Transnational communication of Chinese artefacts: the top-down and bottom-up model

by

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B.A. & B.Ec., Shandong University, 2012

Extended Essay Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

in the
School of Communication in Global Communication
Faculty of Communication, Art and Technology

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Summer 2014

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Abstract

Culture in the hegemonic process at the international relations level, according to Gramsci and neo-Gramscian scholars, could play both maintenance and resistance roles regarding the neo-liberal world order. After China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001, the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts has followed a state-centered and capitalist-directed top-down model, which maintains the neo-liberal world order. Chinese artefacts and culture that stand for or are created by subaltern classes are marginalized in this process, which intensifies the uneven world order. Accordingly, to gain a more even world order, culture should play a resistance role to challenge the current one. The bottom-up model should be added to the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts. The double line, both the top-down and bottom-up, is an ideal model for this counter-hegemonic process.

Keywords: transnational communication; Chinese artefacts; top down; bottom up
Acknowledgements

This capstone paper is based on the contributions by many people.

At first I want to thank my senior supervisor Dr. Frederik Lesage. From the academic theories, structure, the contents to formats of my capstone paper, he gave me very useful and detailed suggestions and comments. He also provided me with the opportunity of doing field placement at Vancouver Art Gallery, which contributes a lot to my capstone paper, especially to the case study. In addition, I want to thank the director of CUC-SFU double-degree program: Professor Yuezhi Zhao. Without her plenty of efforts and contributions, I will not have the excellent chance to study at SFU. She provided me with many academic ideas and study approaches, and gave me a lot of cares on my daily life in Vancouver as well. I also want to thank my CUC senior supervisor assistant professor Xuezhi Qin. He encouraged me to study aboard and would like to give me any academic directions if I needed. In addition, I want to thank Dr. Stuart Poyntz and Dr. Katherine Reilly. They got me ready, to a large extent, to my capstone paper with the basic academic theories and thoughts. I also want to thank Sarah Chen, who provides our program with a comfortable study atmosphere by dealing with the busy daily issues about our program.

Secondly, I want to thank my dear teaching assistant Byron Hauck and my classmates. They gave me plenty of assistance both in my academic life and daily life. Byron has helped me to revise my capstone paper again and again. He is a very responsible TA. I really want to thank him. My dear classmates: Maggie, Mike, Hao, Helen, Jane, Joseph, Lyne, Rebecca and Vanessa, they are so kind to company me with my first year overseas study. I especially want to thank my capstone paper teamwork partner Vanessa Kong, who gave me a lot of suggestions and critiques of my paper.

I also have many thanks to my parents and my dear friend Cindy Wu, who encouraged me and companied me to continually challenge myself and to finish my capstone paper.

I have many thanks, but now I cannot totally write them down. I cherish them a lot and regard them as my motivations to go on my academic life. Thank you very much!
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Under the trend of globalization, transnational communication is created by as well as facilitates this trend.

Transnational communication "gives us an eyewitness view of events in remotest locations, we participate in political discourses of global, regional or even local relevance. These global processes, in which knowledge, values and ethics, aesthetics, lifestyles are exchanged, is becoming autonomous..." (Volkmer, 1999).

Under this trend, culture fluids, exchanges, and is changed, which influences the world order. "The terrain of culture is an important battleground in the struggle over transformational hegemony" (Robinson, 2004, p. 84). Culture could play different roles in different historic moments of hegemony. It could both maintain and resist certain world order.

However, in current transnational culture communication processes, the thoughts and actions mainly follow a top-down model, which is state controlled and capitalist directed. This model highlights the elite culture as the object to be communicated, and regards high and middle classes as the primary audience of art. Additionally, this transnational communication process is Western-centered and nation-state centered. Western states, especially America, set the standard cultural format for peripheral states to find resonance with, which will be analyzed at the second chapter. This top-down model has marginalized the working class and other subaltern class' rights and discursive power in transnational communication. At the same time, the peripheral states
are assimilated by the core states in a cultural field. This top-down model has intensified the current neo-liberal uneven world order.

Transnational communication of Chinese artefacts is analyzed to illustrate this top-down model. China, seen as one peripheral state, after its entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, has fused into the global art market. Transnational communication of its artefacts accordingly pursues economic benefits, as well as is state-controlled and state-centered.

This capstone paper argues that the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts follows a top-down model of transmission. Accordingly, a bottom-up model is discussed and recommended as a way to resolve the contradictions, which arise from the privileging of the top-down model. With the double-line- both top-down and bottom up, culture, which is contained and illustrated by artefacts, can play a resistance role to change the current uneven neo-liberal world order and to struggle for a new and just world order.
Chapter 2. Culture in the world order

To figure out the role of culture in hegemony, the concept of hegemony needs to be figured out at first. According to William Robinson, there are at least four interwoven conceptions of hegemony: 1) Hegemony as international domination; 2) hegemony as state hegemony; 3) hegemony as consensual domination or ideological hegemony; and 4) hegemony as the exercise of leadership within historical blocs within a particular world order (Robinson, 2005). The third approach is associated with Gramscian hegemony and the forth one is applied by the majority of neo-Gramscian scholars. Gramsci initially applied the concept of “hegemony” to the nation-state level between the interactions of dominant and subordinate classes. Neo-Gramscian scholars, such as Robert Cox, Stephen Gill and Owen Worth applied Gramscian hegemony to international relations (IR). To develop a theory of IR, most neo-Gramscian research begins at the domestic starting point of Gramsci’s model of hegemony.

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony derives from his historical analysis. It is a concept for him “to understand the dynamics of Italian state formation during and immediately after the Risorgimento”, (Crehan, 2002, p. 101) which was the movement that led to the unification of Italy as an independent state with its capital at Rome in 1870. Hegemony is a reflection of power relations in certain historical circumstances. Its close relationship with power relations makes it a flexible concept, which adapts with changes in patterns of social power. In the contemporary historical moment, hegemony is held by bourgeoisie dominated civil society.
Hegemony necessarily involved concessions to subordinate classes in return for acquiescence in bourgeois leadership, concessions which could lead ultimately to forms of social democracy which preserve capitalism while making it more acceptable to workers and the petty bourgeoisie. (Cox, 1983, p. 3)

Hegemony today is represented by bourgeoisie dominated power relations. In Gramsci’s conception, this power relation is constituted as a historic bloc. The historic bloc is “a ruling coalition and a social base in which one group exercises leadership and imposes its project through the consent of those drawn into the bloc” (Cox, 1983, p. 167). A historic bloc relies on a hegemonic social class. This class is always the dominant class in a nation-state, and it propagates its values as common sense to maintain cohesion and to set identity within the bloc. Common sense is “held and practised in everyday life is neither linear nor unitary: it is the product of an individual’s relationship to and position in a variety of social groups” (Mittelman, 1997, p. 28).

The hegemonic historic bloc of Gramsci’s model is focused on the nation-state level. At the international level, hegemony, as a political term, was regarded as a central concept during the Peloponnesian wars in Ancient Greece. When IR appeared as a distinct discipline, “hegemony took on greater theoretical prominence and became enshrined within the conservative school of realism that became prominent in the post-war understanding of international politics” (Worth, 2009, p. 20). Robert Cox, the initial neo-Gramsci scholar who brought the concept of hegemony to IR, adopted a historical critical approach, which investigates the formation and outward explosion of a state’s dominate class and the co-opt process of peripheral states by the dominate one.

Cox argues that the formation of the world order follows a core-periphery model. A core state is one that has experienced a thorough social and economic revolution, and has an established internal hegemonic class. This thorough social and economic
revolution provides extra economic and political energy for the core state to expand its hegemony beyond its nation-state boundaries. During this outward explosion process, a consensual relationship is forged between transnational elites by producing a transnational capitalist class to form the world order. Bourgeois intellectuals perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organizations that bind together the members of the bourgeoisie and of a historic bloc into a common identity. Additionally, in order to become hegemonic, the core state sets up a world order, which coerces other states to find compatibility with their own interests. “The economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad” (Cox, 1983, p. 171). This core-periphery model forms the bases of the hegemony theorizing in IR.

