The Political Economy of Tuition Policy Formation in Canada

by

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B.A. (Hons.), Trent University, 1991

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education

in the Educational Leadership Program
Faculty of Education

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Abstract

This study develops a conceptual understanding of the process by which provincial tuition policies undergo major change in Canada. The first research question is whether, and to what extent, two alternative theories of policy change advocacy coalition (ACF) and multiple streams of problems, policies, and politics (MSM) can explain policy change. The second research question examines how these policy processes compare to each other. This research builds upon an emerging international field of enquiry, policy and politics of higher education, and contributes important empirical, descriptive and conceptual findings to the Canadian literature on post-secondary policy. The methodology was a comparative case study of three episodes of significant policy change, selected using purposive sampling (British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba) and employing an analytical framework based on Ness (2008). Data were collected through systematic investigation using two key research tools: content analysis of relevant documentary materials and 59 interviews of policy actors.

The research found that each of the theories provides important and relevant conceptual understanding of policy change. There are five factors associated with policy change: changing financial conditions, changing concerns about accessibility, a changing government mandate with a strong premier, changing public mood, and changing political and policy alliances. The practice of politics is central to tuition policy formation; these politics include political differentiation, brokerage politics, and retail politics. Individual universities, their presidents, and their membership organizations play an influential role in policy formation. Senior leaders within cabinet function as policy entrepreneurs, most frequently the premier. Student organizations are successful in agenda-setting. Successful influence strategies can be characterized as insider tactics, and successful agenda-setting activities include softening up. The conditions for student lobby success appear to be increased in cases where brokerage politics is occurring in an electoral contest. Research itself is not a key factor in policy change. Tuition policy choices are made with consideration of the available research; a more direct influence on policy change is political and policy learning. Regardless of policy choices and contexts, governments describe their overall policy goal as the provision of quality and accessible post-secondary education. A new conceptual model for tuition policy change is proposed.

Keywords: Post-secondary public policy; politics of post-secondary education; policy formation process; Canadian post-secondary policy; tuition fees; post-secondary finance
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAATO</td>
<td>Association of Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology of Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF</td>
<td>Advocacy Coalition Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECBC</td>
<td>Advanced Education Council of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCBC</td>
<td>British Columbia Business Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Business Council of Manitoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>College of Applied Arts and Technology (Ontario)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAUT</td>
<td>Canadian Association of University Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCPA</td>
<td>Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIEA</td>
<td>College and Institute Educators Association (BC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFS</td>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFS-BC</td>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students – British Columbia</td>
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<td>CFS-MB</td>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students – Manitoba</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFS-O</td>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students - Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Canadian Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMEC</td>
<td>Council of Ministers of Education (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COU</td>
<td>Council of Universities (Ontario)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>College Student Alliance (Ontario)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Core Service Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPSE</td>
<td>Council on Post-Secondary Education (Manitoba)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUFA</td>
<td>Confederation of University Faculty Associations of BC</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Deputy Minister</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>First Minister</td>
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<td>HEPI</td>
<td>Higher Education Price Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon</td>
<td>Honourable</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITAL</td>
<td>Institute of Technology and Applied Learning (Ontario)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full-time Equivalent</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministry of Advanced Education (British Columbia)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>MAEL</td>
<td>Ministry of Advanced Education and Literacy</td>
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### Glossary

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<tr>
<td>Ancillary fees</td>
<td>Consistent with definitions in the tuition limit policy in British Columbia (2014), this definition refers to mandatory fees charged by institutions, including capital construction support (e.g., building or technology improvement fees), consumable fees (e.g., fees charged for field trips, material fees for labs, shops, student projects, and consumable supplies) and other fees including application and registration fees, laboratory fees, learning resources fees, athletic and recreation fees, student activity fees, tool rental fees, studio fees, graduation fees, student card fees (for access to library, counseling and other student services), transcript fees, and/or extension fees. Mandatory fees are all those charges that are not tuition and that must be paid by a particular group of students; generally, fees are charged for registration, student activities, and other items “peculiar to an institution” (McKeown, 1982, p.1). The definition of mandatory fees does not include the following: textbooks, parking, food services, residence, printing, or photocopying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary fees</td>
<td>Consistent with definitions in the tuition limit policy in British Columbia (2014), this refers to compulsory student association, union, or society fees (collected by institutions on their behalf), including student medical and dental fees levied by the student association; it also includes parking, food services, residence, health services, or other services available for purchase at an institution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost recovery</td>
<td>A program for which institutions neither receive nor allocate public funding provided by the provincial government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index as determined and published by Statistics Canada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary education</td>
<td>Post-secondary education refers to all undergraduate and graduate study at public institutions (including universities, colleges and institutes) which follow secondary school. For this study, the terms post-secondary education and higher education are used interchangeably.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional programs</td>
<td>University programs at both an undergraduate and graduate level that lead to professional designations, for the purpose of tuition fee rates. These programs often include dentistry, medicine, pharmacy, law, business administration, and engineering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tuition | Refers to the compulsory student charges associated with registration at post-secondary institutions most commonly expressed in per-credit charges or program flat fees, that is, fees charged per program rather than by smaller units of instruction. Tuition may vary by residency, full- or part-time status, and level of the student (McKeown, 1982). For the purposes of this study “tuition fees” denotes generally the sum total of all compulsory student charges identified in an institution’s calendar as tuition fees, or fees for instruction, associated with registration in public post-secondary institutions (including per-credit charges, flat fees, ancillary fees, program fees, etc.), with the exception of fees charged to students and collected by institutions on behalf of external bodies, including student associations, regulatory bodies, or professional associations.

Tuition freeze | A provincial government policy which directs public institutions to maintain existing prices on tuition and mandatory fees assessed by institutions on domestic student registrations. This does not necessarily connote a freeze on provincial grant funding of institutions.

Tuition policy | Refers to provincial government guidelines which bind public post-secondary institutions in that jurisdiction. These may take the form of legislation, government policy directives, or in agreements with a coordinating board or governing body, or an institution directly.
Chapter 1.

Introduction

In the struggle over ideas of accessibility and affordability, tuition fee policy is an active and contested area in Canadian post-secondary policymaking. Provincial governments have undertaken a number of policy experiments in tuition fees over the past two decades, ranging from complete deregulation of tuition fees to complete regulation through the tuition freeze. Significant interest mobilization on tuition fee policy, including Canada’s largest and longest student demonstration in Quebec in 2012, raises important questions about the role of interest mobilization in post-secondary policy-making, and illustrates how little is known about provincial post-secondary policy agenda-setting and decision-making processes.

Tuition fees serve a vital role in financing the public post-secondary system as well as figuring prominently in the broader debate on the appropriate balance of cost sharing between the public and the individual. Much of what we understand about post-secondary policy involves policy outcomes; indeed, the policy debate around tuition fees typically illustrates competing views of the impact of different tuition prices on individuals, institutions, professions, and Canadian society more generally. What is less clear is why particular tuition policy ideas, narratives, and options prevail in political contests in any given social, political, or economic climate. It is also unclear how organized interests shape government agendas and influence decision-making, important factors for all stakeholders in this policy arena. There is little understanding of how exactly these or other post-secondary policies are established; why and how does tuition policy land on provincial government decision agendas? How do organized interests effectively frame and represent policy goals, and how do decision-makers evaluate options and make choices in a contested policy area? What exactly are the politics of tuition fees, and how does politics itself affect tuition policy decisions?
My interest in tuition fee policy emerged during my career as an administrator in Canadian public post-secondary education. During my tenure as a leader in student services and institutional research, public sector tuition fee policy changed four times; tuition fees were twice frozen, once lowered, and on one occasion, completely deregulated. These episodes of major policy change were widely viewed by institutions as "political", but the precise nature of those politics was unclear. Further, institutions were required to implement these difficult policy changes, as well as to evaluate the consequences or impacts of these policies in a financially complex and politically challenging environment, without a clear understanding of the policy goals. These experiences led me to my original research question: what factors were contributing to government adoption of these policies?

The study of the policy process endeavours to explain conditions for policy development and adoption, an aim particularly important to policy actors and practitioners, who wish to improve their influence and successfully advocate for their policy goals, and to scholars exploring the dynamics of education policy formation. It is useful to draw upon conceptual frameworks from the policy sciences for a deeper understanding of tuition policy dynamics, given the complex political economy of post-secondary finance as well as the contradictory normative representations of policy actors in these episodes. This particular study builds upon an emerging field of enquiry, the politics of post-secondary policymaking, focusing on tuition fee policy as an exemplar of "political" policy-making in the Canadian context. Using established theories of the policy process and absent from a normative stance on the tuition policies themselves, this study delves into policy systems in three different circumstances to examine the actors and the dynamics of major tuition policy change. Through examining different policy actors and their representations of the policy process, I seek to understand why governments choose to make significant policy changes on tuition fee policy and to shed new light on the nature of post-secondary policymaking in Canada.
1.1. Context

1.1.1. Global context

In most jurisdictions, post-secondary institutions are largely financed by a combination of public funding and individual student tuition fees; however, the relative share of this combination has been changing over time. The introduction and expansion of cost-sharing is a global phenomenon and a significant policy shift from predominant taxpayer support of post-secondary education to that of students and their families through fees (Johnstone, 2004b, 2006; Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010). Adnett (2006) has attributed this global shift to (a) tax burden pressure and constraints of mobility of capital, (b) relative priority of higher education with other social spending, and (c) rising participation rates in a competitive knowledge economy and its rising costs. Many nations that had a tradition of tuition-free or highly subsidized post-secondary education have implemented new or newly increased tuition fees, with the purpose of shifting the share of public and private financing (Dobbins & Knill, 2009; Eicher & Chevaillier, 2002; Johnstone, 2004b; Li, 2007; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008).

Through different tuition policy experiments, countries have sought to balance increased access and quality through equitable and efficient public policy (Armbruster, 2008; Vandenberghe & Debande, 2008). These policy decisions have sometimes resulted in significant conflict in the public sphere. Johnstone (2004b) found this conflict to be an international phenomenon; he attributed the basis of conflict to be (a) technical, or based in an analysis that cost-sharing strategies cannot work for a variety of context-based reasons, (b) strategic, in that the political acceptance of cost-sharing tuition policies ultimately disadvantages higher education policy, relative to competing claims on public revenue, and (c) ideological, which he described as the most important and fundamental of reasons for conflict.

1.1.2. Tuition as a policy problem

Tuition is a policy problem for all stakeholders in post-secondary education, but it is perceived to be so in very different ways: too high, too low, too regulated, too
unregulated, a barrier to access to be overcome or removed, a demonstration of commitment, a means of private investment in a private good, a means of private subsidy of a public good, an appropriate cost-sharing of costs, a means for institutional funding, a means for strategic communication between government and institutions, and a political flashpoint for student advocacy. For some policy stakeholders, highly subsidized public education is an important part of the Canadian bargain (Mackenzie, 2005) and tuition fees were once only tolerated as a “necessary evil” (Quirke & Davies, 2002). In that light, increases in tuition fees are viewed as a lost entitlement (Ward, 2007). For others, tuition brings to post-secondary education some of the virtues of the market, including the presumption of greater efficiency, equity, producer responsiveness, and timelier student progress to degree completion (Johnstone, 2003).

There are a wide range of public policy options to shape the context for setting of tuition fees at public institutions. Table 1.1 arrays a continuum of regulatory public policy options for tuition fees with different dimensions of the policy problem and a potential range of policy choices for government, based on a model of stakeholder mapping from policy science literature (May, 2005).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Classical Liberal</th>
<th>Increasing action of government</th>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of tuition</td>
<td>Individual private investment in a</td>
<td>User fees an income stream</td>
<td>Zero or low tuition is a public investment in the public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>private good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in access (assuming qualified)</td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay for it</td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay; role for student aid</td>
<td>Access for all; role for student aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prestige, quality</td>
<td>Expensive but not a luxury</td>
<td>Affordable necessity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class formation</td>
<td>Queuing system for optimizing seat allocation</td>
<td>Queuing system for allocating scarce resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Price discrimination</td>
<td>Varies by program based on cost and other drivers</td>
<td>Varies by student based on characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in setting prices</td>
<td>No direct government involvement in tuition setting</td>
<td>Government set tuition price restrictions</td>
<td>Government asserts price regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in regulating prices</td>
<td>None – let marketplace set prices</td>
<td>Regulations imposed if costs not controlled within limits</td>
<td>Government regulation of allowable price increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in financing institutions</td>
<td>Zero to minimal direct government funding</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on consumer influence</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on control over tuition prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of institutions in tuition-setting</td>
<td>Autonomy based on institutional needs and market tolerance</td>
<td>Operate within government guidelines</td>
<td>Limited by government department criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of government department of PSE</td>
<td>Monitor outcomes</td>
<td>Set guidelines for institutions</td>
<td>Set limitations for institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public policy-making involves finding the appropriate balance between matters of financial accessibility, quality, availability, access, and price, as well as matters of social equity. Given the significant and widespread implications for the state and for individuals as a result of these public policy decisions, it is important to have greater insight into the dynamics of tuition policy formation.

1.1.3. Higher education policy environment in Canada

Both constitutional arrangements and institutions of government shape post-secondary education policy in Canada. Canada is one of the most decentralized federations in the world; regionalism and its political institutions are a profound and fundamental feature in Canadian society (Elkins & Simeon, 1980; Smiley, 1987). Canada’s ten provinces1 have autonomy, with authorities delineated by the Constitution, with separate political systems and full complement of institutions of government, which are similar to the federal government in terms of an institutionalized cabinet, powers of first Ministers, and cabinet conventions (Dunn, 2002a). The federal provincial relationship on post-secondary education has been described as soft federalism (Fisher et al., 2006; Jones, 1996); provincial autonomy over post-secondary education has resulted in policy and institutional differentiation throughout the country (Jones, 1997). While both federal and provincial levels of government have policy influence on aspects of post-secondary education, provincial governments set public policy for tuition fees at public institutions.

Institutions of government emerge from Canada’s political heritage of the British model, or Westminster parliamentary system of government, in which the executive and legislative powers are combined. Institutions of government are further characterized by Westminster conventions of Ministerial responsibility, cabinet solidarity, public service anonymity, and political neutrality (Kernaghan, 2002). The success of legislative programs directly impacts the tenure of the parliament/legislature and viability of the sitting government; party politics and party discipline have a role to ensure legislative support of government programs (Hockin, 1977). In provincial governments, Premiers and cabinets are the “focus and fulcrum of governance in a parliamentary system” (Dunn, 2006, p. 215).

1 Canada’s three territories are excluded from this analysis.
Executive power lies with the cabinet and the Premiers; the Premier has significant authority and wields personally substantial instruments of control and as chief policymaker and arguably significant amount of control over departmental priorities (Savoie, 1999). The Premier, as leader of the majority party and holder of office, has significant authority and wields personally substantial instruments of control: creation of cabinet, organization of government, sets appointments, chairs and sets the agenda and tone of Cabinet, and as chief policymaker, arguably sets a significant amount of departmental priorities (Savoie, 1999). Cabinet is the centre of a system that has been characterized as highly centralized in its decision-making, within the cabinet and apart from legislators (Dyck, 2000). By convention, cabinet government takes decisions by consensus and within camera. To this end, Premiers are the most important actors and determiners of consensus in provincial cabinets (Dunn, 2006).

The national average for full-time undergraduate student tuition in 2013/2014 was $5,772—an increase of 3.3% over the previous year, during which time the CPI was 1.3% (Statistics Canada, September 12, 2013). For average undergraduate university tuition fees for full-time students and historical weighted average tuition fee information, please refer to Table A1.1 in Appendix A. In the 2008/09 fiscal year, Canadian provinces spent on average 6.1% of total provincial expenditures on post-secondary education, ranging from 3.4% in New Brunswick to 8.2% in Alberta (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2010). In dollar terms, the national average in that year was $19.1 billion, up 30.8% from 1992/93 (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2010).

Tuition freezes and other forms of regulatory controls have been adopted in Canadian provinces. Table 1.2 summarizes provincial government tuition policy approaches of Canadian provinces over the past decade, classified into the following emergent categories: (a) Frozen: tuition fee increases are not permitted; (b) Restricted: tuition fee increases regulated through policy or legislation, most commonly to a percentage increase year over year; (c) Unrestricted: institutions free to set tuition rates without policy-based limitations; (d) Reduced: provincial government policy directed reduction of existing tuition rates, typically with compensating grants to offset loss to institutions; (e) No policy stated: no provincial policy instruments expressly guiding institutional behaviour. Individual provinces have substantively different policy histories.
from 2000 - 2010; however, the dominant policy regime in Canada during that decade could be characterized as highly regulated, with tuition rates frozen or regulated 77% of the time.

Table 1.2. National Overview of Provincial Tuition Policy in Effect, by Fiscal Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>Saskatchewan</th>
<th>Manitoba</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>New Brunswick</th>
<th>Nova Scotia</th>
<th>PEI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>Reduction</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled by the author.

▲ = change significant

Note: Provincial tuition policies vary widely, with some provinces freezing tuition rates for extended periods, while others increase or reduce them regularly. The table above provides a snapshot of tuition changes across Canada for select fiscal years from 2000 to 2010.
1.2. Statement of Problem

Policymakers seek to achieve optimal cost-sharing arrangements for post-secondary educational institutions and students, given prevailing social, economic, and political pressures. Most empirical examinations of Canadian tuition policy have focused on policy impacts rather than the process of policy-making itself. This focus has resulted in a scarcely explored field of analysis; there is a lack of systematic considerations of the post-secondary policy-making process, and the relationship between post-secondary policy-making and provincial political economy. Despite a considerable amount of political activity, policy experimentation, and public attention, the factors influencing the tuition policy decisions of Canadian provincial governments are largely unknown.

1.3. Purpose, goal and research questions

The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual understanding of the process by which provincial tuition policies undergo major change in Canada. Drawing on the conceptual body of literature on policy process, the goal of the research is to identify the key factors in episodes of major provincial tuition policy change. Given the impacts of policy-making in post-secondary education, the need for improved theorizing in higher education and policy in Canada, and the lack of process knowledge to inform policy actors, the research question guiding this dissertation is: What are the factors influencing provincial tuition policy formation in Canada?

The first research question (RQ1) is whether, and to what extent, theories of advocacy coalition (ACF) and multiple streams of problems, policies, and politics (MSM) explain tuition policy formation in selected Canadian provinces?

The second research question (RQ2) is how do these tuition policy formation processes compare to one another?
1.4. Delimitations of the study

Foremost, this study makes no attempt to undertake a tuition policy evaluation, nor does it strive for normative conclusions; rather, the focus is an analytical study of the policy formation process itself. This study is agnostic with respect to (1) policy choices or alternatives related to the setting of tuition fees or financing post-secondary educational institutions more generally, (2) the role of the federal government, (3) goals of tuition policy, (4) impacts of tuition policy implementation, (5) related and important public policies including student financial aid, including both loans and grants, income tax credits or rebates, student debt reduction programs or strategies, and government supported educational savings plans.

The field of analysis of this study is delimited to three Canadian provinces that experienced a major tuition policy change between 2000 and 2010. Territories are excluded from the field of analysis. This study is further delimited to tuition policies governing general undergraduate university and college tuition in public institutions. Most provinces, and indeed, institutions, have nuanced policies which regulate tuition-setting in professional or applied programs, premium fee programs, graduate programs, international, distance, and other non-resident student fees, new programs, third party contracts, continuing or community education, cost-recovery programs, ancillary, auxiliary, or other fees. These are excluded from this analysis. The purpose for excluding these separate and differentiated tuition policies is to focus on a relatively uniform policy area in order to undertake a comparative analysis across provinces. In excluding the diversity of tuition and fee practices, it is understood to limit potential opportunity to fully understand the creative ways in which post-secondary systems and institutions may be implementing government policy or adapting to different policy regimes. A set of definitions is in the Glossary on page xiv.

1.5. Significance of the study

Given the role and value placed on post-secondary education in the formation of the human and social capital, it is important to develop a greater understanding of how governments respond to social, economic, and political factors by making significant
changes to post-secondary policy, and tuition policy in particular. Such an understanding would complement other research that aims to evaluate the effect of tuition policy on individuals, families, communities, and institutions.

Further, it is important to deepen our understanding of and generate new insights into post-secondary policy formation processes. Of particular importance is how and with what effect are interests articulated and mobilized within post-secondary policy-making arenas. A key question in the policy process is why certain issues rise to the agenda of decision-making and by what means does this occur. Given the substantive tuition policy experiments undertaken in Canada and elsewhere, the role organized interests and politics play in the decision-making process has not been given sufficient scholarly investigation considering its impact on individuals, families, communities, and institutions. Democratic participation in Canadian post-secondary policy formation is supported and informed through improved understanding of the relationship between activity and outcome in public policy development.

Given the degree to which Canadian public policy is formed at the provincial rather than federal level, there is value in an improved understanding of what particular social, economic, and political dynamics impact major policy change in those jurisdictions. Further, given the degree to which policy learning and transfer occurs between provinces, it is important to develop comparative knowledge for understanding the various interactions between provincial policy arenas. Within Canadian political studies, there is an identified need for more empirical and comparative policy analysis at the sub-national level (Imbeau, 2000a).

The significance of this study emerges from the theoretical implications for researchers and the practical implications for stakeholders in the policy making process. This is the first comparative study of Canadian provincial tuition policy formation, adding to the growing international literature on policy and politics in higher education and extending theoretical understanding to complement a field that has fair coverage of studies of policy implementation. This study contributes to the broader study of policy formation

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2 Relatively recent public policy changes have been implemented in the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, Vietnam, and South Korea.
where there is a need for more theoretically informed, empirical, and comparative analysis of decision-making of policymakers—particularly in educational policy (McLendon, 2003; Smith & Larimer, 2009; St. John & Parsons, 2004; Weaver-Hightower, 2008). This study will provide an important contribution to the descriptive and conceptual understanding of provincial post-secondary policy formation processes in Canada, from which tuition policy emerges.

The gap in scholarly attention to the post-secondary policy-making process is noted in the literature both in the US and in Canada; Enders (2004) referred to a “blind spot” in higher education policy studies which focused on policy effects to the neglect of the “input side” of policy formation. Most prominently in the United States, McLendon (2003) called for expanded research into the politics of higher education. Similarly, Bastedo (2007) observed that the study of policy and politics in higher education was an important and growing central subfield in higher education research “seeking new and compelling conceptions and frameworks to help explain policy dynamics” (p. 295). Ness (2010) observed that more than 30 peer reviewed articles had been published on higher education policy process in the previous decade alone, indicating rising interest in the complex dynamics of public policy-making and policy adoption in particular. In Canada, Jones (1998) notes that surprising little attention has been given to how provincial governments make policy decisions concerning higher education and the politics of Canadian higher education. Internationally, there are similar questions currently being addressed through calls for more post-secondary education policy making studies (McLendon, 2003; St. John & Parsons, 2004; Weaver-Hightower, 2008), given the impact of state-level politics on policy choices and educational outcomes and the particularly complex array of political forces and interests that are brought to bear on formation of education policy. St. John & Parsons (2004) argue that policy studies in higher education suffer from a lack of theoretically driven explanations of politics and policy processes impacting policy choice. Further, this study contributes to a small body of work internationally on tuition policy and politics (Sponsler, 2009; Warne, 2008) and of the Canadian politics of higher education finance and policy formation (Boggs, 2009; Jones, 1998; Rounce, 2010; Smith, 2010; Trick, 2005), increasingly of essential interest to scholars as well as advocates, practitioners, and policy makers.
Finally, for stakeholders who wish to influence future post-secondary educational policy, there are significant practical implications for this study. This research identifies key factors influencing major policy change, thus informing policy-practitioners and policy advocates as to the nature of effective representation of interests as well as a deeper understanding of what constitutes winning conditions for government adoption of policy ideas.

1.6. Organization of this dissertation

This first chapter has provided an overview of the broader context for the study, including a discussion of the characteristics of the policy environment of post-secondary education in Canada, the issues in the study of the policy process, and delimitations of the study. The second chapter will review the literature, drawing from Canadian and international scholarly and practice literature. It is organized using a heuristic approach to the policy process by viewing it as definable stages and summarizes the issues in the literature on post-secondary tuition and tuition policy. The third chapter reviews the relevant policy process literature, highlighting the two theoretical frameworks used in this research, the Multiple Streams Model (MSM) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). The fourth chapter presents the methodology, research design, and limitations of this study, including the introduction of an operationalized analytical framework developed from the two theories supporting the study. This framework informs the analysis of each case as well as the cross-case analysis.

The following three chapters present results from three case studies in chronological order: British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba, shown in the timeline below in Figure 1.1.
Canadian Federal government cuts to Health and Social Transfer to provinces

BC general election

BC tuition policy change

Ontario general election

Ontario tuition policy change

Manitoba general election

Manitoba tuition policy change

Figure 1.1. Timeline of Cases

Each chapter provides a description of the structure of the policy subsystem, the antecedent policy conditions to the policy change, the narrative of the policy change event, and a case analysis. The analysis of each of the cases is organized according to the dimensions of the operationalized analytical framework: (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, and (e) the effects of external influences.

Chapter eight presents the findings of the comparative cross-case analysis of the three case studies, again organized generally according to the dimensions of the operationalized analytical framework, and finishes with an analysis of the two conceptual frameworks. The final chapter reviews the primary and additional findings of the study, outlines implications for theory and practice, and presents suggestions for future research.
Chapter 2.

Review of the Literature

Drawing on the conceptual body of literature on policy process, the goal of the research is to identify the factors affecting tuition policy change in three Canadian provinces. This chapter reviews and summarizes the literature, drawing from Canadian and international sources, along two dimensions: first, public policy formation literature, and second, that of post-secondary tuition and tuition policy.

Stemming from a desire to understand, explain, and predict the policy process and account for policy change, policy studies scholars have utilized a stages typology of policy development, or the policy cycle, as a common frame of reference. While there are variations, the model (shown in Figure 2.1) generally has included the following temporal stages: (1) agenda-setting, (2) policy formulation, (3) decision-making, (4) policy implementation, and (5) policy evaluation. It is a useful heuristic to organize, describe and delimit research endeavours, empirical and otherwise, and is an important descriptive classification of the policy process (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Parsons, 2001). It is used here as an organizational frame to review the literature relevant to this study.
Given the public attention to tuition fees, and considering what is known about post-secondary policy formation in Canada, how has the literature addressed questions of tuition policy?

### 2.1. Agenda-setting

Beginning with the first stage in the policy cycle, agenda-setting is the means by which an issue or a set of political controversies within a community becomes a concern warranting attention of the polity (Cobb & Elder, 1972). The agenda-setting process is competitive in two ways; first, other than valence issues, most issues are social problems that are two-sided in nature (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), and second, competition exists for attention as space on the agenda is a scarce resource. As such, agenda-setting is a political and contingent process, emerging from ongoing competition among issue
proponents to gain attention over substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Dearing & Rogers, 1996).

Emerging first as a scholarly subject in the mass communication literature (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993) and influenced by political science (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Downs, 1972), the agenda-setting literature is a key component of understanding the policy process (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Cobb & Elder, 1972; Cobb & Rochefort, 1995; Cobb & Ross, 1997; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Kingdon, 2003; Majone, 1989; Nelson, 1984; Stone, 2002). Generally, the literature has identified three distinct agendas, their interactions, and reciprocal relationships: the media agenda, or the coverage of issues or problems; the public agenda, including public mood or opinion; and the policy agenda, or those issues under active debate (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Kingdon, 2003; Soroka, 2002; Young & McCarthy, 2009). Different means or modes of agenda-setting have been identified, including interest mobilization, problem definition, and issue framing (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005).

2.1.1. Interest mobilization

Scholars have developed alternative concepts to describe and explain group and interest mobilization in policy-making. The first set of constructs seeks to identify the composition and behaviour of individuals and groups within a policy arena, given that policy agenda-setting involves collective political behaviour. Policy subsystems are a theoretical notion developed by Heclo (1978) to describe relationships between agenda-setting and policy change. Within a policy subsystem, there are informal alliances between highly informed and motivated individuals, organizations, and interest groups, formed either in response to or to promote a response to a particular issue called issue networks. Policy actors operate both across multiple policies simultaneously and across different policy stages simultaneously (Weible et al., 2009). Heclo discovered that these issue networks exerted a great deal of influence on policy-making, and they operated within the policy subsystem overlaying formal structures and established relationships. Similarly, the concepts of policy community and policy network are described in Canadian literature (Coleman & Skogstad, 1990; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Pal, 2001; Pross, 1992). According to Pross (1992), the broader policy community also includes the attentive
public, including the media and the academic community whose role is to maintain a "perpetual policy-review process" (p. 99).

Within a given policy community, interests are advanced or represented through advocacy or interest groups, which are those organizations that seek to influence government policy but not to govern (Monpetit, 2009; Pross, 1992; Young & Everitt, 2004). Interest groups can support or be in the centre of social movements (Scala, Monpetit, & Fortier, 2005). Theorizing of interest groups follows several models. Pluralists (Dahl, 1961) and plural elites theorists (Edelman, 1988; Olson, 1965) consider the relative organization and spread of interest groups, including countervailing power and power dispersal, while interest group liberalism (Lowi, 1969) stress classical liberal limits to government, and interest group behaviour in distributive politics. Issue network theory (Heclo, 1978) describes ways in which influence is exerted through policy elites, and theories of social movements such as resource mobilization (Salisbury, 1970), communicative action (Habermas, 1984), and political process theory also have been brought to explain interest groups and their effectiveness (Costain, 1992). Other interest group theory has held that the influence of groups is related to the degree to which power is centralized and the extent to which political parties control policy alternatives (Peterson, 1990).

Interest groups have been found to participate in agenda-setting in various ways. Selected tactics found have included (a) litigation and administrative intervention, (b) confrontation, including protests and public relations actions, (c) production and release of information, including direct lobbying, and (d) constituency influence, including petitions, letter writing, and making campaign contributions (Berry, 1977). Kingdon (2003) found that much of the interest group activity he examined was not focused on a positive promotion of certain policy options, but rather focused on negative blocking of competing interests. Interest groups have been found to emphasize a semi-institutionalized lobbying process (Beyers & Braun, 2014), which serve additional purposes beyond immediate policy outcomes; these purposes include developing internal expertise and developing and sustaining political networks and visibility to ensure longer-term organizational sustainability and influence. Interest group policy entrepreneurship in education has been studied in the United States, notably by Slaughter (1990), Mintrom (1997, 2000; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996), and Ness & Mistretta (2009). In Canada, interest groups participate in
government-led community consultations, including legislative hearings, stakeholder meetings, and private conversations (Young & Everitt, 2004). Some interest groups interact with government through strategic action to influence policy directly; other interest groups, motivated by the search for the best policy ideas, have sought to cooperate or puzzle through policy problems with government to develop optimal policy (Monpetit, 2009). The choice of insider tactics or outsider tactics by interest groups has been found to be contingent upon a number of factors, including availability of group resources, nature of group membership, the degree of conflict over the policy issue, and issue salience (Gais & Walker, 1991).

Interest groups have an influence on policy-making through the production of knowledge and through research and communication through lobbying, including strategically transmitting asymmetric information (Potters & Van Winden, 1992), political framing (Schaffner & Sellers, 2010), and supply of expert knowledge (Beyers & Braun, 2014). In Canada, Pross (1992) found that the effectiveness of interest groups was contingent upon a politically salient group of characteristics, including characteristics of membership, tangible and intangible resources, and capacity in organizational structure and outputs, in addition to policy capacity. Monpetit (2009) found that some interest groups most likely to have their preferences adopted into government policy are those “that have the possibility to end their cooperation – to exit – at a cost to government” (p. 269). Other factors found to influence interest group effectiveness in Canadian studies include the ability to mobilize resources, ideological alignment with the governing political party, capacity of the civil service or government agencies, access to policy-makers, expertise within the group, size and representativeness of the group, and public opinion (summarized by Young & Everitt, 2004).

The international higher education policy and finance literature has noted a need to empirically examine the impact of interest groups on policy and finance of higher education (Gove & Carpenter, 1977; Lowry, 2001; Zumeta, 2004). Relatively little scholarship has been undertaken to assess whether and to what extent Canadian interest groups influence post-secondary policy. Jones (1998) notes that surprising little attention has been given to how provincial governments make policy decisions concerning higher
education; his 1991 study of university interest articulation in Manitoba focused on one element of Baldridge’s model (1971). He concluded that this approach shed little about

the political process as a whole, or about the relationship between specific forms of interest articulation and policy...There has been little research on the politics of Canadian higher education, and little is known about the range of factors and conflicting interests which influence policy. Further research is clearly needed, especially given the importance of the university-provincial government relationship. (p. 102)

Recent volumes on Canadian politics and interest groups have very little or no mention of student interest groups (Pross, 1992; Smith, 2005; Young & Everitt, 2004), likely a result of the tendency of Canadian scholars to focus on issues of federal policy-making or institutional-focused approaches.

2.1.2. Problem definition and issue framing

Problem definition and issue framing is an important aspect of agenda-setting. According to Entman (1993) the action of framing promotes a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. The language and rhetoric used to articulate policy issues are critical in determining which aspect of a problem will be identified and examined (Stone, 1988). Stone (2002) argues that any analysis of the policy process needs to consider “the struggle over ideas” (p. 11); definitions of problems frame issues in ways that are easily communicated, resonate, and persuade. The relationship between the political process of policy making and the description of alternative policy choices is described in the policy design literature (Edelman, 1988; Fischer, 1980; Fischer & Forester, 1996; Stone, 2002); values are imbedded in policy content and policy makers use the policy process to achieve value-based ends.

To Stone, problem definition is more than a rational tussle over conflicting ideas: it is the “strategic representation of situations...representations of a problem are therefore constructed to win the most people to one’s side and the most leverage over one’s opponents” (2002, p. 133). Policy actors avail themselves of this problem definition process, described in the narrative policy analysis literature by several scholars (see Fischer & Forester, 1996; Roe, 1994) and in higher education policy research (Mills, 2007;
Shanahan et al., 2008). The media also has a specific role in setting the issue agenda for the public (Rogers & Dearing, 1988); McCombs and Shaw (1972) first pointed out the media’s ability to influence public attention to issues. This agenda-setting effect has been shown to be evident over a variety of jurisdictions and issues (Iyengar, 1988; Peterson & McLendon, 1999; Soroka, 2002).

Lenth (1993) describes how tuition has become a “touchstone” for issues of access, cost and public accountability:

Tuition policies are pulled in different directions by competing ideas about the most ‘efficient’ pricing and allocation of higher education, about the best way to deal with escalating costs in providing education, and about the relation of tuition to the availability of need-based student assistance, to mention just a few of the economic and policy considerations. (p. 1)

Interest groups have a goal in shaping the representation of tuition fees as a particular type of problem, and framing tuition fees in that light. Scholars respond to and contribute further to these discourses through their own representation of tuition fees in the literature. The scholarly literature reveals different conceptualizations of tuition fees in terms of how they function relative to political economy. These functions are bound by jurisdictional cultural, political, economic, and institutional expectations and practices. These conceptualizations are: tuition as a function of government budget and public finance; tuition as a function of social policy choices; tuition as a function of institutional finance and strategy; tuition as a function of market-emphasized supply and demand; tuition as a function of globalization and neo-liberal economics; tuition as a function of politics.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Conceptualization of tuition fees</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Institutional finance and strategy</td>
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<td>History and political economy-informed tuition research</td>
<td>Social policy choices</td>
<td>Adnett, 2006; Johnson &amp; Leslie, 1976; Johnson, 2006; Levin, 1990; Wellen, 2004</td>
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The literature summarized in Table 1.3 reveals two primary collections which reflect and operationalize these conceptualizations. First, there is market-informed tuition research, using economic methods and reflecting a classically liberal political economy, as reflected primarily in American research. This research emerges from and in response to a policy arena which has a historical record of significant adoption of cost-sharing strategies within a context of well-established public and private providers. The problems considered within the literature reflect the maturity of those competitive systems and the social conditions and concerns associated with those systems and the American political economy. The other realm of literature reflects a rather different historical trajectory: the
problems and political economy of those nations that have a highly or completely subsidized higher education system, primarily with public providers. The research associated with these nations, which include Canada, much of Europe, Africa and Asia, reflects the complex struggles with cost-sharing policy innovation within their political economy. This literature generally tends toward critiques of neo-liberal economic agendas, their impact on policy change, and investigates the issues associated with adjustments of historically embedded welfare states in the face of globalization. One literature seeks to make sense of the market economics of higher education in order to prove and improve outcomes within a system that is largely uncontested. The other seeks to make sense of the market economics of higher education in order to prove that marketization was and remains, at the very least, a contested idea.

2.1.3. Policy transfer

Policy transfer is an umbrella term for the process by which “knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas” in one political jurisdiction is used in another jurisdiction (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p.5). The policy transfer literature seeks to describe and understand conditions and features of policy adoption. A variety of policy-related factors may be transferred including ideologies, approaches, complex policy provisions, or administrative arrangements. Other specific forms of policy transfer include voluntary lesson-drawing, or emulation of policy ideas from other jurisdictions based on performance (Rose, 1993), or policy convergence, which suggests that common structural arrangements and conditions give rise to similar policy adoptions (Bennett & Howlett, 1992). An important aspect often considered in the examination of policy transfer is the availability and use of technical information to the policy community during the policy formation process. Technical information plays a particularly important role in the agenda-setting phase. The role of technical information in policy agendas is critical to understanding the policy process (Weible, et al., 2009). Policy learning can occur when this information signals “real-world” attention, framings, arguments and constructions (Workman, et al., 2009). Policy learning within and between coalitions, and the role played by technical information in the policy process, is best understood in combination with the context (Howlett, 2009).
While there have been promising developments in scholarship on the use of technical information in post-secondary policy-making generally (also referred to as research utilization), we still know very little about its ultimate impact on policy (Ness, 2010). Some policy actors regard research on the impact of tuition fee policy in Canada as an important factor in policy decision-making; this literature is reviewed in the section 2.5 on the policy evaluation stage of the policy process.

2.2. Policy formulation

Policy formation includes the development of policy alternatives and assessing possible solutions to policy problems, including policy design and instruments (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). This section reviews two specific approaches to policy formulation, budgeting and regulation, and then reviews extant tuition policy alternatives represented in the international literature.

The first approach to policy formation is government budgeting, a particular type of decision-making. A government budget is the “most important policy statement of the year” (Dyck, 2000). It has been seen to dominate policy and decision-making (Savoie, 1990) and is the most visible and central process of public policy making (Prince, 2002). Public expenditure is one of nine policy instruments found in Canadian public policy (Baxter-Moore, 1987). In Canada, budgeting is a highly institutionalized event (Prince, 2002) and is a mixture of politics, economics, and management (Doern, Maslove, & Prince, 1988). Budgeting serves as a tool for governing and is simultaneously a reflection of competing values, a record of the past, a form of power, a set of plans, and a set of signals [which are a] central part of the process through which the main ideas and values in Canadian political life are expressed, ranked, balanced or frustrated. (Prince, 2002, p. 402).

Budgeting is a political as well as an economic instrument (Wildavsky, 1979); important considerations in the budgeting process include the effects of political cultures (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989), electoral cycles (Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001), partisan politics (Gittell & Kleiman, 2000; Maslove & Cutt, 1989), political feasibility (Jones, 1986), and political bargaining (Moe & Caldwell, 1994). Scholars have considered the budgeting
process and tested alternative theories of decision-making in the United States (Wildavsky, 1964), Britain (Heclo & Wildavsky, 1974) and Canada (Doern, et al., 1988; Imbeau, 2000b; Savoie, 1990). Theoretical frames for analyses used in Canada include institutional factors (Muller & Zimmerman, 1986); political or economic causal or covariate analysis, such as opportunistic spending in electoral and partisan cycles (Keechbone & McKenzie, 2001); public choice explanations, including that of the “budget-maximizing bureaucrat” (Blais & Dion, 1991; Niskanen, 1971), and other related public choice (Downs, 1957; Flanagan, 1998; Hartle, 1979; Savage & Schwartz, 1999; Trebilcock, 1982, 1994); class analysis (Clarke, 1997; Clement, 1997); pluralism (Coleman & Skogstad, 1990; Dahl, 1967) and elitism (Mills, 1956); state centered approaches (Pal, 1988); institutionalism/neo-institutionalism (Ellis & Maclvor, 2008); principal-agent theory (Forrester, 2002; Schick, 1988); and policy networks (Carlsson, 2000; Heclo, 1978; Howlett, 2002; Rhodes, 1997).

A second approach to policy formation is regulation. Lowi (1964) identified four types of policy issues: constituent, distributive, regulatory, and redistributive. Regulatory policy issues are those that involve allocation of public funds on a contested issue, have engaged interest groups, and are formed in an environment in which there are winners and losers. Tuition rate policy can be seen as regulatory policy, insofar as it affects and alters private spending, sets pricing practices and controls as fiscal policy, and is backed by sanctions of the state. Economic rationales and ideologies both have been found to be inadequate for causal explanation for regulatory behaviour on the part of government; therefore, regulation must be understood in context of the political behaviour of governing politicians (Doern, 2005).

Tuition policy alternatives adopted by national and subnational governments are described and summarized in the international literature (see Johnstone & Marcucci (2010), Marcucci & Johnstone (2007), and Marcucci & Usher (2011)). Marcucci & Johnstone (2007) classified government tuition fee policies for public education into four categories: up-front tuition fees, no tuition, dual track tuition fees, or deferred tuition fees. Each type of tuition fee has associated distinct student aid schemes intended to support participation. Drivers of these different government choices included a number of factors including presumed public and private benefit of higher education, the political economy.
context, including ability of the jurisdiction to manage administration, and the cultural views of responsibility to pay for higher education. The political economy of tuition policy alternatives outlined previously in Figure 1 constitutes an expansion of this original literature and illustrates the continuum of potential policy provisions in this area.

Tuition rates themselves have been established using a variety of policy mechanisms. Many jurisdictions have relied in part on an analysis of program cost (Marcucci & Johnstone, 2007), an idea expressed in the United States’ Carnegie Commission on Higher Education in 1974. Others considered response to market-related conditions, for example, to differentiate fees for levels and programs, relative to their presumed future private benefit, such as in professional programs (Ward, 2007). Other approaches included various forms of indexing to ensure affordability which are discussed later in this chapter. Specific policy instruments for implementing government tuition policy are reviewed in the section on policy implementation in this chapter.

2.3. Decision-making

The decision-making stage of the policy cycle involves the process by which policy options are selected for implementation by policy-makers, based on the alternatives generated during the first two stages. An understudied area, Smith & Larimer (2009) have called for more systemic, empirical, and comparative analysis of decision-making of policy-makers. The policy process literature in Canada has greater coverage in examination of federal policy making than provincial policy making, and these gaps have been noted in the analysis of provincial-level policy processes (Howlett, 2009; Imbeau, 2000a; Pal & Taras, 1988). Federal decision-making has been well examined (Doern & Aucoin, 1973, 1979; French & Van Loon, 1984; Hockin, 1977; Matheson, 1976; Pal, 2006; Pal & Taras, 1988; Savoie, 1990, 1999), with some examination of the role of the civil service in providing advice to decision-making at the national level (Howlett, 2009).

Within a context of international calls for further scholarship of the policy process in post-secondary education (Enders, 2004; McLendon, 2003; McLendon & Hearn, 2003), Canadian scholars have contributed important analyses of federal decision-making in post-secondary education (Wellen, Axelrod, Desai-Trilokekar & Shanahan, 2012), and
federal influence on provincial post-secondary policy-making (Fisher et al., 2006; Fisher, Rubenson, Jones & Shanahan, 2009; Shanahan & Jones, 2007). Others have explored forces influencing policymaking in different Canadian provinces (Axelrod, Desai-Trilokekar, Shanahan & Wellen, 2011; Axelrod, Shanahan, Wellen & Desai-Trilokekar, 2012; Jones, 1997; Padure & Jones, 2009) and focused on Ontario specifically (Axelrod, Shanahan, Wellen & Desai-Trilokekar, 2012; Boggs, 2009; Charles, 2011; Constantinou, 2010; Shanahan, Fisher, Jones & Rubenson, 2005; Young, 2002).

Policy-making can be understood as a political process (Brewer & DeLeon, 1983; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Pal, 2006). As a result, the political dimensions and dynamics in the decision-making stage are one of the most important considerations in the study of the policy formation process. At the decision-making stage of the policy process, the number of policy actors involved is reduced and restricted to those with the capacity and authority to make binding public decisions, normally those persons in formal positions or offices in government (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Howlett and Ramesh (2003) suggested that the most relevant actors tend to be the First Minister and Cabinet, senior political advisors, key members of the civil service and leaders of organized interests.

There is a growing international literature on the influence of political factors on decision-making on post-secondary education policy. In particular, there is an increase in examination of state level higher education policy and politics in the United States (Dar & Lee, in press; McLendon, 2003; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006; McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; McLendon & Ness, 2003; Tandberg, 2010a, 2010b). Gittell and Kleiman (2000) observed the relationship between the politics and cultures of states and higher education policy and concluded that state politics have a demonstrable effect on policy outcomes, including access and economic development. Pusser (2004b) found that key to understanding dynamics of higher education policy formation was “acknowledging the instrumental and symbolic value in broader political contests” (p.211). American scholars have increasingly attended to the importance of political variables in higher education policy, and state financing decisions in particular (Doyle, 2012; Dar, 2012; McLendon, Mokher, & Doyle, 2008; Tandberg, 2008); American state government funding and tuition have been found to depend on political as well as economic factors (Fethke, 2005; Griswold & Marine, 1996; Lowry, 2001; Tandberg, 2008).
Actors identified as influencing decision-making in the United States include interest groups, coordinating bodies, institutional boards, legislature and legislative committees, and the state governor (Layzel & Lydon, 1990; Lowry, 2001; Pusser, 2000). Slaughter (1990) examined the particular role of elite university presidents in federal higher education decision-making in the United States. Subnational higher education governance arrangements also affect post-secondary policy decision-making (Gaskell, 2004; Hearn & Griswold, 1994; Zumeta, 1996).

There is an emerging scholarly body of knowledge on tuition policy and politics, with several dissertations and theses produced recently on the impact of politics on tuition policy decision-making (Culclasure 2003, 2007; Deaton, 2006; Rounce, 2010; Smith, 2008; Warne, 2008) as well as articles and papers (Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010; Neill, 2009; Sponsler, 2009). Warne (2008) examined two case studies to compare the ability of four theoretical frameworks to explain the political processes surrounding tuition policy change, and specifically the move to centralize or decentralize tuition policy between 2000 and 2006. Her analysis highlights the complexity of tuition politics across the states; traditional political variables such as political party, legislative professionalism, and executive centralization were not significant on their own, while institutional arrangements mattered in creating positive conditions for changes in tuition setting authority. She found that higher education is not a high salience issue in most states and that this obscures the relationships among potentially important variables. The key economic variable impacting state decisions to alter tuition authority arrangements, revenue change, showed only tentative results, offering little support to the common wisdom which states that states with less money to spend will allow colleges and universities the flexibility to increase tuition to offset decreasing state support. Internationally, the political contests around cost-sharing policy has been found to be related to resource scarcity and political competition:

Governments are also besieged with other pressing public needs, many of which seem more politically compelling than the claims of higher education and which, together with higher education, greatly exceed, in almost all countries, the available scarce public resources. The result is an increasing sense of austerity within the higher educational systems of most countries and a heightened appreciation of the importance of other-than-governmental revenue. (Johnstone, 2004b, p. 403)
In the US, it has been speculated that middle-class voters and negative public opinion toward tuition increases may influence decisions on tuition policy (Griswold & Marine, 1996), and the political aspect of policy-making has been found to impact policy coherence in higher education policy (Hearn, 2001). In his study of American financial aid policy, Hearn (2001) found that social and political considerations and dynamics in the policy process have greater influence on decision-making than rational analysis. Tandberg (2009, 2010b) applied his fiscal policy framework created to explain state support of public higher education in order to evaluate the relationship between various factors and the states’ relative support of higher education. The study found political influences as well the significant impact of state-level interest groups on state fiscal policy and support of higher education. Zumeta (2009) observed that a number of American states implemented tuition freezes or controls and suggested that government decision-making responded to the public and political intolerance for past sharp or sustained tuition increases. American research identified a political cycle in tuition fees at public four-year institutions associated with gubernatorial elections results where there is competition for swing districts (Reynolds, 2009). Elsewhere, the effect of politics on decision-making on tuition has been noted in Africa (Johnson, Hirt, & Hoba, 2011) and Canada (Neill, 2009); for example, Neill (2009) examined changes of political party in power to identify plausibly exogenous factors for changes in tuition fees.

Other potential political factors that may influence decision-making on tuition fees include local considerations, as those found in retail politics. Differentiated fees may be set according to political jurisdictions, such as out-of-state or international rates (Ward, 2007), which set a benefit to local students and charge what the market will bear for others, as part of a complex system of international education markets and institutional financing. Fethke (2006) noted that scholars argue the discounted local rate is a “payoff” to local interests who influence politicians and government (p. 645). T.J. Kane (1999) speculated that the political resistance of parents may well constrain a college’s option with respect to tuition. Baldrige’s interest articulation model (1971) examined policy formation from the institutional perspective and described the negotiation processes between institutional leadership and government (Pusser, 2000). Marcucci & Johnstone (2007) note the tension between institutional fee-setting and political goals and values of the prevailing government. The international practitioner literature observes that governments “play with
tuition to effect a number of outcomes” (Swail & Heller, 2004), including reduction of costs for students, reduction of taxpayer burden, increasing access and/or enrolment, and striking the right balance between public and private investment. The American Institute for Higher Education Policy expressed concern about political feasibility in higher education finance policy; “rising college prices are the biggest single threat to public and political support for higher education” (Wellman, 2001, p. 65), given that the public does not believe higher education spends wisely, and furthermore, that tuition increases could be avoided if “colleges realigned their spending with those areas the public most cares about, particularly undergraduate education and job preparation” (Wellman, p. 51).

