An inner audience is an internal representation of others' values, goals, and standards for the self (other standpoint on self). It contrasts with an internal representation of one's own values, goals, and standards for the self (own standpoint on self). Using self-discrepancy theory (E. T. Higgins, 1987) as a framework to integrate diverse psychological perspectives on this classic distinction, the authors consider the role of own versus other standpoints in self-regulation. They describe developmental shifts and socialization effects on the self-regulatory strength of own and other standpoints. Evidence that individual differences and sex differences in own versus other standpoints for self-regulation relate to different affective and interpersonal vulnerabilities is reviewed. The concepts of identification and introjection are empirically distinguished in a novel way, and therapeutic implications are discussed.


This article was funded in part by Grant 410-92-1620 from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada.

Almost a century ago, eminent social scientist Max Weber (1967) stated:

In "action" is included all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. . . Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in it's course. (pp. 156-157)

Thus, action is "social" when its meaning and orientation take account of other people. The people being taken into account can be present or they can be absent but internally represented by the acting individual. When they are internally represented, they can be thought of as "inner audiences" (see Homey, 1946).

There has been a long-standing fascination with the impact of inner audiences on self-regulation in many areas of psychology, including clinical, developmental, social, and personality. Classic historical examples include the concept of "identification" (see A. Freud, 1937; S. Freud, 1923/1961; Hoffman & Saltzstein, 1967; Kelman, 1958), the concept of "reference group" (e.g., Kelley, 1952; Sherif, 1948), and the concept of "role taking" (e.g., Cooley, 1902/1964; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1962). Internal or imaginary audiences can be groups, or they can be individuals such as one's parents, best friends, spouse, boss, or advisor (e.g., see Elkind, 1967). Inner audiences can influence individuals' responses to themselves and to other objects and persons in the world. For example, M. W. Baldwin and Holmes (1987) found that female undergraduates liked a sexually permissive essay more if they had earlier visualized two campus associates than two older family members. Moreover, Andersen and Cole (1990) found that undergraduates were especially likely to assume that a novel person who appeared to possess a few features of their own significant other also possessed a variety of other features of this same individual from their own life, filling in the blanks about the novel person in this way. This process was more pronounced when the novel person resembled a significant other rather than a nonsignificant other (see also Andersen, Glassman, Chen, & Cole, 1995), and it can be triggered outside of conscious awareness (Glassman & Andersen, in press).

An inner audience is an internal representation of values, goals, and standards that some person or persons hold for one. According to J.M. Baldwin (1911), Cooley (1902/1964), Mead (1934), and others (e.g., Turner, 1956; Vygotsky, 1962), people develop a sense of themselves by taking the viewpoint of others on themselves as an object in the world. Mead (1934), for example, stated that "the individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular
standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole” (p. 138). The motivational significance of others' standpoints on the self has been discussed extensively in the literature, including the effects of conflicts between different others' standpoints on the self (e.g., parents vs. peers).

The inner audience representation of some one's values, goals, and standards for one can be contrasted with the values, goals, and standards that someone in one's immediate external environment holds for one. The importance of this distinction between private and public social influences is well documented in the research on self-consciousness (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) and self-monitoring (see Snyder, 1979). The present article concerns a different contrast with the inner audience that occurs within private self-regulation: the contrast between an individual's internal representation of the values, goals, and standards that someone else holds for him or her (other standpoint on the self) and an individual's internal representation of the values, goals, and standards that he or she holds for himself or herself (own standpoint on the self; see Turner, 1956). Our purpose is to consider both the developmental antecedents and the functional consequences of self-regulation in relation to own versus other standpoints. We do so within the framework provided by self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b). Using this framework, we review the literature on the role of cognitive changes and socialization in the development of own and other standpoints on self, we predict distinct vulnerabilities from own standpoint versus other standpoint self-regulation, and we reconsider identification and introjection as classic distinctions concerning own versus other standpoints in self-regulation.

Our use of self-discrepancy theory as a framework to understand the role of own and other standpoints in self-regulation draws from attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1984), object relations and self psychology theories (Eagle, 1984; Hamilton, 1989; Horney, 1939; Kohut, 1971; Sullivan, 1953; Winnicott, 1965), and developmental models (Case, 1985, 1988; Cicchetti, 1991; Stroufe, 1990). Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1996b) provides a framework for integrating observations from these diverse viewpoints. The work reviewed here primarily focuses on the development and functions of self-regulatory standpoints. Specifically, we discuss the development of own and other self-regulatory standpoints within the self-system and the factors related to individual differences in self-regulatory orientation. We then examine the psychological consequences of individual differences and gender differences in self-regulation in relation to own versus other standpoint. Next, we address the internalization process by which significant other standpoints come to be identified within the self-system as aspects of one's own standpoint rather than remaining the "felt presence" of others (i.e., introjects; Sandler, 1960; Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962). Finally, we briefly comment on implications for psychotherapy.

Self-Discrepancy Theory: A Model of Self-Representation

Self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987, 1989a, 1989b) provides a framework for understanding the development and structure of self-state representations and for considering the consequences of congruency and discrepancy among various aspects of this structure. Three "domains" of self-representation are differentiated: the actual self (the kind of person an individual believes he or she actually is), the ideal self (the kind of person an individual wishes he or she could be), and the ought self (the kind of person an individual believes he or she should be). Each domain of the self can be considered from several perspectives: a person's own perspective on the self (e.g., the attributes one believes one actually possesses, ideally wishes to possess, and believes one should possess) or the inferred perspectives of a significant other (e.g., the attributes that one has inferred one's mother, father, or another individual believes one actually possesses, ideally wishes one possessed, or believes one should possess). A person's own perspective on the actual self is analogous to what is commonly referred to as the self-concept. Other self-state representations, such as a person's own hopes and wishes for himself or herself (ideal-own self-state) or the duties and obligations that a person believes significant others hold for him or her (ought-other self-state), function as valued standards or self-guides for the regulation and evaluation of the actual self. Self-state representations related to individuals' own perspectives and the inferred perspectives of others exist together within the self-system. These self-state
representations influence-and, in turn, are influenced by-interpersonal experi- ences. Even though representations related to the inferred perspectives of others can be connected with specific persons, they are abstractions of experiences within these relation- ships. There can be a substantial degree of similarity and overlap in the types of abstrac- tions that are stored in a person's significant other representations. The similarity or overlap- ping abstractions across these representations can be conceptualized as a "generalized other" self-guide (see Mead, 1934).

A basic premise of self-discrepancy theory is that individuals experience psychological dis- tress when they perceive their actual self as substantially discrepant from important self-guides. Thus, they are motivated to self-regulate in ways that achieve congruency or avoid and reduce discrepancy. The bulk of research to date has focused on examining the emotional conse- quences of discrepancy between the actual self and the two types of self-guides: the ideal self and the ought self. A discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self, an actual-ideal discrepancy, represents the absence or loss of positive outcomes and is characterized by feelings of dejection and disappointment. In contrast, a discrepancy between the actual self and the ought self, an actual-ought discrepancy, represents the presence of negative outcomes in the form of anticipated punishment for violation of duties and responsibilities and is character- ized by feelings of fear and agitation.

Self-discrepancy theory has been the subject of numerous investigations (for a review, see Higgins 1996b). Much of this work uses an idiographic measure of self-state representations, the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins, Bond, Klein, & Strauman, 1986). The Selves Questionnaire asks individuals to spontaneously generate sets of attributes describing each self-state representation. In addition, they rate the extent to which they believe they actually possess, ideally wish they possessed, or believe they should possess each self-state attribute. Discrep- ancy scores are calculated by comparing the attributes of one self-state representation with those of another, noting the extent to which these representational states are discrepant or congruent (for specific details on calculating discrepancy scores, see Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). The construction of this measure is based on several theoretical assumptions regard- ing the nature of self-state representations and their activation.

The first assumption concerns the idiographic nature of self-representation. This aspect of self-representation is noted in many classic works on the self. James (1890) observed that individuals vary tremendously in the attributes that they consider relevant to the self. Using himself as an example, he noted that possessing expert knowledge in psychology was critical to his sense of self, yet it was probably irrelevant to most individuals. Rosenberg (1979) and Cooper- smith (1967) made similar points. Yet, despite this acknowledgment of the idiographic nature of self-representation, the majority of self- concept measures are nomothetic. In asking individuals to spontaneously list attributes for each self-state representation, the Selves Ques- tionnaire provides a more idiographic measure than do instruments that ask people to rate themselves on a particular set of attributes that are preselected by the researcher. As a result, the Selves Questionnaire provides a sensitive mea- sure of self-discrepancy because of increased variance in the measurement of both actual-self and desired-self representations. Discrepancy scores calculated from nomothetic measures have proven to be of relatively little value and often do not contribute beyond actual-self ratings (e.g., see Marsh, 1993; Wylie, 1974, 1979). In contrast, discrepancy scores based on an idiographic measure of self-state representa- tions have been shown to predict self-esteem beyond actual-self ratings (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b).

A related assumption concerns the accessibility of self-relevant information. Individuals may vary in which self-state attributes are self-relevant at all (i.e., which self-attributes are available in memory) and which attributes are especially relevant most of the time (i.e., which self-attributes are highest in chronic accessibility). The Selves Questionnaire asks individuals to list up to 10 attributes that come to mind in describing each self-state representation rather than to list all of the attributes they can think of. In doing so, the measure taps highly accessible self-state attributes, which are precisely those that are likely to play an active role in self-regulation.

The final assumption underlying the construction of the Selves Questionnaire concerns the issue of awareness of self-discrepancies. Re- search has shown that cognitive constructs,
particularly those that are highly and chronically accessible, automatically influence the processing of information without intention, effort, or awareness (Andersen, Spielman, & Bargh, 1992; Bargh, 1989). Construction of the Selves Questionnaire was based on the assumption that individuals are typically not aware, nor do they need to be aware, of self-state discrepancies for these discrepancies to influence their processing of self-related information. On the Selves Questionnaire, individuals are simply asked to provide attributes describing each self-state representation, separately and one at a time, rather than to compare different self-state representations and identify instances of discrepancy. We do not assume that individuals are aware of their self-discrepancies when they complete this questionnaire any more than we assume that individuals are aware of self-discrepancies when these discrepancies influence online processing.

Each of these characteristics of the Selves Questionnaire ensures the measurement of individually characteristic and personally relevant aspects of self-representation. The initial research using the Selves Questionnaire was concerned with testing unique relations between specific types of self-discrepancies (i.e., actual self-ideal self and actual self-ought self) and specific kinds of emotional states. In the correlational work (e.g., Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985), participants completed the Selves Questionnaire, recording attributes that characterized their actual self, ideal self, and ought self from their own perspective and the perspective of significant others. Psychological distress was found to correlate positively with overall level of self-discrepancy. More important, type of self discrepancy was associated with type of emotional distress: Actual-ideal discrepancy was uniquely related to dejection-related emotions (e.g., feeling sad and disappointed), and actual-ought discrepancy was uniquely related to agitation-related emotions (e.g., feeling nervous and tense). The concurrent relation between type of discrepancy and type of emotional distress has also been supported in studies of clinical populations. Strauman (1989) found that clinically depressed individuals suffered predominantly from actual-ideal discrepancies, whereas social phobics suffered predominantly from actual-ought discrepancies. Scott and O'Hara (1993) and Fairbrother and Moretti (1998) have reported similar results using clinical populations.

