An Analysis of the Framing of Monarchy Within a Contemporary Democracy

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Abstract

This project aims to establish a comprehensive dialogue concerning the contemporary dynamic between the term ‘democracy’ and the term ‘monarchy’. Utilising the theoretical orientation of ‘framing’ documented by George Lakoff and Murray Edelman, this project assesses the notion of a barrier to political discourse surrounding monarchy as a governance structure. The idea of democracy has taken on a moral and value-laden frame that encompasses perceptions of freedom, equality and legitimacy. Democracy as ‘ideal’ is tied to the dominant culture and history of the United States, as well as the liberal or procedural democracy espoused therein. The ‘ideal’ gives way to a space of what is not ideal, or an enemy of the ‘ideal’, termed within this project as the ‘other’. Monarchy is placed firmly within the frame of the ‘other’, existing in opposition to the ‘ideal’ within the notions of inequality, unaccountability, slavery and violence as order. Although monarchy is maintained within democracy amongst many constitutional monarchies, the oppositional framework stands. The pressure of these frameworks can be seen in international development with the example of Bhutan’s transition to procedural democracy, as well as internal state convention revealed by the rhetoric surrounding the Governor General’s decision to prorogue Parliament in Canada in 2008. By demonstrating the constructed nature of these established frames and the combative dichotomy that results between the notion of democracy and monarchy, this project shows that there is an obstruction to a merit based analysis of monarchy as a governance structure.

Keywords: Monarchy; Framing; the other; Democracy as Ideal; Western Monarchy and Democracy; Bhutan; Canada Prorogation 2008
This project is dedicated to my Mother. Always persevering. Always finding adventure in the mundane. Always working towards a goal. Always telling me to ‘plod away’ when tackling a challenge that seems too large, too complex and too tedious to overcome. You were right, just ‘plod away’ and it will get done.
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1. Introduction

Has contemporary political discourse proven to be comprehensive and justly critical concerning the properties of monarchy as a form of governance, or democracy and monarchy as they relate to each other, in the existing dominant perspectives regarding government? In other words, is there an ability to have a discussion about monarchy and the role of monarchy in our respective states and the development of other states based on the current discourse surrounding the topic? Has monarchy been firmly placed within the frame of colonialism, slavery, disenfranchisement, religious promulgation, violence as order and pointless war? Have historical descriptions of monarchical legitimacy through natural order and divine right overshadowed any capacity for a contemporary dialogue surrounding legitimacy and monarchy? This project asserts that the current framing of monarchy against the cultural embedding of democracy does not allow for a comprehensive critical dialogue of the role of monarchy as a form of governance.

The purpose of this research project is to examine perceptions of monarchy and what effects our conceptualizations of monarchy have on the capacity for discourse. Impressions of monarchy are intrinsically connected to the lens through which government is examined. In other words, being in a democratic state affects how people think about and discuss monarchy. The prevalence of democracy in the West, and the featuring role of the West in global development also exerts pressure on concepts of monarchy as governance at the international level. This project attempts to unravel contemporary Westernized ideas about the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ and the relationship between these terms.

This project will use the theoretical orientation of framing derived from the works of Murray Edelman and George Lakoff to define and examine the contemporary definitions and symbolism made seemingly inherent within democracy and monarchy. The notion of ‘framing’ as defined by George Lakoff refers to the “mental structures that
shape the way we see the world.”¹ The definition of democracy and the suppositions concerning monarchy are part of a framework: “All words are defined relative to conceptual frames. When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of frames) is activated in your brain.”² As it relates to this project, when using terms such as ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ there is already an established frame causing the reader to predict the discourse, revile what falls outside their established frame and presuppose the comparative relationship between democracy and monarchy. “Framing is about getting language that fits your worldview. It is not just language. The ideas are primary—and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas.”³ The readers’ frames are created before encountering this project; it would be fair to say that no one would read this essay with a mind that is blank of any association towards notions of monarchy and democracy. As soon as one hears or reads a particular word the frame assigned to that term is activated.⁴ Where do these frames originate?

These frames are established in the broader contemporary discourses, value systems and ideologies:

In every era and every national culture, political controversy and manoeuvre have hinged upon conflicting interpretations of current actions and developments: leaders are perceived as tyrannical or benevolent, wars as just or aggressive, economic policies as supports of a class or the public interest, minorities as pathological or helpful.⁵

As the above quote from Murray Edelman denotes the notion of framing is derived from the way in which events, people and organizations are placed within a society, whether as heroes, villains, justified or reproachable. This project is not asking the reader to shed their frames before entering, rather to be aware of them and confront them critically in the broader perspective of governance theory.

This project is unique in its considerations. Within this project the communications theory of ‘framing’ will be applied to a subject and relationship, that being monarchy framed from within a democratic system, for which there are scarce

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid., 4.
⁴ Ibid., xv.
examples and those examples are indirect in relating a democratic framing dynamic. Academic works that utilize the theoretical perspective of framing to assess the inhibiting effects of said framework on the importance, use or place of monarchy as a governing structure or in global political development are rare if not non-existent. Thus, there is a tremendous gap in the literature, pertinent to governance discourse in political science as monarchies remain in a variety of governance roles within states around the world.

There are several limitations to this form of study. Examples used to support the existence of a frame and examples to refute the assertions of that frame are selected to support analysis. While this project will attempt to mitigate this limitation by providing a large cross-section of sources for analysis as well as sources that may substantiate current discourse, there is ultimately a capacity with any such analysis to suffer from a certain measure of construction. There must also be consideration for this project’s own subjectivity or relativism. Edelman warns; “observers who postulate that the meanings of observations vary with the social situation or with something else must take the same sceptical and tentative position with respect to their own relativism.”

In discussing framing there is a measure of framing that is occurring within the analysis itself. While every attempt may be made to maintain a certain objectivity, dependence on sources utilizing historical reporting on both events as well as a populations’ preferences and feelings, which are susceptible to suffer from their own rigid social-historical structure, may affect analysis.

Before outlining the structure of the essay it is important to provide the reader with the baseline definitions of the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ utilised within this project, in order to bring some clarification to the layered notions of framing. There are a myriad of associations towards the structure of government and the prevalence of values and societal formation in accordance with monarchy. In the most basic emergence of leadership, a leader is born out of individual capacity to provide security and arbitration, as indicated by Spellman. Governance; simply put, refers to the ways in which common affairs are organized, implicit in that organization is the leadership role between the governance authority and the broader society which takes form as a regime.

Within this research project there are three elements attached to the consideration of the term ‘democracy’. The normative implications overlaid with the

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6 Ibid., 4.
procedural model of democracy; and the historical and social context specific to the United States that has contributed to the dominant or orthodox contemporary normative and procedural understanding of democracy in a global perspective.

This essay utilises the procedural definition of democracy outlined by Schumpeter\(^9\) then expanded on by Macpherson\(^10\), Diamond and Morlino\(^11\). These theorists form a definition of democracy through leadership competition theory, which emphasizes the action of elections as well as the political processes creating ‘free and fair’ elections, such as the need for a multi-party system.\(^12\) The procedural definition of democracy is housed within Macpherson’s presentation of liberalism in its contemporary form, or (neo)liberal democracy, termed by Macpherson as the ‘Equilibrium Model’.

The procedures mentioned above that propose to fulfill the democratic requirement have become the orthodox markers in determining whether or not a democracy exists. The term ‘democracy’ within this project will adhere to the ‘procedural’ cast, however there are two equally important dynamics of defining democracy that apply within the project for which the reader must be cognizant.

Schumpeter also defines, and rejects, the ‘classical theory of democracy’. Schumpeter describes the classical theory of democracy as an eighteenth century philosophy in which “…the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry

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12 Alison Ayers, “ ‘We All Know a Democracy When We See One’: (Neo)liberal Orthodoxy in the ‘Democratisation’ and ‘Good Governance’ Project”. *Policy and Society* 27(2008), 6.
out its will.” Schumpeter finds fault with the supposed ‘common good’ that is derived out of the notion of a ‘people’ motivated and directed government. Democracy, in this normative sense, is equated by Schumpeter to the same kind of relationship as that of religion, in that it becomes theocratic in this normative frame.

We may put our problem differently and say that democracy, when motivated in this way [as if a relationship to religion] ceases to be a mere method that can be discussed rationally like a steam engine or a disinfectant. It actually becomes what from another standpoint I have held incapable of becoming, viz., an ideal or rather a part of an ideal schema of things. The very word may become a flag, a symbol of all a man holds dear of everything that he loves about his nation whether rationally contingent to it or not.15

While Schumpeter asserts that the ‘gulf between ideal and reality would be exposed’16, this project contends that the procedural model has been superimposed onto the classic model, in that democracy has become the ‘ideal’ that Schumpeter speaks of, but the method of measuring success in achieving that ideal is through the procedural model. Within this project the definition of democracy has acquired both a procedural and normative understanding.17

Lastly, concerning the definition of the term democracy for the purposes of this project the reader must also consider the orthodox expression of democracy to be contingent on a dominant perspective which demands an inclusion of economic, social and historical pressure on shaping the discourse surrounding democracy. Macpherson and Ayers assert that the context that democracy operates within is a factor in defining it, through the system in which democracy exists, the people that operate the democratic system, the history behind it and the culture throughout it.18 In the contextual consideration of the term ‘democracy’ there is a necessary examination of the

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15 Ibid., 266.
16 Ibid., 267.
17 “…models of democracy involve necessarily…a shifting balance between descriptive-explanatory and normative statements; that is, between statements about how things are and why they are so, and statements about how things ought or should be…irrespective of the proclaimed method used in political analysis, one can find in all models of democracy a complex intermingling of the descriptive and the normative." David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1987,) 7.
democratic form produced in the United States, and its impression upon a global assimilation of that specific orchestration of ‘democracy’ defined.

A post World War II United States emerged out of an isolationist ideology into an interest in the larger world and thereby a world power with a contemporary discourse surrounding the ‘rebuilding’ of nations.\(^{19}\) The inference can be made that this may result in a notion of ‘rebuilding in their own image’, as the United States can be assigned the role of ‘donor’ in what Naeem Inayatullah describes as ‘exclusive knowledge’ in democracy.

Some people think they know what is good for others because they believe they know something crucial denied to others. For example, a society that believes it has mastered democracy may notice that other societies have authoritarian and dictatorial political institutions that leave their people without a voice. In offering to help create democratic procedures, the ‘democratic’ society may wish to increase the freedom of others.\(^{20}\)

In this sense, the United States becomes in many ways an enforcer or ‘donor’ of a specific template of democracy that can be funnelled into international institutions such as the United Nations, as well as expressed by military action. While the aim here is not to suggest that the United States is the sole arbiter of the procedural democratic model, it is necessary to point to the significant international influence of the United States in helping to form a more widely held view of what makes democracy ‘democratic’, and the following cross-over into a ‘donor’ position regarding democracy by organizations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and NATO, as examples.\(^{21}\) The point regarding the United States’ role in defining democracy is crucial because of the afore mentioned social and historical contextual influences that contribute to the shaping of democracy within the United States and then ipso facto internationally. Therefore the term democracy within this project carries with it the


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 346. Inayatullah cites these organizations as ‘donors’, but again it is my assertion that exclusive knowledge here is democracy. Also, while Inayatullah provides The United States and Great Britain as examples of democracy ‘donors’ in the case of Iraq, Inayatullah’s chapter is based around the theory of donors and recipients of ‘exclusive knowledge’ with a keenly historical case study perspective. I am applying this theory to the role of the United States as a global power, and its distinct role as a ‘donor’ of ‘exclusive knowledge’.
normative aspects of Schumpeter’s classic democracy, the contemporary definitions of procedural democracy and the cultural influences of the United States in forming democracy.

As for an understanding or definition of monarchy as a system of governance, the definition is elusive and contentious. It cannot be said that currently one could point to a definition and say ‘this is monarchy’ as existing and historical contradictions in assumptions have strayed so far from the route of leadership as defined by Spellman and into social order and divinity. In contemporary academic writings that introduce the different dynamics of regimes, authoritarianism, as ‘rule by the few’ with an implicit or explicit threat of force for the purpose of maintaining order, is applied to absolutist monarchies.\textsuperscript{22} Janine Brodie and Sandra Rein’s introduction to politics seems less able to place constitutional monarchy or parliamentary monarchy\textsuperscript{23} in a particular regime box, however this may be symptomatic of the confusion surrounding defining monarchy as a governance structure and defaulting to authoritarianism, and authoritarianism’s ‘inherent violence’ to establish a place or vision of monarchy’s function and purpose. The authoritarian image immediately brings to mind the dynamics of violence as order and illegitimacy to rule and thereby associating that image to monarchy.

A common thread within classical and some contemporary literature defining monarchy is a sense of what monarchy is ‘not’ rather than what it ‘is’. Aristotle, Spellman and Dante all agree that despotism and tyranny are not monarchy, but rather a different form of government or a perversion of monarchy that creates a distinct and degenerate form of governance:\textsuperscript{24} “Despotism is a misappropriation of monarchical ideal;

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Critical Concepts: An Introduction to Politics, ed. Janine Brodie and Sandra Rein, 3rd Ed. (Toronto: Pearson, 2005,) 85-86.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Ruskin House, 1976,) 270. According to Schumpeter the difference in parliamentary and constitutional monarchy is as follows: parliamentary monarchy (as in England) has a monarch that is constrained to select a cabinet that would otherwise be chosen by the elected representatives, and hence falls into the category of democracy. Constitutional monarchy, according to Schumpeter, can select the members of cabinet independent of the consideration of the elected parliament and is therefore not democratic. While this separation between constitutional and parliamentary monarchy is not often used contemporarily, and this definition opens the door to more debate surrounding the term of monarchy and its logistical implications, Schumpeter allows for a ‘jumping off’ point in defining the term of monarchy which suits the introduction to this project. The remainder of this project will not make a definitive distinction between parliamentary and constitutional monarchy, using the latter term to encompass both.
\end{itemize}
exaggerating the incapacity of the many to support untold violence and authoritarian control.”

