Painting Time: Metaphor in creative process

by

Suk Kyoung Choi

B.F.A., (Hons., Media Arts), Alberta College of Art and Design, 2009

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the
School of Interactive Arts and Technology
Faculty of Communication, Art and Technology

© Suk Kyoung Choi 2013

Simon Fraser University
Spring 2013

All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for “Fair Dealing.” Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, particularly if cited appropriately.
Approval

Name: Suk Kyoung Choi
Degree: Master of Arts
Title of Thesis: Painting Time: Metaphor in creative process

Examine Committee:

Chair: Philippe Pasquier, Assistant Professor

Thecla Schiphorst
Senior Supervisor
Associate Professor

James Bizzocchi
Supervisor
Associate Professor

Carolyn Mamchur
Supervisor
Professor
Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University

Steve DiPaola
External Examiner
Associate Professor

Date Defended/Approved: January 14, 2013
Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the “Institutional Repository” link of the SFU Library website (www.lib.sfu.ca) at http://summit/sfu.ca and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission.

Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence.

While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Simon Fraser University Library
Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada

revised Fall 2011
Abstract

This first-person research examines the painter’s description of embodied practice. The thesis proposes that embodied descriptions of process may be found in metaphor, grounding this methodology on recent research in the cognitive unconscious and phenomenological methods of first-person access to lived experience. For the purposes of this study, I situate myself as subject, conducting a close reading and reflective examination of my painting process in order to gain insight into the essential aspects of the artist’s description of experience. The methodology investigates correlations between reflexive self-observation and its inscription in language. I use this method to provide an account of pragmatic practice. The thesis proposes a preliminary formulation of descriptors of qualitative experience that may help to inform development of interactive technologies.

Keywords:  Embodied cognition; lived experience; reflective practice; art-painting process; metaphoric image schema; enactive transformation
“...as time gets shorter, wisdom grows.”

With thanks to my Grandfathers,

my Father, Mother,

and all my teachers.
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the encouragement and support of Thecla Schiphorst, Carolyn Mamchur, Jim Bizzocchi, and Steve DiPaola, and to express my gratitude for their guidance throughout the extensive journey of process undertaken in this thesis.
# Table of Contents

Approval.................................................................................................................................................. ii  
Partial Copyright Licence ......................................................................................................................... iii  
Abstract.................................................................................................................................................... iv  
Dedication................................................................................................................................................... v  
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................................... vi  
Table of Contents..................................................................................................................................... vii  
List of Tables............................................................................................................................................... ix  
List of Images............................................................................................................................................... x  
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ xi  
List of Acronyms or Glossary..................................................................................................................... xii  
Introductory Image – “The session”. ......................................................................................................... xiii

1. **Introduction** ....................................................................................................................................... 1  
   1.1. Painting Time..................................................................................................................................... 1  
   1.2. Why is describing lived experience important? ............................................................................. 2  
   1.3. Some acknowledgements in the beginning; setting the stage....................................................... 3  

2. **Review of Literature – Where I’m coming from** .......................................................................... 6  
   2.1. Artist’s creative experience............................................................................................................ 6  
      2.1.1. The pragmatic practice of painting ..................................................................................... 7  
      2.1.2. Painter’s tacit knowledge....................................................................................................... 9  
      2.1.2.1. “Know-how”: The artist’s embodied process ................................................................. 10  
      2.1.3. The reflective conversation ................................................................................................. 15  
      2.1.3.1. Implicit time..................................................................................................................... 18  
      2.1.3.2. “Session”: Expressive and reflective process in creative action .................................. 22  
      2.1.3.2.1. Ideation / iteration process; development of the session ......................................... 23  
      2.1.4. Embodied action: The painter-in-action............................................................................. 25  
      2.1.4.1. Painter’s story.................................................................................................................. 26  
      2.1.4.2. Enaction.......................................................................................................................... 28  
   2.2. First-person experience and intuitive validation ............................................................................ 32  
      2.2.1. ‘Structures of mediation’ – the first-person account ......................................................... 32  
      2.2.2. First-person point of view and the intersubjective experience ......................................... 34  
      2.2.3. Intuitive experience in the creative process ....................................................................... 36  
      2.2.3.1. Issues raised by a previous study on intuitive experience ........................................... 37  
   2.3. Embodied Metaphor....................................................................................................................... 40  
      2.3.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 40  
      2.3.2. Embodied (cognitive) metaphor .......................................................................................... 42  
      2.3.2.1. Body as metaphor ......................................................................................................... 42  
      2.3.2.2. Kinesthetic image schema ............................................................................................. 43  
      2.3.2.3. Container schema .......................................................................................................... 44  
      2.3.2.4. Processual description in metaphor .............................................................................. 45  
   2.3.3. The Metaphor of painting ......................................................................................................... 46  
   2.3.4. Visual elements.......................................................................................................................... 47  
      2.3.4.1. Point .............................................................................................................................. 49  
      2.3.4.2. Line .............................................................................................................................. 50  

vii
3. Methodology: A first- and second-person approach to understanding the painter’s experience .......................................................................................................................... 53
  3.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 53
  3.1.1. The Metaphor of Texture – a pragmatic tool ................................................................. 55
  3.1.2. Terminologies in structures of mediation ........................................................................ 59
  3.1.3. Process as interactivity ..................................................................................................... 61
  3.1.4. Epoche in practice ........................................................................................................... 62
  3.1.5. The cycle of process; the memory of action ..................................................................... 64
  3.2. Gathering process-description ............................................................................................. 67
  3.2.1. Methodological procedures ............................................................................................ 67
    3.2.1.1. Categories of reflexive questions ................................................................................. 72
  3.2.2. Description of the session environment ........................................................................... 73
  3.2.3. Post-session analysis of reflexive conversation .................................................................. 75

4. Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 81
  4.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 81
  4.2. First-person observation – getting into ................................................................................. 85
  4.3. Second-person observation – standing back ......................................................................... 90
    4.3.1. Domain of Form ......................................................................................................... 92
    4.3.2. Domain of Body ....................................................................................................... 93
    4.3.3. Domain of Action ...................................................................................................... 94
  4.4. Transmetaphoric schema – the enactive transformation ...................................................... 95
  4.5. Acknowledgements and limitations of the study ................................................................. 104

5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 105

References ...................................................................................................................................... 109

Appendices ..................................................................................................................................... 115
Appendix A. Archetypes of Painting (with script). .......................................................................... 116
Appendix B. Session 1 .................................................................................................................. 143
Appendix C. Session 2 ................................................................................................................ 153
Appendix D. Journal notes .......................................................................................................... 172
Appendix E. Database .................................................................................................................. 174
List of Tables

Table 1. Structures of mediation. .............................................................................. 71
Table 2. Format of the Database Categories................................................................. 76
List of Images

Image 1.  The Immanent Subject ................................................................. xiii

Image 2.  The Studio for Session 3 ............................................................... 63

Image 3.  The Observed (texture) and the Real (light). .................................. 75

Image 4.  Archetypes of Painting ................................................................. 87

Image 5.  It Comes Out Softly ..................................................................... 89
List of Figures

Figure 1. Continuum of Consciousness ................................................................. 15
Figure 2. Procedural Description of the Reflecting Act ........................................... 20
Figure 3. Expressive and reflective creative process ............................................... 23
Figure 4. Metaphorical schematic image of ‘overlaying’ ........................................... 44
Figure 5. The Metaphor of Texture ........................................................................... 57
Figure 6. The first- and second-person account in this study ................................... 59
Figure 7. Cycle of process ......................................................................................... 65
Figure 8. Hypothetical Model of Painting Process ................................................... 84
Figure 9. Intersubjective Response .......................................................................... 86
Figure 10. Creative Process as Phenomenological Reduction .................................... 91
Figure 11. Metaphorical enactive transformation ...................................................... 99
# List of Acronyms or Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LoT</td>
<td>List of Tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LoF</td>
<td>List of Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introductory Image – “The session”.

*Image 1. The Immanent Subject.*

Note. The light, ever shifting, illuminates the shadows of tacit knowledge held within my brush.
(Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)
1. **Introduction**

1.1. **Painting Time**

This study examines the moment when an artist makes an intuitive decision in the creative process, and attempts to look for metaphorical descriptions of this moment from an artist’s point of view. As a painter, I focus on the painter’s lived experience, examining the description in metaphor of the process of instantiation. This approach is grounded on previous studies of embodied cognition, pragmatic practice, visual theory, and metaphor theory. My hypothesis is based on the application of these studies to my own pragmatic experience as a painter. Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela, and Pierre Vermersch propose that an unfolding practice of knowledge begins when one chooses to “investigate conscious activity in so far as it perceives itself unfolding in an operative and immanent mode, at once habitual and pre-reflective.” (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2003, p. 1). Using the appropriate metaphor of a surveyor proceeding into unknown territory armed with only “a sketchy map and some surveyor’s tools” Depraz, et al. propose an exploration of the “emergence of conscious activity as it happens.” This study attempts to apply that method of investigation to the process of painting.

Artists make active intuitive decisions during the artistic process. Engaged in reflexive practice they act from a body of professional knowledge, embodied as an accumulation of personalized ‘know-how’, through a continuously reforming process of expression and reflection. An artist-painter observes the world, reflects upon how to describe what is experienced, considers what she already knows and how it may be differentiated, “makes up her mind”, and acts through the brushstroke. When a painter acts, it is a decision-making that reflects an observation of the world that is both motivated by, and motivating of, experience. It is this moment of the “making up” of the mind wherein the curious transitional experience of the intuitive act takes place.
When I look at the process of painting, when I paint and observe the act of painting, there seems to be more information in this painter’s activity than is readily describable. There is not just the complexity of representation in material and concept, but also the complexity of the generative act itself. It is obvious that it is difficult to describe complex experience. But why is this so? What are the elements of an active experience with the world that elude description? It seems, while I paint and teach painting, that there is much of sensorial experience that cannot be described directly but only through something else we have already established some agreement about by using metaphorical analogies, and by showing the respondent motions that have proven effective in personal experience. This transformational but tacit relationship of analogy and effective action leads to an embodied understanding held as descriptive of the object or condition.

As we cannot describe tacit experience to others ‘as such’, this study attempts to examine the artist's embodied knowledge through a process of metaphorical reasoning. It explores evidence for metaphorical mapping from lived practice to language in the artistic process utilizing a cognitive relational framework that is grounded on recent research in embodied cognition (Baars, Johnson, and Lakoff). I hypothesize that the artist’s motivation for this mapping is the pursuit of an active awareness, not just of objects and conditions, but also of states of affairs.

1.2. Why is describing lived experience important?

Research on how embodied pragmatic experience is reflected in language describing creative process is sparse. Most available studies are descriptions of artefacts, the refuse of an experience that has since been lost to all but the artist. How may we access, represent and preserve the lived experience that remains tacitly embodied in the artist? How may one begin to describe the continuous process of creativity?

Artists and writers are drawn to describe human experience. Their works spring from an invisible well of embodied practice. This research explores the phenomenological relationship of the artist to her environment and examines ways in
which the *lived body* expresses itself through metaphoric structures in language and in form. Aristotle has described metaphor as something that cannot be learnt from others and “implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars” (Ricouer, 1977/1991, p. 6). It is this intuitive leap of understanding that suggests a pathway, however elusive, towards the description of non-textual knowledge.

The artist’s lived experience is drawn from an experiential understanding of interactive creativity, an understanding that takes as its foundation the practice of intentional expression and reflective self-observation. This study attempts to arrive at an understanding of how cognitive structure emerges in pragmatic self-observation during the artistic process, by drawing from definitions of the principles of visual art posed by Wassily Kandinsky in the early years of the twentieth century, and recontextualizing that knowledge in contemporary cognitive theory (Johnson & Lakoff). In reflexive practice, expression may be directed at objects, which take on the character of artefacts, or upon the artist herself, which is the self-referential, embodying *practice* of the artist.

This study therefore investigates metaphor as a way of describing and understanding the artist’s experience and furthermore understands experience to be the *enactive* foundation of all creative process. Our experience is both formed by and forms a world that is *experienced*. What are the natures of metaphors that emerge during the experience of creative practice and what might their relationships to process reveal? If it is possible to define an approach to the categorization of metaphoric descriptions of experience-based understandings of process, then it may be that the translation and preservation of a multitude of traditions of cultural experience (the intersubjective world-body), that of ages of embodied ‘know-how’ transferred from practitioner to student, may continue to inform future generations of researchers engaged in the examination of awareness in an increasingly digital world.

1.3. **Some acknowledgements in the beginning; setting the stage**

This thesis attempts to discover an intersubjectively verifiable method of describing the experience of a painter. As an artist I am very aware of and appreciate
the stylistic and conceptual perspectives of different painters. However, this study (and I, as a first-person cognitive researcher) only means to look, through the painting process, at the moment of (immanent) action that all artists experience in creative activity, through their diverse individuated methods, practices, and results.

Through application of the concept of “enaction” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch. 1991/1999, p. 173), the research conducts an analysis of an artist's actions, as well as spoken and written words during and after process, looking for evidence of the existence of metaphorical descriptions of embodied concepts relevant to creative practice. That practice is here viewed as a process of continuous interchange between creative action, reaction, observation, and self-observation.

There may be ‘no one way to do something’, but there is, in the practitioner, an embodied knowledge of how to do. It is this reflexive sense of the pragmatic question-and-answer of how, its embodied expression and reflection, which motivates this study.

(Some formatting conventions):

Throughout this thesis, there are certain formatting conventions I have adopted that need to be explained in advance. Underlining of words is used to give emphasis to my voice and to draw attention to the term’s particular nuance in context. Italicized terms will be words that I will explain further in the discussion following their first occurrence, and therefore indicate an intention to define my usage of the term in this research. (These italicized occurrences will remain as such until the paragraph of the defining occurrence is reached when, in some cases, it is important to stress that this will be a key defined term but the definition is best read in the context of its greater explanation). There will be also some use of ‘single quotation marks’ in quoting proverbs or generally known phrases (folk sayings, common expressions), and in paraphrased indirect quotations. In the latter case, the source text is still cited.

I have also taken the creative liberty of inserting an intermittent overlay of what I will call ‘the artist's voice’, an intervention, if my reader will indulge it, of hyper-reflective observation which emerged from a detached overview of the thesis as it was written. Being hyper-reflective overlays on the discourse they do not necessarily restrict their interplay with discreet regions of text, and may in fact overlap each other, or nest. Being
hyper-reflexive I invite the reader to determine the relationship and propose that the meaning found is essential to the nature of the intersubjective investigation that this thesis is grounded upon. This overlaying framework is graphically indicated thusly:

*In script font, the voice of the artist.*

A final formatting convention I should note here is that references to the database of qualitative observations accumulated during the painting sessions are addressed by calling the cell identified in the database as the REF. address of the row containing the entire description, not by any particular portion of that individual record.

In my terminology, I will sometimes use the word ‘drawing’ instead of the related word ‘painting’. In Fine Arts, the differences are commonly understood to be chiefly choices of usage of material and the duration of the session. In this research both drawing and painting are understood as ways of expressing and presenting the artist’s idea to the viewer through a process of physical work involving manipulation of materials and tools and the application of visual metaphors of the body’s division of space. Commonly, drier materials, such as pencil, charcoal, pastel, chalk, etc. will be more often used in drawing than painting, which may foreground the line over the plane, but that does not mean that artists do not use paint to draw. There is general understanding that drawing is more concerned with the presentation of ideas in development, a sense of the study of the active dynamic of process, and usually takes place over a shorter time period than painting. This is partially due to the nature of wet materials as paint takes longer to dry and continue – but this may be still arguable depending on the artist’s way of working. I will use the word ‘draw’ or ‘drawing’ when I mean to emphasize the act of painting, the dynamic process of drawing-out the emergent idea. This research is primarily concerned with the investigation of embodied expressive action in creative practice. ‘Drawings’ remain drawings and ‘paintings’ remain paintings.
2. Review of Literature – Where I’m coming from

The grounding of this research is the artist’s creative experience. This experience is approached from a three-fold perspective of embodied action, intuitive evidence, and embodied metaphor. I will first describe the artist’s experience, from the pragmatic practice of the embodiment of tacit knowledge, to the reflective conversation of creative process, leading to an understanding of the painter as an exemplification of discipline specific embodied action. I then investigate first-person experience, describing how structures of mediation (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2003, p. 80) lead inevitably to the arising of intersubjective meaning formation through the validation of intuitive evidence. The third part of the investigation investigates embodied metaphor and considers how kineasthetic image schemas form cognitive metaphoric structures as active operational principles during the painting process.

2.1. Artist’s creative experience

(What are the origins of intersubjective evidence?):

A painter may place a dot on canvas, very carefully. When we look closely at the dot, the dot is not any more just a dot but also a plane, a plane that has an organic shape and texture. How does a painter know when and where to put ‘a dot’ on a canvas? Where are the intended limits of the dot? How does a painter develop a painting from the dot? What does the artist see that represents this potentiality for the emergence of visual metaphor in this small space of paint? The common thread through this mystery is perhaps found in what I will call in this thesis the *creative praxis of intentional embodiment*. 
2.1.1. **The pragmatic practice of painting**

A single white dot emerges from the immanent, makes its specious voyage to the manifest, and leaves behind on canvass a glistening orb reflecting the retreating brush tip and all the world it holds. In a brief moment of noetic emergence I am transfixed in the texture of time. I part ways, leaving this child dot of the artefact I stand in front of behind, I yet remain forever embodied with the texture of the moment. What does this reflexive relationship the artist holds with experience, its form and its enactment, suggest to a learning of how to see? We have to touch to see. You can do this with your eyes closed.

Phenomenology speaks of an operative or functional *intentionality*, a description of the "movement in which an object or concept is formed, capturing the moment when it is there immanently, experienced without yet having been seen" (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 19). The artist is constantly involved with intention, making it *practice*. Husserl characterizes the *intentional act* as those mental acts that 'have the peculiarity of presenting the subject with an object' (Gurwitsch, 1967, pp. 118-137). The *intentional act*, then, presents to consciousness an *object*, whether 'real' or 'imaginary', an epistemological stance originating from the subjective investigation of cognition itself as the object of cognition (Husserl, 1964/1967, pp.18, 33).

By Husserl’s definition, every intentionality is comprised of a *noema* and a *noesis*. The noema is the structure of consciousness toward which intention is directed; it is the *dot*, the here and now ‘perceived as such’, devoid of meaning but pregnant with context, the pure appearance of the dot, the canvass, the space *as it appears*. Husserl describes this as “what is essentially *given*” (Husserl, 1931, p. 260). But this noema is layered on by meaning, the noetic, *through* the intentional act of the artist that synthesizes the noematic and noetic correlates of intentionality into the essence of experience. As Husserl notes, “Every intentional experience, thanks to its noetic phase, is noetic, it is in its essential nature to harbour in itself a ‘meaning’ of some sort, it may be many meanings” (Husserl, 1931/1958, p. 257). The artist’s practice, then, is to arrive at seeing this single dot as *that* dot; the moment immanent become the thing realized.
Yet it is important to note that the noema of intention are not the substance of day-to-day ‘casual’ appearances, and this difference is critical to the practice of seeing in artistic reflection: “Every noesis is correlated with a noema through which it intends its object. Thus the noema is not present (even marginally) to ordinary involved consciousness; rather it is presented only in that special act of reflection which Husserl calls the phenomenological reduction” (Dreyfus, 1982, p.118). As Clark Moustakas explains in Phenomenological Research Methods, “the working out of the noema-noesis relationship, the textural (noematic) and structural (noetic) dimensions of phenomena, and the derivation of meanings is an essential function of intentionality” (Moustakas, 1994, pp. 25-43). From the perspective of cognitive psychology and theoretical neurobiology, Bernard J. Baars offers a model of intentions as “multileveled goal structures”, or goal contexts that “represent futures states of the system, serving to constrain processes that can help reach those future states” (Baars, 1988, p. 230). From the hierarchical relationships implicit within such a structuring of goal contexts Baars draws an accounting for the sense of significance associated with intentional acts (Baars, 1988, p. 242).

All painters start with some initiating motivation when they begin painting. There may be conceptual and stylistic variations in the process, but every painter must begin with some as yet not fully defined goal. When an artist confesses to having only a vague idea of the goal, it does not mean that there is no intention, even if it is not yet, or cannot be, clearly expressed. If there were no intention they would not be able to (or would not need to) make anything at all. Intention may not initiate with complete (or even much) clarity but it must contain within it a motivational focus, a direction of practice. It must in some way be significant. So the painter begins with what some may call a ‘notion’ and some a ‘feeling’, others an ‘imagination of the mental image’, but which in any case constitutes a cognitive state of immanence, a state of which, in its enactment, “can be made the object of a pure ‘seeing’ and understanding, and is something absolutely given in the ‘seeing’ (Husserl, 1964/1967, pp. 24,33). I understand immanence in painterly process as the cognitive pre-anticipation of discovering what underlies the veil of the unspoken, to begin to move from that feeling towards action, in order to inscribe its form. First there is the ‘thing’ in consciousness, then the synthesis (description) of that thing in painterly action.
The creative investigation of the artist is only sometimes painted.

A painter’s goal may be adjusted and is progressively embodied as the journey of painting proceeds. Along the way, a painter makes many intuitive decisions that are very similar to a researcher seeking evidence, a writer finding a voice and creating a character, a carpenter who solves a structural problem, a surgeon feeling his way through living flesh; critical intuitive decisions that are the foundation of all pragmatic practice. As with many of these practitioners, a painter’s decisions emanate from their ‘know-how’, and this know-how is expressed in action. Donald Schön describes this know-how as coming from an understanding that is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the world that we are dealing with (Schön, 1983). He describes “our knowing (as) ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say that our knowing is in our action” (Schön, 1983, p. 49).

But there are other more ‘artistic’ aspects to creative action than in other pragmatic arts and as such Schön notes two meanings in the art of management: 1) intuitive knowing and 2) reflection-in-action of intuitive knowing (Schön, 1983, p. 241). Schön compares a ‘creative’ and ‘intuitive’ knowing to what he calls, “generative metaphor”. He argues that reflection on ‘seeing-as’, a process of examining similarity in pragmatic observation, takes an important role in invention and design (Schön, 1983, p. 182-4) by suggesting the mechanism through which someone makes a genuine connection between similarities (or dissimilarities). This then is the phenomenological reduction that motivates the practitioner’s art; the pragmatic investigation of meaning formation in lived experience. Pragmatic study of the creative process takes place through the eyes of a painter, who seeks to see through experience.

2.1.2. Painter’s tacit knowledge

As Schön notes in The Reflective Practitioner, not every practitioner ‘reflects-in-action’ (Schön, 1983, pp. 68,69), but reflection-in-action during work is essential to the artistic and intuitive process where practitioners may observe and interact with situations of uncertainty, uniqueness, in qualitative states, and within an emergent complexity. Procedures that can be solved through a ‘technical rationality’ (Schön, 1983, pp. 21-30)
cannot be strictly defined in such cases. Partially because every new observation, through its contextual framing, may present itself as “unfamiliar” and “unexpected”, the artist who is working in a condition of dynamic action has to deconstruct while they also express those actions that produce the very thing that they seek to observe.

When someone makes a unique connection between objects, be they physical or conceptual, in many cases this connection is initially tenuous and unfamiliar, requiring further investigation. This uncertainty motivates recursive (closer) investigation. Donald Schön describes the ‘unique situation’ as the domain of inquiry of pragmatic learning (Schön, 1983, p. 16). Citing examples from diverse professional practices including psychiatry and engineering, Schön describes the art of practice as an inquiry into a state of unique conditions that are intermittent and unknown. This state may be instructively compared with the painter’s experience: Not only does every subject matter that a painter observes stand in unique relation to every other, but the painter’s practice is complex – a cycle of sometimes unpredictable consequences that are themselves reflexive motivations. John Dewey also describes the ‘importance of uncertainty’ (Dewey, How we think, 1910, p. 9).

2.1.2.1. “Know-how”: The artist’s embodied process

How to re-light the fire the very ashes of which are scattered?
(Paul Gauguin, 1919/1994, p. 15)

(Embodied ‘know-how’: The grounding of the self):

This section will address some of the difficulties inherent in describing the artist’s experience. Creative process, a reflexive act of doing and responding, embodies experience within the artist in a way that is not immediately available to discursive exposition. Discourse attempts to describe by means of a single semiotic channel what has been gained through multiple channels of lived experience. This amounts to a curious balancing act between multiple input and seemingly limited output. The unavoidably reflexive nature of process calls for an account of this seeming inequality.

The artistic practice involves a reflexive interactivity between physical actions and procedures, and a requisite reflection upon themes derived from first-hand observation of natural phenomena. This interactivity leads to a practiced but evolving
body of knowledge that artists identify as their ‘way’ of working. Yet a large amount of what is commonly called *practical knowledge* is implicit, tacit; functioning below the level of conscious acknowledgment (Schön, 1983, p. viii). When an artist begins creative work, she therefore does not, perhaps cannot, know exactly how long it will take to get into the state of mind necessary to creative work. The nature of creative insight is that it can sometimes be instantaneous; can sometimes take days. Once paused, the work is difficult to return to. Gauguin’s scattered ashes remind us it can be next to impossible to return to the process in the same way that it was begun. New beginnings must be found, initiated, and connected to what remains of prior understandings.

The simple fact emerges that experience is contextual, and understanding emerges from a ‘connecting of the dots’ of contextual experiences that are each and every one different from, yet continuous with, the others; the scattered ashes of inspiration and causality. This inseparability of concept and experience, this embodiment of ‘prototypical categories of experience’ as described by Johnson and Lakoff, “is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in”, so that we cannot “get beyond our categories and have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience” (Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 1999, p. 19). In Johnson and Lakoff’s terms then, the artist builds and rebuilds her *body* of practical knowledge through a process of *sensorimotor inference*.

*(Development of know-how through balance):*

There has been much discussion attempting to explicate the problem of tacit knowing, a general acknowledgement that “we can know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966/1983, p. 4). This metaphoric phrasing with knowledge applied to itself appears to suggest a recursively irresolvable paradox: How can we know something we cannot describe? How did we obtain this knowledge? How do we tell it to another? A demonstrative example of this kind of knowledge is our primary sense of human *balance*: balancing is something we simply *do*, without any directly observable cognitive involvement nor any ability to describe the experience in progress.

When a baby first stands up, it repeatedly falls down. The baby tries again and again, sometimes holding on to something, but at some point it stands up by itself;
balancing in the world on two legs. From that time on, the body is constantly engaged with gravitation, shifting, adjusting, and learning skills that take place in three-dimensional space. In this active sense, balanced with the world is perhaps a more apt description of our relationship with gravity. The cognitive interaction between body and environment is unavoidable. The development of this ability even prefigures conscious awareness. Human children stand up for the first time near the end of year one, or soon thereafter, but it is not until approximately age four or five that logical reasoning begins to develop, with children being able to predict the order of events (Piaget, 1950/2001, p. 149).

Piaget demonstrates that cognitive schemata are formed in a blend of pre-conceptual type-concepts and sensori-motor assimilation (Piaget, 1950/2001, p. 141). He illustrates that sensori-motor intelligence is "an intelligence in action and in no way reflective" (Piaget, 1950/2001, p. 133, italics added), and describes three essential conditions that arise with the arrival of reflective cognition,

- an increase in speed allowing the knowledge of successive phases of an action to be moulded into one simultaneous whole,
- an awareness of the mechanisms, and
- an increase in distances allowing for extensions to time and space.

