems, however, allows the public and majority parties to address or alleviate discontents, which may be real or imagined (Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2014). In a study on peaceful collection action, Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) state that tremendous strides have been made overall in achieving emancipatory goals, which range from the establishment of democratic institutions to the legalization of same-sex marriages. Despite the increase and success of peaceful political engagements, however, aggressive and unconventional collective actions remain. This is due to the difficulties in attending to the various grievances put forth. If people believe they are

\(^2\) Zhelyabov was a leader of the *Narodnaya Volya* (People’s Will) in Russia. This is an example of how terrorism can be a consequence rather than a cause of the regime’s tyrannical strategy of repression.
marginalized because their world views are so disparate from mainstream society, political violence may become an enticing approach to achieve political ends.

A portion of the SMT literature examines government response, such as the dynamic between authority figures and social movement activists. Futrell and Brents (2003) maintain that when nonviolent responses from authorities are normalized, it mitigates the potential for violence among protesters. On the other hand, repressive government responses or excessive actions by either party can escalate the potential for violence. These approaches are called tactical adaptations. According to Della Porta (1995), aggressive techniques may be used as a counterbalance in reaction to the use of unorthodox movement tactics. Violence is a tool (McMahon, 2005) and in the context of terrorism, Harder (2005) notes that aggressive methods are used to convey messages because these groups are marginalized. Moreover, movements are more likely to use violence or illegal tactics when the system lacks popular support and is perceived to be illegitimate (McMahon, 2005; Wilson, 1973).

To examine the differences between activism and radicalization to violence, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) posit two primary perspectives: an escalation in behaviour and competing angles. Commonly applied to Islamic extremists, behavioral escalation is best described using a conveyor belt metaphor: when legal venues of political participation are not successful, movements will continue along the conveyor belt to illegal forms of political action (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). In this scenario, individuals initially perceive an environment characterized by political efficacy. However, people gradually resort to more unconventional methods of communication as people grasp the dearth of political efficacy and the lack of influence they are able to attain in the political milieu. Passivism evolves into radicalism. On the other hand, the competing angles perspective stress that radicalism is the result of differences in the appraisal of a political environment. According to this approach, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) assert that individuals perceive political violence as the only effective course to achieve their goals. In other words, people believe they have no political efficacy. Without faith in their government and the existing channels of communication

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3 Radicalization is the process by which people become extremist in their ideology (Neumann, 2013). According to King and Taylor (2011), it entails an individual’s psychological transformations that move towards the acceptance of terrorism as a legitimate tactic.
to effect change, political violence is not only viable, but is a suitable alternative. While these perspectives are similar, there are nuanced differences given that an escalation in behaviour develops over time, whereas competing angles is comparatively more abrupt. Similarly, DeNardo (1985) describes terrorism as the sole way to incapacitate a state’s repressive apparatus. The attractiveness of political violence is contingent on “the effectiveness of alternative forms of dissent, as well as other criteria used by radical leaders to choose among competing strategies” (DeNardo, 1985, p. 242).

Accordingly, people engage in more radical forms of collective action because they believe that political change will come in spite of the government, not because of it. Regarding the tactics social movements adopt, Wilson (1973) postulates how the nature of the relationship between groups involved dictates the methods chosen. When a minority group is subjugated by a majority group and feels powerless to establish any meaningful lines of communication to challenge the existing social order, violence ensues. The tactics undertaken by the minority are dictated by the perception of their relation to the majority group; as a result, methods vary according to this association (Wilson, 1973). Situations where people have little hope and are desperate for change promote violence. Wilson (1973) notes that the scope of the frame adopted by actors of minority groups can range from the religious (e.g., angels versus devils) to the secular (e.g., an enemy group of manipulators). Anti-state political violence is, at its core, borne out of the desire for people to be heard and have power over human autonomy. Depending on the type of terrorist organization, the degree of power can extend beyond and infringe the autonomy of others. Given the indiscriminate acts terrorists perform, however, terrorists believe that their rights and freedoms supersede those of other human beings.

A number of studies draw on SMT to explain specific groups and populations that engage in political violence, including Hamas (Adkins, 2008), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Karagiannis, 2005), Brigate Rosse (Ruggiero, 2005), various Islamist movements (Wiktorowicz, 2004), and militant groups (Marsden, 2014). Extending into the international arena, Simpson (2014) uses SMT to assess 106 countries spanning over 20 years. The findings indicate an inverse relationship between terrorism and corruption (Simpson, 2014). Robinson (2004) states that terrorist groups are complex social movements and when they are understood in tactical terms then rational responses
become applicable. As Patten (2005) explains, these contentious collective actions are essentially mechanisms of political representation when people believe there is an absence of legal opportunities and avenues.

2.1.4. **The Steam-valve Theory**

Social movements can not only be effective but also necessary in fostering a healthy relationship between the state and its people. Communication is vital. If citizens perceive that they have no political efficacy, then they may become increasingly frustrated. At best, the state loses popular support; at worst, terrorism or even revolution may emerge. Combining features from the theoretical foundations of SMT and the legal concept of the safety-valve, the steam-valve theory presented in this thesis attempts to understand terrorism with respect to citizen engagement in political actions. The basic theoretical proposition is that the likelihood of domestic terrorist events decreases when citizens collectively perceive peaceful political activism as a viable means to channel grievances; hence, the name steam-valve theory. Diverging from the literature on social activism and governing structures, the core of the steam-valve theory is the people. Specifically, the citizens’ collective perceptions of political efficacy and their tendency to engage in social movements. As such, the premise of the theory is not merely whether or not people have the freedom, but rather, the people’s collective willingness to participate in political processes that are beyond the established institutions to influence policies.

These collective actions can range from signing petitions to attending demonstrations. The attitudes toward these collective actions are identified through societal responses. Collective perceptions are seen as favorable towards social movements when there is an indication of eagerness or disposition to participate in unorthodox political venues as a means of communicating discontent. It is theorized that the relationship between terrorism and shared grievances can be mediated by a primary consideration – citizens’ perception of political efficacy. This theory offers an explanation as to why positive societal perceptions for peaceful collective actions can negatively influence the likelihood that violence will be used to achieve political change. Tompkins (1992) similarly suggests that citizens will engage in violent expressions when it is perceived as a more effective strategy than alternative methods. It is worth noting that
although Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study indicates that nonviolent resistance is more effective in attaining objectives than violent insurgence; it is the people’s perspective of the political climate that matters, not empirical results. Citizens will continue to challenge their governing institutions as long as they perceive an inability to engage in peaceful political activism. When people do not see healthy lines of communication with the state, it is often a symptom of more problematic situations, which are often systemic and cannot be easily rectified.

While political efficacy is an important element, it is not the only structural variable relevant to terrorism. Among the terrorism literature, other considerations have been cited as catalysts for political violence. Accordingly, the steam-valve theory will be assessed in relation to these factors. The remainder of this chapter considers other factors that impact political behaviour and terrorism; these determinants include religion and nationalism, as well as a country’s economic and political environments. In light of recent events, for example the 9/11 attacks and the decapitations of people at the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), terrorist organizations that espouse hate and intolerance using religious dogmas have taken centre stage. There are other identifiers, however, that may underlie these faith-based groups, for instance the pride one has for their country, and macro-structural conditions, such as the economy and political freedoms. Religion (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Pratt, 2010), nationalism (Karagiannis, 2005), economic deprivation (Enders & Sandler, 2012), and repressive regimes (Blomberg & Hess, 2008a; Windsor, 2003) are often named as the motivations or source of grievances. Evaluating the existing literature, the remaining sections of this chapter will delve into these constructs and their relationships with terrorism. While religion and nationalism are not necessarily distinct, this thesis evaluates them separately for the sake of clarity.
2.2. Clash of Faiths

Terrorism and religion share a long and precarious history (Hoffman, 2006). From the Zealot-Sicarii4 (Weinberg, 2005) to the Crusades (Juergensmeyer, 2000) to modern day ISIS (Callimachi, 2015; Yourish, Watkins, Giratikanon & Lee, 2016), acts of political violence committed in the name of faith are not novel. Naar-Obed (2003) states that “our faith is … a great agitator and catalyst for direct action” (p. 122). According to Martin (2015), religious terrorism is conditioned by its environment, namely the historical contexts of ethno-national groups and the political milieu of a region. The nature of the relationship between religion and terrorism is ardently contested by academics, politicians, and the general populace. This polemic is, in part, due to the complexity in distinguishing the various influences of faith, politics, and culture, because values are not borne within a vacuum. Perspectives on how religion may condition terrorism vary from inconsequential (McTernan, 2003) to integral (Huntington, 1996). On one end of the spectrum is the secularization thesis, which identifies religion as an epiphenomenon; McTernan (2003) explains that this argument posits how faith-based systems are used to conceal the real causes of political violence while animating terrorist organizations. According to this framework, religion is not the cause of terrorism, but rather a distraction and surrogate for social, economic, and political issues (McTernan, 2003). By bringing religion to the forefront, people, namely politicians, can readily point to the problem; a problem that is more readily rectified than those in the social, economic, and political sectors. Among those who denounce religion as the root cause of terrorism are journalists, politicians, and religious leaders. For example, McTernan (2003) describes how Khouri’s5 rationale for the events of 9/11 is solely due to the frustration of fringe groups’ on American intervention in the Muslim world. By denying religion’s role in acts that are universally condemned, such as political violence, secular theorists can exonerate their respective faiths and effectively negate any negative connotations (McTernan, 2003).

4 Fighting against the Roman rule, the Zealot-Sicarii arguably engaged in a form of ethnic terrorism; but holding to their Jewish faith, their actions are motivated by religious doctrines.

5 Rami Khouri is a respected Jordanian journalist.
In contrast, the majority of theoretical and empirical works suggests that religion is influential, if not central, in certain types of political conflict (Gerolymatos, 2015; Huntington, 1993; Juergensmeyer, 2000). Faith can translate into violence in religiously devout societies, especially those that contain polarizing ideologies. Siegel and McCormick (2006) assert that acts of terrorism may arise when a religious minority perceives itself to be persecuted by a majority group, which can be religious or secular. Fueling this divide between people is the notion of duality – an *us against them* orientation. Within the religious context, this dichotomy is recast as a battle of *good* versus *evil*; essentially, it is warfare on an epic scale. Juergensmeyer (2000) describes this cosmic war as a metaphysical battle; although this divine struggle is intimate and internal to an individual, the conflict can also manifest itself externally. These cosmic wars are waged between different cultures and religions: Aryans and Jews, Catholics and Protestants, and Arabs and Jews, for instance (McTurnan, 2003). According to Aliyu, Moorthy, and Bin-Idris (2015), Muslim extremists perpetrate attacks against Christians, as well as other non-Muslims, because they transgress divine law by not adhering to Allah’s revelations. In accordance with a strict reading of the scriptures, Boko Haram, for example, view such violations as sufficient reason for extermination (Aliya et al., 2015). In fact, the origin of the group’s name is grounded in anti-Western and anti-secular rhetoric, as the term translates to “Western education is forbidden” (Aliyu et al., 2015, p. 308). Faith-inspired terrorists who kill people in the name of God have deep religious convictions and believe they have sacred duties; the positions adopted by these extremists range from secret agents to protectors of religious interests from atheists and other faiths (McTernan, 2003). One of the ways ISIS reimagines parts of the Qur’an is through the revival of slavery as an institution. The systematic rape of girls and women of the Yazidi religion is prefaced on the belief that the Qur’an condones and encourages the sexual assault of people who practice religions outside of Islam (Callimachi, 2015). More generally, this example shows how the selective use of sacred books can be implicated in terrorism.

A commonality among modern religious terrorists is their strict adherence to holy texts. According to McTernan (2003), faith-inspired terrorists emphasize certain passages, particularly violent ones, while disregarding texts that promote love, forgiveness, and compassion. When scriptures are used selectively, the cosmic war
becomes central to performance violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000), which further feeds the growing animosity between rival religious sects. Warfare, as depicted in the sacred book, is no longer metaphorical but literal (Juergensmeyer, 2000). This is evident in the influence that individuals and groups, such as bin-Laden and ISIS, are able to exert on Islamic fundamentalists (Callimachi, 2015; Martin, 2015), or Swift’s cogent rhetoric to Christians of the White Supremacy persuasion. An example of selective emphasis is seen in the manifesto published on an Aryan Nations (2015) website:

WE BELIEVE that there are literal children of Satan in the world today. These children are the descendants of Cain, who was a result of eve’s [sic] original sin, her physical seduction by Satan. We know that because of this sin there is a battle and a natural enmity between the children of Satan and the children of The Most High God (Yahweh). Genesis 3:15; 1 John 3:12

WE BELIEVE that the Cananite Jew is the natural enemy of our Aryan (White) Race. This is attested by scripture and all secular history. The Jew is like a destroying virus that attacks our racial body to destroy our Aryan culture and the purity of our Race. Those of our Race who resist these attacks are called "chosen and faithful." John 8:44; 1 Thessalonians 2:15; Revelations 17:14

WE BELIEVE that there is a battle being fought this day between the children of darkness (today known as Jews) and the children of light (Yahweh, The Ever living God), the Aryan Race, the true Israel of the bible. Revelations 12:10-11 (paras. 16-18).

In this case, the strict reading of the Bible is used to paint a divine struggle between the spawns of Satan and the children of God; quite literally an ecclesiastical war (see Appendix A for direct citations). By evoking the religious imagination of Aryans, devout followers are compelled to perform acts of violence in order to protect the White race, and by extension, God. As Juergensmeyer (2000) puts it, these roles are preordained through religious imperatives; it is an all-or-nothing battle. In order to secure and defend their faith, the destruction of the other becomes paramount. Prefacing on these exclusive religious claims, compromises are unthinkable (McTurnan, 2003).

While religion can lead people down violent paths, Juergensmeyer (2000) believes that the reverse is also apparent, because “violent events have reached out for religious justification” (p. 161). This means that the relationship between faith and political violence can occur in two ways: 1) elicit religious images to incite bloodshed; 2) characterize worldly struggles as ethereal conflicts. In the second instance, battles are
no longer isolated to the individual but transcends to the cultural and religious realm. According to Juergensmeyer (2000), this latter approach entails three characteristics that increase the likelihood that events will be interpreted as a cosmic war. The first posits that conflict is necessary in order to defend the identity and pride of an entire culture, including the self. The second feature is that losing is unthinkable because it is necessary to fulfill sacred decrees. The third attribute refers to hopelessness, in which struggles can only be overcome by placing their faith in God’s hands. In other words, religion becomes the only source of strength.

In all of these scenarios, the world view is altered and illegal acts in a peaceful society can be morally just in the cosmic war (Juergensmeyer, 2000). Using the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as an exemplar, Underwood (2013) notes that roughly 75% of the group self-identify as Catholic; the social milieu of Northern Ireland is a frequent reminder of the historical and cultural divide between the Protestants and Catholics. While the conflict concerns political and geographic boundaries, the religious identities of those involved are nonetheless relevant and prime motivators (Underwood, 2013). When religion influences the interpretation of everyday struggles and trials in life, it can become problematic. Violence becomes a viable option when answers are derived from such rigid and absolute scriptures.

Accentuating the role of religion even further is Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilization. Diverging from the concept of cosmic war (Juergensmeyer, 2000), religion is no longer an issue, but rather the issue. Although his emphasis is on culture, Huntington (1993) is essentially espousing differences in faith, in which fault lines between groups are generated by fervent religious dogma. While previous struggles throughout Western history concern battles amongst kings, nations, then ideologies, Huntington (1993) posits that the end of the Cold War signified the imminent clash of civilizations. Civilizations are the highest cultural grouping of people, characterized by objective features (e.g., language, history, religion, customs and institutions) and subjective self-identification (Huntington, 1993). Huntington (1993) offers six reasons to explain how the existence of various civilizations will generate conflict: 1) differences are basic; 2) globalization increases interactions between groups which, in turn, intensifies civilization consciousness; 3) religion replaces nation state as a source of identity; 4) de-Westernization of elites among non-Western societies; 5) religion is exclusive and
discriminates sharply; 6) economic regionalism is rooted in cultural and religious commonalities. Each of these explanations either directly states that religion is a key player or describes circumstances where religious differences exacerbate animosity and conflict.

When describing one of five objective elements that characterize civilizations, Huntington (1993) also relies disproportionately on religious examples to illustrate clashes, which can manifest both within and between states. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, which represents ideology, the Velvet Curtain of culture rises and, once again, religious cleavages become prominent within Europe: Christianity in the West, Christian Orthodox in the East, and Islam to the South (Huntington, 1993). These general clusters, or civilizations, engender hostility because of their different characteristics. Huntington (1993) notes that conflicts are predominantly between Islam and the West, which becomes synonymous with Christianity. Violence, however, is not restricted at the state level, but permeates into the subnational level because of migration and the dynamic nature of civilizations. In Nigeria, for example, there are periodic incidents between Muslims and Christians; similarly, Sudan’s Islamist government subjugates its Christian minority (Huntington, 1993). These religious examples are littered throughout history, to the point that religion becomes the dominant characteristic of civilizations. According to McTernan (2003), the Treaty of Westphalia altered religion into a social agent; as a result, religion became part of the nation, as well as the culture, despite the original intent of the treaty.

Building on the examples used to illustrate the clashes of civilizations, another prominent theme Huntington (1993) discusses is that the West will be targeted. Huntington (1993) believes that not only is the West the champion civilization, it is also the standard towards which others strive. Aside from religion, conflicts surface in the pursuit of military, economic, and institutional power (Huntington, 1993). Relatively homogenous countries with diverging ideals regarding civilizations and belonging are referred to as torn countries; these countries vary in their level of desire and ability to join the West.6 While both Turkey and Mexico fall within this category, Mexico is more likely

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6 Interestingly, Australia is an exemplar of a torn country in reverse because of its desire to join Asia and defect the West.
to succeed. According to Huntington (1993), the leaders of Turkey are active in their attempts to merge with the West through alliances; however, Turkish citizens have expressed their view as a Middle Eastern Muslim society and thirst for an Islamic revival. In addition to the enthusiasm among the elite to redefine the country, however, Mexico also has some support from its citizens and dominant groups are willing to convert (Huntington, 1993); these are favourable conditions for Mexico.

On the other hand, countries that have no desire to redefine their civilization is referred to as the Confucian-Islamic connection (Huntington, 1993). A number of countries, also known as Weaponized States (e.g., China, Pakistan and India), either have, or have the capacity to use, weapons of mass destruction (Huntington, 1993). These weapons consist of missiles as well as those that are nuclear, chemical, or biological in nature. A network of trade between these countries, including North Korea and Middle Eastern countries, have developed – a Confucian-Islamic military. Huntington (1993) avers that these states are threats to Western interests in the form of an arms competition. In other words, the social order faces danger because military power is no longer solely in the hands of the West. Continuing with the logic underlying clash of civilizations, these groups will inevitably elevate from rivalry to violence because of their incompatibility; consequently, Western civilization will come under siege. Akin to Islamic leaders’ appeal to Muslims to take up arms in the war against the West, Huntington (1993) advises the Western civilization to unite and protect its interest from this Confucian-Islamic threat.

In response to Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations, a number of criticisms emerge, the least of which is the following passage:

His book conveys a challenge, like he wants us to refute him
Daring us, by scaring us, to doubt him or dispute him
Which is fine for academic-argument-displaying
As long as someone powerful won’t act on what he’s saying


This assessment is indicative of the myriad of responses among the academic community prior to the events of 9/11. Some of the evaluations among this literature that still persists today concern: 1) fractured and disunited civilizations; 2) cross-pollination of values; and 3) its justification for the West to interfere with Middle Eastern
affairs. Huntington (1993) theorizes that civilizational loyalties and apathies will define world politics. If this holds true, then civilizations, such as Sinic societies, will be drawn to each other while rebuffing civilizations that are distinct from their own. In other words, birds of a feather flock together. Bajpai (1999), however, avers that this is not the case. To illustrate how Huntington’s (1993) perspective contradicts reality, Bajpai (1999) points to Taiwan’s desire for independence from the mainland since the mid-twentieth century and Singapore’s actions to limit China’s power in their country. Moreover, the discords among Sinic societies are also palpable in Hong Kong’s recent protests against China’s policies (Phillips, 2015) and Tibet’s longstanding dispute with the mainland over its independence, which was declared over a century ago, in 1913 (Tenpa, 2012). An empirical evaluation further humbles Huntington’s (1993) assertion of unity among civilizations. In Russett et al.’s (2000) work on civilizational differences, militarized interstate disputes are analyzed from 1950 to 1992. The results suggest that, aside from the tensions between Israel and Islam, clashes between Western and non-Western civilizations are no more likely than those between or within other groups, including Islam (Russett et al., 2000). These fragmented civilizations are the antithesis of Huntington’s (1993) assertions.

With regards to the cross-pollination of values, studies show that there is a transfer of values between civilizations. For example, Balci (2009) de-mythizes the clash notion by citing Said’s article as an example, stating that it points to the weakest part of Huntington’s (1993) thesis. Huntington (1993) wavers in outlining the cleavages between civilizations, and Said notes that these civilizations are “hybrid and heterogeneous” and not independent bodies. [The] clash-based arguments …. “plow or divide [civilizations] with barriers” despite “the overwhelming evidence that today’s world, is, in fact, a world of mixtures, of migrations and of crossings over, of boundaries traversed” (Balci, 2009, p. 99).

Cultures overlap as people learn and borrow from one another. Balci (2009) notes that this makes it difficult to delineate the self from the other. Moreover, a recent study shows that globalization does not increase tensions between civilizations, as Huntington (1993) claims. Using World Values Survey data from 1989 to 2007, Uz (2015)

7 De-mythize is a term used by Balci (2009) and it refers to the process of unraveling a widely held idea that is untrue (p. 95).
investigates three models put forth by theorists regarding the impact of globalization: homogenization, polarization, and hybridization. Homogenization suggests that civilizations become increasingly similar to Western culture, whereas polarization stipulates the escalation of differences along civilizational lines, and hybridization posits that the various civilizations will blend and come together as one (Uz, 2015). Huntington’s (1993) thesis is firmly situated within the polarization perspective. Uz’s (2015) results, however, indicate that globalization leads to homogenization, and hybridization to a lesser degree. In particular, the cultural differences between Western and non-Western countries are less than those within these civilizations; moreover, the differences increase over time in the same direction, though they differed in the rate of change (Uz, 2015).

With regards to Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations as a justification for the West to encroach in matters within the Middle East, this becomes more evident following al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States in 2001. According to al-Ahsan (2009), the attacks on 9/11 are often looked at as evidence that supports Huntington’s (1993) stance. These sentiments regarding the West versus Islam are further circulated by the Bush administration (Al-Ahsan, 2009). The role of the media and the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy are also discussed in this context. In the aftermath of 9/11, the political motivations of al-Qaeda are downplayed by the media. For instance, Bottici and Challand (2006) state that bin-Laden was explicit about their reasons, pointing to the 80 years of war endured in the Middle East and to avenge the lives lost in Palestine. These statements were not made known to the public, but particular images and cultural narratives were. As Bottici and Challand (2006) explain, by ignoring bin-Laden’s political goals and framing the 9/11 attacks with the clash of civilizations perspective turned Huntington’s (1993) theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy. These narratives are put forth through media portrayals of Muslims as the radical and conflictual other; furthermore, the work on myth operates with icons, that is fragmentary and allusive references or subtle associations of images which are apprehended through more or less conscious exposure to them. Being exposed to such icons, they tend to slip into our unconsciousness and to thus avoid the possibility of a critical discourse (Bottici & Challand, 2006, p. 325).

It is through such icons, guided in no small part by Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations and the associated intellectual discourse, which helps orient Muslims with a
negatively biased representation. In a similar line of thought, Balci (2009) attests that Huntington’s (1993) thesis advocates for Western society’s presence in the Middle East. Specifically, by conveying that Islam outrivals other civilizations in their ability to foster terrorists, while disregarding the worth of democracies (Balci, 2009). This is among the criticisms of Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations because the thesis incites and furthers violence using premises that are self-fulfilling.

Despite the focus on the traditional Abrahamic faiths, religious terrorism extends beyond the monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In India, Sikh and Hindu terrorists clash in bloody altercations over holy lands and respective intolerance of other religions as well as foreign influence. Aum Shinrikyo of Japan, a Buddhism-inspired sect, used Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway as a means to purify the corrupt world of its negative karma (McTernan, 2003). When religious cleavages are prominent within a society, incompatible faiths often become agitated. For example, sectarian violence between Hindu and Muslim communities within India have fulminated since the end of British colonial rule in 1947 (Martin, 2015). Independence for the Jammu and Kashmir region, which is situated along the edges of Pakistan, India, and China, is the primary concern. While this conflict is riddled with cultural and political goals, their rivalry is also coloured with religious animosity. If Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations is incorrect, then conflicts between civilizations are not simply grounded in cultural differences and religious dogmas. Given these criticisms, other confounding factors are contributing to the relationship between religion and terrorism, if not superseding its impact on political violence.

The relationship between religion and terrorism is undeniably complex. Although an amalgamation of various injustices – political, social, and economic – are often enmeshed in the protest of terrorist organizations, theological arguments can evidently contribute or exacerbate civil conflicts (McTurnan, 2003). While some societies do feel strongly about their religious convictions, through collective feelings of engagement, belonging, and levels of importance regarding faith among its citizens, these beliefs do not necessarily translate into violence. As Huntington (1993) and Juergensmeyer (2000) illustrate, however, when multiple, polarizing religious groups coexist within a society, tensions in the form of bloodshed can arise.
2.3. Nationalism

Apart from religion, other ideological differences, such as nationalism, can also generate cleavages within society. The concept of nationalism is extremely nuanced; it is an identity based on a medley of values and beliefs. At its core, nationalism is a conviction that the interests of the nation are of utmost importance. According to Cooter (2011), nationalism “refers to feelings of belonging that individuals have toward their national groups” (p. 365), in which nations are defined by physical or imagined boundaries. This idea of togetherness, premised on this loose definition of nationality, offers people an opportunity to be a part of something greater than themselves. In a similar vein, Martin (2013) believes nationalism inspires people by focusing on their cultural, religious, ethnic, or racial identity. Since nationalism is a type of ideology, its manifestations – religious, ethnic, or secular – can be placed on an ideological continuum. Martin’s (2013) chart (see Table 2-1) illustrates a range of political beliefs that are applicable to the various dispositions, including moderate to extreme perspectives. With respect to terrorism, groups may see violence as an appropriate response to being marginalized or ostracized by mainstream society. Terrorism in this case is the result of an unwillingness or inability of various social groups to come to a consensus. Among the nationalism literature, the words nation, community, country, and state, are commonly used interchangeably. For this thesis, however, nations, cultures, and communities are defined as groups of people with a shared heritage, customs, and traditions (e.g., with a religious and/or ethnic basis), irrespective of state lines (Brodie & Rein, 2005; Byman, 1998). Conversely, countries and states are used to describe distinct political entities. In order to properly appreciate nationalism in the context of political violence, religion, ethnicity, and secular nationalism will be discussed. Though distinct in their narratives, framing, and objectives, nationalism can underlie each of these categories.
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<th>Table 2-1</th>
<th>The Classical Ideological Continuum: Modern Political Environments (Martin, 2013, p. 63)</th>
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<td>Championed groups</td>
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<td>Desired outcome</td>
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<td>Description of extremism</td>
<td>Future oriented; deep desire to reform or destroy currently oppressive and corrupt systems; forcibly insists their right to justice and equality.</td>
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</table>
2.3.1. **Religious Nationalism**

Religious nationalism consists of politicized fundamentalists who appeal to a spiritual, or supernatural, foundation in their ideology (Martin, 2013). With reference to Martin’s (2013) continuum in Table 2-1, groups under this category tend to be on the right side of the spectrum. A number of terrorist activities throughout the Middle East have been reflective of religious nationalism. Nationalism is love for a nation before anything else; a love that ascribes comrades and enemies, such is the case for Arab or Palestinian nationalism (Makiya, 1993). For this region, religious narratives often dictate Islamic nationalism; political aspirations are driven by the combination of Islamic doctrine and claims to the nation’s interests. This interplay of religion and nationalism dates back to the time of Muhammed as a spiritual, political, legal, and military leader (Boyd, 2015, Lewis, 2003); as a result, there is no separation of church and state. Since love and pride for one’s country are so ingrained with religion in this area, societal responses to injuries and injustices are often coloured by Islamic dogma. Lewis (2003) notes that while terrorist groups may be defined by their culture and religious practice, their motives are driven by nationalist, rather than religious, imperatives.