This project attempts to consider monarchy as a form of governance in the sense of monarchy falling outside the framework of despotism and tyranny, rather than becoming mired in specifics of the nature and definition of monarchy as a system. Therefore this project’s presentation of monarchy emerges from a critical perspective of the contemporary Western framing of monarchy, which is based on natural order, divine right, and the authoritarian violence as subjugation relationship that places monarchy in the midst of tyranny and despotism.

This project is divided into three chapters, ‘The Problem of the Ideal’, ‘The Creation of the Other’, and ‘The Effect of the Framework: Development and Dialogue’. ‘The Problem of the Ideal’ unravels the notion of ‘imperfect liberty over tyranny’, imperfect liberty being: striving towards the ideal of democracy. The ideal form of democracy is framed as preferable to all other forms of government. This ‘ideal’ will be discussed within themes of equality, freedom, responsible rule and self-determination.

Providing this framing of the ‘ideal’ is meant to reveal the ‘ideal’ is a construction, much the same way as the ‘other’ is a construction, which holds broad assumptions that are often false. This construct may become a framework that is embedded into the social and cultural political dialogue.

‘The Problem of the Ideal’ is set up under three sections; ‘What Encompasses the democratic Ideal’, which delineates democracy under a larger normative banner of emotional and moral representation. ‘The Western Orthodox of the Democratic Ideal’, demonstrates the Western slant, or more specifically the role of the United States in the form and dissemination of democracy. ‘The Role of the Ideal in Discourse and Analysis’ sets up the juxtaposition in discourse between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘other’ the crux of this project: the difficulty faced by those seeking discourse around the role of monarchy in a contemporary democratized setting. This democratized setting seemingly strictly prohibits the acknowledgement of a role for the ‘other’ within its orientation as the ‘ideal’.

In ‘The Creation of the Other’ the framing of democracy as ‘ideal’ will be expanded upon to include framing of the ‘other’, or the ‘enemy’. This notion of framing will espouse the connection between the frame of democracy as the ‘ideal’ and the

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27 Assessing the quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2005,) XI.
frame around monarchy as the ‘other’. Defining of self, nation, and ideologies often are derived from defining what they are not. This forms the creation of the ‘other’. The ‘other’ is not benign; rather it is crafted to create an enemy against which the ideal may find a group acceptance and collusion:

...when the enemy helps marshal support for a regime or a cause; in that case those who construct an enemy have every reason to perpetuate and exaggerate that threat he poses... Enemies are characterized by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course of action they pursue, regardless of whether they win or lose in any particular encounter, and even if they take no political action at all.28

The assessment of monarchy against the ‘ideal’ of democracy can be seen in comparative dialogue, as monarchy takes on the form of financial irresponsibility, debauchery,29 condescension, violence, subjugation as slavery and tyranny,30 while democracy is assigned freedom, rights, and the moral imperative.31

‘The Creation of the Other’ is divided into four sections. ‘Frame of opposition’ further establishes the existence and impact of mental frameworks, and the theory of the mental framework in political discourse termed the ‘other’. ‘Frame Construction’ lays out the connection and integration between the term ‘monarchy’ and the framework of the ‘other’, and what that framework entails. ‘Frame Actualization’ is concerned with facing the realities of the basis of such a framework surrounding monarchy through historical examples. ‘Frame Defiance’ demonstrates the broad notions of the framework of the ‘other’ are much too all encompassing and a dangerous generalization of the monarchical governance structure. This section demonstrates this through historical example, and the attempts at reframing by Western Monarchies to come into the fold of the ‘ideal’, in this respect attempting to counteract notions of stagnation in a monarchical governance structure and demonstrating flexibility and adaptation to evolving notions of

31 Assessing the quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2005,) IX. There are attempts by Western Monarchies to re-frame, in order to come into the fold of the ‘ideal’. This potentially demonstrates the transformative capacity of such frameworks.
legitimacy. ‘Re-Framing: Attempts to Come into the Fold of the Ideal’ addresses the more contemporary rational for monarchy within the constitutional monarchical governance structure, and outlines why this attempted re-framing has failed to dispel mental and emotional framework attached to the term ‘monarchy’ as presented in the earlier section of this chapter.

The final chapter, ‘The Effect of the Framework: Development and Dialogue’ will provide examples of the ‘ideal’ versus ‘other’ dichotomy between democracy and monarchy, anchoring the theory in the perceptible realities of changing and shaping governance. These changes can be tied to the framework of the ‘other’, a framework created often in a historical context, which continues to be attached to perceptions of monarchy. The first example will be that of international development, specifically Bhutan, and the Bhutanese transition from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy, with the question of international pressure in the shaping of Bhutan’s development. The second example will be the Canadian context, specifically the 2008 prorogation, citing internal pressure pushing any checking elements or reference to Monarchy away with precedent, which is condoned by the contemporary, popular, frameworks of democracy versus monarchy. This section also aims to address the success or failure of reframing attempts by Western Monarchies mentioned in the second chapter.

This project will demonstrate that there is a barrier to discourse established by the contemporary mental framework of the term ‘democracy’ as ‘ideal’ and the term ‘monarchy’ as ‘other’. This creates an oppositional dynamic between these terms, and therefore the notions of governance attached. The term ‘democracy’ has taken on a very specific idea of ‘good governance’ that applies to a historically and culturally narrow definition of liberal or procedural democracy. This framework creates a deeply combative discourse with the term ‘monarchy’, which inhabits an oppositional frame from democracy, as the ‘other’. Because of this framework discourse surrounding the ideas of monarchy and democracy is weighted with presumption and simplification, disallowing a merit based discourse surrounding monarchy as a contemporary governance structure.
2. Chapter 1: The Problem of the Ideal

Within this chapter the framework of democracy as an ‘ideal’ will be defined, and the assertion of an orthodox conceptualization of democracy which has come to be synonymous with its ideal frame will be demonstrated. This chapter seeks to identify the construction of an ‘ideal’ rather than argue the legitimacy of the contents of orthodox concepts of democracy. Notions surrounding the term ‘ideal’ are original to this project but are developed considering the premise surrounding political construction outlined by William Connolly, Murray Edelman and George Lakoff.\(^{32}\) The assumption of an existence of political orthodoxy or hegemony, which can be derived from the political theories of Antonio Gramsci, expanded on contemporarily within the text *Democracy Upside Down: Public opinion and Cultural Hegemony in the United States*, and reasserted more recently by Bruce M. Russett.\(^{33}\)

This chapter will establish an ideal of democracy, as presented by Larry Dimond and Leonardo Morlino, Giuseppe Di Palma and discussed by John Dewy, and Damien Kingsbury. It will then conduct a critical analysis of the ‘ideal’ in discourse. This chapter will also highlight the element of construction behind framing, and the importance of understanding the presence of such a construction. A deconstruction of democracy’s frame demonstrates that the ‘ideal’ of democracy which has become inherent in discourse is not inherent itself; rather it is a framework embedded into social and cultural political dialogue and practice. Lastly, this chapter will briefly explain how a negative space that is created when an ‘ideal’ is constructed. This negative space becomes a comparative element which creates a larger framework that encompasses a relationship between democracy and all other forms of government. In other words, by defining an

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'ideal’ there is also a definition being created of what falls outside that ideal. This relationship will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter ‘The Creation of the Other’.

In the context of political framing an ideal is the creation of a political model thought of as being correct, as moral, as the inherent in well-ordered political life. The ‘ideal’ ceases to encompass a description of function and moves among society as a promise of something better that must be sought. The ‘ideal’ must then be spread for the alleged good of all. The ‘ideal’ during this historical moment is ‘democracy’, according to orthodox Western values. As Diamond and Morlino have put it: “...deepening democracy is a moral good if not an imperative…”34 There is a contemporary normative assurance about democracy as Giuseppe Di Palma points out: “…democracy in its concrete incarnations has always been ultimately superior. It has been superior as a system to curb oppression, to reassert, as a matter of self-interest, mutual coexistence, to reconstitute a community; and to reestablish a sense of personal worth and public dignity.”35 Democracy’s frame has become a utopian style governance structure that is propagated intensely, as Damien Kingsbury has indicated: “It is broadly held that the most desirable form of political organization is democracy.”36 The preference of democracy as a governance structure manifests itself within the language, images and ideas conveying ‘good governance’. For example, the much used phrase: “Imperfect liberty over tyranny”37 speaks to an ‘ideal’. The meaning of ‘Imperfect liberty over tyranny’ demands the disregard of dysfunction for the threat of what may be worse. This chapter examines ‘imperfect liberty’ as a promise that has become Schumpeter’s critique of classical democracy, that being the evolution of democracy as a pseudo-theocratic element of Western culture.

2.1. What encompasses the democratic Ideal?

This project seeks to demonstrate that this ‘ideal’ is still very much an underlying presence in the procedural democratic theory. One could say Schumpeter’s fear of the

34 Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, Assessing the quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2005,) IX.
‘ideal’ in classical democracy has been realized. As was pointed out in the introduction, Schumpeter associated democracy in the classical theory as being based upon an immeasurable application of normative concepts that would persuade the unknowing or illogical masses into decision-making based on a constructed value concept rather than a logical argument.\(^{38}\) The application of normative concepts goes beyond decision-making within a government and into overall development and design of governance.

More recently, Diamond and Morlino have asserted that a democracy exists when there is universal adult suffrage, recurring, free, competitive and fair elections, more than one serious political party and alternative sources of information.\(^{39}\) Diamond and Morlino go on to describe the aspects on which they assert the quality of democracy is hinged, political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty or control over public policies and officials which make policy, political equity in these rights and powers and, broader standards of good governance such as transparency, legality and responsible rule.\(^{40}\)

What does this mean in terms of an ‘ideal’ in democracy? Diamond and Morlino’s definition combines the aspects of the procedural dynamics of democracy (ie. their mandatory components to be considered a democracy) and the normative components, more specifically ideas of civil freedom, equality between government and governed, independence of the individual and ‘good governance’. The association being created between democracy and the aforementioned terms presupposes an oppositional dynamic between a defined sense of ‘best’ practices in democracy and any other governance structure. For example, looking again at the mandatory components in establishing democracy, Diamond and Morlino require multi-party representation. This implies that other forms of democracy outside of partisan democracy, or more strictly lacking competitive party systems, fall outside the ‘ideal’ formulation of ‘good governance’.\(^{41}\) The assignment of such normatives are further entrenched by a claim of ‘equality’ supposedly brought about by the underlying construct of democracy, which is presented as unique to democracy.

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\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) The observation is based out of Diamond and Morlino’s writing. The analysis being; if partisan politics is necessary in the construction of a democracy, as Diamond and Morlino assert, then other forms of democracy that do not include a system of political parties is excluded from an orthodox understanding of democratic construction.
The attachment of universal suffrage to normative values such as freedom and equality is supported by Macpherson’s analysis of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{42} Although Macpherson has a keen interest in a dialogue that sets apart the economic underpinnings of liberal democracy in favour of ‘individual capacity’, the explanation of liberal democracy that Macpherson puts forward reinforces a relationship between procedural democracy and that normative understanding of democracy that Schumpeter feared and Diamond and Morlino associate as a measurement for the quality of democracy. Macpherson contends that, “Liberalism had always meant freeing the individual from the outdated restraints of old established institutions. By the time liberalism emerged as liberal democracy this became a claim to free then to use and develop their human capacities fully.”\textsuperscript{43} This is a value statement that intertwines a normative framework with a governance model, and has an indirect message towards monarchy in its reference to ‘old establishments’. This speaks to being an idea of government formerly being oppressive and democracy the unchaining of self seemingly both physically and spiritually; an uninhibited individual existing in democracy, while bars of the ‘old establishment’ are knocked down to ultimately instill ‘freedom’ as the associated characteristic of democracy.

According to Guillermo O’Donnell’s democratic theory, equality and freedom exist exclusively under the ‘rule of law’, which is seemingly assigned to democracy,\textsuperscript{44} and further defines a contrast to the rule of authoritarian ‘whims’: “Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively without obstruction and intimidation from powerful State actors.”\textsuperscript{45} Accordingly, equality is the equal capacity to participate in the political process and thereby an overall equivalency of opportunity in affecting the state in which the individual lives: “…a good democracy must ensure that all citizens are in fact able to make use of these formal rights by allowing them to vote, organize, assemble, protest, lobby for their interests, and otherwise influence the decision-making process.”\textsuperscript{46} Further to this point,

\textsuperscript{42} It is important to note that the understanding in this project is that ‘liberal’ democracy comes under the term ‘procedural’ democracy.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino. Assessing the quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2005,) XVI. A deconstruction of the ideal is not the main point, rather the existence of an ideal. What it means in dialogue and the fact that it
the supposed leveling of the playing field in political participation moves into a requirement for equality in a broader perspective, seemingly encompassing religion, race and other factors that have been social dividers “...tolerance of political and social differences, and thus acceptance on the part of all individuals and organized groups of the right of others (including their adversaries) to participate equally, so long as they obey the law. [...], extensive participation also requires a rule of law that will defend the right and ability of weaker social groups to participate fully.”47 The methods of competition and participation under the ‘rule of law’ in a procedural understanding of democracy stretch the meaning of equality to a broader definition of a normative for humanity. The merger between procedural democracy and Schumpeter’s classic democratic problem of the ‘ideal’ in contemporary framing has contributions from a Western historical background, specifically in the governmental, social and cultural development of the United States post World War I.

2.2. The Western Orthodoxy of the Democratic Ideal

The method of imparting or spreading the ideal unto others has a specifically Western slant. As defined in the Introduction, contemporary orthodox democracy is formed largely through the socio-cultural historic background of the United States, and therefore the attainment of freedom and equality as a measure of the democratic ideal is wrapped up in the style of democracy supported and enforced by a distinctly Western perspective.

