AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY IN THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT FROM 2001 TO 2009

by

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ABSTRACT

From 2001 to 2009, Afghanistan was the epicentre of drugs and violence in Central Asia. The vicious cycle of drugs, violence, and political instability highlights the disconnect that existed between United States (US) security and counter-drug operations in the country. This project explores how and why two American policies for intervention in Afghanistan – counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency – have been operationalized and implemented by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the US military respectively, in a disjointed and inefficient manner since 2001. It is argued that perceptions of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US created a “War on Terror” frame that shaped American intervention in Afghanistan, causing DEA counter-drug operations to be subordinated to the security and statebuilding goals of the adopted frame. The failure of the US Government to recognize this critical disconnect in CN and CTCI policy in Afghanistan has allowed both terrorism and opium poppies to thrive.

Keywords: Afghanistan; United States military; opium; policy; frame; counter-narcotics; counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency; War on Terror; Drug Enforcement Administration
C’est avec énorme fierté que je dédie cet œuvre à mes parents,
Rachelle Smith et Alain Mathieu.
Mes succès seront toujours les vôtres.
Je vous aime avec tout mon cœur.

It is with great pride that I dedicate this project to my parents,
Rachelle Smith and Alain Mathieu.
This project is a testament of their commitment
to my personal and academic successes.
I will be eternally grateful for their constant love, encouragement, and support.
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# GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Counter-narcotics (CN)</strong></th>
<th>A strategy consisting of political or militarized action meant to eliminate the threat of illicit narcotics.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-terrorism/Counter-insurgency (CTCI)</strong></td>
<td>The practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in response to terrorist threats and/or acts of terrorism and insurgency, both real and imputed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Eradication</strong></td>
<td>The process of elimination of illicit narcotics crops and its various agricultural inputs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drug Interdiction</strong></td>
<td>The process of interception and prevention in drug control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame</strong></td>
<td>Grounded in interpretivist social theory, a frame is a socially constructed point of reference that directs interpretations and enables the comprehension, understanding, explanation, attribution, extrapolation, and action required in a given situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frame Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Refers to the examination of social experience and is rooted in the process of the “frame” as it is defined above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hawala</strong></td>
<td>In Afghanistan, <em>hawala</em> is a network for informal financial transfers, which functions to facilitate local trading in both licit and illicit goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgency</strong></td>
<td>A condition of revolt against a recognized government that does not reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mujahideen**  
A term commonly used in the 20th century to describe Muslim rebels, considering themselves “warriors of faith”, who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.

**Narco-State**  
A state that is largely controlled by its illicit narcotics and is wrought with corruption, violence, and political instability. Due to its virtually institutionalized nature, the ruling government is unable and often times unwilling to exercise authority and control over its territory or the illicit drug industry.

**Narco-Terrorism**  
Premeditated, politically motivated violence to influence a government or group of people that is either funded by or the result of drug trafficking activities.

**Opium**  
Opium is derived from the Poppy plant (Papaver somniferum) by scoring the poppy capsule. Opium gum is then processed into both licit and illicit narcotics, including morphine, codeine, and heroin.

**Salaam**  
Traditional credit system in Afghanistan that is largely based on opium-sourced lending. Farmers typically are granted loans on the basis of future poppy crop yields.

**Statebuilding**  
The act of creating a functioning political apparatus that is grounded in the Western democratic model, serves public interest, and promotes licit capital growth.

**Terrorism**  
The unlawful use of violence and threats by non-state actors to intimidate or coerce a government or society, especially for ideological or political purposes.

**Ushr**  
An informal tax. The Taliban placed a 10 percent ushr on opium trading and trafficking throughout Afghanistan and it continues to represent a significant source of their revenues.
1: INTRODUCTION

“Controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the country’s problems, but the country’s problems can not be solved without controlling drugs.”

Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey Executive Summary, 2009

In the days following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, American President George Bush declared war against global terrorism. The United States (US) military has since been engaged in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (CTCI) operations throughout Afghanistan in an attempt to eliminate the sanctuary that the Taliban and its affiliated terrorist networks, including al Qaeda factions, have enjoyed in the fractured and failing country. International agencies, policy leaders and government officials have identified that a significant proportion of Afghanistan’s social, political, and economic troubles lies in the thriving opium industry that has long-since been a feature of Afghan life. Afghanistan’s poppies provide resident terrorist and insurgent groups with a virtually unlimited source of revenue, which they use to fund their resistance. As a result, American counter-narcotics (CN) efforts in Central Asia, conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), have been largely ineffective in reducing the allure of the opium industry to Afghans and insurgent groups alike.
Today, Afghanistan supplies over 93 percent of the world’s illicit opium (UNODC, 2010), and despite the substantial allocation of resources by the US Government, Afghanistan’s opium poppy problem continues to hinder efforts to improve domestic and regional security, and to strengthen local government institutions. According to Mark Shaw (2006), Afghanistan’s narcotics industry is heavily influenced by political and military factors. Indeed, a clear correlation appears to exist between Afghanistan’s violence, insurgency and opium poppies. Arguably, this complex and cyclical relationship holds the key to resolving Afghanistan’s current fragilities and to providing a stable foundation for future statebuilding using both CTCI and CN strategies.

Since 9/11, the US Government’s perception of Afghanistan and its inherently cyclical troubles has led to the creation of two competing policies for intervention. On the one hand, CTCI is overseen by the US military and Department of Defense (DOD); and on the other, CN is considered the responsibility of the DEA. During the period under study of this project, the impetus for American military intervention in Afghanistan was to establish stability and security through the elimination of terrorist networks in the country (DOD, 2007; Patraeus, 2010). As Afghanistan’s narcotics industry engenders socially destabilizing effects, the DEA’s counter-drug operations from 2001 to 2009, intended to eliminate the opium threat in order to establish greater stability and security in the country (Braun, 2005). In other words, despite the different avenues taken in Afghanistan, CN and CTCI policies ultimately shared the same security and stabilization objectives. Yet, there was an ongoing resistance among
military leaders vis-à-vis CN operations in Afghanistan, fearing that engaging in CN would further strain the limited resources available by deviating them away from the “War on Terror” (Blanchard 2004). As a result, both the CN and the CTCI operations directly competed for resources and inter-agency support and the dilemma that this operational demand inevitably caused is that establishing security cannot be done without eliminating the narco-threat; and dismantling the Afghan opium industry cannot be done without increasing security and stability.

**Despite the high levels of insecurity and instability experienced in Afghanistan due to the ongoing presence of narcotics and terrorist groups in the country, how and why were American counter-narcotics (CN) operations, between 2001 and 2009, subordinated by the “War on Terror” frame and its operationalized counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency (CTCI) policies adopted by the United States Government from the start of their intervention in 2001?**

This project argues that American counter-narcotics policies have failed in Afghanistan, due to the “War on Terror” frame that was applied following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The reason for this failure is that the “War on Terror” frame prioritized CTCI policies, denying the important linkages between drugs and terrorism in the country. By consequence, the subjugation of CN policy has produced two important outcomes. First, the subordinated CN policies have lacked the means and the resources to adequately address the substantial problem of opium in Afghanistan and as a result, the opium industry continues to function virtually unimpeded in the country. Second, the lack of coordination between CTCI and CN policies has resulted in the sustained rates
of violence, ensuring the prominence of terrorist groups in the country and the Central Asian region.

This research project is grounded in the conceptual schema of “frames” which, according to Autesserre (2009), “shape the international understanding of violence and intervention” (p. 249). Consequently, we will explore how a particular framework for American intervention in Afghanistan, based on eliminating the global terrorist threat, was established in the wake of the September 11th, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. This “War on Terror” frame, it is argued, elicited a steadfast commitment by Washington to combat terrorism in Central Asia at the cost of coordinated CN operations also seeking to establish stability and security in the region. In other words, the post 9/11 terrorist frame created the conditions in which all other policies for American intervention, specifically CN were effectively subordinated under this new threat. According to Peters (2009), combating terrorism in Afghanistan was the sole responsibility of the US military and CN was considered a law enforcement issue, to be addressed by the DEA. This project argues that the agencies responsible for CN and CTCI policy implementation in Afghanistan, namely the DEA and the US military, are equally important assets to Washington’s “War on Terror”. However, the failure of the Administration to mandate a bi-lateral counter-drug and counter-terrorism strategy has directly contributed to the observed increase in the opium trade, violence, terrorism, and insurgency experienced in Afghanistan.

Admittedly, there are alternatives to explaining the success or failure of Washington’s engagement in Afghanistan and its application of CN and CTCI
policies that go beyond the application of a “War on Terror” framework. For instance, poverty and security are intimately linked to CN strategies and have been identified as correlates to Afghanistan’s opium economy (Byrd, 2008; Felbab-Brown, 2009). Poverty, for example, can be both the cause and the result of CN policy failure. In this project, poverty is considered the latter, as successful CN policies in Afghanistan would likely have positive effects on the level of sustainable economic development, security and stability. The aim of this project paper is not to deny the pervasiveness of poverty and the need for economic development in Afghanistan. Instead, this project suggests that while the imperfect application of well-intentioned policies can lead to a failure in achieving their operational objectives, such as poverty reduction for example, the contextual framework in which policies are created is equally significant to their overall success and should not be over-looked.

