

**A Comparison of
William James and Nietzsche on
Consciousness and Will**

**by
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Abstract

I compare William James' and Friedrich Nietzsche's construals of *consciousness* and *will*, two of the core notions in both philosophy and psychology. I delineate the elements significant in their respective accounts of the two notions, and show that there are significant parallels in their views. An appreciation of the affinities in James' and Nietzsche's construals of consciousness and will facilitates an appreciation of their remarkably parallel contributions in both philosophy and psychology. It also enhances an appreciation of James as a philosopher with a rich background and expertise in psychology, and an appreciation of Nietzsche as an original, important philosopher-psychologist. Furthermore, the parallels I will have drawn between their views may provide materials with which to appreciate and substantiate the construal of a strand in contemporary psychology that is philosophically informed, and which embraces a radical version of empiricism that is rid of the dogmas found in traditional empiricism.

Keywords: Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche; William James; Consciousness; Will; Philosophy and Psychology



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Für alle Freigeister

*Much travelled road
is an inferno
for a free spirit
who creates and
does not merely know*

- - -

*Vielbereiste Straßen
führen zur Hölle auf Erden
für die Freigeister
die schöpfen und
nicht nur Wissen anstreben*

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This project began with a hunch and much hesitation. But, as a worthwhile project should, a hunch was substantiated with subsequent research, reading and reflections; they, in turn, contributed to alleviate the hesitation. Still, the hesitation would have lingered, the hunch would have been less substantiated, if there were not the support and guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Holly Andersen, who has affirmed, reaffirmed and reinforced the vigour and value of my endeavour in various stages of the project.

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Abbreviations

James' Works[±]

DCE	Does 'Consciousness' Exist?
DD	The Dilemma of Determinism
ML	Manuscript Lectures
PPI & II	The Principles of Psychology, vols. 1 & 2
PRA	Pragmatism
TEA	The Experience of Activity
TIC	The Ideas of Consciousness
TIR	The Thing and Its Relation
WPE	A World of Pure Experience

Nietzsche's Works[±]

BGE	Beyond Good and Evil (W. Kaufmann, tr.)
EH	Ecco Homo (W. Kaufmann, tr.)
GM	The Genealogy of Morals (W. Kaufmann, tr.)
GSB	The Gay Science (J. Nauckhoff, tr., B. Williams, ed.)
GSG	The Gay Science (W. Kaufmann, tr.)
GSW	Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (neue Ausgabe)
KSA	Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe
KSB	Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe
WP	The Will to Power (W. Kaufmann, tr.)

[±] See References for complete bibliographic information. All numbered citations of James' works refer to paginations. All numbered citations of Nietzsche's except KSA and KSB refer to section numbers. For KSA, the numeral is in the format "xx:yy[zz], nnnn", where xx = *Abteilung* (i.e. the broad division of the *Werke*), yy[zz] = The number assigned to each fragment aphorism by the *Werke* editors, and nnnn = Year. For KSB, the numeral is in the format "xx,yy", where xx = *Band* (volume), yy = The number assigned to the *Briefe* (letter).

Introduction

In this thesis project, I compare William James' and Friedrich Nietzsche's construals of the notions of *consciousness* and *will*. They pertain to two core subject matters not only in psychology, but also in philosophy: will is most commonly discussed throughout the history of philosophy by way of free will, while consciousness manifests in the discussions of such notions as the mental, self, knowledge, perception, and so on. Thus an appreciation of the affinities in James' and Nietzsche's construals of will and consciousness will facilitate an appreciation of their remarkably parallel contributions in both philosophy and psychology. This is the first objective of my thesis project.

James is considered a founding figure of contemporary psychology, but has been underappreciated as a philosopher, although, somewhat ironically, many 'scientifically'- or 'empirically'-oriented psychologists nowadays find James 'too philosophical'. Conversely, Nietzsche is commonly appreciated and discussed as a philosopher, albeit a very controversial one, but hardly recognised or credited as a psychologist. In light of this, the second objective of my project is to enhance an appreciation of James as a philosopher with a rich background and expertise in psychology (and physiology¹), as well as an appreciation of Nietzsche as an original philosopher-psychologist.

However, it is important to make it clear right at the start that my project does not attempt to claim that James' and Nietzsche's views are directly influenced by each other's, because there is no textual evidence to substantiate such claim: neither James nor Nietzsche cite each other in their various works, except one instance where James

¹ James attends medical school and has a M.D. degree, although he never practises. He also studies physiology, and in fact, his first appointment as a university professor is in physiology.

quotes and criticises Nietzsche². But this precisely makes the present project an intriguing and worthwhile endeavour. On the one hand, it is immensely challenging because both James' and Nietzsche's views and ideas are in their own right idiosyncratic and innovative, and thus are not easy to penetrate through and comprehend, let alone to draw parallels between them. On the other hand, if my project is successful, the parallels I will have drawn between James and Nietzsche may provide materials with which to appreciate and substantiate the construal of a strand in contemporary psychology, with James and Nietzsche as pioneers, that is philosophically informed and that embraces a radical version of empiricism that is rid of the dogmas found in traditional empiricism. This is the third objective of my project.

That there is almost no reference to each other in James' and Nietzsche's respective works may explain the small handful of scholarly literature that makes substantial comparisons between James and Nietzsche. On the other hand, rekindled interests in both James and Nietzsche – not only in philosophy, but also other disciplines – may account for the fact that most of the literature emerges in the past couple of decades. In what follows I shall make a succinct survey of the existing literature, and discuss through what subject matters they draw the links between the two philosophers. While my project is thus not a solitary endeavour, it will become evident in the ensuing discussions that it stands distinctive from most of the existing literature, given the subject matters and objectives of my project.

Among the scholars in the recent decades who make substantial comparisons between James and Nietzsche, the most well-known and discussed is Richard Rorty, who, in an essay published in 1981, remarks that both thinkers interpret the 'metaphysical' urge, which is found in most philosophers contemporaneous to their time,

² I briefly mention what the criticism is later in this chapter. Meanwhile, it is worthwhile to note that James owns copies of the German originals of *Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Genealogy of Morals*, although it is unknown if he reads them in depth (the criticism in question James makes, nonetheless, is based on an excerpt from the latter). Also, thanks to the literature research done by Lucas McGranahan for his PhD dissertation on James, it is found that James mentions Nietzsche in at least eight letters to various people (cf. McGranahan, 2012, 218), all written during the last few years before James' death in 1910, and after Nietzsche's death in 1900. James' apparent surge of interest in Nietzsche coincides with the emergence of a lot of literature by other scholars, who show posthumous interests in analysing and critiquing Nietzsche's works.

to define and delineate the ultimate nature of reality in psychological terms; meanwhile, they take philosophy not as a means to get at the nature of reality, but rather to *create* useful, comforting pictures of the world and its ‘truth’ (Rorty, 1972-80, 150). According to Rorty, such is the pragmatist inclination that connects the two philosophers. Furthermore, as he sees it, it is the means with which James and Nietzsche defy the metaphysical urge that is mentioned above.

I refrain from making any critique of Rorty’s contentions³, except to point out that many scholars who see a connection between James’ and Nietzsche’s thoughts appeal to pragmatism, to various extents, as a means to make their cases. Meanwhile, Rorty is in fact not the first scholar that sees this connection: as Rorty himself points out, a French scholar, René Berthelot, calls Nietzsche “a German pragmatist” in his 1911 book (Rorty, 1998, 21). Berthelot contends that Nietzsche and James beget an offshoot of pragmatism that is concerned with a psychological theory of truth with artistic and religious tendencies that may not conform to science⁴ (Berthelot, 1911, 20, 30). As far as I know, Berthelot’s work is the first that makes substantial comparison between James and Nietzsche. Pragmatism is discussed only tangentially in this essay. Meanwhile, James’ radical empiricism⁵ plays a much more significant role in my discussions and comparisons between James and Nietzsche. As will be discussed in this essay, James’ *Weltanschauung* is what he calls *radical empiricism*, which is postulated as a philosophical doctrine in which things to be dealt with and debatable among

³ Some scholars critique that the motivation behind Rorty’s comparison between James and Nietzsche, as well as his other similar comparisons, is, ultimately, to advocate his neopragmatism.

⁴ “Le pragmatisme integral que nous avons rencontré chez Nietzsche d’abord, chez William James ensuite, n’est pas celui des penseurs dont nous allons parler. Tantôt la notion pragmatiste de la vérité s’applique pour eux à certaines verities seulement, non à toutes” (Berthelot, 1911, 20); “Nous avons vu encore à l’oeuvre chez Nietzsche, chez William James, d’autres tendances étrangères ou meme contraires à la science: la tendance artistique, très puissante chez le lyrique que fut Nietzsche, et la tendance religieuse qui, plus que toute autre, a déterminé James à formuler une théorie psychologique de la verité.” (Berthelot, 1911, 30)

⁵ Although commonly construed and discussed as a pragmatist doctrine by many Jamesian scholars, James himself regards radical empiricism as an independent doctrine, as he states expressly: “Let me say that there is no connexion between [my two doctrines of radical empiricism and pragmatism. Radical empiricism] stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist.” (PRA preface ix)

philosophers are – and should be – expressed in terms drawn from the notion of *experience*.

The most voluminous works in English where comparisons between James and Nietzsche takes a central role are two theses that were written within the past two decades. Jeff Edmonds' 2009 doctoral dissertation draws from James' metaphysics of *pure experience* and Nietzsche's metaphysics of *power* to argue for a theory of the concept of experience, and its contribution toward the metaphysics of education. Edmonds construes 'metaphysics' on pragmatic grounds: a metaphysical account endeavours to delineate ways to understand how something – in this case, experiential education – relates to the world, by selecting and emphasizing features that facilitate a pragmatic understanding of it and how it manifests and applies in real-life practices. Furthermore, a metaphysical inquiry aims not at a conception of its subject matter in terms of stable, eternal features, but rather the fluid, organic features that allow for its growth and evolvment over time (cf. Edmonds, 2009, 4, 53-54, 56, 58).

Although the metaphysics of education is not a subject matter of my thesis project, as with Edmonds I make substantial discussions regarding James' notion of *pure experience* and Nietzsche's notion of *power* in his doctrine of *will to power*. Specifically, I compare pure experience with Nietzsche's notion of *drive*: they are the components that are significant in their respective accounts of consciousness, and whose parallels are significant in appreciating the affinity between their accounts. Meanwhile, I make a case for Nietzsche's will to power – which he purports to be the core of a 'new' psychology – as a doctrine of the will that is compatible with James' radical empiricism and his principle of pure experience that play a pivotal role in his account of the will.

Edmonds' project resonates with mine as we share a common conviction that James and Nietzsche offer philosophical perspectives and approach that are idiosyncratic and different from most thinkers contemporaneous to their time: they do not aim at defining a concept or idea as a static entity with stable and enduring features, and base upon it to depict a 'true' world as likewise stable and enduring. I have mentioned above that radical empiricism delineates James' *Weltanschauung*. Meanwhile, Nietzsche expressly states that psychology is the doctrine of the development of the *will to power*

(BGE 23), which is taken by Nietzsche scholars as pivotal to his *Weltanschauung*. Neither of these views endeavours to delineate the 'true nature' of the world; nor do they take experience and will to power, respectively, as some static principles with inert, enduring features.

Anne Sabo's 1997 master's thesis, the other voluminous work in English making a substantial comparison between James and Nietzsche, revolves around the two thinkers' reevaluation of truth in the name of life. Sabo argues that both James and Nietzsche reject the traditional conceptions of truth and react against the many dogmas in philosophical rationalism, by endorsing the notion of will and its strength to address the issue regarding one may affirm life that in reality is in turbulent flux, thereby living a healthier and realising a more powerful attitude toward life (Sabo, 1997, 1).

Sabo takes on her discussions from a comparative literature's perspective, focusing upon the postmodernist interpretations of James and Nietzsche: it is a main objective of her project to argue against various postmodernist readings of the two thinkers' critique of truth, as they undervalue the significance of the critique in promoting an affirmation of life (Sabo, 1997, 2); as such, she pretty much takes for granted the affinities between James' and Nietzsche's respective critique. Thus much of her thesis consists of discussions, comparisons and criticisms of a substantial amount of secondary literature on James and Nietzsche. Unlike Sabo's, the discussions and comparisons in my thesis project are primarily based upon James' and Nietzsche's original literature, since my project aims at making a case for the affinities between the two thinkers' philosophical-psychological accounts of consciousness and will.

Despite the different subject matters and objectives, our projects are connected by a common conviction: our respective comparisons between James and Nietzsche do not aim at devising or suggesting a philosophical *system* that downplays and reduces the idiosyncratic features of each of the two thinkers' views, thereby systematizing and merging their views into one single, unified scheme. As with Sabo (cf. Sabo, 1997, 6, 9), while comparing James' and Nietzsche's views in order to make a case that they share some important insights in philosophy (and, as my project tries to establish, also in psychology), I acknowledge the significance in keeping the unique characteristics of their

respective views intact, because neither James nor Nietzsche would wish to have their views systematized in the first place. I concur with this insightful contention of Sabo:

It is this desire [in many Jamesian-Nietzschean scholars] for reconciliation and coherent systems that I find faulty towards James' and Nietzsche's original projects. I underscore that it is not philosophic systematization, but a quest for 'higher' and 'healthier' ways of living which is the core of their projects. Such a quest is opposed to systems and closure. (Sabo, 1997, 9)

This quest for higher and healthier ways of living, I contend, informs both James' and Nietzsche's endeavours in psychology and philosophy.

As far as I can tell from a fairly thorough literature research, the only voluminous work in the non-English literature where James and Nietzsche are discussed and compared substantially is a 1997 book authored by Kai-Michael Hingst, written in German and originally his doctoral dissertation. Hingst sees James' pragmatism and Nietzsche's perspectivism not as complements to each other, but rather as sharing a common core regarding the constitution of truth (Hingst, 1997, 1). Because of this common core, he argues that Nietzsche may be construed as a pragmatist à la James and James as a perspectivist à la Nietzsche, but emphasizes at the same time that they each contribute distinctively unique insights into the subject matter (Hingst, 1997, 19).

In her article published in the 2009 inaugural issue of the *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, Rosella Fabbrichesi evidently concurs with the connections between James and Nietzsche that Hingst draws. Fabbrichesi's comparison between the two philosophers argues for a substantial overlap between the continental strand of classical hermeneutics and American pragmatism. As such, she centres her discussion around James' and Nietzsche's views on the function of truth in life, and on our urge to *know* the truth (Fabbrichesi, 2009, 1-2). She further argues that "Nietzsche bluntly develops pragmatist motives, and James could be defined as a 'perspectivist' in [a specific] sense" (Fabbrichesi, 2009, 7). Although my project does not deal with the notion of truth, the notion of *knowing* or *knowledge* plays a significant part in my discussions. Specifically, I show that both James and Nietzsche construe consciousness as an organically developed function pertaining to knowledge; knowledge, in turn,

pertains to the relations between pure experiences (in James' account) or drives and affects (in Nietzsche's account).

