THE HUMAN GATEWAY:
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING,
GEOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE, AND BRITISH
COLUMBIA’S ASIA PACIFIC INITIATIVE

By
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B.A., University of Victoria, 2003

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
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MASTER OF ARTS

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Department of Geography,
Faculty of Environment

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Abstract

Since the 1980s, there has been strong economic growth in Pacific Asia, an increase in trade between the region and Canada, and corresponding shifts in British Columbia’s economic base and international trade relationships. Facilitated by free trade agreements, these shifts in the political economy of the Pacific Rim have altered the conditions of regional economic development planning: increased inter-regional competition for capital has led to a growth in entrepreneurial planning strategies. This research explores strategies endorsed by BC’s Ministry of Economic Development to capitalize on economic growth in Pacific Asia as articulated in a 2007 planning document called *British Columbia: The Asia Pacific Initiative*. The thesis notes how this document identifies citizen knowledge, particularly geographic and cultural knowledge, as a key competitive advantage for the province. It concludes that, as trade conditions shift, so too does the relationship between government and citizen knowledge in the planning process.

Keywords: Pacific Asia, planning, economic development, Asia Pacific Initiative, neoliberalism, cultural knowledge, geographic knowledge.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my father, Mark Ruelle, to the memory of my mother, Heather Ruelle, and to my husband, Tsuyoshi Sasagawa.
Acknowledgements

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support, encouragement and patience of my supervisory committee, Paul Kingsbury and Eugene McCann.

The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided financial support for this project through a Canada Graduate Scholarship. Simon Fraser University also supported this research through a Graduate Fellowship. I am grateful to SSHRC and to SFU for this funding assistance.

Marcia Crease and Marion Walter, Graduate Secretaries when I entered and graduated from SFU Geography’s grad programme, respectively, provided timely and expert administrative support.

Mark Ruelle, Elaine Knight and Vince Knight, my Vancouver family, were always good for airport pickups, muffins, and constant encouragement. My grad colleagues at SFU Geography supplied laughter, memories, and pitchers in abundance. Tsuyoshi Sasagawa, my Japan family, is the best part of coming home.
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Introduction

Exhibit A: 1919

No one can complain of a lack of romance in [Canada’s] Western world. Where stood the forest primeval a few years ago now rise skyscrapers, handsome churches, splendid educational institutions, and beautiful homes with gardens of roses and gaily coloured paths. The charm of the city is easily understood. An inspirational loyalty and a commendable civic pride accomplished much. Vancouver is now one of the greatest seaports in the world possessing one of the most beautiful sites imaginable.

Cosmopolitan are the throngs that crowd Vancouver streets. In the procession go the Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, the Indian, and men from all climes, but the white man predominates, as does his civilization.

Vancouver is of the 20th century, full of up-to-date spirit, impregnated with optimism and marked by its bigness of plans.

“Vancouver, British Columbia” in Canadian Uutisten Toimisto (a bilingual Finnish-English newspaper for Finnish-Canadian immigrants),
Port Arthur, Ontario, Canada, July 18, 1919
Exhibit B: 1940

“Just as I, as a subject of Japan, feel loyal to Japan, so the Nisei\(^1\) who are citizens of Canada have their undivided allegiance and devotion to this country,” declared Baron Shu Tomii in an interview with The New Canadian during his brief stay in Vancouver prior to his departure for Japan.

“The Nisei should be willing, in fact, they should count it a privilege to serve Canada in a time of national crisis like this,” he continued. [...] He went on to point out the important part B.C. citizens can play in the Pacific. People residing in the province, the gateway between Canada and the Orient, should hold it their duty and privilege to understand the Japanese and to promote good relations between the two nations, acting as the connecting link.

“Second Generation Japanese Owe Loyalty to Canada Says Diplomat”
The New Canadian, September 25, 1940 p3

Exhibit C: 2007

For British Columbia, the path to a stronger, more vibrant relationship with Asia begins in our principal strengths—our strong, open economy, unique geographical location, spectacular natural environment, and diverse, multicultural community.

-BC’s Asia Pacific Initiative, an economic development policy document published by the Government of British Columbia in 2007

\(^1\) The Nisei (also Nikkei) are second-generation Japanese-Canadians
In 1919, would-be migrants to British Columbia from Eastern Canada read in an immigrant-focussed newspaper (Exhibit A) that the province’s largest city was a kind of colonial-cosmopolitan dreamscape. Vancouver in 1919, as the breathless article revealed, boasted a landscape of “skyscrapers, handsome churches, splendid educational institutions, and beautiful homes with gardens of roses and gaily coloured paths”. There were cosmopolitan throngs on its streets. The city was “full of up-to-date spirit, impregnated with optimism and marked by its bigness of plans.”

Ninety years later, would-be migrants to British Columbia from other parts of the world, should they choose to log on to the provincial government’s immigrant information portal website, encounter a strikingly similar refrain: “Multiculturalism is a way of life in British Columbia,” insists www.welcomebc.ca. “British Columbia has unparalleled access to wilderness, parks, protected areas and recreation areas.” “British Columbia actively promotes international trade with Asia, Europe and the United States.”

As in 1919, so today do prospective migrants to BC read of a multicultural province with thriving urban landscapes, natural recreation opportunities, a multicultural society, and a forward-looking spirit. BC: on the edge of the Pacific, making big plans.
Strong cross-Pacific links are nothing new in those big BC plans. In late 1940, (ten weeks before Pearl Harbor) a visiting Japanese General transited through Vancouver to catch a steamboat back to Japan. On his stopover he commented that “[p]eople residing in the province, the gateway between Canada and the Orient, should hold it their duty and privilege to understand the Japanese and to promote good relations between the two nations, acting as the connecting link” (Exhibit B). Though the term ‘Orient’ was replaced with ‘Pacific Asia’ by 2007, the imperative has stayed the course: a provincial government economic development policy document published seventy years after the General’s visit exhorts BC’s citizens to draw on our gateway position to forge a “stronger, more vibrant relationship with Asia”.

It would seem from these reports that BC’s collective character and dreams have not shifted much over the last century. The refrain continues: BC is a cosmopolitan outpost on the Pacific, making big plans and forging links across the Pacific. Yet, no one would argue that global cultural political economy from 1919 to the present has remained static. Amidst the sweeping cultural, economic, and political changes that the world has seen since 1919, are not these repeated calls for a cosmopolitan British Columbia to strengthen its links to Pacific Asia remarkable in their consistency?

Yes and no. British Columbia’s grand narrative may not have shifted much in the last century, but the subtle techniques and processes by which this narrative of cosmopolitanism and cross-Pacific ties emerges in the landscape of the province
have—as I hope to demonstrate in this thesis—changed significantly. The similarity of the 1919 article discussed above to current-day immigrant recruitment rhetoric and the way echoes of a wartime Japanese General’s imperatives to force cross-Pacific links return in a 2007 provincial economic development planning document are certainly worth noting. However, no less worth noting are the subtle differences in vocabulary in the examples discussed above. Consider that the 1919 article mentions the dominance of the “white man’s civilization” while the 2007 planning document excerpt promotes BC’s “strong, open economy”. Note the shift from the 1940s term “Orient” to 2007’s “Pacific Asia”. Observe, even, the General’s 1940 wartime call for “good relations” between BC and the Orient to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s ambition, as expressed in their 2010 mission statement, to “build a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific community by championing free and open trade and investment” (APEC, 2010, “Mission Statement”).

Katharyne Mitchell, in her study of Vancouver-Asia migration amid liberalizing Pacific Rim economies, asks a question I think is worth repeating here: “In the long march of history,” she wonders, “how is it possible to determine the hows and whys of hegemonic restructuring? What are the signals of paradigmatic change that literally stand out in the landscape, but need to be read with a critical eye to be seen?” (2004, 39). This thesis argues that the signals of paradigmatic change can be, and often are, as mundane and seemingly unaffected by geographical specificity as the vocabulary of a public policy document. If British Columbia’s authorities are indeed trying to nudge the province in new directions in the midst of a
storm of hegemonic restructuring in global political economy, those with an interest in tracking and evaluating these new directions and strategies will not be able to find clear road markers. Tracing the effects of paradigmatic change on a region and on the strategies and tactics that those in power in that region deploy must necessarily start with the details—small gestures, new ideas that are floated and promoted, innovative phrases, novel strategies.

Therefore, vocabulary matters. Terminology and phrasing, even in the driest of policy documents, matter because they provide a way in, an entry-point through which to comprehend large-scale projects that reshape political, economic, and cultural space. The subtle shifts in the words and phrases used to describe and address what seem to be the same decades-old British Columbian concerns—a cosmopolitan population, the province’s position as a gateway to Asia, and its cross-Pacific political and economic relations—may indeed reflect wide shifts in the political, economic, and cultural power dynamics not only of British Columbia but also of the Pacific Rim and the globe. They may, of course, reflect nothing more than creative copywriting—an attempt to put new public relations gloss on the same old issues. This thesis is an attempt to determine whether the subtle shifts in vocabulary in a recent economic development planning document published in British Columbia is the former or the latter.
1.1 Research Topic

This project investigates recent changes in the cultural political economy of British Columbia by analyzing a policy document published by the province’s Ministry of Economic Development in 2007 titled *British Columbia: The Asia Pacific Initiative* (hereafter, *Asia Pacific Initiative* or API). Though nominally an economic development planning policy, the *Asia Pacific Initiative* takes a comprehensive approach in developing strategies to achieve its goal of strengthening British Columbia’s economic ties to Pacific Asia. This project considers two of the Asia Pacific Initiative’s economic development objectives, which are: (1) to take greater economic advantage of British Columbia’s already-existing human ties to Pacific Asia, as manifested in the province’s multicultural population and (2) to further develop facility with Pacific Asian languages and cultures among British Columbians so as to increase trade and investment in the province.

This research considers how the *Asia Pacific Initiative* and the individuals who gave their input to the policy’s drafting articulate the need for, and achievability of, the above two objectives. I work from the thesis, as discussed above, that the techniques and vocabularies of rationalization of state policies, especially policies that intervene so explicitly into the terrain of subjectivity, attempting to leverage the linguistic and cultural knowledge and life choices of private citizens into economic gain for the province, reveal much about the character and direction of hegemonic restructuring and paradigmatic change however mundane or technical those rationalizations may be. Working under this theoretical framework, I trace the *Asia
Pacific Initiative’s articulation with and of greater shifts in the structure of Pacific Rim cultural political economy.

1.2 Research Questions

The following research questions guide this project:

1) What economic, political, and cultural conditions in British Columbia and the Pacific Rim led to the drafting of the Asia Pacific Initiative?

2) How do the Asia Pacific Initiative document and those who helped draft it articulate and rationalize the need to leverage citizen knowledge (particularly geographical, cultural and linguistic facility) to achieve province’s goal of profitable economic integration with Pacific Asia?

3) What do these rationalizations reveal about larger paradigmatic change in British Columbia’s political cultural economic position vis a vis Pacific Asia?

1.3 Research Methods

I gathered data to addressed the above questions from a number of sources. My major source in this research was the Asia Pacific Initiative policy document. My supplementary sources were press releases and supplementary policy documents published by the government of British Columbia; Hansard transcriptions of debates about the Asia Pacific Initiative in BC’s Legislative Assembly; eight semi-structured interviews I conducted in 2008 in person in Vancouver and by phone with five public servants and elected cabinet members (ministers) in BC’s provincial government, one
programme manager seconded to the API from Canada’s federal public service, and two policy analysts at an independent institute, and articles about the Asia Pacific Initiative published in British Columbia newspapers between 2008 and 2010. I recruited my interviewees by first contacting the individuals whose names appeared in the API document itself, then following up on their suggestions for other relevant people to talk to. The interviews ranged from 20 minutes to an hour. At the time of my interviews, the API was still a very new policy. Although transportation infrastructure improvements managed jointly through the federal and provincial governments predated the API and were well underway at the time of my research, API-spurred investments in BC’s ‘human gateway’ had yet to see concrete results. Therefore, our interviews focussed much more heavily on the ideas and motivations behind the API’s comprehensive focus rather than on the policy’s actual achievements in this area.

