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Abstract

The central research question herein is “how do coalitions of government and non-government actors get created and influence the decision-making processes of municipal government in Vancouver, British Columbia?” The goal of this effort is to better understand “who really governs?” (Dahl, 1961) at the municipal level of government in the city during two ‘adjacent’ eras – the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement (VA), including the development of Vancouver as North America’s first supervised/safe injection site/harm reduction model, in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s.

This dissertation considers not only the structures, actors and ideas of municipal governments but also the creation, influence and power of the various coalitions, the urban regimes, as defined by Stone (1989), that form around local decision-making.

It is clear from this examination that coalitions of government and non-government actors, urban regimes, were created and influenced the decision-making processes involved in the development of former Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. In addition, there were continuities and discontinuities identified, linked to the type of policy being considered by the Vancouver municipal government.

In sum, this analysis found that the nature of the decision-making processes, and by extension the urban regimes that were created, were issue-dependent. Urban regimes involved in what Bish and Clemens (2008) have described as “hard” (or “engineering”) issues, such as land development, were substantially different in nature to those involved in “soft” (or human policy”) issues, such as the provision of addiction services - the substance of policy issues mattered more than institutions.

**Keywords:** municipal; government; non-government; regime theory; Expo ’86; Vancouver Agreement
I dedicate this dissertation to
the memory of my late grandparents Bert and Jean Graves;
my late father Patrick Ginnell;
my mother Wanda Ginnell;
my brothers Erin and his wife Jay; Daniel and his wife Leslie;
and most of all to
my five nephews Derek, Liam, Sean, Brad, and Riley.

I also dedicate this dissertation to
my good friends David Anderson and Diane Griffith
who have stood by me through this adventure
—good times and bad.
Acknowledgements

No undertaking such as this would be possible without the support and assistance of a good many people. I would like to particularly thank the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University for everything that was done for me during my “rather long” time on the mountain. Going to SFU literally changed my life, on a few occasions, and I really appreciate my time spent with the many faculty, staff and colleagues over the years. In particular, I would like to express my thanks to Undergrad Assistant Eliza So and Chair’s Secretary Sherry Lloyd who always were eager to help and listen to me, I am very grateful for your assistance over the years both when I was taking classes and later during my graduate studies, TA/TM’ing and Sessional instructing. I would like to express thanks to the kind folks at the Centre for Online and Distance Education (CODE), in particular Sophie Larsen, who was very supportive and made my work with them so enjoyable. I would like to also thank colleagues Shaun Tyakoff and Jeanette Ashe from Douglas College for their encouragement and listening skills during this adventure. Finally, I would like to thank the many students I have worked with as colleagues over the years and those that I have taught over the recent years it was, and is, my pleasure to work with you.

I would also like to thank the members of my examining committee - Dr. Douglas Ross; Dr. Patrick Smith; Dr. Maureen Covell; Dr. Noel Dyck; Dr. Steven McBride and Dr. James Lightbody. Your participation is greatly appreciated by me.

I owe my academic career to Dr. Paddy Smith. At various times this pride of Utopia, Ontario has been my editor, teacher, mentor, friend, sounding board, employment counsellor, protector, and co-conspirator. Paddy always provided me with opportunities, advice, confidence and challenges, and many laughs – for that I am eternally grateful. I am particularly thankful that I have him to thank for my attitudes about engaging students and actually enjoying Political Science.

Finally, I would like to thank the Tour de France, Blenz Coffee, and the Seagull across the lane that gave birth to 3 little chicks in the final two weeks of writing, this dissertation would not have been completed without the distractions and caffeine you provided.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>British Columbia Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cooperative Commonwealth Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Census Agglomeration Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMA</td>
<td>Census Metropolitan Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPE</td>
<td>Coalition of Progressive Electors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Canadian Pacific Railways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTES</td>
<td>Downtown Eastside</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCM</td>
<td>Federation of Canadian Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GST</td>
<td>Goods and Services Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCV</td>
<td>Hepatitis C Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDSA</td>
<td>Health Delivery Service Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBE</td>
<td>International Bureau of Expositions</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLDC</td>
<td>Land-locked Lesser Developed Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMRPB</td>
<td>Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIZ</td>
<td>Census Metropolitan Influenced Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-level Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSUA</td>
<td>Minister of State Urban Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Non-Partisan Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Office of the Auditor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Single Room Occupancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEAM</td>
<td>The Electors’ Action Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBCM</td>
<td>Union of British Columbia Municipalities</td>
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<td>UDA</td>
<td>Urban Development Agreement</td>
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<td>UEL</td>
<td>United Empire Loyalists</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMDG</td>
<td>United Nations Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Vancouver Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Western Diversification</td>
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1. Introduction

More has been written against Tammany Hall than about it. With little evidence, it is difficult to speculate on the nature of the system during the Irish era, but some patterns can be discerned, particularly those which persist in the present Democratic party organization. Foremost is the pattern of bureaucracy. Politics in a "natural" state is preeminently a personal affair—a matter of whom you know and who knows you; whom you like and trust; who you think likes and trusts you; whom you can intimidate and vice versa. The personal nature of such relations makes for a fluctuating, confused, perilous enterprise. Thus politics, business, and war have ever been the affairs of adventurers and risk takers. These are anything but peasant qualities. Certainly not those of Irish peasants, who, collectively, yielded to none in the rigidity of their social structure and their disinclination to adventure. Instead of letting politics transform them, they transformed politics, establishing a political system in New York City that from a distance seems like nothing so much as the social system of an Irish village writ large. Village life was characterized by the preeminence of formal family relations under the dominance of the stern father. Substituting "party" for "family" and "leader" for "father," the Irish created the political machine. (Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 1961)

Despite my own heritage I am not advocating for a return to the days of Tammany, although it may make for much more interesting municipal politics today! The families of Tammany Hall would no doubt have a difficult time, in today's world, to dominate the politics of New York using the interesting methods they did in the 19th century. However, the formation of coalitions based on family structure within the community that dominated the local politics of New York has parallels to community power structures today.

Local governments in the 21st century are important, on the one hand as local service providers, and on the other, as the first interface for a community's citizens with
the principles inherent within liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{1} There are many lessons that can be learned from how the issues, demands and needs of local citizens are transformed into local public policy given the relatively sophisticated systems of decision-making that have evolved in Canadian municipalities. Examining Canadian systems of urban government and all the activities that occur around local decision-making processes offers students of local government and politics a potentially rich body of research material. This dissertation added to the body of research considering Canadian municipal government and, in particular, contributed to the knowledge of how coalitions of government and non-government actors influence local decision-making processes and whether urban regimes existed in such settings. The examination of coalitions of government and non-government actors and their influence on the local decision-making processes is accomplished in the dissertation by analyzing two eras in the history of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada – the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

Contemporary studies of Canadian municipal government have traditionally focused on diverse subjects such as how power is manifested at the local level (Sancton, 2011); the effects of a number of reform eras (Artibise, 1982); the consolidations of municipalities in proximity to each other to gain efficiencies (Frisken, 1994); responses to globalization (McBride, 2003; 2005); and urbanization (Leo, 1995) among many other areas of interest. Less contemporary Canadian municipal studies initially considered the structures and functions of municipalities in the country from a structural, institutional, economic and/or constitutional perspective.\textsuperscript{2} More contemporary Canadian urbanists have examined the effects of the adoption of neo-liberal agendas by both the federal and provincial levels of government, alongside the effects of continuing

\textsuperscript{1} This dissertation will use local and municipal interchangeably while recognizing Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith ’s (2013) notion that in fact the term has multiple meanings including “(a) a particular type of government as well as (b) a process by which laws and policies are made within a specific geographic area” (Tindal , Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013: 3). Tindal and colleagues define a municipal government as “a specific legal device created by provincial and territorial governments to allow residents of a specific geographic area the authority to provide services of common interest (3).

globalization and urbanization.\textsuperscript{3} Much of the analysis of Canadian municipal government today has moved away from the more traditional approach toward examining the notion of local governance and the increasing “fuzzy” interactions among the federal, provincial, regional and municipal levels of government – multi-level governance.\textsuperscript{4}

One only has to look at interesting studies of Canadian urban politics by academics such as James Lightbody, Christopher Leo, Patrick J. Smith, Donald Higgins, Kennedy Stewart, Warren Magnusson, Caroline Andrew, Kristin Good\textsuperscript{5} and others to realize that (a) the governance of Canadian local government is far from myopic or homogeneic across the range of municipalities and the country; (b) there are similarities among the experiences of Canadian municipal governments with those in countries where cross-national comparisons have been conducted; (c) there are lessons to be learned from Canadian municipal government cases that have efficacy for other jurisdictions; and finally, (d) the quality of Canadian municipal governance produces public policy outcomes that are of high quality and have comparative significance for other jurisdictions. Studies by these scholars, and others, have informed this dissertation by providing excellent foundational examples of why urban government is interesting to study and why comparative lessons can be learned from Canadian cases. Much of the background knowledge built into this dissertation emanated from their good work and helped form the basis for a consideration of coalitions at the local government level.

Coalitions (“regimes”) of government and non-government actors\textsuperscript{6} play an important role in the nature of policies that are adopted and tremendously influence how,
and which, citizens become involved in local politics today. These coalitions shape policy to meet the needs, demands, and issues of groups of citizens and as such play an influential role in the outcomes produced by local government.

No one in my immediate family was born in a community of more than 9,000 people. I have lived in tiny towns and larger metropolitan cities across Western Canada - growing up in small town Canada (Flin Flon, Manitoba) and having a parent that was involved as Village councillor in Denare Beach, Sk. for 20 years (my mother Wanda is known as “Queen of the Beach”) - I have always had a level of curiosity about how things get done in a Canadian municipality whether the policy is concerning the paving of a street, providing a warming house for the outdoor rink or zoning a lot for a new corner store, etc. How issues get on the agenda, who formulates and decides on what alternative courses of action are preferred, how policy is implemented and evaluated has increasingly been an academic of interest of mine.

Recently, I have developed a strong interest in considering local government in the context of Vancouver, Metro and British Columbia and Canada (especially in a comparative context) specifically. Vancouver, in particular, provides an interesting case with its strong local government ethos, a combination of interesting local and regional issues that face the municipality, and the fast-changing nature of the city throughout its history. Whether the municipal government is considering constructing new bike lanes or whether citizens should be able to keep chickens in their backyards - the range of policies that local government deals with in the city, and the nature of citizen involvement and engagement, is extremely interesting to those concerned with the study of urban government in general and the creation and influence of urban regimes in particular.

7 I am using the terms coalitions and regimes, throughout the dissertation, as subgroups of the larger community. It is recognized that there are many different communities within a city, in this context community is used in a broad sense, for example, including all the various actors, groups, etc. in the DTES. In a couple of cases, most notably involving the development community, the term is used in a more narrow way although not as narrow as when referring to smaller subgroups that form within the community such as regimes or coalitions of actors. Lightbody (2006), suggests that regimes differ from policy communities in a variety of ways including: the breadth of focus, nature of influence, discretion and flexibility, control, focus, and size.
It is this sense of curiosity about the influence of regimes of government and non-government actors on the municipal decision-making process that motivated my interest in the research in this dissertation. It seemed to me that it was unlikely that local government actors and institutions completed the municipal decision-making process in a vacuum without having to be attuned to what is occurring within the community. The thought here is that something more than just structures/institutions, political actors, or ideas define Canadian municipal government decision-making today.\(^8\) Intangibles such as the creation and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on the local public policy processes must be considered in order to get a true picture of how the outputs/decisions of municipal government are generated. Ultimately, this doctoral dissertation considered coalitions of government and non-government actors, urban regimes, alongside the formal, local decision-making structures of municipal government in a modern liberal democratic system such as what is found in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.

The two guiding research questions of the dissertation were as follows:

1. Do coalitions of non-government and government actors influence the decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government? and,

2. Is local decision-making in Vancouver dominated by a single or plurality of urban regimes and is there evidence of, and lessons to be learned from regime activity, and the intergovernmental cooperation in the Vancouver Agreement and post-Expo lands cases?

There has not been a large body of analysis developed with regard to the examination of the presence and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on the decision-making processes of Canadian municipal government. This is despite the notion that these regimes have become increasingly influential as to how outcomes are generated in the decision-making processes of Canadian local government particularly given the effects of several external and internal

\(^8\) The notion that there is an interaction of actors, ideas and institutions is discussed very well in Howlett, Ramesh & Perl (2009) 50.
challenges. It would be beneficial to the understanding of Canadian municipal government that urbanists increase the number of regime studies in Canada, given the intensity of these effects, and focus more broadly and deeply on the realpolitik of municipal governments. One of the goals of this particular dissertation was to contribute to this regime focus by considering not only the structures, actors and ideas of municipal governments but also the creation and influence of the various coalitions that form around local decision-making.

Howlett, Ramesh and Perl's (2009) discussion of the role of structures, actors and ideas is applicable to a consideration of the creation and influence of government and non-government actors on the decision-making processes of Canadian municipal governments. They suggest that, contrary to a purely institutional or a behavioral focus for analyzing public policy, that there is a role for ideas as well. They advocate for a more holistic approach that includes analysis that considers all three aspects of the decision-making process – it is the interaction of structures, actors, and ideas that underpins how policy is created. It is that holistic aspect that is of value to this dissertation as it points to a consideration of all factors in the local decision making and does not limit such analysis to simply structures or actors, but ideas too (p. 52). This suggests something important to this dissertation – decision-making is not necessarily some well-organized, linear process, led by government actors. Instead it encompasses the issues, demands and needs of citizens interacting through the actions of both government and non-government actors that is significant.

One must also take into account other internal and external challenges that may potentially affect the generation of policy outcomes by municipal government in order to get a more complete picture of municipal decision-making - in addition to the influence of coalitions on local government decision making processes. Andrew and Goldsmith (1998), identify some of these intense internal and external challenges that affect how local governments function at the beginning of the 21st century:

Much of this process is the result of external changes over which individual local governments have had little influence: increasing

The three challenges considered in this dissertation included globalization (along with neoliberalism), urbanization and increasing multi-level governance.
economic interdependence; the process of globalization; changing technologies; or the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, for example. Some external change would be the congruence of changes taking place within the nation-state: the privatization of state services; restructuring the local government system; changing intergovernmental relations. Some changes are political, in the partisan sense, as when political control changes in a municipality, while others might be social: widening social segregation in cities; growth in drug related crime, for example. And some will be generated from within local governments themselves, be they processes or delayering, privatization, and contracting out of services; attempts at improving customer care and citizen relationships; or whatever. The changing nature of the modern state and of the society it serves has had inevitable consequences for elected governments. (p. 101)

This dissertation considered three of the more pervasive external and internal challenges - globalization, urbanization, and increasing occurrence of multi-level governance in order to provide a more nuanced view of municipal decision-making and to generate a greater foundation for understanding how coalitions of government or non-government actors are created and influence municipal government. The adoption of neo-liberal principles by municipal governments in Canada, and specifically in British Columbia and Vancouver, was also analyzed in the dissertation as part of the examination of the effects of globalization once again to obtain a more complete picture of the effects of regimes on municipal government.10

“Globalization” in this dissertation was focused on an economic reading of the term.11 As Cohn notes, defining globalization can be complex as “theorists do not define globalization in a consistent manner, and they have differing views regarding both the causes and effects of globalization.”

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10 Increasingly local levels of government have been faced with internal and external pressures such as “senior” levels of government gridlock (especially in the U.S.), hesitancy to provide the necessary resources for the maintenance and development of local infrastructure (for example the Province of British Columbia’s hesitancy to utilize its Carbon Tax to fund local transportation needs) global economic issues, increasing complexity of governance within cities among others. See Smith & Stewart (2006); Andrew & Goldsmith (1998); Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, l (2013) offer interesting perspectives on why cities are important now and will become more important in the future.

11 Recognizing there are many forms of globalization with variable effects including environmental, cultural, social, etc.
Globalization is a process that involves the broadening and deepening of interdependence among societies and states throughout the world. Broadening refers to the geographic extension of linkages to encompass virtually all major societies and states, and deepening refers to an increase in the frequency and intensity of interactions...Thus, globalization affects some states and regions more than others, threatens the state’s autonomy in some respects but does not prevent it from making policy choices, and contributes to fragmentation and conflict as well as unit and cooperation. Although states and societies were highly interdependent during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, globalization is more encompassing today than it was at any time in the past. Advances in technology, communications, and transportation are facilitating the globalization process as never before; the role of MNC’s in generating FDI, trade, and technology is unprecedented; the capitalist economic system is spreading throughout the globe; and international economic organizations are becoming truly universal in membership. (Cohn, 2008, 370)

It is in this context that the effects of globalization on municipal decision-making processes in Canada, B.C. and Vancouver were considered. It was posited here that the decision-making process in both eras of consideration in this dissertation were affected by forces of globalization including pressures created by the adoption of neo-liberal agendas by governments at all levels.

The second challenge to municipal decision-making considered herein is rooted in the effects of urbanization. The United Nations’ Habitat program defines urbanization as a process: “characterized not only by demographic shifts from rural to urban areas, or by the growth of urban populations, but also by changes in various aspects of society:

- in the employment sector, from agriculture activities to mass production and service industries
- in societal values and modes of governance
- in the configuration and functionality of human settlements
- in the spatial scale, density and activities of places
- in the composition of social, cultural and ethnic groups and the extension of democratic rights, particularly women’s empowerment

(UN Habitat 2011, np).

The UN definition of urbanization recognizes the variable nature of urbanization around the world suggesting that “it [urbanization] takes different forms and its incidence is not uniform” and recognizing that “the experiences of diverse countries around the
world exhibit some remarkable similarities, as well as distinct differences” (UN-Habitat, 2011, 4).

The challenge of urbanization was considered, for the purposes of this dissertation, as an effect on municipalities in Canada, British Columbia, and Vancouver and helped to better explain how regimes are created and influence the decision-making processes at the local government level.

Thirdly, the dissertation considered the effects of increased inter-governmental interactions, or multi-level governance, on the local decision-making processes in Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver. For several reasons, the frequency of governments at various levels working together in non-traditional ways has increased and a greater amount of entanglement among federal, provincial and municipal governments is evident. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has devised a “multi-level governance framework” that the organization has “used in several areas of work related to multi-level governance including on cities and climate change, regulatory governance, sub-national finance and water governance” (OECD, nd.). The OECD divides this framework in two parts:

The “vertical” dimension refers to the linkages between higher and lower levels of government, including their institutional, financial, and informational aspects. Local capacity building and incentives for effectiveness of sub-national levels of government are crucial issues for improving the quality and coherence of public policy.

The "horizontal" dimension refers to co-operation arrangements between regions or between municipalities. These agreements are increasingly common as a means by which to improve the effectiveness of local public service delivery and implementation of development strategies.

(OECD)

This dissertation discussed both dimensions of multi-level governance in the context of how the governments of Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver interact, particularly in the two cases under consideration, the development of the post-Expo '86
Lands and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement\textsuperscript{12}. Of particular importance to this dissertation – is increasing instances of multi-level governance that has implications for local decision-making processes in Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver and, by extension, consequences for the creation and influence of regimes in the generation of municipal government outputs.

One of the overarching goals of this dissertation was to shed light on the interesting world of municipal government, not only in Canada, but on a more localized level in British Columbia and Vancouver. There is a rich tradition of local government within the province and in the city, which provided an interesting backdrop to the analysis included within this work. A better understanding of the dynamics of local decision-making was achieved by examining the creation and influence of government and non-government actors in the two eras under consideration in the dissertation – the development of the post-Expo '86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement\textsuperscript{13} alongside the challenges of globalization, urbanization and increasing multi-level governance.

This section has established a “road map” for consideration of the coalitions of government and non-government actors and their influence on Canadian municipal governments and introduced the objectives of the research. The next section will provide a brief summary of each section and chapter including a description of the various sections and chapters that comprise the research in support of the overall objectives of the dissertation.

\textsuperscript{12} The focus of the dissertation involves the time period in the run-up to Expo '86 to the period of time following, approximately 1980-1990; the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is considered in the period approximately 1995-2000.

\textsuperscript{13} As part of the discussion of the Vancouver Agreement the evolution of the City of Vancouver’s Four Pillar Strategy will also be undertaken.
1.1. Thesis Outline

This section summarizes the content of the chapters within this dissertation following this introduction including the Literature Review/Theory; Context; Methodology; Cases; Findings and Analysis; and Conclusion.

1.1.1. Literature Review/Theory

The literature review begins by providing a theoretical foundation for the dissertation including the canonical research and critiques underpinning Community Power, the Elitist vs Pluralist debate, Urban Regime Theory, and Contemporary Community Power Analysis. This history of the evolution of community power theory is not intended to infer any linearity in its development, instead, it is intended to assist in understanding how power manifests itself in the decision-making processes in the city. The purpose of providing this foundation is to help develop a theoretical framework for considering whether urban regimes exist, and if so, how urban regimes influence local decision-making in Vancouver.

1.1.2. Context

This section provides an historical foundation that considers the municipal government in Vancouver, British Columbia and Canada. This history is then compared alongside the history of municipal governments in Britain and the United States. The goal of this information is to provide:

a. An orienting analysis of the evolution of municipal government in Vancouver, British Columbia and Canada in order to better understand how local government functions within the local, provincial and national cases. This is important to an understanding of the relationship among government and non-government actors and the roles in the local decision-making process.

b. The historical background provided concerns the evolution of American and British municipal government and is intended to propose a comparative explanation, with a focus on “constitutional nuances” for the differences in how local governance is achieved in relation to the Canadian cases.
The effects of internal and external challenges such as globalization, urbanization, the , and the increasing instances of multi-level governance are considered in this section to assist in understanding whether and how coalitions of government and non-government actors form and influence municipal government, in Vancouver and other jurisdictions.

1.1.3. **Methodology**

In this chapter the methodological framework of this dissertation is presented including the theory underpinning the research effort, case study methodology and justification of the case selection. A discussion of the comparative method is included, along with consideration of the efficacy of its use when considering urban cases in general and urban cases in Canada and British Columbia specifically. The specific steps involved in the research process are then itemized and the chapter concludes by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology utilized in this dissertation.

1.1.4. **Cases**

Two cases in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada were analyzed in the context of the dissertation. The municipal government decision-making processes involved in the urban development of the former Expo '86 Lands in central Vancouver (see map) and those involved in the creation of the Vancouver Agreement and 4 Pillars Strategy are examined. Background was provided to anchor the analysis which will focus on the formation and influence of government and non-government actors on the municipal government decision-making processes that occurred in each of the selected cases. The other aspect of the cases is that, similar to Stone’s Atlanta’s studies, historically different eras/decisions form the basis for the case comparisons.

1.1.5. **Findings and Analysis**

This chapter considers the information gleaned from the dissertation’s case study research to gain a better understanding as to whether and how coalitions of government and non-government actors might form and influence the municipal government
decision-making processes and the enduring cross-temporal aspects of urban regime theory in Vancouver.

1.1.6. Conclusion

The concluding chapter responds to the initial introductory arguments and central research questions that framed this dissertation concerning the creation and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on the decision-making process during two eras in Vancouver, B.C. The conclusion also considers suggestions for further research opportunities in the context of urban regime theory in Vancouver, British Columbia and other Canadian municipalities in general.
2. Literature/Theoretical Review

2.1. Introduction

The measure of a man is what he does with power.
(Plato)

This chapter considers the literature and theory that has developed to describe the locus and use of power in communities. Studying the intricacies of how urban populations are governed and the power structures of local communities are analytical streams that have flourished throughout the mid-20th and early 21st centuries. A pivotal debate erupted during this period among those that viewed the power structures of municipalities as emanating from coalitions of local elites vs those that viewed the genesis of power in municipalities as being more pluralistic and multi-dimensional in nature. This section will consider these various debates that developed in the literature during this period surrounding power and local government. The goal of this analysis is to first build a foundation for examining the creation and influence of government and non-government actors on the decision-making process of municipalities and then use that knowledge to support the analysis of the development of the post-Expo '86 and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

This discussion of the various models of community power is not intended to suggest any sort of linearity in the evolution of theory as aspects of each of the theory can be found in the others. For example, Davies (2002) in his consideration of regime theory discusses how Stone’s notion of “pre-emptive power” has its roots in Hunter:

Drawing on Hunter (1953), Stone (1988) defines pre-emptive power as a “capacity to occupy, hold, and make use of a strategic position” (p. 83). Pre-emptive power derives from systemic power in the sense that the state-market division identified in regime theory tends to endow business, rather than other groups, with the capacity for pre-emption, or the capacity to occupy a strategic position. Systemic power creates the
conditions in which pre-emption occurs, but pre-emption itself is dependent upon the exercise of those capacities. It is, therefore, an “intentional and active” form of power. (Stoker 1995, p. 64)

These overlapping concepts, systemic and pre-emptive power, are the cornerstones of regime theory.

Contemporary community power studies in the United States were initiated by the analysis of local governance epitomized by the work of Lynd & Lynd (1937); Floyd Hunter (1953); C. Wright Mills (1956) and others in the mid-20th century. The model developed by Hunter et al. suggested there existed within communities a stratification of power that is dominated by an elite group. This was followed, also in the United States, by a pluralist “challenge” to the elite model of community power structures led by Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, Raymond Wolfinger and others. The pluralist model suggested that power emanates from multiple centres of power and was not confined to an elite group of community actors. The pluralist model developed by Dahl et al. dominated much of the community power literature throughout the mid-20th century (Dahl, 1957; 1961; 1982; Polsby, 1960; 1963; Wolfinger, 1960).

Molotch’s (1976) article, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place” is the seminal work concerning the development of the growth machine model in the 1970’s. Molotch argues that the “very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine” and that it is for that reason groups within the community are motivated to build consensus and are constrained in their efforts. At the core of the growth machine assertion is that nothing predominates over growth in the community and that it is in everyone’s collective interest, elites and non-elites alike, to cooperate (p. 310).

The theoretical work surrounding the pluralist model and that informed the growth machine model eventually was followed by substantial American studies involving “urban regime” analysis initiated by Elkin and Stone and others at the end of the 20th century that studied American cities such as Atlanta and Dallas14 (Elkin, 1985; 1987; Stone, 1989). Davies notes the focus of Elkin’s work was: concerned with the way structural

14 Stone – Atlanta; Elkin –Dallas.
pressures produced a collaborative imperative among governmental and non-
governmental actors, and with his normative project, the commercial republic” (Davies,
2002a, p.2). Hunter on the other hand, was concerned with “the detailed political
processes to which these structural pressures gave rise. His study of regime politics in
Atlanta is about the way political power is realized in city life. He is also concerned
about inequality” (Davies, 2002a, p.2). Recently, several studies have considered the
presence and influence of regimes in American, British and other settings (see Harding,
1994, 1997, 1999; Ward, 1996; Sites, 1997; Stoker, 2011; Di Gaetano & Klemanski,
1993; Di Gaetano & Lawless, 1999; Dowding et al., 1999; Keating, 1991; Prestwich,
1990), mostly using a comparative perspective. For example, Harding considered the
changes to local governance in Britain post-Thatcher and advocated for cross-national
urban regime comparisons; Ward used urban regime theory to examine the shift from
local government to governance in Britain; Sites analyzed the limits of regime theory
over the Dinkins, Koch and Guiliani; Di Gaetano & Klemanski compared Birmingham,
England and Detroit, Michigan using urban regime theory; Di Gaetano & Lawless
compared industrial decay in Detroit, Michigan, Birmingham, England & Sheffield,
England; Dowding used urban regime theory to examine local government in England;
Keating compared regimes in Britain, the United States, and France; and Prestwich used
regime theory to examine regional and urban policy in Britain.

The British studies predominantly discussed the reforms brought forward by
successive central governments post-Margaret Thatcher that essentially downloaded
tremendous responsibilities to local authorities and dramatically changed the relationship
among the national government, private-public authorities, and local government. Only
recently has this literature expanded to include American, British, European and other
municipal cases with a focus on regimes (e.g. Garber & Imbroscio, 1996; Harding, 1997,

Throughout the 20th and early 21st century a large body of theory has been
developed regarding community power whether it comes from the elitist, pluralist, growth
machine or urban regime perspectives. The literature on community power, the elitist vs
pluralist debate, the development of the use of growth machine analysis, the urban
regime approach and contemporary community power analysis are all areas of research
that are considered in depth in following sections of this dissertation in order to gain a
better understanding of municipal government in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada and elsewhere. The central characteristics and main proponents of each model are presented and are then followed by a brief critique outlining the weaknesses of the model. These analyses are then followed by a more general word about the current state of community power theory and suggest how the models relate to the dissertation including the examination of the coalitions of government and non-government actors that are created and influence decision-making processes of municipal governments.

2.2. Elite Model

There is elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost ghostly quality. It seems to be all around us, yet this is “sensed” with some sixth means of reception rather than with the five ordinary senses. We “know” what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in trying to define it. We can “tell” whether one person or group is more powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract as time yet as real as a firing squad. (Kaufman & Jones 1954, p. 205)

The genesis of community power studies can be found in the work of Robert and Helen Lynd (1937) analyzing Muncie, Indiana; followed in 1953 by the study of elites in Atlanta using reputational analysis by Floyd Hunter and C. Wright Mills’ theorizing of urban and national power structures in America. At core of these studies was the argument that there exists in communities a fairly defined and consistent group of elites that control the economic, social and political levers of power in a community. Domhoff (2007) notes that Hunter and Mills differed in that Hunter suggested this elite was business- based while Mills concluded that the elite, in addition to business interests, included members from government and the military:

They simply concluded that an elite few -- business elites for Hunter, or a combination of corporate, government, and military elites for Mills - dominate local and national governments in the United States in a very direct way, and that politics and politicians are secondary because they more or less have to do the bidding of the powerful elites. (p. 1)
Further, Domhoff (2007) suggests that Mills differs from Hunter in the methodology used to determine the power elite in the community in that “Mills hadn’t studied any decisions” (p. 13).

Hunter points to the role of those at the top of a stratified society when he suggests that:

It has been evident to the writer for some years that policies on vital matters affecting community life seems to appear suddenly. They are acted upon; but with no precise knowledge on the part of the majority of citizens as to how these policies originated or by whom they are really sponsored. Much is done, but much is left undone. Some of the things done appear to be manipulated to the advantage of relatively few. (Hunter, 1953, p. 1)

As mentioned, the elite model of power within local communities can be located in the works of Lynd & Lynd (1937); *Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts* ; Floyd Hunter (1953) *Community Power Structure* and by C. Wright Mills (1956) *The Power Elite*. These works sought to identify the locus of power within communities and to analyze how power is used across a wide range of local issues in “Middletown" and Atlanta. The efforts of those favouring the elite model “documented close but informal links between Atlanta’s governmental and economic sectors and suggested that this allegiance exerted control over policy making” (Good, 2009, p. 19).

Prior to the studies by Hunter et al. about the nature of community it was assumed that the people who made and influenced decisions at the local level were:

those persons occupying important offices - elected political officials, higher civil servants, business executives, officials of voluntary associations, heads of religious groups, leaders of labour unions and others – were assumed to be those making key decisions affecting directly or indirectly the lives of most other community residents. (Bonjean & Olson 1970, p. 203)

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15 Middletown was a pseudonym used by Lynd & Lynd for Muncie, Indiana.
16 Regional City was a pseudonym used by Hunter for Atlanta, Georgia.
Presthus in his 1964 study, *Men at the Top: A Study in Community Power*, described how the elite group is created that views them as “specialized and disproportionately powerful” when compared to those not in positions of community power:

The more highly differentiated structure of modern society results in elites, which tend to become separated from the members of their various groups both by their interest in maintaining themselves in power and by the demands of technology and strategy which require secrecy, dispatch, flexibility, and skills generally not characteristic of mass behavior. Although the opposite is frequently implied, elitism is not limited to arbitrary forms of government or politically underdeveloped societies, but is more likely to occur under such conditions. As Pareto said, “every people is governed by an elite.” The crucial matter is the openness of the elite, the ends to which its power are devoted, the means used to achieve them, and the methods available to the mass for changing and controlling it. In this study, we shall conceptualize elites as minorities of specialized leaders who enjoy disproportionate amounts of power in community affairs. (Presthus 1964, p. 11; Pareto 1935, p. 246)

The Weberian view of power dominates community power research – in this view “power is the probability that a person or group can realize their will against opposition” (Perucci & Pilisuk, 1970, p. 1041). This view causes the focus of power to be on the individual elites within the community and assumes that “once you identify persons with reputations for power, or persons with important positions in the community, you are automatically dealing with the most salient community issues” (Perucci et al., p. 1042).

Hunter defined power as “a word that will be used to describe the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things” (Hunter, 1953, 3). He categorized power into three categories including: “historical reference; the second, motivation and other psychological concepts; and the third, values, moral and ethical considerations” (Hunter, 1953, 3). Hunter asserted there were four postulates on power structure:

1. Power involves relationships between individuals and groups, both controlled and controlling.
2. Power is structured socially, in the United States, into a dual relationship between governmental and economic authorities on national, state, and local levels.
3. Power is a relatively constant factor in social relationships with policies as variables.

4. Power of the individual must be structured into associational, clique or institutional patterns to be effective. (Hunter, 1953, p. 5)

Further, Hunter suggested that there are 3 hypotheses on power structure:

1. Power is exercised as a necessary function in social relationships
2. The exercise of power is limited and directed by the formulation and extension of social policy within a framework of a socially sanctioned authority.
3. In a given power unit (organization) a small number of individuals will be found formulating and extending policy than those exercising. (Hunter, 1953, p.5)

An important contribution of Hunter and the Lynd’s was the notion of the horizontal nature of the involvement of very disparate types of elite groups in the community power structure. These groups may be involved “across several decisional areas” and may be “decisive in economic, political, and social contexts” including “health, education, housing, urban redevelopment, tax policy, and recreation” (Presthus 1964, 26). Elite theory supports the notion that there is a good degree of alignment between the political and economic leadership within the community facilitating elite influence “in several discrete and highly technical areas (Presthus 1964, p.26).

In Atlanta, Hunter “allegedly found a monolithic power structure consisting of about forty individuals, most of whom were wealthy and important in business” who “informally determined policy, which in turn was carried out by lower level leaders” (Bonjean & Olson 1970, p.207). Hunter used a variety of techniques including the “reputational approach” to determine who the actors in the power structure were.

The reputational approach is essentially a sociometric technique applied to a specific segment of the community. Usually it involves requesting a group of about fifteen “knowledgeables” (also known as “experts,” “raters,” “informants,” or “judges”), representatives of the various institutional sectors in the community, to identify local leaders. These informants are asked either to select and rank, from fairly long lines of active citizens, the names of the top influential, or to give listings of community “influentials.” (Abu-Laban, 1963, p.36)
Initially, these men of power were “located by finding persons in prominent positions in four groups that may be assumed to have power connections. These groups were identified with business, government, civic associations and “society” activities. From the recognized, or nominal, leaders of the groups mentioned, lists of persons presumed to have power in community affairs were obtained” (Hunter, 1953, p.11).

The methodology used in Hunter’s study, in particular, included identifying men of power based on “reputation” in the community that were in prominent positions in “business, government, civic associations and ‘society’ activities” (Hunter, p.11). The reputational method involved first using lists of leaders from business, government, civic associations and society, then using ‘judges’ to determine “leadership rank” and finally a “process of self-selection” to come up with forty persons in the top levels of power in Regional City (Hunter, p.11). These men were then identified as a "differentiated group" that, as a result of their work or leisure activities, were “set apart physically from other members of the community” (Hunter, p.13). The initial consideration of these men also involved describing the actual physical space they occupied at work, play and home leading to Hunter’s rather pedestrian suggestion that “the physical surroundings reflect(ed) social values and a social structuring of community life” (Hunter, p.15). Hunter argues further for a connection between physical space and community power:

The physical structures are a part of the social structure in that they help to regularize and routinize the behavior patterns of the men around which physical features are built. There is, therefore, an interaction between the physical characteristics of the community and the patterned actions of men. The physical structures, once created, act as passive barriers or channels for the dynamic actions of men. (Hunter, 1953, p.24)

Hunter suggests that these “persons of dominance, prestige and influence” exercise their power as “decision-makers for the total community” somewhat ominously through “persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary, by force” (Hunter, p.24).

Presthus defines elitism as a “system in which disproportionate amounts of power in community affairs rests in the hands of a minority” (Presthus, 1964, p.10/11). These “indispensable elites” are a “specialized group of leaders” that has risen as a by-product of mass democracy (Carr, 1956, p.77). The stratification of modern society
often results in groups being differentiated "by their interest in maintaining themselves in power and by the demands of technology and strategy which require secrecy, dispatch, flexibility, and skills generally not characteristic of mass behavior" (Presthus, 1964, p.11). In this light, these groups (usually dominated by men) "who initiate, direct, and resolve that level of decision-making which has major bearing upon the body politic (Perucci & Pilisuk, 1970, p.1040). The common citizen is left to "efforts exercised through a few relatively powerless voluntary associations" (Perucci et al., 1970, p.1040; Hunter, 1953).

Elite groups use a variety of strategies to influence government including “apply(ing) pressure in an attempt to shape proposed actions to their own design;” bargain and marshal their “resources to do battle on those issues that impinge upon [their] interests” and use a “myriad of tactics in such struggles, including exchange, in which one group supports another on one issue, in return for which it receives support on another issue of vital importance to itself” (Presthus, 1964, p.12).

Elitism connotes domination of the decisional process by a single group or a few men, limited rank-and-file access, little or no opposition, and a failure on the part of most of the adult community to use their political resources to influence important decisions. It refers to the tendency of power, defined as the chances of a group to achieve its ends despite opposition, to rest in very few hands. (Presthus, 1964, p.25).

Walton (1976, p.293/294) asserts that the value of Hunter’s research was fivefold:

a. Hunter coined the term “power structure” and furthered the notion that larger generalizations could be made to other American communities from the observations made about the City of Atlanta

b. Hunter completed the study of Atlanta as one of a small group of social scientists that sought “the explanation of routine events in larger institutional arrangements.” (Walton, p.293)

c. Hunter developed a “systematic, multi-stage method for tracing the structure of influence, the “reputational method,” which examined elite groups within the community not only at “face value reputations” but also considered “behaviorally defined …cliques and crowds” and how they contributed to local policymaking.

d. Hunter’s work also was important for its “recognition and explicit treatment of the systemic nature of power” that included the presence and role of many different hierarchies of power structures within the local community. The power structures of local communities prior to
Hunter were seen to be one-dimensional in nature and did not consider other the presence many important actors that contributed to the creation of local policy.

e. Hunter’s work was also important as it foresaw the changing nature of minorities to the power structures inherent in the local community. He suggested that the state’s use of “traditional methods of suppression and coercion [were] failing” in the relationship between majority and minority populations within the community. It is notable that Hunter’s thoughts on the relationship between majority and minority populations preceded the major events of the civil rights movement and the deaths of Martin Luther King and John F. Kennedy.

(Walton 1976, pps. 293/294)

Hunter’s study at its base was valuable to American urban political politics as its “empirical and methodological rigour” (Good, 2009, p.19) was “scientific evidence that local representative democracy in the US was just a smokescreen for dominant economic interests” (Harding, 1994, p.39).

Of significance to pluralists is the notion that there is a role for citizens and groups not included in the elite strata although their involvement in the decision-making processes of the community is constrained - as noted by Kaufman & Jones:

The leadership makes the policy decisions; it depends on a substructure to execute those decisions. The composition of the substructure is not analyzed in any detail, but it seems to comprise the professions, the governmental and business bureaucracies, the political organizations, the churches, and the lesser officers of the social and other organizations and institutions of Regional City. These people are depicted as the executors rather than the initiators of policy; they function as the mechanism by which the policy decisions of the leadership group are translated into action, the machinery that turns the rudder whenever the steering wheel is turned by the real leaders. (Kaufman & Jones, 1954, p.206)

Sancton posits that the “most comprehensive” Canadian community power study was conducted by David M. Rayside (1991) and focused on Alexandria, Ontario. This study focused on how governmental and “corporate institutions outside Alexandria” occupied positions of community power so that they “were increasingly making the most important decisions for the community” (Sancton, 2011, pp.172/173). Rayside suggests a consistency between the constitution of the power structures within Alexandria and those discussed in elite theory: “In late twentieth-century Alexandria, influence over community affairs in some ways still seems concentrated in a small and relatively
cohesive circle of associates, in ways that parallel the findings of much of the community power literature” (Sancton, 2011, pp.172/173; Rayside, 1991).

The Elite model has efficacy to this dissertation as there is recognition of the role of groups within the community power structure; the use of a variety of strategies to influence government; the bargaining and marshalling of resources; and the use of a variety of tactics to shape actions including local decision-making. This idea is consistent with the assertion within the dissertation that there undoubtedly were actors, or groups of actors, in the Vancouver community, that held positions of leadership whether considering the Vancouver Agreement of the Expo ’86 case. It is the nature of that leadership where the dissertation diverges from Hunter, an issue, among others discussed in the Findings and Analysis section.

Hunter’s explanation of events in larger institutional arrangements also has efficacy for the analysis in this dissertation as it is important to take a more holistic view when considering local decision-making processes at the local level. Hunter’s notion of the role of cliques and crowds is significant to the dissertation as it is consistent with the argument that coalitions of government and non-government actors influence municipal government. Finally, Hunter’s assertion of the presence and role of many power structures points to the plurality of issues, demands and needs that are play when local government makes decisions and creates policy outcomes such as involved in the development of the former Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

2.3. Elite Model Critique

The central flaw in the elite community power discourse was the initial assumption “that there is a small group running the city [that] is not demonstrated but presupposed” (Kaufman, 1954, p.207). To Kaufman, Hunter “begins his structure at the mezzanine without showing us a lobby or a foundation” which makes the work “intriguingly description” that “must be regarded as far from conclusive because it rests…on a faulty base (Kaufman, 1954, pp.207/208).

Herbert expressed issues with how both Weber and Hunter view power:
Both define power in terms that tend to force the investigator to focus on the most powerful, to overlook the power of the less powerful, to fail to differentiate the areas or scopes of power, to neglect the ongoing dynamics of power relations – the give and take involved. Instead the investigator is forced to focus on who has made what successful power decisions. Power is seen as a relationship in which the actor exercising power is either able to get his way, in which case he has power, or unable to get his way, in which case he has no power.

(Danzger, 1964, p.714)

Dahl (and others including Polsby & Wolfinger) later argued that political power within local government was not as "concentrated" as Hunter had suggested (Good, 2009, p.19). Specifically, Dahl criticizes the ruling elite model of local governance in six ways including:

1. The question of who actually comprised the elite group;
2. The notion that the model does not quantify the difference between situations where an elite emerges to consciously seek power and does so amidst an interested citizenry and those where an elite necessarily emerges to form public policy as the masses are essentially disinterested;
3. Ruling elite systems theory does not recognize the situation wherein an elite group may appear to be controlling policymaking while in reality it is a small inner core of that elite that is identifying preferences and designing policy;
4. The ruling elite model does not include recognition of how many times that group must make decisions (as Dahl writes “When it prevails in 7 cases out of 10? 8 out of 10? 9 out of 10? Or what?) In order to comprise a ruling elite;
5. The obvious notion that it is a given that a ruling elite exists in both liberal democratic and totalitarian regimes but the theory does not delineate these;
6. Dahl finally argues that “even in a society like (ours) a ruling elite might be so influential over ideas, attitudes, and opinions that a kind of false consensus will exist – not the phony consensus of the a terroristic totalitarian dictatorship but the manipulated and superficially imposed adherence to the norms and goals of the elite by a broad sections of a community.

(Dahl, 1957, pp.407/408)

Wolfinger, in his critique of the elitist model, points to methodological issues with the "reputational approach" when he suggested that Hunter’s method of identifying the
elite of “Regional City” was at best unreliable and limited as an adequate measure of the location and nature of elite power in local government:

The basic assumption underlying this method is that reputations for influence are an index of the distribution of influence. The researcher asks respondents either to rank names on a list or to name individuals who would be most influential in securing the adoption of a project, or both. He assigns power to the leader-nominees according to the number of times they are named by respondents; the highest-ranking nominees are described as the community’s ‘power structure.’ This technique for describing a local political system is referred to below as the reputational or power-attribute method…

…the reputational technique is little more than a methodologically elaborate variant of the older procedure of asking insiders--city hall reporters, politicians, and so on--for a quick rundown on the local big shots in order to identify potentially useful interviewees.  
(Wolfinger, 1960, pp. 636-637)

Wolfinger (1960) further argued that the approach was “merely a systematic first step in studying a city’s political system rather than a comprehensive technique for discovering the distribution of power” (p. 637). In this view the ranking of influential citizens into some sort of “static” monolith was not conducive to the good analysis of the “dynamic process” of community power and represented a “mismatch of method and subject matter” (p. 644).

Wolfinger’s colleague Nelson Polsby supported the notion that it was the methodological problems with the reputational approach that made it questionable as an analytical tool - “Clearly, all of the principal actors in specified community decisions will have to be on the lists. It has been pointed out many times that such a list, even if it is exhaustive and accurate, does not tell us all we need to know in order to make a description of the way in which community decisions get made” (Polsby, 1963, p.839).

Polsby suggests, in opposition to the elite view, that “nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community” and rejects the stratification thesis that some groups necessarily dominate a community” (Polsby, 1963, p.113). Polsby also argues that pluralism “runs directly counter to stratification theory’s presumption that power distributions are a more or less permanent aspect of social structure” (Polsby, p.115). Instead, pluralists see power as “tied to issues” that may be “fleeting or persistent” which
could lead to “coalitions among interested groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent” (Polsby, p.115).

Further, Polsby draws a line between how the elite and plural models differ with how they treat power:

The final contrast that I want to make between the pluralist and stratification methods has to do with their differing conceptions of what is meant by “power.” I have already noted that stratification theorists emphasize the cataloguing of power bases, meaning the resources available to actors for the exercise of power. Pluralists, on the other hand, concentrate on power exercise itself. This leads to two subsidiary discoveries. First, there are a great many different kinds of resources which can be turned to use in the process of community decision-making – many more resources, in fact, than stratification theorists customarily take account of.

The second product of the pluralist emphasis on power exercise is the discovery that resources are employed only with variations in degree of skill. The elaboration of the ways in which resources are employed enables the pluralist researcher to pay attention to what practical politicians customarily see as the heart of their own craft: the processes of bargaining, negotiation, salesmanship and brokerage, and of leadership in mobilizing resources of all kinds.

(Polsby, 1960, pp.482/483).

Danzger also recognized three weaknesses of Hunter’s approach:

1. Since Hunter’s technique is “reputational, “his data are not power acts, but opinions – albeit of “informed” people – on who has power.

2. Assessments of the power structure by “informed” informants may actually be incorrect. This may be a result of (a) their unfamiliarity with the researcher’s use and meaning of the word “power,” or, (b) more important, their perception of the power structure may be inaccurate or distorted. A sizable body of data lends credence this claim.

3. The Hunter approach to power is far too general in its implication. (a) If fails to differentiate areas over which various members of the “elite” wield power, apparently assuming that power is wielded in all areas by the same elite; (b) it tends to imply that the distribution of power is stable over time, neglecting the possibility that power may be redistributed, as under a change in political administration.

(Panzger 1964, p.708).

Finally, Kaufman & Jones provide a clear indictment of community power analysis:
He (Hunter) has not given us a study of the power structure of Regional City at all. Rather, he has set forth a portrait of one of the groups having some power over some things at some times. The place of this group in the interplay of power groups in Regional City is never made clear, and what from some indications may be a pluralist society emerges under Hunter's hands as a sternly monolithic organization. At best, the study is incomplete; at worst, it may be invalid.

(Kaufman & Jones, 1954, p.209)

Further research suggests that Hunter incorrectly over-reached in the suggestion that an elite, based upon “reputation,” controlled community decision-making as a static entity to the exclusion of other citizens. As a nod to the pluralists and other theorists to come, however, he suggested in the conclusion of Community Power Structure that the “participation by the bottom structure of power” should be encouraged to “contribute much to the discussion of community policy on issues.” Hunter tempered this argument, however, by suggesting that he was “not naïve enough” to suggest that this input would include “Negro citizens, labor, women and others” (Hunter, 1953, p.259).

2.4. Pluralist Model

Robert Dahl’s (1961) study of New Haven, Connecticut, contributed to the pluralist approach to community power using decision analysis. Dahl et al. suggested that power in a community is not concentrated within an elite group -but is more diffused among all types of malleable groups that through cajoling, bargaining, compromising, negotiating claim space within the community power structure in an ever-changing dynamic. This shifting elite pattern is premised on the finding that different elites predominate depending on the policy area in play.

If we ask, ‘Who governs?’ the answer is not the mass nor its leaders but both together; the leaders cater to mass tastes and in return use the strength provided by the loyalty and obedience of the masses to weaken and perhaps even annihilate all opposition to their rule.

(Dahl, 1961, p.7)

The genesis of the pluralist view of local government can be found in Robert Dahl’s studies of the City of New Haven in the 1950s culminating in his work, *Who Governs?* (1961), which opposed the elite theories of community decision-making and power developed by Hunter et al. Dahl argued the development of local government in
New Haven had shifted from “an oligarchy to pluralism” resulting from a variety of changes in the “social characteristics of elected officials...since 1784 (Dahl, 1961, p.12). Dahl was not suggesting that the shift in the distribution of local political power was egalitarian in any way but that the local political system once “dominated by one set of cohesive set of leaders” had evolved into one dominated by “many different sets of leaders, each having access to a different combination of political resources” (Dahl, p.86). He theorized that the equalizing force among those in possession of resources was the ability for all residents of New Haven to participate in the political system, usually facilitated through political parties. He viewed the access to the levers of power by citizens as “easily penetrated” as, in theory, the political system “embodies many of the most widely shared values and goals of the society” (Dahl, p.91).

Presthus (1964) defines pluralism as a "sociopolitical system in which the power of the state is shared with a large number of private groups, interest organizations, and individuals represented by such organizations" (pp.10/11):

Using many paths of access, they apply pressure in an attempt to shape proposed actions to their own design. Obviously, no group succeeds in achieving its preferences all the time, nor are all groups equally concerned with all issues. Instead, each bargains and marshals its resources to do battle on those issues that impinge upon its own interests. A myriad of tactics is used in such struggles, including exchange, in which one group supports another on one issue, in return for which it receives support on another issues of vital importance to itself. (Presthus, 1964, p.12)

Further, Presthus argues that the concept of pluralism is not exactly a contemporary notion and points to the pluralistic concept of community power as being:

inspired by the ancient fear of government, which results from impersonal, arbitrary rule, and by the reluctant conclusion that power corrupts in geometric progression as it grows. The possibility of curbing government’s excessive demands by fragmenting its power was recognized as early as the Greek city states. Aristotle, for example, believed that revolutions were caused by narrowing too much the circle of government; in effect, they followed when power and its prerequisites were limited to a single circle. He noted, too, that stability, the aim of every form of government, requires balance among its various parts  
It is the combination of the influence of both the “apolitical” and “non-political” strata, that embody these values and goals that is responsible for governance of the community (Dahl, p.92). Dahl finds that there is not political homogeneity within the power structure of local government despite this shared influence, instead, (at least in New Haven) there was “not a closed group...its ‘members’ are far from united in their orientations and strategies” (Dahl, p.92). The “independence, penetrability, and heterogeneity” of the government and non-governmental actors in New Haven “all but guarantee that any dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the political stratum” (Dahl, p.93).

Presthus simplifies the central characteristics of pluralism into the following:

1. That competing centers and bases of power and influence exist within a political community;
2. The opportunity for individual and organizational access into the political system;
3. That individuals actively participate in and make their will felt through organizations of many kinds;
4. That elections are a viable instrument of mass participation in political decisions, including those on specific issues;
5. That a covenant exists on what may be called the democratic creed.
   (Presthus, 1964, pp.22/23)

Dahl valued the politician’s ability to straddle these inherent social, economic, and political resource inequities and broker the forces of power within the community. Community power is not limited to those individuals that put themselves up as candidates to run in elections as political actors. For instance, candidates for election rely on several different members of the “subculture of the political stratum” to assist in choosing “a course of action that will either reinforce the voting tendency of categories predisposed of him or his party, or weaken the voting tendency of categories predisposed to vote against him or his party” (Dahl, pp.93/94).

To Dahl, the notion of power revolves around “something like this: A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, pp.201/202). Leadership, in the pluralist view, is characterized by:
1. Relatively wide sharing of powers among leaders specialized tone or to a few issue-areas, calling upon many different resources and techniques for applying resources to influencing outcomes

2. Constraints upon decision-making applied by non-elites and by elites themselves. Conditions of all kinds imposed by impersonal outside forces

3. Uncertainty about the distributions of payoffs of political actions.  
   (Polsby, 1963, p.136)

The development of the pluralist model significantly motivated a large scale body of literature interested in re-defining how power is manifested within communities. The efforts of Dahl and other pluralist theorists “improve(ed) the quality of studies of political power and stimulating a small flood of research reports which claim to have found little evidence to support the power elite model and a considerable body of evidence to support the pluralist model” (Newton, 1969, p.209). In addition, as a result of the work of pluralists there is widespread acceptance as “a close approximation to the way in which power is structured and decisions taken not only in American national and local political systems but also in the political systems of most industrialized societies in the West” (Newton, p.209).

In Canada, the notion of pluralism is usually not discussed in the literature today in terms of community power but is usually considered in the context of the country’s formal adoption of multiculturalism and acceptance of diversity as a normative goal for the society. Canada constitutionalized multiculturalism in Section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982).

An example of the analysis of Canadian pluralism can be found in Kymlicka (2004) who notes that there is not one, but three approaches, dependent on the type of diversity under consideration, to the “Canadian model” of pluralism:

1. multicultiural citizenship to accommodate ethnic communities formed by immigration;
2. bilingual federalism to accommodate the major substate nation-al(ist) group in Quebec;
3. self-government rights and treaty relationships to accommodate indigenous peoples.

(p.836)

Of concern to this dissertation, there have been several Canadian community power studies such as Kaplan’s study of Metro Toronto (1982); Leo’s (1995) study of Edmonton; and Cobban’s (2003) analysis of London, Ontario, etc. These studies tend to look at the relationship among actors, usually couched in terms of development vs non-development actors and their relationships with local government and all were consistent with the pluralist approach.

In considering the pluralist approach with regard to the two cases under consideration in this dissertation it is clear that in both instances various coalitions of actors, both in and outside of government were active and working to meet their issues, demands and needs. This work is considered more fully in the Findings and Analysis section.

