An inquiry into the question of Being in teaching: World, Attunement, and the danger of Enframing

by

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Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Curriculum Theory & Implementation: Philosophy of Education Program Faculty of Education

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Spring 2016

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**Date Defended/Approved:** February 29, 2016
Abstract

Heidegger argued that modern human beings have forgotten a more fundamental and originary understanding of the meaning of Being. This forgetting of Being is not limited to lived experience but permeates the history of philosophy and metaphysics. Put simply, modern philosophy (and, for Heidegger, metaphysics) presupposes a reductive understanding of Being as an entity, or an entity with enduring presence, that ultimately limits the possibilities of human thinking and existence. Educational practice and scholarship also operates from this comportment of a forgetting of Being. The following inquiry raises the question of Being in teaching by phenomenologically engaging with three key distinctions from Heidegger’s thinking as each bears upon educational practice. World and attunement, the first two distinctions, are most accessible in Heidegger’s thinking from his magnum opus *Being and Time*. The third distinction represents a theme from Heidegger’s later thinking on technology, the danger of Enframing. While not exhaustive, each concept interrogates the many-sided question of Being in order to illuminate new possibilities for teaching. The inquiry does not offer solutions but rather traces a path that opens and keeps in tension the question of Being in teaching in order to support further study.

**Keywords:** Martin Heidegger; teaching; phenomenological ontology; Being
The thinking in the pages to follow is dedicated to two groups. First, to all of the previous thinkers who found and forged pathways that opened the inquiry for my own thinking. And second, to all those who teach, whether or not they realize they do.
Acknowledgements

The first person to acknowledge and recognize is my husband and partner, Frederik. Someone told us early in the doctoral journey that this was not just my PhD but our PhD. Never have truer words been shared! Thank you for supporting me throughout and for your love and commitment to my success.

I also want to acknowledge and express my gratitude to my parents and grandparents for being remarkable teachers and role models for me. To my close friends and mentors who played the role of my academic parents, Drs. Larry and Nancy Gustke, without your supporting words and guidance this PhD would not have happened!

This thinking would not be possible were it not for three remarkable women: Pat Dalton, Renee Prillaman, and Toni Williamson. These three women, each in their own way, transformed my life forever. Pat, who passed away in 2006, helped me become comfortable in my own skin and continues to inspire me as a teacher. As my head teacher Renee nurtured me as a new teacher and sponsored the professional development that set me on the path to the thinking below. And Toni for being my friend and colleague, poking and prodding me to walk my talk and create new possibilities for myself. I am connected to Pat, Renee, and Toni through my time teaching at Carolina Friends Middle School. I think of all of my former teaching colleagues when I engage and try to communicate about this work.

In its current form the thinking to follow is indebted to the guidance, support, and mentorship provided by my supervisory committee. Many thanks to Ann Chinnery for guiding me as my pro tem in my first few years at SFU and for connecting me with Stephen Smith, my senior supervisor. Stephen’s phenomenological “disposition” has profoundly influenced my thinking and the effects of his nudges, nods, and penetrating questions are all over this thesis. Thank you for everything, Stephen.

Finally, for the philosophical conversations and always being ready to read and edit my work, immense thanks go to Cameron Duncan. Who knew Andrew Feenberg’s philosophy of technology seminar would bring us together!
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Abbreviations

Works By Heidegger

The plan for Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe (Collected Edition, noted by “GA”) now includes over 100 texts, with 30 to 40 titles untranslated into English. For the present inquiry, I will reference the commonly accepted English translations of Heidegger’s works rather than the Gesamtausgabe as is customary (e.g., “BT, p. 45” rather than “GA 2, p. 45”). I have chosen this manner for two reasons: (1) the page numbers are not consistent between the Gesamtausgabe edition and the English translation, and (2) the Gesamtausgabe is only published in German and given my lack of fluency in the language I have not consulted these original texts. This is not to indicate that I am not familiar with the decisions made in translating into English many of Heidegger’s German words and phrases. I have at times, for example, chosen between differing translations in order to mediate what I believe to be Heidegger’s actual intention. The concern of translating Heidegger into English is now part of the folklore of Heidegger scholars and this will be addressed specifically in Chapters 3 (on language) and 6 (on Enframing/Positionality).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCA (GA 18)</td>
<td>Basic Concept of Aristotelian Philosophy, SS 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BL (GA 79)</td>
<td>Bremen Lectures, Insight into that which is, December 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP (GA 24)</td>
<td>The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, SS 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPT (GA 79)</td>
<td>Basic Principles of Thinking, Freiburg Lectures 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT (GA 2)</td>
<td>Being and Time, 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (GA 65)</td>
<td>Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 1936-1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EHP (GA 4)</td>
<td>Elucidations of Holderlin's Poetry, 1936-1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCM (GA 29/30)</td>
<td>Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, WS 1929-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS (GA 15)</td>
<td>Four Seminars, 1966-1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 1</td>
<td>Frühe Schriften, 1912-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA 70</td>
<td>Über den Anfang, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCT (GA 20)</td>
<td>History of the Concept of Time, SS 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID (GA 11)</td>
<td>Identity and Difference, 1955-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IM (GA 40)</td>
<td>Introduction to Metaphysics, SS 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNS (GA 56/57)</td>
<td>Towards the Definition of Philosophy, KNS 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LQC (GA 38)</td>
<td>Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, SS 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFL (GA 26)</td>
<td>Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, SS 1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBT (GA 5)</td>
<td>Off the Beaten Track, 1935-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHF (GA 63)</td>
<td>Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity, SS 1923</td>
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<tr>
<td>P (GA 9)</td>
<td>Pathmarks, 1919-1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE (GA 59)</td>
<td>Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression, SS 1920</td>
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Semesters

The German academic calendar differs significantly from North American terms and semesters. Therefore the following abbreviations\(^1\) are used to indicate the semesters of Heidegger's teaching:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNS</td>
<td><em>Kriegsnotsemester</em> (War Emergency Semester): Heidegger's course was held from February 7 to April 11, 1919.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Summer Semester. Typically held from May through July.</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>Winter Semester. Typically November through February, with a month off around Christmas.</td>
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Be patient toward all that is unsolved in your heart and try to love the questions themselves, like locked rooms and like books that are now written in a very foreign tongue. Do not now seek the answers, which cannot be given you because you would not be able to live them. And the point is, to live everything. Live the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer.

-- Rainer Maria Rilke

We shall not cease from exploration / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.

-- T.S. Eliot

What is own to phenomenology, as a philosophical ‘direction,’ does not rest in being real. Higher than reality stands possibility. Understanding phenomenology consists solely in grasping it as possibility.

-- Martin Heidegger
Chapter 1. Introduction

What does it mean to be a teacher? Does being-a-teacher resonate with other professions such as being a lawyer or being a doctor? How does being-a-teacher stand with other identities human beings embody, such as being a mother, or with human experiences, such as being ill? What does it mean to be a teacher? Or, to leap ahead, how does teaching stand with Being? I have been circling and living the latter question for years, continually finding myself arriving where I started, knowing the place for the first time. I have now “lived the question” for enough time to recognize that the question “What does it mean to be a teacher?” is already implied within the larger question of Being in teaching. There are very real implications for raising the question of Being that include, to start, teacher preparation and professional development. However, there are also echoes of possibility whenever we write, speak, and think of Being.

This study is an attempt to hear and inscribe these echoes in such a way that the question of the meaning of Being, as Heidegger phrases it, is given sufficient space to show itself, as itself and in itself, within the profession of teaching. This is accomplished by approaching the question of Being in teaching through three Heideggerian distinctions that offer interesting and challenging ways of (re)thinking the practice of teaching: world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing. Raising the question of the meaning of Being in teaching is not a question seeking an answer, but an ontologically-sensitive stance to thinking possibility within teaching in a phenomenological manner. The aim of the inquiry is not an answer to a research question, but more so a meditative and rigorous thinking of the ontological possibilities of teaching.

In this opening chapter, I describe the overarching plan and layout of the thesis beginning with a brief section that situates the inquiry in relation to the thinking of Heidegger. Following, the need for and my own personal connections with an inquiry of this kind is sketched. An outline of the study is described and then supported by a
section on the tone and language of the study before a summarizing and concluding section.

Heidegger, educational philosophy and the present inquiry

Martin Heidegger is arguably the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century. His contributions to philosophy and thinking have been cited both as sponsoring further thinking and also as a violent misunderstanding or misrepresentation of Western philosophy. Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Alain Badiou, and Jacques Derrida (the list could go on) each point to Heidegger as a powerful and influential force in their work. Whether you embrace his thinking or reject it, as a thinker or philosopher, one must situate oneself in relation to Heidegger’s writings and teachings.

The thinking of Heidegger drives and grounds the inquiry. With the possible exception of the Pre-Socratics and Ancient Greeks, no other thinker, philosopher, or teacher has had a more profound influence on modern philosophy and its (lack of) inquiry into Being and ontology than Heidegger. In a lecture course offered in WS 1951-1952\(^1\) titled *What is Called Thinking* Heidegger writes: “The thinker needs one thought only” (p. 50). For Heidegger, this one thought was the question of Being.\(^2\) Heidegger’s guiding question could be: “What is Being?” but could easily be pressed to reveal two deeper questions: (1) What is the question of Being? And (2) What is the meaning of the question of Being? In our everyday lives we operate with a fundamentally automatic assumption of the answers to these questions. These assumptions are so automatic that we can hardly think of an answer, or, more likely, these questions sound almost nonsensical. Heidegger, over and over again throughout his lifetime, attempted to indicate this “question of Being” to those who followed the pathways of his thinking.

\(^1\) WS abbreviates “Winter Semester.” See the Abbreviations for Works Cited and Semesters for more information.

\(^2\) Also, Heidegger: “All great thinkers think the same. Yet this ‘same’ is so essential and so rich that no single thinker exhausts it.” (WCT, p. 36). However, that Heidegger’s singular thought was the meaning or truth of Being is not a settled matter. For a recent counter-argument, see Sheehan (2014), *Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift.*
When we ask the question of Being in teaching, we could hear the question as one of identity: Who is the teacher? What sorts of qualities or capacities might be identified as part of the identity of a good teacher? Heard in this manner, these questions are best approached via the disciplines of educational psychology and possibly sociology. But when heard in an ontological register, the question of Being in teaching inquires into the meaning and significance of the relational capacities and possibilities that we call the profession and practice of teaching. It is in this latter tonality that I want to precede through the study, approaching and circling the practice and lived experience of being a teacher such that the question of Being is given sufficient space to be heard. Heidegger is the one thinker, in my view, who was able to open and keep in tension this space for the question of the meaning of Being, and it is for this reason that his thinking remains central to this study.

Beginning largely with Donald Vandenberg (1966; 1971), philosophers of education have found the intersection of Heidegger’s thinking and educational philosophy a fruitful ground for continued inquiry (Dall’Alba, 2009; Magrini, 2014; Peters, 2002). Influential philosophers outside the field of philosophy of education have also explored education and Heidegger’s work (e.g., Ehrmantraut, 2010; Thomson, 2005). The present inquiry follows in the wake of these writers and scholars in seeking inspiration and guidance into approaching the question of Being in teaching through Heidegger’s thinking. However, the inquiry is not a thinking of Heidegger, teaching, and Being and nor is it a thinking as Heidegger, teaching, and Being. The study is a thinking with and, moreover, beyond Heidegger.

In the introductory section of The Question Concerning Technology (1977), a collection of Heidegger’s essays on the philosophy of technology, the editor and translator offers an informative observation:

Heidegger is primarily a teacher. He does not wish to travel alone and then report what he has seen, nor does he wish to go as a guide merely pointing out objects along the road. He wishes the reader to accompany him on the way, to participate with him, and even to begin to build his own way through thinking, and not merely to hear about what it is or should be. (p. xvi, emphasis added)
That the inquiry will think beyond Heidegger honours not only Heidegger’s way of thinking and teaching (the very notion of a “Heideggerian philosophy” is in direct conflict with the whole of his thinking), but also serves to acknowledge and simultaneously address reservations some scholars have at continuing to find philosophical inspiration in Heidegger’s thought given his personal and political encounters with National Socialism. Many philosophers who follow the paths of thought laid out by Heidegger are readily able to distinguish the despicable behaviours and actions of Heidegger the person while still finding inspiration in his writings and thinking (see, e.g., Feenberg, 2004; Polt, 2013; Sheehan, 2015). While Sheehan (2015) addresses Emmanuel Faye’s recent and ongoing misconceptions about Heidegger and Nazism specifically, he also convincingly demonstrates that too often claims regarding Heidegger’s thinking as it may or may not be “tainted” with National Socialism show a lack of actual scholarship into Heidegger’s work. The topic of Heidegger and National Socialism, while not the purview of this inquiry, will be addressed in Chapter 2 within the context of Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking.

As a field of study, philosophy of education is not immune to Sheehan’s (2015) argument for a close and careful reading of Heidegger’s thinking either. In one of the last articles he published, Vandenberg (2008), who first helped explore the intersection of Heidegger’s philosophy with education, railed against an ignorance of Heidegger’s thinking and its incorporation within educational philosophy. Vandenberg’s complaint was twofold: (1) ignorance of existing work in the phenomenology of education inspired by Heidegger and (2) lack of a genuine understanding of Heidegger’s thinking. Vandenberg’s account demonstrates a lack of coherence of phenomenological thinking within philosophy of education as well as no prevailing view on Heidegger’s thinking in the study of education and philosophy. Therefore, the present inquiry aims to accomplish two goals: (1) name, distinguish, and phenomenologically analyze three Heideggerian distinctions (world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing) as they inform the

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3 Faye has examined the influence of National Socialism and Nazism in Heidegger’s philosophy and writings for many years, including the recent (2009) English translation of Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism Into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1935. Sheehan, without falling into the trap of being a Heidegger apologist, painstakingly examines Faye’s claims and demonstrates the latter’s lack of a contextual understanding of Heidegger’s actual thinking and writings.
question of Being in teaching, and (2) do so in a manner that authentically contextualizes and appropriates Heidegger’s thinking. Greater historical and textual context is offered within each chapter to illuminate Heidegger’s language, distinctions, and thinking. With Heidegger and his influence on the present inquiry named, we turn now to the primary matter of his thinking: the question of Being.

**Who are we?: The question of Being**

The way the term *Being* is being used as it is named in the title and the opening paragraphs must be clarified before moving forward. Heidegger’s “one thought” throughout his career was the meaning of Being. While he used other words and phrases throughout his lifetime including *das Ereignis,* *aletheia,* and *die Lichtung,* each is but another approach to the same phenomenon of Being (Capobianco, 2010). Grasping the ways that Being can be defined and used for analysis in raising the question of Being is the most crucial ground from which to start. In this section only a brief sketch of the Ur-phenomenon of Being is offered as Being as such is more fully distinguished in Chapter 2.

Current co-chair of the Heidegger Circle, Richard Polt, selects the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as the keystone to unlocking Heidegger’s thinking of the meaning of Being (1999). Specifically, Heidegger is interested in grasping how beings presence⁴ as “something” (rather than nothing) and how this presencing then relates to a general intelligibility of Being. Heidegger argues that Western metaphysics assumes and examines the difference between beings and their being, or, remains locked in a dialogue concerned with entities and their essences. Heidegger’s thinking attempts to retrieve a more originary thinking of Being that reveals and reflects on the ontological difference between Being (with a capital B) and being. This understanding is written Being as Being (and with the capital B at present) to distinguish from being as an entity or the beingness of a being that marks the assumptions of

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⁴ “Presence” is best understood as a verb in this context rather than in the traditional tonality of substance.
traditional metaphysics. However, “The Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being” (BT, p. 26) and this complicates matters significantly.

As human beings we are quite comfortable naming beings in language as we have systems and structures in place that relate language to particular beings so that we can communicate about them. We speak of “this chair” or “that table” and once named as beings, describe and categorize them as beings, attributing qualities and features to them. But Being as Being is not a being like a chair, table, or, as some argue, the Christian God. Polt (1999) continues:

Being is intrinsically mysterious. We have to learn to give up our ambition to represent things perfectly and directly when we are trying to deal with Being, for “every saying already speaks from the truth of Being, and cannot leap over itself immediately to reach Being itself” (C, §38). We cannot turn Being into an object and describe it with scientific precision, because we do not control it; we are already plunged into a way of experiencing the difference between something and nothing. So instead of trying to dominate Being conceptually, we should respond to it with cautious and tentative respect. (p. 141)

Heidegger’s pathway of thinking aims to explore and examine the inherent mysteriousness of Being by way of human beings. As its shepherd or guardian, human beings have a special relationship to Being and it is on the basis of this unique relationship that Heidegger conducts his analyses into the meaning of Being. Everything returns to the everyday lived experiences of human beings.

Even though he always returned to common and everyday examples, Heidegger knew that a majority would hear his questions and ideas and dismiss them as empty philosophizing. He repeatedly included passages that addressed the “uselessness” of philosophy in his lectures and courses. Consider the following snapshots from the opening sessions of two lecture courses, the first in SS 1935 and the second from WS 1937-38:

Philosophy, then, is not a kind of knowledge that one could acquire directly, like vocational and technical expertise, and which, like economic and professional knowledge in general, one could apply directly and evaluate according to its usefulness in each case. (IM, p. 7)
Philosophy is immediately useless knowledge. Our reflection on correctness and on truth itself can accomplish nothing toward the correct solution of economic difficulties or toward the correct improvement and assurance of the public health, nor can it contribute anything to the correct increase of the speed of airplanes, or to the correct improvement of radio reception, and likewise just as little to the correct design of instructional projects in the schools. With regard to all these urgent matters of daily life, philosophy fails. (BQ, p. 29)

Yes, philosophy is useless, especially if this response is an answer to a question of utility and efficiency. But these ends are not what philosophy is ultimately concerned with.

It is entirely correct and completely in order to say, “You can’t do anything with philosophy.” The only mistake is to believe that with this, the judgment concerning philosophy is at an end. For a little epilogue arises in the form of a counter question: even if we can’t do anything with it, may not philosophy in the end do something with us, provided that we engage ourselves in it? (IM, p. 13)

Who is this “we,” specifically, that Heidegger here references? The immediate answer is the students before him in the lecture hall. Though truly, Heidegger is challenging humankind to see, hear, and understand philosophy (grasped as inquiry into the meaning of Being) in a new manner. In our journey toward gaining greater clarity into Being as Being, Heidegger’s concern for the true importance of philosophy in its relationship to this “we” may be helpful.

The previously referenced quote was from a SS 1935 lecture course. Exactly one year before, Heidegger taught a course in SS 1934 entitled Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language that relies on the multiple meanings of “we.” The “we” in SS 1934 is rendered as Volk. Volk, like other terms Heidegger reappropriates, is left untranslated in the English translation given its many-layered meaning. Indeed, a portion of the course is devoted to exploring the meaning of Volk as Heidegger is using it. Throughout the course, Heidegger asks a single question: "Are we, then, this Volk, which we ourselves are?" (LQC, p. 60). This is Heidegger’s roundabout way of asking “Who are we?” The guiding thread or theme of the course is straightforward: by asking the question into who we (as a Volk) are, we reveal our relationship to Being as Being. Therefore, it follows that language is the vehicle that assists in this revealing through our
understanding of our history and our grasping of time or temporality (this is a course on the “essence of language”).

*Volk* was a contentious term in 1934 just as it is at present. Heidegger taught this course a short time after resigning as the first National Socialist Rector of the University of Freiburg. In the National Socialist climate of 1934 Freiburg, *Volk* meant the German *Volk* and all of the political baggage that accompanied that meaning. Even today the English *folk* oftentimes carries the connotative meaning of simple or less sophisticated human beings that, used in specific ways, borders on disrespectful and demeaning (e.g., “back country folk” or “folksy charm”). No doubt one can hear and understand Heidegger’s use of *Volk* in this and other lecture courses in this period (1933 to 1945) in a manner that aligns with the rhetoric and politically charged views of National Socialism. But this is not the only way to read the term *Volk*. In thinking with and beyond Heidegger, I believe the distinction of *Volk* can be illuminating and even important today. As hinted above, Being and its relationship to human beings occurs in English as the often overlooked copula “is” and its various forms, are, am, was, were, and so on. In Heidegger’s guiding question, “Are we, then, this *Volk*, which we ourselves are?”, Being occurs twice in the form of the “are.” Who “we” are, at the person, group, citizen, and universal levels, remains a contentious conversation even today. Interestingly enough, this concern with who we are especially reveals itself within modern politics.

As of this writing, citizens in both Canada and the United States are preparing for national elections that will determine their leaders. In newspapers and on television, groups of people vie for the attention of the populace in order to argue that their leader is the “right” one for the country. Put differently, political parties are trying to convince members of the voting public that their platform on the issues is the “right” platform. Either angle approaches the same question Heidegger references in the lecture course: Who are we? Who are our leaders and how does their role as leader impact and influence our understanding of who we are? And, what does this then reveal about who we are? Again, these questions are not indicative of a psychological identity crisis of the times; heard from the deepest level, they are questions of Being. Being reveals itself in and through human beings, in the “we” or *Volk*. This rendering of *Volk* is not too far removed from conversations had between students and teachers when they discuss
what kind of classroom environment or culture they want to create. In short, and making Heidegger’s point, who do these leaders want to be?

We never arrive at a firm grasp on the meaning of Being because such a grasp is impossible. This is why Heidegger, and the present inquiry, remains “an inquiry” into the question of Being. The question of Being is not concerned with a final answer but with the pathways used to approach and relate to it. Consider Heidegger’s urging to readers in the preface to his Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works) to approach his published writings as “ways, not works”: “The collected edition should indicate various ways: it is underway in the field of paths of the self-transforming asking of the many-sided question of Being,” (GA1, pp. 447-8). Thus, the present inquiry offers ways into the question of Being. Being as a phenomenon receives further explanation and description in Chapter 2 as a pathway toward the question of Being in teaching. We continue now to the need for the present inquiry as a feature of my personal background before the need for an inquiry of this kind within educational philosophy.

Need for Study

In the opening lectures of the first course that Heidegger taught at the University of Freiburg after being banned from public teaching for half a decade\(^5\) Heidegger named a key theme of the course: “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking” (WCT, p. 6). He knew that this proposition was shocking and could only be surpassed in its absurdity by the statement a few lectures later that science does not think. Heidegger was trying to provoke his students, not into conflict or anger, but into thinking. It is in this manner that I pose the guiding question for this study: How might greater attention to Being through Heidegger’s distinctions of world, attunement, and Enframing inform and transform teaching?

\(^5\) This was as a result of the decision of a De-Nazification Committee that interviewed and sought testimony as to Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism as Rector and also as a professor of philosophy at Freiburg.
Consider the following example. Returning to the question “What does it mean to be a teacher?” from above, the community of scholarship surrounding education, teaching and learning has most recently been focused on asking this question in the form of “Who is the teacher?” In this tonality the question is heard as the commonsensical “Who is the teacher” and further inquiry is immediately bounded by presuppositions related to identity, psychologies and sociologies of education, and the always-already Cartesianism embedded into Western philosophy and science. These trajectories of study can be interesting and empowering, helpful and informative. All the same, when the question relies on a subject, on the “I” of the teacher, Being remains concealed and other possibilities are rendered unavailable. What if the question were heard in another way? “Who is the teacher?” Even here, hidden in the copula of the English language, Being remains concealed and is only understood as the being of a being without inquiring into Being as Being. That there are other possibilities and potentialities of being-a-teacher are what drives and demands the need for the inquiry. However, before moving forward, I think it best to demonstrate the need for the study as an extension of my own personal history of being a teacher.

**The need for the study as a continuation of my scholarship**

To begin a journey you must know where you are coming from and have an idea where you might be headed. My background fully informs my practice as a scholar, writer, and philosopher, and is the ground for the current inquiry of the question of Being in teaching. In a letter to Karl Lowith from 1921 Heidegger writes similarly: “I work concretely and factically out of my ‘I am’, out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live” (cited in Kisiel, 1993, p. 78). Even with this dictum from Heidegger, I have shied away from relying too heavily on my own lived experience in my studies and inquiries because I wanted to uphold Heidegger’s challenge to the traditional understanding of Cartesianism, of the ontological split between the subject and object, the mind and the body. This caution named, a description of my background as it informs and situates my *being* as a teacher is helpful to grounding the inquiry. However, it must be made clear that I am not necessarily holding myself and my life experience up
to the same calibre or intensity as others. Rather, the inquiry might be better grounded and situated within the context of my life and story.

I come from a family with a mother and a father. I am the oldest child, with one younger sibling, a sister. I was born and raised in the same county in North Carolina where my parents grew up and went to school. From the beginning I have wanted to be busy, to fill my days with meaningful activity. My first love was music and it remained my passion until I was 18. By happenstance I learned that I possessed a disposition towards teaching. It simply came to me, easily, intuitively. This led to university for an education in teaching and learning that turned out to be easier than I thought.

I trained as a middle grades social studies and language arts teacher who taught math, social studies, music, and technology for grades five to eight at an independent school in central North Carolina for four years. I was and continue to be an avid proponent of educational technologies, and I was often called on to provide training sessions for my fellow staff members on integrating technologies into their classrooms. In helping my colleagues explore (at the time) emerging web-based technologies and their implications for teaching and learning, I uncovered a number of positive and negative assumptions that we held regarding the uses and nature of technology. These assumptions included the transformative power of information and communication technologies, hesitations regarding issues of privacy and online identity, the supposed neutrality of technologies, and the relationship between the ideal and the actual implications of teaching with technologies. Reformulating these unexamined assumptions as questions led me to graduate study in instructional technology.

Are technologies transforming teaching and learning as we know it? How can we honour and respect the privacy of others and our own identities? With the integration of technology, what truly has changed? What makes some teachers embrace technology and what drives others to push it away? Among other reasons, I chose to leave the middle school classroom after four years to figure out what my “big questions” were and see if I could find some answers. And, if I could not find answers, I was sure I wanted to rewrite the questions that were being asked.
My Masters research focused on teacher assumptions related to technology and, like most researchers and graduate students, my initial questions led to not only more complex but also two direct questions: (1) What assumptions do educators hold about technology and its use in teaching and learning? (2) How do educators’ assumptions about technology influence their teaching practice? This inquiry focused on a qualitative analysis of teacher’s philosophies of technology and in-depth interviews (Kruger-Ross, 2012). In answering the question at present into Being and teaching, I am continuing to trace this line of inquiry by turning to more philosophical and conceptual methodologies.

I have also had the privilege of simultaneously pursuing doctoral studies while serving as a virtual professional learning coordinator for the North Carolina Virtual Public School for a group of online STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) teachers. This virtual work includes holding weekly meetings with online teachers as well as developing and delivering professional development for all teachers and staff involved in the department. From my own practice as a teacher to coaching my colleagues with professional development in technologies, and my Masters research into teacher assumptions about educational technologies to my current role providing online professional learning, my thinking and writing is primarily determined and informed by the day-to-day lives of teachers.

From a literal reading of the question of Being in teaching, one manner would be to explore the various stances one might take as a teacher. In my background this has meant being in education as a student, then as student teacher, full-time and unsupervised teacher, professional development organizer and coordinator, as graduate student in educational technology, and as a teaching and research assistant. This listing, however, is incomplete and does not fully represent my being in education throughout my career and lifetime. For example, as a high school senior I was not only being in education as a student but also as a teaching assistant. In addition, the various roles and leadership responsibilities I held in clubs and school organizations included even more ways of being in education. This could be continued throughout my budding career as an educator and to present as a doctoral candidate.
Each of these ways of being in education informs my approach to teaching. Education, teaching, and learning occur differently for me from the perspective of a student teacher of grade eight language arts students than from how teaching and learning occurs for me as an online teacher of STEM high school teachers. Not only has my role changed, but so have who my “students” are, the medium of interaction, the content of my teaching, and the methods I would use to work and build relationships with my students. My identity as a teacher might not seem to have changed, but the context and who I am as teacher is transformed. My way of being in education is anything but static and fixed, not only because the context changes but also because I possess agency as a human being.

This literal perspective on Being in teaching could be grasped by the concept of “roles” or within the discourse of teacher identity that is firmly grounded in teacher education scholarship (Alsup, 2006; Beijaard, Meijer, & Verloop, 2004). In my own work, I have explored the use of dispositions and dispositional language as an additional way to encompass the phenomenon of being in education (Kruger-Ross, 2014b). However, Being in teaching as a phenomenon of philosophical inquiry as well as the various ways of being in education from my own career shared briefly above only begin to answer the primary question of Being in teaching.

The need for a thinking of Being in teaching

Thus far we have discussed the influence of Heidegger on the present study, introduced the question of Being as a phenomenon, and considered the need for the inquiry as a natural extension of my background. The remaining subsections attempt to answer the following question: Why spend the time and effort to raise the question of Being in teaching?

Above we found that one of the questions guiding the study was found concealed in another question: Who is the teacher?. Is this, however, merely playing with words and language? Heidegger strongly disagrees for if “language is the house of Being” then surely we should not be so flippant about our word choice. He demonstrates this path of thinking in the beginning of his grammatical exegesis of Being in Introduction to
**Metaphysics.**6 “Because the fate of language is grounded in the particular relation of a people to Being, the question about Being will be most intimately intertwined, for us, with the question about language” (IM, p. 39). Before launching into the substantive, verbal, and infinitive forms of being, Heidegger also points to the importance of such an investigation given the relationship between Being and language:

It simply no longer occurs to us that everything that we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise—that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an absolute, that instead, they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages. This was all based on the assumption that language, too, is something in being, something that, like other beings, can be made accessible and circumscribed in a definite manner. How such an undertaking gets carried out and to what extent it is valid clearly depends on the fundamental conception of Being that guides it. (IM, p. 41)

Heidegger is here indicating the concealment or hiddenness of Being for modern human beings. Specifically, he is referencing our inability of asking the question of Being at all because the question itself is almost unthinkable. Yet when we do inquire into the difference that it makes for us that there is something rather than nothing (as Polt highlights from Heidegger's lecture course cited above), we catch a glimpse of possibilities of existing never thought before. Thinking these possibilities is the primary aim of the study.

This pathway of thinking is not easy, not only given the limitations of representational language but also given the foundational assumptions about reality and about ourselves that must be challenged. As Richard Capobianco (2010) phrases it, this is “excavation” work. The explication and critique of our fundamental presuppositions is not done for spite, as Thomson (2005) describes with an eye toward Heidegger’s pedagogy:

In his later work, Heidegger sought to deconstruct education. Rather than deny this, we should simply reject the polemical reduction of

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6 One can hear in the references below how the SS 1934 question of the relationship between Being and a Volk that occurs in language has evolved over a year into a clearer iteration of his argument in SS 1935.
“deconstruction” (Destruktion) to “destruction” (Zerstörung), and instead be clear that the goal of Heidegger’s deconstruction of education, like his deconstruction of the ontological tradition in general, is not to destroy our traditional Western education institutions, but rather to “loosen up” this “hardened tradition and dissolve the concealments it has engendered,” in order to “recover” from the beginning of the educational tradition those “primordial experiences” that have fundamentally shaped its subsequent historical development (BT 44/SZ 22) (p. 141).

If the aim of the inquiry does not include providing answers to a research question, then what it does promise to do is “loosen up” the “hardened tradition” in thinking the lived experience of teaching in relation to Heidegger’s conceptualizations of world, attunement and Enframing. By thinking through these three distinctions, the study presents three phenomenological accounts of raising the question of Being in teaching such that new ways of thinking, speaking and acting are made available. These possibilities then indicate even more pathways for thinking and reflection into Being in teaching.

Ontological and Epistemological Research: Being and Knowing

Heidegger’s thinking is not easy to grasp for many reasons, but one particular challenge deserves attention as it is also a need for the study: the relationship between ontology and epistemology, or between Being and knowing. As described and referenced above, a majority of educational research into teaching and teacher education, philosophically speaking, by default sets epistemological matters above (if present at all) ontological inquiry. The primacy of knowing is a result of the legacy of Descartes and the power of the dichotomies of (1) the reasoning subject and the inanimate object, and (2) the rational mind and the lifeless flesh of the body. As a result of these dichotomies, present day thinking and research into teaching primarily concerns itself with knowing and knowledge as features of a subject’s consciousness. Becoming a teacher is a matter of taking a series of courses that help future teachers learn the standards and objectives of “effective” teaching strategies that have also emerged from empirical research. In all of these scenarios human beings are consumed in a world of
knowing, a world, Heidegger argues, that presupposes an ontology, or an understanding of Being.

In the years leading up to *Being and Time* the Cartesian primacy of knowing haunts Heidegger and he repeatedly critiques and deconstructs its features in his lecture courses. We will encounter these critiques in each of the pathways to come. For Heidegger, knowing is not necessarily inappropriate or incorrect but derivative of the everyday lived experience of human beings. In our everyday dealings we do not act and behave in a knowing manner, he notes, but rather we just simply *are*. The theoretical stance of the empirical sciences has evolved from the assumption of a knowing comportment and therefore is also subject to Heidegger’s critique. Science begins from the presupposition that knowledge can be gleaned from observations that are analyzed to draw conclusions so as to explain and predict phenomena. But from Heidegger’s understanding, the leap from Being to knowing happens too quickly and without much thinking or reflection. He is not anti-science however:

One should not get the impression that Heidegger is *against* knowledge or science. His enemy is not the intellect -- he is an intellectual himself, after all -- but *intellectualism*. Intellectualists, such as Descartes, try to understand the self and the world primarily in terms of knowing. They fail to recognize that knowing presupposes dwelling. (Polt, 1999, p. 48)\(^7\)

Most approaches to the study of teaching and teacher education operate within the assumptions of the empirical sciences, including research methodologies that emerge from the critical tradition of the Frankfurt School. This is troubling given that much of the work conducted in this mode of research is concerned with exposing relationships of power and transforming the limiting assumptions of modern positivism.\(^8\) In this way, the empirical sciences presuppose an understanding of Being without ever questioning otherwise. However, there are existing attempts within philosophy of education to engage ontologically with educational phenomena and the final subsection summarizes this area of scholarship.

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\(^7\) Here “dwelling” is another name Heidegger uses for the manner in which human beings exist in relationship to Being. Dwelling in this sense means being-in-the-world, a concept we will engage with specifically in Chapter 4.

\(^8\) I recognize that this is a claim that warrants further reflection and reference. I am working on a future piece that would begin to conceptualize these ideas in an accessible manner.
Contemporary perspectives from philosophy of education

This section aims to name and describe a number of scholars who have drawn inspiration from Heidegger’s thought in an attempt to rethink traditional challenges and concerns within the study of education and specifically the philosophy of education. Beyond the work referenced below, there have also been more succinct explorations of Heidegger’s thinking and the technologization of education (Standish, 1997), ways of thinking (Williams, 2013), a critique of Heidegger’s conceptualization of the “authentic” (Trubody, 2014), and humanism (Kakkori & Huttunen, 2012). The section begins with the work of Donald Vandenberg and transitions to Michael Peters before summarizing the work of two recent Heideggerian scholars on Heidegger’s pedagogy, Iain Thomson and Michael Ehrmantraut. Eduardo Duarte’s poetic phenomenology and James Magrini’s groundbreaking work on the ontological foundations of education close this section.

The study of Being within the field of education and philosophy of education largely begins with the work of Vandenberg. After completing his dissertation on the existential phenomenologies of Heidegger and Sartre as they may or may not inform moral education (1966), Vandenberg continued his scholarship to bring greater attention to the question of Being within philosophy of education. These attempts included a book-length study entitled Being and Education (1971) and contributions to edited collections on phenomenology, existentialism and education (1974; 1997). Vandenberg continued throughout his lifetime to explore these themes (2002; 2009) but also attempted to develop an all-encompassing theory of education built on an understanding of education as a human right (1990). The greatest contribution, however, was Vandenberg’s assistance in bringing Heidegger into conversation with philosophers of education (1974; 2008).

The first authentic intersection between philosophers of education and Heidegger’s philosophy came in an edited book by Peters (2002) entitled Heidegger, Education, and Modernity. In addition to Peters’ introduction, the text included the first English translation of the transcript of Heidegger’s deposition to the Committee on De-Nazification which offers a glimpse into Heidegger’s approach as a teacher of philosophy and his pedagogy. The translation is followed by ten essays from leading educational.
scholars that offer their own reflections on Heidegger's work and its significance for education and philosophy of education. A selection of these essays is presented below.

Gur-Ze‘ev (2002) offers an extended reflection on the possibilities of embracing Heideggerian philosophy to open the gate to counter-education. Thomson (2002), in an essay that eventually was folded into a longer work (Thomson, 2005), offers the best summary of Heidegger’s approach to ontological education to date. Bonnett (2002) frames education as a form of the poetic and incorporates Heidegger’s thinking on authenticity and poetic thinking to enrich our understanding of the teacher-student relationship. Peters is quick to remind readers that the text is only the first of its kind as a connection between Heidegger and education. Peters’ claim was true but only for a short time. A recent special issue was published in *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (subsequently published as an edited collection) showcasing interest in phenomenology and educational philosophy (Dall’Alba, 2009). Within this collection, Brook (2009) and Dall’Alba (2009) draw inspiration from the work of Heidegger’s phenomenology to help explore their educational questions.

Within Heideggerian scholarship, the question of Heidegger’s thought and education has largely been taken up by Iain Thomson. Beginning with his dissertation work into Heidegger and ontotheology (1999), through an early essay that explored Heidegger and ontological education (2001), Thomson has been exploring the connections between education, technology, and Heidegger’s thought. In a recent text that brings together four separate essays into book form, Thomson (2005) argues that to fully grasp Heidegger’s thought as a whole, scholars must understand the role that ontotheology plays throughout the philosopher’s thinking. This greater and more foundational understanding of Heidegger’s understanding of ontotheology has implications for many of the insights that can be gained for his later thought, including technology and education.
Thomson cites a succinctly phrased outline of the ontotheological nature of the question of Being\(^9\) offered by Heidegger in *Kant’s Thesis on Being*:

If we recollect the history of Western-European thinking once more, then we will encounter the following: The question of [b]eing, as the question of the being of entities, is double in form. On the one hand, it asks: What is an entity in general as an entity? In the history of philosophy, reflections which fall within the domain of this question acquire the title ontology. The question “What is an entity?” [or “What is that which is?”] simultaneously asks: Which entity is the highest [or supreme, *höchste*] entity, and in what sense is it? This is the question of God and of the divine. We call the domain of this question theology. This duality in the question of the being of entities can be united under the title ontotheology. (1992, 340).

Thomson writes with his sights set on the entirety of Heidegger’s thinking and writings, with particular focus given to his work beginning in the 1940s onward that was heavily influenced by Nietzsche. Heideggerian scholars and philosophers who follow in his wake, Thomson argues, misunderstand and misinterpret Heidegger’s complex understanding of ontotheology. Only by recognizing Heidegger’s ontotheological approach to metaphysics can we best situate his political activities with National Socialism, gain clarity from his unique approach to the philosophy of technology, and address the “instrumentalization, professionalization, vocationalization, corporatization, and technologization of the modern university” (Thomson, 2005, 4-5) via a reontologization of education.

Ehrmantraut (2010) published a study entitled *Heidegger’s Philosophic Pedagogy* that situates Heidegger primarily as a thoughtful and careful teacher of philosophy. Ehrmantraut argues that all of Heidegger’s discourse, from his lecture courses to his public addresses and philosophical writings, can be viewed as pedagogical documents. He takes as his starting point an often overlooked quote about the meaning of philosophy near the end of *Being and Time*:

That science can become practical is indeed now the authentic justification of all science. But the mathematical praxis is not the only one. *The practical aim of our standpoint is one that is pedagogical in the*

\(^9\) Thomson does not render Being with a capital B in his writings. I have noted what should be understood as Being as Being with brackets [ ].
widest and deepest sense of the word. It is the soul of all true philosophy and the truth of Plato and Aristotle. (BT, 402; emphasis added).

Philosophy must be understood, therefore, as a mode of praxis that requires its own kind of pedagogy. Ehrmantraut draws inspiration from Heidegger’s lecture courses between 1928 and 1935 in addition to Being and Time and other key texts, including the infamous Rectoral Address, to demonstrate that education and pedagogy is critical to Heidegger’s understanding and approach to philosophy. Ehrmantraut’s analysis uncovers a Heideggerian pedagogy where a ‘living philosophizing’ is key to leadership, politics, and educational practice.

Returning to philosophy of education, Duarte’s (2012) recent book Being and Learning: A Poetic Phenomenology of Education offers a passionate and intriguing approach to the question of Being and the teaching and learning endeavour. Duarte calls on Plato, Aristotle, and Heidegger (among others) to weave what he calls a poetic phenomenology aimed at revealing his insight that “Teaching arouses a circumturning towards Being” (p. 1). Being, Duarte notes, is always in excess and develops a number of ways to argue for learning as an act of beholding Being. He writes of the learner,

In becoming teachable, by attuning ourselves to Being’s presencing-absencing, we choose the ‘risk’ of engaging in letting learning happen by placing ourselves in the ‘draft’ and drawing others unto this unstable ground, the path of possibility on the hermeneutic landscape, the horizon of interpretation. This possibility emerges as excess, as a spilling over, and indicates our fundamentally poetic ‘nature,’ that is, the poetic quality of Being (p. 9).

In inquiring into Plato’s dialogues, Socrates as the epitome of a learner, and contemplative-meditative thinking, Duarte convincingly demonstrates that his poetic phenomenology is up to the task of naming the excess of Being.

Magrini represents the final voice of the most recent attempts to utilize Heideggerian philosophy to rethink education and being in education. In addition to his other published works (Magrini, 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b), he has also published a book-length study (2014) where he collects a number of his writings to craft a critique of what he terms social instrumentalism and instrumentalism in educational practice. Magrini begins by situating himself within the fields of curriculum studies and philosophy
of education before launching into “practicing education-philosophy.” Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology grounds his thinking as he analyzes the language of learning and teaching, what it means to “be-educated,” and how philosophical hermeneutics can be of service to a fundamental ontology appropriate to educational practice. For Magrini, being in education is a mode of Heidegger’s distinction of being-in-the-world as a being-with-others-in-learning. While space limits a full explication of this critical Heideggerian distinction, being-in-the-world is “[a] metonym for ‘Dasein,’ [that] signifies the holistic or unified phenomenon in terms of which Heidegger explicates Dasein’s worldhood, who Dasein is (particularly in its average everydayness), and the basic existential (the ways it is in the world)” (Dahlstrom, 2013). As a mode of being-in-the-world, Magrini argues that being-with-others-in-learning is a necessary “reconceptualization” of education as an ontological phenomenon. Magrini’s thinking of Being in education laid the groundwork for much of Chapter 6 below.

In this section, four contemporary perspectives into the question of Being in teaching from philosophy of education were shared. Additionally, two Heideggerian scholars who have recently published studies on Heideggerian pedagogy and ontological education were offered to provide context beyond educational scholarship. The present inquiry follows the work of these scholars in Peters’ (2002) call for inquiry into Heidegger’s thinking and philosophy of education with a specific focus on the question of Being in teaching. Specifically, in this study I aim to approach Being with others in teaching in an ontological and phenomenologically-informed manner.

**Outline of the Study**

The influence of Heidegger, an introduction to the Ur-phenomenon of Being, and the need for the present inquiry have been addressed above. This section describes the textual and conceptual layout of the document. The thesis consists of seven chapters. Each chapter can be understood as a pathway of thinking that approaches the question of Being in teaching in a different manner. Four of the pathways are best understood.

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10 Paths and pathways are important in Heidegger’s thinking and the reference here is deliberate.
as making up the traditional components of an academic study: (1) introduction and personal background, (2) literature review of the phenomena in question, (3) overview of the chosen methodology and its appropriateness for the phenomena in question, and (4) a conclusion that summarizes the work completed and gestures toward the implications of the thinking. In addition to these four paths, three chapters will serve as phenomenological “cases,” three ways of thinking Being in teaching: teaching as worlding, attunement, and the danger of Enframing. The following briefly describes the seven paths.