In his 1987 book, *Production, Power and World Order*, Cox promoted the historical understanding of world order. A world order,

can be seen in the same way that Gramsci saw a historic bloc-as the sum of a structure whereby states and production combine to produce a ‘configuration of social forces’ that promotes a common set of norms and values (Cox 1987, as cited by Worth, 2009, p. 22).

The hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally-conceived civil society (Cox, 1983, p. 11). The world order, in this sense, can be regarded as an extension of Gramsci’s civil society to the world level. As for Cox, the contemporary world order is seen as one in which the principles of neo-liberalism have been realized through a combination of inter-related processes, that have shaped state and institutional policy in often unchallenged ways (Worth, 2009).
However, Cox’s core-peripheral model of international hegemony is still nation-state centered. His model of analysis is “part of the dominant realist [camp] at the time” (Worth, 2009, p. 31). The Coxian theory to replace the neo-liberal world order is to form another hegemony that maintains much of realism’s state-centrism (Worth, 2009, p. 31). It follows a top-down ideology that focuses on ‘high politics’ and ignores, to some extent, the subaltern class position in contemporary neo-liberal power relations.

Accordingly, the Coxian world order, which has not transcended the nation-state centered viewpoint, corresponds to Gramsci’s basic concerns: “how might a more equitable and just order be brought about, what is it about, how might people live and imagine their lives in particular times and places that advances or hampers progress to this more equitable and just order” (Crehan, 2002, p. 71). From Gramsci’s concerns, the meaning of ‘just world order’ needs to be discussed. Is there a just world order when everyone is equally represented or is the world order just when a new historic bloc is formed with solidarity with those who are marginalized by power relations?

In the contemporary neo-liberal world order, bourgeoisie and global capital’s pursuit of dominant power and economic benefits, as well as the entailed exploitation of subaltern classes makes it hard for everyone to be represented equally. The struggle for a new historic bloc is the approach to reach a new world order, based on material justice, and equitable representation of subaltern groups’ lives and values. Consequently, to study how a just world order is formed, is to ask how might a working-class lead, alternative, post neo-liberal world order be formed. It can be achieved under the leadership of the working class, who build a bridge between themselves and other subaltern classes, to form an alternative state and society to resist the exploitation of bourgeoisie. A new world order is the establishment of a new hegemonic historic bloc.
In the process of hegemony, culture and consciousness are interactive within power relations. Culture for Gramsci is a "precipitate continually generated in the course of history" (Crehan, 2002, p. 72). In other words, culture forms a certain ideological system assumed by a complicated interaction of historical processes at a certain historical moment. Among different power relations and at different historic moments, culture maintains or resists the world order by standing for different classes’ interests and power relations. Culture could be seen as a double-edged sword in the maintenance and progression of hegemony.

As for the maintenance role, culture, as a tool of social management, is increasingly significant in maintaining the neo-liberal world order.

The culture and ideology of global capitalism work to depoliticize social behaviour and preempt collective action aimed at social change by channelling people’s activities into a fixation on the search for individual consumption and survival and into the hope, however remote, of upward mobility (Robinson, 2004, p. 84).

During this process, neo-liberal capitalism has been articulated in different ways in different nations to manufacture hegemonic forms of common sense to maintain the neo-liberal world order. Meanwhile, developing, or semi-peripheral states have drawn on their own forms of local and national social and political culture to integrate themselves within a wider external hegemonic project (Worth, 2009, p. 29).

An understanding of culture in counter-hegemony is useful for understanding culture’s role of resistance. Counter-hegemony in the contemporary context can be viewed as the working class’s attempt to resist the capitalist. In the process of counter-hegemony, subaltern culture, which is the opposite of the dominant bourgeois culture, resists its subaltern position and the uneven power relations within bourgeois world
order, and struggles for new post-capitalist power relations as well as a new just world order.

However, the problem of this struggle, according to Gramsci, is that the subaltern consciousness could not but be an impoverished and unsystematic one, precisely because of the subaltern’s relative powerlessness. His concern here is to “trace out both the power relations that maintain their subordination and the cracks and fissures that could potentially lead to their overcoming it” (Crehan, 2002; Crehan, 2002, p.98). This is a rejection of the determination found in Marxist economic relations. Beyond the problem of the subordination of working class culture is that subaltern classes have no self-consciousness of their historical identity.

Not only do the people have no precise consciousness of its own historical identity, they are not even conscious of the historical identity or the exact limits of its adversary. The lower classes, historically on the defensive, can only achieve self-awareness via a series of negations, via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy (Gramsci, cited by Crehan, 2002, p. 100).

Consciousness, defined here as where thoughts and ideology are rooted, is cultivated and changed by culture. Culture, according to Gramsci, is understood as thought in action. “I have a Socratic idea of culture: I believe that (culture) means thinking well, whatever one thinks, and therefore acting well, whatever one does” (Crehan, 2002, p. 73). From this point, culture could be a positive element in the struggle for a new just world order.

The cultural expression of a revolution in thought and practice which, as he saw it, was tearing apart the established certainties of the bourgeois world painfully and slowly, with many missteps, giving birth to a new post-capitalist order (Crehan, 2002, p. 83).
To develop this new post-capitalist historic bloc, and to solve the problem that the working class lack self-consciousness of their subaltern condition (Crehan, 2002), the role of organic intellectuals is discussed:

Organic intellectuals ‘combat a worker’s common sense ‘inherited form past and uncritically absorbed’ that leads to ‘moral and political passivity,’ and at the same time elaborate the kernel of good sense that workers share with one another, namely the ‘practical transformation of the world (Burawoy, 2003, p. 226).

Organic intellectuals can raise the working class’s common sense and culture to construct a critical understanding of their subordinate condition in the current world order as a means to resist neo-liberal common sense.

Although there is a clear distinction between the intellectuals who aid the current hegemonic process and organic intellectuals involved in the counter-hegemony, organic intellectuals face pressures and temptations to “relapse into pursuit of incremental gains for subaltern groups within the framework of the bourgeois hegemony” (Cox, 1983, p. 165). To form a new historic bloc, organic intellectuals need to jump out of the hegemonic model, historically understand the culture of the working class and study the power relations behind such culture. For example, artists from subaltern groups, could work as organic intellectuals by facing and portraying the exploited and subaltern condition of workers to evoke their sense of resistance to the uneven social order while avoiding the temptations from the bourgeoisie to only describe the positive and hard-working condition of workers.

Based on the analysis above, culture both stabilizes and changes the contemporary world order. Derived from long historical periods, culture, which contains various forms, genres, content, changes with time and cross-culture communication,
implicates certain power relations and reflects certain ideology and thoughts, which influence action. The artistic presentation of cultural artefacts are a means to gain a more detailed understanding of the two-direction role of culture. A cultural artefact is defined as ‘a simple tool or object showing human workmanship’ (Morgan, cited by Hauf, 2010, p113). This definition illustrates the human-made characteristics of artefacts while ignoring the culture meanings behind them. A better definition of an artefact then is any human-created object that “provides clues about the culture of the people who created and used it” (Hauf, 2010, p. 113).

According to the above definition of artefacts, they have a close relationship to ‘labor’. The artists or the artisans provide manual and ideological labor to create artefacts based on their culture background and these artefacts are used in particular ways to perform certain cultural meanings. Artefacts, no matter from ancient times or from the contemporary age, reflect various aspects and methods of life. According to Stuart Hall's analysis of Raymond Williams’s Long Revolution, culture is defined as the whole way of life .

The ‘culture’ is those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves-in ‘unexpected identities and correspondences’ as well as in …‘discontinuities of an unexpected kind’...(p.63) within or underlying all social practices. (Hall, Cultural studies: tow paradigms, 1980, p. 60)

Cultural artefacts include everyday items used in the household, school, or workplace that illustrate features of contemporary life, along with items that highlight aspects of traditional heritage and beliefs (Hauf, 2010, p. 113). Additionally, “it is frequently observed that artefacts and other social and cultural objects are in some sense ‘creations of the mind’, depending in certain ways on human beliefs or activities”
Accordingly, artefacts can be regarded as an effective object or platform to study culture since different time spans’ artefacts reflect different social practices, which are the materials and models for cultural study. Additionally, artefacts, as one approach to study culture, reflect, illustrate or implicate the human mind and certain power relations behind a particular historic moment of culture. They are produced under certain economic, political, and social interwoven circumstance, and stand for certain ideology.