Piaget observes that during the 'preconceptual period' of cognitive development (before the age of 4-5) children will move an object further or closer to their eyes to come to understand that the same thing may exist in various seen states (Piaget, cited by Polanyi, 1958/1974, p. 75). This observation suggests that conceptual development and sensori-motor engagement are being cognitively associated at an age considerably before any ability to form logical relationships between states of perceptual conditions develops, and are therefore co-embedded into the schematic structures that constitute our ability to perceive, let alone reason, about the world. A further interesting reflection on this is Piaget's observation that children below the age of roughly 2½ will accept objects as non-existent if those objects are covered up (Piaget, 1950/2001, pp. 123-127). Below this age in the pre-conceptual phase they have not yet developed prototypical categories of experience at all; each appearance of an event is a new event.
Viewed alternately, they are in a state of constant undifferentiated (new) sensation.
Smooth as a Deleuzian baby’s bottom.

(Relationship of know-how and tacit understanding):

In Michael Polanyi’s interpretation, this learning by experience is directly associated with the gradual development of structures of cognitive interpretation that allow for the relational conceptualization of inference to arise (Polanyi, 1958/1974, p. 75). The experienced relationships between our actions and effects develop into a cognitive foundation of inferential logic. These inferential structures are so powerful that the child comes to accept that a thing still exists even when it is not seen; he can predict its reappearance. He can discover through reason and action the situated relationship between himself and his goal in the world. Tacit knowledge, then, represents an embodied understanding of experience that shapes our actions and our form. In this sense, tacit knowledge represents an embodied memory of effective action.

Polanyi gives an example of the embodiment of acquired skill that is learned through experience yet remains not describable in words, with the example of riding a bicycle:

[… the principle by which the cyclist keeps his balance is not generally known. The rule observed by the cyclist is this. When he starts falling to the right he turns the handlebars to the right, so that the course of the bicycle is deflected along a curve towards the right. This results in a centrifugal force pushing the cyclist to the left and offsets the gravitational force dragging him down to the right. This manoeuvre presently throws the cyclist out of balance to the left, which he counteracts by turning the handlebars to the left; and so he continues to keep himself in balance by winding along a series of appropriate curvatures. A simple analysis shows that for a given angle of unbalance the curvature of each winding is inversely proportional to the square of the speed at which the cyclist is proceeding. (Polanyi, 1958/1974, pp. 49-50)

Similarly with this complex series of unrealized calculations, the artist-practitioner’s know-how forms through a practiced but undescribed accumulation of inferred relationships between form and function. It is the position of this research that the lived experience of the artist constitutes the result of a life-long phenomenological investigation of this apparent paradox; a first-person investigation of the intersubjectively
Verifiable state through a practice of intentional embodiment. Art is tied to its medium in fundamental ways as the artist's iterative involvement with the nature of material fashions the artefact of her conception. The artist is drawn to a self-reflective observation of what in my personal creative work I refer to as 'cracks in reality', those moments of acute observation when one is able to see what was not there before, to “take the raw material each time anew and twist it into shape” (Henri, 1923/1939, p. 83; italics added) in order to find, like the pre-conceptual child, how things are formed from my relationship to them and to myself that manifests as an interactive play with objects in the world. Play arises when one contemplates relationships, and as Robert Henri says in The Art Spirit, “no one can get anywhere without contemplation” (Henri, 1923/1939, p. 105). Schön supports the suggestion that practitioners’ know-how is in their action (Schön, 1983, p. 50), citing Gilbert Ryle:

What distinguishes sensible from silly operations is not their parentage but their procedure, and this holds no less for intellectual than for practical performances. "Intelligent" cannot be defined in terms of "intellectual" or "knowing how" in terms of "knowing that"; "thinking what I am doing" does not connote "both thinking what to do and doing it." When I do something intelligently... I am doing one thing and not two. My performance has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents. (Schön, 1983, p. 51)

The artist’s embodied knowledge is formed in parallel with her movement in visual space and constitutes a practiced investigation over an extended period of time. I have discussed balance as a fundamental concept in any schema of cognition, in the development of tacit understanding of the world. The artist conducts a practice that balances their actions with their results, engaging in an attempt to form an intersubjectively verifiable experience. In order to achieve this verifiability, this experience must reflect within its creator as well as within its perceiver.

(Towards the reflective process):

Therefore, we have described some of the cognitive foundations of the artist’s embodied process that allow for a description of an act that, as John Dewy notes, “is not simplistically spontaneous but emanates from the intensity of individualized experience of the artist in the world” (Dewey, Art as Experience, 1934/1958, p.144).
But in order for the artist, writer, or creative practitioner to begin work, they have to get closer to the unconscious phenomena that reside below the level of daily awareness (Fig. 1; Baars, 1988, pp. 12-13). In an almost ritualistic process, the artist must find access points into her unconscious world in order to express and observe herself operating as part of the creative act. Re-lighting fire from scattered ashes involves first realizing that ashes are fire in a different state and form; access to meaning starts with looking in a different way. This difficulty involved in this ‘seeing of what is unseen’ may be usefully compared to similar processes found in meditative traditions and dream recall exercises. We therefore turn next to an examination of essential principles found in traditions of self-reflection and reflexive practice.

2.1.3.  The reflective conversation

Self-reflection is taken by this thesis to be the fundamental ‘why’ of creative practice. Self-reflection is experienced through a process of eidetic reduction (Husserl),
wherein invariant elements (of experience) can be isolated and identified out of various relative and contingent features allowing for descriptions of how an act may be concretized (instantiated) in the manner of its essential characteristics without restriction to the limitations imposed by strictly finitary propositional formulations (Johnson, 1987, pp. 1-5). Mark Johnson, in *The Body In the Mind*, argues against the linguistic bias that semantic meaning is exclusively held in the propositional, sentential, structure of language. He therefore proposes a non-objectivist understanding of cognitive operations he terms “image schemata” that represent propositional structures that are “continuous, analog pattern(s) of experience or understanding, with sufficient internal structure to permit inferences” (Johnson, 1987, p. 4; emphasis added). Depraz, et al. similarly describe how we understand the world as process rather than something to which we can give a definition. Depraz, et al. call this process “becoming aware” to thematize individual nature of experience.

The goal of self-reflection is “a unique mental capacity that comes between the new awareness allowed by suspension and inscription of results in traces others can read or see” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 43). Self-reflection allows us, in the words of Depraz, et al., “to tap into a fertile void which escapes, experientially, the boundaries of our given worlds and languages, and reaches an ontological level that is more radically open” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 41). This openness is fundamental to creative practice. The artist believes that the rich experience of reality is most deeply modeled by multiple-points of view, and that these points of view must be examined in reductive examination through repeated iterations of observation and expression.

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch give a procedural description of the reflective act in *On Becoming Aware: A Pragmatics of Experiencing* (Depraz, et. al, 2003). They describe a phenomenological and pragmatic methodology of the reflecting act that they suggest forms the dynamic essence of becoming aware, and define a set temporal cycles called a *session* during which we develop the technique of becoming aware in social practice (Depraz, et al., 2003, p.20).

*Epoche is the basic cycle, the origin of the idea of a cycle*
Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch name the basic cyclic and interactive process of the reflective act *epoche*¹, and include the phenomenological sense of Husserl’s term *epoche* as suspension.² They note the structural dynamic of the act of becoming aware as such:

*Epoche* and intuitive evidence form the *minimal* but self-sufficient *cycle* of the reflecting act. That means they call for one another: *epoche* is naturally completed by an intuition that crystallizes for the subject and which serves as strong internal evidence; this evidence is prepared for and qualified by a gradual process of completion [*remplissement*] that has its own quality of suspension. (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 24)

The three principal phases of *epoche* lead towards the awareness of intuitive evidence that both completes and initiates the cycle through its reiterating principle of a suspension of belief. Depraz, et al. identify three principal phases of *epoche* starting with the 1) *phase of suspension*, “suspending your “realist” prejudice that what appears to you is truly the state of the world”. The initiation of “suspension” consists of three basic techniques (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 26):

- An external existential event trigger (shock or aesthetic surprise)
- Intersubjective suggestion of guidance
- Self initiated (requires practice to stabilize the attitude as in meditation training)

Depraz, et al. equate these techniques of inducing or promoting the initiation of the phase of suspension with various methods such as ‘prescribed cognitive attitudes’, specific ‘bodily attitudes’, ‘modifications of speech’, or the recognition of the ‘real presence of identifiable resistance’ to progress. The phase of suspension is then followed by the 2) *phase of redirection*, which means “redirecting your attention from the

---

¹ A wilful act of suspension of belief in any unexamined truth in search of absolute certainty, termed “epodiciticy” by Husserl.

² “Greek ethical attitude of suspension”, Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2003, p. 25. See also def. “epoche, n.” Derived originally from the Greek Skeptics.
“exterior” to the “interior”\(^3\), and, next, by a 3) phase of letting-go, (or “acceptance” of the experience) which results in “[changing] the *quality* of your attention, moving from an active search to an accepting letting-arrive” (Depraz, et al, 2003, pp. 25-31).

This basic cycle, *epoche*, coupled with “intuitive evidence” is developed towards the stages of expression and validation of results in the context of a session. Depraz, et al. use the term “intuitive evidence” to indicate a complementary component, interacting with the cycle of *epoche*, and leading towards the renewal of the cycle with a further suspension. These methods are thematized in creative practice as techniques of awareness development in the artist’s process.

The artist may have various personal solutions to what may be termed ‘blockage’ (as for example, ‘writer’s block’) and develop various strategies, which with practice themselves become embodied (embodied schema of process). The beginning student will rely more on assigned exercises and structured environments (both familiar and surprising), the experienced practitioner may simply ‘lay out his tools’; brushes, paint, paper, all become part of the context by which conditions that contribute to an initial suspension are set out. We embody ritual beginnings to every day, actions performed that begin others. This is why process as an *awareness* practice is so strictly tied to the suspension of the “natural attitude.” One must step outside ones usual condition in order to observe oneself.

### 2.1.3.1. Implicit time

Robert Irwin in conversation with Lawrence Weschler:

Time is experience. Time is a non-thing; it has no physical properties – or it has infinite physical properties. I can point to its effects – the flower opens, the flower closes, the flower dies; or the way a clock metes out time; or the cadences, the rhythms of a voice – but I’m not pointing at time. Time is only understood in here.” He thumped his chest. “Or there.” He pointed at mine. “It’s totally experiential. And it’s the same way with

\(^3\) See also “The Mirror of the Self”. In *The nature of order: An essay on the art of building and the nature of the universe (Book One)* (Alexander, 2002).
quality: qualities reveal themselves to observers only across time. (Weschler, 2008, p. 235)

Implicit in any process is a *conversation* (interaction) in time. ‘It takes time to get things done’, we say, and ‘where did the time go?’ when we come out of the trance of process. It is clear that any process “takes time”, a metaphor suggesting that we conceive of time as something we have a limited quantity of, and which entails the further suggestion that we have a dimension of time available to cognition, emotion, and intersubjective understanding (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 63) which is limited to the duration of what we understand as our ‘lived-body’ experience (Varela & Sheer, 1999, p. 1). In the most general definition of individual practice, we may define this time period as ‘the global session’, combining notions of cognitive processes drawn from Baars (1988, p. 43) and the temporal dynamic of the intuitive act described by Depraz, et al. (2003, p. 49). The ‘global session’ then is the time available to practice but which is limited by the *first-person’s* possible account of that process. This forms our personal and most general concept of time, which remains an ambiguous dimension, with an unremembered beginning and an unpredictable end. In Robert Irwin’s phenomenologically inspired reduction, time *is* experience.

Depraz, et al. speak of the “at once empty and subjectively long” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 38) time of self-reflection as a non-performative waiting which, through unavoidable sensations of fear, boredom, or restlessness, hinders the practice of the detachment (letting go) required in maintaining an “attentive receptivity”. Another explanation of this difficulty may be found in Baars (1988, pp. 190-192): The very nature of cognition may ‘screen’ us from the perception of that which has been acknowledged as ‘redundant information’ (in other words, perception is an *active* process). The cycle thus repeats; one must suspend judgment and presupposition, trading it for detached but active observation, or in the phrasing of certain Zen traditions “just sitting” in order to enter the cognitive unconscious.

Depraz, et al. attempt to develop a procedural description of the reflecting act whereby becoming aware must be continuously re-enacted in order to ‘incarnate’ or embody the essence of the practice described in its procedure. This pattern “provides room for different scales of temporality, from the fraction of a second […] all the way up
to the historical temporality of the transmission of the act between generations of teachers and students” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 20). They identify three temporal dimensions concurrently available to practices of awareness:

- Time of the basic cycle (cycle of *epoche* and intuitive evidence)
- Global structure of the session (with expression and validation)
- Temporal context (with motivation and "after-effects")

**Figure 2. **Procedural Description of the Reflecting Act


In a reflective practice, these multiple temporalities are fundamental to our cognitive modelling. We are immersed in a sea of temporality that slips in and out of awareness but which forms an undeniable fact of our existence. As Sylviane Agacinski observes:

According to the way we see it, the world seems made up of incessant movements of which we perceive only certain periods, or *sequences*. […] Not only does nothing escape time, but there also are an infinite number of times, or *tempos*, which makes it hard for us to define an epoch, or a
history, since they go together. To define an epoch [...] constitutes a singular moment within a large temporal unity. (Agacinski, 2003, p. 15)

This momentary image in movement forms the artist’s embodied practice as living-time-image, an experience that is ever shifting in its associations and understanding, and which is implicit in a narrative relationship with the emergent artefact, the story of how things come to be in one’s experience.

Based on evidence from neuroscience, Baars has argued that a necessary condition of conscious experience is that first of all an event must cross a threshold of awareness (interesting comparisons here may be drawn to Leibnitz’ continuum of awareness) and must present to cognition an informative experience (Baars, 1988, pp. 28-33). Conscious experience then begins with the acknowledgement of changes in states of affairs. As change is fundamentally an experience in time, we may then define a session (of investigation) as the limited time span of a process that has, through eidetic reduction, reached an acknowledgement of an informative enrichment of experience. Conscious embodiment of the continuing experience must change in some fundamental way that disconnects the new session from continuity with the previous, a state of process associated with ‘acceptance and letting go’ in the cycle of epoche central to self-awareness.

If time is structured by the cycle of process, space is structured by the session. A session is defined by Depraz, et al. as the context of becoming aware, thus “maximizing its structured and embodied dimension” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 21), which is clearly inclusive of the necessity that a session will take time, typically several iterations of the processual cycle, takes place in space, or more broadly speaking within a structured context. The description of categories is “processual” that is, they derive from and are continuously modified by experimental actions.

In lived experiencing, space and time are hardly separable. The phenomenal world arises from (a condition of) immanence to sensation in time. The passing of time embodies a deeper understanding of space.
2.1.3.2. “Session”: Expressive and reflective process in creative action

I take the position that process constitutes a phenomenology of intuitive practice, and that its central concern is not the making of objects but the understanding of experience and the making of meaning. This view of process involves a cycle of epoche leading to intuitive evidence, a technique of self-reflexive investigation aimed at recognizing the appearance of the immanent creative and the looking into the source of its origins. The technique involves a first-person suspension of belief followed by redirection, acceptance, and a reductive examination of essential meanings of expression iterated over an extended period of time in order to arrive at an intersubjectively verifiable experience. Drawing from Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch this cyclic process is referred to as a session in this study (Depraz, et al., 2003). The session contains the expression and validation of the findings of the basic cycle, responding to the need for objectification - necessary for any transmission of accumulated know-how and theoretical articulation between subjects and across generations.

(Global structure of session; expression and validation):

Depraz, et al. state that the (next) two stages of becoming aware are expression and validation, which together they call a “session”. These two phases are methodologically necessary to any research project, and mutually imply each other: “Expression implies a (minimally) objective form, even if it is not verbal; on the other hand, complete validation requires a linguistic act” (Depraz, et al., p. 65). The session is suffused with multiple iterations of epoche, and constitutes the expressive phase and its validation in practice.

(Temporal context; motivation and post-session work):

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch describe the multi-layered temporality of the act of becoming aware, where they discuss the preliminaries and “after-effects” of the session. These temporal boundaries may be understood as limits to a process of ideation that defines all session based investigation.

(Views of a session of practice in the arts):
The cyclic process of expression and validation is described by theorist John Dewey and artist Wassily Kandinsky as essential to the process of art. An artist's lived experience constitutes an experiential understanding of interactive creativity, an understanding that takes as its foundation the practice of intentional expression and reflective self-observation of contextual response.

Figure 3. Expressive and reflective creative process.

Note. Inspired by the structure of session described by Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch (2003), and the concept of an interactive process of experience (between “having an experience” and “the act of expression”), by Dewey (1934/1958). (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

John Dewey describes the artist’s expressive and reflective process as ‘having an experience’ and ‘an expressive act’, arguing that these two have to be balanced in terms of ‘inwarding’ and ‘outwarding’ the energy within us (Dewey, 1934/1958, p. 159-160). Even a single mark on canvas, in that moment when everything passes ‘in a flash’ and is gone, that is both infinitely brief and protracted at the same time, this is the brief point of balance between the inward and outward flow of creative process: The moment that the mark is placed. This moment is bounded by the conditions of its formation.

2.1.3.2. Ideation / iteration process; development of the session

Our consciousness is in continuum. (Husserl, 1931/1958, § 143, p. 397)
When we see the genius of the artist and scientist, we recognize creativity. When we observe any unique and genuine cognitive activity, we acknowledge that as creativity. But you can see creative process at work in many common activities. When one engages in any brainstorming, ideation, or iterative process, one has to structure and shape many possible unconscious elements, i.e., work through the “cognitive unconscious” (Johnson & Lakoff, 1999). A direct experience of any process in life suggests certain common features and self-observation reveals a continuity of experience between those features. Identifying the necessary repetitions in process should help us to gain more from that process.

The artist’s experience proceeds in a continuum of expression and reflection with iterative change introduced at every stage of investigation forming a set of patterned but non-repetitive dynamic interactions with an emergent artefact. If this forms a circular but non-repetitive process, from what source (motivation) do patterns of change in the session originate?

Expression and reflection revolve around individually motivated moments of ideation and iteration. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch discuss cognitive science and human experience with their proposed concept of “embodied dynamicism” in their book *The Embodied Mind* (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/1999). Varela extends the idea of dynamic temporality in lived experience in his 1999 paper “The Specious Present: A neurophenomenology of time and consciousness” (Varela, 1999) where the term “specious” is drawn from American philosopher and psychologist William James (James, 1890/1950, p. 642) who is acknowledged for ascribing the term its sense of “appearing to be actually known or experienced” ("specious, adj.", OED Online).

*Iteration is a motivated hyper-reflection of the artist’s intention:*

Solving a problem often involves asking the question “What has changed?” You identify that there is a problem because the result of an operation is not what you expected. In other words, the artist’s work involves constant observation and self-reflection. In this sense I understand creativity as the considered pursuit of the unexpected. The artist’s embodied knowledge, therefore, presents a lived, if unspoken,
understanding of how spontaneous variation emerges in the creative act through an embodied shaping of conscious thought by the cognitive unconscious (Johnson & Lakoff, 1999).

2.1.4. **Embodied action: The painter-in-action**

I do not know what is untried and afterward,  
But I know it is sure and alive and sufficient.  

Whitman's poetic commitment sings of the necessity of observation and experience in art and life, of faith in the revealing mystery of the unknown and the drive to follow the siren song of discovery. This is the nature of process.

To describe embodiment in the process of art, we must first consider the artist’s body in action; it is a moving body; a series of bodies in time. If by body we understand the individuated presence of our awareness in space and time - our contextual referents - then we may start to observe these momentary bodies left behind in our passage, and to predict their future appearance. Erin Manning, a researcher whose domain is in the fields of art, political theory, and philosophy, draws a connection between the notion of the ‘sensing-body’ and our environment. Manning introduces the term ‘becoming-body’ to emphasize the particular dynamic character of this sensing-body in movement:

The dynamic form of a movement is its incipient potential. Bodies are dynamic expressions of movement in its incipiency. They have not yet converged into final form. Throughout *Relationscapes*, I refer to bodies as pure plastic rhythm. I propose that we move toward a notion of a becoming-body that is a sensing body in movement, a body that resists predefinition in terms of subjectivity or identity, a body that is involved in a reciprocal reaching-toward that in-gathers the world even as it worlds. (Manning, 2009, p. 6)

Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, an interdisciplinary scholar and movement theorist at University of Oregon, suggests that concepts of self, consciousness, awareness, knowledge, perception, and meaning, are all grounded in movement; that our awareness is fundamentally the awareness of movement. Sheets-Johnstone draws out the notion of ‘primacy of movement’ as:
In the beginning, we are simply infused with movement – not merely with a *propensity* to move, but with the real thing. This primal animateness, this original kinetic spontaneity that infuses our being and defines our aliveness, is our point of departure for living in the world and making sense of it. ...*We literally discover ourselves in movement.* We grow kinetically into our bodies. In particular, we grow into those distinctive ways of moving that come with our being the bodies we are. In our spontaneity of movement, we discover arms that extend, spines that bend, knees that flex, mouths that shut, and so on. We make sense of ourselves in the course of moving. (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 136)

Dr. Thecla Schiphorst, a researcher in performance movement at Simon Fraser University describes the long tradition of body based knowledge practices: “The somatic body-based traditions require techniques that use attention, observation, and discrimination, applied to the material of experience for the purpose of self-cultivation. These techniques are developed through training that is tested and validated through the efficacy of practice” (Schiphorst, 2011, p. 3).

The artist’s embodied action forms not only intellectually and practically, but also creatively through an *engaged* interaction with the world. The artist’s expression emanates from this embodiment. Artistic intentionality is therefore a multidimensional explorative experience; not only a ‘making’ but also a ‘doing’. As an artist moves, her passage of transitory bodies follow; when she finally removes herself from her stage she leaves behind the remnant of her passage. In this sense of continuum in action, the artefact itself is a kind of precious refuse of the artist’s body; a record of process and the discarded exuvia of embodiment.

In the following section, I will discuss the *lived body* of the artist, using descriptions by artists, of their process of ‘making’, of ‘doing’, of the forming of artefact from what is unmanifested.

2.1.4.1.   **Painter’s story**

Learn to forget.  

The older the fiddler, the sweeter the tune.  
(English proverb)
An artist’s action is a process of expressive movement that are made to achieve the most direct response to her intentionality. This practice based methodology of art is a ground on which to base a deeply interdisciplinary intersubjectivity that is capable of informing conceptualization around the interactive interface.

The movement of the artist in time yields form. Expressive actions therefore give rise to an emergent meaning production. However, it is more difficult for the artist to explain this process than to conduct it; if you ask how they paint, many will say, “see how I paint”. For instance, on the American television show “The Joy of Painting”, hosted by painter Bob Ross it is possible to ‘learn’ how to represent a tree. According to Ross, the evergreen tree looks like this:

[... start by just tapping; now we use just the corner of the brush [...]. And, see? Just back and forth, using the same corner of the brush [...]. Back and forth, back and forth. Work down the tree push a little harder [brush stroking sound] look at there! [more brush stroking sound] and you can just keep going on and on and on [...] (officialacmoore, extracted from YouTube video, 2009)

What is missing from his description and the video is all the tacit understanding of how to actually do this. We do not experience what Ross experiences here. The interface is external to us; the interactive process without agency is magic. All artistic intentionality is missing in his tutorialization of process; there is no embodied process in this tree, and the representation becomes a copy of the text and not a description of understanding.

Then there is the “mystery of the process” in painting. Post-impressionist artist Vincent van Gogh described his process of painting as follows:

I do not know myself how I paint it. I sit down with a white board before the spot that strikes me, I look at what is before my eyes, I say to myself, That white board must become something; I come back dissatisfied – I put it away, and when I have rested a little, I go and look at it with a kind of fear. Then I am still dissatisfied, because I still have that splendid scene too clearly in my mind to be satisfied with what I have made of it. But I find in my work an echo of what struck me, after all. (Auden, 1961, p. 112; underline added)

The artist does not simply see the studio as ‘an open paint box’, a formularized paint-by-numbers environment waiting for her to press a switch, but instead may stare with terror
and wonder at the void of empty space that lives are unseen in the blank canvas. The practitioner is faced with a problem, something that she has not yet seen armed with only the knowledge of what was and the phenomenological commitment that this will never be the same.

American artist Frank Stella describes this tacit experience from his perspective as a painter as:

I lose sight of the fact that my paintings are on canvas, even though I know I’m painting on canvas, and I just see my paintings If the visual act taking place on the canvas is strong enough, I don’t get a very strong sense of the material quality of the canvas. It sort of disappears. (Lippard, 1968/1995, p. 160; italics added)

In this description by Stella, the intermediary process is not there, nor any of its supporting elements; it has become transparent; leaving in the artist’s telling only process-less image.

From my own experience as an artist, when I draw lines, I never draw the ‘exact’ lines. Lines are drawn out as I move and follow the trace of my eye; every expression holds different a line within it. In this process I constantly ask questions and as much feel the answers as read them. What makes this process of drawing differ over time? What are the typical aspects, if any, that can be observed in this process? Is abstract mark-making spontaneous or pre-figured? How, when, why? The artist understands but finds it difficult to describe the embodied creative act and its development over time.

2.1.4.2. Enaction

The American painter and teacher, Robert Henri describes a state of enactment in the placement of a brush stroke:

It is not enough to have thought great things before doing the work. The brush stroke at the moment of contact carries inevitably the exact state of being of the artist at that exact moment into the work, and there it is, to be seen and read by those who can read such signs, and to be read later by the artist himself, with perhaps some surprise, as a revelation to himself. (Henri, 1923/1939, p. 7)
What is the nature of this momentary yet carried state and the way in which it is lived in the emergent moment? Why and how may we be surprised by and simultaneously engaged with the results of our own actions? Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch have conducted an extensive examination of the relationship between self and situation to show how cognition is inseparable from the lived experience of body, language, and social history.

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch propose a 'middle path' between cognition understood as the “recovery of a pre-given outer world (reason)” and one of cognition as the “projection of a pre-given inner world (idealism)” (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/1999, pp. 172-173). In order to bridge this cognitive perspective they reference the foundational phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty’s critical summation in Structure of Behaviour which clarifies that “it is the organism itself […] which chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 174). On these grounds they develop a view of cognition as embodied action. From this they draw a model of the embodied mind; a body engaged in cognitive action that operates in a functionally enactive space. Embodied knowledge then may be understood as an intertwined active interplay of dimensions of experience lived by the somatic body.

Brian Massumi has eloquently summarized the intuitively acknowledged relationship between action and somatic experience; “Can we think a body without this: an intrinsic connection between movement and sensation whereby each immediately summons the other?” (Massumi, 2002, p. 1). This ‘summoning’ in its interactive sense of reflected sensation becoming embedded in the somatic body as experiential knowledge has been framed as the process of enaction by Varela, Thompson, & Rosch in their definitive summary of directions of research in cognitive science (The Embodied Mind, 1991/1999, P. 173). As Varela, Thompson, and Rosch explain, “in such an approach perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this surrounding world” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 174).

In this way, what is carried by Henri’s brush stroke becomes a transformation of experience. The embodied action of the artist is a blend of the artist’s “sensory and motor processes, perception and action” (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 173). Drawing the
clear analogy of an intersubjective understanding arising from lived experience, Varela et al. describe these processes as “fundamentally inseparable in lived cognition: the two are not merely contingently linked in individuals; they have also evolved together” (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 173). Varela et al. name this reflexive fundamental process “enaction”. They suggest that a ‘preliminary formulation’ of the concept of enaction is defined by two essential traits:

- “Perception” consists of perceptually guided action.
- Cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided.

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch demonstrate how systems exhibit emergent properties when endowed with basic network architectures, using an example of simple cellular automata. They enrich their account to include a dimension of *structural coupling*, a system-defined history of coupling with an appropriate world. This coupling reveals how we may begin to appreciate the capacity of a complex emergent system to *enact* a world.

