Obama’s Foreign Policy toward Russia: Continuity or Change?

by Aleksejs Ivaschuk

B.A. (Hons., Philosophy), University of Winnipeg, 2008
B.A. (Political Science), University of Winnipeg, 2008

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Approval

Name: Aleksejs Ivaschuk
Degree: Master of Arts
Title of Thesis: Obama’s Foreign Policy toward Russia: Continuity or Change?

Examining Committee:

___________________________________
Dr. James Busumtwi-Sam
Department Chair and Associate Professor of
Political Science

___________________________________
Dr. Alexander Moens
Senior Supervisor
Professor of Political Science

___________________________________
Dr. Tsuyoski Kawasaki
2nd Reader
Professor of Political Science

___________________________________
Dr. Douglas Ross
External/Internal Examiner
Professor of Political Science
Simon Fraser University

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Abstract

The complex relationship between Washington and Moscow derives its tension from the ideologically antagonistic past and the strategically uncertain future. At the end of the Cold War, due to such factors as globalization, change was rapid beyond the domestic realms of both countries, reshaping the political landscape and the nature of international threats. This stipulated the mending of the uncooperative continuity between Moscow and Washington. President Obama has reached out to Russia with his ‘reset’ endeavour, and before long encountered difficulties that stem from the inherent ideological and strategic continuity. Cooperation has nonetheless been made possible in a number of important areas of the relationship, namely in arms control, anti-terrorism, and a change of political rhetoric to more cordial tones. With the closing of President Obama’s first term in office, the U.S.-Russian diplomatic ‘reset’ may not be an overhaul, but it is a start that can be built upon.

Keywords: American foreign policy; U.S.-Russian relations; Barack Obama foreign policy; diplomatic reset; continuity and change; international cooperation
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Introduction

Russia has been thrown into the backseat of global relevance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. No longer considered as a superpower, being gradually sapped of its power in demographic and economic trends, the Eurasian giant struggles to find its prospective role in the world. Beginning with Bill Clinton’s administration, the United States has been at ease in disregarding its formerly feared nemesis. So what worth does the subject of improving U.S.-Russian relations have, particularly for the United States? The answer is tied to the fact that Russia still holds a number of important political and economic trump cards in the international arena, with its role being indispensable in energy security, non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, UNSC operations, and the general foundation and stability of the international order.  

America, actively seeking settlement in all of these areas, has much to lose from the worsening of U.S.-Russian relations and much to gain from their improvement. In the worst case scenario, with the loss of Russia as a partner on the international scene, the U.S. should be prepared to lose the UN Security Council as a means to legitimize military actions and sanctions on rogue states; anti-American groups will be emboldened by the more accessible sources of Russian military hardware; democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe would be threatened; non-proliferation is going to become much more difficult to assure; and China will gain greater leverage in dealing with Washington. In an absolute worst-case scenario, extremists may eventually take advantage of the ailment in the arms control and non-proliferation regime to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Russia cannot be ignored without detriment to the long-term American

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interests. The complexities inherent in the advent of the new international order may be better resolved with Russia being in the same boat with the U.S., giving any American administration plenty of incentive toward reconciliation.

The themes covered in the project include: continuity and change, the domestic realm’s connection to the international, and the divide in American foreign policy between the pursuit of consolidation of liberal democratic values and the pursuit of national interests. This project will start with, and analytically build from, the theme of America’s exceptionalism – i.e., its liberal democratic characterization and the implications that it had and continues to have on its relations to Russia. Strategic differences between the U.S. and Russia are also to be highlighted. Of central concern is how and why America relates to Russia given their continually differing dispositions in ideology and strategy.

U.S.-Russian relations have been substantively and negatively influenced by the elements of strategic and ideological tension. These influences appear to linger on, from the ongoing disagreements over the Middle East and North Africa, to the expansion of NATO and missile defense in Europe, and generally antipodal global alliance building.³ Both countries continue to be critical of each other’s domestic systems, and foresee the other side in a decadent decline.⁴ From the American perspective, with the rise of Vladimir Putin and his party, the elections in Moscow have increasingly tilted toward an authoritarian mould, deviating from the triumphant liberal democratic standards of the post-Cold War era. The local popularity enjoyed by Putin and his party complicates matters further, deep into a philosophical debate on the systems of political belief, limits of the democratic ideal, morality, and cultural integrity. The

³ Cohen, Stephen. “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’: Another Lost Opportunity?” The Nation, June 20, 2011, pp. 11, 15. Cohen highlights that there is a contemporary discussion among U.S.-Russian scholars on whether the Cold War has survived or reignited in a less grandiose form.
point is that Russia has not converted to the liberal democratic standards to an extent that America would feel comfortable with, and is instead openly dissenting from the values and expectations that are definitive of America’s international mission. In other words, the issue is that with the end of the Cold War the many underlying factors of the Cold War have not been resolved. With Russia unconverted, the crusade on that front has failed in reaching its logical conclusion. This serves as an ideological and geopolitical speck in the eye of America. Yet, being driven by a resurgently idealist school of thought since the official end of the Cold War, America may not give up in attempting to make Russia, or the rest of the world, into an image that it wants to see, through the leadership it cares to imagine.5 The last half of my project will explore how Obama’s administration has attempted to deal with all this complexity and how, in attempting to steer America on a course of change, it has been willing to reset the framework of relations with Russia.

The focus of the project revolves around the research question of whether Obama’s administration has meant continuity or change in U.S.-Russian relations, in light of how the administration has stressed change as an important objective in the relationship, via its ‘reset’ endeavour. By necessity of academic concision, there are a number of things that the project will limit itself on: normative, policy-making, and administrative and psychological studies will not be the focus in the project’s analysis of state-to-state relations; by working from the assumption that the parts comprise and influence the whole of any state’s decision-making apparatus, the theoretical debates in International Relations (IR), such as on reductionism and structuralism, are not given specific attention; and, the project will be written from a U.S. foreign policy perspective, with Russian interests and actions considered in light of how they in

turn influence U.S. policy. As interesting as it would be to tie in all of the above mentioned areas of the subject, they make up their own spheres of discussion that would expand the project beyond limit, in content as well as focus.

This paper is on U.S. foreign policy toward Russia in the post-Cold War context, with Barack Obama’s administration being the principal focus of analysis. The central research question is on whether Obama’s administration means continuity or change in the U.S.-Russian relations. The body of the paper is broken down into three major parts, with the following topics: 1. Ideological and strategic differences that are the foundation of the tense continuity in U.S.-Russian relationship 2. The post-Cold War change to the international environment and Obama’s ‘reset’ endeavour with Russia as an attempt to adjust the American foreign policy to that change 3. Review of the success and importance of further U.S.-Russian cooperation, along with options for future direction.
Part I
Ideological and Strategic Differences: The Fundamentals of the U.S.-Russia Tensions

As the Obama’s administration nears the end of its first term, a politically charged question remains: has the change that Obama promised been delivered? In foreign policy, no promise for change has been as conspicuous as the one made for the U.S.-Russian relations. To build a better sense of Obama’s mission for change, a closer look at continuity in the U.S.-Russian relations is warranted. To begin with, clarification is needed for how and why the continuity has been derived and maintained. The analytical timeframe of the relations must be expanded to reveal its ideologically tense history and the strategically unclear future.

**Understanding the American perspective and its liberal character**

“Surely, then, it is a remarkable force: this fixed, dogmatic liberalism of a liberal way of life. It is the secret root from which have sprung many of the most puzzling of American cultural phenomena.” – Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, 1955

From its inception, breaking away from the Old World and attempting to act true to its liberal experiment, America has eschewed balance of power games, diverged from the European ideal of having a singular deliberative body behind foreign policy, and sought to secure and affirm its values throughout the world (foremost, domestically). Bound by the bottom-up functioning of its liberal democratic system of governing, the country’s foreign policy existed to defend and not to define what America was. America stood out as exceptional among other states, prompting a change to the realities of statehood: away from the dominant and authoritative power hierarchies of the time and toward representative governance ideals.

As the quote from Louis Hartz at the beginning of this sub-section suggests, the American exceptionalism is derived and is closely linked to the ideological roots of liberalism. Simply put, “America is, or is supposed to be, a land of liberty.” The story from the American

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perspective is that America has a special role in the world. It has been a state that has attempted to hold its moral ground in assuring and safeguarding liberty, resisting the temptation to act as any state does by mere power relations. If it were to follow the national interest alone, regardless of what it means to its ideology and the principles therein, it would betray and undermine what it has rose up for, stood for, and what it has been built on. America would not be America. Her exceptionalism would be a hollow and hypocritical claim.

Besides having the moral mission of safeguarding liberty, the American experiment is singled out as the most practical, prosperous, and orderly model for states to follow. The successes of the American experiment can be explained by the adaptable nature of democratic institutions. The endless, unplanned struggle among the competing American schools of thought, interest groups and lobbies inadvertently aligns policy with the national interest more efficiently and congenially than would be possible by any conscious design, no matter how ingenious the leader(s).10 The strength of the American model lies in how its dynamic structure is able to withstand the dynamic nature of time and circumstance to face the challenges from the ever changing domestic and international conditions. This has given weight to the argument that the American experiment works, that it is the most practical of all the alternatives in the long term, and that it may be universally valid as far as the universality of liberalism and its values can extend. The democratic peace theory arose to serve as one of the most important reasons for why that universality is worth pursuing.11 With the test of time, proponents of the liberal democratic experiment have concluded that it is a resounding success for humanity and a bastion of hope for all of those oppressed.12 The system appeared as a win-win: besides allowing for political freedoms and being the best bet for domestic and international stability, the liberal system has proven to be the most economically successful model worth emulating. As Walter McDougall points out: “never before has the experiment been so effectually tried, of every man’s reaping fruits of his labour and feeling his share in the aggregate system of power.”13

10 Mead, Special Providence, pp. 84, 310.
11 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, p. 17. The question arises: if liberal democracies truly do enjoy peace and prosperity amongst themselves, why not attempt to spread their model throughout the world?
13 McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, p. 18.
None of this is to say that America or its liberal democratic experiment have been perfect.\textsuperscript{14} To trace back in history to find the evidence to the contrary of American liberal proselytization is not to negate how America’s mission is integrally defined, and will continue to be defined, by its values rather than by the power or national interest considerations alone. In other words, the mission itself matters, not its perfectibility in linking the ideal to practice. As George Kennan put it, principles should be seen as rules of conduct – but not of the absolute sort; it is better to see principles as parameters by which the policy is made and conducted rather than in-themselves imperatives.\textsuperscript{15} America needs to survive before it can aspire to greater things. Principles alone do not assure of that survival. Insistence on principle may even create vulnerability for the country, with the enemies of America being all-too-ready take advantage of whatever opportunity they may find.