The first path (Chapter 1) introduces and frames the thinking situating the document as part of an ongoing personal journey of questioning and reflection. The second and third paths (Chapters 2 and 3) are interrelated as the second is concerned with Being in teaching and the third on phenomenological ontology as a method for approaching Being in teaching. The fourth pathway (Chapter 4) appropriates Heidegger’s distinction of being-in-the-world and explores how teaching might be informed by the phenomena of world, or teaching-as-worlding. In the fifth path (Chapter 5) the ontological distinction of attunement (Befindlichkeit) from Heidegger’s Being and Time is analyzed via its connection with Dasein-as-teacher. Grasping attunement as a feature of a teacher’s Dasein, or being-in-the-world, opens even more possibilities for teaching. The sixth pathway (Chapter 6) situates Heidegger’s ontological distinction of Enframing (Gestell) as the dangerous ground of modern metaphysics and also therefore our everyday understandings of the tasks, techniques and relationships that make up the activity commonly understood as teaching. More importantly, a phenomenological reflection on how teaching and learning are constricted by this distinction is offered with the ultimate aim of opening a space for new possibilities in these areas. The seventh and final path looks “back” at the previous six pathways while primarily identifying possibilities and phenomenological inquiry to be completed in the future.

The study aims to open up and ask the question of Being in teaching phenomenologically and ontologically via each chapter or pathway independently and also collectively. The chapters are structured and ordered such that one chapter builds and “makes way” for the following chapter(s). For example, vocabulary is provided and discussed in Chapter 2 that is needed to understand and approach Chapter 3. From the
methodological reflections of Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 there is a leap in thinking as Chapter 4 begins an in-depth analysis of the Heideggerian distinction of world, the first of the three “cases.” World is followed by attunement, and both distinctions are subsumed in the final case of Enframing. World, attunement, and Enframing should be understood and approached as three possibilities for sponsoring and supporting the question of Being in teaching. At present, educational practice and scholarship is inundated with educational technologies and my treatment of Enframing is offered as an additional voice within this ongoing conversation. World and attunement were chosen from my lived experience as a teacher and doctoral student; “world” as a result of a late night philosophical conversation during a conference road trip and “attunement” from the interests and insights of my senior supervisor. Both world and attunement provide, I think, fresh ground from which to think and ask what it means to be a teacher. There are other distinctions and concepts that could also be referenced to support an inquiry such as this one including truth as aletheia, time or temporality, and art/poeisis as a mode or manner of thinking. While I have selected world, attunement, and Enframing to guide the present inquiry, I look forward to continued conceptual work with these additional distinctions as I continue to inquire into the question of Being in teaching and learning.

The language and tone of the inquiry

The inquiry will be conducted by way of a phenomenological ontology into the Being of teaching. World, attunement, and the danger of Enframing will each be approached and analyzed phenomenologically, that is, through the lived experience of being-in-the-world-as-teacher. Given that the relationship between Being and language is complex and multifaceted, and that even using the word Being to describe the phenomenon in question must be at best tentative, the way that the study is languaged must be described.

In general, each approach is prefaced with a section on the vocabulary that is incorporated in order to facilitate the phenomenological explication that follows. For example, grasping Heidegger’s distinction of world (Chapter 4) requires an understanding of Dasein, ontology, world, worlding, and being-in-the-world. After introducing the language necessary for each path, I build a description and analysis of
the distinction as it bears upon Being in teaching. To accomplish this requires not only phenomenological language but also autobiographical vignettes that demand a shift in voice and tone. The success of the inquiry will be in its ability to bring into relief the question of Being in teaching by relying on the power of language to reveal a phenomenon that so quickly conceals itself in that same language. Words are not synonymous with Being and are surely not representations of Being, but are always formal indications of what must be thought and expressed. Language is addressed as a feature of Heidegger’s thinking and therefore in the expressing of the question of Being in teaching in Chapter 3.

The challenges of thinking the question of Being in teaching through language that most often reduces ideas to simple representations is important to consider because the manner of the inquiry must grasp at words and concepts to name and call forth that which conceals itself so readily in this same language. Heidegger writes, “With a worn-out language everybody can talk about everything.” As such, the meanings of certain concepts and words must be loosened and allowed to remain slightly blurry for to hold too tightly will be to engage in the everydayness of talking and thinking that allows language to wither and wilt. Therefore, language becomes not simply a representing of beings in the world but an essential interpreting and translating of Being. Consider Heidegger’s reflections on translation within SS 1942:

A dictionary can provide an indication for understanding a word but it is never a simple authority that would be binding a priori. The appeal to a dictionary is always an appeal to an interpretation of language which is often not grasped at all in its style and limits.

Considered in view of the historical spirit of a language as a whole, no dictionary provides an immediate standard; and none is binding....

There is no translation at all in which the words of one language could or should cover the words of another language....

Translation is an awakening, clarifying, and unfolding of one’s own language by coming to grips with the foreign language.

We will spend a great deal of time naming, distinguishing, describing, and appropriating Heidegger’s highly specialized terminology. These linguistic explorations are not casual forays into phonology or pragmatics, but rigorous engagements with the
way that language informs and delimits our ability to think and inscribe the question of Being in teaching.

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter introduced the present study by tracing the influence of Heidegger, sketched a beginning interpretation of the question of Being, described the needs of the inquiry, and outlined the chapters to come. Specifically, the inquiry offers seven paths as possibilities into the question of Being in teaching. The three pathways beyond the traditionally accepted and expected paths (personal background, literature review, and methodology) of world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing have been selected because each addresses a readily accessible and timely concern within the teaching profession. I selected these three as possible paths to the question of Being in teaching based on my professional practice as a teacher and in my own scholarship into philosophy and philosophy of education. World, attunement, and the danger of Enframing are not exclusive, and are certainly not the best or most effective distinctions to use in such an inquiry. However, it is my hope that through these three Heideggerian distinctions I can offer new ways of thinking, talking, and writing about teaching that honor the profession, my own experience as a teacher, and the experiences of my peers and future teachers that I teach. Therefore, I offer the following inquiry as a contribution at the intersection of teacher education and educational technology conversations. In concluding the first pathway, we arrive at the beginning of the second path for a fuller explication of the Ur-phenomenon of Being.
Chapter 2. The Ur-Phenomenon of Being

The question of Being in teaching gives pause to think. Not only is the wording strange (What is a question of Being?), but the meaning of Being and “in teaching” is unclear and unspecific (“What does it mean to be in teaching?” is one possible interpretation of the question that, while pointing in the right direction, does not fully grasp the question of Being as such). However, odd wording and lack of clarity aside, the pause inspired by the question is not easily summarized, nor is it easy to grasp and bound. Heidegger writes in Being and Time that the phenomenon of Being is that which is closest to and yet also farthest away from human beings (p. 13).

This pathway is focused on gaining access to the primary phenomenon guiding the inquiry: Being. Therefore, to begin we must first distinguish how the word Being is referenced. The entire argument of what follows collapses without a sketch of the phenomenon in question. With Being indicated, we turn to the influence of Heidegger on this inquiry including a discussion of his lifetime of thought, his Being as a teacher of philosophy, and the unfortunate confluence with National Socialism in the middle of his career. An overview of key terms needed to grasp Being follows before transitioning into the primary topic for the following path (Chapter 3), the way into the question of Being via phenomenological ontology.

Approaching Being

Distinguishing the ways that Being can be defined and used for analysis in raising the question of Being is the most crucial ground from which to start. Heidegger’s

“one thought” throughout his career was the meaning of Being. While he used other words and phrases to name the fundamental matter for thought including *das Ereignis, aletheia, and die Lichtung*\(^\text{12}\), each is but another approach to the same Ur-phenomenon of Being (Capobianco, 2010). This much is generally accepted by Heideggerian scholars, with Thomas Sheehan (2001; 2014) and Kenneth Maly (1993) offering compelling arguments to the contrary. However, what are not as well understood are the different senses of Being that Heidegger used to guide his analysis. This is due in part to a difficulty in translating the nuanced manner in which Heidegger attempted to communicate his thinking of Being from German into English. Capobianco (2010) notes that Heidegger’s own fuzzy and inconsistent use of language also complicates an adequate grasping of the sense in which he approaches the question of Being. Two other difficulties that lie at the core of his thinking, truth and language, will be discussed along the pathway of phenomenological ontology (Chapter 3). But first, we must gain clarity on what sense of Being is in question at present and how this sense then frames the understanding of teaching.

**In the Whatness and Thatness of being**

The first and easiest access to Being is the traditional sense: by understanding being as a being or an entity. Within educational practice and scholarship this understanding of being is readily accessible. Practitioners and scholars can easily list off beings necessary to the practice and study of education including students, teachers, subject matters, learning objectives, grades, desks, and computers. Put differently, this sense of being is concerned with the *what* of a particular being or entity. While this is the common sense view of being, this view assumes an understanding of Being as what is present and lasting, or enduring. We should be wary of understanding Being as a being for the present inquiry because almost all research and thinking into education assumes this definition of being. As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, much educational research operates from and within an epistemological standpoint that covers over and conceals

\(^{12}\) Common translations of these terms include “event of appropriation” (*das Ereignis*), “unconcealment” (*aletheia*), and “the clearing” (*die Lichtung*). For Heidegger, each was used as an indicator of a way of thinking and approaching Being.
ontological inquiry that encourages reductive ways of being and essentially limits possibilities of being a teacher.

If the traditional understanding of Being is the concrete grasping of being as a particular being, then the second and related sense is more abstract. This manner of approaching Being is typically described as the being of a being, such as the being of a student or the being of a subject matter. This mode of understanding Being is also described as the beingness of beings or a being’s essential presence or essence. Whereas understanding Being as a being or entity focuses on the what of a being, understanding Being as the being of a being aims for that which a being is in such or such a way. Even as this second manner of approaching Being becomes more difficult to grasp in language, it is of direct concern for the present inquiry into raising the question of Being in teaching.

For example, put in another way, questioning about the Being of teaching can be somewhat captured in the questions: “What does it mean to be a teacher?” and “Who and how is the being that teaches?” When asked, this type of question is usually addressed within the mode of understanding Being as a being rather than the being of Being. Traditionally heard, these questions seem to be asking about a set of essential qualities or capacities that constitute “being a teacher.” This could be explained by the limits of the human being’s ability to use language to distinguish the manner of this questioning, and this is addressed in Chapter 3 on Heidegger’s thinking on language. Regardless, for Heidegger these two senses of being, as an entity of enduring presence and the beingness of being, represent the core concern of metaphysics. However, Heidegger’s thinking of Being is altogether different from metaphysics as traditionally understood and it is in this sense that the term Being is used in this inquiry into Being in teaching.

In the Ur-Phenomenon of Being

Richard Polt selects the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as the keystone to unlocking Heidegger’s thinking of Being. This question comes at the conclusion of Heidegger’s 1929 inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg entitled
“What is Metaphysics?” and begins the 1935 lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Polt (1999) writes clearly regarding Heidegger’s fundamentally transformed understanding of Being:

[W]hat is it about our condition that lets Being have a meaning for us? In other words, why does it make a difference to us that there is something rather than nothing? This is a crucial question about ourselves – for if we were indifferent to the difference between something and nothing, we would be sunk in oblivion. We constantly distinguish between something and nothing, by recognizing countless things as real while rejecting falsehoods and illusions. The process is at work not only in philosophy, but in the simplest everyday tasks: I recognize a pitcher as a being simply by reaching for its handle. It is clear that without our sensitivity to Being, we would not be human at all. Even for the most apathetic or shell-shocked individual, Being means something - although it is hard to put this meaning into words. We are now traveling the path of Heidegger’s thought. For Heidegger, these three questions belong together in such a way that they can be called the question of Being: he wants to notice the wonder that there is something rather than nothing, to ask what difference this makes, and to ask how it can make a difference to us. (p. 4)

Heidegger argues that metaphysics assumes and examines the difference between beings and their being, or remains locked in a dialogue concerned with entities and their essences. Heidegger’s thinking attempts to retrieve a more originary thinking of Being that reveals and reflects on the ontological difference between Being (with a capital B) and being. This understanding is written Being as Being (and with the capital B at present) to be distinguished from being as an entity or the beingness of a being that marks the assumptions of metaphysical thinking. The ontological difference is described in *Being and Time* as the difference between the ontic (beings; beings in their beingness) and the ontological (Being as Being) (the ontological difference is addressed specifically in Chapter 3). However, “The Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being” (BT, 26) and the ontological difference can best be understood as the difference this claim makes to us as human beings.

The ontological difference is often reflected in terminology, such as the difference between beings and Being, or between the ontic and the ontological. While the ontological difference was preeminent in Heidegger’s thought in lecture courses and writings from the 1920s, this key distinction in allowing for catching sight of Being remains a feature of his thought for the remainder of his career (see Harman, 2007, pp.
It is being so wrapped up in our own existence that makes the idea or thinking of Being—much less the asking of the question of Being—so tricky and arduous. No wonder that Heidegger describes Being as that which is closest yet farthest away (BT, p. 13). For example, a building is a being, but the Being of the building is itself not a being. How then do we gain access to Being? Heidegger suggests that one clue might be through the sense of smell:

One can, as it were, smell the Being of such buildings, and often after decades one still has the scent in one’s nose. The scent provides the Being of this being much more directly and truly than it could be communicated by any description or inspection. (IM, p. 26)

School buildings, hallways, and classrooms are said to have their own specific smells about them. Upon arrival, a quick inhale can transport one back in time. The question of Being in teaching, as Heidegger intimates, may be more about the nose than the roles human beings embody.

**Being in teaching**

Given that teaching has been left undefined thus far (as opposed to, for example, teaching in higher education, K-12 classrooms, or vocational/trades), we can conceive of teaching as broadly as possible as a human capacity and endeavour. Teaching and teacher education, understood in this expansive manner, includes an immense number of subfields that span formal/informal settings, subject areas or disciplines, and age (K-12, postsecondary, adult learning). There exist thriving areas of scholarship and philosophical study in each context of teaching. However, the present study is aimed at engaging meaningfully with the lived experience of being a teacher, regardless of being a *math* teacher, or nurse instructor, or a swim coach for eight to nine year olds. Teaching itself, as a phenomenon of human connection and relationships, can benefit profoundly from further ontological analysis.

Why raise the question of Being in teaching at all? In addition to Magrini’s (2014) call for greater thought in relation to the efficiency and instrumental dominance in education, philosopher of education Michael A. Peters (2005; 2009) has argued for bringing Heidegger, the thinker of Being, into greater dialogue within philosophy of
education. Peters (2009) writes: “Heidegger and his forms of phenomenology have been a neglected feature in the field of philosophy of education in the English speaking world … a convincing argument can be made for the centrality of his philosophy to education” (Peters, 2009, xi-x). The present inquiry is a contribution to this “convincing argument.” Considering Heidegger not only as a philosopher but also as a teacher is worthy of reflection given that “[n]o philosopher since Socrates was so committed to questions of education and to good teaching as Heidegger” (Peters, 2009, xi). Donald Vandenberg, an early advocate for the intersection of Heidegger’s thinking and educational scholarship and practice, asks a poignant question in arguing for the thinking of Being in teaching:

How can Heidegger’s analysis of human existence as being there, as Dasein, as articulated in his magnum opus, help us to understand the educational journey of becoming who one can become, oneself, as distinct from becoming what other people want one to be, rather than who one is? (2008, p. 261)

Approaching the answer to Vandenberg’s question requires a further description of the way of Heidegger’s thinking. Before turning to additional terminology that will be helpful for the inquiry, we turn now to look specifically at the influence of Heidegger on the present study.

The influence of Heidegger

Heidegger as the thinker of Being

The thinking of Martin Heidegger drives and grounds the present study. Any inquiry into Being must situate itself in relation to Heidegger. With the possible exception of the Ancient Greeks, no other thinker, philosopher, or teacher has had such a profound influence on modern philosophy and its (lack of) inquiry into Being and ontology as Heidegger. In a lecture course offered in 1951-1952 titled What is Called Thinking
Heidegger writes: “The thinker needs one thought only” (p. 50). For Heidegger, this one thought was the question of Being.¹³

Beginning largely with Donald Vandenberg (1966; 1971), philosophers of education have found the intersection of Heidegger’s thinking and educational philosophy a fruitful ground for continued inquiry (Dall’Alba, 2009; Magrini, 2014; Peters, 2002). Influential philosophers outside the field of philosophy of education have also explored education and Heidegger’s work (e.g., Ehrmantraut, 2010; Thomson, 2005). The present study follows in the wake of these scholars in seeking inspiration and guidance into approaching the question of Being in teaching through Heidegger’s thinking. But the inquiry is neither a thinking of Heidegger, teaching, and Being nor is it a thinking as Heidegger, teaching, and Being. This study is a thinking with and, moreso, beyond Heidegger. In the introductory section of The Question Concerning Technology (1977), Heidegger’s most summative essay on the philosophy of technology, the editor and translator offers an informative observation:

Heidegger is primarily a teacher. He does not wish to travel alone and then report what he has seen, nor does he wish to go as a guide merely pointing out objects along the road. He wishes the reader to accompany him on the way, to participate with him, and even to begin to build his own way through thinking, and not merely to hear about what it is or should be. (p. xvi, emphasis added)

The present inquiry thinks beyond Heidegger by honouring Heidegger’s way of thinking and teaching. The very notion of a “Heideggerian philosophy” is in direct conflict with the whole of his thinking. In short, I aim to appropriate and adapt Heidegger’s language and thinking of the question of Being to further ontological study into the everyday practices of teaching. This approach is of a different kind to others who offer significant contributions as to what Heidegger said or thought about teaching, either in general as a phenomenon of study or as a reflection of his own pedagogical practices. We will turn to this trajectory of scholarship in a moment, but only to contextualize the

¹³ Also, Heidegger (1979): “All great thinkers think the same. Yet this ‘same’ is so essential and so rich that no single thinker exhausts it.” (p. 36). That Heidegger’s singular thought was the meaning or truth of Being is not a settled matter, however. For a recent counter-argument, see Sheehan (2014), Making sense of Heidegger: A paradigm shift.
present inquiry. To accomplish the goal of the inquiry will require the introduction and discussion of many of Heidegger’s ontologically-charged terms. As we move forward, I understand that finding the appropriate words to ground and situate the concepts needed to illuminate Being in teaching will be tedious. I am also assuming that this languaging can be accomplished through one of Heidegger’s primary methods of questioning, namely formally indicating ideas without the terms limiting the meaning and thinking of the concepts.\(^{15}\) By formally indicating these ontologically-charged terms in each pathway, world attunement, and the danger of Enframing can be presented and thought through to explore how the question of Being in teaching can be approached and what new possibilities can be revealed as a result. Here I take my cue from Richard Polt’s discussion of Heidegger’s process of addressing a concept in BT:

> Once again, Heidegger is using a concept before defining it. However, before readers get too annoyed with him, they should reflect that when it comes to fundamental concepts, this is the only way of going about things. A definition of a concept is effective only if we already understand the concepts we use in the definition. The most basic concepts have to be formed and communicated not by giving definitions, but by paying attention to phenomena and developing increasingly detailed descriptions. (1999, p. 52).

Before encountering further terminological concerns, a brief summary of Heidegger’s career is presented. This is shared because Heidegger’s conceptual vocabulary is discussed in depth in each of the pathways to come relative to his teaching and writing. To contextualize the overarching theme of Being in teaching, a sketch of Heidegger’s comments on education and teaching is shared. This is followed by a final subsection addressing Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism.

**Heidegger’s Career**

Given the dominance of Heidegger for the present inquiry, a sketch of his career as a philosopher and teacher are worthy of discussion. Heidegger was born in Meßkirch, Baden, Germany in 1889 and died in 1976, at the age of 86. Heidegger was originally on

\(^{15}\) Formal indication as a way of philosophizing is addressed specifically in Chapter 3 as a feature of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology.
the pathway to the priesthood influenced by his father’s work as the local sexton, but 
evertheless found himself studying mathematics and philosophy at the University of 
Freiburg. An encounter with the work of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl (among 
others, of course) set Heidegger on the path of his lifetime of thinking into Being. After 
parting with theology, Heidegger completed his dissertation in 1913 on psychologism 
under the direction of Arthur Schneider, and completed his habilitation in 1915 under 
Heinrich Rickert.\(^{17}\)

In 1919, Heidegger returned from war service to work as Husserl’s assistant in 
Freiburg. There he worked alongside Husserl and taught courses that show evidence of 
the trajectory of his career. For example, in the first semester he taught after returning to 
Freiburg in the “war emergency semester” Heidegger offered a course that indicated 
many of the key ideas of his middle and later thinking. In Chapter 4 we will consider this 
lecture course at it relates to Heidegger’s thinking of “world.” In 1923, Heidegger was 
granted an extraordinary professorship at the University of Marburg where he taught 
many of his most famous students including Hannah Arendt, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and 
Karl Lowith. When Husserl retired in 1928, Heidegger returned to Freiburg to assume his 
chair in philosophy. Heidegger remained on faculty at Freiburg until 1967. Heidegger 
taught from 1928 until 1946 when French occupation forces banned him from teaching 
and conducting university business. This decision was, in part, due to his relationship to 
National Socialism during his 1933-1934 Rectorate, which is discussed below. When 
Heidegger was allowed to resume teaching in 1950 he was granted emeritus status and 
taught off and on until 1967. This is not to say that Heidegger did not teach at all in the 
periods between 1946-1950 and up until his death. He regularly held private tutoring 
sessions and seminars for students in his home throughout his later period. These 
seminars and lecture protocols have recently been published and offer critical insights 
into the continuity of Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking.\(^{19}\)

\(^{17}\) I, like all those who follow Heidegger’s pathways of thought, are deeply indebted to the work of 
Ted Kisiel (1993; 2007). Most of what follows is directly informed by Kisiel’s scholarship into the 
early Heidegger.

\(^{19}\) See, e.g., *Zolliken Seminars*, *Four Seminars*, and *Heraclitus Seminars* 1966-67.
Other than his magnum opus *Being and Time*, “the Kant book,”\(^{20}\) and a handful of other essays and lectures, Heidegger did not publish much during his lifetime. Most of what is used to study Heidegger’s thinking to date includes an enormous collection of his lecture courses taught at Marburg and Freiburg as well as lectures given in other public settings. Some lectures have been published directly from Heidegger’s own personal notes. Other courses have been pieced together based on fragments provided by Heidegger and course notes or transcripts provided by his students. Heidegger’s collected works, often simply referenced as the Gesamtausgabe (GA), now number over 100 volumes and have yet to be fully published even in German (English translations are still unavailable for a third of the GA).

There are two useful schemas for referencing Heidegger’s thinking and life\(^{21}\). The first comes from William Richardson, author of *Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought*, a key text that brought Heidegger’s thinking to English philosophers and thinkers. Richardson argues that we can best understanding Heidegger’s thinking in two parts: Heidegger I, roughly the Heidegger of *Being and Time* up until the early- to mid-1930s, and Heidegger II, the later Heidegger. In Richardson’s framework, Heidegger I’s thinking of the fundamental ontology of Dasein (terms we will encounter below) shifts in a “turn” (Kehre) that occurs in the 1930s to Heidegger II’s thinking of the historicality of Being in relation to such themes as technology and poetry. Published in 1963, Richardson’s text influenced a generation of Heidegger scholars that, for the most part, adopted the distinction of the two Heideggers. However, at present this dichotomy appears a bit too simplistic and is being reevaluated by more recent scholars.

Theodore Kisiel has devoted at least two decades of his life to examining Heidegger’s early life and thinking, primarily from 1914 (the Dissertation) up until 1927 (the publication of *Being and Time*). His first book-length study, *The Genesis of Being and Time* (1993), focuses on the war emergency lecture courses from 1919 and walks step-by-step through the development and writing of *Being and Time*. The second, *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910-1927* (2007),

\(^{20}\) *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (GA3), first published in 1929. I use the phrase “the Kant book” as it was derisively phrased by Heidegger later in his career.

\(^{21}\) At least that are available in and commonly accepted within English language scholarship.
traces other themes from Heidegger’s thinking that may or may not have been absorbed into *Being and Time*. In his biographical, chronological, and doxographical work into Heidegger’s thinking, Kisiel developed a “convenient periodization” that is more nuanced than Richardson’s Heidegger I and II: young, early, older, and later\(^{22}\).

The young Heidegger  
Up to 1919

The early Heidegger  
1919-29

The later Heidegger  
The thirties to the fifties, also “middle Heidegger”  
(Thomson, 2010)

The old Heidegger  
Late fifties onward

We will use Kisiel’s categorization to quickly refer to the various phases of Heidegger’s life and thinking. Specifically, we will reference the early Heidegger in the paths concerning world and attunement, and the later Heidegger to approach the danger of the Enframing. While the present inquiry is not specifically concerned with Heidegger’s thinking of and on teaching, it is helpful to glimpse his personae as a teacher and to contextualize his written statements on teaching and pedagogy. This is the topic of the next subsection.

**Heidegger as teacher and on education**

It is useful and enlightening to consider how Heidegger, a teacher and philosopher who spent a lifetime exploring and posing the question of the meaning of Being, understood and conceptualized his pedagogy within the educational contexts he worked. There is a growing interest in Heidegger-as-teacher and what might be called a “Heideggerian pedagogy” as separate from Heidegger’s writings and public statements made about teaching, learning, and higher education. This section will approach both of these realms of scholarship before discussing Heidegger and National Socialism and transitioning to a summary of key terms.

\(^{22}\) Kisiel (1993).
Heidegger was famous for his commanding presence as a teacher and public speaker. Students and auditors of his lectures have documented his presence as “nothing short of electrifying” (Polt, 1999, p. 19) as he guided his listeners through his analyses into the Being of the phenomenon in question. Much of what is commonly known about his teaching personae is provided through student accounts including those of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Löwith, Walter Biemel, and Hannah Arendt.

Gadamer writes:

What he provided was the full investment of his energy, and what brilliant energy it was. It was the energy of a revolutionary thinker who himself visibly shrank from the boldness of his increasingly radical questions and who was so filled with the passion of his thinking that he conveyed to his listeners a fascination that was not to be broken ... Who among those who then followed him can forget the breathtaking swirl of questions that he developed in the introductory hours of the semester only to entangle himself in the second or third of these questions and then, in the final hours of the semester, to roll up deep-dark clouds of sentences from which the lightning flashed to leave us half stunned? (1985, p. 48)

Students and other thinkers came from across Europe to attend his lectures and seminars to experience and participate in Heidegger’s teaching. Hannah Arendt, another famous and successful student (and also lover) of Heidegger, notes:

People followed the rumour about Heidegger in order to learn thinking. What was experienced was that thinking as a pure activity ... can become a passion which not so much rules and oppresses all other capacities and gifts, as it orders them and prevails throughout them. We are so accustomed to the old opposition of reason versus passion, spirit versus life, that the idea of a passionate thinking, in which thinking and aliveness become one, takes us somewhat aback. (1978, p. 297).

And this summary from Walter Biemel:

Those who [knew] Martin Heidegger only through his published writings [could] hardly form an idea of the unique style of his teaching. Even with beginners, he was able in no time to coax them into thinking, not just learning various views or reproducing what they had read, but entering into the movement of thinking. It seemed as if by some miracle the Socratic practice of address and rejoinder had come to life again. (1976, p. 7)
Polt (1999), who cites a number of other accounts provided by Heidegger's students, also offers a cautionary note. Heidegger's presence as teacher can also be characterized as bewitching, enticing, and even erotic. "In the recently published volume of Hegel seminars, Heidegger proudly or defiantly asserts that he's right to be called 'the one the students don't learn anything from': 'Here you'll learn nothing, practically speaking!' (GA 86: 559-560)' (Polt, 2014). These characterizations need continued reflection and thought.

In addition to student accounts, there are more than a few references to teaching, learning, pedagogy, education, and higher education within Heidegger's corpus than is usually recognized. Sometimes these references are provided through the editors and translators of Heidegger's work. At other points, translators offer observations based on the lecture transcripts and student notes used to produce the published editions. Many are quick to reference Heidegger's comments on teaching and learning from the first lecture of the 1951 lecture course What is called thinking?. Not surprisingly, in his translator's introduction Gray writes:

As his succinct remarks about teaching early in these lectures bears witness, Heidegger regards teaching as an exalted activity which has nothing to do with 'becoming a famous professor' or an expert in one's field. Instead, he likens it to the master-apprentice relation of the medieval guilds, where the purpose of the teaching craft is to 'let learning occur.' This can take place only when the teacher is 'more teachable than the apprentices,' able to impart by his own example the proper relatedness to the subject matter being learned. (1968, pp. xvii-xviii)

This oft-cited passage from What is called thinking? is usually cited not only as a case study of Heidegger's teaching but also as a philosophy of education or teaching in its own right. Riley (2011) even refers to this section as Heidegger's "brief on teaching." In fact, Heidegger's "brief" spans multiple pages despite what is commonly cited and is not the most coherent reflection of his teaching as we will find below.

From student accounts to translator's notes, we come to Heidegger's words:

True. Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what
teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing else be learned than—learning. His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by ‘learning’ we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information. The teacher is ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far more to learn than they—he has to learn to let them learn. The teacher must be capable of being more teachable than the apprentices. The teacher is far less assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the authoritative sway of the official. It still is an exalted matter, then, to become a teacher—which is something else entirely than becoming a famous professor. (WCT, pp. 14–15).

Unpacking and analyzing the ideas Heidegger presents here at the very beginning of this lecture course is beyond the scope of this chapter and indeed this study. While these ideas are important and are on the surface a clear and somewhat concise description of teaching and learning, this passage does not exhaust Heidegger’s thinking on education. Riley (2011) in particular cites this passage without contextualizing it within the whole of Heidegger’s thinking. This limitation is common within educational philosophy that attempts to draw inspiration from Heidegger’s works (Vandenberg, 2008). Further analysis of this passage from WCT and other references to teaching made by Heidegger are planned for a future inquiry. However, given that my study aims to raise the question of Being in teaching rather than focus on Heidegger’s specific thinking on teaching, learning, and education, references to these thoughts should be understood and heard as providing contextual significance in contrast to a complete analysis of Heidegger’s influence on teaching and learning.

In addition to these broad reflections on teaching and learning, Heidegger had grave concerns about the present and future state of higher education and philosophy in particular. He writes in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*:

The widespread sterility of academic philosophy courses is ... caused by the attempt to instruct the students with the well-known broad brushstrokes, in possibly one semester, about everything in the world, or about even more than that. One is supposed to learn to swim, but only goes meandering on the riverbank, converses about the murmuring of the stream, and talks about the cities and towns the river passes. This guarantees that the spark never flashes over to the individual student, kindling a light in him which can never be extinguished. (MFL, p. 7)
In an early essay entitled *Plato’s Teaching on Truth*, Heidegger grounds an original conception of the Greek *paideia* through a close reading of Plato’s cave allegory that has been referenced and examined by many philosophers and philosophers of education. Heidegger’s interpretation of the allegory is unique and offers a transformed understanding of the purpose of education. Heidegger’s famous *Rectoral Address* is usually presented within the context or near the forefront of his political thinking, but recent scholarship is demonstrating the importance the speech has as a visionary document for university education (Ehrmantraut, 2010; Thomson, 2001). While the focus of my present inquiry is not Heidegger’s thinking and writing on education or teaching specifically, a future study is planned that will incorporate these critical ideas (including references to the dangerous rhetoric of the Rectoral Address). Another forgotten essay is *Traditional Language and Technological Language* (1998) that Heidegger presented as a lecture to a group of science teachers in 1962 in the vocational school of the State Academy for the Continuing Education of Teachers. While primarily seen as a foundational text in the philosophy of technology (that will be addressed in Chapter 6), this essay offers a recapitulation of a familiar theme for Heidegger (language and its connection to thinking and Being) couched within an educational context. All three of these writings are important for grasping Heidegger’s thinking and approach to teaching, learning, and university education but can only be referenced briefly here.

A much less cited yet even more crucial reflection of Heidegger’s pedagogy has been recently translated as the opening chapter of Peters’ (2002) edited collection *Heidegger, Modernity, and Education*. The translation is taken from the deposition Heidegger provided before the De-Nazification Committee on July 23, 1945. The Committee met and heard Heidegger’s statement and ultimately decided the fate of Heidegger’s teaching career: suspension. What is typical in the deposition statement is Heidegger’s unique approach to answering what might seem like straightforward questions into the influence of National Socialism and his teaching. What is interesting and rather atypical for Heidegger is the way in which he responds. The editor notes:

Apart from its historical merit, the deposition is of interest for its exposition of Heidegger’s views on higher education and pedagogy in general, which are not to be found elsewhere in any of his philosophical works, at least in such a sustained manner. Purposely departing from his signature style, Heidegger adopts a plainer idiom, less immersed in the characteristic
philosophical jargon, and provides a unique glimpse into the man himself
_in extenuis_. (2002, p. 43)

Taken as a whole, Heidegger does respond to the charges raised against him and his teaching, but, expectedly, he responds in his own way as “a testament.” As testimony, he returns to and repeats many common themes from his writings and lecture courses including the reductive nature of theoretical and logical analysis, truth as _aletheia_, and overcoming entrenched dichotomies. The pedagogical relationship between teacher and student is compared to the subject and object relation, a relation that the university has tainted with the preeminence of theory (p. 34). Heidegger acknowledges the technologization of the university when he writes:

What becomes clear is that the university as pedagogical community is constructed to be hierarchical and authoritarian: the student is subjected to the discipline of the teacher. Implicit in all of this, of course, is that the representation of the teacher is borrowed from _techne_ and its relations of production. It is precisely this reduction of education to the instrumental, by analogy with _techne_, that is the source of everything awry with the university today. (2002, p. 35)

Heidegger continues to diagnose the current state of pedagogy as regulated by the logic of contract and exchange. I quote here at length due not only to Heidegger’s specificity in his referencing to teaching and learning, but also as a testament to the current climate of university education:

By making theory into its principle, the university inevitably conditions the quality of the pedagogic relation. The result is an encounter between teacher and student, mediated by the theoretical abstraction, which regards the terms of this relation as a matter of minds meeting together in an act of speculation. Instead of starting with a conception of the teacher/student relation at once inflected by both head and hand, the university conceives the pedagogic process in conformity with the model of abstract exchange derived from theory, according to which the fundamental relation is that of mind to the world, regarded as a relation of subject to object by way of representation. The exchange abstraction is thus imparted to the learning experience from without to give it the form and substance of a _quid pro quo_, a relation in which the teacher offers something of value in return for something else of value from the student, the result being that pedagogy now becomes regulated by the logic of contract. Teacher and students always stand to each other, first and foremost, as parties to a contract. The contractualizing of pedagogy has, in fact, achieved such an axiomatic status within the university tradition
that discussion of educational reform, even supposed radical ones, simply take it for granted, ignoring ways of conceiving pedagogy innocent of contract as counter-intuitive. Indeed, one must go back to the figure of Socrates in order to find an example of teaching and learning at odds with the law of exchange. (p. 39)

One of culprits of this reduction in an understanding of teaching and learning is the central role that theory places in the life of the university. Higher education becomes mechanized and more a game of numbers than of educating:

Instruction is thus modeled on exchange: to teach, the teacher disregards the differences and distinctions within the concrete student manifold and addresses himself to the faceless, abstract student that is his counterpart. Likewise, to learn, the student abandons the idiosyncratic expressions of his life for a generic way of thinking that raises him to the level of the teacher. (2002, 40-41).

Heidegger’s critique of higher education and the technologization of pedagogy have been analyzed and addressed by modern philosophers (Bonnett, 1983; Magrini, 2014; Thomson, 2005) that draw inspiration from Heidegger’s other published works. The deposition before the De-Nazification Committee offers a unique perspective into Heidegger-as-teacher, a teacher who mesmerized and electrified students and classrooms, and who challenged traditional philosophies and approaches to teaching and learning. Heidegger’s radical presence as a teacher and philosopher offers greater context into the question of Being in teaching for the present inquiry. While this is not the focus of my study, it is important to recognize that there are references to teaching, learning, and education within Heidegger’s corpus that can be influential in engaging phenomenologically with his thinking in raising the question of Being in teaching. The next section describes and discusses Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism, an encounter that resulted in being banned from teaching and has left a monumental blemish on his public reception over the past 60 years.

**Heidegger and National Socialism**

If asking the question of Being requires an encounter with Heidegger, then engaging with Heidegger requires thoughtful reflection on his involvement with National Socialism. This section presents Heidegger’s direct involvement as Rector of the
University of Freiburg before treating the current scholarly and philosophical climate related to Heidegger’s thinking. I close this section with a personal note about how I have appropriated and approached Heidegger’s thinking before turning to key terminology needed for grasping Heidegger’s thinking of Being.

Heidegger’s Rectorship was referenced above as a point in time in Heidegger’s academic career. To date there remains a remarkable amount of folklore surrounding Heidegger’s rectorship, including: his election, the year as Rector, his resignation, his teaching while Rector, the Rectorial Address, his public and private reflections on the Rectorship, and his silence regarding the implications of his political involvement. Unfortunately, the scholarly conversation that addresses Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism devolves into a simple polarity. The extreme position lies in the recent work of Emmanuel Faye (2009) who argues fanatically that all of Heidegger’s philosophy has been tainted by National Socialism and therefore should not even be considered as philosophy. The opposing “side” may be best named “Heidegger apologists,” or those who believe they are able to wholly separate Heidegger’s politics from his philosophy. However, as Thomson (2005) indicates, this approach is distinctly reductive and not at all helpful or productive for continued dialogue. Many philosophers who follow the paths of thought laid out by Heidegger are readily able to distinguish the despicable behaviours and actions of Heidegger the person while still finding inspiration in his writings and thinking (see Feenberg, 2004; Polt, 2013; Sheehan, 2015). In fact, as we will work to uncover in Chapter 6 on the danger of Enframing, ultimately rejecting or neutralizing Heidegger’s thinking is in direct conflict with the fundamental distinctions within his lifetime of work.

Too often, however, those who leverage attacks on Heidegger’s philosophical thinking do so without having truly and carefully engaged with the key texts. For example, while Sheehan (2015) addresses Emmanuel Faye’s misconceptions about Heidegger and Nazism specifically, he also convincingly demonstrates that claims regarding Heidegger’s thinking as it may or may not be tainted with National Socialism demonstrate a lack of genuine scholarship into Heidegger’s work. Sheehan carefully addresses a selection of Faye’s claims and is able to debunk each one by demonstrating that only by reading and thinking through Heidegger’s work can one really grasp not only
Heidegger’s thinking but also engage meaningfully with his politics. In Appendix One I have included a list of writers who I feel are able to approach Heidegger’s thinking and his behaviors and actions during and after the Rectorate in a manner that remains balanced while not falling into the apologist trap.

Early in my doctoral work I took a seminar on the philosophy of technology with Andrew Feenberg. Feenberg (1999) has taken elements from Heidegger’s thinking on technology and the critical theoretical background from his mentor Herbert Marcuse (also a student of Heidegger) to develop his own “critical theory of technology.” In his seminar, Feenberg walked us through *The Question Concerning Technology* and rendered Heideggerian prose intelligible for the first time. This encounter ultimately gave me the courage to tackle *Being and Time* and also engage with Feenberg’s theory from within a philosophy of education perspective (Kruger-Ross, 2014a; in press). In his seminars, books, and other published writings, Feenberg engages with Heidegger’s thinking while acknowledging National Socialism but not apologizing for Heidegger’s actions. Feenberg also provides context to the unwritten relationships between Heidegger and his students. Thus, I find it possible to work and think with Heidegger while remaining alert to the ongoing scholarly conversation regarding Heidegger’s politics. This has included familiarizing myself with collections of correspondence with and recollections from Heidegger’s circle of colleagues, friends and family (e.g., his letters with Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt, and his wife; and memoirs composed by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Heinrich Wiegand Petzet). These writings, in addition to the continued work on the influence of National Socialism and Heidegger’s philosophy, have given me the confidence that there is much to be learned and gained in and through my study.

I indicated earlier that the present inquiry aims to think with and beyond Heidegger. I also introduced a distinction between scholarship into Heidegger’s thinking on teaching (What does he mean by “letting learn”?) and appropriating Heidegger’s fundamental concepts to think with and think through teaching ontologically. This distinction allows the inquiry to move forward while acknowledging and applauding the continuing efforts to examine Heidegger’s complicity with National Socialism. I quote Polt
(1999) at length to summarize my approach and the manner of my appropriation of Heidegger in the present inquiry:

One must reflect deeply on our Being in order to decide how human thought relates to human life, whether there are absolute moral or political guidelines, and to what degree we are responsible for our choices. Heidegger’s writings are still invaluable stimulants to such reflection.

In a sense, it is a blessing that Heidegger’s life makes it impossible for us to be completely comfortable with his writings. For Heidegger never respected Heideggerians. He never wanted his thought to be a comfortable party line; he wanted it to be thought-provoking and highly questionable. Finally, regardless of what he himself wanted, the most fruitful way to read any philosophy is to wrestle with and against what the philosopher says. (p. 164)

With Heidegger and National Socialism addressed, the inquiry can return to the matter at hand, the question of Being in teaching. While the phenomenon of Being has been described above, there are other key terms and phrases that also need to be described before turning to the next path along the way, namely, Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology (Chapter 3).

Key phenomena

Truly engaging with Heidegger’s thinking of Being requires familiarity with his unique philosophical terminology. Heidegger’s work sought to question the many unquestioned and fundamental assumptions humans make about Being and their own being as humans. To accomplish this goal meant using language in odd and transformative ways. More will be discussed about language and its role in Heidegger’s thinking as well as in the present inquiry in the following chapter. For now, the following sections introduce and describe key terms used by the early to later (middle) Heidegger to provoke thinking in his readers and students. After revisiting the manner of Being of concern from above, philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, Dasein, and existence are
named and described. These descriptions are not exhaustive and should be considered at best *formal indications*\(^{23}\) of Heidegger’s conceptualizations.

**Reviewing Being**

While three ways of understanding being were discussed above, it is helpful to continually indicate these three manners of approaching Being as they are easily confused. Being can be understood as (1) an entity or being with constant and objective presence, (2) the beingness of an entity or being, commonly and traditionally referenced as the essence of a being, and (3) Being as Being, or “the temporal-spatial, finite and negatived, presenting itself (*das Anwesen selber*) of beings in their beingness” (Capobianco, 2010, p. 7). This phrasing is purposefully dense as Capobianco argues that the whole of Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking was identifying the many ways that Being comes to language. I follow Capobianco’s (2010) work as a guide for greater conceptual clarity in thinking through Heidegger’s approach to Being. I follow both Capobianco (2010; 2014) and Polt (1999) in capitalizing Being to indicate the manner that Heidegger gestures toward.

Being with a capital B ... simply conveys in English Heidegger’s distinctive understanding of the meaning of Being (*Sein/Seyn*) in contrast to the meaning of being (1) presupposed in the ontic sciences (*das Seiende*) and (2) articulated in the long history of metaphysical thinking (the being of beings, *das Sein des Seienden*, as the beingness of beings, *die Seiendheit des Seienden*). *Sein/Seyn*, *Being/Beyng* ... is Heidegger’s word that marks or manifests the finite and negatived emerging/unfolding/coming-to-presence of beings in their beingness; it is his word that unifies multiple senses of being discussed by Aristotle; it is, for Heidegger, the word that names the most important (glancing) insight of the ancient Greek thinkers Parmenides and Heraclitus at the very dawn of Western thinking. (Capobianco, 2010, 7-9)

Thus, by naming the current project “An inquiry into the question of Being in teaching” I have elected to capitalize Being to specifically indicate Heidegger’s understanding of the meaning of Being. Therefore, the present inquiry is not concerned with the beings and entities of teaching (such as teachers, students, desks, and

\(^{23}\) Formal indication as a way of philosophizing is addressed in Chapter 3.
textbooks as beings). I am also attempting to think beyond the beingness of beings and entities located within education, and teaching in particular. The thinking to be done gestures toward three pathways (world, attunement, Enframing) to a more nuanced understanding and appreciation of the ontological grounds (the question of Being) of teaching. To do so, we need greater clarity on additional terms in Heidegger’s thinking of Being.

