Towards Developing A Social Impact Assessment:

Involuntary Resettlement in the San Roque Dam Case, Philippines

by

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B.A. (Sociology & Anthropology), Simon Fraser University, 2008

Thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

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in the
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Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

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Abstract

In cases of involuntary resettlement, project-proponents are required under institutionalized international guidelines to conduct feasibility studies (pre-project construction) and prepare social monitoring programs (post-project construction) of the people-affected. This study, using a grounded theory/ethnographic research method, explores mutually dependent networks between project-proponents, local government units and project "beneficiaries" as a way to see how the implementation of compensation entitlements through livelihood reconstruction operates informally. My data revealed that social safeguards were in place superficially. The trauma of having been displaced is exacerbated with the loss of usual social support mechanisms and the associated dilution of cultural land-based norms. My results showed that project-affected participants' sense of self (physically and mentally) is attached to poorly implemented livelihood reconstruction schemes and compensation entitlements. This study uncovers some of the limitations of social impact assessment lacking analysis of the distribution of power in stakeholder relations.

Keywords: Dam-Induced Involuntary Resettlement; Social Safeguard Monitoring Mechanism; Social Impact Assessment; Post-Construction SIA Report; Indigenous Peoples; Project-Affected Persons; San Roque Dam; Philippines; Social Disarticulation Issues; Transnational Advocacy Post-Construction Guidelines; Grounded Theory Method
I dedicate this thesis to Helen A. Cruz. Saya cinta padamu.
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This thesis would not have been possible if it was not for the support of the many people and organizations that I had in the field and at home. I am deeply indebted to the people who participated in this study. I am forever grateful to all of you welcoming me into your homes and sharing your lives with me. Ansamak Ta Ha. This thesis would have been next to impossible to conduct without the commitment and passion of the research team and their friends and families. Our evenings together with you and yours, inspired and led further discussion and investigation.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENR</td>
<td>Department of Environment and Natural Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC PS</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation Performance Standard 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPDP</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Organization (Sebang ni Pansegshan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPO-VPO</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Organization – Vice President of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPRA</td>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japanese Bank for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Power Corporation</td>
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<td>PCDFI</td>
<td>Pag-rangayan Community Development Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAP</td>
<td>Resettlement Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Social Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLIA</td>
<td>Sustainable Livelihood Impact Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPREAD</td>
<td>Sustainable Participatory Relevant Equitable Anticipatory Dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMP</td>
<td>San Roque Multi Purpose Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRPC</td>
<td>San Roque Power Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRU</td>
<td>Seasonal Resource Users</td>
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<td>SLIA</td>
<td>Sustainable Livelihood Impact Assessment</td>
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<td>WB</td>
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Chapter 1:

Damn Dams

Over the last century, large scale hydro-electric dams have become a vital part of the global economy, providing tremendous amounts of electricity and storing massive quantities of water for irrigation, industrial use and drinking water. Yet, such projects often carry a heavy price for those who lived alongside these now flooded rivers. Scholars conservatively estimate that over the last fifty years, some sixty million people plus have been involuntarily relocated. Dams are politically contentious. The politics around the environmental consequences and the fate of those relocated from the dam site is not only a local or national issue, but also a topic of international concern.

This thesis, based on six months of ethnographic fieldwork in the mountains of the Philippines, examines the social consequences of the San Roque Dam, the largest dam built in South East Asia. The dam was built between 1998 and 2003, and the managers of the dam were required to create a resettlement action plan. This thesis built
on my history of travels to this area in 2007 and 2008 (up to six months in total). I focused on two communities, Bantic and Daynet, with approximately five to six hundred members living in the resettlement and surrounding areas.

My fieldwork was not just village-based, but also tried to use the institutional dynamics, especially between the project-affected and project-proponents. These are the Indigenous Peoples Organization and the San Roque Corporate Social Responsibility Department, the National Power Corporation, Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Pag-rangayan Community Development Foundation. The Indigenous Peoples Organization is made up of members from both the Daynet and Bantic resettlement communities. The IPO organization includes a Chairperson, a Vice-President of Operations, a Vice-President of Administration, and six Board of Trustees. These officers are democratically elected to represent Bantic and Daynet in major negotiations. The San Roque Corporate Social Responsibility Department is the organization that interacts the most with the IPO. This department is responsible for approving the release of any social funds for the resettlement communities. The National Power Corporation is technically responsible for ensuring that the dam-affected peoples are receiving livelihood and due compensation entitlements as a result of their displacement. The Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development were hired in 2009 by the San Roque Power Corporation to implement a micro-finance scheme in the resettlement communities. They visit resettlement communities once a week to collect weekly loan repayments and teach principles regarding money management. The Department of Environment and Natural Resource’s Watershed Management team is based on the dam site at the National Power Corporation
office. They are in charge of managing the populations that enter the watershed and gold panning areas. The *Pag-rangayan* Community Development Foundation is the peoples organization funded by SRPC and NPC to implement community development strategies in the resettlement communities. Lacking technical, economic, political, and moral support, the IPO is vulnerable to impoverishment risks, the obvious (food insecurity) and pervasive (powerlessness).

During my fieldwork, I spoke in English. I hired four research assistants, who translated Ibalois, Illacano, Tagalog, Kankaneye, Kalinguia in to English. The project-proponents that I interacted with spoke English and Tagalog fluently. The Philippine people were colonized by the United States from 1898 to 1941. English during US colonization became a widespread language, as well as the national language, Tagalog. Many of the documents signed between the IPO and NPC, SPRC, and JBIC were written in English, a language they rarely spoke at home or in public.

My research was supported by now commonly accepted social and environmental norms, in part because they had to follow new protocols and regulations concerning involuntarily relocated peoples. These protocols mean that determining whether a project like this is successful or not is about examining the project-affected peoples livelihood situation. Programs were created that ostensibly aim to improve their lives. This thesis examines whether or not a goat dispersal program and a cooperative agricultural store achieved its goals or not. My results showed that the creation and implementation of these programs were not developed with the free and prior informed consent of the people. Lacking a meaningful two-way consultation project designs more recently in the CARD micro-finance program show still a top-down management approach. I originally
intended to create a better social impact assessment. However, based on my fieldwork and experience, it does not matter how well developed a social impact assessment is. Efficiently implementing social safeguards will depend on the level of political motivation and incentive between stakeholders to uphold them.

Current research on resettlement is focused on the impacts of the World Commission Dam Report (2000) and how it has yet to strengthen or influence the implementation of these policies to actually mitigate impoverishment risks and enable the affected to share in project benefits (Mcdonald-Wilsmen & Webber 2010). There is less written about how we will go about strengthening the process of implementing these rights and protections. Internationally financed loans meant to fund state projects require borrower countries to recognize the rights of its minority and disadvantaged populations and protect those rights where deemed necessarily interacting with any project-related activities.

Large infrastructure planning, design, and implementation have been traditionally purely technical and non-social. A social impact assessment is an entry point for us to find ways of improving the implementation of supposed benefits and compensation for being involuntarily displaced. There is a tension in the development literature between needing radical changes in our socio-economic system of development, structurally, and, radical changes on the ground for the people needing the autonomy to make and direct their own futures now (McMichael 2004, Escobar 1995, Gates & Gates 1976). These tensions need to be worked out together and not separately because we are dealing with people who were forced to dramatically shift their entire lives for a dam that benefits
others for profit, and, others demanding a comfortable living in urban areas. The long-term impacts of chronic marginalization, and or, a lack of autonomy in a compensation-negotiated space has potentially disastrous outcomes for peoples’ health and wellbeing. Dam-induced involuntary resettlement provides us with an opportunity to examine more closely how individual health problems are influenced by our existing political economy of development on a transnational level.

A social impact assessment is part of the problem and part of the solution. It is part of the problem because it so obviously has been used as a tool of oppression to gain public support for projects that involve displacement. It is part of the solution because through law and convention it provides an entry point for both pro and anti dam advocates to collaborate on how an SIA should be done to mitigate impoverishment risks. An advocate’s work does not end when the dam is built.

Development is a land issue for Indigenous peoples and for groups using land for resources and livelihood (Stavenhagen 2004, Hughes 2000). Colonial doctrines regarding the use and ownership of land may differ significantly from Indigenous people’s understandings of land. For example, land ownership may be recognized among locals through historical use and occupation - everyone knows which parcels are used by whom and for what purposes. Documenting this knowledge of ownership rights in formal terms that would be considered valid by outsiders was unnecessary until the 1970s and 1980s, when land-based livelihood users were forced into fighting to protect their land against state-imposed development programs across the world. In cases of dam-induced involuntary resettlement: "Generations of indigenous people have often inhabited
the same land, which is desirable to them precisely because a river runs through it" (Leslie 2008: 88).

The construction of dam reservoirs historically has been "the largest single contributor to forced relocation" (Newton 2008:21). Development-induced displacement and resettlement (Koenig 2001, Cernea & McDowell 2000, McDowell 1996) "is the direct outcome of a planned political decision to take land away from its current users" that fits "into national ideologies about development" (Guggenheim & Cernea 1993: 4). Forcibly uprooting people from their land and livelihood is "rationalized by beliefs such as the "the greatest good for the greatest number," such schemes reflect basic political choices concerning who should gain and suffer from development” (Guggenheim & Cernea 1993: 4). As a consequence of dam construction and other forms of large-scale development such as irrigation and mining, an estimated sixty to two hundred million people across the globe have been displaced (Penz et al 2011, De Wet 2006, McCully 2001, Koenig 2001, Cernea 2000).

Beginning in the early 20th century, transnational networks between dam proponents--including technocrats, pro-dam bureaucrats, dam building engineers and politicians on a national and local level--and international financial lending institutions have multiplied and strengthened (Khagram 2004). Dam building and construction captured society’s imagination as a symbol of progress:

In 1900, there were approximately 600 big dams in existence, many... in Asia and Africa. The figure grew to nearly 5, 000 big dams by 1950, of which 10 were major dams. By the year 2000, approximately 45, 000 big dams,
including approximately 300 major dams\(^1\), had been constructed around the world! Thus, over 90 percent of big dams were built over the last forty years. (Khagram 2004: 5)

By the 1950s, the World Bank became the premier multilateral development agency in the construction of large dams in the developing world. The growth of the private dam industry expanded rapidly in the 1950's and 1960's (Khagram 2004).

Dam related researchers acknowledge that large-scale dam construction will continue to be a major feature of the international political economy of development in the future (Scudder 2005, McCully 2001, Cernea 2000, Jobin 1999). In anticipation of a need for energy, governments worldwide, and especially in the so-called Third World, have focused increased attention on the energy sector (Khagram 2004, McCully 2001, Jobin 1999). In developing countries, the share in world energy consumption is estimated to have risen "from the current 25 percent [in 2004] to over 40 percent by 2010" (Khagram 2004: 8). Already, it is estimated that dam "turbines generate one fifth of the world's electricity supply, and the water they store makes possible as much as a sixth of the earth's food production" (Leslie 2008: 85).

Feasible sites for large-scale dams are fewer and fewer around the world, and, as a result of high profile protests, opinions in favour of dams as the symbol of progress has diminished (Leslie 2008, Khagram 2004, McCully 2001). However, dam development remains highly lucrative for politicians, pro-dam bureaucrats, and constituents who include “dam builders, road builders, engineers, electricians, carpenters, cooks, plus

---

\(^1\) ICOLD stands for International Commission on Large Dams. A Large Dam “is usually defined by ICOLD as a dam measuring 15 metres or more from foundation to crest. Dams of 10-15 metres may be defined as large dams by ICOLD if they meet the following requirements: crest length 500 metres or more; reservoir capacity at least 1 million cubic metres; maximum flood discharge at least 2,000 cubic metres per second; specifically difficult foundation problems; or unusual design” (McCully 2001: xii). A Major Dam as “defined by ICOLD as a dam meeting at least one of the following requirements: at least 150 metres high; having a volume of at least 15 million cubic metres; reservoir storage capacity of at least 25 cubic kilometres; or generation capacity of at least one gigawatt” (McCully 2001: xii). A Small Dam as “defined by ICOLD as dam measuring less than 15 metres from foundation to crest” (McCully 2001: xiv).
every sort of professional boom towns attract, from developers to prostitutes” (Leslie 2008: 88). Nuclear power and coal fuel sources were met with major opposition from environmental activists in the 1970’s and 1980’s. In comparison to other major electrification strategies, dam construction has been justified to be the ‘greener’ energy alternative (McCully 2001).

Transnationally networked advocacy organizations (largely from North America and the UK) brought about project-affected peoples’ concerns to the international fora. Beginning in the 1970’s, the World Bank became the target of major public criticism surrounding its approval of loans. The Bank was publicized as directly fuelling near-disastrous social and environmental conditions for its borrower countries. By the 1980’s and 1990’s transnationally aligned anti-dam advocates’ protests gained momentum resulted in major construction delays in South Asia and South East Asia (such as India’s Narmada Dam movement and Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam protests). Dam construction fast became considerably high risk and high cost, lacking environmental and social safeguards in development, planning, and operations. The World Bank estimated that cost overruns for dams were on “average 30 per cent more expensive to build than projected (almost three times the overrun on a similar sample of thermal power stations)” (McCully 2001: xxvii).

Established in 1997, the World Commission on Dams, inclusive of both pro- and anti-dam activists, set out to assess the environmental and social impacts of dam construction. In 2004, international private and public financial institutions started mainstreaming their policies concerning involuntary resettlement and for the most part, incorporated many recommendations made in the WCD report, with respect to principles
of meaningful participation and consultation (see Equator Principles 2004 and the International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards 2006). Yet still, the question remains how do we close the gap between what is in principle to protect development-induced involuntarily resettled peoples and to what is actually happening in practice? Today, there is still a large gap between them (Penz et al 2011).

A social impact assessment is a safeguard mechanism for project-proponents and project lenders to account for if resettlement action plans meant to mitigate the negative impacts of involuntary resettlement for Indigenous peoples, and or, vulnerable populations (WB & IFC PS5 2006, WB OP 4.12 2004) were successful or not. This study is interested in how we can expand a social impact assessment’s potential by recognizing it as both a sophisticated tool of oppression used to gain public approval for a project prior to its completion, and at the same time an opportunity for empowering the people affected by development.

A proliferation of rights ratified in national and international laws will not automatically translate itself in practice to the actual protection of rights and wellbeing. In the human rights literature, Landman (2006) reminds us that human rights abuses still occur despite the refinement over time in human rights discourse(s). Likewise, the identification of impoverishment risks have been incorporated as social safeguard mechanisms in cases where involuntary resettlement occurs. Yet, impoverishment risks (Cernea 1996) continue to persist more severely for those involuntarily displaced by development even when compared to those displaced by natural disaster (Mcdonald-Wilsen & Webber 2010).
In the involuntary resettlement literature (Scudder 2005, see De Wet 2006, Cernea 2003, Koenig 2001, Wescoat 2000) there has been scant attention paid to all of these categories: the unexpected events which may occur during resettlement; the complex nature of resettlement; the wider political economy and institutional context; the role of political leaders; human rights and concepts; and symbols of cultural importance to the subject population (Scudder 2005). There is a gap in our knowledge about the day-to-day interactions between project-borrowers, project-implementers and the project-affected. Patrick McCully in his ground breaking book Silenced Rivers owes this to the fact that historically, "the process of planning, promoting and building dams is usually secretive and insulated from democratic dissent" (2001:236).

The impoverishment risks model (Cernea 1996) and the four behavioural stage model (Scudder 2005) are extremely useful for educating development-planners and decision-makers on the negative consequences of involuntary resettlement by systematizing impoverishment risks. This brings attention to social, cultural, environmental, and economic impacts resulting from the neglect of dam-planners and decision-makers to incorporate the social aspects of development from the beginning. Fewer have written about how the system functions on formal and informal levels between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. This alternative gaze brings attention to the distribution of power that underlines the relationship between them to together, compensate the dam affected.

As a way to measure whether or not a resettlement action plan has been successful or not, it is useful to think about a development-induced relocatees experience as needing to pass through four behavioural stages: 1) planning and recruitment, 2) adjustment and
coping, 3) community formation and economic development and 4) handing over and incorporation (Scudder 2005). Prior to and during the project design stages, the resettlers should play a large role in the development planning.

My Masters thesis (data collected from December 4th, 2009 to May 29th, 2010) is concerned with how the San Roque Dam Corporate Social Responsibility Department and the Indigenous Peoples Organization work together to implement livelihood and compensation benefits for dam-affected peoples. Using a grounded theory method (Charmaz 2006), my thesis compares the official version of the development and effects of the San Roque Dam (as outlined in the San Roque’s Corporate Social Responsibility Department’s policy agreements and in public statements) with the ways in which livelihood is implemented in practice. I aim to generate general knowledge on how Indigenous people in the Philippines have been affected by involuntary resettlement. The results of this study will assist in the implementation of future social impact assessments strategies in the San Roque Dam case, not only as a way to track the positive and negative dimensions of the social impacts of the dam but more importantly to inform current livelihood programming strategies for the dam-affected.
Figure one below outlines my research foci and the methods used as my attempt to reach these goals:

**Figure 1. Research Methods and Foci**

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<td>1. What are the lived experiences of those living in the Bantic resettlement and surrounding areas?</td>
<td>Participant Observations, Semi-Structured One-on-one Interviews and Focus Group Discussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. What are the lived experiences of the officers in the Indigenous Peoples Organization?</td>
<td>Participant Observations, Semi-Structured One-on-one Interviews and Focus Group Discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is involved in developing a useful social impact assessment for all stakeholders?</td>
<td>Document Analyses, Participant Observations, One-on-one Interviews and Focus Group Discussions</td>
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SIAs are required for large-scale dam-construction involving involuntary resettlement. However, the significance of the SIA's role and use is rarely discussed in the dam-induced involuntary resettlement literature (see Vanclay 2000 as contributing paper to WCD 2000 report). If an SIA is discussed, it is in the context of an SIA being used to gain public approval and support for the dam project and not in terms of its potential (for example, Matsumoto 2006). Theoretically, there is little collaboration between the SIA literature and the dam-induced involuntary resettlement literature, towards policy development in which major researchers in the field of dam-induced involuntary resettlement are largely preoccupied with (see for example, Scudder 2005, Cernea 2000, Scudder and Colson 1982).

Are social assessments of the San Roque Dam benefiting the development affected as they are intended to? If not, why not? Is there an alternative approach? In the SIA literature, there is a growing interest to understand the impact of SIAs to account
for whether or not these studies actually work towards successfully implementing social and environmental safeguards in any development project (Rattle & Kwiatkowski 2003, Vanclay 2002, Sadler 1996).

My study argues that issues of power are central to developing a social impact assessment as part of finding solutions towards alleviating some of the negative social consequences. Developing a useful social impact assessment for all stakeholders involves understanding the nature of the relationships between the project-affected and the project-proponents and or the implementation agency, informally. This ethnography traces the aftermath of the San Roque Dam’s construction, how compensation was carried out in practice, and what the effects are to date.

Relations of power are central to understanding issues of empowerment, yet issues of power are rarely discussed in the social impact assessment literature. If it is discussed, disunity within the communities or social disarticulation issues (Cernea 2000, 1996) are dismissed as either too messy or too complicated to quantify, implying that these issues are too difficult, if not impossible to mitigate and resolve (Dick 1999).

Are project-proponent resettlement action plans masking how conditions actually worsen for people in the long term? Incorporating an analysis of power in a project’s resettlement action plan will help practitioners explicate the source of a majority of project-related problems that would exist (and continue to do so) lacking an analysis of power. In this case study, a formal social process means understanding how project-affected people were categorized to receive compensation as part of a resettlement action plan (as required by the World Bank and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation). Secondly, informal social processes include understanding how multiple
stakeholders, mutually dependent relationships operate together, to implement in practice, livelihood reconstruction. As a result of being formally categorized as “project-affected” beneficiaries and “Indigenous peoples”, how are my participants’ day-to-day lives shaped as a result?

Impoverishment Risks: the logic behind a social impact assessment

In the literature on resettlement (see Cernea 2000, Cernea & McDowell 2000), researchers have found that the impacts of being displaced are most severe for development-induced resettled peoples compared to those whom are displaced by natural disaster (Penz et al 2011). In case studies of dam-induced displacement in Malaysia (Yong Ooi Lin 2001), India (Newton 2008), and Canada (Samson 2003), compensation has been questioned as a remedy to impoverishment risks; it has been reported to be insufficient and prone to inducing impoverishment risks (Tilt et al 2008, Farmer 2006, Cernea 2003, Cernea & McDowell 2000, Matsumoto 2006, Samson 2003, Yong Ooi Lin 2001, WCD 2000). Furthermore, these studies suggest that human rights, including gender-based inequities, have been glossed over by project proponents and local government units. In this literature, there is much emphasis on the need for the World Bank and other financial lending institutions, in cases of involuntary resettlement, to provide clearer policies and guidelines towards pre-project consultation and prior informed consent (see Matsumoto 2006, Yong Ooi Lin 2001, WCD 2000, and Cernea 1993). It is common that project officials will not compensate those people without formal land title in potentially impacted areas. When it comes to compensation, a significant number of community members who hold customary indigenous rights to the land have not been recognized as entitled to compensation. This has been reported to
occur in Malaysia (Yong Ooi Lin 2001), India (Newton 2008), and Canada (Samson 2003).

In tribal areas or areas populated by Indigenous peoples especially, culture flows from people’s primary means of production – through relationship with and knowledge of the land. Land is attached to peoples’ productive value in the family and wider community. For instance, research on resettlement shows that the value of a women’s skills as originally land-based livelihood users diminishes in a wage labour market as they become more dependent on cash (see Kwiatkowski 2003, Yong Ooi Lin 2001, Mehta 2000, Nussbaum 2000 for examples). With the loss of a land-based livelihood and the resulting erosion of autonomy, and with the frequently uneven and poor distribution of compensation benefits, the social and cultural fabric of involuntarily resettled communities unravels, resulting in high rates of alcoholism and stress (Samson 2003).

According to Cernea’s impoverishment risks model, there are at least eight major types of risks that can occur due to resettlement (see figure 1): landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and community disarticulation (Cernea 2000, 1996).

**Figure 2. Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landlessness</td>
<td>Expropriating land that people since time immemorial had based their primary means of livelihood on, renders their ability to survive well difficult, if not impossible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joblessness</td>
<td>Plans to replace peoples’ livelihood with the ones that they lost has not been successful to restore incomes to what it was before</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homelessness</strong></td>
<td>A sense of loss for home as a result of the project, a temporary loss of housing, and or, worsening housing conditions and or standards after project construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marginalization</strong></td>
<td>A loss of economic and social power fuels spiralling conditions in all aspects of those resettled lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food insecurity</strong></td>
<td>An increased risk that people will go undernourished, temporarily or chronically.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Morbidity</strong></td>
<td>Serious declines in health levels as a result of social stress and psychological trauma; outbreaks of parasitic and vector-born diseases; and unsafe water supplies and sewage systems increases the likelihood for epidemics and chronic diarrhoea, dysentery, etc. to occur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loss of access to common property resources</strong></td>
<td>People lose access to common property assets such as pastures, forested lands, water bodies, quarries, etc. that which compliment livelihood activities are not usually compensated for by project proponents. These losses are compounded by a loss of access to public services such as schools and health care facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community or Social Disarticulation</strong></td>
<td>Life-sustaining informal social support networks that people relied on for reciprocal help and local voluntary associations are dismantled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Traditionally, development-planning approaches have ignored that these risks of impoverishment even exist (Penz et al. 2011) and, as a result, have not provided any safeguards for those involuntarily displaced. At best, when safeguards have been enacted, they have either been ineffective or led to unintended negative outcomes.