It was noted previously that James cites and criticises Nietzsche once. Specifically, he refers to an excerpt from *The Genealogy of Morals* where Nietzsche adamantly argues against ascetic priests – or saints as James refers to them. James takes Nietzsche's remarks to be an argument against weakness of man with an unhealthy will, as exemplified by a saint or some such ascetic beings. Sergio Franzese, a scholar of James, substantially discusses this James-*contra*-Nietzsche case in both a 2003 journal article and his book subsequently published in 2008. He construes James' criticism as reductive and unfair to the actual incentives behind Nietzsche's remarks; meanwhile, he attempts to resolve this apparent discrepancy by construing it as a metaphysical problem related to the notion of 'energy' in James' coinage, which he takes to be akin to Nietzsche's notion of 'will to power' (Franzese, 2003, 11; Franzese, 2008, 194, 197). In this essay, I also discuss Nietzsche's notion of will to power, although not from the moral philosophy's perspective as Franzese takes in his discussions. Rather, I emphasize the explicit declaration by Nietzsche that psychology is the doctrine of the development of the will to power (BGE 19).

Lucas McGranahan, in his 2012 PhD dissertation on James, also makes a substantial and insightful critique of James' interpretation – which amounts to much misinterpretation and some omissions – of the Nietzsche excerpt mentioned above. James' uncharitable reading of Nietzsche, McGranahan argues, obscures the philosophical framework that James and Nietzsche share: it is a framework that resolves around the central philosophical question of how one organises his character by way of giving assent to and dissent from (in Nietzsche's coinage) drives or (in James' coinage) ideas (McGranahan, 2012, 238). I make a substantial discussion and comparison in this essay between these two notions that are idiosyncratic and pivotal to their respective *Weltanschauungen*.

McGranahan's view regarding the remarkably parallel contributions to philosophy between James and Nietzsche is very much in line with mine: He contends that both reject the traditional empiricist construal of knowledge, the neo-Kantian transcendentalist construal of cognition and values, and the reductionistic scientific materialism – to which

I also add, positivism – that amounts to yet another dogmatic metaphysics (McGranahan, 2012, 215). Meanwhile, on the positive side, both James and Nietzsche “re-envisioned philosophy as a new kind of non-foundationalist, practically oriented discipline” (*ibid.*) – thus they arguably strive for a *revolution* of philosophy that has been burdened by, to borrow Nietzsche’s words, the fundamental faiths and prejudices of traditional philosophers, particularly the metaphysicians.

While neither James nor Nietzsche cite each other in their various works except the one instance just discussed, neither can be it concluded that they do not read each other’s works in any substantial manner. Meanwhile, they do share some important common sources of inspiration, as evidenced in their respective discussions regarding those sources. Among them, James and Nietzsche extensively peruse Ralph Waldo Emerson, as they are great admirers of his works and thoughts. James Albrecht’s 1997 journal article argues for some important affinities among Emerson, James and Nietzsche on the ethics of action, power and belief. Meanwhile, he sees Nietzsche to share some fundamental similarities with the pragmatic thoughts running from Emerson to James. Thus, he takes their affinities to compose a more accurate picture of American pragmatism (Albrecht, 1997, 114-5).

There also exist a few brief remarks in the literature where James and Nietzsche are compared for certain affinities between their thoughts (cf. Cormier; Donadio 15, 31, 42; Granier 483-6; Kaufmann, 79, 103, 268; Steilberg 228, 231)⁶. Of note is Ludwig Marcuse’s remarks in his 1959 book, in which he describes James as “ein amerikanischer Nietzsche”, as characterized by their share polytheism, pluralism and pragmatism (Marcuse, 1959, 27, 56). This is an interesting remark because as pragmatism, as noted previously, is the primary link scholars point to in connecting

⁶ There is, in fact, another paper in the existing literature with substantial comparisons between James and Nietzsche that go more than just a couple of sentences. Masahiko Kaburagi’s conference paper, which, unlike all the ones I have discussed, connects the two thinkers from a political theory’s point of view. He argues that their insights on the notion of reason offer inspiration to political and social theorists who strive to seek a new foundation for theories (Kaburagi, 2006 2). He also sees the affinities between their insights and Emerson’s construal of reason (Kaburagi, 2006, 5-6). I choose to mention it in this footnote instead of the main content, because my project does not at all make connection between James and Nietzsche from a political philosophy’s point of view. However, this paper is very interesting and thus deserves a brief description.

between James and Nietzsche, one would expect remark of Nietzsche's being "ein deutscher James" instead.

It is evident from my discussions of the various literature above, that pragmatism and the notion of truth are the most common, popular subject matters with which scholars – especially philosophers – make their comparisons and connections between James and Nietzsche⁷. This is rather unsurprising. During the final few years of his life, James publishes *Pragmatism* (in 1907) and *The Meaning of Truth* (in 1909). The pivotal part of the former is its account of the notion of truth from the perspectives of James' version of pragmatism; meanwhile, the latter serves as an anthology consisting of all his writings that bear directly on the notion of truth, in which James makes further elaboration and clarification. These essays, along with many others he publishes and writes during that time, are relatively 'more philosophical', discussing issues and notions pertaining to metaphysics and epistemology.

Meanwhile, the notion with which commences Nietzsche's 1886 book, *Beyond Good and Evil*, is 'the will to truth' (BGE 1). He proceeds to inquire into the value of this will, and raises the question as to *why* there cannot be a will to 'untruth' just as valuable as that of 'truth' (*ibid.*). The inquiry recurs throughout the book, but is most concentrated in the first section, entitled *On the prejudices of the philosophers* (cf. BGE 1-5, 9-11, 16). Regarding the question above, one may take Nietzsche to hint at a *pragmatist* answer in *The Gay Science*: he claims that truth and untruth are both *useful* for one's pursuit of knowledge, and in fact, for one's life in general (GSW 344). The notion of truth also serves as a good means for scholars to bring Nietzsche's perspectivism into the picture and make a case for its affinity to James' pragmatism.

While I see the significance of making the James-Nietzsche connection by way of pragmatism (and perspectivism) as well as the notion of truth, I think the discussions thus arisen are inevitably 'too philosophical' and obscure their significance beyond the strictly philosophical perspectives. On the other hand, James spends a significant part of

⁷ McGranahan shares partly my observation: "Things have not gotten much better for the James/Nietzsche comparison in the century since their deaths. Rather, with a few (mostly minor) exceptions, focusing primarily on truth, the James/Nietzsche comparison remains a surprisingly neglected, if promising, area of research." (McGranahan, 2012, 219)

his academic career as a professor in psychology, and writes the voluminous *Principles of Psychology* that is considered a treatise of contemporary psychology; meanwhile, Nietzsche considers himself the first scholar in a 'new' psychology that is understood as "morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power" (BGE 12, 23), and overtly self-identifies as a psychologist (EH III.5, 6). In this light, it is plausible to appreciate the affinities in James and Nietzsche's thoughts from the psychological perspectives – that is, via some core notions and subject matters in psychology. This is the motivation behind my thesis project.

This essay consists of two main chapters: Chapter 1 is devoted to the notion of consciousness, Chapter 2 to the notion of will. Throughout each of the chapters, I delineate the elements that are significant in both James' and Nietzsche's accounts of the notion in question, and compare the specific views of the two thinkers on each element. In regard to consciousness, I argue that both James and Nietzsche are critical of the Kantian transcendental ego or the 'I think' consciousness, and reject the neo-Kantian construal of consciousness. I then argue that their respective construals of consciousness share important insights regarding the notions of thought and knowledge. I further contend that James' coinage of *pure experience* and Nietzsche's coinage of *drive*, which are pivotal to their accounts of consciousness and also their respective *Weltanschauungen*, share some remarkably parallel characteristics. In regard to will, I argue that both James and Nietzsche construe will as consisting of physiological, cognitive and affective components. Importantly, they both reject to construe will as a single, static entity, but rather a complex and ever-evolving process. The notions of bodily movements, thought and attention manifest significant parallels in their accounts of will. Their views regarding the notion of free will also share some important insights. I further argue that Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power, which he takes to be the core of psychology, is compatible with James' radical empiricism and his principle of pure experience.

Chapter 1.

Consciousness

Introduction

It is reasonable to think that James takes consciousness to be the cardinal notion in psychology as well as in the philosophy of mind. In *Principles of Psychology*, James takes the subject matter of consciousness to be the starting point of studying the mind from within (PPI 224). This magnum opus of James was published in 1890; two decades later, however, he wrote various journal articles – collectively and posthumously published as *Essays in Radical Empiricism* – in which he criticises the construal of consciousness prevalent at that time, and maintains in the face of such construal that the notion is not only dispensable, but also may even be dismissed altogether.

Nietzsche does not discuss the notion of consciousness as extensively as James; however, where he discusses it – notably, in two aphorisms in *The Gay Science* (sections 11 and 354) in conjunction with various bits in the *Nachlass* – he puts forth some very revolutionary ideas bound to be controversial, especially if they are not understood properly. It is my contention that Nietzsche's account of consciousness contributes significant insights to psychology. Meanwhile, James' and Nietzsche's accounts of consciousness make some very interesting and significant parallels. To make a case for this is the objective of this chapter: As such, my discussions revolve around the two German terms applied to, and commonly translated into English as, 'consciousness': *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit*. The difference between them is, unfortunately, lost in translation in Nietzsche's works, yet this difference plays a crucial role in understanding Nietzsche's account of consciousness, as well as appreciating the parallels between his and James' accounts.

In what follows, I begin with a description of what *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit* are, and in what manner they are different. Next, I discuss the parallels between James' and Nietzsche's critiques of the notion of consciousness in the *Bewusstheit* sense: Specifically, the Kantian synthetic unity of apperception – that is, the 'I think' that pertains to the transcendental ego – as well as the post-Kant, German Idealist construal of consciousness. Then I proceed to the notion of consciousness in the *Bewusstsein* sense: I show that both James and Nietzsche embrace the construal of consciousness as an organically developed function pertaining to knowledge. As such, their construals of knowledge deviate from the typical presupposition that knowledge entails conscious thinking. Meanwhile, the notion of knowledge is closely tied in with their respective *Weltanschauungen*. In order to understand their accounts of consciousness, it is necessary to understand what they take to be knowledge, thought, and what their *Weltanschauungen* are. These are the notions I exposit in this chapter.

***Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit*: Two Terms for 'Consciousness'**

To better appreciate Nietzsche's views on consciousness, it is important to make clear a distinction between the two German terms that are used, both commonly translated in English as 'consciousness'. Unfortunately, this distinction is completely omitted in Walter Kaufmann's translation of the relevant passages in *The Gay Science* (TGS hereafter), while it is briefly, but insignificantly, remarked in a footnote in the Bernard Williams' edition of TGS. Thus, prior to delving in Nietzsche's account of consciousness per se, I begin with a discussion regarding the difference between the two terms. Clarifying this difference not only makes available a proper understanding of Nietzsche's account, but also makes possible an appreciation of the parallels between his and James' account. Moreover, it amounts generally to good scholarship and is thus a worthwhile endeavour.

As remarked in the footnote in TGS aforementioned, *Bewusstheit* is a much more unusual word compared to *Bewusstsein* when referring to consciousness in ordinary discourse: A German noun with the '-heit' suffix typically is a result of converting the corresponding adjective (in this case, '*bewusst*'), and signifies an abstract property (GSB

11 footnote 6). A thorough survey of the German literature available in Google Books suggests that *Bewusstheit* gained its 'popularity' (relatively speaking) and was used alongside *Bewusstsein* in the domains of psychology and philosophy circa early 1800s, which coincided with the emergence of German idealism. Since then, the two terms were used, in different capacities, toward the notion of consciousness among German psychologists and philosophers throughout the 19th Century, and into the development of contemporary psychology in the late 19th Century and early 20th Century.

Certain scholars in the above era make an explicit distinction between *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit*. Notably, Hermann Cohen⁸ and Paul Natorp⁹ – two of the co-founders of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism in the late 19th century. If not drawing an explicit distinction, some scholars use the two terms in a non-interchangeable manner¹⁰. Nietzsche's application of two different terms in TGS 11, one of the two sections devoted to the notion of consciousness (and where the aforementioned footnote is made), as well as in various fragments of the *Nachlass*, is in accord with the fact that the two terms are used, in their respective capacities, toward the notion of consciousness among German scholars. Translating the two terms into English simply as 'consciousness', unfortunately, obscures this distinction. It also obscures the fact, as I contend, that while Nietzsche criticises and rejects consciousness construed in the *Bewusstheit* sense, the notion of consciousness – properly construed – remains a significant element in Nietzsche's psychology.

It is remarked in the aforementioned footnote that Nietzsche, in that very section of TGS, shifts from the term *Bewusstsein* – the very title of the section – to the term *Bewusstheit* in his discussions, as he argues against *Bewusstheit* as an abstract

⁸ Cf. H. Cohen, *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls*, vol.1, ch.3, section 1, where he makes a detailed discussion regarding the distinction between *Bewusstheit* and *Bewusstsein*: in essence, *Bewusstheit* has no content whatsoever but refers only to a (known) fact, which is the fact that there is (the contentful) *Bewusstsein*.

⁹ Cf. P. Natorp, *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*, ch.1, section 4, and ch.2, sections 13-14. In the latter sections, Natorp discusses the distinction between *Bewusstheit* and *Bewusstsein* in the face of a critique of Kant's notion of the unity of apperception, and his subject-object distinction.

¹⁰ For instance, Wilhelm Wundt, *Physiologische Psychologie*, ch.15, which is the chapter on the notion of consciousness; Also, Alexius Meinong's paper *Über Begriff und Eigenschaften der Empfindung*, in which he discusses Wundt's notion of consciousness.

property that is fundamental to humans (GSB 11 footnote 6). Unfortunately, it fails to note that Nietzsche *does* use *Bewusstsein* in one place of the section – and very significantly so, since he switches back to *Bewusstheit* in the succeeding sentence that is the continuation of the thought. Here I quote the two sentences in both German and English, for comparison purpose:

Diesel lächerliche Überschätzung und Verkennung des Bewusstseins hat die grosse Nützlichkeit zur Folge, dass damit eine allzuschnelle Ausbildung desselben verhindert worden ist. Weil die menschen die Bewusstheit schon zu haben glaubten, haben sie sich wenig Mühe darum gegeben, sie zu erwerben – und auch jetzt noch steht es nicht anders! (GSG 11)

This ridiculous overestimation and misapprehension of consciousness has the very useful consequence that an all-too-rapid development of consciousness was prevented. Since they thought they already possessed it, human beings did not take much trouble to acquire it – and things are no different today! (GSW 11)

The two distinct terms Nietzsche uses, *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit*, are both translated into English as ‘consciousness’. While the two terms are independently translatable as such in ordinary literature, I think that in the scholarly context where terms typically have specific, technical usage, as in this case where *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit* are used in such a way that they are arguably non-interchangeable and non-equivalent, a common translation of them simply as ‘consciousness’ unfortunately obscures Nietzsche’s account of consciousness. Specifically, it obscures Nietzsche’s rejection, as I shall argue shortly, of the Kantian ‘I think’ *qua* transcendental unity of self-consciousness that pertains to a synthetic a priori judgment.

The overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness mentioned in the above quote are described in the immediately prior sentences, thus:

[C]onsciousness [*Bewusstheit*] is properly tyrannized – and not least by one’s pride in it! One thinks it constitutes the *kernel* of man, what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, most original in him! One takes consciousness to be a given determinate magnitude! One denies its growth and its intermittences! Sees it as ‘the unity of the organism’! (GSW 11)

The 'unity of the organism' is aptly taken as a description of Kant's notion of 'the transcendental unity of self-consciousness' (*die transscendentale Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins*); or, 'the synthetic unity of apperception' (*die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption*), or, the 'I think' (*Ich denke*) (Kant, 1781/7, B132) – all in the corpus of the synthetic a priori. Thus Nietzsche's discussion in this section of TGS corresponds to a critique of Kant's account of consciousness *qua* synthetic a priori – hence the significance in his usage of two distinct terms, *Bewusstheit* and *Bewusstsein*, in the discussion, and the importance that we discern the distinction.

Nietzsche's Critique of the Synthetic A Priori and the 'I think'

Nietzsche does not discuss at all what he means by 'the unity of the organism' in the very terse section 11 of TGS discussed above. Here, I make a discussion on his behalf, by making a connection of this passing remark with two sections – sections 11 and 16 – of *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE hereafter), as well as a fragment from the *Nachlass* (KSA 7:30[10], 1884-5). It is my contention that Nietzsche's rejection of *Bewusstheit* pertains to his critique of Kant's notions of the 'I think' specifically, and the synthetic a priori in general; furthermore, his construal of *Bewusstheit* goes in parallel with James', which I discuss in the next section: precisely, I take them to respond to a common target, namely, the Kantian and neo-Kantian construal of consciousness¹¹.

Nietzsche's criticism in section 11 of BGE is directed toward Kant's notion of the synthetic a priori; meanwhile, in section 16, he criticises the notion of 'I think' – but instead of narrowly attributing the criticism to Kant, it gears more generally toward any such assertion that pertains to what he calls 'immediate certainty', with the critique of the 'I think' as a vehicle. In neither of these sections, however, does Nietzsche mention the notion of 'consciousness' (as either *Bewusstsein* or *Bewusstheit*). But in conjunction with the fragment of the *Nachlass* mentioned above, it becomes evident that these two

¹¹ It is important to emphasize that the ensuing account of Kantian and neo-Kantian construal of consciousness pertains to James' and Nietzsche's exegeses; as far as my present project is concerned, I shall take the exegeses as-is with minimal discussions regarding their accuracy.

sections are relevant to Nietzsche's construal and critique of *Bewusstheit* as synthetic a priori.

In the said fragment, Nietzsche makes an explicit connection between *Bewusstheit* and Kant's synthetic a priori: He sees an affinity between the question as to how *Bewusstheit* is possible and Kant's question 'how are synthetic judgements possible a priori?' – Namely, the ultimate question in *Critique of Pure Reason*. For Nietzsche, the two questions are of the same nature: He criticises Kant's answer to the latter; thus his critique of the alleged answer to the latter applies to the case of *Bewusstheit*. Moreover, he arguably thinks that there are no feasible answers to either of the above questions. The questions are of the same nature because they are, arguably unanswerable in any substantial manner: answers to such questions amount to "*Worte und nicht mehr*"¹²(KSA 7:30[10], 1884-5). Nietzsche repeatedly criticises that a lot of erroneous propositions among philosophers are a result of "the seduction of words" (BGE 16) or "the snares of grammar" (GSW 354); the rumination on the possibility of *Bewusstheit* is one such instance. So is one's attempt to answer the quintessential Kantian question 'how are synthetic judgements possible a priori?', which is taken erroneously to have a feasible answer that thereby justifies the notion of synthetic a priori.

The critique of the alleged answer to Kant's question, meanwhile, is to be found in the section 11 of BGE: Nietzsche devotes the whole section to a critique of Kant's synthetic a priori: He contends that Kant's answer to the question as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible – namely, by virtue of a faculty (*vermöge eines Vermögens*¹³) – does not yield any substantial explanation (BGE 11). Likewise, we may project this contention to the case of *Bewusstheit*: By virtue of a faculty is *Bewusstheit* made possible. The faculty in question is that of understanding: In the *Critique*, Kant tells us that understanding is the faculty to combine a priori the manifold of intuitions under the unity of apperception – thus this unity, being synthetic, is made possible a priori by

¹² 'words and nothing more' – my translation.

¹³ The German term *Vermögen* is used frequently throughout Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and is translated as 'faculty', 'ability', 'power', or 'capacity'. Kant himself does not write '*vermöge eines Vermögens*' anywhere in the *Critique* as the answer to the question.

the faculty of understanding. But as Nietzsche would argue, this does not amount to any substantial explanation at all.

Moreover, as Nietzsche sees it, the ‘how synthetic a priori is possible’ embeds another question, namely, ‘why synthetic a priori is necessary’ (BGE 11). Likewise, the ‘how *Bewusstheit* is possible’ question embeds the ‘why *Bewusstheit* is necessary’ question. As I shall argue later, Nietzsche denies this necessity altogether.

Before moving on, a quick remark must be made here regarding the *Nachlass* fragment discussed earlier above: similar to TGS 11 that I discussed in the previous section, in this fragment, Nietzsche primarily uses the term *Bewusstheit* – arguably an evidence that he uses it toward an account and a critique of Kant’s notion of consciousness *qua* synthetic a priori. However, there is one sentence where he switches momentarily to *Bewusstsein*. In the original German: “An sich kann das reichste organische Leben ohne Bewusstsein sein Spiel abspielen: so bald aber sein Dasein an das Mit-Dasein anderer Thiere geknüpft ist, entsteht auch ein Nöthigung zur Buwusstheit.” (KSA 7:30[10], 1884-5)¹⁴

As with TGS 11, Nietzsche’s usage of two distinct terms here is significant: He rejects consciousness construed as *Bewusstheit*, which amounts to a compulsion (*Nöthigung*) that he is adamantly against; meanwhile, he does not reject the notion of consciousness altogether. As I shall discuss later, an organism’s co-existence (*Mit-Dasein*) with others gives rise to a need of communication, which, Nietzsche contends, leads to the development of *Bewusstsein*.

Now, having discussed Nietzsche’s critique of the Kantian synthetic a priori in general, I continue to discuss his critique of Kant’s notion of the ‘I think’ specifically. The synthetic unity of apperception – that is, the ‘I think’ (*Ich denkt*) – is the *Bewusstheit* that Nietzsche goes against. In section 16 of BGE, he criticises the superstition of the ‘self-observers’ who believe in immediate certainties; the ‘I think’ assertion is used as an illustration. Nietzsche argues that this assertion “assumes that I *compare* my state at the

¹⁴ In English (my translation): As such, the richest organic life plays its game without *Bewusstsein*; but as soon as its existence is tied to the co-existence of other animals, there also emerges a compulsion to *Bewusstheit*.

present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me" (BGE 16) – this addresses why any certainty, if attainable, cannot be immediate. Nietzsche also arguably denies that certainties per se are attainable in the 'I think': He argues that it involves a series of assertions that are perhaps impossible to prove – among them, that it is I who think, that there exists an I (*ein Ich*), and that it is already determined what thinking designates (*ibid.*). These assertions are all subsumed under Kant's synthetic unity of apperception ¹⁵, and adopted by others in philosophy and psychology in Nietzsche's era.

Having discussed Nietzsche's construal of *Bewusstheit*, I now turn to a discussion of James' critique of it and the Kantian 'I think' in the next section.

James' Critique of the 'I think' (Transcendental Ego) and *Bewusstheit*

In *Principles of Psychology*, James offers a critique of Kantian and post-Kantian transcendentalist theory regarding the consciousness of self, or, as James puts it, the inner principle of personal unity. James' critique is targeted at the notion of synthesis, and subsequently the notion of synthetic unity of apperception – that is, the 'I think' consciousness that he refers to as the 'transcendental ego' (and he refers to anyone embracing this doctrine the transcendental egoists). His complaint, chiefly, is that the transcendental egoist theory renders things overly complicated and mythological, and

¹⁵ In the *Critique*, Kant tells us that in the synthetic unity of apperception, one is conscious of oneself as *he is* – that is, the existence of oneself is given through the 'I think' (Kant, 1781/7, B157-8). Meanwhile, that the 'I think' is a thought by virtue of the faculty or power of understanding implies that what thinking designates is already determined.

thus does no service for a better understanding of the notion of self-consciousness¹⁶ (cf. PPI 363-365, 370): as James sees it, Kant contends that the ego has no positive attributes, but is essentially an utter barrenness with no consequent possibility of any deductive or 'rational' psychology (PPI 362, 364); thus, James says, it is just a pretentious name for the phenomenon that can be alternatively addressed, and in a substantial manner that is useful for a psychological theory of self-consciousness.

Although James does not offer a direct criticism as Nietzsche does, it can be implied from his discussion about the transcendental ego that, like Nietzsche, James does not find satisfactory an explanation regarding how the synthetic unity of apperception, that is, the ego, is feasible by way of its sheer connection with the faculty of understanding (cf. PPI 361, 364). He does, however, remark that it is a puzzle as to how the ego can make the faculty of understanding use the various categories to synthesize the manifold of intuitions (PPI 364) – this arguably ties in with his contention that the whole Kantian picture regarding the synthesis of manifold is a misconstrual of how thought and object in reality are related. In his own words:

The 'manifold' which the intellectual functions combine is a mental manifold altogether, which thus *stands between* the ego of apperception and the outer reality, but still stands inside the mind. In the function of knowing there is a multiplicity to be connected, and Kant brings this multiplicity inside the mind. The reality becomes a mere empty *locus*... [Meanwhile, the manifold] must be 'synthetized' when it comes to be thought... [But i]f we are to have a dualism of thought and reality at all, the multiplicity should be lodged in the latter and not in the former member of the couple of related terms. The parts and their relations surely belong less to the knower than to what is known. (PPI 363)

Given this construal regarding the relation between thought and object in reality, Kant and the transcendental egoists invoke the intellectual power of the faculty of

¹⁶ As far as my discussions here are concerned, I do not make a distinction between 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' (or consciousness of self) – they are considered to be interchangeable. A distinction between them would only make sense in a theory that takes the self to be an entity that supervenes on, but is entirely distinct from, the mind, regardless of how the mind is construed. In this case, the consciousness related to the thinking in one's mind (that is, simply, consciousness) may be considered distinct from the consciousness related to one's self (that is, self-consciousness). Neither James nor Nietzsche, nor Kant for that matter, endorses such view. I use 'self-consciousness' in this section because Kant uses this term (*Selbstbewusstsein* in German) in naming the transcendental unity.

understanding such that the manifold be synthesized; this, allegedly, 'justifies' the transcendental ego *qua* synthetic unity of apperception. And because nothing can be thought, in the Kantian picture of objects in reality, without the manifold being synthesized, the synthetic unity is thus made possible a priori by virtue of the faculty of understanding. But James argues that this multiplicity should be put with the reality 'outside' rather than with the mind 'inside' (PPI 363). As such, without the mental manifold, the faculty of understanding is not really required to exercise its power of synthesis; this, in turn, raises doubt regarding the feasibility of transcendental egoist theory of self-consciousness. Thus, like Nietzsche, James does not find an account of the synthetic a priori of the transcendental ego by appealing to the virtue of a faculty satisfactory.

The words 'the function of knowing' in the above quote ought to be noted, because the notion of knowledge plays a pivotal role in James' discussions of consciousness: Both his critique of *Bewusstheit* and his own account of how consciousness should be understood hinge upon it and its accompanying terms (knowing, knower and known). In the remaining of this section, I shall discuss James' critique of *Bewusstheit*, and show that it attacks the same targets as Nietzsche's. In the next section, James' own account of consciousness will be discussed alongside Nietzsche's.

In various essays written in the early 1900s, James discusses and criticises elaborately the notion of *Bewusstheit* (or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, i.e. abstract, absolute consciousness) of his German contemporaries (cf. DCE 3-4; TIC 108). In James' own words:

[In terms of] the *Bewusstheit* or *Bewusstsein überhaupt* of our German contemporaries, this consciousness is always thought of as having its own essence, distinct from the essence of material things, which by mysterious gift it is able to represent and to know. (TIC 108)

In the hands of such [transcendental egoist] writers... the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the 'consciousness' of experience *is known*. It loses personal form and activity – these passing over to the content – and becomes a bare *Bewusstheit* or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said. (DCE 3-4)

This is the construal of consciousness that is predominant in James' time. Case in point: Natorp's contention, which James critically remarks, that consciousness is the fundamental fact of psychology that defies doubt but which can only be defined or deduced from itself; other than that, it is inexplicable and largely indescribable (DCE 7). This exemplifies the widely held view of consciousness as something idiosyncratic yet indispensable.

The first quote above applies both to a theory of consciousness that endorses a personal ego in the Cartesian legacy, and one that embraces an impersonal ego as in the transcendental egoist account of consciousness discussed above. It is evident, as the second statement demonstrates, that James has much graver concern with the latter: As discussed previously, the Kantian transcendental ego has no positive attributes, and, as James argues, is essentially barren with pretty much no value to any psychological investigation of consciousness. Yet the *Bewusstheit* is entrusted to be present at all times, and, in fact, have a necessary role of witnessing the happenings in time (DCE 5) – this is in the legacy of Kant's contention that objects can only be cognised by making a necessary reference to the 'I think' consciousness, the act of apperception (cf. Kant, 1781/7, B132, 137-138¹⁷).

I take it that James shares Nietzsche's criticism regarding the alleged 'immediate certainty' of *Bewusstheit*. One's consciousness of his own thinking cannot amount to an immediate certainty because any certainty *qua* knowledge of oneself, if attainable at all, can only be achieved reflectively; as such, it cannot be immediate. In his discussion regarding a construal of the consciousness of self as what he calls the 'sanctuary within the citadel' – that is, as the innermost self that governs one's thinking and acting, James points out that even if this self were granted as something certain, such that the stream of thought is present as the indispensable subjective condition of experience, this condition, nonetheless, is "not one of the *things experienced* at the moment. That is, this

¹⁷ On Kant's notions of object and cognition in relation to the synthetic unity of apperception: "Cognitions consist in determinate reference of given presentations to an object. And an object is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is united. But all unification of presentations requires that there by unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them... The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition. Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognise an object, but every intuition must be subject to it in order to become an object for me." (Kant, 1781/7, B137-138)

knowing is not immediately *known*. It is only known in subsequent reflection.” (PPI 303-304) Thus there is no immediacy in this presupposed certainty.

Meanwhile, this alleged reflective consciousness of the self, James says, presupposes that in order to know anything at all, a thought must discriminate between its object and itself; thus allegedly one cannot know without thinking or knowing that one knows. James argues that there is utterly no ground of reason behind this presupposition (PPI 274) – one may be said to know something without knowing that he knows; that is, without a sense of certainty about himself thinking or knowing. Thus, even if we grant the reflective consciousness of the self, certainty is not a necessary condition for one’s pursuit of knowledge.

To sum up my discussions regarding James’ and Nietzsche’s critiques of *Bewusstheit*: I have argued that Nietzsche’s discussion of *Bewusstheit* may be taken as a criticism of Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception, or, the ‘I think’ consciousness that is synthetic a priori, which is taken as something with immediate certainty. I have argued that James, likewise, disapproves of *Bewusstheit*, or, the transcendental egoist account of consciousness, as an essential witness of the happenings in one’s experience, and a necessary substratum grounding one’s thinking and knowing of objects. Like Nietzsche, James would deny that consciousness amounts to anything with immediate certainty.