**Philosophy, Metaphysics, and Ontology**

Heidegger’s thinking, teaching, and writing were like no other philosopher before him. Not surprisingly, categorizing his philosophy was challenging. Was Heidegger (really) doing philosophy? Since his primary interest was the meaning of Being, could he be said to have been engaged in ontology, the study of being and all that is? For one who rejected much of traditional metaphysics it seems misguided to label him a metaphysician. In addition to phenomenology (which will be addressed in Chapter 3), Heidegger regularly used philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology to describe and name the region that his thought worked within, albeit in unusual and radically transformed ways.

For example, philosophy, metaphysics and ontology were common themes of Heidegger’s lecture courses. Consider a sampling of his course titles below in Table 1.

**Table 1 Sample of Heidegger’s Teaching Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term, Location</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNS 1919, Freiburg</td>
<td>The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1923, Marburg</td>
<td>Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1926, Marburg</td>
<td>Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 1928, Marburg</td>
<td>The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1930/31, Freiburg</td>
<td>On the Essence of Human Freedom: Introduction to Philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While these course titles announce what common sense would dictate as the usual topics within philosophy, Heidegger was famous for applying misnomers as titles. In fact, this was a common pedagogical strategy Heidegger used in his teaching. He would approach and lay out his thesis by taking the title of the announced lecture or course, sometimes word-by-word, and completely transforming the common sense meaning to reveal another facet of his thinking of Being. In this way, the lecture title became not a description or representation of the work to follow, but rather the source and guideline for the entire inquiry. For example, the 1935 course entitled *Introduction to Metaphysics* is truly a sustained reflection on the relationship between Being and Nothing. A few years later, *Basic Questions of Philosophy* considers the essence of truth as a feature of “logic.” What, then, was Heidegger up to?

In the opening lecture of *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger gives an extended response to the question “What is philosophy?” as he sets the stage for the initial question he asks that will become the guiding question of the lecture course: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” In the opening lecture to a course presumably on Metaphysics, Heidegger says:

Philosophizing means asking: “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” Actually asking this means venturing to exhaust, to question thoroughly, what is inexhaustible and belongs to this question by unveiling what the question demands that we ask. Wherever such a venture takes place, there is philosophy. (IM, p. 6)

Not long after Heidegger reappropriates the question “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” and indicates that this is the fundamental question of metaphysics, he then states that “metaphysics” is more accurately understood as an indication for philosophy. Philosophy, then, is rightly understood as a way of approaching and inquiring into the question of the meaning of Being. Metaphysics is philosophy, as long
as metaphysics is understood to be asking the ontologically-charged question “Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger further develops this distinction between traditional metaphysics and the metaphysics of the kind he is now labeling philosophy:

Metaphysics does indeed represent beings in their Being, and so it thinks the Being of beings. But it does not think the difference of both. Metaphysics does not ask about the truth of Being itself. Nor does it therefore ask in what way the essence of man belongs to the truth of Being.” (LH, p. 226, emphasis added)

The emphasis placed on the second sentence of the reference above is Heidegger’s indication of the “ontological difference,” a distinction that Heidegger believes his own inquiries into the question of the meaning of Being are able to think. The ontological difference is specifically addressed in Chapter 3 within the context of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology.

What of ontology? Heidegger writes: “[t]he term ‘ontology’ was first coined in the seventeenth century. It designates the development of the traditional doctrine of beings into philosophical discipline and a branch of the philosophical system” (IM, p. 32). But this is not at all the way that Heidegger wants his students to understand ontology. Ontology must be understood in the “broadest sense” (cf. BT, p. 11, top) to “[mean] the effort to put Being into words, and to do so by passing through the question of how it stands with Being [not just with beings as such]” (IM, p. 32).

It would be too easy and misguided to collapse philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology into one as Heidegger seems to be indicating. I prefer to use Heidegger’s distinction of “the same, but not identical” (OBT, p. 279) to best appropriate how he understands the relationship between philosophy, metaphysics and ontology. In the language of Being and Time, one could say that each is equiprimordial (depending on how they are understood, of course). For Heidegger, ontology is the way of inquiring into and through Being as such. Metaphysics, rightfully conceived and counter to its traditional understanding, is aimed at asking the question of Being as well; the same as ontology, but not identical. Philosophy, too, engages the meaning or truth of Being and does so in a specific manner available to human beings:
Philosophy always aims at the first and last grounds of beings, and it does so in such a way that human beings themselves, with respect to their way of Being, are emphatically interpreted and given an aim. (IM, p. 8)

The human being’s “way of Being” is a longer description for what Heidegger refers to as Dasein, the next term that must be addressed. Heidegger’s understanding of philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology are useful to keep in mind within the context of the present inquiry. Specifically, the nuanced manner in which he uses the terms must be attended to in order to avoid misinterpretation. For Heidegger, philosophy is not simply a domain of academic study or a subject matter to be taught in universities. Philosophy is, rather, *philosophizing*, or a way of being-in-the-world that continually inquires into the meaning of Being.

**Dasein**

Heidegger spent a lifetime attempting possible answers to the question of Being, but none as monumental as his attempt to uncover the question of the meaning of Being in *Being and Time* through a fundamental ontology of Dasein. By fundamental ontology Heidegger means an ontological analysis into the foundational presuppositions that give intelligibility or understanding. Heidegger uses the distinction Dasein to analyze and inquire into the Ur-phenomenon of Being. Dasein is not Being as such, but the two are correlated. Dasein literally means “being-t/here” or “t/here-being” (Da - t/here, sein - being) and can roughly be correlated to human beings as beings. As human beings, we are “there-being” or Dasein because we are as we are and where we are. Dasein is only Dasein as it is connected with its t/here, or its world (this is the subject of Chapter 4). Heidegger’s use of the word Dasein at once brings human beings to account for themselves as beings while not transforming Dasein into a super-category of Being. Dasein is us in our everydayness. Heidegger writes: “Da-sein cannot be proven as an entity, it cannot even be pointed out. The primary relation to Da-sein is not that of seeing but of ‘being it’” (CT, p. 205). This, then, points to the primary difficulty of ontological

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24 English translations of Heidegger’s writings are on the cusp of preferring “Da-sein” to “Dasein,” with the argument being that the hyphen more clearly indicates the *thereness* of Being Heidegger is aimed at exploring.
inquiry that Heidegger is attempting to indicate with the term Dasein. He wants to think about existence, that there is something rather than nothing, while acknowledging that Dasein "is" something, but not in the traditional sense of Dasein as another being or entity. Dasein’s significance is in its lived-ness, its experiencing.

This everydayness of Dasein’s existence Heidegger uses to build his ontological analysis in *Being and Time*, and, ultimately, prepare to his reader for the raising of the question of the meaning of Being. Dasein is not, however, another thing or object "out there" in the world. As Kisiel (2002) writes:

Contrary to the usual categories, the very term Da-sein does not express a what but a way to be (Weise zu sein), and so all further investigation of it is aimed at explicating its specific ways to be (later called the existentials by Heidegger): to be in the world, to be authentically or inauthentically, to be toward death, etc., with a decided penchant toward prepositional phrases and adverbs serving to qualify the verbal 'to be.' As the investigation proceeds, Heidegger at times even expresses an aversion to referring to Dasein as an entity, a term which traditionally in our vocabulary and grammar is fraught with the connotations of the substantiality of a thing. The ‘I’ of Dasein is not a thing but a way to be, not a what but a who, with its connotations of orientation to a unique situation. (p. 54)

Kisiel's commentary is critical to expanding the traditional or common sense understanding of Being as well as Dasein. Kisiel has also traced many of the key terms and concepts that led to the publication of *Being and Time* and has noted that "Dasein" was a common term for Heidegger beginning in 1910, almost two decades before the publication of BT. In recollecting this development, Kisiel (2007) writes:

In the course of SS 1923, “Dasein,” which now replaces earlier terms like the historical I, the situated I, and factic life experience, is inaugurated as

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25 In *Preparatory thinking in Heidegger’s teaching* (1987), Mike Groth argues convincingly that “preparing” is an integral method or way of Heidegger’s being as a teacher. Heidegger more than once in BT states that his ontological analysis of Dasein is only in preparation to more appropriately inquiring into the meaning of Being. See, e.g., “It is the concern of preparatory thinking to clear a free scope within which Being itself would again be able to take man with regard to his essence into an initial relationship. To be preparatory is the essence of such thinking. This essential thinking, essential and therefore everywhere and in every respect only preparatory, proceeds in inconspicuousness. Here, all fellow thinking, however clumsy and groping, is an essential help” (OBT, p. 158).
a technical term, e.g., is “formally indicated,” in two distinct directions: (1) in the temporal particularity (Jeweiligkeit) of its facticity or its “be-ing”; and (2) as “being-in-the-world.” (p. 431)

By 1924\textsuperscript{26}, Dasein has developed into its fuller meaning, the meaning referenced in BT:

“Being-there,” in sum, suggests (1) the uniquely situated existence of the human being “thrown” into the facticity of its world and (2) actively being-open disclosive, revealing, discovering its world and itself. (Kisiel, 2007, p. 431)

Dasein’s relationship to its world is the focus for the first distinction of this inquiry (Chapter 4). In order to engage in that phenomenological description, however, we will need to adopt a way of understanding Dasein as the there-being of a teacher. This will be addressed appropriately in Chapter 4. The final terminology distinction addressed is the relationship between Dasein and existence.

**Existence**

Examining Heidegger’s relationship to the term “existence” (and therefore “existential” as in existential philosophy) is worth the effort. Heidegger was and is still often labeled an existential philosopher, a title that he rejected. In the translator’s introduction to *The Question Concerning Technology*, Lovitt (1977) writes:

Thus Heidegger is not an “existentialist.” He is not concerned centrally or exclusively with man. Rather he is centrally concerned with the relation between man and Being, with man as the *openness* to which and in which Being presences and is known. (p. xiii)

Because Heidegger followed in the footsteps of and even borrowed terminology from Soren Kierkegaard, he is commonly classified as an existential philosopher. A few French philosophers (Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir) who followed Heidegger’s thinking and who also adopted the label of existentialist helped to muddy the waters

\textsuperscript{26} Here Kisiel (2007) specifically references “The Concept of Time” (pp. 196-213) and “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle” (pp. 214-237) to argue his point. (Page numbers are of English translations included in Kisiel’s text.)
surrounding Heidegger’s status as an existential philosopher as well. Finally, Heidegger’s relationship with Karl Jaspers, a prominent existential philosopher and close friend, continues to confuse the matter. I too am hesitant to label Heidegger as an existentialist philosopher given the whole of this thinking and career.

Given his suspicions of the implicit presuppositions of traditional metaphysics and the prevailing Cartesian understanding of life, Heidegger was, in today’s terms, concerned with the labels attached to him and his thinking. Lovitt, after addressing the inappropriateness of the “existentialist” label for Heidegger, rejects many other labels attached to Heidegger and his thinking: determinist, mystic, primitive, romantic, foe of technology and science. Another common challenge was of engaging in humanist thinking. For example, in the Letter on Humanism, a letter in response to French philosopher Jean Beaufret, Heidegger rejects the label of humanism for his philosophy by unpacking the traditional conceptions of humanism and demonstrating phenomenologically how they are incompatible with his approach. Just what this approach is and how it might be best understood is the path presented in the following chapter. For Heidegger, humanism is too limited and does not inquire appropriately into the question of Being. The foundation of humanism lies in the human being whereas for Heidegger that there is a foundation at all is questionable. To that end, he is clear that there is a relationship between existence and Dasein, but the connection between Dasein and human being specifically remains murky.

Heidegger’s concern with being labelled an existential philosopher was evident from the beginning of his career. In an early critical review of Jaspers’ Philosophy of Worldviews Heidegger takes great care in distinguishing his understanding of existence in a more nuanced than Jaspers’. Kisiel (2007) summarizes: “[Heidegger] points out to Jaspers that existence is in fact the formal indication of the ‘sense of be-ing of the ‘I am’ capable of being actualized by way of passage through the ‘limit situations’ of life” (p. 433). Simply put, for Heidegger, Jaspers’ thinking did not go far enough and remained entangled in the conceptualizations of “worldviews,” a topic he continued to rail against in the following years. For Heidegger “existence” was but another term on the way toward naming and analyzing Dasein, and the Ur-phenomenon of Being.
While Heidegger did indeed use the word existential in *Being and Time* (and other related terms such as existentiell and existentiale which are addressed in the next chapter), these references were only added in the final draft that was sent to the publisher (Kisiel, 1993). It is for this reason that Heidegger scholars argue that existence, as Heidegger understands and uses the word, should be understood as a formal indication for Dasein’s unique way of Being. Heidegger writes:

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possibility to be itself or not be itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in them. Existence is decided only by each Dasein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such possibilities. We come to terms with the question of existence always only through existence itself. (BT, p. 10)

Polt (1999) offers this summary:

*Existence* will be reserved from now on to denote Dasein’s special way of Being, a way of Being in which *Dasein’s own Being* “is an issue” for it. To anticipate somewhat, we can say that “existence” is appropriate as a name for our Being because we *ek-sist* in the etymological sense: we stand out into future possibilities, into a past heritage, and into a present world. (p. 34)

Polt’s summary also indicates a line of thinking that the present inquiry will not discuss: the relationship between Being and Dasein’s temporality. This trajectory of thinking is part of a secondary work already in preparation. Heidegger was, in a way, concerned with existence and existential thought, but not in the sense that Jaspers or the greater philosophical community (then and now) understood what grew to become existential philosophy as a type of philosophy. For Heidegger, “existence” is a term used to indicate Being. Existence, then, is on the way and in preparation for a greater encounter with the question of the meaning of Being. Collapsing existence into existential philosophy misses Heidegger’s ontological mission altogether by limiting further inquiry.
Concluding Thoughts

As the first path of thinking following the personal introduction, this chapter aimed to examine and reveal the sense of Being referenced throughout the inquiry. Three senses of Being were addressed followed by a summary of Heidegger's influence on the present study. Heidegger’s career and thinking as it relates to teaching generally and his own pedagogy specifically were described before turning to additional terminology necessary to bound the inquiry. These terms included Heidegger’s specialized understanding of philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology, and finally Dasein and existence, two philosophical distinctions Heidegger relies on to ground his ontological analysis in *Being and Time* that remain pertinent through the whole of his lifetime. There are other terms that Heidegger introduces in a particular order that I have elected to withhold for the purposes of structuring the present inquiry. These terms, including ontic/ontological, existentiell/existentiale, and the ontological difference, I discuss in the next chapter as a function of Heidegger’s approach toward phenomenological ontology.

Naming and describing the terms that Heidegger uses to engage with the question of Being will be a common feature of each following chapter. I have chosen this approach for two reasons. First, discrepancies and misunderstandings of Heidegger’s terminology are rampant in scholarship that attempts to summarize and/or appropriate his thinking. These discrepancies range from simply misusing a word or phrase to rendering Heidegger’s thinking demonstrably false by failing to contextualize a concept as it is connected to the other related terms or in relation to the whole of Heidegger’s thinking. The second reason is that Heidegger does not simply use language as a tool, as a one-way representational street between word and idea. Lovitt (1977) prepares the reader of Heidegger’s essays on technology as follows:

In approaching Heidegger’s work the reader must ask not only what he says, but how he says it. For here form and content are inextricably united. The perceptive reader will find at hand in the literary form of each one of these essays many keys to unlocking its meaning. He will also find the content of each continually shaping for itself forms admirably suited to its particular expression. (p. xiv)
This nontraditional way of grasping language is addressed specifically in Chapter 3, the next pathway. While the present chapter has been largely concerned with the what of Being, we turn now to, for Heidegger, the how of Being: phenomenological ontology.
Chapter 3.  By Way of Phenomenological Ontology

Ways or paths are important in Heidegger’s thinking, so important that he urged readers in the preface to his Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works) to consider his published writings as “ways, not works”:

The collected edition should indicate various ways: it is underway in the field of paths of the self-transforming asking of the many-sided question of Being … The point is to awaken the confrontation about the question concerning the topic of thinking … and not to communicate the opinion of the author, and not to characterize the standpoint of the writer, and not to fit into the series of other historically determinable philosophical standpoints. Of course, such a thing is always possible, especially in the information age, but for preparing the questioning access to the topic of thinking, it is completely useless. (GA1, pp. 447-8)

While the older Heidegger focused on analyzing the historicity of Being in relationship to, for example, art, technology, and poetry, the early to late Heidegger was quick to name his way toward the question of Being: phenomenology. Even in his later teachings, Heidegger remained faithful to the manner of phenomenological inquiry, while not explicitly named. For example, in the Le Thor and Zähringen Seminars that took place between 1966 and 1973, Heidegger continues to name his approach phenomenology while continuing to push beyond the boundaries of metaphysical language:

I name the thinking here in question tautological thinking. It is the primordial sense of phenomenology. Further, this kind of thinking is before any possible distinction between theory and praxis. To understand this we need to learn to distinguish between ‘path’ and ‘method’. In philosophy, there are only paths; in the sciences, on the contrary, there are only methods, that is, modes of procedure. (FS, p. 80)
Methodology, as traditionally understood, is best grasped within Heidegger's thinking as a way. Way must be heard as addressing not only a *what* but more importantly a *how* of doing philosophy. For Heidegger, phenomenological ontology is the pathway to the meaning of the question of Being, not in a prescriptive sense but in an attuned and receptive manner. The relationship between ontology, phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology and this approach to educational philosophy and the present inquiry is addressed in this chapter. To begin, three related features of Heidegger’s thinking are described before a fuller explication of phenomenological ontology as an attuned manner of philosophizing. With phenomenological ontology in view, a few additional key distinctions are made before summarizing existing trends along this pathway within educational philosophy. We close with a brief summary and description of the three paths to come in the following chapters.

**By Way Of**

Long before the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger was experimenting with loosening the traditional metaphysical assumptions around fundamental conceptions such as truth, the nature of language, and even how to understand “conceptualization” in itself (e.g., What is a concept? Where does it come from? How does a concept come into language?). While the present inquiry is not concerned specifically with what Heidegger thought about education or teaching per se, it is aimed at appropriating core distinctions Heidegger developed and doing so in such a way that (1) I remain faithful to the distinction itself within its context, and (2) I do my best to authentically indicate (1) while keeping an eye on the whole of Heidegger’s thinking. Thus, this first section describes three fundamental understandings that must be grasped to accomplish both a faithfulness to the pathways to come and to their situatedness in Heidegger’s thinking: formal indication, truth as *aletheia*, and the nature of language. Obviously a complete summary and treatment of Heidegger’s thinking on these matters is not possible here. However, there are insights in this arena of his thinking that, were they not discussed, would diminish the success of the present inquiry.
Formal Indication

Heidegger’s approach to truth and language not only counters traditional understandings of these philosophical topics but is also interwoven with his phenomenological ontology into the meaning of Being. But his thinking of truth as _aletheia_ and the nature of language both rely on a foundational way of philosophizing that Heidegger developed early in his career, years before becoming a tenured and famous professor of philosophy.

As referenced above, Kisiel (1993; 2007) has conducted extensive research into the roots of *Being and Time* and has traced many of Heidegger’s most powerful ideas back to his first war emergency semester course (February-April 1919). While formal indication as a way of doing philosophy is not named as such until WS 1919-1920\(^{27}\) (November 1919 - February 1920) in the lecture course “Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” Kisiel has published what he terms the “KNS Schema” which shows “the power of formality in reflexive categories to gain access to the pretheoretical, preworldly ‘primal something’ of our individual facticity” (2007, p. 429) from the KNS 1919 lecture course. Gaining this kind of access to the facticity of everyday lived experience became the challenge for the remainder of Heidegger’s life. Kisiel (1993) summarizes:

> It all began in KNS 1919, in the upshot of the effort “to go all out after the factic” by finding a method to approach it. The breakthrough to the topic is a double play of matter and method, What and How, drawn to a point where they are one and the same: a hermeneutics of facticity. (p. 100)

Formal indication also makes an appearance in Heidegger’s review of Jaspers’ *Philosophy of Worldviews* where Heidegger uses the term to help distinguish his own approach to the thinking of Being as distinct from Jaspers’ philosophy of worldviews.

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\(^{27}\) In Heidegger scholarship (Kisiel, 1993; 2007), WS denotes the Winter semester (usually November through February), SS the Summer semester (typically May through July). KNS references the *Kriegsnotsemester* (“war emergency semester”, the “interim semester” from February to mid-April 1919).
Heidegger’s formally indicative method grows from his study of the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of analogy of being as well as Emil Lask’s logic of philosophy (Kisiel, 1993) and appears in KNS 1919 in his exploration of the German impersonal sentence. This can be rendered in the English “It” such as “It is,” “It’s raining,” “It gives” or “It worlds.” Heidegger then launches into an analysis of what and how this pretheoretical something (“It”) is and how to best reveal this something in language. I quote Kisiel (1993) at length:

Throughout his long career, Heidegger will never seek to surpass this central insight which gives priority to the impersonal event enveloping the I which “takes place” in that Event. … The original something is an original motion, the facticity of our being is an event or happening, the facticity of Time itself. And the most direct, indicative, way which Heidegger finds to simply name this It which happens to us, to point to its sheer action, to attempt to describe its character and basic tenor, is the German impersonal sentence. (p. 100)

Dahlstrom (1994) summarizes this way of philosophizing:

In lectures delivered at Marburg and in others given both immediately before and afterwards in Freiburg, Heidegger specifically outlines a ‘formally indicatory’ method, that is to say, a philosophical method that proceeds by ‘formally indicating or signalling’ certain phenomena. (p. 776)

Formal indication might be better grasped as embodied gestures. For example, we gesture in the direction of the mountains or of the particular quality of an experience. We are able quite easily to understand the things we gesture toward while not necessarily directly re-presenting the phenomena. The same can be said of the formally indicative way of philosophizing that Heidegger develops in 1919-1920 and becomes simply the way or manner he thinks from thereon out. Returning to the terminology named and described in the previous chapter we can now say that, for example, “Being as Being” and “Dasein” are truly only formal indications of phenomena that Heidegger is trying to name and think phenomenologically.

This feature of Heidegger’s thinking, I think, is a crucial oversight in much current thinking along with and beyond Heidegger because too many readers take Heidegger’s way of philosophizing for granted, completely ignoring the projective and challenging essence of his thought embodied in the formal indication. Novice (and even expert)
readers fail to remember this key feature of Heidegger’s thinking and teaching. Heidegger is not pointing toward representations of propositions that are “True” but rather indicating in such a way that others can follow and think along with him while still retaining a degree of mystery, reserve, and awe. This is the challenge of representational language in action as it was named in Chapter 1. Heidegger describes formal indication for his students in 1923:

A formal indication is always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed universal proposition and used to make deductions from and fantasized within a constructivistic dialectical fashion. Everything depends upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking. Successfully getting onto this path can and must be aided by a precautionary measure which takes the form of rejecting certain positions of looking which are dominant in the situation of research at the particular time, which seem relevant, and which thus of themselves crowd in upon us. (OHF, p. 62)

He continues to name the “certain positions of looking” that must be “rejected”: the subject/object schema and the philosophy of worldviews or standpoints. The former is a key feature of Cartesianism that Heidegger was actively trying to usurp with his thinking, and the latter represented the prevailing philosophy of the time. Specifically, Heidegger is critiquing the worldview philosophy of Karl Jaspers. Heidegger found this approach to philosophy as threatening to the very act of philosophizing. Heidegger comes to understand formal indication as critical to thinking the meaning of Being as evidenced by his early naming even while falling silent on the matter a few years later. Traces of the formal indication as lived in everyday experience can still be seen grounding Heidegger’s analysis of reference and signification in Being and Time §17. Here Heidegger uses the example of a vehicle’s turning signals as “indicators” of a referential structure of a meaningful totality, or context. As Heidegger continues in his ontological analysis, this context is renamed “the world,” the topic of the next path in Chapter 4. For example, as a driver, I can indicate to others than I am planning on turning right. This indication is only partially determinate of my overall journey but only

28 The “philosophy of worldviews” that Heidegger rejected is best exemplified in Karl Jaspers’ Philosophy of Worldviews published in 1919.
makes sense because of the context of relations that exist as a function of the world of cars and traffic laws.

In addition to integrating formal indication into his way of doing philosophy, Heidegger transforms (or, more accurately, restores) the common understanding of truth as correctness to truth as \textit{aletheia}, the topic of the next subsection.

\textbf{Truth as \textit{aletheia}}

As Heidegger’s thinking becomes an inspiration for contemporary philosophers in fields that range from art to technology, language and education, these thinkers often get lost along the way by presupposing a representationalist logic and therefore neglecting Heidegger’s thinking on truth as \textit{aletheia}. All philosophers want to be read and understood on their own terms and Heidegger more so than all others. For Heidegger, truth, \textit{understood as a phenomenon}, is worthy of phenomenological inquiry (Nicholson, 2015). While his primary work on truth is often referenced by his 1930 essay \textit{On the Essence of Truth} (that was given as a lecture three years after the publication of \textit{Being and Time}), truth receives treatment in §44 of \textit{Being and Time} and becomes fundamental in Heidegger’s thinking of Being. Specifically, Heidegger shifts from speaking and writing about the \textit{meaning} of Being to the Truth of Being. Understanding Heidegger’s phenomenological grasp of truth as \textit{aletheia} is the goal of this subsection.

In \textit{On the Essence of Truth} Heidegger conducts a phenomeno-ontological destruction of the representationalist theory of truth that is the foundation of the history of philosophy, logic, and metaphysics. This destruction, as Thomson (2005) notes, is pursued not in the spirit of the critic or nihilist, but rather in an attempt to uncover and analyze the concept or idea in question. The representationalist approach, or the correspondence theory, is and has been understood as common sensical for so long that it is often considered illogical to question it. Put simply, a propositional statement is uttered that, should it be considered “true”, marks an adequate representation of a state of affairs. “The pen is on the table” is a true statement once it is confirmed that the pen is indeed on the table. Put differently, if a statement corresponds to the way things are generally agreed to be at a given moment, the statement is evaluated as true. The
representationalist/correspondence theory of truth then informs the foundational structure of language and grounds the ability of human beings to communicate. An example from the classroom is easy to name; consider the common assessment tool of the “True or False” exam question.

Through his inquiry into the essence of truth Heidegger uncovers a more primordial, in Heidegger’s language, meaning of truth in the Greek word *aletheia*. *Aletheia*, translated as unconcealment, is best grasped as the interplay between the revealing and concealing of a being or entity. For Heidegger, the representationalist/correspondence approach is only partially correct. When we grasp truth as what is revealed or unconcealed (as represented), we are only partially correct because we must also, in order to honour truth as *aletheia*, consider what remains concealed or hidden. Heidegger also uncovers additional insights such as untruth that while remarkable and insightful, go beyond the scope of the present study. Grasping truth as *aletheia*, while a fruitful ground for further thinking, complicates communication and traditional understandings of language - especially communicating about Being.

Harman (2007) situates *aletheia* as an interplay between concealedness and unconcealedness:

> Things are not just visible phenomena, but are partly hidden from view. We never gain an exhaustive understanding of things, but can only gradually draw them out of concealment by degrees, and this process never comes to an end. The Greek word for truth, *aletheia*, seems to point toward the same idea, since it means to draw something out of forgottenness. (p. 174)

Heidegger does not believe that truth as certainty or correspondence is incorrect, only that it is grounded in a more primordial understanding of truth as *aletheia*, or unconcealment.

Instead of adopting a traditional understanding of truth as certainty or correctness (correspondence), Heidegger wants truth to be approached as a phenomenon that is formally indicated. In formal indication, we gesture toward a phenomenon without gripping the idea or the language too firmly so that the phenomenon can show itself as itself (a transformation of the phenomenological method that is addressed below). If we
take Heidegger’s originary meaning of truth as unconcealment seriously, however, we
must be mindful of too quickly misunderstanding Heidegger (1) when he uses the word
truth and (2) as offering a representational theory of existence when he is more
interested in formally indicating the “truth” of Being. Capobianco’s (2010; 2014) language
of the presencing-absencing of Being cited above is specifically includes Heidegger’s
understanding of the unconcealing of truth.

Polt (1999) writes: “Heidegger does affirm that there is truth, and he does hold
that some interpretations (including his own) are better than others – but no
interpretation is final. Heidegger is a relentless enemy of ahistorical, absolutist concepts
of truth” (p. 5). Here we can see the interplay of concealing and unconcealing of truth as
aletheia in its relationship to formal indication. To Heidegger’s thinking, formally
indicating concepts and ideas is able to honor the unconcealing of a truth by
acknowledging that in that unconcealment something remains concealed, or a mystery
remains. Within that unknown lies the contingency of truth when understood in context
as aletheia.

Heidegger’s radical phenomenology of truth is often overlooked or
misunderstood in postmodern scholarship and philosophical inquiry. Gordon and Gordon
(2006) argue that a lack of engagement with Heidegger’s thinking on truth “impoverishes
contemporary thinking and life” (p. 4). They find that some postmodern scholars and
philosophers, including Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida, read and gain only
superficial insights from Heidegger’s writings on truth as aletheia because they hear and
understand Heidegger’s statements as propositional truths rather than formal indications
of the unconcealment/concealment of truth as aletheia. After presenting and discussing
Heidegger’s reflections on the unconcealment of truth, Gordon and Gordon offer a
compelling critique of key postmodern thinkers who, they argue, misinterpret,
misappropriate, or neglect altogether Heidegger’s work on aletheia. Gordon and
Gordon’s critique is one reason why this inquiry will take Heidegger’s indication of truth
as aletheia so seriously.

Before turning to Heidegger and the nature of language in his thinking, a few
more comments on the relationship between truth as aletheia and Heidegger’s shift from
questioning the meaning of Being to the truth of Being. In Chapter 2, we examined “the turn” [die Kehre] as a point in time in Heidegger’s career (in the early 1930s). Many decades later Heidegger reflects back on his understanding of “the turn” in the Le Thor and Zähringen Seminars from 1966 and 1973:

The thinking that proceeds after Being and Time, in that it gives up the word “meaning of Being” in favour of “truth of Being,” henceforth emphasizes the openness of Being itself, rather than the openness of Dasein in regard to this openness of Being. This signifies “the turn” [die Kehre], in which thinking always more decidedly turns to Being as Being. (FS, 47)

While the enormity of this quote from the older Heidegger cannot be fully unpacked at present, I share this observation to indicate how closely truth as aletheia relates to his thinking of Being and as an indication of a future trajectory of my own thinking. Most dramatically, in Contributions to Philosophy29 and again in Four Seminars Heidegger collapses Being and truth (understood as aletheia). He accomplishes this by correlating the interplay between the revealing/concealing of aletheia with the presencing/absencing of Being and beings in their being. Put differently, Heidegger’s thinking of Being is aimed at the presencing of Being as Being and of beings: what Heidegger formally indicates with the question ”Why are there beings rather than nothing?” In this way, I concur with Capobianco (2010; 2014) that Heidegger’s one thought was the many-sided and inexhaustible inquiry into the meaning/truth of Being. While this pathway of thinking does not necessarily directly inform the present inquiry, it is a reason to consider the prominence of Heidegger’s phenomenological description of truth as aletheia.

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29 Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Heidegger’s second major ”work”, holds an almost mythical stature within Heideggerian scholarship. Written between 1936-38 and published only after his death in 1989 as GA65, Contributions is a dense and difficult text that is unlike any of Heidegger’s other writings. Scholars are still unsure of how to fully understand and situate this book within the whole of Heidegger’s writings (English translations have only been available for a little over a decade) and it is for this reason that I did not list the text in the earlier summary of Heidegger’s publications. I look forward to extensive study of this book in my future scholarship.
Language

The third fundamental understanding is Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of language. Formal indication is the use of language to gesture toward phenomena. Truth as aletheia speaks not only to the idea of truth but also how truth is communicated via language. In this final subsection, language is described in two ways: (1) Heidegger’s use of language and his thinking of the nature of language, and (2) how those who follow Heidegger’s pathways must take account for and acknowledge the former (1).

Even prior to the 1930 truth essay, Heidegger can be seen struggling to communicate his inquiries into Being from the very first lecture courses of 1919-1920. Heidegger is often critiqued for his obtuse writing and the unusual uses of language he incorporated into his lectures and speeches. While this is correct to some extent, throughout his life Heidegger was attempting to put into language a new and radically different thinking of Being using a language that, unless the profound metaphysical presuppositions regarding truth as certainty and Being as presence were challenged, limited his ability to do so at every turn. How does one convey insights about the Being of beings when the very language in use so quickly reduces such insights into a representational, or being as a being, understanding? Heidegger writes in the 1925 lecture course History of the Concept of Time: “If we are forced here to introduce ponderous and perhaps inelegant expressions, it is not a matter of personal whim or a special fancy for my own terminology, but the compulsion of the phenomena themselves” (HCT, p. 151). The phenomenon in question is the meaning or truth of Being.

In Being and Time, Heidegger names discourse [Rede] as one of three equiprimordial existentials of Dasein (along with attunement [Befindlichkeit] and understanding [Verstehen]). Existentials reference existence, or Dasein’s special way of Being and are described below. Discourse is the early Heidegger’s formal indication for language. Language is treated directly after Being and Time through his encounters with the early Greek thinkers and the German poet Hölderlin, to name only two examples. Heidegger became convinced that the poetic use of language best exemplified the essence of language, and possibly Being. Earlier we referenced Heidegger’s remarks on
language and its relationship to Being from the 1935 lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics* that are worth repeating:

> Because the fate of language is grounded in the particular relation of a people to Being, the question about Being will be most intimately intertwined, for us, with the question about language. (IM, p. 39).

> It simply no longer occurs to us that everything that we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise—that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an absolute, that instead, they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages. This was all based on the assumption that language, too, is something in being, something that, like other beings, can be made accessible and circumscribed in a definite manner. How such an undertaking gets carried out and to what extent it is valid clearly depends on the fundamental conception of Being that guides it. (IM, p. 41)

> These words are echoed in the famous phrase “Language is the house of Being” from the 1946 *Letter on Humanism*. Polt (1999) expands on Heidegger’s thinking of language:

> Language can never be just a tool that we control, because in a sense, we owe our own Being to language. Language plays a part in the fundamental revelation of the world; it is part of what enables us to be someone and notice things to first place. Even before I choose the right words in which to express the fact that I have a headache, the headache has been revealed to me within a context that is partly linguistic. (p. 176)

Later and older Heidegger’s inquiries into language are only a more focused exposition on his attempts to language his thinking. The interplay between unconcealing/concealing of truth as *aletheia* along with the challenge of shaking off the metaphysical baggage of representationalist language became a lifelong journey for Heidegger, one that never came to rest.

> Recent scholarship into Heidegger and language grounds the second approach to language. Ziarek (2013) argues that too often scholars who follow Heidegger’s thinking tend to treat language as one phenomenon among many “rather than being explored as the ‘engine’ of Heidegger thinking, as the way this thinking advances,
escapes metaphysical determinations, or occasions critical breakthroughs” (p. 2). He continues:

In other words, Heidegger does not offer a philosophy of language in the conventional sense of the term, as language for him is never simply an “object” to be studied or described. Instead, his thinking about language unfolds through a highly idiosyncratic and innovative mode of writing. More than presenting insights about language, this mode of writing enacts the event of language—and language as event—in order to demonstrate how undergoing an experience with language remains irreducible to assertions or theories. (2013, p. 2)

For Heidegger, the most appropriate use of language is represented in poiesis, the etymological basis for poetry. Thinking that embraces this relationship to language Heidegger names meditative, or poetic thinking.

This poetic thinking comes to rely on the ways [...] in which language moves, ways that reach beyond concepts and signs, theories and systems, into the self-designing, poietic event, from and of which language “speaks.” This explains why Heidegger is skeptical about the confinement of thinking to conceptual determination alone, which neglects the crucially transformative, poietic thinking. (Ziarek, 2013, p. 8)

Is this all nothing but word play? For the Heidegger of the 1935 lecture course “Introduction to Metaphysics” engaging with words and language is far from child’s play but rather a determining revealing of a people’s relationship to and understanding of Being. However in SS 1920, fifteen years earlier, Heidegger is carefully thinking through and laying out the connection between what is seemingly word play but is actually the way of philosophizing he is engaged in:

The phenomenological-critical destruction can, however, directly be understood as belonging to the sense of philosophizing so that it loses the appearance of being makeshift and of being the preparation for proper philosophizing. From the outside, its activity at first looks like a critical poking-around at individual concepts and word meanings. One points out ambiguities, contradictions, obscurities, confusions, deficiency in tidiness and astuteness of the conceptual work. Wherever such work is performed in isolation, and this happens not infrequently, it easily gives the impression that phenomenology is word explanation, detection and elimination of equivocations, determination and marking-off of fixed meanings. This conception of phenomenology as a not entirely unproductive cleaning-up in the field of ambiguity and laxity in philosophical and pre-philosophical concepts is fostered by the fact that
phenomenology is posted and claimed as the fundamental science of philosophy. (PIE, p. 21-22)

That phenomenology is conceived as “the fundamental science of philosophy” is a nod to Edmund Husserl’s ultimate phenomenological project. Heidegger’s hesitation with this path of thinking is already evident from this early lecture course as he begins to transform Husserl’s phenomenological method into his own unique approach to philosophy. With formal indication, truth as *aletheia*, and language briefly sketched, we turn to the way into the question of Being in teaching, Heidegger’s originary method: phenomenological ontology.

**Heidegger’s Phenomenological Ontology**

As discussed in Chapter 2, with the question of Being in teaching as our aim, we are already within the realm of ontology. Ontology is the philosophical domain and distinction that denotes the study of reality, of all that is. Specifically, and in a Heideggerian sense, ontology is often referred to as the science or study of Being as such and in general. Where ontology stands within the whole of Heidegger’s thinking is complicated by his struggle to name and provoke the fundamental matter for thinking, the question of Being. As Heidegger’s thinking matured, he came to associate ontology as in the service of metaphysics, and metaphysics as the ultimate realm of philosophy and philosophizing. If ontology refers to the study of Being and beings in the sense framed by traditional metaphysics as beings and their beingness, then Heidegger would not accept the use of this term. But if ontology were to point to thinking of Being as Being, Heidegger would concur. But how to approach the question of Being? For Heidegger, ontology was rightly understood and only accessible via phenomenology (BT, p. 31).

Traditionally understood, phenomenology is the study of the lived experience of human beings. For Edmund Husserl, Heidegger’s teacher and mentor, the foundation of phenomenological study was consciousness and is evidenced in the epistemological method of the epoché. This was troubling for Heidegger because Being was, via Husserl’s methodological bracketing, presupposed. In the lecture courses leading up to
Being and Time Heidegger transformed Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology into phenomenological ontology, or the phenomenological inquiry into the question of the meaning of Being. In his early to mid-career, roughly 1920 and through the mid-1930s, Heidegger titled his methodological approach to philosophical inquiry as fundamental ontology, but this naming was simply another way of indicating phenomenological ontology. In addition to Being and Time, two lecture courses, the 1927 Basic Problems of Phenomenology and the 1928 course known in English as the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, offer Heidegger’s own description of his way into the question of Being. These courses are critical to understanding phenomenological ontology as they directly followed the publishing of Being and Time, wherein he demonstrated and carried out a (partially complete) fundamental ontology into the Being of Dasein. Metaphysical Foundations was referenced earlier in Chapter 2 to distinguish Heidegger’s ontology within and against metaphysical thinking and Basic Problems is addressed below.

How is phenomenological ontology enacted? By using language (where language is not presumed to be a neutral tool) to formally indicate (pre)conceptions and honour truth as aletheia, as the interplay of revealing and concealing of beings and their Being. Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology seeks to ground and understand phenomena not only as they appear and are constituted in lived experience, but also as the phenomena are experienced contextually, temporally, and historically via Dasein. van Manen (1990) describes Dasein as “a Heideggerian term which refers to that entity or aspect of our humanness which is capable of wondering about its own existence and inquiring into its own Being” (p. 176). Some scholars recommend substituting ‘human being’ for Dasein, but this could be misleading as Heidegger uses the term to denote much more (see Chapter 2). For this reason Dasein is almost always left untranslated in English translations of Heidegger’s thinking. Specifically, Dasein is the root of phenomenological ontology.

The 1927 lecture course Basic Problems in Phenomenology is widely regarded among Heidegger scholars as the unpublished third section of Being and Time and

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30 Heidegger often reused the same course titles throughout his career. The course referenced here should not be confused with the 1919 course of the same title.
includes an account of Kant’s theses on being and the Aristotelian concept of time and temporality. Included in the preparatory notes and course overview, however, is a particularly coherent review of the character of phenomenological ontology (BP, 19-23). In Hofstadter’s translator’s introduction, he notes:

Heidegger conceived of phenomenology in a way that departed from the Husserlian mode of analysis of consciousness. Phenomenology became for him the method of philosophy understood as ontology. All the propositions of ontology are, in his view, a priori, having to do with being rather than beings; for being must be understood prior to all encounter with and understanding of beings. Heidegger connects this doctrine of the apriority of philosophy with a unique conception of the manner in which time functions as the source of the a priori. Phenomenology, which looks to “the things themselves,” without theoretical preconceptions, and wills only to unveil beings and being in their evident truth, is of necessity the method which philosophy as thus conceived will employ. (BP, xvii)

Phenomenology, rightly understood as the method of ontology by Heidegger, is comprised of three movements: the phenomenological reduction, construction, and destruction. Ontology must always begin with a being, but Heidegger emphasizes “[B]eing is always being of beings.”

Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns, at first and necessarily, to some being; but then, in a precise way, it is led away from that being and led back to its being. We call this basic component of phenomenological method--the leading back or re-duction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended being to being --phenomenological reduction. (BP, 21).

Here Heidegger deliberately incorporates and transforms the Husserlian phenomenological reduction as the foundation of phenomenological ontology. Once the Being of being has been understood through the reduction, phenomenological construction offers guidance in approaching Being. “Being does not become accessible like a being. We do not simply find it in front of us … it must always be brought to view in a free projection” (BP, 21-22). If phenomenological reduction leads the inquiry away from a being such that its Being can be apprehended, the construction is the glimpse or flash of Being and its structures as one is drawn back toward the being.

The final component in this triadic approach is phenomenological destruction, “a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must be necessarily
employed, are de-constructed down to the sources from which they were drawn” (BP, p. 23). Because ontology is always a study of the Being of some being, and specifically (for Heidegger) the Being of Dasein as that being for whom Being matters, ontology must be understood within its historical and temporal contexts. As such, Being itself is always historically and temporally situated and only via the phenomenological destruction “can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts” (BP, p. 23). van Manen writes of the need for destruction when he notes that “the problem of phenomenological inquiry is not always that we know too little about the phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we know too much” (1990, p. 46). Phenomenological destruction is not new to Basic Problems, however, as Heidegger offers comments on this way of approaching philosophizing in his 1919 lecture courses.

Heidegger also describes his phenomenological approach in Being and Time (Section 7, specifically) as an interpretive method. After deconstructing phenomenology into its etymological components (phenomenon and logos), Heidegger circles back to redefine and situate phenomenology as hermeneutics. He acknowledges the interpretive thrust of his phenomenological descriptions as a feature of logos, or of “letting something be seen as something” as in an apophantic saying. Heidegger is here contextualizing the three movements in his phenomenology (reduction, construction, and destruction) as interpretive movements, a way that allows entities to show themselves as themselves. This radicalization not only transforms Husserl’s phenomenological method but also the traditional discipline of hermeneutics.

In transforming Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness into an interpretive inquiry of the ontological foundations of Western metaphysics, Heidegger launched an entire movement in philosophical thought that has made him the most influential philosopher of the 20th century. Almost all of the prominent French and German philosophers from the past four to five decades have acknowledged the influence of Heidegger’s thought on their own work including Jurgen Habermas, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. While phenomenology traditionally understood can approach and describe the lived experience of human beings, it is via phenomenological ontology that Being is allowed to, in Heideggerian prose, show itself in itself. In the following section, existing approaches at
the intersection of the question of Being in teaching and Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology are explored.