A final critical component of government decision-making is the selection of policy instruments. Policy instruments are “techniques of governance that involve the utilization of state authority or its conscious limitation” (Howlett, 2005, p. 31). These can vary on a continuum from a low to high level of state activity or provision of goods or services as well as level of coercion (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Examples of tuition-setting policy instruments include legislative statute, government directive, or fee-setting arrangements established by a intermediary higher education coordinating board. The international literature describes a global shift in higher educational finance arrangements and taking different forms (Johnstone, 2004, 2006; Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010; Marcucci & Usher, 2011).

For some jurisdictions, these policy innovations represent a radical reconsideration of their social welfare contract and higher education finance in particular; for others, including much of the English-speaking world, most if not all of these forms have already been adopted to some degree. These innovations include development of pre-paid tuition programs (Baird, 2006; Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010) and tuition guarantees, differential tuition charges (Vossensteyn, 2009), and income-contingent or graduate tax repayment schemes (Chapman & Ryan, 2005; Greenaway & Haynes, 2003). Many nations that had a tradition of tuition-free or highly subsidized post-secondary education are implementing new or increased tuition fees, including fees for part-time studies (Vossensteyn, 2009), with the purpose of shifting the share of public and private financing (Dobbins & Knill, 2009; Eicher & Chevaillier, 2002; Johnstone, 2004; Li, 2007; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). Countries that continue to provide tuition-free education do so through
strategies of restricting or limiting capacity and therefore maintaining elite systems, or by implementing dual-track tuition, whereby free or low-cost education is provided to some while others pay premium fees to expand capacity (Johnstone, 2004b; Marcucci, Johnstone, & Ngolovoi, 2008; Vossensteyn, 2009).

2.4. Policy implementation

Policy implementation is the stage in which policy decisions are translated into action. Policy design considerations as well as administrative venues, arrangements, and techniques are relevant to policy implementation and its study. Government bureaucracy, agencies, and institutions are all policy actors involved in implementation; implementation occurs under the scrutiny of interest groups which can create additional political dimensions. Policy implementation is contingent upon jurisdictional governance arrangements, a matter which influences and responds to aspects discussed in other stages of policy-making as described in this chapter. This section first will discuss first the matter of authority for tuition-setting and move on to discuss policy design instruments in particular.

The governance model established in a jurisdiction has a role and an effect on policy formation (McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; Tandberg, 2010a, 2010b; Zumeta, 1992). Several typologies and models of post-secondary governance are described in the literature. McGuiness (2003) developed a typology of state governance approaches in the United States, noting distinctive approaches to governing boards, coordinating boards, and planning agencies. The State Higher Education Executive Officers further developed this typology (SHEEO, 2009), focusing on the differences between governing and coordinating boards. Layzell & Lyddon (1990) articulates a model of diffusion of power in the American state budgeting process and institutional autonomy as a framework to conceptualize policy formation dynamics. The four categories of policy governance in this model are the state-agency model, in which financial controls are held by the state coordinating agency and legislature; the state-controlled model, in which the coordinating agency depends on budget requests of institutions while retaining primary authority; the state-aided model, in which government and institutions are jointly responsible for institutional finance policy and state coordinating body plays an advisory role; and the
independent model, in which institutions are autonomous, contracted by the state to provide education.

The variety of arrangements that provide authority for tuition-setting in public institutions at the provincial level in Canada has not been described in the scholarly literature, however similar arrangements are well documented at the state level in the United States (Mullin & Honeyman, 2008; Mumper & Freeman, 2005; SHEEO, 2011). The choice of policy instruments is guided in part by the institutional or structural arrangements. Wellman (1999) provided a comprehensive description of governance arrangements that impact tuition policy implementation. Most states make public a state tuition philosophy statement indicating whether policy decisions will be guided with the intention of maintaining low, moderate, or high levels of tuition. Most jurisdictions have state-level institutionally-oriented tuition policy, providing different institutional types with different tuition rates. Authority for tuition-setting is typically distributed across at least two levels of governance, including institutional governing boards. Many states use indexing strategies to regulate allowable tuition increases to some sets of external indicators. Finally, states use a variety of differential fee mechanisms to charge students different rates of tuition, including those for higher cost programs (Wellman, 1999).

2.5. Policy evaluation

Policy evaluation literature provides an assessment of policy impacts or outcomes but also contributes actively to agenda-setting, problem definition, and the issue framing/linking described in previous sections. Tuition policy evaluation research is generally linked to other substantive issues, such as student financial aid, affordability, price sensitivity, and access and participation in post-secondary education. Much of the available empirical research investigates the role of tuition price in negatively influencing decisions to participate in higher education, the effect of tuition fees (or rates) on enrolment, and that effect in combination with other factors, including eligibility, parental income or education level, demographic characteristics, and student aid. The political economy perspectives represented in the tuition policy evaluation literature often explicitly or implicitly reflect policy positions and preferences mapped in Figure 1. This section reviews and characterizes tuition policy evaluation research by the following themes.
emerging from the literature: affordability, price response, funding levels and mechanisms, social policy, and distributional effects.

2.5.1. Affordability

The higher education economics and policy literature reflects several theoretical frames to evaluate tuition policy in light of affordability, including human capital theory, public sector economics, microeconomic theories of costs and productivity, microeconomic theories of demand and supply, price-response analysis, revenue theories, market forces, as well as social-cultural perspectives including social attainment theory and social reproduction theory (summarized by St. John & Paulsen, 2001). Publications on Canadian tuition tend to measure affordability by framing the issue in relative terms such as to family income or financial barriers (Anisef, Bell & Sweet, 2001; Ceolli, 2009; Christofides, Cirello, & Hoy, 2001; Clarke, 1997; Conlon, 2006; Frenette, 2007). In other studies, tuition is examined relative to post-secondary participation rates of the population (Drolet, 2005; Fortin, 2005) and socio-economic composition of families relative to their participation rates (MacKenzie, 2005).

Affordability is also conceptualized in relationship with other sociological factors, including those arising from socio-economic status; cost-sensitivity and debt-adversity is a field explored in both Canada and the United States (Anisef, Bell & Sweet, 2001; Cote, Skinkle & Motte, 2008; Heller, 1999). There is reported under-estimation by students of the benefits of higher education or calculation of the return on investment in higher education, in particular by lower-income families or those without post-secondary experience (Junor & Usher, 2004; Usher, 2005). The effect that this would have on access to education is further complicated by aversion to debt and concern about ability to repay; borrowing itself is a manifestation of a form of cultural capital, which can be a barrier to low socio-economic status students (Bourdieu, 1988). Berger, Motte & Parkin (2007), Plager and Chen (1999), and Allen and Vaillancourt (2004) investigated tuition relative to student indebtedness and the growing burden of high debt. Others have considered first year student concerns about cost of education (Quicke & Davies, 2002). Tuition has also been widely examined in the context of the availability of aid and student aid policies, notably Heller (1999) in the United States. In Canada, Berger, Motte and Parkin (2007)
considered the question of affordability, and in summarizing research suggested that the
“price constraint” of tuition is unlikely to be the dominant determinant of access, but rather,
many factors in different groups’ students’ “complex decision-making process” and context
(p.46). Lang, House, Young and Jones (2000) noted new evidence that increasing tuition
fees influenced student university choice.

The literature on affordability of tuition fees also has focused on the prices or rates
alone. Annual reporting from government sources, including from Statistics Canada,
typically described tuition in terms of average full-time price paid by graduate and
undergraduate university students (Statistics Canada, September 12, 2013). Price
reporting, however, lacks important context important for the consideration of affordability.
Affordable tuition is also not necessarily the same thing as low tuition, which has been
referred to as a “pretense” of affordability; Wellman (1999) argues that affordability needs
to be seen in context with measures such as per capita personal income. Price indexing
strategies for calculating tuition fees and setting tuition policy relative to measures of
affordability have been well established within the United States with the development of
the Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) by Kent Halstead of the National institute of
Education (McKeown, 1982). Interest groups have reported on tuition fee prices and
increases often focusing on rates of change, from the previous year or other given period
of time (see CAUT, CFS).

Related to affordability is a theme in the economics of education literature that
investigates price response. Many have sought to understand the elasticity of higher
education, and this research has been largely American, or, in the Canadian context,
focused on university data. Studies of student demand have tended to use the meta-
analysis conducted by Leslie and Brinkman (1987) and subsequently, Heller (1997) as a
benchmark. Their analysis examined a number of individual studies to calculate what they
called a “student price response coefficient” for each. This seminal research was updated
by Kim (2010), and complemented by many, including T.J Kane (1999), McPherson and
Schapiro (1998), and Hemelt and Marcotte (2011); while the theoretical relationship
between tuition increases and enrolments is clear, the effect of tuition increases on
students already enrolled in post-secondary education institutions is less so (Heller, 1997).
Savoca (1990) criticized many of price elasticity studies as they treated the application
decision as exogenous, and adjusting for that decision, suggests that true elasticity may be significantly greater than that calculated using enrolment data alone. In the practitioner literature, there is one significant report written by a policy think tank, the Educational Policy Institute on behalf of the Canada Millennium Scholarship Foundation (Swail & Heller, 2004). This report used natural policy experiments in ten jurisdictions in five countries to test the relationship between tuition pricing and enrolment at universities. Case studies included in the analysis were from four Canadian provinces, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States, and they examined the impact of tuition freeze, reduction, abolition, introduction, and an unregulated, competitive environment. The authors concluded that “variation and enrolment are the result of a complex interaction of factors, only some of them based on price” (p. 47).

Many Canadian studies have examined tuition impact on enrolment and in general conclude that while price is found to have an effect on participation rates, it is equally true that factors related to socio-economic status are highly correlated with participation and with each other (Christofides, Cirello & Hoy, 2001; Corak, Lipps & Zhao, 2003; Drolet, 2005; Johnson & Rahman, 2005; Junor & Usher, 2002, 2004; Levin, 1990; Looker & Lowe, 2001; Michael, 1999; Quicke & Davis, 2002). Statistics Canada’s Youth in Transition Survey (Statistics Canada, 2002) documented the difference of transition rates to post-secondary education; high-income families had a much higher transition than youth from lower-income families and attributed only 12% of the gap to financial constraints. Non-financial barriers have to do with “intractable” issues with class which include a variety of structural, cultural, sociological and psychological variables (Rasmussen, 2006). Junor & Usher (2004) argue that the overall Canadian patterns of rates of tuition increases and increases in participation seem to conflict with some expected outcomes given that there is no strong evidence of a direct relationship between tuition and aggregate participation in post-secondary education, although there is some indication that price constraints impact some groups of student more than others.

2.5.2. Funding levels and mechanisms

Tuition is defined in the literature in a number of ways, often as a function of government budget and institutional finance. However, politically tuition is also framed in
other ways: as a source of new revenue (Ward, 2007), a transfer of costs from government to the consumer (Pyke, 2004), a particular form of tax and subsidy (Dill, 1997), and an attempt to cover shortfalls between public funding and instructional expenditures (Fethke, 2006).

In the international literature, tuition is often analyzed relative to the cost/financing of higher education and state funding (Bevc, 1999; de Villiers & Steyn, 2007; Eicher & Chevaillier, 2002; Gwosc & Schwarzenberger, 2009; Hossler, Lund, Ramin, Westfall, & Irish, 1997; Levin, 1990; Lowry, 2001; Ngolovoi, 2008; Schuetze & Bruneau, 2004; Vossensteyn, 2002, 2009; Zumeta, 1992, 2009); most analyze tuition over time, between jurisdictions, or to national averages. In the United States, several have examined the relationship between tuition fees and state revenue (Koshal & Koshal, 2000; Lowry, 2001; Stringer, Cunningham, Merisotis, Wellman, & O’Brien (1999); some confirm a significant relationship between tuition and levels of public funding (Koshal & Koshal, 2000). Primarily prices are set in response to economic conditions of the state which impact state funding (Griswold & Marine, 1996).

Tuition is an increasingly important structural component of the financing of higher education in Canada. There are a number of arguments as to why this is so. Jones and Young (2004) argue that the complexities of market economics as well as federal-provincial relations in Canada assert influence over higher education policy, while Fisher et al. (2006) observe a general trend toward funding individuals rather than institutions. Quirke & Davies (2002) examine tuition in light of new market-orientation and entrepreneurial activities at the institutional level. Kirby (2007) and Fisher et al. (2006) attribute tuition increases in Canada to reductions in federal government transfer payments to provinces, a common assertion made in the practitioner literature. Canadian interest groups including faculty and student organizations published reports that show tuition relative to federal and provincial budgets; for example, Conlon (2006) and the Canadian Association of University Teachers (2004) trace the decline of federal funding and related tuition impacts. It has been observed elsewhere that institutions historically “backed into” tuition to meet the difference between the costs of providing educational services and declining government grants (McKeown, 1982).
2.5.3. Distributional effects

As mentioned previously, the impact of tuition price on participation in post-secondary education is hard to unpack from other intervening factors, including socio-economic status (Frenette, 2007). However, in addition to the general relationship between affordability and participation, it is important to highlight the literature emphasizing an important component of access, that is, the composition of those populations in society participating in higher education. Low-income students are an important area of consideration, given the social goals of education, as well as the more instrumental agenda of economic development in post-secondary policy.

One concept highlighted in the literature related to access is sticker price, and much research has been undertaken to evaluate its impact. Sticker price is tuition and related charges assessed at registration. In contrast, net cost to a student involves applicable financial aid, grant and bursary systems, if applicable, and later, the educational tax credit system (Usher, 2006). There is evidence to suggest that students have an imperfect understanding of tuition charges and the student assistance system, and that low socio-economic status groups are disproportionately affected by this lack of information (Usher, 2006). Low income students in Canada are impacted more by tuition increases (Coelli, 2009; Corak, Lipps & Zhao, 200) and are more price sensitive and debt adverse (Usher, 1998). Students make decisions in unique, situated contexts, based on their perceptions of opportunities for education and employment, all of which in combination, lead to diverse and individualized outcomes of attainment (Perna, 2006). Low-income students have been seen to minimize costs by choosing lower-cost programs (Ouelette, 2006), and price and location have been shown to be co-determinants in community college choice (Somers et al., 2006) in the United States. Parental education has been seen to have an effect on Canadian student college choice, more so than income (Finnie & Mueller, 2008).

Research has examined econometric calculations of private benefit, or individual return on investment of tuition (Adnett, 2006; Johnson & Rahman, 2005; Stager, 1996), as well as relative to decision-making factors (Jjunor & Usher, 2002, 2004; Looker & Lowe, 2001) and perception as a barrier (Tomkowicz, Shipley, & Ouelette, 2003). Economic models inform much research in this area, in terms of its econometric assumptions about
rational choice and calculations of return on investment. Clearly the price of tuition is one aspect of decision-making. As sticker price increases across educational sectors, it becomes increasingly important to focus on improving student financial aid, but also to market financial aid (Junor & Usher, 2006) and develop financial literacy (Perna, 2006; Tierney & Venegas, 2009).

In this matter, it is important to note that there is a difference between university and college participation rates, and much of the dominant research and theory development in Canada is rooted in analysis of university participation. In fact, in the college sector in Ontario, the distribution of participation in college education by household income quartiles is quite even (22% at the bottom and 24% at the top, with 24 and 28% in the middle two quartiles), even during a period of enrolment growth and tuition increases and deregulation (Rae, 2005). There is also a difference in actual tuition costs; college student tuition accounts for 23% of student costs, compared to 36% of university students (Berger, Motte & Parkin, 2007).

Arguments on the nature of the effect of tuition prices on enrolment at public institutions and its distributional effects in particular are well represented in the interest group and practitioner literature. Given that much of this literature is normative in nature, and plays an important role in framing the problem of tuition and policy agenda-setting, it is important to interpret them in that context. It is particularly difficult for policy-makers and implementers to make sense of policy impacts given the relative scarcity of relevant, policy-analytic data available.

2.5.4. Regressive or progressive social policy

Substantive attention has been paid both to determining what tuition fee levels and arrangements constitute regressive or progressive social policy and the distributional effects of policy alternatives (Dur, Teulings, & van Rens, 2004; Johnson & Leslie, 1976; Johnson, 2006; Levin, 1990; Usher, 2004). A regressive subsidy occurs when one segment of society benefits from a universal program more than others, in that it can be seen as disproportionate benefit to that segment. Fisher et al. (2006) suggested that regressive subsidies are inherent in equal access to any universal social programs in a
capitalist economy, and in a stratified society, as free or highly subsidized education is paid for by all taxpayers, whether accessed or not. These differences shape the framing and operationalized conceptualization of tuition fees as social, political, and economic phenomenon, and as an object of scholarly enquiry.

International research has showed there is a disproportionate benefit from large public subsidies to higher education for the more affluent, as members of that group are more likely to participate (Blondal, Field, & Girouard, 2002; Gonzalez Rozada & Menendez, 2002; Liu, Chou, & Liu, 2006; Psacharopoulos & Papakonstantinou, 2005; Ranasinghe & Hartog, 2002), and that the distributional effects of public subsidies may be limited due to differences other than parental income, such as high-ability (Dur, Teulings, & van Rens, 2004). In the United States, the net effect of the spending and associated taxation has been shown to be distributionally neutral or mildly progressive (Johnson, 2006).

Ward (2007) argues that tuition is a redistributive social policy when charged in combination with moderate fees and well-funded, need-based financial aid. In countries with a historically centralized approach to higher education, and its resultant highly subsidized or free tuition, higher education is seen by the public as universal social program and a universal entitlement, irrespective of income; implementation of or increase in tuition is felt as a lost entitlement and requires a new “social compact” to reconcile lessened or stabilized public funding with market-related revenues such as tuition. In Canada, it has been argued that the high tuition/high aid schemes found in other jurisdictions are a special form of taxation to offset decreased government expenditures, directed not to needy students or to improve educational quality, but to support infrastructure; therefore, they are seen to be regressive (Wilson, 2003). Neill (2007) found that education and tax credits were likely to be regressive, although no more so than the general government transfers to universities and colleges. On the other hand, Mackenzie (2005) showed that in Canada, upper income families contribute proportionately greater taxes through income tax, and therefore the wealth redistribution is fair. He found that, as portion of taxes paid through the progressive tax system, no income group carries a greater share of the burden. This finding offered the counter position to the claim that post-
secondary funding is a net transfer of wealth from the poor to the wealthy (MacKenzie, 2005).

Higher education in many countries is viewed as an instrument for the intergenerational perpetuation of status and power which is in part enabled through highly subsidized tuition policy (Johnstone, 2004a). The international literature on income contingent loans (Barr, 2004; Chapman & Greenaway, 2006; Chapman & Lounkaew, 2009, 2010; Chapman & Ryan, 2005; Johnstone, 2004a) has emerged due to national tuition and institutional financing policy experiments arising, in part, as a strategy to manage these very issues.

Arguments on tuition policy choices as regressive or progressive social policy abound in the policy community literature; student financial assistance programs attract a significant amount of attention in this matter (Usher, 2004). Given that upper-income families tend to access higher education, particularly university education, disproportionate to the general population, many have regarded high levels of public funding (in order to keep tuition low) as regressive public policy in Canada as it is a net transfer of wealth from the poor to the wealthy (Levin, 1990; Mehmet, 1979; Wilson, 2003). Mueller (2008) observed within the two broad options of financing higher education (increasing aid or decreasing tuition costs), that

aside from certain advocacy groups, almost no one suggests that increasing subsidies to post-secondary education is an efficient way to increase access and persistence, since with would simply represent a windfall to middle- and upper-income families who are able to pay for (or at least borrow for) higher education. (p. 6)

One particular thread in this literature focuses on the role of taxation schemes in supporting affordability of and participation in post-secondary education in Canada (Mackenzie, 2005; Neill, 2007). In evaluating tax policy, and its effects on post-secondary education, Usher (2006) reviewed in detail the net price of post-secondary education in Canada, taking into account the various federal incentives and tax credits, and found a significant financial difference between sticker price and net price. The difference between non-repayable aid and universal tax benefits can have a substantial effect on the cost of education, but this effect has been found to vary from province to province (Usher, 2004).
Others have argued that income tax benefits are insufficient to overcome the chilling effect of high fees experienced by all students, and some students in particular (through sticker shock, and difficulties in estimation, as mentioned previously); given that many students have concerns about cash flow, tax credits are of limited use to students’ immediate needs (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada [AUCC], 2011).

A general difficulty with the evaluation research in the area of tuition in Canada is choice of methodologies. Usher and Potter (2006) leveled criticism in this area, suggesting that much of the current research is flawed due to its inferential nature, and the fact that most studies do not take institutional funding and student financial aid into account in their analyses of participation and tuition, including tuition discounting.

2.6. Summary and conclusion

The post-secondary education policy research literature in Canada is uneven both in terms of scholarly attention in the policy sciences and to the different stages of the policy cycle. Policy scholars of post-secondary education have tended to focus on questions of policy evaluation and impact (Enders, 2004), and policy evaluation far outweighs the other stages of policy development in the tuition literature. This may be primarily due to the fact that these data are more readily available, and measurement of policy impact lends itself more easily to quantitative techniques. Overwhelmingly, tuition research—descriptive, scholarly, empirical, and argumentative—is based on university fees; most analyze tuition over time, between provinces, and to national averages; most empirical examinations have had an economic basis. It has been observed that scholarship has been limited by lack of data (Canadian Council on Learning [CCL], 2007, 2009).

The practitioner literature, including government department reports, interest group policy briefs, and think tank research, has provided important contributions to the policy community, if mostly normative in nature. Overall, policy questions in Canada in the literature can be summarized in a few ways: Which tuition policies befit a universal social program, or, which tuition policies are needed to finance and advance a modern mass education system? Which tuition policies are regressive or progressive social policies? What is the appropriate balance of sharing of costs of post-secondary education between
individual benefit and public benefit? What happens when tuition policies change? What is fair? What policy appropriately supports and develops human capital?

However, important questions remain on the process by which provincial post-secondary policy is formed, and tuition policy in particular. The identification of social problems, policy problems, and policy issues are key in problem identification, agenda-setting, and policy formulation. Whether or not government responds to a policy issue and in what way policy choices are formulated and enacted is contingent upon a number of factors, of which this study proposes to examine.
Chapter 3.

Theoretical Frameworks

In general, the study of the policy process endeavours to describe and explain relationships for all stages of the policy development model. The evolution of approaches can be accounted for in terms of subsequent theorists and practitioners seeking to resolve limitations and improve explanatory power of past approaches. These models have two aims: to describe and to predict. To create conditions for empirical research and theory development, policy scholars have developed conceptual frameworks to describe and account for the policy process. Theoretically and methodologically, these frameworks have emerged from a variety of disciplines, including evolutionary biology (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993), organizational theory (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 2003), organizational sociology (March & Olsen, 1989), anthropology (Shore & Wright, 1997), political science (Dryzek, 1990), and history (Ashford, 1992).

Conner & Rabovsky (2011) found in their review of recent literature that “the increased use of theoretical frameworks borrowed from political science and public policy has been instrumental in pushing the boundaries of educational research” (p. 105). Warne (2008) argued that scholars in higher education tend to discuss policy decisions surrounding finance in terms of system design, reflecting a strategic management conception of policy-making, assuming that policy-making is technical exercise, and casting politics as an exogenous variable that intrudes to disrupt improvement in state higher education systems. St. John and Parsons (2004) also reported that policy researchers in higher education tend to implicitly adopt both pluralism and rationalism as their paradigms without tending to politics. This study will explicitly address these concerns.

This section will begin with an overview of alternative theories of decision-making, taking a historical approach. It will then situate the policy process within a larger political system, and within that context, it will review several different models of the policy making process, including the epistemological and ontological paradigms in which they reside. Of particular interest is how these models account for political action or decision-making, and
their relative strengths and weaknesses in light of this study’s focus on the processes related to problem definition, agenda-setting, and policy adoption.

3.1. Alternative theories of the policy process

Informed by theories of decision-making, a number of alternative theories have emerged to explain or predict policy change in the policy making process. Important contributions to policy sciences include theories of incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, garbage can model of organization choice, multiple streams model, advocacy coalition framework, and post-positivist approaches to policy analysis. First, however, it is important to situate the policy cycle in the larger systems context.

Public policy-making and the policy cycle occur within a political context, situated within a broader social system. In order to understand public policy formation, political science is concerned with understanding how control and influence, or power, influences decision-making in public policy. In the development of his political systems analysis, Easton (1953) defines political life as the expression of an “authoritative allocation of values” (p. 146), influenced by the distribution and use of power in political activity. Systems analysis has, as its general premises, (a) that political behaviour is a system; (b) a system is distinguishable from, but interacts with, environment as an open system; (c) variations within the system are interpreted as adaptations to stresses from internal or external environments; (d) feedback and learning through information and other methods builds capacity to regulate future behaviour and transform its own internal structure and processes (Easton, 1965). It is within this broader framework that theories of policy-making process are examined.

3.1.1. Incrementalism

Charles Lindblom argues that decision-making in policy is predominantly incremental in nature; his proposed muddling through process is an alternative description and influential critique of rationalist conceptions of how policy makers approach complex policy (Lindblom, 1968). For Lindblom, political and social interaction involves negotiating and bargaining amongst groups, and he found that political process is essential to policy
making. To Lindblom, no optimal policy decisions are possible, only those which are politically feasible. As political feasibility is greater in those alternatives that are only marginally different from policies that exist, change is through a series of small steps.

A key contribution in the development of the policy sciences, Lindblom’s theory of incrementalism has been empirically tested (Davis, Dempster, & Wildavsky, 1964). However, it has been critiqued as being largely descriptive, and limited in its ability to explain significant or rapid policy changes. In other words, incremental methods are useful in understanding aspects of policy change, but cannot account for discontinuous processes. Incrementalism inspired several responses, notably Etzioni’s mixed scanning, which combined elements of incrementalism with rational decision-making (Etzioni, 1967), and Dror’s normative optimum model (Dror, 1964), which sought to include idealism with rationalism. An incrementalist approach has not been chosen for this particular study as it is inconsistent with the study of significant policy change.

### 3.1.2. Punctuated equilibrium

Extending and building upon notions of incrementalism, Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2002), and subsequent continued research (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009a; Baumgartner, Breunig, Green-Pedersen, Jones, Mortensen, Nuytemans, & Walgrave, 2009b; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Jones, Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003), focus on policy-making processes, and provide a model accounting for rapid changes in policy direction. Punctuated equilibrium refers to the tendency for policy environments to change incrementally over longer periods of time, interrupted with short bursts of major policy change. This is because stable policy subsystems, or institutional structures and arrangements, which facilitate policy formation, generally mitigate against major policy changes, through policy monopolies of established structures, political roles and mobilization efforts. From a research perspective, therefore, agenda-setting forces worth investigating are those which undermine policy subsystems, or, in their terms, create disequilibrium. Central to the theory is the concept of political conflict, which defines mobilization, particularly over ideology and values (Heck, 2004). They do so because a significant amount of conflict needs to occur in a policy subsystem to overcome the tendency to mitigate against change. Their framework relies on political and policy actors
being boundedly rational, and a significant historical/temporal context. This is a powerful framework which been tested empirically and built upon by others (Breunig, 2006; Jones, Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003; Robinson, Caver, Meier, & O’ 2007), and is often used in combination with other frameworks.

As a theory of the policy process, punctuated equilibrium has the benefit of providing insight into both stability and major change. The model is most effective in retrospective analysis and is challenging methodologically as it requires a long time horizon of consistent data to conduct quantitative analyses.

3.1.3. Multiple streams (MSM)

Kingdon’s comprehensive framework for understanding agenda-setting and alternatives is a critical vehicle for analyzing public policy development and change. Kingdon found the rational-comprehensive approach to policy making to be impractical for the most part, and while useful, incrementalism could not account for sudden policy change (Kingdon, 2003). Based upon the garbage can model of organizational behaviour and decision-making (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972), Kingdon adapted it by adding a political dimension to the problems, solutions, participants and alternatives. The model is centered around the concept of organized anarchies, removed from traditional positivist policy science (Hill, 2009) and theorizes at the systemic level, using the policy decision as the unit of analysis (Zahariadis, 2003), is historically contingent, and works as a probabilistic model (Tomlin, Hampson & Hillmer, 2007).

His framework uses the stages typology of the policy cycle as the basis for his process, and contemplates the interactions between three largely independent streams which influence policy-making in a policy. These streams exist in a primeval soup where ideas evolve continuously, both inside and outside of government, until alternative choices are required. Kingdon conceptualizes the distinct streams as follows: the problem stream is comprised of information about various policy problems and the proponents of various issue definitions, including media coverage, events and other factors that shape opinion about policy problems; the policy stream involves the proponents of solutions to policy problems, the factors affecting ideas, and the identification and formulation of alternatives;
and the politics stream consists of factors which influence elections and the behaviours of legislators.

The problem stream is comprised of information about various policy problems and the proponents of various issue definitions, and is where problem recognition occurs. Focussing events in the problem stream calls attention to the problem, such as a crisis or an incident, a compelling symbol or personal experiences of a particular policy maker, and can serve to shift a problem into an issue. Agenda-setting is an important function in the problem stream, and problem/issue definition is central to the process of agenda access and control. The policy stream involves the proponents of solutions to policy problems, and policy communities where policy proposals are developed and debated. Interest groups have a role, but more important are ideas; important aspects of how alternatives move to being a viable policy option involve the process of softening up by policy specialists and coupling, or linking, alternatives with problems. The political stream consists of elections, changes in administrations and composition of legislatures, changes in ideologies, changes to public mood, and publicity campaigns. The political stream, which considers organized pressure groups, electoral interests, national mood or climate around an issue, jurisdiction, legislator turnover, or partisanship, has the strongest effect on the setting of policy agendas. Further, consensus building processes, characterized by bargaining and coalition building amongst policy actors, influence policy actions in the political stream. These changes can act similarly to a focussing event, bringing change sufficient to influence action.

The converging or coupling of all three streams into a single instance dramatically increases the likelihood that an issue will receive serious attention by policymakers, in a similar idea to the issue-attention cycle noted by Downs (1972). In Kingdon’s model, the coupling of these streams at critical times creates policy windows, which results in issues moving onto the decision agenda. Policy-makers recognize problems, suggest solutions, and engage in political activities that oppose or promote policy change, and policy windows open when there is a change in the political stream and remain open for only a short period of time. When they do, they offer opportunities for agenda-setting by policy entrepreneurs to advance their policy interests. In this model, policy windows permit policy entrepreneurs to couple streams, which typically operate independently, and if successful,
can result in major policy change. Policy entrepreneurs act to bring about policy change, have a degree of influence over both problem and policy streams particularly around focussing events and can promote understanding and acceptance of policy ideas and alternatives. The desires and beliefs of policy entrepreneurs are exogenously determined (Barzelay, 2001); however, opportunities for their activity are explained by Kingdon’s model. In order to understand how policies are selected, it is necessary to analyze all three process streams in the policy system. Policy change is a function of agenda-setting, policy windows, and successful coupling of three streams in the model.

A weakness in the model, in response to the institutionalism literature of agency and structure, is a lack of accounting for the ways in which institutions affect political behaviour (March & Olsen, 1989). Other models, such as the advocacy coalition framework, develop a far greater understanding of behaviours of interest groups and actors within policy networks (Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith & Lawlor, 1996). It has been argued that the MSM can theoretically “subsume” the concepts of both advocacy coalition and punctuated equilibrium (Tomlin, Hampson, & Hillmer, 2007) given its capacity and consideration of politics in the multiple streams.

Notwithstanding these critiques, Kingdon’s multiple streams model remains currently the most commonly cited model in policy formation scholarship. It provides the basis for theoretically informed narrative of policy episodes (Barzelay, 2001) and has been widely utilized in empirical work in many policy fields. It is supported in international and empirical studies in public policy and politics (Mayhew, 2005; Zahariadis, 1995a, 1995b), higher education policy (Ness, 2008), school choice (Mintrom, 2000), state level educational governance (Mills, 2007), child welfare (Nelson, 1984), state level policies of governance in higher education (McLendon, 2003; Van Der Slik, 2001), and in educational reform (Levin, 2001). Several scholars have applied the model to parliamentary democracies (Zahariadis, 1995, 2003), including Canadian political science (Tomlin, Hampson & Hillmer, 2007) and public policy (Barzelay, 2001). In Canadian post-secondary education; Saunders (2006) used the model to explore factors in the creation of a provincial coordinating board in Manitoba, and Charles (2011) employed it in her study of the policy process leading to legislative changes in Ontario post-secondary system.
Kingdon’s multiple streams model supports the overall research questions posed in this study of tuition policy change.

3.1.4. Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was originally developed to describe and explain change and decision-making in the policy process more adequately than previous attempts. The framework focuses on actors, their beliefs, and group responses in policy subsystems. Within the policy arena, complex interactions occur between policy actors, public actors, and policy communities; coalitions form to differentiate, develop and norm specific interests or ideas (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Policy change is a function of both competition within the subsystem and events outside the subsystem (Sabatier, 1999) and is best understood by focusing on policy subsystems—that is, the interaction of those who seek to influence the policy-process outcome (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on the interactions of advocacy coalitions--each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions or positions who share sets of common policy beliefs--within a policy subsystem, who share a “non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1988). These beliefs on core policy matters are the glue that holds a coalition together (Mintrom, 2000), and are the key variable for understanding policy actions. The ACF unit of analysis for conducting a stakeholder analysis is the policy subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), which assumes and operates within a substantively and politically complex world with dispersed power, and boundedly rational individuals (Weible & Sabatier, 2005).
The role of beliefs in the policy-making process, and the role in motivating individual and collective behaviour, is best developed in the advocacy coalition framework, in contrast to previous more rationalist explanations of individual and collective behaviour. Further, it is argued that policy beliefs held by policy actors within institutions have more of an influence on policy behaviour than the institutional values and norms of their institutional contexts.

There are five major hypotheses for policy change, which emerge from the ACF. First, that the availability and use of technical information can be an important component of the process, including agenda-setting and issue definition. Policy oriented learning within policy subsystems is an outcome of the availability and use of technical information. Second, policy subsystems are the most useful unit of analysis for understanding policy change, both incremental and major, as opposed to stages or structures. Third, coalitions
of actors within subsystems are relatively stable over long periods of time, and during
times of conflict the subsystem may widen with heightened activity and members. Fourth,
policies generated in policy subsystems incorporate beliefs and theories on policy issues,
alternatives, implementation, and outcomes. Within policy subsystems, core beliefs
persist over time; however, strategies and implementation are subject to change as
circumstances do. Fifth, policy and decision-making change processes are best examined
with temporal process over longer periods of time.

In the ACF, policy change can be explained through two primary causes: the
endogenous variable of beliefs and values of the coalition, and exogenous changes in the
policy arena. That said, exogenous factors are a necessary but not sufficient to explain
major change (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Policy change as result of changes in
beliefs in a subsystem arise from a number of factors, including policy-oriented learning,
changes in actors, or changes in the external environment, including changes in socio-
economic conditions, public opinion, systemic governing coalition, or policy outputs from
other policy domains.

The framework puts an emphasis on these beliefs held by actors and their
networks. These beliefs are operationalized by the ACF as coalitions working to achieve
common ends. Coalitions have diverse actors, who advocate certain values or outcomes,
or help produce or disseminate knowledge on a policy problem. Advocacy coalitions can
be understood as belief systems. Policy subsystems are networks of individuals
connected through a policy problem, from a variety of organizations and situations within
government, but also researchers, multiple interest groups, the media, and others with the
ability to communicate policy ideas. These stakeholders compete over which policy
objectives are translated into policy, and must search for information from a variety of
specialized sources, as well as bargain, align, and coordinate with other actors to achieve
common objectives (Weible & Sabatier, 2005). Stakeholders specialize in a policy
subsystem and maintain their participation over long periods of time in order to foster the
institutionalization and implementation of policy objectives (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1993).
The beliefs and values within a policy subsystem can be divided into deep core values, policy core beliefs, and secondary aspects. Deep core values relate to the stable fundamental normative and ontological axioms held by individuals. Policy core beliefs refer to fundamental policy positions, whereas secondary aspects are about instrumental or operational decisions. These latter beliefs are changeable, through policy-oriented learning, which can include the use of guidance instruments, beliefs and values, and coordinated activity over time. The ACF presumes that coalition members will tend to exaggerate the influence and maliciousness of opponents, filter challenges to their beliefs, and easily accept belief affirming information (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999), in part due to cognitive and epistemological constraints, as well as by constraints formed by social identities, belief systems, and learning processes. Policy oriented learning is defined as “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behaviour intentions, which result from experience and/or new information and which are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 104).

Major policy change comes about due to environmental changes and impacts from other policies, or from within the policy subsystem, termed policy-oriented learning. The framework considers policy change as the result of learning processes within and between advocacy coalitions. Social construction of policies and issues, and issue definition, is ideally understood through analyzing belief systems and the variety of objectives of a wide spectrum of policy actors, and is the primary strength of the ACF in terms of providing conceptual framework for understanding policy change.

In terms of politics, the advocacy coalition framework is frequently used to explain stakeholder behaviours and policy outcomes in intense political conflicts over periods of a decade or more (Weible & Sabatier, 2005). The ACF provides an established vehicle for this analysis, including being successfully applied to studies in higher education policy. Furthermore, it has been recently critically assessed in its application to 80 different policy studies, with the most commonly tested hypotheses involving policy change, learning, and coalition stability (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). Related studies include the study of Canadian education policy change (Mawhinney, 1993). Other empirical research using the ACF has been predominantly concerned with policy subsystems (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996; Weible, Sabatier, Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Henry, & deLeon, 2011).
The strength of the ACF lies in part due to its theoretical basis for understanding both stability and non-incremental or rapid change in policy, which is not built on a theoretical foundation of economic rationalism (Schlager, 1995), and provides the ability to frame hypotheses for empirical testing. Some considerations in use of the ACF are the self-identified limitations including lack of knowledge on coalition formation, and the need to understand empirically how policy subsystems and values/beliefs change over time. Weible et al. (2011) suggest that researcher use ACF alone or in combination with other frameworks in comparative policy research, including understanding policy-oriented learning.

Some have raised questions about the assumption of how stable deep core beliefs are over time (Kim & Roh, 2008), others have flagged concerns that the model fails to distinguish more important policy actors from less important ones because it “does not detail “strategic interactions” among coalition members (Kim & Roh, 2008, p. 669). Ness (2006) in his study of American state-level higher education policy in financial aid found limited evidence of coalitions at the state level. Others argue that the ACF is limited in its attempt to highlight the role of utilization of information by decision-makers (James & Jorgensen, 2009). In this study, limitations of the model include the need to develop cases with longitudinal lens on policy processes, however the ACF is promising as a conceptual lens given the research questions of this study.
Chapter 4.

Methodology

4.1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to develop a conceptual understanding of the process by which provincial tuition policies undergo major change in Canada. The research questions under investigation in this study emerge from the two theoretical frameworks previously discussed. First, the multiple streams model (MSM), using the policy decision as the unit of analysis, examines factors in three streams of the policy process—problem, policy and politics. The problem stream is where problem recognition and agenda-setting occurs; the policy stream involves the identification and formulation of alternatives and policy options; and the politics stream consists of factors including elections, changes in administration, changes in ideologies or climate around an issue, changes to public mood, or organized pressure. Second, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on the policy subsystem as the unit of analysis, and examines factors involving the interactions of actors, policy beliefs, and coordination of coalitions to achieve common goals. Policy change is a result of shocks within or outside of the policy subsystem. These shocks could be changes in beliefs in a subsystem as a result of policy-oriented learning or changes in actors. Changes in the external environment can include socio-economic conditions, public opinion, changes to the systemic governing coalition, or policy outputs from other policy domains. These two policy frameworks provide alternative lenses on the policy formulation process in the three policy episodes of the study, each with different political, economic, and policy governance contexts.

4.2. Research questions

There are two related research questions driving this study. The first research question (RQ1) is: whether, and to what extent, advocacy coalition (ACF) and multiple streams of problems, policies and politics (MSM) can explain tuition policy formation (agenda-setting and alternative specification?) in selected Canadian provinces? The
second research question (RQ2) is: how do these tuition policy formation processes compare to one another?

4.3. Comparative case study approach

The methodology of this project was a subnational comparative policy analysis, developing case studies bounded by episodes of changing tuition policy at the provincial level in Canada. Overall, the approach conforms generally to a comparative within-country case study described by Amenta (2003), in which historical research is undertaken to allow comparative questions to be framed and developed on a comparative basis (Peters, 1998; Van Evera, 1997). The cases documented descriptions of the policy formation process during three specific policy episodes as represented by documentary evidence and interviewees, and was used to examine and answer key policy formation questions.

The comparative approach was selected to allow comparative questions to be framed and developed, for the purpose of both answering key policy process questions and adding to theoretical knowledge. The strength of the multiple case study method lies in the increased replication of analysis within and between cases; it has been demonstrated to support effective testing and building of conceptual frameworks (George & Bennett, 2005; Lijphart, 1971; Yin, 1989). Evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling (Yin, 1989) and therefore regarded as more robust than single case design and a useful research strategy in minimizing problems of endogeneity in studying the impact of ideas on policy (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). Comparative case study analysis is particularly useful with studies that focus on processes (George & Bennett, 2005; Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003) and can assist in determination if a phenomenon is a local phenomenon, or a previously unobserved trend (Marsh & Stoker, 2002). Subnational units of analysis play an increasingly important role in comparative politics, useful for making controlled comparisons (Snyder, 2001).

Comparative case approaches are highly applicable to studies of policy formation in higher education (Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; Ness, 2008; Shaw & Heller, 2007). Slaughter (2001) has encouraged use of comparative methods in comparative higher education research. Specific application of
comparative methods to higher education issues has included studies of tuition policies in the United States (McKeown, 1982; Warne, 2008), a subnational study of merit aid in the United States (Ness, 2008), and subnational studies in governance of higher education (McLendon, 2003; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; McLendon & Ness, 2003; Pusser, 2004a).

A significant and growing amount of empirical research has combined two or more theoretical models to examine aspects of the policy process, including these two models in particular (Dougherty, Nienhusser, & Vega, 2010; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; Mintrom, 2000; Ness, 2008), which have been used in both Canadian and American policy contexts. Drawing on the conceptual body of literature on the policy process, these two theoretical models were selected due to their predicted contributions to this study, and are complementary by providing alternative lenses on the policy formulation process (Compston & Madsen, 2001; Dudley & Richardson, 1999; Ness, 2008).

4.4. Analytical framework

A policy paradigm can be defined as an intellectual construct intimately linked to policy arenas; it is essentially a set of ideas held by a relevant policy subsystem member which shapes the broad goals that policy-makers pursue, the way that they perceive public problems, and the kinds of solutions they consider for adoption (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). Political economy considers the particular mixture of government and market resources and how the state redistributes individual access to benefits, and as such, contributes to understanding how political conflicts are generated through decisions or activities of state mechanisms (Howlett & Ramesh, 1992). Political economy was therefore chosen as an appropriate policy paradigm for situating this study, given the dynamics and factors in post-secondary education policy.

Within the paradigm of political economy, an operationalized analytical framework functions at the conceptual, analytical, and operational levels. Based on research undertaken by Ness (2008), developed from Kingdon (2003) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) and consistent with recommendations of McLendon (2003), the analytical framework has five key dimensions and operationalized sub-questions for both
within-case and cross-case comparative case analysis. These key dimensions were indicated in the policy literature as important elements in understanding major policy change, and are (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, (e) the effects of external influences such as change in public opinion on related issues, change in government, and the provincial fiscal condition. The analytical framework was applied given the type of policy issue under investigation, the types of variables and data available and collected, and the context in which the policy was situated. The following table outlines the dimensions with their associated sub-questions, which guide the study:
Table 4.1. Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Operationalized sub-questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Program goals and their clarity</td>
<td>1.1.1 What were the expressed goals of the policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.2 Was there consensus on the goal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.3 How was the problem defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.4 What indicators were used to identify and describe the policy problem(s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.5 What alternatives were considered?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Politics of policy formation in this episode</td>
<td>1.2.1 Who were the policy actors?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.2 Did policy actors have explicit goals toward which their activities were aligned?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.3 What influenced the policy actors’ policy preference?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.4 To what extent were policy actors representing political party platforms?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.5 Which issues were linked by policy actors to tuition policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.6 What events or activities contributed to the problem being identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.7 What is the temporal sequence of actor behaviour and events?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2.8 What were the key events that brought about a merging of the politics, problem and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Stability of policy coalitions over time in</td>
<td>1.3.1 Were policy actors grouped into coalitions based on core beliefs? What were those</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this policy arena</td>
<td>beliefs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.2 Were policy actors grouped in a more fluid manner based on issues?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.3 To what extent were they “well organized” and resourced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.4 What conflicting positions were there within and between coalitions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.5 Was there evidence of information sharing between coalitions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3.6 Is there evidence of internal or external shocks to the coalitions, policy learning, or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negotiated agreements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Influence of elected officials and</td>
<td>1.4.1 Did elected officials dominate the policy process? How?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-elected policy actors</td>
<td>1.4.2 To what extent did non-elected policy actors influence the policy process? What</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>strategies were used?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4.3 To what extent were non-elected policy actors involved with (or invited to) generating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>policy alternatives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4.4 What was the effect of the political structure in each province?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4.5 To what extent did policy actors utilize technical information? Expert validators?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4.6 Was information on other jurisdictions/provincial tuition policies shared or used?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 The effects of external influences</td>
<td>1.5.1 Did other post-secondary issues affect policy deliberations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5.2 Did policy decisions from other arenas affect policy deliberations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5.3 Did the fiscal climate or budgeting affect policy deliberations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5.4 To what extent did public opinion influence policy deliberations?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Policy = tuition policy
Adapted from Ness (2008).

The questions in this framework provided the structure, scope, and direction of the analysis brought to each individual case study, in order to determine whether, and to what
extent, the two theories of policy change explained the tuition policy episode described. Further, the same analytical framework provided the means by which cross-case comparisons of the tuition policy episodes was undertaken and organized.

4.5. Research methods

This section reviews the study’s design including case selection criteria, case selection, case development, data collection, interview procedures, and plan for data analysis.

4.5.1. Case selection criteria

The three policy episodes for study were selected using purposive sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002) to allow for considerable variation in terms of characteristics along several different dimensions. This methodology uses replication rather than sampling logic (Yin, 1989) and therefore, the multiple case design is analogous to multiple experiments, and not a sampling strategy per se (George & Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Yin, 1989). Appropriate case selection was undertaken to ensure that generalization was bounded by comparing cases that operate within sufficiently comparable contexts (Rihoux & Grimm, 2006) and yet had sufficient variation to ensure that basic hypotheses about policy formation could be tested and that reasonable theoretical statements could be anticipated with a strong comparative basis (Peters, 1998; Van Evera, 1997).

This study applied five criteria to case selection. First, each case must have occurred within the past ten years. Second, each case must have been a major policy episode, undertaken by a provincial government, to change the regulatory environment in which post-secondary tuition fees were implemented. The purpose of this criterion was to maximize comparison by ensuring policy episodes of similar scale. The third criterion was that there was variation in the nature of the policy change, with different antecedent policy and subsequent policy enactment, to maximize variation between cases. Fourth, cases were selected for variance in the political and governance environments in which these policy episodes occurred, including governing parties and the provincial-level post-
secondary education governance structures with a mandate to provide advice or act as an intermediary between institutions and government, in this case, on tuition fees or tuition fee policy\(^3\). Fifth, that sufficient proximity to the policy episode must have been taken into consideration to maximize the likelihood of policy actors to speak candidly on factors of the policy formation process.

### 4.5.2. Case selection

The three selected cases were from British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba with each province providing one episode of tuition policy change. British Columbia in 2002/03 shifted from a policy of tuition reduction to deregulated tuition. After several years of regulated increases, Ontario moved in 2003/04 to freeze tuition rates. Manitoba, after many years of frozen tuition, in 2009/10 moved to a policy of restricted tuition increases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of original policy</th>
<th>Nature of new policy</th>
<th>New policy in effect</th>
<th>Governing party</th>
<th>Size of system</th>
<th>Higher education governance structures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced</td>
<td>Unrestricted</td>
<td>2002/03</td>
<td>BC Liberal</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frozen</td>
<td>Restricted</td>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Coordinating body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three episodes occurred in different economic conditions as well as different educational contexts. In addition to the different antecedent policy histories, there is diversity in terms of the political and governance environments, with different political

\(^3\) Jones (1997) reported that all provinces except Newfoundland have experimented with intermediary bodies at one point or another; the structures and powers have varied considerably (Skolnik & Jones, 1992).
histories, political parties, and system characteristics and size. There was additional variance on the details of the policy in application to institutions, programs and charges. While all three provincial policies applied to all post-secondary institutions, both universities and colleges, the restricted rate increases differed by institution type in Manitoba alone. Manitoba has had a long-standing provincial-level coordinating board with a mandate to advise on tuition fees, while British Columbia and Ontario have had no coordinating bodies for post-secondary education. There were also slight differences in terms of eligible program and charges, and exemptions from policy for certain types of ancillary fees.

The considerable variation in these three episodes characteristics contributed to the research by providing sufficiently comparable contexts with sufficient variation to ensure that questions about Canadian tuition policy formation dynamics could be tested under conditions with a strong comparative basis.

4.5.3. Elements of each case

The approach developed each case study to explore, describe, explain, compare, and test theories of policy formation (Yin, 1989). Policy case studies provide a thorough, rich and deep understanding, or “thick description” (Geertz, 1973), so that the reader will understand the “logic of political life” in those limited settings (Peters, 1998), a particular strength of the case study approach. Case study methods are employed in disciplines including policy sciences (Pal, 2005), comparative politics (George & Bennett, 2005), and education (Merriam, 1988).