There is also evidence that self-discrepancy representations are important vulnerability markers. For example, Strauman and Higgins (1988) found that specific types of self-discrepancy predicted unique clusters of emotional distress measured 2 months later. Structural equation modeling supported the unique relation between actual-ideal discrepancy and depressive symptoms and the unique relation between actual-ought discrepancy and social anxiety. Strauman (1992) also found that discrepancies predicted the persistence of distinct emotional syndromes over a 4-month period. More recently, Strauman (1996), in a longitudinal study, established the long-term stability of discrepancy structures within the self and the negative repercussions for emotional suffering.

Especially compelling evidence of self-discrepancies as vulnerability markers is provided by research on the emotional impact of priming self-discrepancies. In these studies, participants are exposed to various tasks designed to momentarily increase the accessibility of self-discrepancies. In an early priming study, Higgins et al. (1986) asked participants to imagine either a positive event (receiving an A in a course or spending an evening with someone they admired) or a negative event (receiving a D in a course or finding out a lover had just left them). Participants with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies experienced increased dejection and decreased psychomotor speed when they imagined a negative event relative to participants with predominant actual-ought discrepancies imagining the same event or participants who imagined a positive event. In contrast, participants with predominant actual-ought discrepancies experienced increased agitation and increased psychomotor speed when they imagined a negative event relative to participants with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies imagining the same event or participants who imagined a positive event.

Subsequent priming experiments incorporated more sophisticated and idiosyncratically sensitive techniques. Strauman and Higgins (1987) developed an idiographic technique that involved priming specific cognitive structures. Participants with predominant actual-ideal or actual-ought discrepancies were instructed to complete a series of phrases ("An 'x' person is . . .") that made reference to attributes that were related to self-discrepancies.
Control attributes based on another participant's responses (yoked control) were also included in the trials. Moment-to-moment changes in mood and arousal were observed. Activating actual-ideal discrepancies produced feelings of sadness and decreased psychomotor arousal, whereas activating actual-ought discrepancies produced feelings of agitation and increased psychomotor arousal. Strauman (1989) replicated these findings in a sample of clinically depressed and socially phobic individuals.

This research is important in illustrating that the activation of specific types of self-discrepancies is causally related to the experience of specific types of emotional distress. More important, it shows that self-state representations are structurally interconnected; activating the attributes of one self-state representation (i.e., a self-guide attribute) produces consequences associated with the activation of the structural relation between these attributes and other self-state representations (i.e., actual-self attributes).

The importance of the relation between actual-self attributes and self-guides is also supported by our research on self-discrepancy and self-esteem (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). This study examined whether the relation between actual-self attributes and the ideal self contributed to the prediction of self-esteem beyond the valence of actual-self attributes alone. As predicted, actual-ideal discrepancy was significantly related to self-esteem even when the negativity of actual-self attributes was statistically controlled. The mere presence of negative actual-self attributes did not, in itself, predict low self-esteem. Only negative actual-self attributes that were discrepant from the ideal self were associated with low self-esteem. Similarly, only positive actual-self attributes that were congruent with the ideal self predicted high self-esteem.

More recent work on self-discrepancy theory has focused on the motivational significance of actual-ideal versus actual-ought discrepancy. Higgins and his colleagues (Higgins, 1996b, 1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994; Higgins & Tykocinski, 1992) have proposed that actual-ideal discrepancy represents a strategic approach-promotion orientation that is concerned with the presence and absence of positive outcomes. In contrast, actual-ought discrepancy represents a strategic avoidance-prevention orientation that is concerned with the presence and absence of negative outcomes. Higgins and Tykocinski (1992) first tested these predictions by assessing memory for either events related to the presence or absence of positive outcomes or events related to the presence or absence of negative outcomes. Individuals with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies had better memory for events related to the presence or absence of positive outcomes than did individuals with predominant actual-ought discrepancies, whereas individuals with predominant actual-ought discrepancies had better memory for events related to the presence or absence of negative outcomes than did individuals with predominant actual-ideal discrepancies.

The results of studies by Higgins et al. (1994) provide evidence that regulatory focus can be momentarily primed. In one study, participants were asked to report on life changes in either their hopes and aspirations (ideal priming) or their duties and obligations (ought priming). Individuals exposed to ideal priming recalled events strategically related to attaining the presence of positive outcomes (approaching matches to desired self-states) better than did individuals exposed to ought priming. In contrast, individuals exposed to ought priming recalled events strategically related to attaining the absence of negative outcomes (avoiding mismatches to desired self-states) better than did individuals exposed to ideal priming. Higgins et al. (1994) also found that approach strategies for maintaining friendships (e.g., trying to be generous and willing to give of oneself) were selected more frequently by predominantly actual-ideal-discrepant individuals than by predominantly actual-ought-discrepant individuals, whereas the reverse was true for avoidance strategies for maintaining friendships (e.g., trying to stay in touch and not lose contact with friends). Results of a separate study showed that preferences for these different strategies for maintaining friendships could be experimentally induced by framing questions to participants to emphasize either a strategic approach-promotion focus or a strategic avoidance-prevention focus.

Other studies have applied self-discrepancy theory to understanding particular syndromes (e.g., eating disorders [Forston & Stanton, 1992; Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991] and physical health problems [Higgins, Vookles, & Tykocinski, 1992]) and the effects of life events (e.g., becoming a parent; Alexander & Higgins, 1993). These studies are not reviewed here. The research we have reviewed, however, clearly supports fundamental
assumptions underlying self-discrepancy theory, specifically that self-representations contain personally relevant attributes reflecting how people view their actual self and their valued goals or desired end states for themselves, that these representations are structurally interconnected and become activated when one component of the representation is primed, and that the activation of specific structures produces specific emotional and motivational consequences. Together, this research illustrates the scope of self-discrepancy theory in addressing fundamental issues of processing structure, processing dynamics, and processing dispositions, all critical elements in a comprehensive theory of personality (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).

Standpoints on the Self: Extending Self-Discrepancy Theory

Research to date has confirmed the basic predictions of self-discrepancy theory regarding the psychological consequences of actual-ideal versus actual-ought discrepancy, yet little is known about the relevance of the different standpoints (i.e., own vs. other) on the self or about the consequences of self-discrepancies involving these standpoints. In the past, most studies collapsed across self-guides representing own versus other standpoints on the self, considered only one standpoint at a time (e.g., ideal-own versus ought-own), or contrasted actual-ideal-own discrepancy with actual-ought-other discrepancy (where domain and standpoint effects are combined). Self-discrepancy theory, however, conceptualizes domain and standpoint as two equally important orthogonal dimensions underlying self-representation (Higgins, 1987). Yet, only recently has attention shifted to understanding how the interpersonal context in which the self develops molds the structure of the self and influences self-regulation.

The current article extends previous work on self-discrepancy theory by specifically focusing on the development and psychological consequences of own versus other perspectives on the self. As previously noted, self-discrepancy theory assumes that various perspectives or standpoints on the self are organized into distinct but structurally interconnected self-state representations. Individuals may regulate in relation to their own hopes and wishes or in relation to the hopes and wishes that various significant others hold for the self. Similarly, they can regulate in relation to their own sense of duty and obligations or in relation to the duties and obligations that they believe others hold for them. There are several potential sources of self-discrepancy related to own-other perspectives or standpoints on the self. One can experience discrepancy between the actual self and one's own self-guides (actual-own discrepancy) or discrepancy between the actual self and the standards or guides that others hold for the self (actual-other discrepancy). For example, individuals may view themselves as overly passive and avoidant (actual self) and personally believe they should be assertive and forthright (own-ought). The same individuals may view themselves as irresponsible and unreliable (actual self) and believe that their parents desire them to be responsible and reliable (parent-ought). These different types of discrepancy (actual-own-ought vs. actual-parent-ought discrepancy) can occur independently of each other. Each type of discrepancy will create distress, however, because each represents a distinct psychological situation with associated psychological and interpersonal repercussions.

The guides that one holds for oneself may also directly conflict with the guides of significant others for the self. For example, an individual may wish to be independent and free spirited but infer that his or her parents desire attributes such as responsibility and reliability. This type of guide-guide conflict can pose difficulties in self-regulation because approaching one guide necessarily entails moving farther away from the conflicting guide. This "double approach-avoidance" conflict (Van Hook & Higgins, 1988) is vividly illustrated in the following excerpt from Sylvia Plath's *The Bell Jar* (1971), in which Plath described the struggle of the protagonist between the desire to pursue her own goals and those prescribed for women of her era:

I saw my life branching out before me like the green fig tree in the story. From the tip of every branch, like a fat purple fig, a wonderful future beckoned and winked. One fig was a husband and a happy home and children, and another fig was a famous poet and another fig was a brilliant professor . . . and beyond and above these figs were many more figs I couldn't quite make out. I saw myself sitting in the crotch of this fig tree, starving to
death, just because I couldn't make up my mind which of the figs I would choose. I wanted each and every one of them, but choosing one meant losing all the rest, and, as I sat there, unable to decide, the figs began to wrinkle and go black, and, one by one, they plopped to the ground at my feet. (pp. 84-85)

Van Hook and Higgins (1988) examined the psychological situation associated with guide-guide conflict that is so aptly captured in Sylvia Plath's writing. They found that participants who had conflicting self-guides reported greater feelings of indecisiveness, confusion, and uncertainty about their identity and their goals than did participants whose guides were not conflicting.

Another form of guide-guide conflict occurs when the guides that different significant others hold for the self are in conflict. The guides that one's mother holds for the self may differ from the guides that one's father or partner holds for the self, or a parent may hold guides for his or her child that conflict with the guides that peers hold for the child. This type of discrepancy may be particularly likely to emerge when individuals undergo life transitions in the persons that are psychologically relevant to them. For example, during adolescence, when peers become increasingly significant, young people may feel torn between the self-guides that their parents hold for them and those that are prescribed by their peer group. This type of guide-guide conflict can also lead to feelings of confusion about identity and inconsistent self-regulation (see Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; see also Blos, 1962; Erikson, 1963).

In understanding the impact of own versus other standpoints on self-regulation, the basic assumptions of self-discrepancy theory regarding structural and process issues can be applied. One can assume, for example, that the structural organization of self-representations that embody one's own perspective or the perspectives of significant others on the self is similar to that found in self-representations that embody hopes and wishes (ideal self) or duties and obligations for the self (ought self). Thus, one would expect the elements within each standpoint to be structurally interconnected, as shown in Figure 1. For example, information regarding the standpoint of one's mother in regard to the self is probably structurally interconnected. Priming one element within this standpoint representation should activate other elements within the representation. Different standpoint representations (e.g., mother standpoint on the self and father standpoint on the self) are also likely to be structurally interconnected in ways that reflect relationship experiences. For some individuals the experience of achieving to the standards or guides held by their mother may activate matches within the father standpoint representation, whereas for others this experience may activate mismatches within the father standpoint representation.