Existing Approaches

Despite early attempts to bring phenomenological ontology into direct conversation with educational studies and philosophy of education (Denton, 1974; Vandenberg, 1982; 1997) interest is only now taking hold. A symposium in *Educational Philosophy and Theory* on phenomenology and education edited by Gloria Dall’Alba (2009) showcases a number of diverse approaches to studying educational phenomena grounded in phenomenological inquiry. However, only two specifically utilize Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology to address educational practice. The remaining authors conduct their inquiries via the traditional transcendental phenomenology of consciousness.

The Husserlian path of phenomenology has been not only prominent but productive to date: “For more than half a century, phenomenology has maintained a stable and productive relationship with education (Tarozzi & Mortari, 2010), both in a theoretical and in a practical manner” (Gallagher & Francesconi, 2012, p. 3). The intersection of phenomenology and education in North America has been driven primarily by van Manen (1990, 2014), who situates himself within a philosophical lineage that begins with the Dutch phenomenologists. The foundation of phenomenology for van Manen is in practice, and specifically, a writing practice. A key component of doing phenomenology is the attempt to capture in language the lived experience of the phenomenon under study. He writes:

Lived experience is the starting point and ending point of phenomenological research. The aim of phenomenology is to transform lived experience into a textual expression of its essence — in such a way that the effect of the text is at once a reflexive re-living and a reflective appropriation of something meaningful: a notion by which a reader is powerfully animated in his or her own lived experience. (van Manen, 1990, p. 36)
Throughout his career at the University of Alberta, van Manen taught courses and supervised students on their journey into and through phenomenology as a writing practice. This included editing a journal on phenomenology and pedagogy that has recently emerged from dormancy as Phenomenology & Practice. Van Manen (1990) argued that phenomenology as a method of inquiry was appropriate for studying the lived experience of pedagogy and, more specifically, pedagogical relationships. In this way he operates within a theoretical perspective called the geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik tradition that builds on the work of Bollnow, Langeveld, van den Berg, and Dilthey. van Manen offers phenomenology as a way to study the everydayness of the classroom, of the teacher and student relationship. In this way, phenomenology is not meant to serve the same role as an empirical, analytic science and nor is it supposed to offer conclusions regarding predictability or universal models. For a phenomenon as contextually significant and complex as education, a greater understanding of how human beings experience teaching and learning is needed. van Manen (1990) writes:

The problem of phenomenological inquiry is not always that we know too little about the phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we know too much. Or, more accurately, the problem is that our ‘common sense’ pre-understandings, our suppositions, assumptions, and the existing bodies of scientific knowledge, predispose us to interpret the nature of the phenomenon before we even come to grips with the significance of the phenomenological question. (p. 46-47)

Returning to phenomenological ontology, scholarship into Heidegger’s pedagogy is becoming more common within Heideggerian studies (Ehrmantraut, 2010) and philosophy of education (Riley, 2011). Donald Vandenberg, a lifelong scholar of Heidegger, Being, and education, published an article entitled “A guide to educational philosophizing after Heidegger” (2008) that traced his own work and the work of others in bringing Heidegger’s thought to bear upon philosophy and phenomenology of education (see articles by Bingham, Peterson, Ream and Ream, and Waddington in the 2005 special issue). While rather tersely composed, Vandenberg also criticizes four articles published in the special issue that take up, directly and indirectly, Heidegger’s phenomenological philosophy. Vandenberg’s complaint is twofold (1) ignorance of existing work in the phenomenology of education inspired by Heidegger and (2) lack of a genuine understanding of Heidegger’s thinking. Vandenberg’s account suggests a lack of coherence of phenomenological thinking within philosophy of education as well as no
predominant view on Heidegger’s thinking in the study of education and philosophy. The present inquiry aims to overcome Vandenberg’s complaint by acknowledging the continued work at the intersection of phenomenology and education while also faithfully representing the whole of Heidegger’s thinking.

In an attempt to collect and retell the history of phenomenology and existentialism in educational philosophy, Magrini recently published a book-length study on ontology, phenomenology, and philosophical hermeneutics in education (2014). This study was in addition to and the culmination of a number of shorter works on the same subject (e.g., Magrini, 2011; 2012; 2013a; 2013b). Magrini’s intent via his scholarship is to “contribute to envisioning a model of curriculum and education that is, in the first instance, ontological in nature” (2014, p. 2). This approach, he argues would counter “the impoverished ontological state of contemporary standardized education (social efficiency), outlining the potential devastating effects of the learning sciences on the Being of both educators and students, on phenomenological self-hood” (2013b, 1). As to phenomenological ontology, Magrini works to bring together Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein from *Being and Time* and “human science research” of van Manen (1990). Magrini writes, “Unlike Husserl (1969), I am unconcerned with the transcendental consciousness and the intentional structures that constitute the subject’s cognitive experience” (p. 2). Magrini enters into dialogue with the field of curriculum studies (e.g., Aoki, 2005; Pinar, 2013) via Heubner’s (1974) insights into Heidegger and phenomenology (1999). In addition, he offers many ontological footholds on being educated, ontological learning, and phenomenological self-hood. These references are but a few insights gained from Magrini’s attempts to ground education as an ontological experience.

Outside of philosophy of education, Heideggerian scholars turn to the work of Iain Thomson (2001; 2004; 2005) in exploring questions related to education. Thomson, who studied with the American philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, argues that Heidegger’s philosophy must be read and understood as an ontotheological approach rather than simply as an ontological-phenomenological destruction of Western metaphysics. By approaching Heidegger’s thinking as ontotheology, Thomson claims that Heidegger’s insights into education, technology, and politics can be more deeply understood while
being somewhat at odds with current perspectives on Heidegger’s work. Specially, Thomson demonstrates that there exists a continuous thread through Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking that calls for an ‘ontologization’ of education (2004; 2005). The present inquiry can be interpreted as following in the wake of Magrini (2014) and Thomson (2005) insofar as it attempts to introduce greater nuance as to the ontological foundations of teaching.

The conceptual research currently underway at the intersection of phenomenological ontology and education is promising. This section has reviewed recent scholarship occurring at this crossroad between teaching, learning, and philosophical inquiry. Specifically, Thomson (2005) and Magrini (2014) offer particularly interesting trajectories of inquiry into the question of Being in teaching that honours the ontological thrust of Heideggerian phenomenological ontology. The focus of this scholarship remains, however, on Heidegger’s thinking of Being in relationship to education while not specifically engaging in phenomenological ontology into the lived experiences of those phenomena that constitute the teaching-learning context. In short, while the work of Thomson (2005) and Magrini (2014) is critical to approaching the question of Being in teaching, neither takes the next step: thinking Being in teaching by way of phenomenological ontology. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 aim to carry out this thinking in the distinctions of world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing as they inform the practice of teaching. The final section indicates a few final terminological distinctions necessary before leaping into the three pathways to come.

**Key phenomena**

**Languaging Being**

Chapter 1 framed and indicated the trajectory of the present inquiry as requiring a coming-to-terms-with Heideggerian terminology. In Chapter 2, Being and beings, along with philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology were distinguished in relation to Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein and existence. In the current chapter we have discussed formal indication, truth as *aletheia*, language itself, and phenomenological ontology in preparation for the three pathways into the question of Being in teaching. Five additional
terms must be described in order to fully think through the question of Being in teaching in the remaining chapters before turning to the next pathway: world. In truth, the five additional terms are integrally related to one another with the first, ontological difference, the all-encompassing umbrella for the four remaining: ontic, ontological, existentiell, and existential.

**The Ontological Difference**

The ontological difference is a critical feature of Heidegger’s way of philosophizing and approach to thinking the meaning/truth of Being. Therefore it is both a phenomenon to be addressed and described but must also be understood as integral to the way (or method) of Heidegger’s thinking. The challenge of “word play” addressed above indicates the ontological difference, and Heidegger leans on this distinction heavily. In fact, once the ontological difference is distinguished as the relationship between a being and *that* it is being many charges of word play are negated. The ontological difference is often reflected in terminology, such as the difference between beings and Being, or between the ontic and the ontological (addressed below). Heidegger also uses the distinctions existentiell/existentiale to indicate this difference. Polt (1999) summarizes:

[The ontological difference] is not an easy matter to grasp. But roughly, when we ask about Being we are not asking about any particular thing, nor even about the totality of things in the universe; we are asking why all these things count as *beings* in the first place. (p. 28)

For Heidegger, the difference between Being and beings exists prior to the Western metaphysical tradition’s distinction between *existentia* (that a thing is) and *essentia* (what a thing is) (ZS, p. 17). In fact, the ontological difference has largely been forgotten or overlooked by the Western tradition as a result of the metaphysical presuppositions of Being and beings as objective presence. One of the first glimpses that Heidegger provides of the ontological difference is in the 1919 KNS lecture course when he begins to experiment with the German impersonal sentence. The mysterious “something”, the “It”, indicates the relationship between Being and beings in their being in a way that sounds strange to our Western ears (e.g., “It worlds”; “It gives”).
While the ontological difference was preeminent in Heidegger’s thought in lecture courses and writings from the 1920s, this key distinction in allowing for catching sight of Being remains a feature of his thought for the remainder of his career (see Harman, 2007, pp. 45-48). Even though as human beings we can never truly escape Being, we are so wrapped up in our own existence that the idea or thinking of Being—much less the asking of the question of being—remains tricky and arduous. The ontological difference can help hold the space in tension that allows Being enough room to show itself.

**Ontic (Existentiell) / Ontological (Existential)**

In addition to the German impersonal, Heidegger also develops additional terms to help him indicate the difference between Being and beings. This final subsection addresses ontic/ontological before existentiell/existential, both/all terms that help Heidegger indicate his phenomenological thinking of Being.

Ontic (or ontical) is used to denote beings in the traditional sense, as entities. At various times Heidegger references the “ontic” sciences, or those domains that deal only with beings of enduring presence. Ontological, then, is an indication of Being as Being. Sometimes Heidegger is quite explicit at this shift from ontical to ontological by specifically indicating the ontological manner of his analysis (e.g., “Thought ontologically...”). With the language of ontic and ontological we can now paraphrase Heidegger’s thinking in *Being and Time* as an ontological analysis into the meaning of Being by way of a fundamental ontology of Dasein. Polt (1999) offers the following example:

*Ontical* means pertaining to particular facts about entities, without regard to their Being. For example, “How old is the sun?” is an ontical question, while “What is the way of Being of stars?” is an ontological question. Ontical questions stand a chance of being answered by experimental science, but ontological questions call for philosophy. (p. 34)

Heidegger’s approach is in direct contrast to various other ontic methodologies used to inquire into what it means to be a human being, such as those employed by anthropology or psychology. For these ontic domains, Being is already determined and
therefore further inquiry remains concerned with beings and entities without actually inquiring into Being itself. But Heidegger argues that human beings, as Dasein, can never be understood as just another being whose characteristics can be organized into categories like all other entities (this approach describes ontology traditionally understood). Thus, the present inquiry aims to explore Being in teaching by way of three Heideggerian distinctions (world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing) in a manner that approaches Dasein appropriately as a who rather than a what. “Dasein is a ‘who’ whose Being is ‘existence’ and whose ontological characteristics Heidegger dubs existentials” (Polt, 1999, p. 43).

As Polt indicates, early in Being and Time Heidegger describes another word pair to help language the ontological difference: existentiell and existential. Kisiel (1993) notes that, of the two, existentiell was a common feature of Heidegger’s writings beginning in the lecture courses from 1920 onward. Existentiell is correlated with an individual Dasein’s ontic understanding of its own possibilities. Existential therefore indicates the special way of Being of Dasein in its existence, a way that requires the fundamental ontology conducted in Being and Time. Polt (1999) offers the following example to ground this distinction further:

Of course, my understanding of myself and other entities is, to begin with, existentiell: I do not have any explicit theories about Being, but I simply am competent to exist and to deal with various kinds of entities. This competence involves an implicit understanding of Being. If I choose to make this understanding explicit, I can develop an ontology, a philosophical account of Being. (p. 34)

Thus, Heidegger can use existentiell to indicate the ontical grasp of Being of an individual Dasein, and also existential to indicate the ontological analysis he conducts in Being and Time. Both ontic/ontological and existentiell/existential provide Heidegger with a language to help readers think through the ontological difference.

This distinction, the difference between Being and beings, remained a central feature of Heidegger’s thinking long after the publication of Being and Time. In the Zolliken Seminars the ontological difference comes up again and again as needing further clarity. I quote Heidegger at length as he transitions from the ontic to the ontological, to the difference between beings and Being:
For science the domain of objects is already pregiven. Research goes forward in the same direction in which the respective areas have already been talked about prescientifically. These areas belong to the everyday world. However, it is not the same with Being. Of course, Being is also illuminated in advance, but it is not explicitly noticed or reflected upon. Since Being is not the same as beings, the difference between beings and Being is the most fundamental and difficult [problem]. It is all the more difficult if thinking is determined by science, which deals only with beings. The prevailing opinion nowadays is [that it is] as if science alone could provide objective truth. Science is the new religion. Compared to it, any attempt to think Being appears arbitrary and “mystical.” Being cannot be glimpsed by science. Being demands a unique demonstration, which does not lie in the human being’s discretion and which cannot be undertaken by science. As human beings, we can only exist on the basis of this difference [between Being and beings]. (ZS, pp. 17-18)

The ontological difference assists Heidegger in uncovering three equiprimordial “existentials” (referenced above) that are proper to Dasein: discourse [Rede], attunement [Befindlichkeit], and understanding [Verstehen]. While discourse as a fundamental feature of Dasein’s way of Being was briefly described earlier within the context of Heidegger’s thinking of language, attunement is the subject of Chapter 5. Thinking through attunement, however, will require further inquiry into additional terminology surrounding Heidegger’s conceptualization of “world,” the aim of Chapter 4. In moving forward, we will call on and appropriate the ontological difference to hold open the tension of the meaning of Being in teaching.

**Concluding Thoughts and the Paths to Come**

*Being and Time*, Heidegger’s magnum opus and the first text to engage in the philosophical manner that we have been referencing as phenomenological ontology, remained unfinished. At present scholars are still unsure of how to characterize this attempt to inquire into the question of the meaning of Being. Was Heidegger’s project a failure? Can we identify the definitive missing half of *Being and Time* in his other published writings and courses? What are we to make of the text in relation to the whole of Heidegger’s thinking? It seems to me that those who come to Heidegger’s thinking looking for firm and direct answers to questions may well come away disappointed and do not fully grasp the thrust of his lifelong project. Returning to Heidegger’s comments in
the preface of the Gesamtausgabe, “[t]he point is to awaken the confrontation about the question concerning the topic of thinking.” I argue that this is fundamental to Heidegger’s thinking, that we engage in holding open the questions such that in this tension the questions remain as questions before collapsing into answers. In this way it is phenomenological ontology that supports us as we get “underway in the field of paths of the self-transforming asking of the many-sided question of Being.”

Thomson’s highlighting of Heidegger’s vision for an ontologization of education is inspiring (2005; 2015). One can find in Thomson’s analysis of Heidegger’s thinking of education hints toward educational phenomena that could be thought through phenomenological ontology. In these glimpses, Thomson’s scholarship honors van Manen’s (2014) argument that phenomenology should be seen more as a way of questioning than of answering. This observation is telling given the shift in van Manen’s approach from a more representational perspective (1990) to a focus on phenomenology of practice (2014). New possibilities for inquiry and practice become available when teaching and learning are approached as they are experienced in the everyday lives of human beings.

In one of Heidegger’s most accessible reflections on his pedagogical stance as a philosophy teacher he engages in a damning critique of theoretical abstraction and its influence on the teacher-student relation. As referenced in Chapter 2 within the context of Heidegger’s thinking on teaching, this “contractualization of pedagogy” comes as a result of an over-reliance on theory within the university. Using the language that was discussed above, Heidegger is concerned that pedagogy has become simply another ontic science, where Being has been ignored and Dasein’s existence is as another entity among other entities. However, Heidegger does not offer practice or even praxis as a resolution to the challenges inherent in theoretical reflection (the challenge being, as Heidegger would say, that theoretical reflection is based on a more primordial context of meaningful engagement in a world). His point, as is so often the case, is to bring the situation to our attention and to do so in a questioning manner. This manner is the way of phenomenological ontology, a way to raising the question of Being in teaching.
The preceding chapters have been in preparation to demonstrate how three Heideggerian distinctions (world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing) can illuminate and allow inquiry into the Being of teaching by honoring Heidegger’s thinking and language. I have sketched these pathways before but never in as much detail as what follows (see Kruger-Ross, 2013; 2014b; 2015). The primary goal of the inquiry is to allow Being to show itself by way of phenomenological ontology into world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing. As such, each path will begin with a discussion of the relevant terminology needed to ground and bound the path. Following, Heidegger’s language is appropriated in developing a phenomenological ontology to invite a glimpse of Being in teaching where the everyday practices of teaching is foregrounded.

While the three previous chapters have been in preparation for the three distinctions of world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing, they are not only preparatory but also three distinct pathways aimed at providing a glimpse of Being in teaching. Heidegger at times described the experience of Being as a “lightning-flash.” In the introduction, personal background, and overview of the study as a whole (Chapter 1), the description of Being and the language used to make it available for Dasein (Chapter 2), and the summaries of Heidegger’s way of philosophizing (present chapter), one may be able to glimpse the flash of Being. We turn now to Heidegger’s distinctions of world (Chapter 4), attunement, (Chapter 5), and the danger of Enframing (Chapter 6) to offer three additional paths toward Being in teaching.
Chapter 4. World

The aim of this path is to distinguish Heidegger’s distinction of world\textsuperscript{31} specifically as it is co-constituted with Dasein and within the context of being a teacher.\textsuperscript{32} In addition to analyzing being-in-the-world-as-teacher, I will also reappropriate world to explore the ways it could be used to language the everyday, lived experience and practices of teaching. This reinterpretation is not meant to subvert Heidegger’s distinction but rather to engage phenomenologically with world in order to explore how the concept might inform and transform how teachers engage in their everyday work.

To begin, Heidegger’s distinction of world is presented and traced from his early to middle thinking. Building on Chapter 2, world is connected to Dasein, the being-there for whom Being is an issue. This phenomenon is then rewritten as being-in-the-world-as-teacher and analyzed as such. Once this is explored, a brief summary of what this understanding makes available for teachers and teacher educators is shared. Following, we will consider teaching as a type of worlding, or teaching-as-worlding. This path pauses before the following by indicating the interrelationship between the existing paths (Chapters 1-3), and the path-to-come, attunement (Chapter 5).

The World

Dahlstrom (2012) writes that “[w]orld’ is one of the staples of Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary” (p. 237). Andrew Feenberg (2012), a philosopher of

\textsuperscript{31} I only add emphasis to “world” when necessary for readability or to enhance understanding, but world should be heard and grasped in the manner of Heidegger’s distinction as is described below.

technology who continues in the critical tradition of his mentor, Herbert Marcuse, argues that Heidegger's primary contribution to the philosophical tradition is his understanding of world and worlding. Heidegger himself writes in 1927 that “[e]lucidation of the world-concept is one of the most central tasks of philosophy. The concept of world ... is what has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy,” (BP, p. 165). World, and its correlate being-in-the-world, are almost always presented in an overview of Heidegger's philosophy, especially when characterizing the early Heidegger. Too often these two conceptions are presented and moved beyond in order to expand on and analyze other ideas gleaned from Heidegger's thinking. There is a reason that the first of the three Heideggerian distinctions presented is world, and that it follows a discussion of Being and phenomenological ontology. In this section we will “tarry awhile” in the distinctions of world and being-in-the-world before exploring the implications for teaching. We begin with a history of Heidegger’s conception of world, a fuller description of the way world must be understood, and conclude with being-in-the-world before turning to the question of Being in teaching.

Brief history of the conception of world

Heidegger's conception of world was made available for the public for the first time in Being and Time in April 1927. Grasping what Heidegger means by world is, at first, easy enough: a meaningful context of entities that may or not exist within the physical realm. This sense is often used in everyday language in the expression "world of sports" or the "academic" world. We intuitively understand the use of world in these phrases, but it means so much more within Heidegger's thinking. Before continuing, we will consider briefly how Heidegger came to use world in this manner.

Earlier it was noted that Heidegger struggled to find new and different ways to put into words his thinking of Being. The challenge of putting his thinking into language began in his first lecture course in KNS 1919 and continued through his middle period to his later thinking. In the meticulously researched The Genesis of Being and Time, Ted

33 This is a specific reference to the “tarrying awhile” from the SS 1923 lecture course Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity (p. 67), the first time Heidegger begins to formulate his understanding of world in the manner that appears in Being and Time.
Kisiel chronicles Heidegger’s development and teaching from the Habilitation to the publication of *Being and Time*, covering roughly the years 1915 to 1927. According to Kisiel’s chronology, world can be traced through three iterations prior to its appearance in *Being and Time*: (1) in the first lecture course after Heidegger returned from war service in KNS 1919 *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, (2) in the SS 1923 course *Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, and lastly (3) the SS 1925 course *History of the Concept of Time*, which is considered a draft of *Being and Time*.\(^{34}\)

World makes its first appearance in the earliest lecture course from 1919.\(^{35}\) It is introduced in the opening comments of a new direction of thinking after Heidegger has presented and critiqued existing approaches to philosophical inquiry. As he pivots toward lived experience, he states (with a rhetorical flourish):

> We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we somehow leap into another *world*, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap into the *world* as such. (KNS, p. 53, emphasis original)

The lecture course continues to explore the use of world but in a more traditional sense as Heidegger painstakingly builds an argument for a pretheoretical grasping of the “*It*” that worlds in contrast to the world-extinguishing manner of theoretical knowing. He walks his students through an analysis guided by the question “Is there something?” in order to indicate phenomenology as the only path that can access the primacy of the everyday, lived experience of human beings. “Is there something?” is also indicative of the world: “The ‘*it worlds*’ is not established theoretically, but is experienced as ‘*worlding*’” (KNS, p. 79). This experiencing as *worlding* is dependent on a particular “*I*” that engages with its “environing world.”

More precisely: only through the accord of this particular ‘*I*’ does it experience something environmental, where we can say that ‘*it worlds*’.

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\(^{34}\) This is generally accepted within Heidegger studies. See Translator’s introduction, *History of the Concept of Time*.

\(^{35}\) Interestingly, *Ereignis* as the “event of appropriation” of Being also makes its first appearance in KNS 1919, a distinction Heidegger relies on most heavily fifteen years later in *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*. That Heidegger begins his earliest teaching using the vocabulary he will return to many years later is cited by Heidegger scholars as indicative of the continuity of his thinking throughout his lifetime (Capobianco, 2010; 2014).
Wherever and whenever ‘it worlds’ for me, I am somehow there. Now consider the experience of the question ‘Is there something?’ I do not find myself in this. This ‘anything whatsoever’, about whose ‘there is’ I ask, does not ‘world’. The worldly is here extinguished, and we grasp every potential environing world as ‘anything whatsoever’. (KNS, p. 62)

Here we can see a glimpse of the sense that world takes on a decade later in Being and Time. Crucial to note is the dependence the world has on an “I” or a Dasein. This connection between Dasein and its world will be christened as being-in-the-world that will be encountered below.

A few years later in Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger begins to flesh out the understanding of world as a web or context of significance.

This world is something being encountered as what we are concerned about and attend to, and the latter as having the character of initial givens now and soon to come which are closest to us, gives to the world of everydayness the character of an environing world, a world round-about. (OHF, p. 66, emphasis original)

The tone and character of this characterization is followed, a few lectures later, by Heidegger’s “with-world” and “self-world” acknowledging that “[t]hese terms do not demarcate regions over against each other, but rather are definite modes of the world’s being-encountered” (OHF, p. 79). “With-world” and “self-world” do not make it into Being and Time, demonstrating Heidegger’s continued experiments with language. Incidentally, another important feature of this 1923 lecture course is that Dasein finally arrives on the philosophical landscape as Heidegger’s name for factical life or facticity, a term referenced in Chapters 2 and 3, the everydayness of human life.

In SS 1925 we find Heidegger fully engrossed in the phenomenology of Dasein as indicative of the question of the meaning of Being. In this lecture course world is phenomenologically analyzed as a feature of being-in-the-world, a term we will turn to momentarily. Common phrases that will reappear in Being and Time from this originary analysis include the worldhood or worldliness of the world and the referential totality of
the world. The famous “handiness” example as a mode of being in a world is presented as a more concrete component of the work-world, a distinction that will transform into the present-at-hand and ready-to-hand in *Being and Time*. At the close of the lecture course temporality is named as the next-to-be-thought, a thinking that is (partially) recorded in the final published draft of *Being and Time*.

Heidegger had been working through the meaning of world since his earliest lecture course in 1919. He was always walking a pathway toward a particular grasping of the conceptualization expressed in the word world. Given this brief reflection on this path, it is now time to turn to *Being and Time* for a full and complete treatment of what Heidegger means by world.

**World as Heidegger intends**

World receives its most thorough exposition in *Being and Time* (§§ 14-18). After laying out the groundwork of his phenomenological ontology into the meaning of the question of Being through a retracing of phenomenological and ontological traditions, Heidegger announces the world first as a feature of *being-in-the-world* as the fundamental constitution of Dasein. His exposition of being-in-the-world begins with world and worldhood, then returns to consider Dasein’s being as *being-with* and *being a self* (§§ 25-27), and finally *being-in* (§§ 28-38). In the present inquiry we have approached the question of Being in teaching in the opposite direction than Heidegger given my background and experiences as a teacher. While he does present and discuss Being and the being of Dasein prior to his description of being-in-the-world, he is only able to approach and distinguish many of his conceptions directly related to Dasein and Being after more fully explaining being-in-the-world. Given that *Being* has received treatment above (see Chapters 2 & 3), we will not address the unitary phenomenon being-in-the-world until after a complete discussion of world.

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36 Handiness becomes the distinction between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand in *Being and Time*. We will encounter these terms below. The craftsperson’s workshop is the example utilized to indicate the manner by which Dasein interacts with its there in the mode of ready-to-hand where every piece of equipment has its place and is on-hand.
In §14 Heidegger names four meanings of world and provides a brief sketch of each in order to gain ontological clarity. In order to fully understand these meanings, however, one must recall the earlier distinction of ontic as that which describes entities as they are traditionally thought by metaphysics with the ontological approach that Heidegger is pursuing at present. The four meanings of world referenced by Heidegger are:

1) World in the ontic sense signifying “the totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world” (BT, p. 60)

2) World in the ontological sense that adopts (1) and considers the being of those beings named

3) World in an ontic sense “but not as beings essentially unlike Dasein that can be encountered within the world; but, rather, as the ‘in which’ a factual Dasein ‘lives’” (BT, p. 61)

4) World as designating an ontological and existential conceptualization of worldliness.

Heidegger offers these four senses of world in order to reveal his preferred understanding, that of worldliness in an ontological sense (4). Traditional ontology, Heidegger argues, “skips over” this meaning of world and rarely even acknowledges it at all. This is due to our presupposing of an existing world that gets collapsed into one of the first three meanings of world; i.e., we accept that the objectively present beings around us (this chair, that table) are entities in the natural or physical (“real”) world (1) or when we refer to the “public” world or “one’s ‘own’ and nearest (in the home) surrounding world” (BT, p. 61) (3). We almost always pass over the worldliness of the world and in doing so we “de-world” the world by rendering Dasein invisible or nonexistent, or reductively as a subject. Heidegger’s point here, a point that we have been building up to, is that in this conceptualization of world as worldliness we gain access to the engagement and interrelationship between Dasein and its world. This fundamental relationship, being-in-the-world, pulls the Cartesian poles of subject and object back together into a unified phenomena that brings Being back into the equation. It re-ontologizes ontology. According to Bert Dreyfus (1991), Heidegger’s distinction of worldliness as Dasein’s understanding of Being is the guiding phenomenon throughout Being and Time and his later writings (p. 89).
World, in the sense that we now understand as proper to Heidegger’s thinking in *Being and Time*, characterizes a manner of being that foregrounds the meaningful and significant contexts that Dasein encounters and lives in. In a way the world is a basic concept because of its averageness and everydayness; it is there whether or not human beings are aware that it is there.

The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it. (BP, 165)

It remains a formal indication, however, for even to this day Heidegger scholars cannot pin down exactly what Heidegger fully and specifically means by world. While there are clear definitions in *Being and Time*, Heidegger also continues to utilize the term in unusual ways (as we will find in Chapter 6) later in his career.

Recall the brief history of Heidegger’s use of world in his lecture courses. Four years prior to *Being and Time* Heidegger was already warning his students that to grasp his conceptualization of the enveloping world they would need to avoid the trap set by subject-object thinking. He writes: “This constructivistic forehaving [the subject-object schema], almost ineradicable on account of the pertinacity of a sedimented tradition, fundamentally and forever obstructs access to that which we have indicated with the term ‘factual life’ (‘Dasein’)” (OHF, p. 63). In *Being and Time* this critique occurs as a destruction of the Cartesian conceptualization of world as the totality of calculable and objectively present entities that was named and described in Chapter 1 of the present inquiry (§§18B, 21). In re-contextualizing Dasein and other beings within their contexts of significance, Heidegger distinguishes as a direct challenge to the false dichotomy of subject and object what was already indicated above: being-in-the-world.

**Being-in-the-world**

With an understanding of world presented above and Being and Dasein introduced earlier, we can now put together the phenomenon that Dasein itself is: being-in-the-world [*in-der-Welt-Sein*]. “Putting together” refers to the conceptual work we have
been doing rather than an indication that being-in-the-world can be broken or cut into disparate pieces.

A number of other phrases and words can now be brought together in language within this understanding. Dasein, as the being that understands and inquires into the meaning of Being, *is* its being-in-the-world. While it may be helpful in the beginning to grasp the distinction of being-in-the-world by considering being as subject and world as the natural or real world, this conceptual analogy must be set aside to grasp the unitary character of the being of Dasein. In short, Dasein is not Dasein without its world, and world is not world without Dasein. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, needs the world because it cannot be properly thought phenomenologically and ontologically without the understanding that Dasein and world are *always already connected*. I quote Heidegger at length:

> It is not the case that human being “is,” and then on top of that has a relation of being to the “world” which it sometimes takes upon itself. Dasein is never “initially” a sort of a being which is free from being-in, but which at times is in the mood to take up a “relation” to the world. This taking up of relations to the world is possible only because, as being-in-the-world, Dasein is as it is. This constitution of being is not first derived from the fact that besides the being which has the character of Dasein there are other beings which are objectively present and meet up with it. These other beings can only “meet up” “with” Dasein because they are able to show themselves of their own accord within a *world*. (BT, p. 53-54)

Dasein is not simply “in” the world as being-in-the-world like other objectively present entities or beings but comports toward the world in concern [*Besorgen*]. The translation of *Besorgen* has caused a great deal of misunderstanding within Heidegger studies. The second English translation of *Being and Time* by Joan Stambaugh prefers “taking care” and “heedfulness” to translate *Besorgen*, whereas Macquarrie and Robinson’s first edition initially translated *Besorgen* as concern. However, Stambaugh’s translation as “care” cannot be heard in a traditional sense. Polt (1999) interchanges care and concern and even offers his own translation: active engagement.

*[Being-in-the-world]* indicates that we are essentially involved in a context - we have a place in a meaningful whole where we deal with other things and people. The particular content of this context will vary from person to
person, and from culture to culture. But it can be said of Dasein in general that our relationship the world is not disinterested - it is active engagement. We are not, and never can be, radically detached from the world. (p. 46)

Being-in-the-world can also be understood as a type of existential contextualism that highlights the interconnected relationships that exist between human beings and things in the world. This approach has been taken by post-Cartesian psychoanalysts such as Robert Stolorow. In a summary of Heidegger’s philosophy and its influence within his therapeutic discipline, he begins with situating Heidegger’s distinction of world as a type of contextualism:

With the hyphens unifying the expression *Being-in-the-world (In-der-Weltsein)*, Heidegger indicates that in his interpretation of Dasein the traditional ontological gap between our Being and our world is to be definitively closed and that, in their indissoluble unity, our Being and our world “primordially and constantly” always contextualize one another. (2011, p. 14)

As being-in-the-world, Dasein encounters other beings and entities that matter to it, or have significance. How, then, does Dasein as being-in-the-world engage with and interact with other entities in its world? Heidegger has warned of the pitfalls of falling back onto the subject-object dualism. Here we must return to Heidegger’s distinction of worldhood and introduce the concept of equipment.

**In-order-to: Equipment-in-the-world**

In our everyday activities we encounter other beings and entities that Heidegger names *equipment*. Dreyfus (1991) translates *Besorgen* as concerned coping, or a human way of being engaged in our daily activities. Equipment is determined (and therefore defined) by its in-order-to, or its use. “We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern ‘equipment.’ In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. The kind of being which equipment possesses must be exhibited” (BT, p. 68). Heidegger formulates the distinction of equipment, not as a synonym for object, but to indicate how other beings “show up” for us in our everyday, average lives. The language of “showing up” is here borrowed from Blattner (1999):

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“Jones showed up at the party” means that she arrived and made her presence known to others at the party. If Jones had snuck into the house where the party was being held and stealthily made her way unobserved into a closet, we would hardly say that she “showed up at the party.” (p. 10)

According to Heidegger, equipment, other entities in the world, show up (or occur) as “something-in-order-to” (BT, p. 68) in two ways: present-at-hand (objective presence, Vorhandenheit) and ready-to-hand (handiness, Zuhandenheit). Most of the time in our everyday lives equipment occurs for us as something on hand and ready for use, or ready-to-hand. “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is … not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use” (BT, p. 67). We reach for the doorknob to open the door without fully being aware of our actions and relationship to the doorknob. However, when we reach for the doorknob and it does not turn (does not behave or respond as expected), something akin to a Gestalt switch occurs and the doorknob instead shows up not as something handy, but as present-at-hand. Not only is there a shift in how we interact and are in the world, but this equipmental “breakdown” indicates the “worldhood of the world.” In short, in the breakdown we are able to catch a glimpse of the referential context that is our being-in-the-world as Dasein. No sooner than this glimpse occurs, though, does Dasein then simultaneously return to a ready-to-hand comportment as the doorknob is subsumed into the fabric of “in-order-to’s”, “for-which’s,” and so on. As Dasein, we are masters of this Gestalt switch from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand and back again to ready-to-hand.

Ready-to-handness is not necessarily presented as better than present-at-handness (one can hear echoes of the primacy of the practical handiness to the theoretical objectively present), but to demonstrate that present-at-handness is not the primary manner of being. Encountering equipment as ready-to-hand is our everyday way of going about our lives and when we do shift to present-at-hand, this shift is limiting and restrictive—not necessarily in a negative sense—but rather in the positive sense that we become aware that equipment shows up in another way.

Heidegger also does not reference equipment to indicate a group of disconnected tools. Equipment is as equipment based on its inherent equipmentality.
“Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room” (BT, p. 68). Also, “[t]aken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs an equipmental whole, in which it can be this equipment that it is,” (BT, p. 68). The manner of being proper to equipment is that of reference and assignment, of something to something, in a context or world. World, in Heidegger’s sense, can now be grasped more fully as a referential and contextual whole that connects Dasein, beings, and equipment in a fabric or web of significance and meaning. Not only equipment, but sometimes even other human beings can occur for Dasein as equipment in the mode of present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. This occurrence will be found particularly striking within the context of Chapter 6 on the danger of Enframing.

**Being-with: Leaping in, leaping ahead and the They-self**

Dasein is not just its being-in-the-world engaged in everyday concernful coping with equipment, but is also Mitdasein (being-there-with, being-with). Dasein is being-with while also being-in-the-world. As being-with, Dasein is always already enmeshed in a community. Even within equipmental relations the way that Dasein relates is by way of being-with: I borrowed my mother's book, I purchased this item from the salesclerk, this is so-and-so's design for the building. Dasein is only insofar as it is being-in-the-world-with-others. The key distinction to make here is that Heidegger situates and characterizes Dasein as being-with rather than as one subject’s consciousness interacting with another subject’s consciousness.

In the sections devoted to being-with, Heidegger begins to develop a phenomenology of human relationships that he never fully fleshes out. For example, he introduces his distinctions of leaping in and leaping ahead (§ 27) but breaks off before fully developing them. Leaping in is understood as a manner of being-with that we engage in everyday by helping others cope with something, e.g., assisting in carrying a bag, or giving directions. Leaping ahead, on the other hand, is an infrequent kind of being-with where we assist another in their way of Being or in their existence. Polt (1999) offers the following example that calls on the educational world:
Leaping in can be illustrated by a teacher who provides students with ready-made answers while leaping ahead can be illustrated by a teacher who (like Heidegger) provides his students with questions and encourages them to seek the answers for themselves. (p. 61)

The final piece of terminology that Heidegger describes for being-with, and the final term we will need before considering the influence of world on the question of Being in teaching, is das Man, or “one” in the manner of “this is what one does.” In English das Man might be better translated as the “they.” In Dasein’s average everydayness, it is the “they” who dominate such that “we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter” (HCT, p. 56). This manner is inauthentic to Dasein, whose existence is of concern to itself by definition. We hold the door for another because “that’s what one does.” Heidegger is not advocating for a radical solipsism, but rather that the “they” tends to “level down” possibilities of being and that we overlook this simple fact by taking up and embodying the existing interpretations and ways of being of the “they-self”. However, if we recall that Dasein is as being-in-the-world-with-others, we cannot help but be related to the they-self.

Heidegger’s point is to indicate that we have a choice or a say in the matter of who we are. The matter of having choice or a say in our potentiality for being is indicated in the term Eigentlichkeit. Much has been misunderstood in the translation of Eigentlichkeit for authenticity. The term authenticity has recently fallen out of favour in academic discourse due to becoming a common idea popularized within self-help literature. In this way, an individual is authentic if following a passion or in becoming a fully actualized self. Heidegger’s thinking of the question of Being also gets lumped into this ontic understanding of authenticity. Eigentlichkeit is simple and yet profound. It indicates the choice to become ontologically engaged in the Being of human being. For example, by allowing the they to structure your world, you are, according to Heidegger’s terminology, adopting an inauthentic way of Being yourself. At the same time, “[a]uthenticity does not involve jettisoning one’s own tradition -- which is impossible -- but clear-sightedly and resolutely pursuing a possibility that is opened up by this tradition” (Polt, 1999, p. 63). Authenticity does not mean rejecting or shunning popular opinion, but being aware of the they and reflecting on the power they may or may not have on our
ontological possibilities. As Polt points out, possibilities spring from tradition, communities, and cultures.

What Polt also so succinctly points out is the circular nature of Heidegger’s analysis. We exist as Dasein and as being-in-the-world in our everyday lives within a totality of referential meanings and contexts. In addition to things occurring to Dasein as present-at-hand, we also engage meaningfully with useful tools that are ready-to-hand. Dasein is also simultaneously being-with, a being who cannot help but be connected and in relation to other Daseins. In honouring the “mineness” of its Being, Dasein has possibilities of differing ways of being-in-the-world. Dasein can be-in-the-world-as-the-they in a manner that is inauthentic. But, given that Dasein cannot help but be always already in relation to the they, Dasein can authentically be-in-the-world by becoming aware of its possibilities within its existing culture, history, and temporality.

The previous paragraph, had it been encountered any sooner, would have been largely unintelligible. For this reason, we have taken the time to describe and connect the language Heidegger uses to name the fundamental concepts he is distinguishing for his existential analysis. Indeed, encountering what Heidegger is indicating by the words world, worldhood, being-in-the-world and so on assists the inquiry by shifting our understanding of these terms as simply present-at-hand entities devoid of context and meaning. In their explication we can take these terms as ready-to-hand, take these terms in hand and allow them to help us describe the educational world of a teacher.

**Being-in-the-world-as-teacher**

How might Heidegger’s phenomenological description of world shift how we understand and describe the everydayness of the teacher’s life in the classroom? World, understood as the referential totality that Dasein is as being-in, being-with, and being-in-the-world, is appropriated below in the analysis of being a teacher along this pathway. Magrini (2014) formulates being-in-the-world as a being-with-others-in-learning and argues convincingly that this phenomenon is necessary to accomplish any true “reconceptualization” of education. We begin with a general discussion of world and its
relationship to the everyday life of a teacher before examining four example scenarios that allow for further analysis into the question of Being in teaching by way of world.

To begin we will need to expand the meaning of teacher from the traditional and everyday sense to Dasein, the being-in-the-world for whom its Being is an issue for it. This new formulation could be written as teacher-as-Dasein, but this seems unnecessary if we can assume that teacher as used below already accounts for this reontologized understanding of being a teacher. A teacher is its being-in-the-world-as-teacher. Teachers are teachers because they find themselves in their world as a teacher. Teachers understand themselves and other beings (be they other people or equipment) in their surroundings as part of a referential totality of meanings, or within a context, and specifically as a teacher.

Concretely, tables and chairs occur for teachers as ready-to-hand equipment, ready to be utilized in the teaching environment. Pencils, paper, whiteboards, and even computers make sense to Dasein as they constitute the world of teaching. Students show up as students in a manner that honors Dasein’s being-with-others. If a student sits in a chair and the chair-leg is faulty and the student stumbles to the floor, the chair immediately becomes a present-at-hand entity for both teacher and student. In Heideggerian terms, this equipmental breakdown provides a glimpse of the totality of references that make up their world. No sooner has the chair occurred as objectively present than it quietly recedes into the background of ready-to-hand beings, as “needing-to-be-fixed” or “needing-replacement.”

Curriculum also occurs in a specific manner within the present world of teaching. Structured as a set of goals or objectives with particular subdomains, curricula usually exist as present-at-hand objects, determined, organized, and manipulated by human beings. This understanding of a learning objective or outcome fits nicely in line within the traditional Cartesian world of subjects and objects. As objectively present, curriculum designers list and organize sets of outcomes according to a system that has been tested and proven “successful.” Within this world, teachers take curriculum objects and help transmit the present-at-hand outcomes into student’s minds, regardless of the student, the teacher, and other meaningful components that are backgrounded in this approach.
This description finds affinity with Paulo Freire's (1970) “banking” model of education while still indicating a much greater challenge to being a teacher than just in relationship to curriculum.

However, this is but one way to conceptualize the world of teaching, one way to inform being a teacher. This multiplicity is the significance of Heidegger’s world for being a teacher. With the phenomenon of world we (as teachers, future teachers, professors of education and of future teachers, leaders of professional development) now have a language to name and describe the everyday understandings of being a teacher such that we recognize the referential context that includes a richer grasp of Being a teacher. Consider the following example.

**Ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher**

Mrs. Jackson calls on Shirley after demonstrating a math concept on the board. Shirley asks: "Where did the 5 come from? I don't get it." Mrs. Jackson responds: "What do you mean, 'I don't get it'? It's right there on the board and I've worked this problem out twice now," and moves to erase the board.

Who is Mrs. Jackson being such that this is her reaction to Shirley’s question? This may, at first, sound like a nonsensical question, but once it is truly grasped its radical access to being-in-the-world becomes clearer. Who is Mrs. Jackson being? With this question the world can illuminate for us if only for a moment. What was an esoteric, ethereal concept suddenly becomes available. Mrs. Jackson was being someone who assumes understanding comes from seeing numbers on a board, who considers working out a problem twice as sufficient for Shirley, and who does not take student questions and concerns seriously. Mrs. Jackson’s way of being now uncovered also reveals the responsibility that Mrs. Jackson has taken for granted. Ways of being-in-the-world are anything but static; they transform moment by moment, but are based in patterns or habits that we name tradition and culture. Mrs. Jackson’s way of being-in-the-world in this situation is not good or bad, right or wrong; it simply is. But in being distinguished, this way of being can be recognized as one way of being. Mrs. Jackson could now choose an alternative way of being that would give or create an entirely different context or world. Consider the situation repeated with Mrs. Jackson being someone who
respects and honors student feedback, who understands that learning happens beyond the board. The world that would show up for Mrs. Jackson and Shirley would occur markedly different than in the original scenario.