It was not without the risk of endangerment that America survived and thrived on the international stage. Various dangers existed from the day of American independence, from the untamed lands of the frontier to the threat of a powerful hegemon descending from the Old World. The country continued to grapple with the question of whether to keep to its own shores or whether to play a more active role in the world affairs, or at least its own hemisphere, lest the threat to freedom is to creep home.\textsuperscript{16} Before the rise of global networks of terrorism and extremism as a major threat to the liberal foundations and the American state, the Cold War period was a major challenge to the American assertion of strength and universal values.

\textit{Continuity from Cold War ideological bipolarity}

At the embryonic stages of the Cold War, George Kennan, in the now infamous ‘Long Telegram’ and ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct,’ warned of the ideological threat emanating from Moscow. He described it as “the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced, and perhaps the

\textsuperscript{14} Of course, ‘perfect’ and ‘relatively perfect’ are two different things. In the U.S. constitution a reference is made to a “more perfect union,” raising the allusion to exceptionalism as well as to the progressive liberal optimism. It is interesting to note that the American culture would morally deride its ideological rivals, typically more authoritarian regimes, for claiming the same logic in a different direction.


\textsuperscript{16} McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, pp. 162-163, 177; also see Washington, “Farewell Address.”
greatest it will ever have to face.” In retrospect, it is not hard to see why. The task that Kennan spoke of faced a deeply ingrained antagonism between capitalism (liberalism) and socialism (Marxism) on the world’s stage. Unlike prior great-power struggles, this one was thoroughly ideological. Marxism was spreading rapidly, in good part fuelled by the liberal shortcomings of delivering on the values that it preached. The Soviet Union was eagerly serving as its fulcrum. And the vacuum created by the post-World War II environment – with much of Europe in tatters – could not have been any more advantageous to the Soviet designs. The communist state survived its early fiascos of the war to become a behemoth military power, with a then compelling and reinvigorated ideology to boot. Through a complex web of factors, with a shared enemy out of the way, peace between the West and the East appeared as a fragile enterprise. With the increasing gains and momentum that it had, the Soviet state was once again perceived as menacing to overrun the Western civilization. America and its allies increasingly found themselves on the defensive end of a Cold War.

Aware of geopolitical circumstance and of the communist call for a proletarian world revolution, American experts foresaw that the Soviet state ultimately rejected peaceful co-existence, being in the long-run determined to disrupt and destroy the American traditional way

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19 Marxist philosophy is based on the premise that there is disunity of theory and practice in the liberal democratic societies. Marxists would recognize that freedom, equality and justice are readily preached in capitalistic societies via the philosophical backing of liberalism, but they would also note that the conditions of those societies inevitably show a different, more malign side. Colonialism and racism were major examples of that. Of course, to what extent Marxists themselves can bridge their theory with practice is another subject. American policy makers were apparently aware of all this, as evidenced by a statement in NCS-68: “It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.” In the same spirit, the prominent realist scholar Hans Morgenthau once proclaimed that the Cold War will be ultimately resolved “by the visible virtues and vices of [the American and Soviet] respective political, economic and social systems [...] The United States ought to again concentrate its efforts upon creating a society at home which can again serve as a model for other nations to emulate”; see Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, p. 18, 616; Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 17.
of life. National Security Council Report 68, a top secret policy paper issued during Truman’s presidency – which played a central role in establishing the American direction in foreign policy during the Cold War – warned that the American system was in greater jeopardy than ever before: “Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society....”

In short, the Cold War was about a global, value-laden contest between the two superpowers, with both sides stubbornly confident that history was on their side. Soviet power, with its machinery of centralized control and limitation of personal freedoms, together with its claim of ideological overwrite, stood against what America valued at its core. Worse yet, having an uncompromising and calculating spirit that was indifferent to the liberal respect for law, morality, and self-determination, the Soviet power stood ready to spread itself across the globe. The connection between national security and values had become closely knit. It was surmised that the antagonism, with the implied security threat, would remain as long as the ideology of the rivals were antipodal, i.e. as long as a conversion on either side was intractable.

If the United States was to avoid demise, foremost it needed to reaffirm and measure up to its own traditions. Any duplicity in the guarantee of rights and freedoms had to be resolved. The values of the liberal democratic experiment had to be reaffirmed and competitively reintroduced, domestically and internationally (as we shall see later in the paper, this would not be the last time for such a mission). The global spread of a rival ideology, deriving from Moscow as the epicenter, meant that the U.S. could no longer stick to its own borders. The free world was at stake, which could ill afford the disunity, the wait, or the lack of American leadership while the threat of communism surrounded and infiltrated its midst. It is according to this revelation that George Kennan famously concluded that “the main element of any United

22 “NSC-68,” sections IV, VII.
25 Mead, Special Providence, pp. 264-265; McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, p. 161; “NSC-68,” section I.
States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”26 This meant containment by raw power as well as competition in the realization and promotion of value achievement. In everything from sports, industry, agriculture, education and science, each side sought to prove that it held an overall superior system that was the choice for the future.

For all of these reasons, throughout most of the twentieth century America had to continue regarding Moscow as a rival rather than a potential cooperative partner.27 The end of the Cold War signalled an opportunity for a reversal of that continuity. In the 1980s, fraught with a lagging economy, botched reforms, adventurous nationalists, a costly and demoralizing war in Afghanistan, and numerous other endogenous and exogenous problems, the Soviet state suffered one disorganizing blow after another, breaking apart into fifteen independent states by the end of 1991. A reasserted American policy under the Reagan administration is often credited with either causing or abetting the collapse. The most prominent theories that arose to explain the end of the Cold War stressed the same: America had either triumphed or the Soviet Union had internally imploded from its own (botched) initiatives to reform.28

Post-Cold War blues: recalibrated continuity rather than change

With the dismantling of the Soviet state, its ideology in retreat and ruin, a vindication of the American liberal democratic values appeared on the horizon. Even the former members of the communist bloc rushed to the democratic experiment. For America, it was an exulting ending to a tense campaign. The rivalry between Russia and the United States was history. Or so it seemed.

In the years following the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia lost more than a superpower status – its society crumbled in every area of importance. In what came to be a Russian nightmare of a decade, the shock therapy recommended by the American advisors sent Russia into an economic and social tailspin. The country’s crime levels, once known as much lower than in the West, soared to unprecedented heights.29 The domestic industry and production became scrapped, inoperable or otherwise “lost.” The country’s GDP fell between 50

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27 Ibid., pp. 866-867.
28 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, pp. 186-190.
and 83 percent, capital investment by 80 percent, and some three quarters of the population began to live below or barely above subsistence level.\textsuperscript{30} Besides the issues in production and crime, the infrastructures of technology, science, transportation, heating, and sewage disposal disintegrated. Life expectancy took a plunge along with the social safety nets. Malnutrition and once-eradicated diseases were on the rise. Noting these statistics, Stephen Cohen argues that post-Soviet Russia can be counted as the first ever case of demodernization.\textsuperscript{31}

The state with the most nuclear warheads, that bordered a dozen countries and spanned almost as many time zones, was crumbling away. If a crisis of global proportions were to be avoided, there was no doubt that Russia would have to be dealt with and aided. President Clinton, who was elected on a decidedly domestic platform and widely perceived as a foreign policy neophyte, was far from being the best qualified to help the turbulent Eastern European transition.\textsuperscript{32} Randall Ripley and James Lindsay contend that it is this quality in Clinton that led to shortcomings in guidance and implementation of change in the significantly reshaped post-Cold War environment. Through their extensive study of continuity and change, Ripley and Lindsay highlight marked entropy in the structures and policies of American foreign policy, concluding that “the expectations of rapid and dramatic change in the structure and substance of U.S. foreign policy proven to be greatly exaggerated.”\textsuperscript{33} In a nutshell, the push to close shop on the American policies and structures of the Cold War was met with stubborn resistance from the groups that ran those policies and structures. The Clinton administration was aware of the issue, as evidenced by the statements from the Secretary of State Warren Christopher: “[American] foreign policy institutions continue in large measure to mirror the Cold War imperatives.... Budgets and bureaucracies still reflect the reality of a world that’s passed.”\textsuperscript{34} Despite the awareness, the administration fell short on making a difference in steering America toward change – bending to lobbying pressure to keep the American Cold War institutions alive. Ripley and Lindsay explain that the translation of “opportunity for change into actual change” may only have occurred via capable and strong leadership in the subject, the kind that could confidently

\textsuperscript{30} Cohen, Failed Crusade, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 45, 47, 169.
\textsuperscript{32} MacLean, George. Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Russia: From Deterrence and Isolation to Democratization and Engagement (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited Grower House, 2006), pp. 1, 14.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., pp. 313-314, 326.
overcome the institutional entropy.\textsuperscript{35} Naturally, the main engine for the foreign policy change would have had to be the president. Given Clinton’s specialization on the domestic and economic realm, no such leadership was provided.\textsuperscript{36} This would pave the way to failings in American foreign policy mission in Russia, most notably in democracy promotion, which was overshadowed by Clinton’s pursuit of a Russian market economy and a liberal political system that backed it (as if the American socio-political model could simply be exported, i.e. as if Russia could or should be treated as an extension of and for that model).\textsuperscript{37}

Continuity defined U.S. foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. The major difference was that, as American Cold War institutions justified their own existence by redefining their own roles, continuity was realigned to fit new missions in old bottles.\textsuperscript{38} In effect, the priority for American foreign policy changed from a defensive to an offensive capability: from containing the spread of communism to “persuading” nations to convert toward the liberal democratic, free-market standpoint. This was done, as the many American presidential speeches may indicate, for the sake of a more prosperous and peaceful future. The democratic peace theory gained remarkable traction.\textsuperscript{39}

Not everybody agreed to the “recalibrated” continuity, nor was it established as an agreed upon grand strategy. The American foreign policy consensus that was there during the Cold War, pinned to the policy of containment, vaporized with the end of the Cold War. The likes of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington rose to enshrine two different understandings of what is to follow. But they are a select few among many in the numerous debates and proposals for where America should direct itself in the post-Cold War context, none of which appear to decisively offer an answer, giving the impression that the normative search has come

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp. 316-321. Obama faced similar criticism during his presidency, which was able to come about from a campaign platform of change.