2.5. Pluralist Model Critique

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) discuss the weaknesses of the pluralist model – they point out that the pre-selection of issues by pluralists to consider for analysis contains inherent bias included in what is determined to be "generally agreed to be significant," and "on how the researcher is to appraise the reliability of the agreement" (p.949). Further, they criticize Nelson Polsby’s pluralist analysis suggesting “by presupposing that in any community there are significant issues in the political arena, he takes for granted the very question which is in doubt. He accepts as issues what are reputed to be issues. As a result, his findings are fore-ordained” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, p.949). Further, Bachrach and Baratz specifically identify a weakness in Dahl’s initial studies of New Haven arguing that “At the outset it may be observed that Dahl does not attempt in this work to define his concept, "key political decision" (p.949). They also suggest that it is possible for an actor to exert power through a nondecision and point to Dahl’s lack of recognition of this “second face of power”: To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation” and by doing so
“...since he does not recognize both faces of power, Dahl is in no position to evaluate the relative influence or power of the initiator and decision-maker, on the one hand, and of those persons, on the other, who may have been indirectly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being raised” (p.952)

The evolution of community power theory following the rise of the pluralists did not proceed in a way that was necessarily antithetical to the paradigm established by Dahl et al. Instead, further theoretical attempts have been made to build on the nature of pluralism and to reinterpret its focus when considering contemporary issues.

Before moving to a consideration of the Growth Machine Model Robert Presthus summarizes the “debate” between elitists and pluralists eloquently:

Generally, then, on the theoretical and normative side community power structure research has been characterized by a discontinuity between sociological elitist assumptions and political scientist expectations of a pluralistic universe in which social power is elusive, atomized, transitory, and variegated. It seems fair to conclude that both the collection and the interpretation of empirical data have been influenced accordingly. The biases are undoubtedly unconscious, but the consequences seem clear enough. (Presthus, 1964, p.41).

The normative goal of elite power theorists, such as Hunter, was to examine “the origins of, access to, and distributional effects of policy making in general (i.e. public and private)” while pluralists such as Dahl were “occupied with questions of participation and the mobilization of influence in public controversies” (Walton, 1976, p.298).

2.6. Growth Machine Model

The growth machine model was developed in the 1970’s through mostly interpretive studies epitomized by Molotch (1976) who suggested that the growth of the local economy, boosterism, was the “overriding commonality” among disparate groups of all stripes within a community. Logan et al. (1997, p.605) argue that the growth machine model is based on two hypotheses:

1. local politics in the United States revolves around land development and is dominated by a pro-growth coalition and,
2. the urban future is shaped by this coalition’s molding of local policy.  

(Logan et al., 1997, p.605)

Logan et al. posit that development of the Growth Machine model by Molotch and others was intended not to be in diametrical opposition to Dahl, in the same way Dahl was in opposition to Hunter, but instead was intended to reinterpret the pluralist model should “the central concern of local government [was] growth” (Logan, John R., Rachel Bridges Whaley & Kyle Crowder, 1997, p.604). In that case, “one could seek the city’s dominant coalition in land development issues” and identify a “growth machine much like the alliance of mayor, planning office, and downtown business interests that Dahl (1961) had described for urban renewal policy in New Haven” (Logan et al., p.604). Further, Molotch and others argued that “growth must be understood not as a function of economic necessity but as the target of political action” and that “a coherent coalition of elites has a vision of the city’s future that conforms to their own interests and has the power to make it happen” (Logan et al., p.605).

Thus, although there are extensive literatures on community power as well as on how to define and conceptualize a city or urban place, there are few notions available to link the two issues coherently, focusing on the urban settlement as a political economy. (Molotch, 1976, p.309).

Molotch further argues that indicators of success in a community are related to the expansion of population that follows industrial, retail and commercial enterprise, increased land development, increased densification and increases in the amount of financial activity that occurs. From a growth machine perspective, these increases are as a result of “boosters” (groups and individuals) in the community that work together collectively to create the environment conducive to economic activity. These groups and individuals are defined by Molotch as “those serious people who care about their locality and who have the resources to make their caring felt as a political force”(Molotch, p.310). The “key ideological prop” of the growth machine model is the amount of jobs growth and economic activity in the community, the creation of which is “promulgated by developers, builders, and chambers of commerce” and is supported by “the statesman talk of editorialists and political officials” (Molotch, p.320).
Artibise discusses the notion of boosterism in the context of Canadian municipalities when considering the City Beautiful movement. This movement to beautify Canadian cities linked together an interesting mix of boosters including local councillors, businessmen, architects, engineers, surveyors and other civic leaders that saw the benefits of civic improvement and effectively linked “good citizenship and boosterism” so that they were synonymous” (Artibise, 1982, p.124).

While the development of the growth machine model has provided nuance to the application of the pluralist effort, it has not been without criticism. These criticisms are centred mostly on the lack of methodological rigor, the over-reliance on property and development and boosterism.

2.7. Growth Machine Model Critique

There are several areas of criticism as to the efficacy of the growth machine model, particularly as it relates to the creation and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on municipal government.

Logan et al. also point to criticism of the growth machine model suggesting that the “resident-versus-business opposition, as contained in the idea of use-versus-exchange values, needs to be contextualized and elaborated” (Logan et al., p.607). Logan et al. use the example of a neighbourhood organizations being assumed to be in opposition to developers when in fact local community groups may seek out the assistance of developers in order to develop community amenities.

More importantly to this dissertation is the criticism of the growth machine model that is centred on the idea that communities are not a homogeneic group that has a myopic view of the benefits of economic development and growth. In this direction, growth machine theorists are faced with the reality that “very different regimes” may be present in these communities “where the momentum for growth is tempered by concerns about its negative impacts” (Logan et al., p.607). Di Gaetano and Klemanski (1991) and Turner (1992) suggest that regimes within communities range along a continuum from “progrowth regimes” to those that favour “stronger controls [that] are imposed by
“exclusionary regimes that are dominated by residential interests, with highly restrictive zoning” (Logan et al., pp.607/608).

The notion that regimes within communities are heterogenic and that they may range from progrowth to more highly restrictive groups is consistent with the experiences in both the development of the Expo’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. In both instances there were various coalitions of government and non-government groups ranging from those that favoured the development of the Expo ’86 lands or for devising a multi-lateral pact among the federal, provincial and local government to tackle the health, economic and social issues in the DTES to those that opposed both initiatives.17

2.8. Urban Regime Model

Clarence Stone’s (1989) study of urban regimes within the city of Atlanta, dominated the analysis of community power structures in North America for the next 20 years including studies of Edmonton by Lightbody, Canadian Immigration by Good, Portland by Leo, etc. Stone’s basic argument was based on the idea that structured/unstructured, organized/ad hoc, public/private groups interact within the community (including government and non-government actors) and influence the outputs of local government.

Urban regimes are not fixed entities. They form and re-form as groups with differing aims to shape arrangements in ways that promote their sometimes competing goals. In the process, groups adjust to one another, and individual groups themselves undergo change. (Stone, 1989, p.25)

The initial manifestation of urban regime analysis can be found in 1983 when Norman and Susan Fainstein termed the phrase “urban regime” to describe “the circle of powerful elected officials and top administrators in U.S. city government” (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1983).

17 As with each model, the context of their applicability will be discussed in the Findings and Analysis section of the dissertation.
Kristin Good (2009, p.19) suggests that the emergence of urban regime theory was motivated by a desire to “move(s) beyond what had become a somewhat stale debate between elitists and pluralists. "Regime theory “broke the impasses in the ‘community power’ debate by validating the elitist contention that a tight link between Atlanta’s mayor and business elite existed, while also showing that group politics, the electoral process, and local entrepreneurship mattered as Dahl had found in New Haven” (Good, 2009, p.19). Urban regime theory also explained “why governing coalitions and thus also policy processes and outcomes varied across cases” (p.19).

Urban regime analysis grew in popularity throughout the latter part of the 20th century with studies primarily looking at “the exercise of power in the city” with much written regarding the formation, role and importance of various private and public actors at the local level (Stone, 2005). The approach was "analytically attractive because the historical evolution of cities is reinterpreted as the product of a contingent relationship between urban development and political action” (Sites, 1997, p.537).

Stone’s (1989) study of Atlanta, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*, the seminal urban regime work, defines urban regimes as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (p.6). Urban regime analysis centres on the deceptively simple questions of “how local communities are governed” and “how they establish and pursue problem-solving priorities” (Stone, 2005). This type of analysis studies “intersectoral, public-private cooperation and of ‘how that cooperation is maintained when confronted with an ongoing process of social change, a continuing influx of new actors, and potential breakdowns through conflict or indifference (Good, 2009, p.36; Stone, 1989, p.9).

The original impetus for Stone’s (1989) analysis was that he “reformulated the problem between pluralists and elitists:”

I analyzed what it means to combine legal equality at the ballot box with inequality in various other resources – how public officials are affected by the mix of formal democracy and social stratification that provides the context for their behavior. Officials are greatly constrained by the need to court popular favor and win elections, but, I concluded, they are also predisposed to cooperate with those who can provide them with useful
resources and opportunities to achieve results. Thus, an electoral coalition, even when it wins, is not the same as a governing coalition.

(p.xi).

Urban regime analysis, on the one hand, recognizes the role of the formal authorities in place at the municipal level, and on the other, an inherent recognition of the importance of “nongovernmental (and sometimes informal) links" to the process of local governance (Stone, 2005). The effects of coalition- forming brings into question the notion that once an individual or party is elected (with a particular agenda or platform) a direct connection occurs between their obtaining electoral success and the ability to implement their pre-determined priorities. Municipally elected officials must count on the support of other civic actors in order to further their own goals and aspirations and meet the demands of the citizenry which is at the heart of the research and analysis herein. There is interconnectedness, both formal and informal, of elected officials, bureaucrats, citizens, business interests, civic groups and others that together form the urban regime.

Pierre (2005) defines regime theory:

Strictu sensu, regime theory explains the linkages between private capital and political power and the potential synergies that can be exploited between these spheres of urban society. Furthermore, it highlights the differences between urban government (the reliance on political structures in governing the local state) on one hand and governance (the process of coordinating and steering the urban society toward collectively defined goals) on the other hand. Thus, urban regime theory offers one theoretical model of American urban governance and the role of government in such governance (pp.447/448).

Stoker (1998) points out the differences between the elite and pluralist models and urban regime theory:

In contrast to the old debate between pluralists and elitists which focused on the capacity to act: “What is at issue is not so much domination and subordination as a capacity to act and accomplish goals. The power struggle concerns, not control and resistance, by gaining and fusing a capacity to act – power to, not power over.”


Further, Stoker indicates how urban regimes are created:
Actors and institutions gain a capacity to act by blending their resources, skills and purposes into a long-term coalition: a regime. If they succeed they pre-empt the leadership role in their community and establish for themselves a near decision-making monopoly over the cutting-edge choices facing their locality. The establishment of a viable regime is the ultimate act of power in the context of an emerging system of governance. (Stoker, 1998, p.123)

Stone (1989) discusses his methodological approach to the study of Atlanta’s urban regimes when he quotes Abrams:

The reality of the past is just not ‘there’ waiting to be observed by the resurrectional historian. It is to be known if at all through strenuous theoretical alienation. He also reminds us that many aspects of an event cannot be observed in a direct sense; too much is implicit at any given moment. That is why the process, or the flow of events over time, it so important to examine. That is also why events are not necessarily most significant for their immediate impact; they may be more significant for their bearing on subsequent events, thus giving rise to modifications in structure. (p.10)

This point goes to the heart of the research question under consideration in this dissertation – how did events surrounding the creation and influence of government and non-government actors involved in the decision-making process in the Vancouver case (e.g. the Vancouver Agreement and Expo ’86 lands) have significance not only for their impact at the time but also for their “bearing on subsequent events” that gave “rise to modifications in structure” in the future.

Stone points to four key elements that underlie the functioning of regimes at the municipal level:

1. An agenda to address a distinct set of problems
2. A governing coalition around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members
3. Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
4. Given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing. (Stone, 2005)
Decision-making at the local government level for regime theorists “does not simply involve aggregating individuals’ and groups’ policy preferences” instead these “relationships shape actors’ behaviours and policy preferences” and “are not neutral mechanisms through which policy is made (Good, 2009, p.20; Stone, 1989, p.6). The decision making process at the local level is “shaped by the uneven distribution of resources in society” and the bargaining, cajoling, coercing, negotiations among governmental and non-governmental actors in the “interest of maintaining trust and an ongoing relationship” (Good, 2009, p.22).

According to urban regime theory, local coalitions form part of what Harding refers to as a “two interdependent systems of authority: one based on popular control, that is the various organs of representative government, the other on the ownership of private productive assets, that is (largely) the business community” (Harding, 1999, p.677). For urban regime theorists “cities and urban life are produced and reproduced, not by the playing out of some externally imposed logic, but by struggles and bargains between different groups and interests within cities” (Harding, 1999, p.676). They “attempt to account for important aspects of urban change by examining the actions of the groups, individuals and institutions that help produce them rather than assuming that people are swept along by larger forces over which they have no control” (Harding, 1999, p.677).

Dowding (2001) suggests that the work of Stone and others on urban regime analysis resulted in “a hybrid of political economy approaches and political science pluralist approaches” (p.7). Political economic studies included public choice theory, which focused on urban service delivery (Dowding, 2001; 1956; Ostrom et al., 1988; Bish & Ostrom, 1973; Peterson, 1981), along with Marxist approaches that are also interested in service delivery, however their approach focused on the effects of “development primarily in the interests of capital often advanced against the interests of local citizenry” (Dowding, 2001, p.7).

American urbanists have used urban regime analysis to consider many different aspects of municipal government in the United States. Urban regime analysis has been used at the regional, city, sub-city, borough, and neighbourhood levels of governance in the U.S. and elsewhere (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). Objects of research using urban
regime analysis in the U.S. has ranged from how minority groups work their way into governing coalitions to studying the rise of the black middle class. Urban regime analysis has contributed to bridging the gap between pluralists and elitists creating a “new understanding of the way that power works in urban settings, with its emphasis on power to rather than power over.” (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). Outside North America, urban regime analysis has helped facilitate consideration of institutions of elected government that “puts at its heart the social and economic setting in which governments operate” (2001).

Of consequence to this dissertation are Stone’s thoughts on the relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors [that] is based on his understanding of structuring.” To Stone “(p)olitics must not be romanticized as a sphere of free agency. While not tightly controlled by deterministic laws, there are recurring tendencies in political behavior that must be reckoned with” (Stone, 1989, p.10). This type of research motivates the central thesis of this dissertation – urban regimes that included government and non-government actors were created and influenced the decision-making process of Vancouver’s municipal government during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and development of the post-Expo ’86 lands.

Stoker supports Stone’s ideas on the role of both government and non-government actors in the development of outcomes for local government:

Regime theory is more concerned with the process of government-interest-group mediation than with the wider relationship between government and its citizens. Pluralists and elite theorists assumed governments sought to control the mass of the public. For pluralists control is perceived as legitimate because of the open access to government. For elite theorists control is exercise in a manipulative way by excluding certain interests and ideas. Regime theorists view power as structure to gain certain kinds of outcomes within particular fields of government endeavor. The key driving force is the “internal politics of coalition building” (Stone 1989, 178). If capacity to govern is achieved, if things get done, then power has been successfully exercised and to a degree it is irrelevant whether the mass of the public agreed with, or even knew about, the policy initiative. (Stoker, 1994, p.198).
Harding (1999) notes that urban regime analysis started to dominate the study of British local government in the latter 20th century following initial research efforts by American urbanists. Decentralization efforts driven by successive national regimes (Thatcher, Major, Blair, Brown, Major…), mostly driven by neo-liberal agendas, led to the “fragmentation in the institutional structures of local governance;’ the growing importance of the “urban politics of production,” the “proliferation of public-private partnerships” and the “government induced metamorphosis of local authorities into enabling rather than executive bodies” which ultimately led to a greater use of urban regime analysis in the country (Harding, 1999, p.681). Through the urban regime framework researchers began to consider “evidence of cross-sectoral, inter-agency and inter-governmental coalition building for urban development and to assess its importance within the wider politics of localities.” (Harding, 1999, p.681). Recently, urban regime analysis has “begun to travel” to many other aspects of the analysis of local government including “regional coalition building,” urban education policy,” and “lesbian and gay politics” (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001).

In Britain, researchers focused largely on the “actions of public-sector agencies in general and those of local authorities in particular” (Harding, 1999, p.682). Further, the British tended to consider the “more institutionalized forms of cross-sectoral collaboration” (Harding, 1999, p.683). The focus has been primarily on viewing coalitions such as local public-private partnerships as “institutions” while the American researchers considered these relationships more as non-institutional “processes” (Harding, 1999, p.683).

There have been a few significant studies of the presence and effects of regimes in Canadian municipalities – among these Christopher Leo’s (1995) analysis of development in Edmonton, Alberta; Timothy Cobban’s (2003) work on downtown revitalization in London, Ontario and Kristin Good’s (2009) consideration of the effects of regimes on immigration policy in various Canadian cities – especially Toronto and Vancouver, stand out as effective studies that seek to understand urban regimes in the Canadian context. Each arrives at a different conclusion as to the presence and influence of urban regimes in their particular setting – Toronto/Vancouver. These studies have helped to explain the interactions of governmental and non-governmental
actors within Canadian municipalities in addition to showing the interactions occurring within and around local government.

It should be noted that regimes exist surrounding all public policy issues and that there nature and focus changes dependent on the matter at hand. Regime activity is not limited to warm and fuzzy situations of local government – they can also form around serious matters occurring in the community. For example, the regime that formed around the Vancouver Agreement was intended to combat a very serious epidemic within the DTES, this coalition was completely different than the one that formed in the pre-Expo development of the Expo ’86 lands.\(^{18}\)

There are further opportunities to study the presence, function and effectiveness of urban regimes within Canadian municipalities. This type of analysis would be useful to consider such questions as: Why has the presence and influence of urban regimes surrounding Canadian cases not been considered adequately? Do Canadian urban regimes function in a similar manner to those studied in the United States, Europe and elsewhere? How would urban regime analysis provide a new, more nuanced and multi-dimensional analysis of how municipal governments function in Canada? How would urban regime analysis facilitate the intra-national, cross-temporal and cross-national comparison of municipal governments and their coalitions? Can particular variables be identified and utilized to assist in the analysis of the presence, effects and maintenance of urban regimes in Canada? Finally, are there differences in the effects of urban regimes on municipal government in small population Canadian municipalities?

\(^{18}\) Another example that occurred in Vancouver was the formation of a regime comprised of family members, community activists, Aboriginal and Women’s groups, the media, etc. that formed around the issue of missing women in the DTES. The nature of this type of regime was substantially different that those that involved the altruistic nature of the regimes that formed around the post-Expo development and Vancouver Agreement. The objective of this regime initially was to motivate action on behalf of the authorities to commence and continue investigations into a series of missing women from the DTES.
2.9. Urban Regime Critique

Stone (2005) recognizes the deficiencies in urban regime analysis when he suggests that the theory “is certainly not a form of grand explanation, nor is it a step toward unified theory” (p.7). Criticism of urban regime analysis has also centred on its lack of provision of cohesive analytical tools and its U.S. ethno-centricity. Further, Stone points to the difficulty of developing a formal structured theoretical framework for considering such a nuanced and multi-dimensional subject as municipal government when he qualifies the investigations by himself and others into municipal coalitions as not “urban regime theory” but “urban regime analysis” (Stone, 2005, p.335).

Further, Sites (1997) notes the following criticisms of urban regime theory:

1. …its categories of policy orientation (pro-growth, progressive, caretaker) run the risk of mistaking shifts in the form of policy (which may be fairly frequent) for shifts in the major beneficiaries of policy (which are less frequent (p.539);

2. the theory’s central focus on local-state actors results in a serious underestimation of the social (non-state) pressures that influence urban development (p.539);

3. regime analyses is too focused, to insistently, on public-sector actors, local-state initiative, and coalition building at the expense of market and community pressures, economic restructuring, and national-state retrenchment (p.552).

Dowding suggests that there is a fundamental weakness in urban regime theory in that it acts as a descriptive but not an explanatory instrument when considering how urban regimes are successfully maintained over time (Dowding, 2001, p.15).

One of the weaknesses of the British approach to urban regime analysis is its lack of examination of the informal processes at play within municipal government which Stone et al. view as being pivotal to the ability to carry out coalition strategies (Harding, 1999, p.685). Davies (2002) points to a further fundamental difference between the application of urban regime theory in American and British contexts:

Viewed through the lens of urban regime theory, these conclusions show that local governance in the UK remains resolutely different from its counterpart in the USA and a conceptual distinction must be drawn between governance by network, or regime, and governance by
partnership. In the USA, the balance between hierarchy, market and network is different, favouring governance by network. It follows from this distinction that convergence between the local politics of Britain and the USA has thus far been limited (Davies, 2002b, p.319).

Canadian urbanists have been hesitant to embrace urban regime analysis due to the argument “that regime theory may not be so relevant outside the United States, where political parties are much stronger at the local level and/or where central governments provide much more support and direction to local governments” (Sancton, 2011, p.232). The unique characteristics found in the Canadian Constitution’s division of powers under Sections 91/92 may make effective comparative analysis problematic. The effectiveness of using urban regime analysis as used by Leo, Cobban and Good in examining municipal government in Canada has been questioned. Despite an acknowledgement of how much urban regime analysis could bring to a “greatly enhanced” understanding of Canadian municipalities Sancton and others suggest that there are idiosyncrasies that limit its effectiveness. For example, in *Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective* (2011), Sancton asks the question: “Do Canadian Cities Have Urban Regimes?” and refers to an argument that “regime theory might not be so relevant outside the United States, where political parties are much stronger at the local level and/or where central governments provide much more support and direction to local governments” (Sancton, 2011, p.232). In earlier work, Sancton questioned the lack of applicability of regime analysis to the Canadian case “because massive provincial influence makes business involvement in such regime politics unnecessary” (Good, 2009, p.37; Sancton 1993, 20).

Cobban, in his study of London, Ontario also pointed to a potential deficiency in the applicability of urban regime analysis when examining Canadian municipalities as he argued in Canada “local business elites tend to become less involved in local politics” than in the American case as they are “prohibited by provincial legislation from offering tax concessions that attract business interest, and most central cities in Canada (including London) have few, if any competing suburban municipalities” (Good, 2009, p.233; Cobban, 2003).

The deficiencies pointed out by Sancton, Cobban and others may have merit in individual cases in Canada although their veracity of their critique is questionable at
best. For instance, it would be difficult to argue that the party system at the local level in Vancouver, British Columbia is not strong and could not easily rival parties active at the municipal level in comparable American cities. The most recent Vancouver municipal election featured a contest between two-plus major parties the Non Partisan Association (NPA) and Vision-COPE (Coalition of Progressive Electors) both of which were financed in the millions of dollars and representing tens of thousands of voters supporting candidates specifically running under party banners. Regimes have been and are clearly present as strong influential actors in municipal politics in Vancouver.

The second premise may also be incorrect as it understates the governance activities that occur at the local level outside of provincial input and overstates the “creature of the province” aspect of municipal government in Canada. In some cases, such as in Vancouver, the delineation of specific and special city powers has been set outside of the normal parameters of the provincial – municipal structure in a “charter.” The Vancouver Charter provides the city with a greater degree of freedom to autonomously operate in several administrative and legislative areas without seeking provincial approval or being under the control of provincial masters. The formal powers provided to the city under the charter are only one aspect of the increasing ability of the city to function uninhibited by provincial input. This concept will be further explored later in the dissertation.

The next section turns to more general discussion of the state of community power analysis today in the context of examining the creation and influence of regimes and their effects on the decision-making processes involved within Vancouver’s municipal government during the development of the post-Expo lands and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

2.10. Contemporary Community Power Analysis

Urban regime theory shares the view of the elite, pluralist, and city-as-growth machine advocates as to the importance of cities. It is the view within this dissertation that those that advocate positions such as Peterson’s City Limits (1981) underestimate the ability of actors at the local level to deal with contemporary challenges such as those
discussed later in the thesis. Peterson’s argument that “local politics is most limited” is misdirected, however, in the Canadian case, municipalities “cannot make war or peace; they cannot issue passports or forbid outsiders from entering their territory; they cannot issue currency; and they cannot control imports or erect tariff walls” (Peterson 1981, pp.1/2).

Canadian municipalities can create innovative efficient and effective methods of providing local services to citizens, can work to improve the lives of the disadvantaged by tackling social issues at the local level including homelessness, drug/alcohol addiction, and health care crisis such as what occurred during the AIDS/HIV/Hep epidemic that ravaged the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver; can put on massive events, along with partners, such as the 2010 Olympics and can work to improve the air that is breathed, the water that is drank and the quality of local neighbourhoods. In the case of Vancouver, it was the local government that has played the key role in these areas and many others with very inconsistent support of more “senior” levels of government. Perhaps, Peterson’s critique is best suited for considering pre-adoption of neoliberal agendas that had as a central feature the abandonment of local government support through programs of offloading and subsidiarity. If so, in the Canadian case, perhaps Peterson’s dictum “City politics is limited politics” (Peterson, 1981, pp.1/2) should be adapted to meet the 21st century reality of municipal government: “City politics is common sense, creative, effective politics.”

It is important to this dissertation research that many of the central tenets of the pluralist model have been supported in the literature post-Dahl. The notion of pure, or singular, elite control of community power structures in liberal democracies as Hunter et al. favoured has largely been replaced in the literature with an acceptance of the notion that many different groups and individuals with unique “positions” in the community interact to make representations of their own interests, demands, and needs to the larger society. These groups are not led by some mysterious cabal of indispensables that lead the community in a manner that only favours economic interests; the interactions of groups and individuals is necessarily chaotic in a liberal democracy. What appears to be a common thread in the literature today, with consequence for this dissertation, is the idea that community power, certainly guided, but not dictated by ‘elites,’ is faced with a multitude of external and internal challenges that require its use to
be malleable. It also appears that, given those challenges, the focus of the literature has changed from an inward-looking examination of how power is manifested within communities to how communities react to the aforementioned external and internal challenges and dramatic events that might occur.

Cobb and Elder (1971; 1972) consider how issues make it into the public policy making process and suggest some cautionary measures even though the focus of current literature may have evolved to accepting a pluralist perspective that recognizes a strong role for cities. As policy moves through the five basic stages of the public policy process they argue inherent bias must be recognized including:

1. Any political system will operate to the advantage of some and the disadvantage of others.

2. The range of issues that will be considered by any polity is restricted. For Cobb and Elder, issues and policy alternatives tend to “represent the interests and most salient concerns of the previously legitimized political forces. “Assuming that the popular balance of political forces is subject to change – a view not shared by the Marxist approach – “priorities in the system that determine the issues and alternatives will always lag behind the ongoing struggle for influence.” Thus, old issues “will tend to command the most prominent positions in formal political deliberations,” over new policies.

3. Challenges to any existing policy consensus must also note the system’s inertia. In any political system, there “is a strong bias in favour of existing arrangements and agenda questions.”

4. Given such ‘biases,’ “pre-political, or at least pre-decisional processes are often of the most critical importance in determining which issues and alternatives are to be considered by the polity and which choices will probably be made.

(Cobb & Elder 1971, pp.901-904)

Pierre (1999) takes note of a shift in the literature that occurred late in the 20th century with implications for the nature of power within a community and for a study of the regimes that are created and influence the decision-making processes of municipal government. He suggests that there have been two shift post the 1980’s:

Mainstream political science has witnessed two significant alterations of scholarly focus during the past decade or so. One such paradigmatic shift is the renewed interest in political institutions (March & Olsen, 1984, 1989, 1995; for overviews, see Peters, 1996a; Rothstein, 1996). Institutions are overarching societal values, norms, and practices that
tend to make public policy path dependent. Moreover, the “newinstitutionalists” perceive institutions as political actors that not only respond to external changes but also tend to dominate their environments (March & Olsen, 1989). Unlike the institutionalism of the 1920s and 1930s, when the design of the institutional system was the key analytical problem, institutionalists of the 1980s and 1990s see institutions and institutional arrangements as clusters of factors explaining changes in policy outcomes, state-society exchange processes, and government capabilities. (Pierre, 1999, p.376; Peters, p.1996a).

Secondly, Pierre identifies a change in how political science has started to approach what government actually does:

The second significant change is the rapidly growing number of studies centered on the concept of governance at different analytical and institutional levels. Governance refers to processes of regulation, coordination, and control (Rhodes, 1997). Thus, for governance theorists, analyzing the process of coordination and regulation as such is the main concern: The role of government in the process of governance is perceived as an empirical question. (p.376; Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg, 1991; Hollingsworth, Schmitter, & Streek 1994; Hyden, 1992; Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996, 1997).

Pierre suggests that these two changes acts to “bring together regime theory, theories of the state, and urban political economy” and “highlights the wide range of constraints on local authorities’ abilities to bring about change in the local community (Pierre, 1999, p.376). Further he suggests that there exists “kinship between that theory and urban governance” and although “urban governance makes no prejudgment about the cast of actors involved in shaping the urban political agenda, nor does it make any assumptions about the normative direction and objectives or the “governing coalition” (Pierre, 2005, p.452; Stone, 1989)” …”urban regime theory describes one of several different models of urban governance” (Pierre, 2005, p.452; Stone, 1997).

The idea of focusing on the public policy outcomes and the public-private interactions alongside the economic, political and ideological framework that underpin the formal political processes allows for a more nuanced analysis of the two eras

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19 Outcomes in this case are defined consistent with Pierre (2005) as “valid indicators or shared values and objectives, but they could also be manifestations of extreme pragmatic behavior from both sets of actors” (Pierre 2005, 450).
considered in this dissertation. Further as Stoker note, “the value of the governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a framework for understanding changing processes of governing (Stoker, 1998, p.18) and that the notion of governance rests on five propositions:

1. Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government
2. Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues
3. Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action
4. Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors
5. Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools and techniques to steer and guide.

(Stoker, 1998, p.19)

The evolution of community power theory throughout the 20th century and early 21st century does inform how community power can be analyzed in contemporary cases. However, today the focus of community power analysis necessarily must consider many internal and external challenges for local government that previously were not always considered the purview of municipal governments – this is true certainly in the Canadian case. Cities continue to be pivotal in the lives of citizens despite these external and internal challenges. For example, the City of Vancouver has taken the lead in what has become known as “The Four Pillars Approach” to the city’s harm reduction drug policy. Initially, this approach was driven by local politicians and bureaucrats that created the program and then sought out support from other levels of Canadian government. Those involved in the process had the capacity, the will and the heart to create, implement and sustain the program with variable provincial and federal support.

It would be an overstatement to suggest cities do not at times require the support and assistance of provincial and federal governments when facing either external or internal challenges. One only has to look at the response to the recent flooding in Calgary to recognize that there are certain areas, mostly based upon our federal system in Canada, where other levels of government might have a greater capacity to assist.
In a global context, many local governments have had the level of resources provided by national and other senior level governments drastically cut and some cases the future of local government is at best uncertain. Although the demise of the municipal level of Canadian government discussed in the 1976 article “Puppets on a Shoestring: The Effects on Municipal Government of Canada’s System of Municipal Finance” did not ultimately occur to the extent predicted in the article. Given the external and internal challenges today there is a sense that the current system needs tweaking to meet the needs of contemporary Canadian municipal governments as the local providers of basic services and as the location of the initial interface with democratic principles for local citizens as per Ken Cameron’s (2002) thesis in “Some Puppets, Some Shoestrings: The Changing Intergovernmental Context.”

2.11. Summary

The literature review has provided a theoretical foundation for the research within this dissertation by considering the canonical research and critiques underpinning Community Power - the Elitist vs Pluralist debate, Growth Machine theory, Urban Regime Theory, and Contemporary Community Power Analysis. As mentioned at the outset of this history of the evolution of community power theory, it was not intended to infer any linearity in its development, the discussion was intended to assist in understanding how power manifests itself in the decision-making processes in the city. The purpose of providing this foundation was to help develop a theoretical framework for considering whether urban regimes exist, and if so, how urban regimes influence local decision-making in Vancouver.

The dissertation now turns to a consideration of three major challenges to municipal government – globalization, urbanization and increasingly complex interactions among levels of government (multi-level governance (MLG)). Each affects municipal governments in Canada and elsewhere in unique ways, and in the context of the dissertation, Vancouver is not adverse to these challenges affecting the decision-making process within the municipality. All of these pressures were at play during the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. In the end considering the effects of globalization, urbanization
and multi-level governance will help inform the analysis of the creation and influence of regimes on the decision-making processes surrounding the development of the former Expo ’86 and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

2.12. The Effects of Globalization on Municipal Government in Canada, B.C. and Vancouver

In order to understand the creation and influence of urban regimes in the two eras in Vancouver that are examined in this dissertation it is helpful to consider the effects of economic globalization on the decision-making process of the city’s municipal government. In both instances the effects of economic globalization played a role in helping to shape the priorities and efforts of the potential regime(s) involved in the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands and the Vancouver Agreement.

For Lightbody (2006), globalization “is an insubstantial tag for a number of strands of interconnectedness over political borders that disregards international experiences” (p.510). Globalization consists of three “separate but interwoven developments”:

1. more widely available rapid transportation modes;
2. publicly accessible and inexpensive means for worldwide communications;

20 It is important to recognize the focus here is on economic globalization and its effects, the discussion does not consider other forms of globalization such as cultural, social, etc.
21 It is important to note that the concept of “eras” must be considered before proceeding further. On the one hand the dissertation considers, in a temporal way, the two eras of local decision-making in Vancouver, the development of the post-Expo lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. This notion differs when one considers the economic reality of the day as the Bennett government was undertaking many similar steps to those of Margaret Thatcher through his restraint program in British Columbia (for an excellent recounting of Bennett’s program see: The New Reality: The Politics of Restraint in British Columbia. (1984). Warren Magnusson; William K. Carroll; Charles Doyle; Monika Langer; R. B. J. Walker, (Eds.). Vancouver: New Star Books. It could be credibly argued, and I do, that the Thatcher era, in this context, is not restricted temporally – it continues in some forms today. One only has to consider some of the draconian measures adopted by the Harper government as evidence of this endurance.
3. powerful multinational corporations accompanied by international financial markets and regulatory regimes.

Further, Lightbody argues that “globalization seems to homogenize important aspects of cities around the world” – many others have commented on how cities around the globe increasingly resemble each other with generic airports, cultural practices (mostly American), and the proliferation of entities like McDonald’s and Starbucks as well as their higher end consumer equivalents.

Dr. Ted Cohn, in Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice (2008), describes economic globalization as the “broadening and deepening of interactions and interdependence among peoples and states” (p.8). Cohn views “broadening” as referring to “the extension of geographic linkages to encompass virtually all major societies and states; while “deepening” describes the increased frequency and intensity of state and social interactions” (p.8). Globalization is a force that is facilitated by improved technology and rapid transportation that “increases connections among people with less regard to territorial boundaries” although Cohn, McBride and others suggest a continuing role for the nation-state (p.8).

Kristin Good (2009) suggests that globalization has impacted the ways in which local decision makers govern locally, however, in her consideration of the relationship between municipalities and immigration policy in Canada the impact is variable and has “not affected the patterns of governance at the city level in any uniform way” (p.290). Good further suggests that some of the effects of globalization at the local level are “being mediated through past and existing institutional arrangements, both formal and informal” but recognizes in pointing to the Influence of “local regimes and the intergovernmental context” that it is difficult to generalize about the overall responses (p.290). Good argues that a new effect of globalization as being that the leadership of local leaders has been more assertive, there is greater concern by these leaders for global issues and an “emerging consensus that cities are the engines of economic growth in the global context” (p.290). Cohn (2008) points to the difficulty in forming a “consistent definition of globalization” and suggests that theorists “have differing views regarding both (its) causes and effects” (p.8). At the core of Cohn’s point is the notion that some theorists “give priority to the role of technological advances” and in others
emphasize “the role of the state, the capitalist mode of production, and cultural and social-psychological factors” (p.9). Cohn discusses further points about globalization:

1. Globalization is not a uniform process throughout the world. The effects of globalization are more evident in major urban centers than in rural areas, remote islands and LLDCs (Land-locked Lesser Developed Countries). Remote islands may have limited access to travel or communication technologies that enable them to participate in the global community. LLDC’s (Land-locked Lesser Developed Countries) have regularly been victimized by more developed countries in the increasingly globalized world through the exploitation of their resources, workers, and environment by multi-nationals looking for cost efficiencies. Many large cities have as part of their focus attempts to get on the world stage, such as Vancouver’s efforts in the development of the Expo lands.

2. Globalization is not causing the state to wither away. Although the state’s autonomy is eroding in some important aspects, states are adopting new and more complex functions to deal with an interdependent world and they continue to have choices in responding to globalization (McBride, 2003).

3. Globalization can result in fragmentation and conflict as well as unity and cooperation. For example, an increase in global competitiveness has led to the formation of three economic blocs centred in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Although competitiveness is a "contested concept" with various meanings,…competitiveness causes states to be concerned with their relative positions in the global economy.

4. Interdependence and globalization are not unique to the present-day period. Interdependence has fluctuated over time, and it is possible that international events would reverse the current moves toward globalization. For example, before World War I there was a high degree of interdependence in trade, foreign investment, and other areas. This interdependence declined during World War I and the interwar period and began to increase again only after World War II. (Cohn, 2008, p.10)

Smith and Cohn (1994) posit that globalization has included an expansion of “global interdependence” that has encompassed “issues such as environmental pollution, human rights, immigration, monetary and trade instabilities, and sustainable development” (p.619). They argue that globalization has “created more ‘cracks’ of opportunity for local governing actors to operate in the international realm formerly dominated by nation states” (p.619). Smith and Cohn further suggest that globalization has directly affected individual local citizens when citing Bayless Manning:
The economic interdependence of the modern world is more than international. It is also inter-local...every jiggle in the pattern of the international economy is likely to pinch some local group...and convert it immediately into a vocal group. (Manning, 1977, p.309)

Manning has termed this interdependence as “intermestic.”

Globalization has brought with it challenges for both national and sub-national governments "in a more complex environment in which IOs, MNCs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have important roles" (Cohn, p.8). Consistent with Cohn, Smith and Lightbody the challenge of globalization was present in the context of the development of the former Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. The development of the former Expo ’86 lands was directly related to globalization:

The creation of an international exposition in Vancouver is an example of a central tenet of globalization – the desire to become a “world city” and have an increased profile on the international stage. Through Expo ’86 Vancouver and British Columbia stepped out as “dozens of countries were induced into hosting exhibits, cajoled by a mixture of salesmanship, confidence and pressure” and developed relationships with “important outside constituents” in order to increase the province’s reputation and “Vancouver as a major city” (Ross & Staw, 1986, p.291).

Indicative of the effect of Expo ’86 increasing the city’s international profile are the statistics as cited by Harcourt, Cameron and Rossiter (2007) that:

In the fourteen years before 1986, 9 to 11 per cent of international visitors to Canada came to B.C. During 1986, B.C.’s share was more than 17 per cent, and over the following fourteen years, that share increased from 12 per cent in 1987 to 17 per cent in 2000. Tourism now adds $9 billion annually to the province’s economy. And people want to move to the province as well. In the decade after 1986, the population of B.C. grew at the rate of sixty to eighty thousand persons a year, an 18 per cent overall increase (p.108).

Patrick Reid, who became Expo ’86’s Ambassador and Commissioner-General commented when seeking countries to display at the fair: “In my trips around the world when we tried to sign up new countries...they literally did not know where Vancouver was. I remember in Vienna, I had to take out a map and show them. (Expo’s) legacy
was its ability to be a catalyst at that time for change in Vancouver, and catapulting Vancouver into the rank of international cities” (McMartin, 1996, p. D1). This comment is consistent with Smith & Cohn’s notion of local governing actors taking advantage of a crack of opportunity to operate in the international realm (Cohn & Smith, 1994, p. 619). It is also consistent with their consideration of “municipal internationalism” where Smith and Cohn (1994) consider how globalizing pressures have impacted cities:

Cohn and Smith (1994) argue, as well, that the global relationships of municipalities is not limited to the economic sphere, specifically local economic development, when they suggest that cities “have also been involved in a wide variety of cross-cultural, social and political activities” (p. 620). In addition, important to this thesis, is their notion that “cross-border linkages,” such as those evident in a globalized world, “includes linkages involving private actors” (p. 623).

Smith and Cohn also suggest that “Municipal governments in Canada have undertaken a wide array of city-based global activities of cultural, social, educational, economic, and political nature” (1994, p. 631). These activities have been limited by municipalities’ capacity to successfully achieve their goals. In Canada, municipalities are limited by financial resources, the division of powers in the Canadian Constitution, Provincial international policy, Federal international policy, local citizen preferences, institutional capacity, and legislative expertise. By hosting Expo ’86 the city was able to leverage the internationalizing benefits of the fair despite having limited finances, powers, provincial and federal international policies, the preferences of some local citizens that were fearful of the financial implications, and limited institutional capacity and expertise.

The involvement of “one of the richest men in the world” Li Ka-shing in the development of the former Expo ’86 lands is indicative of the globalizing effect suggested by Lightbody (2006) that recognizes increased activities by “powerful multinational corporations” (p. 510). During the run-up to Expo ’86 and immediately afterward the Province of British Columbia was experiencing serious budgetary issues faced with “a severe recession” (Francis, 2003, p. D8). In addition, the “much-criticized bargain price” accepted by the Bennett government for the 71 hectares of the downtown
Vancouver land is indicative of the neo-liberal focus of the BC provincial government faced with fiscal challenges to cut costs (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.109).

Holding the fair and the development of the post - Expo '86 lands is also consistent with Cohn's notion that “globalization is not causing the state to wither away” and that “states are adopting new and more complex functions to deal with an interdependent world” (Cohn, 2008, p.9). The decisions made by the Bennett provincial government and the city government of Vancouver to, on the one hand host a world level fair, and on the other sell off the Expo lands after the fair both represent concentrated, large-scale efforts by the state to generate activity during a difficult economic period of time and despite pressures of globalization.

Expo '86 is widely credited with marketing Vancouver to the rest of the world and reviving the city's economic fortune. It had generated a series of major public works during an economic recession and left the city with some important tourist and cultural facilities: the Canada Place Convention Centre, hotel and cruise- ship facility, the geodesic sphere converted to Science World in 1988-89, the Plaza of Nations complex, and the vital rapid transit line, Skytrain” (Punter, 2003, p.192).

2.13. The Adoption of Neoliberal Agendas

As part of the process of globalization many countries, including Canada, the United States and Britain adopted neo-liberal economic policy which caused several changes to municipal government globally and in Canada. Near the genesis of the theory was the Walter Lippman Colloquium in Paris in 1938 (Denord, 2009) this contributed to the development of neo-liberalism largely motivated by a meeting in 1947 at Mont Pelerin, Switzerland of 36 economists, philosophers and historians. The Mont Pelerin society sought to: “facilitate an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the principles and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-oriented economic systems” in response to what was seen as growing collectivist approaches to economics across the globe post-WWII (Mont Pelerin Society, n.d.). The contemporary Mont Pelerin Society views as dangerous “the expansion of government, not least in state welfare, in the power of
trade unions and business monopoly, and in the continuing threat and reality of inflation” (Mont Pelerin Society).

Led by philosopher-economist, Frederich Hayek, and later economist Milton Friedman, the society’s work provided the intellectual foundation for the development of neoliberal economic policies espoused by Thatcher, Reagan, and Mulroney and others. As noted by Williamson, however, most of the actual application of pure neoliberal doctrine, save privatization, including monetarism, supply-side, economics, and minimal government was largely abandoned as “impractical or undesirable fads” in the contemporary uses of neo-liberalism (Williamson, 2004, n.p.).

Williamson’s assessment may be overstated as there were instances where many of the tenets of neo-liberal doctrine were adopted to a greater degree than those cited by Williamson.

Lightbody (2006) suggests that in the 1980’s the Canadian federal government adopted the philosophy to “do less and pass the responsibility to other governments or private contractors whenever feasible and pay-as-you-go” (p.67). Further he argues that this was accompanied with similar efforts of the provinces and other metropolitan cities to eagerly “emulate the purported successes of federal authorities” (p.67). In the British Columbia case, the government of Bill Bennett, despite preparations to host Expo ’86, in July, 1983 embarked on a program of restraint featuring a “roll-back in governmental activity the likes of which post-war Canada had never known” (Resnick, 1986, p.12).

Following the federal election in 1993, the Chretien Liberals’ attention turned to a pervasive recession in the country and to taking action to respond to the downgrading of the country’s debt by international bond issuers, and public pressure to do something about the country’s ongoing fiscal problems. Chretien’s Finance Minister Paul Martin embarked on a program to attack the deficit and accumulated debt of the country

---

22 Today the way neoliberalism is used is based upon what has become known as the “Washington Consensus” that includes the following characteristics according to American economist John Williamson: Fiscal Discipline; Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities; Tax reform; Liberalizing Interest Rates; A Competitive Exchange Rate; Trade Liberalization; Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment; Privatization; Deregulation; Property Rights. Williamson himself sees the interchangeability of neoliberalism with the Consensus as “a thoroughly objectionable perversion of the original meaning” (Williamson 2004, np.).
through a series of measures including “state down-sizing and offloading, program delivery restructuring, and resource-driven financial allocations” (Lightbody, 2006, p.67).

The motivation for proceeding with aspects of a neo-liberal economic agenda in Canada was described by Finance Minister Paul Martin:

Coming into office in the fall of 1993, we fully expected to find a nasty fiscal situation. The combination of misplaced priorities, which is the stuff of politics, and compound interest, the stuff of the inexorable laws of arithmetic. Indeed, the federal deficit in 1992-93 reached almost 6 percent of GDP. But the much more fundamental problem was the apparent intractability of the sheer arithmetic of debt when the interest rate is higher than the economic growth rate. It became clear that a very long period of restraint would have to be endured to turn the debt momentum around. As part of that, we also needed to fundamentally rethink the role of the national government and the structure of its spending. But there was no ducking the issue. The economic warning flags were everywhere. Despite Canada having one of the world’s best inflation records since 1989, the currency was under constant pressure and real interest rates were increasing, putting a drag on growth and obviously exacerbating the fiscal problem. (Martin, 1995, p.12).

Martin saw the role of the Canadian federal government in this effort as “more like the tiller of a sleek, modern sailboat than the paddle wheel of a 19th century steamer” (Martin 1995, 25).

Graham (2010) notes consequences of the adoption of neo-liberal agendas by provincial and federal governments in Canada on the municipal level:

there has been a significant decrease in provincial transfers to municipalities as provincial governments themselves have disengaged from program spending and tried to simplify provincial and municipal roles and responsibilities. At least some of the impetus for this has been the trickle-down effect of changes in the federal-provincial fiscal framework that restricted provincial governments’ room for manoeuvre (p.234).

In the context of British Columbia, Resnick (1986) suggests the implementation of neo-liberalism was particularly draconian, the Bennett government’s July 1983 budget “was accompanied by twenty-seven major pieces of legislation including the following components:
1. public sector downsizing through dismissals, contracting out, "privatization" and reorganization, to be achieved partly by gutting the existing collective agreement with government employees and by the enhanced power of public sector employers to dismiss employees "without cause";

2. a deregulation package, dismantling the Human Rights Commission and Branch, the Rentalsman, Motor Vehicle Inspection, and regional planning functions;

3. a centralization package, including provisions to allow Victoria direct control of individual school budgets, college programs, and regional planning.

(Resnick, 1986, p.12/13)

Andrew Sancton has suggested that, in the context of Canadian municipal amalgamations, part of the process of globalization’s liberalization of markets has been a “rescaling” of the way local authorities function and the types of policies they generate while considering the direct relationship between neo-liberal economic agendas and municipal consolidations. In considering municipal amalgamations, Sancton suggests that “the process of globalization” is at the “core” of several changes to local government in Canada mostly caused by the adoption of neoliberal policy at the municipal level of government or the by-product of ongoing “senior” governmental thinking and actions (Sancton, 2011, p.307). Sancton also emphasizes the connections between neoliberalism and globalization when arguing that they are “cousins” (p.307).

Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith (2013) suggest that globalizing pressures directly affect municipal government as they “have unleashed an increasingly competitive economic climate in which there is even more pressure on municipalities to pursue policies that support the interests of the business community” and as corporations become more mobile the “bargaining leverage of municipalities” has been reduced (p.418). Importantly for the maintenance of the social safety net in countries like Canada globalization has “curtailed the activities of federal and provincial governments and prompted their cuts in social spending and transfer payments, the result of which has been to shift more responsibility and expenditure burden to municipal governments” (p.418) under what has been called “subsidiarity.” The strategy of transferring responsibilities to municipal government in Canada and not transferring concomitant levels of resources forces cities, such as in the Vancouver with the Vancouver
Agreement, to take on issues (e.g. the InSite safe injection site\(^{23}\)) that historically was not in the purview of local government.\(^{24}\)

Evidence of the effects of globalization pressures on the decision-making process surrounding the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands have been presented above and centred at least in several ways – boosterism in order to increase the international profile of Vancouver and British Columbia; a desire to cut government costs by disposing of most of the land at a minimal price to a major international interest from Hong Kong; and the direct role of the state in making decisions that were intended to generate economic activity in Vancouver and the province. Evidence of the effects of globalization on the decision-making process surrounding the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement will now be considered.

In the Canadian context, the adoption of neo-liberal economic agendas as part of an increasing globalized world manifested itself originally in the Brian Mulroney regime that was first elected in 1984 and later in 1988. The two successive Mulroney Progressive Conservative governments’ sought publicly to privatize government services, cut the public service, lower barriers to trade and the flow of capital, lower taxes, balance the deficit and start paying down the country’s debt, de-regulate, sell off Crown corporations and encourage foreign investment. Mulroney was considered to be following policies consistent with those of the U.K.’s Margaret Thatcher and U.S.’s Ronald Reagan, at best, however, he could only be considered a junior member of the club as the size of the Canadian economy was so much smaller. Similar policies were followed under the government of Jean Chretien first elected in 1993 following the electoral demise of the Progressive Conservatives under Mulroney’s successor Kim Campbell.

\(^{23}\) InSite is the first “safe injection site” in Canada, its creation was part of the cities “Four Pillars Strategy.” Background information on InSite can be accessed at http://supervisedinjection.vch.ca/ and is discussed further later in the dissertation.

\(^{24}\) Canada’s division of powers in the Constitution places jurisdiction over health care issues, which the Supreme Court has determined the safe injection is, in the purview of the provinces. (see Section 91, 92, 93, 94 Constitution Act, 1982).
While motivated by both internal and external economic pressures, Chretien Finance Minister Paul Martin discussed the more ideological, non-economic aspects of this effort in an address to the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank:

What we have really launched is a fundamental reappraisal of the appropriate role of the national government. The context for such a reappraisal is an increasingly interdependent global economy where no nation, however powerful, can really control even so basic a parameter as the exchange value of its currency. The truth is that the limits on the ability of governments everywhere to decree social and economic outcomes have become starkly apparent. This has created a dissonance between what we have conditioned our citizens to expect from their governments, and what governments are actually able to deliver. Contradictions abound (Martin, 1995, p.24).

Ongoing urbanization is another of the challenges in addition to the globalizing challenges identified as having an effect on municipalities. Urbanization has implications for the levels, types, and methods of delivery of services moving forward for local governments. The next section considers the implications of urbanization on municipalities and will serve to assist in understanding the influence of regimes on the decision-making processes involved in the development of the post-Expo '86 lands and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

2.14. The Effects of Urbanization on Canada, B.C. and Vancouver

The world is inexorably becoming urban. By 2030 all developing regions, including Asia and Africa, will have more people living in urban than rural areas. In the next 20 years, Homo sapiens, “the wise human”, will become Homo sapiens urbanus in virtually all regions of the planet. (UN – Habitat 2011, p.vii)

It is helpful prior to considering the effects of urbanization on Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver to first understand how it manifests itself from a global perspective. The United Nations’ State of the World Cities Report provides an excellent framework for defining and analyzing the concept of urbanization (UN-Habitat, 2011) which assists one in understanding these effects at the national, provincial and local
levels. The United Nations’ Habitat program defines urbanization as a process: “characterized not only by demographic shifts from rural to urban areas, or by the growth of urban populations, but also by changes in various aspects of society:

- in the employment sector, from agriculture activities to mass production and service industries
- in societal values and modes of governance
- in the configuration and functionality of human settlements
- in the spatial scale, density and activities of places
- in the composition of social, cultural and ethnic groups and the extension of democratic rights, particularly women’s empowerment.

(UN Habitat, 2011, p.ix)

The UN definition recognizes the variable nature of urbanization around the world suggesting that “it [urbanization] takes different forms and its incidence is not uniform” and that “the experiences of diverse countries around the world exhibit some remarkable similarities, as well as distinct differences” (UN-Habitat 2011, p.4). To elaborate on these diverse and similarities “divergent” and “convergent” trends in contemporary urbanization around the globe are discussed:

### 2.14.1. Convergent Trends

- A slower though more pervasive urbanization

The UN notes that population growth over the next 3 decades will be concentrated in urban areas and is “a stark contrast with the pattern that prevailed between 1950 and 1975” in which shifts in population tended to be more equally distributed between urban and rural areas (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.5). The *State of the World Cities Report 2010/2011* also suggests that although urbanization is continuing, the pace of population shifts is slowing so that “the urban population is expected to grow at an average annual rate of roughly 1.5 per cent from 2025 to 2030. This contrasts dramatically with the annual growth rate of over 3 per cent in the immediate post-World War II period. The annual growth rate is projected to be approximately 1.9 per cent in the period between 2010-2015 (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.5).

- Urbanization is strongly linked to the development process
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a direct correlation between a country’s degree of urbanization and its economic health (Un-Habitat, 2011, p.6). The countries with the largest portion of their population in urban centres in relation to the overall population are most likely to have higher per capita incomes and higher GDP. This effect is not only evident when considering or comparing various countries, according to the United Nations the same situation occurs when comparing trends within urbanized and lesser urbanized areas within countries as well.

The following graph shows the relationship between the percentage of population in poverty vs the percentage of population in urban centres in a sampling of 94 countries:
The graph shows an intimate relationship between the percentage of the population in poverty vs the percentage of population that is urbanized. Based on a sampling of 94 countries, as the percentage of the population becomes urbanized, the lower the overall percentage of people in poverty.
Novel urban configurations: Mega-regions, urban corridors and city-regions

Contemporary urbanization has resulted in the ongoing settlement of populations in traditional forms of urban space and has also led to the creation of different and unique models of settlement including “mega-regions, urban corridors and city regions” (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.8).

