Diasporic Media in Multicultural Cities: 
A Comparative Study on Korean Media in 
Vancouver and Los Angeles

by
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Abstract

In multicultural cities, what are the opportunities and challenges for creating an interculturally inclusive media system, as a means of enhancing multicultural citizenship and cultural literacy among all members of society? This study explores the rapidly growing, yet understudied, Korean media sector in Vancouver and Los Angeles. The passage of Korea’s new election law in 2009, which extends voting rights to overseas Koreans, is likely to intensify the connection between the home country and one of the most monolingual and first-generation-dominant diaspora in Canada and the U.S. This dissertation advances the field of diasporic media by taking an interdisciplinary approach across the fields of multiculturalism and media. By synthesizing Will Kymlicka’s theory of multicultural citizenship and institutional integration for social inclusion, and Sandra Ball-Rokeach’s theory of urban communication infrastructure as a storytelling system, this study offers a critical analysis of multiculturalism as theory, policy, and practice, tracing its influence on diasporic communication infrastructure. Offering the largest media analysis yet assembled, this dissertation maps the social structure, media organizations, media content, and social interaction of diasporic Korean actors. By using Peter Dahlgren’s four-fold typology of the public sphere, structural and institutional conditions are identified as well as city-specific and ethnicity-specific factors in the production and distribution of diasporic media in general, and diasporic Korean storytelling in particular. Consistent with Kymlicka’s proposition that liberal multicultural citizenship must integrate diasporic identities in the public sphere, this study concludes that the Korean media in both cities contribute to creating a vital local public sphere. Nevertheless, regardless of the different official status of multiculturalism and regulatory contexts, Korean media have been constructed largely in the commercial sector, in which prevalent in-language marketing combined with the lack of policy supports results in the underutilization of Korean media as a means of enhancing cultural literacy for all members of society. Such a shortcoming requires more critical multiculturalism and communication theories and policies, in order to re-examine the existing conception of diasporic inclusion in mainstream institutions, to extend the benefits of diasporic media beyond diasporic communities, and establish an interculturally inclusive media system.

Keywords: Diaspora; Korean media; multicultural cities; citizenship; cultural literacy; intercultural media system; media policies
Dedication

To my parents
Acknowledgements

Upon completion of the first phase of my academic journey, I would like to remember and thank those who have walked along with me in this journey. Thanks to my esteemed supervisors, Dr. Catherine Murray, Dr. Alison Beale, and Dr. Mary Lynn Young, for the continuous support and guidance over the years. It has been my great pleasure and privilege to work with the experts in the fields of media and cultural policies and industries, journalism, and empirical research, to mention a few. Thanks also to Dr. Myria Georgiou, Dr. Kirsten McAllister, and Dr. Jan Marontate for gladly accepting the invitation to join the last phase of this journey. I appreciate the thought-provoking comments and questions, which help me move forward.

A special thanks to my senior supervisor, Dr. Catherine Murray, for teaching me the joy of academic life. Her intellectual curiosity and passion for research as a scholar, her professional and thoughtful guidance as a supervisor, and her energy and humour as a person, made a great impact on my academic life. I am deeply indebted to her for her presence in all my academic endeavours, and I hope to continue her guidance through the supervision of my future students.

Thanks to my wonderful cohort, Daniel Ahadi, Dorothy Christian, Mirjam Gollmitzer, Robert Hershorn, and Ayaka Yoshimizu, for great scholarship and friendship that I cherish dearly. The joys, laughs, surprises, and many more will continue in our academic and personal occasions.

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Glossary

**Media**
Media, in this study, include television, radio, newspapers, and websites.

**Mainstream media**
Mainstream media are directed to the majority population who are culturally of European origin (France or the British Isles) and racially Caucasian or white in colour (consistent with the definition of *visible minorities* below). This study limits mainstream media to English-language media only due to a small francophone population (16% of the Canadian population, Statistics Canada, Census 2006).

**Intercultural media**
Intercultural media facilitate an exchange of diverse narratives to enrich the understanding of intercultural groups in multicultural cities. Woods and Landry (2008, p. 250) used the term “intercultural city” to refer to a city in which “cultural literacy is widespread so that people can understand and empathize with another’s view of the world.” “Cultural literacy” here means “the ability to read, understand and find the significance of diverse cultures and, as a consequence, to be able to evaluate, compare and decode the varied cultures that are interwoven in a place” (ibid.). Intercultural media, in this sense, function to offer varied readings of everyday phenomena from diverse communities, which can facilitate the understanding of other people’s worldview.

**Immigrant**
The 2006 Canadian Census defines immigrants to be “people who are, or have been, landed immigrants in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration authorities. Some immigrants have resided in Canada for a number of years, while others have arrived recently. Most immigrants are born outside Canada, but a small number were born in Canada” (Statistics Canada, 2006b). This does not include “children born in Canada to immigrant parents.” They are non-immigrants.

**Visible minority**
The 2006 Canadian Census used the term defined by the Employment Equity Act of Canada, that is, “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” This includes Chinese, South Asian, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab, West Asian, Korean, Japanese, Visible minority, not included elsewhere (n.i.e.), and Multiple visible minority. Under this Act, Aboriginal persons and Whites are considered members of “non-visible minority” or “not a visible minority” (Statistics Canada, 2006c). The 1996 Census was the first to measure the visible minority population (Statistics Canada, 2006a). By way of comparison, “visible minority” concerns ethnic or racial origin while “immigrant” concerns legal status. Immigrants include non-visible minorities (European origin) whereas visible minorities include children born in Canada to immigrant parents.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Canadian Association of Broadcasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Korean Canadian Coactive Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILA</td>
<td>Chicano/Latino Association Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Communications Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Immigrant Services Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KABA</td>
<td>Korean American Bar Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAC</td>
<td>Korean American Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KACF</td>
<td>Korean American Community Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADC</td>
<td>Korean American Democratic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADNO</td>
<td>Korean American Democratic National Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAVC</td>
<td>Korean-American Voters’ Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Korean Communications Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCC</td>
<td>Korean Communications Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCCD</td>
<td>Korean Churches for Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCCLA</td>
<td>Korean Cultural Center of Los Angeles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHEIR</td>
<td>Korean Health, Education, Information and Referral Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIWA</td>
<td>Koreatown Immigrant Workers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KRC</td>
<td>Korean Resources Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KYCC</td>
<td>Koreatown Youth and Community Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAKASEC</td>
<td>National Korean American Service &amp; Education Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPMCC</td>
<td>National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Organization of Chinese Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKF</td>
<td>Overseas Korean Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.U.C.C.E.S.S.</td>
<td>Sino United Chinese Community Enrichment Services</td>
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1: Introduction

How is “multicultural” different from “intercultural”? If the former is a quantitative term referring to “many cultures,” the latter may be a qualitative term, referring to “relationship among cultures.” If multicultural engagement signifies the recognition of diversity, intercultural engagement may signify the interaction of diversity. The latter goes beyond awareness of the difference; it explores the difference. How then can cities of ever-growing cultural diversity and cultural identities advance from multiculture to interculture, where multiple narratives can be properly circulated, contested, and ultimately cultivated into broader discourse? What kind of communication infrastructure is in place in multicultural cities to facilitate this?

Such issues are particularly important in Canada and the United States, which were among the top 10 destinations for 214 million international migrants in 2010 (Kobayashi, Li, & Teixeira, 2011). The presence of foreign-born immigrants is, in fact, significant in both countries and is continually growing,¹ accounting for 20% (equivalent to six million) and 13% (equivalent to 40 million) of the population respectively (Statistics Canada, 2006k; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). Within these countries, a functioning communication infrastructure is especially important for cities like Vancouver and Los Angeles where a majority of the population do not speak the official languages: 40% and 60% respectively² (Statistics Canada, 2006l; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c).

Due to this growth of non-official language populations, diasporic communities have developed a robust communication infrastructure. The continuing growth of the diasporic media sector, amidst the decline of so-called mainstream media in general, has

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¹ These figures show a steady growth of international migrants in the population from 1990, at 16% and 9% respectively (Kobayashi et al., 2011, p. xvii).
² Such demographic composition has been quite consistent since the early 2000; 70% of Canadian immigrants live in three major cities (Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal) and 66% of the U.S. immigrants live in five major cities (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Philadelphia) (Citizenship and Immigration of Canada, 2001; U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000a).
been, in fact, a general trend found across North America. As evidence, there are roughly 300 diasporic media organizations in Canada (see CARD, CCN Matthews Database [Green Book], National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada). The actual number could be higher than what is listed in these national directories, as listings are based on voluntary membership or registration. In fact, Murray, Yu, and Ahadi’s (2007) study on diasporic media finds that in Metro Vancouver alone, there are nearly 150 diasporic media outlets in 22 languages. In the U.S., there are over 2,500 media outlets across the country, serving 54 language groups (http://newamericamedia.org/), and the diasporic media is found to be “the only print media sector that is growing in the U.S.” (PEW, 2006). In Los Angeles County alone, there are over 100 media outlets, and this figure represents newspapers only (County of Los Angeles).

The growth of the non-official language populations is an important factor that has propelled the growth of diasporic media. Other than language, studies³ have identified and explored many other factors that have contributed to this growth, especially around the roles these ethno-racial communicative spaces or “sphericules” (Gitlin, 1998) play for ethno-racial populations. Among the various roles diasporic media may play include: providing communicative spaces (Couldry & Dreher, 2007; Georgiou, 2005); facilitating a public sphere and political agency (Downing, 1992; Downing & Husband, 2005); contributing to national identity and shared “consciousness” (Bailey, 2007; Georgiou, 2002, 2006; Kosnick, 2007; Sinclair, Yue, Hawkins, Pookong, & Fox, 2001; Sreberny, 2000, 2005; Sun, 2006); providing business information and enabling new business start-ups (Zhou, Chen, & Cai, 2006); and contributing to developing a sense of belonging (Ball-Rokeach, Kim & Matei, 2001; Cheng, 2005; Karim, 2002; Lin & Song, 2006; Murray, Yu & Ahadi, 2007; Ojo, 2006).

³ Some of the international projects include Project Metamorphosis by the Annenberg School of Communication 1998-2002 (U.S.A.); The State of the News Media by Project for Excellence in Journalism (U.S.A.); Mapping Minorities and their Media by London School of Economics 2002-2005 (UK); European programme of the Institut PANOS Paris by Mediam’ Rad 2005-2008 (EU). The cultural diversity and ethnic media in B.C. study by the Centre for Policy Studies on Culture and Communities (CPCC) of Simon Fraser University belongs to this group of research projects. Another realm of diasporic media study is policy. The studies that focus on how policy regimes characterize ethnic media at national and international levels include: Browne, 2005; Karim, 2011; Riggins, 1992; Spiller & Smiley, 1986; and Zolf 1996.
These roles for diasporic media further intensify and diversify as a result of the advancement of technology and demographic changes. Technology allows diasporic media to expand globally and form a global diasporic connection. A so-called digital diaspora is being shaped by ordinary migrants (Chan, 2006; Hiller & Franz, 2004) as well as media corporations. Local producers expand geo-spatially to be part of a global diasporic consciousness, and transnational media link globally dispersed diaspora to the country of origin in real time. Second- and third-generation immigrants and culturally and racially hybrid populations also create communicative spaces of their own (e.g., KoreAm Journal), alongside in-language media for the first generation, suggesting that just as the diasporic experience is uniquely different for different groups within and across communities, so too is the utility of diasporic media.

What is missing in the discussion of diasporic media, however, is an understanding of their role in the broader society. Most studies focus on autonomous roles of diasporic media within ethno-racial communities as socio-cultural, economic, and political means that are often culturally private, economically enclave, and politically subaltern at best, without due consideration of how diasporic media can actually benefit the broader society, as a means of citizenship and cultural literacy for all members of society. Such narrow positioning of diasporic media often fails to critically challenge the dominant media theories, which tend to consider diasporic media as ancillary, and not complementary to the broader media system. In other words, the marginalization of diasporic media within the broader media system is recognized; however, inclusion in the public sector has been only vaguely suggested, and the utilization of in-language media available at all geographic levels is encouraged as an alternative means of social expression for ethno-racial populations (Curran, 2000; Downing & Husband, 2005).

However, such marginalization is becoming increasingly problematic in multicultural cities, when considered in relation to democratic choices and informed decision-making, allowing for the ability to properly exercise citizenship. If the so-called mainstream media serve only one half of the population, while the rest (especially those who belong to first-generation dominant diaspora) resort to their own in-language media, where are the proper channels to consolidate, integrate, and disseminate multicultural narratives? This marginalization hypothesis, however, can be challenged by the alienation
hypothesis of diasporic media, in that diasporic media tend to lean toward the country of origin and are less concerned about the country of settlement (Lin & Song, 2006; Murray et al., 2007). Diasporic media remain reasonably “distinct from the dominant public sphere” by covering what matters to society in general (Karim, 2002, p. 239). However, they tend to focus more on what matters to their own communities and the country of origin, and are thereby assumed to be working ineffectively to integrate immigrant citizens into important local/national/global debates on citizenship. However, such hypotheses need to be more carefully tested in relation to the structural and institutional conditions of the production and distribution of local diasporic media (as this study will prove), rather than accepted simply based on content analyses of the quantity of home country news contained in the final output.

Another problem in the study of diasporic media is that diasporic media are discussed only in the realm of media, when they are, in fact, a constitutive element of the processes of immigration, or a by-product of it. As a consequence, the theories, policies, and practices of multiculturalism, immigration, and citizenship must be explored for how they collectively influence immigrant communication infrastructure. Diasporic media, therefore, need to be discussed within the critical analysis of multiculturalism as embedded in the receiving countries and as a part of broader social projects—rather than only within the realm of media—as a means of ethno-racial social expression.

The present study attempts to critically examine diasporic media in the broader media system and explore how they actually work within and across communities at a micro level as a means of citizenship and cultural literacy. Diasporic media are considered internally as a civil society, as a means of multicultural citizenship and civic engagement for ethno-racial citizens, and externally as a contributor to enhancing intercultural understanding and dialogue among all members of society. Diasporic media are thus not “their media” but part of “our media.” In effect, this study envisions an intercultural media system in which diasporic media and mainstream media are properly connected, and multicultural storytelling from diverse communities is embedded in everyday discourse, so as to help members of society experience a full sense of belonging and have the capacity to make informed democratic choices. This media system triggers conversation by encouraging multicultural storytelling to be circulated, contested, and
cultivated into what some conceive as a “shared cultural literacy”; one of the foundational concepts for citizenship and civic engagement. Woods and Landry (2008, p. 250) termed “cultural literacy” as “the ability to read, understand and find the significance of diverse cultures and, as a consequence, to be able to evaluate, compare and decode the varied cultures that are interwoven in a place.” Accordingly, a city where cultural literacy is developed so that “people can understand and empathize with another’s view of the world” is an “intercultural city” (ibid.).

Understanding how diasporic media actually work at a local level, instead of at the national and global levels which media theories generally attend to, thus helps us understand their role in enhancing cultural literacy in multicultural cities. We need to disclose critical literature on multiculturalism to test the argument prevalent in diasporic media studies\(^4\) that these media do not work effectively to integrate immigrant citizens into important local/national/global debates on citizenship. This study explores the structural and institutional conditions that influence the production and distribution of diasporic media through an international comparison of the rapidly growing yet understudied Korean media in two multicultural cities, Vancouver and Los Angeles. As one of the most monolingual and first-generation-dominant diaspora, how Korean media actually work at the community level as a means of aiding immigrant settlement, citizenship, and integration as full members of society would identify the areas of needed capacity building in young developing diasporic communication infrastructure. (An in-depth rationale for the selection of Korean media is explained below.) The guiding research questions include: What are the policy and socio-urban structures that govern media undertakings with respect to diversity? What are the institutional conditions that govern diasporic media undertakings? What civil society roles do diasporic media play? What are the city-specific and ethnicity-specific factors that promote and hinder

\(^4\) Ball-Rokeach’s Metamorphosis project (1998-2002), Karim’s study (2002) on Indo-Canadian Voice, Cheng’s study (2005) on Ming Pao, Lin and Song’s study (2006) of L.A’s Latino, Chinese, and Korean print media, and Murray et al.’s study (2007) of B.C.’s Punjabi, Chinese, and Korean media all commonly find that diasporic media strive to deliver news of the broader society to their respective communities in their cultural idioms. However, these media tend to focus more on what matters to their respective communities and the country of origin, and often lack strategies to bring their stories to the broader society.
multicultural storytelling? What policy options can be considered to ensure multicultural storytelling is embedded and fully integrated into the broader media system?

Theoretically, this dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach across the fields of multiculturalism and media to offer a critical analysis of multiculturalism as theory, policy, and practice, and the combined influence on diasporic communication infrastructure. Unlike previous studies, which attempt to explain diasporic media solely within the realm of media, this study examines diasporic media as a social construct produced by immigration law and integration, citizenship practices, media law and corporate undertakings. Diasporic media practices then are viewed as part of a broader societal culture rather than confined to the private sphere of ethno-racial citizens. This approach also helps critically examine the interplay between the two realms in theorizing, implementing, and practicing intercultural communication. Analysis at three different levels—theory, policy, and practice—helps identify at which level problems may occur and where more research attention should be given.

At a theoretical level, this dissertation study uses Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka’s influential liberal theory of multicultural citizenship and institutional integration, which proposes the creation of ethno-racial options within, not outside, the mainstream institutions, as a means of proper social integration and as a way of enriching the existing societal culture for the democratic enjoyment of all members of society. Such a conception is consistent with the intercultural media system this study envisions, in which multiple narratives are provided as options for all members of society. The study also uses Sandra Ball-Rokeach’s Communication Infrastructure Theory (CIT), which maps a storytelling system in the context of communication action. Media, community service organizations, and local residents serve as main actors of the storytelling system. Ball-Rokeach’s theory is particularly relevant for this study, as the relationship between diasporic media and community service organizations and their collective agency as a civil society is important to examine. Furthermore, the theory positions diasporic media between micro neighbourhood storytelling and macro national media storytelling, thus helping identify a working relationship between diasporic media and the storytelling actors at different geographic and institutional levels. At a policy level, the study reviews the policy and regulatory frameworks of immigration, citizenship, and media in Canada.
and the U.S., and compares the influence of the status of multiculturalism (official versus unofficial) in terms of policy options laid out for ethno-racial populations. Finally, at the level of practice, the overall settlement patterns and development of media options for ethno-racial populations are reviewed. The case studies on Korean media more specifically explore the strengths and weaknesses of the existing theories and policies on multiculturalism and media, and suggest potential policy options that can be considered to enhance diasporic media’s civil society role, and to extend the benefits of diasporic media as a means of enhancing cultural literacy for all members of society.

Methodologically, this study offers the largest media analysis yet assembled in this sector by using Peter Dahlgren’s (1995) four-fold typology of the public sphere, which helps identify structural and institutional conditions as well as cross-national similarities and differences—the city-specific (that is, geo-political specificities such as multiculturalism, media policy directives, or socio-economic resources available to the community) and ethnicity-specific factors (which are only applicable to Korean media, such as home country journalism)—that promote and hinder the production and distribution of multicultural storytelling. The four dimensions include social structure (e.g., historical conditions); media institutions (e.g., organization, financing, legal framework); media representation or style of media content (e.g., news topics, the modes of discourse, the character of debates and discussion); and sociocultural interaction of diasporic actors (e.g., face-to-face encounters and discussions between citizens). In doing so, the study covers a full range of Korean diasporic media available to the Korean community in both cities—all media platforms (television, radio, newspapers, and online bulletin board threads) by ownership (transnational, immigrant, and multicultural media).

Structural conditions include the overall policy and socio-urban structures within which diasporic media operate—immigration, citizenship, and media policies, as well as socio-economic infrastructure and resources available in each city. Immigration and citizenship policies are instrumental to the government’s commitment to multiculturalism and cultural diversity, and manifest themselves in media policies concerning media diversity. Diasporic media are, after all, a by-product of global migration. Furthermore, immigration and citizenship policy changes, and the subsequent resultant demographic changes, influence the relationship ethno-racial populations have with their
communication infrastructure. The institutional conditions, on the other hand, consider media as business entities—their organizational structures and mandates; interactions within and across media institutions; and media content and audience feedback. Content and audience dimensions are equally essential to understand what is considered important not only to producers, but also to audiences. While it is beyond the scope of this study to survey Korean diasporic media audiences, part of this dimension was covered through an analysis of online community bulletin boards. Such a multi-dimensional approach is needed as the complexities inherent in the socio-cultural, economic, and political pressures from local diasporic communities, host and home countries, demand a macro as well as micro level of understanding. As a result, this analysis provides a clear picture of the Korean-specific segment of the diasporic media landscape and advances beyond the often one-dimensional focus of diasporic media studies and the tendency in the field to examine either structure or agency, content or audience.

Why “Diasporic” Media?

Diaspora is defined as “any population which is considered ‘deterritorialised’ or ‘transnational’ -- that is, which has originated in a land other than which it currently resides, and whose social, economic and political networks cross the borders of nation-states or, indeed, span the globe” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 1). In conceptualizing diaspora for the purpose of this study, Vertovec’s three meanings of diaspora and the “combined working” of these meanings are useful: Diaspora as social form as in the “triadic relationship” among the ethnic groups, the territorial states and contexts (the country of residence), and the homeland states and contexts (the country of origin), manifested in institutional networks and communication; as type of consciousness as in the “awareness of multilocality” of being “here” and “there”; and as mode of cultural production as in a hybrid form of diasporic culture (pp. 5-8). The Korean communities in Vancouver and L.A., especially Korean diasporic media in everyday production, manifest these multifaceted dimensions of diaspora in their local-transnational continuity. The term “diasporic media” this study uses depends on this understanding of diaspora, and especially the mode of diasporic cultural production.
There are many words that describe media for ethno-racial minorities: “ethnic media” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001; Breton, 2005; Karim, 2002; Kosnick, 2007), “ethnic community media” (Tsagarousianou, 2002), “ethnic minority media” (Browne, 2005; Downing, 1992), “minority media” (Riggins, 1992; Sreberny, 2005), “minority language media” (Guyot, 2007), “diasporic media” (Georgiou, 2005, 2006), or interchangeably, minority and diasporic media (Siapera, 2010). The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) uses “ethnic media” to define media that is “directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian, or from France or the British Isles” (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117).

This study rejects that term and uses the term “diasporic media” instead for three reasons. First, media for ethno-racial minorities cater to not only language or cultural needs, but also function as a collective consciousness for people in the “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) as part of diasporic experiences. Min’s study (1996, p. 43) on the Korean community in L.A. found that Korean media helped maintain a “nonterritorial community” for geographically dispersed Korean immigrants. Thus, the term “community media,” if it is referring to geographically-bound media in terms of geographic coverage, is not adequate for some communities. Although it varies by media type, the geographic coverage of Korean media generally goes beyond a single community or a city: Metro Vancouver beyond the city of Vancouver, and L.A. County beyond the city of L.A. Especially, Korean television news produced in L.A. is often national, covering both west and east, thus hardly a community media.

Second, the collective consciousness of diasporic experiences is authentic in its own “in-betweenness”: hybridity results from the mixing and mingling with other cultures. Korean-Canadian/American culture, for example, may contain some Korean cultural forms maintained throughout the generations, but it is largely Canadianized/Americanized Korean culture, and is different from the Korean culture of Korea. Therefore, as Siapera (2010, p. 96) argues, diasporic media “prioritizes elements of continuous development, of being in between places, of similarity of experience, but not necessarily of nostalgia for a homeland.” The term “ethnic media,” in this sense, is self-limiting: it implies “culture” as from the country of origin rather than a new hybrid culture that is locally developed by immigrants and people of multiple identities. In other
words, the term over-emphasizes ethnicity and under-emphasizes the fluid, transforming, and hybrid nature of diasporic identity. The term “ethnic media” is also self-limiting by unnecessarily excluding non-visible European ethnicities. Murray et al.’s British Columbia (B.C.) ethnic media directory (2007) lists not only media of visible minorities (e.g., Ming Pao, Voice), but also media of non-visible minorities of European origin (e.g., German Today, L’Eco D’Italia [Il Marco Polo]). Therefore, the term “ethnic” undermines the diasporic experience of European minorities.

Third, the term, “minority media,” positioned in contrast to majority or dominant media as a location of power struggle or a counter-public, can be an overstatement. Georgiou (2005) finds that diasporic media are available at all geographic levels, from local to national and international, and create an interesting universalism-particularism tension within diasporic lives. De Leeuw and Rydin’s study (2007) on media practices of immigrant children and their families demonstrates how the consumption of diasporic, national, and global media works to help them negotiate their identities. Technology enables not only local diasporic media to link locally concentrated diaspora, but also transnational media corporations to link globally dispersed diaspora as well as these diaspora to the country of origin, providing “home” content to diasporic communities. In the Korean diaspora, for example, MBC America, a branch of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation in Korea, provides MBC program content through local over-the-air, cable, and satellite not only to the Korean community in L.A., but also to that of Vancouver (see www.mbc24tv.com). In the Chinese diaspora, Ming Pao, a Chinese daily newspaper published by Ming Pao Group in Hong Kong, also operates its branches in Vancouver and Toronto (see www.mingpao.com). Therefore, diasporic media may simply be a channel to deliver the home content to various diaspora with minimal editorial revision, unlikely to function solely as a political vehicle to pursue a local political agenda.

Why Korean Media in Vancouver and Los Angeles?

This study undertakes an international comparison of Korean media in the two most multicultural cities in North America, Vancouver and Los Angeles. Korean media have been given limited academic attention in the field of Communication: treated only
as part of cross-community comparisons (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001; Lin & Song, 2006; Murray et al., 2007) or in studies specifically on Korean audiences in different cities of the U.S. (Lee, 2004; Moon, 2003; Moon and Park, 2007). In most cases, Korean media are mentioned as part of ethnographic research on the Korean diaspora in the U.S. (Chang, 1988; Chung, 2007; Kim, 1981; Min, 2006). In Canada, Korean media have been given far less attention. It was only in the late 2000s when Korean media were studied as part of a cross-community comparison (Murray et al., 2007; Yu & Ahadi, 2010) and in a study solely on Korean media (Yu & Murray, 2007).

There are a number of reasons for the selection of Korean media. The most important reason is that Korean media are an increasing segment among non-English media. In Vancouver, Korean diasporic media are the fastest growing media segment among 22 languages tracked (Murray et al., 2007). Korean media are found in almost all media platforms in broadcasting (over-the-air, cable, satellite) as well as in print (newspapers, magazines) in online and offline formats (e.g., print/online publications, e-papers, online community bulletins). They are also found in all major cities in North America. The Korea Times and the Korea Daily, for example, operate branch offices in almost all major North American cities: Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Atlanta, Washington DC, Chicago, Texas, Denver, New York, Hawaii, Vancouver, and Toronto.

Korean immigrants’ dependency on Korean diasporic media is well known (Chang, 1988; Chung, 2007; Kim, 1981; Min, 2006), and the demographic profile of the community explains why. The Korean community is one of the most monolingual, first-generation-dominant diaspora in Canada and the U.S.: first-generation Koreans account for 91% and 74% of the total Korean populations respectively (see Chapters 3 & 5). Low proficiency in English also contributes to high dependency on in-language media (Min, 2006). Especially in Canada, 62% of Koreans in British Columbia arrive without English language ability, higher than the immigrant average (50%) (see Chapter 3). Among those who claim Korean to be their mother tongue, nearly 90% speak the Korean language at home (see Chapter 3). A similar figure is also found among Koreans in the U.S. (see Chapter 5). The Korean community is thus still very young compared to other ethnic groups.
Second, geographically, Canada and the U.S. are the two countries where most Korean migrants have moved in the past two decades, accounting for over 30% and 50% on average respectively out of the total Korean migration throughout the world (see Table 1.1). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea (MOFAT, 2009), there are 223,322 Koreans in Canada and 2,102,283 Koreans in the U.S., including naturalized Korean-Canadians/American and Korean citizens (e.g., permanent residents, visa students, others) (see Table 1.2). The province of British Columbia and the state of California, where the research sites are located, host over 30% of the total Korean population of their respective countries. Vancouver and L.A. are particularly favoured destinations by Korean immigrants for a number of reasons. For Vancouver, the city’s natural environment and geographical proximity to Korea are important factors to consider (Kwak, 2004, p. 17). Economic factors are less critical as found in the case of L.A. Vancouver hosts the second largest Korean diaspora in Canada after Toronto, and also has been the top destination for Korean entrepreneur immigrants, accounting for 32% of entrepreneur immigrants in 2001 (B.C. Stats, 2001). However, the city is generally not considered a competitive market for business (Kwak, 2004). In L.A., on the other hand, economic factors have been the dominant motive underpinning Korean migration, as Light and Bonacich (1988, pp. 150-153) argued. Early in the 1970s, L.A.’s garment industry required immigrant labour and resulted in Korean immigrants overselecting L.A. as a destination. Furthermore, L.A. is also a significant hub for U.S.-Korea import/export trade, thus offering a competitive job market (Choy cited in Light & Bonacich, 1988, p. 151). Other than economic factors, a chain migration through kinship also has attracted Koreans to L.A. Table 1.1 demonstrates the incidence of migration throughout the world.
### Table 1.1  Korean migration to the world (1999-2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia &amp; Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23,314</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>19,922</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17,433</td>
<td>2,651</td>
<td>12,754</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>17,927</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>11,473</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>14,477</td>
<td>2,735</td>
<td>8,133</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>14,640</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>7,975</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>3,462</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15,917</td>
<td>3,289</td>
<td>8,535</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,949</td>
<td>3,073</td>
<td>7,277</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12,484</td>
<td>3,918</td>
<td>8,205</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13,974</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>8,734</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12,655</td>
<td>6,783</td>
<td>5,360</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>15,307</td>
<td>9,295</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11,584</td>
<td>5,696</td>
<td>4,565</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11,178</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>4,167</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,509</td>
<td>4,613</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9,759</td>
<td>4,522</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8,277</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>5,083</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,177</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>3,152</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,127</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note. The numbers represent Korean migrants who declared their destination to be either the U.S. or Canada upon departing Korea. Those who changed their status in respective countries are excluded here.

### Table 1.2  Koreans in Canada and the U.S. (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>B.C.</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Total</td>
<td>223,322</td>
<td>76,712</td>
<td>2,102,283</td>
<td>622,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian/U.S. citizens</td>
<td>98,860</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23,228</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean citizens</td>
<td>124,462</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53,484</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Permanent resident</td>
<td>80,705</td>
<td>35,133</td>
<td>524,084</td>
<td>105,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Visa student</td>
<td>22,249</td>
<td>7,599</td>
<td>105,242</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>21,508</td>
<td>10,752</td>
<td>469,528</td>
<td>136,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea (2009)

Note. Extracted Canada and the U.S. only.
Third, this dissertation argues that Korean communities in Vancouver and L.A. possess ideal conditions for cross-national comparison. The two communities are different in historical trajectories; however, similar in settlement patterns. In a comparison of immigration history, including the official formation of the community with an establishment of Consulate Office in each city, demographic profiles, and interracial relations, among others, Vancouver’s Korean community is much younger, less settled (with more floating populations), and more peaceful in interethnic relations. L.A.’s Korean community, on the other hand, is much older, more settled (with a greater naturalized citizen population), and has experienced interracial relations—some of which have been conflict-ridden and competitive. L.A.’s Korean community is also the largest Korean diaspora in North America in terms of the size of population and enclave economy. Therefore, L.A. is often considered among Koreans as another city of Korea (see Chapter 5). As will be shown, however, the two communities are quite similar in settlement patterns including geographical concentration and dispersion, development of an enclave economy and especially, dependence on communication infrastructure (see Chapters 3 & 5).

As an important component of communication infrastructure, Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. each provide advantages in exploring city-specific and ethnicity-specific factors that influence multicultural storytelling. First, Vancouver and L.A. are two west-cost cities whose geographic proximity to Korea makes them gateways for Korean cultural products. Second, Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. are equally available in a variety of media platforms in online and offline formats. However, a set of different conditions that make the comparison interesting include development path, ownership and market size. When looking at development path, the comparison is between a young and a matured infrastructure. The first Korean media outlet in Vancouver was founded in the 1980s, when L.A.’s Korean media had already formed all genres of media outlets. With the launch of the Korea Times in 1969, L.A.’s Korean media can boast over 40 years of history. Comparison by ownership is one between immigrant and transnational media. Korean media in Vancouver are owned entirely by local immigrants whereas L.A.’s media includes branches of transnational media, which operate under different editorial and market directives (see Chapter 5). Vancouver’s
leading outlets are independent franchises, involved in transactions to access content from these branches, but editorially separate from them. By market size, there can be a comparison between micro and macro market structure. Just by comparison of the number of media outlets, there are approximately 20 Korean media outlets in Vancouver compared to an estimated 50 to 100 outlets in L.A., depending on the source (see Chapter 5). The size of each advertising market is proportional to the number of outlets. Vancouver’s Korean media operate with a monthly advertising market average of $500,000, compared to L.A.’s $5,000,000 monthly estimated advertising income (see Chapters 3 & 5). The relatively stronger presence of the branches of Korean conglomerates in L.A., such as Samsung, Korean Air, and Hyundai Motors, has also contributed to the expansion of the local advertising market. How such different conditions influence local Korean storytelling in each city is interesting to observe.

In this context, this cross-national study uses the two multicultural “cities” as a reference for three units of comparative analysis. First, the city is a legal unit, which is subject to the constitutional and legal frameworks of multiculturalism, immigration, citizenship, as well as media. Consequently, the city is a special institutional site of the two nations, Canada and the U.S. Second, the city is a socio-urban structure in which Korean immigrant settlement and media undertakings actually take place. Finally, the city is a geographic boundary or unit, which Korean storytelling covers: Metro Vancouver and L.A. County (as well as adjacent Orange County, the two target markets of Korean diasporic media regardless of the location of media outlets).

Aside from these comparative dimensions, Korea’s new election law,5 which extends voting rights to overseas Koreans beginning with the forthcoming 2012 elections, makes this study timely. This epochal event highlights Korea’s growing diasporic connection through which the Korean diaspora comes under a direct influence of homeland politics. The nearly one million eligible voters throughout Canada and the U.S., with nearly 30% of them in B.C. and California (Table 1.2), are indeed of great strategic

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5 Korea’s new election law was passed on February 5, 2009 to extend voting rights to overseas Koreans who are 19 years old or over (Ryu, 2009). Overseas Koreans include permanent residents and temporary visitors. S. C. Park of Kyungki University (South Korea) estimated the eligible voters throughout the world would be 2,295,937 and nearly 40% (or 879,083) are located in the U.S. (Chung, 2010c.).
interest to the Korean government. The result of the 15th presidential election of Korea, in fact, depended on 390,000 votes (Korea Times, 2009c). Accordingly, this new relationship between Korea and the Korean diaspora may over time create a closer relationship between Korean diasporic media (or overseas Korea media to Korean government) with the Korean diaspora. As a civil society for Korean-Canadians/Americans, how Korean diasporic media may respond to this legislative change, especially with respect to Korean storytelling, and exercise of new models of citizenship is an important part of this study.

1.1 Data Collection and Interpretation

Data Collection

This study was conducted in Vancouver, Canada and Los Angeles, the U.S. between May 2009 and April 2011. Multiple methods are employed to look at the following dimensions: (a) field surveys (one-on-one in-depth interviews); (b) content analyses of television, radio, and newspaper news items as well as surrounding ads, and online community bulletin/discussion boards available on the websites of all dailies in each location; and (c) unobtrusive observation of community events announced in the media. The analysis involves a full range of media platforms (television, radio, newspapers, and online bulletin boards) by ownership type (local immigrant, transnational, and multicultural media). (See Appendix 1 for more details.)

First, the study completed a total of 50 in-depth interviews with (a) media practitioners (e.g., owner, editor, reporter, staff writer) who work for diasporic (or multicultural/multilingual) media, printed, broadcasted, or published online or offline, and directed to immigrants in Canada and the U.S.; and (b) non-profit, non-partisan CSO (Civil Society Organization) representatives who serve immigrants in Canada and the U.S. The reason for interviewing CSO leaders is that community organizations are potentially influential in public discourse, so this relationship is important to understand. The purpose of the in-depth interviews is to examine Dahlgren’s (1995) second dimension; that is, the media institution: the demographic profile of media professionals (e.g., age, education, journalistic training and years of stay in Canada); the history of the
organization; the day-to-day operation and production; financing (e.g., advertising market, multiple ownership); regulation (e.g., awareness of multicultural and media policies among media professionals, cross-language ownership), among others. The semi-structured interviews involved a self-administered importance-satisfaction rating survey on news content, institutional collaboration within the Korean community as well as across media institutions. These attributes were developed based on the findings from earlier studies (Murray et al., 2007; Yu & Murray, 2007).

Second, the content analysis of news items was designed to answer the third dimension of Dahlgren’s public sphere (1995), that is, media representation, concerning “what the media portray, how topics are presented, the modes of discourse at work, and the character of debates and discussion.” The main purpose is to compare the evidence of intercultural elements in Korean media in the two selected cities and see how similarities or differences in multiculturalism and media policies (Chapter 2) and organization structure (Chapters 3 & 5) are manifested in the final outcome. What news items are covered most frequently? What news of “here” and of “home” are most often shown? Are they consistent with what producers claimed (in Chapters 3 & 5)? How do these diasporic media situate their community in the national and local discourse? How “civic” and how “engaging” are these media in terms of covering “here” and working toward intercultural citizenship making? Therefore, the focus is more on “what” is covered than “how” it is covered (as it is usually the focus of cultural studies through semiotic or narrative analyses). The content analysis is particularly useful for the reading of ads placed in Korean media to understand not only the types of businesses that constitute the Korean enclave economy, but also the level of economic embeddedness and social belonging of Korean immigrants in the local market, as an indicator of mutually constitutive socio-economic activities. The content analysis is also more useful than the semiotic analysis because of the form the ads take, since the majority of ads telegraph brief business and/or contact information in smaller than a business-card-size space rather than artistically designed images usually associated with full-fledged commercial ads.

A three-week sample of over 1,800 television, radio, and newspaper news items as well as over 2,800 surrounding ads were collected in each city between March (newspapers and TV) and April (radio) in 2010. From the eighteen days of the three-
week sample (Monday to Saturday), a total of six days are selected to form a “constructed week.” This method is frequently used in the study of communication as it assumes “cyclic variation of content for different days of the week and requires that all the different days of the week be represented” (Riffe, Aust, & Lacy, 1993, p. 54). The coding was done entirely by the author. The intercoder reliability testing was conducted on a “reliability sub-sample” (10% of the total 1,839 items) by a second coder to ensure that “obtained ratings are not the idiosyncratic results of one rater’s subjective judgment” (Tinsley and Weiss cited in Macnamara, 2006, p. 10). A variety of methods was used to check the level of agreement and covariance, and the result was satisfactory on all measurements.6

Aside from the news items, over 200 online community bulletin board threads retrieved from the so called “community” section of the sampled newspapers (online publications) were analyzed. This analysis was designed to address Dahlgren’s fourth dimension, that is, sociocultural interaction (face-to-face encounters and discussions between citizens or the virtual “front people”). Korean newspapers offer venues to their readers to discuss the issues that are important to them. This is a good source of community interaction where readers come to share events or announcements (e.g., congratulatory messages, social programs, job posting, cultural events, new business promotion/updates, other), raise concerns/questions (e.g., immigration, health, job market, studying abroad), buy and sell items, or promote locally originated blogs. This rich community section managed by readers may provide useful information that helps understand “what matters to immigrants” other than news let known by publishers.

Finally, the purpose of observation was to have a closer look at the events announced in media that actually take place during the fieldwork period. The advantages of observation are “subjective understanding,” “being there: seeing the unseen,” “immediacy,” “grounded research,” and “richness and colour” (Deacon et al., 2007, pp. 255-260). What is the event about (what)? Who is hosting the event (who)? When does it take place (when)? Where does it take place (where)? How is the event (how)? Who are

6 For agreement, the average values for Percentage Agreement and Cohens’ Kappa were high, 88.6% and 0.81 respectively, where the optimal score for Cohen’s Kappa is 0.8 or greater (ibid.). For covariance, Pearson’s r for interval variables was 0.938.
the participants (demographic information)? What are the demographic specificities, and how is that different by the type of event? What are their main issues and concerns (through Q&A, if any)? What is the purpose of the event (why)? The observation of events with a series of these questions has two merits for this study. First, it helps understand what is considered worthy of announcing in media on the part of media professionals, and secondly, how people (who may or may not be the consumers of diasporic media) utilize these events in their everyday life. Particularly, at some events where media professionals attend to report, it helps to understand the actual part of media production as well as their interaction with audience. The audience comments also reveal how they make sense of communication infrastructure. Thus, the observation in this study achieves dual purposes that it does not only “put flesh on the bones of quantitative methods,” it adds on and enriches the findings of qualitative study (Deacon et al., 2007, p. 259).

**Interpretation**

In discussing the politics of interpretation, Ien Ang (2006, p. 184) argues that “the ‘empirical,’ captured in either quantitative or qualitative form, does not yield self-evident meanings, it is only through the interpretive framework constructed by the researcher that understandings of the ‘empirical’ come about.” This conception of “interpretative framework” is heavily indebted to the ethical injunction to aspire to “reflexivity” of researchers, that is, “the ethnographer and his or her language are inevitably a part of the phenomenon that is being investigated” (Spencer cited in Mason, 2002, p. 194). In this study, the author depends on her own hyphenated Canadian identity as the “interpretive framework” when interpreting the data collected from the interviews with media practitioners and CSO leaders, and the observation of community events. The author additionally offers a narrative perspective of a 1.5-generation immigrant with a lived experience of a “cultural negotiator” between the two cultures, Canada/U.S. and Korea (discussed below).

A body of literature discusses the pros and cons of this doubly in-between standpoint. Bissoondath (2004, p. 111) illustrates the dilemma that hyphenated people are
subject to, both inside and outside of the subscribed ethnic boundaries. From inside, the so-called second-generation “banana,” which is meant to refer to “the foreignness visible on the outside, concealing a whiteness inside,” is considered less authentic, mostly due to the low proficiency in their own ethnic language. From outside, the foreignness in appearance constantly evokes questions from out-group members, such as what nationality are you? Such dual foreignness is equally raised by Ang (2002, p. 11) in her autobiographic work, *On not speaking Chinese*. Her self-claimed identity as a multiple migrant (“Indonesian-born, European-educated, Dutch-speaking academic who now lives and works in Australia”) can “never be a perfect fit between fixed identity label and hybrid personal experience.” While her not speaking Chinese makes her less “authentic” in the Chinese culture, her racial features simultaneously make her “less real” and “almost the same but not quite” and never let her escape from the where-are-you-from question in the dominant culture.

The author’s hyphenated (or cultural hybrid) identity may lack the authentic in-group representation; however, cutting across the two different cultures, may offer new possibilities in access to and understanding of the practices of “cultural negotiation.” Therefore, the interpretation this study presents is neither the in-group narration speaking on behalf of the Korean community, nor the out-group narration “looking in” the Korean community from the third-person’s perspective. Instead, it is the narration of a cultural negotiator, which attempts to offer the contact point between the two cultures. Such standpoint (or the reflexivity assumed by this author) has two implications. First, it is reflective of not only the author’s own identity, but also the overall objective of this study, that is to connect multicultural “sphericules” in an intercultural media system so as to have multiple narratives raised, shared, contested, and developed into shared cultural literacy. Second, this author’s standpoint is not only a deliberate and most natural choice of self-positioning as a narrator, but also an almost automatically prescribed and imposed positioning as a “spokesperson” or a “negotiator” between the Korean community and broader society (or the broader media system) by the study participants.
1.2 Structure of the Work

Chapter Two: Understanding Diasporic Media in Multicultural Cities: Theories, Policies, and Practices reviews a body of literature on theories, policies, and practices of multiculturalism, immigration, and citizenship as well as media in relation to communication infrastructure. Special attention is paid to the influence of the official status of multiculturalism in Canada and the U.S., both on the policy frameworks and actual practices of immigration, citizenship, and media undertakings. Through this, how policy regimes have theorized and controlled the ethno-racial population through various policy initiatives, and what communication infrastructure options these policies have laid out for these communities, are explored.

Chapter Three: The Context of Production and Distribution – Vancouver provides an overview of the context of production and distribution of Vancouver’s Korean media: the overall community structure and the media’s organizational structure. Specifically, it looks into the historical trajectories of the community that are unique to the formation of community and communication infrastructure: demographic profile, settlement patterns and enclave, and the elements of communication infrastructure. Korean media corporations are also profiled, particularly in terms of their organizational structure, financing, and the legal framework they are confined to, as well as their institutional responses to policy changes, if any. The competitive market structure and adaptation to the changes in “glocal” politics and economics are also discussed. The findings from interviews with media practitioners and civil society organization leaders are presented here. Chapter Five: The Context of Production and Distribution – Los Angeles presents the same analysis for Korean media in L.A.

Chapter Four: Media Practices – Vancouver discusses the Korean media’s civil society role at socio-cultural, political, and intercultural levels in terms of institutional interaction and news content. The findings from interviews with media practitioners and civil society organization leaders continue in this chapter, with a special focus on institutional interaction within and across media institutions. The result of content analyses of selected news items from Korean television, radio, and newspapers in Vancouver’s Korean media further explores geo-ethnic storytelling and cultural
translation. The degree of interculturality in terms of content and advertising is also explored to understand the level of collective effort in promoting multicultural storytelling in the broader media system. Besides the news content, the findings from a content analysis of online community bulletin board threads are presented here: What concerns Korean-Canadians most? What are the topics discussed other than news items? Chapter Six: Media Practices – Los Angeles presents the same analysis of Korean media in L.A.

Finally, Chapter Seven: Toward an Intercultural Media System discusses the similarities and differences between Vancouver and L.A. as well as the challenges and prospects for an intercultural media system, and long-term and short-term policy recommendations. How do the different policy and socio-urban contexts affect day-to-day practice? What are city-specific factors that differentiate the same language media in two different locations? What factors are Korean-specific and occur consistently among the Korean producers? These questions seek to identify “geographically specific” elements that override the cultural specificities and the “uniquely Korean” elements that Korean communities share no matter where they are established. Potential policy measures for Canada, the U.S., and Korea that may be separately or collectively pursued are discussed here.
2: Understanding Diasporic Media in Multicultural Cities: Theories, Policies, and Practices

Intercultural communication infrastructure as a model for communication systems in multicultural societies requires a systematic understanding of multiculturalism: multiculturalism as a political philosophy, as policies, and as everyday practice, as demonstrated by Kymlicka (1995). As a consequence, it is therefore important that scholars do not lump these separate units of analysis together under the name of multiculturalism or assess the effectiveness without reference to the specific units, making it difficult to judge and systematically respond to the source of problems, if any. Such conceptual distinction is equally important for the analysis of media. How multiculturalism is understood in societies influences the direction of media policies and practices. In Canada, for example, a separate media policy for “ethnic” broadcasting, the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy of 1991, is in place to set directives for ethnic broadcasting, whereas the U.S.’s post-ethnic approach lays out no policies geared directly toward ethnic groups. Such a difference reflects, to a fair degree, the influence that the official status of multiculturalism within each society has brought forth. This chapter reviews a body of literature on multiculturalism, immigration, citizenship, and media at the three levels and assesses the context for multicultural storytelling.

2.1 Theories

2.1.1 Multiculturalism as Theory or Political Philosophy

Multiculturalism is the single most common preoccupation for many developed societies today, whether officially recognized or not. There are many models of multiculturalism that seem to reflect policy directions of individual nation-states: conservative, liberal, pluralist, commercial, corporate, and critical or “revolutionary” multiculturalism (Hall, 2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2003, 2004; Ong, 2006). According to Hall (2000, pp. 210-211), conservative multiculturalism pursues “the purity and cultural
integrity of the nation,” while liberal/neoliberal multiculturalism encourages fast integration to mainstream society by providing a universal individual citizenship and tolerating cultural practices in private spheres. Plural multiculturalism, on the other hand, formally recognizes group differences and allows different group-rights, while commercial multiculturalism recognizes the diversity of individuals in the marketplace in which “the problems of cultural difference will be (dis)solved through private consumption” (ibid.). Finally, corporate multiculturalism “manages” cultural differences “in the interest of the center,” while critical multiculturalism questions “power, privilege, the hierarchy of oppressions and the movements of resistance” (ibid.).

While no country seems to identify exclusively with any one particular model, in the most simplistic sense, the classical immigration countries like Canada and the U.S. are closer to liberal/neo-liberal multiculturalism. Liberal/neo-liberal multiculturalism, however, takes place concurrently with conservative multiculturalism, as a result of the complexity involved in diversity management between nation-building projects and intensified globalization, among other factors. The underlying predisposition of Canada and the U.S. is the core conception of ethno-racial minorities as the “Other,” (Said, 2003, p. 43) in reference to the discourse on the Orient in many western politics. In the dichotomy of “the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”),” the latter comes to exist only through definition by the West. A contemporary xenophobic example in Europe is the notorious Le Pen phenomenon in France, when he publicly said on French television in 1984: “I prefer my daughters to my cousins, my cousins to my neighbours and my neighbours to strangers” (Harris, 1990, p. 61; Winant, 2001). A similar example is found in Australia. The Liberal-National Party’s Pauline Hanson (1996) publicly stated that “I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians” (Castles, 2000; Joppke, 2005). In Canada, Prime Minister Mackenzie King discouraged the immigration from “the Orient” during the post-war boom (1945) (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002).
Nonetheless, it is the liberal and increasingly neoliberal model\(^7\) that surfaces in the foreground. Ethno-racial difference is allowed so long as it is pursued within the liberal framework. Canada and the U.S., however, diverge on this notion of liberal framework, which influences policy directives concerning immigration and citizenship. The U.S. leans towards a colour-blind post-ethnic citizenship in the name of “American identity” and favours individual rights, which is more consistent with the neoliberal theory. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2003, p. 23) puts it: “cultural difference does not invite judgment, unless it is combined with class, mobilization and conflict, or confronted with rigid group boundaries and border.” Thus, citizenship carries both symbolic and substantial meanings.

Among the diverse conceptions of citizenship—“multicultural citizenship,” “cosmopolitan citizenship,” “post-liberal citizenship,” “post-ethnic citizenship,” and “hypercapital citizenship,” (Faulks, 2000; Heater, 1999; Hollinger, 1995; Kernerman & Resnick, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995; Ong, 2003; Waldron, 1995), among others—Canada’s official recognition of multiculturalism as political philosophy is consistent with a vision of multicultural citizenship as incorporating group-differentiated rights. Group-rights scholars like Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka (1995, pp. 27-33) seek to articulate “group-differentiated rights” for national minorities (e.g., aboriginals) and polyethnic minorities (immigrants) which include: self-government rights for the national minority in their rights to jurisdiction over a particular territory; special representation rights for minority-ethnic communities in that their rights are to be represented within the deliberative bodies of the state; and polyethnic rights, which guarantee financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups. Kymlicka (2001, p. 171) believes that the difference-blind rules can cause disadvantages for particular cultural groups, and therefore, “recognizing minority rights would actually strengthen solidarity and promote political stability by removing the barriers and exclusions that prevent minorities from wholeheartedly embracing political institutions.”

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\(^7\) Neoliberalism was initiated by the Chicago School of Neoliberalism in the 1960s and practiced during the first wave in the 1980s in the form of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, and the second wave in the 1990s during the Clinton administration as “individual responsibilization” (Ong, 2006).
This notion of multicultural citizenship echoes Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism as political philosophy since the creation of the Multicultural Policy in 1971. The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau announced that:

For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly...National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one’s own individual identity...A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence (House of Commons Debate, October 8, 1971).  

Similarly, Charles Taylor (1999, p. 278-280) believes in procedural integration and the need for “sharing identity space.” He argues that cultural minorities no longer endure cultural repression as ethnic diaspora has now become a “long-established phenomenon.” Rather, these minorities choose to assimilate “at their own pace” as cultural joining is a “continual evolution.” American philosopher Iris Marion Young (2006, pp. 254-255) also supports group-differentiated rights in the form of the right to self-organization, group analysis and generation of policy proposals, and group veto power for collective empowerment of the formerly oppressed.

In terms of implementation of these rights, group-rights scholars suggest a range of institutional integration options, which they believe to be consistent with the philosophy of liberal democracy: “solidarity,” “trust,” “democratic responsibility,” and ultimately, social cohesion. Kymlicka (2001, p. 167) suggests “institutional integration” by having a “societal culture” for ethno-cultural citizens created within common mainstream institutions (e.g., education, government, legislature, workplace, police, health). It takes a form of not “re-creating a separate societal culture, but rather of contributing new options and perspectives to the larger Anglophone culture, making it richer and more diverse” (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 78-79). The “institutional integration” accommodates ethno-racial options as part of “fair terms of integration” for immigrants. That is, “the common institutions into which immigrants are pressured to integrate

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9 According to Kymlicka (1995, p. 76), societal culture is “a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”
provide the same degrees of respect and accommodation of the identities of ethnocultural minorities that have traditionally been accorded to the majority group’s identity” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 162). Such accommodation is important to participate in a public sphere in that:

The need to engage in public discourse arises from the fact that the decisions of government in a democracy should be made publicly, through free and open discussion. But the virtue of public discourse is not just the willingness to participate in politics, or to make one’s views known. It also involves the willingness to engage in a conversation: to listen as well as to speak, to seek to understand what others say, and to respond respectfully to the views of others, so as to continue the conversation (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 289).

It is, in essence, “shared citizenship” in that:

[It] goes beyond the sharing of citizenship in the formal legal sense (that is, a common passport) to include such things as: feelings of solidarity with co-citizens, and hence a willingness to listen to their claims, to respect their rights and to make sacrifices for them; feelings of trust in public institutions, and hence a willingness to comply with them (pay taxes, cooperate with police); feelings of democratic responsibility, and hence a willingness to monitor the behavior of the political elites who act in our name and hold them accountable; and feelings of belonging to a community of fate (that is, of sharing a political community) (Kymlicka in Banting et al., 2007, p. 652).

Similarly, Iris Marion Young’s (2000) “heterogeneous public” models a system that invites diverse groups to common institutions and encourages them to commit to the larger political order, while at the same time preserving and recognizing group differences. In a later work, Young (2006) proposes a more nuanced concept of a post-ethnic or pan-ethnic organization that reflects an issue-based coalition, which does not require group representation in all public contexts. Instead, this designates a group “whenever the group’s history and social situation provide a particular perspective on the issues” (p. 257). Nederveen Pieterse’s (2007, p. 82) decentralized yet highly intercultural “ethnic shopping mall” model also supports cross-cultural relationship-building not only between immigrants and the host society, but also among different immigrant communities. This occurs through “institutionalized power sharing” in that state power is decentralized “across regions and in terms of civic representation and cultural
accommodation” in the areas of citizenship, government position and contracts, language, education, the armed forces, public symbolism, and development resources (p. 58).

In contrast, scholars who support individual rights generally dismissed any attempt of group differentiation as cultural essentialist. The fluid nature of identity is emphasized: identity is not a product, but a part of the identitizing process (Benhabib, 2002; Faulks, 2000; Parekh, 2000; Waldron, 1995). Canadian philosopher Alan Cairns believes in collective identity and “leans toward some form of shared citizenship, above and beyond the differing identities that make up Canada” (Kernerman & Resnick, 2005, p. 6). Cairns finds the idea of multicultural citizenship as working against a supranational identity that ideally embraces all. Faulks (2000, p. 92) also criticizes Kymlicka’s group-differentiated rights in that it only “freez[es] social differences” and overlooks the proliferation of new groups and their rights projects. Similarly, Waldron (1995, p. 108), in his analysis of “cosmopolitan citizenship,” also disregards Kymlicka’s communitarian conception of citizenship, arguing that people need culture but not “cultural integrity.”

Such view is consistent with Hollinger’s (1995, p. 116) conception of post-ethnic identity which “prefers voluntary to prescribed affiliations, appreciates multiple identities, pushes for communities of wide scope, recognizes the constructed character of ethno-racial groups, and accepts the formation of new groups as a part of the normal life of a democratic society.” Similarly, Brubaker’s (2004, p. 11) conception of “beyond groupism” also respects the fluid nature of ethnicity, race, and nation and treats these “not in terms of substantial groups or entities, but in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events.” Such a pan-ethnic movement is, in fact, appearing in the form of online communicative spaces that aim to promote hyperlocal storytelling across ethnicities. (See the examples in Section 2.3.)

Among all, studies by American sociologist Nathan Glazer and philosopher Michael Walzer are particularly critical about group differentiation. Glazer (1983, p. 270) argues that the difference in the founding structure of the U.S. and Canada sets a different course for each on citizenship management in that “the United States was a federation of states which were defined politically, not ethnically; Canada was a federation of peoples,
organized into different provinces” based on “two founding, distinct national elements.” Therefore, it is easier for ethnic minorities in Canada than in the U.S. to claim differences. Glazer further argues that the U.S. is identified with “a unitary and new ethnic identity, that of American” (ibid.). In other words, there are no other ethnicities in the U.S. but “American,” confirming the adherence to the post-ethnic approach. Such identity construction supports individual rights and points out the challenges in the implementation of group rights. Early on Glazer (1975) supported “affirmative discrimination,” arguing that ethno-racial groups are “poor categories for the design of public policy” (p. 198).

The creation of such specially benefited categories also has inevitable and unfortunate political consequences…The gravest political consequence is undoubtedly the increasing resentment and hostility between groups that is fueled by special benefits for some. The statistical basis for redress makes one great error: All “whites” are consigned to the same category, deserving of no special consideration. That is not the way “whites” see themselves, or indeed are, in social reality (p. 200).

Glazer also questions about the extent to which the liberal framework should be altered in order to accommodate multiculturalism. In reference to school curricula, Glazer (1997, p. 7) argues that the “multicultural explosion” makes it difficult for the broader American society to draw a line on “how much we should change the common understanding of American history and society in the public schools.” Similarly, Michael Walzer (2007, p. 176) also acknowledges the limits of state responses to group rights in that “Toleration is, at least potentially, infinite in its extent; but the state can underwrite group life only within some set of political and financial limits.” In other words, there is a limit to “equally” recognize difference and allocate the resources according to the “equal” demand.

Individual-rights claims gain more support in the context of neo-liberalism, which recognizes that the wide spectrum of socio-economic, political, and cultural options individuals possess continually transforms the notion of group—let alone individual—identity (e.g., the emergence of hypercapital Asians, cultural/racial hybrids). As a result, differences exist not only between groups, but also within groups: even people from a single community respond differently to structural inequalities depending
on their capital mobility (Modood, 2007). Particularly, Ong (1999, p. 19), in her analysis of “flexible citizenship,” narrates how the so-called “multiple passport” elite cosmopolitans have become less loyal to the protection of the nation-state and the cultural security of one particular locale, and more dependent on the “logics of displacement” as a result of a rational calculation of economic benefit. There is also a similarly growing demographic segment of the Korean diaspora (see Chapters 3 & 5). Likewise, in defence of consumer/commercial multiculturalism, which most liberal nation-states adopt, Martin (1998, p. 133) argues that identity politics loses its ground in the market, where people are regarded not as citizens but as “consumers, customers, and spectators.” Consequently, in this view, financial mobility determines status within society, regardless of colour, gender or other indicators.

Between these two contrasting approaches to citizenship, the conceptual ground of the intercultural media system this study pursues—as a means of enhancing cultural literacy and intercultural dialogue among all members of society—identifies with group-rights citizenship, especially Kymlicka’s conceptions of multicultural citizenship and institutional integration. There are three important implications in Kymlicka’s theory. First, the conception of multicultural citizenship focuses on “how” and not “whether” immigrants can integrate into the dominant culture as full members of broader society. Integration is already presumed and the focus is on settlement, thus a means to assist cultural adaptation is pursued as part of broader social projects, rather than delegated to individual citizens as an individual responsibility.

Second, this conception of citizenship does consider, not overlook, the fluid nature of identity, but focuses on the dialectic nature of identity construction: fixed and simultaneously “fluid,” prescribed and simultaneously “voluntary,” ethnic and simultaneously “Canadian/American,” and distinct and simultaneously “equal.” It is acknowledged that the cultural joining requires recognition rather than denial of obviously existing differences within and across groups (fixed) as well as the “identitizing process” of becoming new members of society (fluid). This process, however, is not lineal but varies largely by group and also by individuals within these groups, thereby requiring some group-specific assistance. Furthermore, the focus on creating a means of integration within mainstream institutions emphasizes “voluntary”
choices for all members of society rather than “prescribed” entitlement assigned to naively assumed “homogeneous” ethnic identities. Such an approach underlines the two-way cultural adaptation of dominant and minority cultures, thus emphasizing integration rather than assimilation to the dominant structure. It is also democratically inclusive and culturally enriching, as cultural options are made available and visible in the dominant institutions for all, instead of separately pursued only by ethnic groups in their private spheres. Third, this citizenship recognizes the challenges in policy implementation of group-differentiated rights and offers useful conceptual distinctions between “national minority” and “polyethnic minority” to effectively address the main policy concerns. The next section explores how cultural diversity is articulated in the field of media.

2.1.2 Multiculturalism and Media Theories

When diversity is discussed in relation to media and democracy, group-differentiated rights surface in the name of “ethnic services.” Ethno-racial options in the media system are considered as rights to be guaranteed for the proper exercise of citizenship in an information society. Especially, amidst the ongoing debate on “a right to communicate” and “communication rights,” the recognition of communication rights for minorities has been widely discussed. The Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS) activists proposed four conceptual pillars of communication rights, and all of them are critical to develop functioning multicultural citizenship for ethno-racial citizens: Communicating in the Public Sphere, Communicating Knowledge, Civil Rights in Communication, and Cultural Rights in Communication (CRIS Campaign handbook, 2005, p. 41). The last pillar, cultural rights in communication, is particularly important in issues of cultural literacy for, and intercultural dialogue among, members of society.

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10 The former is considered as “a right enshrined in international law” whereas the latter is considered as “an expression of social justice on the ground” (Ó Siochrú, 2010, p. 41).

11 The CRIS campaign handbook (2005, p. 41) defines each pillar as follows. Communicating in the Public Sphere concerns “the role of communication and media in exercising democratic political participation in society.” Communicating Knowledge concerns “the terms and means by which knowledge generated by society is communicated, or blocked, for use by different groups.” Civil Rights in Communication concerns “the exercise of civil rights relating to the process of communication in society.” Lastly, Cultural Rights in Communication concerns “the communication of diverse cultures, cultural forms and identities at the individual and social levels.”
Media models concerning diversity within the media system can be categorized into two streams: public service models and community models. The public service model echoes Kymlicka’s institutional integration by situating ethno-racial options within public broadcasting and emphasizing government support to enable this. Curran’s (2000, p. 142) working model for contemporary television, for example, illustrates a binary composition of centre and periphery media, led by public service television and followed by four individual sectors—private enterprise, civic, professional, and social market. Among these spheres, Curran positions ethnic services within public services.

Similarly, Downing and Husband (Downing & Husband, 2005; Husband, 1998) also support the need for a stronger role for public broadcasting. Acknowledging media rights as an integral part of Kymlicka’s differentiated citizenship rights, Downing and Husband (2005, p. 204) argue that the media play an essential role in facilitating deliberative democracy, thus “a diverse and vigorous media environment is essential to their successful operation.” Specifically, they use Keane’s three modes of communication12 to argue that audience fragmentation as a result of multiple “sphericules” in the multi-ethnic sphere is a necessary consequence of pursuing open democracy rather than a political threat to the effective promotion of civility. With diasporic connectedness enabled by technology, each citizen could participate in as many spheres as desired. Such engagement with a range of public spheres as a way of their “social expression” is, in fact, important for ethnic communities, because in the absence of differentiated citizenship rights articulated in media policy, these communities could be marginalized in the dominant media environment.

For a functioning public sphere, however, Downing and Husband (2005, p. 209) argue that government intervention is critical, much as Kymlicka argues, “through the regulation of commercial media, through the policies of public service broadcasters, and through programs of education and training.” Through such measures, the state fulfils civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights of multicultural citizens. A viable media structure for ethno-racial minority communities will enable them...
to voice their concerns and present their diversity. The case studies on Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. in the following chapters confirm the importance of government intervention in the capacity-building of diasporic media and in facilitating interaction of multiple sphericules in the broader media system.

The community model, on the other hand, focuses on communicative spaces created by and for communities. Ball-Rokeach’s Communication Infrastructure Theory (CIT) suggests “a storytelling system set in its communication action context” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001, p. 396). This infrastructure consists of two elements (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006, p. 413):

(a) a neighborhood storytelling network of everyday conversations and neighborhood stories that people, media, and grassroots organizations create and disseminate, and (b) the communication action context encompassing the tangible and intangible resources of residential areas that promote communication between residents (e.g., residential stability, ethnic heterogeneity, institutional resources, neighborhood milieu, collective memories, etc.).

This storytelling system operates at three levels: macro storytelling of the city, the nation, and the world; meso storytelling of more geographically focused areas; and finally micro storytelling by neighbours. The function of meso storytelling is critical to the system in order to link macro and micro storytelling. If successful, it serves as a civil society by offering a storytelling system that is “broad (from world to neighborhood referents), deep (many stories about all referents), and integrated (strong linkages between macro, meso, and micro storytelling production systems)” (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001, pp. 397-398). This theory is particularly useful for diasporic media studies, as media and community service organizations are important part of community infrastructure, situated between the community and the broader society. The theory helps understand the working relationship among institutions within as well as across communities at different geographic and institutional levels. Following this theory, Lin and Song (2006, pp.367-368) termed “geo-ethnic storytelling,” which consists of geo-ethnic stories that are “ethnically or culturally relevant to a particular ethnic group” and “geographically bound and concern primarily the happenings in the community”: 
Hence, ethnic media with geo-ethnic storytelling practices may report home country stories like most ethnic media do, but they go beyond that to make their stories relevant to the local residents in the immigrant community. Conversely, ethnic media may act like truly local media to perform civic functions, but with geo-ethnic storytelling they do more than local media to address the concerns of a particular ethnic group in a residential area. In this light, ethnic media are not only able to strengthen immigrants’ group identity but are also pivotal in residents’ adaptation process.

The public service and community models describe a variety of platforms on which diasporic media can operate. The strengths and weaknesses of these models, however, invite the growth of the private sector (see Section 2.3). Public broadcasting situates diasporic media within the broader media system, allowing for a democratic choice of audience selection. Nevertheless, the model generally focuses on “recognizing” diversity and “creating” options for specific groups without due consideration on how to make these options broadly “accessible” for a broader audience, as a means to enhance cultural literacy for all members of society. The community model, on the other hand, situates diasporic media within neighbourhoods. If successful, these spaces can be a highly effective intercultural civil society, allowing cross-ethnic storytelling to be widely circulated among neighbours in an everyday communicative action context. Nevertheless, English proficiency is a prerequisite for participation in such storytelling, unless multi-language service is provided, thus excluding young immigrant communities and individuals who lack language skills. Therefore, this may be more appropriate for matured, older communities or second-generation immigrants. The early European immigrant communities such as Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks, who are a majority now through integration and assimilation (Glazer, 2005) and whose cultural identity has been “symbolically erased” within the Euro-American bloc in the national census (Hollinger, 1995), could be examples of this.

Due to these limitations, it is at best geo-ethnic storytelling in the form of independent diasporic media for younger immigrant communities. If these institutions are properly connected to broader community conversations, a more effective civil society role for diasporic communities can be expected. Lin and Song’s model, however, suggests two implications for this present study to address. First, the geographic
boundary of “community” or “residential area” needs to be further specified in the “geo” of geo-ethnic storytelling. While traditional enclaves still survive, immigrant communities have become geographically dispersed (see Chapters 3 & 5). Media outlets and community organizations may concentrate in a certain location; however, a majority of users of these services reside outside of that location, as in the case of the Korean diaspora. In fact, the so-called “heterolocal communities” where “spatial propinquity is absent, but cultural and social connections and institutions bind coethnics together” are emerging as a new characteristic of Asian-American settlement (Li, 2007, p. 222). In this context, general “ethnic storytelling” may be possible, but not necessarily “geo-ethnic storytelling” at a neighbourhood level, as the theory initially proposes. Second, the civil society role within one’s own ethnic community is an important observation, yet bears further elaboration. In other words, the extent to which ethnic media create links between the community and broader society (and the government), and the challenges and opportunities in doing so, need to be examined. If these media are delivering news about “here” and “home” alone, it is difficult for them to claim a civil society role.