The general prediction that the activation of self-discrepancies produces psychological distress clearly applies to both actual-own and actual-other self-discrepancies. The type of distress triggered by different self-discrepancies may depend on whether the discrepancy is related to one's own self-guides or the self-guides of significant others (see Higgins, 1987). What are the "psychological situations" underlying actual-own versus actual-other self-discrepancy that might give rise to distinct emotional experiences? When individuals perceive their actual self as discrepant from their own self-guides, be they the hopes and wishes that they hold for themselves (actual-own-ideal discrepancy) or the duties and obligations that they believe they should fulfill (actual-own-ought discrepancy), they experience a negative psychological situation associated with their inability to effectively regulate toward their own values. This failure is not necessarily linked with how one believes others view the self, and therefore receiving reassurances from others may have little impact on discrepancy reduction. Rather, the focus of the discrepancy and attempts to reduce it must involve the relation between actual-self attributes and one's own self-guides. Feedback from others can be helpful only insofar as it alters one's perception of the actual self, one's guides, or the perceived discrepancy between the two. Preliminary evidence supports the hypothesis that actual-own discrepancy is uniquely related to a sense of personal failure. Specifically, Higgins (1987) found that actual-own-ideal discrepancy was associated with higher self-critical scores, as measured by Blatt's Depressive Experience Questionnaire (DEQ; Blatt, D'Afflitti, & Quinlan, 1976), than was actual-other-ideal
discrepancy. The self-critical (Blatt et al., 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1983) or "personal autonomy" subtype of depression (Beck, 1983) is characterized by a high investment in personal independence and achievement and involves a sense that one has failed to meet one's own standards in this regard.

The psychological situation underlying actual-own discrepancy can be contrasted with that underlying actual-other discrepancy: When individuals perceive their actual self as discrepant from the standards that significant others hold for them (actual-other-ideal or actual-other-ought discrepancies), they experience a negative psychological situation associated with their inability to effectively regulate toward others' values and standards. Consistent with this view, Higgins (1987) reported that actual-other-ideal discrepancy was associated with higher dependency scores on the DEQ (Blatt et al., 1976) than was actual-own-ideal discrepancy. The "dependent" (Blatt et al., 1976; Blatt & Lerner, 1983) or "sociotropic" (Beck, 1983)
depressive subtype is characterized by a high investment in close interpersonal relationships and involves a sense that one has lost the love and acceptance of others.

Outcome Contingency Beliefs and the Effects of Other Standpoint Discrepancies

Actual-other self-discrepancy inherently involves consideration of the self in relation with others. The impact of actual-other self-discrepancies may be moderated by the beliefs that individuals hold concerning the consequences of meeting or failing to meet the guides that significant others hold for them. These beliefs have been termed "outcome-contingency beliefs" (Andersen, Reznik, & Chen, 1997; M. W. Baldwin, 1992; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996; Markus & Cross, 1990; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). If individuals believe that meeting the guides that others hold for them (hopes and wishes or duties and obligations) will result in the presence of positive outcomes (e.g., praise and acceptance) or in the absence of negative outcomes (e.g., not being criticized or rejected), they will be motivated to meet these guides, and they will experience positive affect when they do so. Similarly, if individuals believe that failing to meet the guides that others hold for them will result in the absence of positive outcomes (e.g., loss or withdrawal of acceptance or love) or in the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., criticism and rejection), they will be motivated to ensure that they do not fail to meet these guides and will experience negative affect if they fail to meet them. Individuals may perceive their actual self as discrepant from the guides that significant others hold for them but suffer limited distress if they believe that the love and acceptance of others are not contingent on their meeting or failing to meet these guides.

In short, the impact of actual-other discrepancies depends on the nature of represented contingencies concerning one's relationships with others. The notion of outcome contingency beliefs is analogous to Rogers' (1961) notion of "conditions of worth." Rogers generally viewed contingencies of worth as detrimental to self-development because such contingencies restrict self-exploration and expression for fear of loss of acceptance and love. Consistent with this view, research (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987; Higgins & Tykocinski, cited in Higgins, 1989b) has shown that individuals with high levels of actual-parent-ideal discrepancy who strongly believe that their failure to live up to parental hopes and wishes will lead to abandonment report higher levels of chronic depression than do individuals with the same type and level of discrepancy who do not endorse this belief.

In summary, there is a strong theoretical rationale that supports the distinction between own and other perspectives on the self as fundamental dimensions underlying the organization of self-representation (Andersen et al., 1997). Furthermore, preliminary evidence, as summarized here, suggests that self-discrepancies involving different standpoints on the self represent different psychological situations that carry distinct consequences. In the remaining sections of the article, we deepen our exploration of the distinction between own and other standpoints on the self and implications for psychological well-being. We begin with a discussion of developmental issues. There are distinct advantages to understanding the development antecedents of self-regulatory patterns; adult patterns of functioning, both normative and pathological, are better understood in the context of the developmental patterns from which they have arisen (Blatt, 1995). Indeed, some might argue that a theory of personality is impossible without delineation of developmental factors. In our particular case, it is important to understand the differentiation of the self into a multifaceted representational system and, more specifically, the emergence of own and other standpoints on the self as distinct but overlapping representations. How is the emergence of representational thought related to the capacity to represent, consider, and consolidate different perspectives on the self? What is the relationship between own-other differentiation at different developmental phases and self-regulatory competencies and liabilities? We have previously linked cognitive-developmental and parental socialization strategies to the emergence of ideal and ought self-state representations and outcome contingency beliefs (Higgins, 1989a, 1991, 1996a; Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). In the present discussion, we shift focus and specifically address the emergence of own versus other standpoints within the self-system and individual differences in regulatory orientation.
Although some theorists (e.g., Butterworth, 1990; Stem, 1985) believe that infants are capable of greater self-other differentiation than do others (e.g., Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Mahler, 1968), most agree that experiences of the self in infancy are less differentiated than are later self-experiences. Moreover, it is generally agreed, at least at a theoretical level, that internal representations that clearly differentiate one's own view of the self from that of multiple others emerge gradually and are fully operative only relatively late in development (Harter, 1999). Theorists argue (Damon & Hart, 1988; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a) that, if children are to engage in intentional regulation of the self, they must develop representations of the relation between self-features (affect, behavior, and self-attributes) and emotional, interpersonal, or other consequences. The complexity of their representational capacity will be directly related to their ability to engage in intentional self-regulation and to achieve desired goals. Developmental shifts in organizational and mental representational capacity (Case, 1985; Damon & Hart, 1988; Fischer, 1980; Selman, 1980) probably underlie qualitative shifts in self-regulatory capacity (Case, 1991; Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). Whereas shifts in cognitive development determine the complexity of relations that children can construct, parental socialization strategies and interpersonal context may determine the type, cohesiveness, and complexity of representations that children do, in fact, construct.

In our discussion of developmental issues, we focus on shifts in representational capacity as outlined by Case (1985) and consider how these shifts might influence the emergence of own and other self-regulatory standpoints. These shifts will probably occur within relatively set chronological periods. As we note in our discussion, however, significant individual variation may occur in this regard. To understand the underlying processes of self-development, it is important to recognize that different processes may have ascendancy during different periods of development. Thus, for example, Emde and his colleagues (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991) argued that representational structures during infancy are dominated by the affectivity of experiences and this weaves experiences together into integrated patterns. As development progresses, particularly with the advent of language, experiences are integrated not only along affective lines but also with respect to increasingly complex temporal, social, and reflective self-meaning. Life transitions in the social context and social developmental demands on the self (e.g., with the introduction of teachers, peers, romantic partners, work colleagues, and so on) can also dramatically alter the psychological field in which the self is constructed. This is not to imply that developments during earlier periods are less important in understanding later self-development. Indeed, early representational structures, dominated by affective organization, probably play a pivotal role in providing the foundations for later self-development. The point is that each level of development may be differentially influenced by affective, cognitive, and social factors dominant during that period, with new developments emerging out of earlier structures (Werner, 1957). Figure 2 provides an overview of these emerging structures and illustrates the developmental levels discussed subsequently.

Level I: Sensory Orienting to Sensorimotor Development

During the past decade, research has provided compelling evidence of the capacity of infants to actively participate in organizing their early experiences. During the 1st month of life, this capacity is limited to attending to, but not coordinating, changing stimuli. By 1 month of age, infants demonstrate the ability to direct their attention to stimuli, and Case (1991) argued that, between 1 and 4 months, infants begin to form "integrated" models of significant caregivers. These models are essentially patterns of sensory experiences that are affectively laden. A similar notion has been advanced by Meltzoff (1990), who argued that infants are equipped to detect patterns of stimulation and to form rudimentary cross-modal representations of invariance in experience. Even at the most rudimentary level, the capacity of infants to detect and orient toward positive features of their environment
LEVEL 5: LATE VECTORIAL DEVELOPMENT

Other A’s Standpoint On Self-Trait X \( \xrightarrow{R_2} \) Self-Feature X \( \xrightarrow{R_5} \) Other B’s Standpoint On Self-Trait X

Other A’s Response \( Y_A \) \( \xrightarrow{R_3} \) Self-Psychological Situation Z

Other B’s Response \( Y_B \) \( \xrightarrow{R_6} \) Self-Psychological Situation Z

LEVEL 4: LATE DIMENSIONAL AND EARLY VECTORIAL DEVELOPMENT

Self-Trait X \( \xrightarrow{R_2} \) Other’s Standpoint On Self-Trait X

Self-Feature X \( \xrightarrow{R_3} \) Other-Response Y \( \xrightarrow{R_4} \) Self-Psychological Situation Z

LEVEL 3: LATE INTERRELATIONAL AND EARLY DIMENSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Other’s Standpoint On Self-Feature X

Self-Feature X \( \xrightarrow{R_1} \) Other-Response Y \( \xrightarrow{R_3} \) Self-Psychological Situation Z

LEVEL 2: LATE SENSORIMOTOR AND EARLY INTERRELATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Self-Feature X \( \xrightarrow{R_1} \) Other-Response Y \( \xrightarrow{R_2} \) Self-Psychological Situation Z

LEVEL 1: EARLY SENSORIMOTOR DEVELOPMENT

Self-Feature X \( \xrightarrow{R_1} \) Other-Response Y

(such as feeding and soothing from a caregiver) and away from negative features of their environment has obvious adaptive value. This basic capacity gives rise to four basic types of psychological experience: (a) pleasure associated with the presence of positive features of the environment, (b) distress associated with the absence of these features, (c) distress associated with the presence of negative features of the environment, and (d) relief from distress associated with the absence of negative features. Increasing affective differentiation (3-4 months; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) expands the sensitivity of infants in monitoring variation in their experiences, particularly with respect to their caregivers. It is unlikely, however, that differentiated affect is precisely mirrored in representational structures. Instead, experiences are probably represented and integrated across the basic continuum of positivity-negativity.

Although relatively simplistic, the integration of experiences along these dimensions provides an important affective foundation for the sense of self. Case (1991) has argued that experiences linked with positive affect may be more coherently integrated into models than experiences linked with negative affect because of the generally disorganizing impact of negative affect. Similarly, links between representations of positively and negatively toned experiences are likely to be limited. In this sense, although the young infant possesses a basic capacity to form preverbal, affectively based, cross-modal representations, these probably do not provide an integrated, cohesive representation across the broad range of the infant's experiences.

As infants progress from the early sensorimotor stage (4-8 months) to the middle and late sensorimotor stages (8-18 months), their capacity to initiate and participate in their social world increases profoundly. Early in this stage, these attempts consist of "two-component" transactions (Case, 1991) wherein infants appear to hold the expectation that their behavior (e.g., vocalization and nonverbal expression) will be responded to by their caregiver in a complementary fashion. This mode of interaction represents a shift in level of representation from the experience of discrete sensory patterns to sensorimotor routines (Case, 1991). Building on this level of representational capacity is the subsequent emergence of infants' ability to consider two representations: the representation of their experience (e.g., experiences of apprehension or fear when confronted with a novel person or object) and the representation of the response of their caregiver to this event (e.g., supportive encouragement or anxiety and attempts to remove the child from danger). By referencing new experiences of the world to parental responses, the child can begin to venture into the world while relying on the experience and benevolence of his or her parent to navigate this voyage.