**Mega-regions**: “natural economic units that result from the growth, convergence and spatial spread of geographically linked metropolitan areas and other agglomerations” that are characterized by “polycentric urban clusters surrounded by low-density hinterlands” that “grow considerably faster than the overall population of the nations in which they are located”

**Urban corridors**: are “characterized by linear systems of urban spaces linked through transportation networks” in “linear development axes that are often linked to a number of megacities, encompassing their hinterlands.” Fringe areas in this model of settlement usually “experience the fastest growth rates and the most rapid urban transformation”

**City-regions**: “dynamic and strategic cities that are “extending beyond their administrative boundaries and integrating their hinterlands” into spatial units that are territorially and functionally bound by economic, political, socio-cultural, and ecological systems.” (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.8; Florida, 2008; Florida et al. 2007; Whebell, 1969).

Suburbanization is becoming more prevalent

Another interesting contemporary effect of ongoing urbanization is the movement of populations, usually young families and middle-aged couples, that move outside the more expensive city cores taking “advantage of accommodation that can be more affordable than in central areas, with lower densities and a better quality of life in certain ways.” This suburbanization has implications for the spatial dimensions of urban centres as populations sprawl outside of traditional metropolitan areas into the hinterland. These implications include:

- increases in the cost of infrastructure

25 This may not be current experience in Vancouver as the downtown core has enjoyed a massive influx of condominium development, including the former Olympic Village, which was turned in to a combination of market and social housing post-Olympics.
• increases in the “costs and inefficiencies of transportation”
• increases in energy consumption
• larger outputs of materials “such as metal, concrete and asphalt because homes, offices and utilities are further apart
• fiscal challenges for central municipal governments
• “significant losses of prime farmland as new developments absorb arable land”
• the “degradation of a number of environmental resources” (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.10; McElfish, 2007).

The UN-Habitat program has also identified several central characteristics of the sprawl that usually accompanies urbanization regardless whether that effect occurs in developed or lesser developed countries:

1. population that is widely scattered in low density developments
2. residential and commercial areas that are spatially separate
3. a network of roads characterized by overstretched blocks and poor access
4. a lack of well-defined thriving activity hubs, such as ‘downtown’ areas characterized
5. overdependence on motorized transport coupled with a lack of alternatives
6. a relative uniformity of housing options
7. pedestrian-unfriendly spaces. (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.10)

2.14.2. Divergent Trends

• No uniform “tipping point”\(^{26}\) across regions

It is clear that certain areas of the world have experienced urbanization at different rates than others. For example, North America boasts the highest proportion of people living in urban areas at 82.1 percent, the next most urbanized regions are Latin America/Caribbean (79.4%) and Europe (72.6%). This dramatically contrasts with Africa and Asia which have the lowest rates of urbanization with 40% and 42.5% urbanized

\(^{26}\) Tipping point refers to the year the percentage of population living in urban areas is larger than the number of people living in rural areas.
populations respectively, “significantly below the global average of 50.6 per cent” (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.13).

- Not all cities in developing nations are experiencing rapid population growth

Most major cities in the developing and developed world have experienced some form of urbanization. There are also exceptions, mostly in developing countries, where there has been “relatively low annual growth rates (1 to 2 per cent)” with “further slowdowns (are) likely over the coming years and even ‘population declines’” (UN-Habitat, 2011, p.13).

The following table provides data those countries that have reached the “tipping point” of urban vs rural population as of 2010 or projects when the region will achieve the point of having more urban than rural residents between 2010 and 2050. This is accompanied with a projection in the final column as to what percentage of the population will be urban as of 2050.
Figure 2.2. Urbanization Level and Tipping Point (Urban vs. Rural Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Tipping point before 2010 (year)</th>
<th>2010 urban (%)</th>
<th>Tipping point after 2010 (year)</th>
<th>2050 urban (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORE DEVELOPED REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESS DEVELOPED REGIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-central Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Before 1950</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UN-Habitat 2011, 12; used with permission).

The following table shows the effects of urbanization globally by indicating the size of the urban population by region, the proportion of total population living in urban areas as a percentage, and the projected urban population rate of change expressed as percentage change per year.
### Table 2.1. Urban Population and Rate of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Urban population (millions)</th>
<th>Proportion of total population living in urban areas (%)</th>
<th>Urban population rate of change (% change per year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>4176</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>1037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other developed countries</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>2556</td>
<td>3108</td>
<td>3863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Africa</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>2086</td>
<td>2517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>1021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least developed countries</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other developing countries</td>
<td>2307</td>
<td>2822</td>
<td>3344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: UN Habitat, 2011, p.3; used with permission).

In North America the proportion of population of people living in urban centres by 2030 is projected to be 86.7%, and the urban population in North America will reach $355 million. It is noticeable that the least developed countries that will maintain a rate of urbanization 3.5 times that of North America to 2030 reflecting the notion that urbanization flows are variable among nations.

Similar urbanizing effects are evident when considering the Canadian case – this is projected to continue. The following table shows the city populations of Canada’s six most populous metropolitan areas projected outward to 2025 and the growth rate of those cities in five year increments also to 2025.  

---

27 Vancouver’s totals reflect those of metropolitan Vancouver which includes that 24 municipal entities of Metro Vancouver (the former Greater Vancouver Regional District).
Table 2.2. City Population of Urban Agglomerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>City Population</th>
<th>City Population Growth Rate of Urban Agglomerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>2000-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>2010-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2015-2020</td>
<td>2020-2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2025-2030</td>
<td>2030-2035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>667</td>
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</table>

(Source: UN-Habitat, 2011, p.167; used with permission).
The data shows that the most populous Canadian metropolitan areas will continue to grow albeit at diminishing rates to 2025 and that there is variability, consistent with the findings of the UN, as to the variability among Canadian metropolitan centres as to the rate of projected urbanization to 2025.

The urbanization effect in Canada is not limited to national or metropolitan areas, the following table shows the urbanization of British Columbia between 1851 and 2011 indicating both the urban and rural populations.
### Table 2.3. Canadian Population by Urban and Rural, 2011 Census of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (Urban)</th>
<th>Population (Rural)</th>
<th>Urban (% of total population)</th>
<th>Rural (% of total population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1861</td>
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<td>1871</td>
<td>36,247</td>
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<td>32,977</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>49,459</td>
<td>9,070</td>
<td>40,389</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>98,173</td>
<td>37,228</td>
<td>60,945</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>178,657</td>
<td>90,179</td>
<td>88,478</td>
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<td>1911</td>
<td>392,480</td>
<td>203,684</td>
<td>188,796</td>
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<td>524,582</td>
<td>247,562</td>
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<td>1931</td>
<td>694,263</td>
<td>394,739</td>
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<td>817,863</td>
<td>443,394</td>
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<td>1,398,464</td>
<td>1,026,467</td>
<td>371,997</td>
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<td>1961</td>
<td>1,629,082</td>
<td>1,181,925</td>
<td>447,157</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>1,873,674</td>
<td>1,410,493</td>
<td>463,181</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>1,654,405</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>2,466,610</td>
<td>1,897,086</td>
<td>569,524</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>2,744,467</td>
<td>2,190,411</td>
<td>554,056</td>
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<td>598,365</td>
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<td>641,922</td>
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<td>3,057,388</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>3,309,853</td>
<td>597,885</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>4,113,487</td>
<td>3,511,300</td>
<td>602,187</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>4,400,057</td>
<td>3,790,694</td>
<td>609,363</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

Starting with the 2011 Census, the term ‘population centre’ replaces the term ‘urban area.’ For more information, please see the note titled ‘From urban areas to population centres available on our website, explaining the use of population centres.

The rural population for 1981 to 2011 refers to persons living outside centres with a population of 1,000 AND outside areas with 400 persons per square kilometre. Previous to 1981, the definitions differed slightly but consistently referred to populations outside centres of 1,000 persons.

**Source:** Statistics Canada, 2011 Census of Population.

Last modified: 2011-02-04.
Tindal, Tindal, Stewart, and Smith (2013) suggest that there are several reasons for the population flows toward urban centres throughout the country’s history – the most important being government policy. These include those focused on immigration (both federal and provincial levels and settlement patterns), industry, housing, transportation, and economic policy:

**Immigration Policy**

- Under the division of powers in the Canadian constitution, the federal government is mostly responsible for immigration in the country. The country relies on immigration to maintain its population and Tindal and Tindal et al. suggest that this was “one of the chief reasons for Canadian urbanization” (p.67). Canadian governments have “been an international leader in developing policies and practices to manage ethno-cultural diversity and integrate immigrants.” (Good, 2009, p.4).

- Canada’s government has pursued fairly consistent levels of immigration and ethnic enclaves have developed by immigrants to assist with settlement and integration into Canadian society since Confederation. In addition, successive governments, particularly post-1971, sought to find ways of accommodating many ethnocultural minorities into the Canadian society, initiating the policy of “multiculturalism.” (Good, 2009, p.4).

Immigrants contribute to urbanization as they are much more prone to settle in larger urban centres. Figure 2.3 shows this effect:
This effect that shows most immigrants to the country gravitate to the larger urban centres has implications for the Vancouver case as the immigrant population of the city continues to grow as a percentage of the overall population.
In addition, the Canadian federal government’s shift in the early 1970’s toward greater immigration from Asian countries is significant to Vancouver as there is a large Asian diaspora in the city. The following table indicates the various sources of immigration to Metro Vancouver:
Table 2.4. **Place of Birth of Recent & Established Immigrants to Metro Vancouver, 2001-2011**

(Source: Statistics Canada, 2011, National Household Survey; public domain)

This table shows a comparison between recent immigrants (migrated between 2001 and 2011) and established immigrants who came to Metro Vancouver before 2001. As an example of the strength of Chinese immigration to the area 25% of recent immigrants were born in China.
immigrants and 17.4% of established immigrant population in Metro Vancouver came to the area from China.

**Table 2.5. **Total Population by Immigrant Status and Place of Birth, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population by immigrant status and place of birth - 2006</th>
<th>571,600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrants</td>
<td>292,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born in province of residence</td>
<td>188,740</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born outside province of residence</td>
<td>104,025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>260,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>8,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>4,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean and Bermuda</td>
<td>1,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>3,695</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>7,465</td>
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<td>10,645</td>
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<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>13,120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Southern Europe</td>
<td>8,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>15,795</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>13,895</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Northern Europe</td>
<td>1,895</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5,885</td>
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<td>Western Africa</td>
<td>325</td>
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<td>Central Africa</td>
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<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>2,145</td>
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<td>Asia and the Middle East</td>
<td>184,930</td>
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<td>West Central Asia and the Middle East</td>
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<td>118,855</td>
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<td>China, People’s Republic of</td>
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<td>Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region</td>
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<td>Other Eastern Asia</td>
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<td>Southeast Asia</td>
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<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>16,070</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12,920</td>
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<td>Other Southern Asia</td>
<td>3,150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oceania and other</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Statistics Canada 2006; public domain).
This table itemizes the place of birth of residents of the City of Vancouver as of 2006 indicating a large population from Asia. This is significant as one of the focuses of Expo ‘86 was to show off to the world the City of Vancouver and British Columbia, with a strong diaspora in Vancouver of residents from Asia, the ability to use the fair as a selling tool was enhanced. Two other points are of interest here, the purchaser Li Ka-shing came from Hong Kong and Expo preceded a large influx of Asian money and immigration into the Vancouver region, particularly from China as Britain handed over Hong Kong to China in 1997.

**Industrial policy**

It was the traditional approach by Canadian federal governments to implement a series of tariff policies, “National Policies” that sought to protect several manufacturing sectors and led to the agglomeration of populations into urban areas such as Quebec City, Windsor, Montreal and Toronto.

A recent approach by both the Canadian federal and British Columbia provincial governments has been focused on the development of the Asia-Pacific Gateway which has significant implications for the economy of Vancouver. This strategy has seen investments of billions of dollars being spent by Western provincial and the federal government as well as private business interests in transportation infrastructure to develop “the most efficient and competitive multi-modal transportation system on the North American west coast” (Pacific Gateway Action Plan 2006, 1). The long term strategy is to shift the focus of imports/exports from north to south toward burgeoning markets in Asia offering a tremendous economic benefit to Vancouver.

**Housing Policy**

Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith (2013); Goldrick (1982) and Fallis (1994) suggest that the Government of Canada used the development of urban centres as “a prime instrument of public policy to stimulate and maintain high levels of economic activity” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith 2013, 68) Goldrick (1982), Fallis (1994). Specifically, the use of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to provide “federal financial assistance for single family dwellings reinforced low density sprawl” and was
instrumental in the ongoing urbanization of the country (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.68).

in the context of Vancouver and the development of the former Expo '86 lands on False Creek in Vancouver - the development of Granville Island was managed through CMHC and today the federal authority maintains and manages the development on behalf of the federal government:

The redevelopment of Granville Island was initiated by the federal government in 1972 to create, foster and maintain a unique urban oasis in the heart of Vancouver. In the same year, the administration, management and control of the revitalization of Granville Island was transferred to CMHC by Order-in-Council, as CMHC was already deeply involved in an innovative housing development in the area and it had experience in urban renewal and the skilled resources necessary to carry out the challenge. (CMHC, np.)

In a personal interview with the former federal Deputy Minister for Urban Affairs, the late Peter Oberlander, he described Granville Island before and after CMHC’s intervention, stating that the site was nothing more than an industrial dumping ground – today Granville Island is a pivotal part of a massive rejuvenation of the formerly industrialized False Creek area and along with the development of the former Expo '86 lands forms the anchor for massive residential and commercial development that has attracted residents and visitors (Oberlander interview).

**Transportation Policy**

- Canada followed along with the American example of considerable government resources to the development of suburban centres based on the automobile and commuting to employment throughout metropolitan areas. This both facilitated sprawl and its concomitant exploitation of the environment that continues to this day.

- one of the main themes of Expo '86 was to showcase improvements in rapid transit technology and to promote the use of light rail (what turned out to be Skytrain) in Metro Vancouver. The original $600 million dollar Expo line was intimately connected to the fair and was one of the legacies championed by Mayor Harcourt (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.110.) Harcourt also successfully negotiated a land swap at the
eastern end of the Expo lands and worked with the fair to construct a new Cambie Bridge which is a lasting legacy to the movement of people in and out of Vancouver.28

**Economic Policy**

- Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith (2013, p.69; Lorimer, 1981; Bradford, 2002) also suggest that federal government economic policy that placed the development of metropolitan economies based on resource exploitation and branch plant industry worked alongside the adoption of Keynesian economic policy to help facilitate population shifts to urban centres.

- in the context of Expo ’86 the Bennett government’s efforts at promoting the fair to a worldwide audience was a government policy intended to generate economic activity during a recession. The hope was that the construction jobs realized through BC Place and Expo site; the economic activity of visitors during the fair; and the eventual sale or development of the former Expo ’86 lands would provide an economic benefit to the city and the province.

As Tindal, Tindal et al. note government policy at all levels has contributed to urban centres in Canada becoming increasingly urbanized. In the case of Vancouver it has been a combination of actions taken by governments of all levels in the areas of immigration, industrial policy, housing policy, transportation policy and economic policy that has contributed to the urbanization of Vancouver. Nowhere in Vancouver is it more evident that the city continues to grow than in the area of the former Expo ’86 lands.

Urbanization has affected Canadian municipal government particularly post-World War II. As mentioned previously, most of the country’s population settled in a very narrow ribbon across the country with most of the population within a couple of hundred kilometres from the U.S. border or in southern Ontario and Quebec. Most of Canada’s population can be found in one of the major metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. Lightbody and others suggest that the centralization of population in cities has resulted in Canada becoming “one of the most urbanized

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28 Expo ’86 contributed $12 million, the City of Vancouver raised $40 million as a capital-works effort that had 76% support in a referendum, while the Province declined to participate.
countries (80 per cent) in the world” arguing further that the urbanization in the country “occurred with such rapidity and unpremeditated design following the Second World War that both governing and many other social institutions of the city have yet to adapt well to changing circumstances” (Lightbody, 2006, p.27).

Sancton recognizes the effects of increasing urbanization on Canadian cities suggesting that such pressures have “profound implications for government at all levels” (Sancton, 2011, p.86). Sancton takes an outward- looking view to Canadian cities (which he argues determines the “quality of life for Canadians”) when he suggests that the effects of urbanization and other pressures, such as globalization, forces one to “pay more attention to cities” particularly with regard to “how our cities will fit in the global network.”(Sancton, 2011, p.84).

Despite recognizing the importance of cities and their international context Sancton is reticent to accept that municipal governments have any real importance moving forward in insuring global success when he suggests that “municipalities, through their control over the built environment, can take some action to make their cities more attractive or less attractive to creative entrepreneurs, …they cannot bring the ocean to Winnipeg or ski hills to Toronto” (Sancton, 2011, p.85).

The process of urbanization has both negative and positive effects if one considers the social and economic importance of Canadian cities to the overall country. Growth is accompanied with “associate social and economic benefits” while increasingly densely populated cities “brings a great many challenges” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.74). These positive aspects of increased urbanization include the important social and economic roles cities have played throughout Canadian history. It is in the cities where the bulk of the country’s GDP is created, where the national economy is managed, where the majority of provincial and federal tax revenues are generated, and where the “increasingly rich and diverse environments, cultural and creative activities, distinctive neighbourhoods, and high quality public services including education and health care” that are important to Canadians can be found (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith 2013, p.73).
H.V. Savitch, writing in Administration and Society, points to the challenges for local government faced with ongoing urbanization in the 21st century.

Government, particularly local institutions, will have to generate new ideas to keep or gain a competitive advantage. Government will have to exact greater efficiencies to attract investment and work with consummate skill to mitigate disparities and avoid social unrest. Not the least, localities will have to be more accountable if they are to satisfy citizens, maintain popular legitimacy, and cope with daily pressures.


Savitch is correct, urbanization has, and will challenge municipalities to “generate new ideas” and “exact greater efficiencies” in order to prosper as the effect continues throughout the 21st century. It is suggested in this dissertation that ongoing urbanization is another of the challenges in addition to the globalizing challenges identified as having an effect on municipalities in general and in Vancouver specifically. Urbanization has had, and will likely continue to have implications for the levels, types, and methods of delivery of services moving forward in the city. Governments of all levels have embarked on a variety of programs and policies directed at accommodating urbanization tied to immigration, industry, housing, economics and transportation. This is significant to Vancouver during the two eras analyzed in this dissertation, the development of the former Expo’86 lands was tied to provincial economic and city development policies, for example, while the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement was part of a federal, provincial, and local effort to improve the socio-economic situation for citizens and assist in making Vancouver a more livable city.

2.15. Summary

This section has considered the effects of urbanization on Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver to help build a foundation for analysis of the creation and influence of regimes on the decision-making processes of municipal government. Along with forces of globalization, including the adoption of neo-liberal agendas, urbanization has impacted the ways municipalities develop, the nature of the outcomes that are produced, and what are their governance priorities. The next section will consider a third important influence on municipal government in Vancouver and elsewhere – the
increasing complexity of local decision-making and greater entanglement of local, provincial and federal governments in that regard (multi-level governance).

### 2.16. The Effects of Increasing Multi-Level Governance

**Canada, B.C. and Vancouver**

Problems generated by the spread of AIDS, CFCs, AK47s and opiates demanded action in forms that recognized the place of cities within a world that was not governed from Ottawa. This pointed towards a new connectedness that put civic leaders in the midst of struggles over cultural diversity, environmental purity, personal security, private morality, and human rights. It also enhanced the belief that every place had to find its own niche within the global economy, where it could be reasonably secure in a world of increasing instability. Places aspired to become corporate control centres, playgrounds for the rich, or havens for the upper middle class. However, the displaced and the impoverished were also drawn to those nodes of wealth and power, so that the inequalities and injustices of the global order were replicated locally.

(Magnusson, 1994, p.534).

The division of powers in sections 91 & 92 of the *Constitution Act*, 1982, establish the areas of jurisdiction for the federal and provincial governments of Canada. Of consequence to municipalities can be found in Section 92(8) which states “In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say …municipal institutions in the Province.” Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith (2013) point to two consequences of this “constitutional and legislative framework:"

- **1.** Municipal governments are not enshrined in the constitution as independent orders of government (that is, there is no section in the constitution listing powers exclusively held by municipal governments so they cannot be taken away by other levels of government). Provinces and territories have complete control over the existence and form of their municipal governments.

- **2.** As the powers to make laws regarding municipal institutions are set out as exclusive to provinces, the national government cannot overturn or add to provincial laws regarding municipal governments (pp.228-230).

Sancton also discusses the lack of recognition of the municipal level of government in the Canadian constitution and that municipalities are essentially “creatures of the provinces” noting that municipalities “rely on the provinces for their
legal existence” (Sancton, 2011, p.27). In addition, “provincial governments passed legislation that provided for the kinds of municipalities that could be incorporated, their governing structures, functions and financial resources” as well as “detailing what municipalities could do – and often how they could do it – in what was commonly described as a “laundry list” approach. For example, the Vancouver Charter contains 614 sections outlining the municipality of Vancouver’s powers over issues ranging from the holding of municipal elections to dog catching regulations” (Vancouver Charter, 1953).29 Further, Sancton contrasts the Canadian system with that of the United States’ that features both “home rule” and “Dillon’s law”30 models of local government. In the Canadian case, municipal governments are usually governed under “municipal acts” that identify local government powers by “granting municipal governments various forms of general jurisdiction over a relatively wide range of subjects related to local affairs” (Sancton, 2011, p.29).

For Robert Young, “provincial governments create them (municipalities), regulate them, prescribe many policies they implement, and, not infrequently, eliminate them through amalgamation” (Young, 2013, p.1).31 Young suggests that “municipalities have a difficult time competing” in the “intergovernmental world” given their constitutional position and “relatively weak financial position” (Young, 2013, p.1/2).

Spending by local governments makes up 4.1% of Canadian GDP, while the 2009 average for the 29 OECD countries for which data are available was 12.2% (calculated from OECD, 2012, Table 2). In Canada, most “senior” governments have not allocated to municipalities access to tax bases that grow with the economy, notably

29 The Charter, which is a provincial statute, grants the City of Vancouver different and more powers than those enjoyed by other municipalities in the Province of British Columbia – the Charter is considered more fully in the history of the Vancouver municipal government in the next sections of the dissertation. The Vancouver Charter can be accessed at http://vancouver.ca/your-government/the-vancouver-charter.aspx.

30 “Home rule” is the arrangement in the United States that allows individual states to allow powers to cities to pass statutes as they wish as long as they do not conflict with state or federal rights. The “Dillon’s law” model constrains the powers of the city to those areas of jurisdiction that the state explicitly provides to the local government. See Sancton 2011, 29 for a further description of the two models.

31 Robert Young led a large Canadian 7-year research program that considered multil-level governance in Canada which I was a researcher on considering the divestiture of Canadian ports to arms-length authorities.
sales taxes and the income tax. As a consequence, local governments are unusually
dependent on the property tax and related taxes, which account for about 50% of total
revenue and 62% of own-source revenue (Sancton & Young, 2009, p.502). Other
revenues come mostly from the sale of goods and services and from transfers, which
are overwhelmingly from the provinces and largely conditional.

Young (2013) does suggest that Canadian municipalities do have “some
resources” despite this lack of constitutional standing and financial constraints:

• 1. Information about the locality
• 2. Monopoly of expertise in some areas, particularly land-use planning and
   zoning
• 3. Extensive linkages with organized interests at the local level
• 4. Increased powers that have started to be granted through special charters
   increase the autonomy of larger cities. (p.2)

Young also points to the role of lobbying as one of the root causes of “real
change in the federal stance toward municipalities” in addition to “deep background
factors –demographic change, technological innovation, shifts in political culture, and the
economic re-structuring occasioned by deeper globalization” (Young, 2013, p.2).

The position taken in this dissertation is that it was a series of “structural
adjustments” made within Canadian society, following the lead of countries such as the
United States and Britain in the 80’s and 90’s that featured social safety net cuts,
corporate tax cuts, de-regulation, and other, at times draconian, funding and service
reductions in the name of neoliberal solutions to the economy and society. In this
context of the adoption of neo-liberal policies the principle of subsidiarity was the most
insidious program senior governments followed in Canada and other federal states. The
principle of subsidiarity has its roots in German basic law and was a guiding principle of
the Treaty of Maastricht, a precursor to the current treaties that guide the European
union. The principle refers to the notion that jurisdiction should be placed with the
“lowest” level of government that is able to provide the service, for a Canadian
discussion of the given the country’s federal structure see Bakvis, H. (2013) “In the
shadows of hierarchy”: Intergovernmental governance in Canada and the European
Union. In the context of the downloading, budget-cutting and adoption of neo-liberal
policies that occurred in many countries during the 80’s and 90’s the off-loading of
responsibilities for aspects of the social safety net without accompanying resources by senior government was pervasive - subsidiarity could only be viewed as a pejorative.

Particularly since the adoption of neo-liberal principles by both the Canadian federal government and British Columbia provincial government, alongside the pressures of globalization and urbanization previously discussed in this dissertation, there became a necessity for, and a reality that, municipal governments would increasingly become entangled with both provincial and federal governments regardless of the constitutionalized division of powers in the Constitution. Instances of direct collaboration among federal, provincial, municipal (and in the case of Vancouver regional) governments outside of the traditional structure of intergovernmental relationships, have intensified as pressures increase from local citizens demanding more and better services from “below” and senior governments abandoning their traditional responsibilities for social services (such as housing) and downloading responsibility to municipal government.

Multi-level governance was first discussed in the British context in the writing of Gary Marks who used the term to “capture developments in EU structural policy following its major reform in 1988” to describe the burgeoning integration of local, regional, national and supranational actors within the structures of the European Union (Bache & Flinders, 2004, p.2; Marks, 1992). Marks defined multilevel governance as: “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Bache & Flinders, 2004: p.392; Marks, 1992). To Marks, “‘Multi-level’ referred to the increased interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels, while ‘governance’ signalled the growing interdependence between governments and nongovernmental actors at various territorial levels” (Bache & Flinders, 2004, p.3; Marks, 1992). Marks and Hooghe claim that:

governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities. Because externalities arising from the provision of public goods vary immensely—from planet-wide in the case of global warming to local in the case of most city services—so should the scale of governance. To internalize externalities, governance must be multi-level. (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p.16)
Considering how municipal governments function without paying attention to the complexity of what is being done at the local and the level of entanglement with other “more senior governments” is to miss what is really occurring within the decision-making processes of municipalities in the country today. The multi-level governance that occurred around the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is an excellent example of how complex decision-making is today at the municipal level of government in Canada.\textsuperscript{32}

The creation of the \textit{Vancouver Agreement} \textsuperscript{33} is an excellent, yet complex, example of how a municipal government can set a public policy goal, reach out to governments at both the provincial levels to collaborate and in many ways succeed. The formation of the governance structure behind the agreement was based on Urban Development Agreements that had been negotiated between local, provincial and federal authorities in Winnipeg, Regina and Saskatoon. The Office of the Auditor General for Canada noted a significant difference in the Vancouver Agreement, however while recognizing the value of the multi-lateral arrangement among the three levels of government:

We find a promising governance model in the Vancouver Agreement, where the provincial, municipal, and federal governments are working together to meet community needs. The approach was developed from the ground up and evolved from an unfunded initiative with an agreement to collaborate to one that is funded.

This initiative differs from the other two because it is both a tripartite and a horizontal initiative. It involves three levels of government – federal, provincial and municipal. In 2000 they came together and signed an agreement to address urban decay in Vancouver’s downtown east side. For its first three years the agreement was unfunded. In 2003 funds were identified and announced but funding did not flow until 2004. In 2005 the agreement was renewed with the aim to:

\textsuperscript{32} The full details of the case will be discussed within the “Cases” section of the dissertation, however, the overarching process is brought forward here as an excellent example of the complexity of local government and the multi-level nature of governance in a Canadian municipality today.

\textsuperscript{33} The development of the Four Pillars Strategy was a parallel process that involved a different governance model than the Vancouver Agreement. This is discussed more fully in the Cases section of the dissertation.
• create a healthy, safe and sustainable community;
• promote economic and social development; and
• build community capacity and partnerships among the public, private, not-for-profit, and voluntary sectors  (Office of the Auditor General, 2005, pp. 2/6).

Multi-level governance involved in the Vancouver Agreement was evident in several ways:

• 1. The City of Vancouver had to marshal community support for the initiative including community groups, business associations, and the general public and do so without initial funding. The lack of funding was unique to the Vancouver Agreement when compared to the other Urban Development Agreements. For example, in the Winnipeg UDA $25 million in funding was provided in support of the agreement. The situation was abruptly changed in April 2003 when the three governments announced an investment of $20 million in the Vancouver Agreement. Funding was initiated by the provincial government which had, as part of its Olympic bid, made a commitment to create a $10 million legacy for the downtown eastside (DTES) (Macleod Institute 2003, 9).

City staff, “worked off the edge of their desks” in support of the many programs under the Vancouver Agreement, however, a small multi-departmental group did form under the direction of the City Manager Judy Rogers and Asst. City Manager Wendy Au. “The City of Vancouver’s contribution was in-kind through administration, financial, legal, facilities, and dedicated staff resources working with the community to implement program activities” (Vancouver Agreement, “Highlights”, 9). In addition, the Vancouver Agreement involved in the Vancouver Agreement was evident in several ways:

• 1. The City of Vancouver had to marshal community support for the initiative including community groups, business associations, and the general public and do so without initial funding.34 In the mid-1990’s Neighbourhood Integrated Service Teams (NIST) were established by the City of Vancouver to go into the community and seek information on how best to:

  • - Ensure accessible, efficient, effective and friendly service and delivery;
  • - Establish approaches at a neighbourhood level on issues and service;
  • - Involve the community in issue identification and problem-solving;
  • - Result in creative, collaborative problem solving; and
  • - Provide the community ready access to City Information (Macleod, 2003, p.9).

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35 A phrase used by Wendy Au in a personal interview to describe how bureaucrats would be seconded to Vancouver Agreement activities without funding and maintaining their ordinary job requirements. It was not until funding was provided was there even a secretariat to logistically support the Agreement.

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Health Board (now Coastal Health) and Vancouver Police Department played active roles in support of the Agreement.

• 2. The provincial contribution to the Vancouver Agreement was led by the Ministry of Community and Rural Development and included providing assistance to numerous programs covered under the Vancouver Agreement through B.C. Housing, the Ministry of Housing and Social Development, B.C. Ministry of Health, among others. The province provided a total of $18.6 million over the ten years of the Agreement, particularly as the 2010 Olympics approached.  (Vancouver Agreement “Highlights,” 2010, p9)

• 3. The federal effort was facilitated through Western Diversification, Health Canada and Service Canada with $10 million in funding coming from Western Economic Diversification Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Health Canada and Status of Women Canada (Western Diversification 2010, 4) and other departments. In addition, $5 million was provided through the Urban Aboriginal and Urban Aboriginal Homelessness programs.  (p.9)

There was a desire to involve community actors in a formal way, however, this proved difficult as Edelson (2010) notes:

Some community groups expected to have a seat at the VA management table, but this was not the intention of the governments. This was in part due to differences of priorities among the governments which would take to reconcile. It was also due to what proved to be almost irreconcilable divisions within the community. These conditions made difficult to bring a coherent community voice to that table in a way that would address the concerns of the different groups in an honourable or timely way.  (p.153).

The overall governance structure that coordinated Vancouver Agreement activities involved representatives from all three levels of government comprising the Governance Committee; Management Committee; Planning Table; and 4 Task teams responsible for Economic Revitalization, Safety & Security, Housing, and Health & Quality of Life (Vancouver Agreement “Highlights,” 2010, p.3).

The benefits of the programs provided through the Vancouver Agreement are discussed in the Cases section of this dissertation; however, for the purposes of this discussion of multilevel governance Edelson’s comments are pertinent when he discusses the long term benefits to the governance structure supporting the Vancouver Agreement:
The VA helped to build relationships between people in different branches of government, which resulted in increased collaboration and strategic decision-making. These relationships did not always result in programming that was implemented under the auspices of the VA, but it changed how some of the staff in the different branches of government approached their work.

In some instances, the relationships developed through the VA, or informally ‘in the spirit of the VA,’ was expected to be important for the creation of future programs. The VA experience has provided a significant number of staff with expanded contacts in the other governments as well as concrete examples of how they can work across bureaucratic boundaries. (Edelson, 2010, pp.158/159)

The need for multilevel solutions to major city issues is a necessary condition for achieving good public policy in Canada’s municipalities today as shown by the cooperation and collaboration inherent in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. Smith and Stewart (2004) suggest that some cities, Vancouver among them, have assumed a higher level of assertiveness in the areas of local government they take part in and in doing so are much more aggressive in finding innovative ways of providing services for local citizens. They also suggest that cities can be placed along a continuum of just how aggressive or non-aggressive they are in seeking out opportunities for their citizens. Smith and Stewart (2004) term such cities “Eager Beavers.”

The assertiveness of these eager beavers is sometimes matched with federal government that is “preoccupied with dealing with local social and economic issues” although the federal government “has not, however, consistently seen local governments as a potential participant in policy development or the implementation of federal initiatives with a local focus. Katherine Graham noted that efforts toward greater integration of municipal, provincial and federal governments “have variously had a negative or positive effect on the provincial-municipal relationship” and that the federal government “is exerting an influence on the structure and operation of municipal governments” through national programs such as the “National Homelessness Initiative and through is participation in tri-level specific initiatives” (Graham, 2010, p.222). She
notes that despite “constitutional niceties” the ad hoc interactions that occur do “have direct federal-municipal impacts” (Graham, 2010, p.222).³⁶

Of importance to this dissertation, Graham notes that the Vancouver Agreement represented an effort in collaboration among the federal, provincial and municipal governments that:

…attempt(ed) to deal with the Downtown Eastside through both vertical and horizontal collaboration. It is tri-level – a significant achievement. But each level of government has committed to deploying the necessary resources across its own domain to understand and deal with the complex mix of problems being confronted. Social workers will work with police, with immigration officers, with employment counsellors, and so on. Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is a work in progress. Not surprisingly, there have been challenges. They include integrating different organizational and professional cultures and synchronizing different organizational procedures. The transaction costs of managing the agreement are very high, the agreement is generally considered a model and a foundation for replication in other Canadian cities. In 2005 the Vancouver Agreement received a U.N. Public Service Award – one of only eight awarded worldwide (Graham, 2010, p.230; Vancouver Agreement).

Local governments in the 21st century, in Canada, are today faced with the challenge of having to "promote free expression of individual opinions and, at the same time, social debate and consensus-building" combined with additional pressures for the efficient provision of increasingly complex services. Municipalities are also faced with the dilemma identified by Peter Self (1977) in the 1970’s: “the tensions between the requirements of responsibility - or accountability - and those of efficient action [that] can reasonably be described as the classic dilemma in public administration.” For Self, these competing values represent “a dilemma which has grown … considerably more complex with the passage of time”(pp.277/278). Increased attention is today being paid to consultation, citizen deliberations, public hearings, media information campaigns alongside the democratic criteria of transparency, responsibility, accountability and just

³⁶ The creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is not consistent with this notion of hesitancy to include municipal government as “a potential participant in policy development or in the implementation of federal initiatives with a local focus. In the case of the VA it was local actors, government and non-government working together in a regime to develop programs under the Agreement.
governance, superimposed on increasingly complex and service provision demands of municipal governments across Canada.

Graham points to the inevitability of inter-governmental cooperation in the Canadian context when suggesting:

The idea that federal and provincial governments in Canada could operate in “watertight compartments” has proven impossible to realize. Similarly, recent efforts by some provinces to simplify responsibilities and fiscal relations between themselves and municipal governments have been difficult to sustain. Perhaps the reality in the Canadian context is that government is messy and entangled. The real limits of what any level of government can do to deal with a particular issue or realize a policy agenda are circumscribed by the need to engage other governments and sectors of society. From a municipal intergovernmental relations perspective, that does mean that almost anything is an intergovernmental issue. (Graham, 2010, p.235)

Analysis of the efficacy of the community power models, along with the considering the combination of the effects of globalization (including the adoption of neo-liberal agendas), ongoing urbanization, and increasing complexity of issues facing local governments that necessitate greater multilevel governance provides a great basis for examining the influences on the decision-making processes of municipal government in Vancouver. The two cases under consideration – the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands are good examples where those elements of community power theory is evident three challenges have affected the policy outcomes of a municipal government. These effects are considered more fully in the Findings and Analysis section of this dissertation.

The next section of the dissertation links the current challenges to the decision-making processes of municipalities such as Vancouver to the historical roots of how local government was created in Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver. This discussion will help inform a comparison of how local regimes of government and non-government actors are created and influence municipal outcomes.
3. **Context**

This section of the dissertation turns toward the cases under consideration, the development of the former Expo '86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement, by first providing a profile of the city including technical information such as population, date of incorporation, etc. This is followed in the section by a survey of the history of municipal government in Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver so one can have as complete a picture as possible for the consideration of the two cases.

3.1. **Vancouver Profile**

This section provides basic, technical information for the City of Vancouver, British Columbia case to build a foundation for the further consideration of the effects of urban regimes in the development of the post-Expo '86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

The City of Vancouver was incorporated by the British Columbia legislature with the passing of the *Vancouver Incorporation Act*, on April 6, 1886. The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) initially extended only to Port Moody, with an expansion to Coal Harbour, the municipality was incorporated and a “population boom immediately ensued (Bish, 2008, p.22). The next year Vancouver became the “western terminus for the completed CPR" and the municipality started providing services to the citizenry of about 8,000 people including: “streets, wooden paving, waterworks, and sewers” (Bish, 2008, p.22). Despite a devastating fire that occurred a mere four months after its founding the city steadily grew as the largest population centre on the west coast of Canada particularly because of the expansion of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and primary industries such as lumber and fishing. Today, the city is a major commercial and trade centre
(becoming known as the Asia Pacific Gateway) with a strong service-based economy, plenty of corporate head offices, large port and a thriving tourist industry.

The City of Vancouver’s population in 2011 was 651,048\textsuperscript{37} making Vancouver the most populous of the 24 local authorities (22 municipalities, one electoral area, and one Treaty First Nation) that are members of the regional district of Metro Vancouver (Metro, 2013, np.). The regional governance body, Metro, “deliver(s) regional services, policy and political leadership” to its members over an area of “282,000 hectares and covers a distance of 96 km from Maple Ridge to Bowen Island.” The population of Metro which includes most of the Lower Mainland of British Columbia is approximately 2.3 million people (Metro).

Vancouver is governed under British Columbia provincial legislation known as the \textit{Vancouver Charter} which was passed in 1953 to replace the \textit{Vancouver Incorporation Act}, 1921 and \textit{Vancouver Enabling Act}, 1949 (Vancouver Charter “Preamble”).

The Charter sets out the city’s powers regarding licensing, business taxation, public works, buildings, fire prevention and control, electrical and gas works, street traffic, the airport, health, cemeteries, policing, parks, heritage conservation, along with the powers of the Vancouver City Council, the duties of the Mayor, Director of Finance, City Clerk, City Treasurer, and Auditors, as well as numerous other governmental powers. The City of Vancouver has additional responsibilities for business taxation, public works, and planning that are unique from other municipalities’ powers (Smith, Ginnell & Black, 2010, pp.253/255).

The Charter also provides a governance framework for the city including the powers of the Mayor and 10 Councillors, all of which are elected via at-large elections. The municipality of Vancouver is effectively under the control of the Province of British Columbia, as with all Canadian municipalities, due to the Canadian federal/provincial division of powers (specifically Section 92(8) in the \textit{Constitution Act}, 1982). The Vancouver Charter provides the city with autonomy in several governance areas that

\textsuperscript{37} This was a 1.3 increase over 2010 (Stats Canada).
other municipalities in British Columbia do not enjoy including “matters of civic structure, procedure and operation relating to formal aspects of decision-making and distribution of power” (Tennant, 1980, p.5). The presence of the Charter motivates a “firm tradition or convention that major changes in the formal aspects of decision-making and in the distribution of the civic power must be approved by popular plebiscites” (Tennant, 1980, p.5).

Vancouver’s economy is quite diverse – its economy has also experienced “rapid structural change” evolving from “a service centre for the province’s resource economy to a dynamic urban centre with strong, multi-faceted international connections that have strengthened dramatically with the rise of the economies of Asia Pacific” (Vancouver Economic Development Commission, nd., p.4). Vancouver’s largest employers are related to “providing services to the local population” while its export oriented sectors are focused on limited manufacturing; tourism; professional, scientific and technical services, arts, entertainment and recreation; and financial services predominating. A “comparatively high proportion (5.7 per cent) of people work in the transportation industry” which is a reflection of Vancouver’s role as a “global gateway” through its large port, airport and proximity to the United States (Vancouver Economic Development Commission, nd., p.5).

The City of Vancouver has held two major world events in the last twenty five years, the 2010 Winter Olympic games and Expo ’86, both have served to increase the international profile of the city as a destination for tourists – visitors come from all over the world and enjoy the city’s vibrant, multicultural nature.

The following section takes an historical turn and contributes an outline of how municipal government developed in Canada, British Columbia and Vancouver. The combination of the previously considered theoretical models, contemporary pressures, and history of the development of municipalities, should be considered alongside the technical profile of Vancouver provided in this section to provide a great point of departure for analyzing the two eras of decision-making in the city – the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands. The first step in the next section considers the history of municipal government in Canada.
3.1.1. History of Municipal Government – Canada, British Columbia, Vancouver

Canadian municipal government has evolved throughout time resulting in the various types of local government structures, such as villages, towns, regional districts, cities, metropolitan centres, etc. (varying from province to province) present throughout the country today. It is helpful to analyze the literature considering the history and influences on Canadian municipal government to develop a foundation for understanding its’ contemporary form and function and to use that for the type of analysis that forms part of this dissertation. Ultimately, this historical analysis will assist this thesis by providing a basis for considering the role of urban regimes within Vancouver’s municipal government.

3.1.2. History of Municipal Government – Canada

It is helpful to analyze the literature considering the history and influences on Canadian municipal government to develop a foundation for understanding its’ contemporary form and function and to help identifying the nuances of the various different local government models in the country. This analysis necessarily begins by discussing the constitutional foundation of Canadian municipal government.

Canadian municipal government is recognized under the country’s Constitution Act, 1867 (Section 92) and the Constitution Act, 1982 although not as a separate, distinct level of government. Municipalities function under the direct supervision and direction of their respective provincial government although many of the larger cities are increasingly gaining more autonomy through the granting of powers similar to those in the Vancouver Charter\(^\text{38}\). The literature on local government usually refers to Canadian municipalities as “creatures of the province” which is an unfortunate label as it understates the importance of cities - where much of the country’s population lives, where most of its politics occurs, and most of its wealth is created. Katz and Bradley of the American Brookings Institute agree with this attitude, in The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities and Metros are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy (2013),

\(^{38}\) The Vancouver Charter is considered in depth later in this section.
when discussing contemporary American cities that are increasingly responsible for innovation, wealth generation and political leadership. Municipal government in Canada is an important element of the overall political structure of Canadian society and of critical importance to the lives of citizens.

Lightbody (2006) notes that given their lack of enumerated powers in the Constitution “local governments thus know where they stand, in law and this means at least three important ground rules have been unmistakably established:

• 1. Municipalities in Canada have no autonomous, local and democratic constitutional standing. They have a constitutional position within the realm of provincial omnicompetence.

• 2. Local governments, as incorporated statute creatures of provincial legislatures, exist precisely as defined by provincial statute law. Also, as provincial subordinates, they are bound to provide services only within the clauses of governing provided for the provinces themselves under section 92.

• 3. The federal government has no direct power in relation to Canadian municipalities and cannot intervene in their affairs. The federal role has thus been both cautious and difficult, and, often to the chagrin of federal interventionist politicians, there has never been involvement to parallel the American HUD Secretary. (Lightbody, 2006, p.39)

The genesis of Canadian municipal government can be traced to the political traditions, history and culture of pre-contact Aboriginal society:39 the political and cultural traditions of the French as they settled New France; English settlers to British North America post the Treaty of Paris; and the United Empire Loyalists (UEL)40 that came to the country. The contemporary approach to municipal government in Canada is a response to this history alongside a series of reforms, mostly emanating from the United States, that occurred periodically during the 19th and 20th centuries.

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39 The notion that the Iroquois nation’s conception of the U.S. federal system and by extension the Canadian federal system today is arguable although the similarity between the Iroquois system of multiple levels of government presiding over the same geographic territory as is the case in the U.S. and Canadian cases is notable. See Samuel B. Payne, Jr. The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 53, No. 3, Indians and Others in Early America. (Jul., 1996), pp. 605-620 for a thorough discussion of the debate.

40 The influences of these groups will be discussed later in this section.
The first instances of a federal system that includes both national and subnational governments can be traced to the Iroquois nations that were organized in federal systems prior to European contact. Within their governance structures local tribal meetings would be held on a regular basis and then larger gatherings of tribes would occur periodically.

There is debate in contemporary studies of American federalism about the extent or even whether this influence occurred (Payne, 1996). The Canadian federal system that features shared jurisdiction by the provinces and federal government over the same geographic territory was influenced by the American model and by extension the Aboriginal notion of a federal system. Magnusson discusses the influences of both France and Britain on Canadian municipal government and points to the reasons for the adoption of particular forms of local government by both colonizing countries:

Nevertheless, the British system of local government was as much as anything a device for imposing unwanted responsibilities (and taxes) upon local communities. The ancient parishes were granted their civil powers in exchange for keeping the King’s Peace, maintaining his highways, supporting his churches, and caring for his indigent subjects. The county courts and borough corporations, improvement commissions and turnpike trusts, were allowed even greater powers, but always in exchange for services to the king and his people – and a tacit promise to refrain from charges on his treasury. In France, the royal administration was even more concerned to make local authorities into central agencies. This was certainly true in New France, where local government (such as it was) appeared to both its officers and subjects as an instrument for extracting labour and taxes from reluctant colonists and regulating activities at odds with imperial policy. The displacement of the French imperial power by the more 'liberal' but alien British did little to convince French Canadians that local government institutions could have a different character. (Magnusson, 1983, pp.4/5)

Higgins (1986) posits that Canadian local government is a “product of external influences and circumstances”

The three great external influences are the historic traditions of government and cultural heritages of the first France and then Britain and then the United States. If there is anything that is unique about the systems of local government in Canada it is to be found in the particular way in which those external influences were combined. The centralized character of administration in France and of colonial Britain long
influenced the nature of local governance in Canada. Some vestiges of that remain still in the conduct of provincial-local relations. The influence of the New England states also was of crucial importance to Canada, and American experiences around the beginning of the twentieth century also spilled over into Canada. (p.63)

Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith (2013) point out that the initial settlement of Canada (New France) by French settlers did not feature a strong model of local, or even self-government, as they were “subject to the decisions made by European-based French or, later, British monarchs whose will was made known through governors whom these kings and queens appointed to run their overseas colonies. They also suggest that local government in Canada changed dramatically, to a model that favoured centralization, with the acquisition of New France by the British as a result of the Treaty of Paris, 1763 (p.24).

The desire for increased centralization, following the creation of British North America, was accompanied with an approach to local government that “vested all government in the military” and later “appointed Governors appointed council.” The Governor of the colony, in 1764, “established the ancient English system of local Justices of the Peace” to deal with “unimportant matters.” The Justices of the Peace met in the Courts of Quarter Sessions and had jurisdiction over Montreal, Quebec and Trois Rivieres. The Justice of the Peace system did not have the wide breadth of jurisdiction or the quasi-judicial powers found in the similar system at home in Britain, however it did develop as an instrument of local government until the passage of the District Councils Act by the colony’s legislative assembly in 1841 (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.29).

Sancton (2011) argues that in order to understand “the legal context” of Canadian local government it is necessary to have foundational knowledge of British municipal corporations that were established by both royal charter and later parliamentary statute. These corporations functioned with “little or no control from the monarch and his government” and without “public control through democratic elections.” Corporations participated in commercial trading, regulated “public markets and nuisances,” invested in “public infrastructure” and “raised(ed) taxes funds through various charges and taxes.” The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 provided a more
formal structure for corporations so that they became more of a “regularized, democratic system of local government that extended throughout the entire country” (p.4).

The reforms to the municipal corporations in Britain had an effect on the model of local government adopted in Canada. The first organized local government entity in the country was the municipal corporation created in St. John, New Brunswick on April 30, 1785 (Lightbody, 2006 p.136). This corporation was created by royal charter and included provision for a local administration comprised of a mayor and six aldermen (Lightbody, 2006, p.136).

The American Revolution, 1775-1783, motivated an influx of United Empire Loyalists migration, mostly from New York and the New England colonies, to Nova Scotia and western Quebec. The Loyalists brought with them a substantially different approach to local government from that of the British tradition as it included “a tradition of municipal government through the town hall meeting.” Loyalists were uncomfortable with the French civil law, particularly the “system of land grants under the seigneurial system and the limited local autonomy” present in Quebec, and began pressuring for the adoption of “some form of local courts and administration, English civil law, and separation from that area of Quebec that was east of Montreal” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.30). This view of local government as “the bedrock of liberal democracy” resulted from this influx of American loyalists that was furthered by their desire for greater “municipal autonomy” that contributed ultimately to the development of the Baldwin Act.

United Empire Loyalists, in one of their first legislative initiatives in Upper Canada, and indicative of their desire to bring forward more “democratic” local government instruments, soon passed the Parish and Town Officers Act, 1793, which “permitted annual town meetings to appoint a town clerk, assessors, a tax collector, road overseers and fence viewers, a pound keeper, and town wardens” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.31). Large scale migration (about 800,000 people between 1815 and 1850) to British North America occurred at the end of the War of 1812 and the Napoleonic Wars in Europe which “magnified the existing urban problems and petitioning continued for some form of municipal government” (p.32).
The influence of the United Empire Loyalists that had migrated from the American northeast motivated a view of municipal government as an “indispensable cornerstone of democracy” (de Tocqueville, 1946, p.57). The Loyalists favoured instruments of direct democracy at the municipal level, including town hall meetings, and viewed local government as “a training ground for citizenship of both citizens and the representatives they might send to other legislatures” (Lightbody, 2006, p.109).

The Constitutional Act of 1791 brought with it changes to the colony that included:

- The creation, from the province of Quebec, of the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, with the Ottawa River roughly as the dividing line.
- The provision of a government for each province consisting of a British Lieutenant Governor, an appointed executive council and legislative council, and an elected legislative assembly.
- The use of English law and land tenure in Upper Canada

The provisions of the Constitutional Act did not include provisions for designing a model of local government for the colony as the British were “haunted by the prospect of another colonial rebellion” the notion that municipalities should be “distrusted” as they “were considered breeding grounds for dissent and loyalty” (Crawford, 1954, p.21).

Sancton notes the intimate connection between the eventual creation of the municipal model of government in Canada and the development of municipal corporations in Britain. Municipal corporations represented an expression of the “great tension between the Crown and many municipal corporations” inherent in the British system that recognizes that local government structures under this system “act on behalf of themselves and their residents, not on behalf of the Crown.” The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 that reformed the British local government model had an effect on the development of Canadian local government as it “started a long process whereby Britain’s municipal corporations became part of a regularized, democratic system of local government that extended throughout the country” (Sancton, 2011, pp.4/5).

The Rebellions of 1836-37 in Upper and Lower Canada were in part as a result of “dissatisfaction with local government arrangements (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.33). The British government responded to the Rebellion of 1836-37 by sending
John Lambton, Lord Durham, to the colonies to consider the reasons for the Rebellion. The *Durham Report* (1838) “urged the speedy introduction of responsible government at all levels in order to avoid unfavourable, and perhaps revolutionary, comparisons to the American experience of self-governing” (Lightbody, 2006, p.141). In addition, Durham recognized the importance of local government noting “municipal institutions of local self-government...are the foundations of Anglo-Saxon freedom and civilization” (Craig, 1963, p. 60). Durham was replaced in 1840 by Lord Sydenham who recommended the development of some form of local government for British North America. The *Act of Union* (1840) resulting from Lord Durham’s investigation created one province of Canada to replace Canada West and Canada East, however, the notion of local government in the colonies was not considered as Durham had become politically unpopular in Britain (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.33).

Several incremental steps, including the *District Community Councils Act* of 1841 (“extending self-government over functions other than judicial into the rural areas of Canada West”); the restoration of city status to Montreal and Quebec in 1842; and most importantly the *Canadian Municipal Corporations Act* (Baldwin Act) of 1849, were undertaken to augment the sophistication and design of local government administration in Canada (Lightbody, 2006, p.138).

The *Baldwin Act*, introduced in 1843 and passed in 1849, included reforms that “consolidated the municipal system within a single act and, outside of the cities, established the province-wide two-tier form of county government for Canada West” (Lightbody, 2006, p.138; Plunkett & Betts, 1978, pp.53-56; Higgins, 1986 p.48-49). In addition, there were two important restrictions placed on the role of central government including “the protection of civil rights from arbitrary acts and the protection of municipality’s credit” (Lightbody, 2006, p.138). The Act differed in two ways from the District Community Councils Act – the county rather than the district became the upper tier of municipal government and, “for the first time townships were recognized as a rural unit of municipal government” (Tindal & Tindal, 2013, p.35).

The Baldwin Act, according to Higgins (1986), was based on four basic principles:
• the municipal councils were the creatures of the provincial legislature and were subject to its sovereign authority\textsuperscript{41}

• the powers of a municipality should vary with its size and character

• the municipal councils should be elected by and from the local property-holders…only men who had houses, farms or businesses of their own should be entitled to vote…Moreover, this property had to be of a certain value

• the implicit assignment of the municipal functions of property management to municipal government. (Magnusson, 1983, pp.7/8)

Quebec and Montreal were granted “charters that enabled the citizens to elect a mayor and two alderman per ward, paralleling the introduction of the board of police/elected council in Brockville” in 1832. The Canadian municipal model “generally consisted of cities, towns and villages as urban units; a rural unit variously known as a township, municipal district, or rural municipality; and sometimes an upper tier county unit” that were administered by elected councils that could implement property taxes to fund municipal operations (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, pp.34/35).

All Canadian provinces created “townships, counties, or districts as the basic units of rural municipal government” following the Constitution Act, 1867 (Sancton, 2011, p.5). The provinces also established citizen-driven protocols to facilitate the creation of “villages, towns or cities” in more urbanized communities (Sancton, 2011, p.5). This development was uneven, however, when compared with developments in the East as Manitoba, and the Northwest Territories adopted a two-tier county model in 1883, British Columbia followed the Baldwin model in 1972 and Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta adopted single-tier rural municipal systems (Lightbody, 2006, p.139).

Population growth, mostly driven by immigration, propelled Canada into the 20th century and brought with it significant problems for municipal government. “This massive population increase and its urban nature brought a number of accompanying problems. These are related to housing, service provision, transportation and utilities, community cohesion, and corruption” (TIndal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.46).