The world of dispositions

Traditionally, a way of being-in-the-world would be approached within the language of professional teacher disposition (Kruger-Ross, 2014b). Dispositions give teachers, teacher educators, administrators, and educational researchers a language that can be used to talk about and describe what teachers do and what makes them do what they do. Dispositional language is useful and can be helpful in talking about the enigma that is good teaching. Within the context that this language provides, over a decade of dialogue has been initiated that has created new tools and structures for assisting pre- and in-service teachers aligned with appropriate behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs that support student learning. Dispositions also add a dimension beyond knowledge and skills to evaluating and understanding the teaching profession. Teacher education programs have redeveloped curricula and assessment protocols have been rewritten to include a more holistic view of what it means to be a teacher (see, e.g., Smith, 2004). When used mindfully, the language of dispositions can be used to empower teachers, to help them speak in ways that encapsulates their often difficult-to-describe sense of what they do moment by moment in the classroom.

But what does the language of dispositions not allow? What lies beyond the bounds of dispositional language? What cannot be spoken of or remains inaccessible within the world of dispositions? When we speak and act with the language of dispositions, we limit ourselves to the words that we have available to us that can be used to label visible features. Behaviors, actions, gestures, and voice have all been the focus of study as indicators of disposition. Invisible qualities like attitudes, beliefs, and values have been rendered visible through surveys administered to teachers or identified in the observations made by administrators or supervisors in semi-yearly reviews. There is danger, however, in taking these (in)visible qualities and converting them to objective, quantifiable, and measurable phenomena. Even conducting observational research regarding teacher dispositions involves interpretation and meaning-making. While the
researcher strives for objectivity, it is impossible to remove underlying assumptions that each person brings to their research. In Heideggerian terms, this would be an attempt to de-world the world of the being a teacher. As a profession, are educators and educational researchers truly comfortable with a teacher being "qualified to teach" if they score an 80% or better on a disposition assessment? The objectifying of the qualities of beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviors, and actions is only a small step away from such a reality. While this may seem extreme, what is most troublesome is what may be missed by continuing to speak only in the language of dispositions.

A few questions may help probe the limits of dispositional language further: Are dispositions singular? Can an educator possess more than one? How so? Can dispositions be taught or are they innate? If they can be taught (and changed), in what ways, and to what extent? How do administrators and teacher educators navigate the moral ambiguity of changing or challenging teacher dispositions? Where does the responsibility lie with regard to a teacher's disposition? For example, is it the teacher educator's responsibility to evaluate and address, or is it the pre-service teacher's? Does a teacher have a disposition or does a disposition somehow belong to a teacher? What if administrators or teacher educators force a disposition upon teachers? If it is forced, then does a teacher really 'own' it or is it something that is tolerated? If a disposition is not owned, not fully embodied, then how does it impact teaching?

What may seem like simple language games and word play are attempts to demarcate an area of study outside the language of dispositions. These important questions need to be considered should dispositions continue to be a dominant thread within teacher education research. Below we move outside dispositions to an alternative context, another way of speaking about teaching: ways of being-in-the-world.

How might Mrs. Jackson's scenario play out with the language of professional teacher dispositions? Would teacher educators or administrators be able to determine Mrs. Jackson's disposition(s)? What would happen once the troubling disposition(s) were identified? First, Mrs. Jackson's disposition would most likely be identified as a negative (i.e., not a supportive environment for learning, not a caring relationship/disposition). If the disposition(s) in question were determined, a treatment
plan (also known as a professional development plan) would be prescribed to change Mrs. Jackson’s behavior, beliefs, attitudes, and, hopefully, her disposition. Would this process really change Mrs. Jackson’s teaching practice? Considering ways of being and dispositions side-by-side, addressing Mrs. Jackson’s way of being speaks directly to who she is as a teacher, while focusing on her disposition seems only to scratch the surface of her professional identity as a teacher.

**Personal interlude**

In my past as a middle school math teacher I was able to adopt a different way of being much like Mrs. Jackson. Teaching in a school that does not give grades and instead relies on narrative feedback is challenging for a math teacher who was trained in the traditional manner of teaching. (Not forgetting my years of formal schooling where I was enculturated into this same manner of teaching.) In addition to my stance toward teaching and learning without grades, I was also challenged by the very real limitations of a set curriculum based on skills that progressed in a specific order and for specific ages. These conditions structured my world for a large part of my first year of teaching. Beginning in my math tutoring days in high school I had longed for a way to interact with learners mathematically in such a way that anxiety-inducing phenomena such as grades and tests were no longer limitations to teaching and learning math. Here I was in an environment ripe for this transformation in my teaching, but I found myself continually falling back into traditional pedagogical patterns.

As I was preparing to draft trimester reports near the end of my first year of teaching, I experienced a profound shift in my being-in-the-world-as-teacher. While listing out the fifty or so skills that my students should have “mastered” by the end of their time with me in a school year, something shifted within me as I realized that who I was being as a teacher was structuring my classroom and my students’ learning in such a way that I was stumped at how to best assess their learning and at how to support them along their mathematical journeys. I had been assuming many things about my teaching, classroom, students, and curriculum that I had not been aware of until this point. It occurred to me that learning, especially learning math, was not an on/off conditional activity—it fluctuates and changes over time. All of a sudden the “list” of
curricular objectives showed up for me as waypoints along a connected journey that I was to help students experience. Some of these “skills” would be quick for a student to grasp at first, and others would need repeated visits. A few skills would come slowly and months later need to be revisited again in a different manner.

Words here may not be able to convey the transformation in who I was as a teacher: this was an outstanding shift in my Being that affected my being-a-teacher but also my own being-in-the-world. More will be shared in the following pathways to further expand on this personal interlude. Now we turn to two additional ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher in relation to educational technologies, buy-in and fear, as further examples of how Heidegger’s thinking of Being and world can inform and illuminate being a teacher.

**Being-in-the-world as Giving a Language: Examples from Educational Technology**

It is now cliché to speak of teaching and technology. Statistics about the explosion of information and communication technologies available to teachers, students, and other educational stakeholders abound. The assumption that technology and education should go together is foundational to these studies; and this assumption is rarely questioned. Research into teachers’ roles in integrating technology into their practice has been based on such an assumption. Explorations of teacher attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and dispositions towards technology and its uses in education have become the main thrust in figuring out how to best integrate new technologies into the classroom. In this section I draw on my own research into teachers and technology to see how ways of being might provide another angle from which to approach dialogue surrounding teachers and technology (Kruger-Ross, 2012). Specifically, we will look at teacher buy-in as a way of being and fear as a way of being toward technology in the world of the classroom.

**Teacher Buy-In as a Way of Being**

Buy-in is a familiar phrase in North America that indicates an individual or group’s willingness to engage in an activity or experience. One may have heard the phrase used
in different contexts including: “For this initiative to be successful, we must have teacher *buy-in*” or “The program flopped because the most influential teacher never really *bought-into* the pedagogical strategies.” Were we to examine a disposition of buy-in we would jump to creating bulleted lists and descriptions of behavior. We want to use our understanding of being-in-the-world to go beyond what might be traditionally understood.

This remains a difficult feat since ways of being-in-the-world can be hard to articulate. However, using what we already have experienced as educators and teachers/leaders of educators, buy-in as a way of being-in-the-world should be readily accessible. If teachers are bought-into a program, curriculum, or initiative, they believe in the goals and aspirations. While they possess knowledge of the program, their buy-in supersedes mastering knowledge about the program. They are, or they become, the program. Being bought-in comes with a way of being-in-the-world that embodies the principles of the program in an almost unthinking or pre-reflective way. Teachers who are bought-in are easy to spot, and not just because of their observable behaviors or attitudinal dispositions. Teacher buy-in as a way of being projects a world that allows the teacher to show up as committed to the project through not only her behaviors and attitudes, but also her bodily stance and the words she uses. Teacher buy-in as a way of being is neither right nor wrong and, in this instance, has little to do with the validity of the project or program. These are important considerations and quite worthy of critique, but are beyond the scope of the present example.

At the same time, locating and identifying a teacher who has not bought-into a particular project is readily available. As a way of being-in-the-world as not-bought-into a teacher is disinterested in the project and any engagement with the principles is superficial and inauthentic. While dispositionally a teacher may have fulfilled the criteria of being bought-into a project, looking at the same teacher for her way of being bought-in would quickly demonstrate the usefulness of the distinction.

What would this look like in the classroom? A common scenario might look like this: Researchers at a local university have received grant funding to explore the uses of mobile devices in a nearby middle school. The school administration partners with the university researcher to work out the particulars and announces at the next staff meeting
that the entire seventh grade will be receiving mobile devices in two weeks, and that teachers should start planning to integrate these devices into their lessons. By watching the reactions to this news, one would be able to almost instantaneously identify who in the room bought-into the project.

For teachers who are not bought-in there would be complaining and gossiping about the added work and the lack of support for professional development in technology. In the classroom, this will appear as poor pedagogical choices regarding the integration of the mobile devices. Even if professional development is offered in the two-week interim before the devices arrive, those teachers who attend who are not bought-in are already at a disadvantage to truly gain what they can from the training. In this example, we are assuming a great deal - that mobile devices are wanted, are useful, will be supported through training for students and staff, and so on. However, approaching this experience as how teachers are in relation to the project (being-bought-into or being-not-bought-into) leaves a space for other teachers, administrators, and researchers to ask important questions: Why not buy-in to the initiative? What is keeping teachers from fully buying-into the mobile devices? Taking these questions to another level -- Who are the administrators and university researchers being such that the seventh grade teachers do not have buy-in to the project? These are difficult questions, and are new to the world of educational research. They push for answers; not the final answer, but an answer to the specific situation or world. Ways of being-in-the-world urge us to take account of who we are in a given situation.

**Being Fearful Towards Technology**

Another related phenomenon is that of fear. Fear is often the emotion expressed when there exists a misunderstanding towards a feared person, thing, or object. Separating the *reason* for being afraid from the *experience* of being afraid will help us gain access to this phenomenon. There are many reasons why one might fear technology: Concerns for security of personal information; worry regarding the posting of videos and photos; invasion of privacy; fear of looking ignorant or uninformed, of breaking or misusing something, of causing irreparable damage, or of being overwhelmed. The reasoning for being fearful toward technology is not our concern here. We are focused on the experience of being fearful toward technology. This does
not negate the reasons for possessing fear, but it does provide a way of talking about a way of being such that we can explore what to do with it.

As we saw with teacher buy-in as a way of being-in-the-world, fear can also be a way of being. However, a teacher who is being "in fear" creates a world where his reality, his experience and his way of being is controlled by the relationship with fear. He experiences, behaves, possesses attitudes, and speaks in the language of fear: Computers and software are objects to be feared, that can cause physical or emotional harm, that are best to stay away from. To some extent, any intervention used to address the integration of technology into teaching and learning will not matter; if a teacher is “being someone who is afraid of technology,” this will control the experience for him or her. Being fearful here might not actually manifest itself as running away; being afraid often involves a shutting down or politely disengaging when encountering the feared.

Utilizing our mobile devices initiative from teacher buy-in, a teacher may appear bought-into the initiative. But fear is a powerful way of being and could overcome buy-in. The mobile devices would sit unused in the back of the classroom, only to be pulled out when researchers and administrators arrive for observations. In professional training sessions, the fearful teacher will filter and understand most information as a threat. Teachers understand that when someone is afraid or does not feel safe, his or her ability to learn and understand new information plummets. Tips, tricks, and techniques are experienced as threats. Sometimes the being fearful might become transferred to administrators or even other teachers who had previously bought-into the initiative.

How do you move forward when a staff member’s way of being is of fear toward technology? Obviously, the place to work this out is not in the classroom. Understanding and approaching fear towards technology as a way of being, however, helps give a language that can be used to communicate with the fearful teachers to understand how they experience their fear. Usually in this conversation space opens for teachers such that they are able to see their fear as just one way to be toward technology.
Teaching as worlding

In the final segment of this path, I describe and uncover an ontological understanding of teaching as *teaching as worlding* that may, as Magrini argues, reconceptualize education as an ontological phenomenon or, as Thomson writes, “reontologize” education. Up to this point in the inquiry, the language used aligns with Heidegger’s thinking of Being and the terms and distinctions he uses to indicate this thinking. By appropriating world understood as a web of meaningful significance and recalling Heidegger’s fascination with the German impersonal sentence (e.g., “It gives”), I offer a new way to interpret world as worlding. Heidegger never quite uses worlding in the manner I describe below, but his later thinking (as we will see in Chapter 6) does come close. This transformation in meaning is specifically active, emphasizing the verbal and in-movement nature of worlding. In thinking teaching as worlding, I hope to engage faithfully in Heidegger’s challenge that those should not simply follow his thought pathways but think beyond them.

*From world to worlding*

The majority of the current path traveled in this chapter has been to illuminate and recontextualize teaching practice by way of Heidegger’s thinking of Being. Specifically, teaching was situated as being-in-the-world-as-teacher where Heidegger’s distinction of world gave access to an unusual way of speaking and thinking about teaching. From within an understanding of world as laid out above, teachers engage in their everyday lived experiences within a meaningful context, or world, that makes life intelligible. At the most concrete level, the classroom could be grasped as a world. Desks and chairs exist in the classroom world as equipment for teaching and learning. Technologies in the classroom world are meaningful entities that are always already connected to Dasein. The physical does not exhaust the possibilities of how world can be used to inform and transform being a teacher. Subject matters or disciplines might also be approach and understood as worlds in the sense we have been using. The professor of art history who teaches a course on early Impressionists can be thought of as introducing and situating her students within the world given by early Impressionism. Pieces of art and individual artists show up within the world that the professor helps to illuminate for her students. Understanding teaching as worlding gives teachers and
students a new language and way of being-in-the-world that can honor the contextuality of subject matters that have emerged throughout time and history from the heart of the lived experience of human beings.

The course itself could be understood as a world. The most recent course I taught at the undergraduate level was a methods course on instructional technology for pre-service teachers. Within the world of our course we uncovered that there were many worlds occurring simultaneously for not only me as teacher but also for my students. For example, following the interpretation above, part of my role in the world of this course was to introduce the students to the world of educational technology. In this way, I adopted the traditional understanding of teaching where I, the teacher, possess the knowledge and know-how that must be communicated to my students. However, I also charged the students to help determine and arrange the course schedule, topics, and assignments and this shifted the world of the course. A world where teacher and student co-create the key elements of teaching and learning is counterintuitive to the traditional world of teaching. Additionally, I challenged students to examine and critique my pedagogical decisions and the technologies selected to highlight throughout the course. From this approach, I wanted these pre-service teachers to simulate the world of their future teaching where they will be engaged, reflective, and critical practitioners of educational technologies. Understanding my own teaching as an enacting of worlds helped me remain aware of my own growth as a teacher.

From these examples it is easy to transition from world to worlding. The danger in relying so heavily on the term world is that it too readily is only heard in its static meaning. A more accurate understanding of world is as the active and verbal worlding because world is always already worlding. World occurs and enacts, and is always in motion. Heidegger indicates as such in the KNS 1919 lecture course when he writes “it worlds.”

In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given to me from out of an immediate environment [Umwelt]. This environmental milieu (lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, etc.) does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it
signifies to me everywhere and always everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case the 'it worlds'... (KNS, p. 61)

“It worlds” shifts the way we have been interpreting world up until this point. Heidegger comes close to using the verbal sense of world as we are here doing as we will find in Chapter 6. He also uses the language of Ereignis (event of appropriation of Being) in his middle period to approach the implicit movement of Being in worlding.

Heard in this manner, teaching can be understood as worlding. Teaching is the act of worlding worlds, enacting worlds. The professor of art history does not simply introduce her students to paintings and biographies of artists as static, present-at-hand things, but in a world as a meaningful context. Understood as worlding, the professor enacts the world of early Impressionism. Worlds are lived, experienced and directly correlated with Being and our being-in-the-world as Dasein. The teacher who worlds could exist as if teaching and learning were solely the domain of knowledge and knowing, but would recognize that this worlding is restrictive and eliminates other possible ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher. Worlding reconstitutes the responsibility teachers have in being a teacher by constantly reminding and indicating the correlated relationship between Being, Dasein, and the world (understood as Dasein’s being-in-the-world).

Concluding Thoughts and Indicating the Next Path

The aim of the inquiry is to illuminate the question of Being in teaching by way of three distinctions drawn from Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. This path approached the question of Being as grasped by Heidegger’s distinction of world. World, for Heidegger is understood as the referential totality or context that makes life intelligible. In revealing Dasein as being-in-the-world, Heidegger provides a way of glimpsing Being in teaching. Along this path a number of examples from my own teaching background and empirical research were called on to demonstrate how the phenomenon of world can assist in illuminating Being. These examples started from the stance of being-in-the-world-as-teacher and concluded by pushing beyond Heidegger’s original conceptualization to suggest approaching teaching as worlding.
In considering world in the verbal sense as worlding, the language used to describe the fundamental movement of Being as worlding was strained. For clarity, a number of concepts and distinctions were left untreated in this chapter on world, ideas that are helpful in grasping the movement of Being. These concepts, namely being-in and spatiality, point to the next path of thinking: attunement. In short, attunement is the how or manner of being-in-the-world, of Dasein. As another approach to asking the question of Being in teaching, attunement follows directly from Heidegger’s phenomenon of world.
Chapter 5. Attunement

The pathway of this chapter leads toward Heidegger’s ontological thinking of mood, or attunement (Befindlichkeit), as it can approach the question of Being in teaching. Along the way, we will encounter how attunement informs and transforms existing concepts and terminology already described previously. As can be expected, the relationship between Heidegger’s distinctions is never simple. For example, attunement naturally follows world, the subject of the previous chapter. Yet, describing the connection between world and attunement is limited by the prepositions available within the English language. Attunement is not in a world; rather, world springs from a particular attunement. In a sense, attunement can be understood as prior or primordial to world. We would then say Dasein finds itself within a world as already attuned. Heidegger’s distinctly ontological phenomenology of attunement or mood is a powerful conceptualization that, as we will discover, can be even more accessible and transformative than world.

We begin with a description of the distinction driving this pathway, attunement, as it relates to other common terms such as mood and feeling. Following, attunement is briefly traced as a feature of Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking. Before turning specifically to attunement as it assists in the question of Being in teaching, I situate attunement in relation to key terminology from earlier chapters. The path concludes with reinterpretations of the scenarios presented in Chapter 4 given the language and understanding of attunement.
Attunement

A story may best introduce the primary phenomenon. In a recent “walking assessment”\(^{37}\) with one of my students, I asked the student to connect some of the ideas and themes from the course to his everyday life outside of the university classroom. He was quick to share about his ongoing teaching as a swimming instructor of adolescents and his discussions with his mother, a nursing instructor. However, what was most pressing for him was the fight he had just had with his girlfriend the night before our walk. The previous evening was the third or fourth session where my student had attempted to teach his girlfriend how to drive a manual transmission car. He described to me how the first two to three sessions had progressed, from experimenting with the clutch to the inevitable starts and stalls within an empty parking lot near her home. Overall, he reflected, she knew all of the components and techniques he had demonstrated and she had practiced but there was a critical step keeping her from “getting it.” For my student’s girlfriend, this step was greater feedback and further instruction. For my student, the solution was simple: “Honey, I can’t explain it anymore -- you just have to feel it!” And with this, the argument erupted.

The easiest access to the idea of attunement as Heidegger intends is through the traditional understanding of moods and feelings. We say that someone is “in a mood” or that “we have a good feeling” about an upcoming event. Heidegger’s thinking of attunement reaches much deeper than the surface-level emotions human beings use to label themselves. Attunement is the ontologically fundamental way in which we find ourselves as being-in-the-world. Stolorow (2011) suggests that the German word Heidegger uses to name this conception, *Befindlichkeit*, could literally be translated as “how-one-finds-onesselness” (p. 25). Stolorow continues:

As Gendlin (1998) has pointed out, Heidegger’s word for the structure of affectivity denotes both how one feels and the situation within which one

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\(^{37}\) In my upper undergraduate courses I usually provide students the option to complete a walking assessment with me as their final project or exam. The stipulations are: (1) we select a text to read together that aligns with the theme of the course and their interests, (2) we select a time and location for the walk (usually 1.5 to 2 hours), and (3) I can ask them any question I would like. The first time I offered this kind of assessment I had three students select this option and in its most recent offering six students chose to complete a walk with me.
is feeling, a felt sense of oneself in a situation, prior to a Cartesian split between inside and outside. *Befindlichkeit* is disclosive of our always already having been delivered over to the situatedness in which we find ourselves.

Heidegger’s grounding of everyday lived experience as already in a particular attunement is a remarkable transformation of traditional theories of emotion or affectivity. Understood ontically, the affective domain (variously named moods, feelings, disposition, affectivity, and attunement - this naming is the subject of the following section) does not generally receive as much respect within philosophical inquiry or empirical research. This is not to say that the immense number of scholars working within the affective domain are not conducting interesting and meaningful scholarship. However, given Heidegger’s *ontological* phenomenology of moods and attunement this lack of understanding and respect is, quite simply, naive. Elkholy (2008) summarizes this transformation in grasping the primacy of mood:

Arguably, Heidegger’s most important contribution to the history of philosophy, in addition to entrenching the subject in its world and thereby overcoming the subject/object dualism, is the primacy that he accords to mood in his analysis of human existence. Through mood humans gain access to their world, to themselves and to their relations with others in the world in a manner that is prereflective and unthematic...[M]ood, especially the mood of Angst, has the power to reveal the whole: the whole of how one is in the world and the whole of the world at large. (p. 4)

Attunement belongs to all beings-in-the-world, not just Dasein. Organizations are attuned, as are subject matters. Philosophy, too, is attuned: “Philosophy in each case happens in a fundamental attunement [ground mood]. Conceptual philosophical comprehension is grounded in our being gripped, and this is grounded in fundamental attunement” (FCM, p. 7). Heidegger argues that even the so-called “hard” (objective and therefore free of affectivity) sciences are attuned but do not recognize it:

Often and widely, it looks as though thinking were a kind of reasoning conception and calculation completely free of any kind of tuning. But even the coldness of calculation, even the prosaic sobriety of planning are traits of an attunement. Not only that—even reason, which keeps itself free of every influence of the passions, is, as reason, attuned to confidence in the logically mathematical intelligence of its principles and rules. (WP, p. 27)
Before tracing further the development of and Heidegger’s references to attunement in his thinking, we turn now to the ways that this phenomenon has and can be put into language.

**Languaging attunement**

In German, as in English, there are many words and phrases used to indicate the phenomenon that is the subject of this chapter: attunement. Dahlstrom (2012) translates Heidegger’s overarching term *Befindlichkeit* as “disposedness” and offers “state of mind” and “attunement” as alternatives. Other scholars prefer various translations of *Befindlichkeit*. For example, Stolorow (2011) suggests “disclosive affectivity,” Dreyfus (1991) prefers “affectedness,” and Capobianco (2010) translates as “affective disposition.” Dahlstrom (2012) provides context: “The German word ... is constructed from the verbal construction *sich befinden*. The query *Wie befinden Sie sich?* means simply ‘How are you?’ or, more literally, ‘How do you find yourself [to be]?’” I am weary of translating *Befindlichkeit* as “state of mind” given that this phrasing may further encourage the erroneous split between mind and body that is a byproduct of Cartesianism. Current theories of emotion continue to assume this dichotomy; while locating the “source” of human emotions within the hypothalamus, emotions are still treated as springing from and being controlled by the mind. Disposedness, Dahlstrom’s translation, seems limiting in its ability to convey in English the bodily, contextual, and specifically aural manner that I detect in Heidegger’s thinking of *Befindlichkeit*. Thus, I prefer attunement as the umbrella term to translate this key distinction. However, I will from draw on these other translations when I feel it furthers understanding.

The later Heidegger transitions away from *Befindlichkeit* to *Stimmung*, the German word for mood, to name and describe the fundamental way in which beings (including Dasein) find themselves. Dreyfus (1991) argues that moods should be distinguished from affectedness (his translation of *Befindlichkeit*) but I am hesitant to agree. In a text from 1941 (GA70) Heidegger reflects that his thinking of *Befindlichkeit* is the same as *Stimmung* (see Dahlstrom, 2012). If they are to be used in the manner that
Heidegger describes, moods and other related terms such as feelings, affects, and emotions, must be heard *ontologically* rather than *ontically*. For example, when speaking about the emotion of reservation ("reservedness" as Heidegger names in *Contributions*), we must be able to hear and understand this phenomenon not simply as an ontic feeling contained within our bodies, as one emotion among many, but ontologically as the whole of the way situations occur and show up for us and how we essentially are as being-in-the-world, as Dasein. As we will find below, this misunderstanding of the ontic and ontological grasping of attunement continues to plague interpreters and followers of Heidegger’s thinking.

Moving forward, attunement, mood, affective disposition, and so on will be used to name the primacy of *Befindlichkeit* or *Stimmung*. I believe that using these words interchangeably is possible given the distinction of formal indication made in Chapter 3. With attunement situated in language, the following section offers a brief sketch of the history of Heidegger’s distinction of attunement.

**Tracing the history of the concept of attunement**

Attunement, as the disposed manner by which Dasein finds itself in its being-in-the-world, has an intriguing history that does not necessarily coincide with the history of Heidegger’s concept of world (Chapter 4). One way to trace its arch as a distinction within Heidegger’s thinking is as a bell curve, gradually increasing in frequency until a peak around 1924 through 1928 before cresting and diminishing. On the other hand, Heidegger was always concerned with the interplay between the what and the how, the how of the question of Being. Approached from this stance, Heidegger’s interest in attunement and attuned thinking includes several peaks throughout his career (e.g., the early Freiburg courses, the 1924 Aristotle course in Marburg, *Being and Time*, the 1929 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course in Freiburg, and so on). It is tempting to detect a pattern in Heidegger’s thinking of attunement. For the present inquiry I have selected an arbitrary schema based on three phases: the time leading up to the publication of *Being and Time*, the thorough treatment of attunement in *Being and Time* in 1927, and the importance attunement has in Heidegger’s teaching and writings after 1927. In contrast to earlier chapters, we will encounter and describe additional
terminology and distinctions as they arise in each of the three phases, with particular attention given to terminology introduced in *Being and Time*. With attunement fully indicated, we then turn to the question of Being in teaching as attuned being-in-the-world.

**Before Being and Time: Luther and Aristotle**

The conceptual development of attunement is remarkably interwoven within the context of Heidegger’s early academic career. The years between 1919 and 1923 were a whirlwind of activity for Heidegger, the fledgling instructor at Freiburg. After returning from war service in 1919, Heidegger immediately took on a full teaching load and, while serving as Husserl’s assistant, began his search for employment as a professor. At the time, after completing a qualifying dissertation, a prospective professor had to complete a second dissertation, the Habilitation, in order to apply to teach philosophy. Thus, when Heidegger returned from war service duty in early 1919, he began his work at Freiburg as a *Privatdozent*, or an unpaid instructor.

Heidegger’s courses and seminars during this time included topics such as the phenomenology of religion, phenomenological methodology, as well as phenomenological engagements with key texts of Augustine and Aristotle. In late 1922 to early 1923 Heidegger began to experience the pressure to publish in order to obtain a university position at the University of Marburg. He had long planned on publishing a text of phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle such that “Aristotle book” is frequently mentioned in some of his courses and personal letters. As evidence of his scholarship and in application for the position at Marburg, Heidegger adapted notes and lectures from a course he taught in WS 1921-22 entitled *Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to Aristotle: Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Introduction* into a draft outline of a book proposal. The document was sufficient, and Heidegger transferred to Marburg as Associate Professor in WS 1923-24.

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38 There was a distinct difference between a lecture course and a seminar in the German university system at the time: lecture courses were structured around prepared (previously written) lectures while seminars were a time set aside for discussions and analysis of readings.

39 See Appendix 2.
While *Befindlichkeit*, as attunement, is first mentioned in the WS 1919-20 lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*[^40] in Freiburg, it is not until Heidegger began his teaching at Marburg that his phenomenological engagement with early Christianity and Aristotle gained clarity as the attunement found in *Being and Time*. In WS 1919-20, attunement is described as how I “find myself” in a given situation where the emphasis is placed on the *mineness* of the *how* of my factical life experience. In Marburg four years later, Heidegger hints toward the primacy of attunement during a brief guest appearance in Rudolph Bultmann’s theological seminar on Paul’s Ethics. His two-part lecture, “The Problem of Sin in Luther,” focuses on *das Wie des Gestelltsein*[^41], or Luther’s way of thinking about *affectus*. Translated literally, the phrase means the how of being-*positioned*, or being-disposed. Kisiel (2007) notes that Luther’s *affectus* is “first of all in regard to how the human being is placed before God, then (dis-)positioned in the world in the flight from God” (p. 435). Heidegger’s use of the term *Gestelltsein* in the context of man’s relationship to God is then transformed a few months later in SS 1924 through Aristotle’s passions.

The true breakthrough to attunement as it appears in *Being and Time* comes in the four hour lecture course entitled *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* which represents the closest Heidegger will get to completing the Aristotle book. After SS 1924, Heidegger turns his attentions elsewhere and relevant components of the Aristotle book are adapted to what will become *Being and Time*. While a full exegesis of this unauthorized[^42] but important lecture course[^13] is impossible within this present inquiry, a

[^40]: This course is not to be confused with the SS 1928 lecture course of the same name. Heidegger often offered courses with similar or identical names with very different content actually addressed in the course. Also, Heidegger often gave titles to his lecture courses and seminars that were not the official name recorded with the registrar. These facts have made determining Heidegger’s actual teaching activities throughout his life an ongoing challenge for scholars.

[^41]: Interestingly, *Gestelltsein* as being-[dis]positioned rings eerily close to the language Heidegger will use two decades later to talk about the Being of technology, *Gestell*. In Heidegger’s thinking of technology, *Gestell* is most commonly translated as Enframing—the way that any- and every-thing is positioned within the modern technological epoch of Being. Enframing, as “the danger,” is the topic of the next Chapter.

[^42]: In *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King*, van Buren writes that the entire lecture on “*Aristoteles, Rhetorik, II*” was one of several missing manuscripts “apparently destroyed at one time or another by Heidegger’s own hand” (p. 15). It has been “pieced together” from various existing student notes.
brief sketch of its themes is necessary to tracing the history of attunement. In the opening lectures, Heidegger lays out a plan for approaching the fundamental (grounding) concepts of Aristotle’s thinking phenomenologically. To accomplish this feat, Heidegger approaches a selection of Aristotelian concepts by examining how Da-sein (in both inflections as “being-there" literally and as an entity in and of itself as was introduced the previous year in SS 1923, see Chapter 2) in its being-in-the-world conceptualizes from its there, its factual life experience. Heidegger conducts a sweeping analysis that begins with Kant’s logic, transforms the traditional logic into logos as “speaking,” and identifies ousia (being, presence) as the basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy. Each following lecture presents a feature of the being-there of the human through an extensive treatment of carefully selected quotes from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and *Nichomachean Ethics*.

Heidegger locates in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* “the first systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of being with one another” (BT, p. 178) and references Aristotle as such in *Being and Time*. In BCA, Heidegger finds in Aristotelian rhetoric and the later thinking of having and mood/passion (pathe) the key to Befindlichkeit that he first indicates as Gestelltsein in his engagement with Luther’s conceptualization of sin. Rhetoric, in Heidegger’s transformed sense, “is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there [Dasein], the hermeneutic of being-there itself” (BCA, p. 77). Scult (1999) expands:

Rhetoric, as conceptualized by Aristotle in his definition, provides, makes accessible to philosophy, the systematic "how" of our everyday being-in-the-world (alltäglichen Seins-in-der-Welt), which at the same time is a being-with-one-another (Miteinanderseins) through speech (1924, 47). The dynamic of rhetoric represents our capacity to "see" our situatedness in the world (our hermeneutical situation, our Dasein) as a set of language possibilities that constitute the raw materials out of which we construct our everyday life with one another. (p. 150)

43 An English translation of the SS 1924 lecture course (GA18) was published in 2009 and scholars have still not fully digested its importance. Specifically, Heidegger offers comments on topics that he has been criticized for not addressing more fully in his later works including animality, political rhetoric, and pleasure.
If rhetoric as speaking is interpreting being-there, then the how of speaking is illuminated in the *pathos*, the attunement of being-there. While the influence of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in this manner will be backgrounded in *Being and Time*, Dasein’s moodedness or attunement is an explicit elaboration of Aristotle’s *pathos*.

In the years leading up to *Being and Time*, Heidegger was absorbed in phenomenological studies of religion and textual engagements with Aristotle and other Ancient Greek philosophers. The how-I-find-myself in a particular situation as *Befindlichkeit* occurs as a glimmer in 1919, then receives further treatment as *Gestelltsein* (how I am positioned, disposed) in Heidegger’s lecture on the problem of sin in Luther’s theology. In SS 1924 we find Heidegger tracing the attuned being-there of humans in Aristotle’s thinking of *pathos* in *Rhetoric*.

Something shifted in Heidegger’s intellectual development as he transitioned from Freiburg to Marburg. Not only did his style of writing and speaking improve (see Kisiel, 2007), but he also began to attract greater numbers of students. The Marburg years, as van Buren notes, were those of Heidegger as “the Hidden King” of philosophy. Part of this shift was a result of Heidegger’s phenomenological engagement with Aristotle, the obvious being his securing a professorship based on a proposed book on Aristotle that was never published. The years leading up to the 1927 publishing of *Being and Time* were eventful: the following summer will see Heidegger’s *History of the Concept of Time*, largely considered the first draft of *Being and Time*. It was during these years that he worked with and taught some of his most famous students including Hans Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt, and Herbert Marcuse. The SS 1925 lecture course HCT marks the first time *Befindlichkeit* (translated as the discoveredness of Dasein’s disposition) occurs largely in the manner it will appear in *Being and Time*, the topic of the next subsection.

**Being and Time: As an existential of Dasein’s Being-in**

Attunement receives its fullest explication in §§29-30 of *Being and Time*, following Heidegger’s discussion of Being-with “the they.” In the previous chapter, we left the verbal sense of world as an indication of attunement. Specifically, being-in and spatiality were to be treated here within the context of attunement. After situating these
two concepts within *Being and Time*, attunement will be described as it is explained in §§29-30. Additional insights gained from the SS 1927 lecture course *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* which was delivered after *Being and Time* was published in April are integrated as needed.

While attunement as Dasein’s everyday moodedness enters Heidegger’s terminology most prominently in *Being and Time*, the concept of a mooded existence remains a central feature of Heidegger’s thinking for the remainder of his life. One of the reasons this is overlooked is due to a mistranslation of *Befindlichkeit* as “state-of-mind” in Macquarrie and Robinson’s (1962) first English edition of *Being and Time*. State-of-mind too readily lends itself to a continued separation of mind and body, of subject and object, two dichotomies that Heidegger was attempting to overcome in his analysis of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In state-of-mind one can also hear echos of dispositional language that, without qualification, may reinforce the very presuppositions Heidegger was deconstructing and critiquing. Therefore I have chosen to rely primarily on Joan Stambaugh’s (1996) second English translation that translates *Befindlichkeit* as attunement as it assists in indicating the moodedness from Heidegger’s earlier engagement with Aristotle’s *pathos*.

**Retracing the path to attunement**

In order to situate attunement within the context of Division One of *Being and Time* a review of the pathway of the thinking up until its introduction in §29 is helpful. (This also serves as a review of the primary terms and concepts introduced thus far in the present inquiry.) Heidegger begins the treatise by naming the aim of the inquiry: the question of the meaning of Being by way of a fundamental ontology into the being of Dasein. The distinction of ontic/ontological is made in the first few sections to name being as a being (the ontic) and Being as Being (the ontological). Before sketching an overview of his trajectory Heidegger lays out his method of phenomenology as a fundamental ontology by retrieving phenomenology from its etymological roots (*phenomenon-logos*). Part One, Division One carefully and methodically develops a step-by-step preparatory analysis of Dasein, the being-there of a being for whom its being is an issue for it. Existential and existential are introduced to assist Heidegger in approaching and discussing Dasein, with existential pertaining to an individual Dasein’s
understanding of its everydayness and existential Dasein’s special way of Being as Dasein. The analytic of Dasein is prior to any other approach by an ontic science (e.g., anthropology, psychology) because it engages ontologically with the meaning of Being.

Heidegger then introduces the “fundamental constitution of Dasein” as being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is Dasein and is approached in three ways: (1) in-the-world, (2) being a self and being-with, and (3) being-in. We must be cautious not to assume that by parsing out the approach to being-in-the-world that each component is therefore separate and unique. Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon that, with the concept of world already explicated, is holographic—each of the three approaches reflect and encompass the others. Before engaging meaningfully with the first approach by way of the worldliness of the world, Heidegger offers a critique of “being-in” as “knowing the world” (which was addressed specifically in Chapter 1 of the present inquiry). In his exploration of being-in-the-world by way of (1) “in-the-world,” Heidegger discusses the character of worldliness, innerworldly beings, significance and reference, and offers a critique of the Cartesian ontology of the traditional grasping of world by explicating the spatiality of being-in-the-world. Within this context Heidegger introduces and expands on handiness as present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and ready-at-hand (Zuhandenheit), two ways that beings can “show up” for Dasein. (2) Being a self (in contrast to the They) and being-with shifts the analysis from the referential context of the world in the direction of the “who” of Dasein. Attunement appears within the third way into being-in-the-world as (3) being-in, one of three “existentials” or ways of being-in.

We encountered present-at-hand and ready-to-hand in Chapter 4 without truly engaging in Heidegger’s account of the spatiality of being-in-the-world. §22-24 occur at the end of all the previous sections whereby Heidegger expands and describes the first way of approaching the whole of being-in-the-world, or (1) “in-the-world” above. Directly before these sections on spatiality records another focused critique on the particularly quantitative (Cartesian) understanding of space and entities. For Cartesianism, beings exist in a space (and time) that can be measured and recorded (e.g., x, y and z coordinates of a three-dimensional space). Within this grasping of space, the world, in Heidegger’s sense, is deworlded or voided of context and meaning. The mathematics of spatiality, as Polt (1999) writes: “cannot capture the experience of being in an unfamiliar,
threatening neighbourhood, or finding the scissors just where we expected to find them, or feeling that a room is spacious, or putting one’s glove on the wrong hand” (p. 59). In §22-24, Heidegger offers a new vocabulary of spatial language that is richer and contextual, reconnecting Dasein with its qualitative, everyday experiences with beings and entities in its world.

For example, things that occur for Dasein as within its world have their “place,” where they “belong.” These beings are “at hand” for Dasein, not in a selfish way, but in contextual recognition. Things show up for Dasein as mattering within its spatiality because Dasein is its spatiality, its there. Heidegger introduces two distinctions to further his languaging of the spatiality of Dasein with “de-distancing” and “directionality.” “De-distancing means making distance disappear, making the being at a distance of something disappear, bringing it near” (BT, p. 97). Heidegger’s engagement with thinking distance and nearness remains a feature of his thinking as we will find in Chapter 6. Directing indicates the how of the de-distancing Dasein, directing back to a place, directing toward a region. Again and again Heidegger emphasizes the interrelatedness of the terms he is calling on to bring into relief his thinking. As such, Dasein is its spatiality while at the same time is as it is always already de-distancing and directing. Heidegger also names additional terminology not addressed here including region, giving space, making room, and dwelling in a space.

What is interesting is how close Heidegger’s characterizations come to the language of attunement. This can be explained by the holographic nature of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world and its various components and ways of approaching, but Polt’s example above is telling. In each everyday encounter with space, he names an attuned-way-of-being: threatening neighbourhood, feeling spaciousness, wrong hand. In Chapter 4 Blattner’s (1999) distinction of “showing up” now needs a reinterpretation:

“Jones showed up at the party” means that she arrived and made her presence known to others at the party. If Jones had snuck into the house where the party was being held and stealthily made her way unobserved into a closet, we would hardly say that she “showed up at the party.” (p. 10)
How is the spatiality of Jones’ world attuned when she “shows up” as expected? How is the world attuned from within the closet? Dasein is as its being-in-the-world engaged in its everydayness as it interacts with other Daseins, beings, and entities in a meaningful way, in a way that things matter for it. Heidegger shifts from a discussion of spatiality to the second approach to being-in-the-world, Being-with and the self. The “who” of Dasein as being-with is only a brief waypoint as Heidegger turns to Being-in, the final approach toward analyzing being-in-the-world as the fundamental constitution of Dasein.

**Being-in as attunement**

Attunement is first addressed as an existential of Dasein’s Being-in in §29 and is followed by the specific attunement of fear in §30. Heidegger names the three ways that Dasein is disclosed and discloses itself in relation to its world existentials: (1) attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), (2) understanding (*Verstehen*), and (3) discourse (*Rede*). Much as with earlier terminology, the three existentials are to be understood as equiprimordial with attunement the most powerful. Ekholy (2008) summarizes:

> Mood is the prevailing existential because mood is how the world opens up to Da-sein as a whole. Mood conditions the mode of access of Da-sein’s understanding of beings and others in the world. … Mood opens up the horizon of the world within which Da-sein finds itself in its relations to its possibilities and to other Daseins. By opening up the world, mood opens Da-sein up to its being-in-the-world. … How the world matters to Da-sein, how Da-sein will approach its possibilities, and what possibilities it will find are all determined by mood. (p. 25)

> “Indeed,” says Heidegger, “we must *ontologically* in principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘mere mood’” (BT, p. 135). Dasein is always already in a mood, or attunement, but it is not always necessarily aware of its attuned relationality to its world. Attunement “first makes possible directing oneself to something” (BT, p. 129), where directing is a nod to Heidegger’s phenomenology of space as a function of Dasein’s way of being “in-the-world.” Dasein’s world is coloured by mood.

Ekholy (2008) offers a pertinent example at the intersection of mood and teaching and learning:
Significantly, mood does not disclose to Da-sein a part of the world, or certain situations within the world divorced from others. The world as a whole and Da-sein as a whole are disclosed in mood. For example, if one finds oneself in a bad mood after receiving a poor score on an exam, this mood not only discloses the being of the individual in the mood, but the mood points to a world where exams matter to that student. Perhaps this is because exams may be used to place individuals into this or that educational bracket. Presumably this bracket will determine the students possibilities with respect to employment options, subsequent housing location, social status, and so on. In disclosing what matters to Dasein, mood discloses the world, and vice versa, in disclosing the world, mood discloses what matters to Da-sein in its being-in-the world. (p. 26)

We will encounter further examples of attuned teaching below. Heidegger provides his own concrete example of the fundamental attunement of angst (which he will address later) in the definite mode of fear.

By approaching the phenomenon of fear from three directions, Heidegger states, we will be able to better understand the structure of attunement. Fear is described as: (1) what we are afraid of, (2) fearing, and (3) why we are afraid. The first, the fearsome, always deals with beings in a world that occur as threatening to Dasein. “Fearing itself frees what we have characterized as threatening in a way which lets us be concerned with it” (BT, p. 132). In concern, we take notice and are aware of that which is threatening. The third approach, the why of being afraid, turns the entire mood back onto ourselves:

The about which fear is afraid is the fearful being itself, Da-sein. Only a being which is concerned in its being about that being can be afraid. Fearing discloses this being in its jeopardization, in its being left to itself. Although in varying degrees of explicitness, fear always reveals Da-sein in the being of its there. (BT, p. 132)

After briefly describing the three approaches to indicating the phenomenon of fear, Heidegger states that his is only one possibility among many but remains firm on all iterations of fear eliciting an attunement of being-threatened for Dasein.

The present inquiry pauses here with Heidegger’s overview and introduction to attunement as the first way of Being-in of Dasein without fully describing the remaining interconnected existentials, understanding and discourse, that occur simultaneously
within Dasein’s moodful existence. A full treatment of these two existentials is planned for a future inquiry, but a brief sketch can be offered. Dasein is always Being-in (discloses and is disclosed by) its world as already attuned. Understanding marks Dasein's Being-in as thrownness, or as thrown projection into its world. Thrownness and projection assist Heidegger in shifting his ontological analysis into Dasein in the direction of temporality, a second topic that is outside the scope of the present inquiry. The third existential, discourse, appropriates another phenomenological finding from Aristotle's Rhetoric. Discourse describes Dasein's ability to language its relationality to other beings and entities. Important to grasp, though, is the already always attuned manner of discourse and understanding as equiprimordially constituted with attunement.