Using a thought experiment of driving a car through an essentially limitless series of changing conditions and states, Varela et al. note that “the [experienced] world does not end at some point; it has the structure of ever-receding levels of detail that blend into a nonspecific background” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 147). They use this observation to explicate the impossibility of dividing the complexity of lived experience into discrete elements. Within such complexity,

 [...] it is not clear that we can even specify what is to count as an object independent of the type of action that is being performed. The individuation of objects, properties, and events appears to vary according to the task at hand (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 148).

This variance is generative of ‘numbers of cases’ of lived events, a multiplicity of experience that forms the foundations of experiential knowledge (knowing how). Varela et al. describe this embodied knowledge as ‘common sense’, but this common sense poses an ontological challenge, for,

 [...] if we are forced to admit that cognition cannot be properly understood without common sense, and that common sense is none other than our
bodily and social history, then the inevitable conclusion is that knower and known, mind and world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent coorigination. (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 150)

The emergent complexity of a mutually specifying knower and known is suggestive of an action oriented non-propositional approach to categorization.

Varela, et al. demonstrate that even a simple autonomous system “selects or enacts from a world of randomness a domain of distinctions that has relevance for the structure of the system” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 155). In drawing out this sense of the enactment they point out that in such a simple system the terms ‘significance’ and ‘relevance’ imply a level of interpretation that is not even remotely close to the complexity of lived experience. They summarize that “such a system on the basis of its autonomy (closure), performs an interpretation in the sense that it selects or brings forth a domain of significance out of the background of its random milieu” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 156).

Extending this reasoning from simplistic models to the complexity of living systems where meaning is “the result of the organization and history of the system itself” (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 157), they turn to Piaget, observing that,

Within Piaget's system, the newborn infant is neither an objectivist nor an idealist; she has only her own activity, and even the simplest act of recognition of an object can be understood only in terms of her own activity. Out of this, she must construct the entire edifice of the phenomenal world with its laws and logic. This is a clear example in which cognitive structures are shown to emerge from recurrent patterns (in Piaget's language, "circular reactions") of sensorimotor activity. (Piaget, 1950/2001, pp. 114-115; Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 176)

From this theoretical basis, then, there begins to emerge the foundations of a method of categorization of domains of significance to painters. If “perception and action, sensorium and motorium, are linked together as successively emergent and mutually selecting patterns” then significant domains should reflect the intersubjective processual relationship between form and action (Varela et al., 1991/1999, p. 163). In the texture of the painting reside both the painting and the painting of the painting.
When I paint, in my mind, there may be a brush of the size of a forest, swiping through a mountain of paint at just the right velocity, but the brush stroke cannot exist on canvas at the exact time and space as I imagine it. When the paint in my mind enacts the mountain on canvas, it emerges as a different mountain; it is related but it is never the same one. Some of what is carried in the initial motivation remains as mental image which itself is modified by the action, and some, at reduced scales and from different perspectives, remains behind on the canvass. It now exists in an enactive space and its reflexive existence places it in company with many other marks which I constantly re-organize as they appear.

Enaction describes a model of lived experience whereby reason and idealism can only be conceived of as extreme perspectives in a continuum of experience. An organism’s, or a painter’s, embodied actions form a cognitively categorized experience of the world that is both perceptive and generative. This embodied categorization of experience is utilized in both expression and interpretation, by which “the uniqueness of each experience is transformed into the more limited set of learned, meaningful categories to which humans and other organisms respond” (Varela, et al., 1991/1999, p. 176).

The abstract structuring of these categories leads to and is drawn from lived experience with the efficacy of those structures. With experience, with the repeated stroke of the brush over many sessions of perception and re-action, domains of significance emerge, patterns from signs embedded in the moving brush and in the marks that remain on the canvass.

As Henri has suggested, these marks may be “read by those who can read such signs” (Henri, 1923/1939, p. 7).

2.2. First-person experience and intuitive validation

2.2.1. ‘Structures of mediation’ – the first-person account

Robert Irwin, in Seeing Is Forgetting the Name of the Thing One Sees, observes that lived experience is not abstract enumeration of things, but continuum of individual
feelings; “the modernist trajectory over the past two hundred years has been about everything that progress has been leaving out. Quality as opposed to quantity. Quality, which can only be experienced by each unique individual, phenomenologically, across the passage of lived time” (Weschler, 2008, p. 258). This sense of ‘forgetting’ or of seeing with fresh eyes a learning to see is a fundamental aspect of the phenomenological reduction. As Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch, referencing Husserl, similarly describe this process, the phenomenological reduction “must make us forget at the same time as it makes appear” (Depraz, et al, 2003, p. 40).

In all acts of consciousness, in all that we may be aware of, there is a generally unperceived pre-reflective ability of consciousness to perceive itself. The central assertion of Depraz, et al. in On Becoming Aware is that exploring human experience amounts to developing this pre-reflective ability of consciousness to examine itself and therefore define “becoming aware” as "coming to know in the first-person" (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 3). The first-person’s lived experience is only purely describable from the first-person point of view, forming the first-person account, which may then be shared with another person for whom the account becomes an event in their experience. This other person reflects upon the first-person experience from the mediated position of second-person.

This research therefore approaches a description of the painter’s experience through a reductive analysis of first-person creative practice. This practice is at once, and necessarily, a journey into the unknown and a reflection of what is known. Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch define first-person experience as "that which a singular subject is subjected to at any given time and place" (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 2).

By first-person events we mean the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events. Sometimes terms such as ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and even ‘qualia’ are also used, but it is natural to speak of ‘conscious experience’ or simply ‘experience’. These terms imply here that the process being studied (vision, pain, memory, imagination, etc.) appears as relevant and manifest for a ‘self’ or ‘subject’ that can provide an account; they have a ‘subjective’ side. (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 1)

The research value of first-person investigation, as well as its limitations and requisite conditions, has been well described (Varela & Shear, 1999). The culturally
mediated myth of the purely objective third-person point of view (so-called scientific method) has been critiqued as remaining “far from this regulatory ideal” by Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 80).

Since this study is based on a first-person investigation of cognitive experience I shall present some background information about the methodological basis for this individualized perspective. There have been fewer formal studies of conscious experience from the first-person point of view than from the external objective view. But our cognitive experience is essentially subjective as, in terms of the one who is experiencing, all events are perceived from the point of view of ‘I’. Although we have many ‘shared experiences’, through socially objectified reasoning, e.g., how we understand colours, how we read socially agreed upon symbols such as language and numbers, how we differently understand these elements is fundamentally a personal experience.

The ‘painters experience’, then, will be examined through the lived experience of the day-to-day cognitive activity of an artist engaged in a practice of self-reflexive observation: an artist observing observation.

2.2.2. First-person point of view and the intersubjective experience

All origination is private. But what has been thus originated, publicly pervades the world.  

To share an experience with others implies that a first-person account may be produced and made available through the shared meaning of an intersubjective discourse. This account must be fashioned in such a way that the intuitive evidence discovered and offered by the first-person is in turn verifiable in the reflected experience of the second-person position. ‘Shared meaning’ may then be understood as a continuity of experience between situated individuals.

I take the position that an intersubjective relationship with the experience of others resides in the artist’s attempt to externalize empathically motivated expression in
the shared artefact. Empathy constitutes the intentional embodiment of ‘another’s’ experience. (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 10).

Every philosophy must recognize among its field of objects one object which is like none of the others; it is presented not only known by the knower but also as knowing the knower. The difficulty is that to be subject means to have experiences; to be experienced as subject is to be experienced as having experiences. Somehow, then, the experiences of others must from part of my intentional life, without at the same time being my experiences. (Lauer, 1967, p. 172)

Quentin Lauer goes on to note that Husserl therefore realizes that the solution to this difficulty must be found in a ‘kind of intentional experience which has for its object the experiences of others.’ This intentional experience Husserl names “empathy” (Lauer, 1967, p. 172).

We must, in the fashioning of this account, be careful to distinguish first-person accounts from the strictly private or inaccessible. Varela and Shear stress that “dealing with subjective phenomena is not the same as dealing with purely private experiences, as is often assumed. The subjective is intrinsically open to inter-subjective validation, if only we avail ourselves of a method and procedure for doing so” (Varela & Shear, 1999, pp. 1-2). Therefore, given acknowledged limitations to a continuity of experience, we may begin to identify what aspects of experience are available to a particular practice. Richard Wollheim proposes that “corresponding to each description of an action is a thought, and an action is intentional under a certain description if what guides the person’s action is the corresponding thought” (Wollheim, 1987, p. 18). It is this sense of reflexive intention that motivates the intersubjective validation of descriptions of experience.

Wollheim suggests that a proper account of pictorial meaning is found not in conventions and symbol systems, but in the non-propositional psychological account. This necessarily leads to an intersubjective stance whereby “what a painting means rests upon the experience induced in an adequately sensitive, adequately informed, spectator by looking at the surface of the painting as the intentions of the artist led him to mark it” (Wollheim, 1987, p. 22). By Wollheim’s account, “ways of painting pair with kinds of intention” (Wollheim, 1987, p. 18).
We may then begin to understand intersubjectivity as an emergent sharing of meaning as second-person mediation moves in continuum towards first-person embodiment. Applying this understanding to the lived body, to the self, one may approach structures of mediation as a method of intentional engagement in a reductive process of expression (first-person) and post-session reflection (second-person). A key component of the evidence developed in this cycle takes place in what Depraz, et al. term (after Husserl), *intuitive evidence*.

### 2.2.3. **Intuitive experience in the creative process**

*(Relationship of intuition and *epoche* – intuitive evidence):*

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch illustrate the coupling of the process of *epoche* with the validating intuitive experience. They accept an understanding of this experience drawn from Husserl’s view of taking intuition as a grounding principle of knowledge, a view of intuition in which “objects show up in person” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 45). They propose, based on Husserl’s view, that intuitive evidence for the act of becoming aware can be observed in everyday life through first-person description of embodied procedures aimed at, and validated by, diverse expressions in the pragmatic disciplines.

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch’s definition of intuition refers to “a unique mental capacity that comes between the new awareness allowed by suspension and an inscription of results in traces others can read or see” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 43). In that sense, intuition is equated in this thesis with *formation*, an equation that forms a central theme of this study.

Intuition has a long history in both psychology and philosophy. Originating with the Latin root *intueri* (to look upon, consider, contemplate), intuition is defined as the idea of looking in to the image, the conceived, and has a long history in both philosophy and psychology. For Descartes, intuition is a key principle of logic and what he calls deduction is entirely known through intuition (Cottingham, 1988, pp. 1-6; also, Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 44). Kant introduces two types of intuition, “empirical intuition” that is consciousness of sense-data, and “pure intuition” that is ‘consciousness of *a priori* space and time’ as the foundation of all empirical intuition (Kant, 1899, pp. 63-89; Depraz, et al., 2003, pp. 44-45).
Depraz, et al. ground awareness on the Husserlian notion of intuition, and in this sense, there are at least two major classes of intuitive act: perception and imagination/memory; of “presentation” and “re-presentation” (Depraz et al., 2003, p. 45). But Depraz et al. strictly distinguish these philosophical notions of intuition from the “kind of everyday evidence [we] can have without previous reflection, prior to the gesture of reduction”; they also refer to Bergson and Merleau-Ponty’s perceptive faith (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 45). In popular imagination ‘intuition’ has a general sense of looking into or discovering some hidden and deeply affective personal truth, a sense that is preserved in Jung’s well-known formulation that intuition may be defined as “perception via the unconscious” (Jung, 1959/1980, p. 282).

Depraz, et al. note the juxtaposition between the Husserlian broad sense of experiencing (apodictic evidence, evidence as being-seen, in-sight), versus a mental seeing of something (the force of seeing and intuition) (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 46). They draw from this juxtaposition an understanding of intuitive evidence as the trace of embodied procedural description “in the act of becoming aware” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 46).

If intuitive evidence is the trace of procedural description in the process of becoming aware, there may be ways to observe the formation of this evidence during the creative process. However, there have been very few studies on observing intuitive experience from the first-person point of view in empirical research. Claire Petitmengin-Peugeot notes that we have paid little attention to experience itself in previous studies of the intuitive experience, nor to the essentially subjective nature of that experience. The subjective experience is often ignored or couched in terms of reference to externals (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p.43). Petitmengin-Peugeot presents an extensive study of intuitive experience conducted on first-person description in her paper “The Intuitive Experience”. In her extensive analysis, she notes important difficulties and questions that arose during the study, which I will summarize in the following section.

2.2.3.1. Issues raised by a previous study on intuitive experience

Claire Petitmengin-Peugeot makes note of some of the difficulties encountered in attempting to model a phenomenological description of intuitive experience (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, pp. 73-77). The methodology implemented is derived from
the *explicitation session* technique developed by Vermersch, supported by Piaget's theory of *awareness*. In order to give a first-person account of experience the subject “must become aware of pre-thought knowledge” (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p. 46). This self-awareness of process in action is assisted by second-person mediation aimed at assisting the subject with focusing on *living* (or re-living) a singular subjective experience, helping the subject to move from a reflective observation of action to the formation of a cognitive representation, and enabling the subject to verbally describe this representation, a description Petitmengin-Peugeot names “embodied speech.” The difficulties associated with examining the intuitive experience fall into these areas:

1. **Difficulties of Explicitation**

1.1 Use of the ‘Explicitation Session’ (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p. 73):

Subjects have difficulty describing their intuitive experience *while* they are *experiencing* it. Descriptors drift towards the abstract: Petitmengin-Peugeot notes that it is “difficult […] for the interpreter to maintain the interviewee within the limits of his own experience.” The process of becoming aware of the “here and now” nature of awareness itself varies in time. *Singular* experience varies depending on *every* interior and exterior influence, and guidance in obtaining awareness of intuitive gestures and states requires “both firmness and gentleness.”

1.2 Correlation Between Degree of Awareness and Intuitive Experience (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p. 73):

Petitmengin-Peugeot brackets the singular state of the intuitive experience with the ‘parallel’\(^4\) pre-intuitive physical and mental *gestures of evocation*, suggesting the difference relates to the level of mediation. Reflection upon one’s own

\(^4\) And “past” in terms of temporal relationship to intuitive awareness.
understanding and experience varies depending on prior experience therefore there is variation between the interviewees.

2. **Difficulties in Modeling**

2.1 Problem of the Models’ Validity (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p. 75):

There is an inherent gap of phenomenological reducibility between interviewee and interviewer, between the first- and second-person viewpoints. Although there is intuitive evidence in the explicitation by the interviewee, there is also a process of subjective ‘interpretation’ of that evidence by the interviewer from his own experience and bias in the subsequent construction of any abstract model. Petitmengin-Peugeot explicates that to prevent interpretation becoming ‘simple projection’ the interviewer must also be familiar with the intuitive experience. Petitmengin-Peugeot therefore affirms that phenomenological models of intuitive experience are reductive tools that do not represent absolute ‘truths’ but rather represent keys to approaching a fruitful investigation of that experience, subject to validation during the process itself by those engaged in the intuitive experience.

2.2 Lack of Descriptive Categories (Petitmengin-Peugeot, 1999, p. 76):

There is limited vocabulary and structure in language for describing the intuitive experience. Language is largely limited to what is known and depends upon cultural understandings of internal states and subjective experiences.

Petitmengin-Peugeot identifies several categorical aspects of intuitive experience that are not clearly identifiable in language:

- Its corporeal grounds
- The return of attention to the interior
- The “calming of mental activity”
- An absence of intentionality
- Attention on the “here and now”
- The loss of identity
Petitmengin-Peugeot further suggests there are experiences that appear to be entirely non-conceptual:

- Emerging images that seem neither remembered nor constructed
- The meaning of kinaesthetic sensations in a physically dissociated space

2.3. Embodied Metaphor

2.3.1. Introduction

If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. (William Blake, 1790, Object 14)

American artist Robert Irwin has spent a lifetime of creative research examining the experiential qualia of the visual experience. He remarks:

It’s strange. With food, for instance, people seem able to understand what’s involved: you savor the taste rather than just feed the body. But people have a hard time understanding that it should be the same way with visual experience. (Weschler, 2008, p. 215)

We have looked at the artist’s reflexive creative process, through application of the concept of enaction, to explore the origins of tacit knowledge or ‘know-how’, the knowledge that comes through their embodied action. Let us now turn to exploring ways of looking at that lived experience and the process of the artist.

Is it impossible to describe experience? What could this mean to the artistic creative process? If we look at a painting we see the result of an activity, but understand little of the experience, yet surely the painting is a description of experience. The fundamental nature of human artefacts is that they emerge from experience.

(Artefact as metaphor of experience):

The English word metaphor originates via Latin from Greek *metaphora*, from *metapherein* meaning ‘to transfer.’ The word metaphor is composed of *meta* (with,
across, after, over) and *phora* (carrying, transmission), suggesting its sense of a transfer of meaning that exists beyond literal appearance. When Aristotle says that metaphor ‘cannot be learnt from others’ and yet ‘implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars’, we understand that metaphor forms a personal and intuitive perception of the nature of relationships of ideas and objects in the world. But as much as metaphor forms in the subjective experience of the world, its intersubjective, transitive, nature allows for the conjoined formation of *shared* metaphors, such as language, colour, shape, and bodily experience. The media of art thus become representations of conceptual mappings of process expressed in objectified perceptual experiences.


It is clear that such a schema, remaining midway between the individual and the general, is not yet a logical concept and is still partly something of a pattern of action and of sensori-motor assimilation. But it is nevertheless a representative schema and one which, in particular, succeeds in evoking a large number of objects by means of privileged elements, regarded as samples of the pre-conceptual collection. On the other hand, since these type-individuals are themselves made concrete by images as much as, and more than, by words, the pre-concept improves on the symbol in so far as it appeals to generic samples of this kind. To sum up then, it is a schema placed midway between the sensori-motor schema and the concept with respect to its manner of assimilation, and partaking of the nature of the imaginal symbol as far as its representative structure is concerned. (Piaget, 1950/2001, *The Psychology of Intelligence*, p. 141)

Painting and drawing have a metaphorical aspect. The point, the line, the plane are all elements of a visual language that may be used to draw out lived experience and give it form. A simple dot (a point in space), from another perspective, becomes a plane. How can we say this is ‘only’ a dot? A dot contains *intention* within it; handedness, directionality, force. Action is encoded in form.

If we could describe the lived experience of the artist, a living knowledge, that could be helpful in describing the quality of experience encoded within the external artefact. But it seems as though we have few words to describe personal experience. If
we cannot directly describe experience, and seem only to be able to show and point, can we find evidence in the metaphorical language of the artist, a visual poetics that points the way to understanding? Are there linguistic signposts leading towards that tacit knowledge of process?

There are some things we know through experiential observation. We do this by applying embodied schematic understandings of our relationship with the world. We make inferences based on recurrent experience. Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have called these conceptual patterns "kinesthetic image schema" (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987/1990).

The process of cognitive understanding from a source domain to a target domain is a metaphorical projection onto the world. It is therefore our task to discover how is this applied in creative process.

2.3.2. **Embodied (cognitive) metaphor**

I approach creative process and its metaphors, in fact the whole metaphor of creative process, from the perspective of cognitive metaphor theory, which attempts to describe how meaning arises from lived experience.

Perception occurs when the senses are stimulated by events in the external world. Perception therefore relates to a biochemical, neurological awareness of change, an awareness which gives rise to a sense of agency manifested in movement. Change begets change. Touch, hearing, and sight are cognitively mapped to experience, allowing us to form patterns of awareness through the recognition of objects and the changes they exhibit, leading to an understanding of contextual relevancy.

2.3.2.1. **Body as metaphor**

Mark Johnson and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone write about our bodily experience in the world (Johnson, 2007; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011). Fundamentally this idea is based on an argument for the inseparability of mind and body that is opposed to the Cartesian belief of a dualistic mind and body. From similar philosophical grounds George Lakoff and Mark Johnson derive the conceptual framework of the ‘image schema’ relating to our bodily (kinesthetic) understanding of world, e.g., in-out, up-down-source-path-goal,
etcetera, that refers to a foundational presentation of all our conception, thought, images, and reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Sheets-Johnstone’s term “corporeal concepts” likewise emphasizes that movement is foundational to our perception of self, our perception of the world we live in, and our ability to act in that world. She writes:

[...] if we take seriously that the (experience) “I move” precedes the (conceptual realization) “I can do,” and if we take with equal seriousness the fact that specific perceptual awarenesses of ourselves arising in everyday tactile-kinesthetic acts of doing something are the touchstone and bedrock of our discovery of “I cans” and in turn of corporeal concepts, then it is clear that movement is absolutely foundational not only to perceptual realizations of ourselves as doing or accomplishing certain things or making certain things happen – such as “grinding something to pieces” – and to correlative cognitive realizations of ourselves as capable of just such acts or activities, but to perceptual-cognitive realizations of ourselves as alive, i.e., as living creatures, animate organisms, or animate forms. Aliveness is thus a concept as grounded in movement as the concept “I can”. (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 135)

Further, Sheets-Johnstone draws out the notion of ‘primacy of movement’:

In the beginning, we are simply infused with movement – not merely with a propensity to move, but with the real thing. This primal animateness, this original kinetic spontaneity that infuses our being and defines our aliveness, is our point of departure for living in the world and making sense of it. […] We literally discover ourselves in movement. We grow kinetically into our bodies. In particular, we grow into those distinctive ways of moving that come with our being the bodies we are. In our spontaneity of movement, we discover arms that extend, spines that bend, knees that flex, mouths that shut, and so on. We make sense of ourselves in the course of moving. (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011, p. 117)

2.3.2.2. Kinesthetic image schema

Mark Johnson notes that the philosophical importance of metaphor and the bodily aspects of human understanding have been undervalued by Objectivism (Johnson, 1987, pp. xiv-xvi). Johnson derives an understanding of embodied imaginative (metaphorical) from a description of bodily experience. He develops structures of embodied cognition through the explication of ‘image schema’ and ‘metaphorical projection’. Johnson’s term projection comes from our understanding an experience or
concept through the perspective of another experience or concept; we understand things through projection from what is known onto what is not known.

When we look at a painting like “One: Number 31” (1950) by Jackson Pollock, a canvas covered with splashes of many colours, how can we say which colour came first? How do we know one whether one colour over-lays or under-lays another? There are some things we can determine through experiential observation. We do this by applying an embodied schematic understanding of our relationship with the world.

![Figure 4. Metaphorical schematic image of ‘overlaying’.


As we see in the first image of Figure 4, we do not tend to conceive of the line on the left and the line on the right as broken. We cognitively connect these into one. Likewise we understand layering through a schema of superimposition (second image, Fig. 4). We make these inferences based on recurrent experience (Johnson, 1987, p. 29). Yet these conceptions would be simply not possible were the two-dimensional graphic meant to be an actual representation of a lived world. We tend to read the symbol in (at least) three dimensions because all out experience tells us that one line overlays the other, that there is some microscopic possibility of there being an undiscovered space between what appears to be two objects. The higher dimensional conceptual space tends to grouping in more general categories; we would otherwise have to count the diagram as representing three forms, not as two forms and their relationship.

2.3.2.3. Container schema

Mark Johnson and George Lakoff have described many types of kinesthetic image schemas, including the Container schema, the Part-Whole schema, the Centre-
Periphery schema, and the Source-Path-Goal schema. Johnson and Lakoff’s container schema defines the most basic logical distinction between IN and OUT. Lakoff summarizes our bodily experience of container schema through our constant experience of our bodies both as containers and as things in containers (e.g., rooms). Structurally, the CONTAINER schema consists of a boundary element distinguishing an interior from an exterior; In(side)-Container(boundary)-Out(side) (Lakoff, 1987/1990, p. 272).

Whether in one, two, or three dimensions, physical in-out orientation involves separation, differentiation, and enclosure, which imply restriction and limitation. Understanding the Container schema as a way to bracket a concept or metaphorical element through phenomenological reduction constitutes a functional method with which to conduct an analysis of the process of painting.

It is not only: what are we doing? The question also needs to be posed: where are we (if anywhere at all)? We have used the concepts of inner and outer, and we want a third concept. Where are we when we are doing what in fact we do a great deal of our time, namely, enjoying ourselves? Does the concept of sublimation really cover the whole pattern? Can we gain some advantage from an examination of this matter of the possible existence of a place for living that is not properly described by either of the terms ‘inner’ and ‘outer’? (Winnicott, 1971, pp. 105-106)

2.3.2.4. Processual description in metaphor

Johnson and Lakoff suggest that the Source-Path-Goal schema is one of the most common structures that emerge from our constant bodily functioning. From their definition of embodied metaphoric schema and Baars’ relationship of thought to body motion, I draw a cognitive grounding for describing how artists experience creative process, and by reduction, how they are then able to describe that process.

The artist acts within a multi-dimensional matrix of material, body, and time. In the very first stage of creative work, there arises artistic intention (motivation), but the goal is, at least initially, uncertain. The goal is something not clearly identified until one gets closer to it and not fully identified until reached. Johnson and Lakoff’s source-path-goal schema is therefore a mapping of process that steers one towards a constantly redefined goal. In this sense, the goal is the mental acknowledgement of an evolving similitude to the imagined image.
In the visual arts, the schema of source-path-goal may have both literal and metaphoric senses, as in ‘the brush traces the lines of her face.’ The source is what we do understand; the target is what we want to understand (achieve).

Lakoff also suggests cross-domain correlations between metaphorical schemas, and introduces Source-to-Target mapping. He describes metaphor as having a source domain, a target domain, and a source-to-target mapping. This leads to a series of transitional states which he terms, motivation (initial state) – movement (action sequence) – desired state (final state) (Lakoff, 1987/1990, pp. 276-279).

In painting, intentionality is not only expressed through ‘path’ metaphors (of motivation and action) but also in terms of weight, or balance. Johnson discusses this aspect in terms of the Balance schema. To explain the Balance schema, Johnson uses the example of an abstract painting. He discuss the evidence for metaphorical ‘weight,’ ‘force,’ location,’ and ‘value’ in one of Wassily Kandinsky’s paintings. Obviously these are not physical weight, force, location, and value, but perceptual and visual concepts. When we talk about balance in composition in painting, the visual weight has to be evenly distributed over the picture plane. The suggestion is that perceptual and visual concepts derive from embodied understandings of their physical counterparts.

2.3.3. The Metaphor of painting

We perceive phenomena metaphorically. When we perceptually, cognitively, and somatically recognize something, we understand it ‘as’ something. That thing can be abstract and yet very specific. It can be described in words or if “not quite verbalized” there is a sense that it may be described, if only the right words can be chosen. One of the most significant developments in the history of classical art is the method of creating the illusion of depth on a flat surface, called perspective. Grau describes this new understanding of depth as following:

Fifteenth-century Italian artists, such as Brunelleschi, Masaccio, and Ghiberti, opened up the depths of space through their mastery of perspective. Alberti, and later, Leonardo, translated this into the metaphor of the window. With the aid of the visual technique of perspective, strategies of immersion received a tremendous boost, for they allowed artists to portray convincingly much that formerly could only be alluded to. In Brunelleschi’s work, visual perception becomes the point where
findings of the natural sciences, which seek to control nature, converge. The Renaissance discovery of *perspectiva artificialis* introduced distance and breaks in perception, whereas previously it had been directly oriented on the representational nature of objects. (Grau, 2003, p. 37)

Here, Grau describes as the 'representational nature of objects', which refers to the understanding of an object prior to the Renaissance. It is not situated in depth but rather ‘flattened’ and focused on the ‘pure nature’ of the subject, as if existing in collections of objects outside of contextual relationships. It was not until the Renaissance artists started to use linear perspective that the optical effect of objects on canvas ‘fading away’ with distance through lines of ‘perspective’ towards a single point of convergence (the ‘vanishing point’) was conceptually possible. Artists emphasized this technique by reducing the size of distant objects, dulling down colours, or blurring details as the object gets farther away. But all these techniques are descriptions, accounts, of an event that is experienced through translation; they are *metaphors of experience*.

