EDUCATING THE NATURAL SELF:

ANALYSIS OF AND AMENDMENTS TO THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION

by

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ABSTRACT

Recognition is an important concept that needs to be practiced at both private and public levels. In this dissertation, I look at the concept of recognition from a psychoanalytical perspective and emphasize the role of recognition during childhood. I present a re-description of recognition that focuses primarily on recognizing the natural self, as defined in the work of Eric Berne, during the early years. This re-description includes both recognition that occurs in the child’s home, where the parents or significant others can offer or deny the child recognition, and recognition of a child in the public domain during the first years of schooling, where recognition can again be offered or withheld by teachers or other authority figures in school. I argue that if a child’s natural sense of self is misrecognized in the family or during the early years of schooling through controlling, prejudicial conditions and dialogues, the child can feel not-OK and become conditioned. The child’s not-OK feelings will then be extended through all of school and into the adult world of his or her life in society.

Currently, theories of recognition tend to address the importance of recognition when the self is already in the public domain. While I highly support the idea of public recognition of self throughout this dissertation, I argue that the public self may have already been denied recognition. Such an already misrecognized self needs affirmation when the self enters the public space and struggles for recognition. Thus, an alternative
way of looking at recognition could be through a self that has not yet encountered
misrecognition.

Finally, I discuss social mechanisms and educational practices that reinforce the
conditioned self in students. Self-monitoring or panopticism, alienation, and stultification
are mechanisms that can lead children to experience conditioning or misrecognition. In
order to foster recognition of the natural self, I draw on emancipatory education and
advocate the type of learning that unfolds naturally rather than the one that includes
explication. Recognizing children’s natural selves needs to be attended to and practiced
in school. It is not only a duty but is essential for all humanity.

**Keywords:** recognition; misrecognition; recognition in the early years of schooling;
recognition in childhood; conditioning; natural self; conditioned self; recognition through
the natural self; conditioning in schools, psychoanalysis; transactional analysis; Parent;
Adult; Child; stroke; nurturing dialogues; controlling dialogues; mirror recognition;
Berne
DEDICATION

To all children,

with love.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

The Story of a Little Girl

Once upon a time, there was a little girl who had feelings. She had likes and dislikes. She knew when she was happy, sad, hungry, or cold; when she was in pain; when she liked something and when she did not. She was natural and free. One might even say she was “OK,”\(^1\) OK with her self, her feelings, and her actions. She did not feel the need to act in a particular way so that others would like her. She had no idea what it meant to do things for another person and not for her own self. She was growing up happily and naturally with a free self.

One day, the little girl was playing in the yard. She got hungry and went in to have something to eat, something she would like. But she was given something that she did not like. It was food that did not smell or taste good to her. Just like the other times she had said she did not like something, she said so this time too and asked for something else to eat. However, this time she was confronted angrily and penalized for her request. The adults around her thought she needed to be disciplined. The little girl did not know what discipline meant, but she knew she was scared. She wanted her request for having another type of food to be satisfied, but she was too frightened to follow her own feelings.

\(^1\) I will use the term OK in this thesis in the sense that it is used in Transactional Analysis. This will be explained later in this chapter.
The little girl was told that she was not behaving well. For the first time in her life, the little girl felt she was not OK. She noticed that her feelings of like or dislike could cause her to be penalized by others. At that moment, she felt guilty and insecure, so she decided to forget about what she wanted. Instead, she learned something. She learned what it meant to be OK for adults. She learned it was important to adults that she behave well, which meant forgetting what she was naturally and what she wanted.

Through this first lesson in discipline, insecurity and guilt took over the little girl’s natural feelings and basic satisfactions. Whenever she wanted to express herself, the fear and the subsequent guilt rushed to her and stopped her from responding. The little girl did not want to always feel guilty about what she wanted. It was difficult to handle the guilt; therefore, she decided to please adults to cover her guilt. This way, adults did not ignore her but looked at her with smiles and praised her. So she practiced that behaviour of pleasing others. She forgot her own likes, dislikes, and satisfactions; instead, she became what adults wanted her to be and she pursued their likes and their satisfactions.

The Little Girl Became a Good Girl

To receive the adults’ approval and praise and avoid awful feelings of guilt and fear, the little girl gave up her own satisfaction and decided to become a “good girl”. To be a good girl meant not to be herself, but to act according to what the adults had defined for her. That is, she was defined through her behaviours and actions rather than her natural self and feelings. She then learned how to do things to make adults happy and to
make herself wanted by them. Thereafter, she did what they liked and avoided things they disliked. Every time she pleased the adults, they gave her “recognition”. In other words, they approved of her and rewarded her for disciplined behaviour. And every time the little girl received recognition, she felt the relief knowing that she was secure.

There were times, though, when the little girl happened to be asked about what she liked or wanted. However, those times were after she had experienced fear and guilt, or in general, being not OK. Therefore, to avoid experiencing those feelings, the little girl would keep quiet. The adults did not understand her silence, so they thought she was shy. The little girl did not know what the “shy” label meant but she thought it was something good. Whenever the adults used the word “shy,” they were smiling, as if they were proud that the little girl was quiet and shy. So she learned it was safe to keep quiet and not express what she liked or wanted. She learned to be quiet about her wishes, and instead addressed the adults’ wishes and tried to please them.

As the little girl was growing up, she learned to bury her natural feelings and self under the layers of fear, guilt, shyness, and pleasing others. A few years passed and it was time for the little girl to go to school. She went to school and learned more of these unnatural feelings. She received more discipline at school. There were rules and orders she had to follow. The teacher was an adult, and the little girl needed to obey her requests. To avoid the awful burden of feeling not OK, the little girl gave up her own satisfaction for the reward of the teacher’s approval and tried to please her as well. Every time she did something good and was a “good girl”, she got recognition from her teacher.
She behaved so well in the family and at school that she was called a “nice” girl by everyone. She was well-disciplined indeed!

**The Little Girl Became a Big Girl!**

Years passed. Our little girl became a big girl who did not have many of her natural feelings left. Instead, she was well-disciplined, well-behaved, and nice, with much recognition from others. She was very much wanted by everyone and had achieved many things in her life. But she was not happy. There were times when the big girl felt very tired. While she was not asked to behave well any more by others, or she did not have to please them, she continued doing things for others. She did so because this was the only way she had learned to be, i.e., to be a good girl so that others wanted her. Every time she did something good according to what others wanted, they acknowledged her and affirmed her. But for the little girl, this was all a struggle—a struggle to be wanted, to gain recognition—and so it was tiring.

Deep down she felt she did not live the life she wanted. She did not want to struggle to live. She wanted to be happy. Thus, she decided to read about how to be happy and how to be herself. She thought reading could help. But happiness was not something that could come out of rational thinking and reading. Happiness is much more complicated than that. It is about the natural self and feelings, not reason and logic. Reading did not substantially change things for the big girl. Until one day, one beautiful day, she heard through a friend about a course on self-analysis and self-development. The course was about psychoanalysis and was called “Transactional Analysis” (TA). She
immediately registered in the course. The big girl became so happy and embraced the course passionately.

**The Big Girl Did Psychoanalysis!**

It was in 1993 that the big girl attended the first session of her psychoanalysis classes. It was exactly what she was looking for. She wanted something that could help her change. She was not looking for something to practice rationally and change deliberately, but something that could change her deep feelings. She wanted substantial changes. The instructor of the course, Mahmoud Rashidi\(^2\), assured everyone in the class that deep changes would happen if the members took the lessons seriously and practiced Transactional Analysis regularly. Rashidi explained to the group that their psychoanalysis practices would be based on their feelings and childhood memories, not facts and logic. Therefore, their experiences of analyzing their transactions could be painful. For that reason, the members needed to be strong and patient as changes would eventually happen, though gradually.

In addition, the instructor made it clear that group members should not attend the sessions in order to gain the psychoanalytic knowledge and then use it as a weapon to degrade or judge other people. The sessions were not meant to be a source of information. He emphasized that a rational accumulation of psychoanalytical knowledge does not change the self. The psychoanalytical practices needed a lot of heart and passion in addition to knowledge. The big girl heard these words in the first session and took

\(^2\) Mahmoud Rashidi is a psychoanalyst in Tehran, Iran. He has an MA in Psychoanalysis from the University of Tehran and has been working as a psychoanalyst since 1977.
them to heart. She felt warmth, hope, love, and fear! That night, she went home with a heart full of encouragement and determination to work on herself.

In the first few sessions of her weekly classes, the big girl experienced bad headaches at the end of each session. The lessons were heavy—not heavy to understand, but heavy to accept and digest. The big girl could not believe that the way she behaved and lived for all those years did not have much to do with her natural feelings. Her way of life as an adult was based on her childhood experiences. She did not know that her early life experiences were so powerful and influential. Like every other child, she had both happy and unhappy memories and had recorded and stored them in her brain over the years. Though she could not remember most of them, she was living those memories. It was through psychoanalytical practices that those memories, both positive and negative, were recollected.

Over the weekly sessions, Rashidi asked the group members to work on their everyday conversations and transactions, to analyze the feelings associated with those transactions, and to identify their transactional patterns. He asked them to see how those patterns matched with the ways important people in their lives had behaved and to try to analyze them. It was important to see both the patterns and the feelings related to those experiences. The big girl tried to follow the lessons and find the connections among her transactions. Her feelings which had once been forgotten were coming alive. By analyzing her everyday transactions she could see her feelings of fear and guilt along with other hidden feelings. Every time she remembered a bitter memory, all the feelings associated with that experience were also evoked. That was the most difficult part to do:
playing back the memories, and having all sorts of different feelings coming to the surface. It was painful to realize that she had lived others’ lives and their feelings. Her own feelings were lost.

**The Big Girl Changed!**

Among her childhood experiences, the big girl surely had happy memories, too. Through psychoanalysis, the big girl could remember the time when she was a free child. In fact, those happy feelings were what helped her continue working on the unhappy feelings. Then, there were the changes, the happiest time of the big girl’s life. They were the changes that motivated the girl and gave her energy to continue. The changes first happened rationally in the ways the big girl had learned to do things. She then moved from the state of knowledge and mind to the state of feeling, i.e., the information she had gained was not just simple information but facts locked with feelings and emotions. Finally, she moved from the state of feeling to the state of action. Her behaviour started to change as she had interrupted some of her old patterns. It was this state of final change to which the big girl was always looking forward. For her, this last state was like a green field that she had reached after climbing all those rocky hills.

With the help of Rashidi’s lessons and his guidance, as well as the big girl’s effort and determination over the years, she was able to undo some of her learned behaviours, one after the other. She took the lessons to heart and she changed. Although it was painful to uncover the layers of fear and guilt and many other unnatural feelings that she had learned to acquire as she had grown up, the big girl continued attending psychoanalysis classes and treated it as a journey. The psychoanalysis had helped her to
remember some of the happy experiences she had when she was a child and those happy feelings were encouraging. Therefore, the big girl continued practicing psychoanalysis until today. In fact, it has now become the big girl’s life passion\(^3\).

I Am The Big Girl!

**Contemplating recognition:** I am the little and big girl of this story. I have done Transactional Analysis for over ten years\(^4\). I practice it for my personal growth and change. My psychoanalytical practices have not only helped me better understand my own self, but have also given me a new way of looking at my readings and ideas on the concepts such as “self” and “recognition” in which I am interested. As part of my Ph.D. studies, I remember the spring semester of 2005, when I took the course *EDUC-912: Colloquium in Curriculum Theory II: Current Issues and Questions* with Dr. Charles Bingham. I was very much interested in the readings and discussions we had on self and the theory of recognition in education. In my mind, I constantly used to analyze the readings through my psychoanalytical practices. My contemplation was not something I could control or stop. My mind would automatically ponder the reading concepts on self and recognition. That inspiring course was the key course that helped me find my passion for recognition as my dissertation topic.

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\(^3\) The inspiration behind the story format in the introduction comes from the text “The person who had feelings” by Barbara Dunlap. Retrieved in September 2007 from: [http://www.businessballs.com/stories.htm#person who had feelings](http://www.businessballs.com/stories.htm#person who had feelings)

\(^4\) I started psychoanalytical practices in 1993. However, there were some interruptions along the way which I have deducted from the number of my experiences. Till this year, 2009, it has been over 10 years in total.
During my studies, the more I read about the theory of recognition and self, the more I felt the need to challenge some of the theories on recognition. I remember there were some ideas on recognition in particular that I was constantly questioning. For example, I had read and thought extensively about Charles Taylor’s ideas on recognition and his concept of self as dialogical, as well as my supervisor’s (Dr. Charles Bingham) thoughts on educational recognition and the concept of mirroring. There was a specific definition of mirroring based on Taylor’s argument for the importance of public recognition that I read over and over again: “When I enter the public sphere, I need someone, or some thing, that will mirror back to me an affirming sense of who I am” (Bingham, 2001, p.34). I could not stop asking myself: “Why should I need an outside source to confirm and tell me who I am?”, “What is this need for a positive image in the public and where does it come from?”, “Is it really a need or has it become a need?”

I found myself questioning this idea of recognition through public mirroring, especially positive public mirroring—when the private self is reflected through positive images in the public place to gain affirmation. I thought that, if a person needed positive images from the outside in order to know who he or she is, this meant that the person had already lost his or her sense of being through reflection of negative images. In other words, the person’s self had already been misrecognized; that is why he or she sought recognition or positive images of the self from the outside. To discuss that, I had a meeting with my supervisor—the author of the book *Schools of Recognition: Identity politics and classroom practices* (Bingham, 2001) which I had read. During the meeting, I told him that I did not see recognition through positive mirroring. I said that one’s need

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5 The concept of positive mirroring is discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this dissertation.
for affirmation in the public place showed that such a person has already experienced misrecognition. In such a case, when the self enters the public space, it struggles for recognition because of prior misrecognition.

As I was not seeing this struggle as a kind of recognition that counts, I told my supervisor that I would like to propose a different way of thinking about recognition in my dissertation. Using Transactional Analysis, I suggest I would like to present a re-description of recognition which speaks to a self that has not yet gone through restraints or misrecognition. I said that this re-description of recognition is of particular importance in the early stages of a child’s life. It includes both the recognition of the child at home where the parents or significant others can offer or deny the child recognition, and the recognition of a child during early years of schooling in the public domain, where recognition can again be offered or withheld by teachers or other authority figures in school. It is on the basis of this recognition or misrecognition of self at such early ages that I then discuss recognition of self in adulthood in the public sphere. On that day, my supervisor supported me, and today, it is with his nurturing attitude and his recognition of my idea that I have written this dissertation.
An Introduction to Some Key Ideas

Most theories of recognition are concerned with public recognition of the self; that is, how to recognize a private self when it enters the public sphere\(^6\). This becomes of special importance when the public domain is a multicultural domain; then, the socio-cultural, racial, and other communities to which each person belongs become a matter of recognition. For instance, Charles Taylor (1991b, 1994), Charles Bingham (2001), Nancy Fraser (1997, 2000), and Kelly Oliver (2000, 2001), whose ideas on recognition are discussed in detail in this dissertation, argue for recognition of the self at the public level. They address the importance of recognition when the self is already in the public domain.

While I highly support the idea of public recognition of self and argue for such recognition throughout this dissertation, I would like to show the significance of recognition in childhood as well, when the child’s sense of self can be recognized or misrecognized by authority figures such as parents or teachers.

I argue that one can be offered or withheld recognition early in life, well before he or she enters adulthood. I argue that if a child’s sense of self is misrecognized in the

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\(^6\) This is an exception to Jessica Benjamin’s recognitive theory (1988) which looks at recognition in childhood. In her book “The bonds of love. Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the problem of domination” (Pantheon Books, New York, 1988) Benjamin looks to the earliest years of a child’s life for explaining recognition. She analyzes the process of the struggle for recognition psychologically by looking at the development of the infant and his relationship with his mother. Benjamin says that it is not pleasant for a mother to see that her baby has come from her and yet is not known to her. However, she feels that a relationship is forming when her baby is responding to her with gratification and recognizing her. While Benjamin’s theory of recognition examines recognition in early years of the child’s life, her emphasis is on mutual or reciprocal recognition, in particular, she focuses on recognition of the mother by the child. Benjamin says that mutual recognition starts as soon as a baby is born. When an infant is smiling to his mother when the mother is feeding him, mutual recognition is happening and the mother says: “I recognize you as my baby who recognizes me” (p.15). On the other hand, my dissertation argues for the recognition of the child by his mother, father, or other significant others.
family or in the early years of schooling, her not-OK feelings, her feelings of futility, despair, or unworthiness will be extended through all of school and into the grownup world of her life in society (Harris, 1967, p. 162). Thus, when we talk about recognition at the public level, we need to understand that the public self may have already been denied recognition. This is what I would like to highlight in this dissertation, that most theories of recognition focus on public recognition of an already misrecognized self. However, an alternative way of looking at recognition could be through a self that has not encountered misrecognition. In other words, recognition could be discussed through the lens of a self that is still natural. Let me briefly explain what I mean by a natural sense of self.

I use the term “natural” for a self in the way that is used in Transactional Analysis (TA). According to Berne, the father of TA (1961, p. 42), and his followers, James & Jongeward (1971, p. 139-140 & p. 157), every child is born with a natural sense of self. At birth, a child has a natural or free ego state which is impulsive, untrained, and expressive. During childhood, for better or for worse, this natural ego state falls under parental teaching and programming. Through the imposition of restraints and parental controlling instructions, the child’s natural ego state loses the ability to give and receive affection, be curious about the world, and be expressive. The child learns to adapt her natural way of being to the outside demands and conditions. This new ego state is called adapted or conditioned. The adapted ego state exhibits a modification of the inclinations of the natural ego state. The adaptations happen in response to training, conditions, and

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In order to avoid repeating both male and female pronouns throughout this dissertation, I refer to the child or grownup as “she” in one chapter and as “he” in another chapter.
most importantly, to demands from significant authority figures who are controlling or prejudicial\(^8\).

In this dissertation, I propose that recognizing a self—the kind of recognition that counts—is about recognition of the \textit{natural} self, the self that has not yet become adapted or conditioned. I emphasize recognizing the natural self in early years of a child’s life within the family and through her first experiences of schooling. I argue that if a child’s natural self is not recognized at such early ages, she will struggle for recognition through all of school and her life in society as an adult. Recognizing the natural self of a child is about nurturing her natural self; that is, it is about providing the self with an environment where the natural growth of the self is not interfered or restrained by the critical, prejudicial, or punitive dialogues of authority figures.

Throughout this dissertation, I examine different types of dialogues that parents and other authority figures such as teachers could establish with children. While dialogues that are established with \textit{nurturing} parents or teachers could help a child’s natural way of being flourish, dialogues that in contrast are held by \textit{controlling} or \textit{prejudicial} parents or other authority figures could inhibit the child’s natural expressiveness and impulses (Berne, 1961, 1963)\(^9\). I argue that it is the nurturing dialogues, as opposed to controlling or prejudicial dialogues, established by nurturing parents or teachers, that such dialogues could keep a child’s sense of self natural at early ages. As a child grows up, she then acts, thinks, feels and perceives things based on her

\(^8\) The natural and the adapted or conditioned sense of self will be explained in more detail in the next chapter.

\(^9\) Eric Berne, \textit{Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy} (1961), p. 76
Eric Berne, \textit{The Structure and Dynamics of Organizations and Groups} (1963), pp. 185-186
parental or other authority figures’ teachings and dialogues in childhood. Since one’s sense of self in the adult world of life in society is subject to whether she has been offered or denied recognition in childhood, I would like to highlight first the importance of recognition in childhood.

**Recognition: The Emphasis on Childhood**

A child needs to be nurtured both physically and psychologically by her parents or significant others at the private level. Recognition or nurturing the natural self of a child is a matter of survival. In his book “Games People Play”, Berne (1964, pp. 13-14) emphasizes this need of human beings for recognition since birth and argues that emotional deprivation or lack of physical and emotional recognition in infants can have a fatal outcome. To Berne, this psychological need for recognition and physical intimacy has the same relationship to survival of the human organism as the need for food does. Just like food deprivation, emotional and sensory starvation can harm human beings.

In addition, Berne (1964, p. 15) uses the term “recognition” to define the concept of *strokes*, a general term for physical intimate contact. Strokes may take various forms in practice. This I will discuss in more detail in Chapter Three. For now, I would like to emphasize the importance of strokes i.e., physical touch or other forms of recognition such as smiles, nods, words, or gestures in a child’s physical and mental growth. Natural, positive strokes are usually given to a child very early in her life. James and Jongeward (1971, p. 48) explain that in every intimate interaction that a baby has with her parents or caregivers, such as diapering, feeding, powdering, or fondling, the baby is actually given positive strokes by her nurturing parents. This need for positive strokes and physical
touch stays in the child as she grows up and its fulfilment is necessary for the child’s natural growth.

Nurturing or recognizing a child’s natural self is also about supporting the child’s autonomy. As I discuss in the next chapter, a child’s autonomy is manifested by three capacities: awareness, spontaneity, and intimacy (Berne, 1964, pp. 178-180). At both private and public levels, it is very important that a child’s sense of living in the here and now or her awareness, her freedom to choose and express her feelings or her spontaneity, and her loving, affectionate nature and eidetic perception or her intimacy are not corrupted or interfered with. Unfortunately, parents, deliberately or through lack of awareness, often interfere their child’s autonomy at the private level and thus misrecognize the child.

Since birth, as Berne says, parents teach their children “how to behave, think, feel and perceive” (1964, p. 182). For better or for worse, they serve as models for their children. If the parents are nurturing and sympathetic, that is, if they give positive strokes to the child, then the child keeps her natural sense of self or OK-ness and grows naturally. However, if the parents are critical, prejudicial, or punitive and employ negative stroking, the child records his parents’ erroneous opinions and becomes adapted or not-OK. This child whose natural sense of self has now changed will do different things at the private and public levels to gain a positive stroke or recognition—a kind of recognition that is not about the natural self anymore. This type of recognition, even the unnatural one, will help the child feel OK, though the feeling of being OK is not deep. I will discuss this in more detail in the next two chapters.
Berne further discusses the importance of parental teaching and programming in how a child perceives herself and the world around her. In his other book “What Do You Say After You Say Hello?” Berne (1972) explains that parental programming determines how and when urges are expressed as well as how and when restraints are imposed. To describe programming, he writes:

Physiologically, programming means facilitation, the establishment of a path of lessened resistance. Operationally, it means that a given stimulus will evoke, with a high degree of probability, an already established response. Phenomenologically, parental programming means that a response is determined by parental directives, sound tracks previously recorded, whose voices can be heard by listening carefully to what goes on inside’s one’s own head (pp. 99-100).

Unfortunately, Berne says that most programming is negative. Many parents fill their children’s heads with restraining statements such as “Don’t be stupid!”, or “Don’t be late” (p. 123). But they also give permissions. While prohibitions hinder adaptations to circumstances, permissions give a free choice to the child. Berne asserts that parental programming early in childhood, whether they are nurturing or critical, affects how the child perceives herself and others. It leads the child to make decisions about her life and form an ongoing life plan called scripts. To Berne (1972, p. 203), scripts, which are based on parental programming and childhood decisions, are continually reinforced throughout life. Even when the parents die, their instructions are remembered and followed. Scripts are not acted out consciously, but they are only possible because one does not know what
one is doing to oneself and to others. If this is known, then it is the opposite of being scripted. Berne (p. 245) asserts that this ignorance of one’s script can make the person function bodily, mentally, and socially in ways that are in spite of oneself. In other words, the person does things not because she wishes to do those things but because she is programmed to do so. Because of the interference of parental programming and the formation of scripts, this person only retains the *illusion* of autonomy, as Berne states. She will not do things because she wants to, but because her parents or other authority figures in her life have demanded so. Thus, she lives her life based on her parental teachings.

A question may come to mind here: “Why would a child want to accept her parental teachings or rules and think he is not-OK?” Harris (1967) addresses this question and explains that we should not forget the child’s situation in her early experiences. She is small and dependant. She has no words with which to construct meanings nor an ability to modify or explain situations. If a parent looks askance at the child, the child does not know how to interpret that. The only thing that comes to her mind is that she has done something wrong or something is her fault. If the parents battle each other—the two persons on whom the child’s survival depends upon—she thinks they are going to destroy each other. She does not know that their fight could be about her father’s business which may have just gone down the drain. She watches the scene and thinks it is her fault. She concludes then she is not-OK. When a child thinks of herself as “I’m not-OK” she means: “I’m two feet tall, I’m helpless, I’m defenceless, I’m dirty, nothing I do is right, I’m clumsy, and I have no words with which to try to make you understand how it feels.” (p. 54) But at the same time, the child sees her parents as the source of all security and thinks
they are OK. By that, she means: “You are six feet tall, you are powerful, you are always right, you have all the answers, you are smart, you have life or death control over me, and you can hit me and hurt me, and it’s OK” (p. 54).

This is the same when it comes to a child’s experience in her early years of schooling. A five-year-old child in kindergarten or a seven-year-old child in elementary school has the same interpretations toward her teacher or other authority figures as she has had toward her parents. To her, the teacher is like a parent who has all the answers and is always right. Just like her parent, the teacher is OK and has life or death control over her. Harris (1967, pp. 161-163) says that when a child enters school, not only does she take along with her all the parental teachings and programming; she also practices and re-lives those teachings. A child who has had critical instructions and lack of stroking in the private sphere can encounter problems which sever her not-OK feeling in school. If a child does poorly in school, her complaint of her limitations will be stated as “I’m stupid,” and her parents’ sentiments on that will be, “she’s not working up to her potential.” The child’s feeling of being not-OK, which have been established in the family setting, is now persisted in school. This is the same for a child with lots of stroking; that is, she will do well in school and continue to feel good about herself since in the private sphere she has experienced the same feeling of being OK.

As a result, a child experiences and re-experiences the feeling of OK-ness or not-OK-ness in the private sphere and then in school. If the family establishes prejudicial and critical dialogues with the child, the child will think of herself as small and unworthy in the family and extend these feelings through school as well as in the grownup world of
her life later. Such a self needs recognition in the public sphere because it has already been misrecognized early in life. Therefore, when it comes to recognition at the public level, it is important to consider that recognition or misrecognition starts from early years of one’s life.

**Recognition: The Public Level**

Throughout this thesis, I discuss recognition or nurturing of the self at both the private and public levels. Just like the private sphere, the public sphere needs to be nurturing and attentive to individuals’ needs. When a private self enters the public, it can be offered or denied recognition. Taylor (1994) and Bingham (2001) speak to the importance of recognizing a private self at the public level. In his discussion of public recognition, Taylor advocates acknowledging the individuals’ basic rights as human beings as well as acknowledging their practices and needs as members of specific cultural groups. This is what he calls as “the politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1994, pp. 37-43). Taylor emphasizes the importance of positive mirroring in recognizing different groups of people and states how harmful it is to project an inferior image on others and give them a demeaning sense of self. People could develop a false and distorted mode of being when the society or people around them reflect to them negative images of themselves.

Similarly, Bingham (2001, pp. 32-35) states that the private self can be affected by public commonalities. It can be recognized or misrecognized in the public sphere. One’s conscious thinking of who one is may change by moving from the private to the public sphere. Bingham emphasizes the role of society or other people that could act as a mirror and says that the public sphere should reflect people an image that affirms their
sense of who they are. One of the important points that Bingham makes about public
mirroring is that can not only mirrors can be “reflective”, but they can also be
“constitutive”. That means, the mirror of the society can not only reflect people an image
of who they already are, but it can give them new information and a new sense of self.
Thus, the mirror of the public space can constitute people; i.e., people can become
through the mirror experience\textsuperscript{10}.

As I mentioned earlier and will elaborate more in Chapter Three, I strongly
advocate the idea of public recognition of the private self. A natural self needs a
\textit{nurturing} public domain to be recognized in order to grow and flourish more. Just like
the private domain, the public environment needs to be nurturing and non-prejudicial for
the self as well. It ought to observe the politics of recognition that Taylor talks about and
should be sensitive to the constitutive aspect of mirroring as Bingham describes. Having
said that, I challenge the notion of positive mirroring as a form of public recognition for a
self that is already misrecognized. Providing a recognitive environment for such a
misrecognized self where positive strokes and images are reflected to the self can only
help the self be relieved from the pain of misrecognition temporarily. Positive mirroring
of different groups of people are strokes for the public self; however, for an already not-
OK self, these strokes are only surface solutions. They do not change one’s sense of self
since the underlying feeling of not-OK-ness is untouched.

As I will argue more in Chapter Four, positive images can work as affirmative
remedies (Fraser, 1997), correcting the misrecognition or injustices on the surface. But

\textsuperscript{10} Both Taylor’s and Bingham’s ideas on mirror recognition are discussed in detail in Chapter
Three.
since the self has already been reflected demeaning images and gone through deprivation of emotional and physical recognition as well as parental critical teaching and programming, the positive public mirroring cannot address the deep pain that the self has experienced. At early ages, the child has already decided about her life position and formed her life script based on her parents’ or other significant others’ instructions and valuational system. Whatever the child experiences at an early age, as Berne (1972) says, will be internalized, reinforced, and put into operation as she grows up. Therefore, positive mirroring may not be of much help for changing a script that has been reinforced throughout years. The internalisation and reinforcement are so strong that even when the parents or other figures of authority are not around in the person’s life, the person will carry out her script as if they are still instructing her. Berne (1972) compares this programming to a computer tape or a player piano tape and writes:

[I]t [the script] is planted in his head at an early age by his parents, and stays there for the rest of his life, even after their vocal “flesh” has gone forevermore. It acts like a computer tape or a player piano roll, which brings out the responses in the planned order long after the person who punched the holes has departed the scene (pp. 65-66).

To change such a fixed script, the person needs to undergo fundamental changes through psychoanalysis or some other sort of introspection. While psychoanalysis is a recovery at the personal level, at the social level, public recognition can help a misrecognized self to change if it is the type of public recognition that is proposed by Nancy Fraser (1997, 2000). As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter Three, Fraser
suggests two types of remedies—affirmative and transformative—to address misrecognition and injustices at the public level. While affirmative remedies such as positive mirroring can correct misrecognition on the surface, transformative remedies tend to redress the underlying cultural-valuational structure of the society and deconstruct misrecognition fundamentally. As a result, I will argue that for remedying misrecognition at the public domain it is the transformative remedies that should be applied to misrecognized groups of people. I will argue that using transformative remedies and deconstructing the layers of misrecognition can help people recapture their natural sense of self and claim it back.

Thus, in this dissertation, my emphasis is on the natural sense of self for recognition rather than a self that has already been misrecognized. In my critical reinterpretation of recognition throughout this dissertation, I will focus on the recognition of the self that is still natural. I will argue that it is the natural self, as opposed to the misrecognized, conditioned, or adapted self, that will serve as a model for recognition that counts, recognition that is important, and recognition that serves the human being. It is this type of recognition that I advocate and would like to bring into education. I will argue that in educational contexts, recognition should be about taking care of students’ natural self through providing them with an environment where their self is nurtured and positively stroked. Just like the private place, the public place of school can also be repressive and threatening to a natural self if the dialogues established in the educational setting are prejudicial or punitive. I reiterate that this is of special importance for children at their early ages of schooling. As the little girl of the story at the beginning of this chapter learned to forget what she wanted in the family, in school too students can forget their
own natural feelings and expressiveness and become misrecognized when they are surrounded by restraining or discounting dialogues. Since my conception of recognizing students’ natural selves are coming from my personal psychoanalytical practices, in particular Transactional Analysis, I would like to explain these practices here before I move to the next chapters.

