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Abstract

The quick succession of Vancouver’s first seven police chiefs between 1886-1907 is a unique example of how the construction of Vancouver’s Chinatown as a racial place had an effect on the Vancouver Police Department. Although claims of a purportedly vice ridden Chinatown were central to the turn of the twentieth century politicians and moral reformers’ desires to prevent inter-racial socialization, these claims had no immediate effect on Vancouver. Not until the reformers alleged the police department was corrupt and responsible for the apparently rampant gambling in Chinatown did they influence the department’s operation in Chinatown. This thesis looks at the process by which this rhetoric reinforced ideas about gambling in Chinatown and influenced the police department’s response to this problem. This process allowed moral reformers on Vancouver’s city council to consolidate their power over the VPD and force the VPD to rigorously police Chinatown. Although the reformers' influence on the VPD’s operations in Chinatown was not permanent, their efforts to characterize gambling as a distinctively "Chinese" vice facilitated their efforts to police social interaction between Chinese and non-Chinese people, and aided in the construction of Chinatown as a racialized space.

Keywords: Vancouver; Police; Chinatown; Gambling; Chinese; Moral Reform; Ethnicity
Dedication

Dedicated to my loved ones who have helped me finish my degree with my sanity still intact: Matthew Montgomery, Connie, Jonathan and Jean Pry.
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I want to thank Ruth Anderson for answering my endless questions about process and procedure these past two and a half years. I want to thank Dr. Patricia Roy for becoming part of this project in its final phases, and truly appreciate the time that she has given of herself to this project by participating in the defence. I want to thank Jennifer Spear for being part of my committee and helping me to sharpen and clarify particular ideas. Andrea Geiger, I want to thank you for accepting me as your student and making this thesis possible. Thank you for helping to shape me as a historian by always asking another question of me, and helping me to overcome some of the difficulties I have in writing down what I can articulate more clearly. As in any other long-term endeavour, this thesis has had its ups and downs and you have always encouraged me to work through the downs and appreciate the ups. Matthew Montgomery, you drastically reduced the number of coffee stains, endless and sleepless nights, and tears that would have gone into completing this without you in my life. Lori and Darcy Montgomery, thank you for all the amazing support you have given me and for making sure that I never starved on Sunday nights. I want to thank my parents, who kept high standards for me, and have always encouraged me to pick myself up and go one step further. I would also like to thank the Simon Fraser University history graduate students. I consider many of you my friends and many of you have been essential to the development of this thesis by listening to or reading snippets and always providing constructive feedback. David Chokroun, I want to thank you for your help in formatting this thesis and helping me get it ready for submission.
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VPD       Vancouver Police Department
## Glossary

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<td>Police Investigation</td>
<td>For the purpose of this thesis a police investigation refers to an official inquiry into the conduct of the police held by Vancouver’s police commission, and does not mean an investigation by the police into criminal wrongdoing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restricted District</td>
<td>An informally or sometimes formally recognized area in which police do not enforce prohibitions against certain crimes such as gambling, prostitution, drug use, etc. as long as the criminal activity stays within that recognized area of the city. This method was/is used by law enforcement and city councils to restrict the spread of certain crimes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Echo Chamber</td>
<td>A model that describes how information, factual or not, is passed, amplified, and reinforced by repetition until it achieves credibility.</td>
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Chapter 1.

Introduction

In 1907, James Ramsay, a manufacturer of biscuits, candy, and syrup, as well as a moral reformer who had just been elected to the City Council, gave a harrowing report of his recent visit to Shanghai Alley, Canton Street, and Carrall Street, more commonly referred to as Chinatown because of its Chinese population. He called the place “a seething hell of immorality.” At City Council on February 18, 1907, Ramsay that if the current police chief:

Was in sympathy with the law he was certainly not showing it... They [the city] paid the policemen well and they expected them to do their duty. If Chief Chisholm could not see that duty was done they should get someone who would.¹

Ramsay, and other reformers in turn of the twentieth century Vancouver, wanted to cleanse the city of various behaviours they perceived as immoral such as gambling, drinking, prostitution, and opium smoking. However, Vancouver reformers found it difficult to align the Vancouver Police Department’s (VPD) police practices to their vision. Recounting his visit to Chinatown, he suggested that the current chief was responsible for the continued state of Vancouver’s criminal and immorality problems. These middle-class reformers sought to regulate social and racial relations by racializing these vices, and spoke as though those vices were centered in Chinatown. The police chiefs, however, did not understand their mandate to enforce the law to be narrowly focused on

Chinatown. Under Vancouver’s 1886 Act of Incorporation, the city council had the authority to appoint and remove constables including the chief constable. This empowered Ramsay and the other reformers to focus their efforts on cleaning up Chinatown at the expense of the chief’s position. Consequently, from 1886 to 1907, Vancouver had six different chiefs, giving the city a reputation as a “graveyard for police chiefs.” Only one chief served longer than five years (see appendix Table I). This high turnover was due to conflicts with the city’s police commission, the oversight body responsible for the conduct of the police. These police commissioners alleged that the chiefs had not adequately responded to the immoral conditions in Chinatown. Thus, the reformers’ construction of Chinatown as a racialized space had a fundamental impact on the VPD’s leadership. Moreover, the politicization of the chief constable’s position exacerbated the rhetoric of moral reformers who categorized Chinatown as a racially segregated community purportedly rooted in vice and a threat to Euro-European society.

While exclusionary rhetoric immediately after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885 focused on labour competition, those who sought to limit the social and spatial livelihoods of Chinese migrants in Vancouver claimed that Chinese vice hindered Vancouver’s economy and corrupted its moral fabric. Euro-Canadians used legal and extra-legal means to limit the spread of Chinese in Vancouver. In addition to confining Chinese residents to the area known as Chinatown, anti-Chinese reformers stigmatized ‘Chinese’ activities such as opium smoking and gambling as immoral vices. Not only did this stigmatization assert the racial superiority of Euro-Canadians, it restricted interactions between the Chinese and Euro-Canadians. The

3 Ibid., 245.
4 Examples of these legal and extra-legal attempts to limit Chinese expansion in Vancouver appear as city by-laws restricting the establishment of laundries, one of the main Chinese businesses, to the east side of Vancouver (present day Chinatown), as well as two race motivated riots that destroyed the possessions of Chinese residents in an attempt to drive them out of the city. Kay J. Anderson, “The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place and Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category,” in Immigration in Canada: Historical Perspectives, ed. Gerald Tulchinsky (Mississauga: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 225-229.
reformers use of racial stigmatization in their attempt to restrict racial interactions marked Chinatown as a racialized place.

Between 1886 and 1907, reformers on the Vancouver City Council, particularly on the police commission, and others tried to impose their vision of moral order for the city on the VPD. For these reformers, one of the principal problems threatening their ideal “respectable" society was gambling and other perceived vices that contributed to interracial socialization between Euro-Canadians, Chinese, and other non-white minorities in the city. Although the city council could pass bylaws and restrict licensing that supported federal prohibitions against certain behaviours, such as gambling, drinking, and prostitution, the council depended on the VPD to enforce these bylaws. For their part, the VPD chiefs, perhaps reasonably assessing their meagre resources, or perhaps in order to build their own political careers argued that their mandate was larger than just policing prohibitions against gambling in Chinatown and focused on policing more serious crimes throughout the city. Whereas the VPD arrested and issued fines throughout the city for criminal and by-law infractions, it claimed that it was unable to suppress vice in Chinatown unless the city council gave it more men and money. Moreover, legal restraints that restricted their ability to receive and execute warrants made it impossible to break-up alleged vice in Chinatown. The city council interpreted these constraints as collusion with gambling interests in Chinatown. To the commissioners it appeared that the VPD was protecting constables who engaged in vice while punishing constables who tried to eradicate it, and that the VPD was apathetic in enforcing certain laws. The city council’s struggles with the VPD leadership continued until 1907, initiating investigations into police practices and regularly forcing police chiefs to resign. When it finally found a chief who empathized with the reformers’ agenda and enforced the law in line with the city council’s perceptions of what ailed the city and how to cure those maladies. In addition, only when the VPD fell into alignment with the city council’s desires that Chinatown was finally consolidated as a racialized place.\(^5\) This is

\(^5\) Although historian Kay J. Anderson suggests that the pattern of legally restricting Chinese residents to Dupont and Carrall Streets was completed by 1892, I argue that it was not until 1907 that Chinatown was constructed as racialized place because only then was Chinatown fully imbued with additional connotations and associations to specifically “Chinese" vices and with it the VPD’s heavy emphasis on ridding it of these vices. *Ibid.*, 68.
because increased policing of Chinatown gave the rhetoric credibility that it did not previously have.

The moral reformers’ rhetoric on vices in Chinatown was caught in an echo chamber, in which repetition led to credibility. Repetition of claims, largely unsubstantiated and often false, of rampant gambling in Chinatown by moral reformers, including those on the police commission and city council, eventually convinced people that it must be true. 6 That negatively influenced Vancouverites perceptions of Chinatown and increased the polarization between the police commission and the VPD. 7 As theorists of the echo chamber would agree, the acceptance of confirmatory information allowed reformers to intensify the polarization of gambling in Chinatown with the additional claim that the VPD was doing nothing to stem this apparently rampant gambling.. 8

6 Evidence reported and collected by the VPD shows that gambling occurred in Chinatown. But the extent of its occurrence cannot be adequately analyzed due to the circumstantial nature of the evidence preserved. Although many cases of gambling in Chinatown were brought to the courts, the judges could not always convict because the VPD did not provide a preponderance of evidence because of the difficulty of proving that the games people were playing had a “house” that was run by a “banker” and had unfavorable odds for the players. See infra notes 50 and 257 and accompanying text.


8 The echo chamber is a modern model that describes how different media outlets, such as political leaning broadcast news channels or social media, pass information between themselves while refraining from critically questioning the information and continually repeat that information until it has achieved credibility with its intended target. Although a modern conceptual model, it is applicable to this past polarization of Chinese gambling and police corruption. Bessi(2015); Bessi(2016); Zollo; Darcy Bedgio, “Inside the Echo Chamber: Television News Coverage of the CIA Drone Program,” (Dissertation, University of Florida, 2015)15-30; Philip Morris Companies INC, Scruggs, JF, Memo, “The “Echo Chamber” Approach to Advocacy,” 1998 December 18. Philip Morris Records, Accessed October 18, 2016, https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/mgx0061.
Removing the chiefs only temporarily minimized the intensity of the reformers’ claims. Each removal reinforced the notion that the VPD was either corrupt or incompetent until the appointment of a chief sympathetic to the reformers’ call to action against gambling in Chinatown. When the police commissioners appointed R.J. Chamberlain, a staunch opponent to gambling, on June 1, 1907 as chief constable, the echo chamber effect faded because he thoroughly cracked down on Chinese gambling. No longer did the reformers claim that the VPD was indifferent to the purportedly widespread gambling in Chinatown. Instead, the chief’s comments concerning Chinese gambling and the department’s plethora of arrests, reports, and statistics, which were reported by the newspapers, reinforced the original claim that Chinese gambling was widespread. With this change the reformers’ rhetoric was made credible and the
reformers almost achieved their desired outcome. Although Chinatown was thoroughly policed as a “Chinese” place purportedly rife with vice, the VPD was never able to eradicate gambling.

Whereas reformers in Vancouver saw gambling as corrupt, this was not necessarily the case among Chinese societies or in China. Hans Steinmüller argues that gambling, for Chinese societies, is a beneficial activity. It creates a desired liveliness or “heat,” which allows Chinese sociality to thrive. “Local notions of capability, luck, and fate relate to a kind of ‘social heat’ that is characterized by a certain ambiguity: while expected and necessary sometimes, it can also turn into deplored anti-social indulgence.” In other words, gambling is not necessarily a “vice,” but can serve a useful purpose in facilitating social interaction.9 One Chinese Vancouverite recalled how in early Vancouver, “there was no family, everyone was single…If you went to the gambling house, you could talk and laugh.”10 Suzanne Morton observes something similar to Steinmüller’s “heat” in overseas Chinese communities. She states that gambling was used as a means to make a “connection between fate and business success.” Games of luck could be used improve status within the community “through the conspicuous display of wealth and the public acceptance of loss.” Morton also observed that perceptions of gambling among these communities changed over time. Children of Chinese immigrants began to adopt their birth country’s perception of gambling. In the 1920’s young Chinese men and women believed that they “would fall in status” if they “mingle[d] with people who frequent the clubs.”11 By 1955, much of the Chinese community in Canada was critical of continued gambling by the older Chinese men who had first come to Canada.

Euro-Canadians in British Columbia generally were likewise split on the issue of gambling. White settlers participated in many different forms of legal gambling such as

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10 Robert McDonald, Making Vancouver, 216.
bingo games and raffles, which benefitted religious groups, charities, or education.\textsuperscript{12} Euro-Canadians also took placed bets on prizefights and races. Although class dimensions influenced the perception of gambling, Morton observed, “While gambling was an aspect of Canadian working-class culture…it undermined the ethos of productive labor on which skilled craftsmen asserted their status.”\textsuperscript{13} Between the 1890’s and 1930’s Canadian Protestants filled with a “moral fervor” attempted to reform “prostitution, divorce, illegitimacy, ‘Indians and Chinese,’ public education, suppression of obscene literature… [and the] rescue of fallen women…”\textsuperscript{14} Throughout Canada, gambling increasingly became racialized as a distinctively Chinese activity, which threatened the morality and economic success of Canada. Contrary to the evolutionary perception of Chinese communities in Canada, Euro-Canadians increasingly moved for the wholesale legalization of gambling starting in the 1930’s.\textsuperscript{15}

Opposition to gambling was just one focus of a much large moral reform movement in Canada from 1885 to 1925. Mariana Valverde states that it is “impossible to make any general statements,” about the reformers because they were a diverse group. Moral reformers were typically “well-educated urban Canadians,” who were influenced by the reform movements in both England and the United States. Reformers did not differentiate between morality and social science, their multifaceted program of reform rather than replacing religion “provide[d] the material basis of spiritual transformation… [that] further[ed] the nations’ moral and physical health.”\textsuperscript{16} Besides an attempt to fix perceived moral failings, the reformers had a different intent. According to Richard White, in the United States, “Moral reform became the centerpiece of self-conscious middle-class attempts to create community.”\textsuperscript{17} Drawing upon their middle-class merchant and Protestant female base, these reformers sought to create a

\textsuperscript{12} Such gambling was legal under the Criminal Code of 1892, but became a contentious point between Protestant and Catholic groups because permission for these games seemed to be biased toward Catholic groups. See Morton, \textit{At Odds}, 129-130

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}, 13.

\textsuperscript{14} Mariana Valverde, \textit{The Age of Light, Soap and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925}, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1991), 16

\textsuperscript{15} Morton, \textit{At Odds}, 13.

\textsuperscript{16} Valverde, \textit{The Age of Light, Soap, and Water}, 16, 44-45.

\textsuperscript{17} White, “\textit{It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own},” 308.
“respectable” community of thrifty and sober families. However, when these reformers “attacked drugs, prostitution, liquor, gambling and crime… [they] did not just define and attack “immorality”; they associated immoral activities with particular ethnic and racial groups.”

White suggests that while the racialization of crime separated non-whites and vice from the “respectable” whites, the demimondes acted as sexual and gambling “outlets” for men, as sources of revenue for the city from fines, and as a “warning” for those “who did not conform to the social roles demanded of them in [North] American society.”

Although White observed the largely female composition of the moral reformers, this thesis looks specifically at the schism between the police commission and the VPD; the police commission had gender and property qualifications until 1937 and the VPD did not have female constables until 1912 they only acted as a prison matrons. This limits the analysis of the contributions of female reformers and their effect on the VPD.

Vancouver was a small but rapidly growing city. At the time of its incorporation its population was no more than 1000 people and did not reach 100,000 until 1911, an exponential growth from 1901’s 27,010. Robert McDonald observed that Vancouverite reformers “accord[ed] low status to ethnic minorities,” as well as other transients and the impoverished in order to “secure their own identities as respectable citizens.”

The wealthy businessmen and professional class that spearheaded moral reform in Vancouver constructed the “Chinese” race in a manner that “transcended physical differences” in order to characterize Chinese residents in a negative manner. In Vancouver and elsewhere, Chinese were increasingly associated with gambling, which further entrenched the notion that Chinese migrants threatened the “economic success of white migrants.”

After the “respectable citizens” aligned the VPD’s practice with their

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 305-307.
21 McDonald, Making Vancouver, 201-229.
22 White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” 322.
own reform ideology, Vancouver’s Chinatown came to represent Vancouver’s “outlet” for vice, a cash cow for the city from fines collected, and as a warning against the depravity whites faced if they gambled with the Chinese.

Kay J. Anderson best describes the concept of Vancouver’s Chinatown as a racialized place. According to Anderson, throughout its 140-year history, Vancouver’s Chinatown has been socially reconstructed four times. This more than century long process of racialization dates back to the time of Vancouver’s incorporation. In the beginning “Chinatown was reviled as Vancouver’s public nuisance.” It then became the “Little Corner of the Far East” in the mid 1930’s after the Golden Jubilee. Afterwards it devolved into a slum during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Finally, Vancouver’s Chinatown, like others in Canada, became an expression of multiculturalism and a beacon of Canada’s Chineseness. In her article “The Idea of Chinatown: the Power of Place and Institutional Practice in the Making of a Racial Category,” Anderson states that “the significance of ‘Chinatown’ is not simply that it has been a representation perceived in certain ways, but that it has been, like race, an idea with remarkable social force and material effect.”

Chinatown as an “imaginative geography” was a place in which Europeans affirmed their own identity and privilege by assigning otherness to the Chinatown denizens. The practice of institutionalizing this imagined place through legislation only furthered the isolation of Chinatown from the white Europeans passing the legislation. Anderson concludes that, “‘Chinatown’ is a story, which, in disclosing the categories and consequences of white European cultural hegemony, reveals more about the insider than it does the outsider.”

