HUMAN SECURITY AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
THE NEW FACE OF CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM

by

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B.A. (Hons.), University of Western Ontario, 2006

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ABSTRACT

In the late 1990s, human security was promoted as a new idea to guide the formation of Canadian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. However, a review of the ideas which have influenced foreign policymaking in Canada since the end of the Second World War demonstrates that human security is rooted in internationalism, the dominant Canadian foreign policy tendency. Internationalism prescribes that cooperation, multilateralism, responsibility, international law and a consideration of the values of humanity are the best means to attain a more peaceful world. An examination of Canada’s human security agenda reveals continuity between the approach advocated by internationalism and that of the human security agenda. The events of 9/11 and the election of the Conservative Party in 2006 brought into question whether human security would retain its influence on Canadian foreign policy. This project demonstrates that while the language of human security has largely disappeared from official usage in recent years, internationalism has again proven its enduring quality with the institutionalization of the values of human security in Canada’s foreign policymaking process.

Keywords: Human security; Canadian foreign policy; policy tendencies.
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GLOSSARY

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<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Defence, Diplomacy, Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>September 11, 2001</td>
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<td>AAP</td>
<td>G8 Africa Action Plan</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CANADEM</td>
<td>Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CLF</td>
<td>Canadian Landmine Fund</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Global Peace and Security Fund</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<td>HSN</td>
<td>Human Security Network</td>
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<td>HSP</td>
<td>Human Security Program</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>International Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-2</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Two</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>KPRT</td>
<td>Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landmines Treaty</td>
<td>Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction</td>
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<td>LMG</td>
<td>Like-Minded Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIF</td>
<td>Multinational Interim Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>“Optional Protocol”</td>
<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict</td>
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<td>PBF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBP</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Progressive Conservative Party of Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SCSL</td>
<td>Special Court for Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>United Nations Standby High Readiness Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSEA</td>
<td>Secretary of State for External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>for East Timor</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
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1: INTRODUCTION: NEW IDEAS ABOUT SECURITY

With the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War twenty years ago, the world was thrust into a new reality which required definition. Statesman, academics, journalists, and bureaucrats of various national and international organizations sought to provide the definitive explanation of a world no longer ideologically divided. Expectations of a “new world order” and the emergence of a “peace dividend” were overly premature, exhibiting an idealism that Western leaders are only too capable of mustering following the end of a major conflict. Alternatively, others such as Samuel Huntington and Robert Kaplan provided a more pessimistic prognosis for the post-Cold War world as they asserted that sources of conflict (ethnic, cultural, environmental, demographic, economic, etc.) that had been suppressed during the Cold War, were free to simmer and eventually boil over. Repeated attempts to define the nature of the new international order demonstrated that some of the ideas that informed the Cold War order failed to accurately represent the reality of the new era. As the primary threat to international peace and security – the exchange of nuclear or conventional weapons between the Western and Soviet alliances – largely disappeared, a new conception of security and the means to achieve it were needed.

In the final years of the Cold War, the state-centric notion of security was challenged by a small group of security studies and international relations scholars who felt that the traditional politico-military conception of security that dominated Cold War security calculations was inadequate. The traditional politico-military conception of security perceives threats to a state as arising almost exclusively from foreign military activity: the waning years of the Cold War demonstrated that “other” threats could also menace international peace and security. Consequently, scholars sought to broaden and widen security to include a myriad of non-military threats (such as demographic pressures, resource depletion, underdevelopment and environmental degradation) and also deepen the conception of security to focus on the individual as the referent object.¹ Alongside the debate in the academic community, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) released the Human Development Report 1994 which asserted that “the peace agenda and the development agenda must finally be integrated. Without

peace, there may be no development. But without development, peace is threatened.\textsuperscript{2} As a consequence of the complex interconnections between security and development, the report advocated a people-centred conception of security, which involves safety from “such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life.”\textsuperscript{3} Put more simply, human security requires “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. Flowing from the reorientation of the security referent, the UNDP report identified seven categories of threats or insecurity: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security.\textsuperscript{4} Further, the report emphasized the interstate nature of such threats, as pollution, epidemics, terrorism and refugee movements fail to recognize or respect state borders. Human security, as defined and explained by the 1994 UNDP report, served to produce the foundation for an important debate in the security studies, international relations, and international development scholarly community, and amongst foreign policy and development practitioners, political leaders and in international institutions like the UN.

The conceptual appeal of human security was immediately seized upon by the Canadian government and incorporated into the first post-Cold War white papers on foreign and defence policy. However, it wasn’t until Lloyd Axworthy took over the foreign affairs portfolio in 1996 that human security became a highly visible priority for Canadian foreign policy. In fact, as a consequence of Axworthy’s emphatic promotion of the human security agenda, the agenda has occasionally (though not uncontroversially) been referred to as the “Axworthy doctrine” in the Canadian foreign policy literature.\textsuperscript{5}

For Axworthy, the state of post-Cold War international relations required a “new foreign policy paradigm” and he was convinced that “protecting individuals should be a major focus of our foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{6} The early pronouncements of Canada’s commitment to human security reflected the broader conception advanced by the UNDP; however, the practical application of human security, as an element of Canadian foreign policy, and


\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 23.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., 24-25. For more information on the nature of the threats to these elements of security, see pages 25-33 for a detailed account.


later explanations were more fully rooted in the “freedom from fear” conception. This version of human security focuses on “protecting people from acts of violence and helping build a greater sense of security in the personal sphere” as “underdevelopment cannot be addressed in the presence of war and its attendant insecurity.” It has been argued that Canada’s eventual focus on “freedom from fear” was not accidental, but that it “was the most relevant to the existing instruments of Canadian foreign policy.”

However, it has also been argued that the narrowing of Canada’s approach to human security reflected the government’s overarching commitment to deficit reduction through massive budget cuts, while eschewing the politically unpalatable option of raising taxes. A policy agenda that sought to address the “freedom from want” component of human security would have required substantial increases in spending on development assistance and an enhanced capacity for targeted poverty reduction programs: instead, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien routinely slashed Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the mid to late 1990s. Further, during the period in which human security was being promoted as a foreign policy priority, the budgets for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND) received extensive cuts, prompting questions about the government’s willingness to match its rhetoric with resources. Thus, the human security agenda that came to be endorsed by the Canadian government in the late 1990s was a product of the overly restrictive fiscal climate, but also reflected the traditional approach of Canadian foreign policy, anchored in Canada’s capabilities as a peacekeeper, consensus-builder, institutional supporter and innovator.

The ideas underpinning Canada’s human security agenda are largely an evolution of the a particularly strong and durable set of ideas regarding the appropriate international role for Canada that emerged as the country asserted itself as an international player following the Second World War (WWII). This enduring set of ideas, referred to as the internationalist tendency, can be seen as a hybrid of the ideas of realism and idealism in international relations: the conflictual, competitive and

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occasionally antagonistic nature of the international system is accepted, while ethical calculations factor into state definitions of national interest and strategies to attain such. Essentially, the internationalist tendency prescribes an active role in supporting international peace and security which is premised on calculations of enlightened self-interest and an ethical imperative of responsibility to help others (people, states) in an increasingly indivisible world. This set of ideas guided Canadian foreign policy through the Cold War and continues to influence Canada’s international character. Further, the internationalist tendency has received strong public support over the decades\textsuperscript{10}, from an electorate that is proud of Canada’s contributions abroad and the distinction from the United States that such contributions afford; consequently, a resolutely realist orientation would be politically unacceptable as an ideational basis for Canadian foreign policy.

1.1 Project Purpose and Structure

The purpose of this project is to highlight the importance and durability of particular ideas in the formation of Canadian foreign policy. It will be shown that the ideas which inform the internationalist tendency have proven incredibly durable and continue to exert influence over policy formation. The underlying ideas of the internationalist tendency and their continuing relevance in spite of considerable changes in the international political system created the conditions in which human security could emerge as a distinct foreign policy agenda. This project will demonstrate through a review of Canadian foreign policy that the emergence of Canada’s human security agenda in the mid-1990s represents the post-Cold War evolution of the internationalist tendency, as the overarching goals of foreign policy have remained largely unchanged while the means to achieve them have evolved to respond to the new international context. The policy prescriptions flowing from a human security approach to international security fit squarely within the overarching internationalist framework for Canadian foreign policy, but provided new ways of looking at threats to international security and new strategies for dealing with such threats. However, even though the human security agenda corresponded with Canada’s traditional approach to foreign policy, other factors like international political will and the domestic political and economic climate also exert influence over ideas and the way in which they are put into practice. Such factors

certainly came into play in the decision to focus solely on freedom from fear and the way in which human security features in the current Conservative government’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite economic downturns, changes in political leadership and shifting priorities in the international community, the internationalist tendency in Canadian foreign policy has endured as the framework for policy for over sixty years and a human security approach to international security now forms a constituent part of that internationalist tendency.

To develop this argument, this project will proceed as follows. The second chapter will begin by exploring the role and influence that ideas exert over policymaking. It will outline three similarly conceptualized ideational frameworks developed to analyze sets of ideas in the foreign policymaking environment, which will be synthesized into the analytical framework for this project. This will be followed by an examination of the enduring ideas – termed policy tendencies – in Canadian foreign policy and will conclude with a brief historical survey of their influence over policy formation since the end of WWII. The purpose of this historical overview is to establish the dominance of the internationalist tendency and outline the policy antecedents of the human security agenda. The third chapter will outline the development of human security in Canada’s foreign policy from concept to policy agenda and will conclude with an examination of and response to some of the more pressing critiques of each. The fourth chapter will explore how human security was translated into policy by providing an overview and analysis of the agenda and its policy initiatives during the Liberal governments’ of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin between 1996 and 2005. The fifth chapter will address the perceived decline of human security under Stephen Harper’s minority Conservative government and will conclude by outlining the policies and decisions which appear to demonstrate the institutionalization of human security in Canada’s approach to foreign policy. Finally, the conclusion will summarize the key findings of this project and will reflect on the future prospects for human security as an element of Canada’s foreign policy.
2: THE ROLE OF IDEAS IN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

Ideas serve to shape the way that the world is viewed, the values to be pursued and the actions that are considered possible or permissible. In a seminal study of the impact of ideas on foreign policy, Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane contend that “ideas help to order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outcomes.”\(^{11}\) They further explain that “actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of ideas” and thus “ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action.”\(^{12}\) Peter A. Hall similarly concluded in a study of the impact of ideas on policy change that “the most important step we can take...is to note that it is not necessary to deny that politics involves a struggle for power and advantage in order to recognize that the movement of ideas plays a role, with some impact of its own, in the process of policymaking.”\(^{13}\) In fact, Hall notes that this struggle in the policymaking process “takes place within the context of a particular set of ideas that recognize some social interests as more legitimate than others and privilege some lines of policy over others.”\(^{14}\) These sets of ideas provide the “basic assumptions and framework within which policy is considered.”\(^{15}\) Thus, identifying and evaluating the sets of ideas that guide the making of Canadian foreign policy contributes to a fuller understanding of such policies, how they have changed over time to reflect new ideas and, potentially, the future direction of foreign policy.

It is important to distinguish the different types of ideas that influence policy and the ways in which they project that influence. In separate studies, Goldstein and Keohane and Vivien A. Schmidt identify three categories of ideas that influence policymaking. The first are world views, identified as the overarching ideas which define “the universe of possibilities for action” and therefore establish the confines of thought and discourse.\(^{16}\) World views provide the “organizing ideas, values and principles of


\(^{12}\) Ibid., 5 and 4 respectively (emphasis in original).

\(^{13}\) Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain”, *Comparative Politics* 25, no.3 (April 1993): 292.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.


\(^{16}\) Goldstein and Keohane, 8.
knowledge and society” on which other types of ideas rest. The second category are principled or normative ideas which “mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions,” providing value or normative judgements about the appropriateness of actions or policy. The third are causal beliefs (or cognitive ideas) which provide the guidelines or maps for political action by defining the problems to be solved and the methods with which to solve them. Goldstein and Keohane explain that the types of ideas are interrelated: “causal beliefs imply the strategies for the attainment of goals, themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within the context of broader world views.” More generally, these ideas influence policy through serving as a ‘road map’ for action, as a focal point for choosing amongst policy alternatives, or through the institutionalization of ideas, where ideas are accepted by institutions and are reflected in their institutional discourse and culture.

It is essential to acknowledge that each of these three means of ideational influence highlight that policy outcomes and policy change are affected by both the emergence of new ideas and changes in the underlying or environmental conditions in which ideas operate. Simeon cautions those employing ideational frameworks that “ideas do not provide complete explanations. They tend to be general and thus to account for broad orientations rather than the specific details of policy.” It is these “broad orientations” of political ideas and the importance they have for shaping policy that will form the final section of this discussion of ideas. The analytical framework to be employed in this study is derived from the ideational approaches to policy analysis outlined by Bruce Doern, Richard Phidd, and Kim Richard Nossal, Robert. Levine, and Franklyn Griffiths. Studying different issue areas in different contexts, each concluded that policymaking processes and the outcomes of those processes reflect widely held

18 Goldstein and Keohane, 9; and Schmidt, 307.
20 Goldstein and Keohane, 10. It should be noted that a more extensive literature exists on the role of ideas in politics than what is presented here. Further, the orderly nature of the classification presented here is only truly possible in the abstract, as the distinctions lack this level of conceptual clarity in reality. Despite these shortcomings, such a classification presents a useful construct for the purpose of examining policy
tendencies in Canadian foreign policy.
21 Goldstein and Keohane, 12-21.
22 Simeon, 573.
ideas. While the specifics of their approaches differ, there is a common emphasis on the relationship between ideas, actors and policy. A very brief overview of each work will be presented, highlighting the ideational concepts utilized and relationships identified by the authors, followed by a synthesis of the approaches into an analytically practical framework for the remainder of this project.

2.1 Three Ideational Frameworks

Doern, Phidd, Nossal and “Dominant Ideas

In outlining the interplay framework for studying public policy, which emphasizes the interconnection between ideas, structure and process, Doern and Phidd argue that “to understand public policy one has to appreciate the enduring existence of several dominant ideas.” They define dominant ideas as those which “embody a particular preference in a given policy field” and include such political values as efficiency, individual liberty, equality, equity and nationalism. Doern and Phidd focus on the policy goals and values (or world views and causal beliefs) and maintain that the influence of dominant ideas is derived from the support of segments of society which ensure that the political values which underpin the dominant ideas endure as perennial elements of the policy debate.

Nossal, finding value in Doern and Phidd’s notion of dominant ideas, applied it to Canadian foreign policy and outlines three important qualifications based on his application. First, he notes the latent quality of dominant ideas, stating that “we cannot easily demonstrate their existence for the simple reason that they are not expressed; and they are infrequently expressed because they are rarely challenged.” Second, dominant ideas must be considered within their appropriate context, which includes political, social and economic structures, both domestic and international. Third, Nossal argues that the dominance of a particular idea is transient, but acknowledges that change tends to be very slow and is influenced by changes in the political, social or economic context. However, shifts can be “stimulated and accelerated by profound upheavals in the human condition: plagues, natural disasters, economic collapse, civil or global wars.” With these three qualifications in consideration, Nossal concludes that

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24 Doern and Phidd, 41.
26 Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 139.
27 Ibid., 143.
dominant ideas “exert a pervasive, yet subtle, influence on the making of policy, serving to define the parameters of acceptable policy options.”

**Levine and “Schools of Thought” in Policy Debates**

Levine contends that “ideas and arguments do play a crucial role [in decision-making], and that analysis of the premises and logic of ideas and arguments can improve understanding” and consequently improve the terms of the debate and, potentially, policy. As analytical constructs, Levine’s use of “argument” is meant to denote a policy view, which he defines as “value judgements about desirable states of the world, analyses of possible states, and recommendations about actions policymakers should take to move towards desirable outcomes within the realm of the possible.” Notably, Levine’s ideational construct goes beyond that of Doern, Phidd, and Nossal to include causal ideas about strategies to attain policy goals, thus embracing the three types of beliefs identified by Goldstein, Keohane and Schmidt. Levine then distinguishes between proponents of particular arguments, referred to as debaters, grouping them into schools of thought based on similarities in their views or prescriptions. In seeking to explain the outcomes of policy and policy change, Levine looks to the schools of thought engaged in a particular policy debate, the issues that divide them, and changes in the conditions of the policy environment that may affect the policy views of the debaters. He asserts that “ideas and debates determine policies” as such are responsible for setting the parameters of acceptable action for policymakers.

**Griffiths and “Policy Tendencies”**

In looking to explain and analyze the nature of policymaking in the Soviet Union, Griffiths developed an analytical framework he termed tendency analysis, which involves the examination of “tendencies of articulation”, defined as enduring communicated expectations about a given policy held in common by political actors. Such are comprised of three elements: a set of values or policy goals; an analysis of the context in which the policy goals are pursued; and recommendations of how the goals should be

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29 Levine, 2. In *Still the Arms Debate*, Levine revisits and renews the discussion began in his 1963 book *The Arms Debate* about the conflicting ideas regarding the arms policies of American national security policy in the post-war period.
30 Ibid., 26.
31 Ibid., 7.
32 Ibid., 1.
The political expectations are communicated as policy tendencies by a significant grouping of politically conscious people. Evidently, Griffiths’ political expectations are similar to Levine’s arguments, and also comprise the three types of ideas identified by Goldstein, Keohane and Schmidt. Griffiths further specifies that for a given issue or policy area, there is likely to be a variety of identifiable tendencies in addition to different levels of participation, both of which are subject to the conditions of and fluctuations within the policy environment. Policy tendencies affect the decision-making process through a “process of selection from a number of future directions or expectations of policy which are ‘more or less’ clearly expressed in conflicting tendencies of articulation.” Conflicting policy tendencies may seek the same political value or policy goal but clash over analyses of the policy environment or the recommended method of achieving the value or goal. Finally, he concludes that the utility of an approach which examines the relationship between policy tendencies articulated by political actors and policy outcomes can be found in the identification of observed regularities or “tried and tested ways of dealing with situations.”

**A Synthesized Ideational Framework**

As the above overview of ideational frameworks has shown, there is strong support for the argument that broad orientations of ideas exert influence on policymaking. These approaches acknowledge the presence of dominant policy tendencies, which outline policy goals and the methods to achieve them. These ideas circulate in the policy environment with varying levels of support which provide policymakers with options. For each of the authors, ideas play an essential role in establishing the boundaries of acceptable policy, but must be considered within the particular political, social and historical context in which they are situated. Identifying the dominant ideas or tendencies that underpin policy provides a conceptual foundation for

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33 Griffiths, 364.
34 Griffiths hypothesizes that the different strata of political actors will vary in the extent to which they express the three elements of their political expectation. He conceives of three levels of political actors: the attentive public; intermediate actors like bureaucrats, academics, members of NGOs; and the political elite. The attentive public most effectively articulates the mass values to be pursued in policy. The intermediate actors, of whom Griffiths was most interested, largely undertake the work of analyzing the policy environment and external policy conditions and provide the recommendations for how best to achieve the desired policy results expected by the public. Griffiths, 356-366.
35 Ibid., 362.
understanding the historical development of policy and, potentially, the future direction of policy.

Given the wide array of ideas regarding the appropriate posture for a particular policy area, it is important to acknowledge how a fully articulated policy tendency becomes dominant. A policy tendency emerges during a period of ideational contestation, where a major event like war or a change in political leadership causes the questioning of past practices and ideas. Consequently, new ideas emerge which approach policy problems in a different way, highlight alternative policy goals and prescribe other strategies for attaining such goals. A new policy tendency is adopted only if it receives the support of key decision-makers who are persuaded by the suitability of the ideas and are willing and able to commit the necessary resources. Additionally, the new policy tendency must be politically viable – meaning that the ideas must have broader political appeal within the electorate – and it must demonstrate some measure of success as guidelines for policy. A policy tendency becomes adopted, thus, because it is seen as administratively and politically suitable to the needs of the policy environment, the political culture of society and the interests of the political actors. A policy tendency becomes dominant when it becomes institutionalized and is reflected in the structures, practices and behaviours of the policy environment.

Once institutionalized, dominant policy tendencies exhibit, to some degree, the characteristics of path dependence, which contributes to the continuing dominance of a policy tendency. Path dependence, a construct of the historical institutionalist approach, “refers to the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system.” These self-reinforcing processes, the product of positive feedback, make institutions – or in this case ideas – and their resultant policies difficult to change once a specific course is undertaken. Path dependent processes operate in a similar manner as dominant policy tendencies in that they establish the parameters of acceptable policy, limiting the options available to policymakers. A study of the politics of path dependence argues that such an approach has helped to focus attention on “the political and institutional underpinnings of dominant and long-lived political projects such as the welfare state, Keynesianism” and, in the Canadian foreign policy context,

38 Ibid.
The dominance and prolonged existence of such ideas represents “the institutionalization of a set of persuasive ideas about social and political reality that have been successful in describing reality over long periods of time, as well as prescribing means of ‘solving’ problems within that reality.”\(^{41}\) It is the influence, dominance, and institutionalization of Canada’s dominant foreign policy tendency – internationalism – that serves as the lens through which Canada’s human security agenda will be judged in terms of whether it represents a departure or evolution. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the broad ideas regarding the formation of Canadian foreign policy and will provide an overview of their presence in the history of Canadian foreign policy since WWII.\(^{42}\)

### 2.2 The Policy Tendencies of Post-War Canadian Foreign Policy

The ideas which motivate Canadian foreign policymaking have been the subject of a number of academic studies which attempt to define, categorize and locate these ideas and their resultant policies in Canada’s history. One of the most notable attempts to categorize the broad ideas about foreign policy was put forth by James Eayrs at the Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lectures in 1965 where he outlined a five category typology of foreign policy tendencies: brutal and sceptical realists; liberal and sanctimonious idealists; and finally, the middle ground, practical idealists.\(^{43}\) The brutal realist endorses an extreme line of *realpolitik* and strict adherence to state interests, thus denying morality any place in politics. The sanctimonious idealist, on the other hand, asserts a strong conception of ethics in foreign policy and preaches the moral superiority of their position. Brutal realists and sanctimonious idealists represent the extremes and are marked by an uncompromising commitment to their respective visions. The sceptical realist is incredulous about the utility of moral judgements in foreign policy making. The liberal idealist, on the other hand, is “hopeful” and “optimistic” with a positive view of mankind and its ability to be improved. Finally, practical idealists represent the middle


\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) It should be noted that the description of specific policy tendencies is necessarily imprecise and the borders between them are blurred and dynamic. Further, the historical overview of Canadian foreign policy focuses on policies which support the existence of a dominant policy tendency, and thus is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of foreign policy over the time period surveyed.

ground where idealism is tempered by realism. \(^{44}\) Practical idealists understand that international politics is inherently conflictual but seeks to mitigate this through the creation of a rules-based system, arrived at through negotiation, diplomacy, and the development of norms and international law. \(^{45}\)

The assumption that Canadian foreign policy exists on a continuum between realism and idealism is not limited to Eayrs. Allan Gotlieb\(^ {46}\) argues critically that Canada’s approach exhibits a bipolar quality, as it swings between realist and idealist orientations. He observes that, through the decades, “realism and romanticism, or realpolitik and the missionary spirit, have done battle to occupy centre stage in our foreign policy.”\(^ {47}\) The realist tendency emphasizes the protection and promotion of the national interest, which involves sovereignty, security, territory, economic growth and prosperity. Alternatively, Gotlieb notes that the idealist tendency “is based on a mission to create a more just world, promote democracy, reduce inequities among nations, protect victims of injustice and alleviate the conditions of the poor and oppressed.”\(^ {48}\) While he acknowledges that these two tendencies have “not always pulled in opposite directions” and occasionally combine to form coherent strategies, he does not outline or advocate a policy tendency for this middle way.\(^ {49}\)

Since WWII, Canadian foreign policy has most commonly been characterized as demonstrating the qualities of internationalism.\(^ {50}\) It has been argued that internationalism represents “a balanced synthesis of idealism and pragmatism,” which corresponds with the Eayrs’ notion of practical idealism.\(^ {51}\) Internationalism is motivated by the goal of avoiding war, which is based on the belief that in an interconnected world, peace is indivisible. At its most basic, “internationalism is a body of ideas asserting that governments can mitigate the threat of serious interstate conflict by cooperating with

\(^{44}\) Nossal, revisiting the constructs of Eayrs’ lecture forty years later, argues that “liberal realism” more accurately reflects the median of realism and idealism advocated by Eayrs’ as the approach for Canada. “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy,” International Journal 62 no. 2 (Spring 2007): 269.

\(^{45}\) Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy,” 269-270.

\(^{46}\) Gotlieb was Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1977-1981 and Canada’s Ambassador to the United States from 1981-1989.

\(^{47}\) Allan Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy, Benefactors Lecture 2004, Toronto, 3 Nov. 2004 (Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 2004): 5.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{50}\) US President Woodrow Wilson is credited with developing the idea of internationalism, following World War I. Wilson stressed that the surest way to achieve mutual benefits, particularly in the area of international security, was for governments to cooperate with one another.

other governments."\(^{52}\) David Dewitt argues that for Canada, a state “highly penetrated – by people, ideas, finance, capital, technology, culture, etc. – worldwide events have a direct impact."\(^{53}\) Thus, Nossal contends that the internationalist tendency sees that “the interests of the state are best served when it plays an active role in international politics and particularly when it contributes to the establishment and maintenance of international order.”\(^{54}\) He further asserts that the active role advocated by internationalists is marked by four related ideas: international responsibility, constructive multilateralism, commitment to international organizations and a willingness to use national resources to support those organizations.\(^{55}\) Additionally, internationalism – with its emphasis on multilateral engagement – was seen to be one method of counterbalancing the unilateralist tendency in American foreign policy.\(^{56}\) Canadian adherence to the idea of internationalism reflects the country’s place and capabilities as a middle power and, in particular, one that is strongly dependent on open access to external markets, which requires international stability. It also reflects the geopolitical reality of American proximity and its ‘superpower’ unpredictability.