Gerolymatos (2015) explains that, in Western society, jihad, meaning struggle, has become synonymous with Middle Eastern terrorism, despite the fact that the interpretation of the word varies from an internal struggle against sin to external battles against the enemies of Islam. Following the holy war rhetoric often put forth by Muslim extremists, Western countries are regarded as secular imperialists subverting Islamic societies (Huntington, 1993). In kind, jihad is framed as a necessary path to defend against the corrupt clout of the West (Bunzel, 2015). Influential Islamic scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood, encourage the use of violence to resist not only the influence of the West but also false Islamic governments (Gerolymatos, 2015). Deeply imbued with religious rhetoric, the line between faith- and nationalism-based political violence among these terrorist groups becomes blurred. Al-Qaeda and ISIS present themselves as interesting case studies. Bunzel (2015) states that, although their interpretations of jihad differs, both groups aspire to restore the caliphate and are ideologically driven by strict readings of the Qur’an. Buttressed by Islamic doctrine, they both vehemently despise the West and its secular culture (Bunzel, 2015; Gerolymatos,
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Echoing Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations, it is the amalgamation of negative interactions between the West, mostly notably Great Britain and the United States, and Islam that fuels the ire of militants within Muslim communities. For the Middle East, the hostile perception of the West is reinforced by events (e.g., European colonialism, military occupation, Palestinian crisis, and Iranian Revolution), political strategies (e.g., Sykes-Picot Agreement and Baghdad pact), religious narratives (Sayyid Qutb), pan-Arab nationalist aspirations (e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Islamic state), and the interpretations of the meaning behind the War or Terror (Gerolymatos, 2015). Although clash of civilization (Huntington, 1993) is essentially a religious argument, the relevance of nationalism within particular contexts cannot be ignored. As Siegel and McCormick (2006) note, tensions can rise when the interests of the majority is promoted over the minority, be it religious or ethnic. The situation where religious minorities rage cosmic wars against demonic majorities is comparable to cases in which ethnic minorities take up arms to fight oppressive majorities; albeit frames shift from the celestial to the cultural.

2.3.2. Ethnic Nationalism

When terrorist organizations rally behind a desire for a national identity that is politically recognized, such as a sovereign state, they may be classified as ethnic-nationalist when they engage in acts of violence to achieve self-determination. The concept of ethnic-nationalism is contingent upon a shared history, culture, and language among a group of people (Brodie & Rein, 2005; Garber, 2005). According to Byman (1998), ethnic refers to “a group of people bound together by a belief of common heritage and group distinctiveness” (p. 166). Smith (2008) states that modern nations are generally formed from ethnic ties and sentiments; as such, nations and nationalisms are primarily characterized by ethnicities and cultures. While ethnicity is often the foundation of a nation, a nation is not necessarily synonymous with a country. In fact, Thornton states that the heterogeneous population in “most African countries today are
countries, not nations, states, or ethnic groups” (as cited in Harrow, 2001, pp. 39, 41). When societies are composed of such diverse groups of people, it can be difficult to find a unifying bond. The absence of a fundamental identity in these African countries, such as South Africa, confers the nickname “Rainbow Nation” (Harrow, 2001). On the other hand, there are countries with dominant ethnicities that then define the nationality of that state. This latter ethnic composition is the more common one. For example, Clarke (2007) describes the diverse ethnic populations in China, which consists of a majority Han and other minorities.

Given the emphasis on ethnic ties among certain groups, conflicts occur as a result of the reluctance to compromise. Byman (1998) notes that ethnic identities reject other identities that are perceived as political rivals. In Spain, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom terrorist organization believes that “to be Basque is not to be Spanish” (Byman, 1998, p. 154). According to Gellner (2012), nationalism is a minus-sum game. Many ethnic groups aspire to operate as sovereign states; however, given the existing political bodies, that is impractical (Gellner, 2012). In the context of Europe, Hroch (2012) notes three irreplaceable components in the process of nation-building: a common past, strong linguistic or cultural ties, and equality among its members to form a civil society. Since most states are formed from dominant ethnic cultures, non-dominant ethnic groups are assimilated, integrated, or perceive their own potential nations that are reflective of their people (Hroch, 2012). In the third situation, individuals within the non-dominant ethnic group may pursue emancipation from the dominant structure.

According to Weinberg (2013), ethnic-nationalists have a desire to separate from an existing state to join another country or create an independent nation. As Smith (2008) notes, ethnic communities underlie collective political identities that create a deep sense of unity. People who commit acts of violence in the name of their ethnic-identities generally lean toward the left side of Martin’s (2013) ideological continuum (Table 2-1). Martin (2013) asserts that left-wing terrorism acts are often acts of last resort, in which other means of communicating with the state, such as peaceful dissent, have failed. In the Middle Ages, martyrdom for the community was arguably embodied by the

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8 As is previously mentioned, the reference to states here should be read in the context of nations and ethnic groups, as opposed to countries.
Crusaders and the Ottoman ghazis (Smith, 2008). Examples of ethnic nationalist terrorist groups in the modern age include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Caucasus Emirate in Russia’s North Caucasus, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain (Public Safety Canada, 2014), all of which are inspired by ethnic-nationalism at their core. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is a leftist militant group which seeks to attain autonomy for Kurds, though its original motive was to establish a Kurdish homeland (BBC, 2015d).

Another instance in which minorities confront the state for self-determination is the Uighur people in China. In an examination of ethnic-terrorism in Xinjian, Clarke (2007) finds that although these Uighur separatist movements are largely passive, acts of aggression have been greatly exaggerated by the Chinese government. These discrepancies are worth noting to highlight the role of the state. Namely, there are inconsistencies on the number of dead and the injured in the reports provided by the Information Office of the State Council (Clarke, 2007). Clarke (2007) also states that there has been a revival of the ethnic-identity of the Uighur minority since 1991; however, this has become stifled in light of the state’s rapid economic modernization and zero-tolerance for expressing autonomy. China’s suppression of people’s identities can provoke backlashes, as seen in the violent expressions of some Uighur separatists. The determination of ethnic-groups to establish independent homelands is of utmost importance. To these people, nations with explicit characteristics such as language, culture, and history, take priority over all other interests and values (Martin, 2013). A homeland is perceived as an essential step to making their communities whole and to properly represent their interests within society.

This case for self-determination has roots in Article 1, Part 2, of the Declaration of the United Nations. In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations Charter proclaims that self-determination is a fundamental human right (Huntington, 1993; United Nations, 2015); this statement effectively ended colonialism. By legitimizing national self-determination, the United Nations empowers people to attain independence from their colonial rulers. Consequently, various conflicts manifest between and within groups of people as they seek self-governance. As evidenced in the tumultuous
conditions of the postcolonial Middle East, Harrow (2001) states that colonialism also complicates the concept of nationhood by creating “imagined” communities (see also Gerolymatos, 2015). Imagined communities can consist of people who share ethnic and cultural history, irrespective of state lines (Harrow, 2001). Rothi, Lyons, and Chryssochoou (2005) add that these imagined communities are an important part of identity and self-definition. These communities are not necessarily geographically designated, but rather defined by shared interests and identities among groups of people. Drawing from Anderson’s *Imagined Communities*, Balakrishnan (2012) offers how people’s ties to a nation can elicit comparable sacrifices to those for religion. It is through kinship and the desire for social continuity that can incite individuals to die for their nation (Balakrishnan, 2012).

The family has been traditionally conceived as the domain of disinterested love and solidarity. So too, if historians, diplomats, politicians, and social scientists are quiet at ease with the idea of ‘national interest’, for most ordinary people of whatever class the whole point of the nation is that it is interestless. Just for that reason, it can ask for sacrifices (Anderson, 1991, p. 131; as cited in Balakrishnan, 2012, p. 206).

In other words, the inclination to protect and fight for a nation largely relies on familial motifs. For such terrorist groups, these imagined communities fuel their desire to emancipate from a state(s) through violent means, as depicted by the Kurds in Turkey and Uighurs in China. The identities and kinships of these groups revolve around their ethnic backgrounds; ultimately, these terrorists murder and sacrifice themselves in the name and furtherance of their nation.

2.3.3. **Patriotic Nationalism**

The second [sc. species of religion], limited to a single country only, gives that country its special patrons and tutelary deities. Its dogmas, its rites and its external cult are prescribed by law; outside of the single nation which follows it, it regards everything as infidel, foreign and barbarous; it extends the rights and duties of man no farther than its alters.


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9 It should be noted that while colonialism did not help matters, it is not the root of violent Islamic movements. Habeck (2006) states that early thinkers date back to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the originator of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, known as Wahhbism or Salifi.
Of people who die for their nation, however, the familial motifs of the ethnic-nationalists are framed with respect to the country. The strong bond that is evident among ethnic-nationalists is also noticeable among secular nationalists. This attachment is a form of patriotism; it is a love for the country (Guo, 2007). According to Acton (2012) “patriotism is in political life what faith is in religion, and it stands to the domestic feelings and to homesickness as faith to fanaticism and to superstition” (p. 33). One interpretation of nationalism refers to pride strictly in relation to a country, regardless of religious or ethnic backgrounds. Smith (2008) notes that when nationalism is framed as a "secular religion of the people", it refers to the worship of the nation; in other words, the marriage of human and terrestrial citizenship. Within this context, it is possible that national membership evokes similar sentiments and thus, violence in the name of this secular ideology.

Distinct from ethnic-nationalism, which is premised on ethnic communities, civic nationalism is defined through state citizenship (Verkhovskii & Pain, 2012). Accordingly, a high degree of pride for the country among its citizens denote a high degree of nationalism – albeit in a secular sense. Hroch (2012) states that nationalism stricto sensu is an outlook where “absolute priority [is given] to the values of the nation over all other values and interests” (p. 80). This outlook, however, is not unanimously agreed upon. In fact, Rothi et al. (2005) note that “British does not mean the same thing to all Britons” (p. 149). In examining national identity and relational orientation, two types of attachment orientations emerged: blind relational and constructive relational (Rothi et al., 2005). The former refers to a rigid, single-minded loyalty for, and positive evaluation of, a country; whereas the latter is oriented towards a positive change for a country through critical loyalty and by challenging existing practices. In other words, people in the blind group tend to be more traditional and focused on the past, while those in the constructive group are more progressive and forward-thinking. Due to the nature of these orientations and their respective assessments of their country, people who are highly patriotic tend to fall into the blind group.

Since the values and interests of a country are subjectively prescribed, they can be informed by religious, ethnic, or racially charged ideals. Patriots would be situated on the right side of Martin’s (2013) ideological continuum (see Table 2-1), and share beliefs with religious and white nationalists (Blee & Creasap, 2010). Moreover, people under
this category are defined by the movements, groups, and causes they are against, rather than support (e.g., anti-gay, anti-abortion, and anti-immigration) (Blee & Creasap, 2010). These conservative beliefs are premised on the notion that certain themes, such as acceptance of homosexuality or female autonomy, are contrary to a personal interpretation of a country’s values. Furthermore, Blee and Creasap (2010) explain that extremist conservatives abhor governing entities and value individual rights and freedoms. As a result, passionate disagreements develop when the values reflected by the majority are inconsistent with those held by the minority. The primary focus among these secular nationalists is on policies and legal expressions (Parent & Ellis III, 2014).

The white supremacist movement (WSM) offers an interesting example of these positions. Though small in numbers, the WSM is persistent in its use of extra-institutional means to effect change in society; a common goal within this social movement is to raise awareness among the white populace (Cooter, 2011). This awareness primarily concerns race as well as gender roles. Cooter (2011) notes several aspects that are consistent across the movement, including: superiority of the white race, disdain towards people who are not white, and the exclusive power reserved for the white male. With an ideology premised on a spiritual view of reality, the WSM is essentially driven by the beliefs in a championed cause and that the group is chosen above all others (Brubaker, 2009; Martin, 2013).

For example, the National Alliance resents immigration and the United States (US) government because they argue that they threaten white people and their existence (Freilich, Chermak & Caspo, 2009). In fact, Freilich et al. (2009) describe how the founder, William Luther Pierce III, wrote The Turner Diaries, which inspired Timothy McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Other organizations, such as Klassen’s Church of the Creator (COTC; now the World Church of the Creator), also believe in this conspiracy against the white race, coining the term Racial Holy War (also known as

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10 It should be noted that desirable values are hotly contested even between these conservatives. In a non-violent and strictly political context, Trump and Cruz argue over this topic in a Republican debate (Pilkington & Jacobs, 2015).

11 These rights and freedoms are, again, subjective and do not extend to other people whose values and way of life are contrary to theirs.
Touting and exemplifying the contra-mantra of these organizations, COTC’s newspaper *Racial Loyalty* attacks factions from Mormons to Odins; despite this hostility, the group maintains that they promote “White Civil Rights, White Self-Determination, and White Liberation via 100% legal activism” (Parent & Ellis III, 2014, p. 11). Similarly, the neo-Nazis and their offshoots in the US echo these sentiments.

Firmly rooted in racial bigotry and a hint of religious zealotry, neo-Nazi organizations aspire to return to the “glory days”. Cooter’s (2011) research on the United States’ White Aryan Resistance (WAR) is another example of the link between nationalism and white supremacy. Created by Tom Metzger in the 1980s, WAR is another subset of the larger WSM (Cooter, 2011). To illustrate how WAR’s conceptualization of nationalism is unique from those in mainstream America, Cooter (2011) quotes a passage from the group’s newsletter:

> It is good to be proud of your country and its history, but your country is not your nation. Our Race is our Nation and the only nation we owe allegiance to. For if our Race ceases to exist it will not matter one iota what lands it resided in nor what it did while it was there (WAR, 2000; as cited in Cooter, 2011, p. 373).

For WAR, the American identity should be reserved for the Aryan race; moreover, it is uniquely confined to white males who are willing partake in aggressive acts to reclaim a white state (Cooter, 2011). In this regard, race and nationalism become synonymous with one another. For the neo-Nazis, the Aryan race’s claim to superiority is substantiated through God’s word.\(^\text{12}\)

While the above are all forms of nationalism, its manifestation can have different connotations that are highly dependent on the context. Moreover, these terrorist organizations have distinctive political objectives, which range from the establishment of a sovereign state to aggressively advocating legal matters. Regardless of how the persecutions of groups are framed - religious, ethnic, or secular - there are inherent issues with promoting certain nationalistic interests at the detriment of others. When this problem is perceived to be greatly unjust, with sufficient context, movements are borne.

\(^{12}\) The role of religion in WAR is contentious because it racial-awareness is paramount to all other interests (Cooter, 2011).
2.4. Economic Conditions

Perceived injustices, however, are not restricted to attitudes concerning religion or nationalism. A generous amount of empirical research on terrorism examines the economic conditions of countries and their influence on political violence (Blomberg & Hess, 2008b; Li, 2005; Orsini, 2012). The three primary propositions on the relationship between poverty and terrorism are positive (Enders & Hoover, 2012), negative (Findley & Young, 2011), and unrelated (Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006). In assessing this relationship, Gurr’s (1968) theory of relative deprivation posits that civil strife is the result of perceived discontents. This refers to the perceived discrepancy between a person’s value expectations and value capacities (Gurr, 1968). Value expectations are the goods and qualities an individual believes they are justifiably entitled to, whereas value capacities are those they are realistically able to attain. Accordingly, relative deprivation is the difference between the assets a person claims a right to and the capital they can actually acquire. Gurr’s (1968) study finds that, between 1961 and 1965, “nations’ levels of persisting deprivation are consistently and directly related to their levels of strife” (p. 1123); thus, economic deprivation is believed to be a strong determinant of civil violence. At the macro-level, relative deprivation leads to anger and resentment among citizens, and this widespread discontent increases the likelihood of political violence in that country. Even with the inclusion of other factors, such as religious cleavage and political separatism, the positive relationship between economic deprivation and civil strife remains constant (Gurr, 1968). This implies that terrorism becomes a tool for citizens to relieve their frustrations regarding the perceived injustices within the economic sector.

The idea that unhealthy economies experience more instances of terrorist activity is a dominant theme in the literature (Bravo & Dias, 2006; Ehrlich & Liu, 2002; Krieger & Meierriecks, 2009). As Newman (2006) explains, poverty is popular in this context because it is believed to breed resentment and desperation. Gurr’s (1968) relative deprivation informs a substantial portion of this research. Accordingly, the central argument is that terrorism, and political conflicts in general, are rooted in poverty (Piazza, 2006). In sum, persistent, negative, economic condition is a strong determinant of civil violence. Among this body of literature, the two common measurements of a country’s financial standing are gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and
unemployment rates. It is worth noting that although GDP and unemployment rates are related to economic performance and well-being, they do not directly attend to Gurr’s (1968) relative deprivation (Davies, 1994), rather, they are proxies of the phenomenon. In line with the rooted in poverty perspective, the anticipated relationship is that low GDP per capita and high unemployment rates increase terrorist activity.

A number of studies examine terrorism using GDP per capita as an explanatory variable. In Davies’ (1994) analyses of 12 European countries, GDP negatively impacted political violence between 1965 and 1990. So as a country’s GDP decreases, the probability of political violence increases. Using a similar sample, Caruso and Schneider (2011) investigate 12 countries in Western Europe from 1994 to 2007. Their results show that for every increase in GDP per capita, the expected number of terrorist incidents are reduced by three and a half percent. When political considerations, such as voter turnout and fractionalization of political parties, are added into the model, each increase in GDP per capita decreases terrorism by five and a half percent (Caruso & Schneider, 2011). This indicates that GDP per capita has a greater effect on political violence when political institutions are taken into account. Interestingly, however, GDP per capita is positively associated with terrorist brutality, which is indicated by the number of victims in a given event (Caruso & Schneider, 2011). These results replicate Tavares’ (2004) analyses on GDP per capita and the severity of terrorist events – measured through the number of victims. Caruso and Schneider’s (2011) results suggest that while GDP per capita is inversely correlated with the occurrence of terrorism (i.e. rooted in poverty), it is directly associated with the severity of political violence when they do occur. This latter assertion is substantiated by Tavares’ (2004) findings as well.

Furthering the notion that terrorism is rooted in poverty, Coggin’s (2015) assessment of 153 countries between 1999 and 2008 shows that states with the lowest GDP per capita are found to be significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorism. Using data from 1998 to 2007, Enders and Hoover (2012) posit that as income inequality rises, measured via Gini coefficient, the levels of political violence do as well. With regards to GDP per capita, terrorism tends to decrease when the GDP is above $1,000; however, political violence can increase if there are also issues concerning income inequality, as the relationship between GDP per capita and terrorism
is nonlinear (Enders & Hoover, 2012). In the context of transnational terrorism, Li (2005) states that there is a negative relationship between GDP per capita and the occurrence of terrorism among a sample of 119 countries between 1975 and 1997.\(^{13}\) Likewise, Blomberg and Hess (2008b) use data from 179 countries and find those that are economically healthy generally encounter fewer events of political violence. The negative relationship between a country’s fiscal stability and terrorism is also documented by Krieger and Meierrieks (2009). There is a consensus among these studies that high GDP per capita is correlated with fewer instances of terrorism; thus, reinforcing the rooted in poverty phenomena.

With regard to unemployment rates, the other common indicator used to assess economic health, the prevailing perspective\(^{14}\) is that high unemployment rates increase the likelihood of political violence. Unemployment is essentially a proxy for the broader social welfare of a country (Caruso & Schneider, 2011). Referring to Gurr’s (1968) theory on relative deprivation, an individual’s inability to attain employment would hinder his or her capacity to acquire goods he or she may feel entitled to. Consequently, high unemployment rates should correspondingly translate to high vulnerability to civil strife. Davies (1994) documents a positive association between the rate of unemployment and political violence across a number of European countries between 1965 and 1990, including Greece, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France. In Goldstein’s (2005) study using data between 2003 and 2004, unemployment rates consistently increase the risk of terrorism across multiple models. These models vary in sample size (92 to 169)\(^{15}\) and in the inclusion of various explanatory variables (e.g., political rights, linguistic fractionalization, and GDP per capita). Caruso and Schneider (2011) also find analogous results, albeit in a particular demographic. The results indicate that high unemployment rates among youth have a positive correlation with a country’s tendency to experience terrorism in Western Europe. These findings are echoed by Enders and Sandler (2012) as they similarly maintain that people who have limited opportunities, due to low income or unemployment, are more susceptible to recruitment for terrorist

\(^{13}\) Given that Li’s (2005) study focuses on transnational terrorism, its relevance for domestic terrorism is debatable as the perpetrators are not citizens of the country.

\(^{14}\) Though few, there are some studies, such as Piazza’s (2006), that do not find significant relationships between unemployment and terrorism.

\(^{15}\) This was based on the availability of the data.
organizations. Regarding the civil unrest in Northern Africa, Galito (2012) attests to the detrimental impact of high unemployment rates and unfair distribution of resources in the attainment of peace within the Sahal region. From these findings, it is evident that as unemployment rates increase, the occurrence of terrorism also increases in a number of different contexts.

### 2.5. Societal Health and Well-being

In addition to economic health, the personal health of a country’s constituents also matters. According to Article 25, paragraph 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

> everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (United Nations, 2009).

In spite of this, the right to an adequate standard of living is not always available to people. The overall well-being of a country’s citizens is an important characteristic of that society and a reflection of that state’s concern for its people. While health is a macro-structural indicator akin to economics and is therefore relevant in the assessment of anti-state political violence, it is usually not emphasized; in relation to the epistemology of political violence, it is usually dealt with in a cursory manner (Caruso & Schneider, 2011), when it is discussed at all.

The vast majority of terrorism studies which consider health in their analyses use life expectancy as an indicator of health, either directly (Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Ehrlich & Liu, 2002) or as part of a larger construct (see Abadie, 2006; Coggins, 2015). According to the World Bank (2016), “[l]ife expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life” (para. 1). In other words, it is the mean number of years a baby is expected to live if the current death rate remains constant. Using life expectancy as an explanatory health variable, Drakos and Gofas (2006) examine transnational terrorism among 139 countries and find an insignificant relationship
between life expectancy and the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by domestic entities. With regards to larger constructs, the Human Development Index (HDI) is “the best known of the international development indices designed with the aim of measuring achievements in human and social well-being” (Smith, 2005, p. 325). The HDI compiles a country’s life expectancy at birth, education attainment (i.e., education and literacy), and standard of living, which is the GDP per capita (Human Development Reports, 2015). The findings on the relationship between the HDI and levels of political violence have been mixed. Coggins (2015) and Piazza (2008) find a positive relationship between HDI and terrorism, while Abadie (2006), Goldstein (2005), and Newman (2006) observe no evidence of a statistically significant association between HDI and political violence.

One of the potential problems with the HDI is that, as an aggregate measure, it combines a number of elements that may or may not have important distinctive effects on political violence. As a result, this summary indicator may cloud the individual effects of the individual elements, thus obscuring their individual relationship to terrorism. While life expectancy is an excellent measure of societal health, an alternative measure to life expectancy and HDI is death rate. Although mortality rate is generally used to assess the impact of terrorism events (Bogen & Jones, 2006; Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Tavares, 2004), it is also a valid indicator of quality of life and the effectiveness of health care services. According to Buske (1997), life expectancy at birth is determined through death rates. In other words, healthy countries tend to have high life expectancies and low death rates (Kinsella & Velkoff, 2002; Murray 2011). The World Health Organization (2013) notes that non-communicable diseases (e.g., ischemic heart diseases, stroke, cancer, and chronic obstructed pulmonary disease) is the leading cause of death around the world, accounting for roughly 63% of all deaths annually. Given these figures, it is not only unlikely that direct deaths from terrorist acts contribute substantially to death rates, but also serves as an important measurement of a country’s health system and

16 Coggins (2015) expresses concerns regarding the validity of the HDI results, given the contrasting results of GDP per capita and infant mortality rate.
17 Piazza’s (2008) research is on transnational terrorism so it is not directly comparable to domestic terrorism; this study simply highlights the use of HDI.
condition. Consequently, mortality rate is arguably a helpful predictor of terrorism despite its meager use in the terrorism literature.

Although similar to life expectancy and HDI, mortality rate can indicate a country’s climate, including lifestyle and healthcare conditions. In the medical community, mortality rates are often used as response variables to understand various diseases (Parrish, 2010; Zare & Mahmoodi, 2013) and viruses (Mavalankar, Shastri, Bandyopadhyay, Parmar & Ramani, 2008), or issues concerning pollution (Finkelstein, Jerrett & Sears, 2004), oral health (Jansson, Lavstedt & Frithiøf, 2002), medications (Fontaine et al., 2001), mental health (Tiihonen et al., 2009), and factors relating to neonatal deaths (Govande, Ballard, Koneru & Beeram, 2015). In this context, mortality is the consequence of broader societal and environmental issues that pertain to a country’s healthcare system, as well as the impact of civil conflicts within that region. It is essentially a proxy for a country’s overall condition and its impact on public health.

Despite its relevance in measuring societal health, there are few terrorism studies that use mortality rates as an indicator. Using infant mortality rate as a predictor, Coggins (2015) notes that a high number of infant deaths implies insufficient healthcare provisions and an increased likelihood of terrorism in a given country. These rates, however, have no significant relationship with political violence (Coggins, 2015). Although Coggins’ (2015) extensive analyses encompasses 153 countries over the course of nine years, the data are confined to infants. Consequently, there is still a gap in the literature that examines the relationship between mortality rates and terrorism in which political violence is the outcome and not the predictor. As a measure of social well-being, Shahrouri (2010) uses crude death rate, but the results did not show a significant relationship with terror deaths.

With the exception of a couple of studies (see Coggins, 2015; Shahrouri, 2010), the terrorism literature generally uses life expectancy (Drakos & Gofas, 2006) and HDI (Abadie, 2006; Coggins, 2015; Goldstein, 2005; Newman, 2006; Piazza, 2008) as indicators (independent variable) of health. Death rates, however, tend to be on the opposite side of the equation (dependent variable) to evaluate the effect of political violence (Bogen & Jones, 2006; Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Tavares, 2004). Considering the body of medical research on mortality rates and its relevance to a
country’s healthcare system, death rate is a viable and useful alternative to life expectancy and HDI, despite its limited use – as an independent variable – in the terrorism literature. Consistent with the rationale concerning life expectancy and HDI (i.e., societal well-being), countries with low mortality rates should experience fewer instances of political violence. Death rates should be lower in healthy societies as they would have adequate healthcare provisions to attend to the diseases reported by the World Health Organization (2013).

2.6. Rights and Liberties

In assessing the determinants of terrorism, studies also consider the political environments that may give rise to political violence. Politics is another frequent subject of contention, and a substantial portion of the terrorism literature considers the effects of governing structures and varying degrees of political freedoms. According to Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2012), the structure of political institutions has implications for providing or constraining people’s opportunities. These limitations can dictate the tactics used by those who engage in political violence. In the examination of states and their modes of government, the predominant indicators that are used are systems of governance and degrees of freedom. Systems of governance are usually focused on democracy (see Briggs, 2010; Bjorgo, 2003; Davies, 1994; Blomberg & Hess, 2008a; Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks & Schneider, 2011; Kurrild-Kiltgaard, Justesen & Klemmensen, 2006; Shahroui, 2010; Windsor, 2003), whereas degrees of freedom are concerned with political rights (see Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2011; Tavares, 2004) and civil liberties (see Enders & Hoover, 2012; Estes & Sirgy, 2014; Marsden, 2014).

2.6.1. Democracies and Systems of Governance

Regarding systems of governance, the primary debate centres around whether democracy is more likely to decrease or increase the likelihood of terrorism. To the extent that democracy allows for the expression of divergent opinions and contains mechanisms for addressing these differences, democracy should reduce the impetus for terrorism. For example, Briggs (2010) posits that democratic institutions are the best approach to terrorism. The rationale for this negative association between political
violence and democracies is that freedom offers viable and peaceful alternatives to those who wish to voice any grievances (Choi, 2010; Satana et al., 2013). This argument is supported by Davies’ (1994) study on European countries between 1965 and 1990. Using a binary indicator, democracy has a significant and negative effect on terrorism, which suggests that terrorism cannot be discouraged by the oppressive nature of non-democratic regimes (Davies, 1994). The ability for democracies to help facilitate dissenting opinions also becomes apparent.