In the following sections, the study of culture in the contemporary world order goes further with an analysis of the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts. What is the current pattern of transnational Chinese artefacts distribution and what is the position of Chinese artefacts in the world? Are they interpreted under the bourgeois world order or are they part of a developing new post-capitalist cultural order? What are the power relations behind this transnational communication process? This study will take ‘the contemporary’ as beginning with China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001.
Chapter 3. Transnational communication of Chinese artefacts

After China’s entrance to the WTO in 2001, China’s opening-up strategy reached a new level. China officially became immersed into globalization and the global capital market. In Chinese, entering the WTO is called “Rushi”, which means “reentrance to the world and become an organic member in the global civil society” (Zhao, 2011).

Under the background of the re-entrance to the WTO, the Chinese market has gone through capitalist-directed revolutions to become connected to the global capital market. In this process Chinese artefacts are commercialized to be fused into the global artefacts market.

From the viewpoint of the global art market, as represented by Martin Bremond the chief economist of Artrprice, an art market information statistical website, China became the largest art market in the world in 2013. “Regarding the size and number of auctions, global art market is already under the double oligarchies of the U.S. and China” (Du, 2014). The proportion of Chinese art works in the global art market has risen from 3.2% in 2005 to 24% in 2014 (Du, 2014). Additionally, based on the data provided by Artrprice, in 2013, the total value of Chinese artefacts in global auction market was 4.087 billion US dollars, which ranked first in the world (Feng, 2014). Accordingly, the Chinese artefacts market, no matter in terms of the volume of transactions or number of market shares, has developed at high speed, which indicates the importance of China’s entry to the WTO for the global art market.
However, this statistic data has de-culturalized Chinese artefacts into objective economic data. The cultural meanings of artefacts are ignored by statistic data in the global art market.

When the viewpoint changes from global to local, which analytical framework best describes China’s domestic discourse about Chinese artefacts’ transnational communication? Is it culture and ideology centered or is it market-centered and economic benefits-led? To find answers to these questions, the actors in the domestic discourse will be discussed. The actors include the state (Communist Party of China and Chinese government), culture and art companies, and media.

At the state policy level, Chinese culture’s opening up needs to be analyzed according to a longer time span than only after the re-entrance of the WTO. China has transnational communication of culture since its establishment. At first, we need to figure out that there is a distinction between cultural isolationism and selective absorption of foreign cultures. After the establishment of PRC in 1949, China had many cultural exchange activities with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. For example, the Soviet Union’s films and popular songs in 1950s were ubiquitous in China then as the Hollywood movies are nowadays. Additionally, China communicated Mao Zedong thought and ideology to the Third World frequently during this period. Mao’s Red Book even had markets among the Western youths who against the capitalist legitimacies. Accordingly, before its entrance to the WTO, or before the opening up policy in 1978, the Chinese government had established transnational Chinese culture communication policies mainly towards non-Western countries. However, during this time, China had few channels to the Western countries. Only elite and dominant groups could have access to the Western culture and Western information through internal
channels while the public could only have access to select information from foreign cultures which ideologically conformed with China. It followed a top-down model.

During the post-Mao period, the transnational communication policy of Chinese culture has experienced a huge shift:

Mao was adamantly opposed to any form of economism, and his anti-economist policies certainly affected China's economic development during his reign. However, the post-Mao leadership has reversed this policy almost entirely from "anti-economism" to a modernizationist "economism," prizing economic development over anything else. As a consequence of this total integration into the capitalist "world system," China now faces all the problems that capitalist globalization has brought in. Commodification of culture has become a prominent phenomenon, as China enters a postsocialist era wherein conflicts intensify among transnational capital, the bureaucratic state apparatuses, and different social classes. (Kang, 1997)

After China entered the WTO in 2001, the transnational communication of Chinese culture has been enfolded into the state’s development strategy level as a Western-oriented process. In the report of the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, Zemin Jiang stated that:

Basing ourselves on the practice of reform, opening up and modernization and keeping abreast of the latest developments in world culture, we must carry forward the fine tradition of our national culture, draw on the strong points of other nations and make innovations in content and form so as to enhance the attraction and appeal of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. (Jiang, 2002)

This was the first time that China’s new transnational communication strategy was articulated.
In October 2005, during the Fifth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP, Jintao Hu stated that developing socialist advanced culture relies upon the Chinese cultural artefacts travelling out of the gate of China.

In July 2006, the Culture Development Program of the National 11th Five-Year Plan Period was promulgated. According to the report, one of the key points of the cultural development during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period is the global communication and distribution of Chinese culture (China, 2006). According to this report, the cultural department of the government needs to make full use of both domestic and overseas market and resources; actively guide Chinese cultural productions to take part in international cooperation and competition; promote Chinese cultural productions’ trade to change the former trade deficit pattern (China, 2006). China’s transnational culture distribution strategy, as one of China’s five main development strategies for the future five to ten years, is argued by the CCP to be determined by the whole interests of the state, the promotion of global economy and inner rules of cultural development. (China, 2006)

In 2014, Xi Jinping visited a cultural trade base in the Pilot Free Trade Zone in Shanghai. During this visit, he stated the importance of the transnational communication of Chinese culture. In accordance with Xi’s idea, the Vice Minister of Culture, Wei Ding hosted the Chinese free trade colloquium in Shanghai in June 7. In this colloquium, the ‘Shanghai Model’ was put forward as an innovation model to develop Chinese culture as to stand for China’s contemporary development spirit. Under the ‘Shanghai Model’, Chinese cultural power and global influence are to be improved with the support of state policy. Additionally, the spirit of the ‘Chinese dream’ is argued to be contained in this transnational process.
From 2001 until now, at the state level, the global communication and development strategies of Chinese culture has been emphasized and promoted by the CCP. However, if we go further in studying these policies and strategies, they are abstract, and lack detailed discussion and definition of some key points, including: what is Chinese culture and what is the scope of transnational distribution. These concepts are vague. The policies mainly focus on the opportunities and challenges of Chinese cultural development, and economic profits under the context of neoliberal globalization. Additionally, Western-states ‘unquestionably’ became the target receivers of this transnational communication process.

Under this condition, the state can be seen as applying a top-down model in its global communication of Chinese culture. It regards Chinese culture as a potential source of economic profit. This kind of “Chinese culture” could be fused into the global culture market, which is a subsection of the global capital market. Additionally, the meanings behind Chinese culture have been narrowed down to ones that are applicable to capitalist common sense. In this manner Chinese culture plays a supportive role in bourgeois hegemony. The problem of this top-down, economic logic centered definition of Chinese culture is that it ignores the culture that belongs to or stands for the working class as well as other subaltern Chinese culture, such as folklore that has little commercial appeal. This ignorance also conceals the domestic and global problem of uneven power relations and uneven rights of culture presentation.

Artefacts have a close relationship to culture as they are ‘any human-created object that provides clues about the culture of the people who created and used it’ (Hauf, 2010, p. 113). As same as culture, the global distribution of Chinese artefacts at the state level also follows this top-down model.
In July 2009, the Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China hosted a colloquium for the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts. It focused on the problems and weak points of the global communication and distribution of Chinese artefacts. This colloquium’s report identifies four prominent problems:

1. The lack of correspondence of global artefacts to the market evaluation system;

2. The lack of domestic political and social support and service systems;

3. The lack of a holistic and systematic domestic artefacts market

4. The lack of a domestic capital market for artefacts

From this official report, the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts is unquestioningly regarded as a market-lead, government-directed top-down process. Artefacts are seen as commercial symbols, which ignore their cultural meanings and historical origins. They are distributed overseas to find resonances in the Western-centered commercial value evaluation system. Artefacts that stand for subaltern groups’ interests and valued by non-commercial evaluation systems are ignored by official culture policies.

Beyond the nation-state, domestic Chinese culture and art companies also need to be studied as forming a global capitalist market. Nation-states and markets have a close relationship with each other. This relationship has two opposing tendencies of resistance and cooperation (Zhao, 2011, p. 36). The state pursues its own political and economic interests, caters to transnational capitalists, and limits the discursive power of workers and peasants to release the pressure of public opinion when economic policies
acquiesce in lowering the workers’ salary to improve the global competitiveness of the domestic productions (Zhao, 2011, p. 36).

