Re-Defining Revolution:
A Case Study of Women and Graffiti in Egypt

by

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B.A., Ryerson University, 2012

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Abstract

Like any social phenomenon, revolutions are gendered. The male tilt of revolutionary processes and their histories has produced a definition of revolution that consistently fails women. This thesis aims to redefine revolution to incorporate women’s visions of societal transformation and the full achievement of their rights and freedoms. I argue that approaches to women’s revolutionary experiences are enriched by focusing on the roles of culture, consciousness, and unconventional revolutionary texts. Egypt is examined as a case study with a focus on the nation’s long history of women’s activism that took on new forms in the wave of socio-political upheaval since 2011. Using interdisciplinary, visual analysis, I examine graffiti created by women, or that depict women between 2011 and 2015 to reveal how gender was publicly re-imagined during a period of flux for Egyptian society. The historical and visual analysis contribute to a new definition of revolution, one that strives to achieve the total transformation of society by disrupting gendered consciousness to finally secure rights and freedoms for all.

Keywords: revolution, women’s rights, Egypt, graffiti, feminism
Dedication

To women who imagine and create a better future.
Acknowledgements

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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCAF</td>
<td>Supreme Council of Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFU</td>
<td>Egyptian Feminist Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPD</td>
<td>United Nations International Conference on Population and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCW</td>
<td>National Council for Women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>attitudes and assessments, awareness of identity, and conceptions of how the world works and why, and the sense of power and possibility (Selbin, 2010, p. 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist movement</td>
<td>a subset of women’s movements that seek to alter existing patriarchal power arrangements based on male domination and female subordination (Beckwith, 2000 in Kaufman &amp; Williams, 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>“used to denote the meanings given to masculine and feminine, asymmetrical power relations between the sexes, and the ways that men and women are differently situated in and affected by social processes” (Moghadam, 2013, p. 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender system</td>
<td>“a cultural construct that is itself constituted by social structure. That is to say, gender systems are differently manifested in kinship-ordered, agrarian, developing, industrialized, and post-industrial settings. The type of political regime and state ideology further influence the gender system” (Moghadam, 2013, p. 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic feminism</td>
<td>in Egypt, mainly concerned with areas of discourse and religious knowledge, critiquing patriarchal interpretations and advocating feminist justice within and through Islam (Abou-Bakr, 2015, p. 182).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamist women’s movement</td>
<td>advocates for the principle of gender complementarity within a patriarchal framework and promotes the notion that Islam gives women their rights. This approach is taken by the Muslim Sisters (Sorbera, 2013, p. 24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mural</td>
<td>a large-scale graffiti piece, done top to bottom on a wall; usually a large production involving one or two pieces and usually some form of characters (“Graffiti Glossary”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 as an Islamist political, religious, and social movement and is Egypt’s largest political opposition group (Povey, 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Sisters</td>
<td>the female wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative</td>
<td>“an ordered sequence of events and actions located in its own time-span” (Parker, 1999, p. 112).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmovement</td>
<td>the collective actions of non collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations (Bayat, 2013, p. 14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriarchy</td>
<td>a hierarchical structure organizing male “power and protection in a system of inequality sustained by law, historical custom, religious interpretation […] utilized to maintain political hegemony and class disparity” (Badran, 2014, p. 47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piece</td>
<td>a type of graffiti, also called a painting, that must have at least three colors (“Graffiti Glossary”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cultures of creation</td>
<td>“cultures of opposition that add a positive vision of a better world, an alternative to strive for to improve or replace what exists” (Foran, 2014, p. 9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political cultures of opposition</td>
<td>“the complicated and creative mixtures of diffuse cultural idioms, more formally articulated ideologies, and historical memories that revolutionary actors draw upon to interpret their circumstances and mobilize their forces. Community concerns are put in everyday terms such as fairness, justice, dignity, or freedom, or as concretely as ‘Bread, land, and liberty,’ ‘Death to the Shah,’ or ‘Patria libre o muerte!’” (Foran, 2001, p. 7, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary narrative</td>
<td>“the form within which the events and actions that constitute one revolution or another are interpreted and acted upon. It frames the elements that determine and interpret any given revolution, including its relationship with other historical events. These elements are: the potential for irreversible change in the direction of some end-state profoundly different from the given present; the possibility of power to initiate or control such change; the expectation that one or more agents exist with power and intentions as to the future: and an overarching frame of historical time which provides both normative and predictive indicators for the anticipated future” (Parker, 1999, p. 112-113).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular feminism</td>
<td>advocates for women’s freedom, equality, justice and dignity and promotes the notion that these goals can be achieved only within the framework of a state that is democratic and without religious basis (Sorbera, 2013, p. 29).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street art</td>
<td>a type of graffiti that includes stencils, stickers, paste-ups, classical mural paint brush, fake ads and urban furniture hijacks (“Graffiti Types”).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tag

the most basic graffiti of an artist's name in either spray paint or marker (“Graffiti Types”).

Throw up

a type of graffiti normally painted very quickly with two or three colors, sacrificing aesthetics for speed. Throw ups can also be outlined on a surface with one color (“Graffiti Types,” 2011).

Women’s movements

“social movements where women, organized explicitly as such, are the major actors and leaders and make gendered identity claims the basis for their actions. Women’s movements can consist of antifeminist and right-wing women’s movements. These types of women’s movements address women’s issues and ‘women’s gendered experiences’ but do not necessarily seek to change the patriarchal structure of society” (Beckwith, 2000 in Kaufman & Williams, 2010, p. 28-29).
Chapter 1.

Introduction

Every day, women around the world participate in an ongoing fight to secure their rights and freedoms. These women share determination to be recognized in their humanity as social, political, and economic actors. While significant strides have been made by women and their allies, patriarchy remains intricately rooted in many corners of the globe. Gendered violence and discrimination often thwart the realization of women’s full potential. In 2012, Human Rights Watch referred to women’s historic struggle against these obstacles as an “unfinished revolution” (Worden, 2012).

Throughout history, women’s unfinished revolution has been offered moments of hope through intersections with other revolutions pursuing rights and freedoms for all. Although women had to disguise themselves as men to join in the American Revolution, female revolutionaries openly joined movements in France and Haiti (Ulrich, 2007; Rowbotham, 2013). Women carried weaponry in the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and in Vietnam in the 1960s, and revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala saw female guerrilla fighters contribute to the overthrow of the state (Kampwirth, 2004; Ulrich, 2007). In the 2011 uprisings against President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian women across classes and religions rallied in the streets, acting as citizen journalists, and calling for radical change through social media (Said, Meari, & Pratt, 2015a).

In addition to participating in mass movements, women frequently pursue alternative routes to revolutionary change through nonviolent, independent organizing. In these groups created by and for women, critiques of gender norms and the adoption of new social roles are often encouraged (Randall, 1992; Sorbera, 2013). These organizational methods inspire many women to make choices about religious practices,
the workforce, the legal system, and their personal lives to create small but transformative cracks in patriarchal power structures (el-Saadawi, 1997; Bayat, 2013).

However, even when waves of change reveal a new landscape where rights and freedoms have the potential to thrive, women rarely reap the full benefits. There is evidence of this inequality both in the immediate aftermath of revolutions and in the long term transformation of the state (West & Blumberg, 1990; Andrijasevic et al., 2014). *The Unfinished Revolution* reveals that the struggle to fully achieve women’s rights and freedoms continues in the United States, China, South Africa, and Nicaragua – countries that all experienced at least one socio-political revolution in the past 250 years (Worden, 2012). Although Egypt and other Arab Spring countries loomed large as symbols of hope during revolutionary uprisings in 2010 and 2011, many women continue to face systemic discrimination and violence, reminding us that the movement for women’s rights is still necessary and has not yet become a global revolution (Worden, 2012).

The persistence of gender inequality in post-revolution societies leads to a crucial question: is a definition of revolution that does not include the overthrow of patriarchy good enough? This question and increasing interest in how women contribute to revolutionary change has inspired scholars to call for a new definition of revolution that includes a more diverse range of methods and timelines for societal transformation (Bayat, 2013; Foran, 2014, Andrijasevic et al., 2014). Requiring further analysis is the distinct position women hold in revolution by simultaneously pursuing the socio-political revolution at hand and the ongoing struggle to secure their full rights and freedoms. This is a particularly timely pursuit given that even the most recent revolutionary movements failed to end the marginalization of women and girls, continuing a troubling trend in the history of revolutions (Worden, 2012).

Egypt is an excellent case study for investigating women’s distinct position in revolution since Egyptian women have a long history of organizing alongside political upheaval throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. Women’s mobilization reached a new peak in the protests that led to Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, a movement that reinvigorated conversations about what revolution looks like in the 21st century (Foran, 2014; Sorbera, 2014a). The surge of cultural production in Egypt after 2011 also offers an
opportunity to look beyond conventional sources used in the study of revolutions, an essential step to gaining new understandings of societal transformation (Badran, 2014; Sami, 2015). A wave of graffiti was part of the cultural outpouring, colouring the walls and streets of cities across Egypt. Graffiti is an unconventional but powerful text in the study of women’s revolution experiences, as the art form allows for gender discourses and representations to be re-written in public space and, subsequently, public consciousness (Sami, 2015). This thesis analyzes Egyptian graffiti to explore representations of women during Egypt’s recent period of flux. While many articles have been written about women and Egyptian graffiti, a comprehensive analysis of both graffiti by women and depicting women has yet to be explored with the aim to rebalance the gendered definition of revolution.1

Based on my review of the literature on revolutions and the case study of Egypt, I assert that the term “revolution” is indeed at a definitional turning point. To contribute to the process of re-defining revolution, this thesis explores how to better integrate women’s visions of societal transformation and the full achievement of their rights and freedoms. According to Randall (1992), incorporating women’s perspectives in revolutionary movements and the related literature can renew understandings of what type of societal transformation is possible. Building on Randall’s claim, I argue that better integrating women in revolutionary processes would produce the total transformation of society sought by revolutions throughout history.

Following the lead of other Western feminists studying the global south (Kaufman & Williams, 2010; Jackson, 2015), I acknowledge that writing about Egypt has enabled me to confront my own preconceptions about women in the Arab World, Islamic feminism and Islamist women’s movements. I do not wish to reify binaries, but rather to emphasize the valuable learning that takes place when false divides are broken down. Although I will refer to “women,” or “feminists,” or “Egyptian women,” this is not to suggest that women are a monolithic group with uniform experiences and opinions. I recognize that women take on various roles and positions within their societies and in revolutionary movements. I will also refer to “patriarchy” using Margot Badran’s (2014) definition: a hierarchical structure

1 For research on women and graffiti in Egypt, see Gröndahl (2012), Abaza (2013); Munaff (2014), Nicoarea (2014), Lisiak (2015), Sami (2015), and Bardhan & Foss (forthcoming).
organizing male “power and protection in a system of inequality sustained by law, historical custom, religious interpretation [...] utilized to maintain political hegemony and class disparity (p. 47). I acknowledge that both men and women experience the oppression and benefits of patriarchal power to varying degrees depending on context-specific intersections between geography, race, class, sexual orientation, and religion (Mohanty, 2003; Jackson, 2015). Women’s varied experiences with patriarchy will be the focus of my analysis. In the interests of concision and clarity, I use general terms in an attempt to draw out the broad issues and interests that are present in the relevant literature and that are pertinent to the arguments of this thesis. I am aware that to some degree these generalizations obscure the complexities of men’s and women’s realities.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, I contextualize the need for a new definition of revolution by exploring history and theory that reveal how the term has come to encompass a variety of political activities, including recent movements for societal transformation that challenge conventional notions of what revolution looks like. Critiques of mainstream theoretical frameworks are investigated, with specific focus on the criticisms offered by feminists and gender studies scholars. Since literature on revolution often falls short on the integration of women’s perspectives, I close the chapter by exploring theory on graffiti to establish the art form’s function as an alternative revolutionary text.

The history and theory of revolution are brought to life in Chapter 3 with a historical analysis of the Egyptian women’s movement from 1919 to 2015. Although women participated in various forms of political activity throughout Egypt’s history, many scholars examining the Egyptian women’s movement begin their analysis with women’s participation in the 1919 revolution and the subsequent rise of feminist activism (Al-Ali, 2002).
Chapter 4 aims to demonstrate that the analysis of revolutionary processes and outcomes can benefit from considering creative, alternative texts that capture facets of women’s experiences not documented elsewhere. The chapter explores the findings from a chronological analysis of 266 images of graffiti created by women or that depicted women during Egypt’s period of instability between 2011 and 2015. Integrating history and theory from the previous chapters, I examine how the graffiti tell the stories of where the 2011 revolution came from, who is a part of it, and where it is going in regards to women’s rights and freedoms. The transformative potential of artistic activity and new revolutionary perspectives sources is captured beautifully in the words of Egyptian feminist scholar Nawal el-Saadawi (1997):

The power of creative action [...] lies in its ability to implant the seeds of revolution in the minds and hearts of oppressed men, women and children. This revolution might not materialize in the form of a popular movement capable of changing the system within their age or lifetime, but at least the seeds will have been sown and as surely as the sun rises from the east, they will ultimately flourish (p. 215).

A goal central to this thesis is to demonstrate the power of creative action by exploring how the seeds of revolution were planted in the minds and hearts of Egyptians during the past century, and how those seeds came to flourish in tags, murals, and stencils of women across the walls of Egypt since 2011. In doing so, I hope to contribute to literature documenting the determination and artistry of the ongoing revolution for women’s rights and freedoms.

In the concluding chapter, I offer three key findings that encourage re-defining revolution to include the types of action and timelines that can generate transformational social change for women.
Chapter 2.

Defining Revolution

When the term revolution is used, often a stock set of images come to mind: the storming of the Bastille in France; guerrilla uprisings against Latin American dictators; streets crowded with protesters in the Middle East. While the presence of mass movements demanding change unifies these images, the historical trajectories, motivations, and outcomes of each revolution are unique. Due to the multiple manifestations of “revolution,” it is important to review how the term has come to define what Goldstone (2001) describes as an increasingly diverse set of political activities.

This chapter has four objectives: to explore the development of the term “revolution” throughout history; to provide an overview of theories on revolution; to examine how revolutionary movements and scholarship on revolution consistently neglect women; and, lastly, to investigate what graffiti offers as an alternative text on revolution. As ripples of recent revolutions continue to shape contemporary politics, I argue we are at a turning point for the definition of revolution that requires reconsidering the methods, actors, and timelines included. Given the ongoing struggles for women’s rights after recent attempts at societal transformation, it is a timely inquiry to explore what revolution means, how it is differently experienced by women, and how women’s revolutionary experiences are documented. The opportunity to re-define revolution is valuable since there is a consensus among scholars of feminism and gender studies that better including women revolutionary processes and scholarship on revolution could renew understandings of what type of societal transformation is possible (Randall, 1992; Moghadam, 1997; Andrijasevic et al., 2014).
A Brief History of Revolution

Revolution as Cyclical

Influential sociologist Jack Goldstone (2014) traces revolutionary activities back to the first recorded popular revolution in Egypt. A popular uprising of the poor ended the reign of Pepi II and marked the end of the Old Kingdom in the twenty-second century BCE (Goldstone, 2014). However, Goldstone (2014) and historian Reinhart Koselleck (2004) both argue it was Aristotle and Plato who first fully conceived the notion of revolution in political terms. The two philosophers shared an observation that changes in political power resulted from social injustice and the lack of a constitution that balanced wealth and authority among the population (Goldstone, 2014). Goldstone (2014) explains that with the alternation of power in mind, Aristotle used “revolution” in terms of its Latin astronomical meaning, which Koselleck (2004) defines as “a return, a rotation of movement back to a point of departure” (p. 45). Similarly, Hinduism and Confucianism explained revolution as part of a cycle akin to the circle of life from birth to death (Tétreault, 1994). Thus, in the ancient world, any changes in politics were considered part of a cycle of recurring phases.4

This cyclical notion of revolution was demonstrated in many rotations in power up until the English Revolution (1640-1660) and American Revolution (1765-1783), when practices of restoration were met with emerging ideas about societal transformation. English revolutionaries worked to re-establish “the true constitution” by restoring the balance of power between the king and Parliament while producing new imaginings of society as evidenced in the ground-breaking political theory that emerged (Arendt, 1963; Koselleck 2004, p. 46).5 Just over a hundred years later, the American colonies won eight years of war with Britain and transformed the political system: a representative republic was established with the American constitution in 1788 and, ultimately, set the example for constitutional revolutions elsewhere (Parker, 1999; Goldstone, 2014).

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4 For explorations of revolutions in the ancient world and during the Renaissance and Reformation, see Goldstone (2014) and Koselleck (2004).

5 Influential works by John Milton, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke were produced following the English Revolution (Goldstone, 2014).
Revolution as Transformative

Although the American Revolution impressively produced a new political system, the French went a step further to restructure their entire society (Koselleck, 2004; Goldstone, 2014). Historians (Parker, 1999; Koselleck, 2004) and revolution scholars (Tétreault, 1994; Goldstone, 2001, 2014) describe the French Revolution (1789-1799) as a turning point in understanding revolution due to the total transformation of economic, social and political structures that resulted from peasant mobilization against the elite. Political upheaval was no longer understood as part of a natural and given cycle. Rather, revolution became something that social actors could create and enact to break with history and begin a new era (Arendt, 1963; Parker, 1999; Koselleck, 2004). At the time of the French revolution, Parker (1999) argues France held an exceptional position to change the world due to the nation’s closeness to the heart of the global power system. The French set the prototype for transformative revolution that continues to inform many contemporary uprisings and theoretical approaches.

Renowned political theorist Hannah Arendt (1963) analyzes the French Revolution’s perceived break with history in terms of “the problem of beginning,” a challenge she finds is central to revolution (p.13). The problem of beginning refers to the fact that revolutionaries must collectively imagine and create a new society where all citizens can realize freedom and liberty (Arendt, 1963). Freedom exists when all people are able to start something new through “participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm” (Arendt, 1963, p. 25). Thus, revolutions must initiate a new society where the freedom to appear and act in public space is possible for everyone. However, Arendt (1963) notes the pursuit of that new society is part of a greater, ongoing historical narrative. Arendt argues that revolution is a “force of history,” and that the goals of liberation and freedom are “selfsame and perpetual” (p. 44). While the French revolutionaries confronted the challenge of imagining a new society in 1799, Arendt suggests their actions were part of the ongoing historical imperative to achieve rights and freedoms for all.

Expansion of Revolution

Keeping with the notion of historical forces, Arendt defined the 19th century as being in a state of “permanent revolution” (p. 44). Revolutions spread across Europe in
the 19th century, rippling out from the dramatic change that swept France. By the end of World War I, with the exception of Russia, every state in Europe had become a parliamentary, constitutional regime. Communist revolutions were executed in Russia (1917), China (1949), and Cuba (1959) in defiance of constitutional republics that were seen to transfer authority to new elites, rather than redistributing power among the people as promised (Parker 1999; Goldstone, 2014).

Following World War II, the number of anti-dictatorial and anti-colonial revolutions taking place in developing countries necessitated a redefinition of revolution that recognized models for change outside the Western world (Ray & Korteweg, 1999; Foran, 2005). Sociologist John Foran (2005) proposes that the ways anti-dictatorial and anti-colonial revolutions manifested in developing countries were distinct and reflected different power dynamics than Western states. Though not positioned at the heart of the world system like the French, Foran finds similar modes of social revolution were pursued in Latin America and the Middle East, where local dictators were toppled to bring previously excluded groups into power.6

Foran argues that anti-colonial revolutions were distinct in that they targeted independence from a foreign power occupying the country rather than overthrowing a local dictator. In The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon (1961) articulates the depth of transformation in anti-colonial revolution as “the replacing of a certain <<species>> of men by another <<species>> of men,” a change that is brought forth “in the consciousness and in the lives of the men and women who are colonized” (p. 29). Fanon illuminates a new type of transformation that begins as a deep shift in collective consciousness among the colonized, the power of which ultimately overcomes oppressive foreign rulers to produce a new society.7 Egypt experienced its own anti-colonial revolution against the British from 1919-1922, a key event in the nation’s history that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

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The later decades of the 20th century saw continued expansion of revolutionary activities and objectives. Guerrilla tactics characterized revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Chiapas as small groups of mobile fighters engaged in short, pitched battles against powerful governments (Kampwirth, 2004). Contrastingly, demonstrations and marches produced relatively non-violent transitions to democracy in the anti-communist revolutions in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Color Revolutions and the anti-apartheid revolution in South Africa (Goldfarb 1992, Diamond & Plattner 1993 in Goldstone, 2001). Distinct methods and goals shaped each revolution, whether violent, non-violent, anti-communist, anti-dictatorial, or anti-apartheid. Although expanding beyond the French prototype, new manifestations of societal transformation similarly aimed to initiate societies where all citizens could realize their rights and freedoms.

Before discussing the most recent transformations, it is worth pausing to consider how centuries of “perpetual” revolutionary activity have influenced understandings of revolution. Hank Johnston (2009) articulates the benefits and pitfalls of linking such diverse forms of political upheaval when he states that:

Comparing revolutions, suggesting they descend from one another, provides context, points to the parties most likely to be involved, suggests causes and consequences as well as interests and goals, and highlights the issues and dynamics at play. And yet doing so ignores not only matters of time, place and culture, but also the change inevitable over so many generations (e.g.) Nicaragua 1979 as iteration of Cuba 1959 as tied to Russia 1917 as update of France 1789 (p. 79).

Although placed under the same “revolution” umbrella, distinct contexts and tipping points shape how any given society transforms, and the significance of that transformation over time. The process of comparing and linking revolutionary movements can muddle those important historical differences. By the end of the 20th century, a wide variety of events and understandings were configured within scholarship on revolution, and the definition expanded to the point of becoming a nebulous and imprecise term.

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8 Goldstone (2014) describes the Color Revolutions as those where members of the opposition adopted colored symbols, such as the yellow ribbons worn in the Philippines (1986) and the orange ribbons worn in the Ukraine (2004) (p. 105). Goldstone suggests anti-communist revolutions in the USSR and Eastern Europe were similar to the Color Revolutions in their use of non-violent resistance.
New Transformations

In the 21st century, revolutionary activity continues to take on new forms in the face of intensified transnational forces like globalization, economic downturn, and political disenchantment (Foran, 2014). For some scholars, there is a division in how to understand societal transformation in this new context. On one hand, historian Noel Parker (1999) finds more recent revolutions do not follow a clear historical process, making their meaning and role less obvious. On the other hand, Foran highlights three case studies since the year 2000 that do diverge from revolutionary processes of the past while demonstrating distinct and discernable paths to societal transformation. Firstly, the Latin American Pink Tide nations used electoral politics to achieve power. Secondly, the Occupy Movement created power at the local level while pursuing global change without the typical revolutionary goal of overtaking the state. Thirdly, Tunisia and Egypt exemplified creative occupation of public space that forced out authoritarian regimes.9

The reality of recent societal transformations seems to be somewhere between Parker and Foran. While electoral politics fit into a more conventional path to change, both the Occupy Movement and upheaval in Tunisia and Egypt received attention for straying from a conventional revolutionary path. Both movements were noted by Bayat (2013) and Foran (2014) for the occupation of public space, the use of non-ideological language, and the embrace of transnational networks and grassroots mobilization through social media. The unconventional methods and non-hierarchical organizing strategies of these two movements are certainly less familiar to scholars of revolution. Nevertheless, Foran demonstrates those new approaches do in fact take on recognizable paths to revolutionary transformation: electoral change, the pursuit of power by excluded social groups, and the removal of local dictators.

In Life as Politics, Asef Bayat (2013) suggests revisiting our understanding of revolutions to consider a new aim: not to challenge the global system, but to negotiate with it (p. 233). Negotiation implies a gradual, long term approach to revolutionary transformation that is echoed in recent terminology such as “radical social change” (Foran, 2014). It is worth noting that scholars debate whether these three recent cases were revolutions, social movements, or new forms of collective action. For further reading, see Zúquete (2011), Mason (2013), and Tarrow (2013).
2014, p. 5), “nonmovements” (Bayat, 2013, p. 3), and a “slow-burn” model of change (Andrijasevic et al., 2014, p. 105). This signals a considerable turn from the more familiar notion of swift and sudden state collapse associated with the revolutionary prototype that emerged from France. Once again, revolution is in a phase of re-definition, one that may hold the potential to realize rights and freedoms for all – a transformative achievement yet to be accomplished by any revolution.