In addition to Anderson, Mary Ting Yi Lui also contributes to the framework by which historians understand Chinatowns as racialized places in her work on New York’s Chinatown. She states that turn of the twentieth century accounts of North American Chinatowns “reinforced and reproduced Euro-American notions of racial and cultural superiority against an immoral and vice-ridden Chinese immigrant community.” Although these neighbourhoods were ethnically diverse, the focus on their Chinese

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24 Ibid., 242.
inhabitants forged an understanding of Chinatown as neighbourhoods that were “conduits” for vices. Lui’s framework for Chinatowns focuses on the important role played by contemporary gender roles in constructing New York’s Chinatown. The increased geographical mobility of urban women along with narratives of racial and sexual danger refashioned New York’s “spatial and social boundaries, which were disrupted by the settlement of Chinese throughout the city.”

Whereas Anderson and Lui analyze Chinatowns as racialized places, they largely neglect the process by which cities exercised their control over law enforcement practices in order to create these racialized places. They present governing bodies and law enforcement agencies as a singular and homogenous entity. As Vancouver’s politics shifted with the demands of middle class reformers in regards to the vice in Chinatown, the difference between the police commission and the VPD intensified. Far from quietly agreeing with the reformers, the VPD resisted the reformers’ proposed agenda. As indicated by their resistance to and high turnover rate of VPD chiefs, early twentieth century Vancouver’s political power both to establish and enforce law was a product of several disjointed bodies, namely the Vancouver city council, the board of police commissioners, and the VPD, which had diverse opinions on how to best use their power. It was necessary for these reformers to bring the VPD into line before they could enforce any legislation that would effectively institutionalize Chinatown as a racialized place. This thesis examines how reformers on the city council forced the VPD to bring its policing of gambling in Chinatown into line with their expectations, which in turn exacerbated the institutionalization of Chinatown as a racialized place.

Historian Greg Marquis, who focuses on the three decades after 1904, examines the polarized relationship between the moral reformers and the VPD. He states that reformers had two questions: how to clean and keep the city clean and how to keep the police clean. Across North America, reformers’ anxiety about good governance and corrupt police “made and unmade political regimes, sold newspapers, and embarrassed

and frustrated police departments.”

In the case of Vancouver, Marquis states, “the stumbling block for all police chiefs was morality enforcement.” Marquis explains that these claims of corruption were not factual. According to Marquis corruption occurred in various ways on the police force. Although it occasionally “winked at vice” it was not systematically corrupt. He concludes that what reformers called corruption, was in fact an “ongoing negotiation” between law enforcement and vice, and that reformers were unable to substantially change the dynamics of the police force. Whereas Marquis suggests that moral reformers were unable to change the VPD, the early turnover of chief constables suggests that reformers were able to affect some change within the department.

Before the increased scrutiny from the city council, the police commission, and a concerned Vancouver populace, the VPD maintained few records of its operations. After the first major investigation in 1895, the department began organizing and standardizing its records. Thus, before 1895 the only remaining VPD sources are the Prisoners’ Record Book, the Police Charge Book, the VPD Procedural Manual, order books, souvenir books, and the Police Court Book Journal of Health Code Work. Although the scarcity of internal documents might explain Marquis’ and Anderson’s lack of focus on the early history of the VPD, local newspapers reported intensively on the reformers’ efforts to force the VPD to crack down on the alleged vices in Chinatown, particularly gambling. In regards to contemporary newspaper coverage, I use reports, exposes, and letters to the editors from the Vancouver Daily World, the Daily News-Advertiser, the Victoria Daily Province and Vancouver Daily Province. The Province was originally a Victoria based newspaper limiting the initial attention given to Vancouver happenings, however, in 1898 the Victoria Daily Province started a Vancouver subsidiary, the Vancouver Daily Province, that gave a more detailed account of the police affairs in the

27 Ibid., 245.
28 Ibid., 267.
city than its isolated parent paper. During the limited period of this inquiry, no Chinese newspapers were published that still exist today. I rely upon the Daily World, a sensationalist newspaper, and the News-Advertiser, a conservative newspaper, for their detailed and often identical coverage of the city council and police commission meetings.

Following this introduction, chapter two focuses on the first fifteen years of Vancouver, 1886-1901, when both the VPD and Chinatown were still in their infancy. The chapter looks at the first four chief constables of the VPD and how the position came to be politicized. While the chapter spans fifteen years, the majority of the chapter focuses on 1895-1901 when the VPD went through three police chiefs and two major investigations into its conduct. Prompted by allegations of corruption by moral reformers, these investigations into police conduct began the process of regulating and standardizing the police force, and marked the first attempt of moral reformers to consolidate their power over the VPD.

Chapter three explores the next six years, 1901 to 1907, when the provincial government, in an effort to lessen the politicization surrounding the VPD, took away the city council’s ability to remove police chiefs and invested it in the newly created police commission composed of three provincially appointed commissioners from the city’s elected councillors. Ironically, the members of the police commission, headed by the mayor and with increased connections to reform organizations, grew bolder in their


30 While there is an English language newspaper during this period the same cannot be said for a Chinese language newspaper. In the late summer of 1906 the Wa-Ying Yat-Po (息消好眞) was the first Chinese language newspaper to appear but only a few isolated pages of the Wa-Ying Yat-Po survive. “Chinese Daily Paper is to be Established Here.” Vancouver Daily World, Aug 25, 1906. Accessed January 15, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/68365770.

efforts to force the VPD into submission. Between 1906 and 1907, the police commission removed two chiefs after investigations into their conduct related to Chinatown. The police commission used its power to make the chiefs’ position unbearable in order to force them to resign, forcibly suspended or fired them. This tactic allowed reformers to remove chiefs that they perceived as obstacles to their visions of a moral city.

The fourth chapter concludes with an epilogue, which explores the effect of the Vancouver reformers’ consolidation of their influence over VPD operations in Chinatown. With the appointment of R.G. Chamberlain as chief, the city reformers had finally found the hardliner who validated their racialized version of a criminal Chinatown. The increased crackdowns on vice in Chinatown that followed his appointment only further institutionalized the rhetoric that marked Chinatown as a racialized place.
Chapter 2.

Creating Collusion: Initial Conflict between the VPD and the City Council Over Gambling in Chinatown

On Tuesday, October 16, 1888 the Vancouver Daily World reprinted an editorial from the Victoria Standard on what Victorians thought of Vancouver happenings. The article was a direct response to accounts in the Daily World of a crowded prize-boxing match, which the editorialist viewed as a form of white gambling, and the trial of three Chinese men charged with gambling. The editorial focused on the VPD’s enforcement of Chinese gambling:

The police with an energy born of righteous indignation that John Chinaman – the Heathen Chinee – should dare to pollute the atmosphere of Vancouver by gambling – and gambling for one cent stakes probably at that – carefully and mysteriously lays out its plans and suddenly pounces down on them and yanks them up before the beak…\(^{32}\)

This “seething rebuke” of Vancouver’s gambling raised the question of the relationship between gambling and the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). The article, noted a belief that the VPD engaged in cat and mouse games with Chinese gamblers, “carefully and mysteriously” lying wait until “suddenly pounc[ing] down on them.”\(^{33}\) Yet white gambling happened openly and without punishment. The Victoria Standard, however, exaggerated the arrests of the three Chinese gamblers and the VPD’s concern with shutting down and punishing Chinese gambling. The two sentences that originally appeared in the Daily World recounted only the court hearing, not the arrest itself. In


\(^{33}\) Vancouver Daily News, October 16, 1888.
fact, the only negative description of the three gamblers in the original article was its portrayal of them as “disreputable Celestials.”34 The Victoria Standard claimed that those involved in the boxing match were professors or that is to say well-respected and educated white men and lamented the fact that gambling had degraded such reputable characters to “pound and pommel each other.”35 Yet neither was a professor of the academia. “Prof” R. Foster, of Montreal, and G.I. Irvine, a Northwest champion, were professional boxers from a Victorian gymnasium.36 Although the editorial tried to draw attention to the larger gambling problem of Vancouver, its rhetoric reveals the opinion that while vice was an inherent Chinese characteristic, whites could also be lured into vice. The wild exaggeration of the original article in the Victoria Standard suggests that moral reformers had already affected Victoria, which had the largest Chinatown in Canada. Its language shows that the Victoria had already racialized vice in an effort to both protect whites from and bring back into the folds of the “respectable” white community those white individuals who had partaken in non-white racialized activities.37

Although white Vancouverites perceived Chinese migrants as unassimilable they differed on how best to manage them. Most of the VPD’s early chiefs favoured making Chinatown a restricted district because they believed Vancouver’s Chinese inhabitants were unassimilable.38 However, moral reformers who saw Chinatown as dangerous to white morality also wanted to restrict social interactions between the Chinese and Euro-Canadians. To prevent what they perceived as the degradation of Euro-Canadian society, reformers wanted the district thoroughly policed and the smallest infractions strictly enforced.

Within the first fifteen years of the VPD, 1895-1901, the VPD went through three different police chiefs and two major investigations into the conduct of the VPD. Moral reformers on the city council used allegations of corruption within the police force to

35 Vancouver Daily World, October 16, 1888.
37 White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” 305-308.
trigger police investigations. These investigations into police conduct began the process of regulation and standardization of the police force, which reformers hoped would turn the police toward their view of Chinatown. These investigations marked the first attempt of moral reformers to align Vancouver’s enforcement practices with their own beliefs about Chinatown.

The VPD was established on April 6, 1886 when the village of Granville was incorporated and renamed Vancouver, the same fateful year the city also tragically burned to the ground on June 13.\textsuperscript{39} At the time of the fire the population of the city was less than 1000 people. The volunteer fire department was unable to control the flames and, the morning after, a single building remained. The VPD had a chief, one sergeant, two patrolmen and a jailer. When the fire subsided aid was sent from Victoria and elsewhere and rebuilding commenced. After this initial reconstruction and the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway Vancouver’s population spiked dramatically, but the force only increased by three patrolmen.\textsuperscript{40}

Many of the estimated 3,000 Chinese migrant workers who had been employed by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company left the area when the railway was completed in 1885. However, a few did stay and settled in the area that would become Vancouver.\textsuperscript{41} As the Chinese population began to grow, so too did labour tensions. Several attempts by Vancouverites to drive out Chinese labourers in 1886-1887 culminated in a race riot in February 1887, when 100 Chinese labourers arrived from Victoria within three weeks. Anti-Chinese Vancouverites rallied at city hall on Thursday, February 24, 1887. At the conclusion of the meeting an audience member allegedly called out for a vote to clear out the city that evening. The men, mostly young transients, left city hall and marched to the Chinese camp at Coal Harbour. The men tried to

\textsuperscript{39} Both the population and the chronology of incorporation are contested by contemporary and present sources. The \textit{Vancouver Police Souvenir Book} of 1901 states that the population was 500 people in spring of 1886 and that the renaming of Granville as Vancouver along with its incorporation came after the city’s reconstruction. Vancouver Police Relief Assoc., \textit{Souvenir Book}, \textit{Vancouver Police Souvenir Book}, Clarke & Stewart, printers, 1901, Series 2, Box 8A, Historical Writings, VPD Fonds – General, Vancouver Police Museum Archives, Vancouver Police Museum.

\textsuperscript{40} Vancouver Police Relief Assoc., \textit{Vancouver Police Souvenir Book}, 1901.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.}
intimidate the Chinese inhabitants, destroyed their shanty dwellings and burned their bedding. When Chief Stewart arrived, the anti-Chinese mob would not disperse. It took the full four-person police force to disband the mob. While the mob made its way home it raided Chinatown, looting and burning some buildings.42

The aftermath of the 1887 race riot provided the city council an opportunity to reshape and organize the VPD into a more effective law enforcement agency. Shortly after Vancouver’s first race riot the B.C. legislature passed the “Act for the Preservation of Peace within the Municipal Limits of the City of Vancouver.”43 This act suspended Vancouver’s charter temporarily handing control of the city to the Attorney General and the Provincial Police until the Vancouver police were deemed to have the city under control.44 Vancouver’s city council hastily appointed twenty special constables to prove to Victoria that it could maintain peace. When the thirty-six provincial police officers arrived in Vancouver on March 2, 1887, stipendiary magistrate A.W. Vowell, appointed by the provincial government to deal with the aftermath of the riot, dismissed the city’s special constables. Within eight days the city appointed ten regular officers to the VPD, bringing the total force to fourteen. After peace had been maintained for several weeks, Vowell and the other special provincial police returned to Victoria, and the powers and keys to the gaol were returned to Chief Stewart.45 As historian Patricia Roy argues, the provincial government did not pass this act to assert its dominance over the fledgling city. Nor did the provincial government, which had a predilection to pass anti-Chinese

45 The number of constables noted by Patricia Roy is at odds with the history of the department as recorded in the 1901 Police Souvenir Book, which states that the first addition of the force was three men bringing the force to a total of eight men. While this initial number is disputed, by 1901 the VPD was composed of 26 men: Vancouver Police Souvenir Book; Roy, “Preservation of Peace,” 53.
laws until the federal government overruled them, care about the Chinese migrants who were affected by the race riot. Instead, Victoria was “concern[ed] for justice and for the reputation of the province as a whole.” 46 Although this first disruption in the VPD leadership was not local in origin and not grounded in issues of morality and vice, it shows the power of B.C.’s governing bodies to reorganize and standardize law enforcement agencies.

As Chinese residents began to move back into Vancouver’s Chinatown, some of the more fortunate ones helped others displaced by the lack of employment after the completion of the CPR settle down and helped establish a Vancouver Chinese community. Wooden buildings arose in the area of Dupont Street (present day Pender Street) and Carrall Street. The imposition of a $50 federal head tax on Chinese immigrants effective January 1, 1886 did not halt Chinese immigration, but lined the federal coffers. Chinatown continued to grow. 47 Vancouver’s Chinese population of 930 or seven percent of the population remained proportionately smaller than Victoria’s 4,307 Chinese residents, who made up nearly twenty-five percent of its population. However, the definitive number of Chinese in Vancouver cannot be placed, as the advertisement placed by realtor Robert Mackay in the Daily World, cited this statistic to entice more people to move to Vancouver rather than the capital city. 48

46 Ibid., 59.
48 The advertisement suggests a social competition between Victoria more than just the political competition that stemmed from the provincial versus municipal control. See supra notes 42-36 and infra note 141 and accompanying text. By claiming a smaller Chinese population, the advertisement made the claim that Vancouver was more desirable. In addition to the expose printed in the Victoria Colonist, it appears that Vancouver is more desirable because vice had already been racialized, making Victoria’s Chinese population more of a threat to respectable society than compared to its smaller counterpart in Vancouver. Advertisement for Robert G. Mackay. Vancouver Daily World, Sept 1, 1891, accessed September 1, 2015, https://www.newspapers.com/image/62095800; Vancouver Daily World, October 16, 1888.
The first investigation into police conduct loosely tied the VPD to gambling in Chinatown and reformers claimed that the VPD was in collusion with gamblers. On September 9, 1889, in response to allegations of bribery and mismanagement of city records, the reformers on the police commission ordered an audit of the VPD’s books and accounts. The subsequent investigation spearheaded by the commission’s reformers led to the first removal of a VPD chief. The commission suspended Stewart on September 16, 1889 pending the outcome of the audit and the accompanying investigation. This marked the end of Stewart’s first administration as Vancouver’s chief of police.⁴⁹ Stewart complained on September 23 that the commission had still not

informed of the nature of the charges. On October 1, the Daily World reported that the auditor had found the VPD’s inconsistent accounting unacceptable. This was one of the charges laid against the chief. During the investigation by city council, Chinatown inhabitants told the police commission that the certain officers were forcing them to pay them monthly fees or faced arrest. The council questioned Stewart’s sergeants and constables to ascertain if the chief had investigated claims of racketeering thoroughly as no one had been relieved of duty. Stewart faced forty-five charges; however, the judge who ultimately oversaw the investigation found no fraudulent intent on his part in the VPD’s accounting practices or in the operation of the police force. Nevertheless, the city council removed Stewart for suspicion of misconduct. Stewarts’ suspension temporarily placated the claim that the VPD was corrupt while simultaneously providing further support for the perception that the VPD was in collusion with criminals.

Although the first investigation was wide-ranging, responding to allegations of bribery, mismanagement, financial irregularities, and subsequent inquiries became more intertwined with vice in Chinatown, specifically gambling. However, the reformers’ assertions concerning Chinese gambling had to reach a certain intensity before the claim that the VPD was corrupt could have any effect on the department. John McLaren, who was acting-chief during Stewart’s suspension, became the chief on February 13, 1890. Although numerous rumours said that there were many gambling establishments “relieving diligent Mongolians of their earnings every payday,” Chief McLaren, Sergeant Hayes and Officer McLeod on March 20, 1891 raided only a single gambling house and arrested three Chinese individuals. It was not without a struggle. The parlour’s double doors were heavily bolted and when the officers finally gained entrance, one of the

Chinese gamblers resisted arrest and cut the sergeant’s right hand.\textsuperscript{54} This injury was a badge of honour as \textit{The World} reported several days later that the sergeant was still in pain.\textsuperscript{55} The Chinese gamblers were fined $60 dollars each for being inmates of a gambling house.\textsuperscript{56}

Deliberately or otherwise, the \textit{Daily World} identified vice, specifically gambling, as the principal issue in Chinatown.\textsuperscript{57} Although the \textit{Daily World} did not always agree with reformers, sensationalism sold newspapers and it based its headlines on reports of gambling and subsequent police investigations, which supported and encouraged the reformers’ impassioned attacks on the alleged vice in Chinatown. Chief McLaren continued to oversee the VPD, and the \textit{Daily World} increasingly reported on gambling and gambling arrests, which the police commission in turn used to demand greater VPD enforcement of prohibitions against gambling.

The exposés on gambling, as well as the reports of arrests and trials of gamblers, supported the claims that Chinese gambling was rampant in Chinatown. Following a police raid, the police court typically fined convicted gamblers twenty dollars, approximately one month’s salary, but the fine could be as large as one hundred dollars.\textsuperscript{58} However, no two gambling cases were the same. Some were easily prosecuted, while others could not be substantiated by evidence collected by the VPD. Mayor Henry Collins and Capt. Mellon, J.P., presided over a case involving two Chinese


\textsuperscript{57}Although other newspapers reported on the same occurrences, because of its large distribution, vast advertisement space, and its salacious coverage in its articles (reports, exposés, letters to the editors and otherwise), the \textit{Daily World} had a larger impact the city’s perception of Chinatown as a markedly racial place of vice.