Before proceeding to discuss James’ and Nietzsche’s own (i.e. constructive, rather than critical) accounts of consciousness, I would like to make an additional remark regarding immediate certainty. The belief in immediate certainties, I think both James and Nietzsche would contend, amounts to an erroneous notion of *knowledge*: Namely, there exists certain knowledge – including the ‘I think’ – that is absolute and foundational to all the other knowledge. As mentioned previously, Nietzsche criticises that the ‘self-observers’ who take the ‘I think’ as absolute and immediately certain spin off a whole series of assertions that are difficult, if not impossible, to prove (BGE 16). Their reasoning seems to be that the ‘I think’ as the foundational knowledge within oneself – that is, one *knows* what thinking is, as it is already determined what thinking designates – is necessary for providing the standard by which we may think and attain further

knowledge about anything else ¹⁸. James' theory of knowledge, meanwhile, is also non-foundational; this will become evident in the next section as I discuss in more detail his views on knowledge.

James' and Nietzsche's Accounts of Consciousness

I begin this section with putting forth the two statements that I think depict James' and Nietzsche's accounts of consciousness, respectively. I shall discuss them in details throughout the section. First, here is James':

To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it – for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist... Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to *insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function*. ... There is a *function in experience which thoughts perform*, ... that function is knowing. 'Consciousness' is *supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported [sic], are known*. ... Knowing [is] a particular sort of relation toward one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation itself is a part of pure experience; one of its 'terms' becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, *the knower*, and the other becomes *the object known*. (DCE 4-5; my emphases)

And then here is Nietzsche's:

Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; it is only as such that it *had to develop*. ... As the most endangered animal, he needed help and protection, he needed his peers, he had to learn to express his stress to make himself understood; and for all of this he needed 'consciousness' first of all, he needed to '*know*' *himself* what distressed him, he needed to '*know*' *how he felt*, he needed

¹⁸ Here one may be reminded of Wilfrid Sellars' seminal essay *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*: Particularly, in the chapter 'Does empirical knowledge have a foundation?', he critically comments on the view that there exists the awareness-that, namely, awareness *that* something is the case, which has an intrinsic authority that is said to be 'self-authenticating'; these awarenesses "would constitute the tortoise on which stands the elephant on which rests the edifice of empirical knowledge" (EPM 34). Sellars holds this view to be at "the heart of the Myth of the Given", and to constitute "the framework in which traditional empiricism makes its characteristic [but erroneous] claim that the perceptually given is the foundation of empirical knowledge." (EPM 38) I see that Sellars' criticism of traditional empiricism is very much in the same spirit as James'. Sellars, in fact, alludes to James at the very end of the essay as among the revolutionary figures in empiricism.

to 'know' what he thought. Man, like every living being, *thinks continually without knowing it*: the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this. (GSW 354; my emphases)

To understand James' and Nietzsche's accounts of consciousness, and further to appreciate the parallels between them, it is necessary to make clear three notions that appear in the quotes above: Namely, *thought*, *experience*, and *knowledge*. Thus before discussing the quotes above, I shall first discuss each of these notions: Specifically, I argue that James and Nietzsche share some interesting and significant views regarding the notions of thought and knowledge; meanwhile, James' construal of experience – in particular, what he calls *pure experience* – goes in parallel with Nietzsche's construal of drive.

The notion of thought/thinking

In *Principles of Psychology*, James remarks that the term *thought* or *thinking* is used generally to designate all states or forms of consciousness indiscriminately (PPI 185, 224). The fact of thinking, meanwhile, is the only thing that psychology is entitled to postulate at the outset; specifically, the fact in question is that, as he puts it, "thinking of some sort goes on" (PPI 224). This formulation is to bypass the need of attaching a subject to the verb 'think', which we may feel compelled to do in order to conform with grammar – pretty much in the spirit of Kant's 'I or he or it (the thing) that thinks', even if it amounts to an unknown, transcendental subject of thoughts (Kant, 1781/7, B403). James denies such necessity of applying a subject noun to the thinking, because thinking simply *is* – that is, it exists as an indisputable fact in psychology, and hence the starting point of a psychological study of the mind.

Nietzsche also construes this compulsion of attaching a subject to the thinking as what he would call a snare of grammar (cf. GSW 354): He criticises the insistence of the subject 'I' (or 'he' or 'she', etc.) as the condition of the predicate 'think', as it amounts to a superstition (BGE 17); rather, a thought simply comes as 'it' does. However, even this 'it' could be problematic so long as one insists on applying it as the subject and thus saying 'it thinks' (*ibid.*) – because this 'it' would commit us to endorse some sort of 'ego', and potentially lead us back to the Kantian transcendental ego. Thus, as with James,

Nietzsche takes the notion of thought or thinking as something rather self-contained, not contingent on the existence of a subject.

Another parallel between James' and Nietzsche's views on thought or thinking is in relation to the notion of knowledge or knowing. Regarding the notion of 'conscious thinking', Nietzsche argues that the greatest part of our mental activity does not involve consciousness. Meanwhile, conscious thinking – especially that of the philosopher, i.e. reflective, rational as opposed to instinctive – in fact renders one susceptible to being led astray about the nature of knowledge (GSW 333). I shall discuss what this means later in my discussion of the notion of knowledge. Suffice to point out here that James' view regarding the relation between thought and knowledge is in line with Nietzsche: James contends that the immensely greater part of all our knowing does not reach the 'verified' *qua* reflected status; rather, most of the time we continue thinking without intervention or mediation (WPE 38). Thus most of our thinking does not involve or is not subject to consciousness or some sort of reflective verification; this resonates with his 'stream of thought' metaphor, to which I now turn.

The notion of (pure) experience

James' coinage of the phrase *stream of thought* (or *stream of consciousness*) is perhaps what is most widely recognised from his *Principles of Psychology*. Importantly, the phrase must not be construed as some sort of entity: The term 'stream' is meant to be metaphorical, describing the fact, in accordance with James' contention, that consciousness flows continuously as one whole, rather than appearing to be bits connected as if in a chain (PPI 239). Moreover, in our normal waking life, this stream flows as we engage in various acts of thinking, without interruptions or disruptions in the form of reflective thinking or verification of knowledge as described above.

A little over a decade later, however, stream of thought/consciousness is non-existent in the various essays where he discusses consciousness as the primary subject matter; in its place, James speaks of *stream of (pure) experience* (cf. TIR 51, TEA 84). I think it reflects the fact that James, unlike in *Principles of Psychology*, no longer takes consciousness as *the* fundamental, cardinal notion in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Rather, James downplays it to serve a secondary role: In the essay *Does*

'consciousness' exist?, James remarks that the term *consciousness* connotes some sort of relation among parts of an experience or among experiences (DCE 16). As such, consciousness is a function at the service of experiences, rather than denoting a primal entity (DCE 4). Meanwhile, the relation that consciousness connotes pertains to the notion of *knowledge*. I shall discuss in details James' account of knowledge a little later.

James' use of the term *experience* is idiosyncratic and must be made clear because of its pivotal role: By 'experience', he means "anything that can be regarded as a concrete and integral moment in a conscious [*qua* waking] life", and the term is "exactly equivalent to 'phenomenon'." (MEN 21) Both of these terms are, as James puts it, 'double-barrelled', meaning that the terms serve a dual role: "A phenomenon implies both something that appears, and someone to whom it appears; and an experience implies both an experiencer and what he experiences." (*ibid.*)

A 'unit' of pure experience, James says, is an unqualified actuality, a simple 'that' – hence the 'pure' qualification – in the instant field of the present as it occurs (DCE 15). This immediate experience amounts to what James calls 'practical truth': it possesses validity and readiness to be acted upon further, such as the doubling of it into a state of mind and a reality (*ibid.*). It is important to note that this doubling act is done in retrospection - thus much as the experience is 'immediate', it is not an instance of 'immediate certainties' that Nietzsche adamantly argues against: The experience is 'non-conscious' so long as it remains 'pure'; as such, there is no necessity or involvement of the 'I think' consciousness or any some such. Also, this simple 'that' is, literally, a simple 'that' - it is not an '(one's) experiencing that', because it does not belong to anyone at all. This is akin to the idea, as discussed previously, that there is no necessity of applying a subject noun to the thinking, because thinking simply *is*.

James' coinage of pure experience amounts to a revolution: specifically, it revolts against the then prevailing view regarding the notions of consciousness, experience, and the relation between them. In fact, it goes even further, as it proposes a revolutionary view regarding the nature of reality: in his words, "the primary reality is of a neutral nature, and let us call it by some still ambiguous name like *phenomenon*, *datum*,

*Vorfindung*¹⁹. I myself like to speak of it in the plural and call it *pure experiences*.” (TIC 117) – This amounts to a *Weltanschauung* that James puts forth. I shall discuss it alongside Nietzsche’s later. The discussion will aim at making a case for a parallel between James’ notion of pure experiences and Nietzsche’s notion of drives.

One may question whether pure experience amounts to some ontological entity? I think that it is certainly not James’ intention to construe it as such. Rather, it may be taken as a theoretical entity - but then, perhaps the term ‘entity’ is misleading. It seems that James does have a bit of a hard time coming up with a term to describe it - eventually he settles on the arguably most versatile, neutral term in English: ‘stuff’ (cf. TIC 115, 120). But even this is accompanied by a remark that James feels the urge to make: his speaking of ‘a stuff of pure experience does not imply at all that there is some “*general* stuff of which experience at large is made. There are as many stuffs as there are ‘natures’ in the things experienced.” (DCE 17) In another essay, he remarks that the principle of pure experience is a methodological postulate (EA 84). Thus pure experiences (in plural), or a ‘unit’ of pure experience (in its singular form, as James refers to it), should be taken as akin to molecules or atoms in a theory in physics. But an atomic unit, which is standardised, is disanalogous to a unit of pure experience.

James’ *pure experience* and Nietzsche’s *drive*

I have briefly brought up the notion of James’ *Weltanschauung* above; it is to this notion I now turn. I take James’ construal of pure experience to correspond to the description of the universe that James depicts in the manuscript of his potential philosophical treatise, entitled *The Many and the One*²⁰: At the beginning of the ‘Radical

¹⁹ This alleged German noun does not exist in ordinary German lexicon, and is seemingly James’ own invention, evidently based upon the verb *vorfinden*, which means ‘to find, discover, come upon’ – specifically, what is found is not entirely anticipated – it is discovered or come upon as if by chance or otherwise unexpectedly. It thus stands in contrast with *finden*, which also means ‘to find’, but which is used in a context where one has a certain expectation in what he will end up finding.

²⁰ James worked on this incomplete manuscript during the years 1903 and 4. It is considered by many Jamesian scholars to be his would-be *magnum opus* in philosophy, and is his potential philosophical treatise – e.g. cf. MEN xix). In fact, James himself describes it as such as well: it is “a general treatise on philosophy which has been slowly maturing in [his] mind.” (MEN 325)

empiricism' chapter, James hypothesizes that the materials of the universe's composition, as he sees it, are experiences – the word 'material' here does not imply that James' view is materialist; James' radical empiricism is put forth as an empiricist philosophy without the typical commitment to the materialist tendency (cf. MEN 6). If all this sounds suspiciously ontological, I must clarify on James' behalf that there is no necessity of ontological commitment here. Think of the idea of atoms in Physics: formulating a hypothesis or theory in terms of atoms does not oblige one to admit their existence as real physical entities.

Now, to compare James' *Weltanschauung* with Nietzsche's, it would be useful to repeat the statement of James' that I have previously quoted, as well as quote the beginning bit of *The Many and the One*:

Let us imagine, then, that the primary reality is of a neutral nature, and let us call it by some still ambiguous name like *phenomenon*, *datum*, *Vorfindung*²¹. I myself like to speak of it in the plural and call it *pure experiences*... These pure experiences exist and succeed one another, enter into infinitely varied relations with one another, relations that are themselves essential parts of the fabric of experience. (TIC 117)

My hypothesis [regarding the universe's composition] is that the materials are what I call *experiences*. To be a part of the universe is to be experienced; and not to be experienced is not to be, in this philosophy of 'pure experience.' By an experience, I mean what the Germans call an *Erlebnis* - anything that can be regarded as a concrete and integral moment in a conscious life. (MEN 21)

It is evident from the above quotes that pure experience is the basic building block of James' *Weltanschauung*. As such, given the 'pure' nature of experiences (I have explained what this purity entails previously), the world to be experienced – that is, the primary reality – is of neutral nature. James invokes the German term *Erlebnis* to explain what he means by experience. This word connotes something that occurs at a

²¹ This alleged German noun does not exist in ordinary German lexicon, and is seemingly James' own invention, evidently based upon the verb *vorfinden*, which means 'to find, discover, come upon' – specifically, what is found is not entirely anticipated – it is discovered or come upon as if by chance or otherwise unexpectedly. It thus stands in contrast with *finden*, which also means 'to find', but which is used in a context where one has a certain expectation in what he will end up finding.

moment in time with much vigour, but also often with the spur-of-the-moment and experimental characteristics. It is opposed to *Erfahrung* – another German word commonly translated as experience – which refers to something that is built up over time, and which is rather stable and subdued. Nietzsche, arguably, uses the term *Erlebnis* in a similar vein: He contends that experiences are subject to scrutiny as a scientific experiment (GSW 319).

I now proceed to quote the relevant part from section 36 of BGE that I take to depict Nietzsche's *Weltanschauung*:

Suppose nothing else were 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions, and we could not get down, or up, to any other 'reality' besides the reality of our drives - for thinking is merely a relation of these drives to each other: is it not permitted to make the experiment and to ask the question whether this 'given' would not be *sufficient* for also understanding on the basis of this kind of thing the so-called mechanistic (or 'material') world? ... as a more primitive form of the world of affects²² in which everything still lies contained in a powerful unity before it undergoes ramifications and developments in the organic process – as a kind of instinctive life in which all organic functions are still synthetically intertwined along with self-regulation, assimilation, nourishment, excretion, and metabolism – as a *pre-form* of life. (BGE 36)

This strikes me as something that James, if the two of them ever made a dialogue, would be intrigued by because Nietzsche's view is as if another vector going side-by-side as his own: they may be traced to a common origin, namely, a revolutionary version of empiricism. Pure experiences and drives are the basic elements of James' and Nietzsche's empiricist *Weltanschauungen*, respectively.

Although the notions of pure experiences and drives are not equivalent, they share some crucial overlapping characteristics with which I argue that Nietzsche's views are compatible with James' radical empiricism. The epithet 'radical' is added by James to distinguish his version of empiricism from the rest. The essential element of distinction is that in radical empiricism, only what is directly experienced is admitted into its constructions and is counted as 'real'; meanwhile, anything that is directly experienced must be admitted (WPE 25). This allows James to invoke and construe his notion of

²² The German term of affect is 'Affekt'. I shall elaborate this notion in the next chapter.

pure experiences as, as he puts it, the "minimal world-factors" (MEN 21). As such, a pure experience is a form or way of being that is neutral *as it is experienced*.