The psychoanalysis I have practiced, and the one that will guide this thesis, is called *Transactional Analysis* or TA. TA was founded by Eric Berne in the 1950s. It is a method to analyze transactions that occur between two people or within one person’s head when the person is having a conversation in his or her mind. In his book, “*Games People Play*,” Berne (1964) defines transactions as follows:

The unit of social intercourse is called a transaction. If two or more people encounter each other… sooner or later one of them will speak, or give some other indication of acknowledging the presence of the others. This is called the *transactional stimulus*. Another person will then say or do something which is in some way related to the stimulus, and that is called the *transactional response* (p.29).

Therefore, a transaction consists of a single stimulus and a single response—verbal or nonverbal. Transactional Analysis is a method for examining the stimuli and responses between two or more people on the basis of their three ego states: Parent, Adult, and Child. Parent, Adult, and Child\footnote{When these terms are capitalized, they refer to ego states rather than people.} are the three parts that Berne (1961) believes each person is made up of. Berne notes that these three parts are not concepts like
Superego, Ego, and Id but are phenomenological realities. They refer to phenomena based on actual realities. Briefly stated, Berne defines the Parent as “a set of feelings, attitudes, and behaviour patterns which resemble those of a parental figure (p. 75)”; the Adult as “an autonomous set of feelings, attitudes, and behaviour patterns which are adopted to the current reality (p. 76)”; and the Child as “a set of feelings, attitudes, and behaviour patterns which are relics of the individual’s own childhood (p. 77)”. These three states are discussed below in more detail.

**Parent**

The Parent ego state refers to the people whom we see as important such as parents, family members, teachers, and the like. They can play the role of a Parent for us. The Parent, as Harris (1969, pp. 20-22) states, is our recordings of unquestioned or imposed external events perceived by us in our early years of life. All the dominations and rules and laws that the child heard and saw from her parents in their living, from the earliest parental communications, interpreted nonverbally through facial expression, tone of voice, cuddling or non-cuddling, to the verbal rules and regulations affirmed by the parents as the child became able to understand words are recorded in the Parent. Harris asserts that the Parent is the part that teaches us the “right” ways of doing things or being. Whether they are good or bad, Harris says that “in the light of a reasonable ethic, they are recorded as truth from the source of all security, the people who are “six feet tall” at a time when it is important to the two-foot-tall child that he please and obey them” (p. 23). All these important people and their rules become rigidly internalized in the Parent part of the child as recordings of what the child observed them do and say.
Having said that, the Parent can form the happy part of the child when the parents support the child, when he or she hugs or kisses the child, or when the parent and child play happily together. While the former Parent is the controlling or prejudicial Parent and is limiting or prohibitive in nature, the latter is a nurturing Parent which leads to the child’s growth and happiness (Berne, 1961, 1963)\textsuperscript{12}. A child with nurturing parents develops a Parent ego state that has nurturing behaviour; however, a child who has controlling or prejudicial parents develops a Parent ego state that contains controlling behaviour.

**Adult**

The second state, the Adult, keeps the Parent and the Child under control. The Adult is the thought concept of life based on data acquired and computed through exploration and testing. Harris (1969) describes one of the important functions of the Adult as follows:

…to examine the data in the Parent, to see whether or not it is true and still applicable today, and then to accept it or reject it; and to examine the Child to see whether or not the feelings there are appropriate to the present or are archaic and in response to archaic Parent data. The goal is not to do away with the Parent and Child but to be free to examine these bodies of data (p.33).

Therefore, the Adult is mainly concerned with the examination and verification of the Parent data. In addition, the Adult ego state enables a person to estimate probabilities

\textsuperscript{12} Eric Berne, *Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy*” (1961), p.76  
Eric Berne, *The Structure and Dynamics of Organizations and Groups* (1963), pp. 185-186
and the consequences of various actions. Berne (1961) describes the Adult as to be “organized, adaptable, and intelligent, and is experienced as an objective relationship with the external environment based on autonomous reality-testing (p. 77). That is, the Adult involves the process of checking out what is real and allows a person to find out alternative solutions. The Adult functions of probability estimating and reality checking can help a person evaluate the current situation and make better decisions. In sum, as Berne (1963) says, this ego state “makes survival possible” (p. 186).

Child

The Child ego state is not about being “childish” or “immature”, but is regarded as childlike—being like a child of a certain age. Age is an important factor which could be anywhere between two and five, according to Berne (1972, p. 12). Berne considers the Child as the most valuable part of one’s personality since all the events along with their associated feelings are recorded in the Child. Similarly, Harris (1969, p. 27) describes the Child as our recording of internal events and feelings in response to what we see and hear. Using the experiments of Wilder Penfield, a brain surgeon, in 1951, Harris explains that along with events that a child experiences, the brain records the associated feelings. While nurturing parents can produce feelings of happiness, safety, and acceptance in the child, controlling or prejudicial parents can create situations where the child experiences feelings of fear, guilt, or being unsafe. When a parent forces a child to do something and leads the child to give up his basic satisfaction for parental reward, the child feels he is not OK. Such a conclusion together with the feelings he has experienced in that particular situation are recorded in the child’s brain. Later on in his life, as Harris says, similar situations can bring back the same feelings from childhood and so the person again finds
himself as not OK. Sadly, such recordings can happen to any child, “… even the child of kind, loving, well-meaning parents. It is the situation of childhood and not the intention of the parents which produces the problem” (Harris, p. 28).

On the other hand, despite all the not-OK recordings, there are situations that the child experiences curiosity, creativity, desire to explore and desire to know. Such a child is “…the happy child, the carefree, butterfly-chasing little boy, the little girl with chocolate on her face” (Harris, p. 29). These happy moments are also available when such a child grows up. Both positive and negative experiences are recorded and stored in the Child. Berne (1961) asserts that the Child is exhibited in one of two forms: the adapted child or the natural child. He defines these two forms of Child as follows:

The adapted Child is manifested by behaviour which is inferentially under the dominance of the Parental influence, such as compliance or withdrawal. The natural Child is manifested by autonomous forms of behaviour such as rebelliousness or self-indulgence. It is differentiated from the autonomous Adult by the ascendancy of archaic mental processes and the different kind of reality-testing. It is the proper function of the “healthy” Child to motivate the data-processing and programming of the Adult so as to obtain the greatest amount of gratification for itself (pp. 77-78).

Therefore, the adapted Child is the part of the Child state that acts under the Parental influence. Its natural way of expression has been modified by compliance or avoidance. However, the natural Child is the part within each person’s Child state that is
freer, more impulsive and self-indulgent. In this dissertation, I refer to the adapted Child as the *conditioned* Child—the Child that has been adapted to follow certain conditions. I will explain the terms ‘natural’ and ‘conditioned’ in greater detail in the next chapter.

In summary, the Parent is the “taught” concept of life; the Child is the “felt” concept of life, and the Adult is the “thought” concept of life (Harris, 1969, p. 31). In everyday life, we move from one of these three states to another throughout our dialogues and transactions. This means that when we are interacting with others, we come from one of these three parts and usually switch from one to another. For example, when anger dominates reason, it is the Child in us that is in control and has overcome the Adult. Or, when we demand from the position of power that someone does something, it is the Parent that rules in us. Through Transactional Analysis, we can change these three parts—the Parent, the Adult, and the Child—and become closer to the natural child in us, though I must say the process is not easy.

People use Transactional Analysis for different purposes. They apply it to enrich their communication with others and their understanding of themselves. TA is used widely for clinical, organizational, and personal development. It has a simple language which is comprehensible by anyone and is an effective method at both levels of theory and application. As Harris (1967) says one of the most significant contributions of Transactional Analysis is that it introduces a tool that anybody can use. People do not have to be “sick” to benefit from it (p. xxiii). I have used Transactional Analysis for my own growth and change. It has been part of my life for many years, and is the most
precious thing I have done for myself. If I had not done psychoanalytical practices, I would not be able to talk about natural self today.

**Summary of Chapters**

In this dissertation, I use the psychoanalytic lens of Transactional Analysis practices to detail recognition in education through the natural self. I begin the second chapter of this dissertation by discussing in detail the two forms of self that I use repeatedly in my discussions: natural self and conditioned self. These two are the key concepts to explain and understand my stance on analyzing recognition through the natural self. I will illustrate a personal experience when I was in grade one, showing how I became misrecognized or conditioned due to the presence of my teacher’s power and critical instruction. To elaborate the concept of self as conditioned, I will describe the notion of conditioning theorized by Ivan Pavlov and compare my misrecognition or conditioning at school with Pavlov’s theory of conditioning. While the conditioning experiments by Pavlov come from the animal world, especially dogs, his discussion on the conditioned and unconditioned reflexes and reactions in them help us get a better understanding of the concept of conditioning. I will explain that since a conditioned child thinks of herself as being not-OK, she learns to play psychological games in order to sooth this awful feeling. The child learns games at home and then practices them when she enters school. Games are repetitive and, if they are not dealt with at early ages, the child will play them throughout her life in order to get (unnatural) recognition and strokes. Due to the importance of dialogues in making the child feel OK or not-OK about herself and people around her, I will end the chapter by examining different forms of dialogues and address dialogues through the concept of self.
In chapter three, I examine the concept of recognition and recognition of the private self in the public. Examining the term “recognition” more conceptually, I investigate when and in which context this term is used. In particular, I focus on the meaning of recognition in the field of psychoanalysis and explain that recognition is defined as “strokes” in this field. During my psychoanalytical description of the concept of recognition, I will emphasize childhood recognition and the recognition of the private self. Then, I will move away from childhood recognition and turn to the recognition of the self in adulthood in the larger society. I will discuss the importance of the public sphere for attending to one’s recognition and her self nurturance. Taylor (1994) and Bingham (2001) speak to the important matter of public recognition of self and the effects that public commonalities could have on the private self. Discussing Taylor’s politics of recognition, I describe public mirror recognition and the harm of negative mirroring. Moreover, I explain Bingham’s ideas on mirroring as both “reflective” and “constitutive” and emphasize the constitutive aspect of negative mirroring; that is, reflecting negative images of the self in the public sphere can give people a demeaning sense of self and misrecognize or condition them. On the other hand, I challenge the notion of positive mirroring as a remedy for public recognition of an already misrecognized self. I discuss that Taylor’s idea on positive mirror recognition does not address root causes of one’s misrecognition or not-OK-ness since the mirror of the public space only works as a reflection. In this sense, positive mirroring will not change one’s conscious thinking of who one is as one moves to the public sphere. As Fraser emphasizes, transformative changes are needed to remedy the underlying feeling of misrecognition in the public. This will be explained in the next chapter.
In chapter four, I examine three influential theories of public recognition presented by Holland and her colleagues, Nancy Fraser, and Kelly Oliver. Holland and her colleagues (1998) discuss the importance of socio-cultural positions in offering or denying recognition to people (though they do not use the word “recognition” explicitly) and making them who they are. I will argue that powerful positions and situations can misrecognize and fossilize people’s natural selves. Misrecognized or fossilized selves show habitual behaviours, disconnected from their natural way of being. I will then delve into two further theoretical discussions on recognition posed by Nancy Fraser (1997) and Kelly Oliver (2000). Fraser conceptualizes recognition as a paradigm of justice and explains that cultural injustices can be addressed by recognition. To remedy injustice, Fraser suggests two types of remedies—affirmative and transformative. I will liken these two remedies with my psychoanalytical discussion on natural and conditioned selves and advocate transformative remedies as a path to the natural sense of self. I will then argue Oliver’s notion of “witnessing” as a powerful alternative to recognition. Oliver argues that recognition that is granted to oppress by dominant groups is flawed as it perpetuates subject-object hierarchies. She thus develops a theory of recognition that starts with the subjectivity of the oppressed and suggests subjectivity as the result of the process of witnessing. Witnessing one’s oppression and deconstructing the situation can reinsert one’s subjectivity. Consistent with Oliver’s ideas, I propose my psychoanalytical understanding of witnessing and explain its similarity to reclaiming subjectivity and connecting to one’s natural self.
In chapter five, I will focus on those mechanisms in *education* that misrecognize the natural self or reinforce the conditioned self. These mechanisms are panopticism, alienation, and stultification. While I look at these mechanisms in education more generally, I will link my work to children in the Primary Program (from kindergarten to grade three) and explain how these children might experience self-monitoring, alienation, and stultification which lead to their conditioning or its reinforcement. Looking at the first four years of education from the kindergarten to grade three, I will argue that disciplinary rules in these years create self-monitoring or *panopticism*; grades, grouping children, and labelling them result in *alienation*; and explication leads to their *stultification* which are all forms of misrecognition of the children’s natural selves. In the section on “panopticism”, I explain that students’ natural selves can be suppressed when there is an external power or control observing their behaviour. Due to the presence of power and control, students’ natural self can be confined through the power of a higher being and become more conditioned. I also argue that educational contexts can strengthen “alienation” by encouraging students to do things to please their teachers or their parents at home. I explain that while educational systems such as the “banking approach” can reinforce the student’s conditioned self by asking students to respond to the demands of authority figures, the “problem posing education” removes absolute authority from the teacher and acknowledges the voice of students. In addition, an educational system that is based on “explication” or the desire to explain results in “stultification”. Explication makes students internalize the image of being ignorant and the idea that they need instruction. An educational environment where stultification is promoted is surely not a nurturing environment as it makes students’ natural self suppressed or misrecognized. In
sum, this chapter discusses these three social mechanisms to make teachers, curriculum developers, and other authority figures in education think more about the hidden ways that misrecognition could occur in educational contexts.

In the final chapter, I will include a summary of the main ideas presented in this dissertation as well as my conclusion. Since my emphasis is on recognition of the natural self in the early years of schooling, in this chapter, I will discuss in more detail my concluding thoughts on fostering the natural self in children. I will end this dissertation by pointing out the importance of educating teachers for recognizing children’s natural selves and the long-lasting consequences that lack of such recognition could have in children’s lives.
CHAPTER II: SELF, RECOGNITION, AND DIALOGUES

I have always been amazed by the way the human brain works. This amazement has greatly increased over the course of my extended practice of Transactional Analysis (TA). Throughout these extended TA practices, I have remembered things that I never thought I would. When I have remembered an event, it has been like a tape that has been rewound. I could not only hear the voices, but also see the images of such events. Either happy or unhappy feelings came afterwards. To describe more accurately, it was like I was reliving those moments as if I were there! In the book “I’m OK- You’re OK”, Thomas Harris (1969, p. 27) explains that along with events, the brain records the associated feelings. It may seem that we have forgotten the events and related feelings, but the truth is that we actually live those experiences. Both experiences and feelings stay locked together. Therefore, during life, situations similar to the childhood events that we have experienced can bring back the same feelings.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the feelings are recorded in the Child part. During childhood, if the parents or other important people in the child’s life, including teachers early in his life, discount the child’s feelings and needs, the child’s healthy development is disrupted. James & Jongeward (1971) define a discount as “either the lack of attention or negative attention that hurts emotionally or physically” (p. 53). A child who has been discounted, ignored, or given negative strokes receives the message,
“I’m not OK”. Meanwhile, as the child is observing the behaviour of her parents or other figures of authority, he records their discounting or demanding behaviour in the Parent part. As Harris (1969, p. 20) argues, when the child needs stroking or recognition, the amazing brain comes into play and asks: What must I do to gain their strokes or approval? This is where all the struggles for recognition from the outside get started. The child decides to submit to others and do what they want him to do, or withdraw and gain negative stroking. This decision is made by the child’s Adult part.

In this chapter, I explain in greater detail the process that leads a child to decide about his worth as being not-OK. I will discuss that, as a child concludes he is not-OK, his natural sense of self changes into an adapted or conditioned self. In the previous chapter, I briefly explained what these two types of ego states mean. In this chapter, I discuss these concepts at greater length as they are the foundation of this dissertation. Explaining these two terms helps better understand my proposed stance on analyzing recognition through the natural self. To elaborate the concept of self as conditioned, I will illustrate the notion of conditioning in animals using Ivan Pavlov’s experiments. Pavlov discussed conditioned stimuli and responses in his learning theory of classical conditioning. His experiments with dogs and his discussion on the conditioned and unconditioned reflexes and reactions in them help us get a better grasp of the concept of conditioning. Illustrating a personal experience at an early age of my schooling, I will describe how my teacher’s critical and controlling comments about my hair style made my sense of self in regards to my hair become conditioned.

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Conditioning occurs due to the critical, judgmental, or punitive dialogues that an authority figure establishes with a child. Due to the important role dialogues play in either nurturing or conditioning the self, I will discuss the notion of dialogues more specifically and more rigorously at the end of this chapter. I take all different verbal and non-verbal transactions that occur between the parent or an authority figure and the child as dialogues and propose an alternative conception of dialogues that addresses the self. To further my discussion, I categorize dialogues into controlling and nurturing and describe them through the lens of Transactional Analysis.

Self: The Natural Self

When a baby is born, it is a natural Child with a natural self. Harris (1969) describes a natural Child as a creative, curious child with the desire to explore the surrounding world, the urges to touch and feel, and the recordings of wonderful feelings of first discoveries. In the natural Child are recorded:

… the countless, grand a-ha experiences, the firsts in the life of the small person, the first drinking from the garden hose, the first stroking of the soft kitten, the first sure hold on mother’s nipple, the first time the lights go on in response to his flicking the switch, the first submarine chase of the bar soap, the repetitious going back to do these glorious things again and again (p.29).

Harris argues that, as the above discoveries and experiences are recorded in the natural Child, the feelings of these delights are stored, too. Therefore, a natural Child is a carefree child with all the happy feelings recorded. Similarly, James & Jongeward (1971,
p.140) state that there is a natural Child within each person equal to what a baby would be “naturally”. By nature, a natural Child is affectionate, impulsive, sensuous, uncensored, and curious. A baby is affectionate as it responds to skin-to-skin touch with its mother or when its belly is full. As a baby cries when it is hungry or wet and coons when it is full and comfortable, it is impulsive and spontaneous. A natural Child is unashamedly sensuous and seeks pleasure over pain. It likes the pleasurable feelings of rolling on a rug, splashing the water, or warming in the sun. Moreover, a natural Child or a baby is uncensored about its body and is delighted when explores its body and discovers something. Finally a baby is curious about the world around it and likes to experience it, often by trying to taste things.

The above descriptions of a natural Child are based on Berne’s ideas. As I briefly explained in the previous chapter, in his very first book of Transactional Analysis, Berne (1961, p. 78) defines a natural Child as a Child that is manifested by autonomous forms of behaviour. In “Games People Play”, he describes the autonomous forms of behaviour, and states that an autonomous person demonstrates the release or recovery of three capacities. These capacities are awareness, spontaneity, and intimacy (1964, p. 178). Berne describes awareness as follows:

Awareness means the capacity to see a coffeepot and hear the birds sing in one’s own way, and not the way one was taught. It may be assumed on good grounds that seeing and hearing have a different quality for infants than for grownups, and that they are more esthetic and less intellectual in the first years of life. A little boy sees and hears birds with delight. Then the “good father” comes along and
feels he should “share” the experience and help his son “develop.” He says: “that’s a jay, and this is a sparrow.” The moment the little boy is concerned with which is a jay and which is a sparrow, he can no longer see the birds or hear them sing. He has to see and hear them the way his father wants him to. … The recovery of this ability is called here “awareness” (p. 178).

Berne’s wonderful illustration of awareness shows that awareness is about living in the here and now. A baby lives in the moment and is aware of where he is. He listens to the messages of his body and knows how he feels. He is aware of his natural needs—the needs to be fed and loved—and pursues them. He lives in the here and now until his good father, as Berne says, feels like sharing his experience with the baby. This is the moment when the natural self of the baby starts to become adapted or conditioned. The baby continues recording the messages, behaviours, and attitudes of his parents or other significant authority figures as he grows up. The adaptation keeps him away from his awareness and he thereafter perceives the world through the ways he was “taught” to see it. He can take his autonomy and natural Child back when he recovers his capacity for awareness.

The second capacity mentioned by Berne is spontaneity. A natural Child is spontaneous or impulsive. As described above, babies respond impulsively to their bodily feelings such as their hunger or thirst. They react spontaneously to changes in their situation. However, as they grow up, they lose this capacity. They become adapted to follow others’ behaviours and feelings. The adaptation to Parental influence and the intervention of games spoil the natural Child. To attain autonomy and recover the
capacity for spontaneity, Berne recommends embracing liberation: “liberation from the compulsion to play games and have only the feelings one was taught to have” (p. 180). Such liberation is a path to the natural Child or natural self within each person.

The last capacity that Berne mentions for an autonomous person is intimacy. Berne takes intimacy as a function of the natural Child. As Berne asserts, babies are loving and intimate in nature. However, when they become adapted the greater part of their social intercourse takes the form of games rather than intimacy (1964, pp. 180-181). James & Jongeward (1971) also define intimacy as the potential that each person has, albeit in rare moments, to be free of games and free of exploitation. In those rare moments of intimacy, the person experiences feelings of tenderness, empathy, and affection (p. 64). An infant or the natural Child inside him experiences intimacy “in the everyday transactions of diapering, feeding, burping, powdering, fondling, and caressing” with his nurturing parents (p. 47). If the capacity for intimacy is suppressed in early life experiences, the baby’s natural Child is interfered and so his autonomy is taken away. All the capacities for awareness, spontaneity, and intimacy can be recovered through psychoanalysis or some other sort of introspection.

Self: The Conditioned Self

As explained above, a baby with a natural self is aware, spontaneous, and intimate. He is impulsive, expressive, curious and untrained. While growing up with nurturing parents, the baby keeps these capacities and functions and stays natural. However, the baby’s natural self is usually interfered with by the baby’s parents and
surroundings and becomes adapted or conditioned. Goulding & Goulding (1979) nicely illustrate these two types of the Child and write:

The growing child makes decisions based on his own needs and wants. He also makes decisions based on his perception of what others want him to decide. For instance, if he is stroked positively for going to the potty and/or negatively for wetting his pants, he will learn to use the potty in order to please others. If he learns to use the potty simply because he doesn’t like the feeling of wet pants, then he is toilet training himself in response to his own desires (p. 18).

The adaptive or conditioned child decides to go along with parental messages rather than his own desires and needs. James & Jongeward (1971, pp. 119-120) explain that controlling or prejudicial parents or other significant authority figures fill the child with their own desires, opinions about religion, politics, traditions, sexual role expectations, life styles, proper dress and speech, and the like and make the child overrule his natural Child early in life. These opinions are recorded in the Parent part of the child without being evaluated by his Adult yet. Just like a lion in a circus that is trained to behave in specific ways, a child with prejudicial parents can also be trained to behave and talk in certain ways as those authority figures wish. After being told and criticized by his parents what is right or wrong, or how things should be done, the baby forgets his natural self, instead learns to adapt himself to the demands from significant authority figures. James & Jongeward (1971) explain the adaptation as follows:
Immediately after birth, an infant begins to adapt to the demands of outside authority, doing this out of a will to survive and need for approval and/or the anxiety of fear. Born without a sense of what is right or wrong, a child’s first sense of conscience develops very slowly from interaction with the environment, particularly with parent figures. Smiling and flattering responses from parent figures convey to the child the idea of approval for doing what is right. Cold or angry parental responses convey a sense of punishment and pain for wrong-doing. Young children usually learn what they ought to do by being praised or punished. They figure out … how to avoid pain and how to get approval. They adapt, in some way, to the “oughts” (p. 157).

Conditions as how to be, or how to do things, as well as adaptations to the “oughts”, result in what Berne calls the adapted or conditioned Child. The adapted Child with an adapted or conditioned self finds himself OK if he follows the image that he has in his Parent part—an image that is formed by his parents or other authority figures in his life. Following that image means he is following the wishes, likes or dislikes, values, and feelings of those people rather than his own. While a natural Child feels he and others are OK, an adapted or conditioned child thinks he is OK if he pleases others/works hard/ is strong/is polite, etc. Thus, as Berne (1963, p. 187) says, a natural child is free from the Parental influence, though a conditioned or adapted child is under such influence.
Recognition through the Natural Self

My new way of looking at recognition through the natural self is about *nurturing* the natural self. In the previous chapter, I explained that nurturing the natural self starts very early in childhood. To grow fully, since birth, both biological and psychological needs of a child ought to be recognized by his nurturing parents and other authority figures in his life. Beyond appeasing his physical and psychological needs, the child’s autonomy and his capacities of awareness, spontaneity, and intimacy ought to be supported as well. A child whose sense of self is still natural or unconditioned exhibits these three capacities. In addition, his natural abilities to feel for himself, to be affectionate, curious, impulsive, and expressive have not been inhibited but have been recognized by his nurturing parents. While this explains the recognition or nurturance of the natural self, one may still ask a question of ‘how’—how to support the capacities of autonomy or how to keep the child’s natural abilities to feel for himself.

I address this question through the role of parents or other authority figures in providing the child with the right environment. While I already explained the change of a natural self into an adapted or conditioned self through the demands or conditions (such as *ifs*) of controlling or prejudicial parents or authority figures, I elaborate this question here through an example of an orange plant. I will argue that nurturing the natural self is possible through creating the right environment for the natural child where the child is given the right food at the right time, and is loved *unconditionally* by both (nurturing) parents, while the parents love each other too. Before describing such an environment, I first give the example to make my point about the importance of the right environment in a child’s growth.
Example of the Right Environment

In Iran, my homeland, oranges grow in the northern part of the country because of the cool climate. Oranges, or any other kind of citrus fruits, are produced there very well. They get ripe and their skin develops a yellow color in cool weather. This weather and the soil in the north of Iran provide the right environment for an orange seed to grow and give ripe yellow oranges. Now if the orange plant is brought to a different part of Iran with a different climate, such as in Tehran, and is planted in a flower pot rather than in the ground, the plant will grow only a little and never give any oranges. Even if it does, the oranges will be green and unripe. An orange seed will only grow fully and become a mature orange tree if it is planted in the right weather and in the right soil. This is what the natural self of an orange seed needs. Along with the right weather, the seed also needs a caring gardener to look after it. Taking care of the plant means providing the right environment and food for the plant. While doing this, the gardener does not place any conditions on the seed or plant in order to water it or enrich its soil, but looks after it unconditionally. If such a nurturing environment is provided for the orange seed, it turns into a big, laden orange tree. It does this because the seed has the potential to grow and be an orange tree. This is its nature.

This process is similar in human beings. The natural child with a natural self has the potential to grow and be who he is. What he needs is the right environment where he is given the right food at the right time, and nurturing parents or caregivers who love him unconditionally. If such an environment is not provided for him, the child adapts himself
to the new conditions that are not congruent with his nature. In regard to food, James and Jongeward (1971) describe this adaptation as follows:

A child is naturally programmed to eat when hungry. Shortly after birth, however, this natural urge may be adapted, so that the child’s eating schedule is determined by the child’s parents. A child would also do and take what’s wanted naturally, on impulse, but may be adapted to share and to be courteous toward others in ways also determined by parents (p. 140).

Since the child is small and dependant, he needs his parents to give him the right food when he is hungry. In addition, the child needs his parents’ love to appease his emotional and psychological needs. He wants his parents to love him while they themselves have a loving, harmonious relationship with each other, too. This is shown in the following diagram (Figure 1). Since there is usually more than one person involved in taking care of the child, the right environment means that the parents or caregivers have a good relationship with each other as well as with their child\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{14} I am considering an ideal situation here in which both parents live together and provide their child with a nurturing environment. A child who grows up with both parents forms his Parent ego state according to his both parental figures. However, a child who is raised in a single parent home forms his Parent based on the feelings and behaviours of one parent. In the latter case, there will only be two circles in Figure 1: one at the top which is the Parent and one below it which is the Child.
Figure 1: Unconditional love relationship between parents as well as parents and the child.

All the recordings are in the Parent part of the child. As Harris (1969, p. 23) states, the child’s recording is like the recording of stereophonic sound. The relationship between the child’s two parents needs to be harmonious so that the child thinks of himself as being OK. Harris writes:

There are two sound tracks that, if harmonious, produce a beautiful effect when played together. If they are not harmonious, the effect is unpleasant and the recording is put aside and played very little, if at all. This is what happens when the Parent contains discordant material. The Parent is repressed or, in the extreme, blocked out altogether. Mother may have been a “good” mother and father may have been “bad”, or vice versa. There is much useful data which is stored as a result of the transmission of good material from one parent; but since the Parent does contain material from the other parent that is contradictory and productive of anxiety, the Parent as a whole is weakened or fragmented. Parent data that is
discordant is not allowed to come on “audibly” as a strong influence in the person’s life (pp. 23-24).

It is not usually the case that both the parent-parent relationship and the parent-child relationship are loving and harmonious. This is because of the constant demand from the environment and parents that lead the child to give up his natural satisfaction for parental approval. If a child is recognized or stroked conditionally for his doing, as opposed to his being, if he is approved or given a smile because he goes to the potty, he eats when his parents want him to, or because he behaves the way that his parents or other authority figures wish to, he gradually forgets his natural way of being. This child, as he grows up, plays games in order to get recognition, though this recognition is not a natural, genuine recognition.

Struggle for Recognition through Playing “Games”

The term “game” was used by Berne in his first book on TA, “Transactional Analysis in Psychotherapy” (1961), and then became popular with his “Games People Play” (1964). Games have different types and include many discussions, but for the purpose of my discussion here, I focus on a description of the term “game” and the reason why people play games; that is, where the origin of game playing that ruins people’s intimate lives is rooted. Berne (1964) describes games as a series of transactions that are “habitual, dysfunctional methods of obtaining strokes” (p. IX). More specifically, he defines a game as follows:
A GAME is an ongoing series of complementary ulterior transactions progressing to a well-defined, predictable outcome. Descriptively it is a recurring set of transactions, often repetitious, superficially plausible, with a concealed motivation; or, more colloquially, a series of moves with a snare, or “gimmick” (p.48).

Psychological games are similar to games like monopoly or bridge that people play at social gatherings. They have rules and a concluding payoff. However, unlike social gathering games, psychological games have ulterior messages. As stated above, games are a series of transactions that carry ulterior or hidden purposes. That is, there is an outcome planned and there are actions performed to achieve that outcome; however, the actions are double sided since they have an outside look as well as an inside or ulterior message. The appearance or exterior look of actions is different from the hidden or underlying message inside those actions. That is why they prevent honest and open relationships between the players. Berne (1964, pp. 180-181) says that beyond games lies intimacy. Intimacy is a function of the natural Child. Only people who are free from games or destructive scripts and are still close to their natural Child experience intimacy.

