RECRUITMENT AND DDR: THE CASE OF LIBERIA

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that if Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have evolved from conflict resolution mechanisms to conflict prevention mechanisms, then there must be a greater focus on the nature of the recruitment relationship between the faction and the individual. Based on the theoretical and empirical work of Pugel, Humphreys, and Weinstein, the project uses the case of Liberia and its ex-combatants to support the theory that factions with different social and economic endowments will recruit individuals seeking out those endowments. It concludes that in the case of Liberia and other DDR programmes, there has been an overemphasis on short-term employment solutions for ex-combatants, that DDR should provide more methods to include those ex-combatants who wish to participate in the rebuilding and reconciliation process, and that continued emphasis on the context of the individual is essential.

Keywords: conflict prevention; DDR, disarmament; demobilisation; demobilization; ex-combatants; Liberia; reconciliation; recruitment; rehabilitation; reintegration
For Those Who Remain Unheard...

and for my father, Kevin...

May knowledge bring Peace
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GLOSSARY

Demobilisation

Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilisation may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilisation encompasses the support package provided to the demobilised, which is called reinsertion (UN 2006, 6).

Disarmament

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes (UN 2006, 6).

Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)

A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods (UN 2006, 6). This term will also be used to refer to all DDR programmes in general.

Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR)

The term specifically used in this project to refer to the Liberian DDRR process that took place from December 7, 2003 to July 21, 2009. The rehabilitation component, represented by the last R, was designed specifically for disabled ex-combatants only (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 2).

GoL

The abbreviation for the Government of Liberia. During the Liberian civil war, the GoL was one of the participating factions.
LURD  The abbreviation for Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy. The LURD was one of the factions participating in the civil war, and was supported by the government of Guinea (Levitt 2005, 223).

MODEL  The abbreviation for the Movement for Democracy in Liberia. The MODEL was one of the factions that appeared toward the end of the civil war, in spring 2003, and was supported by the government of Côte d’Ivoire (Levitt 2005, 223).

NPFL  The abbreviation for the National Patriotic Liberation Front. The NPFL was the original faction that began the rebellion against President Samuel Doe’s regime in 1989, led by Charles Taylor, who later became president of Liberia. A full description of the origins of the NPFL can be found in George Klay Kieh, Jr.’s The First Liberian Civil War (2008).

Reintegration  Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (UN 2006, 19).

Securitisation  Used to refer to the process defined by Barry Buzan (1997, 5) as “a particular type of politics defined by reference to existential threats and calls for emergency action in any sector”. For more information, see Barry Buzan’s Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998).
1: INTRODUCTION

Following the end of armed conflict and the signing of a peace agreement, post-conflict states have security challenges that cannot be remedied immediately. One of these challenges is how to prevent former combatants from regrouping and ‘spoiling’ peace efforts. As part of a larger security sector reform (SSR) initiative, a programme is undertaken to demobilise, disarm, and reintegrate these individuals into civilian life. This process is called demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR), and today it is an internationally accepted component of post conflict recovery.

In Liberia, a 14-year period of near-sustained conflict had left the country in 2003 with a collapsed economy and a volatile security situation. To reduce the security threat that ex-combatants posed to the reconstruction of the Liberian state, a programme of Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR) was undertaken from December 7, 2003 to July 21, 2009. Current studies emphasise the importance of providing alternative livelihoods and social structures for ex-combatants; but a gap in the literature exists when looking at whether DDR as a conflict prevention mechanism addresses the recruitment relationship between factions and their members.

Chapter Two explains how DDR programmes have become an important pillar for recovery in post-conflict states. A shift in the priorities of the international community in recent years has led DDR programmes to become a
tool of conflict prevention rather than simply conflict resolution. Chapter Two also
discusses the debate between broad and narrow mandates of DDR, and the
challenges of providing both security and development. Chapter Three argues
that emphasis must be placed on the reasons why individuals joined rebel groups
in order for a DDR project to serve as a conflict prevention mechanism.
Together, these chapters set the stage for encouraging a shift in how DDR
serves its purpose as a conflict prevention mechanism: away from unfulfilled
promises of immediate employment and towards understanding the recruitment
relationship between factions and the individuals recruited.

My argument stresses that if DDR is to reintegrate ex-combatants into
society and provide them with an alternate source of livelihood, then it implies
that these same individuals were receiving similar benefits by participating in
warring factions. Exploring the recruitment relationship between the faction and
ex-combatant will help DDR programmes reduce ties between former
commanders and their soldiers by replacing faction participation with new
economic opportunities and social structures. If there is an inconsistency
between the outcomes of DDR and the individual motivations for joining an
armed group, DDR programmes are unlikely to eliminate the relationship
between the armed groups and their recruits, compromising future peace efforts.

To demonstrate that DDR programmes need to place more emphasis on
the individual-faction recruitment relationship, I use an empirical study of Liberia’s
ex-combatants. Chapter Four explains how the data set from James Pugel’s
2006 interviews with ex-combatants in Liberia is applied to my combined
framework, and is based on the theories of recruitment developed by Macarten Humphries and Jeremy Weinstein. Chapter Five uses Pugel’s survey to show how individuals were recruited depending on the endowments of the factions and the needs of the individuals. In Chapter Six, I use the results to argue that DDR programmes have focused too much on promising jobs to ex-combatants as a homogenous group, rather than looking closely at the diversity within each faction. I close Chapter Six by arguing that DDR programmes should recognise the differences between the reasons why individuals joined as a source of information on recruitment, reintegration, and ultimately conflict prevention. In particular, ex-combatants who joined because of ideological reasons should be given a greater stake in the reconstruction process. Those who were forcibly recruited, or those who joined out of immediate security or financial challenges have different and often more pressing needs that affect their ability to reintegrate.

This paper is not an evaluation of the success of Liberia’s DDRR programme for the ex-combatants or for Liberia as a country, nor is it meant to focus on the origins of the civil war. Rather, this project will use a survey and an academic framework based on those developed by other writers to argue for a reconsideration of how DDR programmes are planned as tools of conflict prevention.
This chapter argues that DDR programmes have become a fundamental part of peace operations today and that the character of DDR has shifted from *conflict resolution* to *conflict prevention*. It is important to understand whether DDR has become a conflict prevention mechanism, because if the goal of DDR is to prevent the re-emergence of conflict as opposed to only resolving conflict, then DDR practitioners must shift their focus away from short-term security-based tactics, and toward long-term strategies of reintegration.

If DDR is meant to prevent conflict on a macro level but still satisfy the needs of ex-combatants on a micro level, then greater focus should be placed on the determinants of individual participation and faction recruitment. In the case of the Liberian civil war, in the third phase from 1999 to 2003, two new groups emerged: the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). If the Liberian conflict was constant, but the factions changed and new ones emerged, then there must be a factor that accounts for the grouping of individuals into factions. To clarify the role of DDR, it is important to define it and outline the background of DDR in international interventions. I will discuss its function as a conflict prevention mechanism, and then the debates surrounding that function.

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1 New groups emerging during the war shows that simply dissolving groups by breaking up the individuals from each other and their leaders will not necessarily be a sustainable solution.
2.1 Conceptions of DDR

One of the greatest challenges with DDR is arriving at a commonly accepted definition. A working definition is important to establish because it will determine how programmes are designed, and it will determine how to monitor their outcomes. Kathleen Jennings (2008a, 157) argues that the aims of DDR programmes are straightforward: they are meant to remove weapons, disperse fighters, and to aid the transformation of fighters into productive citizens. Robert Muggah (2009, 9) says that the typical definition of DDR is "a series of carefully designed and phased activities to create a suitable environment for stability and development to proceed". He believes that DDR is an instrument for preventing "armed conflicts from resuming and keep[ing] the (presumed) sources of post-conflict violence and insecurity at bay" (ibid.).

James Pugel provides a wider definition of DDR as "the conventional label ascribed to a cluster of post-conflict interventions focused on collecting arms, neutralising potential spoilers, reintegrating legitimate ex-combatants into the armed forces or civilian life and preventing war recurrence" (Pugel 2009, 73, italics added). Victoria Gamba (2003, 189-190) also employs a long-term approach, and argues that DDR "is not just about demobilization of warring

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2 Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem identify two commonly accepted types of DDR programmes. The first kind is demilitarisation, which takes place in the war-to-peace transition of developed states. In these cases, there is usually a clear, decisive victory by one party, and DDR is then used to reduce military expenditures during a time of peace. The second type is contained within a peace settlement, in which there is usually no identifiable winner. In these cases, an armed opposition group usually still controls territory and possesses the ability to engage in fighting in the event of the peace agreement breaking down (KÖ, 2004:500; Özerdem, 2009:13). My argument will refer to the second type of DDR, such as the type undertaken in the case of Liberia. For a more comprehensive discussion of the components of DDR, see Appendix D.

3 It is important to notice that conflict prevention is integrated into Pugel’s working definition because Pugel’s work constitutes a major source of data for this project.
parties and their disarmament and reintegration, it [DDR] really should reach out to the demilitarization and disarmament of the mind of a population and an infrastructure that had been mobilized and prepared to sustain war for decades”. She argues (ibid., 189) that since conflict prevention is a long-term issue, and DDR is a tool of conflict prevention, DDR must not be seen as a short-term stabilisation and security issue, but must include issues of long-term reconciliation and development. The “R” in DDR (and DDRR) has often represented reintegration, reinsertion, rehabilitation, reconciliation, or reconstruction, to address the complex nature of post-conflict recovery, and apply the appropriate measures for each context.4

2.2 From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Prevention

The nature of DDR has evolved alongside the concept of war in the international arena. Abdullah and Rashid (2004, 170) argue that war is no longer restrained to the Clausewizian definition of “politics by another means”; it has instead been characterised by anarchy and unbridled violence.5 As the world experienced an upsurge of violent civil conflicts after the Cold War, peacemakers needed a mechanism for conflict resolution in instances where there was no clear winner (Spear 2006, 63). In response to this upswing of intra-state conflicts

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4 According to the New African Partnership for Development, the last ‘R’ in DDRR represents all of those aspects (Gamba, 2003:190). The final “R” in the Liberian DDRR context referred to “Rehabilitation” and was very narrowly defined to include only disabled ex-combatants (Draft Interim Secretariat, 2003:2).

5 Following the end of the Cold War, the nature of war had begun to shift — no longer were wars characterised as ‘proxy’ wars driven by policy, in which one or both sides had an ideological and military support system from one of the two superpowers.
in the 1990s\(^6\), humanitarian and development agencies became highly aware of the insecure environments in which they operated, and now recognise that greater emphasis on security is needed for effective development to occur (Klem and van Laar 2008, 131).

