The Intersection of Town Centre Planning and Politics:  
Alternative Development in an  
Inner Suburban Municipality in the  
Metro Vancouver Region

by

David Pereira  
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A.A., Capilano College, 2003

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Name: David Pereira
Degree: Master of Urban Studies
Title of Thesis: The intersection of Town Centre planning and politics: Alternative development in an inner suburban municipality in the Metro Vancouver Region

Examining Committee:

Chair: Anthony Perl
Director, Urban Studies Program
Professor, Urban Studies Program and Department of Political Science
Simon Fraser University

Meg Holden
Senior Supervisor
Associate Professor, Urban Studies Program and Department of Geography
Simon Fraser University

Peter V. Hall
Supervisor
Associate Professor, Urban Studies Program
Simon Fraser University

Allen Seager
External Examiner
Associate Professor, Department of History
Simon Fraser University

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ABSTRACT

Regional Town Centres (RTC) are a central metropolitan growth management mechanism used to address liveability concerns and help plan for the future in the Metro Vancouver region. Intended to decentralize the magnetic pull of a traditional downtown, these high density suburban nodes are meant to refocus urban amenities in designated built up islands of urbanity in order to decrease the distance residents travel to employment, services, shopping and recreation. Nearly half a century since implementation, the City of Burnaby has demonstrated strong potential to realize the Town Centres concept with the continued development of the Metrotown RTC as well as the municipal Town Centres of Lougheed, Edmonds, and Brentwood. This paper examines the evolution of these centres through a local planning policy and political context. Despite various challenges, the policies produced in the late 1960s persevere today, presenting an alternative evolution to the dominant model of suburbia.

Keywords: Metropolitan growth management; Regional Town Centres; Metrotowns; Suburban nodes, Transit-oriented development; Urban planning and governance.
DEDICATION

To Mom. Since the very beginning of this journey, you have made countless sacrifices to make sure that I had the best start in life. Even though you never quite understood what I was doing, your love and unbridled support is all the understanding I ever needed.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1: Introduction ................................................................................. 1
1.1 Setting the Context .................................................................... 1
1.2 Managing Growth ......................................................................... 3
1.3 Town Centres as a Feature of Growth Management ......................... 4

## 2: Literature review ......................................................................... 7
2.1 Urban Dispersion ......................................................................... 7
2.2 Approaches to Urban Intensification ........................................... 11
  2.2.1 New Urbanism ........................................................................ 11
  2.2.2 Smart Growth ........................................................................ 12
  2.2.3 Transit-Oriented Development ............................................. 13
  2.2.4 Metrotowns ........................................................................... 14
  2.2.5 Suburban Nodes ..................................................................... 17
  2.2.6 Comparing Approaches ........................................................ 19
2.3 The Planning Process ................................................................... 22
2.4 Urban Political Theory .............................................................. 27
2.5 Burnaby Town Centres .................................................................. 31

## 3: Methodology .................................................................................. 51
3.1 Qualitative Data .......................................................................... 52
3.2 Triangulation .............................................................................. 53
3.3 Quantitative Data ........................................................................ 53

## 4: Regional Governance and Town Centres ....................................... 56
4.1 Nascent Regional Planning .......................................................... 56
4.2 Modern Regional Planning’s Reluctant Birth ................................ 58
4.3 Regional Planning Gets a Shot in the Arm ................................... 59
4.4 Regional Planning by Stealth ...................................................... 64
4.5 Regional Planning is Born Again ................................................ 68
4.6 New Plans, Old Habits ............................................................... 71
5: Planning for Town centres: A Case Study of Burnaby, B.C. ........................................... 79
5.1 Radical Roots .................................................................................................................. 80
5.2 The Death and Life of Planning ....................................................................................... 81
5.3 Metrotown Regional Town Centre .................................................................................. 91
5.4 Edmonds Town Centre .................................................................................................. 99
5.5 Lougheed Town Centre ................................................................................................. 108
5.6 Brentwood Town Centre ............................................................................................... 118
5.7 Contrast and Comparison ............................................................................................. 126

6: Observations and Conclusions ....................................................................................... 131
6.1 The Politics of Planning ................................................................................................. 132
6.2 Retail-Oriented Planning ............................................................................................... 133
6.3 Transit-Oriented Planning .............................................................................................. 134
6.4 Suburban-Urban Dichotomy ........................................................................................ 136
6.5 Towards Burnabism ..................................................................................................... 138

Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 141
Appendix A: Significant Regional Events Timeline ............................................................ 142
Appendix B: Comparative Regional Town Centre Indicators ............................................ 143
Appendix C: Comparative Regional Town Centre Work Commutes ................................ 144
Appendix D: Burnaby Electoral Timeline (BCA results) .................................................... 146
Appendix E: Metrotown (Regional Town) Centre ............................................................... 147
Appendix F: Edmonds Town Centre .................................................................................. 148
Appendix G: Lougheed Town Centre ................................................................................ 149
Appendix H: Brentwood Town Centre ............................................................................... 150

Reference List ................................................................................................................... 151
Preamble ............................................................................................................................ 151
Sources ............................................................................................................................... 152
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 | Howard's conceptual diagram of the Town-Country connection (Hall, 2002) .......... 3
Figure 2 | A modern plan for Markham has the reminiscent feel of a post-war rendition. (DPZ, 1992). ................................................................. 12
Figure 3 | The Year 2000 Plan for Washington D.C. (Sixta, 1971: 41). .................................... 15
Figure 4 | Office for the Greater Toronto Area urban structure concept (in Fillion, 2009). .... 18
Figure 5 | Daniel Burnham's 1909 City Beautiful Plan for Chicago. ................................ 22
Figure 6 | Six-Sided Triangle (Lash, 1976: 11). ................................................................. 23
Figure 7 | Lougheed Town Centre, “Area 'H'” (Parr, 1966). .............................................. 35
Figure 8 | Location of present Town Centres in proximity to the "Central Area." Central Area is marked by the star (Author’s custom Google Map). ....................... 37
Figure 9 | Brentwood Town Centre (Parr, 1966). ............................................................. 39
Figure 10 | Kingsway-Sussex/ Simpson Sears Town Center (Parr, 1966). .......................... 39
Figure 11 | 1956 Lougheed Town Centre prior to Trans-Canada Highway construction. The red lines are historical markings, showing the proposed route of the Trans-Canada Highway (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series). ........................................................................ 40
Figure 12 | "Kingsway and Central Park 196-" Kingsway-Sussex Town Centre aerial from above Central Park, looking east (City of Burnaby Archives, item no. 083-001). ..................................................................................... 41
Figure 13 | 1956 Brentwood Town Centre (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series). ........................................................................ 41
Figure 14 | Derived from data in Parr (1969: 4) ...................................................................... 42
Figure 15 | Urban Structure (Sixta, 1971). .......................................................................... 44
Figure 16 | "Multi-level Central Area" depiction of a Meto Town core area (Sixta, 1971: 130). ......................................................................................... 44
Figure 17 | Comparison of auto and pedestrian accessibility (Sixta, 1971: 99). .................. 44
Figure 18 | Intermittent Grids of Metro Towns in Greater Vancouver (Sixta, 1971: 62) .... 45
Figure 19 | Diagrammatic representation of "A Strategy to Manage Growth" (GVRD, 1975). ......................................................................................... 60
Figure 20 | Brentwood Town Center core (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series). ................................................................. 86
Figure 21 | Development Concept Diagram (Parr, 1977: 53) ...................................................... 88
Figure 22 | Conceptual Zoning Mix (Parr, 1977: 47) .................................................................. 88
Figure 23 | Development Concept Model (Parr, 1977: 52) ............................................................. 89
Figure 24 | Proposed location for "Fantasyland." Location is marked by the star (Author’s custom Google Map) ........................................................................................................................................ 92
Figure 25 | Artist’s rendering of proposed Station Square redevelopment (Chow, 2011c) ......... 95
Figure 26 | Artist’s rendering of The Sovereign (Bosa Properties, http://www.bosaproperties.com/) ........................................................................................................................................ 96
Figure 27 | Artist’s rendering of baseplate of MetroPlace (Intracorp, http://metroplaceliving.ca/) ...................................................................................................................................... 96
Figure 28 | Four Quadrants (Burnaby, 1987: 37) .............................................................................. 102
Figure 29 | Hierarchy of Nodes (Burnaby, 1987: 36) ........................................................................ 102
Figure 30 | This 2009 aerial photo shows the present condition of the Edmonds Station area. Boxed area shows Statistics Canada Dissemination Area 59153654 (Author’s custom Google Map) .................................................................................................................... 103
Figure 31 | This 1989 aerial photo shows Dominion Glass as the large site, and Edmonds SkyTrain Station is near the upper right corner (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 1989 aerial photo series). .................................................................................. 103
Figure 32 | Photo of City in the Park residential towers and supermarket (photo taken by author, 2011). .................................................................................................................................. 105
Figure 33 | Figure 35 | This 2009 aerial photo shows the present Highgate Village on the former lands of Middlegate (Author’s custom Google Map) .......................................................... 106
Figure 34 | This 1989 aerial photo shows the former Middlegate Shopping Plaza (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 1989 aerial photo series). ......... 106
Figure 35 | Artist’s rendering of Edmonds Aquatic & Community Centre (Burnaby, 2011)....... 107
Figure 36 | Discovery Place in Lougheed Village (Author) ................................................................. 109
Figure 37 | Lougheed Highway pedestrian underpass (Author) ......................................................... 109
Figure 38 | Original SkyTrain line marked by brown line; proposed Edmonds-Cariboo line marked by red line (Author’s custom Google Map) ...................................................................................... 111
Figure 39 | Original SkyTrain line marked by brown line; proposed and ultimate Lougheed-Broadway extension marked by green line (Author’s custom Google Map) .............................................................................................................. 111
Figure 40 | Core Area Concept (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997: 12), with Author’s custom Google Map showing area highlighted by yellow shading in bottom right corner. .................................................................................................................. 113
Figure 41 | Integrated LRT and Land Bridge over Austin Road (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997: 15) ................................................................................................................................. 114
Figure 42 | Lougheed Highway Corridor adjacent to Lougheed SkyTrain Station (Author) ........ 116
Figure 43 | Artist’s rendering of proposed Northeast Sector Line (Evergreen Line Project Office, 2009: 10). ................................................................. 116

Figure 44 | Northern portion of Brentwood Town Centre. Early developments are located on the top left, and bottom right. (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 1989 aerial photo series). ........................................... 118

Figure 45 | Brentwood Town Centre Development Plan “Transportation Network” (Stenson, 1996). .................................................................................................................. 121

Figure 46 | Brentwood Town Centre Development Plan “Land Use Concept” (Stenson, 1996). .................................................................................................................. 121

Figure 47 | Sketch 9: "Commercial" (Stenson, 1996). ................................................................................................................................. 122

Figure 48 | Sketch 8: "Residential" (Stenson, 1996). ................................................................................................................................. 122

Figure 49 | Sketch 2: "Scale of Buildings Related to Streets" (Stenson, 1996). ................................................................. 122

Figure 50 | Artist’s rendition of Appia’s project. Note Brentwood SkyTrain Station in the background to the right (Burnaby, 2011) ................................................................. 124

Figure 51 | Artist’s rendition of Appia’s planned internal road (Chris Deakakos Architects, 2008) .......................................................................................................................... 124

Figure 52 | Brentwood Park neighbourhood looking southwest at Brentwood Town Centre development (Author) ........................................................................................................... 125

Figure 53 | Brentwood Gate development looking east from Brentwood Mall (Author). ................................................................. 125

Figure 54 | Population Density (persons per hectare). The green and purple east-west lines represent the rapid transit line. Custom GIS map created by SFU Geography from 2006 Census data with Author’s custom Google Map overlays. ............................................................................................................................. 126

Figure 55 | Transit Ridership (to work). The green and purple east-west lines represent the rapid transit line. Custom GIS map created by SFU Geography from 2006 Census data with Author’s custom Google Map overlays. ............................................................................................................................. 126

Figure 56 | Cover page of insert in local Burnaby media (Burnaby, 2008) ................................................................................................................................. 135

Figure 57 | 1956 Metrotown provides a very stark contrast to contemporary Metrotown in Appendix E (composite aerial image from City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series). ............................................................................................................................. 136
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 | Various: Urban Intensification Models. .................................................................................................................. 20

Table 2 | Burnaby Zoning Categories (Parr, 1966: Appendix) ................................................................................................. 38

Table 3 | Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Figures marked with a (a) were compiled manually by the author using Dissemination Areas from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. This (a) is the figure for the City of Langley only, where the majority of the RTC is located within. Including the Township of Langley, the figures would respectively be: 97,097; 31,091; 3. ................................................................................................................................. 74

Table 4 | Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and 'other method' from within the census. (b) Because there was no registered population in the City of Richmond’s RTC boundary addition, it is not necessary to provide two comparisons as with the previous Table. This (b) is the figure for the City of Langley only, the majority of the RTC is located within. Including the Township of Langley, the figures would respectively be: 51,250; 81.39%; 3.02%; 3.33%; 0.17%. ......................................................................................................................... 75

Table 5 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Bottom chart shows excerpt from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes data from bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other method’ from the census. ............................................................................. 98

Table 6 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Bottom chart shows excerpt from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and 'other method' from within the census. Population totals for Town Centres (a) were compiled manually by the author using Dissemination Areas from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Sizes of these Town Centres were also manually compiled, using custom area calculation software built on a Google Maps interface (http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm). ................... 98

Table 7 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. The table atop the following page shows excerpt from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada 2006 Census. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and 'other method' from within the census. Population totals for Town Centres (a) were compiled manually by the author
Sizes of these Town Centres were also manually compiled, using custom area
calculation software built on a Google Maps interface
(http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm). 
...127
1: INTRODUCTION

[...] the "environment" is where we all live; and "development" is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable. Many of the development paths of the industrialized nations are clearly unsustainable.

Gro Harlem Brundtland, Chairman’s forward for the World Commission on Environment and Development (WECD, 1987: xii)

1.1 Setting the Context

According to the United Nations, 4.9 billion people, or sixty percent of the world’s population will live in cities by the year 2030 (Grant et al, 2004). Although this statistic carries relevance in the developing world as millions of people continue to move from the hinterland into urban areas, in western economies, the urbanization process has largely already occurred.

While the developing world can attribute agricultural efficiencies and economic globalization as the key instigators of urban migration, in North America, it was the end of World War II, and the rising dominance of the personal automobile. With the return of soldiers from the battlefields of Europe, and associated large scale industrial production reorienting itself from battle tanks to personal automobiles, the climate was ripe for an era that would result in the great urban dispersion (Grant, 2009). Tied with government stimulus and welfare programs geared towards reengaging soldiers and their young families into society, the outskirts of traditional cities soon began to experience unprecedented development, largely in the form of single-detached housing.

By the 1960s and 1970s though, what began as a program to deal with a swelling population resulted in the creation of a whole other parallel urban world. Harvey Molotch’s 1976 essay, The City as a Growth Machine, began to present suburbia as a place where significant power concentrations flowed. Pro-growth lobbies did not just exist in the corridors of power in downtowns, but also in the suburbs, where they were building whole new power strongholds, forging relationships with various levels of government, and initiating lucrative
development deals that built North American suburbs in further and further rings around traditional cities (Molotch, 1976). However, serving the interests of a pro-growth lobby was not necessarily entirely in the best interests of the people who would live in these neighbourhoods. By the 1980s and 1990s, concerns over increasingly distant commutes and traffic congestion were coupled with criticism borne from texts such as *Silent Spring*, spelling out the detrimental effects of environmental degradation, along with those such as the Brundtland Commission, from which the opening quote of this chapter is taken. In today’s parlance, the suburb is increasingly seen as a threat to environmental sustainability and conservation. American urban scholar Joel Kotkin succinctly sums up this growing malaise and the future of suburbia:

> The next great frontier is going to be the urbanization of suburbia. We will see the development of more urban villages. You have too many people who can’t afford to live any place near work. Land pressures, environmental pressures, NIMBY-ism, and people’s exhaustion with the commute will lead to the creation of denser, more self-contained environments (Kotkin in Pedersen, 2004: online quote).

The irony of Kotkin’s critique though is that it is not a new revelation at all. As the next section demonstrates, urbanists well before Kotkin also sought out alternatives to the predominant urban structure. Although those predecessors were reacting to the health risks generated by pollution and crowded tenements within the industrial city, both sets of visionaries have aimed to employ some sort of strategy to address their contemporary built environments. The common solution that runs through both is the goal of growth management. But as we frequently find, it is not always so easy to implement such long range visions. The best intentions and expertise are often led astray, resulting in unintended consequences, though as we will find further below, there are still times when long range visions are able to overcome these challenges. Above all, the challenges in managing growth should not be taken lightly. These are oftentimes very challenging projects, but as the next section shows, they can also be quite revolutionary.
1.2 Managing Growth

Although it may not have been specifically referred to as growth management, the concept of containing the type of rapid and disjointed growth characteristic of North American suburbs is not entirely new. At the dawn of the twentieth century, urban planning pioneer Ebenezer Howard sought to create new and improved urban realms, as a response to the industrial ills of England at the time. Though Howard’s work was based on a reaction to the slum-like conditions of the industrial city that predated the automobile, his vision was still geared to supplanting the characteristics of polluted, congested, and socially deleterious cities of the time. Envisioning a socially revolutionary way of living, Howard hoped to create entirely new cities, Garden Cities. Howard hoped to create a specific built environment that would capture the best elements of the pastoral freedom of the countryside and the productive wealth and ingenuity of the city, modifying the behaviour of its inhabitants to enrich the social contract between humans (Hall, 2002). Howard sought to create several such ‘Garden Cities’; and eventually two plans were carried through from conception to reality, in the production of Welwyn and Letchworth Garden Cities, though as Howard’s plans continued to develop and become adopted elsewhere, his visions relating to social revolution slowly became muted, while the conceptual segregation of uses eventually morphed and shifted, leading to the formation of garden suburbs, marketed by developers and municipalities as an urban ideal, eventually resembling little more than the forefather to the modern segregated-use, low density residential suburb.

In the years immediately following World War II, in Britain, the National government embarked on a program designed to facilitate the mass return of soldiers into society. In 1946,
an ambitious ‘New Towns’ program was launched, inspired by the promoters of the Garden Cities movement and its students. The nationwide program called for the enhancement of existing urban centres and the new creation of others, connected by a network of roadways and rail links and separated by rolling countryside (Hall, 2002). Eventually resulting in twenty-eight New Towns, the policy formed the foundations of the renowned model of growth management that exists in England today.

As we will find in Chapter 4, these same concepts also inspired the advocates of growth management in the Greater Vancouver Regional District\(^1\) in the mid-twentieth century (Tate, 2009). Although metropolitan growth management has been employed by regions throughout North America and Western Europe for over a century, the particular type of growth management that is practiced within the Greater Vancouver Regional District is of particular interest to urban scholars. The Regional District is recognized as a leader because of the apparently effective capacity to build on the consensus of member municipalities. Observers have recognized that its “institution and practices […] are recognizable, practical, and worthy of emulation” (Sancton, 2001: 554). Though its actual performance has been maligned by critics (Tomalty, 2002), the region still presents a very useful case study, not just as a model of regional governance, but also because of its enduring legacy. Dating to the late 1940s, regional growth management has persevered to this day – a distinguishable credit among most other counterparts in North America.

1.3 Town Centres as a Feature of Growth Management

One particular planning tool that the Regional District began to implement early on was the ‘Town Centre’. From their earliest documents, the Regional District and its predecessor\(^2\), the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, previously referred to these sites as “Valley Cities,” then “Regional Towns” (LMRPB, 1952 & 1963). By 1975, these areas were referred to as “Regional Town Centres,” and within present documents, they are known as “Regional City Centres,” though this paper will predominantly refer to them as Regional Town Centres in the context of regional policy (GVRD, 1999; GVRD, 2011).

\(^1\) As of 2007, the current common name of the regional district is Metro Vancouver. However, because the letters of patent have not yet been changed, the legal name is still the Greater Vancouver Regional District, which this paper will continue to refer to for ease of use.

\(^2\) A detailed discussion on the history of regional governance can be found in Chapter 4.
Perhaps the most sophisticated rendition of this concept was that espoused by the City of Burnaby, a constituent member of the GVRD, and third largest city in the federation of municipalities by population size, trailing only the central City of Vancouver and the City of Surrey, which are respectively about thrice and twice the size of Burnaby’s 2006 population of 210,500. Although the City of Burnaby has adopted the Regional District’s growth management directives, growth management policy has existed in the city well before this. Moreover, as Tate found through her 2009 doctoral dissertation on metropolitan growth management, Burnaby staff and politicians were key participants in helping to craft those regional directives. As we find later, this dissertation did not provide a sufficiently robust analysis of political economy, though it serves as a strong jumping off point for this study, and growth management analysis on the whole. Tate’s dissertation also supports this project’s assessment that the City of Burnaby may have been well ahead of the curve in its application of Town Centre planning. As we will find in the case study, Burnaby’s four Town Centres are distinct areas within the municipality, characterised by much higher average densities and transit ridership levels than adjacent urban areas, second only to the various precincts within Vancouver’s downtown peninsula and immediately surrounding areas. This therefore begs the research question that will guide this paper: how have local municipal planning processes contributed to the development of Burnaby’s Town Centres?

To answer this question, we must first address its constituent segments. The first key part of the question is ‘local municipal planning processes’. It is important to distinguish between local and regional processes. Regional processes will be elaborated in further detail in Chapter 4. However, this project will lay the majority of its focus on policy formation within the Municipality of Burnaby – hence the incorporation of the term ‘municipal’. ‘Planning process’ refers to a specific set of theories, which are elaborated further in the literature review in Chapter 2. Overall, they refer to the policy environment that led to the formation of Town Centre planning. Also relevant to the planning process, and critical to the formation of Town Centre policy in Burnaby, is Urban Regime Theory, a body of literature within Urban Political Economy literature that was first popularized by urban theorist Clarence Stone’s 1989 examination of regime politics in Atlanta, and refined by successive researchers.

The second component of this question is the concept of ‘contributing to the development of’. In most urban planning analyses, it is critical to frame the discussion in the
context of the marketplace. Like most municipalities in the Western Hemisphere, the City of Burnaby can only contribute to whatever market forces are in play over which municipal governance matters have control. External factors such as market downturns, foreign investment, or interaction from senior levels of government are often beyond the direct control of Canadian municipalities, although this is sometimes challenged in specific ways, as we will find later in the Case Study. Conversely, while the term ‘contributed’ refers chiefly to the levers which the municipality controls, ‘development’ refers to those in which the city has a shared stake. The municipal government is ultimately in control of rezoning and long term policy creation, and though there are forces outside of the municipality’s reach, the end products tend to reflect the policy environment that has existed over time.

The last key term, ‘Burnaby’s Town Centres,’ refers to those dense urban creations: Metrotown, Brentwood, Lougheed, and Edmonds. As Chapter 2 will explain, each Town Centre has a clear geographic boundary that has changed only slightly over time. As will be recounted, Brentwood, Lougheed, and Metrotown were all unveiled in 1966, with the latter, Metrotown, notably pre-dating the Regional District’s Regional Town Centre designation proposals within the 1975 Livable Region Plan. With the exception of Edmonds, which was designated in 1987, each Town Centre has a clear policy framework that has been repeatedly clarified by the municipality over nearly half a century. The methodology presented in Chapter 3 will be critical in helping to unpack this narrative of consistency.

This project seeks to tell a specific story in the process of answering this question. Though the Town Centres concept has a particular home in growth management theory, their implementation serves as an important lesson in the history of policy formation over time. As the observations and conclusions will crystallize in Chapter 6, it is essential to recognize the critical relationship between policy and politics, and the role that individual actors have in crafting both.
2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to engage in a comprehensive analysis of Town Centre policy in the region, we need to examine existing, supporting knowledge as it relates to the constituent parts of the question this paper is asking. Three main packages of literature will first be examined. These bodies of literature will also help to set the narrative of this project. The first package we look at will concern, firstly, the factors of urban dispersion, and secondly, a relevant set of strategies of urban intensification. Seeking to explain variations in the municipal acceptance of these intensification models, we will then look at a second body of literature, which seeks to assess why some plans are more effective than others. The first set of this package deals with the administrative environment and some of the dominant motifs in which plans are crafted. The second part brings an underutilized political perspective into urban studies as a method to help understand why certain plans may be more durable over a long period of time. In concluding this chapter, we will look at a third package of literatures, which covers Burnaby’s interpretation of Town Centres. Though most of this foundational material is published by Burnaby, there are many parallels with those preceding academic literatures, an observation that will help the analysis of the case study in Chapter 5.

2.1 Urban Dispersion

In order to understand the core focus of this paper, it is a good exercise first to understand how the need for urban intensification has arisen. As we found through the introduction, suburbia is not an evolutionary organic urban formation, but rather the result of a set of key policy changes that affected all levels of government. Assisting their thesis that current North American sprawl is primarily a land use-transportation problem, Newman and Kenworthy (1995) present that North American regions have grown in specific patterns related to their contemporarily dominant mode of transportation. Leading up to the 1850s, in what the researchers regard as the ‘Walking City’, cities were largely composed of high density, mixed use buildings. Their densities of one hundred to two hundred inhabitants per hectare resided within a fairly organic street structure, where the city would grow slowly over time
within the mandate of maintaining close proximities for the convenience of the pedestrian. The following era, described as ‘Transit City’, had densities of about fifty to one hundred persons per hectare, still composed of mixed use dwellings to accommodate a still pedestrian-dominated world, but with the addition of centralization and streetcar networks that radiated outwards along a grid pattern to accommodate transit-reliant development dependant on fixed rails.

The period following Transit City, referred to as “Automobile City” by the authors, is the most significant period. Marked by the onset of World War II and accelerating afterwards, corporations like Ford and General Motors quickly oriented their production capacity to the domestic consumer market. Picking up where they left off from before the War when mass production automobiles began rolling onto the streets, the period after 1945 saw them boom. The personal automobile offered unrestricted and unprecedented access to the city-adjacent countryside where federal government financial instruments provided generous opportunities for post-war families to either construct their own house, or more commonly to buy into a development where they could choose the colour and accents of their new detached home. It was the first time that home ownership was possible on a scale not seen any time before, and on levels not experienced by the growing middle class’s European counterparts. This form of rapid development, however, led to low density, segregated uses. Arterial grids and cul-de-sacs became the norm, setting out hierarchies of streets in relation to the highways that began running from the growing swaths of this sub-urban area to the central urban city and industrial areas, connecting residents to their place of work, all powered by an era of perceivably endless cheap petroleum. Overtime, this suburban design became tightly linked with personal identity, fuelling “a society that defines privacy in spatial terms, that spells out success in square feet and number of bathrooms that links automobile use with personal identity” (Grant, 1999: 17). The momentum of this growth over time became seemingly impossible to stop.

As Beauregard (2006) describes, though the greatest effects of suburbanization were most rooted in the development of the United States, largely owing to “American Exceptionalism” and the uniqueness of that country’s libertarian flair and search for an identity different from that of its European origins, it was certainly not isolated to that nation. Suburbanization was also felt in Canada, Europe, and Australia, though in many Western
European nations, suburban growth took the form of planned high density settlements. Canada developed more as a hybrid of the two models (American dispersion and European concentration), although it was more heavily influenced by its large southern neighbour. Though Canadian cities to a much lesser extent suffered from the ghettoization that resulted from the abandonment of many American cities in the mid-20th Century, it did experience the same effect of the dominance of the automobile (Beauregard, 2006). Particularly through the 1970s, as populations continued to expand primarily through North American immigration, residents fled traditional cities in search of detached residential plots in replication of the homes of residents who had settled before them. However, the rate at which this growth occurred strained many municipalities, both in terms of their ability to provide basic utilities and services, and the availability of more traditional private sector retail and services. Many of these suburbs were growing into greenfield and agricultural areas, proving attractive to large investors who preferred economy of scale building methods, and assisted by growing credit markets which made financing increasingly available to more income levels.

Because uses were so segregated and sprawled out, residents would need to drive from their large subdivision, to drop children off at school, to their place of work, to the auto service station, and to everywhere in between (Gottdiener, 2003). With no natural centre in suburbs, shopping centres suited the form exceptionally well. They served as proxy places “within which individuals come to participate in a certain type of urban ambiance which they crave at the very same time that they circulate as consumers for the benefit of retailers” (Gottdiener, 2003: 130). However this new pattern can have deleterious social consequences. Cohen (1996) argues this one stop shop for the suburban consumer has not offered a reasonable replacement for the absence of traditional city centres, despite mall owners’ best attempts to design spaces that try desperately to replicate the city facades that they replaced by proxy (Gottdiener, 2003). Unsanctioned political canvassing, union organizing, and free speech are all frequently barred from these deceptively private spaces (Gottdiener, 2003; Cohen, 1996). Cohen also notably finds that shopping centres were responsible for giving prominence to credit cards, offering predominantly female shoppers the opportunity to make large purchases without their husbands present (Cohen, 1996).

In many cases, shopping centres symbiotically enabled suburbanization in Canada. Municipalities came to rely on shopping centres to provide quick and guaranteed tax revenue
and services to residents, though as shopping centres increased in popularity, they tended to exacerbate the worst effects of the suburbs: sprawling parking lots and increased automobile dependence as residents had little other choice in where to shop or congregate. In turn, municipalities expanded roadways and continued to orient the street towards vehicular travel, in a cyclical mission to relieve congestion. The pedestrian environment suffered, as did the traditional main street in established areas that pre-dated the rise of the suburb. For the vast majority of North American communities, this dispersion has not let up. Overtime, this growth has crept beyond established municipalities into less settled areas, where residents have demanded administration and service provision for roads and other utilities and social services. And, the municipalities that have been established have largely been uninterested in reigning in growth within their boundaries, despite much research pointing to the myriad of environmental, economic, and social problems which accompany this type of unbridled growth, not to mention the continually increased traffic congestion (Filion, 2003; Newman et al, 1999). And through this all, the costs to the state have continued to rise due to infrastructure demands, maintenance, and expansion. But beyond state costs, this type of development has resulted in the hidden costs of environmental degradation and inequities faced by people who are unable to drive, among other factors (Cervero & Bernick, 1997).

It is difficult to imagine an alternative future for suburbia given the momentum behind the predominant form. However, as many researchers have already pointed out, for an abundance of reasons, an alternative urban form is necessary. Oil vulnerability, as we have seen through the oil shocks of the 1973 OPEC Crisis, and the impending dwindling supplies of global oil may have calamitous consequences for an urban scheme that depends heavily on a single basic commodity for fuel and roadway construction. The burning of fuel itself also has effects on the increase of air particulate matter, which has been shown to cause respiratory problems in vulnerable individuals, as well as contributing to global warming. The rezoning of fertile agricultural land for residential development has caused food production centres to move further afield, putting even more pressure on oil consumption. But, as we will find in the next section, a number of credible options exist that can help retard this voracious consumption of land.
2.2 Approaches to Urban Intensification

Planning better communities has come into vogue again over the last number of years, largely, as Canadian planning scholar Grant (2009) credits, stemming from the findings of the *Our Common Future* report, produced by the United Nations’ Brundtland Commission, which convened in 1983 and presented in 1987. From that point onward, Grant argues, planners in Canada and Europe rallied around the oft-repeated phrase of the Commission, and incorporate into their practices, a mantra that “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WECD, 1987: 43).

2.2.1 New Urbanism

In the interceding years since the distribution of the Brundtland Commission’s report, best practices to control suburban development have begun to fall into the mainstream, often used as catch phrases by municipalities and private planning firms’ yearning to produce developments that are more cognizant of the human scale. One of the most currently popular of these best practice packages is ‘New Urbanism’, which identifies “the spread of placeless sprawl, increasing separation by race and income, environmental deterioration, loss of agricultural lands and wilderness, and the erosion of society’s built heritage as one interrelated community-building challenge” (Congress for the New Urbanism, 2000: 339). Plans frequently incorporate deep architectural principles and design elements into pre-existing neighbourhood redesigns, or more often greenfield development proposals with moderate densities and mixed use commercial precincts, and strong pedestrian orientations. They also typically feature a mix of residential types, often still incorporating some single family development. If existing neighbourhoods such as Seaside or the Disney Development Company’s Celebration, both located in Florida, are considered models, advocates for New Urbanism appear to embrace the type of planning that constitutes pre-World War Two era neighbourhoods, prior to the popularity of the personal automobile. Two of New Urbanism’s most popular advocates, Andrès Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk of the American-based architectural and design firm Duany Plater-Zyberk (DPZ) are the designers of the former Floridian city.