**Theories of Revolution**

The challenge of defining “revolution” is also a result of diverse theoretical approaches. Since the 1980s, Goldstone dedicated much of his research to defining four generations of theories of revolution, scholarship that shaped the work of many other experts. It is worth noting, as Foran (1993) did, that, much like categorizing and comparing revolutionary events, classifying revolutionary theories into seemingly distinct “generations” obscures complex relationships between and within schools of thought. However, Goldstone’s four generations of theory are useful for an overview that aims to provide a general understanding of different theoretical perspectives, as is the purpose of this section.

Comparative historians created the first generation of revolution theory in the 1920s and 1930s, a “natural history of revolutions,” that focused on the stages and evolution of revolutionary movements (Foran, 1993, p. 1; Goldstone, 2001). Foran (2005) states these theories largely focused on illuminating commonalities among the English, American, French and Russian cases of revolution. Criticism of the “natural history” scholarship targeted the theory’s tendency to describe revolutions, rather than explaining why they happened (Foran, 2005).

The second generation, “general theories,” emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. Reviews of the theoretical literature by Goldstone (2001) and Foran (2005) show scholars produced a number of explanations for why and when revolutions take place with

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10 For literature reviews on theories of revolution, see Foran (1993; 1997; 2005) and Goldstone (2001; 2014).
emphasis on modernization, and social psychological or structural-functional factors. Second generation scholars received criticism for poor observation and measurement of factors central to their theories, and for re-stating the obvious about the causes of revolution. Though found to hold little substantive explanatory power, the first two generations laid the foundation for more robust revolution theories to develop.

In the 1970s, structural theory advanced in the work of Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly and Jeffrey Paige, among others (Foran, 1997; Goldstone, 2001). Structural theory remains prominent in the analysis of revolution today alongside cultural theory, the fourth generation of scholarship on revolution that has been emerging in the field since the 1990s. Due to the ongoing influence of structural and cultural theories on revolution literature, the following sections will discuss the third and fourth generation of theory in detail.

Structural Theory

Structural theories of revolution focus on the relationships between units or social groups rather than the characteristics of the units or groups themselves that are typically investigated in cultural theory. Processes of interest for structural theorists include the development of unification and solidarity between groups, conflicts between classes, states, or between classes and states, exploitation of labour in conflict, commercialization of the economy, colonization, and relationships between states and the international system (Wickham-Crowley, 1997; Goldstone, 2001). The analysis of these processes can take place from the macro, world-system level to the micro level of formal organizations (Wickham-Crowley, 1997). The relationship between the state and civil society is often the level of greatest interest for the study of revolution. Prominent scholar Charles Tilly (1993) argued it was not until the French Revolution created the modern nation state that there was the capacity for fundamental re-arrangements of society and power (in Goodwin, 1997). Building on the French example, structural theorist Theda Skocpol (1979) developed an influential definition of revolution as the “rapid, basic transformations of a

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11 For reviews and examples of structural theories of revolution, see Paige (1975; 1983), Tilly (1978; 1993), Skocpol (1979), Goodwin (1997), Wickham-Crowley (1997), and Goldstone (2001; 2014).
society’s state and class structures ... accompanied and in part carried through by class-based [or mass] revolts from below” (in Wickham-Crowley, 1997, p. 47). Wickham-Crowley (1997) revised Skocpol’s “class-based” to “mass” so ethnic-based and populist uprisings could also be addressed by structural theories of revolution.

Structural theory focusing on state and civil society relationships posits that revolutionary action is a result of the practices and characteristics of the state. These practices include protecting unpopular policies, excluding mobilized groups from power, violence against mobilized movements, weak policing, failing infrastructure, and corruption (Paige, 1978 as cited in Goodwin, 1997, p. 17-19). To illustrate how these practices leave a state vulnerable to revolution, sociologist Jeff Goodwin (1997) proposes four state-based perspectives that emerge throughout structural theory literature.

The first state-based perspective is the state autonomy perspective. This approach builds on the work of Max Weber, and finds state leaders develop identities, interests, and ideologies that shift their action in directions that may be quite different from civil society or other states (Skocpol, 1979 as cited in Goodwin, 1997). The schism in action generates conflict between the state and organized groups that may lead to revolutionary movements.

Second, the state capacity perspective focuses on the material and organizational capacity of the state to fulfill political goals regardless of contention with civil society (Goodwin, 1997; Goldstone, 2014). Thus, revolution may result due to the state’s failure to fulfill their own agenda and/or from a lack of capacity to fend off revolutionary movements.

Third, the political opportunity perspective looks at how the permeability of the state provides openings for groups to influence policy or to mobilize (Goodwin, 1997; Goldstone, 2014). In an extreme case, mobilization would take the form of revolutionary action to overturn the state.

The fourth state-based perspective is the state constructionist perspective that emphasizes the way states shape the identities, social relationships, ideas, and emotions of individuals within civil society (Goodwin, 1997; Smith & Fetner, 2010). The focus for this
fourth perspective is on how the state deems justifiable certain types of collective grievances, actions, and ideas, including those aimed at revolution (Goodwin, 1997). Exploring state practices and perspectives provides insight into the complex interactions that can produce revolution.

While structural theories of revolution are rich in terms of explaining dynamics between states and civil actors and groups, in the 1980s and 1990s scholars called into question the givenness and autonomy of the state (Foran, 1993; Moghadam, 1997; Taylor, D., 1997). The rise of globalization and transnational networks since the 1970s required new articulation of the role of the nation state along with reinvigorated analysis of how revolutionaries would attempt societal transformation in that context (Goldstone, 2001; Smith & Fetner, 2010). Additionally, revolutions in the late 1970s and 1980s proved that ideology motivated actors to create change, forcing staunch structural scholars like Theda Skocpol to reconsider the notion that ideas were secondary phenomena (Reed & Foran, 2002). There was a need for scholars of revolution to pay increased attention to culture, ideology, identity, and agency. These factors were not entirely ignored by structural theorists or the previous generations of theory, but received new emphasis during the cultural turn of the 1990s.

**Cultural Theory**

Cultural theory is the emerging fourth generation of scholarship on revolution. Aiming to bridge the gaps of structural theory, cultural theorists investigate the characteristics of units or groups themselves by exploring identity, ideology, gender, networks, leadership and associated practices and systems of belief.\(^{12}\) Hank Johnston (2009), a social movement scholar, categorizes these cultural factors into three forms: ideations, artifacts, and performances. Firstly, ideations are the traditional components of culture including “values, beliefs, mentalities, social representations, habitus, [and] ideologies” (p. 8). Secondly, artifacts are objects produced by individuals and groups that exist in materiality and that remain after the “initial (cultural) behaviour” that created them, such as music, art, and literature (p. 8). Thirdly, performance is defined as “where culture

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\(^{12}\) For reviews and examples of cultural theories of revolution see Foran (1993; 1997, 2014), Moghadam (1997), Reed & Foran (2002), Johnston (2009), and Selbin (2010).
is accomplished," symbolic actions that are interpreted by the audience who witness the action (p. 8). Both state rulers and civil actors utilize these three forms of culture in various arrangements to contextualize, inspire, and justify actions (Farhi, 1988 as cited in Foran, 1997a). Analysis of cultural factors provides insight into the ways actors make sense of their revolutionary context.

Cultural factors are often employed in what scholars describe as “revolutionary narrative” (Parker, 1999; Johnston, 2009; Selbin 2010). Parker (1999) builds on the work of Paul Ricouer’s *Time and Narrative* (1984) to explore narrative as a way for human beings to make sense of the temporality of their own lives and society. To make sense of revolution, Parker (1999) explains that narrative is “the form within which the events and actions that constitute one revolution or another are interpreted and acted upon. [Narrative] frames the elements that determine and interpret any given revolution, including its relationship with other historical events” (p. 8). Actors make sense of revolutionary circumstances by constructing sequences of historical and contemporary events that generate possibilities of future improvement that they can collectively achieve (Parker, 1999). In periods of uncertainty, narrative can provide familiar meaning and purpose for individuals and movements alike.

Parker (1999) finds that while narrative does not explain why revolution happens, it has two interpretive strengths that causal explanations lack. Firstly, narrative does not require repetition or linear coherence of events to produce an explanation. Thus, it illuminates the complex ways actors experience historical events such as revolution, processes that are not always temporalized in a linear fashion. Secondly, narrative reveals the roles, hopes, and experiences unifying groups, information of great import to scholars studying the cultural factors motivating actors to participate in revolution or not. Narratives unearth the particular and complicated experiences of revolution that may be generalized by causal analysis.

Parker (1999) and Selbin (2010) similarly explain that revolutionary narratives draw upon shared ideations to fulfill three functions. Firstly, the revolutionary narrative confirms the existence of an agent or agents who can imagine and act upon a vision of the future. Secondly, it frames the potential for gaining power and creating change. Thirdly,
revolutionary narratives align change within a broader historical context that provides “normative and predictive indicators” for revolutionary outcomes (Parker, 1999, p. 112-113). Scholars find that by fulfilling these functions, revolutionary narratives hold details of how actors consider their identities (self, collective, institutional), their affiliation with a group or culture, and the desires behind their decision to mobilize (Parker, 1999; Johnston, 2009; Selbin, 2010). The revolutionary narrative clarifies a story of where the revolution comes from, who is a part of it, and where it can go.

For example, many revolutionary narratives call upon past revolutions to align the current mission with a greater, inspiring historical imperative. Goldstone (2014) describes how French revolutionaries identified themselves with the early Romans who overthrew their King. Consequently, they depicted French leaders in togas such as the statue of Napoleon wearing a toga and laurel wreath crown that sits on top of the Vendome Column in Paris, a monument modeled after Trajan’s column in Rome (Goldstone, 2014). In 2011, Egyptian protesters saw their cause in parallel to the French Revolution’s fight against the monarchy and aligned their chant of “bread (or life), freedom, and social justice” with the French by using the mottos “liberté, égalité, fraternité” and “vive le révolution” in street art on the walls of Cairo (see Figures 2.1.-2.2.; Gröndahl, 2012; Sanders IV, 2012). Chapters 3 and 4 will return to the role of revolutionary narrative and graffiti in Egypt in greater depth.

![Mural](image.png)

**Figure 2.1.** liberté, égalité, fraternité  
Note: Mural by Hannah el Degham, Cairo, published by Mia Gröndahl, 2012.
From ancient Rome to contemporary Egypt, the examples above demonstrate how revolutionaries draw upon history in an attempt to “normalize and predict” their own action and visions for the future while confirming the potential for change: since it happened before, it can happen again (Parker, 1999). Revolutionary narrative is not a matter of comparing disparate historical events, but rather an opportunity to observe how ideas cross borders and find meaning in new contexts, as they did in the wave of constitutional revolutions across 19th century Europe. Furthermore, the examples above demonstrate the role of all three of Johnston’s (2009) cultural factors in sustaining revolution: shared ideations of freedom, liberty, life, and equality and the mission to overcome absolute rule; the performance of protest; and artefacts of statues and street art. Johnston (2009) and Selbin (2010) explain that cultural factors accumulate across time and space to form a revolutionary narrative that allows people to assert who they are and who they want to be. Cultural factors and narratives ultimately reveal the ways social actors and groups find meaning and motivation to take revolutionary action, or not.

Based on analyses of revolutions in France, Iran, Eastern Europe, Nicaragua, and Cuba, Reed and Foran (2002) propose that cultures of opposition form at the intersections of cultural factors and narratives. Political cultures of opposition use cultural factors to articulate the shared experiences of otherwise politically and economically diverse actors so they can make sense of their circumstances, mobilize, and build coalitions with others (Reed & Foran, 2002). Whether or not those coalitions choose to revolt, Reed and Foran
explain a common narrative contextualizes, justifies, and encourages unified, collective action.

Inspired by the non-violent and unconventional manifestations of revolution in the 21st century, Foran (2014) builds on the notion of “political cultures of opposition” with “political cultures of creation.” In political cultures of creation, social actors unify based on shared, non-violent cultural factors and narratives that inform the ways they would intend to live and act in the world, as they would like it to be (Foran, 2014). Thus, actors “create” the transformation of society through their day-to-day actions and interactions. Parallels with Arendt (1963) are present in this theory, as actors in political cultures of creation may strive to imagine and enact a new public space where the freedom to participate is realized by all. Cultures of opposition and creation provide key theoretical grounds for the exploration of the Egyptian women’s movement in Chapter 3 and the graffiti analysis in Chapter 4.

Engaging with cultural factors allows theorists to gain insight into the systems of meaning and characteristics within units or groups involved in revolution that structural theory does not investigate (Wickham-Crowley, 1997). However, Wickham-Crowley (1997) identifies the difficulty for cultural theory to explain causes and outcomes of revolution due to what Selbin (2010) describes as the “unsystematic (complicated and contradictory)” nature of culture (p. 9). Skocpol (1979) and other structural theorists find that, often, the outcomes of a revolution look much different than the vision proposed (as cited in Foran 1997; Wickham-Crowley, 1997). Thus, the extent to which a distinct narrative or political culture informs revolutionary action from start to finish is unclear. Cultural theorists are aware of this weakness, and assert that culture cannot be considered in absence from structures or political economy, nor can structures be considered independently from their cultural context (Foran 1997; Moghadam, 2013). Rather, many contemporary theorists acknowledge the necessity to utilize both structural and cultural theory, understanding the two must interact to capture the complexities of revolutions that are increasingly diverse in form (Foran, 1997; Goldstone, 2001; Selbin, 2010; Moghadam, 2013).
Critiquing Revolution

While mainstream structural and cultural theories of revolution hold analytical power, some scholars provide critiques and explore alternative conceptions of societal transformation. Criticism includes lacking consideration of revolutions outside the Western tradition or the revolutionary actions of everyday, non-elite actors such as women, ethnic minorities, youth, the elderly and those living in poverty (Bayat, 2013; Andrijasevic et al., 2014). Scholars argue that the actions of non-Western, non-elite groups require an understanding of revolutionary action beyond the standard practices of organized protest and state overthrow (West & Blumberg, 1990; Bayat, 2013; Andrijasevic et al., 2014). More inclusive and unconventional theories have emerged from the revolutionary activity of the past 15 years. Recent literature by Asef Bayat (2013), John Foran (2014), and contributors to a “Revolutions” issue of the Feminist Review journal (2014) share a conception of organizing that is non-hierarchical, and aimed towards slow, continuous revolutionary change. These emerging notions of societal transformation can open up new sites and timelines for re-defining revolution.

For example, Bayat (2013) proposes the concept of non-movements, referring to “the collective actions of a large number of actors who do not formally organize or follow the guidance of an ideology or leader,” but who unknowingly share practices or activities that ultimately contribute to social change over time (p. 14). Examples include women’s pursuit of activities that defy traditional gender roles until those activities become the norm, and street vendors’ steady encroachment into public space to produce an informal economy (Bayat, 2013). Bayat finds nonmovements demonstrate how marginalized groups pursue change despite lacking the resources or power necessary to unify a visible, revolutionary mass movement.

In a similar bid for new conceptions of revolution, more and more scholars are looking beyond societal restructuring to the transformation of human consciousness. Consciousness includes attitudes and assessments, awareness of identity, conceptions of how the world works and why, as well as a sense of power and possibility (Selbin, 2010,

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13 For discussions of revolution and human consciousness, see Mitchell (1984), Hart (2009), Sorbera, (2014b), and Marinelli (2014).
Cultural theory and studies on consciousness overlap in the content of their analysis, and can illuminate how actors shape and are shaped by understandings of the world, and an individual’s roles and the roles of others, including assessments of who does and does not fully access rights and freedoms. Much of the concern regarding consciousness stems from feminist and postcolonial accounts concerned with power, and oppression in revolution (Fanon, 1961; Mitchell, 1984; Andrijasevic et al., 2014). Post-colonial and feminist thought share an interest in populations conquering oppression to define “a new humanity” that is based on equality, a process that requires working on ‘the self’ to overcome the power of “dominant thinking” (Fanon, 1961, p. 30; Andrijasevic et al., 2014 p. 5). Consciousness is the site for foundational transformation, as it is where new understandings of the world and fellow human beings emerge.

Michael Hart (2009) argues that the relevant fact for politics is that “humans can become different” (p. 136). Hart (2009) emphasizes that revolution is:

- a process that not only destroys habits of servitude and develops capacities for self-rule but also inspires political imagination and expands […] desires, which can press far beyond the present political situation (p.136).

Sorbera (2014a) and Marinelli (2014) similarly target “a change in behavior” and “cultural habits" as the sites for transformation. Hart, Rowbotham, and Marinelli share an interest in addressing the transformation of conditions and conceptions that shape the way humans think, act, and understand the world – their consciousness. Parallels with cultural theory are evident but the ideas are slightly more radical as Hart claims that without the transformation of human consciousness, politics is left in a “holding pattern” (p.136). To avoid political possibilities and the definition of revolution becoming static, alternative conceptions of societal transformation must be considered. Increasing attention to non-violent, non-hierarchical movements producing slow, steady change alongside interest in the role of consciousness suggests that the understanding of revolution is indeed evolving.

**Women and Revolution**

As the terms of revolution shift, it is essential to consider which actors are consistently neglected in revolutionary movements and the ensuing literature. Some of the
most pointed criticism of revolution history and theory comes from feminists and gender studies scholars. Both women’s engagement in revolutionary processes and their inclusion in the records of those events are influenced by what Valentine Moghadam (1997) calls the gender system. The gender system is a cultural construct that takes shape differently depending on the economic development of society, the ways law, custom, policy, and institutions integrate the system, and how socialization sustains it (Moghadam 1997; 2013). Post-colonial feminist Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) emphasizes the importance of assessing how broader, fluctuating systems of constructs such as class, ethnicity, religion, and age intersect with gender to shape how men and women are able to enact their social roles and political agency.

In the context of revolution, gender systems shape the ways men and women are able to take part in and benefit from societal transformation. Despite Foran’s (1992) claim that political cultures of opposition “invite the full incorporation of women revolutionary agents,” many scholars argue that gender systems favored and secured patriarchal power throughout the history of revolutions (as cited in Shayne, 1998; Tétreault, 1994; Moghadam, 1997, p. 24; Goldstone, 2001; Rowbotham, 2013). Regardless of women’s contributions, revolutions rarely address the interests or oppression of women, and the overthrow of the patriarchy is certainly not included on the agenda (Tétreault, 1994; Mohanty, 2003). Mainstream scholarship further ensures the erasure of women from revolution by minimizing or generalizing women’s diverse experiences, if they are mentioned at all (Scott, 1985; Rowbotham, 2013). Distinguished international affairs scholar Mary Ann Tétreault (1994) argues beneficiaries of patriarchy fear a women’s revolution that would come at the expense of their social, economic, and political rights. Tétreault’s incisive argument points to the deep roots of women’s oppression. However, she also reveals the potential site to resolve women’s ongoing revolution: change must target patriarchal gender systems that shape and fortify a consciousness that cannot comprehend men and women sharing the same rights and freedoms.

**Women’s Motivations and Interests in Revolution**

One area of interest for scholars is understanding the reasons women participate in revolution and disaggregating the mystifying term, “women’s interests” (Molyneaux,
propose that depending on the context, there are four broad motives for women to join protests. The first motive is to secure basic needs for survival, which often prompts women to organize collectively at the grassroots level. Second, calls to mobilize the entire population motivate women, especially when invited to join nationalist or racial/ethnic-based causes. Third, opportunities to extend women’s conventional “caretaking role” motivate them to participate as “peace makers” and “moral guardians” (p. 18). The fourth motive for women to join protests is the fight for their rights and interests, which encourages “women [to participate] as women and citizens of society” (emphasis added; p. 19). These motives are complex and interconnected, revealing how women may act within and outside the bounds of roles defined by the gender system.

The fourth motivation, women’s fight for their rights and interests, receives particular attention from scholars. While conventional literature often refers to “women’s interests” as a uniform category, West & Blumberg (1990), Moghadam (1997), and Ray and Korteweg (1999) find more detailed analysis reveals that these issues shift and change throughout a revolution, and do not motivate all women to the same degree, if at all. It is also important to remember that women’s interests are not necessarily contrary to men’s or vice versa. Maxine Molyneux (1985) is an influential critic of the concept of “women’s interests” as a fixed category. Instead, Molyneux argues that “practical gender interests” of mothers and wives preclude the realization of “strategic gender interests,” which aim to change the rules women live by (p. 284).

While much of the revolution literature on women’s interests is built on Molyneux’s work, her categorization has received criticism from Shayne (1998) and Ray and Korteweg (1999). In studies of women’s revolutionary action in developing countries, scholars identified strategic gender interests as the primary motivator for participation, rather than practical gender interests (Shayne, 1998; Ray & Korteweg, 1999). Following the cultural turn, scholars further dismantled the oversimplified idea of “women’s interests” by considering women’s identities and what “sense of self” inspires participation in revolutions (Tétreault, 1994; Ray & Korteweg, 1999, p. 50; Sorbera, 2014a). While revolutionary men and scholars may generalize, it is clear from even a brief analysis of women’s and feminist
literature that neatly categorizing women as uniformly motivated actors is problematic and inaccurate.

**Women’s Experiences with Revolution**

A second area of inquiry is the differences in women’s and men’s experiences during revolution. West and Blumberg (1990) describe the distinct challenges faced by women as a “triple struggle: against the broad tyranny of state or corporate male elites, against sexism within the movement itself, and against the patriarchal machismo of men” (p. 30). Female protestors not only fight for a revolutionary cause, but also struggle against patriarchal discrimination that is both continuous and revolution-specific. Since women must grapple with the gender system differently than men, their experiences in revolution are distinct.

The abnormal circumstances of revolution can open a window for some women to take uncustomary actions by occupying public space and exploring different social roles through protest (West & Blumberg, 1990; Kampwirth, 2004). It is useful to consider involvement in revolution, and protest especially, in Judith Butler’s (1990) performative terms since participation provides an opportunity to maintain or challenge the construction of gender. The presence of women in public space is a physical articulation of dissent that allows their bodies to take on new meanings and understandings of their roles (Hafez, 2014). When women are able to participate as revolutionaries and as leaders, often there is an experience of “consciousness raising,” where women are able to discover their “true” identity, cross boundaries of gender roles, and achieve autonomy, individuality and, ideally, emancipation (Scott, 1985, p. 54; Rowbotham, 2013). West and Blumberg (1990) and Rowbotham (2013) document the transformation of women’s consciousness in political struggles throughout history and in different parts of the world. These scholars find that in revolutionary spaces, a period of equality or empowerment, however brief, can lead to women gaining a new perspective on the oppression experienced in their normal circumstances.

When revolutions open opportunities for consciousness raising and exploration of different social roles, constructions of gender become destabilized for women and men.
alike. If those holding patriarchal control perceive instability in the gender system as a threat, it may result in the adoption of exaggerated and violent forms of masculinity to protect the power of individual men and the state (Johansson-Nogués, 2013; Kandiyoti, 2013). Exaggerated masculinity threatens women’s influence on the revolutionary agenda and their personal safety. Rarely are women who participate in revolution seen as “the type of women the patriarchy is ‘duty-bound to protect’” (Taylor, D., 1997, p. 83; Kandiyoti, 2013). By entering public space, female protestors often challenge their assigned domestic role and become vulnerable to punishment, including sexual violence.

In their examination of women’s responses to conflict, including nationalist and social revolutionary movements, Kaufman and Williams (2010) illuminate how sexual violence is differently used against men and women. Since men who are sexually violated are perceived to be in the “female” role of subordinate, their harassment remains intimately tied to the violation of women (Kaufman & Williams, 2010). Women, however, are targeted for reasons tied directly to their own gender: for their vulnerability, for the message it sends to their own men, and for the symbolism associated with violating women as the markers of national identity (Kaufman & Williams, 2010). Chapter 3 will further discuss how female protestors in Egypt have experienced such violence in public and in prison, sexual harassment that has gone largely without recourse from the state since 2011 (International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2015).