It is important to acknowledge that the academic literature on internationalism points to a variety of internationalisms, which unfortunately are not applied uniformly by authors.\(^{57}\) The above explanation of internationalism is often termed “active” or “constructive” internationalism. Liberal internationalism, which can be equated with Eayrs’ liberal idealists, emphasizes international development and humanitarian causes.\(^{58}\) Conservative internationalism, on the other hand, stresses military strength as the best means to ensure security and fits best in Eayrs’ sceptical realist category. While these tendencies have been intermittently present in Canadian foreign policy, the constructive internationalist tendency has displayed remarkable consistency since 1945. This continuity will be demonstrated through an overview of the foreign policy of the

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\(^{54}\) Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 143.


\(^{57}\) For a full account of the ways in which internationalism has been qualified, see: Munton and Keating, 525-531.

\(^{58}\) Munton, 161.
postwar administrations of Louis St. Laurent, John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney. The importance of this continuity is that it created the conditions in which the human security agenda could emerge as a priority of Canadian foreign policy.

The “Golden Age”

John Holmes, a prominent member of the Canadian foreign policy establishment in the postwar era, asserts that constructive internationalism was “almost a religion” in the decade after WWII. St. Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) from 1946-1948 and Prime Minister (PM) from 1948-1957, and Lester Pearson, Under-Secretary of State from 1946-1948 and SSEA from 1948-1957, presided over external affairs during the “golden age” in which the internationalist tendency rose to dominance. In the 1947 Gray lecture, described by Nossal as “the classic statement of postwar internationalism,” SSEA St. Laurent articulated the five principles underlying Canada’s internationalist approach to foreign policy:

The importance of maintaining national unity at all cost; the need to promote political liberty and freedom in Canada and around the world; the integral role of the rule of law in global governance; the requirement to consider the values of humanity in the conduct of politics; and finally the duty of all Canadians to accept greater international responsibilities and embrace a more active role in the world affairs.

These principles were reflected in the policies that followed, as Canada contributed to the postwar institution building of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Commonwealth. International stability and security – Canada’s national interest as a trading nation – would only be possible through the norm creation and cooperation made

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59 The administrations of Joe Clark, John Turner and Kim Campbell have not been covered given their short duration and resulting minimal influence on foreign policy.
61 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, (Toronto: McClelland & Steward Ltd.): 6. The term “golden age” was first used in 1967 by Escott Reid, a preeminent public servant and diplomat, to describe Canada’s contributions which “molded the shape of the future.” However, Reid’s conception of the “golden age” or “golden decade” referred to Canada’s actions between 1941 and 1951, not the 1940’s to early 1960’s as is commonly invoked in the literature on the history of Canadian foreign policy. Escott Reid, Canadian Foreign Policy, 1967-1977: A Second Golden Decade? International Journal 22, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 172. For a full account of the notion of “the golden age” in Canadian foreign policy, see Adam Chapnick, “The Golden Age: A Canadian Foreign Policy Paradox,” International Journal 64, no. 1 (Winter 2008-2009): 205-221.
62 Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 156.
possible through multilateral diplomacy. Through active engagement in the international sphere, Canada sought to contribute to the construction of a system of international relations premised on the peaceful resolution of disputes through various multilateral forums, supported by international law which would act as a constraint on the great powers.

The internationalist tendency of the postwar years was marked by a willingness to put Canada’s full diplomatic and defensive resources behind the institutions it helped create and the principles it sought to propagate. Under St. Laurent and Pearson, Canada was elected to a non-permanent member seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1947 and in 1955 helped to negotiate the expansion of the UN to include twenty-seven new members. Additionally, Canada contributed to seven UN observer missions during the St. Laurent/Pearson era, in an effort to contribute to international security. These missions ranged from election and troop withdrawal supervision in Korea in 1947 to ceasefire monitoring between India and Kashmir in 1949, to the first peacekeeping mission during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. Additionally, from 1950-1953 Canada fought in the Korean War to honour its UN obligations, but also to try to constrain potential American military extremism.

While often cited for his idealism, Pearson’s foreign policy was influenced by realist appraisals of the policy environment. Canada’s foreign policy under Pearson was grounded by recognition of the international context, Canada’s capabilities and interests and a desire to promote peace. Michael Hart notes that Pearson “saw Canada’s role as an ‘honest broker’ or ‘helpful fixer’ as responding not only to the idealist streak in Canadians’ character but, perhaps more importantly, as advancing their economic and security interests.” The internationalist tendency in Canada was marked by neither altruism, nor complete self-interest, but a combination of the two which saw Canada improving both its position and the international system through its foreign policies.

The Conservative Interlude

Despite a change in the governing party, the internationalist tendency remained the hallmark of Canadian foreign policy during Diefenbaker's Conservative administration from 1957-1963. Some attribute this consistency to Diefenbaker's personal mission to "cut a swath on the international stage" so as not to be upstaged by Pearson, who assumed the Liberal leadership in 1958. However, while Diefenbaker was "not strongly instilled with the spirit of internationalism" and was "too idiosyncratic to be characterized as a realist or idealist," his SSEA from 1959-1963, Howard Green, fit the "idealistic, crusading mould" of St. Laurent and Pearson. Accordingly, the result was "a continuation of old policies with a few new trimmings."70

Under Diefenbaker and Green, the Department of External Affairs continued to grow, in terms of personnel, permanent representation at international organizations, and posts abroad which served to increase Canada's international reach.71 Contributions to UN peacekeeping and observer missions continued, as contingents were deployed in an effort to support international peace.72 Canada's commitment to international security was also broadened under Diefenbaker, who signed the formal agreement creating the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1958 which integrated the command of American and Canadian air defence into a joint system for the protection of the American nuclear deterrent against the nuclear strike force capability of the USSR.

Green emphasized different elements within the agenda of the internationalist tendency, committing Canada to the cause of nuclear disarmament. While the abolition of nuclear weapons may be seen as an idealist preoccupation, it was justified by some

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68 Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism, 11; Bruce Thordarson, "Posture and Policy: Leadership in Canada's External Affairs," International Journal 31, no. 4 (Autumn 1976): 672. To that effect, Diefenbaker spent the first three months as PM serving as the SSEA, as he was "searching for a candidate who would...be 'worthy' of taking over from Pearson." Diefenbaker appointed Dr. Sidney Smith of the University of Toronto to the position of SSEA, which he held until his untimely death in March 1959, which provided Diefenbaker another opportunity to take over the portfolio. H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989): xii, 36-8.

69 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateralism Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002): 96; and Gotlieb, 17.


71 Canada established permanent representation at the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and opened High Commissions and Embassies in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and some of the newly independent African nations (particularly those with a French language connection). Hilliker and Barry, 172-178.

72 Contingents of specialists and/or troops were sent to Lebanon in 1958, to Congo to restore order and monitor the Belgian troop withdrawal in 1960, to West New Guinea to monitor a ceasefire between Indonesia and the Netherlands in 1962, and to Yemen as observers in 1963. United Nations Association in Canada, "Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping – Chronology."
as a policy priority with reference to the national interest as Canada’s geographical position between the United States and Soviet Union made it especially vulnerable to a nuclear exchange. Hence, Canada advocated negotiations between the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union, in the hopes of securing restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons and a prohibition on their testing.\(^73\) Green’s nuclear disarmament policy was tricky to maintain, however, as Diefenbaker had agreed in 1957 to acquire nuclear weapons for the Canadian Forces (CF). Under pressure from Canada’s allies in NATO to arm the CF in Europe and the United States to store nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, Diefenbaker wavered on the issue, viewing it as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty and the rationality of the international community.\(^74\) Diefenbaker’s dithering on the issue of whether to put the CF on alert during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis further demonstrated his difficulty with making critical decisions about Canada’s contributions to continental and international security.\(^75\) This chronic indecision served to divide Diefenbaker’s cabinet, with the resignation of Douglas Harkness (the pro-nuclear Minister of National Defence) which was promptly followed by the defeat of the government in the House of Commons in February 1963.

The Return of the Liberals

The Liberals returned to power with strong internationalists at the helm of Canada’s foreign policy, as Pearson appointed Paul Martin Sr., a colleague during his time in External Affairs, to the position of SSEA. They “shared an attachment to the principles on which post-war Canadian external policies had been based,” but were “sensitive to the importance of adaptation to meet new demands.”\(^76\) Indeed, the policymaking environment had changed substantially, both internationally and domestically, and consequently “the opportunities for Canada to put its internationalist ideals into practice diminished.”\(^77\) Despite these changes, Pearson remained committed

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\(^{73}\) Hilliker and Barry, 151. Much to the disappointment of Green, the Diefenbaker government was defeated before the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in July of 1963.


\(^{75}\) Hilliker and Barry, 242-243.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 253.

\(^{77}\) Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, 158. Nossal points to a number of developments which limited the scope of Canadian internationalism: the recovery of the European powers and Japan; decolonization which reduced the possibilities for UN sponsored peacekeeping missions; the rise of China, which threatened the global balance; and détente between the United States and Soviet Union, which limited an autonomous and apparently radical Canadian role as intermediary. Domestically, Pearson was held to a minority government for both of his terms in office, which placed some limitations on the scope for international action.
to internationalism, arguing forcefully that “Canada is playing an active and constructive role...Such a role should remain an important element in our foreign policy.” Canada’s active role persisted, as Pearson and Martin remained resolutely committed to Canada’s involvement in NATO, NORAD, the Commonwealth, the UN and its peacekeeping operations. Further, Canada’s loyalty to the institutions it helped create was demonstrated through the pursuit of leadership roles: Canada held a non-permanent UNSC seat from 1967-1968, was elected to the UNESCO Executive Board in 1968, and accepted the first Secretary-General position of the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Canada’s role in promoting peace, defusing conflict and building compromise remained active, but encountered some difficulties and failures. Peacekeeping continued to be an important policy tool, as Martin Sr. arranged for contingents to be deployed to Cyprus in 1964, to keep tensions from escalating between the Greek and Turkish cohabitants of the island, and to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to monitor a ceasefire. With the Rhodesian independence crisis of 1965, Pearson was able to find middle ground between the members of the Commonwealth, securing limited economic sanctions against Rhodesia rather than the use of force advocated by some, notably, African nations. Similarly, Canada took a moderate position on South Africa, advocating a more measured approach by joining the UN in condemning apartheid and supporting a ban on arms supplies, but opposing efforts to expel South Africa from the UN as isolation would leave little opportunity for negotiation and pressure. This era was also marked by a significant increase in external aid, which was expanded from educational and military assistance to include technical and capital assistance. The most notable failure resulted from Pearson and Martin Sr.’s failed attempts to restrain American policy in Vietnam, which concluded with the famous Temple University speech in which Pearson (against the advice of Martin Sr. who favoured quiet diplomacy) publically called for a pause in the American bombing of North Vietnam. Pearson’s very public critique of American strategy resulted in the evaporation of any possibility of Canadian influence in the formation of American Vietnam policy.

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79 Hilliker and Barry, 390, 318, 327.
80 Ibid., 281; and United Nations Association in Canada, “Canadian Participation in UN Peacekeeping – Chronology.”
81 Hilliker and Barry, 283-284.
82 Ibid., 330-332.
83 Ibid., 336. Between 1964 and 1968, the external aid budget grew from $4 million to $12.1 million dollars.
Despite the unwavering commitment of Pearson and Martin Sr., the internationalist tendency in Canadian foreign policy was coming under fire from the media, academia and the public. Recognizing the changing policy environment, Pearson’s final foreign policy initiative was the launching of an official foreign policy review. This report concluded that “the basic need seems to be for a re-definition and perhaps some re-orientation of Canada’s external policy to bring it into line with the calculable conditions of today and tomorrow, at home and abroad.”

New Directions: From Middlepower to ‘Effective Power’?

The “reorientation” advocated in the review was immediately seized upon by Trudeau, who, assuming the Liberal leadership and securing a majority government in 1968, called for another review of foreign policy. The objective was to define “a new role for Canada and a new foreign policy based on a fresh appraisal of this rapidly-changing world and on a realistic assessment of Canada’s potential.” Consequently, many have equated Trudeau’s first term as PM with a decline in the internationalist tendency.

Trudeau was forthright about his perception of Canada’s role and place in the international system and advised Canadians that they could expect a more realistic, modest international role. In fact, the “over-emphasis on role and influence,” a product of the desire to play “helpful fixer” in international affairs, was criticized for “obscuring policy objectives and actual interests.” The move away from Canada’s internationalist orientation was not merely rhetorical, as before the foreign policy review was even complete and without the consultation of Canada’s allies in NATO, Trudeau ordered the immediate reduction of CF serving in Europe by half and the phasing out of Canada’s nuclear role in the alliance. Trudeau appeared to further snub Canada’s international

85 As quoted in Hilliker and Barry, 409.
86 Ibid., 410.
89 Story, 381.
90 Bromke and Nossal, 339; and Halloran, Hilliker and Donaghy, 5.
commitments by declining to address the UN General Assembly (UNGA) at the opening of the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration in 1970.91

The white paper of 1970, Foreign Policy for Canadians, marked the challenge of the realist tendency in declaratory policy. It outlined an approach to foreign policy strongly predicated on the pursuit of national interests, which were seen as political independence, economic prosperity and “social purpose” (which was defined as the making of a contribution to humanity).92 In articulating a national interest-based foreign policy for Canada, the white paper outlined six interconnected themes: fostering economic growth, safeguarding sovereignty and independence; working for peace and security; promoting social justice; enhancing the quality of life; and ensuring a harmonious natural environment.93 Reflecting the newfound influence of the realist tendency, Trudeau and Sharp renounced the historical isolation of communist China and extended diplomatic and trade representation to the world’s largest emerging market.94

The safeguarding of sovereignty justified the most contentious policy of the Trudeau era – the “third option” – in which the government sought to diversify trade relations by seeking greater access to non-American markets (specifically, by increasing trade with Europe and Japan) thereby reducing Canada’s overwhelming dependence on access to the American market. The third option “reflected the realist school’s view of what the purpose of foreign policy should be,” but Gotlieb notes that it was largely ineffective, as it “proved to be a flawed policy, inspired by misguided views about the national interest.”95

Although the realist tendency found official expression in the 1970 white paper and Trudeau’s early policies, the internationalist tendency was never fully surmounted. Foreign Policy for Canadians served to justify the internationalist tendency by grounding it in a realist conceptualization of Canadian interests.96 In fact, Nossal contends that “Trudeau never did abandon those fundamentals he had challenged so ardently. His

91 Keating, 106.
92 Story, 380. For a full account and analysis of the principles, priorities and impact of Foreign Policy for Canadians, see: Halloran, Hilliker and Donaghy, 1-20; and Story, 379-387.
93 Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism, 15.
94 Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson, 7.
95 Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism, 17. It is important to note that Gotlieb was initially supportive of the third option’s objective of the diversification of Canada’s trading partners and reducing its overwhelming dependency on the United States. As he admits in hindsight, the third option failed to take account of the “revolution of governance” taking place in Washington, in which Canada’s “special relationship” with the United States would be an important safeguard against the Congressional muscle-flexing on issues related to external trade. Allan Gotlieb, “The Role of Law in the Conduct of Canada – US Relations,” Address to the Canadian–U.S. Law Institute, London, ON, 4 October 2007, http://www.law.uwo.ca/News/October%2007 /Allan%20Gotlieb%20address.pdf (accessed 26 Jan. 2011).
96 Accordingly, the review encouraged analysis and monitoring of the correspondence between policy objectives and performance.
government remained committed to peacekeeping, to the UN, and to international mediation. Trudeau’s later policies exhibited more of the liberal internationalist element, though underscored by realist pragmatism. This is best exemplified by his gradual reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in Canadian defence planning and operations and by his embrace of development assistance and North-South issues as policy priorities. In the 1975 Mansion speech Trudeau called for the international community to recognize a “global ethic” as a consequence of interdependence and argued that efforts should be made to end the inequalities between the developed North and developing South. Supporting this assertion and reflecting the findings of the Pearson Commission on International Development, Canada’s foreign aid grew between 1970 and 1976 from $350 million to $1 billion. Moreover, Trudeau’s 1983 “peace initiative,” pursued through personal diplomacy, sought to restrain the increasing East-West tensions following the Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983 and NATO’s “Able Archer 83” military exercises in November 1983. The objective of the peace initiative was to stimulate dialogue between the two superpowers and included practical proposals which sought to strengthen conventional arms control and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. While Trudeau’s emphasis on rectifying global inequalities, the peace initiative and efforts to promote nuclear disarmament are labelled “idealistic” by Gotlieb and Nossal, they were justified in reference to improving international stability and peace and, thus, correspond to the ideas and objectives of Canada’s internationalist tendency in foreign policy.

The Progressive Conservatives and Two-Track Foreign Policy

The landslide victory of Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative Party (PC) in 1984 ushered in a new style and approach to foreign policy, albeit one firmly rooted in

97 Nossal, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 158. Further, Donald Story argues that “what is indeed noticeable about many of the Trudeau government’s policies is that they emanate from the Pearson period.” Story, 382.
98 Melakopides, 87-127.
99 Thordarson, 675; Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism, 17. The relationship between Canada and the developing world had been a personal cause of Trudeau’s since he had first become PM. In fact, his first public address as PM addressed Canada’s responsibility to cooperate with developing and newly independent states in their quest for self-improvement. The creation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1968 to replace the External Aid Office reflected a shift in thinking about the objective of foreign aid and signified the Liberal government’s commitment to Southern development. Ivan Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign Policy, 1968-1984 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Inc., 1995): 9-12.
100 Head and Trudeau, 297-309.
both the realist and internationalist tendencies. The first PC throne speech committed
the government to “constructive Canadian internationalism,” pursued through multilateral
diplomacy to “defend freedom and preserve peace; to prevent nuclear confrontation; to
improve trading relations; to build a healthier world economy.”102 It also reaffirmed the
centrality of the United States to Canada’s external relations as “our relationship…affects
virtually every aspect of our national life.”103 As a result of these commitments, foreign
policy was pursued along two tracks: the
PM tended primarily to the national interest – the relationship with the United States,
while the internationalist agenda was managed by the SSEAs, Joe Clark and Barbara
McDougall.104

The realist tendency during this era is most commonly attributed to the fervour
with which Mulroney attended to Canada’s relationship with the United States. Restoring
harmonious relations was Mulroney’s primary objective and near exclusive jurisdiction.
The bilateral agenda contained many important issues, such as acid rain, Canadian
assertions of sovereignty in Arctic waters, and Canadian rejection of participation in the
Strategic Defence Initiative, an anti-ballistic missile development program and first-order
priority of President Reagan.105 The agenda was largely dominated by trade issues
which culminated in the signing of the Free Trade Agreement in 1988 and the North

The realist tendency also appears to have strongly influenced the 1987 defence
white paper, “Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada.” The defence
paper criticized the significant “commitment-capability gap” resulting from chronic
underfunding which left the CF with aging, obsolete and insufficient equipment to
perform the tasks expected of them. To remedy this imbalance, the defence paper
called for significant and sustained increases in defence spending and the reorientation
of Canada’s contributions to NATO and NORAD.106 However, the end of the Cold War
dashed realist hopes and these commitments were abandoned as deficit reduction came
to be seen as more appropriate for the national interest given the more benign national

103 Ibid.
104 Gotlieb, Romanticism and Realism, 20.
105 Hart, 88.
106 Norrin Ripsman, “Big Eyes and Empty Pockets: The Two Phases of Conservative Defence Policy,” in
environment.  

Foreign policy outside of the continent was characteristically more internationalist, as the white paper had pledged. Clark, a pragmatic idealist or liberal realist of the Pearsonian tradition, believed that Canada should act where it was likely to make a difference. Hence, a demonstrated activism on the internationalist agenda was evident in the flurry of activity on disarmament and arms control, and peacekeeping, as inherited commitments were maintained and sixteen new UN missions and two non-UN missions were added. These new missions included participation in the UNSC’s renewed attempt at collective security in the 1991 Gulf War and “new” or “second generation” peacekeeping missions (often categorized as humanitarian missions) in Yugoslavia and Somalia in 1992, which confirmed Canada’s determination to contribute to the post-Cold War international order. Additionally, Clark and Mulroney pursued multilateralism on numerous issues with increased vigour: increasing Canada’s hemispheric representation by joining the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990 and securing support for democratic promotion in the organization; active participation in UN “mega-conferences” on child welfare, the environment, and development and human rights; and working to establish a leaders summit for d’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (la Francophonie). The Progressive Conservatives’ internationalist activism made Canada “a substantial player in defining and framing the agenda for the post-Cold War global order.”

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110 Manon Tessier and Michael Fortmann, “The Conservative Approach to International Peacekeeping,” in Michaud and Nossal, 121. It is important to note that there was one exception to the maintenance of peacekeeping mission, as Mulroney chose to withdraw from Cyprus after a 28 year mission in order to shift funding and personnel around to allow for new missions. Tessier and Fortmann, 121-122.  
111 Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (New York: Routledge, 2006): 136-140, 158; and Tessier and Fortmann, 119-121.  
112 Andrew F. Cooper, “Good Global Governance or Political Opportunism? Mulroney and UN Social Conferences,” in Michaud and Nossal, 160-172.  
114 Cooper, “Good Global Governance or Political Opportunism,” 169.
The foreign policy of the Mulroney era featured a more substantive focus on human rights. As a consequence of global interdependence, human rights were no longer seen as the exclusive jurisdiction of states and in the glow of the post-Cold War peace, such an assessment allowed for a rethinking of the principle of non-interference and state sovereignty. In support of human rights, the Mulroney administration took an increasingly tough stance on the apartheid regime in South Africa and China’s record following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Additionally, “good governance” was adopted as an official policy priority in 1991, which was supported by Mulroney, Clark and Barbara McDougall’s personal diplomacy in multilateral organizations and bilateral relations. Included within the ambit of good governance was respect for human rights, democratic development, integrity in government, and poverty alleviation. Mulroney’s human rights campaign also featured a passionate agenda that sought to create a legally binding international agreement protecting the rights of children; Canadian bureaucrats played a pivotal role in negotiating the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, which was followed by the co-chairing of the 1990 World Summit for Children. As a consequence of the high importance placed on human rights policy in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the liberal internationalist or idealist tendency found some expression during the later years of the Mulroney administration.

The “Party of Ideas”

The 1993 federal election brought to power a sizeable majority government for the Liberal Party, led by Jean Chrétien. Following the trend established by Trudeau and Mulroney, Chrétien ordered a full review of foreign and defence policy, each to be undertaken by a special joint committee with some input from the Canadian public. Seen by some as a stalling technique, the review process provided the new government with the space to attend to pressing matters on the trade agenda, namely the conclusion of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of GATT.

115 Kathleen E. Mahoney, “Human Rights and Canada’s Foreign Policy,” International Journal 47, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 556; and Nossal, “Right and Wrong in Foreign Policy,” 273.
117 Gecelovsky and Tom Keating, “Liberal Internationalism for Conservatives: The Good Governance Initiative,” in Michaud and Nossal, 97. Good governance also included priority for basic social programs, acceptable levels of defence spending, and the development of market-based economies.
negotiations.\(^{119}\) The results of the review were broadly incorporated into the white papers which followed, with the defence paper released in 1994 and the foreign policy paper – *Canada in the World* – in 1995. However, prior to their publication, Canada's post-Cold War posture was being shaped and articulated in a number of surprisingly telling speeches at home and abroad. In an address to Parliament in March 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,\(^ {120}\) André Ouellet, reaffirmed the idea first promoted by the Mulroney government that state sovereignty has conditions, namely that there is a "right and duty of intervention to protect civilians ‘being denied their most basic rights’ wherever they might be."\(^ {121}\) Further, he discussed the importance of new institutions and associations for the management of post-Cold War instability in an address to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations post-ministerial conference in 1994.\(^ {122}\) These ideas about the nature of post-Cold War international relations were more clearly laid out and explained in the white papers that followed.

While the foreign policy and defence reviews were carried out separately, the resulting white papers were largely supportive of one another. Both open with a discussion of the swiftly evolving international environment in which defence and foreign policy is made: "Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity."\(^ {123}\) Each provides an assessment of the nature of the threats to Canadian and international security, highlighting the importance of recognizing and addressing non-traditional threats, such as environmental degradation, international crime and disease, overpopulation, and economic inequality. Also, each addresses the pressing fiscal constraints facing policy formation and acknowledge that foreign and defence policy will have to be “more effective and less costly” while reflecting the desire of Canadians to remain actively involved in the world.\(^ {124}\) In essence, the foreign policy and defence posture advocated by the white papers reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to


\(^{120}\) After extensive reorganization in 1995, the Department of External Affairs was renamed and restructured as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in 1995. Consequently, the SSEA was re-titled the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and a distinct portfolio for Trade was established.

\(^{121}\) Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 251.


active, though more selective, internationalism, as reflected in the continued commitment to multilateralism, to collective and regional security, the promotion of human rights and disarmament, and the need to address the root causes of conflict.