2.2 Policies

2.2.1 Immigration and Citizenship Policies

Canada and the U.S., the two equally multicultural and immigrant-receiving countries, engage differently with multiculturalism. The official status of multiculturalism in Canada sets different directions for immigration and citizenship policies. Canada’s recognition of group-differentiated rights and the U.S.’s subscription to individual rights characterize the immigration and citizenship policies and practices in each country. Nevertheless, similar approaches to ethno-racial groups were found in both countries until the 1970s, when Canadian policies started to become more inclusive of these groups as permanent members of society.

First, discriminatory measures against Chinese and Japanese immigrants were implemented at almost the same time to serve the same purpose. In Canada, the Chinese Immigration Act (1885-1923) and a series of the Gentlemen’s Agreements in the early 1900s were used to discourage the permanent settlement of Asian migrants, upon the
completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway (1880-1884) (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002; Burnet & Palmer, 1988; Mall, 1997). Equivalent measures in the U.S. include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907-1908, followed by the Immigration Act of 1917, which further restricted people from the “barren zone” from either settling in or entering the U.S. (James, 2000, p. 18). Ethno-racial minorities continued to be considered aliens and were not fully accepted as members of society. Chinese, East Indians, and Japanese were excluded from voting in political elections in Canada until 1947, when a formal definition of Canadian citizenship was established (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). Similarly, in the U.S., Asians were categorized as aliens ineligible for citizenship until the 1940s, when the U.S. began to ease immigration and naturalization for its World War II allies (Min, 2006).

Immigration policies are thus closely related to foreign relations. In appreciation of China as an ally of the U.S. against Japan in the Pacific War, the U.S. enacted the Magnuson Act of 1943 to loosen the immigration restriction on Chinese (Min, 2006, p. 12). The anti-Chinese measures were repealed in 1943 in the U.S. and in 1947 in Canada (Li, 2007; Lo, 2006). The Confession Program of 1956 further encouraged undocumented Chinese from the exclusion era to confess and obtain legal status in the U.S. (Li, 2007). For other Asians, the Luce Cellar bill of 1946 was passed to grant the right of naturalization to Filipinos, and the McCarran-Walter Immigration and the Nationality Act of 1952 to Japanese and Koreans (Võ, 2004, pp. 20-21). The close military, political, and economic ties established between the U.S. and Korea during the 1950 Korean War helped ease immigration of Koreans to the U.S. Canada’s military connection with Korea was also based on its participation in the Korean War (Wang & Wang, 2011). In addition to foreign relations, the global economy also emerged to influence immigration directives. The liberalization of immigration policies began in the 1960s in both countries, joining the “global race for highly skilled migrants” (Kobayashi et al., 2011, pp. xxi-xxii).

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13 These countries include parts of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malay States, a part of Russia, part of Arabia, part of Afghanistan, most of the Polynesian Islands, and the East Indian Island (James, 2000, p. 18).
Marked by the introduction of Canada’s Immigration Act (and the Point System\textsuperscript{14}) in 1967, and the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 (also known as Hart-Cellar Act) in the U.S., both measures eliminated a racial or country-of-origin quota, which consequently sparked an unprecedented increase of immigrants in general and Asian immigrants in particular (Joppke, 2005; Li, 2007; Li & Skop, 2007; Lo, 2006; Ong, 2003).

Neoliberal immigration and citizenship policies characterize more recent approaches. Under the neoliberal policy initiatives, the most noticeable change in Canada was the cutback on government welfare programs in the 1980s (e.g., Canada Council for the Arts, CBC, the Medical Care Act, the Canada Pension Plan [CPP]) and endorsement of the “model immigrant/citizen” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 66; Brodie, 2002). Not only the self-sufficiency of immigrants “who will not make demands on the social programs of the welfare state,” but also economic contributions of entrepreneur/investor immigrants who would bring outside capital into Canada was endorsed (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 65). As an example, the Business Immigration Programme launched in 1986 under the Mulroney government targeted “urban, middle-class applicants with a particular trade or professional skills” and required a minimum personal net worth of $500,000 (Mitchell, 2001, pp. 169-170). Moreover, philanthropic contributions, particularly those of Hong Kong businessmen, to charitable organizations (e.g., Sino United Chinese Community Enrichment Services [S.U.C.C.E.S.S.]) and to academia (e.g., the Chan Centre Concert Hall of the University of British Columbia) in Vancouver, for example, replaced in part the government retreat from social assistance (p. 178). The drive to recruit highly educated and skilled labour was further intensified in the 2000s. The Canadian 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act strengthened the requirement of language ability, education, and work experience (Kobayashi et al., 2011).

\textsuperscript{14} Point System ended the racist immigration policy by selecting immigrants based on the following criteria: level of education, vocational preparation, knowledge of one or both official languages and occupational demand in Canada (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p. 45). The passing score was 50 out 100, and was raised to 70 in the early 1990s.
The recently introduced Canadian Experience Class\(^{15}\) (2008) was also designed to attract Canadian-educated international students.

The U.S. equivalent would be the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, which created a new investor visa category (EB-5) to attract “highly-skilled or affluent Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China, Malaysia, and Indonesia,” and the H-1B non-immigration visa to attract temporary workers to U.S. job offers (Li, 2007, p. 218; Li & Skop, 2007). These measures also took place concurrently with a decline in welfare programs for immigrants: the Welfare Reform Act or the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which excluded immigrants, both documented and undocumented, from the food stamp and Supplement Security Income (SSI) programs (Freeman, 2001; Leong, 2002).

Korean immigration to Canada and the U.S. has fluctuated according to these policy changes, as well as those of Korea (Table 2.1). The history of Korean migration to North America dates back to the early 1900s, with the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of Chosun (Korea) and the United States on May 22, 1882 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea [MOFAT], 2007). However, scholars generally see the Point System of 1967 for Canada and the Immigration Act of 1965 for the U.S. as landmark dates for Korean immigration, demarcating the waves of Korea migration into pre- and post-1967 and 1965 respectively (Chung, 2007; Lee, 2000; Min, 2006; Martin, 2005). Especially in Canada, it is also around this time when diplomatic relations between Canada and Korea were established (1963), and the Korean Embassy was set up in Canada (1965). Immediately following the change of the immigration law, there was a sharp increase in Korean migration. Between 1965 and 1980, approximately 20,000 Koreans moved to Canada and 300,000 Koreans to the U.S. (MOFAT, 2010).

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\(^{15}\) The Canadian Experience Class was introduced in 2008 to enable “a temporary foreign worker with at least two years of full-time (or equivalent) skilled work experience in Canada, or a foreign graduate from a Canadian post-secondary institution with at least one year of full-time (or equivalent) skilled work experience in Canada,” to be eligible for permanent residence (Citizenship and Immigration of Canada).
The Korean migration to the U.S. continued to grow in the 1970s and the 1980s, and then fell in the 1990s. Some of the reasons for this fall were a stronger Korean economy, a popular presidential election in 1987, and more importantly, the 1992 L.A. riots\(^\text{16}\) (Min, 2006). The Korean migration to Canada may not be exempt from these conditions, however, it shows an opposite pattern—a slow growth in the 1970s until mid-1980s and a peak in the 1990s and 2000s (Kwak, 2004). Other than a small increase for a couple of years since 1973, when the Canadian embassy was established in Korea, there was generally a slow growth until mid 1980s. A number of policy changes in Canada contributed to this fluctuation. Kwak (2004) argues that the revision of the

\(^{16}\) The L.A. riots of 1992 are known to be the “most destructive urban riot that has ever occurred in the United States,” resulting in the death of 58 persons and the total property damage of over $700 million (Kim & Kim, 1992, pp. 25-26).
immigration policy in 1976, which eliminated siblings and other relatives from the family reunification category, slowed down the migration. The 1990s and the 2000s, on the other hand, saw significant growth, owing to the Business Immigration Program of 1986, followed by the Korea-Canada visa waiver (1994) and the simplified medical examination (1997) (ibid.). Relatively easier immigration processes compared to other countries also facilitated Korean migration to Canada (Oh in Wang & Wang, 2011). As a result, in the early 2000s, the migration to Canada actually surpassed that of the U.S., which was previously on average seven times greater than that of Canada (see Figure 2.1). The financial crisis in Korea in 1997 also contributed to the increase in Korean migration to both Canada and the U.S.

Figure 2.1  Korean migrants to Canada and the U.S. (1962-2009)


Note. The numbers represent Korean migrants who declared their destination to be either the U.S. or Canada upon departing Korea. Those who changed their status in Canada and the U.S. are excluded here.

The recently introduced Canadian Experience Class also contributed to the later growth. Figure 2.2 (top) shows the impact of this new policy on the demographic composition of the Korean diaspora—a sharp peak of those who changed their status during their stay in Canada. The U.S., on the other hand (Figure 2.2 bottom), has a generally high rate of status change during a stay in the U.S. This group may include
former international students who applied for permanent residence after the completion of their degree and while being employed at a U.S. company. Many Korean media outlets absorbed this population, recognizing their U.S. education and proficiency in the Korean language (see Chapter 5).

Figure 2.2 Status declared in Korea and in Canada/U.S. (2002-2009)


Note. Korean migrants declared in Korea, Korean migrants declared abroad, and Korean migrants total
Although the conservative and liberal immigration policies have fared similarly in Canada and the U.S., the two countries are different in their approach to recruitment and settlement of migrants. Canada generally looks for permanent members of society, thus assists their settlement once recruited. The U.S., on the other hand, looks for temporary migrants, thus settlement services are not priority. First, the absolute number of annual admissions of international migrants is far greater in the U.S.; however, the per capita rate is higher in Canada. As of 2010, international migrants reached 21.3% (or 7.2 million) in Canada, compared to 13.5% (or 42.8 million) in the U.S. (Kobayashi et al., 2011). In the case of the Korean population, the per capita rate is almost identical for both countries: 0.5% by national population and 1.2% by province/state (British Columbia and California) (Statistics Canada, 2006f; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a, 2010b). The difference in admission of skilled workers, among others, may have contributed to such a phenomenon. Canada relies on the point system to recruit “permanent skilled immigrants,” whereas the U.S. relies on the H-1B visa program to recruit “temporary skilled workers” who become undocumented when their term is over (Kobayashi et al., 2011). Canada is also building a temporary worker base at the lower end of the economic hierarchy, through a Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program and a Live-in Caregiver Program. Such effort raises the number of temporary migrants closer to that of permanent immigrants, while that of the U.S. is estimated to be 12 million (ibid.). The case of the Korean community confirms this trend: while undocumented immigrants are rarely discussed in Vancouver’s Korean community, this group is in fact a major concern for L.A.’s Korean community, especially in relation to the underrepresentation of the community in the broader society (e.g., the National Census). The higher naturalization rate for Canada is also not unrelated to these differences. Tran, Kustec, and Chui’s 2005 study showed that in 2001, 84% of eligible immigrants obtained Canadian citizenship, compared to 40% in the U.S. (Banting et al., 2007).

Second, Canada and the U.S. are different in their approach toward immigrant settlement—this is often termed as Canada’s integration versus the U.S.’s assimilation. Canada’s official commitment to multiculturalism, which evolved from the Multicultural Policy of 1971 and the Multiculturalism Act of 1988, recognizes the plurality of cultures and group-differentiated rights, whereas the U.S.’s colour-blind post-ethnic approach
reinforces individual rights. Thus, immigrant settlement and integration is a government responsibility in Canada, whereas it is an individual responsibility in the U.S. (Kobayashi et al., 2011). The U.S. has only admission policies and no integration policies or resources to administer (ibid.). In contrast, in Canada, federal funding is allocated, through provincial governments, to local non-governmental settlement service agencies to serve legal immigrants (excluding temporary and undocumented immigrants) (Leitner & Preston, 2011). This source of funding, however, characterizes the nature of services. De Graauw and Andrew (2011) find that Canadian agencies focus primarily on social services, whereas those of the U.S. offer a combination of services and advocacy around immigrant issues, owing to having both public and private funding sources. The findings from the case studies on the Korean community in the following chapters are consistent with this observation. While there are many settlement service agencies such as Options Community Services Society available to Vancouver’s Korean community, none of them are advocacy groups. In contrast, the L.A.-based Koreatown-bound agencies such as Korea Resource Center (KRC) offer both social services and advocacy for underprivileged immigrants. Such differences in recruitment and settlement of migrants in the two countries reflect the influence of the official status of multiculturalism to a certain extent. The next section looks at how the two countries fare in the framework of media policy and regulations, and the rationale for a media policy-oriented conclusion for media in general and diasporic media in particular.

2.2.2 Cultural Diversity and Media Policies

The status of multiculturalism is found to influence policy directives, including those concerning media. Riggins’s (1992, pp. 8-10) five media policy models for the state’s structural support for minority media are useful to understand the policy direction of Canada and the U.S.: 1) the integrationist model, which supports minority media with an intention to assist integration and strategically monitor minorities for any attempt for independence; 2) the economic model (or the new assimilationism or the new racism), which supports minority media to help multicultural groups assimilate into the dominant culture; 3) the divisive model, which encourages ethnic rivalry as a mechanism for social control; 4) the preemptive model, which encourages the state to establish its own
minority media to prevent minorities from establishing their own; and 5) the proselytism model, which mobilizes minority media to promote state values. In *Understanding ethnic media*, Matsaganis, Katz, and Ball-Rokeach (2010, p. 193) categorize Canada and the U.S. in the economist model in that “the state is not committed to multiculturalism per se, but rather to the economic advantages that a type of shallow multiculturalism can generate.” However, such a claim needs reassessment: a set of Canadian media policy directives concerning “diversity” suggests that Canada is integrationist whereas the U.S. is economist. This section compares policy directives of Canada and the U.S. concerning diversity to explain the rationale.

**Canada**

In Canada, from the implementation of the Broadcasting Act in 1932 to the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) in the 1950s and the 1960s, the two primary mandates of Canadian media were enhancing “national identity” in linguistic duality and securing “cultural sovereignty” from U.S. cultural influence (Armstrong, 2010; Siegel, 1996; Vipond, 2000). These mandates are stated in section 3(1)(b) of the Broadcasting Act of 1991 in that:

the Canadian broadcasting system, operated primarily in the English and French languages and comprising public, private and community elements, makes use of radio frequencies that are public property and provides, through its programming, a public service essential to the maintenance and enhancement of national identity and cultural sovereignty [emphasis added]

Concerning national identity, the dual-language broadcasting system ensures bilingualism and biculturalism as two important axes of Canadian media undertakings. Concerning cultural sovereignty, various measures have been adopted to ensure market sovereignty from the U.S. Since early in the 1920s, the various Canadian media sectors started to struggle as a result of an inflow of American networks (Vipond, 2000). Consequently, this necessitated tariff protection as “the umbrella under which Canadian industrialists expanded and prospered,” as well as a BBC model of government-owned
broadcasting (p. 26). This was the rationale behind the birth of the CBC in 1936. More importantly, protective measures such as restrictions on foreign ownership and Canadian Content rules were placed to further secure and nurture Canadian cultural production.

According to the Direction to the CRTC on Ineligibility of Non-Canadians (SOR/97-192), the CRTC is directed the following: “no broadcasting licence may be issued, and no amendments or renewals thereof may be granted, to an applicant that is a non-Canadian” (Department of Justice of Canada). In the case of corporations that are “incorporated or continued under the law of Canada or a province, a strict 80% rule is applied in terms of the overall Canadian ownership (ibid.):

(a) the chief executive officer or, where the corporation has no chief executive officer, the person performing functions that are similar to the functions performed by a chief executive officer, and not less than 80 per cent of the directors are Canadians;

(b) in the case of a corporation having share capital, Canadians beneficially own and control, directly or indirectly, in the aggregate and otherwise than by way of security only, not less than 80 per cent of all the issued and outstanding voting shares of the corporation and not less than 80 per cent of the votes;

Canadian ownership is favoured for two reasons: first, Canadian owners are more likely to encourage “local creative expression,” and second, profits are likely to be reinvested in the work of “local creators” (Grant & Woods, 2004, pp. 240-241). This regulation is tightly inter-related with Canadian Content rules for Canadian television stations, which were implemented in 1960 as a measure to both limit American programs and to encourage Canadian production, especially in private broadcasting (Vipond, 2000; Grant & Wood, 2004). The Canadian programs here are defined as those that are: (1) produced in-house by a licensee of the CRTC; (2) that satisfy the CRTC’s own certification system; (3) certified by the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), a division of the Department of Canadian Heritage; (4) produced internally by the National Film Board of Canada (NFB); and (5) certified pursuant to one of the international co-production treaties negotiated by the Department of Canadian Heritage (and called official co-productions to distinguish them from other kinds of domestic and international co-productions (Armstrong, 2010, p. 100). The rules currently require
conventional private television licensees to “devote not less than 60% of the broadcast year and not less than 50% of the evening broadcast period (6 p.m. to midnight) to Canadian programs” (Public Notice CRTC 1999-97). Although there is a constant debate among Canadian media scholars on the practicality, technicality, and ambiguity of the Canadian Content rules, including violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the skewed focus on quantity rather than quality of “Canadianness,” (see for example, Grant & Wood, 2004; Vipond, 2000; Zolf, 1988), the government intervention in content per se has been one important directive of Canadian media policies, and is also what differentiates Canadian media polices from those of the U.S.

Amidst these complexities inherent in the Canadian media system, another challenge that emerged was increasing cultural diversity in Canadian society and calls for proper reflection of multiculturalism in the Canadian media system. After years of public consultation and lobbying of civil society groups and individuals (1985-1991), the Broadcasting Act of 1991 incorporated Canadian diversity as “a fundamental characteristic of Canadian heritage and identity” (Section 3(1)(b) of the Multiculturalism Act of 1988) through the insertion of section 3(1)(d)(iii) (Raboy, 2010, pp. 113-114):

3(1)(d)(iii) through its programming and the employment opportunities arising out of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including equal rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that society [emphasis added]

In this framework, the CBC is also directed to “reflect the multicultural and multiracial nature of Canada” in its programming (Section 3(1)(m)(viii)). More than anything, this insertion made it possible to expect “multicultural and multiracial nature of Canadian society” in various media undertakings, including “programming” and “employment” (Raboy, 2010, p. 105).

Reflecting these new mandates of the Broadcasting Act, the two key policy directives that are relevant to ethnic broadcasting focus on the portrayal of minorities and participation of minorities in production. First, the Policy Framework for Canadian Television (Public Notice CRTC 1999-97) sets out conditions for all conventional
television licensees to ensure that “the on-screen portrayal of all minority groups is accurate, fair and non-stereotypical” and to create a system in which “producers, writers, technicians and artists from different cultural and social perspectives have the opportunity to create a variety of programming and to develop their skills.”

Specifically with respect to the portrayal of minorities, the CRTC required individual broadcasters and the Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) to develop action plans, in response to the CAB’s earlier report, Reflecting Canadians: Best Practices for Diversity in Television (2004), which found an under-representation of Aboriginal peoples, Asian-Canadians, and visible minorities on the air (Armstrong, 2010). As a result, the Equitable Portrayal Code was developed and approved by the CRTC in 2008 to replace the existing Sex-Role Portrayal Code. This new code broadened the coverage from the previous code “to overcome unduly negative portrayal and stereotyping in broadcast programming, including commercial messages, based on matters of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, gender, sexual orientation, marital status or physical or mental disability (Public Notice CRTC 2008-23).

In regards to minority participation in production (through ownership and employment), there are no group-differentiated policies that prioritize minority applications. The CRTC, in fact, rejected the request for identity-based licensing by the Canadian Diversity Producers Association on the grounds that “the current regulatory structure has continued to support these sectors in a variety of ways, such as providing various opportunities for entry into the system, streamlined licensing processes for easier access by new entrants, as well as regulatory supports for existing services” (Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2008-4). One of the “ways” this statement is referring to may be the Category 2 specialty service, which was created to respond to the needs of diverse communities (Broadcasting Public Notice 2002-53).

Regarding participation through employment, the CRTC follows the Employment Equity Policy by requiring all licensees with 25 to 99 employees to report on “the on-air presence of members of the four designated groups (women, aboriginal persons, disabled persons and members of visible minorities)” (Public Notice CRTC 1997-34). In terms of the distribution of minority production, the Regulatory Frameworks for Broadcasting
Distribution Undertakings and Discretionary Programming Services (Public Notice CRTC 2008-100), states amended access rules for third-language services:

All BDUs distributing any of the following ethnic services - Telelatino, Odyssey, Talentvision, Fairchild and Asian TV Network - as of the date of this public notice will be required to continue distributing them.

Terrestrial BDUs will be required to distribute the appropriate above-noted ethnic service(s) when 10% of the population in the service area of the terrestrial BDU is of the ethnic origin targeted by the service(s).

Non-Canadian third-language services can only be offered in a package with Canadian ethnic/third-language services in the same language(s) if one exists, in a ratio of one (1) Canadian service to up to three (3) non-Canadian services.

Another policy that is directly relevant to ethnic broadcasting is the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy, enacted in 1985 and updated in 1999 by the CRTC (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117). The CRTC defines an ethnic program as follows:

An ethnic program is one, in any language, that is specifically directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian or from France or the British Isles. Ethnic programming may be in English, French, a third-language or a combination of languages. It also includes cross-cultural programming provided, once again, that it is specifically directed to any culturally or racially distinct group other than one that is Aboriginal Canadian or from France or the British Isles.

As part of licensing requirements, this policy sets out conditions for ethnic programming, third-language programs, and Canadian content, among others. Ethnic radio and television stations are expected to devote at least 60% of their schedule to ethnic programming and 50% to a third language other than French, English or Aboriginal languages. In order to protect multicultural or ethnic specialty stations from direct competition with non-ethnic stations, the CRTC limits the amount of ethnic programming of non-ethnic stations to up to 15%. Furthermore, the same Canadian Content rules are equally applied to ethnic stations. Although varied by condition of license, the CRTC also requires ethnic radio and television to comply with the same Canadian content level as non-ethnic stations: 60% Canadian content overall and 50% during the evening broadcast period. The ethnic specialty service is not an exception: 15%
for ethnic compared to 35% for English and French specialty services (Public Notice CRTC 2000-6).

While these policy frameworks are in place to accommodate ethnic broadcasting, the actual resources to support ethnic broadcasting are scarce. In the Public Notice CRTC 1999-117, the CRTC acknowledged that there was a disconnect between some of the funding demands and the framework of the Canadian Television Fund (CFT).17 As evidence, in 2001-2002, the Canadian Television Fund allocated no funding to support ethnic TV, when it made a significant amount available for English ($156.0 million), French ($81.9 million) and Aboriginal ($2.6 million) programs (Canadian Ethnocultural Council, 2003).

The Canadian Television Fund subsidises film and television production through public funds and contributions from cable and satellite distribution systems (Grant & Wood, 2004, p. 300). The rationale behind the latter is that cable and satellite companies make large profits by airing inexpensive foreign programs in place of local Canadian content (p. 305). A third-language programming fund employing the same logic as the CTF was proposed by a panel on “access to third-language public television service.” That is, no less than 10% of the revenues of non-Canadian third-language services are contributed to the fund (see the Integration and Cultural Diversity: Report of the Panel on Access to Third-Language Public Television Services by Clifford Lincoln [2004]). This proposal was supported by producers and related associations, but opposed by major broadcasting distributors (Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2004-96). The main argument of the latter was their ongoing contribution of non-Canadian services to the Canadian system “by providing greater programming choice and diversity and by virtue of the existing financial contribution to local expression, Canadian programming and community television required of all Canadian BDUs amounting to 5% of gross revenues derived from their broadcasting activities” (ibid.). Thus, additional financial requirements would discourage potential new services. The report, however, argues that such an idea is

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17 The Canadian Television Fund is a non-profit corporation, created by the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Cable Production Fund and Telefilm Canada in 1996 (Armstrong, 2010, p. 137). In 2009, the Government of Canada announced the amalgamation of the CTF and the Canada New Media Fund to establish the Canada Media Fund (ibid.).
already stated in the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy;\textsuperscript{18} and it has simply not been implemented yet. If this does not come through, the question is then, whether Canadian third-language services are financially able to make such a contribution to self-fund their own production. The numbers shown in the CRTC Communication Monitoring Report 2011\textsuperscript{19} do not guarantee this. The revenue of third-language specialty services (anologue and digital combined) in 2010 accounts for 3.7\% ($78,044,000) of that of English-language specialty services ($2,109,877,000).

All of these measures apply to broadcasting. The print media sector, on the other hand, is completely out of the regulatory loop. The codes of conduct published by non-governmental associations such as the British Columbia Press Council and the National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada (NEPMCC)\textsuperscript{20} are all that are applied. The print sector, however, offers relatively more funding opportunities. The Canadian Periodical Fund (CPF) offered by Canadian Heritage is a potential funding source for diasporic media outlets. It is available for all publishers to provide “financial assistance to Canadian print magazines, non-daily newspapers and digital periodicals to enable them to overcome market disadvantages and continue to provide Canadian readers with the content they choose to read.”\textsuperscript{21} This is a new fund launched in 2011-2012, replacing the previous Publications Assistance Program (PAP) and the Canada Magazine Fund (CMF). Some of the previous funds were made available to diasporic media outlets through collective efforts. According to the NEPMCC, its joint efforts with the Department of Heritage Canada (the former name of Canadian Heritage) resulted in the “inclusion of the members of ethnic press in PAP… a privilege that has been enjoyed for so many years by

\textsuperscript{18} Lincoln is referring to the following statements in the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117): 31. Some concern was expressed regarding the lack of resources available to support independent ethnic television production. The Commission notes that Public Notice CRTC 1997-98 Contributions to Canadian Programming by Broadcasting Distribution Undertakings, provides that independently-administered production funds may be established to respond to some of the funding demands which do not currently fit within the framework of the Canada Television Fund (CTF). 32. It would, therefore, be possible to establish a fund to support ethnic television production. Broadcasting distribution undertakings (BDUs) would then have the option of directing up to 20\% of their total required contribution to Canadian programming to this fund.

\textsuperscript{19} See http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/PolicyMonitoring/2011/cmr4.htm#f439

\textsuperscript{20} This is a not-for-profit organization, which represents 500 Canadian publications and 120 media representatives serving 93 linguistic communities (www. nepmcc.ca).

\textsuperscript{21} http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1268240166828/1268251838678
the Canadian mainstream media.”

The case of PAP suggests the need for organizational efforts to be mobilized in order to access such funding.

**U.S.**

In contrast to the protective Canadian media, two characteristics that describe the U.S. media industry are the commitment to the First Amendment and open competition through deregulation. These are the main differences between Canada and the U.S., although this is not to say that Canada is not committed to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Nevertheless, Canada’s unique situation has resulted in more conservative policy initiatives. According to Katz (2005, p. 19), the U.S. media policy has gone through three development stages. The first stage is identified with the “old structure of broadcasting,” which focused primarily on public service and cultural aspects of broadcasting. Particularly, the commitment to the First Amendment guarantees freedom of content, in that “no government—federal or local—has the authority to interfere with the right of the media to deliver whatever information they wish” (p. 23). This further limits the authority of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to regulating “technological and structural aspects” (ibid.).

The second stage is characterized by deregulation. As early as the 1970s, the U.S. deregulated the cable industry and adopted an “open-skies policy” for cable and satellite, which permitted the import of distant transmissions, and allowed the cable industry to become “a fully commercial competitor to broadcast television” (p. 32). Later, in the 1990s, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 opened the market entirely by lifting remaining restrictions on all communication services (p. 46). Finally, the third stage is characterized by the global media policy led by the U.S., which has resulted in the reality that media policy and competition are no longer a local matter. Technological advancement allows transmissions to reach beyond national borders, thus calling for

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22 For more details, see the National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada (NEPMCC) website (http://www.nepmcc.ca/) under “About NEPMCC”: “Working to make Canada a true community of communities.”

23 The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) is a federal regulatory agency that is equivalent to the CRTC of Canada.
global management. This has led to the “transfer of influence from the government sector to the free market” (p. 39).

In this context, foreign ownership and local content requirements are much more relaxed in the U.S., compared to those of Canada. Concerning foreign ownership, the U.S. lays out no restrictions on the ownership of cable, satellite (or “satellite-delivered pay- or speciality-subscription), print, or telecom services (Grant & Wood, 2004; McEwen, 2007). These sectors are not considered broadcasting. However, a strict restriction is imposed on broadcasting, limiting foreign ownership to 25% of the voting stock of a licensee (McEwen, 2007). This is only slightly higher than Canada’s 20%. Matching to Canada’s policy, the licensee must be a U.S. citizen. Restrictions on foreign ownership, in fact, deter entries of transnational media (see Section 2.3).

Regarding content requirement, there are no U.S. Content rules (as in “Canadian Content rules”) since the majority of content is produced in the U.S. This is more of a concern for countries such as Canada, which import U.S. cultural products. However, content requirements are not entirely absent. Grant and Wood (2004) find that the FCC, as early as the 1930s when it was established, set out various measures concerning local content in the name of “public-interest responsibilities” and encouraged local production of “underrepresented” program genres. These measures included the requirements for “the development and use of local talent,” “program for children,” and “educational programs” in 1960, the Children’s Television Act in 1990, and a three-hour quota for children’s educational programming in 1996 (cited in Grant & Wood, 2004, pp. 212-214).

With respect to cultural diversity, although the U.S. commits to “American identity” with no group considerations, the increasingly multicultural and multiracial nature of society, and the corresponding cultural demands, required the U.S. media system to respond. There are no policies designed solely for ethno-racial minority broadcasting (such as the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy in Canada). However, the FCC (2010) addresses the issues concerning minorities in its broader commitment to “diversity” objectives: (1) Outlet diversity (the number of independently-owned media outlets); (2)

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24 The FCC defines “minority” to be “Blacks not of Hispanic origin, Asians or Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, Alaskan natives, and Hispanics” (Creech, 2007, p. 147).
Source diversity (the availability of media content from a variety of content creators); (3) Minority and female ownership diversity (the number of media outlets owned by minority race/ethnic groups and women); (4) Program diversity (the variety of program formats and content provided by the media); and (5) Viewpoint diversity (the availability of content reflecting a variety of perspectives) (Rennhoff, 2011). Among these five objectives, “minority and female ownership diversity” and “viewpoint diversity” are particularly relevant to this study. Interestingly, when it comes to minority viewpoints, these two different diversities are considered to be interchangeable, in which the former guarantees the latter.


The views of racial minorities continue to be inadequately represented in the broadcast media. This situation is detrimental to not only the minority audience but to all of the viewing and listening public. Adequate representation of minority viewpoints in programming serves not only the needs and interests of the minority community but also enriches and educates the non-minority audience. It enhances the diversified programming which is a key objective not only of the Communications Act of 1934 but also the First Amendment.

There are two implications to this statement. First, there is an assumption that minority owners will produce minority-concerned content, thus contributing to viewpoint diversity. The justification of diversity in ownership as a measure for diversity in content is, however, insensitive, especially in the U.S. media environment, where deregulation and open market competition are the two major underlying forces. Furthermore, media scholars (for example, Browne, 2005; Einstein, 2004) point out the ambiguity of this measure, in that there is no actual agreement on what diversity means among scholars and policy makers: whether it refers to an idea, product, producer (person), or production/distribution outlet (entity). Social responsibility of minority owners is only vaguely assumed and finds no empirical evidence to support it. Even if this is the case,
without due consideration of other socio-economic factors that influence minority owners, ethnicity alone is not a convincing contributing factor.

Second, the FCC’s five diversity objectives are, in fact, just “objectives” rather than regulations, which bear no legal consequences if unmet. In fact, minority ownership is continually declining, especially during the recent economic downturn (see Section 2.3.2). Nevertheless, although the link between minority ownership and viewpoint diversity is naïve, the link between “adequate representation of minority viewpoints” and the potential educational impact on non-minorities in this regard, in fact, echoes Kymlicka’s view on the contribution of ethno-racial options within mainstream institutions to enriching cultural literacy.

Regarding measures that facilitate minority ownership, the FCC adopted the following two programs between the 1960s and 1990s (Waldman, 2011, p. 313):

(1) adopting a tax certificate program that allowed broadcast and cable companies to defer capital gains on the sale of media and cable properties to minority-owned businesses; and

(2) allowing for the “distress sale” of a broadcast station, thereby permitting broadcasters to sell properties to minority owners at reduced rates as an alternative to losing the broadcast assets due to non-renewal or revocation of their licenses.

However, both “race-specific” measures failed to obtain support from the Supreme Court and Congress, and led the FCC to resort to alternative measures, including data collection, bidding credits, and tax certificates. Data collection requires licensees to report on race, ethnicity, and gender to understand minority ownership. The other two are financial support programs through a reduction in the bid amount for auctioned radio and television licenses and further discounts, if conditions are met (bidding credits), and through a deferral of capital gains on the sales of media and cable properties, if sold to minority-owned companies (tax credits) (ibid.).

With respect to minority employment, the FCC prohibits discrimination based on “race, gender, color, religion, or national origin” by broadcasters. As part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Program, the FCC requires broadcasting licensees with more than five employees to annually report on the minority composition of their workforce.
(Form 395-B) as well as upon license renewal (Form 396) (Creech, 2007, p. 159). In a case of non-compliance, further actions are taken such as forfeiture, short-term renewal or non-renewal (ibid.). In 2001, the FCC also proposed a new rule that required licensees to advertise job postings as widely as possible so that all qualified candidates have an equal chance to be informed and compete in the broadcasting industry (p. 160). Additionally, as in Canada, in the U.S., the print media sector is unregulated. There are non-governmental organizations such as the National Newspaper Publishers Association (NNPA), the New America Media (NAM), and the National Hispanic Media Coalition (NHMC), which share codes of conduct and organize advocacy.

Overall, the status of multiculturalism influences the media policy framework in both countries. In Canada, the official commitment to multiculturalism lays out more ethnicity-specific (group-differentiated) regulations. Not only does the Broadcasting Act embrace cultural diversity as an important mandate of Canadian media, but it also sets out policy directives developed specifically for multicultural or ethnic broadcasting (e.g., the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy). Policy measures for minority portrayal and minority participation in production are constantly studied and updated (i.e., Equitable Portrayal Code, Equal Employment Opportunity). Although some of these measures are still more conceptual than substantial and require further attention (see the following section), they clearly show the impact of multiculturalism as part of the Canadian constitution. In the U.S., on the other hand, race-based (group) initiatives are not supported, but not absent either. Minority participation through ownership and employment is encouraged and believed to be related with “viewpoint diversity.” Multicultural and multiracial realities demand a certain level of policy support for minority media undertakings, and this demand has been responded to in the name of “diversity” objectives. Such proactive approaches to ethnic broadcasting in Canada set apart from more reactive approaches of the U.S. and suggest that the Canadian policy framework is more close to the integrationist model whereas the U.S. follows the economist model.

What is equally lacking in both countries is a discussion of cross-ethnic communication by way of making ethnic production accessible to all audiences through, for example, multi-language subtitles and multicultural content rules. Second, substantial support for minority production is still limited or dwindling. Third, all of these measures
concern broadcasting, and the print media sector is completely out of the regulatory loop. The next section explores the consequences of the immigration, citizenship, and media policies discussed in this section.

2.3 Practices

2.3.1 Multiculturalism as Everyday Practice

Owing to various immigration and temporary visa programs from the late 1980s well into the 2000s, which recruited immigrants and labourers to fill out both the top and bottom of the economic hierarchy (e.g., the Business Immigration Programme of 1986 [Canada], the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 [US]), diverse demographic profiles and settlement patterns can be observed among migrants.

In comparison, Asian immigrants fare better in the U.S. when compared with immigrants to Canada. Wang and Wang’s study (2011) finds that while Asian immigrants in both countries generally possess high human capital in terms of education and language, compared to the national population and other immigrant groups, Asian immigrants in the U.S. perform better economically compared to their counterparts in Canada. According to the 2006 Canadian Census, the median employment income for the population aged 15 years old or older who were working full year and full time was $41,401 in 2005, in which immigrants earned $39,523 and non-immigrants earned $42,030 (Statistics Canada, 2006i). Broken down by ethnicity, visible minorities earned $36,333 with some subgroup variations: Japanese ($47,278), Chinese ($39,763), and South Asian ($37,125) earned above the visible minority median whereas Filipino ($34,701) and Korean ($29,450) earned below the median (Statistics Canada, 2006j). Thus, among visible minorities, it is only Japanese who earned more than the national median. For British Columbia specifically, the situation is consistent. The median employment income for immigrants in 2005 was $38,469, compared to $43,973 for non-immigrants, in which well-established immigrants (who arrived after 1991) earned $42,798, almost on par with that of non-immigrants, whereas very recent immigrants (who arrived between 2001 and 2006) earned $29,484 (B.C. Stats, 2006b). Such a
disparity is accompanied by a higher portion of low-income families among immigrants (16%), compared to non-immigrants (7.5%) (ibid.).

On the other hand, Asian-Americans in the U.S. outperform the national median. According to the 2010 American Community Survey Year 1 Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c), Asians tend to earn more than the national median income ($41,526), earning $47,193 (where Koreans earn $45,516). Poverty rate is also lower among Asians (12.5%) than the national rate (15.3%), although it is higher among the senior group age 65 and over: 9% for national total, 13% for Asians, and 21% for Koreans. The poverty rate in the traditional enclaves, in fact, has been a concern: 25% among Chinese in New York’s Chinatown and 26% of Koreans in L.A.’s Koreatown already in 1990 (Ong & Umemoto, 2000, p. 238), suggesting that within-group income disparity is also the case for Asian immigrants in the U.S.

By occupation, Asian immigrants in Canada are more likely to work in primary (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, mining and oil and gas extraction) and secondary (utilities and construction, transportation and warehousing) industries and less likely work in professional and technical services (Wang & Wang, 2011). Interestingly, while the rate of self-employment among Asian immigrants is slightly higher (12 to 13%) than other immigrant groups in both countries, that of Korean immigrants is the highest among all: 26% in Canada and 22% in the U.S. (ibid.). A significantly higher representation of Koreans in the “wholesale and retail trade, accommodation and food services, other services (except public administration)” sector (45% in Canada and 44% in the U.S.) explains the concentration of Korean immigrants in small businesses (ibid.). The case studies of Korean communities in this study confirm this trend, in which diasporic media have become another small business sector among Korean immigrants (see Chapters 3 & 5).

Various factors come into play to make such a cross-ethnic, cross-national difference. Among others, immigration history is one influential factor. The immigration history of Japanese and Chinese communities, for example, dates back to the early 1900s,

25 This is the median employment income for population aged 16 years old or older who are working full year and full time.
26 Note that Canadian figures represent South Korea, Japan, and North Korea.
whereas that of the Korean-Canadian community spans only 40 years. The Korean-American community boasts 100 years of history; however, the actual formation of this community as a group started in the 1970s. The statistics presented above confirm that the longer their stay in Canada, the higher the income immigrants earn. Beside the immigration history, different economic structures and more importantly, different visa programs for temporary workers are known to be primary reasons for differences between the two countries. Wang and Wang (2011) point out that the relatively generous admission requirements of Canada, compared to the H-1B visa program, for example, ironically has led to economic underperformance of immigrants. Kobayashi et al. (2011) further support the argument that Canada’s reliance on the point system to recruit skilled, permanent immigrants fails to properly utilize immigrant manpower for the nation’s economic growth, and also fails to support the personal well-being of immigrants in a new country, due to discrimination in hiring and lack of recognition of foreign credentials, among other factors. The U.S.’s H-1B visa program, on the other hand, requires job offers from U.S. companies as a prerequisite. Although this program also has its own problems, including the lack of privileges granted to temporary workers on par with those granted to immigrants, at least labour activity and comparable salary in the U.S. is guaranteed upon arrival.

Such socio-economic disparity within immigrant communities leads to another trend, that is, bipolar settlement patterns: a development of ethnoburbs in wealthy suburban neighbourhoods with a parallel existence of and a continuous demand for inner-city ghettos and enclaves. The “segmented assimilation,” a term put forth by Portes and Zhou (1993) to describe different assimilation experiences by second-generation immigrants, can be applied to immigrants in general, as a form of “segmented settlement.” Immigrant settlement is not a linear process. On one end of the spectrum, the so called “hypercapital” citizens27 (Ong, 2003, p. 269), who are socio-economically on par with their white counterparts and are distant from the concerns of their economically underprivileged minority counterparts, are increasingly found in the suburbs. This is

27 Ong (2003, p. 269) defines a hypercapital citizen to be one who “submits more readily to the governmentality of fraternally based network capitalism than to the political sovereignty of a democratic nation.”
particularly a trend for Asian settlement, led by investor-class immigrants as well as second-generation immigrants (Kaplan, Wheeler, & Holloway, 2004; Li, 2007; Li & Skop, 2007; Min, 2001, 2006a, 2006c). The 2001 U.S. Census found 29% of Asian Americans in suburban areas, after White Americans (32%) and before African Americans (22%) and Hispanics (22%) (Min, 2006, p. 39).

Accordingly, new forms of contemporary enclaves emerge. Kaplan et al. (2004) argue that while the “new immigrant enclave” of newly arrived immigrants is still found in poor areas in the city, a “one-step-up enclave” for the middle class or close to middle class is established near traditional enclaves to enjoy the conveniences they offer. Furthermore, the “ethnoburbs” (or “suburban enclave”) for the higher class are formed away from traditional enclaves where residents can enjoy a suburban life while having access to ethnic conveniences (Kaplan et al., 2004; Li, 2007). In Vancouver, for example, some of the well-known ethnoburbs are established in the cities of Burnaby, Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, Surrey, Langley, and Maple Ridge (Kwak, 2004, p. 4). Particularly, the City of Coquitlam hosts the largest Korean enclave economy in B.C. Similarly, in L.A., Orange County finds the second largest Korean diaspora (55,573) after L.A. County (Chung, 2007, p. 46).

On the other end of the spectrum, there is a continuous demand for inner-city ghettos and enclaves. The high poverty rate of inner-city ethnic enclaves is, in fact, an outcome of discriminatory urban planning. Studies find a relationship between inner-city ethno-racial ghettos/enclaves and government-supported urban structuring beginning as early as the 1900s, and the urban redevelopment projects in the 1950s and 1960s (Kaplan et al., 2004; Li, 2007). These geographic demarcations were “tools used to inscribe the color line on the residential landscape of the city” (Kaplan et al., 2004, p. 247). In the U.S., for example, public housing was built in already poor and minority saturated inner-city sites, and the suburbs were “effectively” closed to them (ibid.). Through various means, such as neighbourhood improvement associations, the restrictive covenant, and an operation of a dual housing market, Blacks were excluded from White neighbourhoods. The Chinatown in almost all North American cities is another example. This area, known as the “port of entry,” “informal capital city,” or recently “global ethnopolis,” continue to provide Chinese immigrants with a racism-free comfort zone, consisting of “the
conveniences of employment in ethnic businesses, ethnic food, and language” as well as a place to reside for newly arrived immigrants (Li, 2007, p. 221; Min, 2006a, p. 38). Whether these are “neighbourhoods of hope” or “places of stigma” (Murdie & Skop, 2011, p. 64) is a topic of constant debate.

In this bipolar settlement pattern, the immigrant community’s communication infrastructure tends to follow suit. In the case of the Korean community, micro-scale services such as socio-cultural organizations and media outlets (or distribution centres) have developed in new ethnoburbs, while maintaining traditional community service organizations (CSOs) in the old enclave. The nature of organizations in the old enclave also transforms to adapt to the changing demographics of the area, showing a sign of “hope” rather than the “stigma” of the old enclave. L.A.’s Koreatown (or K-town), the largest Korean enclave economy in North America, finds multiethnic CSOs such as the Koreatown Youth and Community Center (KYCC) providing social services and advocacy for underprivileged multiethnic immigrants at the bottom of the economic hierarchy. Immigrant settlement services in Canada have also followed suit, offering services in the ethnoburbs. S.U.C.C.E.S.S., an immigrant settlement agency originating in Vancouver, for example, operates satellite offices in major ethnoburbs such as Coquitlam. As a side note, what is important to note here is that, as briefly discussed earlier, one of the differences between Canada and the U.S. is the nature of these social service organizations, owing to the funding source. Government-funded Canadian agencies focus mainly on settlement and social services, whereas U.S. agencies also offer advocacy in addition to social services. Along with the ones that operate in Koreatown, there are also the Chicano/Latino Association (CHILA), Para Los Ninos, Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), Little Tokyo Service Center, and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), among others. Organizations like S.U.C.C.E.S.S. also find private funders; however, their services are limited to settlement and integration services.

Another trend in immigrant settlement is an increase in migration to interior locations. Canadian immigrants tend to be relatively more concentrated in metropolitan centres compared to U.S. immigrants. According to the 2006 Census, nearly 70% of Canadian immigrants settled in three metropolitan centres—Vancouver, Toronto, and
Montreal—whereas only around 30% of U.S. immigrants settled in the U.S.’s top three immigrant-receiving cities—New York, Los Angeles, and Miami in the 2005-2007 period (Kobayashi et al., 2011, pp. wvii-xxviii). However, more and more new arrivals to Canada have started to consider inner provinces or the neighbouring cities of the metropolitan centres, such as Calgary, Edmonton, and Hamilton, and this is clearly the case for Korean new arrivals (Kim, 2008). In the U.S., although the two coasts, California and New York, still remain the most favoured and concentrated destinations for Asian immigrants, with 3.7 million and 1 million immigrants respectively, a greater representation is found in the Northeast and South, up from 14% to 21% and 7% to 19% respectively in 2000 compared to 1970 (Min, 2006, pp. 32-36). Such a tendency is, in fact, found to be more apparent among Koreans compared to other Asia Pacific Islanders (APIs) as already in the 1970s, 39.4% of Koreans resided in the Pacific region, compared to 68.7% of API (Light & Bonacich, 1988, p. 135). However, this dispersal reflects the presence of war orphans and war brides throughout U.S. cities (ibid.).

In relation to citizenship, socio-economic disparity has resulted in a diverse attitude toward citizenship. Citizenship has become an individual choice and less of a priority for some immigrants. In the classical immigration countries, where citizenship is based on jus solis (given upon naturalization) and dual citizenship is permitted, the naturalization rate is high only in Canada (84%) and is moderate in the U.S. (40%), as mentioned earlier (Banting et al., 2007). The growing neoliberal cost/benefit calculation on the part of migrants is an important reason, among others, for low naturalization. Hammar (1990, p. 104) finds that migrants decide to naturalize when the benefit (e.g., a useful passport for international travel; social, economic and political rights which follow from citizenship) precedes the cost (e.g., renunciation of original citizenship and pension, loss of the right to inherit or to own property). On the other hand, structural barriers continue to prevent socio-economically underprivileged minorities from engaging in political activities. Young (2000, p. 95) argues that group conflicts are often more structural than cultural, in that “a person’s social location in structures differentiated by class, gender, age, ability, race, or caste often implies predictable status in law, educational possibility, occupation, access to resources, political power, and prestige.” Thus, political rights may have been given upon naturalization, yet a lack of
socio-economic means prohibits immigrants from exercising those rights. Such diverging attitudes toward citizenship have been expressed in various ways, from the aspiration for minority political leadership in the settlement country to a political leaning toward the home country.

In summary, these diverse responses to changing immigration policies—first through liberalization of immigration in the 1960s and second through neo-liberalization since the 1980s—resulted in socio-economic and political divides across and within communities. A parallel inflow of investor immigrants and highly educated skilled workers in one stream, and labour workers for the lower sector in the economic hierarchy in the other, has resulted in segmented settlement and social integration. Furthermore, citizenship as a personal choice fares differently for different groups of people. In projecting this diversity on communication infrastructure, this may point to equally diverse relationships with communication infrastructure, depending on immigrants’ socio-economic and political position within society: hypercapital versus underprivileged; older immigrants versus second generation versus new arrivals; and geographically concentrated versus geographically dispersed. The next section looks at communicative spaces created for and by these diverse groups.

2.3.2 Cultural Diversity and Media Practices

Overall, Canadian broadcasting offers ethnic options on various media platforms: radio, over-the-air television stations, ethnic pay and specialty services (“analogue ethnic specialty” and “Category 2 digital ethnic pay and specialty” services), and non-Canadian third-language programming services eligible for distribution in Canada. Specifically, as of 2010, there are over 30 third-language radio services, including five in Vancouver, and six over-the-air television stations, including one in Vancouver (Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2008-4; CRTC Communication Monitoring Report 2011). Rogers’ OMNI, a multicultural television station, serves ethno-cultural communities of over 20 languages with a variety of programs, including Cantonese, Mandarin, and Punjabi daily news. For ethnic pay and specialty services, there are five analogue ethnic specialty services—Fairchild Television (Cantonese), Telelatino (Italian and Hispanic/Spanish), Talentvision (Mandarin), Asian Television Network (South Asian), and Odyssey (Greek)—and 31
Category 2 digital services\textsuperscript{28} (CRTC Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report 2007, 2011). These services are carried by cable companies such as Shaw and Telus. Vancouver’s Shaw also has its own multicultural channel, Shaw Multicultural Channel (SMC), offering over 20 third-language services to its subscribers. Finally, there are 89 non-Canadian third-language satellite services authorized for distribution in Canada (CRTC Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report 2011). All of these options are located in the commercial sector. The overall market size is not available. However, the revenue for the third-language specialty services is known to be approximately $78 million (analogue and digital combined), compared to $2.1 billion for English-language services or $2.7 billion of the total specialty services (ibid.).\textsuperscript{29} The actual market share is small; however, the figure represents an approximately 16% increase from 2006 (or $67 million) (CRTC Broadcasting Policy Monitoring Report 2007).

In the public sector, the CBC also provides some multicultural services. However, unlike multicultural television stations, which focus on multi-language services targeted specifically to ethno-racial audiences, the CBC is committed to providing multicultural programs for a general audience in the two “official languages” only. Such mandate is, in fact, stated in the Section 3(1)(m)(iv) of the Broadcasting Act of 1991 that the programming provided by the CBC “be in English and in French.” As a consequence, the Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2010–2011 to the Parliament states that the CBC’s multicultural programs include an aboriginal news site (cbc.ca/aboriginal), a Chinese news site (cbc.ca/bc/chinesenews), and Hockey Night in Canada in Punjabi (third season), along with documentaries and daily news on immigrants. The Chinese website (although unavailable as of 2012) and the Hockey Night in Canada in Punjabi are the only two programs offered in non-official languages. The CBC’s Little Mosque on the Prairie,\textsuperscript{30} a comedy sitcom about Muslims and Christians living in the small town of Mercy (English language) is another multicultural initiative. Canadian media scholars, however, are concerned that it is a challenge for the

\textsuperscript{28} As mentioned earlier, the “Category 2 specialty services” was created in 2002 in response to the needs of diverse communities (Broadcasting Public Notice 2002-53).

\textsuperscript{29} The revenue for over-the-air ethnic television is unknown. It is included in the English-language stations as being minimal (CRTC Communication Monitoring Report 2011).

\textsuperscript{30} For more details, see the program website: http://www.cbc.ca/littlemosque/about-the-show.php
CBC to even meet its bilingual mandate, especially Section 3(1)(m)(v) which states it must “strive to be of equivalent quality in English and in French,” in the face of continual budget cuts (Raboy, 2010; Vipond, 2000). Especially, Vipond (2000, p. 138) argues that “The Broadcasting Act gives the CBC great responsibilities, and virtually every observer has pointed out that no government has given the CBC the resources with which to accomplish this task.”

In comparison, the U.S., by and large, offers more ethno-racial options in absolute quantity. As an example, Beaty and Sullivan (2006, p. 49) argue that Canadian satellite services provided only half a channel of Spanish service in 2003, when the U.S.’s DirecTV provided 31 channels. The sizable market (by audience numbers) backed up by the unregulated cable and satellite sectors has multiplied ethno-racial options in the U.S. Grant and Wood (2004, p. 212) assess the U.S. media system overall to be “large, rich, productive and extremely competitive,” although public broadcasting is “undernourished.” The situation is similar for the minority media sector. Other than a few options on over-the-air, ethno-racial services are largely available in the unregulated cable and satellite sectors. There is no complete profile of ethno-racial services; however, the recent report to the FCC by Steven Waldman and the Working Group entitled, *Information needs of communities: The changing media landscape in a broadband age* (2011) provides a snapshot. By race, African-American radio stations include WERD in Atlanta (the first African American-owned radio), the National Negro Network (NNN, a nationwide network of 40 stations), and the American Urban Radio Networks (AURN, the largest African-American owned radio network). Univision, one of the top five television networks in America, according to the report, serves the Hispanic community, and KSCI-TV Channel 18 (or LA18, an equivalent to the Asian version of Vancouver’s OMNI) owned by AsianMedia Group, serves Asian communities. LA18 provides a daily newscast in Chinese, Korean, and Filipino. Alongside these offerings, the nation’s leading satellite providers such as Dish Network and DirecTV offer international channels for Asian communities. The cable providers also carry multi-language channels. For example, Time Warner’s “Espanol Tier” carries over 60 channels, and the “Premium” channels carry over ten languages, including Korean, Japanese, Cantonese, Mandarin,
and Farsi.\footnote{For more details, see Time Warner’s channel line-ups (City of L.A.): http://www.timewarnercable.com/SoCal/support/clu/clu.ashx?ChannelFilter=All&CLUID=942&Zip=&SortByPackage=true} Finally, The New America Media (NAM), a network of over 2,500 ethnic media, also provides news headlines and other useful information for ethnic communities (ibid.).

Overall, minority ownership in broadcasting is still limited. In Canada, the CRTC is confident that its support of the third-language sector is sufficient, as described earlier in the case of the request for identity-based licensing (Broadcasting Public Notice CRTC 2008-4). However, minority ownership is absent in over-the-air conventional televisions, and is heavily concentrated in ethnic specialty services or brokerages, “the purchase of blocks of radio and television time by independent ethnic producers who determine the program content and commercial messages and derive revenues from the advertising contained therein” (CRTC 1985, 30-31) (Roth, 1998). Shaw’s SMC is run by these independent producers, although they are not brokers by the above definition. As part of the community service initiatives, Shaw offers free airtime to local independent producers. Three out of four television services in the Korean community (TV Korea, KC TV, and Cakocom) belong to this category.

In the U.S., minority ownership in conventional broadcasting is proportionately higher than in Canada, but is still minimal in the overall system. Waldman’s report (2011, p. 215) finds that minority ownership of traditional radio and television is still far too small by per capita population. African-Americans (13 % of the entire U.S. population) own six television stations (or 0.33 % of total full-power television stations) and 240 radio stations (or 1.6 % of total full-power radio stations), followed by Latinos (14 percent of the population) with 1.11% of television stations and 2% of radio stations, and Asian-Americans (4% of the U.S. population) own six television stations (or 0.44 % of all broadcast television stations). One of the reasons for such underrepresentation is weak financial status. The report quotes a comment by Frank Montero, Washington, D.C., communications attorney and an expert in broadcast finance and FCC regulatory matters, to explain the vulnerability of minority owners in the market: Minority owners tend to be “under-collateralized and therefore vulnerable to economic downturns” (ibid.).
Minority employment in the media industry is also still minimal. The CBC’s Annual Employment Equity Report to Human Resources Skills Development Canada 2010 reports that visible minorities and Aboriginal people represent 6.5% and 1.5% respectively of its “permanent full-time workforce.” The private sector is doing slightly better. CTVglobalmedia, the nation’s leading private television network, reports in its CTVglobalmedia Corporate Cultural Diversity Report 2009 to the CRTC that over 10% of the workforce is made up of members of ethno-cultural groups. Minority employment in the U.S. media is declining. According to the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), there were approximately 5,300 minorities working in newspapers in 2010, down from 7,400 in 2007 (Waldman, 2011, p. 253). This figure is translated to 12.8% minorities in newsrooms, compared to 36% minorities in the U.S. population. Such underrepresentation is taking place concurrently with the FCC’s reinforcement of the Equal Employment Opportunity rule, which requires broadcasters to report the racial, ethnic, and gender profile of their employees (p. 254). One thing to note, however, is that calculating ethno-racial representation in the media industry in terms of per capital population can be misleading. Multiple factors may explain such underrepresentation. Structural barriers may be one factor; however, the level of socio-economic capital and social integration, among others, are also important factors. Especially, in immigrant communities, due to their greater language ability, younger-generation immigrants are more likely to consider media as a career option. The second-generation population in young immigrant communities like the Korean community, for example, is still small: 9% in Canada and 26% in the U.S. (see Chapters 3 & 5).

With respect to the portrayal of minorities, we are still a long way from having the policy measures discussed in the earlier section to actually take effect in practice. Raboy (2010, p. 114) argues that minorities are continually mis- and under-represented in terms of minority portrayal and participation in production, referring to works done by Canadian media and immigration scholars: see for example, Henry and Tator’s Racist discourse in Canada’s English print media (2000) and Racial profiling in Canada (2006), Fleras and Kunz’s (2001) Media and Minorities, and Ojo’s (2006) Ethnic print media in the multicultural nation of Canada. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s research on reasonable accommodation also found a discrepancy between fact and “mediated public
perception,” in that “the negative perception of accommodation often stemmed from an erroneous or partial perception of practices in the field” (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008 cited in Raboy, 2010, p. 86). Similarly, minorities are also under-represented in the U.S. The PEW’s recent analysis of 67,000 news stories (between February 2009 and February 2010) found not only underrepresentation (only 1.9% of the total items), but also skewed representation of African-Americans, focusing largely on issues related to poverty and crime (Waldman, 2011, p. 252).

Availability of ethno-racial services is one thing and accessibility is another. Limited access to ethno-racial services on the part of the audience is an issue similarly found in both countries. Multi-language services of various genres (e.g., news, current affairs, entertainment) are created within mainstream institutions; however, these are only limitedly accessible due to socio-economic reasons. First, English subtitles are provided for most over-the-air programs, thus opening up these programs to all audiences, but only selectively for pay services, thus limiting viewing to in-language audiences. Furthermore, Vancouver (OMNI) and L.A. (LA18) provide local daily news in multi-languages by operating a multi-language news pool aggregated by in-house minority reporters. Such efforts suggest potential to create a window into multicultural storytelling. Nevertheless, no subtitles are provided, thus again limiting access to in-language audience. If English or arguably multi-language subtitles are provided (see Chapters 4 & 6), these services may contribute to improving cultural literacy among all members of society on how the same story is similarly or differently told across ethnic communities.

Canadian media scholars Beaty and Sullivan (2006, p. 144) support this idea that “Canada should cast wide its doors and welcome in as much third-language as possible, ideally with available French and English subtitles so that foreign-language programming can have the widest possible impact across Canada.” In the same vein, multi-language subtitles for English-language programs could also be considered in order to have a wider “impact” on linguistic communities. The current one-way access allows only dominant viewers have access to some minority programs and leaves minority audiences to their own resources. Second, except for the programs offered on over-the-air broadcasts, most multi-language services available on cable and satellite are pay services, available to subscribers only, for free or at additional cost. Beaty and Sullivan (2006, p. 49) argue that
the CRTC allows Category 2 specialty services to broadcast, but imposes no obligations on cable companies to carry them, thus they serve only limited audiences. As evidence of this, All TV, a Korean-language Category 2 specialty service, is a premium pay service for cable subscribers.

A window into the daily reporting of ethno-racial communities is more actively underway in a new media form initiated by not-for-profit organizations in the U.S. New America Media’s (http://newamericamedia.org/) “ethnic media headlines”32 and “ethnic media in the news”33 are good examples. These two sections provide selected news from various ethnic media (in English or translated into English): Korea Times, Korea Daily, India Currents, and Univision, among others. Similarly, the L.A. Beez (www.labeez.org), a multiethnic collaboration that offers hyperlocal news content, provides news feeds (again in English or translated into English) contributed by its media members: Alhambra Source, Asian Journal, Hispanic LA, India Journal, Iran Dokht, and KoreAm Journal, among others. The Alhambra Source (http://www.alhambrasource.org/) of the USC’s Metamorphosis is a manifestation of Ball-Rokeach’s Communication Infrastructure Theory. This multilingual communication platform, originating in the city of Alhambra, attempts to bring ethnically and linguistically diverse residents together to have them civically engaged through participation in online journalism. To make a comparison, if the NAM and L.A. Beez are an institutional (or professional) collaboration, the Alhambra Source is an individual (or community) collaboration. Stories are contributed in English, Chinese, and Spanish from researchers, students, residents, organizations, and professional journalists, among others. All of these projects envision a geographically-focused civil society and aim to facilitate the dissemination and discussion of localized everyday issues among residents. For these intercultural spaces to effectively function, however, a common language or multi-language translation is a prerequisite.

Perhaps for this reason, the most common examples of diasporic media are independent third-language media. There are roughly 300 and 2,500 diasporic media

32 For more details, see New America Media’s “Ethnic Media Headlines”: http://newamericamedia.org/news/ethnic-media-headlines/index.php
organizations in Canada and the U.S. respectively (see CARD, CCN Matthews Database [Green Book], National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada, New America Media). The actual number could be higher than what is listed in these national directories, as the listing preconditions voluntary membership or registration.

Independent research conducted by Murray et al. (2007) in Canada finds nearly 150 diasporic media outlets in the province of British Columbia alone, thus suggesting underrepresentation of diasporic media in the national media databases. Among all media sectors, the print media sector is particularly strong: nearly 80% of these outlets represent print media (Murray et al., 2007). The absence of regulations and a relatively easier start-up process compared to broadcasting may have contributed to the growth of print media. The study further finds a significant growth of diasporic media in the 1990s and well into the 2000s, suggesting a potential relationship between the growing entrepreneur immigrants class since the 1980s (e.g., Business Immigration Programme of 1986) and diasporic media as a growing business trend.

Conclusion

This chapter looked at theories, policies, and practices of Canada and the U.S. in the fields of immigration, citizenship, and media. While there are similarities between the two countries in their liberal/neoliberal approach to immigration, the official status of multiculturalism as a part of the Canadian constitution since the 1980s has set Canada on a different course. Immigrants are accepted more as permanent members of society and government-sponsored initiatives are undertaken to assist their settlement and integration. In broadcasting, media policies are designed specifically for ethnic broadcasting to ensure minority ownership and employment as well as fair portrayal of minorities in the overall media system. In the U.S., on the other hand, such group-differentiated measures are not endorsed, although a multicultural reality demands a certain degree of policy support for minority representation in ownership and employment.

Nevertheless, even with such policy support for ethnic broadcasting, whether proactive or reactive, a mechanism to embed multicultural storytelling in the broader media system is equally lacking in both countries. Ethno-racial options have limited
availability on public and over-the-air stations and are heavily concentrated in the commercial and cable/satellite sectors. Even in Canada, the CBC offers only a few general multicultural programs for all audience without any third-language programs specifically for ethno-racial audiences. Limited access to third-language programs for both majority and minority audiences is a concern. The socio-economic barriers (e.g., limited English subtitle services, pay service) allow only limited options. Minorities’ expression of their communication rights is thus manifested in their own private media outlets (mostly in the unregulated print media sector); however, these outlets tend to lack media strategies to join broader public discourse. Cross-ethnic communicative spaces are emerging in the U.S. to fill this gap. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these spaces in bringing about an actual intercultural dialogue still needs to be monitored. The following chapters look at Korean communities in Vancouver and L.A. as case studies to explore how immigrant communication infrastructure fares in these varying contexts.
3: The Context of Production and Distribution: Vancouver

There are a number of conditions that influence diasporic media practices. Following the macro-level structural conditions presented in the previous chapter, this chapter explores the micro-level community conditions that contextualize Korean media practice: settlement patterns and overall communication infrastructure (community service organizations and media). Special attention is given to Korean media as business ventures in order to understand the institutional conditions that influence Korean media production: organizational structure, financing, and competition and regulation.

3.1 Patterns of Settlement

British Columbia is second only to Ontario in its concentration of Koreans. As of 2009, there were 76,712 Koreans in B.C. and 111,379 Koreans in Ontario (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea [MOFAT], 2009). The B.C. Korean population is further broken down into 23,228 naturalized citizens (30%), 35,133 permanent residents (46%), and 18,351 temporary residents (24%) (see Table 3.1). Compared to the national average, the proportion of naturalized Koreans is relatively smaller in B.C. with a higher portion of Korean citizens (permanent residents and temporary residents). If compared to Toronto, the difference in number is more noticeable: B.C. hosts less than half of the number of naturalized Koreans while having almost an equal number of Korean citizens. Grouping Koreans by citizenship is different from the usual groupings by Canadian national statistics, which group people of Korean origin (naturalized and permanent residents) together and label them as a “visible minority.”

Grouping by citizenship, on the other hand, helps understand the demographic composition of the Korean community, especially the proportion of

\[\text{\footnotesize{34 This group is considered a “visible minority” in the Canadian Census. The Canadian Census 2006 reports that there are 51,860 visible minorities of Korean origin and 34,395 immigrants from Korea (Statistics Canada, 2006f, 2006g).}}\]
Koreans who would be eligible to participate in a Canadian election (naturalized Canadian citizens) or Korean election (Korean citizens) when in 2012 voting rights are granted to overseas Koreans citizens. The skewed demographic composition may create different dynamic within the community, including the editorial direction of Korean diasporic media. It is not yet apparent in Vancouver; however, L.A.’s Korean media are already getting to get prepared for this eventuality. Those media outlets that were previously only committed to distribution or relays of imported programs (broadcasting) are now committed to news production (see Chapter 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Koreans in Canada (2009)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
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<td><strong>B.C.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ontario</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korean Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canadian citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korean citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Permanent resident</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Visa student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


As discussed in Chapter 1, Korean migration to B.C. has been on the rise in the past two decades, especially as a result of policy changes. There was a significant increase of Korean immigrants, notably immediately following the visa waiver in 1994 and the expedited medical examination in 1997 (Kwak, 2004). Korea’s economic crisis in 1997 also contributed to mass migration from Korea to B.C. (B.C. Stats, 2001; Yu & Murray, 2007). Several socio-economic indicators set Korean immigrants apart from the national and other immigrant populations. The post-1967 Korean immigrants, especially the immigrants following the 1986 Business Immigration Program, are known to be educated and middle class, and whose primary goal for immigration is a better quality of life (B.C. Stats, 2001; Kwak, 2004). Sixty percent of those aged 25 years or older who landed in B.C. between 1996 and 2000 have bachelor’s degrees, compared to a 40% immigrant average (B.C. Stats, 2001). Compared to the national population, Koreans in
Canada (15 years old or older) have generally high levels of education: 11% to 27% hold a bachelor’s degree and 5% to 10% hold a post-graduate degree (Lindsay, 2001).

When looking at income, however, there is a striking gap within the community as well as compared to the national population of the same economic group. Most recent Korean immigrants were admitted to B.C. under the skilled workers or business classes. Koreans were the top source of the Entrepreneur Class, second in the Self-Employed Class, and third in the Investor Class in 2000 (B.C. Stats, 2001). Considering the qualification for business immigrants—a minimum investment of $800,000 (Citizenship and Immigration of Canada, 2011)—this is definitely a high-asset, middle-class immigrant group. The median employment income of Koreans in B.C. (15 years old or older working full time, full year), however, is generally low ($29,974) compared to their Canadian counterparts in general ($42,230) and the visible minority counterparts in particular ($35,664): Japanese (43,875), Chinese (36,815), South Asian (34,986), and Filipino (34,558) (Statistics Canada, 2006j). The proportion of low-income earners is even more striking: 43% compared to 16%, at an employment rate of 51% and 62% respectively (Lindsay, 2001).

When analysed by home language, Korean was the third most frequent non-official language spoken at home in the 2006 Census (39,990; equivalent to 1.0%), after Chinese combined (264,955; 6.6%) and Punjabi (119,475; 3%). There are 46,500 B.C. immigrants who claim their mother tongue to be Korean, therefore 86% of Koreans whose mother tongue is Korean speak Korean at home (B.C. Stats, 2006c). A relatively shorter immigration history and a high proportion of first-generation immigrants could explain the high dependency on the mother tongue. Koreans have the largest first-generation immigrant population in Canada (91%), second only to West Asians (Iranian, Afghan, etc.) (Statistics Canada, 2006f). It is even higher, if it is restricted to B.C. (95%).