The games are part of the “script”. In the previous chapter I briefly suggested that the script is the life plan that the child writes based on his early decisions and positions taken by him. James & Jongeward (1971) diagram this whole process as follows (pp. 39-42):

Experiences → Decisions → Psychological Positions → Script Reinforcing Behaviour
Games are played because they are part of the childhood decisions that are continually reinforced. Games have roots in the not-OK self and their payoff or outcome is always the feeling of not-OK. Harris (1967) believes that all games are played to bring a *momentary relief* to this painful feeling of not-OK and the unjust state of “I’m not-OK” and “You’re OK”. “I’m not-OK—You’re OK” is one of the four possible life positions that Harris explains in his book *I’m OK- You’re OK*. Using Transactional Analysis, Harris proposes these four positions held with respect to oneself and others\(^\text{15}\): 1. I’m not OK—You’re OK; 2. I’m not OK—You’re not OK; 3. I’m OK—You’re not OK; 4. I’m OK—You’re OK. He says that, based on the experiences of the first years of life, the child concludes whether he and others are OK or not OK and so he decides his life script. Unfortunately, as Harris states, the most common position shared by many people is not the last position, but is the first position “I’m not OK—You’re OK” (p. 54). This position persists for most people throughout life.

In this dissertation, I focus only on the position “I’m not OK—You’re OK” to make my arguments about recognizing the natural self. This is because of the commonality of this position as well as its congruence with the main theme of my discussion on recognition, which addresses recognizing a self that is OK or natural, as opposed to a self that is not-OK or conditioned. Using the position “I’m not OK—You’re OK”, I explain what it means to struggle for recognition—a type of recognition that is about a not-OK or conditioned self rather than an OK, natural self. To make my argument, I use Harris’s wonderful description on how to deal with this position, as well as Berne’s ideas on games.

\(^\text{15}\) Chapter 3, *The Four Life Positions*
I’m Not OK—You’re OK

The most common way of dealing with the painful feeling of not-OK is through playing games. People holding the position of not-OK feel protected from the pain growing from the not-OK position when they play games (Harris, 1969, p. 124). As I pointed out before, the feeling of “I’m not OK” is created very early in one’s life through verbal and non-verbal communications between the parent or an authority figure and the child. Harris (p. 54) discusses that a child who thinks of himself as being not-OK is willing to do anything to soothe this painful and gain recognition or strokes he desires even though they are unnatural. Doing things for adults and pleasing them as well as accumulating things such as having more toys or more ice cream, for example, all provide a stroke and temporary relief to the child. Many children even use the alternative approach of becoming aggressive towards kids of their size—two feet tall— or sometimes pets, and get momentary relief. Laughing at their sister’s or brother’s mistakes or beating them up, kicking the cat, or pushing to get first in line all show how much a child who is feeling not-OK needs to feel OK and struggles for that.

Similarly, Berne (1972, p. 156) explains that all games have their origin in the child’s feeling of “I’m not-OK”. He says that during early infancy the child’s feeling about himself and others is OK, that is, he starts off in the position of “I’m OK—You’re OK”. However, corruption quickly sets in and the child discovers that his OK-ness relies to some extent on his behaviour, more particularly, as Berne believes, on his responses to his mother; it is not a complete, undisputed, automatic birthright any more. Explaining how a child learns game-playing, Berne writes:
In the course of learning his table manners, he [the child] may discover that his feeling of unblemished O.K.-ness is granted by her only with certain reservations, and this is wounding. He responds by casting aspersions on her O.K.-ness, although when dinner is over they may kiss and make up. But the groundwork has already been laid for game-playing, which begins to flower during his toilet training, where he has the upper hand. During mealtimes he is hungry, and wants something from her; in the bathroom, she wants something from him. At the table, he has to respond to her in a certain way to keep his O.K. grade; now she has to treat him right to keep her O.K. In rare cases both of them may still be straight, but usually by this time she is conning him by working his gimmicks just a little, and he is doing the same (1972, p. 156).

Berne says that at home, while the child learns a few games, he understands that the final result of his game is usually the opposite of what he had originally planned to achieve. For instance, for the behaviours of a child that were mentioned before by Harris (pleasing others or accumulating things such as toys), what is down the road is the opposite of what the child had wished to achieve in the first place—a permanent feeling of being OK. In contrast, he sees there is another trouble waiting for him that brings back the initial feeling of not-OK. Finding someone who has more toys or bigger ice creams, being punished by his mother or father for laughing at or beating up his sister or brother, being clawed by the cat, and getting a sour look from his mother or father after even trying to please them, all show the opposite result of the initial plan. While the child struggles to get (unnatural) recognition from others and feel OK, the feeling of not-OK comes back and he once again concludes “I’m not-OK, You’re OK”.
Playing games continues as a child grows up. Harris (1964) states that adults achieve temporary relief by compliance or accumulating possessions. A person who is willing and compliant to the demands of others finds himself committed to a lifetime mountain climbing to gain approval and feel OK about himself. However, after each mountain, there is another mountain for him to climb. This struggle for recognition is because the not-OK or misrecognized self writes the script and starts the game which leads him to return to the same outcome; he will always say “No matter what I do, I’m still NOT OK” (p. 48). This is similar for a person who wants to feel OK by accumulating possessions such as living in a bigger house than other families or having a bigger car. Harris asserts that there may be a disaster waiting for this person down the road, such as an oppressive mortgage or consumptive bills which lead the person to his original feeling of “I’m not-OK” (p. 55).

As a result, games are played as part of childhood decisions and scripts. As long as the person deals with a not-OK or misrecognized self, he returns to the conclusion “I’m not-OK” no matter what he does. First at home and then in grade school, the child practices his games and gains strokes or (unnatural) recognition to feel good about himself. As long as the underlying feeling of not-OK-ness exists, the child continues his game playing, and his struggle for (unnatural) recognition continues as well. This shows the significance of taking care of a child’s natural self before it gets misrecognized or not-OK, as well as nurturing it at home and in early years of schooling. The importance of recognition during the early years of schooling is discussed at greater length below, through a personal example.
Educational Significance of Recognition Through the Natural Self

The natural self usually changes into an adapted or conditioned self in the first years of life. Emphasizing the early years of life in a child’s development, James & Jongeward (1971) state that a child becomes adapted and takes his life position—the four life positions—by age eight. They write:

Before children are eight years old they develop a concept about their own worth. They also formulate ideas about the worth of others. They crystallize their experiences and decide what it all means to them, what parts they are going to play, and how they are going to play them. These are children’s days of decision (p. 36).

Therefore, the decisions that children make in the first years of life play an important role in the games they play and the scripts they write through their life. James & Jongeward illustrate a counselling case in which a child called Fred had decided to be stupid and not-OK once his mother, and then his teachers, had called him stupid. James & Jongeward explain:

… Fred learned that early in life he had taken the position, “I’m stupid. I am not-OK.” He thought of himself as a failure and acted out the role. Though he did poorly, Fred remained in school, played the same of Stupid, and evoked negative comments, low grades, and nagging from his teachers. This reinforced his basic psychological position (p. 42).
Unlike James and Jongeward who believe in the child’s adaptation by age eight, Harris (1964) says that the Child and Parent stop recording when a child is five years old. He writes:

I believe by the time the child leaves the home for his first independent social experience—school—he has been exposed to nearly every possible attitude and admonition of his parents, and thenceforth further parental communications are essentially a reinforcement of what has already been recorded. … As to further recordings in the Child, it is hard to imagine that any emotion exists which has not already been felt in its most intense from by the time the youngster is five years old. This is consistent with most psychoanalytic theory, and, in my own observation, is true (p. 30).

To Harris, the child’s self is usually adapted or conditioned in one way or another before entering school. However, more conditioning or not-OK feelings can occur at the early ages of schooling. As explained earlier, the child whose self is misrecognized at home learns a few games. When he enters school, he has a chance to try out the games he has learned at home on other children and teachers and reinforce his life position. In school, the child may sharpen some up or tone others down. He also has a chance to test out his life position. Berne (1972) explains:

If he thinks he is O.K., his teacher can confirm this or shake him up by putting him down, and if he is convinced he is not-O.K., she can confirm that (which is only what he expects) or try to build him up (which may make him uneasy). If he
thinks the rest of the world is O.K., he will include her unless she has to prove she isn’t. If he is convinced others are not-O.K., he will try to prove it by getting her angry (p. 157).

Berne says later childhood is the period that determines which games from the private sphere become fixed favorites and which ones, if any, are given up. The most important question to Berne is: “How did your teachers get along with you at school?” and next to that, “How did the other kids get along with you at school?” (p.158). If they are nurturing, the games can be given up. Otherwise, they will be fixed. The teachers are important to Berne as they can play the role of parents in the public place of school. That is, a child sees his teacher the way he sees his parents or other important people in his life. Just like his parents, the teacher is big to the two-or three-foot tall child. To gain (unnatural) recognition or strokes, the child is willing to play any game he can—whether it is accumulating things, struggling for higher grades, or even becoming aggressive towards other students of his size. Berne asserts that a child tries different games to see which ones the teacher falls for and he sharpens his skill. He may give up the ones his teacher declines or has an antithesis for; though, he also tries them out on other kids. To deal with a child who thinks “I’m not OK—You’re not OK”, Berne suggests:

… if the teacher keeps her cool and strokes Jeder [the child’s name] with judicious words, neither marshmallows, rebukes, nor apologies, she may loosen his grip on the harsh rock of futility and float him part way up toward the sunshine of O.K.-ness (p. 158).
A teacher can affect the child’s sense of self and either reinforce it—whether it is natural or adapted—and make it stronger, or change it from adapted to the natural or vice-versa. Depending on what type of dialogues a teacher establishes with a child, whether they are nurturing or controlling, the child concludes whether he and others are OK or not and get affirmation for his conclusion throughout school years. To show the importance of recognizing a child’s natural self in educational contexts, I give a personal example here and describe the educational significance of recognition through the natural self.

**Example:** When I was in grade one, there was a rule in our school for girls with long hair to have their hair pulled back. As a six-year-old child, I liked to let my hair down and I used to go to school with my hair down for some time. But my teacher did not like me disobeying the rule, so after a few times raising her voice with me asking me to pull my hair back, she asked me to bring my sister who was one year older than me. She then told my sister that I would not be allowed to enter the classroom if I had my hair down. I remember the next day I cried so much as my mother, following the school’s rule, was pulling back my hair. For some time, this was happening every morning before I went to school. However, after some time, the power of authority and my teacher’s control affected me so much that I always had my hair pulled back from that day no matter how much I did not like it. Since then, the happy, free girl who was perfectly comfortable with having her hair down, and looking the way she wanted and liked, became increasingly uncomfortable with her hair and have her down.
For many years, I wore my hair pulled back without knowing why. No matter how many times I was told that I looked good with my hair down, I still felt more comfortable having a pony tail. Even though there was no longer any anger and no authority figure around me, having my hair down brought back, unconsciously, the same feelings of fear, guilt, and being not O.K. that I had experienced on that day. To get confirmation and strokes from my teacher as an authority figure, I learned to forget my own feelings and instead tried to please another by behaving in a certain way. With that event, I became fixated on the way I had my hair. Thereafter, I internalized the image of my teacher and the need to please her in order to make sense of who I was, even though she was not around anymore. In my psyche, I thought I had this need to get her approval.

My natural self was misrecognized on that day because of the controlling or judgemental dialogues my teacher had with me. I recorded that dialogue with all the associated feelings, i.e., the way she looked at me, her anger, and her gestures, in my Parent part since she was a significant authority figure to me at that age. The feelings I experienced such as fear and guilt were recorded in my Child part. The game I learned to play was *complying*. I learned to be compliant to the demands of authority figures. Every time I wanted to have my hair down, my Parent part would tell me there was a rule which I had to obey. My Child part would also bring feelings of fear and guilt. To avoid experiencing the feelings of fear and guilt, or in general not-OK-ness, my Adult part would tell me to listen to my Parent and so I would have pulled my hair back. This position of “I’m not OK” in regard to my hair became my life position and was reinforced throughout my life. It was during my psychoanalytical practices that I
analyzed my Parent and Child parts, played back the record of that day, and changed what I had learned conditionally in relation to my hair.

Knowing the harm a controlling dialogue can have on a child and the effect of unrealistic decisions that a child makes about his self, imposes a significant responsibility on both parents and teachers, or other significant authority figures, to recognize and protect the natural self of children. Just like the little girl in my earlier example who did not have a concept of feeling guilty, nor a desire to please others before her self becomes conditioned or adapted, children have no such concepts at the beginning of their lives. It is the controlling, judgemental situations that change a child with beautiful natural characteristics and self into an unnatural conditioned self.

Because of the importance of recognizing the natural self and the ways it becomes conditioned or adapted, I illustrate here the process of conditioning in animals since it is similar to conditioning in human beings. Ivan Pavlov discussed the conditioned and unconditioned reflexes and reactions in animals and discovered conditioned behaviours in animals. Below, I discuss Pavlov’s learning theory of classical conditioning since his experiments with dogs help us better understand the concept of conditioning. I will then explain how my personal experience of conditioning in grade one is similar to what Pavlov explains about conditioning in dogs.

**Pavlov’s Classical Conditioning**

Around the turn of the century, the Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) demonstrated an experiment of conditioning that led to the creation of the first modern
cognitive learning theory. Pavlov’s classical conditioning (1927) involved animals, particularly dogs. In classical conditioning, a stimulus acquires the capacity to produce a response that was originally produced by another stimulus. In Pavlov’s experiments, the salivatory conditioning of dogs is very well-known. In his experiments on conditioning, he chose food as a stimulus. Pavlov writes:

… if the intake of food by the animal takes place simultaneously with the action of a neutral stimulus which has been hitherto in no way related to food, the neutral stimulus readily acquires the property of eliciting the same reaction in the animal as would food itself. This was the case with the dog employed in our metronome. On several occasions this animal had been stimulated by the sound of the metronome and immediately presented with food—i.e. a stimulus which was neutral of itself had been superimposed upon the action of the inborn alimentary reflex. We observed that, after several repetitions of the combined stimulation, the sounds from the metronome had acquired the property of stimulating salivary secretion and of evoking the motor reactions characteristic of the alimentary reflex (p. 26).

Pavlov’s experiments show that when two things that are naturally connected are paired with a neutral thing, the neutral thing has the power to elicit the old response that those two things had produced naturally. To describe this in Pavlov’s terms, in classical conditioning, a neutral stimulus is presented to the subject simultaneously with a stimulus that is of significance, called the conditioned stimulus. Naturally, presenting the significant stimulus elicits an innate, often reflexive response, called unconditioned
stimulus and unconditioned response. If the conditioned stimulus is paired with the unconditioned stimulus and is repeated, they become associated with each other and produce the same response. This is called a conditioned response.

A dog’s natural, uncontrolled, and unlearned behaviour in relation to seeing food is salivation (unconditioned response). This is the natural response of a natural self. After conditioning the dog’s self, the dog learns to associate the sound to the food and so to salivate (conditioned response). Pavlov’s example explains that classical conditioning has the power to make animals learn to feel or respond to the conditioned stimulus the same way as the natural situation. The important point to remember in Pavlov’s classical conditioning is the creation of a relationship by association.

Conditioning in animals is similar to conditioning in human beings. Conditioning can affect humans’ natural self because it involves our feelings. While this kind of conditioning can be done easily and quickly, the result can be severe and lasting especially when the emotion is intense. In the example provided above from my own childhood, I was wearing a pony tail out of fear of the consequences. The conditioning was deep and strong. My teacher’s anger was a stimulus of significance that elicited the feeling of fear in me. My fear was the response produced. My hair was the neutral stimulus. Since these two stimuli happened simultaneously, I associated hair with fear and so even years later, I unconsciously wanted to pull my hair back (Table 1). I used to think that having a pony tail was what I liked. However, I realized that it was my conditioned self that liked the pony tail! Luckily, through my psychoanalysis practices, I remembered that unpleasant experience and I changed my conditioned self.
In Table 1 below, I have shown Pavlov’s conditioning in comparison with human conditioning. I have demonstrated that both in Pavlov’s dogs and in human beings, when the self is natural, the response is natural. The dog salivates when there is food, and the girl is frightened when the teacher is angry. Therefore, there is a natural/unconditioned response to a natural stimulus. However, when there is control over the natural stimulus, that is, the food is offered to the dog under certain conditions, or the teacher’s anger is connected to some conditions having to do with the girl’s hair, the responses become conditioned and unnatural. The dog and the girl both internalize the conditions and so they produce the same response even if there is no natural stimulus. That is, the dog salivates even if there is no food and the girl is frightened even if there is no teacher’s anger.
Pavlov’s Conditioning in Dogs | My Conditioning in Grade 1
---|---
The Natural Self | 
Food ➔ Salivation | My teacher’s anger ➔ fear |
*Unconditional Stimulus ➔* | *Unconditional Stimulus ➔*
*Unconditioned Response* | *Unconditioned Response*
A dog sees his food and salivates. | I see my teacher’s anger and I get afraid. An unconditioned response.
An unconditioned response. |
A bell is rung at the same time that a dog sees his food and salivates. | I see my teacher’s anger at the same time as she criticizes my hair for not being pulled back. |
This is repeated several times. | This is repeated for several days. |
A bell is rung without the food and the dog salivates. | My hair is down while there is no teacher’s anger, and I am afraid. |
The Conditioned /Fixated Self | 
Bell ➔ Salivation | My hair down ➔ fear |
*Conditioned Stimulus ➔* | *Conditioned Stimulus ➔*
*Conditioned Response* | *Conditioned Response*

Table 1: *Comparing Pavlov’s conditioning with human conditioning*

It is important to note that in conditioning—whether conscious or unconscious—training is involved. In Pavlov’s experiments with dogs, it is the training of the brain that makes the dog salivate by hearing the bell. As a result of training, the dogs *learned* to rely on their sense of hearing instead of their sense of smell during the experiments. They
were trained to *forget* their natural self and become conditioned. The dogs learned to respond to something that is not *real* or natural. This is the same with human beings. The natural self can be conditioned so that it responds to a neutral or unreal stimulus as if it were the natural stimulus. Responding to the neutral stimulus occurs as a result of the training that the self has received throughout its life. The training makes us become accustomed to a specific behaviour or way of thinking which we will never question because we *think* that behaviour is real. We do not realize that it is an illusion of the real behaviour.

In her book *“New Ways in Psychoanalysis”*, Karen Horney (1939) describes the interference of controlling conditions in producing disturbances in the child’s feeling for self. She lists the following influences for bringing about (a complete) suppression of the spontaneous individual self:

… the unquestioned authority of righteous parents, creating a situation in which the child feels compelled to adopt their standards for the sake of peace; the attitudes of self-sacrificing parents who elicit the feeling from the child that he has no rights of his own and should live only for the parents’ sake; parents who transfer their own ambitions to the child and regard the boy as an embryonic genius or the girl as a princess, thereby developing in the child the feeling that he is loved for imaginary qualities rather than for his true self. All these influences, varied as they are, make the child feel that in order to be liked or accepted he must be as others expect him to be. The parents have so thoroughly superimposed themselves on the mind of the child that he complies through fear, thus gradually
losing what James\textsuperscript{16} calls the “real me”. His own will, his own wishes, his own feelings, his own likes and dislikes, his own grievances, become paralyzed. Therefore he gradually loses the capacity to measure his own values (p.91).

As Horney notes, powerful attitudes, unquestioned authority, or a general controlling condition can make a child forget about his own real self and feelings. Just like Pavlov’s dog that was not hungry but salivated because of the presence of the mechanical ring, a natural child can forget his natural self and do things for others because of the presence of power and controlling dialogues. While controlling dialogues can change a natural self into a conditioned self, nurturing dialogues can fulfil a natural self and help it flourish. It is this latter type of dialogue that I encourage be attended to in educational contexts.

**Dialogue and the Unconditioned Self**

So far, I have used the term “dialogue” generally in relation to conditioning the self, that is, dialogues that are established to control or be critical of a child. I have said that such dialogues can make the child take unrealistic decisions about his self and conclude that he is not-OK. Now I would like to examine the notion of dialogue more specifically and more rigorously. To do that, I first examine different forms and goals that dialogues can have in teaching and their educational purposes through Burbules’s categorization of dialogues in educational settings. While Burbules’s conception of educational dialogue is a useful model, I see its focus as limited to pedagogical possibilities of dialogue. Thus, I will move away from Burbules’s model and propose a

\textsuperscript{16}William James, “Talk to Teachers”, cited in New Ways in Psychoanalysis by Horney (1939).
different version of dialogue. My categorization of dialogue addresses the concept of self and focuses on the important role of dialogue in either changing the natural self into a conditioned self or in keeping it unconditioned. I will call the former “controlling dialogues” and the latter “nurturing dialogues”. For the controlling dialogues, I will propose different subcategories which I will explain as I develop my discussion on dialogue.

Nicholas Burbules has written about different types of dialogues in educational settings. His focus has been on the pedagogical possibilities of dialogue and its educational purposes. In his book, *Dialogue in Teaching, Theory and Practice*, Burbules (1993) examines dialogue and the many forms it takes in educational contexts. He sees dialogue as free exchange of ideas between equals who are engaged emotionally and cognitively. In chapter six of his book, he suggests four types of dialogue: dialogue as conversation, dialogue as inquiry, dialogue as debate, and dialogue as instruction. On the conception of dialogue and its relation to knowledge, Burbules takes two distinct views on dialogue. One is a *convergent* and the other a *divergent* view of dialogue. The convergent view assumes that “the various positions of the interlocutors are, at least in principle, resolvable into a consensus around a correct answer” (p. 110). In turn, the divergent view looks at the “internal dialogization” of language, saying that plural meanings, complex and ambiguous connotations, and the myriad associations speakers have for the terms they use, often put their utterances at cross-purposes, multiplying possible interpretations rather than narrowing them
toward a single correct one (p. 111, citing Daelemans & Maranhao, 1990; Fraser, 1989).

The other distinction Burbules makes is about two different attitudes toward one’s partner in dialogue. One can have an inclusive orientation toward one’s partner. One “is to understand what has led the other person to his or her position: what beliefs, feelings, or experiences underlie the position and give it veracity, at least in the mind of the speaker” (p. 111). Alternatively, one’s orientation can be critical toward one’s partner in dialogue. This attitude is “more sceptical, questioning; it emphasizes a judgment about the objective accuracy of the partner’s position, and does not hesitate to test it against evidence, consistency, and logic” (p. 111).

Based on a two-by-two grid, Burbules proposes four pairs of combinations/dialogue as follows (p. 112):

- Inclusive-divergent Dialogue as conversation
- Inclusive-convergent Dialogue as inquiry
- Critical-divergent Dialogue as debate
- Critical-convergent Dialogue as instruction

*Dialogue as conversation* focuses on intersubjective understanding rather than going toward one specific direction, answer, or conclusion. The inclusive nature of this type of dialogue leads to divergent points of view, but different views are considered and discussed. An inclusive-convergent dialogue or *dialogue as inquiry* aims at answering a specific question or problem. It involves different ways of addressing a problem such as
investigating the problem and having disagreements, or formulating a compromise in order to come to a solution that is agreeable to the members. *Dialogue as debate* involves a critical-divergent scenario. It has a sceptical spirit, with less aim to find common answers or reaching agreement, but is more about having different points of view, using challenging questions, and encouraging critical thinking. Finally, *dialogue as instruction* uses questions and has a particular direction. It is an intentional process in which the instructor’s query leads to specific conclusion and certain answers.

Through these four types of dialogue, Burbules shows us that dialogue can have different forms and goals in teaching and serve different educational purposes. For example, a skilful teacher can use these different forms of dialogue, switch from one approach to another creatively and flexibly. He emphasizes the *flexibility* and *pluralism* in the dialogical approach that a teacher needs to consider when teaching different students, in different situations, and for different subject matters. For this reason, Burbules is reluctant to call dialogue a “method”. Whereas a method is directive and fixed, dialogue is more flexible and open-ended.

Burbules’s categorization of the four types of dialogue is a very good model to be used in classrooms by teachers. It is focused on the pedagogical possibilities of dialogue and its educational purposes. Having said this, his model does not serve my purpose in addressing the concept of self in dialogue and the important role that dialogue can have in either nurturing or changing the self. Therefore, in the following discussion, I propose a different categorization for dialogue that focuses on dialogues as being nurturing or
controlling. This categorization shows the important role dialogue could play in either nurturing the natural self or changing it into a conditioned self.

**An Alternative Conception of Dialogue: Controlling Dialogues vs. Nurturing Dialogues**

Dialogues include not only words and verbal transactions, but also non-verbal communications such as tone of voice, facial expression, body language, or any social and cultural signs, activities, or sayings. In regard to my discussion on dialogues that parents or other authority figures establish with a child, I use Harris’s description of parental recording which includes all the admonitions and rules and laws that a child hears from his parents and sees in their living. Harris (1969) writes:

They [the recordings] range all the way from the earliest parental communications, interpreted nonverbally through tone of voice, facial expression, cuddling, or non-cuddling, to the more elaborate verbal rules and regulations espoused by the parents as the little person became able to understand words. In this set of recordings are the thousands of “no’s” directed at the toddler, the repeated “don’ts” that bombarded him, the looks of pain and horror in mother’s face when his clumsiness brought shame on the family in the form of Aunt Ethel’s broken antique vase” (p. 22).

Harris adds that parental recording includes the happy moments too; that is, the looks of delight of a proud mother or father and their coos of pleasure are also recorded by the child. All different types of verbal or non-verbal communications recorded by the
child are transactions between the parent or an authority figure and the child. I take these transactions as dialogues and categorize them as either controlling or nurturing.

**Controlling Dialogues**

Controlling dialogues are the dialogues that are established by controlling or prejudicial parents or other figures of authority. A parent, teacher, or a friend is having a controlling dialogue with a child when the child is filled with “opinions about religion, politics, traditions, sexual role expectations, life styles, child rearing, proper dress, speech, and all the facets of cultural and family scripts” (James & Jongeward, 1971, pp. 119-120). When a parent or another authority figure fills a child with such rigid dialogues and becomes critical or prejudicial of his natural way of being, the child may comply with the authorities, become indifferent and withdraw, or become aggressive and engage in destructive actions (Harris, 1969, p. 48). The child who complies tends to be eager, willing, and compliant to what another says and is reluctant to express his or her own ideas when entering the larger society. The child who withdraws pulls into himself since it is too painful for him to be around others. He isolates himself from others by frequent illnesses or with activities they can pursue alone. Aggression is another way in which a child may choose to act. This child may rebel and control others by being aggressive. He may kick and spit and so satisfies an inner wish to rebel.

Controlling dialogues develop the Parent ego state in the child that contains controlling behaviour. I take these dialogues to be formed through negative or conditional

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17 James & Jongeward (1971) also discuss these three common patterns of adaptation or conditioning in their book “Born to Win” (pp. 158-163). They refer to them as complying, withdrawing, and procrastinating.
strokes. That is, controlling dialogues are established with a child when the child is given conditional strokes for doing rather than being. Gouling & Goulding (1979) explain that strokes, even the positive ones that are given to a child for doing something, are conditional and so controlling. They say, “When the baby first pulls herself erect, mothers and fathers talk to her excitedly, clap, smile, and kiss. When she spills or cries too long, she may receive angry words, scowls, or slaps” (p. 96). These strokes that are given to a baby or a child for the fact that he does are conditional strokes.

Controlling dialogues can take different forms. They can be shown as an act or behaviour that implies control, they can be stated verbally in different words or sentences, or they can be stated through hidden social and/or cultural representations. These three categorizations of controlling dialogues are described in more detail below.

**Controlling Dialogues as Behavioral, Verbal, and Representational**

To show the variety of forms controlling dialogues can take, I categorize them as behavioural, verbal, and representational18.

In *behavioural dialogues* one tries to control the other through actions such as finger pointing, superior and patronising gestures, facial expressions, posturing, and the like. For example, a dialogue that a parent has with her hungry baby can lead to conditioning such a child. When the baby is fed by the parent, the baby feels full after a few spoons and throws out the food, but the parent still tries to push the spoon into the baby’s mouth as if he does not know about his hunger. This is a controlling behavioural

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18 I reiterate that this classification is offered by me; however, the ideas come from Transactional Analysis. For the parts that are based on Transactional Analysis, I have given the references.
dialogue in which words are not exchanged. It is a behaviour that transfers messages to
the child and if continued, can condition the child’s self. Likewise, a child who wants to
go up and down the stairs on its own but the parents take his hand in order to protect him,
feels he is less able and inferior because of his parents’ controlling behavioural dialogues.
In controlling behavioural dialogues, the natural self of the child is ignored and buried
under layers of controlling conditions.\footnote{19}

Verbal dialogues include the words we use as we communicate. Critical words,
judgmental words, do’s and don’ts, must and must nots, and patronising words may
create controlling dialogues and result in conditioning one’s self strongly. A simple
dialogue such as “boys shouldn’t wear long hair”, “girls should be sweet and quiet”,
“kids should respect their elders” (James & Jongeward, 1971, p. 120) or other critical or
prejudicial discourses can lead a boy or girl to disconnect their self from their feelings
and see manhood or womanhood through such lenses. By internalizing controlling
dialogues, the boy or girl will see the notion of being a man or woman in specific ways—
ways that are different from their male or female natural self. By repeating controlling
dialogues, it is ultimately those ways that repress and condition the natural self.

\footnote{19} Thomas Harris, I’m OK-You’re OK (Harper Publisher, 1969, p. 22). Harris describes the
Parent and all the forms it can take—whatever the child heard from his parents and saw in their
living. He says, “They range all the way from the earliest parental communications, interpreted
nonverbally through tone of voice, facial expressions, cuddling, or non-cuddling, to the more
elaborate verbal rules and regulations espoused by the parents as the little person became able
to understand words”. In his description of the Parental dialogues, Harris includes different
forms of dialogues all in one category. However, in my description of dialogues above I have
put them in three separate categories based on whether they are behavioural or not, verbal or
nonverbal, and representational or not.
Lastly, *representational* dialogues are societal and/or cultural. They can send superior or inferior messages to different groups of people through specific social and cultural representations. I use James and Jongeward’s (1971) discussion on *cultural scripts* to describe what I mean by representational dialogues. James and Jongeward write:

Cultural scripts are the accepted and expected dramatic patterns that occur within a society. They are determined by the spoken and unspoken assumptions believed by the majority of the people within that group. Like theatrical scripts, cultural scripts have themes, characters, expected roles, stage directions, costumes, settings, scenes, and final curtains. Cultural scripts reflect what is thought of as the “national character.” The same drama may be repeated generation after generation (p.77).

James and Jongeward discuss that script themes differ from one culture to another. While one script can contain themes of suffering or persecution, another script may contain making conquests. In addition to themes, cultural scripts can impose specific roles. Most cultures make a distinction between the roles men are to play and the ones expected of women (1971, p. 78). These roles can be defined and scripted at the early ages of play in the kindergarten, for example, when boys are given trucks and cars while girls are having dolls and a kitchen. Such segregation of toys conveys gender roles and positions and makes the child’s natural self conditioned. Similarly, storybooks which display female characters wearing dresses in feminine colors and acting in a passive manner while showing male characters doing masculine things and behaving more
actively establish controlling dialogues with girls and boys. Such unspoken dialogues can speak hugely to a child and make their beings gendered.

Representational dialogues can already be at work when a baby is born and so encourage one’s self to adapt them. These dialogues are not healthy for one’s natural self and need to be addressed in a culture and society. For instance, there are textbooks that favor oppression and racism and are read by parents and teachers to children. These textbooks can provide an unhealthy environment for children whose self has not been conditioned yet. As an example, I quote the following passage from the storybook Mother Goose that has been cited in *Savage Inequalities, Children in America’s Schools* by Jonathan Kozol (1991).