If and when the United States decides to promote democracy in a specific country, its policies, to paraphrase [Lawrence Whitehead], are likely to be much less attentive to the relations among domestic forces in the country, much more forceful and unilateral, and much more sensitive to whether the prospective democracy will be a friend or foe. This reflects not only America’s preeminent geopolitical role but also the fact that when promotion is chosen, the role is closely embedded, in American minds, in their country’s rooted democratic tradition and exclusive democratic mission.48

is constructed is important to set up the deconstruction of the frame that is centered around the relationship between monarchy and democracy.
47 Ibid., XVII.
The above quote indicates that the United States can be viewed as trying to control the notion and model of democracy that develops elsewhere as it is in the superpower’s self interest to ensure friendly relation. Whether or not Di Palma thought that entailed a mimicking of democratic procedures and value systems or just to ensure a codependency is debatable. What is clear is a Western standpoint of manifest destiny within a push for the spread of a certain kind of governance, which is, as Di Palma indicated, a part of the democratic background of the United States.

American political writer John Dewey cites the American attachment to the term ‘freedom’, referring to this attachment as an ‘ideology’ embedded in the Declaration of Independence.\(^49\) Dewey goes on to discuss the motives of such an attachment, indicating that it was not a measure to misconstrue the suffering of Americans under a colonial banner: “It was rather that leaders generalized the particular restrictions from which they suffered into the general idea of oppression; and in similar fashion extended their efforts to get liberation from specific troubles into a struggle for liberty as a single all-embracing political ideal.”\(^50\) The framing of liberty in relation to the pronouncements of independence by the United States was not a temporary affectation, harnessing support for a war effort and a cobbled peaceable coalition of territory. Instead, it became what Dewey refers to as the “popular psychology of democracy”,\(^51\) that being: “... the ethical belief that political democracy is a moral right and that the laws upon which it is based are fundamental moral laws which every form of social organization should obey.”\(^52\) By establishing the existence of a frame of democracy as a governance ‘ideal’ and the origins of that ideal, a barrier to discourse begins to emerge.

Damien Kingsbury’s writings on political development discusses democratization with a critical perspective surrounding a singular understanding of democracy based on the economic and procedural democratic practices of the West, specifically the United States.

Often discussion about normative models of government defaults to notions of ‘democracy’ or ‘democratization’. It is generally assured at least in Western societies, that ‘democracy’ is the single most effective means of ensuring that the wishes of a society are most suitably represented and supported… [The idea of

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 51.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 5.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
democracy] also assumes in its broader application that a model of democracy as practiced in the West, usually by the U.S., constitutes an ideal aspiration…

The above quote is an assertion that democracy has become an ideal as a form of governance, and the framework of the democratic ideal is embedded in the Western ‘established’ democratic model, specifically that of the United States’ historical carving out of democracy. The reinforcement of the ideal in concrete terms appears as the promulgation of ‘manifest destiny’ articulated through Inayatullah’s ‘donor’ of ‘exclusive knowledge’ theory, which translates into international policy on nation building, as well as a more general outlook communicated more broadly, as Kingsbury indicates above. Discourse surrounding governance absorbs the frame of democracy, and utilizes that frame in debate, therefore the debate becomes entangled within a certain construction that is often not consciously addressed or acknowledged.

2.3. The role of the ‘ideal’ in discourse and analysis

An ideal sets down a standard that is commonly deemed ‘best’. This project argues that democracy has become that ‘ideal’. The democratic development writing of the prominent academic Di Palma, poses an example of what the democratic frame looks like in discourse.

The greater the pool of independent nations and the more we move away from the core of long-established Western-style democracies, the more the nations facing democratisation fall short of qualities classically associated with Western democracy. Such qualities have been investigated extensively by many influential scholars, mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, and fall into three categories: (1) economic prosperity and equality; (2) a modern and diversified social structure in which nondependent middle classes occupy center stage; and (3) a national culture that, by tolerating diversity and preferring accommodation, is already implicitly democratic.\textsuperscript{55}

Di Palma makes reference here to a certain aspect of economic or material equality, personal equality with respect to culture, as well as freedom through the frame of a “nondependent” class and economic prosperity, which implies mobility, power and self-directive. Despite the massively problematic claims asserted in the above quote, Di Palma has used ideas of freedom and equality as rational to attest that Western democracy is an orthodox ‘tried and true’, the correct formula for these normative successes. Also, within the above statement there exists implicitly a negative space that indicates what is not democracy is not ‘free’ or ‘equal’, which is discussed later in this section. Here again, there is a value laden connection occurring between the term ‘democracy’ and the mental frame of democracy. The affecting influence in framing a governance structure has been noted by political writers such as Dewey, Edelman, Lakoff and Kingsbury. A mental frame of ‘democracy’ shapes discussion, writing, presentation, and expectation of democracy as development not only in a broad notion of discourse but also specific to political authors’ writings, as has been demonstrated above with Di Palma. Drawing on the previous section, Kingsbury had also noted that the contemporary frame of democracy had a dangerous construction of inherency that drew in a Western social and cultural dynamic to the framework.

...political systems or political modes of social relations become ‘habituated’ and are accepted as the natural order of things. For example, many American’s cannot understand how the world does not conform to their self-evidently and ‘naturally’ superior political system. Yet what is ‘natural’ to Americans is not ‘natural’ to many others; nor are the circumstances that gave ownership the same or similar in many cases.\textsuperscript{56}

The use of language in defining democracy, as demonstrated in the above sections, provides a frame that defines democracy in a value laden context, which creates relationships within thoughts and attitudes without even necessarily consciously realizing it. Authors of democratic governance theory do at times highlight this issue, but seem to do little to address it within their own writing and analysis.

Philippe Schmitter talks of the possible issue that arises from democratic idealism, identifying the “potential fallacy [as] idealism, or the holding of all actual democracies to unrealistic standards.” and iterates that democracy is a term “used to denote a normative goal that can be approached but never in practice fully attained.” Even Di Palma asserts that one should not hold democracy to unreachable standards, more so as a reason not to criticize it, saying: “It is therefore ill-advised to conflate democracy with a set of elusive ultimate objectives and normative standards- coveted as they are.” Di Palma goes on to suggest a distancing of association between ‘social progress’ from democracy, to provide more ‘realistic’ expectations. That, according to the author, gives ‘democracy’ improved standing in “claiming superiority in the eyes of public opinion and political practitioners.”

Di Palma is conscious of framing democracy and is concerned with effective framing, with a recurring theme in his writing that speaks to democratic development as, “…one of transferring, not plants, but loyalties.” Within Schmitter and Di Palma’s analysis, the ideal can admittedly have flaws but is still the thing worth striving for, as the choice of ‘imperfect liberty over tyranny’. Although these political authors indicate that it is important not to conflate a normative version of democracy with what is ‘real’ in democracy, the language use, definition and argumentation support the relationship between democracy and the normative elements of freedom and equality, further perpetuating the idea that there is no other alternative, since all others are inherently flawed.

59 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 23.
62 Ibid., 14.
David Beetham points out “Without liberty there can be no democracy”⁶³ and “[s]o democracy without freedom is a contradiction in terms.”⁶⁴ Again there is a direct relation claimed between liberty or freedom and democracy, and within this statement a negative space can be seen where there exists a comparator. There seems to be an automatic ‘vice-versa’ in Beetham’s assertion, indicating that democracy requires liberty but also, where there exists democracy there exists freedom. This is a direct connection of terms, a framing that places democracy as the only arbiter of ‘freedom’ amongst governance structures. It then becomes a moral imperative to spread democracy, because that means ‘liberation’ and ‘equality’ for all as the framing falsely implies.

Di Palma’s moral imperative certainly takes shape in his analysis and language choice. Indicating the level of global diffusion of democracy, Di Palma states: “If optimism were based on democracy’s recent record of victories, we should take note that the record is at least mixed.”⁶⁵ Taking note of the language here, Di Palma uses the term ‘victories’, implicit here is a struggle against something else, so again the ideal leads to a comparator. The comparative dynamic of the ideal is that, if there is one that is the ideal then there must be an ‘other’. This dynamic will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter; this chapter’s goal was to demonstrate that the ‘ideal’ is a construction that is applied and implied in discourse surrounding democracy in a contemporary Western setting.

All this is not to say that there are no valid and meaningful points as to the governance capacity and benefits of democracy (or monarchy) within their respective ‘ideal’ frames, I am contending, rather, that contemporary ‘ideal’ framing is extreme and places one governance structure as desirable and moral, whereas the ‘other’ is reviled as inherently flawed. The ‘other’ becomes a part of the ‘ideal’ frame, and is as much a part of the discourse of useful, stable, progressive and desirable governance. The next chapter speaks to the creation of monarchy as the ‘other’ in the context of democracy, and considers the barriers to discourse surrounding monarchy that ensue from this framework.

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⁶⁴ Ibid., 33.
3. Chapter 2: The Creation of the ‘Other’

The first chapter demonstrated the existence of an ‘ideal’ in contemporary discourse, or an orthodox mental frame that places the term ‘democracy’ as a normative value that encompasses both themes of abstract value and a procedural dynamic. The first chapter touched on the idea of a negative space created by the formulation of a mental framework of an ‘ideal’, which becomes a space inhabited by what the ‘ideal’ is not. This chapter expands on the idea of a combative relationship that develops out of the formation of the ‘other’ or ‘the enemy’. First it is important to further expand on the political dialogue in existence around political terminology and mental frameworks that effect social and political discourse and the reasoning behind deconstructing those frames.

3.1. Frame of Opposition

William Connolly’s discussion of the penetrating issue of concepts, and the struggle to manage words as concepts in the political sphere, complements the purposes of this project. Connolly discusses at length the influence of the terms of political discourse as a structure of meanings entrenched in shaping the direction of political action, and explains how a term can be both descriptive and normative. He presents terms of political discourse as ever changing constructions that vary depending on the multiple variables of society, and that also exert force within political discourse, steering the direction of society.

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69 Ibid., 22.
The concepts of politics do not simply provide a lens through which to observe a process that is independent of them. As we have seen, they are themselves part of that political life— they help to constitute it, to make it what it is. It follows that changes in those concepts, once accepted by a significant number of participants, contribute to changes in political life itself... This connection between conceptual revision and political changes, once grasped, can deepen our understanding of the intimate relationship between thought and action in politics.  

This project assumes Connolly’s stance in assessing political terminology as containing a description and values, in which both the descriptive element and normative dynamic are of a constructed nature. Meaning, deconstruction is important in creating a more open and thorough discourse. Connolly is very clear about the constructed nature of political terminology and the effect of opening up that construction:

Deconstructionists show how every social construction of the self, truth, reason, or morality, endowed by philosophy with a coherent unity and invested with a privileged epistemic status, is actually composed of an arbitrary constellation of elements held together by powers and metaphors which are not inherently rational. To deconstruct these established unities is to reveal their constructed character and divest them of epistemic privilege. 

Connolly admits there is no real ability to check discourse into neutrality, or create terminology totally devoid of emotional attachment. But as the above quote suggests, he assumes that recognizing the normative frameworks in political discourse is a good step toward teasing out a clearer and more accessible political dialogue. Connolly also points to the existence of an ‘ideal’ in political discourse and the influence an ideal has over “...assessment of public policies, social arrangements and political processes.” Connolly points to ‘democracy’ as one of the terms that is composed of a construction of terms and values. Connolly asserts that the term ‘democracy’ is just as malleable in its construct as other terms of political discourse, potentially changing over time; in fact, “…a change in our theoretical understanding or historical situation could sever the prevailing connection between the criteria and normative import of ‘democracy’.” This chapter uses the same theoretical approach asserting the normative construct of political terms, but expands that construct to a comparative dynamic existing between political terms.

70 Ibid., 180.
71 Ibid., 231.
72 Ibid., 151-152.
73 Ibid., 152.
74 Ibid., 31.
The aim of this chapter is to show that the creation of the ‘other’ is a construction in the same way the ‘ideal’ was demonstrated to be a construction in the first chapter, and that monarchy is placed in the position of the ‘other’ in contrast to democracy as the ‘ideal’. The relationship that forms between democracy as ‘ideal’ and monarchy as the ‘other’ has become a dynamic between linear progress, enlightenment and development versus the past, ignorance and being undeveloped. The relationship is also embodied by comparisons of freedom versus tyranny, citizen versus subject and ultimately, equality or greater humanity versus stagnant inequality or failure of humanity.

Murray Edelman writes of the “Construction and Uses of Political Enemies” which encompasses what this project refers to as the ‘other’. Edelman aptly describes the creation of the ‘other’ as the characterization of an enemy: “Enemies are characterized by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless of what course of action they pursue, regardless of whether they win or lose in any particular encounter, and even if they take no political action at all.” Edelman goes on to further indicate the aspects of construction of the enemy: “The enemy objectifies and symbolizes a constructed history, a setting, and a future state of affairs.” As Edelman points out, the construction of the ‘enemy’ or the ‘other’ is an integral element in the political spectrum, as it provides discourse with a framework that encompasses both a historical and a future understanding of society, in which ideology informs perception and directs behaviour. Edelman discusses the many uses of the ‘other’ in politics that deeply affects the ‘will’ of the people: “Leaders achieve and maintain their position by focusing upon fashionable or feared problems and by emphasizing their differences from enemies whose past and potential sins they publicize and exaggerate.” Further to this point Edelman discusses the uses of the ‘enemy’ or the ‘other’ in politics and society; “…when the enemy helps marshal support for a regime or a cause; in that case those who construct an enemy have every reason to perpetuate and exaggerate that threat he poses.” Edelman is describing the comparative nature of framing between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘other’ that is the subject of this project. Edelman is, in effect, describing the

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76 Ibid., 67.  
77 Ibid., 81.  
78 Ibid., 121.  
79 Ibid., 66.
active nature of framing, meaning the uses and results of framing in creating an enemy, and clearly indicating the constructed nature of the ‘other’.