High dependency on mother tongue is also a factor of a lower-than-immigrant-average of English proficiency: 62% of Koreans arrive in B.C. with no English, compared to 50% for the immigrant total. This linguistic orientation explains the high dependency on mother-tongue media and the proliferation of media outlets thereof.

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35 The figure includes single ethnicity only.
Table 3.2  Korean populations in suburban cities in Metro Vancouver

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burnaby</th>
<th>Surrey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
<td>202,799 54.9</td>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>111,295 100.0</td>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>60,765 54.6</td>
<td>South Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>16,840 15.1</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>7,805 7.0</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korean</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,680 6.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>Southeast Asian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian</td>
<td>3,110 2.8</td>
<td>Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asian</td>
<td>3,000 2.7</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2,990 2.7</td>
<td>Multiple visible minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>2,780 2.5</td>
<td>Latin American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple visible minority</td>
<td>2,755 2.5</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2,450 2.2</td>
<td>Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>695 0.6</td>
<td>West Asian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not included elsewhere</td>
<td>415 0.4</td>
<td>Not included elsewhere</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coquitlam</th>
<th>Port Coquitlam</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
<td>114,565 38.3</td>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>43,875 100.0</td>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>19,580 44.6</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korean</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,990 13.7</strong></td>
<td>South Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Asian</td>
<td>4,245 9.7</td>
<td>Korean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>4,180 9.5</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>3,050 7.0</td>
<td>West Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>1,530 3.5</td>
<td>Multiple visible minority</td>
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<td>1,000 2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>635 1.4</td>
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<td>80 0.2</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Maple Ridge</th>
<th>Langley</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
<td>68,949 10.6</td>
<td>Total population 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
<td>7,325 100.0</td>
<td>Total visible minorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asian</td>
<td>1,675 22.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1,575 21.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>820 11.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>695 9.5</td>
<td>Latin American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korean</strong></td>
<td><strong>605 8.3</strong></td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asian</td>
<td>550 7.5</td>
<td>South Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American</td>
<td>385 5.3</td>
<td>Southeast Asian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>365 5.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Asian</td>
<td>310 4.2</td>
<td>Multiple visible minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple visible minority</td>
<td>255 3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>55 0.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not included elsewhere</td>
<td>35 0.5</td>
<td>Not included elsewhere</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Suburbanization

Koreans show a similar pattern of settlement regardless of geographic location: suburbanization, enclave business and self-employment, and a communication infrastructure, consisting of organizations, church, alumni networks and community media (Kwak, 2004; Min, 1996, 2001, 2006; Lee, 2000; Chung, 2007; Kim, 1981). Koreans in B.C. are no exception. Koreans tend to settle in suburban cities. The City of Vancouver hosts the largest Korean population of 8,780 (equivalent to 3% of the visible minorities of the city); however, these are mainly international students and their parent(s) (B.C. Stats, 2006d; Kwak, 2004). Major Korean “ethnoburbs” (Li, 2007) are found instead in the outskirts of Vancouver such as Burnaby, Surrey, Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, Maple Ridge, and Langley (Kwak, 2004). These five cities host over 30% of the Koreans in B.C. (approximately 23,895) (see Table 3.2). While Burnaby and Surrey have more Koreans by number, it is Coquitlam where Koreans are most visible. Here Koreans are the second largest visible minority group after the Chinese, accounting for 14% of the total population. This city is also where the largest Korean enclave economy has developed, including Korean media.

Enclave Economy and Self-Employment

The new ethnoburbs support new enclave businesses in the residential areas where Koreans reside. North Road between Coquitlam and Burnaby, Robson Street in Vancouver, and the town centres of Coquitlam, Surrey, and Langley are where Korean enclave businesses are clustered (Kwak, 2004). This is a new development compared to the locations of early-year businesses\(^\text{36}\) along Kingsway, East Broadway, and East Hastings (where the Korean Society of B.C. is located) leading to downtown Vancouver that provided access to Koreans travelling by car (ibid.). The new locations are found in

\(^{36}\) Although much smaller than Vancouver’s Chinatown by size and considered more as business clusters rather than an enclave economy, the early Korean businesses, which developed along the three parallel downtown streets, offered restaurants, video stores, hair salons, gift stores, travel agencies, and other services for geographically dispersed Koreans. Some of those old businesses remain in their original locations; a majority have disappeared or relocated to the ethnoburbs where new enclave businesses thrive.
Korean-concentrated residential areas where Korean businesses “revitalize economically stagnant areas” (Kwak, 2004, p. 27-28). The Korean business directories published by media and organizations (e.g., Koreatimes Business Directory, Hanin Yellowpage, Telephone Directory of Korean-Canadian in British Columbia, Korean Yellowpage or www.bc114.com) list over 2,000 Korean businesses ranging from commercial services (e.g., auto/auto repair, bank/finance, beauty, restaurants, travel/accommodation, educational institutions) to professional services (e.g., accounting, law, health [e.g., medical clinics, pharmacies], immigration consulting). A majority of these businesses are found in these new ethnoburbs. The City of Coquitlam is particularly a hub of Korean enclave businesses. Along North Road between Coquitlam and Burnaby, there are two Korean shopping plazas developed across the street. The two large-scale supermarkets anchoring each plaza (Hannam and H-Mart\(^\text{37}\)) have promoted this new development in the city. Since the early 2000s when these two supermarkets started business, other Korean businesses flocked to the area and formed into Korean plazas. North Road is also where a majority of Korean media outlets are located: Vancouver Chosun, Korea Times, Korea Daily (until October 2010), Kyocharo, Vancouver Education Post, and the Korean Real Estate Weekly, among others (Figure 3.1).

The ethnoburb businesses or new-enclave businesses provide strong examples of self-employment, another important pattern in Korean settlement. As mentioned above, Koreans are second in the Self-Employed Class among B.C. immigrants. One important reason for such high rate of self-employment is a lack of language training. Thus, their high education and experiences from Korea are often compromised in a new job market, and less prestigious positions within the same industry or switching jobs completely are common. A “downward syndrome” in occupational mobility is, in fact, common among Korean immigrants in North America (Lee, 2000). Opening one’s own business, especially in the enclave, is thus a desirable way to maintain social status and avoid language problems to a certain extent. High levels of self-employment, however, lead to a number of issues.

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Figure 3.1 Korean media outlets in Metro Vancouver

First, it raises competition among enclave businesses. An increasing number of related businesses with a moderately growing population offers more options for clients, but results in heated competition among business owners. Judging only by the number of businesses in the Korean-concentrated cities, competition can be easily predicted. Restaurants and travel agencies are good examples. Among the 150 restaurants (mainly Korean or Korean-owned Japanese restaurants) and 45 travel agencies listed in the Koreatimes Business Directory 2010, a majority are located in the City of Coquitlam or nearby neighbouring cities (Port Coquitlam and Port Moody), 30% and 40% respectively.

The enclave economy, especially for these two business clusters, is highly sensitive to the changes in transnational economy. International students and tourists from Korea are important clienteles and help ease out over-competition by temporarily enlarging the market size. However, the recent global economic recession has slowed this traffic down.
International students from Korea have steadily decreased from 15,599 in 2006 to 8,804 in the third quarter of 2009 (Choi, 2011a). One education consulting agency notes that due to a strong U.S. dollar, Canada has become less competitive than the U.S. and Australia. The Philippines and South Africa are also receiving a growing attention among Korean students. The number of tourists from Korea has also decreased from 189,000 in 2006 to 158,000 in 2010 (Kwon, 2011; Statistics Canada, 2006h). Geographic proximity to Korea makes B.C. more desirable than other cities in Canada for temporary migration. However, it also makes B.C. most vulnerable when the transnational economy is in a downturn.

Second, economic difficulties faced by enclave businesses have a spiral effect on local Korean media outlets. Interviews with Korean media practitioners reveal that over 90% of their advertisers are local Korean businesses. However, due to the economic recession, a record number of advertisers have been unable to pay their bills. These mounting outstanding balances lead to deficit on the part of media outlets, which continues the vicious cycle of the enclave economy. Third, self-employment does not create enough job opportunities for local Koreans. Some community workers point to it as one of the reasons for “brain drain” (Community Worker 1). There are no major employers that provide enough job opportunities, especially for the younger generation. Therefore, these young people either commit to tutoring, which does not necessarily help their career in any meaningful sense, or return to Korea for better opportunities (ibid.).

One of the most important patterns of settlement is an establishment of communication infrastructure, namely organizations and media. There are over 100 various Korean-organized organizations/associations/groups as well as Korean-language media outlets in B.C. Alumni networks and religious establishments (mainly Christian churches) are also an important part of community infrastructure. The next section discusses the communication infrastructure of Vancouver’s Korean community in more detail.
3.2 Overview of Communication Infrastructure

Vancouver’s Korean communication infrastructure takes the form of expanded “geo-ethnic storytelling,” that is, stories that are “ethnically or culturally relevant to a particular ethnic group” and “geographically bound and concern primarily the happenings in the community” (Lin & Song, 2006, pp. 367-368). Unlike the Korean diaspora in L.A. where organizations and media have developed more geo-specifically, both in the traditional enclave, Koreatown, and in major ethnoburbs such as Orange County, Korean communication infrastructure in Vancouver serves all Koreans without geographic segmentation. Although a majority of media outlets are concentrated in the City of Coquitlam, they do not necessarily serve Koreans in Coquitlam only. News coverage goes beyond Coquitlam to include geographically dispersed Koreans in Metro Vancouver. Such broad coverage may be attributed mainly to the relative sizes of the population. Orange County alone, for example, is home to over 50,000 Koreans (Chung, 2007, p. 46), a number almost equal to entire visible minority of Korean population in Vancouver. Therefore, in the case of Vancouver’s Korean community, the “community” in the “geo-ethnic storytelling” refers to the Korean community as a whole rather than the locally developed Korean ethnoburb community.

3.2.1 Community Organizations

The 40-year history of Vancouver’s Korean community can be traced from the establishment of Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Vancouver in 1970 (MOFAT). The community’s communication infrastructure has grown over the years: besides over 20 media outlets (see next section for details), there are approximately 60 organizations and groups of various kinds (see Table 3.3). Among these organizations, one of the earlier organizations that represents the community is the Korean Society of B.C. Founded in 1966, even before the establishment of the Consulate General, it has been led by 39 presidents including the current president, Eunice Oh, elected in 2010 (Telephone Directory of Korean-Canadian in British Columbia 2008-2009; Han, 2010a). Besides the one in Vancouver, there are Korean Society offices in Vancouver Island and Fraser Valley (ibid.). As Koreans often put it, “there is always a Korean Society where Koreans are.” Internally, the Korean Society is often considered a site of controversy:
budget operations and the management of community projects, among other issues, have been a constant topic of dispute over the years, as frequently mentioned by media practitioners and CSO leaders interviewed. Nevertheless, externally, the Society is the first point of contact for the broader society to access the Korean community.

One of the most important community projects may be the “Korean Cultural Centre” project. The Korean Society has pursued this project in the past few decades, but it has not been able to materialize yet. According to one community organization leader, the proposed Korean Cultural Center has two important mandates (CSO Leader 1). First, it is a symbolic representation of Koreans in the broader society. Just like the Chinese Culture Center (established in 1973) and the National Nikkei Heritage Center (merged with The Japanese Canadian National Museum in 2003), the center could provide a cultural contact point internally for younger generation and externally for those who have interest in Korean culture. Currently, other than the annual Korean Heritage Day Festival or other ad-hoc cultural events/performances, there is no permanent venue for such contact. The Korean Cultural Centre could be a multi-functional venue. Some of the facilities being considered are a Korean Immigration Museum and Korean War Museum (Kwon, 2010g). Second, it could provide a convenient venue for Korean organizations to consolidate and serve the community better. The current location of the Korean Society on East Hastings is remote and far from where most Koreans reside (Burnaby, Surrey, and Coquitlam). Office spaces and some facilities for seniors are also being considered (ibid.). The most recent attempt was, however, initiated by community organizations other than the Korean Society itself: the Korean Veteran Association and Rose of Sharon (a task force for senior nursing homes). Pursued as a part of a bigger organizational project (the Korean War Veteran Memorial Centre), however, the Korean Veteran’s initiative did not come through (Lee, 2009). The initiative by the Rose of Sharon, on the other hand, is continuing with the “seed money” provided to the Korean Society (Kwon, 2010a). The former president of the Rose of Sharon is now heading the Korean Society. The project is still on-going with a possibility of relocation of the Korean Society to Coquitlam (Kwon, 2010g; Lee, 2010a).

Organizations can be classified by what they do, where they are located, and whom they serve; Korean organizations in Vancouver are classified mainly by what they
do (Yu & Murray, 2007, p. 103) in which the Korean Society is categorized as a “general” organization (see Table 3.3). Only a few organizations/associations/groups are formed into formal organizations with physical spaces and full-time/part-time employees (e.g., Korean Society, language schools). A majority of them are more like “imagined communities” or affinity groupings without formal infrastructure. They are interest groups or private groups (e.g., sports groups, alumni networks) organized for social and recreational purposes. Another common denominator is ethnicity and generation. Almost all of these organizations/associations/groups are led by and for Koreans, and by first-generation immigrants, who have been involved with the organization and/or others for some years. These organizations/associations/groups may be outreaching and collaborating with other ethno-cultural groups occasionally such as the annual Korean Heritage Day Festival; however, the entire membership is Korean (e.g., Korean Society, Korean Cultural Heritage Society, Korean Businessmen’s Co-op Association of B.C.).

Monolingual background may have contributed to sustaining a high level of inter-community attachment (Min, 2007). Tung Chan, CEO of S.U.C.C.E.S.S. (2008) argues that the contemporary Chinese organizations in Vancouver have developed separately by source country and language. For example, there are three separate business organizations, one for those of Hong Kong origin (Hong Kong Merchants’ Association) and one for those of Taiwanese origin (Taiwan Chambers of Commerce in B.C.) and one for those mainland Chinese origin (Chinese Federation of Commerce of Canada).

The Korean Canadian Coactive Society, commonly known as the C3 Society, is the only established organization led by and for the 1.5-38 and second-generation B.C. Korean-Canadians. Founded in 2003, the organization focuses on solidifying foundations for 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Canadians: internally focusing on Korean cultural heritage and externally on leadership and career development. The programs run by the organization combine to serve these two broader mandates: Camp Korea; Youth Can Lead; C3 Leadership Conference; Professional Networking; and Culture & Language (http://www.c3society.org). The organization’s fourth Leadership Conference was held on February 5, 2011 and was attended by over 130 students (Choi, 2011b). Other than the

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38 1.5-generation (or Il-chom-o-se) is “those born in Korea but who arrived in the United States as children or young adults (Martin, 2005, p. 73).
C3 Society, new younger-generation groups are also being formed: the Korean Canadian Leadership Development Committee; Vancouver Korean Canadian Scholarship Foundation Students Society; and the Canada Korea Club (Kim, 2010a). Particularly, the Canada Korea Club aims to facilitate Korean-Canadians’ political engagement.

### Table 3.3  Korean organizations in Metro Vancouver

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization/groups</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- General</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Art &amp; culture</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sports</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Veterans</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Religious</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Korean language school</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Professional</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Business/commerce</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni networks</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- University</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- High school</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Alumni networks are another important component of communication infrastructure. There are over 40 Korean university and high school alumni networks for Korea-educated, first-generation immigrants. A list of contact information is available in the community telephone/business directories (e.g., Telephone Directory of Korean-Canadian in British Columbia 2008-2009, Koreatimes Business Directory 2010). Alumni network activities usually take the form of social gatherings. A proliferation of alumni networks may be attributed to the high emphasis on education among Koreans and the maintenance of transnational social capital among educated, professional Koreans. However, it is not only a Korean phenomenon. A study on global Canadians in 12 countries identified over 200 overseas Canadian communicative spaces (organization, media, and alumni networks). Among these spaces, almost 50% were alumni networks, a similar proportion found in the Korean community (Yu, 2010, p. 16).
Additionally, there are nearly 130 religious establishments within B.C.’s Korean community, including predominantly Protestant churches, one Catholic church, and two Buddhist temples. The number accounts for over 40% of the 300 Korean (or affiliated) congregations throughout Canada (Kim, 2008). The significance of churches in the life of Korean immigrants has been well discussed (Chung, 2007; Lee, 2000; Min, 2001, 2006). Korean diasporic religious establishments serve to provide more than religious services, including settlement services such as finding residences, obtaining a driver’s licence, and setting up bank accounts are quite common (Lee, 2000, pp. 83-84). More importantly, churches provide a sense of belonging for struggling Korean immigrants and satisfy “desire for communal ties” (Min, 2001, p. 186). Those who may identify with “marginal man syndrome” (who “feel loss of social status after having left Korea”) find a place in churches (Lee, 2000, p. 83). This syndrome further explains the contested rivalry of presidential elections within the Korean Society (CSO Leader 2).

It is typical Korean mentality, power hungry…that you used to be somebody in Korea, but you come here running a grocery store when you are a (name of university and major) graduate or you were the top director but now work at Seven Eleven. So they try to compensate by going to these events and say oh yes, I saw higher ups there and shook hands with so and so...they try to channel their power hungry desire by joining (name of organization) and church and become an elder of that church…they are very title conscious…these titles mean a lot to some of these people…but these Jangs (titles) are limited. (CSO Leader 2)

Aside from these Korean-oriented organizations/groups, there are more than 70 Korean community workers, working for the federal/provincial/municipal immigrant settlement services (e.g., S.U.C.C.E.S.S., Options Community Services Society, MOSAIC, Immigration Service Society [ISS], North Shore Multicultural Society), according to the Korean Community Workers Network Directory. If self-sufficiency through mobilization of community was a predisposition for most Korean-oriented organizations/associations/groups, linking available government resources to the community is what these community workers are committed to. These services were almost unknown to Korean immigrants until Korean community workers joined the agencies and collaborated with local Korean media to let the service known to the community (Community Worker 1). As one community worker puts it: “Nobody knew about us in the late 1990s. We get less than 10 calls a day. When the Korea Times
contacted us and made our services known to the Korean community, another media outlet followed after. After that, we received 400 calls” (Community Worker 3). These services are available at geographically dispersed agency branches (e.g., Coquitlam, Surrey, Vancouver) in different service areas (e.g., settlement/ESL, employment, legal, business, counselling, mental health, families, schools by school district). Among the various service programs, education services are particularly popular. One example is “Korean Parents Support Group,” organized by S.U.C.C.E.S.S. It is a workshop/seminar for Korean parents to help them equip themselves with necessary information, from children’s education to parenting in a new country. The topics scheduled in early 2010 included “Inquires and discussion about ESL education in the public schools,” “Building friendship with the spouse and (or) the kid(s),” “Tips for the proper use of non-prescriptive drugs,” and “How to handle the anxiety? Mental health guide,” among many others (S.U.C.C.E.S.S. Korean Parents Support Group Schedule, January to March 2010).

In 2009, the community workers formed the Korean Community Workers Network (KCWN) to serve the community better through networking among Korean community workers. Funded by the United Way’s Community Capacity Building Funds, it initially started as a network of Korean community workers based in the Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, and Port Moody area and gradually expanded to include other cities (Community Worker 2). Through this network, Korean workers are able to optimize the benefits of services available across agencies through trans-agency referrals, if necessary. The members find the network useful as there are many programs and “sometime we don’t even know what other agencies offer” (Community Worker 3). The network also runs a “cultural competence workshop” for staff at public institutions (e.g., libraries, ESL teachers, victim services) to educate these workers on Korean culture (ibid.). Recently, the KCWN organized a Resource Fair for the Korean Community in October 2010. Figure 3.2 shows selected participating agencies including S.U.C.C.E.S.S., Options Community Services Society, ISS, and MOSAIC. Korean workers representing each agency set up their agency booths and introduced service programs to Korean visitors.
Figure 3.2 Resource Fair for Korean Community

Collaboration with Korean CSOs is also underway. One of the benefits of this is also a referral system. There is often an overlap of services self-organized by CSOs, which can be easily coordinated by the agencies. As part of joint initiatives, the Korean Society of B.C. and ISS recently co-organized a seminar on the Canadian citizenship exam (Choi, 2010b). Another example is a seminar on “Effective Study Strategies & Successful School Life” by S.U.C.C.E.S.S. and the Vancouver Korean Canadian Scholarship Foundation (September 4, 2010). Three Korean-Canadian undergraduate and graduate students from a local university shared their university experiences and tips on effective studying. The event was attended by approximately 50 parents and students.

3.2.2 Media

Along with community organizations/groups, Korean diasporic media are an important part of the communication infrastructure. The proliferation of media platforms and information sources online and offline inundate immigrants’ daily lives and enable them to virtually travel back and forth between where they live and where they are from. Amidst diversifying media options, local diasporic Korean media are growing strong, as they are important windows to the broader society for the first-generation-dominant Korean community. A recent audience study by Korea Daily (N=136) found that 75% of Koreans depend on Korean diasporic media for news about Canada and Metro Vancouver whereas 16% use English-language media (6% for print newspapers and 8% for online
newspapers) (Kim, 2010b). Such high dependency on mother-tongue media may have propelled the growth of Korean media. Murray et al. (2007) identified 28 Korean language media outlets in B.C.: there were three television services, two radio stations, three magazines, and 20 dailies and weeklies as of 2007 (see www.bcethnicmedia.ca). Korean is by far the largest single-language media (followed by 25 Chinese- and 22 Punjabi-language media) with the highest per ratio capita of media outlets to population size.

Compared to European and other Asian communities, the history of Korean media is a short one. The two oldest newspapers, the Korean Canadian News (1983) and the Vancouver Chosun (or the Vancouver Korean Press) (1986), were launched in the 1980s. The following two decades, however, saw a significant growth with a launch of television and radio services along with more than a dozen print media outlets: Korea Times (1992), KC TV (1995), and Kyocharo/Byurookshijang and TV Korea (1997), Korea Daily (2001), Radio Seoul FM 96.1 and Boodongsan Bank (2003) (Murray et al. data base). The year 2007 was a significant year of growth for Korean media. Six new specialty weeklies were launched in the first two quarters of 2007: the Vancouver Education Post, Ilyo News, Vancouver Jookan Economics, Boodongsan Korea (or Korean Real Estate), Canada Express, and Bridge (ibid.).

The recent economic recession, however, has pushed at least five outlets out of the market, including some of those that were launched in 2007: Bridge, The Prime Times (formerly Vancouver Jookan Economics), Plus News, Donga Life Weekly, and Radio Seoul. The print sector was hit most by the recession; four of the five media outlets mentioned above were weeklies. Yet the market is volatile; while a few outlets are gone, new players are also entering the market regardless of the recession: All TV B.C. (2008), Korean News (2009), Enjoy &TV (2010), and Today’s Money (2010), along with a few new back-to-back publications as part of existing weeklies (e.g., Canada Express’s Vancouver Life Weekly, Kyocharo’s Golf & Car and Canada Edu News). Interviews 39

39 Some European diasporic media that still operate today dated back to the early 1900s: Swedish Press (1929) followed by L’Eco D’Italia (Il Marco Polo) (1956) and De Hollandse Krant (1969). The majority of Asian media that again still operate today were founded in the 1970s: Mainstream Broadcasting Corporation, CHBM-AM1320 and Link (1973); Buy & Sell Press (1975); World Journal (1976); and Vancouver Shinpo and Indo-Canadian Times (1978) (Murray et al. database).
with Korean media practitioners reveal that there may be more to come, including the ones that are preparing for a come-back after a few months of temporary closure (Media Practitioners 6 & 8).

Vancouver’s Korean media are predominantly print media. Relative ease of entry and regulatory structure compared to broadcasting media is one reason. As discussed in Chapter 2, the broadcasting sector is regulated by the CRTC whereas the print media sector is free from regulations. Membership in Press Councils or industry associations is entirely voluntary. Another reason may be the absence of 24-hour Korean specialty TV until All TV (Decision CRTC 2001-538) was launched in 2008 in Vancouver (Media Practitioner 8). The strong print media sector is, however, a general trend of Vancouver’s third-language media market, where 80% of media are print media (Murray et al. database). One of the unique characteristics of Korean print media is that they are predominantly specialty weeklies. Other than Vancouver Chosun, Korea Daily, and Korea Times (general newspapers which publish three to five times a week), the majority of the newspapers specialize in one issue area and target a specific segment of the market: for example, real estate (Boodongsan Vancouver, Boodongsan Korea); women (Women Self); education (Vancouver Education Post); and classified (Kyocharо). All of these newspapers are available at major Korean locations such as the Korean shopping plazas on North Road (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3   Newspaper stands in Korean shopping plazas in Coquitlam

Source: © Sherry Yu
A majority of these newspapers are also available online. Online services include online publications for news and other community services, including free posts of various topics, specialist Q&A, Buy & Sell, and community calendars, among others. Online communities developed on or linked to these publications are, in fact, a new form of communicative space where various issues and concerns are discussed (see Chapter 4). Online publications are also important additional revenue sources. Thus, strengthening online business is an interest of most media owners, and initiatives solely or in collaboration with regionally dispersed diasporic media are well underway (Media Practitioner 1). Another unique characteristic of print media is that they are available for free. The Korea Times is the only outlet that operates subscription for door-to-door delivery. However, it is also available for free at major Korean establishments such as supermarkets and banks, among others.

In the broadcasting realm, radio has been discontinued, but TV continues. While print media operate largely in isolation, broadcasting media are relatively more integrated in the broader media system, offering Korean options as part of multilingual programs. Korean programs are available on cable and over-the-air. According to Public Notice CRTC 2001-31, Korean was most served language on the Shaw Multicultural Channel (a multicultural channel owned and operated by Shaw Cablesystems) among the over 20 third-language programs in 2001: 19 hours per week, followed by Hindi (9.5 hours) and Italian (9 hours). In 2010, Korean had retained the total number of hours (20.5 hours a week) after Mandarin (40 hours a week) (SMC Spring 2010 Schedule). Hindi/Punjabi is the third after Korean, between 10 and 16 hours respectively, with some overlapping programs offered both in Hindi and Punjabi. These three languages are, in fact, the three most home-spoken languages in B.C. other than English. KC TV (est. 1995), Cakocom (est. unknown), and TV Korea (est. 1997) are three independent producers/program providers for SMC. They provide a variety of imported Korean programs (e.g., news, drama, entertainment) with subtitles, which appeal to a non-Korean audience as well since Korean drama has gained popularity in Asia due to the success of hallyu (or Korean wave)40 (Media Practitioner 18). TV Korea provides a majority of the programs (with 3.5

40 *Hallyu* (or Korean wave) is described as “the flood of Korean pop culture—films, pop music and especially TV dramas—into the rest of East Asia” (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008, p. 2).
hours provided by KC TV and one hour by Cakocom), mainly KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) news and entertainment programs imported from Korea. TV Korea also provides its local productions—“Korean News” and “TV Korea Magazine” (a current affairs program)—through OMNI B.C., B.C.’s only over-the-air multicultural television channel.

A 24-hour Korean specialty TV is also available for cable subscribers at added cost. All TV started a Korean service in B.C. and Alberta in 2008 through Shaw and Telus TV, after Ontario in 2001 (All TV Media Kit). Initially, All TV provided MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) programs only. However, since December 2010, All TV launched a “Super Channel” by incorporating SBS (Seoul Broadcasting Station) programs and strengthened its market competitiveness. Such program integration between these two major Korean broadcasters is the exception rather than the rule, especially compared to L.A. where branches of Korea’s three major broadcasters, KBS, MBC, and SBS (KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International) compete in the same market. It is a competitive advantage All TV can enjoy, owing to the absence of transnational branches in Vancouver. Another exception is that All TV offers programs almost in real time without subtitles; what was aired in Korea is aired the following day in Vancouver, whereas there is usually a four-week hold-back period in L.A. due to subtitle production as well as a lead-time reserved for video store rental business (Media Practitioner 8, Vancouver) (see Chapter 3.3).

Finally, Vancouver’s Korean media are entirely owned by local immigrants. They are locally developed based on local immigrant capital, unlike L.A.’s Korean media which include branches of transnational media conglomerates from Korea. Vancouver’s three major newspapers are affiliated either to press conglomerates in Korea or L.A. branches: Vancouver Chosun to Chosun Ilbo, Korea Daily to Korea Daily L.A., and Korea Times to Korea Times L.A. Vancouver’s All TV and &TV are affiliated to MBC /MBC America and SBS /SBS International and TV Korea is to KBS/KBS America and YTN. All of Vancouver outlets, however, are financially independent franchises that limit their affiliation to content sharing only through licensing agreements.
3.3 Korean Diasporic Media as Media Organizations:
Yet Another Market Entity

A brief overview of media infrastructure suggests that Korean media are yet another market entity, operating through ups and downs of a constantly changing media environment in the transnational and glocal economy. This section explores the business venture side of the Korean media, in terms of organizational structure, financing, and competition and regulation.

3.3.1 Organization Structure

The size of media outlets can be classified by number of employees as follows: large (over 100 employees), medium (50-100), small (10-49), and micro (less than 10) (based on Murray et al., 2007, pp. 152-153). According to this classification, Korean media outlets are small or micro, with the largest employing approximately 15 employees and smallest employing three employees (full-time and part-time combined). Compared to other diasporic media, Korean media are relatively smaller than Chinese media and almost on par with South Asian media. With a small variation by media type, the employees of Korean media constitute editors, reporters (part-time, full-time, interns), anchors, technicians, graphic designers, webmasters, subscription/marketing professionals, administration, and delivery people, among others. Weeklies tend to have a few freelancer translators for local news translation.

One of the questions raised in Chapter 2 was the degree of impact of the 1986 Business Immigration Program on the Korean enclave economy, including media. Interviews with media practitioners revealed not only that Korean media proliferated in the 1990s and the 2000s, but also that a good number of them were owned by post-1986 immigrants, who arrived in the 1990s and 2000s. Analyzing the profile of media practitioners interviewed for this study, the lead-time between the year media owners who immigrated to Canada and the year they started media business is anywhere between

41 All of the seven largest diasporic media outlets in B.C. belong to the Chinese community, with the largest employing 150 full-time employees (Talentvision) followed by 125 employees for Sing Tao and 111 employees for Ming Pao.

42 The profile of participants includes position, year immigrated to Canada, year started/joined Korean media, previous work, location of previous work (country), and generation.
five years and 22 years. It is, however, relatively shorter for the post-1986 immigrants than the post-1965 immigrants. The lead-time may also be a combination of other factors, including prior media experience, type of media, and size of outlet. A half of the owners interviewed had media experience (print or broadcasting) mostly in Korea. The owners who had prior media experience from Korea (e.g., former reporters, editors, ad graphic designers) tended to consider media as their first choice of occupation. Either they first worked for existing media outlets prior to setting up their own, or immediately started preparing for their own media business upon immigration. Yet another group of media practitioners started media businesses “strictly as a business” without having any prior media experience. Their lead-time was relatively longer since they started their media business after having done non-media related businesses over the years.

The lead-time is relatively shorter for staff than owners. All staff reporters interviewed joined their current or former media outlets upon their immigration to Canada. These employees enter the diasporic media market for various reasons, and one common motivation is to continue their media career in Canada (Media Practitioners 10 & 12). These formal journalists tend to occupy the senior reporter or editor-in-chief positions. Some anecdotes, however, reveal that formal journalistic experience can also become barriers. These experienced journalists find a mismatch between their high journalistic expectations and the reality of small-business style operation of diasporic media (Media Practitioners 2 & 4). In other words, there is a gap between what professionals can offer and what is actually needed to produce within limited resources.

I worked for (name of company) as a reporter for seven years and then moved to Canada. I applied for this job a few months after I came here. (Media Practitioner 10)

I have been a reporter for 17 years. I could not think of any other jobs. (Media practitioner 12)

In one occasion we hired a new editor-in-chief, what this person had in mind was a kind of newspaper that is published in Korea and wanted to replicate that here. I said we had no capacity to do that. (Media Practitioner 2)

There are many elites in the community such as former journalists and award-winning writers who are able to cover such issues. However, their talent is often unrecognized and underutilized such as marketing. (Media Practitioner 4)

As such, Vancouver’s Korean media are owned and operated primarily by first-generation immigrants. All of the interviewed owners and most of the senior staff
reporters were first-generation immigrants who obtained education and work experience from Korea. The Bridge (2007-2009), a short-lived weekly specializing in job market and small business opportunities, was the only attempt by a 1.5-generation Korean to claim ownership. The participation of 1.5-generation immigrants is, however, emerging through employment and internship. Local university graduates with social science degrees tend to join Korean media due to their personal interest in media production as well as in writing (Media Practitioners 13 & 14).

I applied for (name of company) as I graduated from the university. The company was hiring reporters then. I had personal interests in traditional media and wanted to use skills I learned from school in a real-media practice. (Media Practitioner 13)

I used to have interest in Korean literature and reading. Also, there are limited career options for (name of major) graduates, if not pursuing graduate studies. (Media Practitioner 14)

These young Korean-Canadians’ bilingual language skills and familiarity with “here”, including bicultural (or multicultural) experience, are appreciated by employers. It is because, whenever hiring is announced, over-qualified individuals with former journalistic experience from Korea apply; however, they often lack the socio-cultural capital to fully exercise their expertise in Canada (Media Practitioners 13 & 14). Along with writing skills, English proficiency and Canadian knowledge are two important components of in-house hiring exams. Some media practitioners, on the other hand, are skeptical about the younger generation’s fit with diasporic media where first-generation mentality prevails. They may be suitable for ad design but not marketing, as they often lack the communication skills to deal with first-generation advertisers (Media Practitioner 1). Work ethics can be also challenging. Korean-style overtime or after-work hour deals with advertisers can be a deterring factor for some (Media Practitioner 8). Nonetheless, synergy may arise by the time the first-generation journalists obtain local knowledge and 1.5-generation journalists build journalistic expertise. So far the average years of work in the local Korean media industry for first- and 1.5-generation employees interviewed is nine years.

When hiring is underway, we receive many applications from over-qualified individuals such as former journalists, PhD students, etc. who are less confident about “here,” when the company is looking for those who are familiar with both “here” and Korea, with a higher emphasis on “here.” (Media Practitioner 13)
My company is short of staffs right now. We want to hire more, but it is difficult to find bilingual Koreans who are familiar with “here.” (Media Practitioner 14)

Local university students (including exchange students from Korea) also join internship programs run by Vancouver Chosun (UBC/SFU Korean-Canadian Journalism Club) and Korea Daily (UBC Bulletin) for similar reasons. Internship program are mutually rewarding. On the part of media outlets, intern reporters contribute to the education sections of the paper, specifically writing on university activities ranging from academic programs to campus activities. With education known to be one of the most appealing issue areas (along with economy and real estate) in the Korean community, a strong education section appeals to parents. Aside from university information, intern reporters also cover other soft news or themed feature stories such as introducing Canadian culture (e.g., hockey, Thanksgiving) or interviews with local Canadians who have special interests/connections with Korea/Koreans (e.g., a special feature series of Korea Daily entitled, “I Love Korea”) (see Chapter 4).

For students, internships can be a stepping stone for career development. Internships provide good opportunities to build resumes and to publish articles under their own name. For some, diasporic media are considered a route to mainstream media jobs or media jobs in Korea. Similar to 1.5 generation employees, interns apply for internships also out of interest in writing. They also tend to have the ambition of being perfectly bilingual, and understand that an internship at a Korean diasporic media outlet is a good way to improve their writing skills. Interns are supervised by senior reporters through one-one-one consultation and occasional writing workshops (Media Practitioners 10 & 13). The competition for internships is high (one to five) and applications are ranked based on resumes and writing samples (Interns 1 & 2).

We train 1.5-generation interns to help develop their uniqueness as the 1.5-generation. We teach them technical skills. It is not like using their free labour. Upon completion of internship, we provide a certificate to meet Canadian standards, Canadian recognition. They also have a higher chance, if they apply for a full-time position. We don’t need to train them again. (Media Practitioner 10)

When I saw a hiring ad by (name of company), I thought it would be a good starting point for career and professional development. I wanted to improve Korean writing to be perfectly bilingual. The competition rate was 1 to 5. They hired 10 out of 50 applicants. I submitted resume and two writing samples. (Intern 1)
I have been an intern since 2009. I was interested in media such as production, arts, music, etc. I also wanted to improve Korean writing skills. I applied through (names of school and Korean students association). 7 out of about 30 applicants were selected. (Intern 2)

The most commonly mentioned barrier to local production and covering more about “here” (see Chapter 4) is a lack of qualified individuals with a combination of journalistic experience, English proficiency, and Canadian knowledge. However, staff lay-offs as part of budget control are another. The next section looks at ways in which Korean media outlets are financed as business ventures.

### 3.3.2 Financing

There are a number of aspects that characterize the Korean media market as a whole. First, the Korean media market is volatile. At a macro level, this is because the enclave economy is dependent on the transnational economy. The ebbs and flows of temporary migrants (e.g., temporary students, “geese families”\(^{43}\)) according to fluctuating currency rates unsettle the enclave economy, including media. The media boom in the first half of 2007 with six new entries, and the disappearance of almost an equal number of outlets during the 2008 economic recession shows the volatility of the market. At a micro level, internal competition is fierce. Media practitioners point out that there are simply too many media outlets in the market. Fierce competition only brings down the quality of production (Media Practitioner 6). Some believe that an ongoing economic recession may “restructure the market,” resulting in a two-horse race structure (Media Practitioner 13). However, they also agree that there will be more new entries in the near future (Media Practitioner 7).

Those who are interested in media business often come to me for consultation. I recommend not to, as financing it is like “filling a bottomless vessel.” But they think I only say this just to stop them… An increase in the number of media means more competition for ads. Consequently, it brings down the ad rates so as the revenue and further leads to a layoff of employees. Less employees then brings down the quality of content or a number of prints. …Publishers must have enough operating capital in order not to be swayed by advertisers. But in reality, we are all small businesses. (Media Practitioner 6)

Those who do not have industry experiences (either as reporters or administrators) launch newspapers and disappear soon after… They believe it is

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\(^{43}\) Kirogi gajok (or “wild geese family”) refers to a family in which the “father works in Korea separated from the immigrant mother and children” (Kim, 2010).
a good business and also guarantees a certain level of social prestige. Yet, without enough financial backup to sustain at least the first few years, it is difficult to survive. High operating cost with a small pool of advertisers is the main reason. (Media practitioner 13)

We are all more or less the same, nobody is outstanding. We don’t have strong players with strong financial backup right now. Unless we have strong market leaders, the small ones will continue to come and go. (Media Practitioner 7)

Second, operating costs are high, but revenue sources are limited. While there is a move toward online publication, it is still predominantly offline media that require certain fixed operating costs: personnel, printing, and broadcasting fee to program providers, among others. For print media, printing costs account for 50% of overhead expenses while personnel expenses remain at 20% to 30%. The print run varies by frequency of publication (dailies vs. weeklies). Among the ones revealed, it is in the range of 3,000 and 16,000 copies for approximately 20 to 80 pages per week (Media Practitioners 1, 4, 5, & 6). For broadcasting, on the other hand, it is personnel expenses that account for over 50% of the total budgets, or on par with broadcasting fee paid to program providers (Media Practitioners 7 & 8). High broadcasting fee is a burden for many local producers; however, producers mention that it is cheaper than own production. A relative advantage compared to L.A. counterparts is that Vancouver’s independent producers are free from airtime fee. As part of their community work, Shaw Multicultural Channel provides free airtime to selected third-language producers. Revenue sources, on the other hand, are limited. Other than All TV, which generates revenues also from subscription, all other media services depend largely on advertising. As mentioned, Vancouver’s Korean newspapers are free. It is, in fact, a unique characteristic of Vancouver’s Korean media. Vancouver is known to be the only market where the concept of “paid newspapers” is debated, and where the socio-economic standard of readers is relatively higher than Koreans in the rest of North America (Media Practitioners 9, 10 & 12). Such tradition only leads to greater dependency on advertising.

Third, when the dependency on advertising is high, the advertising market itself is small, with a low and continually dropping advertising rates. Szonyi (cited in Zhou et al. 2006, p. 51) estimated the advertising market for Chinese print media in Canada to be

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44 All TV (Category 2 Korean specialty TV) is available through Shaw and Telus at additional $15.95 and $15.00 respectively.
$50,000,000. Estimates of the Korean market size vary by owners in the range between $300,000 and $800,000 a month for the market total. Some also describe the market as a one of “10 active media outlets (out of approximately 20 outlets) and 500 active advertisers (out of 2000 businesses)” (Media Practitioner 3). It is generally assumed that two or three major dailies and weeklies hold half of the market share and the remainder is divided among the smaller outlets. Therefore, new entries mean shrinking the market share of the existing outlets or the market size itself to a certain extent, as the promotional rates offered by new entries (e.g., dumping rate, free ads) further lower the already low rate. Once lowered, an ad rate is unlikely to bounce back; advertisers become used to the new lower rate (Media Practitioner 6). After all, these advertisers are the ones who already do business with the existing media outlets in different media types (Media Practitioner 4). The double whammy of the economic recession is that there is a significant cut in the number of ads bought, by up to 30% to 40%, at a mounting outstanding balance. Advertisers have been unable to pay their bills (Media Practitioners 6, 13, & 15). Such a vicious cycle of business is again attributed to having no major shareholders. After all they are all just small enclave businesses operating on small immigrant capital (Media Practitioner 6).

Advertisers, just like Korean immigrants in general, are unstable with their own businesses so they advertise out of fear. They advertise because others do. And they also advertise with different media outlets, when one is enough, thus intensifying competition and pulling down the ad rates. During the economic recession, the ad rates went down by 20% to 30% (Media Practitioner 4).

We are all financially difficult in the economic recession. It is hurting Korean community businesses. It takes six months to one year to collect payments from advertisers, especially seasonal businesses such as travel agencies. In summer when business is good, they pay some, but not at all in winter. Realtors pay only when they make sales; one realtor has not paid $15,000. Until those are in, I have to put my own money in to sustain (Media Practitioner 6).

As an illustration, Table 3.4 shows the type of advertisers by media type. A majority of the advertisers are small businesses (e.g., restaurants, beauty, auto/auto repair) or professional service providers/agents (e.g., real estate, bank/finance, hospitals/clinics/pharmacy, law, immigration/consulting agency) working individually or affiliated with mainstream institutions (e.g., Toronto Dominion Bank, Sutton Group).

Major Korean transnational corporations (e.g., Korean Air, Hyundai, Kia, LG Electronics) only occasionally advertise in local Korean media. Furthermore, the advertisers are
almost entirely Korean businesses with only 5% to 10% intercultural ads from other communities. TV Korea on OMNI has almost 50% of their ads from so-called mainstream advertisers (e.g., Bank of Montreal, London Drugs, Safeway, P&G, L’Oreal). However, these advertisers sponsor OMNI and not TV Korea. (See Chapter 4 for more details.)

Table 3.5 shows the location of ads on the front page of each section. Over 80% of the ads are placed at the top in the masthead or in the middle around the news items. Most of the ads are smaller than a business card size with brief business and/or contact information only rather than full-fledged commercial ads. Thus, professional commercial models rarely appear in the ads: 70% of the ads are without models (see Table 3.6). Instead, advertiser’s photos appear as part of promotion. Twenty-three percent of the ads that have Asian models are mostly this type of ads. All three dailies dedicate on average 50% of the front page of each section to ads.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advertisers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=474</td>
<td>n=106</td>
<td>n=368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank/Finance</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Clinics/Pharmacy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto/Auto repair</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration/Consulting agency</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health product/Pharmaceutical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology/Telecommunication</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toiletries/Body care</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping malls/Retailers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though the majority of advertisers are small business owners, the logic of political economy applies to the relationship between Korean media and their clientele. Advertisers influence the content of media. Especially for a small community like this in which “everybody knows everybody,” the survival of media depends on the relationship with advertisers (Media Practitioner 6).

The Korean community is like a nut tree; everybody knows everybody as many people have immigrated through the family reunification program. It is almost like an extended family, easily related to 300 families. Thus, it is difficult to do “investigative” journalism and expose corruptions and whatnot. If you mess up with one branch of that nut tree, words quickly travel and you lose advertisers like that. We have no capacity to deal with lawsuits, if sued for misreporting. Therefore, we focus on low-key, low-maintenance issues to be on the safe side. You need money to do real media. (Media Practitioner 6)

**Financing Strategies: Cost-Reduction Strategies**

Media outlets, therefore, adopt various ways of financing profit-cost structure. First, reducing personnel costs through employee lay-offs is considered. However, a decrease in the number of personnel means an increase in individual tasks for the
remaining personnel. If this is done by micro-size outlets, for example, it is likely that publishers will end up taking over the jobs of laid-off employees (Media Practitioner 6).

I used to have a graphic designer, a delivery person, translators, and a reporter, but I have laid them off in order to cut down expenses and survive during the economic recession. Now I am doing all by myself, from editing to delivery. (Media Practitioner 6)

Second, downsizing the quantum of local production is also considered. Operating within a minimum number of personnel is offset by decreasing local production and increasing the portion of imported items, that is, news from Korea. Table 3.7 shows the result of a content analysis of 200 news items from the three local Korean dailies (Vancouver Chosun, Korea Daily, Korea Times) and one Korean TV news program (OMNI Korean News) in a constructed week of March 2010. Overall, 34% of news items are locally produced by staff writers and a similar portion (40%) is filled in by items from Korean sources. By media type, 45% of newspaper items and 8% of TV news items are locally produced. The dependency on Korean sources is higher for newspapers (43%) compared to TV news (28%).

Print media practitioners mention that the emphasis is on local production in terms of editorial directives as well as time investment. Nevertheless, there are only a certain number of items that can be produced daily, resulting in a relatively lower quantity compared to imported news. Local production for television news is kept at a minimum. One producer claims that a half-an-hour local program requires a quarter of the monthly revenue, thus playing back imported programs is cheaper. Nevertheless, local production as a whole cannot be completely discarded due to Canadian Content rules (see Chapter 2). TV Korea produces “TV Korea Magazine” (a current affairs program) to meet this requirement. All TV also serves the 15% requirement through local news production and “public service announcements” (programming category #13). In order to support local news coverage, print media are thus eager to secure local content through licensing with mainstream media. Some of the local media contracted with local Korean media include Business in Vancouver, the Tyee, and BC Outdoor, among others (Media Practitioners 3 & 13). Print media outlets also resort to contributions of columns

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45 All TV local news was excluded from sampling as it was discontinued during the time of sampling (March 2010).
by local experts (e.g., visiting scholars to local universities) (Media Practitioner 5). TV Korea also uses OMNI’s news pool: 10% of news items are from OMNI Vancouver.

Table 3.7  News origin by media type (%) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Origin</th>
<th>Total n=200</th>
<th>TV n=61</th>
<th>Newspaper n=139</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff writer</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Times Korea</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosun Ilbo Korea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTN Korea</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonhap News</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Daily Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omni Van</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Press</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CityTV</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third, print media also control costs by reducing printing costs: days of publication, number of pages, or print run numbers. As an example, Vancouver Chosun reduced days of publication from four to three publications a week, and Korea Daily from five to four publications a week during the recession (Media Practitioners 5 & 13). From January 2011, Korean Daily reduced further and is down to three times a week. Such reduction is, however, compensated by its e-paper published five times a week. This adjustment is an innovative way to remain a daily and control overhead. A change in page numbers can also mean a change in the number of ads. A decrease in advertisers requires less space, thus shrinking overall output. As a way to lower printing costs, collaboration among print media could be considered. In other words, print media could consider collectively contracting with one printing shop or even setting up a printing shop of their own. However, such cooperation is far from reality. As one media practitioner puts it: “Setting up a printing company would be ideal. Even a $500 cut per week would be a great help. However, it is only ideal because a joint print shop would reveal a major secret of each company, that is, the number of weekly copies” (Media Practitioner 6).
Print publications are currently available both online and offline. However, it is generally agreed among media owners that a move toward online only is inevitable. As one media practitioner puts it: “Print press will be gone within 10 years and move onto online, a similar trend that is seen in the video rental business” (Media Practitioner 6). It is not only cost-effective but also responsive to the changing media environment. One media practitioner mentions that online ads have continually grown in the past few years, and advertisers now lean more toward online over offline (Media Practitioner 13). Readers prefer online publications as well (ibid.). Daily traffic is difficult to compare by outlet, as they use different measurements: per-day, per-computer (IP address-based) or per-page traffic, among many others. According to one of the leading dailies, however, “un-manipulated” per-day traffic is about 4,000 to 5,000 and together with print publication, the company reaches 10,000 Koreans daily (Media Practitioner 5).

Up to 2005, Saturday morning pick-up of (name of daily) at Hannam Supermarket was a weekend ritual for many Koreans as it was a “major” source of information. Now people rely more on online publication. (Media Practitioner 13)

Yet, increasing traffic does not only mean a transition to online as a means of news consumption. It also means an increasing use of online services other than news provided by online publications. For example, Vancouver Chosun (www.vanchosun.com) ranked first in the rankie.com among the Korean-language websites originating in North America, owing to the value-added services offered online: Buy & Sell (e.g., small household items, auto), Real Estate, Rents/Home-stays/Bed & Breakfast listings, Classified, Community Calendar, Business Telephone Directory, Specialist Q&A (e.g., accounting, mortgage, real estate, immigration, education, health/health products, auto), discussion boards for interest groups (e.g., photo, Vancouver moms), and others. Among these services, Buy & Sell is known to be the foremost contributor to daily traffic. One random daily count (March 1, 2011) shows 166 posts of buy and sell items, and the average hit per post (number of views) is 240 with the highest 3,620 hits (Buy: Gold) and the lowest 3 hits (Sell: iPod).
Financing Strategies: Vertical and Horizontal Expansion

Aside from cost-cutting strategies, media outlets seek ways to finance operation through vertical and horizontal expansion. One of the common examples of vertical expansion (that is, expanding within the same media type) is back-to-back publication of weeklies. It is, in fact, one of the main contributors to the increase of absolute number of Korean media outlets. Such vertical expansion is done by attaching a new publication to existing publications back-to-back. A new specialty weekly of non-overlapping content is selected to differentiate from the existing publication (e.g., classified-golf/car, classified-education, news-life, women-entertainment). This strategy is favoured and adopted by most weeklies, because first, it is a low-risk expansion, which enjoys the reputation of the existing publication. Second, it creates not only new ad spaces, but also adds new dollar value to previously unfavoured or “waste” end pages (Media Practitioners 2, 4, & 13). Third, it helps “generalization of weeklies” and conversely “specialization of dailies” (ibid.). One media practitioner groups print media into three genres: dailies, weeklies, and classified. Through new additions, weeklies become generalized by adding local news, and dailies become specialized by adding more weekly-style specialty sections on/offline. Media outlets thus cross over spaces (online/offline) and genres as they adopt new profit-creating strategies.

It means nothing but struggling. We are struggling. It is just to get more advertisers. It is another new name or a name change rather than an official launching (of new publication) in any serious sense. (Media Practitioner 4)

It was launched to create more ad spaces. We have altogether (number) pages, but all the latter pages are waste. Back-to-back with non-overlapping and lighter lifestyle content creates a whole new space for more ads, the “ad friendly” spaces, so to speak. (Media Practitioner 2)

It is an interesting model that works as a leverage to convince advertisers…This way, we create two front pages, the most expensive page of all. (Media Practitioner 13)

Another method of vertical expansion for print media is publishing other print materials such as business directories. There are a number of online and offline business directories constantly updated or annually published by media and CSOs (see Table 3.8). The profitability of online directories is unknown, however, that of offline publications are known to be quite significant: approximately $1 million in the case of L.A. Such
lucrative potential explains the rationale behind the proliferation of business telephone directories in the community.

Table 3.8  Telephone directories published by Korean media outlets and CSOs in Vancouver

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Directory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114 Yellowpage</td>
<td>Kyocharo</td>
<td><a href="http://www.van1004.com/">http://www.van1004.com/</a></td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haninupso.com</td>
<td>Canada Express</td>
<td><a href="http://www.koreana.com/harinupso.php">http://www.koreana.com/harinupso.php</a></td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreatimes Business Directory</td>
<td>Korea Times</td>
<td><a href="http://www.koreatimes.com">http://www.koreatimes.com</a></td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For broadcasting, expanding hours and/or channels (24 hours) is considered as a revenue-generating strategy. Even with CRTC approval, however, producers are hesitant to commit to a 24-hour format immediately, considering limited returns (especially during the initial years) at increasing operating costs (e.g., broadcasting fee). It is challenging for Vancouver producers considering a smaller market size compared to that of Toronto. Thus, relatively low-risk approaches to expansion are taken. As discussed earlier, All TV B.C. launched a “super channel” in December 2010, incorporating new SBS programs (of a similar variety of genres). In other words, the company chose to strengthen the channel competitiveness instead of launching a new channel. Another platform considered for broadcasting expansion is internet TV. TV Korea launched internet TV (www.mykorea.com) in January 2011 and makes its local productions available on the web.

Media outlets expand horizontally as well, that is, they expand across media as well as other industries. One of the common methods observed is print media expanding into broadcasting. Kyocharo’s venture into IPTV (Enjoy &TV) is a good example. Since early 2010, it offered an archive of the three major Korean broadcasters’ programs (KBS, MBC, and SBS) at $24.99/month (one-week delay) or $34.99/month (no delay). Another form of horizontal expansion is adding a broadcasting component to an online publication (or strengthening online publication). Since November 2010, Vancouver Chosun has
provided “Vanchosun Broadcasting” on its online publication (www.vanchosun.com). A series of short Youtube-like video files have been uploaded by the newspaper itself as well as by readers on various themes: community events, immigration seminar, useful information, and netizen UCC. Between November 2010 and February 2011, approximately 80 video files were uploaded and the average hit was 450.

Aside from expansion across media industries, an expansion into education, cultural or entertainment industries is also often seen. Korea Daily’s “Joongang Education Center” is a good example. As a subsidiary of Korea Daily, it organizes seminars/classes on a variety of topics: cooking, auto repair, and computers, among others (Korea Daily, 2010c). Another subsidiary is “Screen Ad” which is a HD LCD screen ad program for Korean businesses as another venue for Korean businesses to advertise. Through screen monitors installed on site at clients’ businesses, a variety of information can be made available to consumers (ibid.). Korea Daily also (co-)organizes concerts: Soprano Sumi Jo with VSO (2003); musical Jesus Jesus (2005); Eun Mi Lee Concert (2009); god Concert (2010) (Yun, 2003; Korea Daily, 2005, 2009a, 2010a).

As discussed, the survival of Korean media depends on cost-saving and profit-generating strategies. After all, these media outlets need to survive as business ventures in order to serve the community on “civic” ends. The competition is mainly internal; however, the changes in the media market as a whole add new dynamics to the Korean market. Interestingly, in the increasingly challenging media environment, Korean media organically develop self-monitoring and self-regulatory mechanisms as part of their survival strategies in order to secure their own share of the market. The next section looks at the competition structure and self-regulatory rules.

3.3.3 Competition and Regulation

The economic recession of the past few years has definitely slowed down the media market. At the national level, CanWest Global Communications Inc., one of the largest media conglomerates in the country, filed for bankruptcy protection in October

47 The Korea Daily L.A. also operates Joongang Education Centre.
2009 and delisted from Toronto Stock Exchange (CBC News, 2009). Since then the company sold its newspaper assets to Postmedia Network and broadcasting assets to Shaw Communications (CBC News, 2010). In the third-language market, the revenue for ethnic and third-language specialty services also fell from $73 million in 2008 to $70 million in 2009 (CRTC Communications Monitoring Report 2011). It was only in 2010 that the revenue picked up again to $78 million (ibid.).

The economic recession may also have hit the multicultural media arena. Restructuring of some institutions has led to changes in Korean options. For example, comparing the hours per week and time slots of the day, the presence of Korean-language options has weakened within OMNI whereas it has held steady within Shaw. Since August 2009, the time slot of OMNI’s Korean News changed from 7:30 A.M. - 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. - 9:30 A.M. (with reruns at 3:30 A.M. - 4:00 P.M.) with no change to the number of days (Tuesdays through Saturdays). Including an additional thirty minutes given to TV Korea Magazine following the news, there was also no change to the total number of hours. A rerun of Cantonese News (weeknights 5:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.) replaced that time block. A significant change followed a year after in September 2010, when Korean News was downsized from five days to three days (Saturdays at 9:00 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. with re-runs on Sundays 7:00 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. and Mondays 9:00 A.M. to 9:30 A.M.). This change brought down the total hours by over 50% from 6.5 hours to 3 hours. The change occurred during the transition of OMNI B.C.: OMNI joined Citytv, a part of Rogers Broadcasting Limited, as of August 2010.48

Changes in media technology also pose operational challenges. First, online media continues to be the fastest growing platform. The PEW Research Center (2010) reports a continual decrease in the U.S. in the use of traditional news media in 2010 compared to 1991: TV (from 68% to 58%), newspapers (from 56% to 31%), and radio (from 54% to 34%). The dependency on online sources, on the other hand, has increased from 24% in 2004 to 34% in 2010. The move toward online publication or strengthening an online component among Korean media reflects the responses to such changes. It is also a cost-effective and profit-generating platform for small/micro-size Korean media.

48 www.citytv.com/vancouver/aboutus
Furthermore, online is a platform for mainstream media to “tap into Canada’s thriving ethnic media readership” (Zandberg, 2007). As evidence, CanWest attempted a multilingual service in 2007. CBC British Columbia also attempted a Chinese-language news service in 2008 “to have as many people as possible see it,” according to news director, Liz Hughes (Reportr.net, 2008). This news site was, in fact, one of CBC’s multicultural programs (see Chapter 2). Unlike CanWest’s “machine translations,” CBC provided “human translations.” Journalists at Radio Canada Internationals translated the stories picked by staff at the Vancouver newsroom (ibid.). Although both programs are discontinued now—especially CanWest’s service due to technical inadequacy as it was not properly translating even its own name—both cases suggest growing interest in third-language communities among mainstream media and signal potential crossover to the ethnic market in the future. Second, the transition to digital television scheduled for August 31, 2011 is another event that may potentially affect Korean media. In the U.S., the digital transition (completed in June 2009) led to a further growth of the Korean media market. How this transition in Canada will affect Vancouver’s Korean TV market is something to watch.

_Self-Regulation: The Case of Illegal WebTV_

Amidst these changes in the mediascape, there are some regulatory blind spots or gray zones identified in recent years that call for close policy attention from the CRTC. Some of the cases, in fact, have been identified and brought forward by local Korean media in the process of community-initiated, self-regulatory measures. These initiatives could very well be applied to other diasporic media. One of the cases is illegal operators in the broadcasting sector. Vancouver’s Korean TV producers are at war with illegal webTVs. One that is currently embroiled in a lawsuit is Ohcastra.com. This webTV site provides “illegally encoded” programs of KBS, MBC, and SBS as well as independently produced movies, and collects revenue through local advertising. Consequently, not only the content distribution of local licensees, but also the advertising market they depend on

49 The benefits of digital transition include high quality sound and visual for viewers, and “efficient use of spectrum” that will enable new services on the part of businesses (Geist, 2010).
for revenue is in jeopardy (Media Practitioners 8 & 15). This illegal operator offers dumping rates and exploits a significant portion of the market. It also contributes to the further decline of previously thriving video rental businesses, from 16 stores in 2000 to six remaining in 2011 (Media Practitioner 7).

Therefore, local television services (All TV and &TV Communication) leveraged their transnational links with KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International, and formed a legal consortium to take formal action. The five companies signed a joint agreement on the eradication of Canadian illegal content service in July 2009, and filed a complaint of copyright infringement to Ohcastra.com (Big Korea Entertainment, CEO Jeff Kim) in May 2010 (KBS America Press Releases). The case is still open (as of 2011). This case may be another outcome of fierce competition: after all, all this effort is to guard one’s own market share. However, in the end, such self-regulatory measures set the market straight and implement market directives for fair transaction.

The three major Korean broadcasters do not give license to webTV as they know it will break down the market structure. A lawsuit is underway in a joint consortium of the major three and (name of company) against Ohcastra.com. We know that Ohcastra.com still encourages its advertisers, telling them that the lawsuit will take two to three years, and therefore, they can advertise until then. Ohcastra.com attempted to turn this into a paid service last year, but couldn't pursue further due to the lawsuit. Some audiences complain about the lawsuit, because they want to use this service for free. We need to develop an awareness of illegal programs. (Media Practitioner 8)

During the economic recession, one third of the ads were gone. Most went to Ohcastra.com, an illegal site to watch Korean dramas from KBS, MBC, SBS as well as movies. It is illegal, because no exclusive licensing has been established. Currently, it is under a lawsuit... It earns money through ads at lower rates. (Media Practitioner 15)

Self-Regulation: The Case of Canada Express

Another case is related to licensing agreements with mainstream media. The landmark licensing agreement is one between CanWest News Services and Canada Express. Canada Express, a weekly specialty paper founded in 2007, is the first so called

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50 With two weeks of delay (due to subtitle production) compared to almost real-time availability of programs on webTV or Youtube, video rentals are no longer competitive in the market.  

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“translated paper” in the community, providing readers with a mainstream paper in Korean. All of the items are selected from CanWest newspapers, mostly the local dailies, the Vancouver Sun and the Province, and translated into Korean. After three years of persistent negotiation, the company won 50 years of exclusive licensing and gained access to CanWest’s 11 newspapers across Canada: the Province, the National Post, the Saskatoon StarPhoenix, the Calgary Herald, the Montreal Gazette, the Windsor Star, the Vancouver Sun, the Regina Leader-Post, the Edmonton Journal, the Times-Colonist (Victoria), and the Ottawa Citizen (Murray et al., p. 20). The negotiation was lengthy for several reasons. First, the exclusive licensing with diasporic media was new to CanWest. Second, there was a conflict of interest on online services as CanWest was also providing a translation service to third-language communities then (the case mentioned above). Finally, as unprecedented it was, there was no standard rate for royalties set within CanWest.

The exclusive rights to Canada Express conversely mean an automatic withdrawal from other Korean media outlets of the use of CanWest news items. Immediately upon completing the agreement, CanWest took action to protect its licensee by sending out a formal letter to all Korean newspapers, informing them about the agreement and advising them not to use any CanWest news items from then on. All of the print media practitioners interviewed acknowledged that they had received the letter. Reaction to the exclusive licensing, however, varied (Media Practitioners 3, 5, & 6). Some mentioned that they were fully aware of copyrights and have been practicing fair use of external sources. Some others admitted that they have become more conscious and cautious about using CanWest items. Regardless of responses, it is undeniable that the event was a wake-up call for all Korean media.

The company has enough content. There is no reason to depend on the Vancouver Sun, for example, which depends on almost the same news sources we use, such as government news releases and Statistics Canada. (Media Practitioner 3)

Exclusive licensing does not affect operation. We get enough from CP (Canadian Press) and we have in-house content. We received the letter (of notice) and responded back that we won’t use their content. (Media Practitioner 5)

(Name of company) has received the letter of notice for the use of CanWest news items. We limit the use ever since. As long as the news sources are properly cited such as “according to the Vancouver Sun…” there is nothing illegal about using their news items. But photos can be a problem. We do not use their
Both cases demonstrate some interesting developments within the community. The willingness to take such necessary yet costly and lengthy actions requires both familiarity with professional business ethics and means of financial support. These developments may be another form or outcome of fierce competition. Nevertheless, they have contributed to developing a self-monitoring and self-regulatory mechanism and have set principles for fair media practice and business transactions. These developments also set examples for all diasporic media practices that regulatory bodies may want to consider.

Institutional Collaboration among Korean Media Outlets and the Challenges

Other than these two cases, another area for potential collaboration with respect to market disciplines among Korean media outlets is advertising. For a market as volatile as the local Korean media market, a standard ad rate is critical to the prevention of dumping/promotional rates and the encouragement of fair and transparent transactions (Media Practitioners 1 & 5). It also becomes increasingly important in the proliferation of new media platforms. Without standard ad rates, the local ad market is likely to destabilize further. Sharing of ad designs (instead of each outlet making an ad for the same client) is another area of collaboration in advertising, mentioned by media practitioners. When clients use multiple media outlets, they would like to have the same ad run consistently across different media. However, the media outlets that initially designed the ads do not want to share the design with others, thus each outlet ends up with a separate design for their own use (Media Practitioner 4). Lastly, developing a black list of advertisers or media professionals who jeopardize the operation of the entire market (e.g., non-payment) is another collaborative possibility (Media Practitioner 6).

Currently, media outlets tend to hush up problems, instead of letting them be known.

(Name of company) organized a gathering for media professionals. It could have been good, if we could set rules or some sort of a standard we can make a reference to such as ad rates for profit or not-for-profit organizations. Ad agencies usually get a good rate, but when media outlets contact clients directly, they cut down the rates furthermore, thus pulling down the rates for the entire market…However, we could not reach an agreement. (Media Practitioner 1)
(Name of company) once organized a gathering for ad agents to discuss the ad rates. The problems were, however, first, they did not tell their rates, and second, even if a standard rate was established, nobody followed it. (Media Practitioner 5)

Ideally, we can share a black list of advertisers who tend to hop from one paper to another and never pay. Also, we can share a list of professionals such as graphic designers and marketing/advertising agents. I recently hired a marketing/advertising person who used to work for another outlet for a few months….I contacted the former employer for reference, but no mention… Sharing of ads would be great, but it never happens. When such collaboration doesn’t come through, it affects all other types of collaborations. (Media Practitioner 6)

Figure 3.4 shows the importance-satisfaction rating of the areas Korean media practitioners would like to collaborate on. Although the graph is drawn based on the responses of only a half of the media practitioners interviewed on this topic, thus is not statistically significant, it is consistent with the overall attitude of interviewees. Among others, it is “networking among media professionals” that is most wanted, in order to work toward building a mutually supportive and beneficial intra-community media market structure, as mentioned above. However, it is apparently the least satisfactory area, confirming why the areas of collaboration mentioned above are difficult to achieve.

Local networking is hard to come by; however, global one is emerging. The Overseas Korean Journalist Association was launched in Korean in April 2010. Initiated by the Korean Journalist Association, approximately 60 overseas Korean journalists (press and broadcasting) from around the world were invited to form an executive committee (Korea Daily, April 29, 2010b). Yerin Choi from Korea Daily was appointed as a member of a special committee (ibid.). It is one of the attempts undertaken by Korean media in preparation for the year 2012 when voting rights will be granted to overseas Koreans. J. K. Lee, the first president of the association, explains that “overseas Korean media’s role is ever more important with the forthcoming overseas election in 2012” (ibid.).
Conclusion

Vancouver’s Korean community, one of the most monolingual and first-generation-dominant young diaspora in Canada, has established a communication infrastructure that is comparable to other major diasporic communities. In addition to community service organizations, alumni networks, and churches, the significant growth of media outlets places Korean media concentration at the top, in terms of overall quantity, along with Chinese and South Asian media. Considering the community’s short 40-year immigration history since the establishment of the Consulate General in 1970, this is a notable achievement. Reflecting the community’s demographics, Korean diasporic communication infrastructure is monolingual and mono-ethnic in its membership, predominantly led by and for first-generation Koreans. Cross-cultural and cross-ethnic institutional integration is surfacing through Korean community workers at immigrant service organizations such as S.U.C.C.E.S.S., Options Community Services Society, and MOSAIC. These workers take leadership roles in linking the community...
with resources that otherwise would be unknown to the community, a role similar to the intermediary role discussed in Ball-Rokeach’s Communication Infrastructure Theory. The synergy between Korean community workers and Korean CSOs in various community projects is also a lesson to share with other young immigrant communities.