I analyzed the above data by coding texts and transcripts according to the arguments they put forth and the rhetorical strategies they employed. I paid close attention to statements to statements, phrases, or arguments that argued for the necessity of the Asia Pacific Initiative and for the necessity of certain ways of viewing BC in relation to Pacific Asia. Very generally, I looked for instances when documents or people argued, either implicitly or explicitly, that a certain mode of engagement with the Asia Pacific was necessary, then explored the reasons cited for the necessity of this mode of engagement.
1.4 Thesis Structure

This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter One introduces the scope of the project and its guiding research questions. Chapter Two provides an overview of political economic changes in BC and the Pacific Rim that provide the background to my research topic. Chapter Three explores how these changes articulate with wider shifts in the organization of global capitalism, how changes in the relationship of the state to capital have effected shifts in urban and regional planning strategies and in the relationship between state and citizen. Chapter Four provides details of the political economic circumstances that led to the drafting of BC’s Asia Pacific Initiative. Chapter Five offers an empirical analysis of the vocabulary and techniques used to rationalize the Asia Pacific Initiative’s economic development strategies. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes and reflects on the project’s research findings and reflects on their connection to wider shifts in the workings of global political cultural economy.
2: Background and Research Context

The past three decades brought dramatic changes to British Columbia’s economic base, its trade relationships with Pacific Asia, and the province’s urban landscapes. This chapter provides a brief overview of these changes (which in turn affected the region’s current economic development strategies and goals) in order to provide the economic and political context in which BC’s Asia Pacific Initiative was drafted. These changes to BC’s economic base, trade relationships, and urban landscapes occurred in the context of wider shifts in the spatial and ideological organization of global capitalism since the 1970s, which in turn spurred the recent emergence of new strategies in urban and regional governance. I discuss these wider shifts in both global capitalism and urban and regional governance in Chapter Three.

2.1 Economic Growth and Integration in Pacific Asia

Since the late 1980s, many nations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (hereafter referred to collectively as Pacific Asia or the Asia Pacific) have experienced high rates of economic growth. Though economic growth has not been universal or consistent across Pacific Asia, nations that have experienced strong growth, at various times, include China, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, India, Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia (see Table 1).
## GDP in Constant 2000 US$, in billions\(^2\)

*Source: World Bank Indicators*

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<td>China</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1106</td>
<td>2938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2566</td>
<td>3931</td>
<td>4538</td>
<td>4870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) Note: Data for Taiwan was not available
Although the reasons for this strong economic growth are complex and regionally specific and thus beyond the scope of this thesis, broadly speaking much of it can be accounted for by an increase in manufacturing activity that draws on a large pool of low-cost labour in Pacific Asia and was facilitated by government policy (Jomo 2003), increased political stability in much of the region (Younis et al 2008) and, in the case of Hong Kong and Singapore, liberal financial regulations (Schiffer 1991). Some economic growth can also be accounted for through an increase in intraregional trade and in Pacific Asia, as the region becomes more economically integrated (Dee 2007).

2.2 Cross-Pacific Trade and Migration

Since the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, there has been an increase in trade across the Pacific Rim and a reconfiguration of Canada’s trade relationships with Pacific Asia that has seen Canada concentrate on exporting products of its resource, service & quaternary sectors and Pacific Asia increasing its manufacturing exports to Canada (see Tables 2 and 3). Supranational agreements such as APEC’s 2001 Trade Facilitation Action Plan (APEC Committee on Trade and Investment \textit{APEC Trade Facilitation Action Plan}) have facilitated this increase in cross-Pacific trade between Canada and Pacific Asia, and these trade
relationships are likely to continue should the 2010 APEC-proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) be enacted.

Table 2: Canadian Exports to Pacific Asia, 1980-2004 (in $CDN millions)

Source: Statistics Canada Table 227-0001 - Total exports and domestic exports to individual countries, customs basis not seasonally adjusted, monthly (Dollars)

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<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>17.54</td>
<td>28.32</td>
<td>71.88</td>
<td>151.43</td>
<td>122.39</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>871%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>349.83</td>
<td>481.43</td>
<td>737.34</td>
<td>1 061.13</td>
<td>800.68</td>
<td>803.45</td>
<td>230%</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>58.83</td>
<td>117.55</td>
<td>200.99</td>
<td>209.09</td>
<td>338.74</td>
<td>555.44</td>
<td>944%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
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<td>85.29</td>
<td>146.36</td>
<td>271.06</td>
<td>223.01</td>
<td>188.72</td>
<td>518%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>29 707%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>35.86</td>
<td>47.90</td>
<td>27.71</td>
<td>47.19</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>45.07</td>
<td>32.15</td>
<td>49.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>6.62</td>
<td>18.14</td>
<td>37.69</td>
<td>51.40</td>
<td>43.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>24.61</td>
<td>33.80</td>
<td>18.17</td>
<td>42.59</td>
<td>31.61</td>
<td>55.95</td>
<td>227%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>83.07</td>
<td>137.95</td>
<td>105.28</td>
<td>121.12</td>
<td>579%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Merchandise Imports to Canada from Pacific Asia, 1980-2004

*(in $CDN millions)*

Source: Statistics Canada Table 227-0002 - Merchandise imports from individual countries and areas of origin, customs basis not seasonally adjusted, monthly (Dollars)

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<tbody>
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<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>60.16</td>
<td>71.48</td>
<td>91.80</td>
<td>90.72</td>
<td>53.32</td>
<td>147%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>215.12</td>
<td>527.41</td>
<td>991.37</td>
<td>1,273.24</td>
<td>1,605.76</td>
<td>1,304.67</td>
<td>606%</td>
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<td>40.76</td>
<td>84.69</td>
<td>312.0</td>
<td>767.29</td>
<td>1,722.26</td>
<td>10,904%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>33.53</td>
<td>116.54</td>
<td>205.59</td>
<td>250.64</td>
<td>359.52</td>
<td>509.8</td>
<td>1,521%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>36.74</td>
<td>34,332%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>36.74</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>31.56</td>
<td>93.41</td>
<td>140.41</td>
<td>169.86</td>
<td>462%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>16.55</td>
<td>53.89</td>
<td>115.57</td>
<td>119.53</td>
<td>79.05</td>
<td>1,014%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>124.72</td>
<td>206.7</td>
<td>237.24</td>
<td>1,574%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>19.59</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>45.29</td>
<td>135.01</td>
<td>139.66</td>
<td>1,768%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>45.81</td>
<td>114.78</td>
<td>186.62</td>
<td>255.6</td>
<td>418.76</td>
<td>357.39</td>
<td>780%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Human migration across the Pacific Rim has increased in the last two decades as well. Changes to Canada’s business investor immigration laws in 1989 that were meant to attract wealthy would-be immigrants from Hong Kong wary of the effect the territory’s pending handover to China (Mitchell 1993; Ley 2003, 2004) precipitated increased immigration to Canada from Hong Kong. Between 1980 and 2001, Canada received 380,000 immigrants from Hong Kong, 100,000 of whom came under the business investor program and 64,000 as skilled workers; the vast majority of these immigrants settled in Vancouver or Toronto (Ley and Kobayashi 2005). In recent years, patterns of return or circular migration between Asia and Canada (Ley and Kobayashi 2005) have emerged and, related to these circular migration patterns, has been growth of the Canadian diaspora (i.e. non-resident Canadian citizens, either Canada-born or naturalized immigrants) in Asia (Zhang 2006).

2.3 Changes in British Columbia

2.3.1 Economic Base

Concurrent with an increase in Canada-Asia trade and migration came significant changes to BC’s economic base. Since the 1980s, BC’s economy has shifted from a base in the primary- and manufacturing-sectors to heavier dependence
on the service and quaternary-sector (Edgington and Goldberg, 1992). In 1998, for example, 15% of BC’s labour force worked in the primary industries (forestry, fishing, mining, and agriculture) while 51% worked in the services, finance, and public administration sectors (1998 British Columbia Financial and Economic Review, 60).

In 2009, the percentage of BC’s labour force working in primary industries and manufacturing had dropped to 11%, while participation in services, finance, and public administration had risen to 57% (2010 British Columbia Financial and Economic Review, 25).

A current economic snapshot of British Columbia is as follows: the province’s GDP in 2009 was $191 billion, and its per-capita GDP in that same year was $42,824 (BC Stats, Economic Activity: British Columbia and Canada). 80% of those working in BC are employed in the services-producing sector; the five largest segments of BC’s service sector include health care and social assistance (15%); professional, scientific, and technical service (10%), educational services (9%), accommodation and food services (9%), and finance, insurance, real estate, and leasing (8%). Of the 20% of BC workers employed in the goods-producing sector, 37% work in manufacturing and 43% in construction (Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey).

2.3.2 Trade Relationships

Along with recent changes in BC’s economic base have come changes in its international trade relationships. While the United States remains BC’s largest trading partner, accounting for 51.3% of exports in 2009 (2010 British Columbia Financial and
Economic Review, 28), the province’s trade with Pacific Asia has increased significantly in the last ten years as the market for BC exports in Asia has grown. In 2010, the province exported approximately $28.7 billion of goods and services, of which 40.9% went to the Pacific Rim3 (including Japan) (BC Stats Exports (BC Origin): 2001-2010). Since 2004, the province has run an international trade deficit. Trade deficit reached $24.2 billion in 2008, though this deficit is due to trade in goods, not services. The province maintains an international trade surplus in service, indicating that BC’s labour force is producing its surplus capital through the service and quaternary sectors (BC Stats Exports: March 2009).

2.3.3 Built Environment

These broad changes in BC’s economy and trade relationships have left their mark on the built environment of British Columbia. Economic growth has manifested itself in urban development in Greater Vancouver and in major infrastructure projects across the province, while economic decline materialized in rural depopulation and abandoned mines and saw mills.

As cross-Pacific trade increased in recent decades, BC tried to take advantage of its position as a convenient shipping gateway to/from the rest of Canada, the US

3 BC Stats considers the Pacific Rim region to include Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Singapore, Laos, Mongolia, China, Indonesia, North Korea, South Korea, Philippines, Macau, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, Fiji, and New Zealand.
and Pacific Asia. Increased trade in goods, facilitated by NAFTA and APEC, brought increased container traffic; Port Metro Vancouver handled 118 million tonnes of cargo in 2010 (Port Metro Vancouver, *Statistics Overview 2010*) while BC’s northern port, the Port of Prince Rupert handled just over 16 million tonnes (“Prince Rupert Handles Record Annual Cargo Volumes…” 2010). To handle the amount of cargo passing through BC’s ports, both Port Metro Vancouver and the Port of Prince Rupert have, with federal and provincial government assistance, initiated major infrastructural improvement programs.

The population of Vancouver, the largest city in BC, has grown significantly in the last two decades, both through inter-provincial migration and international immigration. Between 1991 and 2009, for example, Vancouver’s inter-provincial net migration rate averaged 4,880 people per year while the number of immigrants arriving in the region from overseas during the same period averaged 34,028 people per year (Metro Vancouver Migration Component 1991-2009).

This growing population as well as the increase in international trade discussed above have made their mark on the urban landscape of Vancouver. In the late 1980s, for example, a major real estate development project occurred at the former site of the Expo 86 World’s Fair. This development, the Pacific Place urban megaproject, was largely financed by investment from Hong Kong (Olds 1998) and it transformed a former industrial site to a high-density urban residential district. While other areas in the City of Vancouver experienced gentrification and rising real estate prices (Ley 1996; Ley and Hiebert 2003), Vancouver’s suburbs also grew rapidly to accommodate
the city’s growing population (Ray, Halseth, and Johnson 1997; Filion, Langlois, Bunting and Pavlic 2010).

In summary, strong economic growth in Asia over the last three decades led to an increase in trade and migration between the region and Canada. This brought BC closer to Pacific Asia both economically and in human terms, while also precipitating a shift in the province’s economic base from the primary and manufacturing sectors to the services-producing sector. BC’s changing population and economic base led to a changing landscape: cities grew, suburbs spread, and ports expanded. As I discuss in the next chapter, the province’s changing economy, population, trade relationships and landscapes, in conjunction with wider changes global capitalism and urban and regional planning strategies, have led to changes in the way BC envisions and plans for its future.
These changes in BC’s economic, demographic, political and built landscapes discussed in the previous chapter have not occurred, of course, in a vacuum, but rather in the shadow of larger shifts in the spatial and ideological organization of global capitalism. At the same time that BC’s workers found finance or customer service positions rather than jobs at the sawmill or cannery, new immigrants filed their papers at BC’s ports of entry, and land surveyors marked the sites of new suburban housing developments, the global economy was shifting from Fordist production and welfare state to prioritize the unfettered movement of capital and to devise vocabularies and policies that valourized the free market.

This chapter discusses how growing adherence to liberal trade policies in global political economy affected the practices of regional economic development planning, policymaking, and governance. Before discussing the affect of neoliberalism on the politics and techniques of regional policymaking, however, I briefly discuss the characteristics and controversies of neoliberalism.

The early 1970s marked the beginning of a shift in economic activity from the Fordist systems of production that had characterized post-war development North America and Europe to policies and practices that promote free market logic and a
general move towards lowering impediments to the mobility of capital, goods, and labour (Harvey 1989a, 2005; Brenner and Theodore 2002). The ensuing decades saw the weakening of the welfare state and the reduction of trade tariffs through agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organization-administered General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs, and the foundation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, as well as an increase in the power of supranational institutions devoted to achieving a free global market for capital, goods, and labour such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. The increasing liberation of capital from the restrictions of tariffs through free trade agreements and from spatial boundaries through new communication and transportation technology represented a turn away from the “embedded liberalism” of the post-war decades and return to the tenets of 18th century economic liberalism. These collective shifts in global political economy took the name neoliberalism (Harvey 2005).