Though DPZ -authored and -inspired proposals have made their way into planning conversations across North America, critics have observed that New Urbanist principles
“reflect the appeal of the values that contributed to suburbia” as many of these neighbourhoods continue to develop in green spaces outside of previously populated areas, further contributing to the duplication of sprawl (Grant, 1999: 17). Others criticize New Urbanism as homage to shape rather than substance, or accuse the advocates of invoking Jane Jacobs as an inspiration despite producing green field developments that actually vary wildly from the urban planning elder’s advocacy for the respectful rejuvenation of established neighbourhoods (Montgomery qtd. in Churchman, 1999). Despite this, New Urbanism has laid claim even in Canada, where DPZ has been consulted in projects across the country from the Ontarian community of Markham (see Figure 2; DPZ, 1992) to the semi-isolated tony Victoria, British Columbia subdivision of James Island (DPZ, 2003), and more recently the Vancouver East Fraserlands River District located in southwest Vancouver on an former industrial site (DPZ, 2011).

2.2.2 Smart Growth

Another oft-cited package of best practices is ‘Smart Growth’, engaging some of the elements of New Urbanism, but with an emphasis on infilling existing settlements. Well established in North America, and popularized by the political buy-in of the State of Maryland’s Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act, Smart Growth congealed in Canada in the early twenty-first century from ideas developed in the United States (Appleyard, 2005). Borrowing from elements evident in both sustainable development and theories of urbanist pioneer Jane Jacobs, Smart Growth has engaged a large following of advocates originating not just from private real estate firms, but also non-governmental organizations, urban planners and other local public officials (Downs, 2005). Though, as some have found, not all of its practitioners appear devoted to even the most basic best practices.
Downs found that on the whole, there was wide variation in how Smart Growth practitioners appeared to interpret the tenets of Smart Growth, selectively doing so in ways that tended to best suit their needs. For instance, he found that some developers who claim to advocate Smart Growth principles in their projects tend to downplay the limiting outward expansion principles on greenfield sites, while touting the other characteristics as added-value features in developments (Downs, 2005). The biggest challenge facing Smart Growth however is in convincing affected residents of the merits of redeveloping existing neighbourhoods to reflect Smart Growth principles. In the absence of senior government intervention, Downs notes that residents tend to strike down core tenets of Smart Growth plans. A senior government, conversely, is more capable of applying more comprehensive plans as opposed to the “disjointed incrementalism” that usually results from various local governments applying varying elements of Smart Growth principles in the fear that residents might rebel and simply move elsewhere (Downs, 2005: 370).

2.2.3 Transit-Oriented Development

While borrowing many concepts from the preceding approaches, transit-oriented development concerns more specifically related to how neighbourhoods can better maximize and relate to transit investments. The canonical text, *Transit Villages in the 21st Century*, written by Cervero and Bernick (1997), advocates for “compact, mixed use community” development through a more intimate relationship with transit stations. Though similar to the previous approaches in terms of their emphasis on re-establishing the heart of communities, this method identifies transit stations as the essence of community:

The transit station is what connects village residents and workers to the rest of the region, providing convenient and ready access to downtown, major activity centres like a sports stadium, and other popular destinations. The surrounding public spaces or open grounds serve the important function of being a community gathering spot, a site for special events, and a place for celebrations – a modern-day version of the Greek agora, centred around the transit stations. (Cervero & Bernick, 1997: 5)

The concept echoes the latter 19th Century Transit City, painted with the same visions of past Garden City designers and their hopes of influencing social organization through the built environment. Though Dittmar, Belzer, and Autler note that TOD is an essential part of the toolkit for vibrant communities, they concede that in reality, it must exist in conjunction with
today’s auto-oriented society in order to be accepted as an integral part of modern cities, rising in importance over time (Dittmar et al, 2004). Even as a limited tool, they recognize that most attempted TOD projects in North America frequently tend to resemble transit-related development, or as others refer to it, TAD – transit-adjacent-development, development that fails to fully capitalize on transit proximity (Renne, 2009).

2.2.4 Metrotowns

A slightly more comprehensive method of controlling dispersion dates back much further than these relatively new concepts, though it grew not out of concern about sprawl but for interest in maximizing the cost-efficiency of building new communities. During the 1960s, economist and urban researcher, R.W. Archer, undertook a comparative study of methods underway in Australia, North America, and Northern Europe to investigate best practices for the most effective development of ‘Metrotowns’ and ‘Regional Cities’ in order to inform his own work in the development of Australia’s new capital of Canberra (Archer, 1969a). The new town concept was primarily borne out of work originating from Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City models as mentioned in Section 1.2, and the subsequent legislation passed in England by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government through the various New Town Acts following World War II. However, Archer’s models went further:

It is proposed that the new town concept can be modified into the ‘metrotown’ as a unit for planned metropolitan development and into the ‘regional city’ as a new growth point unit for the decentralization of part of the future population and employment growth away from the larger metropolitan centers. (Archer, 1969a: 257)

Archer argued that the most cost effective way to supply new urban settlements would be through a connected network of metrotowns, each containing “a wide range of land uses and provid[ing] a large measure of local employment and city-type services but […] still significantly interdependent with the rest of the metropolis” (Archer, 1969a: 258). These metrotowns could exist in hierarchical relationship to a central anchoring district, in what Archer termed a ‘regional city’. Though both concepts borrowed heavily from new towns already in existence, they relied on some models more than others.

Archer scorned privately planned and built American new towns for their lack of coordinated planning oversight and amenity contributions beyond the provision of
infrastructure servicing for empty lots. He noted that these new towns were largely profitable due to their primarily industrial landowners taking advantage of builders who would be “willing to pay a premium to be buffered from local political pressures” (Archer, 1969a: 269). However, Archer found that these cost-savings by the developers were ultimately absorbed by the federal government through “a mortgage insurance scheme to assist in raising funds and reducing interest charges on these outlays and on conditions designed to improve the quality of the new town,” as was described in Section 1.1 (Archer, 1969a: 269).

As an exception to the American model, Archer (1969a) credited the Baltimore Regional Planning Council as the first to come up with the ‘metrotown’ term in 1962, which envisioned a plan calling for a proposed network, with each node accommodating 100,000 to 200,000 people. Using the same strategies, the Washington D.C. Year 2000 Plan (see Figure 3), first floated in 1961 by the National Capital Regional Planning Council “propose[d] metropolitan growth in the form of radial corridor cities” (Archer, 1969a: 259).

Though the American plans required a mixture of state and private coordination, those in northern Europe relied heavily on sole-party financing and development. Stockholm’s A.B.C. Towns, an acronym derived from the Swedish words for work (arbete), housing (bostader), and central place (centrum), were seen as good models for metrotowns because of their effective use of transit, owing to their orderliness and highly centralised planning (Archer, 1969b). Today, the mature network of new town satellites connected to Stockholm via the Tunnelbana is lauded as an impressive example of comprehensive, large scale transit-oriented-development (Cervero, 1995). Finland’s Tapiola, on the outskirts of Helsinki, owed its aggressive growth to the strong capability of six large ‘social organizations’ united under a single non-profit housing association, demonstrating the importance of single-entity control, whether it be private or public (Archer, 1969a). Sole developers were seen as an asset, because they had an integrated planning and development perspective, best suited for the type of wide-ranging land use manipulation involved in creating effective metrotowns (Archer, 1969b). Australia also developed several such towns, the most popular being the satellite

Figure 3 | The Year 2000 Plan for Washington D.C. (Sixta, 1971: 41).
network for the new metropolitan region of Canberra, a particularly good example of the type of rational-comprehensive planning that Archer advocated because it had “not been inhibited by the usual problems of private land ownership and pockets of built-up area” (Archer, 1969a: 259). The metrotown concept was touted as “a real contribution to the problems of metropolitan sprawl and congestion,” (Archer, 1969a: 260) of which its main features and extolled advantages, according to Archer (1969a: 260) were:

a. **Unit for Planned Development**: Physically distinct and planned urban units with populations ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 persons.

b. **Local Employment**: Each containing a wide range of activities including offices, industry and tertiary services and facilities to provide a large number and wide range of local employment opportunities.

c. **Town Center**: Each containing a large city-type center and providing a range of retail, entertainment, medical and educational services for the local population.

d. **Open Space and Transport**: Physical separation from other metrotowns by a network of wide "green belts" to provide definition and landscape contrast for each metro-town, and to accommodate a network of metropolitan transportation corridors together with a number of institutional-type activities.

e. **Growth Capacity**: Further metropolitan growth through new metrotowns with the greenbelt network accommodating the necessary expansion of the transport corridors and special land uses.

But the models that informed the metrotown concept were also susceptible to criticism. By 1974 for instance, the Metropolitan Washington Council of Government in Washington D.C. decried the Year 2000 Plan as unobtainable, citing that the plan overly emphasized physical development and neglected “human and environmental problems” such as “criminal justice, public safety and recreational opportunity” (Grubisich, 1974). By the mid 1970s however, after years of inaction, regional planners had become concerned that the countryside where the compact network of satellite towns were proposed had instead become choked with the same urban sprawl that they were designed to prevent. Though they deemed that a response was required to deal with the dispersion, regional planners had become aware that any effort would only be successful with the genuine and concerted participation of member municipalities. The 1974 redesign therefore took a more conciliatory approach, asking
“local jurisdictions to cooperate where in the past they may have acted alone,” in the hope of fostering a greater compliance with regional plans (ibid). The new language reflected planners’ renewed understanding that “citizens want to be part of the action before the goals and objections are adopted, before any alternatives are declared ‘unfeasible’ and discarded, before plans are ‘cast in concrete’” (ibid).

The reimagining of the original Year 2000 Plan offers a good case study of the challenges of such sweeping plans. Though well intended, these types of comprehensive plans tend to run across local opposition, as the next package of plans also reveals. This is likely why Archer advocated for greenfield developments as opposed to retrofits, and why he similarly preferred a singular capable developer, whether it be a government or private entity. However, as the development of Canberra has revealed, several decades after its establishment, the Australian master-planned capital has also encountered unintended challenges to its development. Although Neutze (1987: 149) argues that “planning in Canberra has been more successful than in other Australian cities,” he admits that the type of centralized plans that created Canberra can sometimes have unforeseen consequences.

Although the sole ownership by the National Capital Authority (NCA) has made comprehensive planning decisions easier to carry out, the directive can sometimes get muddied. For instance, Neutze cites that aggressive development designed to stimulate lease-holder business creation in the region had caused the National Capital Development Commission (predecessor to the NCA) to behave “like a ground landlord rather than a planner, and not even like an enlightened ground landlord because it failed to take account of the parking, traffic, public transport and environmental consequences of the office boom” (Neutze, 1987: 159). The lack of consideration for these elements has continued to sprawl in Canberra, making its residents heavily dependent on automobile usage: hardly the type of future for which metrotowns were carefully envisioned.

2.2.5 Suburban Nodes

Suggesting a modern metrotown - TOD hybrid model, Fillion (2001) notes that transit nodes have the potential to “alter prevailing suburban morphology,” echoing sentiments by researchers Kenworthy and Laube that “an urban region can gradually reshape its transportation patterns by strategically developing in areas and centres that are more dense, more mixed in land use and more oriented to transit and non-motorized nodes” (Kenworthy
and Laube, 1999: 708). In Toronto, this ethic was carried out by Metro Toronto, a regional government in existence up to 1996, two years prior to the city’s amalgamation. The nodes, variously named ‘centres’, ‘mixed-use centres’, ‘regional centres’, and ‘regional town centres’, resulted from the 1981 Metro Toronto Official Plan, a program and product that bears a striking resemblance to those launched in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (Fillion, 2009, see Figure 4).

Made possible as a result of the type of Canadian environment that fostered “public sector interventions in the form of planning regulations and the siting of transportation infrastructures and public sector establishments,” the nodes were “portrayed as instruments of sustainable development,” in contrast to the type of market-driven, polycentric edge cities Garreau (1991) found within the United States, highlighted by his landmark text, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier (Fillion, 2001: 142; Fillion, 2009: 508).

Metro Toronto’s plan, however, did not result in success across the board. Typical of most other suburban nodes, their development varied among three types: redevelopment of existing communities, growth around shopping centres, and new development on greenfield sites (Fillion, 2001). Similarly, their form also tends to vary along a continuum. Some suburban nodes develop within a geographically small and dense area, some focus around transit points, while others grow shapelessly over larger areas (ibid). In order to differentiate these centres from their suburban surroundings, Fillion argues that they “must contain a diversity of activities, with a strong office employment and retail complement, and be developed at a density that is much higher than the suburban norm” in order to attract the kind of around the clock vibrancy that would entice a greater pedestrian focus (Fillion, 2001: 142).

In looking at the Toronto suburban centres, Fillion found a number of characteristic patterns that seemed to contribute to their lack of success. Firstly, through surveys, it was discovered that highway accessibility – not transit accessibility, was seen as an advantage for
businesses locating in town centres, a finding that was also observed by researchers in the Dallas case of Mockingbird station:

Hughes [Mockingbird station developer] was able to sell the development as freeway-adjacent to financial partners who had little appreciation for the value of its proximity to transit. Hughes said he had to “shroud the transit connection in secrecy.” “I talked about the project’s accessibility to the Central Expressway and to Mockingbird lane, and then at the end I’d say, ‘Oh, by the way, there’s also a rail station.’” (Ohland, 2004: 161)

Fillion also observed that in Toronto, “at the core of both centres [Scarborough and Mississauga], stands a regional mall surrounded by abundant parking” (Fillion, 2001: 148). This dilemma also tends to be a feature of Greater Vancouver Town Centres, and as we will discover, malls can oftentimes have an intense symbiotic relationship with these suburban centres, affecting their character far beyond the provision of parking stalls.

Furthermore in Toronto, where two of the investigated centres contained a large amount of office space, Fillion (2001) points out that their presence only resulted from the fact that they were previously administrative centres of pre-amalgamation cities – not owing to their designations from the regional plan. In spite of all this, the Ontario-based planning scholar laments that “notwithstanding undeniable signs of success,” the Toronto suburban centres that he investigated “do not fully live up to their [municipally-promised] expectations,” although he finds nonetheless, that they do contain much higher densities than North American suburban standards (Fillion, 2001: 142).

2.2.6 Comparing Approaches

Thus far, we have covered several relevant urban intensification models:
Table 1 | Various: Urban Intensification Models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Urbanism</th>
<th>Smart Growth</th>
<th>Transit-Oriented Developments</th>
<th>Metrotowns</th>
<th>Transit Nodes &amp; Suburban Centres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• based on principles of architecture, with a heavy emphasis on aesthetics</td>
<td>• oriented towards infilling existing neighbourhoods and increasing densities</td>
<td>• orienting the focus of communities towards the transit system</td>
<td>• Enhancing ‘New Towns’ theory towards creating connected networks of downtowns</td>
<td>• establishing multi-use district centres interconnected by a mass transit network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• greenfield and redevelopments</td>
<td>appropriate for walking, cycling</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Although these models have been presented separately and are advocated separately by various groups, in reality, they are quite non-discrete. Many elements of each category bleed over into other categories – we can see this with TODs borrowing concepts from Smart Growth, while many Smart Growth plans identify transit integration as a key item. These models vary to the degree that they present urban intensification methods, where for instance, TODs aim to concentrate development tightly around a transit station, whereas New Urbanist developments can exist in exurban areas where automobiles are necessary, or in the case of James Island – watercraft are also necessary. Additionally, they also vary in their degree of their performance. With TODs, we would expect that these developments could conceivably increase transit ridership dramatically above current levels. However, the lacklustre performance of most TODs suggests the absence of a larger, regionally-oriented emphasis on urban intensification that cannot be solely addressed through the construction of a rail line and transit station. Metrotowns presented such a comprehensive vision of development that could integrate transit usage. A network of new towns built with the intention of reducing dispersion, though an interesting concept, is one that faces considerable obstacles in the real world. This is due in large part because of the reliance on a single private controlling entity, a feature which can rarely be obtained in current market economies. Transit nodes and suburban centres however, have employed a variation of the metrotown model, though the reliance on multiple localities to produce comprehensive plans has proved too complex.

The commonality that all of these models share is the variation in their effectiveness. In part, with special consideration to New Urbanism, this is based on the opportunities
developers have to build, in say, green field areas versus retrofits. But, more commonly, the variation exists based on contextual issues such as political willingness. Many of these approaches to intensification require considerable and enduring support from municipalities, along with sufficient vision and expertise, in addition to a strong responsiveness to the ongoing needs of residents.

As we find later in this project, what I will do in Burnaby is describe a particular planning policy with foundations in several of these approaches, that has bucked the trend and found enduring political support through the better part of half a century. On the whole in most other jurisdictions however, few of these intensification models have experienced widespread success. Rationalizing this fact, libertarians note that growth patterns reflect demands in the marketplace, arguing that planners’ efforts to tinker with this organic growth tends to disrupt and exacerbate problems that might not have otherwise occurred in the first place (O’Toole, 2007). However, as Dittmar, Belzer, and Autler (2004: 1) have found, this type of premise ignores the “decades of government intervention in planning and [...] subsidization of highways and automobiles.” And in contrast, as Grant (2009) has found, some cities have relentlessly fought against efforts to tinker with the marketplace:

One [City of Surrey, B.C.] councillor suggested that council ignored planning staff advice, putting planners in a position where they could not say “no” to developers. By appointing an engineer as director of planning, council confirmed the priority of development over planning. (Grant, 2009: 18)

The same foundational obstacles that Smart Growth advocates found have also stymied suburban town centres, as Filion (2003) has found. The first issue as we’ve seen in Section 1 concerns the symbiotic relationship between an entrenched suburban form and dominant automobile culture that has created an incredible momentum towards self-replication and self-fulfilment of the same type of development. The next part however, relates to the concept of political will. Both Filion (2001, 2003, 2009) and Downs (2005) have found that plans to reverse or even limit dispersion are frequently hindered by the absence of political will. But how do we measure political will? Rooted in political science studies, political will is not an easily definable term, based on its highly subjective implication (see Post et al, 2010). Instead, two other concepts will be identified here. The first is what I have broadly titled, the planning process, a concept originating from Lash (1976), which sets out the effectiveness of plans based on the relationships between citizens, planners, and politicians.
This is an especially intriguing literature given the historical preoccupation amongst urban planners to exclude citizens from community planning strategies. The second set of theories delves deeper into the political sciences, to find why some municipal political organizations last longer than others. This is an important factor as it has inherently important bearing on the stability of plans. While political will may be enigmatic, we can still start to build an understanding of why certain plans tend to be more stable over time than others.

### 2.3 The Planning Process

As we discovered in the previous section, there appears to be no shortage of well-intentioned plans. Certainly any of the types of intensification could be undertaken in any region and present a lasting alternative to predominant low density norms. So why don’t these plans exist on a larger scale? Why have TOD and suburban town centre plans not been more widely implemented, even within jurisdictions where they’ve received wide adoption and integration into municipal and regional plans? These questions are probably as old as the planning profession itself. However, as planning history has shown us, and as alluded through the period of Metrotown planning, regardless of the power of planners, many plans have faced challenge and failure.

Occurring at the same time as Ebenezer Howard’s ultimately misguided Garden City movement and thereafter, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) was driven by the same hybrid of social vision and the desire to build more habitable cities. RPAA spokesperson Patrick Geddes argued for a planning perspective based on bioregionalism, where citizens, aided by technology and the automobile, lived in harmony with farming and nature. However, by the mid-1940s, Geddes’ understudy, Lewis Mumford came to observe that instead of a harmonious coexistence, the automobile and its related infrastructure came to define the region instead. Although successive rational-comprehensive phases in planning were borne out of different circumstances and led by different visionaries, they each shared similar outcomes. Whether it
was Burnham’s City Beautiful in the early 1900s or Le Corbusier’s mechanistic *La Ville Radieuse* (The Radiant City), it had become apparent that the planning process was somehow unresponsive to needs. Neighbourhoods just didn’t seem to function as envisioned, raising the question – did planners somehow produce imprecise modelling scenarios, or was there something else missing?

In 1976, during about the same time that he was steering the Regional Town Centers program, Director of Planning for the Greater Vancouver Regional District, Harry Lash, produced a text, *Planning in a Human Way*, part of a series published by the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. The text reflected Lash’s own teething pains during his tenure at the helm of planning in the region. It was essentially a conversation on how to include humans in the regional planning process, through the transformation of planning as a top-down, scientific exercise to consultative and organic activity. There are many texts that attempt to do this, though Lash’s provides a local and particularly relevant context. In arguing that planning is less about plans and more about finding common ground, Lash advocated for the production of planning programs that resulted in an inclusive dialogue between planners, politicians, and the public. The public was integral, because they were the ones for whom the plans were made; the politicians because that’s who had to approve the plans, and the planners because that’s who facilitated the process, providing the impetus and ongoing maintenance of planning programs. To conceptualize this relationship, Lash presented a triangle (see Figure 6) to describe the ideal interaction that must occur between all parties, emphasizing a two way dialogue that constantly reflected the input and consultation between each point (Lash, 1976). Speaking in opposition to the type of technocratic, rational-comprehensive plans that dominated past exercises in the region and elsewhere, Lash argued that

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3 The Canadian federal government has always had a very hands-off relationship with municipalities, owing largely to the spirit of the Constitution, which considers municipalities as the sole domain of provincial oversight. This short-lived Ministry of State (1971 – 1976) was a rarity in the Canadian urban landscape.
There is no such thing as planning the right answer, as universally applicable good planning principles, technically speaking [author’s original italics]. There is no canon of good planning. And this is why the planner needs the politician and the public, why the dialogue must continually animate the planning process. (Lash, 1976: 78)

Lash admits to crystallizing this conclusion after observing early computer modelling techniques that showed a wide degree of unpredictability in regional growth plans. He credited this system with allowing him to observe, first-hand and above his years of prior experience that human beings were an integral part of the planning process - and no amount of knowledge and technical expertise could supplant the conversations that needed to take place during the composition of any set of policies. Departing from the traditional ‘survey-analysis-plan’ mentality that was popular in earlier years amongst planners and politicians, Lash argued that

[...] planning should be thought of like the familiar household thermostat which regulates the heating and cooling system to maintain desired ongoing conditions. Planning should be producing action programs and modifications to existing ones, not aiming at a product. (Lash, 1976: 63)

Planning though, was supported by the other axis of the triangle.

A politician has the most difficult job. If he does it well, his job will always be difficult, because he has to do two incompatible things: provide leadership and resolve conflicts. (Lash, 1976: 73).

Lash summed up this new vision of action programs as one in which “the plan is the process,” succinctly describing the way interaction occurs among the needs of the public, the requests of the politicians, and the imperative to serve both (Lash, 1976: 46). But as Lash notes of practitioners in other professions, planners are bound by a shared code of conduct to safeguard the interests of the public through engagement in an effort to unearth “the people who have not been heard, issues that have not been faced” (Lash, 1976: 84). Supporting these concepts, on reflection about the mid-twentieth century’s failed urban renewal strategies across the United States, Fainstein (2005) notes that planners need to be more cognizant of the people of the city and react to plans that negatively affect citizens. Dalton (1989) supports this notion, arguing that planning should not be a technical practice, but a ‘practical activity’, involving ‘consciousness and judgement’ as part of a whole compendium of non-technical skills.
Advancing these notions using knowledge gained from studies of human learning, Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that there is a continuum of the capabilities that urban planners possess. Beginning with rule-based skills, bureaucrats tend to move towards a more sophisticated understanding of their professions as they learn and redevelop their own best practices through experience, towards what Flyvbjerg (2001) calls ‘virtuoso social actors’. A virtuoso social actor is “an individual who, through a combination of innate social skills and a significant amount of experience relevant to the context in which s/he acts, is able to be highly effective in pursuing his or her aims” (Tate, 2009). For example, Tate (2009) qualifies Burnaby politicians and planning staff as virtuoso social actors, through:

 [...] both their technical skills as well as their innate knowledge of the value of being (and the specific contacts needed to be) well-connected to other levels of government. That is, both staff and politicians keenly understood the value and uses of their connections to facilitate the best possible technical and non-technical outcomes for their municipality under the circumstances of the day. Of course, staff concurrently understood how to create and adjust key technical instruments, such as plans, zoning and legal agreements, to suit their agenda. In doing so, they often pushed the bounds of what was permissible at the time under senior government legislation. (Tate, 2009: 224)

Providing a congruent perspective using two case studies from neighbouring Vancouver, Smith and Stewart (2006) argue that despite senior government policy, local government actors can make a difference, with the variable being how much of a difference they wish to make, if any at all. Citing controversial policy implementation in homelessness and drug addictions, they conclude that “local politicians are often as powerful as they wish to be” (Smith & Stewart, 2006: 268).

Within this context, as we find through the case study, there historically has been a strong partnership between planners and politicians during critical stages of policy implementation in Burnaby. However, as the case study equally shows, when this partnership deteriorates, it can have catastrophic effects on the planning process, affecting both the degree of public engagement and the eventual quality of plans and their ability to respond to neighbourhood needs. As the example above of the pro-development council in Surrey and the story of Washington D.C.’s first Year 2000 plan show, oftentimes politicians can be very suspicious of planning staff. Sometimes this uneasy environment exists because specific plans are objectionable, but it can also be the result of internal administrative nuances.
Citing research by F. Rabinovitz (1967), Faludi (1973) notes that there are four ‘major brands’ of planning environments, each residing along a spectrum. The first is the **Cohesive System**, composed of few policy deciders exerting homogenous visions of planning. In this system, the planner is best suited to the role of a technician. Their ability to exercise their knowledge and expertise becomes stifled by the strong, focused vision of their elected superiors - a unilateral vision that risks being unresponsive to the actual needs of the community. The second type of planning environment is the **Executive-Centred System**, dominated by an influential mayor as an elected chief executive, who nonetheless needs to compromise with other leaders, but after fair consensus, exerts their authority in the community. However, this system poses the most professional dilemma for planners, in that “by being co-opted by an elected chief executive, [the planner] becomes identified with [the chief executive]. [The planner] thus los[es] some of the air of objectivity which would [otherwise] surround [one] in a cohesive system” (Faludi, 1973: 199). However, this system could also provide the most ideal incubator for virtuoso social actors to embark on policy formation. The third and fourth type are respectively the **Competitive System** and the **Fragmented System**, with the planner taking an increasingly active role not just in policy analysis, but also in the decision-making process.

Faludi, who wrote the 1973 foundational text, *Planning Theory*, identifies that planners have no easy task, regardless of which system they practice within. They must negotiate their own roles at the behest of politicians, who “are, on the whole, not a representative cross-section of the community” (Faludi, 1973: 227). To complicate matters further, politicians are also typically more self-interested and focused on shorter-term plans which lead to results in the next election (Faludi, 1973). Invariably, their responsibilities as “the selectors, who commit planning agencies to certain courses of action” can sometimes put elected officials and planners at odds (Faludi, 1973: 225). The stop valve for this potential conflict however, lies in that politicians are dependent on planners for advice – they’re the full time bureaucrats who have an ear to the ground, and are aware of what changes are possible (Faludi, 1973). In British Columbia, this observation was highlighted in 2010, when the provincial government, under a Local Government Elections Taskforce, suggested the possibility of extending municipal office terms from three to four years, in order to help “new councillors to learn and conduct the duties of their office” (Province of BC & UBCM, 2010). This of course raises the question of whether it is possible to extend terms of office far beyond a period in which
elected leaders could feel comfortable to institute longer and more ambitious plans. The following section outlines the possible scenarios in which such a policy formation environment could exist over a longer term. This is particularly crucial for urban intensification, because these specific types of plans must often exist in the face of insurmountable odds. For this study, we must therefore delve deeper into the less charted territory of urban politics.

2.4 Urban Political Theory

It appears that within Canadian urban studies literature, political analysis is a “marginal enterprise” (Eidelman and Taylor, 2010: 316) notwithstanding the contributions of Magnusson (1983, 1986) and Mary Louise McAllister (2004). It is frequently the case that political urban studies discussions have failed to go beyond one-off projects, rather than be carried through “long-term debates among communities of scholars” (Eidelman and Taylor, 2010: 305). The result is that the literature frequently fails to scratch the surface of significant political issues in Canadian cities, or embark on longitudinal analyses.

Notwithstanding a deficit in Canadian literature, one of the first notable conversations of political action in the city was covered by Harvey Molotch’s Growth Machine Thesis. Based in the United States, Molotch’s 1993 article, titled “The Political Economy of Growth Machines,” argued that:

[...] nested interest groups with common stakes in development use the institutional fabric, including the political and cultural apparatus, to intensify land use and make money. Coalitions with interests in growth of a particular place (large property holders, some financial institutions, the local newspaper) turn government into a vehicle to pursue their material goals. (Molotch, 1993: 31)

Molotch posited that the city, whether suburban or urban, was soaked in politics.

Though the Growth Machine Thesis is valuable as a springboard from which to investigate urban issues, Harding (1995) argues that the theory is simply too restricted to the contextual realities that exist in its home nation. In the United States, for instance, municipalities are forced to compete with each other over direct federal investments: an occurrence that has historically not been the case in Canada. Partially owing to this historic competitive streak, American cities are deeply fragmented, holding a great deal of control over issues facing their localities, including taxation and land-use decisions. A moderately different
scenario exists in Canada, where provinces instead hold control over municipalities, with the power to create or dissolve them as necessary. While property tax is typically levied and collected by municipalities, their ability to charge additional taxes is tightly controlled by provincial statutes and regulations, producing a much more muted development environment than their southern neighbours have (Harding, 1995). However, this distinction now appears to be fading, as Reese and Rosenfeld (2002) have found. In part because of a continued federal preoccupation with free trade agreements, provinces are incentivizing municipalities to become competitive on a global scale, and this is having particular implications on the ground.

As Harvey (1989) observes, while cities were formerly responsible for managing internal systems such as land use regulations and provision of services and facilities, since about the 1970s when nations began opening up their borders, municipalities have suffered with the withdrawal of centralized federal policies and related financial supports. Compounding matters, the decline of the industrial economy, or rather its shift from western nations to southern and eastern ones, has cities reeling from the shrinking of manufacturing heartlands—traditional sources of secure, well paid employment. In a bid to replace these revenue streams, cities have increasingly begun differentiating themselves from each other to stand out above the rest as attractive places for outside investors.

One way for some cities to enhance their competitive advantage is by forming power partnerships in a bid to enhance abilities to push agendas that otherwise would have been difficult to achieve. Within political science, pluralism is used to explain the distribution of power amongst various stakeholders (Judge, 1995). Pluralism argues that policy making as a whole is fragmented, unstable, and reactive because of the collection of special interests that have staked out a distinct position (ibid). However, if two otherwise disparate interests come together for mutual gain, in reference to urban competitiveness, this power can be used to advance both political agendas and private interests. It requires a great deal of incentive, however, to bring these groups together, and advance a singular cause, such as the continued success of a particular policy, and with that, the city’s enhanced competitiveness.

One way to understand how these interests may come together in an urban setting is by employing a regime theory analysis, as Stone (1989) first advanced through a case study of Atlanta, and developed by further research. Urban regime theory suggests the existence of “an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enables it to
have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone, 1989: 4) It is theorized that private sector members bring together support, while municipal members provide their relatively autonomous ability to approve policies that benefit other partners in this non-hierarchical but otherwise fragmented partnership (Stoker, 1995). Urban regime theory describes “how in the midst of diversity and complexity a capacity to govern can emerge within a political system,” having the potential to offer added value for all parties involved, depending on their shared objectives (Stoker, 1995: 57). Out of the establishment of this partnership, there forms a “relationship of cooperation that becomes something of value to be protected by all of the participants” (Stone, 1993: 9). In this partnership, power is deemed to be successfully exercised if things get done, whether the public is aware of it or not. As we find below with a Canadian example, this can also pose a challenge to those trying to investigate the existence of an urban regime.

Stone (1993) classifies three distinct types of regimes. A Maintenance Regime is a partnership which seeks to maintain the status quo, which can be beneficial to those wishing to preserve the state of things. This is especially ideal for partnerships trying to prevent taxation increases. A Development Regime is concerned with productivity at any cost, though this type of regime typically requires more resources than others. A Middle-Class Progressive Regime is typically preoccupied with populist concerns such as environmental protection and control, or the advancement of social causes over the need for growth. The last type is a Lower-Class Opportunity Expansion Regime, which is perhaps most rooted in Stone’s (1989) Atlanta case study, where large Afro-American voting blocs benefited from social development partnerships among business. As the case study in Chapter 5 reveals, the third type of regime, Middle-Class Progressive, is the best suited regime to describe how Town Centre policy has withstood the test of time in Burnaby.

Before proceeding, it is important to clarify why, despite being both borne out of an American context, Urban Regime Theory (URT) serves as a more useful tool of analysis in this Canadian context than the Growth Machine Thesis. Pierre (2005) for instance, argues that URT does not ‘travel’ particularly well to describe the various urban circumstances in Continental Europe, Scandinavia, or Asian regions in which other researchers have attempted to use the theory to describe urban power arrangements. To counter any notion that the Canadian context is also different from the American one in which URT was born, it has already been
stated above, that despite subtle differences, the two systems have actually been converging over time. Furthermore, to offer a different perspective in defence of the portability of URT, Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue that critics of the theory may have encountered usability challenges, not because of gaps in the theory or lack of portability, but because of considerable ‘concept-stretching’. In addition to myriad other criticisms, they found that some researchers had erroneously attempted to ascribe regime status to the continuity of a particular policy program. Mossberger and Stoker argue that policy support is not a sufficient qualification for the existence of a regime. Though regimes are capable of deteriorating over time, while in existence, they must be shown to remain relatively stable over their duration.