Though the white papers largely supported one another, it is important to acknowledge the specific provisions of each which contributed to Canada’s international security and foreign policy. Of particular importance is the conclusion drawn in the defence white paper regarding the CF. Despite some calls to withdraw from NATO and reorganize the structure of the CF, the defence review reiterated the need for a multi-purpose, combat capable force as necessary for national defence and the maintenance of Canadian influence abroad.\textsuperscript{125} The government argued that the maintenance of such a force was in the national interest as it provides the only assurance that Canada is “able to retain the necessary degree of flexibility and freedom of action when it comes to the defence of its interests and the projection of its values abroad.”\textsuperscript{126} However, despite restating Canada’s intention to meet its international obligations (to NORAD, NATO and the UN), the defence white paper admits that as a result of the domestic fiscal conditions, budget “cuts will be deeper, and there will be more reductions, cancellations, and delays” which require the government to be selective about its engagements and do less.\textsuperscript{127} The foreign policy white paper outlined three interdependent and mutually reinforcing objectives to guide Canadian foreign policy: the pursuit of prosperity, security, and the projection of Canadian values and culture.\textsuperscript{128} The projection of Canadian values – respect for democracy, the rule of law, free markets, human rights and the environment – supports the first two objectives, as these values are seen to provide the necessary conditions for prosperity and security. Further, these values are largely congruent with those of human security, which was first articulated in \textit{Canada in the World}. Canada’s adoption of human security in the white paper demonstrated the receptiveness of the government and DFAIT bureaucrats to a new way of thinking about security. Non-traditional security threats, such as epidemics, mass migrations, economic underdevelopment, and humanitarian crises, were seen to have domestic implications, as there is a “vital link between [Canadian] security and prosperity and the security of others.”\textsuperscript{129} Interestingly, while the white paper signalled a shift in the thinking about national and international security, the methods by which to attain human security were

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{125}] DND, 1994 \textit{Defence White Paper}, 12-14.
\item[\textsuperscript{126}] \textit{Ibid.}, 13.
\item[\textsuperscript{127}] \textit{Ibid.}, 10.
\item[\textsuperscript{128}] DFAIT, \textit{Canada in the World}, 10-11.
\item[\textsuperscript{129}] \textit{Ibid.}, 24.
\end{itemize}
largely rooted in Canada’s internationalist tradition, which emphasized cooperative international action through sustainable development, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and disarmament.\textsuperscript{130}

Ouellet came to the portfolio with several initiatives he intended to pursue, but his tenure as MFA lasted less than one and a half years and was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the foreign policy review and fighting Quebec separatism. Outside of these concerns, Ouellet promoted an agenda that supported the priorities advocated by the foreign policy review. His favoured initiative – the proposal of a rapid reaction capability for the UN – was a response to the call for a renewed approach to peacekeeping in UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s essay \textit{An Agenda for Peace}. The government brought together officials from DFAIT, CIDA and the Department of National Defence (DND), potential allies and academics to produce \textit{Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations}, a comprehensive study which was tabled in the UNGA in 1995.\textsuperscript{131} In the foreword to the report, Ouellet stated that the objective is “to give the UN a capability to react more rapidly to crises and thus enhance its effectiveness and credibility overall.” Michael Pearson, a senior policy advisor to Ouellet and Axworthy, recalled that Ouellet “paid close attention to the issue throughout its evolution and worked steadily with his counterparts around the world to building international support for the study and its key recommendations.”\textsuperscript{132}

Unfortunately for Ouellet, he resigned in January 1996 to take up the chairmanship of Canada post before the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was established by agreement in 1996. Canada participated in developing the capacity and became a founding and contributing member of SHIRBRIG, which became operational in 2000. Axworthy is often credited as the “father” of human security in Canada, but based on Ouellet’s record, it is plausible to argue that he too had a hand in laying the foundation of Canada’s human security agenda.

\textsuperscript{130} DFAIT, \textit{Canada in the World}, 24-33
\textsuperscript{132} Pearson, “Reflections on Implementing Canadian Foreign Policy,” 8.
3: HUMAN SECURITY: A “NEW” IDEA IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Given the novelty of human security at the time when Axworthy became MFA, it should not be surprising that explanations of human security and Canada’s agenda for its promotion underwent development and refinement over the course of his tenure. Axworthy’s emphatic adoption of human security was driven by what he saw as a need to develop new means of addressing the pressing problems of the world, which were no longer localized and had transnational security implications. Consequently, Axworthy identified human insecurity as a potential threat to Canadian security: “it has become clear that problems in one part of the world can have a serious impact in another…What this means for Canadians is that violent and nonviolent threats pose a greater challenge to their security regardless of where they originate.”

Further, in his first address to the UNGA, Axworthy promoted the continued relevance of internationalism and the need to consider security from a human perspective. He argued that “in a new and changing global environment internationalism is ever more important for all nations, large or small, weak or powerful. Changing times have set for us a new broad agenda, which includes focusing on the security needs of the individual.” He elaborated further that while “the end of the Cold War era has not made the issues or tools of Pearson’s day obsolete, it has meant that new issues are emerging that necessitate the international community find alternative ways of thinking and acting multilaterally.”

A more developed explanation and the preliminary structure of Canada’s human security agenda was presented publicly by Axworthy in the 1997 article “Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership.” He explained that:

The forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedom, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as

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important to global peace as arms control and disarmament...lasting stability cannot be achieved until human security is guaranteed.\textsuperscript{136}

This characterization of human security fits squarely within the broad conception promoted by the UNDP in 1994. Further, his emphasis on particular elements of human security – sustainable economic development, human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and good governance – highlighted continuity in Canadian policy, as each of these areas had received varying degrees of attention by previous governments. Reflecting this, Axworthy noted that “the question for the future is how to build on Canadian foreign policy traditions so as to adapt Canada’s international contributions to this changing world.”\textsuperscript{137} To that end, he identified a number of issue areas that Canadian policy would look address: peacebuilding in post-conflict societies to break the cycle of violence; the banning of landmines; the use of human security as a conceptual framework to improve the coherence between foreign policy and development assistance; the protection of children’s rights; and economic development through rules-based trade.\textsuperscript{138} Axworthy highlighted the use of soft power, defined as “the art of disseminating information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through persuasion rather than coercion,” and cooperation with like-minded nations and NGOs as the primary tools for fulfilling the initiatives of the human security agenda.\textsuperscript{139} This important contribution to the scholarly literature marked the first substantive explanation of human security and its attendant agenda from a Canadian perspective.

Axworthy’s later speeches and articles, however, reflect a narrowing of human security at the same time as it developed into a distinct policy agenda. The transition from a comprehensive approach (addressing both development and security) to a focus primarily on the security component – or freedom from fear – has been well documented.\textsuperscript{140} Axworthy explained that “we have pursued human security where we have seen an urgent need and where we thought we could make a difference. Issues have emerged and events transpired that have helped refine the concept and focus our policy initiatives.”\textsuperscript{141} Consequently, he argued that “a broad focus tended to distract from the central realization that underdevelopment cannot be addressed in the presence of

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Ibid.}, 185.
\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, 185-191.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, 192.
\textsuperscript{140} See: Huliaras and Tzifakis, 559-575; and Nik Hynek and David Bosold, “A History and Genealogy of the Freedom-from-Fear Doctrine,” \textit{International Journal} 64, no.3 (Summer 2009): 735-750.
\textsuperscript{141} Axworthy, “Introduction,” 10.
war and its attendant insecurity.” From this perspective, violent conflict is seen as the principal and most immediate threat to human security and thus Canada’s priority was to protect people from acts of violence and foster a greater sense of security for the individual. It was felt that Canada could best contribute to reducing violent threats to human security through preventative initiatives, like the microdisarmament agenda, and reactive initiatives, such as the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. This is largely consistent with Canada’s Cold War contributions to international security in that it sought to mitigate potentially destabilizing crises and create norms and values that would foster a more stable and peaceful international order.

It is important to note that this policy shift was not intended to deny the importance of the development concerns underpinning human security. In fact, Axworthy readily acknowledged that “development assistance plays a vital role in preventing conflict or rebuilding societies after fighting has ended.” Indeed, there is a great deal of commonality between human security and human development, as they are people-centered, multidimensional, and are focused on long-term improvements to human fulfillment. Yet, Astri Suhrke argues that human development is a long-term process aimed at generating structural, socioeconomic change, while human security is a reaction to a sudden crisis like a natural disaster or life-threatening violence resulting from violent conflict. Essentially, while there is overlap in their concerns, human security is generally narrower in scope and is more concerned with prevention and reaction to threats that emerge, rather than the development of long-term processes to improve the human condition. This distinction is reflected in the way in which responsibility for Canada’s international policies are organized, as development policy falls under CIDA’s jurisdiction. Axworthy admitted that despite “a high degree of common action…there existed a rivalry that bordered at times on animosity, and remarkably little coordination of policy or integration of effort…Generally there was a

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143 Ibid.
145 Astri Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of States,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (Sept 1999): 271-272. Suhrke provides an interesting and useful anecdote to demonstrate the distinction between human development and human security, which was adapted from elsewhere. There is "a man standing permanently up the neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him…to provide human security in situations of this kind means protecting that person standing neck-deep in the river from the ripple, either by taking immediate preventative measures to flatten the ripple before it reaches him, or by throwing out a life buoy. Human development, by contrast, is a long-term process designed to get the man out of the river, or to lower the water level or undertake equivalent structural change. Suhrke, 271 (emphasis in original).
divorce between our foreign policy and our development policy…as foreign minister I had no say in CIDA policy."\textsuperscript{146} It is not a huge leap to expect that the division of responsibility for the freedom from want and freedom from fear elements of the human security agenda between the two departments may partially explain DFAIT’s decision to focus on the latter.

The Canadian human security agenda was outlined and explained in the 1999 DFAIT concept paper “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World” with a fuller justification for the policy shift. It was argued that the ambitious and comprehensive nature of the broad UNDP definition made operationalization of human security into practical policy “unwieldy.”\textsuperscript{147} The concept paper highlighted the rejection of the UNDP definition at the 1995 Copenhagen Summit on Social Development as evidence that a consensus existed on the impracticality of a broad approach. The UNDP collects and analyzes important data regarding several aspects of human security through the Human Development Index (HDI), and this data served to support Canada’s shift in policy, as “by the UNDP’s own criteria, human insecurity is greatest during war.”\textsuperscript{148} Consequently, the Canadian conception of human security was refined in the concept paper:

Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails. The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived…a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people’s future safety.\textsuperscript{149}

Thus Canada’s refined conception of human security continued to recognize a broad range of threats to human security, but emphasized the need to protect people from violent conflict, as security is a prerequisite for development. The concept paper

\textsuperscript{146} Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003): 60. This statement is supported by the work of Denis Stairs, who writing about the nature of the department asserts that “DFAIT is perennially in conflict [with CIDA], if not openly at war. This is complication of bureaucratic politics is compounded by the fact that DFAIT, with a very few exceptions, has money sufficient only to run itself, whereas CIDA has money to propagate programs.” Dennis Stairs, “The Changing Office and the Changing Environment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Axworthy Era,” in Canada Among Nations 2001: The Axworthy Legacy, eds. Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer, and Maureen Appel Molot, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001): 24-25. Additionally, Michael Pearson, policy advisor in the Minister’s office at the time, echoes Axworthy and Stairs: “the DFAIT-CIDA relationship...can be difficult because the operational decision-making approaches of the two departments are very different. In addition, relations at the political level are often a complicating factor.” Pearson, “Reflections on Implementing Canadian Foreign Policy,” 12.


\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
identified two strategies as fundamental for improving human security: strengthening legal norms and building the capacity to enforce them. Creating a strong web of legal rights and responsibilities that serve to protect people provides the first line of defence for the human security proponent, as it ideally establishes a non-interventionist protection mechanism. However, as legal norms may be easily broken, the second strategy seeks to build the institutional capacity to enforce the norms, through persuasive, coercive or legal means. The concept paper notes that “human rights, humanitarian and refugee law provide the normative framework on which a human security approach is based” and thus initiatives to strengthen this legal web of protection or enforce the rules on which it is based comprise the basic foundation of the Canadian human security agenda. While the individualized approach to security might have had novel elements, based on this explanation of the strategic agenda, human security was being practiced in Canadian foreign policy long before it was framed in such terms.

3.1 The Critical Appraisal of Human Security

The introduction of human security into international relations and foreign policy discourses was met with substantial critical evaluation and debate within circles of interested academics, policymakers and bureaucrats. Indeed, even among the proponents of a “people-centered” approach to security, there exists considerable variety in the way in which human security is conceptualized and assessments regarding its utility as a guide for policymaking. These debates – described as “the liveliest in recent years” – were prevalent within the Canadian foreign policy literature following the emergence of the human security agenda as a foreign policy priority during the late 1990s. In particular, thoughtful criticism emerged regarding the authenticity of the commitment of the Canadian government to the human security agenda and the propensity for the rhetoric to both outstrip any reasonable commitment and take on an unduly moralizing tone. It was further argued that the promotion of human security occurred at the cost of Canada’s tangible national interests. This chapter will explore the major arguments of human security detractors and will conclude by responding to these critiques.

Problems with Conceptualization

The case against human security begins with the very concept itself. While the UNDP put forth the first substantive definition in 1994, the definition has been hotly contested in the literature with over thirty definitions of human security currently in circulation.153 Gary King and Christopher Murray, strong supporters of human security and its attendant research agenda, aptly summarized the definitional issues and admitted that “even some of the strongest proponents of human security recognize that it is at best poorly defined and unmeasured, and at worst a vague and logically inconsistent slogan.”154 Similarly, Roland Paris, a vocal critic, questioned the utility of human security, as “the concept lacks a precise definition. Human security is like ’sustainable development’ – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means.”155 Peter Uvin asserted that “defining human security clearly or consensually is impossible,” while others, like Don Hubert of DFAIT, suggested that the definitional ambiguity is a consequence of the equal weighting assigned to conceptualizations advanced by academics, governments and intergovernmental organizations.156

While some argue that the appeal of human security lies in its vagueness, much of the criticism of the conceptualization is focused on the implications of this fuzziness. For example, Keith Krause characterized the broad UNDP definition as “ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves slapping the label of human security on a wide range of issues” and thus human security can be seen as “a loose synonym for ‘bad things that can happen’.157 Further, the problem with a broad conceptualization, according to Paris, is that its inclusiveness privileges nearly every conceivable threat to humankind without providing a way to prioritize amongst them.158 The issue of prioritization is important to the critics of human security, as a broad conceptualization

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“risks overcrowding an already overburdened security policy agenda and thus undermines policymakers’ ability to delineate clear priorities.”

This line of criticism happens to be common amongst proponents also, albeit those who support a narrower conceptualization of human security which focuses on ‘freedom from fear’. For example, Robin Hay cautioned that “if Axworthy’s human security agenda is not defined within explicit parameters, Canada may find itself cast as a Boy Scout imperialist, the busybody of international politics with a right to butt into everyone’s business.” Indeed, there is some agreement that “if the term ‘human security’ were defined more narrowly, it would accrue greater analytical and policy value” but the abandonment of the holistic, inclusive nature of the concept draws considerable criticism from proponents of the broad definition. Consequently, human security detractors have identified a serious flaw with the concept, as even within the camp of human security advocates there exists considerable disagreement over how to define and operationalize the term.

Problems with the Operationalization of Human Security

The operationalization of the concept of human security requires more than just a means to prioritize threats; it also requires a set of tools with which to respond to the prioritized threats. Axworthy’s persistent touting of ‘soft power’ as the primary policy tool in the early days of the human security agenda drew considerable fire from critics. Additionally, Axworthy’s assertion that the post-Cold War era placed a higher premium on soft power than hard power was met with vocal indignation from some in Canada’s foreign policy community.

The strongest critic of the utility of soft power was undoubtedly Kim Richard Nossal, who questioned both the applicability of the term to the Canadian context and the motives for Axworthy’s adoption of it. As he explains, the concept of soft power was developed by Joseph Nye Jr., to describe an alternative source of American power which contributed to the maintenance of hegemony: in the American context, soft power

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is seen as a complement to military or hard power, and is an alternative means of getting others to want what you want.\textsuperscript{162} Nossal retains a traditional notion of power in that he defines it as “the ability to prevail in a conflict of interests...to get your way over others” and thus soft power is not power at all, but can more accurately be characterized as “persuasion or inducement.”\textsuperscript{163} Consequently, Nossal argues that Axworthy’s appropriation of soft power “encourages the view that all Canada needs in world politics is a few good ideas” and that “we can do foreign policy on the cheap,” hence his labelling of Axworthy’s foreign policy as “pinchpenny diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{164} Nossal’s overarching concern with soft power is that it “seems little more than an elaborate justification for not spending more on so-called ‘hard’ power resources” which he admits “don’t come as cheaply as soft power” but do a better job of protecting Canadian interests.\textsuperscript{165}

Fen Osler Hampson and Dean Oliver largely concur with Nossal’s assessment and emphasize the limitations of soft power as a policy tool. They argue that “it may be an exaggeration to suggest that hard power remains the ‘currency’ of international politics…but it’s not chump change either...Soft and hard power are thus two sides of the same coin, proponents of the Axworthy doctrine rarely enunciate this linkage.”\textsuperscript{166} The continuing utility of hard power in the pursuit of the human security agenda and the continuing relevance of national security is explained nicely by Bernard Prosper Jr., who states that:

The currency of military capability never depreciates in part because the ability to defend a nation against threats never ceases to be a primary state concern and in part because it allows a country to project its power and influence, defend its values abroad, and provide security to people who desperately need it in countries plagued by civil strife.\textsuperscript{167}

\textbf{The Commitment-Capability Gap}

The human security agenda was subject to intense criticism from the academic community regarding the incongruity between the ambition of the Canadian agenda and the resources allocated to its pursuit. This line of criticism has been almost unanimously


\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Ibid.}


\textsuperscript{165} Nossal, “Pinchpenny Diplomacy,” 93; and Nossal, “Foreign Policy for Wimps.” By “hard power” resources, Nossal is referring to well-equipped military forces, a well-maintained foreign service, well-endowed intelligence services an unfrozen aid budget.

\textsuperscript{166} Hampson and Oliver, 391

\textsuperscript{167} Bernard Jr., 241.
applied to the human security agenda, though the ‘gap’ is characterized by different authors in different ways. David Dewitt decried the prevalence of the ‘commitment-capability gap’ in Axworthy’s foreign policy. He argued that “in practice, while Canada’s capabilities and resources constrain its actions, it continues to profess global engagements even as DFAIT, [CIDA], the International Development Research Center, and DND, among others have faced severe budget restrictions.” 168 Jockel and Sokolsky concurred, but highlighted the severity of the commitment-capability gap from the perspective of the CF, as “the capabilities of the Canadian Forces have been reduced by budget cuts and personnel reductions” but there exists a “widespread view, grounded upon Axworthy’s human security agenda, that Canada should be deploying forces overseas.” 169 In a similar vein, Hampson and Oliver outlined that their “assessment of the basic tenets of current Canadian statecraft finds a distressing gap between the alluring promise of the new diplomacy…and the prospects for its success. In this environment, critical deficiencies in resources are all too readily (and dangerously) exposed.” 170

Robin Jeffrey Hay aptly summarized the above criticisms when he asserted that former Finance Minister “Paul Martin continually fails to put the government’s money where Lloyd Axworthy’s mouth is on human security.” 171 Ultimately, the critique of the commitment-capability gap between what the human security agenda proclaimed and what it was actually capable of accomplishing, was relatively well-placed. Indeed, as many of the critics outlined, all of the resources deemed essential to the effective promotion of the human security agenda received substantial cuts to funding over the 1990s: the departmental budgets for program provision for DFAIT, DND, and CIDA; the downsizing of the foreign service; failure to reinvest in drastically needed military hardware; and a reduction in international development assistance to its lowest-ever level at 0.25 percent of gross national product (GNP). 172 The hard truth was that the Chrétien government’s first policy priority was the reduction of the federal deficit coupled

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168 David Dewitt, 173.
170 Hampson and Oliver, 406.
171 Hay, 230.
with the avoidance of tax increases, and thus policy areas deemed “discretionary” like foreign policy, “non-essential” defence spending and development assistance were amongst the first to feel the budgetary pinch.\textsuperscript{173}

**Excessive Moralizing**

The commitment-capability gap was seen to be further exacerbated by what has been deemed “excessive moralizing,” as sceptics criticized the proclivity to promote the human security agenda in a preachy, moralizing manner. In the Canadian foreign policy literature, Axworthy was accused of “incautious moralizing,” “moralizing arrogance” and a “growing disposition to Phariseean moralizing.”\textsuperscript{174} William Bain argues that the human security agenda “may engender excessive moralism; that is, a tendency to encounter the world as if Canada were engaged in a moral crusade.”\textsuperscript{175} Denis Stairs warns that “a rhetoric of moralistic excess has the effect of depleting diplomatic credibility abroad,” particularly when that rhetoric fails to be effectively supported by resources, as is demonstrated by the commitment-capability gap, or sufficient moral and political will, which he refers to as the morality gap.\textsuperscript{176} This gap, also characterized as a morality-resolution gap by Richard Bowes, damages credibility as the rhetoric creates expectations (within the domestic or target communities) that the policy is incapable of meeting.\textsuperscript{177} Bowes identifies the NATO air campaign in Kosovo as an example of such a gap, where the intervention to save and protect civilians from ethnic cleansing – in the name of human security – was limited to an air campaign to minimize the risk to NATO forces.\textsuperscript{178} According to this line of argument, Canada ought to be wary about moral proselytizing, given that it lacks the ability (or desire) to act unilaterally in defence of the principles it promotes.

In a similar vein, Canada’s human security agenda was charged with trying to destabilize the moral character of international politics. William Bain argued that human security is an unsuitable framework for foreign policy as it “emphasizes certain norms

\textsuperscript{173} Jockel and Sokolsky, and Francis Furtado describe foreign policy/human security policy as “discretionary.”
\textsuperscript{174} Hampson and Oliver, 382; Hillmer and Chapnick, 79; and Stairs, “Canada and the Security Problem: Implication as the Millennium Turns,” *International Journal* 54, no.3 (Summer 1999): 399.
\textsuperscript{175} William W. Bain, “Against Crusading: The Ethic of Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 86.
\textsuperscript{176} Stairs defines the morality gap as “the gap between what we define as a responsible international security agenda for Canada on the one hand, and our political and moral will to respond to it on the other hand.” Stairs, “Canada and the Security Problem,” 402 and 399.
\textsuperscript{178} Bowes, 653-656.
which are often at odds with the prevailing norms of present-day international society” and thus “challenges and possibly undermines the moral foundation of international society as it has existed for nearly four-hundred years.” In particular, Bain takes issue with human security’s embrace of cosmopolitanism and the privileging of the individual at the expense of the state, which he characterizes as “a departure from the classical ethic of national security.” Further, he criticizes human security for imposing a Universalist and Eurocentric conception of ‘the good life’ on target states, despite the dominance of a pluralistic ethic in international society. By challenging the normative and moral basis of international society, Bain cautions that “Canada runs the risk of inflicting injustice of a greater magnitude than that which it seeks to remedy.” At its most basic, Bain’s line of criticism is focused on the character of the morality or values promoted by human security.

**Human Security is Incompatible with the National Interest**

Post-Cold War Canadian foreign policy discourse was largely concerned with Canada’s role in the unipolar international order. In particular, those advocating the realist tendency lamented what they saw as the primacy of values over interests in the formation of Canadian foreign policy. From such a perspective, the human security agenda was seen as a clear example of values trumping interests. Rudyard Griffiths, a former policy planner for DFAIT and one of the few to publicly raise such objections while Axworthy was MFA, criticized the lack of interests in Canadian foreign policy, as he asserted that “it’s time we set aside our Pearsonian internationalism and took at crack at self-interest.” Further, he argued that “the future of our foreign policy lies not all over the map but in the Americas, where our most vital economic and security interests actually complement our international idealism.” Similarly, Jack Granatstein and Allan Gotlieb, in consecutive CD Howe Institute Benefactors Lectures, derided and lamented the prioritization of values over interests in the articulation of Canadian foreign policy. In 2003, Granatstein argued that “the fundamental truth is that…values or principles are for individuals, while nations have interests above all.” While recognizing that a “sensible

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179 Bain, 86 and 85.  
foreign policy should be based on established national values and the country's clear national interests,” he notes that values should be subordinate to national interests. Further, Granatstein sees Canada's national interests as more appropriately secured by a neo-isolationist turn towards continentalism than an internationalist orientation in foreign policy. Echoing the sceptical realist tendency apparent in Granatstein's position, Gotlieb laments that “the national interest is barely visible on the horizon.” He asserts that the "universal advancement of human security…is a distraction from the national interest" as “in place of sovereignty and independence, natural security and economic growth, the leading advocates of Canada's international vocation seem to be establishing a new trinity in the goals of Canadian foreign policy – value projection, peace building and norm creation.” What Canada needs, according to Gotlieb, is a reality-based foreign policy, focused around an accurate assessment of national interests, which includes appreciating the importance of the Canadian-American relationship. These assessments were reflected (though less emphatically) in the 2003 Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) study of options for Canadian foreign policy. The study recommended that “Canada should concentrate its foreign policy resources on areas and issues where it can expect to have significant impact in serving its own national interest” and “should put more emphasis…on the protection and maintenance of Canadian interests than on the projection abroad of Canadian values.”