> “Mary had a little lamb, its fleece was white as snow. … Old Mother Hubbard went to the cupboard to fetch her poor dog a bone. … Jack and Jill went up the hill. … This little piggy went to market. …”

> … Mary is white. Old Mother Hubbard is white. Jack is white. Jill is white. Little Jack Horner is white. Mother Goose is white. Only Mother Hubbard’s dog is black.

> “Baa, baa, black sheep,” the teacher reads, “have you any wool?” The children answer: “Yessir, yessir, three bags full. One for my master …” The master is white. The sheep are black (p.45).

This passage shows how books can establish controlling dialogues with children and reflect inferior images to specific groups of people, telling them that there are right
ways of being, ways that have been defined by authority figures. Through these dialogues, children can simply become alienated and learn that gender, race, social class, things that relate to “having”, and the like matter in one’s being. They can learn that if they are from a specific gender or race or social group, they are more human and so they have more rights. In comparison, others have less and so are less\textsuperscript{20}.

Controlling dialogues, whether they are behavioural, verbal, or representational, limit a child’s freedom and change his natural sense of self into the conditioned. Just like Pavlov’s dog that was conditioned to salivate and produce a specific response even with an unnatural stimulus, a child can also learn to act or behave in a specific way when there are controlling dialogues around. The child’s natural sense of self becomes conditioned and he will lose his ability to think and feel for himself. Where controlling dialogues carry inhibiting, discounting, or in general negative strokes, there are other dialogues that are nurturing and contain unconditional or natural strokes.

**Nurturing Dialogues**

While controlling dialogues change the natural self into a conditioned self, there are other dialogues that develop the natural self. These dialogues, however, do not deal with power or control. They are intimate and lead to growth because of the unconditional love they offer. I refer to them as *nurturing dialogues*. Nurturing dialogues are established by *nurturing* parents or authority figures, as opposed to controlling, prejudicial ones. Nurturing dialogues develop the Parent ego state in the child that

\textsuperscript{20} In Chapter Three of this dissertation, I will explain more about this type of oppression in which insignificant images are mirrored back to people. I will discuss it through Charles Bingham’s (2001) idea of “textual mirroring”.
contains nurturing behaviour. I take these dialogues to be formed through unconditional strokes. That is, nurturing dialogues are established with a child when the child is given unconditional strokes for the fact that he is. Goulding & Goulding (1979, p. 96) explain that unconditional positive strokes can be given verbally: “I love you”; nonverbally with smiles or gestures; and physically, with touching or holding. If these strokes take negative forms such as the statement “I don’t love you because you are . . .,” or grimaces, or unpleasant handling, they are not nurturing anymore.

Nurturing dialogues through unconditional strokes are for a child’s being rather than his doing. For instance, when a parent or an authority figure focuses all his or her attention on the child when she is speaking, he or she is unconditionally nurturing the child. James and Jongeward (1971) assert that one of the finest strokes is when the following happens:

… a parent, teacher, or a friend gives a warm “hello,” uses the child’s name (pronounced accurately), looks the child in the face attentively, and most importantly, listens without condemnation to what the child has to say about personal feelings and thoughts. All preserve a sense of dignity (p. 51).

Nurturing dialogues through positive strokes are not meant to be for children only. They can also be established between adults. The same positive strokes mentioned above can be given from one adult to another. For instance, giving an adult information about her competencies and skills by saying “Your proposal is clear, concise, and just what we needed”, or expressing appreciative feelings such as “It’s a pleasure to work in
the same office as you”, or listening to someone without judging the person, are all nurturing. Nurturing dialogues through positive strokes leave the person feeling good, alive, alert, and significant. At a deeper level, they maintain the person’s sense of well-being, convey the feeling of OK-ness, and nourish the person (James & Jongeward, 1971, pp. 50-51).

In contrast to the controlling dialogues that depart from the position of power and control, nurturing dialogues depart from the position of freedom and genuine authority. Genuine authority has nothing to do with obedience or limitation, but is rather about freedom and independence. This type of authority which has a positive accent is called “authoritative” by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1996). Gadamer makes a distinction between the terms “authoritative” and “authoritarian”. He sees the authoritative version of authority as positive and useful, whereas the authoritarian version as restrictive and negative. To describe the authoritarian, Gadamer writes:

Anyone who carries out certain measures, performs certain actions and makes certain proclamations precisely in order to obtain authority fundamentally desires power and is already on the way to an authoritarian exercise of that power. Anyone who has to invoke authority in the first place, whether it be the father within the family or the teacher in the classroom, possesses none (p. 119).

He also says:
Anyone who is tempted to play on the institutional force of their authority rather than on genuine argument is always in danger of speaking in an authoritarian as opposed to an authoritative manner (p. 124).

As Gadamer states, the authoritarian version of authority is an exercise of power. This authority comes from institutional power and status, and hierarchical position. It is about control, discipline and management, and can lead to one’s excessive obedience and total conformity. It restricts one’s freedom and turns the other into an object. In contrast to the authoritarian, the authoritative manner is not about power or control. It is grounded in the superiority of knowledge and insight. Gadamer writes:

Genuine authority is recognized as involving superior knowledge, ability, and insight. This holds in all those cases where authority possesses a positive meaning, the child in relation to the father, the pupil in relation to the teacher or the patient in relation to the doctor (p. 121).

Gadamer adds that the father, teacher, or doctor’s authority is genuine and positive when they are able to limit their own authority and have no desire for control. That means, the person in the position of authority does not abuse their authority by filling the other with their controlling, prejudicial discourses.

Therefore, “authoritativeness, unlike authoritarianism, is a productive version of authority” (Bingham, 2001, p. 267). Authoritativeness allows for freedom and growth. The fine line between those who are authoritative and those who are authoritarian is their intent and how they use their power. Authoritative people do not have the desire to
control the natural self of the interlocutor nor have the expectation of being pleased by the interlocutor. Through their dialogues, authoritative people do not offer “conditions” for what the other does. As a result, the natural self of the other grows naturally rather than conditionally.

**Summary**

In this chapter I focused on the concept of self and examined recognition through the lens of natural self and conditioned or adapted self. Drawing on Transactional Analysis theory and the works of Eric Berne—the father of Transactional Analysis, and his followers such as Thomas Harris, Muriel James & Dorothy Jongeward, Mary Goulding & Robert Goulding, and Karen Horney, I emphasized the importance of nurturing a child’s natural self within the family and in early years of schooling. Providing the right environment for the child in these critical childhood years where the child is given the right food at the right time, is surrounded by *unconditional* love and natural strokes, and is nurtured by parents who are harmonious and have loving relationship not only with the child but also with each other, such circumstances keep the child’s sense of self natural and unconditioned.

I discussed that if such an environment is not provided for a child, but rather the child’s self is interfered with by parents or other authority figures’ critical, punitive, or judgmental dialogues, the child’s natural self will change into a conditioned one. My personal experience in grade one and my psychoanalytical practices show the depth of the effect that these dialogue can have on a natural child. Using Pavlov’s theory of classical conditioning, I explained that just like Pavlov’s dog, a child in a non-nurturing
environment can forget about his own natural self and produce a specific response even with an unnatural stimulus. A child who starts off in the position of “I’m OK—You’re OK” can become conditioned and programmed by the authority figures when there are inhibitive, discounting, and negative strokes around him. The not-OK child then starts learning psychological games in order to gain unnatural strokes or recognition and some relief, even momentarily, for his not-OK feeling. Having learned some soft games at home, the child later enters school and gets a chance to try out these games on other children and teachers and reinforces his life position.

Finally, I examined the notion of dialogues through the concept of natural self and conditioned or adapted self and categorized dialogues into nurturing and controlling. A parent, teacher, or a friend is having a controlling dialogue with a child when they fill the child with specific opinions and stroke him conditionally. In contrast, the nurturing dialogues are not about what a child does but rather are given for the fact that a child is. These dialogues are intimate, genuine, and lead to the child’s growth. A parent or a teacher who establishes nurturing dialogues with a child can maintain the child’s sense of well-being or fade the child’s psychological games away if there are any. Depending on the ways that a teacher gets along with a child and the type of dialogues she forms with him, the child’s feeling about himself can be reinforced and fixated in school.

In the next chapter, I will move away from discussing recognition in childhood and in education and focus on some influential theoretical perspectives on recognition. In Chapter Five, I will return to the educational significance of recognizing the natural self. For now, I will first explain the concept of recognition in more detail and then turn to the
importance of self in adulthood and in the larger society. Charles Taylor (1994) and Charles Bingham (2001) speak to the important matter of public recognition of self and the effects that public sphere could have on the private self. In the next chapter, I will use Taylor’s and Bingham’s idea of public recognition through positive mirroring and discuss my critique on taking positive mirroring as a remedy for misrecognition.
CHAPTER III: RECOGNITION IN CONCEPT, AND PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF SELF

This chapter focuses on the concept of recognition and the recognition of the private self in the public sphere. I begin this chapter by examining the term “recognition” conceptually to investigate when and in which context it was first used. Using the Oxford English Dictionary (second edition, 1989), I will trace the changes that this important concept has undergone over the past centuries. The dictionary provides a definition for “recognition” as used originally in law in 1473 and continues to the 21st century giving the diplomatic and political meaning of recognition. It does not provide a definition for the term “recognition” in the field of psychoanalysis, though it does offer one for the field of psychology. Since the meaning of recognition in psychoanalysis is not explained in the dictionary, I add a section about the definition of this term using Berne (1961), Harris (1967), and James & Jongeward’s (1971) ideas. Berne and his followers used the term stroke as a form of recognition that could be physical or emotional.

In my psychoanalytical description of the concept of recognition through strokes, I will examine the importance of recognition in childhood when the self is still natural or unconditioned. I will explain that while recognition of the self in the early years is essential, it is also important to recognize self in adulthood and in the larger society. This will be discussed through the lens of Charles Taylor’s (1994) and Charles Bingham’s (2001) ideas on recognition of the private self in the public sphere. Taylor’s theory of
public recognition is based on self or identity as being constituted *dialogically*; that is, one’s account of who she is is formed and sustained by her dialogues with others. Thus, one needs to be recognized publicly (1991b & 1994)\(^\text{21}\). Taylor posits that since one is dependent on recognition by others in order to understand who she is, if this recognition is not granted by others, the principle of human dignity demands that this inequality is addressed. This leads to Taylor’s “politics of universalism or equal dignity” which is the recognition of individuals’ basic rights as human beings.

Taylor also asserts that people of different cultural backgrounds need to be acknowledged for their different practices so that minority cultures survived. This creates the need for “the politics of difference”. These two sets of recognition, “the politics of equal dignity” and “the politics of difference” are called “the politics of recognition” by Taylor (1994). Following Taylor’s notion of public recognition, I discuss Taylor and Bingham’s idea of mirror recognition saying that since recognition is won through exchange with other members of society, one’s understanding of who she is is based on the mirror-image reflected by others. Bingham and Taylor emphasize public mirror recognition and argue that this mirror recognition needs to be positive; otherwise people undergo serious harm.

\(^{21}\) Taylor’s ideas on recognition and self as dialogical have roots in Hegel’s famous dialectic of master and slave. Hegel discusses the master-slave dialectic as the confrontation of two self-consciousnesses, which are like mirrors of one another. Human beings come to consciousness through looking at others and recognizing them. One does not know who he/she is without looking at another person. While recognizing each other, these two selves must remain autonomous and independent (*Hegel*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Speaking to Taylor and Bingham’s public mirror recognition, I will highlight the importance of considering the type of the self that enters the public. I maintain that what is recognized in public is an already misrecognized self or a conditioned self, and that positive mirroring cannot make substantial changes in such a self. Thus, the mirror of the public space only works as a reflection; the recognition is not authentic as it is built upon a self that is misrecognized or conditioned. One with such a conditioned self will look up to others to understand who she is. When she enters the public space, she struggles for recognition and needs to see where her demands and desires stand or whether they measure up with others’ or not. To recognize an already misrecognized or conditioned self at the public level, recognition should go beyond just positive mirroring.

**Recognition: Conceptual Definition**

Recognition is a concept that has undergone some changes over the past centuries. In this section, I would like to examine when, in which context, and with what meaning the word recognition was first used and how these have changed over time.

The term “recognition” has a number of synonyms or near-synonyms. The root is re+cognition which refers to “re+identification”, i.e., re-identifying something as having been previously seen, heard, known, etc. (Online Dictionary). Today, the word “recognition” is usually as signifying acknowledging, appreciation, validation, or acceptance. It is also used politically as “diplomatic recognition” which means “formal acknowledgement by a country that another political entity fulfils the conditions of statehood” (Online Oxford Dictionary). The political taste that the word recognition has obtained today brings some social and moral duties as well as human rights to the table. It
carries respect and justice—not only social justice but also economic. Thereafter, failure to recognize some groups of people means disrespect, degradation, and dehumanization. It is this political meaning of recognition that is discussed in current socio-political theories of recognition (Honneth, 1992; Fraser, 2000; Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Taylor, 1994).

Having known that the word recognition has acquired such a socio-political meaning in the past century made me wonder how it was used prior to this application and in which contexts. I was also interested in knowing whether recognition was used in the fields of psychology or psychoanalysis in the past and if so, in what ways. To trace some of the changes that the word has undergone over time, I used the Oxford English Dictionary (second edition, 1989) and started with the first time that the word “recognition” was used. I briefly explain both the context in which the word has been used as well as its meaning.

The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines recognition as the act of recognizing; “the action or process of recognizing or being recognized” (p. 341). According to this dictionary, the word “recognition” was originally used in law in 1473, with the meaning of “the resumption of lands by a feudal superior for any reason, in later use specially on account of unwarranted alienation by the vassal” (p. 341). Later on, in the 1500s, the word recognition was used to imply the meaning of “knowledge or consciousness” such as whether someone has the recognition and knowledge of something, or someone has recognition or remembrance of something (Oxford English
Dictionary, 1989). While at the present time the word recognition is not used with the same legal meaning, the meaning still lingers and the word carries a positive weight.

During the 1600s, the word recognition was used as “the acknowledgement or admission of a kindness, service, obligation, or merit, or the expression of this in some way” (Oxford English Dictionary, p. 341). This particular meaning of recognition brought along the phrase in recognition of. It was usually applied in history, ethics, and religious contexts to express the meaning of acknowledgement, admission, and value. During the 1800s, the term seems to have been used as more being known or identified in comparison with its previous use in order to acknowledge or approve someone or something, such as: “The action or fact of perceiving that some thing, person, etc., is the same as one previously known” (p. 341). This type of meaning of recognition as “being known or identified” was then imported into the field of psychology.

During the 1900s, recognition was used in two ways: (1) as an attribute to other terms, and (2) in the field of psychology. In the first context, the word was applied as an attribute in different contexts such as linguistics and biology. For example, “recognition colour” or “recognition mark” were used to show colours or markings on an animal or a bird for recognition of the same species. In the second context, the word recognition was used in psychology and was defined as “… the mental process whereby things are identified as having been previously apprehended or as belonging to a particular known (bold my emphasis) category, usually distinguished from the process of recall” (Oxford English Dictionary, p. 342). I will use the second meaning of recognition from
psychology and bring it into psychoanalysis later in the chapter as it, interestingly, distinguishes recognition from recalling or remembering things.

The Oxford English Dictionary does not give a definition or an example of the word recognition in the field of psychoanalysis. However, as I explained earlier in this chapter, this word has already been used in psychoanalysis by Berne, Harris, as well as James and Jongeward. Berne and his followers use the term *strokes* as a unit of *recognition*; that is, physical and emotional transactions or strokes are symbolic forms of recognition. Because of the interconnection of recognition with the concept of strokes, I add a section here to rigorously explain stroke as a unit of recognition in psychoanalysis.

**Stroke as a Unit of Recognition in Psychoanalysis**

In the previous chapter, I reviewed Goulding & Goulding’s (1979) definition of stroke and suggested that strokes could be given conditionally for *doing* or unconditionally for *being*; they could also be either positive or negative. Goulding & Goulding give a wonderful example of natural stroke-giving and receiving between a sister and brother. They write:

Mary is watching her daughter Claudia playing with her seven-month-old son, Brian. They are on the rug together, he sitting beside her, holding a large many-colored wooden bug. One antenna is in his mouth; the others whirl madly as he shakes his head. Claudia grabs an antenna in her mouth and they giggle as they topple together. Brian drops the toy, clutches her hair, and gazes intently as he licks her nose and she sniffs his tongue. He nuzzles her cheek; she moves, makes soft, then louder kisses against his belly. He shrieks, hiccoughs, she copies his
hiccough exactly, and they both laugh. He hiccoughs again and they repeat. Then they hug silently (p. 94).

This example shows a natural, unconditional stroke which is uninhibited and pure. As explained before, if a stroke is given to a child for what she does, it is a conditional stroke; that is, the stroke is dependent on the child’s performance. However, if the child is stroked for being herself, for example, if she is being listened to by her parent without being judged, it is a natural, unconditional stroke.

Prior to Goulding & Goulding and their use of strokes, Berne (1961, 1963, 1964), Harris (1967), and James and Jongeward (1971) explained strokes as symbolic forms of ‘recognition’. Initially discussed by Berne (1961), every person needs to be touched and recognized naturally by other people. In addition, people need to do something with their time from birth to death. These biological, psychological, and social needs are called “hungers” (p. 83). Berne parallels the biological, psychological, and social hungers with the hunger for food. As mentioned in the first chapter, emotional and sensory deprivation can harm a person just like food deprivation. Addressing these hungers is necessary for the mental health of a person. Using Rene Spitz’s work, Berne (1963) explains the importance of physical contact in infants and states that the withholding of natural human touch and caresses can directly or indirectly result in physical and mental deterioration. This has been summarized in the slogan: “If the infant is not stroked, his spinal cord shrivels up” (p. 157).
Hungers for touch and recognition can be appeased with *strokes*. Berne (1964) uses the term “stroke” as a general term for physical intimate contact which may take various forms in practice. He writes:

Some people literally stroke an infant; others hug or pat it, while some people pinch it playfully or flip it with a fingertip. These all have their analogues in conversation, so that it seems one might predict how an individual would handle a baby by listening to him talk. By an extension of meaning, “stroking” may be employed colloquially to denote any act implying recognition of another’s presence. (p. 15)

Therefore, strokes can be given in the form of actual physical contact or by some symbolic forms of recognition such as words, gestures, looks, and the like. Similarly, Harris (1967) defines strokes as physical touching or bodily contacts that keep an infant alive. Without the early physical stroking the infant would not survive. Harris writes:

Stroking, or repetitious bodily contact, is essential to his [an infant’s] survival. Without it he will die, if not physically, then psychologically. Physical death from a condition known as marasmus once was a frequent occurrence in foundling homes where there was a deprivation of this early stroking. There was no physical cause to explain these deaths except the absence of essential stimulation (p. 43).

As Harris says, every child needs strokes and is eventually stroked by the fact that she is small and so is picked up to be cared for. If there is no one to pick the child up, to support her, and to begin the comforting act of stroking, the child would not survive. As
the baby grows up, positive strokes and physical touching are still necessary for the child’s natural growth. James and Jongeward (1971) explain that during life, the early primary hunger for actual bodily contact is modified and becomes recognition hunger. He writes:

A smile, a nod, a word, a frown, a gesture eventually replace some touch strokes. Like touch, these forms of recognition, whether positive or negative, stimulate the brain of the one receiving them and serve to verify for the child the fact that she or he is there and alive. Recognition strokes also keep the child’s nervous system from “shrivelling.” (p. 49)

While either negative or positive strokes may stimulate the body chemistry of a child, James and Jongeward say it is the positive strokes that develop an emotionally healthy person with a sense of OK-ness. Likewise, Harris (1967) emphasizes the importance of positive strokes in childhood for making the child grow with the feeling of OK-ness. He says that if stroking is present, there is OK-ness. However, without natural, positive stroking in early childhood, the child concludes his life position as “I’m not OK”. As this child grows up, Harris asserts that the child feels “a great need for stroking, or recognition, which is the psychological version of the early physical stroking” (p. 47). This psychological need for physical stroking makes the child do things for others in order to gain strokes and feel OK. While the Child part of the child feels not-OK because of the deprivation of stroking, her Adult becomes involved and asks what she must do to gain the others’ strokes. Harris states that there are two ways in which people try to live out the position of “I’m not OK, You’re OK”:
The first is to live out a life script that confirms the NOT OK. It is written unconsciously by the Child. The script may call for a life of withdrawal, since it is too painful to be around OK people. These people may seek stroking through make-believe and engage in an elaborate wish-life of if I and when I. Another person’s script may call for behavior which is provoking to the point where others turn on him (negative stroking), thus proving once again, I’M NOT OK. This is the case of the “bad little boy.” You say I’m bad so I’ll be bad!

A more common way to live out this position is by a counter-script (also unconscious) with borrowed lines from the Parent: YOU CAN BE OK, IF. … This person is eager, willing, and compliant to the demands of others. “Some of our best people” are where they are because of these efforts to gain approval. However, they are committed to a lifetime of mountain climbing, and when they reach the top of one mountain they are confronted by still another mountain” (p. 48).

Thereafter, in order to get any positive or negative strokes, the child decides to do one of these: withdraw and gain no stroke, make others turn on him and get negative strokes, or please others and comply with their demands in order to get positive strokes. No matter which decision it is, Harris says the ending result is a sense of not-OK-ness. This is due to the fact that it is the not-OK Child that writes the script, thereafter, the position is still “I’m not OK”. To uncover and change a life position like this one, Berne proposes analyzing the social transactions through Transactional Analysis so that people can see from where their transactions and their hunger for strokes come.
Social and physical transactions (two or more strokes make a transaction) such as greetings, smiles, or gestures like a handshake are carried out by people in order to appease their social and physical needs. Berne (1961) says while people address their own social and physical needs through such activities and rituals, they exhibit their recognition to others as well and gain strokes from them. If these forms of recognition are exchanged spontaneously and intimately, they are appreciated and gratefully received. On the other hand, if the social and physical transactions are done mechanically or through playing games, the real problem is exhaustion as the recognition is not authentic or natural. Tension mounts and the hunger for recognition emerges again since the craving for strokes has remained unabated. There will also be exhaustion since the social intercourse is in the form of play rather than of intimacy\textsuperscript{22}. Berne notes that the greater part of all social intercourse is playing games. People have social transactions to either please others or get negative strokes. Intimate social transactions rarely occur.

In sum, in the psychoanalytical studies of Berne, Harris, and James and Jongeward, recognition is equal to natural positive strokes that are given by nurturing parents in order to satisfy the child’s natural physical and psychological needs. When such positives strokes are not given naturally to the natural, OK child, the child struggles to get strokes from the outside in order to feel OK about herself. As the child grows up, she gets strokes from the outside by playing games related to her position of “I’m not-OK, You’re OK”. Since it is the not-OK child who plays the games of getting the strokes,

\textsuperscript{22} Chapter 10, pp. 83-86.
there ensues struggle for getting strokes or recognition, which results fatigue or exhaustion afterwards.

Having examined the meaning of the word recognition through the lens of stroke in psychoanalysis, I would now like to go back to the definition of recognition in psychology given by the Oxford English Dictionary. This is intended to give a better picture of the important concept of recognition and its meaning. As mentioned earlier, the Oxford English Dictionary defines recognition in the field of psychology used in the 1900s as “… the mental process whereby things are identified as having been previously apprehended or as belonging to a particular known category, usually distinguished from the process of recall” (p. 342). This is an important definition of recognition as it distinguishes recognition from recalling or remembering things. In the process of recall, we remember things. However, in the process of recognition, we identify things as in the past they have belonged to specific known categories. In other words, in recognition, there is a mental process going on that identifies something with its previous apprehension. That means, something is already known (re+cognition) to the person and apprehended in a specific way. Later on, the same thing can bring the same cognition and apprehension for the person. This view goes beyond mental cognition and also includes the feelings associated with that mental cognition. Here, I am using the meaning of recognition in psychoanalysis described above and relating the thing that is previously apprehended in the definition of recognition in psychology to the term stroke in the definition of recognition in psychoanalysis. I will explain this through a personal experience.
**Personal Example**

When I was a little girl of about five years old, I remember that on a beautiful sunny day one summer, my mother and my uncle’s wife who used to live one level above us in our building were cooking together in the backyard and having fun. I was also in the backyard watching my mother and her company cooking and enjoying the sunshine. As I am writing about that day now, I feel as if I am that little girl enjoying herself under the sunshine having the nice warm feeling of that summer day. It was a bright day and I was happy. Everything was peaceful and loving, my mom, my uncle’s wife, the whole environment, what they were doing. In our backyard, we used to have different plants. One of them was a tomato plant. I remember that this big tomato plant had given so many beautiful red tomatoes that summer. I can still remember their smell. As I liked tomatoes very much, on that day I picked one and ate it with a great appetite and pleasure. The tomato was juicy, tasty, and I loved its taste, smell, color, and texture. That day, I had quite a few tomatoes while watching my mother and her company and very much enjoyed their presence.

Interestingly, as an adult now, every time I go grocery shopping, buying tomatoes is the best part of my shopping. I stand beside their section, smell them—especially the ones that come as a bunch together with their vine—and enjoy their color. When I bring them home, I remove their stem and smell them. I enjoy their smell, color, and taste as much as I did when I was a little girl. The joy and peace that I experience by smelling or eating tomatoes today is because of the joy of eating I experienced that summer day as well as the joy of the happy, loving, and peaceful environment I experienced with my
mother. Now how does this story relate to the definition of recognition in the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis? Let me explain.

The experience of smelling and having tomatoes in my childhood with the peaceful presence of my mother was a positive experience for me. I refer to it as a *stroke*. On that sunny day, my mother gave me a natural, positive stroke by her nurturing and loving presence. All I experienced that day was intimacy and love. The whole environment was pleasant and peaceful. There was no sign of control or anything judgemental or not-OK in that environment, and no struggle or exhaustion from me for getting OK-ness from my mother or her company. I was experiencing the natural position of “I’m OK, You’re OK”. For that reason, today, whenever I smell and eat tomatoes, it is as if I were experiencing the same natural stroke with all its associated feelings. I get the warm, pleasant feeling of being a natural, OK child whose natural self is recognized by her nurturing parent for her being. This is a natural, unconditional recognition of the self.

**Difference between recognition and recall:** The above definition of recognition is definitely different from recall or remembering, as described in the field of psychology. In psychology, recognition is about identifying things with previous apprehension of them since those things are known to the person. As I have said, I want to go beyond such mental identification and bring in the associated feelings as well. In my personal example, tomatoes are already known to me in a way that I had experienced knowing them in my childhood. Today, I apprehend and recognize tomatoes as if they are the ones I had experienced before. I identify and categorize myself with that natural girl in the past whenever I see tomatoes today. This is surely different from the process of recall or
remembering. In recall, memorization is involved. Feelings or identifications are not contributed. For example, when someone is asked “What is the capital of Iran?” and the person answers Tehran, there is only an act of recalling involved (not recognition) since the person only remembers the name of the capital of Iran. There is no associated feeling or identification with the word Tehran when the person replies. However, if the person has been in Tehran before or has some associated feeling with the place in any way—either good or bad, it is not recall anymore. It is recognition, which can either be a natural, positive stroke like my experience, or can be unnatural/misrecognition.

In the following Table (Table 2), I summarize my discussion on the definition of recognition thus far. I have shown several meanings of recognition and the changes this word has undergone over the past centuries. I have started with the year 1473 when the word recognition was used in law for the first time and continued with its application in different subjects such as biology, psychology, or linguistics. To this I add my own research on the definition of recognition through the lens of psychoanalysis. At the end of the table below, I include the most recent meaning of recognition and its application in the field of politics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Senses of recognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>“The resumption of lands by a feudal superior for any reason, in later use <em>spec.</em> on account of unwarranted alienation by the vassal”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during the 1500s</td>
<td>Knowledge or consciousness as in “recognition and knowledge of one’s self” or “recognition or remembrance of one’s own worthiness”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during the 1600s</td>
<td>The act of acknowledging and appreciation of a kindness, achievement, or service, “<em>in recognition of</em>”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during the 1800s</td>
<td>Being known or identified: “identification of a thing or person from previous encounters or knowledge”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford English Dictionary</td>
<td>1) 1901-1977</td>
<td>The term was used as an attribute: recognition-call (in biology); recognition habit and recognition-memory (in psychology); recognition colour/recognition mark (a colour or marking on an animal or bird, supposed to serve as a means of recognition to others of the same species; recognition grammar (a grammar based on the analysis of given sentences in a corpus); recognition picketing (the picketing of an employer to obtain union recognition); recognition-service (a church service held for the purpose of introducing a new pastor to his congregation); recognition signal (any prearranged signal by which individuals or units may identify each other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) During the 1900s (1894-1973)</td>
<td>2) Psychology: identifying something known, different from recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berne, Harris, and James &amp; Jongeward</td>
<td>During the 1900s</td>
<td>Psychoanalysis: a natural, positive <em>stroke</em> such as a smile, a hug, or a touch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Oxford Dictionary</td>
<td>Since the beginning of the 21st century</td>
<td>Diplomatic and political recognition: “formal acknowledgment by a country that another political entity fulfills the conditions of statehood and is eligible to be dealt with as a member of the international community”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In general: “appreciation or acknowledgment”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Changes in senses of recognition over the past centuries
Today, recognition is also a matter of acknowledging nations, countries, different groups of communities and people, and their rights. This is of importance in societies where people of diverse cultures come to live together. For instance, in Canada’s multicultural society, recognition is considered as a legal and moral duty, and has been stated in the Multiculturalism Policy of Canada, (1988), which reads as follows;

“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government of Canada to (a) recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledges the freedom of all member of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage, ...”

Therefore, the political meaning of the word recognition today brings along with it some social and moral duty as well as human rights to the table. Interestingly, considering all the meanings of recognition in the past centuries and its application in different contexts, there is an impression of “acknowledgement” that lingers as we move forward. All connotations compound and linger. This base of acknowledgment has not changed throughout time.

Whether it is in law, biology, psychology, or politics, there is a basic connotation of acknowledgement that accompanies the term recognition. While in law recognition is about acknowledging the right of the superior to resume lands, in biology recognition means the acknowledgment of different birds or animals belonging to the same species. When it comes to psychology, recognition is about acknowledging the familiarity of
something that has previously been apprehended, and in politics, recognition is about acknowledging different groups of nations and people and their rights.

Similarly, in psychoanalysis, the term recognition is related to the meaning of acknowledgment, that is recognition means acknowledging someone’s presence by naturally stroking him or her. A person is recognized naturally when her presence is acknowledged through unconditional, positive strokes for her being, as opposed to her doing. When someone in her childhood is not recognized or acknowledged by her parents or other significant figures, her natural expressiveness and ability to feel for herself can become limited or inhibited. The scarcity of natural strokes in her childhood stimulates stroke-seeking behavior or struggles for recognition. As an adult, the person defines herself through either pleasing others and getting (unnatural) positive strokes, or avoiding others and withdrawing which is about receiving negative strokes.