Studies from Colin Samson (2003) and Paul Farmer (2006) provide ample evidence that impoverishment is the disastrous outcome of an international economy bent on profit from the exploitation of earth's natural and human resources. It is not irrelevant or even accidental that in each of these cases (in Canada and Haiti), each community is isolated and on the margins of political and economic centres located in urban areas. In economically peripheral regions especially, where dam-induced involuntary resettlement has taken place we see the high potential for negative long-term impacts of impoverishment risks.
In Samson and Farmer we see how 15th century slave labour and other oppressive colonial economic relations have resulted today in a deeply entrenched racist public discourse. Samson demonstrates well how this attitude functions in negotiations between dam-proponents and the dam-affected in Canada. Here, dam-proponents developed maps as part of the requirements for an Environment Compliance Certificate. However, this was a futile effort for the project-affected community members. The map symbolized an end to the Innu's personal autonomy and dignity, as they were now being forced to live with mineral development and international air force flight paths (Samson 2003).

Samson (2003) reported that there were fewer good hunts for the community to rely on. The land was diminishing into a stark wasteland, forcing more and more people over the years into participating full time in the market economy, and with no work after the construction phase, more reliant on limited government benefits. The local people became expendable labour pools to the project-proponents and the government. In 2000, this Innu community suffered from the highest rates of suicide and gas sniffing abuse in Canada. In the Globe & Mail, Canada’s newspaper record, what was released as public opinion is saturated with blame against the Innu for their incapacity to catch up to modern times. The general public failed to query about the origins of the gas-sniffing problem, which is tied to the construction of the dam.

The lack of meaningful negotiations with the project-affected peoples and their severe lack of autonomy to make decisions on their own behalf are recognized as major flaws in project development design and planning (Henrikson 2008, Newton 2008, Cernea 2003, Samson 2003, Koenig 2001, Cernea & McDowell 2000, Wescoat 2000, Samson 1999). Norms and principles currently accepted among international financial
institutions clearly state that development designs and operations must incorporate social and environmental safeguard mechanisms. On-going social impact assessments show that dam-induced resettlers continue to be impoverished despite the gains being made on a transnational level to institutionalize human environment norms and principles (Tilt, Braun & He 2008, Egre & Senegal 2003, Burdge 2003, Vanclay 2003). The outcome of these newly institutionalized human environment norms and the degree to which dam-proponents are actually using them is up for serious debate and is a focus of this study.

Ironically, as the 'risks of impoverishment' are well documented by World Bank researchers (De Wet 2006, Cernea 2003, Cernea & McDowell 2000, McDowell 1996), the World Bank continues to be the top financier of large-scale dam development that are the leading cause of displacement worldwide. In 1982, the World Bank policies on involuntary resettlement were established for the first time in Bank policy. Since then, transnational advocacy organizations, peoples' organizations and social movements have put continual pressure on the World Bank to institutionalize human environmental norms and principles in practice. Yet, there are few dam projects worldwide built in the 1980's and 1990's that have rewritten their original resettlement policy to accommodate these plans financially (Cernea 2003).
Background

The research for this study took place in the Agno River Basin (see figure 3), where the Ibaloi speaking peoples, an Indigenous group, reside and represent the project-affected research participants for this study living in Batic and the surrounding areas.

Figure 3. Map of Agno River Basin

Indigenous rights to land and self-determination are enshrined in the Philippine constitution. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 1997, is the legal framework that recognizes that Indigenous peoples rights must be considered. It is under this law that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples was established to ensure and protect Indigenous rights. The state is also signatory to numerous international laws and conventions created to protect and empower Indigenous peoples, including United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. A UN Commission (2004) determined that in the Philippines, development projects that dramatically alter the environment and the lives of the people who live there "are often carried out without their prior, free, and informed consent as the law stipulates" (Stavenhagen 2004: 20). Indigenous resistance and protest against state sponsored "development aggression" were described to have been met with "military force involving human rights abuses" (Stavenhagen 2004:20).

The 1950’s and the 1960’s were a period of rapid development in the Philippines. The generation of electricity was an integral component of this development. The Agno River basin (see figure 3 above) became a prime area for hydroelectric development.

Large-scale gold mining operations, owned largely by US firms, have been operating along the Agno River since the early 1900's (Carino 2000, Hughes 2000). Although Spain had colonized the Philippines for about three hundred years, Spain was unable to penetrate the northern regions of Luzon due to resistance by Indigenous peoples (De Los Reyes and De Los Reyes 1986). In 1898, a US ex-military officer discovered that the 'natives' were already mining for gold (since time immemorial) in this region (Jenks 1905). After the officer married with a daughter of a local family who owned numerous small-scale mining operations, locals started to become less resistant. Hydro development has only recently become a phenomenon with the construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dam in the 1950's and 1960's largely to power a growing foreign-owned mining and forest industry. Contesting of land issues started to emerge in 1903, when the US wanted to subdivide what they thought was state land (in what is now
known as the Baguio city region). This effort was heavily protested through litigation by a wealthy local landowner who claimed ownership to the same land the US was interested to develop as a military base. As a result, native title (customary rights to land as opposed to possessing a tax declaration) has been recognized by the state since 1909, after a heavy litigation period which reached the US Supreme Court (Carino Native Title). Today,

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 1997 of the Philippines recognizes the indigenous right to ancestral domain and the land title to the traditional lands. Philippine law also requires a developer or company to obtain free, prior and informed consent of indigenous people for certain activities, such as (a) exploration, development and use of natural resources; (b) research-bio prospecting; (c) displacement and relocation; (d) archaeological explorations; (e) community-based forest management; and (f) entry of the military. However, indigenous organizations complain that these provisions are not complied with, as they should. (Stavenhagen 2004:7).

As it has been found in Canada (Samson 1999), land claim issues assume that the state is already in possession of the contested land. Native title versus possessing land through a tax declaration reveals how an ancestral land claim underscores the process that free and prior informed consent is really about defining the impacts and handing out the compensation due to those affected - negotiation becomes an issue of entitlement within a framework of state imposed rights as opposed to the real issue of who has ownership and control of the land. It is a given that the state owns the land.

In the Agno River basin, hydro-development surveyors investigated the feasibility of a dam since 1946. Surveyors had speculated that the Agno River possessed very high hydropower potential. A state sponsored Agno River Development Program planned for the construction of six dams. As previously mentioned, two large dams were built: the
Ambuklao dam (1950's) and the Binga dam (1960's). Efforts were also made in the 1950's to build a third dam, but it was never constructed due to massive protests by the locals in and around the surrounding areas (Carino 2000). In the 1970's, the state attempted again to build the third dam. Due to intense protests again, the state decided to revise the plan and build the third dam further down river from the original site (to where the San Roque dam now operates).

According to Carino (2000), the state funded developer’s attempts to survey and gain public support for the San Roque dam was met with a strong resistance because of the ways in which the peoples who were originally displaced by the Ambuklao dam and Binga dam were treated. They were provided with no compensation, resettlement action plan, or environmental assessment. Many of the displacees were forced to migrate into the city, to live in extremely undesirable conditions, and or, if they were fortunate enough, to live with family somewhere else outside of the city. It is not entirely clear in the literature what happened (see Carino 2000) but as way to gain public support for the third dam (the San Roque Dam), stakeholders involved in the construction of the third dam finally compensated those who were displaced by the Ambuklao dam and Binga dam in the late 1990's.

The peoples' knowledge and experience of the Ambuklao and Binga dam and ensuing protests fuelled a major transnational (local, national, and international) campaign against the construction of the San Roque dam from the late 1990's to 2004. The construction of the San Roque dam began in 1998 and lasted until 2003. The 200-meter high, 1.2-kilometre long, earth-filled embankment dam is the largest dam project constructed in Southeast Asia (see figure 4 and figure 5).
In the early 1990’s, Philippine government funded research speculated that with growing urban populations and industry demands, existing power storage and capacity could not meet rising needs for electricity (Carino 2000). For instance, even today, electricity blackouts in Manila are a common occurrence. The Philippine's power development plans from 1993 to 2005 stressed the fact that:

the power supply in the Philippines is dependent largely on oil-based thermal power stations. In 1997, the major sources of power included oil, coal, geothermal and hydroelectric power. (Carino 2000:2)

The state intended to reduce its dependency on fuel consumption by turning to hydro-development as part of its national power development strategy.
The San Roque Dam was developed as a Build-Operate-Transfer scheme, awarded to the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC). Essentially, Japanese and US bank investors formed this corporation and made an agreement with a state agency (what we know now as the National Power Corporation) to build a dam. After twenty-five years of operation, the SRPC's contract with the National Power Corporation (NPC) will cease and the dam and operations will be transferred to the NPC entirely. The loans for the project come from a Japanese export credit agency, the Japanese Bank for International Co-operation, and a consortium of Japanese private banks led by the Japan Export and the Import Bank (Kim 2010, Leong 2007, Carino 2000) with offices based in Japan and the United States. The San Roque Power Corporation has invested four hundred and fifty million US dollars towards the construction costs of the power generation facilities and its management. The Japanese Bank for International Co-operation has lent the San Roque Power Corporation a reported one hundred and fifty million US dollars. The National Power Corporation has borrowed from the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation, two hundred million US dollars allocated for environmental and social issues and an additional six hundred million US dollars was borrowed that went towards the construction of the dam and spillway (Kim 2010). Philippine taxpayers in this agreement shoulder the burden of repayment and risk if the National Power Corporation defaults on their loan.

The San Roque Dam ranked among some of the most politically contentious development projects in the world (Kim 2010, Leslie 2008, Leong 2007, Matsumoto 2006, Yamaguchi 2001, Carino 2000). The terms of the Build-Operation and Transfer agreement caught the attention of the growing transnational movement against dam
building in general when local Indigenous groups like the Cordillera Peoples Alliance brought these issues into the international fora (Carino 2000). UN Human Rights Commissions (Stavenhagen 2004) and transnational organizations began a series of investigations and public consultations to assess the social and environmental aspects of the project (De La Rosa 2000). Resistance by global indigenous and environmental rights organizations such as Friends of Earth, Japan and the International Rivers Network to the San Roque Dam created such a stir that by 2000, the NPC caved to mounting political pressures to compensate the economically displaced with Indigenous rights to negotiate ancestral land claims. The NPC as a way to gain public approval for the project, already under construction, conceded to several conditions one of which included compensation to the economically displaced with livelihood reconstruction as well.

A conservative estimate suggests that over 20,000 people were involuntarily displaced and an additional 20,000 people lost their agricultural lands and livelihood (gold-panning and animal husbandry) as a result of the San Roque dam (Leong 2007). Another published claim puts the figure at 150,000 (Yamaguchi 2003). Transnationally aligned advocacy groups made the first genuine attempt to gather data to include the economically displaced. These estimates differ because after the project started construction anti-dam advocates were not conducting the research in collaboration with each other. Each estimate reflect different methodologies and resources of each organization, in their attempt to collect data about the economically displaced.

In resettlement action planning, understanding how people are using the land is an important component of assessing compensation entitlements and mitigating negative impacts in the short and long term. According to a fact finding mission conducted in
1999 by a group of academics the National Power Corporations' survey conducted in 1995 and updated in 1999 did not account for those who were also economically displaced. The economically displaced in this case are the people who now reside in and around the Daynet and Bantic resettlement communities. My research participants were later included in resettlement action plans (discussed further below) during the construction of the dam beginning in 1999/2000 as seasonal resource users, another name for the economically displaced and relocatees².

Today, according to the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) policy and operational guidelines to determine whether the San Roque Dam will continue to receive loans to operate the dam³, the lenders require periodic social impact assessments. At present, these social impact assessments are meant to measure the success of resettlement action plans by accounting for their income generation, outcome of ancestral land claims, resettlement and livelihood program retention, and status of their infrastructure development. Technically, if JBIC found through these assessments that SRPC and NPC were not genuinely implementing social safeguard mechanisms meant to mitigate impoverishment risks – JBIC can stop issuing them loans. Ultimately, JBIC is liable for ensuring that the dam affected are as well off or better than what they were before their displacement.

The timing of the World Commission on Dams report--completed and made public in 2000 during the construction phase of the San Roque Dam--was timely for anti-dam

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² My seasonal resource user informants shared that they were not included in the first round of compensation benefits because they were not present during the first batch of social assessments, and or, they were without formal land title. As will be discussed in Chapter One, the people were further divided from those who were the original beneficiaries of compensation for not claiming, or, being able to claim to have a permanent structure - although in the way that others had used their structures was no different from them. There were few differences according to my participants in the ways that they all lived (relocatees and seasonal resource users) prior to first hearing about the San Roque Dam's construction.
³ As a build operation and transfer scheme, the National Power Corporation agreed to take out loans for a specific amount of time. It does not matter if they generate electricity or not, they continue to receive loans.
activists and local government units. Transnational anti-dam movements pressured the
Japanese Bank to review the social and environmental aspects of the San Roque Multi-
purpose project. NPC and SRPC’s failure to address ongoing ancestral land claims,
resettlement and livelihood concerns of the dam-affected peoples prior to dam
construction had become a political spectacle. The National Power Corporation and the
San Roque Power Corporation were inundated with protests, bad press, and efforts to
control what was fast becoming a public relations disaster. The *Manila Times* reported
that local government officials were leading numerous protests "denouncing irregularities
and unfulfilled promises by National Power Corporation (NPC) and the San Roque
Power Corporation" (Dumlao 2000:1). The result of these anti-dam protests and threats
of legal action was that stricter social and environmental standards addressing Indigenous
peoples’ rights were addressed by NPC and SRPC to gain the public and local
governments’ political support for the construction of the San Roque Multi-Purpose dam.
In this study, I explore the outcomes of these newly institutionalized human environment
policies and the degree to which dam-proponents are actually using them.

**SRMP Resettlement Action Plan(s)**

In 1998, the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) developed during the project's
construction is SRPC and NPC’s attempt to address the concerns of the directly dam-
affected people. Under the RAP, four resettlement sites were created where a majority of
displaced families were relocated: 1) Camaangan in San Manuel, 2) Lagpan in San
Nicholas, 3) Daynet in Ampucao, and 4) Bantic in Dalupirip (see Appendix 1 for map of
each resettlement in proximity to the dam site). Although there are Indigenous Peoples
living in Camaangan and Lagpan resettlement communities as well, the majority of them
entitled to negotiate their ancestral land claims with the government reside in Daynet and Bantic. Indigenous and or Project-Affected Peoples Organizations were not created in Camaangan and Lagpan to negotiate with project-proponents.

The Indigenous Peoples Organization (IPO) called the Sebang ni Pansegshan is the primary organization tasked to enact the resettlement action plan for Daynet and Bantic. Established in 2004, the members of the IPO were democratically elected by Daynet and Bantic community members to formally represent them in major negotiations between themselves and the SRPC, local government units and other dam-proponents. The Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) is an agreement that is designed as a specific mitigation measure to ensure that project-proponents are taking into consideration the special cultural and social circumstances of Indigenous peoples. The implementation of the IPDP calls for multi-agency involvement which should be primarily led by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, the National Power Corporation, the San Roque Power Corporation, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and concerned local government units.

The IPO is the organization that the Bank recognizes as official project-affected people representatives with Indigenous land claim rights and with special consideration of their rituals, practices and beliefs in program development and consultations (IPDP 2003). According to the IPDP, “It is within this overall context that this Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) has been developed in conformity with the World Bank's Operational Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples and on Involuntary Resettlement and the Philippines Government's Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)” (IPDP 2003:5).
Beginning in 1999, the NPC and the SRPC started the process of hiring consultants to work with the Bantic and Daynet peoples to develop an Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP). Between the years 2000 and 2002, twelve consultations took place between a consultancy group and nine members from Bantic and Daynet to develop the Indigenous Peoples’ Development Framework (IPDF). The language of framework implies that the IPDF will guide the processes towards developing the IPDP. The Indigenous Peoples Organization (IPO) approved the framework for negotiations and consultations by a general assembly in 2004. A Memorandum Of Agreement between the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the National Power Corporation (NPC), the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC), the local government units and the Bantic and Daynet peoples was signed to ensure its implementation.

As part of the compensation package for the Bantic and Daynet communities, the IPDP deals with land tenure, resettlement, environment, community development, livelihood, culture and organizational support for the Daynet and Bantic peoples. In 2003, it was reported in stakeholder consultations that the IPO’s immediate priorities and concerns involved building their capacity to organize and administer compensation benefits, livelihood programs and ancestral land claim negotiations (IPDP 2003). NPC and SRPC agreed to provide support to the IPO as one of the conditions in the final Memorandum of Agreement between all stakeholders. Lengthy plans to rehabilitate the livelihoods and compensate the members of the IPO were formally established. The primary goal of these plans was to ensure that the dam affected is "at least as well off but preferably better off than prior to the project's inception" (SPREAD 2008). By 2013, the resettlement action plan was expected to build a "model community with a developed
socio-economic structure would be established in all four resettlement sites" (SPREAD 2008).

In 2005, these resettlement and livelihood rehabilitation plans developed into an official policy guideline to assist the SRPC with the implementation of effective livelihood strategies. Initially, the SRPC's Corporate Social Responsibility Department took the lead implementing role. In March 2006, the responsibility of lead implementers was then transferred to a non-profit people's organization called the Pag-rangayan Community Development Foundation Institute (PCDFI) through a Memorandum of Agreement entered into between SRPC and PCDFI. The SRPC took no lead role from 2004 to 2009 to implement livelihood programs in resettlement communities.

In 2009, however, the SRPC Corporate Social Responsibility Department took a lead implementing role. But again it merely did so by facilitating a relationship with a micro-finance program set up by an organization called the Centre for Agriculture and Rural Development and the resettlement communities. Notably, the NPC is primarily responsible for implementing the social aspects of the dam as stipulated previously with the monies that they have taken out to take care of such activities (see Kim 2010). Informally, however, SRPC's Corporate Social Responsibility Department since 2000 has taken the responsibility of dealing with the financial aspects to fund and administer social programming.

Interestingly, a new foundation is in the process of being developed to replace the PCDFI and SRPC as the lead agencies to implement livelihood, again, without free and prior informed consent of the communities involved. In this charitable organization (which is planned to be run by SRPC and PCDFI staff) when livelihood programs are
provided to the project-affected people, a charitable tax receipt will accompany it and the receipt will be given to the SRPC for having provided livelihood for the resettled communities. SRPC’s current president conceptualized this scheme.

My data collection occurred seven years after the construction of the San Roque dam. In the terminology of the SIA literature, this would be a “post-construction” report. In 2000, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation adopted World Bank policies (WB OP 4.12) regarding involuntary resettlement for the San Roque Dam more specifically. The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation's obligation to provide the dam with further loans will cease in 2013. According to the SRPC Corporate Social Responsibility Department, they will no longer be required to conduct social impact assessments after loans cease. WB OP 4.12 stipulates however that until the resettlement action plan is complete, which includes the final claim to ancestral land title under WB OD 4.20, the Japanese Bank has an obligation to monitor social impacts.

This study focuses on social relations and interactions between the project-proponents and the project-affected. It reveals a severe lack of autonomy amongst project-affected people to make decisions on their own behalf. My data revealed that strong displays of tutelage – defined by Dyck (1991) as “a form of restraint or care exercised by one party over another as well as the condition of being subjected to such protection or guardianship” (24), reveals “an implicit understanding of the unequal status and power” (24) between parties and individuals -- underlined the nature of the relationship between project-proponents and the project-affected. Social safeguards were
in place, but only superficially. My inquiry in Chapter Two: *The lived experiences of those living in the Bantic resettlement and surrounding areas* found that my participants link the failure of current livelihood programming with the ways they were first categorized by the National Power Corporation in a social survey fifteen years previously. Chapter Three: *The lived experiences of the officers in the Indigenous Peoples Organization* explores the nature of the relationship between the IPO and SRPC. This chapter discusses how important it is for the IPO to have a good image in the eyes of the local governments and the Japanese Bank. The IPO relies on endorsements if they are to have a chance at being internally and externally funded to support their communities and develop a sustainable livelihood program. The IPO was under-funded and lacked strong and reliable social networks in the local area compared to SRPC. My results showed that SRPC was the authority about what happened in the Bantic resettlement community. The IPO was faced with the difficult challenge of maintaining a positive image for them, which counteracted the image of the IPO, SRPC espoused to the public, in public conversations or through SRPC funded and administered social impact assessments.

The original intent of this study set out to develop a social impact assessment. It began with examining a previous social impact assessment conducted in 2008. Social assessments are viewed by the Japanese Bank as representing the lived experiences of the resettlement communities. Chapter Four: *Moving forward: what is involved in developing a useful social impact assessment for all stakeholders* discusses how vital it is to develop a social impact assessment dealing with the distribution of power head on. A social impact assessment is a monitoring tool for project-proponents to evaluate the
success or failure of project-related livelihood programs. My results showed that SRPC were not entirely clear with how the results of social impact assessments should be used. This study argues that results from social impact assessments should not be used to manipulate internal politics within resettlement communities and or take questionable findings and incorporate them as justification for continuing support to already dysfunctional livelihood programs. This study sees this as no surprise as from the beginning principles regarding the distribution of power were missing in the San Roque Dam’s design, planning and implementation.

Methods

In the field, to research the lived experiences of the people directly affected by the San Roque Dam and the dam-proponents involved in implementing due compensation benefits, I drew from an ethnographic grounded theory/method approach. Grounded theory is a process where "theory is derived from systematically gathered data arising through the research process" (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 12). The central tenets behind a grounded theory/method approach are to make constant comparisons, ask theoretically oriented questions and code as a way to develop theory, not attempting to test existing hypothesis (McGhee et al 2007, Charmaz 2006, Hall & Callery 2001). Glasser and Strauss, the originators of the method, sought to challenge positivist assumptions that qualitative research is incapable of verification (Hall & Callery 2001).

Strauss and Glasser attempted to challenge these assumptions that qualitative research could not be rigorous. A central grounded theory method (GTM) tenant was that
the researcher objectively constructs and promotes a position of mutuality between the researcher and the respondents (McGhee et al 2007, Charmaz 2006). I agree with critics of GTM whom argue that our life histories will influence the research at every stage, from its development to the writing up; it is impossible to stay objective. Critics of the grounded theory method argue that at every moment, including our research phase - our biases and beliefs, will influence our decisions and actions (Thomas & James 2006).

Hall and Callery insist that to make a grounded theory method more rigorous, a researcher must make explicit “the social processes that influenced the generation of data and the intrusion of subjectivity into the analysis (emphasis added)” (2001: 258). This chapter focuses on explicating the social processes involved to collect data for this study. Post data collection phases, after conducting keyword searches using grounded theory method and dam-induced involuntary resettlement research, methods and dam-induced involuntary resettlement I did not find references in the field where social science practitioners explicitly outlined their use of a grounded theory method. This study takes seriously issues involving an insider/outsider power dynamic between researchers and research participants: “Such an exploration is important because what often ‘matters’ in the ethical practice of research and teaching is not so much our technical expertise or our ability to ask ‘good’ questions, but our cultural and political expertise: our ability to know and decide when and how and to whom questions should be asked” (Dillard 2008: 90).

Bryman and Teeman (2005) and Creswell (2003) suggest that qualitative research follows a different set of criterion to validate research findings compared to that of quantitative research. To be more rigourous, in addition to being reflexive, the researcher must focus on any discrepancies in the data collected and the length of time spent in the
field. In cross-cultural research, participatory approaches and mutually reciprocal research relationships "ensures that participants benefit from their involvement in research in a tangible and meaningful way" (Salmon 2007: 983).