\textsuperscript{38} Randall and Lindsay. U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War, pp. 313-315.

\textsuperscript{39} MacLean, Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Russia, pp. 5, 15.
to the point of sterility.\(^{40}\) (The Washington Consensus with its infamously contentious nature, even in the most basic elements of how it can be defined, serves as a good example of this sterility). Nonetheless, this did not stop the Clinton administration – or later the George W. Bush administration – of confidently pushing the agenda that relied heavily on the institutional structures and assumptions of the Cold War, from the fact that the government was staffed with experts that were educated and specialized in the bygone era, to the assumption that the Cold War has generated a decisive victor as well as that overbearing confidence in liberalism was warranted. Overwhelmed by the feeling of triumph, the realization of a new age of ideology was yet to set in for the post-Cold War America.

Critiques abound of the way the Clinton administration handled the U.S.-Russian relations. Specifically, criticism arose of the Wilsonian view – endorsed by the Clinton administration but shared amongst the Americans public – that post-Soviet Russia was ready, willing or able to fit some replica of the American liberal democratic political system and its free-market economic model. Truth be told, Americans had and continue to have serious misconceptions about the post-communist Russia: caring little for the influence of Russia’s unique history and traditions, they see what they want to see: the lens of their own ideology blinds them to the relevant differences.\(^{41}\) Russian history dictated entirely different experiences in regards to the liberal ideology. Long before the abortive reforms of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin years, the early twentieth century liberal experimentations in Tsarist Russia came to be associated with disorder and lawlessness. Liberalism appeared as a wrong fit in the thinly spread and multiethnic society, where a highly centralized political authority was seen as optimal, low deference to law was prevalent, and where mores on property existed in an entirely different form.\(^{42}\) Many Americans still have a hard time recognizing that Russians have a preference for a mixed economy, which is continually a part of the platform of every significant Russian political party.\(^{43}\)


\(^{41}\) Cohen, *Failed Crusade*, pp. xii, 70, 104, 136. Questioning the universalization of the liberal democratic experiment, Cohen’s critique is clearly siding with Huntington’s thesis.


\(^{43}\) Cohen, *Failed Crusade*, p. 52-53.
From geography to politics, cultural valuations to economics, the historical developments of the Russian and the Anglo-Saxon traditions are far apart. Ignoring the facts of a different and much older society, the Clinton administration appeared to believe that America had to teach and direct Russia. But the missionary design eventually crashed against the rocks of the Russian reality. Long before the 1998 financial collapse, it had been clear that the laissez faire policies were drastically worsening the lives of the great majority of Russians. In politics, things were not fairing any better. In the midst of this social catastrophe, the prospect of an illiberal democracy became an increasing preoccupation for the Clinton administration.

Washington struggled to balance its interests in averting the Russian economic and social disintegration, popular revanchism, and the return of the communists. Yeltsin was seen as the only option that the administration had in pushing the reforms that it wanted. Yet the Yeltsin regime preserved itself by means of usurpation of parliamentary powers, circumvention and violation of law and constitution, and, last but not least, manipulation of elections. Washington served as an uncritical and obliging cheerleader to Yeltsin throughout the years, at times going beyond propriety in being involved: Yeltsin’s expansion and solidification of presidential power was duplicitously heralded as a “democratic breakthrough,” American advisors were closely integrated into the Kremlin’s policy-making circles, Russian candidates were influenced and pressured to follow the Yeltsin party line, and a $10 billion IMF loan was expediently secured shortly before the Russian 1996 presidential election. The American leadership was quite open about the intrusive nature of its foreign policy, making clear, as Larry Summers did in his testimony before House of Representatives, that the Washington Consensus was “the only course for Russia to follow.”

Ultimately Yeltsin’s presidency came to be known as a guarantor of market-oligarchy, leaving little doubt that his rule undermined the development of genuine democratic standards. Inadvertently, it fulfilled the dominant Russian viewpoint that liberalism was not

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45 Cohen, Failed Crusade, pp. 8-9, 11, 29, 63.
47 Marsden, Lessons from Russia, p. 129; Cohen, Failed Crusade, pp. 149-150, 152.
48 Cohen, Failed Crusade, pp. 114, 125, 133, 140-141.
49 Marsden, Lessons from Russia, p. 125.
50 Aslund and Kuchins. The Russia Balance Sheet, p.30; Cohen, Failed Crusade, p. 36.
compatible with the Russian traditions, repeating history’s prior lessons. The American leadership actively partook in Russian reforms and accordingly shared responsibility in the consequences. Unfortunately, blinded by an ideological crusade, the U.S. has shown cold indifference to the reality of those consequences. The shock politics and economics of the Soviet Union were readily deplored, but not so for the case of the Russian Federation. The plight of the post-Soviet Russians was not as morally worthwhile as the plight of the Soviets. As a result of the shock-therapy, deep contempt is now ingrained in Russian society for Yeltsin and anything and anyone associated with his regime and policies. From the still popular communists to the once renowned Soviet dissidents, the Russians united in resenting what had happened to their country. Common in Russian political history, the all-too-pertinent question of “who is to blame?” was again making its rounds, and it did not take long for the fingers to begin pointing West.

It is no coincidence that at the same time in Washington the question of “who lost Russia?” was being forged. With the closing of the millennium, it became evident that the relations between America and Russia are far from the rosy beginnings envisioned at the end of the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War, with the consensus of containment policy gone, views on the direction of American foreign policy noticeably and widely differed. “To some contemporaries, the trumpeting and encouragement of market democracy seemed the answer to all ills; to others, marginalization of old enemies was the key.” Preferring the latter approach, George W. Bush has proven to be no less troubling for the U.S.-Russian relationship. Set on becoming tough on Russia, Bush embraced a realist, handle-power-with-power approach. He sought to end “happy talk with the Russians,” which was the hallmark of Clinton’s engagement policy (however unhappy that engagement was in Russia). At the turn of the millennium a more confrontational style was emerging in the U.S.-Russian relations.

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52 Surveying continues to confirm that “most Russians have negative attitudes toward the West, Western values, and the Western socioeconomic model,” with the younger generations being the most hostile. Aslund and Kuchins. The Russia Balance Sheet, pp. 99-106, 113; Cohen, Failed Crusade, pp. 50-51, 144-148.
53 Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy, p. 99.
The George W. Bush administration wanted to avoid fixating on the Russian internal politics to focus more on improving collaboration on security issues throughout the world, namely in regards to state actors such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. As the years ahead would show, however, the partnership would not materialize, and instead of where there could have been cooperation there was tension. Aside from a detached collaboration on anti-terrorism, the core U.S.-Russian matters of arms control and non-proliferation were heading in reverse, toward abrasive difference rather than camaraderie. Using the rationale that the “rogue-states” would gain long-range missile attack capability, George W. Bush made missile defense his top foreign policy priority and oversaw the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), drawing instant and prolonged ire from Moscow. The treaty was, by the time of American withdrawal, the bedrock of Russia’s national and nuclear security. Russia was too weak to do anything about the unilateral U.S. exit. Although 9/11 brought the two sides together, with Putin being the first foreign leader to offer unexpected, comprehensive support – which, in crucial security areas like Afghanistan was more than any other U.S. ally could muster – concrete cooperation between the two countries did not materialize in the long term, even on the most pressing mutual concerns.

Given George W. Bush’ strong emphasis on security matters, it should not be supposed that the ideological crusade against Russia was abandoned. It came in a different form, through the framework of a realist approach. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul termed the hybrid as “Selective Wilsonianism.” It appears to be driven by the assumption that dealing with Russia on global issues would be much easier if Russia were a liberal democracy. In his second inaugural address, the Bush administration increasingly began to justify foreign policy as a crusade for democracy promotion. The administration ignored the fact that many of the allies in the war on terrorism – including Russia, who is by far the most important of those allies – were not fitting

55 Ibid., pp. 305, 307, 311.
the liberal democratic model of government. The approach became more pronounced with time, correlated with the need to justify the Iraq war on the grounds of democratic universalization. The toughness of Bush’s realism toward Russia diminished after 9/11 and Iraq, but it was substituted by a tougher stance on issues of ideology. Russia’s lack of interest to reform after the Yeltsin years continued to be a strain. Thomas Graham, Condoleezza Rice’s top Russian advisor at the National Security Council, summarizes the frustration:

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Russia remains far short of having fulfilled the grand hopes for its future widely entertained in both Russia and the West at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union. If there has been a transition at all, it has not been the hoped-for one to a free market democracy, but rather a reincarnation of a traditionally Russian form of rule that in many respects is premodern. Russia has not been integrated into the West in any significant way, contrary to the goals set forth by the Russian and Western governments a decade ago.61

The sustained issue is that Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has failed to meet expectations of converting to a liberal democratic model. Control over the media has been tightened, the powers of regional governors have been curtailed, and the business community has been reined in from having too much “undue” influence on politics.62 Power has recentralized to the Kremlin.