Edelman is not the only analyst engaged in understanding the existence and effects of framing in political discourse that has highlighted the use of an ‘other’ or ‘enemy’ in political framing. George Lakoff discusses the issues of framing in the context of ‘left’ versus ‘right’ politics in the United States. Lakoff cites the use of an ‘enemy’ in a strikingly similar fashion to Murray Edelman. The use of the ‘other’ or ‘enemy’ in harnessing power and legitimating behaviour, actions and ideologies of the ‘ideal’, as well as providing a kind of solidification of the ‘ideal’ is cited by Lakoff: “The enemy of evil is good. If our enemy is evil, we are inherently good. Good is our essential nature, and what we do in the battle against evil is good. Good and evil are locked in a battle, which is conceptualized metaphorically as a physical fight in which the stronger wins.”80 Lakoff discusses how a nation can be brought to war on the back of emotional framing, demonstrating that the creation of a dynamic of good versus evil has real tangible political and social effects. Lakoff highlights the use of metaphors in frame construction. Lakoff also discusses ideas of reframing, or to put it another way, changing or recreating mental and emotional frames. Edelman has also said that reframing is possible, even regarding the seemingly most entrenched contemporary ideas of regimes. While Macpherson has described an inability for Western society to conceptualize outside of affluence over community with an assumption of indefinite growth and a maintenance of a post cold-war entrenchment of the idea of contemporary democracy that affirms all others are tyrannies,81 Connolly asserts that the possibility of reframing means we have an ability to change current perceptions of democracy; “… a change in our theoretical understanding or historical situation could sever the prevailing connection between the criteria and normative import of ‘democracy’.”82

This project does not claim to be the catalyst to ideological change surrounding the relationship between democracy and monarchy. But it is crucial to recognize that there is a relationship that in many respects is a construction that calls upon mental

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80 This was specifically in reference to the Whitehouse administration’s framing of going to war after the attack of September 11th on the World Trade Centres of New York. George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives (White River Junction Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 2004,) 57.
81 Macpherson refers to ‘Model 3’, which is what he calls the “Equilibrium Model, a model that can also be represented by description of ‘procedural’ and ‘neo-liberal’. C.B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (London: Oxford UP, 1977,) 92.
frameworks often formed within the ‘ideal’ versus the ‘other’ relationship. To further highlight the construct of this comparative and often combative framework the next section will focus on the construction of the frame of monarchy against democracy, in which monarchy is the ‘other’ to democracy.

3.2. Frame Construction

The above section describes the existence of a mental framework used in political discourse that can be referred to as the ‘other’, and the goal or uses of that mental framing. This explores the contention that monarchy has been, and is currently framed as the ‘other’ to the ideal of democracy. The assertion of monarchy as the ‘other’ is accomplished by citing historical and twentieth century writings that place monarchy in opposition to the rule of law, accountability, equality, freedom and the advancement of a better world. These characteristics are marked by classic political and historical writings that attach monarchy to divine right or natural order, subjugation, violence as order, and aversion to progress as suppression of the liberty of the individual. These writings typically allege a movement from monarchy to democracy as a linear progression with the assumption that monarchy is a digression to human achievement.

This section is demonstrating the place of monarchy as the ‘other’ within theoretical political writings as the creation of a framework in discourse. The section entitled ‘Frame Actualization’ will highlight historical occurrences that lend credence and reasonability to an all-encompassing mental framework concerning what monarchy is and what it does as a governance structure.

There is both a general implication of ‘democracy versus’ which includes a combative relationship between democracy and monarchy, and an overt description of monarchy that places it in opposition to democracy and the mental framework of the ‘ideal’ that surrounds democracy. As Spellman indicates: “Rule by one implies dependency, natural differences and human frailty, and none of these unflattering traits strikes sympathetic responses, particularly in the West, at the start of the twenty-first century.”

Further to this assertion Spellman adds that contemporary perceptions of monarchy are that of “human inequality, privilege associated with accident of birth, arbitrary social hierarchy, sacred status, the purity and intelligence of the one against the

depravity and incapacity of the many.”84 Spellman not only recognizes that there is a contemporary and Western frame of monarchy that places monarchy as the ‘other’, but also recognizes that the contemporary frame of monarchy that opposes it to the march of progress. Spellman indicates that contemporary perceptions assume that monarchy, along with the framework highlighted in the Spellman quotes above, have been "thankfully [] discarded”.85 Spellman is very much aware of the theoretical, emotional, and political relationship that effects individual perception in a contemporary Western democracy. Much historical political theory aimed at establishing a discourse that legitimised monarchy has rooted within the contemporary framework of monarchy as a governance structure that proliferates inequality.

Eusebius, Bishop of Caeserea, the historian and chronicler for the first Christian Emperor in Byzantium described monarchy as legitimised by natural order and what would be referred to as divine right: “For Eusebius the Roman Empire was nothing short of an earthly reflection of the divine Kingdom.”86 The rationale behind such legitimation of mono ruler-ship was found in Christian theology: with one God ruling over the Kingdom of Heaven, there must be one ruler over the Kingdom on earth. Eusebius’ rationale identified monarchy as the only legitimate form of government.87

This view was embedded in the ideas surrounding legitimacy and accountability in ‘good governance’ for centuries and was expounded by many other political philosophers. Thomas Aquinas proposed monarchy to be most in line with nature. As an example of this Aquinas discusses instances in nature, such as the social hierarchy of bees, to provide legitimacy for monarchy as governance.88

This view was further entrenched by Dante. Dante’s second book in Monarchy defines monarchy’s place of power in relation to the dominance of the Roman Empire. The ‘social superiority’ and ‘right’ of the Roman Empire to conjoin Kingdom’s under one rule, according to Dante, was derived from a ‘noble superiority’89 Dante participates in the creation of the fallacy of ‘natural order’.90 Monarchy emerged in many ways out of assumptions of mythical connections to the spirit world or an individual’s special capacity to commune with the ethereal far before Eusebius or Aquinas forged a written theory of

84 Ibid., 10.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 107.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 153.
90 Ibid., 46.
monarchical legitimacy drawing from a single Christian God.\textsuperscript{91} Contemporary connections between both Christian and non-Christian monarchies and ruler-ship under ‘God’s’ sanction are still prevalent, however it is important to be aware of the articulation and unification of ‘God’ and governance in the creation of the frames of natural order and divine right, which are still a part of the mental frames drawn upon contemporarily.

The overlay of a Christian theological rationale onto nature and then social and governance structures has further entrenched the term ‘monarchy into the framework of the ‘other’ because the present notion of secular governance can be viewed as being a part of the contemporary ‘ideal’. As Purdue points out the post WWI rebuilding of a new world vision by Western powers there emerged an assumption of ‘development’ that followed a script of democratization.

Analysis of the Middle East history and of the Islamic world since the First World War by Historians and writers on politics has been, at any rate until recently, marred by an assumption that events would follow a pattern set by Western history, and that an ineluctable secularization of society would be part of the pattern. The real struggle was between traditional social and political norms and ‘progressive’ developments, which included democracy, economic development and secular nationalism…\textsuperscript{92}

The intertwining of religion and monarchy was not only an interpretation proffered by theologians but ideas of legitimization adopted by Monarchs themselves as a means of legitimacy. The melding of monarchy and the spiritual is an ongoing aspect to monarchical dynamics throughout the world.\textsuperscript{93} In the creation of the ‘other’ the aspect of religion playing a mandatory part in monarchy remains. Hoppe asserts that Monarchical associations to Catholicism further displace them from the ideologies of the U.S.\textsuperscript{94} As discussed in the introduction, the U.S. plays an intrinsic role in contemporary perceptions of democracy, and therefore the ‘ideal’, hence the secularization, in principle, of governance is the ‘ideal’ and monarchy is firmly placed as exclusively

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 161-162.
\textsuperscript{93} There is still much ‘religious’ expectation in monarchies, if not stated outright than de facto. Dutch Reform Church in the Netherlands, Monaco and Liechtenstein legally must be Roman Catholic (while Spain it is de facto), Denmark, Norway and Sweden the sovereign must be Lutheran. Ibid., 226.
situated within the context of the irrational and arbitrary religious aspects of divine right. Divine right or natural order can be described as the legitimating factor of the overall dynamic of inequality that characterizes monarchy as the ‘other’ to the inherent equality of the ‘ideal’.

Inequality is one of the more broad normative values in the creation of monarchy as the ‘other’. It encompasses not only divine right or natural order as a comparison between accidental birth conferring supposed virtue against the popular sovereignty of democracy as ‘ideal’, but also a more feudal class entrenchment that can be brought under the term ‘subjugation’. In Mackenney’s book discussing monarchy, the subjugation of the manor is set against the ‘brotherhood’ of the township. Guillermo O’Donnell highlights the abhorrence of the notion of subjugation by indicating that; “an individual is not, and should never be seen as, a subject, a supplicant of the good will of the government or the state.” The understanding of subjugation extends to a lack of empowerment for the masses under unconstrained rulers that ensure class separation flourishes.

The assessment of citizen versus subject assumes citizenship provides control of the individual for the individual and therefore being subject to one’s own morality, whereas subjugation is being subject to the immorality of the aristocracy. Mackenney discusses monarchy as compared to the democratic assertions of townships prior to the nineteenth century, and the comparisons provide an immoral versus moral character framing. Mackenney discusses the financial irresponsibility of Kings, within allusions to an overall social irresponsibility of monarchs. He asserts that monarchs had a jealous relationship with townships, in that monarchs wished to convert the wealth of townships for themselves. Building upon the combative relationship between monarchy and democracy under the large normative umbrella of ‘equality’, the citizen versus subject relationship should be examined further. The negative attributes of natural order and divine right as well as class entrenchment that belongs to subjects assigned to the construct of monarchy is one half of the combative relationship. Citizens are assigned to

98 Ibid., 7.
democracy under the positive attributes of ‘rule of law’, which leads to a larger normative value of accountability, which is again drawn into the even broader normative value of equality.

Subjugation is portrayed in contrast to citizenship, that being the will of an aristocrat at the apex of a dictatorial governance structure versus the individual sovereignty and empowerment of citizenship within a democracy. As an example one can look to the assessment of democracy being where ‘rule of law’ exists, whereas in monarchy it is assumed ‘rule of law’ is absent. Much like the comparative between citizen and subject, the theme of ‘rule of law’ melds into division of power and the larger notion of accountability, and accountability is absorbed into a broader value laden frame that resides within the more all-encompassing normative of equality. O’Donnell indicates that being a subject within the state ends when a legal framework is established, and asserts that when there exists ‘equality before the law’ that there can exist equal treatment for everyone within government and society as a whole. O’Donnell directly ties ‘rule of law’ to citizenship and the absence of citizenship outside democracy: “What democracy has that these [Military dictatorship, Sultanistic autocracies, Absolute Monarchy] do not is citizens…”

Di Palma supports O’Donnell’s assessment by placing an aspect of rule of law as a means to equality solely within democracy; “…by legalizing equal access to institutional positions and by deploying them to countervail socioeconomic positions, democracy also corrects the unequal effects of social and economic privilege.” Kingsbury coincides with O’Donnell and Di Palma at the juncture of equality and rule of law, as Kingsbury refers to it as a social contract, with a direct reference to the absence of rule of law under monarchy: “Under absolute rule, a sovereign monarch or tyrant is not party to any contract but rules with unlimited authority. This is not a form of civil government because there is no neutral authority to decide disputes between the ruler

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100 Although the word ‘democracy’ is not used in O’Donnell’s quote, this is found in the Assessing the Quality of democracy book, so it is implied. Guillermo O’Donnell, “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” Assessing the quality of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP, 2005,) 4.

101 Ibid., 19.

and the citizen.”\textsuperscript{103} Kingsbury maintains that a freedom based on equality is born out of a system of accountability, among other notions of participation and representation,\textsuperscript{104} and although Kingsbury is a critic of contemporary normatives in governance theory, the above quote demonstrates that Kingsbury assumes that the accountability that exists as a result of ‘rule of law’ does not exist within monarchy, and therefore it can be inferred the equality framed around these notions does not exist within the frame of monarchy either.

Further to the assessment of Kingsbury one can look to the political author Renato Cristi’s assertions that Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Hegel attempt to create legitimacy for monarchy, which lacks accountability through an absence of a division of power.\textsuperscript{105} Cristi insists Hobbes and Montesquieu were against division of power in government, which Cristi argues is a part of constitutionalism, and that constitutionalism is a crux to division of power, and therefore rule of law. Cristi views Hegel’s theories of monarchical legitimacy as being similar to Hobbes, in the sense that monarchical sovereignty is key to monarchical governance. Cristi asserts both Hegel and Hobbes’ advocacy for monarchical sovereignty indicates a rejection of division of power and thereby constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{106} Cristi asserts that Hobbes, Montesquieu and Hegel all, in essence, support the old rationale of monarchical legitimacy that relied on natural order, and the virtue of the few over the incapacity of the many.\textsuperscript{107}

Hegel is seemingly attempting to re-establish a role for monarchy or a place for monarchy within the changing discourse of legitimate government during the early nineteenth century. Cristi critically assesses Hegel’s efforts as failing to provide monarchy with any legitimacy, as Cristi asserts that monarchy stands outside rule of law and therefore has no accountability: “Hegel assigns responsibility to crown councillors individually for all the objective ingredients that go into decision-making. At the same time, majesty absolves the monarch of any personal responsibility.”\textsuperscript{108} The theories of Hobbes, Montesquieu and Hegel as well as Cristi’s response to them is an example of the entrenchment of natural order and sovereignty of the throne as the frame of

\textsuperscript{103} Kingsbury is specifically referring to a lack of intermediary between executive and legislative branches of government, that being the judiciary. Damien Kingsbury, \textit{Political Development} (New York: Routledge, 2007,) 131.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{105} Renato Cristi, \textit{Hegel on Freedom and Authority} (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005,) 112-118.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 18.
monarchy against the frame of individual sovereignty and self-determinism that characterizes the contemporary democratic frame. Indeed, this comparison under citizen versus subject ultimately transforms into the broader frame of equality versus inequality.

