SPACES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF SCALE IN B.C.’S GATEWAY PROGRAM

by

Anthony Clark
BA (Hons.), University of Alberta 2001
BA, Concordia University 1998

RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF URBAN STUDIES

In the Urban Studies Program

© Anthony Clark 2010

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

SPRING 2010

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
## APPROVAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Anthony Clark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Master of Urban Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title of Thesis</td>
<td>Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale in B.C.’s Gateway Program.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Examining Committee:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chair</th>
<th>Karen Ferguson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associate Professor, Urban Studies and History</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peter V. Hall</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senior Supervisor</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Urban Studies and Geography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meg Holden</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Urban Studies and Geography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geoff Mann</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Examiner</td>
<td>Assistant Professor, Geography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Date Defended/Approved:  
March 30, 2010
Declaration of Partial Copyright Licence

The author, whose copyright is declared on the title page of this work, has granted to Simon Fraser University the right to lend this thesis, project or extended essay to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users.

The author has further granted permission to Simon Fraser University to keep or make a digital copy for use in its circulating collection (currently available to the public at the “Institutional Repository” link of the SFU Library website at: <http://ir.lib.sfu.ca>) and, without changing the content, to translate the thesis/project or extended essays, if technically possible, to any medium or format for the purpose of preservation of the digital work.

The author has further agreed that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by either the author or the Dean of Graduate Studies.

It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without the author’s written permission.

Permission for public performance, or limited permission for private scholarly use, of any multimedia materials forming part of this work, may have been granted by the author. This information may be found on the separately catalogued multimedia material and in the signed Partial Copyright Licence.

While licensing SFU to permit the above uses, the author retains copyright in the thesis, project or extended essays, including the right to change the work for subsequent purposes, including editing and publishing the work in whole or in part, and licensing other parties, as the author may desire.

The original Partial Copyright Licence attesting to these terms, and signed by this author, may be found in the original bound copy of this work, retained in the Simon Fraser University Archive.

Simon Fraser University Library
Burnaby, BC, Canada
STATEMENT OF ETHICS APPROVAL

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this work, has obtained, for the research described in this work, either:

(a) Human research ethics approval from the Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics,

or

(b) Advance approval of the animal care protocol from the University Animal Care Committee of Simon Fraser University;

or has conducted the research

(c) as a co-investigator, collaborator or research assistant in a research project approved in advance,

or

(d) as a member of a course approved in advance for minimal risk human research, by the Office of Research Ethics.

A copy of the approval letter has been filed at the Theses Office of the University Library at the time of submission of this thesis or project.

The original application for approval and letter of approval are filed with the relevant offices. Inquiries may be directed to those authorities.

Simon Fraser University Library
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, BC, Canada

Last update: Spring 2010
ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the development and behaviour of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. The objective is to examine this group’s role in governments’ decisions to invest in transportation infrastructure in B.C.’s Lower Mainland, particularly the Gateway Program. Evidence used includes interviews, reports and studies, government documents and news articles that show relationships between the Gateway Council and governments and the regional transportation authority. Using the theories of Kevin R. Cox, Clarence Stone and others, this study shows that the Gateway Council influenced governments in order to implement its infrastructure agenda. The group’s success is based on access to governments, trends within national transportation policy, and disparate local opposition to increased transportation infrastructure. This success translates to the expansion of road and bridge capacity in the Vancouver region, thus an understanding of this group’s role in influencing governments may be important for an understanding of changes to the region’s urban form.

Keywords: Vancouver, British Columbia, gateway, program, greater, transportation, infrastructure, council, government, highways, bridges
DEDICATION

I’d like to thank Dr. Anthony Perl and the professors and staff of Simon Fraser University’s Urban Studies program for their commitment to exploring and understanding urban phenomena.

I’d like to thank Dr. Peter Hall, my senior supervisor, for his insight, wisdom and guidance.

I’d like to thank my wife Sheila McKeage for her love and patience.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ................................................................................................................................II
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................III
Dedication ............................................................................................................................ IV
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ V
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... VII
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................... VIII
Chapter 1 – Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 2 – Growth Coalition Theory ........................................................................... 10
Chapter 3 – The Formation, Makeup and Behaviour of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council .......................................................................................................................... 25
   Early Beginnings .................................................................................................................... 26
   The Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway ........ 32
   Formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council ................................................. 35
   The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and Governments .................................... 38
   Consensus-Building and Stakeholders .......................................................................... 40
   “The Greater Vancouver Gateway Society” and Other Gateway Councils ............ 41
   Westac and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council ................................................. 43
   Greater Vancouver Gateway Society and Translink .................................................. 44
   Engaging the Public .......................................................................................................... 50
   ‘Astroturf’ – The Livable BC Coalition ........................................................................... 52
   ‘Astroturf’ – Get Moving BC .......................................................................................... 54
Chapter 4 – The Development of the Gateway Roads and Highways Agenda .......... 58
   Gvrd’s Transport 2021 ..................................................................................................... 60
   Translink’s Major Road Network .................................................................................. 63
   The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s use of Reports and Studies ................. 69
   The Gateway Council’s Major Commercial Transportation System .................... 71
   Opening Up B.C. ................................................................................................................ 74
   Justification of the Gateway Program by the B.C. Government .............................. 75
   The Livable Region Strategic Plan ................................................................................. 77
   Roberts Bank Rail Corridor: Road/Rail Interface Study ............................................. 78
Chapter 5 – Opposition to the Gateway Program ......................................................... 86
   The Freeway Fight of the 1960s ...................................................................................... 88
   The NDP and Elements of the Gateway Program ...................................................... 94
   Localized Opposition to the Gateway Program .......................................................... 97
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 – Transportation Stakeholder Groups in the Lower Mainland Leading up to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council ................................................................. 31
Table 2 - Voting Members of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council .................. 35
Table 3 - Resource Members of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council .............. 36
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – Gateway Program Projects and Select Lower Mainland Major Highways and Bridges ................................................................................................................................ 2
Figure 2 - Transport 2021: Medium-Range Transportation System Concept ...................... 61
Figure 3 – Gateway Council Infrastructure Priorities ........................................................................ 64
Figure 4 – Strategic Transportation Plan: Potential Major Capital Projects ...................... 65
Figure 5 – Excerpt for TransLink Presentation to the Vancouver Board of Trade .......... 68
Figure 6 – Estimated Future Economic Impact of Container Activity at Roberts Bank .. 81
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

This study is about control of space within British Columbia’s Lower Mainland. Moreover, it’s about the politics of the control of space within the Lower Mainland. This paper seeks to explore how private interests and power brokers in BC’s Lower Mainland have worked together to influence governments at various levels, regardless of their differences, in order to “manipulate urban space for private gain.”

The narrative of the politics of the control of space within the Lower Mainland is a large part of the identity of Vancouver as a result of political struggles over the last 45 years. In terms of transportation, Vancouver has “the distinction of being the largest city in North America without a freeway clogging its arteries.” Attempts in the 1960s to expand freeway capacity within the City of Vancouver led to large-scale opposition and fundamentally changed not only the character of the politics of the city and the region, but also led to unprecedented citizen involvement in planning and infrastructure decision-making.

Vancouver and the Lower Mainland are also known, perhaps paradoxically, “as a critical North American gateway for international trade.” To that end, both federal and provincial governments have launched major infrastructure programs designed to

---

increase road and bridge capacity with the aim of improving the movement of goods through the Vancouver region.

On January 31, 2006, British Columbia Premier Gordon Campbell launched the “Gateway Program,” “a comprehensive $3-billion plan to open up the province’s transportation network.”\(^4\) Cost estimates for the Gateway Program have increased by several billion dollars since 2006. Nevertheless, the Gateway Program has three key projects: the Port Mann Bridge/Highway 1 project, the South Fraser Perimeter Road, and the North Fraser Perimeter Road.

Figure 1 – Gateway Program Projects and Select Lower Mainland Major Highways and Bridges


In October of 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched the “Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative” with $591 million in federal funding for “a variety of infrastructure, transportation technology and border security projects in Western Canada.”

The BC government’s Gateway Program invests solely in transportation infrastructure in the province’s Lower Mainland, while the federal government’s Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative includes “British Columbia Lower Mainland and Prince Rupert ports, road and rail connections that reach across Western Canada and into the economic heartlands of North America, as well as major airports and border crossings.”

Although the B.C. government ‘launched’ the Gateway Program and is for all intents and purposes the proponent of the individual component projects, there are multiple agencies funding the Gateway Program. On the South Fraser Perimeter Road project, for example, funding is split between the federal and provincial governments, with the federal government paying for about one-third of the cost of the road. The North Fraser Perimeter Road involves three agencies for funding and planning: the federal and provincial governments through the Border Infrastructure Program, and the regional transit authority, TransLink, through the agency’s 3-Year Plan and 10-Year Outlook, and the B.C. government’s Gateway Program.

---

The involvement of the regional transit authority, the federal government and the provincial government investments in Lower Mainland infrastructure is noteworthy to the extent that all of these entities have given a degree of credit to a group called the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council (Gateway Council) for some of the impetus behind the respective programs.

Details of the government of British Columbia’s Gateway Program, contained in the Gateway Program Definition Report, twice referred to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s “Major Commercial Transportation System for the Greater Vancouver Region” report for evidence of the need for the Program.\(^9\) A closer examination of the “Major Commercial Transportation System” (MCTS) study shows similarities between infrastructure investments called for by the Gateway Council and those moved forward by the British Columbia government and other entities. In fact, nearly all of the major transportation infrastructure investments called for in the MCTS report have been taken up by various governments or agencies.

Federally, the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative includes a “National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors.” Within the “immediate actions” listed by the government include “building consensus:”

Stakeholder organizations, such as the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, have led the way in forging a consensus that addresses interconnected issues and opportunities across all modes of transportation on Canada’s west coast. The B.C. government has undertaken important research and has worked with stakeholders to develop the province’s gateway program over the last two years. The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative seeks to build on these and other successes, and take the Gateway concept even further.\(^10\)

TransLink has included the South Fraser Perimeter Road and the North Fraser Perimeter Road in regional transportation plans since at least 2002 and has explicitly

---


stated that the authority has worked with the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council “to recognize those roadways that are critical to goods movement. These are outlined in the GVG’s [Greater Vancouver Gateway Council] Major Commercial Transportation System (MCTS).”

The research question this study will seek to answer is, how has the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council been successful in implementing its transportation infrastructure agenda, and, how is this infrastructure agenda encapsulated in the B.C. government’s Gateway Program. As such, this study will focus on the actions of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and its effectiveness as a coalition, especially with respect to its political engagement with various orders of government. This study will also investigate the development of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, its influence on the development of regional transportation infrastructure and federal government transportation policy. This study will show that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has successfully influenced federal, provincial and governments, despite vigorous local opposition to increased road and bridge capacity. As such, attention will also be paid to opponents of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s infrastructure priorities, especially coalitions of opponents.

This study argues that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, as a coalition representing “the collective will of the major transportation interests in the Gateway to develop and pursue a “unified competitiveness strategy,” successfully influenced different orders of government in order to further the interests of the Council’s private-

sector members. Factors involved in this success include institutional ties to federal and provincial governments, strategic use of studies and reports in government lobbying, influence over the Lower Mainland’s regional transportation authority, TransLink, and a disparate and fragmented opposition.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s success suggests that this group has had an effect on the region’s urban form. With new highways and bridges, traffic patterns change, new commercial, industrial and residential developments start, localized pollution and noise may increase, and so on. In short, if the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been successful in influencing various orders of government to expand transportation infrastructure in the Lower Mainland, then this group has changed the shape, form and politics of the region. That, perhaps, is the main reason why this study is important. The ways and means employed by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council ought to be investigated if an understanding of changes to the region’s transportation infrastructure, traffic patterns and urban form are to be gleaned.

Using the theoretical frameworks of Clarence Stone (Urban Regime Theory\textsuperscript{13}), Kevin Cox (Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale\textsuperscript{14}) and others, this paper aims to document the history and strategies of major actors, key events leading up to recent federal government transportation policy changes and the government of British Columbia’s decision to invest billions of dollars of public funds in the Gateway Program, “the largest infrastructure project in British Columbia’s history.”\textsuperscript{15}

This study seeks to investigate the political linkages between actors and entities which define a network of relationships. The materials used for this include interviews, reports, studies, websites, government documents and Hansard quotes. In short, the data included in this study are any materials that show clear associations and links “between the material, phenomenological and social components of situations that are mobilized during the building of associations.”\textsuperscript{16}

The second chapter of this study will provide an overview of the theories used to study the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council in its quest to influence governments towards increased investment in regional transportation infrastructure. Broadly, these theories centre on the study of urban growth regimes and coalitions.

Chapter three of this study will investigate the formation, makeup and behavior of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. Attention will be paid especially to the events that allowed the Gateway Council to bring in membership from provincial and federal governments and how it was able to gain influence over TransLink, the region’s transportation authority. This chapter will also include the use of ‘astroturf’ organizations by proponents of expanded highway and bridge infrastructure in the Lower Mainland. In this case, an ‘astroturf’ organization “refers not to fake grass but to fake grassroots.”\textsuperscript{17} That is, advertising or public relations tactics used to create the impression of a spontaneous expression of public opinion.

Chapter four will trace the development of the agendas related to the constituent parts of the B.C. government’s Gateway Program: the North Fraser Perimeter Road and

the South Fraser Perimeter Road, the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge, and the widening of Highway. This chapter will show that the strategic use of reports and studies by the Gateway Council influenced various orders of government with respect to decisions to invest public funds in transportation infrastructure in BC’s Lower Mainland. Also, I will show that some of the seeds of individual road and bridge projects associated with the Gateway Program were planted before the Gateway Council existed. This does not diminish the importance of the behavior of the Council itself, but may go some way in explaining the apparent reluctance to oppose the Gateway Program by the main political rival of the provincial Liberal government, the BC New Democratic Party.

Chapter five will provide an overview of the opponents of the Gateway Council’s agenda. I will argue that despite a history of successful political activism against freeway expansion in B.C.’s Lower Mainland, anti-Gateway activists have ultimately been unsuccessful due to factors such as personalities and differing agendas. Furthermore, I will argue that the successful techniques of opposing previous road expansion projects focused on harnessing local concerns in order to mobilize local politicians against those projects. The regional scale of the Gateway Program stymied opponents to road and bridge expansion because they focused their efforts on local rather than regionally scaled opposition.

In chapter six, I will argue that part of the success of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, as an organization of multi-modal transportation stakeholders, has to do with the evolution of Canadian transportation policy. The prominence of a multi-modal, multi-stakeholder, private-public entity such as the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council falls in line with the history and development of national transportation policy.
This study will conclude that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council is a remarkably successful growth coalition in terms of influencing governments to invest in regional transportation infrastructure. However, this study will also conclude that evidence does not show that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council is the sole impetus behind the B.C. government’s Gateway Program. That is, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been successful in influencing governments for a much broader range of infrastructure across the Lower Mainland than the three main projects involved in the Gateway Program.
CHAPTER 2 – GROWTH COALITION THEORY

This study relies on a group of theories within political geography known generally as growth coalition theory. Broadly, growth coalition theory suggests that it is the urban elites who transform cities. The elite can be real estate developers, banks, or, as in the case of this study, coalitions of vested business interests, to name a few.\(^\text{18}\)

The work of Harvey Molotch stands out as one of the first iterations of growth coalition theory. In his 1976 work “The City as a Growth Machine,” Molotch states, “A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a common interest.”\(^\text{19}\) An undertone of this statement is that conflicts, specifically local conflicts, are a central factor to the development and organization of cities.

The elites’ goal is to secure the conditions for economic growth, usually through organizing as a collective in order to influence governments, be they local, regional or federal. Governments’ control the regulatory and legislative resources needed for growth, especially those that control the exchange and development of land are of central importance for Molotch.\(^\text{20}\)


According to Molotch, growth machines are based in systems of local elite sociability and local problem solving. 'Locality' is determined by the notion that “economic activities ultimately are rooted in some place and utilize the earth’s resources not only for location, but also as raw material and waste site.” Interest groups attempt to intensify land use in order to make money within urban localities by making use of the institutional, political and cultural apparatus at their disposal.

Molotch’s model is focused on the US context, rather than Canadian. American cities are far more dependent on locally generated revenue to finance services. During the Carter administration, for example, federal and state resources were withdrawn from city finances. Thus local governments in the United States may require local growth in order to generate additional revenues.

The formation and behaviour of coalitions, namely the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, and how they engage governments is of central interest to this paper. Molotch’s model, however, is focused on land acquisition and development. Port and transportation infrastructure development, such as the Gateway Program, has more to do with the flow of people and goods through sunk capital rather than the development of land per se. The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council members seek to increase profits by increasing the flow of goods through the region, not necessarily by intensifying land use or development within the region, thus Molotch’s work does not directly apply to this

---

22 Ibid., 31.
case. Because of the lack of universal application, Molotch’s *Growth Machine* has been described as a model rather than a theory.  

Nevertheless, Molotch’s work on the organizational behaviour of “land-based elites” deserves further attention for the purpose of this study. He argues “that the desire for growth provides the key operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites, however split they might be on other issues, and that a common interest in growth is the overriding commonality among important people in a given locale -- at least insofar as they have any important local goals at all.”

Molotch’s argument that there is an “operative motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized local elites” is very important with respect to this study. ‘Consensus’ is a central concept of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and its various progenitors. As this paper will show, a key event in the formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council was a lock-out of International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) members by the B.C. Maritime Employers Association (BCMEA) in 1986. The central issue of that labour disruption was the movement of containerized cargo through Vancouver’s ports. The solution was to form a group in order to apply “the proper combination of pressure and persuasion to develop a consensus about strategic planning for the Vancouver Gateway container traffic transportation system.” This study will explore the 1986 lockout in greater detail in chapter three on the formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

---

26 Ibid., 310.
Clarence Stone’s *Urban Regime Theory* is an attempt to reconcile the lack of universal application of Molotch’s *Growth Machine*. Stone does this by focusing on the behaviour of coalitions and the central role played by city administrators in creating them.\(^{28}\) Stone calls these coalitions ‘regimes.’ He writes,

> Regime theory starts with the proposition that governing capacity is not easily captured through the electoral process. Governing capacity is created and maintained by bringing together coalition partners with appropriate resources, nongovernmental as well as governmental. If a governing coalition is to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its policy agenda.\(^{29}\)

Urban Regime theory places importance on the idea that effective local governments are dependent on the “cooperation of nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental resources.”\(^{30}\) Key elements of an urban regime are an identifiable agenda and common purpose, stability in that the regime doesn’t reform with each new issue, the regime’s membership is cross-sectoral, the regime’s characteristics are informal and not within the formal structure of a government, and the regime’s arrangements “provide a capacity to act and bring resources to bear on the identifying agenda to a degree that would not happen without the arrangements that constitute the regime.”\(^{31}\)

The elements of Stone’s ‘urban regimes’ bear a striking similarity to the characteristics of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. The Gateway Council has an identifiable agenda, a common purpose, and “represents the collective will of the major

---

\(^{28}\) Clarence N. Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern,” 1.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 6.

transportation interests in the Gateway to develop and pursue a unified competitiveness strategy.”