Gamba (2003, 182) argues that during the 1990s, successful DDR became recognised as an important part of post-conflict development, rather than only of security. During a number of regional meetings regarding the peace processes in Southern Africa, three major security-development issues came to the forefront. First, there had been an increase in violent crime by both individuals and illegal groups. Second, ex-combatants who had not been demobilised properly added to the instability through their involvement in illegal arms transfers and other criminal activities. Third, rebel groups continued to operate in the region, despite the signing of peace accords (ibid., 182-183). It was becoming increasingly apparent that effective disarmament and demobilisation was necessary if full post-conflict reconstruction was to take place in a secure environment. It was at this point that the international community had moved away from its traditional peace keeping role, and toward one of peace building (Özerdem 2009, 1).

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\(^6\) The Human Security Centre’s key findings from the *Human Security Report 2006* state: “Notwithstanding the escalating violence in Iraq and the widening war in Darfur, the new data indicate that from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2005, the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world shrank 15% from 66 to 56” (Human Security Centre, 2007: 1). However, Sub-Saharan Africa was the only place to have a decrease in the number of armed conflicts while four other regions in the world had an increase. Furthermore, “wars that end in negotiated settlements tend to last three times longer than those that end in victories, and are nearly twice as likely to start again within five years” (Human Security Centre, 2007: 2). It is within this context that successful DDR programs are important to countries recovering from armed conflict, particularly conflicts ended by negotiated settlements, because of their high propensity to start up again.
DDR has also evolved alongside peace engagements in general; no longer are peace operations the act of massing forces to secure the peace, and then withdrawing. Today, the comprehensive nature of peace engagements are undisputed — the new peace operations must be willing to engage in a long-term peace and security building processes which Virginia Gamba (2003, 178) aptly describes as, “unpopular, but unavoidable”. Conflict prevention, management, and resolution are no longer a matter of establishing short-term security, but are considered long-term processes that require the enhancement of regional and sub-regional organisations to reduce and mitigate the incidence of conflict in Africa (ibid., 189). In an international environment where there are nearly twice as many peacekeepers deployed in post-conflict environments today than at the peak of UN missions in the 1990s (Muggah 2009, 1), DDR programmes are a standard component of many post-conflict interventions (Jennings 2008a, 157). Today, DDR, security sector reform (SSR), arms embargos, and selective amnesties are all used to help prevent post-conflict countries from slipping back into conflict (Muggah 2009, 1). Knight and Özerdem (2004, 501) argue there is a symbiotic relationship between DDR and the peace building process. Özerdem (2002, 969-970) contends that without successful DDR, sustainable post-war recovery cannot be achieved, and without sustainable peace building, the viability of DDR would be questionable.

The extensive involvement of the international community has led to standardisation for the purposes of monitoring and implementation. There is a

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7 Hereafter referred to as “KÖ”.
large concern that ‘grafting’ DDR programmes onto volatile security situations in post-conflict countries, without regard for the social, political, or economic context will present a large number of risks, because DDR deals specifically with weapons and armed groups (Muggah 2009, 2-3). Muggah supports the idea of avoiding templates and letting context determine the blueprints for DDR operations (ibid., 20). If those who design and implement DDR programmes are attempting to standardise DDR according to their perspectives on the origins of conflict, they risk neglecting the differences between states that may impact the ability of the programme to succeed. A framework for determining the demands for a DDR programme, while still permitting context to guide programme design, is essential. The number of arms collected alone cannot measure its success, nor the number of soldiers demobilised; DDR must include an examination of the way people perceive their security environment, and the steps they take in response to that environment (Spear 2006, 70). For Joanna Spear, a DDR programme is the first step toward transferring a post-conflict country from an economy of war, to an economy of peace (ibid., 71). A political economy of peace must provide greater economic incentives than war, and it operates at the individual level, at the fighting unit level, and the leadership level. While a DDR process normally focuses on achieving security through disarmament, Spear argues that in cases of economic wars, focus should be placed on providing immediate economic opportunities for all three levels to prevent re-mobilisation for financial reasons (ibid., 72). Christina Steenkamp (2009, 113, 119) notes that

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if there is still a livelihood, community support, and a purpose for the armed
groups, DDR will be an unattractive option; the armed groups must first lose their
legitimacy as service providers, and the intervening party must gain that same
legitimacy. To shift the legitimacy from the rebel group to the state, one must ask
what gives these rebel groups their initial legitimacy.

Since DDR has evolved from being a conflict resolution mechanism
according to the international community, to a conflict prevention mechanism
according to African practitioners, the approach to DDR must also change
according to the context in which it is used (Gamba 2008, 190). In Africa, DDR
no longer focuses only on removing the weapons of ex-combatants, but now
includes reconciliation, rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconstruction for not
only the ex-combatants, but for the whole of society—including the victims of
violence (ibid., 191). By integrating DDR into the terms of a peace agreement,
signatories will have a larger stake in the outcomes of the agreement, thereby
preventing conflict and encouraging sustainable development (ibid.). Proponents
of DDR such as Gamba (2008, 181) have confidently linked it to development:
“DDR is a single entity that affects both the chances of peace and the chances of
recreating a secure and safe environment for countries emerging from conflict”.
With the understanding that DDR is an essential part of conflict prevention, and
that the recovery of a country may be at stake if the programme fails, it is
necessary to look at the paths DDR follows as a conflict prevention mechanism.
2.3 DDR: For Security or For Development?

The debates about what a DDR mandate should contain, in terms of economic and social reintegration, are extensive because the stakes are so high. DDR has been in place and implemented enough to argue that the parameters of the programmes have important consequences for the ability of former combatants to reintegrate (KÖ 2004, 500). Özerdem (2004, 501) argues that poorly conceived and executed DDR programmes can become sources of future conflicts. If ex-combatants do not see reintegration progress, they are more vulnerable to recruiting strategies that capitalise on both short and long-term grievances (Spear 2006, 67), posing a serious security risk at the regional level (KÖ 2004, 502). A failure to comprehensively address the immediate and underlying causes of armed conflict means that the “embers of conflict will continue to smoulder, waiting for the next spark to reignite open collective violence following an end to formal hostilities” (Muggah 2009, 2). The debate over how to design a DDR programme, and what is included in it, is important to review as it exposes the extent to which the peace and development goals are intertwined.

This link between DDR and conflict prevention is rooted in the idea that the best way to prevent conflict is through economic and social development. One of the fundamental difficulties with DDR programme design and implementation, other than defining it, is selecting the wide variety of objectives that DDR tries to achieve. Joanna Spear (2006, 70) argues that earlier thinking emphasised DDR as “technical challenges with technical solutions”. Failures
Despite technical implementation, such as in Liberia in 1993 to 1997, have proved otherwise – that DDR is both a science and an art. While Liberia is beginning to show signs of recovery, Kathleen Jennings (2008a, 158) argues that as a conflict prevention mechanism, the most recent Liberian DDRR process was at best temporary, and at worst, counterproductive. Liberia is an important case in which traditional dichotomies of war and peace, civil and military, economic and political, and state and non-state, are not clearly defined (Klem and van Laar 2008, 142). If these concepts are not defined, then it will also be unclear how far the parameters of the DDR mandate should extend. According to Robert Muggah (2009, 15-16), DDR supporters still debate whether the process contributes to tangible safety on the ground because there is comparatively little evidence whether or not DDR even works – for security or development.

Even if basic objectives of the post conflict environment are defined, there is still widespread debate over the exact role of DDR in achieving them. Underpinning this debate is a philosophical disagreement over the objectives of DDR. Authors have noted the inherent contradiction between the development and security objectives of DDR (Jennings 2008b, 327; Pugel 2009, 91). The debate asks whether DDR should employ a minimalist approach and focus only

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9 For the purposes of clarification, the DDR(R) programme for Liberia was a component of the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that extended DDR to contain a “rehabilitation” component (Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003, Part VI). There is significant research that argues that the failure of the original DDR programme under Charles Taylor in 1997 was one of the factors that made re-engagement in hostilities in Liberia feasible (Déme 2005, 67; Özerdem 2009, 10; Podder 2010, 166). The Liberian post-war government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has placed demobilisation at the top of its priority list for enhancing peace and security, and has declared that the demobilisation of ex-combatants is complete (GoL 2010). However, it is difficult to confirm whether the current peace can be attributed to the Liberian DDRR programme because the only clear benchmark of success of a DDR programme is if a state does not relapse into war (Pugel 2009, 70).
on security, or if a maximalist approach that encourages development and governance is more productive (Muggah 2009, 3).\(^\text{10}\) There is also a debate over whether or not the components of DDR should operate as parallel activities, or if they should be sequenced to ensure a secure operating environment (ibid., 10). Gamba (2003, 179) argues that the establishment of security must come first, rather than development, to ensure safe and effective implementation for government policy. However, she states the importance of a comprehensive programme: “By ensuring a broader definition of DDR, providing a regional umbrella to support its implementation, and balancing DDR with other key elements in post-conflict reconstruction an effective road map for sustainable peace can be developed and conflict prevention be applied” (ibid., 191). Kö (2004, 500) share this view, and suggest that DDR is a social contract rather than a military-centred exercise. Few would argue that post-conflict intervention should not include a comprehensive development plan as part of a broader war recovery effort. The reality is that these ideal situations of linking DDR to development do not always exist.

Despite the importance of investing in alternative livelihoods and community support, many post-conflict countries such as Liberia do not have the municipal and national capacities to absorb the new workers trained through DDR. Reintegration sections of DDR have consistently underperformed relative to their theoretically “critical” status within the programmes (Muggah 2009, 13).