Leonardo da Vinci describes “perspective (as) nothing else than seeing a place behind a plane of glass, quite transparent, on the surface of which the objects behind the glass are to be drawn” (Gombrich, 1989, p. 299). Da Vinci describes this ‘magical plane’ as a plane of glass. When a painter paints three-dimensional worlds and creates form on the two-dimensional canvas, that painter must translate the world through a conceptually derived three-dimensional perspective onto a two-dimensional plane. Da Vinci’s ‘plane of glass’ is the metaphorical plane of this translation.

### 2.3.4. Visual elements

Wassily Kandinsky, described as the inventor of abstract painting⁵, proposed a ‘radically innovative’ presupposition of the theoretical grounding of the practice of art, a grounding that he hoped would begin a ‘science of art’. It was Kandinsky’s project to

---

⁵ See Michel Henry (Seeing the Invisible) and the Getty Research Institute Research Library (http://library.getty.edu/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=76560).
“establish certain analytical methods” that would “when developed consistently – pass beyond the boundaries of painting, and finally of art altogether” (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 13).

Michel Henry has written that Kandinsky “provided an explicit theory of abstract painting, exposing its principles with the utmost precision and clarity” (Henry, 2009, p. 2). Kandinsky’s extensive body of painted works and theoretical writings developed in practice make Kandinsky one of the main theorists of art.

It is Kandinsky’s approach to the visual elements, constituting an essentially “spiritual” and we may say phenomenological investigation, that inform the approach of this research to an understanding of visual metaphor. Kandinsky’s definition of form in Point and Line to Plane is grounded in conceptual description that may be well compared with contemporary cognitive schema theory. And as Henry points out, “if the rationality of the principles of abstract painting is the rationality of all paintings— since it is the rationality of painting’s own possibility and since all painting is abstract— then its power of clarification is not limited to Kandinsky’s work” (Henry, 2009, p. 3).

Michel Henry describes this in phenomenological terms:

‘Abstract’ no longer refers to what is derived from the world at the end of a process of simplification or complication or at the end of the history of modern painting; instead, it refers to what was prior to the world and does not need the world in order to exist. It refers to the life that is embraced in the night of its radical subjectivity, where there is no light or world. (Henry, 2009, p. 16)

Henry goes on to illustrate that it is through the abstract that Kandinsky has chosen to investigate the inner self, in order to represent emotion, and that this inner voyage “was the content of all possible paintings: the profusion of life in himself, its intensification and exaltation” (Henry, 2009, p. 16).

The anteriority of the invisible in a domain that previously belonged to the visible and the sense is confirmed in a striking way by the fact that the ‘embodiment’ of the originally ‘abstract’ content of the artwork is what makes the means of painting—these colours and forms—‘accessible to the human senses’. This is what gives Kandinsky’s abstraction its specific meaning. (Henry, 2009, p. 17)
There are three primary visual elements in any two-dimensional artwork: point, line, and plane. Wassily Kandinsky talks about these three visual elements (point, line, and plane) and their combinations (composition and texture of these elements) in an analogy with musical and movement elements in *Point and Line to Plane* (Kandinsky, 1979). Drawing from his lived experience as a painter, he describes the metaphorical ‘tension’ within the visual elements and their potential relationships. When Kandinsky describes movement within the visual elements, he includes in the property of movement and spatial element of *tension/force* and *direction*. From this, Kandinsky draws out a metaphorical comparison of visual elements with musical elements. I will introduce some explication of Kandinsky’s core ideas in the following sections.

2.3.4.1. **Point**

A point is essentially a *static* element; it holds our eyes. According to Kandinsky, the point is “the briefest, constant, innermost assertion: short, fixed and quickly created.” As a formal element, it is the ‘temporally briefest’ and ‘innermost concise’ form. A point holds artist’s tension and direction of her active movement, and it varies its (relational and relative) *size* (relative to the plane and to other formal elements on the plane) and the *form* (external shape of the point) depending on the artist’s directional force. The point can be square-like, triangle-like, circle-like, star-like, or even more complex (Kandinsky, 1979, pp. 28-32).

Kandinsky draws a metaphorical link between the point, as a visual element, and form, movement, and music. When we abstract three-dimensional form from a two-dimensional plane, we see points as cross sectional perspectives of several planes and lines. When we visually abstract a human body, we see the five extremities as the five ‘points’ of our body (head, two feet, and two hands). If the figure has expanded fingers, we will see smaller points (than hands and feet) for fingertips. In this case, the scale of form is represented by the resolution of the point. The size of the point can indicate time in music; larger point may represent longer time or tonal emphasis (ascent).

Unlike a single point, multiple points in a composition can represent the sense of movement and rhythm, depending on their aesthetic placement in space and variation in size (differentiating and creating contrast between points). When there are multiple points of different sizes and at varying relative distances, our eyes stay longer on the
larger point than a smaller point, and take time to jump to the other point when there is more distance in between points.\textsuperscript{6}

Multiple points in composition can represent different intensity or texture depending on their composition and shape. We feel more tension when the composition of points is more intense (placed close together) than when they are apart.\textsuperscript{7} Our eyes move from higher levels of tension to lower levels of tension, and from rough texture to smooth texture. The intensity of points holds our attention by making our eyes move (jump) around the closely placed points on canvas. Rough texture\textsuperscript{8} holds more attention due to its complexity. The irregular shapes created by the negative space between points holds our eyes longer than the clean edge around regular geometric points. Irregular shapes create irregular rhythm, the speed at which a movement is executed, and therefore form a change of rhythm. Irregular changes in rhythm demand more attention, where as we less pay attention to regular changes, e.g., the regular changes of a computer monitor screen saver can be quite hypnotic.\textsuperscript{9}

2.3.4.2. Line

If a point holds tension, a line releases and directs that tension along its path. As a visual element, a line leads our eyes; our eyes follow the trace of the line. Kandinsky describes "the geometric line is [...] the track made by the moving point; that is, its product. It is created by movement [...] Here, the leap out of the static into the dynamic occurs" (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 57). Line is produced from a point through a living force and given direction.

Kandinsky discusses four categorically different types of line; straight lines, angular lines, curved lines, and combined lines (compositional):

\textsuperscript{6} See Diagram 3, in Appendix, Kandinsky, 1979.
\textsuperscript{7} Compare Diagram 1 and 3, in Appendix, Kandinsky, 1979.
\textsuperscript{8} See fig.12, Kandinsky, 1979, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{9} See also “Perceptual Redundancy Effects”, Baars, 1988, pp. 190-192.
1) **Straight lines** (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 57)

2) **Angular lines** (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 68)

3) **Curved lines** (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 78)

4) **Combined lines** (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 92)

A straight line suggests a single direction. Straight line is defined by its tension in its capacity of the "most concise form of the potentiality for endless movement" and direction, i.e., horizontal, vertical, and diagonal (Kandinsky, 1979, pp. 57-58).

According to Kandinsky, the angular lines are the combination of alternate lines. The simplest forms of angular lines consist two discontinued lines that are made by two different directional forces. The force can be emphasized or weakened depending on the differing lengths of the lines. Complex angular lines are the combination of various lengths of segments and angles between the lines (Kandinsky, 1979, pp. 68-78).

Curved lines are the combination of simultaneous lines. The simple curved line has the main tension resides in the arc, which opposes and outstands the other two tension, two point where the line ends (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 79). The "curve-free wave-like" line varies pressure, and reveals different force and direction (Kandinsky, 1979, pp. 86-87). Kandinsky continues with varied pressure: Same length and simple curved lines can have different effects (combinations of directionality and tension) depending on where the pressure varies as they are drawn. With varying pressure, you can achieve a linear accentuation that can be ‘gradual, or a spontaneous, increase or decrease in strength’ (Kandinsky, 1979, p. 89).

These lines can be combined and composed (overlaid or crossover) in a composition. The combination of lines can create two-dimensional shape, lead our eyes in a direction, and create rhythm (or texture) by their repetition, similar to the composition of points.
2.4. Summary

Previous studies and the understandings derived therefrom on embodied action, the reflexive process, and metaphor theory provides a framework for my examination of the creative process of the artist. The continuum of structures of mediation found in first-person and second-person methodology provide a clear procedural framework from which to observe subjective phenomenal experience, while cognitive embodied metaphor and visual metaphor theory offer a schematic framework with which to analyze descriptions of creative process.

On this basis this review arrives at the following three essential principles:

• The painter is an exemplification of discipline specific embodied action the aim of which is the reductive examination of pragmatic knowledge in search of intersubjective meaning.

• Structures of mediation contextualize intuitive evidence, but do not limit it. In the reflexive process of eidetic reduction the first-person position mediates towards a second-person (intersubjective) position.

• Kineasthetic image schemas form cognitive metaphoric structures as active operational principles at the pre-conscious juncture of the expressive and reflective stages of the creative epoche. As such, a language of how things are done emerges from that moment during the painting process. Its description is encoded into metaphors that translate between cognitive domains of body, form, and action.

• The painter’s lived experience is expressed in process and can be read in reflection through visual metaphor.
3. Methodology: A first- and second-person approach to understanding the painter’s experience

3.1. Introduction

The grounds of process

A phenomenological investigation of lived experience centres on the original intuition of what is immediately present to consciousness independent of any presupposition; an immediate vision, in Husserl’s words, of “the things themselves” (Kockelmans, 1967, p. 29). Intuitive perception in this ‘primordial phenomenal’ sense normalizes any inductive and deductive response to distinctions between subject and object, which must be immediately “present to each other on the same level” (Kockelmans, 1967, p. 30). In order for consciousness to approach itself by stripping away the ‘layers of what we first thought to see’ Husserl proposes the application of reflective reductions, which phenomenologically has two possible contexts, that of the eidetic reduction and the phenomenological reduction. The former has as its goal the discovery of ‘general essences’ by ‘investigating what changes can be made in the sample without making it cease to be the thing it is.’ The phenomenological reduction on the other hand begins with an examination of pre-suppositions inherent in the character of the intentional act by which an object is characterized (overlays of culturally derivative acts and assumptions) and attempts a ‘reduction of the cultural world to the world of immediate experience’ (Kockelmans, 1967, pp. 30-34).

According to Husserl, as interpreted by Kockelmans, intentionality is the active tendency of consciousness to “form a meaning and consequently to constitute its own objects.” Thus, ‘objects’ are aspects of meaning “primordially constituted in and through consciousness.” It follows from this that the essence of consciousness is the intentional directedness towards the other-than-self, and the denial (through the reductions) of ‘self-
foundation’ (Kockelmans, 1967, pp. 34-36). Intentionality then, must be intersubjectively validated through a process of self-less reduction and forms an essentially intersubjective experience of the world. It is the core position of this methodology that reflexive pragmatic experience is foundationally validated by the intersubjective transmission of knowledge constituted of observable phenomena that two individuals may agree upon and work from.

The creative process can be described as an enactive and intentional transformation of the painter’s mental image of space and time in order to arrive at intersubjective representation. This representation emerges through the painter’s expressive and reflective process. The transformation of the mental image into the referent artefact presents a lived understanding of how spontaneous variation emerges from, and is fundamental to, the practice of artistic creativity. My research approaches the artist’s process as a practice of continuous self-awareness. In this phenomenological investigation I situate myself as subject and explore my own practice in order to get further insight into the essential aspects of the artist’s description of experience. The methodology therefore investigates correlations between my reflexive self-observation and its inscription in the language I use as an artist. I use this method to provide an account of pragmatic practice.

Artists may not be able to explain how they paint, but do know when and where to place a dot or line, brushes, or swipes and wipes. These painterly strokes constitute responses to the artist’s compositional intent. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson use the term cognitive unconscious to describe “all unconscious mental operations concerned with conceptual systems, meaning, inference, and language” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 12). Further, Johnson argues that cognition is based on manipulation of schemas, or sets of metaphorical understandings about the world that are grounded in fundamental physical spatial relationships (Johnson, 1987). These schema therefore constitute the embodied grounding of what the artist can do, but which they find difficult to describe. These schema map the texture of creative experience.

The artist translates the creative act of painting into a kind of visual language. Just as the writer’s discourse creates the form of written language, the artist’s discourse creates the form of painting. The artist communicates their intention through the
metaphorical form of the visual image (Johnson, 1987, p. 72-80). The artist’s embodied action of painting is therefore a discourse of representation. As a researcher I am interested in revisiting my own artistic process in order to reveal patterns of painterly ‘syntax’ that motivate my own artistic discourse, and to question the assumptions embodied in personal tacit knowledge. This form of self-reflexive observation is the basis of my methodology. The phenomenological reduction is an attempt to shed light on my tacit understanding of the interactive process of painting.

3.1.1. **The Metaphor of Texture – a pragmatic tool**

What do I mean by the concept of “texture”? For it’s standard denotative sense in the western lexicon we need only look to Oxford, where texture is associated in the original Latin with that which is woven, the character of that which is woven, with ‘fabricating, machinating’ and later with the “constitution, structure, or substance of anything with regard to its constituents or formative elements” (“texture, n.”, OED Online). Texture then has always held cognitive references to a compositional layering extending in Cartesian and temporal dimensionality. It is a metaphor that suggests to experience a cognitive mirroring in the embodied relationship of TIME and SPACE. The key feature of texture is that two or more processes are perceived in mutually coincident conditions. Texture therefore represents a paradoxical metaphor, one acknowledging the irreducibility of combinations of events.

Baar’s account of redundancy effects suggests levels of awareness are stimulated by asymmetrical pulses, in short, rhythms, but that also operate at cognitive levels that I will loosely categorize (for the sake of brevity if not accuracy) into three primary categories, corresponding to Baars’ ‘continuum of clear and fuzzy events’, a strata of consciousness ranging from “the clearly unconscious,” through “fuzzy difficult to determine events,” to “clearly conscious phenomena”. The rhythms that stimulate awareness at these three levels of the cognitive unconscious, I will call frequencies, with the lowest frequencies capturing the qualitative sense of that which operates at as a kind of thought or feeling we might ‘wonder’ about, occasionally, over a cycle that can last days or even years. We may use phrases like “something is bothering me”, or “there’s something I’m trying to put into words” at one end of the scale and this frequency may manifest in the creative work in general globally defined ways, the arrangement of the
studio, the decision to work, but is not specifically recognized as form. Higher
frequencies contribute with increasing resonance to specific actions in process and may
be directly expressed and recognized in the movement of the brush through the paint.

In painting, “texture” is constituted of all the dimensional elements, point, line,
plane, and the various metonyms of form. I add to these structural elements a
consideration of Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphoric schema as applied to an examination
of creative process in painting, to account for texture’s sense of intention. This
framework accounts for embodied intention in the act of painting, and includes the layers
of a painterly process that occurs and accumulates over time, and which result in the
artefact. The framework proposes a model of metaphorical texture accounting for
relationships between embodied action, the relationship to the object of intention, and
the multiple temporalities embedded in the process of formation. I have chosen the term
texture in order to model a cognitive bridging between dimensions of embodied action
within the process of painting.
I consider the process of painting as both interactive and cyclical. Of course these are intertwined, but we can consider them separately. The model of metaphoric texture that is presented here is one that considers the action cycle of painterly activity as building in an interactive cycle that is temporally distributed. By this I mean that there is a cycle of actual movement of the brush and material that takes place in very short sequences that are nonetheless compositied of a range of frequencies of experience from long term frequencies embodied in experiential relationships with the world all the way up to the high frequency of the vibrating texturization of observed formations on the canvass. These frequencies are layered within intention that is expressed through a

Figure 5. The Metaphor of Texture.

Note. Frequency and session time intersect at the interface metaphor. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)
cycle of process moving though the expression of the body through action to the manifestation of form which is reflected upon to in turn drive the embodiment of experience in the continuous layering of textural frequency. This is a process that takes place in time but is measured in space. In texture, space is fixed and time varies.

The methodology takes texture as representative of a dimension of intersubjective experience. The methodology understands experience as active, and from this must be inclusive of the notion of time as a stratum of texture, alongside and inseparable from the space it occupies. We do not know the feeling of a rock until we have had some involvement with it over time. We can share this experience. Then we can call this thing – this shared experience, a rock. Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch discuss the notion of multiple perspectives in terms of gradients in structures of mediation.\(^\text{10}\) Several categories emerge from this textural experience. There is the subjective embodied understanding of the rock, and the shared understanding. Then there is the rock, a perpetually emergent artefact. The recognition of intersubjective meaning then is the acknowledgement of a gestalt understanding about states of affairs.

The nature of intersubjective understanding is a state of ‘it doesn’t matter what is in the space, it matters who’. The way we perceive reality, the sensorial experiences we have, biases the way we expect things to behave. Any deviation from this constitutes an addition to the knowledge about that system.

If I note in my experience with painting, “I had a rough time getting it to look rough enough.” How do time and space become woven together like this in art? The word itself (texture) has a curious liminality to it, both noun and verb. I can texture texture. Somehow the thing is the doing of itself. What could this mean, this quality of texture that is both process and result? The information we try to communicate is textural; we make ‘textural gestures’. What could this mean to understandings of form and its instantiation? I began to wonder by what methods texture bound time and space into the experience of painting.
In this experience the concept seemed an interesting foundation for redirection in an examination of the creative process. After all had I not struggled with this in every painting I had ever done? Texture itself seemed the source domain of all the other drawing elements, containing line, tone, pattern, and all their active compositions and relationships.

3.1.2. **Terminologies in structures of mediation**

Figure 6. *The first- and second-person account in this study*

Note. Intersubjective relationship between first- and second-person positions in this study. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

Depraz et al. specify a series of perspectives of experience, points of view that arise from an examination of the distinction between the *content* and *process* of the

---

10 A continuum of perspectives, or inter-related points-of-view.
mental act. These points of view range from the first-person (ideally subjective) to the third-person (ideally objective) along a continuum of social exchanges they describe as “structures of mediation” (Depraz, et al., 2003).

The first-person, in its usual grammatical sense, refers to the self, the entity conceptualized as “I” in lived experience. Thomas Metzinger (2003) has argued that the phenomenal self is not a thing but an on-going process that appears in consciousness. Metzinger’s analysis of the subjective nature of the first-person experience identifies three ‘centrally relevant properties’ including ‘mine-ness’ (phenomenal appropriation; the sense of ownership), ‘selfhood’ (the conscious experience of being someone), and ‘perspectivalness’ (a structural feature: phenomenal space as a whole is organized around a centre, a supramodal point of view)” (Metzinger, 2004, p. 1).

In this research, the first-person therefore constitutes the localized subjectivity of the artist, the being who holds within personal lived experience the embodied knowledge of life-as-a-painter, and who is capable of examining the active content of that experience as it unfolds. This situation of experience is furthermore accepted as having the ability to describe the experienced internal states of the personal process of epoche and to do this with an embodied awareness of the immanent arising of intuitive evidence of the validity of that practice.

The first-person’s lived experience is only purely describable from the first-person point of view, forming the first-person account, which may then be shared with another person for whom the account becomes an event in their experience. This other person reflects upon the first-person experience from the mediated position of second-person.

In the standard grammatical sense, the second-person is the entity addressed as “you”. It is important to note that the source of this address is always another entity conceiving of itself as the first-person. It is this transitional sense of perspective viewpoint that the intersubjective position arises from. Observation nonetheless is of external traces, but conducted in a detached manner by a ‘situated individual’ – one who has experienced an engagement in contextually similar circumstances. As Depraz et al, describe this stance, “…a second-person position is an exchange between situated
individuals focusing on a specific experiential content developed from a first-person position” (Depraz et al., 2003, pp. 82-85). The second-person investigator therefore operates from the assumption that observed states and behaviours are “taken explicitly as traces or manifestations of the mental life of the other, and furthermore as the only access to this mental life” (Depraz et al., 2003, p. 83). The second-person furthermore, constitutes an emphatic being situated between the individual first- and the generic third-person position. The second-person is situated closer to the site of the embodying event than the third-person, an entity not part of the conversation between ‘you’ and ‘I’ that is always referred to as ‘they’, ‘he’, or ‘she’.

In this research, the second-person, situates the self-as-researcher observing the painter’s descriptions and actions, journaling that experience hyper-reflectively from an emphatic position, and analyzes those observations using methods built upon cognitive metaphor theory and phenomenological methods of reduction.

The intersubjective relationship between first- and second-person represents a shared understanding of an empathic nature that has what Husserl terms a ‘kind of intentional experience which has for its object the experiences of others’ (Lauer, 1967, p. 172). Empathy constitutes the intentional embodiment of ‘another’s’ experience. (Varela & Shear, 1999, p. 10). To share an experience with others implies that a first-person account may be produced and made available through the shared meaning of an intersubjective discourse. This account must be fashioned in such a way that the intuitive evidence discovered and offered by the first-person is in turn verifiable in the reflected experience of the second-person position. ‘Shared meaning’ may then be understood as a continuity of experience between situated individuals.

3.1.3. Process as interactivity

In this section I describe a blended methodology that examines the poetics of creative process as a reflexive conversation between the artist and the painting. This conversation constitutes a dialog of interactive exchange between the reflective and expressive aspects of the process of painting. My methodology considers five parameters of exchange that contribute to metaphors of interactivity:
1) Realization: The process of realization, the awareness of the conversation between the work (observation) and the response (intention). Continuous experience-awareness leads to the nuance of Connoisseurship, an embodied awareness of “experiential acuity” (Schiphorst, 2011, p. 2).

2) Participation: In the participatory nature of lived experience, process itself becomes the goal. For the artist, the most useful information comes in and through process: An interaction with the intentional object that calls to the interactor with a siren-call of ‘If you don’t do it, you won’t know.’

3) Process-immersion: Circular flow in the sense of epoche. What is known and what is seen are not the same. Or, as the Koreans say “there are mountains beyond the mountains.”

4) Navigation: The experience of ‘navigation’ in a medium (observation and response to materiality). This ties with the foundational logic of Johnson’s experiential cognition. Interactivity in the studio as derived from contextual navigation, and the formation of domains of significance.

5) Somatic-cognition: Thinking ‘through’ the body – ‘somatic cognition’. The foundation of empathy that leads to the intersubjective basis of meaning.

These parameters all play into the process of epoche, a practice of applied phenomenological reduction in the reflexive conversation of painting.

3.1.4. Epoche in practice

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch propose three principal phases of epoche: suspension, redirection, and letting-go. These are identified as necessary aspects of becoming aware of experience (Depraz, Varela, & Vermersch, 2003). Let me imagine
my process of painting as it progresses through these three phases, with an awareness of their reflexive aspects:

Image 2. The Studio for Session 3.

Note. Depending on the localization of space and the context of the observation, I may work on the floor, on a wall, on an easel or table. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

I prepare all the materials and just sit down. I am just about to paint. There is a body, my body, situated in the proximity of a surface on which I intend to make marks. The epoche is initiated, leading to:

1) The Phase of Suspension: The first suspension that I confront may be the blank canvas in front of me. However it’s dimensions and whatever I am about to paint, the two-dimensional empty plane may induce or require suspension from any artist who has just situated themselves in front of an empty void and is about to begin. It is because we live in a three-dimensional world and our mind is in at least in three-dimensions during any cognitive interaction. The metaphor of the picture plane – a planar slice through cognition – is the defining bracketing of the artists reductive suspension. All my focus is in here. Multi-dimensional cognition is intersecting with a largely two-dimensional expressive space. The very nature of the medium brings forth suspension.

2) The Phase of Redirection: While experiencing the phase of suspension, I may remind myself of my original motivation, what I was about to draw out of my mind. This is elusive and following its constant turns diligently, I enter the void. From deep within eddies of precognition come fleeting glimpses of my
subject, the muse appears. In the curve of a line, a trace of life. I do not move, transfixed.

3) The Phase of Letting-go: Now may be the time to release the thought. This moment is more akin to ‘letting go’ of the thought and ‘just acting’ than it is any direct representation of the thought, which in any case may not be yet clear. This act may also lead to the very first instantiated moment of the painting process, a mark. Immediately, I am returned to the phase of suspension. What is the voice of this mark? What does it tell me?

Once there is a moment of instantiation, this leads to another suspension, as while holding a brush, there will be a cognitive friction between my brush, colour, the canvas, and my perception of the event. This reflective process, as I have bracketed it here, motivates response. These three phases are in continuous circular process that at once engages and redirects the artist. As I get into the act of painting, each response phase takes longer.

3.1.5. The cycle of process; the memory of action

Action – ‘Wash, rinse, repeat’

Rudolf Arnheim, in an extensive reading of Picasso’s Guernica, observes that an artist may not fully know what they mean to say when they begin a particular work, but instead must discover meaning through the creative process by trying various rearrangements of form and space, constantly refining “the interplay of independence and interdependence.” Movements of form entail changes of meaning (Arnheim, The genesis of a painting: Picasso’s Guernica, 1962, pp. 132-133).
We see only the *trace* of the artist in the artefact. But where is *doing* in this formation? An artefact, as usually understood in its objectified sense, is *done* (complete, finished). We need to understand *doing* (as an active verb) in order to understand *done*. For instance when I teach *how* to draw, I have many difficulties teaching someone how to do something only by telling. Showing how and pointing always communicates *as I do*, the ‘as such’ of experience. You have to see process and attempt to emulate it to understand. A language capable of describing *how* to a third person must be able to communicate meaning in a way that results in a verifiable embodiment of action.

What exactly is ‘doing’? Perhaps the meaning of process is found in the context of the artefact. The temporal and structural layering of its attendant processes reveals a visual syntax, just as linguistic syntax reflects the ordering of events in language.

When we try to explain ‘doing’ we need to know how to describe process. Listed below are three domains of pragmatic experience that I consider and define as categorical formations in the process of painting. Several methodological entailments emerge:
1) The *Domain of Body*: A body-based understanding of the way in which process is experienced in the practice.

   a. An intersubjective relationship with the artefact is motivated by the artist who externalizes empathically motivated expression.

   b. Creative process is a blend of bodily relationship to the space and the artist’s perspective. This process embodies both constraint and intention. Therefore, the discourse around the activity reflects an embodied conversation with the body and its limits.

2) The *Domain of Form*: An accounting of the practitioner’s description of appearances.

   a. In painting, how a painter represents her intention through formal metaphors.

   b. First-person description forms first-principles; it is therefore important to engage in rigorous reduction of bias reflecting influences of external mediation during the description of form.

3) The *Domain of Action*: A sensitive representation of the of the trace; the artist’s touch.

   a. A painter’s expression is recorded on the picture plane of the canvas which represents a planar slice through the action space of the artist. The artefact represents a series of an artist’s actions.

   b. Touch begets feeling. Feelings are mixed with intention in a metaphoric texture of space and time. Therefore, evidence of conceptual transformation is investigated.

These three domains implicitly transform over time in the process of painting.

I propose that process as interactive experience leads to an understanding of embodiment as knowledge of movement, the *memory of action*. Process is a seeking for sensory recognition of what has been imagined internally, the embodied lived image,
which stands between the hidden tacit knowledge of how to get there and the manifested form of the artefact. Even one point on a canvas is the result of the artist’s process of constant interactive expression and reflection. As spontaneous as things may appear to the external observer, they do not appear without the intentional movement of the artist’s body.