Although we are arguing that self-regulatory development is linked to the emergence of representational thought, it is important to keep in mind that other factors play an important role in self-regulation at this early age. Sroufe (1990) argued that sensitive caregivers provide "scaffolding" of self-regulatory developments, particularly early during this period, to accommodate the infant's behavior and to bridge developmental transitions. Other researchers have used the term "self-regulating other" to describe the attunement of caregivers to infants' need for a balance between their emerging capacity to coordinate and represent their experiences and the need for caregivers to provide this structure for them (Emde et al., 1991; Sander, 1975; Stern, 1985):

> The coherence of experience results from an emotionally available caregiver who is continually responsive to a particular active, self-regulating, socially interactive, emotional infant - an infant who is "getting it right" in the midst of a particular developmental world that is socially expanding. (Emde et al., 1991,p. 258)

Thus, although there is value in specifying developmental changes in affective, cognitive, and social development during infancy, it is misleading to consider the infant and his or her capabilities in this regard as the single or appropriate unit of study in self-development. The interactive role of the infant-caregiver dyad clearly needs to be considered to understand variants in self-regulatory development, particularly during periods when representational capacity is quite limited.

What is known of self-other representation during this period? Early theorists argued that, at
birth, the infant does not possess even the most rudimentary capacity to distinguish "self" from "not-self" experience (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). Mahler (1968) used the term "normal autism" to refer to the 1st month of life. She argued that, during this period, the infant is unable to recognize others and perceive the functions that they perform for the infant (e.g., feeding) as external to the self. Mahler believed that the infant gradually came to differentiate between self and others and develop an awareness of self as physically separate from others during the 1st year of life. According to Mahler, at approximately 2-3 months of age, infants possess a dim recognition of their own bodies and of their mother as being outside of the self. But it is only later (5-9 months) that they truly begin to differentiate between self and mother. This corresponds to a period of development in which they exhibit stranger anxiety, reflecting their recognition of their primary caregivers as distinct familiar others. Mahler's estimates of when stranger anxiety occurs correspond quite closely to estimates based on observational research (Sternberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983; Vaughn & Sroufe, 1979).

The ability of infants to be mobile and to actively explore and manipulate their environment (e.g., through crawling or walking) corresponds with a process Mahler termed "hatching." At this point, infants (at approximately 10-15 months) appear to be better able to tolerate separateness from their mother but will monitor their exploration by referencing back to their mother and returning for emotional "refueling" (Mahler, 1968). It is only later (at approximately 15-18 months) that infants seem to grasp that their mother exists separately from themselves. Mahler (1968) speculated that at this early age, however, infants are not able to internally represent a coherent and stable representation of their mother to comfort them in her absence, and thus separation typically provokes anxiety and attempts to try to control the mother. Research showing that, by the age of 15 months, infants clearly recognize themselves as an object (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) complements these psychodynamic notions.

In summary, during this period of development, infants move from a relatively limited view of the self to a point at which the self is experienced and represented as a distinct physical and psychological entity separate from others. These early experiences of self are highly interwoven in an affective sense and have important consequences for determining the tendency of infants and toddlers to approach or avoid others (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). As infants begin to differentiate self-experiences from those involving significant others, they begin to associate these two modes of experience with positive and negative affective states. As illustrated by attachment research, the presence of significant others commonly begins to be associated with the presence of positive experiences or relief from negative experiences. Insecurely attached infants do not necessarily associate the presence of the caregiver with positive outcomes. In cases of maltreatment, infants come to associate the presence of the caregiver with negative outcomes and can appear confused and agitated in the presence of the caregiver (Carlson, Cicchetti, Barnett, & Braunwald, 1989). Early patterns of approach-avoidance behavior show at least some degree of stability over the preschool period (e.g., Main & Cassidy, 1988), supporting the notion that early affective foundations of self-representation have important implications for later development.

As infants develop a sense of themselves as distinct agents with interests and desires, they also begin to form an affective sense of self. Theorists from diverse perspectives have argued that the manner in which significant others respond to infants' explorations, interest, and growing capabilities influences the affective foundations of the self. If caregivers respond in ways that enhance self-experiences by providing optimal conditions for self-exploration (Winnicott, 1965), "prizing" the infant (Rogers, 1961), and soothing anxiety and fears (Kohut, 1971), infants are likely to form a well-integrated, positively toned base for self-development. In contrast, if caregivers respond in ways that limit, frustrate, or overwhelm the emerging self of a child, these situations are likely to give rise to a less positive or a negative sense of self. Sullivan (1953) argued that overly harsh or anxiety-provoking parental responses have a profoundly negative impact on the integration of experiences into the self-system, particularly when this occurs at early preverbal stages of development.

In summary, although research specifically examining self-other differentiation and representation during this developmental period is limited, the findings that have emerged are consistent with classic and more recent theories of self-development; both identify the emergence of a fundamental affective foundation for the self and the ability to form generalized representations of invariance in experience as important features of this developmental period. These developments, however, do not support sophisticated self-regulatory
action. At this level of development, infants are not capable of forming representations of the relation between specific self-attributes or behaviors and positive or negative experiences. Nor are they able to simultaneously represent the relation between their specific self-attributes and the attributes desired by others and the consequences of this relation. Nonetheless, even though the complexity of their representations does not allow infants to regulate their behavior in terms of set goals or self-guides, these representations reflect the affective tone of self-other experiences and have important repercussions in determining approach and avoidance orientations.

**Level 2: Early Interrelational Development**

A shift in representational capacity occurs with the emergence of symbolic representational abilities between the ages of 18 months and 2 years (Bruner, 1964; Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Piaget, 1951; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). This shift (interrelational period, Substage 1, 18 months to 2 years of age; Case, 1991) corresponds with the emergence of language and is associated with the ability to consider bidirectional relationships between objects, including self-as-object and other-as-object. As toddlers move through this level of development (interrelational period, Substage 2, 2-3.5 years of age), they acquire an increasingly complex and more well-integrated understanding of their role and the roles of others in social systems (Case, 1991). For example, children begin to understand the relation between their behavior and the responses of others. Moreover, they can include the impact of others' responses to them in this representational sequence. Thus, they can understand that when they behave in a particular way, their mother or father responds in a predictable manner that then leads them to experience a positive or negative psychological state (Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992). In other words, children now understand and represent the interpersonal significance of their behavior and the implications of this for their psychological well being. These self-other contingency beliefs reflect their understanding of social rules and relations and are used to regulate behavior. As such, these early belief structures are the foundations of a "moral self" that allows toddlers to begin to regulate their own behavior in terms of an internal set of beliefs concerning what is and what is not acceptable (Emde et al., 1991).

It is important to note that, in contrast to the previous level of development, children at this level of development are able to differentiate between self and others much more fully. They are now able to identify themselves as unique physical objects (Schneider-Rosen & Cicchetti, 1984, 1991), and they recognize their names and distinguish themselves from other children. In addition, they begin to apply concrete categorical descriptions to the self (e.g., gender, specific interests, and physical abilities; Harter, 1983). Children also enter into a period of tremendous growth in their ability to negotiate the world physically and psychologically. These developments contribute to an emerging sense of the self as distinct and with intention (i.e., to a sense of "I").

Psychodynamic theorists maintain that the emergence of a distinct sense of self is a critical period of self-development. Children begin to express the desire to exert personal control in their lives, and their success or frustration in this regard becomes linked with their self-esteem. They often overestimate their abilities in ways that can appear to be unrealistic and grandiose (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992). This corresponds with a period of self-assertion (Sander, 1975), ambivalence about separation, and a "battle of the wills" (Mahler, 1968). The tendency of young children to overestimate their abilities may be due, in part, to their limited capacity to gauge the relative level of their abilities through processes such as social comparison. Object relations and self-psychology theorists argue, however, that the inflated or idealized images of self and other that emerge during this period of development reflect a critical phase in the development of a "core self." Furthermore, they suggest that parents play a pivotal role in the child's emerging sense of self-esteem by providing reflections - or "mirroring" - of the child's growing competencies. Effective parents have empathy for their child's need to experience herself or himself as powerful and effective, despite the child's obvious dependency and powerlessness. Parental responses that support the child's view of herself or himself as powerful contribute to the child's motivation to go forward and meet new challenges. With this foundation in place, children are better able to integrate later, developmentally appropriate challenges that help them come to terms with
real limitations in themselves and others (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992). If all goes well during this process, children will gradually begin to accept positive and negative aspects of the self and others and internalize self-regulatory functions related to self-esteem maintenance.

Kohut and his colleagues (Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992) also emphasized the need of young children to idealize others as powerful in controlling the world and ensuring safety. Kohut hypothesized that by experiencing parents as powerful, competent, and able to assuage fears, children themselves gradually begin to internalize these "self-functions" and develop competency. As child competence grows, effective parents present their children with increasingly challenging but developmentally appropriate opportunities to assume more responsibility for self-regulation.

Thus, according to object relations and self psychology, effective parenting supports and encourages the emergence of healthy self-esteem and a positive but balanced view of the self and significant others. The emergence of healthy self-other representations is predicated on reciprocal transactions between child and parent that ensure consolidation but also encourage developmentally appropriate growth. Traditional psychodynamic theories link pathological self-other representations to inadequate experiences within the child-parent relationship. For example, self psychology suggests that some parents are limited in their ability to understand and accept the grandiose or idealizing needs of their children. These parents may be threatened by their children's growing competence, preoccupied with their own needs, overwhelmed by the intensity of their children's needs, or fearful of being overindulgent. When parents are limited in this regard, opportunities for experiences of the self or others as competent and pleasurable within a relational context are limited, and an internal sense of self-esteem is not well established. It is argued that, as a result, these children display intense and developmentally inappropriate needs to be admired, praised, and calmed by others and that they are intolerant of minor disappointments and failures and exhibit wide fluctuations in their perceptions of self-worth and esteem for others.

Most developmental theories would accept that parental sensitivity to the emergence of new modes of experience and expression in young children is critical to the parent-child partnership in the development of self-regulatory competence. Parents who are sensitive and attuned to their child's emerging abilities and emotional needs will be more likely to successfully negotiate and communicate expectations that permit children to appropriately express their needs and their emotional experiences. Expectations that are consistent with the competencies of young children and help to bridge them to more independent forms of self-regulation will be most beneficial in providing a healthy context for the expression of inner experiences and exploratory interests. This partnership between parent and child regarding self-other relationships and social scripts provides a structure for the child to internalize and allows him or her to successfully negotiate the child-parent relationship and subsequent social relationships.

The emergence of symbolic representational skills, coupled with the emergence of a "core self," makes this a critical period for the development of self-other representations. Building on the foundations of basic approach-avoidance orientations to self and others established during the previous developmental level, this period of development is probably related to the emergence of more specific beliefs about the attributes of the self, a self that either possesses or lacks valued attributes. Children now have a greater understanding of how others respond to self attributes and an understanding of the impact of others' responses on their own emotional state. With these rather concrete representations now in place, children can consider the relation among the representations and begin to regulate themselves in more sophisticated ways than simply orienting toward or away from others.