Ignoring or actively undermining the building blocks to a healthy liberal democracy, Putin’s Russia is, at best, what some authors have described as a type of electoral authoritarianism.63 In a visible way, the Russian federal and regional elites are no longer committed to the democratic rules of the game, while the conduct of elections has fallen well below the requirements of an electoral democracy.64 It must be kept in mind that Putin’s rise and continued popularity has been based on “an explicit repudiation of the chaotic freedoms of the Yeltsin era,” with democracy perceived as something that necessitates disciplined taming and manipulation.65 To that end, the former KGB officer turned president fosters the belief that

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61 Goldgeiger and McFaul, Power and Purpose, p. 321.
64 Ibid., p. 367.
65 Beer, “Russia’s Managed Democracy.”
Russia’s own more authoritarian tradition is no less moral than the Western liberal variety.\textsuperscript{66} Unfazed by its own version of exceptionalism, Russia would seek its own path, seeking to integrate its past with its present and future direction. In his \textit{Russia at the Turn of the Millennium} address, while not denying the benefits of democracy and freedom or of closer ties with the West, Putin has been direct about the quasi-authoritarian adjustments, claiming that “for Russians a strong state is not an anomaly to be discarded. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order, and the initiator and main driving force of change.”\textsuperscript{67} Popular opinion in the country continues to show backing to this claim, with the majority of Russians being quite disillusioned with liberal experimentation.\textsuperscript{68} But the more Russia taps into its authoritarian traditions, the less adequate it will be to fit the Western community of states, to become part of the “us” as opposed to the “them” alignment. As long as it sides with the latter, it will continue to draw Western antipathy toward itself.

Russia has historically attracted a strategic approach from the U.S. that, in line with NSC-68 and George Kennan’s assertions, gave no choice but to treat the Eurasian state as “highly sensitive to the logic of force.”\textsuperscript{69} The strategy of pitting force throughout the world to challenge Moscow’s expansionism proved successful during the Cold War, but the fundamentals of the strategy were never brought to their logical conclusion: the conversion that both Kennan and NSC-68 envisioned as the necessary endpoint to the Cold War never materialized.

The conversion of Russia into a Western-style liberal democracy nonetheless remains crucial for a true “normalization” of U.S.-Russian relations to occur. Given the unstable, unpredictable and aggressive predisposition of authoritarian states, which solely rely on contingent factors of force and power relations, this will continue to be a top priority for any American president (however latently or overtly).\textsuperscript{70} Cultural differences or not, the conversion

\textsuperscript{66} Russia has a history of looking to emulate the West without adapting its value system. See Klijn, Hugo. \textit{Russia, our Distant Neighbour: The Burden of Conventional Belief} (Netherlands Atlantic Association, 2011), p. 20; Beer, “Russia’s Managed Democracy.”

\textsuperscript{67} Putin, Vladimir. “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” December 30, 1999, in Sakwa, Richard. \textit{Putin: Russia’s Choice} (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 323. In the address, Putin stated: “We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state power.”


\textsuperscript{69} Kennan, “Long Telegram,” pp. 860-861; “NSC-68,” section V.

\textsuperscript{70} Whereas American domestic model is perceived as projecting liberty to the world, the authoritarian model is perceived as entrenched to project subjugation and authoritarianism. Critics have noted that Russia under Putin has shown its authoritarian, moral-aversive traits on the international stage, e.g. by
may not be as unrealistic as many critics presuppose. After all, if the former despotic political systems of Germany and Japan were capable of a conversion to a prosperous liberal democratic framework, why not continue pushing for the same success in Russia?\textsuperscript{71} As Kissinger has pointed out, the Russian path to reform will be impeded, not helped by turning a blind eye to the historic Russian authoritarian traditions.\textsuperscript{72}

At the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, highlighting concerns of a bellicose and undemocratic Russia, Michael McFaul’s testimony before the U.S. Congress on U.S. foreign policy toward Russia focused on encouraging the means to reform and conversion, such as increasing the flow of information and “independent” news into Russia. McFaul, who would later become Obama’s choice for ambassador to Moscow, concluded that:

...even though the current Russian government is pursuing policies that isolate Russia from Western institutions and the international community more generally, the United States and our allies must continue to embrace Russian integration with the West as a long-term strategic objective. Eventually, the current leadership in Russia may begin to see how the costs of their current actions outweigh the benefits, or a new government might gradually change course. When signs of change become evident, the United States and our allies must be ready to act upon them. Full integration of Russia into the West, including even NATO membership of a democratic Russia, should remain an aspiration for visionary American and European leaders.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{Considerations of strategic, future side of continuity}

Before delving into the question of change under Barack Obama’s presidency, it is important to consider another side of continuity in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Strategic and not just ideological differences mark continuity in American foreign policy toward Russia. Whereas ideological tensions arise from consideration of the past, strategic tensions arise from consideration of the future. The latter are based less on the continuity in the differences willing to deal with and abet the world’s pariah regimes, such as Syria, Iran, and Venezuela. See Bolton, John. “Diplomacy by bumper sticker: the Obama administration should reset its Russian policy,” \textit{National Review}, Vol. 61, No. 6 (April 6, 2009), p. 17; Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy}, p. 818; Goldgeiger and McFaul, \textit{Power and Purpose}, p. 314.\textsuperscript{71} Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy}, p. 818.\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}\textsuperscript{73} “Obama’s Russia Policy,” \textit{Russian Life}, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan. 1, 2009), p. 62.
between the internal structures of the states, e.g. their ideology, than on the differences in the configurations of power.

Writing from a strategic standpoint, James Goldgeier notes that “the problems in [U.S.-Russian] relationship have been caused not by lingering Cold War mentalities, but rather by two very different visions of the post-Cold War world, as well as by the sharp asymmetries in power that emerged when the Soviet Union imploded.” Expectations of the future of U.S.-Russian relations must be kept realistic in light of the underlying differences. When thinking about the prospects for a “reset” in those relations, one must understand the trajectory since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. emerged as the only superpower, which created an imbalance of power that makes true cooperation between the former rivals extremely difficult. In other words, having no need for cooperation with a weak state, why should the U.S. avoid taking what it wants, when it wants it? Such strategic outlooks do have far-reaching implications on U.S.-Russian relations.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, writing in *The Grand Chessboard*, concedes that American power is exercised “through a global system of distinctively American design that mirrors the domestic American experience,” where the plurality of views are encouraged rather than suppressed. This makes the liberal state very different from earlier empires, which were essentially authoritarian or absolutist. Nonetheless, this characteristic does not overwrite the dominant role played by power politics. Brzezinski points out that American global supremacy in the post-Cold War context can be viewed as little different from the empires of the past: “These empires based their power on a hierarchy of vassals, tributaries, protectorates, and colonies, with those on the outside generally viewed as barbarians.” Brzezinski argues that, although terminology appears anachronistic, it is not altogether inappropriate to describe “some of the states currently within the American orbit,” exemplified by the largely disarmed Japan and Germany. As the imitation of the American system pervades the world:

> It creates a more congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect and seemingly consensual American hegemony. And as in the case of the domestic American

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system, that hegemony involves a complex structure of interlocking institutions and procedures, designed to generate consensus and obscure asymmetries in power and influence.\textsuperscript{78}

According to Brzezinski, Eurasia is the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy is played. America’s ability to cope with the complex Eurasian power relationships, namely in regards to whether she can prevent the rise of dominant and antagonistic power, will determine whether she can continue exercising global primacy. Thus, America “must remain concerned with the geopolitical dimension and must employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the arbiter.”\textsuperscript{79} This is reminiscent of the historic American and British interest that no single power should become dominant on the European continent.\textsuperscript{80}

The integration of a democratized Russia into the community of Western states is hence an important American strategic interest. A larger, cooperative West “would enhance the appeal of the West’s core principles for other cultures, thus encouraging the gradual emergence of a universal democratic political culture.”\textsuperscript{81} In turn, via the assertions of the democratic peace, this would mean greater international stability and security, under the auspices of American hegemony.

Failing to integrate Russia may result in adverse geopolitical consequences for America. Historical resentments may come back to life, especially from the recent past. After all, it is not uncommon for the Russians to conspiratorially consider the Yeltsin years as a ploy to destroy Russia. Segments of the Russian elite saw a multiplicity of threats arising from the gravely weakened Russia of the 1990’s. The fact that the West, and especially the U.S., played a role in Russian politics during that weakening further drove suspicions that Russia is being encircled for enslavement to Western interests.\textsuperscript{82} Yulia Tymoshenko notes that during those tumultuous years it was a mistake for the West to have assumed that Russia’s reduced status as an international player meant that no special diplomatic status needed to be accorded to the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., p. 27.
\item\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. xiv, 30.
\item\textsuperscript{80} Mead, Walter. Special Providence, pp. 81-82; Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 147.
\end{enumerate}
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Kremlin, “that Russia neither deserved nor should be offered a major role in world affairs.” The indifference, Tymoshenko claims, caused Russia to regard certain Western involvements, such as the democratization and the building of Western ties to the former Soviet Republics, as unfriendly acts meant to further undermine and obstruct the Russian state.

Efforts to reach out to integrate Russia into the West have been spoiled by such factors as NATO expansion. The expansion itself occurred with the breaking of a verbal promise made by George H. W. Bush’s administration to Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO will not go “one inch to the east.” The promise was an assurance for the Soviet Union to allow German reunification. Whether Russia felt betrayed or not was less important than the fact that the U.S. was comparatively too powerful to decline the expansion: it would have been strategically and morally damaging for America and the West not to include more of Europe into an alliance that is a symbol of transatlantic unity.

Vladimir Putin understood the trends in power dynamics and the stipulations from the West. Refusing to accept them, he stressed the validity of Russia’s own traditions, vowing to rebuild Russia politically and economically, with or without Western support. Isabelle Francois highlighted the roots and reasons of the strategic tension:

The Russian leaders are operating within a strategic culture markedly different from the value-based approach that predominates within the Western community of liberal democracies. Foreign policy under both Putin and Medvedev has been aimed at creating a favorable environment for economic and sociopolitical modernization, while ensuring that Russia is not weakened on the international scene.