So far, I have discussed recognition from a psychoanalytical viewpoint with the emphasis on recognition in childhood. Because of the particular importance of childhood experiences at home and in early years of schooling in planning the child’s life script, I first discussed recognition in these early ages. Now, I would like to turn to recognition in the larger society and discuss the recognition of the self in adulthood when she enters the public sphere. Just like the private domain and the first years of schooling, I advocate public self recognition and argue that the larger society should also provide a nurturing environment for the adult. If the adult world of life in society is limiting and inhibitive, or if it imposes discounting images or positions to specific groups of people, people’s senses of who they are can change and become misrecognized.
Charles Taylor (1994) speaks to the importance of recognizing a private self at the public level. He says that the private self is influenced by the presence of an other in the public, whether it is recognized or misrecognized by an other. Since Taylor takes self as being constituted dialogically, those aspects of our identities that we share with other people need to be recognized publicly (1991b & 1994). Having said that, self/identity was not always taken as dialogical. For instance, in the pre-modern era, people were not even aware that they had a sense of self (Anderson, 1998, p.49). It was in the modern era and afterwards that people talked about their self and became conscious about it.

To discuss Taylor’s theory of self as dialogical, I first give an overview of the history of self to examine how self/identity was perceived in the past and over various discourses. I will then go through Taylor’s ideas on recognizing the dialogical self in the public sphere. His work on public recognition as well as Charles Bingham’s will follow later in the chapter.

**Self or Identity: A Brief Historical View**

The term “self” or “identity” has a long history and has been interpreted in various ways. Self or identity can be viewed as a concept in process or it can be seen as relatively stable and static. Thomas Anderson (1998) states that every society has held its own view of the self in the past. For example, in the pre-modern era, it might be said that most people were not individual selves in the modern Western sense. The difference, as Anderson posits, is that those people did not have a sense of self nor were they conscious of that. Anderson explains:
They [most people in the past] didn’t experience themselves as clearly bounded, but rather as seamlessly embedded in their tribes and their ecosystems; they didn’t think of themselves as unique, but rather as more or less identical to others of their kind; and they didn’t think of themselves as neatly integrated, but rather as invaded by strange spirits and forces that could pull them in different directions (p. 49).

Following this account of Anderson, it was during the Renaissance that the modern notion of self came onto the scene. Anderson explains this as follows:

After a long medieval era when it seemed that nothing had changed or even could change, the Western world went through a tremendous transformation—spectacular upheavals in government, philosophy, religion, science. Not only did new worldviews emerge, but so did a new world, as the voyages of Columbus and other explorers discovered previously unknown continents and civilizations. A new consciousness of self was emerging as well. It was during the Renaissance that many grew intoxicated with the idea of a life as one’s own creation, a work of art (p. 50).

Baumeister (1987, p. 165) says that it was during the 17th century that self and self-consciousness came to be recognized as important concepts and values. In the early 17th century, the modern philosopher, René Descartes, proposed the notion of the person as a rational individual. Descartes (1641) viewed the I or self as a substance with consciousness. Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum: “I think therefore I am” showed that only a
thing thinks. I, as a thing, am a rational individual who has a distinct and constant identity. As a rationalist, Descartes claimed that we gain our knowledge from purely intellectual ideas (those of the mind), not from the senses. Thus, the Cartesian view of self considered self as a substance, isolated, and functioning as an undivided whole.

In contrast with the Cartesian view of self, recent theories of self posit the self as an immaterial essence which is multiple and in process. The concept of self has evolved from the modernist Western to the poststructuralist self. The modernist Western self is a rational, integrated individual who has a fixed, distinct and constant identity while the poststructuralist self is changeable, dynamic and socially-defined. The postmodern self is a more complex and multidimensional self. Based on Freud’s (1974/1923) claim that self consists of three parts id, ego, and superego, postmodern theorists started to take self as more fragmented. As Stuart Hall (1996) points out:

We can no longer conceive of the ‘individual’ in terms of a whole, centered, stable and completed Ego or autonomous, rational ‘self’. The 'self' is conceptualized as more fragmented and incomplete, composed of multiple 'selves' or identities in relation to the different social worlds we inhabit, something with a history, 'produced', in process. The 'subject' is differently placed or positioned by different discourses and practices (p. 226).

Holland and her colleagues (1998) have argued that self is being produced through different discourses and is subjected to social power. In addition to the role of social power, they focus on the role of culture in shaping selves and state:
… cultural discourses and their relationship to the self are not like the relation of the clothes to the body, but more like that of a bottle to the liquid it contains. Self-discourses and practices must be scrutinized, for they are clues to the contours of the bottle—the culture—that shapes the malleable self (p. 22).

As a result, Holland et al. emphasize that along with culture that shapes selves, we need to also consider the element of power. The cultural forms that are socially produced and being privileged greatly affect one’s sense of self. Holland et al. discuss culturalists’ and social constructivists’ perspectives on how the self is constructed. While culturalists suggest that one’s self is shaped through cultural drive and the moral world, social constructivists emphasize the role of social power and particular situations that are imposed in forming one’s self. This notion of self being subjected to social power and powerful discourses originates from the discourse or discursive theory, which is a Foucauldian understanding of self, as Holland et al. say. To explain discursive theory through the perspective of social constructivists, Holland et al. write:

The discourses and categories dominant in a society… are “inscribed” upon people, both interpersonally and institutionally, and within them. Selves are socially constructed through the mediation of powerful discourses and their artefacts—tax forms, census categories, curriculum vitae, and the like (p. 26).

Holland et al. try to blend the two differing perspectives into one. However, they state that both culturalists who focus only on cultural logic, and constructivists who give
credit only to social positions and power, leave little room for one’s own subjectivity and agency. As a result, Holland et al. bring in the notion of improvisations as “an altered identity” (p. 18) that creates the foundation for a reformed subjectivity. To Holland and colleagues, identities are changeable, malleable, and subject to discursive power. Humans are both products of social discipline and producers of improvisations. Holland et al. emphasize this human capacity and agency in reshaping a sense of self and making one’s own ways in the cultural worlds. This capacity makes humans re-experience their natural sense of self as opposed to their habitual or conditioned self.

The above broad historical view of self examined the ways that self and/or identity has been perceived over time and over different discourses. Now, as promised, I turn to Taylor’s idea on self and/or identity and the dialogical aspect of it.

**Self or Identity as Dialogical: Charles Taylor**

According to Taylor (1989, 1991a), identity is generally linked to and defined through answering the question “Who am I?” I can define myself through the relations I have with others, or through my function and what I do. This way, I am answering the question of who I am by situating myself in some kind of social, professional, and/or familial space. I can also define myself by relating to *ethical space*, as Taylor calls it. Our tastes, desires, values, issues of importance, standards, opinions, and aspirations all make sense through where we are coming from and where we situate ourselves in ethical space. The important point is that the terms that define this space and situate people within it differ remarkably. Based on what these terms are, people constitute their identities as
self-descriptions that help them create what they are. This is the definition of identity that is important to Taylor.

Emphasizing the *dialogical* aspect of identity, Taylor says that through the dialogues we have with, or sometimes in struggle against, our parents and elders whom Taylor (1994, citing Mead, 1934) calls “significant others”, our first definitions of ourselves are given to us. While we are individual subjects, we are *initially* shaped by our surroundings and it is important to us how our significant others want to see us.

Emphasizing the role of significant others in forming our identity, Taylor (1994) explains that significant others become internal to who we are:

… it would take a great deal of effort, and probably many wrenching break-ups, to *prevent* our identity being formed by the people we love. Consider what we mean by “identity”. It is “who” we are, “where we’re coming from.” As such it is the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense. If some of the things I value most are accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then she becomes internal to my identity” (p. 33-34).

In addition, the dialogues we have with our significant others stay forever, even though they are no longer in our life:

“We are expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work

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23 Charles Taylor makes the same discussion on the role of significant others in shaping one’s identity in his other book “The Ethics of Authenticity” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press; 1991).
with important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us. And even when we outgrow some of the latter—our parents, for instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we live.” (Taylor, 1991b, p. 33)

Taylor stresses our need to look to others for defining ourselves. He says that the dialogues we have with our significant others happen through the language of expression. It is through learning this language of expression that we become full human beings. The language of expression is not just the words we speak, but it is any mode of expression. He says:

… I want to take *language* in a broad sense, covering not only the words we speak, but also other modes of expression whereby we define ourselves, including the “languages” of art, of gesture, of love, and the like. But we learn these modes of expression through exchanges with others. People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us… (1994, p. 32).

Therefore, to Taylor, we define ourselves through language that has been learned through exchanges with our significant others. While we need to develop our own opinions and understandings toward things, this does not work with important issues such as defining who we are as it is always related to our dialogues with others, even if they
are not in our lives any more. It is always through “where we are coming from” and others’ desires that we develop our own desires.

Since identity is shaped dialogically, we need to be recognized for who we are at the public level. In his discussion on public recognition, Taylor tries to work out what a politics of equal recognition could mean. He argues that it could mean two rather different but connected things. That is, there is a need for recognition of the individuals’ basic rights as human beings but also a need for acknowledging their practices and needs as members of specific cultural groups. This is what Taylor calls as “the politics of recognition”.

**Taylor’s Politics of Recognition**

According to Taylor (1991b, 1994), recognition can be discussed at two levels. The first is the intimate level, where one’s identity is formed or malformed through continuing dialogues and struggles with significant others. The person needs the recognition that is offered or denied by significant others at the private level. At the second level, the social or public level, one’s identity can be constituted in an open dialogue, with a continuing politics of equal recognition. To Taylor, it is important to recognize the private self in the public. As Bingham (2001) says, Taylor’s point is that the private self can be affected by public commonalities. The private self does not need to be overcome or retreated or be subjected to legislation. It can be “recognized”; i.e., “a recognitive perspective explores how the self changes as a result of the public encounter.” (p. 32) Therefore, instead of taking self/identity as stable or fixed, Taylor asserts that
one’s self and conscious thinking of who one is can change by moving from the private to the public sphere. This is where the need for public recognition comes in.

When Taylor talks about the private self and its recognition at the public level, he is mainly concerned about the social aspect of identity. Appiah (1994) says that Taylor’s recognition is about acknowledging individuals’ identities, which can be seen as having two major dimensions—collective and personal. The identities whose recognition Taylor discusses are largely the collective social identities such as religion, gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. Personal dimensions of identities such as being charming, intelligent, or witty is not the basis of forms of social identities. Appiah says that the distinction between these two dimensions of identity is a sociological rather than a logical distinction. He continues:

In each dimension we are talking about properties that are important for social life, but only the collective identities count as social categories, as kinds of persons. There is a logical but no social category of the witty, or the clever, or the charming, or the greedy. People who share these properties do not constitute a social group, in the relevant sense (pp. 151-2).

Therefore, Taylor’s emphasis is on the need for recognition of different groups of people for their gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality (rather than for their intelligence, charm, etc.) as well as their equal value socially. It is these categorized features at the social level that Taylor advocates equal recognition for.
Taylor’s (1994, pp. 37-43) politics of recognition, with his focus on recognition on the public scene, is about two things: 1) the acknowledgement of individuals’ basic rights as human beings, regardless of their gender, race, class, or ethnicity; and 2) the acknowledgement of their practices and needs as members of specific cultural groups, including women, African-Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Americans, and other identifiable groups. This results in two types of recognition that Taylor finds in today's political scene: “the politics of universalism” and “the politics of difference”. The “politics of universalism” focuses on the equal dignity (as opposed to honor) of all citizens and the equalization of rights and entitlements. “The politics of difference”, in turn, is about the unique identity of individuals or group of people, i.e., everyone should be recognized for his/her unique identity and distinctness from everyone else, and not be glossed over by the identity of the majority group. It is thus not just a matter of recognizing cultures or traditions so that they can survive, but it is more about acknowledging their worth.

Therefore, the politics of difference is about acknowledging specificity while the politics of equal dignity is about acknowledgement of equality. Both “the politics of equal dignity” and “the politics of difference” mean that while people of different races, sex, ethnicities, and class positions must be recognized and treated equally, they must be seen as distinctive individuals with their own differences. If these two politics are not considered in recognizing people, people can suffer real damage and distortion. For example, for many years, recognition failed at these two levels for Aboriginal people in Canada. In the 19th century, Aboriginals were sent to residential schools by the Canadian government to learn English and adopt Christianity and Canadian customs. Native
children were forced to assimilate so that they would be able to live in White society with Caucasians. The government wanted them to adopt the White life style and forget their own native traditions.\footnote{Wikipedia, Canadian Indian Residential School System, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canadian_Indian_residential_school_system}

Many Aboriginals suffered unspeakable abuse in residential schools, where they were sent to be “whitified.” Since Caucasians were in power, they felt that the Aboriginals, whose values they thought were different from their own, were inferior and uncultured. They were not treated with the politics of equal dignity but were considered as less or inferior. Being in such a powerful, controlling environment, Aboriginals’ sense of identity changed to an identity that contained the powerful conditions and discourses of Caucasians. Just like a parent or any authority figure at the private level who can establish powerful dialogues with his child and make him comply, Caucasians did the same thing towards Aboriginals at the public level. At the private level, the child forgets his own sense of self, likes, and dislikes and follows his judgmental, critical parents. He follows his parents’ wishes, as opposed to his own, and sees what they want him to be. Similarly, at the public level, a specific group of people such as Aboriginals can forget their own sense of being, likes and dislikes, and instead try to please the controlling, judgmental group such as the Caucasians and see what the Caucasians want them to be like. This happens because the politics of difference are not taken into account.

**Public Mirror Recognition: Charles Taylor and Charles Bingham**

Taylor’s notion of public recognition can be spoken in terms of mirrors. That is, the public sphere is like a mirror that can reflect people an image of who they are.
(1994) emphasizes the significance of mirroring in recognizing or misrecognizing different groups of people in the public sphere and states how harmful it is to project inferior images on others. He writes:

Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being (p. 25).

Taylor posits that since self is dialogical, the modern self needs an “other” on the public scene to reflect her a positive image in order for her to find out who she is. Charles Bingham (2001) also speaks to the notion of mirror recognition and says, “when I enter the public sphere, I need someone, or some thing, that will mirror back to me an affirming sense of who I am” (p. 34). Therefore, I need an other to mirror back to me an image of who I am, and this mirror recognition must be positive. Expanding on Taylor’s account of mirroring, Bingham emphasizes the role of mirroring as both reflective and constitutive. He writes:

Mirrors not only “reflect” us, they constitute us. When we look at a mirror, we not only look to see who we already were, we also gain information about ourselves. The mirrored image gained by looking at the silver glass on a wall, as well as the mirrored image provided by the other with whom we come into contact, are both reflective and constitutive. We run to a mirror not only in order to find out what
we already know, but also to gain a sense of self that is new and thus constitutive.
Mirrors would be redundant if we already knew what they had in store. This
double mode of reflection and constitution during the public encounter is
precisely why the recognitive interchange is both promising and uncertain.
Mirroring brings on a new sense of self at the same time that it solidifies the old
sense. The encounter is reflective and reflexive as it both portrays the self and
works on the self (pp. 34-35).

Therefore, to Bingham, one can “become” through the mirror experience; that is,
the mirror metaphor should not just be viewed as a way to see who we already are but
also gives us information about ourselves, and a sense of self that is new. Bingham brings
this constitutive aspect of mirroring in the public space of school and discusses two types
of mirroring within the classroom walls: curricular mirroring and interpersonal mirroring.

**Curricular or Textual Mirroring and Interpersonal Mirroring**

Bingham (2001) defines curricular mirroring as “the sorts of reflections the self
finds by way of the textual encounter”, and interpersonal mirroring as “the fleshy
encounter. I can ‘see’ myself on the written page, or I can ‘see’ myself in another’s eyes.”
(p. 35). What needs to be considered in textual mirroring, especially in a multicultural
society, are the diverse representations across the curriculum. Bingham discusses the
textual mirroring and representation in the curriculum by asking “Who: questions: “Who
is represented in the curriculum?”, “Who is getting recognition through the books that are
being read in classrooms?”, “Whose stories are being told? Who is being represented and
who is being left out?” (p. 36). It is crucial to know whose dignity is sustained through these representations both in schools and in the larger public domains.

Bingham (2001, p. 37) asserts that positive textual mirror recognition is significant in public places such as schools. Using Taylor’s idea on self as dialogical, Bingham argues that since the modern self is formed in conversation and relation to other people, textual mirroring is then part of the conversation that are said and written by other people. In the public space of school, students can look to written sources of mirroring and be recognized or misrecognized. Thus, it is important to consider textual mirror recognition in curriculum especially in a multicultural curriculum where all students need to be equitably represented or mirrored textually and their stories are to be told.

In addition to textual mirroring, Bingham emphasizes the necessity of interpersonal mirroring. Such mirroring in school can be given through teachers and other students. Others can give a student an image of who he is and what it means to be him. Citing Hegel, Bingham (2001) sees this recognition as a conscious discovery of who one is, that is, recognition as rethinking who one is in the presence of another. However, there is another side to recognition—the psychological tones of private and public recognition. In Bingham’s words, one’s understanding of self in past and present, who one was and who one will be, might be different. A teacher or other students may offer a student an image different from the mirror image that he has experienced at home.
Bingham’s interpersonal mirroring applies to my own first grade experience, which I described in chapter two. In that experience, my private sense of self, in particular, the way my hair was, got affected by my teacher’s judgmental dialogues with me. In my private sphere, I was OK with my hair and I was recognized by my significant others whether or not my hair was pulled back. My natural sense of self was disconnected from any prejudices as my parents did not control my hair style. However, this private self was questioned and degraded when I entered the public place of the school. In the beginning, I did not participate in my teacher’s dialogue with me; though, after being repeatedly mirrored an image of “You’re not OK if ….”, I complied and changed my hair style. I could not think of myself (in relation to my hair) in a disengaged fashion anymore as I got misrecognized. This was a defining time for me as afterwards I defined myself in terms of my hair and what to be like through my teacher’s powerful discourse. It was after this misrecognition that I learned to please my teacher in order to gain recognition—recognition that was not natural anymore. Thus, with regard to my hair, my definition of who I was changed by moving from the private sphere to the public.

As illustrated by this example, the mirror recognition one gets at home can be different from the mirror recognition one gets in school and/or in the larger society. This makes one conscious thinking of who one is change by moving from the private to the public sphere especially when the mirroring is negative (as in the above example). As Bingham says, if the image one is given at the public place of school is confining or demeaning, one can become what she is not, due to negative mirroring.

25 The misrecognition did happen to me at the public level, though, it was done to one of my attributes (my hair), an attribute that was personal—rather than social.
The Harm of Negative Mirroring

Concurring with both Bingham and Taylor, I emphasize the harm of reflecting negative images to the public self. Just like a self in the private sphere, if an adult in the public sphere is repeatedly being subjected to an inferior image such as an image of “not being able”, she will gradually adopt that image as a truth. Her natural self will be imprisoned in that unreal image of herself and she will internalize it although it is an inaccurate picture. Thereafter, she will see herself in society through that image and act as if she is that kind of person.

A good example of the constitutive aspect of negative mirroring is nicely illustrated in James Weldon Johnson’s “The Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man”. Johnson (1960) as the narrator of the story tells his experiences as a lighter skinned African-American. As a child, his mother raised him in a different environment than most other blacks because of the money his father had provided them. He was exposed to only upper-class blacks and mostly gentle whites. At the age of nine, he moved from Georgia, where he was born, to Connecticut. In school, where there was racial discrimination and a division between white and black children, he was on the white side. By that age, he had always identified himself as white as he had seen himself different from other students who were not white.

One day, the principal of the school came into Johnson’s classroom and asked the white students to stand up. Johnson did that with the other white students. The teacher asked him to sit down. Shocked at his teacher’s response, Johnson sat down and since then found himself on the other side of the racial division. His white classmates called
him a “nigger”. Johnson was encountering a new image of himself that was different from the one with which he used to identify. In Bingham’s words, the teacher here “acts as a mirror that informs him how he will “look” to others henceforth (p. 41). When Johnsom comes home he asked his mother if he was a nigger. Despite his mother’s negative response, Johnson saw himself as a black person. The picture that his teacher reflected on him changed Johnson’s understanding of who he was both to himself and to others. His teacher’s act made Johnson’s private self gain a different kind of recognition from the ones he had experienced in the private sphere as well as the public sphere of school by that day. Johnson became that reflected image because of his teacher’s act as mirror.

The above example of negative mirroring, as well as my own example from first grade, show that the private self can change into a misrecognized or conditioned self through the experience of encountering a non-nurturing other on the public scene. As argued before, childhood experiences of recognition or misrecognition play an important role in what a child concludes about herself. The conclusion, whether it is “I’m OK” or “I’m not-OK” will be internalized and become part of the child’s life plan or script as she grows up. When the mirroring is negative, the harm is so deep that it can stay with the person for years.

When misrecognition happens and the mirror of the public sphere reflects an oppressive image, it is difficult to take back the harm and heal it. As Johnson says, “It may be that she will never know that she gave me a sword thrust that day in school which was years in healing” (p. 19). The internalization is so strong that even when the negative
mirror is taken away, the misrecognized person or group of people still defines themselves through that oppressive image. They have been so exposed to self-deprecation that even projecting new images such as giving them equal civil rights, voting rights, and equal socio-economic situations does not change their already misrecognized or conditioned sense of self. In such cases, since positive mirroring is done after negative mirroring, it can only work on the surface for the misrecognized people. This is where my critique of mirror recognition comes in.

**A Critique of Mirror Recognition**

In the beginning of this dissertation, I emphasized childhood recognition and discussed that a child can be offered or withheld recognition early in life, way before she starts her life as a grownup in society. I also touched upon the idea of public recognition and said that most theories of recognition are concerned with recognizing the self when the self is already in the public domain. While public recognition of the self needs to be attended to in the larger society, I highlighted the importance of taking the private self and the self in early years of schooling into consideration for recognition. I discussed that if a child’s sense of self is misrecognized or conditioned within the family or in early years of schooling, her feelings associated with unworthiness or being not-OK will be extended through all of school and into her grownup life in society. As a result, when we talk about recognition at the public level, we need to keep in mind that there is a good chance that the grownup in the public sphere has already experienced misrecognition.

This could be addressed through providing a recognitive environment where there is positive mirroring, as Taylor asserts. However, for a self that has formerly experienced
deprivation of emotional and physical recognition or natural strokes, such mirroring works only as a temporary comfort. Positive mirroring is only a reflection, not a pure, authentic recognition for a misrecognized self.

Entering the public sphere, the person with an already misrecognized self needs an other to gain strokes or recognition. This person turns to an other or the outside for recognition since, as Bingham (2001, p. 34) says, she needs to be reflected a positive image that affirms her sense of self. Similarly, Taylor (1991b) advocates the idea of providing a recognize environment where there is positive mirroring. As Taylor’s idea on self as dialogical leads his public mirror recognition of self, I reiterate Taylor’s words here:

My discovering my identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new and crucial importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others (pp. 47-48).

Thus, to recognize the public self which is affected by the dialogues with others, a recognize environment is needed where positive images of self are reflected by others. While positive mirroring is a valuable step toward offering recognition to those who have gone through misrecognition, it does not root out the problem. What Taylor misses is that positive mirroring is only a reflection or representation, not a pure, authentic recognition of a misrecognized self. It is in fact recognition of misrecognition. That is, reflecting
positive images to some marginalized groups of people, for example, for the sake of making them feel equal, accepted, and recognized is a kind of recognition that relies on a prior misrecognition. Since such recognition deals with misrecognition on the surface, through reflection, it cannot change the underlying feeling of not-OK-ness in these people.

As a result, positive mirroring leaves the misrecognized groups of people with a struggle for recognition on the public scene in order to achieve a sense of OK-ness. In the next chapter, I will explain through Nancy Fraser’s (1997) remedies of injustices and misrecognition that recognizing the members of the misrecognized groups through positive mirroring is not a fundamental remedy. Positive mirroring of misrecognized people in the public sphere is helpful in a way that it prevents a misrecognized self to go through more misrecognition, that is, the not-OK or conditioned self does not get reinforced; however, it does not fundamentally address misrecognition. Where it is healthy and humanistic to mirror positive images on the public scene, as Taylor recommends, changing the deep sense of misrecognition needs a change in some underlying sense of values in the societal structure and in devalued group identities.

**Summary**

In this chapter, I defined the term recognition and traced the changes that this important concept has undergone over the past centuries. In particular, I defined recognition through the concept of strokes and emphasized the role of positive strokes in satisfying the child’s physical and psychological needs and her natural recognition. I also advocated the notion of public recognition of self and said that just like the private
sphere, the public sphere needs to provide a nurturing atmosphere for people, too.

Taylor’s politics of recognition speak to this need as he emphasizes the creation of an environment where people’s basic rights as human beings as well as their differences and practices as members of specific groups are both acknowledged. Such an environment helps a natural self to stay natural and unconditioned as it does not thrust upon a self-specific definitions or practices. However, I argued that for a private self that is already conditioned and misrecognized, this environment is only a reflection of positive images. Such positive mirroring is helpful to keep the self away from becoming more conditioned in the public; though, this does not help with substantial changes in the conditioned, misrecognized self. Such prior misrecognition makes the self struggle for recognition in the public sphere. For changing the misrecognized self to a natural one, recognition should go beyond positive mirroring, that is, the underlying layers of misrecognition ought to be addressed. This will be explained in the next chapter through Nancy Fraser’s transformational remedies. In the next chapter, I will stay away from public mirror recognition. Instead, I will discuss three other influential theories of public recognition presented by Deborah Holland and her colleagues, by Nancy Fraser, and by Kelly Oliver. For each theory, I will propose my own parallel psychoanalytical understanding, and I will explain how these theories can be used to advocate recognition of the natural self.
CHAPTER IV: THEORETICAL MANIFESTATIONS OF RECOGNITION

In the previous chapter I defined the concept of recognition through the concept of strokes and emphasized the role of positive strokes in satisfying the child’s physical and psychological needs and his\(^{26}\) natural recognition. I then focused on recognition of the self in adulthood in the public sphere and discussed that the public place, just like the private place, needs to be recognitive and nurturing. Speaking to Taylor and Bingham’s public mirror recognition, I emphasized the *negative* aspect of mirroring as being constitutive and discussed that positive mirroring could not substantially address the underlying feeling of misrecognition in misrecognized groups of people. To aim root causes, transformative changes are needed in the larger society. This will be discussed through Nancy Fraser’s types of remedies in this chapter.

This chapter focuses on three influential theories of public recognition presented by Dorothy Holland and her colleagues, Nancy Fraser, and Kelly Oliver. While the socio-cultural and political thinkers, Holland and her colleagues (1998), do not use the term ‘recognition’ explicitly; they discuss the importance of socio-cultural positions in offering or denying recognition to people and making them who they are. Holland and her colleagues speak to the notion of misrecognition and assigning demeaning positions to specific groups of people. They argue that people’s understanding of their selves is

\(^{26}\) Since in the previous chapter, I referred to ‘child’ as ‘she’, in this chapter I switch to ‘he’.
subject to positioning by whatever powerful discourses selves happen to encounter. After practicing the positions, people internalize the imposed positions and lose their own sense of selves. Using Vygotsky’s theory of fossilization, Holland and her colleagues explain that people’s behavior can become habitual or fossilized through the socio-cultural positions they have been assigned to. I will align myself with Holland and her colleagues in this sense and argue that powerful positions and situations can misrecognize and fossilize people’s natural selves. Both a fossilized self and an unnatural, misrecognized self show habitual behaviours, disconnected with their natural way of being.

Fraser (1997, 2000, 2003) conceptualizes recognition as a paradigm of justice. She asserts that cultural injustices can be addressed by recognition. In addition, socio-economic injustices ought to be considered and addressed by the notion of redistribution. While recognitive remedies enhance social group distribution, redistributive remedies differentiate social groups. To remedy the injustice that cut across the redistribution-recognition divide, Fraser suggests two types of remedies—affirmative and transformative. Using Fraser’s ideas on affirmative and transformative remedies, I will explain that it is the transformative remedies that should be applied to misrecognized groups of people as the affirmative ones do not change people’s understanding of self. I will then resonate Fraser’s discussion on these two remedies with my psychoanalytical discussion on natural and conditioned selves and advocate transformative remedies, since they are associated with deconstruction.

Through Oliver’s (2000, 2001) notion of “witnessing”, I will then argue that witnessing provides a path to the natural self. Oliver describes witnessing as a powerful
alternative to recognition. She argues that recognition that is granted to oppressed people by dominant groups is flawed, as it perpetuates subject-object hierarchies. She thus advocates taking into account the position of the oppressed and develops a theory of recognition that starts with the subjectivity of the oppressed. Oliver suggests subjectivity as the result of the process of witnessing. Witnessing one’s oppression and deconstructing the oppressed situation can reinsert one’s subjectivity. Consistent with Oliver’s ideas, I propose my psychoanalytical understanding of witnessing and explain its similarity to reclaiming subjectivity and connecting to one’s natural self.

Socio-Cultural Positions and Misrecognition in Figured Worlds

In their book, “Identity and Agency in Cultural Worlds”, Dorothy Holland and her colleagues (1998) discuss the role of socio-cultural definitions that are assigned to people in ways that influence how people see and define themselves. They describe people’s understanding of themselves through the notion of figured worlds. By figured worlds, they mean “a socially and culturally constructed realm of interpretation in which particular characters and actors are recognized; significance is assigned to certain acts, and particular outcomes are valued over others” (p. 52). In short, figured worlds are the worlds of socially produced, culturally constructed activities. In figured worlds, people are offered positions in the hierarchies of power and privilege. The offered powerful positions make a significant contribution to how people define themselves.

Holland et al. argue that people’s self-understanding is formed through their internalization of the positions to which they are exposed in the figured worlds. At the societal level, hierarchies of power and privilege and imposed assigned positions to
people can be internalized by people and make some groups of people feel inferior or superior to other groups. These taken social positions will affect people’s self-understandings. Having said that, Holland et al. believe that while people are subject to social positions and power, they can generate and imagine new ways of being. People have agency. They can be dominated by social relations of power, yet they can have possibilities for liberating themselves, either fully or only partially. By giving different examples of Alcoholics Anonymous groups, women in the world of romance, people suffering from mental disorders, and women in Nepal, the authors explain how people can change themselves from being socially positioned from without, to participating in cultural worlds as knowledgeable subjects with agency.27

Holland and her colleagues continue their discussion on internalization of socio-cultural positions by using Vygotsky’s idea on “fossilization” (p. 37). In the following section I will explain the concept of fossilization and take a fossilized self as a conditioned, misrecognized self. Using Holland and her colleagues’ example of women in Nepal, I will illustrate these women’s struggle with their misrecognition in Nepal.

**Fossilization**

Holland and her colleagues (1998) use Vygotsky’s theory of fossilization and explain how a behavior becomes habitual or fossilized through mediating devices.