Briefly, the characteristics of the North Atlantic Fordism which neoliberal policies began to work against were as follows: wages were regulated by state interventions between corporation and labour; states worked to showcase and favourably position their largest corporations or firms on the world market, national industries and markets were relatively protected; the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates was in place; and national central banks managed the allocation of credit to corporations & consumers. Generally, under this political economic paradigm, nation-states actively regulated the business cycle and played an active role
in redistributing wealth across society and across national territory so as to avoid polarizing and social unrest within the nation. The world economy was, broadly, comprised of relatively autonomous national economies with US acting as the global leader (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 1994).

Neoliberalization, on the other hand, works from a different list of priorities favouring, as the term indicates, free and unrestricted trade across national boundaries. “Core neoliberal priorities,” argue Brenner and Theodore, include“‘lean’ bureaucracies, fiscal austerity, enhanced labor market flexibility, territorial competitiveness, and the free flow of investment capital” (2002, 361). State regulation of relatively autonomous national economies and state-managed redistribution of capital within the nation’s boundaries cedes in this new economic paradigm a minimally regulated global economy in which economic competition and capital mobility trumps regulation, restriction, and redistribution.

Academic literature on neoliberalization has proliferated in recent years, and the sheer volume of work on neoliberalizing economies and their social and spatial manifestations can tempt researchers to slip into discussing neoliberalism as a unified causal force (Larner 2003). However, as Peck and Tickell (2002) point out, neoliberalism is not a singular force with a unified logic or defined end-point. Neoliberalization and its socio-spatial manifestations “should be understood as a process, not an end-state. By the same token, it is also contradictory, it tends to provoke counter-tendencies, and it exists in historically and geographically contingent forms” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 383).
What, then, are the socio-spatial manifestations of this process of economic liberalization and the growing dominance of market logic in the macroeconomic sphere? Though historically and geographically contingent, fluctuating, and contradictory, the influences of market logic on society and space can be read in diverse spaces and spatial practices. The remainder of this chapter explores two specific socio-spatial manifestations of the political economic shift towards a newly liberalizing global economy. First, I explore how the state’s reconfigured relationship to capital under neoliberalism affects urban and regional planning strategies. Second, I investigate how this changing state-capital relationship affects the techniques and strategies regional governments use to manage cultural knowledge in their subjects.

3.1 State-Capital Relations: Urban Entrepreneurialism and the Competition for Capital

The changing patterns of production, trade, migration, and consumption that have occurred under increasingly liberal economic policies in place since the 1980s have caused significant shifts in national and regional governments’ positions in relation to global capital flows. Neil Smith succinctly articulates the role of the state in these newly liberalizing economic conditions when he notes that they render “the neoliberal state clearly an agent rather than a regulator of the market” (2002, 428). While under the previous Fordist paradigm a state’s role was to regulate the national economy and redistribute wealth within the nation’s boundaries, new movements
towards neoliberalism in the supranational sphere now induce states and regional planning authorities to actively campaign for and acquiesce to the demands of capital.

This shift in the role of state power from regulating the flows of capital within circumscribed geopolitical boundaries to actively facilitating the attraction and direction of capital flows has occurred at different scales of government: national, regional, and local. However, at the same time shifts in the macroeconomic context of state power have affected its organization, exercise, and spatial reach on all scales (Smith 2002). Recent shifts in urban and regional planning practices clearly reflect this scalar reorganization when, in line with the market logic of neoliberalizing economic space, regional and urban planning strategies come to prioritize entrepreneurialism, compete to attract capital, minimize capital flight, and position themselves as mediators between citizens and the forces of global capital (Hubbard and Hall 1996, 1998; Crossa 2009; Leitner 1993; Harvey 1989b; MacLeod 2002).

David Harvey (1989b) calls these emerging politics of planning “urban entrepreneurialism”, and Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell observe that these discourses of entrepreneurialism emphasize “the inevitability of global competitive forces and the virtues of locally based coping strategies” (1994, 319). Liberalizing trade relationships and the increased mobility of global capital, they argue, create a “harsh environment” in which “localities have, to borrow a phrase from Marx, become ‘hostile brothers’, flinging themselves into the competitive process of attracting jobs and investment by bargaining away living standards and regulatory capacities” (1994, 319). These strategies of submission to forces of global capital and the use of
competition as a coping mechanism are both locally based and, at the same time, impossible to separate from global forces. Peck and Tickell continue:

“Workforce training, the erosion of social protection, the vigorous marketing of place, and the ritual incantation of the virtues of international competitiveness and public-private partnership, seem now to have become almost universal features of so-called ‘local’ strategies. In this sense, the local really has gone global. Yet, the explanation for the uniformity of local strategies does not lie in these localities themselves, with some shortfall in wit and imagination on the part of local actors. Rather, it is a reflection of the global context within which these strategies are being formulated” (1994, 319)

Their argument here is that these planning strategies, which emphasize market logic and entrepreneurial activity to enhance a region’s attractiveness as a destination for investment are both local attempts to draw on a region’s distinct characteristics and indicative of a wide-reaching sea change in scales of state power in political-economic space. Or, in Katharyne Mitchell’s words, they reflect “the ways that local regimes of power and knowledge shift in a complex dance with global economic forces” (2004, 39).

Locally-based coping strategies that position the state in a facilitative rather than regulatory relationship to global capital and the increased inter-regional competition those strategies have changed the way cities and regions are made, directed, and lived in. With the shift in state relationship to capital and growth of entrepreneurial city approaches have come concerns over quality of life (McCann 2004), growth in social polarization (Ley 1996), and (also raising the question of how ‘local’ locally-based strategies are) how planning policies & practices transfer through circuits of policy mobility form city to city (McCann 2008).
As cities and regions recalibrate their planning approaches to draw on strategies that are both locally specific and yet enmeshed with global economic forces, the position of individual citizens within these recalibrations shifts as well. The next section of this chapter explores how the state’s shift to a role as agent rather than regulator of capital affects the techniques it uses to govern its citizens.

3.2 State-Citizen Relations: Neoliberal Governmentality and a Turn to the Technical

In considering how macroeconomic restructuring affects the relationship between state and citizen, Brenner and Theodore’s comments on how economic projects articulate with already-existing political institutions provide some guidance. “[N]eoliberal programs of capitalist restructuring”, they note, “are rarely, if ever, imposed in a pure form, for they are always introduced within politico-institutional contexts that have been molded significantly by earlier regulatory arrangements, institutionalized practices, and politician compromises” (2002, 361). This is particularly true when the market logic driving the restructuring of global capital is introduced to the already-existing institutions that mediate between citizen and state.

When the state’s position towards capital shifts from a stance of regulation to a stance of facilitation, as discussed in the previous section, the relationship between state and citizen changes in broad ways as well. These changes are reflected in new state-deployed strategies aimed to generate, attract, and leverage citizens with the knowledge and dispositions required to further the state’s economic development
policy goals. Keeping Brenner and Theodore’s caution that “established institutional arrangements significantly constrain the scope and trajectory of reform” in mind (2002, 361), this section briefly considers changes in the techniques and strategies of governance that have come about under the politics of neoliberalization.

The techniques, policies, and strategies used by state power in newly liberalizing economic conditions to govern citizen conduct are gathered in academic literature under the umbrella term “neoliberal governmentality”. ‘Governmentality’ here refers to the mechanisms, strategies, and techniques used by governments to produce citizens who can further specific government policies. First used by Michel Foucault (e.g. 1982), the term has gained traction in geography and the social sciences as a theoretical framework through which to understand, essentially, how governing happens—how power works, why it works, and what it creates or destroys in the process. In Nikolas Rose’s words, governmentality refers to the collection of “more or less rationalized schemes, programs, techniques and devices which seek to shape conduct so as to achieve certain ends” (1999, 20). Neoliberal governmentality, then, refers to the programs, policies, strategies, and plans used by governments to produce citizens who can further the state’s agentive stance towards capital under neoliberalism, as discussed in the above section.

Studies of governmentality start with the state’s objectives: one must “start by asking what authorities of various sorts wanted to happen, in relation to problems defined how, in pursuit of what objectives, through what strategies and techniques” (Rose 1999, 20). It is the mundane processes through which a state defines its
current problems and designs strategies to overcome them that interest Aihwa Ong (2006) and Wendy Larner (2003). The workings of governmentality can be located, Larner argues, in “the apparently mundane practices through which neoliberal spaces, states, and subjects are being constituted in particular forms” (2003, 511). Tracking changes in these mundane processes, therefore, reveals shifts in the workings of governmentality. As Peck and Tickell explain, “[a]nalyses of this process [of neoliberalization] should therefore focus especially sharply on change—on shifts in systems and logics, dominant patterns of restructuring, and so forth—rather than on binary and/or static comparisons between a past state and its erstwhile successor” (2002, 383).

It is important to note that this approach to the study of government relies not on a conception of ‘the state’ as a monolithic entity that stands in opposition to, and exercises power upon, private life for its own ends. Rather, considering state power through the concept of governmentality demands, as Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller observe, the understanding that “[p]olitical power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life, and individual conduct” (1992, 174). Rather than occurring in the clean binary field of public/private or government/citizen, governmentality takes place in a fractious arena in which diverse authorities define problems and attempt to produce citizens disposed to act in ways they deem likely to solve those problems.
Because changes in the techniques of governmentality from previous economic paradigms to the current neoliberal context are contingent upon and constrained by already-existing governmental policies, institutions, and practices, any analysis of the shifting relationship between state and citizen under neoliberalizing economic conditions is, of course, an inexact exercise. Revising the concept of the state to refer to diverse authorities allied in shifting configurations through multiple projects further clouds the empirical terrain. However, Aihwa Ong offers guidance on how to identify these often blurry, contingent, and subtle processes by urging researchers to pay attention to what she calls the “optimizing technologies” of government (2006, 6).

Optimizing technologies—the programs, plans, and policies deployed by states to shape citizen conduct—exist, in Ong’s appraisal, in two categories: “technologies of subjectivity” and “technologies of subjection”. The former, she argues, “rely on an array of knowledge and expert systems to induce self-animation and self-government so that citizens can optimize choices, efficiency, and competitiveness in turbulent market conditions” and include such examples as “the adherence to health regimes, acquisition of skills, development of entrepreneurial ventures,” and others. The latter “inform political strategies that differently regulate populations for optimal productivity, increasingly through spatial practices that engage market forces” such as “the fortressization of urban space, the control of travel, and the recruitment of certain kinds of actors to growth hubs” (2006, 6).
In Ong’s appraisal, both technologies of subjectivity and technologies of subjection in neoliberalizing contexts draw heavily on mundane or technical vocabulary as a key component of their rationalization. She explains:

neoliberalism is often discussed as an economic doctrine with a negative relationship to state power, a market ideology that seeks to limit the scope and activity of governing. But neoliberalism can also be conceptualized as a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions (2006, 3).

It is through Ong’s theorization of neoliberalism as marked by “a new relationship between government and knowledge” that induces citizens to act in certain ways and states to deploy certain strategies that I approach the Asia Pacific Initiative in this thesis. I work from the hypothesis that neoliberalizing economic conditions subtly reconfigure relationships between government and citizen knowledge at the same time that the restructuring of global capitalism has altered the practice, strategies, and goals of the planning process.

The final sections of this chapter aim to flesh out Ong’s concepts of technologies of subjectivity and technologies of subjection by discussing a particular relationship between government and citizen knowledge that the Asia Pacific Initiative expressly aims to reconfigure: state multiculturalism. State multiculturalism, as it is rendered in the Asia Pacific Initiative, is a particularly fruitful example of planning strategies that draw on neoliberal vocabularies of entrepreneurialism and the supremacy of market forces to distil issues that were previously sites of political or ideological struggle into technical planning problems with technical solutions.
3.3 Neoliberalism and State Multiculturalism

The idea of the cosmopolitan citizen dates to the Enlightenment and has long been located in the domain of philosophy rather than social science. Proponents of this philosophical cosmopolitanism, from Kant ([1795] 1917) to Nussbaum (1996, 1997), argue for the extension of loyalty and compassion not only to the narrowly scaled domains of home, region, or nation but also to the scale of the global. Kant felt that, as communication and trade increased between nations, the notion of citizenship and concept of loyalty must concurrently expand beyond the nation state in order to assure peace between nations. He argues:

The intercourse, more or less close, which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it. Hence the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastical, high-flown notion of right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law-constitutional as well international law-necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realisation of perpetual peace. For only by endeavouring to fulfill the conditions laid down by this cosmopolitan law can we flatter ourselves that we are gradually approaching that ideal. ([1795] 1917, 117)

For Kant, this cosmopolitan law was both a natural and necessary ideal to strive for and a logical offshoot of increased exchange between nations.