The Gateway Council’s membership has remained relatively stable since its inception in 1994. Its membership is cross-sectoral and includes provincial, federal and regional governments, an airport and harbour authorities, transportation associations as well as private rail and terminal operators. Furthermore, the coalition’s “Honourary Chair” is the Honourable Stockwell Day, President of the Treasury Board and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway.

Although the Gateway Council is not within the formal structure of government, there was a move by the federal Liberal government in 2005 to create a “Canada’s Pacific Gateway Council” with a legislated mandate that included providing advice to “promote consensus among interested stakeholders” and to “promote collaboration, engagement and complementarity of activities with existing networks of stakeholders that have an interest in the Asia-Pacific region or Canada’s Pacific gateway.”

Furthermore, there has been a trend by both the federal and B.C. provincial government to promote the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as a consultative body for stakeholder engagement. This trend has been solidified with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two orders of government wherein the parties agree to conduct discussions with the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and others. The goal of this MoU is “to boost Canada's commerce with the Asia-Pacific region, increase the Gateway's share of North American bound container imports from Asia and improve the

efficiency and reliability of the Gateway and Corridor for Canadian and North American exports, within a system that is secure and environmentally sustainable.”

The final element of Stone’s urban regimes listed above, the notion that the regime brings capacity to act and resources to bear that would not have happened otherwise, is difficult to prove. Certainly the federal government believes that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and other similar bodies bring a capacity to act that would not have been there otherwise. Federal policy includes the promotion of ‘gateway councils’ in jurisdictions across Canada such as the Southern Ontario Gateway Council and the Halifax Gateway Council. According to the federal government, “[g]ateway councils and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building, planning, sound governance and accountability are also key to advancing regional strategies with national benefits.”

Stone identifies a few types of urban regimes, but this study will focus on one type in particular: development regimes which are “concerned primarily with changing land use in order to promote growth or counter decline.” Development regimes attempt to change existing social or economic patterns by linking private investment to public action. They involve change, disruption of established patterns and are therefore often controversial. Development regimes necessitate breaking the status quo and give rise to controversy, thus they often generate small incentives and opportunities, new jobs being a prime example, in order to be palatable to the public. The Gateway Council certainly

---

36 Clarence Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern,” 18.
37 Ibid., 19.
offers reports of incentives and opportunities in order to justify the transportation infrastructure development they hope governments will fund. The Gateway Council’s 2003 update to their 2001 “Major Commercial Transportation System” (MCTS) report states that without billions of dollars of public investments in commercial transportation infrastructure, “the money cost of additional travel time delay by year 2021...will grow to $414 million/year – including $280 million for truck delays and $134 million for business-related car travel delays.”38 The MCTS report is a crucial report for the Gateway Council in terms of lobbying governments for increased or improved freight infrastructure in the Vancouver region.

One area where Stone’s urban regime theory does not mesh with my analysis of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and the B.C. government’s Gateway Program is his assumption “that the effectiveness of local government depends greatly on the cooperation of nongovernmental actors and on the combination of state capacity with nongovernmental resources.”39 While this assumption may be true, this study is not focused on the effectiveness of local governments, per se. This study is focused on the actions of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and its effectiveness as a coalition in bringing increased government investment in the Vancouver region’s transportation infrastructure, especially the Gateway Program. Some local governments, such as the City of Burnaby, have argued that they have been shut out of the decision-making process vis-a-vis the Gateway Program. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, the Gateway Program is well into construction of several projects and the Greater Vancouver Gateway

39 Ibid., 6.
Council has taken a degree of credit for them. Clearly Stone’s assumption that the local governments depend greatly on the cooperation of groups like the Gateway Council does not fully explain these factors.

Kevin Cox’s *Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale*, offers a useful theoretical framework towards an understanding of the shift from the local, as in Stone’s urban regime theory, to the regional in terms of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and the B.C. government’s Gateway Program and the politics therein. For Cox, actors and agents strive to influence governments because they seek certain outcomes within their ‘space of dependence.’ Spaces of dependence are immovable. They are defined by “localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere.”\(^{40}\)

For the purpose of this study, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s space of dependence is regional, specifically it is the transportation infrastructure necessary to transport goods through the region.

A ‘space of engagement’ is “the space in which the politics of securing space of dependence unfolds.”\(^{41}\) In order to secure the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s space of dependence, the group has engaged in politics with a variety of orders of government (Cox calls these orders of government ‘scales.’) For Cox, actors do not necessarily engage in politics at a scale that directly corresponds to their space of dependence. Actors can secure their space of dependence by extending spaces of dependence.

\(^{40}\) Kevin R. Cox, “Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale,” 2.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 2.
engagement by mobilizing higher or more central branches of state agencies in a process that Cox terms ‘jumping scales.’

Thus, while actors like the Gateway Council may be very concerned to protect and increase favourable local conditions, they do not necessarily engage in politics at the local scale in order to achieve this outcome. “Local politics appears as metropolitan, regional, national, or even international as different organizations try to secure those networks of associations through which respective projects can be realized.” This, perhaps, goes some way in bridging the gap between Stone’s assumption that the effectiveness of local governments are dependent upon the cooperation of nongovernmental actors and the politics engaged in by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. Although Stone’s assumption may be true, this study is not concerned with the effectiveness of local governments. Rather, this study is focused on the effectiveness of a particular nongovernmental actor, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, in bringing increased government investment in the Vancouver region’s transportation infrastructure, especially the Gateway Program.

Another work that is of interest for the purpose of this study is Cox’s The Local and the Global in the New Urban Politics. In New Urban Politics (NUP), Cox posits that the hyper-mobility of global capital through the globalization process exerts strong redistributive pressures on local economies. Within cities, some economic interests are fixed and are dependent on the health of the local urban economy, such as banks, local

---

42 Ibid., 7.
43 Ibid., 19.
governments and local residents. 45 In order to combat the threat of hyper-mobile capital on the local economy, residents, workers, business and governments unite behind a common interest: the health and expansion of the local economy. 46 Indeed, part of the Gateway Council’s rationale for increased investment in regional transportation infrastructure is that because of the mobility of containerized cargo, if transportation investments are not made, west coast port cities other than Vancouver will benefit. 47

Further evidence for New Urban Politics theories being played out regionally with the Gateway Project may be seen with the B.C. government’s insistence that the infrastructure projects associated with the Gateway will “create jobs.” 48 However, the Vancouver region is not united behind the common interest of increased transportation infrastructure. Several municipalities, community groups, academics and environmental groups have come out against expansion of the region’s road transportation system.

One of Cox’s main arguments in his Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale work is the notion of growth coalitions ‘jumping scales’ to different orders of government in order to control their space of dependence. There is thus an apparent contradiction between Cox’s 1993 work, New Urban Politics, and his 1998 work Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale. New Urban Politics presents a world where fixed economic interests like local governments and residents unite behind a common goal such as the health and expansion

of the local economy in order to combat the hyper-mobility of capital. However, his *Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale* presents a view where there is confrontation and competition in order to control spaces of dependence. That is, rather than everyone working together, there are often developers, local governments and utilities on one side of the barricades and workers and local residents on the other.

Cox argues that this apparent contradiction stems from a contradiction between mobility and fixity.\(^49\) Different agents have different spaces of dependence, “those spaces within which they enjoy powers of movement.”\(^50\) Local struggles, in the case of this study between Gateway Program boosters and detractors, become spatialized. For all groups, the goal remains control over a geographic area.\(^51\) Groups will attempt to mobilize orders of government in order to protect a local space of dependence, yet different groups may attempt to mobilize different orders of government (jumping scales) in order to control the same area. Thus, even though the politics may be played out at a provincial, federal or regional level, it may be no less local in its nature.

For the purpose of this study, the geographic area in question is bound by the BC Government’s Gateway Program. The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, as a growth coalition, has sought to increase government investment in regional commercial transportation infrastructure as a means to move freight through the region more efficiently.\(^52\) Some municipalities have fought against expanded infrastructure within their borders because, they argue, their residents will bear the majority of the negative

---

\(^{50}\) Ibid., 6.  
\(^{51}\) Ibid., 7.  
local consequences of increased freight traffic, such as noise and air pollution. For example, the City of Burnaby produced a three-page newspaper supplement in 2008 entitled, *Gateway to Gridlock* wherein the City argues that, “Burnaby will be negatively impacted in many ways. Some local roads will experience increased traffic volumes. Burnaby neighbourhoods and parks will experience increased noise, pollution and other environmental damage.”\(^{53}\)

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council sought to control its regional space of dependence by mobilizing higher or more central branches of state agencies and away from local governments. In fact, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council seems to view local governments as a nuisance and a barrier to increased movement of freight through the region. During the federal government’s 2001 *Canada Transportation Act Review*, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council submitted:

[I]n the absence of a national policy towards transportation which clearly expresses its economic importance, local governments have no guidance as to what the national interest is, or why it should be considered. Therefore the economic implications of allowing local “politics” to affect maritime trade related projects are not considered by municipal councils and, at times, municipal staff on instructions from council.\(^{54}\)

Through its 2001 *Canada Transportation Act Review* submission, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council called on the federal government to adopt a “National Transportation Policy Statement” that “explicitly links transportation policy to trade competitiveness and economic growth policies,”\(^{55}\) as well as a new section in the *Canada Transportation Act*


\(^{55}\) Ibid., 1.
to empower a Transport Canada Regional Office expediter in order to fast-track transportation infrastructure and identify and address “inhibitors and obstacles.”

In this case, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, acting on behalf of its members, sought the federal government to amend the Canada Transportation Act in order to decrease or eliminate local (i.e. municipal) ‘inhibitors and obstacles’ to regional commercial transportation infrastructure.

Jonathan Murdoch and Terry Marsden, in their 1995 work The Spatialization of Politics: Local and National Actor-Spaces in Environmental Conflict, sought to integrate political practice into the geographical study of economic and social change. This integration, they argue, is overdue because of the failure of recent academic debates “to consider the complex interrelations between political action, local economies and cultures.”

Murdoch and Marsden’s work is useful to this study as the authors delve deeply into the methodology of studying the spatial constitution of political practice. They examine the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches and developments since the 1980s and come to the conclusion that location-specific events can be approached by examining networks of relationships. Networks of relationships are important because power arises out of group, not individual, action.

Power is a 'composition' made by many people but attributed to one of them. The amount of power exercised is not related to how much someone 'has' but to the number of actors involved in its composition. So power is an outcome of collective action.

---

56 Ibid., 12.
58 Ibid., 370.
59 Ibid., 372.
60 Ibid., 372.
The authors further argue that the case study is the best method because theoretical notions (of power and associations) can be grounded in observation of specific events.\(^6^1\) They supplement this argument with a case study of their own in order to illustrate how actors, known here as actor-spaces to denote a “spatial constitution of the resources which both enable and constrain action”\(^6^2\).

In order to research actor-spaces, Murdoch and Marsden argue that “materials, technologies, texts and so forth form a crucial part of any social order.”\(^6^3\) Exactly how these media will be used as data within a study depends on the nature of the study itself. However, these materials, technologies, texts, etc., ought to be used to show clear associations and links “between the material, phenomenological and social components of situations that are mobilized during the building of associations.”\(^6^4\)

Murdoch and Marsden’s approach forms the basis of my methodology. This study uses materials, texts and so on to show how the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council developed so as to build associations in order to control their particular spaces of engagement.

This study will show that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has effectively mobilized provincial, federal and regional governments, to the same end: increased regional transportation infrastructure. This was done with a goal to diminish the relevance of individual municipal governments in order to control a particular ‘space of dependence:’ the region’s transportation infrastructure. This study will show that to this end, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has succeeded where opponents of the

\(^{6^1}\) Ibid., 373.
\(^{6^2}\) Ibid., 369.
\(^{6^3}\) Ibid., 372.
\(^{6^4}\) Ibid., 372.
Gateway Program have failed. Although opponents of the Gateway Program have succeeded in gaining the support of some individual municipalities in the Lower Mainland directed affected by it, the City of Burnaby and the Corporation of Delta for example, they have failed to jump scales to the same extent that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has. Whereas opponents of the Gateway Program have had a great deal of success in mobilizing some local governments and media, they have not succeeded in mobilizing regional, provincial and federal governments. Instead, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council controls these spaces of engagement.
CHAPTER 3 – THE FORMATION, MAKEUP AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE GREATER VANCOUVER GATEWAY COUNCIL

Since its inception, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been concerned with the business interests of its members. In order to secure and promote those interests, the Gateway Council has sought to influence various orders of government.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, on behalf of its members representing “the collective will of the major transportation interests” 65 in the region, has sought to influence various orders of government in order to secure its space of dependence, which includes most of the Lower Mainland’s freight transportation system, including airports, seaports, railways, roads and bridges. However, this paper will be focused on the region’s roads and bridges as these are the predominant infrastructures that the Gateway Program supports.

Like other growth coalitions, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has organized itself and its activities in order to ensure and secure the continued existence of its space of dependence. 66 In doing so, they have engaged with other centres of social power: governments, news media, etc. In order to engage these centres of social power, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has created a new ‘space’ where the politics of securing its space of dependence are developed. This space is Cox’s ‘spaces of

---

engagement. For the Gateway Council, these spaces of engagement include regional, provincial and federal governments, as well as regional news media. The Council has not had as much success in spaces of engagement at the local level, such as municipal governments and local news media.

Throughout this chapter, I will show some of the key events that led to the formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and its development from a group of transportation stakeholders seeking to increase profits to a network incorporating state agencies. I will also explore how the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council behaves, and how this behaviour has changed over time, in its quest to secure spaces of engagement.

**Early Beginnings**

There was a degree of turmoil between management and labour in Vancouver’s port in the late-1980s and early-1990s that preceded the formal birth of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. This turmoil was due to a great extent to efforts by transportation sector interests, especially the Vancouver Port Corporation and the British Columbia Maritime Employers Association (BCMEA), to increase the flow of containers through the Port of Vancouver with the removal of the ‘Container Clause’ from International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union’s (ILWU) collective agreements.

---

67 Ibid., 2.
68 Ibid., 6.
The Container Clause provision in West Coast ILWU collective agreements since 1967 stipulated, essentially, that containers destined for the Vancouver area be packed or unpacked on the dock by the members of the Longshoremen’s Union. During collective bargaining in 1986, the BCMEA, representing waterfront employers, sought to eliminate the Container Clause from ILWU contracts. The Union declared that the Container Clause was “not for negotiation.” Failing to reach an agreement, the BCMEA locked-out members of the ILWU in October and again in November 1986. Despite government efforts to solve the impasse, the parties remained at loggerheads and the government of Canada passed the Maintenance of Port Operations Act 1986 prohibiting any further work stoppages at Vancouver’s docks and imposing a new collective agreement on both parties with one exception: the Container Clause was to be subject to a separate industrial inquiry commission, the Port of Vancouver Container Traffic Commission (a.k.a. the Weiler Commission).

The Weiler Commission had essentially two tasks. The first was “to make findings with respect to the impact of the Container Clause on the volume of container traffic through the Port of Vancouver.” On this point, the Commission had the power to judge whether the Clause should be removed or not and, if so, what compensation the ILWU should receive.

The second task of the Weiler Commission was to investigate and make recommendations on “any impediments to future growth” of container traffic through

---

72 Ibid., 2.
73 Ibid., 2.
the Port of Vancouver. These recommendations were not binding on the ILWU or the BCMEA. One of the Commission’s recommendations was “a new approach to managing human resources and organizational behavior in the Port than has been taken in the past.”74 To this end, the Commission recommended that a “Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council should be established to coordinate investment and planning in the Port and its related intermodal connections to Central North America.”75

One important role of the Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council will be to attempt to overcome an attitude in the Port that the Commission detected throughout its briefs, hearings and interviews. It is an attitude of “You first.” – “You invest first,” “you develop your facilities first,” “if so-and-so does this, I’ll do that.” While this element of caution often makes good business sense, it can also be the recipe for inertia, inaction, stagnation and decline if it is carried too far, every abides by it. There must be leaders and risk takes in order for the Port to develop.76

The Weiler Commission recommended that the “Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council [be] charged with the responsibility of coordinating investment and planning, not only in the Port, but along the entire transportation system so that a state-of-the-art miniland-bridge could be developed from Vancouver to Central and Eastern North America.”77

The Commission recommended that the Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council be chaired by the Vancouver Port Corporation and include major a broad array of transportation stakeholders, including the Fraser River Harbour Commission, CP and CN Rail, the BC Chamber of Shipping, the BCMEA and the ILWU, as well as other trade unions representing transportation workers. The Commission also recommended the inclusion of “the three levels of government – Canada, British Columbia and the Greater Vancouver Regional District, all of whom have a direct stake in and responsibility for

74 Ibid., 52.
75 Ibid., 54.
76 Ibid., 54-55.
77 Ibid., 130.
ensuring the success of the Vancouver Gateway.”

The Weiler Commission believed this body could “succeed in applying the proper combination of pressure and persuasion to develop a consensus about strategic planning for the Vancouver Gateway container traffic transportation system.”

The ILWU, however, was not quite ready to follow the recommendation of the Weiler Commission for the formation of a “Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council.” According to the Union, soon after the Weiler Commission report, the “same forces in the business community that had pressed for the destruction of the [container] clause soon moved to establish such a committee, the composition of which would be from the chamber of commerce, the provincial government, the Asian Foundation [viz. the Asia Pacific Foundation] and assorted intellectuals looking for positions of authority.”