Hall and Callery (2001) suggest researchers using the grounded theory method should make explicit key ideas that may have intentionally and unintentionally influenced the framing of the research questions, data collection, and analysis. Prior to entering the field, I drew from Sen’s (1999) work on capabilities, whereby poverty and inequality is a deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely a paucity of income. I include them here to show how I have been influenced knowingly and unknowingly because I had spent a significant amount of time studying Sen’s concepts of freedom prior to entering the field. Sen describes five related concepts: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security.

Political freedoms refers to the opportunities that people have to determine the direction of livelihood programs and compensation benefits negotiated for them by the Indigenous Peoples Organizations and the dam proponents. Economic facilities refers to the opportunities that people have to consume, produce, and/or, exchange in the market place and/or, availability or access to financing such as a micro credit scheme. Social opportunities refers to access to education and healthcare. Transparency guarantees refers to feelings of openness to discuss issues that are important to individuals with guarantees of privacy and trust between the parties involved in the discussions. Protective security refers to a social safety net for dam-affected community members as
so to prevent abject poverty and starvation. Notably, I did not make an explicit attempt to link any categories that were emerging out of my data with Sen’s categories or concepts.

Sampling took the form of being at the right place at the right time. Drawing from a snowball sampling technique, the social networks among participants, my research assistants and myself were used extensively. This study relied heavily on knowing where to go next from our previous interviews. We (my research assistants and myself) made a strident effort to locate people (all stakeholders; the project-affected, local government units, SRPC and NPC officials for instance) who would be willing to speak with us to elaborate on topics that which came up in previous participant observations, one-on-one interviews and focus group discussions. The data collected from local government officials was taken in public forums. The election at the end of May (2010) was good timing for us in March 2010 to catch up with local government officials and interview them.

Ultimately, the data collection and the analysis proceeded in tandem. Further data analysis was closely derived from what people were actually saying at the moment and it allowed me to reflect on what is important to the people sharing their stories with me. At its core, a grounded theory approach is a constant process of coding observations, transcribing interviews and writing memos to allow theoretical concepts and categories to emerge out of the data.
Grounded theorists separate, sort, and synthesize data to develop theoretical concepts. Through a stringent process of member checking\(^4\) (Charmaz 2006) I made a conscious effort to develop theoretical categories through open coding and the comparison of these codes. The grounded theorist then further develops their emergent theory through specific theoretical sampling and sorting. Theoretical sampling and sorting involves engaging the respondents for a second and or a third time to elaborate on concepts that are underdeveloped but apparent in the data. This continues until the conceptual categories become saturated or no new questions arise about the related processes or actions that gives meaning to the conceptual categories for the respondent. Grounded theory is a constant process of negotiation and re-negotiation about what is collected and how the researcher is interpreting it. The GTM method of analysis and interpretation develops "systematic categories of information (open coding), selecting one of the categories and positioning it within a theoretical model (axial coding), and then explicating the story from the interconnection of these categories (selective coding)" (Creswell 2003:191).

In 1999, the National Power Corporation and San Roque Power Corporation’s official master list created five categories of project-affected peoples which included: house owners (61 families), land owners (69 individuals were identified), seasonal resource users (117 individuals were identified), structure owners (207 were identified) and tenants (211 tenant farmers were identified, because they were seen to have improved the area with plants within 250 msl of the reservoir area). The project-affected persons

\(^4\) Member checking is another way of saying re-interviewing participants to engage them about particular topics that may have not been as clearly defined or refined in the first set of interviews with them. According to Charmaz (2006), ethics review boards prefer for one reason or another, the term member checking as opposed to re-interviewing.
could be defined as either possessing one or multiple characteristics of a project-affected person as defined above\textsuperscript{5}. The sample (N = 58 from a total of N=176 - total number of relocatees and seasonal resource users as identified by SRPC/NPC) for this study were primarily made up of seasonal resource users and house owners (now known as relocatees). SRPC was treating these two categories as official beneficiaries to receive livelihood compensation benefits. Technically, for SRPC to receive further funding from the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation, livelihood reconstruction and or rehabilitation should have been made available to all project-affected persons. However, after interviewing numerous tenant farmers and land owners, many reported that the SRPC had failed to inform them, of such programs and compensation due benefits. Due to time and space constraints, their testimonies about their perceived relationship with the San Roque Dam were not included in the results section of this study. Notably, in a similar way to the seasonal resource users, the tenant farmers did not see any difference between themselves and the house owners who are now known as relocatees. One informant even had picture documentation of a permanent home and secondary structure on the lot that is now submerged by the reservoir. For one reason or another, NPC social surveyors did not categorize this person as a house owner and or even a seasonal resource user. It so happened that this person married a seasonal resource user years later, and

\textsuperscript{5} For instance, some of my respondents were categorized as a house owner and a structure owner in 2006. This meant that when the original survey in 1995 was conducted by NPC the people categorized as house owners were deemed to have permanent homes in the submergence areas. Because the resettlement site took several years to be completed, on their own they built structures in what is now known as the Bantic resettlement community. Numerous respondents told me that they were told to build there because they would eventually live there anyways. However, after several years of living there in the structures that they had built they were told to dismantle them to make way for the SRPC and NPC endorsed structures that were to be built in their place. This is a very contentious issue for these structure owners who may have been as well relocatees and structure owners and or seasonal resource users and structure owners. To date, they have not been reimbursed for the structures that were dismantled and that was promised to them because as NPC argued with the IPO chairwoman and I, the land is still being contested in the court. Issues of corruption as well is a sour point that was being discussed between at least 32 structures owners and I who claim that they were tricked to sign a receipt that supposedly stipulated that they would receive the money. However, it turns out that this voucher claims that they accepted the money, not that it promised to give them the money. Because they trusted the NPC official negotiating these claims with them at the time, they had no other reason but to believe this person that by signing this voucher that NPC was going to keep their word. This voucher has to date been used by NPC as another excuse not to pay these peoples because they signed this voucher that stipulates in English that they received compensation already.
through this marriage is now due to receive livelihood reconstruction benefits. The people I worked with closely are affiliated with the Indigenous Peoples Organization who at present time are made up of relocatees or previously known as house owners. This is the organization that interacts the most with the dam proponents.

In the Bantic resettlement community where I spent a majority of my time the peoples there spoke Ibalois as their primary language; Ilocano, as their second, and English as a third, and, less frequently, Tagalog. In Daynet, most people spoke Ilocano, Kankaneye, or Kalinguia as their first language, English as their second, and less frequently, Tagalog and Ibalois. In the field, to conduct interviews I required at least one translator at all times who were competent in every language spoken in each community. I hired a total of four research assistants. I gave a copy of my research and ethics statement to everyone I interviewed or talked with including these research assistants. Our discussions as a research team after data collection on any given day inspired ongoing investigation.

In cases of involuntary resettlement World Bank (OP 4.12 & OD 4.20) and other Financial Institutional (IF PS 5 & IFC PS 7) guidelines concerning Indigenous peoples, requires that the proponents facilitate an organization made up of them. In the Philippines, because Indigenous Peoples are constitutionally protected within the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 1997, they are also entitled to negotiate for ancestral land title on top of receiving compensation entitlements as a result of being involuntarily displaced. The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation under WB guidelines has stipulated that they need to see ongoing monitoring reports of project related activities concerning social issues. As a result, the IPO is responsible for holding annual general assemblies (inclusive of all project-affected peoples living in Daynet and Bantic and the surrounding areas) and regular IPO organizational meetings that which is to be reported to JBIC in an internal monitoring report via SRPC.

As required by WB OP 4.12 (involuntary resettlement procedures), WB 4 OD 4.2 (directives regarding Indigenous Peoples) and IFC PS5 (the international finance corporation, a world bank group, updated WB OP 4.12 regarding involuntary resettlement procedures), this specific Indigenous Peoples Organization is officially recognized by all San Roque stakeholders to be responsible for approving and implementing livelihood and due compensation benefits on behalf of Daynet and Bantic community members. There are no requirements for education or experience for members to be elected as officers. The people who have been elected to make up the IPO to date, have had at least two years of post-secondary education, and, with the exception of the Bantic IPO officers currently, and, the second IPO chairwoman who lived in the Daynet resettlement, lives outside of the resettlement community. The IPO are given an honorarium to participate in project-related activities (from the San Roque Power Corporation, described further in Chapter Three) but as I argue in this study, it is not enough.

In 2009, my IPO – Vice President of Operations officer participant networked with the Chamber of Commerce in Baguio city and later rented an office space there, with money coming out of his own expense. During my field visit in 2010, I observed that the IPO needed to follow up with offers from the mayor’s office that the IPO could use a space at the Itogon municipal hall for free. Before an office in Baguio city, IPO officers would usually work from each other’s respective homes. I could not find any official statistics, which identifies how many IPOs, exist in the Philippines. Local government officials insinuated that there are many IPOs in operation in the Philippines as a result of having to negotiate due compensation entitlements and ancestral land title in cases of large scale development, especially in the Northern Luzon area, where natural resources are high in economic potential.
We collected data between the dates of December 4th, 2009 to May 29th, 2010. I lived more permanently at the San Roque Dam site from the time I arrived to the middle of January with frequent visits to Baguio city (approximately six hours away by local transport), and the Bantic (approximately twelve hours away from the dam site) and Daynet resettlement sites (approximately two hours away from the dam site office). I lived more permanently at the Bantic resettlement site from the middle of January to the end of my stay with frequent visits to Baguio city, the San Roque Dam site, Pangasinan; Bekel, La Trinidad, Benguet; Bua, Itogon, Benguet; Manaoag, Pangasinan; and Dalupirip, Itogon Benguet (please see map of the Pangasinan (page 41) and Benguet (page 42) province). During the municipal campaign election period I traveled extensively throughout the northern sections of the Benguet province with the acting mayor running for governor.
Figure 6. Map of Pangasinan Province or Low Lands
Figure 7. Map of Benguet Province or High Lands
I interviewed 6 people from Daynet and 41 people from Bantic that also includes IPO officers. I held informal interviews with three San Roque Dam proponents and one formal interview with a San Roque Dam proponent. I held informal interviews with numerous local, municipal, and provincial government officials and digitally recorded them when they spoke in public meetings with Bantic and the outlying areas. I have an informal unrecorded interview with a professor from St. Louis University who is an authority in the Benguet province on Ibalois culture, of which the Bantic community members belong to. I held 12 follow up interviews (member checking and or re-interviewing procedure) with people from Bantic and the Indigenous Peoples Organization who, I had interviewed earlier. I held four follow up interviews with one IPO officer, and, five follow up interviews with another IPO officer.

I held twenty-two focus group discussions ranging from three people to 68 people (including of seasonal resource users, relocatees, IPO officers, non-governmental organizations, local government officials, SRPC field workers and administration, NPC field workers and administration, Department of Environment and Natural Resources field workers, local and municipal government officials and employees, Department of Education administrators and teachers and citizen activists). I taped naturally occurring conversations wherever I happened to be with a member of the IPO or Bantic community member which includes on the road travelling, at funerals, coffee shops in Baguio city, or wherever else people felt like talking and didn’t mind being recorded. I attended and helped facilitate Indigenous People Organization seminars, meetings and a general assembly that happened during my stay there with the exception of one IPO meeting – all of which were digitally voice recorded. In the second half of my research term (March to
May 2010), I observed more closely the activities and the lifestyle of the current chairwoman of the IPO. I also participated in the municipal campaign during election time to understand more clearly how social networking in the Benguet province and the Itogon region operates, informally and formally.

I took detailed notes for the first three months on my laptop computer and wrote down detailed handwritten notes for the rest of my fieldwork. I recorded text messages from IPO officers, Daynet and Bantic community members, and the SRPC vice-president, Tom Valdez. From SRPC and the IPO, I gathered documents relating to the IPO and Bantic community member’s activities since 2004 dealing with the San Roque Dam proponents and the National Power Corporation. I also collected previous social impact and environmental assessments since 1998 held by the San Roque Dam.

Approximately one month after I arrived to the field, my first participant observation between the IPO and SRPC Corporate Social Responsibility department influenced the way future investigations were framed. My first set of interview questions with Bantic resettlement and surrounding areas, relocatees and seasonal resource users (further defined in Chapter Two), were rather generic asking in a very open ended way what they thought about SRPC, the IPO, and their current lived experiences. The issues that emerged in my initial participant observations with the dam proponents and the IPO were weighted with the data that I collected using this open-ended survey through one-on-one interviews. Member checking or re-interviewing, at first, took the form of focus group discussions in the resettlement communities and in IPO activities where I shared major issues that were arising from my one-on-one interviews and participant observations: disunity and broken promises. Often local government units, local citizen
activists, and non-profit health organizations were present and participated in these discussions where it was fully obvious to everyone participating that these discussions were being digitally recorded.  

The Bantic resettlement site is made up of 22 houses. A majority of people use the resettlement area seasonally as there is no steady income and food generating activities there. From my initial participant observations between dam-proponents and the dam-affected, a series of one-on-one interviews followed (see Appendix 2 for my first set of open-ended interview questions). Focus group discussions in the resettlement communities examined how to resolve existing tensions in a reasonable time frame while at the same time increasing the capacity and independence of the IPO.  

We dealt with issues of power between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. Issues of empowerment and disempowerment were clearly a driving force behind my data collection processes and analyses. We focused on how to create better lines of communication between themselves and outsiders and discussed their access to resources. From this, the IPO were able to take their views and present them to the dam proponents in constructive and productive ways.  

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7 I made it clear at the beginning of any focus group discussion that I was digitally recording it and for what purposes. I make it explicit here that it was obvious to everyone that I was digitally recording our discussions, as a way to show that even if people later joined our meeting, after I discussed any informed consent, these late comers were informed more formally afterwards.

8 The dialectical and active approach taken in this study was mentioned by my IPO officer participants as more constructive when compared with previous researchers in their community (including previous University researchers and SRPC funded research organizations like SPREAD). I have been told that peoples’ attitude changes towards the IPO when they see support from a person like me, a Canadian MA Sociology candidate. More importantly, the IPO’s official statement was officially documented in writing so that decision makers in Manila, from SRPC could get a picture of the current status of IPO operations from the IPO’s perspective. The IPO’s status or perceived nature of co existence with San Roque administrators and field workers, begs me to want to understand the process of implementation of informed consent procedures (IPRA, 1997) that which are not only constitutionally but also internationally, recognized in this case study as well.
non-IPO officers of the community were learning about their rights, as indicated within the framework of previous agreements between themselves and the dam proponents.9

After two months of intensive interviewing (N = 32), focus group discussions (N= 23) and participant observations, I developed a second interview guide which focused on specific issues that were arising from the first half of my data collection term (see Appendix 3). As a way to clarify issues that were emerging I was able to re-interview twelve participants (to clarify previous issues) and engage new participants about these themes which included but were not limited to: broken promises, disunity and the impacts of conducting research similar in approach to mine.

Recruitment Strategies and Nature of Investigation

Since 2007, SRPC well understood that I was interested in participatory action research methods to examine how standardized international Involuntary Resettlement Policies could be best applied in cases of dam-development for dam-affected peoples (Appendix 4). However, from the beginning of my research term in December 2009 and January 2010, I had to jump through several hoops just to get started with my work in Bantic and Daynet. In a meeting with SRPC, I was told by them that they were worried that I would stir things up that did not need stirring (inception meeting, January 12th, 2010, where for the second of three times I shared my research proposal with SRPC executives and administration). Tom, the vice president of SRPC stressed that as “I have been saying in the past [to me], we might be agitating old problems again and even if the

9 The Indigenous Peoples Development Plan created in 2001 was not translated into their local dialect for all project-affected persons to review carefully. There were misunderstandings about formal grievance mechanism procedures for instance. Indicating how from the start, that the IPO were not provided with the necessary tools to run as a governing organization that would take care of their members project related negotiations and activities. Rights discussed here is used more broadly to describe the lack of capability project-affected peoples were given to accomplish any stipulated project related activity as required by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation via World Bank social safeguard procedures and guidelines.
questions are good, it is the matter of asking it”. Tom implies in the above statement that usually there is some effort by SRPC not to ask thought provoking questions.

In many public and open meetings with the local government units, SRPC and Bantic the goat issue came up often. These issues separately and frequently came up in my initial round of one-on-one interviews (N=17) and participant observations. The failures of livelihood reconstruction to date were open coded as disunity, broken promises, and short-term versus long-term memory. In an attempt to ensure I was representing Bantic experiences more generally these open coded conceptual categories were further discussed during our community focus group discussions (explored further in chapter two and three).

Within about one month of my research with the Daynet and Bantic communities and after the discussions with the dam proponents, I began to develop categories to analyse the positive and negative dimensions of their coexistence with the San Roque Dam. I validated responses that emerged initially in one-on-one interviews in a general way (that is without identifying specific people who shared specific concerns about livelihood). People were frequently making the link between SRPC and broken promises with whatever topic was under discussion in naturally occurring conversations, one-on-one interviews, participant observations, and focus group discussions. In my second set of questionnaires, reference to Tom's promises are like ice cream, was oft quoted from a participant from my first set of questionnaires. This question either fuelled a response about their own version of the story often relating to disappointment and or regret, or, why this is so, relating it to them being ignorant and lacking economic and social power. People had much to say about their current circumstances. Livelihood (as a social
process) was a major topic of concern from the start since the San Roque Power Corporation have been unable to implement an effective livelihood program to date.

At the beginning of my study, participant observations, focus group discussions and one-on-one interview revealed that no one was taking responsibility for the failure of these programs and no one understood why these failures occurred. Closer to the end of my study when I was finally able to sit down and think about the kinds of information that I was collecting did I produce memos. After I returned from the field I produced axial coding schemes, when I was coding all of the data that I collected at once. This axial coding scheme drew from data that include: transcripts, documents, field notes and conceptual memos (see Appendix 5). After which, I grouped similar codes into groups where I was able to step back and attempt to get a better picture of what theoretically was emerging out of the data.

Understanding culture and politics became apparent as themes when I started to do more readings in the social impact assessment and the dam-induced resettlement literature. It was then, that understanding culture (Downing 1996) and politics (Koenig 2001) is essential for successfully implementing any livelihood reconstruction in cases of involuntary resettlement (explored further in Chapter Two and Chapter Three).

Local government officials often referred me to as the IPO's consultant. I had to think strongly at first about what the implications were to be considered the IPO’s consultant. In the way that they shared it with me it felt as if they also meant advocate. I made every attempt to share my knowledge and training with the IPO in the best way that I could for the greater goal of getting everyone in Bantic and Daynet a fairer deal when it came to negotiating livelihood contracts with SRPC and NPC. I spent a lot of my time,
sharing with the community how they could run their own focus group discussions and critically examine any written contracts proposed to them. I constantly engaged my research participants about the themes and conceptual categories that I was developing. As time went on, my questions became deliberately focused on understanding the chronological social processes involved to reach our current predicament, after a series of failed contracts and negotiations.

The discrepancies that arose from my understanding of these processes came out during our focus group discussions. I was operating under the assumption that the Bantic non-IPO officers understood the official guidelines for the implementation of livelihood reconstruction because most of my participants in the first round of interviews understood their rights and obligations as set out in the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan, or at least, that is what they told me. That is, all communications prior to reaching SRPC or NPC would or should be, brought forward by the IPO. The IPO should act on behalf of its members on anything related to the project. As a way to understand what went wrong, issues about the legitimacy of the previous IPO administration fuelled further debate between my respondents about what needed to change in the future.

My ability to sample was largely dependent on the activities done the day or even the week before. My research participants’ perception that their situations were dire, in Bantic and Daynet, prompted me to make the decision when we needed to, as an honorarium, fund the capacity of the IPO and provide food and drinks for those involved in my focus group discussions. Providing food and drinks in later focus group discussions eventually became ritual practice.
Chapter 2:

The Lived Experiences of People Living in the Bantic Resettlement and Surrounding Areas

The dictionary tells us that power is 'the ability to do or act'. In French or Spanish the word power is the same as the verb 'to be able' – pouvoir, poder. It shares its etymological roots with the words potent and potential. Put simply, power is our ability to do things, to change things. It is the creative force behind all our experience. It is what makes something possible. NFN 2003: 389

In the Philippines, as constitutionally recognized and protected Indigenous peoples in Daynet and Bantic, negotiating ancestral land title with the state adds to the growing list of items that project-affected peoples are responsible for negotiating. How do project-affected people experience categories and labels created to socially safeguard them from negative development-induced impacts? In this case study, being Indigenous (WB OP 4.2, IPRA, 1997) and project-affected (WB OP 4.12) are categories that has intentionally or not, served to marginalize their co-existence with the dam project.

In this case study and compared to previous dam-induced resettlement initiatives in the Agno River region, efforts were formally made by dam-proponents and the state, to
negotiate ancestral land title, and context specific compensation entitlements through livelihood reconstruction with the project-affected. Livelihood reconstruction plans were developed as part of a compensation entitlement that project-affected peoples, whether they were Indigenous or not, would receive in cases of involuntary resettlement through the project’s resettlement action planning. As stated in the World Bank’s operational guidelines there are steps that must be taken to ensure that the peoples are not adversely affected by project-related activities that include meaningful consultation and negotiation (WB 4.12 and IFC PS 5) and combined with national laws, requires the free and prior informed consent of project-affected Indigenous peoples (IPRA, 1997).

My Indigenous seasonal-resource user and relocatee respondents acknowledged that to mitigate the damage, there must be collaboration and co-operation between themselves and the other stakeholders involved. It was understood when the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan was approved and signed off by all of the stakeholders involved to implement the resettlement action plan, that there would be livelihood reconstruction efforts, more specifically that would: 1) involve the Indigenous Peoples in its planning and its implementation, 2) feasibility studies would be conducted, and 3) the Indigenous Peoples Organization would be given the training and the funds to increase their capacity to implement the plan. To date these fundamental steps were not followed through with in a meaningful way, and if they were, only superficially.

Seven-years post-construction, my participants’ priorities continue to be to implement a livelihood that will sustain them in the short and long term. Livelihood programs will continue to fail lacking a meaningful consultation and a negotiation process between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. Livelihood programs that
have been developed have not seriously taken into consideration the internal diversities within each resettlement community that include their economic and social capacity to negotiate and develop programs efficiently. The SRPC vice-president shared with me that the problem with implementing anything in the resettlement communities results from the fact that the resettled are unable to get along; “disunity is the problem”. An emphasis on “their disunity” the SRPC vice-president insinuates that it is the project-affected peoples problem to resolve first, not SRPC’s, before SRPC will fund the IPO’s administrative costs. I was not so sure.

This chapter explores how the root cause of disunity in the Daynet and Bantic resettlement communities is as a direct consequence of being involuntarily resettled by the dam. My results sections highlight together how a social impact assessment as a social safeguard monitoring mechanism (IFC PS 2006, Equator Principles 2004, WB 4.12 2004) has high potential for downplaying spiralling social and environmental conditions for those categorized as project-affected, with resettlement actions plans lacking an analysis of power in stakeholder relations.