\(^\text{10}\) Criticisms of DDR usually surround how narrow it is on one hand, leaving out too many aspects of post-conflict recovery, or on the other hand too broad, which questions the extent to which it can perform the way it is expected (Muggah 2009, 1).
Kathleen Jennings (2008a, 157) argues that reintegration in Liberia meant the “temporary removal of idleness”, because the programme was predicated on the assumption that idleness caused by unemployment leads to instability. Jennings (ibid.) notes that this assumption reflects a securitised\(^\text{11}\) approach to the Liberian DDRR programme, which turned reintegration into a short-term, security-justified activity. This is at odds with the very nature of reintegration, which is a long-term activity according to the United Nations.\(^\text{12}\) The short-term attempt by international donors and institutions to provide an alternative source of livelihood has consequences that extend beyond the economic sector – it impacts the way ex-combatants interact with their government. DDR programmes are mandate-driven, and the political imperative to adhere to the programme is at the level of the institution implementing it rather than at the national level, preventing a social contract from developing between the ex-combatants and the government (KÖ 2004, 506). This is a difficult situation, because unlike a social contract, “DDR does not emerge spontaneously ‘from below’ but is a part of a broader (Weberian) project of securing the legitimate control of force from above” (Muggah 2009, 2). By disarming, the ex-combatants are attempting to foster a new social contract between the government and themselves (KÖ 2004, 506). It is therefore essential to understand the previous social contract that operated between the armed group and the individual if the state aims to replace it.

\(^{11}\) See Buzan (1997: 5) – description of securitisation in Glossary.

\(^{12}\) See Glossary and Appendix D.
3: CONFLICT PREVENTION THROUGH ADDRESSING FACTION MEMBERSHIP

3.1 The Individual-Faction Link is Important

In the preceding chapter, I argued that the shift of DDR to a conflict prevention mechanism has led to a contradiction between its goals of long-term development and short-term security. This discrepancy means that DDR often cannot fulfil the expectations placed on it, which may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. This chapter proposes a new way to look at DDR and conflict prevention by focusing on the recruitment relationship between the individual and the faction. This argument is based on the premise that to execute any type of conflict prevention initiative, one must acknowledge the root causes for armed group membership.

Humphreys and Weinstein\textsuperscript{13} have identified four major schools of thought on the ways that individuals have been motivated to participate in a civil war: expressive motivations, known as “grievance”; motivations for material gain based on selective incentives, known as “greed”; social pressure from the community that influences the individual, which is a “structural” argument; and a moral, or “pleasure in agency” argument as developed by Elizabeth Wood (HW 2008, 439). Regardless of the academic theory used to explain conflict, each paradigm must explain how the individual and the faction relate to one another –

\textsuperscript{13} Hereafter known as “HW”.

whether through rational choice, social structures, or any other paradigm. Since this requirement is necessary for all explanations of civil war, it is logical to recognise this relationship in all DDR debates, if DDR is meant to prevent the re-emergence of conflict. This chapter will explain that while a rational actor paradigm is important for examining the relationship between the individual and the faction, structural conditions cannot be discounted. It is essential to look at the individual-faction relationship from a variety of paradigms, and to include those paradigms when designing a framework for examining rebel group recruitment within DDR planning.

3.2 Rational Choice and Structural Conditions

The review of theories of civil war is not meant to discuss the debates at length; rather it demonstrates that despite many different theories of civil war, each one must still address how groups mobilise. According to the rational choice paradigm as described by Murshed (2010, 63), conflict is a product of choice. The rational choice paradigm is an excellent tool to examine the origins of armed group membership, providing that it applies to both the individual and the faction, as understanding the motivations of combatants helps reveal the origins and evolutions of their conflicts (HW 2008, 436). Weinstein (2007, 98) argues “to understand how individuals chose to support, collaborate, or participate in rebellion, one must look at the strategies that groups use to respond to the problem of collective action”. Goodwin and Skocpol (1989, 494)

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14 Not only are individuals making a choice to join (except in the cases of forced recruitment), the group leader is also choosing to recruit, or not recruit – which is why forced recruitment can still fall under the rational choice paradigm.
also recognised this relationship between individuals and groups. They emphasise the way in which rebel groups offer selective incentives to encourage or force participation in specific tasks for the advancement of the faction’s goals. As “greed” can provide motivation for both the individual and the armed groups, its importance should be recognised in any conflict prevention initiative. It is also acknowledged that there are factors that impact this “greed” relationship which are often beyond the control of either the faction or the individual. As stated by Murshed (2010, 67), “we must look at the conditions that lead violence to become a more attractive option in relation to other activities” (italics added).

Despite the earlier literature on the role of the individual in revolutions (such as Popkin 1979), there still is a necessity for leadership within a group to organise and arm revolutionary movements (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 492). The most successful revolutionaries are those who can appeal to individuals from a variety of backgrounds. A leader’s success is based on mobilising around an embedded nationalist, populist, or religious “grievance” factor that justifies rebelling against the existing structure, while still delivering state-like collective goods such as security (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 493; Gates 2002, 112). The theory that rebel group recruitment is very diverse and highly organized draws on both rational choice and structural models, because it can incorporate a

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15 They argue that groups living in a rural setting, “simply do not have the organizational wherewithal to rebel in the absence of outside leaders” (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 492).
number of recruitment conditions, including selective incentives, leadership, and mobilisation based on socio-economic identity.\textsuperscript{16}

Two authors who recognize the impact of larger social structures on the decisions of individuals to join rebel groups are Christina Steenkamp and Elizabeth Wood. Steenkamp's analysis (2009, 52) spans the debate between the individual rational decision to use violence for an objective, and the societal structures encouraging and supporting violence. She argues that these two paradigms are not in juxtaposition, but that the societal structures influence the individual's predisposition toward using violence. Steenkamp (ibid., 29) sees a return to conflict, such as in Liberia in 1999, as not only due to the failure of DDR, the failure of the state, or the result of economic incentives. It is also due to the perception of a permissive social environment, which she calls "a culture of violence". She argues that violent conflict alters the way society views its norms and values, and increases the tolerance level for violence at the individual level (ibid., 30). Elizabeth Wood's "pleasure in agency" argument goes further, and incorporates notions of "pride... in the successful assertion of [their] interests and identity". In her research, she found that in the case of those who participated in the El Salvador civil war, the principle reasons for their insurgent collective action were "moral commitments and emotional engagements" (2003, 18). Steenkamp and Wood's analyses are important to understanding the individual-faction link.

\textsuperscript{16} Murshed (2010:65) also supports the argument that viewing greed and grievance separately is of little benefit; it is common for grievances to become an excuse for greed, existing simultaneously.
within a macro context because they emphasise the structural variables that lead to the use of organised violence by both the individual and the faction.

HW also acknowledge the structural influence on the ability for factions to recruit: "the depth of an individual’s discontent with his or her economic position in society is a major causal factor that differentiates participants in rebellion from non-participants" (HW 2008, 440). This discontent emerges from factors such as social class, the rural-urban divide, or ethnic and political grievances, all of which have the potential to increase the vertical and horizontal inequalities that lead to faction participation (ibid.). According to the ‘structure of agency’ approach, an individual’s decision whether or not to join an insurgency is linked to the “characteristics of the community in which he or she is embedded” (ibid., 442). HW applied this idea to both insurgent and counter-insurgent groups, arguing that it is less the ability of the leader to convince the individual that participation is in their interest, than the community norms and pressures of generalized reciprocity that influence individuals to participate. Reducing the impact of a culture of violence on greed or grievances means the state must enact policies that do not only promise economic opportunities. They must also eradicate socio-economic structural conditions for violence at the group level, provide a deterrent for individual violence, and set an example of the legitimate use of force (Steenkamp 2009, 45). In order for this to occur, one must understand the relationship between the groups, the individuals, and the conditions under which they meet. Only then will the design of DDR reduce the likelihood of re-mobilization and subsequent armed violence.
4: UNDERSTANDING THE RECRUITMENT RELATIONSHIP – FRAMEWORK AND DATA

This chapter will discuss my combined framework used to argue that DDR, as a conflict prevention tool, must place greater emphasis on understanding the relationship between the individual and the faction. It will begin in Section 4.1 by outlining the framework’s context. Section 4.2 will discuss the work by Jeremy Weinstein and Macarten Humphreys (HW) in Sierra Leone, and I will combine their theories into a framework for examining the factions and participants in the Liberian civil war. Section 4.3 will discuss the source of data used in my combined framework, and the Section 4.4 will outline the predictions of applying the data set to my combined framework.

4.1 Liberia as a Case Study

Jeremy Levitt’s book, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia provides the historical background for studies such as that of James Pugel, whose survey functions as the baseline source of data for this project. Levitt divides the most recent civil war into three distinct phases: the Charles Taylor insurrection against the regime of Samuel K. Doe, from 1989 to 1997; the lull in the fighting punctuated by the election of Taylor as Doe’s successor and the continuation of a corrupt and weak government; and a final phase characterized by the LURD and the MODEL insurrections from 1999 to 2003 (Levitt 2005, 205-244). Together, Levitt has referred to these three phases as “The Great War”. This
project looks at the third phase of the Great War from 1999 to 2003, because it is the point at which conflict reignited and when LURD and MODEL emerged. To prevent conflict in a country that has experienced wars throughout its history (Levitt 2005), one must look at the conditions that cause these conflicts to reignite rather than at only their historical origins. The factions in the Liberian civil war provide an excellent example of the conditions under which rebel groups mobilise individuals very quickly, and this examination will offer insight into other countries in similar ‘conflict traps’.

Using a case study to argue for a reconsideration of the recruitment relationships when planning DDR is valuable for a number of reasons. First, this project provides the foundation for a future research project “to identify the causes of a specific outcome in a specific case” (Mahoney 2007, 7). The ubiquitous emphasis on context-specific post-conflict recovery programs by academics and practitioners inherently encourages the use of “single-outcome studies”, and this project proves valuable for understanding different characteristics about each faction in Liberia. While a “single outcome study” is not the intended methodology of this project, it could be helpful to examine faction mobilisation in a country or region-specific context.

Second, if a case study is meant to represent a broader set of cases (Gerring 2007, 12), this project does so. It examines the individual-faction relationship in the context of DDRR planning, because “the challenges

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17 This is true in reference to the youngest people who were involved with fighting; many of them would have had no memories of government policies that directly affected them. Young people with little historical knowledge about the conflict are more likely to see social transformation through the lens of their own, individual experiences (Steenkamp 2009, 46-47).
encountered during the Liberian DDRR intervention are analogous to those found in other countries” (Pugel 2009, 90). In 2006, the UNDP released its *Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards*, which was “a set of policies, guidelines and procedures for UN-supported DDR programmes in a peacekeeping context” (UNDP 2006). Standardisation, by such a large organization and at the level of implementation, means that Liberia, or any other state hosting UNDP-sponsored DDR efforts, functions well as a case study of the wider implementation of DDR by the UNDP.\(^\text{19}\)

Concerns by Michael Coppedge over the validity of representativeness – “it is never safe to generalize from one or a few cases” – have led him to encourage the use of case studies for “theory development and intensive testing rather any attempt at extensive testing” (Coppedge 2007, 53). In order to address this problem, and as I have stressed in my “Sources of Error” section, this project has been primarily a form of theory development. My combined framework is a new way of examining rebel recruitment using existing literature, and its data set is drawn from that same body of literature. The purpose of the project is not only to test the validity of my combined framework – it is to demonstrate that a variety of theories for faction recruitment must be included into DDR planning.