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.
gamblers in June 1895. The case had previously been adjourned to allow for the gathering of more evidence. Instead, an exculpatory witness verified that the game being played had no banker, had no house that was earning money, and gave favourable odds to each player. In other words, the game was not intended to make the money for a gaming house. Furthermore, the arrest had been made without any information having been laid or a without a warrant having been issued, making the arrest illegal. Mayor Collins and Mellon agreed that the case against the two Chinese should be dismissed. However, not all trials went smoothly. In late December 1891, a Chinese man drew a revolver on two other Chinese men after they testified in a case against Chinese gambling. The Chinese gunslinger was arrested and fined $400. The trial of these gambling cases reinforced reformers’ claims that gambling was rampant by making it seem commonplace and troublesome due to the difficulties in prosecuting them as well as the strange occurrences that sometimes happened, such as the Chinese gunman.

On April 24, 1891, after another raid on a gambling house in Chinatown, the VPD charged four men with gambling. Yet the Daily World postulated, “Chinatown seems to be infested with professional card-players and gamblers, who make a livelihood by getting the hard-earned wages of the coolies over the green table.” Although the newspaper presented the immediate problem created by gambling in Chinatown as the loss of Chinese labourers’ wages, the perception that gambling was endemic in Chinatown began to take root. In January 1892, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union complained to the city council that gambling and houses of ill-fame existed

59 Mayor Collins was previously a dry goods merchant in Vancouver before he went into municipal politics. John Atkin, “Opium Trade and Head Taxes,” Vancouver Exposed A History in Photographs (Fall 2010) - Donald E. Waite, http://www.globalbirdphotos.com/ve/148_151_Opium_Trade_and_Head_Taxes_John_Atkin.pdf


throughout the city. In 1893, “A Parent” wrote a letter to the editor of the *Daily World*, proclaiming that the city’s gambling problem was out of hand, and was a much bigger issue than most citizens realized. “Parent” did not hesitate to state that both the chief and police magistrate knew how bad Vancouver’s gambling was. This rhetoric made it appear that gambling in Chinatown was an immediate threat to Euro-Canadians. By characterizing gambling as a threat to Euro-Canadians, white middle-class reformers attempted to marshal the Chinatown demimonde as a warning against white gambling in the city by suggesting that Euro-Canadians would lose their wages.

The aspersions against Chinese and games of luck were not made by Euro-Canadians alone. The Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Consul, Hon. Tatsazgoro [sic] Nosse, in order to separate his Japanese compatriots from their Chinese neighbours wished to “refute the statement that the Japanese are more troublesome than the Chinese.” Nosse first stated that there were fewer cases involving Japanese in police court than Chinese. Furthermore, Nosse noted that when the Japanese appeared before the courts it was for fighting amongst themselves, whereas “the Chinese offences — running opium dens and gambling hells [sic] or chicken stealing — are against the community...they do harm by enticing others into their gambling dens and opium holes.” By distinguishing between Japanese and Chinese migrants in this way, Nosse reinforced the claims of moral reformers and others that characterized Chinese immigrants as more prone to criminal activity and particularly gambling and, as such,

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66 Ibid.
dangerous to Vancouver. By focusing specifically on the immorality of Vancouver’s Chinese residents, Nosse explained that Chinese could never assimilate into the “respectable” Euro-Canadian society.

Although rumours of gambling and the gambling arrests allowed the reformers’ allegations to reach a critical intensity during Chief McLaren’s administration, the secondary allegation, that the VPD was corrupt, would not coalesce into a police investigation until mid-April 1895. The rather bold Alderman Gallagher, a general contractor and real estate investor, spurred the investigation. The alderman had been present at the first race riot at Coal Harbour in 1886. His recollection of the events describes the Chinese men in the camps as being kept by McDougall, the contractor who hired them to clear the Brighouse estate of trees. This shows that Gallagher’s reform ideas were at least partially informed by labour and economic competition. Gallagher was disappointed with the outcome of an earlier investigation into a sergeant for allegedly using the city’s coal. The investigation failed to convict the sergeant because no credible witness was willing to testify. Although that investigation focused on

Nosse and his successor Seizaburo Shimizu continued their efforts to convince both the B.C. legislatures and the Canadian government that there was a difference between Japanese and Chinese migrants that Chinese were of a lower class. They pleaded with the governments not to lump the two together especially when the Canadian government was considering subjecting Japanese migrants to the $500 head tax in 1898. They repeated many of the same sentiments Nosse used in his 1895 interview reiterating the allegation that Chinese residents were gamblers. Andrea Geiger, *Subverting Exclusion: Transpacific Encounters with Race, Cast, and Borders, 1885-1928*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 61.


coal, Gallagher stated that he had also “received letters that were far more damaging.”

Attempting to have all of these charges heard, Gallagher called for a blanket investigation into the police department. This seeding of doubt in the department allowed for the reformers to reintroduce their claims that the VPD was corrupt.

Although the reformers would come to investigate the VPD for allegations of corruption, the specifics of those allegations were still unclear. On April 17, 1895, the investigation of Sergeant Heywood inspired the commissioners’ fishing expedition into the VPD’s conduct. Because the city charter gave the commission “power to investigate any matters affecting the good government of the city,” the commissioners laid no formal charges against Heywood, or any other officer, and insisted instead on a complete investigation of the VPD rather than an investigation of any particular individual. However, the police magistrate responsible for the decorum of the proceedings agreed with Heywood’s lawyer that the investigation be tabled until the commission made specific charges against Heywood or other members of the force. The Daily World reported the next day that the recent precedent of an investigation at Toronto University, during which a judge had refused to proceed with any investigation until the commission made specific charges, supported the magistrate’s opinion. The city council and its police commission took a week to formulate charges so the investigation could recommence.

While previous discussions of Chinese residents placed them as being at odds with the city because of gambling, this investigation solidified the perception that gambling was specifically a Chinese problem, despite testimony about white men in gambling houses. On Friday, April 26, 1895, an investigation into allegations of wrongdoing by members of the VPD commenced. This two-month long investigation

70 “That Investigation,” Vancouver Daily World, April 24, 1895.
heard testimony from officers and civilians and, although it was presided over by Mayor Collins, Alderman Gallagher commanded the investigation. Commissioners alleged that members of the force took bribes, had been intoxicated on the job, gambled, and failed to respond to reports of it or thoroughly investigate gambling. From the beginning of the investigation, Alderman Gallagher was convinced of the VPD's guilt and complacency. The mayor, however, took every effort to ensure that the investigation was fair and proceeded in a proper manner. He prohibited Gallagher from asking self-incriminating questions of the witnesses.74

These investigations acted as an outlet for the acting chief’s claims that the VPD was not equipped to eradicate gambling, nor was it expedient to do so. The Daily World followed the entire duration of the police investigation with a negative tone, especially toward Alderman Gallagher. Even before any testimony was heard, the Daily World described Gallagher’s motives as spurred by nothing more than gossip.75 This tone was quite blatant during the first half of the investigation, as indicated by the subtitles of its reports which included such statements as “Many Unnecessary things Said by those Who Want their Own Way or Nothing,” “The Farce Continues,” “Individual Who does not Love the Sergeant Testifies,” and “More Concerning Buckets of Coal.”76 Both the Daily World and letters to its editor portrayed Gallagher as a bulldozer: “when things do not go his way he accuses others of being czars.”77 When evidence given by several patrolmen and known gamblers early in the hearings supported Gallagher’s claims of collusion, the Daily World remained constant in its portrayal of Alderman Gallagher as rude and interruptive at the investigation hearings. Even the Daily News–Advertiser, although it did not outrightly question Gallagher’s behaviour, printed several quotations that showed

Gallagher as impatient and brash when he questioned officers.\(^78\) When listening to testimony he would interject his own experience or make a quip about the last speaker, even if that meant he was making fun of Mayor Collins. Even local grocers used Gallagher as a joke. One advertisement by the East End Grocery in the *Daily World* declared, for example, “Gallagher or no Gallagher investigate our groceries and you will find that they are up to standard.”\(^79\) Although the opposing viewpoints were not entirely muted, continued discussion of gambling gave validity to the reformers’ claim that gambling was rampant within Chinatown.

The initial testimony of VPD members described Vancouver's gambling as posing little threat to the rest of the city and as a problem only among its Chinese. Testimony began with Chief McLaren, Sergeant Heywood and Officers McLeod, McLean, and McKeown, provided similar testimony. They were not aware of anyone accepting bribes or payments other than the allowable gifting of coal to an officer.\(^80\) They did not know of any gambling in Vancouver hotels. None of the officers were habitual gamblers. The officers stated that Chinese were the most likely people in the city to gamble and that only a few white men gambled with Chinese. The only white gambling

\(^78\) “Police Investigation,” *Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser*, May 9, 1895.


\(^80\) According to the 1910 *Rule and Regulations for the Vancouver Police Force*, accepting a bribe was an indictable offence for which the officer could be sentenced up to 14 years imprisonment. However, Eve Lazarus in her article “L.D. Taylor and the Lennie Commission,” reports that in 1921, chief constable James Anderson instituted a "bribe book," which tallied the bribes and counted the bribes towards an entertainment fund for the department. Although Lazarus focuses on a period of supposedly widespread corruption within the VPD, bribery or bribery attempts were not well recorded during this era of the VPD. There were several cases of constables being fired for being part of racketeering and blackmailing gaming establishments in Chinatown. Procedure Manual, *General Rules, Regulations and Instructions with extracts from the "Criminal Code": For the Government, Guidance, and Information of the Vancouver Police Force. Rule and Regulations for the Vancouver Police Force*, Vancouver: The News-Advertisers Printers, 1910, Series 2, Box 3A, Procedural Manuals, Vancouver Police Procedural Fonds, Vancouver Police Museum Archives, Vancouver Police Museum, 66-67; Eve Lazarus, “L.D. Taylor and the Lennie Commission” in *Vancouver Confidential*, ed. John Belshaw, (Vancouver: Anvil Press, 2014), 99; see infra note 91-96 and accompanying text.
place in the city was at the Palmer House.\textsuperscript{81} Although the testimony of the officers clearly established that gambling occurred in the city, their accounts did not support the rumours of a large Chinese gambling operation that presumably threatened Euro-Canadian society.

Responding to the opening testimonies, the \textit{Daily Province}, still based in Victoria in 1895, was, like the \textit{Daily World}, unimpressed with the police investigation’s early proceedings. Its portrayal of the proceeding was less opposed to the reformers’ claims of collusion. On May 4, the \textit{Daily Province} said that the investigation was “progressing in the most useless and undoubtedly comical manner.” Although the newspaper questioned the validity of some of Gallagher’s charges, it was more concerned by the way in which the officers appeared to “have striven at every turn, to balk the examination.”\textsuperscript{82} In contrast to the \textit{Daily World}, the \textit{Daily Province} believed that the “farce” of the police investigation was the reluctance of the officers to comply with it. Their answers were so concise that they gave Gallagher no room to fish. The \textit{Daily Province} thought that if the officers had nothing to hide, they should have been more cooperative.

Although McKeown’s testimony was similar to that of the previous witnesses, it called into question the integrity of the department. While boasting of his own outstanding moral character and skills as an officer, he claimed, “There were never any Chinamen got away from me that I got my hands on.”\textsuperscript{83} An arrest the previous month, however, reveals that this was not the entire truth. While he conducted a one-man raid on a Chinese gambling house, the gamblers knocked him over and escaped by stepping across his body. Although many feet trampled him, he only laid hands on the banker.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{82} “Vancouver,” \textit{Victoria Daily Province}, May 4, 1895.

\textsuperscript{83} “Still Hammering Away,” \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, May 10, 1895.

Although he was determined to impede Chinese gambling, he questioned the VPD’s commitment to the same. He had submitted many reports of gambling along Dupont Street, but was unsure if the department had ever acted on any of them because the court never called him as a primary witness. The suspicion that the VPD did not act on reports of gambling was central to the remainder of this investigation and the ones to follow.

The testimony of Officers Brown and Harris corroborated McKeown’s claims that the VPD did not focus its efforts to enforce gambling restrictions in Chinatown. Their testimony also helped develop a clearer picture of the extent of Chinese gambling in Chinatown. Officer Brown stated that the Chief had given him orders to look for gambling while patrolling his beat. His testimony, along with his report books, shows that he made numerous reports of gambling at several houses on Dupont Street. However, like McKeown, he never appeared in court for cases against inmates of those gaming houses. When making another report about a licensed house that was open after hours, he testified that the chief told him to make the report, but likely nothing would happen. Officer Harris also testified to the VPD’s inaction in response to Chinese gambling on Dupont Street. The police investigation clearly established that the VPD did not play cat and mouse games with the Chinese gamblers. It did not pounce on unsuspecting gamblers and arrest them; instead, it was typically disinterested in the Chinese games.

The VPD, even though it had made previous raids on Chinese gaming houses, with at least one commencing during the two month long investigation, showed disinterest in strictly enforcing the gaming laws in Chinatown. Chief McLaren did not choose to bring the full might of the VPD down on Dupont Street to extinguish a few games of fan-tan. Gallagher wanted to prove more than simply lackadaisical enforcement of gambling laws; he sought to implicate McLaren as part of the vice that occurred in Chinatown.

As the investigation continued, it was apparent that the moral reformers had not muted the opposition to their claims. Those who opposed the fishing nature of the

87 “Fighting and Gambling,” Vancouver Daily World, October 16, 1888
investigation tried to reveal it for the mockery it was. In early May the mayor, the city solicitor, and the police magistrate combined in an effort to unseat Gallagher. They characterized him as an unqualified candidate because of a lack of property. The Daily Province, Daily News-Advertiser, and members of the city council saw this as an concerted effort by the men most closely connected to the VPD to impede the investigation. Additionally this was not the first accusation that the mayor had attempted to fix municipal elections. In his previous mayoral run, accusations arose that claimed Collins had attempted to bribe another politician to withdraw from the race. The Daily News-Advertiser stated that a judge ruling in his favor resolved the issue of Gallagher’s property qualifications. The Daily Province did not necessarily disagree with the criticism of Gallagher’s handling of the investigation, and suggested laying the investigation before a court. Although the coup to unseat Gallagher failed, the Daily Province reported that the motion to remove Gallagher had little support beyond the three men who proposed it. This attempt, however, garnered Gallagher’s investigation more support from other members of the city council who saw the continued attempts to conclude the investigation prematurely as a sign of something wrong. These attempts to disprove or halt the claims that the VPD was corrupted were no match for the repeated and ever stronger claims of the moral reformers.

Alderman Gallagher and the other reformers on the city council continued to fish during the investigation and moved the discussion away from VPD non-action to multiple allegations of corruption. Some witnesses testified to the inebriation of individuals in the

88 While this attempted unseating took place sometime before May 3rd, 1895, it was not reported in the Daily World at that time. However, reference is made to this attempted unseating on May 3rd, 1895 during a regular report of the investigation and August 4th, 1895 in the Daily World report of the general meeting of ratepayers for the third and fourth wards of Vancouver. “Vancouver,” Victoria Daily Province May 18, 1895; “In Their True Colors,” Vancouver Daily World, August 1, 1895, accessed July 5, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/64527834; “The Police Investigation,” Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, June 12, 1895.
91 “From Vancouver,” Victoria Daily Province, May 18, 1895.
92 “From Vancouver,” Victoria Daily Province, June 20, 1895.
93 “In Their True Colors,” Vancouver Daily World, August 1, 1895.
department, others to the abuse of power to cover up that inebriation. 94 Fred H. Andrews, a gambler, who explained the lotteries on Dupont Street, had heard that a teenager bought into the lottery and drew a large sum of $450, but when he went to collect, the Chinese man running the game refused to pay. Officers McLeod and Johnson were informed and said that they would arrest the man if he did not pay the teenager. 95 These stories began to convince the investigators that the members of the VPD were using their position in an extra-legal manner. The two officers had no legal authority to oversee the payout of the lottery, as it was an unlicensed game; on the contrary, the officers should have arrested the lottery keeper and the teenager. Another display of the VPD’s abuse of power is reflected in a separate account of the same story retold by John Redy. Redy, another gambler, claimed that when Officers McLeod and Johnson approached the Chinese lottery about the teenager’s ticket, they not only threatened the Chinese lottery operator, but also swore to create trouble for the whole of Dupont Street. 96 This power relationship was inherently unequal and similar to a protection racketeering scheme. Although there is no substantial proof that these illegal businesses paid for protection from the law, the officers appear to have threatened businesses with the law, without actually enforcing it, in order to ensure tranquility, reflecting aspects of a restricted district.

W. M. Beerman, a dockworker and a gambler, delivered the most scandalizing testimony of the investigation in recounting events at “Chick’s house” on 116 Dupont Street when an officer arrived to investigate reports of gambling. According to Beerman, one of the Chinese men rushed upstairs to tell the gamblers, “The police is in,” and collected a sum of five dollars from them. When the man returned downstairs, he attempted to bribe the officer with the five dollars. Beerman said that he felt safe on Dupont Street, especially at 116 Dupont, because the proprietor had “told him he had the police fixed.” This particular proprietor, Chick, was said to know when another house would be raided, or when the chief might be walking down Dupont. He would oust his

94 “It had been moved on,” Vancouver Daily World, May 18, 1895.
patrons until it was safe to resume the gambling. While the witnesses often mentioned Chick, he did not testify himself because he was then in China. According to testimonies, although Chinese gamblers were supposed to be punished they used their connections with the VPD to secure their daily operations. Chief McLaren, while allegedly favouring Chick by not arresting gamblers at that establishment, still appeared at the door and ordered everyone out of the house knowing that gambling would resume after half an hour. This story further supports the allegation of a form of a protection racket where certain gamblers exchanged money with members of the police force in order to protect their businesses from police raids.

As the investigation continued, Gallagher and the other city council reformers attempted to push McLaren out of the VPD. The investigation continued into July with much the same testimony repeated, both by Chief McLaren and by the officers testifying against him and his deputies. In his closing remarks, McLaren reiterated that he had no knowledge of wrongdoing committed by officers and that he absolutely “knew of no Chinese gamblers getting police protection.”