Level 3: Late Interrelational and Early Dimensional Development

Between the ages of 4 and 6 years, the representational capacity of children increases so that they are able to infer the perspectives of others on a particular event or object, including the self (Case, 1985, 1991; Feffer, 1970; Fischer, 1980; Higgins, 1981; Piaget, 1965). In contrast
to the previous level of development, children can now infer another person's viewpoint on the self. Thus, children at this level can understand that it is the discrepancy between their actual behavior and the behavior desired by their parents that underlies their parents' response to them. These self-other contingency beliefs underlie children's belief that if they are able to display the behavior that they infer their parents desire, their parents will respond positively to them. This permits children to monitor their behavior in relation to the guides of significant others (i.e., other standpoints) and to engage in self-regulation to maximize positive (or minimize negative) consequences for the self. Once again, the sensitivity of parents to the needs and competencies of their children and their partnership with their children are an important cornerstone in determining the nature and clarity of early self-other contingency beliefs. Parents who negotiate and clearly communicate expectations to their children that are congruent with their needs and competencies will be most successful in providing optimal conditions for the internalization of effective and adaptive internal regulatory structures.

At this level of cognitive development, children also begin to represent other standards for self-evaluation. They can compare their performance with that of others (social comparison) or with their own performance in the past (autobiographical standards; Ruble & Rholes, 1981; Shantz, 1983). These new standards for self-evaluation become a source of ideals and goals that can be adopted as one's own self-guides. For example, children may observe the performance of admired others (e.g., peer, older sibling, or sports personality) and may adopt this level of performance as a guide for the self. Thus, at this level of development, children can evaluate their behavior or attributes with respect to a multitude of self-guides, each giving rise to a particular psychological outcome.

Other changes begin to occur in the type and stability of characteristics ascribed to the self. Whereas children at lower levels of cognitive development tend to describe themselves in highly specific behavioral terms and may vary considerably in their self-descriptions on various occasions, children at this level of development begin to describe the self in more generalized terms (Harter, 1983). Nonetheless, they are unable to integrate opposing attributes into higher order generalizations about the self (Case, 1985; Ruble & Dweck, 1995). Thus, the generalized descriptions used by children at this age are not equivalent to trait descriptions used by older children in providing an integrative function. In other words, children are cognitively mature enough to understand that patterns of behaviors and feelings represent more generalized characteristics about the self but not sophisticated enough to understand that conflicting aspects of behavior and feelings can be integrated within the same person. Children at this age also struggle to integrate opposing characteristics of the inferred standpoints of others on the self. Thus, their feelings about themselves, both from their own perspective and from the inferred perspective of others, fluctuate considerably.

The developments that occur during this period are clearly built on the foundations of earlier periods. This period, however, marks the emergence of explicit representations of the viewpoints that others hold toward the self (i.e., other standpoints). As such, the capacity of children to regulate themselves on the basis of a clearly articulated understanding of their social context increases significantly. The emotional tone (positive or negative) and motivational orientation that have become associated with the self and others at earlier developmental levels continue to have a powerful impact on the experience of the self at this developmental level and are now explicitly represented in self-other contingency beliefs. These beliefs, in turn, have affective repercussions for children. Self-other contingency beliefs, for example, that emphasize a lack of acceptance by parents will have a negative impact on self-esteem (Harter, Marold, & Whitesell, 1992). The negative affect that is produced by this type of self-other contingency belief has a disorganizing impact on children and thus may also impair their capacity to integrate self-other experiences. This issue becomes increasingly critical in later stages of development when conflicting and sometimes threatening aspects of the self must be integrated. In contrast, self-other contingency beliefs that emphasize acceptance by parents are likely to give rise to positive self-esteem and to ease the transition into subsequent periods of development.
At this level of development, between the ages of 9 and 11 years, a significant shift in representational capacity occurs, giving rise to the ability to simultaneously represent and compare rankings on more than one dimension at one time. Children, for example, can recognize that although their performance has improved in comparison with their past performance, it is still not as good as that of their peers. The ability of children to consider multiple dimensions in evaluating their behavior allows them to reach increasingly stable and dispositional conclusions about the self. Social comparison information becomes especially salient in self-evaluation (Damon & Hart, 1988), introducing the risk of forming negative dispositional conclusions about the self (Renick & Harter, 1989).

The ability of children at this level of development to think about the self in dispositional terms and the increased stability in self-representation that this brings can make self-regulation even more challenging. Whereas before this level of development children could assume that simply changing a behavior would allow them to meet a standard they held for themselves or one they believed others held for them, this is no longer the case. Now children's self-other beliefs can represent the ways in which their personal dispositions do not meet important standards, and this produces a psychologically distressing and difficult problem to solve.

The growing complexity of the self-evaluative system, along with the increasing potential for conflict within this system, sets the stage for the final level of development, in which adolescents begin to struggle with differentiating among the self-guides that will be retained as part of their own self-guide system (i.e., their own values, goals, and morals), the other standpoint self-guides that will be retained as the "felt presences of others" (Schafer, 1968), and the self-guides that will be rejected.

Adolescence (13 to 16 years of age) brings the capacity to simultaneously consider several perspectives on multiple events or attributes, interrelating different dimensional systems (Case, 1985; Fischer, 1980; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Selman & Byrne, 1974). Adolescents form increasingly abstract generalized perceptions of themselves and others based on their consideration of multiple attributes. Most important, they can now simultaneously compare their own evaluation of these attributes with the evaluations that they believe others hold (e.g., their parents vs. their peers). This level of cognitive sophistication allows adolescents to consider simultaneously the relation of their actual-self attributes to several self-guides (e.g., own self-guides, parental self-guides, self-guides of peers, and cultural norms) and the relation of these self-guides to each other. Furthermore, adolescents can speculate about the self-representational structure of others: the types of attributes that others possess, would like to possess, and so on. They can understand, for example, that an athlete who possesses outstanding abilities feels disappointed when she fails to make an Olympic team because her actual abilities are discrepant from her goals. The capacity of adolescents to represent these self-regulatory scenarios provides them with the opportunity to imagine and act out alternative images for the self and consider the consequences of possessing various personas.

The complexity of representational thought at this level of development greatly increases the complexity of information about the self and the likelihood of discrepancy among various self-states. Adolescents are now confronted with the task of integrating multiple views of themselves in different and often changing social contexts (e.g., family, peer, romantic, and work contexts). As they move through the period of adolescence and enter into early adulthood, they are increasingly concerned with the views that others hold of them, particularly their peers and romantic partners. Primary attachments to romantic partners and close friends emerge and must be balanced with attachment to parents and family members. They are strongly motivated to gain the acceptance of others and may attempt to do so by presenting themselves "falsely," that is, as possessing attributes or beliefs that are not their own but are designed to impress others or conceal attributes they believe are not accepted by others (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, 1996).

The capacity of adolescents to simultaneously consider multiple perspectives on the self,
coupled with the challenge of significant changes in their social relationships, provokes a period of intense self-preoccupation and pressure to consolidate a sense of self. Ego psychologists (Eagle, 1984; Erikson, 1963, 1968; Marcia, 1987) have extensively discussed the process of identity development that ensues during this developmental period. From a social-cognitive perspective, identity crisis is precipitated by the representational capacity to consider simultaneously multiple discrepant perspectives on the self. Early during this period, adolescents will have the capacity to be aware of multiple and possibly conflicting views of the self, but their ability to integrate divergent views will be somewhat limited. It is not until late adolescence that the ability to integrate apparent contradictions in self-attributes develops (Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Mon-sour, 1992). Similarly, it is unlikely that opposing views of the self held by different individuals (e.g., self, parents, and peers) can be successfully integrated and accepted until the period of late adolescence.

If consolidation of the self-system and the adoption of a coherent set of self-guides are overly conflicted, adolescents find themselves in an extended period of crisis and confusion regarding their identity (identity moratorium). This may occur because the cognitive demands of integration are simply too overwhelming. It is equally likely, however, that the emotional consequences of acute levels of discrepancy hinder adolescents from applying the cognitive skills that they do possess to integrate conflicting material. In some cases, adolescents may simply avoid the conflict inherent in considering multiple possibilities for self-definition (identity diffusion) or circumvent this crisis through the indiscriminate adoption of parental or socially prescribed self-guides (identity foreclosure). For adolescents who enter this period with only a moderate discrepancy between self-state representations, the process of identity consolidation can be a gratifying period of self-exploration and definition (identity achievement). The success of adolescents in negotiating this period of development will again depend on the sensitivity and support of their caregivers in providing scaffolding for higher levels of functioning. In particular, caregivers need to provide support and opportunities for individuation and appropriately assist adolescents with the task of integrating conflicting information about the self.

It is important to understand that although adolescence marks a period during which the crystallization of identity may occur, identity formation is by no means restricted to this developmental period. Erikson (1963, 1968) explicitly discussed this developmental stage as a critical one in an ongoing process of self-construction that extends from birth across the life span. Similarly, own and other self-guides have been forming well before this period of development and undergo further transformation during subsequent developmental periods.

We have discussed the emergence of own and other self-regulatory guides as a function of developments in cognitive representational capacity in general and self-state representations in particular. In our description of this process, we have assumed equal development of both types of self-regulatory standpoints on self. Individuals may differ, however, in the extent to which they regulate in relation to their own self-guides versus the inferred guides of significant others. In the next section, we consider the development of such individual differences in self-regulatory orientation.

Individual Differences in Standpoint Orientation

The factors that determine the acquisition of knowledge in general also influence the development of self-regulatory guides. The coherence of self-other contingency knowledge and other standpoint guides is determined by the frequency, consistency, clarity, and significance with which parents communicate information regarding the relation of children's behaviors to parental responses (Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a). When parents frequently and consistently draw attention to the relation between their child's behavior and specific consequences, and they do so in a way that highlights the distinctiveness of this relation, they are likely to produce self-other contingency beliefs in their child that are highly accessible and likely to produce uniform and coherent self-regulation. To the extent that children are motivated to meet parental guides because the consequences of meeting or not meeting these guides are important for them, they
will be inclined to view their parents' communication of contingency information as highly significant.

Parents engage in varying types of socialization strategies that increase or decrease the likelihood of their children developing and internalizing coherent self-regulatory guides. For example, a child whose parents are consistently responsive and sensitive in monitoring the child's behavior and who use induction techniques (i.e., explaining rules clearly and providing reasons for consequences) is likely to develop and internalize coherent self-other contingency beliefs. In contrast, a child whose parents tend to be inconsistent, overcontrolling, and harsh (e.g., restrictive and punitive) or undercontrolling and too permissive (e.g., neglectful) is not likely to develop or internalize coherent self-other contingency beliefs (see Higgins, 1989a, 1991; Moretti & Higgins, 1990a).

In socializing their children, parents may focus their attention on different types of psychological situations. For example, parents may focus on situations in which their child's behavior matches the standards that they hold for their child or they may focus on situations in which their child's behavior does not match standards. Meeting parental standards may result in the child experiencing either the presence of a positive outcome (e.g., praise or affection) or the absence of a negative outcome (e.g., avoiding criticism or rejection). Failing to meet parental standards may result in the child experiencing either the presence of negative outcomes (e.g., punishment) or the absence of positive outcomes (e.g., love withdrawal). In this way, parental socialization practices may lead to the development of self-regulatory styles that focus on the presence or absence of either positive outcomes (promotion focus) or negative outcomes (prevention focus; see Higgins, 1996a).