According to these distinguished and well-respected experts, human security is seen as incompatible with Canada's national interest and ought thus to be abandoned in favour of a more self-interested approach and continentalist orientation.

**Human Security and Development**

Despite claims that human security represents the intersection of security and development, Canada’s human security agenda largely focused on the security or “freedom from fear” aspect. Consequently, Canada’s human security agenda was

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Institute, 2003): 7. He outlines Canada’s “very clear” national interests as the following: (1) Canada must protect its territory, the security of its people, and its unity; (2) It must strive to protect and enhance its independence; (3) It must promote the economic growth of the nation to support the prosperity and welfare of its people; and, (4) It must work with like-minded states, in and outside international forums, for the protection and enhancement of democracy and freedom. *Ibid.*

Granatstein, 8.


Stairs et al., *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003): 40. This study was a collaborative effort between Denis Stairs, David J. Bercuson, Mark Entwistle, J.L Granatstein, Kim Richard Nossal and Gordon S. Smith, prepared for CDFAI.
subject to pointed criticism from some in the development community for the decision to privilege security at the expense of development, when the two are considered indivisible from a human security perspective. In particular, Cranford Pratt chastised the “near-total absence of poverty reduction and equity from Axworthy’s advocacy of human security, rendering the pursuit of ‘human security,’ as the…government has presented it, severely inadequate as a humane and internationalist statement of what ought to be the central determinant of Canadian foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, James Busumtwi-Sam criticized that “although advancements in humanitarian law and human rights are important components of human security, they cannot be viewed in isolation from issues of poverty, inequality, environmental degradation.”\textsuperscript{191} Certainly, this line of criticism is compelling. The theoretical human security literature is quite emphatic in locating poverty (and its attendant hunger and health-related conditions) as a major, if not the preeminent threat to human security.

Further, beyond failing to prioritize poverty reduction as a component of Canada’s human security agenda, both Pratt and Busumtwi-Sam note the steady decline in the Government’s commitment to development assistance and poverty reduction during this period. Between 1993 and 2000 Canada’s commitment to Official Development Assistance fell from 0.44 to 0.25 percent of GNP (from a high of nearly $3.1 billion in 1994/95 to nearly $2.6 billion in 2000/01.)\textsuperscript{192} The overall picture is grim: systematic cuts to aid budgets, increases in tied aid\textsuperscript{193}, and a disproportionate decline in aid earmarked for the neediest regions in the world.\textsuperscript{194} Additionally, it appears that the human security agenda put further strain on already shrinking CIDA expenditures, as “additional demand on aid resources, including for emergency humanitarian relief, post-

\textsuperscript{193} Tied aid is conditional in that it requires the aid recipient to purchase goods or services required to implement development programs or poverty reduction strategies from the donor country. Consequently, a percentage of the tied aid flows back to the donor country, rather than stimulating the developing country’s economy.
\textsuperscript{194} Tim Draimin and Brian Tomlinson note that “aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, a region characterized by growing and extreme conditions of poverty, has declined in nominal dollars by 30.4 per cent between 1992-3 and 1996-7, a rate greater than that for either ODA as a whole (21.2 per cent) or bilateral aid (16.8 per cent).” Draimin and Tomlinson, “Is There a Future for Canadian Aid?,” in \textit{Canada Among Nations 1998: Leadership and Dialogue}, eds. Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998): 153-154.
conflict reconstruction, and security-related objectives, put further pressure on budgets for long-term development and poverty reduction programs.” At the heart of it, this line of criticism questions how Axworthy and the Canadian government could claim to be committed to human security, without addressing arguably the greatest indiscriminate killer of people.

From the development perspective, human security has also been charged with embodying the qualities of neo-colonialism. Mark Duffield asserts that the blurring of security and development has served to classify underdevelopment as a security threat, emanating primarily from the South. He argues that casting “underdevelopment as dangerous, for example, can be seen as part of a moral rearming of the North. It both confines the causes of conflict to the South and helps provide legitimisation for outside involvement.” From this line of argument, it appears that human security provides a moral and humanistic justification for increased Western intervention which obscures the more self-interested motives of domestic security. Duffield further asserts that such has also had the effect of radicalising development, particularly since 9/11, as development policy has de-emphasized poverty reduction as a focus for assistance in favour of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and rebuilding failed states, as a means of protection for the North. Indeed, there is a danger in the way in which this emphasizes the global South, the disproportionate locus of underdevelopment, as a threat to the North; particularly, as it fails to accept any responsibility for the processes, structures and policies which have contributed to the ever-widening inequity between the global North and South. Those states advocating a human security approach have largely been wealthy, liberal democracies which have an interest in maintaining the status quo (in terms of the institutions of global governance), while at the same time forcing their notions of the appropriate route to development and security on the underdeveloped nations of the South, who have little power to resist. Such a line of criticism is indeed formidable.

197 Western intervention, as used here, is meant to be broadly conceived, as either intervention into the activities of another state, whether through development assistance contingent on the acceptance of neoliberal reforms or military intervention during conflict.
Response, Rebuttal and Reflections

Thus far, this chapter has summarized some of the most common arguments against the concept of human security and Canada’s adoption of the human security agenda as a foreign policy priority. As will be discussed, some of this criticism is quite well-placed. Yet, what stands out is that the difficulty lies primarily with how human security was promoted, rather than the idea or spirit of human security itself.

As a concept, human security was criticized by many for the absence of a firm definition. Like many concepts (such as power or politics), it has many definitions; however, at its very core, human security is about the protection and empowerment of people. The UN provides a particularly holistic definition, as human security entails “freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.” The actual disagreement centers on how to prioritize the threats that people need to be protected from, which has been portrayed as a definitional debate between those who advocate the holistic approach and those who prioritize “freedom from fear.” The critics portray the prioritization of threats as human security’s Achilles heel, but the academic literature provides several different schemes for establishing a policy response to the countless threats and vulnerabilities, ranging from a threshold- or severity-based prioritization process to a ‘deprivation-vulnerability’ approach, to a human security index, modeled after the HDI. Further, the adoption of human security as a foreign policy framework by Canada and Japan, who each prioritized different aspects, demonstrates both that prioritization is feasible and that states can choose to address threats based on their capabilities.

As a guide for policy, Canada’s human security agenda was criticized for overselling soft power as a policy tool. Some critics, like Nossal, rejected the utility of the concept of soft power: “the term itself has little to commend it” as it is not power at

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all, at least in the realist sense he advocates.\textsuperscript{202} Axworthy was also criticized for improperly applying a concept developed to explain an American phenomenon to a Canadian context. Nye explains that soft power "uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation – an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values."\textsuperscript{203} Further, Nye insists that soft power is not exclusively wielded by the US and acknowledges that Canada is "very adept in using soft power."\textsuperscript{204} But, the core of the critics’ problem with soft power was that Axworthy consistently touted its utility while neglecting the role that traditional hard power resources could play in supporting the agenda. It is true that in the agenda’s early days Axworthy almost exclusively focused on soft power as a means of promoting human security, given what he saw as Canada’s innate talent for coalition building, idea development and building consensus.\textsuperscript{205} As a result of these critiques and changes in the policy environment, a more balanced approach to the agenda’s policy tools materialized in the 1999 DFAIT concept paper, which emphasized the continuing importance of hard power in support of human security and other foreign policy priorities.\textsuperscript{206} Additionally, Axworthy acknowledged that “soft power cannot always work: the harsh realities of living in a tough, global neighbourhood sometimes require forceful measures.”\textsuperscript{207} Both sets of policy tools have been used to dramatic ends in support of Canada’s human security agenda: soft power was credited with success in delivering the Landmines Treaty, the ICC and ICISS, while traditional hard power resources were brought to bear in responding to crises and humanitarian emergencies, most notably in the Balkans.

In regards to promotion and implementation, the human security agenda was rightly criticized for the glaring disparity between the agenda’s ambition and the resources allocated for follow-through. It is no secret that the 1990s were a particularly

\textsuperscript{202} Nossal, “Foreign Policy for Wimps.”
\textsuperscript{205} Axworthy, “Introduction,” 9
\textsuperscript{207} Axworthy, \textit{Navigating a New World}, 155.
difficult time for foreign policymaking in Canada: the CF and diplomatic service were overextended and desperate for reinvestment; key departments were facing massive budget cuts in an effort to reduce the federal deficit; and policymakers were trying to navigate a transformed international system. Thus, the claim that the human security agenda faced a critical commitment-capability gap was really part of a larger argument regarding the abysmal state of Canada’s hard power resources and overall international decline. It is also important to make a distinction between the rhetoric used to promote the concept of human security to domestic and international audiences and that used to promote the specific and much narrower agenda undertaken by the Canadian government. Canada’s early human security policy priorities (international norm creation and institutional capacity building) reflected the limited resources of the department. Canadian defence experts Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky concede that “in retrospect, Axworthy’s embrace of ‘soft power’ looks like a shrewd tactical move, a way of making the most of the limited cards he had been dealt.”208 As departmental and program budgets started to recover, Canada’s policy priorities for human security grew to reflect increased resource allocation and the post 9-11 policy environment.209 Ultimately, the rhetoric regarding Canada’s human security agenda reflected the reality of the policymaking environment of the day: as the resources allocated to human security grew, so too did the priorities on the agenda.

The rhetoric of the human security agenda was also subject to critiques regarding its overly moralizing nature. The claims to excessive moralizing on the part of Axworthy are largely grounded in the concern that Canada preserves its international credibility, which is seen to be under threat from the expanding gap between the rhetoric of the human security agenda and reality of declining resources and resolve. Accusations of such moralizing are not unique to Axworthy, as John English acknowledges a “moralistic and idealistic strain in the Liberal tradition,” which Denis Stairs extends to Mulroney and Clark.210 Further, such is not unique to Canada either, as states have been couching their foreign policy as moral imperatives for decades, like the US framing the Cold War

208 Jockel and Sokolsky, 7.
209 By 2004, Canada’s five priorities for advancing human security included: public safety through countering transnational crime, drugs and terrorism; protection of civilians through building international norms and responding to acute crises; strengthening the capacity of international community to prevent and resolve conflicts; promoting good governance and accountability in public and private sector institutions; and bolstering the international capacity to undertake peace support operations. DFAIT. Freedom from Fear: Canada’s Foreign Policy for Human Security, (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2002): 3.
and War on Terror as a fight between good and evil. While moralizing rhetoric appears to be commonplace in the practice of foreign policy, the critics are correct in raising concerns about the impact on Canada’s credibility that is derived from the use of such rhetoric at a time when Canada’s capabilities are limited. On the one hand, Axworthy was attempting to promote the concept of human security and convince states and organizations of its utility. Undeniably, there is a moral premise regarding the importance of human life underlying human security which necessitates some level of moralizing given the nature of the concept. On the other hand, where Axworthy’s rhetoric inflated Canada’s capacity for action or contributions to human security or set unrealistic expectations for threatened populations, Canada’s international reputation amongst those it sought to influence and those it was looking to protect could be irreparably damaged.

Some critics found the morality of human security to be the fundamental issue with the agenda. Bain was explicit about his animosity towards human security as a framework for foreign policy, though this posture appears to be derived from a realist perspective which is at odds with the ethical and normative thrust of the agenda. The ethic of realism posits that foreign policymakers have a moral responsibility only to their citizens, and thus the maxim underlying human security is incompatible with a realist perspective. Human security is derived from a Kantian cosmopolitan ethic which seeks to promote the well-being of humankind, regardless of the nationality in one’s passport. Heather A. Smith explains that “the term ‘cosmopolitan’ is meant to denote an ethical foreign policy – one that accepts our moral obligations and duties to others. It also recognizes the interconnectedness of global issues, thus militating against focusing on one pillar to the detriment of another.”211 Such a cosmopolitan ethic has been present in Canadian foreign policy since at least the time of Trudeau, as in 1964 he declared that “the role of leadership today is to encourage the embrace of a global ethic. An ethic that abhors the present imbalance in the basic human condition…an ethic that extends to all men, to all space, and through all time.”212 Certainly, such a statement represents the charges of universalism that Bain argues is characteristic of the human security agenda. However, it is felt that Bain’s argument is overstated, as the conception of the ‘good life’

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advocated by Canada’s human security agenda is one which emphasises and seeks to protect life – and survival is the most universal of pursuits.

Canada’s human security agenda was rebuked by realist critics for usurping the place of the national interest in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. For such critics, human security exemplified the ascendance of a values-based foreign policy, which was seen to divert attention and resources away from Canada’s “objective” national interests, like global order, territorial security and economic prosperity. This approach is not without its problems. It assumes far too casually that national interests are concrete and easily identified. Jennifer Welsh stresses that “national interests don’t fall from the sky. They are constructed by particular processes, people and institutions. It is analytically problematic to assume that this is a neutral and straightforward exercise.”

George MacLean agrees, adding that “a country’s national interest is that which contributes to self-preservation, national security, sufficiency and prestige. More substantively, the interests of a nation are both objective and substantive.” This highlights a second issue with the critics’ case, as they have framed foreign policy formulation in such a way that an artificial distinction was established between an idealistic, values-based foreign policy and one motivated by a realistic assessment of the national interest. Welsh rebuffs this distinction, explaining that “it is artificial to juxtapose interests and values, as if the former were selfish and narrow, and the latter ethical and internationalist. In reality, values and interests work much more in tandem.”

Joseph Nye concurs, arguing that “a democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values are simply intangible interests.” Third and relatedly, this line of criticism appears to assume that the objective of the human security agenda was solely the projection of Canadian values abroad and not a contribution to territorial security, economic prosperity and global order. In fact, Canada’s human security agenda sought to make concrete contributions to international peace and stability, through peacebuilding and conflict prevention measures, the creation of international norms and institutional capacity building. Canada’s human security agenda had and has the

215 Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” 36.
potential to make significant contributions to “the stable global framework” that is the foundation for Canada’s security and prosperity.

Canada’s human security agenda was also criticized for its neglect of the development concerns associated with human security. The justifications provided for why Canada chose to implement a “freedom from fear” agenda rather than attempting to operationalize the holistic conception of human security have been explored in this chapter. It was argued that underdevelopment could not be addressed in the presence of war and therefore focusing on “freedom from fear” would create the conditions whereby development would be possible. Addressing violent threats to humanity was deemed a better fit for Canada, given the country’s limited capabilities, traditional strengths as a negotiator, innovator and peacekeeper, and as a consequence of the institutional division of responsibility for Canada’s foreign policies. While these factors seek to explain why Canada chose to concentrate on violent threats to people, they do not convincingly address why development and poverty reduction, critical components of human security, failed to be a concern of Canada’s human security agenda and actually received drastic budget cuts at the same time as human security was being emphatically promoted abroad. However, as Canada’s fiscal situation improved at the turn of the new millennium, there was a renewed emphasis on development assistance and poverty reduction. Between 2001 and 2005 Canada’s development assistance rose from 0.25 to 0.33 percent of GNP\(^{217}\) and in 2002 PM Chrétien pledged to double international assistance by 2010-2011 with at least half intended for African development.\(^{218}\) In a move to address a pressing impediment to poverty reduction, the Canadian Debt Initiative was launched in 1999, which placed a moratorium on debt service payments and eventually cancelled bilateral debt for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) committed to poverty reduction and good governance through the IMF-World Bank HIPC Initiative.\(^{219}\) By late 2004, eight HIPCs had their bilateral debt with Canada cancelled


and nearly $609 million in debt relief had been applied to thirteen HIPCIs under the CDI. A renewed commitment to development assistance, poverty reduction and debt relief re-emerged as an important component of Canadian foreign policy at the turn of the millennium, as Canada’s fiscal environment improved. This demonstrates that the neglect of the development component of human security was merely a temporary state of affairs and did not represent a wholesale rejection of Canada’s responsibility to impoverished states.

The charge that intervention in support of human security represents neo-colonialism is also a very troubling, particularly if one looks at human security interventions as a means to reinforce Western (or Northern) security. Again, it is difficult to provide a persuasive rebuttal to this line of criticism. It is clear that Western democracies, including Canada, perceive underdevelopment and violent conflict in the South as a potential threat to their security. This connection was clearly evident in Axworthy’s speeches and policy documents on human security; however, to infer from this that human security policies were primarily motivated by self-interested security needs seems excessive, particularly in light of the types of initiatives that Canada’s agenda focused on (which will be discussed in the next chapter). Additionally, the claim that human security served to legitimize western intervention in developing states may also be slightly overstated. While it is impossible to refute the fact that interventions are largely carried out by Western liberal democracies in Southern developing nations, there has been considerable effort – most notably by the ICISS – to characterize intervention in terms of responsibility to affected populations (rather than a right) and to prescribe firm rules and principles to oversee such interventions. However, there is no way to refute the fact that such interventions bring with them Western money, ideas, values and assumptions about how to approach security and development.

For advocates of human security, who see the operationalization of the concept as a means to address some of the most pressing threats to humankind, such lines of criticism may be difficult to accept. David Black and Larry Swatuk acknowledge that


220 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the process used by the ICISS to develop the norm of R2P went to great lengths to ensure the representation of perspectives from Southern nations in deliberations to ensure that the norm adopted was not merely a Western construct. Additionally, the Canadian government has worked to support the development of the African Union’s capacity for peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in their jurisdiction, which could serve to reduce the amount of direct Western involvement in African conflicts.
“such critical approaches are bound to be resented by those on the ‘front line’” but they caution that “such deep critiques need to be taken seriously if the more transformative and emancipatory potential of human security is to be approached.” Addressing the legitimate concerns of critics can only serve to strengthen human security, improve the policy agenda and produce the conditions for a greater acceptance of the human security approach to international security.

The foundational intentions of the human security agenda have their roots in Canadian foreign policy dating back to the postwar period. Internationalism has largely, though not exclusively, formed the overarching idea which has informed the practice of Canadian foreign policy and the formulation of Canada’s international security policy. While Axworthy promoted human security as a “new foreign policy paradigm,” the reality is that much of the “new” agenda had received attention, in one way or another, before human security became the prism through which issues were viewed. The novelty is in the way in which it framed and justified existing foci for Canadian foreign policy in terms of its effect on people. This is not to say that there were not new areas of focus or initiatives pursued under the human security agenda, quite obviously there was a shift in thinking and doing, but even the new initiatives and ideas about foreign policy were firmly rooted in Canadian internationalism and past foreign policy practices. This chapter will outline the human security agenda in Canadian foreign policy during the Chrétien government from 1993-2003 and the Martin government from 2003-2006.

Given the broad policy goal of Canada’s human security agenda – the protection of people from violence – the range of initiatives and tools used to promote human security were significant. As previously discussed, the 1999 DFAIT concept paper outlined two strategies for promoting human security: the strengthening of international legal norms and building the capacity to enforce them. In addition to these two categories of human security policy initiatives, Canada’s responses to international crises and human security promotion through summitry will be examined as they represent the human security agenda in action.

4.1 International Legal Norm-Building

The strengthening of existing international legal norms and the development of new ones to protect vulnerable people was seen as a preliminary but important method of contributing to human security. International norms are standards of appropriate behaviour that “embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment” and

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therefore provide justification for action. New standards of behaviour are defined and framed by norm entrepreneurs, who utilizing an organizational platform (such as a non-governmental organization or NGO, intergovernmental organizations like the UN, or a state agency), use a range of persuasive techniques to convince states and civil society of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a particular behaviour. Those international norms that have reached a sizeable threshold of support, begin to exert normative influence over states in the international system through international socialization which leads to the rapid, but not necessarily unanimous adoption of a norm until it reaches a point where it is taken-for-granted or internalized by states. Canada sought to bolster peoples’ security through the development of international norms that would prohibit a class of indiscriminate weapons, provide greater oversight of small arms and light weapons, protect civilians and children in armed conflict, and add an ethic of responsibility to the principle of sovereignty. In working towards the creation of a new set of international norms constraining state behaviour, Canada relied heavily on soft power resources to promote new standard codes of behaviour.

The Ottawa Process

The movement to ban anti-personnel landmines, or the ‘Ottawa Process,’ is likely the most well-known initiative of Canada’s human security agenda. The Ottawa Process demonstrated the ability of the Canadian government to assume a leadership position in the promotion of a new legal norm which sought to provide protection to people from the indiscriminate violence of a weapon commonly employed in conflict.

Anti-personnel landmines made their way onto the Canadian disarmament agenda as a result of incautious commenting by Ouellet, in the last months of his term as MFA. Ouellet had contradicted official Canadian policy by remarking that the production, export, use and stockpiling of landmines should be banned outright. Notably, this position corresponded with that of the International Coalition to Ban Landmines (ICBL), a sizable coalition of NGOs, UN agencies, and religious groups which had been working fervently since 1992 to raise awareness and pressure governments about the pressing

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224 Finnemore and Sikkink, 896-905.
humanitarian need for a comprehensive ban on landmines.\textsuperscript{226} Under substantial pressure from Ouellet and DFAIT, DND reluctantly acquiesced and Canada’s support for a comprehensive ban became official.\textsuperscript{227} Shortly thereafter Axworthy took over as MFA and vowed to continue to work towards a comprehensive ban.

Despite strong support from states like Canada, Sweden and France, the traditional channel for disarmament negotiations – the UN Conference on Disarmament – had proved incapable of surmounting opposition to a total ban. The ICBL convened several meetings of pro-ban states in 1996 and at the last of these Canada offered to host a conference to strategize ways to move towards a comprehensive ban.\textsuperscript{228} The resulting conference in Ottawa in October 1996 brought together fifty pro-ban states, twenty-four observer governments, representatives from the UN and strong representation from the ICBL, who had been instrumental in rallying support for the conference. It concluded with an invitation to reconvene in December 1997 to sign a comprehensive international treaty banning landmines.\textsuperscript{229}

The landmine treaty was promoted tirelessly in the thirteen months between conferences by the Canadian government and Axworthy, other supportive state leaders, foreign ministers, bureaucrats and the ICBL. Axworthy, who functioned as a norm entrepreneur, recollects that he wrote to every foreign minister about the forthcoming treaty, lobbied at every bilateral and multilateral meeting and rallied Canada’s diplomatic network to push the issue in their respective posts.\textsuperscript{230} Alongside the promotion of the emerging norm, the negotiation and drafting of the treaty took place over ten regional meetings and concluded at a drafting session in Oslo in September 1997, which was

\textsuperscript{226} ICBL was largely an informal coalition, comprised of organizations driven by moral outrage at the indiscriminate and long-lasting nature of landmines. Some of the organizations which joined the ICBL include: Doctors without Borders (MSF), Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, International Committee of the Red Cross, Landmines Survivor Network, Oxfam International, Physicians for Human Rights, UNICEF, Save the Children, the Vatican, and Vietnam Veterans of America.

\textsuperscript{227} Tomlin, Hillmer and Hampson, 230-233.


\textsuperscript{229} Axworthy and Sarah Taylor, “A Ban for All Seasons: The Landmine Convention and its Implications for Canadian Diplomacy,” International Journal 53, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 194-195. Axworthy’s call to reconvene after one year’s time to sign a treaty was a shrewd strategic move that was not planned and took participants by surprise. In fact, this strategy was the subject of serious criticism, as Ottawa was castigated for violating diplomatic etiquette and consultation protocols. Additionally, Belgium – a strong advocate of a comprehensive ban – felt that Canada had hijacked the landmines campaign, overshadowing the upcoming Brussels International Conference on Landmines. David Long, “The European Union and the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines,” Journal of European Public Policy 9, no.3 (June 2002): 434.

\textsuperscript{230} Axworthy and Taylor, 196. In Navigating a New World, Axworthy acknowledges that similar and reinforcing efforts were undertaken by other supportive nations, in particular Austria, Belgium, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and Switzerland, which he describes as the other members of the treaty’s “coordinating team.”
attended by over one hundred states but was overwhelmingly dominated by the American request for specific exemptions. Despite extensive negotiations and the personal support of both President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the US State Department was unable to overcome domestic opposition from the Pentagon and would not sign the treaty.

The campaign reached the tipping point in December 1997 when 122 states signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Landmines Treaty) and pledged more than five-hundred million dollars for demining and supporting victims of landmines worldwide. As a result of the success of the Ottawa process, the ICBL and its coordinator Jody Williams won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize which recognized the Ottawa process as a “convincing example of an effective policy for peace.” Further, in record time, the treaty attained the requisite forty ratifications and came into force in March 1999. Axworthy concluded that the experience showed that “using human security as a concept and soft power as a tool kit had produced a treaty that set out global norms for the protection of people.”

Canada’s diplomatic leadership on landmines did not end with the ratification of the treaty, as the real work in support of a mine-free world was just beginning. In support of Canada’s ongoing contributions to the implementation of the treaty, a $100 million commitment over five years was established in 1997 for the Canadian Landmine Fund (CLF), which was collaboratively managed by DFAIT, CIDA, DND and Industry Canada and was renewed for $72 million for a further five year period in 2002. These funds were used to support initiatives aimed at treaty universalization and to assist states in ratification and compliance measures, such as destroying mine stockpiles and demining affected areas. Exactly half of the CLF was earmarked for programs which

231 Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 143-147. The American had centered their acceptance of the treaty on three conditions: the exclusion of Korea; an exemption for anti-personnel mines used as protective devices for anti-tank mines; and a delayed timetable for the treaty to come into effect.

232 Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 150.