Bravo and Dias (2006) also note that, in Eurasia, the largest number of attacks between 1997 and 2004 occurred in less developed countries governed by non-democratic regimes; in other words, democratic states within this region experience fewer cases of political violence. Similarly, Li’s (2005) work shows that democratic participation reduces terrorist activities both within and between borders among 119 countries from 1975 to 1997.\(^\text{18}\) The results suggest that democracies increase satisfaction and political efficacy while reducing grievances among citizens through proportional representation (Li, 2005). This idea of proportional representation needs to be emphasized here. As Li (2005) explains, there are two types of democratic systems: majoritarian and proportional representation. On the basis of electoral results, the former generates a single-party government from popular votes, whereas the latter forms legislatures that are theoretically reflective of all citizens (Li, 2005). For Li’s (2005) transnational study, majoritarian governments are positively associated with political violence, while those with proportional representation have fewer of these incidents.

The role of multiparty democratic systems is also considered by other researchers. Piazza (2010) states that party systems “serve as an orderly conduit of public demands” (p. 102). Exploring the notion of social cleavage,\(^\text{19}\) Piazza (2010) examines 28 Indian states from 1998 to 2006. It becomes evident that domestic terrorism is not evenly distributed across regions. In particular, Piazza (2010) finds that states with multiparty electoral competition are more likely to experience political

\(^\text{18}\) Democratic participation is significantly, and negatively, associated with transnational terrorism across all models (Li, 2005); however, Li (2005) notes that there are elements of democratic polity that increase the likelihood of terrorist events, such as majority systems.

\(^\text{19}\) According to Piazza (2010), social cleavages are prominent divisions within a country that are communicated through political action.
violence than those with stable, two-party systems with majority rule. Fragmented political systems are believed to precipitate terrorism because governments are unable to shape effective responses to terrorism (Piazza, 2010). This study shows that while democracies allow for the representation of public interests, when these interests are abundant and disparate, weak governments can nurture political violence. The difference between the results presented by Li (2005) and Piazza (2010) may be attributed to the level of analyses (countries versus a country’s political subdivisions), the nature of India’s state governments, or a combination thereof. Weinberg (2013) clarifies that democracies with parties that are divided by relatively small ideological differences are least likely to suffer serious waves of domestic terrorism. In contrast, and acknowledging Li’s (2005) results, Weinberg (2013) proposes that democracies with parties that represent highly polarizing ideologies, such as Peru and Turkey, are more likely to display higher levels of terrorist violence than democracies with relatively similar ideologies (e.g., Sweden). These studies illustrate the differing effects of democratic regimes on terrorism despite their common approach to impart political power to the people.

Studies that have considered various systems of governance have found that those that enforce the highest restrictions on their people experience the fewest instances of terrorism. While democratic states offer the most freedom (Weinberg, 2013), autocracies, such as absolute monarchies or dictatorships, are the most restrictive as they give little to no rights to their constituents (Welzel, 2013). Using Wesson’s scheme, Eubank and Weinberg (2001) categorize their data by regime type: democracy, insecure democracy, partial democracy, limited authoritarianism, and absolutism. Their results indicate that domestic terrorism is more likely to take place in democratic, as opposed to autocratic, states, and maintain that “liberty is to faction as oxygen is to fire” (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001, p. 163). According to Eubank and Weinberg (2001), terrorists in stable democracies may be perceived as the tip of an iceberg, as it hints at a portion of the public’s sentiments. From 1955 to 1971, the Ku Klux Klan had sympathetic support from four to six percent (1.3 to 1.66 million) of Americans; even though it was a small portion of the country’s population, the number is substantial and concerning nonetheless (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001). This research
conveys that when people are given the liberty to openly gather, discuss, and act on common interests, the likelihood of terrorism increases.

In another study, Findley and Young (2011) use four classifications (high and low forms of authoritarian and democratic regimes) to assess terrorist events between 1970 and 1997. The results show less political violence in high autocracies (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Jordan) and high functioning democracies (e.g., Australia and Sweden) than their counterparts (Findley & Young, 2011). Diverging from Eubank and Weinberg’s (2001) linear relationship, Findley and Young’s (2011) finding depicts an inverted-U. Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2014) observe comparable results when measuring governance through autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy. Using the same terrorism data source, Kis-Katos et al.’s (2014) work shows that repressive states are better at inhibiting political violence than partial democracies from 1975 to 2008. This is accredited to the possibility that autocratic regimes may be “less restrained by civil rights and liberties in their fight against terrorism and therefore be more effective” (Kis-Katos et al., 2014, p. 127). When autocracies are compared against full democracies, however, there is no significant difference in their effects on terrorism. As Weinberg (2013) notes, strong regimes are less susceptible to political violence.

Since the strength of a government is an essential component, it is important to acknowledge that researchers have also evaluated the relationship between weak states and terrorism. In light of the 9/11 Commission Report, Newman (2007) assesses a number of countries and terrorist organizations. The results indicate that there is no conclusive relationship between state failure and political violence (Newman, 2007). Newman (2007) maintains that although they host the most destructive terrorist organizations, weak states do not experience significantly more events. Coggins (2015) also evaluates weak and failing states with a sample of 153 countries between 1999 and 2008. The findings show that countries are not more likely to experience or produce terrorism as they weaken; however, political collapse does increase this likelihood of political violence (Coggins, 2015). Coggins (2015) defines political collapse as a condition where there is an absence of effective political control, which is similar to anarchy at the domestic level. These considerations provide more insight, implying that regimes that fall between full autocracy and democracy are not functioning at their maximum capacity. It is evident that countries that offer the least and most political
freedom are better able to avert political violence – through the repression or facilitation of dissonant voices – than those with more moderate forms of governance.

2.6.2. Freedom

Another way to understand states and the nature of their governing institutions is by the degree of freedoms they allow, primarily through political rights and civil liberties. Weinberg (2013) states that democracy entails the protection of citizens’ political and civil rights. Appropriately, Welzel (2013) asserts that democracy is comprised of two groups: participation (political rights) and autonomy (civil liberties). According to Brodie and Rein (2005), political rights refer to the citizens’ ability to vote and to stand for elected office; whereas civil liberties concern various opportunities and freedoms that are afforded to individuals, such as expression, economics, and to be safe from bodily harm. Welzel (2013) emphasizes that democracies should sufficiently guarantee both political inclusion and personal liberties. Furthermore, Findley and Young (2011) note that the degree of democracy also matters. Since citizen rights, or freedom, is simply another approach to measuring political systems, these degrees of freedom (i.e., political rights and civil liberties) correspond with systems of governance. As Welzel (2013) states, high autocracies have little to no rights, while high democracies denote the highest latitude of civic entitlement; high is synonymous with complete or full. Analogous to the latter approach to measuring systems of governance, studies that examine degrees of freedom also find an inverted-U-shape.

Among the studies that focus on political rights, most results substantiate the inverted-U-shape, with the exception of Tavares (2004). Analyzing data from 1987 to 2001, Tavares (2004) documents an insignificant relationship between political rights and the incidents of terrorist attacks. In contrast, Abadie (2006) finds that lower levels of political rights significantly increase the risk of terrorism between 2003 and 2004; however, highly authoritarian states are less likely to experience political violence than those in the intermediate range. This non-monotonic relationship suggests that intermediate levels of political freedoms usually occur during political transitions when governments are weak and unstable (Abadie, 2006). This logic explains Newman

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20 In fact, Drakos and Gofas (2006) note that polity and political rights are highly correlated; as a result, their study opted to use polity.
(2007) and Coggins’ (2015) interest in weak states and their relationship with terrorism. Abadie (2006) also presents the rationale behind choosing political rights, rather than civil liberties, as the indicator to assess a country’s political climate. Using civil liberties may be problematic because counter-terrorism policies may restrict these freedoms; as a result, there may be a correlation between civil liberties and the error term (Abadie, 2006). Goldstein (2005) notes comparable results in using a 105 country sample. Political rights have a positive, significant relationship with terrorism risk and demonstrate a non-linear curve along the liberal to authoritarian spectrum (Goldstein, 2005). As a result, Goldstein (2005) believes that political freedom is a powerful predictor of terrorism. Relying on Abadie’s (2006) approach to political rights as the appropriate proxy for polity, Goldstein (2005) maintains that political rights and civil liberties are likely to provide the same results. In another study spanning from 1998 to 2007, which also uses Abadie’s (2006) line of reasoning, the results are identical. Bandyopadhyay and Younas’ (2011) study on 125 countries report an overall significantly positive effect of political rights on terrorism. Specifically, political rights have a significant, non-linear effect on domestic terrorism, such that the likelihood of terrorism initially rises as the lack political rights decrease, but drops when these rights are essentially absent.

The literature on the relationship between civil liberties and political violence is strikingly similar. Inspired by former U.S. President Bush’s commentaries on terrorism and its connection to poverty, corruption, and repression, Krueger and Malečkova (2003) set out to understand the origin of international terrorists and their respective environments. This is referred to as a Robin Hood model of terrorism, which is not dissimilar to the rooted-in-poverty theory, as “would-be terrorists could be inspired by the poverty of their countrymen” (Krueger & Malečkova, 2003, p. 137). In a cross-country analysis between 1997 and 2002, Krueger and Malečkova (2003) find that when considering the proportion of religious groups in a country, countries with low levels of civil liberties are more likely to produce terrorists than those with high levels, and that

21 This is also known as endogeneity.
22 Goldstein (2005) cites Abadie’s (2006) working paper, which was available in 2004.
23 The population distribution across each of the four major faith groups: Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu, which is compared against the reference category (no or other religion).
countries in the middle are more likely to breed terrorists than those with low levels of civil liberties. Moreover, Krueger and Malečkova’s (2003) work shows a country’s income level is unrelated to terrorist production once civil liberties are included in the model. With regard to the logic behind choosing civil liberties over political rights as a measure of political environment, Krueger and Malečkova (2003) posit that the “variable seem[s] to matter more … for predicting participation in terrorism” (p. 140). Diverging from the trend of the inverted-U in the relationship between the degree of freedom and terrorism, Li (2005) finds an insignificant, though positive, relationship. In this study, which consists of 119 countries from 1975 to 1997, Li (2005) explains that the effect of civil liberties is a secondary consequence of government’s institutional constraints. Since this portion is only briefly alluded to, it is not possible to review this discrepancy further.

The majority of this literature chooses between political rights and civil liberties as a proxy for democracy because the two are highly correlated. Since the Freedom House (2015a) is the primary source for these data, multicollinearity is an issue for a substantial portion of studies that use regression analyses. However, some researchers, such as Basuchoudhary and Shughart II (2010), Newman (2006), and Piazza (2006), insist on the inclusion of both in their assessments of terrorism. With the exception of Newman (2006), Basuchoudhary and Shughart II (2010) and Piazza’s (2006) measurement of political freedom, or repression, is the average of the political rights and civil liberties data from the Freedom House (2015a). These studies, unlike those discussed above, do not find an inverted-U in the association between freedoms and terrorism. In an examination of transnational terrorism between 1982 and 1997 across 118 countries, political freedom is only significant with terrorist violence in the post-Cold War period (Basuchoudhary & Shughart II, 2010). In contextualizing this finding in relations to ethnic identity, Basuchoudhary and Shughart II (2010) state that:

[liberal political institutions indeed are associated with fewer transnational terrorist acts in the period after the Cold War. But this result is not robust prior to 1990. New rounds of terrorist violence seem to have been unleashed in countries where the heavy hand of Soviet control was not quickly displaced by freer institutions of governance (p. 85).

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24 Here, positive indicates a lack of civil liberties. So, the more repressive the government, the more likely terrorism is to occur.
Using a similar time frame, Piazza (2006) evaluates state repression by using data on both terrorist incidents and casualties from the U.S. state department. Focusing on the period from 1986 to 2002 in 96 countries, Piazza (2006) finds that repression itself is insignificant across all models, but the variable which measures the degree of change in freedom is significant with regards to terrorist events. This degree of change is attained by subtracting the 1986 freedom score for repression from the 2002 freedom score (Piazza, 2006). So as country’s level of repression increased, the likelihood of experiencing political violence also increased. For Piazza’s (2006) study, political changes within a country is patently more important than a static appraisal of a government’s repressive nature.

Newman’s (2006) work offers a different perspective on political rights and civil liberties as they relate to terrorist organizations. The notion of root causes of terrorism is assessed through the use of graphs. Newman (2006) determines that the frequency of terrorist incidents does not increase in any notable manner as civic rights are restricted; however, societies with meager freedoms are more likely to breed deadly terrorist groups, as measured through the number of fatalities. Interestingly, these latter charts also depict an inverted-U shape, where countries that fall on either extremes experience fewer casualties from acts of political violence than those in the middle (Newman, 2006). Given the general consensus on the effect of degrees of freedom on terrorism, the deviations from the inverted-U are intriguing. It is clear from these studies, however, that the relationship between them is not linear. Based on the significant findings, a goldilocks metaphor may be used to show the relationship between political systems and terrorism, albeit in a disheartening fashion. When governments are stringent and power is concentrated, political violence and dissent are effectually rendered mute. On the other end of the spectrum, when the government’s power resides in the hands of the people, terrorism becomes an excessive mode of communication. The problematic stance of the government is in the middle where it is not too restricted and not too free. This is the political environment that breeds terrorists.

In light of these terrorism studies on regime types, it appears that a categorical, or ordinal, approach to measuring democracy is necessary to understand its effects on terrorism and the possible nuances that may exist in the relationship between the two. Moreover, other factors, namely religion, nationalism, economic conditions, and societal
health, are also important considerations in understanding the nature of terrorism and the environments that propagate such violence. Accordingly, proper attention must be paid to the circumstances that have been discussed throughout this chapter. The goal of this thesis is to empirically assess the validity of the steam-valve theory on terrorism. Specifically, to explore whether or not perceived political efficacy has a negative effect on political violence that are not due to random chance.
3. Research Design

To test the application of the steam-valve theory, this thesis explores domestic terrorist events between 1990 and 2012 across 18 countries. The data for the analyses are compiled from a number of secondary sources: the Global Terrorism Database, World Values Survey, World Bank, and Freedom House.

3.1. Data

3.1.1. Domestic Terrorism

Based out of the University of Maryland, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; 2016a) is operated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). This open-source database contains a systematic pool of over 150,000 terrorist events – at the domestic, transnational, and international level – between 1970 and 2015 (GTD, 2016a). At a minimum, the GTD (2016a) records information on 45 of 120 variables for each incident, including the date, location, weaponry, nature of the target, number of casualties, and perpetrator(s). LaFree and Dugan (2007) explain that these data are amassed from open media sources, such as Lexis-Nexis and Opensource.gov, where information between 1998 to 2015 are obtained from “over 4,000,000 news articles and 25,000 news sources” (GTD, 2016a, para. 4).

According to the GTD (2014), terrorist events are defined as acts committed by non-state actors and exhibit the following attributes:

1) result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator;
2) entail some level of violence or threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people; and/or
3) perpetrators are sub-national actors, effectively excluding state terrorism.

25 Perpetrators of terrorist attacks are not always known so this information may not be available.
Moreover, at least two of the following criteria must be present:

a) the act attempts to attain a political, economic, religious, or social objective;

b) evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience(s) than the immediate victims; or

c) action is outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (p. 8).

Terrorist events are deemed domestic by comparing the nationality of the perpetrator and the location of the attack. If the offender is a citizen of the country where the attack occurred, then it is domestic; otherwise, it is classified as a transnational incident. This assessment, however, can be difficult in non-contiguous contested territories (e.g., Northern Ireland) or secure borders (e.g., West Bank and Gaza Strip) because countries are defined by national boundaries. When the perpetrator(s)’ nationality represent either of these designations, the GTD (2014) records their nationality as the contested territory and the event as international. The count data on domestic incidents from the GTD (2015) are used as the dependent variable in this thesis.

Figure 3.1  Total Number of Terrorist Activities²⁶

²⁶ These terrorist attacks occurred in the 18 countries that are studied in this thesis. The basis for their selection are presented in the following chapter. The 1993 data on domestic terrorism are smoothed because the year is missing from the GTD (2014) data.
To show the difference between domestic and total terrorist events, Figure 3.1 illustrates a comparison of these incidents from 1990 to 2012. Notably, there are substantially more terrorist events that are classified as domestic from 2001 forward. A number of reasons can account for this pattern, such as changes in media coverage, the rise of social media altering the dissemination of information, or citizens are becoming more raucous, yet impatient, with their respective establishments. There is also a prominent dip in political violence overall from 1998 to 2007, with the exceptions of sizable increases in 2001 and again in 2008. Since 2001, most attacks are domestic (95.17%), in contrast to those prior to 2001 (13.35%). These trends will be deliberated within the geopolitical context of the sampled countries in the results and discussion sections.

3.1.2. Political Activism

Given the premise of the steam-valve theory, data on the collective perceptions of people from various countries are also necessary. The World Values Survey (WVS; 2015a), conducted in nearly 100 countries, explores the evolving beliefs, values, and motivations of individuals around the world, as well as their impact on social and political development in various countries. This global project began in 1981 and is currently “the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation ever [done]” (WVS, 2015a, para. 2). With data consisting of nearly 400,000 respondents, the WVS (2015a) is also the only academic survey to evaluate cultural hubs and countries with varying degrees of prosperity. Appropriately, the primary variable of interest (political participation), as well as two control variables (religiosity and nationalism), are gathered from the WVS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-1</th>
<th>Operationalization and Descriptives - Political Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Political action/engagement: Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different form of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you (1) have actually done any of these things, whether you (2) might do it, or (3) would never, under any circumstances, do it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Mean(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v1‡: Signing a petition</td>
<td>2.09(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2‡: Joining in boycotts</td>
<td>2.52(0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v3‡: Attending lawful demonstrations</td>
<td>2.31(0.73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 130,366
‡ Indicates that the variable is reverse coded in subsequent analyses
As a measure of people’s perception of the use of peaceful political action, the political activism variable is aggregated from a series of questions from the WVS (2015b) from 1990 to 2012. There are five questions that attend to political action; however, two of these questions are excluded because of the high proportion of missing values. Using a three-point Likert-scale to measure the level of engagement, the responses include (1) “actually done”; (2) “might do”; (3) “would never, under any circumstances, do it”. Therefore, (1) reveals that individuals have engaged in the political action to effect change; (2) indicates willingness to partake in the political action; (3) shows an intentional aversion from that form of political engagement. The operationalization and descriptive statistics for political activism are presented in Table 3-1. These measurements are consistent with the literature on social movements (Giddens, 1997; Welzel, 2013). On average, people are not very likely to engage in political action (Table 3-1), though they are willing to consider it. Specifically, citizens are most inclined to sign a petition (2.09 out of 3) and least likely to participate in boycotts (2.52 out of 3). The low standard deviations indicate that these sentiments are also fairly uniform across time. Lastly, respondents of the WVS (2015b) are more motivated to answer v1 than v2 or v3, which may be reflective of the public and political openness of their society regarding political activism.

3.1.3. Other Contextual Predictors

Considering the diverse characteristics of countries around the world, it is important to take their unique attributes into account. Controlling for other factors, which also coincide with oft cited antecedents of political violence, offers a more robust evaluation of the steam-valve theory. In addition to political activism, some of the predictors for domestic terrorism are religiosity and nationalism, both of which are measured by the WVS (2015b). A country’s overall level of religiosity is constructed

27 Political action and engagement in unofficial strikes (35%); occupying buildings/factories (36%)
28 Cronbach’s alpha is .725, which is above the acceptable value (Field, 2009, p. 679).
29 This is highly speculative, however, given that there is only a 2% difference.
from four questions, whereas nationalism is based on one. Similar to the questions regarding political activism, these sentiments are also measured through Likert-type scales.\(^{30}\) Using data from 1990 to 2012, Table 3-2 shows the operationalization and descriptive statistics for religiosity and nationalism.

At first glance, the importance of religion (v4=1.99 out of 4) and engagement (v5=4.33 out of 8) are relatively moderate, while responses regarding self-identification as a religious person and the importance of God are more drastic in comparison. The majority of participants view themselves as religious (v6=1.36 out of 4)\(^{31}\) and that religion is “very important” (7.70 out of 10). This shows that while people may not necessarily attend religious institutions, religion remains influential in their lives. With respect to nationalism, the responses indicate that citizens are proud, if not very proud, of their

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-2</th>
<th>Operationalization and Descriptives - Religiosity and Nationalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religiosity Variable</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean(SD)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v4(^\ddagger): For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life: religion</td>
<td>1.99(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) very important, (2) rather important, (3) not very important, (4) not at all important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5(^\ddagger): Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?</td>
<td>4.33(2.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special days/Christmas/Easter days, (5) other specific holy days, (6) once a year, (7) less often, (8) practically never</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v6(^\ddagger): Whether you go to church or not, would you say you are…</td>
<td>1.36(0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) a religious person, (2) not a religious person, (3) convinced atheist, (4) other *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v7: How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate (1) not at all important, (10) very important</td>
<td>7.70(2.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalism Variable(^\ddagger)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean(SD)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How proud are you to be [enter nationality]?</td>
<td>1.54(0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) very proud, (2) quite proud, (3) not very proud, (4) not at all proud</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\ddagger\)Indicates that the variable is reverse coded in subsequent analyses
* 2 of 118,238 respondents chose the “other” category

\(^{30}\) While there is a general consistency, the WVS (2015b) uses a different Likert-scale for some countries. For example, Colombia uses a three-point Likert-scale for v4 from 2005 to 2007 (Table 3-2). Given the small time frame and qualitative similarities, their averages are used.

\(^{31}\) In fact, 69.5% of respondents perceived themselves as “a religious person” versus 30.5% who answered “not a religious person” or “a convinced atheist”.

54
respective nationalities (1.54 out of 4, SD=0.75). By using a series of questions to assess a country’s overall level of religiosity, the thesis controls for a more holistic concept of faith by accounting for appreciation and engagement. Here, nationalism relates to pride associated with religious nationalism, ethnic-nationalism, or patriotism, depending on the respondent.

Following Welzel and Inglehart’s (2010) rationale, scales are created for political action, religiosity, and nationalism in the subsequent analyses for uniformity and interpretive ease. Certain responses (i.e., v1-3 of political activism, v4, v5 of religiosity, and nationalism in Table 3-2) are reverse coded so higher values reflect positive sentiments. With regard to v6, the data are dichotomized: 1 represents a religious individual and 0 indicates all-else. Accordingly, countries that score high on political activism denotes a high proportion of citizens who have or would consider engaging social movements. As well, countries that are immensely religious and nationalistic can be identified by greater values in their respective categories. These values range from 0, for people holding the least, to 100 for individuals holding the most expressive position – with respect to willingness to participate in political action, level of religiosity, and pride towards their country.

Along with people’s perceptions of political efficacy, their sentiments regarding faith, and admiration for their nationality, a country’s economic condition, societal health, and mode of governance are also important characteristics. To account for each country’s economic condition and health of its citizens, data from the World Bank Group (WBG; 2015a) are incorporated. This databank is an online web source that provides time series data (WBG, 2015b). WBG collects and shares data on a number of economic and social indicators. WBG’s data on economics (GDP per capita and unemployment) and health (death rate) are operationalized and their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3-3. In line with the terrorism literature, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita controls for a country’s average income level (see Coggins, 2015; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2009) and a state’s unemployment accounts for citizens among the labour force population, but without work (see Davies, 1994; Galito, 2012; Goldstein, 2005). From 1990 to 2012, average GDP per capita (logged) in the sample is 8.50 with a standard deviation of 1.41, and the overall percent of unemployment is 8.42
Table 3-3  Operationalization and Descriptives - Economic and Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Variables</th>
<th>Mean(SD)</th>
<th>% missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>8.50(1.41)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product divided by midyear population [in current United States Dollar]. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of total labour force, modelled ILO estimate</td>
<td>8.42(5.47)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1,000 population estimated at midyear. Subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate provides the rate of natural increases, which is equal to the rate of population change in the absence of migration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.56(3.39)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 414
These variables are operationalized by the WBG (2015a) in their data files.

(SD=5.47). This means that while each country's GDP per capita (logged) over the course of 23 years is relatively concentrated, unemployment is far more dispersed.

Death rates measure societal health, as well as indicate and control for the well-being of a country's citizens in analyses. Death rate is favoured over life expectancy in this thesis because of multicollinearity issues with GDP per capita (logged). Though it is not conventionally used as a predictor in terrorism studies, as discussed in chapter 2, the medical community (e.g., Parrish, 2010; Remington, Catlin, & Kindig, 2013) and some research on political violence (Coggins, 2015; Shahrouri, 2010) show the applicability of death rate as an indicator of healthcare conditions. Table 3-3 shows that the mean number of deaths every year, for every 1,000 individuals, is 8.56 (SD=3.40) overall. To account for scale effects, the natural logarithm of each country's annual population for 1990 to 2012 is also taken from the WBG (2015a).

Lastly, the final attribute of a country that is considered in this thesis is the degree of political and civil freedoms afforded to its citizens by the government. Data from the Freedom House (2015a) are used help establish the context of a country's political environment. Founded in 1941, Freedom House (2015b) is an independent organization dedicated to the furtherance of freedom and advocates for democracy. The
objectives of Freedom House concern the empowerment of citizens’ and to encourage
them to exercise their fundamental rights in their respective regions (Freedom House,
2015b). With its focus on the furtherance of democratic institutions in the international
arena, the Freedom House provides information, reports, and data on rights and
freedoms across the world. These topics include, but are not limited to, religious
freedoms, women’s rights, democratic governments, internet freedom, LGBTI\(^{32}\) rights,
freedom of expression, and media freedoms (Freedom House, 2015b; 2016). Freedom
House’s (2015a) data on political rights and civil liberties are used to serve both as a
function of democracy and degree of freedom afforded to a country’s constituents.

The operationalization of political rights and civil liberties are presented in Table
3-4. These measurements are rated using Likert-type scales: (1) indicating the most
freedom and (7) denoting the least. Similar to the previous variables, political rights and
civil liberties are reverse coded so that higher values indicate a higher degree of
participation or autonomy. Freedom House (2015a) defines freedom status as the
opportunity for citizens to act spontaneously in a variety of areas. These areas generally
involve the right to take part in various political processes, government accountability,
and freedom of expression (e.g., religion, speech, and association) without fear of
repercussions. Table 3-4 shows that from 1990 to 2012, countries sampled in this thesis
are freer than not overall. In particular, governments generally grant more political rights
(5.30 of 7, SD=1.76) to their citizens than civil liberties (4.99 of 7, SD=1.50). In other
words, people are more likely to be able to participate in the political process through

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Operationalization and Descriptives - Freedom}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
\hline
\textbf{Variable} & \textbf{Mean(SD)} & \% missing \\
\hline
v12\(^{\dagger}\) & Political rights & 5.30(1.76) & - \\
Free participation in the political process; e.g., voting, legitimate elections, ability to join political parties or organizations, and the state is held accountable for its actions. & & \\

v13\(^{\dagger}\) & Civil liberties & 4.99(1.50) & - \\
Freedom of expression and belief, right to association, rule of law, and personal autonomy without state interference. & & \\
\hline
n = 414 & & \\
\(^{\dagger}\)Indicates that the variable is reverse coded & & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^{32}\) LGBTI is an acronym for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex community.
institutional means than they are to express themselves, vocally or otherwise, without fear of legal repercussions. Though quantitatively similar, these indicators nonetheless measure distinct qualities of freedom.

3.2. Analytic Framework

As terrorism is a relatively rare event (McMorrow, 2009), the data are non-negative integers, skewed, and likely to be over-dispersed. The negative binomial distribution with a log link is best suited for modeling this type of response variable. To accommodate the temporal nature of the data, generalized estimating equations (GEEs) are used to assess the steam-valve theory. GEEs deal with repeated measures by focusing on the average of coefficients in the presence of clustering (Garson, 2012). According to Hilbe (2011), this is a benefit of GEEs over random-effect models as it allows “specific correlation structures to be assumed within panels” (p. 500). As stated above, the dependent variable is count data on domestic terror incidents for each country in a given year. Correspondingly, the effect of time is nested within country in this multilevel analysis. Population (logged) is set as the exposure variable to adjust for the amount of opportunity a terrorist event has of happening for each country in a year. These data are analyzed in International Business Machines Corporation’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS) Statistics v.19 software for Windows.