Areas often chosen for large-scale development tend to require involuntary resettlement of inhabitants who have usually followed land-based livelihood means such as herding, small-scale agriculture, hunting or gathering. These peoples – usually Indigenous peoples – are already living on the periphery of the market economy (see, for example, Farmer’s (2006) analysis of the Peligre dam and Samson’s (2003) study of the Innu in Eastern Canada). A majority of development-affected peoples are not fully
literate in English, which to my knowledge is the primary language used by Banks in the process of negotiating resettlement action plans. In addition to not having been adequately exposed to bureaucratic processes on a government or corporate level in market economy relations. The project-affected "...are pushed overnight, with no transition, from a sustenance to a competitive economy, without help to deal with the psychological trauma they suffer because of the changeover" (Fernandes 2000:212).

While across the world, peoples affected by dam development have usually shared a politically and socially marginalized role they are not necessarily a homogenous group (Koenig 2006). Koenig’s analysis of the distribution of "societal power" and crucial conflicts among different stakeholders is insightful on this point (2006: 106). She notes that if "...the heterogeneity of interest is not recognized, people may have limited ability to organize effectively to respond to resettlement" (Koenig 2006: 119). Class differences between members have not been well studied in the resettlement literature. There is even less known about the distribution of power between resettlement members and how this might impact policy practice in resettlement settings. This has clearly been the case with the development of the San Roque Dam, where transnationally aligned anti-dam advocates estimate that approximately 20 000 people were displaced. SRPC and NPC’s official estimate is only 3,602 peoples whom are supposed project-beneficiaries, where 542 of the master list of beneficiaries are classified Indigenous and project-affected, whom make up the population in Daynet and Bantic resettlement communities and surrounding areas. Major problems will occur in livelihood planning, post-construction, in cases where a large portion of those involved in livelihood projects were not part of the original sample informing initial compensation entitlement matrices. This study explores
the outcome of what happens when the economically displaced are not incorporated as an upfront project cost from the beginning.

The Results of Initial Resettlement Action Planning

Traditionally gold-panners\textsuperscript{10} (see Appendix 7 for map of gold panning areas), according to a survey in 2001, funded by SRPC and NPC, "verified that the gradual shrinkage of the gold panning areas was brought about by the on-going construction activities of the San Roque Multipurpose Project (SRMP)" (SED 2001:4). Prior to the dam's construction, my respondents claimed to have panned for gold all year round, acknowledging that the best time of year to pan was after the rainy season in late December, early January. From this time, till about April/May panning would slow down, and as well, during the dry season, many would also tend to their fields before the rainy season (June to November). After the rainy season would start, many would return to these gold-panning areas to take advantage of the gold particles that would be carried by the run off down the Agno River. The price of gold fluctuates year to year. Panning for gold prior to the dam's construction allowed my respondents to participate and fund their other livelihood activities, like farming. When the reservoir submerged a majority of the gold panning areas, many were forced to either find other wage labour, or encroach upon other gold panning areas not consistently used by them in the past.

\textsuperscript{10} Notably, gold extraction has been practiced as a form of trade and exchange between themselves and the lowland peoples even prior to the Spanish attempting to occupy these areas. In the period of US colonization gold has made up a significant part of the peoples livelihood and as essentially, owners of their own means of production, they were not restricted in the same ways as they would be in a wage labour market. When I speak of my participants not being adequately exposed to the market economy I mean to say that yes, gold extraction is indeed part of the market economy, but, significantly different when compared to wage labour. A dependency on paid labour comes with it, an entirely different set of relations and rules surrounding how to acquire a job and keeping the job to sustain oneself. As gold panners previously entering a more formal market economy, the peoples’ position of power and freedom to choose when and when not to work is diminished – peoples roles and responsibilities in the household and in their community, and, sense of time and work, changed dramatically.
Acknowledging the interval diversity within communities at minimum reminds us that in resettlement planning we should “provide spaces in which valuably different forms of activity can flourish” (Nussbaum 2000: 59). A strong correlation is made in this chapter between peoples' inability to live well and their perceived feelings of powerlessness. My participants link the ways in which they were first categorized by NPC in a social survey in 1995 to explain their current circumstances: perceived failed livelihood reconstruction schemes. Perceived feelings of envy towards others who are seen as a "priority" emerged forcefully between project-affected research participants.

The following excerpt captures a usual day in Bantic between my research assistants, my participants, and myself:
I woke up (early) this morning to my research assistant buzzing outside. Several people had travelled to Bantic early this morning to interview with me. I stepped out of the creaky resettlement shack into the open morning air. It was cold and the ground was wet with morning dew. In our makeshift eating area I found several women to greet me with bags of red rice and bananas as gifts (of which I was always hesitant to accept as I knew it was coming out of their own family consumption for the week). I accepted and asked them if they would have some coffee and breakfast with us. After some discussion about our time here in Bantic, words (I could not understand) were exchanged between my research assistant and the ladies. I was informed that they wanted to be interviewed by me separately.

My first interview was with a woman whom I assumed was in her late forties, but, as it turned out she was in her mid-thirties. I had seen her before at several school events so we were already familiar with each other. I knew she had six children all of whom were in high school with the exception of one who was in college. Prior to being affected by the dam she was a full time gold panner. In 2000, the National Power Corporation (NPC), the San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) and the Japanese Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) caved in to transnational pressures and compensated the seasonal resource users (SRU) with livelihood reconstruction too. Manang and her family were counted as seasonal resource users because they opted to join the Indigenous Peoples Organization first, as a way to place them on the official Master List that the Bank recognized.

My respondent in the following demonstrates how powerless she was to negotiate how she was categorized as a project-affected person and how she would be compensated accordingly.

PM: Manang, when you think about the San Roque dam, what positive or negative things do you think of?
manang: It's good when we're paid fully but they paid less. They valued our plants at about a quarter only. They destroyed our source of livelihood. Now, it's very difficult to earn.

PM: What do you think is the difference between seasonal resource users and relocatees?

manang: They say, relocatees are the priority.

PM: Who said it?

manang: SRPC. So, they're just giving the excess [to SRU's] but most often none.

PM: But when you're looking at yourself, do you see any difference?

manang: The relocatees were given houses and we were not. They're given more.

PM: If you could ask SRPC or NPC anything, what would it be?

manang: We were not considered as relocatees because we were ignorant and because of that, we were ashamed to suggest.

PM: What can you ask?

manang: Why were we not considered as relocatees and why are relocatees always the priority?

One is given the impression that the relocatees are better off than the SRU's because they have been told that they are a "priority" to receive livelihood benefits and they have received a house and lot where SRU's have not. The conversation continued where I learned that the main reason they need money now is for "family consumption and living expenses". Additionally, they had sold and mortgaged some of their properties in 2000. The family has debts that are still unpaid and growing with interest.

PM: Had there been times when you and your family had to go without food?

manang: Yes, often.

PM: In what month does this usually happen?

manang: Rainy season.

PM: How many times a week?

manang: Two to three days a week, at those times we eat bananas and camotes [root crop] only.

PM: Did this happen before or after the dam?

manang: It also happened before but it's far worse now.

PM: How have you been feeling emotionally after the dam?

manang: The NPC are stopping us from working there [Phengbasan panning site] and the landowners are urging us to go home.
My participant’s response to my question about how she feels emotionally is an example of how their lack of power to pan for gold is directly related to the construction of the dam. The dam reservoir submerged a majority of gold panning sites and fertile agricultural grounds that were used interchangeably and they complimented it with various small-scale moneymaking schemes, hunting, and gathering sources. People were considered extremely fortunate to have steady employment.

Compounded by the fact that on a daily basis, people confront what their status means as either a relocatee (with seemingly more, having received a house and lot) and a seasonal resource user (with seemingly less, having not received a house and lot) in the context of still not having fully received their due replacement livelihood and due compensation entitlements. Unofficially, the National Power Corporation (NPC) along with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) were actively discouraging people from panning for gold in Phengbasan (see Appendix 7 for map of gold panning areas) (naturally occurring conversation with Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Watershed Management Field team in Daynet, March 2010). The following excerpt highlights the political climate in gold panning areas:

Since the dam was constructed NPC and DENR local security or watershed management teams have developed a pass system for those whom are deemed entitled to pan for gold in Phengbasan and those whom or not. Passes are given out by these security teams to select groups of people who are deemed native to the area. These local security teams are hired by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and working out of the National Corporation Office at the dam site under the guise of protecting the environment through population control. My seasonal resource user and relocatee participants, lacking an alternative primary livelihood elsewhere are currently going to surviving panning areas even more intensely now; quickening the rate of which, surviving gold deposits and panning areas will be depleted.

More recently, disgruntled native panners are volunteering their time to support the National Power Corporation to stem the tide of panners from
the south whom are ultimately, also, looking to make an income of any kind. I encountered many people who expressed fear that the people from the south carried firearms in Phengbasan. Other disgruntled native panners are organizing amongst themselves to attempt discussions with those from the south, lowlanders, directly, as a way to collaborate with them on how to make their co-existence more feasible.

The social and political environment in surviving panning areas will grow more intense if relations between those from the south and the north are not handled with care – this should be a national and local effort. Further adding to my participants' perceived feelings that they have few options to make a living anywhere and or at any time (Relocatees and Seasonal Resource Users, Naturally Occurring Conversations, March 2010, April 2010, May 2010; Female Relocatee, One-on-one Interview, May 2010, Male Seasonal Resource User, One-on-one Interview, May 2010).

The political conditions that project-affected research participants must live with to earn a limited income could potentially turn into an explosive situation between the lowlander and the highlander gold panners.

The people expect SRPC to live up to their promises touted in their meetings with SRPC and NPC about resettlement action plans through livelihood reconstruction and compensation entitlements. The dam reservoir dramatically changed the social and economic landscape of the region. To date, SPRC has been unable through another form of livelihood, replace the kinds of money the project-affected people were making through gold panning, or, the freedom associated with having an income of that nature as an option. As one of my respondents stressed compared to before the dam "gold panning is seasonal nowadays". My participants prior to the dam could rely on making an income whenever they wanted to, by going down to the river to pan. Now, they were restricted to panning once a year (December to May) after the typhoon season. As a full time gold-panner they were in control of whatever the outcome might be from gold panning, for better or worse.

Physical and mental health manifestations of impoverishment were apparent:
This visit from the Red Cross in Bantic revealed that high-blood pressure rates afflict a significant number of people. The sample (51 participants) was taken during the two-day Basic First Aid workshop we sponsored there. I am concerned given my seasonal resource user and relocatee participants’ lack of livelihood and income about the short-term and long-term impacts. People were going without food more frequently since they were displaced and they had fewer and fewer opportunities to earn an income with diminishing gold deposits in the region.

I was also disturbed to learn in detail that prior to my arrival, the previous chairwoman’s husband from Daynet had sliced the throat of his uncle during a disagreement that escalated with the number of bottles of gin that they drank. My sources revealed that they were very drunk. Now, the chairwoman on top of shouldering the responsibilities as director of the IPO, as a first relative of the uncle by marriage on her husband’s side, the current chairwoman feels obligated to make time to represent her uncle in court against her cousin’s (and the previous IPO chairwoman) husband. (May 2010 field note)

Life is complicated for members of the IPO and especially for IPO officers at present time. A multitude of tensions amongst project-affected research participants were running high.

For one family in my sample, earning a limited income as an elementary school teacher is not enough for the medicines and doctors’ appointments she needed to pay for her son who has cerebral palsy. Her husband (who is a relocatee prior to their marriage) is unable to leave the resettlement site to find work because their son needs full time attention. The following excerpt is taken from a survey questionnaire that they filled out in English, together for me. Money is scarce for everyone. In this case, a dependency on SRPC to live up to their promises inspires perceived feelings of being treated with indignity as a human being. Life is more difficult since they were displaced because my participants expect SRPC to live up to their promises of providing a sustainable livelihood.

PM: How have you been coping to make ends meet since you have been resettled?
manang: We will borrow money, we're trying to do what the SRPC is telling us to do, for example, planting tiger grass even we will wait for a year or years when they give compensation.

PM: What immediately comes to mind when you think about your well-being?

manang: We are pitiful; it seems that we are not human being because if SRPC will promise something they will not pursue it. Their promises were made to be broken.

PM: Have there been times when you and your family have had to go without food?

manang: Yes.

PM: If yes, how often does this happen and when? Can you describe what is happening in your life at the time?

manang: Once a year, during summer: we have difficulty in looking for rice and carrying the rice from the city or the place where we bought it.

PM: How have you been feeling emotionally since you have been resettled?

manang: Fine, but the resettlement area should have abundant water.

In the dry season (December to May), especially, there are few opportunities in the Bantic community and surrounding areas to make an income and not enough water for agricultural purposes. Peoples’ sense of self (physically and mentally) is attached to poorly implemented livelihood reconstruction schemes and compensation entitlements.

Between January and May, Bantic resembles a ghost town largely populated with high school aged children from Bantic and the surrounding areas. The majority of parents leave to pan for gold. If the children wish to continue their education, they have to stay at the resettlement site where they fend for themselves and survive months at a time without their parents. Project-affected research participants shared that educating their children was their number one priority. As one of my participants put it, “maybe if they were educated maybe they would not be in this position”. For the parents that I interviewed educating their children was an important goal and aspiration, even if they had to make sacrifices to make it happen. The parents whom were not able to send all of their children to school were seen not to be doing as well compared to those that could.
The participants who lived semi-permanently at the resettlement expressed feelings of insecurity when it came to keeping their possessions and foodstuff safe.

In Bantic, the principal of the resettlement high school warned us that without parental supervision and a consistent source of food the children would take things if our door weren’t locked. Kids as a few of my participants’ joked run Bantic. The relocatee family with thirteen children were brought up frequently in different ways, from respect towards the elder siblings looking after the youth to sadness that it was difficult for them to provide food and clothing while their parents were panning. Families that were able to help this family out did what they could. I was told that the eldest boys left school and the resettlement often to find work elsewhere.

Figure 10. Bantic resembles a ghost town at the top of Tinidi mountain

The situation with the kids at the resettlement site caused great concern between us. The high school was the reason the children stayed in Bantic all year round and it was the solution to the high-school kid’s current circumstances. Breakfast and lunch programs through the high-school is a good place to start for discussions between the IPO, the Department of Education, concerned local and national government units and concerned SRPC and NPC corporate social responsibility programs. It is reasonable to assume that the IPO would be the first organizations to recognize these realities and make these kinds
of discussions happen for their resettlement community as acting advocates for IPO members more generally. An internal monitoring mechanism is already in place with two of the five currently, more or less, permanent families, that include IPO officers in Bantic.

A handful of families still resided in the resettlement communities all year round because they were the fortunate few to have work as tenant farmers for local landowners in the area (a two to three hour walk away from the site for one respondent). A majority of people opted or simply had to pan for gold at Phengbasan and or find other work in the city. Life is complicated for families in the Bantic resettlement community.

Frequently, people mentioned either in interviews or in naturally occurring conversations how Phengbasan is over populated now with the influx of gold-panners from the lowlands. People also observed that the area is not producing as much gold as it has in the past prior to the dam's construction. From Bantic the walk to Phengbasan took approximately five hours for the seasoned hiker (and triple that for the unseasoned hiker). There are alternative routes but a majority of my participants walked the trail down (with all of their gear, up and down) through several mountain ranges and to the river where the gold was located.

I was told if I wanted to interview more people from the resettlement community I needed to go Phengbasan. Our travel to get there included a two hour jeepney ride from Baguio city to a place called Philex Mines, an hour ride from there, to where the mines are located in the employee transport bus, and lastly, a three hour walk (with our supplies to last us three days) down a well-travelled mountain trail towards the river.

On the way down we ran into two teens travelling up, carrying a roughly ten foot tall and roughly one and a half feet in circumference heavy sheet metal pipe. It was already late in the morning and the two teens looked as if they were as hot as we were in the mid-morning heat - there were no forest to shade us for a majority of the trail. My research assistant
commented that it is not unusual to see this. Everything as it is in Bantic needs to be hauled to and from the gold panning site.

I was relieved when I saw from a distance the seasonal communities that resided along and on top of the steep riverbanks where most people from Bantic were now living. When we arrived into the campsite, people were excited to see us. They heard rumours that we might be coming but with no cell reception there they were not able to confirm our arrival with anyone. Almost immediately I started interviewing and making plans to interview others over the next few days.

![Figure 11. Phengbasan steep riverbank](Photo taken by author)

Before our only visit to Phengbasan, this study focused mainly on whatever complexities might exist behind what people think about broken promises. Why do SRPC’s promises even matter?

The first interview the following day was with a man whom I assumed was in his late sixties and to my surprise he was only fifty-four. The night before he mentioned that he would have time for us before he left for panning in the early morning (before dawn). He was hoping to make up for the amount he was unable to pan for last week. We learned that it was getting late in the season and much of the gold after the rainy season had diminished.
There were high levels of perceived social inequity and economic inequity between relocatees and seasonal resources users and the San Roque Power Corporation and the National Power Corporation.

PM: … people have expressed to me that Tom's words are like ice cream, they are sweet but they melt fast, what do you think people mean by this? manong: Whenever he comes here to conduct meetings, he just cajoles us. When he goes, he overturns them. He's just giving false hopes.
PM: What do you think the difference between an SRU and Relocatee is? manong: Just a little. Sometimes, the SRU's envy us because of those house and lots.

The categories that NPC social surveyors in 1995 developed made little sense to my respondents. The major differences were what people were perceived to have received as benefits (materially and socially). From my observations, the root cause of disunity in the resettlement community were from the ways in which people were first categorized and then provided with compensation and livelihood entitlements accordingly.

In the following excerpt taken from a focus group discussion with a group of seasonal resource users it was clear to them that their participation in the 1995 social survey has had negative consequences on their status today having not been categorized as a relocatee.

SRU1: The reason why we were relocated is the same as the structure owners [now relocatees]. The only difference is we were not present when they interviewed and inspected the area. We don't even know why they came here. RA: so the error is on the one who made the assessment? SRU1: It's only the NPC who came here before. That's why in Bantic, I don't want to hear the word "priority".
SRU2: It is like they don't want us to be benefited... they [relocatees] became like that when they were given houses. The only problem is nobody explains it. NPC was clever in categorizing us.

In another interview with a relocatee asking the same questions he reasoned that:

manong: NPC classified us into 6. The others they were categorized as SRU because they did not answer the questions right in Phengbasan.
PM: What is the right answer?
manong: I do not know the exact answer.
PM: What is the difference?
manong: All of us were supposed to be the same.
PM: How did NPC know that it's the wrong answer?
manong: The PAF's answered that their homes were not permanent. Like Aunt L, she should be a relo. I too cannot understand their question that’s why some of my claims were underpaid.
PM: What was the language used?
manong: Tagalog. Another thing, Aunt L. daughter was the one who answered because she's in Baguio.
PM: What do you see now as the impact?
manong: Relos and SRU's have disagreements now and SRU's are envious because SRPC says that they relos are priority. We are now divided. If only they give the same treatment.

There are real and perceived benefits to being a relocatee as opposed to being a seasonal resource user. To be a "priority" was a major issue for my respondents because they perceived that the relocatees have been given more benefits and a chance for livelihood reconstruction where they have not. In another focus group discussion concerning the current micro-finance program one person remarked that:

manong: the term priority is a big thing. That's why most of the people who were not benefited threatened to opt out if they too are not given any livelihood.
manang: It is hard to pay to the micro-finance. You get the money you loaned now and immediately have to pay it next week.

From my initial set of one-on-one interviews I was operating under the assumption that the micro-finance program was bad for the peoples on all levels. However, after numerous participant observations in micro-finance weekly meetings I learned that there were hidden and important benefits as well. In focus group discussions my respondents shared with me that there may be positive benefits to the program but, as they stressed, going deeper into debt and their downward spiralling impoverishing conditions far outweighed the positive aspects of the micro-finance program.
The micro-finance, established in April 2009, is an unusual relationship developed between SRPC and the Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) to begin with. Usually CARD chooses an area based on strategic research. CARD base the area they will pursue to recruit members on three criterion: 1) at least 1000 people living in the area 2) good source of water 3) and easily accessible to roads and markets. All of these things Bantic and Daynet do not have. Out of 17 CARD members I was able to interview 11 in total. Currently the micro-finance members, made up of relocatees and seasonal resource users in and around Bantic, are paying their weekly repayments not from their CARD project loans but from taking loans elsewhere or from other sources of livelihood that they have been participating in to make ends meet (not associated with SRPC). A member of the program who has been able to repay the weekly repayments from their actual CARD project (and there out of the two of the eleven able to do so) that I interviewed explained that the Bantic micro finance program was not a worthwhile profit at 15 % interest and 900 pesos saved in six months, in addition to them having to climb twice a day up and down Tinidi mountain. Frequently I heard complaints that they were pressured by Tom, SRPC’s Vice-President who said if they do not participate in the micro-finance program they would not receive other livelihood in the future.

In April 2009, when JBIC came to visit the year before, a ginger program was developed between Bantic, SRPC, and the IPO. In August 2009, it was suddenly taken off the table (even after people assumed it was still ongoing and went ahead and started clearing lots and such) when the SRPC-CARD micro-finance was introduced. At a meeting that people had to travel up and down the mountain to (three hours for the
experienced hiker), fully expecting money to buy their ginger rhizomes so they could start planting, in it Tom said that if they wanted the ginger program they had to take this micro-finance program first. People expressed that they were extremely disappointed because they had no idea that these changes were going to be implemented. They expected at that meeting that they would be receiving the capital to purchase ginger rhizomes. SRPC had changed the conditions of the ginger program without the free and prior informed consent of the IPO or Bantic members. The major differences in this proposal from the first are: 1) it is a soft loan that they must start repaying before harvest, 2) they must have an attendance rate in the micro-finance program of at least 80% (which is impossible sometimes to make because they need to attend to other livelihood to make ends meet), and 3) they have no control over buying the ginger rhizomes they must take them from SRPC even though they have good buyers in the local area at a cheaper cost to where SRPC plans to get them.

What is worse with the new ginger contract only three people were actually eligible to receive the ginger program out of 17 people who could potentially be eligible under these new conditions. Still, it ignores hundreds of other people who are technically eligible to receive livelihood benefits just as much as a CARD member. The CARD program is not mandatory for the dam-affected peoples to join however the benefits gained from SRPC by being a member are far greater than those who do not agree to CARD’s conditions. Closer to the end of April it was confirmed by SRPC to the IPO that all future livelihood from SRPC will require people to be a micro-finance member as one of SRPC’s conditions to receive a ginger livelihood. In one and one interviews and focus group discussions people often complained where will they the find the money to repay
back the loans if there are no markets for them close to home and no farm to market road to get there. The people who are SRPC-CARD members are not only going deeper into debt from participating in the program, a majority of them are saving practically nothing and making no profit. CARD was making a profit it from their interest rates and SRPC management and employees were making a profit for administering it. There was absolutely no discussion about the terms of the agreement between SRPC and those who had signed up under the previous ginger agreement. SRPC expected that these people would just sign on to the new agreement.

In February 2010, after learning about the ginger program’s new contract obligations, the IPO decided to request the provincial agricultural technician to come to Bantic and assess whether they could even grow ginger there or not. Plus, with the lack of water in the area they did not think much of anything would grow in Bantic. The SRPC did not conduct a strategic analysis on whether they could do it or not, yet they are forcing people to go further into debt on a risky project.