Gallagher and other reformers, running out of people willing to testify against the VPD leaders, tried on multiple occasions to remove Chief McLaren, Heywood, and McLeod by a majority vote. When Mayor Collins repeatedly blocked these measures, the Daily Province took this as a sign of complete contempt for the investigation as he seemed “eternally bent upon hampering the police investigation... refusing to accede to the decision of the majority of the alderman regarding the dismissal of Chief McLaren.” The Daily World continued its coverage of the investigation and portrayed Gallagher’s attempts to have McLaren removed as a farce, “contrary to law, justice and ordinary

98 Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, June 6, 1895.
British fair-play." Although the commission dropped all charges against McLaren at the conclusion of the investigation, he filed his resignation on August 10, 1895. Although Gallagher was unable to charge any of the members on the force with committing a crime, this investigation supported the claim that the VPD was corrupt and was used as a tool to remove chiefs that challenged to the reformers’ agenda, once the primary allegation that Chinese gambling reached a critical intensity once again.

Having cast aspersions on the VPD's leaders, the city council sought a new chief from outside of the department. The Daily Province reported that the concluded investigation had proceeded in a “manner too well calculated to inspire renewed confidence amongst people in the local administration,” a reference to the VPD’s apparent attempts to hinder the proceedings. The police commission appointed William Ward, the former Inspector of the Toronto police, as the new VPD Chief of Police on September 5, 1895. The Daily Province noted, “Vancouver rests her hopes of a well conducted police force on the new chief… expected to know how to exercise and maintain authority.”

The allegation that gambling was rampant in Chinatown never reached a critical intensity during Ward’s administration. As an outside man, however, Ward experienced several obstacles in his attempts to modernize the force, mostly from the city council, which refused several pleas for necessary changes. He held the position of chief for little more than a year and submitted his resignation to the city council on September 25, 1896. He cited the relatively small size of the force compared to the population, which

104 “Vancouver,” Victoria Daily Province, October 12, 1895.
105 “The New Chief,” Vancouver Daily World, September 5, 1895, accessed September 1, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/64529718. It is important to note that ex-Chief Stewart applied along with fifteen other individuals applied for the position of chief of police showing that although he had previously resigned from the VPD he was still allowed to apply and forced the reformers to still review his application for the position “Police commission,” Vancouver Daily World, September 3, 1895, accessed July 8, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/64529718.
106 “Vancouver,” Victoria Daily Province, October 12, 1895.
made it difficult to maintain the peace. He declared that the VPD needed at least 21 revolver-equipped patrol officers to be effective. Ward acknowledged that incidents of burglary, house breaking, and petty larceny had increased significantly during his term. He did not mention gambling or Chinatown in his resignation letter.\textsuperscript{107} He also noted the “frivolous complaints forwarded by persons to the City Council” about himself, which made the relationship between the VPD and the police commission unbearable.\textsuperscript{108} Ward’s resignation became effective on October 31, 1896. In failing to mention gambling, Ward’s resignation letter demonstrated that the VPD leadership continued to perceive gambling and other vice as secondary to other crime. This perception of gambling and vice posed a direct challenge to the reformers’ agenda to remove immorality. Still attempting to bring the VPD’s practices into line with their own, the police commission again sought a more compliant replacement.

Ward’s resignation caused the police commission to reconsider their policy of hiring outside of the department and the province. A letter to the editor printed a month after Ward’s resignation, criticized Ward’s “administration of police affairs [as having] been far from satisfactory.”\textsuperscript{109} The letter’s author wondered why the police commission would search outside the department when they already had someone tested. Prompted by the dissatisfaction with the level of enforcement during the previous year, city officials seriously considered ex-Chief McLaren’s application for the position of chief. The same editorial claimed that McLaren’s earlier resignation was spurred by his broken home, not his guilt from supposedly colluding with Chinatown gamblers.\textsuperscript{110} His strong history of dealing with tramps and burglars, the writer believed, made him worthy to become chief once again and restore the city from the state it was left in by Ward.\textsuperscript{111} However, the commission appointed another former chief, J.M. Stewart as Chief. He was sworn in on


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, September 29, 1896.


\textsuperscript{110} The editorial did not explain what it meant by McLaren’s broken home. .

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, Oct. 26, 1896
November 16, 1896. Although the commission had previously suspended him after an investigation into police conduct, the original claim of corruption against him did not focus primarily on gambling; Stewart was an acceptable replacement for Ward.

Chief Stewart’s reappointment brought renewed interest in proper police procedure and led to new and increased police documentation. One of the first procedural changes under Stewart was the creation of the *Police Charge Book*. Each entry follows a simple formulaic construction: name(s), description of charge, plea, and penalty. This made the *Police Charge Book* more reliable account than other VPD sources because of its standardized representation of all persons identified. There is a date in the left hand margin with a name and any known aliases appearing directly to the right of the date. Under the name is the charge placed against the individual. The following line was reserved for the defendant’s plea, and the last line is the adjudication.  

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112 Souvenir Book, Historical Writings, 1901.  
113 Textual record, Police Court Charge Book, 1897-1900, Series VPD-S193, Vancouver Police Department Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.
The department began to use the Police Charge Book more extensively in 1889. Chinese men arrested for crimes appeared more frequently in the Prisoners Record Book than in other police records. This is because for most of the charges recorded allowed for either the payment of a fine or a couple of days’ or months’ jail time. Only convictions of theft and burglary were accompanied by strict terms of jail and hard labour.\textsuperscript{114} The most frequent charge against the Chinese for was stealing, which varied

\textsuperscript{114} Although the victim and perpetrator of gambling is an individual and by extension his family, whereas theft has a victim and different perpetrator, the differences in punishment do not stem from this logic, as other crimes with distinct victims and perpetrators also had the option between paying fines or completing jail time. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
greatly from scrap, cash, and jewellery to groceries and chickens. Each conviction led to the same six months’ hard labour. Because Nosse referred to chicken theft as one of the Chinese crimes against the Vancouver community along with gambling and opium smoking it is interesting that in the two accounts of chicken theft, “Sam a Chinaman” and Ah Leuu [sic], each stole exactly 14 chickens a year apart from each other.\textsuperscript{115} Chicken thefts in the 1900s were by no means numerous. The rarity of such thefts does not support Nosse’s claim that such thievery was in the same class as gambling and opium smoking.

During Stewart’s administration, the \textit{Police Charge Book} has three entries listing charges laid against gamblers. In November 1899, Chee and six other Chinese migrants were arrested for playing in or looking on in a gambling house and were fined $25 dollars each. Chee Kong Fong and Ling See Ho were also arrested that day but had their cases dismissed, presumably for lack of evidence. On December 5, 1899, W.J. Naggle and five other white Vancouverites (see Figure 2) were arrested and charged with keeping a gambling house, and for being inmates, onlookers, and players in a gambling house. While Naggle, the man charged with keeping the gambling house, forfeited his $500 bail by not appearing in court, the other men arrested had their cases dismissed.\textsuperscript{116} In February 1890, 49 men, mostly Chinese, were arrested and charged with playing or looking in on a gambling house. No individual was singled out as the keeper of the gambling house. Each man, Chinese and non-Chinese alike, was fined $20 or sentenced to thirty days in jail. These reports show that raids, their resulting arrests, prosecutions, and punishments did not single out Chinese gamblers with greater fines than their white compatriots.

Chief Stewart’s began insuring that details of prisoners were kept in record books known as \textit{Prisoners’ Record Book}, which in some ways was more detailed than the \textit{Police Charge Book} because it has pictures and extensive detail of the crimes committed. The first volume of the \textit{Prisoners’ Record Book}, which began in the fall of

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\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Police Court Charge Book}, 1897-1900, 339-340.
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1898, was not always uniform. Sam, a gambler, was the eighth entry and the first Chinese resident to appear in the Vancouver Prisoners’ Record Book. A picture of Sam appears next to his name written in crisp cursive lettering. He stands in front of an open doorway; a bearded man stands to Sam’s left staring at him as another man stands inside the building looking forward. Sam’s entry has no additional information. Immediately below this entry is another entry for Ah Foy, whose alias is Sam (different than the Sam mentioned previously). Beside his name again is a picture of Ah Foy standing in front of the same house as Sam. Regrettably his entry contains an additional comment. One word is scrawled on the paper presumably at a later date in different penmanship and ink: dead. Often when Chinese and other non-white people appeared in this early record, the record keeper failed to inscribe all the details. Several entries appeared in this first record book with no name, and/or no physical description. Even if the bookkeeper recorded a name and physical description, there was no description of the offence.

The first volume of the Prisoners’ Record Book, in comparison to other accounts in its consecutive volumes, shows that more people paid fines rather than went to jail. It also shows that the Vancouver newspapers did not report all criminal activity and associated convictions secured by the VPD. By way of example, pages 116 to 121 provide the photos and names of twelve individuals, five of whom are Chinese and one Japanese. Only two of these entries, both of them white men, include a description of the crimes for which they are serving sentences. This six-page section represents almost an entire month of imprisonments between September and October 1900. During this period, the Daily World only noted the arrest of a man named Mah for stealing twenty dollars from a Mrs. Richardson in the West End; he was sentenced to


118 While the lack of description given to some Chinese prisoners might suggest that the VPD were more concerned with non-Chinese offenders, I believe that there is not enough evidence to formally assert this. It might also be evidence of botched arrests performed by the VPD, where the prisoners that were not given more detail did not remain in custody long enough for a formal charge. Textual record, Prisoners’ Record Book, 1898-1900, Series VPD-S202, Prisoner Record Books, Vancouver Police Department Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.

119 Prisoners’ Record Book, 1898-1900.
three months in jail. Paradoxically, the PRB does not contain an entry for Mah. Similarly, neither the Daily World nor the Daily News-Advertiser reported the convictions of any of the five Chinese who appear in the six-page section of the PRB.

These discrepancies show that although the newspapers often followed court proceedings, they did not report all crimes in the city, making the newspaper coverage of crime incomplete. Inadequate record keeping shows how influential the reformers were in creating a narrative that tied gambling to Chinese immigrants even though there was no abundance of factual support to support their claims. They used questionable evidence to accuse and remove chiefs for collusion with gambling interests or for inefficiently running the VPD, never having concrete testimony to support their claims.

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Comparatively, the sentences imposed for gambling in the Police Charge Book and Prisoners’ Record Book show that the vice was not considered detrimental to the city. When comparing the entries in the Prisoners’ Record Book and the Police Charge Book it is apparent that in most cases, the judges gave gamblers the alternative of paying fines or serving jail time. The “option” to choose between these two punishments shows the relative disregard given to gambling in comparison to theft.121 Also, the lesser

121 The option to choose is more an economic consideration more than a personal choice, as Marquis notes these fines were typically the equivalent of one month’s wage. These fines were also occasionally paid by the gambling establishment and were accepted as an operational cost to the games. Marquis, “Vancouver Vice,” 242-250; Morton, At Odds, 120-129.
mandatory minimum sentencing for gambling compared to theft shows that Parliament was less concerned with gambling than it was with theft. The fine for gambling was greater than that imposed for other offences, such as $5 for animal cruelty, $2 for breaking health code violation, or even $15 for assaulting a peacekeeper. However, the prison sentence imposed for gambling was comparably lighter than that imposed for other offences. Where gamblers only faced up to thirty days, those convicted of other summary offences faced between ten and sixty days in jail. In addition to the fact that most of the Chinese charges were dropped, and the triviality of the fine, these gambling charges were a potential cash cow for the city more than they were meant to stop gambling in the city. Keepers of gaming houses also saw the fines as the cost of doing business. This stance placed both the VPD and the police court at odds with the reformers on the city council that believed gambling in Chinatown to be a threat to society. Although Stewart made these procedural record changes in part as an effort to fight against corruption allegations, the arrests and the judging of gambling charges during Stewart’s administration provided further evidence for the reformers’ allegations that Chinese gambling was flourishing in Chinatown.

The reformers’ accusation that the VPD was corrupt resurfaced in the wake of a series of unauthorized gambling raids. The issue arose following a gambling raid by Detectives McAllister and Harris at a home on Dupont Street on July 14, 1900. During the raid they seized gambling paraphernalia as well as cash, which the detectives claimed was the bank for the games. Because the detectives conducted the raid without a warrant signed by the police magistrate and without orders from the chief to do so, and had acted in such a manner multiple times before, residents of Chinatown met Chief Stewart and the mayor and threatened to sue the detectives and the VPD for burglary. What made the issue more troubling was that the sums of cash that the detectives catalogued as evidence and the amount the Chinese claimed they seized did not match. This inconsistency prompted Chief Stewart to tell the Daily World: “there was a right and a wrong way of going about them [raids], and he thought that officers should proceed in

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122 Prisoners’ Record Book, 1898-1900.
the regular way.” Stewart dismissed the two detectives, who requested an investigation. The new investigation rekindled the debate over gambling in Chinatown between the city council and the VPD.

Although the investigation into the actions of Detectives McAllister and Harris justified Stewart’s decision to dismiss the detectives, it reignited the police commission’s desire to force the VPD to crack down on gambling in Chinatown. This again placed the VPD in opposition to the reformers’ desire that the police more strictly enforce the prohibition against gambling. Testimony by the detectives, as well as a detailed list published by the Daily World, identified twenty-five houses in Chinatown where gambling allegedly occurred. When the city council questioned the detectives, it was clear that the reformers on city council clearly supported increased crackdowns on these establishments. After the detectives claimed that their lack of reporting and shuffling of monetary evidence was for their own protection, Alderman Wood explained, “Well, have you not the protection of the Council behind you, to support your statements? Don’t you know that if you moved to suppress gambling you would be supported by the Council?” Not all city council members sided with the reformers and believed, as Chief Stewart did, that the irregular procedure and the questionable seizure of money involved in the raid was an indication of blackmail as part of a racketeering scheme. This shows that at least part of the commission viewed the corruption of the VPD as the corruption of individuals rather than a departmental problem. The investigation upheld the detectives’ dismissal, but the detectives continued to defend their actions and claimed that other members of the force were in the pocket of Chinese gamblers, not them. A Yukon newspaper, the Yukon Nugget, postulated that the investigation showed there had been a wholesale buying up of the police force. The alleged extent of gambling in Chinatown and the suspected corruption within the force furthered the perception that Chinatown was a problem. The author of the article believed “If the
Chinese are allowed to gamble among themselves, it will not be long until whites and Japanese are introduced… and then the fleecing process will be in full swing.”

Although Chief J.M. Stewart remained in office after the investigation, the increased attention to the VPD and Chinatown caused him to resign in 1901. While the Daily World had criticized Stewart during the investigation of detectives McAllister and Harris, Stewart’s fiercest critic proved to be the Vancouver Daily Province. In February 1901, Chief Stewart filed libel charges against the Province. Stewart sent two detectives to city hall to bring back bundles of the Daily Province as evidence to prove that the newspaper had treated him “meanly” in their attacks against “his capacity as chief.” The most recent attack published just that day depicted the chief as petty in his most recent and definite suspension of McAllister for accepting bribes. The subtitle of the article was “Chief Stewart Gets Out His Little Hatchet and Hacks.” Stewart sought $5,000 in damages. He claimed that the Province had printed at least eight libellous articles, associating the Chief with accepting money from gamblers and “fast-houses.” According to a statement made by either Stewart or his lawyer nearly a month after Stewart presented the writ to the court, the chief would not succumb to the pressures placed on him and the city to resign his post. The chief, however, intended to take a few months’ leave to visit his sons in the Klondike. As May arrived, Stewart’s health was failing, preventing him “from giving that attention to the duties of his office which it...
calls for, and for that reason it is said he will hand in his resignation."\(^{135}\) His resignation took effect on July 15.\(^{136}\)

The court head J.M. Stewart’s libel case a month after his resignation. Stewart’s lawyers, F.M. McLeod and A.D. Taylor, based the majority of their claim on the premise that the information in the articles and editorials was essentially gossip. The *Province* insisted that it had never expressly stated that the ex-chief had ever accepted money from disreputable characters. The evidence suggested that he had but the newspaper never actually printed that, as it did not have any proof. It left the readers to judge for themselves whether or not Stewart was guilty.\(^{137}\) When J.M. Stewart was supposed to testify he was not in court. A medical certificate stated that Stewart’s sickness came in “acute sudden changes.” Nevertheless, the lawyers for the *Daily Province* argued that Stewart was responsible enough to know when he was going to testify and should have requested that the hearing be rescheduled. They moved to have the hearing resume immediately. The judge refused and adjourned the case to October, when the court would again be in session, which ostensibly shows the judge thought Stewart’s claims had merit and that the case over libel should be argued in court.\(^{138}\) Yet the case did not resume in October, he had left town to be with his family. The only reference to J.M. Stewart in the autumn of 1901 was that his son, Hector Stewart, the Fire Chief of Dawson, was forced to retire early after a petition signed by everyone at the fire station for his gross incompetence.\(^{139}\) This libel case shows that the *Daily Province*, like the reformers on the police commission, relied on stories of gambling to cast aspersions on the chief’s character in order force the department into alignment in regards to vice.


\(^{136}\) Ibid.


\(^{138}\) Ibid.

The VPD and reformers on the city council were divided on how to deal with a perceived Chinese gambling problem. They disagreed on the proper procedure for obtaining arrests and stopping the gambling. The VPD under the leadership of the early chiefs would not blindly enforce laws if it lacked proper authority. The chiefs tailored their enforcement of gaming laws in ways they thought manageable and achievable given the constraints imposed by the department’s size and the procedural requirements of the law. As Chief McLaren said “It is not advisable for a man to rush in to arrest a hundred.”\footnote{“Still Hammering Away,” \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, May 10, 1895.} Although this comment shows that McLaren believed gambling was no small matter, if the department ignored the requirement to obtain a warrant in enforcing gambling laws the VPD was left open to claims of harassment and burglary, as happened after the raid conducted by Detectives McAllister and Harris in 1900. Because of these constraints the VPD chiefs favoured a restricted district in which the VPD did not actively patrol the area, and focused its resources elsewhere. Although there was corruption within the VPD, the VPD, contrary to the way in which it was characterized by reformers, did not protect Chinese gambling on Dupont Street. The department was true to its core mandate to uphold the law, but it could not conduct raids or make arrests based on rumours and hearsay alone.