Parents also play a pivotal role in socializing their children to regulate their behavior with respect to their own self-guides or the inferred self-guides of significant others. Parents vary in the extent to which they socialize their children to attend to others' emotions and to engage in behavior that meets the demands or needs of others (Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983). When parents socialize their children to have empathy for the emotional states of others and to engage in behavior that attends to the needs and desires of others, children are likely to develop a self-regulatory style that is oriented toward the inferred guides of others for the self. In contrast, when parents socialize their children to value independence, autonomy, and individual initiative, they are likely to develop a self-regulatory style that is oriented toward their own self-guides.

**Sex Differences in Standpoint Orientation**

Own versus other socialization practices may also be important in understanding self-regulatory differences between males and females (see also Higgins, 1991). Research on differences in male and female socialization indicates that parents monitor the behavior of their daughters more than that of their sons (see Block, 1983; Fagot, 1978; Huston, 1983; Parke & Slaby, 1983; Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983; Rothbart & Maccoby, 1966; Rothbart & Rothbart, 1976). Females are encouraged to attend to others' needs, to conform to their expectations, and to judge their success or failure in terms of acceptance by others (Cross & Madson, 1997). This pattern of socialization has obvious deleterious consequences for self-esteem and predisposes girls to depression in adolescence (Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). For example, Pomerantz and Ruble (1998a, 1998b) have shown that although mothers are equally likely to use control with their daughters and their sons, they are more likely to use control without granting autonomy with their daughters than their sons. They also found that the use of control without granting autonomy increases the extent to which children accept responsibility for failure. Thus, it is the difference in the meaning of control tactics for autonomous self-regulation, rather than the use of control per se, that contributes to the deleterious effect of female sex-typed socialization (Pomerantz & Ruble, 1998a, 1998b; Pomerantz & Saxon, in press).

As a consequence of distinct socialization experiences, girls and boys may develop different standpoint orientations. To the extent that socialization is sex typed, girls are likely to develop an orientation toward "relational self-regulation": the tendency to construct a self in relation to others (Gilligan, Lyons, & Hammer, 1990; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991; Surrey, 1991) and to self-regulate to the standards that significant others hold for the self. This self-regulatory style may be a function of the lower social status and power of
women in our society, thus increasing their motivation to be sensitive to the perspectives that others hold, particularly others who exert control and power (Martin & Ruble, 1997). In contrast, sex-typed socialization practices encourage boys to develop an orientation to regulate toward standards that are independent of intimate relationships (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997). This prediction is supported by a broad range of research on gender differences in socialization (Cross & Madson, 1997), particularly research on parental socialization of emotional attunement and empathy in sons and daughters. Mothers are more likely to discuss others' feelings with their young daughters than with their sons (Parke, 1967), and by 2 years of age girls are more likely to talk about feelings than boys (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). Parents also encourage their daughters, more than their sons, to attend to others' feelings by using induction techniques that help them understand the impact of their behavior on others (Grusec, Dix, & Mills, 1982; Smetana, 1989). Consequently, girls are more likely than boys to anticipate feeling badly if they act aggressively toward others and to express concern about the impact of their aggressive behavior on others (Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1989; Perry, Perry, & Weiss, 1989).

The view that women are socialized to attend to others' standards for them is consistent with theories that stress the relational context in which females develop a sense of self. According to Miller (1976), women tend to define and experience themselves in terms of their relationships with others. Chodorow (1978) suggested that this occurs because female self-development occurs within a context that emphasizes relatedness to others, particularly mothers, whereas male self-development emphasizes independence, autonomy, and differentiation from others.

In summary, both significant, close relationships and the larger social context shape the developing self. As a result of these forces, individuals may differ in the extent to which own versus other perspectives on the self are psychologically relevant for self-regulation. Individual differences may emerge in (a) the level of discrepancy between own and other standpoints on the self and (b) the psychological relevance of own versus other standpoint perspectives for self-regulation. We now turn to a review of recent studies we have completed that examine standpoint orientation and sensitivity to interpersonal feedback. We also present findings on sex differences in standpoint orientation and their implications for understanding sex differences in dysphoria.

Own Versus Other Discrepancy and Sensitivity to Interpersonal Feedback

Individual differences in own versus other regulatory orientation should have consequences for sensitivity and responsiveness to interpersonal feedback. In one study, we examined whether the impact of receiving negative feedback from others was different for individuals who were predominantly focused on issues of "own" self-regulation versus "other" self-regulation (Moretti, Higgins, Woody, & Leung, 1998). Approximately 400 participants were screened via the Selves Questionnaire to identify those who had uniquely high actual-own self-discrepancy ("own standpoint regulators") or high actual-other self-discrepancy ("other standpoint regulators"). In a subsequent experimental session, participants were led to believe that an observer was evaluating them from behind a one-way mirror. They were asked to provide a brief description of themselves and were then provided with feedback regarding their personality that presumably came from the observer. In actual fact, experimental participants received negative feedback that specifically targeted a self-discrepancy based on their earlier responses to the Selves Questionnaire (self-relevant negative feedback). Yoked control participants received negative feedback that was drawn from the earlier responses of other participants but was unrelated to their own responses on the questionnaire. Affect was measured before feedback, immediately after feedback, immediately after debriefing, and the following day.

We predicted that individual differences in sensitivity to feedback would not be detected either immediately after feedback or immediately after debriefing because the strong and unambiguous valence of the information at these two points in time (i.e., highly negative feedback and highly positive impact of debriefing) would momentarily override any individual differences in sensitivity to feedback. Individual differences in the impact of feedback were predicted to occur
at the 1-day follow-up because the self-relevant negative feedback should increase the accessibility of self-discrepancies. More specifically, we predicted that, in comparison with "own" self-regulators, "other" self-regulators who received self-relevant feedback would show high levels of negative mood at follow-up. As predicted, all participants reported comparable significant increases in negative affect after initial feedback and decreases in negative affect after debriefing. At follow-up, however, only participants with high actual-self-other self-discrepancies who had received self-relevant feedback reported significant increases in negative affect. In fact, these participants reported levels of distress at follow-up that were comparable to their distress when they initially received negative feedback. These results show that the long-term impact of social feedback is determined by the self-relevance of the feedback and the sensitivity of individuals to others' standpoints on the self.

As we noted earlier, there is a tendency for females to be more strongly socialized than males to attend to the standpoints of intimate others on the self (Cross & Madson, 1997). As a result, females tend to experience more distress than males when they perceive their actual self as discrepant from the standards that intimate others hold for them, and they may seek congruency with others' standards at the price of discrepancy with their own standards for the self. This does not necessarily imply, however, that females will be any less distressed than males when they perceive their actual self as discrepant from their own self-guides. Thus, females may suffer from distress when they believe that they do not meet others' standards as well as when they believe they do not meet their own standards. In contrast, males may suffer only when they believe that they do not meet their own standards. The self-regulatory significance of others' standards for the self may contribute to the greater proclivity of females to develop depression (see also Higgins, 1991).

In a recent study (Moretti, Rein, & Wiebe, 1998), we examined the unique relationships of actual-own-ideal and actual-other-ideal self-discrepancy and dysphoria in undergraduate women and men. Women showed significantly higher levels of discrepancy between the actual self and their own ideal standards than between their actual self and the ideal standards that parents and close friends held for them. This finding suggests that women seek congruency with others' standards for the self at the price of discrepancy with their own self-guides. In contrast, men showed equivalent levels of actual-own-ideal and actual-other-ideal self-discrepancy. As predicted, actual-own-ideal self-discrepancy was associated with higher levels of dysphoria in both men and women, but actual-other-ideal self-discrepancy was associated with higher dysphoria only in women. These results suggest that women may be more at risk for dysphoria and depression than are men because women also regulate toward others' standards for the self. As a consequence of "relational self-regulation", individuals may fail to clearly identify and pursue their own goals, thus reducing important opportunities to experience the self as successful and competent.

Relational self-regulators may also undervalue real successes in relation to their own independent goals because their regulatory focus is on standards and goals that are shared between self and others. In addition, their self-worth will be dependent on their perceptions of approval by others, and they may become preoccupied with how to construct themselves to ensure this approval.

Additional support for sex differences in regulatory orientation is provided from a recent study in which we examined the impact of priming own versus others' standpoints on the self (Vlassev, Moretti, & Roney, 1998). Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire to determine baseline levels of actual-own self-guide and actual-parent self-guide "related-ness," that is, the total number of congruent and discrepant attributes between the actual self and own versus parent guides. Four weeks later they returned and were asked to write a short paragraph describing their own goals, wishes, and aspirations (own priming) or the goals that their parents held for them (other priming). After priming, participants listed attributes describing their actual self. Our dependent measure was the degree of change in relatedness between the actual self and own versus parent guides from baseline to priming. As predicted, priming parental guides led females to construct their actual self in terms that emphasized the degree of relatedness between the actual self and parental standpoints. Priming parental standards did not have this impact on males. This finding suggests that females are sensitive to parental standards and that thinking about these standards has at least a temporary impact on how they view their actual self, but this was not the case for males. Priming own standards led males to construct their actual self in terms that
-emphasized the degree of relatedness between the actual self and their personal standards. This effect was not observed for females.

These results offer support for the notion that others’ standpoints on the self are particularly accessible for women and play an important role in their self-regulation. For men, their own standpoint on the self is the important standard of self-regulation. It is important to keep in mind that the differences that emerged between males and females probably depend on socialization experiences that fit traditional sex-typed patterns (Siegal, 1987). In other words, it is important to view this self-regulatory difference as an individual difference related to socialization experiences rather than a sex difference per se; clearly, there are women who predominantly regulate toward their own independent standards and men who regulate toward the standards of significant others.

As previously noted, there are costs and benefits of each of these self-regulatory styles. Individuals who chronically regulate in relation to the guides of significant others run the risk of experiencing psychological distress and low self-esteem if there are losses or disruptions in their interpersonal relationships. Consequently, they may be vulnerable to periods of depression or anxiety, depending on whether they suffer from actual-other-ideal or actual-other-ought discrepancies. They may also sacrifice or fail to attend to achieving their own goals because they are overly focused on the standards that they believe others hold for them. This can reduce important opportunities for experiencing the self as successful and competent, thus reducing the feelings of personal self-esteem that can buffer one from interpersonal losses. Downey and her colleagues (Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Khouri, & Feldman, 1997) have suggested that children exposed to maltreatment develop a cognitive-affective predisposition to expect, perceive, and overreact to potential rejection in interpersonal relationships. Individuals with high levels of "rejection sensitivity" are more likely to perceive intentional rejection in ambiguous interpersonal situations, and they act in ways that decrease relationship satisfaction and partner support (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Our work suggests that the tendency toward rejection sensitivity may be a function of chronically accessible actual-other discrepancies, that is, an underlying self-other representational structure that is consistent with the belief that one does not possess, and perhaps can never possess, the characteristics that are essential in securing consistent acceptance and support from others.