The micro-finance scheme is a planned attempt to provide both the seasonal resource users and relocatees with livelihood equitably. In practice I observed that it has created new categories of meaning for people who are now seen as a “priority” for livelihood programs: people who are able to join the micro-finance program and those who are unable to for various economic and social reasons. Timing is everything in livelihood reconstruction planning and there are benefits to these kinds of programs if implemented in a timely manner during project construction and at the time of peoples’ initial displacement. When the micro-finance was established in 2009, it was the first
time, since the dam was constructed seven years previously, that the seasonal resource
users and the relocatees were learning about what is involved in running and operating in
meetings tailored around money management and livelihood reconstruction. I observed
that these weekly meetings run by the SRPC-CARD team socialized them towards being
on time, by casting shame towards those who might have had to miss a meeting, and, for
not being able to repay the required weekly loan repayment. The micro-finance members
are given verbal gold stars by the SRPC-CARD team for attending and repaying the
required weekly loan repayments.

The micro-finance scheme was difficult for my participants at the time to
maintain. Yet, SRPC made it clear during my stay there that if people would not join they
would not be considered a priority for any other livelihood benefits. In another interview,
when I questioned why they would co-operate despite the fact that they may not want to
join the micro-finance many felt that they had no choice.

PM: I also hear people say that the reason why they joined the micro-finance
is because it is important to appear co-operative with Sir Tom\(^\text{11}\). What do you
think people mean by this?

manong: If we insist what we want, he kills it sometimes.
PM: Examples?
manong: The caraboas. He told us before that it would be 12. When they
came, he said four. Then 12 again when they went there.

The latter excerpt showed that there are consequences to not cooperating with SRPC.

Not cooperating with SRPC has shown my respondents that it can mean that SRPC will
delay the process of receiving and negotiating any form of livelihood. The peoples
negotiating with SRPC up to this point have nothing in writing to confirm or deny what
they had discussed with Tom about the specifics of what they might receive as it in this

\(^{11}\) The people addressed Tom, as Sir Tom. It is meant to be a respectful way of addressing someone who
possesses a higher education and social status.
case, with the number of caraboa also known as native cows they were supposed to receive. The peoples’ limited social and economic power to negotiate with SRPC in writing has shown my participants that they have little choice as to what they can feasibly do or accept in livelihood reconstruction. The above statement demonstrates that SRPC conveniently exercises their short-term memory when it comes to livelihood programs that were discussed between the Bantic peoples and the SRPC vice-president. On one hand, the micro-finance creates an environment where it could be perceived that because agreements are made in writing that the agreement has a higher chance of being followed through with by SRPC. On the other hand, having this kind of security to negotiate with SRPC comes with it many conditions that are difficult for my respondents to adhere to because of their strained economic and social circumstances.

I was at the meeting discussed above in mid-March. The caraboas that my participant is referring to are native cows that were promised to each relocatee and seasonal resource household user by Tom, then executive director of the San Roque Power Corporate Social Responsibility department, in 2006. There were numerous relocatees and seasonal resource users who put pressure on Tom especially to live up to his word. These same people approached me afterwards to complain that Tom approached them in private to ask them jokingly why they are giving him such a hard time. One respondent did not believe he was joking, underneath this person felt he seemed threatening in his body language. This person mimicked for me the way he spoke to them, leaning, strained and heavily towards me describing it. The description of their conversation gave me the chills. I asked myself what is Tom so worried about. Why shouldn't they be having a civil discussion about their lived experiences in the
resettlement community? The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation team on their annual mission in mid-March was the reason why Bank, local government, SRPC, and NPC representatives were in Bantic to begin with.

When I asked another respondent in Phengbasan of what they thought of the statement that *Tom's promises are like ice cream* they remarked:

Mr. Tom promised so much like those livelihoods since 2006 yet nothing is given during meetings, he says those things but when we follow them up, he asks for black and white [an agreement in writing] yet he personally uttered those promises. So, whenever he promises again, the people say really? Like that caraboa, it has been many years now since he promised them. It is during the meetings when JBIC are present that he usually says these good things and promises. So we want that when JBIC is here, one of us should act as translator instead of [SRPC employees] because it seems, they're twisting the truth.

Verbal agreements, I observed, meant something to my participants. That is, under usual circumstances in their culture a verbal agreement stipulates that you are expected to follow through with the terms. Not only were a majority of my respondents ill equipped (unable to write or discuss their lives in a language unfamiliar to them) they were culturally unaware of the significance of a written agreement as opposed to a verbal agreement.

PM: Is there anything you want to say to JBIC?
manong: If they have projects, we want that JBIC should give it directly to us because what mostly happens is, it passes through politicians and SRPC.
PM: People also say that SRPC and NPC don't listen to you because you are not educated. What can you say about this?
manong: That's true. No one really fights for our rights because most of us are uneducated. Sometimes, we are also ashamed to speak too in front of big people involved. It seems those big people are taken by SRPC so that the people here maybe intimidated to speak about problems here. For example, I am shy to speak because the Vice governor is present.

When I first started fieldwork I observed in two meetings between the Bantic people and the dam-proponents that the usual response to anything SRPC asked was in agreement
with whatever they said (February Micro-finance Summit, March Tabu Micro-finance Meeting). Few words were actually exchanged between the SRPC and the project-affected. When we were away from the dam proponents or 'big people' did people start to talk openly in a discussion. It was away from the dam proponents where I started to learn about their problems with speaking with the dam-proponents and where I further investigated as to why. People’s perception that "no one would listen any ways" because they were "ignorant" struck a chord with me. From the beginning, people have had to take numerous risks to adapt to the dam's construction. A respondent who is an SRU explained that since the dam was constructed:

\[
\text{when my husband died, I sacrificed myself working in the trading post on a daily basis. I worked there for one year and when my children graduated in high school, I went back to Oling and planted rice instead. My children are only high school graduates because I have no money. My daughter looked for a job, borrowed money and used it to go to Oman [as an overseas worker]. She stayed there for two years.}
\]

People are keen to provide a means for themselves to do what they need to survive and or fulfill the aspirations that they have for themselves. It is the limits of this thesis to fully examine the risks associated with working overseas as a foreign temporary worker and or live with just a high school education in the city. The more education you possessed in the Philippines the higher chances that one had to get a job as a wage labourer that from my observations, was preferred over employment as a farmer or gold panner which did not require any formal education. There were so many people out of work in the city stores like 7-11 could demand at least two years of college education from any perspective applicant. Plus, the costs of obtaining a visa and the fees that temporary foreign work agencies require are expensive. A loan this big would be difficult for anyone to repay with a limited income and a large family to help maintain. As the next
section elaborates, even if they had a college education it would not matter because they lacked autonomy in decision making and (at the time) they possessed limited mutually dependent networks with local government units. There were three people who were elected as IPO members who completed at least two years of post secondary education. In negotiations with SRPC and NPC, the IPO were negotiating with others who had a much higher level of education either at the under graduate or graduate level.

Why is “disunity” present and has been present in previous social impact assessments that were conducted and funded by SRPC? I observed many social and economic risk factors that lead to impoverishment: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and community and or social disarticulation (Cernea 1996). A socially responsible resettlement approach “…genuinely guided by an equity compass – can counteract lasting impoverishment and generate benefits for both the national and local economy” (Cernea 2000:13). Yet, 

Socially responsible policies alone do not automatically result in successful land-based reconstruction of livelihoods. Socially responsible implementers and administrators of policies are of crucial significance in any reconstruction of livelihood. Administrative delays, bottlenecks, corruption, inefficiency, and insensitivity are some of the risks to be encountered by displaced peoples, especially in many developing countries where bureaucratic structures tend to be massive, powerful, and lethargic (Nayak 2000:99).

In the San Roque Dam case, social safeguards were not originally incorporated into project planning and the project design to include the economically displaced. It was not until 2000, when transnational non-governmental organizations such as Friends of Earth Japan and local government units began to protest for compensation entitlements for the
indirectly affected (up and downstream) and the directly affected and or economically displaced (in the submergence areas) that the Japanese Bank and the dam proponents were compelled politically to take into consideration Indigenous peoples autonomy and rights to land at all. The Socio-Economic Study funded by SRPC and NPC in 2001 was in their words: "in response to Japan Bank for International Corporation's (JBIC) proposal to include seasonal resource users in the definition of project-affected persons (PAPs)" (1). To gain public approval for the project after the dam started construction, project-proponents and stakeholders in 2000 had no choice but to concede and include the economically displaced or the seasonal resource users to receive livelihood reconstruction benefits as well. It was as one of my respondent’s speculated earlier "it's as if they don't want us to be benefited at all". If the purpose of the survey conducted in 1995 was to develop categories of people who would be, and, not be, eligible for compensation and livelihood reconstruction benefits, then, it would seem reasonable for the seasonal resource user (SRU) participants to assume that they were never meant to be compensated.

Timing is everything in development planning and implementation (Koenig 2006). In addition to understanding dam-induced impoverishment risks we must as well focus on how a majority would behave during resettlement through four stages: 1) planning and recruitment, 2) adjustment and coping, 3) community formation and economic development and 4) handing over and incorporation (Scudder 2005). Resettlement specialists stress that impoverishment continues to exist because there is little consideration for the multidimensional stress or capacity of the displaced to achieve

Much of the development literature has been concerned with the beginning stages of project construction and or the impacts of resettlement. There is less known about the success or failure of implementing resettlement programs (Vanclay 2002, Cernea 2000, Cernea 1996). Social disarticulation processes are seen to be the most "pervasive causes of enduring impoverishment and disempowerment" (Cernea 1996: 22).

How do we go about resolving impoverishment risks in policy practice (Rew et al 2006)? There is a lot of discussion in the dam-induced involuntary resettlement literature about how to incorporate the views of the resettlers into project planning and implementation (see Koenig 2001: 62-74). That is, there is a lot of discussion that we should empower the project-affected peoples and include them as participants in the project design and planning. However, in the development resettlement literature, there is less discussion about the potential of social impact assessments, as an internal and external monitoring mechanism, to ensure that these resettlement and livelihood reconstruction processes are incorporating resettlers meanings efficiently. Mitigating impoverishment begins with understanding local systems of governance and findings ways these cultural and social norms can be incorporated into project planning and implementation (see Appendix 6 for sample research tool). It is important as SIA researchers suggest, separate the social processes from the social impacts (Vanclay 1999, Vanclay 2002, Slootweg et al 2003, Van Schooten et al 2003). My study argues that if we do not we might continue to miss how the distribution of power influences the
relationship between the project-affected and the project-proponents that might be hindering, or even, supporting livelihood reconstruction.

The trauma of having been displaced is exacerbated with the loss of usual social support mechanisms and the associated dilution of cultural land-based norms. What can resettlement planners do to rebuild and foster social support mechanisms for the dam-affected? My study argues that there is a way to resolve these tensions but first we need to identify in each resettlement community: which social processes are related to the perceived negative social consequences or impacts? I explore this further in Chapter Four.

It makes sense that "in order to plan better, there is a strong need for better data" which includes how "local production systems work" (Koenig 2001: 64). If not, we run the risk as San Roque has done, of collecting data of impacts without knowing genuinely what life was like for the people prior to their displacement. As a result, NPC and SRPC neglected a large portion of the sample that should have been considered project-affected beneficiaries. The economically displaced were not counted as project-affected in the original assessment and thus the estimated costs for the original social budget of the dam infrastructure project.

Given that there are many development projects worldwide that have not given due attention to the social and environmental impacts of the dam prior to dam construction, it is likely that in most cases where social impacts are being evaluated, SIA researchers will have to make due with what information they have. In this sense, my study argues that instead of highlighting the material changes in the lives of those
affected, since the last SIA study, it is just as important to highlight and understand the processes involved in what might be assessed immediately as a failure of livelihood programs to date.

There is a small but growing interest in the development literature to understand more fully how impoverishment is related to our insufficient attention to the role of culture (Downing 1996) and politics (Koenig 2006, Koenig 2001, Koenig & Diarra 2000). The challenge for resettlement specialists will be to capture culturally specific valuations of time and space in each resettlement context (Downing 1996). Culture answers "primary questions" about: “Who we are? Where are we? Why do people live and die? What are our responsibilities to others and ourselves?” (Downing 1996: 36). "Victims of involuntary resettlement and natural disasters and refugees experience an unexpected destabilization of routines" (Downing 1996: 36). This will help us explain how, ignoring culture and politics in involuntary resettlement cases, can have negative short and long term impacts on peoples’ health and wellbeing in general, physically and mentally. In this environment, people are in a constant state of feeling insecure and powerless. Chronic and at times extreme stress is produced and reproduced because it is directly related to them not having any social and economic power to meet their most basic individual and household needs.

In principle, dam-induced relocatees are given assistance that is not usually provided in other resettlement contexts like in cases of natural disaster or civil war. What is it that makes dam-induced displacement living conditions post displacement as deplorable as a civil war refugee - even when dam-induced displacees are theoretically
provided with assistance to resettle (Downing 1996)? "Resettlement rips routine relations of social time and social space, laying bare critical, but often ignored dimensions of culture" (Downing 1996: 33). The cultural and social distinctions between the project-proponents and the project-affected are less analysed in the resettlement literature yet knowing these political interactions and cultural distinctions may help us understand better how to reconstruct livelihoods for those displaced no matter where we are in the world.

Ritual patterns of behaviour establish meanings and values towards the right and wrong ways of doing and being for individuals. What is often missed by resettlement planners is that in any culture, or, "In routine culture, people navigate within a space-time continuum in which they chart their positions within a socially constructed time, socially constructed space, and among socially constructed personages" (Downing 1996:36). At every level of resettlement planning and implementation not only must we be aware of the cultural and social dimensions of those involuntarily resettled but as well acknowledge the distribution of power underlying these mutually dependent relations.

How can people ask for things that they need to function well especially upon their initial displacement if they have no idea what those things are? The people’s existence as “dam-affected beneficiaries” and “Indigenous” must now operate in an entirely different set of cultural market relations concerned with getting funding and entitlements. Prior to their displacement being Ibalois for instance was not attached to receiving a form of compensation and an expectation of entitlement. At minimum dam-proponents should take into account at all stages of the planning and implementation processes that the dam-affected understand the world differently. Issues of power are
important considerations when dam-proponents are thinking about what are the best livelihood programs to implement for resettlers. Problems are likely to occur when livelihood programs are developed lacking a meaningful negotiation process, where resettlers’ views should have been incorporated into the project design, planning and implementation. We need to develop resettlement policies that recognize cultural and social difference as way to facilitate "a political climate in which they will each be able to pursue the good (whether religious or ethical) according to their own lights, so long as they do no harm to others" (Nussbaum 2000:59).

How have my participants been able to cope with the transition from a common property, culturally land-based livelihood to a private property, culturally based market economy? What is the degree of internal diversity in each community? Is there a way to improve policy practice applying institutionalized human and environment safeguards at all levels of decision making (Rew et al 2006)? How have cultural and class differences between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected and the dam-affected amongst themselves contribute to the lack of unity and co-operation in the resettlement community today?

My participants remember what they had said to NPC social surveyors in 1995 and what they were promised by dam-proponents beginning in 1997. From my observations, the dam-proponents I encountered working for SRPC made decisions about current livelihood programming were often made last minute. I attribute this to the fact that with the department's other obligations to run social corporate responsibility programs, livelihood reconstruction is only taken seriously when the JBIC conducts an
annual mission. Technically, NPC should be in charge of dealing with the project-affected peoples concerns regarding livelihood. However, as previously mentioned, the SRPC took over as the lead financial administrative mechanism when it comes to any social and public aspects of the project. During my fieldwork, the PCDFI, who had been put in charge of implementing livelihood since 2006 was in the process of being dismantled. As the lead financing mechanism, SRPC was undergoing a transformation from funding the previous implementing agency (PCDFI) to now funding a new charitable peoples foundation to implement livelihood benefits.

Dam-proponents argued that the dam-affected when given the opportunity do not speak up for themselves in meetings. Experience has shown my project-affected participants however that when they have spoken up for themselves it has ended in either receiving less compensation or added time to when dam-proponents would confirm a date for a meeting to discuss livelihood issues with them.

Life has become more difficult because for project-affected research participants because to receive the most basic of necessities and due compensation they are dependent on what dam-proponents will give them and when. They have no control about how to plan their futures. My participants' expectations about what they would get for being displaced have not fully materialized. If it has, it has done so poorly. They expect that the dam-proponents would live up to the promises they made to them over the past ten years. These memories of what should have been force people to constantly confront issues of self and their relationships and sense of trust of others. What kinds of impacts do we see as a result? Disunity. How do these experiences impact people's sense of

12 The conversations that SRPC and I had about members speaking up for themselves came up often but most often these topics came up when I was not recording the conversations. Mostly, I would bring these issues up when we were in informal settings like the common eating area and they were later included as field notes. The micro-finance summit and a meeting in Tabu for instance were examples that SRPC would point to as opportunities for the project-affected to speak up and did not.
worth (Fernandes 2000)? People feel ignorant, physically and politically lacking and pressured to make an income of any kind.

The SRPC and NPC are responsible for implementing compensation and livelihood entitlements to the project-affected. Project-affected research participants also expected that the elected officers in the IPO were the ones who in practical terms would negotiate any terms between themselves and the dam-proponents. This section was an attempt to understand my respondents perceived feelings about having been categorized differently from their families and long time neighbours and their perceived feelings concerning their coexistence with the San Roque Dam. The next section will further explore the pressures the IPO faces to administer a sustainable livelihood for their members. More specifically, the next section is concerned with the nature of the relationship between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected.
Chapter 3:

The Lived Experiences of the Officers in the Indigenous Peoples Organization

Don't give in charity what belongs to people in justice.
Dr. Martin Luther King

Why was the Indigenous Peoples Organization (IPO) so desperate for moral and economic support? Fernandes (2000) argues that in other cases of dam-induced involuntary resettlement:

Most researchers have failed to see the link between the marginalized state of the displaced persons before displacement and the deterioration of their self-image subsequent to it. Such deterioration prevents them from gaining awareness of their own strength, which is indispensable for them to perceive themselves as a community capable of being fully human and of demanding a share of benefits. (212)

This chapter explores how Scudder's (2005) four-stage behavioural model can provide ways for thinking about issues of empowerment. If we think of *handing over and incorporation* (stage four) as our primary objective then each stage before it would have a specific goal of getting the IPO closer to being able to manage and control its own operations. A resettlement community is a new form of governance; its operations and
maintenance depends (as a municipality inside of a barangay) on external funding to operate its school, electricity, business, etc. People were living in and around the surrounding area of Bantic prior to it becoming officially recognized as a resettlement community in 2006.

Since the resettlement community was formally established in 2006, the electricity company, the Department of Education, religious missions, local politicians, community health services, San Roque dam-proponents, NPC dam-proponents, and other organizations are in one way or another complicit with what happens in Bantic. The IPO took responsibility for hosting any visitors there and or following up on plans made with them to maintain their support of Bantic as a priority in their planning and decision-making. My results showed that following up and maintaining the support of all of these organizations was a difficult task - maintaining strong social networks with the wider local community was integral to the IPO's success. When I first arrived the IPO had a poor reputation largely because of the previous chairpersons who ran the IPO during the first three terms. The new IPO chairwoman had to prove that her administration was different to SRPC executives in Manila, the wider community and most especially the people the IPO represents, who also claim "the association is useless".

The following field note is taken after the first month of my six-month field experience.

Philex Mines is located about two hours from Baguio city by jeepney along a mostly paved one-truck passage road. At the entrance, the company guards checked me in. My companions informed me that they kindly called ahead to request to put my name on the list. They were happy to share, as I was to hear it, that I wouldn't have to leave my i.d. with the guards. I travelled there to visit with friends and their families for during the New Year. There were
fireworks sounding and flashing everywhere, day and night. I wanted to visit
with one friend in particular, who was also, the current IPO vice president of
operations. He worked for SRPC during dam construction when it was
critical for NPC and SRPC to gain approval for its construction from 1999 to
2001. He was also the president during the IPO’s first term and third term.

He agreed to interview with me when I arrived. In the past I observed
that he took charge of many of the IPO’s responsibilities. I also observed that
while he had many supporters, he had an equal amount of people who did not
trust him. I learned in our first open-ended, one-on-one interview together
that the IPO’s responsibilities were complicated, specialized, and time
consuming. I realized early in our interview that he was in control of the
conversation. And he was very thoughtful to return to previous points that he
felt he needed to elaborate on, even if, I may have asked a different question
regarding another topic.

As the following excerpt demonstrates, the IPO Vice-President of Operations (IPO-VPO)
describes what went into applying for a livelihood funding outside of SRPC. He
highlights the pressures and insider and specialized knowledge one would need to have,
to efficiently apply for these programs within a reasonable amount of time. The IPO
were dependent on SRPC for administrative costs so they could support their efforts to
network for livelihood funding. In 2007 and in 2008, I participated in as many IPO
activities as I could. The current IPO vice president of operations suggests, in the
following excerpt, that external sources were nearly impossible to get. It was difficult to
get funding for IPO action plans. IPO-VPO shared that with one source of national
government funding called ER 194 took a lot of time, money and effort to gain the
endorsements needed to complete the application:

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13 The operations associated with Philex Mines covers to a major extent land that is currently undergoing negotiations for ancestral
land title for the resettlement community of Daynet. The IPO-VPO in particular detailed for me in one-on-one interviews his
experience of negotiating for his family’s compensation when this particular mine had ruined some of their properties in the early
1990’s. Philex Mines because of its proximity to the dam site, gold mining areas and Baguio City was the first place that many of
those project-affected and categorized as relocatees, who are supposed to be living in Daynet, went to live after they were first
displaced. The resettlement site was constructed six years after their initial displacement leaving many with no choice but to move
to Philex Mines to live and work. And, because it took such a long time for SRPC and the IPO to establish a school in Daynet,
many with school aged children especially have opted to just continue to live in Philex today.

14 ER 194 is a funding program provided through the state’s national electrification program and it is meant to provide financial
assistance to any community attempting to establish a livelihood in their areas. It is not a program meant specifically for those
displaced by dam construction.
IPO-VPO: the problem was we needed to convince and follow up until that time when you are there, when we attended the regular session of...
PM: La Trinidad? Yes, yes, I was there...
IPO-VPO: Yes, so they approved that. We had to convince Kato and other officials especially the Board members from district two and we tried our best to convince them and we convinced them at the time that we needed the funds.
PM: So, that was the last time I heard of that status. Have you received the three million yet?
IPO-VPO: No, the fund was already in process, to receive a special fund, we still needed to provide an agreement from a representative of the governor. The governor is questioning us why the past administration granted the request when the IPO was the one to prepare the proposal. The governor wanted that the proposal be made by the provincial office not us.
PM: How were you supposed to know that? I remember reading the proposal details and I don't remember it made mention... that the provincial municipality, was it clear?
IPO-VPO: Yes it is clear but we don't know the management of the governor. We have to convince them, so, what I did during this past administration, because I am also the vice president to the BOT [IPO Board of Trustees]. I talked to the representative of the governor and I asked them if it was possible if they will also support our proposal. Mr. Illongnwt talked to the governor and the provincial planning development officer and he discussed our latest agreement. He advised us that we will provide an endorsement from the Barangay Ampucao [local levels of government] and the municipality to get another endorsement. It is hard to get another endorsement so I suggest if possible or allowed, the Barangay captains and the mayor that will be the one to give endorsement because there is already an endorsement from them. He granted that so I make a resolution signed by Manang Andrea and other BOT's seeking the endorsement of them but the copy was not given to the Barangay captain and the mayor... maybe by Monday...