Unlike the VPD, its critics, the city council, and newspapers relied heavily on rumours to force the VPD into submission to moral reformers. Without clear evidence, the city council constructed Chinatown as a racialized place that threatened their Euro-Canadian sensibilities due to the unsubstantiated infestation of gambling. Indifferent to the VPD’s continued argument that it must follow proper procedure, the city council reformers wanted vice eradicated in Chinatown regardless of how this was done. This was due their ideas about racialized nature of vice. Reformers believed gambling was an innate characteristic of Chinese, and not a part of a “respectable” white mores. Even though there is evidence that white men gambled in their own establishments, moral reformers refused this idea and argued that these men were enticed by “Chinese” vices.\footnote{See supra note 83 and accompanying text.} If Chinese gaming establishments were nowhere to be found, white men would not gamble. The close proximity of gambling threatened to entice and clean out the
pockets of Vancouver’s white men and boys, or so these moral reformers seem to have believed.

Once the idea that Chinese gambling was endemic in Chinatown reached a critical intensity, reformers on the city council, who were well off men due to the property qualifications for their seats, used police investigations to claim that the chiefs of police were involved in this purported gambling. Although the chiefs were acquitted of wrongdoing, the politicization of the VPD and gambling in Chinatown effectively removed them from office. These investigations, because the newspapers followed the attempts by reformers to assert control over the VPD, reinforced the notion that Chinatown was a racialized space that posed a danger to non-Chinese residents of Vancouver. Once the council removed a sitting chief they hoped that his replacement would regulate Chinatown’s inhabitants according to moral reform ideology, which demanded the separation of races and assumed that inherent differences existed between members of different races further castigated Chinatown and served to divide its non-Euro-Canadian inhabitants from the rest of Vancouver.¹⁴²

Chapter 3.

The Incompetence of Two Chiefs: the Changing Tactics of the Vancouver Police Commission in Response to Chinese Gambling

“I do not think I have been given a fair show and I don’t care who hears me say so. I want a full and free investigation. The fuller the better. If I have done wrong let it be known, but why should I be condemned unheard.” These were the sentiments of Chief of Police Sam North when, in June 1906, Mayor Frederick Buscombe suspended North indefinitely and eventually denied him an investigation of his ability to act effectively as chief of police. In order to reduce the impact of the moral reformers’ politicization of the process surrounding the appointment of police chiefs on the composition of the VPD, the provincial government restructured the powers of the police commission. Rather than the elected alderman choosing from their own to make up the commission, the provincial government now appointed the two commissioners, one from the city council’s aldermen, and one a non-elected person meeting the property requirements for public office. This commission was still able to remove constables or chiefs by majority vote. The newly constituted police commission forced Chief North, the successor to Chief Stewart, as well as Chief North’s own successor, Chief Chisholm, from their positions with little or no due process. The reformers on the police commission alleged that the VPD was being mismanaged. The commission graduated from investigating police misconduct to the removal of chiefs for gross incompetency. In securing the removal of both Chief North and Chief Chisholm, claims of their inability to run the police department effectively were enough. These claims, while discussed, were never formally

reviewed in any extensive manner. Because of this change, the chiefs could not counter the reformers’ claims through their testimonies in the extensive investigations as had previously been done. This made the removal of the police chief an easier task for the reformers. Whereas reformers like Gallagher were widely disdained for their fishing investigations into police conduct that never concretely proved any of the chiefs had acted improperly, after 1900 reformers gained support because of a rising middle class and its fears of a growing Chinese population. Minimizing the opposing views allowed moral reformers to appoint a new chief to the VPD who would align the force’s enforcement practices related to gambling in Chinatown with their demands. This in turn contributed to the perception that Chinese gambling was a major problem in Chinatown even without sufficient evidence.

The previous chapter examined how the position of VPD Chief Constable was politicized around cries of collusion with Chinatown gamblers. This chapter looks at how reformers politicized the same position by claiming that the chiefs were incompetent. Rather than accuse the next two chiefs of wrongdoing and incur long drawn out investigations into the police force, opponents of the chiefs and gambling in Chinatown claimed the chiefs were inefficient. Because they attacked their ability and not their character, it was difficult for the chiefs to defend themselves. This strategy left the chiefs with little legal standing to receive due process and retain their positions until an investigation had occurred. This minimized their ability to argue against the reformers’ claims than the previous investigations had allowed. These attacks on ability, like the earlier investigation into corruption, were spurred and supported by the reformers’ continued claims that gambling was rampant in Chinatown.

Aldermen who disliked the idea of an outside man strongly favoured Acting Chief North, and appointed him acting chief on Monday, June 3, 1901, when Stewart’s resignation came into effect. But North had already taken on most of the executive work
several weeks before because of Stewart’s waning health. North, who had ties to members of the city council, was next in line of succession, and was extremely popular with members of the force. North, who was forty years old at the time, had moved to Vancouver when he was 26 and joined the VPD three years later. After serving for several years as a patrolman, he quickly moved up through the ranks. Sam North’s fourteen years in Vancouver and eleven years on the VPD earned him a favourable reputation. He knew the city, its people, and, according to the Daily World, any “police officer [would] tell you that whatever ‘Sam’ North undertakes is very apt to end correctly.”

While North’s long involvement with the VPD made him the most likely candidate to replace Chief Stewart, he was not the only VPD officer to be considered for the position. On June 11, in a closed session, ex-chief of police J.M. McLaren met with the council, several of whom were old friends, as an aspirant for the newly vacated position. McLaren had led the VPD for four years before the publicity of the 1895 police investigation forced him to retire. Although McLaren had years of service with the VPD, the political quandary surrounding him may have prevented the city council from truly considering him as a candidate. The next day the Daily World began to speculate about the possible changes to the force if Acting Chief North became the permanent chief. On June 18, 1901, North succeeded Stewart as the chief of the VPD. The Daily World praised his appointment to the position, lauding him a small biography and ending it with this cheer: “Here’s to Chief North and may he live long to be a terror to evil-doers.”

145 Those on the city council who wanted a man from outside the department to take over the position of chief favoured W.H. Bullock-Webster, a supposedly well-known “executive man” who was exceedingly clever in securing evidence to ensure prosecutions in the police court. “May be Chief of Police.” Vancouver Daily World, June 4, 1901, accessed May 10, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/64399333. Despite his failing health and the commissioners appointing an acting chief, although Stewart submitted his resignation at the end of May, it was not effective until July 15, 1901. Vancouver Daily World, May 20, 1901; Vancouver Daily World, July 18, 1901.

146 “May be Chief of Police.” Vancouver Daily World, June 4, 1901; “City News,” Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, June 1, 1895.


At the beginning of North’s administration, the police themselves attempted to permanently shelve the reformers’ claim that the VPD was corrupt and presented North as the perfect person to fill the position after the city’s earlier troubles with its chiefs. In 1901, the Vancouver Police Relief Association, in order to raise money for the association, published the *Vancouver Police Souvenir Book*. The book had biographical entries for all members on the force but only those in leadership roles whose police work led to the arrests of Chinese migrants were given a full-page or two biography. These stories were badges of honour for the detectives detailed. Recounting such arrests was an attempt by the VPD to appease reformer concerns after the recent change of chiefs. The book also profiled Thomas Wylie and Clerk McIntosh, two officers who served under North. Thomas Wylie, the chief of the detective branch of the VPD, and made many prominent arrests. One such arrest was that of Yip Leuk, who murdered Alex Main, the chief of police in Steveston, B.C. On April 17, 1900, Main was making an inventory of stolen goods, Yip Leuk, a Chinese immigrant, appeared in the doorway with a double headed axe and brought it swiftly down on Main’s head. Main was then mutilated and buried by Leuk and two other Chinese men. A “flimsy clue,” not detailed in the souvenir book or the *Daily World* or the souvenir book, led Wiley to the suspects. He arrested them just before the men were about to be taken away by a lynch mob. What is most intriguing about this account is that the souvenir book did not mention that the *Daily World* that the Chinese Benevolent Association gave Wylie two hundred dollars in reward money for capturing the murderers. This supports the idea that the association, of mostly prominent businessmen who had ties to the Empire Reform

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150 Although the souvenir book states that Wylie made many prominent arrests, it primarily focused on the arrest of Yip Leuk and his accomplices, and quickly mentions the arrest of a white murderer from Victoria. *Ibid.*


152 The Daily World only notes that on April 17th, 1900 Chief Main was missing and unaccounted for, but that Wylie believed Main to be the victim of foul play; *Ibid.*

Association, worked with the police to crackdown on felonious crimes or appreciated their efforts in doing so.\textsuperscript{154}

The profile of Sergeant Wylie was not the only one to recount the brave heroics against Chinese residents. The book also praised Clerk McIntosh as an officer wounded on duty. McIntosh, who had been on patrol with patrolman Butler, spotted a “lurking shadow” about to break in and enter a building. Shots were exchanged between the patrolmen and the suspect, leaving McIntosh wounded. Two days later a Chinese man, who was shot during the scrimmage, was arrested.\textsuperscript{155} The details that the relief association included and excluded in the police souvenir book, suggest this fundraiser book was an attempt to pacify reformers by vilifying the character of Chinese in

\textsuperscript{154} see infra note 184 and accompanying text; see also Mar, \textit{Brokering Belonging} 18-20.

\textsuperscript{155} Souvenir Book, 1901
Vancouver as criminals. Yet the remarkable aspect of this souvenir book is that Chinese merchants in the city bought most of the advertising slots in the booklet. This, in addition to the reward given to Wylie by the Chinese Benevolent Association, hints at the unequal relationship between the Chinese community and the VPD after the first round of successions at the VPD. The Chinese businessmen supported the VPD, but the VPD’s portrayal of Chinese residents was less than outstanding.

During North’s administration, issues of “Chinese” immorality and the protection of Vancouver’s respectable community arose. On April 18, 1906, an earthquake and subsequent fire destroyed much of San Francisco, which displaced thousands of Chinese. Of the 15,000 Chinese residents of San Francisco, only 400 stayed in the city. While most of them moved to Oakland, California, many made their way further north into Seattle and Vancouver areas, causing a new wave of concern about the migration of these Chinese San Franciscans. By May 4 the Moral Reform Association had already informed the VPD that “undesirable characters” had arrived in the city from San Francisco. The Daily World expected Chief North to do his best to keep these “undesirables” out of the city, and that his orders would “be obeyed by persons who are obviously unwelcome in a clean Canadian town like this… [For] there is no room here for the immoral and vicious of San Francisco… forced out of their webs.” Here “Canadian” was synonymous for white and “immoral and vicious” for Chinese refugees. Although the letter cast Chinese San Franciscans as “immoral and vicious,” they held the same opinions of the Chinese who lived in Vancouver.

156 The book also had a story of the Wylies encounter with burglars, the story does not have the same essentializing tone as the multiple stories dealing with crimes committed by Chinese Vancouverites.
These issues of "Chinese" immorality and the eradication of it coalesced into a direct problem for North shortly after the earthquake. On May 5, 1906, all three daily newspapers reported the findings of a grand jury that was empaneled over issues of police misconduct. Based on the evidence the prosecutors presented and their own perceptions of the conditions of Dupont Street, the jury could find no wrongdoing on the part of the VPD or negligence in the enforcement of prohibitions against gambling in Chinatown. Indeed, the jury believed that the VPD spent too much time and money raiding gambling dens at the expense of more important things such as assignation houses.\footnote{As to why the grand jury was empaneled I can find no report in the proceeding weeks as to why it was. But Grand Juries were routinely summoned at that time to investigate public problems and institutions Due to the in camera nature of grand juries the nature of evidence presented is unobtainable. "Pointers for Police," The Vancouver Daily World, May 5, 1906, accessed June 24, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/64391483; “Grand Jury Takes to Police to Task: Declares that Assignation Houses Exist,” Vancouver Daily Province, May 5, 1906.} These findings were contrary to the claims of moral reformers. The difference in opinions was presumably due to the evidence or lack thereof presented to the jury. Although this decision did not mean that the average citizen viewed Chinese gambling as acceptable, the grand jury understood the mandate of the VPD to enforce the law throughout the city and not just to enforce gambling laws on its Chinese residents. The\textit{Daily Province} also reported that the grand jury had investigated the reformers’ claims that the Chinese hospital was in a poor and unclean condition but, in fact, determined that the hospital, supported by private Chinese residents, was "scrupulously clean and reflects well on those having it in charge."\footnote{“Grand Jury Takes to Police to Task,” Vancouver Daily Province, May 5, 1906.} The allegation had been an attempt by reformers through pseudo-religious social science, which linked unclean physical depravity to moral depravity, to further mark Chinatown as a place of vice.\footnote{Valverde, The Age of Soap, Light and Water, 44-51.} Although the grand jury’s decision stopped a trial into supposed malfeasance from proceeding, reformers used the jury’s acknowledgement that gambling existed in Chinatown initiate the claim that North was incompetent.

A month after the grand jury, the Mayor, upset with the outcome, suspended North citing his supposed inefficiency:
June 5, 1906.

Samuel North, Chief of Police, Vancouver.

Dear Sir: - In view of the present inefficiency of your force, I beg to advise you that you will consider yourself under suspension until such time as the board of police commissioners shall take action in the matter.

You will, on receipt, place the force and station in the hands of your next senior Officer.

FREDERICK BUSCOMBE

The significant lack of detail regarding North’s purported inefficiencies was no coincidence. The *Daily Province* reported that the mayor might have dismissed North because of allegations of graft on the force. Because North was responsible for disciplining constables, and he had not done so adequately, Mayor Buscombe viewed North to be neglecting his duties.\(^{164}\) This was not the first rumbling of the mayor’s disappointment with the chief. The *Daily World* claimed that it was an “open secret” that the mayor, who operated a china and glass store during his administration, an active member of his Anglican church and was a former president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, had wanted to replace North with a “new incumbent for the important office” when he was elected in January of 1905.\(^{165}\) Keeping his exact reasons undisclosed made it impossible for North to argue against his suspension. Chief North told the *Province* “I can only say that it is the biggest kind of surprise to me. I have only tried to do what I thought was my duty. No man can do more.” The *Province* speculated that the suspension amounted to a direct dismissal of the chief with no potential for reinstatement.\(^{166}\)


\(^{164}\) “Chief North Suspended by Mayor Buscombe,” *The Vancouver Daily World*, Jun. 6, 1906.


Although North was suspended, the mayor had to convince the police commission that the suspension should be indefinite. At its next meeting the mayor defended himself. Alderman Heaps, a lumber manufacturer, and the provincial appointee to the police commission from the city council, supported the mayor as head of the police commission. Yet the alderman wanted a “definite statement” as to the mayor’s reasons, as North had held the position for several years and was a member of the VPD for close to sixteen years, Buscombe initially refused, “I’m not going to justify myself. I took action as mayor of this city. If the man wants an investigation he can have it.” When further questioned about his reasons by aldermen who had “heard” the city’s vice was comparable to that of any other city its size in Canada, the mayor chastised the aldermen for having “heard” these things rather than investigating and paying attention to the condition of their own city. Buscombe blamed these contrary views on the inexperience of the newly appointed commissioners and told them that their predecessors, Alderman Bethune and Commissioner Malcolm, had unanimously favoured a change. This previous attempt to remove North is intriguing as it would be under the Mayor Bethune (1907) that North’s successor resigned due to an overbearing police commission. The mayor wanted to act while exaggerations of purported Chinese vices gave reformers the support they wanted.

When the commissioners finally forced Mayor Buscombe to explain his decisions he could give only one explanation. “Gambling is rampant... Gambling in Chinatown is worse than it ever had been.” Buscombe refused to go into further detail about the different accusations made against North in regards to gambling “because from their nature they are hard to prove.” The mayor made one thing clear — his faith in the ability of the VPD: “It is up to the police to stop it [gambling], and I think they can stop it.”

167 Board of Police Commissioners Minutes, June 8, 1906.
170 Ibid.
His faith had just one caveat. The VPD could not stop the gambling in Chinatown under the supervision of Chief North. With this argument, the commissioners agreed to uphold the suspension for a one-month period, during which they would not actively look for North’s replacement until he resigned or petitioned for an investigation into the claims of inefficiency.

The mayor’s allegations of inefficiency were buttressed by allegations of corrupt VPD officers. During the one-month provisional suspension of Chief North, Mayor Buscombe gained more support from the police commission due to increased complaints about the integrity of the police force as a whole. The primary focus of these allegations was graft. At a meeting on June 11, Alderman Morton supported the mayor stating that “The force ‘had it in’ for certain individuals and let others go scot free.” However, there was no evidence to support this allegation. North’s temporary successor, Acting Chief Butler, suspended a jailer for supplying alcohol to a prisoner, but handed out no such dismissals or suspensions for graft. While these allegations were made against the character of the VPD as a whole, the mayor and his supporters avoided direct attacks on North’s character. They used these allegations against the force to prove North’s ineptitude.

Buscombe and North’s other opponents used the claim that Chinatown was rife with gambling and allegations of corruption within the force to reinforce their claim that the chief was incompetent. The mayor told the other commissioners that there were “34 gambling places, 11 lotteries and a large number of assignation houses” most of which were located in or near Chinatown. The reference to assignation houses, more commonly referred to as “houses of ill-fame” or brothels, implied that North’s inefficiency extended to all the moral corruption that purportedly happened in Chinatown. However, the commission meeting on June 12th kept its focus predominately on gambling. Alderman Angus Macdonald echoed Buscombe’s sentiment concerning the extent of

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gambling in Vancouver. “One could hear the chips and money rattle over his head almost everywhere in public places [of Chinatown]. The depraved classes have an easy snap of it here.” The commissioners agreed on the extent of Vancouver’s gambling problem. By focusing their allegations on gambling and on the chief’s apparent inaction on the matter, the reformers suggested that gambling should be a main priority of the VPD. The rhetoric used to support this notion further racialized and localized gambling as singularly caused by the Chinese in Chinatown. The two claims were almost paradoxical; the chief was incompetent because of rampant Chinese gambling; and gambling was rampant because of the chief’s incompetency.

Agreeing that gambling was rampant in the city, the commissioners disagreed on how to end it. The majority of the aldermen and commissioners believed that Chief North could have easily been cleared out Dupont Street. North. However, some members blamed the commission and the city for North’s apparent inefficiency. Alderman E.H. Heaps, a centrist voice in this discussion, told the commissioners that had the chief “known he would be backed up in his effort, would have possibly have removed all these (vices) some time ago.” Alderman Edward Odlum, a businessman, and a supporter of the British Israelite movement, said that both bodies had to go the whole way to clear the vice off Dupont Street. These statements show that the aldermen who did not support North’s suspension believed North was not solely responsible for the failings of the VPD in regards to gambling in Chinatown.