Chapter Two provides a detailed description of the methodology employed throughout the course of this research. Relying primarily on a qualitative approach, through discourse and frame analysis, this project assesses post-9/11 American policy-making as a socially constructed process. Chapter Three explores the theoretical foundations of frame analysis, highlighting the discursive processes that initiated the adoption of a “War on Terror” framework for American intervention in Afghanistan, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. This chapter argues that the events of September 11, 2001, created the social conditions that shaped the way American CN and CTCI policies for intervention in Afghanistan were prioritized. Chapter Four details the
development of post-9/11 American CN policies in Afghanistan and argues that the “War on Terror” frame elicited a conceptualization of these policies as competing, rather than complementary endeavours to CTCI operations. As a result, CN operations were subordinated to the elimination of the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. Additionally, the chapter suggests that the presence of the “War on Terror” frame is correlated to the failure of American CN policies to reduce the presence of opium in Afghanistan. Chapter Five presents a quantitative review of the linkages between Afghan opium and insurgency in the country, proposing that the persistence of narcotics has also fuelled the levels of terrorism and insurgency. In other words, the overarching failures of American counter-drug policies, under the “War on Terror” frame, have been the result of the unaddressed connection that exists between Afghanistan’s opium economy and its terrorist groups.
2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

From 2001 to 2009, Afghanistan was the world’s largest supplier of opium and by consequence was the site of US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) counter-narcotic (CN) operations in an attempt to disrupt the regions’ most prominent drug trafficking networks. During this time, US military counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (CTCI) operations also sought to eliminate the Taliban, al Qaeda, and various other known terrorist groups residing in the country. Thus, this research project provides a context-specific single outcome case study of American CN and CTCI policies in Afghanistan, a country that was at once characterized as a producer of international narcotics and terror. Using a mixed methods approach and focussing primarily on qualitative research, the study of American CN and CTCI policies in the intervention in Afghanistan is explored via frame and discourse analysis. The findings indicating the failure of these aforementioned policies, based on the qualitative assessments of official rhetoric and discourse, are further substantiated by quantitative statistical measurements of the concurrent rise of opium and violence in the country. It is important to note that at the time of writing, American engagement in Afghanistan was ongoing. As a result, the time frame selected for this project was dictated by the availability of data for each fiscal year from the start of US intervention in the country. Subsequently, this project assesses the implementation of American CN
and CTCI operations from 2001 until 2009, the final year of available, comprehensive data.

The methodological framework of this research is situated in the form of a case study and was chosen due to its "central tendency" to "illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, with what result" (Schramm, 1971, as cited in Yin, 2009, p. 17). Thus, this project will include qualitative methods of analysis – specifically, it applies discourse analysis, defined as the study of “patterns of language across texts and considers the relationship between language and social and cultural contexts in which it was used” (Paltridge, 2006, p. 2). Discourse analysis, according to H. Russell Bernard (2000), is closely tied to hermeneutic/interpretive analysis, which arose from biblical exegesis and is defined as the continual interpretation “of the words of [religious] texts to understand their meaning and their directives” (Bernard, 2000, p. 439). Bernard (2000) elaborates this thought by suggesting that the hermeneutic method can be extended to all types of texts, including but not limited to speech. Discourse analysis, in this project, is used primarily as a complementary method to frame analysis, given that frame analysis includes the interpretation of semantic language (Goffman, 1974). The bulk of the analysis carried out in the course of this research project focussed on identifying themes in rhetoric by US Government officials, which illustrated the perceptions of the actors involved in American CN and CTCI policy-making between 2001 and 2009. Two categories, or themes, emerged in the discourse and rhetoric that was indicative of the “War on Terror” frame – “victim” and “terrorist”. These particular
themes first surfaced in President George W. Bush’s September 20th, 2001, speech (See Appendix A), describing the incidents of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American response that was required. More importantly, these themes illustrate the “us” and “them”, or rather the “victim” and “terrorist”, perceptions that perpetrated the “War on Terror” frame and ensured the secondary status that was attributed to the Afghan narcotics threat.

Additionally, countless individuals were involved in the process of American policy-making during this time and as a result, a small sample of representatives of the American Government and the agencies overseeing CN and CTCI operations were chosen for discourse assessment. As the official voice and elected leader of the American people, President George W. Bush played a significant role in the framing of American involvement in Afghanistan during his first official address to the American Congress and the public after the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. Official statements released by the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) were included to illustrate the perspectives of the governmental agencies involved. Additionally, a selection of discourse from prominent military and DEA officials was chosen based on the significance of the positions they held within their respective agencies and the views and the perceptions they expressed in regards to the adoption and implementation of the CN and CTCI policies during the nine-year period under study.

The motivations behind this particular research design are that it provides insights as to the nature of the social processes that shaped policy-making in the
US government. As a result, this case study includes a qualitative assessment of US policy and is based on the extensive exploration of academic literature. The discourse, language, and textual analysis components of this research project examines the interpretation of American CN and CTCI policy and are gathered from various documents such as committee reviews, agency reports, and official statements from US government representatives. President George W. Bush’s 2001 address to a joint session of Congress and the American people (See Appendix A) illustrates the “War on Terror” frame for intervention in Afghanistan, adopted immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The House of Representatives review of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (See Appendix B) highlights the turning point of American policy towards Afghanistan as it officially legislated the ongoing incongruity and disconnect between CN and CTCI operational policies. Finally, the 2004, 2007, and 2009 reports from the Congressional Research Service outline the development of US policy and narcotics in Afghanistan.

What this qualitative assessment has found, is that there exists a gap between official US Government rhetoric and the actual policies that were set to engage international terrorist organizations in Afghanistan – specifically the Taliban and al-Qaeda groups in Central Asia – many of which derive a substantial amount of their resources from drug profits. However, the opposite is also true – those involved in the Central Asian narcotics trade ensure the permanence of their industry through affiliations with local terrorist organizations – and while American CTCI and CN policies have been treated, in large part, as
separate entities, they may well benefit from a bi-lateral process of policy-making. In fact, the marriage of military and DEA policies addressing interdependent issues such as narcotics and terrorism, particularly in the case of Afghanistan, may improve the coordination required to increase the success rate of poppy and terrorist eradication. Thus, the process of interpreting the application of frames in US policy-making in the intervention in Afghanistan is an important exercise as it highlights the potential benefits and/or limitations of a multi-pronged policy approach.

2.1 Addressing Issues in Data Collection and Analysis

There is an abundance of documents detailing US counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policy in Afghanistan and to a somewhat lesser extent, US counter-narcotics policy, supporting the interpretation of qualitative data, such as rhetoric and the application of discursive frames. There is, however, much less reliability in the quantitative data detailing the incidence, scale, and scope of narcotics and terrorism in Afghanistan. According to David Macdonald (2007), a prominent researcher in the global narcotics trade and advisor to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “all official estimates and figures emanating from Afghanistan, right up to the present day and whether collected by government or international agencies, are subject to wide variation and should be treated with caution” (p. xxii). There are several reasons for this. First, Afghanistan, as a fractured and politically unstable state, lacks the resources and mechanisms to accurately track the aforementioned data. Equally, the insecurity and instability also complicates the efforts of international agencies such as the
UNODC that are tasked with assessing the effects of opium and terrorism in Afghanistan.

Second, the nature of the illicit drug trade further complicates data collection as it generally operates on the margins of “civil society” – existing mostly as an “underground” phenomenon.

Third, insurgency and terrorism are equally difficult to quantify and qualify. There are currently only three agencies (all based in the United States) which assess the incidence of terrorism and insurgency throughout the world: the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (HSRP, 2007). More importantly, there continues to be substantial variations in the accepted definition of what constitutes an act of terrorism or insurgency, causing obvious challenges in measurement. Terrorism, defined in this research, is considered as the unlawful use of violence and threats by non-state actors to intimidate or coerce a government or society, especially for ideological or political purposes. Equally, insurgency is considered a condition of revolt against a recognized government that fails to reach the proportions of an organized revolutionary government and is not recognized as belligerency. While the definitions of terrorism and insurgency defined in the course of this project differ at the level of ideology, the US Government has essentially lumped these terms into the same category, addressing the two phenomena under the same militarized counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency policies (See Felbab-Brown, 2009). In order to
ensure consistency in the course of this project, terrorism and insurgency will subsequently be used as synonymous and interchangeable terms.