As Mitchell and Parker (2008) contend, writing from a social science perspective, the philosophical framework for cosmopolitan citizenship leans on conceptions of geographical scale as reified, pre-existing concentric circles upon which loyalty or compassion can be neatly scaled. When recent critical perspectives on the production of scale are brought to the debate (Marston 2000; Brenner 1999,
cosmopolitanism appears to be a much more complicated social and spatial process than a simple upscaling of the emotions and practices of citizenship from region or nation to the globe. As Bruce Robbins maintains, cosmopolitanism, like any social practice, is always “located and embedded” (1998, 3). There is no universal cosmopolitanism in the abstract, he argues, no “ideal of detachment” but rather “a reality of (re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance” (3).

Katharyne Mitchell’s (1993; see also Kobayashi 1993) study of racial tensions that arose between long-term Vancouver residents and newly-arrived wealthy immigrants from Hong Kong in the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrates the frictions that arise when philosophical ideals of cosmopolitan citizenship confront contested claims to local loyalty. In her overview of the origins of Canada’s state multiculturalism policy, Mitchell notes that although in the 1970s Canada’s state-sponsored multiculturalism aimed to foster social stability in a nation with existing tensions between French- and English-speaking population and a growing immigrant population, in the 1980s the Canadian government began explicitly to invoke the vocabulary of multiculturalism to ease trade Canada-Asia tarde tensions and to maximize economic growth. In 1985, Canada’s Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney intoned:

We, as a nation, need to grasp the opportunity afforded to use by our multicultural identity, to cement our prosperity with trade and investment links the world over and with a renewed entrepreneurial spirit at home...In a competitive world, we all know that technology, productivity, quality, marketing, and price determine export success.
But our multicultural nature *gives us an edge in selling to that world*...Canadians who have business contacts elsewhere are of the utmost importance to our trade and investment strategy (Mulroney 1986, quoted in Elliott and Fleras 1990, 67 as cited in Mitchell 1993, 282; emphasis added)

Mulroney's words indicated that Canadian multiculturalism policy was shifting from serving the state’s interests in maintaining social stability to playing a more direct role in facilitating state capital accumulation in an increasingly competitive world. His speech marked a turn in state policy from promoting multiculturalism in Canada as a socially stable way of being and relating to an economically profitable method of selling or marketing Canadian wares to the outside world—a competitive, rather than a social, advantage.

This shift in the strategic orientation of state multiculturalism policy, according to Mitchell (2003), continued not only in Canada but also in the USA and UK in subsequent decades. State-sponsored multicultural education in these three countries, Mitchell later notes, shifted quietly but consistently from a social to a commercial policy. She explains:

> [T]here has been a subtle but intensifying move away from person-centred education for all, or the creation of the tolerant, ‘multicultural self’, towards a more individuated, mobile and highly tracked, skills-based education, or the creation of the ‘strategic cosmopolitan’. The ‘multicultural self’ was one who was able to work with and through difference, and conditioned to believe in the positive advantages of diversity in constructing and unifying the nation. The ‘strategic cosmopolitan’ is, by contrast, motivated not by ideals of national unity in diversity, but by understandings of global competitiveness, and the necessity to strategically adapt as an individual to rapidly shifting personal and national contexts (2003, 387-388)
This shift in state multiculturalism policy articulates with the broader shift in global political economy discussed above from North Atlantic Fordism to neoliberalism in that a “multicultural self” able to work for national unity through the “positive advantages of diversity” served the North Atlantic Fordist state’s goals of preserving social harmony and redistributing wealth across the territory of the nation while the skills, knowledge, connections, and mobility of a “strategic cosmopolitan” enhance a nation or region’s economic advantages in the increasingly entrepreneurial and competitive planning environment of neoliberalism.

3.4 Strategic Cosmopolitanism and Dovetailing Interests of State and Citizen

Cosmopolitanism, then, is a lived social practice that takes place in space, is enacted and endorsed by various actors for various strategic purposes, and is contingent upon various concurrent social, cultural, political and economic factors. Recent social science research has explored cosmopolitanism as manifested in embedded social practice, mapping the contours of cosmopolitan or transnational behaviour in specific spatial contexts by looking for “symbols and practices that might be represented as ‘non-local’ or ‘non-particular’” (Mitchell 2007, 707).

Ong’s (1999) ethnography of transnational affluent Chinese subjects is an example of such a research approach. In her research, Ong investigates the non-local and non-particular symbols used by and practices engaged in by affluent and transnationally mobile Chinese subjects, tracing the complex attraction that neoliberal
subject position hold for what she calls the “flexible citizen” (1999). According to Ong, these flexible citizens “both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family re-location” (1999, 112). Understanding these spatial practices, Ong argues, allows us to more clearly understand how human agency comes to bear in a field of inquiry in which top-down economic explanations too often prevail.

Besides Ong’s ethnography, other examples are readily available of subjects strategically engaging in what they see as non-local or non-particular practices or seeking to represent themselves as non-local or non-particular subjects. Examples include Dutch parents enrolling their children in internationalized education programs to increase their future job prospects (Weenink 2008), Japanese women seeking international education or employment in order to circumvent what they feel to be the oppressive power dynamics of domestic gender relations (Kelsky 2001) and returnee or circular migrants between Hong Kong and Canada choosing to spatially separate the sites in which capital accumulation and social reproduction occur, working or investing in Asia and locating their school-age families in Canada (Kobayashi and Ley 2005), and the increasing professionalization of the ‘gap year’ in the UK (Simpson 2005). In these diverse examples of strategic cosmopolitanism, individuals’ attempts to align their subjectivity with non-locality or non-particularity can be read as an expression of agency in specific political economic circumstances that is independent of, though connected to, various government strategies and priorities to which they are also subject.
To be clear: as interesting as they may be, the strategic decisions of individuals or families to maximize their own professional or economic status are not the topic of this thesis. I cite the above research to emphasize that, in certain contexts and under certain political economic conditions, citizens’ cosmopolitan practices can be of advantage both to individuals whose loyalties, goals, and strategies transcend the nation-state and to the state itself. When this dovetailing occurs—when a certain way of being and relating benefits both citizen and state, though for different reasons—that mode of subjectivity gains significant social traction. In other words, those who are subject to the authority of the state exercise personal agency, within the regulatory constraints they face, to put themselves in what they see as advantageous social and economic positions. Governing happens when those particular citizen-crafted subject positions align, whether intended to or not, with the strategies and ideals of those in authority.

In order to understand the complex attraction the strategic cosmopolitan subject position holds for both state and citizen, it is necessary to consider how, when, and why conduct-regulating goals of states and of strategically cosmopolitan citizens converge. Nikolas Rose offers some insight here. Though he is discussing the spaces and practices of psychology and counselling in their role as “technologies for the government of the soul”, his considerations apply equally aptly to practices of strategic cosmopolitanism. Rose argues:


technologies for the government of the soul operate not through crushing subjectivity in the interests of control and profit, but by seeking to align political, social and institutional goals with
individual pleasures and desires, and with the happiness and fulfillment of the self. Their power lies in their capacity to offer means by which the regulation of selves—by others and by ourselves—can be made consonant with contemporary political principles, moral ideals, and constitutional exigencies (1990, 257).

While the relationship of the strategic practice of cosmopolitan to the state of one’s soul is a topic for another day, Rose’s key insight here for the purposes of this project is that technologies of governmentality grow in power when they succeed in aligning institutional goals with individual pleasures and desires. When the institutional goal of BC’s profitable economic integration with Pacific Asia aligns with, for example, individual citizen goals of success in business, education, and travel, government of the self comes to replicate government of the citizen by the state.

The connecting thread here is that, for both state and citizen, a terrain once relatively removed from market-driven considerations (state multiculturalism) emerges in a neoliberalizing macroeconomic context recast as an individual entrepreneurial strategy (strategic cosmopolitanism). This subject position holds sway because it brings person-scaled hopes, plans, and dreams into collusion with institutional economic development plans.

Conduct-regulating goals of states and of strategically cosmopolitan citizens converge because personal autonomy is never entirely separate from political power. Personal autonomy, as Rose and Miller explain, “is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its exercise, the more so because most individuals are not merely the subjects of power but play a part in its operations” (Rose and Miller 174). When citizens consider the ‘market value’ of their cosmopolitanism, when they make
strategic choices to develop their ‘non-locality’ or ‘non-particularity’, they exist not as the subjects of power, the blank sheets on which various authorities inscribe their economic development plans, but rather as active players in the operation of that authority. The authority or power in whose operations we all actively play a part is, as Rose and Miller put it, “not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom” (1992, 174).

The economic development policy that I discuss in the following two chapters is one example of this citizen-making process. Through its technologies of subjection and technologies of subjectivity, the diversely allied authorities who drafted the Asia Pacific Initiative attempt—not explicitly or unilaterally but subtly, contingently and, at times, unintentionally—to make up, or to encourage the emergence of, a particular kind of British Columbian not only able to bear but also eager to strive for a certain kind of regulated geographical freedom.
4: The Asia Pacific Initiative

On April 2, 2007, in the midst of the above-discussed changes (a liberalizing economy and increased economic integration with the Asia Pacific region; changing economic base, labour force, and trade relationships; shift in the role of the state from regulator to agent of the market; and emergence of interregional competition in urban and regional planning), British Columbia’s Ministry of Economic Development published a 40-page document titled the British Columbia: Asia Pacific Initiative (API). Produced in consultation with industry executives, policy think-tank staff, and the federal government, the API outlines the strategies the province plans to use to more profitably integrate British Columbia into the Asia Pacific economic region.

4.1 Policy Goals and Administration

The Asia Pacific Initiative, according to the press release that accompanied its publication, is part of a “long-term strategy to diversify B.C.’s economic ties with the Asia Pacific” (“Asia Pacific Initiative Steers B.C. to Pacific Century”). The document follows the explicitly stated central tenet that a prosperous economic future for BC will require “viewing the Asia Pacific as our economic future and not a competitive threat” (British Columbia: Asia Pacific Initiative, 12).
The *Asia Pacific Initiative* identifies five “priority areas” in its quest to place B.C. in a favourable position towards the Asia Pacific. These are (1) to “advance B.C.’s global identity as Canada’s Pacific Gateway,” (2) “continue to build a world-class infrastructure and supply chain,” (3) “strengthen and maximize B.C.’s trade and investment relationships with Asia,” (4) “become the Asia-Pacific education, tourism and cultural destination of choice, and (5) “ensure the province’s labour force is equipped with the skills to thrive in the Pacific Century economy” (“Asia Pacific Initiative Steers BC…”). The initiative, according to the province’s Minister of Economic Development at the time, Colin Hansen, “shows that we are serious about realigning the Province’s economic priorities to realize our potential in a Pacific Century economy” (“Asia Pacific Initiative Steers BC…”).

Although drafted by BC’s Ministry of Economic Development, the API is, according to the province, “a priority cross ministry initiative” for which “detailed tactical and implementation plans are being developed by lead and supporting ministries and coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Development.” Administrative responsibility for the API traverses a range of provincial government ministries:

For example, the Ministry will work with the Ministry of Transportation to ensure that the province has the transportation network in place to meet increased trade demands with Asia; the Ministry of Forests and Range to strengthen the forest sector markets and actively promote Canadian wood products and construction techniques in Asia Pacific economies; the Ministry of Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Multiculturalism to ensure cultural and social linkages are established by increasing immigration to British Columbia and; the Ministry of Advanced Education and
Ministry of Education to expand educational linkages with Asia Pacific nations. Each ministry of government will also report progress to the Minister of Economic Development who will, in turn report tangible progress to Cabinet.”

(“Cross Ministry Initiatives” n.p.)

Although ultimate responsibility for the API lies with BC’s Ministry of Economic Development, the initiative draws on participation from ministries in all areas of the provincial government.

Likewise, the goals of the Asia Pacific Initiative are remarkably broad in scope. The initiative entwines questions of identity, infrastructure, culture, labour, and education into its goal of refashioning BC into an Asia Pacific ‘crossroads’ and its strategies for achieving that goal. The stakes, we are told, are high: British Columbia, the initial news release explains, stands to benefit from “$76 billion in increased trade and 255,000 jobs by 2020” if it follows the strategies outlined in the initiative and manages to “position B.C. as the pre-eminent economic and cultural crossroads between Asia and North America” (“Asia Pacific Initiative Steers BC…”).

### 4.2 Provincial versus Federal Approach

Despite rhetoric of ‘positioning,’ ‘advancing,’ and ‘steering,’ it is significant that only one of the API’s five “priority areas” involves the development of BC’s actual transportation infrastructure. The API’s other four goals—advancing B.C.’s global identity, strengthening trade relationships, promoting the province as a travel and education destination, and building the skills of BC’s labour force—call for investment in the province’s human and cultural ties to Asia rather than its physical
trans-Pacific transportation infrastructure. However, the actual funds allotted to the API are somewhat out of proportion to the initiative’s stated goals: 95% of the provincial funding allotted to the initiative is earmarked for transportation infrastructure, leaving only 5% of the remaining funding to be invested in the so-called ‘human gateway’ (Policy analyst interview, March 2008).