It is evident from BGE 36 as quoted above, that Nietzsche puts forth the notion of drives as the basic building blocks for an understanding of the mechanistic world: A drive corresponds to a "kind of instinctive life" and a "pre-form of life" (BGE 36) – these descriptions are in tune with James' characterisation of pure experience as an ambiguous form of being, a simple 'that'. Moreover, Nietzsche proposes a *Weltanschauung* in which only drives are taken as 'real'; all other mental phenomena, such as thinking, are accounted for by the relations among drives. This resonates with James' contention of pure experience as noted above.

The relation between pure experience and consciousness in James' account is strikingly similar to the relation between drive and consciousness in Nietzsche's account. According to James, consciousness denotes a function served among experiences, as I have discussed previously. In Nietzsche's case, conscious thinking is a certain behaviour of drives toward one another: Namely, the drives come to a reconciliation after a long process whereby each of them "presented its one-sided view of the thing or event" and competes to assert its rights against the other drives (GSW 333). That a reconciliation is eventually reached among the drives after this long process, Nietzsche contends, amounts to knowledge of these drives toward one another. Both Nietzsche and James have very idiosyncratic construals of the notion of knowledge, to which I now turn.

The notion of knowledge

Just as 'experience' is a double-barrelled term, the same may be said of the term *knowledge* – it signifies both a *knower* and what is *known*. This bipolarity does not at all suggest that the two polars are ontologically distinct; quite the contrary, they refer to one and the same thing. Meanwhile, they may be described as functionally distinct – signifying a practical distinction – in a given context.

As noted previously, James contends that consciousness connotes a kind of relation among parts of an experience or among experiences; this relation pertains to the

notion of knowledge. Specifically, parts of an experience (or experiences), are related in such a way that a part of the experience (or an experience) may function as a 'knower' in one context while being 'known' in another context. James construes the notion of the knower-known relation as such, as an antithesis to the dualism that he takes to be predominant in various schools in philosophy as well as in the so-called scientific (positivist) psychology at his time, i.e. they all endorse a fundamental heterogeneity of the psychic and the physical, in various forms: thought vs. thing; thought vs. content; that which represents vs. the object represented; etc. (cf. DCE 5, TIC 109).

Moreover, the knower-known relation has a direct bearing to the subject-object distinction: James argues against the traditional treatment of the subject and its object as two discrete, discontinuous entities; instead, he proposes that the attributions of these two terms signify a *practical* distinction that is of *functional* order (TIC 120). The traditional world-view, however, embraces a subject-object dualism in the ontological order: whatever is 'out there' in the world is taken to be exclusively an *object* of experience, with a 'spiritual' *subject* as its witness and as the knowing subject of the object (TIC 109).

In light of the above, James' view of knowledge is evidently far remote from being foundational: the dynamic relations between parts of an experience or between experiences, as well as the fact that an experience (or a part of it) can be the knower and the known depending upon the context, suggest that knowledge is not some static entity, with a foundation on which further knowledge is built.

Nietzsche claims in TGS that his discussion in that section is not concerned at all with the subject-object duality – he simply dismisses it as something that “epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk metaphysics)” only would preoccupy themselves with (TGS 354). However, a passage in *The Genealogy of Morals* shows his opposition against the traditional construal of subject-object as discrete entities. There, he speaks of the erroneous common view that separates lightning and flash as if they are two discrete entities, with the lightning being the subject and the flash being its object – this ties in to the cause-effect duality as well: the lightning is the cause and the flash is its effect. He argues that the lightning flash is one and the only one event. He also argues that scientists commit the same error when

they speak of, say, an atom and its force (GM I.13). He points out that such error is a result of their being misled by the grammar of ordinary language, and, more importantly, their failure in disposing of “that little changeling, the ‘subject’” (*ibid.*) – he mentions the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself’ as an instance. In the Kantian world of metaphysics, a thing-in-itself stands opposed to an object, as the former is unknowable while the latter is capable of being known. This thus ties his criticism in with James’ criticism regarding the *Bewusstheit*-content duality: the *Bewusstheit*, in the form of the Kantian or neo-Kantian transcendental ego, is a thing-in-itself that stands distinct from its content, such that the former is the subject and the latter is the object of experience.

Previously I noted Nietzsche’s contention that conscious *qua* reflective, rational thinking renders one susceptible to being led astray about the nature of knowledge. What Nietzsche means by this can be found in the few sections in TGS where he discusses the notion of knowledge, as well as one very significant but brief remark at the end of section 11 of TGS that certainly requires much elaboration. The remark in question goes thus: “To this day the task of *incorporating* knowledge and making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors.” (GSW 11)

The notion of incorporating knowledge to make it instinctive demands much explanation. A good starting point is to explain what *incorporation* means: the German term *Einverleibung* literally means ‘a taking of something and into the body’. In *Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche remarks that incorporation is an organic process involved in physical nourishment during our experience (GM II.1). Meanwhile in BGE, he includes incorporation as among the basic organic functions that belong to the essence of life – or, more accurately, a living body (BGE 259). In section 110 of TGS, entitled ‘The origin of knowledge’, Nietzsche reiterates the remark found in the above quote, that errors have been incorporated over immense periods of time; meanwhile, he adds that these errors have been worked with by all the higher functions and sense perceptions of an organism (GSW 110).

A clarification must be made regarding the ‘errors’ involved here. They include: “that there are enduring things; that there are equal things; that there are things,

substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in itself.” (GSW 110) They are ‘natural’ and practical errors, in the sense that they have proven themselves useful and have helped to preserve the human species, so that over time and eventually, they become part of the basic endowment of the species (*ibid.*). Thus, according to Nietzsche the nature of knowledge consists of errors rather than merely truths; this is why the philosophers who preoccupy themselves with reflective, rational thinking – toward the aim of pursuing truths – are more easily led astray about the nature of knowledge.

Now, I move on to address why knowledge is supposed to be incorporated and to be made instinctive. The answer is to be found in BGE 36, which I discussed previously as Nietzsche’s *Weltanschauung*: specifically, he argues for a primitive form of the world – a kind of instinctive life where all organic functions are intertwined and contained in a unity (BGE 36). Our pursuit of knowledge, insofar as it involves consciousness, arguably amounts to a description of this instinctive life. Therefore, knowledge should be incorporated – taking in and absorbed into our body – and made instinctive, in order to restore the unity and become physical nourishment obtained from our experience.

It is my contention that James would find Nietzsche’s view of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive compatible with his own view of knowledge, and there is good evidence for this. James’ construal of experience not only as what is known but also as the knower qualifies his view of knowledge as what is nowadays called ‘embodied cognition’: in a sense, it is more accurate and more meaningful to say, in accordance to James’ view, that a person’s sensory or perceptual experience knows, rather than a person himself knows; thus James’ view is in line with Nietzsche’s notion of incorporation of knowledge.

Meanwhile, James contends, as with what he calls the ‘naturalist’ view, as opposed to the ‘rationalistic’ view, that

whenever we intellectualise a relatively pure experience, “we ought to do so *for the sake of* redescending to the purer or more concrete level again; and that if an intellect stays aloft among its abstract terms and generalized relations, and does not *reinsert itself with its conclusions into*

some particular point of the immediate stream of life, it fails to finish out its function and leaves its normal race unrun” (TIR 51-52; my emphases).

This evidently shows that James would concur with Nietzsche that knowledge is to be made instinctive: the final destination of the function of intellectualising *qua* knowing is a return to the ‘immediate stream of life’, where experiences, though experienced as very concretely real, go on under the radar of consciousness.

James’ and Nietzsche’s accounts of consciousness

Having discussed the notions of thought, experience, and knowledge that play significant roles in James’ and Nietzsche’s accounts of consciousness, I now return to and discuss the two statements at the start of this section that depict their views of consciousness, making comparisons and drawing parallels between them. Specifically, their views share three characteristics: consciousness is taken as a function pertaining to knowing; it has evolved to become necessary for the sake of knowing; and rather than being something innate that we ‘possess’ as we were born, consciousness is to be ‘acquired’ and is developmental as an ability.

Both James and Nietzsche construe consciousness essentially as a function of knowing. James states this explicitly as seen in the quote: specifically, it is “a function in experience which thoughts perform” (DCE 4). ‘Thoughts’ here are the knowers that know ‘things’ – but it must be remembered that James denies thoughts and things to be heterogeneous; his theory of pure experience construes both as being made of one and the same ‘stuff’, namely, pure experience, the unqualified actuality that cannot be defined definitely but must be experienced instead. Similarly, for Nietzsche consciousness also serves the purpose of knowing: one needs to know how he feels and what he thinks in order to communicate with others for his needs.

At first glance, it seems as if Nietzsche takes the knower to be the person *himself* and his feeling or thought as the known. However, it certainly is not the only possible interpretation of his words, and is indeed an incorrect one, as evident from his discussion in section 333 of TGS, entitled ‘The meaning of knowing’. There, he describes knowledge as involving a certain behaviour of the drives toward one another

(TGS 333) – namely, the drives’ competition against and final reconciliation among each other. Thus the knower and the known pertain to the drives, which is in line with James’ view that they pertain to the experiences. In a section found in the *Nachlass*, Nietzsche explicitly states that knowledge is a quality of all drives²³ (KSA 5:10[F101], 1880-1).

Another characteristic shared by James’ and Nietzsche’s accounts of consciousness is that consciousness has evolved to become ‘necessary’ for the sake of knowing; meanwhile, throughout one’s life, his stream of experiences (to borrow James’ metaphor) flows without constant involvement of consciousness. Consciousness is evolved only for the sake of knowing. James makes it explicit, as seen in the quote above, that consciousness stands for a function, on which he most emphatically insists (DCE 4), that it is necessary to account for the knower-known relation of experiences, and subsequently the practical distinction between a thought and a thing.

Nietzsche also makes it explicit that we think continually without ‘knowing’ it – that is, without the thinking rising to consciousness constantly (GSW 354). But where knowing proves necessary, as in the case where one has to communicate to others for what he thinks or feels, consciousness will serve its function. And it has evolved to become a ‘necessary’ function because of the social nature of human beings – in a sense, we ought to be social for the sake of the preservation of the species; as such, consciousness proves to be a function with great social utility, since it facilitates communication. But while consciousness thus acquires its significance – its being a necessity for knowledge – it is not a vital function, in the sense that an organic life’s vitality does not hinge upon consciousness; consciousness merely serves some specific pragmatic functions in an organic life.

A third characteristic shared by James’ and Nietzsche’s views of consciousness is that rather than being something innate that we ‘possess’ from the moment we were born, consciousness is to be ‘acquired’ and is developmental as an ability. Thus it is a product or a result of one’s development, possibly throughout one’s lifetime, in relation to the drives (in Nietzsche’s case) and the experiences (in James’ case). Moreover, the

²³ “Das Wissen ist die Eigenschaft aller treibenden Kräfte.” – ‘treibenden Kräfte’ is literally ‘driving force’, but as far as the present discussion is concerned, it may taken simply as drives.

extent to which consciousness is developed differs among individuals in degrees. So it is not the case that we all possess one same consciousness as if it is an entity with a definite magnitude; rather, in each of us consciousness involves an ever-evolving process with which it is developed over time. This goes well with the fact that consciousness, in both James' and Nietzsche's accounts, is a function pertaining to knowledge, because knowledge is also supposed to be a typically lifelong development.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed James' and Nietzsche's views on consciousness. Specifically, I have discussed their critiques of the notion of consciousness in the *Bewusstheit* sense: the transcendental egoist construal of consciousness in the legacy of Kant's synthetic unity of apperception (the 'I think' consciousness). I have also discussed their constructive accounts of consciousness, and the parallels between them. Their views on consciousness have not only put them together as the philosopher-psychologists that share and contribute some very interesting and important insights to both philosophy and psychology, but also identified them as advanced, revolutionary thinkers in both domains who break new grounds for the sake of clearing the obscurities in the air as well as bringing in fresh and functional one.

Chapter 2.

Will

Introduction

Will has always been, by way of the notion of free will, one of the important topics throughout the history of philosophy. It is also one of the core concepts in modern psychology. Case in point: the chapter on will is one of the three most substantial, lengthiest chapters in James' *The Principles of Psychology*; the others are on the consciousness of self and the perception of space. In fact, the *will* chapter in James' magnum opus is significantly greater in length than the *stream of consciousness* chapter. Thus the notion of will is as pivotal as the notion of consciousness in James' psychology.

In this chapter, I endeavour to show that there are important and interesting parallels between James' and Nietzsche's construals of will, both integrating certain essential physiological, psychological, and philosophical elements. The overarching idea is that will is an evolving *process* rather than some sort of Aristotelian substance or some inert entities. Specifically, they consider will to have its roots in physiology, and pertain to instinctive activities – or *movements* as they both use the term. Also, they both construe will as a psychological phenomenon – particularly, as pertaining to a state of mind constantly 'in flux'. Philosophically, they both deny that will amounts to some sort of absolute, static entity as the traditional metaphysicians – in particular, those adhering to an atomistic 'soul' or the Cartesian ego – take it to be. Furthermore, with regard to free will, both James and Nietzsche construe the notion pragmatically as a 'psychological necessity', as Nietzsche puts it; meanwhile, they both reject the traditional view that there *exists* a will that is free (or unfree). Rather, it is a matter of strength: hence,

Nietzsche's psychological doctrine of the will to power, the development of which he takes to be the pivotal doctrine of psychology.

A Succinct Account of the History Concerning Will

The notion of will has a long history in philosophy, especially in the context of ethics where it is discussed in terms of free will. However, since the early modern period the discussions concerning will begin to go beyond ethics, as philosophers theorise about the nature of the will from both the psychological and metaphysical perspectives (e.g. Hobbes, 1651; Locke, 1690): Locke, for instance, denies that the greater good determines the will, as the will does not effect any action in pursuit of the good. Instead, he argues that as we constantly encounter in our lives what he calls 'uneasinesses' that arise from our natural wants or acquired habits, the most pressing uneasiness in the want of a desire that is felt at a given point in time determines the will, which in turn sets into movement a corresponding voluntary action (Locke, 1690, 35, 40, 45).

While philosophers and metaphysicians continue their discussions about will from such metaphysical and philosophical-psychological perspectives, by the late 19th century with the inception of modern, scientific psychology, the investigation of the will is also addressed in physiological terms, namely, in terms of voluntary acts related to bodily movements and kinaesthetic. Notably, Wilhelm Wundt, widely recognised as one of the founders of modern psychology, provides an account of the will based upon his *principle of psychophysical parallelism*: Unlike the metaphysical versions that are built upon an assumption of some sort of metaphysical *substance*, such as the Leibnizian *monad*²⁴, Wundt's version is, as he put it, empirico-psychological, and refers to the idea that physical processes run parallel to psychical processes. The latter processes, however, play no part in the causal relations between physical processes; thus physical

²⁴ Leibniz postulated a monad as a 'simple substance' – 'simple' because it consists of no parts, while 'substance', in Leibniz's idiosyncratic use of the term, means it is a being capable of action. A monad may represent the body that pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy, or it may represent the soul in the Leibnizian system; cf. *Monadology* 62 & 63. Neither James' *pure experience* nor Nietzsche's *drive* is akin to a monad, because neither of them is postulated as an ontologically essential being or any some such metaphysical entity with fundamental existence in the world.

causality and psychical causality are completely distinct (Wundt, 1896, 360-363). Thus contemporaneous to James and Nietzsche, many psychologists begin to investigate will and volitional acts empirically and scientifically – their investigations are the hallmarks of empirical, scientific psychology that is distinct from the traditional metaphysical approach.