When revolutions do promote equality and emancipation as a goal, it is often a means to gain followers and to distinguish political or revolutionary groups from one another (Rowbotham, 2013). Inclusion of female participants is part of a careful balancing act between losing followers of the revolution and avoiding women’s rights becoming a priority that could threaten patriarchal power (Randall, 1992; Tétreault, 1994). Pioneering feminist theorist Sheila Rowbotham (2013) observes that while it may be necessary to call on women to participate, often male revolutionaries envision “women ‘put back firmly in their place’” (p. 205). Thus, women’s participation is often only valued for as long as it supports the interests of men who, historically, oversee the agenda and outcomes of revolution.
Women’s rights, issues, and interests are frequently incorporated in a broader revolutionary agenda, and scholars are divided on the impact of that integration. Some discuss the value of solidarity in human rights or the broader revolutionary agenda and find there is danger in separating women from the rest of the revolution, as it implies men’s and women’s goals exist in binary terms (Tétreault, 1994; Shayne, 1998; Rowbotham, 2013). Others find the pattern of subsuming women’s rights to broader goals makes revolutions “inimical to women’s interests” in their various forms (Moghadam, 1997, p. 140; Goldstone, 2001). As Ray and Korteweg (1999) deduce from a review of both sides of the argument, it is difficult to reach a conclusion on whether autonomy of women’s interests is ultimately better or worse for women.

In many instances, when women’s interests and safety are neglected by revolutions, feminist movements emerge. This trend is demonstrated in studies on Latin America by Shayne (1998) and Kampwirth (2004) and research in the Middle East by Moghadam (2013) and Said, Meari, and Pratt (2015c). A rise in feminist organizing is often the result of experiences with the contradictory forces of consciousness raising, disingenuous commitment to equality, and violent masculinity (Shayne, 1998; Kampwirth, 2004; Said et al., 2015a). Building on Moghadam’s earlier work on social change and women in the Middle East, Karen Kampwirth’s (2004) study of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas similarly found that women’s participation in revolutionary movements developed self-confidence, organizing skills, and rebellion that were later applied to independent feminist movements.

According to activist and academic Margaret Randall (1992), feminist organizing provides an avenue for women to continue exploring their agency outside patriarchal hierarchies as they manifest in both the state and male-defined revolutions. In her study of 20th century revolutions, Randall finds women typically organize in horizontal, consensus-based collectives that allow for “less defensiveness in questioning traditional social relations, and much more creative risk taking” (p. 96). Moghadam (2013) argues that autonomous women’s movements that later grow within civil society are in fact “more amenable to women’s activism and - at least in principle - their access to decision-making positions” (p. 250-251). While the revolutionary movement may not ultimately serve as an
effective culture of opposition, Randall and Moghadam find feminist and women’s movements allow women to revolt on their own terms.

However, feminist movements face their own hurdles. Kampwirth (2004) finds that women in Latin America had to confront many criticisms if they became feminists as a result of their participation in revolution. A perception existed that feminism was foreign, bourgeois, imperialist and distracting from the “real problems” at hand (p. 212). Similar criticism targeted women’s movements in Turkey and Egypt that grew alongside their respective nationalist revolutions in the 20th century (Al-Ali, 2002). Feminist movements must also address the balance between organizing outside the patriarchal institutions they aim to change and avoiding co-optation when working within those institutions (Kampwirth, 2004; Kaufman & Williams, 2010). Regardless of where organizing takes place, Tétreault (1994) asserts that while men typically have many social, political, and economic resources available to them, women may face limited access to public space and means for mobilization. Furthermore, the extent to which women can explore a “distinct political identity” apart from their male counterparts is often inadequate for making any meaningful claims to “status, power, or justice” (p. 10). Women face challenges to organizing that men need not consider due to the asymmetrical power dynamics of gender systems.

The obstacles women and feminists face during revolution means changes they produce through independently organized movements emerge over a longer timeline than the period of revolution that is often “ended” by the overthrow of the state (Bayat, 2013; Andrijasevic, et al., 2014). Women organize and create societal transformation in collectives and “nonmovements” that are often less detectable (Randall, 1992; Bayat, 2013). As a result, the contributions of female participants are often overlooked and subsequently unacknowledged in conventional scholarship on revolution (West & Blumberg, 1990; Bayat, 2013). Thus, there is a gap in the literature that requires new perspectives on methods and timelines for societal transformation that better integrate the ways women achieve revolutionary change.
Women and the Outcomes of Revolution

How the outcomes of revolution affect women is the third, and, perhaps, most discussed area of inquiry among feminist and gender scholars. Moghadam (1997, 2013) defines two categories of revolution based on their outcomes for women: patriarchal revolution and egalitarian revolution. Firstly, patriarchal revolutions use gender differences to maintain women’s roles as wives and mothers in the private sphere of the family, and as symbols of the nation, religion, and cultural authenticity. In these domestic roles, scholars find women are required to act as moral participants rather than political agents, preventing them from defining rights and freedoms when it comes time to shape post-revolution society (West & Blumberg, 1990; Tétreault, 1994; Moghadam, 1997). Despite the key roles played by female supporters throughout revolutions in Mexico, Iran, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, studies by Tétreault (1994), Moghadam (1997, 2013), and Kampwirth (2004) substantiate that men in positions of power maintained or resurrected traditional gender roles to cut off women’s political agency before it influenced post-revolution decision-making.

The aim here is not to suggest that women are exclusively in favour of revolutionary participation, and men are entirely opposed to women’s involvement. Randall (1992) finds that when women must defend themselves both within and outside revolutionary movements, “the ‘safety’ of the nuclear family has been seen as a refuge” (p. 108). While the choice to return to the safety of the home is valid, it is important to consider that similar freedom to participate as “agents of change” is denied to many women (West & Blumberg, 1990; Randall, 1992, p.108). Regardless of the extent to which women receive permission or choose to participate in patriarchal revolutions, their influence over the outcomes is usually thwarted.

Moghadam’s (1997, 2013) second type of revolution, egalitarian revolution, explicitly aims for women’s liberation, where women are essential to productivity, civil society, economic success and political mobilization. Dedication to egalitarianism is not uniform or without contradiction, but at minimum, egalitarian revolutions contain the “seeds” for equality and/or feminism in the agenda for change (Moghadam, 1997; Kampwirth, 2004, p. 3). Women’s equality and participation is seen as valuable not only in the revolutionary context, but in establishing a sound and successful society in the long
term. The 20th century revolutions in Russia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua all initially made significant advances in women’s rights by making equality an explicit goal that was later implemented through policy changes and increased political participation (Moghadam, 1997; Kampwirth, 2004). These examples demonstrate the short term benefits women can gain from revolution.

While improvements in women’s status are positive, it is important to note two ways post-revolutionary regimes frequently fail to substantially uphold women’s rights in the long term. First, the way rights are distributed can be problematic as women may obtain more freedom in the public sphere of work, education, and politics while the private sphere of marriage and the family goes unchanged (Tétreault, 1994; Moghadam, 2013). When the law does not allocate women their private rights, men may hold control over decisions regarding marriage age, polygamy, sex, pregnancy and childbirth, and divorce which can place women in roles that may or may not align with their own interests (Tétreault, 1994; Moghadam, 2013). The extent to which women can exercise their improved public rights is often dependent on how tightly men continue to grasp control over private rights.

The second way post-revolutionary regimes fail to uphold women’s rights in the long term is that support often depends on whether women’s rights can be co-opted to support other political agendas. Scholars illuminate multiple motivations for regimes to be pro-women. Moghadam (1997) and Johansson-Nogués (2013) emphasize political interest in pacifying women and men of strategic social classes and the incorporation of women to increase socioeconomic development. Tétreault (1994) explores the utilization of feminism by reputedly egalitarian revolutions to ensure a wider support base that could fend off a counter-revolution. While such motivations can produce improvements, when the regime is not legitimately committed to women, initial successes for women’s rights often fail in the long term. Russia, Turkey, and Afghanistan addressed women’s rights as components of other political aims, resulting in approaches that were temporary and/or imbalanced in addressing both public and private spheres (Moghadam, 1997; Kampwirth, 2004).

Feminist activity similarly falls victim to co-optation in the aftermath of revolution. It is not only the state, but nationalist, sectarian, religious or class-based groups who also
co-opt the discourse and goals of feminism in order to serve a variety of agendas: women’s rights and equality are rarely the central concern (Kaufman & Williams, 2010). Al-Ali (2002) explains organizations dedicated to women’s rights and feminism often lose their legitimacy because the issues are so often adopted by other groups who are not genuinely committed to enhancing the status of women. A study on Latin America by Shayne (1998) and Al-Ali’s (2002) research on the Middle East similarly find that the combination of co-optation, and the absence of institutional targets has resulted in diffuse and relatively impotent revolutionary feminist and women’s movements. An inspiring narrative and effective, innovative forms of organizing are necessary if the ongoing revolution for women’s rights is to be resolved.

**Women and the Failures of Revolution Literature**

A fourth concern for feminist and women’s studies scholars is that much of mainstream revolution literature fails to acknowledge and integrate the different facets of women’s involvement with revolutions. As articulated by West and Blumberg (1990), “men who control the world are able to describe and order it” (p. 8). Influential feminist historian Joan Scott (1986) similarly argues that various processes operate to make men’s actions the norm and representative of human history while women are “overlooked, subsumed, or consigned to a less important, particularized arena” (p. 52). Scott’s argument receives support from many scholars of revolution who find patriarchal authority over revolutionary processes often results in the erasure of women as meaningful political actors (Tétreault, 1994; Andrijasevic et al., 2014; Moghadam 2014). The removal of women is partly achieved by the language of revolutionary history and theory that frequently refers to genderless “actors,” “revolutionaries,” and “social groups.” West and Blumberg (1990) explain that the use of such terms reinforces dominant patriarchal standards that it is men who are playing these roles. These practices produce revolution literature that is “crooked,” “slanted,” and characterized by a “lop-sided male-centered vision,” where men are seen to be the primary actors (Randall 1992, p. 161). Accordingly, a major goal of feminist scholars is to “re-insert” women’s involvement with revolution into historical memory for both their own empowerment and societal knowledge (Randall, 1992, p. 171; Andrijasevic et al., 2014).
However, Foran (2001) points out that the inclusion of women by all revolution scholars cannot take an “add women and stir approach” (p. 126). Rather, an effort must be made to balance out the male tilt of history and theory by understanding the specific and varied ways women engage with revolution (Foran, 2001). According to Kampwirth (2004) and Moghadam (2013), the project of integrating women’s experiences more meaningfully requires a serious consideration of the ways the gender system influences revolutionary activity and outcomes. Even contemporary theory often merely mentions women and gender rather than integrating those perspectives and issues. Much work remains for women in revolution and their visions of societal transformation to be fully recognized.

**An Alternative Revolution Text: Graffiti**

Since conventional literature on revolution has fallen short in capturing women’s experiences, it is essential to begin looking for new sources. Graffiti is an art form that has garnered attention as an important creative resource for revolutionary actors to express their identities, emotions, and visions of the future (Doerr, Mattoni & Trone, 2013). It is also particularly powerful for female artists and spectators, as Sami (2015) finds the art form can be used to publicly re-imagine and re-write gender roles. For example, graffiti coloured the walls of nations swept by the Arab Spring, and the artistic movement continues to flourish and spread throughout the region. Discussions of women’s rights are central to graffiti in Egypt, Libya, and Jordan among male and female artists alike, while Shamsia Hassani, leads the way as one of few women creating graffiti in Afghanistan.\(^\text{14}\) Graffiti is proving to be a valuable resource for expressing grievances and visions of change for women’s status in societies variously impacted by internal or neighbouring upheaval. Thus, it is worthwhile to explore what the art form can tell us about women’s experiences with revolution that may be overlooked elsewhere.

Graffiti has deep historical roots as a mode of communication that expresses identity through public markings. The etymology of graffiti relates to writing. “Graph” refers to the Greek *graphein*, meaning “to write,” and the Italian *graffio*, “hook” relates to scratchings and metaphors regarding a “hook upon which an identity is hung; upon which a movement rests” (Ong, 1990; Phillips, 1999, p. 40). Anthropologist Susan A. Phillips (1999) traces these definitions back to the marks left by Greek soldiers who scratched on vases and coins and left signatures in churches and on walls to indicate their presence in Egypt. Throughout history, graffiti has developed new forms that shift in adherence to the art’s origins in anonymity and the rebellious, unauthorized marking of public space.

The relationship between anonymous artist and viewer is one characteristic of graffiti that fascinates scholars. Graffiti transforms personal stories into public imagery, producing narratives that are simultaneously private and public (Ong, 1990; Rodriguez, 2003). Building on an early graffiti study by Bruner and Kelso (1980), Rodriguez and Clair (1999) similarly find graffiti is honest and open in a way rarely found in other public discourses. The unrestricted nature of graffiti can be particularly potent for individuals or groups whose voices are excluded from traditional institutions of power (Rodriguez & Clair, 1999). When those stories enter street life with fellow citizens, they create a new space for interaction. Whether studying the writing on a bathroom stall (Bruner & Kelso, 1980), gang tags in Los Angeles (Phillips, 1999) or revolutionary graffiti (Sanders IV, 2012), scholars find the art form produces what El-Hawary (2014) calls an “off the wall discourse” (p. 88): a dialogue among people the artist would not come into contact with otherwise. While all art forms generate discussion, graffiti is distinct in that it is equally accessible to all passersby for viewing and deliberation, rather than being limited to a gallery or museum space (Rodriguez & Clair, 1999). Graffiti allows otherwise unheard private stories to become part of public dialogue that may highlight the exceptional or reveal a previously unarticulated, shared narrative. In the context of a revolution, these street-level dialogues can serve as a barometer of contestation and resistance among various social groups (Rodriguez, 2003; Abaza, 2013).

Graffiti often documents an independent, alternative history of events that represent those threatened or forgotten by dominant narratives (Rodriguez & Clair, 1999; Nicoarea, 2014). To create unity among a marginalized group, scholars of graffiti explain
that the artist may draw upon individual and group relationships or alliances, ideas, power
dynamics, and defined identities through shared visual knowledge and symbols (Phillips,
1999; Rodriguez & Clair 1999; Doerr et al., 2013). The term bricolage describes a practice
where new meaning is created by reordering and juxtaposing formerly unconnected
signifying objects (Barker & Galasinki). Sanders IV (2012) suggests graffiti artists
practice bricolage in revolutionary settings to assert agency and create stories about a
future society by rearranging symbols of power. Engaging in bricolage, graffiti artists can
produce the revolutionary narratives described by Parker (1999) and Selbin (2010) that
explain where the revolution comes from, who is a part of it, and where it can go. Selbin
explains these “stories might exist not ‘simply’ to report on [societal] condition[s] but as
catalysts for changing it” (p. 26). Thus, graffiti can disrupt the ways individuals typically
engage with politics (Tonkiss, 2005 as cited in El-Hawary, 2014). Graffiti’s power goes
beyond documentation to inspire citizens to unite and mobilize behind a shared vision of
the future.

Due to the disruptive nature of revolutionary graffiti, it can contribute to the
transformation of consciousness, a process of interest in recent articles on revolution by
Hart (2009), Sorbera (2013), and Marinelli (2014). Conflict reconciliation scholar John Paul
Lederach (2005) describes the relationship of art and human experience as “dialectic” in
that art arises from human activity, and then shapes and gives meaning to that activity.
More specifically, Badran (2012) finds the dialectic nature of art can reflect and shape
critiques of dominant norms in the new space, visibility, and consciousness opened up by
revolution. Implicit in Badran’s statement is what Ryan (2014) describes as art’s ability to
shed light on “things ‘as they really are,’” to reveal the extent to which individuals contribute
to or disrupt systems that prevent them from living freely (p. 371). As a result of that
revelation, Ryan asserts the viewer can take on a new consciousness of their society.

Without entering a discussion of truth versus propaganda in art, which is certainly
beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth considering the distinct way graffiti offers the
opportunity to see the world differently. Operating in public space, a person who may not
otherwise encounter the ideas of the artist is pressed to do so, whether viewing a stencil

15 Bricolage is a term used in discourse analysis (Barker & Galasinki, 2001), cultural theories of
revolution (Johnston, 2009; Selbin, 2010), and studies on art and gender (Tamboukou, 2010).
on the wall of a bus shelter or a mural in a public square. Whether it is thought about for three seconds or three days Rodriguez and Clair (1999) propose the corrective, critical, or revolutionary ideas within the piece enter the minds and, often, conversations of the hundreds or thousands of people whose visual landscape has been artistically altered. In the case of revolutionary graffiti, viewers may be invited to adopt a revolutionary consciousness when ordinary people are depicted as “protesters,” “revolutionaries,” and “martyrs,” fighting against the “corrupt or thuggish” state (El-Hawary, 2014, p. 42). Portrayals in graffiti narratives invite the viewer to imagine themselves as revolutionary actors capable of not only seeing the world differently, but participating in its transformation.

**Women, Art and Graffiti**

As the previous sections outline, women’s roles and outcomes in revolution are distinct from men’s, and the graffiti women produce in that context often reflects on those differences. Scholars find that graffiti reveals the gendered textual and visual vocabularies men and women are socialized to use, allowing the art form to reproduce or challenge the dominant gender system (Bruner & Kelso, 1980; Bardhan & Foss, forthcoming). For female artists in a revolution context, graffiti is inherently subversive because it creates an opportunity for women to challenge culturally constructed boundaries by simultaneously occupying three “masculine” spaces: graffiti, public space, and revolutionary protest (Ganz, 2006; Gröndahl, 2012). In these spaces, female graffiti artists can act as *bricoleurs* by rearranging symbols and narratives of power to create multiple representations of women that may or may not fit within the dominant gender system.

While Rodriguez and Clair (1999) illuminate the democratic nature of viewing graffiti, it is important to note that the creation of graffiti is not as inclusive. Ganz (2006) and (Gröndahl, 2012) argue female graffiti artists are vulnerable in ways male artists are not. Depending on how gender is constructed in their society, feminist activist Nawal el-Saadawi (1997) asserts that women who create art may face the threat of censorship, imprisonment, attack, rape, and/or punishment within religious and cultural institutions. In the case of Egypt, Angie Balata, co-founder of the Women on Walls graffiti initiative, stated that:
female artists were not afraid to go out and paint in the street, despite the frequent harassment, particularly in Cairo. But let’s be frank: a woman cannot try to do this on her own in Egypt (Soliman & Balata, 2013).

Balata’s statement exemplifies an observation of el-Saadawi’s: much like revolutionary behaviour, society has not embraced the creative actions of women or their original thinking. As a result, they must work that much harder against the obstacles of patriarchal gender systems. The harassment female graffiti artists experience is arguably a manifestation of a social discomfort with women acting as creators in public space instead of as passive symbols. In a different manifestation of the “triple struggle” earlier described by West and Blumberg (1990), revolutionary female graffiti artists must fight against the patriarchal state, public harassment from men, and sexism within the male-dominated world of graffiti.

Like other female protestors, female graffiti artists are not all uniformly motivated by women’s issues during a revolution. However, in their respective studies on female artists, Chadwick (2007) and Tamboukou (2010) find women do frequently use art to negotiate discourses related to identity and difference, including the false public/private divide, sexuality, culture, religion, nationalism and ethnicity. Chadwick (2007) offers the reminder that identities are more complex than simple dichotomies and Tamboukou (2010) elaborates that women often use creative action, like graffiti, to “become other” as a way to disrupt binary definitions and explore new possibilities for their subjectivity (p. 694). For example, Egyptian author Bint al-Shati’ celebrates literary arts as a way for women to overcome marginalization and to “break out and sing their desires” so that their voices are asserted as “authentic expressions of an Islamic worldview” that can disrupt male power over religious knowledge (in McLarney, 2015, p. 259, 268). Art is a way for women to embody new subjectivities that can challenge gendered power dynamics.

In the context of revolution, exploration of female subjectivity can take particularly critical forms. Based on art and graffiti that arose from Egypt’s unrest after 2011, Badran (2012) finds revolution “opens up new space and new visibility” for “renewed public scrutiny of ideas about the body, gender, and sexuality” (p. 45). Tamboukou and Badran share an interest in how art can provide an opportunity to examine, disrupt, and transform consciousness around gender. Tamboukou finds women’s critique through art extends to
their way of life in an “aesthetic anticipation of the future,” a useful conceptualization that returns to Foran’s (2014) notion of political cultures of creation (p. 692). Women adopt ideas about gender communicated through their art and graffiti, and in doing so, they embody the type of shift in consciousness they hope to see within society at large.

**Conclusion**

Revolution has undergone many phases of redefinition throughout history, from political cycles in the ancient world, to societal transformation, to the emergent forms of radical social change in the late 20th and 21st century. In these various manifestations of revolution, a consistency holds true to Hannah Arendt’s (1963) proposal: humans can and do try to find new ways to create space for rights and freedoms to be realized by all. How we understand the pursuit of revolution is largely shaped by structural and cultural theories. Theorists argue for the importance of considering relationships between states and civil society alongside the cultural factors that create meaning for the actors within those structures (Foran 1997; Moghadam, 2013). However, revolutions in the past fifteen years motivated scholars to critique mainstream theory and reconceptualise societal transformation. There is a call among scholars like Bayat (2013) and Foran (2014) to improve the inclusion of marginalized actors, and to take stock of their different experiences, methods, and timelines for change that can contribute to new ideas about radical societal change. Hart (2009), Marinelli (2014), and Sorbera (2014a) similarly identify cultural conditions that influence human consciousness as the sources of fundamental and lasting change. Transformation of consciousness does not take place overnight with the overthrow of a state, and so it is worthwhile to consider alternative, long term revolutionary practices.

As illustrated by the analysis of women and revolution, an essential facet of transforming consciousness is drastically changing how we think and behave in regards to gender. Whether addressing the overarching themes in theories of revolution (Foran, 1997; Goldstone, 2001), or specifically examining women’s and feminist’s experiences in revolutions (West & Blumberg, 1990; Moghadam, 1997; Kampwirth, 2004), there is a common finding: regardless of ideology, time, or place, revolutions have consistently failed women in terms of fully achieving their rights and access to power. With more than fifty
percent of the population neglected by societal transformation, we must return to the question of whether a definition of revolution that does not include the overthrow of patriarchy is good enough. Furthermore, as patriarchal victors most often write history, Randall (1992) asks how gender bias and discrimination have influenced our understanding of revolution and its possibilities. What visions of transformation have been lost? Randall argues it is feminism that can “provide the balance and the bridge capable of advancing changes that will last” for the broadest range of people (p. 21). Perhaps the 21st century definition of revolution will finally take into account gender equality’s untapped transformative potential.

Fortunately, revolutionary thinking is always “necessarily forward-looking” and seeking new ways to envision a world where freedom and rights genuinely extend to all (Andrijasevic et al. 2014, p. 1). The new paths taken to revolution in the 21st century have reinvigorated a sense that “something is indeed going on” in terms of how we understand societal transformation (Foran, 2014, p. 6). New approaches allow for a closer examination of the shift taking place in recent revolutions, including a clearer understanding of women’s experiences that have so far been under-represented. By considering graffiti as an alternative revolutionary text, there is an opportunity to access revolutionary narratives by and about women that may not be documented elsewhere.

The case of Egypt is particularly fruitful for examining how contemporary societal transformation includes and affects women. Since 2011, Egypt has offered an opportunity to consider what revolution looks like in the 21st century due to the intersection of women’s ongoing revolution, state collapse, and alternative revolutionary methods, including graffiti. The next chapter will explore what the ongoing revolution for women’s rights has looked like in Egypt since 1919.
Chapter 3.