234 Axworthy, *Navigating a New World*, 155.

would directly impact the lives of those affected by landmines: mine clearance, mine risk education and victim assistance.\textsuperscript{236} Also, Canada helped to conceptualize and provided financial and logistical support through the CLF for Landmine Monitor, an unofficial verification system coordinated by ICBL.\textsuperscript{237} Finally, Canada provided leadership, logistical and financial support to the 2004 Nairobi Summit, the first review conference for the Landmines Treaty, and helped to draft the resulting action plan.

While the world is still far from mine-free, the Landmines Treaty has undoubtedly had a positive impact by decreasing the global use of such weapons and improving the security of people in states ravaged by their use. At the end of the Martin government in January 2006, 154 states had signed the treaty, 147 states had ratified it and forty states remained outside the treaty.\textsuperscript{238} The 2006 \textit{Landmine Monitor Report} highlighted that the use, production, trade, and stockpiling of mines had dramatically declined, while support amongst states outside the treaty was growing. An ongoing source of dissatisfaction amongst treaty advocates has been the abstention of several of the world’s major powers and leading producers of landmines, in particular, the US, China and Russia. However, demonstrating the transformative effect of international norms, each has declared a moratorium on exports and has made efforts to comply with aspects of the treaty (such as halting trade and destroying stockpiles).\textsuperscript{239} Canada’s human security policy helped to put the landmines issue on the international action agenda, develop it into international law, and continue efforts towards treaty universalization.

\textbf{Small Arms and Light Weapons}

The success of the landmines convention propelled the ban’s proponents to shift the normative momentum towards the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW). In his memoirs, Axworthy argued that small arms, like automatic rifles, are “today’s most prolific weapons.” He explained that they are “a legacy of the Cold War, when thousands were distributed to prop up satellite regimes or supplied to surrogate rebel armies, these


weapons have become the prime tool of destruction and disorder in parts of the world where order and legitimate governments are in short supply. Ernie Regehr, a renowned expert on small arms and disarmament, contended that “the availability of arms is the pre-eminent condition that transforms political and social conflict into war,” and further, that the movement of arms around conflict areas “is foremost among the conditions that frustrate the ‘agenda for peace’.” Canada’s human security agenda made the SALW issue a natural fit, though the complexity, sensitivity and lack of consensus around the best means to address the SALW problem was widely acknowledged.

The Canadian approach to SALW recognized that measures to address the issue had to go beyond strict arms control and include peacebuilding measures. The Canadian action plan on SALW proceeded along three mutually-supportive tracks. First, DFAIT sought to address the illegal trafficking of weapons through registries and efforts to improve transparency in the movement of arms. Second, Canada’s Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was utilized to finance small arms disarmament in post-conflict societies, with initiatives like weapons buy-back programs where former combatants received a stipend in return for their weapon, which was subsequently destroyed. Third, the Canadian approach advocated a campaign for banning the transfer of military SALW to non-government entities, modeled largely after the Ottawa Process. This campaign, A Proposed Global Convention Prohibiting the International Transfer of Military Small Arms and Light Weapons to Non-State Actors, failed to receive sufficient support from either states or NGOs and was largely abandoned by DFAIT and Axworthy in favour of pursuing the control of SALW through the UN and traditional diplomatic channels. Accordingly, Axworthy ensured that the SALW control issue was featured on the agenda at the regular and special meetings of the OAS, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), G8, NATO and in various UN bodies like the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

The issue of SALW controls was the focus of the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Canada participated

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240 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 345.
242 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 347.
243 Though, it should be noted that the proposed convention had some effect on norms, as the European Union adopted the core of the Canadian initiative in an official commitment to supply SALW only to governments. Regehr, 263-264.
244 Ibid., 265-270.
constructively in the negotiations and adopted the end document, “UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects,” despite disappointment that it had not gone far enough.\textsuperscript{245} The efforts of DFAIT on SALW control through the UN endured, with participation at biennial meetings and the 2006 review conference, and through supporting the implementation of the UN Programme of Action in other states and regional associations. Ultimately, Canada did not attempt to take a real leadership role on the issue of SALW control, as it had on landmines, though it always framed the issue as a threat to human security and influenced other states to approach it from a similar position.

**Civilians and Children in Armed Conflict**

Alongside the building of international norms on specific threats to people, like landmines and SALW, the Canadian human security agenda sought to push a broader normative agenda on the protection of civilians and children during armed conflict. While the *Fourth Geneva Convention*\textsuperscript{246} strictly prohibits the targeting of civilians during armed conflict, UNSG Kofi Annan lamented that “hardly a day goes by where we are not presented with evidence of the intimidation, brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in situations of armed conflict.”\textsuperscript{247} Further, the 1996 UNGA-commissioned study *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* found that “increasingly, children have become the targets and even perpetrators of violence and atrocities.”\textsuperscript{248} Quite clearly, this represents a severe threat to human security: Consequently, as a critical component of providing freedom from fear, the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict was deemed a top priority of Canada’s human security agenda.\textsuperscript{249}

\textsuperscript{245} Canada had wanted a number of substantive issues addressed, which were the source of significant opposition from other states: such as, the supply of SALW to non-state actors, civilian possession of firearms, and additional controls based on human rights / humanitarian and health considerations. DFAIT, *Canadian Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons In All Its Aspects*, June 12 2003, http://www.poa-iss.org/CountryProfiles/CountryProfileInfo.aspx?CoI=35&pos=10 (accessed 6 Mar. 2011).

\textsuperscript{246} Properly titled *The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War* (1949).


\textsuperscript{248} UNGA, 51\textsuperscript{st} Session, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General*, prepared by Graça Machel in pursuance of the UNGA Resolution 48/157 (A/51/150) 26 Aug. 1996: 9. The study found that during the cycle of conflict, children are threatened with murder, mutilation, abduction, recruitment as child soldiers, and sexual abuse including rape and forced sexual slavery, in addition to the general threats that arise, such as scarcity of food and housing and inadequate access to medical care.

\textsuperscript{249} DFAIT, *Freedom from Fear*, 3-5.
Canada proceeded on this priority by utilizing its newly acquired rotational seat on the UNSC to put the civilian protection issue on the UN agenda. During Canada’s first UNSC presidency in February 1999, Axworthy chaired two thematic debates on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with attention to the special needs of children. These open meetings featured briefs by the ICRC, UNICEF and the UNSG’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, which outlined the harrowing experiences of civilians during violent conflict. The Council responded by expressing its willingness to respond to “situations in which civilians...have been targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians has been deliberately obstructed” and tasked the UNSG with studying the matter and providing recommendations on how to “improve both the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict.”

Upon receipt of the report in September 1999, a UNSC resolution was passed supporting the findings and calling for further investigation to “take concrete actions aimed at enhancing the capacity of the United Nations to improve the protection of civilians in armed conflict.”

Canada’s April 2000 UNSC presidency led to a further resolution which called for peacekeeping missions to contain explicit provisions for the protection of civilians and sought to implement the recommendations contained within the UNSG’s 1999 report. Additionally, Canada co-sponsored Namibian resolutions which introduced child protection clauses in the mandates of UN peace support operations and emphasized the need to consider the impact of Council decisions on children.

Taken as a whole, these resolutions provide a normative framework for the physical protection of civilians and children in armed conflict. Elissa Golberg and Don Hubert applaud the “general agreement among members that the safety of civilians in times of war is a central, rather than tangential, concern of the UN Security Council.” Such concern is reflected in the mandates of most post-1999 UN missions, such as

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Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The mandates of include explicit instructions to “afford protection to civilians under the imminent threat of physical violence” and specific provisions for the protection of children, such as the inclusion of child protection staff and specialized plans for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former child soldiers. Importantly, these efforts have been sustained: the UNSC holds biannual thematic debates and receives regular reports from the UNSG on both civilians and children in armed conflict. Further, the significance of child protection in armed conflict has been reflected institutionally, as it has a dedicated special representative of the UNSG and an official working group within the UNSC. However, despite the considerable progress on the normative and institutional framework, a 2009 UNSC report acknowledges that “this progress has not been matched by a corresponding improvement in actual situations where civilians are affected by conflict.”

In seeking to improve conditions for children in armed conflict, the abolition of the use of child soldiers was a crucial component. Canada sought to raise the minimum age for recruitment and deployment of soldiers from fifteen to eighteen, an issue which the working group on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Optional Protocol”) was at an impasse. In pursuing this initiative, Axworthy assembled a large coalition from within the Canadian government, the NGO community and like-minded states to push towards the finalization of “Optional Protocol.” First, seed money was provided in early 1998 to the newly-formed Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers – a much needed NGO partner to lobby governments and raise awareness in civil society. Second, DFAIT hosted a number of international workshops and consultations to build compromise and strengthen the draft text of the “Optional Protocol”. Third, PM Chrétien used a Canada-US summit in October 1999 to forge agreement on the issue of deployment age with President Clinton. Finally, Canada’s delegation participated actively in the final

257 The minimum age for the recruitment and deployment of soldiers was not a new issue. Efforts to raise the minimum age had been ongoing since 1993. Ross Snyder, “The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,” in Human Security and the New Diplomacy, 154.
negotiations which produced a compromised agreement: the age of recruitment would be raised to sixteen, while the age for deployment or participation would be raised to eighteen.\(^{259}\) Demonstrating the resolve of the Canadian government on the issue of child soldiers, Canada was the first to sign and ratify the “Optional Protocol” and also used its time on the UNSC to urge other states to follow suit.

As a means of keeping children in armed conflict on the international agenda, Canada hosted the International Conference on War-Affected Children in September 2000 which brought together 135 governments, NGOs, and youth organizations in Winnipeg to develop a framework for action. At the conference, Axworthy negotiated a deal between Uganda and Sudan to encourage the release of thousands of child soldiers, held by the Lord’s Resistance Army; however, this agreement broke down a year later, highlighting the difficulty of translating principles into concrete protection.\(^ {260}\)

To that end, in 2001 Canada supported the establishment of the NGO Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, which monitors the rights of children in specific situations of conflict and reports recommendations for action to the UNSC.\(^ {261}\)

The issue of civilian and child protection during armed conflict also served as motivation for other initiatives under Canada’s human security agenda. The International Criminal Court (ICC - to be discussed later in this chapter) contributes to civilian protection by breaking the cycle of impunity for the most serious of crimes, which tend to be committed against civilian populations: genocide, war crimes (which includes the recruitment of children as soldiers), and crimes against humanity. Through investigation of such crimes and the trying of individuals responsible, it is hoped that the Court will act as a deterrent in addition to a mechanism for justice. The emerging norm of “the Responsibility to Protect” provides a framework for fulfilling the protection of civilians in the most grave situations – the categories of crimes for which the ICC is responsible. The protection of people is truly at the heart of the human security agenda.

**The Responsibility to Protect**

Canada’s creation and sponsorship of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) continued the trend of developing norms and legal instruments to protect people caught in violent conflict. Of the norm-building

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\(^{259}\) Snyder, 156-158.


enterprises undertaken, establishing a balance between the principle of state sovereignty and non-consensual intervention for the protection of threatened and vulnerable populations was undoubtedly the most contentious. The ICISS was established in response to UNSG Annan’s impassioned plea in September 1999 for a fresh approach to non-consensual military intervention for humanitarian purposes. He argued that the greatest challenge facing the UN was the need to “to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to stand.”

The challenge presented by Annan complemented the core of Canada’s human security agenda – the protection of people – and provided an opportunity to move the debate on humanitarian intervention forward after the difficulties of the Kosovo intervention. Axworthy formally introduced the ICISS to the UNGA in September 2000:

It is Canada’s hope that this new Commission can diffuse the anxiety that surrounds the issues of intervention and sovereignty by building a bridge between our current notions of these concepts, and in so doing, help to define the way ahead for governments and the UN to tackle the most challenging international dilemma of the 21st century.

Preparations for the intensive one-year study began with the creation of an open, inclusive and participatory commission structure that would represent all regions and perspectives. The Commission was to reach consensus through a series of commissioner meetings, regional roundtables, national consultations and informal working groups of academics, NGOs, and bureaucrats.

The completed report, The Responsibility to Protect, was presented to Kofi Annan in December 2001. As denoted by the report’s title, the Commission shifted the debate from “the right to intervene” to “the responsibility to protect” (R2P). R2P is “the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from

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264 The commission structure featured: two chairs (Gareth Evans, former foreign minister for Australia and President of the International Crisis Group, and Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian that served as a special advisor to the UNSG for Somalia and the Great Lakes of Africa) and ten commissioners of varied backgrounds, regions and expertise (including then Harvard academic and future Liberal Party leader Michael Ignatieff), who were supported by an appointed, fifteen member Advisory Board, designed to give political context and build political momentum for the Commission’s recommendations. After retiring from politics, Axworthy served as chair of the Advisory Board.
avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. In seeking to bridge the divide between state sovereignty and intervention, the Commission maintained the importance of sovereignty as an organizing principle for international relations, but argued that the concept implies a dual responsibility: to respect the sovereignty of other states and to respect the dignity and basic rights of the state’s people. Hence, the primary responsibility for human protection lies with the state concerned but when unwilling or unable to fulfill that responsibility, a “fall back” responsibility is activated within the broader community of states. Furthermore, the Commission stressed that R2P necessitates a spectrum of responsibilities for the international community, as there is a responsibility not only to react to an actual or apparent humanitarian crisis, but also to prevent such crises from occurring and to rebuild afterwards.

Prevention is logically the first priority, as the Commission emphasized that “the international community must change its basic mindset from a ‘culture of reaction’ to that of a ‘culture of prevention’.” Prevention measures include: improving early warning systems; addressing the root causes of conflict through long-term institutional capacity-building and development assistance; and, direct prevention instruments ranging from mediation to positive inducements (like investment) to coercive measures (like economic sanctions or the freezing of assets). When prevention fails, the international community may be required to use more coercive measures, like targeted political, economic or military sanctions to react to a situation of compelling need for human protection. Yet, military intervention remains an option of last resort, to be used only in situations where large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing is imminent or occurring. To guide decision-makers, the Commission developed a modified jus ad bellum for human protection purposes which seeks to ensure: just cause; proper authorization (by the UNSC, UNGA, or an even a regional organization, if the UN fails to act); that military intervention is

266 ICISS, viii.
267 Ibid., 7-8.
268 Ibid., 17.
269 Ibid., 27. To establish a culture of prevention will require “setting standards for accountability of member states and contributing to the establishing of prevention practices at the local, national, regional and global levels.” Ibid.
270 In the words of the Commission, “military intervention for human protection purposes is justified in two broad sets of circumstances, namely in order to halt or avert: “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.” Ibid., 32.
guided by the right intention and is an option of last resort; and that such actions use proportional means and have reasonable prospects for success. Following a military intervention, the responsibility to rebuild seeks to prevent further violent conflict and necessitates a genuine commitment to help build a durable peace through reconciliation processes and security sector reforms, promoting good governance with institutional capacity building and sustainable development.

The ICISS developed a relatively comprehensive blueprint for international action in the face of “conscience-shocking” atrocities, but building the political support to put such norms into practice would be a tougher job. In an overview of Canada’s leadership on R2P, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon explained that since the release of the report “Canada has done more than any other government to generate support for it among UN officials, foreign governments, and the NGO community, both at home and abroad.” Canada has used summits, bilateral and multilateral meetings to promote R2P to state leaders and foreign ministers. Further, DFAIT has hosted numerous conferences and workshops on R2P for policymakers, bureaucrats, NGOs, Canada’s foreign service officers, and academics. Finally, reflecting the centrality of the UN to R2P, Canada focused much of its advocacy efforts on promoting the norm within UN. In its submission to the UNSG’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, Canada urged the panel to consider the findings and recommendations of the ICISS report in their study of threats to international peace and security and the policies and institutions tasked with responding to such threats. The final report of the panel A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility endorsed the “emerging norm” of R2P and emphasized the need for the UN to improve its capacity for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Since the release of A More Secure World, the UN has largely taken the lead in the promotion of R2P. Endorsements of R2P have been included in the UNSG’s report In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All and the

271 ICISS, 32-37.
2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document. In support of the World Summit endorsement of R2P, UNSG Ban Ki-moon released *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* in 2009, where he argued that “the task ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the conclusions of the World Summit but to find ways of implementing its decisions in a fully faithful and consistent manner.” His report outlined a strategy to translate R2P from an emerging norm into a framework for action in the UN and served as the basis for three days of debate on the implementation of R2P. The UNGA debate on R2P in July 2009 demonstrated the incredible advancement of the norm, as “75 of the 93 Member States participating in the General Assembly debate gave strong statements in support of the Responsibility to Protect,” and a resolution calling for the continued consideration of R2P was adopted.

Canada’s efforts to develop and promote an international norm which protects people from the worst types of atrocities has been a difficult but ultimately valuable initiative of the human security agenda. While R2P is yet to be formally institutionalized into the operations of the UN, support for the new norm by the UNSG is strong and support amongst UN members has been steadily growing.

### 4.2 Institutional Capacity Building:

The 1999 DFAIT concept paper identified capacity-building as the second fundamental strategy for enhancing human security, as “there is little point in defining new norms and rights...if societies have no capacity to enforce” them. The term capacity-building became popular in the development community in the 1990s and was used to refer to technical assistance provided to a country to improve their ability to carry out certain functions or achieve certain objectives but can also describe a strategy of improving a state’s domestic capacity for action or response. Capacity-building may...
involve the creation or reform of institutions, the development of a specific skillset or institutional tools to provide a service or react to a situation. Institutional capacity-building was seen to be a critical component of Canada’s human security agenda. The following subsections outline the key initiatives undertaken to improve the capacity of domestic and international organizations to respond to and prevent threats to human security.

**Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative**

In the early years of Canada’s human security agenda, there was a clear attempt by DFAIT to develop the domestic capacity to enhance human security globally. The first of such initiatives was the establishment of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative (CPI) in late 1996. Axworthy saw peacebuilding as a vital tool in the provision of human security: “it involves casting a life line to foundering societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet” and thus the creation of a domestic capacity would enable Canada to respond to such situations in a rapid, flexible way. The objective of the CPI was to “to assist countries in conflict in their efforts towards peace and stability; and to promote Canadian peacebuilding capacity and Canadian participation in international peacebuilding initiatives.”

Originally, the CPI was comprised of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) which was to be jointly managed by CIDA and DFAIT, though the annual $10 million budget came from a reallocation of existing CIDA resources. The PBF was designed as a funding mechanism for developing domestic expertise and supporting peacebuilding activities that fell outside the jurisdiction or mandate of existing programs operating in conflict zones. The CPI was expanded in 1997 to include the DFAIT Peacebuilding Program (PBP), which was created to oversee “policy areas which fall outside the priorities of the CIDA Peacebuilding Fund.” The PBP worked with an annual budget of $1 million and was largely focused on building a Canadian capacity for peacebuilding through consultation.

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283 Ibid, 17.
with NGOs, academics and civil society, and supporting initiatives and capacity building in other multilateral organizations. Between 1996 and 1999, DFAIT and CIDA had jointly authorized and contributed to number of laudable projects, including: financial support for the implementation of peace accords in Guatemala and the former Yugoslavia; the drafting of guidelines for the UN on how to conduct DDR of excombatants; the founding of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, comprised of government and NGO experts; an advertising campaign to counter anti-ICC propaganda; and conferences in Ghana exploring comprehensive responses to child soldier and children affected by violent conflict. In 1999, the joint operation of the CPI broke down, with CIDA advising DFAIT that the PBF was no longer subject to joint ministerial approval, though they would continue to accept proposals. Consequently, DFAIT created a Peacebuilding and Human Security Division to manage the Human Security Program, the successor to the PBP.

The Human Security Program

The Human Security Program (HSP) was created to “support Canada’s human security agenda and to advance Canada’s foreign policy objectives,” with $50 million in funding over five years. HSP was a departure from the strict focus of the PBP on peacebuilding, but retained the emphasis on capacity-building in its efforts to advance the human security agenda. Specifically, HSP was designed to support diplomatic leadership and policy advocacy, country-specific initiatives, and domestic and multilateral capacity-building in five areas of concentration: the protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, accountability, and public safety.

A 2004 program evaluation found that “a small responsive fund such as the HSP can be very effective.” Between 2000 and 2004, the HSP funded 568 projects with nearly 75 percent of funding allocated to projects falling under the protection of civilians, conflict prevention and resolution, and governance and accountability priority areas – the major priority areas of Canada’s human security agenda. Major projects funded

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284 Small, 77-83. This is far from an exhaustive list of the programs and initiatives funded through the CPI. In all, between 1997 and 2000, the PBP provided financial support to fifty-two different projects. DFAIT. “Audit of Departmental Contributions in Support of the Peacebuilding Program (PBP),” 3.


286 Ibid., 1-2.

287 Ibid., 6.

288 Ibid., 22.
included: the 2000 International Conference on War-Affected Children and other related projects from the conference’s action plan; the Sierra Leone Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission; promotion and support for the ICC and ICISS reports; counter-terrorism legislation capacity-building in developing countries; research and consultation in support of Afghanistan peacebuilding; and funding for the start-up and operations of Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM). While this list of projects represents a very small percentage of the work undertaken as a result of the HSP, it demonstrates the breadth of the program and its ability to react to emerging human security issues or geopolitical changes, like 9/11. As a consequence of the breadth and responsiveness, it was found that “the HSP permits Canada to take a leading edge position on human security issues at a relatively low cost.”

The HSP was renewed by MFA Pierre Pettigrew in 2005 for a further five year period at the same level of funding. The renewal coincided with the announcement of the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) by the Martin Government, a $500 million fund over five years which would subsume the HSP and strengthen Canada’s ability to respond to international crises. The original mandate of the GPSF was to: provide a regularized funding mechanism for rapid response to international crises; meet Canada’s commitments to peacebuilding; and fill a funding gap between the CIDA Peacebuilding Fund and the HSP. Reflecting the priority placed on responding to the threat posed by failed and failing states in the 2005 International Policy Statement, the stated objective of the GPSF was “to ensure timely, coordinated responses to international crises requiring effective whole-government actions through the planning and delivery of coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis response, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile situations.” The GPSF has been used to fund peacebuilding initiatives and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction in Haiti, Afghanistan, Sudan, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Essentially, the GPSF is an institutional funding

mechanism for meeting Canada's R2P obligations, given the emphasis on conflict prevention, rapid reaction and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.

**Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights**

Flowing from the objectives of CPI and later the HSP, the creation of CANADEM in 1997 represented a clear example of domestic capacity-building in the area of expert deployment for peace operations. CANADEM, a non-profit organization funded by the CPI/HSP, deploys Canadian private sector experts in human rights, democracy and institution building, election supervision, peacbuilding, disarmament, policing, crisis response, child advocacy and protection, and a number of other areas required for contemporary peace operations, as requested by the UN or NGOs.293 Experts have been deployed around the world, including missions in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan and have served as a valuable resource for the Canadian government, the UN and NGOs on the ground in failed or fragile states and areas of conflict to bolster the capacity of recipient states in the aforementioned areas.

The creation of Canada Corps by the Martin government in 2004 was to serve a similar purpose as CANADEM, but is managed by CIDA. Established as a priority in the *International Policy Statement*, Canada Corps was highlighted as a “key mechanism for providing governance assistance to developing countries” by bringing together Canadians with governance expertise from the government, NGOs and the private sector.294 Like CANADEM, this tool develops Canada’s capacity to prevent, react and rebuild through the deployment of experts to situations where such expertise is direly needed. Canada Corps sent electoral observer missions to Ukraine in 2004, Haiti in 2006 and to supervise the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, before the Harper Conservatives scrapped the program late in 2006.295

**The International Criminal Court**

Canada’s unwavering support for the creation of the ICC represents the human security agenda’s greatest contribution to international capacity-building. As an ardent

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supporter of international humanitarian law, efforts to develop a court to investigate, prosecute and punish gross violations of international law was seen as a natural extension of Canada's internationalist foreign policy. The ICC was viewed as a means to overcome "one of the glaring deficiencies in international law," namely the "absence of a satisfactory means for adopting, applying and enforcing legal norms." 296

Canada approached the negotiations at the Rome Conference in a similar vein to the Landmine Treaty, which prescribed collaboration with supportive states and the formation of "the Like-Minded Group" (LMG), which was chaired by Canada. 297 The LMG was instrumental in the formation of the ICC though the development of the four "cornerstone positions" that would eventually provide the framework for an effective and independent court. 298 In addition to providing moral, diplomatic and financial leadership during the process leading up to and including the Rome Convention, Canada and the LMG worked tirelessly lobbying states, compromising and brokering provisions of the statute, and supporting the participation of impoverished nations through the creation of a special trust fund, so as to ensure that the process leading to the adoption of the ICC was as inclusive and legitimate as possible. 299

During the negotiation of the ICC statute at the Rome Convention of 1998, Canada and its counterparts in the LMG played a pivotal role. Canada's lead negotiator for the Rome Convention, Philippe Kirsch, was selected to chair the main negotiating committee (the Committee of the Whole) and resulted in Canadian delegates playing a major support role in drafting the key provisions of the Rome Statute. 300 Darryl Robinson, a renowned legal scholar involved in the negotiations, acknowledged the indispensable work of his peers, stating that "the Canadian delegation played a brokering role in all areas of negotiation – the definition of crimes, jurisdiction, general

298 Robinson notes that the LMG eventually grew to include over sixty states, though the core group included Argentina, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Norway, South Korea, South Africa, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago and the UK. Knight, 126.
299 The four "cornerstone positions" require the ICC to have: (1) inherent jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression, whether committed during armed conflict between States or internally within nations; (2) a defined and constructive relationship with the UN Security Council that preserves the independence and impartiality of the Court; (3) the ability to initiate proceedings through an independent prosecutor, concerned states and/or referrals by the Security Council; and (4) an awareness of the experiences of victims, particularly women and children, in armed conflict and the criminal law process. DFAIT, “Canada and the International Criminal Court – About the Court – History,” 22 July 2009. http://www.international.gc.ca/court-cour/history-histoire.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=58&menu=R. (accessed 25 Sept. 2010).
300 Ibid.; and Knight, 128.
principles, procedures, and the structure of the institution – by bridging gaps and finding creative ways to address legitimate concerns while maintaining a strong court.\textsuperscript{301} The work of the Canadian delegation was strongly supported by the lobbying and campaigning efforts of Axworthy. At the Conference’s opening session, Axworthy framed the court as a deterrent to wanton violations of humanitarian law and a way to end the cycle of impunity: “Without justice, there is no reconciliation, and without reconciliation, no peace. To achieve this end, we must work together, not simply to establish the court, but to ensure that it is one worth having.”\textsuperscript{302} Further, Axworthy mobilized parliamentarians and the diplomatic corps to lobby their counterparts in foreign governments to support the negotiations for an effective independent court. The utilization of soft power cooperatively by various components within the Canadian government and NGO community provided a substantive contribution to the formation of the ICC.