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\(^\text{18}\) As of 2008, there were 15 countries undertaking DDR programmes (Caramés and Sanz, 2009 10), and by 2010, the UNDP supported DDR programs in at least 11 countries (UN 2010).

\(^\text{19}\) John Gerring (2007, 13) states, “there is no value in taking a random sample of units that are effectively uniform with respect to the phenomenon under study”. I am operating under the assumption that the IDDRS uniformly represent the goals and best practices of all their present and future DDR programs as long as the UNDP continues to implement the IDDRS. I am also aware of the apparent contradiction of attempting to implement standardised procedures in context-specific DDR environments, as described in Section 2.2 and 2.3.
Finally, case studies such as this one “can identify interactions between variables and establish a chronological sequence of events that helps map out the pathways linking the independent variables to the dependent variable” (Sambanis 2004, 263). This project attempts to identify the interactions between the variables of the individual and the rebel group, and contribute to future DDR development by encouraging DDR program developers to map the pathways of individual-faction recruitment.

4.2 Framework Components

The framework I use is a combination of the theory created by Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein (when analysing the determinants for individual participation in civil war in Sierra Leone), and the theory created by Jeremy Weinstein two years earlier (to explain the way that information and endowments shape the structure of rebel groups). Drawing from these two theories, my project creates a combined framework to examine the Liberian recruitment relationship from the perspectives of the recruit and the group recruiting. Using Weinstein’s theories on both sides of the recruitment process will permit a level of consistency within my combined framework that might not otherwise be achieved by amalgamating two theories together by different authors. This section will review each theory, and will then explain how

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20 This description sounds remarkably close to the description of process tracing by Bennet and George (2005, 205-232). However, it does not analyse all the intervening steps between the time an individual was a civilian and when they became a combatant. Nor does it analyse all the steps between the time a rebel group was just a number of individuals and the time it began to offer effective resistance to the state, nor the series of interactions between the group and the individual over time. It is not process tracing because it does not look at relationships over time, only the outcomes of the relationships based on very limited variables.
combining the theories to produce one framework will be helpful to analyse the recruitment relationship during the Liberian civil war.

4.2.1 The HW Theory

Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein offer a micro-level analysis on the determinants of civil war in Sierra Leone, which was facilitated by the empirical survey data collected between June 2003 and August 2003 (HW 2008, 443). In this survey, the authors measured the individual determinants that influenced joining the civil war that took place between March 1991 and July 1999, and between early 2000 and February 2002. This survey was important because the individual participation in civil war offers insight into the way armed groups are formed and held together, a perspective seldom seen through country-level data (ibid., 436).

HW found that the two main factions in the Sierra Leone civil war had a different history of recruitment based on their needs and ability to either bargain or force recruits to join. Initially, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was a mixture of disaffected Sierra Leonean youth, intellectuals, and Sierra Leoneans arrested by Charles Taylor in Liberia. As the war progressed, high numbers of “recruits”, including high numbers of boys and girls, were captured in village raids or through abductions from refugee camps (ibid., 438). By the end of the war, volunteers consisted of just 12% of the total RUF recruits in the HW sample (ibid., 445). In contrast, the civilian government’s paramilitary force, the Civil

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21 One of the most significant ways this data was collected was through the interviewing of both combatants and non-combatants, allowing for an exploration of why individuals did not join the faction just as much as why they did (HW, 2008: 437).
Defense Forces (CDF) was reported to have used a more “institutionalized and voluntary” procedure (ibid., 438). Accounts of origins of recruitment include a desire to defend the community, and a major ideological component: up to 70% of CDF fighters reported joining to support the groups political goals, as opposed to the fewer than 10% who reported joining the RUF for ideological reasons (ibid.).

These findings suggest that participation in civil war is not based on a single, linear logic, but is based on a variety of factors, some of which were consistent between the RUF and the CDF. HW found that welfare, in the form of financial endowments and access to education, as well as fear for safety, mobilised Sierra Leoneans on both sides of the conflict. A striking difference emerged between the groups, however – their ability to use community strength to their advantage. There was a higher association of mobilizing community strength with the CDF, but not with the RUF. This is because the CDF was seen to be defending the status quo, therefore allowing them to effectively use community structures to mobilise high-commitment recruits (ibid., 450-451).

HW conclude that the context of participation in Sierra Leone’s civil war is best explained by a diversity of motivations: while grievance and selective incentives can operate independently, they also complement and reinforce each other under different circumstances. HW argue that if insurgent groups have grown through access to natural resources, then making peace may depend on the ability to restrict rebel group access to those resources. But if groups are able to mobilise fighters using popular discontent as a motivating factor, then
those looking to prevent the re-emergence of violence must address these fundamental grievances (ibid., 436). The study suggests that a supply and demand side exists for fighters depending on strategic concerns (ibid., 451-453), and more emphasis must be placed on how fighters and factions interact to meet the demand or supply of labour, and the long or short-term needs of the combatant. HW argue that the rivalry between theories of individual participation in civil war is not only arbitrary, but also artificial; their findings go so far as to suggest the widespread assumption that individuals rationally choose to participate may even be false (ibid., 436-437). One must look at why individuals choose to join, but also how armed groups or other circumstances force them to join. While the HW study emphasised the determinants of individual participation in civil war, another framework is required to discuss the recruitment strategies of the factions.

4.2.2 The Weinstein Theory

To analyse faction mobilisation, it is necessary to look at how different groups attract different individuals. Jeremy Weinstein provides a complementary perspective to the study of individual determinants of participation in Sierra Leone: a theory of the determinants for recruitment of individuals by the faction, rather than the individual. Weinstein explains that the contrasting recruitment profiles and strategies of rebel groups function as a product of variation in the initial conditions facing rebel leadership (Weinstein 2005, 599; see also Gates 2002). Weinstein focuses on two factors that shape the recruitment process: “the mix of endowments that different rebel leaders have at their disposal to attract
According to Weinstein’s theory, individuals who join rebel groups are either *consumers* or *investors*, and rebel groups possess *social endowments* or *economic endowments*. Economic endowments are defined by Weinstein as provisions funding the “salaries, uniforms, food, and other supplies, all of which can be distributed to supporters contingent on their participation” (Weinstein 2007, 101). Economic endowments share a number of characteristics: they can be delivered relatively quickly, minimising the need for trust, and they can be used to buy arms, ammunition, provide transportation, and organise the detachments. This reduces the potential cost of participating for the recruit and maximises their relative position against the government (ibid.). Social endowments are used when economic endowments are in short supply, because the “promises must substitute for immediate payoffs” (ibid.). Norms of reciprocity, ethnic or religious networks, formal associations, and tighter-knit communities all begin to emerge as social endowments influencing recruitment strategies (Weinstein 2007, 102). The type of endowments a rebel group possesses will determine the type of individuals it is able to recruit: either consumers, or investors.

Consumers are low-commitment individuals seeking immediate, short-term gains. Investors are dedicated to the cause of the organization and will make costly short-term investments in exchange for future rewards (Weinstein 2005, 603). At the early stages of rebellion, consumers will put the group’s goals
at risk when chance of defeat is high because of their low commitment and lack of dedication to the organization. It is essential for the group to attract high-commitment individuals through ideological adherence and social endowments early on in the rebellion period. By using social endowments, the faction can minimise material incentives for joining and can avoid excess low-commitment individuals (Weinstein 2005, 603). 22

This relationship between rebel group endowments and types of individuals recruited was observed in Sierra Leone when the RUF began attracting disaffected Sierra Leoneans, students, and intellectuals through social endowments. Over time, the RUF began to rely on economic endowments such as the extraction of diamonds, and the external support of Charles Taylor to attract new recruits – and the number of consumer recruits rose relative to investors as the war progressed (HW 2008, 437-438). 23 Economic and social endowments are important because the relationships between rebel groups and individuals function similarly to state social contracts, in so far as they offer collective benefits to current or potential members (Weinstein 2007, 97; Gates 2002, 112).

4.2.3 My Combined Framework

By combining individual determinants with group recruitment determinants, my combined framework provides an insight into how individuals

22 Investors signal their quality as high-commitment individuals by accepting the promise of future gains, and consumers will be more likely to join groups offering immediate payoffs, or perhaps, will not join a group at all (Weinstein 2005, 605).

23 Weinstein's theory, in the form of a graph, can be found in Appendix A.
and groups use their own starting conditions to seek out others who can fulfil their needs. This concept of individuals seeking out other individuals or groups to complement their own needs and skills is supported by the economist William Easterly, who cites “matching” as a way for people to increase their returns on investments through like-minded collaboration (Easterly 2001, 155-6). Groups with high numbers of consumers tend to have high economic endowments: consumers are paid with cash, with permission to loot, or with opportunistic crimes.24 Groups containing high numbers of committed, long-term investors will likely have mobilised by using grievance-based ideology, religion, ethnicity, or the community.25

The components of the framework, originally designed for Sierra Leone, are very applicable to the case of Liberia. Not only are the roots of conflict in each country linked through their political economies of extraction and history of polarization (Abdullah and Rashid 2004, 172), the conflicts in both countries share aspects of ethnicity (CIA 2010), geography, and shared political instability due in part to the arms trade across porous borders (Spear 2006, 76). Consistency is maintained by using James Pugel’s data set to provide data for the characteristics of individuals and factions, since it is based on the same survey designed for the HW project in Sierra Leone.

24 Alternatively, groups with high numbers of consumers may also access those endowments through violence, or permission to use violence to obtain them.
25 Variables influencing the recruiting relationship, such as how close to victory the rebel group is, are outlined in Appendix A. This does not imply one type of group recruitment characteristics is more preferable to any other, or that a group with more consumers or more investors has a higher probability of victory. Rather, it provides a way to look at the formation of rebel groups under certain conditions which will reveal more about those who participate in or support them.
4.3 Source of Data

In February and March 2006, the UNDP sponsored a survey conducted by James Pugel in Liberia titled *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia* and it is the fundamental data source for this case study. Pugel provides the most comprehensive data set on the Liberian ex-combatant experience, and the survey was based on the HW survey in Sierra Leone (Pugel 2007, 12). Micro level research, such as that of Pugel and HW, serves the purpose of looking at individual determinants and outcomes within a macro context (Pugel 2009, 77). Pugel defends the micro approach when evaluating DDR programmes, because “micro-level findings will reveal important nuances within their targeted area for practitioners while simultaneously validating observed macro-level outcomes that are of concern to higher-order policy-makers” (ibid.). The purpose of the survey was to “provide an initial assessment of the progress toward the objectives of national reconciliation, conflict prevention, social and economic reintegration, as well as the sustainable development made by the DDRR interventions” (Pugel 2007, 14).