Because of these discrepancies in quantitative and qualitative data collection, conclusively assessing the precise effects of American CN and CTCI policies on narcotics and terrorism in Afghanistan is difficult. However, it is possible to make inferences on the overall outcomes of these policies based on the relative levels of drugs and terrorism present in the country, which has remained much higher in Afghanistan than in any other country, specifically between 2001 and 2009. The primary variables identified for quantification have been sourced from the UNODC and have been triangulated with data from several prominent researchers in the field. Thus, this project includes both a quantitative and a qualitative approach in order to increase the validity of the conclusions that US CN policies in Afghanistan have not successfully reduced the opium-threat, nor has the fractured country seen any gains in security and stability.
3: ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE ROLE OF FRAMES FROM 2001 TO 2009

The application of interpretive theory in the course of this research project explores the social constructions of the political world in which American policies for intervention in Afghanistan, between 2001 and 2009, were designed. More specifically, this chapter attempts to explore how and why American counter-narcotics (CN) policies came to be subordinated to counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency (CTCI) policies through the application of a discursive frame. This chapter begins with a brief exploration of the theoretical foundations of discourse analysis, as it is considered an integral component of the framing process. The subsequent investigation of frame analysis will include the application of discourse analysis in order to argue that the rhetoric found in President George Bush’s 2001 address to Congress and the American people (See Appendix A) initiated the adoption of a “War on Terror” frame that shaped the policies for intervention in Afghanistan. During the course of their engagement in Afghanistan, the US Government’s primary strategic objectives under this “War on Terror” frame was to establish stability and security by eliminating the international terrorist networks that had been enjoying save haven in the fractured country (Patraeus, 2010). These goals, it is argued, were operationalized through CTCI policies that were adopted and subsequently prioritized in the days, weeks, months, and years following the September 11th 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. As a result, CTCI policies have directly
competed with the subjugated CN policies for resources and inter-agency support, ultimately undermining the success counter-drug operations in Afghanistan. Critically, the interdependent nature of narcotics and terrorism in Afghanistan also continued to disrupt the militarized security operations and Washington’s failure to recognize this disconnect in the policy that guides the DEA and the US military that has allowed opium and violence to persist.

3.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis, according to Tim Rapley (2007), is the study of “how language is used in certain contexts” and it is premised on the logic that “language is never treated as a neutral, transparent, means of communication” (p. 2) ¹. At the pragmatic level, discourse analysis sheds light on the interpretive principles that guide the understanding of language and how actions, in turn, arise from that particular understanding (Johnstone 2002). Consequently, discourse analysis is considered to have roots within the social constructionist tradition and it is for this reason that it has been chosen as a complimentary theoretical method to this project’s use of frame analysis. Discourse analysis provides us with the linguistic tools to better comprehend the semantic meaning of rhetoric based on the social conditions that shaped the framing of American engagement in Afghanistan in 2001, and ultimately influenced the failure of CN operations in the country.

The primary objectives of discourse analysis in the context of this project were to identify common themes that emerged in the rhetoric and language of prominent policy-makers within the post-9/11 American Government. These themes provided linguistic markers, supporting the assessment and analysis of the actors’ perceptions, which influenced American CN and CTCI policies between 2001 and 2009. Two categories, or themes, were identified: “victim” and “terrorist. What became apparent through this approach was that American victimization was a common symptom of the 9/11 attacks, and that “othering” was accomplished by labelling the perpetrators of those attacks as “terrorists”. Equally, these labels implied specific connotations as to the appropriate course of action. The language used, first by President Bush (See Appendix A), described the incidents of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, in such a way that they mobilized the American Government and its people to adopt a “War on Terror” frame in order to fight terrorism, and their victimizers, in Afghanistan and Central Asia. These particular themes were found to perpetrate the perceptions of “us” and “them”, or rather “victim” and “terrorist” that substantiated the “War on Terror” frame and ensured the secondary status of the “narcotics” threat.

3.2 Frame Analysis

Framing is a multi-dimensional and inter-disciplinary concept that has roots in both psychological and sociological disciplines. According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), the sociology of knowledge – “that man’s consciousness is determined by his social being” – was born from renowned sociologist Karl Marx’s formulations on “ideology” (p. 5). The authors suggest that the way we
come to know what we know is based on the inherent relationship that exists “between human thought and the social context within which it arises” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 4). Reality then, according to the authors, is an intersubjective experience containing “typificatory schemes” that “impose patterns of interaction” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 29; see also Snow & Benford 1988 and Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).

Ethnographic sociologist, Harold Garfinkel, explains that multiple realities (or frames, in this case) can occur simultaneously, while also being “generated” by any given set of rules (emphasis added; Goffman, 1974, p. 5). He goes on further to suggest that the genesis of one particular frame does not necessarily deny the subsequent formulation of another; rather frames elicit their own definitions and rules as to what is considered true of experience. As such, rules are socially constructed phenomena and are merely a way in which we interpret the proper course of action or reaction based on our own socialized understanding (Goffman, 1974). In other words, the perceived acts of terror experienced by the American government and its citizens at the hands of al-Qaeda can be defined in many ways, thus eliciting various courses for action. In this case, however, the United States became a “victim” of “terror” and responded with the desire to fight against its victimizers in order to “bring them to justice” (See Appendix A).

In his book, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974), Erving Goffman offers his theoretical interpretation of a frame, which he bases on an earlier interpretation by Gregory Bateson in his work, A Theory of
Play and Phantasy (1955). According to Goffman (1974), “definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them” (p. 10). Sévérine Autesserre (2009) builds upon this definition of frames as social constructs by suggesting that they “are embedded in social routines, practices, discourses, technologies, and institutions”, consisting of “ideologies, assumptions and definitions taken as given, and paradigms – which include standard operating procedures and shared definition of the environment” (p. 100). In her study of international intervention and the application of a post-conflict peacebuilding framework in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Autesserre (2009) details the roles and limitations of frames and how they affect policymaking. Frames, she says, “authorize, enable, and justify specific practices and policies while precluding others” (Autesserre, 2009, p. 103). Similarly, the “War on Terror” frame justified specific CTCI policies and precluded the adoption of a bi-lateral counter-terrorism/counter-narcotics strategy due to the fact that Afghanistan’s opium did not cause the overt perception of victimization of American citizens like the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks.

Snow and Benford (2005) describe that framing and ideology have been deeply involved in the “politics of signification” and as a result, the framing perspective can be particularly useful in the analysis of political discourse and action (p. 208). Furthermore, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) suggest that frames are inherent within the culture of international bureaucracies because of their efficiencies in conceptualizing policy – frames outline institutional rules by
operationalizing the appropriate procedures and practices and leave little room for subjective interpretation. Consequently, as the authors highlight, framing is commonly used in many of the world’s most prominent bureaucratic structures in order to provide timely and efficient policy responses when needed. For instance, in this project, framing helps us to understand how the American government embarked on a quest to “combat terror”, based first, on perceptions of the September 11th, terrorist attacks and second, by what those perceptions required in action.

Noaks and Johnson (2005) characterize a successful frame as one that elicits collective action by providing an analysis of events, identifying the offenders, and resonating with its audience. The authors also explain that, “the frames advanced by state officials generally have considerable resonance with members of the public” (Noaks & Johnston, 2005, p. 18). Not surprisingly, by the time American forces entered Afghanistan, the prioritized framework was not to address the undeniable opium-threat, but to eliminate the perceived, imminent and more dangerous terrorist threat identified by President Bush on September 20, 2001 (See Appendix A).

The concept of framing is based on both the understanding of the world at large but also the actors’ influence on that world – influence being exercised in its various forms including, but not limited to, discourse and action. Consequently, socially constructed realities are not defined as stagnant entities; rather they are in a continual state of flux, changing with every spoken word, action and reaction (Autesserre, 2009; Snow & Benford, 2005). Thus, frames have been
characterized in this research project as cyclically bound events and discourse whereby the context in which the frame is born reproduces the conditions required to maintain its coherence. The “War on Terror” frame was first created by the perceptions of the American Government and the public of the 9/11 events; and second, it was sustained and maintained by the language it had itself elicited to conceptualize those events – producing a self-reinforcing cycle.

On the other hand, a frame that is occasioned by an event, in this case the acts of terrorism perpetrated by al-Qaeda on September 11th, 2001, does not necessarily need to permanently define the circumstances that perpetuate its authenticity, as it has continued to do so in American CTCI policy towards Afghanistan. According to Goffman (1974), frames eventually replace one another as the social reality begets a reformulation of contextual understanding. It is important to understand this feature of the framing model because it is the reason why and how policies and practices evolve, becoming better suited and more appropriate to the conditions in which they exist. While the immediate response by the American government under the “War on Terror” frame was to adopt operational CTCI policies that required the US military to focus exclusively on eradicating terrorism, in light of the complex relationship that exists between Afghanistan’s opium trade and its terror networks, the particular “War on Terror” frame may, in fact, not appropriately address the narco-conditions in which terrorism thrives.
3.3 The “War on Terror” Frame

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, immediately thrust the American population (including the Government and its agencies) into a frame of reference that was shaped by the events of the day. Policy-makers within the Bush Administration, and even the President himself, reacted by adopting a “War on Terror” frame for engagement in Afghanistan, in such a way that it was both intentional and unavoidable. This frame was made explicit in the rhetoric of President Bush’s address to the American Congress and the American people on September 20, 2001 (See Appendix A). The language and discourse that constructed the new counter-terrorism frame appears in the very first paragraph, where US President Bush details the bravery and the courage exemplified by his fellow American citizens when they were confronted by “terrorists” during the 9/11 attacks. The victimization of the American Government and its people is evidenced in the dialogue used by the President, as he details the violations committed to them by, what he calls, the “enemies of freedom”. The President states, “Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians” (See Appendix A). Throughout the course of his address, President Bush identifies that al-Qaeda, operating under its notorious leader, Osama Bin Laden, and various terrorist network affiliates had been residing and planning their attacks on Americans from within Afghanistan’s borders.