3.2.1. Interpolation and Data Reduction

While data from the GTD (2015), WBG (2015a) and Freedom House (2015a) have no missing values, the same cannot be said of the WVS (2015b). As opposed to annual assessments, surveys are administered through waves. There are six waves of longitudinal data between 1981 and 2012. In each wave, surveys are conducted throughout the course of approximately five years. Given that this thesis uses annual measurements, the periodic data from the WVS are interpolated for the years not surveyed. In order to properly interpolate the data, each country must have a minimum of three sets of responses. After isolating the variables of interest (see Tables 3-1 and

33 The fit statistics for negative binomial are demonstrably better than poisson.
the patterns of missing values are visually deduced. Once the initial series of patterns are found, linear trends are interpolated between data points. As an iterative process, acquiring patterns and interpolating the data are repeated using IBM SPSS v.19. Once completed, the sets of interpolated WVS (2015b) variables are compiled with the master dataset, which includes measures from the GTD (2015), WBG (2015a), and Freedom House (2015a).

For parsimony and to assess the steam-valve theory properly, this thesis uses composite measures for political activism and religiosity. Using IBM SPSS v.19, exploratory factor analyses (EFA) are conducted. EFAs help identify clusters of variables while simultaneously attending to multicollinearity issues in regression (Field, 2009). Specifically, two principal component analyses (PCA) with orthogonal rotation (varimax) are used to create appropriate measurements of political activism and religiosity, the results of which are presented in Table 3-5.

The PCAs reveal clear factors for political activism and religiosity as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures verify the sampling adequacy for both factors (KMO=.68 and .79); accordingly, these PCAs are acceptable. Furthermore, the significant Bartlett’s test of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-5</th>
<th>Exploratory Factor Analysis I and II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Components</td>
<td>Factor Loadings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1: Political activism</td>
<td>1.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v1: Signing a petition</td>
<td>.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2: Joining in boycotts</td>
<td>.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v3: Attending demonstrations</td>
<td>.806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett’s test of sphericity: $\chi^2 = 68754.846, \ df = 3, p = 0.00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 111,095</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2: Religiosity</td>
<td>2.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v4: Important in life: religion</td>
<td>.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v5: How often do you attend religious services?</td>
<td>.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v6: Religious person</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v7: Important in life: God</td>
<td>.832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.793</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett’s test of sphericity: $\chi^2 = 1442006.191, \ df = 6, p = 0.00$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 108,560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction: Principle component analysis

34 Field (2009) notes that KMO statistics between .5 and .7 are mediocre, .7 and .8 are good, .8 and .9 are great, and those above .9 are superb.
sphereicity for political activism ($\chi^2(3)=68754.846$) and religiosity ($\chi^2(6)=1442006.191$) suggest they are adequate factor solutions. Based on their respective factor loadings, the observed values have strong associations with their underlying latent variables as they all exceed .40 (Dawson, 2014). Using these PCAs, composite measures for these indicators are created to reflect the results of the factor analyses.  

V1, v2, and v3 are combined for a measure of people’s willingness to engage in political activism (see Table 3-1), while v4, v5, v6, and v7 are aggregated to form a more inclusive variable for religiosity (see Table 3-2).

In keeping with Marsden (2014), this thesis uses a combined measure of political rights and civil liberties to create a freedom variable. Similar to political activism and religiosity, the reason for consolidating these two measures is their strong, positive correlation (Marsden, 2014). Although favouring one measure of freedom over another would solve the issue of multicollinearity, it would only provide a partial picture of domestic terrorism as these indicators quantify distinct forms of liberty (see Table 3-4). To demonstrate the different effects of rights and liberties on domestic terrorism, Figure 3.2 visualizes the odds ratios for each set of the bivariate regressions. It is apparent that while political rights and civil liberties share a general trend, they ultimately have different relationships with political violence.

![Figure 3.2](image_url)

**Figure 3.2** Bivariate Analyses for Political Rights and Civil Liberties
In light of these analyses, another PCA is conducted. Based on the Freedom House (2015a) data for political rights and civil liberties, the results (see Table 3-6) indicate that the threshold for sampling adequacy is met (KMO = .5) and the factor analysis is appropriate (Bartlett’s test of sphericity $\chi^2 (1)=692.291$). Akin to the PCA results for political activism and religiosity, the factor loadings for v12 and v13 are acceptable as they are well above .40 (Dawson, 2014). The composite measure, freedom, is created using the sum of political rights and civil liberties. Three new classifications are then created based on the directionality of the odds ratios. This approach is consistent with the literature on governing institutions and their respective freedoms (see Findley & Young, 2011; Kis-Katos et al., 2014; Welzel, 2013). Freedom is analogous to Freedom House’s (2015a) definition of freedom as it refers to the freedom to participate in the political process (political rights) and express beliefs (civil liberties).

Table 3-6 Exploratory Factor Analysis III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor 3: Freedom</th>
<th>Factor Loadings</th>
<th>Eigenvalues</th>
<th>% Variance Explained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v12: Political rights</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>95.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v13: Civil liberties</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.500
Barlett’s test of sphericity: $\chi^2 = 692.291$, $df = 1$, $p = 0.00$

Extraction: Principle component analysis

35 Similar to the factor analyses above, this PCA also uses orthogonal rotation (vartimax)
36 The new categories are: not free (1) = 2 to 4, partly free (2) = 5 to 10, and free (3) = 11 to 14.
4. Results

The objective of this thesis is to offer a useful explanatory model, the steam-valve theory, for anti-state domestic terrorism. A series of analyses assess the theory’s applicability using data on various countries between 1990 and 2012. The sample of countries is contingent upon the WVS (2015b) data. This is because the primary variable of interest, political activism, is a composite measure from the WVS (2015b). As discussed in the section on missing values (see Chapter 3.2.1), each wave of surveys is not conducted in every country so only those with enough data for interpolation were eligible for inclusion in this thesis. Figure 4.1 shows the 18 countries that meet this criteria. The colours indicate the total number of domestic terrorist events experienced by each country from 1990 to 2012. Countries that suffer the highest volume of attacks are in red (n=4), while those tinted yellow (n=9) experience the fewest instances of political unrest. Orange designates countries that lie somewhere in-between (n=5). The sample size is sufficiently representative of terrorist attacks globally as the data include a wide variety of societies and an extensive range of terrorist activities.

This chapter provides a thorough description of these 18 countries within this period, analyses pertinent to the proper construction of the statistical model used in this thesis, and presents the results of the multilevel negative binomial regression. Using an

![Figure 4.1 Countries by Incidence of Terrorist Events, 1990-2012](image-url)
approach that is similar to Davies (1994), a historical overview of domestic terrorism is assessed at a collective level across 23 years before investigating these general trends at the country level. After establishing the context, descriptive statistics, correlations, bivariate regressions, and GEEs will be examined.

4.1. Historical Frequencies of Domestic Terrorism

This section explains the spatial-temporal aspect of anti-state political violence in these 18 countries between 1990 and 2012. Figure 4.2 shows the aggregated number of domestic terrorist incidents over the 23 year period. This initial section will provide a sketch of the global climate by describing important events – regarding indelible terrorist acts that left marks on an international scale, social media developments, and other matters that may have an impact on the world stage. While the relevance of acknowledging significant terrorist incidents – at the domestic or international level – in a terrorism thesis is clear, the recognition of major economic and political events cannot be omitted. Moreover, the rise of social media and networking sites will also be briefly reviewed. Social media and technological advancements are important to discuss, especially in context of understanding terrorism, because of their use in the proliferation of information. As Huey (2015) demonstrates, social media essentially changed the landscape of communication, thus altering the manner in which terrorists function. Together, the précis of these landmarks (i.e., terrorist, economic, political, environmental and social media) can offer a more holistic consideration of the milieu in which the terrorist events within the 18 countries occur.

From 1990 to 2000, there were relatively few instances of political violence before the initial increase in 2001. In fact, 1998 saw the fewest events, with a total of 26 (0.2% of all terrorism activity) acts of terrorism across 18 countries. Globally speaking, some noteworthy events that occurred in the 1990s include Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty, US cruise missiles attack al-Qaeda training camps, and Osama bin-

37 Great Britain transferred their sovereignty over Hong Kong to China in June of 1997, per the 1842 Treaty of Nanking, the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong territory in 1898, and the 1960 Treaty of Beijing. According to some (see Brendon, 2010; Darwin, 2011; Taylor, 2015), this handover marked the end of the British Empire.
Laden’s fatwa was published (MidEastWeb, 1998). The 1990s was also marked with some prominent episodes regarding cult activity, such as Waco (Verhovek, 1993), the Oklahoma City bombing (Jeffery, 2001; McVeigh, 2001), and Aum Shinrikyo’s (オウム真理教) Sarin gas attack (Osaki, 2015). At the turn of the millennium, a new set of events coloured the global landscape, including the first notable increase in terrorist activities (see Figure 4.2). In 2001, the 9/11 attacks on US soil (Taylor, 2011) swiftly triggered the War on Terror with the invasion of Afghanistan (BBC, 2016a). Other examples of politically violent acts since 2000 are the Bali bombings in 2002 (Agency, 2016), Madrid train bombings in 2004 (Burridge, 2014), London train bombings in 2005 (BBC, 2015c), Bhutto’s assassination in 2007 (Moore, 2007), coordinated bombings across Mumbai,  

38 The War on Terror led to the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden in 2006 and 2011, respectively (MacAskill, 2011; Raghavan, 2006).

39 As the former prime minister of Pakistan, she was the first woman elected head of state in a Muslim nation (Independent Lens, 2012).
India, in 2008 (Friedman, 2009; Schifrin, 2009), Breivik’s attacks on Norway in 2011 (Beaumont, 2011), and Boko Haram’s assaults in 2012 (Oboh, 2012).

With regard to crucial developments in technology and social media, landmarks include the emergence of Wikipedia (Lih, 2016), MySpace (2014), Web 2.0 \(^{40}\) (O’Reilly, 2005), Facebook (Phillips, 2007), YouTube (Dickey, 2013), Twitter (Picard, 2011), Tumblr (Tumblr Staff, 2015), Instagram (Streatfield, 2015), and Snapchat (Titcomb, 2015), as well as Apple’s iPhone (Apple Inc., 2016) and Google’s street view (Wray, 2009). A number of economic events also occurred within this timeframe, such as the plateau in crude oil production, global economic downturn in 2007 (Elliott, 2011), as well as 2008’s record high oil prices (Hopkins, 2008) and global financial crisis later that year in September (CBS News, 2008).\(^{41}\) Other notable incidents are the Saffron Revolution in Burma, which occurred in 2007 (Chowdhury, 2008), as did the Virginia Tech mass shooting in the United States (Hauser & O’Connor, 2007). In Tunisia, the Arab spring spurred into action in late 2010, which then swept across the Arab world (Al-Rawi, 2015; Blight et al., 2012). Lastly, in 2011, British troops began to slowly withdrawal from Afghanistan after ten years (Burns, 2011). Given the brief summary of social, political, and economic benchmarks over the 23 years, the particular terrorist events within the sample need to be contextualized. In other words, while Figure 4.2 provides a succinct overview of terrorism trends, the context of each country should be considered with their respective patterns to paint a more cogent picture.

### 4.1.1. **Terrorist Events by Nation**

Similar to the aggregated counts of domestic terrorist events, there is also an uneven distribution of activity at the country level. This wide disparity across countries is evident in Figure 4.3 and Table 4-1, which are a more intricate account of terrorism among the sample, while Figure 4.1 presents a glance of the geographic distribution. Using subgroupings based on the frequency of terrorism events between 1990 and 2012, the 18 countries will be discussed in turn. These arbitrary classifications serve a

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\(^{40}\) This refers to the various internet services, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, which are premised on user-generated content (John, 2012).

\(^{41}\) This refers to the US bankruptcies and bailouts, which ignited the ire of the American public and manifests in a number of protests.
Figure 4.3  Distribution of Terrorist Events by Country, 1990-2012

Low levels of activity denote countries with annual counts of terrorist incidents that never exceeded five. Each of these states, Argentina, Moldova, South Korea, and Sweden, account for under 0.20% of all events in the sample. Moderately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Events (Low to High)</th>
<th>% of Total Events</th>
<th># of Groups*(Rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>2(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>3(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>2(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>3(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>3(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>3(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>2(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>7(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>4(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1481</td>
<td>14.09</td>
<td>11(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1482</td>
<td>14.11</td>
<td>1(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4385</td>
<td>41.73</td>
<td>38(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated number of unique, identifiable domestic terrorist organizations; it is not exhaustive
Low levels of terrorist violence are countries that experienced 20 or fewer instances of terrorism in a given year. Comprising of between 0.21% to 0.80% of the total incidents across the 23 years, Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, and Mexico fall into this category. In contrast with the larger sample, Peru, South Africa, Spain, and the United States show moderately high levels of terrorism as they each contain roughly 1% to 4% of the aggregated terror campaigns, and their annual sum are below 60. Countries that exhibit high levels of political violence suffer no more than 700 occurrences each year, and the majority do not surpass 300 annually. Colombia, India, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkey are considered high level countries and they represent 7% to 42% of the terrorist incidents between 1990 and 2012 across the 18 countries. Given that the number of terrorist events in the high category drown out the other levels of terrorism (low, moderately low, and moderately high), Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of political violence with the exclusion of those in the high classification group. This figure offers a more refined illustration of the countries that will be attended to first. All four classifications of terrorist activity, the countries, and their respective terrorist organizations (see Table 4-1) will be discussed to offer an overview of the sample in this thesis. For a comprehensive list of terrorist organizations, identifiable homegrown groups are presented in Appendix E.
4.1.1.1. Low Level Terrorism

While *low* level terrorism countries experienced a miniscule proportion of all terrorist activities within the 23 year period, they are nonetheless important in understanding terrorism. As noted above, these subgroupings provide a comparative basis. By considering the environments wherein terrorism has been inhibited or impeded, this thesis can provide a more inclusive perspective, strengthening the steam-valve theory. The four *low* level terrorism countries represent more peaceful states and allow for a more robust statistical modeling in the subsequent analyses. Figure 4.5 shows that South Korea and Moldova experienced little to no terrorism; however, South Korea saw two attacks in 1991. Since these two countries have no unique terrorist organizations (according to the GTD, 2015), these sporadic attacks were attributed to lone wolves with no association with any particular group.

With respect to Argentina and Sweden, there was more activity, though intermittent. Diverging from the aggregate terrorism trend in Figure 4.1, there appears to be more of a U-shape in Figure 4.5 with an isolated incident for *Sweden* in 1999. According to the GTD (2015), the 1999 attack wounded two media personnel and

![Figure 4.5 Domestic Terrorism Events by Country - Low](image)
involved the Aryan Brotherhood, or Ariska Brodanskapet. One of the attacks in 2005 was committed by the al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) was responsible for the one in 2011. Neither events, however, resulted in casualties or injuries. For Argentina, the most oft cited groups were Che Guevara Brigade, People’s Revolutionary Organization (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo), and Mariano Moreno National Liberation Command; all of which embraced left-wing ideology. Akin to Sweden, the vast majority of these incidents reported no fatalities or injuries (GTD, 2015).

4.1.1.2. Moderately Low Level Terrorism

The countries that experienced slightly more terrorism than those in the low level category were Brazil, Chile, China, Japan, and Mexico. Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of political violence for these five states across the 23 years. Unlike those in the previous group (see Figure 4.5), countries that saw moderately low levels of terrorism generally experienced some activity each year, even if it was just one incident. Comparatively, the quietest country among the five was Japan, which saw a total of 24 domestic terrorist events over the span of the period (see Table 4-1). Aum Shinrikyo, Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction), and Revolutionary Workers’ Council (Kakurokyo) were the primary organizations cited as the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks. The spread of these attacks, however, was not evenly distributed as over five of these incidents occurred in 1990, most of which were attributed to the Revolutionary Workers’ Council. According to Matsubara (2002), Chukakuha and the Revolutionary Workers’ Council were among a number of ultra-leftist groups born in 1955 after the Japanese Communist Party aborted its platform premised on violent revolutions. Comprised primarily of students and workers in the 1960s, these organizations failed to entice young members as they once did due to the indiscriminate nature of their attacks and fighting within the organizations (Matsubara, 2002). In fact, Matsubara (2002) notes that from 1999 to 2001, eight people died as a result of intra-fraction conflict among ultra-leftist groups.

42 This is not to be confused with the Che Guevara Volunteer Work Brigade, which is an altruistic organization in Cuba that works closely with Canada (Che Brigade, n.d.).
In contrast, Aum Shinrikyo is a Buddhism-inspired sect that is grounded in various religious ideologues (McTernan, 2003). According to Martin (2015), the group was formed in 1984 with the goal to first control Japan then the world. Also referred to as a doomsday-cult, for its fixation on Christianity’s apocalyptic prophecies (BBC, 2016d), Aum Shinrikyo is best known for its Sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, which was mentioned earlier in this chapter (Fletcher, 2012; Osaki, 2015). Its leader, Shoko Asahara, was arrested that same year (Broad, 1998). In 2000, members of Aum Shinrikyo splintered off to create Aleph and later, Circle of Rainbow Light (Hikari no Wa) in 2007 (BBC, 2016d; Ito, 2015). Both these organizations currently have active websites and portray themselves as peaceful groups; however, the Japanese public remains skeptical (Alfred, 2015). With regard to the Sarin gas attack and incidents perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph (2001) acknowledges these events but differentiates itself from its predecessor by presenting itself as a kind and benevolent religion that does not share the same sentiments:

We could say that former Aum Shinrikyo founder Shoko Asahara was a kind of genius in meditation, but at the same time we cannot approve of the incidents his organization caused. While inheriting the superior practices of Yoga and Buddhism, and the meditation method his Yoga talent has left, we’d like to clearly disapprove of the incidents.
We once again deeply apologize to the victims and bereaved families in the incidents. As ones who once belonged to the same religious organization, we deeply feel responsible for the outcome of the incidents. Considering what we have done in the past, I believe we have to reform the organization drastically (Joyu, 2000, paras. 4-5).

Similarly, the Circle of Rainbow Light also attempts to distance itself from Aum Shinrikyo. Circle of Rainbow Light emphasizes that it is not a religion but rather a set of philosophies that focus on happiness and well-being (Hikarinowa, 2012). Unlike Aleph (2001), the official website for Circle of Rainbow Light is regularly updated and provides a selection of readings, videos, interviews, meditation techniques, and Buddhist teachings (Hikarinowa, 2012). According to their website, the group defected from Aleph in 2007 and claims that Aleph brainwashes people via indoctrination (Hikarinowa, 2016). On the same page, Circle of Rainbow Light discusses a compensation agreement for victims of Aum Shinrikyo attacks and also offers warm condolences to those harmed by religious terrorism (Hikarinowa, 2016).

Akin to Japan, terrorism in Brazil was also rather intermittent with the most activity in 1997. Political violence in Brazil was primarily committed by people emboldened by left-wing ideology. Despite suffering more terror campaigns than five other countries in the sample, Brazil only had one terrorist organization within the 23 year period in question (see Table 4-1). Committing political violence from 1991 to 1997, the Landless Peasants’ Movement, or Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), consisted primarily of rural workers. An associated website explains that MST was born in 1984 and is a movement comprised of 150,000 landless families that reside on 7.5 million hectares of land (Friends of the MST, 2016). Their objective is “to fight for land reform and against injustice and social inequality in rural areas” (Friends of the MST, 2016, para. 1). The land distribution is so disproportionate that the poorest 40% of Brazilians own 1% of the land (BBC, 2005). Due to this inequality, MST strived for progressive change through unconventional methods. According to the GTD (2015),

43 Despite these heartfelt apologies, recent raids in Russia may suggest otherwise (BBC, 2016d).
44 Hikarinowa directly translates to light’s circle, in contrast to the English name, Circle of Rainbow Light.
45 As of July 21, 2016, the most recent video on their YouTube channel was posted on July 17, 2016, titled "spiritual science and yoga training" (https://www.youtube.com/user/HIKARINOWAMOVIE).
most attacks by the MST were against businesses, the majority of which did not result in injuries or fatalities. The Brazilian government declared MST’s invasions onto private properties as terrorist acts (BBC, 2005). In recent years, the group has become known as a major force in the demonstrations over the defense of democracy held throughout Brazil (Alves, 2015; Watts, 2014). Given Brazil’s level of activity in Figure 4.6, it appears that public discontent has been more likely to be channeled through peaceful rather than aggressive means since 2008.

For Chile, the trend in Figure 4.6 is irregular; there is a quieter period between 1996 and 2005 when compared to the prior and subsequent years. Terrorist organizations in Chile, such as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), People’s Fatherland Movement, and the United Popular Action Movement have also tended to be motivated by left-wing ideology. This predominance for left-wing terrorism may be attributed to the Pinochet dictatorship which lasted from 1973 to 1990. Reel and Smith (2006) explain that Pinochet’s repressive regime murdered and tortured thousands of Chileans over the course of 17 years; this started when a US-supported coup tumbled a Marxist elected government. Prior to the 1990s, in attempt to assassinate Pinochet, the FPMR killed five bodyguards and wounded 12 (Reel & Smith, 2006). Named after the hero from Chile’s independence from Spain, the FPMR were responsible for majority of attacks between 1990 and 1997 in Figure 4.6. Despite the cessation of terrorist activities by the FPMR in the GTD (2015) data, the FPMR’s (n.d.) official website remains operational and their rhetoric lingers with anti-government sentiments. Another left-wing terrorist organization, MIR, was founded in 1965 (Kushner, 2002, p. 243). While the late-1970s and 1980s saw the height of their activities, the MIR was responsible for some political violence in the early 1990s as well. MIR’s (2016) website is also online. Currently, the primary objective appears to be legalizing the organization and offers opportunities for supporters and members to engage with the MIR through social media, such as Facebook, Twitter,46 YouTube, and even SoundCloud (MIR, 2016).

46 The account currently has over 2,600 followers (https://twitter.com/MIRdeChile).
Distinct from the South American countries, the terrorism in China has been more concerned with ethnic-nationalism and a tint of religious ideology. The groups oft cited for the political violence in this region were the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Uighur Separatists. With the exception of 2001 and 2008, the domestic terrorism pattern for China is remarkably low (see Figure 4.6). The Xinjiang province in western China is the primary site of contention. The Chinese government attributes much of the violence in this region to Uighur extremists and maintains their desire for an independent state as the reason.

In 2001, the Chinese government executed a campaign known as “the patriotic re-education of imams”, which encouraged imams to participate in nationalistic and ideological classes by threatening to withdraw their right to practice, while concurrently curbing religious instruction in Xinjian (Castets, 2003). The rise in terrorist activities in this year, evident in Figure 4.6, may have been in response to this campaign. Alternatively, the escalation could be the result of China’s eagerness to report violence in order to persuade the United States to designate the ETIM as a terrorist entity post-9/11 (Tharoor, 2009). The spike in 2008 can be understood in the greater context – the summer Olympics in Beijing – which made it an attractive year for terrorists as China was thrusted into the global spotlight. In fact, the Chinese government took extra precautions during this time (Jiao, 2008). A notable attack in 2008 was the Kashgar terror strike that killed 16 police officers and injured another 16 using homemade explosives (China Daily, 2008).

Shifting back to the Americas, Mexico also falls under the category of moderately low level terrorism. Mexico experienced considerable fluctuations between 1990 and 2012 (see Figure 4.6). Sharing a commonality with other Latin-American countries, Mexico also suffered from left-wing terrorism, in addition to ethnic and single-issue terror groups. These organizations were the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP), and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN). The PRD, or Partido Revolucionario Democratico, is currently inactive, but was responsible

47 Since Uighur Separatists is an umbrella term and ETIM falls within that category, it may be surmised that the GTD (2015) classifies some of ETIM’s activities under the former.

48 This is appealing to terrorists because it can draw more attention to their cause.
for a number of terrorist attacks between 1990 and 1997, the majority of which occurred in 1996 (GTD, 2015). Active from 1996 to 2007, the ERP (Ejército Popular Revolucionario) was a leftist guerrilla movement that declared war against the government a year after the Aguas Blancas massacre, during which an ambush by police officers that killed 17 farmers and injured 23 (Reyes, 2011). Accordingly, ERP primarily targets the military and police officers. In their first attack, the group convened on police and military posts, which left 12 dead (Sheridan, 1996). Later that same year, ERP gunned down six police officers at two separate locations (Fineman, 1996), and in 2007, ERP blew up pipelines, sabotaging the flow of natural gas to Mexican cities (Chicago Tribune, 2007).

An ally of ERP, the EZLN⁴⁹ (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) was the most active of the three in Brazil, responsible for 24 incidents between 1994 and 2010. Fighting for Indigenous control over resources and land, EZLN declared war on the Mexican government the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect (Kriel, 2014). This event led to 57 fatalities (GTD, 2015). According to Subcommandante Marcos, the spokesperson of EZLN, NAFTA was perceived as “a death certificate for the Indigenous ethnicities of Mexico” (as cited in Watson, 2002, p. 64), as the Mayan’s land would no longer be protected (Kriel, 2014). As an ethnic-nationalist terrorist organization that borrows elements from Marxism (Watson, 2002), the range in the types of targets included private property, police, government institutions, and utilities. Echoing the PRD and ERP, the bulk of EZLN’s attacks also occurred in 1996 (GTD, 2015). It is worth noting that despite EZLN’s terrorist activities, there was public support for the group in Mexico. For example, following a massacre of 45 Indigenous people on December 22, 1997, demonstrators took to the streets two weeks later to voice their outrage and support for the organization (Reuters, 1998a).

### 4.1.1.3. Moderately High Level Terrorism

Countries that fall under the *moderately high* level terrorism experience far more terror campaigns than those previously discussed. The number of events far exceeded 100 over the span of 23 years, with the fewest at 172 terrorist incidents in one country, South Africa. Figure 4.7 depicts the longitudinal distribution of terrorist activities for

⁴⁹ The EZLN also has an official website: http://www.ezln.org.mx/
South Africa, Peru, the United States, and Spain. South Africa and Peru are reviewed first because of they share a similar pattern. After an initial intense rise in attacks during the early 1990s, Figure 4.7 shows that terrorism tapers from 1995 onwards.

For South Africa, 1994 marked a momentous event – the end of apartheid (AFP, 2014). This explains the prominent drop for South Africa in 1995 from 1994 (see Figure 4.7). From 1990 to 1994, however, South Africa was crippled by a number of groups: the African National Congress (ANC), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). In 1990, ANC was unbanned and Nelson Mandela was released from prison after 27 years; in the following year, intense clashes occurred between ANC and IFP (BBC, 2015b). Kynoch (2013) explains that prior to the first non-racial elections, communal violence between these two groups ravaged the townships of Thokoza and Katlehong from 1990 to 1994. While the ANC and IFP both opposed the apartheid, they disagreed on their tactics; as a result, IFP began engaging in conflict with ANC sympathizers (Kynoch, 2013). Kynoch (2013) states that this

![Figure 4.7 Domestic Terrorism Events by Country - Moderately High](image)

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50 These townships are south-east of Johannesburg.
tension only intensified when political efficacy for black South Africans came within reach, and both groups committed atrocities against people across the political divide. Even years after, the friction between AND and IFP remained in South Africa, especially during election times (Georgy, 2009), though to a much lesser extent than it once was.

In a similar fashion, Peru saw an explosion of terrorist activity in the early 1990s that then diminished quickly. Continuing the inclination towards left-wing terrorism among Latin American countries, the groups that plagued Peru follow suit: the National Liberation Army (Peru, ELN), Shining Path (SL), and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission has estimated that 70,000 people lost their lives in the 1980s and 1990s during the civil war, which involved the guerrillas and state forces, including the Grupo Colina51 (Collyns, 2011). So although there appears to be a rapid growth in the number of terrorist attacks from 1990 to 1991, Peru’s high trend in Figure 4.7 is merely a continuation of the turmoil from the previous decade. SL (Sendero Luminoso) was responsible for the bulk of anti-state terrorist attacks within this region. In particular, the Tarata bombing of 1992 in Lima left 40 dead and hundreds more wounded (Brooke, 1992a; Cabitza, 2012). Ideologically aligned with Maoism, SL was born in 1980 and aspired to overthrow the Peruvian government by replacing it with a socialist system (Byman, 1998; Public Safety Canada, 2014). The prominent decrease in terrorist activities was attributable to the capture of SL’s leader, Guzmán, the symbolic head of the snake, as well as several others (Brooke, 1992b). The group was further weakened in 1994 when 6,000 SL guerillas surrendered (BBC, 2012). Since Guzmán’s arrest, parts of SL have splintered off into other groups, some of which are financed through the cocaine trade (BBC, 2015a; Romero, 2009).