Pugel groups his findings according to religion, rank, and gender, but most importantly, by faction. While secondary in importance to his study (Pugel 2007, 26), presenting his findings according to faction offers greater insight into characteristics of the individuals who participated (or were forced to participate).

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26 Using the same framework that guided the survey in Sierra Leone provides a consistent set of parameters to look at recruitment relationships in Liberia.

27 This declaration in itself is evidence that the DDRR programme in Liberia is attempting to function as a conflict prevention mechanism.
General characteristics about the factions’ recruitment profiles can also be found in secondary documents, such as Levitt's analysis of the Liberian civil war (Levitt 2005).\textsuperscript{28}

4.3.1 Proxies for Rebel Group Endowments

To represent economic and social endowments, Figure 3 (Ex-combatant Religious Affiliations), Figure 17 (Incentives for Participation in Factions), and Figures 18 through 21 (faction use of forced labour), will be used. Figure 3 is used to measure the extent to which a group is religiously homogenous, which would increase the level of social endowments. Figure 17 acts as a proxy for economic endowments under the categories of “Money”, “Food”, or “A Job” because these can be delivered immediately. The remaining three incentives offered, “Protect Family”, “Improve Situation in Liberia”, and “A way to get Revenge” will be considered social endowments, as they defer the incentives on the condition of longer-term commitment. Figures 18-21 are used to proxy the extent to which a faction lacks social endowments, as individuals are assumed unwilling to voluntarily submit to labour without compensation, nor promises of future gains, and freedom can be delivered immediately.

4.3.2 Proxies for Individual Determinants

To determine if individuals are investors or consumers before they join, a number of pre-war profile criteria are used. The three criteria used for

\textsuperscript{28} A brief description of the survey, all the figures cited here from the survey, and a table of the findings have been included in the Appendix B and C. The full report can be easily accessed via the Internet from the link provided in the Reference List.
determining the extent to which the faction members were consumers or investors are Figure 4 (Pre-War Political Allegiances), Figure 13 (How Combatants Were Introduced to Their Former Factions), and Figure 16 (Reasons for Joining). While only using Figure 16 may seem to be the simplest method, using information about their pre-war affiliations and their mode of introduction looks at the characteristics of the individuals joining, as well as their circumstances. “Protect Family”, “Supported Political Goals” and “People in Group Lived Better” are considered characteristics of investors because they imply a long-term commitment to achieve those goals. The response “Other Soldiers Killed my Family” is a characteristic of investors because of the option to choose the incentive of “Revenge” offered by the rebel groups, as in Figure 17. “Abducted”, “Scared”, and “Money” are considered characteristics of consumers because they are goods that can be delivered immediately. In the case of abduction and fear, the good provided (or consumed) is the non-presence of violence (or death) toward the recruit at the hands of the faction.

4.4 Implications

By arguing that both individuals and factions have long and short-term goals that are fulfilled through economic and social benefits, I predicted three relationships would exist between the individuals and the factions in the Liberian civil war:

1. Groups with high social endowments, such as ideology and homogenous membership, should be recruiting people who are investors. These investors will have been influenced to join by a
commitment to long-term goals, such as family protection, the change in the government of Liberia, or possibly, revenge for the death of a family member.

2. Groups with high economic endowments, such as access to resources, external funding from a sympathetic government, or access to weapons should contain recruits who are consumers. Consumers join because of their short-term goals: they were offered money, jobs, they were immediately afraid, or they were forcibly recruited.

3. Groups with a mix of economic and social endowments will contain a mix of consumers and investors, recruited depending on the needs and endowments of both the faction and the individual.
5: LIBERIA’S FACTIONS AND THEIR RECRUITS

In this chapter, I will outline the findings of my application of Pugel’s Liberian ex-combatant survey to my combined framework. There are four sections, each one covering a faction, and each section will contain two subsections. Each subsection will address respectively: the endowments of the faction, and the profile of their participants. I will then outline the findings and provide a discussion of the sources of error. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that factions recruit, and individuals join, based on a variety of economic and social circumstances. It builds on Chapter Two, Three, and Four by providing evidence demonstrating that recruitment is more than a product of rational choice and economic necessity – and that DDR practitioners must take this into consideration if DDR programmes are to be effective conflict prevention mechanisms.

5.1 Government of Liberia/Taylor Militia

5.1.1 Profile of Economic and Social Endowments

According to the Pugel survey, the GoL and militia forces had the highest religious homogeneity, with a higher percentage of Christians than any other faction. It was the group most likely to use physical force to compel civilians to

\[29\] To demonstrate the diversity of circumstances of rebel recruitment in the clearest, most succinct way possible, all the percentages have been rounded. For exact figures as provided by Pugel, see Appendix B, Appendix C, or the full report – the Internet link is provided in the Reference List.
perform forced labour, the second most likely after the NPFL to “almost always” use forced labour, and the group least likely to give instructions on how to interact with civilians. Nearly 65% of members report being offered economic incentives (money, jobs or food) – this faction clearly used economic endowments to attract recruits more than any other faction. The common social endowments offered were for family protection and to improve the situation in Liberia. “Revenge” and “Other” were offered less than 1% of the time. According to my combined framework, the participants that should be the most likely to be recruited into the GoL armed forces or Taylor militia would be consumers because of the higher access to short-term, easily deliverable economic endowments for potential recruits.

5.1.2 Profile of Participants

Contrary to the prediction made by my combined framework, the total number of responses in Figure 16 that were characteristic of investors were just over 50%, while responses characteristic of consumers were just below 50%. This may be explained by the high percentage of respondents with previous political affiliations (Figure 4). While more than 88% of those in the GoL had no pre-war affiliation before the conflict (the second highest of the factions), the fact that nearly 8% of the GoL militia were former Doe supporters indicates that those participants had switched into the GoL from another faction. Noting the contradictory result of less than 15% joined to support political goals versus the 54% of those who joined because they were abducted, were scared, or for family protection, it (the result) is best explained by the hypothesis that these individuals
switched due to intimidation or fear. The contradiction between the economic incentives and the number of investor recruits supports the notion that a recruitment relationship is not necessarily linear or rational, but based on a myriad of factors that might not be measurable, such as the culture of violence.\textsuperscript{30}

5.2 NPFL

5.2.1 Profile of Economic and Social Endowments

According to my combined framework, there should be a slightly higher number of investors in the NPFL than in the GoL, but the NPFL still should contain mostly consumers. The religious makeup of the NPFL was only slightly less homogenous than the GoL, and the treatment of civilians was slightly better – there was a higher use of forced labour, but NPFL faction members received more instruction on how to treat civilians.\textsuperscript{31} In terms of incentives offered for participating, just over 53% were economic, and just over 46% were social (23% for family protection, and 20% for the improvement of Liberia – both higher than the GoL). There were no responses for “Revenge”, and 3% of respondents cited “Other” as a reason for joining.

5.2.2 Profile of Participants

The results of the NPFL support my combined framework, but are also nearly identical to the responses of ex-combatants from the GoL: just over 50%...
of the NPFL joined as investors, while just under 50% joined as consumers (according to Figure 16). As the NPFL had been in existence since the beginning of the civil war, it was logical to see a greater number of pre-war allegiances to the NPFL. The number of previous Doe supporters was half that of the GoL, likely because the NPFL existed as early as 1989, fighting against the Doe regime.

The way in which individuals were introduced to their factions (Figure 13) was the response that supported the modified framework more than any other: 13% of respondents answered that they went looking for the NPFL, as opposed to the 5% who went looking for the GoL and LURD respectively. This indicates a higher number of people who chose to join the fighting in advance, which is a characteristic of investors. However, there are two results that might challenge this finding: the number of respondents who answered, “Group ambushed me on road” or “Group attacked village” were nearly the same for the GoL (37%) as they were for the NPFL (38%). The number of people who responded that they had been introduced because a “Friend/Relative joined group”, was lower in the NPFL, at 45%, while the GoL had 53% of individuals who were introduced to the faction because their friends or family had joined.

Another variation to the framework, although the exact numbers are not provided in the chart in Pugel’s document, is that there are slightly fewer investor responses for “Supported Political Goals” and a slightly higher number of responses for “Other Soldiers Killed my Family”, although the difference may be too small to be statistically important considering the sample size. While the
results do not contradict my combined framework, the results only show a marginal relationship between the endowments of the NPFL and the characteristics of its recruits. The data gives the impression that there were slightly more investors in the NPFL than in the GoL, as predicted by the model, although again, the differences may be too small to be of statistical significance.

5.3 LURD

5.3.1 Profile of Economic and Social Endowments

According to Figure 17, LURD appeared to have more economic endowments to offer as incentives than the NPFL, but fewer than the GoL. The incentives offered were, once again, very close to that of the NPFL: 55% were economic (28% “Money”, 10% “Jobs”, and 17% were offered “Food”). For social endowments, family protection was offered to 20% of respondents, improving Liberia was offered 21% of the time, and revenge counted for less than 1% of incentives offered.

Civilians were not treated significantly better either. The responses for Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20 showed similar results as the NPFL and GoL in terms of civilian forced labour. A fewer number of combatants received training on how to treat civilians, there was a greater report of forced labour, and the consequences for non-participation were only slightly less violent for LURD as opposed to the NPFL and the GoL.

The major variation between LURD and the other factions is the religious diversity within the faction, with 71% of LURD ex-combatants self-reported as
“Christian”, 26.98% as “Muslim”, and 1.56% as “none”. If religions, and therefore cultures, were major social endowments because they are rooted in a long-term orientation as purported by Weinstein (2007, 103), then such a religiously diverse membership would reduce the ability for LURD to use social endowments to mobilise. Therefore, if one takes into consideration all three variables (endowments, treatment of civilians, and religion) my combined framework predicts a greater likelihood for consumers, rather than investors, to join LURD.