Under the bourgeois world order, China has become more integrated the global division of labor.

New multinational production, the new new international division of labor, not only links backward sections of the third world to so-called advanced sections of the first world in a form of multinational production, but increasingly tries to reconstitute the backward sectors within its own society: those forms of contracting out, of franchising, which are beginning to create small dependent local economies which are linked into multinational production. (Hall, The local and the global, 1997, p. 23)

This shows the process of multinational production in globalization although it is unitary to some extend. During this process, especially after China’s entrance to the WTO, some cultural institutions that belonged to the Chinese government have finished the corporatization reformation.

In this reformation process, China Arts and Entertainment Group (CAEG) was the first officially authorized Chinese overseas cultural communication company. It is operated directly under the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China. It is also the largest agency in China that works on international Chinese performance arts and art exhibition activities. Additionally, it is the largest agency in the world that represents Chinese performance arts and Chinese arts exhibitions. In April 2004, CAEG was formed based on the combination and reformation of two cultural institutions: China Performing Arts Agency (CPAA) and China International Exhibition Agency (CIEA).

In CAEG, CIEA is an important subordinate agency that aims at the transnational exhibition of Chinese artefacts. CIEA is the sole national art exhibition
agency in China that undertakes inter-government exchange projects and has a global business capacity (CIEA, 2011).

CIEA is directly owned by the Chinese government and follows a top-down model to organize the overseas exhibition and trade of Chinese artefacts. It maintains the state’s interests and reputation. It also operates under capitalist market logic, which emphasizes Chinese artefacts in terms of economic profits. On the website of CIEA, in the Chinese Exhibitions Abroad section, three exhibitions are introduced. They are: To the East-Chinese landscape architecture exhibition, held in Rome; The Cutting –edge of Chinese Contemporary Architecture, held in Brussels; and Silk Road in Colors-A contemporary Chinese Art Exhibition by Famous Artists, held in Ankara. From the viewpoint of the sites of these exhibitions, all of these exhibitions are held in first or the second world countries. The artefacts in these exhibitions refer to Chinese architecture and artefacts produced by famous artists. The hidden discourse in these artefacts is that they are all representations of elite Chinese culture, which corresponds to the standards of Western-centered art appreciation. For example, the exhibition mentioned above in Rome, is the first time a Chinese contemporary architectures’ exhibition has been displayed in the 21st century national Museum of Contemporary Art, which is a world top-level art space (Agency, 2011). This high level museum unquestionably regards the upper and middle class as its target visitors, while excluding those who cannot afford the entrance tickets. Additionally, the exhibited architecture refers to the design style and visual qualities of the art, while the workers who built these structures are ignored.

CAEG, following the capitalist market model, plays the pioneer role to guide other Chinese culture global communication groups or agencies to distribute Chinese culture and art transnationally. For example, Poly International Auction Corporation
(PIAC) was founded in 2005. It belongs to the Poly Group Corporation, which is under the regulation of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. Based on the influences of political control and market logic, PIAC organizes auctions about various forms of Chinese artefacts: antiques, contemporary oil paintings, traditional and contemporary paintings and calligraphy. These artefacts are put on the international artefacts auction market. In the name of communicating Chinese culture through artefacts, PIAC actually highlights economic values to the de-culturalized Chinese artefacts, which produced by elite artists. It follows an economic top-down model to commercialize art production. The artefacts created by the working class are excluded by this economic level of transnational communication because of the less profits that derived from the uneven economic conditions between classes.

Besides nation-state, media are at the combination point of nation-state and society (Zhao, 2011, p. 46) level that need to be studied in the global communication and distribution of Chinese artefacts.

The nation state is the point of backward linkage to society and forward linkage to the international order. Classes and social forces are integrated vertically into these (national) states that then develop inter-national relations horizontally. (Robinson, 2005)

Society in bourgeois hegemony is limited to civil society, and is dependent upon the nation-state. The Gramscian theory that hegemony is defined as consent organized by the operations of civil society, as opposed to organizations by the state with its apparatus of coercive power, should be seen as a methodological tool to distinguish consent and coercion. The state and civil society, that is, do not represent two bounded universes, always and for ever separate, but rather a knot of tangled power relations which, depending on the questions we are interested in, can be disentangled into
different assemblages of threads. (Crehan, 2002, p. 103) Media analysis is an effective approach to better look into the complicated thread between state and society.

Chinese mainstream media’s reports of the transcultural and transnational communication of Chinese artefacts also follows the top-down model. The media owned by the CCP and the Chinese government, maintain the interests of the dominant groups. The media that are directly controlled by CCP, such as the People’s Daily, are regarded as the mouth piece of the CCP, following the guidelines of CCP and propagate official cultural development policies. Under this condition, the party media support the state’s top-down model of reporting and admiring the transnational communication of elite Chinese culture.

The business mainstream media, such as CCTV, which work under the direction of the CCP, the Chinese government as well as market logic, pursue both the dominant groups’ interests and economic benefits. After Deng Xiao Ping’s policy of opening up and reform was put forward, and especially after the nation’s entrance to the WTO, Chinese business media have institutionally fused into the global media system. This fusion means a deep change in media power relations among Chinese media. After its entrance to the WTO, the Chinese government began to share the same economic interests with the Western-centered capitalist market. Accordingly, at the policy level, Chinese business media have the responsibility to realize the double aims of: capital accumulation and official ideology propaganda (Zhao, 2011, p. 236).

This double-aim pattern of Chinese business media has influenced the communication and discourse rights of the mass. Advertisements provide the main commercial benefits for the commercial media. The transnational and domestic political and economic elites and the middle class, who are the target consumers of the
advertisements, are favoured by these commercial companies. Accordingly, elites and the middle class are set up as the target audience of media. Although there are some voices from the lower class in traditional business media and new media, these voices are limited under the political control and marginalized by the market (Zhao, 2011, p. 236). Under this condition, Chinese commercial mainstream media also follow a top-down model in their pursuit of both economic benefits and political interest.

Alternative media represent opposition to the mainstream media. According to Christian Fuchs, alternative media play a role as critical media, which criticize and challenge the mainstream media’s content and structure. In other words, the alternative media “transcend the filtering and censorship of information in the mainstream media” (Fuchs, 2010). The core features of alternative media are their critical content and critical structure. In China, the media, no matter commercialized or party-lead, no matter traditional media or new media, are all under the regulation and control of the Chinese government. Chinese media all obey the basic political direction and all follow the given ideological framework to report news. Alternative media, which criticize the top-down model, and criticize the political and ideological framework, are banned by the Chinese government. Accordingly, there are no officially recognized alternative media that jump out of the top-down model.

This top-down logic in Chinese media is represented in the global communication and distribution of Chinese artefacts. Under the top-down model and based on the specific background of globalization and nation-state centered cultural protectionism, Chinese media reports mainly focus on the topic of ‘how’, while ignoring discussion of the political background and ideological issues of the artefacts (Zhao, 2011, p. 230). These ‘how’ topics are: how the Chinese artefacts market has access to
the global artefacts market; how to absorb overseas capital; how to learn advanced management skills regarding artefact production, communication and trade; how to increase the Chinese artefacts market as a proportion of the global artefacts market. Accordingly, Chinese media focus on market and economic issues under the direction of the CCP’s global communication and distribution policy.

For example, in July 2009, one report from China Art Weekly, which is a mainstream and business art newspaper in China, was titled *What is missing during the Chinese artefacts’ transcultural and transnational communication?* In this report, Chinese artefacts are given two layers of meanings: as commodities that obey market logic and as a certain cultural form that illustrates and contains Chinese culture and te Chinese spirit (Lu, 2009). Accordingly, on one hand, Chinese artefacts are commercialized. On the other hand, a patently nationalistic point of view is being promoted. (Zhao, 2011). This viewpoint regards ‘Chinese culture’ as a certain and pre-defined category representative of the dominant groups’ logic referring to the narrow scope of political and economic benefits. The discussion of what are ‘Chinese artefacts’, what is ‘Chinese culture’, and whose interests are supported and illustrated when Chinese artefacts are distributed overseas is ignored and marginalized. Accordingly, any meaning that Chinese artefact might represent for the lower class and subaltern people is automatically filtered by Chinese media.