Each case study in this dissertation has the following components: background context, policy history, stakeholder maps, and case analysis (see Figure 4.1).
The description of the background context of each case was grounded in a political economy perspective, and considered relevant characteristics such as fiscal climate and economic factors and the nature of the government. The second element of each case was the policy history, a narrative chronological account of policy formation that described the temporal sequence of events. The policy history is a particular form of case study (Ball, 1990; Pierson, 2005) and is an important realm of scholarship in policy studies. The policy history is particularly useful to illuminate sets of decisions, processes, and events (Yin, 1989). The third element of each case study was the construction of policy maps, using data collected from the archival and interview processes. This heuristic was developed by May (2005) in order to display policy actor positions against alternative policy options. It visually illustrates and represents the relative positions and patterns of policy preferences of actors and coalitions in a policy arena. The final aspect of each case study was the analysis of the policy episode, using the operationalized analytical framework described in section 4.4. This addressed the five key dimensions of policy change, with two alternative theoretical approaches to understanding policy change. The analysis included interpretation and explanation of the results.
4.5.4. Data sources and data collection

Based on the comparative case study research design, data were collected for each case through systematic investigation, employing two key research tools: content analysis of relevant documentary materials and interviews. Table 4.3 provides a visual representation of the design procedures:
Table 4.3. Visual Model of Design Procedures, Adapted from Ross (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Framework Development</td>
<td>Expert panel</td>
<td>Operationalized with five key dimensions and their sub questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expert panel</td>
<td>Identification of key policy actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor Identification</td>
<td>Review of government and group organization charts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Data Collection</td>
<td>For each case: Document data collection from interest groups, policy institutes, scholarly publications, government documents, records, Hansard, media coverage, and political documents. Temporal sequence and triangulation</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews Sampling scheme: targeted informants and snowball, sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview Data Collection</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews Sampling scheme: targeted informants and snowball, sampling</td>
<td>Qualitative and quantitative data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Data Analysis</td>
<td>For each case: Triangulation Policy actor analysis Coding, sequencing, and thematic analysis Fact pattern identification Inter-rater reliability</td>
<td>Codes, sequences, and themes Similar and different themes and categories Descriptive statistics Policy history Policy actor maps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview Data Analysis</td>
<td>Application of analytical framework to (a) each case and (b) cross case analysis Interpretation and explanation of the results</td>
<td>Theoretical conclusions for each case and cross case analysis Discussion Implications Future research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Document gathering strategies first identified the documentary evidence, or objects of inquiry (George & Bennett, 2005). These consisted of literature from interest groups, policy institutes, scholarly contributions, and policy studies. They also included policy documents, position papers from actors and governments, analysis of explicit statements made publically by policy actors and legislators, legislative records and legislature library holdings; media coverage, editorials; task forces, service plans, reports, government reporting manuals, and positions of political parties. This documentation and evidence was gathered to establish a systematic relational and temporal sequence (Yin, 1989) of the tuition policy episodes. Content analysis of archival documents allowed for the preliminary construction of these policy episodes, and subsequently, to triangulate interview data and ameliorate potential recall error or bias in informant data (Guba & Lincoln, 1991; Merriam, 1988). Archival research was an iterative process (Hill, 1993).

In the case of British Columbia, archival research included a review of Hansard records on the 37th Parliament, using the index terms tuition fees and tuition policy, as well as government archives of media releases and publically available government documents. There were 434 articles retrieved and reviewed from the news citation index from 2000 – 2004. Briefs, research reports, and position statements were gathered from Internet searches on policy actors in addition to an academic literature review. The Advanced Education Council of British Columbia (AECBC) archives were reviewed, as well as Canadian Federation of Students (CFS) National financial statements (1992-2008) and CFS-BC archive and financial statements (1993 – 2003). Policy actors provided information through follow-up correspondence.

In the case of Ontario, archival research included a review of Hansard records on the 37th and 38th Parliament, using the index terms tuition fees and tuition policy as well as government archives of media releases and publically available government documents. There were 2,146 articles retrieved and reviewed from the news citation index from January 1993 – December 2005. Briefs, research reports, and position statements were gathered from Internet searches on policy actors. Academic publications from OISE contributed to the analysis in addition to an academic literature search, as well as information and correspondence from policy actors.
In the case of Manitoba, archival research included a review of *Hansard* records on the 39th Parliament, using the index terms *tuition fees* and *tuition policy* as well as government archives of media releases and publicly available government documents. There were 395 articles retrieved and reviewed from the news citation index from January 2006 – December 2009. In Manitoba, the three largest newspapers were the Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg Sun, and Brandon Sun (Saunders, 2006); however, most of the coverage of the policy episodes is from the Winnipeg Free Press. Briefs, research reports, and position statements were gathered from Internet searches on policy actors. An academic literature search enhanced information and correspondence from policy actors.

Interviews were chosen as an approach to data gathering given the theoretical frameworks being used; interviewing is most often useful when interviewees have shaped the world around them (Rathbun, 2008). In this study, participants were identified in two stages: (1) targeted individuals identified through archival documents, including review of government and organizational charts, and input from an expert panel, and (2) additional informants recommended through the research process by key informants, using snowball sampling. The identification of key actors in the policy process consisted of examining literature from interest groups, policy institutes, scholarly contributions and policy studies, policy documents, position papers from actors and governments, analysis of explicit statements made publically by policy actors and legislators, legislative records and legislature library holdings, media coverage, editorials, task forces, service plans, reports, government reporting manuals, opposition positions, and interview data. The snowball sample built on insights and connections made by informants and in the document record.

There were a total of 59 informant interviews conducted for this research, selected for their unique perspectives of, and contributions to, the policy episode. Four of these respondents were national policy actors and contributed to the analysis of more than one province’s policy episode. Given the length of time that has passed since the policy episode in British Columbia, over-sampling was undertaken in that province. The interviewees were drawn from actors within the policy field. The conditions of adequate sampling included sufficient inclusion of perspectives from each of the listed categories of policy actors. Convergence was not sought, as data are analyzed and interpreted from the
perspective of representation and not historiography. Table 4.4 presents the numbers and types of participants from each case.

**Table 4.4. Distribution of Interview Respondents, by Case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Manitoba</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior civil servants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups, lobbyists, institutional representatives</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers, academics, commentators</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews were conducted between September 2011 and January 2012. Each potential respondent was sent a letter of request for interview; each letter was followed with contact by telephone and/or email. Recommended participants identified through a snowball technique were informed of that referral in the original letter. Once a respondent agreed to the interview, an appointment was scheduled, and informed consent was obtained either through letter (in person) or through script (by telephone). Whenever possible, interviews were conducted in person; 31 out of the 59 interviews were conducted face-to-face. Interviews ranged from 60 to 90 minutes. Interviews were audiotaped, and the interviewer took field notes to support data analysis. Each participant was offered confidentiality; only one participant declined the offer.

To ensure consistency in the study’s exploration and analysis of key themes, and to allow for follow-up questions, a semi-structured interview was used. Interview questions were drawn from components of analysis related to the theoretical frameworks, asking consistent, open-ended questions and probes (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). The interview guide (see Appendix D) was developed to solicit information relevant to the questions posted in the operationalized analytical framework and adapted from previous interview guides in McLendon (2000), Ness (2006), and Protopsaltis (2008). The questions covered key areas: participant role and organization at the time of the policy episode, participant attitudes and beliefs on key policy ideas, policy history (initiation, formation, and adoption), and further insights, including a request for recommendations of other research.
participants. In addition to open-ended questions, there were three groups of Likert scaled questions posed in the interview: participant beliefs about tuition policy, reasons for policy change, and activities of policy actors.

The interview recordings were transcribed, and reviewed for accuracy, and Likert responses were entered into MS Excel. Unique codes used in place of respondent names to protect respondent confidentiality. Finally, the research employed member checking with each research participant. Each contributor was emailed a draft description of the policy actors and policy history, for review for accuracy and palatability, to confirm the credibility of the account history (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995). The member checking feedback generally confirmed the draft accounts in all three cases; several minor clarifications or corrections on representation of issues and facts were requested and were made based on participant feedback.

4.5.5. Data analysis

As described in the previous section, there were four elements of each case study, each element requiring data analysis procedures. The analysis for each of the selected studies was informed and organized by the conceptual framework and drew from both archival and interview data at each stage.

Background context

Informed by the theoretical frameworks guiding the study, for each case I used scholarly, archival and interview data to develop a description of the political economy of the province and a structural overview of the policy subsystem. This description includes an inventory of the major interest groups at the time of the policy change, including their resources, policy goals, and key influences. Following the design procedures illustrated in Table 4.3, triangulation of scholarly and archival data was used to confirm facts represented in interview data. Member-checking was used to confirm the account.

Policy history

There are two components to the policy history for each case: the antecedent conditions to the policy change, and the narrative of the policy change event. I developed
a thematic description of the antecedent conditions for the ten-year period prior to the policy change based on the theoretical frameworks and responding to questions posed in the operationalized analytical framework. As a result, the construction of the policy history focused on documenting significant changes in the policy subsystem, as suggested by the ACF, and the problems, politics, and policies in the policy arena, as indicated in the MSM. Procedurally, triangulation and fact-pattern recognition of scholarly and archival data was used to confirm the research participants’ representation of facts when possible, or to note differences, and to establish the temporal sequence of events. Member-checking was employed to confirm the accounts in the policy history prior to coding taking place.

**Policy map**

Analysis of policy actors was undertaken using the methods described in May (2005) and informed by the policy map described in the introduction of this dissertation (Table 1.1). This process involved coding policy actor positions relative to a grid of alternative policy positions, based on both archival and interview data. The product of this analysis is a heuristic for each case, designed to describe the overall coalitions and major actors found in each policy arena.

**Coding**

Each of the cases were coded according to the dimensions and variables expressed in the operationalized analytical framework in Table 4.1 (Saldana, 2009). The goal of the coding process was to identify and locate the key elements indicated by the conceptual and analytical frameworks in order to conduct within-case and cross-case analysis. Given that the policy subsystem is the unit of analysis for the ACF and the policy decision is the unit of analysis for the MSM, the description of the policy actors, the antecedent policy regime, and the narrative of the policy episode were all indicated as important case elements to code for each case.

Following the completion of the pilot interviews, the first draft of the codebook was developed. The codes, definitions, and rules for applications were reviewed and discussed by the two coders, and a final set agreed upon with minor modifications. Extensive pilot testing of the coding was undertaken. Upon completion of coding the first case study, the coders met to review the use of codes, definitions, and distinctions, and the level of coding.
The first case of coding revealed sporadic over-coding by both coders, and it was resolved to code to a common, descriptive level (Saldana, 2009). Agreement was sought and achieved on refining code definitions and the development of one new code. As a result of those minor modifications, the primary categories and codes remained unchanged. For this research, two independent coders coded each case independently, and the codes were entered into analytical software, MAXQDA, for analysis. Inter-coder reliability was calculated for all three cases. The results were as follows:

Table 4.5. Measures of Inter-coder Reliability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Manitoba</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSM – Existence in case</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF – Existence in case</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM – Code frequency in case</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF – Code frequency in case</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSM – Segment agreement at 80% correlates</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACF – Segment agreement at 80% correlates</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the independent coding, consensus was reached between the two coders in reconciling all differences, and the final codes were entered into MAXQDA for use for the study.
**Case analysis**

The fourth component of each case was the within-case analysis. Using the operationalized analytical framework and reports from the coding process, this process involved “examining, categorizing, tabulating or otherwise recombining the evidence, to address the initial propositions of the study” (Yin, 1989, p. 105). The analytical process involved a “dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Barzelay, 2001, p. 97) to answer the research questions posed by this study for each individual case; data analysis relied upon and followed the theoretical propositions grounding the case study (Yin, 1989).

**Cross-case analysis**

Lastly, the cross-case analysis was undertaken using a variation of the comparative method. Comparative methods involve the nonstatistical comparative analysis of a small number of cases (George & Bennett, 2005) and followed the general approach to comparative case research described by Strauss (1987). In the cross-case analysis, the data analysis techniques employed pattern-matching, which compares an empirically based pattern with theoretically predicted patterns grounded in the analytical framework. The result of the cross-case analysis is the evaluation of the power of the two theoretical frameworks in order to answer the research questions posed by this study, and the additional findings arising from the analysis.

4.6. Limitations

A limitation of this study emerges from the issue of representation. Questions on representation as a particular issue in the social sciences have been explored in disciplines including sociology (Bourdieu, 1988) and policy sociology (Ball, 1990). Within the modernist paradigm, the social sciences engage and explore questions of explanation of phenomena or events. Key to this project is the description or representation of facts, evidence, or accounts, performed with and to a standard defined within, and guided by, scientific precepts of the discipline. Representation emerges with epistemic and political “predicaments” (Zenker & Kumoll, 2010, p.1.), given that concepts and conversations are shaped and constrained by historical, cultural, and political relations and the only partially discursive social practices that constitute them (Rabinow, 1986). Ideas are socially
constructed and shared, reality is historically contingent (Yeatman, 1994), and the representation of facts implies that some versions of constructed representations are valid and others are not (Edelman, 1988). Given that the description and theorizing about policy change is dependent upon representational mapping to construct accounts, this study undertook strategies to maximize trustworthiness and acknowledges these limitations in the data analysis process.

Several strategies were undertaken through design mechanisms to maximize the truth value of this study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The qualitative design proposed here responds to the need for a situationally sensitive, thick and rich description of a complex phenomena and an analysis approach that is supported by theoretically sound, operationalizable questions. In order to support credibility, the research design contained a purposive and sufficient sampling of cases and participants, and outlined transparent field methods and analytic strategies, and employed conscientious and thorough record keeping. The analysis undertaken used operationalized questions of the theoretical framework in a clear logic model. Member-checking strategies were used, and in final form, data were presented in a clear, accessible format. In terms of transferability, it cannot be claimed that these research results will be replicable and there are limits to its generalizability, given the qualitative nature of the study. However, the strategies undertaken support the potential for transferability of the findings to similar settings, given two design considerations: (a) theoretical frameworks guide this project design, data gathering and analysis consistent with other policy studies, and (b) triangulation of archival and interview data with difference sources is used to corroborate, elaborate, or illuminate the research in question. In terms of dependability, careful attention was paid to documentation of key definitions (such as freeze, policy, tuition) and the use of two theoretical frameworks. In particular, the research design incorporates the overlap of two units of analysis in research design – the policy decision and the policy subsystem – to allow for linkages to other past and future research. With respect to confirmability, detailed documentation was maintained, available for other analyses, and a detailed record was kept of the procedures. Inter-raters were used for data coding, using the operationalized analytical framework, and inter-rater reliability was reported (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
The purposeful examination of data for alternatives is important to trustworthiness and was addressed through design considerations including the engagement of a diverse supervisory committee, reflecting different scholarly and practitioner perspectives. Trustworthiness is also connected to the issue of representation; this research sought to establish representations, and not necessarily to establish facts. Given that the description, explanation, and theorizing about policy change are dependent upon representational mapping to construct accounts, this research did not seek to adjudicate the trustworthiness of individual accounts, but rather accepted that multiple perspectives exist as to the policy history, and those multiple perspectives are provided for in this account.

Other threats to trustworthiness might include history effects, maturation, mortality, interaction effects (such as participants talking to each other about the research, or the interviews), ambiguity about the direction of causality, hypothesis-guessing of participants, or memory recall issues related to proximity to the events in question. These threats were mitigated through research design and analysis procedures, such as the use of triangulation with different data sources and the adherence to a theoretically grounded analytical framework.
Chapter 5.

Findings: British Columbia’s Deregulation

5.1. Introduction

On February 11, 2002, the newly elected provincial government under Premier Gordon Campbell announced a radical policy change, completely deregulating post-secondary tuition in BC. The previous NDP government had maintained a tuition freeze policy from 1996/97 to 2000/01, with an additional reduction of 5% in 2001/02. While tuition policy in Canada has undergone experimentation across most provinces, there are relatively few instances of governments forgoing formal regulatory control over prices at public colleges and universities (Rexe, 2011). At the time of the announced change in British Columbia, there were a variety of provincial tuition policies in place in Canada: Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Nova Scotia all had restrictions regulating tuition policy increases; Manitoba and Quebec were frozen; Newfoundland and Labrador was in a period of annual reductions in fees; and New Brunswick had an unrestricted tuition policy, which had been in effect since 2000/01.

This chapter will first describe the background context of the case, focusing on the features and structure of the policy subsystem and grounded in a political economy perspective, followed by the chronological account of the policy episode, summarizing the critical events that led to a decision for major policy change. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the case using the analytical framework.

5.2. Description and Structure of the Policy Subsystem

5.2.1. Political economy of British Columbia

The economic basis of British Columbia underwent change during the 1990s in terms of occupational growth. The traditional staples resource industries of BC were farming, fishing, mining, and forestry; these became less significant than the emerging
service sector, which included tourism, film and television production, and aquaculture, as well as the public sector (Howlett & Brownsey, 1996). The growth of these sectors to a “post-staples state” in British Columbia has been linked to the rise of new social movements, as the demographics of the provincial population changed (Brownsey, Howlett, & Newman, 2010). In turn, these economic and population changes had an impact on party politics (Howlett & Brownsey, 2001).

BC politics is distinct from other Canadian provinces in the intense two-party competition that has dominated the province’s political history (Crawford, 2010; Fisher, Lee, Maclvor, Meredith & Rubenson, 2005). The province’s economic development drew both entrepreneurs and wage labourers, bringing their respective political movements and rhetoric of class conflict (Stewart & Carty, 2006; Blake, 2011; Wiseman, 2006). This volatile conflict has been so entrenched that centre-oriented political parties have failed to redefine BC politics in non-class terms, and the divide has existed through several configurations of political parties since 1941 (Phillips, 2010). The BC Liberal party was formed as a relatively broad coalition of pro-business and entrepreneurial interests with a focus on business and economic development; the party is a political coalition of provincial conservative, former Social Credit, and federal Liberal interests, with relatively few connections to Liberal organizations nationally or in other provinces, and is more aligned with other provincial Conservative parties, such as Alberta (Blake, 2011). The NDP came to power with organized labour at the core of its constituency and with a whole range of progressive social movements arrayed around that core (Carroll & Ratner, 2005).

5.2.2. Policy subsystem overview

For the first half of the 20th century, there was little political interest or significant investment in the development of a public post-secondary system in British Columbia. Public attitudes toward post-secondary education fluctuated, given in part to the “atmosphere of rugged entrepreneurial activity” (Dennison, 1997, p. 31). Post-secondary access became increasingly important in the post-war period, requiring system expansion. The report Higher Education in British Columbia, and a Plan for the Future, also known as the MacDonald report, was written in 1963 in response to growing pressure throughout
the province to study the long-term requirements of higher education; the design of British Columbia’s post-secondary system emerged as a direct result (Soles, 1968).

Until the mid 1990s the universities enjoyed a “non-interventionist” policy environment, with autonomy in setting tuition fees and establishing academic priorities (Dennison, 1997). This approach changed when the NDP government was elected in 1991; the NDP campaigned with a commitment to education and promoted system-wide post-secondary policy development and coordination. With the change in government, there were significant changes in the 1990s in British Columbia’s post-secondary education system (Schuetze & Day, 2001); these changes included system expansion, institutional differentiation, and introduction of applied degrees (Dennison & Schuetze, 2004). The government’s policy efforts were coordinated in part through newly created agencies, including the Centre for Curriculum and Transfer (C2T2), Centre for Education Information Standards and Services (CEISS), and the College Training and Marketing Society. Government also extended the coordination expectations of the BC Council on Admissions and Transfer (BCCAT) which was created as a formal agency in 1989.

By 2001, there were a number of important policy stakeholders attempting to influence post-secondary policy in British Columbia. The post-secondary system in British Columbia had 28 public post-secondary institutions, with six universities, five university colleges, 11 colleges, five institutes, and one agency, the Open Learning Agency. These institutions were represented by member organizations, as were faculty and student interests. Table 5.1 below summarizes the resources, views, and influences of the major interest groups at the time of the policy episode.
### Table 5.1. Summary of Interest Groups in BC Policy Episode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest group</th>
<th>Resources, views, and influences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The University President’s Council (TUPC)</td>
<td>Represented the presidents of the major research universities. Goals in 2001 were to fill the funding gap to increase access to degree programs, recruit and retain top quality faculty, build research, restore university core budgets to close the funding gap between BC universities and comparable institutions located elsewhere, and capital funding. Privately, individual presidents called for tuition deregulation as a method to achieve that. Influenced by internal analysis of the costs of the tuition freeze, feedback from key constituencies, and government expectations for unfunded growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Education Council of British Columbia (AECBC)</td>
<td>Represented the 22 publicly funded colleges, university colleges, and institutes. Established in 1990 with a multi-constituency character, internal conflict led to disbanding by 2002. Generally silent on tuition policy, but privately individual presidents called for tuition deregulation. Influenced by internal coalition distractions and prestige seeking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation of University Faculty Associations of BC (CUFA)</td>
<td>Represented university academic staff in its member faculty associations, formally incorporated in 1982. Has tended to emphasize the importance of overall levels of government funding, preferring to see tuition fees kept as low as possible. Influenced by membership views and core generally progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and Institute Educators Association (CIEA)</td>
<td>A voluntary federation of faculty associations formed in 1980 representing approximately 7,000 faculty and staff in BC colleges and institutes. Very vocal opposition to tuition fees, and particularly to any fee increases, as student access was a top policy concern. Influenced by membership views and core progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students – BC (CFS-BC)</td>
<td>Represented the majority of student organizations in the BC public post-secondary system, about 100,000 students, and 16 locals. Tuition fees were the priority public policy issue for the federation, with policy goal to maintain the tuition and fee freeze, and establish a long-term plan for the reduction in tuition. Influenced by membership views, national coalition policy-making, and core progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alma Mater Society – UBC (AMS)</td>
<td>Represented approximately 37,000 students, and intermittently affiliated with the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA), a national federation. AMS-UBC adopted a policy in favour of tuition fee increases, limited to the rate of inflation. Influenced internally by changes in organizational policy preferences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Business Council (BCBC)</td>
<td>Represented approximately 250 companies, reconstituted in 1984. In the spring of 2000 recommended the removal of the tuition freeze. Influenced by membership views and economic development and competitiveness concerns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A special purpose coalition, the BC Coalition for Public Education, was formed in the 1990s in response to concerns about attacks on public education generally, including commercialization and privatization. It was comprised of labour unions (BC Teachers Federation, Canadian Union of Public Employees, BC Government Employees Union, and CIEA), professional associations (CUFA BC), student unions led by the CFS-BC, and the BC Federation of Labour. On tuition fees, coalition members did not have a strongly stated public policy position but held common concern about the issues of “commercialization” and general accessibility and affordability of education. (Faculty association leader A)

The policy map displays the BC interest group positions against alternative policy options and the relative interests of coalitions. To illustrate the areas of political support and opposition to tuition policy proposals in this policy episode, the map focuses on interest groups rather than political parties or elected officials as per May’s advice (2005) given the importance of competing interests in shaping policy. Interest groups listed here are selected based on news accounts and interviews as policy actors in the episode. The mapping of interest group positions to the policy menu is based on archival documents and as represented by interest group leaders in the interviews. Not all interest groups have or represent policy positions on each dimension, and sometimes have multiple positions, or positions that change over time. The policy menu in Table 5.2 is adapted from Table 1.1 in Chapter One, focusing on those dimensions of tuition policy relevant to the policy arena, based on representations at the time of the policy episode.
Table 5.2. British Columbia Interest Group Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Classical Liberal</th>
<th>Increasing action of government</th>
<th>Social Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of tuition</td>
<td>Individual private investment in a private good</td>
<td>User fees an income stream</td>
<td>User fees a necessary evil to offset budget shortcomings of government grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>AECBC, CUFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in access (assuming qualified)</td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay for it</td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay</td>
<td>Access for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>AECBC, CUFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price discrimination</td>
<td>Varies by institution</td>
<td>Varies by program</td>
<td>Varies by student based on characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC, BCBC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in setting prices</td>
<td>No direct involvement</td>
<td>Set tuition price restrictions</td>
<td>Asserts price regulation (</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC, BCBC, AECBC</td>
<td></td>
<td>CFS-BC, CIEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in financing institutions</td>
<td>Zero to minimal direct government funding, with emphasis on tuition and other non-tax revenue</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on consumer influence</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on control over tuition prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC, BCBC, AECBC</td>
<td></td>
<td>AECBC, CUFA, CFS-BC, CIEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of institutions in tuition-setting</td>
<td>Autonomy to set tuition prices</td>
<td>Operate within government guidelines</td>
<td>Limited by government department criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC, AECBC, BCBC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Directed by government law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CFS-BC, CIEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of government department of PSE</td>
<td>Monitor outcomes</td>
<td>Set guidelines for institutions</td>
<td>Set limitations for institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TUPC</td>
<td></td>
<td>CFS-BC, CIEA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from May (2005) and Rexe & Nilson (2011). Shaded and non-shaded areas represent the relative coalitions and their preferences.

5.3. Antecedent conditions to the policy change

The following section outlines the significant factors and events within the policy subsystem to inform an analysis of the policy change, given conditions identified in the
conceptual frameworks. In British Columbia, these conditions include significant changes in the governing coalition, changes in institutional leadership and institutional coalitions, and tuition policy history in the province.

5.3.1. Changes in governing coalition

Prior to the policy change, there were a number of changes within the governing coalition. The NDP were elected to majority government for two terms, in 1991 and 1996. During its tenure, the NDP government experienced leadership turbulence; the province had four Premiers, two of whom had had to resign due to scandals (Mike Harcourt, Glen Clark), one brief caretaker leader (Dan Miller), and the last (Ujjal Dosanjh). After being narrowly defeated in the 1996 election, opposition leader Gordon Campbell built a comprehensive electoral platform which ultimately set the agenda for his government; the BC Liberals were elected to an overwhelming majority government in 2001. Gordon Campbell was known to be a strong leader with a practice of centralized control of policy agendas and decisions (Bernier, Brownsey & Howlett, 2005; Palmer, 2009). As one civil servant described it, he ran “a command and control model” of government (Civil servant E). In the 37th Parliament, Premier Campbell’s first cabinet was drawn from a caucus of 77 members, with Shirley Bond appointed Minister of Advanced Education and with Gary Farrell-Collins as Minister of Finance.

The civil service also experienced significant change during the antecedent period. With the election in 2001 there was a shift to a centralized policy and communications strategy which changed the culture and practices within the public service (Vakil, 2009). The Premier’s Office staff increased from 40 staff with a budget of about $3 million in 2001 to 470 staff and a budget of around $56 million by 2004 to accommodate this change (Ruff, 2005). There were also changes to the civil service within the Ministry of Advanced Education itself; prior to the change in government in 2001, the senior staffing had been relatively stable. During the 1980s and 1990s, Ministry officials had close working relationships with post-secondary institutions and their associated organizations, supported in part through structural arrangements in which government and system partners were expected to collaborate. With the election of the BC Liberals in 2001, the civil service experienced significant change. There were frequent leadership changes
including a series of successive changes and interim appointments in the senior ranks in the Ministry of Advanced Education. Furthermore, serious cutbacks were implemented across the entire public service, beginning with an announcement in November 2001 of a comprehensive Workforce Adjustment strategy. On January 17, 2002, known as black Thursday, the government announced a restructuring plan that included a reduction of 3,300 FTEs in the civil service by March 2003, largely responding to a shift away from direct provision of services by government.

5.3.2. Changes in institutional leadership and institutional coalitions

The University President’s Council (TUPC) was established in 1987 by the Presidents of the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, and the University of Victoria, with the addition of the University of Northern British Columbia in 1991 and Royal Roads University in 1996. Composed of the Presidents of the public research universities and supported by staff, the organization provided a coordinating forum for its members on issues and priorities and acted as a focal point for dealings with government. Fully funded by its membership, TUPC was considered to be significant intermediary body in the BC post-secondary policy environment (Fisher, Lee, Maclvor, Meredith & Rubenson, 2005).

As an organization, TUPC refocused significantly in 1999 and shifted from an information-sharing role to a stronger program of advocacy and government lobbying on behalf of university interests. This shift was supported by changes in university leadership, notably the appointment of Martha Piper as President of UBC in 1997. During a relatively short period of time, in addition to the change at UBC, new presidents were appointed at the University of Northern British Columbia (Charles Jago in 1995), and SFU (Jack Blaney in 1997, followed by Michael Stevenson in 2000). There were also changes in Council staff, and increased effectiveness of collaboration between the presidents of UBC and SFU in particular.

The university presidents enjoyed easy access to the Premier and Cabinet during the first months of the new government. It was recorded in the minutes of the Select Standing Committee on Education of October 16, 2001 that the university presidents had
met privately with the Premier and the Minister for a luncheon meeting, and the Minister and the Deputy Minister attended the annual general meeting of the University Presidents Council, which took place in Prince George. UNBC President Charles Jago reported that the university presidents were “delighted” with the government’s framing of the higher education agenda, recognizing the role of university research as a driver of economic and social development; he said it was “refreshing…to be talking to a government that has embraced the concept that advanced education and the role of universities is integral to developing overall government strategy and direction” (British Columbia. Legislature. Select Standing Committee on Education, 2001). As a group, the presidents were achieving success in working with the new government on initiatives of shared interest. In support of the Premier’s economic development agenda, UBC President Martha Piper was appointed a member of the BC Progress Board, charged with identifying issues important to the future economic prosperity of the province and with advising the Premier on strategies, policies and actions necessary to improve the performance of the provincial economy and its social policy supports (British Columbia. Office of the Premier, 2002).

The other public sector institutions were organized through the Advanced Education Council of British Columbia (AECBC), a voluntary, non-profit association representing the 22 publicly funded colleges, university colleges, institutes as well as the Open Learning Agency. Established in 1990, the mission of the AECBC was to act as an agent for advocacy, leadership and support to its members. The multi-constituency character of AECBC was inclusive of the stakeholder groups within the colleges and institutes: representatives of student organizations, faculty, staff, senior officers, and Board chairs all had seats at the coordinating table as well as were invited participants in the various committees and initiatives of the Council.

Many considered AECBC to be an effective organization until changes in institutional mandates “pulled at the unity” of the organization, ultimately becoming a wedge issue within the coalition (Brown, 2000); these tensions were noted to be “emerging over the development of the university colleges” (Brown, 2000, p. 9). A 1988 provincial report entitled Access to Advanced Education and Job Training in British Columbia (frequently referred to as the Access for All report) had recommended changes to the institutional mandates to meet needs of accessibility in the province. As a result, five
community colleges became university colleges: three in 1989, a fourth in 1991, and a fifth in 1995. With these changes, AECBC suffered from increasing internal conflict, divided between the advocacy interests of the university colleges and the remainder of the college and institute system. Tensions peaked with the university colleges and institutes withdrawing from the organization, and the university colleges formed the BC University College Consortium. This resulted in the disbanding of the organization by 2002.

5.3.3. Antecedent policy conditions

The post-secondary policy environment under the NDP from 1991-2001 focused on goals of access and affordability which became formally embedded in the strategic plan for the university college, college, and institute sector, *Charting a New Course*. There was no such plan for the universities; the universities traditionally had been autonomous with statutory protection, which insulated them from formal government intrusion into their affairs (Schuetze & Day, 2001). *Charting a New Course* emphasized system-wide strategies for addressing government priorities, including ensuring affordability through tuition price controls; the government relied on state coordination of post-secondary activities to achieve these policy goals. A key element in the NDP’s access and affordability platform was a political commitment to a tuition freeze, enacted through the *Tax and Consumer Rate Freeze Act* in 1996. The policy instrument of legislation indicated the political commitment of the government which was renewed in each of the following five years and followed by one year of mandatory tuition reductions in 2001.

In political terms, the tuition freeze policy was seen by to be *owned* by the NDP, led by the influence of Premier Glen Clark. The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives termed the tuition freeze “the hallmark” of the NDP government’s post-secondary funding policy (Malcolmson & Lee, 2004); a student leader describes the policy of freezing tuition fees as one of the “key, hallmark, defining policies of the NDP” (Student leader D). It was also regarded as politically popular; as one party ally reported, “it was one of the areas where the NDP government polled well” (Faculty association leader A). As a result of its popularity, the tuition freeze policy formed a central plank of the NDP platform in the 1996 election and again in 2001.
The CFS-BC was seen to have a very public and influential role in the tuition policy file under the NDP government. There were well-known social and political interlocks between elected officials, political staff of the party, and student organizations, and they shared values and strong policy beliefs. The political connections were strong enough that the CFS was seen as “a farm team” for the NDP government (Senior civil servant G); the CFS-BC were “very active members of the [NDP]… There were lots of former Federation of Students executives in key political staffer positions in the Glen Clark government, and they pushed very hard” (Senior civil servant F). As a result, the NDP government was very sensitive to criticism from the CFS on affordability issues; tuition was a top of mind policy issue for the CFS both nationally and provincially. This close relationship between social movements and the NDP, including the tendency of government’s efforts to recruit informal leaders of social movements and import them into government circles, has been discussed elsewhere (Carroll & Ratner, 2007).

The tuition freeze was not popular with the post-secondary institutions. The tuition freeze was accompanied in many years with increased FTE targets that were unfunded and, as a result, the impact of the freeze was amplified. As one senior civil servant observed: “the institutions had been saying for a long time the tuition freeze was killing them, it was strangling them” (Senior civil servant A). According to accounts of several research participants, the institutions had repeatedly made representations regarding negative impacts of institutional financing, productivity expectations, and the tuition fee policy, from the time the tuition freeze was enacted.

In spite of an espoused access policy agenda, many institutions felt that access was being compromised by the financial constraints placed on institutions; “the institutions had occupied the field with information about the real implications and about not what it meant for them, but what it meant for the students in the communities that they served (University organization official A). Institutional representations of the resultant issues included stories of increases in class sizes, capital and space problems on campus, inadequate teaching conditions, insufficient student support services, and decline in accessibility of upper-level courses and consequent lengthening of time to degree completion and increase in student debt; “It was about libraries being open. It was about offering the courses students needed to graduate. It was about reducing degree
completion times” (Student leader A). These representations were made by all types of institutions, but most notably by the universities:

by ignoring all those additional inflationary pressures, demand pressures, cost pressures that had arisen as a result of policy changes, the implication of the tuition freeze is that institutions were locked in a place where they could not meet legitimate and rising access demands, and were very much at risk of not being able to sustain quality in a business environment where quality ought to be at the very heart of what they’re about. (University organization official A)

In addition to general underfunding and its consequences, significant pressure was being brought to bear on the issues and aspirations of the professional schools and graduate studies at the universities. For UBC in particular, there was a perceived need for expansion of seats in medical education, and competition, funding, and quality issues in the law and business schools. Two editorials described the universities’ positions:

The continuing tuition freeze in B.C. deprives universities of revenue, impeding their ability to attract and retain top-notch academics, provide more scholarships to bright and/or needy students and acquire books and journals….Given Victoria's budgetary problems, increased funding for universities is difficult. Is it time to revisit the tuition freeze? (“Tuition frost bites”, 1999, p. A16)

BC university presidents argue convincingly that there is a $54- million funding gap that has meant bigger class sizes, cancellation of labs for first- and second-year science students, course cancellations, less supervision of students and an increasing inability to retain and attract top quality professors. The net result -- a deterioration in the quality of education…BC has a much lower percentage of graduates with bachelor's and master's degrees than the other provinces. That is despite the fact that the number of youth here is increasing much faster than in the rest of the country…Provincial politicians have also been trumpeting the importance of education. Given Victoria's deficit problems, it will likely be unable to top up its contribution. Instead, it should lift the tuition freeze since B.C. universities charge, on average, about $700 less in tuition fees than similar universities in the rest of Canada. Our universities and colleges could then have the resources to provide a quality education to a larger number of students. (“There is a price”, 1999, p. A22)

Further to the issues of professional programs, the underfunding of graduate studies and increasing pressure to create graduate spaces was purported to be creating serious financial and capacity issues within institutions (The University Presidents Council of British Columbia (TUPC), 2000). In response to these pressures, UBC had undertaken significant internal work on tuition policy alternatives. At different points between 1995 and
1999, the UBC Board of Governors and administration had undertaking policy analysis, deliberated tuition policy principles, and developed an approach to implementing policy change. This internal policy work was eventually covered in the press, and generated a positive editorial response; “preparing the groundwork for a differential fee structure once Victoria removes the tuition freeze is good planning on UBC’s part” (“Differential fee structure”, 2000, A10).

Many of the funding and quality issues of the universities received significant media attention, with increasing coverage starting in 1999. These news stories focused on areas of public angst, particularly stories of increases in university GPA admission requirements. UBC President Martha Piper was quoted in the Vancouver Sun that stagnant funding was causing UBC to lose ground, forcing the university to increase class sizes, reduce its range of offerings, fall behind in its library holdings, and not replace people who are retiring (M. Kane, 1999). The media also covered TUPC’s collective budget submission to government for the 2000/01 year, which asserted a significant and growing cost in maintaining the tuition freeze and that the resultant gap in funding translated into higher class sizes, cancelled courses, not enough spaces for qualified students, as well as the difficulty in competing with other North American universities in recruiting faculty. It also referred to lack of library and laboratory resources, losing trained faculty to other North American institutions, and longer degree-granting periods, calling it an “increasingly intolerable and unsustainable position”. The CFS-BC leaders were aware of the advocacy from the institutions and their coalitions, and noted with concern the positive media response to proposals to eliminate the tuition freeze; in their representation to the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services on November 22, 2000, the CFS-BC reported that students were worried “about the continued attacks on the tuition fee freeze” (British Columbia. Legislature. Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, 2000, p. 310).

In opposition, the Liberal caucus was concerned about how to “improve economic performance” (Researcher A), and specifically to address looming labour shortages and human resource planning in key economic development areas, and a desire to diversify the economic base of the province through on research and innovation. For the Liberals, the post-secondary education system was important to the overall economic agenda, and
the universities in particular were seen as key economic partners; human capital interests required the post-secondary system to be responsive to specific government priorities as well as overall growth in capacity and participation rates. On tuition fees in particular, the general perspective was that the marketplace and institutions were the best mechanisms to determine and set tuition fees to be affordable and appropriate for the mandate of the institution, and that government should reduce unnecessary intrusion into Board independence. The caucus was friendly to circulating arguments that good public policy allowed for increased individual investment in post-secondary education based on the economic returns to the individual, and suggestions of increased price elasticity of demand on tuition prices; allowing the post-secondary system to operate with flexible tuition seemed better public policy than an unfunded tuition freeze. From a cabinet minister’s perspective, “the idea of lifting the freeze had great traction both in the general public and particularly among those who could be defined as our support group” (Cabinet Minister A).

Politically, the Liberals had a “very strong message that the NDP had micromanaged the broader public sector to its detriment” (Civil servant C), and it was felt that the “idea of lifting the freeze had great traction both in the general public and particularly among those who could be defined as our support group” (Cabinet Minister A). It also had the value of differentiating policy from the NDP, distancing from the previous government’s “adherence to redistributive policies” (Civil servant E); in terms of the political strategy of the Liberals, “part of what they were doing was just seeking to distance and overturn any key NDP policies and show that there was a failure.” (Student leader D).

5.4. Narrative of the policy change event

5.4.1. 2001 election and the first 90 days of the Liberal government

The Liberals campaigned on wide-ranging commitments, signaling substantive and rapid change from the previous government; the election returned an overwhelming majority to them, reducing the NDP opposition to only two members. With a new government and a new mandate, the Liberal’s broad agenda focused on long-term
economic improvement and fiscal balance, which involved stimulating growth and reducing spending; it was

certainly clear to the Premier that investment in post-secondary education and K to 12 education was a huge prerequisite to future prosperity for the province. And so they wanted expansion of post-secondary capacity on the one hand, but on the other hand they wanted to restore fiscal balance. (Senior civil servant A)

A promise had been made during the campaign that a number of key deliverables from the platform would be enacted within the first 90 days of the government. The week after the election and before being sworn in as Premier, Liberal Leader Gordon Campbell appointed a Fiscal Review Panel to conduct an independent review of the province’s fiscal situation. The report concluded that there was a structural fiscal imbalance representing a serious threat to the financial health of the province, and that government had been operating in a fundamentally unsustainable manner. The report indicated that planned tax cuts and spending cuts were required to revitalize economic growth and implement fiscal discipline and reemphasized the elections commitment to balance the budget and restore the province’s credit rating. This dismal assessment of the fiscal climate set the stage and tone for the subsequent government policy and budgeting exercises. On June 6, 2001, the Premier followed through with his promise by cutting the provincial portion of personal income taxes, costing the provincial treasury more than $1 billion annually. Concurrent to the announcement of the results of the fiscal review, Premier Campbell established a new advisory body, the BC Progress Board, in July 2001. The purpose of the Board was to advise his government on economic and social policy; the President of UBC was appointed as a representative of the education sector.

Other changes affecting the post-secondary community were implemented swiftly, including replacement of many appointed members of university and college Boards of Governors; Okanagan University College had its appointed Board members replaced on July 26, with the majority of appointed members replaced at Camosun College and Capilano College on the next day.
5.4.2. Core Services Review

Deputy Minister Brenda Eaton, Deputy Minister to the Premier, Corporate Planning and Restructuring, was appointed on June 5, 2001, to coordinate the Core Services Review (CSR), a significant mandate and service delivery review of all government programs and agencies tasked to “rethink government”. The CSR had its own directorate that ran the overall review process and was close to the Premier’s office. The necessary and intended outcome of the CSR was clear; any program and service that was deemed inappropriate or outside the scope of government was to be eliminated or phased out. Only programs and services considered “core” would continue to receive government funding, and the overall goal was interpreted to be deregulation, privatization, and decentralization (Vakil, 2009). Within the civil service, the CSR did not specify financial targets for government staff but did suggest that the financial context of the province to be considered. In a separate communication from government, budget development parameters required most ministries to prepare budget scenarios that were to be 20%, 35% and 50% lower than the previous year.

The post-secondary system contribution to the review was uneven. Many advocacy groups in the post-secondary system viewed the CSR as a politically motivated process to eliminate programs that were ideologically inconsistent with the new governing party; its purpose was seen to be “gutting core services, getting rid of things they didn’t think were necessary” (Faculty association leader A). They feared the preference for smaller government and fewer regulatory mechanisms, and protested the need for the review. The universities, through TUPC, made a strong case linking the educational and research mandate of universities and the new government’s core objectives.

In its submission to the Core Services Review, TUPC set out five objectives: establishing BC as a national leader in the awarding degrees; to bring national research and development funding to BC; to resolve the outstanding investment gap between BC universities and the sixteen most comparable universities located elsewhere in Canada by 2003/04; to recruit and retain the world-class faculty; and to establish and maintain necessary capital and technological infrastructure (TUPC, 2001, p. 2). Further, the TUPC submission suggested that one of these regulations, the tuition freeze, in combination with insufficient government funding, had led to significant challenges to BC universities,
including having a direct impact on the availability of courses, university admissions, time
to degree completion, student/faculty ratios, student supports and services. The
submission spoke specifically to issues of government regulation:

Universities in British Columbia have been unreasonably constrained by
government policy on several fronts and have been subject to excess
regulation resulting in intrusion upon the roles and responsibilities of our
governance structures. We want to work with the provincial government to
change, eliminate or reduce these barriers. (TUPC, 2001, p. 1)

The result of the Core Services Review—or at least consistent with the spirit of the
review, and as a result of the issues being directed to Cabinet—was that there were
significant changes in the approach government took to post-secondary education. Within
the Ministry of Advanced Education, major decisions to restructure the post-secondary
system were announced, including closure of sector agencies and institutions, such as the
new university TechBC and the Open Learning Agency, restructuring of the apprenticeship
and distance education system, expansion of degree-granting authority within the
province, and reduction in the Ministry staff of 137 FTE, primarily in apprenticeship
administration (the Industry Training and Apprenticeship Commission). In addition to the
loss of staff FTE within the Ministry of Advanced Education, an important aspect of the
Core Services Review was reform or reorientation of the public service, with the
introduction of New Public Management principles and values, seen as necessary for the
successful implementation of the government’s plans for reform (Vakil, 2009). On tuition
policy, the CSR recommended, “major strategic changes need to be made around tuition.
This is a matter for Cabinet.” (Senior civil servant G)

5.4.3. Ministerial consultations on tuition policy

In advance of the cabinet taking the final decision on tuition policy, on October 18,
2001, Minister Bond announced she would hold consultations with stakeholders on the
matter. In addition to receiving student comments through a website, Minister Bond
arranged to meet with selected student representatives on November 1, 2001, and with
institutional representatives on November 15, 2001, “to receive their views on the fiscal
impact of the extended fee freeze” (personal communication, March 27, 2012). The
government met with a mix of invited student representatives, some with quite favourable
views of tuition policy change. The CFS-BC representatives were shocked to find other student representatives at the table, after many years of exclusive representation of student interests at provincial policy consultations. There were strong criticisms that the meetings were highly orchestrated events, designed merely to soften up the inevitable policy announcement of tuition increases; “it was definitely a very managed process” (Student leader A). Critics felt that these were not legitimate consultations (“what I would call a fake tuition fee consultation” (Student leader D)), and suspected that they were designed merely to soften up the policy announcement and do some due diligence so the announcement was, as one civil servant observed, “either not rushed, or not perceived to be rushed” (Civil servant B). Both faculty and student unions had demonstrated little ability to exert influence over policy decisions with the new government.

5.4.4. Cabinet decision

It is reported that briefing notes with different policy alternatives on how to make the “tuition freeze less constraining and more efficient…went back to Cabinet then three times” (Senior civil servant G). Within government, the level of consensus about lifting the tuition freeze was relatively high; the institutions were friendly to policy change, having lobbied so actively for so long, and there were few alternatives given the financial constraints and need for increased seats. Tuition was the identified policy lever to support these goals. The cabinet leadership on the policy was strong and centralized leadership under the Premier, as was typically the case. There was sufficient support for the decision to deregulate tuition fees entirely rather than set a format for controlled increases. The cabinet secretary is reported to have written the final wording of the policy change. On February 11, 2002, Minister Bond announced the tuition policy change.

5.5. British Columbia case analysis

The analytical framework has five key dimensions and operationalized sub-questions for both within-case and cross-case comparative case analysis. These key dimensions are indicated in the two conceptual frameworks as important factors in understanding major policy change, and are: (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence
of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, (e) the effects of external influences. The following section presents the analysis of each of these factors in the case of policy change in British Columbia.

5.5.1. Program goals and their clarity

*What were the expressed goals of the policy?*

The government’s public representation of the goal of policy change was to provide improved financial resources to the post-secondary education system within the financial constraints of the new provincial budget, an environment that required reductions in government spending and increasingly unfunded inflationary pressure within institutions. There was a desire to increase both post-secondary capacity and post-secondary participation to serve economic and human capital development agendas, as well as to address institutional problems resulting from the “hidden costs” (Civil servant B) of the tuition freeze including decreased student access, increased waiting lists, and reduced course availability.

Further, there was a political interest in solving the political problem of access to university seats, which “popped up in response to the increasing public pressure about not being able to get into particular institutions in the Lower Mainland” (Civil servant C). This political issue eventually landed on the agenda of the Cabinet and the Premier. One cabinet minister reported that his constituents felt the tuition freeze policy was driving admissions thresholds “to levels that were causing lots of public angst” (Cabinet Minister A). It has been reported that the Premier himself expressed frustration to his colleagues about the increasingly high GPA threshold for admission into UBC which had started to become a political problem because “nobody can get into UBC with a B anymore” (Civil servant C). In response to these pressures, tuition policy change was considered to accomplish both policy and political goals.

*Was there consensus on the goal?*

Within government there was a relatively high degree of consensus on the expressed goal of policy change. There were some divisions within the Cabinet about the degree to which tuition should be deregulated, given some concerns about institutional
responses to complete autonomy over fees as well as the potential impact of higher tuition fees on students. However, tuition deregulation was consistent politically with the general policy preferences of party supporters and consistent with their broader policy agenda of eliminating red tape and government regulation.

Within the policy community, there was general agreement on the goal of increased capacity in the system, however a strong disagreement on the mechanism to fund that capacity. TUPC did not publicly call for a lifting of the tuition freeze, but framed the financial and strategic needs of the university sector and called for restoration of funding to fill the gap. As Don Avison, President of the Council, put it: “it’s a perfectly legitimate public policy decision to freeze or to keep steady the cost of tuition. What is absolutely essential is to recognize that there is a very real cost in doing that” (British Columbia. Legislature. Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, 2000, p. 199). Individual presidents were seen to have more specific agendas in private; “outside the bounds of The University Presidents Council, there were very, very activist presidents who were very outspoken on [tuition deregulation]” (Student leader C). CIEA and CFS-BC, and to a lesser degree, CUFA BC, called upon government to increase overall levels of funding to fill the gap, rather than increase student tuition. The civil service was generally sympathetic to the problems of the post-secondary institutions but had reservations about potential negative consequences of complete institutional autonomy over fees. The preferred solution from the civil service was “might have been a more regulated system with a cap – but saw the need to make a change” (Senior civil servant F).

**How was the problem defined? What indicators were used to identify and describe the policy problem(s)**

The policy problem was defined as insufficient funding for institutions combined with increased government expectations of the post-secondary system, given the role of post-secondary education in economic innovation and growth. The indicators used to identify and describe the policy problem included aspects of quality and access at the institutions, including increases in university GPA admission requirements, increases in class sizes, decline in accessibility of upper-level courses and range of courses, longer time to degree completion, increase in student debt, capital and space problems on
What alternatives were considered?

One policy alternative under active consideration but ultimately rejected was allowing tuition increases to a fixed limit per year, in order to provide institutions opportunity for increased revenue in a controlled manner. Some institutions were open to that option, and the Ministry of Advanced Education had completed analysis of a range of tuition caps to support decision-making. In that sense, the alternatives actively considered were variations of tuition regulation; maintaining the tuition freeze was not a policy option actively considered by decision-makers.

5.5.2. Politics of policy formation

Did policy actors have explicit goals toward which their activities were aligned? What influenced the policy actors’ policy preference?