Espousing Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru) shared leftist-ideological similarities with SL. There are also parallels in group downfalls, as both groups suffered from the removal of their leaders. Often overshadowed by SL, MRTA was generally perceived as the less vicious of the two (Brooke, 1996). Due to their disdain for imperialism, the goal of MRTA since 1984 was to establish a socialist government (Choi, 1997). Mirroring SL, a substantial share of

51 This is an anti-communist death squad comprised of military personnel under the administration of Fujimori between 1990 and 1994. Their actions constitute as state terrorism.
MRTA’s activities in Figure 4.7 occurred in 1991. In 1992, the leader of MRTA, Victor Polay, was captured and later, hundreds of guerrillas surrendered under an amnesty program (Brooke, 1996; Sims, 1996). Despite losing one of its leaders and hundreds of comrades, the MRTA carried its most infamous incident in 1996. Néstor Cerpa Cartolini, a co-founder of the MRTA, took over the Japanese Ambassador’s residence along with over 100 hostages Lima, and demanded the release of their members (Farah, 1997). At the end of the siege, the MRTA lost its second leader, Cerpa; this effectively ended the terrorist organization (Rotella, 1997).

Among the sample, the United States offers a unique perspective as homegrown terrorism in the country features elements of right-wing and single-issue extremism. With a gradual growth in terrorist incidents from 1990 leading towards its height in 2002 and an overall steady decline near 2012, the trend for the United States differs from Peru and South Africa (see Figure 4.7). The most prominent organizations responsible for these acts of domestic terror were Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and the ill-famed Ku Klux Klan (KKK). While ALF and ELF are single-issue terrorist organizations, the KKK is primarily a white supremacist group with varying elements of Christianity, as are its offshoots, such as the Aryan Nations.

The KKK is regarded as the United States’ first terrorist organization (SPLC, 2011). Although their roots date back to the 1800s, the current iteration of the Klan did not appear until after World War II, in response to the civil rights movement (Cosgrove, 2013), and, in part, sustained by disillusioned veterans. A small proportion of Vietnam veterans became Klansmen and, with their skills and background, assisted the KKK in their path towards paramilitary violence after the anti-civil rights backlash in the 1960s (Belew, 2014). For example, Beam, a grand dragon who advocates leaderless resistance, was a Vietnam veteran from Texas and created a paramilitary arm for the KKK in the late 1970s (Klanwatch, 2011). Despite their reputation, only four instances between 1990 and 2012 were attributed to the KKK (GTD, 2015), which makes the organization less prolific than it once was. In 1995, a former KKK leader, Don Black,
launched the site Stormfront; this site is known for its white nationalist rhetoric and hundreds of murders have been linked to its registered members (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Although terrorism at the hands of the KKK ceased in 2007 (GTD, 2015), they are by no means a relic and their desire for white dominance lingers. Recently, Klan activity and membership among Christian Aryans have been ignited by Trump’s run for the presidency. According to the Klansmen, who chanted “[w]hite power!” and “[d]eath to the ungodly! Death to our enemies” at a rally, Trump’s rise is perceived as validation by revealing national politics (Reeves, 2016).

But white supremacists did not dominate the political violence landscape in the United States between 1990 and 2012; rather, single-issue terrorists did. The two dominant organizations were Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Similar to the leaderless resistance advocated by Beam (1992), these underground groups have adopted cell structures (Weigant, 2016), which has made it difficult for law enforcement to capture and detain these terrorists (ELF, 2001). Active from 1995 to 2009 in violent campaigns (GTD, 2015), ELF54 (2001) is an offshoot of Earth First! and did not officially claim responsibility for any action until 1997.55 The goal of ELF is to stop the destruction of the planet by capitalist society and in 2001, the organization claims that the North American branch committed over two dozen actions, causing close to $40 million in damages (ELF, 2001). Prior to the decline in ELF’s activities in 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigations led Operation Backfire against domestic terrorism (including ALF), which indicted a number of individuals (Weigant, 2016). Although ELF’s focus is environmentalism, it has worked in cooperation with other like-minded organizations, such as ALF.56 Committing acts of extremism throughout 1990 and 2012, ALF was involved in 80 incidents, which produced two injuries (GTD, 2015). According to their official website, the objective of ALF (n.d.) is “to abolish institutionalized animal exploitation because it assumes that animals are property” (para. 2). While their intent may be laudable, their means to achieve it are not. Originating from Great Britain in the 1970s (Cordeiro-Rodrigues, 2016), ALF was

54 ELF’s official website can be accessed here: http://earth-liberation-front.com/
55 While ELF’s pamphlet suggests that the organization originates from Earth First in England, Earth First! (2017) was actually formed in 1979 in the United States.
56 ALF’s official press office is https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/NAALPO/
primarily associated with arson and bombing animal research labs, as well as the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries (Frieden, 2005). Although ALF continues to engage in political violence as a method to channel their discontent, other forms of terrorism, particularly Jihadism, have taken centre stage since 9/11.

In contrast, the focus on homegrown terrorism in Spain, however, has not shifted in recent years. In fact, the politically motivated campaigns by domestic entities that dominated the region between 1990 and 2012 were the same operations that have been plaguing Spain for decades. The two main groups accountable for this violence were Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) and the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO). Based in northern Spain and southwestern France, the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) was a Basque nationalist group that began aggressively disputing for an independent Basque state in 1960 (Davies, 1994; LaFree, Dugan, Xie, & Singh, 2012). Conversely, GRAPO was a left-wing, antifascist organization that desired to replace the Spanish government with one resembling Mao’s repressive People’s Republic of China (Pedahzur & Weinberg, 2003; Richardson, 2013).

For Spain, domestic terrorism was relatively low between 1990 and 1998, after which substantial political violence occurred for just over a decade (see Figure 4.7). During this time, ETA announced, and then later retracted, a ceasefire of its campaign against the Spanish Government (BBC, 2011). Between 2000 and 2002, Spanish and French security forces disrupted GRAPO (BBC, 2006), hindering their ability to operate effectively. Since Spain’s rising trend in 1999, the first notable drop in terrorist activities was in 2003. In part, this was due to governmental success on GRAPO. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Spain outlawed the Batasuna party for being associated with the ETA and four core members were also arrested in 2003 (CBC News, 2007). Following another series of attacks over the next couple of years, the ETA announced another ceasefire in March of 2006 (Walker, 2006), which led to the second drop in attacks

57 Exceptions include the 2004 Madrid bombings.
58 The ETA refrained from immediately resorting to violence and had a ten-year internal deliberation on its goals and tactics (Weinberg & Pedahzur, 2003).
59 Some sources say GRAPO was based on Maoism, while others suggest Marxist-Leninism.
60 The ETA and GRAPO have committed an extensive number of terrorist attacks during this period as well, but many had been excluded as they did not meet all four criteria explained in Chapter 3. As such, the discussion here focuses on the counts that remain.
evident in 2007 (see Figure 4.7). Coinciding with the ETA's ceasefire, police officers in Spain announced the decapitation of GRAPO with the arrest of its core leadership in 2006 (BBC, 2006). This break in bloodshed, however, was short-lived as assaults by the ETA resumed in 2008. The last terrorist incident orchestrated by ETA occurred in 2010. A video was released maintaining that armed actions will no longer be carried out (Rainsford, 2010), and an official declaration of ceasefire in its struggle for independence was issued the following year (BBC, 2011). Despite the ceasefire, however, recent reports note that ETA has yet to dissolve and abandon arms (The Guardian, 2015).

Evidently, politically violent groups have marred countries within low, moderately low, and moderately high level terrorism categories. A number of terrorist organizations, however, overshadow these groups, such as the ETA and SL, by attacking their respective countries in the name of political change and ideology. From 1990 to 2012, political conflicts pervade countries under the classification of high level terrorism to a far greater extent than those in the other categories.

4.1.1.4. High Level Terrorism

![Figure 4.8 Domestic Terrorism Events by Country - High](image-url)
Throughout the 23 year period covered by this thesis, political unrest and violence has been much more common in the following group of high level terrorism countries (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4-1). A substantial portion of all domestic terrorist attacks among this sample occurred in India (4385; 40%). Russia (1482, 14%), Colombia (1481, 14%), Nigeria (1076, 10%), and Turkey (806, 8%) are the other countries in this group. Figure 4.8 shows a general trend among these countries where terrorist events are relatively infrequent until 2001, with the exception of Turkey and Nigeria. Colombia, and once again Turkey, also diverge from the overall pattern in the early 1990s, in which both experience notably more events than the other three.

4.1.1.4.1. Turkey

To understand the patterns of incidents in Turkey, it is important to recognize the history of the region and those who inhabit it. Under the Persian and Ottoman Empires, Kurdish tribes enjoyed autonomy between the sixteenth century (Yildiz, 2007) and the early twentieth century. With the cessation of World War I came the prospect of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In spite of the promises made by the Allied powers and the Ottoman government, Kurdish self-determination never came to fruition (McMillan, 2016; Yildiz, 2007). The Treaty of Sèvres defines present-day Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire (McMillian, 2016). Gunter (2003) notes that, since then, the modernizing policies of these states assimilated their minorities; the Kurds, however, suffered as their homeland straddles the fringes of these four countries. These strategies took various forms, ranging from Syria denying Kurds citizenship to genocidal assaults in Iraq (Gunter, 2003). Effectively, the Kurdish people were being actively erased – both figuratively and literally – from the region. According to Gunter (2013), the disaffected minority created the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)\(^{61}\) in 1978 and their discontent translated into violence six years later. This is the terrorist organization that afflicted Turkey most prominently for the next several decades. PKK’s period of activity is depicted in Table 4-2. Originally, the goal was for autonomy – to establish an independent Marxist state; however, PKK now fights for the Turkish government’s recognition of Kurdish political, social, and cultural rights (Gunter, 2013). Turkey reached some of its highest numbers of

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\(^{61}\) PKK has two official websites: http://www.pkkonline.net/ and http://www.yja-star.com/ku/
homegrown terrorism between 1992 and 1994, which was followed by a period of relative peace until 2011 and 2012 (see Figure 4.8).

Akin to the ETA, the PKK has declared numerous unilateral ceasefires in their attempts to negotiate peace. In 1993, an agreement appeared to be within grasp until the death of President Turgut Ozal; in 1999, the PKK declared a ceasefire following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, which was dismissed by the Turkish government. In 2009, the two sides were on the verge of a solution when the Kurdish Opening was announced (BBC, 2015d; Gunter, 2013). When this failed, however, violence ensued, and by 2012, Turkey experienced more deaths from the conflict than it had since the late 1990s (Gunter, 2013). Another organization worth mentioning is the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK, see Table 4-2). Founded in 2004, TAK (Teyrébazên Azadiya Kurdistan) was a splinter bloc of the PKK; it cites the PKK’s negotiations with the Turkish government as their reason for leaving (BBC, 2016b; Loveluck, 2016). Unlike the PKK, however, TAK was characterized as a nationalist militant, as opposed to a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla, group (Yildiz, 2007). As Turkey’s most active terrorist organizations, the PKK and its offshoots were significant contributors of political violence in the region, thus driving the trend shown in Figure 4.8.

Table 4-2 Organizations and Period of Activity - Turkey

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= left-wing; = ethnic-nationalist; = religious; = other

62 Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the PKK.
63 This is also known as the Kurdish Initiative; the goal was to resolve the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish government by raising their standards of freedom and democracy.
64 The failure of the Kurdish Opening was attributed to the Turkish government’s improper implementation of the policies, discord within the parliament, concerns regarding future presidency, the Turkish public’s discontent, and the banning of pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (Gunter, 2013, p. 89).
65 In the GTD (2015), TAK is referred to as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks.
While a sizable portion of homegrown terrorism was committed by the PKK, Turkey suffered from a number of other groups as well, including the Turkish Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (TKP-ML), Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Way), Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (İBDA-C), and the Turkish Hizballah (TK-HK). The first three were politically left on the ideological spectrum, whereas the latter two were fueled by religious fervor (see Table 4-2). Created in 1972, the TKP-ML (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist) and its military wing (TIKKO) were inspired by Maoist ideology (Copley, 2016; Sözen, 2006). Committing terrorist attacks from 1990 to 2003, reaching its height in 1994 and reemerging in 2012, the TKP-ML primarily targeted businesses as well as the Turkish military and government.

With regard to Dev-Sol, the terrorist group was originally part of a political organization, the Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front (THKP-C), but resorted to political violence in 1978 when negotiations failed to accomplish their goals; Dev-Sol later adopted the name DHKP-C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi) in 1994 (BBC, 2013a; Sevinc, 2008). The goal of DHKP-C, a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization, was to construct a state that emulates the Communist Soviet Union and the primary targets were government agents and foreigners, Westerners in particular, due to their opposition to US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Khazan, 2013; Sevinc, 2008). For recruitment, this group turned to high schools and universities (BBC, 2004). Dev-Sol was responsible for over 100 attacks in 1991 and roughly 60 in 1992. Since 1994, the DHKP-C has also committed a number of assaults in Turkey, though far fewer in comparison. Throughout the period in question, 2012 was the most active year for the DHKP-C, in which four attacks were attributed to the organization. The worst incident perpetrated by DHKP-C occurred on September 10, 2001, when a suicide bomber killed three in Istanbul (BBC, 2004).

66 There is a dearth of information regarding the TKP-ML and it should not be confused with Marxist Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) or the other Communist parties in Turkey.
67 Its official website may be: http://www.kurtuluscephesi.com/
In comparison to the PKK and DHKP-C, attacks by İBDA-C and TK-HK have generally resulted in fewer casualties (Sevinc, 2008). Differentiating itself from ethnic-nationalist and left-wing terrorist organizations, the İBDA-C is an Islamic militant organization with the dream of re-establishing the Caliphate via a Sunni Islamic federate state (Cordesman, 2005). Though the İBDA-C formed in 1970, their rhetoric did not translate into violence until 1994 when they perpetrated over 20 incidents. This was also their most active year. Although the organization is still active, their last series of assaults occurred in 2003, which were also İBDA-C’s deadliest attacks. In one instance, truck bomb explosions outside two synagogues took the lives of over 20 people and injured 300 more in Istanbul; despite the fact that a news agency received a call from İBDA-C claiming responsibility, the Turkish police doubts the group’s allegation (Arsu & Filkins, 2003).

Similar to the İBDA-C, the TK-HK (Türk Hızbullahı) is also a Sunni Islamist militant organization. Emerging from the Iranian revolution in the 1980s, the TK-HK aspires to implement a theocratic state with Sharia law in place of the current secular Republic (Sevinc, 2008). In the early 1990s, a number of disagreements regarding ideology, leadership, and tactics broke the group into two factions: llimciler (scientists) and Menzilciler (rangers) (Sevinc, 2008). From 1993 to the death of the Menzilciler’s leader in 1994, 100 members of TK-HK died from infighting and the llimciler soon took over the organization’s operations (Sevinc, 2008). In 2000, however, the leader of llimciler was killed and over 1,000 members were arrested (Sevinc, 2008, p. 42). Although the PKK and TK-HK share a common enemy in the Turkish government, TK-HK blamed the PKK for anti-Muslim activities and deemed them an adversary; this conflict resulted in the deaths of over 500 people between 1992 and 1995 (Sevinc, 2008). When the PKK became less of a threat, Sevinc (2008) notes that the TK-HK’s focus turned to secular academics, journalists, feminists, and Muslims who did not share their aspirations from the mid-1990s until the death of their leader in 2000. Despite the tensions within and between these terrorist organizations, only six events were attributed to the TK-HK in the GTD (2015) between 1992 and 2001. In light of the various conflicts

68 The US government’s document cites attacks in 1992 and 1993 (US Department of State, n.d.); however, these incidents are not in the GTD (2015).
within Turkey, it is unsurprising that it falls under the category of high level terrorism countries.

4.1.1.4.2. Nigeria

In contrast with the all other countries in the sample, Nigeria is distinctive due to its pattern of activity. As Figure 4.8 indicates, its experience with terrorism is relatively new. That is, up until 2002 or 2004, it would have been classified as low level; but the acute increase in events from 2009 onwards elevates Nigeria firmly in the high level category. As Africa’s most populous state, the composition of Nigeria can be delineated by religious lines – Muslim north and Christian south (Karimi, 2016). Accordingly, the northern regions of Nigeria have been beset by two dominant Islamic terrorist organizations while the south faced terror campaigns of single-issue and ethnic origins; respectively, these groups were Boko Haram, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimeen fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Table 4-3 illustrates the span of these terrorist organizations. Among these groups, Boko Haram is the most prolific.

Founded in 2002 with the creation of a religious complex in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, the name Boko Haram translates to Western education is forbidden in English from Hausa (Soy, 2016). The jihadist group operates out of northern Nigeria and has become synonymous with fear and bloodshed for the residents of the region, waging campaigns of terror by targeting civilians and military personnel (Foucher, 2016; Karimi, 2016; Soy, 2016). Martin (2015) notes that Boko Haram is “responsible for thousands of casualties, kidnappings, and population displacements, with the weekly death toll sometimes above one hundred victims” (p. 156). Similar to other Islamic-

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<th>Table 4-3</th>
<th>Organizations and Period of Activity - Nigeria</th>
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<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Ansaru" /></td>
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<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Boko Haram" /></td>
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<td>MEND</td>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="MEND" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force</td>
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Note: MEND = Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

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69 Officially, its name is Jamā’atu Ahli is-Sunnah lidda’wati wal-Jihād (جماعة أهل السنة والجماعة), prior to Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIS in 2014.
based terrorist organizations, Boko Haram’s objective is to form a caliphate following their selective interpretation of Islamic law (Anderson, 2015). The first known attack by the group was in 2003 when 200 members struck police stations near the Niger border (CNN Library, 2016). In 2009, Boko Haram launched its military insurgency as it marred Nigeria with suicide attacks, bombings, assassinations, and abductions (Soy, 2016). On the streets of Maiduguri, thousands of civilians fled as shoot-outs ensued before Boko Haram’s headquarters were seized and Yusuf, the leader of the group, was killed (Soy, 2016). This leadership void was subsequently filled by Abubakar Shekau. Shekau is described as part-theologian and part-gangster; he is also the former deputy of Boko Haram and was previously thought to have been killed in 2009 (CNN Library, 2016). The death of Yusuf proved to not only fail to terminate Boko Haram, but incited the group to further violence.

Although the terrorist organization is well known for its abduction of over 200 schoolgirls in 2014 (Umar & Adigun, 2015), Boko Haram wreaked havoc on Nigerians after 2009. According to the GTD (2015) data, incidents from Boko Haram’s campaign of terror climbed sharply, exceeding several hundred events by 2012. In 2010, Shekau announced his new position, 80 people died from a bomb in Jos, and a prison attack killed five and released in excess of 700 inmates (BBC, 2014a; CNN Library, 2016). The following year, the Abuja police headquarters and United Nations building were bombed, and improvised explosive devices detonated close to military barracks on the same day President Goodluck Jonathan was inaugurated (BBC, 2014a; CNN Library, 2016). Then in 2012, Kaduna became the site of a deadly Easter church attack, the newspaper offices of ThisDay were bombed, coordinated attacks in Kano, Kano, took the lives of over 200 people, and Boko Haram’s splinter group, Ansaru, was born (BBC, 2014a; CNN Library, 2016).

Echoing Boko Haram’s evangelical mission, Ansaru desires an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria, stretching from Niger to Cameroon. Al-Ansari\(^{70}\) denounces Boko Haram’s attacks on innocent Nigerians, but asserts that self-defense can lead to the death of non-Muslims; the name of the group means “vanguards for the protection of Muslims in black Africa” and their purpose is to recover the dignity of Muslims lost to the

\(^{70}\) Abu Usmatul al-Ansari is the leader of Ansaru.
West (Chothia, 2013). In fact, Azumah (2014) notes that the group is a humane alternative to its predecessor, Boko Haram. The emergence of Ansaru followed the Kano attacks that resulted in the deaths of many Muslims (Onuoha, 2013). Although Ansaru did not announce its formation until 2012, their first attack traces back to 2011. Engineers from Britain, Italy, and Germany, were held hostage and killed by Ansaru in two separate incidents, one in May of 2011 and the other in January 2012 (Nossiter, 2013). How the kidnapping and subsequent deaths of these engineers equate to self-defense, however, remains unclear.

With regard to the political violence in the southern regions of Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta region, the notable players include the NDPVF and MEND. Unlike the Nigeria’s northern half, the south is abundant in natural resources, particularly petroleum. Although violence as a result of the oil industry is not novel to this region, the degradation in the relationship between the government and oil companies, and Nigerians in the area, led to the creation of both militant organizations.

Stemming from decades of colonialization and marginalization of the Ijaws of Warri,71 Ijaw youths with interests in both their ethnic communities and oil company policies formed a number of organizations in the 1990s, including the Ijaw Youth Council (Hazen, 2009; Ukiwo, 2007). When peaceful efforts for change failed, however, most of these organizations resorted to the threat or use of violence. According to Ukiwo (2007), this shift resulted from what were perceived as futile dialogs with a repressive military regime and the government’s use of soldiers to quell protests against oil companies. Among the militia groups formed was the NDPVF, which was created in 200172 by Mujahid Asari Dokubo, president of the Ijaw Youth Council (Ukiwo, 2007). The goals of this ethnic militia include attaining self-determination for the Ijaw of Warri and control of the natural resources of their Indigenous land (i.e., oil); NDPVF has the support of local communities, despite their condemnation of the NDPVF’s violent tactics (Hazen, 2009). In 2005, the leader, Asari, was arrested and detained on treason charges (Ukiwo, 2007). At this point, it became evident to the group that the attitudes of the federal government

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71 An ethnic group in Niger Delta; these people are marginalized due to their ethnic identities.

72 Other sources (see Hazen, 2009) state that the NDPVF was created in 2003 as a result of the rigged elections, while Ukiwo (2007) asserts that FNDIC (formerly the Niger Delta Volunteer Force) had to change its name in 2001 after Asari established NDPVF.
and oil companies could not be changed by nonviolent means (Courson, 2011). According to the GTD (2015), four acts of terrorism were attributed to NDPVF, which began in 2006, ended in 2009, and were most frequent in 2007. Courson (2011) states that the target of choice for NDPVF were oil installations, the soft underbelly of Nigeria’s economy, as opposed to military personnel or civilians. Moreover, the NDPVF is known to have violent altercations with the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), a rival Ijaw militia (Courson, 2011). In 2009, NDPVF and NDV agreed to a ceasefire in exchange for amnesty after the Nigerian government intervened (Courson, 2011; laccino, 2015). In essence, Maclean (2016) explains that the government paid militants to “guard” the infrastructure of oil companies.

Nigeria’s largest militant group, MEND, emerged in 2006, shortly after the arrest of NDPVF’s leader, Asari, an act regarded as an attempt to humiliate the Ijaw people (Ukiwo, 2007). MEND is a loose network of gangs in the Niger Delta region; politicians from the Niger Delta initially devised the gangs as a means to rig elections but they evolved into a militant movement (MEND) when the armed men directed their violence towards the government and oil companies (Duffield, 2010). In fact, the group is so large that it is, at times, regarded as an umbrella organization with roughly 100 factions (laccino, 2015). Bombings aside, MEND also kidnapped civilians and stole crude oil (Duffield, 2010). MEND’s objective is to retain oil profits within the Niger Delta for roads, schools, hospitals, and utilities (Duffield, 2010); moreover, the group fights for compensation for oil spills, which lead to the destruction of the environment (laccino, 2015). In order to convey their messages, Jomo Gbomo and Cynthia Whyte emailed the media their demands and threatened future attacks while denouncing the government of Nigeria (Duffield, 2010; Ukiwo, 2007). With respect to Figure 4.8, MEND started contributing to the trend in 2006 and reached its apex in 2008 and 2009 with roughly 20 attacks each year. In terms of structure, MEND departs from NDPVF as it does not have a hierarchy or clear lines of leadership; as a result, the group is more

73 These incidents are not included in this thesis, as they arguably do not amount to terrorism because they represent violence between two anti-state entities. The exclusion of these events is discussed in the final chapter.

74 These are the signatures used by the group’s spokespeople.
difficult to terminate (Courson, 2011). MEND was responsible for four attacks in 2012 and the organization continues to inflict political violence in the Niger Delta region.

4.1.1.4.3. **Colombia**

As with other Latin American countries, terrorism in Colombia were predominantly perpetrated by left-wing groups. Between 1990 and 2012, roughly nine ideologically left terrorist organizations\(^75\) committed acts of political violence. During this period (see Table 4-4), the most prolific groups among these were the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP). Responsible for well over 500 incidents from 1990 to 2012, the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) is a guerilla group that adheres to Fidel Castro’s communist ideology with influences drawn also from Roman Catholicism (Dudley, 2004). The ELN was formed in 1964 by intellectuals inspired by the Cuban revolution of the late 1950s and is considered to be the second largest rebel group (BBC, 2013b; Castillo, 2016). Examples of attacks by the ELN include the kidnapping of petroleum engineers in 1990 and the 1998 oil pipeline bombing that claimed the lives of 45 people and burned over 70 (Reuters, 1998b; Yarbro, 1990).

In terms of level of activity, no terrorist organization comes close to FARC-EP in Colombia within the sample. Committing acts of terrorism since the 1960s (Dudley, 2004), FARC-EP is a Marxist-Leninist guerilla group responsible for the majority of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4-4</th>
<th>Organizations and Period of Activity - Colombia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Bateman Cayon Group</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>M-19</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Liberation Army of Colombia</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peasant Self-Defense Group</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular Liberation Army</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>Popular Militia</td>
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<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom.</td>
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<td>CGBS</td>
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<td>United Self Defense Units of Colombia</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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Note: CGBS = Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board
\(\square\) = left-wing; \(\blacklozenge\) = paramilitary; \(\bigstar\) = other

\(^75\) The groups include Jaime Bateman Cayon Group, M-19 and its splinter cell, Peasants Self-Defense Group, People’s Revolutionary Army, Popular Liberation Army, and Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board.
attacks in Colombia. Initially, the goal of the group was to protect farmers from their landlords (Weinberg, 2013). According to Brittain (2010), peasants have supported FARC-EP since the mid-1960s. The group expanded considerably in the 1990s with the advent of neoliberal economic policies and state suppression. The group also serves as an example of how peasants from the countryside were capable of coordinating a sophisticated insurgency which has proved to be a challenge to government suppression for over half a century. As a self-proclaimed revolutionary movement, FARC-EP (2016) describes their relationship with the Colombian government by explaining that

[w]e have encouraged social and political struggles in defense of popular interests and have searched on multiple occasions to reach a peace agreement in order to end the long-lasting bloodshed that afflicts our country. Every time the State has found a violent and repressive response, which have harnessed ... both legal and illegal methods that prevent Colombia from progressing, such as massacres, political executions, dispossession of peasants, dirty war, paramilitarism and terror (para. 4).

Despite their original intent, Weinberg (2013) states that, in light of their recent activities, the group operated as a criminal, as opposed to purely political, organization. Cocaine production was the staple for the guerillas. In fact, drug-trafficking was FARC-EP’s main source of funding and remained one of the main concerns in negotiations with the Colombian government (Acosta, 2016; BBC, 2013b).

Throughout the decades, the organization has shown considerable resilience, despite changes in leadership and the efforts of the Colombian government (Weinberg, 2013). Méndez (1992) notes that in 1988, political killings by the group climbed due to failing peace talks, particularly the process that started during Betancur’s presidency in the mid-1980s. According to FARC-EP (2015), negotiations in subsequent years proved to be equally fruitful. These unsuccessful peace talks were often met with violent responses as FARC-EP’s frustrations intensified. In 1991 alone, an estimated 3,700

76 Originally, FARC-EP’s predominant income was from ransom and extortion (McDermott, 2008).

77 According to FARC-EP’s official twitter (https://twitter.com/FARC_EPeace) and website (Peace Delegation FARC-EP, n.d.), successful negotiation has been reached and a public referendum took place on October 2, 2016.
people lost their lives as a result of political violence (Méndez, 1992). Committing roughly 1,500 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2012, FARC-EP’s targets ranged from utilities to businesses, and private citizens to military personnel. The group’s level of activity varied throughout, ranging from 28 to 150 events in a given year. Examples of FARC-EP’s attacks include the Bojayá massacre in 2002, during which over 110 civilians lost their lives as a result of a mortar attack on a church (Hodgson, 2002), as well as the 2009 Nariño massacres, which resulted in the murder of 17 Indigenous people from the Awa tribe, who were accused of colluding with the army (McDermott, 2009). FARC-EP was also suspected of killing Tangarial and Awa aboriginals several days later (GTD, 2016b).