Korean media, also led by and for first-generation Koreans, are concentrated in the print media sector, a trend also found among Vancouver’s other diasporic media outlets with 80% operating in this sector. Easy of entry compared to the broadcasting sector (e.g., licensing regulations), among other reasons, offers an incentive to Korean immigrants to establish print media outlets as a form of ethnic business. Korean print media, however, have developed independently of the broader media system, focusing largely on in-language marketing. CanWest and CBC attempted multi-language services in 2007 and 2008 respectively; however, both attempts did not survive due to ongoing technical difficulties. Korean television services, on the other hand, are reasonably integrated with commercial mainstream institutions, in that Korean options are available on over-the-air (Rogers’ OMNI) and cable (Shaw’s Shaw Multicultural Channel and Telus) either through Korean independent producers or a 24-hour Korean specialty service. Socio-economic barriers (e.g., subtitles, pay service) to access Korean services, however, challenge the distribution of Korean options. Subtitles are provided for selected drama and entertainment programs, thus suggesting some potential for cultural exchange, however, they are not provided for everyday news (OMNI Korean News), when news is probably the more important channel through which everyday Korean storytelling can be made available to a broader audience. Economically, while OMNI is available free of charge, SMC and All TV are pay services, available free (SMC) or at additional cost (All TV) to cable subscribers.

The fast growth of media over a short time period has created multiple options for audiences. However, an increase in the number of outlets in a saturated and downsizing enclave market, from which the majority of revenue is generated, has intensified competition among small-business-style media outlets. High operational costs (e.g., personnel, broadcasting fee, printing) in a low revenue structure, driven by in-language marketing, challenges the production of Korean storytelling (especially Korean-Canadian content in broadcasting), let alone the media organizations’ operations per se, thereby
constantly pushing media entrepreneurs to seek new financing strategies to survive. Staff lay-offs as part of cost-saving strategies further hinder the opportunities for enhancing the quality and quantity of Korean storytelling. Thus, more systematic marketing strategies that reach beyond in-language groups, and proper policy support for capacity building in this sector are urgently needed.

Nevertheless, on the positive side, this fierce competition simultaneously stimulates further growth of the diasporic media market as media outlets adopt innovative partnerships and business models to survive. Especially, the expansion into education and the cultural industry (e.g., music concerts) suggest potential growth of a diasporic creative economy. The competition also encourages the development of self-monitoring and self-regulatory measures, even in the non-regulated print media sector, as demonstrated in the case of Ohcastra.com and Canada Express. These regulatory blind spots call for policy attention from the CRTC. Additionally, in the absence of Korean options in public broadcasting, multicultural initiatives by commercial broadcasters such as OMNI’s third-language news and Shaw’s multicultural channel, through which independent producers can make Korean services available with no airtime fee, help Korean storytelling get on the air. Such initiatives are a privilege for Canadian producers when compared to their U.S. counterparts, who pay a hefty airtime fee, which accounts for a significant portion of their expenses.

All of these structural and institutional conditions within and outside of the Korean communication infrastructure influence the production and distribution of Korean storytelling. The next chapter looks at the day-to-day production of Korean media in serving socio-cultural, political, and intercultural ends, with a special focus on interactions within and across media institutions, to understand the degree of intercultural initiatives designed to encourage a broader reach for Korean storytelling.
4: Media Practices: Vancouver

The duality of diasporic media—as media businesses as well as editorial vehicles—has been often discussed (Lin & Song, 2006; Yu & Murray, 2007; Yu & Ahadi, 2010; Zhou et al., 2006). As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Korean media are themselves an enclave business. They are vulnerable to the ups and downs of the transnational economy and international migration. The logic of political economy also applies to the relationship between media and enclave businesses; media depend largely, if not entirely, on enclave businesses for revenue. Added to the “market” side of Korean media, there are “civil society” roles to play. Some media practitioners put it: the civil society roles are “the reason diasporic media were born” and are “imposed on immigrant media” to serve their main clientele, “immigrants” (Media Practitioner 10). These roles can be summarized into three areas: “delivering” culturally translated geo-ethnic storytelling; “solidifying” the Korean community and “representing” to mainstream society; and “promoting” intercultural interaction. This chapter discusses Korean media as civic agents. Institutional interaction within and across communities is explored in the day-to-day production of Korean storytelling on socio-cultural, political, and intercultural levels. A careful look at institutional interaction helps in identifying areas for capacity building for effective production and distribution of Korean storytelling.

4.1 Socio-Cultural Roles and Challenges

The socio-cultural dimension constitutes diasporic media as a provider of national and geo-ethnic news with cultural translation. Geo-ethnic news constitutes general local and ethnicity-specific news: from local Metro Vancouver to Korean community news, and from general local events to immigrant settlement information. Especially for general local news, Korean media alone make this information available to Koreans, especially those whose English is too limited to resort to English media. As one CSO leader puts it: “Korean newspapers are the only source of information about local news... In Korea, we have friends, families, relatives, and colleagues. They are all information sources. But in
Canada, we only have Korean newspapers” (CSO Leader 3). Korean-specific community news or immigrant settlement information is also exclusive to Korean media and is completely absent in mainstream English media. In the process of news production, Korean media provide cultural translation, that is, delivering news in culturally relevant Korean idioms.

_Geo-Korean Storytelling and Cultural Translation_

Media practitioners generally mention that it is “ethnically or culturally relevant” and “geographically bound” geo-ethnic news that most of their production efforts and resources are dedicated to (Lin & Song, pp. 367-368). As discussed earlier, a content analysis of 200 news items from the three local Korean dailies (Vancouver Chosun, Korea Daily, Korea Times) and one Korean TV program (OMNI Korean News) in a constructed week of March 2010 reveals that 34% of the news items are locally produced by staff writers (see Chapter 3, Table 3.7). The proportion is higher for newspapers only (45%) compared to TV (8%). Of the locally produced content (written by staff writers), 94% of items are about Canada: 66% are geo-ethnic (42% for general local news and 24% for Korean community news) and 28% are national/provincial news (see Table 4.1). Thus, there is a higher emphasis on news about Canada, although the absolute quantity may be small.

Geographic distribution is similar for the total output. Fifty-five percent of news items are about Canada and 36% of news items are about Korea (see Table 4.2). By media type, while the proportion of Canadian news is similar between TV and newspapers (over 50%), that of Korean news is significantly higher among newspapers (40%) compared to TV (26%). OMNI Korean News instead focuses more on international news. For geo-ethnic news, general local news accounts for 24% and Korean community news accounts for 9%. The proportion of general local news is higher for TV (30%) at the cost of Korean community news. OMNI Korean News focuses
entirely on general local news with no Korean community news. The proportion of Korean community news in newspapers, on the other hand, accounts for 12%.

Table 4.1 Geographic focus of news items by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total n=200</th>
<th>Staff writer n=67</th>
<th>Korea n=76</th>
<th>Other n=25</th>
<th>Absent/unknown n=32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Other ethnic groups)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, the findings show a different view compared to Murray et al.’s 2007 study. The proportion of Canadian and Korean news is reversed: 37% about Canada and 52% about Korea in 2007. This difference may reflect an increase in local production (written by staff writers): both in newspapers (from 31% to 45%) and in TV (0% to 8%). The difference may also reflect a change in geographic focus by media type: newspapers now cover less about Canada (53% from 74%) and more about Korea (40% from 16%) whereas TV covers more about Canada (53% from 19%) and less about Korea (26% from 70%). In other words, the dependency of newspapers on Korean sources has increased over the years. According to interviews with media practitioners, imported Korean news items are an easy substitution for Korean stories. These items do not require English to Korean translation as it is the case for news items from non-Korean sources, thus they can be effortlessly selected from the headlines of Korean sources and placed in the process of editing. As one media practitioner puts it: they are “pre-selected by the publisher” from the affiliated source’s headlines and then reviewed by the Editor-in-

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52 At the time of sampling in March 2010, TV Korea dealt with Korean community issues only on “TV Korea Magazine.” Korean community news resurfaced later in the year when the company downsized the news production to once a week (with two re-runs on Sundays and Mondays) from five times a week beginning in September 2010.
Chief, and finally by all reporters (Media Practitioner 13). OMNI’s Korean News produced by TV Korea, on the other hand, now depends more on the in-house news pool (10%) and covers more geographic levels than in 2007, when Canadian news focused entirely on local Metro Vancouver news.

Table 4.2 Geographic focus of news items by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total (n=200)</th>
<th>TV (n=61)</th>
<th>Newspaper (n=139)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Other ethnic groups)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highlight of locally produced content is cultural translation. National and geo-ethnic news is produced or reproduced depending on the news source. The general local news is “produced” directly by reporters (staff writers) on site at events (e.g., Vancouver Film Festival) or local press conferences called by government departments or security organizations (e.g., Royal Canadian Mounted Police). Seasonally, when government officials plan a visit to Korea, there are also press conferences solely for Korean media to promote the events (e.g., Trade Minister’s visit to Korea) (Media Practitioner 12). There are four to five press conferences daily, and reporters attend selectively the ones that are of interest of the Korean community (Media Practitioner 9). The general local news is, however, mainly “reproduced” or culturally translated by local reporters. It involves first re-packaging news items from external sources. Instead of providing direct translation, reporters rewrite (while retaining the facts) in the language and the type of narration (or story development) that Korean audiences are familiar with (Media Practitioner 2). Second, cultural translation also involves providing background information or the history of event, which mainstream audiences already know, thus excluded in the original
source, but (new) immigrants need to have in order to understand the context. It is through this process of translation that the news is contextualized and recontextualized.

We don’t do direct translation. We initially tried, but it didn’t read smoothly. The way of thinking is different. It is not the usual way of story development in Korean papers. Therefore, we read through once and rewrite it and cross-check for accuracy. If the news needs more background information, then we do desk research to provide background information. (Media Practitioner 2)

In the discussion of reproduction of local news, Canada Express, a translated newspaper, cannot be omitted. The same logic of cultural translation applies. However, there are contrasting views among media practitioners on the degree of reproduction (Media Practitioners 3, 4, 5, & 14).

Canada Express contributed to shifting Korean readers’ attention from Korean news to local news, which would have not been attained without Canada Express. (Media Practitioner 4)

Such practice demonstrates no journalistic integrity; it is just like filling the space. There is no sense of community and no sense of what is good and needed for the community. (Media Practitioner 3)

We have editorial autonomy, that is, we choose news that is relevant to the community and go with what we think is important. Canada Express does not have such autonomy. (Media Practitioner 5)

The paper has limited sources, only from CanWest, and limited views, only mainstream views. I see many biased articles in (name of newspaper); minorities are not properly covered. They also do not cover the lives of Koreans. (Media Practitioner 14)

Finally, cultural translation involves the re-framing of a storyline and re-focusing news actors, regardless of news origin. For an event involving Koreans, there is often a difference in the story focus between mainstream and Korean media. One example is a story about a Maple Ridge truck accident where a truck ran into a Japanese restaurant and killed two female customers. The Vancouver Sun headlines read: “Reduced charges from Maple Ridge sushi restaurant fatal crash anger mother” (Steele, 2009a); “Man found not criminally responsible for fatal sushi restaurant crash” (Steele, 2009b); “Driver in deadly crash into Maple Ridge restaurant wins release” (Steele, 2009c); and “Driver in deadly Maple Ridge restaurant crash to get released today” (Steele, 2010d). In contrast, the Vancouver Chosun headlines read: “Maple Ridge Japanese Restaurant, one of the two died is Korean” (Moon, 2009); “Oh Hyeshim case found ‘Not guilty’” (Han, 2009a); and “Oh Hyeshim case assailant set free” (Han, 2009b). The focus of story for the Vancouver Sun is Brian Irving, the truck driver and the assailant, whereas that of the Vancouver
Chosun is Oh Hyeshim, the Korean female and the victim. One media practitioner puts it: “Korean papers focused on the Korean victim and her family whereas English papers focused on the truck driver, whether or not the driver was mentally ill or what made him to do that…the word “Korean” is mentioned only once” (Media Practitioner 14).

The ethnicity-specific, Korean community news is “produced” by local reporters through on-site reporting or news releases provided by community interest groups. It includes organization businesses/projects/events (e.g., the Korean Society’s year-end party) or press conferences, successful second-generation stories, church news, and cultural events, among others (Media Practitioners 6 & 14). Community news, in fact, occupies a significant portion of on-site reporting (Media Practitioner 14). Self-congratulatory stories about successful 1.5- and second-generation Koreans also often make it to the Korean community section. Some recent examples include: Eric Shim, a baseball player (Vancouver Chosun, February 18, 2011), James Choi, a tennis player (Vancouver Chosun, July 28, 2010), Soo Hwan Kim, Catholic priest (Vancouver Chosun, May 12, 2010), Belinda Kim, Miss Universe Canada participant (Vancouver Chosun, April 22, 2010), and Andrew Kim, musician (Korea Daily, February 11, 2011) (Han, 2010b; Kwon, 2010c, 2010e, 2010f; Choi, 2011d).

News Topics: What is Newsworthy?

What news topics are then selected and reported to Koreans? What are the selection criteria? Korean media practitioners rank immigration/immigration law, economy, and education as the top three priority topics for Canadian news, whereas politics (e.g., general politics, Canada-Korean relations), economy, and education are the top three for Korean news. The main target for Canadian news is Korean immigrants who settle in Canada, whereas that of Korean news is “transnational” Koreans who have temporary residence in Canada and are more socio-economically and politically mobile between Canada and Korea (Media Practitioners 4 & 5). Therefore, one of the main criteria for Canadian news topics is settlement; how to settle and make a living in a new country. On the other hand, Korean topics concern current affairs of Korea. The coverage of Korea’s new election law is a good example: the Korean Consulate General in
Vancouver has conducted a mock election with local Korean citizens (Kwon, 2010h; Lee, 2010d).

We all immigrants have unstable lives, unfamiliar with our new society and have hard time to define our lives. We need media that help us settle in a new society. (Media Practitioner 4)

We focus on first economy, how to survive; second, education as it is the main reason for Koreans to come to Canada; and third, promotion of Korean community in the mainstream society…For Korean news, we focus on politics, economy, and education. Economy news is particularly important for those who still have their properties or businesses in Korea. Education news is also important for those who will eventually return to Korea after their temporary education in Canada. They need to be updated about the changes in Korea’s education system. (Media Practitioner 5)

Comparing the news topics by geographic location (local, provincial/national, and news about Korea), the top three Canadian topics are indeed frequently discussed at a provincial/national level (see Table 4.3): economy/business (15%), migration/immigration (10%), and education (8%). The news about migration/immigration includes some general topics such as “CIC, looking for your opinion on immigration policy” (Vancouver Chosun, March 19, 2010, A1) as well as some Korean-specific topics such as “160,000 Koreans in Vancouver by 2031, a steady growth of immigration and birth rate” (Vancouver Chosun, March 10, 2010, A1). Politics (13%) and health (10%) are two other topics that are also frequently discussed at a provincial/national level: “HST starting in one month” (Vancouver Chosun, March 24, 2010, A1); “The toughest drinking and driving law in the country is about to launch in BC” (Korea Daily, March 9, 2010, A1); and “41% of Canadians suffer from hyperlipidemia, according to Statistics Canada” (Korea Times, March 24, 2010, A1). All of these topics are time-sensitive, and if not publicised through Korean media, would have caused some inconvenience in the everyday lives of local Koreans. At a local level, Korean community news (18%) was most frequently discussed: “Time to build Korean Cultural Centre” (Vancouver Chosun, March 27, 2010, A1); “The 39th Korean Society election” (Korea Times, March 24, 2010, A1); and “Korean folk singers, Yoon and Kim are coming to Vancouver” (Korea Daily, March 16, 2010, A1). The portion of sports news is significant (30%), owing to the Vancouver 2010 Paralympics Games that took place during the time of data collection.
For Korean news topics, on the other hand, politics (15%) and economic (10%) news is most frequently discussed: “Forging overseas account reporting system” (Korea Times, March 12, 2010, A1); and “Revenue Korea, investigation into tax evasion” (Vancouver Chosun, March 27, 2010, B1). Religion (11%) is sporadic: a nationally-renown Buddhist monk had passed away during the time of data collection. Crime/violence (15%) can also be intermittent: there was a sexual assault case widely discussed in the media in Korea (Korea Times, March 12, 2010, B1; OMNI, March 11, 2010).

Table 4.3 News topics by geographic focus (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Topics</th>
<th>Local n=67</th>
<th>Provincial/National n=39</th>
<th>International (South Korea) n=72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics: Parliamentary practices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/violence</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (Korean diaspora)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy/Business (Korean enclave, Korea economy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment/Entertainment industry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather/Season/Daylight saving</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy/Business (General)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration/migrants/immigration/immigrants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment news</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of terror</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festive events/Exhibitions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/Travel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Traffic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science/Technology/Media</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global change/Environmental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing news topics by news origin, the result is consistent (see Table 4.4). Excluding the occasional or seasonal topics, local staff writers cover the Korean
community (18%) followed by education (6%), the economy (6%) and migration/immigration (6%). In news from Korean sources, politics is mostly covered (16%), followed by the economy (8%) and entertainment (8%). Regardless of news origin, these topics are presented mostly as “hard news” followed by “soft news” (see Table 4.5). The portion of hard news is slightly higher for local origin (76% compared to 67% for Korean origin) whereas that of soft news is higher for Korean origin (18% compared to 10% for local origin).

### Table 4.4 News topics by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Topics</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=76</td>
<td>n=25</td>
<td>n=32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics: Parliamentary practices</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime/violence</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (Korean diaspora)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment/Entertainment industry</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather/Season/Daylight saving</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy/Business (Korean enclave, Korea economy)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy/Business (General)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration/migrants/immigration/immigrants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment news</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of terror</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Festive events/Exhibitions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/Travel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation/Traffic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science/Technology/Media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global change/Environmental</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident (e.g., car, fire)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/bilateral economy/business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health reform</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Online Publications and Linking Korean-North American Diasporic Discourse

Almost all of these news items are included in online publications. There tend to be more items online than offline in terms of quantity and length: those that were “shortened or excluded” due to a page limit reappear in their full version (Media Practitioner 13). Online publication is also faster than offline print publication as the items are uploaded online in real time while there is a cut-off time for print publication (ibid.). Another contribution of online publications is that they link transnational diasporic media across North America. For example, Korea Times and Korea Daily are linked to branch offices in major cities across North America. Figure 4.1 shows the screen-shots of Korea Times (www.ikoreatimes.com) and Korea Daily (www.joongang.ca) homepages. For Korea Times (Figure 4.1 top), under the “regional news” tab (highlighted), there are links to L.A., N.Y.C., Washington, San Francisco, Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, Texas, Hawaii, and Toronto. Similarly, at the top of the Korea Daily (Figure 4.1 bottom), there are links to L.A., N.Y.C., Washington DC, San Francisco, Chicago, and Toronto.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=76</td>
<td>n=25</td>
<td>n=32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard news</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft news</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis/Feature</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo/Photo Essay</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.1  Links to branch homepages in major cities in Canada and the U.S.

Note. Screen-shots captured on March 15, 2011. Korea Times Vancouver (top) and Korea Daily Vancouver (bottom) homepages
Local Vancouver news is available through Vancouver franchises’ own websites (Figure 4.1) as well as that of L.A. regional head offices (Figure 4.2). The locally designed websites are far more versatile in terms of news content and online community services customized for local Vancouver Koreans. Online editions operated by L.A. offices, on the other hand, consolidate regional news from different branch/franchise offices and place it in a designated regional news section in a template. The two examples in Figure 4.2 show how the template works. The two websites on the left are master websites (L.A.) and the other two websites on the right are regional websites (Vancouver). The highlighted sections of Korea Times L.A. (top left) and Vancouver (top right) are where respective regional news appears, with the rest of the surrounding ad space.
reserved for L.A. ads (www.koreatimes.com). Similarly, for Korea Daily, the two additional slides at the bottom are where respective regional news is placed (www.koreadaily.com). When scrolled down from the top where international and Korea news are usually placed (middle two slides), there is a small area with a L.A. tab (bottom left) and a Vancouver tab (bottom right) at the bottom where regional news is placed. Again, the surroundings space is reserved for L.A. ads. As such, online publications create a win-win situation for readers and publishers. For readers, news about other Korean diaspora is just a click away. For publishers, L.A. ads have a transnational reach, at least within North America.

**Settlement and Integration through Online Community**

Aside from news, Korean media also provide geo-ethnic information which help assist immigrant settlement in collaboration with Korean community workers. Most of the community workers have either contributed columns or have been interviewed by Korean media at least once, if not regularly, on various topics (e.g., settlement/ESL, employment, legal, business, counselling, mental health, families, schools by school district) (Community Workers 1 & 3). New service programs are made available and regularly updated online and offline through community bulletin boards of newspapers (e.g., Vancouver Chosun’s Vanocuver Sarangbang, Korea Daily’s Gaeshipan, Korea Times’s Donghohae Dongjung, and Town Dongjung) or the community calendars of online publications. Korea Daily’s special column entitled “Community Worker Relay Column” is another example. From June 2008 when the Korean Community Worker Network was still an idea, Korean community workers collaborated with Korea Daily to contribute 25 columns on various immigrant issues and potential solutions for them. Some of the examples include: “Guide to employment with little English” (Lee, 2008), “Guide to small business” (Cho, 2008), “Guide to income tax” (Park, 2008); “Guide to senior programs” (Hwang, 2008), and “Guide to tenant dispute” (Park, 2009). Each column discusses the issue using actual case studies, and introduces available resources (e.g., government programs) and the author’s contact information for further inquiries.
Online communities are also formed around online publications to facilitate the exchange of geo-ethnic information among readers. A content analysis of 80 threads posted on online community bulletins of the three dailies—*Vanchosun Community* (Vancouver Chosun), *Gaeshipan* (Korea Daily), and *Community* (Korea Times)—during a constructed week of March 2010 reveals some interesting results. Table 4.6 shows that most frequently posted topics are announcements by Korean community organizations or immigrant service organizations (21%), followed by announcement by leisure/hobby groups (20%), business/ads (20%), and Canadian life (19%). The topics under “Canadian life” include questions that arise from a day-to-day life in a new country: “How to install Shaw digital phone” (Vanchosun, March 16); “criteria to consider when selecting realtors” (Vanchosun, March 24); “looking for a rent in North Vancouver” (Vanchosun, March 25). “Immigration” inquiries include citizenship/visa procedures or status: “Can we postpone citizenship test?” (Vanchosun, March 15); “interviews after a citizenship test” (Vanchosun, March 15). Among the online communities of the three major dailies, Vanchosun community is most active: 80% of the threads collected for the analysis were from Vanchosun. Media practitioners also generally agree that Vancouver Chosun’s online publication is most popular, attributed mainly to its Buy & Sell (see Chapter 3).

Table 4.6  Discussion topics of online bulletin boards (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussion Topics</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO/Immigrant services</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure/Hobby</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Ads</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada life</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration - Citizenship, permanent residency</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration - Visa, Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance - bank, real estate, other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion/discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, Vancouver’s online community has potential to grow as a means of a self-sufficient “quick fix” for everyday inquiries. Vancouver Chosun’s “Expert Q&A”
makes experts available in the field of immigration, education, accounting, mortgage, health, and real estate to respond to readers’ inquiries for expert opinions. These experts use the space to present their promotional materials such as their profiles and video files of their ads. As such, the space creates a win-win situation for both sides. Readers get free consultation from experts, and experts get space to promote their businesses.

Socio-Cultural Storytelling and the Challenges

Korean media practitioners would want to increase their local reporting, if resources allowed. Figure 4.3 shows the result of the overall importance-satisfaction rating by media practitioners. While Korean news is considered moderately important, it is covered beyond the level of importance. The coverage of Canadian news, on the other hand, is considered highly important, yet it is not covered up to the level of satisfaction. (The coverage of political and intercultural news is thoroughly discussed in the following two sections). News topics that readers would want to have an increase in coverage are also local news, according the results of Korea Daily’s online survey of its readers (n=136): Canadian politics and economy (60%), immigration and settlement (29%), and Korean community news (27%) (Kim, 2010). Canada’s politics and economy were two most read topics (41%), followed by Korean community news (36%), Korean politics and economy (29%), immigration policy (24%) and education (23%) (ibid.).

There are, however, limitations to national and geo-ethnic news production. A lack of human resources may be one reason, and a lack of sources is another. Korean media practitioners have access to press releases by government offices (Canada and Korea), corporate communication offices/PR, or local branches of Korean corporations, Canadian Press, and sources from personal networks. However, there is limited access to sources beyond these due to socio-economic factors of diasporic media, such as language, cultural understanding and company size, among others. Stories shared by one media practitioner speak to this point.

During the Vancouver Olympics, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) limited press passes to paid newspapers with a certain level of circulation in their own service areas. Those who were qualified were granted access to all venues including
stadiums, while the rest were limited to the Press Center at Robson Square. The reporter’s company, being a small-size, “free” newspaper, could obtain a media pass issued by the City of Vancouver, as it was given to Metro, 24 Hours, and the Georgia Straight (local free newspapers) that allowed access to the Press Center only. The company’s headquarter in Korea, on the other hand, obtained a global media pass that granted access to all venues. Thus, the reporter’s company, while this was general local news that mattered to the local Korean community, had to depend on coverage by the Korea headquarters for most of the time. The L.A. branch, which the company is directly affiliated with, also depended on headquarter rather than sending their own reporters to Vancouver or collaborating with the Vancouver office for joint reporting. Another episode shared by the reporter is that it is only recently that the reporter’s company obtained access to the Vancouver Film Festival. This new access reflects the growth in programming of Korean films in the festival in recent years.

Figure 4.3 Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Korean Media Content” by Korean media practitioners in Vancouver
These two cases point out two access issues. First, the chronic weakness of diasporic media, its small size and low circulation, is being penalized and further reinforced in the broader media system, when diasporic media are not in direct competition with mainstream media. Second, there is a lack of recognition and under-utilization of Vancouver franchises by Korean headquarters. The headquarters would rather send its own reporters to Vancouver rather than seeking to collaborate with the Vancouver franchise, when the latter could have been a cost-effective option. The Vancouver franchise was instead approached by other minor press from Korea for joint-reporting due to unfamiliarity with Vancouver’s geography and media culture.

Another limitation to national and geo-ethnic news production is the demographics of the Korean community in general and media practitioners in particular. The Korean community constitutes not only immigrants but also temporary residents (e.g., international students, labour workers). Among immigrants, there are also Canadian citizens and Korean citizens (permanent residents). The ratio of Canadian and Korean citizens in B.C. is 3 to 7 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea [MOFAT], 2010). Thus, there is a certain level of preference for Korean news. As one community worker puts it: “Koreans are generally more interested in Korea. Having property back in Korea really means a lot. StatCan data also show that the Korean community has the largest group of immigrants who had been here less than one year” (Community Worker 2). Cultural translation also poses a certain limitation. A majority of media practitioners are first-generation immigrants. While media owners have a longer lead-time from the year they arrived in Canada and the year they started their media enterprises (as short as five years and as long as 22 years), that of employees seems to be significantly shorter. A majority of employees interviewed were involved in cultural translation almost upon their arrival in Canada, when their own understanding of Canada was still limited (Media Practitioner 5). Although it is now on average nine years that they have lived in Canada, there are still limitations. To compensate for such shortcomings, some reporters collaborate with community professionals such as immigration consultants, lawyers, and economists not only to obtain ground knowledge and experts’ views, but also to better contextualize the issues with adequate background information (Media Practitioner 13). Thus, it is this level of cultural translation provided
by Korean media, which is likely to mature as the Canadian knowledge of media practitioners grows.

I, myself as an immigrant, am still unfamiliar with Canadian culture. What is Halloween? What is Thanksgiving? How do Canadians celebrate? Why is hockey so popular in Canada? What are the rules of hockey? Cricket? I am sure new Korean immigrants are also curious about what I am curious about. I want to provide such information. (Media Practitioner 5)

Another aspect about cultural translation is the point of view. Is it a Korean-Canadian or a Korean perspective? With multiple audience segments, in whose voice is news delivered? How do media practitioners define “Korean”? There seems to be a general consensus that this definition is “Koreans in Canada” or Hanin (ethnically Korean). This broad term encompasses all Koreans regardless their citizenship. “Korean-Canadian,” on the other hand, refers to 1.5- or second-generation Koreans who were born and/or raised and “educated” in Canada, thus less likely to be used to address the majority of audience (Media Practitioners 5 & 14). The findings of the content analysis show no strong sense of ethnic orientation of a so-called us-and-them dichotomy between Koreans and the majority. In most cases, audiences are generally referred as Hanin and least likely as “Korean-Canadians” or “Canadians” (as they are technically all Hanin). However, media practitioners also mention that they do emphasize certain labels such as “Canadian,” for instance in “Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper.” It is not an expression of ethnic identity to set “Canadian” apart from “Korean,” but to assist new immigrants as well as temporary residents who are not familiar with Canada (Media Practitioner 10).

It is Hanin. The legal status is all different; some are Korean-Canadians while others are temporary students or visitors. Those who have Korean background or ethnically Korean are Hanin. The official terms used by the Korean government is kyomin (overseas Korean). (Media Practitioner 10)

The self identity of media practitioners also manifests itself in their narration. The majority of Korean media practitioners are first-generation immigrants, who self identify themselves to be immigrant Hanin. They are new immigrants, conceptually positioning themselves between Korean-Canadians or early immigrants and temporary residents. They are leaning toward neither “Canadian” nor “Korean.” Instead, they use a genetic and embracing term like Hanin to refer to the community. Thus, it is mostly immigrant Hanin speaking to all Hanin on the issues that matter to Hanin. One exception, however,
is that one media practitioner who is an international student from Korea often uses in-group references such as “in our currency…. won” (OMNI Korean news, March 10, 2010), “Canadian Rocky Mountain” and “three Canadians” (March 16, 2010), and “our (Korean) athletes” (March 16, 2010). It is perhaps in this way that self-identity is manifested in narration.

Overall, there is a high emphasis on Canadian news. It is evident in the resources that are invested in local production as well as actual output. However, there may be a difference between providing news and mobilizing public discourse. The next section looks at how Korean media work toward playing an “active agent” role in the broader public sphere.

4.2 Political Roles and Challenges

Media have a role within civil society, which constitutes helping the public engage in public discussion and affect government decision-making processes. The role of diasporic media is especially important in these processes by providing platforms and subjects for dialogue among the members of ethnic groups who are unfamiliar with Canada’s official languages, let alone the civic/political system. It is through these processes that immigrants learn to engage in civic matters in their neighborhood, city and the broader society and participate in politics, if they wish, until they acquire language skills and knowledge to properly exercise citizenship on their own. The previous section discussed how Korean media provide national and geo-ethnic news and information with cultural translation. It includes not only general news and information in ordinary times, but also event-specific news and information during national hot-topic events such as a federal election. A content analysis of coverage of the 2008 Canadian federal election in English and Korean media finds that Korean media provided election-related news and information customized for new Korean-Canadians during the election: how to vote, where to vote, and who to vote for (candidate profiles across ridings) (Yu & Ahadi, 2010). This information, which is critical for informed decision-making among new Korean-Canadians, was only available in Korean media.
The fundamental role of the public sphere, however, goes beyond just providing geo-ethnic news and information. It is ultimately about playing a role in civil society that helps individuals influence broader public opinion and policy decision-making processes. The role of “collective actors” (Gamson, 2001, p. 68) is especially important for diasporic media, as individuals have limited socio-linguistic capital to take action even if they wish to. For diasporic discourse to effectively follow its path, whether it is to influence broader public discourse or policy-decision-making process, diasporic media may act independently or in collaboration with CSOs to collect community opinion and speak on behalf of the community. This section looks at the civil society role of Korean media and the challenges therein.

**Bridging the Community to Broader Public Discourse**

Media practitioners consider engaging in broader public discourse important and are generally satisfied, but within the limited resources available. Figure 4.3 (in Section 4.1) ranks the importance and satisfaction on two attributes: “how politically active or responsive is your editorial department and journalists to controversies involving the Korean community or immigrants (e.g., the Bruce Allen controversy, the Virginia Tech incident)” and “coverage to promote political engagement (e.g., voting rules, campaign activities, intercultural community activities).” For the former, Korean media tend play more or less a watchdog function. Korean media practitioners review mainstream news sources everyday as part of their daily work routine with special attention to coverage of immigrants in general and Koreans in particular. When mainstream media inappropriately cover immigrants or Koreans, Korean media discuss the issues and let the community know. Most of the stories mentioned by media practitioners are related to a lack of cultural understanding: a story about the 2002 World Cup in Korea and how Korean teams were negatively portrayed; a story about Mongolian spots on Korean babies and how that was misunderstood as a case of child abuse; a story about sun caps Korean women wear when they take a walk to protect them from UV rays and how the actual effectiveness of this was sceptically discussed; a story about Vancouver Golf Course’s prohibition on languages other than English and how that is related to the
LPGA’s recent decision on mandatory English use among the players; and a story about Sung Wan Kim (a case of in-community investment fraud against local Korean immigrants) and how it was framed as a religious issue (Media Practitioners 9, 10, 12 & 13).

Korean media discuss these controversial issues internally through their own coverage, and do not necessarily respond institutionally to mainstream media. Media practitioners simply do not believe that it is their role to take any institutional action; they would also not expect mainstream media to reciprocate either. Instead, they believe their role is to present the issues for discussion and have readers as well as CSO leaders respond, if they wish. As one media practitioner puts it: “We do not respond institutionally. Instead we open it up for discussion, let the community and CSOs know about it and take actions, if they wish” (Media Practitioner 5). Thus, in most cases, media practitioners would rather respond individually as concerned citizens rather than institutionally. They are aware of some cases in which readers had responded to mainstream media individually, although there is no recorded information on the outcome of such action.

The case of KOREAN’s (a quarterly Korean magazine) response to the Vancouver Sun’s multi-language translation service is, however, a proactive one. In an article entitled “Thanks anyways Vancouver Sun. Cough cough (English): Reading Vancouver Sun in Korean (Korean)” (Lee, Spring 2007), the publisher shares an anecdote of inter-media interaction. Pleased at first with the Vancouver Sun’s announcement of a multi-language service, the publisher contacted the senior management of Vancouver Sun to get more information about the service. It turned out that the Vancouver Sun depended on a computer-assisted translation service, not an outsourced translation service (in other words, human translation). The translation quality was even more disappointing. The article shows some examples: “Thank you Vancouver Sun, anyways” is translated into “Vancouver’s sun appreciates. Whichever you are.” The publisher, however, points out that it is not an ethnic issue, but a technical issue, in that Vancouver Sun staff underestimated technological limitations. The publisher’s comments made to the Tyee, a leading alternative online news source (Zandberg, 2007) as well as the Vancouver Sun (April 28, 2008).
However, some controversies are not discussed at all. Depending on the topics, such blind spots can lead to the absence of a Korean voice in the broader public discourse, if not raised by CSOs either. One example of this is the Bruce Allen controversy. Bruce Allen, a radio personality and a member of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Ceremonies Committee mentioned in an interview with B.C. radio station CKNW on September 13, 2007 that ‘if you’re immigrating to this country and you don’t like the rules that are in place, then you have the right to choose not to live here…We don’t need you here. You have another place to go. It’s called home. See ya.’ (CTV, 25 September 2007). His faux-pas invited a flood of responses from diasporic communities through their community organizations and media as well as mainstream media. The South Asian community felt Allen had “dissatisfied” the community (Bikramjit Singh of the Khalsa Diwan Society of New Westminster) and called for “resignation” from the Committee (Harry Bains, NDP MLA) (*The Vancouver Sun*, 27 September 2007), while the Chinese community called his comments “deceptive and inaccurate…unacceptable” (Raymond Chan, Liberal MP-Richmond, CTV, 25 September 2007) and thought he had “crossed the line” (Tung Chan, CEO, S.U.C.C.E.S.S., *The Vancouver Sun*, 27 April 2007). There were, however, neither media comments nor a community-wide response from the Korean community. Interviews with media practitioners revealed that the awareness of the incident was, in fact, low.

**Promoting Political Engagement**

On issues related to the second attribute, the promotion of political engagement, media practitioners are relatively more proactive. One media practitioner mentions that the company’s motto in 2010 is in fact to support and “raise” Korean politicians (Media Practitioner 12). The media practitioner further argues that it can be pursued as a common agenda among media practitioners, not in the form of “agenda setting,” but as a community-wide project (ibid.). Korean media, in fact, have experience of this through election campaigns of Korean-Canadian candidates, most notably that of Yonah Martin (Conservative Party) during the 2008 Canadian federal election. A 1.5-generation Korean-Canadian and a founding member of the C3 Society, Martin ran in the Korean-
concentrated, Tri-City riding (New Westminster-Coquitlam-Port Moody), aiming to be the first Korean-Canadian Member of Parliament. It was, in fact, a long-time ambition for the community after several failures of Korean-Canadian politicians in Vancouver, Toronto, and Calgary between 1993 and 2007 (Lee, 2007). Martin received unprecedented support from the Korean-Canadian community. Particularly, election media coverage was noteworthy. Yu and Ahadi’s (2010, p. 62) content analysis of coverage of the 2008 Canadian federal election in Korean and English media found that 21% of news items in Korean papers cover visible minorities compared to 5% in English papers. That 21% in Korean papers was mostly about Yonah Martin. There was also an increase in local production that 60% of election-related news items in Korean newspapers during the time of election were written by staff writers, compared to 30% in the non-event time (ibid.). A significant amount of citizenship education was also underway for new Korean-Canadian voters to elicit informed participation (ibid).

Some community leaders, however, criticize the media’s endorsement of Korean candidates and the community becoming “mindlessly partisan” regardless of party (CSO Leaders 2& 4). A by-election, which came a year after the 2008 federal election, in November 2009, demonstrated the same pattern: another call for community support for a Korean-Canadian candidate, running for the Liberal Party this time.53 The dependency on Korean-Canadian voters was high; “the result depends on the 3,000 Korean-Canadian voters in my riding,” said the candidate in an interview with Vancouver Chosun (Kwon, 2009a).

I noticed a very similar tone of coverage, borderline plagiarism, among media; even interview articles are very similar to one another…they seem to try not to deviate much…I think it reflects very strong collectivism and no individualism. It is group mentality…for example for Yonah Martin’s success, there is no different angle and no different take…how can that be possible? Media need to report how Korean politicians are assessed in the mainstream circle instead of just blindly supporting them just because they are Koreans or just because they are supporting the Korean community. Some of their visions are insufficient and laughable things to support with. (CSO Leader 2)

Ethnic block voting is, however, not always easy to obtain. Political unity is hard to achieve due to what Võ (2004, p. 159) calls “love-resentment-envy” relations between

53 Ken Beck Lee (Liberal) ran in the same riding (New Westminster-Coquitlam-Port Moody) as Yonah Martin (Conservative). He failed to win in the election (2,514 votes) to Fin Donnelly (NDP) (12,129 votes) (Kwon, 2009b).
and within the community. Asian politicians not only need to make broader appeals to a broader community, but also need to work around in-group diversity as well. Media practitioners mention that there is a sense of “why not me” attitude among community leaders toward in-group candidates in that they think “when that person can run for election, I can too” (Media Practitioners 4 &12). Nonetheless, for the community as a whole, it is undeniable that Korean-Canadian candidates contribute to increasing the community’s interest in political participation overall. The aspiration of ethnic communities to have someone from the community “out there” in mainstream political circles is manifested in their support for the community candidates. During the time of Martin’s campaign, the main message that came across from Korean media was that the community can make a difference through exercising their voting rights: “Let’s elect the first Korean MP” and “Let’s write a new Korean history” (Yu & Ahadi, 2010, p. 62).

There was also a consensus in the community that her appointment to the Senate later in 2009 was “a historical event for the community,” something that is “beyond imagination” or “never happened even in the 100 years of Korean-American immigration history” (Media Practitioner 12). Furthermore, Martin’s appointment to the Senate elicited interest in politics among younger generation. Internship programs for future Korean-Canadian politicians immediately followed (Choi, 2010c). The younger generation is also beginning to join in community leadership: the newly formed Korea Society has two 1.5- and second-generation directors on the board.

The federal government has started to pay attention to local Korean media, and it is not unrelated to Yonah Martin. The Prime Minister’s media group to Korea is a good example. Stephen Harper had his first official visit to South Korea and China in December 2009 and invited two of the three local Korean dailies from Vancouver—Vancouver Chosun and Korea Daily—to join his media group. Upon this invitation, the invited media outlets shared self-congratulatory remarks that it was “the first time in Korean media history that the company was officially invited by the government” (Korea Daily, November 27, 2009b) and that they were “invited by the Prime Minister’s office to join Canadian media group” (Vancouver Chosun, November 27, 2009). A provincial-level initiative was a roundtable with diasporic media practitioners. Mayor Gregor Robertson, City of Vancouver, held a media roundtable on April 30, 2010 with
Vancouver’s Filipino, Vietnamese, Indian, and Korean media practitioners to share the city’s plan for current city issues (e.g., crime, homelessness, H1N1) and hear diasporic media’s opinions (Han, 2010c). In general, however, interaction with government institutions is visible mostly during election times and usually absent between elections. Yu and Ahadi’s (2010) work revealed that during the time of 2008 election, Elections Canada as well as political parties approached Korean-Canadian voters through placement of ads in Korean media. The recent Jason Kenney controversy also confirms the rising significance of ethnic voters and diasporic media as important venues to reach them. The controversy was about Jason Kenny’s involvement in partisan fundraising as a Member of Parliament and Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, when a letter Kenney’s office sent out to a Conservative MP was delivered to a New Democratic Party MP (CBC News, 2011). What mattered to some ethnic communities was that the letter asked for fundraising help on media strategies that target specifically Chinese and South Asian voters: “There are lots of ethnic voters…There will be quite a few more soon. They live where we need to win” (ibid.).

Active Agency: Media-CSO Collaboration and the Challenges

Aside from these two political roles, Korean community workers suggest that the Korean media’s coverage of Korean issues and the resulting community reaction alone can pressure government decision-making that affects the lives of Koreans (Community Worker 2). A case in point is a series of incidents of family violence in the Korean community during the past few years (e.g., 2004 Surrey family suicide, 2007 Victoria family suicide, 2008 realtor suicide, 2009 Coquitlam priest suicide). While all of these incidents originated in financial problems that led to family violence, the cases are often reported merely as family violence. Some incidents, in fact, even involved government agencies and their mishandling of the cases which had worsened the situation. A community worker argued that follow-up actions from the community could have been taken immediately in order to let the case be known to the broader society. The potential action could include CSO leaders collecting opinions from the community and collectively requesting further investigation into the involved government agencies and
setting up a Crisis Hotline as a preventive measure. However, none of these actions were taken by the community, when in fact immigrant service organizations were monitoring Korean media at that time to check community reaction to take further action. As there was no further coverage, the organizations did not make a case to the government for further assistance for the investigation.

[Name of immigrant service organization] leaders are curious about how Korean media respond to such incidents. If treated lightly, why should the government respond to that? It is hard for community workers to justify the needs and demand more support from the community organizations or the government... I could not take any action then. I was not sure whether or not I could take such leadership. But I know the system within the organization better now, what can be demanded and whatnot. (Community Worker 2)

A series of examples suggest that Korean media’s civil society role is emerging slowly but surely. What seems to be lacking, however, is a proper connection between media and CSOs as well as leadership of CSOs as a representative of the community in the broader society. In order to take action in a timely manner—such as collecting public opinion and “speaking on behalf of the community”—with limited socio-cultural, linguistic, and political resources, stronger ties between media and CSOs are desirable. A number of the cases discussed above could have taken a different path if stronger ties among “collective actors” were established. It is, in fact, the foremost area of improvement media practitioners would like to focus on. Asked about the areas of potential collaboration with CSOs, media practitioners consider attributes such as “monitoring media practices and influencing news values,” “organizing debates for community issues,” and “forming a communication channel between media and CSOs at an institutional level” of high importance and low satisfaction (see Figure 4.4). The attribute, “organizing debates for community issues,” is especially important in order to collect public opinion.
The media-CSO collaboration is not entirely absent. As part of the overall communication infrastructure, they are in a mutually supportive relationship. Media need CSOs to fulfill geo-ethnic coverage; CSOs need media to promote their activities. CSO leaders, in fact, mention that they have experienced the “power of media” and that they would have not been able to attract community support for various projects such as recruiting volunteers and fundraising events without media’s support (CSO Leaders 1 & 3). Yet the collaboration does not go beyond fulfilling one’s own goals. In most cases, media practitioners would rather keep “distance” to maintain “objectivity.” They also know from experience that media-CSO interaction invites more trouble than benefits, such as demand free ad space or donations for events (Media Practitioner 4). Some other cases involve CSOs demanding or even buying media space to advocate “their side of story” in conflict situations among CSOs (Media Practitioners 5 & 14). If a problematic story is covered by the media, the conflict among CSOs can well extend to the communication infrastructure as a whole. (CSO Leader 3)

Korean media need to have a sense of responsibility that if they lean toward one side of the community, the impact can be very significant. Some media insert
their own personal feeling and present a story in a strange way... the late comers [media outlets] tend to focus on sensational issues to attract consumers... Sensational means conflicts to Koreans... that leads to conflicts within the community. (CSO Leader 3)

The gap between importance and satisfaction can be partially attributed to distrust at an organizational level among CSOs as well as between media and CSOs. Much of the distrust originates in the constant conflict within the Korean Society in the past that is often described as a “chronic yet universal” issue for all Korean Societies around the world—thus is not only confined to the Korean Society in Vancouver (CSO Leader 2). Media practitioners and CSO leaders equally point out that such conflicts arise from personal interests overriding community interests. In other words, there are more interest groups than volunteers. Added to the problem is that there is no third-party arbitrator who would be able to facilitate dialogue and reconcile conflicts (Media Practitioner 12). The Consulate General has been discussed as a potential arbitrator; however, such involvement is also regarded as an “intervention” of Korea in Korean-Canadian issues (ibid.).

Korean community back in 200 years in Manchuria, etc. the same thing happened back then too such as legal problems, fights, factions, jealousy, putting down other groups, embezzling money, and defamation suites in New York, LA, Boston, and San Francisco. All of these problems are present in all ethnic communities due to language and cultural barriers. People feel frustrated; most of who are involved in Korean community organizations are not well integrated into mainstream themselves. (CSO Leader 2)

Another frequently mentioned factor is a quantity over quality issue. There are over hundred organizations/associations/groups organized by Koreans, but only a handful of them are active. Many that are active are not professionally organized. The “marginal man syndrome” discussed earlier may explain the proliferation of organizations. It leads to people considering a title as all that is needed to replace a lost or displaced social position in a new country, rather than an organization itself to serve the community’s needs (CSO Leader 2). Lastly, there are simply no CSOs led by social or political activists. CSO leaders may be interested in political issues or even in politics, but they are not necessarily activists who would be able to mobilize the community and work as frontline community spokespersons. The Korean community is instead known as a “low maintenance community” in that “there are no particular complaints or interests unless
the issues become in direct conflict with their own personal interests” (CSO Leader 1 & Media Practitioner 13).

At a broader community level, a lack of cohesion in the community as a whole is also pointed out as a problem, with the community being “very nationalistic…pure race…we and us and ourselves only (mentality)” is another (CSO Leader 2). It is consistent with the findings of a Korean community study conducted for the City of Vancouver, Canadian Heritage, and MOSAIC in 2000 as part of the City’s Community Profile/Needs Assessment Project: “the divisions in the Korean population” and “a lack of a sense of community” (Spigelman, 2000). Community leaders point out several factors: different times of arrival and the varying socio-economic level, the increasingly transnational nature of settlement, and a generation gap between first-generation and Canadian-born second-generation Koreans, among others. In other words, there are divides along socio-economic and generation lines. Conflicts between old and new immigrants, economically underprivileged and hypercapitalist, and first-generation and 1.5/2nd-generation are manifested at both the individual and institutional levels:

We see fragmentation between old immigrants who came with nothing versus new immigrants with money who play golf every day. And there are 1.5- and second-generation immigrants who don't really speak Korean. Some Korean student organizations are fragmented by Korean language ability; those who can speak Korean versus who can't. (CSO Leader 2)

Among these issues, community workers point out the transnational nature of settlement is an important factor to pay attention to (Community Workers 1 & 2). Are you going to make your tomb in Vancouver? Where do you see yourself with your children in 10 years? These are important questions to ask, as they make a significant difference in immigrants’ attitudes toward how they live while they live “here,” especially when it comes to civic engagement and political participation (Community Worker 2). With obviously different goals in life between those who would leave for “home” and who make home “here,” the type of information each population segment needs may be different, yet simultaneously all of these populations are users of Korean communication infrastructure.

There is a large portion of temporary residents and visitors in Vancouver compared to L.A. and N.Y. This group of people has less intention to settle in the society, like raise kids and retire “here.” Thus, they have different attitudes
toward participation in and contribution to the society as well as plans for the next
generation. Once children have completed their post-secondary education,
parents tend to go back to Korea. (Community Worker 1)

Community workers, as positioned between community and government-funded
umbrella organizations, and in direct contact with local Koreans through their service
programs, suggest many interesting working ideas. One of the ways to have the Korean
Society and leading CSOs focus on their mandate and lead, not follow, the community is
to delegate their micro services to community workers. As discussed in Chapter 3, many
of the programs provided or attempted by CSOs are, in fact, provided by immigrant
service organizations such as S.U.C.C.E.S.S., Options Community Services Society, ISS,
and MOSAIC. It is only a matter of referring those in need to the right agencies, not of
duplicating services. Those resources can then be redirected to other community projects.
After all, the role of CSOs, especially the Koran Society, is to “envision” and suggest
overall direction for the community, rather than provide micro settlement services. It is
also suggested that community leaders take part in government decision-making
processes and have Korean representation in this decision-making. Without knowing the
rules of the game, all of the “initiatives” are likely to remain in the planning stage without
actual outcome. One community worker mentions that “in the committee meetings, it is
all about “what do they (immigrants) want us to do for them, instead of what can we do
for them with resources at hand” (Community Worker 3). The us-and-them dichotomy
still prevails and prevents the discussion from moving forward.

Second, community workers also suggest CSOs should work closely with media
and let important issues be known to the community with more depth. The series of
family suicide cases in the community, for example, needs community-wide attention and
more importantly, a “collective actors” role on the part of media and CSOs to “tie the
lessons of such stories to public policies” (Gamson, 2001, p. 68). Organizing community
debates is one of the important jobs for the Korean Society. Community workers suggest
public venues such as forums, focus groups, and public hearings when collecting public
opinions on a wide range of issues from the Korean Cultural Center and senior housing to
family violence, instead of collecting opinions of usual community spokespersons
(Community Worker 2). Third, collaboration between CSOs and service agencies is
desirable to synergize service programs. For example, C3’s Canadian experience of
growing up as Canadians and parenting programs of immigrant service organizations can generate new ideas.

4.3 Intercultural Roles and Challenges

Intercultural capacity building beyond the Korean community is emerging slowly but surely. It is still minimal quantitatively, but is definitely a priority for many Korean media outlets in both content and market. Securing local sources is critical not only to supplement a human resource shortage, but also to respond to the trend of “specialization of dailies” and “generalization of weeklies.” For greater appeal amidst demographic changes, dailies tend to strengthen their weekly-style, “soft news” sections (e.g., health, women, real estate) whereas weeklies start to include hard news. Equally, the constant ebbs and flows of media outlets in an already saturated enclave market make intercultural outreach to mainstream and other ethnic market the only market breakthrough for many Korean media. Such inevitable market factors, however, could entail positive intercultural implications, pushing previously in-group oriented (or self-sufficient) Korean media outlets to develop media strategies that go beyond Korean community. Many of the strategies are still in words rather than in action and more ad-hoc than constant. However, such attempts are becoming more visible. This section looks at intercultural initiatives and the challenges therein.

Institutional Interaction with Mainstream Media Institutions

Intercultural interactions can be discussed at two different levels: institution (mainstream media vs. diasporic media) and purpose (content vs. market). These two levels intersect at different junctures for different purposes. Korean media tend to interact with mainstream media for content and with other diasporic media for advertising. For content, as previously mentioned, there are a number of sources Korean media depend on for local “hard news” such as government offices (Canadian and Korean), corporate communication offices/PR, or local branches of Korean corporations, Canadian Press, and sources from personal networks. However, local sources for “soft news” are still limited. Korean media thus must reach out to secure a constant flow of content, and there
have been a few cases of licensing agreements between Korean and mainstream print media (usually magazines specializing in business, leisure, etc.) (Media Practitioner 13). Other than media outlets, venturing into mainstream cultural sources such as the Vancouver Opera is another. One media practitioner mentions that the company explores cultural sources to target stay-at-home mothers or “kirogi mothers,”54 referring to family issues related to mothers having hard time adopting a new country (Media Practitioner 5). Thus, when asked about the areas of potential collaboration between Korean and mainstream media, Korean media practitioners prioritize “providing/sharing news sources,” followed by “having membership to mainstream media circles” and “networking among media professionals” (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Institutional Collaboration between Diasporic and Mainstream Media” by Korean media practitioners in Vancouver

Other than formal interactions for content licensing/agreement, day-to-day interaction between Korean and mainstream journalists is more or less random calls for a

54 A mother from a Kirogi gajok or “wild geese family” in which the “father works in Korea separated from the immigrant mother and children” (Kim, 2010).
quick reference check or on site at press conferences. Mainstream journalists contact
Korean journalists sporadically when there are Korean-related incidents that need more
information. Inquires include information about people (e.g., Jiwon Park [a victim of
sexual assault in Vancouver], Sung Wan Kim [an investment fraud] or issues about North
Korea [e.g., nuclear proliferation] or South Korea [e.g., Pyungchang’s lost bid for the
winter Olympics]) (Media Practitioners 5 & 6). Such sporadic interactions, however,
suggest an important implication, that is, cultural translation on the part of mainstream
journalists. As discussed in the previous section, cultural translation provided by Korean
media depends on Korean journalists’ knowledge about Canada. If the same logic applies
to mainstream journalists, multicultural reporting (or diversity reporting) relies mainly on
journalists’ individual cultural literacy. As an evidence of this, in the case of the Victoria
family suicide, mainstream reporters contacted Korean media to ask about potential
cultural implications when Korean media covered it as a plain family violence case
(Media Practitioner 10).

Sometimes I get calls from (mainstream media) reporters for information about,
for example, Cirplus Mr. Kim or Ms. Park, you know that Stanley Park incident. I
contact them later for other stories to find out whether or not the people involved
in some incidents were Korean, my request is often ignored.
(Media Practitioner 6)

With respect to “having membership to mainstream media circles” and
“networking among media professionals,” the majority of Korean media outlets are not
affiliated with mainstream and diasporic media industry associations (Media Practitioner
1). Most Korean media practitioners are not aware of B.C. Press Council and there is no
Korean representation at the National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada
(NEPMCC) (Media Practitioner 5).

We are not affiliated with any Canadian media associations. There is no practical
reward. (Media Practitioner 1)

I have never heard of B.C. Press Council, but I am definitely willing to find more
about it. (Media Practitioner 5)

On the other hand, there is one interesting case that questions the institutional
readiness of mainstream media circles for ethnic membership. One media practitioner
recalls his initial contact with a local industry association in the print sector. The
practitioner is now a standing member of the association; however, his membership
application was initially rejected for the reason that the association had no capacity to review a non-English publication. The association instead offered him an associate member position, which grants all but voting rights. When he refused, the association asked the publisher to provide an English translation of the entire publication for review at his own expense. The publisher instead offered to provide a Korean-English interpreter for one day to assist their review, and finally received a full membership once the review was completed. When asked about the importance of full membership, the publisher puts it: “It is a breakthrough for all non-English publishers” (Media Practitioner 3). Again, the issue of “cultural literacy” on both parts resurfaces. On the part of Korean media practitioners, except for the case above, the existence and significance of mainstream media industry associations are rarely recognized. On the part of mainstream media associations, third-language media membership is still new and no systematic procedure is yet in place to accommodate ethnic members.

_Institutional Interaction with Other Diasporic Media Institutions_

With respect to interaction with other diasporic media institutions, interaction for content is low but market is growing. Figure 4.3, an importance-satisfaction rating on “content” confirms that the coverage of other ethnic communities is considered less important and less satisfied (see Section 4.1). First, the main reason mentioned by media practitioners is a lack of human resources; they would rather cover more news about the Korean community (Media Practitioner 13). Therefore, other than major cultural events such as the Chinese new year festival or issues that are already covered by mainstream media, many of stories about other ethnic communities are untold in Korean media. Second, it is a question of priorities. As the Korean community is still a young immigrant community, the priority is always getting to know about the broader society (Media Practitioner 10). Thus, other ethnic stories tend to get marginalized in reporting. Lastly, there is an added language barrier for content sharing with other diasporic media. One of the print outlets has an exclusive content licensing agreement with a local Chinese daily in Vancouver. However, double translation from Chinese into English and finally into Korean is rarely effective and efficient.
(Name of company) focuses on intercultural networking, but personally I do not put much emphasis on it. There is a lack of basic understanding. We are just at a stage of finding out who they are and what we can do for mutual benefits through a coalition of minorities. I put more emphasis on mainstream.

(Media Practitioner 10)

These findings are consistent with the results of the content analysis. While news about Canada is generally well-covered (in quantity), there is a significant lack of news about other cultural communities. Table 4.1 shows the geographic focus of news items by news origin (see Section 4.1). Over 50% of news items focus on Canada, followed by South Korea (36%). Only 2% of news items are dedicated to other ethnic groups. However, even these items are from other sources with none of the news reported directly by local Korean reporters. What is worthwhile to note is that the 2% of other ethnic news belongs to OMNI’s news pool to which in-house Chinese News and Punjabi News reporters contribute the day’s news items and share these items with other multi-language news teams including Korean. Some of the examples include stories about a local Chinese iPhone application developer (March 20, 2010) and Michael Ignatieff’s (the leader of Liberal Party of Canada) visit to S.U.C.C.E.S.S. (March 23, 2010). Both stories were covered by OMNI Chinese News reporters and selected by the Korean News team for the Korean audience. OMNI’s news pool, in this sense, poses a potential for a window to intercultural news through which Chinese storytelling can be learned, as Chinese news tends to depend largely on in-group sources and actors. A similar pattern of dependency is observed in Korean media (see Table 4.7 and Table 4.8).  

Coverage of other ethnic communities, however, is increasing to provide a window on ethnic neighbours, although stories tend to take a form of occasional special features rather than everyday hard news. Some of the examples include Korea Daily’s special feature called “Mosaic Canada” and “I love Korea.” The “Mosaic Canada” was a three-month series which started on March 22, 2009 with its first story about England. Twelve features covered the information about twelve countries Canadian immigrants are originally from, with stories about people living in Vancouver as immigrants: England (March 22), Israel (March 23), Mexico (March 23), Russia (May 27), Italy (March 29),

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Note that “ethnicity” in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 is coded only when directly mentioned or an identifier is provided in the text or voice. The high portion of “absent/unknown” in the local production (by staff writers) is largely European-origin Canadians whose “ethnicity” was not clearly indicated.
China (April 6), Vietnam (April 13), Iran (April 19), Eastern Europe (April 25), Japan (May 10), Africa (May 22), and Greece (June 1). The “I love Korea,” on the other hand, tells a story about Canadians who have connections with Korea: for example, Bruce Fulton, Associate Professor, Young-Bin Min Chair in Korean Literature and Literary Translation at UBC, and his career in Korean literature translation (January 23, 2010); Seetha Bhagavatula, a UBC student, and Korean language learning (January 31, 2010); and John Weston, MP, and his interests in Taekwondo (March 14, 2010).

Table 4.7 Ethnicity of news source by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity of News Source</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=76</td>
<td>n=25</td>
<td>n=32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (unspecified)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.8 Ethnicity of news actor by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity of News Actor</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=76</td>
<td>n=25</td>
<td>n=32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of countries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In market terms, on the other hand, there is relatively more interaction with other diasporic media. Tapping into enclave businesses of other ethnic communities seems to be an easy first step for intercultural marketing. One media practitioner mentioned that their company hired a marketing manager of Chinese ethnicity just for Chinese marketing to better appeal to Chinese clientele (Media Practitioner 5). It is an effort to eliminate a barrier of double translation and approach clientele with their “cultural idioms.” Some others, however, say that intercultural marketing still has a long way to go. Korean advertisers are trying to tap into Chinese market, but the same flow into Korean market cannot be expected (Media Practitioner 2). Chinese advertisers tend to prefer a short-term contract to test the water first. Thus, there are still more or less ad-hoc trials and withdrawals, if there is no immediate return. These Chinese businesses are, after all, also small enclave businesses. Intercultural ads (mainstream and other ethnic) thus generally remain at around 5% of the overall output for the majority of Korean media outlets. Other than election times when political institutions approach diasporic media to market to ethnic voters (Yu & Ahadi, 2010), Korean media generally have weak ties with mainstream advertisers. Table 4.9 shows the origin of advertisers by media type. Over 80% of ads are from Korean enclave businesses, and this rate is higher (94%) if it is restricted to newspapers only. The remaining 6% of the newspaper ads are placed by transnational corporations from Korea and mainstream/other ethnic ads. The portion of mainstream ads for TV (48%) is inflated. OMNI Korean News follows OMNI’s ad schedule, which allows a half of the ads to be Korean and the other half to be OMNI’s own sponsors.

Table 4.9 Origin of advertisers by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Advertisers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=474</td>
<td>n=106</td>
<td>n=368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Diaspora</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean from Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic communities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Intercultural Outreach: Branding Korean Media

Aside from ad-hoc trials, there are some long-term initiatives to market Korean media’s brands. Korea Daily’s newspaper dispenser at Sky Train stations is a good example. It has been over five years that the company has set up its own dispensers under a contract with TransLink (Metro Vancouver’s transportation authority). It is one of the company’s intercultural initiatives to promote the company’s brand throughout the broader society. Korea Daily is the only Korean newspaper available at Sky Train stations. Another attempt by the company is sponsorship of the annual Richmond Summer Night Market. Operated and organized by Lions Communications Inc. since 2008, the market run annually on weekends (Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) between May and October in Richmond, one of the most vibrant Chinese enclave cities (www.summernightmarket.com). The market originally started small in the late 1990s with only 70 booths at the Continental Centre, Richmond (Lee, 2006). Now it has expanded to include 250 booths and attract over 30,000 multicultural Vancouverites of all ethnicities (50% Chinese and 50% non-Chinese) on average in one weekend night (Lee, 2006; Kim, 2009). Korea Daily joined the Night Market as a media sponsor in 2009 and a co-organizer in 2010 and added the “Korean Festival” to the program to include Korean performances and a cooking demonstration (Lee, 2010b, 2010c).

Intercultural Outreach: Community-Wide Initiatives

Community-wide, intercultural initiatives are also becoming more visible and proactive. Some of the examples are fundraising events for the Haiti and Fukushima earthquakes and tsunami. For the Haiti earthquake, the Korean Society raised over $60,000 from the community, and with a government matching fund, delivered over $100,000 to Red Cross Canada (Choi, 2010a; Kwon, 2010b). For the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, the Korean Society collaborated with ten ethnic community leaders (e.g., Chinese, Filipino, African) to organize a “Walk-A-Thon” in May 2011 (Choi, 2011c; Cho, 2011). Eunice Oh, President of the Korean Society, announced that the event will be not only a fundraising event for Fukushima, but also “a venue for diverse ethnic communities to meet and mingle” (Choi, 2011c). The annual Korean
Heritage Day Festival is still another example. The most recent 2010 Festival was held in Blue Mountain Park of the City of Coquitlam on August 14, 2010 (see Figure 4.6). The year’s theme was “Harmony” to highlight the intercultural tone of the event. The event was open for everyone in the city regardless of ethnicity. There were various performances and contests including Muse Ensemble, Vancouver Korean Dance Society, Gayageum (Korean Harp), Korean Idol Contest by Tom Lee Music, Sunhangdo (Korean martial arts), Latin and Caribbean music and a South Asian dance team (Choi, 2010d). Sponsored by TD Bank and with 20 businesses participating, the event was also attended by the Honourable James Moore (Minister of Canadian Heritage and Official Languages), Yonah Martin (Senator), Harry Bloy (MLA), Douglas Horne (MLA), and Richard Stewart (Mayor of Coquitlam) (ibid.). Such intercultural initiatives are perceived positively within the community as a means to assist social integration (CSO Leader 2).

It's important for organizations to be more pan-ethnic…Some of the Korean organizations prevent Korean immigrants from being integrated to the mainstream society…you get comfortable and that's your social network. You speak Korean and you argue in Korean, and you go to Korean church. You become much distanced and become farther and farther from the broader society and lose the momentum of integration…so if the Korean organizations do something with Chinese community or other communities, it will be a bridge for them to get to know other people and sort of broaden their horizon so to speak. (CSO Leader 2)

Intercultural outreach or pan-ethnic (or pan-immigrant) initiatives are also gaining momentum outside of the community. The service agencies have become not only multicultural, but also multilingual and professional in terms of forming boards of directors (Community Workers 1 & 2). They reach out to ethnic communities to recruit young, professional 1.5- or second-generation immigrants to sit on their boards. Intercultural outreach also crosses borders. S.U.C.C.E.S.S., for example, through its Active Engagement and Integration Project (AEIP), has set up two international offices, one in Seoul (South Korea) and the other one in Taipei (Taiwan). Funded by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the overseas offices deliver pre-departure services to skilled workers, members of the family class and live-in caregivers (http://aeip.successbc.ca).

Governments encourage agencies to cooperate across communities and provide services to multiethnic groups…Even the existing agencies try to dilute their
ethnic color...thus, pursuing Korean non-profit agency is really against the trend. (Community Worker 1)

Figure 4.6  Korean Heritage Day Festival

Source: © Sherry Yu.
Blue Mountain Park, Coquitlam, B.C., August 14, 2010. (Top) Try & learn Korean traditional food; and Korean martial art demonstration by Sunhangdo; (Middle) Title sponsor TD Bank; and Hyundai Motors display; (Bottom) Liberal Party booth; and Liberal MLA Harry Bloy booth

Note.
Conclusion

Overall, amidst market pressure, Korean media play a sizeable civil society role within the Korean community by offering Korean storytelling at socio-cultural, political, and intercultural levels. On a socio-cultural level, culturally translated Korean storytelling that is unique to Korean diasporic media helps local Korean-Canadians enhance cultural literacy, through which a sense of place and identity as part of the process of social integration is negotiated. As well, geo-ethnic information about immigrant settlement services provided through collaborative initiatives with Korean community workers, and online communities developed through online publications of major newspapers further facilitate the exchange of, and provide solutions to, everyday concerns and inquiries raised by local Koreans. On a political level, mobilization of the community in support of Korean-Canadian candidates in elections, and the provision of necessary information to help assist informed civic and political participation, is gaining support in the community. Finally, intercultural initiatives are slowly yet surely emerging to serve editorial and marketing purposes. Feature stories about, and business partnership with, other diasporic communities on local cultural events demonstrate efforts toward intercultural outreach.

What is of concern, however, is the still limited capacity in production as well as distribution of Korean storytelling. On the production side, Korean storytelling is still quantitatively and qualitatively weak. Local production accounts for 45% of newspaper content and an alarming 8% of TV (OMNI Korean News produced by TV Korea). Limited socio-cultural and financial capital (e.g., access to sources, first-generation-dominated manpower, weak revenue structure) within small-business-style media outlets limits local production to a minimum. Audience fragmentation as a result of diversifying demographics (especially settled immigrants versus floating transnational populations) and the need of Korean news by the latter is also found to be a contributing factor. Qualitatively, the first-generation-dominant manpower contributes to the limited Korean-Canadian narrative. Korean media practitioners are mostly trained journalists from Korea, recruited locally through in-house exams (writing, English skills, and Canadian knowledge). However, a short window between the time they immigrate to Canada and
the time they join Korean media often suggests that these journalists are new immigrants themselves in the process of social integration. Only a handful of 1.5-generation reporters are at a staff level, and media ownership by the 1.5-generation has been limited and shortly lived.

On the distribution side, Korean storytelling has limited circulation within the community without proper links to the broader media system. Again, TV Korea’s Korean News provides no subtitles, thus is unable to reach a broader audience. All print media also focus on the in-language group without any attempts to develop English editions, as found in L.A.’s Korean media market. Institutional interaction with mainstream and other diasporic media is also limited. Misrepresentation of or controversies related to immigrants or Koreans in mainstream media are spotted in daily monitoring and are discussed in Korean media. However, these issues are rarely given an institutional or community-wide response. Mainstream media institutions also contact Korean media only for quick reference checks on Korea/Korean-related issues. Interaction with other diasporic media is emerging yet not substantial, as mainstream news is a priority to Korean media outlets. Beyond media institutions, governments and other political institutions also approach Korean media only occasionally around election times.