In assessing the Canadian applicability of Urban Regime Theory, in the Canadian Journal of Urban Research, a debate was published between University of Winnipeg-based political scientist, Christopher Leo and University of Western Ontario colleague, Timothy Cobban. The debate began when Cobban (2003a), using an URT analysis in London, Ontario to explore the redevelopment of that city’s downtown, argued that substantive differences existed between the Canadian and American contexts. Cobban argued that these differences were enough to preclude the existence of urban regimes in Canada. Echoing URT critiques above, Cobban noted that “Canadian municipal governments are no less dependent on the activities of private actors to fulfil their political agendas, especially when development is the overriding political objective, which it almost always is” (Cobban, 2003a: 245-246). Igniting his critique with an impassioned call for the desperately needed advancement of an urban political discussion in Canada, Leo (2003) argued that the “evidence Cobban adduces does not establish the absence of a regime in London” (Leo, 2003: 345). In particular, Leo accused Cobban of prematurely dismissing the possibility of an urban regime by not digging deep enough. In response, despite indicating support for Leo’s plea for more urban political study in Canada, Cobban (2003b) snapped back in defence of his URT analysis of London. Cobban systematically attacked Leo’s critique of his London case study, arguing that the methodology that Leo proposed would have deviated from Stone’s (1993) recommended analysis. In concluding, Cobban admitted that “urban regime theory holds much promise for understanding local government decision-making in Canada,” however he stopped short of either completely denouncing or supporting its applicability to Canadian contexts (Cobban, 2003b: 349).
The debate between Cobban and Leo is useful in two key ways. Firstly, it adds further credence to the need for more urban political analysis in Canada. And, secondly, it helps to clarify an URT methodology that can be used by future researchers. But mostly applicable to the case study in Chapter 5, the debates show that urban regime theory has promise as a worthwhile study tool in the Canadian context.

2.5 Burnaby Town Centres

Despite being one of the largest cities in the Greater Vancouver region, the City of Burnaby has had scant coverage in urban planning and development literatures. This could be attributed to the fact that it neighbours the City of Vancouver, the largest city in the region. As a result, much academic and mainstream research is focused either on the City proper, or with Vancouver as the central theme of discussions that treat the surrounding municipalities as tangential subjects. In one example, a widely distributed publication in 1997, *The Greater Vancouver Book*, showcased thirteen of the region’s municipalities on twenty nine pages, with the notable exception of the municipality of Vancouver – which was thematically covered throughout the remainder of the 882 page volume with occasional non-specific references to other municipalities (Davis, 1997).

Most of the available dedicated literature on Burnaby focuses on the historical pioneering experience. Of this material, a great majority is produced or chiefly sponsored by the City of Burnaby. An extensive review was able to uncover that the only non-municipal and non-graduate student publication to be produced with a focus on Burnaby was a 1995 quasi-academic compilation published by the Community Economic Development Centre and Centre for Canadian Studies at Simon Fraser University (SFU) in honour of the Municipality’s centennial celebrations. Aptly titled *The Suburb of Happy Homes* and edited by SFU Geography Professor Leonard Evenden, the 192 page book contains a wide variety of topics, mostly oriented toward Burnaby’s modern development. The two most relevant chapters are ones produced by Jim Wolf and Kenji Ito, respectively City Heritage Planner, and Assistant Planner employed by the City of Burnaby at the time of publication. Wolf’s Chapter 5 contribution discussed the innovation of Burnaby’s 1924 zoning bylaw, becoming one of the first municipalities in the province to produce Town Planning bylaws, helping to “consolidate the pattern of previously scattered urban development and direct future growth” (Wolf, 1995: 81).
The publication by Ito discussed the establishment of the Metrotown Town Centre, which will be most utilized later within the Case Study in Chapter 5.

In addition to these more popular reviews, there are three relevant graduate projects that have a direct focus on the policy implementation of Burnaby’s Town Centres, all produced within or affiliated with the School of Community and Regional Planning at UBC.

- In 1976, Larry Beasley produced a Master’s thesis titled *A Design Probe Comparison of Regional and Municipal Attitudes Toward Regional Town Centres: A Case Study in Burnaby, B.C.*, which sought to find a resolution to a perceived conflict of opinions over the intended characteristics and strategy between the GVRD’s vision of the ‘Regional Town Centre’ and Burnaby’s vision of the ‘Metrotown’.

- In 1992, Ralph Perkins produced a Master’s thesis titled *Greater Vancouver Regional Town Centres Policy in Comparative Perspective*, which drew in case study comparisons from Melbourne, Australia and Bellevue, Washington against the various Town Centres in the Greater Vancouver Regional District.

- In 2009, Laura Tate produced a Doctoral (Planning) Dissertation titled *Communicative Regionalism and Metropolitan Growth Management Outcomes: A Case Study of three Employment Nodes in Burnaby – An Inner Suburb of Greater Vancouver*, providing a detailed analysis of the intersection between growth management plans in the form of Town Centres, and the incongruent distribution of office space between Metrotown and two other office park areas: Discovery Park and Big Bend.

Despite these three academic papers, there exists an incomplete record of the history of Burnaby’s Town Centres, ostensibly as a result of each respective researcher’s objectives. Beasley (1976), was primarily interested in resolving discrepancies between regional and municipal planning policy, his thesis fails to trace a clear history of the Town Centre Policy. This is by no means a failing through, as for instance Beasley’s Metrotown focus will provide valuable insight in the Case Study in Chapter 5.

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A fourth paper, *From Downtown to Town Centres – Selling the Urban Ideal in Burnaby*, produced in 2008, but had a more direct emphasis on the marketing aspect of residential developments in proximity to transit stations (Newell, 2008).
Perkins’ (1992) paper, conversely, was focused on Town Centres as a regional planning initiative, which we revisit in detail in Chapter 4. Because of this broad regional focus though, Perkins pays only passing attention to the development of a Burnaby-centric policy of Town Centres. When Perkins discusses Burnaby though, it is evident that his historical analysis was only skimming. In dealing with the development of Metrotown, Perkins tells that “By the mid-1980s, however, coincident with the arrival of SkyTrain (light rail system), the shopping centre developers had succeeded in gaining municipal acceptance for three large, unconnected regional shopping complexes” (Perkins, 1992: 49). Perhaps forgiven by the larger scope that his thesis took, Perkins fails to mention a landmark B.C. Supreme Court case that was intrinsically tied to the development of the Metrotown shopping centres, a case that also revolved around a fascinating political story that is also nowhere to be found. The absence of these details simplifies the analysis, and risks producing incomplete conclusions.

As was mentioned in the introduction, Tate’s 2009 dissertation provides the most thorough discussion of Burnaby’s Town Centres policy, serving as a strong foundation for this project and others that follow. However, Tate’s dissertation also falls short of delivering a comprehensive policy analysis. Tate develops this history of Burnaby’s Town Centre policy through a growth management perspective, though she delves into this history through a chiefly bureaucratic lens, failing to outline a truly deep and meaningful history of the City that would otherwise include a political history, or more importantly, an electoral history. At best this absence results in planning policy decisions that are incompletely analyzed. At worst, this kind of study can lead to future policy creation based on false presumptions. Conversely, this project aims to take a full-picture approach to surveying the history of Burnaby.

Aside from several other academic contributions that we find later in this project, the most relevant source material for Burnaby’s Town Centres exists in policy documents originating from either the City of Burnaby or the Regional District, supplemented by secondary sources from news media. Therefore, the analysis that follows is likely the most comprehensive material covering the development of the Burnaby Town Centres policy, a history that spans nearly a half century.

Notwithstanding pre-existing ruminations in the region that we will find in Chapter 4, the impetus for the Town Centre program in Burnaby began in earnest in 1964, with the publication of a document produced by the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board,
predecessor to the Greater Vancouver Regional District. *Towards an Apartment Location Policy*

was addressed specifically to Burnaby and provided a series of recommended policy guidelines designed to focus apartment density, type, and location. The document recognized that new development in the municipality was shifting towards a fifty percent share of apartment growth, “probably indicative of the potentially urban role that Burnaby could play, shifting from a predominantly single-family area to an integrated apartment area” (LMRPB, 1964: 10). However, this was also a time when apartment construction in the city was viewed as substandard. Lambasting Burnaby as a ‘shack town’, one contemporary Councillor proclaimed, “We are not encouraging good apartment buildings because our building bylaws are no good” (“Burnaby future”, 1964).

By 1966, following the hiring of Director of Planning Anthony Parr and after reconsideration, the Burnaby Council approved the publication *Apartment Study* (Parr, 1966). Therein, Parr built on the guidelines in the LMRPB’s 1964 report, presenting a deeply hierarchical vision of Burnaby. The LMRPB report advanced the notion of three basic levels related to commercial activity. The smallest of these, ‘neighbourhood level,’ recognized a very locally specific area within a small neighbourhood catering to people’s “daily needs.” The ‘community level’ suggested an area catering to people’s “weekly needs,” containing “two or three supermarkets” and serving an area of a “1-2 mile radius.” The city-level would represent:

the most major focus of population and activity, providing a wide range of specialty shops, one or two departments stores, and the full range of civic, recreational, cultural, and office facilities normally associated with such population of the 100,000 – 200,000 order, depending on its attractive power and the income level of its population. (LMRPB, 1964: 7)

Parr’s (1966) *Apartment Study*, on the other hand presented the same three tiers, but with a greater specificity, summarized as follows:

- **Neighbourhood**: centred around an elementary school, has a park playground, church, and local stores
- **Community**: composed of 3 – 4 neighbourhoods, has a junior high school, play areas, and a small supermarket
- **District**: composed of 2 – 3 communities, has a senior high school, district park, play field facilities and more extensive retail outlets
However, the most distinct inclusion was the Town Centre, elucidated through the ‘core concept’, based upon existing commercial cores existing at Simpson-Sears (present day Metrotown), Brentwood Mall, and the proposed Lougheed Mall development.

The high density “town centres” would be linked by major roads to each other, and to the administration and recreational complex proposed for the Central Area […]. Each of these centres, a major focus of population and community activity, would desirably include a complete cross section of commercial facilities as well as a full range of cultural and recreational activity expected by an urban population. In addition, an extensive range of residential accommodation would be provided with easy access to well developed industrial areas and places of employment. […] The “district centres” would supplement the major “town centres” and would provide convenience [local] shopping and a range of community facilities to meet the needs of the surrounding residential districts as well as a fairly wide variety of residential accommodation in close proximity to the centre. (Parr, 1966: 2-3)

**Figure 7 | Lougheed Town Centre, “Area ‘H’” (Parr, 1966).**

As with the Lougheed Town Centre area (see Figure 7, Area ‘H’), these Town Centres were given very specific geographic boundaries. With slight variations, these still exist with much the same boundaries as today. The letter on the lower right side of the figure refers to a study area, which was assigned to various areas throughout the city that had either contained apartments, or showed strong potential to contain apartments, labelled from A to P. This label standard was carried to a document described later, titled Community Plans, which immediately preceded the first Official Community Plan in 1987, forming the basis and crystallization of the contemporary Town Centres.
In some ways though, it is not surprising that these plans appeared so rational-comprehensive in the way that previous Garden City or City Beautiful plans did. The Director of Planning during this time, Anthony Parr, began his career first as an architectural assistant in the development of England’s New Towns, then moved on to the military, where he was appointed to the Royal Engineers to assist in planning “new barracks, hospitals, and other army installations throughout the metro [London] area” (“Tony Parr”, 1965). In 1957, Parr left England to work briefly as the first Planning Officer for the District of Saanich, leaving shortly thereafter to instead pursue opportunity at the City of Burnaby. As we will find in Chapter 5, a tumult in the municipality essentially left Parr with a blank planning slate and supportive council, leaving him with unparalleled authority. Up to that point, “Burnaby’s first high-rise apartment [was] yet to rise, for Council [hadn’t] set a final policy on locations,” but Parr’s first declared objective was to set a comprehensive plan (ibid). Despite the extent of his reach over policy though, there is evidence that Parr was at least aware of the importance of public input:

> Without public understanding of development plans, it’s pretty hard to make plans that will satisfy the people involved. [...] Rather than using set standards, municipalities should be analyzed to see what people want. [...] Then Council will have to adopt overall principles to guide the department. (Parr, quoted in "Tony Parr", 1965)

With the vision of a Geddesian planner, Parr sought to survey the city and set out planning objectives through the 1966 Apartment Study. Most notably, upon observing existing development trends, Parr found that the soil morphology of various parts of the city lended itself to more development over time in areas where soils were more stable versus areas dominated by peat soils and steep slopes. Other factors of course also contributed to development, including location of railway and highway infrastructure. Taking these characteristics in whole, Parr justified offering an interpretation of where development should be permitted to locate in the future using a core concept established upon a hierarchical system with Town Centres as the most sophisticated form of development. Using this methodology, the report concluded that future development should be focused in core areas:

> This concept based upon the gathering together in a compact fashion of related community facilities envisages the development of at least three high density “town centres” related to the three major residential development areas of the Municipality. (Parr, 1966: 2)
In the northwest, this included the area around the Brentwood Mall, which was already constructed by that time. The second Town Centre would become the Government Road and “Lyndhurst-Burquitlam” Districts in the northeast area, which were in the process of subdivision approvals. And finally, in the southwest, where the “commercial nodal points” existed near Simpsons-Sears and bounded by Big Bend to the south, where highly unstable soils existed, and the provincial Oakalla Prison to the north.

*Apartment Study* determined that the Town Centres would contain “major parks and recreational centres and commercial facilities at the large hotel, office building, and department store level” (Parr, 1966: 2). But, Parr was aware of the potential for these separate core areas to form separate identities from the City whole. It was therefore proposed that the Town Centres be linked to each other through major roads unifying the City at the “administration and recreational complex proposed for the Central area,” which likely refers to the eventual settlement of the present Burnaby City Hall and municipal detachment for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)⁵, located at Deer Lake Parkway and Canada Way together with the large cultural precinct behind City Hall anchored by the Shadbolt Centre for the Arts (see Figure 8). Also adjacent to this area is the massive indoor/outdoor recreation and park complex located across the Trans-Canada Highway from City Hall straddling both sides of Kensington Avenue: as a single entity, they are located roughly equidistant between the four existing Town Centres.

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⁵ Until 2002, prior to the expansion of the RCMP detachment, a provincial courthouse was also located in this area.
Within this arrangement, each of the centres “would desirably include a complete
cross section of commercial facilities as well as a full range of cultural and recreational activity
expected by an urban population. In addition, an extensive range of residential
accommodation would be provided with easy access to well-developed industrial areas and
places of employment” (Parr, 1966: 3) Within the City as a whole, the report recommended

<table>
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<th>Basic FAR</th>
<th>FAR with Bonuses</th>
<th>Assumed Avg. Gross Unit Size (square feet)</th>
<th># of Units Per Net Acre: From - To</th>
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<td>RM 5</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

five zoning types pertaining to apartment designations:

- RM5 – High Density: high rise apartment, bachelor and 1-bedroom
- RM 4, RM3, RM2 – Medium Density: single people, couples, very young families
- RM1 – Low Density or Garden Apartment: family living related to park, school, and
  local shopping facilities

After surveying density designations in other municipalities across the Greater
Vancouver area, Parr settled on a set value for the densities in Burnaby (see Table 2).

Furthermore, the locations of each of these types were also further detailed. High rise
apartments were intended to be located closer to the town centre core, providing a “necessary
population to support a concentration of higher density commercial development and make
feasible the location of other facilities that will be frequented by large numbers of people”
(Parr, 1966: 3).

Table 2 | Burnaby Zoning Categories (Parr, 1966: Appendix).
Medium density conversely, would be located near ‘district’ or ‘community’ centres, while garden apartments with the lowest densities would be located at the ‘neighbourhood’ tier. As Figure 7, 9, and 10 show, the Town Centre areas were presented with a very fine level of zoning detail.

Figure 9 | Brentwood Town Centre (Parr, 1966).

Unfortunately, no aerial photography from this period is readily accessible. However, inspection of aerial photography between 1956 and 1976 shows that there is a considerable mix in the urban form prior to the Town Centre designations. In Kingsway-Sussex for instance,
the majority of that area was occupied by single family housing, with the exception of three very large parcels: one was occupied by the Simpson Sears catalogue warehouse which, at the time of its opening in 1954, was only one of two in the province at the time; a Ford automobile plant that was built in 1938 to serve western Canada; and a Kelly Douglas manufacturing plant and warehouse, which was a predecessor company to Loblaws Incorporated, owners of the ‘Real Canadian Superstore’, a large box general merchandise primary grocer that occupies approximately the same parcel today. Air photo interpretation from 1956 aerial photos and written descriptions from the 1966 Apartment Plan shows the Lougheed Town Centre as occupied primarily by scattered single family housing in conjunction with very wide swaths of greenfield area (see Figure 11). Conversely, the Brentwood area was covered in greenfield and scattered industrial properties with few residential subdivisions present before its designation (see Figure 13). However, both Town Centres developed very early on with malls as their central feature. Brentwood Mall opened its doors in 1960 at the northeast corner of Willingdon Avenue and Lougheed Highway, where it still stands today following numerous renovations. Lougheed Mall opened its doors by about 1969 after various delays, at the corner of Austin Avenue and North Road, bordering the Burnaby-Coquitlam border. In both cases, those malls were presented as key anchors to what was expected to be a wider variety of retail and office uses. The only Town Centre not to have developed with a mall at its centre was the Edmonds Town Centre, which at the time of the 1966 Apartment Study was not
planned as a Town Centre, but instead a lower tier District Centre. As discussed earlier in Section 2.1, the placement of large retail establishments as the centre of suburbanized areas was very common practice during this time, and typically, many residents welcomed mall construction. With the establishment of Brentwood Mall in 1959 for instance, a majority of neighbours directly abutting the mall on the north side happily supported the rezoning, only requesting that the intersecting Willingdon Avenue be widened and that a planted tree-lined buffer be created between the mall and existing residents ("Shopping centre gets", 1959). The mall opened without any significant delays within two years of its rezoning application ("Shopping centre to be", 1960). As we find below however, the case was different for Lougheed Mall following the passage of the Apartment Studies, and in the mid-1980s, the construction of Metrotown brought a whole other set of challenges.

In addition to the establishment of shopping centres at the cores of Lougheed and

Figure 12 | "Kingsway and Central Park 196-" Kingsway-Sussex Town Centre aerial from above Central Park, looking east (City of Burnaby Archives, item no. 083-001).

Figure 13 | 1956 Brentwood Town Centre (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series).

Brentwood Town Centres, they were also notably located along major arterials. The Lougheed provincial Highway (Highway 7), a main thoroughfare through Burnaby prior to the 1960s construction of the Trans-Canada Highway (Highway 1), cuts through both Lougheed Town
Centre and Brentwood Town Centre, while Kingsway, another official provincial highway (Highway 99), cuts through the Metrotown Town Centre (then known as Kingsway-Sussex) and Edmonds Town Centre⁶.

In 1969, Burnaby Municipal Council requested a review of the 1966 Apartment Study based on a number of expressed concerns, including the “absence of high rise development, parking problems in apartment areas and, [...] the quality of apartment development, particularly under the RM3 Zoning category” (Parr, 1969: 1). The report was also motivated by burgeoning apartment construction trends between 1962 and 1968 (see Figure 14), which

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⁶ Following the completion of the Trans-Canada Highway however, the characteristics of these roads have changed, and though they still remain designated as highways, they are no longer under the provincial jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation in British Columbia. Instead, they have come under the control of regional transportation body TransLink, wherein the Municipality of Burnaby largely controls their characteristics and integration into local roadways.
exceeded earlier expectations presented in the 1964 LMRPB *Towards an Apartment Location Policy* study.

The report attributed the uptake in apartment development in Burnaby to “steadily increasing land costs,” in addition to “rising construction costs,” noting that these conditions led developers away from single family housing and towards the more lucrative multi-unit market. The municipality, however, was more interested in attracting higher density RM5 developments. Although the report noted that higher density units were gradually gaining traction, it sought to decipher the slow uptake.

The absence of high rise (RM5) developments in Burnaby in the past has been apparently largely due to the reluctance of mortgage companies to move from the established areas where high rise apartments have been successfully located. Apartment developers are generally more interested in central areas that can provide a full range of services, as well as many other advantages that would ensure high rent levels (e.g. proximity to places of employment, entertainment, shopping and cultural facilities, etc.)

These are the factors which have encouraged higher density apartments to concentrate in such areas as the West End and Kerrisdale in Vancouver, and in portions of New Westminster and West Vancouver. (Parr, 1969: 8)

Seeking to improve nonmarket conditions where the municipality had more immediate and direct control, the report advocated for enhancing controls and standards which pertained to the:

 [...] governing of usable pedestrian open space, landscaping and screening, building design and off-street parking. These are the elements which determine, to a large extent, the success or failure of a particular development in relation to the surrounding area, as well as to the environmental needs of the people who occupy it. (Parr, 1969: 10)

In order to achieve those ends, the report encouraged the establishment of design panels taking reference from those already underway in Vancouver, Coquitlam, and New Westminster, and the provision of scale model mock-ups to assist Council in their deliberations. Through this report, it was becoming clear that planners wanted to incubate the conditions which would bring about the engine for higher densities and better quality construction. To take stock of the progress, the report concluded with a survey of the active and anticipated development within the respective town centres and other subordinate urban
tiers, detailing an update of the progress towards the intended plans in those areas. This report was also followed up with the 1970 publication of Community Plans (Parr, 1970), a document that took the form of an Official Community Plan of sorts, continuing the survey of municipal progress for the existing designated apartment areas, which of course included the three Town Centre areas.

Perhaps the most sophisticated and ambitious project engaged by the Burnaby Planning Department was the 1971 publication of a 142 page hardcover book titled, Urban Structure: A Study of the Long Range Policies Which Affect the Physical Structure of an Urban Area. The document boldly stated as its objectives, to produce a master urban plan that reflected the nascent goals of sustainable development without using the term:

The aim of the document is, therefore, the establishment of a physically structured urban environment with economy identity and quality, capable of accommodating physical economic and social change. (Sixta, 1971: 9)

Planning Director and author of the foreword, Anthony Parr cited several
contextual conditions which grounded the publication. First among these was the growing interest amongst members of the public regarding quality of life and environmental concerns. Secondly, the document was produced under the cognizance of ongoing regional discussions over the goals of a ‘liveable region’, which went hand in hand with the third objective being recognition of the advantages of public transportation in the region. Lastly, was the recognition that there were large tracts of as yet undeveloped land in the region that could serve centrally important roles among municipalities. That fourth point was developed through the text as a logical conclusion of how to create a mixed use, high density centre that would emphasize pedestrian connectivity over vehicular accessibility (see Figure 16). And though the text was produced in Burnaby using Burnaby examples, it was hoped that “this document will not only assist in clarifying Burnaby’s goals, but that it will also provide a meaningful contribution to metropolitan concentrations in Greater Vancouver and in other metropolitan areas of Canada” (Sixta, 1971: 9). Though entirely endorsed and paid for by the City of Burnaby, the text was spearheaded by Long Range Planning staff member, Gerhard Sixta, seeking to propose new methods of urban development. Sixta arrived at these concepts following a ‘post-mortem’ on the perceived inadequacies of contemporary cities in similar fashion to Jane Jacobs’ landmark text, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, but with vivid illustrations. Many of its ideas seemed to take from Archer’s New Towns (see Section 2.2), but with a strengthened emphasis if not critique of the presence of the automobile (see Figures 16, 17). Following an analysis of potential solutions, Urban Structure concluded that an “Intermittent Grid of Metro Towns” was the best method of making compact areas. The Metro Town was defined:

[...] linear in concept, with a fixed dimension. Their central spine, which serves mainly commercial destination traffic, combines roads, parking, loading, storage and a pedestrian deck on top of roads and parking. One spine serves only one town.” (Sixta, 1971: 63; see Figure 18)
Sixta suggested that one town could reach a size of about 100,000 residents in less than twenty years, in four stages of five year increments. The staging would permit the ‘town’ to grow at a methodical pace, allowing sufficient time to reach ‘self-sufficiency’. Sixta strongly recommended the same findings as Archer, that a sole entity be responsible for the development oversight of Metro Towns, be it public as in similar British models or private as with American ones. Given the enormous financing and oversight involved in constructing a town of this magnitude, the text summoned an analogy of the intensity in financing required to bid for and host an event on the scale of the Olympic and Pan-American Games:

The Olympic Games in Munich, will cost the West German public 500 million dollars. This sum of money just happens to approach the approximate cost of an urban new town of between 70,000 and 100,000 people. The fact that one Canadian City was able to commit sums of money of this magnitude to two projects of this size, (Expo ’67 and Olympic Games ’76), in a time span of less than ten years, should be proof enough that in principle, projects of the scale of urban new towns are possible in Canada and can be built in Canadian Metropolitan areas. (Sixta, 1971: 141)

Though arguably revolutionary for a Canadian municipality, in many ways, *Urban Structure* echoed the maintenance and enhancement of the status quo, suggesting that the Metro Town was also about ‘decompacting [existing] areas’.

The decompacting areas are the continuing suburbs [...]. The pressure for more development in the suburbs is removed by directing it to the towns. The percentage of larger homes would increase, the lots would become large enough to be of use as open-air recreation space, and the quality of landscaping would increase. The tendency of all suburbs would be to become more like our present ‘good’ suburbs; the good things being a feeling of property, of well maintained car roads and an abundance of private landscaping. (Sixta, 1971: 62)

This raises an interesting trend in suburb-city dichotomy that would be continued in successive plans as we find later. Sixta, though, hoped that the advanced Town Centres would be built on untouched greenspace areas, which is why the west beach of Deer Lake, a large urban greenspace in the centre of the municipality was so appealing as a place in which to settle a totally new type of urban existence in contrast to the unappealing form of traditional commercial and residential settlements.

If comments noted in a following landmark report were any indication though, the popular and political reception to *Urban Structure* was quite cold. *The Public Meetings: Phase*
One was produced as a sombre realization that contemporary methods of creating plans and then soliciting public comment are not satisfactory to people (Burnaby, 1974a). As a result, The Public Meetings was published following an historic engagement session between the Burnaby Planning Department and citizens and stakeholders from within Burnaby as part of a visioning process for the City. One of the major stated reasons for the publication was a reaction to the lower than anticipated growth rate experienced by the city compared to the rest of the region. Attempting to rationalize this trend, the document lamented the “recognition that many residents are upset with the urbanization of Burnaby, intensification of industry, [and] uprooting of green spaces for development,” presumably leading to a less attractive place (Burnaby, 1974a). However, the document also resolved that future population pressures are likely to necessitate the need for a focus on residential development. That being said, The Public Meetings sought to salvage the concepts from Urban Structure while expressing awareness of a public distaste for it, arguing that “Urban Structure was mean to prescribe an overall comprehensive framework” (Burnaby, 1974a: 2).

The Public Meetings admitted that Urban Structure was not supported by a majority of residents on the basis that it advocated for the urbanization of a natural greenspace that was seen as a considerable value in the region. In Urban Structure, Sixta had also proposed another Metro Town on the west side of Burnaby Mountain, another area that was equally regarded as a valuable greenspace worthy of preservation. The Planning Department did however, find support among residents who saw the Metrotown concept as congruent with their goals of preserving “natural amenities and suburban lifestyle in the remainder of the Municipality” (Burnaby, 1974a: 22). In response to and reflection of the apparent criticisms, the Planning Department framed Urban Structure as a conceptual document that was not meant to be perceived as a statement of the department’s intentions with regards to the greenfield developments of Deer Lake and the slope of Burnaby Mountain. The tenets were seen as important and relevant as ever though.

Urban Structure was prepared to establish planning goals capable of meeting that [providing needs for population growth] requirement. Basic to this document was a proposed orderly structuring of the urban area designed to improve the way in which people can live, move, play and work. (Burnaby, 1974a: 23)
Having clarified the Planning Department’s intentions by acknowledging the apprehensions of residents towards a perception of increased growth, *The Public Meetings* indicated a resolute stance to accommodate projected growth in as controlled manner as possible.

The major intent of these policies is to recreate community identity in Burnaby by locating and linking residential areas, shops, industries, road and parks in such a way that some form of recognizable structure will be achieved and the monotonous spread of the suburb will be prevented. (Burnaby, 1974a: 1)

In trying to find some sense of consensus with residents however, *The Public Meetings* found that residents were generally accepting of the merits of densification of the Town Centres in that the policy helped to “ensure the stability of the established single family residential areas by removing or preventing existing or potential land use intrusions considered incompatible with those areas” (Burnaby, 1974a: 10). Conversely, residents expressed opposition to any type of ‘spot zoning’ which had until this point been limited largely to senior housing complexes. To this end, the Town Centre policy was recognized as an effective policy in restricting as much as accommodating high density commercial and residential development to a few focused areas in the municipality. However, not all Town Centres were seen as equals.

In seeking to implement the concepts from *Urban Structure*, the municipality sought to locate an appropriate area to establish this higher tier centre. Sensing opposition from residents over Deer Lake or the slope of Burnaby Mountain, those areas were immediately ruled out. In fact, as Tate (2009) found, the establishment of a Deer Lake Metrotown was never seen as a credible option by the Planning Department. The establishment of a Metrotown in Deer Lake was seen as “absurd,” in a place that was never envisioned by the municipality as anything other than a major park space (Tate, 2009: 281). *The Public Hearings* also found that efforts to designate multiple Metrotowns as envisioned in *Urban Structure* would likely result in the dilution of the concept amongst competing urban areas. In deliberating, therefore, between the likeliest areas among the three existing Town Centres, the document provided an honest analysis of the candidates.

These [Town Centres] are the Simpson-Sears, Brentwood and Lougheed Town Centres. Of these, it is considered that the Brentwood and Lougheed Town

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7 By the time *The Public Hearings* was published, the Burnaby Planning Department was referring to the ‘Metro Town’ concept as the ‘Metrotown’ concept.
Centres have tended to develop into auto-oriented regional shopping centres which presently have limited capabilities to develop into a Metrotown with the aforementioned characteristics. On the other hand, the Simpson-Sears town centre does exhibit those characteristics capable of forming the basis of a Metrotown. Supportive of this is the fact that the nucleus of the existing town centre is considered ripe for development. Through this impending redevelopment process, the Metrotown concept would provide the guidelines for managing growth in the desired directions. (Burnaby, 1974a: 24-25)

In referring to “the aforementioned characteristics,” the passage refers to the same tenets distilled in the Metrotown concept from *Urban Structure*, including: a strong pedestrian orientation, a diversity of activities during daylight and night time hours, and a “wide range of commercial and social opportunities” (Burnaby, 1974a: 24). In closing, *The Public Meetings* concluded that the city needed to enhance its public engagement strategy with regards to rezoning and community plans. Preparing for big changes ahead, the document called for the creation of an ongoing public information program that would help foster community awareness of local municipal affairs, as well as a better public hearing notification process.

Four months following the publication of *The Public Meetings*, in a special meeting struck to debate the recommendations of that document, City Council passed a variety of motions, but two received the most attention in the record of minutes. The majority of the July 2nd meeting was preoccupied with debates over the declaration of the Burnaby Mountain Conservation Area, a 576 hectare\(^8\) park dedication including the west slope of Burnaby Mountain that was opposed by owners with abutting properties who had hoped to subdivide the side of the mountain prior to the restriction (Burnaby, 1974b). The other notable motion was an amendment replacing the words of the Simpson-Sears Town Centre, declaring “that the Kingsway-Sussex Town Centre be designated a Metrotown development area with[in] the existing core area hierarchy (ibid).

In 1977, with the assistance of Norman Hotson Architects, the City of Burnaby Planning Department published *Burnaby Metrotown: A Development Plan*, the first of a series of further detailed Master Plans for Burnaby’s Town Centres. Chapter 5 will outline the contents of that publication and the results of the fascinating process which led to the creation of the Metrotown Town Centre. Through the 1980s, the City of Burnaby began to refer to a fourth Town Centre in the Edmonds area. Following the completion of the SkyTrain Advanced LRT

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\(^8\) These are the present dimensions of the park.
line, the City officially made mention of that Town Centre in its first Official Community Plan, published in 1987. In 1992, the City embarked on an extensive updating program for the Brentwood Town Centre, which was completed in 1996 with the publication of the Brentwood Town Centre Development Plan (Stenson, 1996). In 1994, the Edmonds Town Centre Plan was completed following extensive consultation with an Advisory Committee composed of local resident, businesses, and non-profit organizations, resulting in the Edmonds Town Centre Plan (Burnaby, 1994). And, in 1998, the Lougheed Area Advisory Committee with a similar make-up of its Edmonds counterpart gained the approval of Council to pass the Lougheed Town Centre Plan (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997).