This funding discrepancy may be because transportation infrastructure improvements can be more accurately priced, budgeted for and tracked than can the more amorphous goal of strengthening BC’s human ties to Pacific Asia. Although those of my interviewees who were particularly enthusiastic about the latter goal did cite this funding discrepancy as evidence that the province had failed to completely buy in to the API’s more comprehensive vision, the novelty and immeasurability of the API’s ‘human gateway’ goals can explain the funding disparity, especially this early in the policy’s existence, as credibly as can a lack of confidence in the policy on the part of the provincial government.

The comprehensive emphasis in the API on developing both BC’s human links with Asia as well as its transportation infrastructure (in rhetoric, if not in concrete funding commitments as of 2008) stands in contrast to the Canadian federal government’s strictly transportation-focused strategies. Like BC, the Government of Canada has developed its own policy strategies to manage and direct increased trade between Canada and Pacific Asia. However, to date federal strategies have focused almost exclusively on improving Western Canada’s transportation infrastructure (its ports, railroads, highways, customs procedures, and airports).
Briefly, the federal government approach at the time of the drafting of the API was this: In October 2005, following the introduction in the House of Commons of the Pacific Gateway Act (Bill C-68), the Government of Canada issued a news release detailing its Pacific Gateway Strategy (“Government of Canada Announces Pacific Gateway Strategy”). The news release and included background information emphasized the national economic benefits of transportation infrastructure improvements in British Columbia, framing the initiative as a project from which all Canadians stand to benefit. “The Pacific Gateway reaches beyond British Columbia,” claimed Jean-C. LaPierre, the Transport Minister at that time. It is a pan-Western initiative that will benefit all of Canada” (“Govt of Canada Announces…”).

In October 2005, the federal government allocated $190 million in immediate funding for infrastructure improvements, customs streamlining, and trade promotion under the auspices of its Pacific Gateway Strategy. It also set aside $400 million in future funding for “more strategic transportation infrastructure investments, stronger links with Asia-Pacific, labour market initiatives…, and maintaining secure and efficient border services” (“Govt of Canada Announces…”). The federal government claimed the strategy would “break new ground by confronting a broad range of interconnected challenges and opportunities in an integrated manner,” and the strategy involved a number of federal ministries: Transport, Industry, Western Economic Diversification, and International Trade (“Govt of Canada Announces…”). However, three quarters of the federal government’s immediate funding commitment went directly towards transportation infrastructure.
In terms of actual funding commitments, then, the federal and provincial priorities are quite similar. Three quarters of the money supporting the Pacific Gateway Strategy and 95% of the funding for the Asia Pacific Initiative is being invested in British Columbia’s transportation infrastructure, through port expansions in Vancouver, construction of a deepwater seaport in Prince Rupert, railroad improvements, highway expansion, and border harmonization. However, policies on the national level have paid little attention to the more ideational projects of place-marketing, relationship-building, and awareness-raising that the government of British Columbia plans to undertake in the API.

While many of the people involved in the API whom I interviewed for this project lamented what they saw as the overly narrow focus of the federal government, none offered an explanation for it. Many cited BC’s geographic location on the Pacific Ocean and its position as the closest Canadian province to the Asia Pacific region as de facto evidence of the province’s unique suitability as Canada’s gateway to Asia. Reading this logic obliquely suggests that Canada’s federal government, which presides over a larger region and more diverse population than does the government of BC, is constrained by geography and demography to focus more narrowly at this time on transportation infrastructure rather than any broader ‘human gateway’ goals. Beyond this hypothesis, however, the reasons for the differing federal and provincial approaches were never entirely clear at the time of my research.
Despite the relatively small share of funding allotted to the “human gateway” in BC’s Asia Pacific Initiative, the actual document itself devotes considerable space to discussing the importance of these human linkages. The interviews I conducted with politicians and policy analysts involved in the drafting of the API similarly focused on the necessity of and potential economic advantages that would derive from a strong, open ‘human gateway’. Therefore, although concrete funding for this human gateway might pale in comparison to the rhetorical energy devoted to the concept, the idea of a ‘human gateway’ represents a new economic development strategy that attempts to constitute and promote a certain kind of ‘gateway citizen’ as a means of facilitating economic development and capital accumulation in British Columbia. As I argue in this thesis, the idea of the ‘human gateway’ hints at an emerging reconfiguration of the relationships between state, capital, and citizen that are made possible by, and which facilitate, newly liberalized flows of global capital at the same time that they enable citizens to strategically craft their own cosmopolitanism or non-particularity.

4.3 Infrastructure Improvements Before and During the API

Before the Asia Pacific Initiative was released in 2007, the federal and provincial governments had already begun to expand and fortify transportation infrastructure in Western Canada in an attempt to accommodate increased cross-Pacific trade. The federal government’s Pacific Gateway Strategy granted funding in 2005 to improve BC’s Pitt River Bridge and Mary Hill interchange, two key points in
BC’s highway infrastructure, to upgrade railway leading to and from Deltaport, a shipping port south of Vancouver, to upgrade road and rail infrastructure in North Portal, Saskatchewan, to develop more efficient transportation systems in Western Canada. The same funding bill also granted up to $20 million over two years to the Canada Border Services Agency to help speed up processing of travellers and cargo at BC’s ports, airports and borders (“Govt of Canada Announces…”).

In 2006, the three different port authorities of greater Vancouver began, at the urging of the federal government, to consider amalgamating into one port authority in order to more efficiently handle the increase in container traffic volume at the region’s 28 cargo terminals. In 2008, the three separate authorities (the Fraser River Port Authority, the North Fraser Port Authority and the Vancouver Port Authority) amalgamated into the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority. This new entity markets itself as Port Metro Vancouver (www.portmetrovancouver.com/en/about/corporate).

In 2005, the Port of Prince Rupert in northern British Columbia began construction on an expanded container terminal. This terminal, the first dedicated intermodal (ship to rail) terminal in North America, opened in 2007. As the closest deepwater seaport to Pacific Asia, the port markets itself as a cost-effective option to for transporting goods from Asia to North America and vice versa. Shipments can be carried from Asia’s ports to Prince Rupert by sea, then unloaded at the port and transferred to North America’s rail network. As of 2011, planning for Phase Two of the port’s expansion is continuing (Prince Rupert Port Authority 2011).
The Asia Pacific Initiative was released in the midst of the above infrastructure improvement projects. In the years since the API was released, highway, railway, border and port improvements have continued in British Columbia and Western Canada. A new light rail line in greater Vancouver, the Canada Line, was completed in time for the 2010 Winter Olympics in the city; highway widening projects continued in the Fraser Valley east of Vancouver; construction began on the South Fraser Perimeter Road, allowing transport trucks to bypass residential areas on their way from Deltaport to the US border, and various sections of Highway 1 (the Trans-Canada highway) are being widened and upgraded.

4.4 Note on Policy Implementation and Research Focus

While the difficulties involved in translating a remarkably ideational iteration of economic development policy into economic reality would no doubt be an interesting research project, this project does not address the practical implementation of the Asia Pacific Initiative’s various policies and programs. Rather, it focuses on the particular subject positions rationalize by and promoted by the policy, and tries to trace the relationships between the subject positions envisioned in the API to broader shifts in global capital and the planning process.

There are two reasons why this project focuses on the rhetoric rather than implementation of the Asia Pacific Initiative. First: the API is still in the early stages of translating its broad goals into specific policies and programs, be they infrastructural, commercial, or educational. At the time of my research (2008 – 2010),
policymakers involved with the initiative were still scattered throughout various government ministries (in 2008 the API was still trying to find and furnish its own office space). According to the 2010 Asia Pacific Initiative progress report, although transportation infrastructure in BC has improved measurably, quantifiable progress made on the ‘human gateway’ side of the API includes an increase in the number of international students studying in BC, some diversity multiculturalism workshops provided to businesses and post-secondary institutions, and an effort to make Asian language classes available by distance education to BC students (Asia Pacific Initiative: Annual Report 2008-2009).

Although the reasons for this relative inertia (as well as the challenges of quantifying progress on the construction of a ‘human gateway’ between BC and Pacific Asia) would, of course, reveal much of interest about the challenges of incorporating ideas of culture, language, and intercultural knowledge into a workable and measurable economic development strategy, raising larger questions of the utility or trackability of ‘soft,’ unquantifiable concepts in public policy implementation, they are not the topic of this research.

Second, and more importantly, this project’s goal is to understand how wider shifts in the structuring and movement of capital across space in an increasingly liberalized global economy affect state planning strategies, techniques of governance and the rationalization of these techniques. I argue that just as much insight into relationships of power between capital, state, and citizen can be found in the framing of problems and the proposing of solutions—the particular solutions themselves as
well as the language used to rationalize their necessity—as can be observed in their implementation. For these reason, this project distinguishes between the rhetorical mechanisms in API itself and the practical frictions of its implementation and focuses its attention on the former.
In this chapter, I draw on empirical research to achieve three aims. First, I explore the kind of cosmopolitan space that Asia Pacific Initiative promotes under the concept of a ‘human gateway’ between BC and Asia and trace how the API frames this cosmopolitanism as the key to British Columbia’s future economic prosperity. I draw on interviews and document analysis to define the contours and characteristics of the cosmopolitan “Gateway culture” that the API deems necessary for the smooth accumulation of capital in BC, and briefly contrast this “Gateway culture” with previous versions of government-sponsored multiculturalism in the region. Secondly, I demonstrate how the API turns to British Columbia’s already existing geographical ‘facts’ to stand as persuasive evidence for the necessity of this proposed cosmopolitan cultural makeover. Thirdly, I briefly explore how conflicts within British Columbia over recent transportation infrastructure improvements emerged as scalar conflicts and were diffused in API rhetoric (if not in practice) through a certain kind of extrapolated teleology that conflates spatial and temporal scale so that a certain kind of cosmopolitan space stands in metonymically for BC’s economic future. I discuss in the next chapter what this empirical evidence suggests about the future trajectory of state-capital and state-citizen power relations in BC.
5.1 Competing for Capital in a Knowledge-Based Economy

The main thrust of the Asia Pacific Initiative’s economic argument is this: in order to prosper economically, British Columbia must integrate into the Asia Pacific economic region in a way that maximizes the province’s capital accumulation and economic agency. To achieve this goal, the policy argues, British Columbia must not only strengthen its transportation infrastructure links to Pacific Asia (its shipping ports, railroads, airports, and highway networks), but also create and retain higher-value jobs in the province. These higher-value cross-Pacific trade-related jobs will be created by strengthening the province’s knowledge-based economy along with increasing the province’s ‘hard’ infrastructural links to Pacific Asia. The API hopes to increase opportunities for higher-value employment in engineering, logistics, design, and professional services in BC rather than achieve an increase only in relatively low-skilled jobs in the transportation industry.

As discussed in Chapter 4, a key difference between the Canadian federal government approach and the BC government’s policies towards economic integration with Pacific Asia is the former’s narrow focus on transportation infrastructure and the latter’s broader aims. In one of my early interviews, a policy analyst at a non-profit think tank in Vancouver that provided extensive input into the drafting of the Asia Pacific Initiative explained the value hierarchies that formed the basis for the Asia Pacific Initiative’s strategic goals:

I think that there are certain advantages to being in the transportation industry… There’s a lot of jobs that come along with
that. But the challenge is, how you get the higher value added positions. And it’s, essentially, crane operators are less valuable than engineers. And engineers are less valuable than people in the research and design business, who design the systems that the engineers operate.

[…] To many people the essence of Gateway is the container box. And it flows in two directions, and to many it is…the measurement of how many TEUs [twenty-foot equivalent units] are going to pass through Vancouver and Prince Rupert. And that’s the transportation dream in its own right.

But I think that…others are concerned that the container is in itself not particularly valuable. It’s what’s in it where the value is to British Columbians or to Albertans or to Ontarians. In not just the transport of that, but putting things into it, and that is the exporter’s and the importer’s dream--I mean, how do you take advantage of that space?

[…] The bigger vision of Gateway is that you look at that container and you say, how do you generate value around it? Now some of it might be filling it up, or unloading it in ways that bring in cheaper goods or send higher value goods to China, to Asia. To get what I would call the industrialist’s dream, or the retailer’s dream.

But there’s another way of looking at it, that the real value of that container is the logistics systems behind it, the research and development that goes into transportation systems. In other words, the people who…create the algorithms for loading and unloading the container add more value to society than the person on the dock who simply loads and unloads that container. So that where real value added is in production. These are some of ideas behind the provincial approach. (Policy analyst interview, March 2008)

My interviewee links this rhetorical progression of value from longshoreman to crane operator, crane operator to retailer, retailer to engineer, researcher and designer to a parallel progression of dreams from the transportation dream to the import/exporter’s dream to the industrialist’s/retailer’s dream to the social dream.