Other members of the city council, however, claimed that North’s inaction on gambling demonstrated his inability to command the force. Alderman John McMillan claimed that the chief had made a “serious error” in not pushing the bounds of the bylaws out of fear of public reaction to extralegal enforcement. Alderman McMillan was

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174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
typical of many of the reformers who complained about the VPD’s inaction. They believed that the police should have ignored bylaws and procedures to eradicate gambling from Chinatown. McMillan also supported Buscombe’s refusal to make specific charges against North, as the mayor and North would be tied to those exact claims, potentially “whitewashing” the results of any investigation and barring any other matter of importance. After McMillan made this statement the mayor expanded his allegations against Chief North without providing further detail. He declared “Dupont Street was one of the least of the evils he had in mind when he took his summary action.”177 At the close of the June 11 commission meeting, Mayor Buscombe again asked the commissioners why they did not fully support his actions. The previous year the entire twelve-member city council had favoured replacing North if a proper alternate could be secured. Only three members changed during the recent election, meaning Buscombe still had enough support on city council for his actions.178 Now that he had acted, the support of the commissioners was inadequate. The mayor, in an attempt to consolidate the political power of the city under the banner of reform by removing the chief, now had to regain the favour of the entire city council.

The last month of North’s suspension was filled with much speculation. It was still unclear how an investigation into his conduct would proceed. The Chief met with City Solicitor McEvoy to discuss this matter on June 14. Nevertheless, no specific charges were made against North. The commission proceeded with plans to “take up any evidence which was considered germane to the question of the efficiency or non-efficiency of the officer and the conduct of the department.”179 For the impending inquiry, North retained W.J. Bowser, K.C., soon to become the attorney general, to protect his interests.180 Bowser petitioned the commissioners for an open hearing and for specific

177 Vancouver Daily World, June 9, 1906.
180 Ibid.
charges to be laid against North so that they might prepare for the investigation.\textsuperscript{181} The next day Commissioner Boyd, a general contractor and the province’s non-councillor appointee to the commission, requested that the police commission hand the investigation over to a judge of the Supreme Court. North hoped that a transparent investigation would gain him public support. “I want the public to be fully acquainted with all that goes on, and then they may judge for themselves.”\textsuperscript{182} The commissioners were called together at their earliest convenience to discuss the matter as only the police commission could delegate the power to investigate the VPD.\textsuperscript{183} Although North hoped an investigation would begin as soon as June 19, the question of whether his investigation would occur continued for several weeks. During this time the mayor never provided the details of the allegations against North.

The pending investigation was not the only subject of speculation. On June 18 the \textit{Daily World} reported, based on an anonymous source, that individuals who represented the gambling interests of a certain Chinatown faction had approached an unnamed councillor with a single proposal: in return for using his influence as a councillor to have the VPD raid their opposition’s gambling houses, they provide funds for him in the mayoral campaign the next year.\textsuperscript{184} According to the \textit{Daily News-Advertiser}, the money would come in the form of cheques upon successful raids against their competitors. Having received a list of the establishments in question, the unidentified alderman, in the company of policemen, visited the addresses and discovered that gambling was in fact happening there. While consideration was given to arresting the bribers, no action was taken against the discovered gambling houses. Although there is no corroborating evidence to support the accusations of bribery, if it did take place it would demonstrate how some prominent Chinese businessmen, legitimate


\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

or otherwise, negotiated with government officials for leniency in enforcement and perception of Chinatown, as Lisa Rose Mar argues in *Brokering Belonging*. After a skilful elimination of other candidates, the *Daily World* speculated that the anonymous alderman was either Alderman Odulum or McMillan, who were on opposing sides of the suspension of Chief North. The newspaper suggested that the matter could be further investigated during the inquiry into North’s conduct.

Although North was eager to proceed with his investigation it was repeatedly delayed. The question of who would head the investigation was settled only after a vote of the police commission. Because of previous tensions between local and provincial authorities, and given that the provincial alterations to the city charter gave the police commission as much power to hold an investigation as a civil court, Heaps did not want to hand the investigation over to an outsider. However, the mayor believed that having suspended the chief for incompetence it was not his place to judge him. Thus, in a two against one vote, the commission accepted Boyd’s original request to hand the investigation over to the provincial government. However, the province now wanted to be paid to proceed with the investigation. The City Council deferred a decision about shouldering the financial burden of the investigation until its finance committee could consider it.

The same evening that the Council deferred a decision on financing the investigation, the police commissioners met to deliberate North’s suspension. Commissioner Boyd — the original dissenting voice regarding the suspension — was absent. Alderman Heaps, who had been sitting on the fence, now voted to approve the mayor’s indefinite suspension of Chief North. When North refused to resign, the commissioners dismissed him. North refused to resign, as it would be “taken by the

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188 *Ibid.*; *Vancouver Daily World*, June 18, 1906; See supra note 35-37 and accompanying text.
public as indication that he feared to face an investigation.” While waiting for a proper forum to voice his opposition to the reformers’ claims, North lost the opportunity to respond to them.

Like the dismissal of Stewart, North’s dismissal from the force temporarily shut down claims that the VPD was incompetent in its operations. However, unlike Stewart, North never had the opportunity to fully refute the reformers’ claims. Only after the appointment of Chisholm did North blatantly show contempt for the commission’s decisions: “I do not think I have been given a fair show and I don’t care who hears me say so. I want a full and free investigation… If I have done wrong let it be known, but why should I be condemned unheard.” Again North waited for the opportunity of an investigation before he would fully challenge the reformers’ claims. However, the matter of an investigation was not resolved until August 8 when the finance committee acknowledged the necessity of proceeding with North’s investigation, but concluded that the financial burden was not worth it.

When the finance committee refused to fund a provincial investigation for North, the matter of the investigation was brought back to the police commission, which struggled to reach a majority consensus. Alderman Heaps, who had already stated that it was the commission’s right to hold an investigation, was in favour of the police commission presiding over the investigation of North. Commissioner Boyd was wholly against an investigation led by the police commission if chaired by Mayor Buscombe. The mayor refrained from making any decision regarding North’s investigation. However, he defended his right to remain as chair of the police commission no matter what the situation. Because of Commissioner Boyd’s absolute refusal to subject North to an investigation headed by Buscombe, which he claimed would be a “hole and corner investigation,” the matter was unresolved and North was denied an investigation.

191 Ibid.
Although the provincial government’s changes were meant to depoliticize the commission, the single non-elected official, in this case Commissioner Boyd, by trying to save North from being railroaded caused more divisiveness and kept the actions of the commission politicized.

As is evident from Chief North’s removal from the VPD, the reformers’ allegation of incompetence avoided direct attacks on North’s character and made his dismissal more easily obtained in a much shorter time. Using the police commission’s discretionary power to dismiss North meant that the mayor needed the support of only one other commissioner to remove the chief. The lack of an investigation effectively muted the opposition to the reformers’ claims. By elaborating on the supposed vastness of vice on Dupont Street, specifically the apparently numerous gambling houses in Chinatown, the commission and council decided that the VPD was not efficiently eradicating the problem. Removing the police chief for alleged inefficiency in cleaning up Chinese gambling further entrenched the purported vice and immorality of Chinatown in the minds of Vancouverites by centering the claims of ineptitude and inaction solely in response to the gambling there.

During the meeting on July 5, after the commission had settled the matter of North’s indefinite suspension, Alderman Heaps moved to confirm Colin Chisholm, the former superintendent of the London metropolitan police, as acting chief. Buscombe seconded the motion. Chisholm’s permanent appointment was tabled for later. The commission believed Chisholm was an adequate interim chief until another could be found to assume the mantle of chief. During the discussion of the hypothetical succession the previous year the only complaint against Chisholm was 60 years old, but this was easily countered by his extensive service in London’s Metropolitan Force, which assuaged the concerns of the majority of the commission and council. Chief Chisholm was extraordinarily qualified for the position; however, even his long resume of experience could not keep him in his position for long. Before joining the VPD, Chisholm had worked for the London Metropolitan police force since 1868, serving in districts

\[194 \text{Ibid. The } \textit{News-Advertiser} \text{ stated that the job was offered to other candidates but they turned it down. } \textit{“Chief North Dismissed,” Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, July 5, 1906.}\]
throughout the city, the most important of which, according to the *Daily World*, was Pimlico because of the district's "fashionable houses of vice," which gave Chisholm considerable experience in dealing with such matters. Chisholm eventually rose to the rank of superintendent, which he held for ten years. He resigned in 1899, came to North America in 1901. The *Daily World* described the new Chief as well mannered, neither vulgar nor bullying, and with promising administrative and executive ability. The commissioners’ move to replace North before the investigation shows that the reformers had become more direct in consolidating their political power by procedural methods rather than waiting to turn public support in their favour in drawn out investigations.

Under Chisholm the reformers’ claims of rampant gambling in Chinatown reappeared. A month after Chisholm’s instatement, he had still not addressed the primary failings of the VPD under North. On August 1, the *Daily World* received a statement from a “man in a peculiarly good position to know whereof he speaks,” saying that the Chinatown gamblers did not expect interference from the VPD. With multiple sources confirming the status of Chinatown, the *Daily World* reported that there had been more gambling out in the open there than in previous months and even years. This information shocked the *Daily World*, which understood the failure to prosecute Chinese gambling was the principal shortcoming of North. More perplexing to the *Daily World* was the extensive evidence provided by Mayor Buscombe, the *Daily World*, and other contemporary newspapers of gambling in Chinatown. Under Chief Chisholm the police did not prosecute a gambling charge until just prior to the start of his third month as chief on August 28.

Although the increase of gambling in Chinatown and the failure of the VPD and police courts to prosecute was startling, more startling still was the allegedly changing nature of the gamblers themselves. Circumstantial stories emerged that certain Chinatown gaming establishments had fallen victim to fraudulent protection schemes. A

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Chinese Vancouverite told the establishments that he had established connections with the VPD because he had previously worked for a well-known police official. He promised that they too could benefit from his connection for a sum of money. However, it was believed that the money never made it further than that man’s pockets.\textsuperscript{198} The success, while short-lived, of this con artist reveals that it was not outrageous for Chinese gamblers to think that one of their fellow ex-patriots might have the police bought. On August 11, the \textit{Daily World} published a short exposé that revealed the expansion of gambling in Chinatown once the gambling interests were emboldened by North’s suspension, most likely believing that his new counterpart could do no better at cracking down on their gambling. Previously the games had been restricted to “ten-cent” chuck-a-luck games.\textsuperscript{199} Poker games were non-existent and almost all gaming houses turned away white men and boys. Yet Chisholm was slow to investigate accusations of gambling. Chinese gamblers realized they had nothing to fear from him and began to open up their games completely. Now anyone could walk into a gaming house and buy lottery tickets or lay down any size of bet, from ten cents to one hundred dollars. White loggers, described by the \textit{Daily World} as “soft things,” who thought they knew the game and that chance was in their favour, lost an average of five to fifty dollars in one sitting.\textsuperscript{200} While the expose found the white gambling in Chinatown to be questionable, it was more infuriated that the Chinatown gamekeepers took advantage of 14-year-olds in the chuck-a-luck games.\textsuperscript{201} This reported increase in gambling suggests that although North did not eradicate the gambling, his presence appears to have limited its growth.

\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{199} Chuck-a-luck, with variants also known as sic bo (骰寶), tai sai (大細), and dai sui (大小) in Cantonese, was a game of chance played with three dice. With 216 potential outcomes, players placed bets on certain pairings of the dice such as: three of a kind, two of a kind, small (sum of the dice is 4,5,6,7,8,9,10 excluding three of a kind), big (sum of the dice is 11,12,13,14,15,16,17 excluding three of a kind), duo (a specific pairing of numbers that are not the same), or one of a kind (guessing just one number that would appear). The dealer would shake the dice in a cage and release them onto the playing table. “Rules and Strategies for Playing Sic Bo,” Let’s Talk Winning, accessed October 11, 2016, \url{http://www.letstalkwinning.com/Sic-Bo.htm},


\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Ibid.}
The diversification of the gamers is evident in the first gambling arrest under Chief Chisholm. On August 27, a plain clothed officer entered a gaming house on Markey alley between Columbia and Westminster Avenues.202 The officer joined a game of blackjack and played for two hours before he returned to the police station for backup. When the police arrived, the game was still in progress and they arrested the establishment’s “inmates.” Those arrested were Joe Wong Joe, Lee Gen, Harvey Scurry, George Dupee, Joe Collen, and J.H. Cooper. Of these six men, two were Chinese, two were black, and two were white.203 Because this was the first gambling arrest since Chisholm took over, the Daily World flippantly reported that when the defendants appeared in court the next morning, the charge laid against them was “the unaccustomed word ‘gambling.’”204

Youth gambling remained a concern of the city and an apparent weakness of Chief Chisholm for several months. A letter from a father published by the Daily World on September 12 blamed the recent misbehaviour of his son on the open gambling on Dupont Street.205 His son would steal money from him and his wife, and spend it on a card machine at a cigar shop.206 The Daily World “condemn[ed] this place and others of its ilk to Chief Chisholm.” While it acknowledged that the chief probably never knew of these places himself, it reminded him “that he has officers. Someone is responsible.”207 In response to this exposé, Chisholm told the Daily World that he had received two more


203 Ibid.

204 No punishments were reported concerning this gambling raid, only that the defendants appeared in court: Ibid.

205 The original letter said that the cigar shop was on Pender Street, however, Dupont Street had not yet been officially renamed Pender Street. The Daily Province also refers to the street as Pender. Although the father calls it Pender Street on September 12, the Daily World referred to the same street on October 26 under its original name of Dupont; Vancouver Daily Province, September 10, 1906, pp1; Vancouver Daily World, September 12, 1906; “‘Coffin Nails’ Sold to Boy,” Vancouver Daily World, October 26, 1906, accessed May 10, 2016, https://www.newspapers.com/image/68843379.


207 Vancouver Daily World, September 12, 1906.
anonymous letters that confirmed the printed letter, this time from mothers. He noted that while the writing appeared effeminate and elegant, their hand showed them to be from a respectable household. While Richard White observed that middle class Protestant women made up of most of the reformers, Chisholm’s attention to the elements of class and gender allude to how some of these women, barred from public office by their gender and property qualifications, attempted to affect change by writing to the police and city council. These women endeavouring to consolidate their own identity and community, marked Chinatown as a racialized place of vice that was harmful to Vancouver’s white youth specifically their middle and upper class youth.208

Chisholm’s response to youth gambling and vice in general was that parents should implement a respectable curfew for their children and forbid ventures into certain areas, namely Chinatown. The VPD dealt with dozens of cases of teen vagrancy every week, but the newspapers seldom reported on them. Chief Chisholm, however, tried to reassure the city that “wherever evidence can be secured action will at once be taken.”209 However, Vancouverites saw Chisholm’s department as ineffectual in its handling of Vancouver’s youth. The Province reported that he had failed to find a young boy who had run away, and it was only because of the Seattle police that the boy was returned to his parents.210 Although Chisholm probably failed in returning the boy to his parents because the child had already fled to Seattle, the newspaper still criticised him. This slow response to the alleged gambling problem reintroduced the allegation that the VPD operations were being mishandled.

Although he promised to act whenever he had the necessary evidence to secure an arrest, the lack of arrests caused significant problems for Chief Chisholm. Reformers on and off the city council became frustrated with the evidentiary criteria for arrests. Chief Chisholm pressed charges against two Chinese men accused of selling whiskey, although he knew that there was not enough evidence to sustain the charges. He did this out of annoyance with H.H. Stevens, a businessmen and secretary of the Moral

208 White, “It’s Your Own Misfortune and None of My Own,” 305-307; See supra note 5-9 and accompanying text.
210 “Dupont Street Women Called to Court,” Vancouver Daily Province, October 30, 1906.
The chief was originally called to the stand as a witness for the defense and told the court how he went to that particular establishment on Steven’s report that liquor was being sold there. Upon inspection, he found nothing except a few items of gambling paraphernalia. When the prosecution asked the chief why he pressed charges, Chisholm said that he pressed charges to satisfy Stevens who had recently “reflected” on police matters in an attempt to become “popular through the newspapers.” By pressing charges, Chief Chisholm had challenged Stevens’ charges. The defense used these remarks against Stevens when he was called to the stand and destroyed his credibility as a witness due to his lack of qualifications as a detective. In response, Stevens complained that the he had never been consulted as to what evidence he would actually have to provide. To the disappointment of the Moral Reform Association and others who lambasted Chisholm and the VPD in the newspapers, the reformer’s testimony was dismissed as hearsay. Although Chisholm’s understanding of the requirements of the law proved anything but incompetency, the reformers used the lack of arrests to allege otherwise.

While the Moral Reform Association regularly used the newspapers to question Chisholm’s apparent inaction, the city’s aldermen used the police commission to force him to answer their questions. Chisholm, however, answered these questions with essentially the same answer every time: the police could not act on every whisper of wrongdoing. In October 1906, Alderman T.W. Jeffs, a physician, acting coroner for the VPD, and a prominent member of the Presbyterian community, summoned the chief to

211 Stevens would go into federal politics, elected to the House of Commons in 1911 and serving as Minister of Trade and Commerce, as well as Minister of Customs and Excise during the Meighen administration. Richard Wilbur, H.H. Stevens, 1878-1973, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
212 Stevens’ newspaper coverage seems to be limited to the Daily World. I found no articles covering Steven’s claims or letters from the Moral Reform Association in the Province.
214 Ibid. Stevens recounted a different and unverifiable account of his interactions with the VPD in his interview with Richard Wilbur, for his biography. Stevens claimed that he personally had the chief removed after he lodged a complaint. While he worked for a grocer in 1903 he caught two of his cashiers stealing money, which they planned to use to pay back their Chinese gambling debts. He claimed that he lodged the complaint that had either North or Chisholm removed from office, after the chief refused to investigate the gambling. Richard Wilbur, H.H. Stevens, 4-10.
discuss why the VPD had taken no action in response to recent matters brought before them. After hearing reports that children were able to buy cigarettes on Dupont Street, the Alderman brought an officer and a ten-year-old boy to Chinatown and had the child go into different shops to buy the cigarettes. The boy successfully bought the cigarettes from three Chinese establishments. The officer labeled the cartons and took them to the station, but the department took no further action. Jeffs was disheartened that after he had put so much effort into the matter, nothing occurred. The chief's only reply was that he recalled a conversation a week previously and would have to have the matter looked into further. However, the police were limited in their power, because the boy who had procured the cigarettes was not Jeffs’ own son. The Daily World did not explain how the VPD was limited in acting on the information. Presumably the integrity of the evidence collected would be called into question during a trial because Jeffs’ own testimony would be based on the boy’s report making it hearsay and non-admissible as evidence.