TUPC released its 2001 report Creating Opportunities Together: A report from the BC universities, raising policy issues with a collaborative tone: “We look forward to working with a new government… and with others to help position British Columbia for the kind of excellence the Province is so clearly capable of achieving” (TUPC, 2001b, p.1). The Council identified five priority areas for investment: increasing access to degree programs, recruiting and retaining top quality faculty, building research, restoration of university core budgets to close the funding gap between BC universities and comparable institutions located elsewhere, and capital funding. On tuition policy specifically, the Council did not publically call for a lifting of the tuition freeze but framed the financial and strategic needs of the university sector and called for restoration of funding to fill the gap; Don Avison, President of the Council, described the position: “it’s a perfectly legitimate public policy decision to freeze or to keep steady the cost of tuition. What is absolutely essential is to recognize that there is a very real cost in doing that” (British Columbia. Legislature. Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, 2000, p. 199). Individual presidents were seen to have more specific agendas in private; “outside the bounds of the
University Presidents Council, there were very, very activist presidents who were very outspoken on [tuition deregulation]” (Student leader C).

AECBC’s policy priorities at the time of the policy episode were presented to the Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services in November 21, 2000: major increases in the number of needed post-secondary education spaces, improved educational infrastructure, and resources for recruitment and retention of faculty and staff. Public representations of AECBC institutions were generally silent on the issue of tuition policy. Student and faculty groups perceived the mandate struggles of the university colleges as linked to questions of tuition and prestige: “Nobody wanted to be a “community college”, nobody wanting to be a “university college.” This prestige around being a “university” and being able to charge more and have more and do more.” (Student leader A)

Faculty associations were somewhat divided on the matter of tuition policy. On the matter of tuition fees, CUFA BC had not taken a strong position and had tended to emphasize the importance of overall levels of funding. Rob Clift, the Executive Director of CUFA BC, represented CUFA BC’s position in this way: “we don’t have enough money overall to do the job we need to do and to do it well. The question of how much tuition should be is a question for government to decide…We would prefer to see tuition fees kept as low as possible, while at the same time enabling us to do our job and do it well” (British Columbia. Legislature. Select Standing Committee on Finance and Government Services, 2000, p.199). CIEA on the other hand was very vocal about their strong opposition to tuition fees, and particularly to any fee increases; access for students was a top policy issue for the organization, and tuition fees were regarded as a barrier to access to education.

Student organizations were also somewhat divided. The CFS-BC was very active on a broad range of social justice issues as well as post-secondary educational policy matters, and matters of interest during this time were tuition policy and fee levels, student financial aid, the federal funding cuts, access to university seats, university participation rates, funding for vocational and apprenticeship programs, adult basic education seat availability, student support services on campus, retention initiatives, and the protection
and enhancement of system-wide agencies. Tuition fees were the top priority public policy issue for the federation, as they believed that tuition was a barrier and education a right. The Alma Mater Society of UBC, however, tended to operate separately from the other student organizations, and in policy matters did not consistently share the same positions as the other student organizations, particularly those of the CFS-BC. On tuition fees, the AMS-UBC “was led by people who were more or less in favour of the deregulation of tuition fees.” (Student leader C)

**To what extent were policy actors representing political party platforms?**

The Liberal party did not campaign on tuition policy change, in contrast to the NDP’s platform commitment to the tuition freeze. However, it was clearly signaled within the policy community that policy change could be expected should the Liberals win the election. Once elected, members within Cabinet sought to reduce government regulation and red tape, and removing the tuition freeze was consistent with that overall agenda. As one cabinet Minister describes:

> it is fair to say that the notion that tuition fees would be deregulated was, to a certain extent, consistent with the general approach that you could say we had. But it wasn’t so much about lifting the freeze on tuition as it was about empowering institutions to set their own course. (Cabinet Minister A).

In terms of relationship between policy actors and political parties, there were reportedly strong personal connections between key university interests and members of the Liberal party. The institutional administrations, and the university administrations in particular, were seen by the civil service to be actively supporting new Liberal policies; “it was first readily apparent that many of the senior people in post-secondary institutions had been lobbying Mr. Campbell and his advisers during the campaign”. (Senior civil servant G) The president of UBC in particular was commonly perceived to be the primary influencer of the new Premier in post-secondary policy. The relationship between UBC and the Liberals was strengthened with the appointment of Larry Bell as the new Chair of the Board of Governors in the spring of 2000, a business leader and former civil servant with strong Liberal ties working as leader of the Liberal party's transition team. Interestingly, both the UBC faculty association and the AMS-UBC felt the appointment was positive (Wigod, April 22, 2000). New appointments to other institutional Boards of
Governors were made based on changing views of key skills and valuable attributes. However, in spite of these observed connections, the links between Liberal party policy or election platform development and post-secondary organized interests was not found to be institutionalized. This is in contrast to the formalized connections reported between BC student and faculty interest groups, progressive social movements, and NDP party politics (Carroll & Ratner, 2007).

**Which issues were linked by policy actors to tuition policy?**

The Liberals linked the change in tuition policy in part to their representation of the province’s fiscal condition; the policy problem was that the province needed to address deficit spending and long term economic factors at the same time as expanding post-secondary access. This linkage was reinforced through the various financial and economic reviews they undertook; the Fiscal Review concluded that the province’s financial circumstances represented a serious threat to the financial health of the province and that government was operating in a fundamentally unsustainable manner. The report indicated that planned tax cuts and spending cuts were required to revitalize economic growth and implement fiscal discipline, and reemphasized the party’s commitment to balance the budget and restore the province’s credit rating. This dismal assessment of the fiscal climate set the stage and tone for the subsequent government policy and budgeting exercises. The NDP opposition and other progressive coalition actors rejected this representation and argued that the provincial deficit was created by the Liberal government upon election (Carroll & Ratner, 2007); in their view, the public sector finance crisis was “orchestrated because of ideologically driven tax cuts” rather than any structural financial problems (Faculty association leader A).

Second, the Liberal government linked the key issue of university autonomy to the decision to deregulate tuition fees. To many in the Liberal party, the policy issue was less about tuition prices than it was about empowering institutions to set their own course, and trusting and empowering Boards of Governors to make best decisions in the interests of the institutions. It was reported that institutional autonomy in the post-secondary sector was very important to the Premier. Minister Bond described this autonomy to the legislature:
We believe, as I’ve said, that the place for decision-making is at the institutional level. We have excellent leaders. We have boards in this province who have been appointed to be able to govern with institutions to look at what’s in the best interests of students in this province. We are excited about the opportunities we know they will consider as they look to the future, as they look to the commitment they will make in terms of post-secondary students. (Bond, 2002)

Minister Collins also referenced this autonomy in his comments to the legislature, upon introducing the repeal of the legislated tuition freeze:

The repeal of the Access to Education Act will return autonomy to the boards of public post-secondary institutions to set tuition fees and mandatory ancillary fees. This will enable institutions working with students to determine what level of fees is reasonable, fair and affordable. It will also enable institutions to meet the demand for increased student access and improved quality of education. (Collins, 2002).

This perspective was reflected in the language of the final announcement of the policy change which was issued under the headline, “Institutions have autonomy over tuition fees”:

We are restoring post-secondary institutions’ responsibility for determining their own tuition fee levels. Six years of frozen fees, combined with lack of proper funding in previous years, have put enormous financial pressures on institutions. Institutions have firmly told us that they need this flexibility to protect and improve the quality of education they provide and meet students’ needs...Without this autonomy, institutions will not be able to meet the demand for increased student access and improved quality of education...Institutions are in the best position to determine what level of fees is fair, reasonable and affordable, working together with the students they serve. We fully expect they will make those decisions appropriately and responsibly, taking into account the hidden costs students face. (British Columbia. Ministry of Advanced Education, February 11, 2002)

A third linkage made by a number of policy actors was the relationship between tuition policy and declining federal dollars to the provinces. CIEA and the CFS-BC in particular made public representations about the problem of declining federal contributions to post-secondary education and the impact of that decline on students as well as institutions. The Vancouver Sun also made the same connection:
Successive years of cuts in federal transfer payments for higher education and a tuition freeze by the BC government have left universities and colleges starved for cash. As a result, they are unable to make it easier for people to go to school and unable to provide the quality education that our students want and deserve. Over the longer term, this starving of our post-secondary institutions will deprive young British Columbians of the chance of getting rewarding jobs and hinder the province’s economic growth (“There is a price”, 1999, p. A22).

However, the provincial government itself did not make a compelling public case linking cuts in the transfer to changes in provincial tuition policy. This is due in part to the fact that the NDP government had maintained the tuition freeze in the immediate aftermath of the cuts to the federal transfer, and therefore the public did not see the linkage between the cost of education and the federal policy change.

The final linkage related to the question of access. The language of accessibility used by the NDP and the student movement in particular connoted progressive post-secondary policy in social justice terms; accessibility meant barrier-free education, typically with respect to cost in the form of a tuition freeze. The changing financial climate in universities in particular gave rise to a different use of the term; the need for access came to be used successfully as a framing device to describe financial issues faced by institutions rather than issues faced by individuals. Specifically, the tuition freeze was depriving institutions of needed revenue to provide an adequate number of seats to serve community need. As observed by one respondent, this policy story became very successful:

What the government did quite effectively, and ultimately enough to be able to kind of achieve their ends, is they engaged in a campaign to redefine access, and that was the word that the student movement really used...they basically made the argument that because tuition fees had been frozen for so long, universities just couldn’t reach all of the community that needed to be educated. They didn’t have the means to do it, and as a result not enough students were able to access an education, because the administrations just couldn’t create the seats that were necessary with the freeze keeping tuition fees so low. (Student leader C)
**What events or activities contributed to the problem being identified?**

Policy entrepreneurs and the media identified the policy problem using reports from TUPC and the civil service. The universities were the primary policy actors in successfully representing the problem to government, along with the other post-secondary institutions. The universities individually and through TUPC were the primary policy entrepreneurs of changes to tuition policy, supported by similar messages from other institutions and organized business interests, including the BC Business Council. President Piper of UBC as well as others within the UBC community were reportedly promoting tuition deregulation in particular. Although the presidents did not publically call for a lifting of the tuition freeze, student organizations in particular felt that whatever was being said publically, behind the scenes “UBC specifically was pushing, pushing hard…and The University Presidents’ Council, and they certainly were playing a role of asking for tuition fees to increase” (Student leader A). Hidden policy entrepreneurship was also being undertaken within government; Premier Campbell and his senior staff within the Core Services Review secretariat were reportedly promoting tuition deregulation, with the sufficient support of Cabinet. One civil servant recalls:

I remember the premier or some messaging coming from the premier's office that institutional autonomy in the post-secondary sector was very important to him. And at about that same time, there was messaging coming from the Centre about the unintended consequences or the negative consequences, and I think the actual wording was the "hidden costs" of the tuition freeze. And that was a key driver early on in the consideration of the tuition free policy. (Civil servant B).

Finally, the universities’ policy issues and preferences were frequently reported by the *Vancouver Sun* which had been highly critical of the tuition freeze and taken an editorial position in support of tuition deregulation.

**What were the key events that brought about a merging of the politics, problem and policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window?**

In order to identify the key events that brought about a merging of the politics, problem, and policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window, interview respondents were asked to respond to a series of questions on the degree to which they believed that a number of factors played a role in the tuition policy change (Strongly Agree,
Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). The interview guide is located in Appendix C. The following table provides the rank order of factors to which the participants strongly agreed and agreed, as a percent of total question responses.

The top four factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to financial conditions in the policy environment; the overwhelming majority identified institutional financial difficulties as a factor in the deregulation of tuition fees in BC, followed by broader financial conditions in the province, and related factors which influenced the setting of the provincial budget. These financial factors are followed closely by electoral considerations and shifting concerns and attention in the policy environment.
Table 5.3.  Respondent Identification of Factors in BC Policy Episode, by Percent

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<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional budget shortfalls</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall changes in fiscal climate</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changing priority for funding of institutions</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Challenging provincial budget</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proximity to the general election</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on accessibility of post-secondary education</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tuition policy change in other jurisdictions</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase in the amount attention on post-secondary education</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on affordability of post-secondary education</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Changes in pressure lobbying</td>
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<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shifts in public opinion on government policy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on participation rates in post-secondary education</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on student debt</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in the resources of coalitions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to pressure from other branches of government</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in federal provincial government relations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing student financial aid costs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=25

Interestingly, while the rhetoric of issue linkage between tuition policy and the federal government was noticeable in the interviews, when asked to rate factors which played a role in the policy change, relatively few (38%) agreed that changes in federal provincial relations had an impact.

Within the context of these factors, in the policy stream were several powerful and well-organized policy entrepreneurs with clear agenda-setting activities, problem framing, and a preferred policy option, and the government engaged in softening up activities. In the problem stream, there were a number of highly salient issues within institutions, the post-secondary system, the business community, and the media, which were successfully framed as negative consequences of the tuition freeze. In the politics stream, the public mood shifted against the NDP and its policies, and the change in government provided the opportunity for policy change, given that the newly elected Liberal government received a resounding mandate for change.
5.5.3. Stability of policy coalitions over time

The policy actors, coalitions, and history were described in the summary table in section 5.2.2, showing a policy subsystem with generally well established, organized, and resourced coalitions. The institutional coalitions, TUPC and AECBC, experienced change in the period prior to the policy change, with TUPC strengthened in its internal coordination and capacity, and AECBC weakened; there was little suggestion of sustained organization between the two. The CFS-BC, CIEA, and CUFA BC, themselves each as coalitions, and together as broader progressive coalition partners, managed a relatively stable and lengthy alliance on deeply held progressive values related to post-secondary education. The Coalition to Promote Public Education, which had begun in the 1990s, was a relatively modest effort based on common values and was not a factor in the tuition policy episode.

Was there evidence of information sharing between coalitions?

Institutional coalitions function to provide information sharing internally; TUPC in particular was very effective, and AECBC less so. There were no formal negotiated agreements identified between these two groups, and information sharing between these two groups was not a major activity within the policy subsystem. Within the CFS national organization, policy and political learning was part of ongoing member training and organizational development; given that policy and political action priorities were set at the national level, there were explicit mechanisms to support information sharing. The federal arrangements for faculty coalitions were similar in nature, but to a lesser extent given the more diversified focus of those member organizations and the national agenda. Information sharing was found between the members of the official coalition to promote public education and the NDP, and there was policy and political learning from the experiences of progressive allies in other provinces related to tuition policy advocacy or resistance.

Is there evidence of internal or external shocks to the coalitions, policy learning, or negotiated agreements?

There were a number of changes within the policy subsystem during the period prior to the policy change, summarized in Figure 5.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy Subsystem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Relatively Stable Parameters | **Coalitions: Institutions**  
Belief system and values, priorities and perceptions  
Δ in college and institute coalition – fractured  

Constraints and resources of coalitions and actors  
Δ in university coalition – improved  
Δ in college and institute coalition – lessened  

**Actors**  
Δ in university presidents  

Policy-oriented learning and political learning  
Δ in university coalition brought increased capacity for policy and political learning  

**Coalitions: Students**  
Belief system and values, priorities and perceptions  
Δ in student coalition attention on policy issue – lessened  
Δ in student coalition coordinating efforts - lessened  

Constraints and resources of coalitions and actors  
Δ in membership and financial resources – increased  

Conflict, interactions within and between competing coalitions  
Δ in solidarity within student movement – lessened |

| External Events | Changes in socio-economic climate  
Δ in economic climate  

Changes in public opinion  
Δ in public opinion  

Changes in systemic governing coalition  
Δ in government  
Δ in civil service  

Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems  
Δ in budget priorities |

**Figure 5.1. Summary of Changes in ACF Factors in BC, 1993-2003**

The dominant coalition in this policy episode was that of the universities. During the period prior to the tuition policy change, the TUPC gained momentum with the addition of influential new university presidents, a renewed and well-organized shared approach to achieving common goals, and changes to the organization’s focus and resources dedicated to government relations. The universities developed strong common messaging, including a shared budget submission to government, based on common values (such as university autonomy), and common preferences on tuition policy, given the overall context of government funding and performance requirements.

During the same period, the other organized coalition of institutions, AECBC, experienced internal conflict then completely dissolved. By the time the tuition policy was
under active consideration, the institutions were struggling to form new membership organizations. Institutions within the coalition also experienced shocks given government policy change, including institutional closures and changes to appointed members of institutional Boards of Governors.

There were also changes in the coalitions of progressive interests. There were no identified shocks or changes of resources or activity with the two major faculty coalitions, CUFA BC and CIEA. In contrast, the CFS-BC, while growing in strength in terms of membership and financial resources, had a number of internal shocks. There were some minor internal difficulties within the CFS-BC coalition; the newly elected Simon Fraser Student Society president made comments to the Vancouver Sun in May 2000 that broke ranks with established coalition positions, stating that he did not believe the tuition freeze should continue, and that “students should be expected to pay their fair share” (Wigod, 10 May, 2000, p. A3). The CFS-BC and the AMS-UBC were at odds with each other on a number of policy issues, including tuition fees.

However more important, during the late 1990s the CFS-BC increasingly suffered from internal lack of focus. The success of the NDP in forming and maintaining government in the 1990s meant that many experienced student leaders left the student movement to move into political or government roles, and into other influential positions on boards and committees. Further, under the NDP government, student participation was secured in many post-secondary policy and institutional arenas, such as student financial aid appeals and Boards of Governors, and the organization had achieved its main tuition policy objective, a tuition freeze. The student movement turned its attention from core post-secondary issues such as tuition fees to social justice issues and social movements, such as anti-globalization and anti-free trade. This particular issue had relevance for many BC students given that conflict had occurred between protesters and officials during the APEC summit at UBC in Vancouver in 1997. This attention shift within the coalition, in combination with the relative disarray of the other politically progressive organized interests, including the NDP, contributed to an atmosphere where the coalitions of overall progressive interests had been significantly weakened and there were few efforts to coordinate coalition development. This observation of disarray has been made both others in studying social movements in this era (Carrol & Ratner, 2007).
To summarize, there were major positive changes within the university coalition as learning and changes in resources influenced the organization’s effectiveness, and negative changes with the colleges and institutes as their coalition dissolved. The student coalition, while growing in strength in terms of membership and financial resources, had internal divisions and changes in focus including effort and time spent on coalition-building. Finally, the major external shocks to the policy subsystem included changes in the overall financial climate, change in political party forming government and public mood, and changes in the civil service.

5.5.4. Influence of elected and non-elected policy actors

*Did elected officials dominate the policy process? How? To what extent did non-elected policy actors influence the policy process? What strategies were used?*

The influential elected actors in this policy episode were Premier Campbell and his Cabinet who set the overall decision agenda of government. The Premier reportedly had an interest in the policy issue, and desired resolution to the problems in the universities. The strength of the Liberal mandate in the early days was significant in terms of the change from the previous government and the effectiveness with which the changes were implemented:

The change, the complete change of government in 2001 was huge. We went from one very different philosophical direction to another very quickly. And there was of course the added dynamics that, particularly in 2002, 2003 and certainly in that first four years of the Liberal mandate, we had two people in opposition. So, they basically were running the show with no problem. (Civil servant C)

As a result of planning efforts while they were in Opposition, when the Liberals came into power, they had a very specific agenda. The *New Era* commitments outlined immediate priorities and gave clarity for Ministers, caucus members, and public servants, one of whom described the environment this way:

The result of [being in opposition for five years] was when they came into power, they knew precisely what they were going to do. They had written on the wall of the cabinet chambers exactly what their to do list was and they ticked them off as they were done. There was absolutely
unprecedented clarity for Ministers, MLAs and public servants as to what was to be done and what the priorities were. And whether you agreed with those priorities or you didn’t agree with those priorities, the clarity was magnificent. (Senior civil servant A)

The Core Services Review secretariat coordinated the overall alignment of the planning within the civil service to the political orientation and agenda of the Premier’s office. The Core Services Review undertook review of potential “strategic shifts” (Senior civil servant G) in the context of a reduced budget target for the Ministry of Advanced Education. These two exercises, while necessarily iterative and interdependent, became blurred to the extent that for some civil servants, it had a negative impact on the potential of the Core Services Review as a policy-making process due to the uneven recommendations for decisions to achieve budget cuts. The Core Services Review process involved vetting and requesting revisions to Ministry staff-authored recommendations, an often-frustrating experience:

It wasn’t the traditional exercise of bureaucrats putting together policy options and then awaiting a response. It was more a situation where the government – and in this case, there was only one person who mattered – knew what they wanted, but they wanted someone else to propose it…What I think got approved out of the Core Process was not specifically the end of the tuition freeze. I think it was, “Major strategic changes need to be made around tuition. This is a matter for cabinet.” (Senior civil servant G)

The major non-elected influencers were the university presidents individually, and collectively through TUPC. They used lobby strategies to engage in agenda-setting, successfully framed and linked problem indicators to the tuition freeze, and framed the universities’ issues in clear policy alternatives for government. One senior civil servant observed: “the institutions had been saying for a long time the tuition freeze was killing them, it was strangling them.” (Senior civil servant A) The message from the universities focused primarily on the negative effects the freeze had on quality and access at the institutions, the unintended consequences or hidden costs of the tuition freeze, problems attributed to inadequate funding of the system and linked to the revenue constraints on tuition. Although the presidents did not publically call for a lifting of the tuition freeze, student organizations in particular felt that behind the scenes “UBC specifically was pushing, pushing hard…and The University Presidents’ Council, they certainly were
playing a role of asking for tuition fees to increase” (Student leader A). To some extent, the representations university made to government were reported as “pressure”, particularly with respect to the desire for deregulation of professional programs; “[the universities] basically said, “If we can’t mount a world-class program [funded through differentiated tuition], we’re not prepared to offer the program we have” (Civil servant B).

From the perspective of the civil service, the institutions’ lobbying had been fairly articulate and convincing, and there was general support for the need to resolve the overall financial problems faced by institutions and that tuition restrictions should be liberated: “six years of tuition freeze under the NDP, there was a sense that our tuition was so out of synch with the rest of Canada or there was room for some growth, given that it had been frozen for so many years” (Senior civil servant D). There was also some agreement on the need to rebalance the costs, that students may not have been paying their fair share of the cost of their education under the tuition freeze. Further, there was some sympathy within the civil service for institutions that had been “caught” in the tuition freeze: “‘complicity’ might be too strong a word, but there was probably at least some agreement among senior policymakers in the Ministry and senior leaders in institutions that maybe it was time, that maybe the tuition fee policy had run its course” (Senior civil servant F).

**What was the effect of the political structure in the province?**

The effect of the political structure in the province is seen in two ways. First, the nature of cabinet government described in the literature is consistent with the decision-making in this policy episode. The leadership on the decision to deregulate tuition fees came from the centre of cabinet, and the Premier in particular. Second, the effect of the political culture in BC, that is, the polarized and ideological political environment described earlier, is seen in this policy episode. The atmosphere of antagonism and distrust between partisan groups and organized interests was evident in the ways in which these opposing coalitions engaged with each other. One illustrative example of this dynamic occurred in this episode.

With the change in government, the CFS-BC believed the tuition deregulation was inevitable and demanded continuation of the tuition freeze policy. This hard line oppositional stance was taken from the offset. The new government had been considering
a range of tuition rate increases, including a well-developed proposal for a controlled tuition increase of 15%. According to several representations of the government thinking at the time, it is suggested that had the student representatives and their allies been a little more amenable to negotiation, that the newly elected government might have had undertaken more collaboration or consultation with some of those stakeholder groups; as one cabinet minister described, “I think the challenge with the students is that they were not amenable to…compromise is not necessarily the right word. They were not amenable to nuance…” (Cabinet Minister A). In the tuition policy episode, the CFS-BC and CIEA “just stuck to the party line, and there was no attempt by any of them to put themselves in the shoes of a government which was about to make a major policy change…which would have served both better” (Senior civil servant G).

Members of the civil service shared this assessment:

I think if the Federation of Students was more along the lines of, “Well, look, we could live with a 10% lift, but don’t make it completely unregulated,” I think government probably could have gone with that kind of policy to lessen the political backlash. But as soon as the federation and faculty associations drew the line at zero, then the sky was the limit. (Senior civil servant F)

This dynamic has been observed previously in BC, between similar organized interests and the former NDP government; Carrol & Ratner (2005) found there was an “often single-minded purposefulness” within social movements (p. 169). The seemingly unresolvable gap described between some organized interests and government under the previous political regime was continued, and evident in this episode:

The social movements, however, fearing that “reasonableness” would be tantamount to a loss of effectiveness, did, indeed, act like special interest groups in vigorously defending their own agendas and in displaying, from the government’s point of view, a lack of political realism that often contrasted with the political sensibilities of the business community. Indeed, the rank and file movement members seemed to prefer protesting on the lawn of the legislature to being in the Premier’s Office (Carrol & Ratner, 2007, p. 49).

As a result, both faculty and student unions had little ability to exert influence over public policy during the early part of the mandate.
To what extent did policy actors utilize technical information? Expert validators? Was information on other jurisdictions/provincial tuition policies shared or used?

In terms of policy research suppliers and influencers, nationally, the Canadian Council of Ministers of Education (CMEC) functioned as a boundary-spanning force, facilitating data, policy and experience sharing between Ministers and between senior civil servants. Research enterprises such as the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), Fraser Institute, Millennium Scholarship Foundation, Canadian Council on Learning (CCL), Higher Education Strategy Associates (HESA), and Statistics Canada provided policy-relevant research for the policy community, directly or indirectly.

The relative scarcity of technical information in the policy environment resulted in government reliance on policy analysis conducted within the civil service, research from Statistics Canada and the Canadian Millennium Foundation, and research provided by the organized interests, most important from TUPC. There were no expert validators brought into the policy episode by decision-makers. Information from other jurisdictions used included the Statistics Canada's annual comparative tuition information as well as a variety of ad hoc descriptions of the impact of tuition policy change in other provinces.

5.5.5. The effects of external influences

Did other post-secondary issues affect policy deliberations? Did policy decisions from other arenas affect policy deliberations? Did the fiscal climate or budgeting affect policy deliberations?

Economically, the fiscal condition of the province was a major factor in prompting the government program of change. For the government of the day, the tuition policy change was a relatively small policy decision in a program of substantive reorganization of government and government services. Overall, for decision-makers, there was a desire to control spending, as well as an identified need to expand post-secondary education as a prerequisite to future prosperity for the province, as well as support short-term economic growth with long-term structural improvement in economic position, and restore fiscal balance.
Within these complex decision-making conditions, the two largest ministries, the Ministry of Health budget was protected and little user fee potential, as was the Ministry of Education. The next largest, the Ministry of Advanced Education, needed to increase post-secondary seats while managing within a constrained budget. As one senior civil servant described it, “tuition policy was the necessary evil” (Senior civil servant A) to accomplish policy and political goals.

**To what extent did public opinion influence policy deliberations?**

From the government’s perspective, public opinion was clear given the results of the general election; prior to the election, the polls showed support for the BC Liberals had soared to 63 per cent (“Call it balanced”, 2001). Politically, with the overwhelming majority in government and elected with a clear mandate, and with formal and broader opposition forces in disarray, the government did not feel politically vulnerable. There were few organized countervailing forces for the shaping of a new approach to tuition policy, and those organized interests were reeling from the degree and speed of change across various areas of government. The virtual elimination of the NDP in opposition, the rate and speed with which major policy changes were being announced, looming cutbacks in the civil service, the elimination of key agencies and services in the post-secondary system, and the effect of decisions made in other Ministries, such as legislated changes to collective agreements, contributed to overall atmosphere of disarray and had a dampening effect on efforts to mount opposition to the changes. On tuition fee policy change in particular, the political difficulties were seen to have a longer-term benefit:

I think they calculated and I think correctly, that they could make major changes in a variety of areas and weather the storm and ultimately come out of it a few years later having basically changed the terms of the debate in the province and the system. (Student leader C)

The media were also very supportive of change in tuition fees policy. In a typical example, the *Vancouver Sun* ran an editorial supporting the proposed deregulation:

Victoria, in what we can only describe as a reasonable measure, is expected to allow universities to increase fees by an average of 25 per cent for the next school year...So the issue isn’t to subsidize or not subsidize -- it’s how to share the burden. With the level of subsidy so high, and with the personal value of an education so substantial and
tangible, we don’t think it’s unfair to ask students to pony up a little more. The tuition freeze over the past six years has deprived B.C.’s universities of the resources they need to provide a good education, and that’s a disservice to both the students and the society that supports them. ("Given a degree’s value, tuition fees should rise” 2002, p. A10)

5.5.6. Summary

During the NDP era, the government placed an emphasis on state coordination of post-secondary activities to achieve their policy goals of access and affordability. The government was very sensitive to criticism from the CFS-BC on affordability issues, and for these key allies of the government, tuition was a top of mind policy issue and the freeze had been activity promoted as a policy for many years, both nationally and provincially. Institutions had repeatedly represented their frustrations regarding institutional financing and the tuition freeze policy particularly the unintended consequences or hidden costs of the tuition freeze, the major factors being inadequate access to post-secondary education spaces, and insufficient institutional funding.

The BC Liberals believed the NDP had micromanaged the broader public sector to its detriment, and were in favour of reducing unnecessary intrusion into institutions’ independence. They were also focused on economic development and required the post-secondary system to be responsive as well as deliver growth in capacity and participation rates. Campaign commitments signaled substantive and rapid change, signaling potential tuition increases. With a new government and a new mandate, the Liberals focused on restoring fiscal balance, and rapid change. A number of mechanisms were used to further identify fiscal issues and priorities, as well as government spending priorities, with an overall goal was deregulation, privatization and decentralization. Within the post-secondary system, major restructuring began, including closure of sector agencies and institutions, restructuring of key elements of the VET system, expansion of degree-granting authority, and reductions in the civil service.

On tuition policy, the new government maintained the prior government’s policy for the remaining of the fiscal year, providing the institutions funding for the offset. Ministerial consultations with stakeholders were followed by development of policy alternatives for cabinet. Within government, consensus for deregulation was relatively high; the
institutions and universities in particular were advocating for policy change, the premier and cabinet were in agreement, and fiscal condition of the province was a major factor.
Chapter 6.

Ontario’s Tuition Freeze

6.1. Introduction

In the fall of 2003, the Liberal party under Dalton McGuinty was elected to a majority government with a platform commitment to freeze post-secondary tuition fees for two years. At the time of the announced change in Ontario, there were a variety of provincial tuition policies in place in Canada: two provinces had unrestricted tuition policies (British Columbia and New Brunswick); four had tuition freezes (Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland, which had also reduced fees); and Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia had regulated restrictions on tuition fee increases.

This chapter will first describe the background context of the case, focusing on the features and structure of the policy subsystem and grounded in a political economy perspective, followed by the chronological account of the policy episode, summarizing the critical events that led to a decision for major policy change. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the case using the analytical framework.

6.2. Description and Structure of the Policy Subsystem

6.2.1. Political economy of Ontario

Ontario is the most populous and most industrialized province in Canada (MacDermid & Ablo, 2001). Ontario’s mixed economy was founded originally in agriculture, resource extraction, and manufacturing, and became the industrial centre of Canada following the Second World War with significant expansion in resource and processing industries and services, including financial services, energy, and utilities. A series of economic recessions following the 1970s, including the decline of manufacturing, resulted in labour market changes and instability in the province.
The economics of Ontario has had an influence on its politics. Until the 1980s, Ontario’s economic prosperity and political conservatism were linked; Ontario’s politics were dominated by the Progressive Conservatives who governed continuously from 1943-1985 with eight majority governments. Ontario’s generally conservative political culture had its roots in the 19th century; subsequent waves of British immigration in the 20th century contributed to the development of Ontario labour-socialism (Wiseman, 2006). The economic instability of during the latter half of the 20th century led to a turbulent period of political realignment (MacDermid & Ablo, 2001). These changes in social patterns led to electoral shifts in traditional party lines; Ontario’s “historical politics of a deeply stratified but consensus-building, one-province toryism” were replaced by “political instability, party repositioning and new forms of more open class conflict” (MacDermid and Ablo, 2001, p.165). The political upheaval began in 1985, with three different political parties elected into successive governments: the Ontario Liberal Party (1985, 1987), the Ontario New Democratic Party (1990), and the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario (1995, 1999).

By 2003, the province had been governed by the Progressive Conservative party for eight years and there followed a number of changes. Premier Mike Harris formed a majority government first in 1995, and again in 1999; he resigned in 2002, and was replaced as party leader and Premier by former Ontario Minister of Finance, Ernie Eves following a difficult leadership race. In the Liberal party, Dalton McGuinty assumed leadership of the party in 1996. With the general election in the fall of 2003, he formed government after winning a majority, with 72 of 103 seats. From the Liberal caucus, the new MPP Mary Anne Chambers was appointed Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities and former Minister of Colleges and Universities, Greg Sorbara, was appointed Minister of Finance.

6.2.2. **Policy subsystem overview**

The Ontario post-secondary system developed as a binary system, with the universities and the colleges of applied arts and technology (CAATs) as distinct and operating in parallel (Cameron & Royce, 1996; Jones, 1991a, 1991c, 1997; Shanahan, Fisher, Jones & Rubenson, 2005). The provincial government was relatively indifferent to university affairs prior to the Second World War, apart from a policy of funding exclusively
secular universities (Trick, 2005). Even with the rapid development of the both sets of institutions in the 1960s, there was relative policy stability in the post-secondary system (Jones, 1997); Ontario was “typical of many systems: centrally designed and planned, highly dependent on public funding, system-wide collective bargaining, and funded by formula” (Cooke & Lang, 2009). Ontario universities held a high degree of institutional autonomy while the autonomous, board-governed CAATs were significantly directed by government policy (Jones, 1997).

The post-secondary system underwent significant change in the 1990s in response to both environmental conditions and changes in government policy. Disruptive environmental factors include globalization, immigration, population shifts, labour market restructuring, and technology changes (Cooke & Lang, 2009). Further, post-secondary education demand and participation rose beyond predictions for both the university and college sectors (Cameron & Royce, 1996). Ontario’s higher education policy at this time was focused on economic globalization, strengthening science and technology infrastructure, and stimulating university-industry research partnerships (Lang et al, 2000), while at the same time implementing dramatic and unpredictable reductions in government operating grants (Cooke & Lang, 2009). Government also introduced changes in the legislation that governed community colleges (Cooke & Lang, 2009).

By 2003, there were a number of important policy stakeholders attempting to influence post-secondary policy in Ontario. The post-secondary system had 18 publically funded universities and 24 CAATs as well as a number of interest groups. Table 6.1 below summarizes the resources, views, and influences of the major interest groups at the time of the policy episode.
### Table 6.1. Summary of Interest Groups in Ontario Policy Episode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest group</th>
<th>Resources, views, and influences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Universities (COU)</td>
<td>Formed in 1962, COU was comprised the executive heads of each of Ontario’s public universities. Sought a remedy for university funding issues and appropriate balance of cost-sharing between students and public. Individual presidents called for tuition deregulation, but there was a range of preferences between institutions on tuition policy options. Influenced by member views and feedback from key constituencies, internal coalition politics, and internal policy analysis including that of post-secondary finance policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology of Ontario (ACAATO)</td>
<td>Established in 1967, represented the province’s 24 colleges of applied arts and technology. Generally silent on tuition policy, but privately some individual presidents called for tuition deregulation. Influenced by member views and internal policy analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA)</td>
<td>Founded in 1964, OCUFA represented its 27 member faculty associations and 17,000 university faculty and librarians. Concerned about affordability and marketization in education. Influenced by membership views and core values, which are generally progressive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students – Ontario (CFS-O)</td>
<td>CFS-O represented over 235,000 student members in 35 member local students’ unions. Tuition fee issues were top policy priority; policy goal is tuition freeze or reduction, with a long-term goal of elimination of tuition fees. Influenced by membership views, national coalition policy-making, and core progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Undergraduate Student Alliance (OUSA)</td>
<td>Formed in 1992 and officially incorporated in 1995 as the result of an informal alliance of five student governments. Represented the interests of over 140,000 professional and undergraduate, full-time and part-time university students at seven institutions. OUSA’s tuition policy preference at the time of the episode was to support a freeze. Influenced by membership views, core values and mission, and internal policy analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Student Alliance (CSA)</td>
<td>Established in 1975, represented over 70% of all Ontario college students consisting of 17 colleges and 25 student associations with over 126,000 fulltime students. Not particularly active on tuition policy. Influenced by membership views and focus on college access.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The policy map (May, 2005) in Table 6.2 shows these interest group positions at the time of the policy episode against the continuum of alternative tuition fee policy options.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Classical Liberal -----Increasing action of government------→ Social Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of tuition</td>
<td>Individual private investment in a private good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU, ACCATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay for it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role in access (assuming qualified)</td>
<td>Access for those willing to pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price discrimination</td>
<td>Varies by institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU, ACCATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in setting prices</td>
<td>No direct involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in financing institutions</td>
<td>Zero to minimal direct government funding, with emphasis on tuition and other non-tax revenue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of institutions in tuition-setting</td>
<td>Autonomy to set tuition prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of government department of PSE</td>
<td>Monitor outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◆ COU, ACCATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set guidelines for institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adapted from May (2005) and Rexe & Nilson (2011). Shaded and non-shaded areas represent the relative coalitions and their preferences.
6.3. Antecedent conditions to the policy change

6.3.1. Changes in structural arrangements of post-secondary education

There were a number of structural changes in the post-secondary sector during the antecedent period. Changes to the system itself included the growth of applied baccalaureates and new limited authority of CAATs to grant undergraduate degrees, provided in 2000 with the *Post-secondary Education Choice & Excellence Act*. Government also created a new institution, the University of Ontario Institute of Technology in 2002, and in 2003, awarded new mandates for three CAATs, as Institutes of Technology and Advanced Learning (ITALs).

There were two additional significant changes to the overall public administration of post-secondary education in the province during the period prior to the policy change. First, there were several major changes and reorganizations within the ministry responsible for post-secondary policy administration in Ontario, the Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities (MTCU) (Jones, 2004). These changes included the retirement or reassignment of key civil servants in the higher education area, and the introduction of newcomers in the service; the Ministry had been relatively stable from the 1970s until this period of rapid change. The changes created some perceived disruption from the perspective of the institutions, and in particular, the institutions’ investment in developing the civil service knowledge of issues, strategy, and implications for policy implementation.

The other major change to the structural arrangements in Ontario occurred in 1996, with the elimination of the Ontario Council of University Affairs (OCUA) by the Harris government. In place from 1974 to 1996, the Ontario system had had a buffer institution, OCUA, which functioned as an intermediary and coordinating body between institutions and government, and as a forum for decision-making in the sector (Jones, 2004). Fallis and Rose (2008) reported that this elimination left the government without a process for intermediary planning and coordination, a gap which became increasingly filled by the voluntary association representing the universities.
6.3.2. Changes in student movement coalitions

Prior to the early 1990s, the student movement in Ontario was comprised of two primary student federations, the university student organizations affiliated with the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS-O) and community college students largely affiliated with the College Student Alliance (CSA). A schism occurred within the university federation in 1992, and the Ontario Undergraduate Student Alliance (OUSA) was formed by student organizations from the University of Toronto, Queen’s University, Wilfrid Laurier University, University of Western Ontario, University of Waterloo, and Brock University. In the face of an increasing public and government discussion on alternative approaches to tuition policy, the divisions in key values and goals became apparent.

The CFS-O had a strong policy interest in tuition fee issues. The public position on tuition fee policy goal of the CFS and its provincial chapters, including the CFS-O, had been consistent over time and over jurisdictions: zero tuition fees. The national and provincial federations in Canada claimed victory in various tuition fee decisions including Ontario (2002, Queen’s University tuition proposal), Newfoundland (2001, tuition fee reduction), Ontario (2001, tuition fee cap; 1993, tuition fee increase), BC (2001, tuition fee reduction; 1994, tuition freeze), and PEI (1999, tuition freeze). OUSA members on the other hand “accepted tuition as a necessity” (Duffy, 1994, p. A1). OUSA priorities were to provide research and ideas to governments and the public on how to improve the accessibility, affordability, accountability, and quality of post-secondary education; it positioned itself with government as “a constructive organization as opposed to simply a protest organization” (Student leader G).

Political affiliation of the student organizations was also reportedly one aspect of that divide, with OUSA more aligned in policy preferences to the Liberal party than to either the NDP or the Conservatives, and CFS-O much closer aligned with the social justice positions of the NDP.

6.3.3. Antecedent policy conditions

There was a history of tuition increases and policy shifts in Ontario during the decade prior to the tuition freeze decision, including changes to discretionary tuition and
ancillary fee levels, formula-funding discussions, and tuition increases in the 1990s.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Ontario government had regulated tuition fee levels by tying
post-secondary operating grants to revenue collected through tuition, through a complex
and weighted formula funding mechanism. The traditional penalty for overcharging tuition
at that time was an equal reduction in the operating grant (Smith, Cameron, Gorbet,
Henderson, & Stephenson, 1996). Changes in policy beginning in the early 1980s
permitted universities to charge tuition fees at a higher proportion of the formula fee
without penalty. This flexibility was referred to as *discretionary fees*, the purpose of which
was to allow universities access to incremental increases in non-grant revenue. Even with
these increasing discretionary fees, the funding formula largely kept all fees within a
relatively narrow band, with little institutional differentiation (Boggs, 2009); in addition to
constraining tuition fee levels, the formula funding process also limited system capacity at
a time when demand for access was increasing. This resulted in a highly competitive
environment for student seats, the “enrolment squeeze,” and the consequential parental
and student anxiety over post-secondary access was widely covered in the media

Institutions and their organizations sought a remedy for ongoing funding problems,
the appropriate cost-sharing between students and the public, and to address the
problems with the financial aid system; advocacy for this remedy was sustained a number
of years. By the early 1990s, as a result of the enrolment pressures and in the face of
stagnating government funding, the universities in particular advocated for increased
tuition levels (Young, 2001) and attempted to find creative solutions to circumvent these
constraints, including efforts to privatize programs (Lewington, 1993, Nov 22). Jones
(1991a) noted that a growing number of institutions called for more market-driven fees or
greater flexibility in establishing tuition levels in order to address financial needs of
universities.

In the summer of 1993, the COU proposed a number of tuition fee reforms
including raising general undergraduate fees, autonomy for individual universities to set
increased tuition fees for graduate programs and professional programs, and an income-
contingent loan program. The discussion paper argued that the university community was
in a precarious financial position and recommended tuition fee increases to offset two
decades of underfunding, a position covered in the media (Duffy & Daly, 1993, August 24). The COU also raised concerns about the effect of inadequate financing on space and accessibility (Lewington, 1993, Nov 22). The council’s representation of the issues also included decline in quality of academic programs due to larger classes, inadequate library holdings, and deteriorating campus buildings (Duffy & Daly, 1993, August 24).

In 1995, the newly elected Progressive Conservative government announced changes in post-secondary policy, including major cuts to government grants to post-secondary institutions and partial tuition fee deregulation. As a result of an increasingly difficult fiscal environment, the enrolment pressures, and lobbying from institutions, the provincial government allowed greater tuition increases than had previously been entertained under the formula funding policy, with information that suggested that fees could be increased without “hurting accessibility” (Senior civil servant H); details of this period are similarly described by Axelrod et al (2012). President Prichard of the University of Toronto has been attributed with the successfully lobby for “the freedom to raise tuition fees” under the Progressive Conservative government (Galt, 1995, December 12, p. A1); he emphasized ensuring the university’s international competitiveness in quality and funding (Urquhart, 1997) as did Queen’s University’s Principal Leggett (Gombu, 2001). The partial deregulation of university tuition fees permitted up to a potential 10 percent increase, with the option of charging an additional 10 percent to help offset government spending reductions, and a requirement of post-secondary institutions to set aside 10 percent of any new tuition fee revenue for need-based student financial aid. College tuition was increased 15 percent, and tuition fees for international students became entirely deregulated. In response to these policy changes, universities and colleges began to compete and market differences (Lewington, 1995, October 9).

The universities’ continued lobby made major gains in obtaining further tuition policy changes in the following few years. Special government approval was given for several high profile significant tuition fee increases in professional programs in 1996; in response to continuing pressures for deregulation from institutions, an advisory panel was established to recommend the most appropriate sharing of costs among students, the private sector, and the government, and ways in which this might best be achieved. The commission was to look into three key issues: who should pay what among students, the
government and business; how duplication among colleges and universities can be eliminated; and whether to allow private universities or colleges to complete. Its report, *Our Themes: Excellence, Accessibility, Responsibility* was delivered in December 1996 and recommended significant change, including changes in approach to funding as well as tuition fee policy, with increased responsibility for setting fees shifted more to the universities and colleges; greater institutional flexibility to determine fees at the program level; and conditions within which this flexibility would be permitted (Smith et al, 1996). The resultant report was seen to give universities much of what they had lobbied for; President Prichard of the University of Toronto described the report as “the best document in 25 years on universities and colleges” (Lewington, 1996, December 17, p. A1).

Once tuition fees had been partially deregulated, COU president Bonnie Patterson articulated COU’s position on institutional autonomy in a letter to the editor of the *Toronto Star*, in which she stated that “the Council of Ontario Universities has asked for and supported giving individual boards of governors the responsibility and accountability for setting tuition fees” (Patterson, 1998, May 14, p. 1). In May 1998, the new tuition policy was established; policy adjustments provided a new cost recovery fee, which gave institutions the opportunity to disconnect specific programs from the funding formula process, and as a result have institutional autonomy in setting tuition fee levels. This policy allowed universities to set tuition in graduate and professional programs (medicine, law, business, dentistry, optometry, pharmacy, veterinary medicine, and all graduate programs), while colleges could set fees in post diploma and high demand specialist programs, if meeting other accountability requirements. The universities with professional schools were seen to benefit from this policy change the most (Lewington, 1998, May 14). Not unexpectedly, these changes were not universally welcomed; opposition from student and faculty groups in particular voiced concern over the “shift from a publicly funded system toward a more privately funded one. Government is easing its way out of its obligation for post-secondary education” (“Stealthy fee changes”, 1998, p. 1).

By March 1999, the COU was linking financial and funding concerns to three key areas, described in their report entitled *Ontario’s Students, Ontario’s Future*: predicted university enrolment increases of 25 to 40% by the end of the next decade, the need for 11,000 and 13,000 new faculty hires to meet increased enrolment demand, offset faculty
retirements, lower student/faculty ratio, and infrastructural problems arising from deferred maintenance and need for renewal of teaching facilities, instructional equipment, and research laboratories. Subsequent briefs from the COU to the legislature’s pre-budget consultations focused on these concerns, framing them in terms of international and national competitiveness, and the need to have adequate funding to ensure access to postsecondary education. Ken Snowdon, vice-president of policy and analysis of the COU, in support of cost-recovery programs, repeated the organization’s position in 2001, stating “deregulation is something universities support. Institutions want to set tuition fees” (Chung, 2001, p.A02).

As a consequence of the incremental decisions of the Ministry and various tuition policy changes, university and college tuition fees increased significantly. The institutional impacts of the funding formula varied, depending on the enrolment context, but as a whole by 2003 these impacts had created increased pressure on government to fix the overall post-secondary financial model and student financial aid system, tuition policy being one aspect of the whole.

6.4. Narrative of the policy change event

As early as 1998, the Ontario Liberal party was reported to be preparing for the 1999 provincial election and was leading in public-opinion polls. A senior party strategist told the Globe and Mail that the “new agenda for Ontarians is health care and education”; the Liberals saw themselves winning the next election “if they can make it a fight about health care, education and Premier Mike Harris” (Rusk, 1998, May 11, p. A5). However, they lost in their attempt to form government in the 1999 election, and as a result, began actively meeting with stakeholders to formulate policy and prepare the next campaign. Under Mr. McGuinty’s centralized leadership, the party worked to carefully build a network of stakeholder groups across many sectors, and brokered a coalition of those disenfranchised by the Conservative government. Dalton McGuinty was sensitive to the views of the CFS-O and OUSA, echoed by the OCUFA as well, who were critical of tuition increases and promoted increased public investment. The leader’s and the party’s traditional values emphasized that “government has a public-good and a common-good interest to serve” (Cabinet Minister B). The final policy platform was designed to signal
centre-left orientation of the party’s political commitments to tackle social programming broadly.

On January 30, 2003, the Liberal party released its election platform on post-secondary education, which included a commitment to re-regulating all tuition fees and fully funding an immediate freeze. There was an additional commitment to conduct a review the post-secondary system in which the Liberals further signalled a consultative tone to policy stakeholders. The response to the policy commitment was positive. It was immediately validated by the CFS-O, who had committed to ensuring that accessibility to post-secondary education was a campaign issue. From the institutions’ perspectives, the commitment by the Liberals to freeze tuition was not seen as a full policy commitment, but rather a temporary pause until formal policy-making could be undertaken, which was presumed to be some form of exit strategy from the tuition freeze commitment. Given that perspective, institutions were receptive to the policy commitment and redirected their efforts to the larger policy agenda, including matters of policy implementation and the calculation of financial offsets in particular. More important, the universities felt that tuition policy was receiving disproportionate public attention to the real issues, which they wanted to ensure were addressed: student financial aid, the funding model, and longer-term funding reliability and predictability of the funding environment to create higher certainty for university planning.

Heading into the election, the public mood appeared favourable to change in government. The Conservative government was weakened by both internal party issues and diminished popularity with the public. The party suffered from an “uninspiring” leadership race (“McGuinty’s opening”, 2002, p. A12), and significant internal party conflict (Urquhart, 2002). Public opinion was increasingly critical of the Conservative government, including a perceived war on education and widespread labour relations conflicts with public sector unions, and several high-profile incidents had undermined public confidence in the government (Urquhart, 2002). In contrast, public opinion was quite favourable for the Liberal party. The Toronto Star reported that the Liberal party had put together a platform that was “solid, substantive, and affordable” and that Dalton MacGuinty was “presenting himself as a well-prepared alternative” (Goar, 2003, February 10, p. A18).
Tuition policy was raised as a political issue during the election. Public opinion polls showed that the public felt tuition fees had been too high, and deregulation had gone on long enough; the public mood was that cuts in the public sector had hurt the quality of life in Ontario, and services needed to be restored. On tuition policy, amongst members of the policy community as well as with the general public, there was a sense that some institutions had been overly aggressive and opportunistic under tuition fee deregulation and taken tuition increases too far, and well beyond the support of public opinion, and therefore were provoking a need for a political and regulatory response: “we must freeze tuition fees and offer more financial aid for students” ("Tuition freeze needed", 2003, April 18, p. A26). In an op-ed titled “The politics of tuition,” Principal Leggett of Queen’s University called upon the political parties to clarify their platforms:

Parties must come clean on how much freezes or rollbacks will really cost the university system...Until our political parties clearly spell out a full and meaningful platform for guaranteeing that the quality of the post-secondary education provided in Ontario is consistent with that provided in other provinces and in leading universities elsewhere in the world, the current campaign flourishes with regard to tuition policy must be judged for what they are - mere politics. (Leggett, 2003, September 29, p. A21).