The interviewee makes the argument in spatial terms, first evoking the image of cargo container flows, then shifting to the act of “putting things into it,” then “generat[ing]
value around it,” then finally locating “the real value of that container” in “the logistics systems behind it.”

While this rhetoric was, of course, intended only to explain to me the economic logic behind the API’s strategic aims, my interviewee’s emphasis on looking not only at a trade symbol in itself (i.e. the shipping container) but at the economic and social value in, around and behind the symbol (i.e. import/export, retailing, engineering and R&D) echoes a certain wide-angle mode of viewing an economic landscape that I think is important; I return to this point later in this chapter.

Creating higher-value job opportunities by developing a region’s knowledge economy is not an especially new or innovative strategy. This is standard best practice in economic development planning in industrialized countries in which the turn to a knowledge economy brings human capital (that is, capabilities scaled to the individual or to small geographic knowledge clusters) to the fore. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the face of globally mobile capital, and increasing practices of flexible accumulation and flexible citizenship (Ong 1999), regions compete more and more aggressively to attract human capital or to create jobs that take advantage of existing human capital in the region.

The API is explicitly trying to bolster BC’s competitive advantage in this respect. The interviewee quoted above continued:

“What makes British Columbia competitive? What kinds of people, institutions, networks, do we need to use the Gateway as the starting point to this higher value added involvement?”
As I show in this chapter, part of the API’s proposed answer to this question is geographical. That is, the “people, institutions, and networks” that BC must identify and promote in order to craft its unique competitive advantage in the knowledge economy are people, institutions, and networks with a particular geographical outlook and particular facility with the cultural and linguistic geographies of the Asia Pacific. The API argues that making BC competitive in the fight for international capital requires fostering a general kind of geographically aware cosmopolitanism, an openness to other languages and culture, in BC and for advertising that cosmopolitanism in Pacific Asia.

Although the Asia Pacific Initiative is arguing that cultivating an openness to the languages and cultures of Pacific Asia and advertising that openness to business leaders and potential investors in Asia is what will make BC competitive, the policy is not arguing for this openness out of a commitment to the philosophical ideal of cosmopolitanism discussed in Chapter 3. Rather, the argument here is a pragmatic endorsement of cultural openness in BC as a competitive advantage in the struggle to create and retain value in the province as cross-Pacific trade and migration increases. Although the rhetoric of cultural openness that pervades the API draws on discourses of multiculturalism already familiar to Canadians from decades of state multiculturalism policy, the key difference in the API’s iteration is that this openness is oriented towards enhancing BC’s ability to create and retain jobs and investment in the province. The introduction of the concept of capital retention here distinguishes cultural openness advocated by the API from Kant’s philosophical ideal of
cosmopolitan exchange as a necessary offshoot of increased international trade in that the former is driven by a vested interest in retaining or fixing capital while the latter is not. I explore this difference in the next section.

5.2 Knowledge Fixes

David Harvey (1989a) introduced the concept of the “spatial fix” to describe how capitalism expands geographically when space becomes a barrier to capital accumulation. Harvey’s primary examples of this spatial fix involve outsourcing manufacturing to regions of the globe with lower labour costs, this bringing about a spatial separation of production and consumption. Spatial fixes in a knowledge-based rather than manufacturing-based economy often take the form of clustering, of strategic geographical co-location in order to benefit from site-specific embodied tacit knowledge (i.e. knowledge that can’t be codified and communicated over a distance) found in certain people in certain places.

While corporations can relocate their activities, regional governments are of course spatially tied to the territories they govern and can’t make use of the same spatial fixes (at least, not to the same degree) to maximize capital accumulation within their political borders. While a corporation hoping to increase its research and development productivity, for example, might try to relocate R&D to a region with an educated workforce and low average wage—bringing the capital to the knowledge, so to speak—a regional government hoping to develop knowledge clusters within its borders must create or attract the knowledge for the capital. For regional planning
bodies, then, a lack of knowledge in the region throws up the same barriers to capital accumulation as do spatial restrictions for globally mobile corporations. In the same way that relocating geographically overcomes spatial barriers to capital accumulation for those with the necessary mobility, in a knowledge-based economy generating and/or reorienting knowledge—enacting the kind of ‘knowledge fix’ that API proposes—is a similarly strategic economic move for those without the ability to relocate.

Of course, it is impossible to separate ‘knowledge economies’ and ‘manufacturing economies’ in global capitalism; they are integrated and co-dependent. However, in the Asia Pacific Initiative, there is evidence of this kind of ‘knowledge fix’, or strategic move to generate and reorient knowledge in BC so as to maximize economic opportunity for the province. Working from the value hierarchies my interviewee cited, the API proposes reorienting, leveraging, and advertising the BC population’s knowledge in order to strengthen the province’s knowledge economy and generate higher-value jobs as BC becomes more economically integrated with Pacific Asia. This economic development strategy, echoes Aihwa Ong’s (2006, 3) comment that one of the characteristics of neoliberalism is “a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing activities are recast as non-political and nonideological problems that need technical solutions”: managing and capitalizing on citizen knowledge is, in the API, a technical strategy in a rational economic planning policy.
Geographical knowledge is central here. As I explain in the next section, the API identifies an absent or incomplete awareness of BC’s human and physical geographical ‘facts’ as barrier to successful economic development for the province. The policy characterizes this lack of familiarity and facility with the cultural and economic geography of both BC and Pacific Asia as a barrier to the province’s ability to attract investment, strengthen BC’s knowledge economy, and secure a prosperous economic future. The API’s proposed strategic intervention in this field of knowledge involves generating awareness among BC’s residents of the province’s ‘pre-existing’ geographical advantages and the current economic geography of the Pacific Asia, then reorienting this ‘rediscovered’ geographical knowledge to better facilitate capital accumulation in BC. Geographical education will lead to a sort of ‘critical mass’ of geographical awareness and cross-Pacific human links that will transform BC into a facilitative nodal space in a mega-region of the Asia Pacific, thus fixing capital within the economic boundaries of the province.

5.3 ‘Transit Lounge’ Versus ‘Boardroom’ Models of Engagement

Working from the logic discussed above, one of the Asia Pacific Initiative’s stated goals “is to make B.C. the most educated and most literate jurisdiction on the continent” (35) and presumably, to leverage that education and literacy into economic advantage. The API explicitly defines the contours of this desired literacy in light of BC’s economic position and the initiative’s goals:
In this global economy, literacy means more than just the ability to read and write in English. Those who will be successful will be multilingual, and be culturally fluent” (API, 35).

Rather than focus on technical skills or literacy in the province’s common language, English, the API here advocates, based on its appraisal of the conditions for success in the “global economy”, for a widespread openness to and facility with multiple cultures and languages. Language and culture are, of course, intensely geographical kinds of knowledge; the type of literacy the API endorses can therefore be read as knowledge of multiple cultural and linguistic geographies, or a certain Asia Pacific geographical fluency.

Before I go on to address the ‘hows’ of developing the geographical fluency, I first examine here how the API frames the risks of failing to develop this geographical fluency in BC. In the rhetoric of the Asia Pacific Initiative, failing to develop this multilingualism and cultural fluency in British Columbia equates to failing to fix capital in place in our province. In keeping with characterization of capital as a mobile, circulating force that alights and departs space quickly, the API warns of the risks of capital merely passing through BC and failing to take root in the province, so to speak, should British Columbians fail to sufficiently value cosmopolitan geographical fluency or fail to leverage that fluency into a high-value jobs in a knowledge-based economy. If we fail to think of BC’s future economic engagement with Pacific Asia as anything beyond supply chain integration, the API argues, capital will not touch down in the province.
Writing in the *Vancouver Sun* newspaper in 2007, Yuen Pau Woo, the president and CEO of Vancouver’s Asia Pacific Foundation (an independent policy research institute that gave input to the API) argued the above point succinctly:

> if we project our own gateway ambitions merely as transportation infrastructure projects, we will be seen as a place through which business passes, rather than as a place where business is done” (Woo 2007).

Woo continued by arguing that British Columbians “must turn our minds to the longer-term challenge of ensuring that we don’t end up as simply the best transit lounge this side of the Pacific.”

To extent Woo’s spatial metaphor, the API wants to eschew the ‘transit lounge model’ of economic engagement with Pacific Asia for what I will call the ‘boardroom model’. The API proposes to engage with Pacific Asia in a way that garners agency for the province and fixes capital geographically in BC by positioning the province not only as a gateway for imported goods but also as facilitative node in cross-Pacific the knowledge networks. Another policy analyst I interviewed who gave input to the drafting of the Asia Pacific Initiative explains:

> “This is about mega regions, and the effort to try and develop Vancouver as not just BC’s Pacific city but essentially as North America’s Pacific city, where it’s not just transportation infrastructure but where new media, where new kinds of businesses are being created, where there’s new investments being brought in both directions, and facilitated through Vancouver” (Policy analyst interview, March 2008)

Specifically, this effort is to position British Columbia as a place that facilitates the performance and exchange of knowledge work, a profitable node in the cross-Pacific
knowledge economy. In this sense, the API argues for generating a certain kind of geographical awareness sufficient to turn BC, or at least certain elite spaces within the province into what Larner and Le Heron (2002, 765) call “globalizing microspaces”: small spaces such as boardrooms, conferences, research trips, press junkets, or parliaments in which decisions that impact larger swathes of space are made.

These metaphors highlight the question of agency. The boardroom is a spatial metaphor for agency; the transit lounge a spatial metaphor for lack of it. A transit lounge has very little agency. It’s a receptive space, superficially cosmopolitan but lacking the power to shape space. The ‘transit lounge’ model does not engage with capital in a way that garners agency and economic gain for British Columbia. As the policy analysts I quoted at the beginning of this chapter explained, the API envisions fixing knowledge assets within BC in order to maximize the province’s economic agency:

[W]hat you need to do is concentrate the assets here so that British Columbia is a happening place in the sense [of] Singapore or Hong Kong, the two most effective gateways in Asia. […] What you do is you look at how their port officials and their—I mean, for example, in Hong Kong, the Port of Hong Kong is not under the Ministry of Transportation. It’s under the Ministry of Economic Development. So that the port is seen as not just a place where things are moved, but where production value is generated. And so that, for example, in Hong Kong, many of the port authorities make more money by packaging, putting information in to packaging systems for what goes into the containers than in moving the containers themselves.

And that’s an example of what you want. And yes, it can happen in many parts of the world, but the challenge is the creative world, is to capture as much of that as possible and base it here in British Columbia (Policy analyst interview, March 2008).
The asset, then, is an educated, multilingual, and culturally fluent population. The risk is a lack of agency; the reward a thriving knowledge economy. But how, exactly does the API plan to leverage BC’s human assets into economic growth?

5.4 Gateway Culture: The Venice of the Pacific Century

Consider the following quote from the Asia Pacific Initiative document:

As in the renaissance when Venice facilitated the meeting of the West and the Orient, this Asia Pacific Initiative envisions British Columbia—Canada’s Pacific gateway—as the Venice of the Pacific Century and the crossroads between Asia and North America. (API, 10)

This evocative statement is from the introduction to the 40-page policy document, where it appears in an isolated block of text below a photo of what appears to be a night view of central Tokyo. It again indicates the Asia Pacific Initiative’s desire to maximize British Columbia’s facilitative role, this time as the facilitator of “the meeting of the West and the Orient,” a kind of “crossroads between Asia and North America” that leans more towards boardroom rather than transit lounge in terms of its agentive capacity.
The most important global economic transformation of the 21st century is the rise of the Pacific economy.

...as in the Renaissance when Venice facilitated the meeting of the West and the Orient, this Asia Pacific Initiative envisions British Columbia – Canada’s Pacific Gateway – as the Venice of the Pacific Century and the crossroads between Asia and North America.
The API document goes on to name the culture of this Venetian crossroads in BC “gateway culture” and to explain the relationship between gateway culture and capital accumulation in the province:

Developing an Asia Pacific gateway culture in B.C.: [T]he key to a bustling commercial gateway is critical mass—the people, services and supporting government policies—that make it a desirable destination for Asia Pacific business, investment and tourism. (API, 23)

Leaving aside the question of services and supporting government policies and services aside for the moment, it is clear that the API considers the kinds of people that make BC “a desirable destination for Asia Pacific business investment and tourism” to be, as we saw a few pages earlier, multilingual and cultural fluent business facilitators.

Though not mentioned in the original Asia Pacific Initiative policy document, a later program developed under the auspices of the API involved offering resources and advice to municipalities in British Columbia considering forging sister city (‘twinning’) relationships with municipalities in Asia. BC’s Ministry of Community Services and the Union of BC Municipalities published a “twinning toolkit” in 2007 for municipalities considering establishing or concerned about maintaining twinning relationships with Asian municipalities. A few phrases from the introduction to the Twinning Toolkit further elucidate the relationship the API envisions between culture, economic development, and cosmopolitan subjectivity:

Strong immigration, the growth of vibrant Asian communities within B.C, and increasing exchange with Asian countries have established an Asia Pacific Gateway Culture in certain parts of the
province. What is needed now are efforts to strengthen this culture where it exists, and also to extend it to other communities and regions across B.C.