A final distinction remains unaddressed, namely Heidegger’s movement from fear as an example of attunement to Angst as the fundamental attunement of Dasein. Angst will be indicated below in the examples connected to attuned teaching. In short, after reiterating his position that Dasein’s primary way of being is care, or concernful acting, Heidegger reveals fear as grounded in the more fundamental attunement of Angst. Whereas fear is a definite fear of something, Angst is understood as fear of nothing (literally no-thing). In this manner, Angst discloses Dasein’s world as always already attuned to Angst.

The fact that what is threatening is nowhere characterizes what Angst is about. Angst “does not know” what it is about which it is anxious. But “nowhere” does not mean nothing; rather, region in general lies therein, and disclosedness of the world in general for essentially spatial being-in. Therefore, what is threatening cannot approach from a definite direction within nearness, it is already “there”—and yet nowhere. It is so near that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath—and yet it is nowhere. (BT, p. 174)

Following Angst, Heidegger moves quickly to address reality and its connection to world, and truth as it relates to propositional speech and Being. Part One, Division One of Being and Time is so demanding that most commentators cannot and do not continue to describe Division Two. In Division Two Heidegger rallies his reader and recycles back through the fundamental ontology of Dasein from the previous 200 pages of Division One, redefining and pressing further phenomenological terms and distinctions that were made only pages before. For this reason, Polt (1999) rightly names the character of Heidegger’s analysis as “centripetal”: “he always sought the center, the
gathering power of Being” (p. 179). 

Being and Time remained unfinished, but the themes and terms of Heidegger’s magnum opus occurred over and over again in the next four decades of his life. In the next subsection we summarize how attunement (mood) remained a feature of Heidegger’s later thinking. Following this description we will explore how attunement now fully grasped can assist in the present inquiry to approach the question of Being in teaching.

### Attunement in the later and older Heidegger

After 1930, attunement/mood remains in the foreground of Heidegger’s thinking. This is not to say that Heidegger writes and thinks of mood extensively as a phenomenon in his work after Being and Time, but rather that Heidegger takes it for granted that those readers who come to his work already understand the distinction of attunement from Being and Time. Earlier, Richardson’s schema of Heidegger I and II was presented and set aside in favour of Kisiel’s more nuanced approach to grasping the whole of Heidegger’s thinking. In a letter to Richardson that was subsequently published in the opening pages of Richardson’s text, Heidegger expressed his reluctance at being categorized as such. Heidegger does indicate though that if he were to entertain such a distinction, he would require one restriction:

> The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II. (Richardson, p. xxii)

Therefore, when Heidegger does engage in the thinking of attunement, he does so on the basis of his work in Being and Time. Those scholars who theorize Heidegger’s “turn” [Kehre] note that this shift occurs in the early 1930s. Interestingly, the lecture course that is often referenced in the context of Heidegger’s thinking on mood post-Being and Time is The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics which was delivered in WS 1929-30 at Freiburg.

In this final subsection we will summarize three separate engagements with attunement that occurred after Being and Time: (1) in WS 1929-30 The Fundamental
Heidegger’s phenomenology of three types of boredom within the WS 1929-30 lecture course entitled *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* has become infamous within Heidegger studies and in the work of those scholars who find inspiration in Heidegger’s account of mood. The three kinds of boredom (*Langweile*, literally a “long while”) Heidegger describes are a function of how time is experienced: (1) being bored *by* something, (2) being bored *with* something, and (3) profound boredom. Being bored *by* something (1) is the most readily accessible in everyday life. We wait for the bus and in our waiting become bored. This boredom occurs for us as an annoyance because we are left in limbo between our current state and being fulfilled (by the bus arriving). Being bored with something (2) complicates the first form of boredom by not having a specific aim. We are bored with what we are not able to name, and time stands still. In this mode of boredom we look for ways to “kill time” and even while the activities we engage in to help time move along may be pleasant, when we reflect back on them after the fact we find that we were, in fact, just bored. Importantly, boredom (2) shows up as a feature of Dasein and reveals its temporality (time as standing still) in a way that boredom (1) does not.

The third boredom is named profound (3) because it takes the first two forms of boredom, being bored *by* (1) and with (2) something, in their emptiness and colours *everything* in Dasein’s world. Nothing matters for Dasein, not even its relationships to beings. Life is empty, meaningless, and lacks significance. Time occurs in an altogether different manner within profound boredom; not only are we bored with the meaninglessness of our present, but also our future possibilities and past experiences have been drained of meaning. However, all is not hopeless as Heidegger indicates that in this total withdrawal of meaning Dasein is actually thrown back into its possibilities: “All telling refusal [*Versagen*] is in itself a telling [*Sagen*], i.e., a making manifest” (FCM, p. 211). Rather than profound boredom resulting in despair, in the “refusal” of
significance Dasein’s possibilities for being are revealed. Freeman & Elpidorou (2015) summarize:

Indeed, what is revealed to Dasein in this peculiar refusal is its freedom. This revealing acts as a call for action (FCM, pp. 222-28). Dasein is called to resolutely disclose and appropriate itself, that is, to take action in the moment of vision (Augenblick), to choose what is properly its own, and to become the author of its own existential meaning (FCM, p. 224). (p. 16)

Heidegger names boredom in this course as the fundamental attunement of modern times. Interesting to reflect on is the way that we today commonly think of boredom as having us rather than the reverse. In Heidegger’s account of profound boredom we (as Dasein) have boredom and from out of boredom we are able to reappropriate our existential choices to move out of boredom. Other key ideas are named in this lecture course including man as “world-forming” and Heidegger’s most focused engagement with animality. These topics will be addressed in the concluding chapter along with Heidegger’s (lack of) thinking of embodiment.

Even while being skeptical of the “turn” (Kehre) in Heidegger’s thinking, it is obvious that his attention turned toward more historical and art-centred topics such as poetics and language. In the mid-1930s and 1940s this included a number of lectures and lecture courses on the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin. Whether Heidegger’s engagement was “philosophy” or “literary criticism” remains a lively topic for current scholars. He writes in the introduction to an early publication entitled Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry: “The present elucidations do not claim to be contributions to research in the history of literature or to aesthetics. They spring from a necessity of thought” (EHP, p. 21). In his engagements with Hölderlin, Heidegger sought to tap into Hölderlin’s special poetic attunement to Being. Not surprisingly, Heidegger found resonances of multiple attunements throughout Hölderlin’s poetry including serenity, gaiety, love, and joy. However, most notable is the attunement of Dasein’s being “at home” in nearness to Being, a strikingly different attunement to the Angst of Being and Time and profound

44 The lectures have been collected and published as Elucidations of Holderlin’s Poetry (GA 4). Heidegger taught three lecture courses on Holderlin between 1934 and 1942: WS 1934-35, Holderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” (GA39); WS 1941-42, Holderlin’s Hymn “Andenken” (GA 52; translation in preparation); SS 1942, Holderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” (GA53).
boredom of the WS 1929-30 lecture course. Capobianco (2010) writes of this attunement:

Human beings are primordially “at home” in nearness to Being as the Source of all beings; yet in the beginning, we are not aware of this as such. Only after “valiantly forgetting the homeland” and “wandering abroad” is the poet (in particular) called (by Being) to make the long journey “home.” “Homecoming” (Heimkunft) is the occasion for great joy, but there remains the task of learning to “abide” and “dwell” in nearness to Being in its mysterious revealing-concealing. (p. 78)

The attunements that Heidegger gleans from his readings of Holderlin record his continued thinking of mood. For example, in his opening lecture “What is Metaphysics?” upon his return to Freiburg in 1929, Angst remains a distinctive mood of Dasein. However, in a Postscript written in 1943 to this lecture Heidegger retraces the significance of mood for Dasein that demonstrates his transformed grasping of attunement given his encounter with Holderlin. By the mid-1940s, “awe” (Scheu) is the most fitting name for Dasein’s attuned relationship to Being, with Angst, understood ontologically, still naming the “claim [made] on the human being in his essence so that he learns to experience Being in the Nothing” (P, p. 307). Heidegger continues: “For close by essential [ontological] anxiety, in the terror of the abyss, there dwells awe. Awe clears and embraces that place of being essentially human within which one abides at home in the abiding” (P, p. 307). Capobianco’s (2010) recent scholarship has been influential in this reading of mood “from angst to astonishment.”

Heidegger gave a lecture in 1955 in Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France entitled “Was ist das—die Philosophie?” that also includes a focused reflection on attunement. This lecture is often overlooked but furthers Capobianco’s (2010) tracing of Heidegger’s naming of Dasein’s fundamentally attuned relationship to Being as awe or astonishment. Philosophy, Heidegger argues, occurs in a fundamental attunement of astonishment and this has been known since the time of Plato and Aristotle. These ancient philosophers’ relationship to Being was one of attuned correspondence:

45 For a detailed tracing of this path of thinking, see “From Angst to Astonishment” in Capobianco’s (2010) Engaging Heidegger, pp. 70-86.
Being as such determines speaking in such a way that language is attuned (*accorder*) to the Being of being. Correspondence is necessary and is always attuned, and not just accidentally and occasionally. It is in an attunement. And only on the basis of the attunement (*disposition*) does the language of correspondence obtain its precision, its tuning. As something tuned and attuned, correspondence really exists in a tuning. (WP, p. 56)

In this lecture, Heidegger explicitly calls on Aristotle’s *pathos* to name the inspiration for his distinction of attunement. The theme of tuning and hearing recurs throughout Heidegger’s reflections with the aim of hearing the call of Being from out of our modern attunement that, according to Heidegger, remains deaf to the speaking of Being. The always already nature of attunement from *Being and Time* resurfaces in his critique of the attunement of “calculative thinking”:

Often and widely, it looks as though thinking were a kind of reasoning conception and calculation completely free of any kind of tuning. But even the coldness of calculation, even the prosaic sobriety of planning are traits of an attunement. Not only that—-even reason, which keeps itself free of every influence of the passions, is, as reason, attuned to confidence in the logically mathematical intelligence of its principles and rules. (WP, p. 59)

This subsection focused on Heidegger’s thinking of attunement post-*Being and Time* by selecting three engagements of mood: (1) boredom in the 1929-30 lecture course *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, (2) being “at home” in the Holderlin lectures between 1934-1942, and (3) the astonishment that is proper to philosophy. Other encounters with attunement remain untreated here, including in *On the Essence of Truth*, the SS 1935 lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics*, and in his second major work *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*. In the truth essay and lecture course Heidegger continues to develop and distinguish the fundamental attunement of Angst from *Being and Time*. In *Contributions*, however, Heidegger names the attunement that is needed for a new kind of thinking reserve (*Verhaltenheit*) that allows human beings to overcome traditional metaphysics. Attunement remained a feature of Heidegger’s thinking late into his life, making occasional appearances in both the Zollikon and Le Thor/Zähringen Seminars.
While not a complete treatment, this section has provided a sketch of Heidegger’s distinction of attunement throughout his thinking. With a grasp of attunement, we turn to examining how this concept can help approach the question of Being in teaching.

**Attuned teaching**

During my doctoral work I have had the opportunity to lead an online course on the introduction to philosophy of education multiple times. As a basic pedagogical strategy, students are to read weekly readings and post reflections on these readings to an online forum located within the learning management system supported by the university. These reading reflections are weighted relatively heavily in comparison to the other remaining essays students are required to write. The first unit of the course is on the purposes and aims of education. In every term I have taught this course one theme emerges immediately in the first week of reading reflections: something is wrong with education. The course draws students who are interested in becoming teachers, who have an interest in education, or who need the course as an elective to fulfill various degree requirements. As such, education for these students usually means formal education that they divide into two divisions: K-12 (elementary to secondary) and post-secondary. While the readings and topics are engaging for students regardless of their backgrounds, most assume education as what happens within formal educational institutions and most assume that education, as a whole, is broken and needs to be fixed. At first I thought my students were unique until I began to really listen to how the news media and popular culture treats and understands education. Even in conversations with my family members who are teachers we spoke about the things that were broken in their educational worlds, from a new principal’s initiative that does not work to a curriculum model that does not meet the needs of a group of students. Is something seriously wrong with education?

I will admit that when I was in my undergraduate teacher preparation courses I also jumped on the bandwagon of educational critique. I reflected on my past teachers, good and bad, the curriculum, and even the physical structure of my childhood school buildings. Having now spent over a decade of my post-secondary life within academia as
an undergraduate student, middle school teacher, graduate student, professional development worker, and doctoral student, I wonder not only where this assumption about education comes from but also how it helps or hurts educational inquiry. Specifically, and in connection to the pathway of attunement within this chapter, if teachers approach education, curriculum, and pedagogy as if “something is wrong here,” how does this mood then shape and transform their world? This may be the most concrete example of Heidegger’s claim that moods colour our worlds.

In this and the remaining section of this chapter, we will revisit the examples and phenomenological vignettes from the previous chapter to explore what “shows up” as a result of the language and thinking of attunement. As is demonstrated in the opening paragraphs of this section, I will shift voices to the autobiographical when necessary to further ground these sometimes abstract concepts.

**Being-in-the-world-as-teacher**

In Chapter 4, being-in-the-world was incorporated and reappropriated to explore the possibilities of thinking the Being of teaching in its meaningful contextuality. With the distinction of world, the classroom was examined as a type of world where beings and entities encountered were understood as such because of the context. Put simply, within a classroom, teachers show up as teachers, students show up as students, and various equipment (e.g., desks, tables) shows up as tools for teaching and learning. In the language of this chapter, by being attuned to teaching as a “worldly” and “worlding” phenomenon we were able to gain access to the question of Being in teaching. The aim of this pathway is to take the distinction of world one step further to understand the always already attunements of teaching. Where for Dasein attunement discloses the disposedness its world, for this pathway attunement can assist in disclosing and reinterpreting the question of Being in teaching.

Why consider Being in teaching by way of attunement? Magrini’s (2011; 2014) scholarship into the reontologization of education is crucial to responding to this query:

Educational research focused on Heidegger’s philosophy must take seriously the crucial role that moods play in situating the human being in
its world, for to gloss over this issue misses the point that educational reform, from the perspective of Heidegger’s thinking, depends on the following understanding: *in order to change our theories and views on educational practice, we must change our grounding attunement.* (2011, p. 502, emphasis added)

The acknowledgement and transformation of our current attunement, however, is not simply the shift from one way of thinking about education to another theory. It is, rather, a recovering of our potential for developing ontologically. I quote Magrini (2011) at length:

However, this movement to recover our ontological potential for Being is not an easy or simple matter to conceive, for it must not be mistakenly understood in terms of one educational philosophy overtaking another, a battle between warring curriculum models, where progressivism usurps essentialism and neo-constructivism overtakes progressivism. Rather, it entails our confronting and overcoming the ‘metaphysics of presence’, the traditional metaphysical view that tacitly and insidiously determines the way that we are in the world (Thomson, 2002, p. 141). For Heidegger, educational reform is not simply about a change in our mind-set or radical conscious awakening as we find in Sartre’s existentialism or Freire’s spiritually inspired educational philosophy. Rather, it is about transcending our inauthentic modes of attunement, and thereby enacting the authentic possibilities of our Being-in-the-world. What is called for is a radical ‘paradigm shift’, from an inauthentic existence to one that is highlighted by resolute openness to our potential for Being, and this change means that along with our mood, our understanding of the world and the ways in which we interpret and discourse about it has also been reconfigured. (p. 504)

I understand and offer the present inquiry as a feature of the “paradigm shift” Magrini alludes to above. In a far more dramatic way than being-in-the-world, I find attunement a remarkably illuminating distinction for approaching and catching sight of the question of Being in teaching. We re-turn now to the first example of world from Chapter 4 with Mrs. Jackson and dispositions.

**Reinterpretation: Dispositions**

The original example read:

Mrs. Jackson calls on Shirley after demonstrating a math concept on the board. Shirley asks: "Where did the 5 come from? I don't get it." Mrs.
Jackson responds: "What do you mean, 'I don't get it'? It's right there on the board and I've worked this problem out twice now," and moves to erase the board.

We tentatively identified Mrs. Jackson’s being-in-the-world as someone who assumes understanding comes from seeing numbers on a board, who considers working out a problem twice as sufficient for Shirley, and who does not take student questions and concerns seriously. These do not exhaust Mrs. Jackson’s way of being, but indicate the manner in which her world occurs for her. The pertinent question here is how Mrs. Jackson’s world occurs for her? What is her attunement?

As a first pass, the mood associated with Mrs. Jackson in this scenario could be annoyance or frustration: annoyance at Shirley’s question, frustration with having already worked the problem out twice. Identifying the “correct” attunement in this scenario is not necessary, nor is it possible. It is not necessary because the aim here is to get a feel for the mood of the scenario and, even if annoyance or frustration is not Mrs. Jackson’s fundamental attunement, by asking the attuned question with Mrs. Jackson, we could get further clarity. Without interacting with and observing Mrs. Jackson to better understand the context and relationships occurring in her classroom, identifying the fundamental mood from out of which this scenario unfolds would be impossible. We could guess and presume, but this would only serve as a reflective or analytical exercise.

The crucial matter for Mrs. Jackson is to grasp that there is an underlying attunement and understanding how this mood colours the world as described in the encounter with Shirley. This thinking of attuned being-in-the-world is not primarily concerned with the explanations or reasons why Shirley shows up for Mrs. Jackson as annoying or frustrating. These explanatory gestures would assume annoyance or frustration in their ontic understanding where here we are concerned with the ontological sense of these attunements. It does not matter that Mrs. Jackson skipped breakfast and is hungry, or that she had a disagreement with another teacher or student the class period before. Even more, if we were to widen the scope of the vignette and realize that Mrs. Jackson’s annoyed response to Shirley is actually a reaction to another student’s
comment or behavior in the classroom this would not necessarily modify our understanding of the mooded situation.

The point here is to stay with the lived experience, without explanations and reasonings, to acknowledge how Mrs. Jackson’s world then in that moment occurred as annoying or frustrating. Much as Heidegger describes in Being and Time through the attunement of Angst and also in his account of boredom, in this glimpsing of the meaningfulness and significance of one’s mooded encounter within the world new existential possibilities for the inquirer show up. In this “lightning-flash” of Being as attuned being-in-the-world, Dasein can make a different choice. Imagine the following moments of the scenario where Mrs. Jackson, having had this appropriating reflection on her being-in-the-world, addresses Shirley (or the entire class) and names her annoyance or frustration, describes how that then influenced her way of being, and acknowledged her decision to choose a different way of engaging. In this modelling Mrs. Jackson moves beyond the traditional epistemological concerns of the classroom to embrace, as Magrini (2011) indicates, a recovery of our potential as human beings for developing ontologically.

Earlier Mrs. Jackson’s scenario was examined within the language given by professional teacher dispositions. There dispositions were set opposite ways of being-in-the-world and the latter was determined as providing a greater nuance to the lived experience of Being in teaching. With the grasping of attunement, however, these two approaches to naming the everydayness of teaching need not be so contentious. To be sure, dispositions and dispositional language are more often than not attuned to a particular way of speaking and thinking about teaching that occurs in such a way that psychologizes and simplifies teaching in reductive and limiting ways. Dispositions are understood as building blocks that one possesses and that the key to being a “good” teacher is a matter of collecting and embodying a set of prescribed dispositions. Heard and understood in this manner, dispositions limit asking the question of Being in teaching. Even if a disposition of “care” and concern for the “emotional well-being” of students was required of teachers, well-meaning aim of this disposition is truncated by the ever present attunement of “the coldness of calculation” that is, for Heidegger, the attunement of reason and rationality.
However, must dispositional language be heard and understood as such? If we take the attunement distinction and reinterpret the earlier analysis we find that dispositions may normally be attuned in this manner, but they do not always have to be. To borrow from Heidegger, what if we were to hear the language of dispositions ontologically? First, the gap between dispositions and being-in-the-world would lessen. Second, with a transformed understanding of dispositions, dispositional language could then be “used” or “had” by human beings rather than the other way around as is traditionally the case. In this new ontologically-charged relationship to dispositions, dispositional language would not occur as limiting or reductive but as open and empowering. What may seem like a minor shift (“hearing” dispositional language in another “tuning”), is, heard ontologically, nothing short of a transformation in our relationship to language as an access to the question of Being in teaching.

**Reinterpretation: Personal interlude**

Earlier, the encounter with Mrs. Jackson was followed by a scenario from my past experience as a middle school math teacher. In this example a shift occurred for me as a teacher in how I understood my curriculum, the specific skills that students were to master, and how I approached assessing my student’s learning. My being-in-the-world-as-teacher occurred differently than for the example with Mrs. Jackson for my attunement first showed up in my relationship to the curriculum. The best language that I can identify to name the moodedness that coloured my teaching is being trapped. My entire pedagogical world showed up for me as being trapped: trapped by specific skills and trapped by traditional assessment strategies. When I reflected back on my aims of engaging mathematically with students in such a way that math anxiety and testing were not limitations for my students, I recognized in a lightning-flash that who I was being - my particular attunement - was being trapped.

What was difficult to put into language in Chapter 4 may be better addressed here within the context of attunement. The “outstanding shift” in my Being that affected my being-a-teacher and being-in-the-world was the realization that my trapped attunement ran completely counter to what I thought my goals were for me and my students. In this attunement, everything in my teaching world occurred as being trapped,
as being limited, and this *trappedness* infiltrated my relationships with students, my colleagues, and the curriculum. Note that, similarly to Mrs. Jackson’s scenario, nothing *really* changed: I was still the teacher, my students were students, the skills required remained as such, I still needed to assess the skills and provide feedback for my students. What *changed* was an encounter with the question of Being in teaching through my attuned being-in-the-world. The transformational language used in Chapter 4 in describing this personal recollection was used to name the shift in how I understood myself as a teacher, how I related to my students and to the curriculum. I *saw* the skills differently, I *felt* the difference in my classroom, and I *heard* student questions and conversations in a manner that was no longer coloured by being *trapped*. This shift in my being-in-the-world shaped my future pedagogy and also influenced how I talked with parents.

More recently in a conversation on assessment and technology with my undergraduate students in a course on instructional technology methods this scenario re-enacted itself. The conversation in educational technology scholarship concerning assessment is mixed and uncertain as scholars and practitioners work and think through the tension between using technologies to standardize assessment and finding new avenues for grasping assessment with technologies. In order to name this tension for my students as future teachers, I described the shift in my being toward curriculum and assessment. In my sharing, I requested that my students question and critique my pedagogical reasoning, furthering my own understanding of my being as teacher. While I did not explicitly reference my moodedness as a factor in this shift, I have received feedback from students that they were, as referenced earlier in this chapter, able to “feel” it.

**Reinterpretation: Examples from Educational Technology**

The next two scenarios described in Chapter 4 indicated snapshots from the ongoing and ubiquitous conversation within education about the relationship between teaching/learning and educational technologies. Specifically, teacher buy-in and fear toward technology were explored in relation to a teacher’s being-in-the-world. In this subsection we revisit these two scenarios to consider how attunement can play an
illuminating role in exploring further possibilities of Being in teaching. However, prior to this analysis we must introduce the final pathway of the present inquiry (Enframing, Chapter 6) in order to fully grasp the significance of the two scenarios of being-in-the-world-as-teacher with technology.

For historical and intellectual context, Heidegger delivered a series of four lectures to an audience in Bremen in 1949. The second lecture, Das Gestell, was the first draft of what would eventually become Heidegger’s most famous statement on technology, “The Question Concerning Technology.” Das Gestell was then translated into English as the Enframing and can be understood as the conversion of everything into a resource ready to be called upon (including human beings). There are alternative translations for Gestell that will be considered in the following chapter that can influence how readers and scholars approach Heidegger’s famous thinking of modern technology. In the context of this subsection, I will use this notion to frame and inform the two scenarios of being-in-the-world-as-teacher with technology. These connections will be only tentative considering the complete treatment of the danger of Enframing in the next pathway.

Enframing as the mode of revealing of our modern relationship to technology is one of the more accessible of Heidegger’s conceptual distinctions, but most appropriations of this thinking neglect to consider the attuned dimension of Enframing. Magrini’s (2011) account is the exception where he writes: “Adversely attuned through the Enframing effect of modern technology, the contemporary age is characterized by the obsession with calculative thinking, which Heidegger specifically associates with science and mathematics, as privileged modes of world-disclosure” (p. 503). Enframing is not only the way of Being of modernity, framing and bounding Dasein’s being-in-the-world, but also attunes our relationship to all beings as at the whim of human beings. While more is shared along these lines in the following pathway, with this brief sketch of Enframing we can now turn to the two scenarios related to being-in-the-world-as-teacher with educational technologies.

In the specific example of teacher buy-in, we considered a fictitious program whereby a local research university provided mobile devices to a middle school in order
to study the effectiveness of the devices on teaching and learning. Teacher buy-in does not necessarily have to relate to educational technology but is frequently referenced in relation to technological initiatives in schools. Teachers could be in one of two states in relation to the program: bought-into or not bought-into. The various attunements associated with each way of being could be easily named and described. One interpretation could include the attunements of agreement, enthusiasm, or excitement for those bought-into the program, with hesitation, uneasiness, and anger possibilities for the attunement connected to those not bought-into the program. What is more interesting and revealing, however, is considering the general attunement within which the program itself occurs.

From this stance, the entire world of the scenario shows up as attuned to Enframing. Specifically, the mobile device program is a given, and the devices are assumed to be not only objectively present and but also neutral. The program is almost medical (the epitome of modern science and technology) in its use of mobile devices to “treat” students with a supposed illness called “ineffective learning.” The program ignores or remains blind to the lived significance of the teaching/learning context including the relationships between teachers and students, socioeconomic status of the school and local area, and the radical influence on pedagogy required of some technologies. When the Internet (and subsequently computers, and after that laptops, and after that mobile devices) grew in popularity it was hailed as the “great equalizer,” “levelling the playing field” for students of varying cultural and economic backgrounds. All students would have equal access to information, connectivity, and opportunity. What was not considered is what happens within Enframing when everything is levelled down. Surely we want equal access for students, but do we want students as interchangeable cogs in the system? The ultimate culmination of Enframing (as we will find in Chapter 6) is the Human Resources Department: human beings are no longer beings but indiscriminate objects with qualities that make them a “better fit” for a career. Without attention to the adverse attunement of Enframing, this is the world of teaching and learning we live in as well.

The description above must not be heard as negative as is so often the case. This would be an ontic reading of the scenario. Heard ontologically, the attuned world of
Enframing shows up as Enframing and human beings are thrown back into their potentialities-for-being. There are other ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher with technologies that can appropriate and transform Enframing. Returning to the original example, teachers who have bought-into the program could do so in a manner that remains critical of the ways the devices are understood and how they influence pedagogy rather than in an unthinking and blind acceptance of the program. Teachers not bought-into the initiative could attune themselves in the same manner, bringing a positive cautiousness to the lived experience of the devices. The attunements of both ways of being here would colour a very different world of teaching and learning with educational technologies.

The connection to attunement with the second scenario, fear toward technology, is straightforward: the world of the teacher afraid of technologies occurs within the attunement of fear. Grappling with modern technologies seems to be a defining feature of what it means to be a human being at present. While Enframing as world-disclosing and attuned is more explicitly addressed in the following chapter, the intersection and relationship between Dasein’s fundamental attunement of Angst and the attunement of modern technology is important to consider. Within the mood of fear, educational technologies and initiatives show up as threatening for teachers as fear colours their being-in-the-world. In Chapter 4 it was also indicated that fear could be the reason for those teachers who are not bought-into the mobile device program. However, as Heidegger notes in Being and Time, fear is but a derivative of the fundamental attunement of Angst. Understood in its ontological sense, Angst seems a better description of fear toward technology for more often than not “technology” is “no-where” and “no-thing.” I first encountered this particular attunement in my time as a middle school teacher when explaining what the Internet really was in the context of blogs and blogging to my colleague. For this teacher, and for many others, the Internet did not show up as something physically in the world and was thus “not real.” Truly grasping what the Internet is and how it works is not easy. As I talked my colleague through networking and the basics of the Internet, the Angst loosened and he was able to move forward in his thinking and working with the technology.
As we will find in the following path, the adverse attunement of Enframing is powerful and all-encompassing. We have only just begun to approach the complexities of how Enframing can be thought from out of and within an attuned being-in-the-world-as-teacher. The next and final subsection considers how teaching as worlding can incorporate the distinction of attunement.

Reinterpretation: Teaching as worlding

At the end of the previous path, world was appropriated into the active sense of worlding. Heard in this manner, worlding was then considered as a way of thinking the everyday practices of teaching. Worlding can be grasped within subject matters or disciplines. The example named in Chapter 4 was the professor of art history who teaches a course on early Impressionists and how her teaching can be thought as introducing and situating her students within the world given by early Impressionism. I also shared a brief vignette from my own teaching of an instructional technology course for undergraduates. With the concept of attunement to supplement worlding, this approach to pedagogy becomes even more accessible.

What is the fundamental mood of early Impressionism? If understood in an ontic manner, this would seem a simple to answer question. But ontologically, this question points directly into the Being of a particular people in a particular lived experience of a particular historical context. Our art history professor could help "world" this attunement for her students through any number of pedagogical strategies including readings, discussions, and engaging in the lives and artwork of the early Impressionists. The crucial feature within this mode of attuned teaching would be to encourage students to feel the attuned world of the art and artists. One can memorize all of the names of the early Impressions, their years of birth and death, stare at paintings, and read biographical statements and never come close to truly attuning to the world of the early Impressionists. Attuned worlding in such an encounter would be memorable for students not as a course where a great deal of knowledge was obtained, but where the whole world of early Impressionism opened up for them.
In my personal example, I named how the various “layers” of my teaching within an undergraduate methods course could be considered a particular worlding. Each of these layers had their own specific attunements that I worked to cultivate within the course. For example, in one worlding students gave weekly presentations on topics pertinent to educational technology (e.g., assessment and technology, gamification). Within this world, student presenters were encouraged to take on role of teacher with the remaining students and myself adopting the role of students. These roles, traditionally understood, are associated with particular attunements. I introduced a feature that can best be grasped as a Gestalt switch whereby any member of the class could transform the mood of the context by switching out of the traditional roles of teacher/student to coach/colleague. In the first week of presentations, this shift in attunement played itself out in the first few minutes of the first presentation. A student not from an educational background was respectfully interrupted for feedback in his opening statements. His talk had started out with apologies and self-deprecating comments about his nervousness and perceived lack of preparation. In an instant, a peer shifted the entire mood of the room from the traditional teacher/student relation to coaching and supporting a colleague. The interrupting student, who was from a teacher education background, provided immediate and specific feedback for her peer that calmed him down and also strengthened his overall presentation.

This type of shift was a common feature of this course as I encouraged students to inquire into all worlds or layers of my pedagogy and our learning together. For example, I appreciated student’s feedback on the number and types of assessments that were expected of them throughout the course. I named early on my requirement that all assessments be meaningful for them and their learning. This meant that later in the course when a student had quite critical questions on one assignment in particular I was given the chance to model my pedagogy for my students. In this Gestalt switch, the attunement of the class shifted from me as teacher speaking to my students to the world where we were all teachers learning about ourselves and our craft. I was able to explain my reasoning for the assignment, see how I had structured my explanation in a confusing way, and also revise based on my students’ questions that helped me better name what the particular assessment was aimed at assessing. By consistently maintaining these variously attuned worlds within the same course, I believe I was able
to create a space where my students were able to meaningfully engage with educational technologies and practice their teaching craft.

This example is only one way the distinctions of world and attunement have come together to inform and transform my pedagogy and being-in-the-world-as-teacher. Not only do these concepts influence me, but also my students and the topics or curriculum that we learn together. These are two fruitful pathways toward the question of Being in teaching that are grounded in my lived experience as a teacher. World and attunement stretch open our potential-for-being to reveal possibilities that indicate education as far more than an epistemological endeavour.

Concluding Thoughts and Indicating the Next Path

The primary aim of the present chapter was to describe and distinguish the conception of attunement as a way to approach the question of Being in teaching. To begin, attunement was described as the mooded way in which Dasein's being-in-the-world is disclosed. Following, a history of attunement was sketched including a tracing of moodedness throughout Heidegger's lifetime of thinking. This included a description of the early traces of attunement in Heidegger's encounter with Luther and Aristotle's pathos, Befindlichkeit in Being and Time, and in Heidegger's later thinking through Holderlin and the attunement proper to philosophical inquiry. The scenarios described in Chapter 4 were then reinterpreted given the distinction of attunement. These were Mrs. Jackson and dispositions, a personal interlude, ways of being with educational technologies, and attuned worlding. There are limitations to thinking attunement solely from out of Heidegger's work, however, and these are addressed within the concluding chapter of the present study.

In the scenarios with educational technologies, the third pathway toward the question of Being in teaching was indicated as Enframing. Understood by Heidegger to be the mode of Being of modernity, Enframing grounds reality and all that is as manipulable and under human control. Because Enframing is the way in which the modern world occurs, its attunement is ubiquitous and all-encompassing. This moodedness is the cold, calculating attunement of modern science and technology.
*Everything* can be calculated in Enframing. Not only can it be, but it *should* be so that the greatest efficiencies can be achieved. All of nature, animality, and humankind must be measured and catalogued in this mode of Being. How this comes to be and how Enframing structures the world and tuning of Being in teaching is the topic of the following chapter.
Chapter 6. The danger of Enframing

The final substantive pathway of the present inquiry is titled “the danger of Enframing.” This pathway into Being in teaching is of a different kind than world or attunement, requiring its own unique treatment. “Enframing,” as an indication of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and the origin of modern philosophy of technology as a scholarly discipline, is one of (if not the) only ways the general public had access to Heidegger’s thinking. Some familiarity with “The Question Concerning Technology,” for decades a point of access to Heidegger’s thinking with English language speakers, is expected. Enframing also becomes an accessible topic of conversation within undergraduate sociology courses that include a theme or strand on science and technology studies. There is a sense among some scholars that Enframing, because it is accessible and therefore well-known, is intellectually passé.

I find this shift away from Heidegger’s thinking of technology ill-founded for two reasons. First, too many thinkers have borrowed and interpreted Heidegger’s Enframing and associated terminology in ways that do not situate the concepts within the context of the whole of Heidegger’s thinking. In short, these scholars “level down” Enframing to its ontic sense and ignore the ontological power of the concept. This levelling results in a misinterpretation of Enframing that renders it another theory among many others that must be selected and evaluated by human beings. This rendering, however, is itself a symptom of Enframing. The second reason I am hesitant to relinquish Heidegger’s thinking of modern technology is the recent publishing in English of the original lecture series from 1949 where Heidegger first named the essence of modern technology as Gestell. Not only is Enframing contextualized within a series of lectures (it was delivered

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second after the already translated "The Thing," followed by "The Danger" and "The Turning" with "The Danger" only translated in 2012), but Enframing (Gestell) is rendered in English as Positionality. Thus, in this new translation Enframing/Positionality requires not less but greater engagement with Heidegger’s thinking on technology. It is for this reason that the present path aims to appropriate Heidegger's ontological analysis of technology and examine how it influences Being

We turn first to a grasping of key phenomena before describing and presenting a summation of Heidegger’s thinking on technology, first as a feature of the Bremen lecture series of 1949 and then within the most popular (to English speakers) and stand-alone lecture “The Question Concerning Technology.” The Enframing of teaching is sketched before returning to the previous scenarios shared in the pathways of world and attunement. A concluding section brings all three pathways together to examine the relationships indicated between them before transitioning to the final and concluding pathway.

Enframing

Grasping what Heidegger means by Enframing remains disputed and, in some scholarly circles, hotly contested. For the past four decades Heidegger’s naming of the essence of modern technology as Das Gestell has been titled and understood as Enframing within English language scholarship thanks to the excellent first translation of “The Question Concerning Technology” by William Lovitt in 1977. As is almost always the case with Heidegger’s distinctions, Enframing needs to be approached as a formal indication and not simply as a representation of a set concept or idea. Indeed, fully appropriating “the danger of Enframing” in order to approach the question of Being in teaching will take all of the terminological distinctions previously distinguished as well as incorporating additional terms as needed. To begin, we will examine the translation of Das Gestell as Enframing before tracing and contextualizing its origin in the Bremen lectures.
Situating Enframing

To begin to understand Enframing will require a preliminary and necessarily limited definition. Enframing is the word used to translate Das Gestell within the context of the text from a lecture Heidegger delivered on November 18, 1955 in Munich as part of a series of talks entitled “The Arts in the Technological Age.” Die Frage nach der Technik was then translated in 1977 by William Lovitt as “The Question Concerning Technology” and has served as the touchstone for Heidegger's thinking on technology ever since. In a footnote when Enframing is first named Lovitt (1977) describes his reasoning for the translation and how the word is to be understood:

The translation “Enframing” for Ge-stell is intended to suggest, through the use of the prefix “en-,” something of the active meaning that Heidegger here gives to the German word. While following the discussion that now ensues, in which Enframing assumes a central role, the reader should be careful not to interpret the word as though it simply meant a framework of some sort. Instead he should constantly remember that Enframing is fundamentally a calling-forth. It is a “challenging claim,” a demanding summons, that “gathers” so as to reveal. This claim enframes in that it assembles and orders. It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use that it is forever restructuring anew. (p. 19)

It is not helpful for Lovitt's cautionary warning, however, when Heidegger himself uses the example of framing a bookcase as an ontic metaphor for the general thrust of his thinking. After referencing the bookcase, Heidegger himself defines this phenomenon as such: “Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve” (QCT, p. 20). Unpacking this remarkably dense and entangled description is an aim of the present pathway. Richard Polt (1999), who prefers “technology” to Enframing, writes:

The technological attitude involves much more than simply constructing and using complex machines; it is a way of understanding beings as a whole ... The technological approach to beings (which from now on we will call “technology” for short) implies an understanding of Being itself. For technological Dasein, to be means to be either a present-at-hand object that is available for exploration and manipulation, or a subject that is the manipulator and exploiter of the object. (p. 171)
As Polt sets aside the distinction of Enframing, some Heidegger scholars choose to leave *Das Gestell* untranslated in the manner in which other Heideggerian language has been such as *Dasein*, *aletheia*, and *Ereignis* given Heidegger’s unique meaning (see Babich, 2015).

For Heidegger, Enframing names the technological “way of revealing” of Being of modernity. As Lovitt warns, we must be cautious to not understand Enframing in a static and rigid manner. Heidegger knew that language could be used in this way and names that readers should keep from “hastily recasting the language of the thinker in the coin of a terminology,” rather than “devoting all our efforts to thinking through what has been said” (ID, p. 73-74). The following subsections intend to think through *Das Gestell*, first as *Machination*, then *Positionality*, and finally as *Enframing*, before considering how it can assist as the third path toward the question of Being in teaching.

**Machination in Contributions**

With the recent publication of *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, the first iteration of Enframing can now be traced to Heidegger’s concept of *Machination*. *Contributions* is a private collection of notes and reflections dating from 1936–38 that was first published in German in 1989 as *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. The first English translation, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* was completed by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly and published in 1999. Reception of the Emad and Maly translation was mixed due to, according to some scholars, an irresponsible rendering of Heidegger’s thinking in English. Rather than aiming for clarity and readability, these reviewers complained, the first English translation included too many invented words and phrases such as “enswaying” and “charming-moving-unto.” Therefore a second translation was prepared by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu and published in 2012 that aims specifically for more “faithful” translation for the English reader. Rojcewicz & Vallega-Neu’s most recent translation will be referenced below.
The German editor of the Beiträge text (GA 65), names the work as Heidegger’s “second magnum opus,” but scholars are divided on the validity of this claim. Regardless, within the meandering notations and pathways of Contributions, Heidegger works out some of his first thinking on Machination, a term that indicates what will later become Positionality/Enframing.

Machination (Machenschaft) is not only to be understood as pertaining to machines or mechanical objects, but as naming the beingness of beings as calculable products. Dahlstrom (2012) writes:

In the age of machination, everything is taken to be something that can be made, as long as there is the will to do it. (Machenschaft—like the term for power, Macht—is related to the word for making or doing, machen.) As far as machination is concerned, there are only beings, and they are exclusively what human beings can manipulate, calculate, and produce. Any resistance to it is mere material for its expansion. There may be problems and difficulties, but nothing is fundamentally questionable … since what things fundamentally are has been decided.

For Heidegger, as moderns we live and operate within machination unquestioningly. For modern human beings the truth of Beyng as aletheia has been concealed by the presencing of Being as techne. The seeds of this path were planted long ago in the beginnings of Western metaphysics and Contributions records Heidegger’s attempt to think from a “new beginning” that would not eventually unfold as a forgetting of the truth of Beyng. In Heidegger’s words:

“Machination” is the name for a specific truth of beings (of the beingness of beings). We grasp this beingness first and foremost as objectivity (beings as objects of representation), but machination, since it is related to τέχνη, grasps this beingness more profoundly, more primordially. Machination includes at the same time the Christian-biblical interpretation

48 During and after the 1930s Heidegger experimented with different spellings of Being to try to bring into relief the sense in which he meant the term. In Contributions Being as Being is written as Beyng. Polt (1999) writes that Beyng is an “old-fashioned, nineteenth-century spelling that gives the word a faint flavour of something archaic and forgotten. He wants to recall a mysterious sense of Being that lies hidden behind the conventional way of conceiving of Being” (p. 143.) For clarity, however, I mark Being as Beyng only when the original source is rendered as such.
of every being as an *ens creatum*, whether this is now taken in a religious or secular sense. The emergence of the machinational essence of beings is historically very difficult to grasp, because that essence has been in effect basically since the first beginning of Western thought (more precisely, since the collapse of *ἀλήθεια*). (C, p. 104)

Machination, however, is not something that simply happens to human beings; it is who they are. “‘Machination’ is at first a type of human comportment,” (C, p. 67). As “progress” and ultimately “globalization,” machination offers humans the ability to convert everything into commodities and values. Even as private thoughts and reflections that were to be published after all of his other remaining texts and lecture courses, *Contributions* records a remarkably accurate account of the current state of affairs at present. Given that Heidegger was already thinking along these lines around 80 years ago is one reason his thinking in relation to technology remains so powerful.

**Positionality in the Bremen Lectures**

For historical context, Heidegger composed *Contributions* between 1936 and 1938, two years after stepping down as Rector when he was engaged in his Nietzsche lecture courses. Nietzsche was to be a powerful influence on Heidegger in his later thinking and his influence can be found starting in the mid-1930s. The record of Heidegger's teaching activities from this period up until SS 1945 when his course (also on Nietzsche’s thinking) was stopped short due to the war is not as clearly recorded as his teaching record up until the time of the Rectorate. It is generally accepted that Nietzsche served as a primary force within Heidegger’s teaching up until 1945 when he was banned from teaching. Heidegger was not allowed to return to the university classroom until WS 1951-52 with a course that still found inspiration in Nietzsche’s thinking (WCT).

However, in mid-1949 after four years of public silence Heidegger was approached by the Club of Bremen to give a series of lectures. Bremen, writes Heidegger's colleague and friend Heinrich Petzet⁴⁹, held a special place for Heidegger.

because it was the same location where 19 years prior he had delivered his infamous *On the Essence of Truth* lecture that many mark as “the turn” [Kehre]. Heidegger had a fondness for Bremen and felt that he could connect with the citizens of the town without the academic pomp and circumstance found in university life. It was again in Bremen that Heidegger would conduct the lecture series that would announce two of the themes that would engage his thinking for the remainder of his life: (1) “the fourfold” and (2) technology as a matter of “positionality,” Heidegger’s renaming of the earlier *Machination*.