In order to prevent “further meddling in our [ILWU’s] affairs,” the Union and the BCMEA formed the Container Gateway Traffic Council of BC. Membership included the ILWU, the BCMEA, the railways, representatives from the trucking industry, the Port of Vancouver, the Fraser River Harbour Commission and the Chamber of Shipping. Beyond the Vancouver Port Corporation and the Fraser River Harbour Commission, “all other government bodies whether provincial or federal were excluded,” although government officials did appear upon the request of the council.

---

78 Ibid., 130.
79 Ibid., 152.
81 Ibid., 1.13.
82 Ibid., 1.13.
83 Ibid., 1.13.
According to the ILWU, the Container Gateway Traffic Council of B.C. “met about 3 times a year and had addressed some of the more visible and some of the less visible problems in the container trade.”\textsuperscript{84} Available documentation suggests that the Container Traffic Council of B.C. did not meet again after 1990.

Several groups similar to the Gateway Council formed in the late-1980s and early 1990s (see Table 1). This suggests a perceived need for such a group by transportation stakeholders and interests in the Lower Mainland. It should be noted that none of these groups formed prior to the 1986 lockout of the ILWU by the BCMEA.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 1.13.
Table 1 – Transportation Stakeholder Groups in the Lower Mainland Leading up to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Formation Lead(s)</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Gateway Container Traffic Council</td>
<td>Pre-1999</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Initiative</td>
<td>(Scarce information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/Asia Traffic Council of B.C.</td>
<td>June 1991 and June 1993</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Foundation</td>
<td>“64 top executives from Canada and Asia representing all modes of transport, transport services and major shippers”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway</td>
<td>1990 - 1994</td>
<td>Federal Government (Western Economic Diversification) and B.C. Research</td>
<td>ILUW, BCMEA, Vancouver Port Authority, Fraser River Port Authority, North Fraser Port Authority, CN Rail and CP Rail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Vancouver Stakeholders’ Initiative</td>
<td>April 1992 and May 1994</td>
<td>Vancouver Port Corporation</td>
<td>43 organizations including labour, ports, shippers and terminal operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Vancouver Gateway Council</td>
<td>1994 – present</td>
<td>Mutual agreement between the Asia Pacific Foundation and the Round Table on Transportation</td>
<td>Most major shipping and transportation interests in the Lower Mainland and governments (regional, provincial and federal). No labour representation. See <a href="http://www.gvgc.org">www.gvgc.org</a> for an up-to-date membership list</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

88 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
90 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
The Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s progenitor was the “Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway” (Round Table) in 1987.\(^1\) The Round Table formed with “key members of the west coast transportation community, in collaboration with Western Economic Diversification and B.C. Research…[in a] collective effort to formulate strategies and initiate action for solving problems and developing opportunities for international trade through the west coast.”\(^2\) Membership included the BCMEA, the ILWU, the Vancouver Port Authority, the Fraser River Port Authority, the North Fraser Port Authority, CN Rail and CP Rail.\(^3\) It may be important to note that the President of the BCMEA at the time, Bob Wilds, is now the Executive Director of today’s Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and a board member of Port Metro Vancouver.\(^4\)

The Round Table formed because members “were losing significant work opportunities to the U.S. Pacific North West ports.”\(^5\) There was concern amongst members about the future of regional freight transportation and “they wanted to determine what was necessary to protect existing work opportunities and provide for expansion in the future.”\(^6\)

---


\(^3\) Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.


\(^5\) Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.

\(^6\) Bob Wilds, “Speaking Notes - Competing in the GTA,” 1.
By 1991, membership in the Round Table had expanded to include the BC Wharf Operators Association and Transport Canada and Western Economic Diversification Canada were “present as resources.”

Through consensus, the Round Table developed its mission: “To Champion customer service by: Enhancing the efficiency, competitiveness and economics of transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway; Facilitating cooperative change among Gateway service providers, authorities, regulators and users.”

One of the first actions of the Round Table was an attempt to reduce rail taxes in Canada by calling on the governments to “reduce Federal excise tax on fuel consumed by railways, remove investment and other asset taxation disincentives faced by Canadian Railways and replace the capital cost allowance for railway track infrastructure with an investment tax credit.”

The next four years saw Round Table members travelling across western Canada and to Ottawa to lobby provincial and federal governments on these taxation issues. According to Bob Wilds, this lobbying was successful. A number of provinces either reduced or eliminated provincial fuel tax and the federal government amended federal capital cost allowance rules. This “contributed to the improved competitiveness of the Canadian rail system.” Thus, the scope of the Round Table’s activities were regional, that is western Canadian, and federal with an eye on competing with US transportation providers, mainly railways.

---

97 The Round Table on the Greater Vancouver Gateway, “Progress Report,” May 1993, 2.
98 Ibid., 3.
100 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
Concurrently, in 1991, the Asia Pacific Foundation, a national non-profit organization established by an Act of Parliament, created the Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum with “an international advisory board comprised of senior executives from both sides of the Pacific intimately involved with Canada-Asia transport and trade.”¹⁰¹

With the help of both the private sector and governments, the Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum convened a two-day meeting in Vancouver in June 1991 with 64 executives from Canada and Asia representing the interests of all modes of transportation and related services. The meeting’s conclusion: “if Canada wanted to have a major gateway, it would have to deal with serious problems in coordinating modes of transport and in creating a more hospitable policy environment.”¹⁰²

In 1994, the Canadian members of the Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum met in order to “take the initiative and work with government to deliver what the marketplace demanded.”¹⁰³

Many of the issues that the Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum and the Round Table on Transportation were perusing were the same, so discussions took place to merge the two groups.¹⁰⁴ According to Bob Wilds, Managing Director of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, the idea to merge the two organizations was mutual: “We were both doing the same things and both coming up with the same conclusion and figured it was just a duplication of efforts.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² Ibid., 4.
¹⁰³ Ibid., 4.
¹⁰⁴ Bob Wilds, “Speaking Notes - Competing in the GTA,” 2.
¹⁰⁵ Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
Formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council

In 1994, the two groups merged and became the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. The Gateway Council’s membership expanded greatly over that of the Round Table with the merger. Two classes of members were created: voting and resource members. Voting members mostly included transportation service providers in the region (see Table 2), whereas resource members were generally governments (see Table 3).

Table 2 - Voting Members of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vancouver International Airport</th>
<th>Vancouver Port Authority</th>
<th>North Fraser Port Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraser River Port Authority</td>
<td>ILWU (until Dec. 31, 1995)</td>
<td>BCMEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Trucking Association</td>
<td>CP Rail</td>
<td>CN Rail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlington North Santa Fe Railway</td>
<td>Southern Railway of BC</td>
<td>TransLink</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBC – Sauder School of Business</td>
<td>Viterra</td>
<td>Railway Association of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC Wharf Operators Association</td>
<td>BC Ferries (left in 2009)</td>
<td>Seaspan International Ltd.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The BC Trucking Association joined the Gateway Council at this point. Under the Round Table, attempts were made to include this group. However, because the Round Table’s focus was on the competitiveness of the railways, the BC Trucking Association “didn’t want to become a party to it because in some cases they were in some cases a competitor to railways.”

More importantly for the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, the 1994 merger between the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum and

---

the Round Table on Transportation formally brought government members formally into
the fold. Under the Round Table two federal government representatives were present as
‘resources’ (Western Economic Diversification and Transport Canada), the Greater
Vancouver Gateway Council included several orders of government as ‘resource
members’, including the four Western provinces, the Greater Vancouver Regional
District (GVRD) and TransLink, the regional transportation authority. The federal
Minister of Transport became the honourary chair of the Gateway Council. Resources
members do not have a vote on Gateway Council proceedings, but are entitled to attend
all board and committee meetings.

Table 3 - Resource Members of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council

| Asia Pacific  | Business Council of BC | Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters Association | Greater Vancouver Chamber of Commerce Transportation Advisory Panel |
| Foundation of Canada | | | |
| Greater Vancouver Regional District | Province of Alberta | Province of BC | Province of Manitoba |
| Province of Saskatchewan | Transport Canada | Western Economic Diversification Canada | The Western Transportation Advisory Council (WESTAC) |

(Source: The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, “About the Council,”

The federal government lent support to the merger of the Asia Pacific
Foundation’s Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum and the Round Table on
Transportation. In fact, the formation of the Council was announced by the Minister of
Transportation, Doug Young.108

The International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) was a
voting member of the Gateway Council until December 31, 1995. It was decided by the

ILWU Canadian Area Executive Board not to continue participation because the Gateway Council’s “focus on transportation issues had moved to the reduction of Corporate Taxes.” The loss of labour union participation in the Gateway Council may signify underlying tension between the agenda of the private sector transportation interests and the interests of labour. The ILWU originally joined the Container Gateway Traffic Council of B.C. to prevent “further meddling in our [ILWU’s] affairs” by governments and “assorted intellectuals looking for positions of authority.” The reason given for the ILWU’s withdrawal from the Gateway Council marks a shift in the Council’s agenda from the straightforward goal of increasing container shipments through the region, to one of increasing corporate profits which has a much larger implication on relations between the union and private sector transportation interests.

Since the founding of the Round Table on Transportation, members’ “efforts have been directed at local, provincial and federal government officials emphasizing the importance of transportation to our economy and that it should be treated as an economic generator and not a source of tax revenue.” Greater Vancouver Gateway Council efforts are still directed at governments. However, the focus of the Council’s efforts tends to be federal, provincial and regional governments, rather than local, and those orders of governments are far more accessible than they were under the Round Table.

---

111 Ibid.
The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and Governments

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has received government funding for studies and reports. The Gateway Council received at least $800,000 from the federal government for studies and reports since 2006 (see Appendix C – Partial List of GVGC’s Federal Funding for Studies). Not only does the Gateway Council receive public funding for reports and studies, the group in turn uses them to lobby various orders of government for investment in transportation infrastructure in the region. In fact, some of the studies and reports used by the B.C. government for justification of the Gateway Program have been influenced by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s reports or studies. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

In 1994, the governing party in British Columbia was the New Democratic Party. The governing party in Ottawa was Liberal. The Gateway Council’s position did not change between governments of different political stripes: “Our position that we need roads and bridges and tunnels is no different with the NDP than it is with the current Liberal government provincially, or with the Liberals federally or the Conservatives federally. We’ve had exactly the same position when we came out in 1994 and highlighted exactly what we needed and we’ve been consistent about that regardless of government.”

Having governments involved brought obvious benefits to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. Not only did this allow the Council access to federal government funding, it also allowed for consensus-building with governments and transportation sector stakeholders. According to Kristine Burr, Assistant Deputy Minister of Policy for Transport Canada, the Gateway Council’s approach has been integral to implementing

---

113 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
governments’ infrastructure plans. She notes, “The consensus it created on what needed to be done in the lower mainland is one of the reasons why federal and provincial governments could respond to the emerging needs of the Asia-Pacific gateway relatively quickly and in a collaborative fashion.” \(^{114}\)

Building consensus at Gateway Council meetings also has implications for the way in which members communicate the perceived need for policy or infrastructure changes. Council members, through developing consensus, may also be formulating an ad hoc communications strategy. With representatives of major regional transportation interests stating policy or infrastructure proposals with a unified voice, governments may be more willing to enact those proposals. As Bob Wilds, Managing Director of the Gateway Council notes, “…whether it’s us or the [Vancouver] Board of Trade or the chambers of commerce or anybody, everybody is saying the same thing. And that’s tough for the government to ignore. So we’re very fortunate in getting the billions of dollars the government’s been investing in this gateway.” \(^{115}\)

The inclusion of governments with the formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council served as a catalyst to bring on other private-sector members, like the BC Trucking Association, Burlington North Santa Fe Railway and Southern Railways of BC. Voting members pay fees towards the Gateway Council’s operating budget, which is currently about $160,000 a year. \(^{116}\) The Gateway Council has one staff member “plus assistance from all members.” \(^{117}\)

---

\(^{114}\) Canada, Kristine Burr, Assistant Deputy Minister Transport Canada, *Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications*, Issue 2 - Evidence - June 20, 2006.

\(^{115}\) Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.
Both voting and resource members of the Gateway Council can attend board meetings and participate in discussions, subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors, but only voting members are allowed to vote on issues that require official Council decisions.¹¹⁸

**Consensus-building and Stakeholders**

The Gateway Council’s decisions are made on the basis of consensus. However, consensus seems to be a goal, rather than a rule with Gateway Council decisions. According to Gateway Council Managing Director Bob Wilds, “[n]ot everyone necessarily agrees, but we have general agreement on a particular direction to go and we go that way. We generally have unanimous agreement. Some issues we wouldn’t go forward with unless we have unanimous [agreement], others we may move forward with a majority.”¹¹⁹

The Gateway Council engages governments primarily through meetings.¹²⁰ However, provincial, federal and regional governments, such as TransLink and Metro Vancouver, are more likely to be engaged than municipalities.¹²¹ The federal government warrants special attention from the Gateway Council “primarily from the perspective of raising the profile of the Gateway and securing funding for all modes of transportation.”¹²²

The Gateway Council engages other transportation stakeholders not only through their meetings, but also through Vancouver Board of Trade and chambers of commerce

---

¹¹⁹ Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
¹²⁰ Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
¹²¹ Paul Landry, interview with the author, July 29, 2009.
¹²² Ibid.
meetings and forums. Talking points and other communications materials have been issued to members.123

The relationship between the Board of Trade and the Gateway Council is particularly important. Most, if not all, members of the Gateway Council are also members of the Vancouver Board of Trade. The Board of Trade also provides the Gateway Council a responsive environment for presentations on public positions.124 Thus, the Board of Trade and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council are “linked through informal networks of research, policy development and communications” making them powerful actors in the development and promotion of transportation policy in Vancouver.125

“The Greater Vancouver Gateway Society” and Other Gateway Councils

In 2002, the Gateway Council registered under the Society Act as “The Greater Vancouver Gateway Society.” Part of the incorporation process involves developing a constitution and bylaws. According to the constitution, purposes of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Society are to:

a) Improve international competitiveness of transportation of goods and persons through the Greater Vancouver multi-modal gateway (the “Gateway”) in order to retain existing business and attract new customers;

b) Raise awareness among the Greater Vancouver area public and stakeholders (as defined in the bylaws) in the Gateway and its contribution to the local, provincial and national economies.126

123 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
125 Ibid., 72.
Stakeholders are defined as “members, governments at all levels or other Entities involved in the shipping and transportation of goods and people through the Gateway.”  

The federal government has used the constitution as part of efforts to promote “[g]ateway councils and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building, planning, sound governance and accountability…[as a] key to advancing regional strategies with national benefits.”  

The other emerging gateway councils across Canada have used The Greater Vancouver Gateway Society’s constitution as a template to develop their own.  

Furthermore, Managing Director Bob Wilds has advised both the federal government and other emerging gateway councils about the “the positives and negatives about our growth over the years [and] the differences between their councils and our council and the challenges there might be.”  

According to Wilds, other gateway councils have inherent geographical disadvantages when compared to Vancouver. For example, the Atlantic Gateway spans four east coast provinces. Ontario’s gateway is large with many diverse interests. Working towards consensus in those environments is challenging when compared to Vancouver where the transportation interests are much more narrowly defined in terms of geography.

---

127 Ibid., 7.
129 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009,
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
WESTAC and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council

On June 1, 2004, the Western Transportation Advisory Council (WESTAC) and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council became members of each other. WESTAC is “a well-respected, powerful and balanced forum of major organizations” and established in 1973 as a non-profit corporation by Letters Patent, a legal mechanism for the establishment of title or status by a government. The objectives of WESTAC at the time of incorporation were broadly based around issues such as “to promote the efficient movement of people and goods among the western Provinces of Canada,” and “to encourage improved co-ordination and co-operation between diverse groups involved in the transportation of goods.”

Central to the formation of WESTAC was the so-called Crow Rate, the regulated grain and flour rates for railway transport from the Prairies to grain terminals near Thunder Bay and west coast ports. One of the founding members of WESTAC was Alexander Hart, Senior Vice-President of Canadian National Railways. Although the railroads had continuously opposed the Crow Rate, WESTAC initially didn’t take a position on the Crow Rate other than “something must be done.”

Today, WESTAC has 53 members including 10 provincial, federal and municipal government members, 7 representatives from labour groups, and members from ports and terminals, shippers, carriers, chambers of commerce, etc. Given the broad mandate of

---

134 For More information, see the Canada Corporations Act Part II.
137 Ibid., 97.
WESTAC to facilitate the efficient and coordinated movement of people and goods in Canada’s west, it is not surprising that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and WESTAC became ‘reciprocal’ members.

WESTAC shares some qualities with the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. WESTAC’s “breadth, rather than depth, of transportation interests is what enables it to attract the attention of governments, academics and consultants,” according to President Ruth Sol. The breadth of the organization also forces it to maintain impartiality, neutrality, and objectivity when dealing with transportation issues. WESTAC views itself as “champion of transportation.”

Greater Vancouver Gateway Society and TransLink

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and TransLink, the Greater Vancouver region’s transportation authority, worked together on a number of regional transportation plans and studies, just as the Gateway Council’s studies have been used by other departments of the federal and provincial government (see Appendix A: Table of Gateway Council Documents and Excerpts used in Reports or Studies).

As noted in a September 26, 2002 presentation to the Vancouver Board of Trade, the Gateway Council viewed TransLink as “the only body with the charter to implement an MCTS,” the Major Commercial Transportation System. However, in the same presentation, Larry Berg, Chair of the Gateway Council and CEO of the Vancouver

140 Ibid., 46.
141 Ibid., 48.
International Airport Authority, also advocated for a new governance model that would “incorporate business and community interests.”\textsuperscript{143} Thus, according to the Gateway Council, TransLink is the only body that can deliver the goods, but it is unable to do so because of its governance structure.