When Jeffs turned his inquiry to other current matters, he began to understand that the circumstantial evidence that he and other reformers provided lacked credibility in court. When asked how many brothels there were on Dupont Street, the chief responded and told the alderman that there might have been a few, but they were running quietly. When asked why the VPD had not shut down these places, Chisholm responded, “It had been tried time and time again and had failed.” The charges were never sustained. Jeffs found his response baffling given that he had seen a “dozen hacks drive up to one house in half an hour.” The chief told him that he had never seen such a commotion at night; the houses were always dark. When Jeffs later recounted his experience with gambling in Chinatown, having been into several of the establishments to act as a doctor, he described them as operating blatantly, openly and without fear. The chief extended him a professional courtesy and told him that he would involve the alderman in any investigation that stemmed from his reports, but he made it clear that action could not be immediately taken against those gambling houses. On October 30, 1906, twenty-three women were charged with vagrancy, but Chisholm was still doubted his legal ability to fully clear the district. As fourteen women legally owned houses in the

216 Ibid.
district, he did not believe that any action could be legally taken as “they have as much right to live in their own homes as you or I,” he told the Province.\(^\text{217}\)

Although Chief Chisholm followed the appropriate legal procedure for planning raids and making arrests, it did not gain him favour with those who sought to clean out Chinatown. At a city council meeting Jeffs affirmed his dislike of the chief. “Chief North had been dismissed for alleged incompetency and a new man put in his place and now the town was a great deal worse than it was.”\(^\text{218}\) Given that the failure to adequately address gambling was the primary complaint laid against North, Jeffs was likely drawing parallels between the two chiefs rather than reminiscing about North’s chiefdom. In response to Chisholm’s treatment of the Moral Reform Association secretary, the Association’s executive board spoke out against the chief. In regards to gambling they believed Chisholm’s administration had failed “relative to the enforcement of our laws in the interest of the peace of our homes, the safeguarding of our boys and girls, and the moral cleanliness of the city at large.”\(^\text{219}\) Even the Daily World recognized this as the start of a fight between the Moral Reform Association and the chief of police.\(^\text{220}\) Creating two powerful enemies, the police commission and the association, over the same issue that caused his predecessor’s dismissal proved fatal to Chisholm’s own career.

Although no investigation gave Chisholm the opportunity to oppose the claims of the reformers, he enjoyed making things difficult for them. The schism between Chisholm, on the one hand, and the Moral Reform Association and the police commission, on the other, reached its climax in the following year, 1907. For the most part the newspapers had nothing to report concerning Chief Chisholm during November

\(^{217}\) “Dupont Street Women Called to Court,” Vancouver Daily Province, Oct. 30, 1906.

\(^{218}\) Ibid.


\(^{220}\) At this time, I cannot find any definitive information on the Vancouver Moral Reform Association. I have contacted the City of Vancouver Archives for additional information. Ibid.
and December 1906.\footnote{There were Halloween pranks which he dealt with, as well as a few changes to the composition of the force; “Small Boys Observe Ancient Mysteries,” \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, November 1, 1906, accessed June 5, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/image/68843475}; “Butler to Have his Investigation,” \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, November 7, 1906, accessed June 5, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/image/68843585}.} Then, the \textit{Province}, on Saturday, January 12, 1907, reported that Chisholm had submitted his resignation after only six months and ten days in the position. He was leaving both the office and British Columbia.\footnote{“Chief Chisholm will Resign on Monday,” \textit{Vancouver Daily Province} January 12, 1907.} None of this was true. The next Monday the \textit{Province} corrected its report and said that they had fallen victim to the “Foxy Grandpa of the Police Department.” Chisholm played a joke on the entire city thinking “it might soothe the Moral Reform Association if they knew that Colin Chisholm was going to relinquish office.” He stated, “I am going to stay here till they put me out.”\footnote{“Chief Chisholm will Resign on Monday,” \textit{Vancouver Daily Province} January 12, 1907; “Chief Flatly Denies the Story,” \textit{Vancouver Daily World}, January 14, 1907, accessed May 10, 2016, \url{https://www.newspapers.com/image/63078680}.}

However unreliable the report was, the \textit{Province} went into detail about the chief’s career on both continents, and even named a potential replacement from Toronto.\footnote{“Chief Chisholm has Changed his Mind,” \textit{Vancouver Daily Province} January 14, 1907.} The \textit{Daily World} attributed the “hot air story” to the uninformed and libellous nature of the \textit{Province}’s reporting, which reveals the deep competition between the two newspapers. Although Chisholm’s wiliness displayed a very real opposition to the moral reformers’ tactics, he never directly countered the claim that gambling was rampant.

In February, reformers escalated their attempts to force Chisholm to enforce gambling laws. At a city council meeting in mid-February, the council moved that the police commission be recommended to ensure “the laws of Canada and the by-laws of this city be enforced affecting prostitution, gambling, and the sale of liquor…”\footnote{“The City,” \textit{Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser}, February 19, 1907.} Later that month the \textit{Daily World}’s editor refused to print a letter from the Moral Reform Association’s own H.H. Stevens. Sarah McLagan, owner and editor of the \textit{Daily World}, explained that while the paper was more than willing to print letters founded on his own experiences, his most recent attacks on the chief had no clear foundation, that is to say they were complete hearsay, and their accuracy was subject to question. “There are times when a newspaper must open its columns to the discussion of this unsavoury
subject, but we are of the opinion that this is not one of them." 226 The editor believed that all that could be said on the subject of Stevens’ accusations had already been said at the city council.

While the Moral Reform Association and their contemporaries on the city council questioned Chief Chisholm’s ability to lead, the Daily World showed that many in the city were happy with the chief’s operation of the VPD. In February, Alderman Ramsay spoke out against the chief’s management of Chinatown, the newspapers reported that the chief had actually taken swift action on all of the alderman’s recommendations. Within twenty-four hours of his suggestions, only one red light remained in the district above a pawnshop frequented exclusively by a white clientele. Chisholm also permanently positioned an officer on the Shanghai Alley and Canton Street beat. The officer’s main duty was to stop any solicitation and to keep young boys prone to gambling out of the district. 227 This tactic was contrary to Chisholm’s personal opinion that Chinatown should operate as a restricted district under close supervision. Even though the reformers’ rhetoric portrayed him as incompetent, Chisholm followed their directions thoroughly.

However, both Stevens and Chisholm’s own records contradict this account. Stevens responded to the Province’s account of Ramsay’s treatment of Chisholm in the February meeting. In a letter to the editor, Steven’s said that the account was untrue and reflected poorly on Ramsay. Stevens was confused by Chisholm’s claim that the red lights had been taken down. According to him when he visited, the street there was nothing but a red hue. He believed that the chief’s orders had been either disobeyed or disregarded completely. The only mention of Chinatown in Chisholm’s personal Order Book was that the Province’s paperboys had been harassing some of the Chinese inhabitants. If caught, the boys were to be charged with disorderly conduct. Although the city council’s orders were often contrary to his personal beliefs, the chief stated that his personal views “do not and will not in any way effect the carrying out of any orders that

may be given to him by the police commission.” This position stands as evidence of his willingness to follow the order of the police commission.

The March 5, 1907, meeting of the police commission brought Chisholm into direct conflict with Alderman Jeffs and, by extension, the Moral Reform Association. It was the first meeting of the newly appointed police commission. Alderman Jeffs, the newest commissioner, took the opportunity to berate Chisholm on his management of Chinatown. Jeffs reread a letter from the Moral Reform Association, which the Daily World reported had nothing “new or notable” to say, but it showed that Jeffs had strong ties to the Moral Reform Association and not just to his reformer friend Stevens. Jeffs believed that Chinatown could easily be cleared of vice. Chisholm responded by noting the failed attempts worldwide in trying to clear out such purported immorality. Irritated, the chief sarcastically opined that Mr. Stevens, who had written the letter, “might be able to do what is necessary.” Immediately, Jeffs called the chief out for personally attacking one of his dear friends, further revealing the close ties between Jeffs and the Moral Reform Association. The Daily World wrote that a quarrel between the two men had been going on for quite some time, ending with Jeffs’ attempt to show dominance by reminding Chisholm “that he was there to carry out the instructions which might be given him by the commission.” Although Chisholm responded that he would do his duty, he reminded the commission that the VPD did not have adequate resources to carry out large operations. Alderman Jeffs dramatically changed the composition and sentiment of the police commission, making a workable relationship between the commission and Chisholm impossible.

Although there were no formal attempts to suspend Chisholm, the recent appointment of Jeffs to the police commission, along with the commission’s long history of alleging incompetency proved too much for Chief Chisholm. He submitted a letter of resignation to the mayor eleven days after the first meeting of the new commissioners,

228 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
on March 18, 1907. The newly elected Mayor Bethune, however, kept his resignation secret. The news of Chief Chisholm’s resignation broke only on April 6. When Chisholm was finally questioned about his resignation he told The Daily World:

> My reasons? Well, simply that I refuse to be pestered and bothered by irresponsible so-called moral reformers. Besides, I know and I suppose you do, that Commissioner Jeffs was appointed on the board for the express purpose of making things uncomfortable for me, and I refuse to serve under such conditions. I have nothing but good to say of the other commissioners and of last year's board and nothing but the kindliest feelings toward them.  

The Moral Reform Association’s influence on the commission through Jeffs would have meant a string of endless accusations against Chisholm’s ability to deal properly with the supposed immoral Chinatown. Supporters of Chisholm also saw the recent change to the city council as troubling as well. In a letter to the editor of the Daily World, C. Wentworth Sarel commended the chief for having vigorously reorganized and restructured the VPD. He saw the commission as a hindrance to the chief’s true ability as leader of the VPD. “Because his religion and nationality are not that of some narrow-minded creatures who dwell among us, he has been hampered in his work and beset with difficulties at every turn.” The reference to Chisholm’s Catholicism is no coincidence. During the largely Protestant moral reform movement, the two religions were often at odds with each other because of the Catholics’ tendency to rely on religious laws to curb vice rather than advocating for secular legalisation against it. Like Chisholm, some Vancouver residents saw the moral reformers as irresponsible and disrupting the true work of the VPD.

Although Chisholm believed that Alderman Jeffs was the primary cause of the agitation against him, the months following his resignation letter showed that a much larger group caused his resignation. Chisholm gave his effective resignation date as

233 Morton, At Odds, 129-133.
June 1 in order to give the commission time to find a suitable replacement. When the commissioners met to accept the chief's resignation, they exchanged pleasantries regarding Chisholm’s service. Although alderman Heaps stated that a significant number of Vancouverites were thoroughly dissatisfied with his operation of the VPD, Heaps thought this was wrong but he did not want to “bind himself to the fact.” Heaps’ statement shows support only on the surface, allowing himself room to distance himself from the chief if need be. Furthermore, Alderman Heaps revealed that he had already travelled to Ottawa to meet Chisholm’s replacement, Inspector R.G. Chamberlain. Chamberlain apparently knew of the vacancy while the resignation was still supposed to be secret, but refused to reveal who told him this. The Daily World automatically suspected that the new mayor or Alderman Jeffs had told him or others. They commissioners moved that they send a formal letter notifying Chamberlain of his appointment.

The list of Chisholm’s opponents lengthened after his resignation took effect. On June 4 the commissioners awarded Chisholm an honorarium of $150 for his work as chief of police. Chisholm thanked the board and told them it was nice to find “that his services were appreciated at headquarters even if others considered him unworthy.” When the city council met the following week, there was much disapproval of the honorarium. Alderman Heaps’ flimsy support of the ex-chief again appeared when he told the council that the honorarium was gesture of thanks to Chisholm for taking “the position when the force was in bad shape and when they could get no one else to fill the gap.” The honorarium, in his opinion, was not for the work that Chisholm had actually done in his capacity as chief, but just for taking up the position. Alderman Bird felt that

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234 “Mayor Has Received Notice,” Vancouver Daily World, April 6, 1907; “Resignation of Chief of Police,” Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, May 7, 1907.
235 Board of Police Commissioners Minutes, April 10, 1907.
236 Vancouver Daily World, April 6, 1907.
237 Board of Police Commissioners Minutes, April 10, 1907; Vancouver Daily News-Advertiser, May 7, 1907.
238 Board of Police Commissioners Minutes, June 4, 1907.
the only good thing the ex-chief had done was to suppress information from reaching the press. Alderman McDonald resented Chisholm for letting "scarlet women" settle on Harris Street. Alderman Ramsay saw the whole affair as duplicitous. “The commissioners apparently could not get the ex-chief to carry out their orders and they got rid of him and now it was rank hypocrisy to give him this solatium.” Ramsay’s objection is evidence of the combined effort of the police commission to have Chisholm removed from his position. Although most members opposed the honorarium, the city solicitor advised the award of an honorarium was within the powers of the police commission, forcing the city council to ratify the police commissions’ actions.

Like North, Chisholm was forced to resign because of the relentless attacks on his inability to deal with the supposed vices of Chinatown. Although the Moral Reform Association and various Aldermen tried to secure evidence to help the VPD secure convictions against immoral Chinatown inhabitants, Chisholm would not make arrests when he knew he could not get convictions. Changing their tactics, reformers on the city council secured a seat on the police commission and attempted to force the chief to do their bidding. The police commission attempted to micro-manage the VPD’s efforts because it believed the chief to be incompetent. However, because of his professional work ethic, the commissioners forced him to carry out their wishes, often interfering with what Chisholm believed to be other important work. This standoff could not last forever, and Chisholm resigned rather than operate in constant opposition to his superiors. Except for Chief Ward, Chisholm was the only VPD chief in this era to resign without threat of an investigation into malfeasance.

Unlike Chiefs McLaren and Stewart, who were forced to resign due to rumours of corruption, the characters of Chief North and Chief Chisholm remained untarnished. The police commissioners centered their allegations on their incompetency, which avoided lengthy investigations and litigation. By claiming incompetence, investigations were not required even though any member of the force accused of wrongdoing could request them. Earlier investigations were used as fishing expeditions in attempts to find justifications for each chief’s dismissal, provided for the chiefs to directly oppose the

241 “Ex-Chief Chisholm was Given an Honorarium,” *Vancouver Daily World*, June 5, 1907.
reformers’ claims. Claims of incompetency, however, whether or not they were well founded, were enough to remove chiefs from their position on the VPD. Additionally, because the commissioners and council members made vague statements about the chiefs’ inability to clean up Chinatown, the chiefs, despite their many attempts, could never fully defend themselves against the vague claims made against them. This effectively suppressed opposition to the reformers. Despite the restructuring of the police commission by the provincial government, the Protestant businessmen and professionals who the government appointed to the commission were still reformers and they polarized the issue of the VPD’s enforcement of gambling bylaws in Chinatown. These men perceived the VPD’s mandate not as rooted in law but in the need to protect white men, women, and children from the corrupting influence of Chinese Vancouverites. The reformers’ singular focus on Chinese gamblers rather than on the white men who gambled with them, as well as the reformers’ inability to provide substantial evidence of other criminal activity in the city indicates that these allegations of incompetence only referred to the lack of enforcing vice prohibitions, specifically gambling.\footnote{See supra note 225-233 and accompanying text.}
Chapter 4.

Epilogue

“I would like to ask you about the Chinese as residents. Have the Police much trouble with them?” asked Mr. King.

“We have had great trouble the last six months,” Mr. Chamberlain replied with vigor. “The Chinese have got it into their heads that they can run gambling houses, something which is in violation of our laws. We have made several raids and the matter has become serious in my mind. I have lots of complaints from a great many people of their boys (white boys) spending their week’s wages down there... I estimate that each of these houses at a very reasonable estimate will take in $100 a day. There are $5000 a day going into these houses from the white people of Vancouver.”  

This excerpt from the *Daily World* comes from an examination of Chief Chamberlain by Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour who would become the tenth prime minister of Canada.244 King was investigating the claims of Chinatown businesses and inhabitants for property damage during the September 1907 race riots. This riot followed an Asiatic Exclusion League rally in Vancouver’s city hall.245 Chamberlain’s immediate response to King’s question about the behaviour of Chinese

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244 R.J. Chamberlain was appointed Chief of the VPD on June 1, 1907 after Chisholm resigned; see supra note 221 and accompanying text.

245 According to Inspector Mulhern, Chinatown suffered three times that amount of damage that Japantown did. For more on Mackenzie King and how he made his political career after the 1907 Vancouver race riots see John Price, “‘Orienting’ the Empire: Mackenzie King and the Aftermath of the 1907 Race Riots,” *BC Studies* Vol. 178 (Summer 2013), 53-81; Julie F. Gilmour, *Trouble on Main Street: Mackenzie King, Reason, Race, and the 1907 Vancouver Riots*, (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014), 1-60.
clearly indicates that the chief and, by extension, the VPD saw gambling as the problem associated with the Chinese. When King asked Chamberlain if there were any other issues besides gambling the chief replied, “Not very much; they are not more troublesome than any other class of community.” Chamberlain did acknowledge, however, that without the help of the Chinese community, the VPD would have never caught some of the Chinese charged with more serious crimes such as shooting an officer. Chamberlain agreed with the reformers on the city council that gambling in Chinatown posed an immediate threat to the livelihoods and morality of Vancouver’s white citizens. Finally, after a 21-year-long process of trying to bring the VPD to acquiescence, the city’s police commission realized their reform goal with the appointment of Chief Chamberlain.