An Ongoing Revolution: the Women’s Movement in Egypt

Throughout history, Egypt has contributed to the changing definition of revolution, from the first popular revolution on record that overthrew pharaoh Pepi II, the anti-colonial revolution in 1911, and, most recently, the fall of Mubarak in 2011. Women played notable roles in those revolutions and autonomous women’s movements persisted alongside political upheaval throughout the 20th and 21st centuries (Badran, 1995; Sorbera, 2013). Following the historical approaches to revolution taken by Arendt (1963), Parker (1999), and Sorbera (2013), I will analyze the Egyptian women’s movement as an ongoing, cumulative revolutionary effort. This chapter will explore the history of feminist and women’s organizing in Egypt since 1919 to contextualize the extent to which women have experienced transformative societal change since 2011.

An historical approach allows for an assessment of the evolving influence of Egypt’s patriarchal gender system. For such analysis, Moghadam (2014) suggests considering the legacy of past institutions and norms, the role of women’s rights organizations in political change, and the new government’s interest in and capacity for a rights-based system (p. 141). The historical review of the Egyptian women’s movement will integrate scholarship on revolution from the previous chapter to examine the structural and cultural dynamics within the movement, and between women and the state, with particular focus on the constitution.

The chapter will approach feminist and women’s movements as examples of Foran’s (1997) “political cultures of opposition” to explore the histories, cultural forms, and narratives used by Egyptian women to make sense of and mobilize around their shared circumstances. Engaging with the theory regarding political cultures of opposition requires considering their fluid and multiple forms. This is particularly useful for studying the points of disagreement and cooperation between the various branches of Egypt’s feminists and women’s movements throughout the 20th and 21st century.
The five sections of the chapter are divided by periods of revolution or a change in political leadership between 1919 and 2015, including: the Independence Revolution of 1919, the 1952 coup and Nasser’s presidency, Sadat’s rule from 1970 to 1981, Mubarak’s regime from 1981 to 2011, and the three rotations of power in the post-Mubarak period from 2011 to present day. The period leading up to and following Mubarak’s ouster is analyzed in particular detail to illuminate how new forms of organizing emerged in Egypt, including new manifestations of the women’s movement.

1919 Revolution

In 1919, cities across Egypt were sites of revolutionary marches, strikes and protests for independence from British colonizers (Badran, 1995; Baron, 2005). Women participated actively in the anti-colonial revolution, activity scholars identify as a continuation of earlier political activity that included the women’s press, literary salons, and protest against various rulers and occupiers (Badran, 1995; Sorbera, 2013). With their first independent march on December 9, 1919, women began a series of protests against British colonial powers (Badran, 1995; Baron, 2005). From 1919 to 1922, Egyptian women were instrumental to the independence struggle, working alongside and standing in for their male counterparts in a period of equality (Badran, 1995; Sorbera, 2014a).

While the 1919 Revolution may have operated on egalitarian terms, the outcomes did not. Gender studies scholar Nadje Al-Ali (2002) notes that even before the revolution ended, the relationship between men and women was tense as feminists commented on the “patriarchal character” of nationalism during and after the revolution (p. 5). Men dropped egalitarianism from their nationalist discourse when it came time to determine the outcomes of the 1919 Revolution and decide who would hold political power (Badran, 1995). Following the pattern identified by West and Blumberg (1990) and Tétreault (1994) in Chapter 2, Moghadam (2013) finds Egyptian women were invited to support the revolutionary cause, but their traditional gender roles were resurrected to prevent influence over post-revolution decision-making.

British colonizers and Egypt’s emerging male political elite contested “the woman question,” a discussion of women’s fundamental role in society that ultimately relegated
women to symbolize morality and national independence through a traditional cultural identity (Bier, 2011 in Kadry, 2014, p. 200). Post-colonial scholar Partha Chaterjee (1993) defines Egyptian women’s national cultural identity by terms of “self-sacrifice, benevolence, devotion, religiosity [and] connection to the land” (in Sami, 2015, p. 86). However, Hafez (2014) finds that at the same time women were expected to maintain tradition, they were also asked to epitomize “modernity and progress” (p. 179). McLarney (2015) describes this as “the paradox at the heart of liberalism” in Egypt, as women simultaneously “signify the limits of secular political citizenship, the productivity of cultural reproduction, and the sacred realm of family relations” (p. 25). Informed by incongruous ideals, the symbolism of “womanhood” was central to the identity of the newly independent Egypt.

The lived realities of female Egyptians, however, had little influence on the 1923 constitution. Women’s rights went unmentioned in the constitution, a document that many feminist scholars argue ultimately cemented Egyptian legal and political power in “terms of maleness” (Badran, 1995; Al-Ali, 2002; Hatem in Kamal, 2015, p. 153). Despite women equally participating in the end of colonial rule, Egypt exemplified Fanon’s (1961) terms for decolonization with the replacement of one “species of men with another species of men” (emphasis added; p. 29). In a familiar revolution pattern, egalitarianism was abandoned as soon as patriarchal power could be re-secured.

The outcomes of the constitution did not deter Egyptian women. Many female protestors experienced consciousness raising during the independence struggle, and their new awareness of civic rights and duties sparked the beginning of the independent feminist struggle, a common post-revolutionary outcome discussed in the previous chapter (Badran, 1995; Baron, 2005). Developments in the women’s movement are noted by historian Margot Badran (1995), including women beginning to call themselves feminists for the first time, leaders removing their veils as a political statement, and Huda Sha’rawi establishing the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923. These efforts coincided with a movement in arts and culture that saw women pioneering in journalism, theatre, music, cinema (Baron, 1994 as cited in Mostafa, 2015). The confluence of feminism and creative activity marked the emergence of a powerful force of expression for Egyptian women that re-emerges later in this chapter.
A turning point for women’s rights came in the 1920s as the EFU fought for changes in suffrage, education, and reforms to the Personal Status Law that governed restrictions on marriage age, polygamy, divorce, child custody and inheritance (Badran, 1995; Keddie, 2007). Feminists aligned their demands with Egypt’s early Islamic and Pharaonic pasts to legitimize their pursuit of societal change, a strategy that can be examined in terms of Parker’s (1999) revolutionary narrative. Drawing on recognizable female figures who contributed to Egyptian society and culture, from goddesses and deities, to ancient female Pharaohs and Nefertiti, the EFU sought to unify and inspire Egyptians with their history. Feminists argued that, “when Egyptian civilization was at its height, women were advanced” (Badran, 1995, p. 145).16 This historical revolutionary narrative re-emerges throughout the Egyptian women’s movement in the 20th and 21st centuries.

In the late 1920s, the EFU began to see meaningful changes in line with their demands. In 1929, a minimum marriage age was set for both men and women, maternal custody was extended, and clarification was provided regarding women’s ability to request divorce (Badran, 1995). Al-Ali (2000) finds the reforms did not make any significant threat to patriarchal culture and were, rather, part of a familiar post-revolutionary strategy to “deal with” and pacify women through concessions (p. 103). However, women did benefit from the reforms made in 1929, demonstrating how women’s political cultures of opposition produce change along longer revolutionary timelines than initial state collapse.

Zainab al-Ghazali joined the EFU in 1935, but left within a year to form the Muslim Women Society. Al-Ghazali condemned the women’s liberation movement since she found Islam already provides women with their freedom in economic, political, social, public and private rights (McLarney, 2015). Sorbera (2013) explains a distinction arose between Al-Ghazali and Islamist women who sought to achieve “gender complementarity within a patriarchal framework,” and members of the EFU who promoted changes to shari’a and gender equality (p. 24).

16 Similarly, McLarney (2015) notes that women have always “seriously participated in the religious, literary, and political life” of the Muslim community as narrators, transmitters, and “key links in the chain of authority” (p. 255).
The emergence of Egypt’s independent, national identity fostered the divide between the Islamist women’s movement and secular feminism (Badran, 1995; Jackson, 2015). Ray and Korteweg (1999) find Western feminism complicated the pursuit of secular feminism for women in post-colonial Egypt in two ways. Firstly, Western feminism generated problematic images of colonized women that Egyptian feminists did not want to perpetuate (Ray & Korteweg, 1999). Secondly, there was a perception that pursuing feminism created an ongoing connection to Western, colonial powers (Ray & Korteweg, 1999). Many women did not label themselves as feminists because of the term’s colonial implications and those who did engage in secular feminism received accusations of acting as colonial agents and pursuing a Western agenda (Ray & Korteweg, 1999; Jackson, 2015). The Islamic and Islamist women’s movements, however, obtained a classification as “indigenous” (Jackson, 2015, p. 41). Thus, ideas of national identity continued to circumscribe feminism and women’s rights to represent that which was inherently or “indigenously” Egyptian.

It is important to note that the divide between secular and religious feminism did not define the experiences of all feminists. Badran (1995) explains that many Egyptian women, past and present, view their feminism as an independent movement engaging with both indigenous and colonial forms of patriarchy. Furthermore, secular and Islamist feminists did not (and do not) operate in strict opposition or in isolation from each other. For example, Sha’rawi and al-Ghazali both participated in the Women’s Conference for the Defense of Palestine in 1938 (Al-Ali, 2000; Sorbera, 2013). While drawing on different cultural norms, women’s secular, Islamic, and Islamist cultures of opposition were permeable and found common ground on issues related and unrelated to gender, a trend that is present throughout Egypt’s contemporary history. ¹⁷

Despite increasing conservatism in the 1930s, many women continued to challenge their traditional roles within the family by working outside the home and gaining admittance to higher education (Badran, 1995; Sorbera, 2013). Women became involved with philanthropy and social work in an attempt to extend rights to the rural poor, an effort that ultimately set the pace for the government to begin providing services to those

populations (Badran, 1995). The revolution was over, but women’s pursuit of work, education, and voluntarism that shifted state policy demonstrate what Bayat (2013) calls “the feminism of everyday life” (p. 96). Bayat proposes that activities like going to school, to work, and to volunteer are “ordinary, irrepresible, and, ultimately, powerful practices” because they allow women to challenge stereotypical gender roles and steadily encroach upon the power of patriarchal structures (p. 98). Bayat argues these practices are particularly useful under authoritarian regimes where the organization of mass movements may not be possible. Such conditions have defined much of Egypt’s history. While particularly powerful in the 1930s as Egyptian women gained new access to public realms, the feminism of everyday life is a strong undercurrent throughout the Egyptian women’s movement.

However, in the 1940s, tension rose regarding the mixing of the sexes particularly within the universities where women attended political protests as well as their classes (Badran, 1995). While feminists utilized the state’s “national liberation discourse” to argue that interaction between all Egyptians was essential to national cohesion, Al-Ali (2002) points out the state switched back to a traditional narrative about women’s morality and honor to protect patriarchal power (p. 10). Despite the discursive obstacles, secular feminists pushed on, establishing the Egyptian Feminist Party in 1942 and the Bint al-Nil (Daughters of the Nile) organization in 1948, while the Muslim Women Society formally aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 (Hatem, 1992; Sika, 2014). The 1940s saw a growing women’s movement in Egypt, but the following decade was relatively inactive due to another shift in Egypt’s political landscape (Al-Ali, 2002).

1952 Coup and Nasser’s Presidency (1956-1970)

Another wave of political change reached Egypt in 1952, and once more provided women with opportunities to engage in new political activity. The Free Officer’s movement overthrew Egypt’s constitutional monarchy in a nationalist coup that led to the presidency of coup leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1956.18 Much like 1919, women’s participation was

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18 While many scholars refer to the events of 1952 as a revolution, others find it is more accurate to describe the movement as a coup d’état that received popular support.
seen as a means of boosting protest numbers, nation building and modernization (Baron, 2005). According to Kadry (2014), women’s rights were not under consideration, other than in the recurrence of the “woman question” earlier debated in 1919. Women’s consciousness raising within the revolutionary context once again motivated them to pursue change beyond the period of upheaval, and this time with more significant results. The EFU continued to raise the issue of suffrage, which became the focus of their feminist agenda in the 1950s (Badran, 1995). The goal was achieved in the 1956 constitution that made men and women equal before the law, and encouraged women’s participation in work and education (Hatem, 1992; Keddie, 2007). The egalitarianism of the movement in 1952 proved to run deeper than in 1919, informing a period of reform for women’s rights led by President Nasser.

Nasser took a socialist approach to the gender system that proved to be divisive. Rejecting discourses that “naturalized gender differences,” equal access to education, social welfare, health care, and government services was granted to Egyptian men and women (Hafez, 2014, p. 180). Sherine Hafez (2014), a gender studies scholar, explains the resultant reforms to women’s rights were associated with secular, pro-Western culture that did not align with the Islamist understanding of gender. The disparity led to resentment from religious groups and fed into anti-Nasserist sentiments (Hafez, 2014). While there was division between the male-dominated realms of state leadership and civil religious groups, many women were in favour of Nasser’s reforms. In a series of interviews with women who lived through the Nasser era, Al-Ali (2000) records a “widespread perception that Nasser's policies helped women to gain some economic, social and cultural strength through their increased participation in education and employment” (p. 99).

Many women celebrated Nasser’s early years for making significant, positive advances in their public rights, but private rights went largely unchanged. The Personal Status Law that governed the private sphere of marriage and the home was unaddressed by the 1956 constitution, leaving women’s rights considerably imbalanced (Hatem, 1992; Keddie, 2007). At the same time, Nasser’s supervision and prevention of political organizing made independent women’s movements impossible, leading to the folding of the EFU and silencing of prominent feminists like Bint al-Nil founder, Duriya Shafik (Sorbera, 2013; Sika, 2014). After Egypt’s defeat in the Six Day War with Israel in 1967,
the dynamic between women and the state changed. In interviews with Al-Ali (2000), women who did not experience Nasser’s earlier years described the regime as a police state. Returning to Goodwin’s (1997) state autonomy perspective from Chapter 2, the changed dynamic may have resulted from a perception that Nasser’s regime was pursuing an independent political agenda that overtly conflicted with women’s interests and the earlier socialist gender system. As a result, Nasser’s later years were identified with problematic state feminism that co-opted women’s public rights for an agenda of economic and national development (Al-Ali, 2002; Keddie, 2007). Like many post-revolutionary regime’s, Nasser’s approach to women’s rights proved to be imbalanced and skewed towards maintaining patriarchy.

The end of the Six Day War produced another influential trend by sparking a resurgence of Islam (Keddie, 2007). McLarney (2015) explains that Egypt’s defeat lead to a “seismic change” that led to a decline in Nasser’s popularity and ideology of Arab nationalism and a resurgence in Islamic politics, cultural production, and mobilization in the late 1960s and 1970s (p. 16). Islamic dress became common and a pro-veil discourse emerged, a trend historian Nikki Keddie (2007) attributes to women asserting their religious identity while protecting themselves from harassment and criticism in the various public spheres they now occupied. The intersecting cultures of women’s groups, the state and resurging Islam would see significant collisions following Nasser’s death in 1970.


Anwar Sadat’s regime demonstrates how revolutionary changes influence politics long after rapid state overthrow. Sadat became president on October 15, 1970 and countered the popularity of the previous regime by removing all of Nasser’s personnel, centralizing power in the presidential office, and aligning himself with the Muslim Brotherhood (Sika, 2014). McLarney (2015) finds Sadat’s use of the Islamists to counter the leftists fueled the resurgence of Islam. An increasingly Islamic public sphere gave the Islamic movement means to mobilize the Egyptian population and inhabit family and
community spaces out of reach of the state – influence that would shape oppositional politics and the women’s movement in the decades to come (McLarney, 2015).¹⁹

On the issue of women’s rights, Ray and Korteweg (1999) find Sadat’s countering of the leftist Nasserist regime demonstrated how approaches to women’s issues could be used to distinguish one political agenda from another. A new constitution was issued in 1971 that maintained men’s and women’s equality before the law, although with the caveat that those rights remain in line with shari’a law (Hatem, 1992). Tadros (2014) explains the debate caused by the caveat, as Islamists claimed it only impacted particular matters where equality was not absolute, while others found shari’a denied women all kinds of rights. The constitution formally integrated religion with politics, and perpetuated the notion that women were the site for defining cultural authenticity and national identity in periods of societal transition.

Economics were another way to counter Nasser that led to further setbacks for women. Sadat established a number of neo-liberal intifah (open door) policies that generated a wave of foreign influence while the state withdrew from creating change in social and economic realms (Hatem, 1992; Hafez, 2014). Consequently, Egyptians, and women in particular, were caught in a churn of cultural norms that Hafez (2014) argues were formed by “global capital on the outside and Islamist ideology on the inside” (p. 181). Al-Ali (2002) notes the intersection between open door policies and conservative Islamic discourse led to the reversal of many gains made during Nasser’s presidency when women’s integration in the economy was part of “state feminism.” Under Sadat, women experienced high rates of unemployment and inequality in the workplace, alongside growing pressure to return to the domestic sphere.

Al-Ali (2000) and Sika (2014) both observe a consistency between the Nasser and Sadat regimes: the effort to prevent women’s and feminist’s independent organizing. However, young women found venues to pursue their activism as opposition to the regime thrived on Egyptian campuses. A reformed political culture of opposition emerged among

¹⁹ Scholars refer to this period as the beginning of the Islamic revival or awakening that McLarney (2015) describes as an ongoing, nonviolent or “passive” revolution (p. 238). There are parallels between McLarney’s analysis of the Islamic Awakening and this paper’s exploration of the Egyptian women’s movement as an ongoing revolution.
female students. In her interviews, Al-Ali (2000) found many women described their participation in student movements as a “positive experience of shared struggle, hope, and optimism” (p. 105). Earlier belief in socialism shifted to concern over the crisis of socialist ideology, disappointment in socialist male activists, and rejection of “conventional male political structures,” including Sadat’s largely failed neo-liberal policies (Al-Ali, 2000, p. 106). With the promises of socialism broken and neo-liberalism creating new, significant hurdles, women’s political cultures of opposition faced the challenge of imagining a different system for their society.

Lucia Sorbera (2013), a historian of Egyptian feminism, points out that the new generation of highly educated women were prepared to create change, but were largely unable to do so due to Sadat’s deterrence of independent initiatives. Additionally, she argues that a disjuncture of discourse between secular feminists and Islamist women remained. Islamist women’s movements were attractive to lower classes who did not align with the culture of secular feminism that was based in academia and transnational networks (Sorbera, 2013). Thus, Islamist and secular cultures of opposition continued to pursue changes to women’s status in Egypt, although with diverging approaches.

In contrast to the regime’s tendency to reverse or diminish improvements to the status of Egyptian women, Sadat took on reforms to expand women’s rights in the later years of his rule (Al-Ali, 2002). The year 1975 marked the beginning of the United Nations Decade for Women, providing impetus for Sadat to promote gender issues in order to form stronger bonds with Western allies, and the United States in particular (Ray & Korteweg, 1999; Kamal, 2015). In 1975, the Egyptian Women’s Organization and a National Commission for Women were created, which further entrenched state feminism according to political scientist Mervat Hatem (1992). Most notably, with the help of his wife Jehan, Sadat was the first president to enhance women’s status through reform of the Personal Status Law, granting women legal rights in marriage, polygamy, divorce, and child custody, provided those rights did not conflict with shari’a (Hatem, 1992; Sika, 2014). It took a presidential decree for “Jehan’s Law” to pass in 1979, as it was initially opposed by the People’s Assembly (Keddie, 2007). In the same motion, Sadat passed another decree that allotted to women thirty seats in the Assembly and twenty percent of all seats in the local People’s Councils (Hatem, 1992; Al-Ali, 2002). In 1981, he signed the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), again with the condition that it did not counter shari’a (Morsy, 2014).

While these developments in the legal status of women were seen as positive by many, ulterior motives were present. Despite earlier close ties with Islamists, Hatem (1992) suggests these legislative reforms were part of a strategy to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood’s growing strength and to separate Sadat’s agenda in order to improve Egypt’s image in the eyes of the international community. Authoritarianism ultimately characterized Sadat’s rule and Sika (2014) finds women’s rights started to be tightly linked to the president and his wife, building on Nasser’s legacy of state feminism. The presidential decrees were unpopular with Islamists and created a rift among women of different political persuasions (Hatem, 1992). Feminists too were critical of the reforms due to their top-down imposition and vocal condemnation of Sadat’s authoritarianism led to arrests of activists like Nawal el-Saadawi in 1981 (Sorbera, 2013). Revisiting the state autonomy perspective, much like Nasser’s era, Sadat’s agenda of state feminism operated independent of the interests expressed by women and feminists working at the grassroots level.

The Mubarak Regime (1981-2011)

After the assassination of Sadat, Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1981 and continued the economic and political liberalization policies initiated by his predecessor. Hatem (1992) argues Mubarak supported “systems that were hostile to state activism in general and state support of women’s public equality, in particular” (p. 171), an approach that characterized the state as “authoritarian and neopatriarchal”, according to Moghadam (2013, p. 44). Mubarak suppressed militant Islamists but also made concessions to a number of Islamist demands, including reversals that impacted women, such as a weaker version of the reformed Personal Status Law in 1985 and the reversal of electoral quotas in 1986 (Keddie, 2007). These changes led to outrage within “the already antagonized women’s movement” (Al-Ali, 2002, p. 5). While some felt maintaining the law was necessary, others argued its implementation had been unconstitutional since Sadat earlier passed the law by decree (Al-Ali, 2002). This debate illustrated the permeability of boundaries between secular and Islamist cultures of opposition as women aligned
themselves based on their position on policy rather than allegiance to a particular feminist agenda. Although a watered down law restored some of the benefits from the 1979 reforms, Mubarak conceded to the Islamists by taking a more conservative approach to law and policy on women in general (Hatem, 1992; Al-Ali, 2002).

In other social matters, Mubarak was slightly more liberal. Thanks to marginally loosened state control over civil society organizing, human rights activists and feminists were able to establish themselves with some level of autonomy. While Mubarak’s policy of “partial liberalization” prevented the Islamists from gaining power at the policy level, grassroots networks thrived and maintained an oppositional stance in the face of the secular state (McLarney, 2015). In Soft force: Women in Egypt's Islamic awakening, Ellen McLarney (2015) refers to women’s participation in Islamic politics as “soft force,” nonviolent protest against the state performed by women in the private sphere, in the family, and in social institutions.20 The concept of “soft force” falls in line with earlier discussions in this paper regarding women’s every day, nonviolent organizing to gradually transform society. Povey (2013) notes that Islamic and Islamist women’s movements were particularly influential in the 1990s, fighting for “equality, democracy, social justice, and freedom from foreign domination” (p. 39) The Muslim Sisters, the Muslim Brotherhood’s female wing, were especially effective in more formal organizing that facilitated the provision of welfare and religious education (Povey, 2013; Tadros, 2014).

Secular feminists often joined forces with human rights activists, NGOs, and academics, alliances scholars find were based on shared disillusionment with the left and hierarchical, patriarchal politics in general (Al-Ali, 2002; Sorbera, 2013). In a series of interviews with women from Al-Mar’a al-Jadida (New Woman Foundation, NWF), Sorbera (2013) reports there was frustration over wasted years among women who were active in the 80s and 90s. Sorbera (2013) notes a “recurrent narrative of the problematic relationship between the vibrant women’s civil society and the [state] institution which, on paper, was devoted to promote it” (p. 32). A genuine, unified women’s rights agenda within

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20 According to McLarney (2015), “soft force” is a term coined by Islamic activist Heba Raouff Ezzat. Ezzat uses the term to refer to “women’s jihad,” wielded against the “tyrannical government” (p. 1).
the women’s movement and between civil society and the state remained elusive, making it difficult to determine a course to lasting, systemic change.

A break in frustration arrived with the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, which local groups saw as a turning point for women’s organizing (Al-Ali, 2002; Kamal, 2015). Al-Ali (2002) attributes part of the importance of the ICPD to the conference’s creation of a feminist platform that transitioned “research-oriented” activism into “project-oriented” grassroots initiatives that were severely lacking in Egypt at the time (p. 11). Furthermore, it was an opportunity for typically isolated Egyptian women’s organizations to co-operate with one another on a large scale (Al-Ali, 2002). The preparation for the event and the events themselves allowed women to discuss topics that were taboo and unacknowledged on the agendas of many groups, including abortion, violence, reproductive rights and areas of common concern like equality before the law, political participation, and structural adjustment (Al-Ali, 2002). Abouelnaga (2015) explains that by participating in the “taboo” discussion on their own terms, women were in direct conflict with the dominant patriarchal narrative that reduced women to their bodies, bodies that were symbolic of “national honor” requiring protection through “discipline and punishment” (p. 40). While these topics were the domain for men to define national identity and indigeneity in 1919, 1952, at the ICDP in 1994 women were able to extensively explore their own positions on the issues.