In January 2006, BC Minister of Transportation Kevin Falcon confirmed through news media that he had plans to conduct a ‘governance review’ of TransLink, unbeknownst to TransLink chairman and Richmond Mayor Malcolm Brodie.\textsuperscript{144} Coincidentally, Minister Falcon told the same reporter that the Gateway Program would be “$3-billion program and I'll tell you, it's very important to secure the economic future for the Lower Mainland and the province of British Columbia.”\textsuperscript{145}

In March 2006, Minister Falcon announced the selection of a three-person panel to conduct a “review the governance model to determine if Translink is as effective as it could be in meeting the transportation needs of the Lower Mainland and the Province.”\textsuperscript{146} The panel included Chair Marlene Grinnell, former mayor of the City of Langley; Dan Doyle, who was appointed deputy Minister of Transportation in 2001; and Wayne Duzita with “35 years of experience in business and all aspects of the transportation of commercial goods.”\textsuperscript{147}

Mr. Doyle was a resource member of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as representing the government of British Columbia in 2003. During his time on the Gateway Council, Mr. Doyle helped author at least two studies: the “Major Commercial Transportation System (MCTS) – Water Routes for Cargo and Passengers” study, and the

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} William Boei, “Falcon holds to $3b cost for Gateway project,” The Vancouver Sun, Jan 27, 2006, B1.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
“MCTS – Rail Capacity and Regional Planning” study, both from 2003. In 2003, the Gateway Council also produced the influential “Economic Impact Analysis of Investment in a Major Commercial Transportation System for the Greater Vancouver Region” report.

On January 26, 2007, the TransLink Governance Review Panel submitted their recommendations on TransLink’s new governance structure to Minister Falcon:

- A Council of Mayors should be established comprised of Mayors elected to councils in the transportation service region. It is anticipated that the Council of Mayors will grow as the service region grows over the next 30 years.
- A new TransLink Board should be established, composed of non-elected officials with expertise in areas important to TransLink’s mandate. The Board should have 11 members.
- An independent TransLink Commissioner should be appointed by the Council of Mayors for a six-year term.
- The Greater Vancouver Transportation Act should be renamed to reflect the broader region the authority will serve.
- The TransLink Regional Transportation Authority should replace the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority.

Although the TransLink Governance Review Panel recommended an 11-member, non-political TransLink Board, their recommendations do not include how those members ought to be selected.

Based on the review panel’s recommendations, Minister Falcon introduced Bill 36, the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Amendment Act. Bill 36 did not pass through the BC legislature before the session ended, thus it ‘died on the Order Paper.’ Minister Falcon introduced essentially the same bill in October 2007: Bill 43, the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Amendment Act.

Bill 43 allowed for the creation of a “Mayors’ Council on Regional Transportation” that would appoint TransLink’s board of directors, and approve

---

TransLink’s strategic plans involving new taxes, transit fare increases and new borrowing.

The Mayors’ Council would also choose the “qualified individuals to be considered for appointment as directors of the authority.” The list of ‘qualified individuals’ is submitted to the Mayors’ Council by a screening panel consisting of “five persons representing all key transportation sectors in the region, plus appropriate financial and business experience.” The screening panel consists of a member selected by:

- Minister of Transportation;
- Mayors’ Council;
- Institute of Chartered Accountants of BC;
- Vancouver Board of Trade;
- Greater Vancouver Gateway Society

The screening panel hand picks individuals for a list of possible TransLink directors from which the Mayors’ Council must choose.

This form of board selection did not appear to be especially popular during TransLink Governance Review Panel’s consultations, nor was it in the Panel’s final report. The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council was one of the organizations to call for board members to be nominated from both the Vancouver Board of Trade and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

On March 22, 2007, the Vancouver Board of Trade released a letter sent to Minister Falcon. Therein, they made a case for same the governance model as the Port of

---

150 Ibid., Section 172(1).
Vancouver where stakeholder groups nominate possible members to the board, but the
decision rests with the federal government. In their letter, the Board of Trade stated,

> It is important that in the new TransLink the interests of other key stakeholders are properly represented. The interests of organizations involved in goods movement are substantially present in the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. The Lower Mainland Chambers Transportation Planning Panel is a good proxy for the general business community. Other organizations champion the part of the population who commute by automobile.\(^{152}\)

Bob Wilds, Managing Director of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, is a
member of the 2009 Screening Panel, which is required to develop a list of at least five
candidates to fill board vacancies that will happen at the end of the year due to the
expiration of the terms of three current members of the TransLink Board of Directors.\(^{153}\)

A 2007 *Richmond Review* article noted that three of the five people appointed to
the TransLink screening panel had ties to the Vancouver Board of Trade. Graham
Clarke, chosen by the province, was governor of the Vancouver Board of Trade. Dave
Park was nominated by the Vancouver Board of Trade and was that organization’s chief
economist. Bob Wilds was nominated by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Society; the
Gateway Council is a member of the Vancouver Board of Trade.\(^{154}\)

Since its earliest incarnations, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been
concerned with the business interests of its members. As such, throughout its
development, the Gateway Council has tried to influence various orders of government.
In its earliest form, as the Round Table on Transportation, this group attempted to
influence governments using somewhat straightforward lobbying techniques (i.e.
meetings with government officials along with presentations and reports).

---


However, as the Round Table on Transportation merger with the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum, lobbying governments became much easier for those transportation stakeholders involved. The merger between the two groups not only officially formed the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, it also brought government representatives into the fold. The importance of the inclusion of governments in the formation of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council cannot be overstated. With government representation on the Gateway Council, governments were no longer ‘lobbied,’ at least not in the traditional sense. Governments were ‘at the table’ and involved in Gateway Council meetings and discussions.

The inclusion of governments also brought a large increase of resources and private sector membership for the Gateway Council. When the Round Table on Transportation joined with the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Canada/Asia Transportation and Trade Forum to form the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, membership increased from eight to 30 (both voting and resource members). As membership increased, so did the dues paid by members. Furthermore, different orders of governments used the Gateway Council to conduct studies, which governments in turned used to justify transportation infrastructure investments and plans in the Lower Mainland.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council also gained influence of TransLink, the Lower Mainland’s regional transportation authority and “the only body with the charter to implement” the Council’s regional transportation plan, known as the Major Commercial Transportation System. At first, the Council’s influence over TransLink was through the use of studies and reports with TransLink incorporating the Council’s studies

---

and reports into their own. Later, the Gateway Council gained direct influence over the choice of the Board of Directors of TransLink.

Under the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act*, TransLink has the power to establish a “Major Road Network” (MRN) “comprising an integrated system of highways throughout the transportation service region.” TransLink owns and maintains roads and highways designated as part of the MRN. The legislation overrides municipal jurisdiction of roads and highways designated as part of the MRN, this will be discussed further in Chapter 4 – Development of the Gateway Roads and Highways Agenda.

**Engaging the Public**

Engaging the public has been much more difficult for the Gateway Council than has engaging governments. In order make sure the public knows “what the gateway is, what it means to people, and what the consequences are of not having what we already are doing,” the Gateway Council has started a three-year public relations campaign starting in 2009.

According to the report on the Gateway Council’s recommended messaging, “Council members acknowledge that Gateway growth can more easily occur (or can only occur) in the context of solid regional public awareness of the Gateway identity and acceptance of the benefits and opportunities that the Gateway represents.”

---

156 Ibid., Section 18(1).
157 Ibid.
Furthermore, the report on recommended messaging acknowledges that opponents of gateway infrastructure plans are winning the public relations battle (my bold):

With a full schedule of Gateway construction activities either underway or in development, and a public increasingly subjected to these activities and exposed to media focused largely on project critics, the Council and its members are committed to communicating Gateway benefits to the communities of Metro Vancouver.\footnote{Ibid., 2.}

Even though projects related to the Gateway Program are already underway in the Greater Vancouver region, the Gateway Council feels that the battle for the public’s attention and acknowledgement is worth fighting.\footnote{Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.}

Funding for the initial stage of this public relations campaign came from Transport Canada in order to “[d]evelop messaging that has local resonance and alignment with Canada’s Pacific Gateway communications efforts.”\footnote{NATIONAL Public Relations, “Report to Greater Vancouver Gateway Council – Research Program and Recommended Messaging,” March 2009, 2.} The fact that the federal government is funding part of the public relations campaign may indicate government pressure on the Gateway Council to embark on this campaign.

Since the founding of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, lobbying efforts have been directed at government officials emphasizing the role of transportation as an economic generator, rather than a source of taxation. However, public support for increased transportation infrastructure may be important to the Gateway Council as this support translates into support for the funding needed to build the MCTS infrastructure pieces. Regionally, this means support for increases to fuel taxes, property taxes for residents, parking stall taxes and public transit fare increases. Provincially, this means support for increases to provincial fuel taxes. The Gateway Council has supported these
tax increases, and attempted to get public support for them, “predicated on those monies being dedicated to road improvements.”162

‘Astroturf’ – The Livable BC Coalition

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, although a coalition representing “the collective will of the major transportation interests...to develop and pursue a unified competitiveness strategy,”163 has been aided and abetted by other groups and other interests not formally aligned with them. Foremost among these groups has been the B.C. Road Builders & Heavy Construction Association (BC Road Builders), a group that represents “involved in asphalt and concrete manufacturing, grading, paving, utility construction, road and bridge building/maintenance, blasting, and the supply of related goods and services.”164

President Jack Davidson has tied the BC Road Builders’ political support directly to the responsiveness of government to provide transportation infrastructure above other considerations:

Road Builders strongly believe that building transportation infrastructure is a key to a strong economy anywhere. Any civilization anywhere that’s building infrastructure, including the Romans, flourished. As soon as they stopped, they died and that’s the case here...[when] the NDP got in and stopped and our economy just dove, even though the rest of Canada was doing well. Then Gordon got in and understood that you need to keep businesses competitive and started building infrastructure again and our economy sailed. So, to us you didn’t need any studies. Just build it.165

In early 2006, the BC Road Builders sent a letter to undisclosed recipients declaring the creation of a “grassroots movement” the ‘Livable BC Coalition,’ a name with obvious similarities to the Livable Region Coalition which opposes key aspects of the province’s Gateway Program (see Appendix D – BC Road Builders & Heavy Construction Association letter on the Livable BC Coalition). The letter states, “Currently, those groups against the Gateway Projects are making their voices heard in the media and with the Public. With strong support and a coordinated effort, we can reach the public with the facts highlighting the need for strong transportation infrastructure.”

The goal of the Livable BC Coalition was “to sway public and political opinion in support of the government’s transportation programs.” The BC Road Builders, under the auspice of the Livable BC Coalition, sought to try to “get people to go out to the open houses and political events where these things are being talked about. And go to the city councils that are objecting to the Gateway and try to show the positive support.”

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council lent support to the BC Road Builders’ Livable BC Coalition by way of attending meetings and giving input, but not funding. It appears that the Livable BC Coalition was not well funded. The campaign to launch the group was done out of the BC Road Builders’ offices and using their email lists of “a couple of hundred associations and organizations.”

---

166 See Appendix D – BC Road Builders & Heavy Construction Association letter on the Livable BC Coalition.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
170 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
171 Public Eye Online, “Paving the Highway of Consent.”
The BC Road Builders built a “fancy website”\footnote{172} for the Livable BC Coalition that included a feature where users “voted yes [for the Gateway Program] and then it sends a letter to your MLA and MP and your municipal government or your behalf.”\footnote{173} The website was not ‘launched’ because “the need wasn’t there”\footnote{174} by the time it was completed.

The Gateway Council felt a need to get involved with the Livable BC Coalition because opponents to the Gateway Program were “getting all the press...local newspapers that love to print their stuff all the time.”\footnote{175} That is, both the Gateway Council and the BC Road Builders were losing the battle for public opinion through the media. The ‘space’ of public opinion and media was being lost to anti-Gateway activists and groups.

\textit{‘Astroturf’ – Get Moving BC}

The BC Road Builders were also involved in a group called Get Moving BC with support from the BC Trucking Association. In May 2007, the BC Trucking Association sent an email to industry members encouraging them to support Get Moving BC, “a non-profit, grassroots organization composed of individuals, businesses and organizations in the Greater Vancouver area advocating a balanced, efficient, and sustainable transportation infrastructure.”\footnote{176} The letter also stated that, “To date, Get Moving BC has the support of the BC Roadbuilders and Heavy Construction Association, the Independent Construction Business Association, Canada Wide Magazines and others.”

\footnote{172}{Jack Davidson, interview with the author, July 27, 2009.}
\footnote{173}{Ibid.}
\footnote{174}{Ibid.}
\footnote{175}{Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.}
\footnote{176}{Public Eye Online, “Shocker: Brian on Line One Supports Highways,” May 15, 2007.}
Several of the people involved in Get Moving BC were connected to the B.C. Liberal Party, including city councillors Jordan Bateman and Greg Moore, the vice-president of the Fort Langley-Aldergrove Liberal Party Constituency Association and a BC Liberal Party organizer respectively.

Much like the Livable BC Coalition, Get Moving BC was set-up to fight the battle of public opinion. Opponents to the Gateway Program were winning the battle for the ‘space’ of public opinion, so this group was created to do marketing, answer newspaper articles and opinion pieces, and “counter[ed] what was being put out by the other side.”

Another goal of Get Moving BC was to protect the Liberal government. According to Jack Davidson, president of the BC Road Builders, the “…Gateway Program was a done deal as soon as it was announced and all we did was to try to help the government smooth-out the bumps. We had an excellent transportation minister in Kevin Falcon and the Liberal government understood the need and it wouldn’t have mattered much what would have happened. It was going through.”

Throughout, the Gateway Council’s use of reports and studies has been very important. Funding for many of these studies has come from the federal government, at least $800,000 to date (see Appendix C). Governments in turn use these studies to move ahead with infrastructure investments. Many of these investments are in projects that the Gateway Council has advocated for. The power of the Gateway Council’s Major Commercial Transportation System can be seen in the City of Richmond’s request for the inclusion of the Blundell Road/Nelson Road corridor in the study as this would “ensure

178 Ibid.
formal recognition of the need of improvements in the southeast Richmond by senior governments and private stakeholders who may play a key role in its implementation.”

The spaces of dependence of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s voting members (i.e. private sector transportation stakeholders) are the immobile apparatus of the region’s transportation system. With the Gateway Program, this means bridges and roads. Through the inclusion of governments and the strategic use of studies and reports, the Gateway Council was able to control most of the spaces of engagement, or the politics at different orders or scales, and thus control spaces of dependence of its members.

The control of municipal-scale spaces of engagement in the Lower Mainland is not necessary for the Gateway Council to control outcomes in their spaces of dependence – infrastructure sought by the Council is within provincial, regional or federal jurisdiction. Yet, ‘all politics are local,’ as the saying goes. The success of politicians and the programs they champion are dependent on local support, otherwise they may not get re-elected. This may explain the attention paid to the ‘space’ of local media and public opinion by the Gateway Council and other transportation stakeholders.

The ‘space’ of news media, and by extension public opinion, was being controlled by opponents to the Gateway Program and this has concerned the Gateway Council, some of its members, and perhaps the federal government. That concern may have been so great that the Gateway Council and the BC Trucking Association, a member of the Council, both joined the BC Road Builders in ‘astroturf’ activities in an attempt to sway public opinion through news media, public forums and automated lobbying of MLAs and

---

MPs. Currently, the Gateway Council is engaged in a multi-year public relations campaign to “communicating Gateway benefits to the communities of Metro Vancouver” in a further attempt to control the local-scale spaces of engagement in the Lower Mainland.

CHAPTER 4 – THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GATEWAY ROADS AND HIGHWAYS AGENDA

There are many “gateways” presently being developed in Canada. There is an Ontario-Quebec Continental Gateway and Trade Corridor being developed federally.\(^{181}\) Also, there is an Atlantic Gateway being developed in Canada’s Maritime Provinces being promoted federally.\(^{182}\) Likewise, the province of Nova Scotia bills itself “Canada’s Atlantic Gateway,” as a provincial initiative,\(^{183}\) as well as a Southern New Brunswick Gateway being promoted by private interests.\(^{184}\) Furthermore, there is the Arctic Gateway, promising the potential of “the Arctic Bridge,” and ice-free shipping corridor from Churchill, Manitoba to Murmansk, Russia.\(^{185}\)

What exactly a transportation “gateway” is depends largely on which party is asked, although there are similarities between definitions. According to recent federal government policy, a gateway is a “multi-modal entry/exit point through which goods and international passengers move beyond local, and even regional, markets.”\(^{186}\) In 2005, the Liberal government defined a gateway as “a network of strategic transportation links and multimodal transfer points of significance to Canada’s international trade.”\(^{187}\) Or, “a world class multimodal network of strategic transportation links and transfer...
points of national significance that is competitive, efficient, safe, secure and environmentally sound.”¹⁸⁸ TransLink, Vancouver’s regional transportation authority, defined a transportation gateway in 2005 as “an integrated, multi-modal transportation network that will take advantage of our natural, geographic advantage.”¹⁸⁹ These definitions have at their heart the notions of integrated, multi-modal transportation networks to facilitate the movement of goods and/or people.

The B.C. government’s Gateway Program follows closely previous characterizations of ‘gateways.’ When Premier Gordon Campbell officially launched the Gateway Program in January 2006, the $3 billion transportation infrastructure plan was designed “to meet the needs of our growing economy, increasing Asia-Pacific trade, and a growing population.”¹⁹⁰ The British Columbia Gateway Program was labelled “a comprehensive and integrated response that addresses the need for both goods and people movement.”¹⁹¹

This chapter will focus on the development of the agendas related to the constituent parts of the B.C. government’s Gateway Program: the North Fraser Perimeter Road and the South Fraser Perimeter Road, the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge, and the widening of Highway 1. I will show that although the initial push for some of these elements were under the NDP government of Mike Harcourt, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s influence with respect to these elements grew over time. Although ‘launched’ on January 31, 2006, the provincial government appears to have been

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.
¹⁸⁹ Canada, TransLink, House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Pre-Budget Consultations, October 18, 2005.
developing the Gateway Program for some time prior. Furthermore, an analysis of reports, documents and presentations by representatives of other transportation stakeholders, such as the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, reveal over a decade’s worth of lobbying for infrastructure investments around the Lower Mainland that mirror what was ‘launched’ in 2006.

As far back as the early 1990’s the proponents were lobbying governments to invest in some of the elements of the Gateway Program, especially the South Perimeter Roads and the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge.