The framing model advanced by Goffman (1974) offers a potential explanation for the reluctance of the US military to adopt a narco-framed strategy, rather than the chosen CTCI approach, which he describes as
“disattention” – the withdrawal of all attention and awareness. He goes on to demonstrate this perceptual denial is primarily the result of an attempt to maintain the conceptual congruency of a given frame, so that competing information does not pose a legitimate threat to current formulations of reality. In other words, both the American public and the American government focussed primarily on the terrorist agencies that resided within Afghanistan’s borders rather than the narcotics trade to ensure congruency in perception, policy, and practice. In other words, the US military’s engagement in Afghanistan was operationalized in CTCI operations under the auspices of the “War on Terror” and in the DEA’s engagement in CN was considered secondary, and therefore, not critical to the success of the US military’s mission.

Under the label of Operation Enduring Freedom, the military component of the US-led Coalition set out on October 7, 2001 to “fight terror on several fronts: diplomatic, economic, intelligence, law enforcement, and military” (DOS, 2002, p. 1). The first intended targets were the “al-Qaida training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan” (DOS, 2002, p. 1). This militarized engagement in Afghanistan was premised upon the CTCI policy that was adopted in the days following the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001. Officially dubbed the “War on Terror”, President Bush declared:

America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 332).
President Bush also stated, “[o]n September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” (See Appendix A). This ideological frame was further solidified in the way US officials have defined foreign terrorist organizations as those who “threaten the security of US nationals, or the national security… of the United States” (HSRP, 2007, p. 2). Consequently, the September 11th terrorist attacks imparted a perception of American victimhood, which required the decisive action of waging war against those responsible. The military campaign in Afghanistan, according to the discourse offered by prominent US officials, was to protect Americans from any future act of terrorism and to ensure the sovereignty of American territory.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The theoretical foundations of the framing model provide us with an important perspective on the social conditions and the causal processes that have shaped the adoption of US Government policy in Afghanistan. In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, both the American public and its government institutions were thrust into a conceptual schema that ultimately defined their intervention in Afghanistan under the auspices of the “War on Terror”. This chapter has illustrated the social conditions that ensured that the US Government’s primary strategic objectives in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2009 continued to be establishing stability and security through the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policies by the US military. Consequently, the militarized “War on Terror” frame established the conditions in which no other framework for intervention was possible. Finally, the
“War on Terror” frame has provided a platform from which to interpret the existing divide between CN and CTCI policies, and the parameters that have ultimately ensured the persistence of opium and terrorism in Afghanistan.
4: CASE STUDY: U.S. COUNTER-NARCOTICS POLICY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR IN POST-9/11 AFGHANISTAN

“Eight years after 9/11, the single greatest failure in the war on terror is not that Osama bin Laden continues to elude capture, or that the Taliban has staged a comeback, or even that al Qaeda is regrouping in Pakistan’s tribal areas and probably planning fresh attacks on the West. Rather, it’s the spectacular incapacity of western law enforcement to disrupt the flow of money that is keeping their networks afloat.”

Gretchen Peters, 2009: 167

Following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the “DEA took on additional responsibilities” as “hundreds of agents” assigned to narcotics investigation were reallocated by the Federal Bureau for Investigation (FBI) to counter-terrorism operations (DEA, 2010). The “DEA joined the fight against terror” by maintaining ongoing drug investigations further eliminating possible drug profits destined for terrorist organizations. Additionally, the Office of National Drug Control Policy began a large-scale anti-drug campaign in order to raise awareness among American citizens on the “connection between drugs and terror” (DEA, 2010, p. 117). According to the DEA (2010, p. 133),

The drug trade and terrorists have been connected for centuries as various rulers and terrorist organizations have used the vast profits from the drug trade to arm, equip, and train members of their violent groups. However, it was the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, that brought that connection to the attention of the American public. Drug money contributed in part to the ability of the
al Qaeda organization to carry out the 9/11 attacks (DEA, 2010, p. 133).

Interestingly enough, the DEA is not mandated to specifically target terrorists, rather it seeks out “drug traffickers and drug trafficking organizations involved in terrorist acts” (DEA, 2010, p. 133). The DEA explains, “narco-terrorism” is “a subset of terrorism, in which terrorist groups participated directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activities” (DEA, 2010, p. 133). Narco-terrorism does fall within the DEA’s mandate, however, under the “War on Terror” frame, counter-terrorism operations are exclusively the responsibility of the US military (Peters, 2009). As a result, since the 9/11 attacks, the line between terrorism and narcotics has become increasingly blurred and this has arguably resulted in the rather disjointed and inefficient CN and CTCI policies that have since failed to remedy the extensively inter-woven problems of narcotics and terrorism that Afghanistan continues to face.

This chapter explores the development of post-9/11 American CN policy in Afghanistan and the challenges these policies face under the “War on Terror” frame that has prioritized concurrent militarized CTCI policies and their objectives. This development will provide the appropriate foundation from which to argue that the known linkages between narcotics and terrorism failed to be addressed in official practice under the “War on Terror” frame, undermining the abilities of both CN and CTCI policies to create a safe, strong, effective, and drug-free Afghan state.
4.1 U.S. Counter-Narcotics Policy in Afghanistan

Coinciding with the explosion of Afghanistan’s opium industry and the end of the Taliban-imposed ban on opium cultivation, the new overarching agenda for the DEA’s counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan was labelled Plan Afghanistan (also known as the Five Pillar Plan). This strategy, adopted in 2002, was aimed at “reducing heroin production and contributing to the stabilization and rebuilding of the war-torn country” by targeting five critical areas: public awareness, judicial reform, alternative development, interdiction, and eradication (Blanchard, 2004, p. 26; DEA, 2010, p. 171-172). According to Blanchard (2004; 2009), it was clear from the start that post-9/11 involvement in Afghanistan could not be limited to simple CTCI operations. As a result, Plan Afghanistan was an attempt to “reinvigorate” Washington’s commitment to counter-narcotics due to the political dominance of the military campaign, which was ongoing at the time.

In 2002, the DEA with special support from the American Congress led its first “large-scale, multi-national, enforcement initiative” into post-9/11 Afghanistan, known as Operation Containment (Tandy, 2006, para. 3). In her testimony as the new Administrator for the DEA in front of the House Committee on Government Reform, Karen P. Tandy (2006), stated that Operation Containment’s goals was to “implement a joint strategy to deprive drug trafficking organizations of their market access and international terrorist groups of financial support from drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, ammunition and currency” (para. 12). “Emphasizing coordination and information sharing” with its nineteen international partners from Central and Southwest Asia, the Caucasus, Europe,
and Russia, this joint-strategy had two primary objectives: first, create a “security belt” around Afghanistan, and second, to eliminate the traffic of narcotics and precursor chemicals across Afghanistan’s borders (Tandy, 2004, para. 12; Tandy, 2006, p. 3).

However, initial CN efforts in Afghanistan were met with several challenges, most notably, a highly unstable security situation. In 2004, according to Tandy (2004), “the DEA’s presence in Afghanistan has been limited to two agents, whose movement and ability to conduct traditional drug enforcement operations have been severely restricted” as a result of what she called “security constraints” (para. 10). Nevertheless, Operation Containment has been celebrated as a “great success” which yielded 23 large narcotics and precursor chemical seizures between March 2002 and February 2004 alone (Tandy, 2004, para. 15). By 2006, Operation Containment had increased the amount of heroin seized in Afghanistan and the surrounding region to over 2,800 percent (Tandy, 2006). Similarly, Operation Topaz, also an international DEA-led counter-narcotics initiative, begun on March 1, 2001 and focussed on the interdiction of acetic anhydride, a common pre-cursor chemical used in the processing and refinement of opium into heroin (Blanchard, 2004). According to the DEA (2010), Operation Topaz is “a cooperative effort by drug law enforcement and regulatory officials from 40 countries and regions, as well as the International Narcotics Control Board, ICPO/Interpol, European Commission, and the World Customs Organization” (p. 152).
According to the DEA (2010), between 2005 and 2007, DEA-assisted operations in Afghanistan succeeded in seizing 51.3 metric tons of opium, 6.6 metric tons of heroin, and 14.5 metric tons of precursor chemicals. Furthermore, 276 clandestine heroin conversion laboratories were destroyed and 144 individuals were arrested and/or detained. Of course, a significant component of successful counter-drug operations includes the seizure of drugs and precursor chemicals; however, the aggregate number of these seizures cannot be the only measure of success for CN policies. According to the UNODC (2009), the combined seizure of narcotics and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan represents only 2 percent of their actual stocks. As a result, it is difficult to consider Operation Containment or Operation Topaz as the resounding successes they have been labelled.