Each of these aforementioned Town Centre plans has remained remarkably consistent with the originally proposed boundaries. However, as we find in the case study in Chapter 5, a variety of factors has led to the degree of development achieved. Regardless of these historical developments, it is difficult to refute that local municipal planning process have contributed to the development of Burnaby’s Town Centres, as this project asked in the introduction. Quoted by local media during his retirement, former Director of Planning Don Stenson remarked that “the goal (of the planner) is to shape growth, rather than just let it happen” (McQuillan, 2001). However, as we find later, this goal can frequently become a challenging prospect. Fortunately for Stenson however, as he indicated in the same article, he considered the Burnaby Planning Department to be “a plum [workplace] among Lower Mainland Planning Departments,” noting that while Director of Planning, “he’s always had the cooperation of city Council” (ibid). As we find, this is far easier said than done.
3: METHODOLOGY

This project was inspired by my time of employment at Burnaby City Hall between 2007 and 2009. More specifically, it was inspired by Debbie Comis, City Clerk for the City of Burnaby from 1995 to 2011. During my employment as a Clerk Typist in the Clerk’s Office, Comis and I had several thought-provoking discussions about the history of Burnaby. Knowing my interest in planning and policy, Comis once mentioned that there was an interesting story to be told about planning in Burnaby. She noted that the Town Centres were the legacy of a senior planner who helped the city fundamentally reorient itself early on. Part of that legacy, she told me, was the important step of creating a succession plan for senior planning staff in order to continue the same planning programs. Although I appreciated this notion, and believe it is relevant to the way Burnaby’s Town Centre program has been employed in the forty-five years since its inception, it was my experience that followed during 2009 in the Mayor’s Office that taught me that there was something else at play. From that vantage point, I recall numerous times when Councillors and the Mayor would laud the benefits of having stuck to the Town Centre concept over so many years. Proudest among them was the fact that the City had been able to maintain parkland coverage of twenty-five percent, despite record interest in development.

Given this disclosure and before proceeding further, I feel it important to make a clear statement on what may be perceived as a controversial subject. Though this paper, I make the assertion that Burnaby’s development was made possible through a partnership between elected members and trade unions, which I present through the lens of Urban Regime Theory. I did not in any way rely on private or insider information from either of the above civic offices to support my theory of a trade union-supported Urban Regime. My attempts to demonstrate an Urban Regime within the City of Burnaby rests entirely on information that is freely available in the public domain. To this end, I have done my best to document the methodology used in this research in the following sections.

To understand how municipal policies have contributed to the development of Burnaby’s Town Centres, I chose to employ a mixed methods approach, utilizing both
quantitative and qualitative data sources. I did this because in the introduction, I am making a claim that Burnaby’s Town Centres are in some ways remarkable urban areas that are distinct from their surrounding suburban landscape. To qualify this, I have employed numeric data, which will be further outlined in Section 3.3. For my qualitative data, I used a variety of primary and secondary materials that were sourced from various locations. The sources of these items are documented in the References Section of this project to efficiently assist future researchers in sourcing data on the municipality of Burnaby, but the methods can also be transferred to researchers in other municipalities in Metro Vancouver.

3.1 Qualitative Data

In sourcing my material, I kept two main concepts as my compass. The first concept is that memories fade. Retracing a forty-five year history is a daunting task when trying compile an oral history of a place, never mind a sophisticated policy history such as that of Town Centres. And, given the abundance of recorded materials, I felt it would be sufficient to restrict myself to written records. The second consideration was the methodology required for an empirical test of Urban Regime Theory. This methodology requires investigation of primary and secondary source materials, but never direct questioning of potential members of an urban regime, as Cobban (2003b) notes. Fortunately, in a municipality as established as Burnaby, there is a thick institutional repository. In the City of Burnaby, I consulted the City Archives office for a wide range of documents.

From the City Archives, I was primarily able to access Minutes records of Council. Minutes records were invaluable in tracking opinions from Councillors with the deployment of various reports. From the Minutes, one is firstly able to gain a sense of the tone of dialogue, but more importantly, the vote records of various Councillors. To assist in this endeavour, in 2010, a joint project between the City Archivist and City Clerk resulted in the creation of a draft document titled, History of Burnaby Council and Council Committees Since 1892 (Burnaby, 2010a). The document spans the history of the Municipality since incorporation and helped in assessing which councillors held office during specific times, though it did not indicate political affiliations. To uncover that aspect, I had to search through historic news articles. This composed one of two streams that I searched with the same methods, the second of which related to major planning and policy decisions. To find earlier articles, I searched through the
library’s newspaper microfiche archives, of which an account can be found in this project’s Reference List. After combining older media accounts with additional contemporary articles, I amassed a collection of well over 200 articles. Arranging these articles chronologically into a digital database and producing an annotated bibliographic document revealed an incredibly detailed historical account of the evolution of Town Centre policy.

### 3.2 Triangulation

While the sum of 200 articles may appear extreme for a project of this nature, it actually proved quite invaluable. Considering once again the forty-five year window which this paper covers, it can be fairly easy to accidentally ignore certain historical events. It was therefore helpful to rely on news articles to inform the extent of debates that may have been recorded only partially or not at all in the Minutes. It was also useful to find out about debates that carried outside of the Council Chambers, such as those during the Metrotown phasing policy and those that included the court proceedings which would not have been easily searchable through municipal databases.

Using this process, I found that news articles tended to inform the search for Council Minutes, which in turn fuelled the search for additional reports. This method also helped determine the most salient points in the municipality’s history, such as the inception of various Town Centre plans.

For political affiliations, news articles also proved to be quite useful. I used the City’s *History of Burnaby Council and Council Committees Since 1892* (Burnaby, 2011a) to cross-reference party affiliations, to help illustrate an innovative political history of the City from 1961 to 2011 (see Appendix D).

### 3.3 Quantitative Data

I used quantitative data for the comparison of densities and travel patterns within and between Burnaby’s Town Centres. I also compared Burnaby’s Town Centres densities and travel patterns with Regional Town Centres in other municipalities, in addition to densities and travel patterns in the Vancouver Metro Core. I based much of my analysis on methodology borrowed from Filion (2009). Filion’s work, as mentioned previously, compared suburban mixed use centres in an effort to see if they made any difference to the predominant suburban
pattern of low transit use in Toronto’s suburbs. In place of the North York Centre, which Filion finds is the best on these merits, I used the Vancouver Metro Core as a control group. I was first hoping to use the Vancouver Peninsula, which contains the West End area known for low automobile use, however, later in my research, Regional District staff made available to me a fairly recent 2006 custom dataset, comparing all Town Centres including Vancouver’s Metro Core, a composite of the West End and Downtown neighbourhoods within the Peninsula, and the Fairview, Mount Pleasant, and Strathcona neighbourhoods directly adjacent to the Peninsula. Although my earlier data in the Downtown Peninsula produced higher incidences of walk to work data, I have used the larger Core area, firstly because I view the integrity of the data to be higher, and because this is a more generally accepted area in use by City of Vancouver planning documents.

Filion (2009) compared mode of travel to work amongst various suburban mixed nodes with data from the city in which they are located. As we find in Chapter 4, I employed this same comparison, though instead of using data over a 24 hour period, I used journey to work data from Statistics Canada, which contains much of the same data, with the exception of average passenger to driver ratio, and average trip distance. Additionally, because the data is designated as modal trips to a place of employment, it unfortunately fails to capture non-work related trips. Similar data to Filion’s source is available from the Translink, the regional transportation authority. This Trip Diary data however, is based on a survey rather than census and therefore less reliable when trying to compare specific geographic areas like the Regional Town Centres.

As we will find, I did not compare Regional Town Centre or Burnaby’s Town Centre data to the respective municipality as a whole, as Filion did. After some consideration, I rejected this comparison since it would mean comparing a Regional Town Centre to areas within the municipality, including itself. As we find later, I eliminated the RTC area from the remainder of the data, by subtracting it from Census Canada Census Subdivisions, which in this case takes the exact boundary of the municipalities. The resulting number gave me the data for the remainder of the municipality excluding the RTC, offering a better basis for comparison.

To offer a further grain of comparison, I used Filion’s work with transit ridership as a foundation to compare residential densities within Regional Town Centres and Burnaby’s Town Centres. Although this comparison is quite crude, as we find further in this project, it
nonetheless offers a quick way to compare basic characteristics of these areas. Though, as we also discover, this comparison can be fraught with challenges, particularly when comparing Regional Town Centres in municipalities with large expanses of farmland. These issues aside however, I believe that when combined, the aforementioned comparisons suits the framework of this project.

Taken together, and considering the obvious limitations of reaching so far into the past on a case study with as limited budget and scope as a Master’s project, I feel that this mixed methods approach is likely best for this research.
4: REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TOWN CENTRES

The concept of Town Centres is tied very closely with the evolution of regional planning in the Lower Mainland. It is therefore pertinent to discuss the inception and delivery of Town Centres in tandem with key phases in the history of regional planning. Although much of the following discussion will focus around regionally-grounded Town Centres versus Town Centres in general, it is still key to lay the policy formation environment in the Regional District.

4.1 Nascent Regional Planning

Within the region, Town Centres arguably grew out of growth management strategies, which likely had their start in 1963 in the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Association, according to dissertation research by Tate (2009). Prior to this, a semi-professional but vocal citizens’ group called the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Association was dedicated to considering land use planning services, but due largely to “Its lack of legal status and money,” disbanded during World War II (Christopherson, 2000:59). However, the citizen’s project likely had a lasting impact on policy makers of the day, because in 1948, enabling legislation created the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board (LMRPB), as one of six planning boards throughout the province (Tate, 2009). Though inspired by growth management and pushed by influential regional planning advocate of the time, Tom MacDonald, the Board was mainly formed as a reaction to a massive flood that had occurred during the time, resulting in extensive damage and inciting the need for a coordinated approach to drainage and water services (Harcourt et al., 2007). By 1952 the Board produced a non-binding plan, “The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead,” with four broad goals, directly influenced by the 1938 work of Lewis Mumford (LMRPB, 1952):

- Industrial land conservation, in the hopes of future economic diversification from resource-based to manufacturing activities

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9 As we move through this chapter, for the reader’s convenience, Appendix A presents a chronology of major provincial and regional events.
• Recreational land conservation
• Floodplain protection, to prevent future flood damage like that experienced in 1948
• A decentralized pattern of metropolitan growth into smaller dispersed towns, led by industrial dispersal. (ibid)

It is in this Growth Management document that we see the first mention of a decentralization plan. However, the motivation for the fourth point was a nervous reaction to the fears of Soviet attack during the Cold War fervour that swept North America at the time:

[…]from the point of view of safety from atomic air attack we are urged by military experts to limit our cities to not more than ten square miles in area and to separate them by distances of at least ten miles of open country (LMRPB, 1952: 39).

By 1963, the LMRPB’s second planning document, “Chance and Challenge,” provided a more detailed rendition of the decentralization offered in the preceding document. It called for the Lower Mainland to develop a network of new population centres either on existing sites or in green fields, referred to as ‘valley cities’, each containing at least 100,000 residents, to be separated by a sea of greenfield and productive countryside, linked by a regional freeway network (Tate, 2009). The concept was likely sufficiently inspiring, because in 1966, the first legally binding LMRPB plan, the “Official Lower Mainland Regional Plan,” was approved by member municipalities, changing the earlier term ‘valley cities’ to ‘regional towns’, to be developed in stages in order to assure compact form congruent with potential future transit servicing (ibid). This plan also marks the point at which growth management is beginning to be seen as a comprehensive package, with interconnected yet mutually reliant parts, with the advancement of five key objectives:

• Orderly and staged development
• A healthy environment
• Efficient land use
• Effective transportation
• A healthy, diverse economy
4.2 Modern Regional Planning's Reluctant Birth

In 1966, however, the Social Credit provincial government, led by Premier WAC Bennett, wound down the LRMPB, seeing it as a threat to the special relationship that the province was keen to maintain between itself and the municipalities. But it is significant to note that the predecessor operated slightly differently than does the current regional government body. Aside from overseeing a much larger territory, frequently cited as stretching from Desolation Sound on the western-most coast of the Lower Mainland to Hope at the eastern-most point, the Regional Board was a bit of a quirk in the Canadian urban landscape. It followed an American regional governance model, led and organized by local governments, with the ability to hold some autonomy in contrast with the prevailing Canadian model, demonstrated by regional districts pre-existing in Winnipeg and Toronto at the time, and described by Tennant and Zernhelt (1973) as provincially mandated and locally sponsored.

Quickly following the dismantling of the LMRPB, the province, albeit through civil servants in the Department of Municipal Affairs, still saw merit in a series of regional bodies and was not prepared to disband them entirely. The foundations of the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) can best be described as reluctant creation, which would perhaps explain its employment of a hybrid regional governance model somewhere between the US and existing Canadian variants, where there is a large degree of local autonomy, but not without the (varying) involvement of the province. Tennant and Zernhelt (1973) tell an interesting story of the establishment of the GVRD, including efforts by the minister responsible for its creation to try and downplay its launch. Even the naming of the new regional body suggested political reluctance, as it was first referred to by the more geographically nebulous name ‘Regional District of the Fraser-Burrard’, for fear of identifying any specific landmark that could suggest another intermediate level of government (Tennant & Zernhelt, 1973). It was only after challenges were encountered in the issuance of bonds to an indefinable territory that the name was changed in 1968, to the Greater Vancouver Regional District. But the name was not entirely original, as it had been borrowed from two preceding Boards in existence, the Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District, dating to 1914, followed by the Greater Vancouver Water District established in 1926, both with separate legal entities, but virtually the same membership and administered by the same staff under one director (ibid).
The inaugural GVRD meeting was held on July 12, 1967, with Vancouver Councillor Earl Adams elected Chair, and Burnaby Mayor Alan Emmott Deputy Chair. Despite the meeting being unceremoniously tacked onto the tail end of a Hospital Board Meeting, and members given no clear mandate, Burnaby’s Alan Emmott quickly jumped into an activist role, pressing ahead for a coherent plan for the acquisition of key functions. Following an early 1970 motion to defeat ‘opt out’ privileges by individual municipalities, and pushing for the motion’s enshrinement in the Municipal Act the same year, the Regional District had finally come of age, but not through chance, as Paul Tennant and David Zernhelt, who himself went on to become a Cabinet Minister in British Columbia elaborate:

Opposition to the new level of government did not develop among the local officials because provincial officials proceeded circumspectly, cloaking compulsions in option, presenting the new in terms of the old, while disclaiming great intentions. Yet there were such intentions and they have now been achieved in Greater Vancouver. (Tennant & Zernhelt, 1973: 138)

It was indeed a small miracle that the GVRD was incorporated and still exists today, as Tate (2009) finds, with an insightful comment from an unidentified senior staff member of the Provincial Government:

[...] there were a number of people in [The Social Credit-led Provincial] Cabinet who simply didn’t like planning, and there were a number of people in government who didn’t see a value in planning and they certainly saw a conflict between what the Province wanted to do and what planning was delivering. And that’s inevitable... there’s a lot of debate still about that [today] at a Provincial level ('Interviewee B’, 2008, qtd. in Tate, 2009: 167).

4.3 Regional Planning Gets a Shot in the Arm

To offer contrast, typical of the swing politics of British Columbia, from 1972 to 1975, the New Democratic Party briefly came to power, led by civil servant-turned-leader, Dave Barrett, representing centre-left opposite to the Social Credit Party and eventual successor, the B.C. Liberal Party. Aside from overseeing the creation of modern public transit in the province\(^{10}\) and the Agricultural Land Reserve, both key elements of the Regional District’s ongoing efforts,

\(^{10}\) Prior to this change, public transit in the province was run as a subordinate entity of the provincial electric utility, B.C. Hydro and Power Authority. The new legislation granted transit its own governance structure, effectively the Board of Transit Services, supported by provincial government revenue, and synergistically placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Municipal Affairs. (Burnaby, 1975)
the government also takes credit for a strong regional policy formation environment, shepherding the passage of the 1975 “Livable Region Plan,” the most comprehensive growth management strategy to that point (Perkins, 1992).

This paper has shown that the town centre program was already in existence with earlier growth management strategies, however, the document that kicked off the adopted Livable Region Plan, “The Livable Region 1976/1986, Proposals to Manage the Growth of Greater Vancouver” (hereafter referred to as the “1975 Livable Region Proposals”) signalled a commitment to the program that had not been seen before (GVRD, 1975a). Although a decentralization policy had been advanced in the past, the political environment was never quite ready for such a move, until the fallout of the highway debates in Vancouver produced an activist party led by a coalition of left-leaning council candidates, known as TEAM: The Electors Action Movement, who were serendipitously focused on applying growth limits on development in Vancouver. The upstart municipal party’s strategy was mutually beneficial for the regional district’s Town Centre policy, which was dependent on siphoning urban development opportunities from the downtown out into the suburbs, where the region’s population growth was forecasted to boom (Perkins, 1992). By placing these highly urban amenities into specific geographically contained centres, it was hoped that planners could entice residents to live and work in the same local retail trade area, thus reducing commuting movements into the employment-rich central business district in Downtown Vancouver, reversing the trend for “the majority of jobs and cultural facilities to continue locating in Vancouver while suburban town centres remain mainly large shopping centres” (GVRD, 1975a: 18). The Town Centre policy was one of a series of core and interrelated strategies (see Figure 19), including:

1. Achieve Residential Growth Targets in Each Part of the Region
2. Promote a Balance of Jobs to Population in Each Part of the Region
3. Create Regional Town Centres
4. Provide a Transit-Oriented Transportation System Linking Residential Areas, Regional Town Centres and Major Work Areas

Figure 19 | Diagrammatic representation of “A Strategy to Manage Growth” (GVRD, 1975).
5. Protect and Develop Regional Open Space

Indeed, the strategy at last appeared to be gaining traction. TEAM’s platform of controlling growth to preserve quality of life was at first effective with putting strong controls on downtown densities, requiring deep negotiations between planners and developers, or alternatively, having the effect of deflecting that development elsewhere where it could be better accommodated to suit regional plans, into the new Town Centres. The 1975 Livable Region Proposals helped to crystallize this notion as Regional Town Centres (RTC):

A Regional Town Centre is like the downtown of a small city. It has virtually everything one needs on a day-to-day basis. It is small enough so that it is possible to know and be known by local merchants, but large enough to provide libraries, health clinics, theatres and perhaps a community college. It should also be large enough to support practices for lawyers, insurance agents and all those other services one occasionally needs (GVRD, 1975a:18).

Three key shifts distinguished this plan from previous ones. Firstly, the shift away from ‘regional towns’ was intended to bring about, not the automobile centric shopping mall pattern that regional planners noticed appeared to flow from the previous designations, but a richer urban fabric more capable of effectively addressing the region’s intended growth management needs (Spaeth, 1975). Secondly, the addition in the 1975 Livable Region Proposals, advocated by Burnaby’s Director of Planning Anthony Parr saw the shift towards transit linkages between the Town Centres, a divergence in policy and prevalent thinking from the earlier “Chance and Challenge” Plan (Interviewee E, 2008, qtd. in Tate, 2009, p 170). And thirdly, as Harry Lash, Planning Director at the time remarked, “under a voluntary plan it would not be possible to build regional town centres” (Perkins, 1992: 37). The capacity to put all the pieces together requires a coordinated action program that a Regional District is best suited to provide, pulling in coordination from all levels of government, and more importantly, between member municipalities (Perkins, 1992).

The 1975 Livable Region Proposals recommended the immediate dedication of two Town Centres: Burnaby’s Central Park, and New Westminster’s Downtown. Burnaby’s Central Park was seen to be an obvious choice, as the region was likely confident it would have full support of the municipal council, since the very same geographic area had “already been designated for ‘Metrotown’ development by Burnaby Council,” signifying, as Chapter 5 reveals, an enhanced designation within the municipality’s own town centre program (GVRD, 1975a:
New Westminster was an equally exceptional candidate since it was hoped transit would serve the RTC sometime in the not-too-distant future, and an existing downtown precinct had up until then already brought the area close to self-sufficiency, a criterion specified as: an annual retail trade of $50 million annually, the ability to draw audiences to theatres or other cultural events, and an approximate population of 100,000 to 150,000 (GVRD, 1975a). These rough figures, planners hoped, would indicate the ability of a Town Centre to continue to fuel its own growth. What’s perhaps more significant however, is the reasoning by which other RTC candidates were immediately disqualified: The Northeast Sector, collectively Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, Port Moody, and the Ioco-Anmore Electoral Area; the North Shore; Richmond; Surrey; White Rock; Delta. The 1975 Livable Region Proposals granted that some of these locations were not quite ready for the conditions that fostered growth of an RTC. Instead, an innovative financing model was devised, that would enable lucrative land development from existing Town Centres to provide seed development for densification in the other nascent RTCs to provide a cascading effect on density and character in each respective Town Centre. It was anticipated that the Whalley Regional Town Centre in Surrey (imposed despite Surrey’s inability to choose between Whalley and Guildford) and the Coquitlam Regional Town Centre (a greenfield site that the region was hesitant about) would kick off the next stage of compact regional development beginning in 1986, followed by other pairs deemed to fit the criteria necessary to incubate a Town Centre (Perkins, 1992).

On July 9, 1975, however, the GVRD Board of Directors recommended a slightly altered version of the 1975 Livable Region Proposals (GVRD, 1975b). At the time, The Livable Region Plan indicated:

[...] there is considerable scepticism in the community that these proposals can be realized by 1986 as set out in the Livable Region Proposals. There is also broad support from many municipal representatives, but there is a lack of understanding about why Regional Town Centres are being proposed in some areas and not in others.

This fundamental lack of understanding resulting in the passage of the following Recommendation 6, led by Chairman of the Planning Committee, Surrey Mayor W. N. Vander Zalm:

The Regional Board adopt the concept of developing Regional Town Centres and establish the following priorities for regional support:
I. Downtown New Westminster and Burnaby Metro Town be brought to self-sustaining size with the desired qualities, by 1980

II. Choose a location for a Regional Town Centre in the Northeast Sector as soon as possible, and create the preconditions by 1986 for self-sustaining size and quality to be attained

III. Create the preconditions by 1986 for an eventual self-sustaining Regional Town Centre in North Surrey.

A report published later that year by the Regional District, “Regional Town Centres: A Policy Report,” repeated the rationale for choosing the original two RTCs that the 1975 Livable Region Proposals identified (Spaeth, 1975). This report repeated the importance of decentralizing Downtown Vancouver’s development prospects. It also clarified that many existent municipal centres were only effective as shopping districts. It repeated that Metrotown (earlier referred to in 1975 Livable Region Proposals as Central Park) was the most capable RTC, thanks in large part to the pre-existing ‘Metrotown’ designation by the municipality, and in turn, the Regional District vowed to relocate its head offices in the area as a gesture of commitment. More critically, it admonished Coquitlam for wanting to build a Town Centre from scratch, and identified Surrey’s plans as being too isolated, requiring the construction of an expensive form of transit if the vision of linking Town Centres by transit was to be realized. It deemed that an RTC in North Vancouver would further increase congestion, going against the fundamental values of the growth management strategy, and a Richmond RTC would cause a perceived balance of jobs to residents to fall off, causing a disorderly explosion of employment opportunities and pull residents in from other areas. It identified the contemporary economic downturn as the ideal opportunity to embark on the phasing policy for the development of RTCs. However, the overtones in Recommendation 6 were likely to spell trouble for the regional policy, as it hinted at either a lack of comprehension of RTC policy, or wilful blindness to how the implementation process was designed. It might have been the case that municipalities were uninterested in growth management altogether, only in development at any cost. As a parallel, in a corporate engagement process that the GVRD undertook in preparation for the 1975 Livable Region Proposals, it was found that despite all the intentions with regard to RTCs and transit, the most salient point that arose among conversations with business leaders was the need for a transit link from Downtown Vancouver to the Airport in order to alleviate vehicle congestion experienced by visiting business contacts,
a link that would eventually be constructed amidst a torrent of controversy a few dozen years later\textsuperscript{11}.

4.4 Regional Planning by Stealth\textsuperscript{12}

By the early 1980s however, the Livable Region program was quickly unravelling. In the three years following the passage of the 1975 Livable Region Plan, Vancouver’s TEAM slate began to feel the sting of a program of neutered development (Perkins, 1992). Following a protracted pre-approval process between the City of Vancouver and the B.C. Telephone Company (predecessor to the Telus Corporation), the company bitterly decided to move its proposed head office facility into the north-easterly most tip of the Metrotown Regional Town Centre, where it sits today at the intersection of Kingsway and Boundary Road, directly across the street from Vancouver. The loss of this large office complex, coupled with an anticipated population decrease within the City, led to a reversal in policy, with TEAM members partnering with the opposition right-leaning Non-Partisan Association to advance a 1950s type booster program that flew in the face of the Regional District’s decentralization plan (Perkins, 1992). But the nail in the coffin was already hammered in 1975 before the plan even got off the ground, with the return of the Social Credit Party to office. Echoing frustration within the GVRD that the province “never endorsed the livable region program,” Ken Cameron, planner for the Regional District at the time, noted that the “lack of an official provincial commitment to the program has slowed down town-centre development” (Constantineau, 1981). The ramifications of this crumbled partnership were soberly recognized by the reflective policy and planning document, “Creating Our Future: The History, Status, and Prospects of Regional Planning in Greater Vancouver,” produced by the GVRD in 1994, “The plans have […] offered various suggestions as to how compact, complete, communities could be achieved. But instead of a ‘region of unity’, sprawl and dispersion [have] occurred” (GVRD, 1994: 10).

The only remaining hope left to resurrect any aspect of the Town Centres concept presented itself by way of Vancouver’s hosting of the 1986 World Exposition on Transportation and Communication. Sensing immense pressure to introduce a long-awaited transportation

\textsuperscript{11} A discussion of the controversies around the Canada Line, which began as the RAV line, can be found in the Master’s Project, “ Allocating Risk in Transportation Megaprojects: The Case of the Canada Line.” (Ruhland, 2011).

\textsuperscript{12} This heading takes its name from the same term encountered in Tate, 2009.
link through the region, the province, still led by the Social Credit Party during this time, but now with the responsibility of transit under the new Minister of Municipal Affairs and former Mayor of Surrey and chair of the Planning Committee during the 1975 Liveable Region Plan, Vander Zalm, found an opportunity to package an automated Advanced Light Rail Transit Line for the event, fulfilling a pent up need\textsuperscript{13} to deliver service to the municipalities of Surrey and Coquitlam, respectively located directly east and south of New Westminster, the second designated RTC. However, it quickly became clear that under the government’s newly formed Crown Corporation, the Urban Transit Authority, decisions had suddenly become more centralized, signalling the end of a regionally-based transit strategy, and the induction of transit into full provincial control, where transit policies would be centralized for the foreseeable future (Siemiatycki, 2006).

With exemplary reference to the SkyTrain line, “the province alone determined the nature, timing, placement, and funding” for transit services (Perkins, 1992: 38). Despite an apparent dithering about technology choice at the time, it was obvious nonetheless that the region was just as happy to receive any mass transit at all. And, to quell any doubt about the political tinkering of the SkyTrain project, by 1987, when the first leg of the SkyTrain had been completed up to New Westminster, and the second was to take place in the form of an extension to Coquitlam and Surrey, the obviousness of centralized transit policy reared itself again. This time, the Social Credit Party, under the renewed leadership of now-Premier Vander Zalm, unilaterally resolved that only one line extension could be built—to Surrey and the Whalley Centre, where he had a decade earlier in the capacity of Mayor advocated that an RTC be located, and where the Surrey Place Mall currently stood. Despite stern disapproval by Coquitlam’s Mayor Lou Sekora that the New Westminster – Surrey extension would cost between $12 to $15 per patron versus a much cheaper Edmonds – Lougheed extension to link Coquitlam into the transit system, the then Surrey-Newton MLA and Transit Minister Rita Johnston insisted on the line connecting Whalley to the already designated SkyBridge that would connect New Westminster over the Fraser River and to the northern tip of Surrey at the proposed Scott Road Station (Hauka, 1987). During the publicly heated debates between the two elected officials, Johnston defended the Whalley extension, citing:

\textsuperscript{13} A detailed story of the events and decisions involved in the choices behind the Expo Line can be found in the Master’s Project, "Planning the Expo Line: understanding the technological choice behind Vancouver's first rail rapid transit line." (Stutt, 2011).
Nobody’s going to come to Surrey to be dropped off at Scott Road. We’ve got to get them up the hill (to Whalley). To drop people off at Scott Road will provide little more than a faster means of getting out of Surrey (Spaner, 1987).

To which Coquitlam’s Lou Sekora colourfully replied,

Why on God’s green earth would people leave downtown to go to Surrey to shop? [...] It really bothers me to hear that kind of statement from a minister of transit. It’s a ridiculous statement (ibid).

It wasn’t just Town Centres policy that was falling off the track, but also the whole growth management approach. By 1994, contemporary trends were indicating that 50% of residential units over the next 30 years were forecast to be built outside the growth boundary – the regional strategy’s last line of defence. The region wanted, perhaps a bit ambitiously, to reverse this trend, bringing 75% of forecasted future development within the growth boundary (GVRD, 1994). Observers note that the trend likely began in 1983, when Vancouver’s boosters had already taken a firm grasp of the City, and regional powers were entirely disbanded following the re-election of Social Credit Premier Bill Bennett (Tate, 2009; Perkins, 1992). Prior to this period, in 1976 and following the election of Bill Bennett, the GVRD had already granted RTC status to Coquitlam and a municipal plan that showed indecision in Surrey, nicknamed the ‘Dumbbell Plan’, which the saw the region’s third largest RTC designation at 400 hectares encompass the seemingly distinct Whalley and Guildford neighbourhoods, centred by their respective shopping centres. In 1985, North Vancouver’s Lonsdale followed, then Richmond, in large part due to the prior establishment of the head office for the Crown Corporation, Worker’s Compensation Board and the construction of the sprawling Richmond Centre Mall (GVRD, 1994). Langley was also designated as a composition of chiefly Langley City as well as part of the Township of Langley, thanks in large part to sustained pressure by then City Mayor Marlene Grinell despite intense opposition by the Regional District, and then Maple Ridge for no good reason other than that Langley had already been declared an RTC, and there appeared little difference between the two potential new RTCs (Tate, 2009, Munro, 1995).

By 1983, when the provincial government rescinded the statutory planning powers from the Regional District, regional growth management became a taboo phrase as regional planners began referring to themselves by the more cache title of ‘development officers’, reflecting the pro-development approach that the Social Credit government advocated in the build-up to the Expo development years (Tate, 2009). The only blip on the radar occurred in
1986 when two City of Burnaby employees saw an opportunity in the change in Social Credit leadership from the rurally-based Bill Bennett to the urban-based Vander Zalm. They had campaigned amongst municipal colleagues within the region for a voluntary buy-in model, in partnership with staff from the GVRD and Ministry of Municipal Affairs. By 1989, the administrative partnerships were successful in lobbying for friendly changes to the Municipal Act (ibid).

It was not until the 1990s, when GVRD planners and provincial staff sensed the diminishing popularity of the Social Credit Party, that they began producing documents that would pave the path towards a more collaborative relationship with a New Democratic-led government in waiting (Tate, 2009). With the recognition that most designated RTCs have a distinctly suburban feel and over-reliance on shopping centres, with the exception of the more historically rich Lonsdale and New Westminster RTCs, the GVRD recognized the need to strengthen regional governance powers, candidly admitting that “many tough decisions are required, and required soon” (GVRD, 1990). Such decisions were in reflection of the development that had occurred in the interceding years since the 1975 Livable Region Plan. Basic conceptions of future Regional Town Centre policy needed to be squared against employment centres that had since begun to migrate outside of downtown and into greenfield and former industrial areas. With the 1983 loss of regional planning powers in combination with a North America-wide trend towards the dispersive monochromatic intensification of valuable industrial and agricultural lands, the region was powerless to prevent the explosion of office parks, occurring in nearly every municipality that had vowed just a few years earlier to focus employment in RTCs (Tate, 2009). One particularly illustrative vignette is the growth that occurred quickly following the designation of the Coquitlam Town Centre. A news article dating to the time typifies the scenario:

Buchanan has been the [City of Coquitlam] senior planner since 1968. “When I first came here, Coquitlam was kind of a suburb to New West, until the freeway was built,” he remembers. Then it became more of a suburb to Vancouver.

“Part of the Town Centre strategy is to reverse that and put more people working in the area.”
Fifteen minutes away is part two of the equation. Bob Laurie is vice-president of commercial and industrial sales for Intrawest, developers of a 220-acre business park along the Fraser River.

[...]

“They are built to put development close to where people live, to make it easier to hire people.”