Throughout the decade, Tadros (2014) observes that cooperative movements helped women establish networks of contacts outside their groups and to gain experience with organizing, collaboration and shared decision-making. Similar to the collective, oppositional nature of the ICDP, the Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Coalition brought together diverse actors around the goal to create a “socially sensitive” approach to FGM (Tadros, 2014; Kamal, 2015). Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s women’s political cultures of opposition may have been isolated from or in conflict with one another, in the 1990s, different groups began to form strategic alliances based on areas of agreement while still maintaining their particular agendas. Although struggles within and between different branches of feminism did persist, Keddie (2007) states the number of women’s organizations grew and cooperative efforts proved influential in the decades to follow.
Mubarak implemented further concessions on women’s rights and organizing in the 2000s. The first women judges were appointed, a major achievement, explains Tadros (2014), especially for those working in a secular feminist tradition that valued legislative change as a key factor in addressing gender inequality. The state also created the National Council for Women (NCW) in 2000, a governmental institution for advancing women’s status (Keddie, 2007). Tadros (2014) proposes women who operated within the NCW were able to influence policymaking due to their proximity to Suzanne Mubarak, who oversaw the NCW. The NCW was part of an ongoing effort by Mubarak to demonstrate tolerance and gain favour with the international community, a strategy earlier exhibited in the allowance of the ICDP in 1994 (Al-Ali, 2002). Concessions continued when FGM was criminalized, and the Khul’ Law (divorce law) and Law for Family Courts were reformed in 2000 and 2004 respectively (Keddie, 2007; Morsy, 2014). The Family Insurance and Alimony Fund relieved women of financial burdens associated with the pursuit of divorce and a quota for women in parliament was re-established in 2007, marking the Mubarak years with considerable progress for women in both public and private spheres (Morsy, 2014).

Mubarak’s goal to improve Egypt’s position on the international stage was part of a trend since the 1970s, where women’s rights in Egypt increasingly integrated with the burgeoning discourse of international human rights. Over time, Beck (2014, p. 198) observes that Egypt’s leaders and civil society integrated into a “world cultural model” of human rights that Seigneurie (2012) describes as valuing and empowering the individual, including women. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a lack of consensus on whether the integration of women’s rights with human rights is better or worse for women, and the case of Egypt did not clarify the argument. Throughout the 2000s, women’s rights movements and general civil society activism integrated with human rights discourse, which became particularly powerful in protests in the years leading up to 2011.

At the same time Mubarak was reforming women’s status through legislation and policy, he was also countering the oppositional civil society feminism that gained momentum in the 1990s. In 2003, an NGO law was passed to restrict the activity of disparately credible women’s organizations through licensing and security rules and by assigning the Ministry of Social Affairs the right to dissolve NGOs (Keddie, 2007;
Moghadam, 2014). Omaima Abou-Bakr (2015), a scholar of religion and gender, observes that religious components of activities were under particular scrutiny in order to avoid open criticism of the state while still maintaining space for “‘enlightened’ religious arguments” that could assist with Mubarak’s goal to undermine political Islam (p. 194). This ambiguous position celebrated apolitical approaches to Islamic feminism and, at other times, aligned Islamic feminists with Islamists like the Muslim Sisters despite considerably different perspectives between the two groups (Abou-Bakr, 2015). Regardless of religious affiliation, Keddie (2007) reports all women’s NGOs were required to register and “accept the hegemony” of the NCW and the Ministry of Social Affairs, conditions that were met with resistance from independent organizers (p. 127). Keddie’s criticism is shared by Tadros (2014) as both scholars find the NCW co-opted feminism and women’s organizing to serve the agendas of upper-class women and the Mubarak regime, while independent initiatives weakened under the NGO law.

Moghadam (2013) finds that by the 2000s, Mubarak’s presidency had become marked by “cronyism, rigged elections, and repression of any and all dissidence” (p. 231). Though earlier government crackdowns on militant Islamists gained approval among some Egyptians, they were paired with sweeping and arbitrary arrests (Moghadam, 2013). Mubarak also worked to safeguard his own rule and the succession of his son Gamal, which sparked active opposition from civil society (Kamal, 2015). The Kefaya (Enough) movement mobilized against Gamal’s succession in 2004, and the Mubarak regime fought back with what Sorbera (2013) describes as “militias of strong, trained, thugs” (p. 16). Kefaya protesters were beaten up and sexual violence was used against female protesters with the insinuation that by protesting in public, they “wanted to be groped” (Soueif, 2011 as cited in Sorbera, 2013, p. 16). As illuminated by scholars in the previous chapter, often female protestors are not the type of women the state feels bound to protect (Taylor, D., 1997; Kandiyoti, 2013). Rather, violence against women protesting in public affirms that women’s safety exists within domestic boundaries only.

Although Badran (2005) and Sorbera (2013) note sexual violence was used against female protestors in Egypt’s past revolutions and social movements, Ahdaf Soueif (2011) contends that after 2005, “harassment of women in the street rose to epidemic levels” (as cited in Sorbera, 2013, p.16). Public violence against women was one example
of the gaps between the text of the Egyptian Constitution and its application, as injustices prevailed throughout the 2000s. Women continued to face legal discrimination, unequal access to legal services, and damaging cultural stereotypes that prevented them from gaining political power (Morsy, 2014). Mubarak’s reforms to women’s rights proved to be superficial, leaving deeply rooted patriarchy untouched.

Mubarak’s amendments regarding Gamal’s succession passed in 2005, which led to ongoing protests demanding democracy, including the influential April 6 movement in 2008 (Seigneurie, 2012; Kamal, 2015). A young female activist named Esraa Abdel Fattah launched the April 6 movement in support of striking workers in the industrial town of Mahilla al-Kubra (Sorbera, 2014a). Like Kefaya before it, Foran (2014) finds the April 6 movement created a culture of opposition that unified young Egyptians across ideological lines through a diverse, egalitarian model that Singerman (2013) highlights for its use of everyday networks, such as social media. Both Kefaya and the April 6 movement were in search of “dignity,” a term Singerman (2013) explains implied the state must “respect the integrity, safety, and autonomy of the body,” which made the two movements particularly attractive to women (p. 1). Building on the oppositional discussions among women in the 1990s, women in the Kefaya and April 6 movements saw an opening to challenge patriarchal discourse and violence although with new organizational arrangements and strategies that would ultimately shape the next peak in civil society activism.

**In Flux (2011-Present)**

The collapse of Mubarak’s regime in 2011 took many by surprise. However, Sorbera (2013) raises the important point that the upheaval in Egypt was the result of historical processes. One way to examine those processes is to use Goodwin’s (1997) state-based theory to examine the various practices that contributed to the state’s eventual structural failure. Despite the implementation of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and restructuring in the 1990s under the IMF and World Bank, by the 2000s, Egypt was still experiencing poor economic development and reliance on U.S aid (Keddie, 2007; Povey, 2013). The 2009 Arab Human Development Report revealed 20 percent of Egypt’s population lived in “absolute poverty” while 43.9 percent lived below the poverty line of US$2 per day (as cited in Povey, 2013, p. 237). The inability of the government to provide
services, including clinics, schools, and welfare organizations, contributed to the loss of the regime's legitimacy within civil society (Keddie, 2007). Furthermore, the loyalty of elites, including the military, was exhausted and threatened by the potential succession of Mubarak’s son, Gamal (Singerman, 2013). Mubarak further alienated civil society and political opposition by going to great lengths to ensure his party won nearly all the seats in the parliamentary election in 2010, using any means to ensure the Muslim Brotherhood would fail (Singerman, 2013). Goodwin’s (1997) analysis of state practices that engender revolutionary movements would suggest Mubarak’s elitist, personalistic rule, use of violence, and inability to revive failing economic and social systems contributed to unrest among civil society.

Cultures of opposition gained membership as groups remaining from the Kefaya and April 6 movements expanded, and the Muslim Brotherhood figured as the largest opposition movement in the country (Povey, 2013). Ongoing marginalization of Islamic and Islamist groups, like the Brotherhood, led to the development of enduring grassroots networks that could effectively mobilize at the level of civil society, community groups, and NGOs (Povey, 2013; McLarney, 2015). Following the co-operative trend from the previous decade, Povey (2013) describes unification between opposition movements in the 2000s as being rooted in recognition of diversity and the discovery of commonalities.

A significant instance of co-operation arose with the beating of youth activist Khaled Said in June 2010, an event that sparked a massive online network of anti-Mubarak sympathizers (Singerman, 2013). While most Egyptians remained passive, the dissemination online of Khaled’s beaten face sparked organizing against police corruption and brutality (el-Hawary, 2014; Goldstone, 2014). Wael Ghoneim, an Egyptian Google executive, anonymously administered the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook group that symbolically scheduled a protest for the national holiday, ‘Police Day’ on January 25, 2011. Within three days, the page had 100,000 people signed up (Barrons, 2013). Around the same time, Asma’ Mahfouz, a leading figure in the April 6 movement, created a YouTube video calling for her fellow citizens to “take to the streets” on January 25 (Sorbera, 2013, p. 36; Kadry, 2014). Emergent political cultures of opposition with organizing skills and social media networks inherited from Kefaya and the April 6 movement proved to create a powerful push for transformative social change in Egypt.
Khair El-Din Haseeb (2013), founding Director of the Centre of Arab Unity Studies, proposes four factors were in place for successful revolt in Egypt. First, the population was no longer constrained by fear of the state. Second, non-violent means for revolt were established within civil society to avoid justifiable and violent retaliation from the more powerful regime. Third, across religions and classes there was cohesion in opposition to the regime that is similarly noted by Povey (2013). Haseeb’s fourth factor for successful revolt is that the military did not side with the regime. These factors reveal similar structural dynamics to those proposed by Goodwin (1997), as well as cultural elements, like shared oppositional motives between diverse social groups.

For eighteen days, millions gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. The motivations and methods that led to the presence of those crowds partially inspired Foran’s (2014) term “political cultures of creation.” The specific and distinct characteristics of this creative form of opposition include:

- the attempt to get away from the hierarchical organizations that made the great revolutions and move in the direction of more horizontal, deeply democratic relations among participants;
- the expressive power of using popular idioms more than ideological discourses;
- the growing use of nonviolence;
- and the salience of political cultures of creation alongside political cultures of opposition and resistance (Foran, 2014, p. 9).

According to Foran, what distinguishes the political upheaval in Egypt and other Arab countries in 2011 is that these movements were not only oppositional, but also imagining and enacting a positive vision of the future through their revolutionary actions.

Women across classes and religions mobilized on their own initiative and played significant roles during the 18 days at Tahrir Square. Khalil (2014) observes the emergence of a new wave of the women’s movement as “young, poor, and previously voiceless” women sought to transform their society (p. 133). Like their 1919 predecessors, not all women revolutionaries were feminists or mobilized by the pursuit of women’s rights. However, the women who mobilized in 2011 were only able to do so with the force of women’s ongoing revolution behind them. Sorbera (2014a) argues, “during the ‘long Egyptian twentieth century’, feminist activism inspired a human transformation, which [was] part of the process leading to 25 January” (p. 63). McLarney (2015) similarly highlights the role of women’s Islamic cultural production in gradually developing new
Islamic subjectivities and continuously challenging the state. Over time, slow but steady reforms to women’s rights legitimized their presence in public space and their various, persistent oppositional tactics provided historical examples to inspire and justify participation in 2011. Men too were steadily exposed to these changes and saw the value of including women’s perspectives in the revolutionary agenda (Sorbera, 2014a). A century of women’s ongoing revolution had indeed achieved a shift in consciousness.

Seigneurie (2012) and Sorbera (2014a) suggest that the human rights discourse of the Kefaya and April 6 movements supported the growth of unconventional manifestations of the women’s movement. A new generation of male and female activists attempted to liberate themselves from the state’s elitist, co-opted feminism by operating in scattered, non-institutional spaces, including social media, blogs, graffiti, and other pop culture forms (Sorbera, 2013; Sami, 2015). These efforts contributed to the broader culture of creation emerging in 2011. Tahrir Square had the appearance of Moghdam’s (1997) egalitarian revolution as women’s liberation and seeds for equality were fought for as integral elements of the struggle for “life, freedom, and social justice” (Badran, 2014, p. 55). In those first eighteen days at Tahrir, there was little gender-based discrimination or violence and women expressed feeling safe and equal to their male counterparts (Sorbera, 2013). Exemplifying Arendt’s (1963) notion of revolution, men and women across classes and faiths united behind the goal to create a society where all citizens could realize their rights and freedom. The agenda of protestors included civil rights, free speech and freedom from coercion to end historic privileging of particular groups such as security forces, the political elite, a particular religious group, gender or class (Seigneurie, 2012). Women’s rights were not discounted by revolutionaries, rather they were incorporated in a human rights discourse that was believed to allow the issues to exist free of manipulation by the state.

At Tahrir Square, Naber (2011) notes female protestors pursued forms of activism similar to women in 1919 by leading marches, protecting the streets against vandals, mobilizing online demonstrations, and writing investigative journalism, among other efforts (as cited in Jackson, 2015, p. 42). Feminist scholars and activists concur that Egyptian women experienced consciousness raising by protesting alongside their male peers as equals (el-Saadawi, 2011; Badran, 2011; Sorbera, 2014a). Days at Tahrir were described
to Sorbera (2014a) as a *thawra insaniyya* (a personal revolution) as a result of female protestors being valued as Egyptians who contributed to the numbers, power, and belief system within the movement (p. 68). Another form of personal transformation is described by Islamist activist Raouf Ezzat. Among the crowds at the square, Ezzat continued her advocacy of the family as the site of women’s political action while participating in activism in the public sphere through protests, social media and citizen journalism (McLarney, 2015). While some find this position contradictory, McLarney (2015) explains that Ezzat and other Islamist activists embraced contradiction as a way to embody a different kind of politics and subjectivity (p. 253). Women at Tahrir Square built on the oppositional activism and cultural production of the past to embody new political identities in their own revolution.

Although the wave of change experienced by Egyptians and the Arab World in 2010 and 2011 world has been popularly referred to as the Arab Spring, the term is contentious. On one hand, some scholars criticize use of “Arab Spring” for marginalizing earlier transformations and resistance movements in which many women and men participated (Sorbera, 2013; Said et al., 2015a). From an historical perspective, Sorbera (2013) asserts that isolating the events of 2011 with the term “Arab Spring” neglects the decades of opposition that laid the path to a transformative period. Incorporating those past practices informs deeper analysis of the type of change at work in Egypt since 2011 (Sorbera, 2013). On the other hand, Haseeb (2013) argues “Spring” is more suitable than “Revolution” since transformative political, social, economic, and cultural change did not result in Arab countries, despite the revolutionary agendas of those who participated. Rather, “Spring” captures a season of “contradictory phenomena” such as consciousness raising in the face of state oppression (Haseeb, 2013, p. 1). Debate over the term “Arab Spring” is worth noting as it reveals different understandings and expectations of “revolution” that continue to contribute to the terms ambiguity. Furthermore, the rest of the chapter will reveal the consistency of sexual harassment and political discrimination faced by Egyptian women throughout three rotations in state leadership, provoking the question: a revolution for who?
The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)

The eighteen days at Tahrir Square culminated with Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power, a group of 21 senior officers from the Egyptian Army under the leadership of Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. Within a month of SCAF’s rule, women marched and protested the lack of genuine change in post-Mubarak Egypt. Eighteen female protesters were held in military detention, strip-searched, submitted to “virginity tests,” beaten, shocked, and threatened with charges of prostitution (Johansson-Nogués 2013). Samira Ibrahim was among those women, and she became an icon among protesters for sharing her story and filing a lawsuit against the military police (Hafez, 2014; Morsy, 2014). The public rallied around Ibrahim and denounced the practice of virginity tests, which were ultimately declared unlawful by the courts, although the accused doctor was acquitted (Morsy, 2014). Ibrahim represented both the struggles faced by women during political transition and a shift in the approach to women’s rights that was becoming increasingly confrontational. Consequently, previously isolated “women’s issues” became issues of public concern in post-Mubarak Egypt.

However, Abouelnaga (2015) returns to Hannah Arendt’s (1963) notion of revolution, arguing that if revolution requires men and women to “create a public realm where freedom could appear,” the arrest and abuse of eighteen female protestors marked a distinct threat to Egypt’s revolutionary agenda (p. 41). Abouelnaga (2015) contends this violent arrest was one event in an ongoing trend where women’s bodies became battlefields for socio-cultural clashes, exemplifying the post-revolutionary occurrence of violent masculinity discussed in Chapter 2. Gender and development scholar Deniz Kandiyoti (2013) proposes the battle over women’s bodies is part of “masculinist restoration:” a phenomenon where the notion of women’s inequality becomes unacceptable in dominant discourse and results in the state resorting to various mechanisms and coercion to re-secure patriarchy. After 2011, the gender system in Egypt became unstable as women were increasingly conscious of and acting against injustice while the state doubly re-asserted its validity by exercising political and physical power over women. Egyptian women experienced a particularly pitched battle at the intersection
of women’s ongoing revolution against patriarchy and the pursuit of transforming violent post-Mubarak society.

Like "modernization" under Nasser, or the “open door” strategy of Sadat, political transition in 2011 had women caught between political realities and the precarious promise of a better future. The anti-Mubarak sentiment from both Islamists and secular groups made earlier gains for women’s rights vulnerable from 2011 onward. Consequently, Egyptian women engaged in a version of West and Blumberg’s (1990) “triple struggle,” as they fought to democratize politics, while retaining social rights and dodging the often violent “patriarchal machismo of men” (Khamis, 2013 in Jackson, 2015, p. 43). A beneficial law did pass under the SCAF that provided financial and medical assistance to women-headed households, but it was an exception in a political climate that was generally unfriendly to women (Morsy, 2014). Electoral quotas were abolished, there was a lack of clarity and consensus on the role of the National Women’s Council, amendments and reversals to the Personal Status Law were proposed, and conservative groups were on the rise. These trends suggested further limitations were oncoming for women’s leadership and presence in public spheres (Morsy, 2014). In contrast to the vision of a free and just future imagined at Tahrir Square, in post-Mubarak Egypt the targets for women’s struggle were continually multiplying.

It was not long before efforts began to mitigate the obstacles to women’s rights and freedoms. Maya Morsy (2014), a gender and policy expert at UN Women, advocates for the importance of producing a women’s charter in contexts like post-Mubarak Egypt where women are under-represented in decision making processes, a sentiment echoed in the work of Melissa Jackson (2015). In June 2011, UN Women built on a consultation process initiated by The Arab Alliance for Women and the Coalition of Women’s NGOs, two local initiatives in Egypt. UN Women held a national convention for grassroots organizations to discuss the upcoming Egyptian Constitution in relation to women’s interests and rights (Morsy, 2014; Jackson, 2015). In contrast to the post-revolution initiatives of 1919 that largely worked within a local context, the Egyptian women’s movement in 2011 operated in connection with a high functioning transnational network. The result was an Egyptian Women’s Charter adopted and endorsed by 3000 community-based groups from all 26 governorates and signed by 500,000 supporters (Morsy, 2014;
Jackson, 2015). The Charter sought to legitimize women’s claims for a seat at the decision making table and their rights to education, economic security, and legal rights (Morsy, 2014; Jackson, 2015). Building on the 1994 ICPD and other cooperative efforts in the 1990s, women’s groups collaborated and created networks while producing an UN-sanctioned document that could provide formal grounds for their private and public rights.

While organizing within the relative safety of the UN proved fruitful, independent protests and sit-ins were plagued by the SCAF’s intimidation tactics and violent attacks on “women qua women,” (Badran, 2014, p. 49). Due to the symbolic power of their gender, women were targeted, regardless of religious affiliation or class. While in the 1980s the veil had provided protection from harassment to some extent that was no longer the case. Unveiled women were generally targeted more directly, but on December 16, 2011, the military violently dispersed a sit in, and officers dragged a veiled female protester through the streets, exposing her bra and bare torso (Kandiyoti, 2013; Hafez, 2014). The act powerfully demonstrated that state violence was indiscriminate. While what Kandiyoti (2013) calls the crisis of state masculinity continued to take on new, exaggerated forms, the anonymous protester became recognized as another icon for women, referred to as “the blue bra girl” or, more politely, *sit al banat* (the best of all girls) (Hafez, 2014, p. 182). Cases of extreme violence against women were a rallying point for organizing and continuing efforts to shift attitudes about gender in Egypt.

To make sense of their distinct circumstances, some women formed a political culture of opposition based on their shared experiences as waves of sexual harassment and gender discrimination swept Egypt. On December 20, 2011 women independently organized and executed their first march in response to repeated acts of sexual violence, demonstrating the power of collective organizing among diverse women in public space, a traditionally masculine domain (Morsy, 2014; Jackson, 2015). Morsy (2014) and Jackson (2015) agree it was a particularly influential performance of protest as the demonstration led to a rare apology from the SCAF regarding the perpetuation of violence against women. Although not a distinct issue at the outset, ongoing brutality and protest revealed gender issues were in fact at the center of the revolution.
Morsi

Mohamed Morsi was the first President in Egypt’s history to take power through free and competitive elections, representing what Goldstone (2015) calls a “truly revolutionary breakthrough,” even if the win was only by a slim majority (p. 5). Morsi aimed to instate democracy rooted in Islam, a platform known as the Nahda Project.21 Part of the rhetoric of the Nahda Project called for women’s equality and participation in the public sphere while acknowledging women’s central role in the home and family (McLarney, 2015). Morsi’s approach was distinct from Egypt’s past leaders in that he claimed not to see women’s equality with men in the public sphere as infringing upon shari’a (McLarney, 2015). Mariz Tadros (2014), a specialist in Islamist politics and gender, finds pressure was on Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to demonstrate commitment to gender equality in two ways: by ending public, gender based violence and through the constitution. These two issues generated the most mobilization under the SCAF and were sites to ensure women’s rights, if not enhanced, would at least be maintained (Tadros, 2014).

Tadros claims Morsi was largely unsuccessful on these two fronts, while Abou-Bakr (2015) characterizes Morsi’s general gender ideology as “self-righteous paternalism” (2015, p.196). Although the president promised to address gender-based violence within the first hundred days of his rule, Tadros and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (2014) report that incidents of politically motivated sexual assault increased in frequency and severity. Public, sexual violence was also common in crowds at football games and, occasionally, concerts. However, the harassment of women under the SCAF and Morsi was believed to be politically motivated by police, security forces, and ultimately, the state due to the disproportionate targeting of women activists in the same protest spaces and the intensity of brutal violence that rarely saw effective persecution (Tadros, 2014; FIDH, 2014). Kandiyoti (2014) explains that it was a widely held belief in Egypt that violence against women was a way to deter them from participating in the public sphere, with the implication that “only young women of loose morals participate in demonstrations” (p. 2). Thus, sexual violence became a way to control women’s political participation and influence in Egypt’s unfinished revolution.

21 For further detail on the Nahda Project and its approach to women’s rights, see McLarney (2015).
Morsi’s second shortcoming in terms of gender equality was the 2012 constitution. The 2011 Egyptian Women’s Charter was entirely dismissed and many of the women participating in constitutional processes walked out when their male peers ignored or intimidated them (Al-Ali, 2013; Jackson, 2015). Muslim Sisters celebrated a new clause that committed the state to supporting female-headed households, but scholars and UN experts who reviewed the constitution found the approach to women’s rights failed to meet international human rights standards (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR, 2012; Johansson-Nogués, 2013, Tadros, 2014). UN experts found that article 6 of the constitution espoused democratic principles but failed to incorporate international law, including on women’s human right to equality (OHCHR, 2012). Concern was also incited by the interpretive authority assigned to religious scholars not formally tied to Egypt’s legal system (Johansson-Nogués, 2013). Article 219 allowed conservative Islamist political parties, when dominant in parliament, to choose the most regressive interpretations in Islamic jurisprudence and create legislation. Tadros explains that concern from feminists and women’s activists came from the tendency of religious scholars to take a “reactionary stance” on women’s rights (p. 22). The paradox for many Egyptian women was that while they became increasingly aware of and resistant to discrimination, the state continuously found ways to physically and politically ensure their subjugation.