In this sense, Korean media may be a civil society for the Korean community; however, they do not as yet function as a means of enhancing cultural literacy for members of broader society. Korean media are committed at best to “geo-Korean storytelling” that is circulated only within the community, rather than “neighbourhood storytelling” across communities, or multicultural storytelling within the broader media system. In other words, Korean media are a window to the broader society for the Korean community, but are yet to be a window to the Korean community for the broader society. Thus, they may contribute to enhancing the cultural literacy of local Koreans, but not yet contribute to enhancing the cultural literacy of a broader audience to the same extent. Such a reality in the production and distribution of Korean storytelling for this young, monolingual and first-generation dominant diaspora suggests a need for policy support in capacity building in this sector. Canadian Content rules do push TV Korea toward local production; however, the rules without a proper means to move forward allows for only 8% of the production to be local with the rest being supplemented by external sources.
Considering that OMNI Korean News is the only Korean news available over-the-air and is a potential window for Korean storytelling for a broader audience, capacity building in this sector is especially important.

Professional training with respect to enhancing cultural literacy of both mainstream and diasporic journalists also requires policy coordination. Many Korean journalists are in the process of integration themselves, thus journalistic training in Canadian institutions is critical for proper geo-ethnic storytelling. Adaptation of industry standards through affiliation with industry associations is also important and much desired, as mentioned by media practitioners. Similar training is also critical for mainstream journalists with regards to reporting diversity. A quick reference check for the cultural implications of an event can provide only a shallow interpretation. Unless there is a mechanism to institutionally connect journalists, the silent delivery of news about “here” from diasporic media, matched by superficial, quick reference checks into ethnic communities by mainstream media are likely to continue.
5: The Context of Production and Distribution: Los Angeles

The case of Vancouver has confirmed that both structural and institutional conditions characterize the context of media production and distribution. Geo-specific conditions such as patterns of settlement and overall structure of diasporic communication infrastructure influence everyday media production and distribution. This chapter explores geo-specificities that contextualize L.A.’s Korean media with a special focus on Korean media as business ventures.

5.1 Patterns of Settlement

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea (MOFAT), there are over two million Koreans in the U.S., and approximately 30% (equivalent to 622,100) are located in the state of California (see Table 5.1). According to the 2010 U.S. Census, on the other hand, that number is halved. There are 1,423,784 Koreans (equivalent to 0.5% of the total U.S. population, single ethnicity) in the U.S. and 451,892 Koreans (1.2% of the California population, single ethnicity) in the state of California (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a, 2010b). The gap between these two counts is significant: 678,499 in the national total and 170,208 in the Californian total. Korean community leaders’ unofficial estimate is even higher than that from the MOFAT: over two million Koreans in the U.S. with over one million in the state of California, and over 700,000 of those in California are found in L.A. County. As one CSO leader puts it: “We are missing one million Koreans in the Census” (CSO Leader 5). The main reason for
such a gap is the low participation\footnote{As part of efforts to change this, the 2010 Census received some media coverage in the Korean media: 21 out of 1,593 news items of Korean media promoted awareness and participation in the Census. The actual number may be insignificant; it is equivalent to two to three items on the Census in each week (during March and April 2010) by various local Korean media. Some of the headlines read: “Census equals political power” (KBS America, March 16, 2010); “Census forms are available in Korean: Korean organizations encourage participation” (Korea Daily, March 15, 2010); “Assistance available for Census questions” (TVK24, March 20, 2010); and “Census, 20% participated so far” (TVK24, March 24, 2010).} of Koreans in the U.S. Census, said a CSO leader (ibid.). The participation of undocumented Koreans is particularly low. According to Dong-suk Kim of the Korean-American Voters’ Council (KAVC), concerns about potential disadvantage from participating in the Census, in fact, prevail among undocumented Koreans (Wang, 2011). The MOFAT estimate also may not be accurate, as the estimate is based on the numbers reported by consular offices whose numbers are primarily collected unsystematically by the Korean CSOs and churches (Wang, 2011).

We often say the Korean-American Federation here represents 750,000 or one million Koreans. Honestly, it is embarrassing that no institutions such as the (name of CSO), the Consulate General office, and the City of L.A. have an accurate count of the Korean population in the U.S. These are all estimates... Many Koreans do not participate in the Census. I hear from news today that 10% of Americans do not want to participate in the Census either. (CSO Leader 5)

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lrrrr}
\hline
 & \multicolumn{2}{c}{U.S.} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{California} \\
 & Total & \% & Total & \% \\
\hline
Korean Total & 2,102,283 & & 622,100 & \\
U.S. citizens & 1,003,429 & 48 & 359,200 & 58 \\
Korean citizens & 1,098,854 & 52 & 262,900 & 42 \\
- Permanent resident & 524,084 & & 105,900 & \\
- Visa student & 105,242 & & 20,800 & \\
- Other & 469,528 & & 136,200 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Koreans in the U.S. (2009)}
\end{table}

Looking at the demographic profile, Koreans in California are well settled with a relatively smaller “floating” population. According to the MOFAT (2009), close to 60% of the Koreans in California are naturalized citizens, a percentage that is higher than the
national average (48%). This number is also higher when compared to that of B.C. (30%). Korean citizens, on the other hand, account for 42%, a number that is lower than the national total (52%). However, among Korean citizens, there are more temporary residents (visa students and other) (60%) than permanent residents (40%), and some of these temporary residents are undocumented migrants. One CSO leader mentions that of the 750,000 Koreans in L.A. County, 350,000 are documented and the rest are undocumented (CSO Leader 5).

In terms of age, according to the 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Koreans (single ethnicity) are only slightly younger than the general U.S. population (36.7 years old by median age compared to 37.2 years old of the national population) with a higher portion of the younger age group (18 years old or over) and a lower portion of the senior group (65 years old or over): 81% and 10% respectively compared to 76% and 13% respectively (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). Koreans in Korean-concentrated areas, on the other hand, tend to be older than the general population: 39 years old compared to 35 years old in California and L.A. County, and 41 years old compared to 34 years old in L.A. City (ibid.). These figures reflect a higher concentration of both younger and older populations in those regions: 82% and 13% respectively in California, 83% and 14% in L.A. County, and 88% and 17% respectively in L.A. City (ibid.).

In terms of education attainment, Koreans demonstrate significantly higher educational level. Nationally, 35% of Koreans (25 years and over) hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, compared to 18% of the U.S. population (U.S. Census, 2010c). Koreans in California show a similar pattern: 39% compared to 19% of the general population (ibid.). However, higher education level does not necessarily imply higher household income. According to the the 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Koreans’ median household income in 2010 (of those who are 16 years old or over in the labour force) is $50,316 compared to $50,046 of the national median (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). The gap between Koreans and the general population widens at the lower geographic levels: $51,780 compared to $57,708 in California; and $47,773 compared to $52,684 in L.A. County (ibid.). Narrowing the figure down to L.A. City where Koreatown (or K-town) is located, the gap is the widest: $37,046 compared to
$47,031 (ibid.). As discussed in Chapter 2, it is important to note that these figures reflect the income gap within the Korean community: higher individual median income compared to the national population ($45,516 compared to $41,526) and simultaneously a higher poverty rate, especially among Korean seniors (21% compared to 9%). Koreans in L.A. City where Koreatown is located earn far less with individual median income of $38,890 (compared to $36,799) and the highest poverty rate among seniors (30% compared to 16% of the generation population) (ibid.).

One CSO leader mentions that the growing senior population and poverty among them, especially in Koreatown, is one of the major issues the Korean community faces at the present time (CSO Leader 5). The poverty rate among Korean seniors (65 years old or older) is, in fact, higher than that of Hispanic/Latino seniors: 21% compared to 19% nationally, and 22% compared to 15% in California (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). The high poverty rate is also attributed to the growing undocumented population within the community. L.A., which used to be a gateway or a temporary home for most new Korean immigrants, has now become a home for low-income, undocumented migrants, especially since Korea’s financial crisis in 1997 (CSO Leader 3). The rate of Koreans who have declared their status in the U.S. has increased in the past 10 years (MOFAT, 2010). On average, two out of three Koreans in the U.S. have declared their status in the U.S., not in Korea before they left for the U.S. (ibid.).

Poverty among Korean seniors is serious in Koreatown. They are not low income, but below the low income. However, only a few receive government social benefits…Only about 1% of Koreans receive food stamps. Although they have lived in the U.S. for many years, a lot of them do not know about social programs. Such a low level of entitlement to government social benefits also has to do with social stigma. You do not want to be looked as low income….The growing senior population is a serious issue…It is not known to the mainstream society so they think Koreans are well off. More Korean seniors than Latino seniors suffer from poverty. (CSO Leader 5)

L.A. used to be a gateway for Korean immigrants. They come to L.A. first and then move to other states and cities after they make money. However, these days, people go directly to wherever they want to live. More recent, low-income, and undocumented migrants come to L.A., especially after Korea’s financial crisis in 1997. An influx of Koreans to the U.S. tripled in the past 10 years. (CSO Leader 3)

In terms of place of birth, a majority of Koreans are foreign-born. The 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c) reveals that
75% of Koreans (single ethnicity) in L.A. County were foreign-born and 88% speak a language other than English at home (ibid.). These figures are higher when compared to the general Asian population in the same county: 68% of Asians were foreign-born and 80% speak a language other than English (ibid.). One of the noticeable changes in Korean demographics, however, is the growing number of 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Americans who have completed their education in the U.S. and have entered the workforce (Min, 2006c, p. 230). According to the American Community Survey, 26% of Koreans are U.S.-born and 21% (population 5 years old and over) speak English only (ibid.). These offspring of the post-1965 immigrants are in their 30s and 40s, and are active in various fields including politics, military, media, sports, literature, music and entertainment (Martin, 2005). Some prominent examples include Juju Chang (media), Michelle Wie (golf), the Ahn trio (music), Margaret Cho and Daniel Dae Kim (entertainment) (ibid.).

Suburbanization

With respect to settlement, L.A.’s Korean community is also characterized by three main patterns of settlement: suburbanization, enclave business and self-employment, and communication infrastructure consisting of media and organizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, suburbanization is common among Asian immigrants. The 2010 Census reveals the heightened tendency to suburbanization. While all twenty of California’s most populated counties saw an increase in population in the past ten years, Santa Clara, Alameda, San Mateo, and Orange Counties saw the most noticeable increase in this Asian population (see Table 5.2). For the Korean population in particular, L.A. (199,769) and Orange (73,947) Counties continued to host the majority of Koreans (67% of Koreans in California), followed by Santa Clara (26,471), San Diego (18,036), and Alameda (17,731) (see Table 5.3). Of these two counties, except for the concentration in the city of L.A. (97,505), Koreans are generally dispersed throughout the following cities: Fullerton (13, 277), Irvine (13,130), Torrance (10,857), Glendale (10,723), Cerritos (6,964), Buena Park (6,339), and Garden Grove (5,154) (see Table 5.4 and Figure 5.1). These are, in fact, visible-minority-concentrated cities, especially those with a large
Asian population. The average visible minority presence in the eight cities in Table 5.4 is approximately 50% of the general population, with the highest being Cerritos (73%) and the lowest being Glendale (27%). Among visible minorities, Asians account for well over 60% with the highest being Irvine (88%) and the lowest being L.A. (23%). The presence of Koreans is most significant in Fullerton (23%), Glendale (20%), Torrance (18%), and Irvine (16%). Growing suburbanization reflects a prevailing perception among Koreans that suburban residence is “a status symbol and evidence of economic success” (Kang, 2004 cited in Lee & Park, 2008, p. 250) as well as a sign of integration to the broader society (Media Practitioner 22).

Koreans living in L.A. are more isolated than Koreans living in New York… I think it is a space issue. The businesses of N.Y. Koreans tend to be located outside of N.Y. K-town area…K-town here is so huge that you do not need to speak a word of English and you are perfectly okay…That is why those who have lived here longer tend to move out to suburb, what have you, to integrate (to the mainstream society) in a little way…Koreans, for most part, hang on to the Korean community longer (than other ethnic groups) whether through churches, etc.…L.A. Koreans are very Korean. You know what I mean. (Media Practitioner 22)

Figure 5.1 Korean-concentrated cities in L.A. and Orange Counties

Source: © 2012 Google. Placemarks added by the author.
The relatively high Korean concentration in the city of L.A., on the other hand, is attributed to the proximity to Koreatown. Situated three miles west of downtown Los Angeles, K-town is the hub of the Korean enclave economy (Min, 2006c, pp. 236-237). Figure 5.2 shows the recently marked new K-town boundary that stretches from Vermont Avenue to Western Avenue (east to west) and 3rd Street to Olympic Boulevard (north to south) (Chung, 2010a). For Koreans, K-town is a “toehold or social incubator for new Korean immigrants to gain experience in small business, join or create ethnic networks, and accumulate capital for opening their own businesses” (Lee & Park, 2008, p. 250) rather than a permanent residence. Koreans, in fact, account for only 20% of the K-town residents (equivalent to 46,664) while Latinos now account for 50% (Yu et al. cited in Min, 2006c).

Figure 5.2 Koreatown in L.A.

Source: © 2012 Google. Shade added by the author.
### Table 5.2  
Asian population in California’s top 20 Counties: % change over 10 years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>2010 Census</th>
<th>2000 Census</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>Asian 2010</th>
<th>Asian % 2010</th>
<th>Asian % 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California Total</td>
<td>37,253,956</td>
<td>33,871,648</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4,861,007</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles County</td>
<td>9,818,605</td>
<td>9,519,338</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1,346,865</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego County</td>
<td>3,995,313</td>
<td>2,813,833</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>336,091</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange County</td>
<td>3,010,232</td>
<td>2,846,289</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>537,804</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside County</td>
<td>2,189,641</td>
<td>1,545,387</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>130,468</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Bernardino County</td>
<td>2,035,210</td>
<td>1,709,434</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>128,603</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara County</td>
<td>1,781,642</td>
<td>1,682,585</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>570,524</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda County</td>
<td>1,510,271</td>
<td>1,443,741</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>394,560</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento County</td>
<td>1,418,788</td>
<td>1,223,499</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>203,211</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa County</td>
<td>1,049,025</td>
<td>948,816</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>151,469</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno County</td>
<td>930,450</td>
<td>799,407</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>89,357</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kern County</td>
<td>839,631</td>
<td>661,645</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>34,846</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventura County</td>
<td>823,318</td>
<td>753,197</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>55,446</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco County</td>
<td>805,235</td>
<td>776,733</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>267,915</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Mateo County</td>
<td>718,451</td>
<td>707,161</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>178,118</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Joaquin County</td>
<td>685,306</td>
<td>563,598</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>98,472</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanislaus County</td>
<td>514,453</td>
<td>446,997</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>26,090</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonoma County</td>
<td>483,878</td>
<td>458,614</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>18,341</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulare County</td>
<td>442,179</td>
<td>368,021</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>15,176</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Barbara County</td>
<td>423,895</td>
<td>399,347</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>20,665</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monterey County</td>
<td>415,057</td>
<td>401,762</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>25,258</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
Author’s compilation based on Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data and the 2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000b & 2010d).

### Table 5.3  
Korean population in major California Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>L.A.</th>
<th>Orange</th>
<th>Santa Clara</th>
<th>San Diego</th>
<th>Alameda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population (estimate 2005-2009)</td>
<td>9,785,295</td>
<td>2,976,831</td>
<td>1,729,378</td>
<td>2,987,543</td>
<td>1,457,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Visible minority (one race):</td>
<td>4,529,565</td>
<td>1,022,419</td>
<td>769,185</td>
<td>750,970</td>
<td>709,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>862,521</td>
<td>51,016</td>
<td>44,401</td>
<td>151,261</td>
<td>187,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian and Alaska Native</td>
<td>51,809</td>
<td>14,505</td>
<td>9,172</td>
<td>21,272</td>
<td>7,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee tribal grouping</td>
<td>3,159</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chippewa tribal grouping</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nageo tribal grouping</td>
<td>1,917</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux tribal grouping</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1,276,546</td>
<td>479,750</td>
<td>522,847</td>
<td>304,192</td>
<td>358,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>75,358</td>
<td>41,731</td>
<td>100,757</td>
<td>19,229</td>
<td>63,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>374,367</td>
<td>77,288</td>
<td>140,628</td>
<td>45,407</td>
<td>131,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>305,758</td>
<td>64,791</td>
<td>84,934</td>
<td>135,272</td>
<td>79,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>102,215</td>
<td>32,522</td>
<td>27,092</td>
<td>17,992</td>
<td>12,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>199,769</td>
<td>73,947</td>
<td>26,471</td>
<td>18,036</td>
<td>17,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>89,577</td>
<td>154,398</td>
<td>114,918</td>
<td>40,884</td>
<td>26,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>123,522</td>
<td>35,073</td>
<td>28,047</td>
<td>27,372</td>
<td>27,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>26,956</td>
<td>9,481</td>
<td>6,247</td>
<td>13,689</td>
<td>10,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian</td>
<td>5,013</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>2,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guamanian or Chamorro</td>
<td>4,463</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>908</td>
<td>4,744</td>
<td>1,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>10,328</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>2,352</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>7,152</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>5,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some other race</td>
<td>2,311,733</td>
<td>467,667</td>
<td>186,518</td>
<td>260,556</td>
<td>144,998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:  
Author’s compilation based on the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010e)
Table 5.4  Korean population in Korean-concentrated cities in L.A. and Orange Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>L.A. County</th>
<th>L.A. County</th>
<th>Orange County</th>
<th>Orange County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L.A.</td>
<td>Glendale</td>
<td>Torrance</td>
<td>Cerritos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population (Estimate 2005-2009)</td>
<td>3,796,840</td>
<td>195,876</td>
<td>139,976</td>
<td>51,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visible minority (one race):</td>
<td>1,783,580</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>52,815</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>371,325</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>3,913</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian and</td>
<td>20,153</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska Native</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokee tribal grouping</td>
<td>1,267</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chippewa tribal grouping</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navajo tribal grouping</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sioux tribal grouping</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>405,425</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31,250</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>30,284</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>65,514</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,519</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>118,353</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11,937</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>35,104</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>97,505</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10,723</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>21,084</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>37,581</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian</td>
<td>8,433</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guamanian or Chamorro</td>
<td>2,060</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>2,459</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some other race</td>
<td>978,244</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>17,067</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010e)
Enclave Economy and Self-Employment

A strong enclave economy, comprised of small businesses is a second major characteristic of the Korean diaspora. Along with K-town, there are Korean commercial districts in the major ethnoburbs. According to the Korea Times’ Korean Business Directory 2010, there are 20,261 businesses in the five major Korean ethnoburbs (L.A., Orange, San Diego, San Bernardino, and Riverside), and 67% of these businesses (equivalent to 13,509) are located in L.A. County (Lee, 2010e). According to the Korea Times analysis, over 50% of the Korean businesses are professional businesses as of 2010 such as hospitals, law and accounting offices, signaling a “rearrangement of Korean businesses” from traditional labour-intensive businesses to professional, high-profit yielding businesses (ibid.). The growth of hospitals is the most significant, with a gain of 100, which brings the total number of Korean hospitals to 2,100. It is, in fact, the most flourishing business category in the community, followed by realtors (1,650), restaurants (1,265), schools/academies (798), and automobiles (761) (ibid.). On the other hand, businesses such as dry cleaners, shipping, and insurance, among others, showed a decrease by five to 10 percent during the economic recession (ibid.). Korean media outlets are also concentrated in the K-town area. There are over 50 Korean media outlets in the city of L.A. and almost half of these outlets are located along Wilshire Boulevard that runs from east to west in the middle of the K-town boundary (see the dotted line in Figure 5.2).

Orange County houses 25% (equivalent to 5,098) of the Korean businesses (ibid.). Figure 5.3 shows the three major clusters of Korean ethnoburbs in Orange County, led by Fullerton and Irvine: Fullerton-Buena Park, Garden Grove-Anaheim, and Irvine-Tustin. Orange County also demonstrates a business-residence divide. Garden Grove is an

57 San Bernardino and Riverside Counties are included here instead of Santa Clara and Alameda Counties (Table 5.3). The Korean population in each of these two counties accounts for approximately 10,000, only a half of the latter two counties (U.S. Census Bureau, the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates).

58 Some of the labour-intensive businesses often discussed are grocery/green grocery retail, fish retail, retail of manufactured goods imported from Asian countries, dry cleaning, manicure services, and garment manufacturing (Min, 2006c, p. 239). Among these, the grocery/liquor retail is most popular among Koreans (ibid.).
outpost of the Korean enclave economy whereas Fullerton and Irvine are residential areas. Unlike K-town, which saw changes in business type, Garden Grove has seen a change in the geographic centre of the Korean enclave economy. Korean businesses are gradually moving to Beach Boulevard from Garden Grove Boulevard, with a move of Vietnamese businesses from Westminster that are slowly occupying the former Korean business outpost (Media Practitioner 39). The rationale behind this move requires further research: the potential change in the landscape of the Korean enclave in Orange County, as well as an ethnic dynamic in this area, is important to monitor.

Figure 5.3 Korean Ethnoburbs in Orange County

Along with small businesses, large-scale Korean entrepreneurship based on local immigrant capital is also present. One of the leading examples of this is Forever 21. Founded in 1984 as a small clothing company, it has grown to have 500 stores with
27,600 employees in 16 countries (Lee, 2011). The company also continues to be top among minority corporations headquartered in L.A. County, with its 2010 revenue reaching $2.6 billion (ibid.). It was discussed earlier that L.A.’s booming garment industry in the 1970s attracted Korean immigrants to over-select L.A. as a destination. The success of Forever 21 is one of the American dream stories of earlier Korean immigrants well known to the community. Other Korean-American corporations that have made to the list include JC Sales at 10th with $167 million, Pacific American Fish at 11th with $160 million, Ku’s Manufacturing at 13th with $108 million and the Bank Card Service at 16th with $79 million (ibid.). Considering that the GDP of L.A. County (2009-2010) is approximately 500 billion, this is a significant contribution to the county (County of Los Angeles, California Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2010).

The proliferation of small businesses means a high rate of self-employment. According to MOFAT estimates (2009), 40% of Koreans in Southern California and its neighbouring states, including Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico, are self-employed, followed by office workers (25%), professionals (15%), students (10%) and others (10%). This trend is also consistent with Light and Bonacich’s (1988) earlier study on Korean entrepreneurs in L.A. First, compared to non-Korean entrepreneurs, Korean entrepreneurs are prone to self-employment without employees, and businesses often involve family members working for long hours. Second, such “ethnic facilitation” of having kin or co-ethnic labour in the workforce leads to “industrial clustering,” that is, overrepresentation in some industries and underrepresentation in others (p. 179). Korean-language media further intensifies this trend in that “Koreans linked themselves into an information system that channeled them into those industrial niches already dominated by coethnics” and “constrained to buy businesses listed in the Korean-language newspapers” (pp. 187-189).

Such co-ethnic facilitation and overrepresentation in certain industries, however, is no longer a valid option for Korean immigrant entrepreneurs. K-town, and elsewhere in L.A., is transforming into a site of multiethnic labour and an incubator for transnational capital, forcing predominantly monocultural and monolingual Koreans working out of small immigrant capital business enterprises into more interethnic and transnational situations. Such changes involve dealing with intra- and inter-ethnic issues; much of them
have to do with Korean entrepreneurs’ positions as “middlemen” in the increasingly hybridized K-town, as well as elsewhere, which can often have diverse class and ethnic relations. Lee and Park (2008, p. 252) discuss the pyramid of K-town socio-economic classes which places Korean “small business owners” in the middle between “hegemonic actors” ([transnational] investors, large-scale business owners, property owners, and developer corporations) at the top and “(undocumented) Korean workers” and “undocumented Latino workers” at the bottom. As evidence, there are over 30 branches of Korean transnational corporations in California and nearly 70% are located in the city of L.A. and the adjacent cities in Orange County (Korea Times Korean Business Directory 2008-2009). Some of these branches include Samsung Electronics America Inc., Hyundai Motor America, Kia Motors America, Hyosung America Inc., Kumho Tire U.S.A. Inc., Bekseju America Inc., and Jinro America Inc. These are also active sponsors of Korean media outlets (see the next section for details).

High dependency on a multiethnic labour force implies certain potential for inter-ethnic conflicts. An example of such is a conflict over the underpayment of undocumented workers. Min’s (2006, p. 243) 1986 survey of Korean immigrants in L.A. and Orange Counties found cases of underpayment of Latino employees, which resulted in the picketing of Korean firms by Latino employees. Relationships among Koreans in relation to the ethnic diversity within the Korean community are another issue. Lee and Park (2008, P. 255) termed it “invisible multiculturalism,” referring to multiple Korean ethnicities present in K-town: Korean-Chinese (Cho-sun-jok), Korean-Latin Americano, Chinese-Korean (Hwa-gyo) and North Korean defectors. For monocultural and monolingual Koreans who weigh highly the family, regional, and school ties (hyulyeon, jiyeon, hakyeon), the difference –within can weaken the bond.

Inter-ethnic conflicts are, however, not new to the Korean community, although historically, interethnic conflicts surfaced more frequently outside than inside K-town. The traditional role of “middleman minority,” that is, businesses that are located “between low-income minority consumers and large companies, often distributing merchandise made by predominantly White-owned corporations to African American and Latino customers,” systematically positioned Korean entrepreneurs in vulnerable situations (Min, 1996, p. 3). This in-between position often led to conflicts with both
customers and suppliers such as discrimination on price and quality of merchandises (Min, 2006c, p. 243). One of the noted cases is the 1991 case of Soon Ja Du, a Korean grocery owner in South Central,\(^5^9\) who shot Latasha Harlins, an African-American customer, to death while struggling over an unpaid bottle of orange juice (ibid.). A minimum level of English, added to “a low level of tolerance for the cultural differences found in the United States” due to lack of similar experience with “significant subcultural differences in their home country” (Min, 2006c, p. 248) and “no historical understanding or awareness of the American civil rights movement and U.S. race relations in general” (Chang & Diaz-Veizades, 1999, p. 49), makes this middleman position even more challenging. Chang and Diaz-Veizades (1999) argue that the Korean merchant/African-American consumer relationship projects Korean merchants as opportunistic, taking resources away from the African-American community, thus positioning them as easy “scapegoats” on whom African-Americans can let out historically prolonged anger toward the White mainstream society (p. 36), as well expressed in the 1992 L.A. riots.

### 5.2 Overview of Communication Infrastructure

One of the most visible characteristics of the Korean diaspora is strong ethnic attachment, manifested through establishment of communication infrastructure. The first-generation Koreans of monocultural and monolingual backgrounds have created organizations, churches, alumni networks, and most importantly, media outlets to cater to Korean-specific needs. The changes over the years presented in this section suggest that the Korean community has become more “political,” especially in the post-1992 L.A. riots, “younger” through participation of U.S.-trained 1.5- and second-generation Koreans, “intercultural” in its organizing efforts, and “transnational” with an influx of transnational capital from Korea to the enclave economy. This section looks into the L.A. Korean community’s communication infrastructure with special attention to how these multiple factors come into play and conditions Korean storytelling. K-town’s role as a

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\(^5^9\) The history of Korean merchants in South Central (L.A.’s African American and Hispanic neighbourhood) goes back as far as the 1960s and 1970s when they started setting up wig stores in abandoned places, destroyed during the 1960 riots in South Central (Min, 2006c). A higher return than similar business elsewhere is one draw of these neighbourhoods (ibid.).
venue for political empowerment and an institutional bridge in inter-ethnic relations is an important factor.

5.2.1 Community Organizations

L.A.’s Korean community boasts over 100 years of history beginning in 1882 with the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of Chosun (Korea) and the United States (MOFAT, 2007). Thus, Korean immigration to the U.S. started long before 1948 when the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea was established in L.A. and Honolulu, followed by the Korean embassy in Washington D.C. and the Consulate General offices in New York and San Francisco in 1949 (see Table 2.1). The Korean immigration history may be long; however, it was not until the 1970s that the community’s communication infrastructure started to form (Media Practitioner 35). Koreatown, the socio-economic and political hub of the Korean community, was officially designated by the city of L.A. in 1980. As Chung (2007, p. 283) argues, K-town is institutionally complete, equipped with the capacity to serve multiple roles for the fragmented Korean population: “a residential space for the poor and the elderly, an economic outpost for larger global production processes, a venue for socioeconomic and political empowerment, and an institutional bridge for integration with other racial and ethnic groups.”

The Korean community’s leading organizations are located in K-town. According to the Korean-American Federation of L.A., there are 375 Korean community organizations/associations/groups registered to the Federation. However, there are equally as many organizations that are not registered and operate in isolation. Thus, including both registered and non-registered organizations, there are approximately 600 Korean organizations in operation. The 2008-2009 Korea Times’ Korean Business Directory and Radio Korea Business Directory list over 100 “service/public organizations” and nearly 300 “interest groups” in L.A. and Orange Counties. Thus, most of the registered organizations/associations/groups may be included in these directories.

As discussed in Chapter 3, organizations can be classified by what they do, where they are located, whom they serve, and additionally, who they are led by. The Korean
community has organizations that belong to each of these distinctive yet simultaneously overlapping categories. The actual count by category is unavailable. One of the reasons for this is that the directories tend to categorize organizations bluntly by “service/public organizations” and “interest groups” and list them in Korean alphabetical order, not by what they do. Second, organizations differ by size and level of activities. Some are organized professionally and have ongoing activities that are regularly known to the community, while others are organizations of one member and inactive most of the time (CSO Leader 5). In other words, quantity does not necessarily translate into quality. One media practitioner puts it: “There are approximately 300 organizations, yet they are recognized only by those who created them” (Media Practitioner 37). For these reasons, much of the discussions in this section will focus on the selected 15 organizations that are commonly mentioned by interviewed media practitioners as “major” Korean organizations.

Looking at organizations by what they do, a brief scan of the list suggests that there are organizations categorized as social services and advocacy (see below for examples), art and culture (e.g., Los Angeles Korean Festival Foundation), professional (e.g., Korean Community Lawyers Association), business/commerce (e.g., Ko-Am Chamber of Commerce of L.A.), senior (e.g., L.A. Senior Citizens Society), women (Korean-American Women’s Association), religious (e.g., Council of Korea Churches in Southern California, Korean Churches for Community Development), and volunteer (e.g., Pacific America Volunteer Association), among others. Among these organizations, the Korean-American Federation of L.A. is the representative. It is the first point of contact for the Korean community for the broader society and the Korean government alike. Founded in 1962, it was originally named the Korean Association of Southern California (KASC) and later changed to the current name in 1980 (Chung, 2007, p. 65). The Federation has been led by 30 presidents, including the current President, Scarlet Um. With the forthcoming election in Korea in 2012, the Korean Federation carries additional significance as a venue for the Korean government to access over 200,000 overseas Korean voters in California. This number can actually have an impact on election results (Media Practitioner 35).
In the 1970s and 1980s, there were only 30,000 to 40,000 Koreans here in Southern California. Now there are approximately 1,000,000 Koreans, and 220,000 of them are Korean citizens who can vote in Korean elections. The win-loss of elections usually depends on 500,000 votes. Therefore, L.A. votes can be influential. (Media Practitioner 35)

One of the important projects led by the Korean Federation since 2009 is the redrawing of the K-town boundary. Historically, K-town overlaps “contested boundaries” of the “four biracial and multiracial regions, including several highly clustered Asian-Latino spaces extending from Koreatown eastward into West Covina; one overlapping Asian-African-American section around the Koreatown-West Adams border; one White-Asian area on the northern periphery of Hollywood; and a small multiracial area consisting African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans” (Oliver & Grant cited in Chung, 2007, p. 53). The redrawing of a new K-town boundary continued such a tradition over the area. The discussion of this redrawing originally started in December 2008 when the Bangladeshi community proposed to build “Little Bangladesh” in the middle of K-town on 3rd Street (Yoo, 2010). Conflicts of interest continued to surface during the process as there were overlaps in the boundaries proposed by the interest groups: the Koreatown Boundary Committee, Wilshire Center Koreatown Neighbourhood Council, Pico-Union Neighbourhood Council, and Councilman Tom Labonge (ibid.). Specifically, the overlap between the Koreatown Boundary Committee and the Pico-Union Neighbourhood Council included the area where the El Salvador community has wished to develop “El Salvador Business Street” (Chung, 2010b). The Koreatown Boundary Committee, led by C. Y. Lee, Director of the Korean-American Federation, proposed to retain the original K-town boundary, which was officially approved by the City of L.A. in 1980 (Chung, 2010a) (see Figure 5.4). However, after numerous public hearings, the smallest among the proposed options was approved by the City of L.A. in August 2010: from Vermont Avenue to Western Avenue (east to west) and from 3rd Street to Olympic Boulevard (north to south), with the approval of “Little Bangladesh” on 3rd Street (ibid.). The shaded area in Figure 5.4 is the new boundary. The significance of this outcome is more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 6.
The involvement of the younger generation in the community organizations is noticeable in L.A.’s Korean community. The examples of 1.5- and second-generation-led organizations include the social service organizations such as the Koreatown Youth and Community Center (KYCC) and Korean Health, Education, Information and Referral Center (KHEIR), and the advocacy groups such as the Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance (KIWA), Korean Resource Center (KRC), and the National Korean American Service & Education Consortium (NAKASEC), among others. Some of these organizations are sizable in terms of annual operating budgets. For example, the KYCC’s annual revenue in 2008 (the fiscal year ending on June 30) was $4 million, generated from grants, public support, fundraising, among others (KYCC Annual Report 2007-2008). The organization is also backed up by a board of 14 directors who represent various industries and ethnicities (ibid.). All of these organizations led by the younger generation serve pan-ethnic clientele in the K-town area and engage in issues in their
respective focus areas (e.g., youth for the KYCC, labour for the KIWA, health for the KHEIR) that involve both immigrants (or visible minorities) in general and Koreans in particular. In response to the changing demographic composition in the K-town area, the KYCC and the KIWA had changed the first letter K in the abbreviation from formerly “Korean” to “Koreatown” in the 2000s and highlighted the service area rather than the ethnicity of service clientele (Chung, 2007). As one representative of the multiethnic organizations puts it, the organizations are committed to pan-ethnic service, focusing on residents in K-town, instead of Koreans in K-town (CSO Leader 2).

We are not ethnic-specific, we are more geographic-specific… That is our philosophy to really focus on the K-town area… The K-town area is very unique and different from many other suburban areas…I believe if you are a service organization that receives government grants, you have to be really geographically focused. (CSO Leader 2)

The involvement of the younger generation in the community organizations did not come naturally. A majority of the U.S.-raised and educated 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Americans became involved in community issues after the 1992 L.A. riots, the landmark event for the Korean community (see Chapter 2). At the outbreak of the riots and throughout the post-riot period, young professional leaders acted as frontline spokespersons for the community, engaging in the mainstream discourse on the causes and effects of the riots. The “White conspiracy hypothesis” surfaced in the post-riot discourses, as ABC repeatedly played images of Soon Ja Du, a Korean grocery owner in South Central, shooting Latasha Harlins, African-American customer, and of Rodney King being beaten by police in the night of outbreak of the riots (Min, 1996, p. 104). Especially, after ABC-TV’s Nightline that featured only African-American leaders, “encouraging them to criticize Korean merchants without any Koreans being represented,” ABC received complaints via letters and telephone calls from Koreans who found the coverage “biased, unbalanced, and sensational” (Min, 1996, p. 105). The complaints led ABC to prepare a follow-up show that highlighted the Korean community and its stance (ibid.). Angela Oh, a second-generation Korean-American defence lawyer, appeared on Nightline to voice the Korean community’s opinion and “created a space for others to fill the political vacuum within the community” (Park, 1994 cited in Park, 2001, p. 277). Oh was quickly joined by 1.5- and second-generation Korean-American service and political
organizations such as the KAC and KYCC as well as professional groups such as the Korean-American Bar Association of Los Angeles and the Korean American Legal Advocacy Foundation (Min, 1996). Thus, in the case of L.A.’s Korean community, political and intercultural issues are often intertwined.

For the community organizations as a whole, the 1992 L.A. riots had a few important implications. First, a power shift from the “old guard” led by the first-generation immigrants to the younger generation is worth notice (Park, 2001, p. 278). The “failure of established leadership” by the first-generation immigrants was manifested through venting their frustrations only through local Korean-language media, which had “little impact on the mainstream discourse” (p. 276). Second, the power shift, nonetheless, suggested a division of labour in the community during the crisis. The younger generation consolidated political consciousness with, and outreach to, the broader society through organizing rallies and writing letters to the editor of local English newspapers, among other tactics. The old guard, on the other hand, attended to the community, organizing a crime prevention patrol called “Tae Kuk Bang Bum Daes” (Min, 1996, pp. 155-157). Third, the difference in the interpretation of the incident between the old and young generations suggested the difference in the understanding of interethnic relations. While the old generation directed their anger toward the African-Americans who participated in the riots, owing to their past experience with the African-American community, the young generation directed their anger to the police and mainstream media which negatively exacerbated the situation through biased reporting by setting up the riot as a racial conflict between the African-American and Korean communities (Min, 1996).

Aside from CSOs, there are approximately 200 high school and university alumni networks in California, with a majority located in the city of L.A. (Korea Times Korean Business Directory 2008-2009, Radio Korea Business Directory 2008-2009). Alumni networks account for almost 30% of the organizations/associations/groups that compose the communication infrastructure. Almost all of these networks originate in high schools and universities in Korea for first-generation immigrants. There are also over 500 Korean-serving Christian churches, nearly 30 Catholic churches, and over 30 Buddhist temples throughout California, with a majority of them located in the city of L.A. (Korea
Lee (2000, p. 81) classified Korean churches in the U.S. by number of members: small churches (60 or less members), medium churches (60-200 members), large churches (200-800 members), and mega churches (over 800 members). Korean churches tend to be smaller, with an average of 510 members, than American churches, with an average of 730 members. The proliferation of Christian churches is attributed to a sizeable Christian population: 65% of the post-1965 Korean immigrants in the U.S. are Christians (Chung, 2007, p. 49). It is also related to, as mentioned in Chapter 3, tangible and intangible services that Korean churches provide beyond religious services, including settlement services and a sense of belonging and community for those who suffer from “marginal man syndrome” (Lee, 2000, pp. 83-84). Additionally, monolingual background as well as a large pastor population within the Korean community also contributes to the proliferation of Korean churches (Min, 2001, p. 186).

5.2.2 Media

Along with community organizations/associations/groups, alumni networks, and churches, another important component of Korean diasporic communication infrastructure is media. L.A.’s Korean media are the most vibrant among all Korean diasporic media operating in North America. All of the North American headquarters of transnational Korean media conglomerates are located in L.A.: KBS America of the Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), MBC America of the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), SBS International of the Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), the Korea Times, and the Korea Daily. As well, locally developed, immigrant-capital-based media also exist parallel to these transnational branches, competing for the same market: TVK24, Radio Korea, the Koreatown Daily, the Korea Herald Business, the Sunday Journal, the Koreana News, and the Town News, among others.

60 KBS and MBC are two public broadcasters in Korea since 1980 when President Chun turned the media industry into an “oligopoly” of these two broadcasters (Shim, 2008, p. 23). SBS, on the other hand, is the first commercial television station in Korea since 1991 when it was granted a license upon the enactment of the new Broadcasting Law in 1990 (ibid.).

61 The Korea Herald Business is a daily business newspaper in Korea. However, the L.A. office is operated not as a branch but as a franchise, affiliated only through content sharing. It is the same operation format found in Vancouver’s Korea Daily and Korea Times.
The lists of Korean media are available through various online/offline Korean business directories. The total number of media outlets listed differs by source, ranging between approximately 50 and 100 outlets. Such variation is attributed to different geographic focus; some are as broad as all California (Southern and Northern California combined), while others focus on the major ethnoburbs or specifically L.A. and Orange Counties. In addition, all the lists include religious media outlets that target specific faith groups. Religious media account for 20% to 30% of the total. Thus, if a more conservative figure is drawn from these rather comprehensive lists by focusing on the outlets that are, first, located in L.A. and Orange Counties (as media outlets tend to target both markets regardless of the location of outlets), and second, non-religious, and third, available at major distribution locations (e.g., supermarkets, shopping plazas, banks, restaurants, organizations) during the time of sampling, there are approximately 30 active outlets, including four dailies, four weeklies, ten television services, and three radio services. The actual number may not be meaningful since the market takes the form of a two-horse race, led by the major outlets and followed by a distant few other players, as equally mentioned by media practitioners and CSO leaders interviewed. The discussion in this section is based on these leading media outlets.

Development Phases: Growth and Expansion

The history of Korean media is a short one compared to Latino and other Asian communities. L.A. Korean media are led by the two major dailies of transnational Korean newspaper conglomerates, the Korea Times and the Korea Daily, with the branches set up in 1969 and 1974 respectively. The history of the Latino media, on the other hand, is much longer, with La Opinion, a Spanish-language daily newspaper founded in 1926 and Univision, a Spanish-language television network founded in 1962 (www.laopinion.com, www.univision.com). The history of Japanese media goes even further back to 1903, when the Rafu Shimpo, a Japanese/English-language daily newspaper, was launched

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The newspaper struggled throughout the economic recession and hit a low in 2010 when the community held a “Save the Rafu” town hall meeting to seek ways to continue its operation (Watanabe, 2010). The paper is still in operation as of 2011.

L.A.’s Korean media market saw more entries in recent years. The launch of weeklies, TV, and radio which followed in the 1980s included: The Sunday Journal (1982), Korean Sunday News (1984), Korean Television Enterprise (now KBS America, 1983), and Radio Korea (1989). KBS America opened the TV market, as it launched first among the three branches, followed by MBC America and SBS International in the early 1990s. Radio Korea, launched just before the 1992 L.A. riots, could be seen to have played a critical role during the time of crisis (see Chapter 6). With these new entries, the community had all genres of media by the late 1980s: TV, radio, dailies, and weeklies.

The real growth of Korean media came in the 1990s and the 2000s when the entry of new outlets as well as the expansion of existing outlets simultaneously took place. Some of the outlets launched in the 1990s included the KoreAm Journal (1990), MBC America (1991), SBS International (1992), Radio Seoul (1992), KTAN-TV (1993), the Town News (1994), the Kyocharo, the Koreana News (1998), and the Daily Sports Seoul USA (1999). A horizontal expansion of the Korea Times was something to note. With a launch of Radio Seoul and KTAN-TV, the Korea Times formed a multimedia platform well ahead of its competitors. Media ownership by a 1.5-generation Korean-American also emerged during this period with a launch of the KoreAm Journal, a monthly magazine published in English by James Ryu.

The 2000s saw further new entries as well as the expansion of the existing outlets: TVK24, TV Korea, Korea Herald Business (2005), JBC AM1230 (2007), Koreatown Daily, LA18 Prime Time Local News, and SKD TV (2009), IS Plus (2010) and www.mvibo (2011). As for the new entries, TVK24, the first 24-hour “digital cable network” service, is of note. It is the first free Korean-language channel available on major cable networks such as Comcast, Time Warner, and Cox. In contrast to the major three transnational television branches (KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International), the company is also built on local capital and managed by a 1.5-generation

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63 http://www.tvk24.com/new/about.html
Korean-American CEO, Eric Yoon. Another television entry is LA18 Prime Time Local News (Korean language news). LA18, an Asian television network which has relayed Korean programs, formed an in-house Korean news team, in addition to the existing Chinese and Vietnamese News, and started a Korean-language news service in 2009 (www.la18.tv). In addition, in the new digital transition, Seoul Korea Digital TV (SKDTV), an immigrant television service in partnership with the Maeil Broadcasting Network (MBN) in Korea, was launched initially on Channel 44.3 (where KTN is) and is now available on LA18’s digital channel, LA18.9 (www.skdtv.com).

In regards to the expansion of existing outlets, Radio Korea launched TV Korea to offer a Korean version of National Geographic through DirecTV. The Korea Daily also entered into the radio market with JBC AM1230 to form a multimedia group and compete with the existing Radio Korea and Radio Seoul (Korea Times). After three years of service, however, JBC discontinued the service in February 2011 in order to prepare for entry into the television business, according to JBC (Korea Daily, 2011). The Korea Daily also launched IS Plus, a free Metro24-style daily in 2009. In the same year, Daily Sports Seoul USA also launched the Koreatown Daily as an additional local news section to the existing sports section.

Such pattern of market entries has a number of implications on L.A.’s Korean media market. First, L.A.’s Korean media market is relatively balanced, unlike that of Vancouver, where print media are dominant. The relatively flexible television sector compared to Canada may have contributed to the growth of Korean television services. As discussed in Chapter 2, the cable and satellite sectors in the U.S. are not considered as “broadcasting” and are unregulated. Korean services have limited availability on over-the-air, but are abundant on cable and satellite channels. The market demonstrates a gradual development pattern in two periods: the formation period in the 1970s and 1980s (a launch of all types of media) and the growth and expansion period in the 1990s and the 2000s (a launch of more of each type). Each period had a balanced entry of all types, allowing room for new entries to settle and compete with the existing others.

Second, L.A.’s Korean media market consists of branches of Korean transnational media conglomerates (KBS America, MBC America, SBS International Korea Times,
Korea Daily), locally-developed immigrant media (e.g., TVK24, Radio Korea, Koreatown Daily, Korea Herald Business, Sunday Journal, Koreana News, Town News) and multicultural media (LA18 Prime Time Local News). Among television services, Korean ownership in “broadcasting” is absent: all are “program providers,” offering services through purchasing airtime from license holders. The transnational television services may be capable of ownership, but not eligible for ownership. An attempt to purchase a television station failed due to the FCC’s foreign ownership regulation (Media Practitioner 23). TVK24 operates in the cable sector, and LA18 offers Korean-language news but not owned by Korean.

*Market Leaders and Market Structure*

Although they vary by media type, the transnational branches tend to take the lead, taking the form of a two-horse race structure, led by the two major dailies—the Korea Times and the Korea Daily—and followed by the rest. The ebbs and flows of new and old entries do occur; however, such change usually does not alter the overall market structure. The actual number of transnational branches accounts for 30% to 40% of the market; however, they take the majority of market share. Backed up by transnational capital and a constant flow of content, the transnational branches are challenging competitors for local immigrant media. The ownership and source of capital makes a difference in business and editorial directions, including organization, financing, and news values (Media Practitioners 25 & 27). See Chapter 6 for details.

By revenue structure, L.A.’s Korean media market has a mix of paid and free media. All of the branches of transnational media outlets are paid. The Korea Times and the Korea Daily are the only paid newspapers in the L.A. market: 75 cents at the newspaper stand and $22/month by subscription. Each publication ranges between 140 and 180 pages and publishes from Monday to Saturday. Figure 5.5 shows the newspaper dispensers available on the streets of K-town. KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International are also paid. The channels/programs are available on various platforms: terrestrial, cable, and satellite. Only the programs offered for three to four hours a day on digital over-the-air (e.g., KBS World on KXLA Ch. 44, MBCD [MBC America’s digital
channel] on LA18.3) are free. Korean-language channels on cable and satellite (e.g., Time Warner, Cox, Comcast, DirecTV, Dish Network) are 24-hour, available free or at an additional fee to subscribers. Along with KBS, MBC, and SBS channels, there are the Education Broadcasting System (EBS), Yonhap Television News (YTN), Christian Television System (CTS), Arirang TV, JSTV, Buddhist Television Network (BTN), ONGAMENET, The Golf Channel, and WOW-TV, among others. (See the next section for detailed rates.) The local immigrant media, on the other hand, are mostly free. All dailies (Koreatown Daily, Korea Herald Business) and weeklies (e.g., Sunday Journal, Koreana News, Town News) are available free at major Korean locations. TVK24’s two channels TVK1 and TVK2 are included as basic channels in local cable network packages of Time Warner, Champion, Charter, and Cox, available to their Southern California subscribers at no additional fee (TVK24 Media Kit, 2011). Radio channels are available free for 24 hours on AM frequencies: Radio Korea (AM1540), Radio Seoul (AM1650), and JBS (AM1230 until it was discontinued in February 2011).

Figure 5.5  Korean newspaper stands in Koreatown

By service programs, Korean media offer various genres of programming from news to entertainment. Among these genres, local news is most important as it is the only regular program that is locally made. There are six different outlets that offer seven daily
local evening news programs: KBS America (KBS America News), MBC America (MBC News Tonight), SBS International (SBS Evening News), KTN (KTN News), TVK24\(^{64}\) (TVK News Wide and TVK English Edition), and LA18 (Prime Time Local News) (see Table 5.5). Local news serves a dual purpose: editorial and market-oriented. Editorialy, it is about the integrity of media institutions. As one media practitioner puts it: “It is not a broadcasting station if there is no news room” (Media Practitioner 23). Korea’s new election law is also likely to have added further significance to local news production, especially for transnational branches, as a venue for providing necessary information to eligible Korean voters. As one media practitioner puts it: “If there was no change in Korea’s election law, the (names of companies) would not even have considered local news production” (Media Practitioner 23). At least three out of the six local news programs (MBC News Tonight, SBS Evening News, LA18 Prime Time Local News) started only recently in 2009. Market-wise, local news is what earns local reputation and helps tap into the local enclave market. Transnational media pursue localization to be self-sufficient, and local news is known to be the most advertising-friendly (Media Practitioner 26). Such contrasting orientation—strong home connection and simultaneous localization—suggests the constant negotiations that occur in the process of local production.

Broadcasting without a news desk is less influential, even if you have prestige that comes along with the name brand such as (name of company) or (name of company)…We show that we are with local audience and that we pay attention to the difficulties of local Koreans and report their issues. Then, the Korean community wants us more…They invite us to events, etc…Also, one of the reasons for growing news production is that it contributes to the ad revenue. (Media Practitioner 26)

The local news ranges from 10 minutes (MBC News Tonight) to 50 minutes (TVK News Wide). In parallel, these six television outlets also air unedited imported Korean news via various platforms. Among all six outlets, KBS America distributes its imported news (e.g., KBS News 9) via all platforms (terrestrial, cable, and satellite). MBC America and SBS International also use LA18’s digital channels to broadcast the

\(^{64}\) Along with the main evening news (TVK News Wide), TVK24 also offered a mid-day news for viewers in the eastern region (TVK News Live). TVK24 offered TVK News Live and TVK News English Edition during the sampling period in March 2010; however, the company discontinued the services shortly thereafter.
imported news (e.g., MBC News Live, SBS 8 News). In addition to television news, the four daily newspapers also offer daily local and Korean news, and the three radio channels have news segments three times a day (morning, noon, and evening) if not more frequently. The radio evening news segments are lengthy, ranging from two (Radio Seoul and JBC) to three hours (Radio Korea). Except TVK English Edition, all of these news services are provided in Korean without subtitles. Television services provide English subtitles only for selected programs, mainly entertainment programs (e.g., drama, documentaries). KBS America, for example, provides English subtitles to 82% of KBS World programs (Korea Times, 2008). However, no subtitles are provided for everyday local evening news.

Table 5.5  Korean news schedule by outlet (March 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>KBS America</th>
<th>MBC America</th>
<th>SBS International</th>
<th>KTN</th>
<th>TVK24</th>
<th>LA18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local News</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cable</em></td>
<td>Time Warner ch.159/ Cox ch.473/M F 20:00-20:15</td>
<td>Time Warner ch.603</td>
<td>Time Warner ch.158 M-Sat 20:00-20:50</td>
<td>Time Warner ch.158 M-F 23:00-23:20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Terrestrial digital</em></td>
<td>KXLA ch. 44 M-F 20:00-20:24</td>
<td>KSCI ch.18.3 M-F 20:50-21:00</td>
<td>KXLA ch.44.3 M-F 20:00-20:30 T-Sat 08:00-08:30 (rerun)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Satellite</em></td>
<td>TANTV 1 T-Sat 08:00-08:30 M-F 22:15-22:30</td>
<td>TANTV 3 M 20:00-20:40 T-F 20:00-20:30 T-Sat 00:00-00:40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Terrestrial digital</em></td>
<td>KXLA ch.44 M-Sun 21:00-21:35</td>
<td>KSCI ch.18.3 M-F 21:00-21:30</td>
<td>3. KSCI ch.18.1 M-F 20:30-21:30</td>
<td>KXLA ch.44.3 M-Sun 20:30-21:40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Satellite</em></td>
<td>TANTV 1 M-F 22:30-22:45</td>
<td>TAN TV2 M-Sat 19:00-19:40 Sun 19:00-19:15</td>
<td>1. TANTV 3 M-Sat 19:00-19:40 Sat 20:50-21:00 2. TANTV 3 Sat 20:10-20:50 Sun 20:15-20:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, by geographic locations, L.A.’s Korean media are geographically developed in the major ethnoburbs, especially in L.A. and Orange Counties. While the
majority of active media outlets are located in the city of L.A., some are also found in the major ethnoburbs such as the Town News in the city of Garden Grove in Orange County, servicing—yet not limited to—more geographically-bounded Orange County Koreans. The geographically-focused development is also a part of the expansion strategy of the existing media. The Town News launched the Town News San Diego in early 2011, following Kyocharo, which launched Kyocharo Orange County-San Diego in early 2009 and the Koreana News, which launched the Koreana News Las Vegas (see the next section for more details). According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010e), San Diego is the fourth largest Korean-concentrated county in California (see Table 5.3). Nonetheless, while there may be a geographic focus, media products are available across time and space. Major dailies (Korea Times, Korea Daily, Daily Sports Seoul USA) operate distribution centres in Orange County. The media outlets without the distribution centre still make their products available in major Korean locations of major cities through their own delivery system. They also operate websites which can often consolidate horizontally and vertically expanded services under their ownership (e.g., business directories, links to their own radio and television). For print media in particular, new articles are available for viewing almost in real time as individual articles, as well as in e-papers in a PDF format. With this background information about the L.A. Korean media market, the next section looks at business structure of these outlets.

5.3 Korean Diasporic Media as Media Organizations: Yet Another Market Entity

There are various self-directed as well as prescribed roles of Korean media, as discussed in the previous chapters with the case of Vancouver’s Korean media. As immigrant media, there are socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles to play. All of these roles of Korean media are possible, however, only if they survive as business entities in an increasingly competitive market. Among all of the market forces, the presence of regional branches of Korean transnational media conglomerates and the influx of transnational capital into the diasporic media market sets the L.A. Korean media market on a unique development path. This section discusses Korean media as business
entities in three different areas: organizational structure, financing, and competition and regulation.

5.3.1 Organizational Structure

In Chapter 3, the number of employees was used to determine the size of media outlets: large (over 100 employees), medium (50-100), small (10-49), and micro (less than 10). If the same scale is used for L.A.’s Korean media outlets, the market consists of a few dominant, large outlets, followed by small and micro outlets. Overall, small/micro outlets are in the range of seven or less, and large outlets in the range of 300 employees. The large outlets include the two transnational dailies (Korea Times and Korea Daily) and an immigrant radio (Radio Korea). The micro outlets include most of the weeklies and the small include the rest of the outlets from transnational television to local dailies. Media practitioners frequently mention that the size of media outlet determines the market share.

With some variations by media type, media organizations generally consist of editors, producers, journalists/reporters (part-time/full-time), anchors, technicians, graphic designers, webmasters, subscription/marketing/sales professionals, administration, and delivery personnel, among others. In addition to local reporters, some outlets also have regional correspondents in other parts of the U.S. and in Korea as well as from Korea headquarters. Large- and small-size media outlets tend to have separate departments/teams by news genre or type of work, and manage smaller work teams: editorial desk, national desk, local desk, business desk, political desk, newsroom, production department, transmission department, and marketing/business/sales department. In contrast, micro-size outlets tend to have individuals who represent each of these teams. Proportionally, weeklies tend to have a higher emphasis on marketing/sales and administrative personnel than reporters. A few outlets are in fact in operation with two to three reporters; this is quite common for small- and micro-size outlets regardless of media type.

The marketing/sales department is important for all media outlets. For transnational television services particularly, the distribution and sale of content is a
central part of their business. The availability of their content via various platforms, including terrestrial, cable, and satellite networks as well as video rental stores and their own websites (e.g., e-store), explains this. Furthermore, large- and small-size outlets tend to have the so-called “U.S. ad team” or “foreign ad team” that focuses only on mainstream marketing (Media Practitioner 32). Second-generation Korean-Americans usually lead the team (see the next section for details). New departments are also being set up in response to the political and economic changes in the U.S. and Korea. One example is the so-called “political investigation team” recently set up in one of the media outlets to follow up on the impact of the changes in Korea’s election law on the Korean community (Media Practitioner 30). Although it is not the only subject the team is responsible for—it is also in charge of in-depth analyses of both U.S. and Korean politics in general—it is certainly the event that initiated the creation of this team. What differentiates transnational media from local immigrant media is the presence of senior management dispatched directly from the Korea headquarters. The official purposes of global expansion and the operation of overseas branches include revenue generation, cultivation of overseas resources (since new election law) and the promotion of Korean culture or *hallyu* (Media Practitioner 8). Nevertheless, such human resource selection indicates a substantial degree of influence from the headquarters on local business and editorial directives. (See Chapter 6 for details.)

Analyzing the profile of media practitioners interviewed for this study, who represent most of the active Korean media outlets operating in L.A. and Orange Counties, there are several patterns. First, a majority of media practitioners have significant years of media experience with local Korean media. That of owners/CEOs and senior staff members is particularly long, ranging from 10 to 28 years. They are, in fact, part of the post-1965 immigrant cohort; many of the participants arrived in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s, if not earlier. Some are former journalists who joined local Korean media as they immigrated to or came to study in the U.S. Others started their media careers with local Korean media. A few media practitioners also joined local Korean media after years of committing to “other” businesses. Those “other” businesses, however, tend to be

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65 The profile of participants includes position, year immigrated to Canada, year started/joined Korean media, previous work, location of previous work (country), and generation.
somewhat related to media such as marketing and PR. Thus, while they may not have had direct prior professional media experience, they are at least familiar with how the media industry works (Media Practitioner 23). The long media career among the older generation of professionals is also related to the short gap between the time they came to the U.S. and the time they joined local Korean media. The older generation tended to join local Korean media as soon as they immigrated to the U.S. while the younger generation dedicated their early years to education and joined Korean media later upon graduation. Even with the relatively longer lead-time, however, the years of experience of 1.5-generation journalists is still long, ranging from nine to 24 years.

Second, the participation of the younger generation in the local Korean media industry is another noticeable pattern found in L.A.’s Korean media. Although it is mainly through employment rather than ownership, 1.5-generation-owned media is not absent. TVK24 (www.tvk24.com) and the KoreAm Journal (www.iamkoream.com), a monthly magazine published in English, are good examples. The 1.5-generation Korean-Americans journalists tend to be older than their 1.5-generation cohort: they came to the U.S. during their high-school years. Thus, even after years of education in U.S. institutions, their Korean language skills were still good enough to consider Korean media as their first career option. When asked about motivation, one media practitioner puts it: “Most of the 1.5-generation at that time wanted to contribute to the community” (Media Practitioner 26). The sense of belonging and aspiration to contribute to the community was one of the factors that led the older 1.5-generation professionals to local Korean media. Only two of the 1.5-generation media practitioners joined Korean media or multicultural media after they worked for mainstream media for several years.

Aside from 1.5-generation Korean-Americans, former international students are also common among the staff. A good majority of the staff are in fact former international students (Media Practitioner 28). One important motivation to join local Korean media is to continue their residency in the U.S. upon the completion of a degree (Media Practitioner 32). Media outlets also need U.S.-trained, younger generations who have a command of both the English and Korean languages. A self-mobilized retention program of educated, skilled labour, something similar to the “Canadian Experience Class” program in Canada, is underway in the Korean media market.
Most of our staffs are locally-hired former international students. Because it is a Korean (media type) in the U.S., we need people who can write well in Korean. Kids who grew up here may speak Korean, but cannot write Korean…International students often times do not want to go back to Korea…They can apply (working) visa or permanent residency while working here…(Media Practitioner 28)

All K-town reporters have their own stories. Of course, there are reporters who joined the company as permanent residents. However, most reporters (former international students) obtain permanent residency while being employed here…I hear it takes about 7 years to get it. (Media Practitioner 32)

Finally, the career (upward) mobility of media professionals across languages and media types is common. Over 30% of the participants have experienced such moves. Across languages, experiences with local Korean media works as a stepping-stone to mainstream media, and senior staff, in fact, think positively about such career transition (Media Practitioners 28 & 38). As one media practitioner puts it: “I encourage junior staff here to use it as a stepping stone to mainstream media and many of them actually have made it to mainstream media such as (name of company). It is especially easier for camera crews to move to mainstream TV stations, because the job does not require much English” (Media Practitioner 38). They also consider it as “one way to extend Korean presence in the broader society,” expressing aspirations for an institutional or professional link with the broader media system (Media Practitioner 23).

The downside on the part of individuals, however, is that: “When (name of company) hires Korean journalists, they want to have them as access to the Korean community. When they do not serve that role, the company no longer needs them” (ibid.). In other words, there is a conflict between the needs of mainstream media and the individual aspirations of journalists; Korean journalists do not want to limit their coverage to the Korean community only. Across and within media types, some use the local Korean media experience as a means to move within the Korean media sector when they get calls from the bigger outlets (Media Practitioner 32) or when new job opportunities are created with the emergence of new entries, including news production of the existing outlets. These moves also involve setting up new outlets of their own. Some of the currently operating or short-lived media outlets are owned by former staff members of existing media outlets (Media Practitioner 39).

A significantly higher amount of information is just coming into (name of company) without much effort, when smaller outlets like us have to go out to get them. It is
just difficult (working for small media outlets)...There is a bit of difference in salary...Not much though. The economy is not good anyway...People want to work for bigger organizations...We jokingly call our company a journalism school. After people get experience here, they move to bigger companies. So far, more than 40 people have moved to the (names of company) from here. (Media Practitioner 32)

5.3.2 Financing

According to interviews with media practitioners, estimates of the market size vary by outlet, ranging between $2,000,000 and $10,000,000 a month. Smaller size outlets tend to estimate the market smaller than the large-size outlets, yet their estimate often corresponds to the portion which the large-size outlets estimated to be the share of the smaller size outlets. By market share percentage, it is generally estimated that a majority of the market share is occupied by the major dailies (approximately 60%), followed by TV, radio, and weeklies and the rest. The transnational media, especially the Korea Times and the Korea Daily, which are the pioneers of Korean media market, take the precedence in market share. According to one media practitioner, the market share has been consistent since the 1980s (Media Practitioner 37).

Do you think the advertising market is big? It is not actually. There is no actual difference in terms of the volume of ads we did in the 1980s, in the 1990s and what we do now... (Name of company) made some difference. More new entries to the market also made some difference. However, the ads from K-town are all restaurant ads. Therefore, the overall volume may have increased; the actual share is the same. (Media Practitioner 37)

In this market structure, media outlets experience market competition differently, depending on the size of the outlet. Media practitioners of the large outlets tend to say that the market has been “stable” as dailies dominate the market (Media Practitioner 28). In fact, L.A.’s Korean media market has passed the weekly boom in the 1970s and 1980s (which was experienced in Vancouver in the 1990s and 2000s) and entered a settling period. The small- and micro-size media outlets, on the other hand, say that the market is still “unstable” with the ebbs and flows of new entries, usually that of similar size (Media Practitioner 39).

The market is still volatile. Former employees left the company and opened up new outlets of their own. However, they did not survive for long. One went out of business after its first edition, and the second one after six months, and the third one after one and a half years. New entries offer lower rates or free ads. However, they cannot sustain. They think it is easy. (Media Practitioner 39)
Operating Expenses and Revenue Sources

Korean media finance their operation in various ways. It is important to look at their operating expenses and revenue sources. Looking at the operating expenses first, employee wages account for approximately 50% of the total expenses. The rest varies by media type. For print media, printing/printing material costs are the second greatest expense, accounting for 30% to 50% of direct expenses. Although most of the print media outlets publish online and offline, the dependency on offline, print publication is still high. Major dailies operate distribution centers in major ethnoburbs to make their publications available in the respective regions. Printing facilities are thus critical for operations, especially for the Korea Times and Korea Daily whose daily publication contains as high as 180 pages divided into three to four different sections (e.g., U.S., Korea, Economy, Sports, Classified, Food, Health). For this reason, major dailies own a printing facility, thus printing materials such as papers and ink are primary expenses. The rest of the print media outlets, on the other hand, outsource printing agencies. The weekly total for the other two dailies (Koreatown Daily and Korea Herald Business) and weeklies ranges between 70 and 200 pages, with the ones that publish three times a week on the higher end (e.g., Kyocharo).

For television and radio, it is the airtime and/or broadcasting fee (to license holders and content providers) that are the dominant expenses. Cable channels, for example, cost approximately $400,000 a month for only three to four hours a day (Media Practitioner 38). Thus, only a few can afford this expense. The high airtime fee is certainly a burden for many producers. As one media practitioner puts it: “Increasing airtime fees upon every renewal in fact have pushed many out of the market…What we are basically doing is get the money from the local enclave market and give to the license holders” (Media Practitioner 24). The digital transition in 2009 opened up the market to many interest groups. The digital 24-hour channel is available at almost one-tenth of the airtime. Lowered airtime fees, however, are traded off with the proportionally increased content fee to fill 24 hours. Unless the media outlet has secured a constant flow of the
content, it is a challenge to budget for the increased hours. Some digital channels, in fact, have disappeared without prior notice. As one media practitioner puts it: “It is quite common. They think the television business is easy and start it and disappear overnight” (Media Practitioner 38).

For revenue sources, on the other hand, the difference in ownership and source of capital makes a difference in ways in which each group finances its operation. The revenue sources of transnational media are relatively more dispersed ranging from content sale to national/local advertising whereas that of immigrant media is largely limited to local advertising (Media Practitioner 27). Nevertheless, as the transnational media gradually redirect themselves to pursue localization, the dependency on the local enclave market and the competition with immigrant media therein increases (Media Practitioner 25).

Local Korean media (immigrant media) depend entirely on the local Korean market. Therefore, local advertisers are most important. On the other hand, (Name of company) are national so national advertisers are more important than local advertisers…Thus, (name of company) are financially stable. (Name of company) gets a different kind of advertisers compared to (name of company), because it is a “big company.” (Media Practitioner 27)

The result of content analysis of 2,338 ads from L.A.’s 13 Korean media outlets reveals that the portion of advertising varies by media type and not by source of capital: print media tend to dedicate relatively more space to advertising compared to broadcasting. When the ads on the front page of each section of the newspapers are counted, the four dailies dedicate anywhere between 35% and 45% of their total space to ads, with the highest being the Korea Daily (45%), followed by the Korea Herald Business (43%), the Koreatown Daily (41%), and the Korea Times (38%). For television, on the other hand, the ads account for 21% on average out of the total evening news time:

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66 As a side note, the number of pages or hours of broadcast may be a good indicator of a company’s performance as this is one of the cost-saving strategies media outlets employ. Unlike Korean media in Vancouver, newspapers have maintained days of publication, however, decreased the number of pages. Some of the dailies reduced page numbers by 30% during the recent economic recession (Media Practitioner 31).

67 The newspapers include the ads on the front page of each section: the Korea Times, the Korea Daily, the Koreatown Daily, and the Korea Herald Business. Television and radio ads include the ads shown or mentioned during the evening news: KBS America News, MBC News Tonight, TVK News Wide, TVK News English Edition, KTN News, LA18 Prime Time Local News, Radio Korea Evening News, Radio Seoul Evening News, and JBC Evening News. Out the 14 outlets tracked in this study, SBS Evening News is excluded as the archived news segments available on its website do not contain ads.
KTN News (29%), LA18 Prime Time Local News (26%), KBS America News (20%), TVK News Wide (17%), TVK English News (12%), and MBC News Tonight68 (10%). For three radio evening news programs, ads account for 25% on average: Radio Korea (30%), JBC (24%), and Radio Seoul (22%).