The Liberals made campaign commitments for action during the first 90 days in office, including addressing auto insurance premiums, compensation for victims of a tainted-water disaster, and addressing class sizes in primary education. The Liberal leader waivered briefly on platform commitment to the tuition freeze, given increased concern about the province’s projected deficit, anticipated to reach a $2-billion mark, however that promise was reaffirmed quickly under questioning (Galloway, 2003).

The election held on October 2, 2003 returned a significant victory for the Liberals, winning 72 of the 103 seats. They had been successful in building a broad-based coalition of support amongst a diverse set of voters, having “pried away from the NDP a lot of the unions... teachers’ unions, auto workers, all to the Liberals, along with their traditional base of Toronto, the ethnic Canadian vote, Catholic vote, Franco-Ontarians” (Senior civil servant J). The Globe and Mail outlined Premier-designate McGuinty’s timetable for government transition on October 3, 2003; announcing plans to freeze university and college tuition was fifth on a list of 30 (“The liberal timetable”, 2003). The freeze was again
signalled in the Throne Speech of November 20, 2003. The Toronto Star reported that the institutions’ compensation for the tuition freeze was to be announced by February 29, but a “tangled cabinet debate delayed the decision” and “at one point, the Liberal government contemplated back-tracking on its promise”, but Premier McGuinty reportedly personally rejected that proposal and the compensation plan proceeded (Brown & Benzie, 2004, April 8, p. A07). In April 2004, the Ontario government announced a two-year freeze on university and college tuition, effective immediately, on both undergraduate and deregulated professional programs. Minister Chambers provided funding to institutions to compensate for revenue lost in the first year of the freeze (Campbell & Alphonso, 2004).

Following the policy decision to freeze tuition, and responding to the significant need for policymaking in the larger post-secondary policy context, on June 8, 2004 the government announced the promised comprehensive review of the design and funding of Ontario’s postsecondary education system, to be led by former NDP Premier Bob Rae and supported by a seven-member panel. The overall objective of the Review was to provide realistic, evidence-based recommendations to be implemented with the Ontario Budget 2005. In particular, government was looking for strategies to improve higher education by providing recommendations on system design, funding models, the appropriate sharing of the costs of postsecondary education among the government, students and the private sector, and the related questions of an effective student assistance program that promotes increased access to postsecondary education. Following the completion of the commission, the government subsequently introduced a new five-year tuition policy framework.

6.5. Ontario case analysis

The analytical framework has five key dimensions and operationalized sub-questions for both within-case and cross-case comparative case analysis. These key dimensions are indicated in the two conceptual frameworks as important factors in understanding major policy change, and are: (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, (e) the effects of external influences. The
following section presents the analysis of each of these factors in the case of policy change in Ontario.

6.5.1. Program goals and their clarity

What were the expressed goals of the policy?

The Liberal party leadership’s goal of the tuition freeze specifically was intended to obtain some space and time for the whole post-secondary portfolio to be reviewed. The tuition freeze policy was regarded as a “pause” rather than a policy commitment in order to support a longer, deeper discussion about the higher education system; “we need a pause. This is politically popular, and we’re not promising forever.” (Senior civil servant H). In this light, many in the policy community regarded the tuition freeze as a non-decision, a politically popular but temporary strategy for buying time so that actual policymaking could be undertaken; “there was a genuine desire to pause the system and rethink it in view of the impact of deregulation”. (Student leader F) In this light, the freeze was explicitly tied to a review of the higher education system, “it was a freeze for the purposes of having a longer, deeper discussion about the higher education system in Ontario before any future decisions are made on what’s going to happen with fees” (Student leader G). From the perspective of the civil service, the commitments were reasonable and generally supported, particularly as it gave policymakers “a chance to sort of catch up with where policy decisions have taken us” (Student leader G).

Was there consensus on the goals?

Within the Liberal party there was a relatively high degree of consensus on the goal to pause policy-making on post-secondary education. Within the broader policy community, both student and faculty interests were aligned in supporting the tuition freeze policy in both the short and long term. Some individual institutions had reservations about the tuition freeze, however they were willing to support the temporary policy given certain conditions; the agreement of institutional leadership was secured by the commitment to fully fund the cost of the tuition freeze and to limit the freeze to a few years, in addition to the important promise to undertake a comprehensive policy review to address the significant concerns of the universities. There are some reports from the student
movement that the limited time commitment of the tuition freeze was unwelcome, or unclear; however the majority of research participants interviewed clearly understood that the freeze was a short-term commitment, a “temporary gesture” (Cabinet Minister B).

**How was the problem defined? What indicators were used to identify and describe the policy problem(s)?**

The problem in this policy episode was defined as a need for comprehensive post-secondary policy review and reform, which needed appropriate time and resources to be undertaken; the tuition freeze was a temporary strategy to secure the means for that policymaking. There were clear indications that there were problems with the post-secondary system: student debt was increasing to unacceptable levels, there was policy and planning incoherence within the system and the university sector in particular, the civil service and the public were concerned that tuition prices were becoming unacceptably high, and public mood was increasingly critical of privatization and the erosion of public services. Indicators used to identify and describe the policy problem included the comparisons of tuition fee levels for undergraduate and graduate programs, including professional programs, to illustrate Ontario’s relative position.

**What alternatives were considered?**

There were no specific alternatives considered by the Liberal party at the time the party made its electoral platform commitment; the tuition freeze was a well-understood, simple message for the campaign, and a progressive policy commitment with an expiry date. The goal of winning the election directly influenced the proposed policy solution, given that the terms of political support of many of the progressive organized interests was for the tuition freeze as a specific policy commitment. From the perspective of some of the Liberal’s coalition partners, and the CFS-O in particular, the tuition freeze was a viable ongoing policy commitment, beyond the platform. However, most of the actors in the policy community outside the CFS-O agreed that a tuition freeze was not a likely, or even positive, permanent commitment; many felt that a tuition freeze was “good politics, bad public policy”.

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6.5.2. Politics of policy formation

Did policy actors have explicit goals toward which their activities were aligned? What influenced the policy actors’ policy preference? To what extent were policy actors representing political party platforms?

The Liberal party leadership had two goals of the tuition freeze commitment, specific to electoral considerations: first, to create an attractive and progressive electoral platform and second, to build a supportive coalition of interests. These goals were informed by a sincere commitment to accessible and affordable post-secondary education. This combination of “philosophical commitment and political reality (Senior college administrator J) was expected to have political appeal:

The decision around tuition was a political get-elected decision, but that doesn’t mean there wasn’t pressure from students and pressure from the system ... it was a dramatic statement, and [the leader of the Liberal party] needed dramatic statements. (Senior college administrator F)

From one Cabinet minister’s perspective, “a powerful policy on post-secondary education tuition helps us with our core voter, middle class families, middle class women” (Cabinet Minister C). The Liberals were determined to differentiate themselves from the Conservative government, whose post-secondary policies were falling into disfavour with the public. The creation of a winning electoral platform was informed by considerations including several individual riding vulnerabilities, the need to gather momentum away from the NDP with competitive social policy positions, and a desire to attract the youth vote and youth party membership. Although electoral politics was a major factor in the choice of the tuition freeze as a platform policy, the tuition freeze itself was an important but minor component within a larger overall platform; policymakers were somewhat skeptical of a strong link between post-secondary policy and electability, but wanted to accomplish something politically progressive and positive for the post-secondary system.

Further to specific retail politics, it was also important to the party to build relationships with the institutions and interest groups and in particular to bring vocal student groups onside. From a Cabinet Ministers’ perspective:

It really was part of the art of politics. In implementing the freeze, we made it very clear to the sector that we were their friends. We were
going to look at what needed to be done to strengthen the sector. We were not going to continue the legacy of the Harris-Eves cutbacks, so we did it on the basis of hope. (Cabinet Minister C)

For the institutions, their goal was to address the larger and more complex policy questions in the system, and the tuition freeze was accommodated in order to achieve that goal. For student stakeholder groups, including OUSA and the CFS-O, their goals were accessibility and affordability, and the tuition freeze was regarded as a vital commitment in support of those goals.

The COU’s primary policy interest in tuition policy was a remedy for institutional funding problems and to address problems with the financial aid system. The universities’ long history of activism on tuition fees prior to and after 1998 (Boggs, 2009) included providing policy advice to the Ministry, in addition to serving member interests (Jones, 1991b; Skolnik & Jones, 1992); Royce (1998) described the COU as “a surrogate advisory body to the Ministry” (p. 376) which engaged in “shuttle diplomacy” with senior government officials (p.410). The COU was regarded as an influential force in post-secondary policy-making and planning; given the lack of an intermediary body between policymakers and institutions, the COU provided a vehicle for government to work on policy issues with the universities. A feature of the COU found in this study is that it had difficulty maintaining solidarity or discipline within its membership on common policy positions on tuition fees; the Council was not in a position to bargain for all institutions. Independent of the official position and advocacy of the COU, individual and groups of institutions undertook lobbying activities through their own channels, based on their differentiated needs; several university presidents were reportedly in favour of a tuition freeze, given concerns about access. In spite of these contradictions, the COU performed a function for the university coalition by providing a mechanism for policy to be tested, mediated, or negotiated.

Lobbying on the tuition issue was coming strongly from both student groups and OCUFA. Because Mr. McGuinty was sensitive to concerns of students, as a result, organized student interests were seen as “a very powerful special interest group” (Researcher B). By 1997, OUSA publically favoured a tuition freeze, given concerns about tuition levels, and there was no planned improvement for student financial aid (Lewington, 1997, December 16). Quality, access, and affordability were concerns of OUSA leading
up to the 2003 election, and OUSA was supplying policy analysis research to support their agenda. With their goal of zero tuition, and an interim goal of a tuition freeze, the CFS-O started working with the Liberal party from September to December 2002 to help “shape the platform”, meeting with individual members of Parliament and in doing so, generated pressure on the party leadership from below (Student leader E). The CFS-O and OUSA, echoed by the OCUFA as well, were united in their criticisms of tuition policy and promoted increased public investment, including alignment on support for a tuition freeze and a rethinking of student financial assistance in Ontario.

**Which issues were linked by policy actors to tuition policy?**

The predominant issue linkages emerging in this policy episode related to the complex and dysfunctional system of post-secondary finance. One aspect of this finance system was the long, difficult, and changing history of different formula funding arrangements of institutions by the provincial government. Tuition revenue and tuition regulation is but one component of complex policy arrangements governing institutional revenue; institutions and some interest groups represented the tuition policy issue as intractable from resolving those other connected financial frameworks. Incremental policy-making in this area had relieved some financial pressures of institutions over the period prior to the policy change, but created an incoherent set of policy arrangements with unintended outcomes. Even though there had been gains made by institutions in advancing their policy interests, the universities continued to perceive the whole system of funding universities and tuition fee regulation was broken:

> This is the nature of the end run [around funding problems]. So first you stretched the discretion as far as you can stretch it. Then the second thing you do is programs that could succeed without government funding ...that would be end run two. Then you get to end run three, which is this well, everybody’s going to pay this fee but we won’t call it tuition...By the end of the 1990s I guess, the thing just broke. (Researcher B)

Within the civil service, a commonly shared perspective was that the project of deregulation of fees had pushed the system as far as it should go:

> “Spiraling out of control” would be too strong a way to put it, but certainly progressing much faster than anyone was really having the
chance to digest and consider the implications of what was happening. So for my mind, I think the seeds of the 2003-2004 freeze were sown much earlier with the introduction of additional cost recovery programs (Student leader G).

The experiment with tuition fee deregulation had pushed the limits of public tolerance as well as those of student groups and the civil service; “there didn’t seem to be any particular limit on what universities might try to charge for those deregulated fees, and I think what you see happening in 2003 is people thinking this has just gone on too long and gone too far” (Senior civil servant I). The fully funded tuition freeze and commitment to a significant policy review signalled to institutions and other interests that the government was prepared to undertake this needed policy-making.

The other aspect of post-secondary finance linked by policy actors in this episode was that of student financial aid and student debt. Policy actors linked concerns of student debt with tuition fee levels as a way of framing the need for tuition policy regulation or reduction. These frustrations were not just those with high tuition/high aid policy preferences; many progressive policy actors were frustrated by the apparent salience of tuition regulation as a policy instrument compared to the lesser known complexities of student financial aid instruments. Many policy actors expressed frustration that tuition policy receives a disproportionate amount of political attention compared to student financial aid, which is seen to be a more significant are of policy need, with more direct impact on the social equity and capital development goals of post-secondary education; “Tuition freezes, tuition reductions – everybody gets it. Everything else is too technocratic. And I say that as someone who advocates technocratic solutions. I recognize they’re not popular.” (Researcher E) The lack of public attention and knowledge of student financial aid issues was framed as a key policy issue, which had not only failed to gain adequate attention by policymakers, but as a consequence, contributed to unbalanced attention on tuition fees as the primary policy problem and had an unknown and concerning effect on post-secondary participation.
What events or activities contributed to the problem being identified? What were the key events that brought about a merging of the politics, problem and policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window?

Several independently active policy entrepreneurs identified the policy problem in the Ontario case. The CFS-O had a longstanding policy advocacy position for a tuition freeze, and had achieved some success in mobilizing public opinion on the cost of education. The other major student organization, OUSA, had begun to advocate for a tuition freeze as well, adding to a broadening coalition of actors with a shared policy goal, including faculty interests and some institutions. This policy entrepreneurship was both private and public, with significant large-scale mobilizations and media coverage of the issues related to tuition fees. Privately, political strategists within the Liberal party saw the tuition freeze as a useful component of the election strategy. As a result, the Liberal party adopted the tuition freeze as part of their campaign platform, which was ultimately part of a winning policy mix.

Finally, there were key events that brought about the merging of the problem, politics, and policy streams and therefore contributed to the opening of the policy window. Interview respondents were asked to respond to a series of questions on the degree to which they believed that a number of factors played a role in the tuition policy change (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). The following table provides the rank order of factors to which the participants strongly agreed and agreed, as a percent of total question responses. Three of the top five factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to student access and affordability considerations, including student debt. The other two of the top five factors are political in nature: increase in the amount of attention on post-secondary, and proximity to the general election.
Within the context of these factors, in the policy stream there were well-organized and resourced policy entrepreneurs in the two student organizations, CFS-O and OUSA with independent but common policy preferences. In the problem stream, there was increasing public awareness that the cost of post-secondary education was out of step with expectations and other provinces, changing public mood about public services, and failing support for the Conservative government, which was experiencing its own internal political problems. In the politics stream, the Liberals needed to differentiate themselves from the previous government, broker a coalition for electoral support, and needed a simple progressive policy that would resonate with the electorate and be consistent with their overall approach. With the election victory as a key event, the Liberals moved to fulfill their platform promise by implementing the tuition freeze.
6.5.3. Stability of policy coalitions over time

Is there evidence of internal or external shocks to the coalitions?

Figure 6.1 summarizes the major changes in ACF factors in the Ontario policy subsystem during the decade prior to the policy change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy Subsystem</th>
</tr>
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| Relatively Stable Parameters | Coalitions: Institutions  
Δ in organization – elimination of buffer agency  
Δ in legislative mandate of colleges |  
Belief system and values, priorities and perceptions  
Δ in university coalition – lack of internal cohesion and policy agreement  
Coalitions: Students  
Belief system and values, priorities and perceptions  
Δ in student movement – aligned on desire for tuition freeze |
| External Events | Constraints and resources of coalitions and actors  
Δ in membership and financial resources – divided  
Δ in coordination between coalitions – increased |  
Conflict, interactions within and between competing coalitions  
Δ in solidarity within student movement – open conflict turned to policy-oriented alliance  
Δ in political party alignment – from NDP to Liberal |

Figure 6.1. Summary of Changes in ACF Factors in Ontario, 1992-2002

In Ontario, the university coalition was relatively weakened by a lack of internal cohesion on policy preferences within the universities. The most significant shock was shifting conflict and then policy agreement between the two major student organizations, and while deeply held values differences continued, there was increasing coordination to achieve the common policy goal of a tuition freeze. The traditional alliance between many progressive organized interests and the NDP gave way to endorsement of the Liberals. External shocks included changes in the basic attributes of the policy area included the elimination of the buffer institution, OCUA and legislative and mandate changes to the colleges and institutes, as well as changes in public mood, and eventually the governing coalition.
The major significant shock within a dominant coalition in the period prior to this particular policy episode was the schism in the student movement. OUSA was officially formed in November 1992 by a “breakaway group of students” (Duffy, 1994, p A1), who were “disgruntled” that the Federation “had lost touch with students’ real concerns and was not pragmatic enough in its approach” (Nasrulla, 1994, November 1, p.A5). One CFS supporter described the conflict as a provincial “fratricidal competition for legitimacy, security and power,” with the “battle lines” drawn around the issue of tuition fees (Ziedenberg, 1993, p. A15). The split occurred in part because student organizations from the University of Toronto, Queen’s University, Wilfred Laurier University, University of Western Ontario, University of Waterloo and Brock University wished to pursue conversations on tuition fee policy that were at odds with the CFS student leadership at the time, and in part due to very different perspectives on political tactics. The OUSA members wished to propose policy and get policy on government agendas by through lobbying and negotiation. The CFS representatives thought OUSA “conservative” in nature, and felt that the split was part of a “larger backlash against social activism on campus” (Duffy, 1994, January 10, p. A1):

The battle is over two contradictory conceptions of student culture. The schools that formed the Alliance were never comfortable with attempts by the OFS to build a broad-based solidarity with new social movements. They rejected any efforts to link the student agenda to the anti-racist struggle, the empowerment of aboriginal peoples, women and homosexuals, and the environmental movement. These schools rejected the traditional image of the “movement culture” associated with students around the world. To the OFS, such struggles are synonymous with the student movement. (Ziedenberg, 1993, p. A15)

From the OUSA perspective, the CFS-O was misdirecting their advocacy efforts:

Ontario universities have suffered one crippling financial blow after another from the very governments that hold them up as the key to future prosperity. They are becoming second-rate schools with overcrowded classrooms, dilapidated equipment and outrageous student-faculty ratios. ...Yet the OFS has spent much of its time debating abortion, U.S. involvement in Nicaragua and Canada’s role in the Persian Gulf. When it does talk about education, it clings to the same stale doctrine: that students should contribute nothing, not one cent, toward the cost of education. This position has won little sympathy, and the OFS has had virtually no influence. University funding has decreased,
tuition has risen, and student aid has remained desperately inadequate. The OFS has yet to produce a credible response...[Students] find OFS positions unrealistic. (Martin, 1993, p. A19)

On the whole, deeply held values differences drove the division in the student movement, which resulted in a new significant policy actor (OUSA) in contributing technical information and policy options into the policy community, new competition for membership and political attention, and a new factor in brokerage politics. From the perspective of the national CFS’s interests

It absolutely undermines us when there’s a second voice out there saying different things. Yeah, like the government’s best friend is the division in the student movement, without a question. Regardless [of which party is in government]. OUSA was formed during an NDP government, right?... Unity is strength [for students] and disunity is weakness, no question. [NTSO001]

There were many other changes within the policy subsystem during the period prior to the policy change. The elimination of the buffer institution, OCUA, in 1996 was a major change to the basic attributes of the policy area, and the change contributed to the increased policy and political influence of the COU. The lack of internal cohesion and diverse policy preferences within the COU were consistent, as was the core value of university autonomy. The other coalition of institutions, ACCATO, also had had a significant legislative change as well as mandate changes within its membership. There were reported changes to the organization and government relations approaches of the organization. Within the broader policy subsystem, the changes in the civil service and subsequent successful management of the double cohort policy exercise contributed both negatively and positively to policy learning within the government.

**Policy learning in the civil service**

At the time of the policy change, the civil service had successfully completed a significant and complex exercise of coordinating the expansion of the post-secondary system to accommodate the Ontario double cohort. Prior to that exercise, the Ministry had tended to have a low profile within the Ontario civil service; Lang et al (2000) found that Ontario was characterized by limited capacity or organizational responsibility for policy
development on the part of the Ministry, lacking a systematic approach to higher education policy. The double cohort changed this dynamic:

This project had absorbed much of the attention of the Ministry for several years:

We had to create a record number of post-secondary spaces... primarily at the university level... So we need them to expand. It was a pretty big expansion. It was like 25% expansion in capacity... hundreds of millions of dollars of new operating, and billions of dollars of new capital. And basically it allowed, in my estimation, that five or six year period lead up basically modernized the campuses of Ontario universities. And then we've had a pretty steady enrolment growth since then. (Senior civil servant J)

The double cohort planning exercise not only had longer-term impacts on building policy-analytic capacity within government, but also on post-secondary participation rates, and on bringing post-secondary policy to the forefront of public awareness. The double cohort expansion efforts gave post-secondary policy-making some serious attention and focus; it required collaboration, planning, and coordinating between major system players:

Within our ministry, it was the single biggest policy issue that we were dealing with at the time and leading up to 2003. ... And it certainly brought attention to higher education as being an area of public priority, so I think it heightened interest in what we were doing and the issues around higher education. (Student leader G)

**Political learning in the Liberal party**

There are several key areas in which there is evidence of policy learning by the Liberals. First, there were a number of accounts that the Liberal leader was enthusiastic about incorporating lessons drawn from both the British New Labour government, and the Clinton administration, to the extent of organizing formal information sharing arrangements. Second, the Liberal party’s preparation for the general election included the transfer of political staff from the federal Liberals and from Peterson’s Liberal provincial government, to learn from previous experience in brokerage politics; according to one observer, the former Ontario Premier David Peterson’s government “failed to maintain and nurture their relationships with the stakeholder groups. They took a lot of people for
granted and they paid for it big time” (Researcher C). Having learned lessons from their previous attempts to form government, the Liberals turned to the specific election platform, seeking sufficient political appeal to public opinion and distinction from the policies of the previous government to provide momentum to form a majority government. Third, there was provincial experience in brokering coalitions within Ontario post-secondary policy community, particularly under Bob Rae with the response to the federal proposed changes in the 1990s.

Finally, the Liberals were attuned to the recent history of political protest in Ontario, which included several key events of mass mobilization and demonstrations of coordinated organized interests, in response to government policy, such as Access 2000. Access 2000 was a major campaign by the Canadian Federation of Students, which was a nationally coordinated but provincially focused day of action; in Ontario, the Access 2000 campaign culminated in a mass rally in Toronto to put pressure on the federal government to designate improved funding for post-secondary education. These mobilizations and the unpredictable influence strategies employed by student groups in particular, presented potential political problems; bringing these particular organized interests into a political coalition served to mitigate that risk.

At the time of the policy change, there were a variety of provincial tuition policies in place in Canada: two provinces has unrestricted tuition policies (British Columbia and New Brunswick); four had tuition freezes (Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland, which had also reduced fees); and Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia had regulated restrictions on tuition fee increases.

**Negotiated agreements**

The commitment to a tuition freeze was a function of stakeholder relations, public concern, and brokerage politics. The Liberal party was actively meeting with stakeholders to consolidate relations and prepare the general election; given that the student and faculty organizations were united in calls for a tuition freeze, the party chose to negotiate with the institutions conditions which would make that policy choice acceptable. Organized interests in term provided political support in exchange for policy commitments from the party. This political support included public policy and party validation, support for voter
mobilization, and volunteers. It also ensured that there would not be negative attention during the campaign, particularly from the CFS-O.

There were two commitments made by the Liberals that facilitated the policy community’s acceptance of the tuition freeze. First, the party committed to fully fund the cost of the freeze by providing institutions with the tuition offset, a significant financial commitment. Second, there was a commitment to undertake a larger review and planning exercise. These were intended to neutralize university opposition and facilitate cooperation with the major institutions and their interests. As a result, the temporary and funded tuition freeze, with a promise of a comprehensive review, was welcomed as it provided breathing space for the institutions to have a predictable, reliable environment for financial and enrolment planning for two years. Not all institutions had the same policy goals; some were in favour of tuition price controls, and others were on a mission to substantially increase fees. Overall, the commitments met the short-term needs of most:

We didn’t get too excited about a tuition freeze, it was going [to be] offset. We were told it was temporary. What we wanted to hear was there was going to be a commission and this was finally going to get sorted out. …We may not like the way the offset works, and that may benefit some universities more than some other universities, but if it’s temporary and if one of the reasons we’re doing it is to get some breathing space so we can bring in this commission and finally face the problem, good. (Researcher B)

Funding the tuition offsets had the intended effect of facilitating system acceptance of the tuition freeze, and “the universities more or less were happy to acquiesce in that policy” (Senior civil servant I).

Was there evidence of information sharing between coalitions?

Information sharing was found within coalitions, and between provincial branches of national coalitions, such as the CFS-O, OCUFA, and to a lesser extent, institutions. There were formal negotiated agreements between policy actors could be said to be between those actors (CFS-O, OUSA) who validated the Liberal platform commitment as well as the final policy enactment, and the Liberal government and institutions, with the interim commitment to fund the cost of the tuition freeze, and longer term commitment to conduct a major policy exercise.
In terms of the alliances between coalitions in Ontario, during the period leading up to the policy change, there was some increasing coordination between OCUFA, CFS-O and OUSA, along with other public education interests, to achieve common goals in response to the policies of the Conservative government. The CFS-O and OUSA coordination was not always successful given their history and diverging values, however in the period leading up to the policy change, their policy goals were shared. The traditional alliance between the CFS-O and the NDP gave way to the student organization's endorsement of the Liberals based on their tuition policy commitment, and in light of the realistic opportunity to defeat the Conservatives. These two changes contributed to conditions within which the Liberal party's brokerage politics could be successful. The universities and the colleges did not have any substantive change in coordination activity.

The various stakeholders in the policy community had a rare occasion to be relatively aligned in their policy positions, at least for the short term. The *Toronto Star* reported that

> the first tuition freeze in Ontario history has sparked an odd honeymoon between Queen’s Park and the province’s colleges and universities, after a decade of turmoil. The very student unions that for years have slammed Ontario’s shrinking post-secondary grants yesterday traded protest signs for pro-government cheers over the two-year freeze unveiled by Mary Anne Chambers, Minister of training, colleges and universities (Brown, 2004, April 9, A.17)

The announcement also confirmed the future plans of the government; Minister Chambers was quoted as stating

> We know this freeze is primarily a symbolic move, long overdue after more than a decade of huge funding cuts, so now we want to consult with students, parents, industry, colleges and universities about developing a long-term plan to ensure we have an accessible, affordable, accountable system. By helping students succeed today, we ensure Ontario will succeed in the future. (Brown, 2004, April 9, A.17)

The policy actors and their relative positions to each other and policy alternatives can be seen in the policy map. Those policy actors which favour increasing action of government and progressive social policy, the CFS-O most strongly, and to a lesser degree, OCUFA and OUSA, manage an unstable policy coalition, based on policy
considerations or instrumental goals. Many formal actors in the subsystem are not active on tuition policy as an issue, including other employee groups. The institution coalitions and OUSA have less stable policy preferences than does CFS-O, as well as more centrist preferences; the CFS-O is the only major actor which consistently considers the tuition freeze as a core value as well as a policy goal. OCUFA shares many broad values with the CFS-O, but also has more internal policy positions on tuition within their membership coalition. The coalitions of faculty did not experience major internal shocks.

External to the coalitions, there were changing economic conditions, a change in the public mood and subsequent change in government, and changes in the civil service.

6.5.4. Influence of elected and non-elected policy actors

Did elected officials dominate the policy process? How?

The influential elected actors in this policy episode were Premier McGuinty and Minister Sorbara, key leaders in the platform development leader of the Liberal party with key caucus members from the 37th parliament, and then subsequent to the general election, the cabinet ministers from the 38th parliament. The decision to commit to a tuition freeze as part of the electoral platform was “a Premier’s office decision” (Senior college administrator G) along with the “the brain trust of the political advisors” (University organization B). The actors within the Liberal party setting the agenda on post-secondary policy at that time came “from the centre”;

[The role of] the Premier’s office was very significant. From a political staffer perspective, there were some very remarkably intelligent, highly skilled individuals there. I think from a leadership perspective, it would be Greg Sorbara as well as Premier McGuinty, that had a significant influence, again, on making a priority. And then in terms of providing leadership and ongoing management of the file, that Minister Mary Anne Chambers and also managing stakeholders. She stewarded that process until the point when the review took over. (Student leader H)

To what extent did non-elected policy actors influence the policy process? What strategies were used?

The major non-elected influencers from interest groups in this policy episode were leaders from the student movement, both the CFS-O and OUSA. OUSA’s strategies to
influence the policy process involved individual lobbying, building networks, and supply of policy-relevant research. The CFS-O preferred political action strategies involving large-scale student mobilization and action in the media to influence public opinion and create pressure for decision-makers. The rationale for these strategies was, according to one respondent: “the only way that we had influence in any meeting of any government was when we could prove that we held the hearts and minds of the public...we don’t do days of action as a ceremony” (Student leader E). The organization “uses traditional weapons, such as national rallies, to lobby for zero tuition and student-debt relief” (Lewington, 1996, July 25, p. A8). These strategies are valued as key aspects of the organization’s purpose:

The protests, postcard campaigns and rallies will keep the issue on the minds of Canadians and politicians, said University of Ottawa student Farhan Rahman. “Whether or not we accomplish anything today is immaterial,” said the economics student. “Just the fact that we’re here, to show people that the student body is militant, I think is an accomplishment in itself.” (Ayed, 1998, p. A2)

The CFS-O strategy for the 2002 election involved lobbying the opposition parties early to influence party election platforms, getting parties to commit to their post-secondary policy positions on the record, and to closer monitor and reflect public opinion:

we were perfectly situating our issue to be a wedge issue, to be an issue that the Liberals could roll in on and use to distinguish themselves from the Tories. And so it really spoke to our inter-election campaigning....I think we demonstrated that people were upset about it. And it was a way of hammering at the Tories, and really... I mean, he tried to brand himself in that election as the education Premier. So we had helped to bring the stars into alignment on our issue, to properly position it. And it worked, because people were upset. (Student leader E)

Critical to this policy change was the alignment of policy goals between both student groups in spite of these differences.

**What was the effect of the political structure in each province?**

Changes in the political structure played a key role in this policy change, specifically, the development of a winning policy platform for the general election, and then subsequent change in government. The general nature of cabinet government is evident in this episode, given the leadership from the leader. The political culture of Ontario also
played a role. The political instability, changes in public mood and class conflict, and the
subsequent political party repositioning which had been occurring since the early 1990s
informed the Liberal party’s electoral strategy. As a result, the party undertook a deliberate
coalition-building strategy to include broad interests of the centre-left. Also informing the
early party platform development were important provincial values as described by one
member of the team:

There is a political culture in Ontario that goes back quite a ways, that
puts a premium on public education, including our community of public
universities and colleges. ...Our system is a system of public institutions,
and as a result of that, there is a sense of ownership of post-secondary
education which includes political responsibility for tuitions. It’s just part
of the mix. I mean, if you’re the team that makes rules on post-
secondary education, part of the rules that you have deal with from time
to time is tuition policy. And it can fluctuate and vary, but the
parameters for the fluctuation are not huge and great. (Cabinet Minister
C)

To what extent did policy actors utilize technical information? Expert
validators? Was information on other jurisdictions/provincial tuition
policies shared or used?

Technical information was used by organized interests, the civil service, and within
the Liberal party to frame the policy problems in the general policy area. Decision-makers
were attentive to Statistics Canada, Canadian Millennium Foundation, COU, and OUSA
research in particular. There were no expert validators used in decision to freeze tuition.
There are institutional actors who are known to be good with policy, and in particular,
analyzing the consequences of different policy alternatives to institutions and to post-
secondary system performance. These resources are accessed on an informal basis to
inform policy analysis by government in particular. However, technical information played
less of a role in the decision to freeze tuition, than it did in the aftermath of policy
implementation, and calculating the tuition offsets in particular.

Further, there were reportedly organized influences from New Labour policies from
Britain, and from Clinton’s administration. During the 2003 campaign platform
development, the Liberal leader was reported to be “getting a lot of advice from the
Democrats in the US, [and] especially the Blair government...[who were] very influential,
have been very influential in some of the policy directions of the Liberal Party” (Faculty
association leader C). This influence has also been suggested elsewhere in the Ontario government, in the Ministry of Education, by former Deputy Minister Benjamin Levin in his book on educational reform (Levin, 2008).

6.5.5. Effects of external influences

Did other post-secondary issues affect policy deliberations?

Organized interests, in addition to the student and faculty lobby, began to surface in the public with their concerns on the impacts of high tuition fees. For example, the Ontario Medical Association called for a tuition freeze at the province’s medical schools, given concerns about accessibility to medical education by lower income students as well as concerns about implications for a doctor shortage; Dr. John Gillis, president of the Professional Association of Interns and Residents of Ontario said “high tuition fees and the cost of living away from home will deter some students from those communities from choosing medicine” (Yelaja, 2001, p.F03). The Medical Association’s call was supported in an editorial in the Toronto Star:

Soaring tuition is making medical schools - and medicine - a preserve of those who are wealthy or able to take on an average debt of $100,000. But the implications go deeper than destruction of the equal access to education that once was Ontario’s hallmark. This is effectively an offloading of the province’s education debt onto the middle class. Families with deep pockets can finance the costs with little debt. Lower income families can’t get in the door…. But there is a longer-term impact on communities as well. Some 109 communities are short 1,000 doctors. (“Barrier to entry”, 2001, p. A14)

Did policy decisions from other arenas affect policy deliberations?

The Ontario progressive alignment of interests on tuition policy in this policy episode had its roots in a federal policy contest from the mid 1990s. It was in the context of privatization and the enrolment squeeze in Ontario that post-secondary policy discussions began at the federal level, with a controversial discussion paper from federal Human Resources Minister Lloyd Axworthy on rethinking the funding of post-secondary education and student financial aid alternatives, including a possible income contingent loan program. Students were reportedly split on the response to the federal paper
(Nasrulla, 1994, November 1, p. A5) as there were distinct differences in policy goals between the major student groups.

As a result of the political upheaval in the federal arena, described in detail in Axelrod et al. (2012), the question of provincial tuition policy change was put on hold. This delay was reported to be “tactically important” to the provincial government, given that it needed the support of universities, colleges, students, and faculty to fight the federal proposals. Proceeding with “changes to the current funding formula that antagonize the universities [would result in the Minister] fighting political battles on two fronts” (Lewington, 1994, December 8, p. A5). The province led an organized effort to fight the proposed federal reforms; Ontario Premier Bob Rae reported that

Ontario is building a coalition of student groups, teachers and administrators dedicated to fighting federal cuts to universities and colleges. We’re working very closely together and we’re trying to bring every pressure we can to bear on what is simply a (federal) mistake... We're trying to build some linkages - a strong sense of common purpose with students, faculty associations, university and college presidents (Papp, 1995, p. A10).

This postponement of provincial tuition policy by the Ontario government was publically endorsed by OUSA and COU; the head of COU said “there could have been a significant political uproar if [the Ontario Council on University Affairs] had recommended changes in the funding formula that the universities had counselled against” (Lewington, 1994, December 8, p. A5).

**Did the fiscal climate or budgeting affect policy deliberations?**

The election platform on post-secondary education was influenced by a positive economic climate that provided the fiscal environment in which to be able to invest additional resources into public post-secondary education.

**To what extent did public opinion influence policy deliberations?**

Public opinion had a significant effect on policy deliberations, both in terms of electoral strategy and specifically on tuition fees. While electoral concerns of the Liberal party drove the primary decision agenda, however these were responding to signals that
there were important problems within the post-secondary system and changes in public opinion on accessibility and affordability of post-secondary education. There was a change in public confidence in the Conservative government and in particular, a change in public mood toward the need to restore public services; there was a view that “cutbacks had hurt the quality of life in Ontario and we needed to restore our public services” (Senior civil servant K). It was within this general context of public opinion that tuition fee policy in particular was specifically identified as a problem.

As tuition fees increased significantly during the 1990s, the public mood and support for tuition fee increases waned and there was increased media attention on the issue. In February 2000 the *Toronto Star* ran an editorial on the negative impacts of tuition policy, and again in April 2001, citing the “destruction of the equal access to education that once was Ontario’s hallmark. This is effectively an offloading of the province’s education debt onto the middle class” (“Barrier to entry”, 2001, p. A14). In March 2000, the *Globe and Mail* reported that four out of every five Ontarians opposed any increase in tuition fees for college and university students, and strongly supported for putting more government money into postsecondary education; sixty-one percent said government financing for universities, community colleges, and technical schools should be increased (Mackie, 2000). Other media reports speculated that “tuition fees have likely reached their upper limit,” noting that tuition fee levels were already above the government’s own target (Urquhart, 2001, February 19, p. A17).

### 6.5.6. Summary

The antecedent policy history in Ontario set the conditions for policy change. In May 1998, Ontario government established a new tuition policy for the province’s universities and colleges. The policy change introduced complete deregulation of tuition fees for graduate, some undergraduate and professional programs at the universities, as well as for some select college programs with some conditions. This policy followed a lengthy practice of allowing incremental tuition fee increases at institutions, a result of which was the decoupling of some programs from the funding formula model and tuition differentiation among programs and institutions. These shifts, combined with changing enrolments and significant cuts to government grants to institutions, created increasing
pressure on tuition fees at the institutional level, and focused the ongoing funding formula discussion problems toward tuition policy. The institutional impacts of the funding formula varied, depending on the enrolment context, but as a whole by 2003 these impacts had created increased pressure on government to fix the overall post-secondary financial model and student financial aid system, tuition policy being one aspect of the whole. On tuition policy, amongst members of the policy community as well as with the general public, there was a sense that some institutions had been overly aggressive and opportunistic under tuition fee deregulation and taken tuition increases too far, and well beyond the support of public opinion, and therefore were provoking a need for a political and regulatory response. Given the advent of an upcoming general election, tuition policy had the potential to become useful in retail politics, as post-secondary tuition prices are viewed to be highly salient for voters.

When the Ontario Liberal Party released its election platform on post-secondary education, it included a commitment to re-regulating all tuition fees and funding an immediate freeze, validated by important interests. The Liberal policy decision to freeze post-secondary tuition fees was a function of stakeholder relations, public opinion, and brokerage politics. Within the broader policy community, both student and faculty interests were aligned in supporting the tuition freeze policy, a critical component for successful policy change. Political opportunity for the Liberals was the major factor influencing the policy decision, and well-organized and resourced policy entrepreneurs in the two student organizations were successful in moving tuition fee policy onto the decision agenda of the Liberal party, and in setting the terms of debate. The particular implementation strategy to fund the tuition offset and to undertake comprehensive policy review and reform facilitated cooperation of the major institutions and their interests.
Chapter 7.

Manitoba’s Tuition Thaw

7.1. Introduction

In 1999, a newly elected NDP provincial government under Premier Gary Doer announced that post-secondary tuition for all Manitoba universities and colleges would be reduced by 10% and then frozen. Tuition prices had doubled during the 1990s, and the tuition freeze was an important policy commitment that differentiated the NDP from the previous Conservative government during the 1999 campaign.

Having held the tuition freeze in place for a decade, this case describes the decision of that same NDP government to remove the tuition freeze in 2009, officially allowing regulated tuition increases effective for the 2009/10 year. At the time of the policy change in Manitoba there were only a few variants of provincial tuition policies in Canada: three provinces, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, had tuition freezes in place; with the remainder operating with a policy restricting tuition increases.

This chapter will first describe the background context of the case, focusing on the features and structure of the policy subsystem and grounded in a political economy perspective, followed by the chronological account of the policy episode, summarizing the critical events that led to a decision for major policy change. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the case using the analytical framework.

7.2. Description and Structure of the Policy Subsystem

7.2.1. Political economy of Manitoba

Geographically in the middle of Canada, Manitoba also falls in the middle of Canadian provinces on most indicators of wealth and prosperity (Levin, 2005). The economy in Manitoba is mixed, including traditional grain export and other primary sector
activities, transportation, meatpacking, mining, energy, and manufacturing, and in contrast
to the myth of Manitoba’s political economy as primarily a farming province (Hessing,
Howlett, & Summerville, 2006). Its steady and cautious nature in approach to economic
development and economic diversity has shielded Manitoba from the boom and bust
experiences of other western provinces (Thomas & Brown, 2010; Wesley, 2010). The
majority of the population lives in the Winnipeg area, with the remaining dispersed over a
large, rural, and northern area.

The political culture of Manitoba has been described as cautious (Levin, 2005) or
“accommodationist” (Friesen, 2010), arising from settlement patterns in the province. The
original values of agrarian liberalism, urban socialism of working class British immigrants,
and the Toryism of immigrants from Ontario in 1880s (Wiseman, 2006) combined,
resulting in the general political orientation found in the province: a centre-left progressivism also known as Prairie populism. This political culture valued political
pragmatism and compromise, informed by important “populist and collective elements
derived from the province’s early days of settlement when people depended greatly on
their neighbours” (Levin, 2005); citizens expected politicians “not to be so hampered by
their partisan differences or ideology that they become incapable of working together to
solve common problems” (Thomas & Brown, 2010).

Manitoba’s political culture has informed the history of party and electoral politics
in the province. There has been an electoral preference for moderate governments, close
to the political centre (Levin, 2005); the province has “little tradition of political radicalism”,
preferring to follow trends in politics rather than lead them (Levin, 2001, p. 53). As a result,
the political parties in Manitoba are not significantly differentiated in their policy positions
on a number of key areas, including post-secondary education. The New Democratic Party
of Manitoba and the Progressive Conservative Party of Manitoba have alternated forming
governments since the late 1960s, with the Manitoba Liberal Party generally relegated to
third party status.

The NDP were elected to a majority government first in 1999, and again in both
2003 and 2007 under the leadership of Premier Gary Doer, who continued to serve as
Premier until his retirement in October 2009. Premier Doer himself was extremely popular
with the public, with a reportedly strong leadership style. At the time of the policy episode, Minister Greg Selinger was a long serving Minister of Finance and Minister Diane McGifford was Minister of Advanced Education and Literacy, within a government caucus of 36 in the 39th legislature. In opposition, the Progressive Conservative party was led by Hugh McFadyen, with 19 seats, and the Liberal party under Jon Gerrard held two seats.

7.2.2. Policy subsystem overview

Manitoba had a relatively small post-secondary system at the time of the policy episode, including seven public post-secondary institutions. The University of Manitoba was established in 1877, with a federation of several denominational colleges. In 1967, Manitoba expanded the one university system to three major universities: the University of Manitoba, focusing on a broad array of undergraduate, graduate, and professional education; Brandon University in western Manitoba; and the University of Winnipeg, focusing on general undergraduate education, as well as one special purpose French language institution, the Université de Saint-Boniface (Smith, 2011). The legacy of the one university system policy was that the University of Manitoba remained the centre for professional and graduate studies within the province for many years (Gregor, 1995). The province’s original technical training institutes became consolidated as institutions in the community college system in 1969, including Red River College, Assiniboine Community College, and Keewatin Community College, which became the University College of the North in 2004. These institutions were operated directly by the government, until the introduction of the 1993 Colleges Act, which established independent board governance (Gregor, 1995).

The civil service had an important role in the oversight and administration of post-secondary education. The relatively small Ministry of Advanced Education and Literacy was responsible for post-secondary education; Deputy Minister Heather Reichert held the position at the time of the policy change. Within the civil service, the Council on Post-Secondary Education (COPSE) was the crown agency accountable to the Minister with authorities for accountability requirements, program approval, credit transfer and articulation, allocation of funds to the province’s seven public post-secondary institutions, and a range of policy-related authorities, including tuition regulation. COPSE was
established in 1996 by the Roblin Commission, and was an adaptation and extension of a former body, the Universities Grants Commission. On tuition policy, COPSE’s legislated authority established a regulatory role, but this authority is bounded:

[it] is specific to tuition fees, whereas if you look in our legislation for universities and colleges, the boards of governors, or board of regents in the University of Winnipeg’s case, has the authority to set tuition and other fees....That distinction – the Council has authority to regulate tuition fees and the boards have authority to set tuition and other fees – that’s a meaningful distinction (Senior civil servant Q).

Elsewhere within the civil service, located within the Premier’s office, the Policy Management Secretariat was seen to be central and highly influential, and primarily served the Premier’s policy agenda; it was responsible for issues management and longer term overall strategy and was staffed by senior “political staff appointments that support public policy development from the political lens” (Senior civil servant M).

Until the late 1990s, higher education was not a typical or significant political issue in the province (Jones, 1996). However, this political environment changed significantly by that time; “if Manitoba’s post-secondary system between 1967 and 1997 was characterized by stability, the system since 1997 has been characterized by considerable structural change” (Smith, 2011, p. 52). In this period, issues of post-secondary access and affordability emerged as key political issues for the provincial government. By 2009, there were a number of important policy stakeholders attempting to influence post-secondary policy in the province. Table 7.1 below summarizes the resources, views, and influences of the major interest groups at the time of the policy episode.
### Table 7.1. Summary of Interest Groups in Manitoba Policy Episode

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<tr>
<th>Interest group</th>
<th>Resources and views</th>
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<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td>The primary actors were the three presidents of the public universities, and to a lesser extent, the college presidents. Emphasized institutional underfunding, the negative impacts of constraints on tuition fee revenue, and the failure of the tuition freeze as social policy. Options included setting tuition at the national average; use of a HEPI to set annual changes. Institutional autonomy was a key value. Influenced by financial, competitive, and performance pressures from key constituencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba Organization of Faculty Associations (MOFA)</td>
<td>Represented approximately 1,850 academic staff at the four universities, and affiliated with CAUT. Favoured low tuition, and had previously endorsed a tuition freeze, but that position had shifted over time. Tuition fee policy was not a top priority, with more focus on securing appropriate public funding. Influenced by membership views and generally progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Federation of Students – MB (CFS-MB)</td>
<td>Represented 42,000 students in the public post-secondary system, including the university students. Tuition fees were the priority public policy issue for the federation, with a policy goal to maintain the tuition freeze. Influenced by membership views, national coalition policy-making, and core progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba Federation of Labour (MFL)</td>
<td>Chartered by the Canadian Labour Congress in 1956 to represent the interests of CLC affiliated unions in Manitoba, with a combined membership of 95,000 workers in private and public sectors. At the 2008 NDP convention, members of the MFL voted against the continuation of the tuition freeze as constrained institutional funding was affecting members’ working conditions. Influenced by membership views and bargaining conditions, and progressive values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Council of Manitoba (BCM)</td>
<td>Formed in 1998, consisted of 65 CEOs of Manitoba companies. Had a negative view of tuition freeze; preferred shared investment between students and government, and competitive institutions. Concerned about educational quality. Influenced by membership views and economic development concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce (WCC)</td>
<td>Incorporated in 1873, with over 2,000 members in 2008. Goal was to initiate and effect change in government policy and practices to support a growing and thriving business community. Against the tuition freeze and in favour of high tuition/high aid solutions. Concerned about educational quality. Influenced by membership views and economic development concerns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The policy map (May, 2005) in Table 7.2 illustrates these interest group positions at the time of the policy episode against the continuum of alternative tuition fee policy options.
### Table 7.2. Manitoba Interest Group Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Classical Liberal ------Increasing action of government------→ Social Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of tuition</td>
<td>Individual private investment in a private good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access for those willing to pay for it</td>
<td>User fees an income stream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access for those willing to pay</td>
<td>User fees a necessary evil to offset budget shortcomings of government grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price discrimination</td>
<td>Varies by institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varies by program</td>
<td>Varies by student based on characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in setting prices</td>
<td>No direct involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero to minimal direct government funding,</td>
<td>Set tuition price restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with emphasis on tuition and other</td>
<td>Asserts price regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government role in financing institutions</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on consumer influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero to minimal direct government funding,</td>
<td>Mix of government grants and tuition, with focus on control over tuition prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with emphasis on tuition and other non-tax</td>
<td>No or little variance based on universality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>No tuition to ensure universal access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of institutions in tuition-setting</td>
<td>Autonomy to set tuition prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate within government guidelines</td>
<td>Limited by government department criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of government department of PSE</td>
<td>Monitor outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set guidelines for institutions</td>
<td>Set limitations for institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Adapted from May (2005) and Rexe & Nilson (2011). Shaded and non-shaded areas represent the relative coalitions and their preferences.
7.3. Antecedent conditions to the policy change

7.3.1. Antecedent policy conditions

After eleven years of Progressive Conservative government, the NDP were elected in the 1999 general election. At that time, post-secondary participation rates were of particular concern, as was both post-secondary affordability and accessibility, in light of increasing tuition fees (Saunders, 2006). NDP Minister Diane McGifford described the conditions in the period prior to the 1999 election:

I think we all, in this House, know what happened in the ’90s. Tuition doubled. The numbers of students decreased. Young people went to Alberta, or thither and yon. The folks opposite cut university funding for several years in a row, minus two, minus one, zero. Actually, one year they gave a 0.1 percent increase. Then in 1999, they gave a bit of an increase before the budget. They didn’t only cut operating funds to universities, now they like to posture in this grand manner and pretend they’re great friends to universities and colleges, but my belief is they have little respect for postsecondary education (McGifford, 2009).