Adjustments, like agricultural to industrial and industrial to technological, create a surplus of some workers and shortages of others. Laurie said the new-age industries, where desk tops are factories for processing information, need to be close to where the people live. He estimates 10,000 workers is possible. (Poole, 1992)

While large-scale retail development was exploding in the Coquitlam RTC, office space was keeping pace – but well outside the Town Centre’s boundaries contrary to the intent of the Livable Region Plan. Worsening the situation, it had also become plainly evident that Vancouver was not prepared to reduce the prestigious development in the Downtown core that would contribute to diversifying the RTCs (GVRD, 1990). With this in mind, it was recognized that “a new policy framework needs to be put into place for the 1990s if the RTCs are to continue to give shape to the region” (GVRD, 1990: 53)

4.5 Regional Planning is Born Again

By the time Premier Mike Harcourt was already well settled into the first term of NDP government since the Dave Barrett years, the government set forth and passed the Growth Strategies Act in 1995, highlighting the efforts gained by the voluntary buy-in that the municipalities and Regional District had patiently strived towards in the preceding years (Tate, 2009). The Act provided the governance capacity that dictated that member municipalities must provide Regional Context Statements, specifying how their Official Community Plans would fit into the Regional District’s growth management plans. Also, the legislation indicated that regional policies must set 20 year horizons, and focus on broad brush-stroke type planning, such as regional infrastructure and service provision as well as consensus-based goals for regional growth strategies. This new collaborative environment, in concert with the

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14 In 1996, the Growth Strategies Act was rolled into a revised Municipal Act, and re-titled the Local Government Act (Tate, 2009).
voluntary work that the Regional District was facilitating through the ‘Creating our Future’ program, culminated in the drafting of the Livable Region Strategic Plan (LRSP), adopted by the members of the GVRD on January 26, 1996, and with the strengthened partnership in the provincial government, deemed to be a regional growth strategy by the Minister of Municipal Affairs, and given royal assent on February 10, 1996 (GVRD, 1999).

The dream half a decade earlier to enhance the powers of the Regional District had finally become a reality. The LRSP’s answer to the enforcement so grossly absent from previous plans was the establishment of formal agreements between municipalities, through the Regional Context Statements, transit partnerships between the province with the goal to strike a new regionally-based transit body, which would re-establish the relationship between regional planning and transit provision, and various other strategic agreements, including those with the Provincial Agricultural Land Commission, the Greater Vancouver Convention and Visitors Bureau, and presence on various influential Boards, including the Vancouver International Airport, the various Port Authorities, and coordinating powers on the newly formed Intergovernmental Advisory Committee, “which brings municipal, regional and provincial agencies together to discuss regional issues and provide advice to the GVRD board” (GVRD, 1999: 14). With specific regard to Town Centre policy, the regional strategy took a broader vision by wrapping the policy into the second of four “Policy Directions”:

- Protect the Green Zone
- Build Complete Communities
- Achieve a Compact Metropolitan Region
- Increase Transportation Choice

Also significant was the recognition of the importance of the Metropolitan Core, and the inclusion of 13 Municipal Town Centres atop the already designated eight Regional Town Centres mentioned previously, though the plan permits generous flexibility to municipal plans to recognize additional municipal town centres if they are deemed to fit the criteria of “medium and higher-density residential development in both ground-oriented housing and apartments,” combined with “a mixture of region-serving business and local services, be transit and pedestrian-oriented, and be linked by bus connections to the regional transportation system” (GVRD, 1999: 11). Another important modification between the LRSP and predecessor plans is the glaring absence of specific figures to describe what regional
planners would like to see in the Regional Town Centres. Perhaps the planners took the advice of University of British Columbia Master’s student and later Senior Planner for the GVRD, Ralph Perkins. In 1992, the graduate student’s Master’s Thesis delivered a scathing rebuke of previous plans, with the deliberate intention to inform the consultation leading up to the establishment of the LRSP. Although Perkins levies the majority of his criticisms against the composition of Town Centres, he also presents a more nuanced criticism against the policy that originally crafted them. Among the qualification that a “self-sufficient RTC would have to be approximately one tenth the size of downtown Vancouver in terms of commercial space and available service,” upon examining a variety of sources, Perkins (1992) found the following ingredients that Town Centres would need to realize:

- a surrounding population of 100,000 to 150,000;
- one million square feet of office space;
- $50 million in annual retail sales;
- 700,000 square feet of retail space;
- 2,000 to 3,000 dwelling units within a short walk;
- 7,000 to 10,000 jobs within a short walk;
- 250,000 square feet of recreational space;
- a site area of only 100 to 200 acres (40.5 to 81 hectares).

Aside from the recognition that there is no universal measurement of office space, such as the apparent confusion in whether to tabulate utility closets in office complexes, or a manager’s office in a retail outlet or industrial warehouse, or hallway corridor space, sending such specific marching orders to municipalities would have likely been an epic governance challenge, as Larry Beasley found in his 1976 Master’s Thesis (Perkins, 1992). Even Metrotown, the most perceptibly successful Town Centre (Perkins, 1992; Newman & Kenworthy, 1999; MacLellan, 2004a), had extreme difficulties in playing by the GVRD’s strict rules. Beasley found that the City of Burnaby had resisted strongly the Regional District’s preferred method of financing and management for its own RTC. Whereas the GVRD envisioned a quasi-institutional development corporation, the City preferred to undertake the project on its own, comfortable that its own ‘Metrotown’ model was already proceeding just fine despite the delays caused by its strict design standards process (Beasley, 1976). The City was also reluctant to pace itself according to the Regional District’s plans of developing Town Centres in pairs.
And so, by 1996, within the Livable Region Strategic Plan, the Regional District re-launched the Town Centre program, but this time with an obvious reluctance to specify design standards, composition, or directives on management oversight.

4.6 New Plans, Old Habits

On the tails of the LRSP, it was evident that the region needed an expansion of transit, primarily to finally bring the rapidly growing municipalities in the Northeast Sector into the transit accessibility fold. Up to this point, the RTCs in Burnaby, New Westminster, and Surrey were connected and linked to Vancouver’s downtown core. Though a connection to Langley was no more a realistically foreseeable option than it is today, linking Coquitlam’s RTC to the transit network was viewed as the next logical step in a metropolitan region whose suburbs were the largest and fastest-growing in Canada (Howard, 1995).

But in 1995, if accusations aired in the newspapers were any measure, it was already becoming apparent that the province, this time under leadership of the New Democrats, was tinkering with the regional transit planning process again, as suggested by this colourful news article from 1995: “No Joy in Sight for B.C. Commuters: the partisan advantage of Keeping Vancouver-Area Planning Decisions to Itself has Become Apparent to the Provincial New Democratic Government” (ibid). In December 1994, the Regional transit planning Council of municipally elected representatives met together thanks to the new planning environment created by the provincial government which kicked off the new era with the release of the Transport 2021 plan, a document that was intended to produce results for transit in a revolutionary engagement between local officials and the province (Tomalty, 2002). The plan was to construct an extension from New Westminster to connect into the Coquitlam RTC. However, by June the following year, a decision had been made by the Regional Council to touch only the western border of Coquitlam with a line that would travel along Lougheed Highway in Burnaby and Broadway/Grandview in Vancouver, to the existing Broadway Station via a new Commercial Drive Station constructed directly beneath in a railway right-of-way located in the Grandview Cut. Criticizing the line, and a “pie-in-the-sky” proposed extension from Lougheed Town Centre Station to Coquitlam that was not ultimately delivered, by now long-time Mayor Lou Sekora exclaimed,
“It’s for political reasons that they chose the Broadway line. [...] When (transit chair and Burnaby councillor) Derek Corrigan saw Coquitlam-New West was the best line he skewered the figures. And who’s the chair of BC transit and also a Burnaby councillor? That’s a huge conflict of interest.” (Neilson, 1995a)

At the line’s unveiling ceremony, Premier Mike Harcourt stated coolly, “This was the logical choice as shown by the fact the Greater Vancouver Regional District and the Vancouver Regional Transit Commission came to the same conclusion” (Neilson, 1995c). Citing government-commissioned studies defending the planned alignment, Glen Clark, the Minister responsible for B.C. Transit\(^{15}\) at the time, stated “It’s the best because it was the most cost effective and had the best land shaping potential” (ibid). Prior to this announcement, Ben Marr, a GVRD “top civil servant” was quoted in the earlier article in the Globe and Mail, as stating “The question [...] is what comes first: mass transit to shape regional growth or to serve existing residents? I have to believe good planning will rise above politics” (Howard, 1995). As we find in Chapter 5, however, as with many government policy matters – the alignment was likely due to a combination of both planning and politics.

As Tate (2009) notes, though regional planning never fell back into the moribund state it experienced in the mid-1980s, it was a less activist organization than it had appeared in previous years. Although municipalities continued to report back with Regional Context Statements, the Regional District had maintained a fairly low strategic planning profile. In 2002, the GVRD embarked upon “The Sustainable Region Initiative,” considered more of an internal sustainability manifesto for the Regional District than a collaborative regional initiative (Tate, 2009). In 2004, members of the Regional District engaged in heated debate to prevent the recently elected provincial B.C. Liberal government from expanding the Port Mann Bridge, a key commuter bridge spanning the Fraser River and connecting the municipalities of Surrey, Delta, and Langley with the communities of Vancouver, Burnaby, New Westminster, and the Northeast Sector. Part of a federal-provincial partnership, the Pacific Gateway Program is a multi-billion dollar package of primarily roadway improvements, advocated by the provincial government to address congestion that particularly impacts goods movement across the region. However, many critics see the project as principally benefitting industrial and logistics sector donors to the provincial Liberal Party. It is also mused that the project has the added side benefit of aiding future re-election bids by Kevin Falcon, the MLA who oversaw the

\(^{15}\) Provincial corporation charged with transit infrastructure during this time.
Ministry of Transportation during the project’s planning process, and whose seat is within the heart of the Surrey community that is expected to accrue the greatest commuting benefits from a greatly expanded highway network. These plans do not bode well for a Regional District that collectively extols the virtues of compact urbanization.

In recent years, urbanization characterised by low density housing has been growing much more rapidly in the region than have compact communities (Sightline Institute, 2008), suggesting a trend towards a US-dominant pattern of suburban development (Raad & Kenworthy, 1998). However, as we find with the Regional Town Centres, there is a considerable degree of variation in growth across the region, suggesting that the trend towards low density housing does not apply evenly across the board. Appendix B provides a visual comparison of the size of these regional town centres among other information. At the smallest, New Westminster is approximately 96 hectares, while the largest is Richmond, at either 814 hectares or 932 hectares, depending on which record one consults (See Table 3). Material available on the Metro Vancouver (GVRD) website (www.metrovancouver.org) indicates a Regional Town Centre that is 814 hectares, whereas current planning documents from the City of Richmond indicate a Regional Town Centre that is 932 hectares. All other Regional Town Centres reflect boundaries presented by each respective government body and the Regional District. There have however, been changes over time. The most notable change is the Surrey Regional Town Centre, which has altered shape since that RTC was first established in 1976 as the Whalley-Guildford RTC, a 400 hectare core area within an overall 918.5 hectare area. Table 3 (see following page) shows the wide variation in both size and density of present Regional Town Centres.
In an effort to further compare densities of Regional Town Centres within their respective cities, a second subset of data has been provided within Elsewhere, a measure of those areas of the municipality excluding the Regional Town Centres. This data is somewhat problematic however, particularly as we see with Maple Ridge, for municipalities that are composed largely of farmland. Nonetheless, it is interesting to compare more highly urban areas such as the City of North Vancouver, Vancouver, Burnaby, and New Westminster. The only notable challenge however, is the comparison for the Langley Regional Town Centre, an RTC that straddles both the City of Langley and the Township of Langley. However, because most of the RTC is located in the City, the City has been presented as opposed to the Township.

As some observers have noted, particularly Churchman (1999), the concept of density can be somewhat ambiguous, depending on which measurement one uses. For instance, when
looking at Metrotown, if we include Central Park, a large urban park measuring approximately 92.6 hectares, the density is 83 persons per hectare. When we exclude Central Park however, the density rises to 120 persons per hectare. The same could be said when including other forms not specifically related to residential, such as roads and commercial zones. Because data is not easily available to compare residential only zones in all RTCs, it is therefore useful to compare using another quantitative measurement that has been at the centre of many regional discussions: transit usage. The most reliable data that we have to compare transit usage is mode of transportation to work data from the Statistics Canada 2006 Census (Table 4).

Table 4 | Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other method’ from within the census. (a)Because there was no registered population in the City of Richmond’s RTC boundary addition, it is not necessary to provide two comparisons as with the previous Table. This (a) is the figure for the City of Langley only, the majority of the RTC is located within. Including the Township of Langley, the figures would respectively be: 51,250; 81.39%; 3.02%; 3.33%; 0.17%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RTC</th>
<th>Total mode of transportation</th>
<th>Car, truck, van, as passenger or driver</th>
<th>Public transit</th>
<th>Walked</th>
<th>Other Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrotown RTC</td>
<td>10,025</td>
<td>45.79%</td>
<td>42.04%</td>
<td>10.62%</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby elsewhere</td>
<td>83,635</td>
<td>76.92%</td>
<td>28.03%</td>
<td>5.12%</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coquitlam RTC</td>
<td>10,210</td>
<td>75.61%</td>
<td>15.72%</td>
<td>6.42%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coquitlam elsewhere</td>
<td>44,375</td>
<td>82.28%</td>
<td>13.43%</td>
<td>3.11%</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonsdale RTC</td>
<td>11,155</td>
<td>59.03%</td>
<td>25.19%</td>
<td>12.86%</td>
<td>2.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. North V. elsewhere</td>
<td>12,565</td>
<td>75.29%</td>
<td>16.04%</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langley RTC</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>79.44%</td>
<td>8.24%</td>
<td>8.42%</td>
<td>3.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langley elsewhere</td>
<td>5,970</td>
<td>91.46%</td>
<td>3.94%</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maple Ridge RTC</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>74.39%</td>
<td>13.33%</td>
<td>10.88%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maple Ridge elsewhere</td>
<td>30,425</td>
<td>88.33%</td>
<td>6.89%</td>
<td>2.56%</td>
<td>2.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New West RTC</td>
<td>4,410</td>
<td>52.49%</td>
<td>39.80%</td>
<td>5.67%</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New West elsewhere</td>
<td>26,080</td>
<td>67.33%</td>
<td>24.54%</td>
<td>6.21%</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond RTC</td>
<td>15,025</td>
<td>73.41%</td>
<td>16.07%</td>
<td>8.35%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond elsewhere</td>
<td>63,505</td>
<td>84.37%</td>
<td>10.81%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey City Centre RTC</td>
<td>7,230</td>
<td>64.11%</td>
<td>29.25%</td>
<td>4.91%</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey elsewhere</td>
<td>177,130</td>
<td>85.80%</td>
<td>10.12%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Metro Core</td>
<td>72,445</td>
<td>37.98%</td>
<td>24.74%</td>
<td>31.45%</td>
<td>5.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver elsewhere</td>
<td>208,100</td>
<td>64.45%</td>
<td>25.25%</td>
<td>5.51%</td>
<td>4.79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 features a breakdown of this data, and Appendix C features this data in a visual way for a better means of comparing the Regional Town Centres. Through this data, and regarding the earlier data comparison, we are able to reach a much clearer distinction between the RTCs. For example, although Lonsdale has an equivalent density to that of Metrotown, the latter has a much higher transit ridership to work statistic, demonstrating that a much greater share of residents are utilizing transit as a means of regular commuting-travel.
Nonetheless, the higher overall transit ridership within Lonsdale and Metrotown over the other parts of each respective municipality demonstrates that higher densities within a Town Centre formation make a difference to transportation choice, a trend which echoes to a lesser or greater extent across all Town Centres. In admission though, this data still fails to capture a concise description of the character of these urban areas, a qualitative descriptor which would explain, for example, the high levels of walk to work trips in the Vancouver Metro Core. However, a verbal description of each RTC would far exceed the scope and space allotted for this project, though others have made succinct observations. Citing the large size of the Regional Town Centres, Tomalty (1997) quoted an interviewee who shared his critical opinion regarding the composition of Regional Town Centres:

The myth is that these are town centres, but I think a lot are not. They’re glorified shopping centres and residential towers... there are all these other amenities that have to go along with the community if we are going to call it a town centre. (Tomalty, 1997: 51)

Certainly, this could be said for many of the Regional Town Centres. As we recall, the impetus for the massive Whalley-Guildford RTC was the vision of connecting two sprawling malls. Though it would be premature to call the Regional Town Centre policy a failure in regards to generating urban character, some of the historical trends make the state of current strategic growth affairs no terrible surprise. The twenty year window for the LRSP has now lapsed, and since then, elected representatives have once again been deliberating on new growth management proposals in the successor document, optimistically called “Metro Vancouver 2040: Shaping Our Future,” more commonly referred to as the “Regional Growth Strategy” (RGS). In this document, Town Centres have been placed in Strategy 1.2, “Focus growth in Urban Centres and Frequent Transit Development Areas,” as part of a package of related strategies, under Goal 1, “Create a Compact Urban Area,” part of five overarching goals, which are similarly interrelated with previous growth management documents. The five goals are:

1. Create a Compact Urban Area
2. Support a Sustainable Economy
3. Protect the Environment and Respond to Climate Change Impacts
4. Develop Complete Communities
5. Support Sustainable Transportation Choices
The consultation process for the RGS has been broader than past plans, likely aided by the improvement of computer technologies, and the advancement of public engagement theory and practice. However, in June 2011, despite the most generous development definitions and liberal growth allowances yet, the RGS faced what appeared to be the stiffest opposition in the history of growth management planning in the region. Despite multiple internal mechanisms designed specifically to resolve differences between municipalities, one holdout, Coquitlam, had posed a potentially insurmountable challenge, protesting that “the new plan gives the region too much power, taking away local control,” (Bula, 2011) to which Mayor of Coquitlam Richard Stewart decried, “It’s a thirty year document [...]. We’ve got a concern with that” (Nagel, 2011b).

In an effort to resolve the logjam, the Regional District triggered a lever of provincial support installed under the 1996 Growth Strategies legislation within the Local Government Act. However, by late May of 2011, it became clear that the B.C. Liberal government Minister of Community, Sport and Cultural Development, Ida Chong, was reluctant to take an active position in the dispute, requesting a non-binding process instead of the binding one that the Regional District was seeking, which cited it as a necessary tool in the view that further discussions with Coquitlam will prove fruitless, noting Coquitlam’s distance on the issue.

He [GVRD Chief Administrative Officer, Johnny Carline] said Coquitlam’s objections “seek to remove all meaning” from the [RGS] plan and amount to “fundamental philosophical opposition to underlying legislation.”

Carline also noted Coquitlam’s planning director chaired the staff-level working group of counterparts around the region who played a key role in crafting the plan, yet council has taken the opposite position. (Nagel, 2011a)

In 2008 during the previous term of the same provincial government, a municipal employee informed Tate (2009) “[...] I actually think things were a bit more functional in the LRSP time than it is now. I think there’s a whole bunch of reasons for that... And I think part of it, to be really honest – is people (at both the GVRD and in member municipalities) are really busy” (Tate, 2009: 207). But maybe it was a lack of sincerity then as it appears to have been so far in 2011. In 2003 for instance, when talks broke down between the GVRD and member municipality City of Richmond over the extraction of land from the regionally agreed upon
Green Zone, the Regional District sought dispute resolution through the Local Government Act with the Province. However, citing ‘ministerial discretion’, the Minister responsible refused to mediate the disagreement, leaving the City of Richmond to extract the land without penalty, leaving the Regional District with “no choice but to stand down” (Tate, 2009).

In some ways, however, this discord is not so unusual, and for this particular case study as further presented below in the City of Burnaby’s own formation of Town Centres, it is important to recognize that the political process is quite inseparable from the planning one.
5: PLANNING FOR TOWN CENTRES: A CASE STUDY OF BURNABY, B.C.

In some ways it’s unfair to draw general conclusions on the basis of trends in such uniquely different municipalities. There is a plethora of circumstances that have led to higher rates of density and transit ridership. For instance, more available farmland in outer suburbs such as Richmond, Coquitlam, and Surrey puts greater pressure on municipalities to permit development opportunities, in the name of affordable housing, than in inner suburban areas where such land is less abundant. These circumstances tend to duplicate the same sprawling form especially in areas that are poorly served by mass transit service, a cycle which perpetuates itself by being economically unfeasible to introduce new transit services. But sometimes, local governments are able to see past the development opportunities and bring about a shift in thinking. However, this shift has not been the result of cautious planning so much as intense policy formation following a series of significant events. Throughout a general narrative, there are two main points in history that this chapter will highlight. The first consists of the events surrounding the hiring of Director of Planning Tony Parr, and the second is the development of the Metrotown Regional Town Centre. These events mark significant milestones in a broader policy framework that has contributed to the development of Town Centres in Burnaby. Through this process, we will examine all four of Burnaby’s Town Centres, and later we will compare them using various methods, both to each other and to other urban areas in the region.

As far as at least Metro Vancouver is concerned, Burnaby is a somewhat unique municipality, a characteristic that may help explain why some policies were unique to the City. To begin this story, we must for a moment step further back into time than the creation of the Town Centre program in Burnaby.
5.1 Radical Roots

Since early settlement, Burnaby gained the reputation as a strong working class area. To frame this history in context, Harris (2004) notes that considerable differences exist between American and Canadian suburban growth. While traditional thought has been that North American suburbanization has led to the “embourgeoisement” of the working class, or cases such as white flight that were the norm in American cities, a different reality emerged in Canada, though with variation between particular areas (Harris, 2004). While American homeownership was seen as a method to dilute social unrest, “some of the more radical movements in modern Canadian history were rooted in suburban communities of working-class homeowners, especially those who had built their own homes” (Harris, 2004: 43). This was no more the case than in South Vancouver and more particularly Burnaby, which along with Winnipeg’s North End, York and East York in the Toronto area, provided fertile ground for political and social movements. In fact, as Seager and Fowler (1995) note, broad support for socialism was one of the few defining characteristics of an early Burnaby that was otherwise settled along a north-south axis. That support translated into sweeping success by the Canadian Commonwealth Federation (CCF), predecessor of the current centre-left New Democratic Party. CCF Member of the Legislative Assembly Ernest Winch held his seat for just over twenty-three years (Seager & Fowler, 1995). A bricklayer by trade, Winch was groomed through a radical Marxist faction of the Socialist Party of Canada prior to the First World War (ibid). However, challenges to the CCF’s power occasionally came from Communist Party candidates with ties to unemployed movements and labour unions who have also historically been very active throughout Burnaby (ibid).

Although candidates to municipal council typically ran as independents during the earlier years, “it was not until the 1950s that party-backed slates, organized by the CCF and the Liberals, emerged” (Seager & Fowler, 1995: 31). And so, in July of 1950, the first record was published of a political movement that would last to the present day. “A number of churches and other interested citizens” gathered in a hall at the West Burnaby United Church for a meeting hosted by the local Reverend, where the first order of business [...] was establishing a campaign to oppose the granting of beer and liquor licenses in Burnaby” (“BCA oppose”, 1950). By 1955, the Burnaby Citizens’ Association (BCA), as the quintessentially-CCF union of religious and union supporters came to be formally called, set out an official platform on which to run in
the municipal election. Perhaps not so surprising considering the socialist nature of much of the membership, the first item on the platform called for “the need for more careful controls in the sale of Municipal Lands” ("BCA group", 1955). The second item called for the “re-organization of the administrative structure of the Municipality in such a way as to achieve a clear cut line of authority from the Reeve and Council through to the department heads and the department staffs” (ibid), a call that was echoed by BCA candidate Caroline Prior:

> There is a growing need for coordination between various municipal departments and this need will increase as Burnaby expands. But management is and must remain the responsibility of reeve and council if we wish to keep municipal affairs in a healthy state. ("Municipal management", 1955).

However, if Prior’s views were common at the time, they were apparently handled inappropriately by members opposing the governing party in 1963. Holding the first majority on Council since 1956, the right leaning slate of the Non Partisans Association (NPA) triggered controversy when they took the liberty to terminate the employment of the municipality’s first Director of Planning.

### 5.2 The Death and Life of Planning

The exact reasons for the termination of the Municipal Planner are somewhat unclear. William John Blakely began his employment at the City of Burnaby in 1954 as a Planning Engineer. In 1956, Blakely was appointed as the municipality’s first Director of Planning. However, in the summer of 1963 during an in-camera Council meeting with a two thirds majority, the NPA dismissed the Director of Planning along with Director of Engineering. Though cause was not given, a local newspaper speculated on what the reason might be:

> [Blakely] has received less spectacular but equally persistent criticism for his stand against spot rezoning for industrial prospects, mainly from the direction of Councillor Warren Clark, this year named Planning Committee chairman. A clear conflict of policy now seems to exist between Blakely’s firmness in backing previous and current planning objectives, and the NPA’s desire to attract more high tax-paying industry to Burnaby to relieve the tax burden on homeowners, even at the expense of locating new industry where good planning principles would be abandoned. ("Frightening developments", 1963)

Shortly following the firing, the five year veteran Reeve, Alan Emmott, who was one of the three minority BCA members on Council, came to the defence of Blakely. The election
campaign that year revolved around Emmott’s vehement criticism of the governing NPA, and by December of that year, the Council seats were reversed, with the BCA winning six of eight eligible positions on Council (see Appendix D). The local newspaper would later retrospectively note, “The firing of William Blakely, planner, and Quentin Lake, engineer\textsuperscript{16}, was credited to be the largest single factor accounting for the overwhelming defeat of the NPA councillors” ("BCA majority", 1963).

Not long after taking control of Council, the new BCA majority quickly set to reinstating the Director of Planning. After Blakely turned the position down for unknown reasons despite a resoundingly supportive Council, a cross-Canada search was struck to hire a new planner ("New municipal", 1964). After reviewing fifty qualified applications from across Canada, Council took the advice of a human resources consultant to hire Anthony (Tony) Lea Parr as Director of Planning (ibid). At the time of the hire, media reports of the inconsistency of developments across the City were rife. Some referred to their inappropriate placement, while others referred to the diversity of building methods, often resulting in substandard apartment construction. Through that lens, it was widely agreed that regulations needed closer consideration, with the greatest concern related to the state of apartment construction. The situation became so serious, that in March of 1964, Council directed that in spite of weekly development applications, they “would not consider rezoning for high-rise until a sociological and economic study has been concluded to decide the need and desirability of such projects within the municipality” ("Planner swamped", 1964). But the creation of a comprehensive plan would not happen overnight. Parr was left with a planning department near shambles. He told Council that since taking on the position one month prior, it would take three to four years to clear backlogged reports and studies in the Department. While compiling a comprehensive apartment plan under Council’s insistence, Parr was also under pressure to staff up positions that had previously gone unfilled, enabling him to further extend his mark on the department.

In 1965 though, Parr faced his first setback. A Council hearing in March 1965 saw the rejection of an early iteration of the newly minted Director of Planning’s "Core Locations" policy, which piggy-backed on a report produced by the Lower Mainland Planning Board. The report’s recommendations called for the development of high rise apartments in only five

\textsuperscript{16}Lake, the Director of Engineering was also fired, though unlike professional reasons with Blakely, it was suspected that Lake was fired because of personal conflicts with a member of Council, who was also a former employee of the Director’s ("Blakely, Lake sacked", 1963).
areas: the already well-established Hastings corridor, and four other areas including those bounded by three of the existing Town Centres\(^{17}\), which were then referred to as Brentwood, Simpson’s Sears (Metrotown), as well as the Middlegate and Edmonds area (together now known as Edmonds District Centre at the time) ("Core apartment", 1965). One of the staunchest opponents, NPA members Emmet Cafferky and John Drummond, were bothered that the plan would outlaw high rise construction elsewhere in the City (ibid). They argued that low rise garden apartments along Kingsway were unsuitable, where high rise apartments would be better suited going into the future. In agreement with the report however, BCA member Russell Hicks defended the policy on the premise that garden apartments are important for providing a diversity in housing options, striking back at his opposition Council colleagues, arguing that, “If Drummond is not satisfied with the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board report, or with our Planning Department, he should read planning books at the library” ("Core apartment", 1965). In addition to concerns over strategic planning, NPA Councillors also attacked the plan on other alleged deficiencies, as Councillor Cafferky offered: “What Councillor Hicks has talked about is not core living – it’s communal living!,” a jab at the BCA’s sympathies for socialist causes (ibid). Ultimately, the plan was defeated by the BCA majority over fears expressed by NPA members that denying high rise development along high traffic corridors could restrict opportunities for higher density development far into the future.

Deflated but not defeated, Parr went back to the drawing board, and in 1966, he returned with an Apartment Study plan that received approval from Council. Still giving priority to key growth areas, the plan expanded apartment development to ten areas, though specifically emphasizing the development of Town Centres in three key locations, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. Through 1966, developers began to kick off high rise projects in the core apartment areas, showing early uptake of the policy. A review of the Apartment Studies plan in 1969 revealed that the plan was progressing on track, and more importantly, that Council was warming to comprehensive growth plans for the City.

Though work on the Simpsons-Sears Town Centre was proceeding slowly as Council awaited the impending vacation of large industrial tenants, the other Town Centres were clipping along at a fair pace of development. Between Brentwood and Lougheed though, it was

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\(^{17}\) Although the article makes no mention of the Lougheed Town Centre, the Lougheed Cameron planning area was also slated for apartment development in the Apartment Study (Burnaby, 1966).
apparent that the Town Centre concept came to rely heavily on the presence of a strong retail anchor.

In the case of Lougheed Town Centre, that area grew out of two competing proposals. The first, unsuccessful proposal was one that was advocated by the City of Vancouver and designed in anticipation of the construction of Simon Fraser University. The site, located on the southwest slope of Burnaby Mountain, and referred to as the Simon Fraser Townsite, was envisioned as a community that would link the University with the municipality’s northeast area ("Burnaby advances", 1965). The City of Vancouver advocated that site because it would see the dramatic increase in value of an unused overflow cemetery owned by the City ("Townsite master", 1965). However, following market analyses and pressure from the University to maintain reserve land for future research needs, the municipality of Burnaby felt compelled to abandon the 1,619 hectare Simon Fraser Townsite in favour of a Town Centre further down the mountain surrounding a 15 hectare shopping centre indented to be the core near the intersection of Lougheed Highway and North Road, dividing Coquitlam and Burnaby, where it presently exists (Hancock, 1965; "Townsite master", 1965).

Throughout all these plan iterations, it was always the City’s main concern that any shopping center proposal features a significant anchor tenant, so much that the City became directly involved in negotiations with the Hudson’s Bay Company to locate in the anticipated Lougheed shopping centre (Burnaby, 1967). This direct involvement into the development of a mall would echo the Director of Planning’s public comments on the ingredients of a Town Centre: “The ‘Town Centre’ is seen as forming the ‘downtown’ for suburban areas, providing a major focus of activity for the individual citizens” (Mabell, 1965). Parr seemed intent that shopping centres would provide the nexus for Town Centre development moving into the future, where apartment towers would serve as “complimentary [sic] land use” to larger sized shopping centres (Mabell, 1965a). Within Lougheed Mall though, Council also wished for the mall developer to include a public amenity contribution such as an indoor ice rink or adjacent community centre, though assurances from the developer never came to fruition. By the June 1968 ground-breaking, the Hudson’s Bay Company and Woolco Department Stores of Canada had guaranteed a presence in the mall, though there would be no such community amenity in what was billed to be the largest shopping centre in Western Canada ("Mall construction", 1968). The construction of Lougheed though, would cement the notion that Parr considered
that shopping centres would be the key to both focusing and increasing densities in Burnaby. Located west along the Lougheed Highway, across from the Brentwood shopping centre within the Brentwood Town Centre, work was carrying ahead on 800 residential units in six tower buildings, ranging from twelve to twenty stories in height. It was anticipated that once completed, the site would be the “largest single residential unit in Western Canada” (“Brentwood high rise”, 1965).

In 1968, the Burnaby Planning Department hired a private consulting firm to assist with the production of a Brentwood Town Centre Study. That study was produced in the guise of an urban renewal strategy for an area that was mainly composed of light industrial and centred on the Brentwood Mall, eight years old by that time. The *Brentwood Town Center Study 1968* outlined a vision of the Brentwood area that included greatly increased residential densities, a heavy contrast to the low density suburban neighbourhood located directly on its north boundary. Interestingly, it drew attention to the “large amount of open air parking structures” (Parr, 1968). It went on to note that “This is detrimental to the kind of urban environment envisioned for this Town Centre core and the [Brentwood shopping centre] Developer should be encouraged to provide underground parking at a relative cost of $1,500 per stall” (ibid). Interestingly, when the shopping centre owner, Triton Centres Limited was handed a copy of the report for comment, they indicated strong support for including a strong commercial office component as part of a future expansionary phase (Holmes, 1968). However, as we find later, it would be four decades before any such plan would be seriously considered.