5.3.2 Profile of Participants

The characteristic of LURD that profiled many participants as consumers was Figure 13 – method of introduction. LURD combatants, more so than any other faction, were introduced through violent means (at least 52% through ambush or village attack). According to Figure 17 however, in the case of LURD, as well as the NPFL, the number of investors was slightly over 50% and the number of consumers slightly below 50%. LURD was also the faction with the greatest percentage of politically non-aligned individuals prior to the war. This may indicate a larger number of consumers because of their disconnect from politics, and is thus indicative of less social capital in the form of political ideology. Similar to the previous two factions, the greatest number of responses as to why they joined was for “family protection”. LURD also had the highest rate of abduction, at 21%, which may explain the high numbers of politically non-aligned individuals before the war. Other responses for joining were similar to the NPFL and GoL, in which the number of investors according to Figure 17 was slightly higher than anticipated. While Figure 13 supports my combined
framework through high numbers of individuals introduced to their factions through violent means or abduction, Figure 17 does not, as it shows a higher number of responses characterised by investment rather than consumption.

5.4 MODEL

5.4.1 Profile of Economic and Social Endowments

MODEL, the last faction to emerge during the Liberian civil war, has more religious homogeneity than LURD. This faction was the least likely to use forced labour, with the consequences for non-compliance low, and at least 94% of the sampled population reported receiving instructions on how to treat civilians. This was also the group offering the fewest economic incentives (Figure 17): only 26% were offered food, money, or jobs. On the contrary, social endowments comprised at least 69% of responses. “Revenge” counted for approximately 14%, 32 “Protect Family” as 31%, 33 and to “Improve [the] Situation in Liberia” as 27%. According to my combined framework, based on measures of religious homogeneity, treatment of civilians, and incentives offered, MODEL should attract far more investors rather than consumers.

32 Recall: “Revenge” counted for less than 1% of respondents in the GoL and LURD, and was not reported offered at all by the NPFL ex-combatants. This larger statistic is indicative of a social endowment, as per Section 4.3.1. According to Weinstein’s theory and my combined framework, investors will be more likely to accept social endowments in the absence of economic endowments. The combined framework shows that in this instance, MODEL clearly had an absence of economic endowments relative to the other factions, and would be only able to offer social endowments to attract high-committed individuals because low-committed individuals would not join for the promises of payoffs in the future.

33 Recall: the next highest was the NPFL at 23%.
5.4.2 Profile of Participants

The results of my combined framework indicated MODEL had uniquely non-economic endowments, and attracted a high percentage of investors. For pre-war allegiances, 20% of former MODEL combatants reported supporting ex-President Doe before the war. MODEL also had a large contingent of followers who actively sought them out. The number of participants introduced through violence (39%) is very close to that of the GoL (37%) and is the same as the NPFL (39%), but is much lower than LURD. The reasons reported for joining MODEL were similar to the other factions, but two differences are telling: the abduction rate of 12% (other factions averaged nearly 20%) is significantly lower; and the number that reported family protection as a reason for joining was significantly higher, at 42% (other factions averaged 34%). Undoubtedly, MODEL did attract the highest number of investors, and it contained the greatest amount of social endowments of all the factions.

5.5 Results

The Liberian UNDP survey by James Pugel is a valuable tool for examining the recruitment conditions of both individuals and factions. Despite the existence of many factions in the Liberian conflict, MODEL, LURD, NPFL and GoL were those most commonly identified within the survey, and are used for Pugel’s examinations (Pugel 2007, 26-7), as well as in this analysis. In the case

34 This previous allegiance to ex-President Doe was higher than any other faction, and indicates a high number of investors – likely those who attempted to resist Charles Taylor at the beginning of the civil war in 1989, and were attempting to unseat him from power toward the end of the war in 2003.

35 Nearly 34% of respondents reported that they “went looking for the faction”.

36 Recall: LURD recruited through ambush or village attack at least 52% of the time.
of the Liberian factions, my combined framework successfully observed two of my three predicted relationships.

The first relationship, that groups with high social endowments will contain more investors than consumers has been demonstrated in the case of MODEL. As a rebel group that broke away from LURD toward the end of the war out of political loyalty to ex-President Doe (Levitt 2005, 233), MODEL attracted a high political following relative to the other factions. The only other faction to confirm the hypothesis would be the NPFL, who attracted nearly the same ratio of investors and consumers as the social and economic endowments they held.

The second relationship, that groups with high economic endowments would contain more consumers than investors, has not shown strong results within any of the factions. The faction most likely to have had a high number of consumers was the GoL, which had the highest percentage of economic endowments. Instead, the ratio of investors to consumers was still nearly the same as the NPFL and LURD. Aside from the sources of error discussed in the next section, there are two possible explanations for this result. First, perhaps there were insufficient economic endowments, but the “culture of violence” was so pervasive that joining was neither a long-term investment decision, nor a short-term consumption decision. It may have been the result of a subconscious, deeply rooted sense of fear or despair that is not measurable through a
quantitative survey, nor do the combatants themselves understand it.\textsuperscript{37} A second explanation, which also may not be measurable, is the “pleasure in agency” argument, as provided by Elizabeth Wood. Pugel did not have a response for Figure 16 or 17 where respondents could indicate “pride” or “moral commitment” – characteristics of investors – nor did Pugel publish the responses for “Other” in Figure 17.

The third relationship was confirmed: rebel groups with a diverse mix of economic and social endowments also have a mixed ratio of consumers to investors. While the GoL, the NPFL, and LURD attracted a similar ratio of investors and consumers; all four factions used a mix of economic and social endowments; and all four groups attracted a mix of consumers and investors, with MODEL showing the greatest correlation between endowments possessed and the types of individuals recruited.

5.5.1 **Sources of Error**

With the time and length restrictions of this paper, this application of a framework to a statistical study is a first step. The assignment of what constitutes characteristics of social and economic endowments, as well as what constitutes characteristics of consumers and investors, was based on a combination of the descriptions by HW and the multiple choice options offered by Pugel to the survey respondents. It is worth reminding the reader that

\textsuperscript{37} One such example of people making seemingly irrational choices based on this deep-rooted culture of violence is the lyrics of a campaign song for Charles Taylor sung by his child soldiers and future voters in the elections of 1997: “You killed my Pa. You killed my Ma. I will vote for you” (Johnson Sirleef 2009, 353).
respondents were permitted to give more than one response for Figures 16 and 17. Having the option to provide more than one response means those individuals who cited multiple responses may have had a greater impact on the ratio of consumer/investor or economic/social endowment responses. The most problematic was the assignment of the variable “joined to protect family”: without questioning the respondent further it is difficult to determine if this was a long-term security planning choice, or an emergency response based on a rapidly deteriorating security situation.

Furthermore, there was no figure within Pugel’s final report representing the ethnic or tribal breakdown according to faction. However, Pugel acknowledges the importance of ethnicity: “Taylor’s forces were drawn from the historically antagonistic tribes of the LURD and MODEL – the Gio and Mano as well as a strong contingent of Bassa and Kpelle” (Pugel 2007, 27). “While the MODEL was found to have an overwhelmingly homogenous membership of Khran, the LURD’s combatants were drawn from the tribal groups most associated with the northeastern hinterland regions where their insurgency was initiated – Gbandi, Loma and Mandingo” (ibid.). The ethnic composition and history may account for why the GoL and LURD had a higher number of investors despite having a higher ratio of economic endowments. HW (2007, 546) found reintegration success was not strongly correlated with ethnic ties, but
this result may not necessarily reduce the importance of looking at ethnicity as a cause for group mobilisation (Gates 2002, 113-114).\textsuperscript{38}

One further source of error is Figure 3 “Previous Political Alliance”. Since the question was referring to the allegiances as of 1989, and in 2003, the average age of the ex-combatants was 27 years (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 14), there were likely few individuals who were old enough to be political at that time. Many of those who may have been political in 1989 are no longer alive due to the high number of war-related deaths, and therefore could not be questioned at the time of Pugel’s survey.

\textsuperscript{38} It would have been beneficial to examine the ethnic breakdown of each faction; however, this information was not available at the time of writing.
6: DISCUSSION

The finding that Liberian factions attracted certain types of individuals based on their endowments, particularly social endowments, has important implications for evaluating the way the Liberian DDRR programme functions as a conflict prevention mechanism. First, the assumption of idleness due to lack of employment directly leading to faction membership is challenged. Second, the fact that many of the members had joined for the social endowments – such as the future protection of their family; to improve Liberia; and in some cases to exact revenge, demonstrates that some beneficiaries need to have a larger stake in the reintegration process itself. Finally, the results reinforce the argument that context-specific DDR programmes are necessary, and can be effectively achieved and measured through incorporating the individual experience with a faction into the primary planning processes of DDR.

6.1 Idleness as Instability

As discussed earlier, there is a debate over the extent to which economic reintegration – employment – should be framed as a matter of security. The extent to which DDR programmes have been securitised shows that DDR programmes focus on the “greed” side of conflict theory. The securitisation of Liberian DDRR was the reaction of practitioners, who chose to focus more on satisfying the immediate demands of ex-combatants rather than on the long-term impact of the program. An example of one such event contributing to this
securitisation was the disruption by former GoL militiamen of DDRR efforts at Camp Schieffelin, outside Monrovia at the beginning of December 2003, who demanded cash for weapons (Gray 2003). By placing an emphasis on economic reintegration, there is the assumption that some of the motivations for joining an armed group were economic (Spear 2006, 68). If this is true in the Liberian case, then one should see in Pugel’s survey a higher number of the respondents claiming financial reasons as the motivating factors for joining. However, the findings from the Liberian DDRR survey (less than 10% responses of “Money” and “People in Group Lived Better” as a reason for joining) suggest there has been an overemphasis on providing jobs as a long-term method of conflict prevention. If immediate financial gains were not necessarily a major reason for joining, then perhaps they should be re-evaluated as a tool for conflict prevention within DDR. An alternative option is to reconsider DDR as a tool of conflict prevention, and leave it in the realm of conflict resolution.

The types of threats issued by the factions, such as those made at Camp Schieffelin, can be seen in the context of ‘spoiling’. Spoilers, who seek to bargain for favourable conditions through the undermining of the peace process, often use violence and the maintenance of the structures of the armed factions to do so (HW 2007, 535). Even if spoilers were retrained, the inability for the employment sector to absorb beneficiaries who have completed their training is another issue – it is difficult to provide employment when there may be no market for their newly acquired skills (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 33). The inability for DDRR practitioners in Liberia to follow through on their promises of jobs
meant that securitising the reintegration process compromised both the security and development goals (Jennings 2008a, 158).