Heidegger had originally planned on giving a modified version of the essay “The Age of the World Picture” that was about to be published in his first postwar publication *Holzwege*[^50], but hinted in a letter to Petzet (1993) that his thinking was shifting:

> I am now inclined to present ‘The Age of the Worldpicture’ on one day in the first week of December. On the next day, then, I would like to discuss what appears to me to be significant beyond ‘Worldpicture.’ I have a second plan in the background: to read something from a dialogue about ‘The Thing’ which leads us to the same realm of questioning. (p. 54)

We know now that Heidegger adopted this second plan and composed a series of four lectures to be delivered: “The Thing” (*Das Ding*), “Positionality” (*Das Ge-stell*), “The Danger” (*Die Gefahr*), and “The Turning” (*Die Kehre*). In addition to repeating the series in Bühlerhöhe in March 1950, versions of the lectures were presented (with the exception of “The Danger”) over the next few years in other locations. Interestingly, Petzet (1993) remarks that the third lecture was never actually delivered in Bremen in 1949, while the editor of the *Gesamtausgabe* containing the lecture series makes no such distinction. Adding to the mystery, “The Danger” did not appear in English until a recent recent translation of *Insight Into That Which Is* (*Einblick in das was ist*) that published the series in its entirety.[^51]

[^50]: Translated into English in 2002 as *Off The Beaten Track* (GA 5).
[^51]: Previous versions of “The Thing” and “The Turning” had been available in various texts for many decades. See Krell’s (ed.) *Basic Writings* and the collected essays published in the Lovitt translation of *The Question Concerning Technology*. 
**Translating Gestell**

What is crucial in the newly published version of the Bremen lectures is the translation of *Das Ge-stell* as “positionality” rather than the more traditional “Enframing.” Consider Emad & Maly’s (1993) summary of *Ge-stell* to refamiliarize the meaning of Enframing as described earlier:

*Ge-stell* has been variously translated into English as “enframing,” “framework,” “im-position,” etc. Essentially, it designates the sum total of posing-positing-establishing of the calculative thinking of “technics.” In *Ge-stell* “things” are pre-established (posited in advance), without letting them appear or unfold in all their disclosing possibilities. (p. 232)

In this summary, Emad and Maly reference “posing-positing” in a manner that hints at the sense in which modern technology “positions” more than “Enframes.” The editor of the *Gesamtausgabe* containing the Bremen lectures argues that the second lecture (“Positionality”) “served as the foundation for the otherwise entirely newly formulated and expanded lecture ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ which Heidegger held on November 18, 1953 in Munich,” (2012 p. 167-168). However, given the context within which the second lecture occurs (following the famous “The Thing” lecture, and followed by two further essays that continue his path of thinking), I argue that in translating *Ge-stell* as “positionality” the overall tonality of Heidegger’s thinking of modern technology is rendered such that it can be heard in a new manner. Here I would again invoke Heidegger’s own naming of “the same but different” as I am not claiming that the Bremen lectures actually provide a more correct or accurate rendering of Heidegger’s thinking on technology. I submit that by naming the essence of modern technology as positionality, and contextualizing this concept within Heidegger’s presentation of the Thing, the Danger, and the Turning, that a more nuanced and genuine encounter with this thinking becomes possible. My treatment below will not be able to fully accomplish this task, but will be a first attempt to sketch these ideas.

In order to ground my summation of the Bremen lectures, I quote at length Andrew Mitchell, the English translator of the volume, who takes great care in describing his decision to render *Ge-stell* as “positionality” rather than “Enframing”:

*Das Ge-Stell / positionality*
Die Gestelle / framework

Die Gestellung / conscription

Heidegger names the term Ge-Stell with the explicit intent of it expressing a gathering of some kind. It is the gathering of all Stellen, of all positioning, placing, putting as this basic movement has shown itself in the technologically dominated world of today as well as across the history of Western philosophy from its inception with the Greeks. Heidegger explicitly and painstakingly distinguishes what he means by positionality from any sense of “enframing” as the term has previously been translated. Positionality, Heidegger tells us, is not a frame like a bookcase that would contain its contents, nor is it like a water well that would surround its contents either (GA 79: 32/31). It is not even like a skeleton, a note to the manuscript informs us, that would structure a flesh from within (GA 79: 32n.j/32n.10). This coarse sense of structure and framing is not to be heard in the term “positionality.” Heidegger marks the difference himself when he explicitly distinguishes between positionality, das Ge-Stell, and framework, die Gestelle (GA 79: 65/61). The spread of positionality is thus not a framework that surrounds from without, but, in part, a process of conscription [Gestellung] that adopts and compels whatever it encounters into the order of standing reserve. (2012, p. xi)

Returning to Lovitt’s (1977) notes on his translation as Enframing, there are key elements that occur in Mitchell’s description: Ge-Stell must be heard in its “active meaning,” in our interpretation we must avoid thinking solely of a framework and moreso as a “fundamental calling-forth that gathers.” To properly grasp what Heidegger is indicating by Gestell as positionality, we must contextualize Gestell as it connects and relates to the other three themes of the lecture series: The Thing, The Danger, and The Turning.

The Lectures: Overview

Given that each of the lectures (except the third) were published in differing times and formats, each has been considered as an independently contained essay. “The Thing” was published in English at least twice in two separate edited collections, and “The Question Concerning Technology” (as a later draft of the Bremen lecture “Positionality”) and “The Turning” were published in 1977 in a collection of essays on Heidegger’s thinking of technology. With the Mitchell translation of the entire lecture series, including the previously unpublished third lecture “The Danger,” English readers
can now understand the background and interconnectedness of all four of the lectures. These are not “pieces” of a lecture series, but rather “parts” that contain within them the whole. Heidegger writes in “Positionality”:

The piece [das Stuck] is something other than the part [der Teil]. The part shares itself with parts in a whole. It takes part in the whole, belongs to it. The piece on the contrary is separate and indeed, as the piece, is even isolated from the other pieces. It never shares itself with these in a whole. (BL, p. 34)

To drive the point further, Heidegger references the human body: “My hand, on the contrary, is not a piece of me. I myself am entirely in each gesture of the hand, every single time” (BL, p. 34). Therefore, the four lectures must be understood primarily in their relationship to each other, as complementing the same path of thinking. From this interpretive stance, Insight Into That Which Is is able to further current understanding of Heidegger’s thinking of technology that has primarily been focused only on one of the lectures, namely, “Positionality” as the early draft of “The Question Concerning Technology.”

While reading the Bremen lectures it can seem as if Heidegger is talking in circles because he is. This is for two reasons. First, as Polt (1999) has named, Heidegger’s thinking is specifically centrifugal, encircling what he thinks is the matter most worthy of reflection and questioning, the meaning or truth of Being. Second, the Bremen lectures were held outside of the traditional academy and performed for audiences that had no philosophical training or background in the matters Heidegger was aimed at revealing in his lectures. Therefore, as an effective teacher and public speaker, Heidegger continually and regularly returns to retrace the steps in his thinking and incorporates various rhetorical devices such as repetition and varying sentence structures to help convey his meaning and stir his audience into thinking along with him. Thus, if a reader approaches the lecture series as a written text, they will likely find themselves frustrated. However, if readers can attune themselves to listening to the written words they are more likely to catch what Heidegger was attempting to convey in these lectures. A full explication and analysis of the Bremen lectures cannot be accomplished at present. A tentative summation, however flawed, may be helpful in serving as a first interpretation.
Lectures 1 & 2: The Thing & Positionality

Heidegger uses the simple and embodied understanding of distance and nearness to begin the first lecture, “The Thing.” At present, Heidegger argues, everything seems to be brought into nearness via modern technology. Upon closer examination, however, this nearness is not at all what we assume it to be. The way by which things occur for human beings has shifted in a manner that we will come to understand as “positionality.” Heidegger uncovers this shift in a phenomenological analysis of an everyday item: a jug. He is not necessarily trying to recall for his listener “earlier” or “simpler” times, but heard as a more truthful relation to Being, Heidegger is indeed aiming for this tonality in using a jug as his example. The jug becomes the phenomenon that will reveal the thingness of a thing, that which makes the jug itself a thing. The thingness of the thing is traced to Heidegger’s conception of the “fourfold,” a word that indicates the worlding of the world in the interplay between sky and earth, mortals and divinities. Here, world and worlding must be heard in a sense inspired by the world of Being and Time (and Chapter 4 of the present inquiry).

The jug, in being a thingly thing, is considered a thing in its appropriation of the fourfold, or the world. To be a jug, each of the fourfold must have contributed to the being (thingness) of the jug as a thing. With this context, Heidegger’s words can now be referenced:

The thing lets the fourfold abide. The thing things the world. Every thing lets the fourfold abide in something that each time abides from the single fold of the world. When we let the thing in its thinging essence from out of the worlding world, then we commemorate the thing as thing. Thoughtfully remembering this way, we allow the worlding essence of the thing to concernfully approach us. ... When we think the thing as thing, then we protect the essence of the thing in the region from where it essences. Thinging is the nearing of the world. Nearing is the essence of nearness. Insofar as we protect the thing as thing, we dwell in nearness. The nearing of nearness is the authenticated and sole dimension of the mirror-play of the world. (BL, p. 18)
However, things no longer stand as things as they become objects or components ready for manipulation. Where does this loss and breakdown of the thing come from? Ge-Stell, Positionality.

“Positionality,” the second lecture, recalls the “mastery of distance” that brings no nearness from the previous lecture on the thing. Things no longer occur as things but show up as “standing reserve.” Heidegger writes:

The distanceless is never without standing. It stands insofar as everything that presences is standing reserve. Where the standing reserve comes into power, even the object crumbles as characteristic of what presences. The standing reserve persists through a characteristic positioning. We name it requisitioning [das Be-Stellen, to beset with positioning]. (BL, p. 24)

Beginning in this second lecture, Heidegger starts to carefully weave together his thinking about modern technology as the essence of positionality. Positionality challenges forth all beings and entities to stand at the ready for orderability, calculation, effective and efficient usage. Positionality is the essence of modern technology in that everything, all of nature and humankind, falls under the conscription of requisitioning.

This violence of requisitioning, outstripping everything, drags the particular acts of requisitioning only further along behind itself. This violence of requisitioning leads to the suspicion that what is here named “requisitioning” is no mere human doing, even if the human belongs to the carrying out of such a requisitioning. (BL, p. 28)

But, as Heidegger soon reveals to us, even humans themselves fall under the spell of requisitioning. We come even closer to a full definition of positionality: “Positionality names the universal ordering, gathering of itself, of the complete orderability of what presences as a whole. . . . In positionality the presencing of all that presences becomes standing reserve,” (BL, p. 30). Even as humans become “employees” of the requisitioning, they cannot master it. “The human of this age, however, is positioned into positionality even when he does not stand immediately before machines or in the industry of a machinery,” (BL, p. 35). Positionality, however, as the essence of modern technology, is itself nothing technological (BL, p. 30). The standing reserve occurs as components in a system that are interchangeable because they are rendered equivalent. All is not hopeless, however, because “[t]echnology is only
one actuality among other actualities. To be sure, technology remains far from constituting the actuality of everything actual," (BL, p. 38).

Heidegger closes the second lecture by returning to the interplay between distance and nearness as it connects to the essence of technology as positionality:

What is decisive is not that the distances are diminishing with the help of technology, but rather that nearness remains outstanding. We do not pursue the aftereffects of technology in order to sketch its consequences. We think into the essence of technology in order to experience how, according to its essence, this excluding of nearness is implicated in the essential unfolding of technology. The machines of technology are only able to shorten distances, but nonetheless bring no nearness because the essence of technology from the outset does not allow nearness and farness. (BL, p. 42)

Recapitulation

Before considering the third lecture, let us summarize Heidegger’s argument thus far. Distances are seemingly lessening in the present time and he shows that this can be traced to the essence of technology as positionality. Prior to presencing as objects, things (Heidegger uses the example of a jug) “thinged” as the “mirror-play” of the fourfold of the world: earth and sky, mortals and divinities. World in this manner can be understood as a meaningful context as it was in Being and Time. Heidegger is indicating here in his phenomenology of the thing the remarkable shift that occurs from considering beings as things rather than as standing reserve, the way things occur within positionality. In positionality, all that presences or can be represented (beings and entities) does so as standing reserve. Everything is conscripted into the orderable standing reserve, even human beings. Positionality is the essence of modern technology, but is not itself technological, it cannot be contained within a machine. Heidegger does hint at a way forward, and in the third and fourth lectures sketches and describes this path.

Lectures 3 & 4: The Danger & The Turning

“The Danger,” the third and never before published lecture of the series, begins at a breathtaking pace as Heidegger again reframes positionality by tracing back through “The Thing” as the worlding of the world, and the fourfold of sky, earth, mortals, and
divinities. The way the world “guards” things in their thinghood becomes a prominent
distinction that Heidegger uses to transition from the thing, to world, and finally to Beyng.
Heidegger’s language is especially circular in this section as he revolves around Beyng.
He starts with positionality: “In the essence of positionality, the unguarding of the thing
as thing takes places.” (BL, p. 44). This is in opposition to the worlding of the world
whose aim is to guard the thing in its thinghood. World is transformed into the Being of
beings as such. Heidegger writes:

We conceive the world now in terms of what is familiar to us, the Being of
beings. So conceived, the world is what guards Being in its essence.
Guarding in such a way, the world is the guardian of the essence of
Being. Instead of guardianship [Wahrnis] we also say truth [Wahrheit] and
thereby think this basic word more inceptually from out of the worlding of
the world. The world is the truth of the essence of Being. (BL, p. 46)

From within positionality, we have forgotten Being. Heidegger explicitly connects
the “forgetfulness of Being” to aletheia as the truth of Being. The interplay between
presencing/unconcealing and absencing/concealing of aletheia is what claims and
grounds the forgetfulness of Being such that even the forgetting is forgotten. Heidegger’s
phrasing offers minimal clarity:

The abbreviated and therefore easy-to-misunderstand expression
“forgetting of Being” says that both the essence of Being, presencing, and
its essential provenance in aletheia as the event of the essence of this, as
well as aletheia itself, all lapse into forgetfulness. With this lasing into
concealment, the essence of aletheia and of presencing withdraw. Insofar
as they withdraw, they remain inaccessible to human perception and
representation. For this reason, human thinking is unable to think the
essence of unconcealment or the presencing in it. So construed, unable
to thoughtfully remember, human thinking from the outset has forgotten
the essence of Being. But human thinking is only in such a forgetfulness
of the essence of Being because this essence itself has taken place as
forgetfulness, as a lapsing into concealment. (BL, p. 47)

Whereas the world as the guardian of the truth of Being is somewhat considered
a resolution, it is named that positionality names the unguarding of the thing as thing.
Heidegger then turns the argumentative logic on its head by indicating that the world and
positionality are the same. “But once again: the same is never the equivalent,” (BL, p.
49). Heidegger continues:
World and positionality are the same. They are differently the essence of Being. World is the guardian of the essence of Being. Positionality is the complete forgetting of the truth of Being. (BL, p. 49-50).

Heidegger’s argument comes to a crescendo by finally arriving at a definition of the danger, whose essence is as the pursuit of positionality: “The danger is the collected pursuit as which positionality pursues the self-refusal of world with the forgetting of its truth through the unguarding of the thing” (BL, p. 51). But human beings are blind and deaf to the danger as danger. Even more, the “danger” Heidegger is naming here is not in the traditional sense we consider something as dangerous:

Positionality essences as the danger. But does the danger already exist as a danger? No. Perils and distresses immeasurably press upon humans everywhere at every hour. But the danger, namely Beyng itself in the self-endangering truth of its essence, remains veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous about the danger. (BL, p. 64)

With the danger named, we transition into the final lecture: “The Turning.” In short, the turning indicates the movement from positionality (as the essence of modern technology that orders everything into standing reserve and therefore unguards the thing as thing) to world (as guarding the thing as thing) as dispensations of Being. The turning is also directly related to the forgetfulness of Being: “In the essence of danger there is concealed the possibility of a turn in which the forgetting of the essence of Being so turns that through this turn the truth of the essence of Beyng properly enters into beings,” (BL, p. 67). Heidegger closes the lecture (and the series) with an extended analysis of the title of the series, “Insight into that which is,” in order to collect and summarize the content of all of the lectures from out of the title itself:

*Insight into that which is*--this title now names the event of the turn in beyng, the turn from the refusal of its essence into the event of its guardianship. Insight into that which is is the appropriate event itself, as which the truth of beyng relates itself to unguarded beyng and stands by it. Insight into that which is--this names the constellation in the essence of beyng. (BL, p. 70)

With this rudimentary sketch of the lectures series complete, we can retrace Heidegger’s steps through the key distinctions made in each lecture. In these lectures Heidegger wants to open up a space and make this space and everything that occurs
within it questionable for his audience. The audience is atypical for Heidegger in at least two ways. First, the audience is made up of the townspeople of Bremen, an historically “blue collar” shipping port. Second, this is Heidegger’s first public speaking engagement since being banned from teaching four years prior as a result of the De-Nazification trial. Given the lack of philosophical training within his audience, it is interesting that he chose four common ideas (thing, positionality, danger, turning) to name the four lectures. The secondary distinctions he offers (world, fourfold, sky, mortals, and so on) are also fairly concrete. This must have been deliberate given the ultimately abstract nature of the whole of the lecture series.

If we recall from the very beginning of “The Thing,” Heidegger wants to understand what has changed in how human beings relate to distance and nearness. It seems that with modern technologies everything has been brought nearer, but Heidegger is skeptical. As he does in the later iteration of these ideas in “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger creates a contrast case in the “Thing” so that he can indicate and think through the essence of modern technology. When we truly engage with a thing as a thing, we honour both the being of the thing and Being as Being. Here “truly engaging” is a way of naming the way Heidegger claims that a thing is “guarded” by the worlding of the world. The world is a onefold of the fourfold of sky, earth, mortals, and divinities. The fourfold appears for the first time in “The Thing” and remains an ongoing element in Heidegger’s later thinking. We honour the thing as thing by an attuned relationship to Being which is in direct contrast to the world of positionality. Modern technology as positionality orders things into mere objects, deworlding things of their essence and context. Things occur not as things within positionality but as standing reserve, requisitioned and ready for implementation.

Now we have a contrast: (1) the thing, the fourfold of the world, and the relationship to Being, and (2) standing reserve and its conscription within positionality. The “danger” as such is Being’s relationship with itself in that human beings forget the truth of Being. Danger is Being when positionality is itself a dispensation of Being. These two ways of presencing are two epochs of Being: one where the truth of Being emerges from the thing as thing within the fourfold of the world and the other where the truth of Being is forgotten and, as positionality, beings occur as requisitioned standing reserve.
“If positionality is an essential destiny of Beyng itself, then we may suppose that, as one essential way of Beyng among others, positionality changes,” (BL, p. 64). This change or shift occurs in the “turning” between these two contrasting modes of Being, when human beings catch sight of the “lightning flash” of the unconcealed truth of Being, Being as Being. With this summary complete, we turn now to situate positionality within the context of the lecture series before considering the next iteration of these ideas in “The Question Concerning Technology.”

**Positionality within the context of the Bremen Lectures**

The previous sketch of the whole of the Bremen lecture series was necessary to gain insight into how “positionality,” as Heidegger’s name for the essence of technology, was informed by the other three lectures. Previously, these four lectures have been treated as independent “pieces” of scholarship when in reality they are four parts within a contextual whole. It is therefore worthwhile to consider how Heidegger distinguished positionality in its relationship to “The Thing,” “The Danger,” and “The Turning” in a way that is not named in later iterations of this thinking. It is also interesting to consider how translating *Gestell* as positionality (rather than *Enframing*) influences current interpretations of Heidegger’s thinking.

While each of the four touchstones named in the titles of the lectures can be treated on its own, they require one another to fully reveal Heidegger’s complex account of the Being of modern technology. In the closing lecture Heidegger introduces the word “constellation” to name the thinking of the truth of Being he is describing, however this concept is also useful in illuminating the relationships between the ideas in the Bremen lectures. “The Thing” is a remarkable account of a way of approaching and thinking about entities and beings that does not necessarily lead to a deworlding. The power of the argument within “The Thing” becomes available only after considering its contrast in “Positionality.” “The Danger” is more an extension of “Positionality” than its own independent argument. The “danger” is revealed as Being where Being is forgotten in the essence of positionality. “The Turning” reveals another layer of Heidegger’s account by completing the circle and indicating the connection between two modes of Being. Positionality is therefore dangerous to Being, human beings, and ultimately itself
because it forgets the forgetting of Being. But by thinking the thing in its worldhood as guardian of Being, alternative ways of Being can be illuminated.

In the previous chapter we chronicled Heidegger’s first encounter with the affective domain (attunement) in his translation of Luther’s affectus as Gestelltsein, the positioning of mankind in its connection with God. Two decades later, Gestell reoccurs with the flavour of the Machination of Contributions as, in Mitchell’s translation, “the gathering of all Stellen, of all positioning, placing, putting as this basic movement has shown itself in the technologically dominated world of today” (2012, p. xi). Heidegger is attempting to bring into language the way of Being of modern technology as Gestell. But which offers the greatest insight into this thinking: the mooded inflection gathered from Luther, the positioning of the standing reserve within the Bremen lectures, or the Enframing of “The Question Concerning Technology”?

This question indicates a fascinating future trajectory for this thinking. For now we leap ahead five years from winter 1950 to the late autumn of 1955 as Heidegger prepares to give a speech titled “The Question Concerning Technology,” a revision of his earlier lecture “Positionality” delivered in Bremen.

Enframing in The Question Concerning Technology

The philosophy of technology as a discipline and domain of study can arguably trace its origins back to Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology”.52 As indicated earlier, this essay represents one iteration of a talk that Heidegger delivered between December 1949 and March 1950. Heidegger may not have actually spoken aloud these words or this particular version, but it is generally accepted that this essay represents most coherently his philosophy of technology, which marks the beginning of the modern philosophy of technology.53 A full explication of “The Question Concerning Technology”...

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52 I am indebted to Andrew Feenberg for introducing and providing not only the context and framework for grasping the philosophy of technology, but also walking me line-by-line through “The Question Concerning Technology” and Heidegger’s thinking of technology.

53 Whether or not this must be re-evaluated given Andrew Mitchell’s (2012) recent translation of GA 79 which contains the Bremen lectures series “Insight into that which is” that greater contextualizes Enframing/Positionality remains an open question.
Technology” is beyond the scope of this section and much less this chapter, but the key ideas and thinking that guide the essay are critical for the present inquiry.

Recall that what Heidegger was most interested in was the mundane and normal parts of life that elucidate and reveal the manner or kind of relationship that exists between man and Being. For Heidegger, Being is all there is, but cannot be summarized or conceptualized as a being in particular. Rather, Being is the way human beings are in everyday life as they go about engaging with other beings (as attuned being-in-the-world). Man’s relationship to Being is also influenced and contingent upon an understanding of time, or temporality. In The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger invites the reader (or hearer as it was originally intended) to raise the question concerning technology. This essay is not about answers but rather an attempt to arrive at the appropriate way of asking the question of technology. How is the question raised? Through thinking the question. From the beginning of the essay a “free relationship” to technology must be adopted to get underway, and by this Heidegger means letting go of assumptions or preconceived ideas about technology. The way of his thinking will be an attempt to find the ground of technology to help ask the question, and the reader will continually be surprised to find that the ground is not exactly where or what they think it is.

Remembering that Heidegger is not as concerned with beings as such but their Being, it is not shocking that in questioning technology Heidegger is most interested in the essence of technology. Essence is another in a long list of words (e.g. Being, being, entity, Enframing) that Heidegger uses that are difficult for translators to translate. The English often translates into “essence” but the reader should avoid attempts to reify the term into a concept or being. For now, it might be easier to adopt a comportment that allows for the unknown while avoiding attempts to objectify. Heidegger offers a jolt to the reader when he states quite early on in the essay that “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological.” But what does this mean? This statement accomplishes at least two things. First, it makes the reader pause and become frustrated. How can such a sentence be true? Everyone knows that technology is just technology, right? The second accomplishment is that the statement points to a path where thinking can happen around the question concerning technology. As a feature of
this second item, the careful reader will hear echoes of the relationship between man and Being in this challenging statement. This might be the most frequently cited phrase from this essay, but yet the most clearly misunderstood unless the reader continues and stays engaged in the text and in the thinking of the text.

Heidegger then presents the two traditional ways of thinking of what technology is: (1) a means to an end; and (2) a human activity. These are not necessarily incorrect, but they are only at the surface level of understanding technology. However, these two approaches actually “belong together.” Instrumentalism is the common name given to the first way of thinking about technology. The second approach, technology as a human activity, is often called the anthropological definition of technology. Surely these are correct, Heidegger says. But are they true? Heidegger is sceptical.

**Bringing-Forth as the Way of Revealing of the Ancient Greeks**

In order to frame his argument and further demonstrate that instrumentalism might well be correct but not necessarily true, Heidegger presents the case of the Ancient Greeks via Aristotle’s four causes (Final, Form, Efficient, and Material). Again, a full encounter with the philosophical thinking behind his reasoning is not necessary for grasping what Heidegger is trying to convey about the relationship between technology and human beings. Heidegger hopes that by calling on a pre-modern understanding of instrumentalism and causality, the Greek version, we can better understand our current situation with modern technology, which is best encapsulated by the efficiencies of means to an end.

Heidegger argues that the Greek’s system of causality, and their way of being, is best grasped as a *bringing-forth*. In this manner, beings exist because they are brought-forth by a process that weaves together all of the four causes, not just the most efficient means to an end. A bringing-forth is a revealing, or a way of being in the world and with things that assists in honouring the essence of the thing. A craftsperson does not simply make a table from any pieces of material; s/he works within the limits and possibilities of the materials to assist in allowing the materials to fulfill their function and purpose. With a contrast case in place, Heidegger can present the manner of revealing dictated by modern technology.
Enframing as the Way of Revealing of Modern Technology

As *bringing-forth* was the way of being of making for the Ancient Greeks, the manner in which modern man approaches technology is best enumerated as a *challenging-forth*. Heidegger argues that modern human beings treat nature as a storage house of raw material, and then *challenge* it to deliver us its powers. The way of being of modern technology, the way it brings things forth today, is named by Heidegger as *das Gestell* or, in English, the Enframing. As a normal German word, *Gestell* means a bookcase, skeleton, ordered system, to place or put things, to order. A *challenging revealing* wants to order everything, put it in the right spot, move it around until it is available for use. These movements are based on human plans that create this order and are not given by nature. There is no prior ideal of things, and no essence of some sort. Humans decide what is meant to be. As Enframing, all of nature is there to be transformed, exploited as a business opportunity.

Heidegger names the raw materials of Enframing the *standing-reserve*. Everything must be converted into raw materials to enter the technological world. *Bestand* is the original German that is usually translated as standing-reserve. The physical world then gets revealed as an object of technique, of technical control. Everything from the modern standpoint is potentially standing-reserve, or can be brought under the power of technology. Heidegger uses the example of the hydroelectric power plant on the Rhine River in Germany as an example. The meaning of the river is transformed by the damming and not recognizing this shift in meaning is monstrous. Heidegger is not here concerned with the physical transformations as he is with how these occurrences are understood.

The real danger lies when human beings are reduced to *Bestand*. This happens in two ways: 1) humans become things within the system; and 2) the way in which human beings are incorporated into the system transforms them into the control function of the system. One does not have to look far to see examples of the transformation of human beings into standing-reserve: air travel, human resources departments, and schooling. In schools, students are components within the educational system, they must be made to fit and be controlled. If they do not fit a particular set of arbitrary standards students are sent off to be “fixed.” Students and staff are reduced to
identification numbers and their computing user IDs and degrees and certifications are awarded once a checklist of curriculum objectives have been successfully imported into student brains. In the same way that human beings challenge and demand availability from nature, the schooling system does for students. What is more, educators, parents, and legislators are all a part of this system and literally comprise it such that the power to challenge the system is unthinkable or inaccessible. Enframing embraces human beings too. In a mind-twisting manner, humans do not control their own control; it is uncontrollable. This, of course, characterizes human beings as standing-reserve. As a revealing, modern technology is not a human activity. It is a dispensation of Being, a way of being-in-the-world. Humans have the illusion of control and this is part of the very structure.

“The Question Concerning Technology” ends ambiguously as Heidegger quotes the poet Hölderlin: “where the danger is, grows/the saving power also.” What is this saving power? The closest Heidegger comes to an answer is in poeisis, in the arts. I would argue that, given Heidegger’s distinction “danger” in the Bremen Lectures, this reference to Hölderlin can be heard as a call for more questions and avenues for further thinking and reflection. For the purposes of this section and in order to summarize this essay, Heidegger’s cautions must be explained. When it comes to the relationship between man and revealing, between human being and technology, there exists only one possibility with modern technology. This one way is the danger of Enframing. That humankind can see only one way, a way tied to causality, and that nothing is immune from – this is what danger is as such. Heidegger says it more eloquently: “Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing” (QCT, p. 27). More specifically, and in summary, he writes:

The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. … But human reflection can ponder the fact. (QCT, pp. 33-34)

Those who come to Heidegger for answers will be disappointed. His work does not offer simple and easy solutions, but challenges the reader into thinking with him and, ultimately, thinking for him or herself.
Machination, Positionality or Enframing?

What are we to make of Das Gestell? As may be expected, we need Machination, Positionality, and Enframing to fully conceptualize Heidegger’s thinking of modern technology. Neither can be considered on its own to determine the “Truth” of Das Gestell, if such a thing could even be accomplished. Each serves as a waypoint along Heidegger’s formal indication of his thinking of modern technology. Heidegger never quite changes his mind on the matter, as the general thrust of his engagement with technological thinking does tend toward a specific direction. Important to note, however, is his explicit reference to the lack of a value judgment associated with this thinking. Heidegger was not technophobic (see Babich, 2015). He writes in “Positionality”:

Note that here there is no passing of judgment on the radio listener or even on radio. It is only a matter of pointing out that in the standing reserve called the radio there reigns a requisitioning and positioning that has intervened in the essence of the human. (BL, p. 36)

Heidegger’s indicating is obviously not a passive pointing out, but, neither is it active. His indication is prior to the concepts of active/passive as this pointing out can occur for the human being as the “turning,” and in “turning” toward the danger of the forgetting of the truth of Being a transformation occurs in the human relationship to Being. It is for this reason that the title of this chapter is “the danger of Enframing.” I selected Enframing as is customary in English language scholarship to name Heidegger’s thinking of modern technology, while purposely including “the danger” as a nod to its complicated role in relation to this thinking. Specifically, the danger is not danger in the traditional sense but the connecting concept that points toward the turning that is possible given that in the forgetting of Being, Enframing (positionality) is but another way of Being. Therefore, human beings are always already within this special relationship to Being, albeit currently coloured by the requisitioning of Enframing.

As we transition to consider the influence of Heidegger’s thinking of modern technology as Enframing on the question of Being in teaching, I will incorporate all of the above terminology as needed. Enframing and positionality will be used interchangeably, along with danger, turning, thing, and world where necessary to clarify meaning. We will
also draw on all of the previous terminology named and distinguished in the previous chapters to more fully explicate and bring to the fore the Enframing of teaching.

The Enframing of teaching

The previous pathways of the present inquiry have been approaches meant to awaken the question of Being in teaching. World and attunement, the two distinctions leading up to the danger of Enframing, were each named, described, and appropriated with a number of teaching scenarios with the aim of sponsoring a “turn” in thinking. Here I deliberately call on the “turning” of the Bremen lectures to introduce the second portion of this chapter on the Enframing of teaching. To engage phenomenologically below will require calling into question the Being of teaching from the ground up as a function, feature, and outgrowth of positionality, the essence of modern technology. In the previous chapter on attunement, Enframing was considered as the moodedness of modernity. Specifically, Magrini (2011) indicated that the attunement of Enframing thoroughly infects teaching and learning at present. In this section we will concernfully approach the Enframing of teaching.

Rather prophetically, Heidegger was able to see and predict the current status of the modern university as well as teaching and learning broadly considered. His key insight was that the current (modern) understanding and relationship between humankind and Being is that of Enframing. That is, our everyday realities are structured and our possibilities framed by the assumption that all that is within the control of human beings, that everything stands ready for our use and consumption. Even within the now-fashionable academic discourses of ecology and sustainability there exists a pernicious assumption that reveals the depth of Enframing: these areas of scholarship already presuppose that the earth and its ecosystems require human beings to be sustained. What is more, human beings are needed to enact and accomplish the goals and aims to address the growing ecological crisis. The danger of Enframing is the collapse of critique and a complete amnesia of the fact that human beings are a component within and creator of the Enframing that enframes them. How do human beings engage with this danger that is modern technology? Heidegger never quite
provides a satisfying answer. But then again, answers might not be what are truly needed.

The Enframing of education was rampant in Heidegger’s time as it is today and it may be for this reason that Heidegger leaves those who follow his thought with much to ponder. The examples are easy to name: students are organized into groups by age, sometimes by ability level, sometimes to meet various percentages based on physical characteristics such as gender and ethnicity; curriculum is understood as chunks of information that can be measured and spooned into student’s heads at the whim of curriculum designers and legislators; learning is measured and marked according to an arbitrary numerical system that determines student abilities and possibilities in life; teachers are evaluated based on how well their students’ “learning” (as recorded in standardized testing scores) adheres to statistical models; in higher education new programs and courses are funded and developed based on their ability to increase budgets or map onto market demands for trained workers rather than further humankind; and new parents are obsessed with how their newborns and toddlers compare and rank relative to their peers because developmental psychologists have determined what “normal” childhood development is. With the ubiquity of Enframing, simply pondering might seem futile. Yet in another relevant text, Heidegger notes that thinking is the most essential relationship that humans can have with Being (WCT). In a day and age when acting and doing are most valued, thinking is, well, unthinkable.

“Philosophy is a radical practice”

Before returning to the scenarios, I offer the following personal account of why the Enframing of teaching and learning is of great personal concern to me and my career. As I finished drafting my Masters thesis and began searching for PhD programs and faculty members that aligned with my interests I had a stark realization: the program I was looking for did not exist. The questions that had grown from my research within educational technology became more and more philosophical and therefore I began my search for PhD programs in philosophy of education. The problem was there were very few active PhD programs in philosophy of education in North America. There was the odd program here and there, but only offered admission at specific intervals. There were
also philosophy programs that were sub-domains within educational studies, history, sociology, or professional doctorates.

What became more and more obvious, however, was the proliferation of PhD programs in educational psychology, statistics and quantitative methods, and instructional design/technology. This was frustrating as I was coming out of a program that valued these three areas in particular and my thesis advisor was herself an educational psychologist. The questions that I had about teaching, learning, and technology went far deeper than what was accessible to the educational psychologist or statistician, who would consider my interests, as not measurable, objectifiable, and representable, unimportant. I did not have the language then to name what I understand now was the result of an Enframing of higher education. To quickly describe this scenario to those friends and family members outside education, I wanted to look for solutions to educational problems that moved beyond testing learners to death and quantifying everything under the sun until all of teaching and learning becomes data that can be managed and mastered by a technology. A PhD in educational psychology or instructional technology would have required me to operate within this world of Enframing while the path of educational studies was too broad and meandering for my interests.

This is why, when I found the Curriculum Theory & Implementation: Philosophy of Education program at SFU, I knew it was for me:

Philosophy is a radical practice. It is a way of being rooted in calling out and responding to the world. This PhD program with an emphasis on Philosophy of Education is hence both a call and a response to those who wish to engage in a radical approach to understanding and transforming education.

The present inquiry is a radical approach that aims to be both a call and response to transforming education generally, and teaching specifically. In an effort to reveal Being in teaching I have aimed to provide glimpses into a grasping of teaching that exists outside of positionality.

http://www.sfu.ca/education/gs/degreediploma/doctoral/ctphil.html
Positioning the Scenarios

In what follows we will reexamine the four scenarios shared along the previous pathways in light of what has now been distinguished along the present pathway. In attempting to name and describe the actuality of the Enframing of teaching as the attuned being-in-the-world-as-teacher, we will be, as Bert Dreyfus has recorded, trying to point out water to a fish. This is a difficult task given that “That’s the way things are” is the very matter that must be addressed. We will have been successful if we can distinguish in the examples the Being of the Enframing of teaching and as the question of Being in teaching, while still holding onto the fact that Being and Enframing are one and the same, but different. The previous pathways of world and attunement addressed the four scenarios in their own language (e.g., worlded teaching, attuned teaching). These discussions have already laid the groundwork for the possibility of grasping this distinction of the danger of Enframing. What remains is a re-turn and re-inscribing to indicate this shift.

Dispositions

The original vignette was described as follows:

Mrs. Jackson calls on Shirley after demonstrating a math concept on the board. Shirley asks: “Where did the 5 come from? I don't get it.” Mrs. Jackson responds: "What do you mean, 'I don't get it'? It's right there on the board and I've worked this problem out twice now," and moves to erase the board.

Whereas in the transition from world to attunement we in essence moved forward allowing attunement to complement the previous distinction of world, in these reinterpretations we will encounter the examples from the beginning, fresh and new, prior to the distinctions of the present inquiry.

Approaching the scenario from within our normal, average everydayness is easy. We can distinguish Mrs. Jackson as the teacher, Shirley the student, and the traditional structure of the mathematics classroom. We enter the scene after Mrs. Jackson has worked out an example problem multiple times on the board. How does Mrs. Jackson’s teaching occur within Enframing?
Positionality takes the deworlded object one step further by rendering (conscripting) it as a resource to be called upon, as standing reserve. Therefore in Mrs. Jackson’s classroom, everything occurs as manipulable and orderable. Teaching is a domain concerned primarily with knowing and communicating knowledge. The math concept, as a concept and piece of knowledge, is correlated with a particular skill or objective within a present curriculum that has been designed and prescribed by “experts.” Mrs. Jackson has purposefully selected the example to work out (twice) that she thinks best exemplifies the math concept to be taught. Learning is a straightforward, mechanical process of observing another until the information (the math concept) has entered the mind of the learner. Or, better yet, adopting or appropriating the position of another.

Pedagogy, growing from this understanding of learning, is a simple logical problem: how can Mrs. Jackson transfer the math concept from her mind to the mind of her learners in the most efficient and effective manner possible? By demonstrating the concept twice and then having learners practice the same or similar example to prove their learning. Learning is putting together building blocks of skills, and therefore teaching is the communication of the best way to put these blocks in order to teach the learner. As noted earlier, this scenario is not simply another iteration of the “banking model” of education as described by Freire. This scenario describes what teaching and learning is for Mrs. Jackson (and her students, presumably) and this understanding also, as a mode of Being, becomes who Mrs. Jackson is as well. To think “outside” of this understanding of teaching is by definition impossible.

From Heidegger’s Bremen lectures we understand now that the question of Being in teaching within Mrs. Jackson’s scenario has not been banished forever, but is right here in front of us and has been the whole time. This is the “danger” – that we have forgotten Being, even when it discloses as Enframing. Positionality is a mode of Being, and even while Being concealed itself in its essence within positionality, it truly was only concealed nearby, right alongside Enframing. By offering the earlier distinctions of world and attunement, we were able to glimpse flashes of Being (as concealed within Enframing) in teaching.
Dispositions and the language surrounding professional teacher dispositions were named as a contrasting case to ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher for Mrs. Jackson. Professional teacher dispositions, understood from out of the ongoing and overly-psychologized dialogue of dispositions, become further tainted by positionality. The Being of teaching in this manner is understood as a human being’s capacity for embodying a listing of particular dispositions that can be named, ordered, summarized, and communicated at any time and place. Professional development for existing teachers is correlated with the vehicle oil change and regular tune up; a time outside of the classroom to tweak dispositions and impart new, “research tested” dispositions. But dispositions do not have to occur in this restrictive manner, and ways of being-in-the-world-as-teacher are also susceptible to positionality. This is where the conceptualizations of world and attunement come into play as distinctions.

Recall the earlier way of philosophizing exemplified by the early Heidegger named formal indication. To summarize:

A formal indication is a way of pointing to existential phenomena, roughly fixing their preliminary sense and the corresponding manner of retrieving those senses, while at the same time deflecting any “uncritical lapse” into a conception that would foreclose pursuit of their genuine sense. ... The sense of a concept as a formal indication is less a matter of content than a matter of enactment or performance (Vollzugssinn). (Dahlstrom, 2012)

World and attunement, as existentials of Dasein and existentially indicated concepts, were enacted within Chapters 4 and 5 in such a way as to reveal Being in teaching as Being in contrast to Being as Enframing. Both concepts work separately and in unison to re-world and re-contextualize teaching. Teaching can be grasped as a process of imparting knowledge from the mind of the teacher to the mind of the student in an orderly and timely manner prescribed by a predetermined curriculum. Teaching as a profession can be summarized and framed as the possessing of multiple dispositions that determine “good” teaching. However, both of these ways of grasping teaching operate from within Enframing, a mode of Being that can only recognize itself as Being. That teaching can be grasped as a linear process where “knowledge” exists as physical and very “real” blocks of information that can be communicated in an efficient manner is the most blatant example of Enframed teaching. Everything in teaching and learning
becomes standing reserve, from the teacher and student to the knowledge and curriculum. When professional dispositions are heard and understood as another object to be mastered, we find ourselves back in the monologue generated by Enframing. World and attunement indicated otherwise, that there are other dispensations of Being. How to go about accomplishing this is tricky, and is addressed below following the reinterpreted scenarios.

**Personal interlude**

In my personal interlude, the attunement that most accurately described my experience prior to the shift in my being-in-the-world-as-teacher was *trapped*. My being-in-the-world occurred as trapped within a curriculum and framed by a preset way of assessing student learning. With the language distinguished in this chapter we can now name this trappedness as Enframing. Earlier the context of Enframing or positionality was thought from *outside* Enframing whereas for this scenario I experienced myself as a component *within* the system of Enframing. The tension between Being as Being and Being as Enframing was experienced by me as being trapped, with no way forward and no existing possibilities other than being another orderable object responsible for ordering and manipulating other knowledge/learning objects into the minds of the standing reserves of my students’ brains. Within my classroom and as a teacher I felt I had *no choice* but to operate within the traditional role of math teacher. Even while I knew I wanted to create a space for my middle school students where math as a subject matter and assessments as assessments were not threatening and things to be feared, my world existed as if there were no other possibilities other than to reenact these troubling pedagogical stances and practices.

In the opening sentence quoted earlier where Heidegger situates his completed works there is an often overlooked word that is worthy of reflection within this example. It runs: "[the collected edition] is underway in the field of paths of the *self-transforming* asking of the many-sided question of Being" (GA1, pp. 447-8, emphasis added). The asking itself is self-transforming. The shift that occurred for me once I was able to glimpse the attuned trappedness of my being-in-the-world-as-teacher was self-transforming *because I asked the question of Being*. When in Chapter 4 I shared that I was unsure of whether or not my language could convey the monumental nature of this
shift it was because new possibilities for being a teacher were revealed where previously there had been only walls bounding my being. This experience was nothing short of magical for I had no other language to describe the self-transformation. Who I was as a teacher occurred differently for me, more deeply than dispositions, identity, personality, beliefs, or even assumptions. My curriculum showed up not as something prescribed but as an exciting journey to traverse. My students showed up not as cogs in the wheels of my classroom but as co-Daseins (to borrow the pre-Being and Time language for Mitdasein or being-with). How I spoke and thought about my teaching and my student’s learning shifted in all aspects of my professional practice: as I engaged in weekly staff meetings, in my relationships with my colleagues, and in conversations with concerned parents.

But the slippery slope back into positionality has not been overcome, in fact it is right alongside us even now. The next question asked after the naming of my self-transformative experience with the question of Being as Being is: How can we get this to happen for all other teachers? Surely we could come up with a curriculum, a professional development experiences where we could set up a few objectives, create activities, develop a self-assessment, follow up with classroom visits. Here we are back in the dialogue of Enframing. For to talk and think in this way is to speak from out of Enframing, as if human beings could order and arrange everything in life so that it can be “mastered” -- even Being itself. In this way, as we will find below, even technology cannot be overcome by human beings because technology, as Enframing, is a designation of Being and Being itself can never be mastered by human beings. Still, then, what are we to do?