Despite significant progress, the Rome Convention failed to reach finalized negotiations on a number of contentious issues regarding funding, subject-matter jurisdiction and the means by which jurisdiction would be triggered. In spite of these longstanding difficulties, Kirsch and the Bureau of the Committee of the Whole opted to propose a statute to the convention. According to Kirsch, the package “represented the state of negotiations to that point and the clear trends that had emerged from the debates and consultations” and incorporated solutions which sought to “bridge gaps and accommodate concerns in such a way as to broaden support.”\textsuperscript{303} The package was adopted on July 17, 1998 by 120 states as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; though notably absent from this strong showing of states were China, India, Pakistan and the US (who had unsuccessfully pushed for an absolute exemption of their soldiers from prosecution).\textsuperscript{304}

With the statute adopted, the Canadian delegation to the Rome Convention, Axworthy and officials in DFAIT made quick work of ensuring Canada’s compliance while

\textsuperscript{301} Robinson, 173. For example, the definition of crimes against humanity adopted in the Rome Statute flows from a Canadian proposal which ensured that jurisdiction was not limited to situations of armed conflict, but included crimes committed internally and during peacetime. Also, the Canadian delegation ensured the inclusion of specific sexual and gender-based crimes as well as the conscription of children into armed hostilities. Robinson and Valerie Oosterveld, “The Evolution of International Humanitarian Law,” in Human Security and the New Diplomacy, 164-165.


\textsuperscript{304} Robinson, 173 and 175.
encouraging and supporting other states to do the same. By July 2000, Canada had signed and ratified the Rome Statute and its collateral instruments, passed the requisite domestic legislation and paid its dues in full and on time.\textsuperscript{305} The Rome Statute came into effect in July 2002 which led to a new push by DFAIT to reach universal ratification. To that end, Canada held workshops for other states on how to develop compliant domestic legislation, provided funding for an official ratification and implementation manual, partnered up with members of the “Friends of the International Criminal Court” (previously the LMG) for an international public education campaign.\textsuperscript{306} Further, Canada has exerted focused pressure on both China and the US in the hopes of bringing these major powers on board.\textsuperscript{307} In addition to promoting the ICC and supporting ratification, considerable efforts were made to support the operational aspects of the court, such as funding for the training of judges, lawyers and other court personnel and providing $500,000 for investigations in Darfur. Also, Canada’s lead negotiator Kirsch was elected as a judge and the first President of ICC; his contributions to the creation and functioning of the court led UNSG Ban Ki-Moon to refer to him as the “father of the ICC.”\textsuperscript{308} Canada’s diplomatic mettle was effectively demonstrated during the negotiation of the ICC and the efforts to bring the court into force; such was a firm foreign policy priority as the ICC was seen as a crucial instrument in building the institutional capacity to foster, support, and safeguard human security around the world.

4.3 Canada’s Response to International Crises

Thus far, the discussion of initiatives has focused on the proactive measures which seek to contribute to human security through advances in the international legal regime and enhancing the ability of Canada and the international community to respond to immediate and chronic threats to human security. Such initiatives are an important component of a foreign policy that seeks to support and enhance human security, but equally important are the policy responses to imminent or actual threats to human security. Thomas and Tow refer to such as “specific threats,” which are “actions that have an immediate effect on the safety or welfare of victims and demand immediate

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{305} Riddell-Dixon, 1083-1084.
  \item \textsuperscript{306} Ibid., 1084. The majority of funding for these initiatives came from the HSP, which spent over $2.5 million between 2000 and 2004 on projects supporting the ICC. (DFAIT, Summative Evaluation of the HSP, 22)
  \item \textsuperscript{307} Lana Wylie, “Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court,” American Review of Canadian Studies 39, no. 2 (June 2009): 118-120.
\end{itemize}
In the post-Cold War era, the international community has had more latitude in responding to specific threats to both human and international security (though, there is often great overlap between them). Additionally, the tools available to the international community to respond to specific threats have been augmented to reflect the increase in intrastate conflict: peacekeeping has been supplemented with peacemaking and peacebuilding operations.

The volume and nature of international crises in the post-Cold War era provided some impetus for the development of Canada’s human security agenda. However, the increase in armed conflict coincided with the well-documented decline of Canada’s foreign policy tools and a fiscal environment hostile to protracted international engagements. Consequently, Canada’s response to the myriad of international crises between 1993 and 2005 has been quite uneven. The response has been robust for some international crises, such as the series of conflict in the Balkans, which included preventative diplomacy, military intervention and peacebuilding. In many cases, such as Haiti, the DRC (Zaire, prior to 1997), Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone, and East Timor, Canada’s response has been to support the peace process through diplomacy and contributions to UN peace support operations, in conjunction with the use of programs like the PBF, HSP and GPSF to contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding. Finally, in some crises, like Darfur, Chechnya and other African hotspots, Canada’s response has been extremely limited, generally comprised of formulaic “statements of condemnation” from DFAIT and marginal diplomatic and/or financial support.

This subsection will outline Canada’s response to international crises which featured human security as either a justification for action or where it influenced Canada’s response. While the parameters of this project do not allow every crisis to be addressed, the cases selected provide a sufficient overview of the way in which Canada addressed threats to human and international security. Further, it is important to note that in all cases, there were mixed motives for Canada’s involvement: human security may have been one motive, but others, such as supporting allies, defending national interests and values, or contributing to the UN, featured in such decisions as well. This subsection will investigate Canada’s response to severe threats to human security in five international crises: Haiti, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Afghanistan.

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309 Thomas and Tow, 183.
Haiti

Haiti has been in a near perpetual state of crisis for decades. Ravaged by a string of coup d’états that replaced one corrupt, authoritarian government with another, the deeply impoverished people of Haiti have been subject to incessant violence, chronic insecurity and political instability, and consequently, little opportunity for sustainable economic development. Positive developments in the past twenty years, like a transition to democratic leadership, have been short-lived as armed opposition has continued to threaten democracy in Haiti. The result of such continual threats to Haiti’s democracy and security has been the near uninterrupted involvement of regional powers (like Canada, the US and members of the OAS) sanctioned by the UN, as either interventional forces or stabilization missions.

Following a 1991 military coup d’état which overthrew democratically-elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government, the UN authorized a multinational force (MNF) in 1994, led by the US to facilitate Aristide’s return to power. Chrétien turned down a role for Canada in the MNF, explaining that “we didn’t see deposing dictators as our role in the world” but made a commitment to the post-intervention UN stabilization and reconstruction effort. As promised, Canada participated in each of the four UN missions between 1995 and 2000, which were mandated to establish a secure and stable environment, professionalize the newly created Haitian National Police (HNP), and establish the conditions for free and fair elections. Canada’s contributions were substantial: “Canada ended up both commanding the effort and providing the largest military contingent in the international security force sent in to replace the US forces.”

In particular, Canada played a major role in the professionalization of the HNP through the deployment of civilian police, which was seen as “an important transition mechanism from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.” The provision of order and security in Haiti, of which the HNP training was a requisite part, was needed in order to undertake

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310 Diplomatic measures by the OAS and UN to mediate a solution between Aristide and the Haitian Army had appeared productive, appeared successful, with the signing of the Governors Island Agreement in 1993, but in the end, the Haitian Army reneged on the agreement. UN, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), “UNMIH: Background,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html (accessed 1 Oct. 2010).
311 Jean Chrétien, My Years as Prime Minister, (Random House Canada: Toronto, 2007): 90-91.
312 UN, DPKO: “UNMIH: Background”; “UNSMIH: Background”; “UNTMIH”; and “MIPONUH.” It should be noted that the UNTMIH and MIPONUH missions were tasked solely with the professionalization of the HNP.
peacebuilding, institution-building, elections, justice and national reconciliation, and economic development – all areas where Canada provided technical assistance and funding. In 2004, Haiti’s fledgling democracy was once again threatened by rebels opposed to Aristide’s government, triggering a renewed political and humanitarian crisis. In February 2004, under intense pressure by the rebels, US and France, Aristide resigned and again fled Haiti. At the request of interim President Boniface Alexandre, the UNSC immediately authorized a short-term Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to “contribute to a secure and stable environment” and “facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.” In this case, PM Martin embraced a role for Canada in the MIF and succeeding UN mission MINUSTAH by contributing 450 troops and a helicopter unit as “one element of Canada’s over-all strategy to help Haiti.” MINUSTAH had a much broader mandate than the missions that preceded it, emphasizing the need to support constitutional and political processes, promote and protect human rights, and underscored the need to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” at the urging of Canadian officials. Additionally, to meet the security objective, MINUSTAH explicitly called for DDR programme for all armed groups in Haiti.

Canada’s MIF forces were transferred to MINUSTAH in June 2004 and were augmented with the largest police contingent to the mission, initiating the second phase in Canada’s 3D (defence, diplomacy, development) strategy in Haiti. Canada’s civilian police largely resumed their training and professionalization programmes from earlier

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316 Yasmine Shamsie, “It’s Not Just Afghanistan or Darfur: Canada’s Peacebuilding Efforts in Haiti,” in Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2006): 213-214. There have been persistent accusations that the US engineered the overthrow of Aristide and forced him into exile as they no longer saw him as effective. PM Paul Martin noted that he had no reason to believe these claims; Canada did not support a call by CARICOM to investigate the circumstances leading to the collapse of Aristide’s government. Paul Martin, Hell or High Water: My Life in and Out of Politics (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Ltd., 2008): 342.
319 The Small Arms Survey estimates that up to 200,000 SALW are present in Haiti with the vast majority held by armed groups and civilians. Coupled with the high rate of violent crime, this represents an incredible source of insecurity. Robert Muggah, “Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 14, Nov. 2005: 14.
missions, though reflecting the lessons learned. Funding from CIDA and DFAIT’s GPSF worked to strengthen the provision of justice through HNP training, building the institutional-capacity of the courts to adjudicate the law, and securing detention facilities. They funded programs to improve the functioning of the Haitian Parliament and also provided $35 million to the Haitian election cycle in 2005-2006, which included training Haitians as electoral observers to develop their domestic capacity.\textsuperscript{322}

Early evaluations of MINUSTAH’s contribution to Haiti were mixed. The UNSG’s 2006 report warned that the security situation showed marginal improvement, but remained “fragile and volatile.”\textsuperscript{323} The difficulty of implementing DDR led to negligible results and coordination between the HNP and MINUSTAH was strained. The 2005 presidential election, despite some localized interference, was deemed a qualified success and “marked a further significant step in the reinforcement of Haiti’s democratic process.”\textsuperscript{324} However, the sequence of natural disasters – floods, hurricanes, and landslides – devastated the country and impeded the mission, due to the overwhelming humanitarian need. The 2009 UNSG report was more positive in light of encouraging trends in security, greater cooperation in Parliament, and a more professional HNP.\textsuperscript{325} But again, development was largely hampered by hurricanes, mudslides and finally the devastating earthquake of January 2010 (which will be discussed in the next chapter.) Peacebuilding and development objectives are difficult to meet when missions are constantly responding to humanitarian emergencies, particularly when Haiti already qualifies as a failed state without the added difficulties imposed by natural disasters.

The Balkans

The international crisis in the Balkans began in the early 1990s with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s partition into several independent republics was marked by an intense and complex civil war between several heavily armed factions. Canada had been involved in the Balkans during the Bosnian War, with substantial contributions to UNPROFOR from 1992 to 1995 and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in 1995


\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 1.

which brought the warring factions to negotiate the Dayton Peace Accords.\textsuperscript{326} Canada was deeply involved in the post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in Croatia and Bosnia, where the CPF contributed to: electoral preparations, civilian policing, landmine removal, infrastructure repair, and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{327} Where Canada's participation in UNPROFOR and IFOR reflected human security principles in action, Canada's involvement in the intervention in Kosovo reflected the evolution of the concept and consequently used human security as the justification for action.

Like the crisis in the Balkans, the Kosovo crisis arose out of the partition of Yugoslavia. As a Serbian province comprised primarily of ethnic Albanians, Kosovo had exercised significant autonomy under the central government of Yugoslavia; however, this autonomy was swiftly abolished by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević following the country's breakup. Following the Bosnian war, Kosovars undertook armed resistance against the Serbian police and Yugoslav forces, which elicited a heavy response, including repression of ethnic expression, ethnic cleaning and human rights abuses.

Most accounts of Canada's involvement in the Kosovo crisis highlight the return of hard power to Canadian foreign policy, but the “hard edge” of human security was only pursued after preventative measures had failed. On the diplomatic front, Axworthy engaged Milošević in 1996 on the issue of human rights abuses against the Kosovar population and pressured the G8 to apply economic sanctions against Serbia in 1998.\textsuperscript{328} Canada was especially active in seeking a solution to the political impasse that characterized the UNSC’s response to Kosovo. UNSC resolution 1199 acknowledged that the crisis represented a threat to international peace and security, but failed to authorize an appropriate response in the face of the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Canada’s February 1999 UNSC presidency was utilized as an opportunity to bring the UN onside, as Axworthy, Robert Fowler (Canada’s UN Ambassador) and Paul Heinbecker (Assistant Deputy Minister for Global and Security Policy) lobbied for Council authorization for intervention. When that failed, they began the groundwork to pursue a “Uniting for Peace” resolution through the UNGA.\textsuperscript{329} Simultaneously, NATO members

\textsuperscript{326} Canada deployed 1200 troops to UNPROFOR who were subsequently transferred to IFOR in 1995.
\textsuperscript{327} DFAIT, “Evaluation of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Program of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,” 15 and 30.
\textsuperscript{328} Michael Manulak, “Canada and the Kosovo Crisis: A ‘Golden Moment’ in Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 64, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 567.
\textsuperscript{329} The “Uniting for Peace” resolution (UNGA Resolution 377) states that when the UNSC fails to exercise its primary responsibility for peace and security as a result of impasse, the UNGA may consider the matter and make recommendations for collective action to maintain or restore international peace and security.
worked to negotiate a comprehensive settlement agreement, the Rambouillet Accords, but the outright rejection by Milošević in February 1999 marked the exhaustion of the diplomatic efforts. Axworthy recalled in his memoirs the difficulty with which he accepted the need for a military solution in Kosovo:

The policies that I espoused were founded on the premise of protecting people against violence and force. Yet it was those very principles that impelled me towards accepting the need for military action as a last resort. It was evident that ‘hard power’ might have to be used to protect against the abuses and atrocities that has become so endemic in the Balkans.

The failure of diplomacy and soft power in the Kosovo crisis led to the first military intervention justified in reference to human security. Heinbecker argued that “the war against Serbia was a war of values, a war for human security” thus heralding the hard edge of Canada’s human security agenda. The lack of UN authorization proved problematic for Canada, but ultimately it was decided that humanitarian concerns overruled the lack of Council authorization. To that end, NATO began Operation Allied Force, a three phase campaign of air strikes in March 1999 which broadened the categories of targets over the course of the three phases. Canada contributed eighteen CF-18 Hornet fighter jets, airborne tankers, surveillance aircraft and hundreds of ground crew and RCAF personnel to the NATO operation and augmented its military contributions with humanitarian assistance, with nearly $45 million for relief agencies on the ground. Canadian pilots completed approximately ten percent of missions against ground targets and led about half of the strike packages in which they were involved. Serbian forces responded to NATO air strikes by escalating ethnic cleansing and

According to Heinbecker, the “Uniting for Peace” track to UN authorization was eventually taken off the table as the Canadian contingent to the UN was “not sure that we would have gotten the clear authorization to act that the pressing nature of the crisis required.”

331 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 183. (Emphasis added)
332 Heinbecker, 15.
333 Despite this decision, Canada ensured that the legal case for intervention was strong. Justification was made in reference to “past UN resolutions, humanitarian law as embodied in the Geneva and genocide conventions, and the mission’s broad international support…the decision to intervene emphasized the necessity of the mission over its technical legality.” Manulak, 570.
336 Heinbecker and McCrae, 129. Though the Canadian contingent had relatively little influence on the planning and conduct of air campaigns, it proved a valuable ally by swiftly approving the transition of campaign phases and imposing few operational caveats on its participation. Manulak, 573-574.
launching a propaganda campaign against NATO, highlighting the collateral damage of NATO bombing with the purpose of undermining Western support for the mission. Consequently, NATO increased the intensity of air strikes, increasing air power from four hundred planes to over one thousand, while also discussing the option of deploying ground forces.

The intensification of NATO air strikes coincided with the search for a diplomatic solution. The May 1999 G8 foreign ministers meeting produced a set of general principles for a settlement of the impasse between NATO and Russia which would guide negotiation of a peace agreement and outlined the composition of an international peacekeeping force to take over from NATO. In developing the wording for the final agreement, Axworthy and the Canadian contingent were instrumental in finding compromise that made consensus possible. This statement of general principles provided the basis for the successful negotiation of a peace plan which Milošević agreed to in June 1999. Finally, the Canadian delegation to the UN worked extremely hard to negotiate the UNSC resolution regarding the settlement and follow-up peacekeeping mission in language acceptable to the Russians: the adoption of resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999 marked a great achievement in Canadian diplomacy.

The conclusion of armed hostilities marked the beginning of Canada’s postconflict peacebuilding efforts. When the UN-authorized, NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) took over on June 12, 1999, over fourteen hundred Canadian soldiers moved into Serbia and Kosovo to deter the resurgence of hostilities, create a secure environment, and support the international humanitarian and civilian presence. Canadian soldiers and civilians experts provided important assistance in demining activities, rehousing returning refugees, rebuilding critical infrastructure that had been destroyed during the airstrikes, disarming combatants and rebuilding security sector and government institutions. Axworthy recalls that “we won a commitment from cabinet for civilian peacemaking comparable to the money being spent on our military contribution.” Importantly, the experience in Kosovo, from failing to secure UN authorization for intervention to the criticisms regarding the infringement of sovereignty,
provided the impetus for a comprehensive evaluation of how humanitarian intervention should be approached. The result was the announcement of ICISS in September 2000. The Kosovo crisis demonstrated Canadian resolve in supporting the human security agenda, by putting the full weight of diplomatic, military and humanitarian resources into finding and maintaining a solution which would provide a starting point for the development of freedom from fear for the people of Kosovo and Serbia.

Sierra Leone

The West African nation of Sierra Leone has been characterized by authoritarian governments, political instability and endemic violent conflict since its independence from Britain in 1961. In the 1990s, a brutal civil war and conflict over precious minerals between the inept and corrupt authoritarian government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) devastated the country. Civilians were actively targeted by both sides in the most horrifying manner: murder, amputation, abduction, forced sexual slavery of women and children, and the use of children as child soldiers and human shields were commonplace.\textsuperscript{343} The inability of regional peacekeepers (ECOMOG) to enforce and implement the provisions of the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord necessitated a strong UN force to keep the peace process on track. The negotiation of UNAMSIL’s mandate corresponded with Canada’s term on the UNSC and consequently included a provision to “afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”\textsuperscript{344}

Despite urging a strong mission with a robust mandate, Canada’s military contribution was minimal\textsuperscript{345} – five soldiers to support the DDR plan – as the CF were “overstretched” by other deployments.\textsuperscript{346} UNAMSIL’s near collapse in May 2000, following the capture of nearly five hundred poorly trained and ill-equipped UN peacekeepers prompted calls to strengthen the mission. Recognizing the urgent need to sustain the mission, Canada contributed: a staffed Airbus to transport troops from countries without such capacity; thirty-seven soldiers for cargo-handling at the airport to


\textsuperscript{344} The mandate also included: implementation of the Peace Accord; monitoring the ceasefire; provision of humanitarian aid; implementation of the DDR plan; and to establish a presence at “key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone. UNSC, 4054th Meeting, “Resolution 1270 (1999) [On the Situation in Sierra Leone]” (S/RES/1270) 22 Oct. 1999.

\textsuperscript{345} In his memoirs, Axworthy recounts that “in Canada, Sierra Leone was a tough sell. We had major commitments at the time in the Balkans, and there was little appetite to go into such a messy situation – a view shared in most other capitals.” \textit{Navigating a New World}, 263.

\textsuperscript{346} Mike Blanchfield and Mike Trickey, “Chrétien rules out sending troops to Sierra Leone,” \textit{Ottawa Citizen}, A1, 13 May 2000.
get troops into the theatre quickly; and 1700 bulletproof vests and helmets for peacekeeping units without such basic equipment. Additionally, Canada provided $5 million in humanitarian aid with a further $2 million specified for housing refugees and war-affected children. Finally, Canada actively supported the reconciliation and justice process through the Special Court for Sierra Leone by providing: $2.5 million to fund operations; assistance in negotiating the terms of the court and managing its operations; the donation of a judge and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) investigators. These contributions reflect the importance placed on reconciliation as a means to stop the cycle of violence. Overall, Canada’s contribution to human security in Sierra Leone was minimal, when compared to other missions like Haiti or the Balkans, but minimal does not imply meaningless. While peace and development in Sierra Leone remains fragile, the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission was deemed a qualified success at the end of its mandate in 2005.

**East Timor**

After nearly twenty-five years of Indonesian occupation, the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence in a UN-sponsored referendum in August 1999. The announcement of the referendum results was followed by a descent into chaos, as pro-Indonesian militias unleashed a campaign of violence and destruction that levelled the capital city of Dili and caused hundreds of thousands to flee. Indonesian security forces failed (or refused) to uphold their commitment to maintain security, which forced the evacuation of the UN observer mission and triggered the planning of a humanitarian intervention.

Australia proposed a robust international force to intervene to stop to the atrocities in East Timor. Canada, while strongly condemning the continued inaction of Indonesia, was hesitant to commit to intervention without the support of Indonesia and the UN. Axworthy convened a meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) foreign ministers to urge support for intervention and to put pressure on the Indonesian

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leadership to accept outside assistance in managing the humanitarian crisis. With Indonesia’s endorsement, the UNSC passed resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999, which authorized INTERFET, a MNF under Chapter VII to “take all necessary measures” to restore peace and security, protect and support UNAMET and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Canada made a six month commitment of 600 troops, a supply ship, and two Hercules transport planes to INTERFET. Given Canada’s deployment of three thousand CF’s in the Balkans, this contribution was small but played a significant role in the mission. Canada’s two Hercules planes carried forty percent of INTERFET’s cargo and over two thousand troops into East Timor, while the supply ship (HMCS Protecteur) served as the sole source of oil replenishment for the entire mission. Rear-Admiral Roger Girouard recalls “our contribution was evident in the quantum leap with which living conditions improved in East Timor,” as CF’s cleared rubble, rebuilt critical infrastructure and public services, like hospitals and schools and provided a secure environment for refugees to return home.

UNSC resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999 established the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) which “had overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice. The CF assisted in the transition from INTERFET to UNTAET but were substituted by a much smaller deployment of five staff officers, twenty civilian police officers and civilian experts in political affairs and justice issues in March 2000. UN Ambassador Fowler acknowledged that “the bulk of Canada’s future contributions is likely to take the form of humanitarian assistance.” Nossal and Hateley argue that the “token and symbolic contribution” to INTERFET and UNTAET demonstrate that national interest trumped

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355 Girouard, 45.
human security in Canada’s response to East Timor. However, this is an unfair and inaccurate assessment. The modest numbers of Canada’s contribution deceive their actual impact on the ground. Further, Canada’s commitment was made clear when a troop contribution was assured, against the advice of Minister of National Defence Eggleton, who urged that the CF were overstretched because of the mission in the Balkans. Canada’s post-conflict financial commitment to East Timor is more difficult to reconcile with a genuine human security agenda, as only $7.4 million in CIDA funding was pledged.

**Afghanistan**

The Afghan operation represents a unique case in Canada’s response to international crises, both in terms of the motives and nature of Canada’s involvement. The terrorist attacks against the US by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 provoked the solemn promise of retaliation against the perpetrators, justified in self-defence and supported by NATO invoking Article 5 of its Charter (which considers an attack against any member as an attack against all.) As a consequence of Canada’s NATO obligations, close relationship with the United States, and Canada’s own national security concerns emanating from international terrorism, military involvement in Afghanistan was virtually inevitable. However, early explanations of Canada’s role in Afghanistan also highlighted human security concerns, as Chrétien informed the Canadian public that the mission would “act on a broad front that includes military, humanitarian, diplomatic, financial, legislative and domestic security initiatives.”