An emphasis of immediate economic reintegration in the form of employment underestimates the abilities of individuals, combatants or not, to provide for themselves using informal methods. In the case of Liberia, Joanna Spear has noted that despite the implementation of the DDRR programme, there has been an upswing in illegal resource exploitation, an increase in the number of Liberians who are recruited as mercenaries in other parts of West Africa, and a continuing problem with violent crime (Spear 2006, 74). However, Christopher Blattman argues ex-combatants are not always the “damaged, alienated, and potentially violent” individuals as is commonly believed, but are in some cases more likely to become politically active (Blattman 2009, 237). Individuals who remain involved with illegal activities and groups may not necessarily be doing so because they cannot reintegrate on their own and have no skills other than combat – participation in illegal activities may simply provide greater rewards with less risk. When there are not enough opportunities for these skilled beneficiaries to work, or when the benefits of formal employment are insufficient, then an alternative approach is necessary to ensure these individuals choose not to remain involved with armed groups, and are not vulnerable to recruitment. In cases where there are high numbers of people profiled as investors, opportunities are needed for these individuals to use their abilities for a purpose they deem important. This purpose must be important enough to them that they would prefer not to join an armed group in the future.
6.2 Permitting Investors to Invest

Earlier in this paper, I reviewed the debate between the need for security versus the need for development. This section argues that not all combatants are motivated by the same incentives – those who have joined the fighting for ideological reasons or for political goals may have a new role to play. Spear (2006, 74) argues that ex-combatants must have a stake in the local development issues that are supported by the community for successful reintegration to take place. In theory, this seems like an obvious solution, and is mentioned throughout in the Liberian DDRR Implementation Framework (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003). Unfortunately, DDR is often held hostage to the goals and objectives of the international donors funding the programmes (Muggah 2008, 137). This is because, as noted in Section 2.3, employment is often emphasised as the key to establishing security at the expense of comprehensive aspects of reintegration, such as political participation. In the case of Liberia, Pugel (2009, 84-85) argues that, “the limited attention to the political aspects of reintegration constitutes a hole in the strategic framework of the Liberian DDRR programme”.

The emphasis on the inclusion of ex-combatants in the broader reintegration process is supported by the findings of HW (2007, 533). In Sierra Leone, even though individuals with higher levels of education and wealthier backgrounds (characteristics of investors) had a more difficult time reintegrating, and those who were ideologues were more likely to remain connected to their units, these same individuals were also more likely to participate in the
programme itself (ibid., 558). HW (ibid., 544) state that individuals and factions who distrust the intentions of others are also more likely to reject democratic processes as a way of resolving disputes. Taking one step further, Pugel (2009, 91) states, “reintegration should be conceived in a way that it targets a more inclusive group – particularly communities of return rather than an exclusive focus on combatants themselves”. There is a potential for these highly ideological, perhaps distrusting individuals to provide a perspective on the post-war recovery process that outsiders (or the group with the monopoly of force) might neglect. After all, if their ideals are strong enough to fight for, perhaps the rechanneling of their energy into a productive discourse on the development of the state might be a wise investment.

Despite the importance of understanding civil war participation at the micro level, a larger macro context in relationship to the individual cannot be completely ignored. Karina Korostelina (2007, 49-50) argues “the salience and meaning of other social identities acts as a powerful moderator of the influence of a specific social identity on a person’s attitudes and behavioural intentions”. The attitude and behavioural intention she is referring to is, “readiness for conflict with out-groups as ethnic minorities” (Korostelina 2007, 65). Her research on the Crimea showed how different concepts of national identity affect this level of readiness, and in her case study the level of conflict-readiness was impacted by the extent to which individuals felt a stronger ethnic, multicultural, or civil concept of national identity (ibid., 65). Perhaps, then, there should be a greater emphasis on moving ex-combatants and the civilian population toward a larger notion of
national or group reconciliation rather than just the breakup of the factions. If individuals were strong ideological followers, they will be more likely to retain ties to their faction (HW 2007, 547). It is important to replace such ideological tendency with allegiance to the nation or community rather than the faction or ethnic group (if applicable). DDR, as a staple of post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention, is one such vehicle for national reconciliation to take place.

6.3 Standardisation and Context

The findings from the survey and my combined framework have reinforced the growing consensus that diversity within warring factions must be addressed if DDR is to become a conflict prevention mechanism. Pugel (2009, 83) argues that to sustain donor confidence, accurate beneficiary predictions are necessary to ensure sustainable support for the program, and he observes a consensus that DDR needs to be accessible to the highest number of beneficiaries possible. This consensus has led to the standardisation of DDR programmes by the UN, known as the Integrated Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) by the UNDP. The IDDRS does recognise the importance of the individual experience when designing reintegration programmes (UNDP 2006). The outcome of any DDR programme however, depends on the political context in which it is carried out, and the will of the parties to demobilise (KÖ 2004, 500). As was the case in Liberia, there is often pressure to complete a DDRR programme quickly and within a specific budget (Pugel 2009, 73-74). Financial and temporal strain on those implementing the programme results in technical and empirical measures of success rather than on long-term issues.
such as psychological recovery (Spear 2006, 69). In the case of Liberia, UNMIL chose to proceed with the disarmament and demobilisation phases despite not having comprehensive lists of combatants from the factions, making it unclear who was a ‘legitimate’ fighter (AI 2008, 24). The DDRR Implementation Framework theoretically acknowledged the special circumstances of women, children, and disabled fighters (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 9), but assumed homogeneity within each of those groups. Gamba (2003, 190) states that it has been rare for DDR practitioners to collect information regarding the DDR process from those who actually participate in the process. Additionally, there are still concerns over who qualifies as a beneficiary, and how to target those individuals (Muggah, 2009, 14). Certainly, many of these individuals were not fighters before the conflict started. Thus, any future DDR programme must incorporate elements to address how these individuals got in, because the conditions for joining would have been different than those who were already members of a faction.

James Pugel (2009, 73) argues that the authors of the Liberian DDRR Implementation Framework were very detailed and precise regarding the disarmament and demobilisation sections, but the rehabilitation and reintegration sections were far too vague. While there were references made to the necessity of support and resources from the international community to complete the two and a half year transition period, the programme was under-funded from the beginning (ibid., 73-74). Pugel says this dismissal of reintegration and rehabilitation is due to the common association many Western donors have of
peace building and peace consolidation with only disarmament, rather than with reintegration (ibid., 75). Reluctance to fund the programme into the long term undermines its effectiveness, especially if the original conditions that led individuals to join the rebel groups re-emerge. Long-term reintegration and rehabilitation is essential because an individual’s personal experience of violence during conflict can continue the culture of violence. This same culture allows an individual to continue using violence to solve problems during and after the peace process (Steenkamp 2009, 50).

Ignoring the individual experiences and diversity within factions has the potential to undermine the ability of the individual to reintegrate. One group with such vulnerabilities are women and girls. In a scathing report published in March 2008, Amnesty International declared that the DDRR process in Liberia had discriminated against girls and women, failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict, and failed to restructure the armed forces of Liberia. These failures led many of the ex-combatants to leave Liberia, and regroup in Guinea and Sierra Leone (AI 2008, 8-9). According to the report, “Successful reintegration depends not only on understanding why they were forced to, or chose to, participate in the fighting forces, and understanding the roles with these forces, but also understanding the consequences of their participation” (AI 2008, 11). Women who had sexual roles in the factions were uniquely impacted by their participation. The children born because of rape left these women with an increased opportunity cost to attend school or retraining for employment, the illnesses they have contracted because of their participation have impeded their
abilities to work, and ongoing discrimination has left many women socially disempowered (AI 2008, 18-19). Amnesty cites a “lack of political will” to implement the gendered approach that was supposed to have been used during the Liberian DDRR process (AI 2008, 21). Despite a growing acknowledgement of the importance of including all types of war-affected groups, and accounting for their individual experiences, in practice, this has yet to be achieved.

In the Liberian case, not only women, children, and disabled veterans should receive targeted assistance – the case of Liberian women indicates that women’s reasons for joining were not all the same. Within other disaffected groups and the group of beneficiaries as a whole, there are those who may need longer or shorter-term assistance. The best way to determine this assistance is to collect greater amounts of information from the beneficiary at the time of the interview.39 If the Liberian DDRR programme had not addressed the recruitment vulnerabilities by 2008, nearly five years after the process had begun, it is possible other groups or individuals were ignored or excluded by the process. Standardisation, therefore, might not be the best solution to serve the highest number of beneficiaries as possible, but only to serve the most vocal groups.

39 The Survey of War Affected Youth (SWAY) project in Uganda (Principal researchers: Christopher Blattman, Jeanie Annan, Khristopher Carlson, and Dyan Mazurana), has attempted to utilize best practices from the field of psychology to mitigate some of the problems commonly associated with interviewing ex-combatants. See Aldhous 2008; Blattman and Annan 2009; Blattman 2009 and the Uganda SWAY website located in the Reference List for methodology and description of the project.
7: CONCLUSION

By applying my combined framework of rebel group recruitment and individual determinants of participation to the survey conducted by Pugel, this research supports the argument that the composition of rebel groups and the choice to join them is the result of a complex set of circumstances and endowments. It also supports the notion that DDR programmes must be designed from context rather than standardisation. What it challenges, however, is the assumption that unemployment leads directly to faction membership. Rather, the findings encourage DDR planners to place greater emphasis on understanding the reasons individuals join, because it may impact their ability, and the ability of the state, to reach political reconciliation and reintegration. This reconciliation is important when immediate formal sector employment is not readily available. One of the best ways for the state to achieve political reconciliation and reintegration I argue, is to engage in more detailed information-gathering about the reasons why these individuals joined, and the circumstances under which they joined, during the interview process of DDR. More extensive interviewing during one of the DDR phases, or even throughout the programme, will provide an important opportunity to collect information regarding the composition and character of rebel groups and those who join them. If one of the goals of DDR is to prevent conflict by breaking up the armed groups and re-establishing relationships with the broader community, then the nature of the
individual relationship with the armed group must be understood. Improved information gathering will permit DDR planners to tailor the programme towards the individuals themselves, and do so within a regional, ethnic, or gendered context. If DDR is to function as a conflict prevention mechanism, it will need to place a greater emphasis on the origin of armed group involvement, particularly if the conditions leading to armed group involvement arise again.
APPENDICES


According to Weinstein’s framework, rebel groups in position “D” will have difficulty in recruiting individuals until they have passed the threshold indicated by the diagonal line. Groups in position “A” will attract a high number of consumers while Groups in position “B” will attract a high number of investors. Groups in position “C” will attract both consumers and investors.