3.2. Gathering process-description

The process of process

This study approaches first-person investigation as an experiential reduction on the methodological framework of what is being done, why it is being done, and an interactive observation of how experience emerges from those conditions. We may consider this as a basic triad of communication, wherein the intentional act must potentially contain within it all three cognitive responses. The research therefore attempts to derive from a first-person phenomenological reduction of process, a set of non-propositional parameters capable of describing that process.

This methodology 1) starts with the application of reflective observation and the notion of embodied mind and cognition (Johnson, 1987) from the perspective of first-person lived experience (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991/1999), 2) takes the procedural methodology of observing the moment of becoming aware in this experience (Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch, 2003), 3) to observe the artist’s reflexive process (Schön, 1983; Dewey, 1934/1958) and cycle of epoche and intuitive evidence in the process of becoming aware of the self (Depraz, et al., 2003), 4) I use image schema of metaphorical projection (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987/1990) and visual language (Arnheim, 1954/1974, Kandinsky, 1979) to analyze procedural descriptions of the creative process of the first-person (‘I’, as an artist), 5) in order to arrive at a second-person metaphorical conceptual framework from which to observe the artist’s first-person experience.

3.2.1. Methodological procedures

1) What:
The methodology looks for evidence of embodied kinesthetic image schema in metaphorical language used in the descriptions by artists of their creative process.

2) Why:
If tacit knowledge of process is embodied in the practitioner, then it should be possible to observe intentional relationships between the description of the act and the embedded experiential structure of the object interacted with. These descriptions would then form part of the tacit how of process, a description that is yet non-propositional and open to adaptation, and may help with the design of systems of experiential knowledge transfer and contribute to cognitive studies of creativity modeling.

3) How:
The research takes the position that first-person reporting mediated through the reflection of second-person observation forms a lived representation of the artistic practice. These perspectives considered together are taken as valid phenomenological descriptions of the intersubjective motivations implied by intentional experience. These descriptions constitute descriptions of processual practice.
The artist is engaged in periodic and sensitive interventions in the form of a scripted routine of ‘open’ questions. By open I mean questions that are only suggestive of the eidetic reduction of assumptions about process related domains of influence. A stream of consciousness discourse is therefore motivated while working on a series of paintings that have only the pre-defined theme of ‘light’.¹¹
This discourse is similar to explaining to someone else from the position of a tutor, or mentor, about how I am painting, as I paint. This is something I am well familiar with in my teaching of drawing and painting. One speaks while painting; both the action of painting and the words spoken are trying to say

¹¹ Baars describes the stream of consciousness as a “complex interplay between conscious events and their goal contexts” (Baars, 1988, p. 240).
something. I believe this may be particular to the teaching of visual arts and is less available to other arts as the teaching methods of; for instance, dance and music tend to involve demonstration and choreographic-notational transfers of knowledge.

Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch generally refute simultaneous verbalization of experience, but do not demand any requirement not to do so. They believe that “when you are truly working on new solutions, you’re not really all that available for an additional task of verbalization”, and have additionally noted the value of the experienced ‘external’ practitioner as investigator (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 76). They suggest a more central intersubjective position, describing the second-person position as being “an exchange between situated individuals focusing on a specific experiential content developed from a first-person position” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 81).

In response, I suggest these concerns may be alternately framed as arguments for the benefit of the experienced practitioner conducting the initiating referent investigation, the reflective second-person observation, and initiating the reflexive iteration of continuing session work. Depraz, et al. extend this idea of the conditions constituting a new reduction in the process of reflection upon the referent experience, calling it “hyper-reflection” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 88), the reflection of reflection, from which I draw the structuring of methodological procedure in this study. The validity of this approach, as I have argued above, may be particularly evident in the visual arts, and from lived experience I am able to verify its efficacy, but creative practitioners in other disciplines may have similar experiences. A musician and a writer, for instance, have both anecdotally described to me periods of considerable reflection (which may even involve in-process verbalization) following the playing of a few notes or the writing of a ‘simple’ sentence. The goal seems to be an attempt to draw out an understanding of how and why those lines originated in that referent first-person experience. Those giving such accounts have described this ‘drawing out’ as a conversation with the self that is often ‘spoken out loud’. This reflection in turn leads to an iterative transformation of the experience, forming its subsequent nature. In other words, this reflective pause is as much a part of the artist’s process as the actions preceding and following it.
This research therefore attempts to define a space of investigation in which every attempt is made to passively wait for an ideal state of non-interruption in the activity of the artist, which is approximated by the establishment of a meditative routine prior to the insertion of self-questioning into the session. Second-person access may be obtained through re-visiting video and audio taped sessions, the transcripts of those sessions, and journals describing the session experience. The intent is that the second-person observers own processual actions do not disrupt or lead the focus of the first person investigator. This may be achieved through approaching the evidence as the ‘first-person removed’; as a researcher directly experienced with the phenomena but separated from the referent context.

The essence of this method is that the second-person position does not require a physically distinguishable persona to act in the mediation of that capacity. An implementation of second-person mediation imposes certain restrictions on what may or may not be assumed from direct experience; these restrictions may be applied by the “first-person removed” as reflective parameters bracketing the phenomenological reduction of the second-person observation of the self. This methodological adaptation is defined as the state which is most naturally representative of the artist’s practice (wherein a conversation with the self in first-person practice has been part of the lived experience of the artist throughout her development) and further accepts the immediacy of the directly experienced second-person investigator as most implicitly operating at the liminal border of awareness between the embodied knowledge of the practitioner and the empathic but limiting reduction of the observer. This methodology positions the reflective act of second-person mediation at the ‘edge’ of a kinesthetic image schema of containment: the empathic response is neither enclosed in an interior space available only to the first-person, nor artificially ‘outside’ as an objectified separation from the experience. The intersubjective position of the second-person is structurally situated such that the reflective positions of first- and second-person are recognized as essential to the lived-experience of the artist and are always present in the cycle of epoche. It is not possible as an artist, engaged in a reflexive practice over the temporal framing of the session, to separate myself from this cycle. It is therefore my position that there is no essential conflict in the movement during process along a continuum of structures of mediation and that this movement is an essential component of process, forming an
embodied cognitive model of the most basic iteration of the source-path-goal schema of creative process, that of a transition of perspectives between self and other that is the path of intersubjective awareness.

The methodology thus takes a particular approach to structures of mediation, and defines particular nuances of first and second-person distinction in the session work of the painter. This distinction is maintained over multiple sessions in its formulation here, whereas from session-to-session that which constitutes the ‘interruption’ (or ‘self-interview’) is reductively reconstituted based on second-person reflection in the hyper-reflective phase. This ‘interruption’ is intended as a signifier of that which induces ‘suspension’ and is therefore contextually variable but draws from the framework of the method’s domains and derivative categories.

The model is maintained in a pre-conceptual state in my mind as something to be critically examined in process. This pre-supposes that the investigator has to have, as a part of this methodology, a willingness to maintain through a stream of consciousness, a discussion of why they are doing these things, as they are doing them. So I pre-reflect upon, and maintain beside me as I work, a chart or series of questions that stimulate first-person discourse. I kind of look at it, think about it, while acting. Alternately, as in the meditative traditions, the model may be embodied as a practice, a set of repeated sub-routines that are not the practice but the foundation of a possible rhythm within the practice. Table 1 below shows an application to this study of Depraz, Varela, and Vermersch’s structures of mediation, demonstrating these perspectives.

**Table 1. Structures of mediation.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation</th>
<th>First-person</th>
<th>Second-person</th>
<th>Third-person</th>
<th>Researcher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is she doing?</strong></td>
<td>Direct access to thoughts.</td>
<td>Observation of motion of the subject.</td>
<td>The view from another context.</td>
<td>The detached personal view.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I am trying to bring into the world what I see inside.</td>
<td>She is painting a picture. It seems to tell a story. She uses the materials in a particular way.</td>
<td>They made these. (Cannot directly observe process.)</td>
<td>Looking for evidence of embodied creative process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Why?</strong></td>
<td>I want to know how they are not the same.</td>
<td>Because it is her way of representing a concept or emotion. (&quot;Expression&quot;).</td>
<td>It was a response to context. (Cultural, historical.)</td>
<td>So that this knowledge may be taught, shared, represented.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How?  

| How? | Through first-person practice (reflection, observation, testing), understanding my media, and comparing continuously how things look in my mind and in the world. | By various actions, materials, techniques, and descriptions. | Largely unknown. The paintings and perhaps journals of the artist. Recipes of materials. Histories. Media has extended the availability of the second-person investigation? | By examining the degree to which and in what ways the use of metaphor reveals the use of Kinesthetic Image Schemas in artistic activity. |

Note. (Table contents © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012); building from the definition of first-, second-, and third-person accounts as described by Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 85, and adding method-appropriate interpretation gained through lived experience.

3.2.1.1. Categories of reflexive questions

The nature of questions in the usual sense implies a leading valence; an intention that formulates the question and influences (the understanding of) its answer. As I do not in the first instance seek propositional, quantitative ‘answers,’ I do not propose to approach the mysteries of the tacit experience with an absurdly recursive questionnaire that devolves into “How did I do that?” The essential character of eidetic reduction suggests that the thing hidden in the mystery of ‘how’ is best understood by asking the active, intentional ‘why.’ Reflexive questioning then attempts to reveal a deeper question through an intentional act of questioning the questions. In search of categories of experience, I borrow from Varela et al. the notion of a “domain of distinctions that has relevance for the structure of the system” (1991/1999, p. 155). It is these structures in embodied cognition that these deepening questions will reveal.

Descriptions of process are obtained during a first-person case study conducted while an artist is engaged in an extended session aimed at drawing out intersubjective qualities in a series of paintings. Questions may be similar to the following examples¹², and are categorized by one or more associations to the proposed domains of pragmatic experience:

1. Primary domain: Form
Questions about the nature of form.
e.g. How does one *begin* to represent light? Light itself is perceived as formless form. Process based ‘questions’ in this domain may represent active states rather than objective mediations: reflection upon the *emergence* of form, or *formation*.

2. Primary domain: Somatic body
Questions about the *state of the body*.
   e.g. Describe what *you perceive* in movement at this time. Intersubjective sensorial valences are mirrored in the metaphors of embodiment relating to touch.

3. Primary domain: Action
Questions about *actions or active conditions*.
   e.g. How does *this* become *that*? Action is unavoidably a *doing of something*.

### 3.2.2. *Description of the session environment*

*(General description of the session):*

As I note in Session 1 (Appendix B):

What do I do when I start drawing?
What is starting?
When do I start?

I already started when I was setting the light, when I was walking, when I was putting my things down. I observe things all the time.

---

12 Following the principle of ambivalent reference to primary experiential domains.
The session begins with a ‘getting into’ the studio, but the studio is an amorphous space and time that in fact I carry with me. People have a romantic view of the artist’s studio reinforced by wonderful images of classic spaces occupied by famous personas at the height of their career, or equally seductive visions of righteous squalor, but these things may distract as much as enhance the process of art. They are in any case irrelevant to the essence of intention. Art takes place in the everyday. It is critical that the eidetic reduction takes place in every moment. And so I begin. In this research, the studio, wherever it may manifest is appended by a certain amount of technology. All sessions are recorded on video as a form of first-person augmented memory available to second-person mediation. The only interruptions are ‘standing back’ and ‘reflecting-in-progress’ Standing back is like a self-critique. As noted in Session 2 (Choi, i45):

I don’t think I would paint without standing back.
It gives me a second opinion.

I observe interaction through the externalized framework of the second-person position, constituting as myself as researcher, by revisiting videotaped sessions of my process-experience as an artist. These two sessions are completely separated, usually by several days apart, to refresh my perspective by implementation of distancing, to avoid ‘being caught in one position’, and to establish a somatic difference in observation and reflection.

The original first-person investigator, now situated in second-person mediation, through reviewing the audio and video taped sessions, conducts reductive reflection upon the removed experience by examining closely their response to the second-person position with respect to the experience. Data is extracted based on structured questions and journal analysis during and after the completion of each painting. This lived experience remediation of the investigation adds a reflective layer to the reference experience (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 87). These examinations will revisit the questions proposed, as well as investigate any new questions that have arisen as a result of post-process experience and reflection upon that experience.
Image 3. *The Observed (texture) and the Real (light).*

Note. The tacit transformation of texture motivates the methodology. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

3.2.3. **Post-session analysis of reflexive conversation**

*(General description of the post-session):*

The recorded speech of the artist was examined for metaphorical descriptions that responded in some way to processual activity observed. These data were
assembled in a data base detailing sequence of descriptions, related actions if any, related artefactual evidence if specified, and the text of the description.\textsuperscript{13}

Categories of metaphorical reference are derived by drawing inferences to practice-specific terminology. Of interest is that terminology’s localization in the primary experiential domains of form, movement, and the somatic body (Johnson, \textit{The Body in the Mind}, 1987, p. 29). How (under what conditions in what relationships) these categories are composed into reflective motivations is taken as the primary evidence for cognitive structures of embodied cognition. From this matrix, which may itself be modified, extended, or simplified during the first-person development of the investigative process, an analysis of metaphorical schema’s relationships with expressive actions will be conducted, to determine what patterns of usage may emerge in the complex relationship between artist and artefact. It is proposed that these descriptions and patterns of usage are resonant of embodied descriptions of \textit{how to do}. Of interest is evidence for usage of experiential and conceptual metaphor peculiar to the various \textit{stages} of practice (as identified by Depraz, et al., Wallas, and Wollheim).

\textit{Table 2. Format of the Database Categories}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body domain</th>
<th>Action domain</th>
<th>Form domain</th>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Reflective session</th>
<th>Hyper-reflective session</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Validation (practical result)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>memories</td>
<td>(are)</td>
<td>landmarks</td>
<td>“I am going to put the landmark to remember this moment.”</td>
<td>small pointing gesture, application of minimal tone</td>
<td>form encapsulates time: marks are both spatial coordinates (elemental) and observations (of the world)</td>
<td>Process description / metaphor / embodied schema</td>
<td>practical evidence - returned to later</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. An example of an entry from the database, cell (i30). (Choi, 2012).

\textsuperscript{13} Video and audio timecode were noted also as guides to locating media during analysis, but are not frame-accurate: This information was used only as a loose index of where I might find the media for reflective analysis, not for any specifically temporal metric.
The observed data is categorized by the ‘referent session’, ‘reflexive session’, and ‘hyper-reflexive session’, placing any identified metaphorical process descriptions into their source and target domains as well as noting schematic structures. Table 2 is meant to illustrate categories of analysis; full data is actually kept in notebooks and database form (see Appendix E). References in this thesis are to the database and are specified by reference to the cell row and column identifier.

(Domains of significance):

1. Action: In order to begin to derive a basis for categorizing first person data, it may be best to relate image schema to process by example. Say I begin a process, in my case a drawing perhaps; the first thing that always follows a beginning, if the research is to continue in any meaningful way, is an observation, leading to a question. This is an example of a container schema in process; I am momentarily caught inside a prior assumption. Therefore, the observation leads to redirection.
   a. Actions are identified as the change-relationships of association.
   b. Those elements significance in the session.


(Assumptions inherent in the session methodology):

Several conditions are implied by the session methodology. The modalities and constraints that define a session’s boundaries constitute its ‘rules of engagement’. They emerge from a consideration and reduction of the point of view, constituting the conditions under which a session is formed and identified, the means by which it proceeds, and the conditions that define its end. These conditions fall in several related areas and are consequential to the acknowledgement in first-person investigation of structures of mediation as defined by Depraz, et al. (2003, pp. 80-85), and Varela & Shear (2003, pp. 7-9). These conditions (with their consequences) follow:
1) First-person observation of inner conditions during the expressive cycle is possible.

   a. Initiating condition: Motivating impulse
   b. Terminating condition: Intuitive evidence

   It is my contention that as the cycle of *epoche* motivates the artist's natural rhythm of observation and expression, the initiating condition of creative awareness is bound to the moment of suspension. This moment is experienced as creative ‘inspiration’ and can emerge at any moment and from any thing: a leaf, a smile, a sense of loss, a stone, or a word. That emergence is associated in this research with phenomenological ‘immanence’ and in its initial appearance is an internal awareness of redirection. This suspension and redirection of the everyday leads naturally through the cycle of *epoche* until the awareness of a new condition or state of affairs is reached (embodied), which is in fact a new beginning. This may take place over multiple temporal cycles concurrently.

2) First-person observation of exterior situations (expressive-reflective cycle)

   a. Initiating condition: Artefactual expression
   b. Terminating condition: Validation of intersubjective evidence

   Exterior situations are firstly a reflexive response to suspension; a ‘what am I experiencing in this moment?’ experience. This is differentiated from the interior awareness by its instantiation in the artifact that forms the beginning of an intersubjectively identifiable experience. As I express what I have identified and reflected on internally, the texture of this relationship deepens.

3) Reflective second-person account

   a. Initiating condition: Augmented memory (video as memory assist)
   b. Terminating condition: Transcription and journal documentation

   The instantiation of an artifact and its resonance in various reflected forms places the first-person account into a realm of new possibility: it
moves from memory to record, leaving the shell of my body and eventually becoming for me, as it is for the intersubjective second-person, only accessible through its trace - the evidence that remains after experience is embodied.

Three further observations may be made about this process-sequence, descriptive of how the process must be conducted if it is to respect the ‘coming to know’ central to the phenomenological reduction of artistic *epoche*:

4) A voluntary standing-back (temporal and empathic separation) between steps 2 and 3: Hyper-reflection
   a. Hyper-reflection is equated with an intersubjective movement between the structures of mediation of first- and second-person in this study.

5) The second-person mediation is conducted under strict eidetic critique
   a. This is not an aesthetic judgment, but ‘observation of observation’

6) These steps taken together constitute one completed global session cycle\(^{14}\)

This investigative session framework constitutes a triangulated examination of the relationship between structures of mediation (point of view) and the access to levels of awareness granted by those structures.

*(Factors that are ignored):*

It is noted here that the sessional aspects of *when* and *where* constitute the spatio-temporal context of the *origin of a session* and are therefore folded into an investigation of the *how* of process. This is also intended to promote a methodology that is capable of forming and recognizing intersubjective domains of significance in multi-cultural environments. It is prudent to note that in any consideration of an event, there are an infinite number of associated events. A study must necessarily remove most of these from consideration. We cannot for instance consider any needlessly personal

\(^{14}\) See “global structure of session” (Depraz, et al., 2003, Chapter 2).
context such as the weather and what the artist ate for breakfast. As Wittgenstein has most eloquently phrased it, “what cannot be spoken about must be passed over in silence.”

The model of process presented in this methodology attempts to arrive at that which is *intersubjectively verifiable*, understood as *that which may be repeated*. Verifiable actions may be understood as having produced similar patterns of reflective observation on repeated occasions among a diversity of subjects.
4. Discussion

4.1. Introduction

For an artist, a painter, the artefact represents one aspect of the cycle of process; it constitutes the interactive object of experience. Engaged in process, artists constantly observe the world, the materials they are utilizing, and their own actions as they express the internal (mind) image, localized narrative, and subject matter. Artists make actions while observing those actions; painters draw out an image as they see it. This process exists in continuum, so often hard to describe as the first-person within the lived experience (Varela & Shear, The View from Within, 1999).

For a painter who is in the process of painting, there are three primary difficulties in describing the experience: 1) It is an experience only the first-person can know, 2) it is difficult to control an intuitive experience that is unpredictable and personal in its access (Varela & Shear, 1999), and 3) there is some possibility that descriptions of experience change that, and future, experiences: the work may be different than if it were undertaken, feeling the same way and at the same time, but without trying to describe it.

As this latter difficulty somewhat precludes and further work if it is not addressed I will re-consider it here. Firstly, as discussed previously the essence of this method is that a required second-person position does not require a physically distinguishable persona to act in that capacity. The artist is capable of acting in the first- and second-person positions during the cycle of the session and it is an essential aspect of the epoche that awareness traverses this divide through suspension, redirection, and letting go of assumptions about that division. Intersubjective knowledge arises from the empathic deconstruction of that division.

From the painter’s perspective, there is a cycle of expression and reflection accumulating in an embodiment of tacit experience. This creative praxis of intentional
embodiment iterates in reflective repetition in order to reach for instantiation; until a mark is made on the canvas. From this view, it is clear that reflexive qualitative analysis, if it is to have any value defined by its own reductive process, takes a lot time. This is why Depraz, et al. call for the need by the research community for the derivation of phenomenologically descriptive categories of different practitioners’ experience. They stress that it is only possible to “elaborate a descriptive categorization if a community has already put into place the intersubjective conditions for validating the categories in question” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 78). This ‘putting into place’ is a cultural process, the accumulated embodiment of a community of practitioners, and community is an event that takes place over an extended time. It would be of value to examine all the written works of artists in this light, as it seems clear from the results of this study that considerable time is required to investigate the smallest aspects of creative experience.

A close reading of sessions in this study reveals some evidence of embodied action in the stream of conscious discourse of the creative practitioner. It seems that the deep conceptual integration of one consistent metaphor, that of the body, may indeed account for a fundamental understanding of experience and therefore its interpretation and expression. This hypothesis of cognitive embodiment has been well argued for by Lakoff and Johnson, and Varela, et al. It is revealing that the metaphor of the body is so frequently used in the metaphoric translation of the practitioner. Studying the artist as a practitioner adds an experienced voice to the field of intersubjective validation through a ‘widely embodied’ series of life-long intentional interactions with the material landscape.

The cultural embodiment of the creative community is both wide and deep. Some of these strata may be examined by looking at the diverse evidence left behind, a kind of artefactual geography, and some must be obtained through rigorous first-person observation. This suggests that the artists themselves may contribute in extremely meaningful ways to this process by maintaining eidetic journals, a suggestion that many artists will dismiss outright as ‘outside’ their process. It is hoped that my data and methods propose a strong argument for a reconsideration of this ‘reflective blind spot’. Such reconsideration would constitute a communal application of the process of epoche to the cycle of process itself. This contribution would reflexively validate the intersubjective significance of metaphoric cognitive structures to a redirected investigation of creative process.
Redirection

I have summarized graphically (Fig. 8) a model of emergent structure that attempts to account for a categorization of my first-person experience with the process of painting and that has been investigated in this research in a series of structured sessions. The mapping has an intuitive validity in practice yet must be further investigated over an extended series of increasingly reductive examinations, focusing on key relationships between its suggested domains of experience. It is surmised that enactively formed categorical relationships will reveal the essential characteristics of the embodied knowledge within cognitive structures. I draw this supposition from an understanding and observation of process in painting, in that process as it reflects on my personal experiences, and from the observation of intersubjective relationships. Categories reflect individual lived experience and its resultant interactions. The intersubjective second-person empathic position is revealing of the factors forming the how of process.

The graphic representation of process presented in Figure 8 is meant to model the process as observed in first-person experience in this research. Process is described as a continuum of structures, from the cognitive unconscious strata of tacit embodied knowledge to intentionally motivated actions. In the left part of Figure 8, tacit knowledge is categorized as metonymic formulations of experience holding what I will tentatively consider as ‘immiscible valence’. These metonymic formulations are represented in the most peripheral circles. By ‘immiscible valence’ I mean the quality of lived experience that may not be further reduced and may not constitute any part of another. These prototypical categories are formed in an enactive relationship with lived experience. One could think of these peripheral categories as ‘personal preference settings’, a tendency to utilize the individuated quality in certain ways and situations that modulate the currently embodied ‘valence’ of personal experience.
Figure 8. Hypothetical Model of Painting Process.

Hypothetical model of the painting process from a methodology of first-person practice.
A central hypothesis of this research is that these embodied metonymic representations are grouped into higher domains of experience that are fundamental to increasingly intersubjective understanding. I have described these primary domains as somatic body (perception), form (conceptual relationships), and action (all that constitutes movement, or fundamental changes in states and conditions). This grouping of experiential understanding is situated in cross-domain structures of metaphor. Metaphor is posited to form the fundamental grounding of enactive translation, from meaning to experience to meaning. Structures of mediation (‘perspectives’) grow from the acknowledgement and incorporation of intersubjective interaction in this model.

4.2. First-person observation – getting into

Suspension

The continuum of structures of mediation is keenly felt in the eidetic reduction required to move from the first- to the second-person position. All that is strictly personal must be put aside. In this research methodology, second-person mediation is, in fact, the ‘first-person removed’, yet inextricably tied up with its own first-person position. In reflexive first-person practice, the ‘first-person removed’ must question every assumption made by the self. One attempts to make the subject into the object of investigation. This reflexive mediation is what I choose to represent as the ‘intersubjective response’ (Fig. 9), an intersubjective relationship across the reflected point of views. In this structure of mediation ‘I, artist’ must enter into an empathic relationship with the ‘I, researcher’. These structures of understanding must have experiential commonalities for any possibility of the transfer of meaning. These intersubjective meanings are assembled intuitively into metaphors that describe pragmatic embodied knowledge between persons.
**Figure 9. Intersubjective Response.**

Note. First- and second-point-of-view as reflection across instantiation. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

These reflecting points-of-view are schematized as a ‘journey’ in this research. Intersubjective meanings are translated into embodied actions; actions speak louder than words, and words are yet actions.
Image 4. Archetypes of Painting

Note. A work I developed prior to this thesis research that investigated my painterly response to characterization of Jungian influenced archetypal personalities in painting; the 'messenger', 'totem', 'shaman', and 'watcher'. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

I have observed, in a preliminary study to this research (presented at the Conceptual Structure, Discourse, and Language Conference 2012, Vancouver), an example of metaphoric and schematic translation that inspired this investigation. Engaged in a studio session that involved the production of a large canvass (Image 4) with a central theme of the Archetype\(^{15}\). There was a form I had identified only with an archetypal aspect of my creative origins (my literal personal development as a painter in

\(^{15}\) The painting is a visual narrative reflection on aspects of my own practice in terms of considerations of Jung’s *unconscious archetypes*.  

87
childhood), a totemic representative of the intuitive. That form, nonetheless, was already imbued with a personality, sufficient to elicit a conversational interaction with the painting. My charcoal was hovering over the canvass, beginning as if fading in, from above, to the touch of the first particle of carbon on canvass, the point that would start the line. Hovering, but drawing the line in the air with only the hint of the form in mind, approaching the canvass slowly, the line, several lines began to appear. I said,

“It comes out softly.” (Choi, 2012, i5)

Later, noting in my journal observations about the experience from a video I had been recording of the session I said,

“Several lines loosely following a path are drawn out.” (Choi, 2012, i6)

These combined lines held a strange resonance for me. They were pregnant with a sense of emergence. A line emerges from the unconscious; it was not placed so much as seen. These tentative but pre-conceptual lines held the promise of a journey that was intensely personal yet would open before me if diligently observed. From this perspective, observation constituted an observation of itself; a moment of direct interaction with the experience of the medium. I “put down, draw, a line that somehow I already know” (Choi, 2012, i91). This description leads to the question of ‘how do you do that’, the key question of all practical disciplines. What the outside observer does not see is that the answer to the question, is the question itself. This is the first-person’s how; this is how ‘I’ do it. The artist learns by an enactive observation of what emerges from tacit experience. At one point I say "maybe I pre-draw a line hundred times before I actually put a line on the canvas" (Choi, 2012, i93). I equally ask ‘how’ a line can be drawn out as it is observed, from the tacit, and from the pencil. The question, ‘how’, asks about the nature of conditions that bring forth metaphoric descriptions and categories of experience like spoken lines about drawn lines.
Image 5. It Comes Out Softly.