Dependency on local businesses, especially enclave businesses, is overwhelmingly high regardless of the source of capital69 (see Table 5.6). Nearly 80% of the ads are from local Korean businesses. Multicultural media have a relatively smaller portion of local Korean businesses (63%), which is compensated by mainstream businesses (22%). The portion of mainstream ads is much smaller for Korean media, with a slightly higher portion for immigrant media (6%) than transnational media (5%). The actual portion of mainstream ads may be insignificant; however, the revenue generated from that 5% is incomporable to that from the local Korean business. As one media practitioner puts it: “In actual dollars, the mainstream ads will probably account for 50% to the total ad revenue. A few local enclave ads are equivalent to one mainstream ad” (Media Practitioner 32). Thus, the “U.S. ad team” or “foreign ad team” is worth the effort to operate. Mainstream advertisers include transnational corporations (e.g., Verizon, McDonalds, Statefarm, Toyota), government (e.g., Census, iWatch), and local professional services (e.g., Richard Hoffman lawyer). What is common to all Korean media is the absence of ads from other ethnic communities. (See the next chapter for further discussion.) Transnational Korean corporations are also important advertisers, accounting for 16% of the ads. Immigrant and transnational media tend to have slightly higher portions (15% and 17% respectively) compared to multicultural media (11%).

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68 MBC News Tonight is a 10-minute local news program inserted in the middle of MBC News Live imported from Korea. Thus, only the ads shown before and after MBC News Tonight are included here.

69 The 13 media outlets can be categorized by source of capital: local immigrant, transnational, and multicultural. Local immigrant media outlets include TVK24, Korea Town Daily, Korea Herald Business, and Radio Korea. Transnational media outlets include KBS America, MBC America, KTAN TV (Korean Times), Radio Seoul (Korea Times), JBC (Korea Daily), Korea Times, and Korea Daily. Finally, multicultural media outlet includes LA18.
Table 5.6  Origin of advertisers by source of capital (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Advertisers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local Immigrant</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Multicultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=2338</td>
<td>n=1087</td>
<td>n=1161</td>
<td>n=90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Korean</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic Mainstream</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.7 shows ad types by source of capital. Looking at the type of ads overall, auto/auto repair (12%) is most visible, followed by bank/finance (11%), restaurants (9%), travel/transportation/accommodation (6%), and law agencies (6%). There is no difference in ranking between immigrant media and transnational media. However, immigrant media tend to have relatively more locally-oriented services such as restaurants (11%), law agencies (7%), and entertainment/sports events (5%). Transnational media, on the other hand, tend to have relatively more transnational services or trading products such as travel agency/transportation/accommodation (9%) and health products/pharmaceuticals (5%). In contrast to immigrant and transnational media, multicultural media have relatively higher representation of technology/telecommunication (17%), alcohol (9%), shopping malls/retailers (9%), and hospitals (7%).

Among the local advertisers, Korean-owned financial institutions include the Saehan Bank, Nara Bank, Central Bank, and the Wilshire Bank, among others, and medical institutions such as hospitals/clinics/pharmacy include Western 3rd Medical Center and Jaseng Center. As mentioned earlier, hospitals are the most populous business category among over 20,000 Korean enclave businesses. Real estate agencies are also important clientele. One of the leading agencies’ advertising spending is $700,000 to $800,000 a year (Media Practitioner 28). Transnational advertisers, on the other hand, include regional branches of Korean corporations mentioned earlier such as Korean Air, Kia Motors, and Bekseju America Inc. Direct importation of the unedited transnational ads is quite common; the ads designed for audiences in Korea are used in L.A. without editing for the local Korean audience (e.g., Bekseju).
## Table 5.7 Type of ads by source of capital (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ads</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Multicultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=2338</td>
<td>n=1087</td>
<td>n=1161</td>
<td>n=90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto/Auto repair</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank/Finance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health product/Pharmaceuticals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment/Sports events</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization events/Announcements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology/Telecommunication</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supermarket</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping malls/Retailers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals/Clinics/Pharmacy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparels/Shoes/Accessories</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (national)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery/Services (e.g., moving)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the location of ads, Table 5.8 shows the location of 375 ads appearing on the front page of each section of the four dailies. Ads tend to appear mostly at the top of the page (42%), middle (36%), and bottom (22%). The ads at the bottom of the page account for 30% of the page, which is the most revenue generating space of all. For example, the Korea Daily charges between $857 (5F) and $1200 (7F). The television and radio ads, on the other hand, are dispersed throughout the program. They tend to appear/mention at the beginning and/or at the end of each news section. Table 5.9, which shows the ethnicity of main commercial model/voice, gives an idea of the ad format. Among all media types, newspaper ads tend to be most product/contact information-
oriented in that 78% of the ads do not feature models. They are mostly quick-reference ads rather than full-fledged commercial ads.

Table 5.8  Location of ads – Newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Ads - Newspaper</th>
<th>Total n=379</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full page</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9  Ethnicity of main commercial model/voice by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity of Main Model</th>
<th>Total n=2338</th>
<th>TV n=439</th>
<th>Newspaper n=379</th>
<th>Radio n=1520</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of ethnicities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it applies only to transnational media, another source of income is the subscription. The Korea Times and the Korea Daily offer the same subscription fee: $22 monthly and $220 annually. These two are also available at 75 cents at the newspaper dispensers on the street. For television, on the other hand, the 24-hour Korean-language channels on cable and satellite are available to subscribers for free or at an additional fee, depending on marketing style (e.g., bundle, per channel). For example, Dish Network’s Tiger Pack, which contains seven Korean-language channels (Arirang TV, BTN [Buddhist], JSTV [Christian], KBS World, ONGAMENET, The Golf Channel, and WOW-TV), is offered at an additional $19.99.\(^7\) KBS World is included in its basic pack,

Dish America ($24.99 monthly as of 2011).\(^2\) The DirecTV’s KoreanDirect, which includes 10 Korean channels (MBC, MBC Every1, SBS, SBS Plus, EBS, YTN, CTS, National Geographic Channel Korea, Radio Korea, and TAN TV), is offered at an additional $26.99/month and $31.99, if the Golf Channel is included. \(^3\)

**Financing Strategies: Vertical and Horizontal Expansion**

Given this expense-revenue structure, media outlets seek ways to finance their operations through vertical and horizontal expansion. One of the common examples of vertical expansion is geographic expansion by setting up a branch in neighbouring counties or states. Such expansion is common for transnational newspapers. The Korea Times operates regional branches (through direct operation) or franchises (through licensing contract) in major U.S. and Canadian cities: Seattle, Washington D.C., Atlanta, Huston, Dallas, New York, Denver, Chicago, San Francisco, Hawaii, Vancouver, Montreal, Niagara, London (Ontario), and Ottawa.\(^4\) As well, the Korea Daily operates in eight major cities including L.A.: Washington D.C., San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, Seattle, and Hawaii.\(^5\) Immigrant newspapers are not an exception. The Kyocharo (est. 1998), a three-times-a-week classified paper, launched the Orange County-San Diego edition (a total of 60 pages including 20 pages of L.A. content) in 2009 in addition to its back-to-back L.A.-Las Vegas edition (8 pages of Las Vegas content attached to the 72-page L.A. edition). It is an expansion from the previous L.A.-Orange County edition (72 pages for L.A. and 28 pages for O.C.). The Koreana News (est. 1998), a weekly newspaper, also publishes a back-to-back L.A.-Las Vegas edition, and the Town News (est. 1994), a weekly, also expanded in early 2011 to include San Diego, in addition to L.A. and Orange Counties. Another type of expansion considered by print media is an MOU (content sharing) among Korean media outlets in selected U.S. cities. It is a cost-effective way to release their own content across the U.S., which helps appeal more to mainstream advertisers (Media Practitioner 32).

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\(^3\) [http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/content/international/korean](http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/content/international/korean)

\(^4\) [http://www.koreatimes.com/info/hkib/branch/](http://www.koreatimes.com/info/hkib/branch/)

\(^5\) [http://corp.koreadaily.com/eng/media/index.html](http://corp.koreadaily.com/eng/media/index.html)
The geographic coverage is important for mainstream advertisers. It is a minimum of five regions in the U.S. our content needs to be released. Therefore, we sign MOUs with Korean media outlets in other regions and share content. (Media Practitioner 32)

Television outlets also expand geographically. KBS America is available in ten major U.S. regions via cable (L.A., San Francisco, Seattle, Hawaii, Fairfax County, Montgomery County, Baltimore, Atlanta, New York, and New Jersey, as well as Toronto in Canada) and in two cities via terrestrial (L.A. and San Francisco) and nationwide via satellite. SBS International is also available via cable and satellite in major counties in California as well as in New York. TVK24, which is the “digital basic cable” included in major cable networks (e.g., Time Warner, Cox, Champion, Charter), is available nationwide in 22 major cities (TVK24 Media Kit, pp. 4-5). Such nationwide availability gives a competitive edge to the outlets that offer it, enabling them to attract national advertisers and become less dependent on the local market (Media Practitioner 27).

Another form of vertical expansion for print media includes publishing other print materials such as business directories (see Table 5.11). There are a number of online and offline business directories published by media outlets. Three of the four dailies (Korea Times, Korea Daily, and Koreatown Daily) publish business directories. Directories are strong revenue sources. As one media practitioner puts it: “The directories are published not because the Korean community needs it more, but it generates high revenue, between $1,000,000 and $1,200,000” (Media Practitioner 23). In addition to the print directory, the Korea Daily has also operated a call centre called “Hananet” since 2003, to provide an in-house, in-person, Korean-language business directory service. According to the company’s media kit, it handles 10,000 inbound calls daily. Aside from business directories, the Korea Times publishes the Weekly H, a weekly magazine available online (e-book format) as well as offline, for its subscribers (www.weeklyh.com/aboutus). The Korea Daily also publishes Lady Central 21, a monthly lifestyle magazine, as well as various guidebooks (e.g., Golf Guide, Medical Guide, Travel Guide, Franchise Guide). According to the company’s media kit, Lady Central 21 has a monthly circulation of

76 http://www.kbs-america.com/schedule/schedule_channel.aspx#cable
77 http://www.sbs-int.com/advertising/advertising_intro.asp?smnu=51
78 http://www.corp.koreadaily.com/eng/media/tele.html
79 http://www.corp.koreadaily.com/eng/media/magazine.html
The recently launched IS Plus, “a premium sports/entertainment daily newspaper,” (est. 2009) also has secured a 35,000 daily readership (ibid.).

For broadcasting, channel expansion is also considered as vertical expansion. TVK24 launched its TVK2 in 2009 in addition to TVK1 launched in 2005 upon inauguration, in order to attract 1.5- and second generation Korean-Americans. Multiplication of platforms (terrestrial, cable, and satellite) is another way to increase visibility. Transnational broadcasting media have multiple contracts with multiple carriers (instead of attempting to brand their own name with one channel) to better appeal to advertisers and maximize advertising profits. Some advertisers prefer over-the-air while others prefer cable or satellite (Media Practitioner 26).

Table 5.10  Telephone directories published by Korean media outlets and CSOs in L.A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Directory</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>URL</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea Times Business Directory</td>
<td>Korea Times</td>
<td><a href="http://yp.koreatimes.com/">http://yp.koreatimes.com/</a></td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Yellowpage</td>
<td>Koreatown Daily</td>
<td><a href="http://www.koreanyellowpage.com/">http://www.koreanyellowpage.com/</a></td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California114.com</td>
<td>Portal site</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ca114.com/guide/company.asp">http://www.ca114.com/guide/company.asp</a></td>
<td>Online</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Online platforms allow for a new form of vertical expansion. All major media outlets (Korea Times, Korea Daily, Koreatown Daily, Radio Korea, Radio Seoul, KBS America, MBC America, SBS International, TVK24) operate websites and make media kits available for online or offline advertising, containing all relevant marketing information for advertisers. Print media outlets make e-papers available on their websites (e.g., Korea Times, Korea Daily, Koreatown Daily, Korea Herald Business, Sunday Journal, Koreana News, Town News). According to the Korea Daily, it has over 200,000 subscribed users and over 100,000 daily visitors.\(^{80}\) The Korea Times also claims to be the “most visited among the internet sites operated by Korean immigrants in North America” and was ranked 21,266th in the International Web Rank (as of August 2007), according to Alexa.\(^{81}\) The three transnational television services (KBS America, MBC America, and

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80 http://corp.koreadaily.com/eng/media/online.html
81 http://www.koreatimes.com/info/mediakit/
SBS International) also operate e-stores for content sales. Specifically, KBS America launched www.mvibo.com in 2011, “an online video streaming service” for KBS, MBC, SBS, YG Entertainment, JYP Entertainment, among others. Nonetheless, some media practitioners are skeptical about online ad sales. Websites are operated primarily as a service to readers rather than a profit-generating source. As some media practitioners put it: “People think online ads make money, but it is not true” (Media Practitioners 28 & 39).

Horizontal expansion is already a part of L.A.’s Korean media development pattern. As one media practitioner puts it: “Multimedia conglomerates are an overdue discussion. The market is already set up that way as part of advertising strategies” (Media Practitioner 38). By the early 1990s, the Korea Times had already secured its posts in all three major media sectors with a launch of Radio Seoul in 1992 and KTAN-TV in 1993. The formation of a media group came later for the Korea Daily in 2007 when it launched its own radio, JBC AM1230, although it was discontinued as of February 2011 (Korea Daily, 2011). Radio Korea also launched TV Korea with DirecTV in 2005 to provide a Korean language National Geographic (RadioKorea.com Media Kit 2009). Some media practitioners are, however, skeptical about the idea of media conglomerates. They may appeal to advertisers, however, such business structures simultaneously disperse resources, thus eventually become a burden for management (Media Practitioner 23).

The idea of a multimedia group is a Korean style. It helps attracting advertisers as they want to get a package deal. However, I think differently. I think a good newspaper or a good television is ideal. For broadcasting, there are many different business items to pursue such as content development and distribution and acting institution. (Media Practitioner 23)

As such, the competition is mainly internal. However, changes in the media and political arenas both in the U.S. and Korea bring external competition into the market. The next section examines some of the external pressures and the responses of Korean diasporic media to those pressures.

5.3.3 Competition and Regulation

The prolonged economic recession had a profound impact on the Korean enclave economy, pushing some of the traditional small businesses (e.g., grocery, dry cleaning)

82 http://www.mvibo.com/about.html
out of business. It has consequently affected the Korean media industry in one way or another as Korean media depend heavily on the enclave businesses. Nevertheless, changes in the media environment in the U.S. as well as in Korea, more than the recession, have re-contoured the landscape of L.A.’s Korean diasporic media. In the U.S., the digital transition in June 2009 (FCC, 2011) is the foremost important event that has changed the competitive structure of the local Korean broadcasting media. It has multiplied the number of Korean channels, creating free Korean-language television options, which were formerly available mostly to cable or satellite subscribers at additional fees. The increase of channels was so quick and sudden that it even caused confusion on the part of the audience in the initial period, as the existing program providers hopped from one channel to another as well as from cable to digital. For example, MBC programs (MBCD), which were formerly relayed by KTN through LA18, are now available on LA18’s digital channel LA18.3, as LA18 has changed to LA18.1 and as KTN moved to KXLA44.3. On LA18.1, the newly launched in-house Korean-language news, the LA18 Prime Time Local News (est. 2009), appears followed by the SBS 8 News (imported news from Korea) and SBS dramas.

The lower airtime fee with better sound and picture quality is the main draw of the digital channels. However, as mentioned earlier, a 24-hour channel requires low initial investment (approximately $30,000) but high maintenance costs (Media Practitioners 23 & 38). If a few hours a week required only a few video tapes to drop off for a contracted station to play, a 24-hour channel requires a full system of production, programming, and transmission. A gradual channel fee hike is already underway and is likely to result in the restructuring of Korean digital channels in the foreseeable future (Media Practitioner 23). However, on the bright side, free digital options are attractive to consumers amidst the mounting monthly household communication bills. There is high likelihood that cable subscribers will switch to digital over-the-air (Media Practitioner 38).

The so-called dot channels, which were initially only about $18,000 for 24 hours, are now $30,000. It will go up. However, the ad market is limited, thus I think within a year the market will be restructured. (Media Practitioner 23)

TV is an expensive toy for the Korean community to play with. It is simply too expensive to be sustained by the local enclave ad market...Regional branches like (name of company) even cannot afford that...It is around $400,000. (Name of
company) has continually cut down hours and now they are doing only two to two and a half hours (a day). DTV is cheaper, less than $30,000 for 24 hours. Those who previously could not even think about doing it are now buying channels...However, there is a problem. They do not have content, transmission system as well as technicians to attend to at least during the hours people watch... However, good news is that people pay a lot for communication these days. iPhone costs about $100 monthly and the cable also costs a lot. However, DTV only needs a $30 to $40 antenna. So people start cancelling the cable and switch to DTV. I hear from people that there are six digital Korean channels available in L.A. now. (Media Practitioner 38)

Aside from the digital transition, the overall technological improvements that enable multiple platforms to carry Korean content has also altered the market structure, leaving traditional distribution channels such as video rental stores vulnerable. KBS America launched www.mvibo.com, a VOD website to provide “a real alternative to illegal websites with most of the shows available within three hours after broadcasting in Korea” (www.kbs-america.com/services/vod.aspx). However, it is fiercely contested by the Korean Video Association of the U.S. (translated) in the fear of losing their business (Jin, 2011). The association organized its second rally in L.A. in early May 2011, following the first one in April, requesting the closure of www.mvibo.com and crackdown on illegal websites (ibid.). According to KBS America, however, the site is the solution to combat illegal websites. As discussed in Chapter 3, the illegal websites, in fact, have been a concern to many transnational media as well as local program providers. KBS America, MBC America, SBS International, All TV (Canada), and &TV (Canada) collectively filed a lawsuit in 2009 against Ohcastra.com, which illegally distributed the contents of major Korean broadcasters through YouTube, Myspace, among others.  

The launch of www.mvibo, however, is only one of the ongoing complaints among video rental businesses. The so-called “video war” between video rental businesses and the three transnational television services (KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International) hit its peak when video rental businesses rallied during Korean President Lee’s visit to the U.S. (Washington D.C.) in June 2009 (Lee, 2009b, 2009c). The complaints included, first, the inconsistency of original copy fee by region: $150 in L.A. and N.Y. compared to $200 to $400 in Washington. The higher fee amidst the rising store rental fees posed threats to the survival of Washington businesses. Second, the

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breakdown of four-week hold-back time by which video rentals make videos available two weeks after their original play in Korea (with subtitles) and transnational media play two weeks thereafter, was a concern. Some programs were available on cable and satellite channels prior to the hold-back time (ibid.). With an emergence of 24-hour satellite channels and internet websites (www.mbivo.com), video rental businesses were on the verge of domino bankruptcy. In fact, only 10 out of 40 video stores in Washington D.C. have survived (Lee, 2009b, 2009c; Choi, 2011e). One media practitioner mentions that such conflict is a result of responding to new challenges brought by technological advancements while continuing the old “low-grade business strategies” (Media Practitioner 24). The new measure is a double-edged sword, destroying its own distribution structure and simultaneously posing a threat to the existing distribution channels.

We need to deal with the outcome of the low-grade business strategies. There are many conflicts between transnational media and local independent producers who used to get content from them. All contents are available now on internet; however, they cannot do the same-day broadcast because of the still existing video distributors from the early years. They have destroyed their own business structure themselves. (Media Practitioner 24)

Korea’s new media law, passed in July 2009, is another factor that is likely to alter the landscape of L.A.’s Korean media. This new deregulation law lowered the entry barrier for large conglomerates to form multimedia groups through “cross-ownership in general programming and content providers” (Korea Communications Commission, 2011). In December 2010, the KCC selected five newspaper conglomerates to expand into the broadcasting business: The Chosun Ilbo, the Korea Daily, the DongA Ilbo, and the Maeil Kyungjae as general channel providers and the Yonhap News as a news channel provider (KCC, 2010). These media corporations will be in direct competition with the existing over-the-air KBS, MBC, and SBS in Korea. One local Korean newspaper in L.A. reports that the new channel providers also attempt to cross the border to create partnerships with major Korean diasporic media outlets in North America. Over 20 Korean television providers in the major U.S. and Canadian cities including that of L.A. have been contacted (Sung, 2011). Considering the presence of regional branches of KBS, MBC, and SBS in L.A., the competition from the headquarters is likely to be carried over to L.A.
In the abundance of Korean television services including transnational branches, Kim (2010c) suggests the Japanese model of TV consortium (TV Japan) as a potential solution. TV Japan, launched in 1991 by NHK Cosmomedia America Inc., is the only Japanese language channel available in the U.S. and Canada via the Dish Network to 670,000 subscribers (www.tvjapan.net). Japan’s major corporations such as NHK, JAL, ITOCHU, and SMITOMO are major shareholders of the company. Kim (2010c) points out two major problems with Korean transnational media. First, Korean transnational television organizations are obsessed with entry into the U.S. market, as one media practitioner also puts it: “the entry into the U.S. market is big in Korea” (Media Practitioner 24). Nevertheless, that entry often takes the form of just transmitting content via digital channels as an add-on to existing programs, rather than a full-fledged launch of branch offices. Second, Korean broadcasters are also obsessed with diversifying platforms in and out of Korea rather than focusing on a few. And after all that effort to get into the U.S. market, they focus predominantly on Koreans. Their businesses are limited to in-community and in-language, targeting overseas Korean audiences.

The vice president of (name of mainstream company) does not understand the rationale for multi-entry of broadcasters. Everyone wants to enter into the global market…The entry to the U.S. market is big in Korea. (Media Practitioner 24)

However, following the TV Japan model could be a challenge for Korean transnational media. Most of them have already “entered the U.S. market” and the “corporate pride” as well as a lack of government control in forming a consortium will not let one network take precedence (Media Practitioner 24). Under Korea’s media law, the public broadcasters (KBS and MBC) compete with a commercial broadcaster. Already in the 1990s, KBS and MBC relied on advertising for revenues, 61% and 98% respectively (Shim, 2008, p. 23). They are after all “commercial public” (Media Practitioner 24). Such ambiguous positioning of the public broadcasters continues in their operation of U.S. branches and leads to the competition with local immigrant media, when they are, in fact, public broadcasters expected to cater to the operation of overseas Korean diasporic media. Such competition over a saturated diasporic market dilutes transnational media’s globalization initiatives and simultaneously challenges local immigrant media businesses. The TV Japan model thus suggests an important implication. After all, it is not that Japan has no other competitive television networks that they only
launched TV Japan (ibid.). The increasingly complicated diasporic media market requires policy intervention on the part of Korean government.

Due to such a complex competitive market structure, the collaboration among Korean media outlets is difficult to expect, although the venues for professional networking among Korean media practitioners are not completely absent (Media Practitioner 31). The Korean Broadcasters Association, a 20 year-old association for broadcasting professionals, has 40 to 50 members (mostly reporters) and previously functioned as a venue for professional exchanges such as setting up broadcasting standards, among other issues. However, it has lost its purpose over the years and has become more like a social gathering for reporters (Media Practitioners 21 & 26). Also worth note are the Southern California Korean Reporters Group, the Camera Crew Association, and the Korean Press Association (translated) (Media Practitioners 23, 27, & 34). Most of the interaction is, however, also limited to interaction during on-site reporting or social gatherings (Media Practitioners 31 & 35). Professional pride also plays in this, as journalists tend to associate within the same media type (Media Practitioner 32).

All are competitors, thus companies do not like their reporters being close to one another. The drawback of no interaction at all is low journalistic integrity. It becomes just like another small business. (Media Practitioner 31)

We usually play individually but act collectively as a group when there is an issue. It is like building a house on sand. We come together if need be and get separated if need be as well. (Media Practitioner 35)

Nonetheless, there is an aspiration for professional exchange (Media Practitioner 38). Among the seven areas of potential collaboration, L.A.’s Korean media practitioners, in fact, identify “forming a community media consortium/association” as the most important yet least satisfied (see Figure 5.6). It is also tightly related to the second most important attribute, “providing journalistic training.” One media practitioner mentions that the utilization of socio-cultural capital accumulated by Korean-American journalists is particularly important (Media Practitioner 28). L.A.’s Korean media have been around long enough to have retired journalists of their own who have (self-) trained to become Korean-American journalists to serve the Korean community. Creating venues for knowledge transfer of this valuable social capital to the next generation, as well for
bridging Korea and the U.S. in various socio-cultural, economic and political arenas, needs to be pursued as a bigger industry project (Media Practitioner 28). In the fast changing media environment both in the U.S. and Korea and increasingly complicated competition structure therein, the need for professional exchange and guidance is growing more than ever.

The (name of association) has nothing to do with reporting. It is just for social. That is it. Ideally, we can discuss how to improve reporting quality or what to do when there are issues in K-town. However, we do not do any of these. (Media Practitioner 38)

We need a press foundation to discuss some important issues such as compensations for reporters, teaching opportunities, i.e. seminars by retired reporters, networking for reporters to connect with Korea on investment, consulting, knowledge sharing, etc. (Media Practitioner 28)

**Figure 5.6** Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Institutional Collaboration among Korean Media” by Korean media practitioners in L.A.
**Conclusion**

Overall, the L.A. Korean community, the largest Korean diaspora in North America, displays a robust communication infrastructure. K-town continues to function as a socio-cultural, economic, and political hub of the Korean diaspora. A flow of transnational capital and a multiethnic labour force facilitates the enclave economy and simultaneously intensifies the multiethnic and bipolar class structure of K-town, creating a new source of inter-ethnic tension, in addition to the ongoing geopolitics and ethnic rivalry within the area. Nevertheless, the changing socio-economic and cultural landscape of K-town also works as a positive force for the Korean community in general, forcing the 1.5- and second-generation-led organizations in K-town to take active leadership roles in multiethnic social services and advocacy. Such pan-ethnic efforts, after all, have resulted in turning K-town into a model of Ball-Rokeach’s geographically grounded, multiethnic communication infrastructure, suggesting a possibility for new multiethnic enclaves or “neighbourhoods of hope,” instead of “places of stigma” (Murdie & Skop, 2011, p. 64).

Reflecting the high dependency on in-language media, L.A.’s Korean community offers a rich diversity of media options on a variety of media platforms in commercial broadcasting, cable, satellite, and print, online and offline. As a hub for Korean media businesses, led by branches of transnational media since the late 1960s, L.A.’s Korean media market has demonstrated balanced development in television, radio, and newspapers (dailies and weeklies). Especially, in the unregulated cable and satellite sectors, 24-hour Korean channels are abundant. Korean options are also strengthening on over-the-air networks. LA18 has recently started an in-house-produced Korean-language news program. Additionally, the digital transition has allowed for more Korean options on digital over-the-air. Such a variety of venues to access Korean services suggests the potential for greater intercultural exchange of cultural products, especially in the time of the Korean wave, if proper marketing strategies to reach a broader audience are employed.

Nevertheless, Korean media are yet to lead multiethnic storytelling to the same extent as Korean-led CSOs in K-town. As is the case in Vancouver, Korean services are
predominantly led by and for first-generation immigrants, and are concentrated in the commercial sector, focusing on in-language marketing. The socio-economic barriers (e.g., subtitles, pay services) to access Korean services thus hinder the distribution of Korean storytelling. Subtitles are provided, but only selectively and mostly on entertainment programs. There are six Korean evening news programs; however, none of them (except for the currently discontinued English edition) provides subtitles when these could be great windows into Korean storytelling for a broader audience. Economically, Korean options are limitedly available on over-the-air broadcasts, and abundant in the pay-service cable and satellite sectors that are available to subscribers only. Hopeful signs are emerging through free digital over-the-air services, although how these new services will open further access to a broader audience warrants further monitoring.

The fierce market competition in the two-horse race led by transnational media has created a lopsided competition structure, in which local immigrant media are inevitably found in a vulnerable position. High operational costs, especially high airtime fees to license holders and/or broadcasting fees to content providers, in a saturated enclave market are great burdens on local production. The FCC’s financial measures to aid minority ownership (e.g., bidding credits, tax certificates) do not seem to work effectively in the Korean media market. Most Korean television services are program providers who purchase airtime from license holders rather than network owners in the broadcasting sector, thus are less likely to be the direct beneficiaries of these measures. Media outlets instead form an in-house “U.S. ad team” to attract mainstream advertisers, including governments, to support their operation, suggesting that assistance for day-to-day operations is perhaps more important than assistance for bigger financial transactions. The changing media environment as a result of advancements in technology (e.g., VOD, illegal operators) and constant policy changes (e.g., digital transition, Korea’s new election and media law) in the U.S. and Korea put Korean storytelling further at risk. Especially, Korea’s new election law is likely to influence Korean storytelling.

On the positive side, such fierce competition stimulates further growth in the media market. Media outlets adopt innovative horizontal and vertical expansion strategies, in and out of the media industry, online and offline, to survive. Korean media also provide a stepping stone for Korean journalists in their move to the broader media system.
The self-mobilized “Canadian Experience Class”-style labour management also helps Korean diasporic media to secure manpower. With this understanding of the increasingly complex nature of L.A.’s Korean media market, the next chapter will look at how the interplay of these internal and external pressures is manifested in media production, especially in serving socio-cultural, political, and intercultural ends.
6: Media Practices: Los Angeles

One of the unique characteristics of L.A.’s Korean media market is the predominance of transnational media. This market structure continues in media production. The transnational link with Korea headquarters secures a constant flow of content, while immigrant media self-supply through their own production or partnership with non-competing media outlets in Korea. Overall, such operational strategies have financed media operations and multiplied Korean options; however, how they influence the socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles of diasporic media is an open question. Who owns/operates (transnational media vs. immigrant media) to serve whom (Koreans vs. Korean-Americans) for what purposes, makes the difference in geographical focus (Korea vs. U.S.) and the standpoint of storytelling (“Korean” versus “Korean-American” perspectives). Are these media outlets primarily meant to serve overseas Korean citizens to connect them to Korea, or it is to serve Korean-Americans in the process of integration? Although the function of media may not be as clear-cut as stated, whether or not there is a difference in editorial orientation by source of capital is an important question to ask. This chapter looks at how such dynamics play out in media production, especially serving socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles of diasporic media.

6.1 Socio-Cultural Roles and Challenges

The socio-cultural role of diasporic media includes providing national and geo-ethnic news with cultural translation for those who depend largely on Korean media for news about “here.” As discussed in Chapter 3, geo-ethnic news constitutes “ethnically or culturally relevant” and “geographically bound,” news: from local city news to Korean community news, and from general local events to immigrant settlement information. Geo-ethnic storytelling by L.A.’s Korean media can be more geographically grounded. Compared to that of Vancouver, L.A.’s Korean communication infrastructure has developed in major ethnoburbs, servicing locally specific Korean clientele. While major Korean media outlets are located in the K-town area, a few others such as the Town
News, a weekly newspaper, are located in Orange County. To cover this physical distribution, the Korea Times and the Korea Daily also have devoted one page each to the news about Koreans in Orange County and San Diego in the A section, separated from other pages that deal with headlines primarily concerning K-town. News stories are also culturally translated or repackaged, using cultural idioms (history or contextual references) familiar to Koreans and providing background information, if necessary, for those who are unfamiliar with the chronology of events, which took place prior to their immigration to the U.S. As Chung (2007, p. 51) argues, Korean media have served to provide “culture-friendly information on both homeland and American events, along with tips on how to promote educational and economic goals.” It is through this process of selection and translation that the news is filtered and contextualized by local Korean media practitioners and made available to a Korean audience.

*Geo-Korean Storytelling and Cultural Translation*

Media practitioners mention that it is to national and geo-ethnic news that most of their production efforts and resources are dedicated. Although the absolute quantity may be small, these locally-produced items often make their way to the A section of newspapers or the headlines of television and radio (Media Practitioner 31). The findings of a content analysis of 1,593 television, newspaper, and radio news items conducted for this study (see Table 6.1) confirm that 38% of the total output is locally produced and the rest is supplemented by news imported either from Korea (22%) or elsewhere (40%). Newspapers tend to produce more news items locally (55%) than radio (39%) and television (28%). Of the news items produced locally, 86% of the news items focus on national (27%) and geo-ethnic news (54%)—with a similar distribution between general local news (27%) and Korean community news (27%)—and significantly less coverage on international news (11%) (see Table 6.2). International news items, mainly about Korea (52%) and other parts of the world (29%), are usually supplied by imported

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84 This includes six Korean-language television evening news programs (KBS America News, MBC News Tonight, SBS Evening News, KTN News, TVK News Wide, and LA18 Prime Time Local News), three radio evening news programs (Radio Korea, Radio Seoul, and JBC), and the front page of each section of the four daily newspapers (Korea Times, Korea Daily, Koreatown Daily, and Korea Herald Business).
Korean sources (Korea head offices or news agencies such as Yonhap News). A majority of the U.S. national news (69%) is also supplied by various U.S. sources (e.g., LA Times, Associated Press).

The section weight is more important than the absolute quantity as a whole. The A section is the most dedicated, invested, and revenue-generating space. Thus, it is important to compare section by section than the absolute quantity. It is because people tend to read the A section and plus one more section and disregard the rest. A small article in the A section and a big article in the B or C section is incomparable. What matters to Koreans and matters to the U.S. in general goes to the A section. (Media Practitioner 31)

Table 6.1  News origin by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Origin</th>
<th>Total n=1593</th>
<th>TV n=501</th>
<th>Newspaper n=232</th>
<th>Radio n=860</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff writer</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2  Geographic focus of news items by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total n=1593</th>
<th>Staff writer n=605</th>
<th>U.S. n=100</th>
<th>Korea n=355</th>
<th>Other n=23</th>
<th>Absent/unknown n=510</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total output by media type (see Table 6.3) also demonstrates a higher emphasis on news about the U.S. (64%) than Korea (17%) or international news altogether (34%). Television news tends to have relatively higher emphasis on U.S. news (76%) compared to newspapers (64%) and radio (58%). Television news also covers more national news (39%) compared to newspapers (29%) and radio (27%). For geo-ethnic news, on the other hand, there is no significant difference in the overall portion.
However, the distribution between general local news and Korean community news varies by media type. Television news tends to cover general local news (14%) and Korean community news (14%) equally whereas newspapers cover Korean community news (20%) more than general local news (9%). Radio news, on the other hand, covers general local news (20%) more than Korean community news (7%).

Such stronger emphasis on news about the U.S. than about Korea is contrary to the findings of Lin and Song’s (2006) content analysis on Korean, Chinese, and Latino newspapers (8,255 items sampled between 2003 and 2004). The study found a rather similar distribution between U.S. (38%) and Korean (43%) news. The difference may be the result of a change in geographic focus over the years, or of sampling. While this study focused on the four dailies only, Lin and Song included 14 publications, including dailies and weeklies. The weeklies may have contributed to increasing the portion of Korean news.

The reason for the generally higher emphasis for national news for television may be attributed to the area of distribution and the location of programming and production. Korean channels on cable or satellite networks target nationwide audiences, or at least audiences in major cities in the western and eastern regions. Thus, there is a limit on how head stations in L.A., which control production, programming, and transmission, can produce “local” content that concerns L.A. or K-town only. Korean audiences receive exactly the same programs, including locally produced evening news, at exactly the same time, wherever they reside. The production of two separate regional news programs is thus in discussion. As one media practitioner puts it: “We plan to make two different news, L.A. news and nationwide news. This way, we can satisfy all. Right now, it is focus-less. It is somewhat nationwide with less of L.A. news. Audiences in the east do not care about L.A. news” (Media Practitioner 26). Newspapers, on the other hand, can focus more on L.A. and neighbouring ethnoburbs, as branches or franchises of the transnational newspapers (Korean Times and Korea Daily) across the U.S. cover geo-ethnic news of their own. The remaining immigrant newspapers often do not have a nationwide network, thus focus on L.A. and major ethnoburbs as they wish.
Table 6.3  Geographic focus of news items by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=1593</td>
<td>n=501</td>
<td>n=232</td>
<td>n=860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The geographic focus of television news is significantly different by source of capital: local immigrant (TVK24), transnational (KBS, MBC, SBS and KTN85), and multicultural television news (LA18). Table 6.4 (top) shows that multicultural TV is the most U.S. news-oriented (94%) compared to local immigrant (83%) and transnational TV (63%). The coverage of national (45%), general local (23%) and Korean community news (21%) is also relatively higher in multicultural TV than in local immigrant and transnational TV. The coverage of state news (news about California), on the other hand, is the highest in local immigrant TV (17%), compared to transnational (6%) and multicultural TV (5%), whereas that of Korean news is the highest in transnational TV (17%), compared to almost none in local immigrant TV (1%) and multicultural TV (3%). The portion of local and state news is maintained at the very minimum in transnational TV (32% compared to 46% of local immigrant and 49% of multicultural) for the higher portion of international news (36% compared to 15% of local immigrant media and 6% of multicultural media).

Comparing newspapers by source of capital (Table 6.4 bottom), transnational newspapers (Korea Times and Korea Daily) are also significantly more Korea-focused than local immigrant newspapers (Koreatown Daily and Korea Herald Business). Over 30% of the total news output is dedicated to Korean news in transnational newspapers whereas there is only 9% in local immigrant media. Local immigrant newspapers are relatively more U.S.-focused (74%) compared to transnational newspapers (62%).

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85 KTN (as well as Radio Seoul) is affiliated with the Korea Times, thus categorized as transnational.
Geographic focus of news items by source of capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus -</th>
<th>Television Only</th>
<th>Newspapers only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Local immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Only</td>
<td>n=547</td>
<td>n=203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus -</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Local immigrant</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=232</td>
<td>N=58</td>
<td>N=174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National and geo-ethnic news is produced or reproduced differently depending on the news source. The general local news is “produced” directly by reporters (staff writers) through on-site reporting, telephone interviews, or press releases. One of the important criteria for on-site reporting is the event’s relevancy to the Korean community. For example, the so-called “metro news” of one of the newspapers reports on the activities/decisions made at the city/county halls that are relevant to K-town (Media Practitioner 29). The U.S.-Korea events that are taking place in either L.A. or Korea (e.g., a U.S. politician visiting Korea, U.S.-Korea FTA talks) are also considered on-site newsworthy (Media Practitioner 30). The general local news is also “reproduced” in the process of cultural translation. The stories of broader interest are re-contextualized to highlight the geo-ethnicity (Media Practitioner 26). For example, one of the un-bylined news items on the Census narrates, “the response rate of the city of Los Angeles that includes K-town (emphasis added) was 11%” (KBS, March 24, 2010). Another un-
bylined news item reads, “The Census questionnaire has been mailed out to 120 million households today. The Census questionnaire includes ten questions in English that ask name, race, and gender, among others. If you need a questionnaire in Korean, please call a free Korean-language service, 1-866-955-2010” (emphasis added, TVK24, March 15, 2010).

Healthcare reform is a good example. We narrate it based on “our standard.” Americans think differently. We focus on what will happen to senior’s Medicare and prescription drugs, how much we have to pay at our income level, etc. (Media Practitioner 26)

The source of national and general local news ranges from national (e.g., ABC, CNN, NBC, Associated Press) to local media sources (e.g., City News Service, L.A. Times, OC Register) and local government bureau sources (e.g., court schedules, press releases from the city of L.A., State of California, LAPD, county supervisor offices and various organizations) (Media Practitioners combined). In the recent years, Korean aides/assistant/advisors of local politicians (unidentified) also have become good news sources as they are responsible for monitoring the coverage of their interests in Korean media (Media Practitioner 29). Official partnerships for content sharing vary by outlet (Media Practitioner 33). However, it is generally acknowledged that these sources must be properly by-lined. Some outlets have learned from experience: “We received notices from the (name of company) for using their photos… Ever since then, we ask them first whether or not we can use or buy them” (Media Practitioner 28). Others mention that the formal procedure of such requests to mainstream media is a deterrent, thus they rarely use their items (Media Practitioner 38).

There is no content licensing with (name of company). (Name of company) or (name of company) may say they do. However, that is not true. (Name of company) reporters are our news sources. We cite the source such as “According to so and so reporter of (name of company). (Media Practitioner 33)

Aside from local sources, Korean media also use the so-called “international news” from Korea. Transnational media tend to depend on “international news” produced by Korea headquarters, which often includes U.S. news along with general international news. The U.S. news is categorized as international news in Korea whereas it is national news to Korean media outlets in L.A. As one media practitioner puts it: “We use the items (name of headquarter) already used. We do not use a lot though. Sometimes the
relationship between us and them is ambiguous” (Media Practitioner 25). The acknowledgement of news story origin, however, becomes less clear, compared to mainstream media sources. Especially for transnational media, it is not clear whether this U.S. national or general local news was locally produced by a L.A. branch or headquarters in Korea, except for the bylines that appear in the “Korea Section” (or "Bonkookpan") of newspapers with email addresses of reporters that usually end with “co.kr” or mentioned as “a correspondent of (name of company)” in locations other than L.A. Media practitioners mention that such ambiguity purposefully inflates the perception of local production (Media Practitioners 33 & 34). In other words, in a case where imported items exceed local production, which is often the case, or when too many items belong to one local byline, the elimination of regional origin helps right the imbalance.

We used to indicate the region of production, for example, the name of the reporter, L.A. However, we removed them all as such a regional indicator makes local production look relatively smaller. As far as I know, other newspapers also tried and removed it altogether. The portion of Korean source is obviously bigger. (Name of company) tends not to cite Yonhap News items…The reason our company removed the regional indicator is that our company tends to have relatively more items belonged to one byline…Readers already know. We previously provided reporters’ email addresses along with bylines. Sometimes it gets too long that it is difficult to distinguish the main text from a byline. (Media Practitioner 33)

Most Yonhap News items are cited. However, I write the rest so it does not look good if my name constantly appears …I just put an initial of our company name. (Media practitioner 34)

Such a constant flow of U.S. national news is a relative advantage compared to Vancouver’s Korean media. Canadian news is not as frequently covered as U.S. news by international bureaus and news agencies of Korea. Another relative advantage of L.A.’s Korean media is the utilization of news produced by correspondents from Korea headquarters who are stationed in L.A. offices. Their reports are available in addition to that of staff writers. Considering the time difference between L.A. and Seoul, some stories are made available to local L.A. Korean audiences even before the audiences in Korea (Media Practitioner 27). In addition, an interesting transnational flow of news from L.A. to Seoul is underway through a sharing of locally produced L.A. news with Korea’s news agencies. As one media practitioner puts it: “We have a MOU with the (name of news agency) to have one of our local news item per day to be covered in Seoul” (Media Practitioner 23).
The ethnicity-specific, Korean community news is “produced” by local reporters. The news about the Korean community as a whole or Korean-Americans as individuals serves as an “advocacy” function of Korean media (Media Practitioner 38). Korean media discuss “our stories” and “our victories” which mainstream media never celebrate (ibid.). The recent examples include “Professor D. I. Kim’s students won an award at the traffic safety symposium” (Radio Korea, April 9, 2010) and “Korean female student, elected the new student body president of Northwestern University” (JBS, April 21, 2010). The recent appointment of Sung Kim as the new U.S. ambassador to South Korea (as of June 2011) has been also widely discussed in L.A.’s Korean media (Kim, 2011c). TVK24’s “Story G” is another example. It features successful Korean-Americans in a documentary format. During the time of study, a story about Sonia Kim Été, CEO of Academy of Couture Art, a fashion design school in L.A., was introduced (TVK24, March 14, 2010). Korean media also rebroadcast coverage of Korean-Americans spotlighted in mainstream media. The L.A. Times’ article on “Forever 21’s Stylish Sisters” is an example. It covered a story about two daughters of Mr. D. W. Chang, CEO of Forever 21, (Chung, 2010d). Asian studies scholars often criticize the reinforcement of “model minority” stereotypes (Min, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2007; Cheng & Yang, 1996). However, the recognition of “model Koreans” is simultaneously part of the “immigration ideology,” that is, “the belief that America is the land of opportunity in the initial stages of immigration unlike native-born minority groups” (Chung, 2007, p. 61).

A L.A. Times reporter once asked me if our company is the same as the L.A. Times. I asked back, what is the difference? I now think differently. We have a community advocacy function. It is undeniable… “The skin is nearer than the shirt.” It is what we are born for. Our priority is to tell our own stories that involve the Korean community. That is what determines our news value. We want to tell our stories, celebrate our victories and encourage our children’s achievements, which mainstream media never discuss. We recognize them and give credits to ourselves. The mainstream society cannot understand our unique problems…We talk about those problems; sometimes we criticize them and other times we sympathize. (Media Practitioner 38)

For geo-ethnic information, a good source is the classifieds, which Korean immigrants often resort to find employment and business opportunities. Min’s study (2001) confirms that Korean immigrants find employment through personal networks or ads in Korean diasporic newspapers. The classified sections of the Korea Times and the Korea Daily, for example, are sizable, with only a few pages less than the A section: 16.
pages compared to 28 pages of the A section, and 20 pages compared to 26 pages of the A section respectively. The classified section contains information on employment, real estate, rent/lease, among others. The downside of the so-called “ethnic classified,” however, may be that Koreans are limited to the options listed in Korean newspapers only, as discussed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, considering the amount of information circulated through the classifieds, it is undeniable that this is an important source of information at least for the newly arrived.

Finally, Korean news is “reproduced” through direct insertion of imported news or rewriting of Korean sources to geographically reorient the news for local Koreans. It involves replacing words such as “our country” referring to Korea with “the Korean government” (Media Practitioner 27) or simple editing of the text for a better read (Media Practitioner 32). Sharing of Korean items also occurs across media. For example, Radio Korea’s Korean news is often tagged with an anchor’s comment that “this news is provided by KBS America.”

We write opening and closing and all other news scripts. 70% to 80% of our news is news about Korea. We rewrite to shift a focus to the U.S. For example, we replace “our country” with “the Korean government” or “the U.S. Department of Commerce” with just “the Department of Commerce.” We also say something like, “there are such and such performances currently playing in Korea so if you plan to visit Seoul, enjoy the opportunities. (Media Practitioner 27)

Unlike others, we don’t just copy and paste. Even those Yonhap News items, we rewrite...There are no bylines for Yonhap News items so the news writing is often sloppy. (Media Practitioner 32)

News Topics: What is Newsworthy?

Analyzing by news topics that are selected and reported to Koreans, again the “relevancy to the Korean community and the interest of Koreans” is one of the most important criteria, equally mentioned by media practitioners. Comparing the news topics by geographic location (Table 6.5), at the local level, Korean enclave economy/business (12%) and community news (11%) are most frequently discussed.86 “The food truck

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86 Note that 21% of the transportation and traffic news are mainly traffic information by three radio evening news programs, announced every 10 to 15 minutes. Similarly, sports and weather forecasts are included in everyday television and radio news, thus the number tends to be relatively higher than the rest of the news topics.
Kalbi enters the OC market” (Korea Daily, March 12, 2010, K1); “Forever 21 ranks 2nd among L.A.’s 50 top minority corporations” (Korea Times, March 16, 2010, D1); and “Korean-American Coalition, an official not-for-profit partner of the LPGA” (KBS, March 12, 2010) are examples. At the state/national level, economy/business (15%) and politics (11%) are at the top: “Recovery of California economy is slow” (TVK24, March 24, 2010); “New smoking law passed” (KBS, March 24, 2010); and “Tax credit to first-time home-owners extended” (Korea Times, March 24, 2010, A1) are examples. Aside from economy/business and politics, immigration (5%) and education (5%) are two other topics frequently discussed: “Increase in immigrant settlement in medium- and small-size cities” (KBS, March 15, 2010), “California lays off 22,000 teachers and staff” (TVK24, March 15, 2010); and “Arizona’s new immigration law” (Radio Korea, April 24, 2010).

At the international level, news about South Korea covers acts of terror (40%) and crime/violence (16%). The high coverage of acts of terror is attributed to the sinking of a South Korean warship that occurred on March 26, 2010, killing 46 soldiers: “Major disaster in the west sea, the sinking of Korea’s warship Chogae” (Korea Daily, March 27, 2010, A1/A2); “Internal explosion or external attack? 46 are missing” (Korea Times, March 27, 2010, A1); and “Chonanham being recovered” (Radio Korea, April 12, 2010).

The coverage of crime is also high, attributed to a murder case in March 2010.

The process of Korean news selection varies by type of media and source of capital. Immigrant media or broadcasting outlets tend to select item by item, whereas transnational newspapers select page by page from the day’s print publication of the headquarters to construct a 15-page “Korea Section” or “Bonkookpan.” The Korea Section is in fact a unique addition only found in Korean transnational newspapers: “It is a section seen only among Korean press. The L.A. Times or La Opinion does not have, for example, a Mexico Section. However, this section serves to create ad spaces. Thus, it is difficult to say that the paper is more Korea-focused because of that” (Media Practitioner 31). In other words, the quantity of Korean news alone is not a good indicator of home orientation.
Comparing news topics by news origin, general local and Korean community news is locally produced by Korean media outlets, whereas U.S. national and Korean news are supplied by external sources. Table 6.6 shows that other than regularly included sports, stock market, weather, and traffic information, staff writers focus largely on Korean enclave economy/business (9%) and community news (9%). The U.S. sources (e.g., Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Washington Post, CNN) provide economy/business (17%), crime/violence (12%), and sports (12%). For sports news specifically, only 34% (50 out of 148 items) are locally produced by Korean media and the rest are supplied by U.S. and Korean sources (12% each). Korean sources provide

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<th>Provincial/National</th>
<th>International (South Korea)</th>
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<td>n=274</td>
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<td>Politics: Parliamentary practices</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>International/bilateral politics</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy/Business (Korean enclave, Korea economy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community (Korean diaspora)</td>
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<td>Stock market</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State/City politics</td>
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<td>Entertainment/Entertainment industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics: Election</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</table>
crime/violence (10%), international/bilateral politics (9%) and international/bilateral economy (5%): “Google, criticized for closing its China office” (SBS, March 23, 2010); and “North Korea increases rent of diplomatic offices by 20%” (Korea Daily, March 12, 2010, B1) are examples. Regardless of news origin, these topics are presented mostly as “hard news” (89%). Table 6.7 shows that the portion of “soft news” is relatively higher for the items written by staff writers (9%): “Koreans’ stress level, four times higher than other ethnic groups” (KBS, March 16, 2010); and “Newly finished Korean cultural centre” (KTAN, March 25, 2010).

### Table 6.6 News topics by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Topics</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<th>n=355</th>
<th>n=23</th>
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Table 6.7  Genre by news origin (%)

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<tr>
<th>Genre</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
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</table>

Comparing news topics and genre by source of capital, there is no significant difference. However, interviews with media practitioners reveal that due to relatively smaller financial and human resources, micro- and small-size local immigrant media tend to focus more on “soft news” or community events (e.g., fashion, food, celebrities, lifestyle) and leave “hard news” or real-time news (e.g., crime, accident) to large-size media outlets (Media Practitioner 32).

We have no capacity to run a 24-hour crime/accident team just like (name of company) or (name of company). We have no capacity to do immediate onsite reporting, thus no need to create such a team. And even if we create it, we know we do not have a competitive edge. Instead, we focus more on explorative news on issues such as food and fashion. (Media Practitioner 32)

Online Publications and Online News Archives

Almost all news items make it to the online publications, although this varies by outlet. For newspapers, some outlets upload all items while others are more responsive to their readers’ reaction. One media practitioner mentions that uploaded news items stay or get replaced based on the number of hits (Media Practitioner 28). Such monitoring also provides a set of data to determine which items should go into the print publication.

Aside from websites, all four dailies make e-papers available in a PDF format: “We have an e-paper boom now” (Media Practitioner 32). Figure 6.1 shows the screen-shots of L.A.’s four daily e-papers on a random day (February 16, 2012): the Korea Times, the Korea Daily, the Koreatown Daily, and the Korea Herald Business. The Korea Times makes its e-paper available free for subscribers and same-day users, and charges $2.00
daily and $50.00 annually for archive searches for L.A., San Francisco, Washington D.C., New York, and Hawaii publications. The Korea Daily’s e-paper is also available free for subscribers and same-day users, and email delivery service is provided upon request. The Koreatown Daily and Korea Herald Business make the week’s papers available for free viewing. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Korea Times and the Korea Daily also provide links to their branch homepages. For the Korea Times, there are links to New York, Washington DC, San Francisco, Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Hawaii, Vancouver, and Toronto. For the Korea Daily, there are links New York, Washington DC, San Francisco, Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, Texas, San Diego, and Vancouver.

It is selected by a website manager based on the number of hits. If an item does not get enough hits, it is replaced with another. Some breaking news may put on hold until the next morning for the print publication. Online and offline managers always fight when the hold items made it to the online publication before the print publication by mistake. (Media Practitioner 28)

Figure 6.1 e-papers published by L.A.’s four Korean dailies


Some television and radio outlets also make local production available free. The highlighted areas in Figure 6.2 are lists of archives available on websites of television
outlets on a random day (February 16, 2012). KBS America operates www.mvibo.com (previously www.kbsworld.com) to provide free and pay programs (e.g., drama, documentaries, movies, news). One of the free programs is the locally produced KBS America News, archived for three months (top left). MBC America (http://mbc-america.com) also uploads its 10-minute local news segment, “MBC News Tonight,” on its website (top right). TVK24 (http://www.tvk24.com) archives the TVK News Wide for two months for free viewing, and SBS International (http://www.sbs-int.com) also archives its 30-minute news for one month. Figure 6.3 is the Korea Time’s website (February 9, 2012). Right below the masthead, there is a list of services available from the e-paper to its own radio (Radio Seoul) and television (KTN). Each label leads to the respective service; all three media types (newspaper, radio, and television) are only one click away.

Figure 6.2 Archives of Korean television news

Note. Screen-shots captured on February 16, 2012. (Clockwise) KBS America (www.mvibo.com), MBC America, TVK 24, and SBS International
Figure 6.3  The Korea Times L.A. homepage and links to its affiliates

Note. Screen-shots captured on February 9, 2012. (Clockwise) The Korea Times homepage; e-paper; KTN (TV); and Radio Seoul

Settlement and Integration through Online Community

Besides news, online communities are formed on websites of the Korean media outlets to facilitate an exchange of geo-ethnic information among readers as well as between readers and experts in specific issue areas. Most active online discussion boards are formed on the Korea Times (“Open Lounge” or “Yulinmadang”) and the Korea Daily (“Ask USA”) websites. The two discussion boards are distinct in terms of the type of information discussed. While the former facilitates an exchange of philosophical ideas or critiques87 (categorized as “opinion” in Table 6.8), the latter concerns technical issues: the U.S. Social Security Administration, Immigration/Visa, Law, Education, Finance, U.S. Life, and Health.88 In order for experts to respond to technical questions raised by readers, the Korea Daily selects “the Korea Daily Recommended Experts” for one-on-one consultation or has experts registered as “Ask USA Expert.” Similar to the Vancouver

87  http://www.koreatimes.com/board/index.php?board_no=1
88  http://www.koreadaily.com/qna/ask/ask_list.asp
Chosun, the “Korea Daily Recommended Experts” can use the profile space to promote their businesses by posting their contact information.

The average daily postings of all four dailies ranges from 30 to 50 threads, mostly generated from the Korea Daily. A content analysis of over 244 threads during a constructed week of March 2010 (Table 6.8) finds that the issues related to immigration (28%) are discussed most, followed by law (18%), U.S. life in general (16%), opinion (13%), and finance (12%). Some of the examples of immigration-related questions include re-entry permits, work permits as international students, and citizenship applications, among others. The average hit frequency of the 244 items is 284 (with the highest being 2,450 hits and the lowest being 11 hits). Looking at the top five most read topics (Table 6.9), issues relating to undocumented immigration prevail, reflecting a sizable presence of undocumented immigrants in the Korean community. The first thread (hit frequency=2,450) asks whether or not it is possible to get a visa reissued when the person has stayed in the U.S. for two years as an alien student and whether or not the person can be transferred to a high school in Korea. The third thread (hit frequency=1907), “In case I give up my house,” asks the ways in which the person can be financed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussion Topics</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n=244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration (e.g., citizenship, visa)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law (e.g., crime, divorce, labour/commercial)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. life (e.g., auto)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions - Various</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance (e.g., bank, real estate, tax, accounting)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare/Social programs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Ads</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.9  Top 5 online threads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Thread Title</th>
<th>Hit Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Undocumented immigrants in the U.S.</td>
<td>2450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Undocumented immigrant's unlicensed driving</td>
<td>2315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>In case I give up my house?</td>
<td>1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Applying permanent residency as an undocumented immigrant</td>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Retaining permanent residency</td>
<td>1845</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Hit frequency is measured six months after the initial posting of threads in order to reserve a lead-time for readers to respond.

Over 50% of these questions are answered by experts, who are designated as field “experts” by the newspaper (52%) as well as non-experts, that is, readers who would like to share their own personal experiences/expertise with others (51%). The readers who posted their questions also respond to the comments (20%), as a way of asking follow-up questions or simply expressing their appreciation to those who have responded to their questions. The main language of discussion is Korean (95%); however, some experts do occasionally respond in English to the questions asked in Korean (5%). The coverage of these online communicative spaces is international (Table 6.10). Although the websites originate in L.A., the questions are from Koreans across the U.S. outside of L.A. (36%) as well as from Koreans in Korea (3%).

Table 6.10  Regional origin of online threads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other U.S.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Socio-Cultural Storytelling and the Challenges

Ultimately, Korean media practitioners want to increase their national and geo-ethnic reporting. Figure 6.5 shows the result of the overall importance-satisfaction on content. The rating confirms that media practitioners are satisfied with the coverage of news about Korea (that it is not as important as U.S. news but well covered) whereas they
are relatively less satisfied with the coverage of U.S. news. (See the following sections for the interpretation of the remaining three attributes). A lack of human resources is one of the barriers to local production, as frequently mentioned by media practitioners. A lack of the absolute number of reporters is one thing (Media Practitioner 32) and a lack of bilingual reporters who have capacity to do proper cultural translation is another (Media Practitioner 29). The former is a constant reality: “It is a community paper with an understaffed structure” (Media Practitioner 31). The number of items responsible for reporters on each day varies by media type and size of outlet, ranging from three to 10 items.

The lack of bilingual reporters, on the other hand, may be linked to decreasing interest in Korean media as a career option among the younger generation. An interview with one 1.5-generation media practitioner who made it to mainstream media reveals that there is aspiration for working in mainstream media as a sign of integration and upward mobility (Media Practitioner 21). As in Vancouver, the perception of diasporic media as second-class journalism with low journalistic integrity is also a contributing factor. Some media practitioners point out that a longer career in local Korean media does not necessarily mean more transferrable, marketable capital as media professionals. The locally hired staff, especially those who started their media career in L.A.’s Korean media industry in the early years of Korean media, tends to be self-grown journalists/reporters without formal training. As one media practitioner puts it: “There were not many professionals in this field, because it is an immigrant community. When I worked as a field reporter, nobody trained me. We had to learn on our own, because the so-called senior reporters also just joined the company and had no experience” (Media Practitioner 21). In respect to such lack of journalistic training, transnational media practitioners tend to express professional superiority (Media Practitioners 26 & 27). Such prevailing perception suggests double marginalization of diasporic media within and across media outlets.

This is my dream company…This is an American company. I wanted to experience an American company. Even if we live in America, we work for Korean companies. ... I have no opportunities to speak English...I have to readjust myself to fit in here. I am still learning. Maybe this is my final destination. (Media Practitioner 21)
We train our reporters so that they can be on par with our Seoul office reporters in terms of journalistic skills. We organize annual workshops and ensure reporters to follow the guidelines from our Seoul office. Occasionally, we have training teams from Seoul to train all overseas producers. (Media Practitioner 26)

News quality as well as reporters’ journalistic integrity is simply incomparable...We cannot be treated the same as (name of company)’s reporters...They are not properly trained as reporters...I want to do it right...I rarely monitor other’s news...It is just not worth it...Can never be compared. (Media Practitioner 27)

**Figure 6.4** Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Korean Media Content” by Korean media practitioners in L.A.

The second barrier to local production is the origin of capital and the subsequent influence on editorial direction. For transnational media, the senior management dispatched from Korea headquarters influences the Korea-versus-local orientation. The conflicts between Korea-focused senior management and local-oriented chief editors surface from time to time (Media Practitioner 28). Senior management occasionally do reorient themselves to local coverage after a few years of stay in the U.S.; however, others continue to overemphasize Korean news. The latter tend to dissociate themselves from the local Korean community and remain “transnational” in their orientation. As one media practitioner puts it: “We are going to return to Korea. The Korean community is
less important to us. If Korea is developed, the Korean community is still developing. The management style is ten years behind that of Korea…Negatively speaking, we look at Korean immigrants here as second-class citizens” (Media Practitioner 27). Such a mentality sets apart “Korean media” or “media from Korea,” that are interested in local Koreans only as a market, from “Korean-American media,” that are more concerned with local Koreans as citizens in the U.S. This claim may be an overstatement as local immigrant media are not free from the market pressure. Nevertheless, the attitude of senior management toward the Korean community as “second class citizens” does suggest that “who speaks for whom to serve what purpose” does influence the editorial. With respect to this, there seems to be an expectation in and out of the media industry for a new direction toward “Korean-American media” instead of “Korean media” or “media from Korea,” with an appointment of the first locally hired CEO, K. H. Ko, of the Korea Daily, in 2010 (Sung, 2010). How this change will influence the editorial direction is important to monitor.

I have a problem with the “Bonkookpan” (the Korea Section).… Is (name of person) from here? Why do we even talk about him here? We have Korean news for recently immigrated people or for visitors. However, we need to empirically find out the ratio of our readers, the portion of those who have lived here for over five years. I believe those who have lived here over five years are not too interested in Korean news. The management from Korea place more emphasis on Korean news. However, after five years, they lean more toward news about here. Another reason we need Korean news is to create more ad spaces. (Media Practitioner 28)

Ownership makes difference in all, production, formatting, editing, and most importantly, what is newsworthy. For example, local media (immigrant media) consider recent investment fraud case very important when media from Korea do not…We also use different words to describe the Korean community. We call it hanin (Korean) society, but they call it dongpo (overseas Korean or fellow countryman) society…Thus we try to keep distance from the Korean community. (Media Practitioner 27)

Third, similar to Vancouver, another limitation to increasing local production is the demographics of the Korean community. According to the estimate by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea (MOFAT, 2009), among the approximately 500,000 Koreans in Southern California, 56% are U.S. citizens and 44% are Korean citizens. Of those Korean citizens, 40% are permanent residents and the remaining 60% are a floating population (e.g., students, visitors). Such demographic distribution requires some coverage of Korean news. Especially for the forthcoming 2012
election for which overseas Koreans are eligible to vote, it is the interest of all three parties—Korean government, Korean media, and Korean voters—to properly inform and be informed about the details of the Korean election. Overall, the source of capital does make a difference in the portion of geographic focus and the attitude toward Korean community news.

6.2 Political Roles and Challenges

The civil society role of diasporic media goes beyond providing culturally translated geo-ethnic storytelling. It also includes helping the public engage in public discussion and affect government decision-making processes. A series of interethnic encounters discussed earlier has contributed to strengthening political consciousness among the leaders and community members, which has led to actual engagement in broader public discourse. As evidence, during the 1992 L.A. riots, the English edition of the Korea Times worked closely with the Los Angeles Sentinel, the largest African-American newspaper, to facilitate dialogue between the two communities through an exchange of articles and editorials (Chang & Diaz-Veizades, 1999). Internally, Korean media collectively functioned as a venue for first-generation Koreans (whose English was not sufficient to join the mainstream discourse) to stay informed (Media Practitioner 23).

The contribution of Radio Korea is particularly well-known. Due to the nature of the medium, Radio Korea was able to provide real-time news on the development of the event, which saved the lives of many Koreans in affected neighbourhoods and helped coordinate the community for peace rallies (Min, 1996). Such active engagement in inter- and intra-community debates is a sign of healthy democratic practice. However, whether or not such engagement is part of everyday practice or is limited to only national hot-topic events such as the L.A. riots is worth investigating. This section looks at everyday role of Korean diasporic media as a public sphere.

The 1992 L.A. riots is a good example of how mainstream media manipulate the situation and frame the story artfully as a Korean-African-American conflict…Mainstream media collaborate to serve the benefit of the country. That is why it is important to have our own channel. (Media Practitioner 23)

Kim (1981, p. 185) argues that Korean media function as “a powerful means of provoking, leading, integrating, expanding and enlightening some selective community
values or opinions.” As discussed earlier (Table 6.6), overall, political news is one of the frequently covered topics (6%), along with economy/business (7%) and international/bilateral politics (6%). Looking at the geographic focus of political news only (Table 6.11), U.S. politics more than Korean politics makes it into L.A.’s Korean media coverage. By source of capital, however, transnational media tend to cover relatively more news about Korean politics than local immigrant media.

Table 6.11  Geographic focus of news items by news origin – News about politics only (election and parliamentary practices combined) (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total n=206</th>
<th>Local immigrant n=60</th>
<th>Transnational n=132</th>
<th>Multicultural n=14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bridging the Community to Broader Public Discourse*

Korean media practitioners are generally satisfied with the response to political controversies and the promotion of political engagement, considering the available resources. Figure 6.4 in the previous section showed the importance-satisfaction rating on content by media practitioners. The attributes on “politically active or responsive to controversies involving the Korean community or immigrants” and “coverage to promote political engagement” are considered as the “responsibility of Korean media” (Media Practitioner 23) and are satisfied with the level of coverage, again considering the level of resources at hand. Just like Vancouver’s Korean media practitioners, monitoring of local and national mainstream media and news agencies is part of the daily routine. When mainstream media inaccurately or negatively portray Koreans, Korean media respond immediately to correct errors or back-report in their media through the investigation of the rationale for such portrayal. As one media practitioner puts it: “I cannot remember
which story it was now, but we found degrading remarks about Koreans in a story of (name of company). We complained and received a letter of apology” (Media Practitioner 28). Such an ombudsman role of Korean diasporic media continues in ensuring a portrayal of Koreans or Korea in other ethnic community media. One media practitioner recalls a recent incident where an ethnic newspaper used a photo of the North Korean national flag to represent South Korea (Media Practitioner 31).

These two attributes are important, because mainstream media are often biased. The Virginia Tech incident is a good example. Korean media have responsibility to let the mainstream society know that this is not a representative of the Korean community. Korean media also have responsibility to raise awareness of misrepresentation of Koreans, for example, in museums and textbooks. (Media Practitioner 23)

Aside from minor day-to-day engagement, hot-topic events never stop in L.A.’s Korean community, especially issues at the intersection of politics and race. Some of these are long-term projects that span years. Korean diasporic media contributes to forming the community discourse during the time of such events. One of the relevant issues is the redrawing of the K-town boundary discussed in Chapter 5. Two other cases to be introduced here are the K-town electoral district and the Preserve America Community. Electoral districts are rearranged based on the results of every Census. In 2001, Little Tokyo, Chinatown, and Philippinetown secured their towns as single electoral districts while K-town remained split (Chung, 2007, p. 52). The Korean community formed a committee in 2001 to prepare for the forthcoming 2010 Census. The project aimed to consolidate four congressional districts and two senatorial districts that currently oversee K-town into a single electoral district (Chung, 2007; Kim, 2011d). This was essentially the main reason why the Korean community wanted to retain its original K-town boundary. As the result of the 2010 Census came out in early 2011, a committee formed by the Korean community involving Korean CSOs—such as the KAC, the KYCC, the KRC, the Korean American Democratic Committee (KADC), and the Korean American Democratic National Organization (KADNO)—held a public hearing in collaboration with other Asian organizations and introduced a proposal for a new K-town electoral district. The proposed district stretches from Hoover Street to Crenshaw Boulevard (East to West) and Freeway No. 10 and Melrose Avenue (South to North) (Kim, 2011d.). The newly formed California Citizens Redistrict Commission will
introduce a draft of new districts based on the results of the 2010 Census and the proposals from communities in June 2011, and will finalize it in August 2011 after a public hearing (Korea Times, 2011).