The NDP’s 1999 election platform included an election commitment to freeze tuition, both as a commitment to make post-secondary education “more accessible and more affordable” (Senior civil servant M) as well as an electoral strategy. In addition to political strategy, there were serious concerns about post-secondary accessibility:

There was a genuine commitment to ensuring that there were opportunities for education, that people were accessing them, that that access was not limited to certain socioeconomic strata and/or population groups, and that others were not excluded and were included (Senior civil servant O).

In other words, in both coalition politics and to the public, freezing tuition was seen to be “one way to send a signal on affordability for students” (Cabinet Minister D). As an electoral strategy, the tuition freeze was seen to be one of the NDP’s main planks in the election campaign (Kuxhaus, 2007), an election that afforded the NDP the opportunity to re-establish their social democratic image (Netherton, 2001). The tuition freeze had the advantage of being well understood by voters; “tuition freeze is a good bullet” (Senior civil servant O). This success in policy communication was important to the campaign; “the
language of a freeze of course is very definitive, clear, as they would say in British Labour; crunchy language. It's very tangible...that's worth quite a bit in retail politics" (Cabinet Minister D). The Winnipeg Free Press described the tuition freeze as a "powerful political gambit" ("No to educare", 2007, p. A12). In political terms, there was a sense that "the government, politically, the NDP, owned the issue of tuition" (Senior civil servant P); the tuition freeze had become "part of the government's brand" (Cabinet Minister D). More important, beyond a cornerstone policy, for many in the NDP the importance of the tuition freeze became a political "article of faith" (Senior civil servant L).

While the original political commitment to the tuition freeze policy remained in place, government accepted some incremental changes to tuition fee levels, changes characterized as "safety valves" (Cabinet Minister D). These incremental changes arose as concessions to institutions, based primarily upon representations from universities with professional schools. In 2003, the Minister of Advanced Education allowed tuition fee increases in the Faculty of Law at the University of Manitoba, and set five conditions under which tuition fees could be permitted to increase: only if higher fees did not limit accessibility to a program, had no adverse impact on Manitoba’s labour market, if the program had a high graduation rate leading to immediate employment at high pay, and if there was an especially high equipment and quality costs. The fifth factor was students’ willingness to pay a higher fee (Martin, 2007, March 9, A.6). As a result of government willingness to entertain exceptions to the tuition freeze, specific requests to increase fees in pharmacy, dentistry and law were approved, and proposals to increase fees in music and education were not, as they failed to meet all the criteria (Martin, 2007, March 9, p. A6).

Ancillary fees and international student tuition fees were not regulated under the tuition freeze, and contested fee increases were implemented in order to meet institutional financial objectives. These adaptations arose as a result of an enormous amount of pressure for policy change from institutions, which were brought to bear on government through elected officials, and in annual budgeting through representations to COPSE. In 2005, government made allowances for a variety of ancillary fees at the universities. In May 2006, the University of Manitoba sought and received approval to increase international student tuition by 80 per cent and implement a new $100 fee for all students.
in order to bridge the gap between revenue and university expenses. In a similar response to financial pressures, the University of Winnipeg approved a $100 fee increase for all students and a 35 per cent tuition increase for new international students, bringing the university into line with the Brandon University and Université de Saint-Boniface, which had also passed fee increases to “skirt” the tuition freeze (Janzen & Santin, 2006). In response to appeals from international students and calls from student leaders to freeze international tuition fees, Minister McGifford “conceded the province has the ability to legislate such a freeze, but did not promise the students she would pursue one” (Janzen, 2006, May 25). The increases in ancilliary fees were seen by student leaders to be a “direct attack” on students and the tuition freeze policy; Garry Sran, president of the University of Manitoba Students Union was “horrified” at the fee increases (Janzen, 2006, May 20).

During the period prior to the policy change, the media actively supported increased tuition deregulation, and university efforts to increase revenue. The changing “media landscape and the public discourse” (Student leader I) included criticisms of the NDP; “one of the main things is that they were getting criticism from the media… a lot of people were pointing to them mismanaging the universities and college system” (Student leader I). Editorials in the Winnipeg Free Press described their concerns of the “practical impact of cut-rate tuitions on the quality of education” which “merely short-changes the value of a Manitoba degree” (“No to educare”, 2007, p. A12):

What possible reason can there be to continue to starve the university of the funds it does not get from the province or students to provide quality education, to improve the ranking of the university and attract the calibre of teachers that better heeled Canadian universities can afford (“Bottoming out”, 2006, p. A.14)

Equally, the editorial staff of the Winnipeg Free Press characterized the student leaders in a negative light, often with an antagonistic tone. One editorial argued that an increasing number of Manitobans think university students were “ingrates”, whose education

is heavily subsidized through the taxes of working people, many of whom do not have the advantage of post-secondary education and will never enjoy the advantage in greater income and increased quality of
life that university graduates will enjoy because other people paid for their degrees. A demonstration from the University of Winnipeg this week offered harsh proof of how self-centred, how self-entitled, some university students now feel [as a result of the seven-year freeze on university tuition fees in Manitoba] ("Cut-rate tuition", 2006, p. A14).

Another criticized the cost of the commitment to the freeze policy as a universal entitlement:

It seems an article of faith for student unionists that a post-secondary education is a Canadian birthright, not unlike the way universal medicare is regarded. Any taxpayer can attest, however, that such universal programs do not come cheaply. ("No to educare", 2007, p. A12)

The representations from institutions and policy criticisms in the media were met with some sympathy from those in the civil service. Over time, it was observed that the tuition levels in Manitoba were increasingly out of step with national averages, and it was estimated that there was room to maneuver in terms of affordability. Further, there was a need for additional revenue at the institutional level that the government could not provide in its grants. Given the incremental fee decisions, there was an increasing interest by the Council in depoliticizing the tuition policy decisions and developing an improved framework of principles or guidelines for decision-making in cases of appeal for tuition rate changes: "after we started getting a bevy of professional school applications for higher tuitions … we needed to start trying to depoliticize the tuition question and try to develop a principle-based approach to it" (Elected official B).

7.3.2. Changes in institutional leadership

Manitoba had a relatively small post-secondary system, including seven public post-secondary institutions. During the period leading up to the policy change, there were changes in university presidents: University of Manitoba (Emoke Szathmáry, from 1996-2008, and David Barnard, appointed in 2008); University of Winnipeg (Lloyd Axworthy, appointed in 2004); Brandon University (Louis Visentin, from 2000-2009, and Deborah Poff, appointed in 2009) and Université de Saint-Boniface (Raymonde Gagné, appointed in 2003). The institutions were not formally organized as a group, however as individual
entities the universities and the colleges, including their administrations and Boards of Governors, were important policy actors within the decision-making system.

7.3.3. Changes in progressive coalition alignment on tuition fee policy

A major change in the policy subsystem in the period prior to the policy change were two separate shifts in the progressive coalition of interests who had previously supported the tuition freeze, one involving the faculty coalition and the other, organized labour. Prior to the 2000s, the Manitoba Organization of Faculty Associations (MOFA) and the CFS-MB generally had a high degree of cooperation and coordination of interests on post-secondary funding, with expressed similar general policy views on affordability and access and underlying values of the nature of public education. Coordination with the CFS-MB typically focused on these views, such as during provincial and federal elections, and there had been an understanding that faculty associations at most of the institutions did not “speak against” the student movement, a “political entente” (Senior civil servant O). During the period prior to the policy change, the established position of MOFA on tuition fee policy shifted, from firm to less support. A former faculty leader describes this change:

In the '80s, '90s and maybe even early 2000s, we were unambiguously opposed to any tuition increase. Subsequently... the position on that by the Manitoba Organization of Faculty Associations became much more muddy. I think the University of Manitoba Faculty Association... actually at some point supported tuition increases. Some of us complained bitterly, and then they backed off ... But they did not take that sort of concerted opposition, MOFA didn’t, to tuition increases that it had previously (Faculty association leader D).

The more significant change in the progressive coalition occurred leading up to and during the NDP convention in 2008. Organized labour had been a significant early supporter of the tuition freeze policy; “for the first part of the Manitoba NDP government, [labour] was one of the big backers and pushers of the tuition freeze” (Student leader I). During that time, organized labour was a confirmed ally of the CFS-MB and the NDP, and the tuition freeze position was considered “a coalition politics issue” (Senior civil servant O). However, over time some labour leaders saw a negative impact of the tuition freeze
on their membership; a position paper was written and a “couple of Labour leaders supported coming off of the tuition freeze” (Cabinet Minister D). This position was directly related to the financial well being of institutions and their employees:

Labour saw the impact in terms of their membership, in terms of whether it was university staff or physical plant staff or whatever, that the salaries of their members were being impacted by the overall financial health and sustainability of the policy (Senior civil servant O).

Given the previous solidarity on the policy, the student leaders found this to be a “shocking position for labour to take” (Student leader I). By many accounts, this was the first occasion when labour was “at distance from the student movement on that policy” (Senior civil servant O). These tensions manifested in a specific incident on the floor of the NDP convention:

[The students] were working with the NDP Youth who put forward the motion calling on the government to keep the tuition freeze... the labour delegates at the convention were whipped into line.... there were at least three senior cabinet Ministers who stood up and supported the freeze ... I mean [those elected officials] broke party lines, and there were another three or four MLAs who stood up. A lot of them disappeared from the room just before the vote, and there were... one MLA and an MP, actually, were standing at the mike to persuade delegates to vote in favour for the motion, and that’s when McGifford and the central staffers basically shut down the vote before they were able to speak... it was a huge internal battle front within the NDP (Student leader I).

The youth representatives reportedly lost the vote by a narrow margin “because of the labour delegates” (Student leader I). This schism within the coalition had a few fault lines. First, the fracture on the convention floor indicated CFS-MB’s alienation from labour; the students appeared to fail to understand the policy impacts, or “what the policy meant in a larger picture and not just an individual pocketbook type of perspective... the students made a fatal error by not understanding what it meant for labour” (Senior civil servant O). Second, youth delegates at the convention appeared to be divided. The proposed change to tuition policy saw a “split” in both organizations and within “fractured” the overall younger convention participants (Student leader I):

Most of the students were part of the Young New Democrats or part of the constituency organizations that were there representing their constituencies. They didn’t feel as strongly about it as the people who
were part of the Federation of Students. So there were sort of varying degrees of objection [to the motion]. (Cabinet Minister D)

As a result of the divisions and changes in policy positions of coalition members, the coalition politics changed.

7.4. Narrative of the policy change event

7.4.1. University of Manitoba engineering student actions

As financial conditions within institutions became problematic, students became increasingly divided on their support of the tuition freeze policy; some groups of students believed their education was suffering from the tuition freeze, and there were others “whose thinking was in line with the institutions themselves” (Senior civil servant N). In January 2007 an op-ed titled “NDP’s tuition freeze is downgrading value of education” written by James Blatz of the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Manitoba was published in the Winnipeg Free Press. He outlined how the number of elective courses offered by the Faculty of Engineering has steadily declined, negatively impacting the quality of programming compared to other universities. The article placed the blame on the tuition freeze policy, arguing that since 1999 it had steadily weakened the competitive position of Manitoba’s universities, both nationally and internationally, and threatened the ability of the university to provide enough engineers for the province (Blatz, 2007, p. B4). Further concerns arose that the engineering program’s professional accreditation might be downgraded by the national body that inspects engineering programs across Canada, the Canadian Engineering Accreditation Board (Welch, 2007, February 8); it was reported that Manitoba’s largest university was “so stretched for cash” that the engineering faculty’s accreditation could be jeopardized (“No to educare”, 2007, p. A12).

In response to the financial and accreditation crisis, in March 2007 the University of Manitoba engineering students voted by referendum to increase fees for engineering courses from $104 per credit hour to $144, specifically to address aging laboratories, insufficient equipment, and the number of teaching assistants. The Winnipeg Free Press
ran an editorial on March 9, 2007 calling on the Minister to “butt out” and remove the number of “hurdles” and “meddlesome conditions” in the way of the students’ bid to raise money for their faculty (“With respect, butt out”, 2007, p.A10). By June, the proposed engineering fees were approved by COPSE and the Minister, in part due to the students’ overwhelming support for them (“Students hike their own fees”, 2007).

The engineering accreditation crisis and subsequent student fee referendum both signaled and facilitated a turning point and a change in mood around the tuition freeze policy; “there was a growing sense that something had to be done” (Senior civil servant Q). Within government quarters, attention was focused as a result; “it had been on some people’s agenda for some time, and I think it was just finally recognized that to maintain it further would have negative impacts on the system” (Senior civil servant O).

**2007 Election and 2008/09 Budget**

Heading into a spring general election in 2007, the NDP’s overall popularity was down; the public mood was described as “a little bit restless” and the government was “on the defensive” (“They’ve got fever”, 2007, p. A11). During the election, the NDP carefully controlled its messaging on a tuition freeze commitment, with the overall intention of avoiding a platform promise:

There had been a conscious campaign decision that they were not going to reference the freeze. They were not going to talk about continuing the freeze in public documents on their campaign. And so I think the Premier actually on the 2007 election trail had in his mind that this was not going to last forever, like he had no intentions of continuing the freeze on an on-going basis. (Senior civil servant M)

The NDP was sensitive to criticisms that they were “failing Manitobans and the university sector” and did not want the tuition freeze policy to become “the defining issue of the election” (Student leader I). Despite the public mood, “post-secondary education didn’t get a whole lot of play” (Senior civil servant M) and on May 22, 2007 the election returned the NDP to a third consecutive majority.

During the development of the first budget after the election, 2008/09, the universities forecasted major budget problems and called for major funding increases to
maintain programs under the continued tuition freeze. In preliminary forecasts filed with COPSE, the University of Manitoba asked for a 10.7 per cent operating grant increase of $25.4 million, and Brandon University for 10 per cent, or $2.6 million more, (Martin, 2007, October 1); further, it was revealed that University of Manitoba had accumulated $211 million of deferred maintenance (Doer, 2007, November 28). By this time “revenues started to tank” (Senior civil servant L) and the economic recession started to directly influence government planning:

The start of the recession was happening and everybody knew money was going to be tighter and tighter and that operating grant increases to the post-secondary sector were going to be strained. And so I think there was that realization that they couldn’t continue indefinitely with the tuition freeze, so it was part of an overall look at the financial climate. (Senior civil servant M)

Within government, there was a change in attention on tuition policy; “there was a growing sense that there needed to be some more revenue generated through tuition. Also, ten years is a long time so there was a sense that it was time for that kind of change” (Senior civil servant Q). The fiscal pressure on government was increasing, as was the pressing need to fill the gap between revenue and expenses in post-secondary education. Members of the civil service had long held a skeptical view of the tuition freeze and were supportive of the changing climate; “lots of people in the bureaucracy knew that that was bad public policy” (Senior university administrator C). While there was a lack of consensus within both Cabinet and the NDP caucus, there had been a gradual shift in many MLAs’ commitment to the tuition freeze:

There wasn’t a sudden turning point or conversion on the issue. I think Cabinet always recognized that you need to switch to a different kind of policy at some point. There was several years of debate whether this was the time, and obviously the answer had been no in those years. And then finally it was just thought this is now [the time] to come off it and start to allow some modest increases... It was just the time to move off it. (Cabinet Minister D)

Prior to a formal government announcement, there were two different media stories that foreshadowed policy change. The first signal was a newspaper article in December 2007, in which the immutability of the tuition freeze policy was called into question:
McGifford is loath to give her own opinion on the freeze, saying instead it is a decision for all of caucus. “I think my duty is to speak to my colleagues, so I don’t want to publicly speak to that,” said McGifford. “I have to respect the confidentiality of cabinet discussions...The Premier has always said the tuition freeze wouldn’t last forever and I agree with him,” said McGifford (Welch, 2007, December 30, p. A1).

The second signal was another and more specific newspaper story three months later, which speculated on government plans to allow tuition fee increases at colleges and universities beginning in fall 2009. Published the day before the planned budget speech, the Winnipeg Free Press suggested the end to the government commitment to the tuition freeze; it was further reported that the University of Manitoba, the University of Winnipeg, and the Business Council of Manitoba all supported the end of the policy, and together were “seizing on the political room the NDP has created to push for an end to the tuition freeze” and that the door was open to a thaw as the NDP “did not promise in last year’s provincial election to maintain the tuition freeze” (Martin, 01 Apr 2008: A.3). This second story caught many off guard, including the student unions; some were unconvinced that the government was seriously considering an increase (Martin, 01 Apr 2008: A.3) and others felt that the idea was leaked to the press to “engage feedback” or “float” the idea to gauge student reaction (Student leader I).

The CFS-MB reacted to the April 1, 2008 news report by mobilizing its members and put pressure on the provincial government to delay, and extend the freeze for a year. Key to this pressure was the matter of interpreting campaign promises from the 2007 election. The CFS-MB found a campaign brochure from NDP MLA Sharon Blady describing “extending the tuition freeze” as a party priority (Martin, 2008, April 2, p. A4) and subsequently criticized the government for “engaging in some fancy footwork”:

Minister of Advanced Education and Literacy responded with a dubious lesson in semantics, pointing out the difference between ‘extending’ and ‘maintaining’ a tuition freeze. In one of the most lacklustre political performances ever, she argued that ‘extend’ means for a finite time period, whereas as ‘maintain’ means an indefinite continuation of the policy (Jacks, 2008, p. B4).

Other groups also responded to the potential policy change. Within the party itself, the Young New Democrats responded with pressure; a representative wrote a letter of
congratulations to the government on “eight successful years of a tuition freeze”, and looking forward “to the continued priority of affordable post-secondary education in Manitoba” (“Have your say”, 2008, April 5, p. A16). University interests including President Szathmary and Terry Hidichuk, Chair, Board of Regents of the University of Winnipeg reiterated their observation there was no election promise of an indefinite tuition freeze. The Winnipeg Free Press wrote in favour of the policy change (“Failed experiment”, 2008, April 2) and the Certified General Accountants Association of Manitoba reported a positive calculation for the net cost of education to Manitoba students, even with tuition unfreezing (Martin, 2008).

The government quickly backed away from the anticipated schedule for policy change generating further speculation. With the budget announcements on April 7, 2008 Minister McGifford announced that the tuition freeze was extended for the 2008/09 budget year while allowing tuition to gradually return to 1999 levels beginning the following year. In order to accommodate the extension of the tuition freeze, operating grants to universities and colleges were increased. Minister McGifford said it was the desire to give students a transition year, rather than a fear of student protests or the negative optics of breaking an election promise, which prompted the delayed implementation of the tuition thaw by a year (Welch & Martin, 2008). Others thought it was the effect of the CFS-MB; James A. Blatz observed in the Winnipeg Free Press on April 13, 2008:

> Political posturing and ‘optics’ have again taken precedence over sustainability and good governance. Has the provincial government been bullied by student activists into arbitrarily maintaining the current tuition freeze policy for yet another year? All evidence would suggest this is the case. University of Manitoba Students’ Union president Garry Sran said the extension of freeze was a “huge victory” for students and said the CFS-MB would not accept the end of the tuition freeze without a fight (Welch & Martin, 2008, April 8, p. A4).

However many in the policy community attributed the delay to the pressure of the Young New Democrats rather than the CFS-MB; they were “strong advocates for not lifting the freeze, and so they were a strong voice that ultimately I believe delayed that one year” (Senior civil servant M). The Young New Democrats held some authority within the party given their contributions to the elections; they “worked as party staffers, who worked in the constituency offices, who were the ones who won a bunch of the seats for them because they worked so hard on his campaigns” (Student leader I).
7.4.2. Commission on Tuition Fees and Accessibility to Post-Secondary Education in Manitoba

In the same announcement on April 7, 2008, Minister McGifford also announced a one-person commission to review the province’s policy on affordability, accessibility, and excellence. In announcing the Commission, the Minister noted that this work was part of the government’s desire and commitment to “ensure post-secondary education in Manitoba is accessible and affordable” and its scope was to review the province’s policy on affordability and accessibility, and on the relationship between tuition fees, student aid, and accessibility to postsecondary education in Manitoba. Overseen by the Ministry of Advanced Education and Literacy, Dr. Benjamin Levin was appointed commissioner on July 28, 2008.

The official terms of reference for the Commission were established by government: to review international research on the relationship between tuition fees and university accessibility; analyze data on university participation in Manitoba, focusing on under-represented groups (including Aboriginal, rural, northern, part time and mature students); analyze current tuition and extra fees at Manitoba’s post secondary institutions and compare them to those in other provinces and countries; review the main sources of student aid in Manitoba (federal, provincial and institutional) and analyze their impact on accessibility; review the contribution of student fees to the overall financing of post secondary education in Manitoba and compare it to other provinces and countries; review the impact and role of provincial education tax credits; and recommend public policy on the topic, including legislation if appropriate. These terms of reference provided a clear and limited mandate for the Commission, focusing on accessibility; the Commission was not a general inquiry into post-secondary education, its operations, governance or financing (Levin, 2009, p. iv).

Mechanisms were in place for public input, including a website, however the overall commission strategy focused on a review of the evidence, and supported community representatives to engage with each other and their conflicting perspectives. Extensive submissions were discouraged. The Commissioner’s primary focus was the question of accessibility not tuition policy per se, and his the approach emphasized public stakeholder engagement over lobbying. The consultations were facilitated in several formally arranged
events, rather than town halls or public hearings, in September 2008. The CFS-MB was highly critical of the management of the process, from the stakeholders invited to the lack of public hearings:

I think one of the biggest reasons why it was such a joke and how it was so clearly politically motivated was the fact that the business community was invited as a stakeholder. I mean, there’s just no logic to that. If they wanted to expand it to the broader community... and this is one of the arguments we brought up was why aren’t campus labour unions invited, why are not community groups invited, why are the aboriginal community stakeholders not at the table...so it was not a consultation. It was a sham is what I consider it to be. (Student leader I)

The report was submitted March 31, 2009 and released to the public on April 2, 2009. After receiving the report, government officials met with representatives of primary stakeholder groups, including university administrations and students, to discuss tuition fee policy and future access initiatives. In the final report, the Commission was careful to respond to the policy arguments in favour of a free- or low-tuition policy. On tuition policy specifically, the Commission argued that students ought to pay a share of the cost of their postsecondary education, as individuals reap large benefits from post-secondary education:

There is no justification for this personal benefit to be subsidized completely given the many other pressures on public expenditure. The amount or share of costs that students should pay is less clear. While current levels are arbitrary, there is no compelling reason to move to a very different fee structure (Levin, 2009, p. v.)

As a result, the Commission recommended that Manitoba should allow moderate tuition increases capped at $150 a year for university students and $125 for college students.

7.4.3. Final policy decision

With a continued divided caucus and some outspoken divisions within Cabinet, Premier Doer had made the decision to implement tuition policy change, with the understanding that “it was time for this to happen” (Senior civil servant M). Key to the decision was a change and a general will within Cabinet:
I think at the end of the day, it came down to both the finance Minister earlier and the Premier latterly themselves finally being convinced, both by the stakeholders in terms of the institutions and by the Minister and the members of caucus that there was a way of rejigging the policy in a way that made sense. And I think the less convincing argument was that it wouldn’t be politically damaging…but I think that that turned out very much to be the case, and I think really there wasn’t a huge political fallout from the change in decision. (Senior civil servant O)

The regulated nature of the decision was important, as a serious concern of policymakers was to introduce more revenue to institutions without creating adverse conditions for students and for future political success. The capped increase approach was the compromise position that prevailed within Cabinet; “we were worried about the signal [tuition policy change] would send for all the same reasons that we introduced [the freeze]... we eventually decided we would come off the freeze but we would essentially move into a regulated environment” (Cabinet Minister D).

On Wednesday, April 22, 2009 Minister McGifford announced a 4.5 per cent increase in tuition fees at universities, and a $100 tuition increase at Manitoba’s colleges; even with these increases, Manitoba’s tuition fees were to remain far below those in neighbouring provincial jurisdictions and well below Canadian averages. The final decision drew a lukewarm from both institutions and student organizations. Institutional presidents were a little disappointed as it was seen to be a political rather than a financial solution, given that the financial challenges still remained:

In a sense, the government got the best of both worlds. They were able to say to those of us that wanted the tuition freeze to disappear, “It’s not frozen, it’s not zero.” And they were able to say to the Canadian Federation of Students, with whom they’re very close, “We didn’t increase tuition fees substantially at all.” So from my perspective, and this university’s perspective, it was a huge convulsion that in the end made no material difference. When you’ve got a large gap between the funding for this university and the funding for comparable universities elsewhere, getting a 1% or 2% rise on tuition fees is just not addressing the problem. (Senior university administrator C)

The students were unhappy with the policy direction, but also with the change in government position relative to their organized interests:
Manitoba kind of breaks my heart because it was a government who we had a good relationship with, who did the right thing for so many years with the tuition fee freeze, and then for whatever reason just kind of finally succumbed to the pressure being exerted on it by the editorial board of the Winnipeg Free Press and a handful of university presidents who’ll never be the Manitoba NDP’s friend anyway. (Student leader J)

7.5. Manitoba case analysis

The analytical framework has five key dimensions and operationalized sub-questions for both within-case and cross-case comparative case analysis. These key dimensions are indicated in the two conceptual frameworks as important factors in understanding major policy change, and are: (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, (e) the effects of external influences. The following section presents the analysis of each of these factors in the case of policy change in Manitoba.

7.5.1. Program goals and their clarity

What were the expressed goals of the policy? Was there consensus on the goal?

The primary goal of government for the tuition policy change was to provide post-secondary institutions needed financial resources to ensure accessibility and quality education, in the context of constrained government finances. The purpose of the policy change was therefore financial; it was intended to “give some relief to the institutions” (Cabinet Minister D) or “put the financials of the institutions in better order” (Senior civil servant O). However this financial reform was undertaken only with an understanding that it would redirect policy efforts to continue to support post-secondary accessibility:

I think in the government of the day’s mind, this was not actually a move away from access or from fairness to students or from a commitment actually to students. It was an adjustment to be more refined in terms of having resources better targeted to those who needed it most and to at the same time find a way to ensure more fiscal sustainability for the institutions in the long run and so, in that way, to make a better linkage policy-wise between ensuring that access and
excellence were mutually reinforcing and not mutually competing objectives. (Senior civil servant O)

Within government, there was a high level of agreement on need to improve conditions within post-secondary institutions, but no consensus on the specifics of moving away from the tuition freeze policy. The Cabinet and the NDP caucus were quite divided; some in the caucus were deep believers in a low tuition strategy for Manitoba. The division related to differing perspectives on two matters. First, the degree to which the tuition freeze was a political important policy to maintain; the Policy Management Secretariat perceived the policy to be “an extraordinarily successful, political maneuver, so they, along with the Premier, were very much invested in that original policy made in ‘99 and were very reluctant to fool with it for political reasons” (Elected official B). Second and most important, there was a question of the degree to which the tuition freeze was an effective public policy, and in particular, in functioning as a signal of accessibility.

**How was the problem defined?**

The policy problem was defined first in terms of concerns about the impact of insufficient institutional revenue on educational quality and competitiveness, and secondly, in terms of questioning the efficacy of the tuition freezes as a policy lever to promote the government’s commitment to educational and social equity. On this second point, there had been media coverage of this question during the period leading up to the policy episode. President Szathmáry of the University of Manitoba wrote that the tuition freeze in combination with the level of provincial funding has had a negative impact on Manitoba’s universities: “Manitoba’s universities have long been underfunded, and the tuition freeze is a failure as an instrument of social policy” (Szathmáry, 2006, p. A17). The University of Manitoba’s vice-president academic Robert Kerr was quoted stating that the tuition freeze “really hasn’t produced the effect that might have been hoped for” in terms of improving access of low income students (Welch, 2007, February 15, p. B1).

At the heart of defining the policy problem was, therefore, an active debate within government as to the effectiveness of the tuition freeze policy; this question of effectiveness was defined in terms of increasing post-secondary participation, and in particular, promoting and improving access to lower socio-economic groups. There
appeared to be insufficient evidence to reach a definitive conclusion, given the limitations of research available. In one senior official’s perspective, “we simply didn’t have the data to assess the effectiveness of the low tuition “signal” to non-traditional PSE participants, as Premier Doer had always described it” (Cabinet Minister D).

**What indicators were used to identify and describe the policy problem(s)?**

Institutions, the civil service, vocal business interests, and the media identified the problem as threats to post-secondary educational quality. The *Winnipeg Free Press* reported issues of overcrowded classrooms, crumbling infrastructure, and hindered ability of universities to attract top professors (Kuxhaus, 2007). This final concern, the ability to compete for talent, particularly in professional schools, was an important indicator:

> all institutions...would say that the tuition freeze really tied their hands in terms of being able to both compete in the world of salaries [for professors]...making a difficult environment for retention, recruitment, operating, program offerings to compete. (Senior civil servant O)

Staff members at COPSE felt that the tuition levels in Manitoba were increasingly out of step with national averages. Further comparative indicators used to quantify the policy problem included the comparisons of tuition fee levels for undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs, to indicate Manitoba’s relative position to other Canadian provinces and comparator institutions.

In terms of the effectiveness of the tuition freeze as public policy, COPSE undertook research on the impact of tuition policy and in February 2007 released its analysis for all three Manitoba universities. The research found that the tuition freeze had not changed the proportion of poor or working-class students attending Manitoba colleges and universities; instead, the tuition freeze may have increased the proportion of students from wealthy neighbourhoods instead (Welch, 2007, February 15). These findings were similar to those found by the Canada Millennium Scholarship Foundation, research that was cited in the local press (“University starts early”, 2007).
What alternatives were considered?

The institutions proposed several alternatives for new tuition policy; one option suggested by the universities was to set tuition levels at the “national average” (Senior university administrator C). Another alternative suggested by President Axworthy in March 2008 was to replace the tuition freeze with tuition tied to a new inflationary index appropriate to universities; he suggested that the 2008/09 provincial budget “is an opportunity for the province to rewrite our fiscal framework” and that removing the tuition freeze would give the universities “a lot more discretion” in securing the revenue to operate (“Tie university tuition increases”, 2008, p. B1). Presidents Szathmary and Axworthy together called for a “university price index” that would take into account such costs as journals, laboratory equipment and supplies, which tend to rise at a higher rate than the consumer price index (Martin, 2008, April 1).

Government considered a range possible tuition increases under controlled conditions; the primary decision, however, was whether or not to step away from the commitment to the tuition freeze. Complete deregulation of tuition was never given serious consideration. Once that decision was made, the concern was to ensure that any increases would not have a negative impact on participation rates, or accessibility for low socio-economic groups.

7.5.2. Politics of policy formation

Did policy actors have explicit goals toward which their activities were aligned? What influenced the policy actors’ policy preference?

The university presidents wanted government to address the significant financial constraints of their overall funding, to mitigate the negative effects of insufficient on educational quality. Although all institutions experienced similar pressures, the universities, rather than the colleges, led the lobby; “not as much the colleges, because colleges’ tuition is a much smaller factor in the overall composition of their funding” (Senior civil servant M). The institutions’ position on the tuition freeze was quite clear to government; “they never really missed a chance to say they thought the tuition policy was holding them back” (Cabinet Minister D). According to one government member:
it was a constant back-and-forth with the heads of institutions who were always lobbying not just for increases in their operating grants but also to have the ability to increase tuition fees. Which, it varied from institution to institution, but it was roughly 20%, 25% of their revenue for each of the major colleges and universities. ...We realized you couldn’t ignore inflationary pressures and so on indefinitely. (Cabinet Minister D)

Pressure for policy change from institutions was brought to government through elected officials and the civil service. Presidents, chancellors, and other influential people connected with the universities called for government action to improve funding of institutions, and to remove constraints of the tuition freeze. Generally the Premier met with the presidents as a group at least once or twice a year, and then individually with the presidents of the major institutions “much more than that, probably three or four times a year each” (Cabinet Minister D). Individual university presidents also met regularly with the cabinet secretary, various Ministers, caucus members, and Deputy Ministers from across government, as well annual budgeting representations to the Council. The universities had a common message: they “have consistently sung from the same page about the need for much higher operating grants from the Doer administration, which has constrained revenue growth for the schools with a tuition freeze since 2000” (“PCs adopt NDP freeze”, 2006). The universities enjoyed favourable coverage of their issues and concerns in the Manitoba press, however their advocacy with government was predominantly private. As one government caucus member described presidential lobbying: “nobody got outside the circle and tried to embarrass the government ... the pressure would have been internal, behind closed doors kind of thing” (Elected official B). Generally, the universities preferred to avoid direct confrontation with the government.

The civil service, within the Ministry as well as COPSE, had an interest in policy change, and in particular, for a less political and more sustainable policy for institutional financing. The university representations were met with some sympathy; “the issue had been raised about the need or the desire on the part of department bureaucrats to lift that freeze” (Senior civil servant M). On tuition policy options, COPSE was “alive to the fact that the institutions need resources” and had put forward “fairly consistently, options to get out of the freeze” as “the revenue issues at universities have a deleterious impact on
quality at universities and colleges” (Senior civil servant Q). A challenge with the intermediary agency was the tension between Council and government:

There is always a degree of friction between the government and the Council. The universities feel the Council is too much an arm of the government and the government feels the Council is too much an arm of the universities, which probably means they’re about in the right place (Senior civil servant L).

In practice, the tuition question had “always sat at the centre of government here, not with COPSE” (Elected official B). The role of COPSE to provide analysis on budget and planning for institutions, given policy parameters set by government, was advisory only; in truth, the Minister “has the ability to do anything he or she feels like doing in the best interests of the province” (Elected official B). The Council had an increasing interest in depoliticizing the tuition policy decisions and developing an improved framework of principles or guidelines for decision-making in cases of appeal for tuition rate changes:

after we started getting a bevy of professional school applications for higher tuitions than might otherwise exist for regular arts and science students, that really we needed to start trying to depoliticise the tuition question and try to develop a principle-based approach to it...And I think we actually could have worked on those principles a little bit more and tried to depoliticise the question. Because it had become...such a political question. (Elected official B)

The CFS-MB was the most active student body in Manitoba in support of the tuition freeze; “the college student associations, it’s more they’re just very close with their local administrations, and they don’t want to rock the boat (Student leader I). The CFS-MB had significant influence on the government agenda, and was particularly influential in the original NDP commitment to freeze tuition, arguably the principal policy for that government relating to post-secondary education; “government has strongly aligned itself with the CFS on tuition...[it is] the principal policy for government relating to post-secondary education, the one they talk about the most is their efforts to make it affordable and accessible” (Senior civil servant Q). The CFS-MB lobbied through a variety of strategies including meeting with elected officials, senior civil servants, and political staff from all political parties both federally and provincially, and through written submissions to government, and through membership involvement and mobilization:
we have a three-prong approach which is mobilization, research, and lobbying. So we try to...use research to support our policy recommendations, and we try to do as much as possible face-to-face government meetings, but we also emphasize what we see as one of the strengths of the student movement, which is our ability to do grassroots mobilizing. And that takes the form of rallies, petition drives, public forums, fax bombing [NTSO001].

Strong social interlocks are found between the CFS-MB and the NDP; “there are a lot of student activists within the party” (Senior civil servant L). Key internal activists were effective in moving funding and tuition issues onto NDP decision agendas and politicizing tuition policy; the students “had key allies within cabinet and within the party...[and] worked with key staffers who worked in policy development” (Student leader I). CFS-MB members also worked with a number of NDP riding organizations to provide volunteer support in election, and were therefore valued for their skills in mobilization; “our hopes rise and fall on our ability to put that pressure on elected officials and build that popular support” [NTSO001].

For MOFA, tuition fees themselves were not a top priority in their representations to government; faculty associations reportedly “really haven’t weighed in too heavily on tuition” and spoke more to express their concern on “general issues of post-secondary funding” (Senior civil servant Q). From the government’s perspective, the coalition between the MOFA and the CFS-MB was not completely aligned on tuition policy: “the CFS wants tuition fees eliminated. Faculty associations want tuition fees to be manageable for students, they don’t want it to be too high” (Senior civil servant Q). One senior observer described the “contradictory” nature of their position:

On the one hand, they wanted to be seen to be protective of students and the affordability question. On the other hand, they had their own self-interest around, not only their own salaries and such, and benefits, but in terms of resources to their departments. (Elected official B).

The business community had influential and engaged members who were against the tuition freeze policy. The business community’s influence was significant; they had been instrumental in education policy-making under previous governments (see Saunders, 2006 for discussion on the creation of COPSE), and business leaders enjoyed “very good relationships with the NDP government” (Senior civil servant L). The Business
Council of Manitoba president Jim Carr held a vocal and highly critical view of the tuition freeze policy which received increasing media attention from the fall of 2006 onwards; at that time, the *Winnipeg Free Press* noted “rising fees is part of the broader campaign, one led by Manitoba’s business community, to ramp up the pressure on Premier Gary Doer over the tuition freeze that makes it difficult to recruit first-rate professors capable of turning out students who can compete globally” (“PCs adopt NDP freeze”, 2006). Subsequently, he argued that allowing colleges and universities to charge higher tuition fees would better enable “our institutions to attract the best and the brightest students and faculty members, maintain the highest quality labs, keep buildings in good repair and fund the necessary research to develop the highest possible reputation” (Carr, 2008, April 6, B5). Other business interests also weighed in on the tuition policy, and its negative consequences; the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce is reported to have “demanded” the tuition freeze be phased out and replaced with loans and bursaries, as the freeze was ‘hurting the universities’ ability to provide a world-class education (Rabson, 2006, September 15, p. A10). The *Winnipeg Free Press* notes:

If a university degree is undermined by the diminished quality of a school that cannot afford to give students what they need to compete in a global job market, then the chances that they will be offered a good, high-paying job upon graduation naturally will erode. The quality of the graduates’ education is beginning to worry Manitoba employers, but Ms. McGifford and her cabinet colleagues refuse to listen. Blocking voluntary tuition increases, ostensibly for the good of the students, is a kind of engineering, one that threatens the foundation of Manitoba’s economy. (“With respect, butt out”, 2007, p. A10)

Individual business interests also took public positions against the tuition freeze, and reiterated the concern about competitiveness. In an op-ed titled “Students need more than cheap universities” a local CEO Nicholas Hirst took aim at the policy:

Low university tuition fees have been sold on the basis that they are “affordable.” Manitoba sells itself as a province on the basis that it’s “affordable”. ... My concern is that we are selling our universities to Manitobans, and the rest of Canada, not on their quality, but on their cost. ...Our universities have a great deal going for them, but lack of money is hurting them. They don’t have the residences or the libraries of their competitors. They lack the kind of bragging rights and reputations schools like the University of Toronto, McGill and the University of British Columbia use to attract the best and brightest across the country. In part, this is because Manitobans seem to prefer

For government policymakers, there was an explicit desire to introduce more revenue to institutions, however it was also just as important to do so without creating adverse conditions for students. This was particularly important given an ongoing government concern and commitment to increasing post-secondary participation, and concerns about accessibility. The regulated nature of the allowed increase was therefore a critical aspect of the policy decision:

We were worried about the signal it would send for all the same reasons that we introduced it ... “sticker shock” or “rate shock” ... We eventually decided we would come off the freeze but we would essentially move into a regulated environment. Not have... the basic tuition to jump by more than a certain amount each year after we lifted the freeze. (Cabinet Minister D)

To what extent were policy actors representing political party platforms?

Although the 1999 election saw differences in party platforms on tuition policy, by the 2007 election these differences had largely disappeared. Beginning as early as 2006, editorials in the Winnipeg Free Press commented on the lack of differentiation between the parties on tuition fees; “[Conservative party leader] McFayden’s policies sometimes seem to be so NDP someone joked that if you were trying to tell the difference between him and Doer, McFadyen is the one on the left” (“They’ve got fever”, 2007, p. A11). Kim Speers, politics professor at the University of Manitoba, commented that McFadyen’s position on the tuition freeze was a strategically safe position to take because it prevented activating students, who have “lots of energy and they would love to go out and protest” (Rabson, 2006, September 15, p. A10). The Conservative party’s position drew criticism in the press:

On the critical issue of university funding, the Tories have decided to support the government position that is increasingly being discredited, namely the freeze on tuition. If Mr. McFadyen truly believes a freeze on tuition is the right policy for Manitoba, that’s fine, but it appears he is more concerned about being popular than constructive. The system simply does not work when the Opposition abandons its duty to scrutinize the government in favour of staking out safe ground (“No opposition”, 2007, p. A18)
The political calculations of the major political parties on the tuition freeze policy reflected the nature of political values in Manitoba; “the political space between the two [political parties] wasn’t all that big” (Senior civil servant L), and as a result, “the dance to the centre is pretty crowded” (Senior civil servant N). This includes party positions on tuition fee policy. The electoral calculation was important given the very narrow political space between the political parties:

People who were in caucus or in cabinet and really weren’t that involved in education policy often took the more populous line that the tuition freeze policy had been a very popular policy, remained popular among students and families, and they would have added that it was a signature policy of the government. I mean, there’s no doubt it’s a very difficult thing when everybody gravitates to the centre in policy terms, to actually have policies that stand out and differentiate your party (Cabinet Minister D).

**Which issues were linked by policy actors to tuition policy?**

Institutions primarily framed the issue in terms of inadequate funding of the universities and colleges, and given the constraints of government funding, the negative impact of the tuition freeze; “there were complaints that our very policy had created cost pressures, that we weren’t allowing the universities to properly cover without sacrificing quality of education” (Cabinet Minister D). Specifically, institutions lobbied government on concerns about educational quality:

the fact that it had been frozen for so long, and while the operating grant increases had not been overly bad, the fact of the matter was that they weren’t keeping pace with what they perceive other universities in the country were able to achieve. So they were pushing from the quality aspect. (Senior civil servant M)

The universities also linked the regulatory nature of the policy to matter of institutional autonomy, which was an important value; “by and large the pressure for the change ultimately can be attributed to their ongoing… desire to have…the flexibility of an independent institution… an institution independent of government” (Elected official B). This view was reflected in the media; the Minister “should not be involved in micromanaging the business of universities and colleges” (“With respect, butt out”, 2007, p. A10).
Student organizations, and the CFS-MB in particular, linked the tuition freeze to broad objectives of accessibility and social equity, and the specific question of student debt. Garry Sran, president of the University of Manitoba Students’ Union, argued that lifting the freeze would be a burden for students and lead to increased debt load, and suggested that government should focus on increasing core funding to universities (Kuxhaus, 2007). Further, the tuition freeze was characterized as a strong and ongoing political commitment of the NDP. In political terms, there was a sense that the tuition freeze was considered “one of the hallmark policies of the NDP, and of Doer himself” (Jacks, 2008, p. B4) and therefore was a permanent commitment of that government.

Lastly, at the centre of the tuition freeze debate was the question of its effectiveness as social policy in promoting access; in this light, the tuition freeze was characterized as a failure. The Winnipeg Free Press regularly made calls for the elimination of the freeze, suggesting that it had not made education any more accessible (see “Freezes failing”, 2007, February 15), a position shared by comments from both universities and research enterprises. In a particularly forceful editorial, the Winnipeg Free Press characterized the tuition freeze as the NDP’s “failed nine-year experiment in “educare” and central planning” and called for “ending the muddle-headed thinking that has weakened the province’s post-secondary institutions, while providing none of the intended benefits” (“Failed experiment”, 2008, April 2, p. A12).

**What events or activities contributed to the problem being identified?**

In the period leading up to the policy episode, policy entrepreneurs within the universities lobbied government on the problem of insufficient funding, and the media identified the tuition freeze as a policy problem. The impact on quality and competition for faculty were particularly salient examples of the impact of insufficient funding to universities. These concerns were shared by business interests, who expressed concerns of eroding quality as an economic development issue of the business community, as well as a philosophical one; competitiveness with other provinces and comparisons to other major research universities were made to support the need for increased resources for universities. The print media covered the policy concerns and policy proposals of these actors extensively and sympathetically. Hidden policy entrepreneurship was undertaken within the cabinet and the government caucus, with significant resistance.
Within this context of increasing concern, there were three significant events that focused attention on the tuition policy as a problem: the break in the progressive coalition at the NDP convention, the engineering accreditation problem and student referendum at the University of Manitoba, and the report of the Commission.

*What were the key events that brought about a merging of the politics, problem, and policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window?*

Interview respondents were asked to respond to a series of questions on the degree to which they believed that a number of factors played a role in the tuition policy change (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree). The following table provides the rank order of factors to which the participants strongly agreed and agreed, as a percent of total question responses. Three of the top seven factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to institutional finances and the provincial budget, two relate to student access and affordability considerations and two relate to changes in the policy environment, changes in lobbying and changes to tuition policy in other jurisdictions.
### Table 7.3. Respondent Identification of Factors in Manitoba Policy Episode, by Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional budget shortfalls</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenging provincial budget</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on affordability of post-secondary education</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in pressure lobbying</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition policy change in other jurisdictions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on student debt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall changes in fiscal climate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing priority for funding of institutions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to the general election</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing student financial aid costs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on accessibility of post-secondary education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the amount attention on post-secondary education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing concerns on participation rates in post-secondary education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifts in public opinion on government policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to pressure from other branches of government</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in federal provincial government relations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n=10

Within the context of these factors, in the policy stream there were well-organized policy entrepreneurs from the universities and business interests, with a clear policy options to address the financial conditions of institutions, and internal to the government there were policy entrepreneurs interested in finding a more effective policy to achieve educational participation goals. In the problem stream, there was increasing lobbying and pressure arising from incremental policy decisions, revenue constraints in institutions, a changing fiscal climate for government, and the engineering accreditation problem at the University of Manitoba which brought public attention to and business community comment on the problems of educational quality and competitiveness. In the politics stream, the government was secure in its new mandate with political capital in post-secondary education based on a history of popular policy decisions, and there was growing public awareness that the cost of post-secondary education was out of step with expectations and other provinces, and public receptivity to change. The Commission acted
as the catalytic event that created the final policy window, and established the research basis for tuition policy change.

7.5.3. Stability of policy coalitions over time

Section 7.2.2 described the generally well-organized and well-resourced policy actors and coalitions in this policy subsystem, with relatively consistent policy positions. There were relatively few significant changes within the coalitions policy subsystem during the period prior to the policy change. Changes in university presidents did not appear to have a significant effect, and the civil service was relatively stable, as was the NDP itself. The CFS-MB was growing in membership, having added a key local to its organization. There were some leadership changes within MOFA, which appear to have had an impact on their change in tuition policy preference, away from unconditional support of the tuition freeze. The alliances between organized progressive interests were well established and based on shared, progressive values.

However, one significant internal shock to the coalition did have a direct effect on the tuition policy episode; the break between the leaders of the Manitoba Federation of Labour and the CFS-MB at the NDP convention. Leaders in both groups were responding to their members’ needs as well as core values, and in this case, the MFL had members who believed member working conditions were negatively affected by the tuition freeze. This break signified the degree of difference in beliefs, priorities, and perceptions in what was formerly seen to be a solid coalition, within groups and between groups, significant enough to cause a break, taking precedent over previous coalition agreements.

Was there evidence of information sharing between coalitions?

Information sharing was found throughout the policy subsystem, which is expected given the small size of the policy community. Information sharing was found between organized interests and each other, and organized interests and the NDP. Within the CFS national organization, policy and political learning is part of training and organizational development, and policy and political action priorities are set at the national level, so there are explicit mechanisms to support learning. There were no formal negotiated agreements identified between institutions. Two different information leaks occurred during this policy
episode, from the Manitoba Federation of Labour to the CFS-MB, and from the government caucus to the Winnipeg Free Press.

**Evidence of internal or external shocks to the coalitions**

External to the coalitions, changing economic conditions and changes in public opinion put pressure on government, and hastened decision-making on whether tuition policy change should occur. Figure 7.1 summarizes the major changes in ACF factors in the Manitoba policy subsystem during the decade prior to the policy change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Policy Subsystem</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatively Stable Parameters</td>
<td>Coalitions: Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constraints and resources of coalitions and actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ in membership and financial resources – increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Events</td>
<td>Conflict, interactions within and between competing coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ in coordination and solidarity with labour movement – open conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy-oriented learning and political learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Δ in policy learning and government policy ideas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7.1. Summary of Changes in ACF Factors in Manitoba, 1999-2009**

There were relatively few significant changes within the policy subsystem in the period prior to the policy episode, with the exception of the breaking alignment on tuition policy between the leaders of the Manitoba Federation of Labour and the CFS-MB; this schism was a result of insufficient coordination between coalition members, and diverging policy goals.

Policy learning played an important role in this policy change, which was facilitated by Dr. Benjamin Levin and the Commission. As described earlier, a key question informing decision-makers was the effectiveness of the tuition freeze in promoting accessibility of post-secondary education in the province. Given that accessibility was an important value as well as a policy goal, the commission functioned as both a vehicle for policy learning for policy actors, including decision-makers, as well as a vehicle for socializing new policy ideas. Given the credibility afforded to the commission, a sufficient number of decision-
makers and key personalities were persuaded by the technical information and policy advice provided by the commission that tuition policy change was not contradictory to the accessibility agenda. The policy actors and their relative positions to each other and policy alternatives can be seen in the policy map. The policy preferences of policy actors as indicated on this map are only one dimension of policy behavior; the political culture of the policy context has an important influence as well.

7.5.4. Influence of elected and non-elected policy actors

*Did elected officials dominate the policy process? How? To what extent did non-elected policy actors influence the policy process? What strategies were used?*

The major players for the decisions arising from the Levin report were the Premier, his Ministers and their senior political staff, and supported by the Policy Management Secretariat. The influential elected actors in this policy episode are Premier Doer and Minister McGifford. The Premier was reported to have a strong leadership style; it was “very much a command and control operation” (Elected official B); decision-making within government was highly influenced by the views of Premier Doer, with “considerable deference to the decision-making of the Premier” (Senior civil servant N). Minister McGifford was seen to be a “huge advocate of kind of a progressive, distributive system” (Senior civil servant O), and “cared deeply about gender issues and about the situation of people living on the margins of society” (Levin, 2005, p. 16). Minister McGifford was a champion of removing the tuition freeze and she “fought very hard for this policy change” (Senior civil servant O).