Weinstein also notes that there are three other factors which may influence the recruitment relationship: the probability of a rebel victory, the probability of receiving the promised gains upon victory, and the individual’s discount rate, because “future benefits are worth less to those who heavily discount the future” (Weinstein 2005, 605). There are also three strategies that the rebel leadership itself will use to ensure the right kinds of recruits are attracted: they will gather information about the potential recruit using established links within the communities; they will enforce vouching as a way of guaranteeing that recruits brought by friends are those that are most suitable to the group; and
finally, they will use *costly induction* – the processes developed by the group to discourage low-commitment individuals from joining. Examples of costly induction include ideological training, or a time delay in access to a weapon (Weinstein 2005, 606). By engaging at the micro level of recruitment, Weinstein moves past the assumption that all potential recruits are of the same value to rebel groups (Weinstein 2007, 100).
Appendix B: Combatant and Faction Profiles

The following figures have been directly imported from James Pugel’s *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Liberia* (United Nations Development Program Liberia: Joint Implementation Unit, 2007). For the sake of simplicity, the original titles and figure numbers have remained as found in the *Survey*.

Taking the form of a quantitative survey, Pugel collected the following information:

1. Background information that collected socio-economic demographics
2. Factional and sub-factional affiliations and geographic locations
3. Combatant recruitment techniques and motivations and incentives for participation
4. Organizational structures and associated patterns of military operations
5. Factional interactions with civilians during conflict
6. Former combatant experience with international intervention programs
7. Individual feelings – self esteem
8. Perspectives on social integration and political expression

**Figure 3: Ex-Combatant Religious Affiliations**

![Ex-combatant Religious Affiliations](image)

NB: 583 respondents (186-Taylor’s G0L, 126-LURD, 76- MODEL, 150-NPFL)
Figure 4: Pre-War (1989) Political Allegiances

Ex-combatant Pre-war Political Affiliations
by faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Doe</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>81.33%</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Party/Political Affiliation</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: 582 respondents

Figure 13: How Combatants Were Introduced to their Former Factions

How Introduced to Former Faction
by faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friend/Relative joined group</td>
<td>33.76%</td>
<td>10.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group attacked my village</td>
<td>25.68%</td>
<td>44.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group ambushed me on road</td>
<td>16.22%</td>
<td>28.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group attacked my faction</td>
<td>16.22%</td>
<td>28.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A member/family approached me</td>
<td>22.37%</td>
<td>28.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Went looking for faction</td>
<td>22.37%</td>
<td>28.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: 533
Figure 16: Reasons for Joining

Reasons for Joining by Faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>GoL/m</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supported Political Goals</td>
<td>33.76%</td>
<td>35.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abducted</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>21.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scared</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>19.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Soldiers Killed my Family</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents could give multiple reasons - 692 responses

Figure 17: Incentives for Participating in Factions

Incentives Promised for Joining Group responses by faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>GoL/m</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>32.41%</td>
<td>28.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Job</td>
<td>17.93%</td>
<td>8.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family would be Protected</td>
<td>15.43%</td>
<td>10.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20.19%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were allowed to indicate multiple incentives (1,039 responses)
Figure 18: Direction on Treatment of Civilians on the Battlefield

Ever Given Instructions on How to Treat Civilian Population?  
by faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.16%</td>
<td>14.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74.84%</td>
<td>85.42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MODEL          | 5.50%        | 12.3% |
|                | 94.12%       | 87.7% |

NB: 424

Figure 19: Former Fractional Employment and Implementation of Civilian Forced Labor

Forced Labor: Use of Non-combatants  
by faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.22%</td>
<td>9.524%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.55%</td>
<td>52.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.94%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MODEL          | 34.21%       | 7.333% |
|                | 22.37%       | 46%    |
|                | 43.42%       | 46.67% |

NPFL           | 46.67%       | 46%    |
|                | 40%          | 46%    |

NB: 538
Figure 20: Non-Combatant Freedom of Choice in Supporting Former Factions

Forced Labor: Non-combatant Freedom of Choice
to work for a faction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Always</td>
<td>11.83%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>57.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Never</td>
<td>38.16%</td>
<td>30.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Always</td>
<td>44.74%</td>
<td>49.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>17.11%</td>
<td>49.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Never</td>
<td>38.16%</td>
<td>40.94%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NPFL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Always</td>
<td>14.54%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>80.22%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost Never</td>
<td>5.24%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: Civilian Ramifications of Refusing to Submit to Forced Labor During Conflict

Forced Labor: Non-combatant Consequences
for not participating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOL/Militia</th>
<th>LURD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>14.54%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaten</td>
<td>80.22%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported to Elders</td>
<td>5.24%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing</td>
<td>5.24%</td>
<td>74.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: SS7

NB: SS1

63
Appendix C: Results

Faction Endowments and Participant Profiles: Figures 16 and 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GoL</th>
<th>NPFL</th>
<th>LURD</th>
<th>MODEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Endowments</td>
<td>Social Endowments</td>
<td>Economic Endowments</td>
<td>Social Endowments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumers</td>
<td>64.84%</td>
<td>35.16%</td>
<td>46.21%</td>
<td>53.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors</td>
<td>45%*</td>
<td>55%*</td>
<td>45%*</td>
<td>55%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D: Components of DDR

Disarmament

Disarmament is the first phase of DDR. Özerdem (2009, 18) defines the goal of disarmament as “the registration, counting and monitoring of combatants, and their preparation for discharge with identification documents”. Joanna Spear argues that there are two goals of disarmament: first, to remove the means through which violence is perpetrated, and second, to provide a confident, stable environment for security reform measures to take place (Spear 2006, 64). However, the atmosphere of insecurity that exists at the end of a conflict makes it difficult for fighters to give up their weapons, as they often constituted their only means of physical and economic security (Spear 2006, 64).

In many cases, an incentive is required to convince individuals or factions to willingly give up their major sources of leverage for negotiations. In the case of Liberia, a weapon was required to enrol in the programme, and the weapon was then exchanged for a stipend (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 27). There are difficulties with using cash as an incentive for disarmament, such as in circumstances where cash is exchanged for weapon (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003, 13). Disarmament today is no guarantee of security tomorrow (Spear 2006, 64; Gamba 2003, 180; Özerdem 2009, 15). Porous borders combined with an illegal arms market is a deadly combination: despite a 'successful' DDR programme in Sierra Leone, fighters moved across the border to fight in Liberia for $200-$500 per person (Spear 2006, 76). The money be used to buy newer weapons, and cash-for-arms programmes attract old and unserviceable weapons, fuelling the illegal arms trade in the region.

As a result, these cash-for-weapons DDR programmes have been shown to have a negligible effect on the security of the region in instances where the illegal arms market is active, the rule of law is weak, and the political or security climate enhances the economic value of owning and using a gun (KÖ 2004, 505). In the words of Özerdem (2009, 10), “the regional considerations in environments such as [the] West Africa and the Great Lakes Region are particularly important, as any phase of DDR in one country would like to have considerable impacts on conflicts or peace processes in neighbouring countries”. Any DDR programme that focuses exclusively on national disarmament at the expense of regional factors is at risk of undermining its own progress.

Demobilisation

Demobilisation, which follows disarmament, is an important transition point for an ex-combatant. Not only are all military symbols such as a rank and uniform removed, but demobilisation usually includes a period of cantonment in which the ex-combatant becomes a programme “beneficiary”, and receives medical examinations, counselling, a reintegration package, transportation to his
or her community of choice, and his or her needs are surveyed (KÖ 2004, 507). KÖ (2004, 507) argue that there are three basic rationales for cantonment: it provides the opportunity to collect information about the participants; it provides the opportunity to educate beneficiaries and their families about the options for reintegration while allowing for a phased reintegration process; and it provides the factions a middle ground to prove their willingness to demobilise while retaining forces in concentrated areas in the event of future instability. Özerdem (2009, 18) states that one of the most important issues in the preparation for demobilisation in finding the best incentive structures for each of the factions to demobilise. The incentives that Özerdem mentions include: the confidence in the sustainability of the peace process; the improvements in the overall security environment; and financial benefits.

Reintegration

Despite the definition provided by the United Nations, there is no real consensus on what reintegration actually means or implies (Jennings 2008a, 157), however this lack of uniformity has not stopped practitioners from applying standardised procedures to complex issues. Muggah (2009, 3) himself argues, “generic approaches to reintegration cannot adequately account for the heterogeneous and differentiated motivations of armed groups”.

The point in between the time in which a beneficiary has been demobilised and their reintegration society is the point in which the beneficiary is most vulnerable. The wartime skills that they had learned are very different from those that are needed for effective post-conflict reconstruction (Gamba 2003, 180). Not only have they lost their ability to provide for themselves as a combatant, they likely do not yet have the means to support themselves and their families (KÖ 2004, 510; Spear 2006, 68). Ex-combatants often perceive themselves to be of a different group entirely from the rest of society, causing both psychological and social reintegration problems (Spear 2006, 75). Part of the aim of reintegration is to break the chain of command between the fighters and commanders, as well as to disperse the beneficiaries to reduce the risk of conflict re-igniting (Spear, 2006, 68). According to authors such as Gamba (2003, 180) and Spear (2006, 68), it is at this point during DDR that ex-combatants are the most likely to return to crime or war. For this reason, financial reinsertion assistance in the form of cash is often used to provide the beneficiary with the option of not rejoining the faction for economic gain.

It is important to recognise both long-term and short-term needs for these individuals because not all beneficiaries require the same amount of assistance, and so criteria for assistance should be implemented and established in a transparent manner (KÖ 2004, 510). In Liberia, the reintegration process consisted of the provision of education or technical training, a small monthly stipend, and a set of tools upon course completion (Jennings 2008a, 157). Since there are needs that were filled by armed groups that now need to be filled by reinsertion assistance, one can conclude that the relationship between factions
and individuals contain a strong element of rationalism on either the part of the recruit, the recruiter, or both. To prevent the return of these individuals to these factions, one must look at how the state or community can continue to play a role in the fulfilment of needs of ex-combatants by looking at why these individuals joined these groups in the first place.
REFERENCE LIST