This new electoral district has a few implications for the Korean community. As one CSO leader puts it: “If the district is formed, it will be easier for Korean-Americans to run for councilman and later for state member…That is what we want” (CSO Leader 5). According to the KADNO, there are approximately 50 elected or appointed Korean-American politicians in the U.S., including Sukhee Kang, Mayor of the city of Irvine, and Joseph Cho, former Mayor of city of Cerritos and City Councilman (Kim, 2011e). Brad Lee, President of KADNO, mentions: “It is encouraging that the number (of Korean-American politicians) is growing quickly” (ibid.). However, there is no Korean representation in Congress, while there are 42 African-Americans, 26 Hispanics, and 10 Asians (Kim, 2011f). Thus, this new electoral district is considered as a means to move a step closer to this goal.

Ethnic block voting, however, as discussed in Chapter 4, has challenges of its own. Added to the “love-resentment-envy” (Võ, 2004, p. 159) among candidates, another barrier for the K-town district is that it is in a large part a commercial hub rather than an ethnoburb where Korean-Americans actually reside. Fifty percent of K-town residents are in fact Latinos (see Chapter 5). Geographical dispersion of the Korean diaspora works against the potential synergy Korean-Americans expect from a single K-town district. Another barrier to block voting is individualistic approaches to politics. Dong-suk Kim of the KAVC points out that Korean-Americans tend to enter politics individually and seek community support later whereas Jewish-American politicians, for example, enter politics with full community support already behind them (Kim, 2011g). A similar pattern is found in terms of campaign support. Koreans tend to support politicians, Koreans or non-Koreans, individually rather than community as a whole, thus raising a community voice for a collective political agenda is difficult (Media Practitioner 30). Once finalized as a single district, however, it is worth investigating the kind of political dynamics the Korean merchants and Latino residents in the area will produce. Already in the K-town area, multiethnic organizations such as the KIWA, an advocacy group for immigrant workers in K-town, has addressed questions from the Korean community such
as “How could a center titled Korean-something give trouble to the same Koreans and Korean businesses by standing on the side of the Mac-Jaak [Latino workers]?” (Danny Park, Executive Director of the KIWA in the study of Lee & Park [2008], p. 258).

All major government bureaus monitor (name of company)... U.S. politicians raise funds through fundraising parties. So far Koreans have supported individually rather than the community as a whole. It may be effective for delivering individual agenda, but not for raising a community voice... Koreans account for only 0.7% of the U.S. population, and have no single electoral district to represent Korean voters. There is no Korean-American in the Congress. Collective action is important. (Media Practitioner 30)

Another relevant case is the designation of K-town as a “Preserve America Community” by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP). Founded in 2003, the Preserve America program is a federal initiative which designates communities that “protect and celebrate their heritage, use their historic assets for economic development and community revitalization, and encourage people to experience and appreciate local historic resources through education and heritage tourism programs” (www.preserveamerica.gov). The designated communities are eligible to apply for up to $250,000 in federal grants for sustainability programs and are allowed to use the “Preserve America Community” signage for the promotion of their community (Seo, 2009b). K-town was designated in 2009 as one of 845 “Preserve America Communities” (www.preserveamerica.gov), along with the Historic Filipinotown (Seo, 2009a). The designation came a year after that of Little Tokyo, Chinatown, and Thai Town in early 2008 (Ha, 2009).

All of these three cases (including the K-town boundary project discussed earlier) demonstrate an intimate interplay between geo-politics and race. The geographic boundary of an ethnic enclave is demarcated clearly and extended as a means of claiming territory and asserting political leadership. At the centre of these claims, there is invisible ethnic rivalry: some rivalries are conflict-ridden while others are mutually supportive. If the K-town boundary project involved a rivalry among ethno-racial groups within the original K-town boundary (through Little Bangladesh and El Salvador Business Street), the latter two cases demonstrate a rivalry across urban geography. As multiethnic and political as these cases are, the involvement of multiethnic organizations, interest groups, and residents in the decision-making process is common. Korean media play a role in
engaging the Korean community in these processes by organizing forums for discussion independently or in collaboration with CSOs and contribute to collecting community opinions (Lee, 2010f; Seo, 2009c).

*Promoting Political Engagement*

The political role of diasporic media is equally played out by Korean media regardless of the source of capital. However, in most cases, the large outlets with more stable capital (not necessarily the source of capital) tend to take the lead in major geopolitical and interethnic community projects. One recent example is the 2011 Korean-American Political Conference (June 2-4, 2011) in L.A. Celebrating its 42\textsuperscript{nd} anniversary of publication, the Korea Times organized the conference, hosted by the World Federation of Korean Politicians (translated), Korean-American Leadership Foundation, and Bright Future Foundation (Kim, 2011g). The conference was the first of its kind for Korean-American politicians to discuss the agenda for Korean-American political advancement, and was attended by over 100 current and past politicians and 500 community people (ibid.). According to Dong-suk Kim of the KAVC, the ultimate purpose of this conference was to support Jun Choi, former Mayor of the City of Edison, New Jersey, in his run for Congress (ibid.). The Korea Daily also organized roundtables of a similar nature. One of the recent examples is a roundtable for Korean-American politicians in Southern California (Lim, 2010). Attended by five Korean-American politicians, including two current and former Korean-American mayors in Orange County, issues concerning voter registration and campaigns, support and networking with other ethnic communities were discussed (ibid.).

Mainstream government officials and politicians also join the Korean-American discourse, especially during election times, to gain support from the Korean community. Such intents often synchronize nicely with the community’s intent to create a path to mainstream politics by supporting non-Korean politicians. Mainstream politicians may provide internship to qualified Korean-Americans or support community projects such as the K-town electoral district (Chang, 2009; Yang, 2011). In other instances, mainstream politicians join the debate hosted by Korean media. An example is the Los Angeles City
Attorney Candidate Debate, organized by TVK24 on May 4, 2009, prior to the May 19 L.A. City Attorney election. The two candidates, Carmen Trutanich and Jack Weiss, were invited to the debate, moderated by Christopher Lee, the current L.A. City Attorney (see Figure 6.5).

**Figure 6.5** L.A. City Attorney Candidate Debate

Source: © Sherry Yu
Note. Wilshire Plaza Hotel, L.A., May 4, 2009

*Active Agency: Media-CSO Collaboration and the Challenges*

In pursuing these community projects, Korean media collaborate frequently with CSOs. As part of the overall communication infrastructure, they are in a mutually supportive relationship. CSOs are good news sources for media (Media Practitioner 28), and media are important communication routes for CSOs to promote their activities. In fact, for not-for-profit organizations that depend on public and private funding, media coverage of their activities is an important part of funding applications (CSO Leader 3).

We all depend on each other. We need media to have our activities known to the community, and media also need information from us, because their subscribers are interested in our actions, immigration, etc.... We have a pretty good relationship with media, and I think every year, we make about 300 to 400 media hits...It is pretty much every day...interviews or talk shows with the (name of organization). (CSO Leader 3)

The frequency of coverage is one thing and the tone of coverage is another. One CSO leader puts it: “Negative coverage in Korean media affects private funding. For
example, (name of company) never sponsors any organizations that are related to either any specific religion or community conflicts” (CSO Leader 5). For this reason, some organizations proactively cultivate media relations by organizing “media roundtables” to share and educate Korean media on the political agenda they pursue (CSO Leader 3). One example is a roundtable organized by the KRC on the “Effects of the California Budget Crisis on the Korean-American Community” on March 16, 2011. Such collaboration is, in fact, the most desired form of collaboration. Figure 6.6 shows that among the eight attributes asked, “providing the so-called advisory council members to media outlets to review general practices or policy issue areas,” “organizing debates for community issues,” and “forming a communication channel between media and CSO” are considered relatively more important but least satisfied. There is aspiration for professional dialogue between the media and CSOs.

It is not like a press conference or an interview. It is a way of educating and informing media about the issue. I invite them for an hour. We make some presentations and have an in-depth Q&A session… what this action is about…why we need immigration reforms, what the arguments are…We do this two to three times a year. (CSO Leader 3)

As such, Korean media facilitate or lead important community discussions. However, there are a number of issues that often prevent Korean media from “doing more” or properly engaging in broader public discourse. Foremost is again a lack of resources—financial or human capital (Media Practitioners 32 & 37).

I write ten articles per day. We cannot expect depth of information with this level of workload… Our chief editor, however, encourages us to write at least one or two feature articles a week. (Media Practitioner 32)

In order to be politically active, we should be able to engage in the debate. We simply do not have that capacity. (Media Practitioner 37)
Another barrier is a perceived low level of sense of belonging and interest in U.S. politics therein among Koreans (Media Practitioners 25& 32). One Korea Times columnist states the problem clearly: Korean-Americans are silent during the U.S. election but loud during the Korean election for which they have no voting rights (Yeo, 2008).89 Such a response is not surprising; some Korean-Americans, in fact, renounce their American citizenship to be considered as proportional representation candidates in political parties in Korea (Media Practitioners 28 & 31). For the first-generation Koreans, it is Korea’s politics more than U.S. politics that they pay attention to. The responses to Korea’s new election law, however, vary. For some Korean community leaders, voting rights in Korean elections mean regaining of first-class citizenship (Korean citizenship). Such symbolic significance may not be an overstatement considering the prevailing perception of overseas Koreans as “second-class citizens.” Thus, some community leaders are pleased that a “long-cherished wish has finally been obtained” and expect “policies for overseas Koreans from the Korean government” to improve “overseas

89 Note that this article was written in 2008, prior to the amendment of the election law (Korea).
Korean rights” (Kim, 2009b). Some other CSO leaders and media practitioners, however, think otherwise, anticipating further fragmentation of the Korean community: Koreans versus Korean-Americans (CSO Leader 6). Nonetheless, the issue is likely to heat up if the election campaign (advertising and speech) through overseas Korean media is allowed. This bill was recently brought before the National Assembly (Korea) on motions (Kim, 2011b).

1.5- and second-generation Koreans are more interested in political issues. The actual audience of our news, however, is relatively less interested in political issues… Instead, they are interested in what happened in K-town and what is on sale in which Korean markets. We prioritize news accordingly…1.5- and second-generation Koreans watch mainstream news… Compared to ABC, CBS, and CNN, our capacity to cover mainstream accidents or events is just inadequate. (Media Practitioner 25)

The immigration reform is important. However, Koreans do not know what it is about and why it is important… We check the number of hits for news items… Items like this are rarely read… Koreans here do not seem to think that they belong here. Also, they do not think they are eligible for government benefits. (Media Practitioner 32)

Lastly, there are many cases of collaboration; however, tension between the media and CSOs arises occasionally from political economy played out at an organizational level. Some CSO leaders consider Korean media as another for-profit organization rather than part of the community’s communication infrastructure (CSO Leader 5). Tension may also arise when the organizations overuse media. One CSO leader recalls complaints from media practitioners that the organization was using media as a PR agency (CSO Leader 4). Media practitioners also complain that organizations hold press conferences unprepared or unnecessarily (Media Practitioners 28 & 33).

Media are profit organizations… When the economy is bad as now, they come to us for advertising… If we do not respond, it is not always so, but the coverage of our organization tends to carry a negative tone… When the economy is bad, people want more bad news… They have nowhere to release their stress… The (name of companies) are always under law suits. (CSO Leader 5)

We get continuous support for coverage when we send out press releases. However, sometimes media complain that there are too many press materials and warn us not to use the community media as a PR agency. Nevertheless, it is due to the lack of understanding of our programs that they think all of our programs are the same. (CSO Leader 4)

There are too many releases that are not newsworthy. We include them for the sake of providing information… The organizations can just send those materials to us, but they always insist on having a press conference. For whose benefit is that? They spend money and we spend time. (Media Practitioner 33)
6.3 Intercultural Roles and Challenges

Intercultural reality is more evident in L.A.’s Korean community than in any other Korean diaspora in North America. K-town, the community’s socio-economic and political hub, is increasingly multiethnic. Geographically, K-town also borders on four ethno-racial communities, as mentioned in Chapter 5. For the Korean community as a whole, interracial marriage also has become more common. According to the Asian American Studies Program (AAST) of the University of Maryland, over 50% of second-generation Koreans married spouses outside their own ethnicity as of 2009 (Kim, 2011h). Amidst these increasingly intercultural realities, evidence of intercultural capacity building beyond the Korean community is underway for the communication infrastructure as a whole. Intercultural initiatives are led more by multiethnic community organizations, headed by 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Americans such as the KYCC, KAC, and KIWA, than by Korean media or single-ethnic Korean organizations in general. These organizations offer geographically grounded services for K-town residents regardless of ethnicity or race. However, looking at media alone, there is no substantial difference when compared to Vancouver’s Korean media.

Institutional Interaction with Mainstream Media Institutions

For L.A.’s Korean media, intercultural interaction at an institutional level is mainly that with mainstream media rather than with other diasporic media, for both editorial and market purposes. For editorial, Korean media interact with mainstream media on an issue-by-issue basis, mostly issues that involve misrepresentation of Korea or the Korean community in mainstream media, as mentioned earlier. Mainstream media, on the other hand, approach Korean media mostly for further reference for events “that are big enough to be of interest to the broader society” (Media Practitioner 38). Examples of such include the cases of Euna Lee, a South Korea-born, American journalist who was detained in North Korea in 2009, and Yuna Kim, a South Korean gold-medal figure skater from the 2010 Vancouver Olympics (Media Practitioners 21 & 28). In the case of Euna Lee, a CSO leader recalls that ABC reporters stationed in one of the CSOs in K-town for 24 hours to follow the story’s progress (CSO Leader 5). For local issues, the
conflict with the Bangladeshi community over the K-town boundary is a case in point (Media Practitioner 28).

These interactions also occur through business partnerships. The history of collaboration with the L.A. Times is especially of noteworthy. Both the Korea Times (since 1999) and the Korea Daily have established partnerships with the L.A. Times to provide the L.A. Times Sunday edition to their subscribers. The Korea Times also has a joint delivery system with the L.A. Times, which is more cost-effective than operating an in-house delivery system or outsourcing. There were more joint marketing trials in the past than what is underway now. During the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the L.A. Times and the Korea Times jointly developed a one-page promotional insert to market local businesses. As part of its community service, the L.A. Times also opened access to its photo library to the Korea Times at no fee with some conditions that the photos must be properly cited and permission must be obtained from the section head prior to use. The Korea Times also has ties with the New York Times. In the past, also as part of its community service, the New York Times offered training sessions for the Korea Times reporters on news production, although it was more ad-hoc than regularly scheduled. This partnership continues now through content sharing; the Korea Time’s website, www.koreatimes.com, has a separate tab, containing selected New York Times articles (in English).

Nonetheless, media practitioners are sceptical about such partnerships. They see these efforts more as marketing strategies rather than customer service to cater to the needs of readers, or an actual need for mainstream content. In fact, media practitioners are not enthusiastic about content partnerships. Professional pride is one factor; the aspiration for a local Korean narrative instead of “their narrative” is another (Media Practitioner 26). As one media practitioner puts it: “We do not want to ask a favour of mainstream media” for content (Media Practitioner 37). More importantly, as mentioned earlier, such resistance can be attributed to having a constant flow of U.S. news from international bureaus of transnational Korean media corporations and news agencies (Media Practitioner 25). National U.S. news (which is international news for Korean

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agencies) from a Korean perspective is constantly provided by their headquarters or affiliates which can be used with minor or no cultural translation, unlike that of mainstream news items.

We have no intention to increase local news through content sharing with mainstream media... It is their news and their point of views... We want to produce our own narratives. If we were to increase the local portion, we would rather include diverse views present in the U.S. (other than mainstream views). (Media Practitioner 26)

The Seoul office has an international news department. It covers U.S. news. We use those items. We are the L.A. office so we focus on here. The (name of a province in Korea) office does not cover the Blue House. It is the Seoul office's job. (Media Practitioner 25)

For this reason, on the importance-satisfaction rating on the collaboration of Korean and mainstream media (Figure 6.7), Korean media practitioners are satisfied with the current level of “providing/sharing news sources.” The areas that show a significant importance-satisfaction gap are instead “having membership to mainstream media circles” and “networking among media professionals” as well as “providing journalistic training” and “monitoring media practices.” These attributes show that there is aspiration for advancement of professional journalistic skills, a similar expectation to that identified in the collaboration among Korean media practitioners in the previous chapter. Only a few outlets are affiliated with mainstream media circles. Some of the examples mentioned are the Asian American Journalists Association (AAJA) and the Southern California Cable Television Association (Media Practitioners 23 & 28). And yet, recognition of Korean media journalists in intercultural media circles is not absent. S. L. Yoo of the Korea Daily Washington received the Best Immigration Coverage from New America Media at the second Washington D.C. Ethnic Media Awards with an article entitled, “Immigration Status Not a Factor in Receiving WIC Benefits” (Lee, 2011c). The Korea Daily Washington reports that Yoo was the only Asian reporter among the 14 ethnic media reporters awarded (ibid.). J. H. Cho of the Korea Daily New York was also selected as a New York Community Media Alliance 2010 fellow (Ahn, 2010).
Institutional Interaction with Other Diasporic Media Institutions

In comparison, interaction with other diasporic media is generally low. The coverage of intercultural news about other ethnic communities is considered of low importance. Figure 6.4, the importance-satisfaction rating on “content” by Korean media practitioners shows that the satisfaction with intercultural news coverage is actually higher than its importance. A number of reasons are associated with this. First, general U.S. news is prioritized over that of other ethnic communities (Media Practitioners 29 & 37). Considering the limited resources at hand, Korean media would rather cover more about “here” in general than about specific ethnic groups in particular. Second, there is generally a low interest level in other ethnic communities when in fact multietnic interaction is part of everyday life in K-town (Media Practitioner 32). The “socio-economic class” of K-town (Lee & Park, 2008) may influence news coverage. The attitude toward “undocumented Latino workers,” along with undocumented Korean workers, at the bottom of the class structure among K-town Koreans influences news
value (Media Practitioner 32). In contrast, there is also resistance to ethnic grouping among media practitioners. The conception of “us,” as in all immigrant communities or in a broader society, prevails among some media practitioners (Media Practitioners 30 & 33). Identifying common issues for immigrant communities or for a broader society in general is a priority over individual ethnicity-specific issues.

General U.S. news is our priority. It would probably be the similar level of interest that Korean media in Korea would consider the (name of ethnicity) community in Korea. (Media Practitioner 37)

Honestly, news about the Vietnamese or the Filipino community is not much of our interest. We are here to provide news that Koreans are interested and that are useful to Koreans. Thus, unless there is, for example, an event in the Vietnamese community that the Korean community is involved, an event that involves the Vietnamese community only is not significant… Koreans here meet Latinos as frequently as they meet Koreans. However, there is surprisingly no interest in Latinos…Koreans tend to think that Latinos are labour workers. (Media Practitioner 32)

It depends on the interest of readers… But generally speaking, if the Korean community is small, we might need to look at other racial groups…However, we all mingle here. We have Latino friends, African-American friends, and white friends. We do not call it a “white community.” I do not think it is a good approach to categorize communities by ethnicity. (Media Practitioner 30)

We only cover that are related to the Korean community such as some community events that Koreans might be interested in attending. It is not necessarily that there is no interest in other ethnic communities. Instead of focusing on particular ethnic communities, we tend to cover issues that are relevant to immigrants in general such as immigration reform. (Media Practitioner 33)

These views are consistent with the results of the content analysis. Although news about other ethnic communities was rated on par with news about Korea (Figure 6.4), it was in fact absent during the sampling period. The geographic focus of news items by news origin (Table 6.2), by media type (Table 6.3), and by source of capital (Table 6.4) all confirm that there is no news about other ethnic communities at a local level. There was a complete absence of news about other ethnic communities in LA18 Prime Time Local News as well, even when it has access to a news pool just like OMNI Korean News. Looking at the ethnicity of news sources (Table 6.12) and news actors (Table 6.13), other than unidentified ethnicities, staff writers tend to focus on Korean sources and actors. Comparing ethnicities of news sources and actors other than Korean between staff

91 Note that “ethnicity” in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 is coded only when directly mentioned or an identifier is provided in the text or voice. The high portion of “absent/unknown” in the local production (by staff writers) is largely European-origin Americans whose “ethnicity” was not clearly indicated.
writers and the U.S. mainstream sources, there was no significant difference. For news actors, on the other hand, the U.S. sources tend to focus on diverse ethnic groups relatively more than staff writers do. The coverage of other ethnic communities may appear in relation to the Korean community during hot-topic events such as the K-town boundary and conflicts with the Bangladeshi community, as discussed earlier. However, it is generally absent in day-to-day news coverage in Korean media.

### Table 6.12  Ethnicity of news source by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity of News Source</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=1593</td>
<td>n=605</td>
<td>n=100</td>
<td>n=355</td>
<td>n=23</td>
<td>n=510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (unspecified)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.13  Ethnicity of news actor by news origin (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity of News Actor</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Staff writer</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Absent/unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=1593</td>
<td>n=605</td>
<td>n=100</td>
<td>n=355</td>
<td>n=23</td>
<td>n=510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (unspecified)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of countries</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Intercultural Outreach: English Editions and the “U.S.” Ad Team**

Intercultural coverage may be low; yet potential for intercultural outreach is present. The initiatives for 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Americans suggest a potential role as a gateway to Korean-American storytelling, although some improvement is desirable. TVK News English Edition is a good example. Discontinued as of 2011, it...
was a 20-minute English-language daily news program (23:00-23:20, Monday to Friday) for 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Americans. In comparison with TVK24’s Korean-language news, there are areas worth consideration to serve the target audience more appropriately. Comparing geographic focus of TVK News Wide (Korean) and TVK News English Edition (English), the English-language news focused entirely on the U.S. with no international coverage including news about Korea. The proportion of news was particularly high at local and state levels: 15% compared to 9% for Korean community news, 48% compared to 11% for general local news, and 26% compared to 15% for state news (see Table 6.14). In other words, there was more coverage of general U.S. news, which the target audience may have multiple sources to resort to, and surprisingly low coverage of the Korean community when this could really be a venue for Korean-American storytelling and a window for non-Koreans to get a sense of Korean-American discourses. Perhaps it is the Korean community news and news about Korea at an international level that should be strengthened, if English news is to be accountable to their supposed target audience.

Table 6.14  Geographic focus by language – TVK News Wide (Korean) and TVK News English Edition (English) (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=203</td>
<td>N=157</td>
<td>N=46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another initiative is the newspapers’ English Editions, which were only short-lived (e.g., Korea Times English Edition led by K. W. Lee) or never actualized. Again, geo-storytelling of Korean-American narratives may have been possible, if continued; however, it was discontinued due to the limited appeal to advertisers and high cost. When it is obvious that the readers are entirely first-generation immigrants, it is simply hard to
convince management as well as advertisers of the potential readership of an English section. The maintenance of a so-called English section team of perfectly bilingual staff with journalistic training is also a challenge. New America Media, in fact, approached one of the newspapers to contribute articles; however, the company rejected the offer for the same reasons.

One surviving Korean media outlet with the capacity to reach broader audiences may be the KoreAm Journal (www.iamkoream.com), a monthly magazine published in English since 1990 by a 1.5-generation publisher, James Ryu. It is mandated to provide “a forum for English-speaking Korean Americans” (KoreaAm, March 2010, Vol. 21, No. 3). The magazine covers various genres including “the news, culture, entertainment, sports, politics, and people of Korean America” (www.iamkoream.com). Some of the topics included in the March 2010 edition are “(Another) KA booted from Pyongyang,” “This season in reality TV—Asians abound!” and “Peeking into Korea’s historic past.” The magazine also provides the “Community Pages” for Korean-American organizations to post their activities: Korean American Bar Association (KABA), Korea American Coalition (KAC), Korean American Community Foundation (KACF), Korean Churches for Community Development (KCCD) and Korean Cultural Center of Los Angeles (KCCLA), among others, use this service. The magazine is also linked to LA Beez, a local cross-ethnic, intercultural communicative space, and makes Korean storytelling available for a broader audience (see Chapter 2).

On the market side, the dependency of Korean media outlets on mainstream advertisers is higher than on other ethnic advertisers, although altogether this accounts for only about five percent (e.g., non-smoking, teacher recruiting, and the Census) (Media Practitioner 28). Table 6.15 shows the distribution of ads by origin of advertisers. Six percent of the ads appearing during the sampling period were generated from mainstream advertisers, whereas there were none from other ethnic communities. Media practitioners, however, collectively mention that there should be more. Intercultural outreach beyond the Korean community is, in fact, the only potential breakthrough in the saturated Korean enclave market (Media Practitioners 36 & 39). The economic recession reminds the previously in-group-oriented media owners that the enclave economy is no longer self-
sufficient. The aforementioned “U.S. ad team” or “foreign ad team” is a good example of how this has been addressed.

Currently 99% of the ads are from Korean enclave businesses. Reaching out to mainstream is the only breakthrough. Right now, we have one from (name of company) and the other one from a (name of company)... Because the Korean population is big here, they want to advertise with Korean (media type)... What they care most about is geographic coverage. (Media Practitioner 39)

Table 6.15 Origin of advertisers by media type (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Advertisers</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=2338</td>
<td>n=439</td>
<td>n=379</td>
<td>n=1520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Diaspora</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean from Korea</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intercultural Outreach: Community-Wide Initiatives

Intercultural outreach is a trend not only found among Korean media outlets. There are community initiatives that also cater to these goals. One example is the “We Speak English” campaign, organized by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in L.A. in early 2010 to revitalize the K-town economy and to promote the internationalization of Korean cuisine (Shim, 2010b). Consulate General J. S. Kim points out that the language capacity of Korean businesses (e.g., English menu, English-speaking employees) is often under-promoted and that the campaign would help attract non-Korean customers (Lee, 2011h). The Consulate office initially distributed 500 “We Speak English” stickers (to place on the door of K-town Korean businesses) with 2,000 more to follow in collaboration with the Korean Federation (ibid.). It is, in fact, the second initiative by the Consulate office after its “Revitalizing K-town economy” campaign in 2008, sponsored by the Korea Times and participated in by over 20 Korean CSOs (Lee, 2008b).
Another example is a workshop on successful marketing strategies for Asian restaurant owners (June 4, 2011, Wilshire Grand Hotel). In recognition of a lack of cultural understanding in dealing with customers from ethnicities other than their own, the KYCC invited a consultant to speak on various franchising as well as marketing strategies from PR to employee training (Kim, 2011i). Asian restaurants often fail to expand, even with high competitiveness and growth potential, because they focus too much on taste and price, when the key to success is providing a pleasant “eating-out experience” to customers through pleasant services (ibid.). In parallel, Korean businesses also started switching business signs from Korean to English or to a mix of Korean and English to attract non-Korean customers (Kwak, 2010). A majority of the signs in K-town have long been just in Korean. The Korea Daily reports that the popularity of all-you-can-eat barbeque restaurants in K-town has attracted non-Korean customers, thus a demand for English signs and menus has increased (ibid.). The businesses, in fact, have seen an “increase in non-Korean customers” after offering English options (ibid.). In addition, the City of L.A. has strengthened the language requirement of signs since 2009, encouraging the ratio of Korean and English language to be 50/50 (ibid.). Still another initiative to make K-town more interculturally friendly is a “Visitor Information Center” in K-town, initiated by the Korean American Chamber of Commerce of Los Angeles (Chung, 2011e). The absence of such a service, together with representative Korean landmarks, has been frequently discussed. Other than Korean restaurants, there are no venues for K-town tourists to experience Korean heritage. The Dawooljung is the only landmark; however, it is under-maintained due to budget shortfalls (Lee, 2011b).

Beyond ad-hoc trials, long-term intercultural initiatives are becoming more visible and proactive. The annual L.A. Korean Festival is a good example. Attended by 20,000 people, including local and Korean politicians such as Tom Labonge, City Councilman, Carmen Trutanich, L.A. City Attorney, and J. P. Hong of the One Nation Party (Hannaladang), among others, it recently celebrated its 37th Festival (September 30 – October 3, 2010), organizing various events including performances by Korean pop music (K-pop) stars and local sports and art groups, foods, parades, and others (Kim, 2010d). During the event, the Korea Times organized its annual “Korean Parade” (ibid.). Local Korean and mainstream corporations (e.g., Hyundai Motors, Kia Motors, Toyota,
Prudential, McDonald’s) also joined the festival through sponsorship (ibid.). Besides the L.A. festival, the Korean communities in the major ethnoburbs also organize their own Korean festivals: the 27th Orange County Korean Festival (8-10 October 2010); the 2nd Inland Korean Festival (December 4, 2010); and the 2nd Irvine Korean American Day Festival (15-16 January 2011) (Moon & Lee, 2010; Moon, 2010; Lee, 2010g). According to the organizing committees, the purpose of these festivals is to promote their Korean heritage to the younger generation and the broader society through various events: Non-Korean K-pop contests, Kimchi making demonstrations, Korean traditional music performances, and Taekwondo demonstrations (ibid.). Some of the festivals are transnational, inviting a sister city or a “friend city.” The Irvine Korean festival invited a calligrapher from the City of Seocho in Korea, its friend city, to join the festival (Moon, 2010).

Another example is the Korea Daily’s annual Anabada92 Flea Market. Attended by 20,000 people of diverse ethnicities, it celebrated its fifth year on March 24, 2010 (Hwang, Moon, & Chang, 2010). A total of 150 sponsors and retailers participated, along with over 30 public/private corporations/institutions (e.g., Pepsi Cola, McDonald’s, White Memorial Hospital), to organize the flea market as well as a job fair and a free medical clinic for local residents (Korea Daily, 2010d). The Latino- and African-American communities also joined the event, making the 2010 market a “pan-community event,” according to the Korea Daily (Park, 2010). In-Sung Choi, JBC news chief (2010e) mentions that considering the in-group orientation of the Korean community and the under-recognition of the Korea-American market among mainstream corporations, the Anabada market may help break down the “invisible wall” that exists among the various ethnic communities. Choi further says that the market is a positive move “for Koreans who find intercultural cooperation and interaction difficult, for mainstream corporations who are surprised by the development and the size of Korean community, and for Latino neighbors who feel distant from their Korean neighbors.”

There are also initiatives in the Korean community to proactively encourage geo-storytelling through established civic communicative spaces. At an individual level, the

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92 The word Anabada is a Korean abbreviation for “Save, Share, Exchange, and Recycle.”
local neighborhood council is a good example. Korean-Americans have a presence at some of the councils overseeing K-town such as the Wilshire-Koreatown Neighborhood Council, Pio Pico Council, and the Downtown Council (Media Practitioner 29). The Wilshire Center Koreatown Neighbourhood Council is the largest among the 100 neighbourhood councils in the city and shows the highest Korean representation. Among the 26 directors, over 90% are Koreans, including 1.5- and second-generation Koreans. Through this, Koreans are involved in the city’s decision-making process on what matters to K-town such as pipeline construction in K-town (ibid.).

At an institutional level, multicultural CSOs such as the KYCC, KHEIR, KAC, KIWA, KRC, and NAKASEC collaborate amongst themselves (CSO Leader 3) as well as with multicultural CSOs originating in other ethnic communities on common issues such as immigration, education, and development. Some of the organizations mentioned during the interviews include: the Chicano/Latino Association (CHILA), Para Los Ninos, Organization of Chinese Americans (OCA), Little Tokyo Service Center, and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). In terms of media use, it is not limited to Korean media, but extended to include mainstream media such as the L.A. Times and ABC as well as Asian and Latino media such as La Opinion to reach out to multiethnic clientele (CSO Leaders 2 & 5).

For projects like the Census, different organizations get together… Each organization is doing different things as they have their own working groups… Maybe this group works with youth, parents, or senior, and so on… Collaboration with different groups is effective. (CSO Leader 3)

What is important is that we recognize the importance of one another and work together… It is easy to say than do… In the past five to ten years, we have partnered with many different organizations… We share resources and subcontract on various projects such as counseling, education, and environment. (CSO Leader 2)

Intercultural outreach or pan-ethnic (or pan-immigrant) initiatives are gaining momentum outside of the Korean community as well. One example is MTV’s new Asian American reality show, K-Town (Producers: Eugene Choi, Mike Le, and Eddie Kim), in the works since 2010, starring eight “over-sexed, outspoken, and shamelessly egotistical Asian-Americans” as an Asian version of Jersey Shore (Kim, 2010c). Eddie Kim, one of the producers, mentions that it is the first “all-Asian cast on television” since Margaret
Cho’s *All American Girl*. He further mentions that “this show has garnered more press and attention here in America than any K-pop star, actor, or anything Korean since the L.A. Riots.” There are, however, concerns among waiting audiences about whether or not the show will “perpetuate negative stereotypes” of Asians or become “a disgrace to Asians.” To this, Kim (2010e) from MTV responds that the show will rather “shatter America’s stereotypes.” If they claim that the images of a “model minority” or “perpetuating negative stereotypes” are not all about Asian-Americans or that they are changing, it is worthy of observation to see what the group of young Asian-Americans on this new reality show can offer.

**Conclusion**

The socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles of Korean diasporic media discussed in this chapter confirm Korean media’s civil society role. Korean media offer culturally translated news and information local to L.A. that helps Korean immigrants make sense of “here” in the process of social integration while simultaneously remaining connected to “home.” Not only do they provide news at all geographic levels, but they also work as a community watchdog, monitoring mainstream media to correct misrepresentations of Koreans and the Korean community, to assist the community’s participation in the broader public discourse. Online communities developed through online publications of major daily newspapers further facilitate the exchange of everyday concerns and inquiries among Koreans, not only within L.A. but also across the U.S. The feedback from field experts and contemporaries provides “quick fix” solutions to Korean immigrants with limited socio-cultural capital. Such localized yet increasingly national Korean-American storytelling is unique only to Korean diasporic media, compared to mainstream media and Korean media operating in Korea, allowing a continuous negotiation and meaning-making process of place and identity as Korean-Americans. What is of concern, however, is that Korean media play such a socio-cultural role to a varying degree, depending on the source of capital. The dominance of transnational media in L.A.’s Korean media market sets up a competitive structure between

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93 For more details, see the KoreAm blog post entitled “Ktown reality show producer responds to concerns”: http://iamkoream.com/index.php/ktown-reality-show-producer-responds-to-concerns/

94 ibid.
transnational media and local immigrant media that is not only economic but also ideological. These two segments of the media industry diverge on geographic focus and on their attitude toward the Korean community. Higher emphasis on Korean news with reasonable dissociation from the local Korean community characterizes the editorial direction of transnational media, and challenges Korean-American storytelling. With the forthcoming 2012 Korean elections, how such an editorial direction will play out in Korean-American storytelling warrants monitoring.

The political and intercultural roles of diasporic media, on the other hand, are rather equally played out regardless of the source of capital. The collaboration with politically-conscious, multiethnic CSOs in joint community projects facilitates a dialogue within the community. In a relative sense, this collaboration is, in fact, more substantial in L.A. than in Vancouver. Co-organization of public discussions on various community events and media roundtables for information-sharing are possible models to follow. In playing such an active agent role, it is more the capital (financial) itself rather than the source of capital that determines the level of pursuance. As evident in various geopolitical and interethnic projects, financially-capable media outlets, whether transnational or local immigrant owned, tend to take the lead. Intercultural initiatives such as the Korea Times English Edition or the TVK News English Edition are good examples. Only these market leaders could mobilize such initiatives.

Nevertheless, Korean media are yet to lead multiethnic storytelling initiatives, let alone to embed Korean storytelling in the broader media system as a means of enhancing cultural literacy for all members of society. Although there is certainly a higher emphasis on U.S. news over Korean news, only 38% of news is locally produced—with a higher proportion for newspapers (55%) and TV (28%)—and the rest is supplemented by external sources, mainly from Korea. More local production can be expected in contrast to Vancouver, considering the relatively stable capital flow within a sizable market. Nevertheless, a similar lack of socio-cultural and financial capital is pointed out as the reason for low local production. Considering the high airtime fee in addition to the broadcasting fee to program suppliers, such claims may not be an overstatement, but rather a direct outcome of these high costs. With respect to distribution, everyday Korean storytelling is circulated mainly within the community. None of the local Korean
television news programs are subtitled, and print media focus entirely on the in-language group. Potential for more proactive interaction has occasionally surfaced and enabled actual collaboration, for example, the Korea Times English Edition and the Los Angeles Sentinel during the 1992 L.A. riots. However, English editions, both newspapers and television, have been only short-lived due to market pressure. Frustrations among media practitioners concerning the failure of such intercultural initiatives illustrate that for Korean diasporic media as business entities, market obligations precede social responsibility.

Therefore, similar to Vancouver, L.A. Korean media are a window to the broader society for this monolingual and first-generation dominant diaspora, however, not a window to Korean storytelling for a broader audience. As efforts for capacity building in production, more localized measures that address day-to-day operations are needed for intercultural projects such as English editions to survive. Relatively stable capital flow within a sizable market is offset by higher operational costs such airtime fees, which could be redirected to enhancing local production quantitatively and/or qualitatively. Proper links to professional industry associations are also desirable. Aspirations for professional development are high within the community of Korean media practitioners, owing largely to insufficient training in the early years of journalists’ careers and double marginalization of diasporic media within and across media institutions. The underestimation of the quality of diasporic media reporting as second-class journalism indeed prevails among mainstream as well as Korean transnational media practitioners. Such professional links are also desirable for mainstream media practitioners as a venue for improving cultural literacy, as the misrepresentation of Koreans and Korea continues in everyday mainstream reporting. The next chapter looks at possible policy interventions to aid Korean media to overcome such barriers.
7: Toward an Intercultural Media System

There is no doubt that Korean diasporic media function as an information gateway and a cultural translator for first-generation Koreans (95% in Vancouver and 75% in L.A.) who depend largely on Korean-language media. Korean news may be available to Koreans from different Korean sources; however, it is diasporic media that select, repackage, and customize local news for local Koreans. Nevertheless, diasporic media are, after all, business entities that are vulnerable to the ups and downs of the “glocal” economy. Vancouver’s enclave economy has been directly affected by the recession and the subsequent currency fluctuations. The influx of global capital and multiethnic labour parachuted into L.A.’s K-town also turns this site into a space of class and ethnic contestation. Among all enclave businesses, media are most strongly affected by transnational capital; most notably through transnational branches of print media and over-the-air networks. Added to this, technological and constitutional changes (media-related and others) in Canada, the U.S., and Korea also constantly alter the media landscape. The digital transition since 2009 (in the U.S.) allowed a surge of so-called digital channels (or point channels as in LA18.3) and multiplied Korean-language options in the broadcasting sector. Korea’s new election and media laws are also expected to export home competition to Korean diaspora in North America. Undertaken in this period of critical changes, this comparative study on Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. examines the respective historical trajectories and offers a future outlook on Korean diasporic media’s capacity to forge citizenship and civic engagement among Korean-Canadians/Americans and thereby enhance cultural literacy for all members of that society.

This chapter summarizes the city-specific and Korean-specific factors that promote and hinder Korean storytelling in the process of Korean media production and distribution, and expands on the theories, policies, and practices of multiculturalism, immigration, citizenship and media (Chapter 2). Based on interviews with media
practitioners and CSO leaders, this chapter also suggests potential policy measures to help nurture multicultural storytelling in the broader media system.

7.1 Vancouver-L.A. Comparison: Differences and Similarities

Overall, this comparative analysis of Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. finds a similar pattern of production and distribution with respect to playing socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles, despite the different regulatory, settlement, and business contexts. Nevertheless, the areas where these two cities converge and diverge do identify city-specific and Korean-specific characteristics that promote and hinder Korean-Canadian/American storytelling.

*Differences between Vancouver and L.A. Korean Media*

One of the most notable differences is the status of multiculturalism. Canada’s official commitment to multiculturalism as part of the constitution accepts ethno-racial populations as permanent members of society and lays out policy and regulatory frameworks to assist their social integration. In broadcasting, Canada’s CRTC and the U.S.’s FCC diverge on foreign ownership and local content requirements, which consequently lay out different operational environments for local Korean media. On foreign ownership, Canada places tougher rules on controlling foreign investment. The CRTC and FCC lay out similar restrictions on foreign investment on broadcasting: 20% and 25% of the outstanding voting share in Canada and the U.S. respectively (Broadcasting Act 1991; Communication Act 1934). The difference, however, is that the FCC sets out no rules for cable, satellite (or “satellite-delivered pay- or speciality-subscription), print, or telecom services while the CRTC applies the same foreign investment rule (Grant & Wood, 2004, p. 237). In this ownership structure, Vancouver’s All TV, a Category 2 ethnic specialty service, is the only licensee under the regulatory supervision of the CRTC, while the rest three (TV Korea, KCTV, and Cakocom) are independent entities. In L.A., Korean broadcasting services are program providers (through “brokerage” who purchase airtime from licensees). L.A.’s three transnational
television services are also registered “U.S. branches” and not “broadcasters,” and thus operate outside of the FCC’s regulations.

Regarding content requirements, the Canadian Content rules are also imposed on ethnic television: 60% overall content and 50% during the evening broadcast period should be made in Canada by Canadian creators (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117). Ethnic specialty services are also not exempt from such requirements: 15% compared to 35% for English and French specialty services (Public Notice CRTC 2000-6). Such requirements contribute to increasing local diasporic media production to a certain extent, as demonstrated in the case of TV Korea’s Korean News and the TV Korea Magazine. In the U.S., on the other hand, there is no U.S. content requirement, but a strict local content requirement on children’s and educational programs (Grant & Wood, 2004). Korean services are aware of such requirements (Media Practitioner 23). However, other than the required programs, local production is dependent largely on the availability of resources. Thus, even with the presence of transnational capital and a relatively bigger market size, local production is often kept to a minimum, leading to a similar result as in Vancouver.

Second, another contextual difference between the two cities is their respective settlement patterns. First, Vancouver’s Korean community is less settled compared to L.A.’s Korean community. Nationally, the ratio of naturalized Koreans to Korean citizens is similar in Canada and the U.S.: 44% to 56% and 48% to 52% respectively. However, the ratio diverges at the provincial/state level: 30% to 70% in B.C. and 58% to 42% in California (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea [MOFAT], 2009). The higher proportion of Korean citizens in B.C. reflects a higher floating population such as temporary visitors and international students. L.A.’s Korean community, on the other hand, is relatively more settled with a higher proportion of U.S. citizenship holders. Nevertheless, nearly half of Korean citizenship holders in L.A. are known to be undocumented migrants (see Chapter 5), a population which is rarely mentioned in the statistics about Vancouver’s Koreans. Such a fragmented demographic composition implies multiple targets for Korean media and challenges the development of Korean-Canadian/American storytelling. Especially with the forthcoming 2012 Korean elections, the potential impact on editorial direction is important to monitor.
Another demographic difference is a higher proportion of first-generation Koreans in Vancouver (95%) compared to L.A. (75%), reflecting the shorter immigration history of Vancouver’s Korean community. A relatively bigger second-generation population in L.A., on the other hand, has seen emerging Korean-American storytelling led by younger Korean-Americans, as manifested in the KoreAm Journal and MTV’s *KTown*. Especially, their connections with cross-ethnic intercultural spaces (KoreAm Journal with LA Beez) and within mainstream media (MTV) have great potential for wider distribution of Korean storytelling. Such initiatives set L.A. apart from Vancouver where only sporadic attempts have been made (e.g., The Bridge). More initiatives for and by the 1.5- and second-generation and their Korean storytelling can be expected, as a generational shift in media ownership is also underway. While it is not common in Vancouver and L.A., first-generation Korean media owners in other regions in Canada and the U.S. have passed down their businesses to their children (Media Practitioner 8).

Beside demographic composition, L.A.’s Korean community has a relatively more conflict-ridden settlement history. The Korean merchants’ middleman minority position in the economic hierarchy—without prior interracial experience and knowledge about U.S. race relations—has resulted in challenging interracial interactions (see Chapter 5). The conflicts continue today, manifested in various K-town projects such as the redrawing of the K-town boundary and uniting K-town as a single electoral district (see Chapter 6). Relatively higher concentration of transnational capital and multiethnic labour in L.A.’s K-town also calls for intermediaries. In many of these cases, the U.S. educated 1.5- and second-generation Korean Americans have taken leadership roles through their K-town-located advocacy groups such as KAC and KIWA.

In addition, what differentiates the younger-generation from older-generation leadership is that the younger-generation leaders tend to be geographically-oriented than ethnically-oriented, servicing K-town residents broadly than Koreans specifically, forging pan-ethnic leadership (see Chapter 5). Such a transition suggests a new form of ethnic enclave, advancing from “places of stigma” to “neighbourhoods of hope” (Murdie & Skop, 2011, p. 64), from a symbol of ethnic segregation in urban geography to a site of cross-ethnic contestation and collaboration. This is an important finding from this study. Such a transition is not unrelated to the unique characteristics of K-town. Unlike other
ethnic enclaves where commerce and residence co-exist, K-town residents are mostly non-Koreans. The separation of commerce and residence has been a barrier for many community projects. However, this is one of the few outcomes where disadvantage has been turned into an advantage, placing young Korean leaders at the forefront of pan-ethnic leadership. All in all, if geo-ethnic Korean storytelling by 1.5- and second-generation is gradually emerging, “geographically bound” multiethnic socio-political services provided by this generation are well settled in L.A.

Third, Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. diverge on media ownership. Vancouver’s Korean media are entirely immigrant-owned, especially those who immigrated in the post-1986 Business Immigration Program period. L.A.’s Korean media, on the other hand, include branches of transnational media headquartered in Korea: the Korea Times, the Korea Daily, KBS America, MBC America, and SBS International. Such multiple entries into the North American market, especially broadcasting corporations, continually challenge local independent producers. Transnational media companies’ complex business relationship with local immigrant media, as well as with video distribution channels, produces conflicts at times, as they are content providers and simultaneously competitors. What is concerning is that such fierce competition hinders opportunities for enhancing the quantity and quality of Korean storytelling. Staff lay-offs as part of cost-saving strategies often overload an individual share of work, which consequently challenges the commitment to in-depth research of cases. What is of more concern is that the presence of transnational branches also places the Korean diasporic media market increasingly under the direct influence of Korea. The transnationalization of Korean politics and economics (e.g., Korea’s election law and new media law) continually shapes and reshapes the diasporic media market and overwrite Korean-American politics and economics. The current demographics of the community demand a certain degree of “Korean influence.” Nonetheless, overwhelming preoccupation with matters concerning Korea questions of what kind of future the Korean community can guarantee for the next generation of Korean-Americans.

Nevertheless, the positive side of such fierce competition is that it simultaneously stimulates further growth of the diasporic media market through innovative new partnerships and business models, online and offline, some of which mainstream media
institutions might want to replicate. One example is e-stores operated by transnational television branches, which enable online purchases of various media products (e.g., DVDs, video online streaming) from their websites. The sites are available in English, thus a strategy for cross-ethnic, intercultural marketing, targeting a broader audience. Another example is the Korea Daily’s Joongang Education Centre operating in both Vancouver and L.A. This new model of horizontal expansion into a non-media business offers a new relationship with audiences through an old-fashioned institutional venue where audiences come to learn (take courses) and share similar experiences. In the era of social media networks through which media institutions focus on linking with individual audience members, this model suggests the importance of group links.

The impact of transnational expansion is a reality for the U.S. Korean media, but not as yet for that of Canada. However, the prospect cannot be dismissed. As one Vancouver media practitioner puts it: “All immigrant services may not be able to sustain since Korean broadcasting companies set up their own branches in North America and create competition against the immigrant services…They are going to eat us up” (Media Practitioner 7). Thus, Korean-Canadian producers feel a need to prepare for the transnational expansion into the Canadian market through localization and specialization. Some of the measures being considered or underway include: making partnerships with Korea’s cable channels to secure content (instead of relying entirely on the three over-the-air broadcasters); developing geographically-specific programs; and expanding into media-related businesses such as equipment sales. In L.A. as well, media outlets also tend to focus more on “community” than “commerce” in this future scenario. Community projects are often mentioned as part of future plans: operating a cultural centre, organizing a mentorship program, and providing space/airtime for public announcements/social marketing, among others (Media Practitioners 28 & 35). Breadth or depth (a media conglomerate model versus a medium specialist model) is always a dilemma for many Korean media outlets. Yet, a shift toward a specialist model prevails for future projects: English-learning programs, cooking programs, talk shows, programs for the younger generation, among others (Media Practitioners 23, 25, & 27).

The role of Korean media is to help Koreans adopt American attitude and the American society…It is also important to help cultivate Korean-American culture, suggest directions on how to live in America and what culture we are going to
identify ourselves with, cultivate a good image of L.A.’s Korean community, etc…Similarly, in Korea, media not only deliver news, but they also suggest directions for the society… In the past, we delivered information such as how to turn on a gas stove, how to get telephone numbers, how to apply for driver’s license, where to buy a house, which schools to send children to, etc…Now, people find all of this information on the internet before they come to the U.S. Therefore, instead of such information, it is attitude now, to adapt American attitude and American life style… American newspapers cannot do that for us. (Media Practitioner 28)

In the future, we need to focus on promoting Korean-American identity, instead of providing general information…to provide directions on how to settle in America… Korean media so far have focused on Korean politics…Koreans here know about Korean politics more than Koreans in Korea do. That is wrong…Even the entertainment section covers mostly about Korean celebrities…What is the relevance? Publishers’ attitude needs to change. (Media Practitioner 35)

Lastly, owing to such different market structure, Vancouver and L.A.’s Korean media diverge in their development pattern: a relatively balanced growth in all media types in L.A. is contrasted by a heavy concentration of print media in Vancouver. L.A.’s Korean media pioneered Korean diasporic media in North America, starting in the late 1960s with the Korea Times (est. 1969) and the Korea Daily (est.1974). The different stages of development—the formation period in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the growth and expansion period in the 1990s and the 2000s—had a balanced entry of all types, allowing room for new entries to settle and compete with the existing ones. There are also one or two strong leaders in each medium, structuring the market competition.

Vancouver’s Korean media market, on the other hand, was formed much later. The Korean Canadian News (est. 1983) and the Vancouver Chosun (est. 1986) were launched in the 1980s when L.A.’s market already had all media types in place (dailies/weeklies, television, and radio). A relatively smaller capital base from immigrants (as opposed to transnational capital of L.A.’s Korean media) has led to a concentration of print media. Compared to broadcasting, print media requires a relatively smaller initial investment, thus can be easily set up just like another ethnic business. The print media sector is also completely out of the regulatory loop in Canada, thus providing additional motivation to immigrants. As a result, in the 2000s, Vancouver’s Korean media market saw a weekly boom with six new weeklies launched in the same year (2007), although only about half of these outlets have survived until today. Such heavy concentration in one media sector, however, is a concern, as more fierce competition is likely to put local production at risk.
Similarities between Vancouver and L.A. Korean Media

All of these regulatory, settlement, and market differences, however, produced more similarities than differences in local production and distribution. Although the means of interaction and historical particulars may be different, the overarching patterns of development, such as the relationship with the broader media system, production of Korean storytelling, professional development, and dependency on the enclave market, are similar. These similarities are, however, the result of a dynamic interplay of various factors rather than entirely ethnic.

First, Korean media in both Vancouver and L.A. serve as a civil society for local Korean communities. The socio-cultural, political, and intercultural roles they play—through providing culturally translated news stories, mobilizing the community in support of Korean-Canadian/American political candidates, and finally organizing intercultural projects for editorial and market purposes—are indeed critical for social integration of this monolingual and first-generation-dominant diaspora. Nevertheless, such a role has been only limitedly extended to the broader society as a window to everyday Korean storytelling. In the broader media infrastructure as a whole, Korean-language services are available on all three television platforms (terrestrial, cable, and satellite), with a high concentration in the commercial cable and satellite sectors. Shaw’s TV Korea and All TV, Time Warner’s KBS World, DirecTV’s Korean Direct, and the Dish Network’s Tiger Pack among the “international packages”\(^5\) are good examples. Nevertheless, these options are only limitedly available to a broader audience due to socio-economic barriers. English subtitles are provided only to selected programs, mainly entertainment programs (e.g., drama, documentaries) rather than everyday local evening news. Furthermore, most Korean channels are pay services provided to subscribers.

By nature of the medium, newspapers and radio are developed largely outside of mainstream institutions. Efforts to link Korean media with mainstream media institutions are evident through various types of business partnerships: Vancouver’s Canada Express

\(^5\) The Dish Network, for example, offers 200 international channels in 28 languages (http://www.dishnetwork.com/international/default.aspx).
and its exclusive licensing with CanWest and L.A.’s Korea Times and the Korea Daily’s content licensing and joint delivery system with the L.A. Times are examples. However, all of these efforts are still one way, limited to providing broader public discourse to the Korean community. No proper links have been established between Korean and mainstream media to systematically embed Korean storytelling in the everyday discourse of the broader media system. Other than occasional coverage of Korea or Korean community news in mainstream media, or Korean news (English translation) available through the New America Media (NAM), much of the everyday Korean storytelling is circulated only within the community. Intercultural attempts such as the Korea Times English edition are only short-lived due to the failure to satisfy revenue goals. The KoreAm Journal is the only surviving publication that is accessible to English-speaking audiences. Sadly, if Kymlicka’s (1995) multicultural citizenship and institutional integration is about consolidating multicultural options within the broader media system to make them interculturally available to all members of society, such options are certainly limited for the majority of the population.

On a side note, the limited access to Korean storytelling in newspapers is not unrelated to the overall downturn in print media. According to the PEW 2009 State of the Media report, more and more ethnic newspapers are giving up on costly print versions and moving on to online publications (Waldman, 2011). Korean print media practitioners in general predict that Korean newspapers will disappear in 10 years, following in the footsteps of video rentals (Media Practitioners 1, 6, 28, & 35). When Korean dramas and K-pop music are available online almost immediately (for example, www.mvibo.com), there is really no need to resort to rent videos or experience a four-week hold-back time. In the same vein, newspapers are a less appealing option as a medium for everyday news when online real-time news is available 24 hours a day. As one media practitioner puts it: “There is no longer a deadline for news” (Media Practitioner 33). It is expected to run for 24 hours. However, no local Korean media are capable of 24-hour production.

I used to think that newspapers would prosper another 20 to 30 years…However, I think differently now. Readership is dropping by 10% every year. The situation in Korea is even worse. It is 20% there. L.A. is likely to follow that path. (Media Practitioner 28)

Korean newspapers here will be gone in 10 years. The 1.5- and second-generation do not use Korean media. Korean government does not support
overseas Koreans. They have no plan for us. The consulate office in L.A. used to have 30 people. Now, there are only 10 people. Downsizing means less visitors and local Koreans live away from the community. Fifty percent of the Korean community is 30 years old or younger. (Media Practitioner 35)

It is important to note, however, that such a trend reflects a change in platform, from offline to online, and not the disappearance of newspapers entirely. The case of video rental is different: the video rental business remained offline until the providers created an online platform of their own, a change which they had no control over. On the other hand, almost all Korean newspapers are already available online, and are responding to the trend in innovative ways. Vancouver-based Korea Daily’s model of print for three days and e-paper for five days a week is a good example. More importantly, Korean-Canadian/American storytelling unique to Korean diasporic media, which imported cultural products or online resources originating in Korea cannot offer, should not be underestimated. Newspapers are likely to continue the adjustment in the balance of online-offline portions in the future.

Second, for the Korean communication infrastructure as a whole, Ball-Rokeach’s (2001, p. 396) theory of Communication Infrastructure which models “a storytelling system set in its communication action context” is underway; yet it is led by multiethnic CSOs instead of media outlets. In Vancouver, Korean community workers at immigrant settlement agencies take leadership roles in bringing pan-ethnic venues of services and dialogue to the community such as “Resource Fair” for the Korean community and the “cultural competence workshop” for staff at public institutions (see Chapter 3). Such involvement is critical in the absence of organizations in the community that are capable of providing such services. The Korean Society only occasionally provides ad-hoc services. The 1.5- and second-generation Korean-Canadians also focus largely on socio-cultural issues rather than social services. In L.A., politically-conscious CSOs led by the younger-generation spearhead “geographically bound” multiethnic K-town services (e.g., KAC).

First-generation-led Korean media in both cities, on the other hand, have encountered limitations, which do not correspond to the expectations set by Ball-Rokeach’s CI model. As discussed earlier, this model requires a common language, English, as a prerequisite for participation, thus is only suitable for matured immigrant
communities. “Geo-ethnic storytelling,” that is weakly connected to the broader media system, is what is currently available to the Korean community. Among the cross-ethnic communicative spaces discussed earlier, the Metamorphosis’s Alhambra Source, an online multilingual storytelling space by local resident, therefore, seems to be an immediate option for the Korean community. How these project sites will further develop to consolidate multiethnic storytelling and facilitate cross-ethnic dialogue requires further attention.

Third, Korean-Canadian/American storytelling is still quantitatively weak. By actual output, both Vancouver and L.A. are oriented to cover more about “here” than “home”: 55% of Vancouver news items focus on Canadian news and 64% of L.A. news items focus on U.S. news (Table 7.1). However, only about one third of the total output is actually produced by staff writers: 34% in Vancouver and 38% in L.A. (Table 7.2). The remaining is supplemented by other sources, mainly Korean: Yonhap News, KBS, MBC, the Korea Times, and the Chosun Ilbo, among others. Locally produced items are largely regionally-focused: Canadian news (94%) and the U.S. news (86%). In other words, if local staff writers cover news, it is mostly about their respective regions (general local news or Korean community news). The only difference is a geographic focus within regional news. Vancouver’s Korean media have a higher emphasis on local news (66% compared to 54% in L.A. media) whereas L.A.’s Korean media have higher emphasis on national news (27% compared to 19% in Vancouver media). L.A. media also produce more international news (11%) than Vancouver media (3%). One thing to note, however, is that the higher national coverage in L.A.’s Korean media may also be related to relatively easier access to U.S. news. Imported international news (which is mainly U.S. news) from the Korea headquarter is national news for L.A.’s Korean media. Such a privilege is not the case for Vancouver’s Korean media.

Vancouver media are also more Korea-focused that 36% of news items (in contrast to 17% of L.A.) are news stories concerning Korea. Of this, 86% of Korean news is from Korean sources compared to 52% of Korean news in L.A. media. By media type (Table 7.3), both TV (26%) and newspapers (40%) in Vancouver’s Korean media cover more about Korea than TV (9%) and newspapers (25%) in L.A.’s Korean media. The lack of resources (financial as well as human resources) may be one factor; the need for
Korean news for editorial and market purposes is another. Considering the significant Korean citizen population in both cities (70% and 42% of Koreans in B.C. and California respectively), a certain amount of Korean news is necessary, and it is more so for Vancouver. As well, Korean news contributes to creating more ad space to finance operations.

What is important to note is that the ratio of “here” to “home” news items found in this study refutes that of the earlier comparative studies on Korean media in Vancouver (Murray et al., 2007) and L.A. (Lin & Song, 2006). Both studies found Korean media’s significant leaning toward “home” news: 52% of Vancouver’s Korean television and newspapers cover Korean news, compared to 37% that cover Canadian news (Murray et al., 2007). Similarly, 43% of L.A.’s Korean newspapers cover Korean news, compared to 38% coverage of U.S. news (Lin & Song, 2006). This study, on the other hand, found a reverse ratio of Korean to Canada/U.S. news (36% to 55% in Vancouver and 17% to 64% in L.A.), although Vancouver’s Korean media continue to focus relatively more on Korean news than L.A.’s Korean media. The methodological difference, that is, covering a full range of media types (television, radio, newspapers, online discussion boards) by source of capital (immigrant, transnational, multicultural), provides a more accurate picture of local Korean production. This study also finds that the complexity involved in the process of media production and distribution—differences in editorial directions by source capital, restraints on financial and social capital, transnational connections, among others—makes it difficult to judge in-group orientation of diasporic media solely based on the absolute quantity of “here” and “home” news.

Fourth, Korean-Canadian/American storytelling is still qualitatively weak. In narrating local stories, there is neither a strong sense of in-group orientation relative to “other,” nor a sense of integration to the broader society as “Korean-Canadian”/”Korean-American.” Korean media outlets equally position Koreans rather neutrally as hanin (ethnically Korean). Koreans are addressed ethnically rather than politically by citizenship. The predominance of first-generation immigrant reporters influences such a standpoint. Still, a majority of media practitioners both in Vancouver and L.A. are landed immigrants, who are technically Korean citizens, rather than Canadian/American citizens.
Table 7.1  Vancouver-L.A. comparison: Geographic focus by news origin (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
<th>L.A.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Staff writer</td>
<td>Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Other ethnic groups)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2  Vancouver-L.A. comparison: News origin by city (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Origin</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
<th>L.A.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=200</td>
<td>n=1593</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff writer</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3  Vancouver-L.A. comparison: Geographic focus by media type (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
<th>L.A.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=200</td>
<td>N=61</td>
<td>N=139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Korean)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (Other ethnic groups)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (General)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial/State</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (South Korea)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (North Korea)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International (General)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only major difference in the organizational structure between Vancouver and L.A.’s Korean media is a presence of locally educated, 1.5-generation media practitioners at a senior management level in L.A.’s Korean media, while there are none as yet in Vancouver’s Korean media. Vancouver’s Korean media have only a handful of 1.5-generation reporters at a staff level. The 1.5-generation’s media ownership is also almost
non-existent in Vancouver. Aside from the Bridge (2007), a short-lived weekly newspaper, there has not been any ownership attempt by 1.5-generation Korean-Canadians. The presence of transnational management and former international students is another difference. Vancouver’s Korean media are affiliated with transnational media in the form of franchises, thus completely independent from the Korean headquarters for editorial and business directives. For L.A. branches, on the other hand, the senior management from headquarters is stationed in local branches, governing overall business operations. Also in Vancouver, the participation of international students is evident mostly through internships (e.g., exchange programs) whereas a majority of staff in L.A. media are, in fact, former international students. Presumably, more Korean-American storytelling can be expected from L.A.’s Korean media due to the higher proportion of 1.5-generation senior managers. However, the equally strong presence of transnational senior management dictates overall editorial direction in accordance to that of headquarters. A tug-of-war between Korean-American and Korean managers for Korea-American or Korean storytelling leads to a similar result for Vancouver and L.A.

In *Becoming Intercultural*, Kim (2001, p. 77) argues that “the relatively stress-free ethnic communication experiences” can delay the process of cultural adaptation by limiting the “opportunities to participate in the social communication activities of the host environment.” However, ethnic media can “facilitate cross-cultural adaptation in the initial phases as long as the coethnics involved are themselves well adapted” (ibid.). In other words, if the storytellers (staff writers or senior management who set directives) are well adapted to the broader society, diasporic media can contribute to intercultural storytelling and civic engagement. This idea is related to what a CSO leader mentioned: “A leader who cannot speak English cannot lead the community to be intercultural” (CSO Leader 6). In-group orientation of the first-generation CSOs is thus partially, if not entirely, attributed to English language proficiency.

Judging from this context, the dominance of first-generation media professionals and a small gap between the time they immigrated to Canada/U.S. and the time they joined local Korean media is a concern. Media practitioners may have engaged in geo-ethnic storytelling perhaps too early when they themselves may not be well adapted. However, it is also true that over 40 years of Korean media history in North America has
produced media practitioners of established tenure in the local Korean media industry—an average of nine years for Vancouver and 13 years for L.A. In other words, the Korean media have retained media practitioners who have adapted themselves to the local society and are capable of Korean-Canadian/American storytelling (although the number is minimal, and some media practitioners may say that the years of experience do not necessarily translate into journalistic integrity and capacity for Korean-American storytelling).

Cultivation of a stronger Korean-Canadian/American identity and storytelling is also much desired at the intersection of dwindling Korean media consumption due to multiplication of media platforms and a growing younger generation population. Within constantly changing media platforms, “home” is only a click away. In other words, local Korean media are not the only option to learn about “home.” Not only the dependency on local Korean media, but also the absolute number of consumers thus diminishes. The younger-generation of Koreans is growing; however, they are unlikely to consume Korean media, at least the way they are presently offered for first-generation audiences. Thus, the future of Korean media depends on the capacity to flexibly respond to the changes in the media environment and demographics of the Korean community.

Cultivation of Korean-Canadian/American identity and storytelling is thus timely. It is uniquely Korean, retaining a link to “home” and ethnic origin, and simultaneously Canadian/American, geographically oriented to “here,” where Korean-Canadians/Americans physically are. Korean-Canadian/American storytelling is also potentially intercultural, contributing to geo-ethnic storytelling, if access is made available to non-Koreans as well. Such an orientation, after all, serves the best interests of Korean immigrants who uprooted voluntarily to be part of a new society. The duality of Korean-Canadian/American identity struggles, between nostalgia for home and aspiration for integration, can be expressed through the multiplication of local Korean media. Nevertheless, ultimately it is integration—of their own as well as their children—to the broader society that justifies all the hardship that first-generation immigrants experienced in the new country, as mentioned commonly by interviewees. The growing younger population suggests that there will be more Korean-American media by and for them.
However, the still dominant first-generation-led Korean media have roles to play in such a transition for the new arrivals as well as for the next generation.

Fifth, professional collaboration among Korean media practitioners is weak due to fierce competition, in contrast to a mutually supportive working relationship established between Korean media and CSOs. Institutional ties that bind them together are weak. There are formal and informal groups and associations such as the Korean Broadcasters Association, the Southern California Korean Reporters Group, the Camera Crew Association, and the Korean Press Association in L.A. However, most of these exist for social rather than professional purposes. Due to fierce competition among media outlets, even individual interaction among reporters is discouraged rather than encouraged. Nevertheless, there are aspirations for a professional development and an exchange of skills and dialogue. Thus, a link to mainstream media circles is desired. For this, promotion of mainstream options should come first; there is generally a low awareness of mainstream media industry associations among Korean media practitioners.

In the absence of a local Korean network, however, new business ethics emerge to self-regulate the market, as demonstrated in the cases of Canada Express (content licensing with CanWest) and Ohcastra.com (illegal webTV). Although the rationale behind these events may be to secure market share, they have certainly contributed to making the Korean diasporic media market more transparent and disciplined. The institutional collaboration within and across Korean media outlets in Vancouver and L.A. was noteworthy. Although the anecdotes shared by media practitioners suggest that the disconnection among media outlets and media practitioners has become the norm due to fierce competition, the media outlets do in fact act as a collective agent if need be. In addition, the case of Ohcastra.com calls for policy attention from the CRTC to place proper regulatory frameworks on illegal websites which jeopardize the operation of its licensees. Lastly, in the absence of a proper local media network, a global network of overseas diasporic media practitioners is instead emerging to connect Korean journalists from around the world. The Korean Journalist Association launched the Overseas Korean Journalist Association in 2010, partially in preparation for the upcoming 2012 elections. The potential impact of this network on local Korean-Canadian/American storytelling with respect to mobilizing “Korean” discourse is important to monitor.
Lastly, on the market end, the dependency on the local enclave market is high regardless of city and source of capital. Eighty-four percent of Vancouver and 77% of L.A. ads are generated from enclave businesses (Table 7.4). By medium, newspapers in Vancouver and L.A. equally have higher dependency, at 94% and 88% respectively, with equally smaller portions of mainstream ads, at 3% and 6% respectively. The high dependency on the local market means fierce competition among media outlets. As one media practitioner puts it: “We have 13 television services in a one million dollar market. Is it realistically possible to operate with $50,000 a month?” (Media Practitioner 28). For transnational media, the local enclave market is not a sole revenue source; however, the level of dependency on the local enclave market is similar to that of immigrant media. Such in-group-oriented marketing and limited route through which local media are financed is likely to further challenge the production of Korean-storytelling. Cross-ethnic marketing is thus considered as the only breakthrough for most. Outreach to other ethnic communities, as in the case of Vancouver, and to the mainstream community through the formation of a “U.S. ad team” in the case of L.A., is underway. However, Vancouver and L.A. media outlets equally have not yet developed strategies to properly connect with the broader economy.