With a differing ideological standpoint, Russia is to be viewed as a long-term strategic rival to the Western world, which for the foreseeable future will be led by America. The lack of ideological conversion will continue to preclude Russian integration into the West, generating

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84 Ibid., pp. 73-74
87 Ibid., p. 22.
strategic distrust and uncertainty. If an authoritative Russia is able to sort out its demographic and economic problems, it is likely to return as a major force of opposition to the U.S. global interests. If the West is to avoid the serious geopolitical setback, it requires a common foreign policy toward Russia. This means maintaining close liberal democratic ties as well as commitment to NATO. Message of continuity may be necessary to safeguarding consensus and solidarity in the alliance, especially as elements of change take root in the new century. Sensing any oppositional incoherence, Russia can take advantage by driving a wedge between Western Europe and America. With that accomplished, it may even seek to reawaken its own regional hegemonic ambitions.\textsuperscript{89}

Part II
Obama’s mission for change

The relationship between America and Russia is still one of rivalry rather than cooperation. Unlike in the past, however, it would be erroneous to say that Russia is a number one foe of America. There are several reasons that explain the change: 1. Russia is no longer an ideological powerhouse looking to spread itself across the globe in opposition to the U.S. liberal democratic model (although reservations about American interventionism are still made in Moscow) 2. The strategic interests of Russia and America are now in many ways parallel: global financial stability, non-proliferation, international terrorism and radicalized Islam are the most pressing issues that both countries face today. Times have changed. The world is far from where and what it was in the last century and the biggest international threats now arise from non-state actors as much as (if not more than) from state actors.

From change of international environment to promise of change in American foreign policy

Through the rapid technological and socio-political developments inherent in globalization, each culture is increasingly exposed to another culture. This creates opportunity as well as friction, integration as well as potential clashing and revulsion. Ideas may clash by means of words, but, when enough frustration builds at achieving nothing by abstracted dialogue – over common or idiosyncratic problems – ideological and radicalized politics may step in with its reputation of resorting to violence. In the post-Cold War period, with state-backed bipolarity of ideology gone, the ground for violence has survived in the crevices internal to the state. The growth of asymmetric and transnational threats has pushed each state to rethink its strategic and moral standpoints. America gained no exception to this reality. The country’s historical security advantage of being protected by the Atlantic and Pacific has shrunk, reigniting the domestic debate on increasing security at the expense of liberties. The threats can no longer be considered as remote, simple to identify, or easy to quarantine, nor are they likely to cease anytime in the foreseeable future.90

The challenges of the new global system are complex, being fundamentally different from such challenges as containing an ideology or defeating a unitary enemy. Gone are the days

when simple terminology such as “containment” – or “war on terrorism,” for that matter – could define American foreign policy, and they are unlikely to return “in this world of many players and many, many issues.” In our new age, vibrant competition exists between societies and cultures, not just between liberalism and extremism. A single, sustainable model of success may not be applicable across the board. “The most important thing for Americans to recognize is that it really is a new game,” wrote Bruce Jentleson and Steven Weber, stressing that “[t]he United States is facing a global competition of ideas, [where] the rules of engagement are much closer to those set out by Milton Friedman than Carl von Clausewitz.” The difficulty becomes, then, “not so much in developing new ideas, as in escaping from old ones.”

The 21st century has its own dynamics, the kind that are yet to be clearly drawn out. Some things are nonetheless becoming clearer, such as that past ideas and approaches “seem increasingly inadequate for meeting the challenges and choices that define this new age of ideology.” Simplification in matters of ideology has not occurred: the new age is not about a two-choice answer between liberalism and communism, and certainly not about any single choice. If anything, political complexity across the board is growing, involving extremism in religious, political, and economic forms. At the same time raw power is becoming less important for seeking change, whether domestically or internationally, while pluralism is becoming a dominant and widely accepted attribute in political life, possibly indicating a positive projection of the democratic ideal. Given these dynamics, America has to get back to the drawing board to sort out how its liberal democratic traditions may compete in what can be termed as “a global marketplace of ideas.” The solutions of the modern and polymorphous challenges that threaten America depend on its success in reinventing and readjusting itself to an evolved global system. Dealing with a top-down, systematic phenomena, the enterprise would have to be ignited by a renewed American leadership. Being optimistic, Jentleson and Weber conclude

93 Ibid., p. 45.
96 Ibid., 45-48; Jentleson, Bruce. *American Foreign Policy*, p. 631.
that “a new set of leaders will compete to rise to the fore,” capable of articulating and implementing policies that fit the times.\(^9^8\)

Barack Obama has been welcomed as a leader who can bring pertinent change to America. Obama recognized the circumstantial vicissitudes that were inherent in the new century. He recognized that globalization has significantly reshaped the political landscape of the world.\(^9^9\) Criticizing the George W. Bush administration for viewing the problems on the international scene in an obsolete way, as state-based and amendable by military means, Obama concluded that “[modern international] threats demand a new vision of leadership in the twenty-first century – a vision that draws from the past but is not bound by outdated thinking.”\(^1^0^0\)

All in all, America has developed a need for a fresh approach in foreign policy, the kind that would alleviate the deteriorating foreign policy of the Bush administration and encourage the world to be engaged in solving problems with America. Challenges and their complexity on the international scene have proliferated, but the unilateral resources to solve them have not.\(^1^0^1\) In other words, “in this world of many players and many, many issues,” multilateralism has become indispensable. Former U.S. Senator Gary Hart, writing an open letter to his own Democratic Party members, stresses exactly this point:

> Twenty-first-century realities require we get all the help we can. These realities include WMD proliferation, terrorism, failed and failing states, tribalism, ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, the decline of nation-state sovereignty, integrating markets, climate change and the threat of pandemics. One nation alone cannot solve these problems. It is not in America’s national interest, and particularly its security interests, to go it alone or rely on ‘coalition of the willing’ composed of minor powers rallied in extremis.\(^1^0^2\)

Distancing himself from the prior administration, Obama argued that the “needed reform of these alliances and institutions will not come by bullying other countries to ratify changes we hatch in isolation.”\(^1^0^3\) Addressing the New Economic School in Moscow, President

\(^{9^9}\) Lindsay, “George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the future of US global leadership,” p. 765.  
\(^{1^0^0}\) Obama, Barack. “Renewing American Leadership,” Foreign Affair, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August, 2007), p. 4.  
\(^{1^0^1}\) MacDonald, “Rebalancing American foreign policy,” p. 115.  
\(^{1^0^3}\) Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,” pp. 4, 11.
Obama promised that “America will not seek to impose any system of government on any other nation.”\textsuperscript{104} Assured by the belief that in the long-run history is on the side of the liberal democratic experiment, Obama retracts ideological crusading and emphasizes that “each nation determines its own destiny.”\textsuperscript{105} Given the unclear and divisive effect of democracy promotion, there is plenty of reason for restraint. There is no need to force a hand; it has not worked well in the past for America, as the Yeltsin years illustrate.

History happens to have served up a complex and increasingly coalescing, multi-cultural and multi-dimensional world, where a rigid or single-minded approach to international relations is unfitting and counterproductive. Instead of trying to forcefully direct that world, Obama’s style is in attempting to focus on the workable problems, – to fix rather than shape the ongoing realities.\textsuperscript{106} He is best described as a pragmatist who, in his own words, wants “a strategy no longer driven by ideology and politics but one that is based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground and [American regional] interests.”\textsuperscript{107} As evidenced by Obama’s statements on the respect for the culturally varied conceptions of democracy and on the relativity of exceptionalism, the democratic experiment for Obama’s administration does not mean the same thing as the liberal democratic experiment. Embracing a strategic vision with a broad set of priorities that revolve around the re-establishment of American standing and leadership in the world, President Obama keeps away from the divisive absolutes, focuses on the (earthly) common ground, and understands that there are trade-offs in each political arrangement. Readily willing to use dialogue over coercion, “he tacks away from topics that he believes divide nations – democracy, defense, markets, and unilateral leadership – and toward topics that he believes integrate them – stability, disarmament, regulations, and diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{104} Obama, Barack. “U.S. President Barack Obama address to the New Economic School in Moscow,” Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, July 8, 2009; MacDonald, “Rebalancing American foreign policy,” p. 117.
\textsuperscript{105} Nau, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” p. 34.
A new spirit of humility has set in under the new administration, with more attention paid to the “global commons” and the rising threats therein.109 As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, a multipolar world has to be understood as a “multipartner” world, “in which the United States would call on other countries – rivals as well as allies – to assist it in preserving global order.”110 In such an approach, cultural and ideological differences are kept away from the front burner, being “soft-pedalled” for the sake of practicable cooperation. It should come as no surprise, then, that on her official tour in China, the new U.S. Secretary of State claimed that the human rights issues “can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crisis.”111

George W. Bush did give signs of understanding the concept and calling of a “multipartner” world. A year after 9/11 Bush stated that the great powers find themselves on the same side of opposing the “common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”112 Yet, by choosing unilateral and at times utterly antagonizing strategy and tactics, the Bush administration squandered its chances to promote and harvest that unity. The cowboy do-it-alone mentality, intolerance to socio-economic and ideological plurality, and talk of “either with us or against us” marred the efforts to combat the global challenges. At the same time, the growth of American violations of human rights and liberties, including torture, arbitrary detention, and secret prison camps, blurred the line in the cause of “fighting evil.” Counterproductively and unsurprisingly, it fuelled unprecedented anti-Americanism. The Iraq debacle by itself explains how and why the international community was repulsed from following the American leadership anywhere it chose to crusade. Washington has had to learn the hard way that there are real limits to the goals that it can unilaterally pursue.113

The failings of George W. Bush foreign policy arose from the incompatibility of the means taken to the situation faced. Obama tapped into those failures, making a prominent call to bring change to the way American foreign policy was done. At the forefront of that priority

112 “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” The White House, September 2002. Bill Clinton and Bush senior also understood that calling, often reciting a new world order that would involve many more actors on a more levelled international playing field.
was the realization that the U.S. “needed partners to achieve its goals and protect its interests. And those partners could be won over only through diplomatic engagement, not intimidation.”