Harold Laski, British political theorist and former Chairman of the Labour Party of Britain in the mid-twentieth century as well as American political theorist and author Frank Hardie wrote about the monarchical opposition to equality in the 1930s. Frank Hardie wrote: “The monarchy in its present form will last as long as inequality last[s], and not very much longer”¹⁰⁹ Harold Laski echoed Hardie’s sentiments but further entrenched the frame of equality of democracy and inequality of monarchy in comparing the Labour Party’s dedication to ending inequality and monarchy’s maintenance of inequality: “The whole impact of the crown and the social system it necessitates is to preserve that temper of inequality it is the purpose of the Labour Party to deny.”¹¹⁰

The division of the rise of discourse surrounding ideals of contemporary democracy from the old legitimization of monarchy and the embedded nature of equality versus inequality within that division is aptly summed up by John Dewey: “It is not accidental that the rise of interest in human nature coincided in time with the assertion in political matters of the rights of the people as a whole, over against the rights of a class supposedly ordained by God or Nature to exercise rule.”¹¹¹ Dewey is referencing the contemporary individualism in democracy, in other words, consideration of the individual over a class or social strata. Dewey’s statement relates to the above transition from natural order and divine right as rational for monarchy, to the rule of law and accountability insisted upon within the frame of democracy, culminating in the subject versus citizen and ultimately monarchy versus democracy framework that expresses the overarching normative value of equality.¹¹² The frame of subject versus citizen and the presence versus absence of rule of law also lead into ‘freedom’, another broad normative value that supposedly exists in democracy and is absent in monarchy.

Under the broad emotional frame of ‘freedom’ the comparison of citizen versus subject can be drawn on again, this time encompassing the broader notion of freedom

¹¹² Ibid., 104.
versus repression. As indicated above the frame of monarchy is without accountability, and contains the sovereignty of monarchy that is devoid of the rule of law and suffering from grandiose notions of superiority as ordained by God, according to theories of legitimacy under natural order and divine right. Cristi cites Montesquieu’s purporting of monarchical legitimacy against the incapacity of the masses; “…Montesquieu maintained that a democratic constitution depended on the virtue of citizens, and illustrated this view with a reference to revolutionary England in the seventeenth century and the vain efforts of its citizens to establish a democratic government. He blamed their failure on their lack of virtue.”¹¹³ Monarchy is easily assumed to have little stopping it from transforming into tyranny, ignoring the masses and having the capacity and character for violent suppression of the masses. Mackenney supports that assumption. He portrays townships pre-nineteenth century as benign and Princes as aggressive, as well as assuming general overall financial and social irresponsibility, Princes who were ‘jealous’ of the autonomy of townships, looking to take their wealth.¹¹⁴ Monarchy maintains a reputation of corruption, bad governance and violence against its citizens.¹¹⁵

Monarchy also came to be suppression of freedom at an international level under colonialism, which incorporates slavery.¹¹⁶ As it has been said about European states during the nineteenth century: “For the imperialists it was simply assumed that their values, techniques and idea system were universally applicable, and that ‘backwards’ peoples should welcome this gratuitous offering.”¹¹⁷ Weber has assumed a difference in a ‘subject’ relationship being voluntary and a slave relationship being involuntary,¹¹⁸ however, as Spellman has indicated monarchy has been firmly attached to colonialism and slavery¹¹⁹ therefore the ‘subject’ frame that has been firmly placed around monarchy in contemporary discourse is attached to slavery and can be assessed as one of suppression of freedom. Here again there is a frame of opposition; the ‘subject’ suffers

¹¹³ Renato Cristi, *Hegel on Freedom and Authority* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2005,)
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¹¹⁶ Ibid., 81-82.
¹¹⁷ Ibid., 228.
from a suppression of freedom whereas the ‘citizen’ is deemed ‘liberated’\textsuperscript{120} and gains freedom.

The last frame of opposition highlighted here will be one of linear progression and the idea that there will or should be a common transition in governance as progress, and those states that have not yet made the transition to ‘democracy’ are deemed ‘backward’. Di Palma suggests that authoritarian regimes (and defacto monarchy) lacks the ability to be progressive, asserting that authoritarian regimes, because of their closed society are; “…sluggish, inefficient, unable to adjust to changing times and irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{121} This is not a new assumption, as Mackenney points out that there had been an East versus West divide in Europe in the nineteenth century because monarchy was still in authoritative control in the East, as opposed to constitutional control, Eastern Europe was assumed to be backward both socially and economically.\textsuperscript{122}

The West versus ‘other’ comparison is still a part of the frame that drives the notion of democracy as ‘ideal’ and all else as ‘other’. Hoppe has surprisingly aptly described the historical point at which a shift to ‘ideal’ versus ‘other’ relationship became one of democracy versus other. Hoppe indicates that WWI went from a territorial conflict to an ideological conflict which was exacerbated when the United States joined the campaign: “…after the United States had entered the European war [WWI] and decisively determined its outcome, monarchies all but disappeared, and Europe along with the entire world entered the age of democratic republicanism.”\textsuperscript{123} The end of the First World War marked the transference to a particular idea of democracy deemed as ‘ideal’, as illustrated in the first chapter, and from that historic occurrence comes an enforcement of that ideology. As Spellman has indicated: “Every culture in every age is tempted to believe that its values and norms are the only right ones, and our present dim view of monarchy as a model of legitimate government is certainly no small illustration of this principle in action.”\textsuperscript{124}

The combative relationship between ‘ideal’ and ‘other’ encompasses the idea of striving for a better world. The linear progression mentioned in the previous paragraph

incorporates the combative relationship between the ‘ideal’ and ‘other’ into progressing toward the improvement of humanity, a lofty normative that creates a dynamic that supposes the ‘other’ holds back progress in every facet. Purdue highlights this assumption of progression while referring to WWI and President Wilson’s assumptions about the spread of democracy: “[President] Wilson’s naive belief that democracy and self-determination would result in governments dedicated cooperation and amity between states went hand in hand with the view that monarchy was an obstacle to a better world.”[125] Purdue sums up the oppositional relationship between democracy as ‘ideal’ and monarchy as ‘other’ within the context of an assumed linear progress of history, society and development.

3.3. Frame Actualization

The frame of the ‘other’ outlined above has evidence to support its merit. There are ample examples, historical and contemporarily, that support the notions of unaccountability, inequality, violence as order and absence of freedom within monarchical regimes. This section highlights a few examples, of the plethora that are available, of instances that make monarchy’s placement as the ‘other’ feasible and seem fitting. This project does not aim to further entrench the oppositional dynamic between democracy and monarchy, but to breakdown the frame as an all encompassing list of attributes that puts monarchy in strict opposition to democracy. To accomplish this task it is important to acknowledge the faults, dangers and catastrophes of Monarchies as a way forward in breaking down the defensive posture assumed within debates surrounding ideas of democracy and monarchy.

The unaccountability accusation levelled at monarchy is not unwarranted. There are many examples, particularly of financial unaccountability seen in monarchy. There are examples of the financial default of Kings, such as Edward the III of England and Henry II of France. The financial crises of 1557, spurred by major debts incurred by monarchs going to war and an attempted recovery of credit through public investment in government capital schemes such as bonds resulted in Spanish and French governments suspending payments for those who had invested, alludes to an overall

Unchecked social irresponsibility. More recently Philip Hall was denied access to Treasury Files and Royal Files of the United Kingdom in 1992, but pursued other evidence to uncover a history of Royal tax evasion and transfer of public monies into Monarch’s private funds. Unaccountability in monarchy includes succession policy and its resulting instability.

In Monarchies with familial succession there are issues of incompetence and a need to justify the incumbent to maintain the principle of regime structure. Primogeniture has the serious downfall of an inability for implementing leadership change, potentially resulting in violent overthrow and a focus on legitimizing unfit leaders, as well as manipulation of weaker leaders by surrounding political actors. The law of fratricide in the Islamic world in 1451 is an example of the primogeniture pitfalls that shape society with violence that extended to killing entire families, and even after the law was overturned in 1600 other methods, such as imprisonment, were used to maintain a violent grasp on power.

The violence extended beyond the inner circle of nobility to capture of territory and overthrow through war as a means of succession. The rampaging and sacking of land and peoples extends through the history of monarchical regimes, such as the Thirty Years War, the Medieval rampages through Italy and the border dispute of what later became known as Eastern Europe.

There is a potential for weaker monarchs to be controlled by external actors, within their family, their court, and their military and any contemporary with political capital, the Catholic Church through several centuries in Europe being a prime example. This potential unchecked manipulation extends outward to colonisation and

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the use of Regents. As Purdue points out in regards to monarchies in the Far East through the nineteenth century, “[t]hey performed their largely honorific roles in the dangerous gap between the demands of their colonial overlords and the nationalistic aspirations of their middle classes.”\textsuperscript{132} The previous quote also makes mention of Colonialism, a part of the larger theme of subjugation, inequality and continued establishment of that inequality in a feudal capacity through the tyrannical violence that has occurred under Kings, Queens, Sultans, Emperors and Empresses.

There are many examples of monarchs using violence to impose order. Spellman highlights the Ming Dynasty and Dowager Empress Cixi of China as an example of government corruption and government perpetuated violence.\textsuperscript{133} As mentioned in the above paragraph the violence of monarchical government extends out to Colonialism, under the rational of divine right, examples are prevalent even before the outset of European global navigation, such as Columbus and Henry ‘the Navigator’.\textsuperscript{134} The further entrenchment of the frame of monarchy as inequality can be associated to the building of Empires based out of slavery. Slavery was rampant in ancient Mesopotamia and extending to the widespread colonialism across oceans established by Europe.\textsuperscript{135} Indeed the assignment of unaccountability, inequality and subjugation to a monarchical regime structure is not without merit. However it is important to examine the evidence that demonstrates the defiance of these frames.

3.4. Frame Defiance

This section presents historical occurrences and argumentations that defy the frame construction of ‘ideal’ and ‘other’ concerning democracy and monarchy. Inequality and unaccountability as it relates to monarchy includes class stratification, which eliminates discourse between regime and citizen. Monarchies’ defiance of this frame of inequality in this instance includes examples showing that monarchy is not destined to neglect the masses or advocate a master-slave relationship as a broader societal representation of the natural state of ruler-ruled. These examples are seen in the

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Discovery, Invasion, Encounter: Sources and Interpretations} ed. Marvin Lunenfeld, (Lexington: D.C. Health, 1991.)
\textsuperscript{135} Kevin Bales and Becky Cornell, \textit{Slavery Today} (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2008,) 25-40.
political capital of the masses heeded to by monarchies, as well as monarchical political action that had established many humanitarian and social policies. Within the frame of unaccountability the political capital held by the masses can be revisited with examples of direct democratic action occurring within many monarchical regimes, as well as the utilisation of electoral methods as opposed to primogeniture. The attachment of monarchy to certain violence, and endless expansion of subjugation through war and conquering can be countered with examples of monarchical regimes being opposed to going to war, and demonstrating actions of the maintenance of peace. Finally this section highlighting frame defiance will touch on the aspect of monarchy being a signature of non-progression, or backwardness, and the idea that citizens would not want or choose a monarchical regime element in state governance. This last element will be expanded on more thoroughly in the final section of this chapter.

The frame of a presumed natural state of inequality under a monarchical regime is challenged by the examples of the provision of economic and social stability. One example is the economic stability provided by the Brazilian monarchy during a time of serious instability in the rest of South America. Latin America’s and Mexico’s transition into self-government was fraught with republics turning into military dictatorships and libertarian violence. Only in Brazil was massive violence averted and general stability and prosperity maintained by “embracing the monarchical principle.”

Brazil’s Monarchy in early part of the nineteenth century engaged in economic development to secure economic growth and increasing stability for the citizens of Brazil. These policies included opening ports to all nations, and proactive policy of agricultural diversity, nation building and cultural founding through infrastructure.

Demonstrations of social stability through nation building, and also citizen welfare are evident under certain Monarchies. Social stability via a relative nonviolent existence was provided for long periods of time by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Saudi Monarchy, and Iraq Monarchy by establishing peaceful coexistence between large states fractured by ethnic, familial and religious divisions at least for a period of time and in some instances long periods of time. While in some monarchical regimes social stability is arbitrating peace within a heterogeneous population, other monarchical regimes looked for social stability within social change in the direction of human and civil

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137 Ibid., 100-101.
rights. The Brazilian Monarch introduced a Constitution in 1824, which included the principles of having an elected Constituent Assembly, protection of personal property, toleration of non-Catholics and commitment to human rights. The Brazilian Monarchy also pressed to end slavery in Brazil. At the end of the nineteenth century the German Monarchy specifically but later the British Monarchy, began to become involved in social welfare such as factory standards or in essence work-place standards, universal elementary education, health services and housing. This social welfare element to monarchy continues into contemporary roles of monarchy according to Frank Prochaska. These examples provide a counterpoint to an all-encompassing frame of inequality within a monarchical regime and also lead into doubts regarding the all-encompassing frame of unaccountability.