Between Morsi’s election in June 2012 and the signing of the constitution in December 2012, innovative and creative organizing intensified, including graffiti initiatives that will be discussed further in Chapter 4 (Tadros, 2014). Tadros (p. 23) describes this period as an expansion of “informal, organic, and responsive” initiatives by young people continuing the nonhierarchical organizing from 2011. These projects reacted to the changes on the ground and attracted an expansive group of professionals, non-professionals, activists, and artists who shared what "a common struggle" to make public space safe for women (p. 23). Mostafa (2015) identifies that struggle as one among many “aspirations of the 2011 revolution [that were] constantly being renewed and energized”

22 The OHCHR also noted that approaches to religious law in articles 2 and 3 failed to provide women’s right to equality in the family. Article 10 preserved the “moral character” of the family but did not guard against violations of women’s rights based on religious or cultural tradition.

23 The 2012 Constitution was suspended in July 2013 following the removal of President Morsi from office.
(p. 124). There were differences in how the initiatives engaged with the Morsi regime, but they were unified as “the offspring of the revolution” and collectively valued ongoing activism in the streets and in online media (Tadros, 2014, p. 23).

Within the street-level realm of politics, Hala G. Sami (2015) describes much of the activity as “a strategic use of culture” (p. 86). As mentioned previously, post-revolutionary contexts often use women as symbols for the nation and its culture, a strategy that ultimately limits notions of womanhood and women’s agency to particular realms. Women often react to those limitations with activism noted for its “creativity” as the pursuit of change moves outside state institutions and norms. Sami asserts that many initiatives emerged to “create new spaces of discourse and [to] rewrite cultural narratives” that contributed alternative constructions of women’s identities to the gender system (p. 87). Sami notes how the activist movement Baheya Ya Masr, Doaa Eladl’s satirical cartoons, and the Women on Walls graffiti movement similarly engaged with popular culture. The three initiatives appropriated and gave new meaning to female figures from Egyptian culture in order to empower and legitimize the resistance efforts of contemporary women (Sami, 2015). Badran (2014) observes that after 2011 there was an increase in creative, artistic output by women similar to the aftermath of the 1919 revolution. While operating in different contexts, the creation of performances and artefacts drawing on Egyptian history and culture provided women with ways to make sense of and legitimize their revolution experiences.

The strategic use of culture and non-hierarchical, informal, and responsive organizing demonstrate the continuation of 2011’s political cultures of creation identified by Foran (2014). The culture of creation shared by the initiatives in 2012 featured engagement with popular art forms that allowed men and women to imagine and enact a world where they shared rights to public space, justice, and freedom. Participation in that milieu was especially powerful for women since it provided the chance to shape their culture and society (Badran, 2014). Badran maintains that past and present opportunities to engage with cultural representations of women have proven to be as essential for Egyptian women as their involvement with political and legislative structures. Chapter 4

24 Women’s activism is described as creative in West & Blumberg (1990), Randall (1992), el-Saadawi (1997), Baron (2005), Bayat (2013) and Badran (2014).
will further explore graffiti as a particularly powerful form for Egyptian women’s cultural engagement and self-representation.

While women explored new venues to pursue protest, a culture of exaggerated masculinity continued to develop within the state as a means to affirm the strength of the patriarchy. The political sphere and constitution rejected women and violence against female protestors remained a common tactic (Johansson-Nogués, 2013; Kandiyoti, 2013). Morsi tightened his grasp on patriarchal authority when he attempted to assume new and more concentrated powers in November of 2012, but his assertion of power backfired (Moghadam, 2014). Along with a disappointing constitution, Moghadam suggests Morsi’s incapability to fulfill promises of restoring public services, increasing jobs, and representing all Egyptians created impetus for civil society to mobilize. Like the fall of Mubarak, one interpretation of Morsi’s failure is as a slow and steady structural failure that fueled the fire of well-organized and aggravated political cultures of creation.

In the spring of 2013, young people rallied behind the Tamarrud (Rebel) petition calling for the removal of Morsi as president (Badran, 2014). With more than 30 million signatures, larger crowds amassed on June 30, 2013 than those of the 18 days at Tahrir Square in 2011 (Badran, 2014; Tadros, 2014). Tadros identifies a significant change in that women who had been absent on January 25, 2011, including those from rural areas, the provinces, and Upper and Lower Egypt, were present on June 30, 2013. Like 2011, women’s rights were integrated in a broader mandate, but were voiced in the crowds with the chant “sawt al mar’a thawra mish awrah’ (a woman’s voice is a revolution not a depravity)” (p. 26).

Under the leadership of the chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah el Sisi, the military ousted Morsi. For some Egyptians, hatred of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood led to an often uncritical support of their overthrow and suppression, and praise of the military’s actions as “the will of the people” (Al-Ali, 2013, p. 313; Sorbera, 2014a). In the broader scope of the ongoing revolution, several scholars note a divide between Egyptians who saw Morsi’s removal as a continuation of the movement that began in 2011 and those who saw it as a counter-revolution returning Egypt to 2010 (Morsy, 2014; Sorbera, 2014a; Goldstone, 2015; Said et al. 2015c). The tension between
these accounts of Morsi’s removal is one that goes back to the distinction between cyclical and transformative definitions of revolution. Has Egypt entered a new era since 2011, or is the upheaval part of a political cycle returning to a familiar form of leadership? As the dust continues to settle, it seems a longer historical view is necessary in order to assess the type and degree of transformation shaping Egyptian society.

**el Sisi**

On 3 July, 2013 Adly Mansour took over as interim president to oversee the creation of a new constitution ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections (Kamal, 2015). In November, Mansour issued a presidential decree commonly known as the Protest Law, which gave the police legal power to arrest protestors who did not have permission from the ministry of interior to organize publicly (Mostafa, 2015). The FIDH (2014) reported that on November 26, police disbursed a protest against military trials for civilians in accordance with the Protest Law. A dozen women were arrested, beaten, detained and later left in the desert outside Cairo (FIDH, 2014). A new era of censorship and control over civil society had begun.

The creation of the constitution held some promise of change. The National Council for Women played a role in securing women’s rights, a re-instantiation of state-feminism that gender studies scholar Hala Kamal (2015) finds was countered by the presence of civil society feminists who monitored the membership of the committee and constitutional processes. Although there was only 10% representation for women within the Constitutional Committee, Kamal maintains feminists were generally satisfied due to the caliber of the five women who participated and because many male members were known supporters of gender equality. There was some internal disagreement regarding what rights to enshrine, but the 2014 constitution ultimately held many firsts, including commitment to women holding public and senior management offices, women’s representation in legislative institutions, and women’s appointment to judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination (Tadros, 2014). Tadros notes that for the first time in Egypt’s history, the constitution offered protection to women from all forms of violence through Article 11, an achievement women fought for in each constitutional amendment.
of the past century. The balance between public and private rights for women gave some hope of egalitarian outcomes for the most recent wave of political upheaval.

Reflecting on the creation of the 2013 constitution, Kamal (2015) describes a division among feminists on how to vote. Some believed it should be supported based on the inclusion of women’s rights and civil rights, while others argued it should not be supported on those bases alone since the constitution defied human rights in other realms, such as military trials for civilians and economic privileging of the military (Kamal, 2015). Despite these fractures and low voter turnout, women participated in high numbers and the majority of voters were in favour of the new constitution, resulting in its ratification in January 2014 (Kamal, 2015).

In 2014, Abdel Fattah el Sisi began his campaign for presidency, and Egypt was divided. Rabie (2014) and Abou-Bakr (2015, p. 196) both note that following the successful overthrow of Morsi, a narrative emerged in the media and civil society that portrayed Sisi as the nation’s chivalrous hero while Egypt was cast as “the damsel in distress.” However, Al-Ali (2013) and Sorbera (2014a) describe doubt among Egyptians regarding the presidential candidate’s true intentions and refusal to support Sisi and the military simply on the basis that they removed Morsi. Al-Ali (2013) was skeptical herself and made the following statement:

I do not for a second believe that General el Sisi, and the Egyptian military more widely, are interested in either women’s or human rights, or the democratic values, and ideas of freedom, dignity, and respect associated with the revolutionary movement (p. 315).

While not unanimously popular, Sisi did gain particular favor among many ordinary Egyptian women. Sisi specifically targeted women with speeches, conferences and campaigns while female supporters organized marches to promote his presidential candidacy. Subsequently, the discourse of chivalry and heroism gained new power (Rabie, 2014; Abou-Bakr, 2015). When it came time to vote, Egyptian women were the ones noted for their political action. Live election updates from online news website *Mada Masr* (2014) noted that at the ballot box men were outnumbered by women, many of whom carried laminated cards of the presidential candidate while chanting “Sisi is our hero” and "vote for Sisi the champion," among other slogans. Along with representing the general
population’s desire for stability, Sisi also came to symbolize a possibility for change that was particular to women, two narratives that contributed to his successful election as Egypt’s new president in June 2014 (Rabie, 2014; Abdelatty, 2015).

Unfortunately, Sisi fulfilled Al-Ali’s (2013) doubtful prediction. Following his election, Sisi battled against the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters, clamped down on freedom of expression in the media, and restricted public demonstrations (Sorbera, 2014a). According to Badran (2014), Sisi had low tolerance for criticism of “the power amassed by the state,” concentration of authority the president claimed was “in the name of security” (p. 49). At the time of writing, how these oppressive strategies impacted Egyptian women’s rights is a point of contention in the media and reports from NGOs. Ambassador Mona Omar, the former secretary-general of the state-run NCW, told news site Al-Monitor that the constitution improved the status of Egyptian women (Abdelatty, 2015). Omar referred to the articles that promote gender equality, the prevention of sexual violence, and the return of the electoral quota system, as well as the historic appointment of a woman as the president’s adviser in National Security Affairs (Abdelatty, 2015). These are certainly important signs of progress, but as history shows, there is a risk that constitutional amendments and quotas are symbolic gestures rather than real commitments to change.

In the same Al-Monitor article, Dina Al-Khawaja, a professor of political science at Cairo University, asserted that there is a gap between political and constitutional representation, and women’s lived experiences. (Abdelatty, 2015). Al-Khawaja claimed women continue to face marginalized economic participation and harassment in public (Abdelatty, 2015). According to the 2014 Women’s Status Report, under Sisi’s rule, women suffered from general decline in civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and gender-based violence, findings supported by the 2014 Global Gender Gap report issued by the World Economic Forum and the 2014 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (ECWR, 2014, p. 4). While in the past two years President el-Sisi’s government gave constitutional and public support for the fight against sexual violence, FIDH (2015) report the widespread use of sexual violence against women and men during arrests and detention without recourse for perpetrators. The continued decline in women’s status reveals great deviation from Sisi’s earlier
campaigning, suggesting his interest in women’s political engagement may have been co-optation rather than commitment.

With the Muslim Brotherhood made illegal and Sisi pursuing an ongoing “witch hunt,” Muslim Sisters have become particularly vulnerable to violence (FIDH, 2015, p. 10). Tadros observes that women from other strains of feminist activism responded to the repression of Muslim Sisters in various ways, with some defending their human rights while others argue their affiliation with the Brotherhood makes violence justifiable. Many of the Muslim Sisters radicalized or retreated from public life due to the security crackdown (Tadros, 2014). The fight for Egyptian women’s rights and freedoms continues, although along a path obstructed by the historical ruts of diverging agendas and state co-optation.

**Conclusion**

Since 1919, Egypt experienced multiple transformations and throughout it all, women made meaningful contributions to socio-political movements and the ongoing revolution to fully achieve their rights and freedoms. The history of the Egyptian women’s movement exemplifies the variation of women’s interests, motivations, and experiences in and out of revolution. When access to decision making and political power was limited, Egyptian women turned their exclusion into new organizational strategies, from everyday feminism, to participation in mass protests, to leading ongoing grassroots initiatives. This has come with countless challenges including division within and between women’s groups and persecution by authoritarian regimes. The work of Johansson-Nogués (2013) and Kandiyoti (2013) illustrates that Egypt is one of many cases of revolution where patriarchy violently re-instantiates itself when the gender system becomes unstable. However, women have become increasingly adept at self-organizing and forming strategic alliances on issues of mutual concern in order to continually create cracks in patriarchal power (Tadros, 2014; Kamal, 2015).

So, what form and degree of revolutionary change have women experienced in Egypt since 2011? Women continue to face significant social, economic, and political barriers and division among their own movements. However, Sorbera (2014a) and Ashcar (2013, in Mostafa, 2015) offer a shared observation that the transformative results of
political upheaval in 1919 and 1952 only appeared many years later, something worth bearing in mind when considering the extent to which Egypt’s gender system has altered since 2011. Sorbera (2014a) asserts that to suggest that no positive change has been achieved would be a great disservice to the men and women actively working to transform Egypt today, and to those who worked to improve Egyptian women’s status over the last century.

As Bayat (2013) contends, just because a unified revolutionary movement is not visible does not mean transformational change is not taking place. This seems to be the case for the women and activists in Egypt today as Sorbera (2014a) finds that there remains an “optimism of the will among Egyptian revolutionary women” (p. 73). Through participation in new grassroots initiatives and cultural strategies, women across classes, age groups, and religions gained experience with independent mobilization and tools of political activism (Khalil, 2014; Kamal, 2015). As a result, women are playing an important role in shaping new conceptualizations of their society (Sorbera, 2014a). In order for broad socio-economic changes and women’s rights to take hold, Moghadam (2014) argues the issues and agenda setting must be taken on by the few women who do hold power within political institutions. Efforts for change must be pursued within and outside state structures if the revolution for Egyptian women’s rights and freedoms is ever to resolve in their favour.

Understanding the particularities of women’s revolutionary activity allows for consideration of alternative narratives and forms of organizing that may otherwise go unseen, and which can push us towards a new notions of societal transformation (Bayat, 2013; Sorbera, 2014a). Continuing efforts to re-define revolution, the next chapter will look beyond conventional sources with an analysis of Egyptian graffiti created by and about women since 2011. As mentioned earlier, graffiti is one cultural strategy that captured Egyptian women’s revolution experiences while re-imagining their rights and freedoms. Thus, graffiti can facilitate a discussion about a new, emerging consciousness regarding gender in Egyptian society.
Chapter 4.

Against the Wall: Women and Graffiti in Egypt

The previous two chapters of this thesis explored various manifestations of revolution. Chapter 2 established the broad history and theory of the term “revolution” to provide insight into how the term has developed different meanings over time. Following recent events in the 2000s, scholars have called once more for a re-evaluation of revolution so that it more accurately captures societal transformation in today’s global political climate. More recent theories by Bayat (2013) and Foran (2014) emphasize examining slow, continuous forms of creative change. The re-evaluation of revolution echoes the work of feminist and women’s studies scholars who have long found revolutionary processes and scholarship inadequate for women (Randall, 1992; Andrijasevic et al., 2014). Chapter 3 applied the revolution history and theory from Chapter 2 in an examination of the women’s movement in Egypt from 1919 to present day. Particular focus was given to women’s experiences since the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Throughout the nation’s ebb and flow of political transformation, many Egyptian women encountered the conflicting forces of personal, political consciousness raising and increased oppression from an unstable patriarchal state (Hafez, 2014; Khalil, 2014). While revolutions have yet to fulfill their promises of women’s rights and freedoms, many Egyptian activists remain determined to transform their nation’s gender system.

A new definition of revolution can adjust the elite, male tilt of history by incorporating the cultural tools and narratives used by historically marginalized actors, such as women (Randall, 1992; Foran, 2001). The purpose of this fourth chapter to balance the terms of revolution by exploring a form of narrative that became particularly powerful in Egypt: graffiti. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Egyptian men and, especially, women found that graffiti facilitated revision of cultural narratives and creation of new discourses regarding gender (Sami, 2015). To explore those (re)writings in depth, this chapter assesses the findings from a chronological analysis of 266 graffiti created by women or that visually or textually represented women on the walls of Egypt between 2011 and 2015.
Integrating theory on revolution, art, and graffiti from Chapter 2 and history from Chapter 3, Egypt’s graffiti, graffiti movement, and graffiti viewers are analyzed from three angles throughout this chapter: as revolutionary narrative, as a political culture of creation, and as a nonmovement. The first angle is to analyze the graffiti pieces collectively in chronological order to form a revolutionary narrative. Exploration of narratives is valuable because they provide a snapshot of “the systems of meaning” motivating graffiti artists and encouraging dialogue among public viewers (Johnston, 2009, p. 20-21). Egyptian women’s historic national influence, demands for political agency, and experiences with sexual harassment and discrimination figure prominently in the narrative analysis. By examining these more recent visual “scripts” alongside narratives throughout the Egyptian women’s movement, there is a chance to unfold consistencies and disparities in women’s experiences from 1919 to present day. Doing so facilitates further consideration of what kind of “revolutionary” change has taken place for Egyptian women in the aftermath of 2011 and in the longer view of the past century.

The second angle of analysis is to align graffiti artists with Foran’s (2014) notion of political cultures of creation, where actors “create” the transformation of society by adopting the nonviolent ways they would intend to live and act in the world, as they would like it to be. The graffiti movement exemplified new forms of revolutionary organizing that allowed male and female artists to imagine and enact a world where men and women could safely coexist and re-imagine gender in Egypt.

The third angle is to consider graffiti from the perspective of those who view the artwork by applying Bayat’s (2013) term “nonmovement,” the social change that can result from the shared, everyday practices of ordinary people who are not guided by an ideology, organization, or leader (p. 14). As thousands of individuals knowingly or unknowingly share in viewing graffiti during their daily movements through the streets of Egypt, they repeatedly encounter new stories about women that challenge patriarchal norms. Bayat’s (2013) notion of a “nonmovement” suggests that while a single encounter with such narratives may not have a lasting impact, the repeated, collective exposure to graffiti about women’s experiences can produce space for new consciousness regarding gender roles and women’s rights.
The overarching objective of this chapter is to contribute to the diversification of perspectives and sources included in the re-definition of revolution. By engaging with graffiti by or about women from three angles, the analysis aims to demonstrate that alternative texts can illuminate experiences of women that conventional literature often neglects. Furthermore, by considering sources that capture different perspectives, there is an opportunity to reveal visions of societal transformation that can inform new conceptualizations of revolution.

Graffiti Analysis

Graffiti produces a number of challenges for analysis. As a mode of communication between art and language, graffiti scholars find few theoretical frameworks capture the various types and meanings of wall inscriptions (Phillips, 1999; Rodriguez, 2003). When graffiti is created in the setting of revolution, there are even fewer methods readily available for visual analysis, as revolution research has largely focused on texts (Doerr et al., 2013). While text-based graffiti has been studied using discourse methodology, image based murals and newer street art forms such as paste-ups and stencils demand a multi-faceted form of analysis. For both text and image, “visual modifiers” such as colour, shape, form, and style transform or challenge the meaning of the message being communicated (Phillips, 1999, p. 39). Bauer and Gaskell (2000) suggest the extent to which a researcher can grasp the meaning behind these modifiers depends on knowledge of relevant cultural-specific lexicons of symbolism and metaphor. To address these challenges, the graffiti analysis in this chapter has drawn on the methodologies of visual semiotics (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Doerr et al., 2013), critical discourse analysis (Gee, 2005) and feminist linguistic analysis (Mills, 2012). Research on Egyptian symbolism, and cultural and historical iconography was also pursued to support interpretation of visual modifiers.

Methodology

Images of graffiti were selected based on whether the artwork was created by a female artist or if it visually or textually referred to women, thus drawing in work by anonymous artists, male graffiti artists, as well as graffiti collectives. While much of the artwork was erased, modified, or no longer exists on the walls of Egypt, images of the
graffiti were captured online and in print, which Bardhan and Foss (forthcoming) describe as a continuation of the graffiti’s documentary function. Local, national and international news media, art publications, blogs and social media such as Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter and Pinterest were used to collect graffiti images published between 2011 and 2015. The images were cross-referenced across sources in an effort to find the earliest possible posting of the graffiti piece so an accurate chronological timeline could be created. Image collection ceased when no new images were found through searches of print and online sources. Graffiti that was not translated from Arabic to English by the artist or source was sent to a translator.

The images were then compiled in Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis computer software program. Each image was classified in the following categories: identity of the artists (identified/unidentified); the date the image was posted online or published in print; the location of the graffiti (Cairo, Alexandria, Mansoura, Luxor, other Egypt); the form of graffiti (tag, throw up, piece, mural, street art; see Glossary); the gender of the artist(s) (male, female, mixed, unassigned); and, the type of artist (individual, collective, unassigned). Graffiti created by collectives was automatically labeled as “mixed” gender since the names of individual members were not available. Using Nvivo’s classification function, the images were organized and analyzed chronologically.

Bauer and Gaskell’s (2000) visual semiotics analysis process was followed to produce a denotational inventory for each graffiti image. First, each image was reviewed individually to create a description of the use of colour, size, positioning, text, veiled or unveiled women, what parts of the body were shown, direction of gaze, number of figures, etc. Second, the higher levels of signification – connotation, myths, and references – were described in each image. These culturally specific significations were supported by references to the classifications used in Mia Gröndahl’s Revolution Graffiti, themes from Mona Abaza’s (2013) “Imagining Gender in Cairene Graffiti,” and graffiti analysis completed by Bardhan & Foss (forthcoming) in their article “Revolutionary Graffiti and Cairene Women: Performing Agency through Gaze Aversion.”

25 Information regarding the artist’s economic status or religious affiliation was not available in the literature used for this analysis. Such data would certainly be illuminating for future research.
Synthesizing the key connotative categories, each image was coded in Nvivo under the following: "Egyptian and Proud," "Freedom and Revolution," "Socio-Political Issues," "State Power," "Martyrs and Heroes," and "Women on the Walls." To assess the ebb and flow of these connotative themes during the five-year period, a query was run comparing each code by year. Notes were taken on these queries to describe the presence or absence of particular denotative and connotative themes in the graffiti over time, and the various ways women were depicted or referred to from 2011 to 2015. The images discussed in the following sections represent the themes that occurred most frequently each year.

Following the methodological recommendations of Rodriguez (2003), and Bardhan and Foss (forthcoming), the findings from the image analysis were triangulated with theories of revolution and feminist theory to provide a more robust examination of the multiple meanings within each artwork, and the graffiti collection as a whole. The findings from the analysis are organized chronologically by year, with 2011 serving as the “beginning” of the narratives, 2013 as the “middle,” and midway through 2015 as the incomplete “conclusion.” However, these narratives build upon and continue discourses from the Egyptian women’s movement, and will be examined in that historical context as the most recent chapter in a longer story.