In addition to the left-wing terrorist organizations, Colombia was also the home to a right-wing paramilitary group known as the United Self Defense Units of Colombia, or Auto defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which came into force in 1996. With roots in drug-trafficking and links to the military, the group claimed to be a self-defense organization that protects the powerless state by attacking dissenting voices (BBC, 2013b). As a right-wing organization, opposition was defined as the left. According to Saab and Taylor (2009), AUC’s origins coincided with the chaotic state of the region’s drug trade following the fall of the Colombian cartel. The prime targets of AUC were civilians as well as ELN and FARC-EP’s guerrilla combatants.

In a particularly gruesome incident, the AUC crushed the heads of 24 avocado farmers with stones and a sledgehammer, then set their home village, Chengue, ablaze in 2001 (Wilson, 2001a). In the same year, over 25 people were killed in the town Alto Naya and those suspected of assisting leftist guerillas were left scattered along a road (BBC, 2001). The Colombian government has stated that the AUC likely killed more civilians than FARC-EP (Wilson, 2001b). Beyond the killings, the paramilitaries also captured property from peasants in a country where there was a severely imbalanced distribution of land. From 1997 to 2007, AUC seized close to 800,000 hectares of land and displaced a million peasants (Kovalik, 2015). The organization was also known to extort money from international corporations. A plea agreement from 2007 revealed that the banana company, Chiquita, had given AUC over $1.7 million so the group would not

78 This attack was the result of the cross-fire between FARC-EP and AUC paramilitaries.
harm its employees (Sullivan, 2007). On the other hand, some businesses have been accused of paying the AUC to threaten their workers. In 2003, Coca-Cola’s bottling partners in Colombia were accused of hiring the AUC to harm trade union leaders via intimidation, threats, and murder (Brodzinsky, 2003).

The GTD (2015) database indicates that the AUC’s activities span between 1999 and 2002, and again from 2008 to 2009. The group contributed to over 50 incidents in total. The absence in activity between 2002 and 2008 is attributable to the 2003 accord AUC signed with the Colombian government to officially demobilize by 2005; this same accord granted amnesty to the paramilitary leaders and over 30,000 members (Brittain, 2010). Activities in 2008 and 2009 indicate that AUC members have not fully committed to the ceasefire. It is suggested that these paramilitaries have simply shifted their engagement towards criminal gangs (Saab & Taylor, 2009). In effect, the formal unit of the AUC may be gone, but the violence committed by its former members remain as they transition from terrorism to criminal enterprises.

4.1.1.4.4. Russia

The pattern of political violence in Russia is unique from the other countries in the sample. There is a gradual upward trend from 1990 to 2012 that is more consistent and linear, with a slight drop between 2004 and 2007 (see Figure 4.8). The primary perpetrators of these events were Chechen rebels and Islamic extremists. Russia’s history and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 played a crucial role in the rise of these entities, as the conflict in this region was intertwined with its political climate. Situated in the Northern Caucasus at the south-western part of Russia, the Chechen people’s conflict with the USSR has roots from World War II in 1944. Stalin deported Chechens after accusing them of treason, and forbade their return until 1957.

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<th>Table 4-5</th>
<th>Organizations and Period of Activity - Russia</th>
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<td>Chechen Rebels</td>
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<td>RSRSBCM</td>
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Note: RSRSBCM = Riyadus-Salkhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs

- = ethnic-nationalist; ■ = religious

79 The accord gave the combatants until December 31, 2005, to disarm (Saab & Taylor, 2009).
Decades later, the Chechen Republic formed from the rubbles of the collapsed USSR and sought autonomy from Russia (Taylor, 2014). Their nationalist desires, however, went unanswered by the Russian Federation. By 1994, Chechnya enjoyed de facto sovereignty with a small military (Presidential Guard), an international airport, as well as control over oil production and exports. The situation took a turn for the worst, however, when the Russian army stormed into the capital, Grozny (BBC, 1994). In response, the leader of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Dudayev stated that “[w]e are right in the eyes of the world because we’re defending our lives and our freedom. We wanted talks but instead Russia started a war” (BBC, 1994, paras. 13-14). This display of violence by the Russian government resulted in the First Chechen War.

Over the course of two years, the Russian army demolished the area and killed many Chechens before the government pulled out, declared a ceasefire in 1996, and signed a treaty in 1997 (Specter, 1996; Stanley, 1997). Prior to this treaty, in June 1995, dozens of armed Chechen rebels besieged the police headquarters then set the city of Budyonnovsk on fire before they entered a Russian hospital and held its patients hostage while demanding Russian troops leave their land (Specter, 1995). The Second Chechen war began in 1999 when Chechen rebels overtook villages in Dagestan and a series of explosions ripped through apartments in both Dagestan and Russia (Taylor, 2014). Vladimir Putin rose in popularity among Russians because of his harsh response to these acts of terrorism (Lohr, 2013). According to Weinberg (2013), Grozny was leveled by Putin's brutal and repressive policies. This second war lasted until 2002 (Smith, 2014).

As Figure 4.8 indicates, there was a noticeable rise in terrorist events from 1999 onwards. Resorting to guerrilla tactics, the political violence committed by Chechen rebels and Islamic militants includes the Beslan elementary school siege, subway

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80 According to Russian forces, the goal was to restore constitutional order in the region.
81 This was deemed a successful negotiation as hostages were released without harm.
82 334 people died as a result of this three-day siege in 2004, 186 of which were children.
bombings, and holding a theater hostage (Lohr, 2013). The dip in 2005 (see Figure 4.8) corresponds to the loss of the Chechen rebel leader, Aslan Maskhadov; despite this, however, the rebels continued their assaults on the country as a means to gain independence (Associated Press, 2005). Maskhadov’s successor, Sadulayev, is an Islamic scholar. Although the separatist movement was largely premised on Chechnya’s sovereignty, the rebels embraced Islamic overtones at the onset of the Second Chechen war (Vakhayev, 2006). Accordingly, aside from the Chechen rebels, a number of Jihadist groups, such as the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Caucasus Emirate, and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs also participated and contributed to the violence; of these groups, the Caucasus Emirate (CE) was the most active.

The CE (Кавказский Эмират Kavkazski Emirat) was the product of an evolution from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Чеченская Республика Ичкерия) and the Caucasian Front (Кавказский фронт); the former is an unrecognized secessionist government of the Chechen Republic, while the latter is the Islamic arm of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Formed in 2007, CE is a Sufi nationalist organization that is allied with the global jihadi movement; the goal of the group is to establish an independent Caucasus Emirate (Stanford University, 2014). In addition to attacks on transportation and infrastructure, CE perpetrated suicide bombings on the Moscow subway in 2010. These 2010 events were preceded by a video in which the leader, Doku Umarov, stated “I promise you the war will come to your streets, and you will feel it in your own lives and on your own skin” (Barry, 2014, para. 13). The number of Dagestani people, who tend to be more Islamist than their Chechen counterparts and have better connections with the global jihad, have gradually increased among CE’s membership since the group’s inception (Barry, 2014; Ratelle, 2014). Consequently, this has opened an initially local issue – the establishment of an independent Chechnya – to an international forum with the advent of global jihadism for this region.

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83 Ethnic Chechens are primarily Muslims and the climate arising from the indiscriminate attacks by the Russian government strengthens the influence of Islamist fighters (Taylor, 2014).

84 These are essentially one group, just different parts of a whole.
4.1.1.4.5. **India**

Islamic militancy was an issue in India as well, along with separatists, other religious fundamentalists, and left-wing revolutionaries. The country also generated the highest number of homegrown extremist groups that are active and operate directly on Indian soil (Kartikeya, 2009). Given the extensive history and mixture of India’s various terrorist organizations – exemplifying ethnic-nationalist, religious, right, and fringe left sentiments – the respective origins, backgrounds, and objectives of these groups are the focus, as opposed to the groups themselves. This alternative approach, which is similar to the discussion on Russia, conveys a more succinct overview given that there are roughly 38 different terrorist organizations (see Table 4-6). India’s intense level of terrorist activity in Figure 4.8 reflects this large number. Although political violence in the 1990s was relatively mild, India was hurled into the forefront from 2000 onwards. Specifically, the years of extreme turmoil were from 2001 to 2004 and again between 2008 and 2012 (see Figure 4.8). The central players that contribute to these trends sought independence from India, attempted to convert those of other religions, or longed to overthrow the government and upper classes, while offering little to no tolerance to those who oppose them.

Cradling Bangladesh in north-eastern India (see Figure 4.9), Assam suffered from right-wing insurgencies and ethnic conflicts. One of the loudest voices touting sentiments concerning regional patriotism is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Baruah (2009) states that the goal of ULFA is to restore the sovereignty the group believes Assam lost to Britain’s colonial rule in 1926. Although British India ended in 1947, the desire for liberation among the Assamese did not emerge until several decades later. According to Bhattacharyya and Puri (2013), and Subramaniam (2012), the ULFA was established in 1979 to unshackle Assam from the neglectful and exploitative Indian government. The group proceeded to lead the nationalistic Assam Movement from 1979 to 1985 in response to Bengali immigrants (Bhattacharyya & Puri, 2013). Under the leadership of Paresh Barua, roughly 270 incidents were attributed to

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85 Though not discussed in this thesis, the data includes terrorist incidents from those who seek self-determination for the Karbi, Koch Rajbongshi, and Kuki (Kukiland) people.

86 An example of right-wing terrorism is the All Tripura Tiger Force, as it wants to rid the Tripura region of Bengali-speakers.
the ULFA between 1990 and 2012. One of these attacks occurred in 2008 where 13 coordinated bombs across four towns killed 77 people and injured hundreds; given the sophistication of the operation, however, it is believed that the group did not act alone (Hussain, 2008). Throughout the 23 year period, India’s neighbours have also been implicated in aiding insurgent groups. In particular, Bangladesh and Pakistan have been accused of supporting ULFA as they periodically seek refuge and train in their states (Flood, 2011). These problematic situations only fuel the tensions between regions and segments of India’s population.

Meanwhile, India also faces conflict centred on ethnic divides. Bodo, also referred to as Kacharis, is an ethnic group Indigenous to Assam. This group is characterized by a particular dialect; historically, the Bodos migrated from south-west China to eastern India centuries ago then assimilated with the Assamese population.

Table 4-6 Organizations and Period of Activity* - India

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Period of Activity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Tripura Tiger Force</td>
<td>1990-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Umar Mujahideen</td>
<td>1990-2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black Widow’s</td>
<td>1992-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bodo Militants</td>
<td>1994-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI – Maoist</td>
<td>1996-2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI – Marxist</td>
<td>1998-2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination Committee</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dima Halao Daoga</td>
<td>2002-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garo National Liberation Army</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamtapur Liberation Organization</td>
<td>2006-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kangleipak Communist Party</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
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<td>KLNLF</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karbi People’s Liberation Tigers</td>
<td>1990-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maoist Communist Center</td>
<td>1992-2004</td>
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<td>National Democratic Front of Bodoland</td>
<td>1994-2006</td>
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<td>National Liberation Front of Tripura</td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
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<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland</td>
<td>1998-2010</td>
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<td>NSCN-IM</td>
<td>2000-2012</td>
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<td>Naxalites</td>
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<tr>
<td>People’s Liberation Front of India</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPAK</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s War Group</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Liberation Front of Assam</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only groups that have committed ten or more attacks are included here due to the number of organizations.


This is not an inclusive list; only the more notable organizations are presented.
Figure 4.9 Map of India with States and Capitals (Nath, 2003). This ethnic group suffered under the Indian government's neglect for decades prior to taking up arms. According to Nath (2003), the demands for an independent state were initiated by the All-Bodo Student Union in 1987. Since then, the Bodos have been waging a bloody battle for a separate home-state. From 1990 to 2012, the Bodos ethnically cleansed non-Bodos, signed the Bodoland Autonomous
Council Accord in 1993, and eventually agreed to the Bodoland Territorial Council Accord in 2003 (Nath, 2003). The two militant groups that were founded in the early 1990s are the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). In 1997, BLT bombed a passenger train that killed 38 people, then issued a statement asserting that attacks will continue until the Indian government grants them an autonomous Bodoland (Associated Press, 1997). The Indian government acceded to BLT in 2003 with the peace accord and acquired the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (Singh, 2013). While BLT ceased fire, violence by the NDFB have increased since 2000 with particular attention paid to Bengali Muslims for fear of losing their chance of an autonomous country. By 2012, tensions between Bodos and Bengali-speaking Muslims flared, resulting in hundreds of villages set on fire that displaced nearly half a million and the deaths of over 100 people – many of whom are Bengali-speaking Muslims (Singh, 2013). As Samrat (2012) explains, this bloodshed was the outcome of a gradual build-up with origins that are decades deep.

Directly east of Assam is the Nagaland state (see Figure 4.9). Premised on Naga nationalism, Christian rhetoric, and a hint of Maoism, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) was a paramilitary group that yearned for a sovereign Christian state, Nagalim. According to one of their Facebook groups, NSCN's origins trace back to 1980 and has three goals:

1. Establish an independent Nagaland (Nagaland and areas of Manipur and Myanmar where Nagans reside);
2. Integrate Manipur districts inhabited by Nagans to create a state that will remain under the Indian constitution;
3. Establish Southern Nagaland (Senapati, Ukhrul, Chandel, and Tamenglong) within the Indian Union;

NSCN's ideology was “based on the principle of socialism for economic development and spiritual outlook Nagaland for Christ” (NSCN-IM, 2012, paras. 8-9). The group splintered in 1988, however, due to conflicts within NSCN that resulted in the death of nearly 200 members (Goswami, 2016; Hussain, 2016). The two new factions are NSCN-Islak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and NSCN-Khaplang (NSCN-K). Although an initial

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88 There is discord among Bodo terrorist groups over the nature of Bodoland – whether it should be a state within India or an entirely separate country (Associated Press, 1997).
A cease-fire was signed in 1997, there have been 80 rounds of peace talk since (Hussain, 2016), and NSCN-IM perpetrated roughly ten acts of terror between 1999 and 2012 (see Figure 4.8). Despite these violent outbursts, negotiations for peace accords continued between the Indian government and these terrorist organizations.

Akin to Assam and Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir is another region under contention (see Figure 4.9). As a primarily Muslim area that dreamed for a state independent of India, Pakistan-based groups often attacked New Delhi and Mumbai, sustaining a conflict that began in the late 1940s (Weinberg, 2013). This struggle started with the creation of Pakistan and India. Martin (2015) explains that when British colonial rule ended in 1947, the sectarian violence between Muslims and Hindus prompted the division of British India to be premised on religion – east and west Pakistan (Bangladesh) for the Muslims and India for the Hindus – at which point, mass migrations traversed across these new state lines. Since then, Pakistan has been sponsoring terrorist proxies to counter Indian interest and its army by using their intelligence agency, Directorate for Inter-services Intelligence, or ISI (Martin, 2015). The relevant and most aggressive groups that contribute to this conflict were the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkut-ul-Ansar (HuA), Hizbul Mujahideen, and the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF). One of India's most notorious attacks was perpetrated by one of these groups.

Over the course of four days, LeT coordinated a series of attacks across Mumbai (formerly Bombay) causing the deaths of over 160 people (Martin, 2015). Among the locations attacked were Taj Mahal Palace and Tower hotel, Oberoi Hotel, an ultra-orthodox Jewish centre (Nariman House), and Leopold Café (CNN Library, 2015; Friedman, 2009). The LeT is one of the most active separatist groups in the Jammu and Kashmir region. Between 1990 and 2012, the group was responsible for over 100 incidents. With the assistance of Pakistan’s ISI, LeT was formed in the late 1970s to fight against India and Afghanistan (Schirfrim, 2009). Coll (2008) explains that LeT resembles Hezbollah and Hamas because the group is not merely a terrorist organization; it operates hospitals and schools in the region. In terms of its ideology,

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89 Its charity arm, Jamat-ud-Dawa, is also recognized as a terrorist organization; however, this group is not necessarily considered a domestic terrorist entity as it is primarily based in Pakistan. Along with JeM and HuA, LeT is a proxy network (Subramaniam, 2012).
LeT is immersed in Islamic extremism and its goal is to establish a theocratic state in Pakistan while provoking a religious revolution in India (Shah, 2014).

Though discussed to a lesser extent than Islam and the other two Abrahamic faiths in the Western society, Sikhism is one of the most popular religions in India. Based in the Punjab state with roughly 20 million devotees, the area is immersed in Sikh nationalism (Martin, 2015). Even prior to the 1990s, a tumultuous relationship existed between Sikhs and their government. Backed by Pakistan’s ISI, Sikh nationalists have fought for the creation of Khalistan in Punjab since the 1970s (Martin, 2015). During this period, a segment of dissatisfied Sikhs were led by a charismatic preacher, Bhindranwale, who articulated that discrimination against Sikhs undermines Sikh identity (Van Dyke, 2009). These negative sentiments then festered for nearly a decade. Weinberg (2013) notes that major acts of terrorism and struggles for independence in north-western India in the 1980s include the bus massacre in 1983 and the Golden Temple occupation in 1984 that led to the government’s invasion of the Temple, known as Operation Blue Star. In retaliation, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her later in the year for authorizing the operation, to which Hindus responded by rampaging Sikh neighborhoods. 90 Continuing this merciless tit for tat battle, Air India 747 was blown up by Sikh militants – killing hundreds of people (Weinberg, 2013). From 1980 to 1992, an estimated 25,000 people died (Van Dyke, 2009). Examples of Sikh terrorist organizations are Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), Bhindranwale Tigers Force of Khalistan (BTHK), and the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF). These organizations share three common features: they were formed around the 1980s; the primary objective is the establishment of a Sikh homeland, Khalistan; and tigers are a prominent fixture in their brand. While their motivations are rooted in a desire for an autonomous state, Sikhism is a core component of Sikh nationalism that defines their ethnic identity. For other terrorist groups, the profound devotion to deities and theology is the heart of their ideology that compels them to commit political violence.

To the Viśva Hindū Pariṣāda (VHP), Hinduism is a mobilizing force. Recent figures indicate that Hindus comprise about 80% of India’s population of 1.2 billion

90 Between 1984 and 1992, roughly 250,000 Sikhs have died as a result of the clash with Indian troops (Martin, 2015).
people (Bacchi, 2015). Mawdsley (2005) states that Hindu nationalist organizations emerged in the 1920s and had maintained a relatively low profile. The core ideology of the religious Hindu Right family, or Sangh Parivar, is Hindutva – the essence of Hindu-ness or Hindu nationalism (Mawdsley, 2005). The three core units of Sangh Parivar are the Rashtriya Swayemsevak Sangh (RSS), created in 1925 as a cultural, quasi-military, and voluntary service group to promote paramilitary training; VHP, which was established in 1964 as an umbrella for all the features of Hindu belief and practice; and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which acts as the political wing in the Indian government (Harriss, 2015; Mawdsley, 2005). VHP’s (2010) official website explains that the goal of VHP is to organize and protect the Hindu Dharma. The Sangh believes that Hindus have been historically oppressed by a number of actors, ranging from Muslims to the British during colonialism (Lochtefeld, 1994). While they present themselves as a benevolent organization (see VHP, 2010), their religious ideology and treatment of those who do not adhere to Hinduism suggest otherwise. According to Mawdsley (2005), Hindutva “is assertively militant and masculine in tone” (p. 8); as a result, Gandhi’s non-violence is frowned upon, sexual violence is rampant in insurgences (e.g., Gujarat riot in 2002), and nuclear tests that show their strength and intimidate their Pakistani neighbours are cause for celebration. These chauvinistic attitudes embraced by the Hindu right compound the oppression and humiliation felt by the Sangh Parivar.

These perceptions colour their approaches to other religious denominations. For the Hindu Right, certain groups (e.g., Buddhists and Sikhs) can be included into the Hindu fold because they originate from India, whereas other religious entities (i.e., Christians and Muslims) are to be expelled or must convert to the Hinduism (Mawdsley, 2005). These attitudes are translated into rigid and aggressive declarations. The BJP asserts that Hindus who convert to Islam or Christianity should be met with death sentences; however, the reverse does not hold true since Hinduism is where people belong (Bacchi, 2015). To the Sangh Parivar, Christianity and Islam have perverted India’s historically Hindu population; accordingly, conversion to Hinduism is simply a return to one’s original faith. Since the 1990s, Hindu extremists have brutalized Christians – raping nuns, killing priests, and destroying churches – as they equate Christianity with cultural aids. According to the Human Rights Watch (1999), violence
against Christians intensified following BJP’s electoral victory in 1998. The primary perpetrators are VHP and RSS. Along with anti-Christian propaganda, those under the Sangh family carry out campaigns of violence on Christian communities (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

With respect to violence against Muslims, December of 1992 marks one of the most active months in India. Hindutva activists waged an assault in Ayodhya against the Babri mosque and Muslims within the region; this inter-communal violence occurred because the Hindu Right wanted to replace the mosque with a Hindu temple as they believed it is the birthplace of the Lord Ram (BBC, 1992). Along with the obliteration of the sixteenth century mosque, riots throughout India left over 200 dead, many of whom were Muslims (Gargan, 1992). The clash between Hindus and Muslims continued into the new millennium. In 2002, 59 Hindu pilgrims were set on fire by a Muslim mob while on a train near Godhra; this event triggered Hindu gangs to avenge these deaths by engaging in raping, burning, and murdering sprees (Oliver & Harding, 2003). Although not directly involved, the BJP were complicit in the assaults and deaths of over 2,000 Muslims. During this time, a member of the BJP, Modi, instructed his administration to not respond (Oliver & Harding, 2003). The acts of terror committed by the Hindu Right were unique from the India’s other terrorist organizations that have been discussed thus far due to the fact that BJP is inserted in the Indian government, which offers the Sangh Parivar more influence and power than other politically violent counterparts.

While terrorists of the religious kind plagued India’s civilian population, radical secular ideology can be equally toxic. Echoing prior discussions on left-wing extremists, India is no stranger to the violence inspired by Marxist or Maoist ideology. China’s geographic proximity to India serves to aid the insemination of Maoist philosophies. The Naxalites are the prominent group in India that embrace this ideology. According to Weinberg (2013), Naxalites are left-wing Maoist revolutionaries that operate in eastern India’s destitute regions and engage in a fusion of guerrilla tactics in rural expanses and assassinations in urban centres. Departing from the Hindu Right and under the guise of a class struggle, the Naxalites rebuff the role of religious rhetoric in politics (Chitralekha, 2013).

91 There are also other organizations that exemplify left-wing terrorism. For instance, People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) is an ethnically-based separatist movement on the north-eastern fringes of India (see Figure 4.9) that centres on Maoist/Marxist ideology.
In brief, Naxalites engaged in an armed struggle against the Indian government for the rights of the poor and landless (Chouhan & Phartiyal, 2013). Chitralekha (2012) explains that the origins of Naxalism is entrenched in the Naxalbari (see grey star in Figure 4.9) uprising of 1967 in West Bengal, in which peasants working in tea gardens rebelled against police brutality. Other sources note that the Naxalbari movement was a communist campaign led by students (Farooq, 2004). Some media outlets speculate China’s involvement in supporting and training Naxalites, and ties have also been drawn to Maoists in other countries, such as Nepal, Philippines, and Turkey (Chouhan & Phartiyal, 2013).

In keeping with Ray (2011), the contemporary term, Naxalite, refers to a member of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI (ML). Since its inception, the Naxalites, in unison with Maoists in Nepal, have established some authority from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh (see Figure 4.9), extending into Nepal. Chitralekha (2012) explains that this ribbon of land encompasses 20 Indian states and is known as the Red Corridor. As a coalition of various groups, CPI (ML) in its current form is the result of a series of organizational changes since the mid-1960s. This is illustrated in Figure 4.10. Consistent with popular belief, CPI (Marxist) split from CPI in 1964 following the 1962

Figure 4.10   Evolution of the Naxalites in India

Mao's Chinese Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 70s inspires the Naxalbari uprising as well as the ideologically-left revolts across South America (Chitralekha, 2012).
Sino-Indian war; five years later, CPI (ML) was born in 1969 (Ray, 2011).\textsuperscript{93} From 1990 to 2012, the CPI (ML) participated in eight attacks – all of which occurred between 1999 and 2009 – against the police, government institutions, civilians, and the RSS (see Figure 4.8). Other groups that bare the Naxalite designation are the People’s War Group (PWG, or People’s War) and CPI-Maoist.

Emanating from the same narrative as the CPI (ML), the Bihar state (see Figure 4.9) witnessed further fragmentation of CPI (ML) in the 1970s (Chitralekha, 2012). These groups, as depicted in Figure 4.10, include CPI (ML) Liberation, CPI (ML) Party Unity, and CPI (ML) People’s War. This latter group, PWG, was created in 1980 by a former school teacher, Seetharamaiah, when he decided to incite a “revolution from the barrel of a gun” (Farooq, 2004, para. 7). Though under a different banner, PWG espoused goals that mirror the greater Naxalite narrative. Garnering support from the poor and the landless, PWG fought for an independent communist state from Andhra Pradesh and its neighbouring area (Farooq, 2004). Between 1990 and 2004, PWG committed nearly 100 acts of terrorism, reaching its peak in 2003 with 22 incidents. Nearing the turn of the millennium, another union occurred when the PWG and CPI (ML) Party Unity became one (Chitralekha, 2012). In 2004, political violence by PWG ceased. This was not the result of an armistice or the eradication of PWG, but rather another consolidation of groups among the Naxalites.

When CPI (ML) departed from the original CPI (M) in 1969, another faction, known as the Chinta group (renamed Maoist Communist Centre, or MCC), also broke away; MCC changed its name again in 2003 to the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) when it united with the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) to increase its presence in Punjab (Chitralekha, 2012). The shifts for the Maoist groups can also be traced in Figure 4.10. Some of the incidents committed by the MCC occurred immediately prior to their union in 2003. For example, an ambush near the

\textsuperscript{93} “Both CPI and CPI(M) circles pooh-poohed the formation of [CPI(M-L)], saying that it made no significant difference” (Ray, 2011, p. 97).
Jharkhand-Orissa border (see Figure 4.9) took the lives of 18 people, including 14 Jharkhand policemen; in another incident, an elderly woman led an attack on a police convoy at a village in Odisha, torching seven vehicles (Chaudhuri, 2003). In quick succession to the formation of MCCI, the Maoist guerrillas created a bloc with their Marxist-Leninist allies.

The most recent incarnation of Naxalites takes the form of CPI (Maoist) in 2004, which is a merger of MCCI and the PWG (Chitralekha, 2012). As a result, CPI (Maoist) is currently the largest left-wing terrorist group in India (Chouhan & Phartiyal, 2013). According to CPI (Maoist)’s (2013) Facebook page, the objective is to “overthrow the anti-people government of India by the Democratic revolution” (para. 1). In other words, its goal is to marshal a classless society in India. Despite their claim as a political party (see CPI (Maoist), 2013), CPI (Maoist) should not be mistaken as a mainstream communist party that is electable in government (Chouhan & Phartiyal, 2013). Over a thousand attacks were attributed to CPI (Maoist) between 2005 and 2012 (see Figure 4.8). According to Chitralekha (2012), the epicentre of Naxalite strength is Jharkhand, though their influence and that of their Naxalite comrades spread across the Red Corridor. Regarding intensity, Maoist violence accounted for over 300 attacks in 2009, roughly 500 in 2010, and dipped back down to approximately 300 in 2011. Two notable events in 2010 happened in Chhattisgarh, which resulted in the deaths of over 75 policemen, and West Bengal, when CPI (Maoist) killed about 100 people by sabotaging a train (Chouhan & Phartiyal, 2013). Suffice to say, these left-wing extremists, particularly Maoists, were the primary contributors to India’s exponential hike present in Figure 4.8.

In sum, two aspects of anti-state domestic terrorism are patently evident: there is substantial variation, both temporally and spatially, in the data. Certain countries have a higher likelihood of breeding and sustaining terrorism (e.g., India) than others (e.g., Moldova or South Korea). The data also embody various types of terrorist organizations – ranging from religious to ethnic-nationalist, politically right to left, which are fueled by grievances that are economic and/or political in nature. By examining the historical

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94 The Naxalites, such as MCC and PWG, have close ties with ULFA and have pleaded their allies to stop killing innocent Hindi-speakers in Assam (Indo-Asian News Service, 2003).
trends, at both an aggregate and disaggregate level, the narratives driving these patterns are marginally better understood. This comprehension, however, needs to be supplemented with an assessment of relevant data. The purpose of the following statistical analyses is to unpack the nature of political violence with respect to the steam-valve theory while considering other antecedents oft cited in the terrorism literature.