**GVRD’s Transport 2021**

In 1991, the Fraser River Harbour Commission commissioned a study on the feasibility of the South Fraser Perimeter Road. At the same time, the Fraser River Harbour Commission began assembling lands along River Road in Delta on or near where the South Fraser Perimeter Road aligns today. Finance Minister Paul Martin had committed the $200 million of federal funds for the project “while on the stump throughout the Lower Mainland” before the general election in 1993. In addition to the federal government, the BC NDP government, and the governments of Delta and Surrey were behind the plan. The Corporation of Delta and the Vancouver Port

---

195 Ibid.
Authority also asked the provincial NDP government to invest in the South Fraser Perimeter Road as early as 1991.¹⁹⁶

In 1991, the Social Credit government of Bill Vander Zalm directed the Greater Vancouver Regional District to conduct a two-year transportation plan in order to “cope with growth and establish critical priorities for that region.”¹⁹⁷ The Social Credit party lost the general election later that year to the NDP of Mike Harcourt; the GVRD continued putting together the transportation plans.

Released in October 1993, the *Transport 2021* transportation plan includes proposals to build the South Fraser Perimeter Road, improve sections along what is now being called the North Fraser Perimeter Road, and widen of Highway 1 and the Port Mann Bridge (though the Port Mann Bridge was to be widened for high-occupancy vehicles only).¹⁹⁸

Figure 2 - Transport 2021: Medium-Range Transportation System Concept

---

¹⁹⁷ British Columbia, Hon. Lam (Lieutenant-Governor), *Speech from the Throne*, May 7, 1991.
All of these elements are in the present government’s Gateway Program, with the exception that Transport 2021 called for high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane expansion on Highway 1 and the Port Mann Bridge rather than an expansion of all lanes.

The NDP government did not immediately invest in the transportation infrastructure upgrades called for in the GVRD’s Transport 2021 report, nor did the government reject the findings of the report (at least not in the provincial legislature). By 1995, Premier Clark suggested that upgrades to Highway 1 and building the South Fraser Perimeter Road were being held-up by a lack of commitment from the federal government, but the government was “engaged in discussions with the municipalities and the Fraser port commission around possible contributions that they might make to
expedite the project.”\textsuperscript{199} In the end, only the expansion of the Port Mann Bridge for an HOV was committed to by the NDP government.

**TransLink’s Major Road Network**

In April 1999, TransLink became responsible for regional transportation in the Lower Mainland, a scant two months before Premier Clark directed the Authority to start preliminary work on the South Fraser Perimeter Road. According to the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act*, TransLink was required to complete a strategic plan with respect to the authority’s “goals and directions for the regional transportation system.”\textsuperscript{200} In the creation of long term and strategic planning, TransLink is required to consult with local, regional and provincial governments, the general public and “any other persons the authority considers appropriate.”\textsuperscript{201}

The *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act* gave TransLink the power to establish a “Major Road Network” (MRN) “comprising an integrated system of highways throughout the transportation service region.”\textsuperscript{202} TransLink could designate roads and highways to be part of the MRN by the passing of a bylaw.

Under the legislation, TransLink owns and maintains roads and highways designated as part of the MRN. The legislation overrides municipal jurisdiction of designated roads and highways designated as part of the MRN. For example, the *Vancouver Charter* or the *Community Charter*, provincial legislations which give jurisdictional powers Vancouver and BC municipalities respectively, are overridden by the *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act* in terms of MRN roads and

\textsuperscript{200} *Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act, Revised Statues of British Columbia*, Section 193 (a).
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., Section 193(5)(f).
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., Section 18(1).
highways. Municipalities cannot “reduce the capacity of all or any part of the major road network to move people...[or take] any action that would prohibit the movement of trucks.” Thus the prospect of municipal involvement in roads and highways designated as part of the Major Road Network would be significantly reduced under this legislation.

TransLink is subject to regulations of the Lieutenant Governor in Council (Orders in Council), and analysis of TransLink documents reveal the Gateway Council’s influence on some of the strategic decisions of the transit authority. A discussion paper related to the development of TransLink’s 1999 Strategic Transportation Plan states:

Plains from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) view transportation improvements as essential to facilitating economic growth: A theme common to plans of the Vancouver Port Authority, the Vancouver Island Airport Authority, Freight Transportation and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council* is the key role of transportation infrastructure in supporting the region’s economy (see map). Another related theme is that needs of freight transport have not been adequately addressed by existing plans (i.e. Transport 2021). *Several of the first priority projects are not in the current plans of TransLink or the Province and some may be contrary to the LRSP’s growth management strategy.

Figure 3 – Gateway Council Infrastructure Priorities


203 Ibid., Sections 21(1) and 21(2).
The discussion paper notes that many of the road improvements needed for goods movement interests are not under TransLink jurisdiction and that many of the road improvements identified by the Gateway Council and others are on provincial facilities and not under TransLink’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{205} The discussion paper goes on to suggest that “there is a critical need for the MRN [Major Roads Network] and provincial facilities to be better co-ordinated and planned as one seamless system of ‘important’ or ‘strategic’ roads which serve the region…For example, there appears to be general consensus that the ‘\textit{South Fraser Perimeter Road}’ needs to be built but it is unclear whether this is a provincial facility or whether or not local or TransLink funding would be needed to ensure its construction.”\textsuperscript{206}

In April 2000, shortly after the release of TransLink’s 1999 Strategic Transportation Plan Discussion Paper, TransLink released its Strategic Transportation Plan wherein it listed the South Fraser Perimeter Road, among other projects, as a “potential major project.”\textsuperscript{207}

Figure 4 – Strategic Transportation Plan: Potential Major Capital Projects
In 2002, TransLink produced the “2002 Transportation Plan” that outlined a proposal for “integrated transport in the Greater Vancouver area.” This document gave some credit to the Gateway Council for helping to develop TransLink’s Major Road Network system (my bold):

Priorities for MRN improvements are established by working closely with the area municipalities. Input is also sought from other major stakeholders such as the Gateway Council. This Council has representatives from the port, rail, airport, trucking and marine industries involved in goods movement.

TransLink’s 2003 “Keeping Vancouver Moving” discussion paper explicitly linked the regional transportation authority’s goals with those of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. The paper’s authors noted that the discussion paper “is not a new “plan,” but rather a further refinement of our current strategic plan...[in order] to facilitate consultation and public dialogue over the fall of 2003.”

---

209 Ibid., 8.
TransLink puts forth a number of transportation initiatives, including increasing the rapid transit network in the region, expanding bus service, and addressing road congestion through the funding of the Major Road Network (MRN). Included in the MRN is the North Fraser Perimeter Road.\textsuperscript{211}

TransLink’s proposed ‘package’ of transportation infrastructure investments “greatly supports the efforts of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council (GVGC) to deal with goods movements.”\textsuperscript{212} The discussion paper’s authors are explicit about the link between TransLink and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council:

The GVTA [TransLink] has been working with the GVGC to recognize those roadways that are critical to goods movement. These are outlined in the GVGC’s Major Commercial Transportation System (MCTS), which identifies the essential road and other links to seaports, airports, and major rail or truck terminal facilities.\textsuperscript{213}

By 2005, during federal budget consultations, TransLink Chairman Doug McCallum asked “the Federal Government to partner with us as we look towards the future and the growing trade opportunities with China, India and other Asian countries.”\textsuperscript{214} Mr. McCallum also cited the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s priorities in his testimony to the House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Finance:

Based on the priorities identified through the Gateway Council, ourselves and the Province, we estimate that $10.95 billion in transportation investments in road, transit, marine and rail infrastructure, data collection and analysis is needed. Currently, local and provincial governments are working hard to make the necessary transportation improvements in the region. However, to realize the full potential of trade with Asia, we need more resources – resources that cannot be raised locally alone.\textsuperscript{215}

TransLink asked for federal funding for the North Fraser Perimeter Road and the South Fraser Perimeter Road, as well as changes to the \textit{Canada Transportation Act}. 

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 18.  \\
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 27.  \\
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 28.  \\
\textsuperscript{214} Canada, TransLink, \textit{House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance – Pre-budget Consultations}, October 18, 2005  \\
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. 
\end{flushleft}
On September 17, 2003, CEO of TransLink, Pat Jacobsen, participated on a panel
discussion entitled, “Regional Transportation: Opening the Gateway.” Fellow panelists
included Bob Wilds, Executive Director of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and
Geoff Freers, Director of the BC Government’s Gateway Program. During her
presentation, Ms Jacobsen appears to have aligned TransLink’s priorities with those of
the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s in terms of regional roads and bridges (see
Figure 5). Ms. Jacobsen’s presentation included the above slide which states, “Many
GVTA projects are the same as Gateway’s MCTS.”

---

216 Vancouver Board of Trade, “Event Speeches & Archives,” Wednesday, September 17, 2003,
217 Vancouver Board of Trade, “Event Speeches & Presentations Archive-Regional Transportation:
Opening the Gateway, Jacobsen’s Presentation,” September 17, 2003, 25
The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s use of Reports and Studies

Elements of the Gateway Program were proposed, though not funded, by NDP governments prior to 2001. Furthermore, those same NDP governments directed TransLink to begin planning for those same elements. TransLink, in turn, used reports and studies from the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council to guide their planning.

After 2001, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s use of reports and presentations appears to be very important in terms of the development of the transportation infrastructure agenda related to today’s Gateway Program not only for TransLink’s plans, but also for provincial and federal governments to justify the funding of infrastructure and changes in policy.

An overview of the Gateway Council’s reports, presentations and other documents directed to federal, provincial and regional governments related to regional infrastructure may provide a foundation for understanding the successes of the Council. Conversely, this may also provide another reason as to why opponents of BC Gateway Program have not been able to stop, or even significantly alter, infrastructure projects related to the Gateway.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council formed in 1994 “to pursue a vision for Greater Vancouver as the Gateway of Choice for North America, able to capitalize on opportunities from expanding world trade and tourism.” Their first document dealing directly with transportation infrastructure in British Columbia was produced in 1996 for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transportation. The report, entitled, “Transportation, Trade & Tourism: A New Agenda for Jobs and Growth,” states:

The Gateway Council’s view is that tourism and truck traffic can co-exist to the benefit of all stakeholders, provided necessary public infrastructure improvements are made to allow and facilitate access for both truck and bus traffic. For example; a planned continuous two lane port road connecting the Burrard Inlet terminals to the Trans Canada Highway and downtown Vancouver would greatly improve cargo movements to and from the terminals and enhance tourism.\(^{219}\)

The report also called on the federal government to invest in highway improvements along River Road to the South Fraser Terminals, highway connections to Deltaport, improved highway connections between Sea Island and major highway and truck routes, and an extension to Deltaport Way\(^{220}\) near the Roberts Bank terminal (Deltaport).

In 1998, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council struck a ‘Working Group’ of stakeholders from all transportation modes, as well as different sectors of the economy and different orders of government.\(^{221}\) The purpose of this working group was to develop a vision for the future of regional freight transportation in the Lower Mainland.

Out of those discussions, the Gateway Council decided to seek “fair competitive framework with US Gateways, a comprehensive gateway infrastructure program and the capital necessary to implement it and policies and regulations conducive to service expansion and improvement.”\(^{222}\) In order to achieve that ‘vision,’ the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council embarked on a series of reports and lectures that culminated in the 2001 “Major Commercial Transportation System” report. This would prove to be an import report for lobbying various governments in to further the Council’s regional transportation infrastructure agenda.

\(^{220}\) Ibid., 30.
\(^{222}\) Bob Wilds, “Speaking Notes - Competing in the GTA,” 3.
The Gateway Council’s Major Commercial Transportation System

The Gateway Council’s “Major Commercial Transportation System” (MCTS) report from 2001 is a very important document, in terms of its use for lobbying various orders of government. The Technical Memorandum submission to TransLink in 1999, “initiated further work to refine definition and prioritization to advocate for the integration of the MCTS into transportation planning processes”\(^{223}\) for the Gateway Council.

The first phase of the Major Commercial Transportation System was released less than two years later in August 2001. The MCTS’s vision is to be “[a]n efficient and internationally competitive regional commercial transportation system for the Gateway.”\(^{224}\)

Perhaps tellingly, the MCTS’s definition process was initiated “in light of the constraints facing transportation funding and planning in the region.”\(^{225}\) Thus, the MCTS’s definition process “had a main objective to achieve a focused and cooperative development from various levels of government and transportation operators for freight movements.”\(^{226}\) To achieve this “cooperative development” of regional transportation, the Gateway Council struck a “Working Group and Technical Committee” that was heavily weighted with representatives from various orders of government, including representatives from the BC Ministry of Transportation and Highways, Transport Canada, the Greater Vancouver Regional District, TransLink, the Vancouver Airport Authority, and the Vancouver Port Authority.\(^{227}\)

\(^{224}\) Ibid., page 9.
\(^{225}\) Ibid., 7.
\(^{226}\) Ibid., 7.
\(^{227}\) Ibid., 8 and 19.
Shortly after the release of the MCTS in 1999, Chair of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and CEO of the Vancouver International Airport Larry Berg declared that TransLink was the only body in the Lower Mainland capable of implementing the MCTS: “TransLink is the only body with the charter to implement an MCTS - 21 Municipalities are not in a position to do it - Gateway MCTS project depends on comprehensive, long term, regional transportation plan and program for the Lower Mainland.”

The MCTS plan called for 18 infrastructure projects, including major highway upgrades, new or improved rail links and river crossings, and a new rapid transit line. Also included were improvements to an additional 34 existing roadway segments, rail facilities, and rail/road crossings. The total cost was estimated at $7.4 billion.

In 2003, the Gateway Council commissioned the Delcan Corporation to conduct an economic analysis of the Major Commercial Transportation System plan. The report, entitled “Economic Impact Analysis of Investment in a Major Commercial Transportation System for the Greater Vancouver Region,” concluded that the cost of completing the MCTS plan would “likely to exceed $6 billion (in year 2002 dollars). However, the stakes are also high. Failure to invest in the projects will have a significant long-term cost for not only the Region but all of Western Canada.”

Furthermore, according to the Delcan study, failing to invest in the MCTS would result in losses of 7,000 to 16,000 jobs by 2021, along with $475 million in GDP per

---


229 Ibid.

year, according to the report. The full social benefit of the MCTS was calculated to be $1.1 billion per year by 2021, including an increase in GDP and time saved from an uncongested road system.231

The Delcan study on the MCTS shows the careful coordination between the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and federal and provincial governments. The study includes the logos of the federal government, the federal Western Economic Diversification Canada and the provincial government. It also thanked “the tireless efforts of an advisory group”232 which includes representatives of Transport Canada, TransLink, the BC Ministry of Transportation and, of course, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

Although the Delcan report is dated July 2003, it was not publicly released until November 2003 when the federal Western Economic Diversification released a statement propounding that investments in the MCTS “are vital to the economic growth and functionality of internationally important gateways.”233 The release also states “[i]mprovements to the Major Commercial Transportation System in British Columbia are vital to the economic growth and functionality of internationally important gateways.”234 The release notes that, “The Gateway Council members have provided a bright spot in creating jobs and economic growth in B.C.’s economy.”235

With respect to the MCTS, the City of Richmond seems to have understood the importance of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as “a strong advocate of regional

231 Ibid., E-4.
232 Ibid., A-1.
235 Ibid.
infrastructure improvements to ensure the international competitiveness of the region as a major transportation gateway.” 236 The inclusion of this corridor in the MCTS would “ensure formal recognition of the need of improvements in the [sic] southeast Richmond by senior governments and private stakeholders who may play a key role in its implementation.” 237

In response to the Director of Transportation’s recommendation, Councillor Kumagai suggested that information on various warehouse developments in the area south of Nelson Road be included in correspondence to “give an overview of the truck traffic anticipated for the area” and that further information be provided “which would support the fact that Westminster Highway and Nelson Road cannot accommodate the increased traffic.” 238 The above recommendation was moved, seconded and carried.

Opening Up B.C.

In October 2003, the B.C. government released “Opening Up B.C. – A Transportation Plan for British Columbia.” “Opening Up B.C.” proposed $1.1 billion towards transportation infrastructure. It also put forward the notion of “The Gateway Transportation Strategy.” 239 Investments included the South Fraser Perimeter Road, a new crossing over the Fraser River to connect Maple Ridge with Surrey, the twinning of the Port Mann Bridge, and the “potential” North Fraser Perimeter road. 240 All of these investments in Lower Mainland infrastructure are, according to the plan, “in partnership

237 Ibid., 4.
240 Ibid., 28.
The Gateway Transportation Strategy was focused on transportation investments in the Lower Mainland, whereas the Opening Up B.C. plan had a province-wide agenda.

**Justification of the Gateway Program by the B.C. Government**

According to Pam Ryan, Director of Planning and Community Relations for the BC Government’s Gateway Program, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s MCTS study “was pretty concurrent with when we started planning for the Gateway Program, symbolized that there was absolutely a need to invest, to do some major infrastructure investment to address some of the commercial transportation challenges that we were facing. However, that definitely was not the impetus.”

When asked about which reports or studies may have been part of the impetus behind the Gateway Program, Ms. Ryan referenced three studies that prompted the government to act. The first of these “came up around 2003 when things were really gelling with some of the decision about what project to move forward with, the information that was released by Transport Canada that indicated that congestion was costing up to $1.5 billion a year was a significant piece of research.” According to Ms. Ryan, this study was conducted by Transport Canada in partnership with TransLink.

A thorough search of documents on the Gateway Program website shows a 2003 report by WESTAC, the Western Transportation Advisory Council. WESTAC membership includes transportation stakeholders and governments across Western Canada (except the BC government). The 2003 WESTAC “Opening the Arteries for

---

241 Ibid., page 33.
243 Pam Ryan, interview by author, July 13, 2009.
"Growth" report states “Transport Canada working with TransLink has estimated that traffic congestion in Greater Vancouver costs residents and businesses between $800 million and $1.2 billion annually and that cost is growing…“[b]etween 7,000 and 16,000 jobs are estimated to be associated with this lost economic activity.”

The footnote for these costs of congestion figures in the Greater Vancouver region within the WESTAC report refers to none other than the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s 2003 “Economic Impact of the Major Commercial Transportation System.” That report, prepared using data provided by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, TransLink, the BC Ministry of Transportation and Transport Canada, pegs the annual cost of congestion for the four western provinces at over $1.5 billion in lost sales by 2021.

Another document that Ms. Ryan, as a representative of the BC government’s Gateway Program, pointed to was a report from the BC Trucking Association indicating “that their members were stopped or slowed in congestion about 75% of the time and the cost to trucking and the BC trucking industry was about $500 million.”

Although a copy of this report was not publicly available, when asked Paul Landry, the President and CEO of the BC Trucking Association responded by stating that the methods and data used were “rudimentary” and he did not know where a copy of it might be found.