A planning report in 1970 would continue to cement the importance of the three Town Centres. It would however, also emphasise their reliance on anchor shopping centres, including the Brentwood shopping centre and the newly developed Lougheed Mall (Parr, 1970). Even despite this however, the Planners were steadfastly aware that they alone could not possibly force the full implementation of the Town Center vision as well and as quickly as they would have otherwise preferred. In one item of correspondence for instance, Planning Director Tony Parr writes to a developer who is interested in building low-rise office space in the centre of the Brentwood Town Centre, within an area which Council had previously approved for “a high density commercial development” (Parr, 1971; see Figure 20). In rationalizing his refusal to support the development application, Parr went on to state:
It is our opinion that in view of the prime location of the subject lots, high intensity retail uses with a considerable drawing power should be part of the proposed development. This approach would further facilitate the establishment of a proper relationship between the two areas of the Town Centre on each side of Willingdon Avenue. (Parr, 1971: 1)

![Figure 20 | Brentwood Town Center core (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series).](image)

However, in other cases, planners accepted that there is only so much that can be controlled. For instance, in a document entitled *Community Plans*, which preceded the legislatively required Official Community Plans which would come later, the City recognized that adjustments to the Brentwood Town Centre plans were required as a result of shifting market demands in the area.

Although the 1969 revised apartment study proposed the area bounded by Gilmore, Douglas, Madison and Lougheed for future medium density apartments, the existing commercial and industrial developments are such that it is unlikely that they would be replaced by medium density apartments. In the last four years, three additional industrial developments have taken place, which will further restrict the potential for apartment developments. Therefore, as a result of the industrial developments both within and around the area, we would recommend that the apartment study be revised so as to acknowledge the existing and potential service commercial and industrial developments within the area. (Burnaby, 1970: Community Plan #9)

Conversely, in other cases, planners were successful in rejecting proposals to build competing developments outside the Town Centres. In one case in 1966, Planning Director
Parr brought a report to Council, rejecting a proposed apartment project that would have brought 258 residential units with between two and three bedrooms on a 6.8 hectare site ("Council halts", 1966). Parr noted that a residential development of that size would negatively alter the surrounding neighbourhood located immediately north of the Brentwood Town Centre, bringing increased traffic into a predominantly single family residential area. Despite pressure from the developer’s lawyer, a former Vancouver Councillor, Burnaby Council sided with Parr in rejecting the development ("Council halts", 1966).

In 1974, a third major policy in the spirit of the 1966 and 1969 Apartment Studies was released. The Public Meetings: Phase One was arguably the city’s attempt to confront what was viewed as a new era in municipal planning; a realization that traditional methods of creating plans and soliciting public input afterwards was not a satisfactory process.

[...] over the past months the nature of public meetings has changed, and it is clear that people no longer want ready answers. In order to fully understand what is involved they desire to be included from the beginning in discussions as a part of preparing proposals for their community, rather than be presented with completed plans for comment. (Burnaby, 1974a: 2)

In addition to a change of planning process, the document also presented a more sophisticated vision of Town Centres, elaborating the concept of a more established hierarchy as imagined through the 1971 theoretical text, Urban Structure. But, in addition to the Kingsway-Sussex/ Simpson Sears Metrotown designation, the text also articulated a parallel policy narrative regarding the preservation of existing single family neighbourhoods. In essence, it appeared that the strategy for the Town Centre concept was as much about maintaining the prevalence of traditional single family neighbourhoods as it was about creating concentrated nodes of high density. Through this, it is likely that the Planning Department was able to find support for the Town Centre concept by providing an opportunity to avoid densification in single family neighbourhoods. Thus, item one on the work plan appended to The Public Meetings stated that the Planning Department begin “a review of those single family areas where the residential character should be preserved and densities remain unchanged” (Burnaby, 1974a: iii). However, this is not to downplay the significance of apartment habitation for future population growth in Burnaby. In 1974, the Director of Planning emphasized that new growth in the City was anticipated to be achieved increasingly through apartment construction. To achieve the goal of 40,000 new units in 25 years, Parr
indicated that the proportion of apartments units would therefore increase from 32.2% of dwellings in the municipality that year to 58% by 2000 (Ross, 1974).

Stemming from The Public Meetings: Phase One and in nearing anticipation of industrial land availability, the municipality went quickly to work on an ambitious plan for Metrotown. In 1977, the municipality published a report in the form of an 83 page book, titled Burnaby Metrotown: A Development Plan. In that text, many of the same concepts from Urban Structure were echoed.

Deviating from the other established Town Centres, the plan provided the vision for a highly mixed use centre with a much greater balance and connection between public and private spaces. In Brentwood for instance, the uses had become dominated by large floor plate land owners, centred around the Brentwood shopping centre, an 11.5 hectare private retail space further surrounded by a sea of parking. Metrotown, conversely, would seek to hide the automobile beneath a centre (see Figure 21), which would be highly mixed across the entire core (see Figure 22). In addition to mixed uses, building heights would also be varied (see Figure 23). The proposal for Metrotown presented a very different image than the existing Town Centres, in part because long overdue and now anticipated transit connections would enable planners to facilitate a pedestrian environment that was otherwise impossible during the designation of the other established areas. Two years after the Metrotown plan was released however, a series of events were triggered that would irreversibly alter the future of Metrotown.

On November 17, 1979, the Burnaby Citizens’ Association (BCA) suffered one of its biggest upsets in years and for the first time in decades, did not hold the Mayor’s seat (see Appendix D). Incumbent Councillor and long-time right-leaning Burnaby Voters’ Association
(BVA) party organizer Bill Lewarne attributed his win to a stronger electoral organization and a platform that was “more receptive to the ideas of all, and not just special interest groups” (Isfeld, 1979a). Lewarne may very well have been referring to the close relationship that the BCA had with the provincial New Democratic Party. In 1973, then-BCA-Mayor Tom Constable left his post to take on the provincial role of Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Municipal Affairs in the Dave Barrett Government. Further explaining his party’s victory, Lewarne admitted that he “had not anticipated a voter sweep by Mercier, but said that the mayor-elect’s support of extended shopping hours and the advertising campaign in local shopping centres and through the mail had ‘a dramatic effect’” (ibid). Lewarne was referring to a fairly heated debate that had been occurring just prior to the election, where the incumbent BCA Council had openly opposed an extension to shopping centre hours.

As local media reports pointed out, the owner of the Brentwood and Lougheed shopping centres did not take well to this debate. Seeking to shift the perspective on the issue, Trizec Equities Ltd.:

[...] sponsored an advertising campaign in their malls and in the mail under the heading “Why can’t you?”, a catchy phrase to draw the reader into the current controversy over the extension of shopping hours for retail stores, with the emphasis on opening up Wednesday nights and (ever so gently) Sundays. The advertising copy outlined findings of a recent survey, sponsor by Trizec itself, showing 78 per cent of Burnaby residents in favour of extended shopping hours and, among other findings, that 100 of 141 merchants in the two malls also favour the extension. (Isfeld, 1979b)

Along with the campaign, the mall published a list of candidates who favoured the mall owner’s position together with a picture of the eventual successful Mayoral candidate, David Mercier, in newsletters that were distributed to all mall patrons within the two malls. Equally interesting, contributing to the seismic shift in Council, the newspaper also notes that the
incumbent Mayor also allegedly lost support when he expressed an interest to bring the business community under the BCA tent:

> Even his old union, The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, declined to endorse his candidacy for the first time. And despite years of trying, Constable never had much credibility with the business community of Burnaby which was solidly behind Mercier this election. (Rankin, 1979)

Almost immediately following the election, the new Council began to practice a different vision of governance. Echoing the events of 1962 with the BVA’s predecessor, an altercation between a Councillor and the Director of Planning made front page news in the local paper. Councillor Vic Stusiak presented a notice of motion in an in-camera Council meeting to rescind approving officer authority for City Planner Tony Parr, stating “He has very broad interpretive powers. I will say that I think it may be a conflict of professional interests, no matter who the approving officer is” (“Planner’s powers”, 1980). However, Stusiak’s insistence that his “motion is not aimed at Parr. It’s aimed at the approving officer” would suggest that, there was the perception of a personal attack. This raises a very interesting premise, that since his hire in 1964, there had been no mention of such an attack on the Director of Planning, though as discussed above, there were times when other right-leaning Councillors objected to the Planners’ long range visions. However, this was the first time during Parr’s tenure when the executive (as relevant political theorist Faludi, 1973 refers to as the Mayor) was no longer of the same political stripe as when Parr was hired. Without a friendly Mayor, Parr was left vulnerable and challenged.

The interceding years prior to the next election in 1981 did not see considerable activity on Town Centres, and work on the 1977 Metrotown concept seemed almost non-existent. One of the largest planning projects at the time, however, was the Residential Growth Management Study. Essentially, this was a program designed to investigate opportunities where densities in single family neighbourhoods could be raised. It was the first time that such a program had been considered, and was a deviation from previously stated intentions to focus development in Town Centres. Eventually referred to as the Residential Neighbourhood Environment Study, the plan divided the municipality into the existing 29 planning areas, and surveyed residents on the acceptance of densification methods such as

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18 In 1966, a split in the Non Partisan’s Association caused the party to field no candidates in that November’s municipal election. The BVA ostensibly carried the right slate thereafter (Marino, 1966)
secondary suite conversions and triplex and fourplex conversions, among a variety of different +infill methods (Burnaby, 1981). By 1984 however, the proposal, reviled in the media by residents as the Compaction Plan, was resoundingly defeated as Council quietly laid the program to rest ("Nobody mourns", 1984). In the meantime, following another election win by the BVA, it was quickly becoming apparent that the 1977 Metrotown plan was just a distant afterthought. Since coming to power, the plan for Metrotown had deviated further from a mixed use concept and further towards the type of single use retail residents had become familiar with.

5.3 Metrotown Regional Town Centre

In 1982, it was revealed that the chief developer on the Metrotown core, Daon Development Corp., was encountering considerable financial difficulties. The developer had been permitted by Council to construct a “Park Royal-sized shopping centre and apartment complex” (Todd, 1982). The project was so significantly threatened, that when speaking about the expected transit station being proposed for the area as part of the anticipated elevated light rail construction, a BC Transit spokesperson indicated “if the market doesn’t turn around and there’s no commercial venture, it will be able to serve as just a station” (ibid). So why, in such a few short years, did Metrotown’s development plans move from the highly mixed use type of vision contained in the 1977 plan, to the vision of a mall that “could make Park Royal look small”? (ibid). One explanation could be the economic downturn at the time, where developers were shirking from projects all across the region. The Mayor and Council would therefore have been content that a developer would be coming in to take advantage of a massive industrial site previously held by an old light fixture factory, a food production facility, and Western Canada’s former catalogue distribution centre for Sears merchandise. But there may be another theory.

Daon Development Corp. was founded by Jack Poole, a well connected Social Credit Party supporter and later architect of that party’s transformation into the modern BC Liberal Party (Mason, 2009). It was common in Burnaby, as evidenced by the ascension of former Mayor Bob Prittie, for local Council members to later seek public office or administrative positions with like-minded senior levels of government. Such was also the case of 1979 Mayoral victor, Dave Mercier, who later went on to hold Member of Legislative Assembly
office in the provincial riding of Burnaby-Edmonds for the Social Credit Party. It would therefore, not be too much of a stretch to suspect that there was some collusion between a SoCred-friendly BVA Council and a recognized SoCred supporter, though of course connecting these dots through Council records would not be possible. And indeed, media reports during the day would suggest that then-Mayor Lewarne refused to believe that Daon would not be capable of delivering on their development (Spaner, 1985c).

To add further speculation, in 1985, a large retail developer from Edmonton arrived in Burnaby to assemble a massive 34 hectare site west of the Brentwood Town Centre for the purposes of building a massive regional shopping centre (see Figure 24). The developers, the Ghermezian Family of Triple Five Corp. and owners of Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota and the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, approached Council to construct what was being dubbed as Fantasyland, at the corner of Boundary and Lougheed Highway, across the border from the City of Vancouver. Mayor Lewarne however, quickly came out in opposition to the mall proposal, which would have seen an investment of $300 million investment into the shopping destination and “mini-Disneyland” (Spaner, 1984). The Mayor may have very likely opposed the development because it contravened the Regional Town Centre program, which as we saw in Chapter 4, was suffering during this time from lack of provincial support. However, Lewarne’s suggestion that Triple Five collaborate with Daon Developments to construct the Fantasyland at Metrotown would suggest that the Mayor wasn’t so much dedicated to the Metrotown concept as he was to the unhindered success of Doan (ibid). A spokesperson for Daon however, turned down the possibility of a joint partnership, citing that “Our styles of corporation are very different and it’s not a joint venture [that] I think would be effective.” Despite

Figure 24 | Proposed location for “Fantasyland.” Location is marked by the star (Author’s custom Google Map).
the Mayor’s and Council’s rejection on a rezoning that would have been required, Triple Five continued to pursue the Lougheed and Boundary site anyway (ibid). In 1985, it was revealed that Triple Five had entered into negotiations with staff at both BC Hydro and BC Transit, respectively then the provincial crown electrical and transit utilities, for surplus land that each organization owned on the site (Spaner, 1985c). When BVA Councillors refused to accept campaign contributions from Triple Five representatives in return for support, the corporation demanded that Council include the site on a ballot question ahead of the 1985 municipal election ("Political involvement", 1985). Failing Council’s permission for the ballot question, Triple Five then approached the Provincial Government with a proposal to Cabinet (Spaner, 1985a). By later that month however, Burnaby Social Credit MLA and husband of eventual 1985 BVA Council victor Sheila Veitch, Elwood Veitch reported that Victoria would be distancing itself from Triple Five Corp., a move that would be followed by the abandonment of land negotiations with BC Hydro and BC Transit (Spaner, 1985b). It was a highly unusual move for an otherwise strongly free-market government in a downturn economy.

As soon as it was apparent that Fantasyland plans would be permanently stalled, Lewarne breathed a sigh of relief. Once the project no longer posed a threat to Metrotown, rumours began surfacing over anchor retail tenants who were apprehensive to come into a marketplace that would have potentially been divided by two large centres. Instead, as early as April of 1985, it was revealed that Manufacturer’s Life Assurance Company would be taking a stake in a second massive shopping centre proposed in Metrotown by West Vancouver-based Cal Investments (Gillett, 1985a). In light of the news, Trizec Equities was also planning multimillion dollar expansions and renovations to the Lougheed and Brentwood shopping centres (Gillett, 1985b). By the fall of that year however, Doan’s continued financial problems forced the company to abandon plans at Metrotown. In its place, Toronto shopping centre veteran Cambridge Shopping Centres Ltd. came in to rescue the project ("Daon out", 1985). By this time, it was becoming apparent that Town Centre planning in the municipality was becoming little more than shopping centre planning.

With Doan Developments out of Metrotown, Council’s stance on Metrotown almost instantly took a contrastingly different turn. In September of 1986, exactly one year since Acting Mayor Vic Stusiak and Municipal Manager Melvin Shelley ceremoniously broke ground on Cal’s development, Council received a report from the Director of Planning with concerns
about the pace of development within the Metrotown core. The report pointed out that the adoption of a construction phasing policy which at that point would label all currently completed work as phase one, “would mean that none of the second phases of the three major projects constituting the primary core area would be recommended for advancement until all three first phase projects are completed and occupied” (Burnaby, 1986). The City was concerned that the developments being led by Cal Investments together with Cambridge Shopping Centres and a third minor developer would grow so quickly as to prevent the formation of anything even remotely similar to the fine grained urban fabric that was contained in the 1977 Metrotown plan. However, the phasing policy proposal was quickly protested by Cal Investments, who with the backing of the Manufacturer’s Life Assurance Company, was coming out as the largest and quickest shopping centre builder.

From the start, it became clear that the phasing policy would split Council allegiances. On one side, there was the Mayor as well as a Councillor who at the time owned a clothing store at an adjacent strip mall that would have been in direct competition with retailers within the shopping centre. Those two members of the BVA were joined by BCA Councillors Lee Rankin and shortly afterwards, Doug Drummond. Several separate Council votes transpired on the phasing policy, which was repeatedly rejected by the vast majority of the BVA candidates, with the exception of one occasion when former BCA Mayor-turned BVA Councillor Allan Emmott sided with the phasing policy supporters (Burnaby, 1987a). The Council decision however, caused Cal Investments to bring a lawsuit against the City of Burnaby for approving the phasing motion, which effectively brought a moratorium against the ongoing Metrotown retail projects. In an unprecedented ruling on April of 1987, B.C. Supreme Court Justice Justice John E. Spencer rendered judgement in favour of Cal Investments, stating:

[...] to permit repeated reconsiderations... would both impede the business and bring uncertainty to the affairs of the assembly. No one could rely upon its declared policy from day to day on a closely contested matter. (Pafitt, 1987)

Undeterred by the court ruling, Councillor Lee Rankin insisted that Council should proceed with phasing regardless of the decision, claiming that a phasing policy could still be achieved through the submission of a new community plan (ibid). In the meantime, in an

19 Drummond came out as an initial supporter, who, as a “self-avowed movie fan, said he was particularly pleased the Cal projects calls for three cinemas. ‘We’ll have quite a choice now in Burnaby,’ he said (Gillett, 1985b).
attempt to strike a compromise, Cal Investments signalled intentions to revise their retail-only plan with the inclusion of options on apartment and office components, mainly in the form of tower blocks within the mall (Stainsby, 1987). However, as talks continued to break down following Council’s presentation of a revised community plan, a rift began to show again. On July 13, 1987 Council began the meeting that would introduce a revised community plan. That meeting however recessed at midnight until one week henceforth coincidentally when the Mayor was expected to be out of town (Burnaby, 1987b; Romell, 1987a). On July 21, 1987, Councillor Victor Stusiak resumed the Council meeting, and with a temporary majority of BVA Councillors including Allan Emmott, proceeded to strip any mention of a phasing policy from the planning department’s revised phasing recommendations (Burnaby, 1987b; Romell, 1987a). Despite one more attempt at phasing, it was clear that Council would be unable to stop the pace of development of a retail-only core.

The debates had proved disastrous for the incumbent party. On the municipal election held in November 1987, the Burnaby Voters’ Association was trounced at the polls, going from seven seats to two. Though the shopping centres respectively opened in 1986 just in time for the opening of the adjacent SkyTrain line, competition became intense between Daon Development and Cambridge Shopping Centres. However, in 2002, Cambridge brokered a deal to buy out its competitor; resulting in the merger of both properties (see Appendix E). The merger led to the demolition of a passerelle between the two centres, and the construction of a two story complex that included a central food court location and additional retail stores. Notwithstanding the merger, Sears Canada has retained their property amid further integration into the one previously owned by Daon Developments.

Despite the explosion of retail, it remains clear that Metrotown has continued to attract incredible levels of development interest, as shown by the collection of residential towers in Appendix E. In spite of the monoculture of the Metrotown core’s development, many new construction projects have resulted in a considerable mixture of uses. Crystal
Mall for instance, located on the southwest corner of McKay and Kingsway across from Anthem Properties’ Station Square Mall, features a Hong Kong style mall with significant office and hotel components, highlighted by a 218 unit residential tower that was completed in 1999, all within a 2.2 hectare site. More recently, the area has encountered a flurry of development, including two large mixed use towers and an ambitious redevelopment proposal for Anthem Properties’ Station Square site (see Figure 25). Anthem Properties, who purchased the site in 2004 with The Beedie Group, plan to redevelop the site, which currently contains a large parkade complex and two large format retailers, by renovating those current retail spaces with the addition of office space and the insertion of five residential towers on a 4.1 hectare site, for a potential population of between 1,500 to 1,800 residents by 2020 (Chow, 2011c). To take advantage of the renewed development interest in Metrotown and the other Town Centres, in 2010, the City of Burnaby introduced a suffix ‘s’ zoning to their high rise zoning districts (Burnaby, 2010b). The ‘s’ designation, intended for Town Centre development, permits developers to increase the heights of residential and commercial projects, raising the maximum floor area ratio (FAR) from 2:6 to 5:0, in exchange for enhanced density bonusing contributions. Justifying the move, one Councillor pointed out that “It’s more bang for our buck,” adding that “it would be mean more money and space for the city’s nonprofits” (Fuller-Evans, 2010b).

One result of the move is the development of the Chancellor, a 245 unit, 37-storey
tower with townhouses, built on a former auto service station and just over 500 metres from the Metrotown SkyTrain Station. The density bonus contribution will include construction of an adjacent 800 square metre building to serve as a seniors centre (Chow, 2011b). And within 800 metres of the station, the Sovereign is also undergoing construction, located on the northeast corner of Kingsway and Willingdon across from the Crystal Mall, and will feature a 169 room hotel, 202 residential units, and retail space (see Figure 26). Another mixed use development in the area will be located directly across from the Metrotown SkyTrain Station (see Figure 27). MetroPlace will stand 46 storeys, contain 342 residential units including reduced market rate for 41 units, and up to 150 square metres of community space (Chow, 2011a).

Though the interest in development could be attributed to the intense work that the Greater Vancouver Regional District and moreso the City of Burnaby contributed in its early stages, analyses of the growth cannot ignore the presence of the anchor retail tenants in the area. As the developer of the Chancellor stated, “demand for the project has much to do with its location, next door to Metropolis at Metrotown shopping centre and Bonsor Recreation Centre” (Chow, 2011b). Though the latter can take some credit, the former attracts 25 million visitors per year and within Canada, is second in size in to Triple Five Corp’s West Edmonton Mall (Burnaby, 2007). Though Metrotown shows great promise as a model for transit-oriented development, its future will need to be closely monitored as developments like Station Square and these others take shape, in that the city is better able to anticipate potential hurdles. However, Metrotown has already proved itself on a number of merits. For instance, the area maintains not only the highest density in the region second only to the Metropolitan Core (see Appendix B), but also claims the highest public transit usage for among travellers to work within the region (see Appendix C). As we saw in the previous chapter, Metrotown residents also trump neighbours elsewhere in the City of Burnaby on merits of density and transit usage to work. On the next page are those data sets for Burnaby only.
Table 5 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Bottom chart shows expert from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes data from bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other method’ from the census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Urban Density (pp hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrotown</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby elsewhere</td>
<td>177,189</td>
<td>8,605</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, when we take into account all four Town Centres, a different picture emerges:

Table 6 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Bottom chart shows excerpt from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other method’ from within the census. Population totals for Town Centres (†) were compiled manually by the author using Dissemination Areas from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Sizes of these Town Centres were also manually compiled, using custom area calculation software built on a Google Maps interface (http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm).

<table>
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<th>Population</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Urban Density (pp hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrotown RTC</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentwood TC†</td>
<td>5,798</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonds TC†</td>
<td>22,627</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lougheed TC†</td>
<td>10,804</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby elsewhere</td>
<td>137,960</td>
<td>7,876</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tables tell us a very important story, that though the development from Metrotown is admirable in terms of density of transit usage, when we compare it to the remainder of Burnaby, the municipality’s density and transit ridership stats are quite skewed by high density and transit ridership rates within the other Town Centres. Thus opens our discussion into the next Town Centre which forms the political focus of this project.
5.4 Edmonds Town Centre

If Metrotown provided the capstone to the end of an era marked by the fall of the BVA, Edmonds could arguably be the poster child for the dawn of a new era of governance in Burnaby. We’ve already analyzed the events that took place around the development of a Metrotown core and the effect that had on the disintegration of the right-leaning slate in Burnaby. However, there was another series of events at play that also helped to push the slate out.

As we found in Chapter 2, Edmonds Town Centre was not established in 1966 as part of the original three Town Centres. During that time, within the established municipal hierarchy contained in the 1966 Apartment Studies, it was referred to as a District Centre due to the level of growth along Kingsway, a corridor that connected the well-established Cities of Vancouver and New Westminster, but likely fell short of the potential of a Town Centre due to the presence of large industrial tenants. By 1980, in anticipation of regional discussions regarding a mass transit alignment, the area was referred to as the Kingsway/Edmonds Area for planning study purposes (Parr, 1980a). In 1986 with the opening of SkyTrain and vacation of large industrial properties, planners began referring to the area as the Edmonds Town Center (Parr, 1986). By 1987, the Edmonds area had attained Town Centre status through the City’s 1987 Official Community Plan, which recognized four quadrants containing one Town Centre each. Notwithstanding the late designation, the area had long since obtained a certain local identity, and in the 1987 election, this area appears to have been at the epicentre of a heated debate that was raging on about the municipality’s pattern of growth.

In the remaining months of 1987 during the BVA majority, Councillors were debating on the merits of permitting higher densities within the Edmonds area in a location known as the Edmonds Triangle (see Appendix F). In this area, residents were increasingly concerned about plans to introduce high rise residential towers to two properties adjacent to their low rise garden apartment complex (Diamond, 1988). Sensing an opportunity to gain favour ahead of the fall election with a growing ferment in the neighbourhood, the two BCA Councillors voted with local opinion to oppose the rezoning within the Edmonds Triangle, including a pledge to freeze all high rise rezoning within the City ("Edmonds area", 1987). And

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20 In Appendix E within the shaded triangular area labelled ‘Edmonds Triangle’, the residents in opposition resided on the east side of the triangle, and the proposed buildings were on the west side.
though this strategy may very well have assisted the BCA together with the BVA’s fragmentation, there is another supporting reason to explain why the BCA may have won that election, and the six following elections with overwhelming majorities (see Appendix F).

In advance of the 1987 municipal election sitting Mayor Bill Lewarne spoke out against a letter that Premier-apparent NDP leader Mike Harcourt sent to local party members. In that letter, Harcourt wrote, “The Burnaby Citizens Association is directly affiliated with the New Democrats. Each and every one of the candidates running under the BCA banner has been endorsed by all the New Democrat constituency associations in Burnaby” (Ward, 1987). Later defending the Mayor’s attacks against the letter, Harcourt told the media, “the BVA, like the Non-Partisan Association in Vancouver, is a ‘Socred farm-team’” (ibid). This highlight of the BCA-NDP connection would have serious implications. As we find later, the relationship appears to have impacted the alignment of the region’s second SkyTrain line. Prior to that though, the relationship would benefit the BCA when the newly minted Premier Harcourt revised the Municipal Act to permit the inclusion of municipal slate names on ballots, a change that “has become of some significance, especially in British Columbia’s larger centres” (Smith & Stewart, 2009: 301). Perhaps the greatest assistance this relationship provided though, was the confirmation of support from the labour movement.

Summing up his perceptions of why the BCA won by a landslide in the November 1987 municipal election, Copeland fended off accusations that the party owed its success to the “labor slate vote,” arguing that success was attributed to a variety of other issues, “including concern among Burnaby residents over highrises, the explosive growth in Metrotown and preservation of neighbourhood livability” (Romell, 1987b). However, local media accounts could demonstrate otherwise. For example, one article highlighted the changed atmosphere at the municipal hall three years after the BCA landslide. Following an altercation between a non-union administrator and union employees, the administrator noted that “There certainly seems to be a coincidence of when this council came to power and the level of union activity around the hall […] There’s definitely a flavour or an understood or stated agenda. There’s a certain political affinity.” (Lark, 1990). During the first year when campaign financial disclosures were required by provincial legislation, one report noted that “Union money was the single greatest factor” in the previous year’s election race, showing that:
the successful Burnaby Citizens Association campaign was helped out by 44 separate contributions from labour unions, including several staggering amounts from the Canadian Union of Public employees and its Burnaby local. (Hilborn, 1994).

When piecing together why unions were so eager to support the BCA, one quick reason may be the relationship between the BCA and the NDP, a party commonly known for its ties with the labour and progressive movements. Fair wage legislation is a popular policy that is commonly supported by provincial and federal NDP parties as part of their social justice platforms, but also seen as supportive by labour unions, who as with other left leaning parties in the United States and Great Britain are often the largest contributors in both financial and in kind support. In 2009, Wayne Peppard, Executive Director of the BC and Yukon Territory Building Construction and Trades Council, an organization representing labour unions within the region, appeared before Burnaby City Council requesting support for an unrelated item. In that presentation, Peppard “acknowledged and thanked the City for its continued use of a fair wage policy” (Burnaby, 2009b). Peppard was referring to a Fair Wages Policy that was enacted by the City in March 1988 following a municipal report (Director Engineering, 1988). The Manager’s report cited that work began on a Fair Wages policy in mid-December, just a few weeks following the new Council’s first inaugural meeting on 1987 November 21. The coincidence would seem to present the first strong evidence of the existence of a Middle-Class Progressive Regime that was backed by union support in trade for a policy that would stipulate that any construction contracts bid on by external labour contractors would need to meet a minimum qualification that would include paying employees at a wage recognized as the standard for unionized tradespersons in that field (ibid). In each sequential election when financial disclosures were made public, the BCA continually posted massive contributions from labour union organizations (Hilborn, 1997; Weir, 2000; Weir, 2003).

The second term of the BCA marked another interesting development. During the BCA’s first term, in 1989 Municipal Manager Melvin Shelley resigned amid some controversy ("Shelley tosses", 1989). Following an exhaustive cross-Canada search resulting in 120 applications, in 1992 during a closed session of Council, the BCA majority selected 28-year veteran Director of Planning Tony Parr to assume the chief staff responsibility (Hilborn, 1992). Mayor Copeland dismissed the criticisms of the decision to hire Parr, 62, who would be forced to retire under provincial laws three years into his role (ibid). The Mayor then went on to
indicate that Parr’s previous position would be filled from within the department’s existing ranks, establishing a succession practice which continues to exist.

In 1987, the provincial government, under the *Municipal Act*, introduced legislation requiring communities to implement Official Community Plans (Burnaby, 1987c). The legislation was flexible though, permitting local governments to develop a plan for either specific parts of their jurisdiction or for the entire jurisdiction (Burnaby, 1987c). In December, during the second inaugural meeting of the new Council, Burnaby adopted Official Community Plan Bylaw Number 8873. The document outlined plans for the whole of Burnaby against the earlier consternation of one opposition BVA Councillor, who during draft debates, derided the plan, believing it “could prove so rigid that it will pose a problem for years to come,” (“Plan for 2001”, 1987). The document affirmed Burnaby’s advocacy for regional transit planning, citing the benefit and curse of its centrality, a context that has negatively contributed to the “impact of commuter flows into our residential areas” (Burnaby, 1987c: 23). Through the document, planners also maintained the priority on high densities within the municipality, noting that, apartment development will account for about three-quarters of the Municipality’s net dwelling growth. The growth will be directed to designated apartment areas with Metrotown the largest of these, containing 15,000 total apartment units within its boundaries.” (Burnaby, 1987c: 33)

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21 By 2006, apartment units in Metrotown totalled 12,105, comprising 96% of all dwelling units (Metro Vancouver and Statistics Canada, 2006 Census).
In crystallizing this concept of land use, the document continued to built on foundations of the nodal development of Town Centre plans, and nodal development. Within this discussion, a hierarchy of development was presented, echoing many of the same principles of previous planning documents (see Figure 28).

Within Burnaby, four of these nodes would focus development within four quadrants (see Figure 29). SkyTrain was seen as specifically supporting the development of these nodes, and “should be used to reinforce the concept of nodal development around the stations” (Burnaby, 1987c: 38).

While the Metrotown phasing debates were in full swing, municipal planners began working on proposals to take advantage of the recently vacated Dominion Glass site, a 6.5

Figure 31 | This 1989 aerial photo shows Dominion Glass as the large site, and Edmonds SkyTrain Station is near the upper right corner (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 1989 aerial photo series). Figure 30 | This 2009 aerial photo shows the present condition of the Edmonds Station area. Boxed area shows Statistics Canada Dissemination Area 59153654 (Author’s custom Google Map).

hectare industrial property, and the opening of the Edmonds SkyTrain station (see Appendix F). Prior to this point, the focus of the Edmonds neighbourhood was at Kingsway and Edmonds, where Middlegate, a small shopping plaza was located. At that time, the transit line was only in the conceptual stages under studies guided by Regional District (Parr, 1980b). In early 1986, a residential development concept plan was introduced for the Edmonds area to the south of the station, which would feature the highest densities immediately close to the station, gradually easing to town housing furthest from the station. With the exception of the Dominion Glass site, the largely undeveloped area was bounded by a large urban park to the west, and a vacated municipal landfill to the southeast,
which in later plan iterations came to be recognized simply as public space. The development that would occur in the southern portion of the Edmonds Town Centre would come to be distinct from that in the northern portion, where mainly smaller properties would be assembled slowly into higher density residential apartments over time. In the south for instance, by 2006 within the time that the Dominion Glass property (see Figure 30) was demolished in the late 1980s, a single developer had constructed four residential towers and other mid-rise dwellings on a 4.2 hectare parcel (see boxed area, Figure 31) as part of the aptly titled City in the Park neighbourhood, which has come to house 1,150 residents (Statistics Canada, 2006). This block together with other concurrent areas would come to be crystallized in the Edmonds Town Centre Plan, a project that would come to define Council's new approach to planning.

The Edmonds Town Centre Plan resulted from an intense public engagement process. The fourteen member advisory committee composed of two Councillors, one School Trustee, and various local citizens, distributed a brochure to area residents and facilitated forums, which were attended by over 200 local residents (Burnaby, 1994. Local media reports described the Plan as:

A citizen-made development plan intended to create a virtually self-sufficient community [...] put together in just over 17 months by local residents and city staff in an experiment intended to allow citizens plan their own neighbourhood. (Kirkby, 1994a)

The Plan called for the creation of three cores: a primary one in the long established thoroughfare of Edmonds Street and Kingsway, a secondary one located in the north-eastern portion of the Town Centre along Edmonds Street, and a third located in the immediate vicinity of the Edmonds SkyTrain Station (Burnaby, 1994). In addition to the densification of these residential and commercial mixed use cores, the Plan also called for the area to be supported by infilling and intensification within adjacent residential neighbourhoods.