Note. I begin to recognize the form that I have seen already inside. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

People say ‘I’m getting into it’ or ‘not getting into it’ as if they in fact enter with all experiential domains into an experience. They are moving from the source condition, present entirely to them, to a target condition that has the self as its goal. This awareness of ‘getting into’ already embodies change, or it’s potentiality, and therefore the engagement with an active process. In other words, the artist is changing from a condition of diverse experience towards a focused engagement with a particular process that singles out a domain of significance through a reductive relationship, with or through another perceived entity. But the peculiar characteristic of the first person experience is that this entity is itself the first-person, the subject as object. In this research it is the second-person who initiates this journey of reflective practice and it is, again, the second-person who must describe it. Then it is the first-person who witnesses this account. The validity of these reflecting points of view are found not in personal necessity, but in its contribution to an intersubjective understanding of experience. The initiation of process, then, begins with an essentially empathic gesture, the suspension of assumptions about how this may be achieved.
4.3. Second-person observation – standing back

Redirect

The initiation of a ‘suspension of assumptions’ has already put into place a redirection of mediation and set in motion the journey towards the empathic second-person point of view. Redirection allows for fresh observation of what may have been so ‘close to home’ that self-observation was obscured. During one of my reflective painting sessions I paused to consider aspects of ‘separating myself’ from experience, or more accurately, observing myself\textsuperscript{16} In that moment I stated, “when I paint, I am there, by stepping out, I can see (observe) myself \textit{what I am doing}” (Choi, 2012, i47). I note in this statement a particular cognizance of the continuum of cycles of \textit{epoche} within creative practice. When the painters paint they don’t always see themselves acting, just the action; they may at times even be the action (Choi, 2012, i47). But the process is reflexive in a way that allows for separation to a position where one observes the action and is simultaneously able to see oneself acting. This is the awareness of painting, an observation of observation.

Lest it be objected that the observation of awareness inherent in the act of painting is somehow fundamentally disruptive to that process (inimical to ‘flow’ or immersion), as if there were a qualitative Heisenberg principle at play stating that observation of the first person event changes the nature of the event, let me reiterate that the methodology not only accounts for the separation between the positions of a first- and second-person mediation of the process, but identifies that this mediation is inseparable from and in fact an essential aspect of self-reflective process.

Thecla Schiphorst speaks of a space of second-person mediation that develops naturally in the shift from first-person involvement with process to a detached but intersubjectively empathic position. Her research into creative process involves a cycle

\textsuperscript{16} By nature of the \textit{container schema} in the domain of the body seems to present itself as an ‘outside’, or ‘separate’, perspective.
of facilitated training and reflective observation, where she notes the intersubjective origins of the validity of a continuum of structures of mediation: "This facilitation included stepping back once participants could interact in the space on their own, and observing the interaction space from an empathic mediation perspective" (Schiphorst, 2009, p. 267). Stepping back to ‘observe what I have done’ is an obvious requirement of reflection, but as Schiphorst’s research clearly suggests, the empathic practitioner, the one who imparts refined knowledge by demonstration, steps back into the intersubjective second-person mediation to observe *themselves* (which includes the trace they leave in conditions) *while doing*. The movement from one perspective to the other is of fundamental importance to reflexive practice and research.

![Creative Process as Phenomenological Reduction](Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

**Figure 10. Creative Process as Phenomenological Reduction.**

Note. Intuitive evidence initiating redirection. (Image © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)

Redirection is an event that springs forth in consciousness with the clarity of a new awareness. What was can never be understood as it was after redirection occurs.
Here is an example from this study: We usually conceive of distance in quantitative terms and numerically measure the number of unit subdivisions that fill a defined range of parameters. At one point, having been engaged in reflection upon “the state of the body”, I observe that, understood enactively, distance is an organic quality, and is not fundamentally quantitative: "The distance can be organic, if there is a constant change between eyes, observing point, and the object, in what I am observing" (Choi, 2012, i118).

I noted:

The word organic. It is not clearly computational. I talked about organic texture, organic line. Irregular rhythm. Something that is less predictable. Solvent is more organic than the colour. Light is organic. There is constant change in light. Then the fact of what I am observing. Object changes constantly. Change, alone, does not seem to be organic. But a constant change in an unexpected way. But not random. I won’t associate randomness with the nature of organic. Organic has more sense of, huge, uncontrollable, but really complex. Complex will be another metaphor I would use (Choi, 2012, i118).

It would seem that this embodied understanding of distance is critically dependent on time (change), similarly with Piaget’s observations (Piaget, 1950/2001, p. 150), that illustrate the shifting of structures of mediation early in the development of concepts about the relationship between time and space.

4.3.1. **Domain of Form**

(Questions about the nature of form):

How does one begin to represent light? Light itself is perceived as formless form. Process based ‘questions’ in this domain may represent active states rather than objective mediations: reflection upon the emergence of form, or formation. Form is in this representation described as the result of change, not it’s process.

An interesting observation about the nature of artistic metaphor is the frequency of the BODY IS (an animate) FORM construction, which seems very suggestive of embodied expression. In an attempt to understand the target domain of the self, the target of all self-reflexive practice, knowledge is transformed into an intersubjectively
experienced source domain of the artefactual form. Numerous examples of this turn up in the session transcripts, from “touch is media” (i20), “sharp is small” (i35), “memories are landmarks” (i30), to “repetition is texture” (i55), etc.

4.3.2. Domain of Body

In this study, the proposed domain of the somatic body is defined as including all that is sensorial and admitted into awareness, and all that a body may express through its knowledge and movement. In this formulation, the body is constituted by its somatic boundary and in the trace of its passage through enactive experience. First-person investigation reveals that the body is a composed awareness, the cognitive composition of experience, defining limits to the ‘container’ of consciousness that is itself forever reemerging.

In the act of painting, the artist’s body has two possible aspects of composability, the body-in-inwarding (perceptual, cognitive, and sensorial perceiving), and the body-in-outwarding (body in expression and the arising form).\(^{17}\) In the first aspect, the lived body is that which is sensing\(^{18}\) the artist perceives and senses through her whole-body in a somatic discourse.\(^{19}\) The second aspect, the expressing body, is that which is seen in the performance of painting. This second body leaves its trace in the artefact of performative activity.\(^{20}\) Expressing body is transient, ephemeral, existing only for the time of its intersubjective relation to the work at hand. As the artist removes herself from her stage, she leaves behind the trace of her body, the artefact.

We become aware of our presence and our affective relationship with the world. With the development of digital media technologies, e.g., the video camera, motion

\(^{17}\) See also “doing and undergoing” and “interaction”, Dewey, J., 1934/1958.
\(^{18}\) See also “sensing body in movement”, Manning, E., in Politics of touch: Sense, movement, sovereignty, 2007.
\(^{19}\) See chapter 8, Schiphorst, 2009.
\(^{20}\) See also “expression and body”, Manning, E., in Relationscapes: Movement, art, philosophy, 2009.
capture technologies, time dilation of frame rates, etc., our body-in-movement becomes more visible; we can see the continuous wave of its passage.\textsuperscript{21} Bodies on the move can be modulated and composable as well as reconfigurable. Just as the painted body on canvas has forms, colors, textures, and movement, so the painting body creates movement through time. The painted body is the resultant passage of the painting body. The artefact is manifested through a living artefactuation, a residue of process.

It is from the position of the artist’s description of the state of the lived body that this study turns for evidence of experiential categories descriptive of the body. That description is obtained through reflexive observation of the expressing body and the response to traces it leaves behind. This study considers reductive themes such as the perception of ‘specious’ movement\textsuperscript{22} reflections on intersubjective sensorial valences (‘feelings’ about states), and how that body is mirrored in metaphors of texture.

The domain of the body takes the form of metaphors relating the state of the body. There are a few conceptual structures that emerge in this study describing this state. As an example, “painting is dancing” (Choi, 2012, i66). Let us examine this metaphor in terms of the domains of significance to the discipline of painting. I propose that “painting” in this construction is a metaphor of the body that is not simply an action but that its performance relies on extensive lived experience of the moving-body. The domain of the somatic body carries the possibility of embodied movement. For this reason, painting is of the body; the body dances with every change within and without.

4.3.3. **Domain of Action**

How does ‘this’ become ‘that’? Action is unavoidably a doing of something. Actions may not be visible, yet they form the starting and continuing of a response to states and conditions. A response always leads to another response. One understanding is mapped on to another and it is the active interplay of the two as they give rise to a

\textsuperscript{21} See “body in movement” (Manning, 2007).
new abstract relationship that stimulates cognitive response. This study has examined the active formation of metaphor as an intuitive mapping between domains of experience coupled through embodied action.

Questions about actions or active conditions were proposed for consideration in sessions of painting. As a practicing artist I reflected upon notions of how things were done as they were being done. For example, at (i62), I remark:

Shadow and light lay over the form, texture lays over the form.

In this construction, the “lay over” reveals a metaphoric relationship between sense and form; SENSE is (shaped by) FORM. Shadow, light, and texture are understood through an active observation (sense) and molded into the formal element through the domain of embodied action (“lay over”). Furthermore, form is understood through an active engagement with movement through space and spatial movement in time; lived experience is achieved through active relationship in the world.

4.4. Transmetaphoric schema – the enactive transformation

"Letting Go. This is that. Ready to begin again."

Embodied metaphor springs out of the redirection of intuitive response. It identifies the lived experience of intuitive evidence obtained in the cycle of epoche as central to the pragmatic practitioner’s expression of tacit knowledge. The enriching of that knowledge through reflective self-observation of effect and affect is embodied in the practice itself. This reflective observation forms a cognitive system that develops

---

22 The ‘freeze frame’ moment; what somatic conditions the body identifies with in ‘a single moment’,
domains of distinction; patterns of cognition that develop over time in lived experiencing. Particular to the reflexive character of validation in creative practice is the necessity for expression to be grounded in practice. For an enactive practice to flourish, expression must join with observation. The two mediate each other in an embodying cycle from our sensorial experience to our somatic experience.

Lakoff and Johnson give evidence that conceptual metaphors are mappings across conceptual domains that structure our reasoning and our experience. For instance, if we look at their often-quoted example of the metaphor "Up is More", our experiential understanding of quantity is conceptually correlated with our sensorimotor experience of verticality. Lakoff and Johnson give quite a thorough explanation of metaphoric schema, however, they do not give much description about what happens in between those schema when they come into relation with one another in processual time; e.g. what happens in between 'up' and 'more'. What is the sense of 'is' in the metaphor – is it changing, as metaphoric action?

Lakoff and Johnson discuss causality in metaphoric schema (metaphors of sequence and causation, e.g. source-path-goal, source-to-target mapping), and complexity in their early work, Metaphors We Live By. According to Lakoff and Johnson, there are 'complex coherences' across metaphors: (1) "There are often many metaphors that partially structure a single concept", and (2) "when we discuss one concept, we use other concepts that are themselves understood in metaphorical terms, which leads to further overlapping of metaphors" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 97).

But this still does not explain what happens between ‘up’ and ‘more’ (in my question above). In the case of ‘up is more’, we conceptually correlate ‘up’ as (it) is ‘more’. In English, when we say A ‘as (it) is’ B, there is, by virtue of the transient nature of propositions of understanding, a sense of the ‘in the existing circumstances’ embodied within the expression. Metaphors may change, and as translational cognitive devices we expect them to change over time. When we say A is ‘in the existing circumstances of’ B,
conceptually and metaphorically, A and B have a similar contextual *weighting* of (conceptual and metaphorical) energy – we assimilate, or integrate, their conceptual metaphorical values. I consider this weighting suggestive of evidence for a *textural* enactive embodiment of experience, in that the embodied meanings that come into play in the integration are weighted by lived experience. This experience lends valence to the metaphors that are put into association in the intuitive response.

Lakoff and Johnson note that conceptual integration is “how conceptual structures are combined for use in particular cases, especially in imaginative cases” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 261). Because creative process is highly imaginative enactment, we may expect to find more examples of conceptual integration in artistic and design processes.

*Painting time is the when of the how.*

Intuitive realization may appear to occur at the ‘re-directing moment’ of *epoche*, but embodied process is a multi-dimensional (multi-temporal) experience wherein awareness may appear at any time, accounting for its seeming unpredictability. In a multi-temporal structure of awareness another strata may be engaged in another phase of a cycle of *epoche*. In a continuum of such models of awareness (from the cognitive unconscious to the perception of objectified expression) *epoche* has many simultaneous pathways to and from the embodiment of experience. Therefore, in a reductive model that has as its grounding the suspension of assumptions, multiple pathways are potentially available at every stage of becoming aware.

In visual arts, drawing is a type of activity that is begun with the intention of producing a finished piece of art, by producing a visual image through the making of lines and marks. It is not coincidental that English term ‘to draw’ also means to 'pull or

---

drag' something out. So in the visual arts, artists draw as they see. Artists pull or drag out their perceptual, conceptual, and emotional idea to arrive at the 'image'; e.g., a painter draws out her mental image towards something visually perceptive. It is a process of transformation, from an artist’s sensorial and somatic metaphors, her observation and understanding of the world, to visual metaphors, and to somatic metaphors in action. This describes a process of ‘metaphorical projection’ (Johnson, 1987, p. 82).

**Input and output: Movement, not packets.**

The enactive process has what may be thought of as an input and output phase. Observation within experience, a living reflective act, constitutes a sensorial accumulation of embodied meaning, called here 'sensorial metaphors'. These sensorial metaphors attempt to place perceptual experience in intersubjectively communicable categories. Thus we have shared understandings ranging from what the colour red looks like, to what the scent of an orange is like, and to only brief suggestions of more complex blending like the ‘feeling’ of an autumn day by the sea.

In terms of the art based methodology of this study, I associate the input phase with the contextually observed conditions; the studio, the subject, or specifically in my subject framed here as ‘the real light’. Various observations may be made about this light. It is the painter’s work to translate this experienced world to an experiencing body of form.
Figure 11. **Metaphorical enactive transformation.**


To the external observer, the first appearance of the act of painting is directly associated with *action*; expression is most essentially a body in motion. In order for this expression to convey any intersubjective meaning, that expression must be framed in terms of shared *somatic metaphors*. These somatic metaphors form a template for a *way of moving* in a continuous appropriate response to the intuitive translation between the observer and the artist’s expression.

We then have a model of process that associates a conceptual translation from the input data of sensorial metaphors with a balancing response of expressive output data of somatic metaphors (Fig. 11). Intuitive translation occurs in the interconnection between the sensorial metaphor and the somatic metaphor. In this unconscious
cognitive process the 'real light' becomes (to use the word in its purely phenomenological sense) the 'expressed light.' In this research I will call this intuitive metaphoric translation, 

*Enactive Transformation.*

The enactive transformation represents metaphors in transition. What is transition? It is related to actions in sequence: The change in the changes. There is a sense of sequence in the way we use metaphors. If we have sequence in action, there must be sequence in metaphor. There is a sequence in the way we move. If we are sitting down, we won't jump before we stand up. As such, there is a general sequence in embodied action that is also expressed in transitions of metaphor. The tacit turn from sensorial metaphor to somatic metaphor, observation to response, is most essentially active.

**Example:** (i55, i123, i125, i127). Considering the nature of the poking (stippling) action in painting it emerges that my embodiment of time is relative to the medium of expression. I arrive at this through observation of the sequence of actions required to produce the intuitive response to textures of different viscosities. Texture is a series of pressure durations: a rhythm captured in a medium. But this rhythm is an expressive response to transitional metaphors of sensorial space as "the sense of time in (the) painting is different, it will be reflected by the artist’s mixture of sense; touch, hearing, etc. In this example, the active embodiment of experiential time is a textural relationship with space.

The domain of action, our embodied understanding of movement, is observed to have a central role in the translation of sensorial metaphors to somatic metaphors, here framed as the cognitive basis of the reflective and expressive phases of creative process. Furthermore, I suggest that it is within this tacit action-space that the only truly intersubjective meaning can arise, given that the input and output phases of the processual experience are entirely subjective components of meaning formation.

**Example:** (i39, i40, i69). Fundamentally, intersubjective meaning proposes an empathic relationship with the intentional object. As this intention is so basic to the cycle of *epoche*, it is reasonable to assume that it may be expressed frequently in process description. Painting was described in the sessions through the metaphor of dance,
where actions in space are enactively shared: "The canvas and the material will be my partner. When you dance with someone else, you exercise together, but still you won’t exactly know the move(ment). There is an improvisation." Here we have an intersubjective reference – the action of painting happens through touch-movement. Additionally there were several suggestions that the space of painting becomes conceived of as cross-referential with the body of the artist: "Your relationship with it, in a sense, changes. It is as if you shrink or expand" and, "there is a relationship, a physical, spatial relationship between you and the painting." This suggests expressive and reflective spatial metaphors of scale; it is not the body or canvass that changes, but it is conceived of that way. This implies that an intersubjective relationship with the artifact in terms of body-space allows for meaning to be transferred to the third-person through a perceived sense of motion in the artifact’s representation of space.

This study takes the position that it is simply not sufficient to propose a simple categorical translation takes place at the level of the intuitive unconscious, as if there were a hidden one-to-one mapping between limited parameters of experience. This unfortunately has been reinforced in computing technologies by the quantitative language that computers speak, a Cartesian division of ON and OFF that introduces polarization at the most discrete strata. This is simple binary translation, expressed mathematically as a=b OR a=c.

Instead, I argue that the Enactive Transformation must function in a multi-dimensional continuous space and that this space therefore is constituted of continuous and evolving relationships rather than discrete categories. The description of this relationship then takes the of form that a<b<c<a. In other words, meaning is relative to the relationship of the reflective and expressive aspects (and their modifications) of experience.

This approach therefore grounds the methodology of this research in the assumption that evidence for transmetaphoric translation may be found in the semiotic structures that emerge from artists’ attempts to describe the how of process. This research asks, ‘what is the nature of the metaphors that are formed at the moment of intuitive expression in the artistic process?’
Example: (i73, i74). An interesting multi-domain metaphor emerges in my response to the behaviour of water-based media: "water is all those; movement, body, and form." This was while testing the amount of solvent (water) required in achieving the flow required to create the form of a shadow in my painting. The difficulty was not the medium but the artefact: "From my experience, I know water, its gravity, viscosity, and wetness. But I do not know how the water will act when I apply to different papers (in thickness and texture), or (on a) different day, or with a different brush (with a new brush, with a new utensil). There is different flexibility for different utensils." This clearly suggests that what is known are elements, what is not known is the how of the relationships. Flexibility suggests mutability: ever changing, never knowing, always experiencing. I refer in the process of exploring this changing relationship to a "play with gravity" - an embodied association of water and action that metaphorically ties the body (water) to its embodied experience (action).

Given the argument above, it is hypothesized, and supported by the preliminary evidence, that these metaphors are of a transitional form that is continuous and adaptive, and that conceptual translation between the sensorial and somatic takes place in a cognitively intersubjective meaning-space that is grounded in embodied action.

In our experience, we are dimly aware of the specious presence of an 'objective reality' which this thesis has delimited to the enactively embodied moment of becoming aware. Jung has called the awareness of this intuitively intersubjective nature, the collective unconscious. It forms the raw fact of existence that both motivates and fashions experience. The artist (alchemist) plays at the intersection of emergent process and physical artefact. The attempt to bring an object from cognitive unconscious into the world changes that world, inserting a record of embodied action back into that objective reality. The reflexive analysis of several sessions of this practice, suggests the following:

1. The artefact is the trace left behind of the creative act. Once instantiated it forms a record of embodiment.
   Example: (i24). Embodied knowledge is brought forth and transformed into material during the painting process, "exposing the nature of material," which "is based on the understanding of the material": One exposes (accounts for in form) what one understands through its being traced out.
2. Observation takes place over a certain time, but the reflection comes back in ‘blurred memory’. The blurriness however is a model of a much richer field of phenomenal information, a multi-sensory texture that is nonetheless reflected (‘imprinted/embedded’) in its various representations. Example: (i30). "I am going to put the landmark to remember this moment." Here form encapsulates time: marks are both spatial coordinates (elemental) and observations (of the world). These are metaphors describing an embodied relationship between cognitive spatial orientation and illusionary space in the painting – a mapping between embodied space and artefactual space.

3. Continuous data (experience) as opposed to quantized time (e.g. the photograph is an early version of this epistemology). Experiencing a photograph is not experiencing the experience. Example: (i116). Considering abstraction and complexity I remarked that the “question (of) randomness is interesting. In (the) digital filtering, the challenge won’t be ever like what I am doing in painting: Continuous expressing and reflecting.” Algorithms do not embody the continuity of experience.

4. Gestures are pre-configured. A gesture embodies a thousand lines. An action represents embodied knowledge. Example: (i91, i93). "Students think that I put down, draw, a line that somehow I already know." This curious observation is something I have noted frequently when teaching drawing and implies that people assume knowledge is embodied: that drawing is simply an “as it is, of course” condition if the practitioner is experienced, but this assumption is remains devoid of any intersubjective meaning until it is personally experienced through active engagement. As I note in this transcript, "maybe I pre-draw a line hundred times before I actually put a line on the canvas." This ‘transient motion’, defines an embodied textural space from which emerges the individuated line.
5. Metaphoric texture is overlaid records of embodied process.
Example: (i106). "If you don’t feel well, you can be expressive, but hard to be reflective. It is like being a child. A child will express but hardly reflect on what they are doing. Over time, you will get more reflective. The cycle is balanced. As you get older your body is not outwarding as much as you when younger, but more reflective, inward energies. For instance, Matisse, when he was young, he was much expressive, as he got older, his lines were much simpler but very controlled, accurate." This is a clear example of ‘experienced action’. As reflection deepens, expression becomes more direct. It was from this observation that I derived the dedication of this thesis: ‘As time gets shorter, wisdom grows’.

These observations suggest that the method of 'conversation with the work' is a valid foundation for an investigation of categories of pragmatic experience. The practitioner is engaged in a creative interaction with their work, and it has proven worthwhile to consider a wider view of the influence of this interaction on cognitive schema. These schemas influence the formation of process and its description by the artist.

4.5. Acknowledgements and limitations of the study

I am aware of the possibility of biased influence in any kind of first-person investigation of tacit knowledge, but a pursuit of the veracity of lived experience and the courage to speak out from a mastery of process (at risk of ‘necessary error’) is part of every master painter’s practice and responsibility. I admit there must always be some limitation known or discovered in the process of delivering knowledge through language and embodied actions, and in how that knowledge can be differently interpreted, for every individual stands on different experiential grounds. I understand that many of my methods are based on my first-person experience as a painter, and that this will be different, and differently applied, in other art-practices, art-theories, and the reflective practices of other practitioners.
5. Conclusion

The validation of epoche is the intuitive awareness of a deeper question.

There have been many studies of pragmatic discipline and a generally acknowledged awareness of the importance of first-person investigation. Yet despite the practical evidence gained by the pragmatic practitioner and the criticality of describing that knowledge, approaches to first-person research in this domain have proven challenging. The reflective practice of phenomenology and psychology addresses the essential nature of qualitative experience, while cognitive linguistic research provides the background of an approach to a body-based understanding of the world. I have argued in this thesis for a consideration of the artist's lived experience as a reflective practice of embodied first-person knowledge that models a bridging between theory and practice.

My conclusions centre on the sensitivity inherent in this bridging. As an artist, while teaching drawing, it is difficult to explain how something is done; the knowledge gets filtered through linguistic channels. An inclusive approach to the incoming expression (the experience of another) is a method allowing for individual motivations and ways of approaching a problem. This approach must be in the form of an intersubjectively shared knowledge followed by a series of reflective actions. In this approach, subjects are then free to draw upon their own experience to model an image from their own embodied set of translated metaphors.

From this understanding I arrive at a preliminary derivation of several qualitative grounds of creative practice. It is clear that further work will reveal many more but these suggestions are intended to describe some key aspects of validation in a methodology of creative process. To arrive at intersubjectively validated meaning in first-person research, there are these three qualitative grounds to be considered:

1. The practitioner's commitment.
At risk, perhaps, of terminology that is suggestive of a ‘moral’ dimension to experience, I propose that a key aspect of a definition of quality in lived experience is an enactive relationship with commitment. The intentional act of commitment cannot be separated from its response. Our conscious awareness evolves from an enactive reflection upon sensorial experience. In this reflection upon experience, the degree to which an event is ‘felt’ forms the basis on which the practitioner may, more or less, commit to an embodied relationship with that event. This commitment is embodied in tacit knowledge, how we know more than we can say.

2. Utilizing shared meanings.

Although every experience is different, every lived experience springs from one place, the inner self. This motivation is therefore formed in a practitioner’s lived experience that is shared in an intersubjective context. The practitioner composes an individuated dance through her embodied action. An individual’s lived experience within the world is purely subjective, however, there are intersubjectively shared meanings that are described in depth through metaphor and in width by more cases. It is important to utilize shared meanings with consistent motivation to arrive at any meaningful first-person research.

3. Acknowledgement of the complex nature of lived experience.

We agree by now that first-person experience is complex in quality. On this ground, I suggest these two aspects be considered in first-person research: 1) a wide range of first person experience, and 2) a particularization of how pragmatic disciplines approach case-by-case problems.

*Outcome and contribution*

First and foremost it is hoped that this research contributes in a meaningful way to other artist-researchers as a method of further investigation of creative activity, and to the communities of qualitative research and embodied cognitive study. In order for a complete account of tacit experience to be actualized, the value of multi-disciplinary research needs to be acknowledged and implemented. But we must not forget that the
first-person perspective is essential to this investigation. ‘Community’ is after all a global network of individually motivated subjectivities.

Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela, and Pierre Vermersch conclude, “the only way to get beyond the theoretical aporia of phenomenological descriptive language is the long and laborious communal elaboration of descriptive categories in which the researcher can recognize his own experience” (Depraz, et al., 2003, p. 77). It is sincerely hoped that the preliminary investigations of this thesis will lead to a deeper and wider understanding of art as research and its applications to a research paradigm of intersubjective experience. This development must seek collaborative relationships with researchers studying first-person pragmatic practice in a wide variety of disciplines in order to ground qualitative research in its most intersubjective description. From this description an increasing granulation of the domains of significance will lead to emergent models of qualitative experience relevant to other disciplines.

Interactive technologies attempt to emulate and enhance lived experience. The description of methods approaching a categorization of creative experience can also apply to human-computational interface design. Intersubjective applications may adapt not only to individual user processes, but shared patterns of experience between users. The possibility of interface adaptation to changing relationships between conditions of experience leads to the possibility of preserving and enhancing living knowledge, which has been a motivation of the pragmatic disciplines throughout history.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the artist’s motivation is the pursuit of an active awareness of states of affairs. If this awareness is expressed and observable through embodied metaphor, then the identification of intersubjective experience encoded into those metaphors leads to a description of domains of distinction that validate and translate embodied knowledge. This suggests that a continuum of translation may enhance development of computational translation of human intention, and further development of trans-medial communication.

Admittedly, this study has been able to accumulate a small amount of data. But this research constitutes an approach to an investigation of process from a first-person examination of experiential understanding. It is hoped that this approach has grounded
theory in a framework of practical investigation that may lead to beneficial results. But it is possible to draw out some tentative observations regarding useful directions for future work. Any attempt to fully account for the diverse interpretations of how first-person knowledge is embodied and expressed in creative pragmatic investigation starts a research program that by definition must take at least one lifetime. A community of reflective practice suggests that the referent, reflective, and hyper-reflective examinations of pragmatic experience may themselves be formulated in a larger temporal-cultural cycle of suspension, re-direction, letting-go. From this community fresh and deeper questions will emerge, which in that expanded global *epoche* may form expressive redirections, worthy of validation by an increasingly self-aware humanity in shared understanding.