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At first, in the development of a mediated complex of thought and feeling, mediating devices may be tangible, used voluntarily and consciously: a word said to oneself to encourage oneself to action, a piece of music to which one listens to change one’s mood, a chart that one consults to know what to do next in a work routine. Repeated experience with the tangible device eventually become unnecessary, and its function may be “internalized” (Vygotsky 1978; Wertsch 1985b). The sign-image, that is, its representation within the “inner speaking” (and more generally, inner activity) that constitutes whatever substance there is to self-consciousness, comes to evoke the routine originally organized in relation to the external sign. Finally, the process of self-training may even be forgotten, and the evocation of control may become automatic. Even the sign-image escapes notice, and the behavior becomes in a translation of Vygotsky’s Russian, “fossilized” (p. 37).

Vygotsky’s theory of fossilization describes how the steps and process of learning which were once separable and recognizable to a person lose their separability and fall from awareness. The person does something without thinking how he or she does that anymore. Holland et al. give an interesting example of fossilization in relation to training flight attendants. Their example shows that the training can change the flight attendants’ sense of natural self. Holland et al. (citing Hochschild, 1983, p. 37) state that flight attendants are trained to control their anger over obnoxious passengers by imagining that such a passenger might have had a bad day or might have a fear of flying. The training and use of such a mediating device was so ‘successful’ (as they call it) that it made many flight attendants lose their own sense of anger, on or off the job. They learned to control
their thoughts and emotional reactions so that they could have a specific response toward passengers. Holland et al. summarize the process of fossilization beautifully by saying, “one can learn to ignore aspects of situations to which one would have previously responded” (p. 38). A flight attendant who could become angry at obnoxious passengers is trained to forget about her sense of anger and act as if there is no anger. While previously she would have responded with anger toward such passengers, she is now suppressing her emotional reactions automatically.

This process of internalization and fossilization is similar to the process of misrecognition or conditioning. A fossilized self and a misrecognized or conditioned self are both trained and show habitual or fossilized behaviours. They both have gone through some stages of learning which at first were tangible and recognizable to them. Though, after practicing the same lessons or training, they internalized the lessons and became unconscious about them. A person with a fossilized or conditioned self forgets the process of learning habitual acts. She does things no longer thinking how she does them. For both fossilization and conditioning, it is the controlling situation and the repeated experience that makes the person internalize the lessons, such as the lesson of losing the sense of anger for flight attendants, and thereafter make her do them automatically. In both conditioning and fossilization, the process of learning habitual acts is forgotten; what is left is the product, which is a learned, unnatural behavior.

While a self can be fossilized through self-training and taking lessons (such as the lessons for the flight attendants), it can also be fossilized due to cultural training. Cultural training can transmit fossilized behaviors to us without our even knowing that we are
being trained. For example, in a variety of sexist scenarios, women learn some specific sets of values or disvalues and ways of being in the world—ways that tell them to forget their natural selves and act as if they do not have feelings of womanhood, or even pretend that such feelings do not exist at all. This training does not occur through specific lessons, but can be as powerful or even more powerful than the flight attendants’ training. Women can be thrown into a culture that trains and controls them. They can be misrecognized by learning how to suppress their natural self, their inner voices, and their feelings without even noticing. All these controlling situations and misrecognitions are internalized and fossilized by women. Ignoring their selves becomes a fossilized behavior and women learn to live with repression.

Following their discussion on fossilization and the role of controlling situations in fossilizing one’s self, Holland et al. give examples of women’s figured worlds in Nepal where women’s understanding of themselves has been socially and culturally pre-defined. For instance, in such a socio-cultural world, a good girl has been pre-defined and offered positions in the hierarchies of power and privilege. A Naudadan good girl is a girl who follows the ideal life path set out by Brahmanical teachings. She is interpreted and evaluated based on her acts, roles, and her life course. Her world is envisioned as follows:

“...a girl is first a daughter and a sister. She grows up surrounded by relatives who urge her to cultivate the habits that will mark her as a good daughter, wife, and daughter-in-law. From their teachings and scoldings she learns to be a hard worker, obedient and respectful to elders, and shy, gentle, and virtuous. In the next stage of life path she is married soon after she reaches puberty. With
marriage she becomes a daughter-in-law, a wife, and eventually a mother. She is hard-working, faithful and devoted to her husband, obedient and helpful to her mother-in-law, and a respectable woman in the community. With the birth of children, especially sons, she acquires a valued identity—what some have called the central or prototypical identity of women: that of mother (Stone, 1978). A woman who bears sons proves herself to be a good woman with a good fate. Finally, as a mother-in-law, a position accorded higher status than other female roles in the family, she can direct and control the lives of her daughters-in-law. At the end of the life path, ideally, a woman never becomes a widow. A good and virtuous woman, through ritual observance and daily practice, ensures the health and long life of her husband and dies before him” (pp. 216-217).

The life path described above shows how explicitly women are pre-defined in their figured worlds in Nepal. Throughout their lives, the imposed powerful and controlling conditions define specific positions for them. Being bombarded with different powerful positions that their culture and society offer them, women lose their sensitivity to such threats, accept them, and internalize them. They learn to behave through these assigned positions and ignore their natural way of being. As Holland and her colleagues (1998, p. 219) say these women not only know the expected life path and the ways they should behave as good women but also they embrace these concepts and define themselves through these positions and behaviors.

Having said that, Holland et al. believe in human being’s agency and their generativity. Using the above example of women in Nepal, Holland and her colleagues
discuss how these women combated their fossilized situations and deconstructed the values and disvalues that they had been exposed to through their society and culture.

**Combating Fossilized Situations: Women in Nepal**

Holland et al. explain how women in Nepal deconstructed their pre-defined positions as inferior to men. They say that in 1990, there was a pro-democracy movement in Nepal which overthrew the one-party Panchayat system that had been in place for thirty years. In Naudada, several incidents happened, such as women marching and shouting their demands: “Men, stop your drinking and gambling! Let women inherit property! Give women equal rights! Don’t marry off your daughters so young!” (p. 214), or women threatening a drunken husband who had beaten his wife. These events were unusual and surprising as these women had enacted the cultural definitions of the “good Hindu woman” set by Brahmanical teachings. They had recognized the controlling situations that defined good women as “good workers, good girls, and obedient and honorable daughters” (p. 215), and had become sensitive to social and cultural injustices.

According to Holland et al., women in Naudada also claimed their sense of self through songs which helped them express their awareness of their positioning and conditioning within their domestic lives. For instance, during the big ritual Tij festival, women compose songs that convey their inner speech, and sing them to hundreds of people. In the following song, women criticize the socio-cultural roles and positions of women versus men and demand equal rights:

You [parents] compel the daughter to work hard.
How can we abolish this exploitation?

When the daughter is educated, they call her a prostitute.

They believe such matters.

Our society won’t allow women to be educated.

When we think of this, it makes us angry.

They not only select the husband,

And donate us to him like the gift of a cow,

We have no right to select a boy whom we like.

No money is in our hand to spend.

Even when we are sick, we women have to work.

They say we are lazy and trying to cheat them.

A minor mistake they blow out of proportion.

We women have to live like animals.

How long can we tolerate this kind of custom?

We must become determined to abolish this condition! (pp. 229-230)

Holland et al. argue that Tij songs were used by women as a tool for authoring themselves in society they lived in. The songs and the way they were produced and used in women’s interactions with one another influenced women’s understanding of themselves in their families' world as well as in central Nepal. Over the course of their research, Holland and her colleagues found that women were becoming more proficient in (re)producing critical commentaries. In their songs, women not only ascribed their suffering to their bad treatment in the family and compared the treatment of daughters with that of sons, but they also criticized the government for policies and practices that
harmed women. The songs were about their heartfelt feelings focusing on both their
domestic relationships as well as the national political parties which portrayed the
women’s roles in the world. Women were envisioning and demanding a world where new
dispositions and sensibilities could be formed. Holland and her colleagues write:

In the space of the Tij Festival, women were authoring new worlds and, in turn,
new selves. Different constructions of being female were evolving with novel
imagined worlds. As they appropriated political song texts as tools of self-
identification, Kamala [a thirteen-year-old song writer] and the other women
producing these songs were developing ways of conceptualizing themselves as
politically aware actors and activists in a political world. Through the medium of
the festival, alternative worlds, identities, cultural forms, and senses of agency
were codeveloping. This was a path toward a new world of gender relations and
gendered identities in Naudada (p. 269).

Therefore, Holland and her colleagues show that while one’s self is socially and
culturally constructed, people can change themselves from being socially positioned to
participating in the cultural worlds as subjects with agency. Such transformation is
possible through recognition of, and reflection on, the imposed positions and injustices.
This is what we see in the above song. To change positions, people need to first recognize
that they have been misrecognized and their self is conditioned. Thereafter, they can
deconstruct the threats to their self, seek remedies and see the alternatives.
What is so very important about Holland and her colleagues’ ideas on people’s understanding of themselves is that they turn to *people* for changing their understandings of themselves and they *believe* in people’s ability to change. They believe that people have agency and ability in reconstructing their sense of self, and that they have agency to make their own ways into cultural worlds. To Holland et al., people can express their experiences and become aware of their positioning, just as the women in Nepal did. Holland and her colleagues emphasize people’s agency for improvisation and changing their self-understanding. Therefore, while people can be instruments and products of social situations and discipline, they have capacities to produce new ways of being.

Whereas Holland et al. highlight recognition from the perspective of people, that is, they highlight that recognition can be achieved by people themselves, other thinkers like Nancy Fraser look at recognition from the perspective of society and ask society for equality and social justice. For example, Holland et al. see that women in Nepal understand the socio-cultural injustices that are imposed on them and come to recognize their own selves through fighting and combating. On the other hand, Fraser asks in particular for socio-economic justices and egalitarian redistribution in order to recognize all groups of people. Fraser also suggests remedies to deal with injustices and lack of recognition. Her ideas are discussed below in detail.

**Nancy Fraser on Recognition**

Nancy Fraser is a critical theorist whose concern is justice. She looks at the concept of justice from two important perspectives: cultural and socio-economic. Fraser (2000, p. 109) says that in today’s society, we need both cultural justice as well as socio-
economic justice. To establish cultural justice, we need to ask for recognition and to establish socio-economic justice, we need redistribution. Recognition and redistribution are important dimensions of justice, and they are both needed. However, Fraser states that in the late twentieth century, recognition has displaced socio-economic redistribution. This means that recognizing different groups of people has supplanted socio-economic equality as a remedy for injustice. Fraser’s concern is that struggles for recognizing different groups of people with different nationality, ethnicity, gender, “race”, and sexuality should not pre-dominate economic equality. In other words, demands for recognition should not replace or displace economic redistribution.

To make this clearer, Fraser (2000, pp. 110-111) first analyzes the above two paradigms of justice—recognition and redistribution. She argues that addressing redistribution or socio-economic injustices is rooted in the political-economic structures of the society. For example, not having an adequate material standard of living, or being poorly paid, are matters of socio-economic injustices. On the other hand, cultural or symbolic injustices are rooted in social patterns that are represented in the society. For instance, being disrespected routinely in stereotypical public representations, or being rendered invisible because of acknowledging only one dominant culture’s practices are matters of cultural injustices. Fraser says that both socio-economic injustices as well as cultural injustices are widespread and so should be remedied.

Here is how Fraser proposes ‘redistribution’ as a remedy for the socio-economic injustices and ‘recognition’ for the cultural injustices. She (1997) says that redistribution might involve “redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, subjecting
investment to democratic decision making, or transforming other basic economic
structures.” (p. 15). In general, she refers to all of these factors as ‘redistribution’. On the
other hand, recognition can include:

“upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned
groups. It could also involve recognizing and positively valorizing cultural
diversity. More radically still, it could involve the wholesale transformation of
societal patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication in ways that
would change everybody’s sense of self” (p. 15).

While the above remedies are different, she refers to them all as ‘recognition’.
Fraser says that these two remedies leave us with an either/or choice—whether we should
embrace a politics of redistribution that seeks to cease class differentials or we should
choose a politics of recognition with the aim of celebrating group differences. Despite
distinguishing these two remedies, Fraser declares that the two are intertwined. Both
redistribution and recognition are fundamental dimensions of justice that should go
together. One remedy should not be subordinated by the other. Fraser (2003, p. 16)
explains this wonderfully through the idea of a two-dimensional spectrum of different
social divisions which I have shown in Figure 2. Imagining a conceptual spectrum of
different kinds of social divisions, Fraser sees one end with divisions that fit the paradigm
of recognition and the other with divisions that fit the paradigm of redistribution. In
between are cases that fit both remedies simultaneously (Figure 2). Fraser posits social
divisions that are rooted in the economic structure of society at the redistribution end of
the spectrum. This side of the spectrum includes injustices derived from socio-economic
maldistribution, such as that brought about by class differentiation. Since class differentiation has roots in the economic structure of capitalist societies or maldistribution, the remedy to redress this exploitation is redistribution, not recognition. That is, to overcome the injustice, the class distribution of benefits and limits should be restructured.

![Redistribution-Recognition Spectrum](image)

Figure 2: Redistribution-recognition spectrum

On the other hand, at the other end of the conceptual spectrum are social divisions that fit the paradigm of recognition. Fraser (2003, p. 17) states that such division is derived from the *status order* of society rather than the economic structure. Since the injustices are related to the society’s institutionalized patterns of cultural value or misrecognition, the remedy for this status differentiation (as opposed to class differentiation) is recognition (as opposed to redistribution). Then, Fraser argues that social divisions are mostly located in the middle of the spectrum. Calling them “two-dimensional”, Fraser says that social divisions such as class, “race”, sexuality, and gender involve injustices that have roots in both the economic structure and the status order of the society; thus, redressing them needs attending to both the politics of redistribution and the politics of recognition.
Fraser (2003, pp. 20-22) discusses that these two-dimensionally subordinated groups suffer both maldistribution and misrecognition. For instance, gender, as a two-dimensional social differentiation, is both a class-like division and a status differentiation. To describe the class-like division and distributive perspective, Fraser writes:

On the one hand, it [gender] structures the fundamental division between paid “productive” labor and unpaid “reproductive” and domestic labor, assigning women primary responsibility for the latter. On the other hand, gender also structures the division within paid labor between higher-paid, male-dominated manufacturing and professional occupations and lower-paid, female-dominated “pink collar” and domestic service occupations. The result is an economic structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive injustice, including gender-based exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation (p. 20).

Fraser explains that gender as a class-like division has roots in the economic structure of society. At bottom, the remedy required to address the injustice will be a distributive address which transforms the economy so that its gender structure is eliminated. This elimination means to get rid of the gender division of labor “both the gendered division between paid and unpaid labor and the gender divisions within the paid labor” (p. 20). Having said that, this is only one dimension of the social division spectrum. Gender is also about status differentiation. It includes cultural patterns of interpretation and evaluation which affect the status order. In Fraser’s words, gender injustice is about androcentrism: “an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing everything coded as
“feminism,” paradigmatically—but not only—women” (pp. 20-21). Androcentric value patterns inform many areas in society such as law (e.g. legal constructions of privacy, self-defense, and equality), government policy (e.g. reproductive and immigration policy), standard professional practices (e.g. medicine and psychotherapy), as well as the popular culture and everyday interaction. As a result:

... women suffer gender-specific forms of status subordination, including sexual assault and domestic violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; exclusion or marginalization in public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of the full rights and equal protections of citizenship. These harms are injustices of recognition (Fraser, 2003. p. 21).

Here, gender appears as a status differentiation which cries out for recognitive redress. Gender, like other social divisions such as “race”, class, and sexuality, is a two-dimensional social differentiation with both class-like dimension and status dimension which simultaneously bring about matters of redistribution and recognition.

Integrating redistribution and recognition is not an easy matter, as Fraser (2003, p. 27) says. To develop an integrated approach that accommodates both dimensions of social justice, Fraser asks whether recognition is a matter of justice or self-realization; in other words, whether claims for recognition are held to concern justice or self-realization. She then discusses Charles Taylor’s view of recognition as he takes recognition as a matter of self-realization. That is, recognition, or being recognized by another subject, is
about obtaining full, undistorted subjectivity. Thus, misrecognition happens when a
group of people are looked down upon or devalued by others’ attitudes or representations.
Unlike Taylor, Fraser looks at recognition as a matter of justice, rather than self-
realization. She treats recognition as an issue of social status: “examining
institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of
social actors” (p. 29). Fraser calls this way of rethinking recognition the status model of
recognition.

The Status Model of Recognition

As mentioned above, Fraser advocates an integration of recognition and
redistribution rather than undermining or subsuming one under the other. Both
redistribution and recognition are fundamental dimensions of justice that should go
together as she rethinks the notion of recognition. Looking at recognition as a matter of
justice, Fraser discusses specific institutionalized value patterns in society that produce
injustices and misrecognition. Through her status model of recognition, Fraser sees
misrecognition through the lens of social status:

… examining institutionalized patterns of cultural values for their effects on the
relative standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as
peers, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we

can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in contrast,

institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as inferior,
excluded, wholly other, or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in
social interaction, then we should speak of *misrecognition* and *status subordination*. (2003, p. 29).

In order to view recognition as an issue of social status, we need to consider the status of group members as full partners in social interactions. According to the status model, as Fraser (2000, p. 114) says, social-welfare policies, for example, that characterize single mothers as sexually irresponsible people, or racial profiling that relates racialized people with crime, are examples of misrecognition. In these cases, the injustice lies where ‘male-headed households’ are considered as proper while ‘female-headed households’ are not; or where ‘whites’ are taken as law-abiding citizens whereas ‘blacks’ are thought to be dangerous. The result is that some social actors are denied “full-member” status in society, which renders them incapable of participating as peers, due to an institutionalized pattern of cultural value. Redressing these injustices requires the de-institutionalization of the related value pattern that hinders parity of participation and its replacement with an alternative that fosters equality.

In sum, the remedy for injustice is to remove the impediments for equal participation. Once again, to remedy maldistribution, economic restructuring is required so that the objective conditions for participatory parity are ensured. To remedy recognition, the deinstitutionalization of the patterns of cultural value is required for the same reason of parity of participation. In both redistribution and recognition, the general remedy of removing obstacles to participatory parity can be done in more than one way. Fraser (2003) writes:
Economic restructuring could mean redistributing income and/or wealth; reorganizing the division of labor; changing the rules and entitlements of property ownership; or democratizing the procedures by which decisions are made about how to invest social surpluses. Likewise, as also noted, misrecognition can be redressed in more than one way; by universalizing privileges now reserved for advantaged groups or by eliminating those privileges altogether; by deinstitutionalizing differences or by valorizing them or by deconstructing the oppositions that underlie them (p. 73).

Having more than one institutional application as a remedy for the injustices of maldistribution and misrecognition, Fraser asks which ones should be taken into effect. To answer this question, Fraser proposes remedies that cut across the redistribution-recognition divide. She refers to the former as ‘affirmative’ remedies and to the latter as ‘transformative’.

**Affirmative and Transformative Remedies**

Fraser (1997, p. 23) suggests two remedies for injustice: 1) affirmative, which is formal equality or correcting inequitable outcomes on the surface; and 2) transformative, which means to addressing the underlying social structure that generate them and deconstructing the issue. Affirmative remedies relate to revaluing the disrespect to devalued group identities while the sense of everyone’s self remains unchanged. These remedies do not address the underlying framework that has produced the injustices. However, in transformative remedies people’s sense of self changes through transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. Therefore, while in affirmative remedies,
the aim is to address the end-products, in transformative remedies, it is important to address the processes that generate those very same end-products.

As Fraser states, we need to ask for both socio-economic justice and egalitarian *redistribution* and cultural justice and *recognition* as remedies. Both redistribution and recognition are needed; however, *transformative* redistributive and recognition remedies are required. The affirmative redistributive and recognition remedies leave intact the deep structures that have produced socio-economic and cultural injustices. Fraser (1997) states that these affirmative remedies do not change the sense of self of the devalued social group. To explain more, she illustrates both the affirmative and transformative remedies for cultural injustices:

Affirmative remedies for such [cultural] injustices are currently associated with what I shall call “mainstream multiculturalism.” This sort of multiculturalism proposes to redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them. Transformative remedies, by contrast, are currently associated with deconstruction. They would redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. By destabilising existing group identities and differentiations, these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of members of currently disrespected groups, they would change everyone’s sense of self (p. 24).
The contrast between affirmation and transformation can be applied to remedies for both maldistribution and misrecognition. An example of an affirmative strategy in the distributive perspective is the liberal welfare state, as Fraser says (2003, p. 74). Welfare aims to address maldistribution through income transfers. It is aimed to increase the consumption share of the disadvantaged group without disturbing the underlying economic structure. On the other hand, an example of the transformative strategy is socialism. This approach aims to change the division of labor, the forms of ownership, and other underlying structures of the economic system in order to redress the unjust distribution that generates it.

Similarly, the affirmative and transformative strategies can be applied to remedies for misrecognition. Fraser (2003) gives an example for these two strategies and writes:

An example of an affirmative strategy in the latter perspective [recognitive] is what I shall call "mainstream multiculturalism." This approach proposes to redress disrespect by revaluing unjustly devalued group identities, while leaving intact both the contents of those identities and the group differentiations that underlie them. It can be contrasted with a transformative strategy that I shall call "deconstruction." This second approach would redress status subordination by deconstructing the symbolic oppositions that underlie currently institutionalized patterns of cultural value. Far from simply raising the self-esteem of the misrecognized, it would be destabilize existing status differentiations and change everyone’s self-identity (p. 75).
Thus, what Fraser emphasizes in her transformative remedies is to transform specific institutionalized value patterns in society that produce injustices and misrecognition. As explained in the status model of recognition, we need to consider the status of group members as full partners in interaction. If we take some as less than full participants, then we are in the zone of misrecognition and status subordination. As a result, transformative remedies address injustices that relate to an institutionalized relation of social subordination which happens because the status of a full participant in the society has been denied to or withdrawn from someone. It is this type of remedy that should be applied to misrecognized groups of people, as opposed to affirmative one. Affirmative remedies do not change the disrespected groups’ understanding of self. The injuries and injustices would still be there.

Transformative Remedies as a Path to the Natural Self

Fraser’s discussion on addressing injustices and misrecognition through transformative remedies resonates with my discussion on addressing the not-OK self through deconstructing the layers of conditioning. At the social level, Fraser argues that to redress injustices, reflecting affirmative images would only work on the surface. While it is helpful and humanistic, affirmative remedies do not appear to be the solutions for the injustices. We cannot just assume that, for example, by increasing women’s salaries or giving them equal access to job positions as men, or for example, by giving some lands back to Aboriginals, misrecognitions will disappear and that these people will develop a sense of self. Such remedies are useful; however, they do not change women’s or
Aboriginals’ deep feelings about themselves. Substantial work needs to be done—work that affects the underlying cultural-valuational structure.  

Similarly, at the psychoanalytical level, for recognition to be substantial, it ought to happen in transformative ways. It is through deconstructing the layers of conditioning and misrecognition that the natural self re-emerges. Affirmative remedies such as reflecting positive images to a person with a not-OK self can only soothe the awful feeling of being not-OK momentarily. Such remedies are only aimed at addressing the outcomes without addressing the unjust framework. The person has already been misrecognized during her childhood by being exposed to critical, prejudicial conditions. As a child, since her biological and psychological needs were not satisfied by her parents or significant others, she became conditioned and learned to gain strokes or recognition from the outside. Giving her positive strokes or reflecting positive images would relieve her from the feeling of unworthiness or being not-OK, though they do not change her underlying sense of being not-OK. One’s sense of self changes only if substantial work is done; that is, the person needs to go through the process of undoing the layers of conditioning by psychoanalytical practices or some other sort of introspection in order to recapture her natural self.  

In short, redressing misrecognition by means of transformative remedies can help a person claim her natural self back. I want to further emphasize that this premise is also discussed by Kelly Oliver (2000, 2001) through her notion of “witnessing”. Oliver sees witnessing as an alternative to recognition. She takes witnessing as “bearing witness for

what cannot be seen” and asks us to go beyond the kind of recognition that demands visibility. She suggests that we acknowledge the oppression and victimization of those whose subjectivity has been undermined, even if we have not seen their oppression. Moreover, Oliver sees witnessing as a promising notion to claim one’s (the oppressed) subjectivity. That is, a person can find subjectivity through witnessing her own oppression and misrecognition. When a person is witnessing her own misrecognition and speaks about her oppressive situations, she is actually reinserting her subjectivity. As I will discuss Oliver’s ideas in more detail in the next sections, witnessing is a powerful alternative to reconceiving subjectivity. Reinserting or repairing subjectivity through witnessing is, like transformative remedying, to reclaim, and to offer a path to, the natural self.

**Kelly Oliver’s Critique of Recognition**

Kelly Oliver is a critical philosopher who has developed a theory of recognition by starting from the position of the one-othered rather than from a position of the one-recognizing. Oliver (2000, p. 32) argues that in work that relies on the notion of recognition, there is an unreasonable emphasis on the idea that people get a sense of their selves inter-subjectively. That means that we come to recognize ourselves through either the positive or negative recognition of the other. A positive sense of self is the result of positive recognition from the other while a negative sense of self comes from negative recognition or lack of recognition from the other. Therefore, the other is either the one who confers recognition on us, or the one on whom we confer recognition. In either case, the other is an object for the subject. The question then is what about the subjectivity of this so-called other?
Thus, Oliver’s concern is about the subject position of the othered. By taking into account the subject position of the othered, Oliver critiques the theory of recognition as, she says, demands for recognition from an other actually show that one is subject and the other an object. To put it simply, when there is a subject, the other is an object. We need to consider that the other is also a subject. Oliver (2001) argues the dichotomy between subject and the other, or subject and the object, and writes:

To see oneself as a subject and to see other people as the other or objects not only alienates one from those around him but also enables the dehumanization inherent in oppression and domination. It is easier to justify domination, oppression, and torture if one’s victims are imagined as inferior, less human, or merely objects who exist to serve subjects. Within this familiar scenario, to see oneself as a subject is to imagine oneself as self-sovereign. This sense of myself as a subject gives the impression that I have agency and that I can act in the world. To see other people as objects or the other denies them the sovereignty and agency of subjectivity. To see other people as objects or the other is to imagine them unable to govern themselves as subjects (p. 3).

Oliver questions the subjectivity and agency of a person when he, the person, is objectified. She argues that one is not a subject when he or she is dominated by an other, Critiquing contemporary theories, Oliver says that becoming a subject should not be about enslavement and domination. What is still dominant today is the Hegelian notion of recognition that describes subjectivity as the result of hostile conflict and our relations
with others as struggles for recognition. This means that subjectivity is constructed as two independent subjects fighting for the position of domination, instead of cooperation and mutual growth. If we take subjectivity as the result of hostile conflict (the Hegelian notion), then subjectivity is destroyed rather than created. In such a conflict, one’s desires and wishes are at the expense of the other’s (2001, p. 4).

Oliver (2001) also critiques those theorists who take subjectivity as dialogic and believe that “the subject is a response to an address from the other” (p.5). For instance, Charles Taylor defines an individual’s identity and sense of self dialogically. Oliver argues that such definitions of subjectivity—subjectivity as the recognition that comes through dialogue—disregard the response-ability and the address-ability of the subject. These dialogical theories of recognition undermine the response-ability that is implied in the other. They do not see that the other is not mute or invisible, but is a subject and agent. When one is objectified and subordinated, the two merits of address-ability and response-ability are damaged. Address-ability and response-ability are the roots of subjectivity. In recognition that comes through discourse, we are responsible for responding in ways that open up, rather than close off, the possibility of response by others. Oliver (2001) says,

We are responsible to the other’s ability to respond. To serve subjectivity, and thereby humanity, we must be vigilant in our attempts to continually open and reopen the possibility of response. We have a responsibility to open ourselves to the responses that constitute us as subjects (p. 19).
However, in theories on subjectivity as dialogic, subjects struggle to deny their dependence on others. For instance, Taylor (1994) states “the crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character. … We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us” (pp. 32-33). Oliver argues that a theorist like Taylor, who sees subjectivity or identity in relation to recognition that comes through dialogue, does not realize that subjectivity is about response-ability, or response to address. Subjectivity is not about subjects being opposed to others. In subjectivity as dialogical, subjects take each other as objects, struggling to deny their dependence on others. As Oliver (2000) says, “subjects still dominate in spite of their dependence on dialogue with their “others” and “objects”” (p. 32). Oliver argues that if we are subjects and have subjectivity by virtue of our dialogic relationships with others, then we are subjects who are not in war with others. While subjectivity is necessarily inter-subjective and dialogic, it is not necessarily hostile. Subjectivity does not necessarily need to produce hostility between people. That is why she asks for seeing subjectivity through the position of those othered as it seems that the subjectivity of the other is at the expense of the subject’s. To develop a theory of subjectivity that starts with the subjectivity of the othered, she discusses the process of witnessing, which is explained below.

**Oliver on Witnessing**

Witnessing entails two meanings: the juridical meaning of eye-witness, and the religious connotations of “bearing witness” for what cannot be seen (2000, p. 31). For the purpose of my discussions here, I only focus on the second meaning of it which is acknowledging one’s experience even if we have not been an eye-witness to it.
Witnessing is a powerful alternative to recognition and a basis for subjectivity. Oliver asks us to go beyond the kind of recognition that is about visibility or demands visibility. This is because some people within the dominant culture are visible and empowered, yet those who are suffering remain invisible within the mainstream culture and, as a result, are disempowered. Witnessing means that we acknowledge the oppression of the other—the other whose sense of self and subjectivity has been degraded and misrecognized although we may not have seen their degradation.

Oliver (2001) says that subjectivity is the result of the process of witnessing. Witnessing is the basis for othered subjectivity since it includes both address-ability and response-ability. She explains that antagonism or hostility is not necessary for becoming a subject. It rather ruins subjectivity because it destroys the possibility of address-ability and responsibility or witnessing. To address antagonism or hostility of the othered, Oliver argues that the othered can be a witness of it. That is, the othered can start repairing damaged subjectivity by taking up the position of a speaking subject.

Subjectivity is the result of the process of witnessing. Witnessing is not only the basis for othered subjectivity; witnessing is also the basis for all subjectivity; and oppression and subordination work to destroy the possibility of witnessing and thereby undermine subjectivity. Against theorists who maintain that subordination or trauma is necessary in order to become a subject, I argue that subordination or trauma undermines the possibility of becoming or maintaining subjectivity by destroying or damaging the possibility of witnessing (p. 7).
When an other attests to his degradation and oppression, he is in fact claiming his subjectivity. With the virtue of address-ability and response-ability, this ‘other’ is now a speaking subject. Thus, we need to admit and acknowledge the person’s experience and its realness without passing any judgment, even if we have not been an eye-witness to one’s oppressive experience. The process of bearing witness helps in reconstituting address-ability and response-ability that were damaged through the oppression. To Oliver, this is the kind of recognition that is more rewarding.

Therefore, the kind of recognition that Oliver sees necessary for subjectivity is different from the kind of recognition explained by theorists such as Taylor who see subjectivity in terms of recognition resulting from dialogue. According to Oliver, “Acknowledging the realness of another’s life is not judging its worth, or conferring respect, or understanding or recognizing it, but responding in a way that affirms response-ability” (p. 106). She believes that we need to respond to others beyond what is understandable and visible to us. We need to acknowledge that there are experiences that are beyond our comprehension but are still real. The one who bears witness is testifying to something that is beyond vision; the witness or the listener has not seen the oppressive experience of the person though he or she bears witness. He or she bears witness and responds to something that is beyond the visible world of the eyewitness. Thus, witnessing is a more rewarding alternative for recognition as it allows us to acknowledge what can never be seen and is impossible to see.