Within three months of the release of the Edmonds Town Centre Plan, former Director of Planning Tony Parr retired from his position as City Manager. While serving as Parliamentary Secretary to the provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs, Member of Legislative Assembly Joan Sawicki lauded Parr for his twenty-eight years of service (Noble, 1994). Sawicki remarked that “Parr could be considered the father of urban planning” (ibid). Recalling her time when she was elected as a BCA Councillor in the 1987 sweep, she went on to say that:
He provided ‘solid professional advice’ on planning, helping councillors make decisions that have preserved green space in the city. Before it was fashionable […], Parr promoted channelling growth into the areas best suited for it, preventing it sprawling wherever buyers and sellers saw fit.” (ibid)

Tate (2009) also noted that while still employed with the City, Parr was regarded as one of the so-called “Planning Elders,” whom while the Provincial Government was creating Growth Strategies legislation, helped consult with the Minister of Municipal Affairs along with several other key planning figures.

Within the time that the Edmonds Town Centre Plan was introduced, a commercial tower was constructed directly southeast of the Edmonds SkyTrain Station for use by the provincial electric utility, BC Hydro. Other non-residential development in the vicinity however has not materialized apart from a small supermarket built for the City in the Park neighbourhood (see Figure 34), a dense residential area highlighted by towers jutting out of park like settings. A parcel located directly adjacent to the Station has not yet developed either, though its designation as a comprehensive development district (CD) may very well see a considerable mixed commercial or retail property in the near future. The area immediately east of Griffiths Drive, within 200 metres, has also seen very intensive residential development. Within the past few years, two residential towers have been built surrounded by the Byrne Creek fish-bearing ravine park system straddled by public walking trails which meander through the south of the Edmonds Town Center (see Appendix F).

The CD zoning within the City of Burnaby’s Zoning Bylaw, favours higher densities and a mixing of uses within single properties.
In 2003, a rezoning was approved that saw the transformation of the four hectare Middlegate Mall from a shopping plaza and sprawling parking lot to the Highgate Village (see Figures 33 and 32), a mixed use development highlighted by four residential towers and anchored by a large format grocery store (Belhouse, 2003). Though the other anchor tenant was intended to be office, it was first occupied by a Bingo Hall, then more recently as a fitness centre. The developer, Bosa Properties, has come to be one of the most prolific developers in Burnaby, growing from a single-family home construction company in the 1960s and going on to construct an overwhelming number of towers in the City from corporate offices located in the Metrotown area (Bosa Properties, 2011).

Just west from Highgate Village is the redeveloped site of the former Burnaby South High School, which was demolished in the early 1990s and replaced by a newer building just west of the Edmonds Town Centre. When this property came available, the City worked with the developer who oversaw the construction of three residential towers and the restoration of a 1914 school building into a community centre (Stenson, 1995b). Immediately south from Highgate village are several other residential towers, including a social housing complex and a private seniors care home in addition to several other residential towers that have been developed from the land assembly of single family homes and industrial properties. At the Edmonds-Kingsway axis is a newly completed development featuring two residential towers.
and the City’s newest library branch. To the northwest of the Edmonds-Kingsway axis, is the former Eastburn Community Centre, which recently has been demolished and will be replaced by a new community centre and swimming pool, slated for completion in 2012 (see Figure 35).

The renamed Edmonds Aquatic and Community Centre is the subject of the City’s ongoing attempts to revitalize a neighbourhood that has faced considerable socioeconomic challenges as a result of one of the largest immigrant refugee populations in the province. The neighbourhood significantly contributes to the diversity of the City, though much of the area immediately behind the Highgate Village and the new Edmonds Aquatic and Community Centre contains some of the lowest incomes and scholastic attainment levels in the City (Burnaby, 2009a). Development pressures may redefine this neighbourhood in the future, as redevelopment continue to take place, displacing low rental retail establishments that are presently used by the lower income population. One example is the 1.1 hectare Value Village discount thrift store site, located in the eastern corner between the Kingsway-Edmonds Axis (see Appendix F).

At 379 hectares, Edmonds is by far the largest of the four Town Centres. It also has the distinction of being the only Town Centre that is not currently served by a large shopping centre, a feature that was touted as a benefit in the 1994 Town Centre Plan. A vision of various neighbourhood villages forming together to create a complete community was touted. However, challenges continue to beset the community, which has become a strong draw for substantial high-rise residential development, but strong mixed-use components featuring retail and commerce continue to be a challenge for the Town Centre. In 1995, the former Assistant Director of Current Planning ventured to take a guess at the area’s attraction for residential development:

[...] recent growth in apartment development [in Edmonds] and by the establishment of the BC Hydro Headquarters complex, are partly attributable to its proximity to Metrotown. (Ito, 1995: 137)
In the time since Ito’s candid observations, a large retail district has been constructed a mere 600 metres from the southern border of Edmonds Town Centre. The site, anchored by the auto dependent Market Crossing retail centre, has many of the same characteristics of other North American power centres, containing several large format retailers on nearly 13 hectares. In 2005 during Council deliberations on the development, one Councillor specifically cited the impact on Edmonds Town Centre while expressing concerns about the controversial site (MacLellan, 2005). While Market Crossing provides a curious contrast to the original vision of a complete community for Edmonds first realized by its 1994 Town Centre plan, it also speaks to the harsh realities inherent in the challenges of building in the suburbs. While Edmonds Town Centre may lack a central shopping centre core like Metrotown, it appears that the former has still come to rely on dense retail, even while those establishments are located outside of its boundaries. However, chalkling up Edmonds’ development solely to retail would be premature. As we have seen, the introduction of transit has still played an important role in concentrating and shaping this Town Centre. As we find through the next two sections, this dual narrative has also had profound implications in the development Burnaby’s other Town Centres, despite very different contexts.

5.5 Lougheed Town Centre

The development of the Lougheed and Brentwood Town Centres contain many similarities. And as we’ve seen with Metrotown and in part, Edmonds, the development of retail infrastructure has played a significant role in the history of the Town Centre concept, whether by accident or by design. No less is this the case than in Brentwood and Lougheed. As we have noted earlier in this Chapter, the two Town Centres have been anchored by shopping centres since their early beginnings. In the case of Lougheed, the City was directly involved with mall developers and department store owners while plans were underway to choose whether development would occur in the Simon Fraser Townsite on the slope of Burnaby Mountain, or at its eventual location where it sits today (see Appendix G). This work began in 1964 with a developer’s interest to construct the shopping centre here in 1964 (Dirassar, 1964). As we found, because a variety of issues, the municipality ultimately chose the site straddling the Lougheed Highway, and though the site got off to a slow start, in 1968, a developer had staked the claim to build the shopping centre. The construction of the shopping
centre in Lougheed is perhaps more integral than any other Town Centre. To understand why this is the case, we first need to look at the name of the mall.

The Lougheed Mall oddly, has no connection to the name of the adjacent highway. The Lougheed Highway received its name from former Provincial Public Works Minister, Nelson Lougheed, who in 1928 lobbied for a road link to his once-rural lumber mill in Port Haney within what is now Maple Ridge. Instead, the name for the shopping centre comes from William Lougheed, a successful locally based property developer who, in the early 1960s while the municipality was deliberating on a core for its northeast section, approached the municipality to develop a shopping centre and adjacent Lougheed Village (Needham, 1988). The proposal seemed to mesh well with the municipality’s plans for the sparsely settled, albeit established area. And, through 1968, while Edper Investments Ltd., a Montreal-based investment trust was constructing the shopping centre, Lougheed was busy assembling property surrounding the shopping centre and constructing some of Burnaby’s first significant high residential rise buildings ("Mall construction", 1968). The majority of this construction appears to have been completed by around the late 1980s, and mostly appears to have been designed or at least inspired by late Canadian architect Arthur Erickson (see Figure 36). In 1972, a pedestrian underpass was constructed below the Lougheed Highway that connected both neighbourhoods (see Figure 37). Also established during this time was the Lake City East/Stoney Creek neighbourhood (see Appendix G). This neighbourhood is very dissimilar to the one that straddles the Lougheed Highway to the south. It is largely surrounded by an active salmon bearing creek system, and contains low rise apartments and town housing, in contrast

Figure 36 | Discovery Place in Lougheed Village (Author).

Figure 37 | Lougheed Highway pedestrian underpass (Author)
to the high-rise building style to its south. Also, most of the construction in this neighbourhood is wood-based as opposed to the concrete-based Lougheed Village area. Further the north of he shopping centre lies the Sullivan Heights neighbourhood, a single family, low density neighbourhood that is quite isolated from the higher density dwellings to the south and mid medium density to the west, with the exception of one entry point on the southeast corner (see Appendix G). This area is much more relatable to similar development style on the opposite side of North Road, which separates Burnaby from neighbouring Coquitlam. Beyond these neighbourhoods, the Town Centre is surrounded by major arterial routes and natural parkland. Within this heavily wooded area, there lies a RCMP highway patrol station, and a recreational vehicle park.

The Lougheed area has historically been well served by bus transit, particularly since the area has acted as a hub for transit from the inner ring municipalities to the Northeast Sector municipalities of Coquitlam, Port Moody, Port Coquitlam, and beyond. In 1975 while construction in the Lougheed area was booming, the Burnaby Planning Department produced a report titled *Public Transit in Burnaby: A Review with Terms of Reference for Future Requirements* (Burnaby, 1975). The report started off by indicating that since transit in Burnaby had improved since 1972 when NDP Barrett government greatly increased provincial transit funding, there were likely going to be future opportunities to further enhance transit connections. In particular, the report discussed a theoretical framework for transit in the municipality, with an emphasis on a loop network of buses that would circulate between Lougheed Mall, Middlegate (now Edmonds Town Centre), Simpson Sears and Old Orchard (now Metrotown), and Brentwood. The service was then expected to evolve into a light rail transit system, whereupon the “stations themselves should be area zoned such that development in the vicinity is supportive and controlled” and even developments could be embedded directly into the transit stations (Burnaby, 1975: 33). However, as we discussed in the previous Chapter, this public transit ethos was only a temporary flash, somewhat declining following the 1975 return of the Social Credit Party to power. Opportunities for rapid transit would not present themselves for another several years.

In 1984 amidst quickly proceeding provincial musings on rapid transit alignments, the municipality of Burnaby once again endorsed an option to connect the Northeast Sector municipalities, to the Lougheed Town Centre from the main line already underway (Parr,
1984). But despite the Council’s strong support for the Northeast Sector extension, as we found in the previous Chapter, the proposal was scuttled for a connection from New Westminster to the northern tip of Surrey.

In 1989, following the planning program of the first leg of rapid transit, the while the Provincial Government again floated proposed extensions to the original SkyTrain line, projects were discussed regarding connections to Richmond, further into Surrey, and once again, the Northeast Sector municipalities through a Lougheed connection (Parr, 1991). However, during the early planning stages while it was presumed that the province was still deliberating between two separate lines in the Northeast Sector proposal, a consultant’s report was leaked showing that the province was interested in moving ahead with only one option: a route that would occupy a hydro utility right of way and travelling through settled single family neighbourhoods in the eastern portion of the municipality (Kines, 1991; see Figure 38).

Burnaby Council however, voiced intense opposition over the leaked alignment, pushing instead for their originally preferred loop alignment that would connect the Lougheed and Brentwood Town Centre into the

![Figure 38](image1)

**Figure 38** | Original SkyTrain line marked by brown line; proposed Edmonds-Cariboo line marked by red line (Author’s custom Google Map).

![Figure 39](image2)

**Figure 39** | Original SkyTrain line marked by brown line; proposed and ultimate Lougheed-Broadway extension marked by green line (Author’s custom Google Map).
existing line (see Figure 39). Others in the region however, voiced opposition against any line extension. Then-Vancouver City Mayor Gordon Campbell for instance, argued against any further rapid transit investments, stating that “we cannot spend our way out of transportation problems,” painting SkyTrain infrastructure in the same light as highway expenditures – both of which cost large sums of money and pour residents into Vancouver’s downtown core (Campbell, 1991). The future premier’s argument was premised in the Regional Town Centres concept that called for the concentration of mixed uses in suburban nodes. However, as Perkins (1992) and Tate (2009) had previously indicated, in many suburban nodes, introducing office space was much easier said than done. The standard for the region, as others have found, was for retail in suburban cores and office in metro cores, except for unique, and sometimes lucky circumstances where intensive planning in suburban nodes resulted in office retention (Filion et al, 2000; Filion, 2001; Filion, 2009). And, although Burnaby was striving for mixed use nodes containing retail and office, it would turn out to be a retail lobbyist that would add fuel to Burnaby’s efforts for a Lougheed-Broadway alignment at a time when the new NDP government would resume regional transit planning.

Since the construction of Brentwood Mall in 1960, singular companies have owned and controlled both Brentwood and Lougheed Mall. It’s important to note though, that the owners of these shopping centres has not necessarily been so much interested in retail, but instead land value accumulation over time. This is the same model that Sears Canada’s majority shareholder, Sears Holdings, uses (Milstead, 2011). In Brentwood and Lougheed’s case, the malls have been controlled not by retail corporations, but large real estate investment and insurance firms. This probably explains why, in 1992, Trilea Centres, a subsidiary of owner Trizic Equities Ltd., presented an economic feasibility report titled “Let’s Do it Right” to Burnaby City Council supporting the merits of a Lougheed-Broadway rapid transit alignment, which would pass through Lougheed and Brentwood Mall (Burnaby, 1992; Marziali, 1992a). A 1994 report would suggest that Trilea’s intuition was well placed.

According to Colliers Macaulay Nicolls [sic] 1994 Shopping Centre report, Burnaby shopping malls continued to dominate the retail market, benefitting from their proximity to SkyTrain and healthy residential development. (“Burnaby malls”, 1994)

In 1992, as we will discuss in the next Section, City Planners began working on considerable enhancements to the Brentwood Town Centre plan in an effort to help convince
the provincial government to opt for a Lougheed-Broadway alignment. Conversely, it was always expected that Lougheed Town Centre would eventually be connected, bolstered by the probability for future connections into the Northeast Sector. It was therefore the promise of a future Northeast Sector alignment that helped the NDP government solidify regional support for the costly project (Fuller-Evans, 2010a). To help enhance the case, the 1992 Brentwood Town Centre planning review found that the municipality could eventually “double the amount of developable land” in the Brentwood area, particularly in sections occupied by large industrial tenants ("Brentwood plan", 1992). The benefit of the Brentwood area was also the opportunity to considerably upzone commercial properties and redevelop elsewhere “without much impact on residential neighbourhoods” (Marziali, 1992b). The opportunity for Burnaby was also assisted by the resurgence of regional planning, as noted in the previous Chapter. During growth management discussions leading up to the Livable Region Strategic Plan, Burnaby planners indicated that commitment to take on more population was tied to “a rapid transit system connecting Broadway SkyTrain station to Lougheed Mall across Broadway-Lougheed [...] If Burnaby does not get the transit line, city growth will be severely curtailed” (Kirkby, 1994b). The City’s position was notably in opposition to the Regional District’s request that “new homes [...] be mainly ground-oriented and single-family, while Burnaby wants more high rises and medium-density homes such as townhouses and co-operatives” (ibid).

By early-1995 with a rapid transit alignment imminent, Burnaby Mayor William Copeland outlined the process for a proposed Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, following a similar visioning format to the previously lauded Edmonds Area Advisory Committee (Copeland, 1995a). Through the following weeks, the City attracted 100 participants at two community forums generating 48 applicants for membership on the Committee, and by mid-1995, the tems of
reference were produced, outlining the role of the citizen-led Council advisory body (Copeland, 1995b). By late 1995, the Greater Vancouver Regional District and the provincially partnered Vancouver Regional Transit Commission reversed its earlier support from a New Westminster-Coquitlam alignment to a Lougheed (Burnaby)-Broadway (Vancouver) alignment, signalling endorsement for Burnaby’s preferred alignment, followed by a phase two alignment connecting Lougheed Town Centre to the Northeast Sector (Howard, 1995). The decision however, set off a maelstrom of criticism. Coquitlam’s Mayor decried the Lougheed-Broadway line as a “terrible waste of money […] meant to boost Burnaby’s dying malls,” predicting that funding would run out before construction would begin on the Coquitlam extension (ibid). Richmond’s Mayor surmised that the vote was the result of B.C. Transit studies which surfaced “after the (Provincial) government appointed Burnaby councillor and NDP activist Derek Corrigan as chairman of B.C.Transit” (ibid).

Regardless of how the alignment was eventually endorsed, Burnaby’s Mayor lauded the regional decision, noting that it “will be good for business at both malls (Lougheed and Brentwood) and all other businesses along there” (Neilson, 1995b). The respective managers for Lougheed and Brentwood Mall also expressed their delight in the alignment. The manager for Lougheed Mall stated, “we recognize that wherever the LRT concept goes there are usually some sales rewards as well as other land site opportunities. The following year, the City of Burnaby launched a string of pedestrian improvements intended to improve walkability of the existing residential neighbourhoods within the Lougheed Town Centre (Traffic & Transportation Committee, 1996). That same year, the Vancouver Regional Transit Commission approved a strategic change of direction for bus improvements that would result in benefitting travel between Burnaby’s Town Centres, moving away from bus service into suburban areas, towards bus service serving major urban concentrations (Beattie, 1996).

In 1997, the City of Burnaby released the **Lougheed Town Centre**

![Figure 41 | Integrated LRT and Land Bridge over Austin Road (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997: 15)]
Plan. By the time the Plan was released, most of Lougheed had already been built up as we have discussed. Therefore, one of the chief foci was the designation of an enhanced core area. The Plan, unveiled prior to the rapid transit technology announcement, called for a mixed use core on the grounds of the Lougheed Mall. The redevelopment would see the integration of rapid transit and a finer urban fabric (see Figure 40 and 41). The Plan called for a total additional 3,700 residential units in the Town Centre on top of the existing 6,200. Of those, 2,400 would be absorbed by the enhanced core, “with about three-quarters of these within a mid to high-rise form” (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997: 16). The plan also envisioned a massive influx of commercial uses. It estimated that the present complement of commercial space in the Lougheed Town Centre was about one million square feet, of which half “relates to Lougheed Mall” (Lougheed Area Advisory Committee, 1997: 18). The Plan proposed:

the eventual development of an additional 2 million sq.ft. of commercial space. Of this, 1.8 million is in the Core Area and will be in the form of major office, hotel/convention and street front commercial space. These proposals will take advantage of the benefits that will arise from the introduction of two LRT lines that will converge in the Town Centre […]. (ibid).

The Plan also proposed a plethora of other components that were found in the earlier Edmonds Town Centre Plan, including enhanced connectivity of park space, greater pedestrian amenity, and various road enhancements. The core component of the Plan was dependant on a light rail rapid transit station on the pad then occupied by a bus interchange, which would integrate with the redeveloped mall, and provide for connectivity to the Northeast Sector. One year following the Plan’s release however, regional discussions concerning an at-grade light rail transit option had been abandoned by the Provincial Government. In 1998, Premier Glen Clark decided to change the technology of the proposed rapid transit line, citing municipal wrangling over modifications to the alignment that would conceivably push the cost of the light rail system far beyond what the province was willing to pay (Howard, 1998a). Others however, mused that the change from at-grade transit to the pre-existing SkyTrain technology from the 1986 line was the result of an increasingly unpopular government facing re-election in two years (Howard, 1998b). SkyTrain construction was perceived to be a labour intensive process, involving many unionized labour trades, whose support could later theoretically aid the 2001 election bid (ibid). However, things went from bad to worse. As the
governing NDP continued to slip in the polls as a result of accusations of financial mismanagement, the SkyTrain line was also affected.

In late 1999, the groundbreaking ceremony for Lougheed Station came amid very little fanfare, occurring one day after the Regional District’s “transportation committee voted unanimously to signal its unhappiness about the location selected for the station near Lougheed Mall” (Simpson, 1999). In an effort to keep the SkyTrain line on budget, the government had decided to forgo the initially proposed alignment to the existing bus loop which would have benefited access to the Coquitlam side of North Road. The crown corporation in charge of construction, the Rapid Transit Project Office, indicated that they had asked the owners of Lougheed Mall to cover the cost of bowing the line out to the shopping centre’s main entrance, at a cost of $20 to $25 million (ibid). The City of Burnaby and the owners of Lougheed Mall immediately voiced their displeasure over the realignment. In protest, the Ontario Pension Board, by then owners of Lougheed Mall refused to sell the land necessary to accommodate the SkyTrain footings and relocated bus interchange (Braverman, 1999). This triangular piece of land was instead eventually expropriated by the crown office, resulting in the station’s somewhat awkward configuration and poor relationship to the surrounding area. Eventually however, the mall did construct a covered at-grade walkway from the station to the Mall followed by an expansive internal renovation project, though development of the enhanced core

Figure 42 | Lougheed Highway Corridor adjacent to Lougheed SkyTrain Station (Author)

Figure 43 | Artist’s rendering of proposed Northeast Sector Line (Evergreen Line Project Office, 2009: 10)
has failed to materialize despite the SkyTrain placement (Devitt, 2002).

The next potential renaissance for Lougheed Town Centre presented itself in the form of again renewed discussions for a connection to the Northeast Sector. During 2008, amid the BC Liberal Provincial Government’s plans to resume discussions on the expansion, it was once again decided that the SkyTrain technology would be used despite earlier resolutions to implement an at-grade light rail line. In anticipation of the construction of the line, the City of Burnaby saw an opportunity to shape development in another part of the Lougheed Town Centre, having abandoned the concepts contained in the 1997 Lougheed Town Centre Plan amid disengagement from the mall owners. The hope was to have a station at Cameron Street, the road located at the northern border of the Lougheed Mall. However, it quickly became apparent that the new government, at ideological ends of the political spectrum from the municipal government, was not interested in entertaining a Cameron Station, citing a prohibitive cost of an additional $7 million for the station ("City to negotiate", 2010). However, in expectant anticipation of the station, the City had already rezoned land for a mixed use development across from the proposed alignment (Larsen, 2008; see Silhouette development, Appendix G). Instead, the line was proposed to run from the existing Lougheed SkyTrain station and up North Road without a stop until it turned into Coquitlam, before proceeding further, directly into Coquitlam and further into the Northeast Sector (see Figure 42). Despite negotiations between the City and the crown corporation charged with the construction of the line, named the Evergreen Line, talks have not yet resulted in the inclusion of the station, although the considerable delay of the line amid funding challenges may yet change this situation.

Regardless how the Lougheed Town Centre becomes affected by transit in the future, the introduction of rapid transit has still provided a new array of transportation options to a sizable concentration of residential density (see Figure 43). Excluding the shaping potential in Brentwood as will discuss in the next section, the existing population in Lougheed at least appears to have benefitted greatly. This new transit renaissance has arguably enhanced the continued viability of this Town Centre, and although the core was not fundamentally altered following the introduction of SkyTrain, as we find in the next Section, there may yet be an opportunity for this to happen.
5.6 Brentwood Town Centre

As we discovered in the previous Section, contemporary planning for Brentwood has relied heavily on the introduction of rapid transit. Prior to SkyTrain, development within the Brentwood Town Centre had been very limited. Centred around the long-established Brentwood Mall, the Town Centre is surrounded to the north by a sea of low density single family homes that stretch upwards a dozen blocks until they terminate at the long established Hastings Street corridor (see Figure 44). For much of the Town Centre’s recent history, from this northern border southwards, the area has been largely dominated by auto dealerships, variously sized light industrial operations, and auto repair centres.

There have nonetheless been several minor attempts in the past to establish some of the characteristics uses envisioned in the early Town Centre concepts. For instance, above, we mentioned that a project unveiled in 1965 for the corner of Delta Avenue and Lougheed Highway resulted in one of the municipality’s first infusions of high density residential (see Figure 44, rights side).

Following the 1968 Brentwood Town Centre Study, there was an additional minor development constructed to the west of the Brentwood Mall on two separate properties sandwiched between the Masonic Cemetery to the west and the Beth Israeli Cemetery to the east (see Figure 44, left). Apart from these residential developments, there was also some spot commercial development, although nothing substantial apart from light industrial had materialized in the Town Centre since about the late 1970s. For all intents and purposes, the development represented in the aerial photo above features a Town Centre that was frozen in time.

Figure 44 | Northern portion of Brentwood Town Centre. Early developments are located on the top left, and bottom right. (Composite of City of Burnaby Archives items in 1989 aerial photo series).
As was mentioned previously, it was not until 1992 that a planning review would be conducted on the Brentwood Town Centre as part of “another step in convincing the provincial government to build rapid transit on the Lougheed Highway” ("Brentwood plan", 1992). Building on this, in 1994, the Burnaby Planning Department prepared the Framework for the Brentwood Town Centre Review (Stenson, 1994). This document cited that “the redevelopment of the Brentwood Town Centre is based on the premise that an LRT line will be established along the general Lougheed Highway corridor and will be a catalyst for major redevelopment” (Stenson, 1994). Preliminary estimates in the document cited a potential future population of 10,000 residents resulting from the addition of 8,000 residents within 5,000 units, though these residential developments would be “coupled with high-density core-related office and hotel developments and some further street-oriented retail commercial” (Stenson, 1994: 3).

The framework grounded future planning on Brentwood in five organizing principles. They were:

a. Organization of the town centre on the basis of a transit-oriented, high-density, mixed-use, high-vitality central core around the Lougheed Highway and Willingdon Avenue intersection with surrounding medium density supporting development.

b. Development of a complete community with the ability for people to live, work and play within the Brentwood area, and provisions for an inclusive and diverse community to benefit people of differing ages, family formations, income levels, physical abilities, and social needs.

c. Promotion of lower-scaled, pedestrian-oriented streetscapes and movement corridors, creating a unifying, village concept urban design approach for the overall town centre.

d. Provision of a complete and integrated public infrastructure to support the town centre development.

e. Pursuance of appropriate measures to enhance the environmental quality of the area and to cope with substantial site constraints in the area.

(Stenson, 1994: 3)

Although the planning process was absent of the same citizen advisory panel framework that existed for the development of the recent Edmonds and Lougheed plans, in 1995, the Planning Department had initiated a public engagement process to solicit citizen
input on the City’s intentions for Brentwood Town Centre during each phase of the three-phase process (Stenson, 1995a; Stenson, 1996). Once the framework was established following an earlier citizen engagement process, phase two involved the distribution of 10,000 information brochures to local residents, the hosting of public information sessions at the area’s proxy gathering place: Brentwood Mall, and an open house and presentation. Through all of these engagement opportunities though, it was apparent that the majority of comments received originated from the Brentwood Park area: the most populous and more established low density neighbourhood to the north of the mall. A summary of comments revealed the sentiment of most residents:

The desire was expressed to protect abutting or nearby single-family dwelling neighbourhoods from new development by providing buffering treatments, lower-scaled developments, and view corridors. (Stenson, 1995a)

Planners also received comments from industrial landlords, expressing support for rezoning opportunities to up-sell their properties to prospective developers. And as we saw from the previous section, the owners of Brentwood Mall had also expressed support for the area’s rejuvenation.

From media accounts, it was clear that Council was delighted to redevelop the Brentwood Town Centre area. Citing the contemporary lack of cohesion in Brentwood, one Councillor stated, “It has not gelled in the way the others have […] [T]he main thing is for an evolution from the low-intensity, industrial, car-dealership type of centre into a higher-density, residential centre with coffee shops, restaurants, green spaces, street trees and benches” (Beattie, 1995). By 1996, the Brentwood Town Centre Development Plan was finalized, maintaining a consistent message from the original framework, that is, a concerted focus on the intensification of the Town Centre with focus around the variously proposed rapid transit stations, even though those plans had not been completely finalized yet (Stenson, 1996). This lack of clarity about the final technology was exhibited through the Plan’s attached sketches, of which ten were produced. The figures on the following page are two of those sketches.
As we see by the above concept maps, the Plan was produced prior to the province changing the technology of the rapid transit from at-grade light rail to the elevated SkyTrain.
technology. However, unlike with the *Lougheed Town Centre Plan*, this would have a negligible effect on the Plan since the station was always envisioned to cross over Lougheed Highway as opposed to private property, thus not requiring private participation for an immediately transit-integrated core assembly process. Similar to the Lougheed Plan though, the Brentwood Plan proposed a considerable redevelopment of the mall site.

The figures above (Figures 47, 48, 49) represent the Plan’s intent to shape the Brentwood Mall with darker and denser objects representing a greater intensity of elements. This redevelopment plan was echoed in a publication produced by graduate students and honorary consultants who worked on a special design charrette in 1997 under the direction of the University of British Columbia James Taylor Chair in Landscape and Liveable Environments (Condon & Proft, 1999). Initiated in 1997 with the endorsement of the City of Burnaby and partial support from the Provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 37 participants from various architectural and planning backgrounds engaged in a visioning process for the Brentwood Town Centre in four teams, highlighting the project leads’ desires for Brentwood. Those teams were:

- Team One: Unifying the Whole
- Team Two: The Circle and the Cycle
- Team Three: Evolving Towards Sustainability
- Team Four: Healthy City/ Healthy Ecosystem

The result of the project, *Sustainable Urban Landscapes: The Brentwood Design Charrette*, presented several options of reshaping Brentwood Town Centre using the most current best practices in planning and design. What it also did though, was highlight the
unprecedented opportunity to reshape an area that was once totally dependent on automobile travel.

Since the introduction of SkyTrain, redevelopment within Brentwood Town Centre has taken off at a quick pace. In the past fifteen years, seventeen residential towers have been built, including numerous ground-oriented associated mid-rise dwellings at the base of these towers. Two significant office towers have also been built within the Town Centre’s proposed core. The originally envisioned Dawson Street Urban Village has also taken shape, though its footprint has extended to the Gilmore SkyTrain station at the west end of the Town Centre, where some of the earliest development opportunities presented themselves. All of the high rise structures in Appendix G, excluding those areas noted as pre-existing the 1992 plan review are new development.

A recent ownership change for Brentwood and Lougheed Mall has also signalled a massive redevelopment within the Town Centre’s core. According to a 2010 press release announcing the ownership change from previous owners, Ontario Pension Board to Shape Properties and Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan, Shape President Jim Horton announced that the partnership intended to increase density and mixture on the shopping centre site, in line with the City’s objectives, presenting an opportunity to connect into the existing elevated SkyTrain station. Though not yet unveiled, the developer aims to “create an environment that while urban in nature creates a pedestrian friendly ambiance that seamlessly blends the indoor and outdoor experience” (Shape Properties, 2010). Clarifying the developer’s intent in an industry trade publication, Graeme Johnson, Vice President of Leasing, indicated that:

Customers today want to be excited to go shopping. They want a venue that plays nice music, has nice landscaping and accessible parking […]. Basically, shoppers demand a higher product while shopping now. A better shopping experience equals more money spent. (Chris, 2010)

Explaining the developer’s desire to introduce residential development onto the 11.6 hectare site, during the same interview, Johnson noted “adding residential around a project is always a good idea, because you virtually have customers living inside your mall” (ibid). While development of the site is expected to take place in 2012, once complete is it likely that the Shape may move on to its other property, Lougheed Mall, where the original Lougheed Town Centre Plan may yet have an opportunity to be realized through a fresh ownership structure.
One of the challenges facing Brentwood Town Centre however, is the ubiquitous presence of auto dealerships. This is why, in 2004, Burnaby Council authorized the sale and rezoning of a municipal property located just outside the southern border of the Town Centre. The Planning Department worked with the purchaser of the property to develop an auto mall (Belhouse, 2004). The rezoning application was designed to “free up the existing car dealership sites for new development in the town centre area” (MacLellan, 2004b). The site was rezoned with covenants “to restrict car dealerships to those relocating from existing locations within the Brentwood town centre area” (ibid). The innovative rezoning quickly enabled one dealership to vacate their site located directly southwest from Brentwood Mall (see Appendix H). The relocation resulted in the land assembly of an approximately 4 hectare area by Appia Development represented by Chris Diekakos Architects, who in 2006 presented a rezoning application featuring three residential towers with a combined 509 units, an office tower, and ground oriented retail facing inward on an traffic calmed internal road (see Figure 50). In 2011 however, following the City’s recent designation of the ‘s’ suffix permitting increased zoning within Town Centres, the proponent resubmitted a rezoning application containing four residential towers with an accumulated total of 1,351 residential units and an integrated office tower atop the

![Figure 51](image1.jpg)  
**Figure 51 | Artist's rendition of Appia's planned internal road (Chris Deakakos Architects, 2008)**

![Figure 50](image2.jpg)  
**Figure 50 | Artist's rendition of Appia's project. Note Brentwood SkyTrain Station in the background to the right (Burnaby, 2011)**
previously proposed ground oriented retail podium. The redesign resulted in an increase in the FAR from 5.35 to 7.1 (see Figure 51).