4.2 The Narco-Terror Divide

This section critically analyzes the divisions that were maintained between CN and CTCI operations and their respective agencies, mostly from the point of view of the US military. Arguably, there are two important causal factors that have hindered the development of a more appropriate frame for American intervention in Afghanistan, which would include equally prioritized CN and CTCI objectives through improved inter-agency coordination.

First, much of the discourse and the actions originating from the identified agencies (i.e. the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the DEA, and the US Military) regarding the implementation of American CN and CTCI policies have been ambiguous and, at times, inherently contradictory. For
example, according to Christopher Blanchard, an analyst in Middle Eastern
military forces in Afghanistan had “engaged in some counternarcotics activities
due to limited rules of engagement” (emphasis added; Blanchard, 2004, p. 23).
Evidently, the term “some” used to quantify American military engagement in CN
efforts in Afghanistan was extremely vague. And, in 2004, despite minimal
pressure within the then-Bush Administration to expand US involvement in
counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, American troops were not permitted to
become directly involved in drug interdiction and eradication missions that went
beyond their established security and statebuilding mandates (Blanchard, 2004).
In other words, the US military was limited to engaging in counter-narcotics
operations in Afghanistan as a supportive contingent and was only authorized “to
seize narcotics and related supplies encountered during the course of normal
stability and counterterrorism operations” (Blanchard, 2007, p. 37). During this
time, the limitations placed on military engagement in CN activities in Afghanistan
were affirmed in the discourse originating from military agencies and its officials,
who overtly rejected the possibility of an expanded military role in CN operations
in Afghanistan. Former NATO commander, US General James Jones,
summarized the military’s unequivocal position by stating, “counter-narcotics
enforcement is not a military mission” (as cited in Blanchard, 2007, p. 37).
Likewise, former defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, simply said, “we don’t do
drugs” (as cited in Peters, 2009, p. 8).
In 2004, an exception to this civil-military divide for engagement in Afghanistan was the development of Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) by the DEA in conjunction with the DOS and the DOD (DEA, 2010). The FAST were composed of five teams of “DEA Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists” that were tasked with “mentoring, training, and advising the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), a specialized group formed from members of the Counter Narcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A)” (DEA, 2010, p. 172). However, since the start of FAST operations in 2004, teams have been deployed on a relatively limited basis, conducting only thirteen operations in Afghanistan and therefore do not represent an accurate depiction of the day-to-day divide between DEA and military operations.

In 2005, US and Afghan counter-drug operations were granted “limited” access to transportation in American military helicopters – no more that four operations per month – and some successes had been made in counter-narcotics operations carried out in more remote locations throughout Afghanistan (Blanchard, 2007, p. 38). However, the cap-style limitations placed on counter-narcotics operations supported by American military resources highlights the persistent reluctance of the US military to be included within a more coordinated CN strategy in Afghanistan.

In 2006, Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, rejected any further engagement of the US military in counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan, citing a desire to avoid “mission creep” (Peters, 2009, p. 183). Equally, the Pentagon kept a firm dividing line between addressing Afghan insurgency as a
military responsibility and maintaining that the opium trade would remain a problem of law enforcement, undertaken by the DEA (Peters, 2009, p. 183). As a result, the DOD received explicit directions regarding their engagement in Afghanistan: “US military forces in Afghanistan do not and will not directly target drug production facilities or pursue drug traffickers as a distinct component of ongoing U.S. counternarcotics initiatives” (Blanchard, 2007, p. 32). Three years later, the rules of “limited” military engagement in CN in Afghanistan had changed very little from 2004, as they were only to “seize and destroy drugs and drug infrastructure discovered during the course of routine military operations carried out in pursuit of conventional counterterrorism and stability missions” (Blanchard, 2007, p. 32).

Furthermore, according to Boyce & O’Donnell, 2007), in Afghanistan, efforts to empower the state and to eliminate narcotics trafficking have been “complicated… by the decision of the US government to enlist anti-Taliban warlords as partners in its global war on terror” (p. 278). Thus, the reliance on local informants, whom often maintain ties to Afghanistan’s drug trade, has continued to undermine overall CN efforts in the interest of furthering CTCI objectives. The dominant thought was that if US or coalition forces were to become directly involved in CN operations throughout the region, it would “alienate them from the Afghan population”, putting any ongoing counter-terrorism missions at risk while also draining the little amount of resources that were destined for CTCI operations (Blanchard 2004).
On the other hand, not all military affiliated officials agreed with this position. In 2007, US Central Command (CENTCOM), a specialized department of the American military, tried to insist that counter-narcotics were an integral part of the United States’ larger objectives of security and statebuilding. However, in official policy, the military as a whole continued to resist the adoption of counter-narcotics within the larger framework of their strategic objectives (Blanchard, 2007). Consequently, a fundamental lack of consensus amongst military officials on what actually constitutes the best approach for managing the concurrent narcotics and the terrorist threats in Afghanistan has allowed the conditions in which the incidence of both drugs and insecurity has risen dramatically. Second, in 2007, under the “War on Terror” frame, American policy-makers officially restricted the DOD from adopting a counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan. The House of Representatives Report on the 2007 Defense Authorization Bill indicated that US agencies “must not take on roles in which other countries or other agencies of the US government have core capabilities” (See Appendix B; Blanchard, 2007, p. 37). Thus, in one dramatic measure, the House’s assessment of the 2007 Defense Bill officially legislated the “War on Terror” frame and embargoed counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism policies from becoming joint ventures for any American agency, civilian or military. This was because both CTCI and CN operations were already underway under the auspices of the US military and the DEA respectively. The legislation of the 2007 Defense Bill is critically important to the current discussion on the divisions between DEA and military policies in Afghanistan because, in an effort to
improve agency efficiency and to avoid operational redundancies, it also ensured that bi-lateral, inter-agency collaboration would be complicated by the terms of their respective engagements. Thus, although both American CN and CTCI policies share the same objectives – improving Afghanistan’s social and political, security and stability – in official policy, Washington ensured that beyond the 2007 fiscal year, the co-dependent threats of terrorism and drugs could never be addressed in a holistic and arguably more successful fashion.

In 2009, Anthony Cordesman (2009), an American defense expert, argued there was an increasing urgency for US policy officials to demonstrate the intention to adopt a harmonized plan to integrate civilian and military efforts in Afghanistan. The current strategy, which separates the civilian endeavours from concurrent military operations, is “fatally flawed”. In other words, American strategic operations require greater synthesis and effective management that draw upon civil-military engagement, of which counter-narcotics is an important element. “In fact, one of the major gaps in the present US debate over strategy lies in the extent to which it has focused almost exclusively on the military side of the problem” (Cordesman, 2009, para. 48). Notwithstanding its own inherent limitations, CTCI policy has simultaneously existed with its CN counterpart in such a way that they continue to compete with one another, rather than providing ‘holistic’ and comprehensive assaults on the inseparable issues of narcotics and terrorism.

Gretchen Peters (2009), a global narcotics expert, also calls for a "blended" approach to CN and CTCI efforts in Afghanistan. Intelligence sharing
between the agencies would arguably go a long-way, according to the author. “US troops shouldn’t be expected to run counternarcotics missions, but they should support them” (p. 224). Nevertheless, as of December 1, 2009, a total of 68,000 military troops had been sent to Afghanistan under the “War on Terror” frame, with another 30,000 committed to deploy by mid-2010 (Klein, 2009). Comparatively, earlier that same year, the Associated Press (2009) reported a “surge” of DEA agents was sent to Afghanistan in a commitment to bolster CN efforts in Afghanistan, bringing the previous total of 12 field agents to 80. The exorbitant disparity in personnel allocation alone serves as a clear indication that CTCI is of much greater importance than the engagement in CN. Despite the massive imbalance between country-drug and military personnel in Afghanistan, both the DEA and the military, according to Peters (2009), must attempt to expand their focus to include CN and CTCI strategies that go beyond law enforcement and eliminating terrorists. In order to see sustainable reductions in opium production in Afghanistan, the DEA must therefore, be equally pro-active in strengthening CN and CTCI operations under a more unified set of objectives.