\textsuperscript{41} This principle was later encompassed in the Constitution Act, 1867 in section 92(8) which gave the provinces the power to 'make Laws in relation to…Municipal institutions in the Province.
Two eras of municipal reform resulted from this growth, and accompanying pressures on local infrastructure, beginning in the U.S. and spreading across North America affecting the administration of government at the local level. The reform movement in the mid to late 1800’s was based on the desire to clean up cities that had become “unhealthy, dirty, and corrupt” and “marked the beginning of professional social work, urban planning, public health, public libraries and serious attempts to promote temperance and honest and efficient municipal government” (Sancton, 2011, p.175). Sancton notes that this “progressive” movement “had strong support in Canada” and that its “most important effect…was to convince most Canadian urban municipal voters that political parties served no purpose in municipal politics because they introduced political factors into decisions that should be based only on sound business-like and technical principles” (p.175).

The focus on municipal planning reform in Canada was led primarily by local government officials, interested businessmen, architects, engineers and other civic boosters that were “unhappy with the squalor and the ugly environment developing in Canadian communities with the rapid urbanization of the time.” The overarching goal of one part of the planning reforms was the “City Beautiful Movement” which had the goal of promoting “the achievement of civic grandeur through the development of civic centres featuring monumental buildings grouped around a public square and a broad tree lined avenue leading to it.” The second part of the planning reforms was mostly led by public health advocates under the rubric of the “City Health Movement.” The goal of this movement was to “press[ing] for better public water supplies and sewer systems and for the eradication of slums” in order to stop the spreading of diseases such as typhoid caused by overcrowding and substandard living conditions of urban dwellers (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.51/52). Municipal government reforms, known as the “City Efficient Movement” had the goal of turning planning and municipal administration into a more “rational scientific process in which experts would provide technical solutions” to arrive at ‘one best way’ to run any organization, to be discovered by rational inquiry” (p.53).

A second era of reform occurred at the municipal level in Canada throughout the 1960’s and 70’s. Sancton (2011) suggests that this period was based on “opposition to slum clearance, expressways, and uncontrolled development of high-rise buildings
created a new urban reform movement” (p.214). In this era “to a considerable extent Canadian municipal reformers followed the American lead, despite the fact that conditions in the two countries were often dissimilar” (Magnusson 1983, 16). Sancton (2011) also suggested that the “new reform movement was a direct repudiation of the main positions of the old one” (p.214).

The new reformers emerged from a general radicalism of the 1960s during which all power structures were placed under great pressure. What followed was a series of new social movements, each with its own cause: feminism, environmentalism, gay liberation, the anti-globalization movement. Each of these has had its effect on municipal politics in general and new reformers in particular. (p.215)

Lightbody (2006) suggests that the second reform movement was based on “flower-child idealism” about “‘realpolitick’ and power” which began with a “conception of the urban space as an amalgam of different social and economic sectors and then proceeded to the claim that their existences ought to be institutionalized on council” (p.186). These reformers opposed at large elections and campaigned for neighbourhood wards in Toronto, (Higgins, 1986, p.333), produced the 50 districts of 11,000 residents for Winnipeg in 1971, and clamoured in Vancouver for a return to the 12 single-person wards which the city had from 1929-36. Their arguments partially explain Calgary’s move in 1977 to replace six dual-member districts with 14 single-person wards and were also the reason behind the Saskatchewan NDP government’s move to bring wards into Saskatoon and Regina in 1973. This also indicates why the government’s successor Progressive Conservative ministry abolished wards in 1987: the gladiatorial class understands system bias. (Lightbody, 2006, p.186)

Magnusson (1983) suggests that the second reform movement that began in the United States revolved around “a reaction to the party machines” where “at first the demand was simply for putting good men in office, the conviction gradually spread that major structural reforms were required in municipal government” (p.15).

By eliminating the division of the city into wards, it was hoped that the practice of distributing services as favours to people in particular neighbourhoods could eventually be overcome: councillors elected at large would, in theory, be obliged to look to the needs of the city as a whole. The aim was to have a municipal council that allocated
funds and developed public services in accordance with a rational plan, which in turn was based on a disinterested conception of the civic good. (p.15).

Magnusson (1983) asserts that the second reform movement resulted in a “strengthen(ing) [of] the position of civil servants in relation to their political masters” so that “the development of new activities and the extension of the old was increasingly dependent on professional attitudes” (p.18). Further he argues that “the growth of municipal government in the succeeding years was partly the consequence of professional ambitions, which themselves were encouraged by growing professional competence” (p.18).

The modernization of administrative structures that occurred as a result of this wave of municipal reform had the effect of increasing the capacity of the local authorities, but not of changing their basic orientation. The functions of fostering and regulating urban development were bureaucratized, routinized, and to a considerable extent de-politicized (p.19).

Lightbody posits that there have been four persistent themes in the development of Canadian municipal government since Confederation:

• An attempt to achieve local control, which is not to be confused with any sort of struggle for genuinely democratic local practices;
• Local decentralization, which would permit quick and easy institutional adaptations to fit local circumstances and their residents’ own standards for efficacy and efficiency;
• The model for municipal governing, which was widely understood never to exist as any direct replication of the provincial and federal parliamentary model;
• The diffusion of concentrated political authority, which might emerge at the local level in the general campaign for decentralization of specific powers

(Lightbody, 2006, p.140).

Concomitant with these themes, similar to that of the British case, has been “an enduring general problem” that is to “strike the appropriate balance between central control and local autonomy” as “provincial governments have never surrendered their right to make that decision” (Lightbody, 2006, p.140).
The desire to strike a balance between central control and local autonomy emanates from three different sources. First, the notion of a decentralized system emanated from the separation of judicial and municipal functions under the District Councils Act of 1841 that empowered municipal officials to make quasi-judicial judgments “on the basis of explicit judicial fairness and not breadth of any political vision” (Lightbody, 2006, p.109).

The lack of real constitutional recognition of Canadian municipal government has not limited provincial legislative action and federal intervention involving extra-constitutional activities between the more senior level of government and local government. “Since the beginning of the 1990’s, municipal associations in a number of provinces have pushed for some form of provincial charter that would recognized the existence of a separate level of municipal government” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.206). Many “positive legislative changes” have been enacted in most provinces since with a number of key features:

- the provision of natural person powers;
- authorization to act within broad spheres of jurisdiction;
- a commitment to advance consultation;
- a requirement for municipal approval before certain actions (notably amalgamation) could proceed; and
- a commitment to provide resources commensurate with the municipal responsibilities being allocated.

(p.206)

The federal government has played an important role supporting local government from time to time despite the lack of constitutional recognition of the Canadian municipal level of government. These interventions are not a new phenomenon as by the late 1960’s, ‘more than 117 distinct programs (were being) administered by 27 departments in Ottawa (that had) influenced metropolitan development plans’” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.218; Feldman & Milch, 1981, p.250). These programs were generally not coordinated very well, little input was sought from local government, and there was “no opportunity for advance consultation and little hope of obtaining adjustments after the fact” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.218).
One of the formal attempts at coordination and consultation among the various levels of government in Canada was the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) which was created as a response to two main factors: a rejuvenated Liberal Party government under the new leader Prime Minister Trudeau and an ‘urban crisis’ that was seen as plaguing American cities and Canadian ones also. When Pierre Trudeau became the new Liberal leader and Prime Minister in 1968 he and his closest advisers emphasized what one analyst has described as a ‘…new philosophy of policy-making which emphasized rationality, systematization and comprehensiveness.


The department “focus(ed) on developing policy and coordinating the projects of other departments” and increase(ing) coordination among all three levels of government in dealing with the challenges of urbanization.” The MSUA lasted until 1979 when it was dismantled during a period of belt-tightening by the federal government. The demise of the department was not seen as being financially driven, - it was seen to be more tied to a lack of power, the fortress mentality of other federal government departments and provinces “protecting their (municipal) turf” (Tindal, Tindal, Stewart & Smith, 2013, p.219).

Multi-level cooperation continued throughout the end of the 20th century and a desire to become more formalized was evident. The 2004 federal budget under Paul Martin included provisions for “accelerated federal infrastructure support, provided GST relief for municipalities, and provided a share of federal gasoline taxes” (p.222). The increased focus and more formalized approaches to municipal needs by the federal government during the Martin government’s period of power has not been matched by the current Stephen Harper government.

The Harper government’s view is that “the federal government should not be signing formal intergovernmental agreements with municipalities, not to mention that, ideologically, his government is generally opposed to such ‘liberal’ projects” (Sancton, 2011, p.35).

Despite the frequent assertion that municipalities are mere ‘creatures of the provinces’, in practice they form an integral part of Canada’s system of multi-level
governance, even taking account of the Harper government’s disapproval of formal tri-level agreements. In recent years, acting mainly through the FCM, municipalities have had a significant impact on federal politics and policies. They have certainly been successful in raising awareness across Canada about the need for all governments to invest more in physical infrastructure, much of which is built and maintained by municipalities “(Sancton, 2011, p.38)

Canadian municipalities today function somewhere in what Smith and Stewart refer to as the “mushy middle” between the restrictiveness found in the American Dillon’s Rule and the autonomy of home rule (Smith & Stewart 2004, p.258-263). In this analysis municipalities are seen as either beavers that were “formally weak creatures prone to danger avoidance and fleeing from inter-jurisdictional conflict” or cats that were “relatively autonomous units enjoying considerably more policymaking discretion” (Smith & Stewart, 2004, pp.258-263; Jones, 1986, p.90). Canadian municipalities lie somewhere in between – the mushy middle.

Smith & Stewart (2004) built on this analysis by suggesting that all local governments are located at some point on a “none-versus-absolute formal authority continuum” that could be classified as ‘strong’ or ‘weak,’ depending on the potency of their formal powers” (p.252). In addition, they introduce the notion of “agency” to “explain how beaver cities can sometimes drive the whole-of-government policy responses despite a lack of formal authority” (p.252). Smith and Stewart’s ultimate thesis is that conceptualizing municipalities as being located along a continuum from weak beaver to strong beaver or weak cat to strong cat within the mushy middle did “provide a new perspective on the ability of local governments to influence whole-of government policy” (p.268). Perhaps more valuable is their argument that the level of municipal power in a multi-level governance structure, such as present in Canada and the U.S.A., is not only determined by constitutional constraints or enumerated powers, but lies in the hands of municipal leaders themselves as “local politicians are often as powerful as they wish to be - a valuable lesson for local and provincial politicians and the citizens who elect them” (p.268).

Smith and Stewart’s argument is consistent with an increasing call from various directions in Canada for increased confidence and the exercise of power by
municipalities despite constitutional constraint. For example, Jane Jacobs, speaking at
the first meeting of the big city mayors in May 2001, suggested the following:

I think you have an ingrained mindset of dependency and that this is
going to be the hardest thing for you to overcome…You must somehow
gather your self-esteem not to be apologetic about yourselves. Certainly
the country needs to be educated about how important the cities are. But
if the cities themselves don’t believe it or are apologetic about it, or are
afraid to bring it up, even aggressively, the education of the country and
the understanding of what really is necessary an what ails us, is never
going to come about. (Andrew, 2001, pp.100-110)

The following section focuses closer on the history of municipal government in
British Columbia including the initial enabling legislation that created municipal
government in the province, the Community Charter, and issues regarding the electoral
process in the province.

3.1.3. History of Municipal Government - British Columbia

The genesis of municipal government in British Columbia can be found in an
ordinance passed in the Colony of British Columbia in 1865 which “laid down the
guidelines for future municipal organization” based on the “home-rule” model which
allowed municipalities to basically “do anything not otherwise forbidden by law” (Bish,
2008, p.21). Two years after B.C.’s entrance into Confederation in 1871 a new
municipal act was passed that replaced the 1865 statute “and enabled municipalities to
undertake a range of activities42, but it did not provide for incurring debt, nor did it
include any mandatory activities that the municipalities were required to perform” (Bish,
2008, p.21). This system lasted until 1896 with the passage of the Municipal
Incorporation Act, the Municipal Clauses Act, and the Election Act which essentially
separated municipal government into cities/towns (for populated areas) and regions (for
less populated areas) and added a residency requirement for municipal electors and
candidates (Smith, Ginnell & Black, 2010, p.246).

42 These activities included the power to tax persons and property and collect fees for granting
licenses. According to Bish (2008, 21) this Act was subsequently amended in 1881 to
provide for municipal borrowing.
The 1896 legislation ended the notion of home rule at the local level and instead enumerated powers and authority for municipalities (Bish, 1990, 15-17; Smith, Ginnell & Black, 2010, p.246). Municipal opposition to the increased provincial control motivated the creation of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) in 1905 to represent the interests of local government in the province (p.246). The precursor to a formal Department of Municipal Affairs was created under the 1914 Municipal Act which created the province’s first Inspector of Municipal Affairs. The 1914 act “formed the basis of local governing in BC until 1957” (Bish, 2008, p.21; Smith, Ginnell, & Black, 2010, p.246). The Municipal Act of 1957 and the Local Government Act of 1996 along with the Regional District Act, 1965 and Municipal Finance Authority Act, 1969, formed the basis for the powers and responsibilities of local government in British Columbia to 2004.

In January 2004, the BC government passed legislation known as the Community Charter which developed and explained the “roles and responsibilities of municipalities” in the province (Smith, Ginnell & Black, 2010, p.253). The powers and responsibilities originally laid out in the Local Government Act remained in force for regional districts and still “controls important aspects of municipalities, such as elections, land-use planning, improvement districts, heritage conservation, and regional growth strategies (Ministry of Community Development, n.d.). The Community Charter provides local government with a legal framework for the operation of the individual municipalities and also provides “authority and direction to deal with municipal issues that may arise in the future and provide a more flexible framework for municipal powers” (Community Charter 2003, section 3),

The focus of the Charter is to give municipalities four important powers:

• 1. Municipalities were to be granted natural person powers
• 2. Charter grants new service powers to establish any all services they consider to be necessary
• 3. Municipalities would be granted the power to enter into private-public partnerships with entities inside and outside British Columbia
• 4. Opened up the possibility of municipalities to access revenue generating instruments other than the traditional source - property taxes (Smith & Stewart, 2004).
The normative goal of the Charter is to provide greater municipal autonomy and flexibility is laudable, however, as Smith and Stewart have found the Charter “does little to alter the ‘creature of the province’ state of affairs” and ends up facilitating “continued suboptimal policy capacity for municipalities in BC (Smith & Stewart, 2004).

The Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development currently administers the Charter on behalf of the provincial government. A move to reform the relationship between the province and municipalities in British Columbia and the internal structures/operations of local government have recently been the subject of a major reform initiative at the provincial level although these efforts have been stalled because of political events and the priorities of the B.C. government under Liberal Premier Christy Clark. In British Columbia as of 2013, there are 49 cities; 49 districts; 17 towns; 42 villages; 1 Island Municipality; 1 Regional municipality; and 2 Resort municipality and 28 regional districts. for a total of 189 municipal governments. In addition, there are 203 First Nations.

There are four basic types of municipalities in British Columbia:

- a village if the population is 2,500 or less;
- a town if the population is 2501 to 5,000;
- a city if the population exceeds 5,000; or
- a district if the area to be incorporated is greater than 800 hectares and the average population density is less than five persons per hectare.

(Bish, 2008, p.25)

The local government decision-making process in British Columbia is made by the “elected mayor and councillors, who together comprise the council, by members of boards, commissions, and committees, and by administrators within the scope of authority delegated to them by elected or appointed officials. Decisions are constrained by electors and potentially by auditors, the Inspector of Municipalities, the Ombudsman, the Information and Privacy Commissioner, and the courts. Decisions may also be influenced by local interest groups” (Bish, 2008, p.32).

BC has recently also created the position of Municipal Auditor to oversee local spending.
Smith & Stewart (2005; 2010) have drawn attention to a serious flaw in the governance of not only the City of Vancouver but all municipalities in British Columbia – the lack of transparency and accountability in the funding of municipal election campaigns. They argue that it is imperative that there be “an increase in local accountability to avoid corruption or capture by local interest groups or by the professional bureaucracy” (Smith & Stewart, 2005; p.26). It is quite easy to describe limits on contribution and spending limits in Vancouver municipal elections – there aren’t any. Smith (2013) has suggested that inaction by the province has resulted in the situation where:

BC has the least regulated (‘wild west’) local election finance regulation in Canada. Anyone can contribute any amount and no voter would hear of such until 6 months after an election; and there is no local lobbying registration despite significant sums of money floating through BC’s local elections (np.).

Candidates, elector organizations (parties) and campaign organizers “are obliged to record all campaign contributions and election expenses and disclose all campaign contributions and elections expenses in a campaign financing disclosure statement”:

• Campaign financing disclosure statements must be submitted to the City Clerk no more than 120 days after general voting day.
• If there are any changes or amendments after the disclosure statement has been submitted, they must file a supplementary report.
• Failure to file a campaign financing disclosure statement or a supplementary report may result in the imposition of significant penalties.
• By law, the campaign financial disclosure statement are available for public inspection from the time of filing until seven years after general voting day for the election to which they relate.  (Smith, np.)

Lightbody (2006) supports the notion that election funding is out of control, not only in Vancouver or British Columbia, but across the country when he argues that “Campaign costs have inevitably increased markedly in large and rapidly growing municipalities. It is estimated that the successful mayoralty candidates in large cities spent an average of $200,000 on their campaigns by the end of the 1990’s” (pp.205/206). Further, Smith notes that in Vancouver “the local party spending the most on elections won” and that in the November 2011 election, won by Mayor Gregor
Robertson’s Vision party, the two major parties running mayoral candidates spent upwards of $4.5 million to elect the Mayor and 7 Councillors (Smith, 2013, np.). The *Vancouver Sun* newspaper has assisted in a greater understanding of the levels of municipal contributions and spending by creating a detailed database of municipal contributions and spending for the 2011 election.

The next section considers the history of municipal government in the City of Vancouver including the Vancouver Charter, the city’s civic party system, and the regional involvement of the municipality.

### 3.1.4. History of Municipal Government – Vancouver

Legislation regarding the power, authority, and general operations of Vancouver is set out in the *Vancouver Charter* (1953). As Bish notes, this legislation has its origins in the *Vancouver Incorporation Act of 1886* and, while it is becoming increasingly similar to the *Local Government Act*, the *Vancouver Charter* remains a separate piece of legislation governing the City of Vancouver alone (Bish, 1990, p.16).

This Charter sets out the powers of the mayor or ten councillors, including their method of election and the city’s powers regarding licensing, business taxation, public works, buildings, fire prevention and control, electrical and gas works, street traffic, the airport, health, cemeteries, policing, parks, heritage conservation, along with the powers of the Vancouver City Council, the duties of the mayor, director of finance, city clerk, city treasurer, and auditors, as well as numerous other governmental powers (Vancouver Charter, 1953).

Tennant suggests that the involvement of civic political parties in Vancouver has “been a crucial element in Vancouver politics almost since the present city was established” (Tennant, 1980, p.3).

Tennant identifies 6 characteristics of the party system in Vancouver:

- the successful parties are purely local parties;
- parties are active on a year-round basis;
- the main parties (today, COPE (Coalition of Progressive Voters), Vision, and NPA) monopolize access to elective office at the city level in Vancouver;
• the secret ballot is used for candidate selection;
• elections are financed, organized and conducted by the party organizations on behalf of their slates of candidates;
• most elected members have maintained their party affiliation after elections and the party label is commonly attached to the names of elected members in public discussions. (pp.23/24)

Unlike every other major Canadian city, except Montreal, Vancouver has had a long tradition of vibrant local political parties, that in many ways mirrors the left-right dynamic of the provincial party system in British Columbia. In B.C. the inclusion of civic political parties began with the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation's (CCF) foray into civic elections in 1933 (Smith, 2013; Tennant, 1980). The CCF did not achieve electoral success, however, they posed enough of a threat to scare the business community to respond to this 'socialist threat' by forming the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) in 1937. The NPA (Non-Partisan Association) has regularly enjoyed electoral success “winning 75 percent of available council seats between 1937 and 1968, the NPA was the dominant party in a ‘stable system’ (Smith, 2013; Tennant, 1980). A “more centrist” party, TEAM (The Electors Action Movement) emerged in the 1972 election in “opposition to a major freeway development planned to run through downtown Vancouver, including its Chinatown community). The NPA returned to power from the mid-1980’s to 2002 when the party lost the civic election to the left-leaning COPE (Committee of Progressive Electors) (Smith, 2013, np.).

Smith (2013) suggests that the “three most recent Vancouver elections (2005, 2008, 2011) demonstrate a shifting dynamic, with three different ‘parties’ electing mayors/councils in the four elections since – and including – 2002 and the left gaining and the centre-left holding city council control in 2011.” The election of 2005 saw the NPA defeat COPE and regain city hall. The election of 2008 saw a cooperation agreement between COPE and the upstart Vision Vancouver which saw COPE not run a mayoral candidate which resulted in a victory for current Vision Mayor Gregor Robertson. The centre-left Vision continued to grow through the 2011 election with the party controlling City Hall outright today.

Of importance to this dissertation, the City of Vancouver relies heavily on a well-developed bureaucracy that supports its elected masters. Similar to most major
Canadian cities, public servants play an important role in the governance of the city. Smith points to the importance of having an infrastructure working for the city to provide local services: “Like their federal and provincial counterparts, once in government local politicians rely on the civil service to implement their election promises and for detailed policy advice” (Smith, 2013, np.). In Vancouver, there does not appear to be evidence of what Dye has called “bureaucratic capture” (Dye, 2001, p.140) as there is regular direction provided to staff on issues by the elected local politicians and regular support provided by members of the local bureaucracy to elected local politicians with the overarching goal of generating good public policy.

Vancouver has a series of Advisory committees that offer support to council on issues such as heritage, planning, the arts, etc. and has several municipal entities including the Public Library and Civic theatres that are appointed by council, “but have their own staffs, policies, and administrative functions (Gutstein, 1983, p.211). Vancouver has an elected Board of Parks and Recreation that was established in 1890 that “sets its own priorities and runs its own operations, but receives the bulk of its funding from council” (p.211). Also directly elected is the city’s school board and “depends on council only for the collection of the taxes it levies, so that council receives the blame when school taxes go up” (p.211).

Smith (2013, np.) recognizes the presence of a thriving civil society in the city:

From immigrant settlement groups – such as MOSAIC and SUCCESS – to environmental organizations – like Western Canada Wilderness; West Coast Environmental Law; Greenpeace; the Nature Conservancy; SPEC; BEST West Coast; BC Energy Coalition – and other of the local members of the 640-member BC Environmental Network – to socially-active entities such as VANDU; DERA; Occupy Vancouver; End Legislated Poverty; Pivot Legal Society; LEAF; BC Civil Liberties Association; BC PIAC; and a broad range of other “social and political” NGO’s – such as CCPA, Think City and the like – all reflect a growing pattern of significant community engagement. First Nations have also become major players across this range of local social, environmental and political matters.

Vancouver is a member of Metro which is the regional district that is responsible for most of the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. A strong regional ethos has developed in Vancouver and the other members of Metro tied to inter-municipal service
provision and a strong history of planning. In 1967, the British Columbia provincial
government created the Greater Vancouver Regional District and today it is one of 29
regional districts in the province. These districts were created to provide a regional
perspective on governance, provide the instrument for agglomeration of public goods in
order to gain economies of scale across the region, and to “ensure that all B.C. residents
had equal access to commonly needed services, such as supplying and treating drinking
water, collecting and treatment wastewater, and managing solid waste disposal” (Metro).
The first instances of regional cooperation on service provision can be traced “to 1911
when the City of Vancouver with its Point Grey, South Vancouver, and Burnaby
neighbours formed the Burrard Peninsula Joint Sewerage Committee” (Smith &
Oberlander, 1998, p.375). The impetus for the more formal creation of the GVRD/Metro
and a regionalized approach were floods that ravaged communities along the Fraser
River in 1948 (p.375). At that time, “amendments to the municipal act were passed
allowing contiguous local authorities in a metropolitan region to develop a joint planning
capacity” which resulted in the creation of the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board
(LMRPB) was formed in 1949 (p.375).

This section has attempted to provide an historical foundation for further analysis
of the two cases considered in the dissertation. This history when considered alongside
the effects of the challenges of globalization and the adoption of neoliberal agendas; the
effects of urbanization and the increasing complexity of municipal government will
provide context to the dissertation’s analysis of the local decision-making processes
surrounding the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and the
development of the post-Expo ’86 lands. The following section discusses the
methodology used for the research and analysis aspects of the dissertation.
4. Methodology

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter the methodological framework of this dissertation is presented including the theory underpinning the research effort, case study methodology and justification of the case selection. A discussion of the comparative method is included, along with consideration of the efficacy of its use when considering urban cases in general and urban cases in Canada and British Columbia specifically. The specific steps involved in the research process are then itemized and the chapter concludes by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology utilized in this dissertation.

King, Keohane & Verba (1994) suggest that methodology is about “how to pose questions and fashion scholarly research to make valid descriptive and causal inferences” (p.3). These questions may be “descriptive, explanatory, or pragmatic, and all of these questions may be answered by means of discipline comparisons” (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p.552).

The methodology utilized in this dissertation is consistent with the focus of many previous single case urban studies in political science in Canada and elsewhere. Several research instruments were used in the course of developing this dissertation including primary and secondary sources, key-informant interviews, document analysis and pertinent secondary source literature which together allows for a good understanding of the historical eras of the case involved. Triangulation is used to synthesize the information so that it can then be properly analyzed so that the use of these multiple forms of data-gathering methods can be maximized (Berg, 2007, p.6; Burnham et al., 2008 p.232; McNabb, 2010, p.242).
This dissertation employed a combination of an historical or past perspective approach along with causal-comparative research which is consistent with the research strategies employed by Stone (1989) and his seminal “urban regime” analysis of Atlanta. Similar to Stone, this dissertation initially considers the history of the case, in particular two eras in Vancouver – the development of the former Expo lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. Stone’s (1989) selection of eras to analyze when considering urban cases is “somewhat arbitrary” (p.13). In this seminal study, Stone selected the pre-War, inter-War and post-War periods of Atlanta’s history which was intended to facilitate structure (p.9) in his comparisons of active urban regimes in the city. He further discusses his use of the historical method:

Historical analysis makes assumptions about causation, the main one being that social phenomena are to be understood as having multiple causes (Stone, 1989, p.257; Abrams, 1982). Research proceeds by analyzing the conjunction of factors, not by isolating single variables (Stone, 1989, p.257; Skocpol 1979).

History is unable to replicate endless observations under laboratory conditions. Instead it proceeds from the notion of sequence. Events have manifold causes, many of which we may never identify or even be conscious of. But by following events sequentially, we gain some understanding of what remains constant, what changes, and what is associated with each. Given a significant degree of social inertia, a historical sequence holds some set of factors constant, but it also allows for others (including the intentions of purposive actors) to change. The examination of a sequential process is a rough counterpart to laboratory control. History does not purport to be an exact science, but it does allow for systematic study. (Stone 1989, p.257)

Stone asserts one of the reasons for pursuing an historically-based research approach is because the “shaping of a regime...is not permanent” (p.257) Further, he suggests that “by observing the flow of events over time, we can see what combination of factors have recurring weight and what changing factors alter the course of events” (p.258). Finally, he suggests that the “flow of events is much affected by human intentions, understandings, and misunderstandings” (p.258).

My primary interest in this approach is to consider significant events in the past to construct a comprehensive and objective background of how they occurred.
In Stone’s explanation of his method and sources at the conclusion of his Atlanta study he discusses the importance of explicitly theorizing his study of Atlanta in that it “makes it easier to determine if an argument is internally consistent and also compatible with the observable events purportedly explained” (p.258). This dissertation follows the same framework as he employed as Stone clearly stated the parameters of his study – for this dissertation the “where” is Vancouver, B.C., the “when” is two eras the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands (1986-1996\(^{45}\)) and the creation and development of the Vancouver Agreement (2000-2010) and the “what” is the creation and influence of urban regimes on the decision-making process of Vancouver’s municipal government.

Stone (1989) followed three steps in his Atlanta research: (1) he used a large body of secondary research spanning from 1946 to 1988, (2) he extensively used the archives of the Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Constitution as well as “other documents, reports, and newsletters from both public agencies and private associations, and (3) a series of interviews with “participants in Atlanta’s political life” (pp.259/260).

Initial research efforts for this dissertation involved building a foundational knowledge of the creation and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on municipal decision-making in a generic sense and then more specifically in the United States, Britain, and Canada. This was accomplished through an extensive survey of the pertinent literature and more specific information concerning the Canadian case including, government documents, peer-reviewed journals, published books, archival material both in printed and online form (e.g. the City of Vancouver website) and many other materials.

The second step in this research process was to select the cases to be involved in the research, the process of which is discussed thoroughly in a future section below.\(^ {46}\) Once it was decided to focus on one subnational case, the City of Vancouver, British Columbia - two eras were identified to examine the creation and influence of urban regimes on the decision-making process.

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\(^{45}\) The development of the former Expo ’86 lands is still progressing today, a substantial period of development of the area occurred in the ten years immediately following the fair.

\(^{46}\) Please see section 3.3 below.
regimes on the local decision making process. The selection of one case over differing periods of time is consistent with Stone’s study of Atlanta in which he noted that “urban regimes are perhaps best studied over time.”47

Using one case over two eras allows for analysis over time given limited data availability. As well, it allows analysis of the similarities and differences between two periods of time and provides nuancing of the decision making process in each of the two eras. The goal of the case selection was to choose at least two “eras” where major municipal decisions within Vancouver were undertaken—one in the post- Expo ’86 (1986-1996) and the other, the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement (2000-2010). In selecting two eras that are “adjacent” in time allows for the potential for overlap in actors that participated in either case.48

In depth research using several sources was undertaken to understand the background history of each of the two eras, including historical, political and socio-economic information. The next step was to identify and examine the effects of government and non-government actors’ participation in the decision-making process involved in the two situations. This step was accomplished through the examination of primary and secondary documentation and later through the selection of government and non-government actors through identification and selection of “key players” from analysis of the historical materials and using the “snowball process” that emanated from the key-informant interview process. Following the selection of key players semi-structured interviews were conducted to glean information about the role of coalitions of government and non-government actors in the two cases. Finally, the research ultimately leads to a discussion of what was gleaned from the data, offers suggestions for lessons learned from the case, and suggestions for future research.

47 As mentioned, Stone studied Atlanta in three eras Pre-War, Inter-War and Post-War.
48 This is similar to Stone’s selection of the three eras above which were also “adjacent” to each other.
4.2. Development of Foundational Knowledge

As mentioned previously, an extensive survey of the pertinent literature and more specific information concerning local governing in Canada including, government documents, peer-reviewed journals, published books, archival material both in printed and online form (e.g. the City of Vancouver website) and many other materials was undertaken in order to develop a foundational knowledge of the creation and influence of government and non-government coalitions on the decision-making processes of municipal governments.

The initial focus of this survey was to consider the seminal works concerning community power available in the literature. Most of this initial work emanated from the United States with later information available on British, other European and a very few Canadian cases. This material was accessed in several ways including: the use on internet search engines such as Proquest and Google Scholar and others; utilizing library searches at Simon Fraser University, Douglas College and Vancouver Public Library; accessing the City of Vancouver archives website and other sources including accessing materials provided in previous course work involving my master’s and doctoral studies.

One of the more influential works that drove my interest in the creation and influence of government and non-government actors on municipal decision-making processes in a general sense was the work of Clarence Stone in *Regime Politics* (1989). Stone’s analysis of urban regimes in a single setting, Atlanta, motivated my interest in other issues of the location of power within local settings and how that power is used by both government and non-government. Recognizing that Stone’s position had evolved based on the works of other urban theorists (mostly American) I turned to considering the early work on community power by Floyd Hunter and others, the ensuing debate that emerged between elitists and pluralists and then later to post-urban regime literature. Following this survey of non-American literature I turned to considering initially British urban cases and then later European cases. Finally, I surveyed the existing literature

concerning the very few Canadian cases in the literature\textsuperscript{50} that considered coalitions and their relationship to the community power structures within municipalities. The information gleaned from the material considering American, British and Canadian cases was augmented by previous analysis encountered throughout my studies of urban government individually and in a comparative setting.

I then turned to completing the case selection for the dissertation. To facilitate this I began investigating the historical background surrounding the two eras under consideration in the Vancouver, British Columbia case.

\subsection*{4.3. Case Selection}

The descriptive, explanatory, or pragmatic questions being asked in this dissertation are aimed at understanding the formation and influences of coalitions of government and non-government actors on Canadian municipal government. As mentioned in the previous section, in order to accomplish this I have identified two “eras” of municipal decision-making policy in Vancouver, British Columbia – the development of the former Expo ’86 and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. The cases are similar in that they both represent examples of municipal decision-making processes that create policy outcomes for citizens. The cases differ, obviously in their subject matter, and also on the type of policy outcome – the post-Expo ’86 case is an example of what could be termed “hard” municipal policy\textsuperscript{51} while the creation and implementation could be termed a “soft” municipal policy outcome.\textsuperscript{52} These similarities

\textsuperscript{50} See for example, Leo, 1995; Hamel & Jouve, 2008; Good, 2009.

\textsuperscript{51} I am using “hard” to describe local decision-making processes that are involved in land issues in the municipality. In the case of the post-Expo’86 lands this involved design and implementation of the community plan, zoning, density, amenities and services. The influence of government and non-government actors on the decision-making process is statutorily restricted as the development process limits interactions among politicians, developers and local government bureaucrats.

\textsuperscript{52} I describe “soft” particularly in the context of the Vancouver Agreement which was intended to further several directions of social policy, beginning in the Downtown Eastside of the city. The amount of community and local bureaucratic actors’ involvement in such “soft” policies involved in the Vancouver Agreement were noticeably greater than those “hard” policies surrounding the Expo ’86 lands.
and differences generate a better understanding of the role of government and non-government actors in the Canadian municipal government decision-making process.

The historical approach is used in this dissertation. The research looks back at two important municipal eras in Vancouver, British Columbia’s history - the development of the post-Expo ‘86 lands (1986-1996) and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement (2000-2010) with an overarching goal of providing objective background on the events surrounding each case in a manner that is cohesive. Primary and secondary sources were used in this approach – these were then augmented through the interview process in order to fill in the gaps of the research. Following the historical approach that describes the details of the creation and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors on the decision-making process in each of the two eras the dissertation then identifies similarities and differences between the two cases.

The development of the post-Expo ‘86 lands (1986-96) is an interesting case to consider when examining the decision-making processes involved. The development involved the creation of a densified development around the False Creek area of Vancouver, B.C. The development process involved local and provincial politicians, local bureaucrats, community activists, several architect(s) and their firms, and private enterprise. The process of developing the post-Expo ‘86 lands actually pre-dated the fair itself – several buildings were constructed along with “important tourist and cultural facilities” in support of the fair (Punter, 2003, p.192).

The creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement was initially intended to meet a serious health care crisis in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) neighbourhood of Vancouver, B.C. In the mid-1990’s a serious HIV/AIDS epidemic and pervasive drug culture dominated the DTES so that by 1999, 61% of all Vancouver’s drug arrests and 25 federal, provincial, and municipal departments were spending $1 million per day on “health, safety, crime, social services and housing needs” of DTES residents (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.149). At least 300 community organizations were

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53 Each of the two ways are considered in a further section.
54 A full description of the Expo ‘86 lands case follows in a later section.
active in the ten block area of the DTES responsible for alcohol services, substance abuse services, counseling services, employment services, immigrant and refugee services, family and childcare services, welfare services, economic development services an advocacy (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.149). The actors involved in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement included community activists representing both neighbourhood interests and NGO’s, community health care providers, local Vancouver politicians, bureaucrats, and police; provincial politicians and bureaucrats; and federal politicians and bureaucrats. There was little inter-governmental cooperation or coordination, and a general need for more resources to combat the crisis, despite the high concentration of services in the neighbourhood prior to the development of the Vancouver Agreement. The Agreement was in effect for 10 years to 2010.

This historical research that provides the foundation for this dissertation has been guided by the organizing hypothesis that coalitions of government and non-government actors had indeed formed and influenced Vancouver’s municipal government during the two eras under consideration. The actions of groups of actors – in this case community activists, municipal bureaucrats, and political actors are considered and analyzed to accomplish the goal of understanding the past and the consequences of the creation and influence of urban regimes on the Vancouver case.

The development of post-Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement were selected for a number of reasons:

- **Municipal Decision-Making Processes**: both cases involved decision-making processes of municipal government and involved local political decisions, local bureaucracy activity, inter-governmental conflict/cooperation, and non-government actor participation.

- **Involvement of a Heterogeneous Set of Actors**: It was important to select cases that involved groups of municipal actors, both in and out of government, in order to set a foundation for examining how coalitions form and influence the

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55 This was confirmed in a personal interview with former City of Vancouver Drug Policy Coordinator Donald Macpherson. The common perception, mostly created by public pronouncements by a number of politicians (including according to Macpherson, former Mayor Mike Harcourt) was that the problem was that of coordination.

56 A full description of the Vancouver Agreement follows in a later section.
decision making process at the local level. One of the central questions was to consider the durability of coalitions over time and how their creation and influences change over time.

- **Differences in Policy Outcome Objectives:** It was necessary to examine two cases that had very different policy outcome objectives to identify similarities/differences in the manner in which coalitions form and influence the municipal government decision making process. I have used the term “soft” to describe the social policies involved in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and “hard” to describe the development of the former Expo ’86 lands. This idea is developed further later in the dissertation. The quality of the policy outcome in each case, given the benefit of hindsight, was quite strong despite the aforementioned differences.

- **Cross-Temporal Comparison:** In order to further stimulate a comparison of the two cases over time the similarities and differences between the two cases in two distinct eras were selected – the Vancouver Agreement (1999-2010) and the development of the post-Expo lands (1986-approximately 1996). Although the time period for both cases is quite close there appeared to be very overlap between the cases as one (the Vancouver Agreement) was mostly driven by local government actors (bureaucrats) while the other (the development of the Expo ’86 lands) involved a separate process and cadre of actors.

- **Interest in the Case/Interest in Theory-Building:** Lijphart notes that the selection of particular cases may be motivated by “an interest in the case per se” or, more importantly for further research – “an interest in theory-building” (Lijphart, 1971, p.691). I have a personal intellectual interest in the decision-making processes involved in both cases and look forward to using what I have learned in this dissertation process as a foundation for continued study of the role of coalitions of government and non-government actors and the use of regime theory in developing a better understanding of urban decision-making in Canada and elsewhere.

The Vancouver Agreement and the Expo ’86 lands are ideal cases for the study of the creation of the coalitions of government and non-government actors and their influences on municipal government decision-making. Both are fundamentally supported by very similar formal municipal government structures; they involve significant involvement from government, corporate interests, and the community and they were developed in two different, but adjacent, time periods allowing for excellent cross-temporal comparison of how Vancouver’s municipal government was influenced by coalitions in two distinct settings.

Qualitative small-n comparative case study analysis is used as the method to achieve the research goals of this dissertation. Despite the limitations of small-n studies
the “in depth knowledge” of a limited number of cases “makes it easier to see which
case aspects are relevant to the question at hand and how these aspects fit together”
(Ragin & Rubinson, 2009, p.14; George & Bennett, 2005). Given this in depth
information it is then possible to “construct new theory or revise existing theory, thus
generating new hypotheses for future testing” (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009; p.14) The initial
sense is that there is a strong argument to be made, given the findings in both cases,
that the type of coalition created and its influence on municipal decision-making is
affected by the type of local government policy under consideration.  

4.4. Use of the Comparative Method

A clear awareness of the limitations of the comparative method is
necessary but need not be disabling, because, as we shall see,
these weaknesses can be minimized. The "conscious thinker" in
comparative politics should realize the limitations of the comparative
method, but he should also recognize and take advantage of its
possibilities.  

(Arend Lijphart, 1971, p.685)

Denters and Mossberger (2006) posit that the benefit of comparison is that it “substitutes
for the experimental method” as it is “usually impossible to manipulate particular aspects
of political or urban systems in an experimental fashion and observe the differences that
these changes make, social scientists instead use variation across systems to explain
similarities and differences” (p.552). Consistent with Przeworski and Teune (1970), they
further suggest:

The logic of the comparative method is that by comparing units
(countries, cities, or any other units) that are most similar in some
aspects, the researcher is able to control for the variables that are similar
and isolate other variables as potential causes of observed differences.
Likewise, most different comparisons control for the variables on which
systems differ, eliminating them as possible explanations for similar
outcomes.  

(Denters & Mossberger 2006, p.553)

57 This point will be elaborated more thoroughly in the findings section of the dissertation.
Lijphart defines the comparative method “as one of the basic methods...of establishing general empirical propositions” and points to four distinct strengths of its use:

• It is a method “not just ‘a convenient term vaguely symbolizing the focus of one’s research interests.’” (Lijphart, 1971 p.682)

• The method is “one of the basic scientific methods, not the scientific method” making it “narrower in scope” (Lijphart, 1971, p.682) in response to Lasswell’s argument that “‘for anyone with a scientific approach to political phenomena the idea of an independent comparative method seems redundant’ because the scientific approach is ‘unavoidably comparative.’” (Lijphart, 1971, p.682; Lasswell, 1968, p.3)

• Lijphart views the comparative method “as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not as a method of measurement.” (Lijphart, 1971, p.683)

• Lijphart differentiates between method and technique suggesting that the “comparative method is a broad-gauge, general method, not a narrow, specialized technique.” (Lijphart, 1971, p.683)

Ragin & Rubinson (2009, p.14) supports Lijphart in that they suggest that although the case-oriented research and qualitative methods used in the comparative method imposes “limits on generalization” and “hinder hypothesis testing” it does allow for greater “in depth knowledge” and can be useful in the construction of new theory or revising existing theory, “thus generating new hypotheses for future testing” (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009, p.14).

Lijphart continues in his support for the use of the comparative method and the efficacy of case study analysis, and particularly those with a small-n, when he contrasts its use against those studies that use a more statistical method:

The comparative method should be resorted to when the number of cases available for analysis is so small that cross-tabulating them further in order to establish credible controls is not feasible. There is, consequently, no clear dividing line between the statistical and comparative methods; the difference depends entirely on the number of cases (Lijphart, 1971, p.683).

Kantor and Savitch (2005) suggest that the use of the comparative method can be valuable to “clarify and better explain phenomena” (p.135). First, because
comparison more precisely shows how variables work differently in a variety of settings; second, because comparison affords us a better chance to understand how the discovery of anomalies within different social systems can be refined and ultimately enhance theoretical understanding; and third, because comparison provides contrast models that point up crucial distinctions within a given set of findings (Kantor & Savitch, 2005, p.135).

Denters, Mossberger et al. concur in the value of the comparative method pointing to its value in illuminating and eliminating variables that might be at play within a particular case.

The logic of the comparative method is that by comparing units (countries, cities, or any other units) that are most similar in some aspects, the researcher is able to control for the variables that are similar and isolate other variables as potential causes of observed differences. Likewise, most different comparisons control for the variables on which systems differ, eliminating them as possible explanations for similar outcomes (Denters & Mossberger, 2006; p.553; Przeworski & Teune, p.1970).

It should be noted, at this point, that it is very difficult to make exact comparisons when using the comparative method at the municipal government level across various national contexts due to the historical, political, cultural, structural, social and economic nuances of each jurisdiction. There is value in comparative urban analysis as it has the potential to “assist[ing] scholars in uncovering causal mechanisms and drivers of political, economic, and social change at the urban level” and “will help us in providing valid and reliable answers to interesting questions and filling gaps in current knowledge about political phenomena” (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p.551; Pierre, 2005).

A discussion of these “historical, political, cultural, structural, social and economic nuances” of individual states in the context of the municipal government level follows in a subsequent section of the dissertation.
4.5. Small – N Case Study Analysis

The use of either single or small-N case studies is a methodological appropriate research approach when considering urban cases, however, the small-N approach “offers more opportunities for sorting out the effects of different explanatory factors” (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p.561. Ragin suggests that it is the tendency of social science researchers is to develop theory “use qualitative case-oriented techniques to examine small-Ns, while those who want to test theory tend to apply quantitative, variable-oriented methods to large-Ns (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009, p.15; Ragin, 1994).

Ragin points to the efficacy of small-N case studies:

Case-oriented research and qualitative methods, by contrast, are most useful when applied to a small number of cases. Because qualitative techniques leverage the researcher’s in-depth knowledge of cases, every additional case requires researchers to further divide their attention. Examination of details highlights the distinctiveness of each case. While imposing limits on generalization and thereby hindering hypothesis testing, this focus facilitates theory development (George & Bennett, 2005). In-depth case knowledge makes it easier to see which case aspects are relevant to the question at hand and how these aspects fit together. This understanding may be used to construct new theory or revise existing theory, thus generating new hypotheses for future testing. Reasons for the selection of cases in small-N studies include:

• seeking to make them the case(s)) “understandable” (e.g. Stake, 1995);
• the case(s) may be chosen “because they are extreme in some way and thus present a process or phenomenon in relatively pure form (e.g. Dumont, 1980);
• the case(s) may be “typical or run-of-the-mill” (e.g. Becker et al., 1961) to “learn more about the conventional arrangements and practices”;
• the case(s) may have historical or cultural significance (e.g. Lipset, 1963);
• the case(s) may be selected for “explicitly theoretical reasons: because they challenge a widely held theory or because they support a widely questioned theory (e.g. Eckstein, 1975);
• the case(s) may be selected “because the phenomena that researchers wish to study are too complex, context-bound, or context-sensitive to be studied in any other way (e.g. Ragin, 2009, 1139; Yin, 1994).

What is of most interest to this dissertation is the notion of trying to understand complex issues and making them more understandable. Both the Vancouver
Agreement and development of the post-Expo ‘86 lands involved complex and different decision-making processes that were influence in variable ways by coalitions of government and non-government actors. By “drilling down” and seeking to learn more deeply how the decision-making processes occurred in each case one can learn more about how Canadian municipal governments make public policy in two very different areas. Pierre notes that by “describing the cases in a holistic fashion, highlighting the internal logics of each of the cases while at the same time teasing out changes in the variables identified by the analytical framework, the final analysis will set the stage for meaningful comparison as well as tell a good story” (Pierre 1999, p.456).

Ragin also notes that the overarching goal of using case-oriented methods may not necessarily involve making causal statements as “even the construction of composite portraits based on commonalities results in representation of cases that are full of implications that can be tested with correlational methods applied to large samples” (Ragin, 2009, p.1142).

4.6. Use of the Comparative Method for Urban Cases

Two questions surround the use of the comparative method for urban cases and in the context of this dissertation. The first question is whether the comparative method has been effectively used in the consideration of urban government overall; secondly whether such an analytical tool as the comparative method can be used effectively to consider urban regimes among cases within and outside Canada.

In response to the first question it is clear from the outset that the use of the comparative method has assisted in building an increasingly large body of research concerning urban cases enriching both our knowledge of individual cases and the relationships among cases intra- and internationally. Smith and others note in Lightbody’s Canadian Metropolitics (1995) that despite challenges there is great value in considering individual urban cases as “local governments have proved more than resilient: they have remained significant cultural repositories and centres of our democratic traditions, and they are important bases in sustaining national economies, they have become significant global actors despite lack of formal authority in
international affairs and they have established themselves as major players in ensuring livability and sustainability both locally and globally” (p.489). Cross-national, comparative urban political research presents a wealth of theoretical and empirical opportunities. Examining local phenomena can give us a better view of variation within and across countries than comparative research that focuses primarily on the nation-state (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p.566). There is an ongoing need for more study that involves the use of the comparative method in analyzing urban cases whether that is completed cross-nationally, cross-temporally and/or intra-nationally, etc.

One advantage of using the comparative method is that “good comparative urban political research is able to provide valid and reliable information about the merits of [such] reforms and will inform policy makers about best practices” (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p.551; Sellers, 2002). Snyder (2001) supports the efficacy of the comparative method in the context of subnational cases by suggesting the strengths of the type of research design is:

- it can serve as a powerful tool for increasing the number of observations (p.94);\(^{59}\)
- it makes it easier to construct controlled comparisons (p.94);
- the ability of comparativists can be strengthened “to establish control over potential explanatory variables” ((p.94); Linz and de Miguel, 1966; Lijphart, 1971, pp.689-90);\(^{60}\)
- increases the possibility that individual subnational cases “can often be more easily matched on cultural, historical, ecological and socioeconomic dimensions than can national units” (p.96);
- can help pinpoint how variation in political institutions shapes economic performance and policy choice (p.96); and finally
- subnational comparative analysis offers an indispensable tool for understanding the decentralizing political and economic trends of the contemporary era (p.103).

Denters and Mossberger (2006) stress the advantages of cross-national comparative research suggesting “Cross-national, comparative urban political research presents a

\(^{59}\) Snyder (2001) in “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method. Studies of International Development” points to the value of subnational studies that involve comparison but that focus must pay attention to methodological quality.

\(^{60}\) Linz and de Miguel (1966); and Lijphart (1971; 689-90 support Snyder’s call for greater methodological quality.
wealth of theoretical and empirical opportunities” (p.552). Examining local phenomena can give us a better view of variation within and across countries than comparative research that focuses primarily on the nation-state (p.566).

Pierre (2005) points to the hesitant use of small-N comparative case research at the urban level arguing that: “urbanists have been surprisingly slow in using comparisons as a research strategy” (p.446) and in exploiting the “excellent possibilities to systematically test hypotheses about causal relationships between different variables (p.447). Kantor and Savitch (2005) suggest a reason for the hesitancy Pierre identifies noting that, as a rule, social scientists resist the consideration of cities in a comparative way preferring instead to conduct national or cross-national studies. Further they argue that a challenge for urbanists has been to develop “rigor” in the comparative consideration of the local level of government so that a “systematic” approach can be undertaken (p.136). Snyder posits that, despite the benefits of using the comparative method in analyzing subnational and cross-national cases, there are some reasons for approaching the use of the comparative method in subnational settings cautiously (Snyder, 2001, p.95).

Peters agrees with Snyder’s cautionary note when he notes that “a false sense of security” might develop with the use of subnational units (Peters, 1998, p.35). As the basic strategies of subnational comparative analysis “involve within-nation comparisons that focus on subnational cases within a single country” as well as “between nation comparisons that focus on subnational cases across countries” Snyder also argues that there may be a “trade-off between the ability to gain control and the ability to generalize” (Snyder, 2001, pp.95/103). He suggests this effect may be mitigated by combining comparisons that involve within-nation comparisons and between-nation comparisons of subnational units from different countries (Snyder, 2001, p.103). It may be also possible, albeit difficult given constitutional nuances of how different countries treat subnational units, to examine different issues/eras in similar settings.\footnote{This would require a good deal of controlling for variables related to the relationship between particular national governments and their subnational units.}
4.7. Use of the Comparative Method in Canadian Urban Cases

Historically, Canadian political scientists have generated many important and interesting research projects considering a variety of subjects (see McBride, 2005; Lightbody, 2006; Smith, 2003; Covell, 1987). There is, however, a dearth of comparative urban analysis in Canadian political studies of any variety be they small-N, large-N qualitative or large scale quantitatively based. This is not to suggest there has not been several research initiatives focused on interesting topics such as the effects of municipal consolidation (Sancton & Magnusson, 1983; Meligrana, 2000; Ghitter & Smart, 2009; Foran, 2009); the capacity of local municipal politicians given increasing complexity (Stewart & Smith, 2005); comparisons on new immigrants are treated in Canadian cities (Good, 2009) among several others. All of these studies offer a healthy respect of Canadian municipal and metropolitan governments and illuminate the many issues that are apparent in local decision-making processes today. The reason for the shallow pool of Canadian comparative urban studies when compared to other fields within the discipline is really quite simple - there are relatively very few Canadian urbanists!

One of the goals in this dissertation effort has been to add to the body of knowledge of what is understood about Canadian municipalities and then to be able to use that knowledge in the future to be able to compare and contrast with municipalities in other countries and settings (e.g. provinces and states). The ultimate goal is to be able to use such comparisons to understand the decision-making processes of Canadian municipal government better and perhaps suggest best practices in the future. There is no reason why substantially more cannot be learned about how decisions are made at the municipal government level in Canada – the potential is unlimited.

4.8. Use of the Comparative Method in British Columbian Urban Cases

There are very few stand-alone comparative urban analysis of any size or type that consider British Columbia municipalities. Most examples of studies of municipal
government have to do with voter participation, electoral spending/funding, municipal financing, the capacity of municipal politicians, analyses of the evolution of British Columbia’s provincial government, the role of B.C. in the Canadian federation, etc. Qualitative or quantitative analysis, on any wide-scale, has not been conducted in any large scale manner. The Union of BC Municipalities, government agencies, and non-government actors regularly produce reports that involve levels of comparison among British Columbia municipalities and regional districts either within British Columbia or alongside other jurisdictions. The study of various aspects of governance and government in the City of Vancouver in a comparative perspective has been regularly used as part of comparative studies with other jurisdictions in Canada, the United States and other jurisdictions around the world.⁶² Tom Hutton offers one such example in *The Transformation of Canada’s Pacific Metropolis: A Study of Vancouver* (1998) where he compared the growth of Vancouver at the turn of the 20th century with other medium-sized cities within Canada, other Asia Pacific countries, and American cases such as Seattle.⁶³

### 4.9. Interviewees and Selection Process

Interviewees were selected by examining historical research materials and determining individuals that could offer key information that would provide factual background and individual perspectives about the development of the Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. The goal was to involve a variety of government and non-government actors to provide for the possibility of a multiplicity of views from several directions. Contact information was gained by investigation of websites, written articles/books and from other interviewees and prospective interviewees were contacted via telephone or email. Other interviewees also offered suggestions, commonly referred to as the “snowball effect,” as to other

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potential interviewees that could offer additional information in support of the dissertation.

4.10. Interview Process

Semi-structured Interviews were conducted both in person, when necessary via telephone and written email responses via telephone and via written email responses each taking approximately one hour to complete. Written notes were taken and each interview followed a similar format, as provided for with Ethics Approval. In person interviews were conducted at various locations in Vancouver, B.C. A complete listing of the participants is included in the Appendix A. No interviewees requested anonymity and the assurance was given to each that should direct quotations be used they would be provided with the ability to provide approval prior to this information being included in the dissertation.

Approximately 20 key informant interviews were conducted in order to fill in the gaps of what the primary and secondary sources in both eras provided. The focus of the interview questions were structured in an open-ended fashion so that interviewees had significant latitude in developing their answers although questions were guided by the overarching goal to obtain from participants their views on the creation and influence of government and non-government coalitions on the municipal government decision-making process during each of the two eras selected. Specific questions were asked of each participant as to what they found to be the strengths and weaknesses of the decision-making process, who they felt were the main drivers of the decision-making process, and what each participant saw as the legacy of the decision-making processes in each of the two cases/eras selected.