Furthermore, Oliver says that while the act of speaking and witnessing proves subjectivity, the social context can call it into question. This is because the social context
and the dominant culture can reduce people to objects by making them an other. In such a context, those who want to legitimize themselves, their agency, and their right, experience their oppression every time they speak about it. They are in the position of an other and it is the dominant culture that legitimizes their subjectivity. In addition, it is difficult and painful to testify because of the paradoxical nature of bearing witness to one’s own oppression.

The act of witnessing itself can help restore self-respect and a sense of one’s self as an agent or a self, even while it necessarily recalls the trauma of objectification. Witnessing enables the subject to reconstitute the experience of objectification in ways that allow her to reinsert subjectivity into a situation designed to destroy it. Even so, the paradoxical nature of bearing witness to your own oppression makes it difficult and painful to testify (2001, p. 98).

Oliver (2001) explains that every time the oppressed speak about their oppressive experiences, there is the risk of becoming an object again (citing Harriet Jacob, 1861, p. 100). What is important is considering those who listen to them or read about them and how the testimony of the oppressed is taken by those people. Testifying is beneficial when the listener does not judge them or put their testimony on trial, but instead becomes a sympathetic listener. Oliver’s discussion on witnessing one’s oppression is similar to my discussion on witnessing one’s conditioning. In the following section, I explain this similarity as well as Oliver’s critiques on subjectivity and recognition, and relate them to my discussion on natural and conditioned self.
**Witnessing and the Natural Self**

To Oliver (2000, pp. 31 & 37), this is a question: if we see recognition as a struggle, and the relationship between people as a fight for recognition, then how can we expect to have a peaceful outcome? How can we imagine peace and compassion in a condition where domination and foreclosure are essential to becoming a subject? Oliver criticizes the Hegelian theory of recognition where we can only recognize ourselves in relation with others through struggle, presuming that human relations are essentially struggles rather than compassionate, peaceful relations. Recognition is not about seeing the other as an object for either conferring recognition on us or being conferred recognition by us. If I see myself as the subject and the other as an object for me and my recognition, then I am denying the subject position of the other. In such a relationship, there is domination, subordination, and struggle for who dominates the other, rather than dignity and respect.

Concurring with Oliver, I also argue that recognition should not be a struggle. As I discussed earlier, recognition that comes *after* misrecognition of the natural self is a struggle. It is a struggle to get recognition from the outside. In recognition as a struggle, recognition is seen as something that can be conferred on the person from the outside. Since the person is not given the natural strokes and the nurturing environment in childhood, her biological and psychological needs are not satisfied naturally. As a result, she learns to please an other, withdraw, or accumulate possessions in order to get strokes from others. Thereafter, struggle for getting recognition from an other or the outside world becomes her life quest. This kind of a relationship that is based on the struggle between two subjects, one—the child—struggling for recognition and the other—the
parent or any authority figure—conferring recognition on the child, is not recognition but is in fact oppression and subordination. The child who struggles for recognition starts from the perspective of othered subjectivity and is enslaved. The parent who confers recognition is in the position of subject who objectifies the child. Such object-subject relationship makes the child conditioned and conclude that “I’m not-OK, You’re OK”.

This process of oppression and subordination is painful for the child to witness. Just like Oliver’s notion of witnessing, it is difficult for a child to bear witness to her own experiences of becoming conditioned and losing her subjectivity. In conditioning, unjust and controlled situations make the child turn over her subjectivity to those adult figures as he is small and helpless. The child experiences oppression and internalizes the not-OK experiences along with the associated inferior feelings. Later on in her life, every time the person remembers an oppressive event of her childhood, she will go through the same painful experience of witnessing her own oppression or misrecognition, and will view herself as an object.

Having said that though, through recalling the pain and trauma of those experiences as well as bearing witness to her own degradation and oppression, the person in the position of othered subjectivity can start repairing those inferior feelings. As Oliver says, the act of witnessing one’s oppression reinserts one’s subjectivity; i.e., the oppressed or conditioned person who has been considered as an other testifies to her subjectivity through the act of witnessing and becomes a speaking subject. That is, by witnessing and testifying to one’s own oppression, the person with the conditioned self who has been othered, reclaims its original subjectivity and her natural self. Any
reclaiming through deconstructing the oppressive situations and conditions can be a path for the person to return to her natural self and her natural being as a subject.

Summary

In this chapter, I discussed three influential theories of public recognition presented by Holland and her colleagues, Fraser, and Oliver. Using Holland and her colleagues’ ideas on self, I explained that socio-cultural power can interrupt the natural recognition of people’s selves through assigning them positions. While Holland and her colleagues’ view on recognition is about transformation in people’s understanding of their misrecognized self and claiming their agency back through their individual awareness and combat, Farser’s view turns to society—rather than to the individuals—for taking back one’s agency, and asks society for recognition and social justice. Fraser’s concern about the cultural and socio-economic injustices and misrecognition in society results in proposing two remedies: “affirmative” which addresses the inequality on the surface, and “transformative” which advocates deconstructing the injustices in the societal cultural-valuational structure. Resonating with these two remedies from the psychoanalytical perspective, I argued that it is the transformative remedies that can address, deconstruct, and change the underlying feeling of misrecognition or not-OK-ness.

Lastly, I discussed Kelly Oliver’s ideas on witnessing as an alternative for recognition. In witnessing, to recognize the ‘other’ as a subject, we need to acknowledge her experiences even if it goes beyond our comprehension or vision. In addition, one can
witness her own oppression or misrecognition and reinsert her subjectivity by speaking about her painful experiences. Discussing Oliver’s notion of witnessing from a psychoanalytical point of view, I argued that the misrecognized or conditioned person who had been ‘othered’ can testify to her subjectivity through psychoanalytical practices and use these practices as a path to her natural being and sense of self.

In the next chapter, I will move away from the theories of recognition and the concept of recognition through the natural self in a general way; instead I will focus on the educational significance of recognizing the natural self. In particular, I will choose three social mechanisms self-monitoring or ‘panopticism’, ‘alienation’, and ‘stultification’ that reinforce the unnatural or conditioned self in students. I will then examine these mechanisms in the primary years of schooling (from kindergarten to grade 3) and explain how children might experience panopticism, alienation, and stultification in school. Panopticism, alienation, and stultification all either encourage and change a student’s natural self into a conditioned or misrecognized self, or they reinforce an already conditioned self in students. No matter which one it is, it is the misrecognized self that is the final product.
Throughout this dissertation, I have reinterpreted recognition through the lens of the natural self. I have considered this self, as opposed to the conditioned self, as a model for recognition that counts and serves the human being. While in the previous chapters I have discussed the concept of recognition through the natural self more generally, in this chapter, I specifically address those mechanisms in education that misrecognize the natural self or, in other words, that reinforce the conditioned self. These mechanisms are panopticism or self-monitoring, alienation, and stultification. Looking at these mechanisms in education, I link my work to the education of young children and explain how in the primary years of school (from kindergarten to grade 3), they might experience self-monitoring, alienation, and stultification, which lead to their conditioning or its reinforcement. This will include my ideas on changing teaching practices for young children.

As I discussed in the beginning of this dissertation, conditioning occurs during childhood, when the child is between two and eight years of age, and is then developed as the child grows up. At home, the child’s natural self is usually adapted or conditioned in one way or another. After entering school, the child can become more conditioned if the teachers and environment are not nurturing. I emphasized recognition of the child’s natural self in early years of a child’s life in the private sphere as well as the public
sphere through her first experiences of schooling. I argued that a child who has already experienced not-OK feelings within the family can practice the same script in school and be at a disadvantage in learning. Unless there are nurturing and competent teachers who can stroke an already misrecognized child with their sensible words and judicious actions as well as a nurturing environment where children can experience their natural, free selves, school can be a place for children to reinforce their conditioning and not-OK feelings.

In this chapter, I am more specific about the educational practices that can condition or reinforce the child’s adaptation. While I argue the three social mechanisms of panopticism, alienation, and stultification in regard to education more generally, I include specific educational practices that create or reinforce conditioning for younger children. I focus my discussion on the first four years of education from the kindergarten to grade 3 as these years are critical in becoming conditioned or its reinforcement. In particular, I argue that disciplinary rules in these years create self-monitoring or panopticism; grades, grouping children, and labelling them result in alienation; and explication leads to their stultification, which all misrecognize the natural selves of children.

Describing self-monitoring or panopticism, I explain that students’ (and even teachers’) natural selves can be suppressed when there is an external power or control observing their behaviour. Where in Foucault’s description of panopticism, the inmates are confined in prison and are under the watchful eyes of guards, in panopticism applied to educational contexts, the students are under the watchful eyes of authority figures in
the form of monitors, teachers and administrators. Because of the presence of power and control, students’ natural selves can be confined by the power of a higher being and become more conditioned. I also discuss the concept of alienation and explain that educational contexts can strengthen alienation by encouraging students to do things to please their teachers or their parents at home. Actions like ranking, emphasizing grades, or labelling students can cause students to become alienated. Moreover, I argue that educational systems such as the banking approach can reinforce the student’s conditioned self, since they transform the consciousness of the student into a consciousness that conforms with the prescriber’s (e.g. teacher). In such a system, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits while the students pile up many facts and information as a result of knowledge transmission. As Freire notes, the students internalize a sense of self-depreciation and become dehumanized. Dehumanization is equal to alienation—a distortion of being fully human.

The last social mechanism I will analyze in this chapter is Rancière’s idea on stultification (1991). Stultification happens because of the desire to explain or ‘explicate’. Explication makes students internalize the image of being ignorant and the idea that they need instruction. It gives more power, authority, and control to the teacher while taking it away from students. An educational environment where stultification occurs is surely not a nurturing environment as it causes students’ natural self to be suppressed or misrecognized. In general, while no educational system considers panopticism, alienation, or stultification as aims of education, somewhere along the way, these occur. This can be partly due to the hidden agenda that exists in curriculum. My purpose here is to discuss these social mechanisms with the hope this
can help curriculum developers, teachers, and other authority figures in education to attend more to recognizing students’ natural selves.

**Conditioning and Panopticism**

The concept of panopticism was originally developed by Michel Foucault in 1975. Foucault begins with his discussion on panopticism by describing a disciplinary model and the measures that were taken in a town in the 17th century when the plague appeared. The disciplinary model taken was a contingency plan for the administration of quarantine during the plague. It took extreme measures to control the disease. Foucault begins the description of the measures by first explaining the process of quarantine such as partitioning of space, closing off houses and locking up inhabitants, and then the process of purifying the houses by making the inhabitants leave and separating the lepers. Throughout his description, Foucault points out the exercise of power in ceaseless inspection and registration. He shows the extreme of power’s presence and efficiency of surveillance in the execution of quarantine during plague by describing the town as follows:

The plague-stricken town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies—this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city. (p. 198)

The plague and all the techniques and institutions for administering the quarantine and purifying the town bring into play the exercise of disciplinary power. Foucault says
(1975, pp. 198-199) that while leper formed separation and exclusion, plague gave rise to disciplinary power. Lepers were excluded and left to their own devices (in the darkness of a dungeon) whereas those sick of the plague “were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself” (p. 198). The image of the separated lepers forms the project of exclusion, and the image of the plague stands for all sorts of abnormality and disorder in disciplinary projects. These two ways of exercising power—one of binary division and branding (the leper) and the other of coercive assignment of differential distribution (the plague victim)—later become combined to form a disciplinary subject. The fully developed model of this double subject that provides both separation/exclusion and segmentation can be seen in the operation of the “panopticon”.

Foucault discusses Bentham’s panopticon as a power mechanism that creates disciplines or a method of behaviour. The panopticon is a type of prison building designed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century. Bentham had the idea that “power should be visible but unverifiable” (p. 201). Thus, he designed the prison building in a way that inmates were constantly visible but they never knew whether they were being observed. Meanwhile, they were made to think that they were always seen: “He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication.” (p. 200)

The panopticon has a tower at the centre with wide windows open to the inner side of the ring, making it possible to see each cell in which a prisoner is kept. The prisoners are seen but they are not able to see and communicate with the guard or other
prisoners. The concept of the design is to allow the guard to see all of the prisoners while the prisoners never know whether they are being observed or not. The design was meant to create a sense of permanent visibility that ensured the functioning of power. Foucault (1975) describes the major effect of the panopticon as follows:

To induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (p. 201)

Therefore, no force is needed to make someone do something in a specific way. The external power has already been inscribed. Since no inmate can see if they are being observed or not, they patrol themselves as if there is a constant power presence. The sense of being under constant visibility guarantees the function of power even if no one is asserting it. Foucault says that such a building design, one that implies the idea of visible but unverifiable power, can be applied to any group of people who need to be controlled such as prisoners, medical patients, madmen, school children, or workers.

If the inmates are convicts, there is no danger of a plot, an attempt at collective escape, the planning of new crimes for the future, bad reciprocal influences; if
they are patients, there is no danger of contagion; if they are madmen there is no risk of their committing violence upon one another; if they are schoolchildren, there is no copying, no noise, no chatter, no waste of time; if they are workers, there are no disorders, no theft, no coalitions, none of those distractions that slow down the rate of work, make it less perfect or cause accidents. (pp. 200-201)

While the panopticon was presented by Bentham at a particular institution, we see that Foucault takes its applicability as a power mechanism to different groups of people. Whether they are patients, students, or workers, the director in the central power is able to change their behaviour, impose upon them the functioning he or she thinks best, and judge them continuously. The use of this capability by a director or any authority figure seems like a return to the plague-stricken town and the permanent surveillance that Foucault began the chapter with. Therefore, any institution or any authority person that follows the principles of panopticism exercises power and controls people. Having said that, the institutions usually do it in a way that their people see them (the institutions) as open and free. While the outside is controlled by the inside surveillance, the panoptic system works in a way that individuals willingly accept the modes of control. This is the magic point about panopticism—thinking of oneself as free while constantly patrolling the self due to interior surveillance.

**Panopticism in Schools**

Panopticism is first external and then changes into internal control. The person who is exposed to external power starts self-monitoring after some time and self-monitoring then becomes parts of her. For instance, in a classroom or a lecture hall, if the
instructor knows she is being taped, as a teacher or instructor, she will watch what she says and lectures. Since she is aware of her behaviour and has not internalized the external power yet, she still has some control over herself. Therefore, at first the power is sensible and external. However, after some time and practice, the power becomes internalized and the person no longer needs the external form of visible power, instead she will rely on her inner presence of power. The instructor, whether her speech is recorded or not, will be in control and watch what she says. She patrols herself. In the example of the prisoners and the guard, the control becomes internal, too. The prisoners train themselves to be in control and watch their behaviour no matter if they are observed or not. From now on, they play the role of that guard or authority figure and rule their self.

Similarly, in school, students can learn to patrol themselves when they are put in the state of constant control and visibility. In classrooms where the function of the power is guaranteed, students can internalize certain ways of being and practice panopticism. After internalization, power is exercised by students even when there is no one around to assert power. This is comparable to the notion of conditioning when the natural self learns to behave in certain ways due to the presence of power. Just like the prisoner in the panopticon, the student can also feel helpless and fearful and so accept the conditions of power. Going back to my first grade experience, I too was conditioned to control one aspect of my natural behaviour in relation to my hair. I trained myself to behave in a way that would please my teacher, and I would always see the power of authority in place even if she were not present any more. Like the guard for the inmates, my teacher was a permanent observer and an invisible guard in my mind afterwards. Panopticism can
produce habitual behaviours and make the students ignore their unconditioned or natural way of being.

There are many situations in an educational system that can be related to panopticism and conditioning. At younger levels of schooling, especially the first four years of the kindergarten to grade 12, panopticism occurs through disciplinary rules and practices. Children are encouraged to act within limits of institutional acceptability. Attendance, punctuality, and having rings for different periods of class to tell children when each class starts and ends are exercises of a constant surveillance over children. Such practices train children to behave under the direction and control of another’s will and power. Disciplinary measures make children self-monitor and conduct their acts through observing disciplinary norms. Under disciplinary power, children are trained to follow the rules, execute the operations well when doing things in class, make as less noise as possible, and follow a timeline for finishing a task as they need to reduce the time loss when moving from one operation to another. Whether it is the condition of being on time, making no noise, or wasting no time, children are confined in the classroom under the power of a higher being, i.e., under the watchful eye of the teacher, just as inmates are confined in prison, under the watchful eye of the guard.

In primary school, children are still given time-outs by their teachers and are excluded from the classroom environment if they disobey disciplinary rules. There are practices related to assigning “superstar status” to students who make less noise and are perceived as being “nice” (and compliant). The stars are then taken away from the children if they break the disciplinary rule of being nice and quiet. To manage the
children in their class and keep things organized, teachers, sometimes following the school’s rules, try to use such disciplinary actions in order to manage things. Permanent observation of children by the authority figure or teacher in order to make sure things are in order in the classroom make children forget their own sense of being, instead following the authority figure’s wishes. It leads the children to self-monitor while ensuring the teacher’s place of power. Self-monitoring or panopticism reinforces the conditioned self and disconnect children from their natural way of being. Panopticism and conditioning both exercise disciplinary power and can engrave behaviour that is unnatural and conditioned.

**Alienation**

Another social mechanism that reinforces the conditioned self in students is alienation. Alienation, following its common connotations, means being for an other, doing things for the sake of an other rather than for oneself. To look at alienation from a historical perspective, Baumeister (1987, p. 163) says that it is early in the 20th century that themes of alienation and devaluation of selfhood became a concern. Starting from the late medieval period, Baumeister explains that it was during the 11th to the 15th century that a clear concept of the unity of the single human life was developed. Then, in the early modern period (1500-1800), the distinction between the inner self and the outer self, individuality, and human development were stressed and recognized. Later, in the Romantic era (late 18th and early 19th centuries), people looked for secular forms of fulfillment and a deep conflict between the individual and society was sensed. During the Victorian era (1830-1900), there were crises concerned with knowing the self, defining the self, understanding one’s potential and fulfilling it, and relating the single self to
Then it was early in the 20th century that self-deprecation and alienation became an important issue due to the individual’s helpless dependency on society. As Baumeister says since the Second World War individuals have continued to search for ideals and means of self-definition and fulfillment.

Moreover, we can view alienation from a societal perspective, discussing how some people, such as women, blacks, aboriginals, etc. have been alienated throughout history. For example, as de Beauvoir (1957) explains in her book “The Second Sex,” women’s taking second place in the world was (and I must say still is in many countries) due to strong environmental forces of educational and social tradition under the purposeful control of men. This left little room for women to take a place full of human dignity as independent and free existents. That is, women learned to define themselves through men. In de Beauvoir’s words:

“humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being. … She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.” (p. xvi).

As de Beauvoir asserts, woman as the Other has historically been taken as abnormal; she is a deviation from the normal, an outsider who is alienated from her true sense of womanhood but tries to emulate normality. Woman alienates oneself in a foreign image—an image “to play at being” (p. 51). She shows to play at being through two modes of alienation: to play at being a man which will be frustrating for her, and to play
at being a woman which is also a delusion as it is to be the Other or an object—and the
Other, as de Beauvoir says, remains subject in the middle of her resignation. Therefore,
such an alienated woman who tries to play at being a man or a woman would not be
connected to her natural human nature and real being.

Karl Marx (1844) has used the term “alienation” in a similar way—alienation as
being for an other, doing things for the sake of an other rather than for oneself, though he
has set it within his own complex of theoretical assertions: alienation happens when
people are separated from their real human nature. Marx discusses the separation of
people from their human nature through the existence of a capitalist system. In Marx’s
(1844, cited by Fromm, 1961, p.30) words: “The less you are and the less you express
your life—the more you have and the greater is your alienated life. … Everything the
economist takes away from you in the way of life and humanity, he restores to you in the
form of money and wealth. The more one has, whether it is money, job, beauty, grade,
degree, and the like, the more the person feels alive. Although this sense of life is not
about the natural sense of being but is about a self that has lost its autonomy. I am
because I have! I am no longer granting worth to my natural sense of self but I am
attributing what I am about to what I have.

One can certainly look at alienation through the lens of Pavlov’s classical
conditioning that I explained in Chapter Two. In such cases, conditioning happens when
something that is not authentic or real, but is a representation of the real thing, creates,
after several repetitions, the same response or reaction as the actual stimulus. In Pavlov’s
example, the bell that was representing food could make the dog salivate since the dog
had associated the sound of the bell to the food. The dog was not salivating anymore due to the real feeling of hunger, but because of something unreal he had responded just as if the actual stimulus had occurred. This is alienation. In alienation, the animal or human being is not herself anymore. The alienated person does things for the sake of others. The person is stimulated to do things to gain recognition or affirmation from others. Just like Pavlov’s dog whose sense of hunger was stimulated and confirmed by the bell—something that was not real or authentic—a person’s sense of being can be affirmed by an expensive car or a big house. Therefore, things (havings) that lead to gaining affirmation and recognition from others come into play in one’s life. Life becomes a matter of having and consuming more. The more one has, the happier seems that person to be.

This alienating tension that has been identified by Marx as well as many others brings me to a discussion on being and having as two modes of existence, which Erich Fromm (1976) has analyzed in his book “To Have or To Be”.

**Having versus being:** Eric Fromm talks about alienation in the form of having vs. being. He sees having and being as two different kinds of orientation toward self and the world. Fromm relates the nature of the having mode of existence to the nature of private property and profit, and describes having in the Western industrial society as follows:

*To have, so it would seem, is a normal function of our life: in order to live we must have things. Moreover, we must have things in order to enjoy them. In a culture in which the supreme goal is to have—and to have more and more—and in which one*
can speak of someone as “being worth a million dollars,” how can there be an alternative between having and being? On the contrary, it would seem that the very essence of being is having; that if one has nothing, one is nothing.” (1976, p. 15)

To Fromm (1976), consuming is one of the most important forms of having. The more one has, the more one can consume. In the having mode of existence, Fromm makes a distinction between joy and pleasure and explains how we get satisfaction by having social success, winning the lottery, earning more money, or using drugs, for example. He says that even if these havings produce different degrees of pleasure, they are not conductive to joy; in fact “the lack of joy makes it necessary to seek ever new, ever more exciting pleasures” (p. 117). But, as Fromm says, there is a peak for such satisfaction that is reached when one has achieved her goal—a goal that is not the intrinsic passion of the person but is an external excitement for having more. Thus, when the person reaches the so called peak of excitement or satisfaction, she experiences sadness afterwards “for the thrill has been experienced, but the vessel has not grown” (p. 117). In other words, the pleasure or satisfaction of having more is experienced temporarily since as soon as the person consumes and attains her goal in terms of having, the previous consumption soon loses its satisfactory character and leads the person to go for another having or consuming. As a result, the earned satisfaction is not conducive to greater human growth and strength but in contrast, leads to human crippling because nothing has changed within oneself. This means that in the having mode, one’s inner powers are not enhanced.
In contrast to having, being does not deal with possessions. It means the less you have, the more you are. While temporary pleasure (which eventually ends in sadness) is the result of the mode of having, joy is what one experiences in the being mode of existence. In Fromm’s words, joy “is not a “peak experience,” which culminates and ends suddenly, but rather a plateau, a feeling state that accompanies the productive expression of one’s essential human faculties” (p. 117). Hence, whereas the temporary pleasure of having more can ultimately lead to sadness, the fruit of giving up the havings is the emergence of the mode of being and joy.

Fromm (1976) admits that the mode of being is less experienced than the mode of having and so is more difficult to define. We know more about the mode of having than the mode of being. We do not see much evidence of the being mode of existence because our society is devoted to possessing property and making a profit. Therefore, as Fromm states, “most people see the having mode as the most natural mode of existence, even the only acceptable way of life” (p. 28). This makes it difficult for people to understand the nature of the being mode, or even to realize that having is only one possible way of existence. To comprehend and experience being, one needs to give up on the mode of having and free herself from the vicious circle of possession→ transitory using or having → throwing away → new possession (p. 72). By holding onto the possessions and consuming more, the mode of being does not emerge. In contrast, it is by giving up one’s accumulations that the person experiences the being mode of existence.
Giving Up the Havings

One who has more is alienated more. That is, alienation deals with *having* rather than *being*. Having more money, big cars, travel, or high grades and degrees can make a person more alienated from her real sense of being. Such a person is happy because of all her *havings*. As Fromm says, it is safe and secure for many people to have all these *havings*. Thus, thinking about losing them can make one feel insecure. It is frightening to try to define oneself without the *havings*. As Fromm states:

… most people find giving up their having orientation too difficult; any attempt to do so arouses their intense anxiety and feels like giving up all security, like being thrown into the ocean when one does not know how to swim. They do not know that when they have given up the crutch of property, they can begin to use their own proper forces and walk by themselves. What holds them back is the illusion that they could not walk by themselves, that they would collapse if they were not supported by the things they have. (p. 89)

I wish to relate Fromm’s above discussion on having and being to my discussion on self. It is possible to take having and being modes of existence as the conditioned and natural selves respectively. It is frightening for one with a conditioned self to give up on havings. Havings have become parts of the person and so losing them means destroying oneself. For a conditioned self, havings are the attitudes and behaviour of all emotionally significant people who have served as parent figures to a child. Havings are what the child has recorded based on the significant people’s behavior in her Parent. Since one
lives with these recordings, giving them up is equal to giving up all the possessions one has accumulated throughout her life. Let me explain it in more detail below.

As I explained in Chapter One, during childhood, if parents or other important people in the child’s life discount their child and encourage destructive scripts or dialogues, the child will accept those people’s dialogues and become conditioned. This conditioning happens because the child is small, helpless, and needs to be fed and taken care of. She thinks of herself as powerless and unworthy, while her parents and other authority figures are seen by her as powerful giants and worthy. Her small size and powerlessness make her to surrender her natural self and become conditioned.

As this conditioned child grows up, she practices the submission and conditioned self throughout her life, forgetting her own natural self. She *forgets* her own being, her own wishes, likes and dislikes, and *becomes* what others want her to be. Her natural and real way of being as a free child changes into a conditioned and unreal one. As an adult, however, she thinks this is her real self and these are her own wishes. Others’ dialogues and wishes, and others’ approval become her *being* (the being of a conditioned self). The conditioned self exists and is there because of all the discounting discourses it has. The more the conditioned self has powerful discourses, the more this unreal self is alive. Because such powerful dialogues become a permanent part of the person’s life it is painful for her to think of such dialogues and wishes as those of others. It is painful to give them all up.
Going back to the little girl at the beginning of this dissertation, it was difficult and painful for her to see that her behaviour and way of being were based on the big people’s wishes in her life. She had become a good girl for the sake of others’ satisfaction. As a natural child, she had given up on her own, natural wishes in order to avoid the awful feelings of unworthiness and fear. Then, as a grownup, it was painful for her once again to give up on everything she had acquired since childhood in order to acknowledge the underlying feelings of fear and unworthiness. That is why psychoanalysis and removing the layers of conditioning were difficult and painful. Those conditions were her havings, and living through the conditioned self or those havings was her being (the being of a conditioned self). It was painful for her to lose the havings.

Thus, the conditioned self gets its definition from the outside through those havings: “I am=what I have and what I consume.” (Fromm, p. 27) This is alienation; alienation is based on havings. I am because I have. The more I have the more I feel alive. As a result, giving up on such havings destroy my existence. However, this “am” or being is not about the natural sense of being. It is based on the self that has gone through discounting dialogues and conditioning. As a result, a conditioned self is the same as an alienated self which gets its satisfaction or recognition from the outside and through having more. Alienation or having more keeps people away from their natural sense of self and natural being. Giving up on alienation or havings is equal to removing the layers of havings that have buried the natural self. This is accompanied by much pain and fear; thus, people avoid the idea of losing their havings.
Alienation can be strengthened in educational contexts. Schools encourage students to do things to please their teachers, or their parents at home. Actions like ranking students, or basing performance on grades, or labelling students, can cause students to become alienated and to move away from their natural sense of being. In addition, educational practices such as banking, practices that view the teacher as the absolute authority with all-powerful knowledge, make students alienated and conditioned. This is discussed later through Freire’s notion of educational oppression.

**Alienation in Schools**

As educators, we should make sure that alienation, or the constant need of having more, is not encouraged in schools. As I explained above, an alienated person deals with a conditioned self and is satisfied with having more since having more brings more (unnatural) recognition from the outside for the conditioned self. In alienation, due to the presence of power and control, the person feels afraid and powerless and tries to please the authority figures in her life. This starts in the private sphere when the authority figures at home establish demeaning dialogues with the child, and it continues as the child enters the public place of school. In the public place of school, there are practices integrated in curriculum that can encourage children to do things for the sake of others. For instance, grades can lead a student to alienation, that is, a student can define himself—whether she is good or bad, intelligent or not, eligible to go to a higher level or not, and so on—through the grades she gets. The student forgets who she is when she is ranked based on her performance and test scores. She may study for the sake of getting higher grades rather than for her own learning.
Madeja (2004) uses the term “testing mania” to show how alienated the school system of today is. Testing mania describes the recent climate and context for assessment in schools. Both students and schools are being ranked based on their test scores. Test scores are a measure of school and students’ success. This is a form of absolute control that puts a considerable amount of stress, anxiety, and fear on students. To improve students’ performance on the tests, some school systems, teachers, and administrators supply information about the tests to students. Madeja says, “Schools are controlling attendance on days that the test is administered: Students who will not perform well are discouraged from attending or diverted to other activities in the school, rather than taking the test and performing poorly” (p. 4). Describing a personal experience, when the statewide BEST (Basic Educational Skills Test) was introduced in the 1970s, Madeja explains how the low scores of students in Missouri created an embarrassing situation for the schools. When the next year the same test was held, there was a dramatic improvement in test scores. As Madeja says, “They [the teachers and the school system] started to coach the students early in the year as to the content of tests and as a result the curriculum of most schools [was] altered dramatically in order for the schools to “teach to the test.” (p. 6).

The approach of teaching to the test” trains students to study for grades and see their grades in specific ways—ways that have been defined by the educational administrators and legislators. Students are trained and conditioned to see their learning in relevant to their school rank and their scores on tests. Just like Pavlov’s dogs that were trained and conditioned to respond to the bell sound in certain ways, students can be trained to react to a number or ranking that appears on their test sheet in specific ways.
Providing students with such a controlling and threatening environment by ranking them and then labelling them causes students to become more conditioned and alienated.

**Labelling**

Ranking students through their scores is a dangerous conduct that can label students. In schools, students can easily get labelled and be categorized. As Paley (1979) explains in her book “White Teacher”, students can be called obedient, naughty, slow, at risk, smart, fast, dumb, and the like, according to teachers’ preferences or the school’s system. The child shuts down parts of her natural way of being or natural self in order to comply with those labels. She internalizes the related labels or images and alienates herself from her true being. To explain this adoption of labels or images and becoming like the labels, Paley writes about the school of her childhood and says:

> The teachers defined us as obedient or naughty, fast or slow, popular or invisible, according to their preferences, and we accepted the roles we were given. Few of us were able to recapture our self-image while in school, and even in college I pretended to be like everyone else. Those of us who became teachers adopted the conventional wisdom that teacher knows best and fashioned our classrooms in the manner of those who went before us (p. xv).