*Closing statements*

Within our lived experience of change, within metaphors of experience, lays a basic cognitive metaphor of time. At about halfway through childhood, a child begins to learn that something that will come to be called ‘time’ exists. As Piaget observes, prior to this cognitive structural formation, a child lives in a world where “faster implies more time”; experience at that age implies that “faster=further=more time” (Piaget, 1950/2001, p. 150). This response is clearly suggestive of time perceived as a dimension of space. But in this innocent early mapping the journey from source to goal carries no *time*, just a ‘counting of steps’, and a non-series of obstacles with no intentional process of reflection. As experience grinds and bumps its way with repetitive and increasing urgency, time begins its slow change from infinite to finite. The texture of experience brings time into our picture of the world. As babies we crawl, gathering slivers and knowledge, with time turning to dying forests and dust. As we get older, texture densifies yet retains its original patterns.

We fall in love with experience. As time gets shorter, wisdom grows.

*The subject does not wait.*
References


Appendices
Appendix A.

Archetypes of Painting (with script).

Archetypes of Painting; The messenger, the totem, the shaman, the watcher, constituted an early exploration of some of the concepts later developed in my Masters Thesis. The event consisted of a recorded painting ‘performance’ (a session of studio work with a specifically narrative structure) for a class in narrative development I was taking from Carolyn Mamchur at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby. Reproduced here (as image insertions into this thesis appendix) are the slides (with script) from the class presentation of the ‘performance’ wherein I reflectively examine the nature of process and its narrative associations with themes I worked with during the painting process. Of particular interest to me is the slide titled “Detachment” (Slide 25) where I had overlaid a mapping of the narrative journey I took through this painting experience. This ‘journey’ was a foundational inspiration for the further work conducted in this Masters Thesis.

(All images in Appendix A © Suk Kyoung Choi, 2012)
Archetypes of Painting

The Messenger, The Totem, The Shaman, and Watcher

Performed on April 3rd 2012.

------------------------- script -------------------------
What is process?

Is it what I do? What I imagine? My dance with the material world?

The thing that I draw is only a momentary impression to me, a trick of the light and sensation, a perspective shimmering on the surface of the water, the temporal fading of flesh.

A line that is here, and gone.
The Messenger

The artist is the bringer of fire! Prometheus!

The pointer out of cracks in the wheel of life, an experiencer of the unknown, a responder, an activator. A living embodiment of the tacit.
What am I supposed to do here? … thinking about my active relationship with the line.

I’m doing basically a blind contour. Your arm is about here, and the body there, I don’t know how this angle got to be that way… I can go really deeply in the face. The eyes are endless pools. I don’t know how I got that; that was the arm.

I didn’t get this shoulder right - oh, that’s beautiful. It comes out softly.
The pose is a dynamic state, not a stillness. I just try to experience your arm; I don’t care where it is. I use lots of negative space. The forms come out of the negative space. I’m drawing gesturally so I want to capture tones in blocks, quickly. You are moving constantly. The drawing and the drawn are both constantly moving together. Color moves all the time; it’s the light moving. Everything is always moving or we don’t see it. I’m just drawing the movement.

And something appears.
What is process? Is it a journey?
The Totem

The symbolic representative of the spirit, he stands, moving this way, speaking with the two faces of Janus, pointing towards the one that will follow, myth of terrible force, a story that changes but remains the same.
It stands before me

Echoes of meaning.

Early morning, late night.

What is this region?

A void.
Process seeks a micro-narrative relationship with emergent impression in the media.

A life of awareness is a life of intensity.
Perspective during process is an ambivalent horror.

How can I step back from the Oroborus? I am inside the thing already, consumed by it, chasing a line that never ends, from the trace of the charcoal scratch to the body electric.
Sleep and Birth
“...perchance to dream...”
The Watcher

The watcher prepares for the return of intention.

Watch closely. Feel closely.

The charcoal drifts over the canvas, the brush with water. The light touch is an echo of time.
I wander through the labyrinth searching along the lines of threads that have been dragged through the dust. I could hear a voice coming from the depths, drawing me on. It seemed to whisper that the paths could only be read together like a melody hidden in the chords of a breeze that called,

“Mother.”

*Compositional relationships are a play with the voices of the elements. An element can define a region of unresolve that spreads across the whole canvas. I approach completion by observing the balance (or contrast) of relationships. It’s about the sort of relationship that is reached. Problematic relationships ask questions – one can “erase” the element, but not solve the riddle.*
The Shaman

The pure becoming.
The innocent.

_Representations can never catch up with reality._

_Originality has currency, both spatial and dynamic, in it. The rest is representation._
Knowledge forever emergent.
The lines of her face, countless impressions.
A return

What is born will be reborn.

The process-response of conscious thought through my medium, already detached from the tacit unknown, becomes frozen in a slow time world of plastic, oil, charcoal, graphite, and canvas.
“how to finish?” “how to start?”
I’m moving around the drawing, ah, I have the answer, ah, I see the answer emerging through its kinetic expression/relationship in the drawing elsewhere. I approach completion by observing the balance (or contract) of relationships. It’s about the sort of relationship that is reached. Relationship is a play with the voice of the elements.

The artist may intend to leave the artifact behind for a little while longer, or not.

The artifact is refuse.

Kronos eats all.
A new beginning

Tacit experience makes every drawing a self-portrait.

The face you see most often.

The body most lived.

We share what we cannot tell by pointing, saying *this*, and showing.
Postscript
Discoveries

The serpent in the cave problem.

Disorienting space destroys flow. I have realized that third person observation in studio practice is problematic by nature.
Third-person observation is destructive to flow? Oh ya...definitely... And yet first-person observation interrupts immersion... It’s not like you’re really going to stop and take notes... do I have to put down the violin to hear myself play?

On the other hand, writing notes about drawing while drawing was not an immersive experience either. Perhaps recording while working, a stream of consciousness interaction with the artifact. Having conversations with the painting. Reminiscing with the canvas. Paint from the mouth and words from the brush. Transcendental semiotic conflation.
Detachment

I equate embodied experience with self observation. Self observation requires a particular imagination, the ability to see oneself from a perspective outside experience, or at least to engage intently on the thought experiment of doing so. This is how I approach art as explorative experience; not “making art” but “doing art”. In this way, drawing takes on more of its sense of pulling-out, a bringing forth of what is already there, but hidden: A kinetic and somatic access to knowledge.

My research into process has taken me on a journey, one whose source I find somewhere in the footsteps of a small girl after she became aware of another through the gateway of loss, a journey whose path must extend beyond the confines of containment in a life, but one whose goal focuses on the perfection of the next moment.
Appendix B.

Session 1.

I began with the idea of simply drawing light…

Following are transcripts of recording made during two extended painting sessions during which I engaged in self-reflective dialog while painting. As it turned out the first of these two sessions proved more useful for determining what needed to be modified in my session methodology in order to continue the research. Notes preliminary to this following session also apply to the second session attached as Appendix C.
[Session date: October 28, 2012]

[Archive file: STE-015_3db]

Notes:

*Italicics, in curly brackets* Indicate questions I prepare in advance, as if asking myself as teacher to (myself as) student: This procedure is after all the essence of how I define the expressive and reflective cycle of process in this research. These directional questions are followed by transcriptions of the ‘conversation with myself’ recorded during the painting session. These immediate first-person records are themselves re-iterated in my stance as second-person transcriber/interpreter.

There are, therefore, further practical decisions made at this stage as an in-depth analysis of every word is not intended or relevant, and such analysis would (by experiential observation) in any case take months for even short session transcripts. Reflective transcriptional editing is therefore conducted, in order to bring out (emphasize) meanings revealed to me as the artist engaged in an examination of perspectives (structures of mediation) in the painting process.

Grey highlighting signifies extended first-person reflexive comment.

Green highlighting signifies comments that may not be first-person (interruptions by other persons present during the session – not relevant to this study).

Yellow highlights are reminders to myself of data I wish to consider further, and which are transferred to the research database.

[[Yellow highlighted double square brackets]] Signify hyper-reflective observations conducted after a several week separation from the material.

Orange text signifies hyper-reflexive session observations (from video or audio records). Key frame images may be saved also for later (hyper-reflective) review.

Technique:

One observes the action and sees themselves acting: The observation of observation is the awareness of painting.

I note (through the process of *epoche*, ‘reductively bracketing’ = ‘reflecting on the true essence of’) what I see in the image of what I am doing as I report on conditions. This possibly will be revealing of the domains of body and action primarily, but there may also be things and moments that relate to the touching of the paper and the drawing out of form.

I will go through my reflexive transcriptions and consider them in relation to the images on video and on paper. I record these thoughts as ‘hyper-reflections’. I may not choose to reflect on ‘everything’, but probably more will reveal more.
Session name: “Conceptual beginnings”

{What do you do when you start drawing?}

What do I do when I start drawing?

What is starting?

When do I start?

I already started when I was setting the light, when I was walking, when I was putting my things down. I observe things all the time.

I am putting some lines on canvas, maybe I am not yet started, just may be doing some movements, when we teach drawing we say it is doodling, it is kind of drawing out what is in my mind. But does not right away appear as ‘form’

Something I was doing, when I said setting the lights in the studio

It is part of looking for subjects, I think although you have subject in your mind already what you are going to do, looking for the subject, what the essence of the subject is about, you need time to look for that subject.

{What will you do when you are in that preparatory time; what exactly do you do that is not already there?}

I try to walk slowly, putting music on, try to get rid of thoughts in my mind, because I do have a life, let’s say, there are thoughts about school, thesis writing, when I draw, I have to focus on drawing, it’s almost like a meditation, when you do a meditation, for me, I have to slow down myself. From my normal temper, because partially it is a stage of looking at yourself to observing what you are doing to reflect what you are doing. It is not a casual act. You have to put entire yourself into this.

You want to cut out all distractions. Yes.

The music doesn’t distract you?

I put the music that won’t distract me.

I think it depends on the artist, some artists won’t like music. It is my preference. For sure, I make a setting that works for me. It includes everything, light, ambiance. Like you need the right tool to work with.
Space you work with changes.

Space that you prepare. Your studio changes.

But it is same although they live in the studio space. They need the right space for that day, for that painting, they may want to change the light, or move around objects in the studio. And yes, that will change the space.

There is something about the studio that is changeable, but that isn’t changeable.

Artist works with space. You will try to make the best situation for you, for that day, at that moment.

{How does your breathing change? From when you start walking around things up, and you sit down and start drawing.}

I almost go up to the point of pausing. Pause. I slow down as much as possible, as much as I can, my breathing, as far as I can, almost stop breathing. And then I can make my own pace, from that point, the pace that I want. Depending on the painting that I work on, if the painting is more active painting, a lot of big gestures will be made, I will stretch my body, and I will loosen my all body parts.

But today, the painting is smaller, I am painting, sitting down, and I want to more observe the phenomena rather than expressing, so I try to make the pace more slower, may be more down.

{What is the relationship between the pace and observation?}

I think there is a relationship between the pace and action. So depending on your drawing style than what you are observing.

Maybe because I am still at the beginning stage, I am more being careful. It is getting faster... first, I was drawing gestural lines that could not be as meaningful as I am doing now, I was drawing lighter lines, as I move my arm, my shoulder, my intention more comes out together. If I am sitting down, not doing anything, nothing comes out.

So there is relationship between body and focus.

It is a bit like Piaget’s sensorimotor response? You observe what you do as you do
Depending on the subject matter, if the subject matter moves slow, your eyes will follow slow, if I draw a running horse, my eyes will follow fast, my action will be fast as my eyes follow.

Also depending which stage you are working on, sometimes you will work loosely, sometimes you will work more precisely. Right now I am more at the stage of drawing out, so I am working more loosely, less precisely, because at this stage it is a little meaningless because it is a very early stage.

(12:50)

Right now I am getting faster, the light appeared there. So I am getting faster. Try to capture that.

I mean environmentally...

It all depends on the subject

Well depending on what I draw

For some people this can be abstract or very figurative.

There

Sometimes

It needs different speed of brush

*How do you represent what is changing and still maintain the distinct character?*

See now it disappeared. But the essence does not go anywhere.

I guess it is the artist’s decision.

I want to draw the moving time. So I try to capture every moment but I try to layer them as time goes. And there is different texture. Depending on the speed.

To what extent do you find you, it seems that drawing can suggest you start to see.

Yes, as I draw, I see more and more.

Do you have to resist that?

I adapt that.
Because it is the moment your imagination emerges with what you are observing phenomenologically. Phenomenological change in my observation.

I said it emerges.

Yes, together, it emerges out.

And yet it seems sensitive, it could become abstraction (17:43)

Yes that is why they teach 'squinting your eye's traditionally. But trained artist, they automatically, they get rid of noise in the environment, same as the sound from the environment, there is noise, and there is sound that you want to hear (18:04)

And the work is part of that environment?

Yes, it is

[Archive file: STE-016_3db]

I said something about the density of light.

Right now I am drawing the looser light.

What is looser light?

Light that is spread. Light that is not dense.

Sometimes dense in terms of light, and dense in terms of colour.

There is light of light, and there is colour of light.

Colour of light is affected by the environment.

So when I said shadow is dense light,

Light and density

It is fundamental to seeing the value, to form.
I am ‘faking’ value on the canvas (3:18)

A break is good. You get to see your work from the distance. You get refreshed.

Is it different from stand back from the painting, and standing back from the subject?

*What is the standing back from the work? Is it very specific to the working space, standing back from the working space? So what does it do?*

When you are painting in front of painting, you are in there. (4:52)

You are inside the world. Your mind is inside. You are inside.

That inside somehow relates to your distance to the work though.

It can be literal distance. But I am here. But I am there. If you are not there, you cannot create the world.

When we talked about the linear perspective, I am already there.

[Archive file: STE-017_3db]

*What have you discovered?*

I think the light, density of light can be, the relative contrast to the lights around. The shadow looked dense, because there were less light before. And now there are more lights, light looks dense.

*How do you feel about the body relationship to time when you draw light?*

The day passes, the light changes. But your in a drawing world, it seems like it is changing but not changing. You seem to want to achieve both.

It is changing because I am constantly observing, but it is not changing because they are in one canvas.
Natural passing of the, from one minute to another minute is not same.

*How do you know when the work is done when you draw light?*

Depending on my theme. If it is a journal of observing the light. When do you finish your journal? When the day ends, the observation will be done.

(6:45)

*What is a day?*

Day is a beginning to beginning, and end to end, of the day.

You can draw this drawing; tomorrow will be different.

It is not just the light, slightly or radically different

My state will be different too. I will change too.

(9:10)

Your drawing materials and the materials that you are drawing, they both evolve; the light is tied up with both of them. I am curious about the relationship between light and material. Because light is immaterial.

If it is a loose texture. If it is scattered light, I will make scattered texture.

There is translation going on, the way I use the material. Also the character of the self.

The material changes moment to moment

Everything is constantly changing. You can use a material loosely or hardly.

But brush stroke is more looser, the stick, hard material is stiff. Material is depending on

(13:50)

Fundamentality seems to refer a lot to motion, movement.
Brush verses stick. That physicality is largely related to the motion properties.

It is more about the way you use the tool than the material essence of the tool.

There are traditional ways of how to use materials, for instance, you won’t mix water with oil. But if the artist does not necessarily want to achieve the traditional, go ‘well together’ depends on how you define

The descriptions of ‘go’ and ‘well’ are kind of action words.

See, it is going together. The brush is going with colour with canvas.

So the material goes with my process.

(17:00)

(18:11)

What is using fingers about?

There are many ways to smudge. The hand is the best; I have more control.

You can use tissue, it will take more colours off, cotton fabric, the canvas will hold more pigments, and finger will hold best and I can use more freely. And it is most there for you. What is there is your hand.

(22:12)

{Does your body get frustrated as you try to draw?}

Why do I try to draw?

I guess I am trying to make the world. I try to control the brush, I try to control every material to make the world, not copy the world.

Yes, the tension is more there when you are close to beginning and ending. The middle point is more like that you are in the flow.

{How would you know the end is coming?}
(25:50)

*Is it possible to say how much conscious decisions you make? Or is it more spontaneous?*

99% with conscious. But there are 1% that happens without my consciousness.

You have to be highly aware of what you are doing.

*I am very aware of what I am doing.*

(28:25)

*I can see more from the drawing than what I am seeing actually.*

(30:00)

When the image is blurry, our brain is much active than when we see the clear image. I see constant blurry images in the environment, very active images.

*When is it ‘almost done’...*

I think a set of narrative is done. The narrative that I try to... events of the journey are done. I think it is very balanced. Every object is balanced itself. The canvas is balanced as itself as a cup is balanced, as the chair is balanced. Once an artist places a dot on a canvas, the balance of the canvas is broken. So artists puts more visual elements until they achieve the final balance.

*It is like an interactive gaming.*

*I am putting something out of balance, and I am going to put whatever that puts back to the balance.*
Appendix C.

Session 2.

This session is broken down into various categories in the research database attached as Appendix E.
[Session date: November 9, 2012]

[Reflective sessions conducted Nov. 19, 27]

[Archive file: Video File GOPR1565]

Session name: "Pre-reflective action"

**Drawing a line and stroke**

The session starts at 1:46pm.

**Video 02:40**

**Feeling of the paper. Material will change all the time.** [note: Association of material with embodied change (experienced through touch)]

[[In the video, as I say ‘feeling of the paper’, I was making a gesture of touching the paper. I guess I was automatically associating the feeling with touching here. A gesture of feeling resistance: The tooth of the paper.]]

But touch of the material. The feeling of the touch will change all the time. Touch automatically suggests feeling. **Feeling the drawing.** [note: synesthetic sense]

Feeling the drawing is not like the literal touching feeling of this paper. I touch *through* the pencil. Let’s say [there are] different materials and textures. It is similar to as you ‘touch’ with your hand something. You feel different texture [depending on what you are touching]. It [may be] smooth or rough. I think it is similar to that. It is similar, when I touch through the brush, or pencil, I feel the texture. I think that is how I create the texture [in painting]. We create texture through touching, with brush. [note: Relationship of touch and texture. Touch happens through a medium, but is direct, ‘as you touch with your hand’. Also, explication by association with intersubjective sense of other]

[[As I say ‘I touch through the pencil’, in the video, I slowed down my pencil stroke, and gave a gentle touch with a pencil, a gentle stroke. And also as I say ‘as you touch with your hand’, I was touching the wall beside the painting with my finger. So I was associating touching through the pencil as same as touch through my finger.]]

**Video 4:00**

**So that suggests feeling is drawing.**

When I touch through the utensil, yes.

*{The relationship through touch to observation?}*
When you touch rough thing, what do you feel? You will feel the rough thing. [note: Nice reflexive ‘statement of fact’!]

So I guess the rough texture [through brush].

I guess there is one difference, I guess:

When you touch something, and let’s say you feel rough[ness], but normally, you cannot change the feeling of the roughness. Because that is an object, that is rough. But when I paint, because you are touching through the brush, you feel, but you also can change the texture, [as you touch]. Let’s say the paper is rough, because of its tooth, and you are drawing with a pencil, the line will come out roughly, but you can make it smoother, by smudging. So I feel through touching [with brush], but at the same time I [make [used ‘change’ originally]] the texture. [note: ‘Touching through’ vs. ‘observing that’; interface is expressive, observation is metaphorical(?)]

5:40

Video 7:10

So that will be a difference.

6:00

Different media respond differently to the canvas.

6:20

At some level, the level of touch.

Is that a sense of touch?

6:40

Yes, it will depend on the material, I will use a rougher medium, to create rough texture, I can emphasize, increase the rough texture. But also I visually create, [make] the illusion of roughness. [note: Similarity acknowledged by embodied visual understandings of touch. Embodied actions capable of reproducing texture. Suggestion that the media have the property of touch within them; ‘different media respond differently … at the level of touch … to the canvas]

It seems like there is an aspect of scale.

In this case I am using less solvent more colour.

Video 9:20

Exposing the nature of material.
It is based on the understanding of the material. [note: One can expose (account for) what one understands.]

I know how thick or thin the brush will draw out when I use a certain amount of solvent and colour. As well as I know, depending on the angle of brush, how thick and thin the line will be drawn out.

Video 10:00

I don’t measure it. But when I start, as I warm up myself, I test my tools. Daily, (session to session) they are slightly different, so I will apply them, [note: Understanding that the tool itself is changing constantly.] [The session is an observation of context. Relationship of state and orientation of body and form through effect/affect.]

[[When I describe ‘warming-up’, I made a circular motion with my arm and utensil that I was holding.]]

[[I was drawing a line, observing the light that came through the window, I gave a light stroke, looked outside, squinting my eyes, gave some more strokes (twice), looked outside squinting my eyes again, and gave several more strokes.]]]

[feeling-thinking-feeling moment]]

Video 10:50

14:17

Video 14:35

**How do I feel about short stroking motion?**

Right now, I am using it to define the form, it is like my own landmark. I see the light there and dark shadow there (just beside the light) and that is where I am going to put the dark line. But it has to go together with the rest of painting. It is going to move, so I am going to put the landmark to remember this moment. [note: marks are both spatial coordinates (elemental) and observations (of the world).] [[Light is spatial. Intent is multi-dimensional]]

[[When I describe ‘my own landmark’ I made a connection with my index finger between my head and a point on the painting.]]]

[[An embodied understanding of relationship between cognition in my head and illusionary space in the painting?]]

I am going to put colour that I am going to use for that area.

Video 15:30

**How do you know the shape? Does the form relate (to the ‘landmark’)?**
The shape of the shadow, the shape of the light that I am observing. For instance, if there is a wider shadow, I will use a wider brushstroke, if it is a thin line, I will use a sharp stroke. [note: association of thin with sharp, and marker points with grouping of space.]

[[When I say ‘the shape of the light that I am observing’ I made a gesture with my index finger, drawing a line, outer to inward, towards my eye.]] >>> An obvious connection of vision, sight, with an observation.

[[When I describe ‘a wider brushstroke’ I angled down my brush, using the side part of the brush. Wider brush stroke = Side part of the brush; more pressure]]

[[For the ‘little thin line’, I used my thumb and index finger, putting them together, making a point, and drew a short line. Little Point = Thin Line. Short line = little line.]]

Video 16:15

What is sharp stroke? How do you make it?

I make it with the tip of the brush, or tip of the utensil depending on what medium I am using.

But that is only part of it. That is the object, but the action is another thing.

I will angle my arm more. When I make a sharp stroke, actually, I will go closer [to the canvas]. Sharp, which means much a smaller area. So I will need to be more accurate than when I put a wider stroke. So I will lean over my body, or I will lean back to see more accurately. To see the position (relation to the rest of the canvas) more accurately. [note: Sharpness is accuracy metaphor. This embodies as angles and distances.][[Accuracy is contextual.]]

[[When I go ‘closer’ to the painting, yes, my body literally goes closer. I literally lean back to look at my painting from a distance, to see the whole image.]]

17:32

I do magnify, as my body gets closer, it zooms in, as my body gets further, it zooms out.

Both cases, I said my body, rather than my eyes.

18:00

Because you cannot zoom your eyes.
Video 19:00

Your relationship with it, in a sense, changes. It is as if you shrink or expand. [note: metaphors of scale; it is not the body or canvass that changes, but it is conceived of that way]

20:00

There is a relationship, a physical, spatial relationship between you and the painting. [note: suggests expressive and reflective space]

Video 21:00

Working on different sizes of painting:

In both cases, my arm length defines my position of painting. When I work on a larger painting, I will move my arm big, more I won’t be able to get closer, because the canvas size, I will be already at close.

21:40

That sounds like the distance is related to whether you have to move your arm or your body.

Video 22:20

Imagine you are sitting, your origin point does not change.

If it is a large painting, my origin point will change, because I have to move around. [note: the artist as coordinate system]

[[Yes, the artist as coordinate system. When I described ‘I have to move around’ I moved two hands parallel to my body sides. Two hands bracketing = My body. Moves to side to side = Spatial change.]]

Standing back is like a self-critique. I don’t think I would paint without standing back. It gives me a second opinion (thought). [note: process relationship of physicality/space and structures of mediation]

[[When I discuss about ‘a self-critique’ I moved my hand back and forth between the painting and myself. Which I think about it now, I was thinking about me in front of the painting (while I paint), and me standing-back (while reflecting my own process).]]

[[And yes, I physically stand back too (in the video).]]

24:15

Separating yourself.
When I paint, I am there, by stepping out, I can see (observe) myself (what I am doing). [note: when the painter paints they don’t see themselves acting, just the action, but the process is reflexive in a way that allows for separation to a position where one observes the action and sees themselves acting. Awareness of painting. Observation of observation.]

24:50

Video 25:05

Direction

Line follows the surface, the form of the surface. [note: the dimensional form is assumed to be real; the line follows a surface]

What is the direction of the surface? [note: surfaces have direction]

What is the direction of my observing?

The direction of my eyes moving.

I don’t think I think consciously, of the visual elements, but let's say there is a pole, because it is vertically long, my eyes will follow the vertical line. So my stroke will come out vertically (as my eyes move). [note: visual metaphors follow perception]

[[Of course, when I describe ‘my eyes follow the vertical line’, my hand was drawing vertical lines...]]

26:00

Video 26:30

The speed

Either it is loose or dark, that will depend on the contrast of the light, colour, value.

What if the pole had a lot of horizontality?

Let’s see that building there. The building is vertically long, but has a lot of short bricks (which are horizontal). Then I will give a lot of these horizontal lines, to make the verticality, by repetition. I am using (short) horizontal strokes, but then the plane (building) is vertical. Then I will pile them vertically.

[Now I think about this last comment, it is quite interesting that I used the word ‘pile’. Because I was not piling the strokes but putting short lines in parallel in the
vertical direction. If I really piled the strokes, literally, there will be a group of lines creating a dark tone, although it will still not be the literal piling, it will texture, and that was clearly not what I was doing. Apparently, somehow, the idea of ‘piling bricks’ was there in my mind as I was explaining my act of drawing.

[[note: it emerges that texture is a perceived dimensionality – its embodied action (and expression) overrides the conceptual knowledge of the object it ‘piles’ on. Alternately, this could be seen as building [re-producing in 3D space] the actual object rather than drawing it (representing in on a picture plane)]]

Is that primarily textural? [note: ]

Video 27:55

It is texture. The repetition is (creates) texture. When there are repetitive lines, as Kandinsky says, when there are regular lines (in distance) you will see a regular texture, when there are irregular lines in distance you will see an irregular texture. Our eyes follow the line, jumping through, if the lines are aligned regularly, our eyes will jump in the regular rhythm, if the lines are irregularly aligned, our eyes will jump in the irregular rhythm. Texture follows the rhythm. Texture creates the rhythm.

[[note: Texture as visual depth; ‘jumping through’. Perception as embodied action; ‘eyes jump in rhythm’.]]

[[[Texture as metaphoric expression and reflection; ‘creating and following’. We process the image by moving through it.]]

When we see texture, we perceive it as rhythm. I see, I feel, the rhythm from the texture. Because our body has a musical rhythm. It is like when we listen music, when we see something, our body follows it (eye direction).

[[This comment, ‘our body follows’ is also interesting. Because it is not our body, but our mind. But if you understand the notion of embodied mind and sensorimotor patterns, yes, our body will follow as our perception moves.] [[note: embodiment literally follows perception]]

“Cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided.” (“enaction”, Varela, et al.)

29:15

Video 29:20

As we see something, our body moves, there is a visual rhythm, like a musical rhythm. And that is how my stroke changes, either sharp and short, or wide and
smooth. For instance, I see an interesting organic rhythm up there, so I am using my brush, (in a way of) little more flow there. [note: again, cross-sensory modalities]

30:10

Video 30:35

Texture and form

Shadow and light lay over the form, texture lays over the form. [note: ‘sense is shaped by form’ metaphors]

31:33

Video 31:55

It is like dancing. You move from the rhythm of your body. Same, to make the (visual) rhythm, the organic rhythm, you have to move, you have to move your brush in that rhythm. Brush is an extension of my arm. To move the brush in a certain way, you have to move your arm, therefore your body.