**Educational Technologies**

Given that modern human beings assume (in contradistinction to Heidegger) that the essence of technology is something specifically technological, that is, as in and of a device or machine of some sort, the previous examples concerning the two ways of being in relation to technology will be somewhat easier to approach. These two examples were named teacher buy-in and fear toward technology and the scenario revolved around a hypothetical initiative that included the introduction of mobile devices in a middle school. Enframing was previously named in the context of the chapter on
attunement as the moodedness of both approaches to being related to technology. Below we will consider the entire context, the Being, of teaching within these scenarios.

The mobile device initiative is permeated by Enframing and not because it is specifically about technological devices. The presumption grounding the program that researchers are to insert devices to measure their effectiveness and impact on student learning or teaching is itself treating the entire classroom context as a matter of standing reserve. A classroom is an object that a treatment (mobile devices) can be put into to see (measure) how the other objects (students and teachers) respond. If student test scores and time-on-task increases (both a result of the Enframing of teaching and learning where learning is calculable via assessments and observable seat time), the mobile devices are a success. Teacher buy-in and fear toward technology can now be seen in a new manner not as simply a part of a teacher’s being-in-the-world, but as a function and feature of the Enframing of the whole of Being as positionality. This indication is not to shift “blame” from teacher to Enframing for blame is of no concern within this context. Turning from “It's my fault” to “It's the computer/technology/device’s fault” is not forward moving.

Heidegger offers his thinking as “free of judgment,” neither good nor bad. Regardless of whether we agree with his intentions, it is worth thinking through the merits and possibilities opened by such an approach. I received feedback from reviewers on an earlier draft of the ideas on teacher’s ways of being in connection to technologies that challenged me on the assumptions I had been making throughout my analysis. Taking Heidegger’s comment seriously about withholding judgment, I had purposely tried to leave the positive/negative argument in relation to technologies open. In response I wrote:

This section could be interpreted as operating on an implicit assumption that technology is good and resistance to technology is bad, but this is not necessarily so. Ways of being are not good or bad, right or wrong – they simply are. The expositions above on buy-in and fear toward technology are not about technology, its affordances or drawbacks. Rather, buy-in and fear are presented to sketch out how conversations about technology might be understood in a different context. Teachers (as well as students and administrators) have a myriad of other responsibilities both inside and outside the classroom. However, unquestioned fear of technology, much in the same way as
unquestioned adoption of technology, cannot be a way of being/disposition for teachers. By acknowledging their being in relation to technology teachers can take responsibility for and take on a new way of being regarding technology for themselves and their relationship to technology. Doing so enables and empowers teachers to critically and radically evaluate the integration of technologies into their classrooms. (Kruger-Ross, 2014b, p. 170-171).

In approaching teacher buy-in and fear toward technology by way of being-in-the-world-as-teacher and attunement in Chapters 4 and 5, my aim was to uncover or reveal the way in which teaching and teaching with technologies is always already “trapped” (to use the language from the personal interlude) within a dispensation of Being that has forgotten (or concealed) the essence of Being as the possibility of being otherwise. This is not an indication of a specifically negative or positive manner, more or less efficient, for to ask this question is to, in Heidegger’s language, already ask of technology from within the essence of technology as positionality. It is for this reason, I believe, that Heidegger can never truly name this challenge of evaluating technology because he is not sure of how to go about doing so in a manner that is not already technologically Enframed. Or, he would raise the challenge that we are still, as human beings standing within the Enframing, preparing to think technology otherwise.

**Worlding**

In the final scenario, we examined how the worlding of the world might push the accepted thinking of Heidegger’s distinction of world beyond the literal and static meaning of a referential context, to the more verbal and active sense of worlding. The example shared was related to a professor of art history who approaches her teaching through this idea of worlding the world of her curriculum for her students. This worlding would also include an attuned component that would contextualize what could become a static process (the process of worlding) by ensuring that the moodedness of the world was foregrounded.

Within the context of the current pathway, the conceptualization of worlding can easily be seen to align within Heidegger’s account of the worlding of the world as the gathering of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities that is in essence the “thing.” As Heidegger intuits in “The Thing,” throughout the Bremen lectures, and also the popular
essay “Building Dwelling Thinking,” the fourfold is Being itself. Capobianco (2014) argues for Heidegger’s claim while also indicating that those who have adopted Heidegger’s thinking of world, worlding, dwelling, and the fourfold have done so without an appropriate appreciation for what Heidegger is trying to accomplish. For example, worlding becomes just another process, procedure, or method of applying to a problem, or, when scholars confuse and take Heidegger’s words and ideas too literally or ontically, rather than hearing and feeling the ontological tonality. “Divinities” does not necessarily represent God or gods in the traditional sense but rather “the holy.” “Earth” does include soil, plants, mountains, oceans and so on, but indicates in the direction of so much more. If world, as being-in-the-world-as-teacher, is a nod to the positioning of positionality, worlding is this indication raised to the second power.

One of Heidegger’s most powerful rhetorical moves in Insight Into That Which Is is his revealing of the worlding of the world as the same as positionality. This is shocking considering the care he has taken to distinguish the two concepts. “The same, but different.” Within an Enframing attunement, this is logically impossible. The same cannot be different, the identical is identical by definition. This logical conundrum is precisely Heidegger’s point—human beings cannot see another possibility outside of the identity principle (i.e., A=A), the foundational building block of logic. Modern logic could be contextualized as the language of Enframing. Logic, of course, is the language of computers and networking technology. When the worlding of the world exists as positionality this is accepted as good, as natural. That human beings forget this collapse of world into Enframing is dangerous, in the sense indicated above.

In an earlier pathway I shared a vignette from one of my recent walking assessments. A second example will bring this distinction into greater relief. A young female student from communications who enrolled in my instructional technology methods course chose to do a walking assessment to give her the opportunity to explore her interests in women and new media technologies. Together we decided to read a graphic novel reflecting on the (mostly) true relationship between Charles Babbage and Ava Lovelace. As an instructor, the text was ripe for reflection and further discussion. Here was a history of the beginnings of the computer as told in a modern format that reinterpreted the actuality of the past while also reinterpreting and stretching reality to
consider alternative relationships in time and space. Also, the text contained a number of presumptions about technology, language, and gender that would sponsor a great deal of dialogue. The particular scenario that gripped this one conversation with my student from communications was on the language of computers.

Language plays an interesting role within the novel as Lovelace is characterized, in my view, within traditional female stereotypes. Whether or not this was an accurate representation from the stance of the Victorian era or the modern stance was also a topic of discussion. Given that Lovelace was the daughter of the famous poet Lord Byron, the differences between poetry and mathematics are overly exploited in a manner that is predictable. Poetry is too wishy washy, has too many meanings, and is subject to the whims of the emotions (like females?) whereas mathematics is cold, deals with hard facts, black or white. In a chapter within the novel the two main characters discuss the possibility (in the mid-1800s!) of a device that could input a large piece of writing, sort it into pieces of data, store the data, and then output the writing in the same or differing format. The inventors run into the challenge of how to accomplish this given that language is not always easily converted into 0s and 1s and they lament the lack of a universal grammar and language.

I asked my student what her thoughts were on the matter. Did we need a universal language? Why would we want to have a universal language? Her response was entirely positive: “Of course we want a universal language! How great would it be if everyone understood each other all the time? I’m pretty sure someone is close to figuring out that language any day now. Technology just moves and evolves so fast!” That the language of Enframing was not even questionable took me aback. The “language” of educational technologies (as a scholarly dialogue and the literal “language” of coding) had been an ongoing feature within classtime discussions. What had this student missed in those conversations? That we are unable to question the worlding of the world, when no more questions are necessary--that is the danger.
Concluding Thoughts

In this chapter we have distinguished the path of Enframing/positionality by tracing the history and context of this distinction as Heidegger’s way of indicating the essence of modern technology and also reviewed the scenarios from previous chapters to consider their latent Enframing. The sketching of Enframing/positionality included an in-depth review of the Bremen lecture series of December 1949 followed by the later and more popular iteration, “The Question Concerning Technology.” The four examples were retraced to reveal, concealed within them, the essence of technology as positionality. Thus the previous pathways of world and attunement were demonstrated as pathways to provide a glimpse into the question of Being in teaching. The danger of Enframing is, quite literally, an approach to Being in teaching itself. But again, what are we to do?

Heidegger does offer an indication of a way forward in a speech he delivered in his hometown of Messkirch around the same time as “The Question Concerning Technology.” In his talk he urged listeners to find a way to simultaneously say both “yes” and “no” to technology, or adopting a comportment of Gelassenheit (releasement towards things). This “solution” strikes most as an impossibility given the assumptions held about technology and the dichotomy created by the affirmative and negative. How could one say both yes and no to technology at the same time? Can you say or can you comport yourself toward a phenomenon while holding yes and no together? Heidegger does not urge us to say “Maybe” to technology, but yes and no simultaneously. Challenging the assumptions that govern the understanding of educational endeavours with technologies requires a challenging of the assumptions that literally and figuratively shape who we are and who and how we are in the world as human beings.

Education as a discipline and as a philosophical endeavour could be transformed if we took the time to critically challenge the presumptions we hold as educators in relation to technology. Too often we fall into speaking about technologies by utilizing a vocabulary that limits us to an either-or, means-ends approach. If teachers, teacher mentors, teacher educators, professional learning experts, and other administrators could find ways to work together to explore, name, and transform their assumptions about technologies, we would be well on our way toward saying “yes” and “no” to
technology as Heidegger recommends. We would also be able to adopt a critical comportment toward educational technologies, simultaneously acknowledging their power and allure, while empowering ourselves as teachers to make the pedagogical decisions we know are necessary to meet the needs of students. By naming and reflecting on our presuppositions about technology we can reaffirm our responsibility as teachers rather than letting our presuppositions think for us (Egan, 1978).
Chapter 7. Concluding Thoughts and Future Possibilities

The aim of this final chapter is to bring to conclusion the six previous pathways traversed in order to approach the question of Being in teaching in a manner that is summative, critical, and projective. Toward this aim, we first review and summarize the six pathways (Chapters 1-6) with the benefit of hindsight. Following, limitations and specific “gaps” uncovered throughout the inquiry are named and distinguished in relationship to existing alternatives and new possibilities for future inquiries. Finally, the present inquiry is drawn to a close by indicating further questions and trajectories that could and should be considered given the analyses sketched within the previous six pathways.

Retracing the Previous Pathways

A summation of the previous chapters is helpful in order to grasp what has been indicated. The present study offers an inquiry into Being in teaching by way of three Heideggerian distinctions: world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing. Important to capture from the beginning is the recognition that the present study is not the inquiry but an inquiry into Being in teaching. There exist other possibilities, other ways of approaching, and alternative manners that would constitute inquiries into Being in teaching that would not diminish but only supplement and complement the present study. Physically and conceptually the study as a document is organized into seven pathways or chapters, each with the aim of raising the question of Being in teaching individually and in concert with the other paths. Traditionally understood, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7 roughly correspond to the Introduction, Literature Review, Methodology, and Conclusion, respectively, of a thesis. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are to be understood as three individual and interrelated cases. However, my preference is for each of the seven pathways to be grasped as approaching the question of Being in teaching first as a
specific pathway, and second as seven paths “in the field of paths of the self-transforming asking of the many-sided question of Being” (GA1, pp. 447-448). Thus, all of the pathways taken together as a whole form a constellation that can illuminate the question of Being in teaching in and of itself.

The first chapter introduced the phenomenon in question, the Ur-phenomenon of Being as Being, in a general way to indicate “Being in teaching.” The need for the present inquiry was described as well as the way that who I am as a teacher and as a human being calls for and situates the need for a study of the kind recorded here. Before sketching the structure of the six paths to come, four Heideggerian distinctions were presented and discussed: the usefulness of philosophy, Volk, knowing and Being, and translation/interpretation.

The second and third paths (Chapters 2 and 3) are complementary by definition. Chapter 2 described and brought into relief Heidegger’s question of the meaning of Being by naming the many everyday ways that the word “being” is used as derivative of the overarching Being as Being that Heidegger is most interested in exploring. In Chapter 3, the way of approaching the question of Being is named phenomenological ontology and, without necessarily reducing this way of philosophizing into a prescribed method, we examined Heidegger’s concepts of formal indication, language, and truth as aletheia in order to grasp this way. Heidegger’s attempts to language his thinking of Being was reflected in extended discussions of philosophical terminology in both chapters including metaphysics, philosophy, ontology, and Dasein within Chapter 2, and aletheia, ontic/ontological, and the ontological difference in Chapter 3. Both paths included references to existing attempts to raise the question of Being in teaching (and education).

The first distinction approached Being in teaching by way of Heidegger’s world from Being and Time. Thus, as we enter Chapter 4, we find ourselves already along a path traced within Being and Time. Being, Dasein, and ontology (from Chapter 2) were recalled in addition to phenomenological ontology (from Chapter 3) to arrive at the referential totality of a meaningful context, or, the world. A brief history of Heidegger’s development in thinking “world” was traced before more fully describing the manner by
which world is to be properly understood. Before transitioning into a discussion of world and Being in teaching all of the terminology from Chapters 2 and 3 is called on to formulate the fundamental constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Four scenarios were then described and examined given Heidegger’s distinction of being-in-the-world-as-teacher. In each scenario, the world(s) of teaching (heard in the multiple sense) were illuminated in their meaningful contextuality. In the concluding section the fourth pathway was shown to be followed intuitively by the fifth pathway of attunement.

Chapter 5 presents the second Heideggerian distinction to approach the question of Being in teaching, attunement. The first task of the path begins with a discussion of how to translate Befindlichkeit, the word Heidegger uses to name the attuned way of Being of Dasein. Following, the concept of attunement is traced through Heidegger’s early, middle, and later thinking in order to grasp what Heidegger means by attunement and to demonstrate the importance of mood/attunement throughout the lifetime of this thinking. To connect the distinction of attunement to teaching, the four scenarios named and described in the previous pathway (Chapter 4, world) were summarized and reinterpreted. In the third scenario, buy-in and fear toward technology, the following pathway was revealed as the danger of Enframing.

The sixth pathway, the danger of Enframing, was approached in a manner other than the previous distinctions of world (Chapter 4) and attunement (Chapter 5). Grasping Enframing, as Heidegger’s naming of the essence of modern technology, included a conceptual and historical leap for world and attunement were primarily situated within the Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time. The Bremen lectures, where Heidegger first publicly airs his thinking of modern technology as positionality, did not occur until two decades after the publication of Being and Time. Enframing was first discussed as a matter of translating the German das Gestell into English. This required a tracing of Heidegger’s thinking of technology from Machination, to Positionality, and finally Enframing. In this discussion, the Bremen lecture series of 1949 and “The Question Concerning Technology” were analyzed as iterations of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. With Enframing/positionality more fully explicated, we returned again to the four scenarios from the Chapters 4 and 5 to glimpse Being as Being understood as Enframing as already embedded within each of the examples.
We find ourselves now engaged along the seventh pathway (Chapter 7). With the previous six pathways now sketched, we turn to the next section to name and describe the limitations and gaps that remain at the conclusion of the present inquiry.

**Limitations, Gaps, and the Unthought**

In this section I share three limitations or gaps that represent areas within the scope of the present inquiry that need much more thinking. I have identified and selected three gaps, one for each of the distinctions named in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, for the specific reason that they indicate paths that I plan on traversing in the future. The three gaps are: (1) the limitations of world, (2) embodiment in teaching, and (3) the insurmountability of positionality/Enframing. There exist any number of additional gaps that could have been selected to name and describe below as nothing is ever fully thought through. For example, Duarte (2012) and Magrini (2011; 2014), two philosophers of education who engage faithfully and meaningfully with Heidegger’s thinking of Being, both write of the importance Heidegger’s thinking of art and poiesis can be to the everyday practices of teaching and learning. This is a considerable gap that is not addressed in the present inquiry that I would like to consider further in the future. This and other possible trajectories are considered in the following section. For now, we turn to the limitations inherent in Heidegger’s account of world.

**Limits of the World**

The primary gap in Heidegger’s distinction of world is that it does not allow for any gaps in thinking. Put another way, there is no alternative to world, no way to think outside of or beyond world for, the circular logic of Heidegger’s argument tells us, to think outside of the concept of world would already in and of itself be another world, albeit one where we deny worldhood. To be sure, attunement and the danger of Enframing are also of this same kind (denying attunement is itself an attunement, naming and rejecting Enframing is as a result of Enframing). Is this a symptom of an existential concept or phenomenon? Can we truly think outside or beyond world?
A second challenge to world and one that continues to leave me puzzled, is Heidegger’s description of animals as “world-poor.” This declaration occurs within the WS 1929-30 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. von Uexküll’s conceptualization of *Umwelt* (meaning “environment” or “surroundings”) was one of the inspirations for Heidegger’s distinction of world. Heidegger was familiar with von Uexküll’s work into the relationships that exist between organisms (humans and non-humans) and their environments as a matter of communication, meaning, and significance. Why deny or de-world animality? Quite a few scholars have recognized and criticized Heidegger for this denial and aim in their work to flesh out an account of animality that does not necessarily assume the entrenched dichotomy of man and beast (Calarco, 2008; Mitchell, 2011; Schalow, 2006).

Calarco (2008) notes the flaw in Heidegger’s logic:

The problem is rather that Heidegger uncritically accepts two basic tenets of ontotheological anthropocentrism: that human beings and animals can be clearly and cleanly distinguished in their essence; and that such a distinction between human beings and animals even needs to be drawn. (p. 30)

Many call upon the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968) to help address this gap in Heidegger’s thinking of world. The second limitation of the present inquiry follows directly from the first as is named in the following section.

**Supplementing attunement: Embodied teaching**

A second gap in this study is its lack of an account of embodiment within the Being of teaching. This would be best served within the pathway of attunement as the fundamental moodedness of our everyday lived experience, as I understand Heidegger’s account, must wholly include the body. Therefore it is interesting that Heidegger hardly ever engages with embodiment within his analysis of the being of Dasein or later in his career in his thinking of technology and poiesis. This gap marks a limitation of the present inquiry and of Heidegger’s thinking.
The limitation of Heidegger’s thinking of Dasein’s embodiment has been addressed, however, by both those who follow his pathway of thinking and those who do not. David Levin (now David Kleinberg-Levin) published a study entitled *The Body’s Recollection of Being* whose aim was to fill just this gap. He summarizes:

I would like to observe that the objective of this study is to retrieve for future history a *body of understanding* which our dominant tradition has kept in concealment. The retrieval is two-fold, since, first of all, this tradition has vigorously fought to suppress the life and truth of the body, and, secondly, the mainstream of our tradition has steadfastly excluded ancient spiritual teaching - traditions of ancient universal wisdom - which speak in archetypal and mythopoetic language of the body’s deep ontological understanding of Being and of the ways to bring it forth. (1985, pp. 4-5)

Much as those scholars who seek to supplement Heidegger’s thinking of world, Kleinberg-Levin also draws inspiration from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in his recollection of Being. Maxine Sheets-Johnston’s (2011) work on the phenomenology of movement, while drawing specifically on Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, also helps to address this limitation in Heidegger’s thinking.

**Positioning Positionality**

In the same way as was indicated with world above, Heidegger does not offer much guidance on what to do with the essence of technology as the Enframing of Being that weighs upon modern humankind. Polt (1999) writes that there are two common critiques lodged at Heidegger’s account of modern technology. The first is that he remains too passive and fatalistic. Feenberg, in his critical theory of technology, makes this same complaint in labeling Heidegger a substantivist, or someone who assumes that human beings are at the whim of technology. The second critique challenges Heidegger at his own game by asking just how “Enframed” his own account of Enframing is. Polt (1999) summarizes:

At their worst, Heidegger’s analyses of technology are themselves “technological”: he writes as if he has a technique for unlocking the mechanism of history. But at their best, essays such as [*The Question Concerning Technology*] are effective ways of initiating reflection on the deeper trends that lie behind the terrifying events of our age. (p. 174)
One way of addressing the first limitation, that Heidegger does not leave modern human beings with much hope, is by exploring comments he made in another speech around the same time that *The Question Concerning Technology* was given that was referenced earlier within Chapter 6. In this speech Heidegger names *Gelassenheit* (releaseament) as the best way forward for human beings in their relationship with modern technology. This indicates a very fruitful path for further thinking, and is more fully described in the following section that considers additional possibilities for future pathways of thinking.

**Future Trajectories**

As I indicated at the beginning of the inquiry in Chapter 1 and elsewhere, the questions that drove me to doctoral studies and eventually to the present inquiry were revealed from within my Masters research. Similarly, in the preparation of this study even more questions and pathways for thinking emerged. This section considers future trajectories of thinking in three subsections: (1) additional paths to Being in teaching, (2) responding to Enframing, and (3) alternative approaches to Being in education.

**Access to Being in teaching**

As indicated in Chapter 1, the pathways traveled in the present inquiry do not come close to exhausting the possibilities of approaching the question of Being in teaching. The selection of world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing was driven by the constellation that could be generated by considering them together rather than any sort of special status attributed to the three distinctions. In this subsection, three alternative approaches to Being in teaching are proposed for future inquiry.

To say that for Heidegger the relationship between Being as Being is correlated with truth understood as *aletheia* may be an understatement. While Being is the name attributed to the topic of Heidegger’s lifetime of thinking, the essence and nature of truth was always alongside from the very beginning and continuing through to his final seminars. Consider the opening paragraph of *The Age of the World Picture* that was referenced in the previous chapter as the initial plan for the Bremen lecture series:
In metaphysics, reflection on the essence of beings and a decision concerning the essence of truth is accomplished. Metaphysics grounds an age in that through a particular interpretation of beings and through a particular comprehension of truth, it provides that age with the ground of its essential shape. This ground comprehensively governs all decisions distinctive of the age. Conversely, in order for there to be adequate reflection on these phenomena [Erscheinungen], their metaphysical ground must also itself be recognized in them. Reflection is the courage to put up for question the truth of one’s own presuppositions and the space of one’s own goals. (AWP)

Heidegger is, of course, using metaphysics in the sense described in Chapter 2, as a nexus of philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology. Grasping the essence of truth as aletheia is central enough to Heidegger’s thinking and language that it had to be distinguished in Chapter 3 within the context of phenomenological ontology, Heidegger’s way of philosophizing.

It is not shocking that the interplay of revealing and concealing that is named in truth as aletheia would be an interesting alternative pathway into Being in teaching. Heidegger’s unconcealment as a conceptual distinction worthy of study on its own is gaining more interest as of late (Wrathall, 2010). Truly grappling with the transformation of the traditional understanding of truth in connection with Being in teaching would require an immense amount of thinking and analysis. Given that teaching, at least as it is currently understood from within positionality, is concerned primarily with propositional truth, or truth as representation, the loosening of assumptions in order to glimpse aletheia would be considerable. However, it would be worth the time and energy since there is something within unconcealment that speaks to a more primordial encounter with truth than the propositional truth of science and mathematics. This would include a shift from the calculative thinking of positionality to the more meditative, ontological thinking of Being. This shift could also be informed by scholarship into the intersection of education and art/poeisis as responses to Enframing, as Heidegger indicates at the end of QCT (see, e.g., Duarte, 2012).

Time, or temporality as it is more accurately titled, is the second alternative pathway toward the question of Being in teaching. In the present inquiry we named Heidegger’s thinking as “the question of Being,” but there are many names Heidegger uses to indicate in the direction of this thinking. One of the easiest ways to quickly
describe Heidegger’s project is to acknowledge that he was always trying to combat the “metaphysics of presence” that he saw as dominating the whole of the Western philosophical tradition since the Ancient Greeks. If beings and entities are not assumed to be constantly present at all times, the question of Being unravels and reveals the constellated interrelationship between Being, beings, time, truth, and so on. Returning to the previous path, if human beings and content objectives are not simply “standing reserve,” always on the ready to be implemented, we would have to acknowledge and inquire into our fundamental grasping not only of beings as beings, but also time.

Heidegger’s title for his magnum opus, *Being and Time*, names the subject not only of his book but of two key themes throughout his thinking. Most scholars approach Heidegger’s work from the perspective of Being with fewer being brave enough to reverse and appropriate his thinking of temporality. In some ways, Heidegger’s account of time and temporality is far more radical than his ontological analysis of Dasein. In short, Heidegger claims that there is a more primordial understanding of time than that of clock time, what he names temporality. Temporality is described in *Being and Time* as Dasein’s lived experience of time as an unified, threefold phenomenon that encompasses human beings’ everyday understanding of past, present, and future.

The metaphysics of presence cannot fully grasp the actual lived experience of temporality as the amalgamation of a present moment that presses into a future on the basis of the movement of a having been. Objects within standing reserve are atemporal, they have no time by definition. In an earlier draft of the ideas that now are recorded in Chapter 4 on teaching as worlding, a colleague challenged my use of “way of being” in such a way that I had, inadvertently, reified or rendered objectively present an idea that I was using to indicate a fluid and amorphous phenomenon. I was crestfallen because I could not, and still cannot, think all the way through the question of Being in teaching by way of temporality. I do have a number of ideas on the question of Being in teaching in relationship to postcolonial philosophies of education that I hope to share soon as this trajectory needs a great deal more attention.

The final alternative trajectory to approaching the question of Being in teaching has been intimated throughout the present inquiry: meditative thinking. The nature and
essence of human thinking is yet another strand in Heidegger’s question of Being. Heidegger argues that thinking, understood at its core, is humankind’s most essential relationship to Being. In numerous lectures and speeches in his later period Heidegger indicates that thinking has been taken over and gripped by the calculative thinking of science. In this context science must not be heard to include all of the sciences as such but rather a particular way of engaging in scientific practice that, to use the language of the present inquiry, ignores the question of Being as Enframing. When we forget that thinking can be other than calculation and efficiency, we are indeed in danger.

Heidegger offers meditative thinking, or ontological thinking, as an alternative to the limited thinking defined by positionality. Meditative thinking may best be described as an attunement, or a way of thinking that aligns with reading and interpreting poetry or a work of art. This indicates the “poetic attunement” Magrini (2011) names and describes as a countermove to the Enframing attunement that prevails in modern education that aims for social efficiency and instrumentalism. Thinking, as meditative, ontological thinking, would serve the question of Being in teaching immensely. As Magrini argues (2011; 2014), a poetic attunement may be the best solution to the Enframing of teaching and learning.

Responding to Enframing

The final trajectory indicated by the work completed in the present inquiry concerns the “turning,” as Heidegger names in the Bremen lectures, to the truth of Being while not attempting to master, control, or manage Being as human beings purport to do from within Enframing. Heidegger names the attunement whereby human beings can simultaneously say “yes” and “no” to technologies Gelassenheit, letting beings be, or, in the common English translation, releasement. As a response to positionality, Gelassenheit indicates an intriguing pathway of thinking for the future. In the present inquiry we walked step-by-step from Being, to attuned being-in-the-world, and through Enframing. We stopped short of answering the question, “What’s next?” What is next, I believe, is Gelassenheit.
Gelassenheit is best exemplified in a text of the same name that was published in German in 1959. The text, which was translated into English in 1966 as Discourse on Thinking, collects two writings: (1) Gelassenheit (known in English as the Memorial Address) which was a speech given on October 30, 1955 in Heidegger’s hometown of Messkirch in honor of the 175th birthday of composer Conradin Kreutzer, and (2) Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking, a dialogue written between 1944-45 between a teacher, a scholar, and a scientist. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, the translators, give the following explanation for their translation of Gelassenheit as releasement:

Gelassenheit, although used today in German in the sense of “composure,” “calmness,” and “unconcern,” also has older meanings, being used by the early German mystics (as Meister Eckhart) in the sense of letting the world go and giving oneself to God. “Releasement” is not as old a word in English, but because it is rare and so free from too specific connotative meanings, it can carry with relative ease the very special and complex meanings which are implicit here and made explicit in the Conversation which follows. (1966, p. 54, fn 4)

Interestingly enough, in this text Gelassenheit is presented alongside a thorough discussion of meditative thinking as the future trajectory discussed above. There is increasing interest in what Heidegger is indicating in his thinking of Gelassenheit (Babich, 2015; Capobianco, 2010) that calls for further inquiry from philosophers of education. Thus, the question of Being in teaching must be reinterpreted anew given a fuller account of how “letting beings be” can be grasped and understood within teaching and learning.

If Heidegger is correct in claiming that “[t]echnology is only one actuality among other actualities” (BL, p. 38), and positionality as the modern dispensation of Being cannot simply be laid down or set aside in an active sense (for to do so would imply that human beings are masters of and can control Being itself), then Gelassenheit as letting beings be or releasement must offer a hint or indication of the direction we should be looking. Or, better still, heard as an attunement, Gelassenheit could assist in attuning human beings to hear the call of Being and therefore move beyond the entrapment of Enframing. Much, much more thinking is required of this pathway, but the possibilities are thought-provoking.
Additional approaches to Being in education

In its initial drafts, the present inquiry had as its mission approaching the question of Being in *education* rather than in *teaching*. Limiting the inquiry to analyze “in teaching,” understood as a subset of “in education,” was strategic. Approaching the question of Being in education is beyond the scope of a single inquiry. In this final subsection, alternative approaches to raising the question of Being are considered and described as future trajectories for inquiry and research.

The importance of language was referenced within Heidegger’s way of philosophizing in Chapter 3. What must be considered when looking at phenomena within the world of education (understood as a separate domain from other human activities such as medicine or sport) is how the given language already structures our understanding of the phenomena that occur. For example, the present inquiry aims at a subset of education named “teaching” where “teaching” and “teachers” are presupposed as opposites to “learning” and “learners.” The dichotomy exists in other terms as well: instructor and student, professor and undergraduate, educator and pupil. Even while we strive for student- or learner-centred education/teaching/learning we are still, at a fundamental level, assuming and enacting a dichotomy between teacher and learner. There are languages, however, that do not make the distinction as black and white as English does between the verbs *to teach* and *to learn*. Therefore, language, in the terminology of the present inquiry, frames a world of available (visible, describable) phenomena. But it must be recognized that to some extent these phenomena can be blurred.

All this is to indicate that if the present inquiry was aimed at approaching the question of Being in teaching, then the next iteration could approach the question of Being in *learning*, or as a student. The distinctions called upon in the present inquiry might be useful to incorporate into the question of Being in learning, but others may be more fitting. From my own teaching, I have found that calculative and meditative thinking, the distinction Heidegger makes within the context of *Gelassenheit*, to be a useful pathway to walk with students. In a semi-abstract manner Heidegger’s various descriptions of “the way” or “pathways” have also provided an approach to learning that
offers greater ontological possibilities than more traditionally epistemologically-based pedagogical approaches.

To complete the relationship of teacher and learner we arrive at the to-be-learned, the subject matter, content area, or discipline. What might the question of Being in a subject matter look and feel like? The brief sketching of the conceptualization of teaching as worlding in Chapter 4 was only a first step in preparation for this suggested pathway. Heidegger’s distinctions related to history would be influential here. Heidegger approaches the study and grasping of history from within an ontological difference. History can be heard in two ways: (1) in the ontic sense as a story of events, names, and dates of things that have been and (2) as the ontological happening that marks the manner in which a people or nation understand, enact, and embody a dispensation of Being. Not surprisingly, Heidegger dismisses as superficial the former grasping of history in favour of the latter. This distinction could be integrated as a pathway into the question of Being in a subject matter or curriculum. At the risk of sounding Heideggerian, memorizing the periodic tables and its developmental history does not truly encapsulate what it means to be a scientist. Better still, it does not ask into the Being of the scientific subject matter. For Heidegger, the question of Being of a curriculum or discipline would require a type of groundwork that takes account of the foundational assumptions made of and about Being and beings.

A final trajectory could include engaging further in a phenomenology of the places and spaces of teaching and learning. In Chapters 4 and 5 we only intimated about Heidegger’s phenomenological account of spatiality in Being and Time. Heidegger’s other works related to this topic (e.g., Building Dwelling Thinking) further develop the Being of place and space, albeit overly anthropomorphic. As a supplement, the work of one of Heidegger’s students could be called upon to supplement. Otto Bollnow, a German philosopher of existentialism and pedagogy, wrote on a large number of subjects outside this area including spatiality. In 2011 his text Human Space appeared for the first time in English. In the text, Bollnow traces a phenomenology of human spatiality that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries to include anthropology, psychology, and architecture. How might the question of Being approach the site of teaching and learning? How does spatiality inform (or transform) the physical
contexts of teaching and learning? How might moving beyond the walls of the classroom affect teaching and learning? These questions would guide this future direction of thinking into the question of Being in the spatiality of education and are of considerable interest at present within educational scholarship and practice. These trajectories of future thinking do not exhaust the possibilities of continued inquiry, but only indicate four pathways among many that remain open for exploration.

**Concluding Thoughts**

In this final chapter a summary of the present inquiry was offered followed by an indication of the limitations and gaps left outstanding. A number of possible future pathways for thinking and research were named and described as directly following and as a result of the analyses completed in the present study. The present inquiry does not offer solutions in the traditional sense but rather traces a path that opens and keeps in tension the question of Being in teaching in order to support further study. In this manner, six pathways were offered in order to illuminate the question of Being in teaching: my personal background and history, Being as Being, phenomenological ontology, world, attunement, and the danger of Enframing.

The thrust of this inquiry is personal, it is self-transformative. It is an attempt to approach an understanding of the lived experience of teaching radically, such that I am able to look my colleagues in the eye when we speak about the profession of teaching. Understanding the Being of teaching grounds the profession as a profession that is highly valued and deserving of respect because those who call themselves “teacher” embrace and take a stand for themselves and their profession. What does it mean to be a teacher? What ways of Being ground good teaching? These are not questions to be answered but questions to be lived.
References

Works by Martin Heidegger


*Frühe Schriften* (GA 1). No English translation available, original work published 1978.


Other Works Cited


Appendix A.

Heidegger and National Socialism


Appendix B.

Heidegger’s Teaching Activities

Developing an accurate timeline of Heidegger’s teaching is challenging for at least two reasons. First, records of announced courses and seminars are spotty at best and, second, regularly the course that Heidegger announced at the beginning of term to the administration ended up not being the course he taught at all. The most up-to-date listing of Heidegger’s teaching activity from 1915 to 1930 is chronicled in English and German by Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan in *Becoming Heidegger: On the trail of his early occasional writings, 1910-1927* (pp. xl to lvii). A truncated listing of this period is listed below on the basis of this work. The most complete list of Heidegger’s teaching activity in German is included in William Richardson’s *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (pp. 663-671). Building primarily from the Gesamtausgabe and Richardson’s text, I have provided a draft of Heidegger’s teaching from 1930 to 1973. As one trajectory of my future scholarship will include exploring Heidegger as a teacher, this list will continually be updated and revised.

**Heidegger’s Teaching Activities up to 1930**
*(developed from Kisiel & Sheehan, 2007, pp. xl to lvii)*

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**University of Freiberg, Heidegger as Private Instructor**

WS 1915-16
Course The Basic Trends of Ancient and Scholastic Philosophy, 2hr.
Seminar On Kant’s *Prolegomena*

SS 1916
Course German Idealism, 2hr.
Seminar Practicum on Texts from Aristotle’s Logical Writings (with E. Krebs)

WS 1916-17
Course Basic Questions of Logic, 2hr.

SS 1917<br><sup>55</sup>
Course Hegel, 2hr.

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<sup>55</sup> Although the courses for SS 1917, WS 1917-18, SS 1918, and WS 1918-19 are announced they were never taught due to Heidegger’s war service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Plato, 2hr.</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Lotze and the Development of Modern Logic</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1918-19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lotze and the Development of Modern Logic</td>
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<td>KNS 1919</td>
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<td>The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews, 2hr. [GA 56/57]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS 1919</td>
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<td>Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value, 1hr. [GA 56/57]</td>
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<td>SS 1919</td>
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<td>On the Essence of the University and Academic Studies, 1hr. [GA 56/57]</td>
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<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Introduction to Phenomenology in Connection with Descartes’s <em>Meditations</em></td>
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<td>WS 1919-20</td>
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<td>Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 2hr. [GA 58]</td>
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<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Practicum in Connection with Natorp’s <em>General Psychology</em></td>
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<td>Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to Aristotle: Ontology and Logic, 4hr. [GA 62]</td>
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<td>Practicum: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to Aristotle (<em>Nichomachean Ethics</em> VI, <em>De anima</em>, <em>Metaphysics</em> VII) (private, 2hr)</td>
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<td><strong>SS 1923</strong></td>
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<td>Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity, 1 hr. [GA 63]</td>
<td>Phenomenological Practicum for Beginners in Connection with Aristotle’s <em>Nichomachean Ethics</em></td>
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<td>Colloquium on the Theological Foundations of Kant’s <em>Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone</em> (selected texts; for advanced students; with Ebbinghaus)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Practicum: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to Aristotle (continued from WS 1922-23)</td>
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**University of Marburg, Heidegger as Associate Professor**

<p>| <strong>WS 1923-24</strong> |                                                                 |                                                                 |
| <strong>SS 1924</strong>    |                                                                 |                                                                 |
| <strong>WS 1924-25</strong> |                                                                 |                                                                 |
|                | Interpretation of Platonic Dialogues (<em>Sophist, Philebus</em>), 4hr. [GA 19] | Practicum on the Ontology of the Middle Ages (Thomas, <em>On Being and Essence</em>, ...) |</p>
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<td>History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena Toward the Phenomenology of History and Nature, 4hr. [GA 20]</td>
<td>Beginners' Practicum in Connection with Descartes' <em>Meditations</em></td>
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<td>WS 1925-26</td>
<td>Logic, 4hr. [GA 21]</td>
<td>Beginners Phenomenological Practicum (Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>)</td>
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<td>SS 1926</td>
<td>Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy, 4hr. [GA 22]</td>
<td>Practicum on History and Historical Knowledge in Connection with J. B. Droysen's <em>Ground-Plan for Historical Science</em></td>
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<td>History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant, 4hr. [GA 23]</td>
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<td>SS 1927</td>
<td>The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 4hr. [GA 24]</td>
<td>Advanced Students: The Ontology of Aristotle and Hegel's <em>Logic</em></td>
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<td>SS 1928</td>
<td>Logic, 4hr. [GA 26]</td>
<td>Einfuehrung in das akademische Studium, 1hr. [GA 28]</td>
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<td>Phenomenological Practicum on Aristotle, <em>Physics III</em></td>
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### University of Freiburg, Heidegger as Professor

**WS 1928-29**

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**SS 1929**

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<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Advanced: On the Essence of Life with Particular Regard to Aristotle’s <em>De anima</em>, <em>De animalium motione</em>, and <em>De animalium incessu</em></td>
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<td>Seminar</td>
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<td>Augustine, <em>Confessions</em> XI (on Time)</td>
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<td>Seminar</td>
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### Heidegger's Teaching Activities from 1930 to 1973
(developed from Richardson, pp. 663-671)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Course Description</th>
<th>Reading Materials</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS 1931</td>
<td>Aristotle's <em>Metaphysics</em> Theta 1-3 On the Essence and Actuality of Force [GA 33]</td>
<td>Beginners: Kant, <em>Progress in Metaphysics</em> [GA 84.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS 1931-32</td>
<td>The Essence of Truth [GA 34]</td>
<td>Kant, <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em> [GA 84.1]</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS 1932</td>
<td>The Beginning of Western Philosophy: Interpretation of Anaximander and Parmenides [GA 35]</td>
<td>Intermediate: Plato, <em>Work in Greek</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1932-33</td>
<td>No teaching</td>
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</table>
| SS 1933  | The Fundamental Question of Philosophy (Essence of Truth: The Cave) | Advanced: The Principle of Contradiction  
Seminar: Lower: The Concept of Science |
| WS 1933-34 | The Essence of Truth [GA 36/37] | Advanced: Fichte's *Doctrine from 1794*  
Seminar: Lower and Intermediate: Leibniz, *Monadology*  
Seminar: Complete Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*  
| SS 1934  | Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language [GA 38] | |
SS 1935
Course        An Introduction to Metaphysics [GA 40]
Seminar      Advanced: Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*

WS 1935-36
Course        What is a thing? (Basic Questions of Metaphysics) [GA 41]
Colloquium    Overcoming Aesthetics in the Question of Art (with Bauch)
Seminar      Intermediate: Leibniz's concept of the world and of German Idealism [GA 84.1]
Seminar      Advanced: Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*

SS 1936
Course        Schelling's *Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* [GA 42]
Seminar      Advanced: Kant, *Critique of Judgement*

WS 1936-37
Course        Nietzsche, *The Will to Power as Art* [GA 6.1/43]
Seminar      Lower: Selected pieces from Schiller's philosophical writings about the arts [Not in GA]

SS 1937
Course        Nietzsche's Fundamental Metaphysical position in Occidental Thinking: the doctrine of *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same* [GA 6.1/44]
Seminar      Practicum in Connection with the Course [GA 87]

WS 1937-38
Course        Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic” [GA 45]
Seminar      Practicum in Connection with the Course

SS 1938
Working holiday

WS 1938-39
Course        Introduction to Philosophy [GA 46] (untranslated)
Seminar      Lower: Philosophical and scientific concept formation

SS 1939
Course        Nietzsche's *The Will to Power as Knowledge* [GA 6.1/47]
Seminar      Advanced: On the essence of language [GA 85]
WS 1939-40
Course    Art and Technology
Seminar   Intermediate and advanced: Hegel's Metaphysics of History

I. Trimester, 1940
Course    Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* (II: *The European Nihilism*) [GA 48]
Seminar   Aristotle, The Essence of Truth

3. Trimester, 1940
WS 1940-41
Course    Basic Questions of Philosophy
Seminar   Advanced: Leibniz, *Monadology*

I. Trimester, 1941
Course    The Metaphysics of German Idealism: Schelling, *Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom* [GA 49]
Seminar   Exercises on the beginning of Western Philosophy

SS 1941
Course    Basic Concepts [GA 51]
Seminar   Beginners: Kant, *Prolegomena*.  
          Advanced: o. Angabe

WS 1941-42
Course    Nietzsche’s Metaphysics (announced but not delivered)
Course    Hölderlin’s Hymn “Andenken” [GA 52]
Seminar   Beginners: Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*
Seminar   Advanced: Plato, *Seventh Letter*

SS 1942
Course    Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister" [GA 53]
Seminar   Beginners: Basic concepts of Kant’s Metaphysics  
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<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Course</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WS 1942-43</td>
<td>Course: Parmenides [GA 53]</td>
<td>Seminar: Advanced: Continuation of SS 1942</td>
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<td>WS 1943-44</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1944-45</td>
<td>Course: Introduction To Philosophy -- Thinking and Poetizing (cancelled after the third hour on 8 November) [GA 50]</td>
<td>Seminar: Leibniz, <em>The 24 Theses</em> (discontinued after the first hour)</td>
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<td>1946-51</td>
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<td>Banned from teaching</td>
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**University of Freiburg, Heidegger as Professor Emeritus**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semester</th>
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<tr>
<td>SS 1951</td>
<td>Seminar (priv.): Exercises in Reading: Aristotle’s <em>Physic</em> II, I and III, 1-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1951-52</td>
<td>Course: What is called thinking? [GA 8]</td>
<td>Seminar (priv.): Exercises in Reading: Aristotle’s <em>Metaphysics</em>, IV and IX, 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS 1952</td>
<td>Course: What is called thinking?</td>
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<td>Term</td>
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<td>WS 1956-57</td>
<td>Exercise Hegel's <em>Logic</em>: On the beginning of science</td>
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<td>SS 1957</td>
<td>Principles of Thinking, lecture [GA 79]</td>
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<td>WS 1957-58</td>
<td>The nature of language, lecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>WS 1966-67</td>
<td>Seminar Heraclitus (with E. Fink) [GA 15]</td>
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**Unofficial or External Teaching/Lectures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Course</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>On the Essence of Truth</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Bremen Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is [GA 79]</td>
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<td>1949</td>
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<td>1964-66</td>
<td>Zollikon Seminars [GA 89]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966-73</td>
<td>Four Seminars (Le Thor, Zahringen) [GA 15]</td>
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