The steps that the IPO-VPO took to gain approval, and to lastly, have it signed by the current chairwoman and other IPO Board of Trustees influenced their chances of receiving external livelihood funding. I observed in participant observations, one-one interviews, and focus group discussions with other IPO officer respondents that governing project-related community decisions is laced as well with familial and personal difficulties (explored in Chapter Two).
Later in our interview, I thought if livelihood was so difficult to get funding for, what was negotiating their ancestral land claim agreement like? During my last visit in 2008, this IPO-VPO officer shared with me that the Department of Environment Natural Resources was taking a long time to deal with their claim as signatories to the agreement because Daynet falls within a state proclaimed claimed watershed area. Daynet’s ancestral land claim falling within a watershed reservation area adds to the number of people that needed to negotiate for approval of the IPO's ancestral land claim proposal. The following illustrates that "following up" for the IPO is important, if their rights and interests for livelihood funding and ancestral land title will be treated as a "priority".

Me: How is the ancestral land claim going? Is DENR giving you permission to get the land?
IPO-VPO: Regarding the ancestral, it’s good, they surveyed the area last year and identified the right owner then they commit to give us ancestral land title.
Me: It's still processing?
IPO-VPO: Must have to follow up it up because we still don't have a solution on that.
Me: Still nothing complete, and technically you don't have it. Is the National Commission on Indigenous People helping you with that?
IPO-VPO: Yes, but we must have to work more on that, and get focused on that matter because it will not work if we will not follow up.

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) was developed as a government agency to more specifically deal with ancestral land claims in response to the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997) that which recognized indigenous peoples' rights to the land. Reliable informants from NCIP shared with me that they suffer from a lack of funds to operate. With no money, they can only deal with the highest priority cases, such as mining industries, that illegally encroach on watershed areas, and or, contested ancestral land claim areas just up the mountain from the Daynet resettlement. Following up with different agencies to ensure that they are prioritized is a large part of the IPO's
job. If the IPO is barely able to follow up for potential external livelihood funding, it was no surprise to me that ancestral land claims are still unresolved.

What is happening with Indigenous Peoples Organization operations at the present time? According to the views of the IPO officers, the IPO needed funding for administrative costs to make meetings called by SRPC or NPC, and, gain approvals from all of these signatories that are responsible for negotiating anything to do with the resettlement communities. The IPO-VPO officer in the previous interview made a mention of a fund that SRPC has for the IPO. The IPO when I first arrived to the field in December 2009, were hopeful that if they acted more professional by producing an operations manual, that they would receive additional funds to operate from SRPC.

In order to go ahead with any IPO action plan and or resolution, they were required by SRPC to provide them with a formal written request. To receive approval for administrative funding from SRPC, they also need endorsements from the local government. However, as the following excerpt describes a previous livelihood scheme that the PCDFI implemented through a co-operative in Bantic had failed and the money that was loaned to the co-operative at the time in 2004/2005 had not been repaid back to the Postal Bank. The current administration was facing difficulty earning approvals from the local governments with previous IPO activities mired in money mismanagement and accusations of corruption. For instance, a previous social assessment conducted in 2008 emphasizes that according to the PCDFI officers and administration, "If ever problems were mentioned these were blamed on the PAF's (that they are negligent and lazy), on SRPC (for the late release of budget), on bad weather and on the poor condition of
the ..." (SPREAD\textsuperscript{16} 2008:54). Approvals for funding from the local government and attending agencies were difficult to obtain because of their poor reputation and their controversial history as an organization. According to the IPO-VPO:

I told the officers that we tried to get money after the manual and for the expenses. [During the IPO's first term, when SRPC originally released some partial funds set aside for the IPO (two million pesos, roughly $46,291.34 CAD in total, as per the MOA), the IPO needed approval first for it from the mayor.] The mayor granted our request so we could get the money and we opened an account for the IPO, and together, we used that to create an agreement that we have 150,000 that will be used by the IPO. They remit that 10,000 of that money would be used for processing and expenses.... and 100,000 of that money was supposed to be for Bantic. But the money for Bantic we cannot yet give because they didn't yet repay the loans from before and we are worried that they would just spend the money....

I asked this respondent (three months later in an unrecorded conversation) why the IPO approved the release of the rest of the two million pesos to the PCDFI in 2006. I was told that the IPO felt pressured to accept the proposal by SRPC. Lacking free and prior informed consent from the IPO and its members, SRPC and PCDFI had already developed the contract stipulating that the PCDFI would be in charge of implementing livelihood for Daynet and Bantic. The IPO was not left with much of a choice. Even though it was stipulated in the Memorandum Of Agreement that they would be supported to implement livelihood with the help of technical agencies (which never happened; instead, the IPO is blamed for not being able to follow up with these agencies regularly).

The Bantic co-operative was established as one of the PCDFI's first set of livelihood projects to be implemented in Bantic. It was developed as a co-operative

\textsuperscript{15} The end of this sentence is shown as it was in the SPREAD's final report to JBIC. The final report in my possession had been edited by SRPC and AMEC at this point. AMEC is the human environmental consulting firm hired by the Japanese Bank who reviews any social and environmental concerns related to the San Roque Dam. They recommend to the Japanese Bank if SRPC and NPC should continue to receive loans or not.

\textsuperscript{16} SPREAD was the research team hired by SRPC in 2008 to conduct a social impact assessment that is required by the Japanese Bank to assess the success or failure of the livelihood programs that have been implemented to date.
agricultural supplies trading store located a few hours away from Bantic proper in another village at the base of the mountain. The loans that the VPO is referring to in the above, is this failed agricultural cooperative scheme that enabled members to take out small loans. The members of the program may have repaid the loan but the records were with the previous president of the cooperative who for the time being was ignoring the IPO’s repeated request to hand over the cooperative’s paperwork to the new IPO. The project started in June 2006. In 2006, there were 52 beneficiaries and by 2007, there were 72 recipients who supposedly benefited from this project. Reliable informants shared with me that the co-operative administration was not even from Bantic, and they were unsure why the decision was made to build the co-operative so far away from Bantic to begin with. Others shared with me that the location was chosen because they thought they would have more business in that area. Plus, the co-operative president at the time was not living in that barangay and not in Bantic proper.

The following field note and interview reveals that the IPO and the resettlement communities needs to not only prove that they are responsible as a way to gain endorsements from the local governments but more importantly, they need to show SRPC executives, the decision makers in Manila, that they can manage the money.

Bantic is faced with the problem of repaying back a loan to the Postal Bank from a co-operative that was developed with the PCDFI. According to numerous participants, the co-operative administration mismanaged and misspent the funds. The leadership in charge of the co-operative at the time were not living in Bantic.

IPO officers and previous Bantic co-operative members claim that the IPO chairman at the time - the current IPO VPO, the director of the PCDFI, and the co-operative president had an internal arrangement. The co-operative president was not returning anyone's calls from the current IPO chairwoman, previous co-operative BOD officers, and a local government official who deals specifically with co-operatives. The IPO chairwoman and I even went to visit him at his home. We were told that the previous co-operative
The president had all of the papers that the IPO needed, if the IPO had a chance to resolve the past mistakes made.

The entire female side of the family greeted our entourage with cold water and a warm conversation about what I was doing there. The chairwoman briefed me afterwards to say that he is just not there, the family requested for her to come back another time. Numerous relocatees shared with me that the co-operative was a difficult project because they had little knowledge about how to operate it to begin with. Issues of transparency left people feeling sore about how the co-operative was run, along with the fact that community members are now in debt with the Postal Bank because of its failure.

The IPO chairman at the time of the co-operative scandal, when we discussed his role in the past shared with me that he was not good at accounting for expenses. He claimed to me that he did record the list of accounts payable and the accounts received but he was bad at collecting and keeping official receipts. In focus group discussions that I observed the VPO was challenged by the group to take responsibility for his mistakes. In interviews that I had with the VPO, the issue that the IPO had a lot of responsibility and no technical or adequate financial support came up with increasing frequency. The following excerpt describes some of the responsibilities of his office during his first term.

The 10 000 Pesos\(^{17}\) that SRPC first released to the IPO in 2006 was used mostly for organizational and administrative purposes:

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\begin{align*}
\text{IPO-VPO:} & \quad \text{That money, we spent it on the organization for accreditation, ER 194 [external livelihood funding], budgets that we sourced out to the province and the municipality of Itogon, and, for the school. The school in Bantic and Daynet, I initiate that because there are some requirements that you have to take care of. The school in Bantic, the lot we have to still deal with in the court where the school was erected is still under... it is in the court... PM: Oh it is still in the court, so it is technically not Bantic's yet?} \\
\text{IPO-VPO:} & \quad \text{No that is being claimed by Jensen and Amos so it's not yet settled, at first we must have to provide documents that is being requested by the Department of Education [Dep Ed]. They want documents because the documents are not settled so I initiated that from NPC with the case and} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{17}\$ 223.68 CAD as of 1/10/2011
SRPC after that so Dep Ed agreed approved the start of the school and the problem again is the teachers who will be assigned to that area. SRPC I think provided one teacher yes then the municipalities provided one for the school, two teachers in Bantic and two teachers in Daynet.

PM: so that was your first term as IPO president?
IPO-VPO: Yes, then... another one is the school accreditation I forgot the other activities.
PM: so what have you learned the most as the IPO president so far?
IPO-VPO: what I learned is the management, the presentation, there must be a presentation of actions plans and the officers, there must be a knowledgeable secretary to help the IPO.
PM: with administration, filing...
IPO-VPO: yes because we can't maintain a permanent secretary because the fund is not enough so then the board is supposed to do it instead. And you can't just tell to the board that you must have to do this because this is your job because..
PM: yes, because it is volunteer
IPO-VPO: yes but the problem why you can't command them they must have to earn or work for their family although in most of the meetings they are very supportive because we have a small honorarium but not all meetings we have another technical people we don't have technical people we can't hire although what is mandated in the IPDP there are technical people from agencies who are supposed to help to make a proposal, a feasibility study...
PM: then what prevented those things from happening?
IPO-VPO: From what I observed is most of the time they are busy, again, we can't command them to do this for us, they can't because they are busy they have a lot of commitments to other people also, so that's how we encountered them. It's supposed to be that they will be doing some proposals, project proposals with us, so that's one I thought we must have to have a plan for the IPO, to hire technical people so we can easily develop a proposal and make a plan.

Again, "following up" appears to be very important for the IPO to move ahead on any project with so many stakeholders involved in livelihood programming creation, development and implementation. The IPO is dependent on SRPC to provide them with the funds to do the basic legwork of networking with local governments and agencies that were at first supposed to help the IPO develop livelihood programs.

To apply for funds from SRPC, the IPO needs to first have the money to fund the proposal. In order for the IPO to receive any reimbursements after SRPC’s approval, the
IPO needs to provide official receipts, and, a list of names of people who attended (if a meeting was held). I observed that for meetings that were approved, the reimbursements took months for an approval, and/or, a reimbursement from SRPC. The IPO's job is complicated because it is self-initiating and largely self-supporting. Reliable informants from SRPC shared that the requests that were approved for reimbursement from the IPO were sent off to the Manila office. The SRPC at the dam site could not control how long they would get a receipt of acknowledgement and or reimbursement.

In a private conversation, the vice president of SRPC told me that the new SRPC president was not happy that so much money has been spent on livelihood already with no positive results. Our private conversation insinuated to me that the current SRPC president was less willing to fund the IPO. Our conversation gave me the impression that the current president had not considered yet that SRPC and the PCDFI were complicit as well in such a waste of money. The Admiral referred to below is the director of the PCDFI and ex-director of SRPC’s Social Corporate Social Responsibility Department. According to this IPO VPO officer, the Admiral had been using the organization for his own personal gains:

PM: So the PCDFI, the Admiral, the organization, they were in charge of livelihood before? Why is it that you think it didn't work?
IPO-VPO: The reason it didn't work because of personal gains for the Admiral.
PM: Can you give me an example?
IPO-VPO: I thought they give projects for the people but I thought they didn't ask the people what they like, they are just the ones who is to decide what is the project, then, maybe they give a little fund for them but in the report they give more, yes, as we are informed they spend less than one hundred million in three years, but where did that money go? While the IPO just spent 1.5 million, it is a big difference that is part of the two million that

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18 During the approval stages of the San Roque Dam the Admiral was in charge of gaining the community’s support and director of what we know now as the SRPC Corporate Social Responsibility Department.
we requested that was in put in the MOA but it is not, they give us a boat which is a part of the two million.

PM: What? The boat? I was under the impression that it was a gift.
IPO-VPO: A gift? Now the money we spent, part of the money was used for the goat raising for Bantic and the cow, or cattle for Daynet.
PM: Which both didn't work.
IPO-VPO: Yes.
PM: When I was there, the cattle weren't acclimatized to live in the mountains and they were suffering because they couldn't walk in the mountains.
IPO-VPO: Yes because they didn't have a say.
PM: So the IPO didn't get to choose the caraboa they were given the caraboa [in Daynet].
IPO-VPO: Then I have some information of the projects if there is a rip rap pool which is...
PM: What is that?
IPO-VPO: A rip rap pool like this, retaining wall but it is rip rap because it is stone and it cost only sixty thousand but in the document they record it cost 260 000.

The IPO-VPO and therefore the IPO administration was faced with the difficult task of proving that they were being sincere towards the people and had no intention of wasting money for personal gain. The caraboa that the IPO-VPO is referring to was for the Daynet resettlement community, although, Bantic as well have been requesting caraboa since 2006. Instead, the Bantic peoples received goats of which a majority died upon receipt of them immediately and or within the week (to be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter). According to the IPO-VPO, the activities that the IPO were responsible for and pressured with, especially when they were first displaced in 2000, was overwhelming.

My results showed that SRPC had no intention of handing over and incorporating livelihood reconstruction plans to the IPO. Is the nature of the relationship between the IPO and the project proponents related to the negative status of livelihood reconstruction
and compensation entitlement outcomes? The project-affected persons in this case study are forced to negotiate and consult with a tightly controlled bureaucracy bent on providing the minimum of entitlements for both SRPC and government funding. If the IPO were unable to gain endorsements for their projects from the local governments they would be unable to meet SRPC's and the states’ requirements for livelihood funding at minimum. I observed that outsiders unfamiliar with their day-to-day lived experiences of people in Bantic would base their judgements on largely what SRPC and the PCDFI office would tell them. Bantic is located far away from market roads.

In an intense meeting between the IPO and SRPC, January 5th, 2010, one IPO officer asserted that "...we are crying, they, the families are crying for us, to how SRPC will assist or provide us, as a member of the affected families". Where will we get the money? the IPO officer respondents often moaned when faced with decisions about organizing to ensure that everyone was together for important meetings, having food for guests who came to assist in Bantic, and asking the administrative assistant to write resolutions, letters and reports for on behalf of the IPO, to SRPC. The list of IPO responsibilities and tasks related to negotiated for and consulted on compensation entitlement and livelihood reconstruction plans was enormous for any underfunded and understaffed governing organization.

SRPC was in the process of establishing a new livelihood implementing agency and the IPO were under the impression that they would be in charge of implementing livelihood. The following excerpt demonstrates the nature of the relationship between
SRPC and the IPO. IPO officers told me later that this meeting indicated to them, their poor chances of getting administrative funding from SRPC.

Observing any meeting between the IPO and SRPC was an exercise in futility - SRPC would not directly answer reasonable questions that the IPO posed. "Please permit me to speak" Eric raises his hand interrupting Tom from his speech about action plans, ridiculing the IPO for thinking too big about the task at hand. Tom laughs leaning back as he allows Eric to continue. Eric clears his throat "ahh the action plan we are planning is...". Tom interrupts him quickly to scold Eric "no no ok it's like this what are you expecting from us?" Eric retorts "what are we expecting for us ah for you is to have a sustainable livelihood that would be permitted with the project-affected families then how many years that we don't have that because of how many issues that was prop up but now...". Interrupting Eric abruptly again Tom sternly remarks "I would like to make clear that the livelihood is not being done we are doing supporting livelihood is not being met because of the responsibility, so I don't even want to talk about affected families... we wanted to help of course the common interest of two is just affected families so we are doing this because of an obligation we are doing this because we wanted to help."

Throughout the meeting Tom repeated "we are doing this because not as an obligation we are doing this as a help the affected families...." Tom insists that the financing mechanism from now on to implement livelihood will be the micro-finance program. The IPO officers are confused because they had spent the previous year preparing themselves to take charge of implementing livelihood. It was verbally promised that they would implement livelihood by the vice president, Tom, in front of JBIC/AMEC the year before.

There are expectations of the IPO that SRPC had of them but they were never made explicit to my IPO officer respondents. In practice, it was difficult for IPO officers to operate effectively and efficiently without funding. At the same time it was difficult for them to guess what the management of SRPC expected of them.

Tom closer to the end of our three-hour meeting finally made a clear statement about how he viewed the IPO's role. It sounded like he expected them to act as a sort of public relations organization. The IPO, Tom reasoned could "develop other skills in marketing and networking for the market. I think that could be facilitated by the IPO if we are doing Laya [ginger] in Bantic the IPO should be thinking about how to market that in
the end". Tom implies here that the IPO would not be in charge of implementing livelihood.

Notably, it is also implied that the IPO would be doing all of this on their own time and money. In this transitional phase at SRPC (from the PCDFI to a new implementing agency), the IPO needed to prove quickly that they should be the new implementing agency. It seemed unlikely to them as the IPO officers were making every effort to prove that they were acting professional but to no avail. Repeatedly they were scolded about what they were doing wrong and they were provided with little guidance as to what would make things better. The following excerpt suggests that Tom does not think giving the IPO administrative funding will in turn help the people.

When IPO officers asked where is the money that SRPC had promised last year for administrative funding the vice president snapped that "you are expecting a pay from us which I don't like that's not helping people". He continues to laugh at the suggestion and between his laughter he pauses to say "if that is what you have in mind I don't think we are helping the people, we are not, I am sorry".

Technically, the money for their administrative costs should not come out of monies meant for livelihood programming as this should be part of a replacement cost (under WB OP 4.12 2004). Tom implies above that the administrative costs would take money away from livelihood programming when it should not to begin with. Additionally, SRPC and NPC needs to show by 2013 that those affected by the dam will have been fully compensated for and through resettlement action plans established in 2000, livelihood reconstruction programs should be in the fourth, handing over and incorporation stage of Scudder’s four stage behaviour model. Pressure is placed on SRPC and NPC by AMEC, the consulting firm (social and environmental compliance experts) hired by the Japanese Bank, to prove that SRPC and NPC did everything
possible to implement a livelihood program that will sustain the peoples livelihood at a level just as good or better, prior to their displacement. An inspection panel was developed by the Bank to provide project-affected peoples with an alternative redress mechanism apart from the legal system. From what the IPO-VPO shared with me, the status quo at SRPC and PCDFI has failed to fully consult the people and genuinely monitor the implementation of livelihood reconstruction. It is no surprise that AMEC in the past were unable to locate and mitigate impoverishment risks if they made no attempt to understand the distribution of power between these mutually dependent stakeholder relations.

For all eight of the IPO officers I interviewed, life was difficult. Funding to participate in IPO activities came out of their own pockets. The current IPO chairwoman has also been known to contribute funds to enable the participation of other officers. The officers the chairwoman was assisting had little disposable income, making their engagement with the IPO dependent on others for assistance. IPO officers from Bantic faced particular barriers. For many, attending IPO activities meant that their families sacrificed food in that week. Time spent in gathering or farming activities would have to go towards travel to get to the dam site to where the meetings are usually located. For two of my IPO officer research participants who lived in Bantic, money that usually went toward family consumption in that week went instead towards travel and food costs to attend IPO related activities. The IPO officers have little choice but to sacrifice if they

\footnote{In San Roque’s case, when the resettlement action plans were initially developed, incorporating issues of empowerment and disempowerment had not been yet fully institutionalized as it is in the updated 2004 version of the World Bank Operational Guidelines 4.12 regarding Involuntary Resettlement. In 2006 it has been made explicit through the World Bank Group, the International Finance Corporation (Performance Standard Five), involved in complimentary, additional and collaborative finance lending towards state development. In WB IFC PS 5 2012, issues of meaningful consultation and processes are highlighted and stressed, incorporating the World Commission on Dams report. Equator Principles in 2004 was an international attempt to institutionalize human and environment norms across private and public finance lending institutions of which the 2006 IFC Performance Standards have incorporated.}
wanted to be perceived as acting on behalf of their members and as acting professionally with the hopes that SRPC will release funding for their administrative costs and hope for livelihood reconstruction programs for all project-affected members.

The chairwoman I observed had a major advantage over the previous chair-people: she has not been involved in any scandals in the past. There was an opportunity here to change the minds of the dam-affected people and the SRPC administration in Manila that the IPO were the best people to manage the implementation of livelihood reconstruction plans. The chairwoman visits the resettlement communities regularly and it will be her actions that will test whether or not SRPC is genuine or not to provide livelihood for the peoples. In unrecorded naturally occurring conversations that I had with the vice president of SRPC, he expressed on numerous occasions that he did not trust the two past IPO chair-people. He made no negative mention of the current IPO chairwoman.

It is the first time these communities have ever negotiated for themselves in this way for entitlements as a result of being displaced. In this case study, the imbalance of power is prominent between the project-proponents and the project-affected. From the beginning the IPO had not clearly known their rights, roles and responsibility as an organization. The IPO were under the impression following the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan that they would be in charge of implementing livelihood and the major operations and administration to run their communities. They had to rely solely on the SRPC for direction and funds.

In 2010, IPO officers were asking SRPC to explain "how about expectations I would like to permission of our BOD [board of directors] about the expectation of SRPC we would like to permit me to answer about that... permit... let's think about that...". The IPO officers respond in Ilocano and Tom looks sternly at Eric and says "what we have in mind?" leaning forward as if to challenge him falls back with a disappointed smirk looking up at the ceiling and then down.

The SRPC implies in this meeting that they do not see the IPO as having much of a governing role at all:
Richard asserts, "As an officer since before up until now it has been how many years have been passed when..." Tom interrupts him suddenly and laughs at him as if to prevent Richard from saying something further. Richard attempts to continue again "we are waiting for the..." and Tom interrupts him again encouraging the other SRPC executives to laugh at Richard. Richard is encouraged by another IPO officer to continue in his own language but Richard insists to speak in English so I can understand what is being said: "...NPC we will be having a very good life then before the construction of NPC because before the construction I before the construction NPC promised to us that we will having a better source of income after the dam and having a good life then before then now then before the dam so...". "A better life" Eric adds.

The Japanese Bank is required to assess if the dam-affected people are being equitably and fairly represented. Bank social safeguard policies require the borrower project to fund an IPO organization so individual project-affected peoples are not negotiating directly with the project-proponents. These social safeguards mechanisms are in place to mitigate uneven compensation distribution and further social impoverishment through failed livelihood reconstruction action plans. Being the first time many project-affected peoples have had to document their lives and dealings in this way adds pressure to their worsening circumstances in their personal and social lives. To date this IPO has not been able to sustain a livelihood for themselves at all.

Seven years after the construction of the San Roque dam, IPO officers perceive that past failures with livelihood reconstruction influence their current ability to convince their members of the viability of new projects. It came up numerous times that IPO officers feel "used" by project proponents whether it is to get signatures from members for SRPC, or, rally participants to join livelihood schemes. Verbal agreements for my participants were seen to mean something, when they had negotiated with the project-proponents in the past. Their concerns, however, never made it into current project
designs for livelihood reconstruction. The promise of a better life continues to play on their minds.