Findings

2011

In 2011, images of women were diverse, depicting film icons, martyrs, and revolutionary protestors. Figures 4.1.-4.4. show a strong alignment of women with the Egyptian flag, the colours of which represent particular historical events. Nicoarea (2014) explains the red strip represents the 1952 coup by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the white symbolizes the uprising that overthrew king Farouk and ended Muhammad Ali’s rule, and the black is a reminder of the oppression Egyptians experienced under British colonialism. Returning to Parker’s (1999) notion of revolutionary narrative, using these colours is one way to draw on collective memory of past revolutionary movements that provide broader historical context for contemporary protest.
Figures 4.1.-4.3. combine the national flag and women's bodies through face paint, hair or scarves, and clothing. These images align with the feminist theory of revolution that suggests women symbolize both historic, national pride and the promise of progress (Baron, 2005; Kadry, 2014). This symbolism is further illuminated in the text of Figure 4.4. Next to a woman gazing at the viewer are lyrics from a song by Sheikh Imam, reading “Preserve Egypt's standing/And we will keep the old promise/Egypt is more honest than time” (Gröndahl, 2012, p. 14). Continuing narrative themes from the revolution in 1919 and the 1952 coup, the graffiti images and text reveal women in post-Mubarak Egypt were central to maintaining the nation’s identity in a period of flux (Hafez, 2014; Sami, 2015). While that narrative is not inherently negative, Kadry (2014) asserts it is important to consider the ways that treating women as symbols of the nation can limit notions of womanhood and agency to particular realms. This is particularly important in Egypt, where the dynamics of a patriarchal gender system shape the nation women symbolize.
While protesting against the Mubarak regime, Figures 4.5.-4.8. also provide a snapshot of a narrative challenging gender discourse that feminist scholars find has historically portrayed Egyptian women as symbols of national pride and victims in need of protection (Sorbera, 2014a; Bardhan & Foss, forthcoming). Rather than passive repositories for national identity, the graffiti narrative portrays Egyptian women as active participants in the political transformation process. In an interview with The Egypt Independent, female graffiti artist Ranwa Youssef explained the power of graffiti:

“It’s not art for art’s sake. It’s politics. We are telling people that the revolution is continuing and our demands still haven’t been met […] We are interacting with people to tell them that we are the revolution and these drawings are part of it. These drawings tell the history of our struggle against Mubarak (in Osman, 2011).

Youssef’s statement reveals the roots of graffiti theory by describing how the art form documents an alternative history of struggle against state power and how that history produces “off-wall” dialogue about revolutionary goals.
Figure 4.5.  Untitled
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, posted on Jul 8, 2011, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 (by Sarah Carr; NonCommercial; ShareAlike) on https://www.flickr.com/photos/sarahcarr/5927570707/in/album-72157626776788960/ Translation: I’m going down-going out … July 8.

Figure 4.6.  Untitled
Note: Street art by Hend Kheera, Cairo, posted Jul 27, 2011 on https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2011/07/27/new-graffiti-in-cairo-nighttime-stalking/ Translation: ‘We’ll get you from Sharm, You Traitor, Soona!

Figure 4.7.  Untitled
Note: Street art by Radz, Cairo, posted Oct 16, 2011, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 (by Radwa Fouda, NonCommercial, NoDerivatives) on http://radwafouda.blogspot.ca/2011/10/suzan-mubarak-graffiti.html Translation: Students’ friend.

Figure 4.8.  Untitled
As discussed in Chapter 3, June 2012 – December 2012 was an exemplary period of innovation in activist organizing, including graffiti initiatives (Tadros, 2014; Mostafa, 2015). The year 2012 was the most active for graffiti artists within the five-year period studied. Within the collection of images for this thesis, 34 pieces of graffiti were created by or about women in 2011, while 104 were created in 2012 (see Figures A.4. and A.5.). Female artists produced nearly equal numbers of graffiti as their male peers, despite the higher risk for women creating art in public. Many pieces continued the call to action for the ongoing revolution, with messages like “get angry,” “If not now, then when? And if not you, then who,” and, “Let’s start a love revolution; you’ll be shocked by the amount of love planted in us” (see Figures 4.9.-4.11.). Along with the text directed at the viewer by using “you” and “let’s”, Bardhan and Foss (forthcoming) suggest the direct gaze of a woman with a downturned mouth connote judgements, implicating the viewer in receiving her message and taking action. These pieces build on the narrative of 2011 where women are strong and capable political agents participating in the revolution. Furthermore, the graffiti fulfill a function of revolutionary narrative by confirming the existence of female actors imagining and instigating action for a better future. This confirmation is important for female activists experiencing consciousness raising, as they see proof of similarly politically agentic women on the walls around them.

Figure 4.9.  Eghdaby (Get Angry)
Note: Street art by 4SprayCans, Cairo, posted Jan 26, 2012 on <https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/01/26/january-25-the-anniversary-graffiti/>
Much of the 2012 graffiti regarding women’s experiences in revolution condemned the sexual harassment described in Chapter 3. A recurring character in revolutionary graffiti was Samira Ibrahim, the young woman who took the military to court for subjecting her to a virginity test (see Figure 4.13.). The beating of sit al banat, or “the blue bra girl,” was also captured in numerous murals and stencils. Many walls in Cairo were decorated with Bahia Shehab’s blue bras and text reading “no to stripping the people” above Arabic in the shape of a footprint stating “long life and peace with revolutions” (see Figure 4.12.). Figure 4.14. portrays a realistic representation of the incident with Arabic text above stating, “We (the people) will never forget sit al banat -” an Arabic phrase meaning woman of women – an expression of holding a woman in the highest esteem. In a review of women in revolutionary iconography, Lisiak (2015) finds the Supergirl Tawra piece by El Teneen in Figure 4.15. expands on the symbolism of the blue bra. A female superhero is depicted with the red letter tha on her chest, meaning thawra (revolution) along with the Arabic text below her stating “it continues” (Lisiak, 2015). Her costume is red and blue, colours that
respectively represent destructive fire and fury, and truth (Olderr, 2012; Bardhan & Foss, forthcoming). Sit al banat became a symbol for women’s ongoing fight.

The narrative on sexual harassment is consistent with an ongoing trend in contemporary Egypt to make violence against women a public concern, rather than a “women’s issue” (Abouelnaga, 2015). However, Polletta (2009) notes that feminist activists are also aware of the danger of telling personal stories of injustice and humiliation that can portray women as passive victims rather than powerful agents. Egyptian graffiti challenges the potentially threatening arch of such stories. Rather than producing shame or silencing, Al-Ali (2013) asserts stories of sexual harassment made women like Ibrahim and sit al banat into icons of the revolution, and contributed to a public dialogue on the status of Egyptian women. In the broader revolutionary narrative, these images frame the potential for creating change by confirming the existence of women overcoming the label of victim.

Figure 4.12 Untitled
Note: Street art by Bahia Shehab, Cairo, posted Feb, 2012, CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 (by Bahia Shehab; NonCommercial; NoDerivatives), on http://www.ted.com/talks/bahia_shehab_a_thousand_times_no/transcript?language=en#t-180997
Translation: No to stripping the people, and the footprint reads: Long live a peaceful revolution.

Figure 4.13 Untitled
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, posted Jul 14, 2012 on http://loganmideast.blogspot.ca/
Translation: You can’t break me, Cairo.
Many pieces of graffiti made explicit statements regarding the various forms of discrimination many Egyptian women experience. Figure 4.16 delivers a violent threat to male harassers with a woman’s figure shown inside a prohibitive red circle with the statement “no touching, castration is waiting for you” One stencil of a veiled woman targeted the withholding of women’s rights with the demand “you owe me my rights” (see Figure 4.17.). Mirah Shihadeh’s spray can woman stating “no to sexual harassment” coloured multiple city walls from 2012 to 2015 (see Figure 4.18.). A stencil shown in Figure 4.19. objects to the judgment of women’s appearance by depicting a niqab, a hijab, and women’s hair with the message “don’t label me.”26 Such artistic expressions highlight consciousness-raising, statements Polletta (2009) finds can be a method to “prove that [women] know better than any expert the source of and solutions to their problems” (p. 40).

Figures 4.16.-4.19. confront problematic forms of discrimination and propose solutions, such as the achievement of women’s rights or turning violence upon men.

26 Based on my analysis, hijabs and niqabs were the most direct references to Islam in graffiti by or depicting women. Seigneurie (2012) suggests graffiti depicting images of mourning, including mothers who lost their children or memorials for martyrs and imprisoned activists, often had an “Islamic valence” (p. 498).
Furthermore, the stories of Ibrahim and sit al banat sparked other women and men to acknowledge gender discrimination and to voice protest against its continuation. The graffiti narratives on sexual harassment and discrimination against women resultantly became more complex and reflective of many Egyptian women’s experiences as both victims and agents of change.

**Figure 4.16** Untitled  
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, published in 2012 by Mia Gröndahl.  
Translation: No touching, castration is waiting for you.

**Figure 4.17** Untitled  
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, published in 2012 by Mia Gröndahl.  
Translation: You owe me my rights.

**Figure 4.18** Untitled  
Note: Throw up by Mira Shihadeh, Cairo, posted Jul 2, 2012 on http://loganmideast.blogspot.ca/  
Translation: No to harassment.

**Figure 4.19** Don’t categorize me  
Artists also used entertainment icons to deliver messages about the treatment of women. Figure 4.20. depicts singer Umm Kulthum and Figures 4.21. and 4.22. show actresses Souad Hosny, respectively sharing the messages "There is a limit to patience," "There is no such thing as exclusively for men," and "Girls and Boys are equal." Amidst the violence in 2011 and 2012, a young blogger explained these respected female icons represented "a life that I wish to see in Egypt … It is full of social freedoms and women are pretty, fashionable, and free" (as cited in Gröndahl, 2012). Drawing on the popularity of these films among young people, Gröndahl suggests graffiti artists leveraged the respect of female cinema stars to create historical context for the messages of frustration and desires for equality among many contemporary Egyptian women.

NooNeswa, the graffiti collective responsible for the stencils in Figures 4.21. and 4.22. used the images as part of gender-sensitive and female-driven street art campaigns to “tackle and invert negative social ideas of stereotypes toward women” (El Nabawi, 2013, n.p.). NooNeswa co-founder Merna Thomas said “[t]he idea was to gather a group of young, female rights activists and visual artists to collaborate in constructing public campaigns aimed at changing the narrative of women in Egypt” (El Nabawi, 2013). Thomas articulates graffiti’s narrative function and describes a more organized element of the graffiti movement that mobilized around women’s socio-political status. NooNeswa is one example of how the new manifestation of the women’s movement pursued goals that
Sorbera (2013) claims were aligned with feminism and previous women’s rights efforts, whether explicitly stated or not.

Female figures from Egyptian history also gained prominence in graffiti, further contributing to the historical narrative that provided what Parker (1999) calls “normative and predictive indicators” for the possibility of women holding influence over society (p 112). Alaa Awad’s work was particularly striking for its use of Pharaonic symbolism. Gröndahl (2012) describes the mural in Figure 4.23. as depicting Mother Egypt protected by dogs, representing the people, while wolves or hyenas, representing evil powers, attempt an attack. This image of Mother Egypt reveals the historic roots of women symbolizing the nation. In another mural, Awad portrays twenty-one Pharaonic women in colourful robes walking with batons and staffs in hand, which Gröndahl (2012) suggests represents women’s long history in protest (see Figure 4.24). El Zeft’s paste-up of Nefertiti in a gas mask is one of the most recognizable pieces from the revolution, as it was turned into stencils, posters, and masks for protests (see Figure 4.25.). Nefertiti was one of the most powerful queens of Egypt. In Zeft’s piece she is depicted in black, a colour connoting death, with red paint below, which Bardhan and Foss (forthcoming) propose signals “women’s power and capabilities in the context of this revolution” (p. 14). These graffiti offer examples of Egyptian women’s powerful roles throughout history and provide context for their contemporary activism.

Figures 4.23.-4.25. draw on the same historical narrative raised by the Egyptian women’s movement in 1919, while giving the stories new power with visibility on public walls. Well known Egyptian graffiti blogger Soraya Morayef (suzeeinthecity) (2012) commented that the graffiti “was art and history in the making, the first time I had personally observed graffiti as an art form to reflect reality and record history - and in real time as well.” Morayef’s observation further reveals the impact of aligning historical figures with current events. Haghani (2015) finds imagery of powerful women from Egypt’s past creates a point of contrast for the current fall of women’s status and justifies contemporary political demands. In the case of women’s movements in 1919 and 2012, there was a shared desire across time and place to revive memories of women’s impact on Egyptian society and to legitimize claims to political influence and public equality.
Figure 4.23  Untitled
Note: Mural by Alaa Awad, Cairo, published in 2012 by Mia Gröndahl.

Figure 4.24. Untitled
Note: Mural by Alaa Awad, Cairo, posted Feb 6, 2012 on
https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/02/08/in-the-midst-of-
madness-graffiti-of-the-ultras-on-mohamed-mahmoud-street/

Figure 4.25. Nefertiti
Note: Street art by el Zeft, Cairo, posted Sep 23, 2012 on
https://www.facebook.co
m/photo.php?fbid=10152
130799385075&set=a.10
150996137635075.76356
2.638490074&type=1&th
eater
While most graffiti narratives revealed Egyptian women’s influence and agency, a counter-narrative also emerged. Some images used women’s bodies to feminize, and thereby demean, notions of justice, government, and the military. Figures 4.26., 4.27., and 4.29. show naked, sexualized women as symbols of the law and the Egyptian government’s infidelity to the people and, in Figure 4.28., representing the SCAF’s submission. Badran (2012) observes that Egyptian artists confronted “securitized patriarchy and uniformed masculinity” by reversing gender roles as a form of ridicule (p. 25). While women were making significant contributions to redefining their nation, their bodies were used to represent the failings of the very institutions from which they were excluded. This type of imagery is less frequent within the graffiti collected for analysis, but it offers an important point of contrast. These images exemplify a subservient element of women’s symbolic representation of the nation in comparison to the pride and honesty connoted in Figures 4.1.-4.4. This comparison illustrates the limitations and contradictions in Egyptian women’s symbolic roles as their lived political experiences were more diverse and agentic.

Figure 4.26. Untitled
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, posted Jun 5, 2012 on https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/the-presidential-elections-revolutionary-graffiti-continues/
Translation: Justice.

Figure 4.27. Untitled
Translation: The judges of Egypt.
Figure 4.28. Untitled

Figure 4.29. Untitled
Translation: The parliament is the son of a whore.

2013

The year 2013 is the “middle” of the graffiti narratives in this study, and the beginning of the steady decline in the graffiti movement’s activity (see Figures A.5. and A.6.). In 2013, graffiti increasingly represented regular Egyptian women along with the historical figures and entertainment icons of 2011 and 2012. These everyday female protestors were depicted as active participants in revolt whose agency was not limited. Figure 4.30. shows a female protestor holding her male peer by the arm, with the text “During battles, I will be behind you, protecting you.” In a clear reversal of traditional Egyptian gender roles, a strong female protects her male colleague. Sorbera (2014a) takes the interpretation of the image a step further, proposing the graffiti represents women “protecting the revolution against patriarchal violence” (p. 67). Figure 4.31. shows a veiled woman with her right arm raised and the statement “Fear Me, Government!” Figure 4.32., a mural titled “The Manifesto of the People,” similarly depicts a veiled woman leading a crowd, both arms raised and wearing a keffiyeh, a symbol of solidarity with Palestine. It is worth noting that female protestors are shown veiled and unveiled,
reflecting and encouraging the participation of women across religious spectrums. In contrast to the images of women from Egypt’s history and entertainment, these graffiti contribute to a narrative that confirm the existence of regular female Egyptians experiencing consciousness raising, demanding change and continuing the revolution alongside their male peers. These images depict what Moghadam (1997) would call an egalitarian revolution, even if in reality, the patriarchy continued to act out against revolutionary women. Thus, Figures 4.30.-4.32. also reinforce the existence of a culture of creation where male and female actors imagine and act upon a shared vision of a free future.

Figure 4.30. Untitled
Note: Street art by anonymous, Cairo, posted Jan 7, 2013 on https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/women-in-graffiti-a-tribute-to-the-women-of-egypt/
Translation: During battles, I will be behind you, protecting you.

Figure 4.31. Untitled
Note: Street art by Keizer, Cairo, posted Jan 7, 2013 on https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/women-in-graffiti-a-tribute-to-the-women-of-egypt/
Translation: Fear me, government!
In 2013, photographer Mia Gröndahl and cultural manager Angie Balata founded Women on Walls (WOW). WOW is an initiative of female and male artists using graffiti to talk about women’s issues and rights (WOW, 2015; Sami, 2015). Balata explained the reasoning behind engaging Egyptians through graffiti:

What drew us to graffiti was its accessibility. Passersby in the street can stop and talk with the artists; they don’t need to go to a closed space like a museum or an art gallery to see the piece. Everyone who sees it receives the same message — even those who don’t necessarily want to receive it (Soliman & Balata, 2013).27

Balata’s description echoes the theory regarding graffiti’s generation of public dialogue and the disruption of consciousness experienced by both willing and unwilling viewers. In the spring of 2013, WOW harnessed graffiti’s public, disruptive characteristics

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27 Throughout Egypt’s history, state control over art and cultural production took on various forms. Nasser developed policies of centralization within the state, while Sadat’s open door policies led to privatization and a significant drop of government support for artists. Winegar (2006) finds Mubarak created a model that blended Nasser’s and Sadat’s approaches, though there was still a “right” kind of art for the government to support based on national ideology and cultural authenticity. Although Egyptian artwork has long been critical of the state, the public and unauthorized nature of graffiti marks a significant shift for the production and consumption of art in Egypt. See Winegar (2006) and Badran (2012, 2014).
to make women’s presence more visible in the streets of Egypt (WOW, 2015). Projects were executed in Mansoura, Alexandria, Cairo, and Luxor with women working alongside male artists, creating a space where harassment could be avoided (Soliman & Balata, 2013). The desire to create a safe, creative space for male and female artists is reflective of the graffiti movement’s political culture of creation that sought to exemplify a world where men and women could challenge and re-imagine the gender system on equal ground.

For example, a mural by female artist Lamis Suleiman shown in Figure 4.33. depicts a number of well-known women leaders from Egyptian history and entertainment with the text “Enough shit, Mr. Sayed/my lord/my master” (Sami, 2015). Suleiman exemplifies how graffiti can target the transformation of consciousness through bricolage. Suleiman realigns the meaning of a shared cultural reference with visual modifiers such as size, positioning, colour and text. The largest and central figure in the mural is Amina, who Sami (2015) describes as a recognizable film character known for representing submission and docility. Due to her size, positioning, and close proximity to the confrontational text, Amina becomes identifiable as a commanding and powerful figure in this new visual story. Surrounded by other influential female figures from Egyptian history,
women take on an empowering stance as the largest and central figures in the mural with two small men dwarfed at the bottom of the wall (Sami, 2015). As Sami (2015) notes, the status of women and men becomes reversed and subverts the notion that women are to be excluded from the public sphere. Thus, by rearranging formerly unconnected figures from known cultural and historical narratives, the mural encourages a transformation in consciousness regarding women’s exclusion from public space.

Suleiman’s piece provides an opportunity to explore who is and is not present in graffiti about women’s ongoing revolution for rights and freedoms in Egypt. Other respected figures such as the singer Umm Kulthum, nuclear scientist Samira Moussa, contemporary political activist and head of the Egyptian Farmers’ Union Shahenda Maqlad, Samira Ibrahim, Nefertiti and the ancient Greek-Alexandrian philosopher Hypatia, among many others, surround Amina in the mural (Sami, 2015). Including Ibrahim in the mural aligns her strength and determination as a contemporary Egyptian woman with the achievements of other historic female figures. In doing so, Suleiman fights the notion that women of influence exist only in Egypt’s past and continues the narrative that women have influenced Egyptian society throughout time.

Notably, no leaders from the Egyptian women’s movement are represented in Suleiman’s piece or any of the others in the collection for this analysis. This absence may be indicative of the general aversion from feminism within contemporary activism described by Sorbera (2014a), a trend Khalil (2014) links to the elitist, state-sanctioned feminist groups of past political regimes. In contrast, Gröndahl (2012) claims entertainment icons and historical figures have mass appeal and draw on collective memories of powerful women. It could be debated whether excluding past feminists and leaders of the women’s movement is an act of erasure or a natural evolution as advances for women’s rights gain new forms of expression.

The narrative against harassment remained strong in 2013, with imagery and text that reflected an increasingly violent public life for women. In Figure 4.34., well-known male artist Keizer made an explicit threat to harassers on Cairo’s walls, stating in red text: “If you put your hand on another woman, we’ll cut your penis off.” Along with the photo of the graffiti posted on Facebook, Keizer thanked women for their ongoing efforts and
acknowledged those too traumatized to share their stories. In the Facebook post, Keizer made the following statement:

This a direct message to all sexual harassers regarding what happened on the 25th of Jan 2013. This was an orchestrated, organized and coordinated effort to sexually intimidate, rape and demoralize female protesters and demonstrators from voicing their opinion and their right to be present in a public space such as Tahrir Square.

Mirah Shihadeh and El Zeft similarly reflect on coordinated sexual violence in a mural called “The Circle of Hell” depicting a single woman surrounded by a crowd of drooling, smiling men making comments like: "She really wants it;" "I'm horny . . . what am I supposed to do;" "Don't be afraid . . . we've come to help you;" and, “Don't you see what she's wearing" (see in Figure 4.35.). The mural is a reference to the pattern of attacks perpetrated by circles of men and boys who singled out and separated women from crowds of protestors in Tahrir Square (FIDH, 2014). Two hundred and fifty such attacks were documented from November 2012 to July 2013, and many survivors reported men saying, “Do not be afraid, I'm protecting you,” (FIDH, 2014). Shihadeh and El Zeft's piece documents these women’s experiences and suggests a shift in consciousness: a vanishing sense of national pride depicted by Egyptian flags in the distance behind the mob of harassers.

In Figure 4.36., another mural comments on the troubling intersection of women’s protection and sexual violence by drawing on an image from Freud’s *What’s on a Man’s Mind*. In an optical illusion, a naked female body blends into the face of a bearded man, alluding to sex as the driving force on men’s minds. Adding to the original optical illusion, the man is shown covering the eyes of another woman, with the text “no to sexual harassment” in black and red, colours of mourning and violence (Olderr, 2012). The image connotes the contradictory desire within the patriarchy to both protect and violate women.
Figure 4.34. Untitled
Note: Street art by Keizer, Cairo, posted Jan 29, 2013 on https://www.facebook.com/KeizerStreetArt/photos/pb.266308690060395.-2207520000.1434485461./547061975318397/?type=3&theater
Translation: If you put your hand on another woman, we’ll cut your penis off.

Figure 4.35. The Circle of Hell
Note: Mural by Mirah Shihadeh and el Zeft, Cairo, posted Feb 22, 2013 on https://www.facebook.com/RevolutionGraffiti.StreetArtEgypt/photos/pb.313913465299751.-2207520000.1433567430./560820790609016/?type=3&theater
Translation: "She really wants it," "I'm horny... what am I supposed to do," "Don't be afraid... we've come to help you," "A very tasty girl, honestly," "Don't you see what she's wearing," "But she's not my sister," "I can do what I like, pal!"

Figure 4.36. Untitled
Note: Mural by anonymous, Cairo, posted Nov 3, 2013 on https://www.facebook.com/RevolutionGraffiti.StreetArtEgypt/photos/pb.313913465299751.-2207520000.1431187838./679047328786361
Translation: No to sexual harassment.
Figures 4.34.-4.36. reflect a change in the narrative on sexual violence. While images of Samira Ibrahim and sit al banat were personal stories of individuals who became icons, the graffiti of 2013 demonstrates the increasingly brutal violence experienced by more and more Egyptian women at the hands of more and more Egyptian men. Graffiti artists took it upon themselves to document that violence and to ensure the frequency of sexual harassment did not lead to the Egyptian public becoming blind to the disgrace of such acts. Within the broader revolutionary narrative, the graffiti confirms the existence of male and female actors experiencing and acting upon consciousness raising in regards to the systemic sexual violence permeating their society.

2014

Based on the collection of images for this analysis, graffiti by or about women decreased by almost 50% in 2014 compared to 2013 (see Figures A.6. and A.7.). This decrease is representative of a broader trend in public commentary as Morsi and, later, Sisi clamped down on freedom of expression, restricted public demonstrations and curbed criticism of the power of the state (Badran, 2014; Sorbera, 2014a). According to Sorbera (2014a), these efforts were in support of prevalent nationalist accounts about Sisi and the army protecting civil society from “terrorists,” a discourse that gained dominance in the media and among the Egyptian public. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Don Karl, co-editor and publisher of the book *Walls of Freedom*, explained, "public sentiment actually does make it more dangerous for graffiti artists to express themselves freely [...] The slightest critique and you can be accused of being one of the ‘terrorists’" (Wolf, 2014). Criticism of the state was aligned with terrorism, and graffiti artists were resultantly seen as a threat. WOW co-founder Mia Gröndahl noted that when a man saw a graffiti piece in progress, he asked nervously "Is this a military boot that she’s painting? No, no, no, nothing anti-Sisi" (Wolf, 2014). As mentioned in Chapter 3, by 2014 a substantial portion of Egyptian society increasingly desired stability and security rather than revolution.