Canada’s involvement does appear to be rooted in self-interest, driven by the need to placate US security concerns and quell a genuine threat to Canada’s national security. But to claim that Canada’s participation in Afghanistan represents a hard shift towards the realist tendency is overstated. Jockel and Sokolsky argued that:

> Joining the US-led coalition in 2001-2002 to topple the Taliban was no departure for Canada from the nature of its recent defence commitments around the world. Here was still another multilateral ‘peace enforcement’ operation in a troublesome area of the world, fully blessed in this case by both the UN and NATO.

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357 Hataley and Nossal, 7.
360 Jockel and Sokolsky, “Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, expenses down, criticism out...and the country secure,” *International Journal* 64, no.2 (Spring 2009): 329-330.
David McDonough agrees: “Canadian participation in post-Cold War stability campaigns, of which Afghanistan is the latest perhaps most strategically vital, follows logically from its tradition of liberal internationalism.” Canada’s mission in Afghanistan represents a unique case but a consistent approach to international peace and security: it is unique in that it represents a comprehensive response to the international security implications of a failed state, while it is consistent with prior international engagements in that Canada participated in a mission with widespread international support and UN authorization. A human security approach influenced the operational strategy in Afghanistan as it was recognized that a purely military oriented approach would fail to address the underlying factors which had contributed to state failure and allowed Afghanistan to become a haven for terrorists. Addressing the lack of effective political institutions, the suppression of women and the extreme levels of poverty faced by the Afghan people was deemed as important to the success of the mission as driving out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

The military component of Canada’s Afghanistan mission has had several distinct phases. The initial post-9/11 deployment consisted of a naval task force of six warships and 1500 naval personnel which conducted maritime interdiction and force protection from October 2001 to October 2003. Canada’s special operations forces were deployed to Kandahar in December 2001 and were joined by 750 combat troops in January 2002 for a six month rotation in a combat role to assist the US with counterinsurgency operations. The second phase began in spring 2003 with the deployment of 2000 ground troops in a peace-support capacity as part of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by providing security in and around Kabul. In August 2003 NATO assumed control of ISAF and in October 2003 ISAF’s mandate was expanded to include all regions of Afghanistan – decisions that

364 McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan,” 624. It is widely accepted that Canada’s decision to redeploy forces to Afghanistan in 2003 was a strategic move to keep Canada out of Iraq without abandoning the US in its War on Terror. Jockel and Sokolsky, “Canada and NATO,” 330; McDonough, “The Paradox of Afghanistan, 623-624; and Sjolander, 85.
Canada played an instrumental role in brokering. The third phase began in August 2005 with PM Martin reorienting Canada’s participation by taking over the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in the dangerous and unstable Kandahar region. The Canadian PRT in Kandahar was not yet fully operational when the Martin government was defeated by the Conservatives in January 2006.

In each of these phases, Canada’s military contributions were supported by humanitarian aid and development assistance. The desperate need for such assistance by the people of one of the most impoverished countries in the world was commonly cited as a justification for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. The report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan found that Canadian aid was used for: infrastructure projects, like repairing or rebuilding roads, irrigation systems, schools and prisons; development projects, like microfinance for women, community development councils, and rural development; and capacity-building measures, like training the Afghan National Police and teachers. Though Canada’s participation in the Afghanistan mission is clearly motivated by self-interest and national security concerns, the overarching premise of human security – that security and development are mutually dependent – is clearly evident in the approach that Canada and its allies have taken to address the threat that a failed state like Afghanistan poses to international peace and security.

4.4 Summity: Putting Human Security on the International Agenda

The final category to be explored is the use of summity to promote the idea of human security and Canada’s particular agenda. Summity is the “meeting of political leaders for official purposes, an activity which constitutes diplomacy at the highest level.” It serves several important functions in modern statecraft, such as: an

366 For the rationales provided for why the Kandahar PRT was selected by Canada, see Holland, 279-280.
367 In fact, both Chrétien and Martin were criticized for overemphasizing the development and humanitarian component of Canada’s participation in Afghanistan, while downplaying the combat, war-fighting aspect. Anita Singh, “Rhetoric in Canadian and American Foreign Policy Post-9/11: A Case Study of Intervention in Kosovo and Afghanistan,” presented at the 79th Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, May 30-June 1, 2007, Saskatoon, SK, pg 11.
368 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008): 28-29. The Panel’s report is more commonly referred to as the “Manley Report” and this overview of development activities is only a small portion of the activities undertaken.
educative role regarding policy implications; an occasion to explain and defend policy positions; an opportunity to promote an agreed position of two or more states; a forum to elevate important issues to the top of the international agenda; and an opportunity to exert strong international leadership, capable of producing desired results on chosen issues.\textsuperscript{370} Between 1996 and 2006, summitry was used skilfully to promote the concept of human security and its utility as a focus for international politics in ad hoc and institutionalized summits, to both critical and sympathetic audiences. This subsection will look at the efforts to promote human security through summitry in three cases: at the UNSC, through the Human Security Network (HSN), and at the G8.

**Non-Permanent Seat on the UNSC: 1999-2000**

Canada’s two year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC provided a unique opportunity to advance human security at the UN’s highest and most influential decision-making body. Though the campaign for a UNSC seat began in 1995, it took on a new sense of urgency under Axworthy, who outlined a three-part election platform for Canada. Canada’s proposed programme of action would focus on promoting human security in Council debates and decisions, improving the transparency of the work of the Council and increasing the Council’s credibility and effectiveness.\textsuperscript{371} While warned that campaigning on such an agenda could deter prospective voters, the strategy was effective as Canada received 131 of 171 votes on the first ballot.\textsuperscript{372}

The implementation of Canada’s UNSC agenda is interesting in that each of the areas were pursued simultaneously. In promoting human security, Canada’s delegation was primarily focused on getting the issue of the protection of civilians in armed conflict on the UNSC agenda. As this has already been discussed at length in this chapter, it will not be discussed here. However, in addressing the issue Canada utilized some procedural practices to improve the transparency and accountability of the Council, like holding open meetings on thematic issues involving non-member states, NGOs and civil society groups.\textsuperscript{373} Further, while acting as president of the UNSC, Canada initiated open thematic debates on a number of important human security issues, with implications for UN credibility and effectiveness, such as: the human rights dimension of conflict in

\textsuperscript{370} Dunn, 249-251.
\textsuperscript{372} Von Riekoff, 77.
\textsuperscript{373} Additionally, Axworthy and Fowler often briefed the media and non-member states about the content of closed-door meetings. Further, the Canadian government established a website that gave weekly summaries of Council business as a means of facilitating greater transparency. Von Riekoff, 80-81.
Afghanistan; applying the lessons learned from Rwanda to future humanitarian crises; and the humanitarian impact of sanctions.\(^{374}\)

On the objective of increasing Council’s credibility, Canada sought to improve the effectiveness of UN sanctions by accepting the chairmanship of the Angola sanctions committee.\(^{375}\) After receiving UNSC authorization, Fowler established a panel of experts to monitor how sanctions were being violated, by whom, and to propose recommendations on how to make them effective.\(^{376}\) The resulting report in March 2000 outlined the findings of the investigation, including the controversial action of naming those found violating sanctions; ultimately, three quarters of the recommendations and Canada’s proposal for a monitoring mechanism for sanctions violators were endorsed by the UNSC.\(^{377}\) The sanctions issue was revisited during Canada’s April 2000 presidency, as Axworthy chaired an open thematic debate on sanctions which led to the creation of a UNSC informal working group on sanctions, which would continue the work of the panel. Harold Von Riekoff argued that Canada’s efforts “not only produced tangible results in the case of Angola but also generated a wider momentum to reform UN sanctions practices at large.”\(^{378}\) Further, working towards more effective sanctions, particularly in regards to the illicit diamond trade’s connection to armed conflict, served to “curb a persistent source of conflict in Africa” according to Fowler, thus making a contribution to human security.\(^{379}\)

In large part, these initiatives were proactive, but as is well known, the UNSC is primarily a reactive body. During Canada’s UNSC term, several crises emerged that required a response from the Council. The Council’s responses to Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor have previously been discussed in this chapter. However, it is important to note that Canada’s experience on the UNSC during the Kosovo crisis – a source of significant frustration – led to Canada’s proposal for the ICISS at the Millennium Summit meeting of the UNSC.

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\(^{374}\) Pearson, “Humanizing the UN Security Council,” 142.

\(^{375}\) After decades of protracted conflict in Angola, a diplomatic breakthrough led to the holding of multiparty elections; However, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), resumed fighting immediately following the elections. The UNSC imposed sanctions against UNITA in 1993, which include: an arms and oil embargo, travel and asset restrictions, and a prohibition on the sale or export of diamonds by UNITA. Robert Fowler and David Angell, “Angola Sanctions,” in Human Security and the New Diplomacy, 192.

\(^{376}\) Fowler and Angell, 193.

\(^{377}\) Von Riekoff, 87-88; and Pearson, 143.

\(^{378}\) Von Riekoff, 100.

\(^{379}\) Fowler and Angell, 191.
Canada’s 1999-2000 term on the UNSC made some substantial progress in highlighting human security issues and made steps towards responding to them. Von Riekoff suggested that “Canada succeeded in getting the vocabulary and concept of human security firmly established within the UN system and to make it part of the prevailing discourse,” but acknowledges that there is much work to be done to make human security a reality. Canada’s term on the UNSC demonstrated that human security can produce results when it is backed by committed people, with sustained energy and a focused agenda.

The Human Security Network

The HSN was formally established in 1999 as a multilateral consortium of “like-minded states” brought together by mutual concern for human security-related issues. The development of the HSN began with a series of bilateral meetings between Canada and Norway in 1998, which sought to build on the cooperation established during the Ottawa Convention, and concluded with the signing of the Lysøen Declaration which outlined a collaborative agenda of human security issues. However, recognizing an opportunity to build a coalition of the willing, Axworthy saw the Declaration as a means of creating a humanitarian counterpart to the Group of Eight. By the first ministerial meeting in May 1999, the HSN had become a cross-regional group of ten members and one observer state plus a number of NGOs focused on maintaining the momentum of the Ottawa Convention, ICC, and Lysøen Declaration.

The HSN was largely focused on a “freedom from fear” or narrow conception of human security, but occasionally considered issues that fell under the broad categorization, like HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation. While the agenda for the HSN was open-ended, the issues that received the most focus (and were derived from the original Lysøen Declaration) were the ratification and implementation of the Landmines Treaty and the Rome Statute of the ICC, human rights and humanitarian law, SALW, the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict, non-state actors in armed conflict and conflict prevention. As should be evident, the agenda of the HSN was very similar to Canada’s human security agenda, which provided a valuable forum

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380 Von Riekoff, 101.
382 Axworthy, Navigating a New World, 405; Small, 233.
383 The members include: Austria, Canada, Chile, Ireland, Jordan, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Thailand, while South Africa participates as an observer. The HSN expanded to thirteen members by 2005, with the addition of Greece, Mali and Costa Rica.
for debating and developing concerted initiatives and policy positions to be articulated in other forums, like the UN. For example, statements were made on behalf of the HSN to: the 2001 UN Conference on SALW; the UNSC during open thematic debates on issues like the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict, on women, peace and security; and the first session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2006.

The importance of the HSN as a forum with which to maintain momentum on human security issues diminished under Axworthy’s successors. While MFA Bill Graham was a “strong supporter of the network,” he admitted that in the post-9/11 international climate “the HSN and its specific agenda ‘were not at the top of the list of our preoccupations.’” Further, declining foreign minister participation and the inability of Canada, as HSN chair in 2004-2005, to negotiate a strong position on R2P led to the questioning of Canada’s continued participation. While Canada’s leadership and sustained commitment to the HSN came under question, the group’s overall contribution did not: the UNSG’s 2010 report on human security stated that the HSN “continues to play an instrumental role in highlight the added value of human security.”

The HSN sustained momentum on human security issues, developed consensus on a number of sensitive issues and pushed for action in important organizations. It served as a tailor-made forum for the promotion of Canadian and international human security interests among like-minded states.

**Serial Summity: The G8 Summits**

Canada’s membership in the G8 afforded an unique opportunity to promote human security and its attendant policy agenda to the world’s greatest powers. John Kirton of the G8 Research Group states that the intended purpose of the G8 Summit is to bring together leaders to discuss pressing problems of both a domestic and transnational nature. He explains that:

> Beyond informal discussion, summit leaders had to produce, present, and persuade others of the value of new directions – the innovative principles and norms that would guide government policy-makers and their democratic publics along different paths towards an improved global

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388 The members of the G8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the USA.
order. They also had to take concrete decisions to put these new principles into effect.\textsuperscript{389}

With these intentions in mind, the G8 Summits are exceptional in their potential capacity to move items onto the agenda of the world’s established powers.

In his capacity as MFA, Axworthy capitalized on the opportunity to put human security issues on the agenda by demonstrating the connection to conflict prevention, a G8 priority since 1997. At the 1999 summit in Germany, the G8 foreign minister’s meeting final communiqué featured a stated commitment to “fight the underlying causes of the multiple threats to human security.”\textsuperscript{390} In seeking to address “the most serious threats to mankind,” the G8 foreign ministers agreed to support several major human security initiatives: the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict, SALW, the Ottawa Treaty.\textsuperscript{391} The commitment to human security was reaffirmed at the foreign ministers meeting of the 2000 G8 Summit in Japan, which produced a formal agenda of “Initiatives for Conflict Prevention” which largely reflected prominent human security priorities. Agreement was reached by the foreign ministers on a detailed plan of action on the following threats to human security and contributors to conflict: SALW, conflict and development, the illicit trade in diamonds, children in armed conflict and international civil police.\textsuperscript{392} While largely relegated to the foreign minister’s forum, “human security issues were at the top of the agenda, not an afterthought.”\textsuperscript{393}

Canada’s hosting of the G8 Summit in Kananaskis moved human security issues from the foreign minister’s meeting to the principal agenda. While the term ‘human security’ was not specifically used, the commitments made under the G8 Africa Action Plan (AAP) were decidedly human security oriented. The AAP represented the G8’s response to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)\textsuperscript{394} and reflects a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{391} This “G8 human security agenda” also pledged to: control conventional arms transfers; combat organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
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broad conception of human security as it prioritized security, development and health.\textsuperscript{395} The $500 million Canada Fund for Africa was created to support Canada’s compliance with the provisions of the AAP and was augmented by PM Chrétien’s announcement to double Canada’s development assistance by 2010.\textsuperscript{396} Notably, the AAP’s sections on ‘peace and security’ and ‘strengthening institutions and governance’ are largely congruent with the intentions of Canada’s human security agenda. For example, on peace and security, the G8 made commitments to support African efforts on: conflict resolution and prevention; peacebuilding; SALW, DDR, landmines and the role of natural resources in conflict; and the protection of civilians in conflict. Additionally, the G8 pledged to support the development of an African capacity for peace support operation, which resulted in Canada committing $20 million to the development of African Union (AU) peace support operations and further donations of military hardware.\textsuperscript{397} The strengthening institutions and governance priority correspond with Canada’s focus on capacity-building, as the G8 leaders committed to supporting NEPAD objectives of expanding capacity-building programs in all areas of governance. The Canadian government followed-up on this commitment with $44 million in funding in support for institution-building and capacity-building programs at the intergovernmental (AU), state and local level of governance.\textsuperscript{398} In large part, these items on the G8 AAP were maintained and built upon in the subsequent G8 Summits.

\textbf{4.5 The Achievements and Legacy of the Human Security Agenda}

Canada’s human security agenda, as it was developed and promoted by Axworthy and continued under subsequent MFAs, has demonstrated again that Canada is capable of making a difference in the world. The combination of a solid normative idea about the way to address pressing global issues, an activist MFA with the support of the PM and DFAIT, and the ability to direct limited resources in an effective way produced a foreign policy agenda with a number of significant achievements. While not all of the initiatives undertaken were successful, those that did succeed continue to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{395} G8, \textit{G8 Africa Action Plan}.
\item \textsuperscript{396} DFAIT, “What Has Canada Done So Far to Implement the G8 Africa Action Plan and NEPAD?”
\end{itemize}
influence the discourse and practice of international relations and in some cases have made a discernable impact on human lives.

A notable success of the human security agenda is undoubtedly the Ottawa Process which produced the Landmines Treaty. Axworthy recognized the considerable momentum the ICBL was generating on the issue of landmines and demonstrated that Canadian leadership, exercised through diplomacy, could build consensus and produce a new international legal norm in record time. While the treaty is not yet universal, despite the best efforts of Canada and others, the ICBL reported that 2010 witnessed the lowest ever use of landmines, demonstrating that the norm is indeed taking hold.\textsuperscript{399} Further, Canada’s initiatives in support of the treaty, like demining and the destruction of stockpiles, clearly work to protect people from the landmines indiscriminate violence and foster development as land once rendered unusable by landmines can once again be productive.

A second important legacy of the human security agenda is the way in which it pushed the protection of people in armed conflict onto the international agenda in a meaningful way. There was a distinct movement away from just concentrating on the warring factions in a conflict, to consider the needs of civilians and means to protect them. This was a major focus of Canada’s term on the UNSC, it factored into the way in which Canada responded to (some) international crises and received its ultimate expression in ICISS’s development of the norm of R2P. The protection of civilians and children in armed conflict remain a major focus and concern of the UN, as is exemplified through regular debates in both the UNGA and UNSC and through reports of the UNSG. The norm of R2P continues to gain momentum, albeit slowly. The next chapter will discuss how R2P has influenced Canada’s response to the crisis in Libya. While it is clear that many civilians throughout the world continue to be threatened by and targeted in armed conflict, Canada’s actions in support of human security have served to put this issue firmly on the international and UN agenda.

The final important achievement of Canada’s human security agenda is the establishment of the ICC. The incredible efforts of Canada’s delegation during the negotiations of the Rome Statute of the ICC and follow-up actions to support universal ratification certainly helped establish the institution. The importance of this institution,

\textsuperscript{399} ICBL, \textit{Landmine Monitor 2010} (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2010): 1. The Landmine Monitor 2010 reported that Myanmar is the only state that is laying landmines, while in only six other countries (Afghanistan, Columbia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan and Yemen) non-state armed groups continue to lay landmines. Further, only three states were identified as actively producing landmines for export (India, Myanmar and Pakistan), which is the lowest ever level recorded.
and therefore Canada’s efforts to support it, is derived from the way in which it supports other human security and human rights objectives; namely, as a protection mechanism for civilians by breaking the cycle of impunity and holding those responsible for grave human rights abuses and war crimes accountable. The ICC is responsible for the administration of justice for the gravest of crimes, and will hopefully also act as a deterrent.

These important achievements serve as the legacy of Canada human security agenda. Part of this legacy is the way in which the Canadian government was able to engage and cooperate with likeminded states to produce norms and institutions that made human security a central concern. Claiming such as achievements is not meant to indicate that the work is done: universalization of the Landmines Treaty and Rome Treaty of the ICC remains an important objective and R2P is still in the early stages of normative development; however, each represents an important step in the right direction towards providing freedom from fear.
5: HUMAN SECURITY AND THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT OF STEPHEN HARPER: IGNORED OR INSTITUTIONALIZED?

The electoral defeat of PM Paul Martin and the Liberals in January 2006 brought to power a minority Conservative government led by Stephen Harper, which appeared to signal a coming shift in the style and substance of Canadian foreign policy. While the rhetoric of a Canadian foreign policy that reflects Canadian interests and values was retained during and after the election campaign, the campaign platform and early foreign policy pronouncements indicated a shift towards a harder, more realpolitik orientation in Canadian foreign policy. The platform outlined the “need to ensure that Canada’s foreign policy reflects true Canadian values and advances Canada’s national interests” but also stressed the “need to strengthen Canada’s independent capacity to defend our national sovereignty and security.” Duane Bratt argued that “under Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, Canadian foreign policy has been transformed into an emphasis on high politics.”

The Harper government’s foreign policy record between 2006 and 2011 does appear to represent a shift from the internationalist to the realist tendency. Bratt identifies the Harper government’s foreign policy commitments to the protection of arctic sovereignty, the rebuilding of the CF and prioritizing Afghanistan as evidence of the return to “high politics.” Establishing “closer collaboration with the United States and increased cooperation with all hemispheric partners” as Canada’s first priority in the DFAIT Departmental Performance Report 2006-2007 also appeared to signal the resurgence of the realist tendency. Additionally, John Kirton points to an early decision of the Conservative government to be the first to cut funding to the Palestine Authority after the election of Hamas in January 2006 as an indication of a shift away from liberal internationalism. This decision paved the way for a more robust rhetorical

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401 Duane Bratt, “Mr. Harper Goes to War: Canada, Afghanistan, and the Return of ‘High Politics’ in Canadian Foreign Policy,” presented at the 79th Annual CPSA Conference, May 30-June 1, 2007, Saskatoon, SK, pg 2. Bratt does admit that the turn towards high politics began under the Liberals following 9/11, but that the foreign policy preoccupation remained in the low politics sphere, as exemplified by the G8 Africa Action Plan under Chrétien and Martin’s concern for human rights in Sudan.
402 Bratt, 2.
404 Kirton, “Harper’s ‘Made in Canada’ Global Leadership,” in Canada Among Nations 2006: Minorities and Priorities, 44. Most notably, the US and Israel followed suit shortly thereafter, casting Canada as a stalwart and uncritical ally of Israel.
recognition of Canada’s “alliance” with Israel, which included calling Israel’s 2006
airstrikes, artillery fire and invasion of Lebanon in response to the abduction of two
Israeli soldiers and rocket attacks by Hezbollah a “measured response.” While this
overview is far from complete or conclusive, the above foreign policy decisions highlight
the realist tendency in Canadian foreign policy.

The reorientation of Canadian foreign policy towards the realist tendency and
“high politics” under PM Harper was accompanied by a drive to remove human security
as a foreign policy issue at DFAIT. Jeff Davis, a columnist for The Embassy (Canada’s
preeminent foreign policy weekly), discovered from DFAIT insiders that “since taking
time…Conservative political staffers have worked to purge the language of the
previous Liberal government’s much lauded ‘human security’ policies from the DFAIT
lexicon.” Directives were issued to officials in DFAIT and the diplomatic corps which
forbid the use of phrases like “human security,” “public diplomacy,” “good governance,”
and even Canada’s foremost human security achievement, “responsibility to protect.”
Such efforts included the removal of Canada’s human security website and institutional
changes to reflect the Harper government’s priorities, as the Human Security Policy
Division was renamed the Human Rights and Democracy Bureau and the HSP was
renamed the Glyn Berry Program for Peace and Security, after a Canadian diplomat
killed in Afghanistan. However, some experts, like Fen Hampson, have argued that the
removal of human security from the official lexicon is more about rebranding, to
differentiate the Harper government from the previous Liberal governments. Similarly,
Francis Furtado questions whether “the abandonment of the grander rhetoric of human
security really matter[s] in practical terms?” to which he responds “probably not.
Canadian governments have continued to behave as they did through the late 1990s:
moving to safeguard human beings as threats to [their] wellbeing came up and where
there was an international coalition that was able and willing.” Canada’s involvement
in the Libya intervention is a good example of this. This chapter will provide a brief
survey of several areas where human security and its principles have exerted some
influence over Canada’s international actions and policy direction.

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405 Paul Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game, (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010): 200-202; and Mike
Blanchfield, “Harper Stands by His Comments on Israel’s ‘Measured’ Response,” The Gazette, A1, 18 July
2006.
406 Jeff Davis, “Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off,” The Embassy, 1 July 2009,
407 Ibid.
408 Davis.
409 Furtado, 418.
Afghanistan

PM Harper inherited the Afghan mission and the decision to deploy troops to Kandahar province from the previous Liberal governments, though he had wholly supported the mission during his time as leader of the opposition. As PM, Harper raised Afghanistan from a significant component of Canadian foreign policy to the top priority. In a symbolic but calculated gesture, his first international trip as PM was to Afghanistan in March 2006 where he advised the CF that they were there to: “defend our national interests; protect Canada and the world from terror; and help the people of Afghanistan rebuild their country.”410 In a study which analysed the rationales for Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan provided by successive Canadian governments, Jean-Christophe Boucher found that the Harper government was the most active in justifying Canada’s participation in terms of its positive effect on the Afghani people.411 For example, in a 2009 speech, PM Harper told the CF in Kandahar:

Before you came here, the Taliban ran Afghanistan like a mediaeval gulag. They kept ordinary Afghans poor, unhealthy and uneducated; they treated women and girls as sub-human; they subjected people to barbaric punishments; they trampled all freedoms; and they conspired with Al Qaeda to export terrorism around the world. Those dark, desperate days are ending. You have brought hope to those who had none.412

Additionally, Boucher found that the Harper government was the only one to make “an explicit link between the CF’s efforts to improve security in Kandahar and the possibility of achieving development goals.”413 The relationship between security and development in Afghanistan was accepted by PM Harper, as he reiterated the necessity for the 3D approach advocated by the Martin government: “we are calling on Parliament to make a three-pronged commitment: defence, development and diplomacy. All three are inextricably linked.”414 The 3D approach is based on the most fundamental human security premise, that security and development are interdependent, and thus presumes that governments need to coordinate the response of departments involved in responding to international crises. In essence, the 3D approach to conflict is the

413 Ibid.
institutionalized expression of human security and marks the maturation of the peacebuilding approach advocated by Axworthy.