In contrast, individuals who chronically regulate toward their own self-guides may run the risk of placing too much value on achieving their own goals. If they fail to achieve at a level commensurate with their standards, this will have negative consequences for their sense of personal self-esteem. To the extent that they are overly focused on their own standpoint, they may fail to attend to the standpoints that others hold for them. This may take a toll on the intimacy and support that they are able to derive from relationships. Placing a high value on personal achievement in our society, however, tends not to be associated with depression. It may become a greater vulnerability at a point in life at which achievements begin to lose their glow or when there is significant disruption in achievements (e.g., loss of a job, demotion, downsizing, or displacement). We turn next to a more in-depth examination of self-regulatory differences in standpoint orientation, and the case of overlapping standpoints, by revisiting the classic psychological process of internalization.

### Standpoint Orientation and the Process of Internalization

For most individuals, both their own and others' standards for the self are relevant for self-regulation. Although we have discussed own and other standpoints on the self as if they are independent of each other, there can be substantial overlap between them. As we discussed earlier, own and other standpoints on the self are interwoven through development, and the degree of overlap between these two standpoints on the self varies between individuals. Psychodynamic theories of internalization offer an understanding of the process by which own and other standpoints are integrated in self-regulation. Although different definitions of internalization have been proposed, there is general agreement that this process involves the gradual transformation of regulatory functions provided by significant others and society into inner self-regulatory mechanisms (Blatt & Behrends, 1987; Hartmann, Kris, & Lowenstein, 1946; Meissner, 1980, 1981; Schafer, 1968). According to Schafer (1968), "internalization refers to all those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and characteristics" (p. 9). Psychodynamic and object
relations theorists conceptualize internalization as a lifelong process that is expressed differently at various points in development (Blatt & Behrends, 1987; Meissner, 1981). In its earliest form, internalization is based on little or no self-other differentiation. This form of internalization is sometimes referred to as "incorporation" (Schafer, 1968; Meissner, 1980), a process by which "object representations completely lose their object character and are merged or fused with self-representations without distinction" (Meissner, 1981, p. 18). This form of internalization is believed to be characteristic of infants and very young children. Incorporation is also believed to be characteristic of cases of extreme personality disorder (e.g., severe borderline personality disorder) in which individuals experience great difficulty in maintaining their sense of self in relationships.

With greater psychological maturation, regulatory functions are identified as being outside of the self (e.g., parental). These functions may be taken into the self, or "introjected," in an attempt to provide inner regulation. Even though this process leads to self-regulatory functions being adopted from others and taken into the self, these functions continue to be experienced as the "felt presences of others" (Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962; Schafer, 1968). In contrast to incorporation and introjection, which involve taking in regulatory or other functions provided by others, "identification" involves the restructuring of preexisting self-regulatory guides and structures. Through this restructuring process, some aspects of self-regulation begin to be adopted or identified as one's own. In contrast to introjection, identification marks the transformation of external regulatory guides to self-guides that are now accepted as one's own. Development is conceptualized as a dynamic process involving both introjection (the taking in of regulatory functions from others) and identification (the restructuring and refinement of internal self-regulatory structures). Although this process is not restricted to childhood (Blatt & Behrends, 1987), there may be critical developmental periods during which individuals are particularly receptive to external influences (e.g., early development) or particularly challenged by the need to develop new or more mature forms of self-regulation (e.g., social role changes associated with adolescence and early adulthood). As the self becomes reorganized and self-regulatory guides are adopted as one's own, the capacity for inner regulation increases and dependence on the environment for self-regulation decreases (Hartmann et al., 1946). Thus, the internalization of self-regulatory mechanisms is an adaptive developmental process that ensures effective self-regulation across varying environments and life crises.

Developmental research has also examined the impact of parental socialization practices on internalization. This work is based on a more general definition of internalization as taking over the values and attitudes of society as one's own so that socially acceptable behavior is motivated by intrinsic or internal factors rather than the anticipation of external consequences (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994). Deci and Ryan's (1987) work has been helpful in identifying the parental and other socialization conditions that facilitate internalization. They have argued that internalization and identification are more likely to occur when socialization is oriented toward supporting autonomy rather than instituting control. For example, Grolnick and Ryan (1989) found that autonomous self-regulation in children was related to parental autonomy support, that is, parental encouragement and support of participation in decision making and independent problem solving. From their perspective, autonomy is most likely to be achieved when parents allow children to move toward independence in self-regulation within a secure and supportive relationship. As Ryan and Lynch (1989) pointed out, the process of achieving autonomy is facilitated by secure attachment rather than detachment from parents: "Individuation is not something that happens from parents but rather with them" (p. 341).

Internalization is clearly an important psychological process and a cornerstone of self-development. Yet, there has been little research that specifically examines the assumptions about the internalization process. Do the hypothesized differences between identified and introjected guides have self-regulatory consequences? One would predict that identified .self-guides would have an especially powerful impact on self-regulation because they represent a "shared reality" (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1996a) about the self with significant others; the regulatory guides that were once external to the self and held by significant others are now also accepted as one's own. When one perceives one's behavior
or performance as discrepant from a shared reality about one's goals and standards, it is difficult to escape feeling negatively about oneself. One may attempt to alter one's interpretation of one's behavior, consider the context in which it occurred, and so on, but it is difficult to disregard a self-guide that one shares with significant others and holds central to who one is and what one believes in. Thus, discrepancy with identified self-guides can produce extremely negative psychological consequences, but congruency with identified guides can result in exceptionally positive consequences because one has met central goals that define who one is individually and in relation to important others. The relationship between the actual self and introjected guides can also produce negative or positive psychological consequences, but these guides are experienced as ego dystonic, and they are less fundamental to one's core sense of self than are identified guides. The fact that these guides are introjected and not identified means that one has not accepted them as a shared reality about the self. The power of introjected guides, however, should not be quickly dismissed. Discrepancy with introjected guides can have serious negative psychological consequences when individuals believe that there are significant and undesirable consequences associated with discrepancy, such as loss of love and acceptance or punishment. That is, outcome contingency beliefs are probably a key characteristic in determining the psychological consequences of discrepancy with introjected rather than identified guides; in contrast, discrepancy with identified guides can, in and of itself, produce significant distress.

Not all self-guides have their origins in parental guides. There are a variety of other life experiences that influence the development of self-regulation. In addition to parents, a wide range of significant others (e.g., other family members; teachers; social, political, and religious figures; and fictional characters) are important in molding the self-guides that individuals adopt. These influences may be especially important if they coincide with an individual's particular life circumstance, interests, or talents. If these guides are adopted as one's own, their self-regulatory significance can equal that of identified parental guides because they represent a shared reality about the self with specific individuals or society in general (Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Higgins, 1996b). Thus, these independent self-guides (i.e., independent of the parental standpoint) can be as important as identified parental guides in self-regulation.

In a recent study that examined the consequences of internalization (Moretti & Higgins, in press), we differentiated and operationalized the measurement of three types of self-regulatory guides: identified or shared parental guides, introjected or nonshared parental guides, and independent guides (see Figure 3). Identified guides include only those parental guides that are adopted as one's own and thus represent a shared reality about the self. Introjected guides are those parental guides that are not adopted as one's own and thus remain as the "felt presence" of parents within the self-system. Finally, independent self-guides include guides that are not represented in the parental standpoint on the self and are probably derived from sources other than the parental relationship. In each case, self-guides are either in an active regulatory relationship with the actual self or not currently active in self-regulation but could become active if primed.

Drawing from our analysis of the self-regulatory consequences of internalization, we predicted that identified and independent guides would be more strongly related to emotional and interpersonal functioning than would introjected guides. We also examined sex differences in the significance of self-regulatory guides, anticipating that identified guides representing a shared reality about the self with parents would be more important for females than males. Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire, listing attributes describing their actual self and attributes describing their ideal self and their ought self from their own standpoint, their mother's standpoint, and their father's standpoint. Responses were scored according to standard procedures to determine congruency and discrepancy between the actual self and self-guides (Moretti & Higgins, 1990b). Once this was determined, responses were scored again to determine the percentages of matches, mismatches, and nonmatches that were shared between the own and parental guide (identified guides), unique to the parental guide (introjected guides)

1 Introjected parental guides that are not actively involved in self-regulation may become active as a consequence of
priming. For example, it is not uncommon for individuals to find that certain cognitive-emotional and behavioral patterns associated with parental standpoints on the self are relatively absent in their lives but return on reengagement with parents. The return of these patterns of behavior may be due to priming of self-parent representations, including introjected guides. Introjected parental guides that influence behavior only once they are primed are probably less significant in self-regulation than are chronically accessible introjected parental guides.

Figure 3. Identified, introjected parental guides and independent self-guides in relation to the actual self. Areas of overlap between the actual self and self-guides represent self-guides currently active in self-regulation (i.e., attribute matches or mismatches). Areas of nonoverlap between the actual self and self-guides represent self-guides not currently active in self-regulation (i.e., attribute nonmatches).

and unique to the own guide (independent guides). Participants also completed measures of psychological distress (Symptom Check-list-90-R; Derogatis, 1983) and interpersonal problems (Revised Inventory of Interpersonal Problems; Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990; Horowitz, Rosenberg, Baer, Ureno, & Villasenor, 1988).

For the parental guides, the study found that less than half (40%) were classified as identified or shared guides and that more than half (60%) were classified as introjected parental guides. The identified guides were more likely than the introjected parental guides to be active in self-regulation (i.e., to be related to the actual self). Even though only 40% of parental guides were identified, these guides constituted a substantial overlapping proportion of the own guides (44%): The remaining own self-guides (56%) were independent of parental guides. As predicted, identified and independent self-guides were most predictive of emotional and
interpersonal functioning. When the actual self-matched identified and independent self-guides, individuals reported lower levels of psychological distress and fewer interpersonal problems; when the actual self was discrepant from these guides, individuals reported more distress and interpersonal difficulty. Introjected parental guides, the "felt presence" of parents within the self-system, were generally not predictive of functioning.

As predicted, important gender differences emerged in the study. Although similar proportions of parental guides were classified as identified, introjected, and independent for males and females, these guides were not of comparable importance in self-regulation. Consistent with our hypothesis, the relation between the actual self and identified parental guides significantly predicted functioning in females but not males, whereas the relation between the actual self and independent self-guides significantly predicted functioning in males but not females. Interestingly, introjected mother parental guides were also predictive of functioning in females. These findings are consistent with the view that females tend to be socialized to construe and regulate themselves in terms of interpersonal relationships, whereas males are encouraged to develop a sense of self that is autonomous and independent from parents. It is important to understand, however, that these results do not imply that relationships are important for females and trivial for males. What the results do suggest is that the psychological and self-regulatory meaning of parental standpoints is quite different for females and males (see also Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995).

A similar pattern of findings was revealed in our recent study of internalization in adolescents (Moretti & Wiebe, in press). Although sex differences were not found in the percentage of identified, introjected, and independent guides represented in the self-system, the self-regulatory significance of these guides differed for male and female adolescents. For female adolescents, discrepancy between the actual self and parental standards predicted emotional problems, regardless of whether these standards were shared between girls and their parents (identified parental standards) or not (introjected parental standards). Discrepancy with standards that were independent from parents also predicted problems in girls. In contrast, discrepancy with independent standards, but not identified or introjected parental standards, predicted internalizing problems for male adolescents.

The standards that males report as independent of their parental guides may be shared with their peers, and self-regulation toward these standards may have both positive and negative consequences. When male adolescents meet the standards that they share with their peers, they may enjoy some measure of social acceptance and success. At the same time, engagement in activities that are congruent with the standards of their peer group may be associated with increased externalizing or "problematic" behavior.