Paley warns teachers to avoid such misrecognitions and to be careful to recognize students for their own beings, their uniqueness and individualities. She says, “Friendship and love grow out of recognizing and respecting differences” (1979, p. 131). Children should grow up knowing and liking the fact that they are different, they look and speak in different ways, and their differences are worthy of recognition. Generalizing or
assimilating one to another only makes children disconnected from their own way of being. At the same time, while children need to be recognized for their differences, they should all be treated the same as human beings with equal rights. In her other book “You Can’t Say You Can’t Play”, Paley (1993) proposes a social order in her kindergarten classroom. She observes that in games, some children are ignored or rejected by their classmates in playing. For different reasons, some children cast others out by making walls around themselves and keeping unwanted children out. Paley creates an analogy by saying:

The classroom that allows children to evict others from play is like a castle with no doors. Those inside the castle are invested with magical powers and the outsiders are forced into the role of unlovely monsters. (p. 117)

By proposing the rule “You can’t say you can’t play”, Paley tries to eliminate the notion of exclusion and control. Exclusion occurs when one plays the role of boss or owner of the game and determines or controls who plays with whom, who is in the game, and who is rejected. Paley’s non-punitive and non-judgmental dialogues with children encourage them to think about themselves and others as equal. Children learn to include those who want to play with them no matter what their socio-economic status are, what they are like, and whether they know the game or not and can spoil it. Through a long period of talking and thinking aloud with children, Paley allows them to reflect on their controlling behavior and become disengaged with those dialogues, instead, be more accepting of each other for who they are and treat one another equally when they play.
Similarly, in the storytelling activity (children making stories and then playing them out), Paley proposes children to choose their characters by chance rather than being chosen by the author of the story. This practice made those children who had never taken the roles as bad guys, witches, and monsters, accept and play them instead of passing them onto the unwanted. Paley (1993) says:

Perhaps, in giving up control of who plays which character, the storytellers are liberating themselves from the demands of peer expectations. Furthermore, the actors, now chosen by chance, not by preference, no longer feel beholden to the author for approval. (pp. 127-128)

Paley’s natural recognition of children for who they are make them disconnect from alienation from oneself as well as their fellow classmates. Before such recognition, children who were the bosses or owners of the games—those who would consistently reject other children to play through their punitive dialogues—were practicing alienation while reinforcing exclusion and their own sense of power. Paley nicely shows that excluding others and deciding for them what role to play or whether to play or not can alienate others and make them look for their (the game owners’) approval. It is alienating to prescribe for others what to do and how to be. Establishing nurturing dialogues with her students, Paley breaks the chains of alienation and discourages rejection or exclusion.

Like in Paley’s kindergarten class, in other early years of schooling (kindergarten to grade 3), alienation occurs through labelling and grouping students. In the Primary Program, children can become conditioned and feel alienated through grouping, ranking, or labelling. Grouping children based on different criteria such their ability, their
disciplinary behaviour, or their attentional behaviour, and labelling them as gifted, quiet, thought disordered, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or any other designation are forms of misrecognition. Children identify themselves with these naming and adapt themselves to think and perform within their labels. A child who is grouped into students with “discipline problems” thinks of herself as “I’m not OK” and internalizes this script of not-OK-ness. Labelling for disciplinary behaviour or even for grading can be translated by the child as “I’m stupid” or “I can’t be well, why should I try” or “I can’t do anything right”. These interpretations accepted by the child negatively affect her learning while strengthening her not-OK feelings as well. Such labelling practices hinder the child’s educational and emotional/psychological development and reinforce the conditioned self.

Paulo Freire (1970) also talks about alienation in education. In his book “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, Freire calls the person who is in the position of power and control “the oppressor”, and the person who is powerless and under control “the oppressed”. He says when there is an “oppressed”, there must be an “oppressor” (p. 21). The oppressed internalizes the image of the oppressor and behaves in the way the oppressor prescribes. At first the oppressed behaves in that prescribed way because of her fear or helplessness; though, after repeating internalizing that behavior, she would think of that behavior as her own. The oppression leads the oppressed to be alienated as her behavior is a prescribed behavior representing the imposition of the oppressor’s choice

29 Similarly, Herbert Kohl in “I won’t learn from you” and other thoughts on creative maladjustment. (New York: The New Press, 1994) argues that labelling students can make them decide to “not-learn” and resist learning. “Not-learning” is so often mistakenly associated with incapability and failure, as Kohl says. However, those who decide to not-learn have the ability to understand the material, but they actively choose to not-learn.
upon her; it is not the behavior of the oppressed anymore. As a result, Freire emphasizes educating the oppressed in order to liberate them from their alienation. This form of education is discussed through Freire’s educational concept of “problem-posing”. But before this, Freire discusses the banking concept of education. While the problem-posing approach is seen as a practice of freedom and liberation, the banking system is considered as a practice of oppression and alienation.

**Banking Concept of Education**

In the banking concept of education the teacher is considered as the oppressor and the students are the oppressed. The teacher is the one who knows, talks, and thinks whereas the students are ignorant, quiet, and unable to think for themselves. The students cannot think on their own, and so cannot have their own ideas since their ideas come from their oppressor. The system expects students to unquestioningly accept the oppressor’s ideas. Thus, the students are listening or receiving objects who are trained to see themselves as ignorant or those who know nothing. Being projected an image of absolute ignorance by their teacher, the alienated students accept the image of ignorance while justifying their “teacher’s existence” (p. 72). Such a banking approach to education has a dehumanizing power which minimizes the students’ existence and thinking while strengthens the teacher’s.

The banking educational approach denies that people are dependent and attached to the world. Since it takes people existing apart from the world, it does not allow people to think and reflect upon their world nor take actions to transform their oppressive situations. Therefore, as Freire (1970, p. 81) says, education becomes a practice of
oppression and domination. The teacher chooses the material—the kind of material that is not in relation with the world—and deposits it before the students. As the oppressor, the teacher asks the students to listen and memorize the discussion that is alien to them; however, the students are not asked to express their ideas or reflect on the material. They are inhibited from any creative or critical thinking as well as any true acting. As a result, the teacher thinks and acts but the students only have an illusion of thinking or acting through the thought and act of the teacher (p. 73).

Seeing that the banking educational system creates oppression and alienation, it can be argued that such an approach reinforces a self that is not real or authentic. That is, an educational system which is about students’ thinking and acting through their teacher reinforces a self in students that is alienated. This alienated self that works for the sake of others, rather than for the sake of herself, resonates with the conditioned self—the self that has learned to be for the significant authority figures and their approval. As discussed before, such a conditioned self responds to the demands from significant authority figures and gives up the basic satisfactions for the reward of parental approval or other authority figures. As in a banking educational approach, students learn to respond to the demands of authority figures in school and think or act through their teacher’s thought and action, the system suppresses their natural way of being. Students lose their ability to think for themselves, to be curious about their world, and to act truly, instead, they think and behave in conditioned, prescribed ways. Thus, the banking concept of education strengthens the conditioned self which has been trained to be for others.
To confront the banking concept of education and the practice of alienation, there is an alternative approach that encourages emancipation and liberation from the domination of the oppressor. This approach to education is active and participatory and is called “problem posing education”.

**Problem Posing Education**

Despite the banking system that gives power and authority to the teacher, Freire (1970) proposes “problem posing education” that removes absolute authority from the teacher and acknowledges the voice of students. Having referred to oppression as “overwhelming control” (p. 77), Freire views the banking concept of education as oppression in which students’ thinking and actions are controlled. On the other hand, in problem posing education, students are challenged to have their own thoughts and actions and are critical thinkers of their situation. In this method, the teacher does not impose her ideas or thoughts on the students, but pose students with problems relating to themselves in the world and with the world. Since students comprehend the challenge as interrelated to other problems within a context, rather than a theoretical question, they become more critical and less alienated. As a result, in the problem posing education, students experience their relation with the world and the challenges in the world as well as their obligation to respond to those challenges. This is what Freire means by education as the practice of freedom and writes:

Education as the practice of freedom—as opposed to education as the practice of domination—denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people.
Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without people, but people in their relations with the world (p. 81).

As Freire notes above, in problem-posing education, people do not see the world as static but perceive it as a reality in transformation. They are engaged in inquiry and are critical of the way they exist in the world. Whether it is in society, in schools, or in families, the leader-citizen, the teacher-student, or the parent-child reflect simultaneously on themselves and the world, and take actions upon reality. They transform their alienated situations so that they can become “beings for themselves” (p. 74). As a result, in the problem-posing approach, school is a place where students can come to an awareness of themselves as well as the injustices in their society, take action upon the injustices, and be for themselves rather than for others. This is possible through taking away absolute power and authority from the teacher and instead recognizing students for their ideas and thoughts.

While Freire’s banking concept of education describes students’ alienation as they are inhibited from creative or critical thinking, the problem-posing education speaks to students’ engagement in action. In the problem-posing approach, students are authentic beings who are engaged in reflection, inquiry, and creative transformation. As Freire (1970) says, “it enables teachers and students to become Subjects of the educational process by overcoming authoritarianism and an alienating intellectualism” (p. 86). Hence, in this system, students overcome their illusions of acting or thinking through the act or thought of the teacher, instead, act and think for themselves and become less alienated. This alternative educational approach helps students’ selves fight for their emancipation.
and become less conditioned. Since the students are not reflected oppressive images of being ignorant nor their thinking or action are controlled by the educational authority figures, they stay less conditioned. The less a student’s self is conditioned and alienated, the more her natural sense of self is.

Today, the educational system has undergone fundamental changes and shifted from traditional banking methods of teaching to more problem-solving methods with emphasis on critical thinking, knowledge construction, and human and social development. Looking at the primary program for children and educational practices at these early years of schooling, one can see the educational system is not banking anymore and the students are more active in their learning process rather than being passive or receivers of information. Having said that, when it comes to evaluation, there is still that aspect of banking educational system with the focus on grading. According to the British Columbia Ministry of Education\(^\text{30}\), there are no standardized tests for primary school children. These tests create an formal and unfamiliar atmosphere for the children with unfamiliar types of questions as well as time constraints, all of which are stressful for children. Grade equivalent scores are given to children based on the collected information and evidence of the child’s learning. As stated, while there are no standardized tests for children in the primary program, there are still grades. Fortunately, the report card with the grades speaks to the strengths and weaknesses of the child and is descriptive. However, the child at such a young age can see herself through the given number or letter rather than the description.

As an example, I remember my cousin’s daughter in Ontario, who was in grade one last year, was looking at only the letters in her report cards. She was not able to even read all the details about her grades or why, for example, she got a C in math. She did not even have much of an idea of what C meant. But soon she realized that C meant she did not know enough or everything she was supposed to know about math. At such a young age, a child can convert the low grades or comments such as “C”, “Try harder” or “too slow” into being not-OK. She does not know how much harder she should try or how much faster she should be in order to be right. Such comments are translated to “I can’t do anything right” by her and disengage her from her natural sense of being. Grading is that part of the traditional education system which still exists in schools and creates conditioning. Unfortunately, it is so ingrained in the educational system that one would find it difficult to think of it any differently.

**Stultification**

Stultification is the last social mechanism that I will discuss here as a reinforcement of the conditioned self in education. The term “stultification” is used by Jacques Rancière (1991) in his book *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emanticipation*. To explain this term, it is necessary to first describe the concept of “explication”. Rancière argues that schools are the first place where students learn they need someone to explicate things to them. It is the first place that students can mistakenly get the idea that their intelligence is less than the intelligence of the explicator, where they learn that they always need an explicator or a master to simplify information for them. Schools fuel this belief that students should rely on an authority or a schoolmaster to explicate to them, and schools convince them that they are unable to
complete tasks without explication. Thus, Rancière sees the most important quality of a schoolmaster as the virtue of ignorance. A schoolmaster, as Rancière says (2010) is “a teacher who teaches—that is to say who is for another a means of knowledge—without transmitting any knowledge” (p. 2).

Rancière (1991) sees explication as “the myth of pedagogy” (p. xix) and explains that this pedagogical myth divides the world into two: “the knowing and the ignorant, the mature and the unformed, the capable and the incapable” (p. xx). Explication makes students internalize the image of being ignorant, unformed, and incapable and creates the need for instruction and a knowledgeable master. It gives more power, authority, and control to the teacher while taking away the students’.

In stultification, the explicator master, whether he desires it or not, controls the students’ minds and their thinking. This control arises from the master’s belief that his knowledge is more than the students’ knowledge; he has more intelligence; he is more capable of understanding the learning material and so he is superior. The explicator finds himself more powerful than his students while the students lose their sense that the power of learning is actually derived from their own will. Rancière (1991) explains the essential task of the master—to explicate—as follows:

… to disengage the simple elements of learning, and to reconcile their simplicity in principle with the factual simplicity that characterizes young and ignorant minds. To teach was to transmit learning and form minds simultaneously, by

31 I follow Rancière in taking the explicator as ‘he’.
leading those minds, according to an ordered progression, from the most simple to the most complex (p. 3).

Stultification happens because of ordering knowledge, intelligence, and capability. One is superior while the other is inferior. As Rancière argues, in stultification, the master explicator has the desire to transmit knowledge to students so that they are brought to the master’s level of expertise. The master sees the students as deficits whose minds are incapable and ignorant. There is inequality, and it is this belief in inequality that creates the need for explication. In explication, it is important to consider this belief; that is, in explication, the intention that the master is departing from is important to consider, and that is inequality. However, when the point of departure is equality—equal knowledge, intelligence, and capability—the terms superiority or inferiority, and the whole idea of stultification lose their meaning.

As a result, stultification occurs when learning is not a matter of will, but is a matter of linking two intelligences. Rancière sees the two faculties of will and intelligence as important in the act of learning and states that stultification is the result of coincidence of these two faculties. In his words:

There is stultification whenever one intelligence is subordinated to another. A person—and a child in particular—may need a master when his own will is not strong enough to set him on track and keep him there. But that subjection is purely one of will over will. It becomes stultification when it links an intelligence to another intelligence (p. 13).
To Rancière, the two faculties of will and intelligence need to be separated rather than linked. When the intelligence of the master comes into play and is linked to the student’s, it becomes stultification. On the other hand, the ignorant schoolmaster leads the students to emancipation rather than stultification. Intellectual emancipation is what Rancière emphasizes and proposes as a philosophy and method of teaching.

**Emancipation**

While stultification is done by the explicatory schoolmaster under the presupposition of inequality, the emancipation is operated by the ignorant schoolmaster who believes in equality. The ignorant schoolmaster, as opposed to the explicator schoolmaster, exercises no relation of intelligence to intelligence. Rancière (1991) defines emancipation as “the act of an intelligence obeying only itself even while the will obeys another will” (p. 13). In emancipation, the idea of intelligence over intelligence, or superiority and inferiority, is meaningless. This intellectual emancipation and the consciousness of the equality of intelligence is what Rancière emphasizes in education. He says that it is not the lack of instruction that stultifies people, but the belief in the inferiority of their intelligence (p. 39).

Therefore, equality is the focal point in emancipation. Obstacles stopping the abilities of the ignorant one occur not because of her ignorance, as Rancière (2010, p. 5) says, but her consent to inequality. Such an ignorant person is satisfied with not “being able” to do so and with the admission that she is incapable of knowing more. But what an emancipatory teacher does is that she forces the ignorant to prove her abilities under the presupposition of equality in intelligence. Rancière writes:
The axiom of equality of intelligences does not affirm any particular virtue for those who do not know, no science of the humble or intelligence of the masses. It simply affirms that there is only one sort of intelligence at work in all intellectual training. It is always a matter of relating what one ignores to what one knows; a matter of observing and comparing, of speaking and verifying. The student is always a seeker. And the teacher is first of all a person who speaks to another, who tells stories and returns the authority of knowledge to the poetic condition of all spoken interaction. … It is at one level much more radical, because it concerns the very conception of the relation between equality and inequality (p. 6).

As a result, what happens in an emancipatory relationship between the teacher and student is that there is will over will, without any indication of explication. There is imitation, repetition, making mistakes, correcting themselves, doing and reflecting about what they do, taking apart, putting back together, and such in a pure relationship, and so there is learning. It is crucial for the students to be placed in such a nurturing exploratory learning environment to thrive in what they like to do. If they are placed in an environment where teachers explicate, there will be stultification, rather than learning.

**Stultification and Conditioning**

I relate stultification and emancipation to reinforcement of the conditioned self and the natural self accordingly. I argue that an explanatory paradigm of teaching, as opposed to the ignorant paradigm, can change a natural self to a conditioned one, or strengthen an already conditioned self. Just like a parent who can consciously or
unconsciously condition his or her child’s natural sense of self through seeing himself or herself a length ahead of the child and stultifies the child at the private level, an explicator teacher as well, whether he desires it or not, can stultify his students through reflecting them pictures of less intelligent or less capable at the public level.

In both paradigms, the parent or the explicator teacher sees his intelligence and capability ahead of the child or the students and wants to transmit his knowledge to them—which lead to stultifying them. The child or the students imitate their master like a parrot and cultivate only one faculty—the faculty of memory—as opposed to other faculties of intelligence, taste, and imagination, as Rancière says (1991, p. 24). Thus, instead of developing their intellectual powers and abilities, the child or the students see themselves as incapable, submit to the hierarchical world of intelligence, and gain a sense of depreciation. Both stultification and conditioning involve the same process and have the same result; they both lead to a self that is misrecognized or conditioned. In other words, a stultified self is like a conditioned self that has gone through inferiority and misrecognition.

On the other hand, in the ignorant paradigm or emancipatory teaching, the students are obliged to use their own intelligence since the master obliges them to realize their capacity (Rancière, 1991, p. 15). The students learn by themselves without a master explicator, driven by their own natural desire. Just like a natural child whose sense of natural self grows when she learns a language without a master explicator through hearing, retaining, speaking, making mistakes, and correcting oneself, the students’ natural selves can flourish when they learn and speak through their own intelligence
without any stultification. A child stays natural or the students are emancipated because
their nurturing parents or ignorant master do not believe in superiority or inferiority of
intelligence or capacity. They do not see their mind as better or more capable than their
child or students’ minds. Rancière (1991) explains this nicely where he talks about the
power of intelligence existing in any human manifestation. He writes:

There aren’t two sorts of minds. There is inequality in the *manifestation* of
intelligence, according to the greater or lesser energy communicated to the
intelligence by the will for discovering and combining new relations; but there is
no hierarchy of *intellectual capacity*. Emancipation is becoming conscious of this
equality of *nature*. This is what opens the way to all adventure in the land of
knowledge. It is a matter of daring to be adventurous, and not whether one learns
more or less well or more or less quickly (p. 27).

Since in emancipatory teaching, there is no principle of intellectual inequality—
especially the intellectual inferiority of children or superiority of the adults—the students
become conscious of their nature as intellectual subjects and the true power of the human
mind. The students’ natural tendencies and abilities in terms of what *they* think about a
subject and what *they* see, do not change or transform into the ideas of the master or into
how the master wants them to think. Just like a nurturing parent who does not see his
child inferior or less able in understanding and doing things and so keeps his child’s self
natural at the private level, an emancipatory teacher can strengthen the students’
connection with their natural senses of self at the public level. Therefore, in emancipatory
teaching, the natural self of the students are recognized and nurtured by a master who lets his students see for themselves, think for themselves, and follow their own path.

Emancipatory teaching is the teaching approach that I advocate in the primary program for young children. In these four years of schooling when conditioning can occur and develop, teaching approaches that involve explication result in stultification. Any teaching practices that give children the message of “you don’t know” or “you’re less able” can stultify them and reinforce their conditioning. If the primary level teacher relies on his or her authority to explicate to children, convincing them that they are unable to complete tasks without explication, children think they are behind and experience stultification. Explication projects an image of being ignorant onto children and fuels this belief that they are not OK since they know less.

To avoid stultification in these early years of schooling and thereby avoid conditioning, I emphasize the need for an ignorant schoolmaster as opposed to an explicator one. Explication is not necessary for learning. Children learn because they want to, with their own will. It is their will that should be taken as the primary element of learning. Explication disregards children’s wills and misrecognizes them. Instead, it creates incapacity and inequality. Children learn in an environment where no boundaries or distance are indicated between their knowledge and the teacher’s. In such an environment, their intelligence is not subordinated to their teacher’s. Rather, equality is the point of departure—equality in intelligence, capability, and understanding. Having equality as the point of departure withholds the teacher to explicate and prevents conditioning.
In a nurturing learning environment where teachers are not explicators, children are provided with opportunities to learn through play, reflection, and being engaged in meaningful experiences. Teachers are not there to explicate or answer children’s questions directly, but are there to provide children with materials and experiences that help them find the answers on their own. The foundation of learning is what children present as the topic of their learning. If they ask questions about numbers and want to learn about numeracy, for example, the teacher brings the related material and resources, lets them learn numeracy through exploration, making mistakes and correcting themselves, taking things apart and putting them back together, and reflecting on what they have done. This tells children that the power of learning is at their will and their capability, not the will or capability of the teacher. To emancipate children and keep their natural sense of being, the teacher should become conscious of children’s nature as intellectual subjects and understand that they are not deficient or inferior but are human beings who can take ownership of their learning.

This emancipatory method of teaching needs teachers who are nurturing caregivers. They do not have the desire to explicate to children nor the belief to indicate their superiority in intelligence or knowledge. They practice equality and leave children’s intelligence out of the picture, instead, bring in children’s will to the scene of learning. Such ignorant teachers are themselves more connected to their natural and free Child and are less conditioned. Since early years of schooling are important in keeping children’s natural selves, teachers of this primary level of schooling need to be educated about the importance of recognition in childhood. They should be aware that their teaching
approach—whether it is based on an ignorant paradigm or an explicatory one—and their recognition or misrecognition of children for who they are can make children feel OK or not-OK about themselves. Recognizing children for their being rather than their doing strengthens their natural, free Child and their insight. Recognition through the natural self needs to be attended to and practiced in schools by competent, nurturing teachers who are well-educated in this important matter.
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

This dissertation has provided a new way of looking at recognition through the lens of natural self. Using Transactional Analysis, I have described the importance of recognizing the natural self in childhood and early years of schooling. My main aim has been to draw attention towards childhood recognition when the self is still natural and unconditioned in the private space of home. There is a psychological need for natural recognition (just like the biological need for food) and this need should primarily be addressed in the early years of one’s life. By shifting this attention, I have not tried to disregard recognition in adulthood and in the larger society as I do support the public recognition. Rather, I have wished to develop an understanding that the self in the public sphere could have already undergone prior misrecognition.

Currently, most theories of recognition seem to be concerned with recognizing different groups of people when they enter the public sphere. Public recognition of self is about affirming one’s private self at the public level. In this dissertation, I have proposed that one can be offered or withheld recognition early in life, much before she starts her life as a grownup in society. I have written to make the call for recognition in the earlier years of life, emphasizing that recognition starts from childhood. It begins with embracing the natural self within each child and is done through providing the child with a nurturing, loving environment where both the parent-parent and the parent-child
relationships are loving and harmonious. It then continues as the child enters school where once again the child’s recognition is at stake. It is at stake in teacher-student and student-student relationships, as well as all other encounters that the student experiences in the curriculum. Whether the child is offered or denied recognition by parents, teachers or other authority figures influences her in the kinds of decisions she makes about her life.

Children make decisions about who they are and who others are, and take psychological positions about themselves and others (e.g. I’m OK, You’re OK) based on recognition or misrecognition of their natural selves. If they are stroked naturally and unconditionally in childhood, their life will be free from games and struggles for (unnatural) recognition. They decide to pursue their own needs and wants. In contrast, if they are stroked conditionally for what they are doing (e.g. I’m OK if …), they decide to go along with the authority figures’ messages early in life, become conditioned, and so overrule their natural, free child in order to survive. In the latter case, a girl becomes a “good girl” and a boy is called a “good boy” when they are conditioned. Such labelling by a parent, teacher, or any other authority figure means, “I am glad you are like me, girl”, or, “Now that you listen to me, I like you. You are such a “good boy””. This girl or boy will lose his or her own sense of self and become dependent on others, always in need of affirmation from them and in constant struggle for recognition.

I have argued that this struggle for recognition, which is not a natural form of recognition, could be understood as a concept with roots in early years of life within family and school. If a natural self is discounted and misrecognized, it is difficult, though
possible, to claim it back. Since people inhabit their misrecognized sense of being, it is
difficult and painful to address and change their underlying inferior feelings. People do
not usually dig down into their feelings and uncover the feelings of unworthiness, guilt,
or fear they may have experienced in their lives. They may live their entire life without
even knowing about their misrecognition. Going back to the little girl in grade one, she
could have lived with the feeling of unworthiness and the illusion of pleasing her teacher
for the rest of her life. Thus, it is crucial to support the natural self and encourage it in
schools by establishing nurturing dialogues.

When a self is misrecognized or conditioned, at a personal level the grownup can
do psychoanalysis or some other forms of introspection to uncover her natural self and
remedy her misrecognition. This needs a lot of courage, patience, and time. In addition,
the person can address her misrecognition and injustices through the public space. That
is, still at the personal level, the person can participate in the socio-cultural worlds where
she is offered positions in the hierarchies of power and privilege and initiate combating
the values and disvalues she has been exposed to through their society and culture. Like
women in Nepal who deconstructed their pre-defined positions, people can combat their
fossilized situations by recognition of, and reflection on, the imposed injustices and
demand new dispositions and ways of being.

At the public level, society can help and redress misrecognition through
transforming the underlying social structures that generate injustices or misrecognition.
While there are affirmative strategies (such as positive mirroring) that aim to correct the
injustices in society, I have argued that these remedies leave intact the deep structures
that generate misrecognition and so do not change the deep pain that the misrecognized self has experienced. In the context of an educational setting, especially a multicultural setting where students bring in their different socio-cultural backgrounds to the context, textual mirroring would be an example of affirmative strategy. It aims to address the misrecognition or disrespect that some marginalized groups of students have already undergone by bringing their names, images, stories, and traditions into the curriculum.

On the other hand, to provide a recognitive public place for different groups of people and/or to redress misrecognized people at the social level substantially, I have advocated the strategies that deconstruct the patterns of cultural value—the patterns that limit equal participation of some people. These patterns should be replaced with the ones that take all people as full members of society and enable them to interact with others as a peer. I have taken these transformative remedies such as universalizing privileges that are now only available for advantaged groups, or deconstructing the opposition that underlie the differences among groups, as a way that can help people reclaim their natural sense of being.

Moreover, the pubic sphere can be recognitive to people who have already experienced misrecognition by admitting and acknowledging their misrecognition and its realness even if their experience is beyond comprehension. In the context of a classroom, students who have already experienced injustice or misrecognition can claim their subjectivity when they are provided with an environment where they can describe their oppressive situations without any judgements being passed. This would be an authentic and rewarding recognition for the students since the students, as speaking subjects, are
able to bear witness to their own misrecognition and degradation. Through such
recognitive environments, misrecognized students have the opportunity to restore their
self-respect and reinsert their subjectivity. In addition, they develop an appreciation for
others as sympathetic listeners—others who have not judged them or put their testimony
on trial.

Providing students with recognitive environments enhance students’ subjectivity
and the growth of their natural selves. This is of special importance in early years of
schooling when children are in the first four years of their education—from kindergarten
to grade three. Throughout these years, children’s natural selves can become adapted or
conditioned if the right environment with nurturing teachers is not provided for them. I
have discussed that in such an environment, teaching practices that lead to self-
monitoring or panopticism, alienation, and stultification should not be encouraged as they
create conditioning. To foster the natural self, educational discourses and practices that
include disciplinary rules and invite children to behave in specific ways, the ones that
group, label, and grade children based on their ability, attention, intelligence, or their
knowledge, as well as the teaching discourses that involve explication, all need to be
discouraged in primary levels of schooling.

Children, in early years of schooling, can forget their own wishes and natural
sense of self when they are engaged in disciplinary, controlling, and prejudicial
discourses or conditions. They can easily translate or interpret such conditions and
dialogues into messages that, if believed by them, can result in long-lasting life problems
for them. The disciplinary, controlling conditions can be hidden in the educational
contexts. The judgmental dialogues can also include hidden messages. Asking children to be on time or be quiet can be converted into this message for a child “I don’t like you if you are not on time or quiet”. To please the teacher and gain strokes, the child yields his own wishes and become conditioned. A thirty-year-old woman in my Professional Development Program class once said that as a little caring human being in primary school who had plenty of thoughts and ideas in her head, she used to speak; though, she learned from the authority figures in school to be quiet which she translated as not to like herself.

Similarly, at the kindergarten level, children who are stroked conditionally for taking care of younger children, or for being polite, or for not crying (being told that only babies cry) can interpret these as the message, “Don’t be child”. Since in these early years of life children’s Adult ego state has not yet fully developed, they follow the adults’ discourses and wishes and translate their “Dos” and “Don’ts” or “must” and “must nots” to the message that they are not wanted if they do not comply. If a child is not recognized naturally for his own being, but is stroked conditionally for his doing (such as his grades or disciplinary behaviour), the child’s natural self changes into a conditioned self and makes him struggle for (unnatural) recognition.

To foster the natural self in primary schooling, I have advocated an emancipatory method of teaching where there is no explication. Teaching approaches that indicate superiority of the teacher in intelligence, knowledge, or capability result in stultification. Children in these early years of schooling need to learn on their own through exploration, repetition, making mistakes, and reflection so that their insight and natural self grow. In
addition, what they learn and take from the curriculum is not prescribed. What children learn, and in what way they learn, should not be at the will of the teacher, but at their own will. This means there are no learning outcomes or expected responses already planned in their educational activities. There is no “supposed to” as in what they are supposed to learn in a specific lesson. Children are the ones who determine what they want to inquire about and learn. Such education cannot be achieved unless there are nurturing teachers who have love and compassion for children and for their learning.

Nurturing teachers are open to children’s questions, ideas, and to their ways of finding answers. They allow children to question what has already been affirmed as the acceptable norms or values, and welcome their curiosity. To move teachers to be more recognitive of children’s natural ways of being, they need to be educated. Teachers should be educated about the critical importance of natural recognition of children’s selves and the consequences of lack of such recognition in children’s lives. They should be aware that children’s sense of self changes into a conditioned one when they are explicated to, as explication indicates that they (the teachers) have more knowledge, intelligence, and ability to understand the learning material and so they are superior to children. The more teachers themselves are unconditioned and natural, the better they can practice equality and recognition.

In sum, recognition contributes to students’ sense of dignity and promotes human flourishing. In contrast, misrecognizing the natural self of students inhibits their growth and is an affront to their dignity. It is an assault to their natural self. By proposing the redescription of recognition with a focus on natural self and its significance in education,
I have tried to increase a capacity to afford natural recognition in the public space of school. This is possible through making the discourse of recognition more available to educators. I have written in the hope that this discourse is widespread and that an awareness can grow of practicing human flourishing through recognizing natural selves both at home and in school. I have hoped that natural self recognition allows for a deeper appreciation and understanding of the self in childhood and helps the demand of such recognition to be heard. Recognizing the natural self of children is not only a duty but is essential for all humanity.


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