The increased densities within Brentwood Town Centre also present an opportunity for the City to address a considerable community amenity shortage in the area. The closest recreation centre is located just outside the Town Centre’s north-westernmost border, and was likely designed for the locally related single family neighbourhood making it critically under capacity for the new development. Other amenities in the area include two elementary schools, also outside the Town Centre, likely explained by the area’s traditional lack of actual residential presence. The City is now trying to solve this deficit in part through the ‘s’ density bonusing provisions introduced in 2010. With the above mentioned Appia development for instance, with the enhanced density, the developer will be contractually obligated to provide the City with $31.6 million over four phases of development. Part of this money will go towards a flex space within the development, and part will go towards affordable/ special needs housing, while the remainder will be disbursed in the “Brentwood Town Centre Financial Account” (Luksun, 2011b: 18). The first phase, to proceed following the project’s September 2011 public hearing, will result in the first instalment of $8.8 million in density bonus contributions.

There can be little argument that the character of Brentwood has change substantially over the past number of years. The Town Centre serves as a considerable contrast to single family neighbourhood on its northern flank (see Figure 52). The development here is also fairly dissimilar from the other Town Centres, likely owing to the opportunities of massive financial windfalls from owners developing low

Figure 52 | Brentwood Park neighbourhood looking southwest at Brentwood Town Centre development (Author)

Figure 53 | Brentwood Gate development looking east from Brentwood Mall (Author).
intensity industrial properties into mixed-use residential and commercial properties. Reflecting on the aerial photography from Appendix H, it is apparent that this is an area in quick transition, with a variety of developments taking place equally across the Town Centre, but closing quickly on the shopping centre and core area (see also Figure 53). Much like the other Town Centres, this also echoes the recurring theme of a transit-retail duality. However, as we found above, that duality is becoming increasingly blurred as developer proposed more ambitious mixed use and hybrid developments. We will explore this further in the Conclusion. However, before proceeding, we cannot dismiss the notable contrast between development within Town Centres from outside, as well as the difference in travel habits of those inhabitants. We will therefore look at this quantitative difference briefly in the next Section.

5.7 Contrast and Comparison

Comparing the Town Centres is a somewhat challenging endeavour since development in Brentwood has taken off at such a rapid pace. The last Census count was in 2006, only six

![Figure 54](image) | Population Density (persons per hectare). The green and purple east-west lines represent the rapid transit line. Custom GIS map created by SFU Geography from 2006 Census data with Author’s custom Google Map overlays.

![Figure 55](image) | Transit Ridership (to work). The green and purple east-west lines represent the rapid transit line. Custom GIS map created by SFU Geography from 2006 Census data with Author’s custom Google Map overlays.
years following the construction of the SkyTrain line through Brentwood. Given the growth, the data from 2006 is therefore quite outdated. Census data from 2011 should therefore give us a much clearer picture regarding population counts and travel mode to work counts. In the meantime, we will have to work with the data currently available. That being said, using dissemination areas, we are still able to observe a fairly interesting story. The maps above compare each of the Town Centres to each other, using dissemination areas for data. However, because some dissemination areas cover over large areas, they may stretch outside their respective Town Centres. Within the large polygon between Metrotown and Edmonds for instance, the majority of this area is occupied by light industry but the vast majority of residents in this area actually reside within the Edmonds Town Centre on the old Burnaby South Secondary School lands. Because of time and labour constraints, the remainder of the City in both maps was coloured with the data representing ‘Elsewhere’ from Table 6.

At the end of Section 5.3, in Table 6, we observed that in Burnaby there is a significant difference in both overall residential density and transit ridership between areas within the Town Centres and those elsewhere in the City. For convenience, that table is reproduced below, but with the addition of data from the Vancouver Metro core area, in order to permit a similarly robust comparison as Fillion (2009).

Table 7 | Top table shows excerpt from Table 3: Land Densities taken from GVRD custom data set from Statistics Canada (2006) census data. The table atop the following page shows excerpt from Table 4: Comparisons of Mode to Work data using Statistics Canada 2006 Census. Other Means includes bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other method’ from within the census. Population totals for Town Centres (*) were compiled manually by the author using Dissemination Areas from the Statistics Canada (2006) census data. Sizes of these Town Centres were also manually compiled, using custom area calculation software built on a Google Maps interface (http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-area-calculator-tool.htm).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town Centre</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Urban Density (pp hectare)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrotown RTC</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentwood TC*</td>
<td>5,798</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonds TC*</td>
<td>22,627</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lougheed TC*</td>
<td>10,804</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby elsewhere</td>
<td>137,960</td>
<td>7,876</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Metro Core</td>
<td>150,160</td>
<td>1,634</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These tables tell us a few interesting things. The first table demonstrates that Burnaby’s Town Centres have much higher residential densities than the rest of Burnaby, described as ‘Elsewhere’. However, as we saw with Regional Town Centres, this data can be somewhat misleading, especially, as mentioned before, when we consider that 25% of Burnaby’s land is occupied by designated park space, a feature that also plays heavily in constraining the City’s growth.

In the lower table, we find that transit usage to work is considerably stronger within the Town Centres than elsewhere. As this case study has unfolded, we realize that this is attributed to the strong residential development trends within the Town Centres. Regrettably, we are unable to make a judgement on transit ridership outside of trips to work. However, by unscientific observational evidence, the stations do exhibit strong ridership throughout the duration of the day, although traffic is expectedly heaviest during rush hour peaks. Further analysis in this regard would be warranted for future projects. For those trips to work however, the data still presents some relevant findings. Data for walking trips to work for instance, may tell us two things. Firstly, as Filion (2009) found in Metro Toronto, suburban areas can sometimes have inhospitable walking environments. Large concept stores with massive setbacks designed for convenient automobile access, poor pedestrian amenity such as absent awnings on building faces, shadowed areas that degrade personal security, or even insufficient or poorly maintained sidewalks can all present challenging conditions for pedestrians. However, in the case of Burnaby, the planning process has paid a considerable amount of attention to these elements especially in Town Centres, as we’ve seen for instance, with considerable upgrades in Lougheed, and well maintained park trails in Edmonds.

Another factor that precludes walking is extreme distance. As evidenced by transit ridership and aerial photo analysis, we can see that a lot of emphasis has been placed on accessibility to transit stations. In 2007, TransLink and the City of Burnaby worked together on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total mode of transportation</th>
<th>Car, truck, van, as passenger or driver</th>
<th>Public transit</th>
<th>Walked</th>
<th>Other Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metrotown RTC</td>
<td>10,025</td>
<td>45.79%</td>
<td>42.04%</td>
<td>10.62%</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentwood TC</td>
<td>2,360</td>
<td>63.35%</td>
<td>28.18%</td>
<td>5.93%</td>
<td>2.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonds TC</td>
<td>8,995</td>
<td>59.09%</td>
<td>35.41%</td>
<td>3.78%</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lougheed TC</td>
<td>7,485</td>
<td>62.79%</td>
<td>29.73%</td>
<td>6.01%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnaby elsewhere</td>
<td>83,635</td>
<td>74.44%</td>
<td>20.29%</td>
<td>3.53%</td>
<td>1.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Metro Core</td>
<td>72,445</td>
<td>37.98%</td>
<td>24.74%</td>
<td>31.45%</td>
<td>5.84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a considerable redesign for the Metrotown and Edmonds SkyTrain stations (Transportation Committee, 2007). This study has led to ongoing discussions on a considerable redevelopment of at least Metrotown station, as has occurred at other stations throughout the region. And, with Brentwood and Lougheed as we saw, the stations at the core of those Town Centers will likely become reconfigured to maximize accessibility in the future as well. But quite different from high transit ridership rates, high walking rates may suggest that residents have destinations to go to within reach from their homes. As mentioned above, Tate (2009) conducted a considerable analysis on the location of employment within Burnaby. By observation, we can confirm that Metrotown has a much stronger non-retail employment presence than the other Town Centres. Data produced by Metro Vancouver (GVRD) for instance, indicates that information and culture industries compose 18% of employed persons to 24% in retail (Metro Vancouver, & Statistics Canada, 2011). Conversely, the Edmonds and Lougheed Town Centres appear to lack significant non-retail or light service employment. Judging from proposed rezoning applications however, Brentwood Town Centre shows the greatest promise in integrating employment opportunities into mixed use developments.

As Tate (2009) discovered though, Burnaby policy appears quite contradictory on the focus of employment opportunities within Town Centres. In the past two decades, the City has fostered the construction of multiple business parks throughout the City. It is a trend that exists throughout the region as well, though in Burnaby’s case, is somewhat in variance with the City’s own complete community objectives. This is somewhat surprising, especially considering the capacity the City has shown to stimulate development within the Town Centres. In a document intended to steer the City’s market sector, the 2007 Economic Development Strategy 2020 suggests that some of this deficit is due to the “vanilla character” of the City:

Burnaby has tended to develop large concentrations of employment in areas that are functional, but perhaps dull. Even Metrotown does not yet have the sort of urban character that pulls firms looking for density, and provides a hotbed for small retailers, restaurants or start-ups. (Burnaby, 2007: 22)

However, a bulletin produced in 2004 by commercial real estate analyst Avison Young points out that there is an appetite if the City is able to stimulate these Town Centres. The report suggests that many companies are increasingly on the lookout for spaces outside of business parks:
These amenity requirements are increasingly pulling many tenants away from isolated business parks and toward downtown, town centres and other highly urban areas (such as West Broadway). Transit access is also a concern or even a requirement for many companies. (Avison Young, 2004)

While Burnaby’s planning policies have produced opportunities for high density development within Town Centres, it appears that more work needs to be done in creating the opportunities for non-retail employment. These opportunities may present themselves as Brentwood and the other Town Centres continue to evolve, although market economics may yet pose a challenge that is difficult to manage. While they may be increasingly attractive to residents, for businesses, Town Centres pose a conundrum for commercial organizations. When struck with location decisions, many companies may choose to absorb high downtown real estate prices as a cost of doing business in close contact within their cluster. Others meanwhile, may find that lower rents and wider spaces in less settled business park areas are more amenable to either their preference for cost, or their need for large space. Town Centres thus face an uphill challenge, as they need to be both attractive, yet adaptive to business needs while presenting the right market price. But as we find in the Conclusion, in Burnaby’s case, the lack of significant office space may also be the result of another circumstance: good long range planning. Regardless, it is arguably quite possible that Burnaby’s Town Centres hold a strong potential to achieve greater levels of non-retail mixed use. As we’ve seen with the previous sections, it is clear that City policy has been quite persistent over time in establishing Town Centres. Moreover, while it appears that the policy was borne out of efforts to attract and concentrate residential development, the policy at least holds the potential to translate well into other non-retail forms of development.
6: OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

At the outset of this project, we asked the fundamental question, how have local municipal planning processes contributed to the development of Burnaby’s Town Centres? As we have discovered, it is quite apparent that the Burnaby planning process has greatly contributed to the development of Metrotown, Brentwood, Lougheed, and Edmonds. The lack of considerable densities elsewhere in the City is a testament to this fact. The City leadership deserves some credit for the discipline required to maintain a policy from 1966 to the present, especially one that was specifically targeted at reversing the trend of low-density suburban growth. Nevertheless, a strong planning ethic alone is not responsible for the formation of Burnaby’s Town Centres. One can only wonder what Burnaby would look like today if the Council that fired Burnaby’s first planner during the early 1960s, had maintained power, or, if during the early 1980s, Council had accepted the offer of Triple Five to develop a Fantasy Land at the corner of Lougheed Highway and Boundary Road. One could only expect that the entire Town Centre policy would have been irreversibly crippled. Even when regional planning fell into a moribund state, local municipal planning processes continued not just to influence the development of Burnaby’s Town Centres, but later to guide development with increasing tenacity that still maintained the tenets of the original plans.

However, a number of important observations that will be touched upon in this chapter were generated out of the preceding work that goes beyond the simple telling of the story. One of the most controversial findings of this work exposed a particular political context that previous writers had incompletely detailed before. Secondly, a fixation on retail anchors as Town Centre cores was weaved throughout the story that has had profound implications on the planning of the City. The third important contribution concerns the importance that public transit has played. Summing these last two points, this project makes a contribution to not just the literature of urban studies, but also in practical planning as a model to other suburban areas looking to bridge the suburban-urban divide.
6.1 The Politics of Planning

With more specific regard to Burnaby, we found that the influence of development went well beyond local municipal planning. Instead, politics has been a strong feature in the planning process. But, far from corrupting the planning establishment, it appears to have contributed to the efficacy of long term planning that has generated a productive dialogue between, using the terms of Faludi (1973:225), elected ‘Masters’ and bureaucratic ‘Servants’. These are of course figurative terms, but in Burnaby, even local media noticed the literal reality in Burnaby. In 2001, upon his retirement, Don Stenson, the Director of Planning who succeeded Tony Parr, noted that “he sees his job as molding the vision of politicians, citizens and business” (McQuillan, 2001). The relationship, though, is not entirely one sided, as the article continues, “He credits his political masters for adopting a planner’s perspective,” though in all fairness, he “also praises the active involvement of residents in shaping Burnaby” (ibid). In Burnaby, in the last half century, one political party has held the Mayor’s seat for forty-two years, and a Council majority for thirty-three years. The duration and concentration of a political force such as this is quite unusual in the region, and in many other Canadian municipalities, more typically characterised as fragmented systems. In the discussion of Edmonds Town Centre, we found that two important events had occurred. The first of these is that a particular regime was established to have existed, though evidence woven throughout this project suggests that that regime likely existed well before the BCA landslide in 1987. The second point is that the Director of Planning, who joined the city under the BCA in 1964 as an election promise was appointed City Manager in 1992. In the discussion of Metrotown, it was suggested that Metrotown had developed in the way it did thanks in part to a political affiliation between the council and provincial government of the day – the longest contiguous period during this study’s time frame where the BCA held the least seats on Council. A parallel explanation to the two earlier theories, that being the political alliance and the recession, could exist simultaneously with a final explanation. We found that the Director of Planning throughout this period, maintained support for Metrotown while opposing the massive fantasy land complex put forward by Triple Five Corp. In considering urban regime theory analysis, we know that one way to test for an urban regime is to identify a point in which the regime endured. In Burnaby’s case, while the BCA may not have been in control of Council, it is evidence by the Council of the day’s continued support of the Town Centres policy on the whole, that the regime still endured.
Although an analysis in other jurisdictions may reveal different political realities or alliances, the imperative lesson from this project is that any study of planning history should at minimum, reflect on the dominant centres of power. In Burnaby, this consideration has offered one view of why the Town Centres policy has lasted nearly a half century. But a political analysis could also help one discover why other policies in other jurisdictions face persistent challenge.

### 6.2 Retail-Oriented Planning

As we found throughout the Case Study, this planning process has had massive implications for the development of Burnaby. From when Parr was first hired, we saw that planning began to take a certain shape. While Parr was interested in concentrating residential density, it became clear that this structure was reliant upon either the establishment, as was the case in Lougheed, or the maintenance, as was the case in Brentwood, of shopping centres. While observing the preliminary planning phase for Metrotown, Beasley noted that Burnaby planners whom he interviewed remarked that “there should be large shopping facilities directed at serving the surrounding regional market (the key facilities being department stores)” (Beasley, 1976: 71). In the development of the Metrotown Plan, Beasley also found that Burnaby’s development standards were so carefully crafted as to restrict the pace of development. Beasley concluded that in order to find a resolution with the Regional District’s plans for other Regional Town Centres, Burnaby should essentially loosen its standards. In retrospect, we have observed that those standards were eventually all but eliminated when a new Council was elected to power. These two points, planning process and reliance on retail, raise very important conclusions regarding the long term development of Burnaby’s Town Centres.

It is clear that retail districts have played an important role in this story. One can even form the impression that the City has stuck with this axiom to the detriment of other non-retail commercial establishments. However, as we move into the future, we know that City policy also has its eye set on reconfiguring the malls within the Town Centre cores in at least Lougheed and Brentwood. We can only presume that the Council and the Planning Department would wish to do the same with Metrotown, as was envisioned in the 1977 Development Plan. Though it is only speculation, one wonders if the redevelopment of Station
Square and the continued pace of residential development may put pressure on the current Metropolis at Metrotown Centre shopping centre owners, Ivanhoe Cambridge, to consider a similar redevelopment on their lands as well. With Brentwood and Lougheed though, we know that Shape Properties is already very interested in putting proposals forward that, at least preliminarily, appear to mirror the mixed use core that the City had envisioned for both Town Centres. Arguably, the consistency of Town Centre plans has enabled this evolution to take shape. While it is easy today to criticize the Town Centres as merely retail focused vertical suburbs, that would be a rather naive judgement. When considering the evolution of most great global cities, we have to accept that they have taken hundreds of years to achieve maturity. The City of Vancouver’s Metro Core, for instance, has taken over 125 years to achieve its current density and rich diversity. Metrotown was only designated forty five years ago, and if we base its beginnings as the 1977 Development Plan evolution on the first complete development plan when large industrial properties began to vacate, the growth has only taken thirty four years. As a credit to the civic engagement process, each of these Town Centres has taken on a unique flavour, and has become a magnet for development. It is a characteristic that speaks both to the market signals that the City has delivered with predictable planning policy, but also to the willingness of existing residents to accept this intensive development and redevelopment with little to no opposition. As these Town Centres mature, we can expect that unique communities and neighbourhoods will evolve independently from the present shopping centre identities with which many outsiders currently associate.

6.3 Transit-Oriented Planning

During the early development of Metrotown, Beasley (1976) also noted that in the early days of planning the new Town Centre, when the region was still uncertain about whether transit would be provided, planners were prepared to roll out development without transit. However, the plans for Metrotown envisioned the future potential for transit built directly into the development. This strategy would have seen the municipality create a ‘Metropark’ public parking authority, whereby the municipality would own all major parking facilities. Upon provision of rapid transit, the municipality would then phase out their parking structures, reduce roadway capacity, and transition users to transit modes (Beasley, 1976). This innovative approach is not so surprising when we consider the lengths to which the City
later went to entice a transit connection through Brentwood. Though interestingly, this preoccupation with transit seems as much about an anti-automobile approach as it is with a pro-transit one.

In 2005, Burnaby Council took the uncharacteristic step of voicing vehement opposition to Provincial Government plans to expand the Trans-Canada Highway and build an addition to the Port Mann Bridge, a major arterial southeast to southwest through the region over two large bodies of water. To bolster their position, Burnaby Council instructed the Planning Department to produce a report on the Provincial Government project. Among many interesting observations, the report outlined how the road building project, known as the Gateway Project, was in variance to the Livable Region Strategic Plan, the Regional District’s growth strategy document (Belhouse, 2005). The City’s Mayor, Derek Corrigan, became of the region’s most outspoken critic of the plans for highway expansion, lobbying his peers to join forces in opposing the Provincial Government’s plans. In 2007, Council took the unusual step of adopting a motion to decline the Province’s request to enter into negotiations with the City in order to undertake a detailed study of integrating the City’s roadways into the Gateway Project (Luksun, 2007). During this time, the City also placed four-page insert in the local paper, indicating to residents why the City remained opposed to provincial plans for highway expansion (see Figure 57). However, in 2008, with the Gateway Project’s construction already proceeding, Council submitted a revised memorandum in order to have official input into highway improvements that would have connected into Burnaby roadways with or without the City’s approval (Luksun, 2008). This agreement was finally formalized in 2010, though the City continued to voice its opposition to the project,

[...] citing a broad range of concerns relating to the consideration of viable project alternatives, induced traffic and urban sprawl, regional plan implications, increased auto travel, expansion of general-purpose travel lanes,
and a range of concerns regarding environmental and community impacts. (Luksun, 2010).

Although these positions speak to a certain activist and progressive nature of the current Council, they are also somewhat expected considering the general character of municipal policy throughout the study period of this project. As mentioned previously, the City’s former Director of Planning, Tony Parr, was singled out from his peers for a planning vision that constituted advocating for policies that were ahead of their time. We saw this in the advocacy for transit oriented development in the early 1960s before the term was coined. And, again we saw in 1975 when planners had the audacity to decry the Lougheed and Brentwood Town Centres as overrun by the automobile in a time when travel was seen as an inalienable right for most North Americans. As we find in the next Section though, it appears that support for these policies may had as much to do with maintaining the status quo as it has for advocating for and delivering such progressive policy.

6.4 Suburban-Urban Dichotomy

As we found repeatedly throughout the Case Study, there has been a trend throughout various Town Centre policy iterations to preserve the character of single-family neighbourhoods. In various publications, explicit reference to the merits of Town Centre

Figure 57 | 1956 Metrotown provides a very stark contrast to contemporary Metrortown in Appendix E (composite aerial image from City of Burnaby Archives items in 478 series).
development were frequently delivered in sync with objectives to preserve the character of established single family neighbourhoods. Conversely, within the Town Centres, as we found with Edmonds Town Centre, civic policy was crafted to increase densities in those single family neighbourhoods, not to forget that residential density within Metrotown was the result of successive rezonings from the assembly of single family homes (see Figure 57).

During spring 2011, while regional discussions were buzzing following the permission of laneway housing construction in the City of Vancouver, a citizen delegation to Burnaby Council requested that the City consider introducing similar laneway housing policy. In response, the Mayor emphatically stated that this method of increasing densities was “not in the pipeline” (Fuller-Evans, 2011). Elaborating on the City’s position, the Mayor stated:

Burnaby is a different community than Vancouver [...]. [T]he city has focused on creating density around transit hubs, such as SkyTrain stations. The increased density in these areas is one thing, but increasing it in single-family home neighbourhoods may not be welcome [...]. Only so much will be tolerated at one time. (ibid)

The Mayor’s observations are hardly new either, echoing some of the same conclusions Filion (2009) found in Toronto, where stood reluctant to accept transit corridors through established neighbourhoods. At least in Burnaby’s case, it appears that Town Centres policy has been somewhat successful in resolving this challenge, by designating wider areas for high density development than just those immediately surrounding the nodes, although making sure to not make them too large. Even in the largest Town Centre, Edmonds has been designed to permit development around long existing bus routes that radiate from the Town Centre’s core SkyTrain station (see Appendix F). However, this transit development policy did not occur overnight. The policy has required years of commitment, dedication, and stability. This direction appears to have been successful in part because of the government commitment to maintaining the character of single family neighbourhoods. We see this as especially true in the Brentwood Town Centre, an area that is experiencing an incredible growth in density, despite its location directly adjacent to an established single family neighbourhood with considerably lower densities.
6.5 Towards Burnabism

In many ways, the implementation of the Town Centres policy has relied on certain inherent dualities: politics and planning, transit and retail, and urban and suburban. From these dualities, we find that Burnaby has developed a certain kind of model that could be emulated elsewhere.

As we saw, the planning-politics duality is resolvable. It is possible to craft planning policies into saleable policies for the whole community, though it depends on communication and acceptance. Firstly, it depends on the messaging being told to both sides of the density equation. In Burnaby, policy favoured the preservation of established low density neighbourhoods, while focusing future growth in high densities within Town Centres. To make this work though, the City has worked hard to isolate the two to prevent a suburban backlash. To do this, the City has installed stringent planning controls, to mixed reviews:

Representatives of the development community and the light industrial sector have suggested that Burnaby is not always the easiest place to do business in the region, in part because of approvals processes that can be perceived as being demanding and tedious by those not familiar with them. (Burnaby, 2007: 23)

However, as the statement from business representatives on the 2007 City’s Economic Development Strategy 2020 panel notes, this discipline has been balanced by predictability in the marketplace:

On the other hand, Burnaby has benefited from paying attention to the quality of urban development and being consistent in its planning and development decision-making. (ibid)

The quote goes on to state, that “There is a need to find ways to be more efficient, faster, and more flexible without sacrificing standards,” however, judging by the intensity of development in all four of Burnaby’s Town Centres, it appears that stability and predictability have considerably outweighed fears within the marketplace. Adding credibility to the approach, in early 2011 when the local media approached Burnaby resident, Brian Bonney, recent Director of Provincial Affairs at the Canadian Federation of Independent Businesses and long-time Burnaby Voters’ Association organizer, Bonney said “To give [Mayor] Derek Corrigan and his team some credit, they’ve run Burnaby pretty good [sic]” (Richter, 2011).
It is also worth repeating the findings of Dittmar, Belzer, and Autler (2004). In their text, *The New Transit Town*, the authors state:

We believe that transit and transit-oriented development are essential parts of the toolkit for healthy metropolitan economies and improved quality of life. But we acknowledge that transit and transit-oriented development have their limitations, that autos, highways, and suburbs are also integral parts of the toolkit, and that a return to the era of streetcar suburbs is neither possible nor necessarily desirable. (Dittmar et al, 2004: 1).

At first glance, Burnaby appears dully suburban in character. There are no considerable developments on its vast waterfronts, the various water bodies that exist within the City are surrounded by lush parkland, while numerous green spaces undulate throughout the City. Similarly, the City has held development at bay on the over 190-hectare Deer Lake Park. In fact, the City has maintained a buy-back program, reclaiming residential properties into the multipurpose wildlife preserve and cultural asset. In other municipalities across the region, these areas would be considered prime real estate. Many of the Regional Town Centres touch water, while subdivisions have covered many mountainsides. Conversely, in Burnaby, the development policies that have existed in the past half century have contributed to the preservation of green space, and enhanced the economics of rapid and conventional transit service. Quite unlike the aesthetic Vancouverist model, the qualities outlined by Burnabism pertain to the urban structure of a whole municipality or region. But as much of a comprehensive planning exercise, it also refers to the level of political participation in planning. This interaction, or intersection, has resulted in a consistency from plan inception to implementation. It is a program that is designed to gain political acceptance and long-term support.

In responding to an election-related question in a local paper, incumbent Councillor Colleen Jordan provided a long-horizon response uncharacteristic of the typical short-term gain municipal candidate platforms. Reflecting on the thirty years since she moved from the Edmonds Town Centre, Jordan noted, “the new Highgate [Village, see Appendix F] area has evolved, complete with new city facilities like a firehall, library, and recreation centre. Private development replaced the mall, and new housing continues to expand. This is exactly what the OCP envisioned” (Wanda, 2011d)
This project has been intentionally constrained to fit within the scope of the question, however, some of the conclusions have raised several points of research that can help to further refine both the principles of Burnabism, but contribute to urban studies in general. Future research for example, may include the effect that proximity to other municipalities has had for development trends in Burnaby. For instance, Brentwood’s and Metrotown’s commuting proximity to Vancouver may in large part be factors in the pace of development there, while Lougheed’s proximity to the Northeast Sector municipalities may have increased that Town Centre’s popularity as a historic gateway hub to Vancouver. Foreign immigration may also be another future study area. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many new developments are particularly popular with recent immigrants from Mainland China, who are more accustomed to high rise living than many multi-generational residents more familiar with low-rise suburban living. Lastly, this project paid some attention to the predominance of retail-oriented planning, but the discussion raises more questions around the role of shopping centres as a different retail form than one would expect in most traditional downtowns.

Beyond these future research pursuits, not all of Burnaby’s policies are models worthy of emulation. But, with regard to the development of Town Centres policy, the City does present a noteworthy study that could be of use to other North American jurisdictions hoping to resolve development conflicts, while addressing the need to achieve sustainability targets.
## Appendix A: Significant Regional Events Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Provincial</th>
<th>Locally Relevant Provincial Policy</th>
<th>Lower Mainland</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>LMRPB is formed</td>
<td>1952 The Lower Mainland Looks Ahead (LMRPB)</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>WAC Bennett SoCreds wind down the LMRPB</td>
<td>1963 Chance and Challenge (LMRPB)</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Dave Barrett New Democrats elected</td>
<td>1967 GVRD is established</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Board of Transportation Services established</td>
<td>1975 The Livable Region Proposals New Westminster, Metrotown RTCs are proposed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Bill R. Bennett &amp; SoCreds brought back to power</td>
<td>1975 The Livable Region Plan Surrey and Coquitlam RTCs added to Metrotown and New Westminster</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Statutory powers of the GVRD are rescinded</td>
<td>1985 Lonsdale, Richmond, Langley, Maple Ridge RTCs added to original RTCs</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Municipal Affairs Min. Bill Vander Zalm oversees ALRT SkyTrain line from Vancouver to New West.</td>
<td>1987 SkyBridge between Columbia &amp; Scott Road Stations unveiled</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Rita Johnston becomes SoCred Premier</td>
<td>1994 Surrey SkyTrain extension between Scott Road &amp; King George Station unveiled</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Mike Harcourt New Democrats (NDP) elected</td>
<td>1995 Growth Strategies Act</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Glen Clark becomes NDP Premier</td>
<td>1998 Millennium Line SkyTrain unveiled</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Dan Miller becomes NDP Premier</td>
<td>1996 Livable Region Strategic Plan Municipal Town Centres officially recognized</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Ujjal Dosanjh becomes NDP Premier</td>
<td>2003 GVRD injunction on Richmond Green Zone rejected</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Gordon Campbell BC Liberals</td>
<td>2004 Pacific Gateway program unveiled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>LMRP Rapid Transit Line to Richmond Canada Line (RAV Line) unveiled</td>
<td>2011 Regional Growth Strategy stalemate</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Comparative Regional Town Centre Indicators

This series shows relative sizes of the Regional Town Centres. All data originates from a GVRD custom data set from the 2006 Statistics Canada Census, with the exception of Richmond RTC, which was compiled manually by the author using Dissemination Areas from the 2006 Statistics Canada Census.
Appendix C: Comparative Regional Town Centre Work Commutes

This series shows data taken from Statistics Canada 2006 counts, showing employed labour force 15 years and over with usual place of work or no fixed workplace address by mode of transportation, for each Regional Town Centre.

![Pie charts showing mode of transportation for various Regional Town Centres: Metrotown, Richmond, Langley, Lonsdale (CNV), Maple Ridge, Coquitlam, New Westminster, Surrey.](image)

1*Other Means* refers to combined data for bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other’.
Other Means refers to combined data for bicycle, motorcycle, taxicab, and ‘other’.

Burnaby Elsewhere\textsuperscript{2} refers to all areas of Burnaby excluding the four Town Centres.
Appendix D: Burnaby Electoral Timeline (BCA results)
Appendix E: Metrotown (Regional Town) Centre

The next four appendices feature 2009 custom Google Map aerial images, with boundaries indicated by the shaded blue line. The original SkyTrain route (Expo Line) is indicated by the shaded purple line, while the most recent SkyTrain line (Millennium Line) is indicated by the shaded green line.
Appendix F: Edmonds Town Centre
Appendix H: Brentwood Town Centre
REFERENCES LIST

Preamble

The City Archives’ website (www.heritageburnaby.ca) contains a wealth of municipal material, though many documents were retrieved with the assistance of the City Archivist. The website has gained international recognition since 2010, when it shared an industry award with the Smithsonian Institution. For material not available on this website, I consulted material directly from the City Archives located in the Burnaby Public Library’s McGill branch, a source for many of the early Council Reports. Having an accessible online database helped for a quick discovery of preceding and succeeding documents that may have been referred to in reports or Minutes statements, though several visits to the Archives were necessary for large archival documents that were not digitized. For all documents produced from 1997 and on, I was able to call up materials from the most current database of Council records, located on the City’s corporate website at www.burnaby.ca. From this website, I was also able to find more recent publications produced through the Planning Department.

For regional source material, I consulted the Regional District’s Harry Lash Library. Located at the head offices for Metro Vancouver (GVRD) in Burnaby, this library is the physical repository for most recorded material pertaining to strategic regional planning. Together with the online presence located at www.metrovancouver.org, this was an excellent source for some of the deep history on Regional Town Centres. For supplementary regional documents, as well as other major municipal policy documents, I consulted the W. A. C. Bennett Library at Simon Fraser University’s main campus.

To gather external accounts of policy and planning decisions, I consulted news articles which proved to be an invaluable source. Because Burnaby was historically the second most populous municipality in the region, there is a wide repository of news coverage on the City from local, regional, and national media sources. To gather historic news articles, I consulted with reference librarians at Burnaby Public Library’s main Bob Prittie branch at Metrotown to

23 ArchivesNext. For further information, please visit http://www.archivesnext.com/?p=1532.
search through microfiche. Prior to this however, I used the Burnaby Matters database which retrieves periodical and article titles only, searchable by subject. Compiling a list of relevant articles, I brought these to the reference librarians, who then retrieved several microfiche at a time for me to scan through. Though more recent articles are available in digital databases, older articles are located only on microfiche, of which most can be found at the main branch.

**Sources**


Fuller-Evans, J. (2010b, November 3). More bang for our buck: new development could be pilot project for higher density in the city. Burnaby Now, p. 3.

Fuller-Evans, J. (2011, April 6). Laneway homes not in pipeline; Mayor says city has chosen to focus density on transit hubs instead. Burnaby Now, p. 1.


Shelley tosses in towel, staff caught by surprise. (1989, April 15). *Burnaby Now*, p. 3.


Townsite master planners roused. (1965, June 10). *Burnaby Courier*, p. 1