64 For example, former BC Premier and Mayor of Vancouver and current High Commissioner to London for Canada was contacted in London and had questions submitted via email. Mr. Campbell then responded also via email.

65 A full discussion of the key informant interview process follows in a future section and a list of those contacted/interviewed can be found in the Appendices.
There were challenges in achieving the research goals inherent in this dissertation and each of the two eras under consideration involved its own specific research challenges. On a macro-level, the body of urban literature while certainly not a “black hole” does not achieve the amount of information in other fields of political science. Further, the level of information pertaining to the effect of government and non-government actors on the decision-making progress of municipal governments is quite minimal. On a meso-level, the information available on how such coalitions are created and influence Canadian municipal governments is even scarcer. Finally, on a micro-level research into how these types of coalitions were created and influenced the Vancouver municipal government decision-making process during the development of the post-Expo’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is all but non-existent, save few other aspects covered in the dissertation.

The type of research instrument used in the course of examining the two eras of the Vancouver differed for several reasons. Much of the information concerning the former Expo ’86 lands came from primary sources such as newspapers, historical articles, city documents and archival items. Similar information concerning the Vancouver Agreement was very much more accessible by using online sources.

There is also an imbalance in the numbers of interviewees that participated given each era. In the case of the former Expo ’86 lands significant numbers of potential interview subjects were deceased, had retired or had moved into significantly different roles or were simply unavailable to participate. Although the quantity of participants was significantly less than in the Vancouver Agreement era examination, the quality of those interviewed and the extent of research using other instruments mitigated effects on the overall research. In the case of the Vancouver Agreement, a different effect occurred, several key-informants were still involved in government, particularly those at the federal level, were hesitant, or did not respond to requests to participate. Secondly, and this actually serves the overall research effort well, there are differences in the viewpoints of the various interviewees as to the history, success/failure and memories of the era. This effect will be discussed further as part of the findings section of this dissertation. While it may have been possible to interview an increased number of subjects, the quality of
participant that includes Premiers, Mayors, Members of Parliament, City Managers, etc. motivates my explanation that quality trumps quantity.\footnote{It is arguable as to the effect of increasing the number of interviewees as, despite the differences in perspectives of the participants regarding the decision-making process, there is little difference in the historical facts the provide the foundational background in each of the two eras.}
5. Cases

5.1. Introduction

The following sections provide background information for the two eras under consideration in this dissertation including the development of the Post-Expo '86 Lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. The section will conclude with a discussion of the major decisions that were taken in the two cases and an assessment of the role of the various government and non-government actors involved will be provided. This information will inform the analysis of regimes in the Vancouver Agreement and Expo lands cases that are included in the Findings and Analysis section of the dissertation.
5.2. Post-Expo ’86 Land Development

Figure 5.1. Expo ’86 Lands Map

(Source: Expo ’86 Guide; public domain)
5.2.1. Background

“...conceptualize what ought to happen in these spaces and places, not in 1986, but in 1996...what can we build so that the city is a better place to live and work and walk...and then fit the temporary uses in.” (Dr. Peter Oberlander, May 31, 1982)
This section of the dissertation will consider the development of the post-Expo '86 lands in the downtown core of Vancouver, British Columbia in order to examine the creation and influence of regimes that formed around the local decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government. Initially, historical background is provided about the lands that eventually became the Expo '86 site followed by a consideration of the events and actors leading up to and after Expo '86 with a focus on the decisions that ultimately led to the development of the site. The section ends with an examination of the issues surrounding the post-Expo development of the area. The focus of the discussion is on the period immediately following Expo '86 to approximately 1990.

Expo '86 was located in the heart of Vancouver, British Columbia, along the north short of Vancouver’s salt water core. The site was formerly the western terminus for Canadian Pacific Railways and throughout its history was home to a variety of industries including: metal works, saw mills, shipyards and coal burning gas plants” (MacQueen, 2003, p.39). Macqueen notes: “almost half the inlet was buried to satisfy demand for land – infilled with demolition rubble, industrial waste, even tar and cinders from the gas plants (p.39).

The inlet, as noted in 1914, was ‘unsightly, offensive and a menace to the community’s health.’ The situation did not improve over time as in Summer, the Province newspaper reported in 1945, ‘the stench was often sickening”'(MacQueen, 2003, p.39). The site was “contaminated with toxic wastes from several coal gasification plants that operated from the 1920’s to the 1950’s…other areas have heavy metals from a battery plant” (Matas, 1990, p.A:10). Certainly not a very attractive description for the site of what would become a major international exhibition – Expo ‘86. Marathon Realty, the real estate arm of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), controlled the majority of the north side of False Creek – as a result of a land grant to the company in 1884.

The land was part of the original 1884 land grant from the provincial government to the Canadian Pacific Railway and had been operated by the railway for 90 years as railyards or leased out to industries that would generate business for the railway (Gutstein, 1986, p.68). The land grant involved B.C. giving the CPR 6,275 acres of land in exchange for the company moving the western terminus from Port Moody to
Vancouver. Gutstein suggests the company would have done this anyway without the land grant as “most members of the government, as well as the government itself, owned other large tracts of land nearby, and would profit from the CPR development (Gutstein, 1986, p.97).

**Expo and Marathon Realty**

Marathon Realty had submitted a plan to the City of Vancouver for development of the site in 1969 called *La Ville Radieuse* (Punter, 2003, p.187). The plan involved “nineteen towers, each 150 to 200 metres tall, set along the shoreline away from a major highway (Pacific Boulevard). The city had its own priorities in mind so Marathon withdrew the initial plan and introduced a different plan in 1974 that involved the creation of “four distinct neighbourhoods and requested a rezoning for them” (Punter, 2003, p.187). Marathon was finally given city approval for its redevelopment when a 95 acres parcel between the Cambie and Granville bridges was re-zoned from industrial use to comprehensive development zone.

The City of Vancouver’s desire for the development to have a significant (one third) social housing component stalled the project but would become significant to the overall development ethos in Vancouver in the future. Representing the city in the negotiations was Gordon Campbell who worked for the city in the planning, social planning and engineering departments and was Mayor Art Phillips’ executive assistant from 1972-76. Campbell would later start his own development firm prior to eventually joining Marathon as a project officer. His career would take a political turn when he became a Vancouver Alderman (1984), the Mayor (1986) of the City before becoming Premier of British Columbia, June 5, 2001. Campbell’s primary responsibility with Marathon was management of the False Creek development (Gutstein, 1986, p.69).

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67 Philip Owen confirmed that the inclusion of social housing as a requirement for development projects became the norm as a result of the Expo lands development.

68 For more on this please see Kevin Ginnell, 2012, “From Policy Wonk to Wonking Policy: Gordon Campbell, The Early Years.” This paper was presented at a meeting of the British Columbia Political Studies Association, May 2012 in Kelowna, British Columbia.
Transpo is Born

As part of a plan to celebrate Vancouver’s 100th birthday architect Randy Iredale delivered a “concept study” development proposal involving Marathon’s lands in False Creek for Provincial Recreation and Conservation Minister Sam Bawlf in 1978. Bawlf wanted a multi-use stadium and Iredale added “the Roundhouse complex as a technical museum, a convention centre and international trade exposition facilities, parks and a series of canals” (General Report 1986, Document 11). Bawlf also proposed “An international exposition to complement Vancouver’s 1986 centenary” (General Report 1986, Document 1169).

In the 1978 Vancouver civic election Gordon Campbell supported TEAM70 mayoralty candidate May Brown who lost to the NPA’s Jack Volrich who favoured using the city-owned Pacific National Exhibition site for the location of the new stadium (General Report, Document 11). Campbell, along with Martin Zlotnick and Frank Rigney (who would later develop the Georgian Court Hotel next to the stadium site, former Mayor Art Phillips and architect Randle Ireland, began organizing the “Stadium for Downtown Vancouver Association” to lobby for the False Creek location (General Report, Document 11).

Also in June of 1978, Grace McCarthy, one of Bennett’s senior cabinet ministers and B.C. Provincial Secretary,71 investigated the possibility of having the Mona Lisa painting loaned by France to British Columbia and have it visit Vancouver as the centrepiece of the city’s centennial and the 100th anniversary of the completion of the Canadian Pacific railway from coast to coast. McCarthy asked Ambassador Patrick Reid (who was in charge of Canada House in London as Canada’s High Commissioner) at the Cavalry Club in London, England for support in that effort. At the time Reid was also serving as President of the International Bureau of Expositions (IBE) which was responsible for selecting world’s fair locations during this period (General Report “Chronology,” 1986, p.2). As a result of discussions between McCarthy and Reid it

69 The General Report is a treasure trove of information on Expo ’86 containing 23 reports on every minute detail of the fair.
70 TEAM is an acronym for The Electors’ Movement.
71 McCarthy also represented the constituency of Vancouver-Little Mountain,
became apparent that “The French were never going to lend Vancouver the Mona Lisa, but there was a Canadian-built rapid transit system (which would eventually be known as Skytrain) looking for a place to demonstrate its fast, quiet technology” (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.94).

On December 13, 1978, Premier Bennett signalled the province’s decision to apply to the IBE. The application was initially for 1985 in competition with Japan and France and 1986 was a second choice. Formal application was made to the BIE at its June 20, 1979 meeting in Paris with the preferred year 1986 to coincide with Vancouver and CPR’s anniversaries. The application divided “the event between the main site at Pier BC (now Canada Place) while corporate, state and provincial pavilions as well as amusement elements would be set at the PNE. A light, rapid urban transit system would join the sites” (General Report, “Chronology” 1986, p.3).

The application included the name “Transpo ’86” and the theme “Man in Motion” and identified the location of secondary sites which included Jericho Beach, Vancouver International Airport, and the Boeing plant in Seattle – False Creek was not proposed in the original application to the IBE (General Report, “Chronology” p.4). In September, 1979, B.C. Premier Bill Bennett appointed Paul Manning, a former aide to Pierre Trudeau and a May Brown supporter to study the stadium location issue. Manning would recommend to Bennett in December, 1979 that the stadium be located in the False Creek location (Gutstein, 1986, p.73). The Expo ’86 application was given approval by the IBE in November, 1979 and Bill 1972 establishing Transpo ’86 was passed in the B.C. legislature.

The Expo Lands

On November 6, 1980 Premier Bennett struck a $60 million deal ($30 million in cash, $30 million in a land swap) with Campbell and Marathon for 38 hectares (175 acres) of the company’s False Creek land (Punter, 2003, p.187). The land that was given by the Province to Marathon in the land swap included “valuable downtown properties and other undisclosed benefits including, at least, some valuable forest lands”

72 The official title of the bill is the Transpo 86 Corporation Act.
That the CPR did receive other benefits became clear in January 1981 when MLA Don Lockstead (NDP- Mackenzie) charged that a swap of timbered for recreational land by the government and the CPR-owned Pacific Logging Co. was a multi-million dollar giveaway of public assets. The BC government gave Pacific Logging about 5,000 acres of prime timberland on the Sunshine Coast in return for 9,800 acres of logged off recreational property on central and northern Vancouver Island. Basing his estimates on statements by forestry officials, Lockstead charged the timber values alone were more than $60 million and the property value could exceed $100 million for the land being traded to Pacific Logging. (p.97).

The property obtained by the province from Marathon lacked servicing so the fair contributed cash for “redesigning streets, installing water lines and preparing the land for development (Mulgrew, 1986, p.52).

Premier Bennett held a breakfast party for 500 at the Hotel Vancouver in January 1980 where he presented a plan for the redevelopment of the False Creek land that included “a 60,000 seat stadium, an avenue of the provinces, and various trade, restaurant, park, pavilion, and office facilities” (Gutstein, 1986, p.72). At the same time Bennett announced that B.C. would hold a world transportation fair to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Province and CPR’s 100th anniversary of completing the transcontinental railway from coast to coast. Premier Bennett’s plan, for what became the Expo lands, was to also include “10,000 residential units and 750,000 square metres of offices on the False Creek lands after the exposition, the profits from this venture going to finance provincial projects in other B.C. cities and towns” (Punter, 2003, p.187).

British Columbia Place, Ltd.(BCP) was established by the Province to develop the False Creek Lands following Bennett’s announcement of the fair and B.C. Place with “powers to raise and disburse funds, expropriate funds, and override all city planning powers” (Punter, 2003, p.188). This was consistent with the development of the urban regime that existed pre-Expo ‘86 as it allowed the Province to supersede the powers granted to Vancouver under the Vancouver Charter over zoning and land use in the city. Ley (1987) noted that the corporation was “established specifically to bypass municipal interference” which contributed to “acrimonious and openly adversarial negotiations
between the province as developers and the city as regulator” (p.53). Bennett appointed BC businessman Jim Pattison as Chairman of the Board for Expo who did so as a volunteer because he saw the “possibilities” of the fair (Mackie 2011, np).

**Expo and the Economy**

For the Social Credit government of Bill Bennett, the main impetus for the Province to host the fair and afterward develop the Expo lands at the point of the early 1980’s was economic development. In the run-up to the fair B.C. was in a deep recession - contributing to this recession was a downturn in commodity prices which affected British Columbia’s ability to collect fees and royalties in support of the government’s budget. Despite this and growing public consternation over the economy, Bennett announced on January 29, 1980 government spending on a “$854 million transit system, a $125 million amphitheatre, a $1 billion world’s fair and a $135 million trade and convention centre” (Mulgrew, 1986, p.46). Despite this announcement unemployment was rising, and because of that the government’s spending on social assistance also began to climb. By October, 1981 the BC economy, always so dependent on the price of rocks and logs, collapsed.

The unemployment rate defied the Socreds and federal efforts and continued to rise. When Bennett was first elected, the rate had fluctuated between seven and eight per cent of the workforce; by the 1980’s it seemed stuck at about fourteen percent (Mulgrew, p.53)

**Expo and the Feds**

Expo ’86 came close to being cancelled in October 1981 when the province warned the federal government that if there was no cost-sharing of the fair’s deficit it would not be held. The Trudeau government was preoccupied with constitutional issues at the time and was hesitant to get involved in a funding fiasco such as what occurred over the Montreal Olympics. At the same time, the province was having difficulty securing funding from the federal government for any of the projects. Ottawa’s response was to inform the province that there would be no transit funding provided to the province without the fair (Harcourt interview). Bennett had announced a postponement of the $25 million convention centre at Pier BC in December 1981 when its price tag
rose to $135 million and the feds only were prepared to put in $17 million for a cruise ship facility on the site (Gutstein, 1986, p.75). Expo ’86 was put on hold until new negotiations over funding could be completed with the cost of the fair pegged at that time to be $300 million (General Report, “Chronology,” 1986)

Gutstein (1986) suggests this was:

probably a negotiating ploy because four months later Ottawa and BC signed a deal to twin the convention centre and Expo ’86, tying the two together in terms of funding and function and breaking the deadlock which had existed. The convention centre would become part of the exposition site and all federal money destined for Expo (increased from $100 million to $134 million) would go into the one project (p.75).

In exchange, the B.C. government agreed to build, on a cost sharing basis with the federal government, a light rail transit line linking the federal pavilion to the main Expo site giving “both governments a chance to show off the new Canadian made rail transit” (p.75). Also as part of the deal, B.C. agreed to finance Expo ’86 on its own and finance any potential deficit through Lotto 6/49 revenue. (p.75)

During this period the name Expo ’86, suggested by Commissioner-General Reid as more marketable, was first used and Chief Architect Bruno Freschi was hired in October, 1981. At a meeting at City Hall Dr. Peter Oberlander, the vice-chairman of the B.C. Place Citizens Advisory Committee, discussed with Freschi – the need to conceptualize what ought to happen in these spaces and places, not in 1986, but in 1996…what can we build so that the city is a better place to live and work and walk…and then fit the temporary uses in (Gutstein, 1986, 107). At that meeting Dr. Oberlander, as a harbinger of things to come, also made representations to the chief architect to save the CPR Roundhouse on the Expo site, for which he received a “mild commitment” (p.107).

If the contemporary notion of how citizens are governed in Canada is that government has been replaced by governance with local, provincial and federal levels interacting continually in some form of multilevel governance model, then certainly Dr. Oberlander was the poster boy for leading such a scheme. There is not enough space available in any dissertation to include everything that Dr. Oberlander accomplished in his life at the municipal, provincial, federal and international level – his smartest move
was marrying his bride Cornelia who worked with Arthur Erickson for many years and is one of the pre-eminent landscape architects in the world (Ginnell, 2013).\textsuperscript{73}

**The Fair and Labour**

The Bennett government’s response to the province’s dire economic situation was to budget a deficit and initiate spending restraints, “including a cap on public sector wage increases” (Francis, 2003, p.D:8).

The Premier took to the airwaves in February 1982 to announce his plan for slowing the rate of government spending. Crown corporations were told to begin cutting costs. Over the next few years, the largest government run firm, BC Hydro, would axe more than 3,000 employees. Everyone had to tighten their belts, according to the millionaire who had never ventured beyond high school. (Mulgrew, 1986, p.53)

After being re-elected in 1983, the Bennett government’s restraint program intensified “as he announced plans to cut the civil service by 25 per cent and to sell off or shut down a wide variety of government services and agencies” prompting the Opposition Leader Dave Barrett to comment: “restraint was one thing, but this was a scorched earth policy” (Francis, 2003, p.D:8; Magnusson, 1986).

The avalanche of twenty-six bills he introduced reordered the province’s health care system, eliminated government controls on landlords, stripped unionists of rights, slashed social programs, restructured the education system, overhauled the civil service and eviscerated human rights legislation. It was an arbitrary rewriting of the province’s social contract. (Mulgrew, 1986, p.56; Magnusson, 1986)

Labour responded with massive marches and rallies with up to 85,000 people attending. Protests took place throughout the Summer of 1983 and the province “moved to the brink of a general strike in November as civil servants struck for a new contract” (Mulgrew, 1986, p.56). Eventually the Bennett government backed down from some of the more draconian steps in the package.

\textsuperscript{73} Dr. Oberlander was responsible for taking me to the United Nations to deliver a presentation at a conference in support of the UN Habitat-Istanbul movement. He was instrumental in developing Habitat from its inception – his retort to those that question the UN today was always the same – “we need something where people could get together, and, it is all we have.” Dr. Oberlander sadly passed away in 2008 – he is missed.
In October 1983, the Expo board informed the province that the deficit for Expo would be $311 million, eclipsing the projection of a $12 million deficit made by the Commissioner General of the fair two years earlier. In response the fair cut costs and started moved to allow non-union labour to work on the construction of the site as an attempt to theoretically lower labour costs for Expo (Mickelburgh, 1986, p.125). This led to a confrontation between union and non-union workers at the Expo site that threatened once again to stop the fair from occurring. Jim Pattison recommended to the Premier that Expo be cancelled unless a contract was negotiated with the building trades (General Report 1986, Chronology). In a televised address in March 1984, Bennett acted on the Expo labour issue by ordering Pattison to “either strike a deal with the unions within ten days or he would cancel the fair” (Mulgrew, 1986, p.57). Bennett went on:

> These are difficult times and new realities must take hold. The growth of non-union firms is simply an example of the market in action – a gale of competition in a previously insulated environment…The bottom line is that there will be no discrimination in British Columbia based on union or non-union status…It would disturb me greatly, as I know it would disturb most British Columbians, if Expo had to be cancelled. (Mulgrew, 1986, p.59)

After nearly 18 months of negotiations and serious damage to the fair’s timeline labour peace was guaranteed when an agreement between Jim Pattison and the building trades union was achieved.

There were thirteen points in the peace pact, including wage monitoring provisions, organizing procedures, jurisdictional resolutions, even health and safety requirements. The all-important minimum wage rate was set at the basic level in the unions’ contracts, minus the hefty benefit requirements. That set the wage at $18.73 an hour – about $4 an hour less than the total wage benefit package earned by union construction workers. (Rossiter, 1986, p.137)

There was one main problem with the pact that would guarantee the completion of the fair’s construction – the Expo board rejected it. In the end the Bennett government passed special legislation that "divided Expo into fourteen union and non-union projects…This completely removed the building trades’ ability to use their non-
affiliation clauses\textsuperscript{74} to fight non-union construction at Expo” (Rossiter, 1986, p.140). Construction using non-union and union workers re-started and was mostly completed by the fair’s opening.

The fair was a major source of employment in difficult times as it was estimated that on any given day 15000-17000 people were working on the site during its operation broken down as follows:

- Expo ’86 employees 4500
- Official Participant employees 5000
- Concessionaires employees 7500
- Estimated number of pre-Expo employees 29000\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Expo and Harcourt}

Vancouver Mayor Mike Harcourt, who had been elected to succeed Volrich as Mayor of Vancouver in 1980,\textsuperscript{76} had been “lukewarm to Expo” when the idea became public. When City Council considered passing a motion of support for the fair in July 1991, which passed 7-4, Harcourt opposed although his opposition was tempered by concern over the federal government’s threat to withdraw support for rapid transit in the city unless Transpo goes ahead (General Report 1986, “Chronology”). “In response to Mike Harcourt’s pressure, BC Place recalled 40 acres from the fair for social housing development, reducing the footprint of Expo by 25%. Harcourt was not black and white on either Expo ’86 or the Skytrain as some people thought” in spite of reservations having to do with costs and light rail (Mike Harcourt interview; Harcourt, Cameron, & Rossiter, 2007, p.96).

Harcourt insisted that despite the effective provincial powers over provincial lands “that didn’t mean carte blanche on the important land-use issues that arose from the Expo ’86 proposal and whatever would be built on the site afterward” (Harcourt,

\textsuperscript{74} The non-affiliation clauses limited how much union workers were compelled to work along non-union workers on the Expo job site.

\textsuperscript{75} Source is the General Report, Statistics of Operations Staffing Department, document 14.

\textsuperscript{76} Harcourt had been a city alderman from 1973-1980 and was mayor from 1980-86 before being elected Premier of British Columbia in 1991.
Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.96). Harcourt was very much interested in making sure the city would not be getting strapped with a large debt from the fair and even made this “one of the planks of his 1980 run for mayor” (Mackie, 2011, np.).

In an interview in support of this dissertation, Harcourt discussed why he had been hesitant when faced with the financial predictions associated with Expo. He had researched a study associated with the corruption and deficit connected to the City of Montreal emanating from the 1976 Montreal Olympics and he did not want to see Vancouver have the same fate with Expo ’86 (Harcourt Interview). In particular, he had consternation over the requirement that the City of Vancouver would be responsible for 25% of the deficit for Expo ’86 should there be one. Given the possibility of such a burden for Vancouver post-Expo he set out six conditions for his and eventually the city’s (once he won election as Mayor77) support of the fair including:

• No debt for the city;
• The site assembled;
• Rapid transit in place;
• Security in place;
• Tenants protected; and
• Traffic management systems in operation

(Harcourt interview; Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.96).

Harcourt also discussed his famous clash with Grace McCarthy at meeting at the Hotel Vancouver. McCarthy was the lead Minister handling the fair for the provincial government and she had insisted that Expo would cost no more than $100 million. Harcourt pressured the minister over the budget and deficit potential for the fair - this resulted in McCarthy publicly calling Mayor Harcourt “a liar” over his assertion that the fair would cost more than the $100 million that the minister was predicting. In the end, the future premier was correct. He also recalled attending a briefing by two provincial bureaucrats at city council and found their briefing lacking as they insisted the fair “could be held on a capital budget of $75 million and an operating budget of $75 million (Harcourt interview).

77 Harcourt was Mayor of the City of Vancouver from 1980-1986.
Harcourt spent “the better part of 1981 [working] to get the city off the promissory note for a quarter of the debt” (Mackie, 2011, np.) when he won election as mayor by approximately 3,000 votes as an independent. Harcourt mentioned that one of his goals upon being elected was to avoid the types of problems that had occurred in Montreal and although he had been hesitant to support the fair initially he switched gears and focused on getting the most out of Expo development as possible for the City of Vancouver. Ian Mulgrew, noted that “Harcourt abandoned his anti-Transpo platform almost from the moment he sat in the mayor’s chair” (Mulgrew, 1986, p.50).

As part of Harcourt’s strategy to obtain as many amenities from the fair he “appointed an aldermanic task force consisting of hard-nosed (right winger) George Puil, courtroom terrier (left winger) Harry Rankin and the charming but knife-edged (Liberal) May Brown to negotiate a deal with BCP” (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.102). Harcourt and the committee negotiated with Liberal Senator Jack Austin who took the matter to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Harcourt recalled the federal position: “Jack Austin was very creative, the federal government wanted to show off a light rail transit system test track in Kingston” by building what is now known as Canada Place and linking it to the main Expo site the federal government would have the ability to showcase the technology. As a result of this committee’s and Harcourt’s work the city received “immunity for the city from the Expo debt in exchange for the city exempting Canada Harbour Place, as the Canadian pavilion and future convention complex was named, from the $600,000 to $1 million annual charges for water, sewers, fire and police protection” (p.103). Harcourt calls the deal a “win/win/win situation if there ever was one” (p.103).

**Harcourt and the Cambie Bridge**

Mike Harcourt also discussed the process by which the city was able to replace the Cambie Street bridge as one of his proudest achievements as a legacy of Expo. He described the negotiations with Jim Pattison as a case of “Expo needed it- the City needed it” (Harcourt interview).

The Cambie bridge, a “timber structure,” had been built in 1910 and was in need of repair or replacement by the 1980’s. There had been general agreement that a new bridge would be “essential to serve as a link with the Expo site from the West Broadway
area.” (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.111). Gutstein describes the original Cambie bridge’s state:

The lanes were narrow and buses had to switch to the centre lane when they went through the centre truss, then shift back to the curb lane. There was also some congestion at the south end of the bridge but according to city engineers the bridge could have lasted another 20 years. The real problem was the congestion caused by the B.C. Place stadium at the corner of Beatty and Robson at the north end. The city engineer warned council that it was essential that Cambie Bridge traffic be diverted from that corner. (Gutstein, 1986, p.80)

The construction of the Cambie bridge was also used by Harcourt as “leverage” in the tough negotiations with the Province of British Columbia over the city being held responsible for a percentage of the Expo ‘86 debt (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.111).

Expo’s participation was sealed by the transfer of some city-owned parcels of land that everyone agreed should be incorporated into the Expo site at its eastern end. Bridges are a big deal in Vancouver, for obvious reasons. But this one was special, because Harcourt put together the vote to proceed on it councillor by councillor. (Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.111).

The city was able to negotiate a deal that saw Expo contributing $12 million to the construction of a new bridge with the city putting in $40 million. A plebiscite had been held, that enjoyed the support of 74 percent of those voting and using a “continuous pour method” engineers from California “completed the bridge in 7 months (6 months early) and 25% under budget’ (Harcourt Interview).

**Expo and the Vancouver Agreement**

As time went on Harcourt became a big booster of the fair, particularly once the city was “off the hook” for any debts incurred and a number of infrastructure projects including the Convention Centre, B.C. Place, Skytrain, etc. were secured for Vancouver. During our interview he also brought out an interesting point about the inter-governmental processes that occurred in the lead up to Expo. Although negotiations among the City, Province and Federal governments were tough at times, “the experience of Expo set in place a process for cooperation that led to the creation of the
Vancouver Agreement and the sustainability focus of the 2010 Olympics” (Harcourt interview). Further, he suggested that the process of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement had an “ethos of cooperation and the community putting best foot forward” and was “less conflictual that the Expo ’86 process had been at the beginning” – the roots of that attitude was tied to the experience of the Expo ’86 experience (Harcourt Interview). Former Councillor Gordon Price, in a personal interview for the dissertation, noted that this type of cooperation was a result of the attitudes of people like Harcourt, subsequent Mayor Philip Owen, and Councillor Darlene Marzari who had the attitude “that government would be for good” and that “new ways of how we do things” was necessary (Price Interview).

This provides an interesting perspective on the Vancouver Agreement era as not being the first instance of a new model of multilevel governance but merely a continuation of the process started under Expo. This notion will be furthered explored in the following Findings and Analysis section of the dissertation.

**Expo and Evictions**

Not everyone shared in the “success” of the fair as there were reports that itemized evictions among people mostly living in the former Skid Road, the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver. Although the reported numbers of displaced people as a result of Expo differed considerably there is no question that some people did have to give up their accommodations because of the fair. Then community activist Jim Green reported that 750 -1000 people were evicted from their homes and that he knew “of 11 people who died within the first two or three months of the evictions” (McMartin, 1996, p.D:1). Harcourt suggested that in the four years leading up to Expo “about eighty private rooming houses – which provided more than two thousand rooms for low-income families and individuals – have closed down” (Harcourt et al., p.104). Punter notes that “over a thousand evictions ensued in the period prior to Expo, mainly from fifteen hotels serving as rooming houses, none of which actually made any money from their conversion even though their rents were increased tenfold” (Gerecke, 1991b, p.10).

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78 Jim Green would later become a Vancouver city councillor and passed away on February 28, 2012.
The approach under the Expo process was considerably less focused on the needs of the local neighbourhood community when compared to the Vancouver Agreement process. This notion will be further discussed in the Analysis and Findings section.

Post-Expo Development

In order to facilitate the sale of Expo '86 assets, including the False Creek site, the government of British Columbia created a crown corporation, the British Columbia Enterprise Corporation (Cruickshank, 1988, p.A:8). The corporation was in the middle of a scandal that eventually saw Premier Vander Zalm exonerated by the RCMP “on allegations of influence peddling” as it was charged by the former Chairman of BCEC, Peter Brown, and its President Kevin Murphy that Vander Zalm and David Poole had unduly attempted to “require the corporation to consider a purchase offer from Delta developer Peter Toigo (which) created a political firestorm” (Cruickshank, 1988, p.A:8). “Grace McCarthy the former minister who was responsible for BCEC, cited Vander Zalm’s interference with the Crown corporation among her reasons for quitting cabinet” (Cruickshank, 1988, p.A:8).

In an interview with former Premier Vander Zalm, he admitted favouring Canadian based ownership of the post-Expo lands and that the lands should be parcelled out piece by piece which was “rather controversial” (Vander Zalm interview). Media reports at the time suggested that it had been Vander Zalm that had favoured selling the Expo lands as one parcel, in the interview he suggested that it was Grace McCarthy, as head of BCEC, and the lead Minister on the Expo file, that brought the single sale model to Cabinet. He also noted that they “didn’t much money, and could have got more by selling it piece by piece” (Vander Zalm). Development of the Expo lands did proceed in both the pre-fair and post-fair periods despite these inherent jurisdictional tensions between British Columbia and Vancouver.

The decision Harcourt made to support Expo, despite misgivings about the potential costs to the city was critical, it resulted in Vancouver receiving significant infrastructure for little or no cost from the federal/provincial governments and developers. It would be difficult to imagine Vancouver today without Canada Place, BC Place, the Cambie Street bridge and the amenities included in the development of the former Expo
lands. In the context of regime theory there were clearly concerted efforts in several directions around the decision-making processes leading up to Expo. For example, there were a number of people in and out of government that wanted to insure that Vancouver benefitted from holding the fair as much as possible. These coalitions will be considered more closely in the Analysis and Finding section of the dissertation. Following the fair, however, the rules of the game would substantially change – the Province, faced with a poor economic climate and the possibility of being on the hook for large-scale soil remediation costs of the Expo lands, held a “hasty” international bid process and ultimately sold the land to a company controlled by Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-Shing and his son Victor Li for $125 million (Palmer, 1989, A:6; Punter, 2003, p.193; Olds, 1994, pp.17-23).

Former Vancouver City Manager Judy Rogers\(^79\) opined that the City of Vancouver was satisfied to play a much more major role in the development process with the new private developer (Li’s company assumed the moniker of Concord Pacific) and more importantly with not having to deal with the soil remediation costs associated with the property (Rogers interview).

The new premier\(^80\) wanted to get the province out of the land development business and to begin a British-style experiment with privatization. The new administration also reasoned that, by hurrying the Expo lands project, it could create some much needed employment and bring in the money it wanted to apply against its borrowing while interest rates were high.

Although thousands of hours, and dollars, had already been invested by provincial and municipal officials in planning a parcel development which would have linked the Expo lands with Chinatown, the decision was taken by the province to scrap it and sell the entire territory to a single bidder (Palmer, 1989, p.A:6).

\(^79\) Ms. Rogers worked for the City of Vancouver for 25 years - in 1996 she became Assistant City Manager in 1994, deputy City Manager in 1996, and City Manager in 1999.

\(^80\) William Vander Zalm, Social Credit Premier, Minister of Municipal Affairs, Minister of Health, Minister of Education and former Mayor of Surrey, had been elected in 1986.
Vaughn Palmer, writing in the *Globe and Mail* in 1989 summarized the difficulty with this rushed process:

The successful bid from Mr. Li will bring B.C. about $125 million (in 1988 dollars) far less than the sale or lease of smaller parcels would have recouped. The province has also ceded virtually all the planning control it once exercised. There is now justifiable concern that a city within a city is going up in the core of Vancouver. While municipal planners say they will exercise rigorous controls, the fact that the traditional arms-length relationship with the developer Concord Pacific Ltd. has been discarded for a team approach does not inspire confidence. (Palmer, 1989, p.A:6)

It is outside the scope of this dissertation to consider the sale further, suffice to say Vander Zalm and his government was extremely criticized over the process: allegations of interference from the Premier's office in the selection process; pure influence peddling; the lack of consideration of local interests who were interested in bidding; and the low return vs the ultimate cost of the soil mediation were all suggested as reasons for why the deal was bad. The issues surrounding the sale cost Vander Zalm a lot of political capital and one of his senior cabinet ministers Grace McCarthy even resigned over the undue involvement of the Premier's office in the process (Palmer, 1989, p.B:6; see also Mason & Baldry, 1989).

The notion of splitting up the parcel and to develop a series of unique neighbourhoods was consistent with Harcourt's (and others) vision for the area although the Socred provincial government wanted to sell it as a block. Harcourt recalled a lunch with architect Stanley Kwok where literally the neighbourhood master plan for the extension of roads, the street grid around Pacific Boulevard, parks and schools was sketched out on a napkin (Harcourt interview). It was also consistent with Grace McCarthy's vision too. In a speech to the Vancouver Board of Trade on April 9, 1987, McCarthy "urged her audience to stop thinking of the Expo lands as a single site – 'It is in fact a whole series of component sites, each with its own requirements, markets and opportunities... these sites must be developed sensitively and flexibly over a period of time" (Palmer, 1990, p.A:16).

In an interview in support of this dissertation the former Mayor of Vancouver, Premier of British Columbia, and current High Commissioner to Britain - Gordon
Campbell, pointed out that the lands around North False Creek had been of public interest since 1968 and that after 1968 there was “no one against the redevelopment” of that area of the downtown.81 “First of all I was for the redevelopment of the False Creek Lands but that development had to meet the City’s public objectives. The most important thing was how to reintroduce these strategic lands as a wonderful place in the heart of the city” (Campbell Interview).

This notion of collective interest in reclaiming the industrial lands around False Creek for the betterment of all citizens of Vancouver is a common theme both pre- and post-Expo ’86 and several people were consistently championing the redevelopment. The idea that a group of people worked together, from various government and non-government perspectives, is indicative of the presence and influence of a regime. This regime had two parts to it - one side that desired the development to proceed as a series of small neighbourhoods (such as Harcourt), and those that favoured development of the lands as one large parcel (such as Concord).

The plan for the post-Expo ’86 lands re-development was initiated by the BC Place (BCP) corporation which commissioned “five leading architects to develop a series of distinct neighbourhoods with a mix of medium to high-density housing” (Punter, 2003, p.188). Planning had actually started for the development of the post-Expo lands in 1981, shortly after the Province and Marathon made the original deal. The initial process was huge including “nine million square feet of office, hotel and retail space (the entire built-up downtown area contained only 16 million square feet), 11,000 new apartment units, plus parks and other amenities (Gutstein, 1986, p.83).

In 1983, the province, through BCP, appointed Vancouver architect Stanley Kwok as project manager who “fostered a much more cooperative approach to planning and design development” as he had been involved in development and planning during his 15 years of experience in Vancouver (Punter, 2003, p.189). Kwok would later become the chief planner for Concord Pacific development of the former Expo lands.

81 At the time Campbell was a development manager for CPR’s real estate arm, Marathon Realty.
Gutstein (1986) noted Kwok’s desire for a closer working relationship with the City of Vancouver something that he “seem(ed) to have achieved, according to city planners:

City staff are in the same downtown office as the BC Place staff and consultants. Every idea is shared, every approach is explored together, everybody’s concern gets equal time in the process. The confrontation of 1983 has been replaced by a desire to reach consensus – to make sure the proposals are not their plans versus my plans, but our plans.

(Gutstein, 1986, p.84)

BC Place wanted to develop lands between Granville and Burrard bridges, south of Beach Avenue on land that had been part of the Marathon lands but not a part of the main Expo site (Gutstein, 1986, p.81). “BC Place wanted development here quickly so that it would have a positive cash flow to offset the drain of the BC Place stadium which was not meeting financial projections” (p.81). Gordon Campbell suggested that the “pressure to develop the land was intense” as the “holding charges alone on a $150 million purchase would amount more than $1 billion over 10 years” (Lee, 1988, p.A:8). High densities were to be needed in the development in order for BC Place to generate significant revenues as the corporation was faced with the cost of land acquisition from Marathon Realty ($30 million in cash); the provincial contribution to the construction of BC Place as required by the Premier ($130 million); sewers, roads seawalls, parks and interest charges (well over $200 million or $1 million per acre); and debt servicing of $680,000 a month (Gutstein, 1986, p.84). In many ways this development would set the tone for how the rest of North False Creek would be proceed so it was of great interest to the government and non-government actors in the community.

In late 1983, BC Place Chairman Jim Pattison put forward a development application that included the rezoning of 900,000 square feet of “hotel, apartment, commercial and retail uses” (Gutstein, 1986, p.82). The application received favourable comments from the Vancouver City Planning Commission, however, they did have concerns over the height of buildings and the densities Pattison wanted (p.82). The development process also featured a great deal of public input featuring “close communication with the public, neighbourhood groups, and special interest groups (p.83).” Council voted 7-4 to approve the plan with Mayor Harcourt supporting the plan “to grant BC Place extra density because of public amenities planned for the
development such as the stadium, seawall walkways and improved False Creek water quality” (p.83).

The four COPE councillors on council voted “No” to the proposal as they favoured a staff recommendation that the heights of buildings be limited to 15 storeys (Vaughan Interview; Gutstein, p.83). This was indicative of a consistent theme expressed from several sources including the City’s planning department, the COPE opposition, Mayor Harcourt, later City Planning Director Larry Beasley, that opposed higher towers and favoured mixed-use development in the area. Philip Owen was of this view as he favoured the mixed use model, but that if may have been possible to have a number of “point towers” that could stretch higher, offer more density, with minimal effect to the neighbourhood (Owen interview). The city and Concord Pacific did eventually agree on plan for 28 hectares (70 acres) to the east of BC Place, however, this plan was abandoned with the discovery of contaminated soil in 1989 (Punter, 2003, p.189).

A New Plan

A new plan for the post-Expo lands was brought forward to City council by Concord Pacific in 1989. According to Gordon Price a key component of the plan was the notion that amenities, including a seawall and parks would have to be a significant part of the development (Price interview). Don Vaughan, the pre-eminent landscape architect responsible for the design of the shoreline plan including parks such as David Lam Park, greenspace and for the creation of the “bays and peninsula scheme” adopted for the post-Expo development of the False Creek lands, recalled a story during a personal interview in support of this dissertation, while working for Stanley Kwok. The usual practice was to devise development plans based on density and then fit in parks and greenspace – the new Concord Development plan would be different as Kwok approached Vaughan at the outset and they determined 50 acres of the site would be park, access to the water and greenspace. Vaughan’s vision for the shoreline was the one selected by Kwok as being the plan for the False Creek shoreline. A two-week competition had occurred among Concord’s designers to come up with an approach to Concord’s development. The competition was guided by three principles:

• the existing water’s edge at the high water mark would be the property line
• all streets would be extended to the waterfront, this meant that end zones would have views of the mountains and water
• towers would be turned so they met the existing grid and the connection to the grid would be indistinguishable (Vaughan interview)

Originally, a concept that envisioned a series of lagoons was promoted as being the preferred design, but that was quickly abandoned when it became clear that the nature of the tidal flow in False Creek would make it impossible. The city was also not supportive of the lagoon vision as the general feeling was the model would be “isolating” which would be unacceptable. Vaughan’s vision was to have buildings jut out into False Creek with an “open plan” from a modernist perspective. Stanley Kwok supported Vaughan’s vision immediately as it potentially increased the “length of view edge” by three times and that meant an increase in residences with a water view and a potential increase of at least 20% in the revenue that could be realized. Vaughan saw it as protecting the “best land for parks” that reminded him of the “little old English green” concept where a “commons” was important. Each of the areas that jutted out would form “a point with identifiable function and variety” with almost all parts of the plan having playgrounds and parks. Eventually the project came under the control of city planner Larry Beasley who had the reputation of “not liking rough edges and tall buildings” – according to Vaughan at one showing of a model of the development Beasley walked up and “snapped the tops off the styro-foam building” (Vaughan interview).

Don Vaughan developed the master plan for parks in the development and coordinated a selection process that involved 35 landscape architects. An interesting memory of Vaughan’s was his inspiration for the development’s seawall – he had visited New York’s Battery Park in Lower Manhattan and had noticed that its width was conducive to accommodating large crowds using the walkway in multiple ways. Upon returning to Vancouver he convinced Kwok and Beasley that the width of the False Creek seawall should be doubled from 15 to 30 feet allowing for cycling, walking/running, roller blading, and other uses to coexist. As mentioned, according to Vaughan, Beasley did not like messy edges so he was in favour of the clean lines the seawall would offer and Councillor Price, who was representing the city on the project, favoured the notion of well-defined bike and pedestrian paths – eventually the bike path
would be paved and the pedestrian walkway would use pavers as a surface as one of the first steps in the development of the site (Vaughan interview).

The new plan would “allow Concord Pacific to build office towers of up to 34 stories, as well as housing for 13, 300 people, two hotels and several restaurants and retail outlets” as well as “eight day-care centres and designated sites for 1,530 subsidized units for the poor” (Matas, 1989, p.A:15). Concord had agreed to sell back land to the city for social housing for $50 million (ironically the same amount as the down payment for the entire parcel of land paid by Concord) in April 1988 (Matas, 1989, p.A:15). Under the new zoning plan, the estimated value of the former Expo lands would be about $700 million (Matas, 1989, p.A:15). Councillor George Puil suggested, at the time of the city’s approval, that the city should have retained ownership, however, he felt the “city struck a good deal with the developer in preparing the plan” (Matas, 1989, p.A:15).

The Expo Lands Today

Gordon Price noted that the post-Expo development of the False Creek lands was guided by a series of principles that included insuring the plan took “children, green space, cars, co-op housing, rental homes, and mixed use” into consideration in a complementary manner (Price interview). According to Price, the development of the plan was on a “mixed use” model, especially in accommodating diversity in income and including new Canadians – he told an interesting anecdote where Yugoslavian refugees were initially put up in the Roundhouse Centre as an indication of the need to be open to all types of people in the area (Price interview). He also pointed out that there was far from a consensus as to how to develop the area, and that the only source of city power in the development process was its role in “zoning and bylaw enforcement” (Price interview). The primary difference was between those in the community that favoured development in a piecemeal way with unique neighbourhoods and those that favoured an all- encompassing plan involving high densification and buildings of 30-50 storeys “cheek to jowl” (Owen Interview). This also goes to what Gordon Campbell had suggested, that there was a desire among the local decision-makers to turn the tables on developers by setting design principles such as density, height, form and amenities, and then making any developer and development meet those standards or not proceed.
This is quite a different model than what had been the case in the city prior to the development of the post-Expo lands, previously developers would go to the city and tell the city what they were going to do and force the city to accept or the developers would not move forward with the development. The decision to move in this direction by the local government and the city’s planning department has driven the zoning and planning functions in Vancouver ever since (Campbell interview).

Figure 5.3. David Lam Park

Price added that the initial steps of completing David Lam Park and a temporary seawall gave the public access to the water it never previously had, “solidified the city’s direction about cycling” and provided “a prudent vision of the area around False Creek” (Price interview). Price recalled that council made it clear to the city’s planning bureaucracy that “amenities had to be included” mostly through the efforts of Gordon Campbell and Councillor George Puil (Price Interview). Most of the direction would be
supported through council votes dominated by the NPA majority who would first caucus among themselves so there was “not much conflict” and “no surprises” regarding the direction of the city’s new development process (Price interview). As a result, Price recalled that in the implementation of the new process there was “not much dispute” and that the “process worked.” Overall, the city was “in the driver’s seat” making it “easier for other developments” in the future (Price interview).

Gordon Campbell supported the notion of creating a new attitude about development in Vancouver concerning the new plan for the former-Expo lands when he became Mayor the City of Vancouver in 1986 and the city “undertook a new approach to major land holdings in three areas: False Creek, the Burrard Inlet Waterfront, and the Fraser Lands” that featured a “public process to establish what the city wanted on the lands” (Gordon Campbell interview) The City came up with “16 guidelines” to clearly say "these are the public objectives on these lands" (Campbell interview). The guidelines put the onus on the development community to conform to the desires and needs of the city rather than the city reacting to developers.

If a developer wanted to engage in the redevelopment then that was the framework into which any proposal should fit - my theory was that it was not an effective use of time, energy, or resources if the city just kept saying what it DID NOT want, it was our job to say what we DID want in the public interest. (Campbell interview)

Former Vancouver City Councillor Gordon Price made the point that the nature of land development made it extremely difficult for the development of any type of regime that involved the cross-involvement of government and non-government actors. There certainly was interaction among the local government bureaucracy, architects, developers and the public prior to entering, and as part of the public consultation aspects of the development process – however, as both Gordon Price and former City Manager Judy Rogers noted, the process dictated this activity was minimized at the point of application. Local politicians and developers are normatively and statutorily constrained as to participating intimately with each other in the local development process involving density, amenities, zoning, etc. which contributes to a different form for a “hard” land-based policy than a “soft” social policy (Price/ Rogers interviews).
5.2.2. Development of post-Expo ’86 Lands - Key Decisions Made

The development of the post- Expo lands was framed by two major decisional areas:

1. The Province of British Columbia, under the Social Credit government first under Bill Bennett, and then William Vander Zalm, decided to use the development of the Expo lands as an economic development driver in a period of economic crisis.
   - emanating from this decision several other ancillary choices were made:
     - the decision of the provincial government to use the False Creek land for Expo ’86, B.C. Place and post-fair and the later decisions to generate a return on the sale of land by selling to one, instead of a several, buyer(s);
     - the province’s decision to assume any deficit following the fair and financing that through the use of lottery funds effectively absolving Vancouver and Canada of any responsibility following the fair;
     - the provincial decision to sell the Expo lands as one parcel of land vs a series of smaller units
     - the provincial decision to sell to offshore interests, Hong Kong billionaire Li Ka-shing instead of local developers;
     - the decision of the federal government to link Expo ’86 and Convention Centre to public transit funding which put pressure on the city government and province to act consistent with federal policy, particularly on the use of Skytrain technology;
     - the provincial decision to allow non-union labour to work on the Expo site and to threaten the unions with legislation to enforce that, this was a harbinger of the Socred and later Liberal attitude toward unions in the Province;
     - the provincial decision to accept responsibility for the environmental remediation of the post-Expo lands in the original sale Agreement with Li Ka-Shing.

2. The City of Vancouver, under Mayor Mike Harcourt, made a critical decision to support the Province’s development of the Expo lands including Expo ’86, the building of B.C. Place and the disposition of the land after the fair and use its support as leverage to receive several major pieces of infrastructure including B.C. Place; Canada Place; the Skytrain connection between the Expo lands and Waterfront station; assistance with the financing from Expo of the new Cambie St. bridge; and parks, seawall and green space connected to the Concord development of the False Creek parcel.
   - emanating from this decision several other ancillary choices were made:
• the decision by the city to incorporate a master plan for the development of the former Expo '86 lands that was based on a mixed use model with extensive park space, seawall, green space, medium to high density and other amenities;

• the decision of the city government, under Gordon Campbell, to set guidelines and standards for developers to follow first on the post-Expo lands and later in other areas of the city that featured what the City wanted by way of development. This notion was a major change from the situation previously when the developers would go to the City and set the parameters of the development.

An examination of these two decisional areas will be conducted in the Findings and Analysis section with a focus on how they relate to the regimes that were created and influenced the decision-making processes involved in the post-Expo '86 lands development.

5.2.3. Summary

This section has considered the background to the development of the post Expo '86 lands. The decision-making processes that occurred pre- and post Expo '86 were considered in order to understand the different regimes that formed around the case. Further analysis of the formation and role of these regimes will be discussed in depth in a subsequent section of the dissertation. The next section of the dissertation considers the second case, the creation of the Vancouver Agreement.
5.3. The Vancouver Agreement

Figure 5.4. City of Vancouver Downtown Core

(Source: Google Maps; used with permission)

5.3.1. Background

This section considers the case of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement (VA) in Vancouver, British Columbia. Initially a brief historical
background will be provided leading to a discussion of the goals and principles contained within the Agreement. This is followed by an examination of the governance structure underpinning the VA followed by a comment on the funding process used for the Agreement. Further background is then provided on the area most targeted by the VA, the Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood (DTES) of Vancouver. The context for the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement in the DTES is shown by citing several statistics. The section will conclude with a discussion of the major decisions that were taken in the process of the creation and implementation of the Agreement and an assessment of the role of the various government and non-government actors involved will be provided. This information will help inform the analysis included in the following section of the dissertation.

The Agreement(s)

The “Canada, British Columbia, Vancouver Urban Development Agreement (UDA) Regarding the Economic, Social and Community Development in the City of Vancouver” (2000 - Vancouver Agreement (VA)) was a collaboration among the governments of Canada; the Province of British Columbia; the City of Vancouver and various community organizations that called for a framework “to work together to improve conditions for low income people in Vancouver, with an initial focus on the inner city neighbourhood of the Downtown Eastside” (Edelson, 2010, p.139).

The “Vancouver Agreement” was actually two agreements – the first one was agreed to in June of 1999, signed in Vancouver, March 9, 2000 and ended March 9, 2005. Modifications were made and the initial agreement finalized following public consultations involving “invited community representatives” in September, 1999. Examples of these groups include the Aboriginal Community Centre for Employment Services Society; Atira Women’s Housing Society; Carnegie Community Centre Association; Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood House; Downtown Eastside Centre for the Arts; Downtown Eastside Residents Association; Dugout Drop- In Centre; Lookout Shelter Society; Main and Hastings Housing Society; Portland Hotel Society; Pot Luck Café; Ray Cam Community Association; Vancouver Native Health; Vancouver Aboriginal Friendship Society; Women’s Health Collective, YWCA and “many other NGO’s that sponsor and undertake supplementary fund raising and use volunteers to supplement
their efforts of paid staff in providing housing, health care, detoxification, shelter, food, community arts and related services” (Edelson, 2010, pp.147/148).

The stated purpose of the first Vancouver Agreement was to bring all three levels of government, community organizations and residents together to “enhance sustainable economic, social and community development” (Vancouver Agreement, 2000 p.1). The second Vancouver agreement, renewing the process, was signed March 10, 2005 and ended March 31, 2010 – (Vancouver Agreement). Many of the programs, including the InSite safe injection site and United We Can, etc. still successfully operate today despite the Agreement ending in 2010.

Urban Development Agreements (UDA’s) were instruments used by the federal government to bring cities, provinces and the federal government together to “address broad issues through partnerships and shared goals” that focused on “addressing key challenges facing various cities, realizing opportunities in innovation, and ensuring the full participation of all groups in the economies of those cities” (Western Economic Diversification, (WD) 2010, p.4). The WD entered into similar agreements with Saskatoon, Winnipeg, and Regina (Western Economic Diversification Canada, 2010, p.1).

Urban Development Agreements were intended to achieve one of three goals:

- **Targeted generation projects**: The most well-known form of place-based policy, this involves special investments in local initiatives or facilities to renew the physical, economic, or social infrastructures of distressed areas.

- **Bending policy mainstreams**: This involves changing or adapting the broader sectoral policy interventions that fundamentally shape the prospects of distressed areas to ensure better fit with the particular needs of residents, and over the longer term to guard against simply displacing problems from one area to another.

- **Scaling up innovations**: This involves acting on the lessons and experiments launched in distressed areas and taking them to scale, for example, through resources to embed them in the community fabric or through transferring the innovations to other urban settings where appropriate. (Bradford, 2008, p.4)

There were similarities and differences in the Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg and Vancouver Agreements. The Saskatoon and Regina Agreements were similar in their focus on downtown revitalization and social development to the Winnipeg Agreements.
and all received funding from municipal, provincial and federal governments. The Saskatoon Agreement was announced in May 2005, and committed $10 million ($5 million from Western Economic Diversification and $2.5 million each from the Government of Saskatchewan and the City of Saskatoon) aimed at revitalization of the older neighbourhoods, “encouraging participation in artistic, recreational and cultural activities, and revitalizing the city’s older neighbourhoods, encouraging participation in artistic, recreational and cultural activities, and promoting a positive business climate that attracts innovation” (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.1). The Regina Agreement was also signed in May 2005 and followed the same funding formula as the Saskatoon Agreement with a “focus on the city’s inner-city neighbourhoods and downtown revitalization” (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.1).

Winnipeg had a history of UDA’s beginning in 1980, with an urban development agreement signed in Winnipeg82 to “provide increased employment opportunities [for core area residents], to encourage appropriate industrial, commercial and residential development in the core area and to facilitate the effective social and economic participation of core area residents in development opportunities (Bradford, 2008, p.9). The Winnipeg Agreements (there were a series of four agreements spanning 20 years – Bradford 2008) were different than the Vancouver Agreement. In the case of Winnipeg, the urban development agreements were signed as a response to flight out of the central core, inadequate housing, poor economic development, unemployment and a large influx of Aboriginal people83 all combined to turn downtown Winnipeg into a area that was “commercially stagnant, decaying aesthetically and rife with social ills” (Krotz, 1983). In contrast, the Vancouver Agreement was part of a response to a public health crisis in the Downtown Eastside community of Vancouver. The area was in the midst of an epidemic of drug overdoses, HIV/AIDS/HPV infections and an open drug market was created in the heart of the DTES at the corner of Main and Hastings (Bradford, 2008). There was a strong health care component in the Vancouver Agreement that included the active participation of Health Canada, the Province’s Ministry of Health and the local

82 Other UDA’s were signed with the municipal government in Saskatoon and Regina in addition to Vancouver and Winnipeg (Western Economic Diversification Canada: Evaluation of the Vancouver Agreement - Audit & Evaluation Branch May 2010, i.