What does "life is more difficult" mean to an IPO officer project-affected person, who is also responsible for administering livelihood for the people? Not only did they see themselves as failing the non-IPO officer members in the resettlement communities but also in addition to that they perceived that SRPC treated them like children. The IPO could not win on any front related to the project. IPO officers were angry with SRPC for wasting their time and money. To date they have received no explicit confirmation as to their status and actual obligations to provide livelihood reconstruction for the resettlement communities. The "costs for transport" and the "costs for a secretary" to take the minutes needed to attend meetings with SRPC ends always with "all talk no action". IPO officer participants speculated that Bank compliance for SRPC was why SRPC is wasting their time. SRPC needed to show that meetings were conducted but beyond this we had no clue about what was actually reported to the Bank about what was discussed. Research participant’s perceived from the meeting that SRPC were not genuinely moving towards providing them with their entitlements to livelihood reconstruction, full compensation, and ancestral land title because they did not agree to provide the IPO with the administrative funding that they needed to operate.

The IPO's ability and capacity to govern were "Already over in his mind as if they persecute us". An IPO officer participant explained to me regarding the IPO-VPO's uncooperative behaviour in our previous meeting together with SRPC. The IPO-VPO was noticeably fed up, faced with the fact that the capability seminar\textsuperscript{20} was cancelled last minute (for the first of three times during my field work) the night before. Coupled with the fact that there was no commitment still from SRPC to provide them with the administrative funds to operate it was no surprise to either of us that he

\textsuperscript{20}The capability seminar was a program that SRPC promised to fund as part of the IPO’s capacity building entitlement as was first negotiated upon their displacement and the IPO’s creation in 2002/2003.
drank heavily the night before and was heard shouting obscenities about certain SRPC administration and employees into all hours of the morning.

Prior to the first meeting between the IPO and SRPC that I observed, the IPO-VPO officer had worked hard to prepare for it. I observed however, that the work that he did to act professional was largely done on his own and with little help from the other IPO officers, including the current chairwoman at the time. The others, as he explained do not have the knowledge or the time to work on the operations manual that SRPC was expecting of them. In this meeting that we held, the IPO officers including the IPO-VPO were strongly tempted to quit. After the meeting, the IPO officers shared with me:

"Mam, it's a good thing you came or I don't know I was to quit the IPO" an IPO officer exasperated shared with me outside of the SRPC offices after the intense and emotional meeting between the IPO and SRPC. In the same conversation another officer told me, "As if we are treated like children". These IPO officers desperately needed moral and technical support in addition to the economic support.

In previous social impact assessments researchers argued that project planning must account for the project-affected peoples’ empowerment:

It can be undertaken in such a manner as to coach the PAF's [project-affected families] towards self determination by a reflective assessment of the self and the community - their strengths, the resources that they can mobilize, what they can change, and the constraints they have to deal with. This is an important element to strategies on people empowerment. At present, many of the PAF’s delve so much on their weaknesses and inadequacies - that they are not very literate, they are materially poor and that the SRPC should also provide them regular food rations and case for their daily needs. Their high level of dependency on SRPC speaks of this. (SPREAD vol.1 2008: 58).

The researchers did make a good point by commenting on how self-effaced the project-affected peoples were in general but they did not analyze why. Nor did they provide any guidance to the project-proponent officers as to how they would go about incorporating project-affected members' views genuinely. The project-proponents need reminding that
this is the first time for many project-affected peoples to negotiate on this level with governments and corporations. Free and Prior Informed Consent procedures are mandatory in all negotiations and consultations with project-affected groups of Indigenous Peoples (WB OP 4.12 2004, IPRA, 1997) yet the dam-proponents to date have not followed these procedures. The project-affected peoples would not have been in this position to begin with if the dam reservoir had not submerged their homes and livelihood. The dam-proponents are providing entitlements and not charity to the dam affected. Not analysing the relationship between the people's self perceived efficacy and the dam's construction ignores the fact that disunity and people's existing dependency on the dam for livelihood reconstruction is as a direct result of the dam construction itself. It has become common for the dam-proponents to blame the peoples for their circumstances.

Notably, SRPC community field officers were generally good at pointing out what needed to be done but no one with decision-making power took any actions towards strengthening the relationship between local government units and the dam-affected people. For instance, the capability seminar is a resolution the IPO created in their attempt to network with the local government units who were volunteering their time to share their knowledge with them. In March / April 2009, SRPC and the IPO verbally discussed that funding would be released to host the capability seminar at the dam site. The IPO-VPO had spent the previous months following up and ensuring that all of these different agency representatives' schedules could be co-ordinated to attend. The IPO officers were under the impression that if they co-operated with SRPC to sign documents that supported the dismantling of the PCDFI with SRPC, that they could in return expect
SRPC to live up to their end of the bargain. SRPC had a different plan that became obvious after SRPC cancelled the IPO’s seminar last minute for the third time. After the IPO's insistence that it was important for new officers especially, the IPO decided to on their own host the event at a more accessible location close to Baguio city for everyone in Bantic and Daynet (and the surrounding areas) to attend. New social networks for the IPO were created with members of different local government units and commerce organizations. Plus, it gave people an opportunity for people to ask questions about their options with people not associated with the dam directly. From this seminar, the local government units (representing the municipalities of Itogon and Benguet) accepted our invitation weeks later to an open focus group discussion in Bantic about the community’s views of their interactions with the San Roque administration.

When decisions were made to build the dam, the dam-affected were living on the periphery of the market economy and powerless to prevent their own displacement. When NPC was trying to gain approval for the project in the late 1990's, NPC had spent a lot of money to ensure support from the local government units in and around the surrounding areas. According to the IPO-VPO:

NPC was rushing because they have no time to get the consent and the support of the people. It is why they give financial assistance for Barangays Ampucao, 7.5 million, and just to convince the municipal, 13 million, and, the province, 20 million. I know the story of Daynet when the dam constructed. I know that you can tell the other people if they know that and compare it to what I am saying... but what the officials will say, will be very different.

Dam building is big business. For local governments, dams are a source of funding. Many of the officials who were around during the building of the dam are still in power
in the area, and may have risen to even higher positions since. However, the people of Bantic and Daynet continue to live a marginalized co-existence with the San Roque Dam. Fernandes (2000) is insightful on this point that is reminiscent of the Daynet and Bantic peoples experience: "As a consequence of [this] project, they [were] brought face to face with the dominant society without adequate preparation, throwing them into a crisis of cultural and social identity and an even greater position of powerlessness" (207).

Resettlement community members lack autonomy individually and as a collective, Indigenous Peoples Organization to negotiate for their own interests. For SRPC executives in Manila, to approve the release of any funding for the IPO is dependent on the IPO's endorsements from local governments and the outcome of previous social impact assessments. The next chapter will introduce the concept of a social impact assessment and evaluate through these social impact assessments how SRPC executives in Manila might perceive the IPO and their capability to govern themselves.
Chapter 4:

Moving Forward: What is Involved in Developing a Useful Social Impact Assessment for All Stakeholders?

Social impact assessments are considered as part of the process to determine if a project is instituting successfully or not social safeguard mechanisms as outlined by the World Bank in cases of involuntary resettlement. Pressures from NGOs and the US Congress, whom mandated that federally, funded projects (and later any USAID funded projects) to consider the environment (which was later defined to include human environment), lead the World Bank to focus on ‘human environment’ beginning in the 1970s (ICGPSIA 1994, Vanclay 1999, Goodland 2000, McCully 2001, Davis 2004, Khagram 2004, Goldman 2005). The social impact assessment (SIA) originated as a "specific concept at least, with the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act of the USA...." (Vanclay 2003: 1). There are four phases in a development project where a social impact assessment needs to be carried out: 1) the project design stages and or the 'public approval stages' (Goodland 2000, Vanclay 2000), 2) the construction phases of the
project, 3) the post-construction phases of the project and, 4) the decommissioning stages of the project. Treated separately, the social aspects of the project are usually introduced after the project design stages. It is uncommon for a social impact assessment to actually influence operations and budgets in any meaningful way. The SIA literature implies this is because the SIA was imposed as a federal mandate and it was not something of which development proponents sought out as necessary on their own (Vanclay 2000, Goodland 1999, Vanclay 1999).

What are some of the characteristics of a social impact assessment? There is no consensus in the SIA literature about how social impact assessments should be carried out in principle and in practice (Tilt, Braun & He 2008, Vanclay 1999). Yet it is seen as part of the process towards improving the situation of peoples negatively affected by large-scale development. According to Vanclay,

Social impact assessment is the process of analysing (predicting, evaluating and reflecting) and managing the intended and unintended consequences on the human environment of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by these interventions so as to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment. (2002:388)

In Tilt et al's (2008) reflexive analysis of the SIA process, they stress that the central challenge is to get the impacts right (choosing locally salient variables and finding the scope temporally and spatially) and to get the process right (choosing participatory methods with an emphasis on 'rights and risk' in a cross cultural context and to avoid ethnocentrism and cultural pluralism). Other researchers in this area supporting this idea, stress that a SIA is more than a set of techniques and methodological principles; rather, it
is a philosophy towards creating a system of democratic sustainable development within a project and within the wider political economy of development in general.

How has SIA been carried out in relation to the San Roque Dam? In this chapter, I analyze a SIA conducted in each of the San Roque resettlement communities in 2008 by a non-governmental research team hired by SRPC, called SPREAD Incorporated, based in Baguio city. The SPREAD Incorporated (Sustainable Participatory Relevant Equitable Anticipatory Dynamic, Inc.) describes themselves as a non-governmental advocate research team. The previous chapter explored how important it was for the IPO to "follow up" and earn endorsements for their programs to operate. This section analyzes how the SRPEAD team conducted the 2008 social impact assessment focused on livelihood reconstruction, as well as how the IPO is "presented" overall in the document. Livelihood is a focus of both of our discussions concerning the Bantic resettlement community.

Official and Unofficial Version(s)

The SPREAD team examined all four of the resettlement communities Lagpan, Camaangan, Daynet and Bantic. The table below describes the official (SPREAD 2008) and unofficial version (Me 2010) about why livelihood continues to fail in the Bantic resettlement community.
In 2008, data was first collected and analysed by the SPREAD team (according to the flow chart below), who passed a draft on to SRPC for feedback. After these revisions it was given to the human environment firm, AMEC (acronym unknown), (hired by the Japanese Bank for International Co operation to monitor the environmental and social impacts) wherein it was then passed back to SRPC and then back to SPREAD for further
revisions. SPREAD then produced an updated report; it was submitted again to SRPC for final changes, and the report was then formally submitted by SRPC to AMEC and JBIC. I did not see the original terms of reference for SPREAD's original research plan, however, I did observe in 2008 how the information was disseminated and how this information was disseminated was confirmed with me by reliable informants at SRPC.

**SPREAD's 2008 Dissemination of Information Flow Chart**

The initial report that SPREAD passed on to SRPC was carefully scrutinized by SRPC and given back to SPREAD before it was given to AMEC. It is not uncommon for the researcher to share drafts of the final report with their informants (SRPC being one of them). However, this capability was not shared with the IPO. This is despite the stipulations of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 1997, which calls for research conducted in indigenous communities to be shared in full with the people who participated in the study. To date, the IPO has not received a copy of the full SPREAD report.

The following field note and interview with the IPO-VPO reveals that SPREAD's final report has been used by SRPC for beyond its original purpose: for JBIC to assess if the San Roque dam proponents are measuring up to human and environmental norms.

It was about noon when I arrived to Baguio city to meet with the VPO. I have been travelling constantly, to and from Bantic to Baguio city and the dam site. I am exhausted. The VPO had invited me to Baguio city to discuss more specifically the meeting that the IPO would have with JBIC in the coming weeks. The IPO needed an action plan. I was spending a
majority of my time with the IPO in Bantic, to understand the overwhelming amount of testimonials from community members that the micro-finance program was pushing them deeper into poverty. And there appeared to be a lot of confusion as to what the IPO actually did, amongst community members and IPO officers.

Hopped up on coffee sitting across from the VPO I was tired, edgy, and excited, all at once. The VPO and I hadn't seen each other for about a week, and there was much we had to catch up on before JBIC's arrival. He was nervous. He expressed doubt that SRPC would live up to promises of administrative funding despite our efforts in the last couple of months to network with local government officials, produce the IPO operations manual, and conduct site meetings in Daynet and Bantic. The chairwoman and I were perplexed that the VPO could expect five million pesos from SRPC with out accounting for why the IPO needs it. She could develop a stronger bid for funding to cover their administrative costs.

In the following third interview with the IPO-VPO, I am concerned about the causes of failed livelihood programming and my respondent's role in the two livelihood programs that were implemented in Bantic (goat program and the cooperative) by the PCDFI:

PM: When you think back, what can the IPO take responsibility for, in terms of its failure?
IPO-VPO: Why we are submitting our proposal is that it is the strategic plan on how to implement future projects.
PM: What I am saying is that you have to be prepared to discuss the mistakes, what are the mistakes of the IPO? Because that will come up again and again and you need to answer for your part in its problems. Can you think of any now that the IPO did at that time to make the goat program for Bantic fail for example?
IPO-VPO: When the goat was already delivered it was delivered in Luwegan and most of the beneficiaries care for the goat up the mountain to Bantic. The goat has requirements. If the goats are coming from a very far place, before you transfer them they must rest for one night and the next day you can bring them up. They should have rested. We had one-day seminars but they did not inform us too much. When we brought the goats to Luwegan everyone was so happy to get the goat we didn't think that we have to stop here and take one nights rest.
PM: The IPO should have been the ones to remind the people to come the next day. The IPO knew that it was good to come the next day. When you saw the goats did you see any visible problems with them?
IPO-VPO: Yes, they did so we removed those with SRPC and PCDFI and it was the PCDFI who chose the goats, and they must remove the ones with mouth disease.
PM: So what happened, you told them that some have a mouth disease they took them away. Did they replace those goats?
IPO-VPO: Yes they did. The goats are a very sensitive animal and if you don't quarantine them because of the climate they might like this.
PM: The SRPC, PCDFI, and IPO were all there to give the goats. Everyone should take the responsibility for the failure not just the IPO.
IPO-VPO: Yes.

Interestingly, earlier in our interview he shared (in confidence) a portion of the SPREAD report that did not cover this particular failed livelihood program. SRPC shared the co-operative in Daynet that questioned the transparency of the IPO chairman at the time (his nemesis). And I questioned why SRPC would want to give only a portion of the SRPEAD report to the VPO in particular. I could only speculate it was to incite disunity between the IPO chairwoman at the time and the present VPO officer because they were both up for re-election (of which neither of them won).

Would have it been useful for the IPO to have had received the entire report? Yes. The IPO could have at least challenged what the report was saying or could have at the very least added to the story of why the goats likely died. The goats were not acclimatized to living in the colder temperatures in Bantic. As the IPO-VPO shared the IPO was not involved in the purchasing of the goats, although they had originally agreed to do so at the time. The director of the PCDFI changed the agreement of the seller last minute without the IPO's knowledge.

The SPREAD assessment did report that the goats came from Urdaneta which is much further south from the seller to which they originally had agreed to purchase from (SPREAD vol.1 2008: 41). In the focus group discussion that SRPEAD held with the beneficiaries of the goat program, the director of the PCDFI was present and according to the report responded to the peoples concern that the goats were not acclimatized to the area. In the SPREAD report (2008), it is documented that the PCDFI director did share in a focus group discussion that the participants selected the goats and that the IPO formed a committee to canvass the goats. He neglected to mention that he changed his
mind in the last minute and did not follow the previous agreements that he had with the IPO.

In a different volume of the SPREAD report, SPREAD did interview a person, remaining anonymous, who confirmed the IPO's story that the goats were from the south, the lowlands in Urdaneta and not from the north, the highlands. Despite this however, in the following excerpt, in a different volume, one is still given the impression that the failure of the program largely rests on the shoulders of the Bantic people for not providing the goats with the proper shelter, and or, from eating them during the holidays.

The PAF's [project-affected families] were not ready with the requisites to care for the herd. Many of the goats were left out in the open at the time they were physically stressed from a very long trip.... And with no ready shelter, the goats got sick then eventually died. This is exacerbated by the lack of assessable veterinarians and technicians that could have provided assistance in herd health and feeding management.... In some instances, according to some of the PCDFI officers, the PAFs do not give accurate reports about cause of death of stocks. This is especially true during the Christmas season when high mortality caused by disease is being reported, when if truth be told, these were slaughtered for the Christmas feast.... (SPREAD vol.1 2008: 41)

From my observations, the Bantic people and the IPO were not fully responsible. Yet, SRPC in numerous conversations that I had with them and with other local government officials point to the goat program and the co-operative as reason or justification for why the IPO is not capable of implementing livelihood on their own in the future. Social assessments are important because SRPC and JBIC release funding based on the status of previous livelihood programs. In a communication between an SRPC executive and the field worker, for SRPC to justify changes to an original agreement that the IPO/Bantic had with SRPC to receive ginger, developed in 2009, the executive refers to sections of the SPREAD report where dole outs are mentioned:
On the ginger production, yes definitely it should not be a dole-out. I'll work on the possible repayment scheme after the preparation of the Borrower's Annual Report, but definitely payment should not be made after harvest. Based on PCDFI experience, wherein payment is to be made after harvest, repayment rate is very low. PAP's usually blame poor production (due to weather conditions or poor soil quality) for non payment. (Email communication between SRPC management and SRPC site worker, I received this copy and paste by SRPC site worker from her email, February 20th, 2010)

There are a lot of problems with the logic of the ginger livelihood scheme that SRPC had planned to implement to the Bantic members prior to JBIC's arrival in March 2010. I observed that SRPC Corporate Social Responsibility Department only started to work on Bantic’s ginger scheme with any seriousness a few weeks before JBIC's human and environmental mission. SRPC neglects the fact that the people are without capital to begin with and would not have the capital to repay back any loan prior to harvest. The poor weather conditions and poor soil quality to justify the reasons for being unable to pay back a previous loan (in the Camaangan resettlement) seems reasonable, if SRPC has conducted no feasibility study to prove otherwise. The environmental conditions in Bantic for an agricultural group loan has higher chances for failure when compared to the agricultural group loan in another resettlement community, being referred to in the above. Bantic does not have suitable irrigative facilities and as we tested, the soil was high in acidity (which points to the poor quality in the soil). If Bantic accepts the loan and fails they will be pushed further into debt as a community to SRPC, and, the Postal Bank as they already are with the PCDFI's failed livelihood co-operative scheme.

The existence of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment compliance standards implies that the imbalance of power between the project-proponents and the
dam-affected will be a central issue in the SIA research design, data collection and analysis. It is a requirement for SRPC to consider social and cultural issues (WB OP 4.12, IPRA, 1997). Part of the solution towards failed livelihood in Daynet and Bantic from the perspective of IPO officers is to strengthen the administrative capacity of the IPO. These issues are meaningful to the dam affected. An SIA should not only focus on collecting demographic information on the dam-affected peoples. The goal for the dam-proponents and the dam-affected is to create a mechanism to increase a sense of independence for the dam-affected from dam funding.

Current debates in the SIA literature stress the importance of making the distinction between a social process and a social impact (Vanclay 1999, Vanclay 2002, Slootweg et al 2003, Van Schooten et al 2003). An overwhelming amount of SIA reports are limited to their collection of data pertaining to social impacts (i.e. ICGPSIA 1994, Taylor et al 1995); the field has until recently confounded process and impact. A social impact is best understood from the perspective of those affected by a project, by those whose lives are changed as a result of a project (for example, see Farmer 2006, Samson 2003, Fernandes 2000, Downing 1996). In contrast, a social process is related to processes that are "set in motion by project activities or policies" (Vanclay 2002:192). Involuntary resettlement will come with intended and unintended consequences that will create social impacts of a positive and negative nature.

What can we do to measure the social impacts and the social processes? SIA specialists (Slootweg et al 2003, Van Schooten et al 2003, Vanclay 2002, Vanclay 1999)
suggest conducting a scoping survey to capture the development-affected peoples perceived feelings. Dealing with resettlement for a group of people with largely land-based economies and being able to find a substantial replacement livelihood to the one(s) they lost due to the project is only part of the issue. Projects like the San Roque dam also disturb existing patterns of relationships and agreements. The SIA literature has not emphasized enough issues of cultural pluralism and how it influences the work we do to mitigate negative consequences. Vanclay (2000), for example, emphasizes that it is important to capture project-affected member's meanings but does not emphasize as other SIA academics have done, that there are also issues pertaining to insider/outsider realities (Tilt et al 2008). There are unique cultural and social differences between the project-funded research team, the project-proponents and the project-affected people. What is important and meaningful in one culture might not be so important in another (Sen 1999). Culture as a concept should also be understood as in a constant state of flux, forever synthesizing into something new, dependent on its historical context and environmental and socio-economic influences (Ahearn 2004). This aptly describes the challenge of understanding the social impacts of a project like the San Roque dam.

The final SPREAD research team uses a Sustainable Livelihood Impact Assessment (SLIA). This is an approach derived from Ashley Hussein's (2000) study of the experience of the African Wildlife Foundation in East Africa. Notably, there are similarities between an SLIA and an SIA. Namely, SLIA and SIA researchers would agree not to enter the field with a pre-conceived set of variables to understand the social reality of any said development. "The overall framework used to structure data collection
and analysis comes from outside, although indicators of impact are developed ‘internally’” (Ashley & Hussein 2000:16). In a similar vein, SIA specialists would agree that while a conceptual framework is necessary to have prior to entering the field, indicators of impact should be developed in conjunction with the development affected in a "scoping survey" (Vanclay 2002: 183-184). That is, both SLIA and SIA researchers emphasize participatory research approaches to ensure that the social impacts that are being developed by outsiders (researchers) are relevant and meaningful for the development affected. SIA specialists caution us against establishing a list of social impacts otherwise "a checklist would mean that charlatan consultants - those with little training in the social sciences... - may use the checklist instead of undertaking a proper scoping process" (Vanclay 2002: 184) - process in practice, being key towards developing a social impact assessment. The context of events and the process in practice is what should be emphasized in any final report in a social impact assessment. A brief description of what, who, when and why? This information will give all stakeholders and concerned parties a fuller picture of why the implementation of livelihood programs may be failing to date - where is all of the money going? Equally important, asking for a brief description helps us understand where we are along Scudder's behavioural four stage model: is the IPO ready to take over and incorporate these programs themselves in the near and far future? If not, why not?

The problem with current definitions of what is a participatory approach is that it is still unclear in the literature about what it means in practice. For the SLIA and SIA specialist it is a way of gathering data. In practice, if we use SPREAD as the example we
see that they were technically being participatory by holding focus group discussions and key informant interviews with the project-affected. Yet arguably, not participatory because their focus group discussions and key informant interviews relied on the dam-proponents to hand pick the dam-affected peoples who would participate in the study. As Koenig stresses, do not forget about the internal diversities and the politics; to increase rigour in our research we need to snowball sample from the initial sample and include participant observations to capture political processes and dynamics. The research approach should be to follow through with the intention of carrying out a grounded theory method like approach: member check, make comparisons, and develop action plans in collaboration with the respondents; keeping in mind cultural and social difference concerning the project-affected peoples most especially.

SPREAD did not conduct a scoping survey but they did hold two inception meetings, the first being with the dam-proponents and the second with the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. Participant observations were not taken during the inception meetings between proponents and affected. It was not the explicit intention of SPREAD to understand the quality of the relationships with power as a central concern between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. The interactions between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected were not highlighted in SPREAD's final report.

In the SIA and SLIA literature it has been made explicit that the SIA study make a strident effort to capture the project-affected peoples' perspective about the project in question. This is important not only to understand more fully the social impacts but as well in principle it should provide ways for practitioners to make recommendations to the
dam-proponents and the dam-affected on how to solve any problems they are having within project operations. However because many of these social impact assessments are not usually made public knowledge it has been difficult to assess what works and what does not work towards accomplishing this. If made public there might be some effort for the researchers to account for the insider/outsider realities that are inherent in this kind of research dynamic. The results of what they collect might be written acknowledging that others apart from the people who are paying them to conduct the study has access to these reports as well.