4.3 Conclusion

While it is arguable that Washington’s commitment to CN in Afghanistan had ever been “reinvigorated”, it is clear that the “War on Terror” frame had lasting effects on the divisions between DEA and US military operations in the volatile country. This chapter has suggested, based on official statements from
DEA representatives, countering terrorism appeared to, at the very least, become part of DEA discourse and the agency’s own objectives for intervention in Afghanistan. In principle, this would not have been problematic. However, the narco-terror divide that was maintained by the US military under the auspices of the “War on Terror” frame, ensured that CN and CTCI policies never managed to be operationalized in a coordinated way. Consequently, neither policy made any significant strides in countering narcotics or terrorism in Afghanistan.
“Throughout the protracted period during which Afghanistan was at war, both with itself and with outside invaders, the political economy of pursuing and sustaining conflicts has been closely intertwined with illicit activities. Indeed, the link between war and illicit activities became progressively stronger over the long conflict in the country”
Jonathan Goodhand, 2006, p. 196

Afghanistan’s “poppy problem” constitutes a significant threat to all facets of Afghan society and it is becoming increasingly clear that addressing these issues are not entirely straightforward. The social costs of opium in Afghanistan are far-reaching and the illicit economy is perhaps the single biggest factor fuelling violence, terrorism and insurgency. According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, published by the Bureau for International Narcotics Law Enforcement Affairs (2008), Afghanistan’s substantial opium production has served to undermine the “consolidation of democracy and security” in the country (p. 15). This chapter first outlines the nature of Afghanistan’s drug economy by providing a brief account of the Taliban’s rise to prominence through their direct involvement with the opium industry. Second, it details the linkages between poppies and domestic and regional insecurity, criminality, and corruption. This chapter argues that US counter-narcotics (CN) and counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency (CTCI) policies under the “War on
Terror” frame have thus far fallen short in addressing the link that exists between the opium economy, terrorism, and insurgency. Moreover, the subordination of American CN policies has been correlated to sub-optimal results in security and statebuilding operations throughout Afghanistan. This chapter concludes with an exploration of selected alternative explanations of the persistence of opium and insurgency in Afghanistan in order to reiterate the importance of analysing the social conditions that shape policy-making, which have played a significant role in the successful implementation of CN and CTCI policies.

5.1 The Taliban and Opium Poppies: A Brief Historical Account

The origins of opium production in Afghanistan have been dated as far back as the 18th century. However, the rise of the modern opium economy in the country began roughly around the time of the Soviet invasion in the 1970s (Byrd, 2008; Peters, 2009). Opium became an important source of financing for the mujahideen resistance forces fighting against the Soviet occupation (Byrd, 2008; UNODC, 2009). Consequently, by the time the Soviet regime withdrew from the country in 1989, the previously thriving epicentre of the opium trade known as the Golden Triangle – which includes Laos, Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand – had been replaced by the emerging Golden Crescent – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran – as the world’s supplier of high-quality and low-cost opium (Rashid 2008).

As civil war waged on in Afghanistan during the 1990s, the Taliban warlords used the ever-increasing narco-revenues to fund their resistance in the form of salaries and weapons purchases (Rashid, 2008; Rubin, 2004). The UNODC (2009) estimates that between 1995 and 2000, the Taliban earned
US$74-US$100 million per year by placing an ushr (tax) on the domestic harvesting, production, and trans-border trafficking of opium. In 2001 and what would mark the Taliban’s final year in the Afghan central government, a nation-wide ban on opium production was introduced (Byrd 2008). Figure 5-1 shows the dramatic effects of the Taliban opium ban. However, the criminalization of opium production in the country did not represent the emerging moral consciousness of the Taliban regime, nor did it elicit a sustained decline in opium cultivation. In fact, speculation surrounding the ban suggests that it was simply a strategic manoeuvre to maintain the Taliban’s monopoly over Afghanistan’s opium industry by counter-balancing market saturation – which had occurred due to high yields in the previous growing seasons – and the resulting decline in opium farm-gate prices (Blanchard, 2004; Rashid, 2008). As a result, the following year, in 2002, opium cultivation had resumed to its pre-ban levels and has increased in a consistent manner ever since.

Figure 5-1: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1994-2009

Source: UNODC 2009
Between 2005 and 2008, the UNODC (2009) estimates that the Afghan-Taliban accrued roughly US$350-US$650 million in revenues from opium farming and trade. According to US military Captain Brian O’Malley (2007), “illegal drug trafficking helps to finance the Taliban and other enemies of the (Afghan) government” (para. 5). As a result, proceeds from the opium economy have not only managed to paralyze the Afghan state by allowing the Taliban and the various warlords to control the local government; they have also constituted the financial means by which the Taliban and other insurgent groups hinder American security and statebuilding operations in the form of armed resistance.

5.2 Linking Poppy Revenues to Insecurity

Efforts to stimulate growth and security through the development of Afghanistan’s economic, political, and social institutions have been hampered by the existence of a thriving narco-industry. Since 1994, according to the UNODC (2009; see also Macdonald, 2007), opium cultivation in Afghanistan has nearly doubled. As a result, Afghanistan currently produces over 90 percent of the global supply of opium, represents an industry valued at US$500 billion, and employs roughly 3 million people (Blanchard, 2004). More importantly, Afghanistan’s opium economy constitutes over one third of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Ward, Mansfield & Pain, 2008). Still, it is not just opium production that is on the rise, the number of insurgent attacks throughout Afghanistan has also risen dramatically over the past five years. Figure 5-2 illustrates the observed increase of violence that has occurred since January 2003.
According to the Human Security Report Project (HRSP, 2007), this trend is also echoed in the concerns of many Western experts that believe global terrorism and insurgency have been increasing steadily since September 11th, 2001, when al-Qaeda perpetrated the most deadly terrorist attacks on US soil and declared “war” against the Western influence. While the HRSP (2007) indicated that overall international terrorism is in decline, three countries have not experienced this same trend – Afghanistan, Algeria, and Pakistan are seeing an increase in violence and insurgency. The 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) shows,

[containing poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is intimately tied to the considerable security challenges faced there by counterinsurgent Coalition forces. A growing body of evidence indicates the presence of a symbiotic relationship between the narcotics trade and the anti-government insurgency, most commonly associated with the Taliban. Narcotics traffickers provide revenue and arms to the insurgency, while insurgents provide protection to growers and]
traffickers to prevent the government from interfering with their activities (INCSR, 2008, p. 21-22).

The UNODC (2009) also highlights that twin insurgencies occurring simultaneously in Afghanistan and Pakistan are largely based along the extremely porous Durand Line that separates the two countries, allowing a virtually unrestricted flow between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for the Taliban, the al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani network. These groups have levied taxes on both licit and illicit businesses and trade in the region in order to fund their insurgent activities (UNODC, 2009). In a climate where unemployment is rampant and basic social services are largely unavailable, the Taliban has used both its dividends from the drug economy to finance its war expenditures whilst providing critical resources to many of the desperately impoverished rural residents. In 2009, the estimated number of Afghan Taliban was approximately 30,000, including 15,000 Pakistanis, and the UNODC reports that Taliban recruits earn an average of PKR² 15,000 (approximately US$200) per month (UNODC, 2009). Comparatively, according to the World Bank’s 2009 assessment of Afghanistan, the country’s annual Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was approximately US$370 (World Bank, 2009). Not surprisingly, the financial resources that the Taliban provides to its recruits function as an attractive, and often irrefutable, incentive to take up the insurgent group’s cause. This opium-financed trans-national insurgency has occurred in spite of large-scale American CN and CTCI operations in Afghanistan

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² Pakistan Rupees are used because the Afghan currency (AFN) has suffered significant devaluation throughout the course of the conflict.
between 2001 and 2009. In fact, the data appears to indicate that since the start of American intervention in Afghanistan, CN and CTCI policies have not only failed, they have been mirrored by an increase in both drugs and violence.

The UNODC (2009) and the Afghanistan Opium Survey (2009), illustrates the strong correlation that exists between the lack of security and opium cultivation in Figure 5-3. Approximately 98 percent of Afghanistan’s total opium cultivation originates from the country’s most insecure regions – the Southern provinces of Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, and the Western provinces of Farah, Nimroz and Badghis (Lind, Moene & Willumson, 2009; Mansfield & Pain, 2008; UNODC, 2009). Moreover, despite US military and DEA efforts to increase security and disrupt the opium industry throughout these provinces, they remain inaccessible to virtually everyone, including many non-partisan humanitarian groups due to the high incidence of violence and insecurity.
Opium’s desirability as a cash crop, in a highly volatile environment – for both its climatic variations and the frequency of violent insurrection – has essentially created a self-reinforcing cycle whereby increased risks yield higher market prices, while drug lords and their associated insurgent groups continue to profit at the expense of national stability. The precarious political landscape, the rising social inequalities, and the lack of a favourable investment climate have resulted in a perpetually week and under-funded national economy (Goodhand, 2008). Correspondingly, the World Bank (as cited in Rashid, 2008) has cautioned that opium, warlordism, and insecurity have created a “vicious circle of mutually
reinforcing problems” (p. 324). As a result, the Afghan drug economy has represented a legitimate and seemingly unwavering threat to all statebuilding and reconstruction targets. Indeed, this cycle will continue to challenge the appropriateness of the “War on Terror” framework – which has prioritized CTCI operations and subordinated CN polices – that has defined American involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009.