83 This influx was not accompanied by an appropriate amount of services being provided.
Vancouver-Richmond Health Board (later Coast Health Authority) – this component does not appear to be as evident in the Regina, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg agreements which all appear to be more economic development based although the health of citizens in the community must have been a priority.

Another difference between the Vancouver and three other plans was the infusion of funding. In the Winnipeg Agreements the federal government “put $30 million on the table for a comprehensive renewal effort contingent upon matching contributions from the province and municipality” (Bradford, 2008, p.9). In the end, the Winnipeg UDA obtained funding of $96 million over 5 years “impacting some 1,000 projects” (Bradford, 2008, p.9).

The Vancouver Agreement supported “economic revitalization, safety & security, housing, health and quality of life” despite the agreement not having dedicated funding for the first three years. Eventually funding was received to support the Agreement, particularly once the 2010 Olympics were awarded to Vancouver, and the total funding eventually obtained was “$28 million over 10 years affecting 96 projects managed by 50 community partners” 84 (Vancouver Agreement “Highlights 2000-2010”).

The fact that there was no dedicated funding initially was an important aspect to the overall success of the Agreement process:

This was both a benefit and a disadvantage. It was easier for the different levels of governments to approve the Agreement because it did not have to compete with other projects for funding (Mason, 2006) and “each partner could voluntarily contribute based on the pre-existing structures and resources available to them. However, once

84 Major Community partners under the Agreement included: BOB (Building Opportunities for Business); Eastside Movement for Business and Economic Renewal Society (EMBERS; The Four Pillars Employment Project; United We Can (UWC); Potluck Café Society; The Arts & Culture Strategic Framework and Investment Plan; Bladerunners Creative Industries; Atira Women’s Resource Society Artisan’s Cooperative; Great Beginnings Program; and the InSite safe injection site (The VA strongly supported the overall strategy and facilitated several of its initiatives) among many more.
the VA was in place, a lack of long-term funding hampered its ability to make long term plans or to leverage other resources” (Edelson, 2010: pp.154/155; Mason, 2006).

Former City Manager Judy Rogers suggested that the lack of funding initially instilled a sense of “creativity” in the management of the process. Further, this lack of funding made it easier for local bureaucrats to change the approach on issues should that be necessary. Ms. Rogers also mentioned that the program changed once a formal funding process was introduced to the Agreement, the process became “all about the money” and groups in the community started to be “territorial (Rogers interview).

The lack of initial dedicated funding also ultimately contributed to the relative ease with which the supportive regime, that built up around the Agreement and Four Pillars Strategy, was created. George Abbott, former British Columbia Health Minister responsible for the VA, in a personal interview in support of this dissertation suggested that although there may not have been a “line item” in the budget funding in the first stages of the Agreement, it was indeed provided by the Government of British Columbia “through regular departmental funding” at the outset (Abbott interview).

The Macleod Institute in its evaluation of the VA for the Management Committee in 2003 pointed to how the program changed after the provision of funding:

The VA is experiencing a fundamental culture shift as a result of receiving the dedicated funds. Key informants at the Management Committee level reported that the nature of their discussions has changed radically, since much more time is now spent on determining appropriate administrative structures and processes. The nature of potential projects has also changed. As one respondent said, ‘Funding influenced a focus towards more individual, and less collective, proposals.’

(Macleod Institute, 2003, p.20).

85 A discussion of the multi-level nature of the Vancouver Agreement is discussed in a section that follows.

86 Abbott was elected as MLA for Shuswap in 1996 and served in the B.C. Cabinet as Minister of Health, Education, Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, Sustainable Resources Management, and Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services during his career in provincial government.
Table 5.1. Sources of Funding – Vancouver Agreement – 2000-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government (WD Funds)</td>
<td>$7,663,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>$18,369,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>$1,502,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$27,534,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Western Economic Diversification 2010, 5; public domain)

Vancouver contributed “heritage preservation incentives and funding from their Downtown Eastside Capital fund, as well as in-kind goods and services and staffing resources (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.5). Former City Manager Judy Rogers and current Assistant City Manager Wendy Au both reported that the City of Vancouver’s largest contribution was to allow several staff members the opportunity to administer the Vancouver Agreement “off the corner of their desks.”

The ability to second staff to administer and implement the programs attached to the Vancouver Agreement allowed the city to leverage the use of provincial and federal funding while contributing minimal cash amounts from city coffers. Several of the key players stated that money became a problem when dedicated funding was forthcoming post-2003. Donald Macpherson spoke of the lack of coordination of existing funds as being problematic and regretted the Agreement did not contain additional funding for “an emergency situation” (Macpherson interview), both Rogers and Au commented that the nature of the Agreement changed once funding was introduced, that there was no “clarity in the funding mechanisms,” and that once money was available both the province and federal government wanted increased control of the process and the Agreement “became about the money and groups became territorial” (Au/Rogers/Macpherson interviews). It should also be noted that the funding for the parallel Four Pillars Approach including the Safe Injection Site (SIS) came from the Vancouver Agreement effort (Rogers interview).

Following is an explanation of where the money was spent based upon the four overarching principles of the Vancouver Agreement: economic revitalization, safety & security, housing, and health & quality of life:

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87 This meant that city administrators were overseeing and participating in the Vancouver Agreement while conducting their usual business within the local government.
Table 5.2. Number/Value of Initiatives Under the Vancouver Agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>All VA Funding Sources</th>
<th>WD Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Revitalization</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>$13,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety &amp; Security</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$2,205,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$4,027,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health &amp; Quality of Life</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$5,379,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Agreement Coordination</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$2,553,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Operating Expenditures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>$27,534,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.5; public domain)

The Auditor General of Canada, in an audit and evaluation of the Agreement in 2005, noted that the Vancouver Agreement was a different than the other agreements as “because it is both a tripartite and a horizontal initiative” (Auditor General of Canada 2005, p.6) In Winnipeg’s case, the UDA model was championed by Lloyd Axworthy, an MP from Winnipeg and senior Cabinet Minister in the governments of Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chretien (Layne, 2000). In the Vancouver case, Vancouver Mayor Philip Owen, drove the Agreement through the channels of his city hall, and provincial and federal governments (Mason, 2006; Toronto Star, 2006) Owen would later develop, along with the City’s Drug Policy Coordinator Donald Macpherson, the Four Pillars Approach. The VA strongly supported the overall strategy and facilitated several of its initiatives including In Site, SIS Wraparound Services; The North American Opiates

88 “… a strategy of prevention, treatment, enforcement and harm reduction. The strategy was a blueprint for a comprehensive and holistic approach to drug addiction and its attendant social problems” (Vancouver Agreement 2010, 33).

89 “North America’s first legal Supervised Injection Site (SIS), opened in 2003 to provide direct services to drug users including referral to detox, counselling and treatment, as well as to reduce the level of drug use on DTES streets. The Enhanced Enforcement Initiatives (see Safety & Security) helped fund a coordinated approach to starting up this service, as well as Onsite, a detox facility located above Insite. The foundation of cooperation among the three levels of government combined with high-level leadership in the VA was a major driving force” Vancouver Agreement Highlights 2010, 33).
Bradford (2008) notes that “there was a New Democratic provincial government in British Columbia and Manitoba at the time of initial institutionalization, because it is difficult to imagine a government hostile to federal government intervention in provincial/municipal affairs buying-in to such an institutional arrangement” (9).

In 1997, the City of Vancouver created “The Vancouver Coalition for Crime Prevention and Drug Treatment,” later known as the “Four Pillars Coalition,” which had at its core “the integration of prevention, treatment, enforcement and harm reduction activities in a comprehensive strategy of community economic and social development (Mason, 2006, p.9; Macpherson, 2001, 2004). The program was a “widespread partnership between civic agencies and wide-ranging community groups and social service agencies” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.11). As Mason (2006) notes “the coalition successfully applied for a grant ($5 million) from the federal government to fund a five-year Crime Prevention (program) through a Social Development Project, which subsequently became known as the Downtown Eastside Community Development Project” and ran from 1999-2004, initiating “a wide series of community capacity-building activities, targeting vulnerable groups” (Mason, 2006, p.9). Funding came from several agencies including the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC), Status of Women Canada, Heritage Canada, Human Resources Development Canada, B.C. Ministry of

90 “…supported by $2 million of VA funding, was the largest health and quality of life initiative. These support services included access to methadone treatment; adult outpatient withdrawal management services, including medication substitutes and acupuncture; and expanded, centralized youth withdrawal management services. Since its inception in 2003, the project has helped to significantly reduce fatalities as a result of overdose. The financial benefits of prevented HIV infections and deaths are significant. In addition, Insite users are twice as likely to engage in addiction treatment as non-Insite users” (Vancouver Agreement 2010 Highlights, 33).

91 “…demonstrated that providing addicts with access to free heroin could help stabilize their lives, move them towards recovery and abstinence and reduce the negative impacts of their drug use on the community” (Vancouver Agreement Highlights 2010, 33).

92 “which opened in fall 2009, is the first long-term residential treatment centre for B.C. youth who are withdrawing from drugs and alcohol. The VA supplemented other funders to open this facility” (Vancouver Agreement Highlights 2010, 33).

93 “…was a project that focused on methamphetamine prevention and harm reduction for low-income youth. It included an education campaign and peer-training program; professional training and a resource website for front-line workers; and a youth-led theatre and film project” (Vancouver Agreement Highlights 2010, 33).
Public Safety and Solicitor General, and the City of Vancouver (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.11).

The precursor to the formal Vancouver Agreement was a program called the “Downtown Eastside Revitalization Program,” which was ran out of the City Manager’s office and sought to “pull various municipal departments under the umbrella” of one program coordinated by Neighbourhood Integrated Services Teams (NIST) (Macleod Institute 2003, p.11).

According to one of the lead city actors in the Agreement process, Assistant City Manager, Wendy Au, Vancouver’s UDA sought to address problems connected to substance abuse, aboriginal issues, mental health problems, the burgeoning drug culture, and changing demography of the DTES (Au interview). The Agreement would involve the municipal, provincial and federal governments in two areas of jurisdiction involving health and law enforcement. Under the Canadian Constitution’s Division of Powers, sections 91 through 93, the Province of British Columbia had enumerated powers over health care in the city, while the federal government had enumerated power over the Criminal Code of Canada while the province had administration of justice responsibilities in B.C. over law enforcement. The Vancouver Agreement sought to bridge the constitutional gap and called for the “three governments to work together, within their jurisdictions and mandates, and with communities\(^\text{94}\) in Vancouver to develop and implement a coordinated strategy to promote and support sustainable economic, social and community development” (Vancouver Agreement, 2000, p.1).

There was a recognition by the provincial and federal government that the local government was best to lead the efforts encompassed in the Agreement as it “was useful to have familiar people on the ground that could provide information” and could best “coordinate the relationship between the community and government” (Au interview). This was based on the notion that the “city was closest to the people” so therefore was in the best position to facilitate the programs under the VA. Members of the community, residents, and business interests were “happy to have local contacts” as

\(^{94}\) Including community organizations in the Downtown Eastside.
“conduits between the city government and the community” and that there had been no direct connection to senior levels of government under the Agreement (Au interview).

Au did mention that there was “confusion at the community level” initially as the Vancouver Agreement “did not have a grant program” as was traditionally the case with other social service programs (Au interview). There was opposition to the VA, focused mostly on the harm reduction aspects of the Four Pillars Approach, emanating primarily from the local area business associations, specifically the Gastown and Chinatown Commercial Associations. Au recalled the city held 3 days of public hearings over the strategy with 900 people attending, however, because of the support developed by Philip Owen and others the “three levels of government stood together” (Au Interview). Opposing groups did not support money being spent on drug treatment, preferring that the City prioritize economic development and increasing funding of police efforts in the neighbourhood (Au interview). Au noted that at the same time, the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) was making representations to the City requesting action on the epidemic in the DTES, even laying a coffin on a table in the Council Chambers and planting crosses on the grounds of City Hall to show the lethal nature of the crisis (Au interview; Livingston interview).

Initially there was “little trust among the stakeholders,” eventually because of the Agreement, lasting trust has developed resulting in support for programs such as InSite and Community Benefit Agreements guaranteeing jobs from the 2010 Olympic developments (Au interview). According to Au, the first Agreement fostered “good relationships among the community, business, and government” with a lot of “development work that complemented the Agreement undertaken” (Au interview). Au also stressed the importance of the “interpersonal relationships that made it possible to get a listening ear” when it was necessary (Au interview). She did mention that “there was a recognition of the contribution of city employees to the Agreement” by the other levels of government, however, there was “minimal federal recognition of the Agreement” (Au interview).

For Rogers, the types of personal interactions and networking that was done among government and non-government actors is a lasting legacy of the Agreement (Rogers interview). Her initial role was “to get government in” and took “lots of small
steps and develop partnerships” which included the “integration of the Carnegie Centre” among others (Rogers interview).

The development of the Vancouver Agreement was motivated by several people. However, the implementation of the Agreement itself was driven by committed city bureaucrats such as Judy Rogers, Wendy Au and Donald Macpherson. Political leadership on the Agreement was initially provided by Philip Owen\textsuperscript{95} who Rogers described as “true and steadfast” in his desire to move forward first on the Vancouver Agreement and then the Four Pillars Approach. This was to be a community-led initiative. It was Owen’s leadership that was the “reason for the success” of the Agreement and Approach (Rogers interview). For Owen it was “all about public health and public order” and that there “needed to be better coordination” of social services particularly in the Downtown Eastside (Owen interview).

Edelson (2010) noted that at various times all levels of government and many community organizations were providing services and jurisdiction over many issues important to the citizens of the DTES:

**Federal Government**

- responsible for the health transfer payment to insure basic standards of national health care as guaranteed under the Canada Health Act;
- collects taxes and manages the Old Age Pension, and Canadian pension plan for seniors and people with disabilities;
- funds major economic initiatives;
- responsible for the Criminal Code of Canada;
- sets legislation and policies regarding immigrants and funds many services to help newcomers gain citizenship.

**Provincial Government**

- responsible for education, health care and social welfare programs;

\textsuperscript{95} Francis Bula notes that originally Owen was not in favour of the harm reduction approach, suggesting that he would not support safe injection sites until other cities did so first because “otherwise, we’ll have 20,000 addicts here instead of 5,000” (Smith & Stewart 2004, Bula 2000).
defines municipal responsibilities and regulates municipalities through the Municipal Act, Community Charter and Vancouver Charter;

- responsible for funding major roads and transit infrastructure;
- regulates the designation of agricultural land reserves and crown lands which help constrain growth of municipalities and contain urban sprawl;
- owns Crown corporations that build and manage low income housing and provide services such as automobile insurance, ferry service and hydroelectric power.

**City of Vancouver**

- City is governed by the provincially granted Vancouver Charter by a ten member council and Mayor elected at large;
- Vancouver has an elected park board and school board
- the City collects property tax revenue and fees for other services
- the City is responsible for streets and sidewalks and regulates land use, density through the Zoning and Development By-law and regulates the Building Code
- Vancouver has a large land bank valued at $6 Billion that it uses to obtain borrowing
- authorizes the creation of Business Improvement Associations

**Non-Governmental Organizations**

- All levels of government as well as community and private foundations provide a wide array of social, health care, housing, business, cultural, child care and recreation services to their members or the general public
- There are a number of religion-based organizations associated with the Catholic Church, First United Church, Salvation Army, Saint James Anglican Church, Union Gospel Mission and there are a number of local and regionwide non-secular community organizations. (Edelson, 2010, p.147)

In most instances the three levels of government and the NGO’s (Appendix B) that were providing services no doubt had the best interests of citizens in the DTES at the core of their efforts. However, one can easily imagine with multiple agencies, with multiple areas of concern, multiple governance and management structures, and multiple budgets, might lead to a lack of coordination and collaboration. This was the reality in the DTES and necessitated a new approach to attacking the problems of the neighbourhood by government and non-government agencies alike.
At the genesis of the Vancouver Agreement the key provincial political actors included an NDP government in Victoria led by Premier Glen Clark with Ujjal Dosanjh as Attorney General, Mayor Owen’s first cousin Stephen Owen was Deputy Attorney General of the province. Later, Owen would become the federal minister responsible for Western Economic Diversification and “ensured that federal involvement fostered broad-based economic development goals to the Downtown Eastside” (Mason, 2006, p.20). It should be noted from the outset, Mayor Owen, when asked about the role of Stephen Owen, suggested that “he was a backroom sort of a guy” – in his role as deputy attorney general in Victoria he acted as a gatekeeper to gain access to Premier Dosanjh which helped shepherd the Vancouver Agreement through the provincial government ⁹⁶(Philip Owen interview). NDP Minister of Community Development, Cooperatives and Volunteers and MLA for Vancouver-Mount Pleasant was also a strong advocate of the original Agreement and was one of the signatories on the first Agreement. In Ottawa, the Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chretien was in power, Alan Rock was the Minister of Health and Hedy Fry was serving the Vancouver Centre constituency as Member of Parliament and all were supporters of the VA process. Owen commented that particularly Rock was an effective advocate of the goals of the VA and Four Pillars Approach and facilitated the federal support of Prime Minister Chretien initially and later Prime Minister Martin (Owen interview). Mayor Owen had taken Rock for an informal tour of the DTES which quickly convinced the Minister there was a need for immediate action and federal support of the VA and Four Pillars Approach (Owen interview).

It became apparent in the middle of the 1990’s that there was a problem in the DTES. Donald Macpherson, the City of Vancouver’s Drug Policy Coordinator, had warned Mayor Owen previous to 1997, that crack cocaine was “moving its way up the West Coast and when it hit Vancouver there would be a real problem” (Owen Interview). Macpherson had come to the City in 1996 after running an Adult Literacy program at the Carnegie Centre in the heart of the DTES’ open drug market on the corner of Main and Hastings where it was quite common for him to have “people dying daily on the sidewalk” outside the building in the height of the crisis in the DTES (Macpherson interview). Macpherson was an example of a community “activist” moving from the

⁹⁶ One would assume Stephen Owen performed a similar role at the federal level, however, this was not stated by Mayor Owen.
outside to inside of the city bureaucracy providing a unique perspective that had the potential to positively influence public policy in the DTES.\textsuperscript{97} He became the City’s Drug Policy Coordinator and started working with the City and Health Canada to look for solutions to the problems associated with the injection of crack cocaine and other substances in the DTES (Macpherson interview).

Don Lyotier also related an aspect of this inside/outside effect recalling that under the VA a different type of communication started to develop. Previous to the VA residents of the community “had difficulty to articulate problems to government” as there were no “transmission belts” to facilitate communication. He noted that the city had a difficult time figuring out “how to connect with individual needs” and to insure service providers “were asking the right questions.” Lyotier supported the VA concept as it “represented a way of doing things differently” and that “relationships could be built in a new way” under the Agreement. The Agreement facilitated mechanisms whereby he “could speak to decision-makers in a different way” including “what’s bugging us” and “what’s working for us.” Further he suggested that the Agreement generated a better relationship with the business community pointing to the VA’s “relationships among human beings” that could be built upon (Lyotier interview).

In 1997/98 a series of meetings were held between Macpherson, Wendy Au, representatives from the City’s social housing program and representatives of Health Canada\textsuperscript{98} eventually the possibility of the federal government entering into an Urban Development Agreement was suggested by Health Canada (Macpherson Interview). This was then communicated to Judy Rogers, the City Manager, and led to more discussion – “from the City perspective it was all good news” (Macpherson interview). At the same time Mike Harcourt publicized the notion that the problem of the DTES was a lack of coordination of funding and programs and that “money was a part of the problem” (Macpherson interview).

\textsuperscript{97} This occurs fairly regularly at the city level in Vancouver, for example, long time Member of Parliament shifted from being a community activist in the DTES to City Councillor (1982-93) and now as the Deputy Leader of the federal NDP and MP for Vancouver East since 1997.

\textsuperscript{98} Macpherson identified Sylvie Berube and Director General Elaine Scott of Health Canada as being important to the federal government’s involvement
Donald Macpherson, “had been working on a master’s degree in adult education, moved with his wife and children in 1986 from Ontario to B.C.” and “he got a job at the Carnegie Community Centre, running its adult literacy program” (Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, 2009, p.44). In his position he started noticing an increase and change in the nature of drug use in the DTES. Instead of it being mostly the abuse of alcohol or substitutes such as shoe polish he saw the emergence of injection drug use out in the open in the neighbourhood and an increase in the crime used to fund it. Macpherson noted the effects of the change: “Our door staff were reviving people every day in the washrooms who were blue,” he says. There were so many memorial services for locals who had fatally overdosed that it seemed they were happening daily” (Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, 2009, p.45).

In 1994, the Office of the Attorney General of British Columbia through the Office of the Chief Coroner issued a report entitled the Report of the Task Force into Illicit Narcotic Overdose Deaths in British Columbia, The report was authored by Chief Coroner Vince Cain and included a fairly revolutionary conceptualization of the drug problems in the DTES:

There needed to be “a greater understanding of who these people are, where they come from and where they are going.” Cain was among the first officials to state boldly that drug addiction was a health problem and a social problem, not just an enforcement problem. No one is immune, he wrote. Doctors, lawyers, and others from affluent neighbourhoods had fallen victim, as well as those in low-income communities like the Downtown Eastside. The war on drugs, Cain’s report said, “can only be regarded as an expensive failure.” While there was no easy fix, he recommended some innovative harm reduction measures, “from facilitating safe use of illicit drugs to facilitating detox and addiction treatment for those motivated to discontinue their drug use.” (Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, 2009, p.51).

Further, Cain pointed to the futility of the so called “war on drugs” and offered a suggestion for a different approach - “While a portion of the drug problem will remain a law enforcement problem, the time has surely arrived for society to re-examine, re-define, and clarify the balance between public safety and harm reduction” (Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, 2009, p.52).
In 2000, Macpherson, following research he conducted in Europe, invited a series of harm reduction experts from Germany, Australia, Amsterdam and Switzerland to Vancouver in order to discuss strategies for Vancouver. As a result, Macpherson began formulating a plan at the behest of Philip Owen for addressing the community’s drug-related issues which he presented first to the NPA caucus (which was the party of the Mayor and enjoyed a majority) in October 2000. Macpherson described the reception the “A Framework for Action: A Four-Pillar Approach” received: “They tore a strip off me [and] Philip,” MacPherson recalls. As Owen remembers it, “Don MacPherson and I were absolutely shattered. It was a stab in the back. It was just disastrous” (Campbell, Boyd & Culbert, 2009, p.156).

Council passed the final strategy in November 2000 despite the consternation of Owen’s own civic party. The Mayor had been very smart with his strategy to move forward – instead of a knee jerk reaction that might generate significant opposition, Owen had spent considerable time in the DTES discussing the needs of the community and “getting his ducks in a row” in a measured way. The result of Owen obtaining the support, first of Hedy Fry, then Ujjal Dosanjh at the provincial level and Alan Rock, Jean Chretien and Paul Martin federally, was that the Council had no choice but to approve the process behind the Four Pillars Approach (Owen interview).

Even Owen’s strategy of bringing the approach forward was calculated to build support of the initiative. Initially the effort was kept secret, Owen had told Macpherson “to keep quiet” about the plan, Macpherson notes that even other bureaucrats involved in the Vancouver Agreement did not know about the approach until it was publicized. He also mentioned that the first meeting of Vancouver Agreement after the strategy was made public - officials were “a little cool” to him (Macpherson interview). Even the media was co-opted into the plan as information was provided to key media types in the City, however, they were asked to “embargo” the information until everything was in place to execute the Approach (Owen interview). When the approach was announced it was a splashy affair with a two full pages in the centre of the Vancouver Sun explaining the policies underpinning the approach and a media blitz led by the Mayor (Owen interview).

The Agreement was to be five years as then it would not be affected by the election cycle, Owen stated that “it would have been hard for the province or federal
government to get involved when election was coming on” (Owen interview). Owen agreed that the VA was mostly driven by bureaucrats in city hall with the support of a variety of provincial and federal actors.

The federal government was interested, particularly in the health care issues involved, and favoured a governance structure that followed a model of “horizontality” which “involved cutting through silos (Au interview).

The federal government has recognized the need to deal with complex issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries and defy simple solutions. Some of these problems have multiple causes, have developed over a long period of time, and cannot be addressed by individual departments or governments. They require a response by a number of organizations, often through horizontal initiatives (Auditor General of Canada, 2005, p.1).

**The Vancouver Agreement and the Mushy Middle**

Mayor Owen, Macpherson, City Manager Judy Rogers, and others’, desire to move forward with the Vancouver Agreement, and later the Four Pillars Approach, despite the lack of dedicated funding, is an example of a municipal government acting aggressively outside the constitutional constraints found in the Canadian division of powers. Smith & Stewart developed the “mushy middle” continuum in order to describe whether a particular municipality is a “beaver” or “cat.” A local government that is a beaver would be one that “were seen as formally weak creatures prone to danger avoidance and fleeing from inter-jurisdictional conflict” while cats “were described as relatively autonomous units enjoying considerably more policymaking discretion” (Smith & Stewart, 2004, p.252; Jones, 1986, p.90). The continuum ranges from “formal local government authority that has ‘no local discretion’ at one end and ‘Total local discretion’ at the other” (Smith & Stewart, 2004, p.253).

As a result of the actions of a coalition of government and non-government actors it is clear that Vancouver, in the Vancouver Agreement case, was at least an eager beaver and likely heading toward becoming a strong cat on Smith & Stewart’s mushy middle continuum. Smith and Stewart suggest that “the ability to opt in or out of a broad range of powers” included in a series of *Municipal Acts* (1873, 1896, 1957, 1997),
the *Local Government Act* (2000), and the *Community Charter* (2003) and other initiatives that “expanded formalized powers,” “has allowed B.C. municipalities to develop at least into strong beavers, if not yet into cats” (Smith & Stewart, 2004, p.255). This effect is even more enhanced when considering that Vancouver enjoys certain special powers under the *Vancouver Charter* (1953).

Smith and Stewart use “North America’s first legal supervised injection site (SIS), opened on Vancouver’s Hasting Street in September 2003” in order to “help shed light on ‘eager beaver’ local governments” and to “illustrate some of what any B.C. municipality might need to do to be successful in whole-of-government settings” (Stewart & Smith, 2004, p.259). InSite is discussed fully later in this consideration of the Vancouver Agreement case. The Findings and Analysis section will also return to the mushy middle metaphor later in the dissertation.

**Vancouver Agreement Action Plan**

The initial VA steps were to be:

- To form a Policy Committee, made up of the Federal Minister, the Provincial Minister, and the Mayor of Vancouver, or their designates, to oversee the implementation of the Agreement.
- To focus their efforts on those parts of Vancouver where the need is greatest.
- To focus first on the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver.
- To establish passages to engage members of the community in achieving their economic, social and community goals.
- Within three months to develop an implementation schedule (including activities, timelines, focuses, and financial commitments) to be attached, and at least annually to negotiate an updated schedule of initiatives and commitments which updates existing ones and documents new ones.
- To see that initiatives under this Agreement link with and build on one another.
- To work within jurisdictions, mandates, policies, strategies, and fiscal direction of each government.
- To make balanced investments in support of social and economic change within their respective mandates.
- To finance activities under this Agreement initially through more effective targeting of government allocations.
- To encourage funding from non-government partners.
• To use their individual authorization procedures for committing the funds required when they agree to support an activity under this Agreement.

(Vancouver Agreement, 2000, pp.1/2)

The leads for the Agreement were Western Economic Diversification Canada, the Provincial Ministry of Community Services, and the City Office of the City Manager of Vancouver, however, the process was created and implemented from the “bottom up” with local actors taking the lead in most instances. One important local actor in the process was City Manager Judy Rogers. Rogers, in a personal interview for this dissertation, noted that “it was her nature, she felt compelled to bring forward a model that would work” in Vancouver and specifically in the DTES. She noted that early on the DTES community felt “excluded and wanted more input” in the Vancouver Agreement process – at times there was “little coordination” and the groups “appeared to be speaking a different language” than the city (Rogers interview). As noted the original VA did not contain any funding mechanism, Rogers suggested this resulted in a great deal of “creativity” and little mistrust from the community. When funding began about two years into the first Agreement the issue became about money and groups started getting very “territorial” (Rogers interview). The original Agreement gave the “relationships” in the community, however, “connectivity became difficult once money began to be available and as Rogers notes that the “original intent was never money” (Rogers interview).

The VA involved an integration of several municipal, provincial and federal government actors and a plethora of community organizations to improve the conditions of citizens in the DTES including B.C Housing, B.C. Hydro, Vancouver Police, the Coastal Health Authority (the Vancouver-Richmond Health board), Health Canada, Western Economic Diversification Canada, and the provincial Health ministry among others. As a result of the Agreement, the provinces and federal government became more concerned with the community - the city was already embedded and involved in

99 These principles would also serve as the framework for action in the second half of the Agreement too.

100 Because of the health and safety aspects of the agreement the Vancouver City Police and the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority played integral roles in the implementation of the agreement.
several areas of concern in the DTES (Rogers Interview). Rogers stated that the first six months of the process was spent in the community communicating with groups and residents to educate them on the goals of the Agreement. Au suggested that a “good relationship among the community, business, and government developed” during the first five years “that complemented the Agreement” (Au interview). Both Rogers and Au suggested that these good relationships continued in the second Agreement to 2010, however, the provision of funding did affect how the government and non-government actors cooperated.

**Vancouver Agreement Vision**

The preamble of the VA contained the overall vision for the Agreement and pointed to the desire for greater intergovernmental collaboration and cooperation:

> The governments of Canada, British Columbia, and the City of Vancouver share the vision of creating, healthy, safe and sustainable communities. In such communities all organizations, from informal groups to governments, work effectively together to improve the quality of everyone’s life. Sustainable communities make the lives of people healthier and safer now and in the future.

> These three governments already make substantial contributions to the well-being of Vancouver. And yet they recognize that by working more closely together they will be able to enhance sustainable economic, social and community development in Vancouver. Their mandates, though different, are complementary, and all are directed at the same people. The citizens of Vancouver will be affected by how the separate programs of these governments interact to produce joint results. Each government therefore sees the importance of cooperation and coordination with the others both to achieve its own goals and to provide the best results for the people of Vancouver. This recognition has fostered the five-year Vancouver Agreement.

(Vancouver Agreement, 2000, p.1)

The second Agreement included similar sentiments in its preamble and added the following:

> This vision has been advanced through the Vancouver Agreement (2000) and its integrated Strategic Plan, developed in 2002. In this Agreement the parties continue their commitment to this vision and to furthering the achievements of the last 5 years in the areas of economic, social, health and community development. While significant achievements have been made during the term of the Vancouver Agreement (2000), there are
areas requiring further attention, initiatives established but deserving expansion and replication, and partnerships to be explored or further developed. The achievements under the Vancouver Agreement (2000) have demonstrated that by working more closely together, all three orders of government can foster and enhance sustainable economic, social, health and community development in the City of Vancouver.

(Vancouver Agreement, 2005, p.2)

Vancouver Agreement Governance Structure

The governance structure of the Vancouver Agreement involved four levels of management:

- **Policy Committee**: this would be a high level committee including a federal & provincial minister responsible for the VA, and the Mayor of Vancouver – responsible for decision-making and accountability.
- **Management Committee**: executive level staff members from each partner responsible for “intergovernmental relationships, external communication, monitoring and evaluation, investment decisions, and oversight of operational activities”
- **Coordination Committee**: responsible for “day to day management of initiatives approved under the Agreement” included a small administrative unit to provide support for VA initiatives
- **Operating Management Committee**: “over time the Management Committee established an Operating Managers Committee so that senior managers in relevant ministries and departments could negotiate and coordinate major policy changes, funding, and other support for priority initiatives.

A number of Intergovernmental Task Teams were also appointed to consult with the community and to carry out initiatives in specific areas (Edelson, 2010, p.150).
Initial Response of the Community, City, Province and Federal Government

From interview feedback from community, local, provincial and federal actors it is clear that the bulk of the operational work undertaken emanated from outside this formal structure. The many programs involved in the Vancouver Agreement were driven by a relatively small cadre of local government bureaucrats supported by key senior politicians. Minister Abbott recalled the agreement moved forward with “good meetings around 2001, 2002, 2003 between Stephen Owen - the Minister Responsible for Western Economic Diversification, Philip Owen - the Mayor of Vancouver and Minister. Abbott recalled that, in particular, Mayor Larry Campbell (elected in 2002), was particularly effective in his interactions with the province – “he was a good guy to deal
with and had good ideas that contributed to a good relationship” with the province. Later, the provincial position was intensified in the lead up to the 2010 Olympics as Premier Gordon Campbell was “anxious to have Vancouver as a willing, active participant in the Olympics” (Abbott interview).

The Federal Position

The initial federal position was related to the interest taken in the process by Stephen Owen, the mayor’s cousin, who represented Vancouver as a Liberal MP (elected in 2000 in the constituency of Vancouver Quadra) and served in the cabinet as Paul Martin’s Ministry Responsible for Western Economic Diversification and as the Minister of State for Sport. Donald Macpherson suggested that from the federal perspective it was also leadership from Elaine Scott the Director General of Health Canada, who met with Wendy Au and him, to begin coming up with solutions for the issues facing the DTES. This led to the involvement of City Manager Judy Rogers, who started along with other members of the local bureaucracy, shepherding the VA agreement process locally. Later, based on the work of Scott, Stephen Owen and others, the Martin government immediately supported the Four Pillars approach and InSite specifically therefore continuing the VA effort (Macpherson interview).

The Provincial Position

The initial provincial position on the Vancouver Agreement had been established by the previous NDP government - “cabinet supported the initial goals” of the Agreement and Abbott sensed that “a strong consensus existed between the province and the administration of the city” (Abbott interview). The Liberal provincial government of Gordon Campbell continued this support when it came to power in 2001 (Abbott interview). Abbott confirmed this, suggesting that the process was based on “a strong consensus” that had developed at the local, provincial and federal government levels and that at the provincial level the governance of the VA was conducted in a “casual, informal way that was not highly formalized” (Abbott interview). He also suggested that the strength of the VA was “the potential to bring resource support from 3 levels of government that resulted in marginal gains although problems still exist” (Abbott interview). High level meetings of political actors involving ministers or deputy ministers occurred quarterly at the provincial level where “people were free to raise issues” (Abbott
interview). One area of concern around the cabinet table, as recalled by Minister Abbott was the notion that “one city being set aside as a place where a special agreement would be in place with special funding” and that “there was no shortage of sentiment there should be a Surrey agreement” (or other communities in the Province) (Abbott interview).

Later, provincial support of the harm reduction model, included in the Four Pillars Approach, was motivated by the Penny Parry Report (Something to Eat, a Place to Sleep, and Someone Who Gives a Damn, 1997) for the Provincial Ministry of Health. The report “declared a link between AIDS/HIV epidemic in the DTES, especially among drug users” (Campbell et al. 2009, p.105). The report was intended to provide the provincial government guidance for where to spend $3 million it had committed to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and the effects of the burgeoning injection drug use in the neighbourhood (Campbell, et al. 2009, p.105).101

The City of Vancouver Position

The initial position of the City of Vancouver on the Vancouver Agreement was driven by the Mayor of the day Philip Owen and focused effort by the City Manager Judy Rogers and other local government actors such as Wendy Au. Later, the city’s Drug Policy coordinator Don Macpherson took a strong leadership in the development of the Four Pillars Strategy. Clearly the local bureaucrats drove the Vancouver Agreement process as there was support, but minimal direct involvement (and following the adoption of the Four Pillars approach consternation over the harm reduction model), by political actors at the municipal, provincial or federal levels.

101 There were several important medical reports and efforts that indicated how dire the situation was in the DTES at the end of the 90’s. These included the Whynot Report, by Elizabeth Whynot, which advocated greater coordination of health care services and a safe injection site to combat HIV/AIDS infections; the work of Dr. Julio Montaner who noticed a significant increase in HIV/AIDS infections in the DTES; and Steffanie Strathdee headed a study that connected the incidences of HIV/AIDS with incidences of intravenous drug use. Penny Parry’s study was focused on how best to spend the provincial funding ($3million) that the province had agreed to spend on DTES issues. Donald Macpherson points to the Cain report which quantified the level of drug over dose deaths as being foundational to the eventual development of the Four Pillars Approach (Macpherson interview).
Macpherson, suggested that the process was driven by bureaucrats at the local level not municipal politicians who would “persuade, cajole and bargain” to gain support for the VA initiative. Macpherson also noted that the “city informed a lot of direction of the decisions” taken during the VA process and that the position of “city staff being close to the ground” meant that they had few constraints in the implementation of the VA and later the Four Pillars approach. Finally, Macpherson suggested in the VA decision-making process there were many instances of meetings for the sake of meetings among representatives of all three levels of government and that most effective “action came from less formally structured conversations” among the actors, including community groups such as VANDU, involved in a “discrete” way (Macpherson Interview).

Donald Macpherson related an interesting anecdote regarding the implementation of the Four Pillars approach and the relationship between the City of Vancouver and Province in DTES efforts. As mentioned previously, the development of the Four Pillars approach was done secretly even within City Hall - “Philip said to stay quiet” so that even other members of the Vancouver Agreement management team had no idea about the plan (Macpherson interview). Further, Macpherson mentioned that the provincial government was “pissed” at the prospect of the Four Pillars approach as Jenny Kwan the provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs, and member of the legislative assembly for Mount Pleasant which bordered the DTES, had been in the process of “developing a provincial level drug policy” (Macpherson Interview).

Former NPA Councillor Gordon Price commented that, in fact, he felt “like a mushroom in the dark” in the VA process particularly with the creation of the Four Pillars approach as “groups started to realize Owen was one that could get things done” (Price interview). There was little understanding of the Agreement, according to Price, and this “ultimately led to splits on council and the demise of the NPA”(Price interview). Further, Price suggested that the intergovernmental meetings on the Vancouver Agreement were nothing more than “briefings” (Price interview).

Former City Manager Rogers noted that “she observed provincial people were concerned about looking for solutions in the DTES and that there had been a need to attempt to coordinate and not duplicate services” provided by all levels of government and to “get at some of the monopolies” of service provision that developed in the
neighbourhood. Ann Livingston indicated this monopolization is still a problem in the DTES, pointing specifically at the control of services exerted by the Portland Hotel Society (Livingston interview). Specifically, she points to the “appointed board of the society that is exclusionary” and has “no accountability” (Livingston Interview).

The Community Position

The Vancouver Agreement called for intensive “capacity-building” and engagement with the Downtown Eastside Community. The objectives of the Agreement in this regard were as follows:

- Develop and pilot new networks of communication that help to coordinate the implementation of activities and projects.
- Develop public input processes that empower the community and include them in decision-making.
- Establish participation processes, which include representation from Downtown Eastside communities, to advise the Policy Committee, and to develop proposals for their consideration.
- Develop opportunities for the community to consult with experts so that actions are based on the latest information available.
- Hold symposiums and workshops, and draw on experts as required (Vancouver Agreement, 2000, p.10)

The initial position of community groups in the DTES was one of mistrust (Au interview). In the early stages it was reported that there was a distrust of the VA process from NGO’s, particularly in the DTES, as they thought that existing funding being provided to service agencies within the community would be affected despite the efforts of local politicians and bureaucrats representing the VA on the ground (Au interview). Ann Livingston, who has been an activist for over 20 years in the community mostly through V.A.N.D.U. (Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users), suggested that there was some level of “initial excitement” about the agreement because “money was going to be spent” in a cohesive way to combat the problems of the DTES (Livingston Interview).

Livingston also suggested that it was a “mystery as to who got the money” under the Vancouver Agreement and offered that she suspected that “most of the money went to paving in the DTES” (Livingston interview). She mentioned that it was an “embarrassment to see that the money went for aesthetics and police” and that initially
the police wouldn’t even talk to her group. She recalled a lot of press releases being generated by the VA bureaucracy and recognized the leadership of Mayor Owen but also asserted that there were many more “discrete alliances with the municipal bureaucracy” as being connected to an organization like hers that advocated on behalf of drug users could be a “potential liability (Livingston interview). Ann Livingston also pointed to the internal problems within non-governmental organizations in the DTES, in particular the tendency for the larger, better funded organizations to take many measures to maintain control to the “exclusion of other groups.” This effect remains today and was not solved by the Vancouver Agreement (Livingston interview).

One of the programs created in the DTES under the Agreement was the “United We Can” operation that facilitated the collection and recycling of refundable containers in the downtown core and ensured binners received a fair return for collecting the items. Ken Lyotier, founder of the operation shed further light on the attitudes of the community toward the VA. He suggested that initially it was the leadership of Mike Harcourt, who was an MLA at the time for the area (and former Councillor and Mayor in Vancouver 1980-86), and had an intimate knowledge of the “history and development of social services agencies” that motivated community action during the DTES’s worst days in the late 1990’s. Harcourt called upon business, government, social service agencies and residents to come together, in what became known as the DTES-Strathcona Coalition, with “a goal to look at gaps and overlaps in service” in the community. The overarching focus of the group’s monthly meetings was on finding “efficient and effective” ways to provide services after it “became clear agencies were seeking funding from everywhere – city, province, federal government, foundations, and donors.” People in the bureaucracy were getting increasingly “worried” about their own employment and the provision their group’s ability to provide services (Lyotier interview).

There was a desire to find ways of evaluating the service provision model in the DTES; it became apparent that there was intense competition among groups and, Lyotier noted that led to the ultimate demise of the Coalition. Lyotier also identified a cleavage within the community between those active in service provision that got paid and those that did not get paid. He suggested this “created imbalances” in the community and meant that many people had “no incentive to attend” any efforts at
achieving a better model for the DTES. Lyotier became the coordinator for the coalition and he soon noticed that service providers, even if they didn’t live in the neighbourhoods of the DTES, thought of themselves as residents. Further, he noticed that had the effect of creating “inequality between wage earners in the community and those that were not wage earners or low wage earners” in what he termed “social colonialism.” Finally, he suggested the genesis of the VA “wasn’t coming from the street” and that it was a recognition from the bureaucracy that “the method of funding and managing was not being successful” (Lyotier interview). Mr. Lyotier’s comments are significant to an analysis of the creation and influence of urban regimes surrounding the Vancouver Agreement process and will be considered further in the Findings and Analysis section of this dissertation.

VA Guiding Principles – Agreements 1 & 2

The first agreement developed twelve “guiding principles” including:

- **The appropriate delivery of services and programs:** this was an identification of the need for inter-governmental and inter-agency cooperation – there was a recognition that “Some programs and services require a national approach, some a provincial approach, some a regional approach, and some should be delivered in specific parts of the City of Vancouver.”
- **Strategic planning:** this was the notion that “sound strategic planning principles” would be used such as “issue analysis, gender and diversity analysis, problem solving, consultation, and implementation.”
- **Community diversity:** this was recognition of the “diverse interests” in Vancouver and that these “must be articulated, understood, supported and balanced”
- **Gender and cultural diversity:** the agreement would recognize “respect for gender and cultural diversity, including that of urban Aboriginal people”
- **Heritage areas:** recognition of the “importance of heritage areas”
- **Communications:** this called for “improved communications and information-sharing with the community” in order to “help make the decision-making under the Agreement to be open and transparent”
- **Innovation:** the agreement was to “promote and support innovative ways of addressing issues”
- **Participation:** the agreement would champion inclusiveness and accessibility
- **Build on existing work:** previous “reports and analyses” would be the basis for the agreement’s planning and decision-making
• **Sustainable, local economic development:** noted the desire to undertake local economic development with community and business partners in a sustainable way

• **Partnerships:** in the administration of the agreement the “parties will partner with other institutions, including foundations, the non-profit sector, post-secondary and other educational institutions, and the private sector

• **Evaluation:** evaluation of the “programs, projects, and actions” under the agreement would occur. (Vancouver Agreement, 2000, pp.2/3)

The second agreement had a slightly different set and fewer (1/2) guiding principles. The 6 principles in the renewal agreement included similar notes on innovation, collaboration, diversity as were in the initial agreement. The addition of dedicated funding by the federal and provincial government certainly affected the “tone” of the second Agreement as there appeared to be much more concern over analysis, research, accountability and transparency that were not evident in the first Agreement. Three additional/different principles were also introduced into the new agreement:

• **Informed decision-making:** Instead of relying on previous analyses and reports “planning and decision-making…will build on the work already underway, and will be informed through ongoing research and analysis”

• **Community engagement:** an effort would be made to involve the community and stakeholders more through “inclusive and accessible participation processes and these processes will assist with decision-making”

• **Accountability:** there was recognition of the need for “accountability for public funds” and “transparency of processes and procedures.” (Vancouver Agreement, 2005, 3).

In participant interviews with key government and non-government actors and decision-makers from the community, local, provincial, and federal government it is apparent these differences in guiding principles between the two phases of the overall Agreement was only the “tip of the iceberg” of change that developed in the process over time. These differences centred primarily on the effects of funding on how the processes of the VA were defined and how the groups’ involvement changed. The significance of these changes is discussed more substantially in the dissertation’s analysis of the cases section.

The “sheer scale of jurisdictional fragmentation” was the “greatest immediate obstacle facing collaborative work in the Downtown Eastside” (Mason, 2007, p.12). Respondents unanimously reported that the strength of the agreement was in its ability
for participants from all levels of government to collaborate in new ways. In the Western Economic Diversification’s final evaluation of the VA (2010), the department cited the Auditor General of Canada (OAG) which “recognized that the federal government needs to find effective ways to work on complex socioeconomic issues that cross organizational or jurisdictional boundaries, defy simple solutions, typically have multiple causes, and have developed over a long time” (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.14). Further, there was a recognition by the OAG that “some problems cannot be addressed by individual departments or government; they require a response by a number of departments, often through horizontal initiatives such as the VA” (Western Economic Diversification, p.15). Finally, the OAG report “found a promising governance model in the VA, where the provincial, municipal and federal governments work together to meet community needs” (Western Economic Diversification, p.15). Interviewees unanimously agreed with the proposition that the VA process provided a different method of integrating the various interests within and among participating governments. This notion certainly suggests that the method of integration of interests impacted the multi-level nature of the governance structure, decision-making processes and regime understandings under the Agreement. This concept will be examined in more detail in the Findings and Analysis section.

The Downtown Eastside

“The VA was triggered by an acute health crisis in the DTES”
(Vancouver Agreement, 2010, p.7)

The Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood of Vancouver was the “first focus” of the first Vancouver Agreement – 6 pages of the 10 page Schedule “A” of the document were directed at a “proposed Downtown Eastside Strategy” (Vancouver Agreement, 2000, p.5). Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside neighbourhood is geographically situated in an area “bounded by the waterfront along Burrard Inlet on the north, Richards Street on the west, Clark Drive on the east, and Pender and Terminal Streets on the south.
The City of Vancouver describes the neighbourhood’s significant and rich transportation, cultural, commercial, retail and industrial historic past:

The DTES is Vancouver’s oldest neighbourhood and contains many important heritage sites. The area was the centre of Vancouver at the beginning of the 20th century and remained for many years a major hub for the City’s commercial and industrial activity. The Carnegie Community Centre, built in 1903 at Main and Hastings with funds donated by steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, housed Vancouver’s first public library and remains an active community centre to this day. Vancouver's first City Hall also was located at Main & Hastings. The City’s first department store, Woodward’s, opened on Hastings Street in 1903. Hastings Street was also home to Vancouver’s oldest theatre, the Pantages, founded in 1908. Canada's first permanent cinema was believed to be the Edison Electric Theatre, opened in 1902 on Cordova Street. The DTES was also the major transportation hub for the city, housing among other amenities the BC Electric Interurban Station (the City’s streetcar terminus) at Hastings & Carrell Streets; the North Shore Ferries terminal at the foot of Columbia Street; and the coastal steamship piers between Carrell and Main Streets. The neighbourhood had a flourishing retail business environment that created jobs for local residents. (City of Vancouver, 2006).
As the City of Vancouver’s Senior Planner for the Downtown Eastside, Nathan Edelson was in a unique position to be able to chronicle and comment on the demise of Vancouver’s oldest neighbourhood: “Then, in the mid-1990’s, Woodwards, the areas last remaining major national department store, went bankrupt …within a year more than a third of the nearby storefronts it had anchored were vacant; most have yet to be replaced by legitimate businesses” (Edelson, 2010 p.143) At the same time, “significant structural changes in the economy and its workforce” combined with well- paid union workers leaving the neighbourhood also occurred. The adoption of “neoliberal political agendas” by government meant that “levels of welfare and other health, mental health, housing, education and social services” were reduced (p.143).

The older workers were joined by several thousand younger people, many of whom were addicted to illegal drugs. In addition, many of the people who were released from mental institutions could only afford to live in the SRO’s (Single Room Occupancy Hotels), most of which were located in the Downtown Eastside. Many of these people had come from other parts of the city and the province, and they arrived destitute and without adequate community support (Edelson, 2010, p.143).

The most insidious aspects of the “decay” of the DTES neighbourhood was the “spike in fatal drug overdoses and HIV infection” that occurred in the mid-1990’s (Vancouver Agreement: 2000-2010: Highlights, p.7). Edelson points to the causes of this spike:

There was also a significant increase in the illicit drug market and companion survival sex trade, property theft and violent crime between different drug related gangs. The nature of drugs changed from a predominance of marijuana and heroin, which tended to tire users out, toward injection-based crack cocaine and crystal meth. These drugs are highly addictive and can contribute to very aggressive behaviour and street disorder. They are also taken many times during the day and night when services such as needle exchanges are closed. This resulted in a dramatic rise in the sharing of needles. Consequently, levels of hepatitis, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) rose to those experienced in the poorest parts of Africa (Edelson, 2010, p.143).

The following series of charts show the crisis that occurred in the mid-90’s in Vancouver, centred primarily in the Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood. They itemize
the increase in injection drug use, HIV infections, and overdose deaths during that period of time. The first chart shows the increase in injection drug users in in Vancouver, mostly in the DTES during the mid-90’s as noted by Edelson:

**Figure 5.7. Percent of people who inject drugs in Vancouver**

(Show: B.C. Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS; public domain)

In the late nineties the drug of choice Vancouver and the DTES was heroin - an enormous spike occurred among the number of people injecting heroin on a daily basis in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 which was accompanied by a dramatic increase in overdose deaths and HIV/AIDS/HCV infections. The following chart shows the spike that occurred in drug overdose deaths, in Vancouver, mostly in the DTES, in the mid-90’s:

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102 Vancouver Community Health Services is an effort by the Coastal Health Authority to bring community based health care to urban neighbourhoods. Vancouver’s Coastal Health replaced the former Vancouver – Richmond Health Board.
Figure 5.8. Illicit Drug Overdose in the City of Vancouver, 1996-2011

The spike in overdose deaths in 1996 and 1997 was accompanied by a spike that occurred in HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) and HCV (Hepatitis C Virus) infections in Vancouver and the DTES especially in 1997.
In 1997, the Vancouver/Richmond Health Board declared a “public health emergency” that motivated “various policy and programmatic initiatives” being launched “including initiatives at the municipal, regional, and provincial and federal levels” (Kerr, nd., 30).

It should be noted at this point that the municipal, provincial and federal government efforts within the Downtown Eastside were quite extensive. In a case study prepared in December 2003 for the VA Management Committee by the Macleod Institute, it was asserted that:

over 300 community organizations were involved in providing services in the DTES. Many of these organizations received government

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103 The Macleod Institute is an independent institute affiliated with the University of Calgary. The Institute’s website lists its focus as being “program evaluations, environmental management (including cumulative effects and climate change), and performance benchmarking” and services include(ing) research, analysis and interpretation; extensive peer and literature reviews; policy/program design and development; business process transformation, and strategic management advice” (Accessed at http://www.macleodinstitute.com/).
funding to deliver alcohol and substance abuse services, counseling services, employment services, immigrant and refugee services, family and childcare services, welfare services, economic development services and advocacy. With that number of organizations, competition for government funding was fierce; it was difficult for governments to determine who to work with; and service offerings and impact were fractionated. (Macleod Institute, 2003, 10)

The Macleod Institute’s (2003) evaluation of the VA also found that despite “the engagement of 25 federal, provincial, and municipal departments, and expenditures of approximately $1 million per day, health, safety, crime, social services and housing needs were not being met” (p.10). At this point, the City of Vancouver took action in two directions, as Edelson (2010) noted, “it was clear that the solutions to these serious issues were beyond the resources and authority of the City to resolve on its own” (p.144). On the one hand, the City Council “formally requested the development of a Vancouver Agreement among the three levels of governments to address these issues” (p.144). On the other hand, the city began its own parallel process that eventually became known as the “Four Pillars Approach.”

The Four Pillars Approach

The Four Pillars Approach revolved around a plan that was devised to:

- Provide the City of Vancouver and its citizens with a framework for action that compels the provincial and federal governments to take responsibility for issues within their jurisdiction.
- Show which levels of government are responsible for actions to achieve the goals in the framework.
- Clarify Vancouver’s drug problems and establish appropriate, achievable goals.

The foundations of the Four Pillars Approach involved considering the issues of the downtown holistically and from BOTH a crime prevention and health care approach and included four areas of focus:

- **1. Prevention**: Involved education about the dangers of drug use and sought to build awareness about why people misuse alcohol and drugs and what could be done to avoid addiction. A Framework for Action supported coordinated, evidence-based programs targeted to specific populations and age groups - programs that focused on the causes and nature of addiction as well as on prevention.
• **2. Treatment:** consisted of a continuum of interventions and support programs that enabled individuals with addiction problems to make healthier decisions about their lives and move towards abstinence. These included detoxification, outpatient counselling and residential treatment, as well as housing, ongoing medical care, employment services, social programs, and life skills.

• **3. Enforcement strategies:** were key to any drug strategy. In order to increase public order and to close the open drug scene in the Downtown Eastside, more effective enforcement strategies included a redeployment of officers in the Downtown Eastside, increased efforts to target organized crime, drug houses and drug dealers, and improved coordination with health services and other agencies to link drug and alcohol users to available programs throughout Vancouver and the region. In order for A Framework for Action to increase public order, it required the collaboration of various enforcement agencies such as the Vancouver Police Department, RCMP, the newly created Organized Crime Agency, probation services, and the courts with the other programs and agencies involved in each pillar.