From the Chinese artefacts’ condition in the global art market, the global distribution process for Chinese artefacts seemingly follows a “bottom-up” model in that China is positioned as a peripheral state resenting its artefacts to the core states. However, there are two problems in this bottom-up model, firstly, from the viewpoint of the Chinese government, the role of cultural companies and media, as illustrated above,
is to follow a top-down model in the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts under the logic of the capitalist market. The contributions of subaltern groups is ignored and marginalized. Secondly, this transnational trade and communication process unquestioningly targets Western countries as the receivers. The third world occupies only a little attention in China’s global strategy of cultural promotion. This process is a product of the uneven world order and in return it intensifies the unevenness of the world order. China’s cultural exchange and trade could enlarge the gap between the core states and peripheral states.

At the transnational level, Chinese artefacts follow a top-down model of distribution. This occurs in a process of glocalization that ignores the direct symbolic and ideological domination of the Western-centered global art market. It is based on the isolated localized and historicized identity of artefacts and obeys the rules of global art market. In addition, local artefacts are distributed to find resonance with the Western-dominant art market evaluation standard. The transitional communication of Chinese artefacts illustrates the combination of local negotiation and global framework control, which combines the global dynamics of cultural economy to locally specified practices.

Transnational cultural power does not operate as the absolute symbolic center but is deeply intermingled with local indigenizing processes in a way in which cultural diversity is organized through globally shared formats rather than through the replication of uniform cultural models (Hannerz 1996; Wilk 1995, cited by Iwabuchi, 2008, p. 148).

This process of glocalism is argued to encourage greater economic profits. Profits are to be earned more through artefacts with local Chinese cultural characteristics rather than by disseminating artefacts based on the “aesthetic” through the distribution of dominant standard of artefacts set by Western countries.
From the viewpoint of glocalization, the overseas distribution of Chinese artefacts, which has quickly ranked up in the global art market as the volume of transactions of Chinese traders and goods has rapidly increased according to a framework established by the capitalist market of the core states. It is this profits-led economic process, which accordingly excludes the subaltern groups’ interests and cultural ideology. The subaltern class lives in a subordinate position based on the background of the expansion of the global capitalist market. The artefacts that represent their material and ideological life or artefacts that implicate their struggle for a new just life and work circumstances does not appeal high class buyers because these symbolic issues are in opposition to the buyers’ ideology and economic benefits logic. Accordingly, at the transnational level, the communication of Chinese artefacts follows a top-down model. High and middle class control over this process deprives the lower class of their expression and right to struggle through the global art market.

From the domestic level, in other words, at the local and national level, the overseas communication of Chinese artefacts also follows a top-down model. The cultural policies, domestic culture corporations, and media, all deal with the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts based on the double-aim of: capital accumulation and public adherence of official ideology. The top-down model at the local level also maintains the interests of the dominant high and middle class while marginalizing the discursive power of the lower class because of the privileged place of economic profits over considerations of class interests. Behind top-down models such as this are uneven power relations that are premised on subaltern classes having little discursive power in culture while compelled to follow the dominant political and economic culture framework.
In the following section, a case study of the Forbidden City Exhibition at the Vancouver Art Gallery will be illustrated, which follows the top-down model of the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts.
Chapter 4. The Forbidden City in Vancouver: a top-down discourse

From October 2014 to January 2015, over 200 artefacts from the Forbidden City will travel to Vancouver to contribute to transnational communication between China and Canada. Dubbed “The Forbidden City: Inside the Court of China’s Emperors”, this exhibition documents and presents a special 500 years’ history of China at Vancouver Art Gallery. This exhibition will at first take place in the Royal Ontario Museum at March 2014, and then travel to the Vancouver Art Gallery.

At face value, this exhibition is the presentation of Chinese artefacts in Canada. This face value may be explained with a simplistic Gramscian analysis of international relations, where peripheral states vie for acknowledgement and discursive power by exhibiting artefacts and culture in core states. This, accordingly, describes China in the role of resistance for a just world order. However, this face value is deculturalized and ignores the uneven power relations behind the cultural communication of these artefacts. To better appreciate the role the Forbidden City Exhibition plays in the global communication of Chinese artefacts and in the cultural world order, an account needs to be made at first of the content displayed by the exhibition, and the economic and political power relations behind it. What artefacts are on the exhibition? Who or which institutions provide the funds for it? Does it follow a commercial model or a public benefit model? What are the aims of this exhibition? Who are the target audience? These questions challenge the simplistic core-peripheral model of the content, economic interests and power relations articulated in this exhibition.
Over 200 of the Forbidden City’s treasured artefacts were chosen to be exhibited. These artefacts belong to the Palace Museum, which is managed by the Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China. Accordingly, the artefacts from the Forbidden City are all public and government-controlled. Royal Ontario Museum’s curator Chen Shen personally travelled to Beijing to choose these artefacts from a selection of 1.8 million artefacts based on his elite social and education background. These artefacts as well as the buildings in the Forbidden City are heritage, which are different from contemporary artefacts, some of which are produced as commodities to be sold on the private market. From this viewpoint, this heritage was not produced to would take part in the global capital market and follow the resulting top-down model. However, the heritage is the expression of culture and identity. “The cultural diversities, although representing the continuity of identity codes, are inserted in an evolutionary process which involves multi-scale (from local to global) phenomena associated to tangible or intangible, spatial or temporal and to the technology or to the nature based characteristics” (Giobanni Francesco Mascari, 2009). Accordingly, if the viewpoint is excavated deeper, the Forbidden City artefacts are the expressions of culture, which could potentially play either a top-down maintenance role or a bottom-up resistance role in the cultural world order.

Among the list of the Forbidden City treasures (Gallery, 2013) are artefacts which range from representations of the political life of the Ming and Qing emperors in the outer court to the daily normal life of royal family in the inner court. From the outer court part, they are artefacts, such as: ceremonial Qing armour, an ink on silk portrait of Emperor Qianlong in ceremonial robe, and the Emperor Yongzheng’s stamp (seal) (Gallery, 2013), present a portrait of the royal political life depicting the glory and wane of the last two feudal dynasties in ancient China. Through these artefacts, a story is told of
the explorers whose diligence or indolence would influence and determine the destiny of a dynasty. From the inner court part, displayed artefacts include: the Empress’s formal coat (Chaogua) during the Yongzheng period, a cabbage-shape vase from Qing dynasty, and a portrait of Emperor Qianlong’s concubine in Chinese dress (Gallery, 2013). They display the royal family’s daily life and their luxurious life style. In this transnational artefacts exhibition, the resonance of the Chinese culture and Canadian culture is also illustrated and highlighted. Chinese traditional culture highlights hierarchy, while Canadian culture highlights rights and equality of every member in society, including children and pets. Accordingly, children and dogs are two popular and important topics in contemporary Canadian cultural representations, and in the Western context at large. Among the artwork going to be exhibited, there is a robe of Emperor Tongzhi who wore it when he was enthroned as a six-year old child. Through this robe, childhood, as it was experienced in the Forbidden City, may stimulate the curiosity of Canadian audiences whose particular interests have been directly responded to by the exhibits curators. There is also a silk dog outfit for royal dog to wear.

From the list of the exhibits going to be displayed, the ‘top’ royal dominators’ life style is what prioritized for audience consumption. The Chinese royal artefacts exhibited in Vancouver offer a transformative communication experience by equipping audiences with maps to guide them through the universes they construct (Duncan, 2014, p. 91). Through experiencing the Forbidden City Exhibition and being exposed to the Forbidden City artefacts, audiences have the chance to find resonance or conflict with the cultural world pattern they have built based on their ideology, customs, epistemology, and methodology; which is a historically educated and accumulated process. However, this argument is based on an undefined concept of audiences. Who will be the target audiences of this exhibition? To find the answer, the official introduction documents
should be analyzed at first. There is only one place in the introduction for this exhibition (Gallery, 2013; Gallery, 2013) talks about the audiences: “audiences will encounter fascinating ceremonial, institutional and personal daily lives of China’s emperors.” Accordingly, this ‘only place’ also gives the vague definition of audiences as an abstract concept. Looking beyond the literal level of this report, the questions who are the audiences and who has the chance to experience the sense of cultural recognition or rejection of Chinese artefacts needs further consideration.