My exegesis of James' account is primarily based upon the substantial *Will* chapter in James' *The Principles of Psychology* (*PP* hereafter); as for Nietzsche's account, I focus on section 19 in *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE* hereafter) where he discusses the three components of the will, but I also draw on various other relevant sections from his various works.

In what follows, I begin by laying out Nietzsche's three-component account of the will; then, for each component, I identify and delineate James' views that I argue to be parallel to Nietzsche's. There are two reasons for making the comparison in this manner: First, in the voluminous *Will* chapter in *PP* James does not present his account of the will with a layout in terms of components as Nietzsche arguably does in *BGE* 19, and I do not see any merit in attempting to construct one on his behalf for the purpose of the discussions here. Second, and more importantly, on account of the parallels between James' and Nietzsche's views with regard to will that I will have drawn, the materials pertaining to James' views that I discuss serves to provide substantial support to Nietzsche's account.

Nietzsche's Three-component Account of Will

Nietzsche dismisses as a popular prejudice among philosophers the construal of the will as an *entity* or a *faculty* that is well known by us, and of which we have immediate certainty. He contends that while the will is linguistically referred to as if a definite unit, it is in fact something complicated: rather than being a single, simple and static entity, the will is a complex and ever-evolving *process* – thus the will and the activity of willing essentially refer to the same thing. He is adamant against the idea that willing is something “simple, a brute datum, underivable, and intelligent by itself” (*GSW* 127), because such an idea invites metaphysical assertions that are difficult, if not even

impossible, to prove (BGE 16). Of relevance here is the assertion, presumed by the prejudiced philosophers but denied adamantly by Nietzsche, that there is an 'ego' or atomistic 'soul' that wills²⁵. James would concur with Nietzsche's construal of will as something complicated: he begins the *Will* chapter of PP with a remark that the subject at hand involves too many separate points to be arranged in a sufficiently continuous logical order (PPII 486).

In BGE 19, Nietzsche identifies three components²⁶ subsumed under the term 'will': a physiological component, a 'thinking' (cognitive) component and an *affective*²⁷ component. First, there is the physiological component: a plurality of sensations that consist of the sensations of the states 'towards which' and 'away from which'²⁸, the sensations of the 'towards' and 'from' themselves, as well as a muscular sensation accompanying them. Of note with regard to this muscular sensation is the fact that its action commences even before we put our body into motion: As Nietzsche puts it, the muscular sensation, "even without our putting into motion 'arms and legs,' begins its action by force of habit as soon as we 'will' anything" (BGE 19).

Second, there is the 'thinking' component: a *ruling thought*, as Nietzsche puts it. He does not develop this notion further in this very section of BGE, but it certainly demands some elaboration, which I shall tackle later; suffice to say for now that the activity of willing is necessarily connected with the activity of thinking, as the will is organised around a ruling thought (*ibid.*).

The third, remaining component of the will is *affective*: specifically, the affect of command. What Nietzsche means is that when one wills, he issues a command to himself of fixating upon one aim at a given point in time, such that this aim be rendered exclusively necessary at that point in time; moreover, one feels, as Nietzsche puts it, an *inward certainty* that this aim will be effected by an action (*ibid.*) – this feeling of inward

²⁵ I shall return to this topic in a later section entitled *Thought, Attention and the 'Ego'*.

²⁶ Nietzsche himself does not use the word 'component' or some such in his discussion in BGE 19. And this word should not be mistaken as implying that Nietzsche construes will as something rather structured: an alternative to 'component' may be 'element' or 'aspect'.

²⁷ Namely, that of *affect* (in German, *Affekt*). It is a rather technical term, which I shall explain later when I discuss this third component of the will.

²⁸ I shall explicate what these states are a little bit later as I argue for a parallel in James' view.

certainty, as I see it, corresponds to an inward disposition to expect or believe that the action that effects the aim be upon one's willing. Thus he feels that he is in command of his actions through his will: in Nietzsche's words, "he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one: he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself" (*ibid.*).

Willing and Bodily Movements

James explicitly states that willing – or more precisely, the actions that we may will – has its roots in physiology (PPII 321); thus he bases his account of the will upon a comprehensive investigation of the mechanism of production of bodily movements. As he puts it,

The only ends which follow *immediately* upon our willing seem to be movements of our own bodies. Whatever *feelings* and *havings* we may will to get, come in as results of preliminary movements which we make for the purpose... As we must wait for the sensations to be given us, so we must wait for the movements to be performed involuntarily, before we can frame ideas of what either of these things are... When a particular movement, having once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately willed. (PPII 486-7)

The physiological notion of movements has a great significance in James' account of the will: He describes movement as a natural immediate effect of willing that does not entail consciousness – that is, it is not the case that a movement must be preceded by a state of consciousness (PPII 495, 527). James further divides movements into involuntary and voluntary: involuntary movements, to which instinctive movements belong, are automatic and reflex; they are primarily functions of our organism. Voluntary movements, which involve prevision of what they are to be, are secondary functions. Both kinds of movements, however, are bodily movements that are involved in the activity of willing (PPII 487).

As we have just seen, Nietzsche, like James, considers will to have its roots in physiology. In one passage of BGE, Nietzsche makes a proposition to the physiologists

that the instinct of willing – in particular, that of what he calls the *will to power*²⁹ – be taken as the cardinal instinct of an organic being (BGE 13). He considers the body and physiology as the starting point for an analysis of willing, as evident in his discussions in a fragment in the *Nachlass*. Specifically, he speaks of bodily movements, based upon which we infer that something has been willed: “all feeling, willing, thinking... wherever we see or divine movement in a body, we learn to conclude that there is a subjective, invisible life appertaining to it. Movement is symbolism for the eye; it indicates that something has been felt, willed, thought” (WP 492; KSA 11:40[21], 1885³⁰). Thus for both James and Nietzsche, where willing occurs or something is willed, there is bodily movement. Such movement goes beyond a spin of a person’s brain or mind to consider the thought of a potential action. Rather, the person’s limbs move, or his head turns, or his eyes gaze, etc.

I have mentioned previously that the physiological component in Nietzsche’s account consists of sensations of the states ‘towards which’ and ‘away from which’. These may be construed as the feelings of attraction and repulsion, respectively, which have a physiological basis. These states are akin to the two opposing forces that James argues to be involved in one’s behaviour at any given time (PPII 527): they correspond to what he calls reinforcing (or impulsive) and inhibitory *ideas*, respectively (cf. PPII 525, 528). In James’ words,

[T]he inhibition of a movement no more involves an express effort or command than its execution does. Either of them *may* require it. But in all simple and ordinary cases, just as the bare presence of one idea prompts a movement so the bare presence of another idea will prevent its taking place... A waking man’s behaviour is thus at all times the resultant of two opposing neural forces... The reinforcing and inhibiting ideas meanwhile are termed the *reasons* or *motives* by which [a] decision [to effect a certain action over other possible actions] is brought about. (PPII 527-8)

James’ notion of idea demands some explications, to which I now turn.

²⁹ I shall return to Nietzsche’s famous doctrine of will to power later as I discuss the notion of free will.

³⁰ In this chapter, I make quite a few references to the *Nachlass*, all of which have corresponding sections in the posthumous publication *Will to Power*. The former is available only in the original German, whereas there is the English translation of the latter. Thus I consult both works, and make citations from both, and a few quotations from the latter.

James' *Idea* and Nietzsche's *Drive*

James speaks of an idea as a *psychic (mental) conception* consisting of imagery of passive sensation of movement that is left in and imprinted on one's memory by the said movement; he refers to such idea as 'kinaesthetic' (PPII 492-3). Kinaesthetic ideas, as James describes them, are "images of incoming feelings of attitude and motion" (PPII 495), or feelings of effect – that is, "feelings to which a [voluntary, volitional] movement when effected would give rise" (PPII 500) – which amounts to "the anticipation of the movement's sensible effects, resident or remote" (PPII 521). Such anticipation is necessary for determining *what* the movement shall be; it also is often sufficient for determining *that* it shall be (*ibid.*). What he means by the *what*-determination is nicely illustrated in this example from James:

If I will to write 'Peter' rather than 'Paul,' it is the thought of certain digital sensations, of certain alphabetic sounds, of certain appearances on the paper, and of no others, which immediately precedes the motion of my pen. If I will to utter the word *Paul* rather than *Peter*, it is the thought of my voice falling on my ear, and of certain muscular feelings in my tongue, lips, and larynx, which guide the utterance... An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial consequences of a movement... is the only psychic state which introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of our voluntary acts. (PPII 500-1)

Provided that one has previously written the letters that compose the word 'Peter' or uttered the word *Paul*, he is capable of forming an idea – an image of the sensations involved – which anticipates and determines what the movement (namely, the writing of 'Peter' or the utterance of *Paul*) shall be effected. It should be noted that the inception of a kinaesthetic idea involves an involuntary performance of the corresponding movement; the movement first leaves an image of itself in the memory, thus making it possible for one's willing to effect it subsequently (PPII 487). Nietzsche seems to have a similar insight when he says that all actions must first be made possible mechanically before they are willed (WP 671; KSA 10:24[34], 1883-4). It should also be noted that consciousness is not involved in the formation of thoughts and ideas here; they may enter into consciousness when one introspects or deliberates. As discussed in the last chapter, James and Nietzsche take conscious thinking to be just a subset of all thinking.

I think Nietzsche would also concur with James' notion of the feelings of attitude and motion, or feelings of effect, which guide a volitional action: in a fragment in the *Nachlass* where Nietzsche critiques the concept 'cause', he offers something that is akin to James'. In that section, he argues that what begets an action is the feeling of strength, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling that begins the action; this feeling, however, is typically misconceptualised as a 'cause', such that a will – more precisely, a willing agent as a subject – to do something is mistaken for the cause of an action (WP 551; KSA 13:14[98], 1888).

Returning to James, his contention that the *that* of a movement is often sufficiently determined by a kinaesthetic idea of the movement is significant: it implies a denial of the notion of an agential 'I' – a willing agent as an entity – that authorises and consciously consents to a willed action in order to make it effectual. Where the idea is not sufficient to effect a movement, as in the more complicated cases of volitional movements, an additional conscious element – what James calls a *fiat* – may be necessary to give a mandate or express consent (PPII 522). This fiat, James explains, is "a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions alike, and incapable of serving to distinguish them" (PPII 501); it serves as an intervening, deliberate act of mental consent of the willed action, in the face of some antagonistic idea(s) that strongly inhibit(s) and threaten(s) the effectuality of the willed action that is guided by the corresponding kinaesthetic idea. Analogously, the fiat may be thought of as an explicit shout of 'Do it!' to one's body (much like, say, a swimmer talking to his limbs), as a little oomph to effect the willed action.

In the preceding chapter, I discussed and argued that Nietzsche's notion of *drive* (Trieb) makes a significant parallel to James' notion of *pure experience*: they serve as the basic building blocks of James' and Nietzsche's respective *Weltanschauungen*. Despite their pivotal roles, both notions are as perplexing as they are intriguing. In various essays written in the mid-1900s (collectively and posthumously published as *Essays in Radical Empiricism*), James illustrates the notion of pure experience primarily to show its significance in his radical empiricism and pragmatism; but none of these three notions is easy to penetrate. Meanwhile, it is even worse in Nietzsche's case, as he never provides any account of what he means by a drive; instead, he simply applies

the term matter-of-factly, while seemingly leaving it to his readers to figure out what it is from the applications.

Despite the little consensus in secondary literature as to how to understand Nietzsche's notion of drive, two features nonetheless may be taken as commonly agreed: first, the notion is most significantly manifested in his discussions of will; second, the notion has such close ties with the notion of *instinct* that they are often indistinguishable. In the face of these two features, I argue that there are some significant parallels in Nietzsche's notion of drive and James' notion of kinaesthetic idea – the notions are idiosyncratic to their respective accounts of will. Moreover, I also argue that James' notion of kinaesthetic idea is, to some extent, a precursor of his later notion of pure experience; meanwhile, the former notion caters specifically to his account of will circa the years where PP was published, just as the latter notion caters to his radical empiricist *Weltanschauung* that is further developed and consolidated in the decade after PP was published, and which is relevant to both notions of consciousness and will.

In the voluminous *Will* chapter of PP, kinaesthetic idea is discussed extensively, whereas the notion of pure experience is nowhere to be found throughout PP. The latter would only emerge two decades later, in the various essays James writes on his radical empiricist account of consciousness. Meanwhile, in one particular essay, *The Experience of Activity*, James applies his radical empiricism, its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience – he calls this principle a theoretical postulate (TEA 84) – to the experience of activity, which pertains primarily to the notion of will but is also connected to the notion of consciousness. In this essay, kinaesthetic idea is not discussed at all, although its remnant is there, as evidenced in the following:

*There is complete activity in its original and first intention. What it is 'known-as' is what there appears. The experiencer of such a situation possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up... the word 'activity' has no imaginable content whatever save these experiences of process, obstruction, striving, strain, or release, ultimate *qualia* as they are of the life given us to be known. (TEA 87)*

James gives an account of the experience of activity based upon his radical empiricist principle of pure experience. The 'idea' that the experiencer has corresponds to the *feeling* of the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up; this feeling is essentially the feeling of attitude and motion, or the feeling of effect, which corresponds to a kinaesthetic idea, as I have discussed a while back. Thus I see that the notion of kinaesthetic idea is a precursor to the development of James' notion of pure experience.

The above is significant in appreciating a shared characteristic between James' (kinaesthetic) idea and Nietzsche's drive: James refers to the content of an activity – namely, the experience(s) corresponding to the activity – that an idea contains as *qualia* of an experiencer's life. James does not use this term as a technical term, as used in contemporary philosophy where it denotes the 'what it is like', phenomenal character of mental states or experience. Rather, qualia denote experiential *dispositions* or *tendencies* involved in a volitional act, where one experiences process, obstruction, striving, strain, or release that either promotes or hinders his effectuation of the act. Similarly, there is textual evidence in Nietzsche's works that a drive denotes an inclination or disposition (*Neigung*) pertaining to volition (e.g. cf. BGE 201, HATH 57, GSW 335).

Another shared characteristic between James' construal of idea and Nietzsche's construal of drive is that they are 'given' to us by the natural world. I must emphasize that this 'given' is to be taken in a very specific sense: it is not that ideas or drives are given to a person as some sense data of which – to put it in the language of Wilfrid Sellars, who puts up a fight against sense data theorists in his seminal essay *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* – he has immediate awareness or acquaintance³¹, which in turn puts him in a ready position to *know that* the sense data are what he in fact has, and to draw inferences from them about the physical world. Rather, an idea or a drive is given as brute data – or, to put it in James' language, a bald, simple *that*. What this *that* is then 'known-as' – that is, what it then becomes – depends not upon its intrinsic properties, because such properties are simply absent. Instead, it depends upon the

³¹ The immediate awareness or acquaintance, I think, corresponds to the immediate certainty that I have discussed in the preceding chapter.

relations among all ideas or drives at that given point in time, because such relations have a say as to whether an idea or drive will be effectual and, in the case that it is effectual, as what it will be effected.