• **4. Harm Reduction:** was a pragmatic approach that focused on decreasing the negative consequences of drug use for communities and individuals. It recognized that abstinence-based approaches are limited in dealing with a street-entrenched open drug scene and that the protection of communities and individuals is the primary goal of programs to tackle substance misuse. A Framework for Action attempts to demonstrate the need for harm reduction by outlining, and drawing upon, other successful programs around the world that have significantly reduced both the negative health and societal impacts and the costs of drug addiction. (City of Vancouver, 2001, p.3/4)

One of the more controversial components to the approach was the creation of a safe injection site in the Downtown Eastside, "InSite." The operation of InSite began in 2003 as part of the Four Pillars Approach’s notion of harm reduction and is funded by the Province of British Columbia, administered by the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and managed by the Portland Hotel Society. The facility has a full range of health care professionals including "nurses, counsellors, mental health workers and peer support workers" that provide support to people who come into shoot their drug of choice using “clean injection equipment such as syringes, cookers, filters, and tourniquets” in one of InSite’s twelve injection booths.

104 The Portland Hotel Society has become a major force in the DTES in recent years, it has major contractual relationships with government to provide management of a number of social services.
There are many research reports that confirm the success of the Four Pillars Approach to the serious issues in the DTES, however, it is outside the scope of this dissertation as to any in depth investigation of the InSite’s long term success (InSite, np.) As a measure of the successful emergency interventions the facility provides - people visiting InSite “overdosed 1418 times between 2004 and 2010,” however, no one passed away (InSite, np.) InSite provides research on their website that supports the long term benefits of the facility – noting that “since InSite opened, overdoses in the vicinity of the site have decreased by 35% (InSite, np.).

**Nixon in China?**

Mason (2011) places Mayor Owen as “the most unlikely champion of the hardened drug addict. A wealthy blue blood and conservative-minded politician who was rarely seen out of uniform: navy blazer, silk tie, crisp white shirt” (Mason 2011, np). Owen was a son of a former B.C. Lieutenant-Governor and was a scion of the westside Vancouver based Non-Partisan Association (Mason 2011, np.).

When questioned about why NPA Mayor Owen was successful in introducing the Agreement and Four Pillars Approach NPA Councillor Gordon Price mentioned that it was because of the “Nixon in China” effect\(^\text{105}\). Owen suggested the reasons for the Agreement and Approach’s successful introduction had to with one thing “the process” (Owen interview) Further, he asserted that “you can’t run to 3rd base” from home base, you “can’t cut corners, and jump out to get big headlines.” He mentioned that it took years to lay the groundwork for the process, “he had personally educated himself” and had pride in taking a “revolutionary approach good for his children and his grandchildren based on public health and order” (Owen interview). The Mayor’s enthusiastic participation in such an issue was so far from his earlier public profile that he quite possibly could have been the only person that could pull off moving the process forward in a new direction to successfully address the serious social problems in the DTES (Price interview).

\(^{105}\) This refers to the notion that Richard Nixon was successful in his overtures to China in the 1970’s because he was the last person anyone expected to succeed.
Owen did not enjoy the support of the entire NPA caucus – he suggested that key NPA Councillors Jennifer Clarke, George Puil and Lynne Kennedy “never really bought it” as they favoured more of a structured, conservative, no-nonsense approach to the drug issues of the DTES. The NPA “made the mayor, who had served three terms, battle for the mayoralty nomination. He lost to Jennifer Clarke, who would be destroyed by former coroner Larry Campbell” (Mason 2011, np.). He noted that the vote to move forward with the Agreement process was unanimous, and that he had caught George Puil counting the votes before putting up his hand in favour (Owen interview). Owen took pride that he always dressed this way on his many trips he took and “teas” that he held to gain knowledge about the issues, demands and needs of the residents of the DTES suggesting the Mike Harcourt would often change his clothes first! (Owen interview). The meetings Owen participated in were informal, not publicized and with some of the most hardened addicts in the neighbourhood (Owen interview):

I went in there and said,” I’m your mayor and I’m here to help,” Mr. Owen recalled. “I’d like to hear your stories. Tell me about your drug use. Tell me about your family. Do you have a place to sleep? And as I listened, I was just blown away as they chatted about their personal lives. That was it for me. That got me going” (Mason 2011, np.)

Senator Larry Campbell offered his take on Owen’s efforts:

Mayor Owen had done much of the work. He’s the big reason InSite happened. And he paid a huge price for it politically. I imagine he is a pretty happy fellow today (Campbell was interviewed the day the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in favour of the continuation of InSite), and he deserves to be.” (Mason, 2011, np.)

Mayor Owen summed up the response to the Vancouver Agreement and the Four Pillars Approach by suggesting that he had done the work to get the government and non-government actors onside and that “the media understood the benefits,” attitudes “changed quickly and the sting got out of it” and that “it wasn’t tough for too long” (Owen interview) “The proof was in the pudding” (Owen interview).

The provincial position on harm reduction was one of “concern” and mixed with regard to the social housing aspect of the approach. Final provincial support for InSite was influenced by then B.C. Health Sciences Minister Colin Hansen (elected in the
constituency of Vancouver-Quilchena in 1996) who supported the need for a harm reduction approach Abbott suggested that Premier Campbell was “not initially convinced of the value of social housing” in context of the process underway in the DTES, although later he would come around to a more understanding position. Abbott pointed to the notion that it was “difficult to have an agreement that engaged attention and support of the federal, provincial and municipal governments as it could become a debating society and there was no consensus on InSite issues” (Abbott interview).

Figure 5.10. Life Expectancy at Birth, DTES, Vancouver Health Services District, and British Columbia


(Source: BC Stats; public domain)

There is no better graphic way of showing the ultimate successful influence of the urban regime that was involved in the Vancouver Agreement and Four Pillars Strategies.

Hansen has been in the provincial cabinet since 2001. He has been Minister of Health Services; Minister of Finance; Minister Responsible for Asia-Pacific of British Columbia; and Minister Responsible for the 2010 Olympics.
Someone living in this neighbourhood today has the expectancy to live a full eight years longer than someone that was in the midst of the chaos of the late nineties. In addition, the efforts of this regime has had a significant effect on the numbers of intravenous drug users injecting daily reducing the numbers by half of what they were in the late nineties, deaths from overdoses have been dramatically reduced by 2/3rds mostly due to the efforts of those supporting InSite and rates of infection of HIV/AIDS/HCV are minute compared to where they were in 1999. The VA was also responsible for improving the socio-economic lives of citizens in the neighbourhood and, alongside the Four Pillars Strategy, it is an example of good public policy. The creation and influence of coalitions that formed around the Vancouver Agreement and Four Pillars Approach informs a better understanding of the development of regime thinking in the decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government.

Problems do remain today in the DTES, every generation seems to have its challenges in the neighbourhood. The success of the VA, aside from the obvious and most important ones identified above, was the regime’s ability to get outside the constricting silos of jurisdiction and move toward developing good social policy for citizens through a whole-of-government approach. There is no question that challenges remain in the DTES, however, by having the attitude of not taking no for an answer and committing everything possible in the effort to improve the lives of citizens, even if it meant breaking down the walls of jurisdictional fortresses that were present in and out of the neighbourhood members of the regime were successful in doing something at the local level that is important – they made a direct and important difference in the lives of citizens in their community.

Summary

This section considered the case of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement (VA) in Vancouver, British Columbia. A brief historical background was provided leading to a discussion of the goals and principles contained within the Agreement. This was followed by an examination of the governance structure underpinning the VA and a comment on the funding process used for the Agreement. Further background was then provided on the Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood (DTES) of Vancouver. The context for the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement in the DTES was shown by citing several statistics. The section
concluded with a discussion of the major decisions that were taken in the process of the creation and implementation of the Agreement and an assessment of the role of the various government and non-government actors involved was provided. This information helps inform the analysis of regimes in the Vancouver Agreement and Expo lands cases that are included in the Findings and Analysis section of the dissertation.

5.3.2. Creation and Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement – Key Decisions Made

The creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement, and alongside it the Four Pillars Approach, was framed by two major decisional areas:

- The City of Vancouver’s decision to proceed with a strategy, that became the Vancouver Agreement/Four Pillars Approach, had two central areas of focus – harm reduction (including the decision to use a prevention rather than an enforcement model to improve public health and order) and use of a multi-level governance model to facilitate programs and services aimed at ending the health and social crisis that was occurring in the DTES in the late 90’s and to hopefully improve the long term health and socio-economic situation in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside.

- emanating from this decision several other ancillary choices were made:

  - many community groups decided to “buy-in” and participate in the process despite the lack of new funding and the involvement of the Vancouver Police Department;
  - the decision by the local government under Philip Owen to proceed slowly without any dedicated funding with the roll out of the strategy to insure the support of government and non-government actors;
  - the decision by the Vancouver-Richmond Health Board to issue a “state of emergency” in the DTES and to design and participate in programs in support of the strategy;
  - the decision by the Vancouver Police Department to participate in programs in support of the strategy;
  - the decision by residents to support the programs and services the VA offered, including support of InSite by the community;

  - 2. The decision of the City of Vancouver, Province of British Columbia and Canada to utilize a horizontal governance model that involved operationalizing the Vancouver Agreement and Four Pillars Approach with local leadership and action and eventual provincial and federal funding and participation.
• the federal decision of the Liberal government of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin to participate in a locally driven strategy using the Urban Development Agreement model;
• the provincial decision to fund the InSite program insured the early and ongoing development of the harm reduction approach;
• the federal decision to view the social and health crisis in the DTES as a health issue rather than a law enforcement issue and provide a waiver to InSite in order for it to begin functioning;
• the Supreme Court decision to allow InSite to remained open and the notion that harm reduction was a health care not a criminal issue.

An examination of these two decisional areas will be conducted in the Findings and Analysis section with a focus on how they relate to the regimes that were created and influenced the decision-making processes involved in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and Four Pillars Approach.

5.3.3. Summary

The development of the post-Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement are interesting cases in which to examine how regimes are created and then influence the local decision-making processes of the municipal government in Vancouver. There were coalitions of government and non-government actors that came together both in support and in opposition to the fair, however, the process constrained the perimeters of how those regimes were constituted and functioned. The way these regimes worked forms the basis for the Analysis/Findings chapter which follows.
6. Findings and Analysis

6.1. Introduction

To initiate analysis and an examination of the findings in this dissertation it is helpful to restate the initial goals of the dissertation. In the Introduction to this effort it was asserted that it was a sense of curiosity about the influence of regimes of government and non-government actors on the municipal decision-making process that motivated my interest in the research in this dissertation. It seemed to me that it was unlikely that local government actors and institutions complete the municipal decision-making process in a vacuum without having to be attuned to what is occurring within the community and factors in the intergovernmental arena. The thought was that something more than just structures/institutions, political actors, or ideas define Canadian municipal government decision-making today.\textsuperscript{107}

As Stone, Elkin, and other urbanists have argued coalitions of government and non-government actors - urban regimes - are created and influence the public policy processes and must be considered alongside the formal, local decision-making structures of municipal government in a modern liberal democratic system such as what is found in Vancouver in order to get a true picture of how local outputs/decisions of municipal government are generated. By examining two major decisional eras in Vancouver, the intention is to contribute to this debate.

The two cases will now be examined for the following;

- Major Decisional Areas
- Key Actors
- Consequences of the Decisions

\textsuperscript{107} The notion that there is an interaction of actors, ideas and institutions is discussed very well in Howlett, Ramesh & Perl (2009) 50.
• Analysis of the Role of Regimes Using Stone’s Criteria

6.1.1. **Major Decisional Areas – Post-Expo Lands/Creation and Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement**

This dissertation now turns to the 4 major decisions (the ancillary decisions that were taken were discussed in full in Chapter 5 and are considered to a lesser extent than the 4 major decisions) that were taken in the process of the development of the post-Expo lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement, alongside the Four Pillars Approach.

6.1.2. **Major Decisional Areas – The Development of the Post-Expo Lands**

As suggested in Chapter 5 there were at least two key decisions in the development of the Post-Expo Lands - they include:

1. The Province of British Columbia, under the Social Credit government, (first under Bill Bennett (Appendix C), and then William Vander Zalm, decided to use the development of the Expo lands as an economic development driver in a period of economic crisis.

2. The City of Vancouver, under Mayor Mike Harcourt, made a critical decision to support the Province's development of the Expo lands including Expo '86, the building of B.C. Place and the disposition of the land after the fair and use its support as leverage to receive several major pieces of infrastructure including B.C. Place; Canada Place; the Skytrain connection between the Expo lands and Waterfront station; assistance with the financing from Expo of the new Cambie St. bridge; and parks, seawall and green space connected to the Concord development of the False Creek parcel.

6.1.3. **Consequences of the Decisions – Post- Expo ’86 Lands**

They allowed us, for the first time, to see ourselves as others might see us - the mountains and the eagles and the rain and all that ... but the chauvinism and smug, small-town babbitty, too. It was a passage of sorts, a coming out party for a backwater. The Chamber of Commerce types (whose boosterism barely disguised a hard-edged profit motive) peddled the feel-good line that Expo brought the world to Vancouver.
The reverse was true. Expo forced Vancouver out into the world (McMartin, 1996, p.D:1).

This evaluation of the decision-making process in the development of the post-Expo lands used research articles, news accounts and responses from actors that were involved to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the decision-making process that occurred in the course of the two key decisions under consideration.

The legacy of Expo was indeed to show the city to the world and show the world to the city and to be somewhat of “a coming out party” for Vancouver to the world. The fair had significant short and long term effects for the city and province during a difficult economic period. This section considers the consequences of the Province of British Columbia to hold Expo ’86 and then develop the post-Expo lands.

It is helpful from the outset to recall the background information for the case before discussing the position of the three levels of government with regard to the development of North False Creek which later became the Expo ’86 site prior to analyzing the City of Vancouver’s decision to support the Province’s plan for the land. As mentioned in the background to the case the land used for Expo ’86 had been owned by Marathon realty representing CPR’s real estate interests and had previously been industrial land used for a variety of industries including the CPR’s rail yards, saw mills, and gas liquefication plants. Marathon Realty, had submitted a series of development plans for the land on the North side of False Creek as early as the late 1960’s.

The City had rejected the initial plans either because it had different priorities or because Vancouver sought a greater social housing component. Marathon withdrew any development plans until 1974 when a second plan involving 95 acres between the Cambie and Granville Bridges was approved by the city for rezoning from industrial to comprehensive development. This development process saw the emergence of Gordon Campbell who worked the project for Marathon Realty - Campbell would emerge several times during the process of developing the post-Expo lands as developer, Mayor of Vancouver and Premier of British Columbia. The Province began the process of organizing a world’s fair and purchased Marathon’s False Creek site in a cash and land
swap deal in 1980 for the purpose of holding a world’s fair – Transpo (later Expo ’86),
the building of a 60,000 seat stadium and post-Expo sale of the False Creek property.

Premier Bennett’s announcement at the Hotel Vancouver in 1980 to hold a
world’s fair on the newly acquired property had consequences for the community, the
City of Vancouver government with Mike Harcourt as Mayor, and the Province of British
Columbia under Bill Bennett. The analysis herein leads to a better understanding of the
creation and influence of regimes involved in the decision-making process of
Vancouver’s municipal government in the context of the development of the post-
Expo ‘86 lands. This will then facilitate an analysis of the decision-making process in
relation to Stone’s urban regime theory which will be considered later in the Analysis
section of the dissertation.

Community Consequences

The development of the post-Expo lands has turned what used to be an industrial
cesspool into a livable, thriving neighbourhood in the centre of the city forever changing
the nature of everyday life in the downtown core. The centre of Vancouver, on the
former Expo lands, has become a residential hub which is considerably different than
what historically occurred in many downtown cores around the world. When work is
finished on the lands¹⁰⁸ more and more people will not be getting in their cars and driving
an hour home as part of their commute. Instead, the development of the Expo lands is a
way that allows people the ability to work, live and play within a small area which
benefits the community in many ways.

Not everyone was in favour of the changes that occurred as a result of the
development of the Expo lands before and after the fair. “Seven hundred and fifty to a
thousand people were evicted from their home and I know of 11 people who died within
the first two or three months of the evictions” (the late Jim Green, former city councillor
and DTES activist in McMartin, 1996, p.D:1). SFU Professor Don Gutstein expressed
similar sentiments as Green:

Expo was definitely a turning point in Vancouver’s history, and you
can like the rampant growth that is going on because of it, or you can not

¹⁰⁸ The former Expo ’86 lands are still being developed by Concord Pacific.
like it. Personally, I don’t like it. I think that it’s too big a city now, I think it’s gone beyond the sustainable city now, I don’t like to see the old landmarks disappearing. The cityscape – the whole feel of the city, the size of the buildings, the traffic – all of this has changed so dramatically.

(McMartin, 1996, p.D:1)

McMartin summed up the sentiments of many in the community who opposed Expo and the development of the former Expo-lands

But tallying up the exact numbers of evictions or deaths misses the point. The point is, Expo demanded we subsume our old social moral ethic of accommodation with a new, more pragmatic business sense. Maybe this was happening all over the world, but Expo brought it home to us. We were about to be catapulted! We had to get on board! It demanded we put on a good face for the world, and the poor were party-poopers. Those Expo boosters who see nothing but good coming out of Expo always talk about its intangibles – the pride it instilled in us, the can-do spirit it generated, the cosmopolitan air it brought to the city – all of which is true.

But another intangible, conveyed in the bullying of the Downtown Eastside and the public’s impatience with those who lived there, was the understanding that in the brave new world that was coming money would be calling the shots like never before. Expo was a sea-change – Big Government’s last hurrah before handing over the tiller to Big Money – and from there on the course we would be sailing would follow the bottom line. And that made us harder. Success went to our heads, and to our wallets, but it didn’t go to our hearts. (McMartin, 1996, p.D:1)

City Consequences

As mentioned in the background of the case the central figure in the City’s initial position regarding the development of the post-Expo lands was Mayor Mike Harcourt and council. At the outset Harcourt had not been in favour of two aspects of the Expo process, on the one hand he did not support the idea of Vancouver being on the hook for any deficit and on the other hand he was not particularly fond of the choice of mass transit system and route that eventually would become Skytrain (Mackie, 2011, np.). He maintained that the he would not support the fair unless his six objections were met:

- No debt for the city;
- The site assembled;
- Rapid transit in place;
Security in place;
Tenants protected; and
Traffic management systems in operation
(Harcourt, Cameron & Rossiter, 2007, p.96)

Harcourt’s position, and that of the city, appears to have changed following the linkage by the federal government of the provision of transportation infrastructure and Expo ’86 funding. Ian Mulgrew, noted that “Harcourt abandoned his anti-Transpo platform almost from the moment he sat in the mayor’s chair” (Mulgrew, 1986, p.50). Harcourt’s original position did not seem to be ideologically or politically driven, instead it appeared to be motivated by a genuine concern for the long term prosperity of Vancouver. When the linkage decision was taken by the feds the city’s and Harcourt’s focus changed toward getting the most out of Expo ’86 as possible with regard to infrastructure; once again in the long term best interest of the City. Evidence of this cooperation is evident in Harcourt sending the committee of Councilors Puil, Brown and Rankin to reach a creative deal over what is now Canada Place with the federal government. This notion of exploiting every chance possible to gain amenities was evident in the lead up to and with the sale of Expo lands to private interests afterward as well.

An ancillary benefit to the city was the international exposure that resulted from the 22 million plus visitors and 54 countries exhibiting pavilions on the site during the fair and the building of BC Place stadium which has become a major sports and entertainment venue in the core of the city. The on the ground jobs generated by the fair is estimated to be close to 30,000 people before and during Expo. It is difficult to calculate the long term effects of Expo ’86 on the tourist industry in the city, it would not be difficult to suggest that it had a positive impact during and after the fair closed. The Commissioner General of Expo ’86 discussed that effect when he mentioned to Peter McMartin in the Vancouver Sun (April 1996) that “Expo’s legacy was its ability to be a catalyst at that time for change in Vancouver, and catapulting Vancouver into the rank of international cities” (p.D:1). It is easy to visualize the aesthetic benefit to the city as the Concord Pacific company continues to develop the former Expo lands site and a number of architecturally pleasing mixed use buildings have sprung up alongside the former
Yaletown warehouse district to help bring vibrancy and high priced condos to the downtown core.

Vancouver also benefited from the sale of the former Expo lands as it left someone else (the Province of British Columbia) responsible for millions of dollars of soil remediation costs (Judy Rogers interview). The development post-Expo also facilitated a new relationship between the development community and the city as Council became more proactive in setting benchmarks for the land and challenging developers to meet those standards – this represented a sea-change in how the city proceeded with development projects which remains to this day (Campbell interview).

**Provincial Consequences**

The province did benefit from increased economic activity on the Expo site before and during the fair despite the deficit created and the level of capital utilized to host the fair. It is a given that, in a period of economic downturn, the fair served to stimulate jobs, tourism and economic activity that had both short and long ramifications for the Province.

The sale of the land was an economic, ecological and political nightmare as the province was stuck with the remediation costs of the contaminated former industrial lands (estimated as being upwards of $100 million). There were those in the province that argued that by selling the lands in small parcels a more interesting series of neighbourhoods could be developed and a greater level of revenue from the sale of the parcels could be realized (Harcourt interview). Grace McCarthy had suggested that “(O)ur mandate was to sell it and to sell it as quickly as possible to create jobs as quickly as possible” (Bell, 1994, p.B:4). Consultant and former President of the Real Estate Board of Greater Vancouver, Brian Calder, suggested a lot of money was left on the table when the province sold the land to Li Ka-Shing – “If a realtor ever negotiated the deal the government did they would have lost their licence, if not faced a lawsuit for not adequately representing their client” and “It we’d gone through the rezoning process we can see now that what we’d have got is $761 million…Our provincial government sure as hell did something wrong” (Hume & Odam, 1992).

Politically, the alleged interference from the Premier's office that was intended to favour local interests over offshore interests in the purchase of the former Expo lands
resulted in suspicion and mistrust of the Vander Zalm regime with calls for inquiries and Royal Commissions to investigate (Ford, Dawson, Austin, 1991, p.5). Grace McCarthy, one of the Socreds senior ministers resigned “citing Mr. Vander Zalm’s interference with the Crown corporation (BCEC which had been set up to dispose of the Expo ’86 asset) among her reasons for quitting cabinet” (Cruickshank, 1988, p.A:8). The political consequences were brutal, the media was preoccupied for a very long time with the potential corruption over the Expo ’86 lands – much of the new Premier’s political capital was expended over the issue and it is arguable if he ever managed to recover (Cruickshank, 1988, p.A:8). From Vander Zalm’s point of view he did not understand why people did not want a local developer or group of developers to have opportunities and that he had, in fact, favoured separating the Expo lands into smaller parcels, which, interestingly, is not what occurred (Vander Zalm interview).

Ecologically, the situation was also a nightmare, the companies hired by the Province had various schemes for getting rid of the contaminated soil potentially containing “lead, mercury and arsenic at levels above environmental standards for residential land” from the former Expo lands that involved: dumping it off Point Grey, shipping it to the United States, sending it to Princeton’s landfill or spreading it on farmland in Richmond (Clark, 1991, p.22).

Concord Pacific, the company developing the 82 – hectare (202 acre) Expo site, wants to remove 90,000 cubic metres (3.2 million cubic feet) of undisturbed “glacial till” from an area of the site bounded by Pender and Taylor Streets. The soil would be loaded onto barges and tipped into the Point Grey dumping ground, a 250-metre (820 foot) deep circular area about eight kilometres off Point Grey (Clark, 1991: p.22).

Greenpeace was “outraged about the plans to dump 9,000 truckloads of soil from the site into the waters off Point Grey: ‘The ocean is not a dump site” commented Greenpeace marine biologist Brian Killeen” (Clark, 1991: p.22).

**Federal Consequences**

The consequences for the federal government were tied to the federal desire to publicize internationally Canada’s burgeoning mass transit technology, Skytrain, within the Expo’86 transportation and communication world exposition. The development of
the link between the main Expo site and the Convention Centre was an excellent promotional tool for the feds. The federal government, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, was pre-occupied with the constitutional crisis in the country, never ending negotiations, at times high stakes brinkmanship and a poor world economy. Trudeau (Appendix C) was enormously unpopular in the West after the National Energy Program was brought in and there was minimal support for the federal Liberals in B.C. Trudeau needed the ongoing support of Premier Bennett in the constitutional process and the federal government’s provision of transportation infrastructure and support of the fair would assist in mitigating a wee bit the effects of the heavy concentration on Quebec’s issues and the sense of Western alienation that was taking hold.

The consequences for the federal government also involved the country’s place in the world, by featuring technology Canada could be seen as a progressive, intelligent country that would be worth investing in and worth buying products from in the future. It may be worthwhile to think of Expo ’86 as part of a progression beginning in 1967 with Montreal’s Expo ’67, the 1976 Montreal Olympics, Vancouver’s Expo ’86, Calgary’s 1988 Olympics and Vancouver’s 2010 Olympics as a progression of events hosted in Canada intended to raise the country’s international profile as a place to visit and do business with moving forward. Supporting events such as Expo ’86 could be seen in the light of being in the national interest in addition to domestic political considerations.

6.1.4. Analysis of the Role of Regimes Using Stone’s Criteria - Development of the post-Expo ’86 Lands

A number of foundational questions must be answered prior to being able to logically respond to Orienting question number 1:

• Was there a regime or were there regimes of government and non-government actors active during the development of the post-Expo lands? If regimes did not form, what were the reasons why they did not form?
• If regimes did form, who were the key actors within the active regime(s) of government and non-government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands?
• What were the goals and objectives of the active regime(s) during the development of the post-Expo lands?
• What resources and strategies did the key actors within the regime(s) of government and non-government actors utilize during the development of the post-Expo lands?
• Was the active regime successful in achieving its goals and objectives?
• Were there any connections among active regimes of government and non-government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands?

Question A: Was there a regime or were there regimes of government and non-government actors active during the development of the post-Expo lands? If regimes did not form, what were the reasons why they did not form?

In order to analyze whether regimes exist in the case of the development of the post-Expo lands it is useful to consider the template used by Clarence Stone which establishes the following criteria for identifying the presence and behaviour of regimes. For Stone, and for the purposes of this dissertation an evaluation of whether a regime or regimes existed will be made based on the following criteria:

• An agenda to address a distinct set of problems

In the case of the development of the post-Expo lands there were several competing agendas in play from a variety of perspectives:

• There were several different agendas can be identified in the community in the post-Expo lands development case: Before the fair the community wanted to insure that there were no more forced evictions taking place from neighbouring communities, particularly the DTES, where SRO’s were being converted into accommodations causing residents to be forced to leave and rents increased once conversions took place. Activists in the community publicized the forced evictions that were being caused, although there were inconsistencies in the statistics provided, and in some cases dramatized through mentions (particularly by Jim Green) about the number of suicides that were related. By bringing the forced eviction issue to the forefront pre-Expo social housing activists may have set in motion a long term strategy that led eventually to a lucrative purchase and development of the former Woodward’s location in the DTES.

• Community boosters were enthusiastically supportive of what Expo ’86 would mean for Vancouver in terms of economic activity before and during the fair, development post-Expo, and giving the city exposure to the international community, particularly Asia as there is a large diaspora in the city, and the international community exposure to the city which might result in increased tourism and international trade.

• Unions in the area had an agenda to obtain much of the construction on the Expo site for union labourers to the exclusion of non-union labour. This became a source of conflict during the construction of the site as the province
wanted to use non-union workers, and they threatened and then created legislation to facilitate that, in order to cut costs.

- Developers in the City and elsewhere looked forward to the possibility of participating directly in the development of the former Expo lands site itself or indirectly through developing properties that would be adjacent to the newly improved lands. The ability to develop lands that had been previously nothing more than an industrial waste dump offered developers and entrepreneurs potentially tremendous short and long term benefits. An example of the spin-off effects on adjacent properties to the Expo site can be found in the development of the Georgian Court hotel by a group led by Gordon Campbell when he was an active developer. The province had decided to sell off the Expo lands in one parcel as quickly as possible after the fair, this had ramifications for who purchased the parcel, although Li Ka-shing from Hong Kong purchased the land there were a number of local developers and entrepreneurs that considered making bids and made bids for the property - albeit unsuccessfully.

- The City of Vancouver had on its agenda the desire for economic activity in the city before and during the fair, and once there was a linkage made by the federal government between the provision of funding for mass transit in the city and supporting Expo '86 the city, led by Mayor Harcourt (despite his initial lukewarm attitude about Expo '86) changed its agenda. Instead of opposing the fair the Mayor and Council actively sought out opportunities, successfully, to exploit and leverage funding from the federal and provincial government to secure major infrastructure including amenities such as a trade and convention centre/cruise ship terminal, BC Place, assistance with the new Cambie Street bridge, sewer/water/services for the eventual development of the post-Expo lands, amenities such as seawalls, parks and green space and an orderly master plan for the long term development of North False Creek among others. The ability of Mr. Harcourt and Council to obtain this major infrastructure for a very small amount of capital by leveraging and negotiating is a lasting legacy for Vancouver from Expo '86.

- The Province of British Columbia’s agenda, as stated by Premier Bennett was to host an international exposition in conjunction with Vancouver’s 100th birthday and the 100th anniversary of the extension of the CPR to the West Coast, build a 60,000 seat stadium (which would become BC Place) and then sell the post-Expo land off to the benefit of all British Columbians. The fair and accompanying construction was about jobs, economic activity including tourism and the prospect of doing more international commerce along with creating enthusiasm in an economic period where the economy of the province was in terrible shape. The agenda did not appear to include concerns over the escalating costs of the fair or the prospect of a deficit from Expo. Instead Bennett had confidence the fair would be a success and any deficit could be mitigated through Lotto funds.

- The federal government’s agenda had to do with providing a method of publicizing the mass transit technology being developed in Kingston, Ontario in order to create economic spin-off in the short and long terms for the entire country. In the early days of the fair’s development the government of Pierre
Trudeau was no doubt pre-occupied with the patriation of the Canadian Constitution and creation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Undoubtedly, there had to have been some arm-twisting from the province to further the notion that B.C. deserved the same level of federal government spending on infrastructure as was done for the Montreal Olympics in 1976 and Expo ’67. The howls of “the West wants in” could be heard from Vancouver to Ottawa at the time which may have had an effect on Trudeau’s government, particularly after the effects of the National Energy Program and recession were taken into consideration. Senators Olson, Austin and Perrault all played an integral part in insuring federal participation in the infrastructure surrounding Expo occurred and provincial needs were mostly met (General Report, 1986, “Chronology”).

Given this discussion it is clear there were a series of agendas that were in play during the development of the post- Expo lands representing a variety of perspectives emanating from the community, developers, city, province and federal governments.

- A governing coalition around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members

The governing coalition around each of the agendas was perspective-specific. In the case of the community the Downtown Eastside residents became the public face of combatting the forced evictions in the neighbouring communities to the Expo lands. There was a strategy for increasing the amount of social housing, particularly in the DTES that activists pursued rigorously. The forced eviction issue surrounding Expo gave an opportunity to build capacity within the community to further the agenda of those involved.

The development community had a governing coalition around their agenda that featured most of the major developers in the community eager to take advantage of the construction involved in and around Expo. The ethos pre-Expo was that these developers would come up with ideas and then pitch to the city the terms of the development. That would change with the development of the post-Expo lands and the adoption of a more proactive agenda by the city with regard to zoning and land use development.

A coalition did form after the sale of the Expo lands to a private developer. Prior to the sale there were jurisdictional issues that came up involving the powers of the
province, under the Canadian Constitution, over municipalities and Vancouver’s powers under the Vancouver Charter regarding zoning and planning in the city. The legislation creating B.C. Place Ltd. as a crown corporation responsible for the development of Expo and B.C. Place gave the province the ability to supersede municipal jurisdiction in a similar way that the province later passed legislation in the run-up to the 2010 Olympics to guarantee there would be no municipal disruptions in the construction of infrastructure for the games\textsuperscript{109}.

Once the land was sold to Concord Pacific and Stanley Kwok moved over from his position with B.C. Place to become Concord’s lead architect for the development of the post-Expo lands a regime did begin to take shape among the professionals within the city planning, zoning and engineering bureaucracy and Concord’s development staff. City politicians were constrained statutorily from having intimate connections with developers during the process of rezoning or determining the nature of a development so the real connections were done at the professional bureaucrat level between the government actors at the city and the non-government actors at Concord. An ethos of cooperation became apparent among the membership of this regime particularly in the interactions among Kwok, City planner Larry Beasley and their staffs.

The city had a governing coalition through the efforts of the Mayor and council who set the goals and objectives surrounding the pre and post development of the Expo lands and the strategy of using the fair to obtain lasting legacies for the Vancouver. The pre-Expo coalition was led by Mayor Harcourt and Council while post Expo Mayor Gordon Campbell and leadership in the planning department were instrumental in pursuing the coalition’s agenda. This regime would not only change its composition but it would also change its agenda after Expo and the sale of the lands from the province to private interests.

Mayor Campbell and Council, along with the city’s planning, zoning and engineering operations, following the fair, were focused on managing the former Expo lands as effectively as possible by setting benchmarks and guidelines proactively that

forced developers, including Concord Pacific, to conform to what the city wanted and needed and not the other way around.

The governing coalition of the province was headed first by Premier Bill Bennett then after the fair Premier William Vander Zalm, Minister Grace McCarthy, BC Place Chair Jim Pattison who was also responsible for Expo, the Board of Directors of B.C. Place and later when it came to dispersing the Expo assets of the British Columbia Enterprise Corporation. The coalition was governed during the run up to Expo quite informally with decisions usually held after discussions between Pattison and Bennett and McCarthy. The governing regime became much more formal as the province decided on who should purchase the Expo lands and after McCarthy complained of interference by the Premier’s office in the selection of a purchaser for the former Expo lands and suspicions of influence peddling were being alleged and investigated by the RCMP (Cruickshank 1988: A8).

The governing coalition of the federal government was quite minimal, support for the Liberals in the West was minimal, Prime Minister Trudeau had to rely on a cadre of Liberal Senators to represent federal interests on matters involving Expo and the federal contribution to infrastructure development in Vancouver.

At some point in the pre-Expo preparations there were regimes that formed that represented interests across jurisdiction or agenda. For example as Expo developed, a regime formed between the representatives of the city, province and federal governments after some fairly acrimonious negotiations over funding of Expo and the Convention/cruise ship building. Bennett and Trudeau came to a funding arrangement that met the needs of the federal government’s desire to showcase Canadian mass transit technology and the province’s need for funding support of Expo, while Harcourt/Vancouver City council and the federal government, through negotiations with Senator Jack Austin, was able to secure a deal over the construction of what is now Canada Place. At one point, the province had threatened to cancel Expo over the funding problems, the Mayor and Council were initially lukewarm to the fair over concerns for the potential debt liability for the city from Expo’s operations and the mass transit plans that were being forwarded by the federal government, and the province and
city were bickering over who had jurisdiction over the planning of the Expo site. Once negotiations occurred that solved the various issues among the government actors they formed a strong coalition, put everyone on the same agenda - determined to put on a successful international fair that all would potentially benefit from eventually.

- Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition

The community had very little in terms of resources to pursue their agenda, activists protesting forced evictions had to rely primarily on their ability to access the media and to then be able to publicize the effects of the dislocation of residents in the neighbourhoods in proximity to the Expo site. Post Expo, as a result of the proactive manner in which the Campbell regime set development standards and entered into extensive public consultations the amount of public backlash was minimal. The main input from the community came from public disdain for the perceived corruption in the sale of the Expo lands; the notion that the development of the land would be better if done in a series of smaller parcels; that the province could have received much more money for the land if it did develop it piecemeal and sat on it for a period of time and finally later on concern over Concord marketing condo projects first in Hong Kong; where they would sell out almost instantly - before Vancouver residents could have the opportunity to purchase.

Mayor Owen indicated in his interview, that as part of the redevelopment of the downtown core alongside the post-Expo development of North False Creek, the city had shifted 50 million square feet of previously commercially zoned real estate to residential categories. This was an instant boost to the development community and major residential developments began to be built in previously inaccessible areas of the city’s core. Coupled with increased demand from Asian speculators flocking to developments being marketed by Concord the demand for condo type development prices increased and lots of money was made in the development community as a result. The developers, post–Expo, contributed to the regime that developed with the City’s professional planning, zoning, and engineering professionals. Finally, many of the substantial amenities that were received came as a result of these developments.
The province brought to the regime with the city and federal government prior to Expo, the operational leadership of the development of the fair through Jim Pattison as Chair and the Crown Corporation BC Place Ltd. and capital for infrastructure and management of the site itself. Post-Expo the responsibility to the regime and the resources brought to the table were reduced dramatically. Once the land was sold to Concord the province’s sole responsibility as a result of the sale agreement, was its responsibility for the site’s long term soil remediation which has been estimated to cost upward of $100 million.

The federal government did not have any responsibilities to the regime post-Expo other than the management of what became Canada Place through the Canada Lands Corporation. The feds did provide significant funding for the expansion of Skytrain throughout the Lower Mainland, although this was not tied, other than the Expo line, to its involvement in the fair.

- Given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing. (Stone 2005)

This was not evident in the community, other than the efforts of the Downtown Eastside Residents’ Association (DERA) when considering the coalition that formed around the issue of displacement and forced evictions because of Expo.

A sense of cooperation developed post-Expo in the development community/city professional staff regime. A more cooperative ethos became the operating standard in the relationship. City planners were charged with ensuring the development of the post-Expo lands was done in a way that was conducive to helping make the downtown core more livable for people through mixed use housing. The form of development would be constrained, not by Concord, but by the 16 principles that the professional staff of the city and the development community came together to create. This was a major step in new developments proceeding in a mutually beneficial way.

The answer to question A as posed in Stone’s criteria for whether a regime exists, therefore, is that there were regimes of government and non-government actors that formed during the development of the post-Expo lands. Regimes did not form in the
community as resources were insufficient and the capacity for forming relationships with the other actors was limited.

The composition and agendas of the regimes that formed within the pre-Expo period changed after Expo. Government actors, at times in the pre-Expo period, were antagonistic toward each other, once the city realized its limited liability for debt from Expo; the potential economic and amenity bonanza it could realize before, during and after the fair; after the province was given assurances over federal funding, particularly of the Convention centre site, and once the federal government linked mass transit with Expo support; the government actors at all three levels coalesced into a regime led primarily in the pre-Expo period by the Province of British Columbia and the post-Expo period by the City of Vancouver. Post-Expo government actors at the city, led by the Mayor and planning, zoning and engineering professionals, developed a regime with the city’s development community eager to take advantage of relaxed zoning in the downtown core and heightened demand as a result of an influx into the Asian community and Concord’s post-Expo development.

There were at least two coalitions that formed in the development of the post-Expo lands – one involving the city, province, and federal government in the pre-Expo period focused on holding a successful fair and creating economic benefit. The second regime formed between the city led by the Mayor and Council and city professional planning, zoning and engineering staffs and the development community. Two regimes were not in competition despite the overlapping involvement of the city actors – instead the second regime could be seen as an evolution of the first regime post-Expo.

**Question B:** If regimes did form, who were the key actors within the active regime(s) of government and non-government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands?

The key actors that led the government dominated regime in the pre-Expo period included:

**City:** Mayor Mike Harcourt and Cabinet (including an effective committee political rivals George Puil, May Brown and Harry Rankin who participated in the negotiations over what is now Canada Place and the federal government led by Senator Austin)

**Province:** Premier Bill Bennett and Cabinet (including senior Minister Grace McCarthy)
Jim Pattison, Chair Expo and B.C. Place Ltd.
B.C. Place Board and Management
Expo ‘86 Senior Management

**Federal Government:** Prime Minister Trudeau and Cabinet
Senator Jack Austin
Senator Bud Olson
Senator Ray Perrault

The key actors who led the development community/city regime that developed post-Expo included:

City: Mayor Gordon Campbell and Council (the NPA dominated city hall in this period so the Mayor had little trouble getting development related issues through)
City Professional Staff including planning, zoning, and engineering professionals led by City Manager Ken Dobell and eventually dominated by City Planner Larry Beasley

Developers: Stanley Kwok (and a cadre of architects and planners working on the master planning of the former Expo lands, most notably Don Vaughan)
Li Ka-shing, led group that purchased former Expo lands from Province and created Concord Pacific
Victor Li, Li Ka-shing’s son, with his father’s backing set up Concord Pacific and ran the corporation until divesting most of his interests to Burcon International Developments Ltd.
Terry Hui, principal Burcon, purchased most of Expo lands and became CEO of Concord Pacific Holdings, Ltd. in 1997

**Question C: What were the goals and objectives of the active regime(s) during the development of the post-Expo lands?**
The key actors who led the government dominated regime in the pre-Expo period had the following goals and objectives:

City:
- Gain as many infrastructure amenities as possible through negotiations with the federal and provincial governments
- Working to have a successful Expo ‘86

Province:
- Gain economic benefit in the construction of BC Place and the Expo site, the fair itself and the sale of the former-Expo lands
- Working to have a successful Expo ‘86

**Federal Government:**
- Marketing of mass transit technology to an international audience
- Working to ensure Bennett support during difficult constitutional period
- Having a successful Expo ‘86

The key actors who led the city/development community dominated regime in the post-Expo period had the following goals and objectives:

**City:**
- develop proactive principles for future development in the city
- develop collaborative relationships with the other members of the regime

**Developers:**
- seek a collaborative relationship with their regime partner to maximize development opportunities over the long term

**Question D:** What resources and strategies did the key actors within the regime(s) utilize during the development of the post-Expo lands?

The key actors who led the government dominated regime used the following resources and strategies within the regime of government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands in the pre-Expo period:

**Federal Government:** Utilized infrastructure funding and linkage between support for Expo ‘86 and the provision of mass transit to gain support of the city and province

**Province:** Utilized seemingly bottomless provincial treasury to develop Expo and the construction of BC Place. Used constitutional jurisdiction by passing legislation minimizing the ability of the city to interfere in the development of BC Place and Expo ‘86

**City:** In the pre-Expo period the city used its position as local service provider (sewer, water, etc.) as part of its negotiations over what would become known as Canada Place Mayor Harcourt used a very tough committee of negotiators from Council to come to an agreement with the federal government over the convention centre/cruise ship terminal. The city’s use of resources and strategies changed from the outset of the pre-Expo period development of the post-Expo lands – initially the strategy was to have conflict with the province over the city being responsible for debts from Expo ‘86, later the city worked to insure the fair was successful and contribute to the economy of Vancouver.
Initially, the city had conflict with the federal government over the choice of technology (Skytrain) over LRT options. Later, the city would enter into an agreement with the federal government that would see Vancouver gain a convention centre, a cruise ship terminal and a link between the main Expo site and the convention centre.

The key actors who led the city/development community dominated regime used the following resources and strategies within the regime during the development of the post-Expo lands in the post-Expo period:

**City:** the city strategy was to work with Concord’s planning staff and develop a coordinated approach for the development of the post-Expo lands that could then be amplified across the city

**Developers:** the development community had to generate the capital necessary to take advantage of the newly formed collaborative development ethos in Vancouver including to develop newly re-zoned land in the city’s core.

**Question E: Was the active regime led successful in achieving its goals and objectives?**

The key actors in the government dominated regime enjoyed overall success, however, the province suffered financially from the direct operation of Expo ’86.

**Federal Government:** Yes, Expo ’86 gave the federal government the ability to market mass transit technology to an international audience.
- Pierre Trudeau enjoyed support of Bennett during difficult constitutional period
- Expo ’86 was widely considered a success, although not financially

**Province:** the province definitely saw increased economic activity from the construction of the Expo site, during the fair and in the sale of the post-Expo lands – unfortunately the direct revenue gained was less than the expense, it is impossible to quantify the long term positive economic benefits of Expo to the province and the costs of the remediation of contaminated soil will ultimately wipe out any profit from the sale of the lands in one parcel to Concord.
- Expo ‘86 was widely considered a success, although the province accumulated an estimated debt of at least $311 million.

**City:** the city achieved the goal of gaining as many infrastructure amenities as possible through negotiations with the federal and provincial governments in the run up to the fair.
The fair generated economic activity during difficult economic times and exposed Vancouver to the international community. The key actors who led the city/developer dominated regime post-Expo achieved their goals and objectives:

**City**: the city achieved a collaborative relationship with the development community and created a set of principles by which future development has been guided in a proactive rather than reactive manner.

**Developers**: A collaborative relationship developed between city planning, zoning and engineering professionals led by the Mayor and Council and the development community led by Concord Pacific’s planning staff. This resulted in a boom in real estate development and progress in the development on the former Expo ’86 lands that was orderly and created a vibrant community in the city’s downtown core.

**Question F**: Were there any connections among active regimes of government and non-government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands?

There were connections between the active regimes of government and non-government actors during the development of the post-Expo lands in the pre-Expo period:

**Federal Government**: there was no federal role in the relationship between the development community and the city during the development of the post-Expo lands.

**Province**: Once the province sold its interests in the post-Expo lands it had no direct involvement with the members of the development community/city regime.

**City**: the city was present in both regimes that were created in the development of the Expo lands. It had an intimate relationship with both the federal and provincial government prior to the fair in developing the Expo site itself and other infrastructure in support of the fair and city.

**Developers**: Concord Pacific Ltd. was the central developer involved in the development of the Expo lands, it did have a connection to the province through the sale of the lands following the fair and developed a more collaborative relationship with the city following Expo.
**Orienting Question 1:**

Do coalitions of non-government and government actors influence the decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government?

Given the discussion above it can be credibly asserted that in the case of the development of the post-Expo lands coalitions of non-government and government actors influenced the processes of Vancouver’s municipal government. The regime that formed among the federal, provincial and city governments in the pre-Expo period did influence the decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government. The municipal government’s goals and objectives changed once it joined the other actors in a regime dominated by government actors at the federal, provincial and city level that was supportive of the fair. The decision-making processes of the municipal government were also affected post-Expo when the regime that was created between the development community and the city’s professional planning, zoning and engineering staffs, led by the Mayor and Council, worked in a collaborative way on the development of the post-Expo lands. The interactions between the regime members resulted in Vancouver adopting a new, proactive and collaborative model for its relationship between the city and the development community.

**Orienting Question 2:**

Is local decision-making in Vancouver dominated by a single or plurality of urban regimes in the Vancouver Agreement and post-Expo lands cases?

Given the discussion above - the notion that local decision making was dominated by a single regime in the development of the post-Expo lands is not valid. In the case of the development of the Expo lands two different regimes emerged, one in the pre-Expo period consisting of government actors from the federal, provincial and city governments that had a variety of interests but inevitably came together in support of the fair and the development of associated infrastructure. The second was created in the post-Expo period consisting of a combination of government actors in the form of municipal professional planning, zoning and engineering staff, led by the Mayor and Council and non-government actors from the development community led by the planning and development staff of Concord Pacific Ltd.
6.1.5. Major Decisional Areas – Creation and Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement

As suggested in Chapter 5 there were at least two key decisions in the development of the Post-Expo Lands - they include:

- The decision of the City of Vancouver to proceed with a strategy that became the Vancouver Agreement/Four Pillars Approach.
- The decision of the Province of British Columbia and Canada to participate in a horizontal governance model that involved operationalizing the Vancouver Agreement and Four Pillars Approach with local leadership and action and eventual provincial and federal funding and participation.

6.1.6. Consequences of the Decisions - Creation and Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement

This evaluation of the decision-making process in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach utilizes a number of different perspectives including key informant interviews, analysis completed by the Auditor General of Canada, the Macleod Institute, urban researchers, and actors that were involved in the process.110 The analysis begins with the institutional analysis of Western Economic Diversification Canada, the Auditor General, the Macleod Institute and the Vancouver Agreement administration itself.

Western Economic Diversification (WD) (2010) produced a rather sterilized evaluation of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement based primarily on economic criteria including “Relevance;” “Performance (Achievement of Objectives);” and “Performance (Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy)” (WD 2010, 2). The evaluation identified the central goal of the Agreement: “...it was an un-funded agreement that committed all parties to cooperate in promoting and supporting economic, social, health and safety issues in Vancouver” (WD 201, 3). The evaluation recognized how the VA changed in 2003 when the agreement “became a vehicle to coordinate and disperse funds targeting the problems of the Vancouver Downtown Eastside. Government partners collaborated to contribute and leverage funding for

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110 These would include analysis completed by key informants; Edelson 2010; Smith & Stewart 2005; Mason 2006; Vancouver Agreement 2000-2010; Western Diversification 2010; Macleod Institute 2003; Auditor General of Canada 2005; ) and my own observations.
projects that addressed health, economic, social, housing, and public safety challenges in the inner city” (WD 2010, 3).

Federal funding for the VA came from several department and agencies including “Western Economic Diversification Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Health Canada and Status of Women Canada” (WD 2010, 4). The projects involving the federal government departments and agencies were “implemented across a wide range of areas including infrastructure, health, housing, economic development, neighbourhood safety, and job training and creation initiatives” (WD 2010, 5).

With regard to the first criteria, “Relevance” the WD evaluation “recognized that a collaborative effort was required to deal with the level of complexity of the issues and overlapping responsibilities” that were caused by “jurisdictional fragmentation” that featured “12 federal departments, 19 provincial ministries, and 14 city departments” and “over 300 service agencies” active in revitalization and service provision in the ten block by ten block DTES (WD 2010, 14).

In the second category “Performance: Achievement of Objectives” the WD found:

People involved at the community level stated that the VA changed people’s attitudes and improved the atmosphere among agencies in the DTES. It was mentioned that before the VA, there was a great deal of animosity between various groups in the area. However, by working together on VA projects, these groups improved their attitude towards each other. Groups such as businesses, residents, police, prostitutes, and drug users had a different and more positive view of each other after their experiences in the VA. (WD, 2010)

The VA created a significant amount of spin-off activities in its legacy such as the accomplishment of events, agencies and community efforts that will continue on after the initiative is over.

111 The WD defines these objectives as: “whether the projects realized their outputs, the achievement of immediate and intermediate outcomes, and agreement goals, factors that constrain or facilitate achievement of program results, and the resulting impacts of the program” (WD 2010, 18).
The VA left a legacy of cooperation. The VA process brought people together who were previously unaware of each other’s efforts and responsibilities. Focus group participants reported being surprised at the extent of other government activity and level of staffing for VA projects. These relationships are likely to continue after their involvement in the VA (14).

In the federal government’s evaluation of the VA’s “Performance (Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy)” the WD “invested over $7,671,000 into projects undertaken within the VA” while the provincial government and private sector invested an additional $20,298,000” meaning that for every “department dollar invested leveraged another $2.6 from the other parties” (WD, 2010, p.31). In the case studies conducted in support of the WD evaluation it was respondents had “a high level of satisfaction in dealing with departmental staff, and with the way the Agreement was delivered” (WD, 2010, p.31). Respondents suggested improvements in the following areas: reducing the number of subcommittees; clarifying the mandate to enhance focus; enhancing the access to information in a coordinated fashion; and minimizing reporting requirements” (WD, 2010, p.31).

Finally, the WD evaluation, based on “results mentioned by key informants” and “comparative analysis,” identified overall strengths and weaknesses of the Vancouver Agreement, starting with one the Auditor General’s evaluation had also mentioned – “the lack of horizontal accountability mechanism that outlined roles and responsibilities for the partners, and provided a strategic framework to measure results” as well as the following series of failures and successes:

**Successes**

- The high level of commitment of the people involved in the creation and implementation of the Agreement
- The resources dedicated to the Vancouver Agreement effort
- The focus on innovative programming and risk-taking
- The adoption of a horizontally based governance model that facilitated cross-jurisdictional collaboration

**Failures**
• Inconsistent political support (elections changed priorities and support levels)
• Bureaucratic nature of the Vancouver Agreement/decision layers/delays in approvals
• Personnel turnover which resulted in removing Vancouver Agreement champions
• Territoriality and individual mandates among the participating agencies
• Low involvement of the community in the decision-making process
• The scope of the Agreement which was mentioned as too large
• The joint decision-making process which at times was challenging and slow

Further consideration of the WD evaluation will be completed in the General Analysis section of the dissertation as the report offers a variety of interesting “leading practices” that may be considered lessons learned and are worthy of more examination. The section now turns to an evaluation of the Vancouver Agreement conducted by the Auditor General of Canada in November, 2005.

The Auditor General of Canada’s evaluation of the VA was conducted in the context of examining three “horizontal initiatives” that had been undertaken by the federal government including the National Homelessness Initiative, Vancouver Agreement and the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy. As previously discussed in the dissertation, the Auditor General: found that the Vancouver Agreement had a promising governance model with provincial, municipal, and federal governments working together to meet the needs of the community. This agreement started at the grassroots and evolved from an unfunded collaborative agreement, to one that is funded” (Auditor General, 2005, p.15).

The Auditor General also found some synergy between two of the initiatives being evaluated:

…coordination between the activities of the Vancouver Agreement and the National Homelessness Initiative. The Vancouver Agreement’s task team on homelessness and housing met monthly, leading to increased co-ordination between Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and the British Columbia and Yukon office of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation. (Auditor General, 2005, p.16)
The Auditor General’s (AG) evaluation elaborated on the success of the Vancouver Agreement as a “benchmark for other urban development agreements in Western Canada” recognizing three awards the VA received:

- the Institute of Public Administration of Canada’s Award for Innovative Management for Horizontal Collaboration in 2004;
- the United Nations’ Public Service Award for “improving transparency, accountability and responsiveness in public service” in 2005, which cited the agreement for its innovative partnership with government agencies, community groups, and businesses; and
- the Association of Professional Executive of the Public Service of Canada Partnership Award in 2005. (Auditor General, 2005, p.16)

The federal evaluation did point out some problems with accountability in the Vancouver Agreement process:

- …(f)or public reporting the Vancouver Agreement also included projects from other federal programs that were “in the spirit” of the agreement. However, the federal government did not have criteria to determine which projects were in that category. Also, information on what the federal government actually contributed to the agreement was not readily available or was inconsistent. For example, although one project received funding from three federal departments, it was only considered to be “in the spirit” of the agreement by one of the departments. (Auditor General, 2005 pp.17/18)

This lack of criteria may explain why in the report’s Exhibit 4.1“The Three Initiatives We Examined,” the federal contribution from 1999-2000 to 2004-2005 was listed as $22 million, a figure that does not appear anywhere in any of the other records accessed for the purposes of this dissertation.112

As for general comments about the VA, the Auditor General pointed to “weaknesses in how the federal organizations involved managed horizontal initiatives” with the cause being “insufficient attention by the Privy Council Office and the Treasury Board Secretariat to horizontal initiatives is an underlying cause of such weaknesses”

112 The Auditor General examined the contributions of Health Canada; Human Resources and Skills Development Canada; Privy Council (subsequently Infrastructure Canada; Public Health Agency of Canada; Treasury Board Secretariat; and Western Economic Development Canada.
(Auditor General, 2005, p.19). One reason for the lack of concern by the Secretariat was identified by the Auditor as caused by a suggestion by the Treasury Board that the VA was not a horizontal initiative as it “received direct funding from one department.” The AG suggested “the way the agreement was funded and received support from federal, provincial, and municipal governments did not diminish the need for guidance and support from the Secretariat” (Auditor General, 2005, p.21).