139 W.M. Spellman, Monarchies 1000-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2001,) 102. This
141 W.M. Spellman, Monarchies 1000-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2001,) 216. This period is described still as Imperial Germany, and the King controlled many aspects of Parliament including selection of Ministers and Diplomats. These social initiatives were enacted through the political dominance of Count Otto Von Bismarck, who although sat within the Diet, the legislative body, was adamantly monarchist. “... [Bismarck believed] his duty was to aid the King is rescuing his native land from what he regarded as the insolent pretensions of the modern parliamentary spirit...”. “Count Otto von Bismarck,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, Vol. 41, No. 239. April 1, 1870, 648-661. American Antiquarian Society (AAS) Historical Periodicals Collection, Series 5. http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/ehost/areview/archiveviewer/archive?sid=2757552a-9023-4e3b-870acc99a0574827%40sessionmgr15&vid=6&hid=20&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3Qtbg%3d%3d#kw=true&acc=false&ipld=div5&ppld=divp18&twPV=null&xOff=0&yOff=0&zm=fl&fs=null&rot=0&hid=20&docMapOpen=true&pageMapOpen=true&AN=56451569&db=h9m (accessed June 2013). Bismarck’s’ enactment of social welfare policy sought to further entrench the Monarchy: “The social policy, resulting in a system of health insurance in 1883, accident insurance in 1884 and old age and invalidity insurance in 1889 also arose in part from Bismarck’s desire to find a way of taking the life out of the parliamentary party system. Nevertheless it was the most remarkable and long-lasting achievement of Bismarck’s last decade in office. The growing army of property-poor workers were to be tied directly to the state and the wind was to be taken out of the sails of the socialists. By becoming a pensioner of the state the worker would acquire a conservative mentality and a loyalty to the monarchical state. The roots of social policy were obviously broader than these immediate political motives.” Feuchtwanger, Edgar. Imperial Germany 1850-1918, ed. Taylor and Francis. 2002. http://lib.mylibrary.com?ID=35425 (accessed June 2013,) 85. Within the British context of social welfare and monarchy, the policies take on a philanthropic means of delivery. Frank Prochaska discusses the engagement of the monarchy and the welfare state notion all the way back to George III, with a highlight on the extensive works of Queen Victoria particularly regarding expanding healthcare facilities. Frank Prochaska, Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare Monarchy (Yale UP, 1995).
The frame of unaccountability under a monarchical regime is challenged by the examples of direct democratic action pursued by citizenry and influencing state policy, as well as forms of ascension that do not use strictly male primogeniture. Purdue indicates, “Monarchies, like governments, needed popular support.” Monarchies need political capital, and contemporary democracy does not have the monopoly on popular movements engaging with or pressuring government. Revolt, protest, demonstrations, and uprisings through early modern Europe as well as contemporary Western democracies often are demanding change in policy or governmental actors as opposed to regime change. As Jack A. Goldstone indicates: “Revolutions have often been depicted as struggles between the ‘bad’ defenders of a dying social order and the ‘good’ builders of a new one; successful revolutions should therefore put an end to outmoded ideas and institutions and usher in a new era... however, revolutions are not provoked by a battle between the past and the future, or between good and evil; they are instead provoked by imbalances between human institutions and the environment...” In referring back to Goldstone’s point, revolution is often evolved out of the incapacity or refusal to change or adapt to the changing environment. Spellman sums up the ability for monarchy to remain as a relevant governance structure in a simplistic way: “... as long as Europe’s monarchs took cognizance of the changing urban and industrial society, popular support for the political system would continue.” In essence protest as a method of direct democratic discourse is something both contemporary Western democracies and monarchies can and do utilise as a means of holding a regime to account.

Due to the contemporary focus on electoral methods as being directly linked to the frame of democracy it is important to note that monarchical regimes can engage in electoral methods or less stringent male primogeniture ascension policies. Indeed,

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through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Poland had an elected Monarch.\textsuperscript{147} In many ways democratic systems headed by a President reflect the efforts of Alexander Hamilton in pursuit of an elected monarch as part of the new American regime post-American War of Independence. Later examples of utilising ballot style direct democratic methods include the post WWII referendum in Belgium in 1950, which produced a 57\% majority in favour of monarchical return. Whereas in Italy the Monarchy respected the results of a referendum indicating 59\% of the population were in favour of removal of the Monarchy.\textsuperscript{148} There are other methods less reliant on strict forms of primogeniture that involves consultation in the succession process.\textsuperscript{149} In other words, male primogeniture is not mandatory to the definition of the monarchical regime, and historical examples demonstrate that there is the capacity to alter succession methods within monarchical regimes.

The frame of violence as subjugation within a monarchical regime is challenged by examples of monarchical regimes advocacy of tolerance among citizenry, avoidance of war, and policies opposed to oppression. The King Henry IV of France enacted the Edict of Nantes in 1598, ending the French Wars of Religion by officially "recognizing French Protestants as a legally protected religious minority."\textsuperscript{150} Emperor Charles V of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire advised his son and successor the importance of devotion from the masses through love over violence. “ It is certain that people submit to the rule of their princes more readily of their own free will than when they are kept in strict bondage, and that one can retain their services better by love than violence. I admit that the power which rests on a sovereign’s gentle kindness is less absolute than that which rests on fear; but one must also agree that it is mote solid and enduring…”\textsuperscript{151}

Examples of a desire to avoid conflict include the Greek Monarch during WWI. In 1916 and 1917 there were two government powers in Greece, one led by Eleftherios

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\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 199. This refers to the Monarchy of Saudi Arabia, with examples of ineffective leaders being replaced by family council during the middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.


\textsuperscript{151} Emperor Charles V, “Advice to his son (Phillip II), 1555,” \textit{Humanism and the Northern Renaissance}, ed. Kenneth R. Bartlett and Margaret McGlynn (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2000,) 434. Further evidence of frame defiance in Emperor Charles V of Spain’s writing is the notion of justice. He advocated for an examination of the circumstances, persons, place and time, to be included in considerations of justice matters. Ibid., 435.
Venizelos who was the Prime Minister and King Constantine. Vinizelos wanted to join the Entent powers, with the expectation of victory and increasing Greece’s territory at the expense of the Ottoman’s, and the King wished to remain neutral. Another example is that of Spanish Monarch Juan Carlos, who became King in 1969. King Juan Carlos was a major party in steering Spain away from the authoritarianism of General Franco to a parliamentary system with a presiding monarchy peacefully. As cited previously, the Brazilian Monarchy were abolitionists, this press for an end to slavery confronted the Elected Assembly’s insistence on maintaining slavery in Brazil to keep the support of sugar magnates, and eventually became one of the reasons for the exile of the Brazilian Monarchy. While Brazil was the last state in the Americas to end slavery in 1888 at the insistence of the monarchy, it is important to note that legal slavery and slave trade had ended in the British Empire entirely by 1833, while it remained in the United States until 1865, demonstrating that changes in policy of a humanitarian nature is not entirely dependent on the type of regime. A grasping of power at all costs and an inability to co-opt political control are a part of the frame of subjugation. Throughout monarchical existence there has often been a requirement to compromise in consultation with other estates, as will be further discussed in a more contemporary context during the final section of this chapter.

The above examples of frame defiance are certainly not exhaustive, nor can they be given the breadth of this project. Rather, the goal of this section is to, at the very least, disjoint the all-encompassing contemporary framework of monarchy. It would be preferable to offer a chapter for each aspect noted within the section of ‘Frame Construction’ to provide a more expanded perspective on the attributes, but there is really only enough room to say, they are not as bad as one imagines.

After WWII liberation from fascism and decolonisation invigorated the spread of democracy often to find that there was ample failure in the attempts to transplant the Western model of democracy. The prospect of debating different styles of governance including monarchy does not automatically eliminate the principles of rule of law, or other

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153 Ibid., 204-205.
aspects of contemporary democracy, but rather demands a closer examination of the
drawbacks and advantages of differing regime structures, as well as if and how they can
work together.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{3.5. Re-framing: Attempts to Come Into the Fold of the Ideal}

Monarchy has made attempts to re-frame itself and come into the fold of the
‘idea’, by redefining its role through the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries. Until this point, this
project has not made a distinction between monarchy as absolute or constitutional; this
is because the dichotomy presented here is less focussed on portraying a certain picture
of what is contained in a monarchical governance structure., and more concerned with
establishing the emotional frameworks attached to the term ‘monarchy’. This project
also engaged in discerning how these frameworks came about and how it effects a
discussion regarding governance theory.

As this project implicates the Western context, it is necessary to further evaluate
the notion of monarchy, or the attempt to re-define or re-frame monarchy within the
changing frameworks of legitimacy. In essence, the attempt to jar the term ‘monarchy’
out of the frame of the ‘other’ and bring it into the fold of the ‘ideal’. The idea of
constitutional monarchy will now be specifically explored, especially because it
engenders the desire to ingrain itself into liberal or procedural democracy.

‘Ideal’ versus ‘other’ in the case of monarchy has not come about inherently
rather a large shift in ideas of legitimacy and legitimate government, and hence requires
monarchy as a portion of governance to alter itself to remain legitimate. In this section
there are three dynamics of attempted re-framing, or what can be at this point termed
legitimization, that monarchy has attempted to conform to in order to shed the frame of
the ‘other’. The three dynamics of attempted re-framing of monarchical legitimacy are
the creation of a humanitarian role for monarchy; monarchy as a symbol of nationalism
and a place for monarchy to remain as a check on power within the governance
structure of democracy. The example of remaining integrated within governance will be
the most expanded upon aspect, as this project aims to demonstrate the framing of the
term ‘monarchy’ as it relates to governance theory. These examples will be referenced

\textsuperscript{158} Hans-Adam II Reigning Price of Liechtenstein, \textit{The State in the Third Millennium}
(Liechtenstein: BVD Druck & Verlag AG, 2009,) 45.
specifically to the British Monarchy at this stage in the project; as mentioned previously, the most obvious attempts to transition from the monarchical ‘other’ to democracy ‘ideal’ in a Western context occurs in a constitutional monarchy. This will also become relevant later in chapter three when discussing the example of the 2008 prorogation issue in Canada.

The thought of monarchy taking on the role of the welfare state was touched on earlier in this chapter under ‘Frame Defiance’. There has been an argument put forward by some scholars indicating the decline in the social state in favour of the neo-liberal state has resulted in the ability for the Monarchy to fill the humanitarian gap. As an expansion of this point within the understanding of reframing of the Monarchy Frank Prochaska “argues that [monarchy] has remained relevant, and thwarted republicanism and socialism because it created a new role as a focus for civil society through its patronage of charities and its ‘highly visible public-spirited social service’.”

Through the early to mid-20th century patronages and public appearances had escalated for the Monarchy, attempting to embody and serve public values.

The attempted re-framing through humanitarianism is somewhat encapsulated with the larger role of symbol. The legitimizing of Monarchy as a symbol includes national identity, culture, government legitimacy and unity. In some ways this is continuous through history, as several examples above within the section entitled ‘Frame Defiance’ demonstrate that the governance structure of monarchy may provide for nation building and social stability within states containing heterogeneous populations, such as Canada. The Monarchy as a symbol seems a kind of intangible dynamic of legitimacy

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that grasps somewhere between Weber’s ‘traditional’ and ‘charismatic’ authority,\textsuperscript{163} and calls upon the idea of a ‘dignified’ symbol of government proffered by Walter Bagehot.\textsuperscript{164}

The attempt has been, and continues to be made, in re-framing monarchy within liberal democracy by establishing new legitimizing roles within constitutional democracy. Western monarchies saw a transformation over the course of the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, by relegating the monarchic components of government to largely symbolic roles and ensuring democratic control and accountability for the functional elements that direct public policy. As a result constitutional monarchies drew from the legitimacy afforded liberal democracies; in this sense, a defining feature of the ‘ideal’ was incorporated into the ‘other’.

Walter Bagehot features as a scholar who characterized the new era of a role for the Constitutional Monarchy. Walter Bagehot is described as an enduring influence in the monarchy dialectic. Bagehot wrote \textit{The English Constitution} in 1867, which discusses roles of the different governing institutions of England, including the role of monarchy. His writings are considered to be a, then-groundbreaking, re-evaluation of the role for monarchy within a constitutional monarchical setting. Moving away from the warrior king of protection and organization to the symbolic king, which under Bagehot formed the oft-cited contemporary role of the Monarch; to advise, consult or encourage and to warn the democratic decision makers.\textsuperscript{165}

Bagehot’s role for the Constitutional Monarch seemingly helped form a newly integrated role for monarchy within liberal democratic governance, and is further


rationalized contemporarily under the notion of convention and as a check on power. Conventions provide, in this case, for the malleability of the relationship between Parliament, the elected body, and the Monarch.\footnote{Andrew Heard, \textit{Canadian Constitutional Conventions} (Don Mills: Oxford UP, 1991,) 16. And Nathan Tidridge, \textit{Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government} (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 57.} This changing relationship has altered the role of the Monarchy, and the vast majority of governance power held within the Monarch is directed through elected ministers.\footnote{Ibid., 65.} This leaves a very limited role for Monarchy to exercise independent action within governance through ‘reserve powers’ or ‘royal prerogative’, which includes certain instances of dissolving parliament, appointing ministers or calling an election.\footnote{Ibid., 57.} These powers are meant as a final check on the power of elected ministers.

There is some general agreement amongst political scholars that democratic models require checks on power.\footnote{Damien Kingsbury, \textit{Political Development} (New York: Routledge, 2007,) 104.} Under the contemporary governance structure of constitutional monarchy there are many scholars that affirm the new position of the Monarchy is to provide a check on power.\footnote{Canada. \textit{A Crown of Maples: Constitutional Monarchy in Canada} (Gatineau: State Ceremonial and Corporate Events Directorate, Department of Canadian Heritage, 2012,) 16. David Smith, \textit{The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995,) 181. And Nathan Tidridge, \textit{Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government} (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 65. And Nathan Tidridge, \textit{Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government} (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 65. } Nathan Tidridge provided an excellent analogy; the Monarchy within the Western constitutional monarchy structure is like a fire extinguisher. It is not necessary to use it everyday, but it is necessary to maintain in case of emergencies.\footnote{Nathan Tidridge, \textit{Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government} (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 65.} The attempted re-framing of monarchy from the late 19th century onward has brought the Monarch into ideas of humanitarianism, symbolism, and as a check on power under the ‘ideal’ of democracy; however it has not dissociated the frame built up over time.

Despite its evolution, Monarchy has not successfully unburdened itself from the frameworks of inequality, slavery, unaccountability, and an unwanted relic that have come to insolate to term ‘monarchy’. For many people, the re-positioning and reframing of the Monarch in the Western context under constitutional monarchy has not alleviated the ‘gut’ response to the term ‘monarchy’ that has been established through protracted discourse up to and including the 21st century. The established frame is evident within
the many contemporary critiques of monarchy. The new facets of attempted monarchical reframing come under the same frame of the ‘other’, such as Monarchy as humanitarian or symbol. Critical perspective indicates that it is a poor attempt to bring monarchy into the fold of the ‘ideal’ and often uses language that coincides to the frame of the ‘other’ established in this project.

The humanitarian or welfare state role of the Monarchy is critiqued under the notion of inequality, meaning if the royal ‘Them’ were not endowed with such wealth to greedily and abhorrently spend and misuse on themselves,172 perhaps then there would be more for the elected government to spend on the welfare state.173 The Monarch as a symbol in a contemporary context was promulgated by Walter Bagehot’s theory of ‘disguise’, and was never intended to truly carve out a new role for monarchy, and therefore does nothing to alleviate the notion of monarchy being an unaccountable relic.