“Target audience” is a commercial concept. It simply considers the abstract groups of people: consumers and the public while concealing the imbalance power relations behind them and their positions (Zhao, 2011, p. 46). Targeting audiences itself illustrates the market logic of this exhibition. VAG, participating in the capitalist market and exhibiting elite culture, which will be analyzed further in the following section, actually regards the elites as its audiences. VAG presupposes the standard characteristics of its ideal audiences. Economically, they must be able to afford the price of a ticket or better yet afford the fees to join the gallery’s membership club. Ideologically and educationally, audience members are supposed to be intelligible with some knowledge of the critical code underpinning the art and to be optimally prepared, socially, psychologically and culturally to enact in an individual gallery experience (Duncan, 2014, pp. 92,95). The economic and ideological standards exclude subaltern groups of people whose economic interests have been exploited by bourgeoisie and the their consciousness, according to Gramsci, could not be but impoverished and unsystematic, precisely because of the subaltern’s relative powerlessness (Crehan, 2002). In this Forbidden City Exhibition at VAG, the discussion of targeting an audience has naturally followed a top-down model both in terms of how they are selected and who they represent in society. The targeted audience is comprised of members of the upper
and middle class whose economic and ideological conditions correspond to the bourgeois market, while the lower classes are ignored in the communication of the exhibition.

However, this ‘top-down’ model of privileging the goods of the ruling class so far just limited to the artefacts and audiences themselves, while the artefacts and audiences are objective to some extent. Accordingly, to a deeper level, these artefacts that were chosen and introduced in a specific manner, and the audiences who were targeted as the elites reflect the ideological direction and tendentiousness of the curators, sponsors and the economic and political interests groups behind them. Media, the main information resource for the public to be informed about this kind of transnational activity, play a leading role in guiding the public about how to understand these artefacts and in encouraging the target audiences to visit it. In this context, the Canadian media’s reports need to be analyzed. Firstly, compared to the Chinese media, Canadian reports could directly influence the potential visitors’ thoughts and actions. Secondly, because this exhibition has not taken place yet, few Chinese media have reported this culture activity that will happen in Canada. Performing a Google search, a total of 33 reports about this exhibition as reported by Canadian media can be found. These are mostly from B.C., in both English and in Chinese, and from both traditional media and new media sources. They all around the press conference held at VAG on October 2013, when this exhibit was announced. Among the reports, 4 reports are from the Globe and Mail, 5 reports are from the Vancouver Sun, 3 video reports are from CBC News, 2 reports are from Global Chinese Press, 2 reports are from Singtao Daily, and the others are from local B.C. media such as Ming Pao, Fairchild Radio, Vancouver Sun Chinese Edition, World Journal, Georgia Straight, Metro, Vancity Buzz, City 365, Enjoy Living Vancouver Style.
Among the 33 reports, there are 2 reports that focus on the B.C.’s financial investment in culture. The other 31 reports nearly follow the same pattern as each other by highlighting the significant influence of this transnational artefacts exhibitioin; claiming that it facilitates Chinese culture’s communication in Vancouver and facilitates cultural, economic, and diplomatic relationships between Canada and China. The Canadian media hold a blind positive viewpoint of this exhibition, which corresponds to the ideological direction and tendentiousness of the curators, sponsors and the economic and political interests groups behind them.

For example, on October, 22 2013, the Global Mail reported this press conference, titled Vancouver as the West’s home for the East’s Art, by focusing on the beginning meaning of this exhibition that this exhibition could be seen as the beginning of more opportunities for Chinese culture to be communicated in Vancouver and North America:

When the Forbidden City: Inside the Court of China’s Emperors arrives at the Vancouver Art Gallery a year from now, it will be one of the most significant exhibitions in the gallery’s history. But the three local powerhouses who made it happen have even bigger ambitions: the establishment of Vancouver as a major cultural gateway between China and North America and, ultimately, the creation of a permanent home for Chinese art and culture in the city- possibly in the VAG’s current home. (Lederman, 2013)

In the report, Chinese culture is discussed in an abstract way. This uncritical reading of Chinese culture privileges the elite culture which corresponds to the interests of transnational bourgeoisie for they need an environment of peaceful elite culture exchange. This free cultural exchange could provide them with more economic profits from global art market. While elite culture is surely one part of Chinese culture, according to Walter Benjamin, there is “no document of civilization which is not at the
same time a document of barbarism” (Benjamin, 1969, p 256). From the Forbidden City artefacts to the 5000-year development of Chinese culture, all of these artefacts reflect a suppressive, exclusionary, peasant-bilking autocracy. The top-down model of Canadian media’s reports by re-representing these artefacts of autocratic repression as representative of Chinese culture as a whole, helps to intensify the subaltern position of those at the margins of Chinese culture in both China and in the Western countries.

To further analyze the top-down discourse of the Forbidden City Exhibition, the funds of it need to be studied. This exhibition is sponsored by China National Offshore Oil Corporation Limited (CNOOC Limited) and The Robert H.N. Ho Family Foundation. Both of these organizations have donated one million Canadian dollars to bring this exhibition from China to Canada.

CNOOC Group is the third-largest national oil company in China. It is owned by the Chinese government. This ownership mainly means that the government holds over half CNOOC’s stocks. CNOOC actually is operated according to capitalist market logics. CNOOC Limited is sponsoring this Forbidden City exhibition, on one hand, to act as a financial surrogate for the CCP and their effort to express Chinese soft power and improve China-Canada relations. On the other hand, this sponsorship will improve CNOOC Limited’s reputation in the Canadian market, especially with the Canadian oil and gas industry; a move which may be linked to its 2003 acquisition of Canadian oil and gas company Nexen Inc. Accordingly, CNOOC Limited’s sponsorship illustrates the combination and correspondence of the interests of the Chinese government and Chinese bourgeoisie that has already been seen in other instances in the global capital market, such as the CIEA as mentioned before.
The Robert H.N. Ho Family Foundation was established in 2005. It is a private philanthropic organisation based in Hong Kong. It supports innovative programmes, to raise awareness and foster appreciation of Chinese cultural heritage, to nurture the presentation of the history of Chinese arts and to support the application of Buddhist insights to the challenges facing society today. This foundation facilitates the spread of and communication of Chinese culture inside China and overseas. However, their cultural activities should not be taken at face value. The funds of this foundation are earned from the bourgeois market. Accordingly, the cultural activities funded by this foundation can hardly transcend beyond basic capitalist market logic.

Additionally, the funds from these sponsors are not enough to support the whole exhibition, which includes: market communication, daily operation costs and the VAG’s expenses and promotion funds. The Canadian federal government and British Columbia’s provincial government’s financial support is also deficit. In October 2013, British Columbia’s minister of cultural development Coralee Oakes demonstrated that there would be no money in next year’s provincial budget to finance a new Vancouver Art Gallery in downtown Vancouver. Accordingly, to make up the deficiency of funds, VAG is seeking to generate profits from the ticket sales and the by-products around the topic of the Forbidden City, such as the books, models, and notebooks. VAG and its marketing department therefore have a great responsibility for attracting visitors to the show, not only for its success, but also for their own institutional well being. Accordingly, we need to look at VAG itself to study about its responsibility and further more to study its operation model, characteristics, and the power relations behind it.

Vancouver Art Gallery is a not-for-profit organization supported by its members, individual donors, corporate funders, private foundations, the City of Vancouver, the
Province of British Columbia through the BC Arts Council, and the Canada Council for the Arts (Gallery, 2013). From this introduction, it seems like VAG does not follow capitalist market rules of capital accumulation and is able to dedicate its efforts to promoting Vancouver and BC residents’ culture life and providing artists, especially the BC born artists, with a platform to display their works. However, its funders are all operated within the bourgeois market or support the market rules. They could hardly jump out of the uneven power relations to fund this gallery. As a result, VAG itself is an institution based on the elite bourgeois background. Furthermore, with the same problem as the Forbidden City Exhibition, these sources do not cover all of the Gallery’s operational costs, which are made up with ticket sales. However, this begs new questions: whose work is able to have the chance to be displayed in VAG that could attract as many as possible audiences? Who is able to pay 75 dollars a year to join in the Gallery’s membership? Who is able to pay 20 dollars for a single visit to VAG? All the answers point to the elites groups whose economic and ideological condition is applicable to the gallery’s target audience standard as analyzed before. As a result, VAG follows the elite conceptual model of modern art galleries.