SPREAD conducted ten different focus group discussions with each resettlement community and two focus groups with members of the people’s organization funded by SRPC to implement livelihood. The objective of these focus groups was to capture more specifically from the dam-affected peoples' perspective: 1) why they participated in livelihood programs to date, 2) the assistance they received to sustain the project, 3) the status and or problems that have occurred to date, 4) any benefits that were derived from said project, and 5) any recommendations for its improvement. Key informant interviews took the form of a household survey not specifically designed for each resettlement community. Other information was collected from a secondary analysis of previous social assessments. Additionally, information about the dam-affected were drawn from key focus interviews with dam-proponents, local government units and other affiliated community associations involved in the implementing livelihood to date. SPREAD did present case studies focused on each livelihood program in the final report.

In the final report SPREAD did point out: 1) a high level of dependency on the dam-proponents, 2) the project-affected people lacked problem solving skills, and 3) they
project-affected people lacked co-operation and unity. My analysis of SPREAD's final report highlighted high levels of ethnocentric behaviour and high levels of cultural pluralism. If we view these concepts as the dam-proponents and the researchers they hire not being sensitive to existing cultural differences and member's perceptions. For instance take SPREAD's conceptualization of the dam-affected people's high level of dependency on project funding:

Dependency is very strong undertone in the kinds of responses that came out during the FGD's. For instance, in the case of the vegetable project [not in Daynet or Bantic], the use of the word "allowance" alone portrays that of a child asking for pocket money from the parents. The allowance is in fact a loan that they are supposed to pay back from a fraction of whatever sales they would realize from the project. But as what happened, not much repayments were done, which in effect the so-called "allowance" a dole-out. (vol. 1 2008:27)

We are given the impression that the dam-affected are like children asking endlessly for things that they need in their communities. The SPREAD team through statements like this minimizes SRPC's and NPC's obligation to provide them with these needs as stipulated in previous agreements since 2004 (SRPC MOA-IPDP 2004:3). SPREAD does not question the practicality of giving loans to people who primarily have never had to rely on wage labour to survive prior to their displacement lacking external support and administrative funding.

Through participant observation I discovered that no one was taking responsibility for the failure of livelihood programs and no one with decision-making power fully understood why these failures persisted. A review of previous agreements would have shed some light on why the dam affected is still relying on SRPC to provide them with the things that they need. Agreements made by SRPC with the IPO since 2003/2004 is left still not met. Basic infrastructure like irrigative facilities and or a reliable potable
water system in the resettlement communities were still undergoing problems and in one community's case (in 2010) had not been implemented yet. Nor, were ancestral land title agreements fully negotiated. Since 2006, compensation entitlements for structures torn down by National Power Corporation have not been fully for paid by the National Power Corporation.

SPREAD failed to make the connection between lacking basic infrastructure in the resettlement communities, the communities’ relative proximity to the dam and market places (in their community mapping section in the final report), and or, the results from the household survey that they conducted. If they had made these connections between their preliminary conclusions (high levels of dependency) and the data they collected (focus group discussions, community mapping, and livelihood surveys) using their SLIA methodology as a framework they would have gleaned that there are other factors to consider.

The dam-affected people's participation in SPREAD's social assessment took the form of SPREAD asking questions about livelihood project identification and beneficiary selection and the outcome of the focus group discussions are summarized as a checklist which appear to be more for compliance purposes than anything else. For instance, we are told that: "PAFs themselves identified and selected this livelihood project in a community consultation meeting called for by PCDFI in March 2007". However the report gives us no sense of the context of these consultations. From my observations consultations took the form of dam-proponents telling the dam-affected their plans for livelihood for them and what they needed from them to sign off on it. Can we be
confident that it was not a dam-proponent who provided this information in the focus
group discussion - if we know that they were present during them?

What have I learned to develop a social impact assessment (or as I originally
intended to)? An alternative method that we could use to help the researcher explain for
the high levels of dependency is by gathering data from the perspective of the dam-
affected without the dam-proponents present, that which to my knowledge SPREAD did
not do. At the time of my arrival to the field site, from the perspective of the dam-
affected they have no other course of action but to follow what SRPC currently dictates to
them (lacking political freedoms). In naturally occurring conversations, numerous IPO
officers shared their exasperation over what else they needed to do in order to please
SRPC so they could get the money they were promised verbally.

Livelihood (a social process) was a major topic of concern from the start of my
data collection process for the Indigenous Peoples Organization (IPO). Since the
communities have been resettled, they have yet to receive a livelihood program to date
that has worked. Frequently, there were numerous IPO officers who shared with me their
feelings of hopelessness about trusting SRPC to fulfil their promises. They viewed their
verbal agreements as an obligation because they trusted SRPC. From my observations,
the ways in which SRPC has manipulated these realities, purposefully or not, has
ultimately delayed any hope for the effective implementation of livelihood reconstruction
in Daynet and Bantic.

These negative social processes (the status quo towards implementing livelihood
showing high levels of cultural pluralism) were from my observation, manifesting into
social impacts that took the form of perceived feelings of mistrust, hostility, broken
promises, and disunity between the dam-affected communities and the IPO and between
them and the dam-proponents. It will be impossible to resolve all of the problems
involved in implementing livelihood in the San Roque dam case. It is important for the
SIA specialist to be aware of previous agreements (informally and formally) made
between the dam-proponents and the dam-affected. It will help the SIA specialist get a
sense of the dam-affected levels of empowerment and historically what it has meant for
them.

The final SPREAD social assessment report emphasizes how the dam-affected
needs to take responsibility for their actions and they do make recommendations towards
this end. I agree that accountability on the part of the dam-affected communities’ needs
to be taken into consideration. However, emphasis should have been made on aspects of
the dam-affected people's life that would have made their efforts to negotiate and make
meetings with the dam proponents difficult. Especially in the Bantic resettlement where
there are no reasonable access to markets, a stable source of water, and no agricultural
potential (chapter two and chapter three explores how peoples' lack of political freedoms
limited their access to livelihood in varying degrees). The final SPREAD report treated
each resettlement community as having similar circumstances. It was a mistake because
each resettlement community has its own distinct forms of socio-cultural and economic
development and proximity to the dam site and market places (please see Appendix 1 for
map of resettlements in proximity to the dam site).

As a way to help the SIA specialist capture local historical contexts it might be
useful for them to create a time line as a major talking point regarding when and how
resettlement took place from the time they were officially displaced. Following the lists
of agreements (previously made between all stakeholders at the time of their
displacement) and weighed against peoples current perceived levels of power and or
freedom to negotiate for themselves and their communities will lead us to ways of
understanding more fully the social processes and social impacts occurring in each
community. From there, the SIA specialist can together with the dam-proponents reflect
on the information that came up with the dam-affected and an action plan to resolve these
issues can then be developed.

One is given the impression throughout the final SPREAD report that the dam-
affected are incapable to govern communities and modes of development because of their
lack of education, the disunity between members in each community, and their
dependency on SRPC. When I compare SPREAD's report with my own findings, my
respondents shared with me that they were not consulted about the kinds of programs that
they would like in their communities. It was frequently expressed that when they would
have suggestions on what kinds of programs that they think would work, dam-proponents
would either belittle them about their ideas or ignore their suggestions altogether. It is
not just a matter of the dam-affected not being educated enough or capable enough to
work together due to internal hostilities for livelihood programs to work sustainably.
Even if, the IPO officers were highly educated or had a reasonable level of unity and co-
operation within each resettlement, livelihood reconstruction problems would still exist
because of the project-proponents’ status quo of operations. It is not so much the that the
project-affected need to change but the project-proponents themselves and their attitudes
with what providing due compensation entitlements and livelihood reconstruction means
in the context of involuntary resettlement.
The IPO needs to be informed as part of their capacity building that before any livelihood program takes place what kinds of protocols to expect to be held by the livelihood-implementing agency. This should be part of the negotiations and part of the logical framework plan from the start - outlining people’s roles and responsibilities to implement livelihood. To date, the IPO were unclear as to the way things actually worked leaving them dependent on SRPC to make any decisions about the livelihood programming. The question then becomes does SRPC know what they’re doing to ensure a smooth *handing over and incorporation*? I have major doubts. In principle, there were an army of agencies and stakeholders appointed to assist the IPO with applications for funding for their ancestral land title, livelihood reconstruction and compensation entitlements. Eight years later, the IPO are still struggling to negotiate these fundamental items negotiated upon their initial displacement.
In Conclusion:

Transnational Solutions?

A social impact assessment is a monitoring mechanism for project-proponents and project lenders to determine if a project implemented successfully or not, social safeguards meant to mitigate the negative impacts of involuntary resettlement for Indigenous peoples, and or, vulnerable populations (WB & IFC PS5 2006, WB OP 4.12 2004). What assumptions about people's roles and obligations from all stakeholders were being shared with me to give reason or justification as to why livelihood programs have failed? How do we evaluate why disunity is present in the context of involuntary resettlement monitoring (see Appendix 6 for sample research tool)? A capability approach as espoused by Nussbaum (2000) reminds us that resettlement action planning is about acknowledging the basic tenets of human fellowship. High levels of social support, unity, and cooperation anywhere can buttress the negative impacts of natural disaster, real and perceived poverty and injustice, and or any difficult life changes. How were my project-affected respondents coping? My project-affected participants were not
convinced that they should take full blame for the failure of livelihood programming to date. It is obvious to these participants that changes must be made towards how projects like the goat and cooperative livelihood programs were managed, implemented, and monitored.

The San Roque Power Corporation and National Power Corporation are fiscally responsible and legally obligated to ensure the genuine implementation of livelihood reconstruction programs, finalizing due monetary compensation entitlements, and, assistance with negotiating ancestral land title. The people are in this position to begin with as a result of the dam’s construction. The social impact assessment has been established as a research tool and monitoring mechanism to assess whether or not SRPC and NPC is living up to its fiscal and legal obligations. When JBIC’s build operation and transfer loan to SRPC and NPC ceases in 2013 is not reason enough for SRPC and NPC to feel that a social impact assessment is no longer required. By SRPC saying so implies that they had no intention of genuinely implementing livelihood reconstruction and compensation entitlements from the beginning.

When costly construction delays are no longer a major concern of lenders and borrowers how can we continue to put pressure on the borrower to continue to genuinely implement institutionalized social safeguard mechanisms? Transnational anti-dam advocates are responsible for large international financing institutions to incorporate social and environmental principles as a way to avoid bad press and costly construction delays. After these extremely politically contentious issues raise the statuses of their
organizations in the economy of transnational advocacy work, is it right that they leave during the most critical component of the dam-affected peoples development with their newly formed co-existence with the dam? Transnational advocacy organizations’ absence post-construction implies that for the project-affected to accept resettlement compensation entitlements, these communities are getting what they deserve. Why did Friends of Earth, Japan with ties to the International Rivers Network essentially drop technical, moral and economic support to the project-affected after the dam was completed?

The issue of responsibility and obligation came up often from SRPC’s vice president when we discussed the problems occurring in Bantic and Daynet. I question if there should be post-construction guidelines as well for transnational advocacy organizations doing much of the leg work to get these dam-affected concerns into the internal fora to begin with? Pressures from transnationally aligned anti-dam advocates were nearly non-existent after the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan was developed in 2003. Where did the transnational anti-dam advocacy support go and why?

As part of civil society, transnational advocates can spring up anywhere and with the right funding and technical support are the most skilled to ensure that current and institutionalized social safeguard mechanisms in cases of involuntary resettlement. The nuts and bolts of a resettlement action plan exist but lacking a politically driven incentive to implement social safeguard mechanisms the situations of those forcibly displaced will only get worse, not better. The distribution of power is central in cases of development-induced involuntary resettlement. University and transnational advocacy collaboration is
a good place to start thinking about how to sustain any political pressure on corporations and governments. It makes sense that transnational advocacy organizations be considered a stakeholder from the start of a Bank lender’s resettlement action planning.

**Limitations**

- not fluent in local language(s)
- new to the research site in Bantic, while some knew me from previous years, I didn't know a lot of the seasonal resource users (in and in the surrounding areas) who didn't usually attend project-related activities. It took time to find most of my respondents spread out over the Itogon territory (Phengbasan, Oling, Dalupirip proper, Tabu, and Philex Mines), and, a lot of energy through positive social action for me to earn peoples' trust.

-by April/May I was experiencing burnout because from the first day of my arrival I had been "in the field" ready and willing to conduct research. I was in high demand everywhere I went by the IPO, Bantic and surrounding area community members, local citizen activists, non-profit health organizations, and local government officials.

- troubles with having a constant source of electricity - most of my notes were hand written. In the latter half of my research with the continual travel to interview I was restricted to writing memos sometimes a couple of weeks after the interview and the observations were recorded.

- had to rely on research assistants and a translator to produce transcripts from Ibaloi, Ilocano, Tagalog into a document in English.
- a significant portion of what has been recorded is not translated and transcribed yet, although I do have field notes and written observations reflecting on these events.
Works Cited


2008. *Assessment Study of the Comprehensive Livelihood and Rehabilitation Program of the San Roque Power Corporation volume three*. SRPC.


Appendix 1  Map of Resettlement Communities in Proximity to Dam
Appendix 2  1st Set of Interview Guide Questions for Daynet and Bantic

1. What immediately comes to mind when you think of the Sebbang Ni Pansegshan (IPO)?

2. What positive experiences have you encountered in the IPO?

3. What negative experiences have you encountered in the IPO?

4. What immediately comes to mind when you think about the San Roque Dam?

5. What comes to mind positively when you think about the San Roque Dam?

6. What comes to mind negatively when you think about the San Roque Dam?

7. If you could ask or tell the San Roque Dam Proponents (either from SRPC or NPC) anything, what would it be?

8. On average how much do you spend each month on your family’s living expenses? And what are they?

9. Is your family in any financial debt?

10. How have you been coping to make ends meet since you have been resettled?

11. What immediately comes to mind when you think about your well being?

12. Have been there times when you and your family have had to go without food?

13. If yes, how often does this happen and when? Can you describe what is happening in your life at the time?

14. How have you been feeling emotionally since you have been resettled? Please describe.

15. Do you have a friend or someone close to you that you trust that you can go to for support when you need someone to talk to?

16. What makes you most happy? Please explain.

17. What makes you worry the most? Please explain.


19. How have you been feeling physically since you have been resettled? Please describe.
20. Do you have a chronic illness or physical disability?
21. Does anything cause you constant pain or discomfort?
22. Is there anyone in your family with a chronic illness or physical or mental disability?
23. Does anyone in your family at home experience constant pain or discomfort?
24. Is there anything that you would like to ask me?
Appendix 3  2nd Interview Guide: Conceptual Category Questions

What is your full name?

What is your status? What is your age?

In your opinion what is the actual difference between an SRU and a Relocatee?

When I first arrived to Bantic, I heard many people say the reason that they accepted the micro finance program was because it is important to appear co-operative with Sir Tom from SRPC? What do you think people mean by this?

Future livelihood from SRPC is going to be a soft loan. What are some positive and negative things that come to your mind immediately when you think about this?

What do you think people mean when they say that “Tom's promises are like ice cream, they are sweet, but they melt fast”?

I have heard people say that even if they tell SRPC or NPC their problems, no one listens or takes them seriously, because they are not educated. In your opinion, what do you think people mean by this statement?

Have you ever shared your problems with SRPC or NPC and felt that your problems were not listened to or taken seriously?

What have you learned about SRPC or yourself during my stay here that you didn't know about or think about before?

I have heard people say that they wished I were here at the beginning of the project. In your opinion, what do people mean by this statement?

When you think about the future what concerns you the most?
Appendix 4 Reference Letter from SRPC to Pepita Smith (Elena McKee)

San Roque Power Corporation

Tommy T. Valdez
Head, Office of Corporate Social Responsibility

REFERENCE LETTER NO.: 0210/SRI/O-3966

26 April 2007

Subject: Reference Letter for Ms. Pepita Smith

To Whom It May Concern,

My name is Tommy T. Valdez, Head of the Office of Corporate Social Responsibility, San Roque Power Corporation. Our company operates the San Roque Multipurpose Project (SRMP), a flagship project of the Philippine Government that complies with International Standards and Practices. AMEC, a consulting firm for the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation that regularly monitors SRMP’s compliance to social and environmental concerns recommended Ms. Pepita Smith to conduct a Participatory Action Research study of the SRMP from February 29, 2007 to April 15, 2007.

I was impressed by Ms. Smith’s previous research and work experiences and her motivations in life. She spent many hours in our office familiarizing herself with our policies, programs and other stakeholders involved in the SRMP. She networked with other communities, local government officials and non-government organizations in an effort to better assist the Indigenous Peoples affected by SRMP. By living with the community, she was able to provide the technical support they needed for the development of a Comprehensive Livelihood Plan for the betterment of their lives in the face of their co-existence with our project.

Ms. Smith is efficient and extremely competent. Her communication skills, both written and verbal are excellent. SRPC welcomes her return so she can continue her research of the project-affected communities and World Bank Guidelines on Involuntary Resettlement.

If you have any further questions, you can reach me at tomv@mozcom.com.

Sincerely,

Tommy T. Valdez
Head, Office of Corporate Social Responsibility
Appendix 5  Conceptual Memo and Coding Scheme

The perceived nature of livelihood programs for the Bantic peoples

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<td>-no feasibility study</td>
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<td>-contradicts with the official version of the program</td>
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<tr>
<td>-program difficult and non-sensical</td>
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<td>-felt pressured</td>
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<td>-broken promise</td>
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<td>-short term memory</td>
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<td>-new conditions don't reflect previous agreement that was made verbally</td>
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<td>-program doesn't benefit everyone as according to official claims</td>
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- The micro-finance, established in April 2009, is an unusual relationship developed between SRPC and the Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) to begin with. Usually CARD chooses an area based on strategic research. CARD base the area they will pursue to recruit members on three criterion: 1) at least 1000 people living in the area 2) good source of water 3) and easily accessible to roads and markets. All of these things Bantic and Daynet don't have. Out of 17 CARD members I was able to interview 11 in total. Currently the micro finance members [made up of relocattees and seasonal resource users in and around Bantic] are paying their weekly repayments not from their loans for CARD projects but from taking loans elsewhere or from other sources of livelihood that they have been participating in to make ends meet (not associated with SRPC). A member of the program who has been able to repay the weekly repayments from their actual CARD project (and there are two of the eleven) that I interviewed explained that the Bantic micro finance program wasn't a worthwhile profit at 15 % interest and 900 pesos saved in six months, in addition to them having to climb twice a day up and down Tinidi mountain. Frequently I heard complaints that they were pressured by Tom who said if they don't they wouldn't receive other livelihood in the future.

- In April 2009, when JBIC came to visit the year before, a ginger program was developed between Bantic, SRPC, and the IPO. In August 2009, it was suddenly taken off the table (even after people assumed it was still ongoing and went ahead and started clearing lots and such) when the SRPC-CARD micro finance was introduced. At a meeting that people had to travel down the mountain to, fully expecting money to buy their ginger rhizomes so they could start planting; in it Tom said that if they wanted the ginger program they had to take this micro finance program first. During my data collection process, SRPC had offered the ginger program but with conditions that were not discussed or negotiated at all with the IPO or Bantic members clearly. What is different from the first proposal is: 1) it is a soft loan that they must start repaying before harvest 2) they must have an attendance rate in the micro finance program of at least 80% (which is impossible sometimes to make because they need to attend to other livelihood to make ends meet) 3) they have no control over buying the ginger rhizomes they must take them from SRPC even though they have good buyers in the local area at a cheaper cost to where SRPC plans to get them.

- What is worse with the new ginger contract only three people are actually eligible to receive the ginger program out of 17 people who could potentially be eligible under these new conditions. Still, it ignores hundreds of other people who are technically eligible to receive livelihood benefits just as much as a CARD member. The CARD program is not mandatory for the dam affected peoples to join but, the benefits gained from SRPC by being a member are far greater than those who don’t agree to CARD’s conditions. Closer to the end of my work term we learned that all future livelihood from SRPC will require people to be a micro finance member too as one of SRPC’s conditions. People questioned where they will find the money to repay back the loans if there are no markets for them close to home and no farm to
market road to get there. The people who are SRPC-CARD members are not only going deeper into debt from participating in the program a majority of them are saving practically nothing and making no profit. The only peoples who are benefiting from this program is CARD from the profits it makes from their interest rates and SRPC for administering it.

In February, after learning about the ginger program’s new contract obligations, the IPO decided to request the provincial agricultural technician to come to Bantic and assess whether they could even grow ginger there or not. Plus, with the lack of water in the area they didn’t think much of anything will grow in Bantic. The point is, SRPC did no strategic analysis on whether they could do it or not and are forcing people instead to go further into debt on a risky project that likely won’t work. I tried to work with Sir Tom on this and made several attempts to get him to negotiate these items. But as I have digitally recorded he wanted to get the ginger implemented before the Japanese Bank for International Co-operation made their annual visit.

The Bantic people’s issues are time sensitive. The IPO’s repeated request for a stable livelihood is creating tension between Bantic and the IPO. Aside from the IPO being not taken seriously by dam proponents, the IPO and their ability to govern the Bantic and Daynet communities is entirely dependent on SRPC to provide the funding, the tools and resources needed to effectively administer livelihood programs. Frequently, non IPO officers mentioned in interviews with me how the IPO never gets anything done. Generally, people aren’t aware of what their own indigenous peoples organization has to go through and put up with to get anything done. In focus group discussions, my assumption to blame everything on SRPC for the failure of livelihood programming to date was challenged by my non-IPO respondents to say that no they rely on the IPO to make these decisions for them. They encouraged me to look more closely at the IPO and in return I attempted to share with them my observations of the current administration.

For IPO officers (and Daynet and Bantic community members in general), time not only equals money but their efforts to participate in meetings with dam proponents (for which there are many) means time away from participating in essential subsistence activities. Frequently I heard complaints about the fact that there are so many meetings but with no action on any of the points discussed. In one particular focused group discussion we held on March 23rd, we realized as a group that in the past that nothing meaningful to them that was discussed with dam proponents was in writing. We had no documented proof that any agreements they made were real. It was the Bantic peoples’ word against SRPC’s.

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<th>take for priority reasons</th>
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<tr>
<td>- IPO took charge</td>
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<td>- feasibility study needed</td>
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<td>- attempted to compare observations with SRPC</td>
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<tr>
<td>- what the IPO can do is restricted to what SRPC will give them</td>
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<td>- no autonomy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- non-IPO officers unaware of IPO circumstances</td>
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<td>- IPO familial strains</td>
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<td>- organizational strains</td>
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<td>- no documented proof of previous verbal agreements</td>
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Appendix 6  Sample Research Tool
Nature of Relationship

Internal Diversities

Acknowledge Insider/ Outsider Realities

Monitoring Team  Project-Proponents

Project-Affected

Project-Proponents  Project-Affected
Appendix 7  Map of Gold Panning Areas

MAP OF GOLD PANNING AREAS
(PANGASINAN AND ITOGON)

LEGEND:
★ GOLD PANNING AREAS FREQUENTED
   BY SRUS IN 1999 AND 2001
▲ GOLD PANNING AREAS FREQUENTED
   BY SRUS IN 1999
✦ SITIO PROPER

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