Despite ongoing challenges to their work, artists continued to highlight the efforts and sacrifices of female protesters. Ammar Abo Bakr created a mural in support of human rights activist Sanna Seif, who FIDH (2015) reports was contentiously sentenced to three years in prison on charges of illegal assembly (see Figure 4.37.). Bakr depicts Sanna veiled and seated among several other faceless women in the same classic portrait pose.
The graffiti documents Sanna’s personal story while referring to the many other female protesters persecuted without public recognition. Like Samira Ibrahim and sit al banat, Sanna is a character added to the cast of influential and agentic Egyptian women. The mural exemplifies the effort of graffiti artists to document an alternative and ongoing history of women’s activism, a public display to ensure their fight is not forgotten.

![Figure 4.37. Untitled](https://www.facebook.com/RevolutionGraffiti.StreetArtEgypt/photos/pb.313913465299751.-2207520000.1427579990./878783072146118/?type=1&theater)

**Figure 4.37. Untitled**
Note: Mural by Ammar Abo Bakr, Cairo, posted Nov 24, 2014 on https://www.facebook.com/RevolutionGraffiti.StreetArtEgypt/photos/pb.313913465299751.-2207520000.1427579990./878783072146118/?type=1&theater

Women on Walls (WOW) gained further prominence, with half of the graffiti created by or about women in 2014 produced during WOW events. While some artists, like Salma El-Gamal, stated they began doing graffiti “just to do it,” WOW offered an opportunity to get a political message out (Bajec, 2014). Others, like Enas Awad, saw her role as an artist to display on the wall what is wrong with society, and to allow the public to respond “positively to the negative” (Bajec, 2014). In Awad’s view “women can reclaim free space and make a statement that can reach people’s minds” (Bajec, 2014). During WOW, journalist Alessandra Bajec reported the artists received encouragement from women who saw them working in the street, and those women expressed support for the idea of using graffiti to talk about women’s issues.

Awad’s desire to reach people’s minds with her statements, and the exchanges between female artists and viewers are particularly noteworthy for considering the women’s movement in terms of Bayat’s (2013) “passive networks” of everyday feminism. Passive networks emerge when female strangers observe a commonality and engage in
a shared, everyday activity that leads to the internalization of “shared identities in the streets” (Bayat, 2013, p. 22). For example, when women walking through the street express interest in graffiti about women’s issues, they share and internalize an identity as supporters of public art promoting women’s rights and freedoms.

Passive networks are part of a “nonmovement” among Egyptians. With various levels of interest in or access to a more traditional, visible feminist or women’s movement, initiatives like NooNeswa and WOW create an opportunity for passive networks and collective identities to form based on shared, but often unspoken interest in women’s rights and freedoms. Nonmovements exert influence on consciousness through what Bayat (2013) describes as the power of presence, the ability to assert collective will and establish new spaces of freedom to be “heard, seen, felt and realized” (p. 26). Graffiti offers a new way for women to be seen and for Egyptians to connect with one another in the pursuit to shift consciousness around gender. While not as recognizable as a march or rally, in a political climate set to extinguish political agency, passive networks and nonmovements allow practices of resistance and consciousness raising to continue.

Despite budget cuts, in 2014, WOW continued to raise and disrupt consciousness regarding women’s issues and rights. Artist Enas Awad describes her work shown in Figure 4.38.:

The split face reflects the alternating roles of the Egyptian female. The first half of the face reflects the Pharaonic female who ruled one of the greatest and strongest civilizations in history; and as time passed, there appeared the second half, especially in the eyes of society — the female that is restricted, has no equal rights to participation in society and in the workforce. This side of the female has been forced to retreat from society, by society, as is reflected in her uncertain features beneath layers of clothing … she is treated as though it was shameful to have been born female” (Frenkel, 2014).

Awad’s portrait of an older woman carrying a gas can similarly reflects on “the oppressed female in the society, whose rights are lost and has no voice” (see Figure 4.39.; Frenkel, 2014). Depicted in black, the colour of death and mourning, the sense of women’s loss is present in the piece. Awad’s imagery and descriptions reflect on major issues faced by regular Egyptian women in their asymmetrical relationship with a patriarchal gender system. Similar to the images of regular female Egyptians protesting, these images
confirm the existence of women struggling to overcome social inequalities to define their own role in society.

Figure 4.38  Untitled
Note: Mural by Enas Awad at WOW 2014, Cairo, posted Apr 12, 2014 on https://adonis49.wordpress.com/tag/sheera-frenkel/

Figure 4.39  Untitled
Note: Piece by Enas Awad at WOW 2014, Cairo, posted Apr 12, 2014 on https://adonis49.wordpress.com/tag/sheera-frenkel/

Figure 4.40.  Untitled
Note: Mural by Salma Gamal at WOW 2014, Cairo, posted Apr 12, 2014 on https://adonis49.wordpress.com/tag/sheera-frenkel/

Figure 4.41.  Untitled
Note: Mural by Gaz at WOW 2014, Cairo, posted Apr 12, 2014 on https://adonis49.wordpress.com/tag/sheera-frenkel/
On the theme of looking to the future, Salma Gamal describes her works shown in Figure 4.40. as, “a hand that says 'enough' to all the negative things faced by women [...] the woman’s face is full of eyes because she can see her future and is able to choose her own future” (Frenkel, 2014). Like Awad’s split-face, Gamal’s piece features eyes that gaze straight ahead, suggesting a direct and confrontational message that implicates the viewer.

Similar to Gamal, the artist Gaz looks ahead to the future in Figure 4.41. explaining that the piece “reflects on the modern-day Egyptian female in 2014, who is progressing and adapting to all the changes taking place around her while keeping with the ways and styles of older traditions of Egypt” (Frenkel, 2014). The woman is depicted gazing forward and averting the eyes of the viewer, a gaze Bardhan & Foss (forthcoming) suggest represents a determined focus that does not concern the viewer. Along with Gaz’s explanation, there is a connotation that modern Egyptian women are focusing on their own vision of the future. These images share women’s reflections on their position between past and future, providing needed contrast to nationalist symbolism so often inflicted upon Egyptian women in periods of political transition.

Figures 4.40. and 4.41. reflect the previously mentioned theory of Maria Tamboukou, who suggests women’s critique through art serves as an “aesthetic anticipation of the future” (p. 692). Tamboukou claims women artists engage in a “political project par excellence” that intervenes and interrupts what is typically understood as sensible in order to imagine “a life to come” (p. 692). Joined by male peers, WOW expresses and enacts a culture of creation that challenges “sensible” ideas about Egyptian women’s roles in public space and society in general to imagine a better future. In doing so, they inspire the public to take on a new collective identity, forming a nonmovement that aims towards a slow and steady transformation of Egyptian consciousness to value women’s rights and agency.
To date in 2015, WOW remains the key source of graffiti by and about women. A shift continues in the narrative with even fewer calls to collective action and increased emphasis on change within individual women. Messages in the murals instruct “reserve your right to think,” “be yourself,” and “follow your passion” alongside images of individual women or female symbols (see Figures 4.42.-4.45.). By using “your” and “yourself,” the narrative of these pieces frame the potential for gaining power and creating change as an individual. This narrative aligns with what one protestor described to Sorbera (2013) as “a personal revolution,” an expression that reflects an individual’s experience with consciousness raising (p. 35). The narrative of personal transformation challenges the patriarchal gender system that assigns power over women to the State, the Army, and the family (Sorbera, 2013). Sorbera (2013) explains this re-evaluation of identity and gender is part of what Egyptian intellectuals call the thawra insaniya (the human revolution) or “redefinition of the self” that is occurring in an ongoing cultural process in Egypt (p. 41). Thus, the shift in the graffiti narrative that promotes women defining their own individual path is part of a broader societal exploration of what it means to be Egyptian after five years of upheaval.

Although WOW’s graffiti demonstrates important work being done around women’s rights and public equality in Egypt, it is not uncontroversial. In 2015, the project garnered criticism for painting murals on Mohammed Mahmoud Street, a location at the heart of the revolution. Given WOW’s status as a funded initiative, ethical questions were raised about the place of commercial graffiti alongside grassroots art created during the revolution (Elsirgany & Curnow, 2015). Prominent artists such as Ammar Abo Bakr have claimed that “the walls represent a ‘graveyard for martyrs’ and that the area should not be used for ‘commercial graffiti’” (Elsirgany & Curnow, 2015). The discussions over territory reveal a new phase for graffiti in Egypt as the movement develops internal factions and politics. Already threatened by a climate of state persecution, division among artists creates further splintering and fragility within the graffiti movement. In a Jadaliyya article written in January 2015, sociology professor Mona Abaza speculates whether the “order” imposed on the streets by Sisi was signaling the end of street art. Abaza notes the whitewashing of walls and growing “exodus” of human rights activists, artists, and
intellectuals under the watch of the regime. It seems the graffiti movement is experiencing its own period of flux within a nation still seeking stability.

**Figure 4.42** Untitled
Note: Mural by Khadjia Mostafa at WOW 2015, Cairo, posted Apr 6, 2015 in https://www.facebook.com/womenonwalls.WOW/photos/pb.619162831478514

**Figure 4.43** Untitled
Note: Piece by Laila at WOW 2015, Cairo, posted Apr 11, 2015 on https://www.facebook.com/womenonwalls.WOW/photos/pb.619162831478514.-2207520000.1444964015./851517904909671/?type=3&theater

**Figure 4.44** Untitled

**Figure 4.45** Untitled
Note: Close up of Dina’s mural.
Despite threats from the regime and a growing public desire for quiescence, protest continued in 2015. Graffiti artists, although in fewer numbers, remained dedicated to documenting activism. Figures 4.46. and 4.47. depict two more female protestors who sacrificed their life and freedom. In Figure 4.46., a paste-up shows a portrait of Mahienour El-Massry, who was sentenced to two years in prison in 2013 for organizing and participating in a gathering commemorating Khaled Said (FIDH, 2015). El-Massry’s gaze is direct, she is missing her right eye, and her hair is tied back with a green scarf, a sacred and lucky colour in Islam (Olderr, 2012). A red stencil depicts Shaimaa El Sabagh, who was shot dead by police on the fourth anniversary of the revolution while depositing flowers in remembrance of martyrs at Tahrir Square (see Figure 4.47.; Abaza, 2015). Sorbera (2013) and Jackson (2015) assert that the persistence of female activists in occupying public space and openly voicing demands for change reveals there is no turning back from Egyptian women’s newly manifested political agency. A similar level of determination exists among graffiti artists. Even while it becomes increasingly dangerous to produce subversive art in the streets, there is a desire to continue a narrative that captures and expands the history of brave, revolutionary women.
Conclusion

Political agency, non-discrimination, and gender based violence are issues of importance for many Egyptian women today (Kamal, 2015). These issues gain a new form of creative expression in the graffiti collected for this chapter. Since 2011, a graffiti narrative regarding women’s roles in revolution has transformed from symbols of nationalism and progress (Figures 4.1.-4.4.) to depictions of individual female agency (Figures 4.41.-4.45.). This shift is most clearly seen in the change of “characters” supporting the revolutionary narrative from 2011 to 2015. From flag-bearing women, to powerful figures in history and entertainment, to contemporary female protestors, representations of Egyptian women became increasingly close to the lived experiences of the women participating in societal transformation. This is a notable change as it challenges traditional gender discourse where women are passive repositories for cultural, religious, and national identity and instead shows their active participation in Egyptian society. This graffiti narrative is a new manifestation of historic efforts within the women’s movement to demonstrate female political agency and its power.

The issue of sexual violence gained its own narrative within graffiti, particularly in 2012 and 2013. This narrative reflected and inspired action against what Denize Kandiyoti (2014) describes as the violent “masculinist restoration” that was attempted by post-Mubarak governments. As state leaders worked to justify patriarchy, graffiti provided a counter-narrative that challenged the violent means with which the state was securing itself. While sexual violence was an ongoing issue of public concern in contemporary Egypt, when harassment grew and took on more violent forms, graffiti made the issue accessible to all Egyptians by producing dialogue at the street-level.

While the graffiti of political agency and sexual violence powerfully asserted female voices, another narrative emerged in 2014 and 2015 that illuminated the challenges associated with women’s new, emerging identities. Female graffiti artists used their work to explore how women can preserve past traditions while pursuing a future on their own terms. These pieces provide a valuable window into women’s experiences as history has so often positioned women between tradition and progress as an outcome of patriarchal political strategies (Hafez, 2014; Sami, 2015). Instead these graffiti pieces reveal the
visual and textual vocabularies that allow women to shape their own narratives on the balance between past, present, and future identities. Considering 2015 as the incomplete conclusion of the graffiti narrative, Egyptian women are at a point of individual transformation that holds the potential for greater social change. It remains to be seen whether the notion of “personal revolution” is the result of an exhausted, disenchanted movement, or an innovation in revolutionary thinking.

What is missing from the graffiti is as telling as what is portrayed. The graffiti narratives reveal what histories are and are not resonant in the pursuit of women’s rights in Egypt today. As mentioned earlier, notably absent are leaders from the women’s movement in the 20th century, such as EFU founder Huda Sha’rawi, Zainab al-Ghazali, founder of the Muslim Women Society, and feminist activist Nawal el-Saadawi. Similarly, no references to feminism are made in the graffiti collected for this study, although analogous messages are expressed. Lucia Sorbera (2013) argues that the literary salons and the nationalist struggle associated with the women’s movement of the past century laid the path for women to explore new forms of expression in the present. It is 20th century women’s movements that supported the work of respected women like scientist Samira Moussa, entertainers Umm Kulthum and Hind Rostom, and activist Shahenda Maqlad who are now enshrined in graffiti on the streets of Egypt. While the links are not always made explicit in graffiti, it is only because of previous manifestations of the women’s movement that it is possible for current narratives on women’s rights and freedoms to be expressed so publicly on Egyptian walls.

The graffiti offer a vision of a world where women no longer face violence or discrimination, and are instead visible, valued agents of individual and societal transformation. Those narratives are an expression from a specific political culture of creation where men and women imagine and enact a world where they share the same rights and freedoms. It can be argued that the graffiti narratives from that culture of creation inspire a nonmovement among viewers. Repeated, shared exposure to new gender imagery can create a shift within public consciousness. The central assumption underlying these new revolutionary efforts is articulated by Michael Hart (2009): “humans can become different” (p. 138). Egyptian graffiti is a strategy that reveals the potential for
men and women to create new consciousness around gender, a transformation that could truly revolutionize society.
Chapter 5.

Re-Defining Revolution

A revolution for women’s rights and freedoms is taking place around the world, and Egypt is one of the many fronts of that struggle. This thesis has attempted to reveal the motivations, methods, and goals used by women in their ongoing revolution alongside and within socio-political transformations. Throughout history, the meaning of revolution shifted with the different ways rights and freedoms were pursued, from early political cycles, to total societal overhaul, to emerging slow, horizontal forms of social change. The fight for women’s rights similarly took on new and diverse forms and persisted long after state collapse, as the case of Egypt demonstrates. At different points in time, social work, feminist movements, student organizing, and human rights activism were all forums for Egyptian women to unify and network in cultures of opposition against patriarchy. Women’s organizing and feminist movements often find spaces and methods that create change more subtly, especially under authoritarian regime’s like those that shaped the Egyptian state for the past century (Badran, 1995; Bayat, 2013). Whether organizing formally or engaging in everyday feminist acts, pursuing equality or complementarity, many women found creative ways to assert their interests and change Egyptian society (Badran, 2014).

Such strategies are not uncommon in women’s movements around the world. However, in many cases, revolution literature overlooks the reality that such efforts produce beneficial, and even revolutionary, cultural shifts in the long term. While Egyptian feminists fought a long battle for the vote in the early 20th century, in 2014 women were catered to as an essential demographic for Sisi’s presidential campaign. The sincerity behind Sisi’s engagement with Egyptian women is up for debate, but the transformation of women’s total exclusion from formal politics to their key role as voters is one example of how transformative change may operate along longer timelines than are usually considered “revolutionary.”

Since conventional literature often neglects the routes women take to creating change, this thesis has followed feminist scholarship to “look askance,” and consider other
paths to understanding revolution (Andrijasevic et al., 2014, p. 5). Analyzing graffiti created by and depicting women is one way to access the demands, roles, and representations women may not be able to express elsewhere. In the case of Egypt, from 2011 to 2015, graffiti chronicled contemporary women’s experiences with sexual harassment, discrimination, and political agency during a period of socio-political flux. Much of the graffiti depicted powerful women from the nation’s past, thus connecting women’s historic revolution to the contemporary pursuit of societal transformation. These themes were consistent in the work of male and female artists, suggesting the culture of creation that emerged in 2011 continues to operate within the graffiti movement today.

While much of Egyptian society is exhausted and seeking stability, for many other men and women the egalitarian promises that rallied thousands at Tahrir Square continue to motivate efforts for change. A small group of men and women remain dedicated to using the walls of Egypt to collectively imagine and enact a world where they share the same rights and freedoms.

The analysis of graffiti and the women’s movements in Egypt offers three key findings to consider in the redefinition of revolution. Firstly, looking beyond social and political institutions can reveal other sites of revolutionary change. Several scholars who followed Egypt’s period of flux since January 25, 2011 suggest that a cultural shift is one of the most important developments that has emerged (Badran, 2014; Sorbera, 2014a, Mostafa, 2015; Sami, 2015). According to Samia Mehrez (2012), that “new found power of ownership of one’s space, one’s body, and one’s language is, in and of itself, a revolution” (p. 14). Marinelli (2014), Sorbera (2014b), and Mostafa (2015) suggest that it is in these often-personal transformations that new forms of consciousness arise.

This thesis has focused on how the transformation of consciousness would include revolutionary conceptualizations of gender and women’s rights. Foran (2014) illuminates that in Egypt, cultures of opposition and creation provided space to re-imagine society, including new representations and discourses on gender roles and rights, as discussed by Sami (2015). These important transformations would not necessarily be captured by explorations of revolution focused on changes within socio-political structures and institutions. Examining culture can reveal the values, attitudes, and beliefs that inform individual and collective consciousness of how gender operates in society. Thus, cultural
theories of revolution can better integrate the overthrow of patriarchal gender systems by further analyzing the cultural factors that offer openings to transform consciousness.

Secondly, timelines for revolution must be adjusted to allow for insight into steady and emergent transformation. Doing so will account for different paths to social change used by women and the slow process of transformation at the level of consciousness. Furthermore, as Badran (2014) argues, it is essential for the timelines of cultural and gender revolution to align with political and social revolution if total, lasting societal transformation is to take place. Badran (2014) and Sorbera (2014b) make the case for this adjustment by highlighting that the past century of Egypt's revolutions and cycles of political leadership nurtured a consciousness in search of transformative change that only came to pass in the last five years. The ways Egyptian women participated in the 2011 uprisings and ongoing activism were the flourishing results of fledgling efforts begun almost a hundred years ago. Sorbera (2014b) returns to Arendt (1963) in her observation that “the beginning’, erupts at a specific and unexpected instant […] However, the 'unexpected' is always the result of a long-lasting incubation” (p. 105). Thus, a new consciousness does not materialize over night with the overthrow of the state, but rather, it emerges over time through multiple processes of change and as product of spaces where all citizens are able to imagine new possibilities for their society (Marinelli, 2014; Sorbera, 2014b). The analysis of the women's movement demonstrates that while the seeds for change were planted long ago, it was not until 2011 that a culture of creation emerged where men and women reimagined and enacted a new, egalitarian society together. A new definition of revolution will benefit from terms that account for multiple types and timelines of change.

It could be argued that including new timelines and forms of change poses a threat to the precision and power of the term “revolution.” Including more cases and the evolving meaning of revolution can return to the conceptual stretching that necessitated a new definition in the first place. However, I argue that it is important for the societal transformation achieved by women and other marginalized groups to be called “revolutionary” so that those actions are aligned with the same degree of power as the male-driven movements that have defined “revolution” throughout history.
The third key finding for re-defining revolution is that the most recent “innovations” in revolutionary methods are reminiscent of the ways women often organize independently. Although some women also participate as militants and engage in violent tactics during revolution, they are in the minority (Ulrich, 2007). Kampwirth (2004) and Bayat (2013) assert that, more often, women find ways to mobilize non-violently, especially under patriarchal, authoritarian regimes and in feminist movements that emerge during revolution. Women often “creatively” organize through non-hierarchical networks outside formal institutions to create slow and steady social change (Randall, 1992, p. 96; Moghadam, 2013). There are clear parallels between the fluid, horizontal, consensus-based, organizing described by Randall (1992) and Moghadam (2013) in Chapter 2, and Egyptian protestor’s non-violent, “informal, organic, and responsive” methods explored by Tadros (2014, p. 23) and Foran (2014). Similar modes of mobilizing were used during the Occupy Movement and throughout the Arab world since 2010 (Foran, 2014; Sorbera, 2014b). Not unlike women’s ongoing revolution against patriarchy, recent revolutions faced increasingly oppressive and, in some cases, violent states that necessitated the adoption of tactics that allowed opposition to continue without too easily being targeted.

By mirroring organizing strategies often utilized by women, it can be argued that 21st century revolutionary methods are increasingly feminized. This claim requires further study, but if taken into consideration within the scope of this thesis, there are initial concerns and possibilities that can be addressed. One concern is that feminizing the methods of revolutionary change does not necessarily mean revolutions will “feminize” to include and benefit more women. What is at stake is the connection between the innovative methods of organizing and their roots in feminist or women’s movements. There is potential for women’s revolutionary strategies to be co-opted by male-driven movements or state agendas that ultimately neglect female contributors and their interests. As this thesis has shown, the co-optation of women’s revolutionary work is common. While women are more than capable of re-evaluating how to pursue their goals, the co-optation of a familiar mode of organizing would certainly be a setback.

However, the feminization of revolutionary methods holds possibilities too. A familiar mode of organizing arguably provides women with greater access to participation in revolutions. As Moghadam (2014) stated, non-hierarchical, networked organizing is
more conducive to women adopting decision-making roles, and thus their participation holds greater influence over revolution outcomes. In the case of Egypt, many of the non-violent, horizontal initiatives born of the post-Mubarak uprisings were led by women in order to pursue ongoing battles against sexual harassment and discrimination (Sami, 2015). Organizing independently from the state, these efforts aimed to sustain Egypt’s cultural shift from the ground up. Egypt provides a compelling case for further examining the feminizing trend I have identified so that women’s rights and freedoms may finally be integrated as defining terms of revolution.
References


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Appendix A.

Graffiti Analysis Data

Figure A.1. Count of Graffiti by Location (2011-2015)

Figure A.2. Count of Graffiti by Type (2011-2015)
Figure A.3.  Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2011-2015)

![Bar chart showing the count of graffiti by artist's gender from 2011 to 2015.]

Figure A.4.  Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2011)

![Bar chart showing the count of graffiti by artist's gender in 2011.]

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Figure A.5. Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2012)

Figure A.6. Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2013)
Figure A.7. Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2014)

Figure A.8. Count of Graffiti by Artist(s) Gender (2015)

Table A.1. Identified Female, Male, and Collective Egyptian Graffiti Artists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female Graffiti Artists</th>
<th>Male Graffiti Artists</th>
<th>Collectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enas Awad</td>
<td>Ammar Abo Bakr</td>
<td>Freedom Painters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mona Elboghdady</td>
<td>Anwar</td>
<td>Mona Lisa Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanaa El Degham</td>
<td>Alaa Awad</td>
<td>NooNeswa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Nickname</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salma El-Gamal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women on Walls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadiga El-Ghawas</td>
<td></td>
<td>El Teneen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gee el Shaikh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ganzeer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salma Fahmy</td>
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<td>Keizer</td>
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<td>RaDZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ahmed Naguib</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Tefa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mira Shihadeh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahia Shehab</td>
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