The effective functioning of diplomatic engagement implied greater respect for cultural and ideological difference. Accordingly, unlike in the past, the new agenda in American foreign policy could not afford to be too parochial or unimaginative “about what the world is likely to value tomorrow.”

In order to advance American interests in the dynamic international environment, the U.S. needed to expand its spheres of cooperation – by accommodation if necessary. The improvement of bilateral relations with China, India, and Russia, i.e. the rising starts of the multipolar world, were highlighted as critical to that goal.

**Pushing the ‘reset’**

Major swings in foreign policy direction are not uncommon within and across different American presidential administrations. Case in point, George W. Bush arrived into office campaigning on a humble foreign policy that shunned nation-building and world policing, but quickly turned to interventionism and democracy promotion after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. Seeing the world retrenched against American interests, Obama’s administration has flung the pendulum in the other direction and at a different angle, turning to multilateralism, prioritizing practical interests over ideological crusades, and pursuing diplomatic outreach that avoided categorizations of rivalry and shades of dogma. Obama remains an internationalist in the sense that he “believes in expanding possibilities for mutual accommodation between nation-states, sparked by the American example, and in the potentially integrative qualities of his own personal leadership on the world stage.” Rather than aggressively pushing for democracy or resorting to coercive strategies toward other nations, a more reserved and accommodating

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117 Nau, Henry. “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” *Policy Review*, Issue 160 (April 1, 2010), p. 27. The pendulum swings in the American foreign policy direction are by no means a novel manifestation. Throughout history, America continually modified its policy as it sought to adapt to the dynamics of the international environment, to survive, thrive, and eventually lead. The contexts and contents of the world change, and the actors therein must adopt or suffer the consequences of falling behind on the times. See Mead, *Special Providence*, pp. 63-64.
America is changed “to lead by example,” with its foreign policy strategically readjusted to improving America’s standing and credibility with “rivals and friends” alike.119 (As shall later be seen, not everyone agrees to this strategy or its consequences).

The strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington has yet to find its proper footing. George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin had no personal qualms as Presidents. Their governments shared a number of important strategic points of interest, yet the joint partnership on those interests never came about.120 The advent of the Obama administration’s reset endeavour was meant to change that, serving to give a renewed relational framework for cooperative action – barren or at least wilfully ignorant of past tension and antagonism. Obama’s visionary approach to foreign policy was not deterred by the realities of the past, nor did Obama shy away from being the first to reach out in any troubled relationship. Even the most ideologically offensive members of the international community, “those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent,” received a similar treatment, with Obama famously proclaiming in his inaugural address that “we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.”121

President Obama describes “four pillars” of future international engagement: non-proliferation and disarmament, the promotion of peace and security, ecological preservation, and “a global economy that advances opportunity for all people.”122 With the avoidance of a divisive agenda playing a key role, democracy and its active promotion are noticeably off the priority list. Emphasis that was part of the crusading attitude of the prior administrations is redirected to strategic communication and diplomacy: better understanding of other nations is sought, with the strengthening of international cooperation pursued on the basis of mutual interest and respect rather than forceful and unilateral leadership.123 Most certainly this establishes a favourable ground for improving U.S.-Russian relations, priming better bilateral cooperation, especially where both countries find the greatest mutual interest: key security areas of non-proliferation, arms control, and the promotion of peace. Fortunately, the U.S. and Russia share a history of negotiating agreements in those areas (none of which could survive

120 Safranchuk, “Traveling in Different Boats.”
without the U.S.-Russian cooperation). Unfortunately, U.S. and Russia also share the tense strategic and ideological continuity that has time and time again hindered the fulfillment of closer ties, proving that it is ingrained in the relationship.

Unwilling to ideologically or geopolitically pressure Russia for fear of the counterproductive friction that is still fresh in its tracks, President Obama appeals to America’s need of “a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests.”

Showing a familiar pattern in foreign policy strategy, Obama brandished cordial rhetoric toward Moscow and was willing to make the first move. He went out of his way to live up to his words, from admiring the legacy and inviolability of Russian culture – read, the right to be free from liberal universalization – to preparing concessions on political sensitive issues such as missile defense in central Europe. When President Obama met President Medvedev for the first time, it took them little time to jointly declare that they were “ready to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a fresh start in relations.” Thus the ground was set for the U.S.-Russian ‘reset.’

Overall, there have been some visible results in the U.S.-Russian relationship ever since Obama came into office. Bearing fruit from all the administration’s invested time and effort, beginning of 2010 was significantly better for the relationship than the beginning of 2009. Already the most important U.S. supporter in Afghanistan, Russia increased interest in helping Afghan economic development, upgraded counter-narcotics cooperation, and negotiated a new air corridor and additional supply routes for the American forces, relieving those forces from relying too much on Pakistan. These welcome changes do well in “fighting violent extremism and resolving regional conflict” in the global hotspot that has become increasingly important for American foreign policy. As a sign of further improvements, NATO and Russian held their first ever joint operational exercises in counter-terrorism and fighter aircraft demonstration; these seemingly simple steps can go a long way in building the shaken confidence and trust in the U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian relations.

125 “Obama and Russia,” p. 9.
126 Goldgeier, “A Realistic Reset with Russia,” p. 15.
Judging from the initial rhetoric and concessions, it looked like the continuity in the U.S.-Russian relations was finally cast aside, but the coming years would show that the road ahead was more rutted and stretched than had been hoped for. The political circumstances in both countries resisted, or otherwise diverted, change on some of the central pivots of the relationship. Both leaderships that sought change were naïve to have believed that they could insulate the areas of common agreement and interest from the areas of disagreement and friction. The ‘reset’ remained limited and unstable, particularly in the most important area of U.S.-Russian interest and potential cooperation: non-proliferation and missile defense. The disagreement that arises in that area reflects the difficulty of going forward. The entire next subsection is dedicated to the subject.

**Non-proliferation, missile defense, and arms control**

All of the major aspects of contemporary U.S.-Russian relations revolve around global security concerns, with non-proliferation, missile defense, and arms control being the focal points. These three are “intertwined in terms of their inherent potential to anchor the reset policy,” with any progress in one area being dependent on the flexibility of the other. By the same token, the three are also “linked by their ability to derail the challenging process of engagement.” Strategically and geopolitically, missile defense is as delicate a matter for the Russians as non-proliferation is for America. Both are ultimately tied to arms control. What complicates things further is the fact that a number of other state and non-state actors are directly and indirectly involved in the exchange, namely U.N., Europe, and erratic states such as Iran and North Korea.

Since their shocking introduction at the end of the Second World War, nuclear weapons have been central to the international order and military and diplomatic strategy. Nuclear and other doomsday weapons have set the tone on virtually all issues in U.S.-Russian relations, throughout the Cold War and beyond. Times and circumstances have brought enough changes for a revaluation of each state’s WMD arsenals, as well as the security dilemmas that

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131 Nagorski, Andrew. “Obama’s 50-50 Russia Strategy,” *Newsweek*, Vol. 153, No. 14 (April 6, 2009). Both countries continue to account for over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Clearly, the leadership in Moscow and Washington are in better position to do something about nuclear proliferation than anyone else. See Burns, “The United States and Russia in a New Era.”
they pose. In the 21st Century, America is threatened by the failing and poorly governed states – that can serve as a hotbed for extremists – as much as, if not more than, by traditionally strong and aggressive states. The danger of terrorists acquiring even a single WMD from the opportunity of state-actor disintegration has given the doomsday threat another dimension, necessitating further cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

Warning against unchecked extremism, President Obama has been unequivocal in labeling the terrorist doomsday scenario as the number one global threat, calling it “the single most important national security threat that we face” and “a threat that rises above all others in urgency.” Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations (UN) reinforced this view: IAEA noted that nuclear terrorism is “the most serious danger the world is facing,” while the UN’s special panel on future threats to international peace and security singled out nuclear Armageddon as the prime threat. The panel warned that “[w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” Graham Allison argues that “[d]evelopments since 2004 have only magnified the risks of an irreversible cascade,” which the Iraq invasion made worse by sending the message to anti-American states that “the only apparent credible way to deter the armed forces of the US is to own your own nuclear arsenal.”

Of importance is that Russia has decided not to renew Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which is set to expire in the spring of 2013. The post-Cold War program was designed to help former Soviet Republics dismantle their nuclear, biological and chemical weapon stockpiles. Having recovered from the ruinous 90s, Russia insists that it no longer needs foreign aid or involvement in WMD disarmament. With Russia taking over the initiative independently, the program’s purpose will not really be lost, and given how the program’s cessation is a plus for the American taxpayers, one may find it surprising that the U.S. should at all be unhappy. The U.S. leadership nonetheless finds it concerning that the two-decade-long U.S.-Russian success story would be allowed to expire. Emphasizing the program’s successes in

135 Ibid., p. 80.
helping secure and disable WMD, Obama has called on Russia to renew CTR, interpreting Russian resistance “as a negotiating position to change the program rather than halt it altogether.”137

Prevention of nuclear terrorism and reassurance of non-proliferation is where the U.S. needs Russia the most. At a time when the U.S. minimizes its forces in order to adjust itself away from global overextension and domestic deficits,138 it will need greater support from powers such as Russia in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. Obama has prioritized these regions in his foreign policy while discounting the option that America can go it alone.139 Even before becoming President, as part of his campaign Obama pledged to “work with other nations to secure, destroy, and stop the spread of [nuclear] weapons in order to dramatically reduce the nuclear dangers of our nation and the world,” adding:

This will require the active cooperation of Russia [...] to update and scale back our dangerously outdated Cold War nuclear postures and de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons [...] Although we must not shy away from pushing for more democracy and accountability in Russia, we must work with the country in areas of common interest.140

Obama showed that he meant business when he decided to revamp – but not abandon – the U.S. missile defense policy in Poland and Czech Republic. Shorter range interceptors were instructed to be used at the sites, the kind that Moscow would find less objectionable. In due course, the concession led to Moscow’s reciprocal cooperation on arms control and Iran. In June of 2010, due to Russian and Chinese abstentions, much tougher U.N. sanctions against Iran were allowed to fall in place.141 Few months before that, the New START treaty was signed in Prague on April 8th, 2010, effectively replacing the soon-to-expire Treaty of Moscow (SORT) and the unconsummated START II and START III treaties. After the signing of the treaty, in a remarkable gesture of openness and transparency, the U.S. government for the first time made public the

138 In DoD’s January 2012 file, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta expressed the view: “U.S. is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint Force for the future that is smaller and leaner.”
size of its nuclear stockpile.\textsuperscript{142} The events represented a renewed, much welcome engagement by Washington and Moscow on arms control.