Accounts suggest that Premier Doer was hesitant to implement policy change, however with Minister McGifford’s advocacy and the evidence from the commission, he was persuaded sufficiently to make a decision unpopular with some members of both his caucus and cabinet. The final decision on tuition was made internally within the legislature, probably in the Premier’s office (Elected official B). Key to the decision was a change and a will within cabinet:

I think at the end of the day, it came down to both the finance Minister earlier and the Premier latterly themselves finally being convinced, both
by the stakeholders in terms of the institutions and by the Minister and the members of caucus that there was a way of rejigging the policy in a way that made sense. And I think the less convincing argument was that it wouldn’t be politically damaging... but I think that that turned out very much to be the case... there wasn’t a huge political fallout from the change in decision. (Senior civil servant O)

It was a difficult decision, as “there were caucus members who when the decision made, felt alienated by the decision” (Senior civil servant O):

it was not unanimous, there was not unanimous support and consent for lifting the tuition freeze. Ultimately it did get through, it was the Premier’s desire to lift it, but I know that there were some outspoken members of caucus and possibly even cabinet that weren’t comfortable in lifting the freeze. (Senior civil servant M)

The non-elected actors influential in this policy process were staff in the Premier's office and Commissioner Levin, who was brought into the policy arena as an expert, with strong influences of the university presidents. The university presidents used lobbying strategies to engage in agenda-setting, successfully framing the policy problem in terms of resources to institutions and raising questions as to the efficacy of the tuition freeze as a social policy. Presidents were seen by the public as trustworthy on public policy matters; “they are very important opinion leaders, and so... the government was quite sensitive to that and cognizant of their views” (Cabinet Minister D). As they had direct access to the Premier, it “puts an enormous amount of pressure on a government and on a Minister in terms of policy decision in particular” (Senior civil servant P). These positions were reinforced by the media, which supported tuition deregulation and was critical of the tuition freeze. The universities enjoyed favourable coverage of their issues and concerns in the Manitoba press; “the university presidents are very well regarded and very well respected and have a very easy time of getting their messages out into the media” (Student leader I).

What was the effect of the political structure in each province?

The effect of political structure is seen in this policy episode. First, the nature of cabinet government is evidenced as the Premier took the final decision with sufficient cabinet support to prevail over dissenters. Second, Manitoba's small size and cautious
political culture influenced the policy formation process. The government was cautious in introducing radical policy change; government also lengthened the implementation horizon in an attempt to reduce conflict with the student groups and others opposed to policy change, and introduced process to support policy debate. The Premier chose a trusted expert for assistance, and used a process to provide expert policy advice and to support policy learning within the policy community. This approach to policy formation helped generate awareness and support from the public and key members of government.

**To what extent did policy actors utilize technical information? Expert validators? Was information on other jurisdictions/provincial tuition policies shared or used?**

The Commission used technical information from a variety of sources, including policy analysis from the civil service and research from Statistics Canada and the Canadian Millennium Foundation. This information included comparative tuition fees. This technical information as well as scholarly literature informed the ultimate framing of the policy recommendation. Research enterprises such as an active branch of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), and national influences such as Millennium Scholarship Foundation (MSF), Canadian Council on Learning (CCL), Higher Education Strategy Associates (HESA), and Statistics Canada provided policy-relevant research for the policy community in Manitoba, directly or indirectly.

**7.5.5. Effects of external influences**

**Did other post-secondary issues affect policy deliberations?**

There were a few post-secondary policy issues referenced in tuition policy deliberations, in addition to the accreditation crisis in the engineering program at the University of Manitoba. First, Manitoba faced one of the lowest rates of conversion from high school to college in the country, a problem which helped contribute to public and policymaker concern about the importance of supporting and signalling accessibility of the post-secondary system (Welch, 2007, February 15). Second, during the period leading up to the policy change, there were pressures from government for the post-secondary system to expand capacity. This pressure, as described by one senior civil servant, further compounded the existing difficult financial situation within institutions:
we were constantly asking the other colleges and universities to do other things, and we’d ask them to expand the particular programs. There was a real nursing shortage early in the decade, and we had asked both the colleges and the universities to expand their enrolment. Some of this we did fund through special program grants or through capital, but the on-going costs [were not]... (Cabinet Minister D)

Did policy decisions from other arenas affect policy deliberations? Did the fiscal climate or budgeting affect policy deliberations?

The deteriorating fiscal condition of the province was a major factor in accelerating decision-making in this policy arena, impacting on provincial budgets. Government concern for youth retention in Manitoba triggered a number of policy changes in the provincial taxation system, in order to encourage young people to stay and work in the province. These efforts were seen by government to be connected to the need to improve quality and capacity within the post-secondary system, as was the desire to improve economic competitiveness.

Some key events related to program quality, such as the accreditation threat, lent weight to institutions’ concerns about the level of resources available to them, and the impact that was having on economic prospects of students and employers. Tuition policy change was seen as one strategy to meet policy goals in these areas, given sufficient comfort that accessibility goals would not be compromised.

To what extent did public opinion influence policy deliberations?

When the NDP were elected in a change in government in 1999, public opinion held that post-secondary education was becoming unaffordable. The election platform’s commitment to a tuition freeze, and subsequent cut to university tuition by 10% proved popular. The tuition freeze remained in place for a decade and over two subsequent general elections. With the original tuition freeze policy in place, the incremental changes accepted by government as concessions to institutions, including in professional schools, did not generate negative backlash in public opinion.

The Winnipeg Free Press was regarded as contributing to shaping public opinion, as well as reflecting it; the paper covered post-secondary educational issues and ran many editorials in favour of removing the tuition freeze. This sentiment was shared also by editor
of the *Brandon Sun* writing in the *Winnipeg Free Press*, who expressed concern that rural students have a harder time funding post-secondary education. In his view, the tuition freeze policy did not solve this ‘obvious inequity’; instead, attention should be paid to the student loan program and bursaries, which “would at least ensure equitable access for rural students without causing the headaches tuition freezes inevitably create for universities” (Brown, 2007, February 10, p. A19.). The student organizations felt that the media had a specific agenda, with a strong impact:

The *Winnipeg Free Press* would run op-ed after op-ed slamming the tuition fee freeze, and university presidents were there saying the same thing all along... It’s kind of a small media market ... the media in Manitoba are not these neutral bodies without their own political positions and political goals. [NTSO001]

The public mood was generally supportive of the NDP government, and it was estimated that the public would support policy change, an estimation which proved accurate given that they were no subsequent electoral consequences to the policy change.

7.6. **Summary**

Manitoba is a small province with a relatively narrow field of political activity, with each party having similar policy platforms in post-secondary education. The NDP government had campaigned a decade previously on the policy of a tuition freeze, and had maintained that approach every year, responding to and reinforcing the perception that this was a hallmark policy and a political “article of faith”. There was some dispute as to the nature of the political commitment during the election prior to the policy change; that dispute was centered between the CFS-MB and government. Further to those issue linkages made by policy actors in identifying the policy problem, the major theme which emerged in the research is that of competing ideas: competing ideas of policies related to good retail politics, and competing ideas of what works in terms of promoting accessibility to post-secondary education. There were differing sensibilities as to how important the tuition freeze policy was to the continued electoral success or public support of the NDP government. Having successfully campaigned on a policy of tuition reduction and
affordability, many within the caucus and the party, including the Premier, believed in its popularity and were reluctant to separate themselves from those original commitments for political reasons. Perhaps more important, there were differences of opinions as to the effectiveness of the tuition freeze in promoting accessibility of post-secondary education in the province. The Commission brought the policy discussion into focus, and made its recommendation for tuition policy change, which was largely adopted.
Chapter 8.

Cross Case Analysis

The aim of this dissertation is to describe the policy formation processes involved in episodes of major provincial tuition policy change and, by drawing upon two alternative theories of policy change, to develop a conceptual understanding of tuition policy change in Canada. The purpose of undertaking cross-case analysis is to explore the theoretical propositions guiding this study to identify patterns and analyze causal links (Yin, 1994). This analytic strategy supports the theoretically informed identification of the dynamics of tuition policy change. This chapter considers the cases of tuition policy change described in the previous three chapters, and compares them using the analytical framework’s five key dimensions.

8.1. Program goals and their clarity

In these cases, tuition arose as a policy problem requiring government attention through agenda-setting. The cross case analysis focuses on several aspects of agenda-setting, the first two being problem definition and policy goals. As Wildavksky (1979) pointed out, problem definition is never a purely technical exercise; policy choices are statements in a contest of different and competing values.

8.1.1. Problem definition

A critical component of agenda-setting, problem definition is “not so much which definition is correct but which is most credible and politically acceptable at any particular time” (Cobb & Elder, 1972, p. 173). Each of these cases shows a similar approach to problem definition; decision-makers’ concerns were framed as responses to problematic tuition policy adopted by the previous government. Government actors defined the problem as negative impacts or the unintended consequences of the previous tuition policy or incremental modifications to previous policy. In Manitoba and Ontario, incremental policy-making had relieved some institutional financial pressures, but created
tensions arising from lack of coherence of policy arrangements. In BC, the intractability of the tuition freeze and lack of mechanisms to relieve institutional pressures gave rise to increased pressure lobbying, given funding constraints and increased government expectations of the post-secondary system.

Similar indicators were used to identify and describe the policy problem across the three cases. In BC, these indicators included aspects of quality and access at the institutions: increases in university GPA admission requirements, increases in class sizes, decline in accessibility of upper-level courses and range of courses, longer time to degree completion, increase in student debt, capital and space problems on campus, inadequate teaching conditions, and insufficient student support services. In Ontario, the problem was electoral; in the process of platform development, issues were identified with the previous government’s approach to tuition policy. Indicators used to describe these include levels of student debt, descriptions of policy incoherence from actors within the system and the university sector in particular, tuition prices, and changes public mood. In Manitoba, the problem was defined first in terms of the impact of insufficient institutional revenue on educational quality and competitiveness, and second, questioning the efficacy of the tuition freeze as a policy lever to promote educational and social equity.

It is noteworthy that for the decision-makers in these three cases, tuition policy was not the most important component of planned or necessary post-secondary policy reform. Interviews revealed that policy actors in all cases shared the view that tuition policy was intractably linked to that of student financial aid and public funding of institutions, and was perhaps less important than the other two in terms of meeting broad public policy goals.

In spite of this understanding of the problem, tuition policy tended to dominate public focus and political activity. This aspect of these cases suggests that tuition policy is the more attractive policy lever for policy actors. This is due in part to effective agenda setting of interest organizations, and in part to the technical and communicative complexity of addressing reforms in student financial aid or institutional finance. These two aspects of agenda setting in these cases, “whereby choices look for issues, problems look for decision situations in which they can be aired, solutions look for problems to which they
might be the answer, and politicians look for pet problems or policies by which they might advance their careers” (Cohen-Vogel & McLendon, p. 739).

8.1.2. Policy goals

In all three cases, government officials represented the same overall policy goal: the provision of quality and accessible post-secondary education. The political actors appear to agree on the notion of educational quality, which can be inferred through the various indicators the governments used to monitor the policy area in these cases. These include a wide range of indicators of student and institutional performance, including teaching and learning conditions. On the matter of accessibility, however, the expressed policy goal carried slightly different connotations in terms of problem definition and desired action. Post-secondary accessibility can be defined in a number of ways, including the capacity available in an institution, a program, or a system; the degree to which institutions behave selectively or receptively; geographical proximity to educational opportunities; or in different measures of affordability for students. This overall policy goal, with its different connotations, was a successful choice for framing and interpreting political problems and policy alternatives (Cobb & Ross, 1997). In BC, the framing and focus of the policy goal was capacity in the system and reduction of excessive selectivity for admission to the research universities; the language of accessibility was used to describe financial issues faced by institutions, and therefore raised questions of capacity, rather than issues faced by individuals. Further, economic development goals were directly informing post-secondary policy, a relationship found elsewhere in Canada (Lang et al, 2000). In Ontario, accessibility emphasized both sufficient capacity within the post-secondary system and affordability to students. In Manitoba, where accessibility had previously been framed primarily in terms of a low tuition strategy, accessibility was reviewed in light of the technical information on student transitions and financial aid.

Government's instrumental goals were somewhat different. In two provinces, financial considerations were key. In BC, decision-makers wished to provide flexibility for improved financial resources to the post-secondary education system within the financial constraints of the new provincial budget and reductions in government spending. In Ontario, the commitment to a tuition freeze was intended to create an attractive
progressive election platform and build a supportive coalition of interests to win the general
election; “it was about policies that would help us get elected” (Cabinet Minister C). The
goal in Manitoba was to provide post-secondary institutions needed financial resources in
the context of constrained government finances and a policy review of the effectiveness
of the tuition freeze.

These cases show a range of agreement by decision-makers on tuition policy. In
BC, within government there was a relatively high degree of consensus on the expressed
goal; however, there were some divisions in Cabinet about the degree to which tuition
should be deregulated. In Ontario, within the Liberal party there was a relatively high
degree of consensus on the tuition freeze, given its instrumental purpose and temporary
nature. In Manitoba the cabinet and caucus were divided; there was a high level of
agreement on the problem, but little consensus on the policy decision to remove the tuition
freeze. In two jurisdictions, a lack consensus within Cabinet or government caucuses
seems to have posed only a moderate impact on the process of tuition policy change; the
lack of consensus appears to have triggered additional policy analysis prior to policy
change. This additional analysis served the purpose of socializing legislators to the conflict
(Schattschneider, 1960), an important aspect of softening up.

Softening up processes (Kingdon, 2003) are evident and important in these cases
of policy change. In BC, the government appointed and conducted in rapid succession a
fiscal review, a core services review to examine all government programs and agencies,
a budgeting and planning exercise, and a consultation on tuition policy. Each of these
activities served to signal policy change and diffuse opposition. In Ontario, while the
campaign platform promised a tuition freeze, it also signalled a future review of the policy,
which was presumed by most interests to include an exit strategy from the tuition freeze
policy. In Manitoba, the leaked story in the press served as a trial balloon, and having
gauged public and coalition partners’ reactions, government arranged for a commission
to establish the rationale for policy change and socialize the new policy with those
interests, including inside the party caucus.

The goals of tuition policy change in all three cases directly influenced the
proposed policy solution. Policy alternatives considered but rejected in BC were variations
of tuition regulation; maintaining the tuition freeze was not a policy option actively considered by decision-makers. In Ontario, there were no specific alternatives considered at the time given that the tuition freeze was not a permanent commitment. In Manitoba, a range possible tuition increases were considered; the primary decision, however, was whether or not to step away from the commitment to the tuition freeze. Complete deregulation of tuition was not considered an option.

8.2. Politics of policy formation

8.2.1. Tuition policy actors and their goals

The major policy actors are relatively similar in each of these cases, reflecting a general pattern: students and their organizations, institutions and their organizations, and politicians. While there was diversity in perspectives within and between cases, it is useful to summarize the dominant policy goals for comparative purposes. Table 8.1 shows the dominant issues of the different categories of policy actors in the three cases at the time of the policy changes.
Table 8.1. Summary of Policy Actors’ Dominant Issues and Policy Goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top issues and policy goals</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Politicians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Affordability equals accessibility in PSE</td>
<td>Insufficient funding for PSE, impacting quality and capacity</td>
<td>Financial crisis + economic development goals + need for increased funding for PSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuition freeze</td>
<td><em>Increased PSE funding, through tuition if necessary</em></td>
<td><em>Increased PSE funding, through tuition if necessary</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Affordability equals accessibility in PSE</td>
<td>PSE funding formula + student financial aid</td>
<td>Electoral goals + affordability concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuition freeze</td>
<td><em>Sufficient PSE funding, through improving overall policy framework</em></td>
<td><em>Balanced PSE policy within overall platform</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>Affordability equals accessibility in PSE</td>
<td>Insufficient funding for PSE, impacting quality</td>
<td>Financial crisis + need for increased funding for PSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuition freeze</td>
<td><em>Increased PSE funding, through tuition if necessary</em></td>
<td><em>Increased PSE funding, through tuition if necessary</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Institutions*

Individual universities, their presidents, and their membership organizations play an influential role in policy formation. The cases of British Columbia and Manitoba showed a clear relationship between university representations and policy change. In Ontario the series of events were quite different, however, the policy decision to temporarily freeze tuition, which would normally have met with significant opposition from the universities, was made more palatable by the strategic decision to fund the gap in the short term, and invest in a larger policy review in the longer term. In each of these cases, university presidents were seen by other policy actors to be powerful, having access to the premier’s office and cabinet, with influential governors and allies with alumni and donors, and were believed to have the public’s confidence in matters of post-secondary policy. In all provinces, interviewees reported that university president-premier relations are extremely important and influential; governments are believed to be wary of negative media attention on matters of university access. Further, universities as institutions, not just the presidents, also have influence as they are important forces in communities and electoral constituencies as important public institutions, employers, and drivers of economic and social development. Within this comparatively small policy systems, others have found and described this complex set of relationships and networks between universities and government (Jones, 1996, 1994; Trick, 2005).
In all three cases, the university presidents and their coalitions, and to a lesser extent colleges, were primary policy actors in setting the decision-agenda, identifying and framing the policy problem and identifying clear policy alternatives for government. In all cases, the institutions had made repeated representations to government about institutional financing and tuition policy. A concern raised in each jurisdiction was the propriety of government tuition regulation at universities, given institutional autonomy described in legislation; for colleges this was a lesser matter. In all cases there were tensions between select institutions and the others, as they were seen to be seeking special privileges, or to differentiate based on price and prestige. Universities were the primary entrepreneurs of the idea of tuition deregulation, also supported by similar messages from other institutions and business interests. This entrepreneurship tended to be undertaken privately, although a few instances occurred in the public view. The universities’ policy issues and preferences in all three cases were covered supportively by the media.

Pusser (2004b) in his study of the University of California found that university administration functions as an interest group, and that other policy actors perceived campus leaders as having their own agendas and administrative self-interest, a factor which had an influence on policy decision-making. This is similar to findings in this study; typically, institutional administrations are the only constituents within the policy subsystem to argue for higher fees, and therefore certain negative values or motives are attributed to leaders, particularly by advocates of tuition freezes. This phenomena is consistent with shift, a component identified in the ACF. Devil shift is when coalition members exaggerate the malicious motives, behaviours, and influence of opponents (Sabatier, Hunter, & McLaughlin, 1987); the ACF predicts that this will occur, and the degree of this exaggeration is influenced by the distance in policy beliefs between coalitions and past conflicts, particularly when there have been policy contest losses. It is important to note that the values of institutional leaders are not well understood in these policy episodes; their values are obscured by the nature of the advocacy work institutional presidents are required to undertake to secure resources or revenue, which often puts them in opposition to student organizations and other progressive interests. Given the role of values in the formation of strong coalitions, and the relatively loose coalitions found in this research, it may be that university and college leaders have a wider diversity of values than is
expected by other actors, or commonly understood. It is also perhaps noteworthy that *devil
shift* was similarly found in the portrayal of decision-makers in cases where tuition freeze
was removed, however politicians appeared to be less frustrated with this characterization.

**Students**

In this study, governments attended to the political activities and policy positions
of student organizations; these organizations contribute important and compelling policy
stories to the public, and have an ability to influence public opinion through mobilization of
their membership. Student interests are represented by institution-specific student
organizations (associations or unions), which are typically associated with one of two
major national student federations, CFS and CASA. These national student federations
are diverging in their political allies and choice of political communication and tactics, play
important roles in the three cases.

Many national and provincial federation student activists enjoy close ties with
different federal and provincial political parties. In all three cases, there were
representations of strong personal connections between key individuals from organized
interests and formal political parties. Particularly reported were connections between
members of the CFS and the NDP, and CASA or OUSA members and the Liberal party
of Ontario and of Canada. The relationship between individual policy actors and these
political parties was frequently commented upon, particularly cited as an explanation for
congruence between interest group platforms and party policy platforms, as well as for
policy adoption of political parties when elected. However, in this study, the connection
between party policy or election platform development and organized interests was not
found to be particularly significant in terms of policy change.

Overall across these three cases, the largest impact of the CFS affiliated student
organizations on the policy formation process is their work in setting the terms of debate.
In each case, the student organizations are seen to own the issue of tuition fees and their
communication messages shape the debate: to freeze or not to freeze. If tuition is already
frozen, the CFS will adjust their message to advocate for a reduction in fees. The tendency
for interest groups to look to exclusively occupy issue or policy “niches” has been observed
in other policy arenas (Maloney, Jordan, & McLaughlin, 1997). Notwithstanding their
agenda-setting influence, there has been uneven policy success including the two cases in this study where a tuition freeze was lifted. In the case of BC, the new centre-right government was disinterested in CFS objections to tuition fee deregulation, in part because the BC student organizations were divided on the issue, but mostly because the CFS was seen to be militant and not prepared to negotiate with the new government. Because of the large amount of political capital held by the new government and given that institutions themselves were friendly to the change, the student opposition was easily dismissed: “It’s easy to tune students out as advocates…The challenge with the students is that they were not amenable to compromise is not necessarily the right word. They were not amenable to nuance.” (Cabinet Minister A). This finding is consistent with Axelrod et al. (2012), who found that “oppositional politics and approaches have some, but limited, effect” (p.90) on influencing government policy.

In Ontario, where student interests were the most divided in political strategies and policy beliefs, both federations were temporarily aligned on the policy goal, and given the brokerage politics occurring, this alignment of interests had a positive effect on policy adoption at that time. In Manitoba, the student interests were somewhat divided, but it was the fracture in the coalition of students and the labour movement that contributed to the policy change. Given the broader context of economic conditions or competing government priorities, the conditions for student success appear to be increased in cases where brokerage politics is occurring in an electoral contest. However, as shown in the two cases of tuition freeze reversal show, having an NDP or a Liberal government in power or an institutionalized policy of frozen tuition, does not assure continued commitments to that freeze.

8.2.2. The rhetoric of tuition policy: framing and issue linkages

Edelman (1988) suggests that linking issues through language is an element of political coalition building, whether undertaken consciously or not. Language reveals the struggle over values and ideas; the “uses of language are crucial to the political analysis of public policy making and problem definition” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 9). The three cases contained very similar tuition policy rhetoric of in terms of issue framing and linkages. These linkages found include connection to financial and economic context of
the policy decision, university autonomy, decline in federal funding to provinces, and professional program fees.

Financial and economic context

As shown in Chapter 2, tuition and tuition policy is often conceptualized in the literature in financial or economic terms, ranging from government budgets and public finance (Levin, 1990; Ward, 2007) to institutional financing arrangements (Fethke, 2006), and larger economic forces (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; Heller, 1997; Johnson & Rahman, 2005). This framing of tuition policy was evident in these cases. In the two cases of change to a tuition freeze, there was an active framing of the problematic fiscal context of tuition policy. In Ontario, where austerity was not part of the policy decision, institutions and government framed the problem as a longstanding, increasingly incoherent and complex set of policy instruments related to post-secondary financing.

University autonomy

In all three cases, the issue of university autonomy was a rhetorical element of institutional policy actors’ arguments for tuition policy change, generally scaffolding arguments for improved institutional financing conditions. This particular pairing of tuition policy and university autonomy was also reflected in newspaper editorials. Only in BC was the government’s final policy decision formally framed in this light, emphasizing reduced government intrusion and the responsibility and accountability of institutional boards. One consequence of this particular framing was to diffuse negative political reactions to tuition increases away from government and onto the institutions themselves.

Federal funding decline

The federal government initiated significant cuts to the Canada Health and Social Transfer in 1995/96. Given the prevalence of articles citing the decline of federal funding to the provinces as a cause for increased tuition fees in Canada (Kirby, 1997; CAUT, 2004; Fisher et al, 2006; Conlon, 2006), this factor was anticipated in this study. However, relative to other factors, the research participants rated changing federal-provincial relations in the bottom one or two factors in each case. As a result, the changes in federal funding is not found to be a proximate factor overall for tuition policy change in these
episodes. There are, however, interesting differences between the cases and between types of policy actors.

There are slight differences between the cases in the reported linkages between federal policy change and tuition prices. In both Ontario and Manitoba, tuition increases were almost immediate in the aftermath of these federal funding cuts. Given the difficult financial conditions of the two provinces at the time, it was apparent to many system stakeholders that there was a causal relationship between the changing provincial revenue and increasing cost of education. In Ontario, this causal relationship was reinforced by the public political work of Ontario coalition partners led by Premier Rae to fight the federal changes at that time, described in section 6.2.6. In Manitoba, this perception was common; “the feds were … reducing social transfers. And so there was incredible pressure on the [government] here at the time in Manitoba to cut, so tuitions were runaway” (Elected official B).

In BC, however, the political attention to the consequence of the federal funding cuts was quite different. In this study, participants were divided in their attribution; on the one hand, to some policy actors, the federal change was “completely irrelevant” (Senior civil servant A) or “if it was a factor at all, it was pretty marginal” (University organization official A). The alternative perspective tends to be invoked in terms of policy resolution to the funding gap for institutions; “the federal government needs to increase their support of post-secondary education with their transfer payments to provinces” (Elected official A). One explanation for this difference in perspective is in how the NDP government of the day dealt with the change in public revenue. The provincial government froze tuition in 1996 as part of an electoral campaign, and as a result, any direct relationship between the federal policy change and cost of post-secondary education was obscured for the public. The implications of the federal government changes weren’t, however, obscured for policy actors in the province. From the perspective of a cabinet minister, provincial politicians from 1996 onward were all in some state of either ineffective advocacy or complete denial about the real implications of the federal budget constraints of ‘93-‘94. The NDP never found a convincing public narrative to tell about that and it was not politically in [the Liberal party] interest to say that NDP program funding choices were outside their control because then we would be letting them off the hook for the choices they made (Cabinet Minister A).
The second observable difference is in the diverging perspectives of policy actors when analyzed by participant type. Figure 8.1 shows the percent of participants who strongly agreed or agreed that changing federal-provincial relations was a factor in these episodes of tuition policy change.

![Figure 8.1. Percent of Research Participant Agreement on Federal-Provincial Relations Factor in Tuition Policy Change, by Category](Image)

Note: N=47

A few policy actors in all three cases linked tuition policy change to declining federal funding transfers to the provinces; this linkage were made by the major of faculty interests and researchers interviewed. It is notable that the decision-makers and other elected officials, as well as the members of the civil services, in all three provinces did not make this particular linkage. This difference in perspectives may explain one phenomenon observed in this policy community: faculty and student interest groups’ *venue shopping* on tuition fees in the federal arena. As described earlier, many interest groups lobby federally, including student interest groups (CASA, CFS) and faculty interest groups (CAUT); while some policy interests do have direct federal authority, such as research funding and student financial aid, tuition fees are a provincial matter. These findings may suggest that there are important differences between groups in dominant beliefs or models of causality, influencing not only their policy preferences but also their identified authority for resolution.
Professional program tuition fees

Professional program fees were outside the scope of this study, however they have arisen during this research as a potentially important factor in tuition policy change. Professional program fees have attracted attention in the literature given concerns about the effect of prices increases on enrolment (Frenette, 2008; King, Warren, & Miklas, 2004; Kwong et al., 2002). Tuition fees for professional programs increased significantly in much of Canada during the 1990s; this occurred through policy differentiation of these programs from undergraduate programs. In this study, professional programs attracted early political and policy-analytic attention; they are described in distinctive rhetoric with different policy ideas than undergraduate programs, including the balance of public/private good, the nature of the individual investment and the role of labour market outcomes on pricing, the institutional need for increased investment to meet international or national competitors’ prices and quality standards, and aspects of prestige.

In two cases, professional programs had in a sense piloted new strategies and ideas for tuition pricing, in a market deemed to be less sensitive to pricing changes and with fewer political consequences. These pilots could be seen to be incremental policy changes, and preceded major change episodes. It is possible that institutions used incremental changes to professional fees as softening up (Kingdon, 2003) for major tuition policy change, including testing student and public tolerance for increased, and often unconstrained, prices. It is also possible that through these incremental changes, market concepts were successfully introduced and international policy borrowing was successful.

Role of elections

Scholars have noted the relative importance of the electoral cycle in policy-making, and in post-secondary policy in particular (Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001; McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005; McLendon & Ness, 2003; Wong & Shen, 2002). In this study, proximity to the general election is a notable factor, with each policy change implemented early in each government’s mandate. The policy change was a specific campaign promise in only one of the three cases, Ontario. Interviewees in all three cases reported

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4 Professional programs include medicine, dentistry, law, or graduate level business education.
“conventional wisdom” of government: make significant policy change early in the mandate, particularly if those changes could be unpopular, in order to have those changes institutionalized in time for the next election.

In the case of both BC and Manitoba, there is no direct relationship between implied or explicit campaign promises of the winning parties and the tuition policy outcome. However, these results likely understate the degree to which tuition policy does become embedded in political party platforms in Canada. In both Manitoba and BC’s electoral history, previous governments had made a campaign promise of a tuition freeze, and those political parties (both NDP) won the general elections. Examination of further cases of tuition policy change might reveal stronger evidence of a relationship.

8.2.3. Influence strategies

A key question for stakeholders is how to effectively advance policy interests. The outside initiative model considers the efforts of individuals or groups to gather broader support for its concerns or policy goals; this includes galvanizing political support (Cobb & Elder, 1983). The inside access model considers the efforts of a relative few number or a narrow group of individuals to place a policy issue on a government agenda with little or no attention from the public (Cobb, Ross, & Ross, 1976). Using a framework adapted from Binderkrantz (2005) to distinguish between activities interest groups pursue, Table 8.2 shows strategies used by groups in these policy episodes. Direct strategies involve approaching politicians or civil servants, and indirect strategies involve using the media or mobilization of supporters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Direct strategies</th>
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<th>Indirect strategies</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Administrative strategy</td>
<td>Parliamentary strategy</td>
<td>Media strategy</td>
<td>Mobilization strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individual Institutions</td>
<td>Contacting the relevant minister; civil servants; Responding to requests for comments; Actively using public consultations</td>
<td>Presenting to committees of the legislature; Contacting other members of parliament</td>
<td>Writing letters to the editor and columns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Coalitions</td>
<td>Contacting the relevant minister; civil servants; Responding to requests for comments; Actively using public consultations</td>
<td>Presenting to committees of the legislature; Contacting other members of parliament</td>
<td>Writing letters to the editor and columns; Publicizing analyses and research reports</td>
<td>Arranging public meetings and conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Contacting the relevant minister, civil servants; Actively using public consultations</td>
<td>Presenting to committees of the legislature; Contacting party organizations; Contacting party spokespersons, political staff; Contacting other members of parliament</td>
<td>Contacting reporters; Issuing press releases and holding press conferences; Writing letters to the editor and columns; Publicizing analyses and research reports</td>
<td>Arranging public meetings and conferences; Conducting petitions; Arranging direct action and public demonstrations; Organizing letter-writing campaigns</td>
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Note: Adapted from Binderkrantz (2005)
In these three cases, institutions and their coalitions tend to emphasize direct strategies, and while student organizations overall take advantage of all opportunities afforded through direct and indirect strategies, CFS organizations generally support more outsider tactics than CASA affiliated or independent organizations. The literature generally suggests that insider tactics are more likely to be effective in influencing public policy, a finding supported in all three cases in this study (Baumgartner et al. 2009a; Beyers & Braun, 2014; Binderkrantz, 2005; Jordan & Maloney, 1997). The government perspective on insider and outsider tactics is illustrated by these comments from an Ontario cabinet minister, typical of policymaker perspectives in this study:

I’m not sure that [CFS] work out the big picture. I don’t think it’s their intention to work out the big picture. I think quite often their intention is to stir up debate, but not necessarily to come up with solution... a tuition freeze is unrealistic, because to unilaterally freeze tuition would beg the question – so how are you going to fund the delivery of the same programs that the students are expecting to have?... [on the other hand] we valued OUSA’s rigour, research, objectivity, creativity. (Cabinet Minister B)

Even in the case of the tuition freeze, a policy goal sought by the CFS-O, the policy decision was predominantly achieved through insider tactics. The cost of insider tactics, however, is that policy change will be incremental in nature, termed “bargainable incrementalism” (Maloney, Jordan & McLaughlin, 1994, p.36), a view shared by many of the policy actors in this study.

Gais and Walker (1991) predicted that choice of insider strategies or outsider strategies is determined by several factors including nature of the participants, group resources, and degree of conflict faced in the policy contest. The literature is not conclusive about why certain tactics are selected, however Jones (1995) noted that the increased institutionalization of student organizations brought with it increased pressure to work within formal structures and not through outsider tactics, such as protest; this type of shift has been observed in other sectors (Jordan & Maloney, 1997). In instances where student interests are quite divided, a typical point of division is the choice of tactics; in Ontario, generally OUSA preferred insider strategies and CFS preferred outsider tactics to achieve policy goals. The explanation for the choice of tactics in these policy episodes could be explained by the group’s core purpose; Walker (1991) found that the first priority
for groups leaders is to find an organizational strategy that will ensure the continued existence of their group, and their choice of tactics usually arises out of this search (p. 105). Further, tactics are generally consistent with the group’s character; protest organizations are inclined toward outsider tactics, and some groups are “almost forced into an outside strategy of public persuasion and political mobilization” (Walker, 1991, p. 105-106). Previous scholarly research into Canadian student organizations had reported that individual university and college student organizations felt they had relatively little influence on provincial government policies, although they reported spending substantial time monitoring government policy (Jones, 1995).

8.2.4. What are the politics of tuition fees?

It has been observed that scholars in higher education have tended to frame policy decisions in terms of system design, reflecting a strategic management conception of policy-making, and assuming that policy-making is technical exercise (Warne, 2008). This study shows the centrality of politics to these policy-making processes; in fact, there is little evidence at all of technical policy-making in these final decisions. For policymakers, tuition policy can serve important political functions far beyond important stated educational and social goals; it is a useful reminder that public education is “a profoundly political institution” and is a particularly interesting intersection of ideas, institutions, and interests (McDonnell, 2009). Tuition policy is model political policy: a salient issue with both a populist and a highly complicated administrative nature, and a scant, contradictory literature, with well-resourced issue proponents in a long-standing political contest.

Given the evidence that politics affects policy, and that it has a critical role to play in the various aspects of policy formation, it is important to briefly identify a few of the key themes which emerged in the study regarding the particular politics of tuition fees. I begin by differentiating types of political influences on policy: partisan models, which stem from political ideology, and opportunistic models, in which all governments show opportunistic tendencies for electoral success (Alesina, Roubini & Cohen, 1997).
Ideology and tuition policy partisanship

The Canadian policy debate over tuition fees is squarely situated within a broader normative debate on the purpose of post-secondary education; this debate includes societal goals of social equity, and the means to achieve it. Typically, the argument turns to responsibilities and obligations of the state and individual in financing higher education. Conflicting tuition policy ideas are in many ways representative of this more general ideological debate: competing political positions of those who favour government regulation and social investment by the state, versus those who prefer market-oriented solutions and personal investment for the individual benefit, or those who argue that austerity measures require change to the balance of individual and state investment in post-secondary education. Lowi famously declared that “policies determine politics” (Lowi, 1972, p. 299); his view was that the anticipated outcomes of policy alternatives (distributive, redistributive or regulatory outcomes) shaped the issues and political debates.

These ideological contests have at their core powerful differences in values and beliefs, differences which are also reflected in the scholarly literature; Slaughter (1990) observed that the post-secondary policy literature is “ordered by questions of access and equity, which are countered with issues of excellence, quality, and autonomy” (p.11). One explanation for the extensive and seemingly intractable factual disputes which abound in this policy arena is cultural cognition; individuals resist accepting information that threatens their cultural commitments:

Essentially, cultural commitments are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged political issues. Culture is prior to facts, moreover, not just in the evaluative sense that citizens might care more about how gun control, the death penalty, environmental regulation and the like cohere with their cultural values than they care about the consequences of those policies. Rather, culture is prior to facts in the cognitive sense that what citizens believe about the empirical consequences of those policies derives from their cultural worldviews. Based on a variety of overlapping psychological mechanisms, individuals accept or reject empirical claims about the consequences of controversial polices based on their vision of a good society. (Kahan & Braman, 2006, p. 138)

In the formal politics of government and policy-making, tuition policy evokes ideological symbolism that can serve a partisan function, typically in the glue or
maintenance of political coalitions, as the ACF would suggest. In this case policy development occurs in response to cultural commitments and shared values, rather than technical-analytic processes. Tuition policy supports a powerful political narrative; it is sufficiently powerful to be attractive to political parties seeking to differentiate themselves in electoral contests. Pusser (2004b) found a post-secondary institution used as an “instrument in a broader struggle for the control of political and economic benefits” (p.213); in his view, key to understanding dynamics of higher education policy formation was “acknowledging the instrumental and symbolic value in broader political contests” (p.211):

the heightened visibility and symbolic importance of higher education policymaking...makes public universities attractive sites of contest for external political actors and interest groups As a key site of the allocation of public costs and benefits, the university is an important political institution. Such issues...have great salience in the state and for major political parties and their constituents. (p.215)

There were many instances in this study of policy actors reporting the importance of political differentiation, and how tuition policy could and did serve that purpose. Consider this characteristic example from a BC cabinet minister on the this issue, which emerged as a theme in the politics in this study:

Let me be careful to distinguish between two kinds of differentiation. One is "We're not them." Simple. You know, there is the NDP and the BC Liberals. The other is to introduce ideology into the debate...it's sometimes as simple as looking for the argument that represents a clear distinction between you and the opposition. And much less about the search for the right public policy answer. (Cabinet Minister A)

**Electoral opportunism**

The relationship between tuition policy change and electoral success is an interesting question. Tuition policy played a role in larger political contests and agendas in the provinces in this study. The specific dynamics of this role is a challenge to identify given many contradictions expressed even by the same policy actors. On the one hand, cabinet members interviewed in all three provinces reported that this was not a pivotal policy from their perspectives; tuition policy was important to the overall policy agenda, but was not a flagship policy issue or choice in these particular episodes: “It’s not the dominant flavor of the serving, but it’s an important ingredient [in elections]” (Cabinet...
Minister C). Elected officials in this study even expressed some skepticism about the direct electoral importance post-secondary policy:

the linkage between post-secondary policy and electability I don’t think can be strongly documented...except if you have been particularly good to post-secondary institutions in [smaller] communities, there’s electoral benefits...but when you do polling about what’s important to people, these things never score very high. (Cabinet Minister C)

I’ve knocked on thousands of doors and no one has ever said “We want you to put more money into post-secondary institutions, or into post-secondary education”. (Cabinet Minister B)

And yet at the same time, the same policy actors report attentiveness to the issue: “tuition policy is one of these perennial issues, I don’t think it will ever not be an issue” (Cabinet Minister B) and “You’ve got to do it, but it never appears prominently...[Tuition policy] is part of your inventory of public policy tools and public policy responsibilities “ (Cabinet Minister C). It is expected that politicians would evaluate issues or policies in terms of competition and electoral appeal; Cohen, Moffitt and Goldin (2007) found that politicians do not always aim for policy success as policy designs reflect political considerations, and policy outcomes include “politics as well as practice” (p. 523).

These seemingly contradictory stances can be explained in two ways, first in terms brokerage politics, and second, retail politics. An important factor in policy and politics is issue salience, or the relative importance or prominence of an issue to the needs or aspirations of voters. As tuition fees involve people directly, aspects can be well understood by voters as a pocketbook issue they might be able to influence, and it may have aspirational significance to many others (Clift et al, 1997). As a result, tuition fees have significant political salience for middle class voters; although fees are not the only salient issue in higher education (quality, credentialing, accessibility), they appear to have a signaling function for many post-secondary policy features. When tuition fees are framed as a social, political or ethical problem, it draws in or attracts support from a larger and broader range of stakeholders (Howlett & Lindquist, 2004); likewise, when tuition fees are framed as a technical problem, experts generally dominate the debate and decision-making. As a result, the framing of tuition fees has an impact on brokerage success and in successful coalition building.
Tuition policy is also seen by some policy actors to be useful in retail politics. Politicians need to be seen to be responsive to constituency concerns and public opinion, and post-secondary policy can be a “very powerful tool” (Cabinet Minister A) in swing ridings and in smaller constituencies. In this study the electoral calculations of tuition policy decisions are surprisingly simple. Tuition policy change does not mean you’re not going to get elected or doesn’t guarantee you will get elected. I mean, I’m still uncertain about who the constituents are. ... And so what you’re trying to do is strike a balance that is reasonably fair to a host of competing considerations and is not necessarily the right answer, but is the best answer that you can come to... It's a rare moment when public policy is the trumping factor...The search for the happy marriage between the right answer and electoral success is the fundamental driving tension. That happy marriage, the electoral side of that happy marriage operates both at the sort of provincial level and at the local level. (Cabinet Minister A)

Other scholars have noted connections between post-secondary policies and electoral politics. Griswald and Marie (1996) observed a relationship between middle class voters and tuition fees, and Ness (2010) found connection between merit aid policy formation and electoral goals. McLendon (2000) found an electoral connection and an instrumental value of higher education policy to political goals, placing higher education squarely within the stream of state electoral politics and links it to the vicissitudes of the larger political arena in a way not currently documented in the published literature...even as campuses are employed as political instruments of state, the institutions themselves may enjoy a reciprocal leverage over elected officials. (p. 332)

One might imagine that the politics of protest might have an impact on retail politics in tuition policy episodes; Pusser (2004b) found a positive outcome from student resistance, for example, and student organizations often claim credit for favourable policy decisions. In this study, while there were mobilizations of public protest in both BC and Manitoba, the contested policy change itself did not appear to have any negative electoral consequences, and public opinion reported in the media was generally supportive. The protest dynamics within this study function more as a backdrop, an element of bargaining and political power which interest groups hold in their formation of political allies, such as the case in Ontario.
Delinieating lines and sources of conflict

A few scholars have considered the causes of conflict over tuition policy. Johnstone (2004) notes that conflict over tuition policy and tuition fee charges is an international phenomenon, and describes the bases of conflict: (a) technical, or based in an analysis that cost-sharing strategies cannot work for a variety of context-based reasons, (b) strategic, in that the political acceptance of cost-sharing tuition policies ultimately disadvantages higher education policy, relative to competing claims on public revenue, and (c) ideological, which he describes as the most important and fundamental of reasons for conflict. The ideological opposition to tuition fees, or increases in tuition fees, draws on a range of views critical of markets, private ownership and international mobility of capital, as well as international mobility of production and trade; it also critiques the acceptance of continuing social and economic inequalities.

Here in Canada, a key to the nature of the politics of post-secondary education may be found in Slaughter (1988):

it may be necessary to conceive of the State and higher education as engaged in multiple and sometimes conflicting functions simultaneously. For example, the State and higher education are both the subject and object of struggle. They are arenas of conflict in which various groups try to win ideological hegemony yet at the same time they are resources for members of contending groups intent on political mobilization in external arenas. (p.245)

A related theme in the study was the question of competing notions of quality decision-making. Interviewees from each province expressed a central tension felt by many within the policy community: “is x tuition policy good policy or just good politics?” The distance between political decision-makers and those actors who would prefer more “rational” policymaking is aggravated by policy changes which seem reactive or reflect short-term thinking. Members of policy subsystems can cite multiple examples of this type of government policymaking in post-secondary education, rather than through “rational, planned, or coherent response to perceived needs” (Lang et al, 2000, p. 14). From the alternative perspective, good politics and good policy are not mutually exclusive:

I would say responsible fiscal management was good politics, and expanding post-secondary access was good politics. And tuition policy was the necessary evil to accomplish the two bits of good politics. So if you believe a few commentators who
have experience in the area, in the long-term, good politics and good policy are one and the same thing. (Senior civil servant A)

Some lessons can be drawn regarding Canadian politics and post-secondary policymaking generally. First, this is an important field of analysis which can inform both scholars and policy-practitioners; this field can provide critical process knowledge close examination of the actors, the context, and the dynamics of agenda-setting and decision-making in post-secondary policy contests. Second, much like Warne’s observation, scholars and practitioners will benefit from addressing the often-missing factor of the practice of politics in their policy analysis and advocacy; addressing the factor of politics overcomes the analytical limitations of viewing policy process as rational, and addresses some of the observed complexities in policy generation (Weaver-Hightower, 2008).

8.3. Stability of policy coalitions over time

The stability of policy coalitions is a key element of the ACF; policy change can arise from shocks internal to coalitions, or from external shocks to coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In all three provinces, the major organized coalitions are those of post-secondary institutions and of students. Within the three policy subsystems, there are broader coalitions incorporating these specific coalitions. These align fairly consistently over the time period and in the provinces covered in this study: left-leaning or progressive coalitions formed by student, faculty, and labour interests and allied with the NDP or a left-centre Liberal party, and right-leaning or conservative coalitions formed by business interests, a Conservative or right-centre Liberal party, and sometimes, individual institutional administrations. According to the ACF, in major controversies within a policy subsystem, when “policy core beliefs are in dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over a long period” (Weible & Sabatier, 2005, p. 129).

8.3.1. Student coalitions

From a comparative perspective, this study shows overall that changes in student coalitions are associated with tuition policy change. The student movement has been somewhat unstable in all three provinces, and nationally. Student interests are
represented by institution-specific student organizations, which are typically associated with one of two major national student federations. These two umbrella organizations compete for membership, sometimes quite acrimoniously; membership contributes significant financial as well as political resources. As discussed earlier in the Ontario case, the primary national student coalition, the Canadian Federation of Students (CFS), experienced internal shocks in the 1990s with the split of several student organizations to form a competitor federation, the Canadian Alliance of Student Associations (CASA). CASA has experienced growth since its inception in 1995, with five large founding members\(^5\). CASA’s original emphasis was to focus on policy development issues specific to post-secondary education rather than social development, and to advocate only within the federal jurisdiction, leaving provincial advocacy to member associations. In these three cases, the only CASA-affiliated association found to have a significant role in tuition policy change was the Ontario Undergraduate Student Association (OUSA) in Ontario, described in detail in that case.

The national CFS has grown substantially since 1991 in terms of membership and financial resources and is the only student coalition strongly indicated as influential in all three cases. The following graph illustrates the pattern of annual and overall growth.

\(^5\) University of British Columbia Alma Mater Society, University of Alberta Students’ Union, University of Saskatchewan Students’ Union, University of Waterloo Federation of Students, and Student Society of McGill University.
This growth has allowed for increase in expenditures on activities key to improved policy advocacy, including publications, communications, and research to support annual campaigns on their issues. Given that the primary policy concern is tuition fees, this results in a significant expenditure on the issue. Further, increased membership lends potential individual and group mobilization on key issues, and therefore presents some potential for influence during elections and annual budget development. This growth may contribute to the perception in all three provinces that the CFS has gained influence over the last two decades.

Each of the three cases of policy change illustrates a policy environment in which multiple active networks of organized interests coordinate activity, and in each case, these networks experienced significant internal and external shocks. In BC, the student coalition while growing in strength in terms of membership and financial resources, had internal divisions and suffered from internal lack of focus. This attention shift within the student coalition, in combination with the relative disarray of the other politically progressive
organized interests, including the NDP, contributed to an atmosphere where the coalitions of overall progressive interests had been significantly weakened. In Ontario, the most significant shock was shifting conflict and then policy agreement between the two major student organizations, the CFS-O and OUSA. Deeply held values differences continued, however there was increasing coordination between OCUFA, CFS-O and OUSA, along with other public education interests, to achieve common policy goals including a tuition freeze. In Manitoba, the one significant shock was the break between the leaders of the Manitoba Federation of Labour and the CFS-MB as a result of was insufficient coordination between coalition members, and diverging policy goals; these diverging goals proved significant enough to cause a break, taking precedent over previous coalition agreements.

8.3.2. University and college coalitions

Across the three cases, the coalitions of institutions are relatively stable, given membership, mandate, and influence; large shifts or breaks in those coalitions are relatively rare. These coalitions can vary in internal cohesion and effectiveness, depending on the strength or “glue” of the shared values and beliefs of the members (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The strength and coordination of coalitions appears to be associated with policy change in these episodes.

Each of the three cases shows internal and external shocks to university and college coalitions. In BC, the university coalition gained momentum through changes to the organization’s focus and resources, which the other institutional coalition of colleges and institutes dissolved. Manitoba did not have a membership organization to represent universities given the small size of the system, but the engineering accreditation crisis at the University of Manitoba brought attention to the issue to tuition fees and illustrated the division between the flagship institution and others. In Ontario, there was a lack of internal cohesion on policy preferences within the universities within the COU.

Colleges in all three provinces tend to have common values and policy interests, and lower levels of intra-group conflict than the universities; the case of British Columbia’s college and institute coalition (AECBC) is a rare example, illustrating how individual
members and their political agendas can undermine the viability of a membership organization. Colleges also appear to have relatively lower level of influence with policy-makers than universities, with colleges focusing on efforts to cultivate influence with the civil service much more than elected officials. In all cases the colleges were perceived to be benefiting from university policy advocacy and agenda-setting.

Universities in these cases, on the other hand, have more fragile alliances, in the sense that there is a greater diversity of member values and beliefs, and higher levels of intra-group conflict. In Ontario, for example, the individual institutions coordinated strategy and messaging with the COU on some common issues, but some had a preference for their own government lobbying and were at odds with the collective position. In case of tuition fees, there was internal disagreement between university presidents regarding strategy. Some presidents were in favour of tuition price controls, as they believed that their markets were tuition price-sensitive, had institutional values rooted in affordability and accessibility, or were apprehensive of the internal politics and consequences of a deregulation episode in their institutions. From a strategic perspective, some institutions were motivated to keep tuition low as they felt they could perform better financially on increased enrolment rather than price. Others were on a mission to substantially increase fees; individual institutions, and faculties within institutions, were policy entrepreneurs of tuition deregulation, and in particular, high tuition and high aid approaches.

### 8.3.3. Faculty and special purpose coalitions

Previous research found that political activity of Canadian faculty organizations is steered more by provincial than independent associations (Anderson & Jones, 1998); faculty associations did not play a significant role in these policy episodes. In BC and Manitoba, there were no identified shocks or changes of resources or activity with the two major faculty coalitions; in Ontario, there was increasing coordination between OCUFA, CFS-O and OUSA, along with other public education interests, to achieve common policy goals including a tuition freeze. Further, the traditional alliance between many progressive organized interests and the NDP gave way to endorsement of the Liberals. Others have called for examination into the political alliances between internal university constituencies
and external interest groups and political institutions, and their impact on both governance
and policymaking (Pusser, 2004b).