Modern art galleries have their beginnings in Renaissance palaces, where displays of art treasures were assembled as monuments to the great princes of the church and state. With the development of secular culture, art galleries began to construct the modern concept of ‘art’, which “put increasing value on the quality and uniqueness of an artist’s mental labour as distinct from the quality and quantity of his manual skill and the cost of this materials” (Duncan, 2014, p. 87). This conception of art galleries highlights the distinction and differences between mental labour and manual skills. Mental labour of artists illustrates the high culture, which is out of the ordinary space and distinct from normal, day-to-day life. Additionally, this kind of labour speaks to
the affinities of ‘aesthetic experience’. On the contrary, manual labour implies low
culture, which stands for the workers’ repeated and mechanical work. When placed in
galleries, the condition that the manual meaning of the artefacts is removed while the
aesthetic meaning is highlighted reflects the universalization of the values of the
institution’s expected and targeted patrons. Additionally, the unique architecture of art
galleries and their new exhibition designs prompt their “participat[ion] in the market
economy by contributing to the cultural life of cities, making them more attractive to
tourism, commercial investment and global trade” (Denton, Cited by Tami Blumenfield,
2013, p.11)

Accordingly, uneven social order and disinterestedness is formed in this
case. At first, only the visitors who are well-educated and with some knowledge to
underpin the aesthetic codes of the artefacts are included in the planning of and
welcomed by art galleries as analyzed above. Art galleries could be regarded as a test
site of class identity, as they intensify the distinctions of social class stratification.
Secondly, under this conception, art galleries could be regarded as a ritual site in the
contemporary world for the visitors to experience pure aesthetics, in the suspension of
normal life. “Museums give their visitors the same spiritual benefits as traditional rituals:
a feeling of revelation or uplift and a sense of being mentally nourished, restored or
refreshed” (Duncan, 2014, p. 93). According to philosopher Immanual Kant, this
‘refreshed’ aesthetic experience, which ignores the actual conflicts, uneven social and
world order, and other social and political problems, leads to the “aesthetic
disinterestedness”. The disinterestedness makes the elites focus on the pure elite
aesthetics in this space while have no experience about the subaltern art and the
uneven power relations behind it. The galleries correspond to or even reinforce the high
ideology of the social elites. Consequently, modern art galleries, defined from the elite viewpoint, intensify the subaltern people’s marginal conditions.

From the base financial supporters, target audiences, the Forbidden City artefacts on exhibition, Canadian media’s reports to the Vancouver Art Gallery itself, all illustrate that the Forbidden City exhibition at VAG follows a top-down model. Although from the face value, it exhibits one peripheral culture in a core state, which seemingly indicate the movement towards a just cultural world order, this exhibition actually follows a capitalist culture market order and displays elite Chinese culture and privileges upper and middle class elites as its target audiences who are able to support this exhibition to be economically profitable. However, this top-down model has ignores the rights of Chinese subaltern culture to be presented transnationally and limits transnational subaltern class access to this exhibition. It maintains and even intensifies the uneven cultural world order with the model of Western-centered transnational culture communication.
Chapter 5. The need for a bottom-up model

Based on the above analysis of the condition of the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts, we find that it follows a top-down model. This top-down model could lead to two problems. Firstly, it ignores and excludes the transnational communication of lower and subaltern classes’ artefacts. The artefacts of elite Chinese are politically and economically regarded as objects that unquestionably stand for Chinese culture in this phase of China’s re-entry to the global art market. The second problem is that this top-down model leads to nation-state centered and Western-centered patterns of distribution, trade and communication. The CCP has become the main player in this process, controlling domestic policy, media and leading China taking part in the global capitalist market behind it. Additionally as most distribution is focused on export to Western nations, such as the Forbidden City exhibition at VAG, and third world countries have much less access to this kind of cultural exchange activity, this process is Western-centered. This nation-state centered and Western-centered process intensifies the uneven cultural world order. In this context, a bottom-up model is needed.

Firstly, at the nation-state level, China cannot get rid of its socialist ideological heritage (Zhao, 2011, p. 54). Since the establishment of People’s Republic of China, China has announced itself as a socialist country. We cannot overlook its history of socialist struggles and movements and we cannot deny its socialist regime. The establishment of a socialist system in China announced that the working class held the power of nation’s sovereignty and had gotten rid of capitalist oppression and exploitation. Although “socialism with Chinese characteristics” policy is deeply rooted in
capitalist practices, and China is developing a globally integrated capitalist market economy, the socialist culture remains contained in the potential of the Chinese working class.

Secondly, subaltern Chinese artefacts, which present the meanings and essences of the nation’s subaltern culture, play a role of resistance to the neo-liberal world order and have the power and potential to contribute to a new post-capitalist historic bloc. What Gramsci wanted to understand of subaltern culture is the mechanisms, which continually reconstituted this class. What is it about the conditions of subaltern life, and the relationship of subalterns to dominant groups in society, that keep them subaltern? In other words, what does hegemony actually look like in concrete historical contexts, and how might it be overcome? Accordingly, Gramsci found that the main characteristic of subaltern culture their being ‘historically on the defensive’ (Crehan, 2002, pp. 100,105). Subaltern culture is positioned to resist and struggle against exploitation and to resist the current uneven world order. Additionally, according to Raymond Williams, “the major cultural contribution of the working-class in this country has been the collective democratic institution formed to achieve a general social benefit” (Williams, 1957, p. 31). Contrary to capitalist democracy which is limited and exclusive, the subaltern working class represent the needs to build a democracy that covers the whole society. Accordingly, subaltern culture has the responsibility and characteristics to struggle for a new and just historic bloc.

A bottom-up model has the possibility and responsibility to be added in the Chinese artefacts’ transnational communication process. However, this model cannot be limited to a discussion of what kind of Chinese artefacts need to be included in the process of transnational communication, how the state takes actions to promote this
process, and how the working class is made subaltern in this neo-liberal world order. The viewpoint needs to go beyond this singular and limited scope to see the whole and interactive picture. Gramsci provides a framework for doing this with his use of Marxist theory describing how the structure determines the superstructure. Gramsci’s historical materialism, ideas and material conditions are combined together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible to the other. Superstructures of ideology and political organization shape the development of both aspects of production and are shaped by them (Cox, 1983). This interactive and juxtaposed relationship between political, economic and ideological spheres avoids reductionism. It also avoids reducing everything either to economics (economism) or ideas (idealism) (Cox, 1983).

Accordingly, to study the potential of a bottom-up model, the viewpoint cannot be limited to a nation-state centered or economy centered one. Instead, a more open model needs to be discussed. Here, Raymond Williams’ and Stuart Hall’s ‘open model’ for IR could be applied. This ‘open model’ argues for a more open, complex and articulated process to study international hegemony. In this process, culture plays a vital role. It understands the “mechanisms of hegemony are not just confined to consent between classes, but to processes that are ‘highly complex’, and ones that are ‘continually being renewed, recreated and defended ’” (Williams 1980:38, as cited by Worth, 2009, p. 26). A bottom-up model, according to Williams and Hall, is more open, multi-layered and less-limited because it takes the interaction and juxtaposition of the political, economic and ideological spheres into consideration. In addition, a bottom-up model could be analyzed as a more general account of hegemony that fully allows for the contrasting and contradictory practices that occur at different levels of the hegemonic order (Worth, 2009, p. 31). Accordingly, a bottom-up model itself and the counter hegemony entail an open and flexible way. The study of art distribution needs the openness and flexibility
afforded by a bottom up model so that the complexity of existing power relations and the impacts these relations cause can be brought to the fore.