5.3 Alternative Explanations

Admittedly, there are many plausible alternatives to explaining the rise of opium and insurgency in Afghanistan that go beyond the interpretation of Washington’s engagement in Afghanistan and the application of CN and CTCI policies that fall under the umbrella framework of the “War on Terror”. For instance, French researchers, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and Laurent Laniel (2007), argue that the failure to address poverty, through economic development strategies, is the reason opium production continues to soar, not the other way around. A significant proportion of the Afghan population lives in poor, rural households, with approximately one third of the Afghan population living below the poverty line (Macdonald, 2007; Ward, Mansfield, Oldham, & Byrd, 2008). The pervasiveness of poverty throughout the country has made many of its citizens vulnerable to shocks – including economic fluctuations and insecurity. Much of the country’s growth drivers – education, welfare delivery systems, and infrastructure – were destroyed or badly damaged during the almost three decades of war (Ward et al., 2008). The 2001 US invasion also coincided with the Taliban ban on opium production, which caused a high number of the
peasantry to default on their *salaam* loans (Rubin, 2004). As a result, the majority of the population engages in subsistence farming but many are not self-sustaining and require supplementary income through family members participating in labour-intensive employment outside the agricultural sphere (Ward et al., 2008). Similarly, William Byrd (2008), a World Bank Economist, suggests poppy eradication strategies have significantly affected poverty levels through the direct and indirect consequences that these CN operations have on various coping mechanisms related to the loss of livelihoods and indebtedness, including the sale of assets, and the reduced availability of capital in local financial markets.

Between 2004 and 2009, despite the adoption of the Five Pillar Plan, the crux of American CN policy in Afghanistan was “forced premature eradication” of opium poppy crops (Felbab-Brown, 2009, para. 10). According to Felbab-Brown (2009), this strategy failed to acknowledge the security and economic needs of the country and generated “vastly counterproductive effects with respect to not only counternarcotics efforts, but also counterinsurgency, stabilization, and state building.” (para. 10). In an attempt to compensate for the effects of eradication on domestic poverty levels, some strategies such as alternative livelihood development have been implemented. For example, in 2002, the United Kingdom, tasked in the Bonn Agreement as the lead nation on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, initiated a US$140 million crop substitution program. The premise was simple, the
British Government would pay opium farmers to eradicate their crops. However, instead of decreasing the amount of opium crops in the country, production began to “skyrocket”, as Afghan farmers began to plant more poppy fields in order to gain access to the “easy money”. The project was considered a humiliating failure and was dropped the following year (Peters, 2009, p. 189). Similarly, in 2007, more than US$200 of American and British funds earmarked for crop substitution and alternative development program in the province of Helmand still coincided with a 45 percent increase in the opium output in that province alone (Peters, 2009, p. 210). Though not all alternative livelihood programs have been as utterly unsuccessful, the data continues to convincingly argue that Afghanistan’s opium and insecurity issues have not been addressed comprehensively addressed through the current policies; and this suggests that perhaps there is a larger issue at play, such as the way those policies were shaped subsequent to the “War on Terror”.

Adam Pain (2008), a development expert and advocate of poverty reduction, remains sceptical of any attempts to successfully substitute poppy crops for other types of licit cash-crops because, as he argues, the opium poppy economy has been an example of market-driven agriculture and its tendency to create inequality… If opium cultivation ceases, the only risk that will disappear is the one associated with its illegality — eradication. All other risks — seasonality of production and prices, crop failure, markets structured and regulated by informal and formal power relations, price changes driven by globalised markets and limited assets among poor households — will continue to be a major source of insecurity for the poor (p. 48).
As such, he stresses that addressing inequality and poverty should be primary target areas for successful narcotics eradication campaigns and included in Afghanistan’s future statebuilding mandates, as these issues continue to remain conspicuously absent (Pain, 2008). Similarly, Ward et al. (2008) suggest that placing greater emphasis on the job and wealth creation aspects of enterprise development, particularly in the rural agricultural sector, would likely help reduce overall poverty levels and improve the success-rate of contemporary counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency strategies.

Pain (2008) suggests that while poppy cultivation has not been identified as a cause of poverty, it has in some cases exacerbated existing social inequalities due to the high taxes in the informal credit system, the volatile nature of market prices, and the riskiness associated to opium crops. Although poverty reduction strategies would undoubtedly improve the sustainability of CN and CTCI operations, as Felbab-Brown (2009) argues, “[d]evelopment under a hail of bullets simply does not work, and in the context of insecurity, illicit economies persist and dominate” (para 24). In other words, addressing poverty certainly has a place in solving Afghanistan’s troubles, however, it over-simplifies the relationship that exists between CN and CTCI policies that, under a socially constructed framework, have ultimately failed to reduce both drugs and insurgency in the country.

Still, others would argue that CN operations are working in Afghanistan. UNODC (2009) data on the increased seizures of heroin in Afghanistan since
2002 indicates that perhaps CN operations have been successful. Yet, seizure rates between 2002 and 2006 (there is little comprehensive data available on drug seizures in Afghanistan before 2002) have been erratic – ranging from 815 kg to 7,771kg (UNODC 2009). Nevertheless, the increase in seizures can easily be attributed to the increase in opium production during that same period (UNODC, 2009). Moreover, in 2006, though Afghanistan seized almost 8 per cent of all opium seized in the world, it only accounted for 0.5 per cent of the opium actually produced in the country (UNODC 2009: 34). According to the UNODC (2009), it is estimated that less than 1 per cent of opium production is ever seized in Afghanistan. Additionally, the UNODC (2009) report argues that while precursor chemicals have been acknowledged as important targets in counter-narcotic strategies, they, like opium production, represent only 1 per cent of their total potential seizure values. Given the size of Afghanistan’s narcotics industry, the combined seizure rate of less than 2 per cent of opium and precursor chemicals can hardly be considered a success.

Similarly, poppy-free provinces are reportedly on the rise. Poppy-free is a label attributed to any Afghan province that produces less than 100ha of opium in a single growing season (UNODC, 2009). Like seizure rates however, the number of poppy-free provinces has been equally unstable. According to the UNODC (2009), in 2009, there were 20 provinces with less than 100 ha of poppy cultivation – marking substantial gains in counter-narcotics efforts since 2004, when there were only four poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan. However, when compared to 2002 – the year opium production dramatically increased following
the 2001-Taliban ban on opium – there were 17 poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan (UNODC, 2009). More strikingly, only four provinces (Ghazni, Logar, Paktika, and Panjshir) between 2002 and 2009, have maintained their poppy-free status, with the UNODC (2009) citing that weather conditions in Ghazni and Logar do not favour opium poppy cultivation. This indicates that the aggregate number of poppy-free provinces is particularly vulnerable to outlier effects such as climactic change and market fluctuations in opium pricing. As a result, it is difficult to conclusively argue that the “poppy-free” designation is little more than coincidence, rather than a reliable indicator of successful CN policy in Afghanistan.

According to Felbab-Brown (2009), “the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar provides a telling example” of a flawed counter-narcotics approach (para. 11). Nangarhar had been one of Afghanistan’s most dominant producers of opium poppy. However, from 2007 to 2009, its governor, Gul Agha Shirzai, managed to reduce opium cultivation to negligible levels through the use of drastic suppression efforts – “including bans on cultivation, forced eradication, imprisonment of violators, and claims that NATO would bomb the houses of those who cultivate poppy or keep opium” (Felbab-Brown, 2009, para. 11). According to many Governor Shirzai’s efforts have been heralded as a major victory against opium cultivation in the country (Felbab-Brown, 2009). However, Felbab-Brown (2009) explains, Nangarhar’s successes have not been as ‘easily’
achieved throughout the rest of the country. Moreover, it does not represent a truly successful CN strategy, as the ban caused the indebtedness of 90 percent of its citizenry and substantially increased the province’s poverty levels. The lack of legal economic activities also resulted in the increase of criminal activities, such as theft and burglaries, and pushed many to seek employment in the opium industry in the neighbouring province of Helmand (Felbab-Brown, 2009). Thus, despite the relative (and very minimal) increase of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan since 2002, Nangarhar represents the elasticity of the opium industry in the country, as cultivation decreases in one region or province, it increases in another, most notably, the province Helmand, where the incidence of violence and narcotics is highly centralized (UNODC 2009).