Probably calling it a study is putting lipstick on a pig. I see the reference to 75 percent of the time...I’m not sure where that came from. That is attributed to us, but honestly, if I had

---

246 Pam Ryan, interview by author, July 13, 2009.
to find it, I wouldn’t know where to look. Similarly with the $500 million. I think that goes back to the late 90s or early 2000s. That figures got to be 10 years old. But essentially what that was a sort of derivation.\textsuperscript{248}

Those two reports, one that appears to be from the Gateway Council \textit{et al}, and the other from the BC Trucking Association, helped provide the impetus to the BC government to move ahead with the Gateway Program.

Another document Ms. Ryan pointed to that helped the BC government with planning the Gateway Program was a 2004 BC Progress Board report entitled, “Transportation as an Economic Growth Engine.” Again, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council influenced this report. Not only is the Gateway Council’s MCTS report cited, but the BC Progress Board recommends policy changes by all orders of government in order to “[s]upport the work of the Gateway Council and consider giving it formal advisory powers to provincial and local governments.”\textsuperscript{249}

**The Livable Region Strategic Plan**

Ms. Ryan also pointed to the Livable Region Strategic Plan (LRSP) to validate at least one part of the BC government’s Gateway Program’s highway and bridge building agenda: South Fraser Perimeter Road. Developed in 1996 by the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD), the LRSP provides “the framework for making regional land use and transportation decisions in partnership with the GVRD’s member municipalities, the provincial government, and other agencies.”\textsuperscript{250} The 1996 LRSP included the South

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.
Fraser Perimeter Road in order to connect industrial areas in Langley, Surrey and Delta to Deltaport on the west coast of the region.

According to Gordon Price, former City of Vancouver Councillor, former board member on the Greater Vancouver Regional District and former TransLink director, the inclusion of the South Fraser Perimeter Road in the LRSP was that it “made sense” in order to provide a “connection between port facilities and Highway 1 south of the Fraser [River].”\textsuperscript{251} According to Price, the inclusion of the South Fraser Perimeter Road in the Livable Region Strategic Plan is “all the more reason not to build [the] Port Mann [Bridge]” because traffic originating from or destined for the port facilities at Deltaport could connect with Highway 1 without crossing the Fraser River.\textsuperscript{252}

The issue of the South Fraser Perimeter Road in the LRSP is important, as I will show later, because one of the main opponent coalitions of the Gateway Program is the Livable Region Coalition, which formed in order to “[take] a stand in favour of the Livable Region Strategic Plan, and a stand against poorly-conceived highway expansion projects and their associated land developments.”\textsuperscript{253} The fact that the South Fraser Perimeter Road is in the LRSP caused friction and ultimately disunity amongst activist groups trying to work together to stop the Gateway Program.

**Roberts Bank Rail Corridor: Road /Rail Interface Study**

One of the more recent studies the Gateway Council has participated in is the Roberts Bank Rail Corridor (RBRC): Road /Rail Interface Study. This study won the

\textsuperscript{251} Gordon Price, interview with the author, August 12, 2009.
\textsuperscript{252} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{253} Livable Region Coalition, “About Us,” \url{http://www.livableregion.ca/about.html}, (accessed October 21, 2009)
2006 Bill Curtis Technical Achievement Award from the Institute of Transportation Engineers.\textsuperscript{254}

The RBRC study was carried out by Transport Canada and sponsored by the BC Ministry of Transportation, TransLink, Transport Canada, the Vancouver Port Authority and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.\textsuperscript{255} The study was conducted between April 2006 and February 2007 with the stated goal to “improve road and rail transport infrastructure along the corridor and, by doing so, facilitate VPA growth and expansion plans at Roberts Bank.”\textsuperscript{256}

The Roberts Bank Rail Corridor is a 70 km section of rail starting at the Roberts Bank terminals in the municipality of Delta and ending near Abbotsford, BC. The RBRC crosses five municipalities and 38 at-grade roads on railway tracks controlled by three rail companies (BC Rail, CPR and CN).\textsuperscript{257}

The stated goal of the study is to “improve road and rail transport infrastructure along the corridor and, by doing so, facilitate VPA growth and expansion plans at Roberts Bank.”\textsuperscript{258} According to the study, something called the “national competitive imperative”\textsuperscript{259} is at the heart of expanding rail capacity to and from the Roberts Bank terminals:

Rapid growth in trade with Asia-Pacific economies over the last decade testifies to the continuing evolution of the global marketplace, and the increased coupling of worldwide economies. Acknowledging this reality, integration of Canadian industry into the global economy has become a competitive imperative for Canadian governments and industry. The

\textsuperscript{255} ND Lea Inc. For Transport Canada, “Roberts Bank Rail Corridor: Road/Rail Interface Study,” February 2007, ix.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., E-1.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., E-2.
prospects for the Canadian economy, and ultimately our quality-of-life, depend upon our collective ability to align with emerging global supply chain trends.\textsuperscript{260}

Due to ‘the increased coupling’ of economies around the globe and the complexity and breadth of global supply chains, all local roads must be “fully functioning in order to capture the full benefits of Asia-Pacific trade.”\textsuperscript{261} However, given the complexity of transportation systems and global supply chains, the national benefits of increased rail capacity to and from Roberts Bank are “imprecise and limited by starting assumptions.”\textsuperscript{262}

Given the “national competitive imperative” and the forecast increase in container movement through Roberts Bank, there is a “compelling business case for investment along the RBRC and elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific Gateway transport and logistics system.”\textsuperscript{263} The forecasted increased in container movement through the Roberts Bank terminal and the direct and indirect benefits of increased trade are presented in the following table.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Ibid., E-2.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Ibid., E-2.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Ibid., E-2.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Ibid., E-3.
\end{itemize}
Although the study highlights national benefits to increased local rail capacity, there are also local impacts, both positive and negative. Local negative impacts include lands removed from the Agricultural Land Reserve which may impact existing farms’ viability and reduce the amount of land available for food production.264 Some local benefits include a potential for decreased noise from train whistling and decreased car travel times due to fewer stops at rail/road crossings.

The Roberts Bank Rail Corridor Study is important because it shows the level of trust and prominence that the Gateway Council has attained with the federal government. According to the federal government, this study “clearly demonstrates the power of the gateway concept and its focus on systems and partnership. No single partner acting alone could have addressed all the interconnected issues.”265 Through this study, the Gateway Council has fulfilled a role elucidated in federal government policy: “[g]ateway councils  

265 Canada, “Roberts Bank Rail Corridor,” May 29, 2007, 1  
and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building, planning, sound governance and accountability are also key to advancing regional strategies with national benefits."\textsuperscript{266}

This study is important for several reasons. Firstly, it shows how far decision-making power has been taken away from a local context to a national/global perspective. The ‘national competitive imperative’ dictates the near complete abandonment of local concerns or issues in order to “capture the full benefits of Asia-Pacific trade.”\textsuperscript{267} Casual readers are reminded, in this study, that “ultimately our quality-of-life depends upon our collective ability to align with emerging global supply chain trends.”\textsuperscript{268}

Furthermore, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s role in this study shows the level to which the group has ascended with respect to regional infrastructure research and planning. If what the study’s authors write is true, that “ultimately our quality-of-life”\textsuperscript{269} might depend on these infrastructure improvements, then the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council is an important organization indeed.

Finally, in terms of the history of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, things appear to have gone full-circle. The progenitor group of the Gateway Council, the Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway, formed in 1987 due to a waterfront management/labour impasse related to the trade of containerized cargo through Vancouver’s ports.\textsuperscript{270} The Round Table coalesced “[i]n a] collective effort to formulate strategies and initiate action for solving problems and developing opportunities for international trade through the west coast.”\textsuperscript{271} With the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

\textsuperscript{266} Canada, \textit{National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors}, 5.
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., E-2.
\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., E-2.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., E-2.
\textsuperscript{270} See Chapter 3 - The History, Makeup and Behaviour of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.
Council’s central role in the Roberts Bank Rail Corridor Study, the group garnered the opportunity to fulfill that role.

The formation of the Gateway Council and their use of reports and studies appears to have had a great influence on governments’ decisions with respect to transportation infrastructure in general and the Gateway Program in particular. The content, if not the spirit, of the Gateway Council’s reports and studies were used by various orders of government, the regional district and the regional transportation authority in order to justify investment in Gateway Program infrastructure projects. Some of the Gateway Council’s studies and reports were used verbatim in TransLink and provincial and federal government reports used to justify investment in transportation infrastructure related to the Gateway Program (see Appendix A – Table of Gateway Council Documents and Excerpts used in Reports or Studies).

Of the three reports cited by Pam Ryan, Director of Planning and Community Relations for the BC Government’s Gateway Program, that helped prompt the provincial government to launch the Gateway Program, all have been shaped in some way by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

Furthermore, the City of Richmond viewed the Gateway Council as a de facto decision making body. Appealing to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council to include the Blundell/Nelson Road corridor in the MCTS because of anticipating increases in truck traffic from new warehouse development in the area despite the fact that “Westminster Highway and Nelson Road cannot accommodate the increased traffic” shows that Richmond Councilors and planners viewed the Gateway Council as

---

controlling the space of decision-making. As Director of Transportation Gordon Chan stated in his report to the Richmond Public Works and Transportation Committee, inclusion of this stretch of road in the *Major Commercial Transportation System* would “ensure formal recognition of the need of improvements in the southeast Richmond by senior governments and private stakeholders who may play a key role in its implementation.”

With their reports and studies, the Gateway Council has moved beyond the role of lobbyist of governments to resource of governments. According to Bob Wilds, Managing Director of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, the use of reports and studies is a crucial part of the Council’s activities:

> We don’t lobby, we do studies and we get assistance from them [governments] to do studies and we make those studies public. When we get a study that has recommendations in it, we pursue the recommendations. If you call that lobbying, then I guess that’s lobbying. But when they help us pay for studies, I guess they’re helping us define what we need, then we just go out and try to get what we need.

Greater Vancouver Gateway Council studies have moved beyond tools used to lobby governments to become tools used *by* governments. If governments help the Gateway Council define what the Gateway Council ‘needs,’ then governments are effectively setting the Gateway Council as a proxy of already-establish government plans or directions. If this is the case, then the independence and validity of Gateway Council studies may be questioned. Rather than a source of objective analysis of transportation infrastructure needs in the B.C.’s Lower Mainland, if Bob Wilds’ assertion is true, then the Gateway Council is acting as a validator of infrastructure plans already under consideration by various orders of government.

---

273 Ibid., 4
274 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009
Looking back at the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s MCTS report, many of the major new road, rail and rapid transit infrastructure projects called for in the report have either been built or are in the process of being built (see Appendix B – List of Gateway Council’s MCTS Major Network Investments). The Gateway Council notes (my bold):

With the exceptions of the Massey Tunnel, Blundell connection to Highway 99 and improvement to Highway 17 from the Tsawwassen Ferry Terminal to Highway 99, identified MCTS road investments have been incorporated into the Province of British Columbia’s Gateway Program and/or TransLink’s Major Road Network projects over the next decade.²⁷⁵

The MCTS study was “a major impetus for moving governments”²⁷⁶ to invest in road, rail and bridge infrastructure related to the Gateway Program, according to the Gateway Council’s Bob Wilds. The power of the study lies in the use of studies and reports to get the public’s attention, which in turn affects government decision making: “I don’t think we had anything that was earth-shatteringly new...we got the public’s attention, which obviously gets governments’ attention, the importance of making these investments and the consequences of not and how much this gateway really generated in economic revenue for this province and this region.”²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009
²⁷⁷ Ibid.
CHAPTER 5 – OPPOSITION TO THE GATEWAY PROGRAM

Despite the successes of the anti-freeway activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, present-day anti-Gateway Program activists have not been able to stop freeway expansion. There are several reasons why the successes of the freeway fight of 1969-1970 did not translate into successful opposition to the Gateway Program in the last few years. Unlike the freeway fight of 40 years ago, opponents of the Gateway Program have not been able to build a coalition of sufficient size and diversity, especially with political parties, to put enough pressure on governments for them to give up highway expansion plans. In fact, more than one coalition has formed with different agendas and at times working at cross-purposes. Generally speaking, activists and communities north of the Fraser River have joined the Livable Region Coalition. Again, generally speaking, south of the Fraser River activists have rallied around the Gateway 40 group. Other individual groups also abound. Rather than a unified and truly regional coalition fighting the Gateway Program agenda as a regional transportation program, disparate groups, individual communities and a couple of coalitions fight based on their individual agendas. An effect of the anti-freeway movement in the late-60s/early-70s was the regionalization of issues ‘livability’ through the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Ironically, the regionalization of some of the issues around livability was also an obstacle to the formation of a region-wide coalition of anti-Gateway Program activists. Today’s activists still focus very much on the local: local negative impacts and pressure on local politicians. This tactic has limited impact on regional transportation infrastructure plans.
that run over several municipalities. The South Fraser Perimeter Road’s inclusion in the Livable Region Strategic Plan (LRSP) helped negate the chance for a unified opposition to the Gateway Program as some activists and groups were bound by funding to support the LRSP. Furthermore, in the story of opposition to the Gateway Program, personality matters. Key personalities and personality conflicts appear to have also helped negate the chance for a unified opposition.

The very nature of the Gateway Program itself has determined some of the disunity amongst activists and activist groups. The successes of the late 1960s and early 1970s were built on tactics perhaps best suited to a strictly single municipality. The regional aspect of the Gateway Program and the inclusion of two of the three component parts of the Gateway Program in the Livable Region Strategic Plan appear to have severely undermined the effectiveness of opposition.

There are politicians that oppose the BC government’s Gateway Program, of course, but these politicians tend to be either locally constrained or marginalized in terms of their access to power. For example, some of the most fervent opposition from politicians to the Gateway Program are in Delta, B.C., perhaps because this municipality will see negative local effects associated with industrial projects, like increased noise and pollution related to port and highway development. However, these politicians either cannot sway their party to oppose the Gateway Program, as in the case with federal Conservative John Cummins (Delta-Richmond), or do not have access to a party, as in the case with Independent MLA Vicki Huntington (Delta South).

The Greater Vancouver Regional District (Metro Vancouver) gave the Gateway Program only qualified support. While Metro Vancouver opposed the widening of the
Port Mann Bridge and Highway 1 as this project was “inconsistent with the Livable Region Strategic Plan, and therefore the GVRD Board urges the Minister to accept the foregoing measures as constructive proposals to attempt to accommodate the Minister’s program within the spirit of the Livable Region Strategic Plan (LRSP) and the Sustainable Region Initiative (SRI) and align regional and provincial perspectives and interests, and avoid the divisive conflict which would otherwise result.” However, despite objections to that particular project, Metro Vancouver wished to “work cooperatively” with the Minister of Transportation on the implementation of the provincial Gateway Program.

Provincial NDP MLA Guy Genter (Delta North) has been a vocal opponent of the Gateway Program, but his party has been reluctant to fully oppose or support the Gateway Program. Initial opposition by the NDP under current leader Carole James has changed over time to become tacit support of the government’s plans. Part of this reluctance may stem from the NDP government’s decision under Premier Mike Harcourt to commit to the South Fraser Perimeter Road.

**The Freeway Fight of the 1960s**

There has been an important history in the Vancouver region of opposition to freeway developments. In the late 1960s, Vancouver residents mobilized to oppose a “‘slum-clearance’ project that had been underway in Strathcona for neatly ten years.”

---


279 Ibid.

In the autumn of 1968, some Strathcona residents were informed that several blocks of their neighbourhood would be demolished to make way for social housing and a massive elevated freeway. The plan was to replace entire blocks of “charming shiplap turn-of-the-century workers’ housing...with concrete row houses and apartments” and freeway running through the area to the Burrard Inlet waterfront where drivers might cross to the North Shore via a proposed third crossing. The social housing aspect of the scheme was supported by the federal government of the day through urban renewal and public housing funding.

Business interests, including the CPR, together with the City of Vancouver and the National Harbours Board had been trying to build freeways through and around Vancouver, but were stymied by a hostile public and unhelpful provincial and federal governments. However, in 1964, amendments to the *National Housing Act* allowed the federal government to contribute funding to transportation aspect of so-called urban renewal projects. With funding all but secured for a major redevelopment and elevated highway project, the City of Vancouver began planning an east-west freeway as part of the redevelopment of the Strathcona area.

The plan, unveiled in 1967, would require the demolition of 600 homes and would put an eight-lane, 61-metre wide, 9-metre tall freeway through the Western edge of Chinatown between the Georgia Viaduct and a freeway over the CPR’s track on the waterfront. Intense public pressure against the freeway mounted throughout 1967 until

---

281 Ibid., 33.
284 Ibid., 154.
285 Ibid., 154.
finally, in January 1968, Vancouver council gave up on plans for the freeway through Chinatown, but approved the Georgia and Dunsmuir viaducts.\textsuperscript{287}

Public pressure succeeded in overturning freeway and urban renewal plans because of several factors. Between 1967 and 1968 there was a large uprising of citizen opposition “when a number of separate concerns and issues coalesced...The major issues which just seemed to arise one after the other included the urban renewal of Strathcona, the freeway through Chinatown...and the third crossing of Burrard Inlet.”\textsuperscript{288} This public pressure was characterized by large-scale, vocal and prolonged opposition at city council meetings and public rallies.

Furthermore, existing community groups such as the Grandview-Woodwards Area Council (GWAC), and newly formed groups such as the Strathcona Property Owners and Tenants Association (SPOTA), embarked on successful lobbying campaigns directed at municipal, provincial and federal governments.\textsuperscript{289} The lobbying campaign had at its core an alternative to the urban renewal and freeway plans. SPOTA produced an alternative plan which hinged on a residential redevelopment program, which would be the first of its kind in Canada.\textsuperscript{290} The lobbying campaign was particularly successful at the federal level with Prime Minister Trudeau’s Transport Minister Paul Hellyer. Hon. Hellyer quickly saw “the logic of rehabilitation rather than bulldozer renewal”\textsuperscript{291} and recommended a freeze on all urban renewal projects in Canada.\textsuperscript{292} As for other orders of government, the province of British Columbia, the Minister of Municipal Affairs Dan

---

\textsuperscript{287} Mike Harcourt and Ken Cameron with Sean Rossiter, \textit{City Making in Paradise}, 52.
\textsuperscript{288} Donald Gutstein, \textit{Vancouver Ltd.}, 153.
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 159
\textsuperscript{290} Mike Harcourt and Ken Cameron with Sean Rossiter, \textit{City Making in Paradise}, 49.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 50.
Campbell supported SPOTA’s alternative plan.\textsuperscript{293} It was only the municipal government that remained firmly on the freeway and urban renewal bandwagon. As a reaction to the unresponsiveness of Vancouver’s Non-Partisan Association (NPA) government, anti-freeway activists formed The Electors Action Movement (TEAM) party.