In-group marketing, in fact, reflects the general characteristic of the Korean enclave economy as a whole. The “We speak English” campaign in K-town, which was recently undertaken to open up the community to the broader market and cater to non-Korean clientele, is one sad reality. The campaign has a few broader implications. First, K-town, the economic hub of the Korean enclave economy, has sustained self-sufficiently over the years mainly through in-group, in-language clientele. Second, in the broader urban geography of the city of L.A., K-town is a socio-cultural and economic space largely for the Korean population rather than for the greater L.A. population. Finally, the time has come that K-town needs to self-promote its foreignness, responding to the general assumption that K-town businesses provide limited English, outside of the Korean community to rescue their businesses during the economic recession. After 30 years since its official designation of K-town, the “We speak English” campaign is the only intercultural marketing strategy K-town can offer.
The similarities in local production and distribution, even within structural differences, may illustrate that more Korean-specific than city-specific factors are in action. In other words, Korean media behave similarly wherever they are. However, a close look at each of the similarities and differences suggests that a dynamic interplay of both factors leads to similar results. For example, the Canadian Content rules may contribute to local production; however, it is conditional on financial resources and willingness of producers to go beyond the threshold. The next section examines potential policy support that Korean media practitioners wish to obtain from their respective governments as well as from the Korean government.

### 7.2 Policy Supports and Recommendations

In 2001, the CRTC invited public input on the need for over-the-air ethnic television in Vancouver (Public Notice CRTC 2001-31). The various responses can be categorized as follows: fulfillment of citizenship, sense of belonging and social cohesion, affordability, and geo-ethnic storytelling. One of the comments quoted below illustrates the need for ethnic television as an essential means in the process of integration. Free ethnic options in the broader media system are a sign of welcoming and simultaneously a necessity to be properly informed about “here” to make informed decisions:

… while we are learning English, it is just as important for us to know what is happening in our new country and in the world, so we can make informed decisions until such time that we are fluent. There are no benefits to keeping over 800,000 of Vancouver's population ignorant about Canada and many benefits to giving them access to useful information and education. (Wai Sin and family, Comment # 372)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Advertisers</th>
<th>Vancouver</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>L.A.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n=474</td>
<td>n=106</td>
<td>n=368</td>
<td>n=2338</td>
<td>n=439</td>
<td>n=379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Diaspora</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean from Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic communities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absent/unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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274
Such demands coincide with Kymlicka’s conceptions of multicultural citizenship and societal culture. Creating multicultural options within mainstream institutions, however, requires policy support. As discussed in the previous section, Korean options are created inside and outside of mainstream institutions depending on media type. In the broadcasting sector, Korean-language channels are available within mainstream institutions along with other “international” options on all types of platforms (over-the-air, cable, satellite). English subtitles also make some of these options accessible across ethno-linguistic communities. Korean print options, on the other hand, are developed largely in isolation. A culturally-translated broader discourse is brought to the Korean community every day; however, Korean-Canadian/American discourse is only sporadically available to the broader public.

Such a reality echoes a comment from one media practitioner: Who knows too little about whom? (Media Practitioner 5). Immigrant groups are information-rich. There are immigration agencies, CSOs, and most importantly, community media that relay necessary information about “here” to assist immigrants’ settlement and integration. It is the broader society, especially governments that are not properly updated on such progress and constantly assume that immigrant communities are isolated, uniformed, and thus unable to be first-class citizens. Thus, for Korean storytelling to be properly embedded in the broader media institutions as part of everyday discourse in the broader public sphere, a policy support system should be in place to facilitate two-way efforts from Korean diasporic and mainstream media to engage in everyday dialogue. There is no reason to allow individual members of the community to remain ignorant about each other and the issues that matter to them.

Does the government know about us? Does the government know what roles we can play? Does the government know what contributions we can make? How does the government understand us? How the government sees us makes a difference in their support… If they know ethnic media can be a watchdog, monitoring government practices, it will be a different story. (Media Practitioner 5)
7.2.1 Canada

Multicultural Content Rules

Within the current media regulations in place, the prohibition of foreign ownership (ineligibility of non-Canadians) and Canadian Content rules are two major regulations that set Canada apart from U.S. These protective measures that are intended to guard the Canadian media industry from U.S. media expansion, also contribute to guarding the local Korean diasporic media market from the cross-border expansion of Korean transnational media, and encourage the production of Korean-Canadian storytelling to a certain extent. However, the regulations alone without further policy support limit further contributions. This is particularly true for Canadian Content rules. The case of Korean media shows a few issues arising from this lack of policy support.

First, Canadian Content rules are conditional on the producers’ commitment to local production and financial and social capital to realize it. All producers interviewed for this study were committed to localization and customization of content. Such commitment is in part a genuine interest in local production and a survival strategy in preparation for future transnational expansion. Nonetheless, a lack of resources, owing to internal restructures during the economic recession, makes it difficult even to maintain the current level of Canadian content requirements. Local producers simply do not have capacity to commit most of their local staff to produce half an hour show (e.g., TV Korean Magazine). Thus, without policy support as a means to achieve the ends for production of geo-ethnic storytelling, the Canadian Content rules are more a burden than an incentive.

Second, the Canadian Content rules focus on Canadian creation of various genres (e.g., drama, documentary, children’s), but there is no requirement for multicultural content within the Canadian content. The current 60% rule imposed on ethnic television (although adjustable by conditions of license) and the 15% on Category 2 ethnic specialty service are the only rules that multicultural content may be expected, assuming that multicultural/third-language producers are likely to produce multicultural content. (This is the assumption that the FCC’s minority ownership rule relies on.) As discussed in Chapter 2, media scholars point out regulatory loopholes and ambiguity about the
definition of Canadian Content rules (Armstrong, 2010; Vipond, 2000). What does or should “Canadian Content” in multicultural Canada entail? Does it properly reflect the current media environment and changing ethnoscape of Canada? Perhaps it is a time to redefine the criteria of Canadian content. If the original intent of the requirement was to strengthen Canadian identity through real Canadian cultural production by Canadian creators, wherein the Canadian identity reflects multicultural characteristics of Canada in any sense, a certain requirement of multicultural content needs to be emphasized. In proceeding with such mandate, cross-ethnic joint production by mainstream and diasporic media or by diasporic media of two or more ethnic communities can be considered. While Canadian broadcasting policies reinforce commitment to serve cultural and racial minorities properly and accurately (Public Notice CRTC 1999-97 and 1999-117), such policies generally encourage individual commitment rather than joint commitment through cross-ethnic collaborative work. Finally, the Canadian Content rules can be considered for the print sector to nurture geo-ethnic storytelling. It is currently limited to broadcasting media only, and there are absolutely no rules governing the print media sector on Canadian and/or local content. Thus, in the case of Korean daily newspapers, the local production remains at 45% and the rest is supplemented by external sources through direct insertion or local translation.

Multi-language Subtitle Services

Aside from multicultural content, multi-language subtitle services for official-language programs can open a new horizon of options for ethno-linguistic audiences. The same logic as used for the CRTC’s requirement on closed captioning can be applied to multi-language subtitles. Equally, echoing Beaty and Sullivan (2006), official-language subtitles for more third-language programs can also reach broader audiences. Such two-way efforts for intercultural exposure can be a cost-effective way to enhance cultural literacy, considering the hefty investment required for local production of multicultural content. Another way to increase exposure to cross-ethnic storytelling is utilization of a news pool of multicultural television stations. OMNI’s multiethnic news pool, for example, is a great window to multiethnic storytelling that is rich in diverse perspectives
on major local news. In addition to news stories presented by major mainstream networks, how local Chinese, Punjabi, and Korean producers interpret and narrate a story about the same event can help broader audiences understand what is important to various ethnic communities. Official-language or multi-language services are critical to serve this end. At present, these news programs are offered in own languages only.

**Greater Role of the Public Sector**

Considering the multicultural/multilingual endeavours led by the commercial sector such as Roger’s OMNI and Shaw’s Shaw Multicultural Channel, which serve over 20 linguistic communities in collaboration with local independent producers from ethnic communities, the absence of such initiatives by the CBC, other than the Punjabi Hockey Night, calls for a greater role to be played by the public sector. Shaw runs SMC as part of its community work and offers free airtime to independent producers. Such an endeavour lifts the burden of airtime fees which often hinder local production, as demonstrated by L.A.’s Korean television services, and encourages multi-language programs to get on the air. The involvement of the public sector would help remove economic barriers to access for ethnic options, by having these available on free over-the-air stations.

**Group-Differentiated Support: Financial Support**

Besides overarching regulatory issues, Figure 7.1 shows the attributes that Korean media practitioners consider important in their everyday media production.\(^\text{96}\) Most important yet least satisfied is the need for more placement of government ads. The prevailing perception among media practitioners is that diasporic media outlets are not sufficiently considered in the selection process. There are only one or two such ads a year (Media Practitioners 1 & 7). It is only during the election times that more opportunities surface (Media Practitioner 6). The situation is the same for corporate ads. Only about three percent of the newspaper ads are generated from mainstream advertisers and these are mainly local professional services targeting the Korean Community (e.g., Simpson, Simpson, Simpson).

\(^{96}\) These attributes are developed based on the findings of Murray et al.’s study (2007).
Thomas & Associates) rather than multinational corporations (e.g., McDonald’s) as seen in L.A.’s Korean media.

We get government ads only during the election times. However, governments can consider using diasporic media to make major government announcements such as Harmonized Sales Tax. Also, during major events such as the Olympics, they can consider using diasporic media to invite more participation across communities, for example, volunteer recruiting. (Media Practitioner 6)

Aside from the placement of ads, funding for various media projects that specifically aid diasporic media production is desired. Publishing funds and tax benefits for ethnic publishers are among those mentioned (Media Practitioners 3 & 5). As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no group-differentiated support, designed specifically for diasporic media outlets. It is open to all. At least in the print sector, there are potential funding sources (e.g., Canadian Periodical Fund [CPF]) that ethnic publishers might consider. However, there is absolutely none in the broadcasting sector. The Canadian Television Fund (CTF) is not at all available to ethnic producers. The third-language media fund, discussed in Chapter 2, may be an option to consider, if there are no other alternatives. However, the idea of self-funding by language in that the CTF funds official-language and aboriginal production whereas the third-language fund subsidizes third-language production is in itself exclusionary and discriminatory toward third-language production.

Publishing fund for ethnic publishers doesn’t exist at the moment, but it will help maintain journalistic integrity without relying so much on advertisers. It is particularly important for small communities. I know, however, that regardless of languages, all print media outlets (newspapers and magazines) are suffering. (Media Practitioner 3)

Group-Differentiated Support: Professional Training, Networking, and Partnership

The second most important area in need of support is access to press conferences and government press releases. These two attributes are relatively more satisfied than the rest. One comment, however, is that “a fair reporting environment” is desirable at press conferences so that Korean reporters do not “hang back” (Media Practitioner 5). It was mentioned that Korean reporters lose chances to ask questions to mainstream reporters,
those who ask “good questions” (Media Practitioners 9 & 10). Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that such evaluation has more to do with journalistic skills than discrimination in any sense, thus calling for capacity building through professional training. In regards to press releases, discrimination by community size is, however, mentioned. As one media practitioner puts it: “Government announcements need to be distributed to both mainstream and diasporic media to maximize their reach. However, it seems that those are often sent only to major communities such as Chinese and Southeast Asian communities. They need to be sent to smaller communities as well” (Media Practitioner 3). This may also have to do with the relative size of these outlets among Korean media overall. Such comments were never mentioned by Korean media practitioners from the bigger-size outlets.

Figure 7.1 Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Government Support – Canada” by Korean media practitioners in Vancouver

The attributes that show a significant gap in the ratings are “monitoring practices and undertaking market research” and “facilitating media-academia collaboration.” These two attributes are related to market as well as journalistic integrity. On market research, a
majority of leading media outlets has media kits, which consist of basic corporate information as well as target market information, available for advertisers. However, regular tracking data on media consumption is a challenge, especially for Vancouver’s diasporic media. Only leading Chinese media outlets have been able to conduct audience research (e.g., Vancouver Chinese media habits study 2005 and 2007 Canadian Chinese Media Monitor by Fairchild TV, 2005 Chinese newspaper readership study by Sing Tao). No studies on this scale were conducted by Korean media. The Korea Daily’s recent online survey on readership patterns was the only audience study done on Korean audiences in Vancouver. Market research, however, is an important diasporic media project, especially when a placement of a still small amount of mainstream ads (both government and corporate ads) is considered. Building an archive of consumer studies will help better communicate with mainstream advertisers, one of the proper strategies Korean media currently lack.

Concerning media-academia collaboration, there is an aspiration for more professional development. Intercultural training is one area of focus. Some CSO leaders point out that a lack of proper intercultural knowledge often leads to reactive rather than proactive approaches to the coverage of ethnic communities and results in the reinforcement of stereotypes (Community Worker 3 & CSO Leader 2). As an example in Chapter 4, the discussion about ethnocultural communities at a local government level often circles aimlessly around “what government should do” in response to requests from ethno-cultural communities rather than proactively questioning “what government can do” with resources at hands prior to requests being made (Community Worker 3). Intercultural training as part of journalistic training is thus important (CSO Leader 2) to improve the cultural literacy of storytellers who in turn influence the cultural literacy of audiences. Ad-hoc reference checking without an understanding of deeper socio-cultural implications (e.g., suicide cases in the Korean community) only essentializes cultural differences.

We need adult education, training workshops, or seminars to help people… Media can also educate broader members of society about Korean culture. Koreans (portrayed) in mainstream media are all negative, either North Korea or dog eating. The Japanese community has tried to build their image in the mainstream society… Ryerson School of Journalism teaches journalists about diversity, racism, and multiculturalism. The School received an award from the
Networking through established media circles can also be one way to enhance cultural literacy. In the absence of a regulatory framework for the print media sector, monitoring of media practices among members is critical. However, the awareness of existing mainstream media circles as well as so-called ethnic media circles such as the Canadian Ethnic Media Association and the National Ethnic Press and Media Council of Canada is generally low among Korean media practitioners. None of these were mentioned during the interviews and no Korean media practitioners currently sit on any of these boards. In order to increase membership from diverse communities to the broader media circles, a membership quota by ethnic community or membership in mainstream media associations as part of licensing renewal requirements could be considered. The current low awareness of and participation in media circles is attributed to voluntary participation. Without knowing what is out there, participation cannot be expected. The quota system, in this sense, would encourage the self-promotion of media associations to recruit ethnic members. In doing so, it is equally important for mainstream media circles to be multiculturally equipped to do proper monitoring. As the experience of one media practitioner with a local industry association suggests, institutional readiness is critical before extending invitations to ethnic members (see Chapter 4). On the part of diasporic media outlets, the requirement of membership in mainstream media associations may encourage diasporic media to explore mainstream or diasporic media circles, if they wish to renew their licenses.

7.2.2 U.S.

Minority Content Rules

The concept of “Canadian Content rules” is unfamiliar; however, well received. As one media practitioner puts it: “It is a good regulation to restructure the market to have only a few good ones that can engage in local production” (Media Practitioner 38). Just like Vancouver’s producers, the aspiration for local Korean-American production is high. And yet, L.A.’s Korean media are also not free from financial restrictions. While at operating in a market that is ten times bigger than that of Vancouver, local production is
still minimal. Specifically, easy access to imported content often compromises local production. The changes in local market conditions also restrict local production. The proliferation of digital Korean channels carrying only imported content from Korea lowers the competitiveness of existing ones by shrinking individual market shares. Therefore, for local Korean-American productions such as TVK24’s Story G to take off, government assistance for ethnic production and distribution is desirable.

The U.S. does not have an American content requirement; however, public-interest obligations imposed on broadcasting licensees is in place (see Chapter 2). The use of local talent, the development of children’s and educational programs, and the reservation of three hours a week in the broadcasting schedule for such programs are part of license renewal requirements (Grant & Wood, 2004). As an extension of public-interest obligations, ethnic programs (with English subtitles) can be added to reflect the interest of local ethnic communities. Such an idea is consistent with the diversity of viewpoints stated in the FCC’s “Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 1978,” which also echoes Kymlicka’s conception of “societal culture” and institutional integration. This serves “not only the needs and interests of the minority community but also enriches and educates the non-minority audience, thus enhancing cultural literacy” (ibid.). Although the original intent of this statement was to achieve viewpoint diversity through minority ownership, policy supports to aid the distribution of minority production can also achieve this goal. In fact, a relatively weak financial status of minority media owners and the ongoing underrepresentation of minority journalists in the media sector pose limits for minority productions to get on the air.

*Group Differentiated Support: Financial Support*

As it is the case for Vancouver’s Korean media, the placement of government ads is most desired by media practitioners yet least satisfied. It is again generally understood that mainstream media are major recipients of government ads, and only a few make it to Korean media. Some of the examples found in this study include Census 2010, www.FluShotLA.com, and iwatch. As discussed, the benefit of government ads is the
higher ad rate, incomparable to the rate for enclave businesses. As one media practitioner puts it: “Although we do not get as much as the L.A. Times, we do get major ads from the government. The ad rate is much higher as the government already has the rate set for mainstream media” (Media Practitioner 32). The situation is the same for corporate ads. Although some major transnational corporations appear in Korean media such as McDonald’s, Verizon, Statefarm, and Toyota, the actual number is still minimal. Such low popularity of Korean media among mainstream advertisers may be attributed to the size of the Asian population, among others. One media practitioner mentions that the Asian market is growing but is still not considered a critical mass (Media Practitioner 21).

Yes, English speaking population is growing, but not to the level where we need to change our programming or there is ad support. Although people try to sound like... when you put all English-speaking Asians, Chinese, Korean, whatever together, it’s a growing population. But without the gimmick of how they play with the Census numbers whatever to be recognized by the general market, it is a small market...They have tried already here and they tried at (name of company). Different people have tried already, but they went belly up...I look at them and say marketing is one thing and PR is another, but the number only goes up to 5% and the number is number...It’s not there yet. When there are English speaking Asians, it is novelty; it's not that they would want pan-Asian targeted programs...unless you provide really compelling content. (Media Practitioner 21)

Another area of financial support is airtime fee. In the case of Korean media, Korean ownership in “broadcasting” is limited. Korean television services, transnational and immigrant media alike, are program providers who lease airtime from license holders. Local immigrant media are often limited in financial resources to have ownership in broadcasting whereas financially capable transnational media are not eligible for ownership under the foreign ownership restrictions. As discussed in Chapter 5, the high airtime fee hinders local production. Korean media practitioners complain that it accounts for a significant portion of direct expenses and the increase in the airtime fee at every renewal has pushed some outlets out of the market. Most of their advertising revenue generated from the Korean enclave businesses goes directly to the license holders. This comment is consistent with the findings of Hong, Hong, Lee, Kim, and Chae’s study (2009) on overseas Korean-language broadcasting conducted for the Korea Communications Commission (KCC). Over 70% of the expenses of Korean television companies operating in the U.S. are used to pay off the airtime fees.
In the current market-driven air-fee pricing, the visibility of minority programs, let alone Korean-American productions, is likely to diminish. In accordance with the rationale behind the FCC’s ownership diversity regulation, financial assistance (e.g., discounted airtime fee) for Korean-American services can be considered. The FCC offers financial measures that aid minority ownership (e.g., bidding credits, tax certificates); however, none of these were mentioned during the interviews (see Chapter 5), reflecting the reality that a majority of Korean media outlets are program providers. The proposed assistance may be limited to those eligible for broadcasting ownership in the U.S. The assistance could also be conditional on the assisted amount being used for local production.

Figure 7.2 Importance-Satisfaction rating on “Government Support – U.S.” by Korean media practitioners in L.A.
Group-Differentiated Support: Professional Training, Networking, and Partnership

The low popularity of Korean media with advertisers is attributed to a lack of proper marketing strategies. It is related to the second most important yet least satisfied attribute, that is, “monitoring practices and undertaking market research.” Again, leading Korean media update media kits frequently and make market information available for advertisers. However, it is mostly about the changes in their operation rather than updates on consumer profiles. As also discussed in the case of Vancouver, market research is critical to effectively communicate with mainstream advertisers. It is particularly important for L.A.’s Korean media which are proactively undertaking mainstream marketing through a “U.S. ad team” and which multinational corporations have begun to pick up on, although moderately.

For support in monitoring and market research, a partnership between media outlets and academia is desirable. In fact, “facilitating media-academia collaboration” is one of the high-importance and low-satisfaction attributes. Audience research on Korean-American viewership in different regions of the U.S. has been conducted by Korean scholars. A study on satellite television viewership of Korean immigrants in L.A. (Moon and Park, 2007) and in Texas (Lee, 2004), and a study on media consumption patterns of Korean immigrants in Chicago (Moon, 2003) are good examples. As it is the case in Vancouver, however, diasporic media outlets tend to hire marketing research agencies to conduct audience research. Studies done by Korean media outlets are not traceable. However, for the 2006 study on Chinese American media consumption and purchasing behavior survey, for example, the World Journal hired Interviewing Service of America to conduct research on its behalf. The nature of social science research and market research may be different yet complementary, thus a synergy can arise through an exchange of resources.

Regarding “affiliation with press councils,” similar to Vancouver, there is generally low awareness of mainstream media circles. As one media practitioner puts it:

97 The World Journal (est. 1976) is a Chinese-language newspaper distributed in major cities in the U.S. and Canada. For more details, see http://www.worldjournal.com
“It is much needed, but no Korean media outlets have membership in mainstream media circles. They do not know what is out there. We only have press cards to access LAPD or Sheriff” (Media Practitioner 35). As discussed in Chapter 6, Korean media are reasonably connected to the “ethnic media circles” such as Asian American Journalists Association (AAJA) and the New American Media (NAM) through membership of Korean media or Korean-American journalists in mainstream media institutions serving as board directors (AAJA) and Korean media outlets receiving awards from NAM (e.g., Korea Daily reporters). Stronger connections with existing media circles are important. Referring to some of the quotes mentioned earlier, there is a sense of frustration derived from the perception of second-class journalism in Korean diasporic media compared to Korean transnational media. A sense of professional pride from headquarters-trained professionals also contributes to such frustrations.

Stronger connections are mutually beneficial for all journalists. The technical gap among journalists within the Korean community is one thing; a lack of cultural literacy among journalists in general, mainstream and Korean media organizations alike, is another. As experienced by Vancouver’s Korean media, ad-hoc reference checking without deeper cultural understanding only reinforces stereotypes. Thus, as suggested for Vancouver, the membership quota for diasporic media outlets as part of funding requirement can be considered. Such a requirement can potentially encourage mainstream media circles to actively promote and recruit diasporic media members. Similar to Vancouver, the attributes on government press releases and press conferences are of high importance and satisfaction compared to the rest of attributes. One comment by a media practitioner, however, suggests a concern about the quality of translation: “We prefer the original releases in English, if it is going to be a Google translation” (Media Practitioner 33). In other words, poorly-translated releases are of no use.

Overall, looking at the areas in need of support, there are many commonalities among Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. They may operate in different regulatory frameworks, however, financial aids through the placement of government ads, subsidies, and tax credits, and professional aids through affiliation with media circles and partnerships with academia are common needs. In all of these efforts to assist third-language or minority production in Canada and the U.S., it is important to remind policy
makers that group-differentiated support is critical, as Kymlicka would propose. Ethnic minorities are often grouped together with women, Aboriginals/Native Americans, people with disabilities, and sometimes elders, without considering diversity between and within minority groups. For example, Korean and Japanese communities are at different stages of development in communication infrastructure, much like the Korea Times and the Rafu Shimpo. Thus, grouping all of these differences under the name of “minority” cannot lead to proper allocation of capacity-building resources. It is not about supporting minorities in general, but about supporting minorities in need.

7.2.3 Korea

While Korean media practitioners generally say just “government” (without a geographic level) when addressing Canadian/U.S. authorities to whom they make the requests for support discussed above, they mention the names of specific agencies when it comes to Korea: KBS, Korea Communications Agency (KCA), Korea Communications Commission (KCC), and Overseas Korean Foundation (OKF). There are three main areas in need of support: providing funding for overseas Korean media production, broadcasting rights at much lower or no broadcasting fee, and finally, restricting transnational media business expansion in North America.

Funding for Overseas Korean Media Production

Regarding funding for local production, one of the agencies frequently mentioned is the Korea Communications Agency (KCA). Founded in 1972, the agency “conducts policy research on radio frequency, broadcasting and communications, and strengthens foundations for radio, its frequency usage, the promotion of the broadcasting and communications industry, and the improvement and vitalization of media user rights while delivering customer satisfaction.”98 Korean media practitioners expect the KCA to “support overseas Korean media production and limit the major three broadcasters’

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98 The inaugural name of KCA in 1972 was “Korea Radio Operation and Engineers Association.” The name has changed twice since then until it settled with KCA in 2011: Korea Radio Station Management Agency (KORA) in 1990 and Korea Radio Promotion Agency (KORPA) in 2006. For more details, see http://www.kca.kr/eng/sub01/sub01_11.jsp
business to content sales. Ideally, we would want to have locally grown media, not transnational media from Korea” (Media Practitioner 28). One of the KCA’s six major business areas is, in fact, the promotion of the broadcasting industry, which includes support for overseas Korean-language program production. In 2010, the agency supported 17 overseas productions (equivalent to KRW1.798 billion won or CAD1.6 million), up from 11 productions in 2009, and financed production costs for six producers (equivalent to KRW1.484 billion won or CAD1.3 million).

Another agency that supports Korean diasporic media is the Korean Communications Commission (KCC). Since 2005, with the amendment of Broadcasting Act, the KCC supports overseas Korean-language broadcasting through its “overseas Korean broadcasting aid project.” It aims to secure accessibility for overseas Koreans to Korean language and culture to maintain Korean national identity, and enhance the image of Korea through providing support in the three main areas: supporting overseas local production, providing broadcasting rights for Korea’s over-the-air content, and providing professional training/education and broadcasting equipment (Hong et al., 2009, pp. 33-36). Hong et al.’s study on mid-term and long-term plans for overseas broadcasting finds an increase in the project budget over the years. With joint support from the KCC, KCA, and KBS, the budget has doubled in 2009 (KRW2.24 billion or CAD2 million) from KRW1.22 billion (or CAD1 million) in 2005 (p. 38). Nevertheless, that fund was designed to support overseas Korean media outlets in five different continents, thus too small to provide substantial support for each.

Still another agency mentioned in relation to the local production is the Overseas Koreans Foundation (OKF). Founded in 1997, the OKF is mandated to “support overseas Koreans to maintain their national identity, improve rights and interests, and consolidate capacity to improve competence.” Among the OKF’s core businesses listed on its website, there are projects related to overseas Korean media: “PR and media support” and “the establishment of a satellite network for Korean-language news for overseas Koreans.”

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99 For more details, see KCA’s homepage under “About Us”: http://www.kca.kr/sub06/sub06_12.jsp
100 KCA (2010). Progress and status of KCA businesses 2010. See under “Results of major businesses”: http://www.kca.kr/sub06/sub06_22_01_01.jsp
The former aims to facilitate interaction between Koreans in Korea and abroad, and networking between Korean media in Korea and abroad. The latter aims to transmit Korean-language news to Korean diasporas around the world to strengthen Korean identity and help retain the Korean language. Media practitioners, however, complain that it is usually the overseas Korean language schools where most of the funding goes (Media Practitioner 7). For Korean media, on the other hand, the foundation only occasionally sends promotional tapes to promote cultural events in Korea such as “Visit Korea Year,” and provides no direct support for Korean-Canadian/American media production. In fact, the foundation supported nine overseas Korean presses in 2010, and the priority was given to Korean presses operating in specialized regions such as China and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), where there is a high Korean population, but Korean media operate in poor media environments.

The aid programs of all three agencies suggest that there is a growing recognition of Korean diasporic media. Although still minimal, there has been an increase in funding each year to aid overseas production. What seems to be lacking in all three approaches, however, is a discussion of partnerships for joint production between Korean diasporic media and Korean broadcasting networks. With the success of hallyu (or Korean wave) in which made-in-Korea cultural products are gaining popularity, the Korean media industry is preoccupied with exporting Korean cultural products abroad. In fact, in 2010, the export of Korean programs totaled USD187,031,000, 1.89% up from 2009 (The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism of Korea, 2011). Among all genres, drama accounts for 88% (equivalent to USD132,677,000 (ibid.)). The Korean wave is also spreading in the U.S. Kim’s study (2007, pp. 146-147) on the Korean wave finds that Korean dramas are broadcast to 2.7 million U.S. households, and particularly in the Bay Area, Korean dramas earn higher ratings than ABC’s Extreme Makeover.

Parallel to the Korean wave, a Korean-American wave is also gaining momentum. There is a growing interest in Korean/Canadian-American production and talent. As one

104 This figure excludes the content sales to overseas Korean media and DVD/video sales (MCST, 2011).
media practitioner puts it: “The topics such as Koreans in the world would be of interest to (name of Korean broadcaster). A story about a Korean-American politician, for example, is a good special feature/documentary topic” (Media Practitioner 7). In contrast to model-minority storytelling led by first-generation producers, more diverse narratives are produced by younger generation Korean-Americans, as manifested in MTV’s “K-Town.” Free from the so-called “model” constraints, they emphasize the multiplicity of Korean-American identities. Also, free from national boundaries, younger generation Korean-Americans go transnational, travelling between “here” and “home.” John Park, American Idol semifinalist (Season 9) and a 1.5-generation Korean-American from Chicago, went on to win Superstar K2, a Korean audition program hosted by M.net.¹⁰⁵ Such twin waves are emerging and can possibly synergize to continue the popularity of Korean talent, if strategic partnerships can be established between Korean diasporic media and Korean broadcasting networks.

**Broadcasting Rights for Overseas Korean Media and the Restriction on Transnational Media Expansion**

In content provision, KBS is the first agency mentioned by media practitioners. Media practitioners expect the role of public network to be played by KBS. As one media practitioner puts it: “We certainly expect more from a public broadcaster. KBS should cater to the needs of overseas Korean media outlets, but in L.A. it competes with them” (Media Practitioner 8). A series of disputes over broadcasting rights and distribution rights have disappointed local immigrant producers and video rental businesses. It has been a situation where a former collaborator becomes a competitor in a lopsided competition structure. It is further mentioned that “If KBS is a public broadcaster, it should make its own programs available to overseas Korean media at a minimal cost” (Media Practitioner 24). Such support, however, is realistically unattainable as KBS America competes with MBC America and SBS International. Finally, in relation to limiting transnational businesses, the multi-entry model of Korean transnational media, in

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¹⁰⁵ This information is retrieved from John Park’s profile on Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Park_(musician).
contrast to a consolidation model of TV Japan was discussed in Chapter 5. The feasibility of consolidation among the three networks after over 20 years in the business is questionable. However, hopeful signs surface through the case of www.mvibo.com, a collaboration of the three branches to combat illegal web TV.

**Consolidating Overseas Strategies and Creating a Trans-governmental Link**

For meaningful negotiations on all of these issues to move forward, more systematic networks and channels of discussion among diasporic media producers, Korean broadcasters, and the respective media authorities are needed. As Hong et al. (2009) suggest, a “control tower” in a form of government body that lays out a policy framework and consolidates resources for overseas Korean-language broadcasting may be helpful. The currently scattered funding channels and programs can find a proper home to offer more concerted and directed support. The control tower can also seek diversification of funding sources. During the interviews with media practitioners, transnational Korean corporations are mentioned as highly valued sponsors. As one media practitioner puts it: “Korean corporate branches may use overseas media for advertisements. Our rate is competitive, only one-fifth of that of Korean media in Korea” (Media Practitioner 7). It is consistent with the findings of Hong et al. (2007) that corporate sponsorship is most highly favoured among Korean media practitioners. The study introduced the case of Korea’s Hyundai Home Shopping which sponsors Korean-language broadcasting in Sakhalin at a rate of KRW100 million (or CAD90,000) annually. However, such corporate-diasporic media sponsorship is still rare. Thus, the control tower could call for sponsorship and through the adjudication process, select and match corporate and diasporic media. Matching funding provided by government and/or over-the-air networks can be also considered.

In the case of the U.S. where disputes over broadcasting rights and distribution rights continue, the control tower could intervene with appropriate measures to negotiate conflicting interests. Specifically concerning issues of copyright fees and the hold-back period need immediate policy intervention. The fluctuation of copyright fees by region and the breakdown of the four-week hold back period, especially with the launch of
www.mvibo.com, have long been the agenda of street rallies. Illegal web TV/downloading is another area in need of immediate attention. The case of Ohcastra.com suggests the possibility for future cases of copyright infringement. Vancouver’s local immigrant producers and L.A.’s transnational branches consolidated efforts to take legal action against Ohcastra.com. However, legal action is costly and time-consuming—the case is still open and continuing in 2011. Although it would be undertaken within the legal framework of the region where the outlets are located, the control tower could provide proactive rather than reactive prevention measures. Measures such as www.mvibo.com are only experimental. It is a double-edged sword, which solves one problem, but simultaneously creates another.

### 7.3 Future Research Areas

During the investigation of production and distribution of Korean media, this study identified a few areas for future research. First, the further impact of policy/constitutional changes in Canada, the U.S., and especially in Korea on Korean diasporic media needs follow-up studies. As discussed, transnational expansion of media conglomerates places Korean diasporic media under the direct influence of Korea. Newly launched media conglomerates in Korea, as a result of the new media law, are seeking partnership with Korean diasporic media in North America, thus their competition with the existing over-the-air networks (KBS, MBC, SBS) is likely to be imported to the diasporic media market. How such dynamics will influence Korean-American storytelling is important to monitor. In relation to this, the impact of Korea’s new election law on diasporic media’s editorial direction—especially how that may be similar or different by media ownership—is something to watch. This study only identified an initial impact, most notably shown in the proliferation of Korean-language news. In Canada, the digital transition and its potential impact on Korean diasporic media is also important to monitor. A comparative analysis of Vancouver and L.A. will show whether or not Vancouver’s Korean media follow in the footsteps of L.A. by leading to the proliferation of Korean digital services.

Second, emerging Korean-Canadian/American storytelling by 1.5- and second-generation Koreans in North America is an interesting and compelling research area.
Such storytelling is currently led by first-generation Koreans; however, that of the 1.5- and second-generation is likely to pick up and to materially change in direction. The KoreAm Journal is leading the younger-generation’s Korean-American storytelling, and it has made available to all English speakers a window to Korean storytelling. In Canada, Korean-Canadian storytelling has yet to surface. However, there are initiatives for pan-Asian storytelling by younger-generation immigrants. Schema, a webzine, is a good example. Promoting “Asian Cool,” the magazine opens a venue for cross-Asian, intercultural dialogue and everyday reflection of Asian Canadians. While first-generation immigrants are at different stages of socio-cultural integration, thus equate more with ethnic storytelling, younger-generation who are mostly raised and educated in Canada are more prone to pan-ethnic dialogue based on a common denominator, that is, their identity as Canadian. How such pan-Asian or pan-ethnic storytelling works out for the construction and circulation of multicultural storytelling in the broader society is important to monitor.

Third, in relation to 1.5- and second-generation storytelling, the cross-ethnic, intercultural communicative spaces such as LA Beez and Alhambra Source require continuous research attention. Some take an institutional approach, with a collection of ethnic media headlines (e.g., LA Beez) while others take a community approach, with contributions by community residents (Alhambra Source). How these spaces with two different methodological approaches work to contribute to the creation and distribution of multicultural storytelling is important to monitor. The lessons from these innovative spaces can be considered to develop media strategies for diasporic media.

Lastly, a comparative analysis across ethnic communities is recommended. This study employed three methodologies (content analysis, in-depth interviews, and observation of community events) to investigate a full range of media types (TV, radio, newspapers, online bulletin board) by ownership (immigrant, transnational, multicultural media). Such triangulation provides a fuller picture of the context and process of media production and distribution, and answers the rationale behind what has been naively claimed as “in-group orientation” or “leaning toward home,” red-flagging the assumption that diasporic media contribute to fragmentation rather than cohesion of a multicultural society. This methodological approach for a comparative analysis of third-language
media can identify city-specific and ethnicity-specific factors through which similarities and differences across third-language communities can be learned and best practices can be shared.

7.4 Conclusion

In multicultural societies consisting of members from diverse ethno-cultural and linguistic backgrounds, cultural literacy is an important precondition to building citizenship. It is a foundation upon which a common history can be built. Among the ways to improve cultural literacy, a media system that offers multicultural storytelling to all of its members is particularly important. It triggers conversations and encourages multiple narratives to be circulated, contested, and cultivated into broader discourse. Through this process, members of society make democratic choices and informed decisions.

The multiculturalism and media theories discussed in this study support the conception of an intercultural media system. Kymlicka, through the conception of multicultural citizenship and institutional integration, argues that ethno-cultural options should be created within mainstream institutions as part of the broader selection available to all members of society. Specifically for media, this would mean creating third-language programs within mainstream media institutions. Media scholars such as Curran, Downing, and Husband, support Kymlicka’s institutional integration model by emphasizing a stronger role for public services, within which ethnic services can be housed. In contrast to this rather macro model, which considers mainstream institutions as the main actors, Ball-Rokeach offers a geographically-grounded, community-driven micro model, which considers community media, organizations, and local residents as the main actors of multiethnic storytelling in various socio-cultural action contexts. Especially if the actors located between neighbourhood and national media storytelling link the two effectively, the storytelling system serves as a functioning civil society. Following this model, Lin and Song offer a more narrow sense of a storytelling system, one that provides “ethnically or culturally relevant” and “geographically bound” geo-ethnic storytelling through diasporic media. The methodological approaches may be
different, yet all of these models aim for the same goal, that is, a healthy functioning citizenship through inclusive public spheres and cross-ethnic, intercultural dialogue.

Earlier studies on diasporic media in Canada, the U.S., and elsewhere, however, confirm that the media system in multicultural cities does not necessarily meet this liberal ideal. Diasporic communities tend to play autonomous roles in their own communicative spaces for geo-ethnic storytelling; however, they are only weakly integrated into the broader media system. In-group orientation of storytelling, in which “home” is emphasized more than “here,” was also raised as a concern by Ball-Rokeach’s Metamorphosis project and other scholars. However, the bigger issue was the dominant academic view that diasporic media are considered only as “media for ethno-racial populations” without due consideration of their role within the broader media system and the broader society. The significant presence of non-official language populations and the growth of diasporic media in multicultural cities, however, suggest that such conceptual or substantial marginalization of diasporic media limits the opportunity for members of society to be properly exposed to multiple narratives, which are increasingly important for the proper exercise of citizenship and adaptation of cultural literacy in a multicultural society. Especially in cities like Vancouver and L.A., such marginalization would mean so-called mainstream media exist to serve only a half of the population while the rest resort to their own in-language media. Another problem in the study of diasporic media is that diasporic media are discussed only within the realm of media, when they are, in fact, by-products of immigration. Thus diasporic media are tightly related to patterns and processes of immigrant settlement, social integration, and citizenship, and therefore, need to be discussed also in the context of the fields of multiculturalism, immigration, and citizenship as a channel through which ethno-racial citizens can make informed decisions. Therefore, this study explored the broader role of diasporic media in the media system as a means of encouraging citizenship and enhancing cultural literacy for all members of society.

Theoretically, this study advanced the field of diasporic media study by taking an interdisciplinary approach across the fields of multiculturalism and media, and offered a critical analysis of multiculturalism as theory, policy, and practice, and the combined influence on diasporic communication infrastructure at a micro level. Situating diasporic
media in the broader media system, diasporic media are examined not only as a communicative space for socio-cultural expression, but also as a civil society which encourages functioning citizenship and civic engagement of ethno-racial citizens, and a contributor to enhancing the cultural literacy of all members of society. At the theoretical level, Kymlicka’s conceptions of multicultural citizenship and institutional integration are projected onto the public and community media models proposed by Curran, Downing, Husband, and Ball-Rokeach. At the policy level, historical trajectories of policy and regulatory frameworks, with respect to immigration, citizenship, and media undertakings, were reviewed. The case study on Korean media demonstrates the actual practice, that is, how these theories and policies fare in the production and distribution of Korean storytelling in one of the most monolingual and first-generation-dominant diaspora in Canada and the U.S.

Methodologically, an international comparison of Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. offers the largest media analysis yet assembled in this sector by mapping the social structure, media organizations, style of media content, and social interaction of diasporic actors in Korean media in Vancouver and L.A., by using Peter Dahlgren’s four-fold typology of the public sphere, which helps analyze the structural and institutional conditions of production and distribution of diasporic media. The analysis of a full range of Korean diasporic media available to the Korean community in both cities helps identify the city-specific and ethnicity-specific factors. Such analyses combine to provide a fuller and clearer picture of Korean media, compared to earlier studies, which focused only on selected media types in a single region.

The study concludes that the cases of Korean media in Vancouver and L.A. support Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multicultural citizenship. Both cases demonstrate that actual everyday media practices are struggling to integrate diasporic identities in the public sphere but are not recognized as doing so. Korean diasporic media are indeed an actually operating civil society, which serve Koreans on socio-cultural, political and intercultural levels through the production of everyday Korean storytelling. Socio-culturally, Korean media are committed to the production of geo-Korean storytelling through cultural translation of what matters to the broader society as well as to the Korean community. The provision of such culturally-relevant and eye-level translation of
local news in the narrative (or storytelling style) that Koreans are familiar with, helps local Koreans make sense of the place better in the process of settlement and social integration. The result of this content analysis reveals that there is a quantitatively higher emphasis on “here” than “home” or the country of origin, than earlier studies had found (Lin & Song, 2006; Murray et al., 2007). Korean media also take a leadership role in extending Korean storytelling to the wider community through mobilizing local immigrant capital to access broader markets, and through policing the portrayal of Koreans and the Korean community in mainstream media. Examples such as the ombudsman role played by L.A. media outlets in their daily monitoring of, and feedback on, the portrayal of Koreans and the Korean community, as well as ad-hoc cross-community media collaboration during national hot-topic events (e.g., Korea Times and Los Angeles Sentinel during the 1992 L.A. riots) demonstrate Korean media’s efforts to reach out beyond the community to be part of the broader society. Similar commitment found in Vancouver is the case of the KOREAN magazine. The publisher’s comment on the Vancouver Sun’s multi-language translation service made to local mainstream and alternative media.

Perhaps most importantly, this dissertation finds that political projects are carried out independently or in collaboration with community service organizations to forge political leadership in urban geopolitics. The diasporic Korean communication infrastructure in general is committed to not only “bridging” the community and the broader society, but also “pushing for recognition” or “securing Korean representation” through mobilization of the community for Korean-Canadian/American political candidates. The case of Senator Yonah Martin in Canada and a number of forums and discussion groups organized in support of Korean-American political candidates in the U.S. reflect aspiration for integration as full members of society, not for isolation as eternal aliens. Intercultural outreach is also recognized by many of the media professionals interviewed as ever more important for Korean media, both editorially and business-wise. They reported many attempts to link to the broader media system or other linguistic-minority media outlets. High aspiration for institutional integration both at individual professional (media practitioners) and institutional (media outlets) levels suggests potential for further engagement with the broader society. As evidence, Korean
diasporic media provide a useful stepping-stone for younger-generation Koreans in their career development. Through internships and self-mobilized skilled labour management, Korean media outlets not only self-supply labour but also provide a bridge to the broader workforce.

All of this evidence combines to disprove any simple alienation hypothesis, which claims Korean media construct primarily a home-country orientation. Arguably, this may be said also to prove that citizenship remains primarily a national construct. These two urban cases do indeed facilitate Korean-Canadian local citizenship, showing not only the everyday processes of civic engagement, but also a wider recognition of the broader society and national issues, although little north/south North American diasporic links.

All of this evidence also supports Kymlicka’s proposition of group-differentiated rights over individual rights. Post-ethnic views on citizenship—from the perspectives of the fluid nature of identity or of voluntary nature of group association (Benhabib, 2002; Faulks, 2000; Parekh, 2000; Waldron, 1995; Ong, 1999) or of a single American identity or of the policy limitation of “equal” recognition (see for example, Glazer and Walzer), among others—leave the responsibility for the process of integration to individuals by overlooking the dialectic nature of identity: fixed and simultaneously fluid; prescribed and simultaneously voluntary; ethnic and simultaneously American; and distinct and simultaneously equal. However, group-differentiated rights, through which proper means are provided, can actually facilitate the process of becoming new members of society (thus creating fluid identities) rather than essentializing ethnic identity. The cases of Korean media clearly demonstrate the process of developing a new Korean-Canadian/American identity rather than of essentializing ethnic Korean identity. Group-differentiated rights are particularly important for young immigrant communities like the Korean diaspora, which can expect to take a longer period of time to integrate. A functioning citizenship cannot be expected, if all necessary means for social integration needs to be self-provided.

However, despite these hopeful signs of intercultural engagement, this dissertation concludes Korean media play only a limited role in enhancing cultural literacy for all members of society. This finding confirms the limitations of the public and
community models suggested by media theories (Curran, 2000; Downing & Husband, 2005; Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001). In both cities, Korean options are largely available only in the commercial media sector, in which in-language marketing prevails and intercultural initiatives such as an English edition of Korean newspapers fail without proper policy supports, thereby offering only limited access to a broader audience. Socio-economic barriers (e.g., subtitles, pay service) hinder this broader access to Korean options. Subtitles are provided for selected drama and entertainment programs, however, not for everyday news, when news is probably the more important channel through which everyday Korean storytelling can be made available to a broader audience. Furthermore, Korean services are found on various platforms; however, only those that are available over-the-air are free while the rest are pay services, available to cable or satellite subscribers free or at an additional cost.

More can be expected from the public sector; however, it largely does not live up to these expectations. Even in Canada, the CBC may provide multicultural programs, but not necessarily third-language programs. Considering the strengthening multicultural initiatives in the commercial sector—such as Roger’s OMNI and Shaw’s Shaw Multicultural Channel, operating in collaboration with independent producers from ethno-linguistic communities—the role of the national public broadcaster, as a voice of the nation’s cultural identity, needs a critical assessment. Finally, in the broader cross-ethnic intercultural community sector, Korean options are also only rarely available. Reflecting the varying degree of social integration of ethno-racial subgroups, limited socio-cultural capital (e.g., language) in the first-generation-dominant young communication infrastructure prevents a majority of Korean immigrants, as well as the media institutions, from joining such spaces. Korean media are thus at best following the model of Lin and Song’s geo-ethnic storytelling, serving as a civil society of their own, with a limited link to the broader media system as a means of cultural literacy for a broader audience. Hopeful signs, however, are surfacing through collaboration between media and community workers at immigrant service agencies (Canada) and the leadership of younger-generation Korean-Americans in multi-ethnic social/advocacy services (U.S.). Selected Korean storytelling is also available through NAM (translated)
and LA Beez (through KoreAm Journal), although the actual impact of such spaces on broader public discourse warrants further research.

At a policy level, the status of multiculturalism as a theory or political philosophy does make a difference in policy directives for immigration, citizenship, and media undertakings. Canada’s official recognition of multiculturalism as part of the constitution accepts immigrants as permanent members of society and lays out social programs that assist their settlement and integration. Diasporic media, as part of a multicultural societal culture, are recognized in the Broadcasting Act, and policy measures are established specifically for ethnic broadcasting. The Policy Framework for Canadian television (Public Notice CRTC 1999-97) and the Ethnic Broadcasting Policy (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117), for example, set out directives for ethnic broadcasting. Furthermore, measures such as Canadian Content rules have been proven to contribute to third-language local production, as demonstrated in the case of TV Korea. The U.S., on the other hand, in the name of an overarching American identity, does not officially support group-differentiated measures. Nonetheless, multicultural and multiracial reality, as an undeniable fact, requires some degree of policy support for ethno-racial populations. In the field of media, minority ownership and viewpoint diversity are promoted as part of the broader “diversity objectives” of the FCC. Thus, among Riggins’s (1992) five policy models, this study identifies Canada as an “integrationist model” rather than the “economist model” as claimed by Matsaganis et al. (2011). However, regardless of the different policy frameworks, Korean media in both Vancouver and L.A. are equally limited in the production and distribution of Korean storytelling. Limited financial and social capital, amidst the constant changes in the global economy, technology, and policies/constitutions in Canada, U.S., and Korea, challenges the commitment to local Korean storytelling.

At the level of practice, conceptually, Korean media’s civil society role has confirmed the applicability of the notion of “diasporic media” (instead of “community media” or “minority media”) proposed by Siapera (2010). Korean storytelling presented by Korean diasporic media is largely based on culturally translated and geographically specific issues that matter to local Koreans, albeit to different degrees. Such hyphenated and hybridized Korean-Canadian/American storytelling, unique to Korean diasporic
media, emphasizes a continuous negotiation of identity based on shared diasporic experiences among members of the Korean community. This reflects a reality of “being in between places,” rather than reinforcing an ethno-culturally-specific Korean identity (Siapera, 2010, p. 96).

Korean diasporic media also confirm as well as suggest a new layer to the universalism-particularism continuum in diasporic lives, proposed by Georgiou (2005). The socio-cultural, political, and intercultural agenda of Korean diasporic media through production of culturally translated Korean storytelling, mobilization of the community for political engagement, and partnership with cross-ethnic communities in cultural projects, supports universalistic projects of the broader society. Simultaneously, Korean diasporic consciousness is facilitated locally and nationally by Korean diasporic media, especially online publications of Korean newspapers, which make Korean storytelling in major cities in Canada and the U.S. available to local Koreans, and thereby reinforce a particularly Korean diasporic identity. The online communities developed through these publications further enable the exchange of everyday concerns raised in the process of social integration within and across the Korean diaspora in Canada and the U.S., thus forging national Korean-Canadian/American diasporic discourse to a certain degree. In this universalism-particularism continuum, however, it is important to note that Korean diasporic consciousness and identity is still limited largely to the national boundary within respective countries. Although it is facilitated online, thus accessible cross-nationally in North America as well as across the globe, no substantial connection beyond the national boundaries between the Korean communities in Vancouver and L.A. or between these two communities and Korean diaspora across the globe is as yet initiated.

The question in the evolution of the “flow” of Korean diasporic media, then, is if transnational expansion will occur with a centre-periphery dynamic, hub and spoke spatial conformation, or finally, a network of multiple expatriate diasporic nodes serviced by Korean media, reflective of a more horizontal relationship among the diasporas to forge a North American or broadly global Korean diasporic identity. Additionally to the question of spatial formation, is the question of affect: beyond the scope of this dissertation’s exploration of the online diasporic services available at time of writing. This question requires much further academic and popular analysis.
Another layer to the universalism-particularism continuum suggested by the cases of Korean diasporic media is the one that is emerging within the community. The tension between the Korean-Canadian/American storytelling of local immigrant media (“here”) and the largely Korean storytelling of transnational media (“home”) suggests multiple identity constructs within a single community: aspiration for integration (universalism) and simultaneously a push for home connection (particularism). Korea’s growing diasporic connection in politics and economics, as a result of recent changes in election and media laws, is likely to continue this tension. In this sense, the orientation of Korean diasporic identity is a complicated one that is difficult to explain in the binary of “here” and “home.” It is time to leave behind the simple dichotomous question whether ethno-racial populations are more loyal to “here” or “home.” Rather diasporic media production and consumption takes a form of co-existence and a continuous transformation of identity orientation in the interaction between the universal and the particular.

Overall, Vancouver’s Korean community is younger and less settled, with local media almost all local in origin, in contrast to L.A.’s community, which is older and often considered as “another city in Korea,” characterized by a strong foreign media ownership presence. Nevertheless, the common settlement patterns of geographic concentration and dispersion, the similar tendencies to develop an enclave economy, and equal dependence on communication infrastructure suggest deep similarities in immigrant adjustment which cannot be explained by apparent differences in legal institutions of multiculturalism and broadcasting policies. Korean diasporic media are found to behave more or less similarly in their patterns of development. Such similarities suggest that the factors that promote and hinder Korean storytelling are intertwined and mutually reinforcing. First, the CRTC regulations on foreign ownership and Canadian Content rules do promote the production of Korean storytelling by guarding against transnational media expansion, and by setting up a local production quota. Nevertheless, such measures without further policy support on production per se only work to limit the entry of new Korean options in the media system and lead to low-quality production. As well, for the FCC, diversity objectives are intended to promote viewpoint diversity through minority ownership. However, when Korean television services are mostly not license holders but program providers through
brokerage, and concentrated in the cable and satellite sectors with limited presence in broadcasting, the Korean viewpoint within U.S. broadcasting media cannot be guaranteed.

Second, the fierce market competition hinders the production of both quantity and quality of Korean storytelling and pushes intercultural attempts such as an English edition of newspapers and television news out of the market, or leads to an “annexing” strategy by the English market leaders. However, the market competition simultaneously pushes the further growth of Korean diasporic media through localization, specialization, and innovation of new partnerships and business models to survive and expand, some of which mainstream institutions may want to consider. The already-saturated local enclave market forces Korean media outlets to advance from in-group marketing to intercultural marketing by proactively reaching out across communities through their in-house “U.S. ad team.” Furthermore, the competition between transnational and local immigrant media and the corresponding difference in editorial direction puts Korean storytelling further at risk. Nonetheless, transnational media with sufficient capital tend to take leadership in organizing public hearings and mobilizing the community in support of Korean political candidates, although this is not to say local immigrant media do not support them. The relatively stronger financial capacity of transnational media enables such community mobilization, which otherwise would have been less likely to take place due to the limited capital from local immigrant media. Additionally, the fierce competition also advances self-regulatory measures to discipline the market, as demonstrated in the case of Canada’s Canada Express (content licensing with CanWest) and Ohcastra.com (illegal webTV).

Finally, Korean communication infrastructure, if headed predominantly by first-generation leaders, tends to function as a civil society only within the Korean community, without many strong or deep links to the broader society. The limited socio-cultural barriers without proper policy support hinder the opportunities for Korean storytelling to be widely circulated in the broader media system. Nevertheless, initiatives led by the younger Korean hyphenated generation are emerging to form a complementary relationship between diasporic and mainstream organizations, as demonstrated during the 1992 L.A. riots. Although presently limited to service/advocacy groups, a similar relationship can be expected to form with 1.5- and second-generation media outlets.
This critical analysis of diasporic media across the fields of multiculturalism and media reveals the limitations of existing theories to explain the ways to properly include diasporic communities in the broader public sphere, and suggests more careful and critical theories and policies to re-examine the existing conception of diasporic inclusion in the mainstream institutions. Theoretically, critical multiculturalism theory needs to address ways in which institutional integration can be carried out in practice. At present, the focus is on creating ethno-racial options for specific populations, without specifying the institutions, which will actually undertake the projects, and without suggesting strategies to make these options accessible to a broader audience. Without due consideration of these two important aspects of institutional integration, creating ethno-racial options within mainstream media institutions can be only beneficial to ethno-racial audiences without making any substantial contribution to the broader media system as new options for all members of society.

With respect to policy initiatives, support for capacity-building in minority production is critical. As suggested in the policy section, first, “multicultural content rules” in addition to Canadian Content rules in Canada and to children’s and educational program requirements in the U.S. may support production of multicultural storytelling. The current measures only vaguely reinforce the need for a “multicultural reality” or “viewpoint diversity” to be reflected in broadcasting, without any regulatory obligation to follow these measures. To this end, multi-language services can also be considered to broaden media options for all members of society. Second, more localized financial support through the placement of government ads, subsidies, and tax benefits, and marketing support through monitoring and market research are desirable. The current financial support measures focus too much on “transaction,” which is a more distant concern for many Korean outlets operating as program providers, rather than “day-to-day operations” (U.S.). Finally, professional support through affiliation with mainstream media circles and partnerships with academia can help in the capacity-building of the first-generation-led media outlets. Korean media’s intercultural initiatives reflect an aspiration for these institutional links; however, such aspirations often fail to receive a reciprocal commitment from mainstream media outlets and industry associations alike.
In meeting these goals, group-differentiated support with respect to varying degrees of communication infrastructure within ethno-racial communities is critical. In the policy discourses of both countries, ethno-racial minorities are often not only bluntly grouped together under the name of “(visible) minority,” but also together with women, Aboriginals/Native Americans, people with disabilities, and sometimes elders, without due consideration to the diversity between and within each of these groups. Thus, a more careful engineering of policies is desirable. Additionally, a transnational link among media authorities in Canada, the U.S., and Korea in creating a support system for diasporic media could be considered to strategize and synergize resources, as Korea itself ramps up its aid programs for overseas media in support of the Korean wave. Concerted efforts through consulate offices may help provide supplementary rather than overlapping aid to Korean media outlets.

These policy recommendations are largely based on the two case studies of the Korean diaspora, one of the most monolingual and first-generation-dominant diaspora in Canada and the U.S., and thus possibly limiting further generalization. Nevertheless, despite the varying degrees of social integration within and across ethno-racial subgroups, the present study contributes to identifying the areas of concern in the communication infrastructure of young diasporic communities of other ethno-cultural and racial origins.

In sum, intercultural communication is a shared responsibility among the government, mainstream and diasporic media. An intercultural media system requires two important preconditions: first, carefully crafted, group-differentiated policies on capacity-building and institutional collaboration; and second, two-way efforts and commitment to multicultural storytelling from mainstream and diasporic media institutions (or communities). Under the current media system, ethno-racial populations are more likely well-informed about the broader society than the majority population is about ethno-racial communities. Echoing a comment from a representative of the local ethnic community at a hearing on multicultural television in Canada, there are no benefits to keeping over 800,000 members of Vancouver’s population ignorant about their adoptive nation. Equally, there is no reason to keep over 26 million of the majority population ignorant about their ethno-racial neighbours. To preserve democratic choices and truly accommodate deep diversity in perspectives, it is important to think more
carefully about the ways to improve intercultural literacy. Diasporic media, if properly institutionalized, can be an important means to achieve healthy functioning multicultural citizenship for all members of society.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Detailed Methodology

In-depth Interviews

The participants are recruited from a list of media and organizations, constructed by the researcher from a range of sources such as community business/telephone directories (e.g., Korean Society of British Columbia for Fraternity and Culture) and media directories (e.g., B.C. Ethnic Media Directory, New America Media Directory). The main selection criteria are media type, frequency of service, year of foundation, audience/client reach, etc. The researcher contacted individuals via telephone or electronic mail. Upon agreement, the researcher set up an appointment for interview.

Each interview lasts approximately one hour and conducted based on a semi-structured question guideline. A semi-structured interview is a “conversation with a purpose” (Lindlof cited in Decon et al., 2007, p. 67) and is useful to obtain structured (quantitative) and unstructured, voluntary (qualitative) data from the participant. The interview guideline consists of eight sub-sections: (1) demographic profile; (2) understanding of community; (3) company history and editorial mandate; (4) news content; (5) collaboration within Korean community; (6) collaboration between Korean media and English media*; (7) media business*; (8) cross-language and cross-generation competition*; and (9) outlook. (* The sections are asked to media professionals only.) The sub-sections 4, 5, and 6 had importance-satisfaction rating questions for the participants to fill out during the interview.

All of these questions are directed to examine Dahlgren’s (1995) second dimension, that is, the media institution (e.g., organization, financing, legal framework). Preliminary work indicates that the proliferation of diasporic media in the 1990s reflects the neoliberal turn of immigration policies that created a new entrepreneur class within new populations. It is important to understand the demographic profile of media professionals (e.g., age, education, journalistic training, years of stay in Canada) and understand the impact of neoliberal immigration policy in the media industry. Who are these media professionals? Are they old or new immigrants? Are they first generation or 1.5 generation Koreans? Are they entrepreneurs, or journalists or both? What is their motivation as media professionals? Is their motivation any different from non-diasporic media professionals? This study also looks at how they position their audience: Koreans in Canada/America, Korean-Canadians/Korean-Americans, and Canadians/Americans. Such positioning helps understand how media professionals position themselves in their narratives and construct their news.

Second, the history of the organization is another important area to investigate; whether the organization has evolved with the community or is an emerging one, new to the community. Historical trajectories of media outlets as part of community history will also help trace the policy changes and the subsequent impact on media development. Third, how does the day-to-day operation and production work? What is their daily routine? How do they collect and select news? What is considered newsworthy and why? Who decides what is newsworthy? How important is the intercultural content? How do people
interact within the organization and with other intra-community and intercultural (media) organizations? What prevents or promotes such interaction? Is it different by media type? The intra-community interaction, in terms of agenda setting and community mobilization, and intercultural interaction, in terms of sharing news items or alternative narrative, are particularly important to explore. As human resources are usually lacking, some issues (e.g., government budget release) may require triangulation of community experts to offer an in-depth analysis to the community. Some other issues (e.g., the Bruce Allan controversy) may require collective responses to the broader public sphere. Some news may need to be translated, while others can be directly written by staff writers. More often than not, such intra- and inter-community collaboration is weakly built (Ball-Rokeach et al., 2001; Lin & Song, 2006; Yu, 2008). The interviews further explore what prevents or promotes such interaction.

To glean insights into financing, the advertising market created by and for these media outlets is thoroughly discussed. Szonyi (cited in Zhou et al, 2006, p. 51) estimates the advertising market for Chinese print media in Canada to be as big as 50 million Canadian dollars. The size of that of Korean media in both cities is estimated based on the responses of major print media practitioners. This estimation is valuable, because while the CRTC makes the financial information of the licensed broadcasting media outlets available to the public, the information is limited only to the major media outlets (e.g., Fairchild Media Group) and broadcasting only. There are other important areas to investigate: Multiple ownership (as demonstrated by B.C. Hanin, which owns Boodongsan Korea, Good Day and Women Self, and as demonstrated by Korea Times L.A., which owns Radio Seoul and KTN TV); the expansion of specialty newspapers to general newspaper (e.g., from The Vancouver Jookan Economics to The Prime Times); and online advertising and cross-language advertising. What underpins these developments and what are the immediate and long-term consequences? Particularly, what is the implication of cross-language advertising? Would it promote or hinder intercultural interaction? Would the commercial exchange lead to cultural exchange?

For regulation, the first area to explore is the awareness of multicultural and media policies among the media professionals. How sensitive are they to policy changes with respect to daily operation and production? Another area to explore is the legal aspect of new media ventures. The prime example of this case is Vancouver’s Canada Express. Launched in 2007, the paper offers a direct translation of selected CanWest news items. The significance of this venture lies in that it is by far the first formal licensing agreement between mainstream and Korean-Canadian diasporic media on the use of news items. The implications this may have on the practices of other Korean media in terms of obtaining the local news items are an important area to investigate. Deserving of further exploration are recent cross-language developments such as the emergence of major English language market leaders in multicultural programs such as Rogers and Shaw; the recent attempt by CanWest to offer multi-language services to diasporic communities through The Vancouver Sun (Zandberg, 2007); and CBC’s recent launch of Chinese-language service to the Chinese community in British Columbia (CBC, 2008). Are there any legal frameworks established to govern any of these practices? Or is this still a gray zone for media to launch pilot cases? Are these intercultural initiatives or commercial
drives concerning ethnic economic mobility? Are there any community monitoring systems in place to cross-check and ensure the quality of translation provided by the English media? What is the role of diasporic media about these initiatives, support or critique?

Simon Fraser University’s Office of Research Ethnics approved the interview guideline. As instructed, the interviewer (the researcher) provided the participants with Study Information Document to help understand the details of study prior to signing a Consent Form. All participants signed Standard Consent Form, that is, a consent form without employer consent. A majority of participants were the head of the institution who did not need employer’s consent. The rest did have authority to participate in any study and found it unnecessary to obtain employer consent. All participants could skip any questions they wish to and agreed to have the interviews recorded, except two interviewees. A majority of interviews were conducted at the participants’ work place with a few exceptions; they were conducted at public places such as restaurants nearby the participants’ work place.

Content Analysis

For television, all of the locally produced evening news are selected in the first three weeks of March 2010. In Vancouver, there are only three locally produced news shows: OMNI (Tuesday to Saturday morning), All TV (Monday to Friday evening), and KCTV (Saturday evenings and rerun in Sunday mornings). All TV is excluded from sampling as it discontinued local news during the time of sampling. KCTV weekly news is excluded as it is a Korean dubbing of selected CBC news items in a week. It is difficult to see it as local production that is comparable to OMNI and All TV. In L.A., there are six Korean evening news shows that are locally produced by the following media corporations: KBS America, MBC America, SBS International, TVK24 (Korean), KTAN, and LA18. Hanmi Cable Enterprise Inc. used to produce in-house news since 2009, but discontinued news production during the time of this study. TVK24 also produces—other than TVK News Wide at 8:00 P.M.—TVK News Live at 4:00 P.M. (Korean) for audience in the Eastern region and TVK English Edition at 11:00 P.M. for second-generation Korean-Americans. TVK English Edition is analyzed separately for data consistency (language). Generally, the news shows run between 10 minutes (All TV) to 50 minutes (TVK24) and air from Monday to Friday, except for TVK24 which has evening news on Saturdays as well.

Radio was available only in L.A. as Radio Seoul discontinued service in Vancouver. For data consistency, the evening news of three non-religious, 24-hour L.A. radio shows are sampled: Radio Korea, Radio Seoul, and JBC. Each evening news show runs between 2 hours (Radio Seoul and JBC) and 3 hours (Radio Korea) from Monday to Saturday. The sampling was done in the first three weeks of April 2010.

For newspapers, all dailies are sampled in the first three weeks of March 2010: The Korea Daily, the Korea Times, and the Vancouver Chosun in Vancouver, and the Korea Daily, the Korea Times, Koreatown Daily, and Korea Herald Business in L.A. The weeklies are excluded for the reason that while general interest papers (dailies) cover
both “here” and “home,” special-interest papers (weeklies) vary in their focus. Some are more “here” by specifically focusing on issues such as education, job market, real estate, and women (Murray et al. 2007), while others are heavily “home,” reproducing “home” content. The Korea Daily and the Korea Times in L.A. publish from Monday to Saturdays, and Koreatown Daily and Korea Herald Business publish from Monday to Friday. The Vancouver newspapers are published somewhat irregularly: The Korea Daily Vancouver (Tuesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday), the Korea Times Vancouver (Tuesday to Saturday), and the Vancouver Chosun (Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday). The sampled dailies generally consist of three to four sections (e.g., Local, Korea, Business & Economy, Sports & Entertainment, Life Style, Real Estate). The first page of each section of the newspapers is sampled to understand the news topics that are considered most important. PEW’s Project for Excellence in Journalism News Coverage Index uses the same method based on the rationale that the items on A1 are “what newspapers emphasize, their top agenda,” thus “the papers have made the decision to feature those stories on that day’s edition.”

The protocols include: Media Source; Media Type; News Origin; Dominant Construction of Media Item (e.g., photo, graph/table, drawing, map, text); Length; News Item Genre (e.g., hard news, soft news, analysis); Geographical Focus (local, regional, national, international); Dominant Source/Actor (occupation, location, ethnic origin, generation, gender, age, socio-economic status, presentation); Gender of Reporter/Anchor; News Topic; Identity Orientation; Ads (ad/news ratio, type, region, origin of advertisers, location of ads, gender and ethnicity of models/voice).

Aside from the news items, online community bulletin board threads were analyzed. All of the seven newspapers operate online editions including a “community bulletin board.” The threads posted in the first three weeks of March 2010 (Monday to Sunday) were collected six months after the initial posting in order to reserve a lead-time for readers to respond and to measure hit frequency. The protocols include: Discussion Category (e.g., immigration, education, business/ads, finance, law, U.S. life); Hit Frequency; Response Frequency; Region; Language.

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106 For more details, see http://www.journalism.org/about_news_index/methodology
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There are a number of areas this study particularly looks into: (1) home orientation (“home” versus “here”); (2) identity orientation (“Koreans” versus “Korean-Canadians” or “Korean Americans”); and (3) bulletin board topics. First, to test the hypothesis that diasporic media cover more news from “home” than from “here,” the amount of homebound news to local news is quantified. Of the local news, the ratio of locally produced news items (reported by local in-house reporter) to locally translated news of the English media items (e.g., Canadian Press) is also calculated to check the level of engagement in making alternative narratives. Second, identity orientation represents a sense of “geo-ethnic” belonging (Lin & Song, 2006; Murray et al., 2007). How stories address Koreans in North America, whether as “Koreans” or “Korean Canadians” or “Korean Americans,” may show a kind of identity pursued by Korean media.

Unobtrusive Observation

The researcher randomly selected and attended the events as they take place during the fieldwork period. This “immediacy” aspect of observation enables the researcher to “be with the community” and obtain live experience of “here.” A majority of the events were free, organized by community organizations (e.g., S.U.C.C.E.S.S) or commercial business (e.g., accounting agencies, real estate agencies) on various issues from local ESL programs to tips for individual income tax reporting. The researcher did unobtrusive observation for most of the time without revealing the identity and the purpose of visit either to the hosting organization or to the participants.
Reference List