Since Afghanistan’s opium production peaked in 2007, annual production has declined somewhat. According to Felbab-Brown (2009), “[d]uring the 2008-09 cultivation season, the area of cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 22% to 123,000 hectares and opium production fell by 10 percent to 6,900 metric tons (mt)” (para. 9). She warns however, that the majority of this observed decline has little to do with CN operations, being driven in large part by market forces completely unrelated to policy – “[a]fter several years of massive overproduction in Afghanistan that surpassed the estimated global market for opiates by almost three times, opium prices were bound to decline. Even at 6,900 mt, production still remains twice as high the
Felbab-Brown (2009), argues that counternarcotics policies, based on eradication or interdiction, have yet to succeed in “bankrupting or severely weakening any belligerent groups profiting from drugs anywhere in the world – not in China, Thailand, Burma, Peru, Lebanon, or even Colombia” (para 14). Thus, it is illogical to expect that the same basic approach to CN in Afghanistan would have a different outcome, particularly when the link between opium and insurgency in the country is so strong.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a quantitative assessment of how Afghanistan’s opium poppies have continued to threaten overall security and statebuilding efforts despite the presence of American CN and CTCI operations in the country. Overall, it appears that countering narcotics in such an unstable environment requires a multi-pronged approach that successfully manages to integrate inherent fragilities, such as narcotics, violence, terrorism, and poverty within its global strategic objectives. According to Felbab-Brown (2009), “[a] well-designed interdiction program will further complement the counternarcotics, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and state-building efforts by helping to establish a rule of law” (para. 7). Unfortunately, under the present “War on Terror” framework for intervention in Afghanistan, it is unlikely that CTCI resources will ever be reallocated to CN policies. As a result, future debates over American policy in Afghanistan will need to consider the
current conditions that perpetuate drugs and violence throughout the country, its surrounding regions, and the world at large.
6: CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Between 2001 and 2009, opium and insurgency defined the social, economic, and political landscape of Afghanistan. This project has adopted the qualitative methodological approach of discourse and frame analysis to identify themes in discourse and rhetoric, such as President George W. Bush’s address to Congress and the American people (See Appendix A), which summarized the perceptions of American victimhood stemming from the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. These perceptions of victimization set in motion the adoption of a “War on Terror” frame that shaped the policies for intervention in Afghanistan. In the post-9/11 context, strategic interests of the “War on Terror” frame were clear, “the fight against drugs was deprioritized to the hunt for terrorists” (Peters, 2009, p. 108). As a result, Washington’s policy stance, which separated the DEA-led counter-narcotics (CN) endeavours from concurrent militarized counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency (CTCI) operations under this framework, was fatally flawed. The lack of harmonization between CTCI and CN is not the result of an “intelligence failure” claims a CIA agent stationed in Afghanistan, “it was a failure to analyze the evidence we had” (Peters 2009: 115). To date, the US military has virtually ignored Afghanistan’s narcotics problem with grave repercussions – as the security situation has continued to deteriorate and local terrorist groups and their affiliates have watched their narco-revenues and resources flourish. This paper suggests that while the DEA and the
US military are integral to Washington’s “War on Terror”, the failure of the Administration to mandate a bi-lateral counter-drug and counter-terrorism strategy has directly contributed to the persistence of drugs, violence and insecurity in Afghanistan.

This project set out to investigate the nature of the social processes that shape policy-making in the US Government. More specifically, the purpose of this project has not been to lay out the best approach for CN and CTCI policy in Afghanistan. Instead, the intention was to critically review the social conditions that elicited the “War on Terror” frame, in order to identify the potential limitations that this particular approach may have imbedded within the post-9/11 CN and CTCI policies. Still, improving security and stability in Afghanistan will undoubtedly require a framework for intervention that places a more balanced focus on CN and CTCI policies and comprehensively address the complexities of Afghanistan as a narco-terror state. The lessons to be taken from this project will set up the foundations for future research on the linkages that exist between global forms of terror and the narcotics trade and the potential marriage to be made between the policies created to address them. Thus far, the adopted American framework for intervention in Afghanistan has failed to integrate security, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics within a larger framework for US involvement. Until all the correlates to Afghanistan’s thriving opium industry, including the terror networks that protect it can be identified, the state’s primary global exports will continue to be poppies and violence.
APPENDICES

Appendix A: The President’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People

United States Capitol Washington, D.C. 20 September 2001 (9:00 p.m. EDT)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President Pro Tempore, members of Congress, and fellow Americans:
In the normal course of events, Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union. Tonight, no such report is needed. It has already been delivered by the American people.

We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground—passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer. And would you please help me to welcome his wife, Lisa Beamer, here tonight. (Applause.)

We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers, working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers—in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers their own.

My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire world has seen for itself the state of our Union—and it is strong. (Applause.)

Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done.

(Applause.)

I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time. All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of this Capitol, singing “God Bless America.” And you did more than sing; you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our communities and meet the needs of our military.

Speaker Hastert, Minority Leader Gephardt, Majority Leader Daschle and Senator Lott, I thank you for your friendship, for your leadership and for your service to our country. (Applause.)

And on behalf of the American people, I thank the world for its outpouring of support. America will never forget the sounds of our National Anthem playing at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate.

We will not forget South Korean children gathering to pray outside our embassy in Seoul, or the prayers of sympathy offered at a mosque in Cairo. We will not forget moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America.

Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations who died with our own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis; more than 250 citizens of India; men and women from El Salvador, Iran,
Mexico and Japan; and hundreds of British citizens. America has no truer friend than Great Britain. (Applause.)

Once again, we are joined together in a great cause—so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. (Applause.)

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are the same murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and responsible for bombing the USS Cole.

Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans, and make no distinction among military and civilians, including women and children.

This group and its leader—a person named Osama bin Laden are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.

The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for the world.

Afghanistan's people have been brutalized—many are starving and many have fled. Women are not allowed to attend school. You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough.

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan—after all, we are currently its largest source of humanitarian aid—but we condemn the Taliban regime. (Applause.) It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.

And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. (Applause.) Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. (Applause.) Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. (Applause.) The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. (Applause.)

Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. (Applause.)

Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa.

These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions by abandoning every value except the will to power they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies. (Applause.)

Americans are asking: How will we fight and win this war? We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.

Our nation has been put on notice: We are not immune from attack. We will take defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities affecting homeland security. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. So tonight I announce the creation of a Cabinet-level position reporting directly to me the Office of Homeland Security.
And tonight I also announce a distinguished American to lead this effort, to strengthen American security: a military veteran, an effective governor, a true patriot, a trusted friend Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge. (Applause.) He will lead, oversee and coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard our country against terrorism, and respond to any attacks that may come. These measures are essential. But the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows. (Applause.)

Many will be involved in this effort, from FBI agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty. All deserve our thanks, and all have our prayers. And tonight, a few miles from the damaged Pentagon, I have a message for our military: Be ready. I’ve called the Armed Forces to alert, and there is a reason. The hour is coming when America will act, and you will make us proud. (Applause.)

This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces, intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is grateful that many nations and many international organizations have already responded with sympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, to the Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all. The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if this terror goes unpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, can not only bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. And you know what we’re not going to allow it. (Applause.)

Americans are asking: What is expected of us? I ask you to live your lives, and hug your children. I know many citizens have fears tonight, and I ask you to be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat. I ask you to uphold the values of America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them. No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith. (Applause.)

I ask you to continue to support the victims of this tragedy with your contributions. Those who want to give can go to a central source of information, libertyunites.org, to find the names of groups providing direct help in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The thousands of FBI agents who are now at work in this investigation may need your cooperation, and I ask you to give it.

I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.

I ask your continued participation and confidence in the American economy. Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people. These were the true strengths of our economy before September 11th, and they are our strengths today. (Applause.)

And, finally, please continue praying for the victims of terror and their families, for those in uniform, and for our great country. Prayer has comforted us in sorrow, and will help strengthen us for the journey ahead.

Tonight I thank my fellow Americans for what you have already done and for what you will do. And ladies and gentlemen of the Congress, I thank you, their representatives, for what you have already done and for what we will do together.
Tonight, we face new and sudden national challenges. We will come together to improve air safety, to dramatically expand the number of air marshals on domestic flights, and take new measures to prevent hijacking. We will come together to promote stability and keep our airlines flying, with direct assistance during this emergency. (Applause.)

We will come together to give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home. (Applause.) We will come together to strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike. (Applause.)

We will come together to take active steps that strengthen America’s economy, and put our people back to work.

Tonight we welcome two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. (Applause.) As a symbol of America’s resolve, my administration will work with Congress, and these two leaders, to show the world that we will rebuild New York City. (Applause.)

After all that has just passed all the lives taken, and all the possibilities and hopes that died with them it is natural to wonder if America’s future is one of fear. Some speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead, and dangers to face. But this country will define our times, not be defined by them. As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world. (Applause.)

Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time now depends on us. Our nation this generation will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. (Applause.)

It is my hope that in the months and years ahead, life will return almost to normal. We’ll go back to our lives and routines, and that is good. Even grief recedes with time and grace. But our resolve must not pass. Each of us will remember what happened that day, and to whom it happened. We’ll remember the moment the news came where we were and what we were doing. Some will remember an image of a fire, or a story of rescue. Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever.

And I will carry this: It is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives that ended, and a task that does not end. (Applause.)

I will not forget this wounding to our country or those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle for freedom and security for the American people.

The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. (Applause.)

Fellow citizens, we’ll meet violence with patient justice -- assured of the rightness of our cause, and confident of the victories to come. In all that lies before us, may God grant us wisdom, and may He watch over the United States of America.

Thank you. (Applause.)


Excerpt

Counter-Narcotics Policy for Afghanistan

The committee supports the efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD) to use drug interdiction and counternarcotics resources to support the global war on terrorism and notes that there are clear links between international narcotics trafficking and international terrorism. In that regard, the committee supports DOD’s unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and activities by organizations designated as terrorist organizations in Colombia and Afghanistan. The committee notes with regards to Afghanistan, the Department has responded to requests for support from the Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Government of the United Kingdom to help the Government of Afghanistan develop the capacity to address the country’s serious and growing narcotics problem. The committee believes that the high level of DOD support to the Department of State in building law enforcement capacity in Afghanistan is the correct approach.

The committee is concerned that despite the development of an interagency implementation plan for U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan and the surrounding region, the Department is being asked to fund and manage activities well beyond its core mission. The Department must continue to play an important role in the international and interagency fight against narcotics in Afghanistan, but it must not take on roles in which other countries or other agencies of the U.S. Government have core capabilities.
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