There is yet another shared characteristic between James' idea and Nietzsche's drive that is evidently controversial, if not even quite puzzling at first glance. Nietzsche suggests that a drive *per se* is, in accordance with Nietzsche's peculiar usage of the term, 'aristocratic': a drive strives to represent itself as the master of all other drives (BGE 6). Nietzsche's usage of the term certainly demands explication: In a fragment in the *Nachlass*, he characterises what he calls 'aristocratism' as the instinct of imposing order, the ascetic habit to remain master, and both strong will and passion (WP 95; KSA 12:9[178], 1887). He claims to defend aristocracy against what he calls 'herd-animal ideals': "The presupposition inherent in an aristocratic society for preserving a high degree of freedom among its members is the extreme tension that arises from the presence of an antagonistic drive in all its members: the will to dominate" (WP 936; cf. KSA 13:11[140], 1887-8). Nietzsche construes a human body as a political structure of aristocracy: "The aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (struggle between cells and tissues)" (WP 660; cf. KSA 12:2[76], 1885-6) – therefore, it is arguable that drives are aristocratic in his account.

James' notion of idea also has some sort of aristocracy: as he puts it, an idea may either awaken or suppress a tendency to feel a certain way and thus produces motor effects appropriate to it (PPII 524). James, in fact, also explicitly uses the terms 'aristocracy' and 'aristocratic': In PP, he coins the term 'aristocratic temperament' to refer to an individual characterised by what he calls 'interstitial thinking' (PPII 371) – a mind of a high order, whose "mental lungs breath more deeply, in an atmosphere more broad and vast than is their wont" (PPII 370); moreover, an aristocracy possesses "intellectual and moral individuality of character" and "ideals of full manhood" (ML 112). Like Nietzsche, James defends aristocracy against what he calls 'plebeianism', namely the 'vulgarian' temperament marked by profuseness of reasons and a "constant need to animadvert upon matters" (*ibid.*).

Construing the notions of idea and drive as aristocratic, much as being polemic, has a very important significance, but it must be understood correctly: the aristocracy

exists among the ideas and drives, such that whichever idea or drive dominates at a given time 'rules' the will. This construal provides an alternative to the common construal of the will involving an agent as a supervening *being* that executes and bears the will.

Thought, Attention, and the 'Ego'

I now proceed to explicate the second component of the will, namely a ruling thought. As previously noted, the activity of willing, in Nietzsche's view, is necessarily connected with the activity of thinking, as the will is organised around a ruling thought. Now, it is important to note that thinking, as with willing, is a process; what is referred to as 'a thought' in Nietzsche's account is not a single, simple entity that is static and stable. Just as will and the activity of willing refer to the same thing, thought and the activity of thinking also refer to the same thing, namely, a process that is ongoing in an organic being. A ruling thought thus should not be taken as an entity with lasting dominance: instead, in psychological terms, it represents a state of mind that guides one's attention at a given point in time. Meanwhile, this state of mind is constantly in flux, since thinking is an ongoing, developing process.

Nietzsche's construal of thought is very much in line with James'. James expressly states, as the first and foremost fact in psychology, that "thought goes on" (PPI 225) – hence his metaphor of the *stream of thought*: thinking flows and is sensibly continuous; meanwhile, states of mind are successive in an organic life (cf. PPI 237-9). Moreover, a state of mind at a given point in time is never identical with another state of mind at a different point in time: in James' word, thought is in constant change, while by 'change' he means "that which takes place in sensible intervals of time" (PPI 230). Thus states of mind are felt or experienced not as discrete but continuous. I further argue that James would concur with Nietzsche's notion of a ruling thought, as I construe it, as representing a state of mind that guides one's attention at a given point (or interval) in time. The notion of attention – an intriguing psychological phenomenon in its own right – plays a crucial role in James' account of will. In James' words,

[T]he heart of our inquiry into volition [is] when we ask by what process it is that the thought of any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind... attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies; The

essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most 'voluntary', is to attend to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. (PPII 561)

Nietzsche, in fact, also speaks of the notion of attention with regard to the will, albeit briefly as a passing remark: He describes the straining of attention as that involving "the straight look that fixes itself exclusively on one aim, the unconditional evaluation that 'this and nothing else is necessary now'" (BGE 19) – this description qualifies his view of attention as a potential psychological phenomenon.

Nietzsche's notion of a ruling thought in his account of willing is an antithesis to the construal of the will by traditional metaphysicians as pertaining to some sort of absolute, static, singular entity – in particular, as either an atomistic 'soul' or the Cartesian ego (that is, the 'I' in the *cogito*). Nietzsche is also against the Kantian notion of the 'I or he or it (the thing) that thinks' – namely, the simple representation of a transcendental subject of thoughts (Kant, 1781/7, B404). What is common between proponents of the Cartesian ego and those of the Kantian transcendental ego is that they both presuppose an agent – an ego – *behind* the thinking or willing: No matter it is an 'I' that thinks (i.e. the 'I' in the Cartesian *cogito*) or it is the Kantian noumenal substratum, there is the presupposition of an *extra* layer of substratum. I have maintained above that James would concur with Nietzsche's notion of a ruling thought; furthermore, I also contend that James' views with regard to the atomistic soul or ego are in parallel with Nietzsche's, and in contrast to the traditional metaphysicians and proponents of the Cartesian ego or Kantian transcendental ego.

In the discussions about the notion of personal self or 'ego', James offers something very much akin to Nietzsche's ruling thought: James argues that the present mental state – which he tentatively calls 'the Thought' – is, as he puts it, a *pulse of cognitive consciousness* that dies away and is replaced by another over time; it is "born an owner, and dies owned [by the successive Thoughts], transmitting whatever it realised as its Self to its own later proprietor" (PPI 339). Each Thought is a *vehicle of choice*: it makes choices of appropriating and repudiating movements and the accompanying sensations (PPI 340). Appropriations and repudiations are directed towards one's body or the intimately felt part of the present object (PPI 341); they are thus connected with Nietzsche's notions of the states 'towards which' and 'away from

which' that I have discussed previously. Moreover, the Thought serves to engage attention at a given time to the effectuations of the choices that it makes of appropriating and repudiating. As it dies away and is to be replaced, attention to these appropriations and repudiations is also disengaged.

Now, I think the significance of this notion of Thought with regard to the refutation of the atomistic soul or ego is that James' account may be taken as an alternative to what Nietzsche refers to, in his argument against materialistic atomism, as the *soul hypothesis* (cf. BGE 12). James contrasts his notion of the Thought with what he calls the Soul-Substance: the Thought is a perishing and mortal 'thing' (neither a substance nor an entity), whereas the Soul-Substance is presumably a fixed unchanging entity (PPI 345). Moreover, what amounts to the unity of the self is accounted for exclusively as phenomenal and temporal facts pertaining to the present Thought; there is no Soul-Substance that lurks behind the Thought as an entity existing on a non-phenomenal, metaphysical plane (PPI 344-5). James postulates the notion of Thought as a strictly psychological phenomenon, which is verifiable and has empirical connection with corresponding processes in the brain (PPI 346). In this light, James' account of the (present, passing) Thought, I argue, provides the content of the notion of ruling thought that Nietzsche posits in his account of the will, but of which he does not provide further elaboration. It also provides support to my contention that the ruling thought in Nietzsche's account in part serves as an antithesis to the construal of will as pertaining to an atomistic soul or ego.

On discussing the alternatives to the 'soul hypothesis' as conceived by the soul atomists, traditional metaphysicians, Cartesians and the like, Nietzsche posits possible alternatives and conceives these alternatives as hypotheses available for the 'new' psychologists. As he puts it,

One must declare relentless war unto death against the 'atomistic need'... just like the more celebrated 'metaphysical need'... it is not at all necessary to get rid of 'the soul' at the same time, and thus renounce one of the most ancient and venerable hypotheses... But the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions of 'mortal soul,' and 'soul as subjective multiplicity,' and 'soul as social structure of the drives and affects' want henceforth to have citizens'

rights in science. When the *new* psychologist puts an end to the superstitions which have so far flourished with almost tropical luxuriance around the idea of the soul, ... he finds that precisely thereby he also condemns himself to *inventions* – and, who knows? – perhaps to discovery. (BGE 12)

The notion of soul may strike most empirically-oriented psychologists and philosophers nowadays as obsolete as far as the study of mind is concerned; it is a term now used almost exclusively in the philosophy of religion, and rather figuratively in psychology. The German term *Seele*, however, may be translated also as ‘mind’ or ‘psyche’, and was used commonly as such in both psychology and philosophy by James, Nietzsche and their contemporaries. James uses the term ‘soul’ constantly, and arguably in the same manner as *Seele* used by his German contemporaries. As a sample, in the *Will* chapter of PP, he speaks of the soul as the psychic side of the phenomenon regarding cerebral activities of pleasure and pain (as promoter and inhibitor of movement, respectively): the soul as a codeterminant of the mechanical effectiveness of these activities. As such,

[the soul is] somewhat like the applause or hissing at a spectacle, to be an encouraging or adverse *comment*... [it] *presents* nothing herself; *creates* nothing; is at the mercy of the material forces for all possibilities; but among [them] she selects; and by reinforcing one and checking others, she figures not as an ‘epiphenomenon’, but as something from which the play gets moral support. (PPII 584)

This construal of the soul is very much in line with Nietzsche’s suggestion, as in stated previously, of conceptualising soul as mortal, subjective multiplicity, and social structure of drives and affects.

I conclude my discussions of the second component of the will with a remark regarding the role of consciousness with respect to the ruling thought. As noted above, the Thought is a *pulse of cognitive consciousness* that serves to engage attention to the choices it makes of appropriating and repudiating. Thus the notion of consciousness plays an essential role here. However, one must guard against succumbing to making such presupposition as ‘the Thought *is* conscious (when it makes its choices)’, as though a willing, ruling thought is an entity or a subject that possesses consciousness. The

Thought or the ruling thought is a state of mind that guides one's attention at a given point in time – this characteristic underlies the 'pulse' connotation.

Affect of Command, 'Free Will' and the Will to Power

The remaining, third component in Nietzsche's account of the will, namely the affect of command, is closely tied in to the notions of free will and the will to power. Prior to discussing these notions, it is necessary to first explain *affect*. Affect is distinct from feeling (*Gefühl*), although they both pertain to inner flow/movement (*innere Bewegung*) (cf. KSA 13:14[170], 1888). Meanwhile, and more importantly to my discussion, affect (*Affekt*) and drive (*Trieb*) are not equivalent terms (e.g. cf. BGE 12), although Nietzsche seems to use them interchangeably at times (e.g. compare GSW 333 and KSA 5:11[128], 1881). Many Nietzsche scholars take affects and drives as largely interchangeable. This may be reasonable given the topics and primary interests of their discussions. But I think that making a distinction between them enhances understanding of Nietzsche's notion of the will to power, and thus a better appreciation of his psychology, namely, the doctrine of the development of will to power.

Walter Kaufmann, a renowned Nietzsche scholar and translator, suggests that Nietzsche's use of the term *Affekt* carries overtones of Spinoza's *affectus* (BGE 12 n17). There indeed is evidence for this: in a postcard sent to Franz Overbeck in 1881, Nietzsche, having just turned to the philosophy of Spinoza, acknowledges him as his precursor (*Vorgänger*), and is excited by the fact that they share an overall tendency of making knowledge the most powerful affect³² (KSB VI.135). Thus I take Nietzsche's use of the term *Affekt* to be akin to Spinoza's *affectus*, which is defined as either an increase

³² "... seine Gesamttendenz gleich der meinen ist – die Erkenntniss zum mächtigsten Affekt zu machen ..." Nietzsche does not elaborate this, but I think he would be especially excited by Spinoza's contentions regarding the knowledge of good and evil, as found in two propositions in *Ethics*: Spinoza contends that the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affectus of pleasure or pain (Spinoza, 1677, III.Prop8); moreover, he contends that a knowledge of good and evil cannot restrain any affectus *by virtue of being true*, but rather, a knowledge *qua* affectus, when it has more strength than the others, will to that extent be able to restrain them, and thereby *becomes* true (Spinoza, 1677, III.Prop14).

or decrease of its power of activity (*potentia agendi*) that a body/mind undergoes when it interacts with another body/mind (Spinoza, 1677, III.Def3).

I have proposed previously that Nietzsche's notion of drive seems to denote a volitional inclination or disposition. Here I add and propose that a drive pertains to some trait or character a person has that is developed over time and relatively stable. It is as opposed to an affect that is something impulsive and transitory³³. As such, an affect is experiential and transitive in character: it lurks in the transitions between states of an experience. I find Gilles Deleuze's discussions on Nietzsche and Spinoza helpful in making a case for my proposition: Deleuze, a keen scholar and admirer of both philosophers, makes illuminating accounts of Spinoza's *affectus* and Nietzsche's will to power in his anthologies on the two philosophers respectively³⁴. Here I focus on the former and shall continue with the latter when I discuss Nietzsche's will to power.

In Deleuze's words:

[I]mage affections or ideas form a certain state of the affected body and mind, which implies more or less perfection than the preceding state. Therefore, from one state to another, from one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that are experienced, durations through which we pass to a greater or lesser perfection... These continual durations or variations of perfection are called 'affects,' or feelings (*affectus*). (Deleuze, 1970, 49)

Thus *affectus* is found not *at* a state, but *between* states of an affected body or mind, corresponding to the modification – the increase or decrease of *potential agendi* – in the said body or mind. This resonates with these words of Nietzsche:

³³ In his article *Nietzsche on Agency and Self-Ignorance*, Paul Katsafanas remarks that Nietzsche typically uses drives to explain broad patterns of behaviour pertaining to a person's character, a custom, or a way of life, whereas he frequently uses affect to explain particular actions and psychological states pertaining to desires, impulses, and emotions (p.7). I find this suggestion of his akin to what I have proposed.

³⁴ Thus far in this essay, my discussions have been revolving around primary literature. Here, though, I resort to Kaufmann and Deleuze for their insights on Nietzsche's will to power and affect, since these notions are peculiar and not clearly described or developed in Nietzsche's published works, and thus will benefit from the well-respected and well-researched Nietzsche scholars.

Between two thoughts all kinds of affects play their game: but their motions are too fast, therefore we fail to recognise them. (WP 477; KSA 13:11[113], 1887-8)

[Between two successive states] it is a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with different quanta of power. (WP 633; KSA 13:14[95])

While affects are transitive and transitory elements between states of an affected body or mind, drives, on the other hand, lurk in or around the states of a volitional experience as the stable elements. But just as the struggle and fight among affects between two states as Nietzsche depicts in the second quote above, there are also struggle and fight among drives as each of them wills to be dominant (cf. GSW 333).

Having discussed what affect is, I now proceed to discuss the two notions that are tied in to the affective component of the will, namely free will and the will to power. Specifically, I compare James' and Nietzsche's views regarding free will; meanwhile, I argue that Nietzsche's idiosyncratic notion of will to power is compatible with James' radical empiricism and his principle of pure experience.