TEAM members included Darlene Marzari and Mike Harcourt, both intimately involved in the anti-freeway fight. The TEAM slate nearly wiped the NPA from council after 36 years in power.\textsuperscript{294} Harcourt became mayor of Vancouver in 1981 until 1987. In 1991, Harcourt became premier of the province under the New Democratic Party banner. Marzari was elected in 1986 and 1991 as the NDP MLA for Vancouver-Point Grey. She served as the Minister of Municipal Affairs from 1993 to 1996.

Hundreds of Vancouverites became involved in activism and protest because they did not want to see the central areas of their city bulldozed to make way for elevated highways, as they’d witnessed in nearby Seattle and Portland. TEAM formed as a direct response to this issue.\textsuperscript{295}

However, the movement soon transcended these issues. The formation and subsequent election of TEAM signalled a change in the political dynamic not only in Vancouver proper, but also the region as a whole. TEAM formed as a reaction to the NPA’s “non-partisan/expert elitist authoritarianism”\textsuperscript{296} style of urban planning. TEAM members and supporters wanted to replace this style with a model that included community input and participatory planning.

\textsuperscript{293} Donald Gutstein, \textit{Vancouver Ltd.}, 159.
\textsuperscript{295} Donald Gutstein, \textit{Vancouver Ltd.}, 153.
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid., 183.
Moreover, however, the activism and protest that led to TEAM was a reaction by Vancouver citizens to get rid of the top-down expert bureaucrat tradition at city hall that refused to take into account social, environmental and aesthetic aspects of transportation plans.\(^{297}\)

The shift in planning priorities and approaches that the election of TEAM over the NPA lead to are still evidenced today, and not only in the distinction of Vancouver being one of the few North American cities without a freeway cutting through its downtown.

At the regional level, attempts were made to include residents in planning processes. In 1973, Harry Lash, senior planner with the Greater Vancouver Regional District, began work on a “Livable Region” plan as an attempt to involve the public in identifying planning issues and alternative futures for the region. Lash and the GVRD used meetings with formal organizations and advisory panels to find out how the region’s citizens viewed their region and their vision for its future.\(^{298}\) Lash’s hitherto untested citizen engagement surprised planners by what the public wanted: “The hard kernel of public opinion was, ‘A resistance to further rapid growth, a concern for personal livability, a desire to participate in community decisions, and a wish to see action.’”\(^{299}\)

Federally, resistance from low- and middle-income residents to urban renewal and displacement due to freeway development became so strong that the government abandoned these grandiose schemes. By 1972, Urban renewal programs were replaced with neighbourhood improvement and residential rehabilitation programs, as well as

programs to support non-profit and cooperative housing. Unfortunately, Canada’s national housing program was abandoned in the process.

At the local neighbourhood level, the freeway fight of the late 1960s forged new alliances and formed new community groups that are still active to this day. The Grandview-Woodlands Council (GWAC) was formed to oppose the freeway proposal in the late 1960s. GWAC is still active today in opposing the Gateway Program. In the early 1970s, after a successful fight against Toronto’s Spadina Freeway and New York’s Lower Manhattan Freeway, Jane Jacobs came to Vancouver to share her expertise with Marzari and Harcourt as the revitalization of Strathcona began under a TEAM city hall. Ned Jacobs, Jane’s son, is very active in present-day anti-freeway and sustainable transportation activist circles in Vancouver.

Provincially, in 1995, Darlene Marzari, as Minister of Municipal Affairs, saw the Growth Strategies Statutes Amendment Act become law. This legislation “was designed to help regions accommodate population growth through coordinated planning. The Act aimed to strike a balance between municipal autonomy and regional interests through a framework of mutual respect and dispute resolution.” The Growth Strategies Statutes Amendment Act was an attempt by the NDP government to strengthen regional planning institutions after the Social Credit government eliminated those institutions’ planning powers in 1983.

300 John Punter, The Vancouver Achievement, xxiii.
301 Mike Harcourt and Ken Cameron with Sean Rossiter, City Making in Paradise, 53.
The NDP and Elements of the Gateway Program

After the launch of the Gateway Program in 2006, Carole James, Leader of the NDP, declared that the Port Mann Bridge was “...the wrong plan, it’s the wrong direction, it’s the wrong bridge.” 304 Furthermore, the party’s provincial council passed a resolution declaring, “…that the BC NDP oppose the Campbell government’s Gateway Program...[and] that the BC NDP propose an alternative to The Gateway Program, that reflects the principles of Sustainable BC.” 305

During the 2009 election, James and the NDP released a statement that, “The NDP has been clear that we will not cancel the Port Mann bridge.” 306 This prompted columnists to declare that “It is hard to imagine a more scatterbrained approach to transportation policy than the position taken by NDP leader Carole James on the provincial government’s Gateway Project.” 307

Eric Doherty, an activist with the Livable Region Coalition said James’ apparent support of the Port Mann Bridge project was “disappointing. But it also raises questions about whether they [NDP] are serious about tackling climate change, and also whether they are really serious about creating jobs in B.C. Jobs in the automobile sector are about exporting jobs out of the country and out of the province.” 308

Something that the columnists, and perhaps Carole James herself, forgot to mention is the fact that drive for these road and bridge elements goes back well before the

307 The Province,” NDP Opposition to twinning Port Mann Bridge is off track,” The Province, A20
formal launch of the Gateway Program in 2006 and the pre-2001 NDP government supported elements of today’s Gateway Program, such as the expansion of the Port Mann Bridge and the South Fraser Perimeter Road. This is part of the reason why opponents to the Gateway Program have not been able to garner complete support from today’s NDP Opposition, though individual MLAs have lent support.

In the late 1980s, the Fraser River Harbour Commission began “assembling lands along the waterfront in eastern Delta [along River Road] to permit them to provide additional deep sea terminals well into the next century.” 309 By 1993, the Fraser River Harbour Commission began lobbying federal, provincial and municipal governments on the South Fraser Perimeter Road. Government reacted favourably to the Harbour Commission’s lobbying for the South Fraser Perimeter Road. 310 The Corporation of Delta and the Vancouver Port Authority also asked the provincial NDP government to invest in the South Fraser Perimeter Road as early as 1991. 311

By 1995, NDP Premier Mike Harcourt, who was active against freeway expansion in Vancouver during the freeway fight of the 1960s, mused about private-public partnerships (P3s) to build several large infrastructures in the province, including two of the three elements of the Gateway Program: the South Fraser Perimeter Road and Port Mann Bridge/Highway 1 expansion. Premier Harcourt made these musings at a meeting sponsored by the B.C. Road Builders and Highway Construction Association and the provincial government. At the meeting, on the P3 and tolling option for highway expansion, the Premier is quoted as saying, “There is an inevitable choice: either you pay

as you go on user pay now or you sit in gridlock for 20 years. Do you want to wait 20 years or do you want to get building now?"³¹²

A few months later, on June 5, 1995, the Liberal Opposition accused the NDP government of foot-dragging on twinning the Port Mann Bridge and prophetically asked, “Will it fall to a Liberal government to finish it...?"³¹³

By 1996, Glen Clark had taken over as leader of the NDP after Harcourt resigned as leader of the party. The NDP returned to power with a majority government after the general election of that year. However, investment in the constituent parts of today’s Gateway Program was not taken up in earnest by the NDP government. In 2001, a Liberal government led by Gordon Campbell formed government. Closer to today, NDP gave only tepid support for some of the regional transportation infrastructure projects included in the Gateway Program years. This may be because of the NDP government’s support, under Mike Harcourt, of the South Fraser Perimeter Road and Port Mann Bridge/Highway 1 expansion.

Nevertheless, in 1999, Premier Clark committed $74 million to support the expansion of one lane on the Port Mann Bridge to bring the total number of lanes to five.³¹⁴ Work on that expansion was completed in 2001. Premier Clark also directed the Greater Vancouver Transit Authority (TransLink) to begin preliminary engineering for the alignment in 1999 with a budget of $640,000.³¹⁵

³¹² Harold Munro, “Private developers pondered by Victoria; Partners,” The Vancouver Sun, April 26, 1995, B1.
³¹⁴ Lori Culbert, “Premier turns the spotlight on to traffic improvements,” The Vancouver Sun, March 12, 1999, A1.
Localized Opposition to the Gateway Program

Local politicians in Delta, B.C. have been amongst the strongest critics of the Gateway Program. One of the area’s most vocal opponents of the Gateway Program has been former Delta City Councillor Vicki Huntington. In the 2009 provincial election, Huntington successfully ran as an independent, campaigning vigorously against several infrastructure projects affecting Delta including the expansion of the Roberts Bank container terminal and construction of the South Fraser Perimeter Road.

Since the provincial election, Huntington has maintained pressure against the Gateway Program in general and the South Fraser Perimeter Road, part of which runs through her constituency, in particular. She’s done this by participating in anti-Gateway Program town hall meetings hosted by the Livable Region Coalition and other activist groups, and by maintaining a media presence against the Gateway Program.

With the South Fraser Perimeter Road project, Huntington has targeted for criticism not only the federal and provincial governments as proponents, but also the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. Huntington says, “The road doesn’t have the necessity for moving goods that [Greater Vancouver] Gateway Council has pretended that it has, and I tend to agree with those people who think that the primary reason for the road is a behind-the-scenes effort to develop land.”

In a Delta town hall meeting, Huntington said the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council “is a group of private industrial interests that have redefined the transportation corridors in this region with no reference to the people or their local governments.”

Local MP John Cummins (Delta-Richmond), of the governing federal Conservative Party, who endorsed Huntington in the last provincial election, has also been vocal about his opposition to the Gateway Program. “Quality of life is being sacrificed in communities south of the Fraser River as the federal and provincial governments push ahead with the Asia Pacific Gateway Corridor project,” he wrote in a 2007 mail-out to residents in his riding. Nevertheless, despite Cummins’ protests, the federal government remains committed to the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative.

The Livable Region Strategic Plan and the Livable Region Coalition

The Livable Region Strategic Plan (LRSP) supports the construction of the South Fraser Perimeter Road. For the purpose of this study, this is important not only because of the general political milieu that it was born from, but also because the LRSP is a policy of the Board of the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) and is implemented through the delivery of regional services and through working with other orders of government.

318 Sandor Gyarmati, “Huntington endorsed by MP,” The Delta Optimist, Saturday, May 9, 2009, 3
Work on the Livable Region Strategic Plan began in 1989 and it was adopted in 1996. Prior to 1995, it was assumed that compliance with the plan would on a voluntary basis only. However, with the passage of the *Growth Strategies Statutes Amendment Act*, municipalities were now required to respect the regional plans, as defined by the act, in their official community plans. Region plans were required to take into account provincial goals, such as minimizing sprawl and protecting natural areas. The province, in turn, was required to align public investment and other decisions with regional plans.321 This model of local, regional and provincial cooperation led to the Greater Vancouver Regional District’s Livable Region Strategic Plan that is in place now.

The LRSP’s purpose is to help the regional government of BC’s Lower Mainland realize the following vision through land use and transportation development:

Greater Vancouver can become the first urban region in the world to combine in one place the things to which humanity aspires on a global basis: a place where human activities enhance rather than degrade the natural environment, where the quality of the built environment approaches that of the natural setting, where the diversity of origins and religions is a source of social strength rather than strife, where people control the destiny of their community, and where the basics of food, clothing, shelter, security and useful activity are accessible to all.322

The “four fundamental strategies” of the LRSP are to protect the green zone, build complete communities, achieve a compact metropolitan region and increase transportation choice.323 The LRSP’s transportation policy guides the GVRD board to “assign priority for increased roadway capacities first to high occupancy vehicles, goods movements, inter-regional movements and then single-occupant automobiles.”324

There appears to be general acceptance of the LRSP’s four pillars by the Vancouver region’s environmental and sustainable transportation activist communities.

---

321 Ibid., 7.
322 Ibid., 18.
323 Ibid., 18-19.
324 Ibid., 23.
and groups. Indeed, one of the region’s more active groups, the Livable Region Coalition, was formed not only to oppose the Gateway Program, but also to uphold the principles of the Livable Region Strategic Plan.\textsuperscript{325} Formed in late 2004, this coalition of academics, individuals and community and environmentalist groups, believes “that the provincial government’s freeway expansion proposal is a serious threat to the quality of life in the Lower Mainland and Fraser Valley.”\textsuperscript{326} Furthermore, the province’s plan to expand highways “threatens to undermine the successes of the GVRD’s Livable Region Strategic Plan.”\textsuperscript{327}

There is an impressive spectrum of academics, politicians, activists, and groups promoting environmentalism, and sustainable transportation involved in the Livable Region Coalition. In fact, some of same communities and activists (or their progeny) involved in the freeway fight in Vancouver of the late 1960s and early 1970s are also active in this coalition. One of the founding ‘partners’ of the Livable Region Coalition is the Grandview-Woodlands Area Council.\textsuperscript{328} Ned Jacobs, son of Jane Jacobs, the urbanist and anti-freeway crusader, is also a member.

\textbf{Disconnected Opposition}

After the provincial government announced the Gateway Program, there was a concerted effort to unite the burgeoning opposition movement under a single banner. According to Ned Jacobs, there were a few camps of opponents to the Gateway Program, some with different reasons.

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{328} Ben West, interview with author, Vancouver, B.C., August 1, 2009.
The people who oppose the port expansion and the people who were beginning to oppose the SFPR in South Delta and who were organizing with land owners whose farmland was in the way, I just thought that there was a really strong need to combine these fights and oppose the Gateway and get a coalition going that would be much broader than it was.\textsuperscript{329}

According to Jacobs, organizing the activists into a unified whole was slow going at first because of the disparate nature of the opponents and the nature of local benefits or negative effects. For example, some activists were against the Port Mann Bridge/Highway 1 expansion, but were in favour of the South Fraser Perimeter Road because of the road’s inclusion in the Livable Region Strategic Plan. Jacobs met with NDP environment critic Shane Simpson (Vancouver-Hastings) to discuss the Gateway Program. According to Jacobs, Simpson was “Ok with the South Fraser Perimeter Road because it would take traffic out of his neighbourhood. He was diplomatic but I could see he wasn’t sold on it [opposing the Gateway Program].”\textsuperscript{330}

South of the Fraser River, the various groups opposing the Gateway Program were organized under one umbrella by Donna Passmore, according to Jacobs. North of the Fraser River, The Western Canada Wilderness Committee (now simply the Wilderness Committee) and the Society Promoting Environmental Conservation (SPEC) began organizing against the Gateway Program.

SPEC, however, was hamstrung by their funding arrangements against campaigning against the entire Gateway Program. Organizer Dave Fields was hired by SPEC using funding from the U.S.-based Bullitt Foundation which is devoted to sustainable development in the Cascadia region of the northwest United States and

\textsuperscript{329} Ned Jacobs, interview with author, Vancouver, B.C., October 12, 2009.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
southwest Canada.\textsuperscript{331} The Bullitt Foundation granted SPEC $25,000 in 2007 “to continue building a diverse coalition to advocate for transit and oppose efforts to widen Highway 1 and build a second bridge across the Fraser River in the rapidly growing Lower Mainland area of Vancouver.”\textsuperscript{332} Although SPEC and the Wilderness Committee did participate in anti-Gateway events in Delta\textsuperscript{333}, SPEC had to stay focussed on opposing the Port Mann Bridge/Highway 1 expansion rather than the SFPR or the entire Gateway Program.\textsuperscript{334}

Other attempts to form a united coalition of opponents of freeway expansion in the Lower Mainland were reportedly further stymied by personality conflicts between Donna Passmore of the Gateway 40 and David Fields of SPEC.\textsuperscript{335}

Local activists have applied similar tactics in their bid to stop freeway expansion today as they did in the past, yet, thus far, these tactics have been unsuccessful in stopping the Gateway Program. During Vancouver’s freeway fight of the 1960s, public pressure succeeded in overturning freeway and urban renewal plans because of large-scale public protests, activists united in their cause and strong support from at least one vigourous opposition political party.

Anti-Gateway Program activists have enjoyed a considerable amount of success in terms of explaining to the public the negative impacts associated with the Gateway Program, and this success is acknowledged by the public relations firm hired by the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{331} The Bullitt Foundation, “Bullitt Foundation Vision,” \url{http://bullitt.org/who-we-are} (accessed Feb. 9, 2010).
\bibitem{333} For example, see Stopgateway.ca, “A Day to Stop Gateway,” Sat., Sept. 29, 2007, \url{http://www.stopgateway.ca/Sept292007.htm} (accessed Feb. 9, 2010).
\bibitem{334} Ned Jacobs, interview with author, October 12, 2009.
\bibitem{335} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
Greater Vancouver Gateway Council to promote the Gateway Program. Furthermore, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, the BC Trucking Association and the BC Road and Highway Builders’ Association engaged in two ‘astroturf’ operations against opponents of the Gateway Program, perhaps a testament to the success of opposition groups in their media relations efforts.

Anti-Gateway Program activists have also enjoyed considerable success in gaining support of local Delta politicians, including Independent MLA Vicki Huntington (Delta South), federal Conservative MP John Cummins (Deltla-Richmond East) and provincial NDP MLA Guy Gentner (Delta North). However, aside from MLA Vicki Huntington who does not have a party, those politicians’ political parties have not opposed the Gateway Program.

Yet, despite these successes, the Gateway Program remains a key part of the B.C. government’s plan to “create new arteries of commerce and reduce travel times, congestion and emissions.” The regional nature of the Gateway Program, and the local tactics used by activists against it, appears to have a great deal to do with the reason why the Gateway Program remains a key part of the provincial government’s agenda. The Gateway Program is made up of three projects across Vancouver’s Lower Mainland, including the South Fraser Perimeter Road which is in the Liveable Region Strategic Plan. SPEC received funding to fight against only the expansion of Highway 1 and the Port Mann Bridge. Ostensibly the Liveable Region Coalition would be in favour of the South Fraser Perimeter Road as this project was included in the Livable Region Strategic

---

337 British Columbia, Lieutenant Governor Hon. Steve L. Point, Speech from the Throne, Tuesday, February 9, 2010.
Plan, the principles of which the LRC is dedicated to upholding. However, the LRC counters that the Gateway Program “is a direct attack on the Livable Region Strategic Plan” and it contradicts the stated goal of reducing vehicle emissions and vehicle kilometres travelled.