The recent return to arms control negotiations should not be seen as a return to the adversarial, Cold War type of U.S.-Russian relationship. Rather, it is a sign that the relationship is still in the flux of “unfinished business,” which predominately looms over the European security architecture. The issue is in threat perception. Hinting ideological and strategic differences, Russia is still unconvinced of the benign nature of the spread of Western influence and the expansion of NATO.\textsuperscript{143} The distrust over the stems from the recent past: Russian conventional forces have been decimated by the socio-economic breakdown experienced under Yeltsin (decimation that incidentally arrived hand-in-hand with Westernization), requiring that the country rely on nuclear deterrence in the face of superior conventional forces of the U.S. and/or Europe. The need for a broad political-military dialogue is obvious. An updated Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty would go a long way toward resolving these issues, helping alleviate Russian concerns over its defenses. One may think that conventional forces are the less relevant segment to the arms control discussion, given the prominence of the nuclear arsenals, but they actually serve as the linchpin that tie the problem or its possible solution, being a major part “of the overall debate on the U.S.-Russian arms control approach and core to the U.S. reset policy vis-à-vis Russia.”\textsuperscript{144} What complicates matters is the fact that Russian nuclear deterrence is being threatened by the American missile defense plans in Europe.\textsuperscript{145}

In part because of close connection to the concerns of missile defense and Russian threat perception, the renewed arms control negotiations have notable shortcomings. Despite being lauded as Obama’s greatest foreign policy achievement, the New START treaty is better viewed as a mixed bag of continuity and change rather than a radical breakthrough for change. There are several reasons for this. First, quantities of strategic nuclear warheads and their

\textsuperscript{142} Yarynich, Valery, Pavel Zolotarev, Bruce Blair, Victor Esin, and Mathew McKinzie. “Smaller and Safer,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5 (September 1, 2010), p 9; Burns, “The United States and Russia in a New Era.”
\textsuperscript{143} Francois, “The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security,” pp. 26, 34.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., pp. 11, 19-20, 26.
\textsuperscript{145} The plans have a history of being reignited on the U.S. side contrary to the ABM treaty. The first violation was the Strategic Defensive Initiative (SDI) undertaken by Ronald Reagan’s administration, which helped propel the last of the Cold War arms races that also played a part in tumbling the Soviet Union. Later, as already noted, George W. Bush would unilaterally withdraw from the treaty. Goldgeiger and Michael McFaul. Power and Purpose, pp. 312, 315; Cohen, Stephen. “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’: Another Lost Opportunity?” The Nation, June 20, 2011, p. 12.
launchers are reduced under the treaty, but both countries will continue to have more than enough “overkill” from the retained arsenals. Second, the arsenals will continue to have the same risks from launch-ready alert postures – involving rapid-launch capability vulnerable to false alarm – because these mechanisms have been untouched by the treaty. Lastly, and arguably the most important shortcoming, tactical nuclear weapons are not covered by the treaty, being ignored by military strategists and arms control experts for weapons that have a range beyond 5,500km.

The U.S. holds far fewer tactical nuclear stockpiles than Russia. Tactical nuclear weapons now serve as the bulwark of Russian national defense and military might, compensating for the lost Soviet superiority in conventional arms. Guarding its last bastion of military and diplomatic repute and attempting to counterbalance NATO’s conventional superiority, Moscow is reluctant to negotiate reductions on those weapons, often linking any progress to the missile defense discussions. There is a complex dilemma in play. America finds it disagreeable that her closest European allies – as well as the American forces stationed in the allied countries – are a potential target for nuclear attack, more from regimes like Iran rather than Russia. Missile defense is an option that could resolve that, but Moscow will staunchly refuse to accept it because it cannot afford to lose its nuclear advantage. With the overabundant Russian nuclear arsenals remaining, that refusal in part reinforces the need for missile defense for America and her allies. Yet there is another option. As the former U.S. ambassador to Russia William Burns notes, the source of suspicion and tension in the issue of missile defense can instead be a transformative opportunity between Moscow and Washington. Beyond sharing knowledge and expertise on the technology, the two countries can reap benefits from exchanging military attaches, jointly observing missile defense tests, and establishing “a joint center for monitoring missile launches worldwide.” Any breakthrough on that cooperation would surely be a “game changer” in their favour. Further and more conclusive cooperation would fill in the security gaps between the U.S., Russia, and Europe, triangulating better ties and assuring a win-win for all three sides: Russia will finally be granted its historically elusive security of its Western

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150 Francois, “The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security,” p. 26
frontier, Europe would no longer be a hostage to Russian insecurity, and the U.S. could gain cooperation on more threatening and erratic regimes such as North Korea and Iran.

During Obama’s presidency, interest has increased for U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense: “discussions have taken place in both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian channels, with significant exchanges of information on practical issues relating to missile defense.”151 As a positive sign, a proposition has been made for joint data fusion centers that “would allow Russian and NATO officers to have simultaneous access to missile launch data from sensors in NATO countries and Russia, giving both sides a full real-time picture of potential threats.”152 This would in turn allow for “shared training in operations and for other cooperative arrangements, which would give Russia a greater sense of comfort.”153 Isabelle Francois notes that for cooperation to take root, “it is in the interest of NATO and the United States to reassure Moscow and to offer transparency with some avenues for cooperation.” At the same time, underlining the unfinished business on arms control and European security architecture, Francois cautions that “one should refrain from ambitious game-changer rhetoric, given the lack of broad European security dialogue and of trust and confidence.”154

It did not take long for the Obama administration’s optimistic missile defense efforts with Russia to find disagreement and roadblock, from both sides of the divide. The administration reached out with bilateral and multilateral assurances that its approach to missile defense – European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), designed to counter threats from regimes like Iran – would not have the capability to intercept sophisticated Russian strategic missiles. Russian leadership was unmoved by the vocal promises (given the history of American promises on the issue, it should come as no surprise), requesting “legally binding guarantees” and demanding that the U.S. altogether abandon its missile defense plans for Poland and Czech Republic. In effect, this amplified the lack of trust and confidence of an already fragile U.S.-Russian cooperation.155

The U.S. domestic opposition is no less adamant in obstructing further cooperation on arms control and missile defense. American critics insist that there is a real and practical

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151 Francois, “The United States, Russia, Europe, and Security,” p. 27.
152 Ibid., p. 32.
153 Ibid., p. 32.
154 Ibid., p. 32.
155 Ibid., pp. 27-28.
concern over how, with the signing of the New START treaty, Russia has successfully gained the upper hand by being allowed to keep its thousands of “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons at the same time as the U.S., as revealed by Obama’s key advisor, keeps only “a few hundred.” This advantage goes to the heart of the historic American proclamation of maintaining “second to none” nuclear capability. Driven by the post-Cold War U.S. unilateral disinterest of nuclear weapons, the loss of American nuclear parity was widely perceived as imminent, but its suddenness caught many off guard. Some fear that such disinterest is opening the door for other countries to violate non-proliferation, reinforcing the need for the Western states to reanalyze their nuclear standing and to develop proper defensive measures. Unfortunately for the West, at the insistence of the Russians, New START also has a number of checks on missile defense: prohibition is made for the conversion of intercontinental-ballistic missile launchers for any missile defense purposes, and missile defense capability is linked to the offensive nuclear capability. In other words, a balance in Mutual Assured Destruction is reassured, undermining the whole point of missile defense. It appears that the ABM, or at least the more important segment of it, has been cunningly resuscitated.

The Obama administration’s eager pursuit of arms control and diplomatic accommodation of Russia has been criticized for generating strategic vulnerability for the U.S. and its allies. John Bolton, at the forefront of that critique, claims that Obama promotes an “innocents abroad” policy that naively ignores the ideological and historical differences that underpin the U.S.-Russian relationship. Decrying how America’s past attitude and actions have been incriminated in the troubled relationship, effectively levelling the moral playing field, Bolton chastises the President for facing a “belligerent” and “assertive” adversary with softness and retreat. In ideologically harsh tones, the U.S. domestic opposition assert that the “abandonment” of Poland and Czech Republic missile defense installation sites constitute a betrayal of American allies and friends, to the satisfaction and empowerment of a steadfast

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adversary – an outsider to the liberal democratic community. Morally charged words like “shameful,” “sacrifice” and “appeasement” are the staple of these assertions.161

At the end of the day, the issue of U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control and non-proliferation is intrinsically ideological. Russia does not belong to the Western community of states, nor does it share the passion to fulfill the membership prerequisites. Arguments are incited within the American policy making circles that the Eurasian giant should not qualify for the highly sensitive security cooperation, e.g. missile defense, prompting NATO and the U.S. to work to develop the system independently, regardless of Russia’s consent.162 This is not unlikely in view of how Washington is unconvinced by Moscow’s assistance on the threats emanating from the rogue states. U.S. leadership may one day readjust its recently conceded limitations in the New START to accomplish better missile defense capability. That may be the reason why Obama has not given Moscow the satisfaction of altogether scrapping missile defense installations in Central Europe.