4.2. Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics presented in Table 4-7 show that there is considerable variation across countries for certain indicator variables.\(^5\) On average, a given country experiences 26.54 (SD=80.65, range 0 to 673) terrorist attacks per year. However, this is not reflective of the 18 countries, because the data are positively skewed. Certain countries (e.g., India) contribute a substantial portion of the attacks, while others (e.g., Sweden) experience considerably fewer events (see Figure 4.3). Given this lack of symmetry, a more representative indicator of central tendency is the median (2.50). With regard to political activism, the values range from 33.98 to 80.37, with an average of 54.27 (SD=9.02). Considering that political activism ranges from 0 to 100, the countries in the sample are slightly more likely to engage in peaceful forms of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean(SD)</th>
<th>N(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic events</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>26.54(80.65)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td>33.98</td>
<td>80.37</td>
<td>54.27(9.02)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>95.66</td>
<td>64.09(20.12)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>69.42</td>
<td>97.11</td>
<td>85.22(7.51)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>8.52(1.40)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>27.20</td>
<td>8.41(5.44)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1000)</td>
<td>4.486</td>
<td>18.385</td>
<td>8.55(3.40)</td>
<td>396(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>2.49(0.621)</td>
<td>26(6.6)</td>
<td>148(37.4)</td>
<td>222(56.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) While the data for explanatory variables run from 1990 to 2012, counts of domestic terrorist events in 1993 are absent from the GTD (2014). Although the Codebook (GTD, 2014) provides counts at the national level, these total attacks do not domestic incidents are not distinguished; 1993 is excluded from the analysis using the filter function in SPSS.
communication with their government than not. In terms of each country's average across the 23 years, states with citizens least willing to participate in political action are China (36), Moldova (48), and Russia (48), while those most willing reside in Sweden (76), the United States (70), and South Korea (62). Colombians, Peruvians, and South Africans represent the median (53) among this sample. In other words, people in China are considerably less, and Swedish people noticeably more, likely to engage in peaceful forms of communication with their government than the other 17 countries – indicating their respective perceptions on political efficacy (see Appendix B).

The next set of measurements pertain to the control variables. A greater variation is evident in the levels of religiosity (SD=20.12) than nationalism (SD=7.51). The mean values for these variables suggest that the countries in the sample are moderately religious (64.09) while quite highly, and consistently, patriotic towards their country (85.22). With respect to averages, the most religious countries in the sample are Nigeria (94) and Brazil (83), where China (17) and Japan (38) are comparatively more secular. Citizens proudest of their patriotic identity are from Colombia (96), Mexico (92), and Peru (92); on the other hand, Japan (72), Moldova (73), and Russia (76) have the least patriotic constituents in the sample.

The descriptive statistics for GDP per capita and percent unemployment show that this analysis incorporates a fairly wide spectrum of countries, comprised of states with both healthy and dire economies. Lastly, the vast majority of the 18 countries are considered free (222, 56.1%), with regards to political rights and civil liberties, between 1990 and 2012. The least common category are countries that are governed by repressive states. Across the 23 year period, countries that have been consistently free are Chile, Japan, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United States; conversely, China is the only country with an invariably authoritarian government in the sample. The level of freedom for the remaining 11 countries fluctuated throughout this timeframe.

The correlations among the outcome variables are shown in Table 4-8. Given that the assumption of linearity is violated (Field, 2009), Spearman’s Rho is used to explore the degree of association. The coefficient of determination, $R^2$, indicates how much variability of one measure is shared by another (Field, 2009). A handful of these indicators are significant at the .05 level, in which half are significant at the .01 level,
### Table 4-8 Correlations among Study Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.562*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (ln)</td>
<td>.550*</td>
<td>-.395</td>
<td>-.169</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-.152</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>-.118</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.303</td>
<td>-.228</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>.710*</td>
<td>-.258</td>
<td>-.159</td>
<td>.786*</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.153</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

though these categories are collapsed in Table 4-8. The degrees of association are not a cause for concern as there are no perfect or high correlations. A perfect degree of association between variables suggest that they are quantifying the same phenomenon; this would be redundant and cause modelling errors.

For the data in this thesis, the highest correlation is between GDP per capita and freedom (.786*), which is not high enough to establish multicollinearity. A series of secondary testing also reveal that the comparatively higher coefficients do not negatively affect the substantive results. It is worth noting that although the concept of freedom should theoretically tap into the same construct as political activism, a country’s political rights and civil liberties do not pose a multicollinearity issue with people’s willingness to engage in peaceful, unconventional forms of movement tactics to achieve political change (.710*). This may indicate that the levels of freedom afforded by the state attend to a slightly different phenomena than the levels of freedom perceived by its constituents. Possible implications of this are discussed in chapter 6.

### 4.3. Generalized Estimating Equations

For the reasons stated above, the 1993 data are also excluded from the following models. The GEEs are specified using a negative binomial probability distribution with a log link function. Period is included as a within-subject effect to control for time, and a logged population measurement is added into the model as an offset variable. The results of the analyses in Table 4-9 are presented as odds ratios, which indicate by what factor the expected terrorist attacks rise or decrease from a unit increase in an explanatory variable (Garson, 2012; Hilbe, 2007). In other words, it shows the effect and
relative magnitude a predictor has on terrorism events. When the odds ratio is greater than one, the indicator has a positive effect on terrorism, while a value less than one suggests a negative effect. Given that countries are the unit of analysis, this thesis is concerned with collective perceptions among citizens, as well as the economic conditions and political climates of each country.

Model 1 in Table 4-4 shows the results of bivariate analysis that assesses the impact of political activism on domestic terrorist incidents. The findings show that each increase in a country’s inclination to partake in peaceful, though unconventional, forms of civic engagement is associated with 5% fewer instances of political violence. This decrease in political violence is statistically significant. With respect to the steam-valve theory, this result provides a preliminary confirmation on the effect of political efficacy on domestic terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations</td>
<td>.946*</td>
<td>.952*</td>
<td>.955*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.970*</td>
<td>.939*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1.217*</td>
<td>1.252*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>1.142</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>1.156*</td>
<td>.920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom‡</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>.047*</td>
<td>.622</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3.371*</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom‡ and Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>1.399*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>1.012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom‡ and Death rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>.196*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>1.260*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>1.037</td>
<td>1.045</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries = 18
Number of years = 22 (1990 to 2012, excluding 1993)

n = 396
‡ The reference category is Free
* Significance at the 0.05 level

96 The offset variable (popln) and within-subject effect (period) are the same for all models.
A proper assessment of the steam-valve theory requires the consideration of other determinants that may influence homegrown terrorism. Model 2 includes a set of control variables that attend to religiosity, nationalism, economics, health, and levels of freedom, in addition to population size and time.\textsuperscript{97} The GEE analysis in Model 2 shows that the effect of political action on domestic terrorism remains significant (.952, \(p.<0.05\)). Religion, civic nationalism, death rate, and freedom are also significant; however, when compared to the bivariate models (see Appendix D), the changes in direction (religiosity) and significance (death rate) indicate a potential for interaction effects at play.

Model 3 attends to these interactions. The significant effect of political action on homegrown terrorism persists in Model 3. This means that as a country’s political efficacy increases, the likelihood of domestic terrorist events decreases, even after controlling for ancillary predictors oft cited as causes of terrorism. Specifically, for every increase in a country’s political activism, the rate of homegrown terrorism significantly decreases by 4.5\% \((p.<0.05)\). With regard to time, period is a more concentrated effect that attends to the residual variations in a year and since it is insignificant, it suggests that there are no linear trends that are not accounted for. A number of control variables, however, do have significant relationships with political violence committed by native actors. Most notably, nationalism, or pride for one’s country, has a strong positive relationship with terrorism. A unit increase in a country’s nationalism is associated with a 25.2\% \((p.=0.00)\) increase in political violence, in which its effect is significant.

A country’s level of freedom also has a significant association with domestic terrorism, albeit in a less forthright manner, as it interacts with two other predictors. According to Fox (2008), when there are interactions in a model, the partial effects of one variable depends on the value of another. In Model 3, freedom interacts with both religiosity and death rate. That is, the effect of freedom on homegrown terrorism is contingent upon a country’s level of religiosity as well as death rate, but not concurrently. As Table 4-9 indicates, for a given country that is free, compared to one that is not free, each unit increase in religiosity significantly increases the level of domestic terrorism by 39.9\% \((p.=0.00)\). The same cannot be said of countries that are partly free in relation to

\textsuperscript{97} All else is held constant in each interpretation of the results as Models 2 and 3 are overall models.
religiosity and the effect on homegrown terrorism; in contrast to free countries, they are not significant (1.2%, $p>0.05$). In relation to health, a country that is free is 80.4% ($p=0.00$) less likely to suffer from political violence for every increase in death rate, when compared to a country that is free. For a partly free country, in contrast with a free country, an increase in death rate by one point significantly increases domestic terrorism by 26% ($p<0.05$). In terms of economics, although the directionality of GDP per capita (logged) (2.2%, $p>0.05$) and percent unemployment (4.3%, $p>0.05$) are positive, neither have significant effects on political violence. These analyses present interesting discoveries and provide a strong basis for further assessment. The subsequent chapter will discuss the findings in relation to the terrorism literature. More importantly, it will contextualize these results by using the steam-valve theory.
5. Discussion

The overall results of this study support the steam-valve theory – the concept that positive societal perspectives on peaceful political activism disengage people’s perceived need to participate in terrorist acts as a means to communicate with the government. This chapter interprets and contextualizes the findings from chapter 4 in relation to the scholarly work on terrorism.

Political Activism & Efficacy

Social movements are the manifestations of discontent. McAdam et al. (2001) state that social movements are a method for people to connect with, and participate in, their governments outside of formal venues. When societies are able to relieve frustrations, political violence becomes less likely (see Briggs, 2010; Pruyt & Kwakkel, 2014). The focus of this assertion is on the ability for people to air grievances; that is, how the capacity to participate in political movements can alleviate the potential for, and actualization of, violent expression. In a similar vein, Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) discussion on activism and radicalization submits that terrorism occurs when there is a dearth of political efficacy. Using Wilson’s (1973) terminology, people are less likely to engage in politics of violence when citizens view peaceful means of communication (i.e., politics of order and disorder) as viable methods. As such, countries with citizens who believe they have political efficacy experience less terrorism. In these types of environments, political violence is no longer perceived as the only form of dissent and people do not feel powerless in their political futures (DeNardo, 1985; Wilson, 1973).

According to the results of this thesis, people’s collective willingness to engage in social movements through political activities, from petitions to peaceful demonstrations, does, in fact, decrease domestic terrorist events. In other words, when people believe they have political efficacy, violence will be perceived as unnecessary. This is consistent with the literature that considers peaceful political activism, and movements in general, as a mediating factor for political violence. While the findings are consistent with the research on political activism, the operationalization of the concept differs in this thesis, as the people’s perspectives of their political efficacy is at the core. Accordingly,
people's perceptions and actions are irrespective of the path to radicalization, legislation, and the various components of the SMT (e.g., resource mobilization, political opportunity, and framing). So while academics and this thesis share the emphasis on the importance of political activism as a release for public dissatisfaction, the distinction lies in the approach.

Given the scope of this thesis and its quantitative slant, the findings bolster the existing literature. The GEE results strengthen the association between political activism and homegrown terrorism; more importantly, they support the argument regarding the necessity of governments to allow disgruntled citizens to safely and openly voice their concerns in a meaningful way. According to the relevant body of research, their voices are conveyed through social movements and political activism. Considering that collective actions are borne from social and political conditions, a country's level of religiosity, nationalistic sentiments, economic status, health, and system of governance are often relevant factors.

Religion

When it comes to religion, the concept of an afterlife and people's fervent devotion to God, or Gods, may motivate individuals to commit acts of terror. Various historical events have exemplified this relationship, dating back to the Zealot-Sicarii (Weinberg, 2005) and including up to the conflicts that currently plague the Middle East (Callimachi, 2015; Osborne, 2016). Given the frequency with which holy scriptures are cited to justify the use of violence for political ends, the connection between faith and terrorism cannot be ignored. Moreover, when minorities are, or perceive themselves to be, persecuted by the majority, religion can become a source of strength as well as vindication (Siegel & McCormick, 2006). Within the academic community, the three primary streams of thought are integral (Huntington, 1993), problematic (Juergensmeyer, 2000), and inconsequential (McTernan, 2003).

Theorists of the former persuasion, such as Huntington (1993), perceive religion as the catalyst for terrorism as it divides people along cultural and religious lines. Faith, in this case, is an agitator and animates individuals to commit political violence because differences are so ingrained that compromise becomes inconceivable; thus, the clash of
civilizations. Juergensmeyer (2000) asserts a less determinative narrative to account for the relationship between religion and terrorism. This second perspective argues that while people’s faith can inspire individuals to engage in political violence, religion is not principle to conflicts. Specifically, faith becomes problematic when existing struggles are framed through the cosmic war. Metaphorical battles and the duality in the selective passages of sacred texts are translated into reality; consequently, relevant actors become demons and angels (Juergensmeyer, 2000). For the secular theorist, however, religion is not the issue and is merely a convenient scapegoat to justify terrorist acts (McTernan, 2003). In essence, theology bares the blame for systemic, secular, issues that are in fact social, economic, or political in nature.

Among the empirical literature that assess this relationship, the primary concerns are religious cleavages (Davies, 1994; Krueger & Malečkova, 2003) and intra-religious polarization (Kis-Katos et al., 2014). Accordingly, previous studies are suitable to address Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations rather than Juergensmeyer’s (2000) cosmic war or the secularization thesis because tensions between faiths can be accounted for (fragmentation vs. intensity). Due to the nature of the data in this thesis, the results in chapter 4 are not appropriate to evaluate the rivalry and incompatibility of faiths. This thesis operationalizes religiosity as a measure of devotion and level of importance in life. Since religiosity is a characteristic of how devoted a country’s citizens are to deities, as opposed to religious affiliation, this thesis is able to tap into Juergensmeyer’s (2000) cosmic war and the secularization thesis. The analyses reveal another novel aspect - the interplay between faith and a country’s mode of governance. According to the GEE results, religion’s impact on homegrown terrorism is contingent on the state of political and civil rights of a country. Subsequently, this thesis illustrates the contextual nature of the effects of religion, and offers some support for both the problematic (Juergensmeyer, 2000) and inconsequential (McTernan, 2003) nature of faith on political violence.

Among countries with strict regimes that offer little to no freedom to their citizens, the cosmic war perspective is apparent. People are more willing to fight and die for their faith in a repressive state. The notions of duality – good versus evil – and the duty to commit acts of terror in the name of God are more appealing for individuals in these political environments in contrast with democratic states. The literal interpretation of
sacred texts may increase hostility towards the other; thus, polarizing segments of society (Jergensmeyer, 2000). These findings suggest that individuals may no longer fear the repercussions of dissent under autocratic regimes as they are fighting for a higher purpose. Moreover, their existence on earth becomes trivial with the belief of an afterlife.

Conversely, countries that give partial freedoms with respect to rights and expression support the inconsequential angle when compared against countries that afford lots of freedoms to their constituents. This suggests that partial freedom is sufficient for religious individuals; despite the restrictions, there remains adequate freedom to congregate and practice their faith. While citizens may be religiously devout in these types of countries, their faith does not provide a sufficient basis to commit acts of violence against the government and innocent civilians. Stated differently, with the consideration of other factors, secular sentiments appear to be more effective motivators to commit acts of terrorism than religious duties to deities for people under partially free, as opposed to free, polities. Exemplifying the secularization thesis, religiosity in these milieus has no effect on terrorism. Given that the findings offer disparate effects depending on the degree of freedom citizens have, this political condition becomes integral to the understanding of the role of religion and its effect on terrorism. Consequently, the results may imply that Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations is incorrect. Cultural and religious arguments are not the sole, or leading, factor in conflicts. Faith interacts with the systems of governance, so levels of freedom contribute to the relationship between religion and terrorism, and even negates its impact on political violence.

Patriotism

Cleavages in society can also stem from other types of ideological differences, such as those based on nationalism. The term nationalism and people’s sense of belonging are informed by the concept of nations, which can be expressed in a religious, ethnic, or secular fashion. With regards to terrorist organizations, the religious and secular (or patriotic) forms are situated on the fringe right, while ethnic nationalism

98 Again, this is difficult to ascertain given the nature of the data.
exemplifies the peripheral left of Martin’s (2013) ideological continuum (see Table 2-1). Terrorists who espouse religious or secular nationalistic sentiments generally want to maintain the status quo or a return to better times, whereas ethnic-nationalists desire change and departure from the current political state of affairs. As chapter 2 illustrates, these various interpretations of nationalism inform people’s identity by fostering a sense of belonging, pride, and loyalty. Within the context of terrorism, religious nationalists who use violence against the state are compelled by theological narratives and nationalist imperatives (Lewis, 2003). In contrast, the ethnic-nationalist feel obliged to a group that shares their heritage, culture, language, and often persecution as they shed blood to attain self-determination (Byman, 1998; Weinberg, 2013). Lastly, civic nationalism, or patriotism, relates to the pride one associates with a country (Acton, 2012; Smith 2008). Those who are blindly patriotic (Rothi et al., 2005), with an uncompromising opinion and loyalty for their country, may resort to violence as a means to preserve that positive, subjective, conception of their nation (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Freilich et al., 2009). Among these strains, nationalism is the common underlying theme and the particular rhetoric terrorist organizations advocate hinges on the historical context and political milieu of a country.

The GEE results support the abundance of literature on nationalism and terrorism that suggests a positive relationship between the two. Specifically, as people’s sense of belonging to their country increases, so too does domestic terrorism in that country. Given that the nationalism construct measures one’s pride for their sovereign state, the findings tap directly into civic nationalism; though it cannot be presumed to be in the extreme or violent sense. However, it does suggest that identity based on national lines can polarize citizens, in which patriotism among the majority alienates minorities. The latter group, the minorities, is of particular interest because political violence is committed by the fringes of society. Alienation here is passive; it is the indifference felt by those with contrasting values and norms. These individuals, though strong in their convictions and shared identities, are minority members living amongst a more cohesive majority. Various interpretations of nationalism render different perceptions of pride and fealty toward their nation. In other words, the stories – both positive and negative – held by a country’s citizens dictate how they see themselves. Echoing the frames used by religiously inspired terrorists, each of these strains prescribe allies and enemies, namely
the state, in which acts of violence are necessary to effectively achieve the political change they desire.

For religious nationalists who commit violence against the state, their culture and rhetoric are theologically based, though they are driven by nationalistic objectives (Lewis, 2003). The Sikh terrorist organizations in India exemplify this typology, as Sikhism is the crux of their shared identity and they dedicate themselves to the creation of a Sikh homeland, Khalistan (Martin, 2015; Van Dyke, 2009). Among the ethnic-nationalists, the fear of losing their culture and language is the primary motivator for terrorist acts, while the shared history of oppression and political struggles unites them (Byman, 1998; Garber, 2005). For instance, China’s population is primarily Han with a number of other ethnicities. According to Clarke (2007), the Uighur minority are persecuted by the Chinese government. The Uighur separatists respond in kind, plus interest, to campaigns such as the patriotic re-education of imams (Castets, 2003), which is an attempt to effectively suppresses the unique identity of this ethnic community by erasing their culture.

With regard to the civic nationalists, they are a part of the majority who express pride in their country. Consequently, nationalism in chapter 4’s GEE analysis includes this group; however, the civic nationalists who commit acts of terror only consists of a minute portion of the majority. Due to their radical world views, patriots of this sort would also feel alienated and misunderstood by the majority. As Parent and Ellis III (2014) explain, these secular nationalists are concerned with policies and legal expressions. They are extreme conservatives who love their countries, but loathe the government (Blee & Creasap, 2010). Those in WSM, for example, tout their identities in relation to their respective countries. In the case of WAR, only Aryan males should be considered Americans (Cooter, 2011), though Aryan females are also necessary to propagate their superior race in the face of coloured threats. Regardless of the particular nationalistic narrative indorsed by terrorist organizations, it is apparent that the alienation felt by these groups, as a result of their country’s patriotism, polarizes their experiences. In

99 Due to their goals, these terrorists also fall into the category of an ethnic-nationalist group.
turn, the distinct concept of nationalism becomes a mobilizing force to commit acts of domestic terror.

**GDP & Unemployment Rates**

Aside from religion and nationalism, economic conditions are another oft cited source of political violence. An abundance of scholars maintain the important effects of the economy on terrorism. Most commonly, studies use GDP per capita (Findley & Young, 2011; Kis-Katos, Liebert & Schulze, 2011) and unemployment rates (Enders & Hoover, 2012; Goldstein, 2005; Tavares, 2004) as proxies of a country’s financial standing. Gurr (1968) offers a theoretical framework to explain this phenomenon by focusing on relative deprivation in the context of economics and the manifestations of civil strife due to perceived discontents. As a result, Gurr (1968) stresses a negative relationship between a country’s economic performance and civil violence. Accordingly, the vast majority of research posits and substantiates the notion that unhealthy economies experience more terrorist events than their counterparts (Caruso & Schneider, 2011; Davies, 1994; Galito, 2012). Based on these studies, it appears that poor financial environments can breed desperation among the populous.

The results of this study run contrary to the body of evidence that highlights the value of economic conditions in understanding the nature of terrorism. The results in chapter 4 show that GDP per capita (logged) and percent unemployment have no effect on political violence. In other words, the relative financial performance of a country’s productivity, or living standards, and the prevalence of unemployment do not drive domestic terrorism when other elements are considered. Economic conditions simply pale in comparison to the other factors evaluated in the GEE analysis. Their effects on political violence are mitigated by other country attributes, particularly its perceived political efficacy, religiosity, nationalism, death rates, and level of freedom.

This is not to suggest that economic conditions do not matter in the context of terrorism, but rather that the aforementioned factors are more potent animators for political violence. For example, the Naxalite group PWG, now CPI (Maoist), in India
have more influence and support in areas populated by Dalits, who are not only poor but are also considered to be at the bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy (Farooq, 2004). Evidently, economics do play a role in terrorism, though it is not the primary motivator. With respect to the different domestic terrorism classifications, organizations that espouse left-wing ideology (i.e., Leninism, Maoism, and Marxism) are most concerned with economic issues as they focus on class systems (Martin, 2013). Colombia’s FARC-EP and Peru’s Shining Path, for instance, both garner support from the peasants and vow to establish a socialist system in place of their respective capitalist regimes (Brittain, 2010; Byman, 1998; Public Safety Canada, 2014; Weinberg, 2013), but it may be the perceived corruption, injustices committed by the state, or lack of opportunities for political participation that foster the distain for the state among these left-wing terrorists. So while economic conditions are important considerations, the GEE findings indicate that they are not the cause of domestic terrorism. Perhaps Azumah (2014) is correct in suggesting that blaming high levels of unemployment and poverty is a simplistic approach to understanding a complex phenomenon.

*Health and Mortality Rates*

Though not frequently considered in the academic literature on terrorism, characteristics that attend to a country’s health do appear to have some bearing on the comprehension of anti-state violence. In particular, the personal well-being of a country’s constituents is an important factor. Public health is a reflection of the government, the level of care provided by the state, as well as the overall quality of life in a society. In other words, it is a proxy for a country’s overall condition and its impact on public health. A small portion of terrorism research evaluates this notion of health using indices such as life expectancy (Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Ehrlich & Liu, 2002) and HDI (Abadie, 2006; Coggins, 2015; Goldstein, 2005). Due to analytical issues, however, this thesis uses death rate to account for a country’s health and, more importantly, to explore the empirical chasm in the terrorism literature.

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100 Interestingly, the PWG claims to provide a voice for the poor and yet most of their victims are the poor.

101 Which encompasses the total population of a country with relations to terrorism events, as opposed to infant death rates (see Coggins, 2015) or the examination of terror deaths (see Shahrouri, 2010).
A noteworthy discovery is observed in the GEE analysis. The empirical assessment in chapter 4 exposes an interaction involving death rate and a country's system of governance. This is comparable to religion as the manner in which death rate affects political violence is conditional on the political rights and civil liberties afforded by their governing entities. In particular, death rates have a negative effect on terrorism in countries with limited levels of freedom, whereas a positive relationship exists between death rates and political violence under states branded with a partial freedoms status. That is, among countries with high death rates, repressive regimes experience less terrorist activities than democracies. When high death rates are considered along with partially free governments, these countries are more prone to terrorism than their democratic counterparts. In the context of the general discussion on health and its influence on terrorist events, this finding contradicts Abadie (2006), Goldstein (2005), and Newman's (2006) studies that discern no association between HDI and terrorism; however, the GEE analysis is also not entirely congruent with Coggins’ (2005) positive relationship either. The findings in this study may contradict previous research because of methodological differences. Given that HDI is a construct consisting of life expectancy, education, and GDP per capita (Human Development Reports, 2015), studies that assess HDI are not necessarily comparable proxies of health. With regards to life expectancy, the antithesis of death rate, the GEE findings in chapter 4 are inconsistent with Drakos and Gofas’ (2006) research as well.

The nuanced effect of death rate present in the analyses of this thesis paints a peculiar understanding of its relationship with homegrown terrorism – on the one hand, death rates serve as a diminishing factor and on the other, an aggravating one. In repressive political climates, as opposed to liberal settings, a country’s death rate significantly decreases the use of violence against the state to achieve political change. Conversely, when a government releases its control over its constituents slightly, terrorism becomes favourable among dissenting factions when compared to free states. In other words, when death is likely to result from dissidence, a climate of fear and intimidation permeate these societies; a sense of helplessness so strong that despite the high death rates and other considerations (i.e., political efficacy, faith, and nationalism), there is no sense of belonging and the sole objective becomes survival. If, however, the state allows for some opportunities to participate in the political arena and for self-
expression, the objective shifts to a desire for more. Terrorism, as a vehicle to achieve better living conditions and political imperatives, becomes more prevalent. In partly free countries, people’s ability to respond to the high death rates are less encumbered as citizens are afforded slightly more freedom to associate and congregate, which helps to mobilize the disenchanted and frustrated against the government. So despite the atypical consideration of societal health, specifically death rates, its inclusion proves to be important in the understanding of homegrown terrorism.

Freedoms – Rights and Liberties

Given the relevance of political rights and civil liberties in the context of religion and death rates, the political climate of a country cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, the system of governance, specifically democracy, is one of the most common indicators in the terrorism literature. Political institutions prescribe the types (or lack) of opportunities citizens have (Aksoy et al., 2012), including the avenues available to express public discontent. Controversies, however, arise within the literature regarding the directionality and effect of governance on terrorism due to its policy implications. To investigate the relationship, academics use different methods to operationalize government institutions. Among studies that use a binary measurement (i.e., democracy vs. non-democracy), the vast majority posits that democracies alleviate terrorist activity (see Briggs, 2010; Davies, 1994; Li, 2005). With regard to the categorical operationalization of governance, research tends to focus on the varying levels of freedom with relations to political rights and/or civil liberties. For these studies, autocracies denote the highest restrictions on rights and liberties, while fully functional democracies are on the other end of the spectrum as they offer the most freedoms (Welzel, 2013). With some exceptions (e.g., Eubank & Weinberg, 2001), the general consensus among this body of literature suggest an inverted-U shape (see Abadie, 2006; Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2011; Krueger & Malečkova, 2003). For example, Findley and Young (2011) and Kis-Katos et al. (2014) find that domestic terrorism attacks occur less frequently in countries that restrict all forms of freedom, or protect their citizens’ freedom, than those who offer partial freedoms. In other words, states with partial democracies are most likely to experience political violence.
Using political rights and civil liberties as a function of systems of governance, the results of this thesis neither directly support nor refute the literature. The impact of a country’s mode of governance on terrorism hinges entirely on the religious context and well-being of its citizens. Given that free is the reference category, the remainder of this section discusses not free (e.g., autocracies) and partly free (e.g., partial democracies) in comparison to free states (e.g., fully functioning democracies). According to the GEE results in chapter 4, autocratic regimes experience higher volumes of political violence than partial and full democracies when the country scores high in religiosity. With regard to states with high death rates, an inverted-U is apparent; thus, mirroring the literature that uses a categorical approach to measuring polities — albeit with a particular emphasis on the people’s well-being. With these considerations, democracies are far more preferable and consistent in terms of their negative relationship with terrorism than their counterparts (i.e., autocracies and partial democracies). Arguably, this interpretation supports the notion that democratic institutions are most capable of effectively diminishing terrorist activity (Briggs, 2010); a position generally held by academics who use the binary approach. Due to the interaction between freedom and other characteristics of a country, however, its role in understanding terrorism becomes more complex than previously suggested. Consequently, this interplay allows for a unique perspective on a longstanding debate.