[…] In the new 21st Century economy, cultural awareness represents not only a possible conduit to economic growth, but a form of development in and of itself. (BC / Asia Twinning Toolkit, 12)

The latter paragraph in particular illustrates the enmeshment of cultural knowledge and economic development: the Twinning Toolkit repositions cultural awareness not as a “possible conduit to economic growth” but as “a form of development in and of itself.” The shift is subtle but important.

A policy analyst I interviewed made the same point, endorsing

this view that human interconnections can be part, not just of a celebration of cuisine and cultures, but be a real economic driver for the province. (Policy analyst interview, March 2008).

Although rhetoric of bridge-building between Canada and Pacific Asia is nothing new, the move, as illustrated in these quotes, to bring “cultural awareness” or “human interconnections” squarely into the realm of economic development is new and worth noticing.

Since the 1970s, Canada has had official government policies in place encouraging multiculturalism (Kobayashi 1993). Multiculturalism specifically oriented to the purposes of capital accumulation emerged in Vancouver in the 1980s, most noticeably in a campaign to promote Canadian multicultural values in response to a negative reaction to moneyed immigrants from Hong Kong purchasing expensive real estate in Vancouver at the time (Mitchell 1993). In that campaign, racism was linked to localism or to a too-narrow worldview and was exculpated not only as
counter to Canada’s liberal spirit of tolerance but also as a significant barrier to the Vancouver’s economic development. The linking of anti-Hong Kong immigrant sentiment with a racist or overly local worldview, blaming this local-centrism for sabotaging Vancouver’s future economic prosperity, and buttressing this argument with an appeal to Canada’s widely accepted liberal multicultural values successfully diffused public tension.

There are three subtle but important differences between that earlier 1980s appeal to Canada’s multicultural values in the face of anti-immigrant sentiment and the API’s calls for multilingualism, cultural fluency, and a critical mass of Gateway culture; these differences demonstrate how the relationship between government and knowledge has changed since the time of Mitchell’s research. First, in the API document itself and in supporting documents and interviews, there was a noticeable absence of appeals to liberal cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism to justify the need to create and promote “Gateway culture”. Eschewing philosophical arguments that were central in Vancouver in the 1980s, the API explicitly ties cultural awareness or cultural fluency to economic development. Second, “Gateway culture” is not, strictly speaking, multiculturalism. It is, rather, the subsumption of multiple cultures into one “Gateway culture” oriented in one direction: economic growth. Finally, as I explore in the remainder of this chapter, Gateway culture leans on geographical knowledge in a way that previous iterations of Canadian multiculturalism do not. The liberal multiculturalism of the 1980s rested on aspatial philosophies of liberalism
and human rights; the API implicitly posits geographic awareness as the propaedeutic for the formation of Gateway culture.

5.5 Geographical Rationalizations

As noted above, the API’s goal is to develop British Columbia’s knowledge economy and establish the province as a facilitative node in the Asia Pacific economy. It sees “Gateway culture” as a necessary prerequisite to this goal, and, as I demonstrate in this section, sees geographic awareness as a prerequisite to establishing this “Gateway culture”—a pre-prerequisite, so to speak. The rhetoric of the API appeals to British Columbia’s pre-existing geographic ‘facts’ and extrapolates from the province’s pre-existing geography a certain momentum or teleology that must be recognized and capitalized upon in order to generate a critical mass of Gateway culture sufficient to transform BC into the “Venice of the Pacific Century”.

5.5.1 Fixing Geographical Knowledge

Section 5.2 of this thesis discussed the mechanisms by which a lack of knowledge becomes a barrier to capital accumulation in the kind of knowledge-based economy the API envisions for BC. Those with spatial mobility can make spatial adjustments to overcome these barriers, but government planning bodies without the capacity to relocate spatially must deploy a strategic reorientation of knowledge to surmount the same barriers. The Asia Pacific Initiative, in pursuing the latter strategy, identifies a specific lack of geographic knowledge in British Columbia: in the
text of the API, in supporting documents, and in interviews with politicians and policy analysts there was consistent concern that the majority of British Columbians lacked sufficient awareness of the province’s physical, human, and economic geographical advantages.

5.5.2 BC’s Physical Geographic Advantages

To begin an interview with a policymaker in BC’s Ministry of Economic Development, I asked an open-ended question about how geographical awareness of BC’s location in the Asia Pacific region had shaped the content of the Asia Pacific Initiative. The interviewee responded by noting a general lack of geographical awareness among business leaders and the general public of BC’s ‘true’ geographical position:

Interviewee: Well, I think…awareness of our geographic advantages…is something that I don’t think is top of mind for very many people that I encounter, even in Canada or in the Asia Pacific. (Policymaker interview, February 2008)

It is, the interviewee continued, only “when you sit down and describe to them where the routes that airplanes take or the routes that ships take, over the North Pacific ocean as the shortest route,” that people start to understand that British Columbia has “this geographic advantage of being so much closer to the ports and the airports of Asia than any other part of North America is.”

In 2004, the government of BC and private sector investors collaborated to fund a $500 million capacity-expansion project at the deepwater seaport of Prince
Rupert in northern British Columbia. The interviewee pointed to this event at a significant moment in geographical education:

The event that I think brought it [i.e. BC’s advantageous geographical location] home to many opinion leaders and business leaders in Asia was the opening of the port in Prince Rupert. ‘Cause that got noticed.

And what I find is there’s more people aware of *where we fit into the world geographically* than certainly existed 2 1/2 years ago. So I think we’re making some progress on that front. (Policymaker interview, February 2008; emphasis added)

I then asked if the interviewee though the construction of the Prince Rupert seaport had increased geographic awareness among Canadians, among business leaders in Asia, or in both groups. The interviewee cited a disjunction between ‘expert’ and ‘general’ awareness in BC of the province’s economically advantageous geography:

No, I think there is a strong awareness in British Columbia among business leaders of our geographic advantage, but I don’t think the general public—you know, most people still think of the world with a reference to a flat map that’s hanging on the wall, which of course shows that the way to get to Asia is to follow the, go down to the 37th parallel and follow it across the Pacific Ocean to Tokyo and Beijing. So I *don’t think people tend to relate to the fact that the world is round* and that the shortest route is up over the North Pacific. (Policymaker interview, February 2008; emphasis added)

A map from the API document itself attempts to provide objective cartographic evidence of BC’s advantageous geography:
For most British Columbians the world actually is, for all intents and purposes, flat. The precise contours of the globe and relative locations of its seaports matter to people who work in transportation, logistics, and supply chain management, but to most of the population of British Columbia, the flatness or roundness of the world is an abstraction, not an experienced reality. As Gayatri Spivak puts it succinctly: “the ‘globe’ is counterintuitive. You walk from one end of the earth to the other and it remains flat. It is a scientific abstraction inaccessible to experience.” (1998, 329) Why, then, did my interviewee see the roundness of the globe—a scientific abstraction to the majority of BC and relevant in practical terms only to a small proportion of the population employed in specific industries—to be knowledge that should be activated and understood intuitively?
This interview occurred early in my research, and for a while I didn’t know what to make of the lament that British Columbians weren’t sufficiently aware that the world is round. To be fair to my interviewee, I had identified myself as a graduate student in geography, which may have primed the person to use geographically inflected vocabulary.

At first, I took these faint echoes of Christopher Columbus to stand as evidence that those who had drafted the Asia Pacific Initiative though of themselves as far-seeing leaders challenging received ideas about the world in a time of turmoil and change, which is, I think, accurate in one sense. However, as the project went on I took this quote to indicate not only a sense of pioneership in the drafting of the API, but also a call to geographical re-education, backed by a certain economic logic, in which geographical proximity comes to stand in as a kind of short-hand for cultural and economic linkages.

Physical geographic fact makes a handy short-hand in that most British Columbians, my interviewees included, consider geography to be an out there, already-existing fact, waiting to be fully understood. Physical geography, in this instance, serves as a neutral, existing fact that the API appeals to for persuasive traction in its quest to generate and promote gateway culture in BC.

5.5.3 BC’s Human Geographic Advantages

There was parallel concern expressed in the API document and supporting documents and interviews that British Columbians were not sufficiently aware of our
already-existing human geographical advantages so as to be able to leverage those pre-existing advantages into economic prosperity. The Asia Pacific Initiative policy document claims that

British Columbia already has strong economic, cultural, and personal ties with our neighbours across the ocean. Those existing relationships make British Columbia as much a part of the Asia Pacific as we are of North America. It’s time to turn those relationships into a strong foundation for long-term prosperity (API, 4; emphasis added)

To paraphrase: BC already has multiple ties to Pacific Asia, and those ties, despite general public unawareness of their existence, locate the province as much in the Asia Pacific as in North America. Waking the province up to our already-existing ‘Asia-Pacificness’ will bring help the province capitalize on these relationships.

To establish that an advantageous human geography really does exist for BC vis a vis our Asia Pacific economic opportunities and our competitive advantage over other regions with similar economic development goals, the API presents Exhibit 4: Cultural Ties (Figure 3, below).
Just as the interviewee above turned to the ‘inarguable’ fact of BC’s geographic location to substantiate the necessity of economically mandated actions, here the API turns to quantitative data to substantiate claims of an existing but not yet capitalized-upon human geographic advantages.

Like any group identifier, “Asian” is a tricky term; ‘Asianness’ can be defined by citizenship, native language, phenotype, residence, cultural practices, or a number of other arbitrary signifiers, depending on who is doing the defining and why (c.f.
Here, “Asian % of population” indicates the percentage of the population of BC, Alberta, Canada, Washington State, and Australia that identifies as being of Asian descent on government censuses. Statistics, of course, leave little room for history and neither do I have space here to provide an overview of the long history of migration from Asia to British Columbia, the varied experiences of BC’s migrants of Asian descent, or the diverse class, religious, and ethnic backgrounds of British Columbians who identify on the census as being ‘of Asian descent.’ The point is, “Asian” is very broad term, and “of Asian descent” is broader still. The API makes no clear link between what the quantifiably measurable presence of specific phenotypes within the borders of British Columbia means for the province’s future economic development.

This leap in logic was not lost on the policymakers and policy analysts I interviewed. One policy analyst urged me to think of Exhibit 4 not so much as quantitative proof of a certain future economic trajectory for BC, but as an indication that the API was unusually aware of the importance of human connections in economic development policy. The analyst explained:

[The data suggests] that Canada…particularly British Columbia and particularly Vancouver, is already connected to Asia in human ways. And I think that’s a kind of attitude [in the API document] that is maybe a little unrealistic. But what’s important as an attitude is it suggests that connections matter. Specifically, connections matter in this context because they can be leveraged into economic gain. The analyst continued, arguing that BC should be:
looking more practically and with more specific focus on, OK, you’ve got a community that has a large percentage of people of Asian descent, some of them very active in different areas. What does that mean commercially? How does it help us upgrade our economic activity? (Policy analyst interview, March 2008)

The quantitative evidence presented in the API, in other words, is meant to serve as the starting point for increased human and cultural geographic education, oriented to the purpose of upgrading the province’s economic activity. The driving idea behind this focus on quantifying and leveraging cross-Pacific human links, however challenging and unpredictable that may be in reality, is the idea—new to Canadian multiculturalism and a symptom of the market logic of a newly liberalizing economy—that these relationships are likely to mean something commercially.