Monarchy as a symbol according to Bagehot was not that of nation building or national identity creation, but rather the symbol of a government but not the action of a government. Bagehot referred to this kind of symbology as the “DISGUISE” that concealed the real rulers, that being the cabinet government in a parliament, from the unimaginative, non-intellectual and impassioned masses. Bagehot described this disguise as the most important role of the Monarchy at that time.174 There are political


authors that do not think Bagehot has contributed to the monarchical debate, but rather further confused the issue. Frank Prochaska describes Bagehot’s text as a hindrance to a truly accessible and critical evaluation of the role of monarchy, describing Bagehot’s arguments as; “…some fine, misleading phrases, which have besotted monarchists and constitutional writers ever since.”

Bagehot assigns disparaging assessments of monarchy on two accounts, as a façade of uncomplicated government to ‘disguise’ the complex functionality of the elected branch of government, and the ineptitude of monarchy itself. Bagehot clearly indicates that the majority of the population is plagued with a form stupidity that defies intellectual argumentation and relies heavily on traditional foundation, which stagnates progress.

Let an accomplished man try what seems to him most obvious, most certain, most palpable in intellectual matters, upon the housemaid and footman, and he will find that what he says seems unintelligible, confused, and erroneous… Great communities are like great mountains – they have in them the primary, secondary, and tertiary strata of human progress; the characteristics of the lower regions resemble the life of old times rather than the present life of the higher regions… A republic has only difficult ideas in government; a Constitutional Monarchy has an easy idea too; it has a comprehensible element for the vacant many, as well as complex laws and notions for the inquiring few.

Bagehot indicates that the most important role for monarchy is the disguise that shrouds real ruling government in order to maintain the loyalty of the ignorant masses. As Bagehot has indicated, “…to be a viable symbol of unity to those still so imperfectly educated as to need a symbol.”

Bagehot’s assertion that the dynamic of the Monarch as ‘disguise’ is the most important role leaves room for one to rationalize that Bagehot is intent on creating a very passive and eroding role for Monarchy, to eventually be phased out entirely once the popular notion of stable government is passed onto elected ministers, which it presently is. Bagehot indicates that a good monarch is one who knows when to intervene and when to extricate themselves from governmental affairs, but more often than not, the

177 Ibid., 40.
monarch gets it wrong. “If we look at history, we shall find that it is only during the period of the present reign that in England the duties of a constitutional sovereign have ever been well performed.” It seems Bagehot did not assign much weight to the three royal rights to consult, to advise and to warn, as they are not a new important role for monarchy but instead guides to keeping monarchs out of direct decision-making.

Through the new re-framing of monarchy under the guise of advise, consult and warn, one can argue that monarchy really is placed in a position of being phased out. Monarchy is continuously being pushed towards a strictly symbolic role that is even more diminished further restricting the governance role of the Monarchy under ‘advise, consult, and warn’. This seems to further embed the notion of Monarchy being

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179 Walter Bagehot. *The English Constitution*. 1867. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4351/4351-h/4351-h.htm> The Gutenberg Project. Posting Date August 11, 2009, 53. From: W. Bagehot *The English Constitution*. Ed. M. Taylor (Oxford, 2001). It really seems as though Bagehot is maintaining posterity by asserting all monarchs previous to the present executed the office poorly. The statement smacks of saving face for certain political circles. Bagehot is essentially saying that all other monarchs were terrible at their post, except the one reigning at the authorship of his *The English Constitution*, how convenient for his criticisms not to apply.


181 Nathan Tidridge is speaking specifically about the Royal assent of Bills, however the sentiment can be more broadly applied. “When a prerogative is not exercised for a prolonged period of time, a perception is created that it is no longer relevant which over time turns onto fact.” Nathan Tidridge, *Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government* (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 68.


183 Paul Richards advocates the delivery of the throne speech goes to the Speaker and that the Monarchy not be involved in the opening of Parliament. Also, the speech should begin “Our government will...” instead of the current monarchical reference to the Crown’s government. Richards indicates that “[t]his is not a question of semantics, it goes to the heart of whether Britons are citizens or subjects.” Paul Richards, “Long To Reign Over Us?” *Fabian Society*, No. 576,. (London: College Hill Press, August 1996,) 13. Emmett Macfarlane wrote this in reference to the Canadian government talks with First Nations, which have historically included a place for the Governor General as the representative of the Queen. “The governor general’s role is almost entirely symbolic, in that it reflects the source of sovereign power in the Canadian state. But that power should only be exercised by state institutions, comprising the executive, legislature and judiciary. The governor general plays no political or policy role...Nor does the Queen, for that matter, and if she tried, it would rightly be regarded as an affront to Canadian constitutionalism.” Emmett Macfarlane, “On the power of the Governor General A debate about the role of the David Johnston may seem arcane, but it’s also revealing,” *Maclean’s*, (January 11, 2013). http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/01/11/on-idle-no-more-the-governor-general-should-remain-idle/ (accessed May 2013). Canadian Member of Parliament Pat Martin advocates stripping mention of Monarch from the swearing of allegiance when becoming a new Canadian: “It’s just so fundamentally wrong...These people are from all over the world — Paraguay and the Congo and the Philippines and Vietnam. Why are they swearing loyalty to some colonial vestigial appendage from the House of Windsor? It’s bizarre really.” Dean Flannery, “Should Canada sever ties with
illegitimate and thereby unaccountable in the ‘ideal’ of democratic policy or decision-making. The re-framing of monarchy has not dissuaded the use of divine right, despotism and slavery as applicable to the contemporary frame of monarchy, which comes with it the projection of the ‘other’ described earlier in this chapter. In essence


184 “In truth, we have no real idea about the extent to which the Queen remains impartial or interferes in the business of government. We simply don’t know what she has been saying to our prime ministers all these years in her weekly briefings. We don’t know if she, like her son Charles, has ever used her position to influence government policy. And there is a broader question about the monarch’s constitutional role: if it is her job to ‘advise, warn and be consulted’ then by what criteria does she offer such advice and warnings and on what democratic authority and with what legitimacy does she offer such advice? “ “60 Inglorious Years: A proactive reassessment of the Queen’s Record,” abstract, Republic: Campaigning for a democratic Alternative to the Monarchy. http://www.republic.org.uk/updates/?page_id=365 (accessed June 2013).

Jason Groves, “Fresh ‘meddling’ fears as it emerges Prince Charles has held private talks with eight ministers in the past year,” The Daily Mail (December 29, 2012).


And Robert Booth, “Prince Charles’s ‘meddling’: a royal right, or a privilege too far? Constitutional experts say the Prince of Wales has a ‘duty’ to stay out of political controversy,” The Guardian (June 30, 2010).


185 “60 Inglorious Years: A proactive reassessment of the Queen’s Record,” abstract, Republic: Campaigning for a democratic Alternative to the Monarchy. http://www.republic.org.uk/updates/?page_id=365 (accessed June 2013). “The Queen is the Lord’s Anointed, called by Him to reign over us. She is, by right of blood and birth, hereditary supreme governor of the Church of England. That obliges her to make speeches to various gatherings of the Anglican communion, and she can hardly be expected to include a passage which explains that it is no longer synonymous with a country from which it takes its name. It all adds up to the simple fact that the notion of an established church - associating the monarch not even with the whole religion but with a denomination - is an absurd anachronism that has no place in a multicultural society.” Roy Hattersley, “ER has no divine right. She might be the Lord’s Anointed, but the Queen should not show her partiality for one faith.” The Guardian (November 21, 2005). http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/nov/21/monarchy.religion (accessed June 2013).

“… the entire notion of monarchy is pretty bizarre when you get down to it, too. The idea that there are such things as kings, queens, princes and princesses at all, and that they come by their right to proclaim themselves as such divinely — wow, that’s kooky.” Dean Flannery, “Should Canada sever ties with the British monarchy? Does it make sense that Canadian citizens swear an oath of loyalty to the Queen of England? We look at the proposed solution,” Chatelaine (April 22, 2013). http://www.chatelaine.com/living/should-canada-sever-ties-with-the-british-monarchy/ (accessed July 2013).

186 “[T]he monarchy is a relic of despotic feudal power - a left-over from an era of absolute power, where a supposed divinely-ordained ruler literally lorded it over the British people.” Peter Tatchell, “Goodbye to Royalty: Monarchy is Incompatible with democracy. It is time Britain elected its head of state,” The Guardian (June 1, 2007).


the frame of monarchy being contrary to progress as an outmoded governance structure and inherently anti-democratic, remains.\textsuperscript{188}

Democracy and monarchy should no longer be looked at as directly oppositional. Monarchy, like procedural democracy, can be transformative and malleable, as conventions in some ways demonstrate. ‘Democracy’ needs to be pried away from the procedural democracy understanding. Extreme idealism in democracy is as dangerous as extreme idealism in monarchy. As Kaplan suggests; “Though the swing toward democracy following the Cold War was a triumph for liberal philosophy, the pendulum will come to rest where it belongs- in the middle, between the ideals of Berlin and the realities of Hobbes. Where a political system leans too far in either direction, realignment or disaster awaits.”\textsuperscript{189}

The final chapter discusses the contemporary relevance of this issue. The international example via the mandated democratization of the U.N. that creates an expectation of states to follow a pattern of regime development in order to participate in global economic development will be discussed, with the focus being the example of Bhutan’s transition from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy. The Final chapter will also highlight the Canadian example, concerning how the Canadian Constitutional Monarchy can stand up to a debate addled with a framework that may create a serious barrier to discourse. The prorogation of parliament in 2008, the role of the Governor General and the rhetoric of the Harper government will be the specific event drawn upon to provide a rough estimate of the impact the contemporary framework appears to have on Canada’s internal governance structure.


4. **Chapter 3: The Effect of the Framework: Development and Dialogue**

At this point the reader must be questioning why this topic is relevant, or why is there a need to discuss monarchy at all? The simplest answer is that monarchy still exists. There are unresolved issues regarding governance structures that maintain, or are transitioning out of absolute monarchy; and certainly there are contentions deeply affected by these contemporary frameworks within constitutional monarchies such as Canada. Within the first two chapters there has been a demonstration of the constructed aspect of the term ‘monarchy’, with the construction having a comparative dynamic against the term ‘democracy’. Within this chapter there will be an introductory discussion of the impacts of these frameworks against international development and the internal governance structure of a constitutional monarchy, specifically Canada. This chapter aims to provide the reader with a sense of the importance of these contemporary frameworks of ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’. That importance is represented in the stunting of the capacity for debate regarding the use, effectiveness, or transformative capacity of monarchy as a governance structure, demanding the framework of ‘democracy’ set forth in this essay to be the model for successful and ‘ideal’ aspects of democracy.

The discussion surrounding the enclosure of democracies and state governance development into a specific kind of democracy is a lengthy one, therefore the examples given here are just an opening to the importance of understanding the impacts of such frameworks, and hopefully to raise the debate to a new openness, not contingent on a singular understanding of democracy as being applicable only within a certain method, highlighted in chapter one. This chapter does not aim to further layout an all-encompassing debate or application of the frameworks presented within this project.

Within UN Documentation, there can be seen the noted importance placed of developing states to develop democracy within the logistical framework indicated in chapter one, as a measure of moving towards the ‘ideal’ of democracy and the rewards and further respect from the international community that comes with such compliance.
For the purpose of demonstrating the potential inhibition of debate and a drive for
democratic governance structures, a specific example will be offered as a demonstration
of international development effected by the contemporary framework of monarchy. The
example that will be presented here is the example of Bhutan’s transition from Absolute
Monarchy to a Constitutional Monarchy.

The example of Bhutan provides a reasonable questioning of the ability of states,
regardless of functionality within their borders, to participate or have their voices heard at
the international level or to participate in global economics if they are not complicit with
democratization within the vision of the United Nations. Bhutan had been an
independent Absolute Monarchy since the early twentieth century, prior to which power
was shared between the Premier and the Spiritual Authority.  

Under Absolute Monarchy Bhutan enacted many policies concerning the well being of the population and the
environment. The population in general was not advocating or desirous of a change in
governance structure, and the public expressed reservations about shifting towards
(procedural) democracy. “Democracy was not introduced because of strong and
organized demands coming from citizens, who felt that parties could be their most

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effective channel of representation and voice.” However, it seems that Bhutan was required to follow the UN ideals of democratic development in order to participate in UN funded economic, education and health development.

To further iterate the earlier discussion in chapter one regarding the theory of ‘donors of exclusive knowledge’, the UN has a continued mandate for global democratization, a democratization that has taken on the very specific form of liberal or representative democracy, referenced within this essay as ‘procedural’ democracy. Within the UN, which holds many resources, there is a correlation drawn between democracy and development. Amongst the list of reasons states democratize includes what can be termed as low-key international pressure. This is premised on advocating democracy as the best form of governance and reinforcing that claim with foreign aid, which not only goes to administration and organization of the new governance structure, but also in development of civil-society, including education and overall income, with the stipulation of democratic reforms being initiated. This seems to be a potentially strong motivating factor in the case of Bhutan, given their economic and geographical circumstances.