With regard to free will, Nietzsche expressly states that what is termed 'freedom of the will' is essentially an affect involving the feeling of being in command and thus superior in relation to that which or who obeys (BGE 19) – that is, a person's feeling of freely exercising his will corresponds to the affect of command. Neither James nor Nietzsche thinks that we have free will, if the conception of free will hinges upon the erroneous presupposition of will as a static entity rather than an ever-evolving process. Meanwhile, they share the view that free will, construed with such an erroneous presupposition of will, is a misconception. In its stead, James and Nietzsche construe free will pragmatically as a psychological necessity: James advises us to assume it true and act as if it were true (DD 146); meanwhile, he defies the construal of free will as involving a supernatural agent, but instead proposes to think of the notion as the character of novelty that manifests in the psychological phenomena involved in new activity-situations (TEA 97 n18).

Nietzsche sees that the preoccupation with doubting or agonising over the lack of free will reflects the *sickness* of one's will (a will can literally be sick, given that it is an organic development), since such an individual fails to embrace "the independence of decisions and the intrepid sense of pleasure in willing", as he puts it (BGE 208). For Nietzsche, free will is not an antecedent, let alone prerequisite, for one's action or thought. The 'freedom of the will', rather, is "the expression of the complex state of delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same time identifies himself with the executor of the order" (BGE 19) – this expression, arguably, comes *after* one has effectively exercised such volition. One's embrace of this expression amounts to a psychological necessity whereby one acts out of the feelings of freedom and of the power of self-determination, and conceives of such a pleasure (BGE 213; GS 347). This complex state of delight corresponds to the affect of command.

It is important to note that Nietzsche does not in any way mean to say that a person has free will *so long* as he is a commander, since in Nietzsche's account, neither free will nor unfree will exist in the first place. Also, and more importantly, the will involves not only one's position as a commander but also his simultaneous position as an obeying party. As the obeying party, a person has the sensations of constraints, impulsion, resistance, and motion that commence after the willing, and which amount to the action as the effect of the command (BGE 19). Thus every act of the will consists of a duality of command and obedience. In this light, it is not the case that one's will is free; rather, one has the feeling of the freedom of will as an affect of being in command, as one enjoys the commanding side of the duality. In Nietzsche's words,

That which is termed 'freedom of the will' is essentially the affect of superiority in relation to himself who must obey: 'I am free, 'he' must obey' – this consciousness is inherent in every will... A man who *wills* commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience. (BGE 19)

The contention that will consists of a duality of command and obedience is also found in James' account of the will, although its nature does not fully align with Nietzsche's: In James' case, willing consists of a period of struggle between an idea that one wills to take on the role of commanding and the contrary ideas that compete with it. The former may gain an upper hand and exercise its commanding role when the

contrary ideas at a certain moment cease to be inhibitory and succumb to obedience (PPII 524-5).

This invites the question as to how the idea that one wills to be in command comes to be effective? In neither James' nor Nietzsche's case does the answer hinge upon the notion of free will, since, as I have already pointed out, free will does not exist as an antecedent to one's thought or action. Rather, it is a matter of the strength of the will. Here we come to Nietzsche's notion of the *will to power*, which he purports to be the pivotal psychological doctrine, such that psychology is to be understood as "morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power" (BGE 23). As I have mentioned previously, Nietzsche argues that the will to power is the cardinal instinct of an organic being. What he means is that the life of an organic being is accounted for by its instinctive endeavour to discharge its strength (BGE 13). Thus the will to power is the will of life. Moreover, as Nietzsche argues, life's struggle, no matter great or small, always revolves around power, growth and expansion (GSW 349) – that is, around the endeavour to become and grow strong. Hence the relevance of the notion of will to power to the question raised above: An idea that one wills to be *effectively* in command may become effective for a strong-willed person, who thus experiences an affect of command.

The will to power doctrine remains not fully developed and explicated prior to Nietzsche's collapse in 1889 and subsequent mental breakdown, as the majority of discussions pertaining to it appear in the unpublished *Nachlass* rather than the published works³⁵. Further to borrowing his insights regarding Spinoza's *affectus*, here I draw on Deleuze's illuminating discussions of Nietzsche's will to power, which he takes to be

³⁵ Some Nietzsche scholars insist on resorting to only the published works for 'legitimate' views of Nietzsche, and thus would dismiss this claim. They would, and indeed do, argue that the will to power doctrine should not be given as much weight as it has been given by many scholars and readers, for the reason that the majority of Nietzsche's thoughts pertaining to it are in the *Nachlass* rather than the published works. On this regard, I beg to differ – the discussions Nietzsche makes in BGE 23 and 36, which I have discussed above, suffice to make a case for the importance of will to power in his thinking. Thus I take the relevant *Nachlass* fragments as significant and endorse the importance of the will to power in Nietzsche's philosophy and psychology. For an elaborated discussion of the issues regarding the use of the *Nachlass* and *Will to Power* in studying Nietzsche, consult Bernd Magnus' essay 'The Use and Abuse of *The Will to Power*' in *Reading Nietzsche*, C. Solomon & K.M. Higgins, eds. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 218-235.

inspired by Spinoza's theory pertaining to *affectus* and force. According to Deleuze, the will to power is "the genealogical element of force, at once differential and genetic. [It] is the element out of which issue both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that, due to this relation, devolves to each force" (Deleuze, 1962, 49). The will to power is inseparable from force, yet they ought not be conflated: "Force is what can exercise power; will to power is what wills that it be exercised" (*ibid.* 50). The force, as I see it, pertains either to a drive or an affect that the will to power may manifest as.

Deleuze sees that the will to power is a *plastic* element "ascribed to force, but in a very special way: it is both a complement of force and something internal to it" (Deleuze, 1962, 49); it "metamorphoses itself within [its field of application] and determines itself, in each case, along with what it determines", thus is a good candidate for constituting a superior empiricism (*ibid.* 50). Construed as such, Nietzsche's will to power doctrine is nicely compatible with James' radical empiricism, which contends that any element admitted to empiricism must be directly experienced, including the relations that connect states of an experience (WPE 25). The will to power is *not* something over and above its field of application – that is, the forces and the relations among these forces within an experience. Moreover, Nietzsche maintains that "all driving force is will to power, that there is no other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this" (WP 688; cf. KSA 13:14[121], 1888); likewise, "the will to power is the primitive form of affect, all other affects are only developments of it" (WP 688; cf. KSA 13:14[121], 1888). Nietzsche also contends that "the will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge" (WP 635; KSA 13:14[79], 1888). Thus the will to power is nicely compatible with James' principle of pure experience: an elemental fact of experience is a simple 'that', an unqualified actuality in the instant field of the present as it occurs (DCE 15).

I end my exposition of the will to power with a discussion of a fragment in the *Nachlass* that may be taken as addressing a philosophical aspect of the doctrine of will to power. In this fragment, Nietzsche speaks of 'personal perfection' – striving for becoming more powerful (KSA 8:6[26], 1886-7) – in relation to the notion of will. He argues that "personal perfection as conditioned by will, as consciousness [*Bewusstheit*], as reasoning with dialectics, is a caricature, a kind of self-contradiction – A degree of consciousness [*Bewusstsein*] makes perfection impossible" (WP 289; cf. KSA

13:14[128], 1888³⁶). Any act thus conditioned therefore cannot attain perfection; meanwhile, it succumbs to the (moral) ideal – and prejudice – of ‘free will’ as construed by traditional metaphysicians: one misattributes the perfection – experienced as exalted states – that arises from the development of the feeling of power to the erroneous conviction that he has ‘willed’ them upon freedom of his will (*ibid.*). Instead, as Nietzsche sees it, it is the will to power that underlies all perfection of acts.

This fragment is especially interesting and significant because here we once again have an instance where Nietzsche uses the terms *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit* back-to-back. Nietzsche tells us that personal perfection as consciousness *qua* *Bewusstheit* renders such pursuit of perfection a caricature and a self-contradiction (WP 289; KSA 13:14[128], 1888). Given my discussions in the previous chapter pertaining to *Bewusstheit*, it is evident why it amounts to a caricature and a self-contradiction: *Bewusstheit* is neither possible nor necessary, and thus makes any pursuit of perfection impossible. However, it is merely a ‘degree’ (*Grad* in German, which may also be translated as ‘rank’, ‘grade’, ‘level’ here) of consciousness *qua* *Bewusstsein*. Thus Nietzsche does not thereby reject the notion of consciousness altogether. Meanwhile, we may infer from Nietzsche’s discussion here that the development of will to power does *not* necessarily involve consciousness. Thus to those who still insist on embracing the notion of ‘free will’ in the traditional metaphysical manner, Nietzsche would tell them that this free will, being potentially unconscious, would not possibly serve as the *causa prima* constituting one’s actions.

The Will in Action: James’ Scenario, a Nietzschean Construal

I see that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power serves as a more positive answer to James’ answer to the question raised in the previous section, namely how a willed idea comes to be effective; also, I think it is one that James would happily accept. Here, I make use of James’ example, which he takes to be a case containing “in

³⁶ “Die persönliche Vollkommenheit als bedingt durch Willen, als Bewusstheit, als Vernunft mit Dialektik ist eine Carikatur, eine Art von Selbstwiderspruch ...”

miniature form the data for an entire psychology of volition” (PPII 525). He describes a scenario in which a person struggles to get out of bed on a freezing morning in a room without a fire: despite the fact that he wills to have the idea of getting up to be effective, a resolution pertaining to it “postpones itself again and again just as it seemed on the verge of bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive act” (PPII 524). Eventually, the idea does become effective, but, as James sees it rather negatively, it is largely a result of one’s stumbling upon a ‘lucky instant’ where the idea escapes from the resistance from the inhibitory ideas, thereby producing immediate motor effects of appropriation, i.e. getting up (*ibid.*). This lucky instant, which seems rather passive or otherwise miraculous in James’ construal, may alternatively be accounted for by the strength of the will: a stronger-willed person – one who has a more ‘developed’ will to power – strove to discharge his strength, wills to get up and effectively exercises his will.

With Nietzsche’s three-component account of will at hand, we may make a description of the phenomenon thus: The strong-willed person experiences a plurality of sensations that consist of both attractions to and repulsions from the willed action; as he wills to get up, the ruling thought takes charge and engages his attention to such endeavour; the affect of command strains the attention such that it becomes fixated pretty much exclusively upon the one particular aim of getting up, rendering this aim to be necessary at that given point in time. In the meantime, the accompanying muscular sensation associated with the getting-up movement also begins its action by *force of habit*, as Nietzsche puts it, even before he puts his body into motion to effect the getting-up movement (BGE 19). Thus we find in such a person an exercise of his will that exhibits strength and the power of self-determination.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed Nietzsche’s three-component account of the will and, for each component, delineated James’ views that I have argued to be parallel to Nietzsche’s. Specifically, I have shown that James’ views provide substantial materials that support the framework that Nietzsche builds for the notion of will. I have also argued that both James and Nietzsche reject the traditional construal of will as a single, simple and static entity; in its place, they both construe will as a complex and ever-evolving

process. I have argued that while free will is construed by both James and Nietzsche pragmatically as a psychological necessity, what really pertains to one's will is a matter of strength; as such, Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power addresses the question regarding how a willed idea comes to be effective, and it provides an answer that, as I have argued, James would happily accept.

Conclusion

I have discussed James' and Nietzsche's views on consciousness and will – two of the core notions in both philosophy and psychology. I have shown that there are many interesting and significant parallels in their views that are comparable or complementary to each other. An objective of my thesis project is to enhance an appreciation of James as a philosopher in addition to his reputation as a psychologist, and likewise, an appreciation of Nietzsche's contributions to contemporary psychology in addition to the recognition as an original (albeit highly controversial) philosopher.

Regarding the notion of consciousness, I have shown that James and Nietzsche reject the neo-Kantian account of consciousness that has its legacy from Kant's transcendental, synthetic unity of apperception. Specifically, they both are adamantly against the construal of consciousness as a static entity or subject that possesses knowledge. Rather, consciousness is an organically developed function pertaining to knowledge; knowledge, in turn, pertains to the relations between pure experiences (in James' account) or drives and affects (in Nietzsche's account). James' pure experiences and Nietzsche's drives and affects share some intriguing characteristics that make their *Weltanschauungen* interestingly comparable.

Meanwhile, I have argued that James and Nietzsche share some important and significant insights regarding thought/thinking: in particular, they both take conscious thinking as constituting only a portion of all thinking, while their views provide an alternative to the typical view that behind a thought there is an ego *qua* conscious thinker or agent. Perhaps a punch line may sum up the above: *You* know nothing, but you *know* more than you *think* you know. 'You' know nothing because the 'you' *qua* ego does not really exist; meanwhile, a lot of thinking does not enter into consciousness, and a lot of knowledge is upon the process of incorporation and embodiment, and do not necessarily involve deliberate thinking.

Regarding the notion of will, I have argued that both James and Nietzsche reject the construal in traditional philosophy, and also inherited by many psychologists contemporaneous to their time, of will as a single, simple and static entity. Rather, they see will as a complex, ever-evolving process facilitating an organic life. As such, will consists of physiological, cognitive and affective components, and involves such notions as bodily movement, commanding thought, attention, kinaesthetic idea, drive, affect that can be studied empirically as psychological phenomena. In particular, the notion of ruling, commanding thought is an antithesis to the atomistic soul or ego that underlies the accounts of will embraced by many psychologists and philosophers.

A common anticipation shared by James and Nietzsche, as I see it, is that the 'new' psychology, purported to be a worthwhile and distinctive discipline studying the mind, is freed from the dogmas or prejudices found in the traditional metaphysicians – notably, the notion of free will. I have argued that both James and Nietzsche construe free will pragmatically as a psychological phenomenon pertaining to the feeling of strength of the will; such feeling, the affect of command as Nietzsche calls it, is tied to Nietzsche's revolutionary doctrine of will to power. While there is no equivalent or comparable doctrine in James' account of the will, I have shown that will to power is compatible with James' radical empiricism and his principle of pure experience that play a pivotal role in his account of the will. I have also illustrated that the doctrine of will to power serves as a positive, constructive answer to the question that James raises regarding how a willed idea comes to be effective over the other, often conflicting ideas.

The parallels I have drawn enhance the respective views of James and Nietzsche that are, at least in the eyes of many scholars, idiosyncratic, peculiar and revolutionary, and thus are either misunderstood or undervalued. They also suggest that while neither James nor Nietzsche seems to read each other, unbeknownst to them their views converge to a common underlying position: namely, a radical version of empiricism that is rid of the dogmas that are found in the traditional counterpart. I see that James and Nietzsche beget a stream in contemporary psychology that is philosophically informed, empiricist and pragmatist. While they have individually inspired

and influenced many philosophers and psychologists that succeed them³⁷, many more fascinating and valuable inspirations can be drawn from an appreciation of the parallels between their insights.

³⁷ Among the well-known names, Ludwig Wittgenstein makes substantial discussions of James in his *Philosophical Investigations*, and explicitly credits James as a source of inspiration to his views. I have mentioned previously Wilfrid Sellars' allusion to James at the end of *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. Meanwhile, as evident in my discussions in the previous chapter on will, Gilles Deleuze is an admirer of Nietzsche's philosophy. So is Sigmund Freud, who discusses and cites Nietzsche in various works of his.

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