The appointment of Chamberlain was a critical juncture that had helped the reformers gain more power over the VPD’s operations. With the support of the entire commission Chamberlain’s appointment as chief proceeded with relative ease. Just three days after taking office, Chamberlain presented several recommendations to the police commission concerning hiring, purchasing three bicycles for the department, and uniform changes for the summer heat, many of which the commission accepted. This was unusual as the commissioners were unaccustomed to quickly accepting recommendations from the chiefs and normally resisted proposals for expansion, which was one of the reasons that led both Chief Ward and Chisholm to resign. This new willingness to support VPD expansion stemmed from a change in mayors, as Buscombe had run a campaign centered on financial accountability. Additionally the increase in VPD funding was out of necessity to meet the needs of a growing population (see appendix Table II). Within his first six months as chief of police, Chamberlain’s VPD conducted ten gambling raids in Chinatown that led to 89 arrests, fourteen of which led


248 See supra note 90-91, 216-217 and accompanying text.

to jail time. The increase in Chinese gambling arrests was exactly what the reformers on the city council desired and Chamberlain was more than willing to oblige.

In 1908 the *Daily World* proclaimed, “Vancouver has in Chief Chamberlain the man she has been looking for as head of the police department is shown by the attitude he is taking now.” The attitude to which the newspaper referred was his bold position on Chinatown. On April 17, 1908, Chamberlain told the *Daily World*, “I am going to clean the gambling out if I have to tear Chinatown to pieces.” Yet the department’s increased raids had resulted in the arrests of mostly white men in those Chinese gambling establishments. The chief was astonished that many of these men had destitute families, yet they were gambling away their money. Although Chamberlain despised gambling and was keen to arrest all individuals in gaming houses, including the white gamblers, the chief saw the root of the problem as specifically a Chinese one. He argued that a restricted district was not an effective solution because of the imminent danger Chinese gambling posed to white patrons, specifically white youths. His beliefs aligned with those of the reformers who had fought for twenty-one years to address these supposed Chinese problems.

The VPD’s growth under Chief Chamberlain shows the overwhelming support of the reformers on the police commission gave the like-minded chief. The six-member

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police force of 1886 had grown to sixty-two officers by the time that Chamberlain took control of the VPD in 1907. 253 Within three and a half years Chamberlain enlarged the force to a total strength of 202 to match the needs of Vancouver’s growing population. 254 The chief introduced several new positions such as a deputy chief, inspectors, and detectives. 255 Chamberlain drilled and disciplined a large force that consisted of “[a] chief constable, deputy chief constable, chief inspector, two inspectors, one station sergeant, twelve patrol sergeants, inspector of the detectives, sergeant of detectives, eight detectives, 154 constables, police court clerk, police court stenographer, assistant police court clerk, four clerks, four tailors, two patrol drivers, two ambulance drivers, auto driver, two stablemen, police surgeon, and matron.” 256 These new positions and increased size improved the VPD’s ability to enforce prohibitions against vice in Chinatown, specifically gambling. Without a deputy chief, the chief, under the criminal code, had to execute all warrants to raid Chinese gambling houses. With the appointment of Charles Mulhern as deputy chief, Chamberlain no longer had to be present at these raids. 257 Chamberlain even sought to commission the building of a larger jail. 258 Previous chiefs had struggled against the police commission to secure more resources and men. The relative ease with which Chamberlain secured additional men and resources suggests that the police commission, with Vancouver beginning to enjoy a great prosperity, was more willing to fund the VPD now that it was in alignment with the reformers. 259

253 Gilmour, 19.
258 Ibid.
259 Presumably even if the early chiefs, excluding Ward, had received additional funding they would not have heavily policed Chinatown, because they believed in maintaining a restricted district. The chiefs saw heavy crackdowns as a waste of resources in worldwide losing battle against vice. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
However, even after the reformers finally appointed a “tough on (Chinatown) crime” chief, their effect on the VPD was not permanent. According to historian Greg Marquis, on November 11, 1911, Chamberlain asked the police commission for guidance on enforcing prohibitions against Chinese gambling because the “board’s confidential instructions” were that “the detectives were told to hit the gambling halls ‘a few times’ each month, ‘but not drop any other work for this purpose’.” By 1912, reformers no longer spearheaded the police commission; the head of the commission, Mayor L.D. Taylor, was well known to have favoured a restricted district for most vice, something entirely opposed by Chief Chamberlain. Speaking about prostitution on Alexander Street and the intentions of the police commission on December 5, 1912, Chamberlain declared, “They still stood for a segregated area as they always had and that they never intended to clean out Alexander Street…. That they intended to allow the girls to go back to Alexander Street.” This unprecedented acceptance of creating restricted districts within Vancouver for both gambling and prostitution shows a dynamic shift in the composition of the police commission, reformers no longer having a seat on the commission. By January 1913, ex-Chief Chamberlain had joined the Canadian Pacific Railway’s police force, and Charles Mulhern took his place as chief.

Although the reformers had temporarily lost power on the police commission, the strength of their claims did not falter, and neither did the VPD’s commitment to policing Chinatown. Chamberlain’s departure did not end the VPD’s commitment to clean up vice in Chinatown. Mulhern led the force and “declared that it was his intention to wipe out all

262 “Cat Refuses to be Put in the Bag Again,” Vancouver Daily World, December 5, 1912.
the Chinese gambling resorts and that no mercy would be shown.”264 However, he served for only a few months before succumbing to “swelling of the brain” and died on January 3, 1914.265 Although the police commission was no longer forcing the issue of gambling enforcement on the VPD, Mulhern’s force had closed down numerous gambling houses during his short administration, showing a continuation of the reformers’ past influence on the VPD.266

With the appointment of another new chief, the VPD was still committed to the reform agenda, into the claims that Chinatown was rife with gambling. The commission appointed Mulhern’s Deputy Chief M.B. McLennan as the new chief constable on January 1, 1914. He served until March 20, 1917, when a drug user, who injured several other officers, killed him in the line of duty.267 By the time McLennan was appointed chief, reformers were once again on the commission and both the VPD and the police commission were focused on eradicating Chinese gambling. They met to discuss ways to crack down on Chinese gambling in the face of new tactics supposedly used by Chinese businessmen to establish gambling houses “under the protection of charters obtained under the Benevolent Societies Act for clubs... where they can defy the gambling laws of Canada and evade punishment.”268 It is unclear which benevolent societies or tong associations the commissioners were referring to; however, the commissions’ concern was most likely a persistent apprehension over games between

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fraternal members. Although the law prevented the VPD from raiding these establishments, the chief as well as the commissioners were “very anxious to have these evils eradicated.”

The commitment of the VPD to enforce gambling laws and crack down on other vice continued until 1928. By 1931 the overall population of Vancouver was 246,593. Yet the Chinese population in Vancouver only reached 11,522, or 4.6 percent of Vancouver’s population (see appendix Table II). However, the VPD arrests of Chinese residents were disproportionately high as compared to non-Chinese. With the creation in 1916 of the morality squad, which focused specifically on gambling, prostitution, liquor and drugs, arrests of Chinese gamblers rose. This special unit arrested nearly twenty thousand people for gambling over its twelve-year existence (see appendix table III). VPD departmental records show that Chinese arrests made up 20.37 percent of the arrests between 1921 and 1928 (see appendix Table IV). Despite the lack of departmental records that directly connect the arrests of Chinese to gambling, the general trends of these arrests support the conclusion that they are connected. The most significant evidence for this are the arrests in 1925 when both the arrests of Chinese and gambling arrests rose to 3,669 and 3,853 respectively, the highest number for either record set during this period. Given the fact that arrests of Chinese men were typically second only to the arrests of Canadian-born Vancouverites, it is evident that the VPD made it a priority to enforce gambling prohibitions on Chinese gamblers within the city (see appendix Table IV).

While the morality squad’s arrest statistics supported allegations that gambling was rife in Chinatown, they did little to ease reformers’ concerns, as it was apparent that

269 Ibid.
271 Between 1917 and 1928, according to the statistics available (see Appendix Table III), over 19,969 people were arrested for running a gambling house or being found in a gambling house. Police Commission, Vancouver Police Department. Vancouver Police Department Statistics, VPD General Fonds. Vancouver Police Museum Archives, Vancouver Police Museum, Vancouver, B.C.
272 Ibid.
frequent arrests had not eradicated gambling. These concerns raised anew the claim that the VPD was corrupt and incompetent owing to the continuation of gambling in Chinatown. The morality squad did not remain the tool of reform it was meant to be. Due to changes in the mayor’s office and on the police commission, as well as individual corruption within the VPD, the morality squad was disbanded in 1928 following the Lennie Commission. Specially appointed commissioner R.S. Lennie heard 180 hours of testimony regarding “any supposed malfeasance, breach of trust or other misconduct” by any member of the VPD. The investigation soon widened to include the police commissioners, among them L.D. Taylor, the most frequently elected mayor of Vancouver.273 Lennie found that the “demoralization and inefficiency of the force… led to a casual enforcement of laws against drinking, gambling, and prostitution…” 274 According to Lennie, arrests totalling almost 5 percent of the total Vancouver population was lackadaisical policing. Although Chief H.W. Long was suspended, after the investigation, the commission reinstated him, but demoted him to the rank of inspector. Perhaps because of his implication in this investigation, L.D. Taylor lost the 1929 mayoral election to the reformer W.H. Malkin. Nevertheless, his political exile was short-lived and he was re-elected in 1931. The only lasting impact of the Lennie Commission was that the new chief disbanded the morality squad.275 Even though the appointment of Chamberlain was a critical juncture that finally aligned the VPD operations with the desires of the moral reformers after twenty-one years, in other words, this alignment was only fleeting.

An analysis of the first twenty-one years of Vancouver and the VPD shows that reformers effected significant changes within the department, namely the removal of several chiefs and the implementation of new department procedures in Chinatown. Each successive appointment of a new VPD chief reflected renewed efforts on the part of moral reform advocates to secure a more rigorous enforcement of increasingly more


275 Ibid.
stringent prohibitions against gambling in Chinatown. Although it took the police commission twenty-one years to find a like-minded chief constable, the commissioners’ power over the VPD changed its operations and enforcement of gambling prohibitions in Chinatown. Under Chiefs Chamberlain, Mulhern, and McLennan, the VPD grew and so did its arrests of Chinese gamblers.

Moral reformers on the city council and police commission attempted to limit the social and spatial lives of Chinese migrants by fixating on claims that Chinese vice would corrupt the moral fabric of Euro-Canadian communities should the two ethnic groups intermingle. In an effort to restrict the interactions of Chinese and Euro-Canadians, the city council created several by-laws that limited the economic activities of Chinese workers.276 Having concentrated Chinese residents to the area known as Chinatown, moral reformers began to stigmatize activities such as gambling and opium smoking, as immoral “Chinese” vices at odds with the “respectable” white community established in Vancouver.277 This stigmatization asserted the assumed racial superiority of Euro-Canadians while further entrenching the idea that Chinese migrants were a threat to their economic success because the Chinese were purportedly using vice to enslave white men and women.278 However, many of Vancouver’s citizens enjoyed these so-called vices, Chinese, Euro-Canadian, and otherwise. Whereas the city council had largely restricted the Chinese population to Chinatown, its focus on enforcing prohibitions against vice in Chinatown into the 1920’s would limit whites from socializing in Chinatown.279 The city council and police commission believed that if gambling and other vices were not present in Chinatown, there would be nothing to draw Euro-Canadians into this racialized place.

Law enforcement was necessary to the reformers’ efforts to restrict Vancouver’s interactions between Euro-Canadians and the Chinese inhabitants in Chinatown. While moral reformers believed policing social interactions between Euro-Canadians and

277 Opium was not outlawed until 1908 with passage of the Opium Act White. “Its Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” 305-308; see supra note 6-10 and accompanying text.
278 Morton, At Odds, 124.
Chinese residents helped, they believed that interactions between Chinatown’s inhabitants and Euro-Canadians would only be stopped if there were no longer alluring vices to draw Euro-Canadians into the gambling, opium, and prostitution dens, which they believed were centered there. According to the reformers on the police commission, the VPD was to obliterate these purportedly “Chinese” vices from Chinatown at any cost. However, the VPD did not always act in accordance with the wishes of the police commission. The chiefs were more concerned with enforcing the law throughout the entire city within the constraints of the law. In order to more effectively serve the rest of the city, a few early chiefs actually favoured establishing Chinatown as a ‘restricted’ district that allowed gambling and other vice to continue there while at the same time limiting the spread of these vices into the larger community. The VPD’s lacklustre enforcement of prohibitions against vice, especially gambling, caused repeated uproars on the part of the moral reformers on the police commission at the turn of the twentieth century. Reformers claimed that either the VPD or the chiefs were in collusion with organized vice in Chinatown, or had complete apathy for the law. The police commission utilized its powers over the VPD to remove several of Vancouver’s first six chief constables before it found an acquiescent chief constable in 1907 in Chief Chamberlain. After this, the city’s reformers were able to actualize their goal of enforcing a racialized divide that separated Chinatown from the rest of the Vancouver with the full support of the VPD.

The process through which reformers on the city council consolidated their power over the VPD and forced the VPD to concentrate its enforcement on Chinatown exacerbated the institutionalization of Chinatown as a racialized place. Although moral reformers saw Chinese gambling and other purported vices as injurious to the Euro-Canadian community in regards to both racial and moral purity, their politicization of the VPD’s enforcement of prohibitions against these vices further marked Chinatown as a racialized place. Although the people gambling in Chinatown were a diverse group, the moral reformers, newspapers and police commission all tended to portray the alleged

See supra notes 83, 140, and accompanying text.
vices in Chinatown as “Chinese.” If any Euro-Canadian or other ethnic group participated in these vices, it was reportedly because some Chinese person had lured them there. In this attempt to restrict interactions between Chinese and Euro-Canadians, the city council and police commission racially stigmatized certain vices, such as gambling. The emphasis on Chinese gambling, rather than the support given to the VPD by the Chinese community in other matters, castigated Chinatown as vice-ridden.

Discontent with the continued existence of Chinese gambling reformers reiterated their allegations of a widespread and entirely unchecked gambling empire in Chinatown. These allegations continued to be made, amplified, and reinforced by their repetition without considerable evidence resulting in the removal of five police chiefs. However, the appointment of R.J. Chamberlain represented a critical moment in the VPD’s operations in Chinatown that pacified the moral reformers’ claims that the VPD was indifferent to the gambling in Chinatown. Instead, Chamberlain’s comments concerning Chinese gambling, together with the department’s plethora of arrests, reports, and statistics, all of which the newspapers reported in detail, added to the original claim that Chinese gambling was endemic. After twenty-one years of constant and exaggerated claims, the reformers finally forced the VPD to intensify its policing of Chinatown. Although the reformers’ influence on the VPD’s operations in Chinatown was not permanent, they succeeded in their effort to characterize gambling as a distinctively “Chinese” vice, in part due to the echo chamber effect. This marked Chinatown as a racialized space, which in turn facilitated reformers’ efforts for increased policing of the area, limiting the social interaction between Chinese and non-Chinese people.

See supra note 114; see also Prisoners’ Record Book, 1898-1900; see also Police Court Charge Book, 1897-1900.
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Vancouver Police Department. Textual record, Prisoners’ Record Book, 1898-1900, Series VPD-S202, Prisoner Record Books, Vancouver Police Department Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.


---. Textual record, Police Court Charge Book, 1897-1900, Series VPD-S193, Vancouver Police Department Fonds, City of Vancouver Archives.


Table 1:
Chief Constables of the VPD Appointment Dates and Reasons for Removal from Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Police Investigation</th>
<th>Resignation</th>
<th>Suspension</th>
<th>Reasons for dismissal or resignation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Stewart</td>
<td>April 6, 1886</td>
<td>September 16, 1889</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Irregularities in VPD book keeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John McLaren</td>
<td>February 13, 1890</td>
<td>August 10, 1895</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Police Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ward</td>
<td>September 5, 1895</td>
<td>September 6, 1896</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Insufficient force size and funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.M. Stewart</td>
<td>November 16, 1896</td>
<td>July 15, 1901</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unpopular dismissal of detectives, and failing health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam North</td>
<td>June 18, 1901</td>
<td>June 5, 1906</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inefficient as Chief Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collin Chisholm</td>
<td>July 5, 1906</td>
<td>June 1, 1907</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Refused to work with the moral reformers on Police Commission, Also complained about insufficient funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Chamberlain</td>
<td>June 1, 1907</td>
<td>December 5, 1912</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Disagreed with the Police Commission on restricted districts for gambling and prostitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Mulhern</td>
<td>January 8, 1913</td>
<td>December 31, 1914</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medical leave, died January 3, 1914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.B. McLennan</td>
<td>January 1, 1914</td>
<td>March 20, 1917</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Killed in the line of duty</td>
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# Table II:

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Chinese Population</th>
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<th>Chinese Growth</th>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>13,709</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>930*</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>27,010</td>
<td>13,301</td>
<td>2,840**</td>
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<td>1911</td>
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<td>73,391</td>
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<td>16,812</td>
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<td>83,373</td>
<td>11,533</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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*Number taken from an advertisement for Robert G. Mackay, *Vancouver Daily World*, Sept 1, 1891.

**This number includes all persons classified by the 1901 census as Asian, as Asian sub-ethnicities were not tracked during this census.

Source: *Censuses Canada*, 1891-1931.
### Table III:

**Police Court Annual Reports**

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
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<td>Drug Act</td>
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### Table IV:
Yearly Arrest statistics by Nativity, 1921-1928

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<th>1921</th>
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<th>1925**</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1449</td>
<td>2081</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2279</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td>2881</td>
<td>2511</td>
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<td>735</td>
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<td>630</td>
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<td>889</td>
<td>707</td>
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<td>618</td>
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<td>1649</td>
<td>3659</td>
<td>1953</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>411</td>
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<td>1259</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>1572</td>
<td>1381</td>
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<td><strong>Total Arrest:</strong></td>
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<td>8082</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9912</td>
<td>9,320</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>10083</td>
<td>10394</td>
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<td><strong>Pct. Chinese Arrest:</strong></td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*No yearly statistics are available for arrests made by nativity for this year

**Although the arrest statistics show an already drastic increase in arrest of Chinese denizens, the statistics are even more enlightening when split between male and female arrests. Male arrests were 1843 Canadian to 3646 Chinese, while female arrests were 764 Canadian to 13 Chinese.

Vancouver Police Museum Archives, Vancouver Police Museum, Vancouver B.C.