Under strict regimes, people are more willing to commit acts of political violence for religious reasons; however, they are less prone to engage in terrorism when death is a common occurrence. In other words, faith translates into political violence when people are governed by autocracies – spiritual authority supersedes human authority. Considering that their ability to congregate and practice their faith are paramount, the constraints imposed by authoritarian regimes ignite the cosmic war narrative that Jergensmeyer (2000) proposes. Using selective texts, it becomes imperative that the good (fervent followers of religious dogma) must defeat the evil (repressive governments). This is in contrast with fully functional democracies which impose no bounds on, and upholds the freedom of, religion. In Canada, for example, the freedom of religion is protected pursuant to ss. 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, Jergensmeyer’s (2000) cosmic war perspective becomes less applicable in this latter political environment.
With regard to death rate, two possible explanations can account for the suppression of homegrown terrorism - the first concerns repression and the second is media – both of which are related. Repression of intellectual and critical thinking is not conducive to dissenting opinions (Goldman, 2009). In states that are highly policed, less than positive opinions on the regime can have deadly consequences. When generations after generations are born under such conditions, the desire to revolt or openly question the state is not only unlikely, but is often not considered by the people due to fear. These despotic conditions, imposed by the state, become a way of life. Among the few who risk their lives and voice opinions against the regime, it would be difficult to amass like-minded people because of the restrictions on liberties. For this reason, it is more challenging for terrorist organizations or movements to form. Lone-wolves, or leaderless resistance, can overcome this obstacle; however, the print and press (including social media) informs these individuals who are often inspired by the actions of others (e.g., McVeigh’s Oklahoma City bombing). In fact, Beam (1992) states that newspapers and computers are the organs of information. He maintains that those who are “truly committed to the cause of freedom will act when they feel the time is ripe, or will take their cue from others who precede them” (Beam, 1992, para. 17), but authoritarian regimes are also likely to police the flow of information. By manipulating the media and silencing social media platforms, governments can control the dissemination of material, including ideas that may be harmful to the state (Mihalcea, 2012). Without these mediums, it is more difficult for individuals to become radicalized and the government can effectively suppress facts about high death rates unbeknownst to the public.

With respect to partially free systems, religiously devout societies are no more likely to experience political violence than full functioning democracies. The results suggest that governments simply need to afford some rights and liberties in highly religious countries to alleviate the occurrence of homegrown terrorism. However, this system of governance does engender homegrown terrorism if the likelihood of death becomes a central concern within the populace. Akin to the goldilocks metaphor, partial democracies provide enough rights for their constituents to feel they have some agency over their lives, but do not afford sufficient freedoms to achieve full autonomy. When a country promotes this type of political environment and suffers from inadequate healthcare provisions, it becomes problematic. The poor living conditions coupled with
the opportunity for like-minded individuals to congregate can manifest through political violence. Relating this to Coggin’s (2015) study, this political climate may indicate ineffective political control (i.e., a political collapse). Failing states are less likely to have proper medical care and conditions that are favorable to a higher quality of life than fully functional democracies (or autocracies). Moreover, the other two systems of government are better equipped to address citizens’ concerns regarding high death rates by either facilitating peaceful means to voice discontent or silencing them completely. Accordingly, partially free democracies become conducive to terrorism as it becomes a viable response to the dire conditions people face. In light of the results of this thesis, the relationship between political milieu and political violence cannot be properly evaluated irrespective of other contextual factors.
6. **Steam-valve Theory and Political Efficacy**

At the heart of this thesis is people’s perception of political efficacy. Specifically, citizens’ belief about their level of autonomy and ability to be heard when they are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, regardless of the nature of their concerns (i.e., religious, nationalistic, economic, healthcare, or political). Given that terrorism is a small-N phenomenon, if the general populous feel a dearth of political efficacy, then it stands to reason that the extreme segments of the population will not only agree with those sentiments, but be more willing to push the boundaries of acceptable responses. In other words, it increases the likelihood that the fringes of society will view acts of political violence as reasonable means of communication. The results presented in this thesis buttress these claims.

*Political Activism*

Confirming the literature on social movements, the results of the multilevel negative binomial analyses suggest that when citizens are willing to engage in nonviolent political actions to communicate their frustrations to their government, homegrown terrorism is less likely to be seen as a viable method of dissent. Collective actions, in this sense, arise from frustration and a desire to influence governing institutions. Among countries that experience low levels of terrorism, some instances of political activism are apparent in South Korea and Sweden. A sizable portion of South Koreans participated in protests, demonstrations, and strikes against their president, Park Geun-hye, as they called for her resignation (Hong-Ji, 2016). With crowds of roughly 500,000 to 1.5 million individuals, and an approval rating of 4%, South Koreans believed that Park is dangerous as a president and demanded accountability amidst a political scandal involving $70 million (Campbell, 2016).\(^{102}\) Earlier in 2016, the Swedish government also faced protests as movements clash on issues concerning immigration. The migrant crisis in Europe ignites sentiments that encourage both for the attacks on, and protection of, migrants (Gigova & Hume, 2016). On the digital front, Spotify

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\(^{102}\) There are other issues that plague South Korea and animate its citizens (e.g., an increase in violence against women, stagnant economy, distrust in government, as well as Trump’s election – its impact on South Korea’s exports and global standing); however, the scandal surrounding Park and Choi is the most prominent, and latest, controversy.
triggered collective action as the company demanded reforms for the country’s education, housing, and taxes by threatening to relocate employment opportunities to the United States (Cuthbertson, 2016). In this case, globalization plays a role in affording a startup company, Spotify, a certain level of influence over government policies. On a separate matter, people engaged in protests after the police released six suspects in a case concerning an alleged gang rape of a wheelchair-bound woman (Khan, 2016). Although this latter example does not concern legislative reform, it shows another facet of social movements and its ability to alleviate frustrations with state institutions.

With respect to the moderately low level terrorism category, Brazil and China exemplify some noteworthy instances of peaceful political activism. In Brazil, over one million citizens responded to a major corruption scandal and economic recession by rallying against President Dilma Rousseff; these individuals perceive the government as a criminal organization and demanded change within the polity through peaceful civil actions (Watts, 2016). Government corruption and its ability to energize a country’s citizens are not unique to Brazil, or South Korea. The Umbrella Movement, a mass pro-democracy street protest across Hong Kong in 2014, was a response to the Chinese government’s infringement on the special administrative region’s right to fully democratic elections. In particular, the Hong Kong people lost the freedom to elect their Chief Executive (Jenkins, 2016). As a photographer notes, “[m]y first thought was: the people of Hong Kong have united. My second was: the government is screwed” (Phillips, 2015, para. 4). Social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, played crucial roles in coordinating the protests and the proliferation of information. Reportedly, 1.3 million tweets on Hong Kong circulated throughout the initial five-days; moreover, protestors garnered international support through the use of hashtags – by referencing the Arab Spring and police brutalities in the United States (Sile, 2015). While the size of the movement was expansive, the lawful demonstrations did not provoke the desired reaction from the Chinese government. In fact, roughly two years after the Umbrella Movement, tension between Hong Kong and China sparked protests once again. The two elected Youngspiration members of parliament, Leung and Yau, altered their oaths in defiance of mainland China’s creeping influence in the region’s politics, education, and culture (BBC, 2016e). The Chinese government responded in kind. Beijing interpreted
Hong Kong’s constitution in a manner that infringes the region’s autonomy by defining the reading of an oath that is inconsistent as seditious; moreover, pro-independence politicians cannot be permitted to serve in the legislature (Jenkins, 2016). This effectively violates the constitutional principle of “one country, two systems”, which came in effect after the handover in 1997 (Phillips, 2015). This chain of events – from the oaths to Beijing’s response – provoked some of the largest protests in Hong Kong since the Umbrella Movement.

Regarding the governments confronted by moderately high and high volumes of homegrown terrorism, South Africa, United States, Colombia, India, and Turkey are among the countries with citizens that engage in peaceful forms of social movements. Protests in South African universities suggest that racial tensions are not simply attitudes of the past (BBC, 2016c), and demonstrations by students over tuition was met by aggressive police tactics when a segment of protestors turned violent (BBC, 2016f). President Zuma, however, was responsive to these collective actions and froze tuition fees (BBC, 2016f). In the United States, the tumultuous 2016 election instigated various movements across the country. Two common platforms the candidates discussed were immigration and terrorism (Sanger & Haberman, 2016; Sarlin & Seitz-Wald, 2016).

Arguably, the issues pertaining to immigration and international policies have roots in Clinton’s air strikes against al-Qaeda training camps (CNN, 1998), bin-Laden’s fatwa (MidEastWeb, 1998), pipeline explosions in Nigeria (AP Archive, 2000; Associated Press, 1998), the Israeli-Palestine crisis, and most notably, the 9/11 attacks – which sparked the War on Terror (BBC, 2016a). Following the results of the election, a flurry of movements erupted from coast to coast as individuals were emboldened by, but also fearful of, the outspoken and politically incorrect president-elect; specifically, they were reactions to an America that Trump will potentially bring forth. On the one hand, people saw that their convictions towards certain groups were legitimized (Cox, 2016; Guerra, 2016; Hellmann, 2016). On the other, there were Americans who gathered to voice their concerns over particular viewpoints and values by using mantras such as “not my president”, “love Trumps hate”, and “no Trump, no KKK, no fascist USA” (Fuller, 2016; Jablon & Mathis, 2016; Petty & Jablon, 2016). Aside from the election, peaceful water
protectors have also protested against the Dakota Access oil pipeline. These protestors were doused with water in subfreezing temperatures for halting development on Indigenous property, which would contaminate their water supply (MacPherson & Nicholson, 2016). These movements are cries for help, or of victory in certain cases, to a governing entity they believe will listen and enact meaningful change.

Although the voices of the water protectors and the Indigenous people have yet to be heard, the Colombian government does appear to listen to its people. In September of 2016, Colombian president Santos and FARC-EP leader Timochenko signed a peace deal to end a 52 year conflict (Brodzinsky, 2016a). A referendum was then given to the Colombian citizens to ensure democratic legitimacy; when the deal was rejected by a small margin, the government designed a new agreement which is likely to be passed by Congress (Gigova & Quiñones, 2016). Various protestors voiced their respective concerns on the matter during the period leading up to, and after, the vote. Some Colombians were dissatisfied with the deal because they believe there is insufficient punishment for the rebels (McKirdy & Romo, 2016). Supporters of the “yes” vote also took to the streets. As one demonstrator states, “[t]he [six] million of us who voted yes also should be heard … this is a way for us to show the impotence we feel” (Brodzinsky, 2016b, para. 26). While President Santos has afforded the opportunity for Colombians to vote, whether or not the new agreement will properly address the concerns raised by those who declined the initial deal remains to be seen at the moment.

In India, a state that has been governed by both partially free and free democracies, protestors also raise their voices to express their frustrations to the government. Following the death of Wani, a young and extremely popular militant in the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir region (see Figure 4.9), demonstrators communicated their outrage in both peaceful and violent means (Bukhari, 2016). The unrest injured thousands of civilians and security personnel, and killed scores of others, most of which are civilians (The Times of India, 2016; Wani, 2016). So although a country may be categorized as a full democracy, the context and political climate of a country matters as well. With regard to the citizens in Turkey, a country with partial freedoms, their “no” vote in a referendum and protests against a proposed bill succeed. In other words, their political activism results in meaningful change within the system.
This bill would have effectively “legitimize the practice of men taking brides in their early
to mid-teens” (Associated Press, 2016). The presence of these social movements, both
small and large, indicate a level of willingness among the public to engage in dialog with
the government. With respect to peaceful political activism, it is important to emphasize
that people only engage in these activities when they feel that change can be achieved.
The ability for citizens to safely participate in social movements, however, is highly
dependent on the polities that govern the country.

**Systems of Governance**

Although the tendency for people to engage in political activism is inextricably
linked to the opportunities that are legally available to them, these two elements are not
equivalent. The absence of a strong association between political activism and freedom
suggest that while these two concepts appear to attend to the same phenomenon, they
are in fact measuring different constructs. In other words, the opportunity and freedoms
a government offer its citizens are not synonymous with the likelihood people will
engage in said freedoms.

Consistent with Eubank and Weinberg’s (2001) study, the conflicting results in
this thesis can be understood by addressing the conceptualization of freedom. On the
surface, it appears that their findings and the phrase “liberty is to faction as oxygen is to
fire” (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001, p. 163) are in direct contradiction to the steam-valve
theory. In the context of Eubank and Weinberg’s (2001) research, however, liberty
refers to democratic institutions, as opposed to people’s perception of their political
efficacy. Stated differently, liberty is defined through the state, rather than the people.
In essence, the expression that Eubank and Weinberg (2001) use refers to the freedom
variable, and not the composite measure of political activism. Given that there is no
issue with correlation (see Table 4-8) and the nature of their relationships with terrorism
also differ (see Table 4-9), the results from Eubank and Weinberg’s (2001) research
only strengthens the steam-valve theory. It is important to recognize that simply
because citizens have the freedom to express themselves do not necessarily imply that
these rights are upheld or encourage. There are other factors that may dissuade their

104 Significant correlation of .710, and the effect of political activism remains constant between the
models, while freedom is conditional as it is contingent on religion and death rate.
willingness to engage in those liberties. The political climate in Hong Kong (Jenkins, 2016; Phillips, 2015) and the actions of the United States government against the Indigenous people (MacPherson & Nicholson, 2016) are examples of this. As a result, these factors support the notion that it is necessary to consider not only how democratic a country is, but also how democratic people perceive their country to be. These constructs are measuring two sides of the same coin.

With respect to the freedom of expression, this liberty appears to be an important right for terrorists. A member of the FARC-EP secretariat states that “to have peace[,] a people must also have an environment to express the joys of peace” (Brittain, 2010, p. 201). This entails that the ability to communicate grievances alone are insufficient. Citizens must be afforded, and believe to have, the opportunities to share positive aspects of their life as well as the negative. Che Guevara, a Marxist revolutionary from Argentina, also perceives a dearth and suppression of human expression as a failure of the government:

There is more repression of individual freedom here, than in any country we’ve been to; the police patrol the streets, carrying rifles, and demand your papers every few minutes… the atmosphere, here, is tense, and it seems a revolution may be brewing. The countryside is in open revolt and the army is powerless to suppress it.


While the manner in which a state governs its people is an indispensable consideration in understanding homegrown terrorism (see Aksoy et al., 2012), its citizens’ perceptions of political efficacy are central. Since domestic terrorism is committed by the people, it is only logical to consider indicators to predict such events by evaluating people’s perceptions. It is possible, however, that the results of this thesis are coincidental and there is no cause-and-effect between perceived political efficacy and the frequency of terrorist activities. In order to confidently make such an assertion, further empirical analyses using the steam-valve theory are necessary.

Hope

We are not the enemy of the Turks; we support the ideals of brotherhood; we want justice and freedom. Today, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are crying out for their freedom; believe me, our cry will be much greater than theirs.

The above excerpt demonstrates the sentiments of a Kurdish protestor from a non-violent political movement in Turkey. When individuals are willing to participate in peaceful forms of political activism, it means that there is still hope. People believe that their actions can result in meaningful change within the government and that their voices will be heard. While political efficacy is constructive when it is directed towards a state that is willing to listen to its people, hope can have an adverse effect when it is placed in the hands of terrorist organizations. Arguably, the initial shift from government to alternative avenues can be observed in one Brazilian demonstrator. An anti-government protestor states, “[p]eople are angry. We’ve had it up to here. [President] Dilma needs to fall so we can have a new government. Right now all we have is drift. It’s hopeless” (Watts, 2016, para. 26).

These feelings are further compounded within the political milieu wherein their voices are neither considered nor heard. FARC-EP (2016) asserts in their first political declaration that “we have risen up in arms because the doors to legal, peaceful and democratic political struggle were closed in our country” (para. 4). When people are disenfranchised and political efficacy dissipates, citizens will search for unconventional methods, including terrorist organizations. In a blog entry, FARC-EP (2015) offers their reason for lifting the 2014 unilateral ceasefire by blaming government actions. The leader states:

We should not be surprised, then, that today we find ourselves at a point of escalation of the confrontation by decision of a counterparty that after our gesture of peace, amplified its cry for war. We are where the government wanted us to be, knowing the consequences: in this asymmetric and absurd warfare, we were not going to allow them to kill us (para. 3).

This attribution of blame for the failure of the peace talks shows ineffective dialog, a lack of trust towards the government, and serves as an attempt to justify their use of violence to further FARC-EP’s political goals. These sentiments may also be shared by individuals not formally associated with terrorist organizations. According to Foucher (2016), Boko Haram receives support from certain communities because they believe that they can have political efficacy through the group. People’s voices are swept aside by the Nigerian government as corruption breeds, pressure increases on natural

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105 Colombia is categorized as a partially free democracy in the data.
resources, and poverty continues to grow since the 1990s (Foucher, 2016). Boko Haram, however, addresses certain concerns among the public including access to Islamic education for women (Foucher, 2016). This echoes the idea that change will not come because of the government, but in spite of it.

The desire to be heard is a common denominator among terrorist groups as well. Subcomandante Marcos, the spokesman for the EZLN, claims that

We don’t want to impose our solutions by force, we want to create a democratic space. We don’t see armed struggle in the classic sense of previous guerrilla wars, that is as the only way and the only all-powerful truth around which everything is organised [sic]. In a war, the decisive thing is not the military confrontation but the politics at stake in the confrontation. We didn’t go to war to kill or be killed. We went to war in order to be heard (as cited in Gresh, 2009, para. 17).

This Mexican terrorist organization believes that violence is the only means to effectively communicate with the government. While it may appear that state policies give sufficient means to their constituents for political engagement (Fodeman, 2015; Steam valve closed, 2000), it is ultimately the perception of the people that matters. In accordance with the steam-valve theory, when societies are not convinced they have proper, peaceful political mediums to meaningfully engage with their governments, their cries for justice and freedom are more likely to manifest in violence. People need to believe that their voices mean something, that there is hope for change through the existing establishments; otherwise, individuals – namely, the fringe – will turn to other avenues. If they do not participate in the violence themselves, then they may support those who offer the hope that the governments cannot.

6.1. Limitations and Future Directions

While the steam-valve theory is promising thus far, this thesis and its analytic techniques are not without shortcomings. The limitations include the data and methods used to evaluate the theory. Due to the nature of the research design, it would be extremely difficult, time consuming, and costly to conduct primary data collection for this thesis. Although the analyses incorporate a wide variety of data sources (GTD, WVS, WBG, and Freedom House), concerns inherent with secondary sources remain. While secondary data are considerably easier to gather than primary data, limitations included
in the package are conceptual issues and additional biases. According to Pastia and Davies (2016), “problems arise when the individuals collecting the data and those analyzing it differ” (p. 76). For example, the composite measure of political activism can only attend to citizen’s willingness to sign petitions, join boycotts, and attend peaceful demonstrations, but cannot account for why people are not likely to engage. It is presumed that individuals are not willing to partake in collective actions because they feel a lack of political efficacy, but there may be other reasons as well. With regards to biases, the GTD (2015) and WVS (2015b) are of particular concern. Aside from media bias (i.e., presentation of incident), GTD (2015) data are primarily dependent on the availability of media sources, so its records are inconsistent as they are entirely contingent on the freedom of press in a country and newsworthiness of an incident (i.e., terrorist attacks in Western democratic countries are more likely to receive coverage than their counterparts). Based on the clash between NFPVF and NDV in Nigeria and the İBDA-C events in Turkey (see chapter 4), it is evident that certain incidents are absent in the GTD (2015), despite the databank’s extensive repertoire. In other words: no media reports, no data. Consistency may also be a problem with the WVS (2015b) because these surveys are conducted by a number of different researchers in various environments. It is also unclear why responses are missing from a number of questionnaires. Another issue is that the 1993 data for domestic terrorism are missing from the GTD (2015), so the GEE analyses are not continuous.

The sample size may also be a concern. While the thesis covers 23 years, excluding 1993, the number of countries (n=18) is relatively small and limits the generalizability of the results. Still, it is arguably not a big enough sample to test the steam-valve theory appropriately. Although revealing and necessary (given the multicollinearity between life expectancy and GDP per capita, logged), the use of death rate as an indicator may not be ideal either because these casualties include those from anti-state terrorist events. It is worth noting, however, that these figures, while horrible in nature, are diminutive in comparison to deaths from diseases (World Health Organization, 2013). Lastly, it is important to be cognizant that only three countries, across the 23 year period, ever fall into the category of “not free” for the freedom variable. In light of this small number, and the aforementioned limitations, the findings of this thesis and the soundness of the steam-valve theory should not be exaggerated.
With these shortcomings in mind, there are a number of areas future research can attend to. The quantitative findings of this thesis only provide one part of a larger picture. For example, the reasons behind why people perceive a lack of political efficacy (e.g., ignored or scared to do so), or perhaps the respondents believe they do have political efficacy but simply do not feel the need to resort to such drastic measures (i.e., formal methods are sufficient). Moreover, it would be intriguing to uncover the various factors that influence a person’s willingness to engage in political activism.

Given the mitigating effect of perceived political efficacy on domestic terrorist events, future studies can explore the steam-valve theory and the notion of political efficacy from a variety of angles. With respect to Moskalenko and McCauley’s (2009) perspectives, it is unclear how people arrive at a lack of political efficacy and start on the path of radicalization (i.e., escalation in behaviour vs. competing angles). The concept of freedom also varies - not only from country to country, but person to person within a state as well. Given the historical changes in the meaning of terrorism (e.g., ethnic-nationalism post-WWII, ideological terrorism from 1960s to 1980s, and religious terrorism post-9/11), it would be interesting to examine the steam-valve theory using a longer timeframe. In addition to a larger sample and an extended period, future studies can assess the theory using other indices, such as immigration and ethnic composition. The introduction of other races and cultures may be perceived as problematic by certain individuals. Examples of such tensions are apparent in the United States in light of the refugee crisis and recent election (Gambino, 2016; Thrall, 2015). Ethnic composition is interesting because a homogenous nation may have fewer instances of domestic terrorism than nations with high ethnic fragmentation. Conversely, states with higher ethnic fragmentation may have fewer individuals engaging in political violence than homogeneous ones because of higher levels of tolerance and understanding. Finally, it is crucial that the steam-valve theory is rigorously evaluated by other academics to ensure its utility and the validity of its framework. Based on the results of this thesis, these questions are invaluable to understanding the root causes of terrorism and preventing future instances of political violence.
6.2. Conclusion

This thesis attempts to provide a theory on domestic terrorism through an authentic assessment of the political conditions as perceived by the people. Standing on the shoulders of giants, the construction of the steam-valve theory did not occur in a vacuum. The theory is inspired by Gurr’s (1968) model of relative deprivation, while considering the legal scholars’ concept of the safety valve and building on the knowledge of academics well versed in the SMT literature. Differentiating itself from the various models among the SMT research, the central actors of the steam-valve theory are the people; more specifically, the collective perspectives on the political efficacy of political activism as a viable method to achieve change. In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the steam-valve theory, this thesis empirically assesses the characteristics of 18 countries across the span of 23 years. The analyses indicate that the steam-valve theory does have merits to understanding the nature of homegrown terrorism.

While the focus of the analyses is on the effect of political activism on political violence, the multilevel negative binomial regression reveals interesting findings worthy of discussion. Overall, the findings indicate that nationalism is a strong, positive, predictor for terrorism, while religion and societal health’s relationship are conditional. Specifically, the effect of a country’s level of religious devotion and death rate on domestic terrorism are both contingent on the political dynamics (i.e., political rights and civil liberties) of that state. In contrast with fully functional democracies, autocracies with highly religious citizens experience a higher rate of political discord and violence, though there are no noticeable differences between full democracies and partial democracies. Regarding quality of life and societal health, domestic terrorism is less likely to occur in states that are not free than those that are; furthermore, partly free countries with poor healthcare conditions are the most prone to terrorist activity. Lastly, when it comes to economics, neither GDP per capita nor unemployment appear to be stable predictors of political violence.

Although the GEE results are promising for the steam-valve theory, it does not claim to solve the problem of domestic terrorism. The theory, however, does provide another piece to understand ways to help alleviate political violence. Moreover, this thesis highlights the importance of considering people’s perceptions and their
evaluations of their political environments, as opposed to solely assessing via governing institutions. By offering a different approach to understanding terrorism, the steam-valve theory may serve as a foundation for future research on the factors that foster political violence. Based on the empirical findings and in light of the goals of this thesis, to create a useful theoretical model to understand domestic terrorism, the steam-valve theory is acceptable.
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Appendix A.

Selective Use of Bible Passages and the Aryan Nations

To show the use of selective texts, quotes that are left-aligned are direct excerpts from the Aryan Nations (2015) website, taken from paragraphs 16 through 18. Texts using right-alignment are the direct Bible passages Aryan Nations (2015) is referencing.

WE BELIEVE that there are literal children of Satan in the world today. These children are the descendants of Cain, who was a result of Eve’s [sic] original sin, her physical seduction by Satan. We know that because of this sin there is a battle and a natural enmity between the children of Satan and the children of The Most High God (Yahweh). Genesis 3:15; 1 John 3:12

Genesis 3:15: And I will put enmity between you and the woman, and between your offspring and hers; he will crust your head, and you will strike his heel.

John 3:12: Do not be like Cain, who belonged to the evil one and murdered his brother. And why did he murder him? Because his own actions were evil and his brother’s were righteous. (Note: This is under the heading Love One Another)

WE BELIEVE that the Canaanite Jew is the natural enemy of our Aryan (White) Race. This is attested by scripture and all secular history. The Jew is like a destroying virus that attacks our racial body to destroy our Aryan culture and the purity of our Race. Those of our Race who resist these attacks are called "chosen and faithful." John 8:44; 1 Thessalonians 2:15; Revelations 17:14

John 8:44: You belong to your father, the devil, and you want to carry out your father’s desire. He was a murderer from the beginning, not holding to the truth, for there is no truth in him. When he dies, he speaks his native language, for he is a liar and the father of lies. *Jesus’ response to the Jews who are about to kill him; children of Abraham versus children of the Devil

1 Thessalonians 2:15: Who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets and also drove us out. They displease God and are hostile to all men

Revelations 17:14: They will make war against the Lamb, but the Lamb will overcome them because he is Lord of lords and King of kings and with him will be his called, chosen and faithful followers

WE BELIEVE that there is a battle being fought this day between the children of darkness (today known as Jews) and the children of light (Yahweh, The Ever living God), the Aryan Race, the true Israel of the bible.

Revelations 12:10-11

Revelations 12:10-11: Then I heard a loud voice in heaven say: "Now have come the salvation and the power and the kingdom of our God, and the authority of his Christ. For the accuser of our brothers, who accuses them before our God day and night, has been hurled down.
Appendix B.

Variable Trends from 1990 to 2012

Political Activism (World Values Survey)

Religiosity (World Values Survey)
Appendix C.

Domestic Terrorism Events by Country
Appendix D.

Multilevel Negative Binomial Regressions – Bivariate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political activism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions, boycotts, and</td>
<td>.946*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demonstrations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>1.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1.128*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>.732*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>1.147*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom‡</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>.041*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>5.497*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of countries = 18
Number of years = 22 (1990 to 2012, excluding 1993)

n = 396

‡ The reference category is Free
* Significance at the 0.05 level

106 The offset variable (popln) and within-subject effect (period) are the same for all models.
## Appendix E.

### List of Identifiable Homegrown Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Abbr</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adivasi National Liberation Army</td>
<td>ANLA</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Tripura Tiger Force</td>
<td>ATTF</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Umar Mujahideen</td>
<td>AuM</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Liberation Front</td>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of God</td>
<td>AoG</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aryan Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babbar Khalsa International</td>
<td>BKI</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Fatherland and Freedom</td>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan</td>
<td>BTHK</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Widow</td>
<td>DHD(J)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo Liberation Tigers</td>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodo Militants</td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucus Emerate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Che Guevara Brigade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen Rebels</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India - Maoist</td>
<td>CPI-Mao</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India - Marxist</td>
<td>CPM</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communist Party of India - Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination Committee</td>
<td>CoRCOM</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>L</td>
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