[[And yes, I moved my arm, whole body side ways, and brush squiggly as I describe the organic rhythm.]]

Maybe that is why I lean over whole body and lean back whole body. [note: visual rhythms are organic rhythms – embodied actions]

Painting is like a dancing.

32:12

Video 33:20

Painting is like a dancing with an extended utensil. It is one body. [note: extensions to the body]

Thinking about the duo dance.

How is the painting like dancing with a partner?

The canvas and the material will be my partner. When you dance with someone else, you exercise together, but still you won’t exactly know the move. There is an improvisation. Things happen in the canvas. [note: intersubjective reference – happens through touch-movement]
I think this is also interesting, that I said things ‘happen’ in the canvas. Apparently I use mixture of in and on about the canvas, because I consider ‘the world’ in the canvas. It is interesting how people say things like ‘image in canvas’. Canvas is like a liminal window. [note: ‘in’ has sense of depth, texture] [[liminal window'; the thing that is real is the thing that isn’t there, the fourth wall]]

Video 34:15 >>> Video stopped at 34:42 in the middle of the next discussion.

To talk about different media. Watercolour.

[Second part of the Video, File GO011565]

A lot of people think watercolour is hard to control. It is hard to fix. It is more unpredictable. It is very predictable, for me, because control is gained through a lot of experience with it. [note: predictability = experience]

Video 1:30

As a domain, water is all those; movement, body, and form. [note: multi-domain metaphor]

[[Now I think about it, it is not only the water in painting. All solvents are multi-domain metaphor. Although not sure about those mediums... mediums we mix with colour are more like colour rather than solvents. They are more fixed to the context. For instance, when I draw a red line, I should use red-ish colour. When I draw a rough line, I may mix rough medium. But using water or oil does not change... not sure if this will be how useful to the research though...]]

From my experience, I know water, its gravity, viscosity, and wetness. But I do not know how the water will act when I apply to different papers (in thickness and texture), or in different day, or with different brush (with a new brush, with a new utensil). There is different flexibility for different utensil. [note: what is known are elements, what is not know is how of relationship. Flexibility suggests mutability; ever changing, never knowing, always experiencing]

37:15

The speed, very slow motion.
Because I want to make a thin layer, I have to hold it down, pressing hard, when I use watercolour. I use less colour (more water) to make a thin layer (colour). I lift the brush fast at the end to make the water blob to be hung at the end of stroke to use as a dark tone – in watercolour painting, the water blobs can create darker tones or texture. [note: conditions are initiated and observed]

I have to play with gravity. When I move fast the water drips fast, when I move slow the water drips slow. [note: the embodied association of water and action]

I know how much water is in the brush, and how wet and dry the stroke will come out before I put on the paper from my experience. [note: an awareness of some aspects of relationships between elements]

[[With a dry (less solvent) brush, I will achieve a rough stroke. With a wet (more solvent) brush, I will achieve a smooth stroke. Still not sure if how this will be related to the study...]]

41:20

Video 7:00

When you draw a faster line, where are you looking at?

I was not consciously aware of this, but now I think about this, be aware of it, my eyes draw follow the line as I draw. I will position my brush where I want to start the line, my eyes will draw a virtual line, of the line I want to draw, my eyes will go together as I draw the line with brush, and I have to lift my brush just before my eyes pause the end point. [note: ‘draw follow’ the line, sense of dissociation between the drawing and the drawn even at the moment of instantiation; pre-reflective action]

Video 10:20

I pre-build an action.

>>> Break >> Video 10:30 >>>>>>>>>> 17:00 >>>Temporal Bias
Session name: “Temporal bias”

Somehow the action is pre-rehearsed or pre-reflective. I am not aware of this always usually when I paint. Right now I am more aware of it because I am paying an attention to this. I think I do always pre-rehearse or pre-reflect. [Note: 'more' awareness is possible through attention]

When I draw a line, after I position my utensil, I will see the (potential) end point, where I want to stop my line, my eyes will come back to the position where my brush is at, and then eyes will follow the line as I draw. [Note: Pre-reflective action manifests in the movement of the eyes]

When I draw lines from the objects, I won’t look at the line that I am drawing. How do you know what is right when I draw?

It just looks right.

Looks like or feels like?

I think it is both. When I reiterate form, I do that until it feels right. So I guess feeling comes first. And I will think it seems right. Then I will think it feels right. So the feeling is the first and last determinations. For instance, if the form does not feel right, I will exam (ask) it (to myself), why does it not feel right? So I will look at the form, I will investigate why, by comparing to other parts, if there is an assumption of ‘maybe because of this’, then I will fix according to that, and then see again, (ask to myself) now does it feel right? [Note: ‘First and last determination’ is ‘feeling’; closer to the cognitive unconscious. Conscious mind ‘guesses’ at solutions].

Feeling>>Thinking >>Feeling moment.

So always my responses are about feeling more than seeing. [Note: Feeling (empathy) associates with reflective response]

4:20

It comes back to the first question about feeling through media...

Video 21:50

4:45

Feeling has multiple senses
Stroking with pencil is all kind of sensitive transient kind of motions

I do a lot of pre-rehearsed action, drawing a lot of invisible lines before I draw a line. But sometimes that does not help. Sometimes that is not enough. I am still not feeling right, or not sure.

Maybe this is why I make a lot of loose line strokes when I start painting, because when I start, sometimes I have a feeling but I am not sure of it. It is a part of pre-rehearsing.

Pre-building actions.

Students think that I put down, draw, a line that somehow I already know.

7:00

Video 24:13

But I see more as, in fact, the drawing emerges out of this texture of this, somehow you develop.

From the pre-rehearsing. Maybe I pre-draw a line hundred times before I actually put a line on the canvas. [Note: See previous session ‘it comes out softly; stroking as a ‘transient motion’, a textural space from which emerges the individuated line]

8:15

Video 25:20

Emergence of form from pre-drawing

When you are not engaged in, drawing, painting, do you do this?

Yes I think I do that all the time. Because I am a trained (not trained but professional) practitioner of observing. Although I don’t observe things consciously but I do observe things constantly. That is why maybe I sometimes think ‘oh this is a good idea’ while I look at something, but not typically observing I thought. It could be a part of the narrative. [Note: Observation as textural emergent phenomena. Associated with narrative, suggesting metaphors embodied in experience]

For instance I am seeing strokes all the time, different colours all the time.

10:00

Video 27:10
What do you mean by strokes.

Stroke is the plane that I see, the plane that I draw. The plane can be thicker and wider, or thinner. One set of my seeing is a stroke. Let's say I am seeing from here to there, I am drawing a virtual line, by sight, by seeing, that is one stroke. And I will go back see another one; that is another stroke. Either that is invisible or visible, for an artist, that is a stroke. [Note: Very interesting; seeing is stroked perception. Could observation be 'painted' into an embodied texture of experience?]

My seeing things as strokes happen almost automatically, I do not do that consciously. Either I draw out or not I draw strokes all the time. Some, I may do consciously, a lot of time I think I do unconsciously, and some point it comes to as a realization to me. That is a moment of realization about what I am observing to me.

11:30

Video 28:35

The sense of presence of you in that space shift, stepping in and out?

When I step out, I see the entire painting as a stroke, but when I am in painting, I see many strokes.

Texture is created by strokes.

It can be line, or colour, everything I create is made by strokes.

12:45

Stroke is a bunch of mixture of velocity, action. It is not just a line. [Note: Temporal and spatial dimensions of texture. Point of view divides space into actions]

14:00

Video 31:05

{What is the relationship between you and the object that you are observing?}

How does it reflect in the painting?

You have to constantly give different perspective. To be seen right.

If you are in one position, I don’t see the line that I am drawing, because I am following the line. My eyes will be on the point in the line where the utensil is touching the canvas, but not seeing the line that I am drawing. So I have to have multiple perspectives.
So every painting is fundamentally multi-perspective. [Note: Husserl; noema; the relationship is intentional]

Thinking about that I draw invisible strokes all the time, I see things as strokes, fundamentally, what I see is an accumulation of my knowledge of experiences, different strokes about an object. I think one can say every glimpse of experience is different perspectives.

16:10

People like Picasso did realize that and pushed far.

I think Picasso was quite a researcher type. I think artists are more expressing people. Researchers do more reflect. Both do both. But artists do more expressing and researchers do more reflecting. Expressionists will be more expressive than the Cubist. Cubists should more reflect things more than Expressionists. [Note: Cognitive bias of practice]

Video ended at 34:08 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

18:25

State of your body.

{How does your state of body when you are not feeling well influence your expression?}

If you don't feel well, you can be expressive, but hard to be reflective. It is like being a child. A child will express but hardly reflect on what they are doing.

Overtime, you will get more reflective.

The cycle is balanced.

As you get older your body is not outwarding as much as you when younger, but more reflective, inward energies. For instance, Matisse, when he was young, he was much expressive, as he got older, his lines were much simple but very condensed, accurate. [Note: Obvious suggestion of 'experienced action'. As reflection deepens, expression becomes more direct. 'As time gets shorter, wisdom grows'.]

[Silence]

22:18

What directs that you may work one part of it, but your focus will shift to another part of it. It does not seem to be sequential.
It is sequential. I am trying to make it balance, it has to be worked together. [Note: ‘Sequence’ in texture is ‘non-linear’]

23:40

It seems like emergence of multiple different textures in scale.

In the scale, one part has to be more worked, than other parts, but they have to grow up together. [Note: ‘Grow up together again references a 3-dimensional texture space]

Marks that I make can disturb myself. Although they are there for later. At the moment it can distract my eyes. So I have to squint my eyes. [Note: Seeing less to see more.]

[Silence]

26:30

Integration of unexpectedness. Like Pollock. Everything is generally controlled when you paint, but nothing is exactly controlled. I like the unexpectedness. It is like a challenge. It is more exciting. I give my materials agency. It is like my partner. A dancing partner. [Note: Clear reference to intersubjective relationship with the medium]

Picasso said that it is good that someone invented photography because the most important thing is left to the artist.

Photoshop is not so interesting. You change filter in the Photoshop, you can imagine what is going to be like.

Question about randomness is interesting. In the digital filtering, the challenge won’t be ever like what I am doing in painting. Continuous expressing and reflecting. [Note: Algorithms do not embody the continuity of experience!]

32:30

The word organic. It is not clearly computational. I talked about organic texture, organic line. Irregular rhythm. Something that is less predictable. Solvent is more organic than the colour. Light is organic. There is constant change in light. Then the fact of what I am observing. Object changes constantly.

Change, alone, does not seem to be organic.

But a constant change in an unexpected way. But not random. I won’t associate randomness with the nature of organic. Organic has more sense of, huge, uncontrollable, but really complex. Complex will be another metaphor I would use. [Note: Metaphor of complexity.]

How is distance organic? [Note: Organic distance! (because understood enactively)
The distance can be organic, if there is a constant change between eyes, observing point, and the object, what I am observing.

Organic seems to be related to a certain sense of change.

Change in relation to your change [Note: Hyper-mediation, hyper-reflexive]

Nature of change seems to be related to intersubjective relationship.

Artist, as an interface, or a translator.

I am translator between my mind and painting. [Note: Intersubjective second-person point of view; translator stands 'between']

38:20

{How do you represent the change in light? Over the course of session?}

If I were a video camera, as the day goes, you will see darker scene. The night time will be black.

The sense of time in the painting is different, it will be reflected by artist’s mixture of sense; touch, hearing, etc. For instance we have words mimicking smell and sight, smell and touch. People say things like seeing like temperature. [Note: Time texture, sensorial space]

Can you hear gravity?

In Korean there are words depicting the movement, look of movement and sound of movement. [Note: Embodied descriptors]

We have words depicting motion; the word depicting a child’s walking is different than the word depicting an adult’s walking.

So the way artists use the words are different, as a motion in painting. Like poking. In motion, poking is pushing at something, briefly. There is poking in painting. Poking has a sense of focused directed movement.

Do I poke my paint?

Why and how is it appropriate in painting?

It gives a condensed pressure in painting. With oil painting, I poke more. Not much with watercolour, since it is hard to poke water I guess. [Note: Actions are expressed (utilized) in ways that are cognizant of embodied experience]
I think we will see more poking in pointillism or in blunt strokes. Poking you need more colour and less solvent. It gives thicker texture. There is a stage of poking. [Note: Sequence of actions is time texture]

Session name: “Starting actions”

(How_to_start_action)

Poking and time

There is general sequence of actions in painting. [Note: Actions in sequence]

Poke won’t come before smearing. There is a temporal bias in action. [Note: ‘Temporal bias in action’].

Because poking will give textural thickness. If you smear after the thick texture, the stroke won’t be effective on top of thick texture. Smearing action is more related to light texture. You will put a lighter texture first than the thicker texture. You can smear after poking, but generally if will be more effective smear first and poke after. So there may be a general sequence of action. [Note: ‘Effective sequences’].

I think because the artist’s process is not much studied, the actions have not been much studied. So I did not know, or was not aware of, the general sequence of action. Because how do I do that? Is all about action. [Note: also Schon; knowing is in the action]

[[Action is combination of function and intent]] Note: intentional action

I would not use the same action of putting the colour as taking the colour off.

[[Actions are also multiple temporalities. They are made up of mini series of actions.]]

( Oliver Sacks: mixed sensory modalities).

You can visually magnify, but it will change the work. The ‘sound brush’ will change the work. [Note: perception is embodied into expression]
Painting I finish is the same as I imagined at the beginning. Sometimes, sometimes not. Like when you write a story. Sometimes the characters change the narrative. [note: personalization of metaphor ... intersubjective agency with the artifact]

If you ask it will be ever same, it will be never the same. [note: Texture is time and space]

But it has some kind of reflections of structures that I can put into...[note: fractal? The definition of the system results in the emergence of domains of significance out of complexity]

12:40

{How does character emerge?}

They must come from your unconsciousness.

Character emerges out from your sense of observation. Character, in English, as a meaning of being, a sense of qualia. [Note: Affective quality of time and space embedded in texture.]

[After note>>>

Giving the name is like giving the character, and giving the presence.

Painters give the ‘name’ to what is there to be seen (i.e., Picasso’s painting of Gertrude Stein)

Somehow painting is more realistic than real, because a painting is already an intersubjectively identifiable thing; an ‘accepted-as-created-by-other’ entity. An artist created it through using visual metaphors that have been intersubjectively (empathically, through embodied knowledge) understood.]

18:30

Sometimes the nature of material can be reductive (watercolour has limitations)

You cannot catch up the speed. [Note: Similar to ‘if you ask it will be ever same’, this session above]

So you have time limitation, depending on the medium. [Note: inseperable time and space
Appendix D.

Journal notes.

Hyper-reflective post session journal notes follow.
[Journal Notes]

I use more the word ‘drawing’ for the drawing light session, although I use wet medium, oil paint, because it is very dynamic and active process. The light changes and moves constantly, it is lived object, and therefore, I have to constantly draw out what is in my mind to the ground of representation.

Drawing light session 3: After the Oct. 28th session

Now I think about the music, after the painting, as I wash my dishes, it is a part of setting a stage to me. Not only that, it is setting a tone, my bodily rhythm for the act of painting. It is putting myself into ‘the mood’. A mood is a time-space, a session space. When people dance, they turn on the music that they will dance with, with the mood of dance. It is similar to me. It sets mood differently than when I do dish washing, cleaning the room, and writing a thesis paper. It is like an enchanting sound when people do a meditation. It helps to ‘get into’ your state. By state I mean by where/when you are ready to observe and observe your observation (reflecting your action).

Drawing light session 1 was under the entirely different lighting and environment. It changes the colour of light I see. Session 3 had limited light, therefore, I tried to find more lights out of what I am observing. I found more colour than when there were more light. It was much subtle but various.

Journey through the session 3 started with a little struggle, there was a less light to observe, it was a very dim day. But when I observe a space consistently, I start to see the changes. Of course the light was changing, although it was not so saturated as the brighter days. It was faint but had more subtle colours. First, I started to draw the subtle change, the moving lights, until I was familiar with those subtle colours. I slowly put colours into the canvas where I see subtle differences in the subject matter.

I felt that it was close to ‘done’, when I started to see balance of the image, lines, colours, textures, etc.
Appendix E.

Database.

Pages may be assembled by alignment of row and column headers: the database is a single segmented sheet.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media file ID</strong></td>
<td><strong>Referent session “name”</strong></td>
<td><strong>“theme”</strong></td>
<td><strong>Session date</strong></td>
<td><strong>Session start time</strong></td>
<td><strong>NOTE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Video time (min:sec)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Audio time (min:sec)</strong></td>
<td><strong>REF.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Body domain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Action domain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Form domain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Expression</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Video File</td>
<td>preliminary investigation</td>
<td>archetypes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>identified metonymic associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Video File</td>
<td>GOPR1566</td>
<td>pre-reflective action*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Drawing a line and stroke</td>
<td>November 9, 2012</td>
<td>1:46 PM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Exposing the nature of material.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. *form, recognition* comes out softly
2. *feeling of the paper*
3. *feeling of the drawing*
4. *as you touch with your hand*
5. *because you are touching through the brush, you feel, but you also can change the texture*
6. *Different media respond differently to the canvas... at some level, the level of touch*
7. *rougher medium, to create rough texture, I can emphasize, increase the rough texture*
8. *Exposing the nature of material... it is based on the understanding of the material*
9. *I know how thick or thin the brush will draw out when I use a certain amount of solvent and color*
10. *when I start, as I warm up myself, I test my tools. Daily, (session to session) they are slightly different, so I will apply them.*
11. *placing short strokes) to define the form, it is like my own landmark*
12. *I am going to put the landmark to remember this moment.*
13. *shape of the shadow, the shape of the light that I am observing*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Video observations</td>
<td>Reflective session</td>
<td>Hyper-reflective session</td>
<td>type</td>
<td>Validation (practical result)</td>
<td>First-person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>a sense of pleased surprise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>overlay of several soft lines along a general path</td>
<td>several lines loosely following a path are drawn out</td>
<td>schema</td>
<td>experienced observation</td>
<td>observation of efficacy in teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Making a gesture of touching the paper</td>
<td>materials are known through touch</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>feeling, sensation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>I slowed down my pencil stroke, and gave a gentle touch with a pencil, a gentle stroke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Relationship of touch and texture. Touch happens through a medium, but is direct, as you touch with your hand</td>
<td>as I say ‘as you touch with your hand’, I was touching the wall beside the painting with my finger. So I was associating touching through the pencil as same as touch through my finger</td>
<td>description of ‘how’ touch</td>
<td>intersubjective agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>change of shape is transmitted through a medium</td>
<td>feeling is reflexive texture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>touch measures intermedia response</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>medium is embodied in texture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>One can expose (account for) what one understands</td>
<td>* texture schema</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>When I describe ‘warming-up’, I made a circular motion with my arm and ulseal that I was holding. I was drawing a line, observing the light that came through the window. I gave a light stroke, looked outside, squinting my eyes, gave some more strokes (twice), looked outside squinting my eyes again, and gave several more strokes.</td>
<td>Understanding that the tool itself is changing constantly</td>
<td>The session is an observation of context, Relationship of state and orientation of body and form through effection</td>
<td>embodied knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>When I describe ‘my own landmark’ I made a connection with my index finger between my head and a point on the painting</td>
<td>form emerges from marker positions and colour</td>
<td>Light is spatial. Intent is multi-dimensional.</td>
<td>Process description: feeling-thinking-feeling moment / metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>small pointing gesture, application of minimal tone</td>
<td>form encapsulates time: marks are both spatial coordinates (elemental) and observations (of the world)</td>
<td>An embodied understanding of relationship between cognition in my head and illusionary space in the painting?</td>
<td>Process description / metaphor / embryo schema</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>When I say ‘the shape of the light that I am observing’ I made a gesture with my index finger, drawing a line, outer to inward, towards my eye.</td>
<td>practical evidence - returned to later</td>
<td>observation of efficacy in teaching</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.15</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>sharp</td>
<td>(means)</td>
<td>small</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>When I describe 'a wider brushstroke' I angled down my brush, using the side part of the brush. Wider brush stroke = Side part of the brush, more pressure. For the 'little thin line', I used my thumb and index finger, putting them together, making a point, and drew a short line. Little Point = Thin Line. Short line = little line.</td>
<td>association of thin with sharp, and marker points with grouping of space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>When I go 'closer' to the painting, yes, my body literally goes closer. I literally lean back to look at my painting from a distance to see the whole image.</td>
<td>Sharpness is accuracy metaphor. This embodies as angles and distances metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>Accuracy is contextual, and relative to the body</td>
<td>reactive observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Metaphors of scale; it is not the body or canvas that changes, but it is conceived of that way.</td>
<td>suggests expressive and reflective space</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>conceptual distance is related to whether you have to move your arm or your body</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>When I described 'I have to move around' I moved two hands parallel to my body sides. Two hands bracketing = My body. Moves to side to side = Spatial change.</td>
<td>the artist as coordinate system</td>
<td>embodied cognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>When I discuss about a 'self-critique' I moved my hand back and forth between the painting and myself. Which I think about it now, I was thinking about me in front of the painting (while I paint), and me standing back (while reflecting my own process). And yes, I physically stand back too (in the video).</td>
<td>process relationship of physicality/space and structures of mediation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>When the painter paints they don't see themselves acting, just the action, but the process is reflexive in a way that allows for separation to a position where one observes the action and sees themselves acting.</td>
<td>awareness of painting, observation of observation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>the dimensional form is assumed to be real, the line follows a surface</td>
<td>directionality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Of course, when I describe 'my eyes follow the vertical line', my hand was drawing vertical lines...</td>
<td>visual metaphors follow perception</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Apparently, somehow, the idea of 'piling bricks' was there in my mind as I was explaining my act of drawing.</td>
<td>texture is a perceived dimensionality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Texture as visual depth; 'jumping through'. Perception as embodied action; 'eyes jump in rhythm'.</td>
<td></td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Texture as metaphoric expression and reflection; 'creating and following'. We process the image by moving through it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we see texture, we perceive it as rhythm. I see, I feel, the rhythm from the texture. Because our body has a musical rhythm. It is like when we listen music, when we see something, our body follows it (eye direction)."  
"As we see something, our body moves, there is a visual rhythm, like a musical rhythm."  
"Shadow and light lay over the form, texture lays over the form."  
"To make the (visual) rhythm, the organic rhythm, you have to move."  
"Brush is an extension of my arm."  
"Dancing is like dancing."  
"Dancing with an extended utensil. It is one body."  
"The canvas and the material will be my partner. When you dance with someone else, you exercise together, but still you won’t exactly know the move. There is an improvisation. Things happen in the canvas."  
"Water is all those, movement, body, and form."  
"From my experience, I know water, its gravity, viscosity, and wetness. But I do not know how the water will act when I apply to different papers (in thickness and texture), or in different day, or with different brush (with a new brush, with a new utensil). There is different flexibility for different utensil."  
"I want to make a thin layer, I have to hold it down, pressing hard."  
"Play with gravity."  
"I know how much water is in the brush."  
"I was not consciously aware of this, but now I think about this, be aware of it, my eyes draw follow the line as I draw. I will position my brush where I want to start the line, my eyes will draw a virtual line, of the line I want to draw, my eyes will go together as I draw the line with brush, and I have to lift my brush just before my eyes pause the end point."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>This comment, ‘our body follows’ is also interesting, because it</td>
<td>embodiment literally follows perception</td>
<td>cross-sensory modalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>is not our body, but our mind. But if you understand the notion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of embodied mind and sensorimotor patterns, yes, our body will</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>follow as our perception moves.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>And yes, I moved my arm, whole body side ways, and brush</td>
<td>sense is shaped by form metaphors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>squiggly as I describe the organic rhythm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>extensions to the body</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>'more' awareness is possible through attention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Pre-reflective action manifests in the movement of the eyes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>First and last determination is 'feeling': closer to the cognitive unconscious. Conscious mind 'guesses' at solutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Feeling (empathy) associates with reflective response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>people assume knowledge is embodied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>See previous session 'it comes out softly', strokes as a 'transient motion', a textural space from which emerges the individuated line</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Observation as textural emergent phenomena. Associated with narrative, suggesting metaphors embodied in experience</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>My seeing things as strokes happen almost automatically. I do not do that consciously. Either I draw out or not I draw strokes all the time. Some, I may do consciously, a lot of time I think I do unconsciously, and some point it comes to as a realization to me. That is a moment of realization about what I am observing to me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Very interesting; seeing is stoked perception. Could observation be 'painted' into an embodied texture of experience?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Temporal and spatial dimensions of texture. Point of view divides space into actions</td>
<td>perceptual scales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recording of parameters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Thinking about that I draw invisible strokes all the time, I see things as strokes, fundamentally, what I see is an accumulation of my knowledge of experiences. Different strokes about an object. I think one can say every glimpse of experience is different perspectives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Husserl, noema; the relationship is intentional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State of your body.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Video ended at 34:08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>121</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- "I think Picasso was quite a researcher type. I think artists are more expressing people. Researchers do more reflecting. Both do both. But artists do more expressing and researchers do more reflecting. Expressionists will be more expressive than the Cubist. Cubists should more reflect things more than Expressionists."
- "If you don't feel well, you can be expressive, but hard to be reflective. It is like being a child. A child will express but hardly reflect on what they are doing. Overtime, you will get more reflective. The cycle is balanced. You get older; your body is not outwarding as much as you when younger; but more reflective, inward energies. For instance, Matosse when he was young, he was much expressive, as he got older, his lines were much simple but very condensed, accurate."
- "It is sequential; I am trying to make it balance; it has to be worked together."
- "It's the scale, one part has to be more worked, than other parts, but they have to grow up together."
- "Marks that I make can distort myself. Although they are there for later. At the moment it can distract my eyes. So I have to squint my eyes."
- "Integration of unexpectedness. Like Pollock. Everything is generally controlled when you paint, but nothing is exactly controlled. I like the unexpectedness. It is like a challenge. It is more exciting. I give my materials agency. It is like my partner. A dancing partner."
- "Question about randomness is interesting. In the digital filtering, the challenge won't be ever like what I am doing in painting. Continuous expressing and reflecting."
- "The word organic. It is not clearly computational. I talk about organic texture, organic line, irregular rhythm. Something that is less predictable. Solvent is more organic than the colour. Light is organic. There is constant change in light. Then the fact of what I am observing. Object changes constantly. Change, alone, does not seem to be organic. But a constant change in an unexpected way. But not random. I won't associate randomness with the nature of organic. Organic has more sense of: huge, uncontrollable, but really complex. Complex will be another metaphor I would use."
- "The distance can be organic. If there is a constant change between eyes, observing point, and the object, in what I am observing."
- "I am translator between my mind and painting."

Artlet as an interface, or a translator.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>How do you represent the change in light?</td>
<td>38.20</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The sense of time in the painting is different, it will be reflected by artist's mixture of sense, touch, hearing, etc. For instance we have words mimicking smell and sight, smell and touch. People say things like seeing like temperature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;So the way artists use the words are different, as a motion in painting. Like poking. In motion, poking is pushing at something, briefly. There is poking in painting. Poking has a sense of focused directed movement. It gives a condened pressure in painting. With oil painting, I poke more. Not much with watercolour, since it is hard to poke water. I guess.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.20</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;I think we will see more poking in pointilism or in blunt strokes. Poking you need more colour and less solvent. It gives thicker texture. There is a stage of poking.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Video time (min:s from start of file) varies from Audio time (min:s from start of file) as the devices were initiated at separate times but recording the same session. Times in any case are only an indicator of where on the media the information may be found and are not intended to be an explicitly quantitative component of the data.