How could a bottom-up model be understood to apply to the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts? In China, after Deng Xiaoping’s opening-up policy, and especially after its entrance to the WTO, China has entered the global capitalist market and participated in globalization. This trend has disrupted the state’s former economic and political protectionist policies, and has put some power that formerly belonged to the state into the hands of transnational institutions, which helps to maintain the current world order. When the nation-state begins to weaken, becoming less convincing and less powerful, the power of nations seems to be distributed into two ways simultaneously. It goes above the nation-state and it goes below it. It goes global and local in the same moment (Hall, 1997, pp. 26-27).

With the trend of globalization, culture, which interacts with politics and economy, goes in the two directions as well. At the global level, while Western culture, especially America’s, has not straightforwardly homogenized the world, it has nevertheless diffused a series of cultural “formats,” based on which various differences which have been expressed and elucidated in many parts of the world (Iwabuchi, 2008, p. 145). Local strategies, which seem to have their own differences and characteristics, are actually under Western-centered global structural and ideological control and influence. As Stuart Hall points out, this is a “peculiar form of homogenization’ that does not destroy but rather ‘recognizes and absorbs those differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world” (Hall, 1997, p. 27). This globally standardizing and locally diversifying model emphasizes the uneven power relations in the current world order.
Accordingly, a bottom-up model of the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts should break the limited viewpoint of privileging local diversity by realizing the influence of Western ideological control. A bottom-up model provides a platform to jump out of the framework of cultural imperialism to identify how current uneven, interactive and complex political, economic and cultural power relations work. It highlights new cultural imagination and new forms of cultural expression, in a challenge to the current unevenness in global and local power relations. In other words, a bottom-up model enables one to imagine the possibility of socialist culture that is different from and beyond the capitalist one (Zhao, 2011, p. 270).

China’s working class has already practiced in a bottom-up model to communicate their artefacts although this is currently limited to the local level. On May 1, 2008 the Culture and Arts Museum of Migrant Workers was opened in Picun, which is a migrant workers’ residence near the Beijing International Airport. This museum is sponsored by Sun Heng, a singer for migrant workers. All the artefacts in this museum are donated by migrant workers themselves, including the poems written by the children of migrant workers, woollen shoes woven by workingwomen, and the guitar played by Sun H(Agency, 2011) (Cox, 1983)eng in the Migrant workers’ Spring Festival Gala. The museum’s daily manager Hao Zhixi said, “although in Guangdong and Chengdu, there are also museums about migrant workers, the Culture and Arts Museum of Migrant Workers is the only one totally organized by migrant workers themselves without any official background” (Hao, 2013).

Sun Heng said he wants to record the culture of migrant workers into history. “We migrant workers have made a great contribution to the country and to the prosperity of the economy. Our contributions and sacrifices cannot be ignored and forgotten. So we build our own museum; record our own history and culture”, (Sun, 2013).
From this museum, we can tell that China’s working class has the ideological foundation, and has taken actions based on this foundation, to exhibit their own artefacts and communicate their own culture. However, this practice is still limited to the local level lacking any connections with global counter-hegemony powers.

“How local environments of oppression are located within larger economic and political realities is essential if a subaltern account is to have any hope of becoming genuinely counter-hegemony “ (Crehan, 2002).

The Forbidden City Exhibition in VAG could take some points from the Culture and Arts Museum of Migrant Workers to make up the ignorance of bottom-up model. To the artefacts themselves, curators could highlight the manual labor and the sophisticated skills contributed by the royal artisans. The mental labour and manual labour need to be both contained in the introduction of the artefacts. Additionally, VAG could provide more space for the audiences to form their own thoughts and understandings. The interactive museum audio guide of Museum of Modern Art in New York (Kennedy, 2005) is a good example to follow.

The guides are an outgrowth of a recent podcasting trend called "sound seeing," in which people record narrations of their travels - walking on the beach, wandering through the French Quarter - and upload them onto the Internet for others to enjoy. In that spirit, the creators of the unauthorized guides to the Modern have also invited anyone interested to submit his or her own tour for inclusion on the project's Web site. (Kennedy, 2005)

This self-creation and understanding guide process could be learned by VAG. However, the problem is how the audiences think about this exhibition by themselves. As to Bourdieu, reading aesthetics is a more socio-historical process. In this context, understanding and appreciating the Forbidden City artefacts relates to the audiences’
social background. “Aesthetics is returned to the world and the social structure of societies rather than being definable in terms of a necessary philosophical logic” (Hardy, 2007, p. 41). However, the social background is uneven in the neo-liberal world order. Accordingly, how to guide the audiences have their own thoughts, which are not related to the judgement of right or wrong, high or low is a complicated issue that needs further consideration. To the funds and profits of this exhibition, VAG could make it more accessible to the subaltern groups. For example, the tickets could be free to the low-income groups and the disabilities. Additionally, the alternative media in B.C. such as the Tyee, could show other parts of this exhibition: the artisans’ manual labour to make the Forbidden City artefacts and the lower class people have few access to VAG in their reports, instead of the top-down topics repeated in the mainstream media.

Accordingly, the bottom-up practices of the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts, such as this museum, need to surpass the local level affect resistance to the current bourgeois historic bloc and struggle for a new and just world order.
Chapter 6. Conclusion: the double-line in transnational communication of Chinese artefacts

Transnational communication of Chinese artefacts, which now follows a top-down model, needs to follow the double-line of both top-down and bottom-up communication models. The current top-down communication stems from powerful political support and fully funded organization projects while bottom-up communication begins with an individual initiative in pursuit of some value-adding activity. (Gaynor, 2013, p.15)

The need for a bottom-up model does not mean the exclusion of the top-down model. A top-down model firstly provides political and financial support for the transnational communication of Chinese artefacts. It provides a platform for the global communication of Chinese culture, both towards Western countries and non-Western countries through diplomatic, economic and cultural exchange activities, which may eventually increase the global influence of Chinese artefacts. As the Forbidden City Exhibition in VAG, without the supports from sponsors and the Palace Museum in Beijing, it would be hard to reach Vancouver. Secondly, a top-down model could increase the global market share of Chinese artefacts and bring in economic profits, and provide funds for further culture communication. Just as the data provided by Artprice that Chinese artefacts have huge art market shares currently under the top-down model.

However, as analyzed above, this top-down model has excluded the subaltern culture that belongs to or is created by subaltern classes. It cannot actually jump out of the uneven neo-liberal world order to struggle for a new one. It is Western-centered and nation-state centered. Additionally, resistance to the neo-liberal world order in the fields
of global communication and cultural policy has never been interrupted, and the statement that communication and culture cannot be totally commercialized remains. At the methodological level,

it is necessary to shift from ‘structural history’ and ‘technological history’ to the ‘human history’, to shift from the endless arguments of systems and policies to the dynamic historical logics. The notice should be focused on the changes of the public’s conditions in historical span and be focused on the public’s influences on structure and history” (Zhao, 2011, p.291).

Accordingly, subaltern people’s conditions and their culture should also be included in transnational culture communication processes.

As a consequence, the double line of integrating top-down and bottom-up approaches should be applied to the transnational communication strategies of Chinese artefacts. This double line provides both the benefits of gaining the political and economic support to facilitate continued cultural exchanges and providing space for the subaltern groups and subaltern culture to transcend the current barriers they face from the processes of hegemonic entrenchment. This would allow both Western countries and non-Western countries to have access to a diversity of Chinese artefacts and be exposed to the culture that resists exploitation and that excises imaginations for a new regime and new life style in contrast to the current hegemonic status quo of capitalist society.

This double-line model should avoid nation-state centered and Western-state centered logics. Instead, it should follow an “open model” that constructs heterogeneous and multiple cultural spaces on different levels: local, national and international in Western countries and non-Western-countries. It does not replace the hegemony of one
group simply with the hegemony of another, which is “a relationship formed through a repositioning of class relations, but through an organic whole that is articulated through complex interactions with the social sphere” (Worth, 2009, p.27). The top-down and bottom-up model should not be regarded as clearly distinct two models. They are interwoven with each other and are contained by each other. This interwoven process, which is part of open model, needs further study in my continuous study. This open-model would allow for China to realize its goal of resisting the neo-liberal world order and establish a new and just historic bloc through the transnational communication of its artefacts.
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