For now, perhaps the leadership in both Moscow and Washington can take solace in how the technology behind missile defense has yet to reach levels of convincing reliability.163 The uncertainty of that reliability is sure to delay any breakthrough on missile defense agreement, one way or the other. Until the breakthrough, each side could use the threat of missile defense development as a diplomatic and military scarecrow rather than as a practical initiative that could be cooperated on. As Andrew Kuchins concludes, the uncertainty involved may also allow greater flexibility in deferring the whole issue: “Given new cost constraints and persistent questions about effectiveness of the technology, the Obama administration might not be giving that much away by agreeing to delay deployments pending a new assessment of the threat.”164
Part III
Change to Wager On

The title of the concluding section reflects a hopeful yet realistic outlook: improving U.S.-Russian relations involves a gamble with indeterminate risks, but one with a compelling payout. If the gamble is taken, risk-tolerance would have to mark each step of the way, reflecting the uncertain and complex terrain of the U.S.-Russian relationship in the context of the 21st century’s challenges. From international terrorism and nuclear proliferation to ecological and market upheaval, the ominous threats from without and from within are here to stay for both countries. The new and dynamic challenges are difficult to take on with outdated or rigid foreign policy approaches, i.e. with foreign policy continuity. Some risk-tolerance for change is needed to avoid entropy and decay that is sure to arise from failing to steer adjustments to fit the globalized times, which speak of “global commons” over international crusades. Far from a shared global interest, the attempt at spreading American values, zealously pursued by Clinton and Bush, has hurt American mission and interests across the world. Although the shared values, or at least value conciliation, could set a more cordial framework for the international cooperation, it cannot singly substitute for the practical interests that are the building blocks of that cooperation. Pursuing such blocks, Obama strode into office on the promise of delivering the necessary change to adjust America to the new world. Recognizing the need Russian cooperation on some of the most important global challenges, Obama sought to ‘reset’ the much-troubled relationship. Obama’s mission has been selectively successful: counterproductive ideological crusading has ceased as a serious bilateral flashpoint, practical agreements such as New START and sanctions on Iran stand accomplished, and general atmospherics have been much improved. The latter should not be underestimated for its importance toward future cooperation.

In office, Obama found it necessary to reconcile lofty rhetoric and promises with a pragmatic approach and the realism of domestic and international political environments. It did not take long for exogenous and endogenous tension to arise from the attempt. Obama was able to afford progressive initiatives where he could find and politically afford them, but given the often difficult and uncompromising domestic and global situations, it was a luxury rather

165 Nau, “Obama’s Foreign Policy,” p. 29.
166 Indyk, Lieberthan and O’Hanlon. Bending History, p. 263.
than a standard. This made the Obama administration’s pragmatism starker. Domestic critics pounced on the idealist-realist balancing, particularly in regards to Russia, claiming that it was poor strategy and a disregard for many of the things America has long stood for. The efforts to engage Russia were derided as coming at heavy costs, including the ignoring of traditional allies and their concerns.  

There are limits to change. The sheer complexity and uncertainty of U.S.-Russian relations can yield opportunity at the same time as it can lead to gridlock. The domestic factors have made progress more difficult rather than easy. America has been hit hard by its own concerns, spawning competing revitalization movements, each with a very different picture of what America stands for and how it needs to adapt to the world. They are systematic responses to the changing dynamics of the new century. Predictably split on the left-right ideological spectrum, one side is presented by Obama, his left-wing supporters, and the Occupy movement, while the other side is presented by a combination of conservatives including Sarah Palin, Glen Beck, and the Tea Party movement. Social tensions are high, and the range of actors involved make the situation so much more complex.

Domestic opposition to Obama’s administration can be very adamant in its refusal to deal with Russia, tending to emphasize the differences over the shared interests. The Republicans in particular are prone to see a moral aberration in any dealings with Russia. Interestingly, the view of moral staining is rung domestically in the same breath as Obama’s approach at the international scene is described as one of lacking realism (i.e., non-moral/idealistic). In short, the issue is quite ideological, feeding the increasingly polarizing political environment. Consequently this is “reducing the prospects for effective bipartisanship in foreign policy,” depreciating Obama’s mission for change and impeding “the pursuit of an intelligent and decisive foreign policy in an increasingly complex global setting.”

Case in point, the New START treaty received approval from the U.S. Senate “only after a bruising political battle that consumed the White House’s attention for several months. The

169 Halper, “President Obama at mid-term,” p. 4.
lesson was clear: passing foreign policy legislation would require intense commitments of scarce
time and energy.” James Lindsay notes that, under such a poisonous political atmosphere,
“even if Washington led wisely and sympathetically, others might not follow.” Lindsay contends
that unless Obama is able to break the circle, to find a way “to align his foreign policy
prescriptions with evolving global trends, the gap between American aspirations and
accomplishments will grow, and the prospects for successful US global leadership will dim
further.”

The need for Russia’s cooperation on America’s top foreign policy concerns will remain.
Non-proliferation, arms control and anti-terrorism are issues that the U.S. can ill afford to
jeopardize. “The road to American national security still runs through Moscow,” notes Stephen
Cohen, describing how “Moscow’s military and diplomatic reach can still thwart, or abet, vital
U.S. interests around the globe from Afghanistan, Iran, China and North Korea to Europe and
Latin America [...] without an expansive cooperative relationship with Russia, there can be no
real U.S. national security.” In general a worsening relationship with Russia can easily lead
into negative consequences for American long-term interests: with the loss of Russia as a
partner at the international scene, the U.S. should be prepared to lose the UN Security Council
as a means to legitimize pressure on states like Iran, anti-American groups will be emboldened
by new sources of Russian military hardware, and China would gain greater leverage in dealing
with Washington. Recognizing many of these hazards, Zbigniew Brzezinski concludes that “[i]n
our time, unlike 1,500 years ago, the West and the East cannot keep aloof from each other: their
relationship can only be either reciprocally cooperative or mutually damaging.” The
opportunities that are unfolding before the U.S. and Russia far outweigh the differences
between them, and unless those opportunities are taken, other parties stand to take advantage
from the U.S.-Russian fallout.

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172 Ibid., p. 779.
173 Cohen, “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset,’” p. 11. Interestingly, the security interest that Russia and the U.S.
share against terrorism is also quite value-laden: Islamic fundamentalism is at the forefront of the
terrorist threat, bringing a sense of cultural and ideological clash between nations and states.
174 Simes, “The Costs of Renewed Confrontation,” p. 52; Hart, “Don’t Lose Russia,” p. 24; Aslund and
Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, p. 3; Safranchuk, “Traveling in Different Boats.”
175 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “Balancing the East, upgrading the West,” p. 97.
in a New Era.”
Warning that “[t]he relationship with Russia cannot be allowed to drift,” Isabelle Francois concludes that “the reset policy will remain a significant building block to secure a broad cooperative agenda with Russia on [sic] the long run.”\(^{177}\) Robert Burns conurs in that view, observing that the “interactions between Russia and America are often an uneasy mix of competitions and cooperation, [and] navigating past the mistrust and misapprehensions of the past will take considerable time and effort, from both [America and Russia].”\(^{178}\) Realistically speaking, in light of the history-bound perceptions, expectations, mindsets, and general relational patterns, the U.S.-Russian relationship has been poorly conducive to improvement. The evident purpose of Obama’s ‘reset,’ in line with his pragmatist style, was to positively change that conduction rather than overhaul the whole relationship. To that end, there has been success. Burns does well in explaining its derivation:

> In a more mature relationship between Great Powers, even one with all the historical baggage that Russia and America bring, we ought to be able to build on shared interests while not pulling our punches on differences, and take steps that benefit both of us without grand bargains or tradeoffs that come at the expense of others. That is admittedly easier said than done, but it’s the spirit and mindset in which the new Administration approached a badly broken relationship with Russia.\(^{179}\)

There is a message of hope: the past and the future are inextricably connected, but the inextricable nature of that connection hints at a choice rather than at the inevitability of continuity. To the Obama administration’s credit, under duress of the numerous domestic and international difficulties, the hope in U.S.-Russian relationship has been given a lifeline.

There are a number of potential paths that can be taken:

- Geopolitical and ideological rivalry: least desirable for the U.S. and Russia, but a path that the countries may easily revert to, particularly if given domestic change toward conservatism (in Russia’s case that will mean authoritarian or communist tradition rather than liberalism).
- Russian conversion toward the liberal democratic model of governance: questionable but not entirely impossible. Historically, Russia has had a love-hate relationship to...


\(^{178}\) Burns, “The United States and Russia in a New Era.”

\(^{179}\) Ibid.
Western influence; at times adopting many of the Western ways and values, at other times being repulsed by a number of important differences.

- American restraint of liberal universalization: questionable but also not entirely impossible. As noted before, post-Cold War environment and globalization have brought a new set of dynamic changes that demand a new look at cultural-ideological differences. The times of value-driven foreign policy appear to have exceeded their stay; hence any universalization will have to be pursued by the competition of ideas rather than force.

- Short-term compromise marked by pragmatics and overlooking of core differences: likely a temporary solution, but one that may be useful to pursue until both sides figure out where they stand ideologically, in absolute and relative terms. This is most likely the path taken by Obama. It is a good question to ask whether he would have taken it if it were not for the global challenges that demanded greater cooperation between the great and rising powers.

- Long-term compromise: perhaps the most desirable path, but one that would require the greatest effort to maintain. Foremost, it contains the difficult prerequisite that Russia and U.S. resolve their core differences, in values, ideology and conceptions of democracy.

At the current state of events, there is a varied and dynamic set of options for the U.S.-Russian relationship. Obama has been re-elected, but the bipartisan Congressional support still appears far from assured. Putin’s tightening authoritarianism in Russia is likely to complicate that divide, and it will certainly leave an impression that the U.S. administration will have to uneasily explain. On the up side, Russian government’s more entrenched political authority and looser ties to internal lobbying and interest groups makes it a stable partner for compromise. Open and negotiable Russia can help Obama’s mission for change. If national interests of both sides are timely juggled and reckoned to find common ground on concessions – which, admittedly, may have to come at the expense of others like Iran, Syria on the Russian side and Europe on the American side – the near future is likely to bring the U.S.-Russian cooperation that has been anticipated since the end of the Cold War.
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