The assumption of authority for Kandahar PRT (KPRT) in February 2006 marked a significant shift in the nature of Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. In particular, the KPRT provided an opportunity to apply the 3D approach in a more focused manner. In Afghanistan, PRTs are tasked with “helping the democratically elected government extend its authority and ability to govern, rebuild the nation, and provide services to its citizens.” Such a mandate requires a coordinated approach, and thus PRTs “facilitate civil-military cooperation and consist of soldiers, diplomats, and civilian subject-matter experts, working together to extend the authority of the Afghan government by supporting reconstruction efforts.” Regrettably, Canada’s assumption of responsibility for KPRT coincided with the unanticipated intensification of the Taliban insurgency across the province, which required the CF to strengthen counterinsurgency operations and resulted in increased casualties for the CF. As a consequence of rampant insecurity, the defence component of the 3D approach has largely overshadowed development and diplomacy. The 2008 Manley Report identified this as an area in need of improvement, arguing that “it is essential to adjust funding and staffing imbalances between the heavy Canadian military commitment in Afghanistan and the comparatively lighter civilian commitment to reconstruction, development and governance.” The government acknowledged this difficulty, recently admitting that Kandahar is “one of the most difficult operating environments in the world for an aid and reconstruction program.”

Responding to the recommendations of the Manley Report, the Harper government outlined four priorities for Kandahar for 2008 to 2011. The first priority is

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416 Holland, 278.
417 In fact, 2006 had the highest rate of CF casualties with 36. Kimberly Marten explains that the Taliban insurgency has been so strong in Kandahar because the province is the birthplace of Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar. Kimberly Marten, “From Kabul to Kandahar: The Canadian Forces and Change,” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no.2 (June 2010): 215.
418 Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, 28.
420 Canada, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011, Report to Parliament, June 2008, http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/documents/q108/index.aspx (accessed 22 May 2011): 1-2. In addition to the four priorities for Canada’s engagement in Kandahar, two national priorities for Afghanistan were outlined in the report: first, to help advance Afghanistan’s capacity for domestic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes; second, to facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation. Further, Canada’s priorities were based upon the
security and building the capacity of the Afghan security forces – the Afghan National Army and Police – to bear responsibility for security themselves. Mentoring, training and equipping the Afghan National Army and Police has been performed by the CF and RCMP since the beginning of Canada’s involvement, additional security sector reforms, like training prison guards has been undertaken by Corrections Canada. The second priority focuses on governance and development, and pledges to strengthen the Afghan government’s institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth. To that end, the Canadian government has invested in: education, by building schools and training teachers; vocational training and job creation; and infrastructure projects like roads, irrigation channels, and wells for drinking water. The third priority is to provide humanitarian assistance to extremely vulnerable people, which includes food aid through the UN World Food Program, non-food aid (like blankets, tents and food preparation tools), health assistance like vaccinations, and finally, mine clearance. The final priority for Kandahar is also security related, as it aims to enhance border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is a source of significant insecurity, as its porous nature permits the movement of Taliban from Pakistan-based training and supply camps. To meet this objective, the Canadian government has funded the training of border officials and the building of required infrastructure.

Canada’s engagement in Kandahar received a significant boost of support in December 2009 with US President Barack Obama’s announcement of thirty-thousand additional US troops for Afghanistan, with a large contingent designated for Kandahar. The troop surge resulted in the transfer of responsibility to the US of several highly volatile districts in the province and eventually led to the co-management of KPRT, with needs of Afghanistan, as outlined in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

the US assuming the top civilian position. These changes allowed the Canadian mission to concentrate their efforts on security, reconstruction and development in the Dand and Panjwayi districts, and facilitated substantial progress on Canada’s signature projects: the Dahla Dam and irrigation system, improving the education system in Kandahar, and a health campaign aimed at polio eradication.

Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan is set to end in July 2011, though commitments have been made to maintain a civilian presence to support Afghanistan’s transition from a failed state to one capable of providing its own security and managing national development. In particular, the Harper government has committed to “investing in the future of Afghan children and youth, including through education and health,” promoting regional diplomacy and delivering humanitarian assistance to needy populations. On the security front, the government has committed to “advancing security, the rule of law and human rights, including through the provision of up to 950 non-combat military trainers and support personnel who will help train Afghan soldiers.”

Canada’s post-combat role in Afghanistan largely reflects the types of post-conflict initiatives undertaken in Haiti and the Balkans; however, it is impossible to describe the current state of the intervention as post-conflict. Ten years, billions of dollars and 157 Canadian fatalities have not had the desired effect of leaving Afghanistan “a country that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure and to create the necessary space and conditions to allow the Afghans themselves to achieve a political solution to the conflict.” While Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan has made modest (and unfortunately fragile) improvements in human security for the Afghan people, the ultimate goal of an effectively governed and secure Afghanistan is still a long way from realization. Hopefully, the failures and operational difficulties of Canada’s 3D approach in Afghanistan will be thoroughly analyzed so as to improve the effectiveness

427 Ibid.
of future peacebuilding operations. Finally, the withdrawal of Canada’s military contribution demonstrates the unfortunate reality that there are limits to what the government and electorate are willing to sacrifice for the security and development of another country.

The 2010 Earthquake in Haiti

On 12 January 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake levelled Port-au-Prince, Haiti with devastating consequences, as 300,000 died and over one million were left homeless. The Harper government’s response to the overwhelming humanitarian crisis was remarkable in terms of its speed and commitment. Both a financial commitment of $5 million and the rapid deployment of a comprehensive Canadian contingent to Haiti occurred within hours of the earthquake. Canada’s deployment included: 2000 CF and their medical units; the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART); experts in search and rescue, medical and logistics, engineering, and victim identification from CIDA, DFAIT, RCMP and other departments; and humanitarian technical experts to help coordinate the work of NGOs on the ground. The initial $5 million for immediate humanitarian needs was supplemented with approximately $700 million to be disbursed through UN agencies, Canadian and international NGOs, and through the international reconstruction effort. PM Harper and MFA Cannon were very active in pursuing the stabilization and reconstruction agenda through multilateral channels, including co-chairing the International Donors Conference Towards a New Future For Haiti and participating in the development of the Haiti’s National Reconstruction Plan. Canada’s response to the earthquake was primarily motivated by the overwhelming humanitarian need, but it also reflected the Harper government’s strategic focus on the Americas in Canadian foreign policy. Further, the Harper government demonstrated that when motivated to do so, the Canadian government is capable of mounting a full and swift response to severe threats to human security.

The 2010 G8/G20 Summits and the Maternal Health Initiative

Canada’s hosting of the 2010 G8 and G20 Summits, in Muskoka and Toronto respectively, presented a unique opportunity, like Kananaskis in 2002, to set the

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430 Ibid.
431 Ibid.
international agenda for the world’s leading industrial democracies. While the G8 dealt with substantive matters related to the global economic crisis, international peace and security and development issues, the signature initiative to emerge from the G8 meeting was “The Muskoka Initiative: Maternal, Newborn and Under-Five Child Health,” which sought to address the lack of progress on the UN Millennium Development Goals of maternal health and child mortality. The Summit communiqué explained that “the Initiative is focused on achieving significant progress on health system strengthening in developing countries facing high burdens of maternal and under-five child mortality and an unmet need for family planning.” Further, the initiative covered a wide range of matters affecting maternal and child health, including: antenatal care; attended childbirth; post-partum care; sexual and reproductive health care and services, including voluntary family planning; health education; treatment and prevention of diseases including infectious diseases; prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV; immunizations; basic nutrition and relevant actions in the field of safe drinking water and sanitation. In total, G8 members contributed $5 billion (US) over five years to the Muskoka Initiative, with Canada contributing nearly a quarter of that amount. Harper’s G8 maternal and child health initiative is largely congruent with the intentions of the human security agenda and demonstrates the flexibility of such an agenda, as governments are able to select which threats to human security they wish to focus on.

Libya

Canada’s reaction and response to the crisis in Libya represents perhaps the clearest example of R2P in action, even if such framing was not utilized by the Canadian government. The crisis in Libya is rooted in the “Arab spring,” where citizens of notoriously repressive regimes across North Africa and the Middle East – most notably Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Iran and Libya – staged massive and sustained pro-democracy public demonstrations in the early months of 2011. To different degrees, such demonstrations were met with violent crackdowns by government forces. In the

433 Ibid. Notably absent from this list is funding for the provision of safe abortions for women of developing countries. Former PM Martin disagrees with this position. While describing the maternal health initiative as “tremendous,” he argues that Canada should funded abortions under the initiative as women put their lives at risk to have abortions in unsafe conditions. Paul Martin, “Not Only Should Canada’s Maternal Health Initiative Include Funding for Abortion, It Should Also be Discussed at the G20 Summit,” The Mark, 23 June 2010, http://www.themarknews.com/articles/1479-make-abortion-a-g20-issue (accessed 26 May 2011).
case of Libya, the government crackdown on protesters was especially harsh and indiscriminate. In an address to the nation, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi ordered his forces and those loyal to his leadership to crush the popular uprising, as he “threatened swift, violent and all-out retribution to those who continued to oppose him.”

As the scale of violence perpetrated against the civilian population intensified, which Libya’s deputy ambassador to the UN called “genocide,” the international community rallied and considered the appropriate response.

On 26 February 2011, the UNSC unanimously passed resolution 1970 which demanded an end to the violence, referred the situation to the Prosecutor for the ICC and established a sanction regime against Libyan officials, which included an arms embargo, a ban on travel and the freezing of assets for specified Libyan officials. Canada’s support for UNSC resolution 1970 was resolute, with the Harper government going beyond the UN sanctions to prohibit transactions of the Government of Libya and Libyan Central Bank. In explaining Canada’s action, PM Harper appealed to the basic premise of R2P: “a government’s first and most fundamental responsibility is to protect the safety and security of its citizens. Mr. Qadhafi has blatantly violated this most basic trust. Far from protecting the Libyan people against peril, he is the root cause of the dangers they face.” Qadhafi’s failure to comply with the demands of resolution 1970 and continued violence against civilians led to the adoption of UNSC resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011. With the support of the Arab League, the UNSC instituted a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized member states “acting nationally or through regional organizations …acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya …while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” Again, Canada responded swiftly with the deployment of six CF-18 fighter jets, a frigate for maritime surveillance of the arms embargo and five hundred CF personnel. PM Harper justified Canada’s deployment in terms of “helping protect Libyan citizens from further slaughter. It is a moral obligation and quite simply the right

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435 Richard Spencer, “Rambling Despot Vows Bloody Fight: In Televised Address, Gadaffi Refuses to Leave Libya, Promises Retribution,” National Post, A.1, 23 Feb. 2011. There are many spellings of Qadhafi’s last name in circulation, but this project will utilize the spelling used by DFAIT.
thing to do.” The language invoked, particularly that of the moral obligation was largely reminiscent of that used to justify intervention in Kosovo, minus any reference to human security.

Canada’s participation in the NATO-led operation in Libya has been significant in terms of both the rationale offered, as demonstrated above, and its contribution. As of 20 May 2011, CF pilots have flown 450 sorties over Libya (approximately ten percent of total sorties), enforcing the no-fly zone and striking strategic targets. Additionally, Canada has provided $6.5 million in humanitarian aid to assist Libyan civilians, approximately 200,000 internally displaced people and 750,000 refugees in neighbouring countries. In terms of progress on the missions goals, the intervening forces have had some success in reducing the capacity of Qadhafi’s forces (against military targets like heavy artillery, weapons caches, and command centres) and have brought the Libyan government to the negotiating table, which thus far has produced a formal agreement to allow international humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas of Libya.

Two months after intervening, fighting between the anti-Qadhafi rebels and pro-government forces has persisted with devastating consequences for civilians caught between the opposing sides. Additionally, the NATO mission in Libya has encountered significant criticism. The previously supportive Arab League has criticized the heavy response of intervening forces, the Russian foreign minister has accused the mission of “crusading”, and there are persistent claims of impending “mission creep.”

Globe and Mail columnist Margaret Wente accepts that “R2P is the moral underpinning of the war in Libya,” but doesn’t see this as a positive development. She charges that “the war in Libya is a creation of the liberal intellectuals – just as the war in Iraq was a creation of the neo-conservatives” and laments the rise of “humanitarian imperialism.” Further, recent media commentary has raised pressing questions regarding Canada’s

442 UNSC, 6527th Meeting, “The Situation in Libya: Statement by Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Libya,” (S/PV.6527) 3 May 2011.
participation. Some, defining national interests narrowly, claim that the mission is ill-advised as “no one has strong enough reasons of their own for intervening” while others assert that “supporting R2P and, by extension, the military action in Libya, is in Canada’s self-interest.” The ultimate end goals in Libya have also been a source of confusion, as the stated objective of protecting civilians is humanitarian in nature, while the political goal endorsed by most Western leaders – the ousting of Qadhafi – is beyond the mandate provided by the UNSC.

The record of post-Cold War humanitarian interventions has demonstrated that such business is by its nature messy, unpredictable and certainly the subject of intense criticism. But the Libyan intervention marks the first occasion whereby the principles of R2P have been used to justify intervention to protect civilians. Canada’s consistent prodding at the UNSC about the importance of protecting people from violence and the related report of the ICISS establishing the norm of R2P have finally come full circle to be utilized in an extreme case of human need. But, despite this apparent victory for R2P and the Harper government’s pronouncements about intervention being “a moral obligation,” the Canadian government has failed to capitalize on a significant opportunity to promote R2P and recognize the milestone that Libya marks in its normative progress. Again, the Canadian government may not be “talking” human security, but it is “walking” it.

The Harper Government and Human Security: Still Informing Policy

It is clear that human security is far from a priority of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, which has placed a far greater emphasis on “high politics” like Afghanistan, Canada-US relations and arctic sovereignty. However, it would be an overstatement to suggest that human security and its attendant principles have lost all saliency. As outlined in the previous sections regarding Canada’s actions in Afghanistan, Haiti, Libya and the G8 initiative on maternal health, the Harper government is not using human security language but is striving to reduce human security in a number of crises and through focused initiatives.

A further example of the continuing influence of the principles of internationalism and human security can be found in the Harper government’s sustained commitment to development assistance. Between 2006 and 2010, ODA has risen from nearly $3.7

billion to over $5 billion (USD) per year, which represents an increase from 0.29 to 0.33 per cent of GNI.\textsuperscript{446} The Harper government upheld the promises made by the previous Liberal governments’ of Chrétien and Martin, achieving the doubling of African aid from 2003-2004 levels in 2008-2009 (an increase from $1.05 to $2.1 billion) and the overall doubling of aid to $5 billion by 2010-2011.\textsuperscript{447} Additionally, in June 2008 the ODA Accountability Act was passed in Parliament, which mandated that ODA is focused on long-term poverty reduction. This legislation established three conditions for ODA: it must contribute to poverty reduction; take into account the perspectives of the poor; and it must be consistent with international human rights standards.\textsuperscript{448} The ODA Accountability Act marked an important step towards ensuring the Canadian ODA is effective and focused on poverty reduction. Finally, the Conservative government has made important steps towards increasing aid efficiency by committing to untie Canadian ODA. In 2008, the government announced that it would untie all food assistance immediately and all development assistance by 2012-2013.\textsuperscript{449} These achievements demonstrate a strong commitment to increasing and improving Canada’s assistance to the developing world. Further, these actions demonstrate a commitment to the provision of “freedom from want” in a more concerted manner than the previous Liberal governments.

Additionally, some key initiatives of Canada’s human security agenda have been largely retained by the Conservative government. In particular, Canada’s permanent mission to the UN continues to actively lobby on a number of critical human security issues, like the protection of civilians and children in armed conflict and even the responsibility to protect. Canada has been a strong advocate and supporter of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and has made substantial contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund.\textsuperscript{450} However, the primary difference is that this work is being undertaken by Canada’s diplomats at the UN and fails to be adequately supported by the PM or MFA. Foreign policy expert Brian Job stated that “where you’ve seen the

current government draw back from the previous human security agenda has been on its proactive leadership at the institutional level in the international system” and “this lack of diplomatic leadership…has left Canada with a foreign policy of a much smaller scope.” He further asserts that “human security was a broad agenda about looking for opportunities to be innovative, and that’s not the modality of the current Conservative government.”

The lack of international leadership on international security and the distancing from innovative aspects of Canada’s human security agenda may serve as an explanatory variable in the country’s historic defeat in the 2010 election for a UNSC seat. In an assessment of the causes and implications of Canada’s failure to win a UNSC, Denis Stairs acknowledges that a badly managed and unfocused campaign, a foreign policy agenda that is alienating some states, and forces beyond Canada’s control, like the nature of voting blocs in the UN, are key explanations. Canada’s historic defeat demonstrates that both action and inaction in foreign policy have consequences.

The dominance of the human security agenda, as promoted by Axworthy, is largely a remnant of the past. The specific agenda items, like promoting the ICC, R2P, SALW, have been replaced by priorities with a decidedly more realist orientation. However, the intentions and principles underpinning human security continue to exert influence over Canada’s approach to and formation of foreign policy. This is demonstrated by the 3D approach in Afghanistan, intervention premised on the need to protect civilians in Libya, reducing threats to women and children posed by lack of access to proper healthcare services and in the overwhelming response to the dire humanitarian crisis in Haiti. Human security may not be the priority anymore and the language may have vanished from foreign policy pronouncements, but Canadian foreign policy is still being formulated with the objective of reducing threats to human security around the world.

451 Davis.
452 Ibid.
6: CONCLUSIONS

For the past sixty-five years, the formation of Canadian foreign policy has been primarily influenced by the ideas which form the internationalist tendency. In the literature, internationalism appears as a sort of hybrid of realist and idealist ideas – what Eayrs calls practical (or pragmatic) idealism. From realism, it accepts the conflictual nature and anarchical structure of international relations, while idealism prescribes that the conflict and anarchy can be circumscribed through cooperation, negotiation and the institutionalization of rules and norms which constrain the negative behaviour of states. The synthesis of these two sets of ideas to form the internationalist tendency has resulted in a relatively coherent and largely stable approach to Canadian foreign policy, which values multilateralism, international responsibility, the rule of law in international politics and, in the words of St. Laurent, “a requirement to consider the values of humanity in the conduct of politics.”454 The second chapter of this project sought to demonstrate that these ideas have largely, though not exclusively, established the parameters of acceptable foreign policy since the end of WWII.

It is principles of internationalism, combined with the geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War that provided the opportunity for human security to emerge as a new policy tendency for particular aspects of Canadian foreign policy. In discussing the influence of enduring ideas on policy, Nossal noted that changes to dominant ideas occur slowly and are influenced by changes in the political, social and economic context. The concept of human security arose from the political changes resulting from post-Cold War unipolarity and, in part, was accepted as a means of attaining Canada’s foreign policy goals as a result of Canada’s economic context in the late 1990’s, which was marked by austerity measures. However, human security was acceptable largely because it fit within the parameters of acceptable policy, as established by internationalism. Human security reflects the normative ideas of internationalism, namely that progress towards a more peaceful world is attainable through cooperation, multilateralism, responsibility, international law and the consideration of the values of humanity. While human security will not be relevant for all aspects of Canadian foreign policy (like Canada’s relations with the US), it constitutes the new face of Canadian internationalism.

As a framework for Canadian foreign policy at the turn of the twenty-first century, human security represented a coherent set of ideas about the causes of international conflict and instability and the means to address them. The threats to international peace and security were largely transnational in nature and reflected the growing interdependence of states; thus, events like famine, disease or civil war in distant parts of the world could have an impact in Canada. Security was no longer conceived of as just threats to states but to people also. The consequence of broadening the concept of security was that the range of issues that could threaten increased exponentially, which opened up Canada, as a proponent of human security, to criticism regarding the imbalance between the ideas championed and the policies implemented. However, to advocate human security should not have meant that Canada singlehandedly had to respond to every threat. Canada’s policy approach to human security under Axworthy was developed according to Canada’s material capabilities and strengths. The agenda featured four interrelated priorities. The first was developing and building consensus on international legal norms, like the abolition of antipersonnel landmines, restrictions on SALW, and protecting civilians and children in armed conflict which paved the way for R2P. The second priority was building the institutional capacity, both domestically and in international institutions, to respond to threats to human security, which included the creation of the ICC. The third priority was to apply human security to Canada’s response to international crises which, admittedly, had a mixed record. Finally, Canada sought to promote the concept of human security to the international community, which occurred at the UN, through the HSN and multilateral summits like the G8.

The political context in which the human security agenda operated underwent a seismic change in the new millennium: domestically, with the retirement of Axworthy in 2000; and internationally, with the horrific terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11. These events produced a political change that deprioritized the human security agenda but did not wholly reduce the saliency of its principles. Further, the election of the Harper Conservatives in 2006 appeared to signal a move away towards the realist tendency, as they advocated “Canada first” and a more self-interested and continentalist-oriented foreign policy. However, internationalism has again proven its enduring quality with the institutionalization of the tenets of human security in DFAIT, as evidenced by the 3D approach in Afghanistan and the intervention in Libya to “protect civilians.” The abandonment of the language of human security, while disappointing for its proponents, has not been accompanied by the wholesale abandonment of the principles which
underpin it, which again appears to demonstrate that human security has been assimilated into the internationalist tendency.

At least for this observer, it is more important that Canadian foreign policy seeks to address pervasive and imminent threats to human security than it is to use the language when doing so. The extensive criticism levied against Axworthy and the agenda is at least partly rooted in the way in which it was so boisterously promoted at home and abroad, rather than a scathing review of the underlying ideas and assumptions on which the agenda was based. A more judicious and less self-congratulatory approach, befitting the traditional tone of internationalism, is appropriate for the future of human security in Canadian foreign policy. In advocating that Canada become a “model power for a troubled world,” Jasmin Cheung-Gertler articulates this sentiment nicely:

Enlightened self-interest should provide a necessary cautiousness, and a reticence to dip sanctimonious fingers in many geopolitical pies, while also preserving a humanist understanding of the obligations of living in an international community. Human security is a better conduit than assertive multilateralism – or policies of Canada-first – for achieving this balance.455

It is important to acknowledge that human security, as the new face of Canadian internationalism, is entering a critical period in its development. The most important normative legacy of human security, the responsibility to protect, is currently being tested as the basis for action in the intervention in Libya. While the final outcome of this intervention is currently unknown, the success or failure of the international community to protect civilians in Libya will undoubtedly have an impact on the future influence of the responsibility to protect and human security. Success – which will require the cessation of hostilities, transition to democratic governance and international acceptance of collective responsibility to rebuild – is likely to embolden the international community and persuade Harper’s majority government of the merits of the responsibility to protect and human security. Failure, on the other hand, has the potential to extinguish any future influence for such ideas in Canadian foreign policy. Yet, there are grounds for optimism about the future of human security, even if the Libya intervention fails to meets its final objectives, because it presents an opportunity to fine-tune the policy responses to threats to human security, which could ultimately create a more coherent and applicable framework for future action. As Francis Furtado reflects, “most initiatives that are now

seen as successful did not immediately move from bright idea to complete fulfillment. More often than not, they were the product of an imperfect process that built on incremental gains – sometimes after having recovered from disappointing setbacks. The basic ideas and principles of human security have demonstrated that they possess an enduring quality; the remaining challenge is to find a way to convert them into effective and practicable policy.

Finally, there are several persuasive reasons why PM Harper’s Conservative majority government should maintain human security – or whatever they want to call it – as an element their foreign policy. First, the breadth of human security is actually a benefit for a government like PM Harper’s which is trying to distance itself from previous Liberal governments. Given the wide range of human security issues, the government could choose to address a particular category of threats that were not fully addressed by the previous Liberal governments, like food security or nuclear disarmament or even reforming international economic institutions to give a greater voice to developing countries. Further, it could focus its human security initiatives on a particular region, like the Americas, focusing on continental human security. As explained by Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis, human security is “a flexible and malleable concept, allowing each state to figure out on its own the ways of introducing it into its foreign policy.” Second, the human security agenda emerged during a period of fiscal restraint and budget slashing; as the Harper government will be entering a similar period of deficit reduction, a comparable approach could be adopted given that the human security agenda, while in the national interest, is largely discretionary and can be assumed with a small budget (as Axworthy demonstrated.) Finally, commitment to internationalism, of which human security is a constituent part, resonates strongly with the Canadian public. Don Munton and Tom Keating acknowledge that “Governments are generally on safe political grounds characterizing their policies abroad as internationalist, given the strong public consensus that exists on the basic elements of an active and committed international involvement.” While free from the constraints imposed by a minority Parliament, the Harper government will be looking to preserve their majority government through to the next election. Demining fields in Columbia, sending the CF to Darfur to protect civilians or prioritizing pressing health issues, like HIV in Africa may reduce some of the stalwart opposition to his government from the left-of-centre Canadian population.

456 Furtado, 418.
457 Huliaras and Tzifakis, 575.
458 Munton and Keating, 548.
Human security serves as an important element of Canada’s post-Cold War internationalism. It reflects a concern for humanitarianism that is in the tradition of Canadian foreign policy and seeks to improve the lives of those less fortunate, a value that is important to domestic audiences. As a wealthy and developed country that is relatively secure, Canada has both an obligation and an interest in making the world a more secure place for all to live. Human security represents a constructive foreign policy perspective and agenda for mitigating and responding to international conflict which will become more – not less – relevant in the years to come.
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