5.5.4 Friction and Corrective Vision

During the time of this research, infrastructure improvement projects carried out under the auspices of the provincial government’s Asia Pacific Initiative and the federal government’s Pacific Gateway Project were the most visible manifestation of BC’s Asia Pacific economic integration on the landscape of BC. Beginning in late 2007, a project to expand a major trucking route running from the Port of Vancouver to the US border (Highway 1) encountered some public resistance. Public objections focused mostly on plans to demolish an existing bridge across the Fraser River (the Port Mann bridge) and replace it with a new toll bridge. Those who objected argued that rather than expanding vehicle capacity on the route, the provincial and municipal governments should expand public transport options in the region. A Surrey
resident’s letter to the editor of the Vancouver Sun newspaper is typical of objections to the bridge:

[What I don’t understand is why, in the course of twinning the Port Mann Bridge, the additional lanes are being paved for vehicles rather than being used to construct rail of some sort. […] Considering rising fuel costs, air quality, carbon emissions and traffic congestion, it seems to make sense to be looking for ways to get cars off the road, not to encourage more single-passenger trips into the city. (“Rail tracks should be built instead of roads”)]

In an interview I conducted with a policymaker in BC’s Ministry of Transport, the interviewee framed these protests as a scalar issue. At the time of our interview in early 2008, construction on the bridge was just beginning. This policymaker, obliged to defend a very unpopular project to British Columbians, accused those who objected to the bridge plan of having a worldview too narrow to fully perceive BC’s real economic situation:

The reason we have to build this [bridge] is to get shipping containers from Asia to the US. It’s not just a local transport issue. I mean, sure, public transportation is important. But you can’t put shipping containers on top of busses. (Policymaker interview, March 2008)

This interviewee’s comments frame opposition to the API and Gateway’s projects as the products of an insufficiently scaled understanding of British Columbia’s and place in and growing economic integration with the Asia Pacific. To parse the subject of this argument, my interviewee seemed to say that those who look too narrowly, who focus only on daily life in their own local regions and lack sufficient awareness of the global trade connections on which their regions depend, will object to projects that are actually in their best interests.
Kevin Cox (1998) has already made the point that framing issues in terms of a particular scale can be a useful political tool; my interviewee’s response is an example of that phenomenon. Scales are always more interconnected and interpenetrating than a simple framework of unidirectional causative power allows. The Port Mann Bridge carries commuter traffic from Vancouver’s suburbs to its central business district and it also ferries goods from factories in, say, the Pearl River Delta to the shelves of US retail outlets; it is both local and global at the same time. The fact that BC very likely could benefit economically from a certain mode of economic integration with Pacific Asia does not necessarily mean that in this particular bridge construction project the needs of freight trucks should necessarily trump the public transit needs of local residents. The way protestors and my interviewee strategically framed the issue in terms of scale depended on their goals: improved public transport and a higher quality of life for the former; increased tax revenue from an expanded international shipping industry for the latter.

These goals are not mutually exclusive. Increased tax revenues from the shipping industry, for example, could be used to improve public transport in BC; improved public transport could lead to higher quality of life would then become a competitive advantage in attracting skilled engineers or managers to run BC’s ports and logistics industries more efficiently. This moment in my research was the time when someone involved with the API strongly invoked a ‘common sense’ appeal to a ‘proper’ geographic worldview in a political conflict in which geography was neither on one side nor the other.
In the same interview, we discussed other instances in which the interviewee had encountered resistance to the infrastructural projects planned by the API in tandem with the Pacific Gateway project. When discussing a conversation the policymaker had had in a high-rise condominium in downtown Vancouver with someone who opposed the API and Pacific Gateway’s infrastructural improvement projects, the interviewee again framed this conflict in terms of vision and perception:

We were having this conversation and out the window in front of us we could see the Port of Vancouver. And I just wanted to say, “Look out the window, look at the port, that’s the reason we need this [initiative]!” (Policymaker interview, March 2008)

In this instance, the interviewee again advocates ‘reading’ a landscape ‘correctly’: looking at the Port of Vancouver and reading the cranes, shipping containers and freighters as proof of the necessity of a certain economic trajectory for the province. The API and its creators and defenders often invoked this strategy of pointing to a landscape, to census data, or to maps of shipping routes as proof of the need for a liberalized, open economic exchange between BC and Pacific Asia.

On December 14, 2010, the Victoria Times-Colonist newspaper published an article on growing public concern over the safety of supertankers transporting oil through the northern waterways of BC (“Let professionals decide on tanker routes, Lunn says”). Earlier that month, an opposition party Member of Parliament had introduced a private member’s bill proposing a ban on oil-tanker traffic off BC’s north coast. The bill was prompted by a planned oil pipeline from the oil sands of
northern Alberta to the coast of BC would transport oil to the coast, where it would be loaded into tankers bound for Asia.

Gary Lunn, a Conservative MP from Saanich-Gulf Islands responds in the article to the proposed bill by arguing that such decisions should be left to professionals. “The people to do this correctly are the professionals,” he argues in the article, “not a bunch of people trying to make political hay”. The pipeline is under review by the National Energy Board and Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, and Lunn argued in the article that these professionals, not concerned citizens, should be the ones to make the decision. “You have to trust the process,” he said.

Lunn’s comments echo those of my above interviewee in their argument to leave decisions that could have significant economic impact on BC to those best qualified to decide the issues. My above interviewee implied that those ‘best qualified’ to decide on the Port Mann bridge plan and the necessity of the API’s infrastructural projects are those who have a sufficiently broad view of BC’s economic situation and future opportunities. Lunn states that those ‘best qualified’ to decide on the safety of oil tankers in BC’s northern waterways are federal government agencies.

Other scholars have noted a growing priority being placed on professionalism or qualifications under neoliberalism (Laurie and Bondi 2005), and the positions of MP Lunn and my above interviewee provide another example of this phenomenon. Citizen concerns over (in these examples) the quality of the environment or potential
impact of infrastructure projects on their quality of life fall into the category of lay or non-professional opinion and are subordinated to the demands of economic development as interpreted by those with the ‘right’ qualifications and worldview.

Here, again, are examples of a reconfigured relationship between government and geographical or environmental knowledge under the imperatives of economic development in an increasingly competitive, newly liberalizing global economy. Professional knowledge or correctly informed and correctly scaled worldviews come to the fore in these examples and serve as noteworthy contrasting examples of the kind of lay citizen knowledge that the API makes no space for. According to the logic of the API, multicultural and multilingual citizens are key to a prosperous future for BC; citizens with overly ‘local’ concerns over their own quality of life or the risks to their environment from infrastructural development are less so.

The spatial element to this argument stands out: both my interviewee and MP Lunn appeal to the same widely scaled conception of British Columbia’s position and most pressing concerns that pervades the Asia Pacific Initiative in an attempt to abrogate jurisdiction over processes with pan-scalar impact. This conflict illustrates how the API in fact works to scale citizen knowledge: the policy views British Columbians’ knowledge of and facility with Pacific Asian languages and cultures as a means to enhance BC’s competitive advantage as it tries to attract trade and investment from Pacific Asia; it regards British Columbians’ concerns over the environmental effects of increased supertanker traffic as too narrowly local to be of any economic benefit to BC.
The way that ‘overly local’ knowledge is belittled in these two examples of conflict can also be analyzed through the concepts of fixity and flow as they relate to the API and its dual ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ infrastructure expansion goals. Peter Hall and Anthony Clark (2010) note in their study how maritime ports that have been disconnected from their surrounding city-regions are now negotiating a more enmeshed relationship with their ‘fixed’ physical and political surroundings. Using the example of Port Metro Vancouver, Hall and Clark argue that maritime trade interests are reaching the limits of their ability to disconnect from the local regions through which their capital flows. The above two examples (local objections to the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge and supertanker routes on the basis of environmental and quality-of-life concerns) can also be read as attempts by people in the regions in which ports are fixed to limit or push against the ability of global capital to flow unrestricted through their daily lives. The way in which these attempts to limit the flow of global capital are criticized by those involved in the Asia Pacific Initiative’s implementation as too local or too narrowly scaled, both spatially and temporally, reveals the policy’s underlying investments in the concepts of flexibility, flow, and openness, both in BC’s transportation infrastructure but also in the human links that connect the province to the other side of the Pacific.
6: Conclusion

Peck and Tickell noted early in their work on economic neoliberalization that “we have entered a period of institutional searching…for macro-economic and political governance structures compatible with the restoration of sustained growth” (1994, 320; emphasis in original). Noting the profoundly unsustainable reconfigurations of global capital then underway, Peck and Tickell predicted that this phase of institutional searching would continue in the near future as, in their view, “a means of restoring sustainable growth has yet to be found.” (1994, 320).

The goal of this research was to consider how movements towards neoliberalism in global political economy might affect the relationship between governments and citizen knowledge in urban and regional planning processes. Starting from the premise that a reconfiguring relationship between government and knowledge, particularly citizen cultural and geographic knowledge, was a key part of the institutional searching discusses above, this thesis used qualitative research methods to outline the contours of a changing relationship between government and knowledge within the domain of a specific economic development planning project, BC’s Asia Pacific Initiative. By examining the rhetorical strategies deployed in the API, my research aimed to discover how this particular planning document and the people involved in drafting and implementing it understood their roles as policymakers, how
they identified and spoke of what they saw as BC’s future challenges, how they spoke about the knowledge (particularly cultural and geographic knowledge) that BC’s citizens possessed, and what these considerations reveal about broader shifts planning and governance strategies in a larger context.

BC’s *Asia Pacific Initiative* is an example of a specific search for new vocabularies, new resources, and new techniques that the province’s policymakers and planners might draw on to produce citizens amenable to these authorities’ economic development goals. In vocabulary, the *Asia Pacific Initiative* turned to invocations of market forces, competition, and entrepreneurialism to articulate the importance of achieving its policy objectives. In the search for resources, the API identified potential for economic development in the linguistic and cultural fluencies of BC citizens, tying multicultural and multilingual knowledge more intimately with the goals of capital accumulation. And in the search for new techniques of rationalization, the policy turned to geographical knowledge, mustering evidence of BC’s apparently pre-existing human and physical geographic position to stand as self-evident proof not only of the urgency but also of the achievability of the API’s economic development objectives.

Neither policy nor people exist in a vacuum. As Kevin Ward reminds us, “[p]olicies do not appear from nowhere. They are introduced into real and lived places first, and then through a range of human and non-human actors are ‘made’ into a success” (2006, 70). It works both ways: real and lived places and their people, too, make and are made by government policy. Geography does not exist in a
vacuum either: my research underlines that geographical fact, often unquestioned outside the discipline of critical human geography, played an active role in legitimizing the strategies and techniques of the Asia Pacific Initiative. As a form of knowledge that may still posses a lingering aura of hard scientific truth in the political realm, geography can serve, as it did serve in the API, as a politically salient rhetorical technique. In considering the nexus between global economic shifts, planning and policy strategies, and the production and regulation of certain subject positions, this thesis therefore puts forth the argument that analyses can only benefit by considering where, when why, how, and by whom geographical fact is invoked. Geography does indeed belong to that “range of human and non-human actors” that make policy a success.

It may be also be productive, however, to set aside concerns about what makes policy a success and consider the question of failure. The Canadian poet David Helwig opens his poem on Canadian identity, “Considerations”, with the line “Any country is only a way of failing” (Helwig 2006, 138)—as apt a description of the state as any. Helwig’s sentiment applies to public policy as well too: any policy is only a way of failing. The problems a policy and its makers identifies, the solutions they propose and the strategies they promote are serially productive failures—no policy is ever perfectly implemented, no citizen ever completely compliant.

As Rose and Miller remind us about government, there are always flaws in the manufacturing process; things always escape:
Government is a congenitally failing operation: the sublime image of a perfect regulatory machine is internal to the mind of the programmers. [...] Things, persons, or events always appear to escape those bodies of knowledge that inform governmental programmes, refusing to respond according to the programmatic logic that seeks to govern them (1992, 190).

The Asia Pacific Initiative will, at least partially, fail to achieve its goals or to produce the citizens it imagines are ‘best’ for BC. Things, people, or events will escape or have already escaped the bodies of knowledge that informed the drafting of the policy. But the particular contours of the API’s inevitable failures, the infinite ways in which its strategies might fall flat, the actual policy outcomes are one thing; the “sublime image of a perfect regulatory machine” that exists in the minds of the policymakers is another.

This thesis was concerned with the latter. What frames the viewscreen of those with the strongest grip on power in the province as British Columbia continues its institutional searching for ways of governing that can restore and sustain economic growth? As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, the “sublime images” that exist in the minds of the various authorities who drafted and who will try to implement the API of a perfectly functioning government; of what future economic challenges BC is likely to face; what trade relationships and economic activities it must foster and what qualities it will require in its citizens in order to perfectly overcome those challenges are created in conjunction with and shaped by larger shifts in global capitalism. This research examined the policy document itself and the comments of those who contributed to its drafting to reconstruct a (necessarily blurry) image of a government acting as a agent of capital, of a province that will face increasing competition for
investment, talent, and an export market, and of the need to strengthen its cross-Pacific trade relationships and, most crucially, develop/attract a multilingual and multicultural citizenry. This logic adheres to the tenets of neoliberalism that have come to hold increasing sway in global political economy; the image of BC, its future challenges, and truest path to prosperity that underpin the Asia Pacific Initiative developed under their influence. The things, people, and events in BC’

To finish: the Asia Pacific Initiative might have been a fruitful field in which to explore the changing relationship between government and knowledge in a minimally regulated global trade environment in which states and regions compete to attract and generate capital, but it is, at the same time, a real plan, considered and drafted and implemented by real people in a real place. This ambitious and wide-ranging, if at times nebulous, policy stands as evidence that, at least in British Columbia, the period of institutional searching Peck and Tickell describe is still ongoing. The province may still be searching for economic and political governance structures that will ensure sustainable growth and prosperity for everyone in the province; the relationship between government and citizen knowledge advocated in the Asia Pacific Initiative represents both an imperfect solution and a stopping point on that search at this particular moment in time.
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