The Auditor General report also cited the necessity for the federal government to become more flexible in its participation in horizontal initiatives citing a report by the Canada School of Public Service that found:

- It proved to be much more difficult than anticipated to use existing departmental program funds to support Vancouver Agreement projects. One lesson appears to be, therefore, that terms and conditions of existing programs do not easily lend themselves to the flexibility required to effectively address the complex problems of situations such as the downtown east side in Vancouver. (AG, 2005, p.23)

Finally, the report noticed that members of the Vancouver Agreement did have a “misunderstanding” as to the allocation of funds from existing programs and that “some community organizations thought it represented additional money, and others thought that the federal government was double counting. In a startling assertion about the financial administration of the VA the Auditor General found: “There was no comprehensive picture of the federal investment in the agreement” (AG, 2005, p.24).

The Macleod Institute conducted a “governance study” at the behest of the Management Committee of the VA in December 2003, as dedicated funding was starting to be provided for the Vancouver Agreement process. The evaluation “would describe the VA in terms of its original intentions, actual operations and people’s perceptions of it, and to make recommendations for a governance framework, including the basis for accountability and evaluation” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.11). The study initially found that the VA was “a dynamic collaborative arrangement involving dedicated partners who are driven by passion and commitment to achieve results in social as well as economic terms” with an “ability to mobilize the forces and resources needed to succeed in urban centres and, in particular, the DTES” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.iii). At the core of the VA was it success in “forging shared objectives and in helping to correlate multiple
agencies in a common effort to deal with multi-faceted challenges” (Macleod Institute, p.iii).

The Institute identified four issues reference regarding the governance of the Vancouver Agreement:

1. **Decision-making criteria** – the study found a lack of “standards and criteria” particularly with regard to transparency and identified two methods of decision making in the VA process – “VA management decisions, and decisions about what projects would be brought under the VA’s umbrella;”

2. **Community participation** – the study showed that by 2003 the VA lacked “a community input strategy;”

3. **Structure of authority** – the study pointed to the effects of becoming a funded program from an unfunded program and that initially “the VA’s model of distributive authority allowed maximum flexibility for multiple decision makers and managers” but as a result of the new funding “the VA is now experiencing a pull toward a more centralized structure (delegated authority).” In a foreshadowing of what came later in the life of the Agreement the study warned that “the value of collaborative partnership may be lost if a more centralized command and control model is adopted” and that “money is not the solution when integrated service delivery is the goal” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.iv).

4. **Evaluation** – the study pointed to the difficulty of evaluating the Vancouver Agreement “because a clear distinction has not been drawn between project outcomes and outcomes of the collaborative partnership itself” and that “the VA performance needs to be evaluated against a set of measurable standards set forth in a Governance Framework.” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.iv).

In its evaluation of the VA to 2003 the study found that the Agreement had developed into “a collaborative partnership in which each partner exercises equal power in the decision-making process” and that “only decisions that are unanimous (in the case of the Policy Committee) or consensual (and hence unanimous, in the case of the Management Committee) are acted upon under the VA” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.14). The study also pointed out weaknesses in the governance model noting that “a strategic plan did not appear until 2002,” however, once completed the “Integrated Strategic Plan” in 2003 “defined 31 priority strategies and actions under four headings:
• Revitalize the Hastings Street Corridor
• Dismantle the Open Drug Scene
• Turn Problem Hotels into Contributor Hotels
• Make the Community Healthier and Safer for the Most Vulnerable

(Macleod Institute, 2003, p.14).

A further criticism identified by the study indicate a lack of a “formal participation processes” and that the “roles and responsibilities of communities and NGO’s were not clearly delineated” (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.15). The study also found that:

Defining what community participation means in the context of VA governance remains a piece of unfinished business. When the VA was initiated, governments and communities did not arrive at a common view of what should be done. Governments believed that consultation and empowerment were vital components, but many communities felt themselves to be separate, with an obligation to remain focused on their own mandates. In addition, the vulnerable community was rarely organized in a way that allowed for consistent representation in committee processes. (Macleod Institute, 2003, p.15)


1. **Resource Pooling**: Mason noted that initially the “Vancouver Agreement was) presented as a model for a more flexible financing of intergovernmental partnerships, where the parties pool resources according to their fiscal capacity and where, also, private money is actively sought” (Mason, 2006, np.; Wong, 2002, p.13). Mason also noted “the agreement partners found that the absence of new funding hampered long term-planning” which affected the process negatively and that when funding was eventually provided by the provincial and federal governments ($10 million each in April 2003) mostly in anticipation of the 2010 Olympics, the “altered the dynamics of the agreement;” “raised the public profile of the partnership and added pressure on agreement parties to deliver on the priority actions featured in the strategic plan” although the “flexible financing crucial to parity of treatment of each governmental
partner was preserved, which maintained the symmetry of political representation underpinning effective collaboration within the agreement” (Mason, 2006, np.).

2. Leadership: Mason’s study acknowledged the importance of leadership and recognized the pivotal role played by Mayor Owen and Mayor Larry Campbell who were cited as “the most visible political advocate[s] for the agreement, and arguably, the locus of executive leadership…they both embraced the Four Pillars framework for the Downtown Eastside” and “extended the window of opportunity for municipal collaboration with the national and provincial governments” (Mason, np.). Stephen Owen was also found, in the study, to be “a political champion in Ottawa” and ensured that federal involvement fostered broad-based economic development goals for the Downtown Eastside” (Mason, np.). Mayor Philip Owen, while stating his appreciation for his cousin’s involvement, first at the provincial level as Deputy Attorney General of British Columbia and then as Member of Parliament for Vancouver-Quadra and Minister of Western Economic Diversification, somewhat downplayed how much Stephen Owen contributed, especially at the provincial level, that he functioned primarily in a backroom way that insured Mayor Owen access to Premier Dosanjh. Instead, Mayor Owen pointed to the initial support of Vancouver-Centre Hedy Fry and then B.C. Attorney General, and later Premier Dosanjh, as being critical particularly at the genesis of the Four Pillars Approach (Mayor Owen interview).

3. Community Involvement: Mason notes that the VA features “an explicit commitment to inclusive and accessible community participation” and that “consultative processes inform priorities for action” (Mason, 2006, np.). The study found that “the systematic participation processes envisaged in the Downtown Eastside Strategy have not been realized” (Mason, 2006, np.). Mason found that the VA “had not generated significant practical benefits for the community” according to Downtown Eastside activists that had been interviewed for the study.

There was also a finding in Mason’s study that the “greatest challenge for the Vancouver Agreement has been, and remains, the participation of the Downtown Eastside aboriginal population” (Mason, 2006, np.). The primary reason for this challenge, identified by Mason, was the “fragmentation of voice accentuated by fractured federal-provincial responsibilities” as the federal government has fiduciary responsibility
for Aboriginal peoples in Canada under the *Royal Proclamation of 1763* and *Canadian Constitution Act*, 1982 (Section 35) while the provincial government is responsible for social policies including health care and welfare (Mason, 2006, np.).

4. **Mutual Learning**: “(B)y facilitating flexible, cross-agency cooperation, the Vancouver Agreement was credited with promoting the transmission of skills and information, which both rendered the process more effective, and also fed back into the participating public sector organisations.” As identified by most contributors to this dissertation, however, and recognized by Mason – “a high turnover of federal and provincial staff during the first few years of the agreement was judged to have slowed down progress in intergovernmental collaboration” (Mason, 2006, np.).

5. **Horizontal Accountability**: Mason’s study noticed the reticence of participants in the suggestion that “Vancouver Agreement partners addressed only belatedly the horizontal accountability of the agreement process.” Further, Mason suggested a “more integrated monitoring and evaluation was political prerequisite for the 2005 renewal of the agreement” (Mason, 2006, np.).

Smith and Stewart (2005), in “Local Whole-of-Government Policymaking in Vancouver: Beavers, Cats, and the Mushy Middle Thesis,” considered Vancouver’s urban housing policy, specifically the development of the former Woodward’s building and the 2010 civic plebiscite on the Olympics, and the Safe Injection Site (SIS) (part of the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach). They found the following lessons that could be learned for “local decision makers when thinking about whole-of-government responses to their priority challenges:"

- **Individuals can make a difference**: Policy champions are needed if local governments are to play the whole-of-government policy game successfully.

- **Political will is essential**: Even where stakes are higher, politics matters. Vancouver’s response to developing a harm-reduction model on drug treatment was exactly the opposite of that of neighbouring Surrey, the region’s second city. There, the main pillar in local policy is enforcement. In Vancouver there are four pillars.

- **Local political support is essential**: Although not everyone was on the same policy page regarding how to proceed, the new city council had armed

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113 This notion was confirmed by the Rogers, Au, & McPherson interviews and was identified as a persistent theme throughout the entire Agreement’s duration.
itself with electoral support. This made it harder for senior governments to ignore it.

- **Local buy-in is even more important**: Despite millions of dollars in investment in Vancouver’s DTES, the relative success of the SIS to date has depended more on local involvement – in the city and in the community.

- **Understanding the organizational cultures of other governmental levels is important**: It seemed clear at the beginning of the Vancouver Agreement development that each jurisdiction operated in some isolation. The renewal of the agreement in 2005 showed that considerable learning had taken place in the interim.

- **The policy goal itself is key**: The two cases – the drug crisis and homelessness – were recognized across the local political spectrum as priority challenges. The high standing of both issues helped engage the other levels of government in adapting existing public policy to find new solutions (266/267).

Several of Smith and Stewart’s findings, as a result of their two case studies, have direct implications for this dissertation. Their examination of the two Vancouver cases supports the argument that “a more complete understanding of the local policymaking process can only be reached by moving beyond an examination of formal institutions.” The role of supportive regimes in both cases that Smith and Stewart considered, outside the formal government structure in Vancouver, was also pertinent. Mayor Owen’s realized that he could take the initiative at the municipal level, despite jurisdictional constraints present in the Canadian Constitution’s division of powers, and initiate an important multilevel governance attempt at mitigating the effects of a large scale epidemic of intravenous drug use and incidences of HIV/AIDS infections, along with the accompanying economic and social effects, in the DTES. In addition, Smith and Stewart’s final assertion that local governments have the ability to turn into eager beavers rather than lazy cats which “makes it harder for municipal leaders to justify inaction, claiming that they are limited by formal constraints,” is significant to this dissertation as it supports the idea that despite the aforementioned constraints municipalities have the capacity to act on matters of local concern without waiting for senior governments to initiate actions to mitigate negative effects.

The Province of British Columbia and the Government of Canada each became involved in the VA process for the same reason, a desire to contribute to attacking the social, economic, and health disaster that was occurring in Vancouver. The quickness
and relative speed with which everyone joined the effort and agreed to an integrated approach “to getting the bricks and mortar together first” is a tribute to each governments’ interest in solving a public policy mess in a creative way that involved a horizontally structured approach (Owen interview). It is also a tribute to Mayor Owen’s steady approach to building a consensus among the government actors at all levels so that momentum could be achieved for the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and the Four Pillars Approach. The fact this effort initially emanated from the local level is an example of an “eager beaver” led initiative and points to the notion that in the future this type of creative intergovernmental relationship, of multi-level governance, may be the most effective way to capture the major urban nuances of making public policy.

There is evidence that the Vancouver Agreement with the Four Pillars Approach alongside, achieved success given the need for creative intergovernmental relationships and multi-level governance to capture the major urban nuances. For example, the evaluation of the Vancouver Agreement process by the Auditor General of Canada noted: “We found a promising governance model in the Vancouver Agreement, where the provincial, municipal, and federal governments are working together to meet community needs. The approach was developed from the ground up and evolved from an unfunded initiative with an agreement to collaborate to one that is funded” (Auditor General of Canada, 2005, p.2). Further, the Western Economic Development evaluation of the Agreement in May 2010 asserted that: “the VA, with its horizontal management structure focused on revitalization, was recognized by all key informants as a ground-breaking strategy for the three governments involved. Federal representatives participating in the Vancouver Agreement described it as a ‘living experiment in governance’ (Western Economic Diversification, 2010, p.27). City Manager Judy Rogers noted that “despite considerable turnover” during the life of the Agreement because of elections and shifting of bureaucrats at the provincial and federal levels, “the Agreement did create enhanced cooperation among the 3 levels of government” that has left a “legacy of new resources and an inspirational attitude” (Rogers interview). Ken Lyotier offered a great insight as to the success of the multi-level approach:

I used to think that it was an inevitable circumstance, roles and jurisdictions had to evolve toward something more flexible that was
more accountable, had integrity, and met the responsibility of a democracy to respond to community needs and responsibly mediate private and public interests. The Vancouver Agreement was on the right track, the systems were just conceptual structures… in the end its just ‘us.’ It was like the war metaphor – you can’t worry about position as they are at the gates! Those involved in the Agreement had the courage to step past roles and be human and represented a different culture of how to do things – the politics changed, the population changed and the people changed. (Lyotier interview)

In the process of the Vancouver Agreement there were people in the community that doubted whether the governance model or the goals of the Four Pillars were supportable. Members of the city council even felt there were “better things to do” that the situation was “no win,” that the “non-market community would never give credit” for successes, and that “there were other places where we could get credit” (Price interview). Nonetheless, among those in the trenches of administering the Agreement, such as Wendy Au and Judy Rogers, there was a notion that the vehicle (the Agreement’s governance model) was “important” and that it created a lasting level of “caring and better service models” (Au interview; Rogers interview).

Finally, there was recognition of the strength of Vancouver as an eager beaver in its participation in the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach –

The process was driven by municipal bureaucrats not municipal politicians (except Mayor Owen) who persuaded, cajoled and bargained to move things forward. Of the personalities involved within that bureaucracy there was a sense of naïveté with an interested and invested staff that informed a lot of the direction of decisions.

The decision-making process surrounding the Agreement involved city staff close to the ground without any constraints (Macpherson interview). Drug Strategy Coordinator Macpherson also pointed to the difficulties of a cross-jurisdictional arrangement when he noted there were tensions among politicians and bureaucrats at all levels based on conflict between the rather altruistic goals of the principles of the Vancouver Agreement and the more direct strategies of harm reduction within the Four Pillars Approach – “the province hated Four Pillars” (Macpherson interview).
The relationship of the VA process to regimes and an analysis of the coalitions that were created and influenced the decision making processes of the Vancouver municipal government in the course of the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Strategy is included in the Analysis of the “Vancouver – Agreement Using Stone’s Criteria” section that follows in the dissertation.

Community Consequences

The creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement was a reaction to an unprecedented health, social and economic crisis mostly in the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood of Vancouver. The shocking levels of HIV/AIDS/HCV infections associated with the intravenous injection of crack cocaine accompanied with an economic hollowing out of the neighbourhood placed citizens in peril and created a decaying community. There had been many programs provided by the city, province, and federal government in order to meet the challenges of the DTES – given the speed and severity of the situation in the neighbourhood a new, innovative approach was required.

The background and evaluation sections recognized the Vancouver Agreement was not without flaws, however, what it did serve to do for the community was to concentrate efforts among government and non-government actors cross-jurisdictionally to find new and better ways of providing services given the challenges of the neighbourhood. The flexibility of the VA’s approach meant that efforts were not constrained by institutional wrangling among the various stakeholders and the focus could be on the community. The Agreement’s governing structure and modus operandi offered resources to be utilized on the ground in the DTES by local actors best suited to meet the needs of the community in a way that had not been accomplished previously. The leadership of the city meant that communications from the community about citizens’ needs could be accomplished effectively and services re-directed efficiently.

The efforts of InSite has seen an improvement in the quality of life among intravenous drug users in the DTES, has reduced overdose deaths, has reduced instances of HIV/AIDS/HCV infections as a result of intravenous drug use, and contributed to an increase in the overall life expectancy in the neighbourhood. These
efforts have been an important consequence of the VA process that is measureable and quantifiable.

Finally, although there was mistrust in the community at the outset of the VA, working interpersonal relationships among government and non-government actors (some discrete and some overt) were created as a result of the process. Several of the interviewees confirmed that this was a lasting legacy of the VA that has assisted with improving relationships within the community even to today.

City Consequences

The City of Vancouver took the lead in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement and the Four Pillars Approach in a way that it had not done previously. In the past the city had been restrained in exerting leadership in the relationships among its provincial and federal cousins. As well, there had been a reticence to look outward to international markets by the local government. The Vancouver Agreement, under the leadership of Mayor Owen and others in the city bureaucracy, is an example where Vancouver took the lead role in developing an innovative approach to a local community policy area, while respecting constitutionally enumerated jurisdictions, and utilizing resources leveraged from the more “senior” levels of government. The lack of initial funding for the VA necessitated an approach at the local level that saw bureaucrats (and Mayor Owen) head into the DTES and work with the people to secure the support and the confidence of the community without having to wait for provincial or federal approval. When funding did arrive the nature of the local leadership changed, some would say unfortunately, but the local nature of the leadership continued.

Several interviewees commented that many of the interpersonal relationships that were developed by city politicians and staff remained post-VA and some, including Mr. Harcourt, noted that he felt the ethos of multi-level governance that he felt originally

114 Although Smith and Cohn describe in detail the city’s international activities mostly connected to international “sister” cities and economic interactions with multi-national corporations in “International Cities and Municipal Paradiplomacy” (1994). They also noted that Bill Bennett met with business leaders in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento in 1984 during the province’ s economic crisis.
developed over Expo continued with the Vancouver Agreement and on to the cooperation around the 2010 Olympics.

The city can also look with confidence at the positive impact its adoption of the Four Pillars Approach has had on the DTES. Rates of HIV/AIDS/HCV infections, overdose drug deaths have decreased and the life expectancy of residents in the community have dramatically increased through the efforts of the city associated with the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach while recognizing there is still plenty of work to be done to improve the situation.

Finally, at the city level, there was a sense in discussing the legacy of the VA with interviewees, that the process invigorated local actors, increased capacity to act on local matters with expertise and skill, and inculcated a certain degree of confidence that action could be taken with or without the support of the provincial or federal governments.

**Provincial Consequences**

The province offered strong leadership at the outset of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement although funding for the process was not a budgetary line item at the beginning. By recognizing the importance of local leadership in the VA process the province assisted in the overall success of the Agreement. Later with the provision of funding, leading up to the Olympics, the province contributed to the implementation of many community programs intended to improve the lives of DTES residents. Finally, with its direct funding of the Four Pillars Approach and the acceptance of the harm reduction approach through InSite and other programs, the province has directly participated in achieving dramatic improvements in overdose drug deaths, HIV/AIDS/HCV infection rates, and the life expectancy of citizens in the community.

Whether the provision of provincial services has improved as a result of the Vancouver Agreement process is arguable and difficult to quantify. In the conversations with several interviewees, however, it was apparent that the VA process did help develop interpersonal relationships that no doubt positively affected the types and direction of service provision in the best interests of the DTES community. The ability to put a face to a name, or to have a level of familiarity with other actors at different levels
of government (particularly locally) would have to assist in the effectiveness and efficiency of service provision in the DTES.

**Federal Consequences**

The main consequence for the federal government emanating from the VA process was the development of an ability to directly affect the lives of Canadian citizens in a local community without encroaching on the constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction of the province using the innovative and effective governance structure underpinning the Agreement. The government’s recognition of the efficacy of the harm reduction strategy under the Four Pillars Approach showed a mature understanding of the issues that were and are occurring in the DTES.\(^{115}\)

The Vancouver Agreement’s governance structure and modus operandi also provided the federal government with an effective way of participating in horizontal initiatives with the provincial and local governments. This was confirmed in studies both by Western Economic Diversification and the Office of the Auditor General who both championed the Agreement’s governance structure. The Agreement may still offer an organizational template for future local, provincial and federal initiatives targeted at the local level.

**Orienting Question 1:**

Do coalitions of non-government and government actors influence the decision-making processes of Vancouver’s municipal government?

Yes, under the leadership emanating from the community, city, province, and federal government a collaborative, horizontal governance structure that enabled improvements in the conditions of DTES residents was created. Under the Vancouver Agreement process Mayor Philip Owen and Donald Macpherson developed the Four Pillars Approach with provincial and federal support which was important to the long term success of the program. The Agreement and Approach would also not have

\(^{115}\) Unfortunately the Harper Conservative government has been far from mature in its approach to the harm reduction strategies that have been effective in the DTES primarily under InSite.
moved forward and enjoy measureable success without the hard work of local public servants led by Judy Rogers, City Manager.

**Orienting Question 2:**

**Is local decision-making in Vancouver dominated by a single or plurality of urban regimes in the Vancouver Agreement and post-Expo lands cases?**

Local decision-making in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement was dominated by a single regime comprised of federal, provincial, city, and community government and non-government actors. The nature of the regime changed, as noted above, with the provision of dedicated funding by the provincial and federal governments. The regime dominated the process through a model of governance that, while respecting constitutional nuance, functioned across jurisdictions mostly led by local government actors on the ground in the DTES. This activity in the neighbourhood was supported by high level political support throughout the duration of the Agreement.

**6.1.7. Analysis of the Role of Regimes Using Stone’s Criteria - Creation and Implementation of the Vancouver Agreement**

To relate the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach to the thesis of this dissertation it is important to consider the case in the context of Stone’s research on urban regimes.

A number of foundational questions must be answered prior to being able to logically respond to Orienting question number 1:

- Was there a regime or were there regimes of government and non-government actors active during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement? If regimes did not form, what were the reasons why they did not form?
- If regimes did form, who were the key actors within the active regime(s) of government and non-government actors during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?
- What were the goals and objectives of the active regime(s) during the development of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?
• What resources and strategies did the key actors within the regime(s) of government and non-government actors utilize during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?
• Was the active regime successful in achieving its goals and objectives?
• Were there any connections among active regimes of government and non-government actors during the creation and development of the Vancouver Agreement?

**Question A: Was there a regime or were there regimes of government and non-government actors active during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement? If regimes did not form, what were the reasons why they did not form?**

It is useful to consider the template used by Clarence Stone which establishes the following criteria for identifying the presence and behaviour of regimes. For Stone, and for the purposes of this dissertation, an evaluation of whether a regime or regimes existed will be made based on the following criteria:

1. **An agenda to address a distinct set of problems**
2. A governing coalition around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members
3. Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition
4. Given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005).

**1. An agenda to address a distinct set of problems**

In the case of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement there were initially several competing agendas in play from a variety of perspectives:

a. The Community’s agenda at the genesis of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement is directly related to the social, economic, and health crisis that was occurring in the DTES in the late 1990’s. The community was literally dying on the sidewalks of the neighbourhood and the crisis was out of control, what was being done, the money that was being spent, the programs that were being offered were not enough
to stem the literal decay of the community and the people in it. There was a need for dramatic action to take place in order to start to offer solutions for the many problems being experienced by residents of the community. The background section graphically showed the demands that the situation made on those in authority, what was required was a response that worked.

The background section also pointed to the fact that there was no shortage of programs, social service agencies and money to at least show an effort to address residents’ needs. What was lacking was a new approach that marshalled the forces of governments and agencies at all levels, government and non-government actors, and included greater levels of collaboration and coordination. The agendas that had been followed in the community were not working and were becoming insignificant in addressing the needs of residents.

The city initially funded a variety of social service programs in the DTES, however, with the spike in drug use, incidences of HIV/AIDS infections, drug overdose deaths and the development of an open drug market in the streets of the neighbourhood motivated a search for new strategies and agendas that could be used as a framework for addressing the DTES's crisis. As a result of a series of reports from the provincial Health Ministry, the Vancouver-Richmond Health Board, and a declaration of a medical epidemic in the DTES the issue started to appear on the agendas at the city and provincial levels and several important steps began to occur at the city level. Director General Elaine Scott also started to make interventions on behalf of Health Canada into the city administration to offer assistance (Judy Rogers interview). One of the more significant occurrences was the warning by the city’s Drug Strategy Coordinator Donald Macpherson of the impending disaster that would occur if crack took hold in the DTES (which did occur). As part of the city’s response Senior Management began to brainstorm as to what could be done. Eventually, a plan, the Vancouver Agreement was devised, initiated at the local level and involved departments, agencies and actors from all levels of government in Canada, to try to combat the crisis in the DTES.

The B.C. government was providing social services to the residents of the DTES through the regular processes and channels, however, there was little recognition of the dire situation in the community until the alarm was sounded in the aforementioned
reports and declaration by the chief health officer. There was little or no coordination with the other levels of government and little movement outside the normal paradigms of service provision that had been established in the DTES.

The federal government had little direct contact with the residents of the DTES in the provision of services as the division of powers in the Canadian Constitution directs the provinces to be responsible for health and social service provision. The exception to this was their provision of several Aboriginal social services as the federal government has a fiduciary responsibility under the Royal Proclamation and Canadian Constitution in this regard. The feds had also participated in local social programs (including social housing) directly in communities prior to the adoption of neo-liberal agendas at both the federal and provincial levels of government throughout the 80’s and early 90’s. Since the end of the 20th century the feds, especially under the Conservative have been reluctant to get involved directly in issues of local jurisdiction.

2. A governing coalition around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members.

A governing coalition did form around the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement alongside the Four Pillars Approach that helped facilitate community input into the provision of social services to residents of the community. The DTES-Strathcona Coalition was intended to act as a transmission belt upward to the facilitators of the Agreement and downwards to members of the community.

A small cadre within the city bureaucracy drove the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement, although Philip Owen has to be given credit for championing and finding a way of implementing the Four Pillars Approach alongside the Vancouver Agreement in the DTES. Part of the city’s strategy was to get actors, who were active in the community, such as Donald Macpherson at the Carnegie Centre, to come “inside” and assist the city to target services within the DTES in the right direction. This knowledge could only be gained by consulting people that had actually been on the streets and sidewalks and seeing how brutal the situation was for the residents of the community.
The Province quite early set in place a funding process to help combat the problems in the DTES. The BC Health Ministry provided $3 million in funding ($1 million per year) in order to address the effects of the increases in substance abuse and was early to the table in supporting using a different approach to the issues in the DTES. There was no evidence identified in the research for this dissertation that indicated the presence of any type of coalition at the outset of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. There does not appear to have been any formal governing coalition in place at the outset of the crisis, however, it is likely inter-departmental/inter-agency cooperation was facilitated through deputy ministers collaborating with other Agreement partners under the direction of the elected leadership.

Health Canada did take interest in what was occurring in the DTES although no formal action was taken in the neighbourhood to find an approach that would improve the situation. A coordinating group within the lead agency Western Economic Diversification Canada did eventually become active and was the federal point of contact on Vancouver Agreement issues during the duration of the Agreement.

The governing structure of the Agreement facilitated an inter-agency/inter-governmental governing model separate from any type of governing coalition that had been present in the government structures of the city, province and federal governments.

3. Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition

Resources for community groups or residents were not readily available in the DTES until after several programs dedicated to citizen engagement were set up under the auspices of the VA. One of the goals of the VA was to improve the amount of communication among members of the community and between the community and authorities. One of the weaknesses identified in the VA evaluations was that there was confusion as to the goals and objectives of the VA and little understanding of its purpose. This was compounded by a lack of dedicated funding at the outset of the Agreement, and when there was dedicated funding, there was no framework for determining who got what. The horizontality model was unprepared (through no fault of
the actors involved) to pivot and assume a funding role as efficiently and effectively as everyone involved would have liked.

When the need for greater action was recognized by the city it committed the resources necessary to implement the Vancouver Agreement and later the Four Pillars Approach. In the case of the Vancouver Agreement much of the resources expended in support of plan involved goods and “services in kind” and staff time. Part of the innovative nature of the Agreement, and later the Approach, was to find new ways of coordinating and collaborating so that a dollar would be more effective in combatting the crisis in the DTES. The city did expend resources in the organization of the Agreement and Approach in their management and policymaking that took place (Rogers, Au and Macpherson Interviews).

The Province did provide funding through the Health Ministry in support of harm reduction and the safe injection site. Later in the process, once the 2010 Olympics had been awarded to Vancouver, the province stepped up and made a $10 million dollar contribution to the VA and Four Pillars Approaches conditional on the federal government doing the same, which they did.

For the first 3 years the VA was unfunded so the federal government’s focus was on finding innovative ways to get a bigger bang for the many bucks being spent in the DTES over the long term and find solutions for the short term crisis that was occurring at the end of the nineties.

4. Given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing (Stone 2005).

One of the goals of the VA was to build the capacity of the local community to be able to participate in the decision-making processes - this led to prioritizing what was important to the community so that policies and program could be effectively and efficiently provided. Judy Rogers and Wendy Au both expressed that a large percentage of their time, particularly when the program was unfunded in the early going, was spent on engaging the community by physically going into the neighbourhood and discussing issues with stakeholders.
Community groups did participate in the VA process, however, once funding arrived after a few years the traditional paradigm of competition, silo protection and fortress mentality seeped back into how the groups interacted together and with the VA. The lack of a framework for administering the funding to the community was cited in the evaluations as being one of the reasons for distrust and a lack of knowledge of the goals and objectives of the VA. Funding issues and the competition among service providers, particularly among NGO’s is a factor in the DTES still today (Livingston interview).

The city was instrumental in setting up a governance and operational system for the management and execution of initiatives under the VA and Four Pillars Approach. The governance structure was discussed earlier in the Background section of the dissertation, at the core of it was to facilitate the development of interpersonal relationships cross-jurisdictionally and within the city itself in order to better work toward finding solutions to the DTES issues.

Provincial government actors were participants in the governance, management and implementation of the VA and Four Pillars Approach similar to the federal government’s involvement while recognizing that it was the city bureaucracy that led the day to day operation of the VA. The B.C. Ministry of Health worked closely with the actors involved particularly in the funding and administration of InSite.

Federal government actors were participants in the governance, management and implementation of the VA and Four Pillars similar to the provincial government’s involvement while recognizing that it was the city bureaucracy that led the day to day operation of the VA. Donald Macpherson and Philip Owen were both impressed, in particular, with how much Prime Minister’s Chretien and Martin were knowledgeable and supportive on the issues, this suggests strong advocacy by the Health Minister Rock nudged on by Vancouver MP’s such as Libby Davies, Hedy Fry, and Stephen Owen (Macpherson & Owen interviews).

Question A: Was there a regime or were there regimes of government and non-government actors active during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement? If regimes did not form, what were the reasons why they did not form?
Yes, there was a regime of government and non-government actors that was active during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement. There were agendas present in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement, in the cases of community, city, province and federal reps there was a desire to focus on the crisis that was occurring in the neighbourhood.

**Question B: If regimes did form, who were the key actors within the active regime(s) of government and non-government actors during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?**

The key actors that led the government dominated regime in the pre-Expo period included:

**Community:** Various Community Groups – worked on several dozens of projects in the DTES and attempted to work within the Agreement and Approach – a few examples…

BOB – Building Opportunities for Business – primary economic revitalization agency under the VA

- Created, maintained or expanded 194 businesses
- Developed 50 training courses
- Served 354 business clients
- mentored or assisted 168 businesses
- placed and supported 358 people in employment

EMBERS – Eastside Movement for Business and Economic Renewal Society

- Delivered business support services

Four Pillars Employment Project

- Employment services for people in recovery from substance abuse

United We Can (UWC)

- provides income, employment and some social services to binners

Potluck Café
- café and catering enterprise that provides job training and employment opportunities for residents in the DTES

InSite
- Safe Injection Site (SIS) provides direct services to drug users including referral to detox, counselling and treatment, etc.

The VA supported 96 projects with close to 50 partners

**City:** Mayor Philip Owen

Mayor Larry Campbell

Mayor Sam Sullivan

City Manager Judy Rogers

Asst. City Manager Wendy Au

City Drug Strategy Coordinator Donald Macpherson

Large number of city civil servants working off the sides of their desks

**Province:** Premier Ujjal Dosanjh

Premier Gordon Campbell

Premier Mike Harcourt

MLA Jenny Kwan

Minister Colin Hansen

Minister George Abbott

Variety of Provincial Civil Servants in a series of Ministries and Agencies – Health, Community Services, etc.

**Federal:** Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

Prime Minister Jean Chretien
C. What were the goals and objectives of the active regime(s) during the development of the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?

The simple answer to this question would be survival. However, the real goals and objectives of the active regime certainly involved initially survival and moved on later to maintenance and finally to revitalization. Improving the lives of residents of the DTES was at the heart of the regime’s efforts, particularly to stop the crises that were occurring at the end of the 1990’s and leading toward making positive change in the community. As noted in the analysis, the nature of the goals and objectives of the regime were affected by the introduction of funding – the priority became administration and management rather than innovation and collaboration.

D. What resources and strategies did the key actors within the regime(s) of government and non-government actors utilize during the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement?

The regime used a broad based collaborative governance structure featuring consensus and cooperation built on a governance structure that was modelled on horizontality. The Agreement attempted to bring down the silos and fortresses that had built up among service providers and the community itself and initiate a new paradigm in the relationship between the various government levels and residents. All evaluations suggest that the development of informal interpersonal relationships among the community, city, province, and federal actors was a lasting legacy of the VA. The adoption of the Four Pillars Approach under the leadership of Mayor Owen was an
innovative example of how an integrated process can motivate a different more effective way of dealing with a public policy issue at the local level.

E. Was the active regime successful in achieving its goals and objectives?

The answer to this question would be mixed. The local government attempt at doing things differently was admirable, however, with the introduction of funding the success of that new way began to be threatened and the previous paradigm of competition and protection of tight resources rose again. As mentioned, the overarching legacy of the Agreement has been the interpersonal relationships among actors at all levels of involvement. The success of the Four Pillars Approach - particularly harm reduction is undeniable (Rogers, Au, Macpherson, Lyotier & Livingston interviews). There has also been a non-ideologically based support for the safe injection site while being faced with an onslaught of court cases and ideologically based rhetoric from the Harper Conservatives that only could be quelled with a Supreme Court decision in 2011.

F. Were there any connections among active regimes of government and non-government actors during the creation and development of the Vancouver Agreement?

The collaborative ethos involved in various actors from various sectors coming together to deal with a major crisis in the DTES has had a lasting effect on how multi-level governance occurs in the city. As noted in the Expo lands case at some point the best interests of the citizens, city, province and country became the priority rather than petty inter-governmental battles, a number of the actors that were interviewed recognized this lasting effect. It was an effect, however, identified by Mr. Harcourt, that remnants of the cooperative ethos that developed around Expo survived to be a factor in the attempts at combatting the crisis in the late 1990’s and the tripartite agreements concerning the sustainability aspects of the 2010 Olympics (Harcourt interview).

6.2. Regime Analysis of the Cases

The following assertions can be made as to the role of regimes in the two cases under consideration in this dissertation:
The presence of regimes is evident in the development of the post-Expo '86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

The cases show that the nature (composition, focus, resources) of the regime may be different dependent on whether it is dealing with a “hard” or “soft” social policy, political circumstances and community citizen needs.

A regime may be created, as it was in the Vancouver Agreement case, as evidence of a city that has the capacity and determination to be an “eager beaver” and lead efforts at change rather than wait for more “senior” governments to take charge.

Regimes may change as circumstances change. For example, in the case of the development of the post-Expo lands, there were changes between the regimes that formed before the fair (feds, province and city) and after the fair (development community and the City of Vancouver).

The crisis that was in the DTES necessitated a regime that was driven from the bottom up by representatives of the city and the community as compared to the top-down approach of the regime that was created among government actors in the preparations for Expo ‘86.

Regimes comprised of different sets of actors can develop within a case, for example, in the development of the post-Expo lands case one regime of government actors representing the city, provincial and federal governments was active in the pre-Expo period. A largely different regime, made up of professional planning, zoning and engineering staff led by the Mayor and council from Vancouver and the development community (led by Concord Pacific’s planning staff) was formed, post-Expo, in order to refine development policy in the city for the future. Another example can be found in the VA process, initially the process was designed and championed by senior political and bureaucratic leaders at all levels of government. Later, particularly when dedicated funding was provided, it was the front-line city workers at the local level in Vancouver that did the heavy lifting.

There was evidence that the collaborative ethos that dominated both of the regimes involved in the Expo ‘86 case carried over to the regime activity in the Vancouver Agreement. There were a very few actors common in both eras under consideration in the cases but it was more the presence of an ethos of cooperation that appeared to be present in both instances. In the VA case there was an altruistic, collaborative, cooperative and committed effort on the part of participating actors that was concerned with battling a terrible epidemic in the DTES. In the case of the development of the post-Expo ‘86 lands there was an altruistic, collaborative and committed effort on the part of participating actors that was concerned with putting on a successful world exposition for the benefit of everyone. Later, there was an equally altruistic, collaborative and committed effort post-Expo to insure development of the post-Expo lands and other projects was completed for the benefit of everyone. Mayor Harcourt made that connection and Judy Rogers/Wendy Au confirmed that spirit was a remnant from the Expo process. There is also evidence in the tripartite agreements signed in support of the 2010 Olympics that ethos is enduring in Vancouver.
The cases show that issues at the local level are increasingly complex so different regimes may be more effective than others dependent on the nature of the public policy under consideration. The notion of a regime that is enduring over the long term may be arguable. For example, in the VA case the problems that required addressing in the DTES involved difficult health, social, economic, responses from Vancouver’s municipal government. A regime needed to be devised that could creatively address the difficulties in a multi-dimensional way using a multi-level governance model. Today, the complexity is even more evident necessitating even more creative regimes of government and non-government actors being created. For example, the City of Vancouver’s government, in the course of a day, may have to deal with the financing of social housing, the building of bike lanes, the transportation strategy for the city, and whether chickens are allowed to be raised in the backyard. Without the ability to collaborate cross-jurisdictionally and with non-government members of the community the decision-making processes of the city may be negatively affected.

The discussion of the cases also shows that increasing responsibilities for important human services being offloaded to the local level necessitates the formation of a different type of regime than what would have been necessary pre-the adoption of neoliberal principles. One can hardly envision a regime forming that supports a locally driven safe injection site such as in the InSite case forty years ago. Back then local government’s greatest concern was whether or not dogs needed to have a licence or whether stores could open before noon on Sundays, if at all.

Policies of senior governments have had an effect on the types of issues local government is compelled to deal with to insure the safety and good life of local citizens – which necessitates the creation of equally different types of regimes. The type of regimes created under senior governments that espouse neoliberal policies differ from those with more progressive attitudes about public policy.

The behaviour of the regime is affected by whether the issue under consideration is a matter of soft or hard public policy. For example, the Vancouver Agreement could be made up of a loose coalition of both government and non-government actors as there were few statutory issues within the case. Certainly the cross-jurisdictional, horizontal nature of the governance structure was innovative and a positive legacy of the VA process. That process had very little constraints to it other than the priorities of the governments involved. In the Expo ’86 case there were restrictions - particularly when considering the post-Expo ’86 period. Once a prospective development was, and is today, put into the city’s development process there are restrictions and constraints as to how developers and politicians interact. City employees, such as the City Manager are involved in managing the process that is in place by virtue of legislation passed by the province, bylaws passed by the city and the Criminal Code of Canada. These constraints had an influence on how the regime that formed between the city and development community behaved post-Expo in the development of the former Expo ’86 lands.
• The Vancouver cases considered in the dissertation are not pure versions of what Stone initially considered as regime theory. Stone (2005) came to the realization that his original theory at best could act as an analytical framework or approach that could illuminate what is occurring within the power structures of communities. This dissertation supports this notion as there is a heuristic value in using examination of regimes as an approach to nuancing what is actually occurring in the decision-making processes at the local government level. It is likely similar effects are occurring in other Canadian communities that regimes of government and non-government actors are compelled to deal with every day.

• Clearly both Vancouver cases were examples of how local governments are forced to deal with the consequences of an ever increasing urbanized and globalized world. In the VA case, one of the strategies was intended to attack the proliferation of intravenous drug overdoses in the community. The rise of intravenous crack cocaine usage that then contributed to the spike in HIV/AIDS infections is a global phenomenon, Donald Macpherson warned Mayor Owen of its impending arrival to Vancouver and he was right. Local governments can no longer be just concerned with looking inward and focus on “traditional” issues, the pressures of urbanization and globalization are pervasive, particularly for an international city such as Vancouver is today.

• The Vancouver cases also motivate a discussion of the role of ideologically based political parties. In both cases considered there was cross-party support for the regime’s goals and objectives. At various times in both cases actors crossed party and ideological lines to act for the good of the larger community although these interactions were not always unanimous and at times contentious. For example, the conservative Mayor Philip Owen personally educated himself on the benefits of approaching the problems of intravenous drug addiction not from a law enforcement perspective but from a public health perspective – he favoured an approach that championed “public health and public order” (Owen interview).

• In addition, although the original impetus for the regime being formed may change, or even become non-existent, the interpersonal relationships that underpin the coalitions of government and non-government actors may endure cross-temporally and issue to issue.
7. Conclusion

The two guiding research questions of the dissertation were as follows:

- Do coalitions of non-government and government actors create and influence the decision-making processes of Vancouver's municipal government? and,
- Is local decision-making in Vancouver dominated by a single or plurality of urban regimes?

The answers to these two questions, given the evidence provided in the two cases, are deceptively simple:

1. Yes

2. An issue-dependent plurality

Unfortunately, that simplicity does not help much in analyzing the activities of regimes involved in the development of the post-Expo lands and creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement so it is necessary to provide a much fuller analysis leading ultimately to useful conclusions.

The most important finding that comes out of the consideration of the two cases herein is the notion that people and their interpersonal relationships do matter at the local level of decision-making. Two revelations are apparent from the analysis of the regimes in each case –

1. The commitment and determination of individuals, whether they were in government or not, was critical to the local decision-making process. This was despite constitutionally enumerated powers, political power, economic clout or other factors. There are no doubt those that participate in local decision-making for their own gain – in both cases considered in this dissertation there was evidence that key members of the community came together to form regimes simply to help make the city a better place and to give local citizens a better life.
2. The activities of regimes had a long-lasting residual effect and the relationships that form within and around these coalitions helped facilitate better decisions in the future. For example, most interviewees mentioned that it wasn’t necessarily what the regimes did or how they functioned that was valuable over the long term. Instead, it was the ability to pick up the phone or email someone that had been involved in the development of the Expo ’86 lands or the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement later on that had value. Mike Harcourt pointed to this effect when he mentioned that much of the collaborative approaches eventually used in the Vancouver Agreement and 2010 Olympics were underpinned by what had occurred in the pre- and post- Expo era. The structures and issues may have been different but the ability to communicate and collaborate among familiar actors was a benefit to making good public policy.

It is clear that there were regimes present in the two cases consistent with Stone’s analysis of what occurred in the Atlanta case. These regimes were comprised of both government and non-government actors and functioned both within and outside the formal structures of the local, provincial and/or provincial governments. These coalitions were not dominated by the market (although the market played a variable role), especially in the Vancouver Agreement case, which is consistent with Stone’s later writings (2005) that there had to be something more than economic gain at the heart of what regimes attempt to accomplish. The coalitions under consideration were malleable, they could change even within the case and certainly over time, dependent on circumstance and resources. The two cases provided an interesting view of how local decision-making is accomplished and the effects of regimes on those processes.

It is also clear, consistent with Stone, (1989) that alongside the “systemic power” that was evident in both cases the regimes that formed did exert pre-emptive power. The coalitions exerted these powers differently dependent on the case, however, the ability of the regime to marshal significant resources in order to achieve the prospective policy objective was evident in both cases. To use Stoker’s words (1995, 64), the regimes exerted “intentional and active” forms of power to achieve their goals.

There are lessons that can be learned from Canadian municipal cases such as considered in this dissertation. The notion, that has been argued in the literature, that
Canadian cases are not conducive to the use of regime analysis is unfortunate. Analyzing the interpersonal relationships persistent in the regimes involved in the local decision-making processes of Canadian cases can provide useful insight into how municipal governments function. Given that assertion, the notion of increasing the amount of comparisons between Canadian cases with cases from other nations is both possible and an attractive prospect for future research. This dissertation contributed to the research on Canadian municipal government by concentrating on an under-studied aspect of local government – the creation and influence of coalitions of non-government and government actors on decision making processes. This dissertation has shown that the nature of community power at the municipal level at times is regime-focused. The nature of the regime may vary, for example, when dealing with “hard” public policy such as in the case of the development of the former Expo lands and pluralist-focused when considering “soft” policy such as in the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement.

Whether and how regimes influence municipal bureaucracies, political actors and governance provided one of the focuses of the research in the dissertation. It was shown that there is something more than just structures/institutions or political actors, or ideas that define Canadian municipal government decision-making today and that the intangibles such as the influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors and shifting inter-governmental relations must be considered in order to get a true picture of how the outputs/decisions of municipal government and urban governance are created.

This effort considered these types of coalitions of government and non-government actors alongside the formal structures of local decision-making of municipal government in a modern liberal democratic system such as in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.

There are many lessons that can be learned from how the issues, demands and needs of local citizens are transformed into local public policy given the relatively increasingly sophisticated systems of decision-making that have evolved in Canadian municipalities. The dissertation rejected the idea that the study of Canadian urban politics is the “black hole” of Canadian political studies and has shown how municipal
government in Canada can be an interesting field of research. In the examination of the development of the post-Expo ’86 lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement with an eye for all the activities that occur around local decision-making; the dissertation offers students of government and politics a rich potential for further research. This dissertation adds to the body of research considering Canadian municipal government and, in particular, contributes to the knowledge of how coalitions of government and non-government actors influence local decision-making processes and whether urban regimes exist in such settings.

The examination of the efforts of the regimes involved in the development of the post-Expo lands and the creation and implementation of the Vancouver Agreement are excellent examples of why local governments in the 21st century are important and how urban decision-making requires attention to shifting nuances. On one hand, local governments continue their important role as facilitators of local service provision, and on the other, as they continue to evolve as the first interface for a community’s citizens with the principles inherent within local liberal democracies. If one had a crystal ball and could see the future of local government it would be likely that this importance will only intensify as local government becomes increasingly exposed to internal and external pressures such as globalization, urbanization, “senior” levels of government downloading, incompetence/indifference and multi-level government interaction among many more, and the increasing complexity of the 21st century local world.

A survey of a number of contemporary studies of Canadian municipal government that have focused on diverse subjects such as how power is manifested at the local level; the effects of a number of reform eras; the consolidations of municipalities in proximity to each other to gain suggested efficiencies; the use of New Public Management (NPM) instruments; and responses to globalization/urbanization among other areas of interest were discussed. Less contemporary Canadian municipal studies initially considered the structures and functions of municipalities in the country from a structural, institutional, economic and/or constitutional perspective were identified at the outset of the dissertation. The notion of an evolution of the studies of contemporary Canadian urbanists was asserted to today as researchers began to examine the effects of the adoption of neo-liberal agendas by both the federal and provincial levels of government, alongside the effects of continuing globalization and
urbanization. It was also argued that much of the analysis of Canadian municipal government today has moved away from the more traditional approach toward examining the notion of local governance and the increasing fuzzy interactions among the federal, provincial, regional, municipal and community levels of government – multi-level governance. Finally, it was suggested that these new and different areas of analysis have been driven over time largely by the concomitant internal and external changes that have occurred at the local government level in Canada and elsewhere.

At the outset of the dissertation the parameters of the study were established by arguing that in the analysis of Canadian local government, given the external and internal challenges discussed by Andrew & Goldsmith and others, that there is a greater need for enhanced examination of the presence and influence of coalitions of government and non-government actors, regimes, on the decision-making processes of municipal government. The reasoning behind this assertion is that these types of coalitions have become increasingly influential as to how outcomes are generated in the decision-making processes of Canadian local government particularly given the effects of external and internal challenges. The overlap of actors throughout various eras and the time-sequenced nature of the Vancouver cases also allowed the identification of lessons from earlier decisions similar to what Stone experienced in Atlanta. It was argued that given the intensity of these effects and the limited number of regime studies in Canada, urbanists, specifically of the Canadian variety, should focus more broadly and deeply on the realpolitik of municipal governments within the country. There is some evidence this is indeed occurring.

This work contributed to the body of regime research by considering not only the structures, actors and ideas of municipal governments but also the creation and influence of the various coalitions that form around local decision-making. Howlett, Ramesh and Perl's discussion of the role of structures, actors and ideas was used and seen to be very applicable to a consideration of the creation and influence of government and non-government actors. Their suggestion that, contrary to a purely institutional or a behavioral focus for analyzing public policy, that there is a role for ideas and how they are posed also has efficacy for this dissertation. Their advocacy of a more holistic approach that features analysis that considers all aspects of the decision-making process including the interaction of structures, actors, and ideas underpins how policy is
created. This notion is applicable to studies of regimes in the recognition that power must be considered holistically and not as if it is being derived or exerted from one particular place. Their theorization also has implications for this dissertation as it points to a consideration of all factors in local decision-making and does not limit such analysis to simply structures or actors, but ideas and process too (52).

The paper has contributed to the idea that the study of local government is interesting, hardly anemic and certainly not an academic ghetto. The study of Canadian local government is still a largely untapped research area, particularly when considering what actually occurs within the decision-making processes within municipal government. Lightbody’s notion that ‘public policy innovation is most frequently accomplished as a result of street-level experience; even our largest cities are still local and intensely personal” (Lightbody 2006, 13) is supported by this dissertation.

The dissertation recognizes the view that although the “scant attention” (Eidelman & Taylor, 2010, p.305) paid to Canadian cities by academics may be rooted in a myopic view that municipal governments are constitutionally constrained as “creatures of the province(s)” and as such have very little governance autonomy. This study certainly does not support the notion that such research on municipal government in the city is not intellectually stimulating or that cities cannot actually “do” things. This dissertation assists in providing a greater understanding of “urban politics and policymaking in Canada” (Eidelman & Taylor, 2010, p.305; Graham, Phillips & Maslove, 1998, p.1). The dissertation has sought to contribute to the study of the governance of Canadian urban cases and as such adds to a greater understanding of how communities are governed at this most important level of government in both a cross-national and cross-jurisdictional sense.

This work in this dissertation was stimulated by the several interesting studies of Canadian urban politics by academics such as James Lightbody, Christopher Leo, Patrick J. Smith, Donald Higgins, Kennedy Stewart, Warren Magnusson, Caroline Andrew, David Siegel, Kristin Good and others and is guided by a recognition that (a) the governance of Canadian local government is far from myopic or homogeneic across the range of municipalities and the country; (b) there are similarities among the experiences of Canadian municipal governments with those in countries where cross-
national comparisons have been conducted; (c) there may be lessons to be learned from Canadian municipal government cases that have efficacy for other jurisdictions; and finally, (d) the quality of Canadian municipal governance produces public policy outcomes that are of relative high quality and have comparative significance for their own citizens and for other jurisdictions. This dissertation was informed by many previous studies providing excellent foundational examples of why urban government is interesting to study and why comparative lessons can be learned from Canadian cases.

In the end the question of “Who Really Governs Vancouver?” can be answered quite simply when one considers the cases within the dissertation. Power in the city is exerted by governmental and non-governmental individuals acting together in coalitions, hopefully in the best interests of citizens and the community.
8. Reference List


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**Websites**


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Appendices
## Appendix A. Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Category</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ann Livingston</td>
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<td>Stephen Owen</td>
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<td>Philip Owen</td>
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<td>Hedy Fry</td>
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<td>Ken Lyotier</td>
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<td>Karen O'Shanercy</td>
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<td>Cathy Chalupa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvie Berube</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judy Rogers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sam Sullivan</td>
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<tr>
<td>George Abbott</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don Vaughan</td>
<td>Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kris Olds</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Macpherson</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Vander Zalm</td>
<td>Government</td>
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</table>
Appendix B. Community Partners


The partners of Vancouver’s Coalition for Crime Prevention and Drug Treatment were:

- Vancouver School Board
- Vancouver Park Board
- Vancouver Board of Trade
- Vancouver Port Corporation
- Vancouver International Tourism
- Vancouver Airport Authority
- Volunteer Vancouver
- University of British Columbia
- Simon Fraser University
- S.U.C.C.E.S.S
- Vancouver Foundation
- United Way
- VanCity Credit Union
- Downtown Vancouver BIA
- Vancouver Hotel Association
- Rotary Club of Vancouver
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Vancouver Recovery Club
- Vancouver Family Court & Youth Boys & Girls Club of Justice Committee
- Boys & Girls Clubs of Justice Committee
- Greater Vancouver Taiwanese - Canadian
- Hope in Vision Cultural Society
- Downtown Vancouver Association
- Downtown Eastside Youth
- Salvation Army Activities Society
- Mount Pleasant BIA
- Mount Pleasant CPC
- BARWATCH Granville CPC
- Kerrisdale BIA
- Kensington Community Centre
- Alcohol - Drug Education Service
- First United Church
- Robson Street BIA
- Vancouver Economic Society
- Chinese CPC Development Commission
- Odd Squad Productions
- YWCA of Vancouver
- Grandview-Woodlands CPC Davie Street CPC
- Cedar Cottage Community Concert Properties Ltd.
- Policing Centre Canadian Bankers Association
- Circle of Hope Coalition Society
- Renfrew Collingwood Drug & Alcohol Committee
- The International Dyslexia Alcohol Committee
- Association, BC Branch Anglican Diocese of
- Vancouver Police
- New Westminster
- Native Liaison Society
- BC Coalition for Safer Communities
- Together We Can TELUS
- Victory Outreach Vancouver

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## Appendix C. Prime Ministers and Premiers Term in Office

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<tr>
<th>Prime Ministers</th>
<th>Term in Office</th>
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<tr>
<td>John Diefenbaker</td>
<td>June 21 1957 – April 22 1963</td>
<td>Liberal-Conservative</td>
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<td>Lester Pearson</td>
<td>April 22 1963 – April 20 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pierre Trudeau</td>
<td>April 20 1968 – June 3/4 1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joe Clark</td>
<td>January 4 1979 – March 2/3 1980</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
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<td>Pierre Trudeau</td>
<td>March 3 1980 – June 29/30 1984</td>
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<td>John Turner</td>
<td>June 30 1984 – September 16/17 1984</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<td>Jean Chretien</td>
<td>November 4 1998 – December 11/12 2003</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Martin</td>
<td>December 12 2003 – February 5/6 2006</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Harper</td>
<td>February 6 2006 – Incumbent</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>Dave Barrett</td>
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<td>Bill Bennett</td>
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<td>Rita Johnston</td>
<td>1991 – 1996</td>
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<td>Glen Clark</td>
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<td>Dan Miller</td>
<td>1999 – 2011</td>
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<td>Ujjal Dosanjh</td>
<td>2000 – 2001</td>
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<td>Gordon Campbell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christy Clark</td>
<td>2011 – Present</td>
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