The gender differences we observed in the relevance of own and parental standards are consistent with previous findings (Higgins, Loeb, & Moretti, 1995; Higgins, Loeb, & Ruble, 1995). Specifically, this research has shown that for male adolescents in comparison with female adolescents discrepancy between the actual self and peer self-guides decreased between Grades 8 and 9, whereas discrepancy between the actual self and parental guides increased. In other words, boys more than girls moved away from parental guides and toward peer guides during early adolescence. But this transition was emotionally difficult for boys, and conflict between peer and parental self-guides was associated with feelings of confusion.

Comparison of results from our study of adolescents and results based on young adults (Moretti & Higgins, in press) showed that the percentage of parental guides that is identified or shared is lower in adolescents (25%) than in young adults (40%). Conversely, the percentage of parental guides that are not adopted as one's own (i.e., introjected parental guides) is higher in adolescents (75%) than in young adults (60%). These results are consistent with research showing that it is not until late adolescence or early adulthood that individuals are able to integrate their own views with those that parents hold for them (Harter & Monsor, 1992).

This research illustrates the importance of understanding how internalization, as a central process underlying the interrelations between own and other standpoints, functions within self-regulation. Our methodology provides a new avenue for research in this area, allowing researchers to measure the specific self-other quality of self-regulatory guides.
Further research examining individual differences and developmental processes involved in internalization will enrich understanding of the interpersonal nature of the self-system. More specifically, our work provides preliminary evidence that not all significant other standpoints have equal self-regulatory significance. For example, the maternal standpoint seems to have particular significance for adolescent girls and young adult women, but the peer standpoint has particular relevance for adolescent boys. There may be much value in investigating what is unique and what is invariant across other standpoint perspectives on the self.

In our current work, we have focused on the "internal audience," that is, individuals' internal self-other representations. Clearly, this plays an important role in self-regulation. Nonetheless, care must be taken to ensure attention to how individuals construct meaning within the context of "real" interactions in significant relationships. Holmes and his colleagues (Murray & Holmes, 1993, 1995; Murray, Holmes, & Griffen, 1996) have provided robust evidence that relationship satisfaction and duration are linked to the capacity of romantic partners to jointly construct and maintain a positive, albeit idealized, view of the relationship and partner qualities. The emergence of a shared and positive view of self-other relationships is negotiated between partners and depends on their willingness to enter into the joint construction of this view; it cannot be sustained by either partner alone, regardless of how positive and idealized his or her internal representation might be (Holmes & Murray, 1995; Murray, Holmes, MacDonald, & Ellsworth, 1998). Thus, the internal audience does not stand on its own, separate from the flow of interactions in the world. Unfortunately, the majority of researchers have focused on the psychological consequences of either the internal audience or interpersonal interactions and relationship quality. Rarely has the dynamic relationship between these two aspects of experience been examined despite the fact that neither can be fully understood in isolation. How and to what extent do experiences in relationships contribute to change in the internal audience? A full examination of this question is beyond the scope of the current article; however, the therapeutic process is precisely focused on the issue and offers some insights in this regard. We turn now to a brief examination of the implications of our discussion for understanding the therapeutic process.

Therapeutic Implications of Self-Other Representations

Clinicians have long argued that psychological disturbance is linked to fundamental problems in the self-system (Homey, 1939; Kohut, 1971; Kohut & Wolf, 1992; Sullivan, 1953). Several schools of psychotherapy identify the self-system as the target of psychological intervention, although the nature of such interventions and their intended effects are conceptualized in vastly different ways. For example, psychodynamic therapists observe transference aspects of the therapeutic relationship as a reflection of the underlying deficits of the client's self-system, and changes in the therapeutic relationship are a barometer of progress or resistance. Perhaps the most central intervention of the therapist is the provision of empathy for the client's struggles, coupled with support and constructive interpretation. In a sense, the therapist uses these tactics to scaffold the client into a more adaptive relationship that provides the opportunity to experience the self more fully and to integrate previously fragmented aspects of the self.

On the surface, cognitive therapists take a very different approach. They (Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) argue that early experiences are organized and represented in schemas about the self, the world, and the future. In some individuals, beliefs about real or imagined rejection are integrated into the self-schema early in life and become dormant until triggered by loss. Once activated, these dysfunctional schemas produce distortions in information processing because of the deleterious impact of negative self-beliefs. Cognitive therapists target these beliefs and work collaboratively with clients to revise them to be more adaptive and reasonable.

Despite the differences between these approaches, both acknowledge that clients' self-system-their unique way of interpreting and experiencing the world-is the crux of psychotherapy. Yet little has been done to develop a systematic approach to understanding the multiplicity of self-system problems that give rise to psychological distress. Thus, therapists
can fall prey to treating clients with quite different self-system problems as if they were the same. For example, many clients may suffer from "low self-esteem," yet this symptom derives from distinct types of self-regulatory failures.

In our earlier work (Moretti, Higgins, & Feldman, 1990), we described how self-discrepancy theory provides a framework for organizing diverse therapeutic interventions to maximize their effect on the self-system in depression. We argued that there were several advantages to understanding the impact of therapeutic interventions in terms of their effects on the self-system and systematically organizing interventions in light of this understanding to maximize potential change. By identifying the self-system as the target and as an integrating theme of intervention, self-system therapy cuts across the rigid boundaries of major psychotherapeutic models and encourages therapists to systematically use diverse techniques to alter specific aspects of self-system vulnerability. Hence, the distinctive characteristic of self-system therapy is not the type of therapeutic technique that is used. Instead, it is the knowledge of self-system functioning to guide the use of techniques and the identification of the self-system as a target of the intervention.

In treating depression, we proposed that it is critical for therapists to focus on changing the extent and accessibility of actual-ideal self-discrepancy (see Moretti et al., 1990, and Strauman, 1998, for an extended discussion of self-system intervention strategies). By understanding the self-system problems described, therapists can further increase the specificity and effectiveness of therapeutic interventions. In addition to distinguishing actual-ideal and actual-ought self-discrepancies, we have identified several sources of discrepancy within the self-system involving own versus other standpoints. These include discrepancy between the actual self and own standpoint self-guides (actual-own self-discrepancy), discrepancy between the actual self and significant other standpoint self-guides (actual-other self-discrepancy), and discrepancy between own standpoint self-guides and significant other standpoint self-guides (guide-guide conflict). The difficulties associated with an overreliance on either own standpoint or other standpoint self-regulatory systems have been addressed. The importance of the internalization process and the implications for understanding the psychological relevance of parental and other self-guides have been discussed. Therapeutic interventions can be used to alter the accessibility of each of these self-system problems. For example, if clients chronically self-regulate toward the inferred self-guides of significant others, it may be beneficial to use techniques that increase the accessibility of their own standpoint self-regulatory system (e.g., encourage them to consider their own hopes, wishes, duties, and obligations). Doing so may reduce their dependency on others for maintenance of self-esteem and broaden their opportunities to derive a sense of self-worth and competence. Similarly, if clients chronically regulate toward their own standpoint, it may be beneficial to use techniques that increase the accessibility of other standpoints within the self-system (e.g., encourage clients to consider the hopes, wishes, duties, and obligations that others hold for them and encourage them to take others' perspectives on the self). This may open new avenues for developing intimacy and a sense of connectedness in their relationships.

At times, it may be therapeutic to focus on shifting patterns of accessibility away from actual-guide discrepancy and toward actual-guide congruency. In other instances, work may be best directed at increasing awareness of the factors that underlie actual-guide discrepancy. From this perspective, it may be necessary to draw attention to self-discrepancies to facilitate therapeutic exploration and change (Fromm-Reichman, 1960; Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville, & Chevron, 1984; Sullivan, 1956). What-ever therapeutic orientation is adopted, it is important to understand the impact of interventions systematically. Interventions that focus on one element of the self-system may be ineffective and perhaps even deleterious because the impact on the entire self-system is different from what is intended by the therapist. By knowing the complexity of relationships among various self-representations and the factors that influence the processing of self-related information (Moretti et al., 1996; Moretti & Shaw, 1989), therapists can be more precise in their deployment of interventions (Andersen & Berk, 1998; Moretti, 1991; Moretti et al., 1990; Strauman, 1994; Strauman & Kolden, 1997; Teasdale & Segal, 1995; Westen, 1991).

In particular, understanding the nature of own versus other standpoints within the self-system can be useful to therapists in understanding the relationships that their clients have both inside and outside of therapy. By understanding internal representations of self and
other and the dynamic interplay between them, therapists are better able to use the therapeutic relationship with their clients as a vehicle for change. For example, it is reasonable to extrapolate from our discussion that transference aspects of the therapeutic relationship probably represent client representations of standpoints on the self. This is consistent with work by Andersen and her colleagues (Andersen & Berk, 1998; Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998; Andersen et al., 1997) showing that information derived from relationships with significant others influences evaluations of new acquaintances and may raise expectations of similar interaction patterns. For example, research has shown that affect associated with a significant other causes undergraduates to like or dislike a novel person, to be motivated to approach or avoid him or her emotionally, and to expect acceptance or rejection based on the degree of resemblance of the novel person with the significant other (Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, 1996). Indeed, changes in the content of the working self-concept also occur in this process—in the direction of the self-with-the-significant-other—such that undergraduates become who they are with their significant other when with a new person who resembles that significant other (Hinkley & Andersen, 1996).

The therapeutic relationship typically affords a very powerful context that evokes or activates representations of self-other experiences in significant relationships. Considering that individuals internally represent multiple standpoint representations on the self (e.g., mother, father, and significant other), it is likely that the transference relationship in therapy will take on characteristics of these diverse standpoint perspectives at different points in time. A client may move from a hostile to submissive stance as aspects of therapy activate or prime different standpoints on the self. This suggests that transference in a therapeutic context, as well as in everyday interpersonal relationships, does not necessarily have a direct correspondence to representations of one specific relationship with a significant other. Rather, it may be best understood as a dynamic and fluid interplay between activation of multiple standpoint representations in conjunction with real experiences in the new relationship. Understanding transference in these terms can provide a more complete understanding of the diverse relational influences at play in the relationship and assist therapists in successfully negotiating the turbulence of the therapeutic process and supporting change. Moreover, this analysis can be helpful in understanding that transference is rarely, if ever, based solely on projection of elements of a single significant relationship independent of features of the new relationship at hand.

Psychodynamic theorists have long recognized the importance of internalization in the therapeutic process. Our analysis of the internalization process illustrates the relevance of an integrative approach in understanding the impact of internal representations on self-regulation. The therapeutic relationship offers the possibility of experiencing the self in a new and curative self-other context (Blatt, Auerbach, & Aryan, 1998; Blatt, Auerbach, & Levy, 1997; Blatt, Stayner, Auerbach, & Behrend, 1996). In effect, the therapist, in the context of the therapeutic relationship, can become a new standpoint on the self, a standpoint that offers new ways of reflecting on the self and new opportunities for adaptive growth. To the extent that therapists understand this to be the case, they can strategically contribute to change by contributing to the development of this new standpoint on the self, one that can be openly discussed and negotiated within the therapeutic relationship and internalized into the self-system.
References


Harter, S., Bresnick, S., Bouchey, H. A., & Whitesell,


Meltzoff, A. N. (1990). Foundations for developing a concept of self: The role of imitation in relating self to other and the value of social mirroring, social modeling, and self practice in
infancy. In D. Cicchetti & M. Beeghly (Eds.), The self in transition: Infancy to childhood (pp. 139-164). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