In two provinces, formal politically progressive coalitions formed in the 1990s to
promote public education, and these continue to the present day. In British Columbia, the
BC Coalition for Public Education was formed in response to concerns about attacks on
public education generally, including commercialization and privatization, and was
comprised of labour unions, teacher unions, professional associations, student unions,
and the provincial Federation of Labour. Coalition members often took different policy
positions on tuition fees, but there was common concern about the issues of
commercialization, accessibility, and affordability in post-secondary education. In Ontario,
there was a similar coalition, the Ontario University and College Coalition, with similar
membership and goals. In this study, there is no indication that these two special purpose
coalitions had an effect on the policy decision, nor in shaping the policy agenda.

8.3.4. Information sharing in these subsystems

Information sharing was found within coalitions, and between provincial branches
of national coalitions, and to a lesser extent, institutions. Institutional coalitions function to
provide information sharing internally, and to some degree with other institutional
c Coalitions, however this was not a major activity within the policy subsystem. There were
few formal negotiated agreements between policy actors in any of the cases. The most
common form of information sharing is political in nature, such as strategies for advocacy
and lessons learned from other provinces. The other example of information sharing is
commissioned research funded and shared by student and faculty coalitions to support
their policy advocacy, including opinion polling and economic analyses.

8.3.5. Brokerage politics

This study raises questions on the limits of brokerage politics and the practice of
c ailation building on post-secondary educational policy issues. This study found patterns
in brokerage politics in all three provinces. In the case of Ontario, the brokerage was
evident in the Liberal party coalition building for the election. In BC, the research university
interests aligned with economic development interests and the developing platform of the BC Liberal party. In Manitoba, the progressive coalition of interests brokered by the NDP was fragmenting at the time of the policy change. Carroll and Ratner (2005; 2007) found similar issues within a BC NDP government, which came to power in the 1990s with organized labour at the core of its constituency. During the duration of that government, the relations between social movements and the political party became “increasingly ambivalent”; the major problem with brokerage was the tendency for policy formation to lose its coherence (Carrol & Ratner, 2005, p. 173). Carroll & Ratner (2007) describe challenges of balancing pragmatism, principles, and the challenge of communicating and maintaining a socially progressive vision while managing the business of government; these challenges are apparent in the policy histories of all three provinces, although not in each of the specific cases.

The ACF suggests that coalitions formed loosely on policy preferences rather than deep core values are more fragile. A gap found in the study is the conceptual link to explain or understand coalition behaviours and practices in the policy subsystem, in the brokered arrangements of party politics, potentially the unique challenges required for progressive governments to govern effectively. Given the level of political contest on tuition fees in the provinces and the changing ways in which social movements are interacting with governments on policy issues, further research in this area is implicated.

8.4. Influence of elected and non-elected policy actors

8.4.1. Politicians

The influential elected actors in all three cases were the premiers and senior members of cabinet, who set the overall decision agenda of government. The premiers in each case reportedly had a particular interest in the post-secondary education policy, and tuition policy in particular, and desired resolution to the problems in the university system in particular. The premiers in all three cases were experienced and seasoned politicians with well-organized and well-staffed parties at the time of the policy change. By most accounts, the decision for policy change in all cases was made in the centre; the major actors were the premiers, ministers, and their senior political staff. In BC and Ontario, the
decision reflected a general consensus with cabinet; in Manitoba, the Premier had a more divided caucus and some outspoken divisions within Cabinet, and made the decision with the support and encouragement of his Minister. Premiers are ultimately the decision-maker by the nature of cabinet government; in these three cases they were seen as solidly in favour of the policy change. In the case of BC and Ontario, there were coalition politics involved, brokered by the party leader as part of the election platform development in Ontario, and as the early government agenda in BC. Interestingly, all three Premiers are described as having a strong, centrist management approach, or “command and control” style. This finding is consistent with other observations; the Westminster system has seen an increasing concentration of power in the executive branch in Canadian provinces toward Premier-centred government (Howlett et al, 2005; Savoie, 1999; White, 2005).

8.4.2. The civil services

The non-elected actors within each of the civil services played only a supporting role, with the exception of BC. The convention of the Westminster system is that senior civil services are required to be politically agnostic and anonymous. However they do play a role in supporting or providing a sympathetic ear to coalition policy arguments, based on their own independent policy analysis – and that policy-analytic capacity can vary tremendously from province to province, or in the same province over time. In all three cases hidden policy entrepreneurship was also being undertaken within government; in all three cases the civil service was generally alive to the policy problems and had completed analysis of different policy alternatives. Only in the case of British Columbia was it suggested that an aspect of the civil service, the Core Services Review, had a direct effect on the policy selection. Given the confidential nature of cabinet government, the relationship between the Core Service Review and cabinet is undetermined. Unlike research elsewhere, this study did not find influential hidden policy actors such as powerful think tanks or philanthropic foundations (Slaughter, 1990).

The civil service can be thought as a coalition in one sense, in that there are traditionally held values and beliefs, conventions, and field knowledge expected of and inculcated in government Ministries over a lengthy period of time and within a common culture. One factor uncovered in two of the cases, BC and Ontario, was that the traditional
civil service was in the process of being hugely disrupted through workforce adjustments through reorganization and staff reductions, as well as the deliberate import of new values to the civil service by new governments, that is, the system of New Public Management. These changes functioned as major shocks to the policy community. Administrative agencies have more moderate positions than interest groups and thus often act as policy brokers or intermediaries between coalitions (Sabatier, 1998); this view is consistent with the representations made about the views of the civil services at the time of the policy change.

8.4.3. The effect of political structure on tuition fee policy formation

The effect of the political structure is seen most strikingly in the nature of cabinet government; in each of these cases, centrist decision-making style is consistent with that described in the literature. In each case, there were divisions within cabinet on aspects of the tuition policy change, however the preference of the premier prevailed. Only in Manitoba was the lack of cabinet solidarity a matter represented as common knowledge in the policy subsystem. Manitoba is also only case which had an intermediary or coordinating body as a structural component of post-secondary administration, which appears to have had no role in the policy change in spite of the fact that it had legislative authority over tuition policy. This finding is consistent with Hearn and Griswold (1994), who found that the presence of a coordinating board made no difference in their study of American policy innovation.

The effect of the political culture is notable in each policy episode. In BC the polarized and ideological political environment manifested the manner in which the government and progressive coalitions continued class-referenced conflict. In Ontario, the relatively recent political instability and political party repositioning informed the Liberal party's electoral strategy, coalition-building to include broad progressive and centrist interests. Manitoba’s cautious and accommodating political culture resulted in a cautious and consultative approach in introducing radical policy change, using a rational policy analysis approach, and a longer implementation horizon.
Further, the political economy context of each province influenced the degree of regulation chosen. The three cases represent three different antecedent policies, and three different policy choices, ranging in the degree of regulation. Regulatory policy issues are those that involve allocation of public funds on a contested issue, have engaged interest groups, and are forming in an environment in which there are winners and losers. Economic rationales and ideologies both have been found to be inadequate for causal explanation for regulatory behaviour on the part of government; regulation must be understood in context of the political behaviour of governing politicians (Doern, 2005). Tuition policy can be seen as regulatory policy, as it affects and alters private spending, sets pricing practices and controls as fiscal policy, and is backed by sanctions of the state. The regulatory choices of governments express how governments perceive nature of the policy problem and the appropriate role of government in addressing those problems. Each policy choice can be understood in the political context of the policy episode. Ontario’s policy choice is consistent with the political need for the most visible or salient form of regulation, the “frozen” tuition policy, given the context of an electoral contest and the need to signal progressive values to the electorate and coalition partners. Manitoba’s policy choice, consistent with its political culture, moderated both values and financial circumstances to a compromise position. British Columbia’s policy choice reflects the deregulation generally supported by the political supporters of the Liberal party, as well as the financial context in which that particular decision-making occurred.

8.4.4. Use of technical information and experts

Interview respondents in all three cases reported monitoring policy decisions on tuition in other jurisdictions, and using provincial and national averages of tuition prices as reported by Statistics Canada in its annual report. Policy actors in these cases used this report to inform policy arguments in their jurisdiction, typically framing their argument relative to others; developing positions that tuition is too low, too high, or about right, based on rank in the table. Each case used comparative indicators, such as funding per student or tuition fees for undergraduate and professional programs. Each case compared institutional and provincial data to other institutions and jurisdictions in Canada, as well as in the United States. Decision-makers were aware of different research arguments, however the research itself was not a key factor in decision-making. This is consistent with
utilization research, which has shown that policymakers do not make direct instrumental use of policy analysis or policy evaluation in policy decisions (Shulock, 1999) and can show conceptual or political use of research (Ness, 2010).

The use of research by decision-makers in these cases might best be described as the following: decisions were taken with consideration of the available research, and interpreted through their political evaluation of the current context. The balance of evidence with politics is not consistent across the three episodes. To paraphrase from research in health policy on the role of evidence decision-making: in these cases of tuition policy change, evidence when necessary but not necessarily evidence (Willison & MacLeod, 1999). This is an important implication from this research.

Drawing upon the notion of a climate of ideas, as described by Levin (2001), in which actors in a policy environment develop mental models of cause and effect, effective and ineffective interventions, this particular policy area suffers from lack of politically neutral policy evaluation; most of the prevailing ideas on the impact of tuition policy change emerge from the policy stories told by interest organizations. These stories may be grounded in research, however the explicit goal-oriented nature of the research ensures that the results are contested in the broader policy debate. The role of ideology in defining policy problems in this policy area is clearly represented in the policy analysis of interest organizations. In that sense, all cases reveal the social construction of policy problems. Policy actors define and frame troubling social problems in ways that claim causal relationships in ways that suggest preferred policy solutions to the problem. The political contests between policy actors arise from the differences and competition between these social constructions, as blurring of lines between ideas and interests (Kingdon). Rosen (2009) describes the politics of representation, in which competition occurs between different actors to explain policy problems and policy remedies:

These explanations are embedded in policy solutions and often take the form of compelling narratives that allocate responsibility for these problems to particular evils and provide persuasive, relatively simple solutions for them. These reassuring accounts contain and reduce the inherent complexities of education, assigning simple, stable explanations and motives to unstable, ambiguous, and highly complex events and conditions. Such accounts can be thought of as myths: stories that help individuals make sense of social life... the central
consideration in the analysis of narrative or myth-making as a social process is thus not the accuracy of a given account, but the extent to which it provides a satisfactory explanation for a situation that helps people make sense of their experience and orient their future action: that is, its commensurability with perceived reality (regardless of whether or not it also conforms to the facts, which are frequently ambiguous anyway). Indeed, powerful myths actually shape the interpretation of evidence, such that facts that contradict them may be overlooked or ignored. (p. 271)

St. John & Paulsen (2001) posed important questions on the use of information in policy-making: first, how can evaluative information on the impact of finance policies be used to inform government policy decisions, and second, “or is ideology, coupled with advocacy by interest groups, too compelling a force to make use of evaluative information?” (p. 557). In these three cases, the relative scarcity of technical information contributes to contests over the meaning and implications of the existing evidence. In each of the episodes, policy actors offered competing research claims as to the impact of tuition on enrolment, as well as the distribution of benefits of post-secondary education; policy actors adopted the research that supported their particular policy agenda, and tended to discount the alternatives. Further, given the partisanship or ideological stances assumed by many of the producers of technical information on tuition issues, the research tends to align along those opposing lines. As a result, any scientific debate in the policy subsystem on tuition policy does not prevail over political values or ideology, and most of the prevailing ideas on the impact of tuition policy change emerge from the policy stories told by interest organizations. Policy actors in all three cases linked their policy advocacy to their assessment of the impacts of previous tuition policies, typically negative. These assessments of policy impacts are largely made by specifically commissioned research, partisan think tanks, or publically funded research enterprises. These descriptions of policy impacts are further linked to policy actors’ beliefs regarding the role of tuition policy, or broader purpose of post-secondary education, in values terms. Therefore, the contrasting policy stories of tuition policy impacts support ideational contests of the actors.

Only in Manitoba did the government formally call upon an expert; Dr. Benjamin Levin was called upon to run the Commission. In the case of Manitoba, debate became formalized within government rather than between government and opposition, as in BC, or competing political parties, as in Ontario. The establishment of the Manitoba
commission was an institutional response, intended to bring objective evidence into a values-informed policy analysis, and satisfy the policy community that satisfactory consideration had been made on both questions. This was important as for many in the caucus and in the party, accessibility was an important value as well as a policy goal, and future electoral success was an important consideration. This process is a widely used symbolic strategy that publically accepts the reasonableness of a debate while it avoids immediate commitment; governments choose commissions as they can serve to broaden the base of political support and legitimate concerns (Cobb & Ross, 1997). The choice of commission is consistent with the role of policy broker, for Weible and Sabatier (2005), policy brokers often mediate between advocacy coalitions engaged in intense political conflict. Policy brokers “seek to find reasonable compromise among hostile coalitions” (Weible & Sabatier, 2005, p. 128); politicians, civil servants or courts can assume this role.

8.5. The effects of external influences

There were two areas of external influence found in these policy episodes: financial and public opinion. The primary influential factor in policy deliberations on tuition policy in these three cases was financial, both the effect of the fiscal climate on provincial budgets and the effect of changing government funding on institutions.

Public mood for change and public opinion appear to be consistent with major policy change. In all three cases, both the interview data and review of media coverage revealed a change in public mood. In spite of interest group perceptions to the contrary, each policy change in this study was supported generally by public opinion. The public mood for change in BC and in Ontario resulted in a change in government and attendant policy commitments, including a change in tuition policy. In Manitoba, the mood for change was gradual within the policy community, and combined with the changing public mood on tuition fees, resulted in a significant influence on policy deliberations. These changes are consistent with the responsiveness literature, which describes a strong link between public opinion and policy decisions (Jacobs & Shapiro, 1994; Soroka, 2002; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010), and with previous research on tuition fees in Canada. Lang et al (2000) noted the effect of the media and public opinion on tuition fee decisions in the Ontario
Cabinet in the early 1990s, and in particular, the political difficulties of tuition fee increases, both with universities and with negative public reaction.

In all three cases, the final policy decision was consistent with the recommendations of editorials in the major papers in those jurisdictions. The role of the media is vital in agenda-setting; issue visibility is critical, and news coverage or editorial attention gives issue visibility. Soroka (2002) asked the important question, why do media, public, and policy agendas move together sometimes and not others? The recursive nature of the reciprocal relationship between media, the attentive public, and policymakers and policymaking renders it difficult to be conclusive about agenda-setting. On the one hand, there is an observed pattern or correlation between the content of newspaper editorials and the public policy decisions of governments in the three examined episodes. However, it is not clear if the editorials are reflecting public sentiment or shaping it, or shaping the alternatives on formal agenda or reporting on policy ideas already under active consideration, reporting on or driving the policy agenda. The two theoretical frameworks used in this study do not give clear guidance into determining the precise relationship between public opinion and its influence on the policy actors in these episodes, or between public opinion and the media.

8.6. Key factors in tuition policy formation

8.6.1. Factors in tuition policy change

Tuition policy contests raise key questions of values, resources, and the relationship of post-secondary policy formation to political economy. A key question of this research is to determine which factors contribute to tuition policy change. The two theories of policy change used in this study provide clear directions to ascertain which elements in the both the policy subsystem and in the decision environment are most likely to be key factors in this change events.
Table 8.4. Summary of Key Factors in Tuition Policy Change, by Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSM Factors</th>
<th>ACF Factors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem Stream</strong></td>
<td><strong>Politics Stream</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>Change in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>Significant mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic goals</td>
<td>Strong Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient funding for PSE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Election/change in government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public concern on tuition prices</td>
<td>Brokerage politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE funding formula problems</td>
<td>Strong Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal platform planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>New mandate for government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient funding for PSE</td>
<td>Sufficient political capital to absorb decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal crisis</td>
<td>Strong Premier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From a political economy perspective, the primary influential factor in policy deliberations on tuition policy in these three cases was financial, both the effect of the fiscal climate on provincial budgets and the effect of changing government funding on institutions. Policy actors find a point of departure in the validity of financial crises; in both BC and Manitoba, many progressive coalition members were convinced that the financial pressures were orchestrated as a rationale for major public sector cuts, or exaggerated for political purposes. For example, the BC government campaigned and was elected with a mandate for tax cuts, which impacted government revenues such that public sector spending cuts were inevitable consequences. In any event, the financial context plays a
predominant role in the representations made of the context of the policy decision in Manitoba and BC. In Ontario, the election platform created within a positive economic climate in which resources were available to invest in public post-secondary education.

In all three cases, proximity to the general election is a notable factor. In the cases of Ontario and BC, both policy changes were grounded in the development of election platforms to a greater or lesser extent. In both cases there was a significant change in government; very prepared and well-organized opposition parties overturned the previous governments, which were weakened by political scandals. These parties campaigned on clear platforms with a broad coalition of support, generated through collaborative policy development and/or brokerage politics. Electoral concerns were the major external influence on the Ontario case, responding to signals of problems within the post-secondary system and changes in public opinion on accessibility and affordability. In Manitoba, the election returned a long-standing government, and so the dynamics of change were different. In that case, government felt that it had a solid track record of spending, and combined with shifting alliances within the interest coalitions, had the political space to make an unpopular decision with students, with sufficient time to recover any lost ground prior to the next election.

In this study, financial conditions matter. In BC, the factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to financial conditions in the policy environment; the overwhelming majority identified institutional financial difficulties as a factor in the deregulation of tuition fees in BC, followed by broader financial conditions in the province, and related factors which influenced the setting of the provincial budget. These financial factors are followed closely by electoral considerations (84%) and shifting concerns and attention in the policy environment. In Ontario, three of the top five factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to student access and affordability considerations, including student debt. The other two of the top five factors are political in nature: increase in the amount of attention on post-secondary, and proximity to the general election. In Manitoba, three of the top six factors identified by the respondents in the policy subsystem relate to institutional finances and the provincial budget, two relate to student access and affordability considerations, and the other was proximity to the general election.
8.7. Discussion of the conceptual frameworks

This section considers whether, and to what extent, theories of advocacy coalition (ACF) and multiple streams of problems, policies, and politics (MSM) explain tuition policy formation in the three cases in this study. The factors conceptualized in these two frameworks were found to be evident. The analysis of these three policy contests affirms the suitability of the two selected theoretical frameworks from political science in these post-secondary policy episodes, and the success of utilizing the analytical framework at conceptual, analytical, and operational levels. This framework was used to understand the policy contexts and histories, and through comparative analysis, to inform a new conceptual understanding of tuition policy change.

8.7.1. Discussion of the Multiple Streams Model (MSM)

The multiple streams model (MSM) conceptualizes the streams as follows: the problem stream is comprised of information about various policy problems and the proponents of various issue definitions, including media coverage, events and other factors that shape opinion about policy problems; the policy stream involves the proponents of solutions to policy problems, the factors affecting ideas, and the identification and formulation of alternatives; and the politics stream consists of factors which influence elections and the behaviours of legislators. Key events merge the politics, problem, and policy streams and therefore the opening of the policy window, which occurs in a short period of time when conditions are favourable to policy change. In each of the three cases in this study, the MSM provides a very strong framework for describing conditions of policy change. In BC, in the policy stream were several powerful and well-organized policy entrepreneurs with a clear agenda-setting, framing, and policy options, including a preferred option, and the government engaged in several softening up activities. In the problem stream, there were a number of highly salient issues within institutions, the post-secondary system, the business community, and the media, which were successfully framed as negative consequences of the tuition freeze. In the politics stream, the public mood shifted against the NDP and its policies, and the change in government provided the opportunity for policy change, given that the newly elected Liberal government received a resounding mandate for change.
In the Ontario case, the MSM factors are quite clear. In the policy stream there were well-organized and resourced policy entrepreneurs in the two student organizations with independent but common policy preferences. In the problem stream, there was increasing public awareness that the cost of post-secondary education was out of step with expectations and other provinces, changing public mood about public services, and failing support for the Conservative government, which was experiencing its own internal political problems. In the politics stream, the Liberals needed to differentiate themselves from the previous government, broker a coalition for electoral support, and needed a simple progressive policy that would resonate with the electorate and be consistent with their overall approach. With the election victory as a key event, the Liberals moved to fulfill their platform promise by implementing the tuition freeze.

In Manitoba, in the policy stream there were well-organized policy entrepreneurs from the universities and business interests, with a clear policy options to address the financial conditions of institutions, and internal to the government there were policy entrepreneurs interested in finding a more effective policy to achieve educational participation goals. In the policy stream, the government engaged in a significant softening up activity by establishing a commission to undertake policy analysis and recommendations. In the problem stream, there was increasing lobbying and pressure arising from incremental policy decisions, revenue constraints in institutions, a changing fiscal climate for government, and a few focusing events which brought public attention to and business community comment on the problems of educational quality and competitiveness. In the politics stream, the government was securely in its new mandate with political capital in post-secondary education based on a history of popular policy decisions, and there was growing public awareness that the cost of post-secondary education was out of step with expectations and other provinces, and public receptivity to change. The commission acted as the catalytic event that created the policy window, and established the basis for tuition policy change.

8.7.2. Effectiveness of the MSM

The MSM is useful as a heuristic, as it provides helpful structure with which to develop and analyze accounts of policy dynamics. Given the ways in which the policy
window is contingent upon the convergent of the three streams, in these cases it was particularly helpful to focus on the decision to change policy as the unit of analysis as a technique to focus in on the dynamics of decision-making. Similar to the research which inspired this particular study, evidence of all core components of the MSM were found in these episodes; coupling of the three streams, influential policy entrepreneurs, and the opening of a policy window (Ness, 2010). The study shows that the MSM can be applied to provincial-level post-secondary policy formation in Canada, and that it sheds light on the processes which contribute to policy change, a finding similar to American studies of state educational policy (McLendon, 2003, Ness, 2008; Young, Shepley, & Song, 2010).

Limitations found in this study are consistent with emerging criticism of the model, including a major limitation is that it is not predictive (Yong, Shepley & Song, 2010; Zahariadis, 1999). In response to found limitations, others have made adaptions to the model. McLendon (2003) added a dimension of economic, political, and demographic factors as key context for analysis; Ness (2008) incorporated research utilization, a factor from the ACF, to the MSM model.

### 8.8. Discussion of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

The ACF considers that policy change can be explained through two primary causes: the endogenous variable of beliefs and values of the coalition, and exogenous changes in the policy arena. Policy change as result of changes in beliefs in a subsystem arise from a number of factors, including policy-oriented learning, changes in actors, or changes in the external environment, including changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, systemic governing coalition, or spillage from other policy domains. There are several key factors in the ACF upon which policy change is contingent; I will review each of these in turn.

#### 8.8.1. Policy learning and the use of research

Policy learning is a process in which individuals apply new information and ideas to policy decisions, and in particular, the accumulation and application of that information
(Busenberg, 2001). In the ACF, policy change arises as a result of policy learning, which can arise from shocks from outside or from within coalitions, or from new information. Policy learning involves the dissemination of both policy-specific and political knowledge; both aspects of this learning of these were found in this study.

In all three cases, policy and political learning was a specific goal within the organized interests. They have both formal and informal relationships with national federations, potentially drawing on national resources for their provincial efforts; resources include experience and technical resources, including research and policy analytic capacity, and expertise in political advocacy and communication. For example, the provincial chapters of the CFS, which coordinate research, advocacy, and communications activities, draws upon resources and lessons from the national organization. This is particularly powerful given the almost singular focus of the organization’s policy advocacy on tuition fees. Similar activity occurs with other student organizations, faculty, and institutional interests, to a much lesser extent on tuition policy in particular.

Policy failure provides key learning opportunities in policy subsystems. May (1992) describes three lessons drawn from policy failure, each provoking activity to create “better” policy: instrumental policy learning (viability of policy designs), social policy learning (social construction of policy, including dominant beliefs or models of causality), and political learning (strategy for advocating problems or policy ideas). In all three cases in this study, actors learned from tuition policy experiments in other Canadian jurisdictions; negative perceptions were reported in the Ontario and Manitoba cases of the consequences of previous rapid fee increases. In particular, actors were acutely aware of and interested in the effect of tuition fee deregulation experiments on access and participation, financing of institutions, as well as on public opinion and success of political communication on tuition policy.
Political learning was also evident in all three cases in terms of the history of the policy file in that province; decision-makers are generally keen to differentiate from previous administrations or political competitors on policy alternatives. In the cases of BC and Ontario, the policy was an active election issue and point of differentiation between campaigns and in all provinces; the antecedent policy histories show quite clear demarcations of policy choices between political parties and election platforms. For example, in both BC and Manitoba, the tuition freeze policy was seen by to be owned by the NDP; party insiders felt that it was one of the areas where the NDP government polled well and the policy formed a central plank of NDP election platforms. In BC, the shaping of that platform was not popular with institutions in the system; it was felt that political decisions favoured the interests of the party’s key allies, the student and college faculty organizations, over financial and related educational representations made by institutions. The other specific instance of political learning is from the case of Ontario. First, the Liberal
party drew lessons from the past and elsewhere, engaging in brokerage politics to create a coalition for electoral purposes, and the successful management of the double cohort policy exercise by the civil service and the system, which contributed positively to policy learning.

Further, political learning was also evident in the use of tuition policy as a method of political differentiation from competitors, as well as specific political strategies used. Concerns about the negative consequences of rapid increases in fees observed in Ontario in the 1990s and in BC from 2001 - 2004 were at the forefront of actors in all jurisdictions, in terms of political fallout and public spectacles, as well as considerations of policy effectiveness and impact. In all three cases, policy and political learning was a specific goal of many of the organized interests. Another area of learning involves the dissemination of political or policy knowledge with systems of organized interests, who draw on national resources for their provincial efforts as well as individuals with historical perspective on political history.

Another aspect of policy learning is the role of technical information in contributing to changing beliefs. The only case in which technical information on the relationship between tuition fees and measures of system or individual success appeared to change policy beliefs, and therefore had a significant direct effect on policy change, was in Manitoba. In that case, the function of the commission was intended to create policy and political learning, with an outcome that did entail policy change. The nature of that learning is somewhat uncertain, given the difficulty in ascertaining specifics on policy conflict within Cabinet; it may be that cabinet members acquiesced to the authority of the premier rather than changed their policy beliefs. In the ACF it is anticipated that a high degree of conflict may be a barrier to policy learning; policy-oriented learning most likely to occur when there is an “intermediate level of informed conflict” between two coalitions (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009, p. 129).

A question posed in the research is the effect of policy adaptions from other jurisdictions. All three cases in this study showed general monitoring of international trends by each coalition. There was only one specific instance in which there are specific accounts of transnational policy learning. There were several individual representations
that the Ontario Liberal Party was influenced by policies of the British New Labour government, and the Clinton administration; these influences were formalized with organized information sharing sessions.

8.8.2. Effectiveness of the ACF

The ACF provides a highly detailed conceptual lens to examine the specific “interplay between external shocks and internal subsystem conditions in fostering policy change” (Weible, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009, p. 128). Each of the three cases of policy change in this study reflect the conceptual expectations of the ACF; that coalitions would experience significant internal and external shocks in the 10 year period prior to the policy change, as well as power and structural shifts or significant changes in the policy environment. In this regard, the ACF provides important and relevant conceptual insight into dynamics of policy change. Similar to Coleman and Skogstad (1991), this study found that groups of policy actors are best understood when “attention is paid to first, the broader political, economic, and ideological environment within they function; and second, the legacy of history” (p. 314).

An important aspect of the both of these frameworks, but the ACF in particular, is that their theoretical propositions can be operationalized, giving theoretically informed direction to each step in the research process. During the interviews for this study, many policy actors struggled to situate themselves within coalition dynamics, and very rarely did policy actors relate any changes in coalitions to the policy change in their province. Many policy actors have passing involvement in this particular policy arena, and as a result are unable to provide first hand accounts of coalition activity over the ten year period prior to the policy change. Through close questioning of their coordinating activities, a review of the historical record, and triangulation of events between sources, I was able to effectively map these important historical shifts in coalition arrangements. Without the guidance of the ACF to specifically look for these key elements of policy change, I believe they would have been unaccounted for by policy actors in the interviews, and therefore a vital factor of policy change would have been missed. Other less complex implications for the ACF in this study include the relatively few number of policy actors and coalitions to assess, the conventions of cabinet secrecy and solidarity, as well as civil service anonymity, and party
discipline within caucuses. These conceptual differences between the Westminster system and the American system that gave rise to the original model are not necessarily irreconcilable. However, the particular aspects of the Westminster system referenced here must be addressed in both the conceptualization of the framework, and its operationalization in research. The contribution of this study, therefore, in adapting the ACF to this particular political environment is to separate the positivist assumptions of the ACF operationally from the overall model. In its stead, I have considered policy actors’ representations of facts, beliefs, and values and incorporated those representations into the analysis. This is necessary, given the legal limits of information availability on some aspects of the policy process (such as Cabinet documents) and decision-making (in-camera decision-making). It is also desirable, as these representations are important social facts and key to understating the internal logics of the policy debate as well as the political and values contests.

A limitation of the ACF is that while it attends to the policy change itself, it does not provide much precision into the insights into the nature of the policy choice; it is still slightly unclear as to why some policy learning happens in some circumstances, and in others, subsystems are so resilient to change. This limitation has been identified elsewhere; the precise nature of this learning process has yet to be fully understood (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Also, it would be interesting to be able to weight the external and internal shocks in terms of likelihood of change, and to further develop which shocks might be both necessary and sufficient conditions for policy change. Further, the ACF is limited in terms of its capacity to predict policy choices; for example, the ACF doesn't explain why Manitoba chose a regulated policy rather than an unrestricted one, or the vice versa in British Columbia. Marshall, Mitchell and Wirt (1989) noted that a pressing question in comparative policy studies is why do states develop different policies? Further development is needed to understand the effects of distinct political cultures, histories, and economies on specific policy choices.
Chapter 9.

Conclusion

This chapter provides a final review of the study and reports key findings of the research, including a new conceptual model of Canadian tuition policy generation, and discusses implications for both practice and research.

9.1. Review of the study

The purpose of this study has been to understand provincial tuition policy changes in Canada. Drawing upon two alternative theories of the policy process, the goal of the research is to identify the specific factors and dynamics influencing tuition policy change in Canada, deepening our conceptual understanding of the change process for this particular policy area. First, the multiple streams model (MSM), using the policy decision as the unit of analysis, examines factors in three streams of the policy process— problem, policy and politics. Second, the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on the policy subsystem as the unit of analysis, and examines factors involving the interactions of actors, policy beliefs, and coordination of coalitions to achieve common goals. These two policy frameworks provide alternative lenses on the policy process in the three episodes of the study, resulting in a new conceptual model for tuition policy change.

The study emerged from several considerations. First, tuition policy has increasingly attracted a considerable amount of political activity and public attention. Given the importance of tuition policy to stakeholders in the post-secondary system as well as the general public, there is a need for greater process knowledge to inform policy actors to contributing to policy decisions in this area. Second, despite significant tuition policy experimentation over the past twenty years, little is known about the tuition policy development process. Third, most of the limited number of empirical examinations of tuition policy in Canada has focused on policy impacts and the effect of price increases on enrolment in particular (Finnie & Usher, 2006; Frenette, 2005; Swail & Heller, 2004), leaving questions of how this evaluative research might influence policy formation. Finally,
there are limited insights into Canadian politics and post-secondary policy formation processes more generally, particularly those studies drawing upon theories of policy process. This dissertation seeks to address some of these gaps.

The methodology of this project is a comparative policy study, using three subnational case studies of tuition policy change. The three cases documented descriptions of the policy formation dynamics, drawing upon documentary evidence and interview data from 59 interviews. This resulted in a description of the background context of each case, grounded in a political economy perspective; the policy history, a narrative chronological account of policy formation describing the temporal sequence of events; and finally, the analysis of each policy episode, using the operationalized analytical framework detailed in Chapter 4, which addresses the question of five key dimensions of policy change, with two alternative theoretical explanations for policy change. These cases were followed in Chapter 7 with a cross-case analysis, again guided and informed by the analytical framework. These key dimensions are (a) program goals and their clarity, (b) the politics of policy formation, (c) policy coalitions and their stability over time, (d) influence of elected officials and non-elected policy actors, (e) the effects of external influences such as change in public opinion on related issues, change in government, and the provincial fiscal condition. Lastly, this final chapter presents key findings emerging from the study, and introduces a conceptual model of tuition policy change.
9.2. Review of the Findings

9.2.1. Findings

This study has resulted in ten key findings:

1. Each of the alternative theories of policy change provides important and relevant conceptual contributions to understanding tuition policy formation in each of these cases. In turn, they are complementary in this study, as they highlight different aspects of policy contingency and contribute equally to the new conceptual model of tuition policy change.

2. There are five common factors associated with tuition policy change, which are incorporated into a new conceptual model. Within the policy-making context, the apparent necessary conditions for tuition policy change are: changing financial conditions for the government, changing concerns about accessibility of post-secondary education, a changing mandate for government with a strong premier, a changing public mood on post-secondary education, and changing political and policy alliances within the post-secondary policy sub-system.

3. The major policy actors in tuition policy are universities, their presidents, and membership organizations; politicians; and student membership organizations. Universities play an influential role in policy formation and in particular, in identifying and framing the policy problem and identifying clear policy alternatives. Senior leaders within cabinet function as policy entrepreneurs, most frequently the premier. Student organizations are successful in agenda-setting, setting terms of debate, and occupying the policy niche of tuition fees. Successful influence strategies on tuition fee policy formation can be characterized as insider tactics, and successful agenda-setting activities include softening up.

4. The practice of politics is central to tuition policy formation. These politics include political differentiation in electoral contests, and the use of tuition policy in both brokerage politics and retail politics.

5. Regardless of policy choices and contexts, governments describe their overall policy goal as the provision of quality and accessible post-secondary education in their jurisdictions; the term accessibility carries different connotations in each case, reflecting framing and agenda-setting. The specific instrumental goals of tuition policy change in this study were not overtly ideological in nature.

6. Tuition policy research itself is not a key factor in tuition policy change; tuition policy choices are made with consideration of the available research.
A more direct influence on tuition policy change is political and policy learning.

7. The problematization of tuition fee policy arises from perceived negative impacts or the unintended consequences of the previous tuition policy, or incremental modifications to previous policy, combined with concerns about the overall policy mix of student financial aid and institutional finance. Tuition policy tends to dominate public focus and political activity due in part to effective agenda setting of interest organizations, and in part to the technical and communicative complexity of addressing reforms in student financial aid or institutional finance.

8. The conditions for student lobby success appear to be increased in cases where brokerage politics is occurring in an electoral contest.

9. The conditions for implementation of deregulation or tuition rate increases appear to be increased in cases of fiscal stress combined with expectations of increased capacity or quality improvement.

10. Political structure, political culture, political economy, and tuition policy history has an influence on policy formation. The coordinating body in this study had no effect on policy change.

9.3. Implications for theory

A central interest of this study is to develop a deeper understanding of tuition policy formation processes. An important question emerges from this research: how is tuition policy generated in Canada? According to both the conceptual frameworks used in this study, policy change is contingent on factors specific to the policy subsystem and within the broader environment. Each of these three cases contributes deep, rich insights into how and why decisions were taken to change tuition policy; the comparative analysis provides insights into how tuition policy-making is shaped by the configuration and actions of individual and organized interests, and changes in the political economy.
Figure 9-1 integrates these insights into a new conceptual model for tuition policy change, as a contribution to the post-secondary education policy literature and improved theorizing of post-secondary policy generation in Canada. Based on the three case studies, the model proposes a set of conditions for tuition policy change. These conditions reflect common change factors. First, within the broader environment, the model identifies a changing public mood on post-secondary education. This change both contributes and responds to framing and agenda-setting by individuals, groups, and the media. Change in public mood is a key element of both the conceptual frameworks. In the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993, 1999), changing in public opinion is identified as an external shock to the policy system; in the MSM (Kingdon, 2003), change in national mood or public opinion is a key element of the politics stream. Second, the model identifies changing political and policy alliances within the post-secondary policy sub-system; these changes involve new or different interest mobilization and cohesion within coalitions, and political activity between coalitions. This type of activity is indicated in the ACF as an important internal shock to coalitions, specifically changing non-trial coordination of activity, evidence of inter- or intra-coalition conflict, or attempts for negotiated agreements. Finally,
the model anticipates a merging of the three MSM streams of problems, policies, and politics with a particular configuration of specific factors. In the problem stream, the model identifies changing financial conditions for the government, which can be identified through systemic indicators, monitoring, or a focussing event. In the policy stream, the model identifies changing concerns about accessibility of post-secondary education; policy proposals are generated and exchanged, and possibly signalled through softening up activities. Finally, the merging of the policy window would appear to occur when there is a changing mandate for government and a strong premier in the politics stream.

Further case studies using the methodology and the operationalized analytical framework of this study would contribute further confirmation or enhancements to the model, enriching our understanding of how these particular or other additional factors function in different political economies. It is anticipated that these different elements could be operationalized and empirically tested, and that future theoretical developments might consider to what degree each of these factors exert influence in a given context. In particular, an outstanding question is whether these factors are necessary or sufficient for policy change, and to determine the specific dynamics of cause and effect; one particular question might be to determine which environmental conditions foreshadow specific policy choices, such as a tuition freeze or non-decisions. The applicability of this model could also be applied and tested in other contexts. Emerging from Canadian provincial case studies, the model may have utility in studies of post-secondary education policy and finance in other jurisdictions, such as American state policy. Further, it may prove fruitful to undertake empirical testing of the model in related policy areas, such as student financial aid.

9.4. Implications for practice

The primary implications emerge from understanding the causal dynamics that contribute to policy change, in order to improve policy advocacy effectiveness. In that sense, all the research findings are informative for policy actors or practitioners who seek to influence government policy, and can be used to interpret the dynamics of a particular tuition policy arena. There are four specific implications for practitioners. First, to maximize opportunity for achieving policy goals, policy actors would benefit from maintaining
effective coalition relationships; this activity involves paying close and on-going attention to shared values, policy beliefs, and resource distribution between coalition partners. Second, when brokerage arrangements or informal coalitions are formed based on policy preferences alone, policy actors need to fully understand the limitations of those commitments and coalition bonds. Third, as found in other studies of the post-secondary policy process (McLendon, 2000), this research suggests that policy actors would benefit from participation in all three streams in the policy generation process (the framing of problems, developing policy options, and monitoring political changes) with the goal of readiness for quick response to a sudden opening of the policy window. This is particularly important policy knowledge given the system of organized anarchy that is post-secondary policymaking; the winning conditions for successful advancement of policy ideas are dependent less on rational policy analysis than on being able to identify windows of opportunity to advance policy ideas with the right message. Finally, given the scarcity of technical information on tuition policy, there is an anticipated advantage for policy actors to invest in policy-analytic research that communicates policy narratives and proposed solutions.

9.5. Implications for future research

9.5.1. Role of strategic communication and policy implementation

An area for exploration is the question of tuition policy implementation. This study found evidence that a particular form of policy learning influences strategic communication between government and institutions, or advocacy organizations and government. In particular, institutional analysis and memory of past policy shocks and behaviour of policy actors has an impact on strategic behaviour between policy actors in that province and in other provinces. This type of policy learning was evident in policy stories related to both the dynamics of deregulation of fees and tuition freezes, and was brought to light during interviews in all three provinces. It was remarked upon that leadership both in institutions and government had recollections or knowledge of past tuition fee policy changes, and that institutional responses take that learning into account in setting their strategy when new windows open, to the extent that it would almost be predictive. This dynamic has been
described as institutions avoiding “getting caught with their tuition down” (Clark, Trick, & Van Loon, 2011). This lesson has important consequences to policymakers, given that governments need to have a better understanding of the dynamics of tuition policy implementation in order to inform policy-making.

9.5.2. Network analysis

This study raised questions as to the nature of technical information, and the relationship between producers of ideas and modes and pathways of dissemination of those ideas. Given the importance of policy analysis to questions of access and affordability, and the role policy actors play in contributing policy ideas, it would be worthwhile to explore the structure and relationships between policy actors in post-secondary policy communities in Canada, and in particular its flow to policymakers, and influence within the broader policy community. The type of analysis might include network analysis of policy actors’ relational data.

9.5.3. Values and beliefs

The ACF considers values and beliefs in conceptualizing policy change within policy subsystems, but does not provide the basis to measure, link or interrogate those beliefs. The multiple streams model examines the consequences of policy actors’ values and beliefs but not their genesis or their meaning, and in particular, why conflicts arise in the form they do. These gaps in these two conceptual frameworks are revealed in this study. More work needs to be done to explore and theorize the nature of these political contests in terms of values and beliefs, and in particular, understanding the key factors which function in ideational and enduring policy disputes in post-secondary education.

9.5.4. Application of alternative conceptual frameworks to tuition policy episodes

The data collected during the dissertation research could be expanded and examined using alternative conceptual frameworks. This would broaden and enrich the comparative analysis. With sufficient data, analysis could include punctuated equilibrium
(Baumgartner et al., 2009) to describe and investigate patterns of sudden policy change and extended periods of apparent stasis. Drawing upon critical discourse analysis (Ball, 1990; Fairclough, 2003; Wodak, 2009; Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001), the data could be analysed to better understand policy actor values, interests, and choices, particularly in light of preferred political strategies.
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## Appendix A.

### Canadian Tuition Fees

Table A1.1. Weighted average tuition fees for full-time undergraduate students by province and Canada total, in current dollars

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6 The Survey of Tuition and Living Accommodation Costs for Full-time Students at Canadian Degree-granting Institutions (TLAC) is administered by Statistic Canada; data cover the 2011/2012 academic year. Weighted averages are calculated using the most current domestic enrolment data available at Canadian degree granting institutions at the time the data were released for a given reference period. The data for 2006-2007 are restated for comparison purposes due to changes in data definitions, resulting in changes in weighting for that year forward. From 1972-73 to 2006-07, undergraduate faculties include Agriculture, Architecture, Arts, Commerce, Dentistry, Education, Engineering, Household Science, Law, Medicine, Music, and Science. Since 1997-1998 both in and out-of-province students are considered in the calculations for Quebec, therefore accounting for their differential fees for in and out of province Canadian students. Starting in 2007-2008 both in and out-of-province students are considered in the calculations for Nova Scotia, therefore accounting for their differential fees for in and out of province Canadian students. Starting with 2007-2008 adjustments to the calculation of weighted averages were introduced to account for differential fees according to the year of study in Ontario. Starting with the revised 2007-2008 data (identified in the table by 2007-2008r) the undergraduate programs include Engineering, Law, Dentistry, Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Veterinary medicine. Since the distribution of enrolment across the various programs varies from period to period, caution must be exercised in interpretation.
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<td>501</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>4942</td>
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<td>241</td>
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<td>359</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>475</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>5146</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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Source: The Survey of Tuition and Living Accommodation Costs for Full-time Students at Canadian Degree-granting Institutions (TLAC), Statistics Canada.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2010/2011</th>
<th>2011/2012</th>
<th>% change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>5,258</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>5,497</td>
<td>5,731</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>5,647</td>
<td>5,835</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>Quebec</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<td>Ontario</td>
<td>6,316</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<td>3,593</td>
<td>3,645</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>5,431</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<td>Alberta</td>
<td>5,505</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>4,758</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>5,366</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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</table>

Source: The Daily, Statistics Canada, September 16, 2011
Appendix B.

Canadian Tuition Fees and Government Funding

The relative share of tuition fees to government funding and overall university revenue has changed over the past thirty years. Table B1.1 shows how government funding constitutes a decreasing proportion of university revenue, and tuition an increasing proportion; in 2009, 58.3% of university operating revenue was covered by government funding and tuition covered 35.3% (Canadian Association of University Teachers, 2011).

Table B1.1. Government funding and tuition as a per cent of university operating revenue, total of Canadian public universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Tuition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CAUT Almanac of Post-Secondary Education 2011-12

Table B1.2 shows the differences between provinces in level of tuition as a per cent of university operating revenues, with Ontario the highest at 44.5% and Newfoundland and Labrador the lowest at 15.9%.

Table B1.2. Tuition as a per cent of university operating revenue, by province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland and Labrador</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CAUT Almanac of Post-Secondary Education 2011-12
Appendix C.

Semi-Structured Interview Guide

Semi-Structured Interview Guide on Tuition Policy Formation

Role/Organization

Tell me about your role and the organization you worked for or represented during the policy change in [province, date].

Thinking back, when did you first become aware of the proposal for tuition policy change in [province, date]?

Were you involved in the tuition policy episode of [province, date]?

In what capacity were you involved in the process that led to the tuition policy change in [province, date]?

For how long were you involved in the process that led to the tuition policy change in [province, date]?

What is your organization’s preferred public policy with respect to tuition?

What would you say are your organization’s top five public policy concerns for post-secondary education currently?

Where would you rank tuition policy in that list?

Does your organization engage in lobbying of elected officials? Government staff? Others?

Does your organization solicit media coverage of policy positions?

To what extent does your organization form alliances with others to work to achieve common policy goals?

Attitudes, Beliefs

Interviewer: I’d like to move on to questions about your beliefs. I want you to indicate whether you to strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of the following statements.
### Interviewer: I’m going to move to questions about the beginning of the tuition policy change…. In [date, province]

13.a. When you think about the policy change in [date, province], do you consider that tuition policy change to be an incremental or major policy change?

13.b. From your perspective, how and why did a proposal for the change in tuition policy emerge an issue in [province, date] in the first place?

Some have suggested that certain factors led to this issue rising to the top of the agenda. I have a number of factors here - please state to what degree you believe that the following factors played in the shaping of the tuition policy in [province, date].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.k. public opinion</td>
<td>14.l. pressure lobbying</td>
<td>14.m. federal provincial government relations</td>
<td>14.n. regional issues</td>
<td>14.o. election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.p. pressure from other branches of government</td>
<td>14.q. the amount of attention on post-secondary education had increased.</td>
<td>14.r. Others……..</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. Initially, what do you think was a primary goal or goals of tuition policy in [province, date]?

16. What do you think were the problems that the initial policy proposal addressed?

17. To what extent was there consensus on the goal of the province’s tuition policy? (Scale of 1-4)

18. To your knowledge, were there any other policy proposals that were considered at the same time in [province, date]?

19. From your perspective, who were the major players in the initial proposal for tuition policy change in [province, date]?
20. According to your recollection, when the tuition options or proposals were considered, do you remember what information was circulating at the time?

21. What information did you use?

22. What is your recollection was the public opinion on the issue of tuition policy, initially?

Policy Adoption

Interviewer: Turning from policy alternatives, to policy adoption....

23. Why would you say that this particular policy option was adopted in [province, date]?

24. Looking back at the process that led to the change, what would you identify as the most critical events for the successful adoption of this policy?

24.a. Who made the policy issue a “hot issue” when it did?

25. Who developed the specific proposal to change tuition policy?

26. Who were the major players in the final decision?

27. Would you say that there is a core group of people who are always involved in post-secondary education issues?

27.a. Who are they?

28. Who were the coalitions or alliances involved in this policy process?

28.a. Are these long-standing coalitions?

28.b. Were there any changes in coalition proponents or advocates during this policy process?

Interviewer: I have a number of statements about the tuition policy actors during this policy episode in province in year. Please state the degree to which you think that the statement reflect your perspectives
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1= Strongly Agree</th>
<th>2=Agree</th>
<th>3= Disagree</th>
<th>4=Strongly Disagree</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29.a. During this policy episode, policy actors had explicit goals toward which their activities were aligned.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.b. During this policy episode, the policy goals of the primary policy actors were well understood.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.c. Elected officials dominated the policy process.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.d. The policy coalition (x) was “well organized”.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.e. The policy coalition (y) was “well organized”.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.f. The policy coalition (x) have worked together a long time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.g. The policy coalition (y) have worked together a long time.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.h. Policy actors preferred policy alternatives based on constituent preferences.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.i. Policy actors preferred policy alternatives based on what they considered to be ‘good public policy’.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.j. Policy actors represented political party platforms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.k. Policy preferences split down party lines.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.l. Policy actors’ motivations and preferences were “rational – explain not leave to interpretations”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29.m. The deliberations on this policy issue were contentious.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.n. Policy actors raise the same tuition policy proposal over and over again, in different places.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.o. Ideology influenced the initial stages of the process.</td>
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</table>

30. To what extent did tuition policy or tuition policy change in other jurisdictions influence this policy adoption?

31.a. Do any other influences come to mind?

32. How would you characterize the political mood of your province when this policy was enacted?

33. Would you please tell me what the political environment for post-secondary education was like when this policy was enacted?

34. What influenced the rise of tuition policy change to the top of the legislative agenda in [province, date]?
35. Were people surprised that the tuition policy issue emerged as a priority when it did, or had everyone seen it coming?

Conclusion

35. As we wrap up our discussion, is there anything that you would like to add that would help us better understand the tuition policy problem?

Snowball Reference

Are there others that you recommend I should speak to?

Further participation and follow-up

I will email you my written summary and findings of the tuition policy process in your province, for your review and confirmation. I appreciate any feedback you might provide. If you have any comments; please feel free to contact me. Thank you again for taking the time to meet with me today.

### Appendix D.

## Codebook

![Figure D1.1. Codebook](image)

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<th>Advocacy Coalition Framework</th>
<th>Internal Coalition Shocks</th>
<th>Internal Conflict</th>
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<td>Internal Activity</td>
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<td>External Spillover</td>
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<td>External Socioeconomic Climate</td>
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<td>Alternatives</td>
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<td>Problem Definition/Framing</td>
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<td>Policy Alternatives</td>
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<td>Policy Learning – other jurisdictions</td>
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<td>Spillover Effects</td>
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<td>Problem System Indicator - other</td>
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