Bhutan was economically dependent on India and as a result political concessions were made to India. In 1949 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation led to an acceptance of advice and guidance from India on foreign policy. Between 1981

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197 Mark Turner, Sonam Chuki and Jit Tshering, “Democratization by decree: the case of Bhutan,” Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 1. (2011,) 194. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.532626 (accessed June 2013). While the authors believe that this is a limited influence in the case of Bhutan, the presentation of Bhutanese reliance on foreign aid from India in the following paragraph, and therefore that control on foreign affairs forfeited to India in exchange would indicate a concrete motive for Bhutan to diversify actors providing aid.)
and 2001 86.5% of Bhutan’s exports went to India, and 79% of imports came from India.
Up until 1991 the State Bank of India was the only institution providing Foreign Direct
Investment to Bhutan, and foreign aid was mostly produced by India, including extensive
road building and hydroelectric projects, which had been mainly funded by India.\(^{198}\) This
would certainly indicate a desire to diversify economic partners in order to be less
beholden to one. In 1990 the Monarch of Bhutan outlined the rational for democratization
in Bhutan, that being Bhutan’s security in the world, national integrity and enhancing
Gross National Happiness.\(^{199}\) The opportunity to achieve such goals and for accessing
development monies through the United Nations certainly presented itself through the
Millennium Development Goals programme of the UN, specifically goal eight, which
promises development assistance and comprehensive debt reduction with a focus on
small land-locked countries carrying high debt.\(^{200}\)
A report produced at a UN Development Goals conference in 2008 is an example
of Bhutan’s understanding of the requirement for compliance to UN democratization
models in relation to receiving development funds, as Paw Panjo the representative of
Bhutan, first reported successful elections. “The formation of the new Parliament and
subsequent adoption of the first written Constitution would affirm Bhutan’s transition into
a democratic constitutional monarchy.”\(^{201}\) This statement was immediately followed by
the affirmation that Bhutan is fully committed to achieving millennium development
goals.\(^{202}\) The international investment in Bhutan has diversified greatly now including
Denmark, Switzerland, Austria, Japan, the United Nations Development Programme, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank, much of
which goes into infrastructure development.\(^{203}\) The example of Bhutan provides a space

\(^{198}\) Ibid., 195.
\(^{199}\) Ibid., 201.
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%202010%20En%20r15%20-
low%20res%2020100615%20-.pdf (accessed December 2010). Bhutan is carrying high debts,
crossing debt thresholds. World Bank, “Bhutan: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis,”
(October 2007,), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-
1190907436115/DSAFY08Bhutan.pdf (accessed December 2010).
\(^{201}\) United Nations, “Failure not an Option on Road to 2015, General Assembly President Says, as
he Proposes annual ‘stock-taking’ debates on Millennium Development Goals,” Department of
Public Information-News and Media Division (New York: General assembly, United Nations,
September 2010).
\(^{202}\) Ibid.
to reasonably question the effects of the dichotomy between monarchy and democracy, and to be aware of this dichotomy as it presents itself in the constraint of inclusion at the international development level.

The Canadian polity provides a second example of the importance of identifying the dichotomy of ‘ideal’ and ‘other’ between democracy and monarchy. The dichotomy presented within this project is present within the contemporary understanding, or lack there of, of the presence, use, and capacity of monarchy within the Canadian governance structure. The example of the impact of this dichotomy of discourse can be seen within the specific example of the Harper government prorogation of Parliament in 2008.

To provide some context it is necessary to delineate the Monarchical structure within Canada. Under the Constitution Act of 1867 the executive government of Canada is vested in the monarch, the Queen is the Head of State, and is represented by the Governor General at the national level, as well as the Lieutenant Governors of each province. The conventions that have changed the relationship between the legislative body and the role of the Monarch and Her representatives mentioned in Chapter two apply also to the Canadian relationship between the elected ministers and the Crown. In the normal course of events the monarch’s representatives merely give symbolic approval to decisions made by the elected actors in cabinet and the legislature. On rare occasions, however, the governors have personal reserve powers to exercise independent of what their ministers might advise. It is when these reserve powers are ever used that the potential clash between democracy and is seen most clearly in Canadian politics. Because the example of prorogation in this instance is at the Federal level, this project will focus on delineating the relationship between the Governor General and Parliament, specifically the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister essentially selects the Governor General as the representative of the Head of State, sometimes without consultation with Cabinet. The recommendation is made to the Queen, and She officially appoints the Governor General. The Governor General does not have a set tenure, but as per convention, it is about five years. Dismissal of the Governor General is also at the initiative of Cabinet, in

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a way making the Governor General a “subordinate” to the executive.\textsuperscript{205} The Queen would again be ultimately the one to officially dismiss the Governor General, and may refuse such a request. The reserve powers outlined in chapter two are supposedly within the prerogative capacity of the Governor General, and include the ability to refuse advice, appoint ministers, dismiss parliament and call an election.\textsuperscript{206} When these powers are exercised, there is the potential to challenge the legitimacy of the Queen’s representatives contradicting decisions made by the elected leaders.

David E. Smith asserts that there is a Canadian ambivalence towards identifying as either a republic or monarchy, or just generally discussing the crown.\textsuperscript{207} Smith attributes a portion of this ambivalence to the geographical proximity to the United States\textsuperscript{208}, mirrored by the assertions within this project of a cultural integration of conceptualization of governance propagated by the United States and into a broader contemporary ideal of democracy. Smith indicates, in sum, that because Canadians do not necessarily understand the ‘meaning’ or role of Canadian Monarchy it is folly to attempt a dynamic merit-based comparison between monarchy and republicanism.\textsuperscript{209} Smith has a point to some degree in assuming an ambivalent Canadian populace based on several polls indicating a rather even split in public opinion regarding the Monarchy in Canada. Support for abolition is split, and continues to stay just below the 50% mark.\textsuperscript{210}

Further to this point Smith says: “The juxtaposition of monarchy and democracy is stark

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 172-174.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Nathan Tidridge, \textit{Canada’s Constitutional Monarchy: An Introduction to Our Form of Government} (Toronto: Dundurn Group, 2011,) 67.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 57.
\item \textsuperscript{210} “Trust and the Monarchy: An Examination of the Shifting Public Attitudes Toward Government and Institutions,” Study commissioned by CBC, Toronto Star, SRC, La Presse. Study Conducted by \textit{EKOS Research Associates Inc.} Frank Graves (President) and Christian Boucher (Senior Director) (May 1-16, 2002). www.ekos.com/admin/articles/31may2002.pdf (accessed June 2013). The 2002 study by EKOS revealed a steep polarization in the opinion of monarchical relevance, abolition and overall of the presence of monarchy being regressive; there is an overwhelming lack of understanding of the role of monarchy. As an example, this study showed 69% of Canadians thought the Prime Minister is the Head of State, while only 5% said the Queen and 9% saying the Governor General. The general ignorance of Canadians around the Parliamentary governance structure in place in Canada in echoed by an Ipsos Reid poll produced in 2008, revealing that 51% of Canadian believe the Prime Minister is directly elected. David E. Smith, “The Crown and the Constitution: Sustaining Democracy?” \textit{The Evolving Canadian Crown}, ed. Jennifer Smith and D. Michael Jackson (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s UP, 2012,) 59.
\end{itemize}
because two millennia ago Aristotle saw them as incompatible forms of government. While this statement is a serious oversimplification of the premise presented within the first two chapters, it does hit on the foundation of the argument that has been made within this project. The contemporary frame has established a severe juxtaposition between the terms, and in understanding these terms, sadly creating dysfunction in capacity for dialogue surrounding the presence today, and the use tomorrow of monarchy within Canada.

In 2008 the Conservative government, headed by Steven Harper potentially faced defeat in the House of Commons through a confidence vote. Harper’s minority government was likely going to be toppled by a coalition formed by the Liberal and NDP Parties with a signed declaration of parliamentary support from the Bloc Québécois, in hopes of forming government. Prior to the vote Harper asked the Governor General to temporarily suspend or prorogue Parliament, a prerogative of the Governor General, in order to address the situation. The Governor General agreed. The anti-democratic rhetoric surrounding the Governor General during the time of making the decision demonstrates the ability to exercise or even maintain reserve powers are mired within the mental and emotional framework between ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ established within this project.

When the monarchical element is called upon in a public way to participate in the application of governance, as it was during the question of prorogation in 2008, the critique of the Governor General’s actions are not limited to the situation at hand, but take on the wider combative dichotomy between ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’. While Smith suggests a general mixed sense of the governance structure in Canada by Canadians, Ned Franks highlights a more severe dichotomy represented by the public opinion and rhetoric during the question of prorogation in 2008. Franks discusses the Harper rhetoric during the debate over prorogation, popularizing the notion that the coalition government was undemocratic. Franks believes, rightly, that Harper’s rhetoric would have prevailed, that the actions of the coalition would be affirmed through political capital of public opinion as anti-democratic, and that if the Governor General refused him prorogation that that office would be easily castigated in the same ‘un-elected’, ‘anti-

democratic’ rhetoric, that at the time was popular in Canada: “Only now [if the Governor General had refused to grant prorogation] the governor general would have been identified, along with the coalition, as one of the enemies of democracy.”\(^{213}\)

To be clear, the rhetoric referred to here by Ned Franks is Harper’s propagation of both the coalition and the crown against the notion of democracy as the public will. This is the aspect of the term ‘democracy’ mentioned in the introduction under Schumpeter’s classical democracy model. In this sense, Harper tapped into the frame of ‘the other’ being against the people motivated and directed government. This anti-democratic rhetoric was used against the coalition in order to create political leverage through public opinion, and as Franks points out, would have shifted against the Governor General if the Governor General refused prorogation. This is a clear demonstration of the idea of monarchy being firmly placed in the role of the ‘other’, as the role of the Monarchy would have come under the label of ‘anti-democratic’.\(^{214}\)

Presently in Canada, situations that create opportunity to question the role of the Monarch are in essence opening a ‘Pandora’s Box’.\(^{215}\) The notion of monarchy as governance becomes subject to criticisms it cannot withstand because of the contemporary Western ‘ideal’ versus ‘other’ relationship, in which it falls under the defined ‘other’. The discourse takes on the Monarchy in Canada as a symbol with no symbolism,\(^{216}\) an expense without a cause\(^{217}\), and a power that is illegitimate.\(^{218}\)

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\(^{217}\) “[Tom Freda, national director of Citizens for a Canadian Republic] says it is ‘exorbitant,’ for example, that the Ontario lieutenant-governor employs nine staff members, and ‘shocking’ that
the study performed by EKOS is cited above to demonstrate the lack of knowledge surrounding the role of Monarchy in Canada, perhaps the most prominent demonstration of a perceived disconnection of monarchy from a role in governance can be found within the questions of the study itself. One question asks respondents if the importance of Monarchy rests within their historical significance or their celebrity status? Absent from the options was the role played by monarchy in governance, as if it is already irrelevant or absent.

Clarity of the dichotomy between ‘ideal’ and ‘other’ as it relates to democracy and monarchy may be key to halting the slow haphazard disintegration of the elements of monarchical governance in Canada and the loss of any benefit that governance structure may hold within the Canadian Federal Parliamentary system. The argument is not that Monarchy needs to fall in line with elements of the contemporary ‘ideal’ of procedural democracy, rather, there needs to be an end to such idealization and enemy creation between the two terms. Only then can there be a justly critical and merit based analysis of the pros and cons of the dynamics of each, and how they can function within a constitutional monarchy.

the B.C. office shells out piles of cash each year to run a 102-room official residence for its lieutenant-governor. As for the ‘highly irrelevant’ Governor General? ‘The Governor General has literary awards and cuts ribbons and plants trees and travels to Nunavut and eats seal meat. But what else?’” Katie Engelhart, “Queen costs us more than the Brits pay: Over the past 10 years, the Canadian cost of supporting the monarchy has more than doubled,” Maclean’s (July 14, 2009). http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/07/14/queen-costs-us-more-than-the-brits-pay/ (accessed June 2013).

There is a need for a deconstruction of the frameworks affecting perceptions of democracy and monarchy, and certainly how those frameworks create an oppositional relationship between the two concepts. These contemporary frameworks exert pressure on the affairs and security of developing states, as well as the internal affairs of states still incorporating a monarchical element somewhere within its structure. The within this project is similar to Michael Foucault themes of deconstruction. “[E]xposing artificialities [modernity] congeals or conceals in the hope of enhancing space for politics… To redress the current imbalance in favor of ordered constructs…” The frameworks outlined within this project are playing live roles in present day governance dialogue, making the unfurling of their subtext, inferences and hidden meanings a must in order to expose a more open and potentially unfettered dialogue surrounding the diversity of governance, and the potential roles of such governance within the specific context of the state or society effected.

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5. Conclusion

There is a barrier in contemporary discourse around the role or even presence of monarchy as a form of governance. This barrier is erected in the mental and emotional juxtaposition between the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’. Within this juxtaposition democracy inhabits the place of the ‘ideal’, the best attributes within this comparative dynamic, and monarchy inhabits the ‘other’, the worst attributes in this comparative dynamic. This dichotomy is rooted in the Western historical and political culture, which is then spread more globally into international development expectations of complicity in ‘good governance’; and internal to Western democracies’ attitudes and shaping of governance within their respective states. The more recent attempts to redefine monarchy within the Western Constitutional Monarchies to bring them closer to the ‘ideal’, or at least separate themselves from the ‘other’, has for the most part failed, and the long protracted development of the dichotomy between the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘monarchy’ remain separated by the frameworks embedded through time. Despite some advocacy for Monarchy, within the Western context the idea of a place for monarchy will lose against the constructed oppositional dynamic of monarchy being against democracy.

The theoretical orientation of ‘framing’ supplied by George Lakoff and Murray Edelman provided this project with a solid notion on which to build the argumentation of idealisation of the term ‘democracy’ in a comparative dynamic of demonization against the term ‘monarchy’. Through the 19th century onward the dialogue on legitimacy in government has changed, and post WWII the influence of the United States within that dialogue has become profound. The recipe for success in ‘good governance’ has become intimately tied to the culture and history of the United States, and the liberal or procedural democracy exercised therein.

The outstretched history of monarchy has provided a plethora of political rational and historical examples of what is contemporarily oppositional to equality, accountability and legitimacy. Divine right, slavery, violence as order and a notion of being contrary to progress, litter the landscape of postulation surrounding the term and notion of
‘monarchy’. Although, within the governance structure of constitutional monarchy there is evidence of the capacity for monarchical malleability through convention, and the ability for a procedural democracy and monarchy to function in conjunction, this more contemporary development has seemingly not shaken the framework of monarchy as ‘other’.

Democracy within this comparative relationship holds the moral imperative, whereas monarchy is the direct opposite, or the enemy of democracy. Monarchy is maintained under a notion of inequality, unaccountability and illegitimacy. This barrier to discourse will have an impact on the development of governance, creating incapacity to approach monarchical governance with justly critical measures in developing ‘good governance’. As a result, government structures may be forever changed through a contemporary mental framework, potentially causing the dismantling of a valuable governance resource.
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