To date, opponents to expanded road and bridge capacity in the Lower Mainland have failed to affect governments’ determination to go ahead with the Gateway Program. However, the province’s Gateway Program is not a ‘done deal,’ despite assurances by the provincial government and other transportation stakeholders to the contrary. At the time of writing, a final design/build/finance/operate contract for the South Fraser Perimeter Road has yet to be finalized, although initial construction work on the Road has begun. Furthermore, although the provincial government’s Speech from the Throne promises support for the Gateway Program, provincial finances remain tight and the chosen proponent of the South Fraser Perimeter Road is expected to both commit to a price for the project and confirm the sources of their funding.

---

CHAPTER 6 – NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY

Part of the narrative of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s apparent success in controlling their particular space of dependence, as defined by certain commercially important regional transportation fixtures, and their particular space of engagement (federal, provincial and regional governments), is the tenor and tone of federal transportation policies set forth by the government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Yet, these policies can be viewed as part of a trend, a trend that has gained importance with the increasing importance of intermodal freight transportation over the last seven decades.

In October 2006, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper launched the Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative with an initial announcement of $591 million in federal funding for transportation infrastructure projects across Canada’s western province. The next year, the government released a “National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Corridors.”

Policies to be pursued by the federal government include increased international marketing, amalgamation of the Vancouver region’s three adjacent port authorities, and the development of “gateway councils and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building” in jurisdictions across Canada. An example used by the

342 Ibid., pages 11 and 12.
government to show “that competitors can work together to improve the transportation system” was a 2006 “co-production” agreement between Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) to share services and lines in the Lower Mainland, “enhancing service for rail customers and supporting the growth of Pacific Gateway ports and terminals.”343

Yet, looking back at national transportation policy since the 1930s, many of these policy changes have either occurred in the past or have been called for in the past either by national commissions or by transportation stakeholders themselves.

Furthermore, throughout the fabric of national transportation policy, the threads of competition and cooperation warp and weave; the importance of one over the other, or in various combinations, has shifted. It should be noted that the terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ are not mutually exclusive. At times, these notions have intermingled, for example in the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s “unified competitiveness strategy”344 whereby competing transportation stakeholders seemingly agree to work together for shared benefit.

Transportation may have been the most important factor in the history and development of Canada as a nation. There are myriad examples of how transportation brought settlement, development and political integration to the corners of our nation. However, the role of transportation has shifted in the last few decades from a policy tool

used for nation-building to a much narrower, though some may say equally important, tool for economic development.\textsuperscript{345}

The evolution of federal transportation policy and legislation can be characterized as promoting monopolies in the late 1800s\textsuperscript{346}, to promoting competition \textit{between} transportation modes starting roughly after the Second World War. From WWII to the mid-1980s, national transportation policy trended towards the promotion of competition \textit{within} transportation modes. Lately, the federal government has sought policies that promote “consensus…and opportunities across all modes of transportation.”\textsuperscript{347} This evolution will go a long way in explaining the apparent prominence of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council “representing the major transportation interests in the Greater Vancouver region”\textsuperscript{348} in federal policy and decision-making.

This chapter will show the evolution and development of national transportation policy, with an eye particularly on inter-modal freight policies and recommendations. As intermodal transportation has gained importance in the Canadian economy and political landscape, the calls for organizations such as the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council have gained volume.

\textbf{Trucking Undermines Canada’s Rail Monopolies in the ‘30s}

The Canadian transportation landscape was, for all practical purposes, mono-modal until the 1930s. Leaving aside government attempts to “rid Western Canada of CPR


\textsuperscript{346} Canada, \textit{100 Years at the Heart of Transportation: A Centennial Historical Perspective of the Canadian Transportation Agency and its Predecessors}, (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004), 8.

\textsuperscript{347} Canada, \textit{Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative}, 15.

monopolies”349 and “to protect the public from the arbitrary and harmful consequences of the railway freedom and recklessness which had characterized the latter half of the 19th century,”350 the only real challenge to railway monopolies occurred in the 1930s with increased competition from air and truck transport amidst a slumping economy of the Great Depression.

Railway companies in the 1930s were, for the first time, challenged by direct competition from automobiles and aircraft due to a rapid expansion of the nation’s highway system and the introduction of regular national airline services.351

As a result of increased competition and slumping passenger and cargo revenues during the ‘Dirty Thirties,’ Parliament passed the Canadian National – Canadian Pacific Act which, among other things, directed the two railway companies to cooperate for the good of the national economy. A 1931 Order in Council encapsulated the government’s motives behind the legislation:

Having regard to the vital importance of transportation to the trade and commerce of Canada, the serious and continuing deficits of the Canadian National Railways System, and the diminishing revenues of the Canadian Pacific Railway system, conditions which have been brought about in part by duplication of tracks, facilities and services of every kind and in part by competition by other modes of transportation, particularly motor vehicles operating on highways, the Ministers concur with the proposal that the whole subject be studied by Commissions with the powers hereinafter set forth. 352

The Act contained provisions directing the two companies to cooperate by sharing each other’s lines, cooperate on line abandonments to minimize passengers being stranded, and arbitration was to be used for cases of disagreement on matters of cooperation. Since both companies had extensive holdings other than railroads, like hotels, they were directed by the

351 Ibid., 7.
government to cooperate on those things as well. The Act forbade the two companies from merging.\textsuperscript{353}

The \textit{Canadian National – Canadian Pacific Act} of 1933 was not a rousing success. Between 1933 and 1939, there were “some line abandonments, joint freight and passenger facilities, running rights and haulage of freight without line abandonment and certain miscellaneous projects including joint operation by the two companies of the Vancouver Hotel.”\textsuperscript{354}

However, with the outbreak of World War II in 1939, CN and the CPR found themselves in a profitable position once again and “consideration of co-operative projects of any consequence ceased.”\textsuperscript{355}

Although today’s federal government has not publicly considered forced cooperation between rail companies, cooperation between them is nonetheless celebrated. On January 26, 2006, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railway announced a rail sharing agreement centred on both the Roberts Bank terminal and Burrard Inlet rail traffic.\textsuperscript{356} The federal government heralded this agreement showing “that competitors can work together to improve the transportation system.”\textsuperscript{357}

This idea of ‘competitors work together,’ especially rail companies operating in the Vancouver region, is echoed by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. In their 2004 Lower Mainland Rail Infrastructure Study, the Council notes that railways “are

\textsuperscript{354} Royal Commission on Transportation, Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation, (Ottawa: King’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1951), 221.
\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 220.
competitors on a North American scale…and they work together by necessity rather than by choice.”  

The study notes that while this sort of cooperation between railways “requires to some degrees a loss of autonomy and reduction of traditional competitive behavior,” parties can work together “seeking a common set of goals related to economic trade development.”

**Sir Gibb’s National Port Survey**

Due to the general decline in freight traffic in Canada in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Dominion government commissioned a *National Ports Survey*. Between 1931 and 1932, Sir Alexander Gibb conducted the Survey because, among other things, “the central Government of Canada has been more closely concerned with transportation questions than in many countries… the whole system has required and still requires subsidization to a vast extent.”

In the Vancouver region, Gibb expressed concern that Fraser River ports were being subsidized over and above Vancouver’s port on the Burrard Inlet with tax dollars for wharf repairs, dredging and reclamation work. Gibb found “the situation [was] entirely unsatisfactory…and if it were allowed to develop would be intolerable.”

His solution was two-fold. Firstly, develop Fraser River ports as predominantly lumber oriented. This would involve moving Burrard Inlet’s lumber industry to the

---

359 Ibid., 80.
360 Ibid., 91.
361 Dominion of Canada, “National Ports Survey 1931-32” (Ottawa: Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1932), 9.
362 Ibid., 168.
Fraser River. Vancouver would continue as a predominantly grain exporting port, which was the predominant and growing export from Vancouver at that time.\footnote{Ibid., 158 and 169.}

Secondly, Gibb proposed that all ports from “the confluence of the Pitt river and the Fraser river from the international boundary to the head of the Indian Arm should be under one control and policy.”\footnote{Ibid., 169.} This recommendation for port amalgamation was revisited by the Harper Conservative government some 75 years later as part of a national policy framework within the \textit{Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative}.\footnote{Canada, \textit{National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors}, 4.} The same national policy framework heralds “Gateway councils and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building, planning, sound governance...[as] also key to advancing regional strategies with national benefits.”

\textbf{Royal Commission on Transportation 1948}

Another commission of interest to this study is the Royal Commission on Transportation appointed on December 29, 1948 with hearings into 1950. Since the late 1920s, automobile transportation was increasing its competition with the rail companies. In the 1930s, air travel increased in Canadian air space. The Commission noted that “coordination” and “integration” of all forms of transport in Canada should be affected under regulations by one and the same Board, the Commission points out that some such policy was envisaged in the Transport Act of 1938 with respect to railways, ships and aircraft.\footnote{Royal Commission on Transportation 1948, “Summary of the Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation 1948,” (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1950), 25.} Thus, the Commission recommended a multi-modal or ‘systems’ approach to transportation policy and regulation.
However, the Commission bemoaned decisions made by Parliament in 1944 to separate air regulation from other modes with the creation of the Air Regulation Board.

The net result of the action of Parliament in 1944 was to lessen the possibility of coordinating and harmonizing the different transport media under Federal control. It left to the Board of Transport Commissioner the duty of carrying on this coordinating and harmonizing in so far only as the railways and a minor branch of water transportation system are concerned. [...] the fact is therefore that while Parliament made provisions for a Board of Transport (instead of Railway) Commissioners, it did not go as far as it might have gone towards bringing about complete coordination of all carriers engaged in transport. And the trend of legislation in recent years has been away from integration and coordination.  

This Royal Commission on Transportation also took issues with the provinces of Canada for not being willing to give up their jurisdiction over motor transport. The Commission had “no ground for hope that central, uniform control and regulation of all forms of transportation…is realizable in the near future.” It is debatable if ‘uniform regulation’ of all modes of transportation exists today.

This notion of transportation planning using a multi-modal or ‘systems’ approach was revisited by the federal government in 2007 as part of the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiatives: “A central objective of federal involvement will be to foster a ‘systems’ approach to investment, planning and policy development.” Again, the government points to ‘gateway councils’ as a means to promote this type of planning.

The MacPherson Commission

It took nearly 20 years for Canadian transportation policy to shift away from the ‘silo’ mentality between transportation modes that the Royal Commission on Transportation noted in 1950. In 1967, the National Transportation Act received Royal Assent to become law. The Act was based on the Royal Commission on Transportation

---

367 Ibid., 25.
368 Ibid., 25.
369 Canada, National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors, 12.
370 Ibid., 12.
of 1961, known as the MacPherson Commission. The MacPherson Commission’s recommendations continue to influence federal government transportation policy today, especially with respect to competition between modes of transport.\textsuperscript{371} According to the commission,

In brief, the broad aim of public transportation policy should be to ensure – consistent with other goals of national policy – that all various modes of transportation are given a fair chance to find their proper place within a competitive system. The application of such a policy is, we believe, essential if we are to obtain – at a minimum cost – a balanced and efficient transportation system which is fully adequate to meet the nation’s transportation requirements.\textsuperscript{372}

Initially, the principle of competition between modes as federal policy was put in practice by allowing railway companies to set freight rates without regulatory intervention from the government. According to J.R. Baldwin, 1967’s Deputy Minister of Transportation, “If competition was to be accepted as the force which would maintain the balance between availability and rates then all modes of transport must be kept in fair relationship.”\textsuperscript{373}

Present-day federal transportation policies counteract the trends set in place by the MacPherson Commission. Rather than have ‘all various modes of transportation’ competing against one another, the federal government encourages transportation stakeholders, especially those in sectors with a limited number of stakeholders such as railways and port authorities, to be aware they are not competing with one another, rather they are competing with similar sectors internationally, especially in the United States and Mexico. The federal National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade

Corridors calls for cooperation amongst competitors in order to “contribute to the national pursuit of economic competitiveness.” 374

The National Transportation Act

The principle of competition between transportation modes was further enshrined with the National Transportation Act, 1987. The Act further implemented the principle of competition not only between modes, but also within modes. Yet, transportation sector stakeholders of the day appear to have been hoping for coordination rather than competition.

During a review of the legislation in 1992, the National Transportation Act Review Commission noted that “[p]erhaps the most common argument we heard throughout our consultations was a demand for better co-ordination of government policies such as trucking regulations, provincial railways, taxation and infrastructure. We also heard a call for greater co-ordination between federal and provincial administrations – and between various parts of the federal government itself.” 375 However, the Commission appears to downplay the prospect of ‘better co-ordination of government policies’ by suggesting that “cross-jurisdictional planning…perhaps depends most of all on participants’ perception of mutual benefit – a condition that cannot be guaranteed in each of the many areas where co-operation is desirable.” 376

Although the most common argument heard by the 1992 National Transportation Act Review Commission during consultations was for better inter-governmental cooperation on transportation policies, and the Commission noted that the National

376 Ibid., 168.
Transportation Act “contains virtually no provisions with regard to intermodal transport per se,” their recommendations to the federal government were rather timid. The Commissioners’ recommendation to the government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien was to simply amend the National Transportation Act to include “a general policy goal that the Canadian transportation system facilitate interprovincial and international trade.”

The most recent comprehensive review of Canada’s transportation policies and legislation was in 2001 with a legislated review under the Canada Transportation Act which dictated “a comprehensive review of the state of transportation in Canada” every five years.

During the review, federal government representatives heard some transportation stakeholders call for national transportation policy to shift from competition between and within modes towards a policy of coordination between modes. The Canada Transportation Act Review Panel “heard repeated calls for a new and forceful vision for national transportation policy. For most, vision calls for stronger leadership by the federal government, to bring greater co-ordination, harmonization and integration of the various transportation modes.”

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council was one of those stakeholders calling for “greater co-ordination, harmonization and integration of the various transportation modes.” The Council submitted that the government’s policies “failed to address the role of transportation in Canada’s international trade as a logistics system.”

---

377 Ibid., 123.
378 Ibid., 170 (Recommendation No. 40).
379 Canada Transport Act, Consolidated Statutes of Canada, Section 52.
381 Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, “Serving the Nation’s Trade,” 7.
382 Ibid., 7.
Road, rail, air and marine transportation are addressed as separate modes, rather than as an efficient multi-modal / intermodal system for moving cargo and passengers. This lack of a “system” view militates against the development of a competitive Canadian system to move the nation’s goods and services and does not support its international tourism industry.\textsuperscript{383}

To remedy the perceived deficiencies in national transportation policy, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council called on the government to develop policies that “fosters co-operative relationships among all participants in the transportation / logistics system.”\textsuperscript{384}

**The Pacific Gateway Act**

In 2005, the federal (Liberal) government appears to have heard the spirit of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s call for change. In October 2005, the federal government introduced Bill C-68, the *Pacific Gateway Act*, which would have invested $590 million in transportation projects. Perhaps more importantly, the *Pacific Gateway Act* would have established “Canada’s Pacific Gateway Council to promote consensus among a full range of public and private sector stakeholders, and advise decision-makers on priorities for developing the Pacific Gateway.”\textsuperscript{385}

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council thought that the “Canada’s Pacific Gateway Council” was not needed as “it was more or less a duplication of activities that already existed” and questioned the need for another gateway council.\textsuperscript{386} According to Bob Wilds, current Managing Director of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, the idea of a “Canada’s Pacific Gateway Council” was put forward by the government

\begin{footnotes}{\textsuperscript{383} Ibid., 7.} 
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 8. 
\textsuperscript{386} Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.}
without consultations or considerations to his group: “It was something that came out of the government itself.”

The bill died on the Order Paper due to an election call late in 2005 and in January 2006, a Conservative minority government was elected. Shortly after the election the Conservative government met with the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council. Perhaps showing its importance, the newly formed federal government issued a new release announcing a meeting with the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as part of “federal government's commitment to ongoing consultation with key private-sector and government stakeholders in the West.”

**The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative**

In October 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative (APGCI), “a massive undertaking…a collaborative effort involving all levels of government and the private sector.”

The federal government’s APGCI’s “National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors” includes ‘immediate actions’ to be undertaken by the government such as building consensus between transportation modes and lauds the efforts of the Gateway Council for such a thing:

Stakeholder organizations, such as the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, have led the way in forging a consensus that addresses interconnected issues and opportunities across all modes of transportation on Canada’s west coast. The B.C. government has undertaken important research and has worked with stakeholders to develop the province’s gateway program over the last two years. The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative seeks to build on these and other successes, and take the Gateway concept even further.

---

387 Ibid.
390 Canada, *Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative*, 15.
A year later, in 2007, the federal government fleshed-out some of the policies around fostering “a ‘systems’ approach to investment, planning and policy development.”  

The Harper government’s 2007 national policy framework within the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative is designed to “enhance multimodal integration of major transportation systems” as well as to “foster further development and exploitation of the transportation systems that are key to Canada’s most important opportunities and challenges in international trade.”

Government policy would be used to promote “[g]ateway councils and other stakeholder-driven forums for consensus-building, planning, sound governance and accountability are also key to advancing regional strategies with national benefits.”

In many ways, the policies of today’s federal government can be characterized as ‘back to the future.’ That is, many of today’s policies have either been called for or enacted at some time during the rich history of Canadian transportation policy, including port amalgamation, cooperation between modes, especially railway cooperation, and attempts towards a ‘system-based’ approach to transportation planning.

With the increased competition between transportation modes in the 1930s, there have been consistent calls for “coordinating and harmonizing the different transport media under Federal control.” Those calls appear to have gotten louder in tandem with the increased importance of intermodal or container shipping.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council formed as a result of the desire of many of Vancouver’s transportation stakeholders to increase the flow of containerized freight

---

392 Ibid., 1.
393 Ibid., 5.
through the region. This formation occurred in the absence of government leadership to develop policies that promote “greater co-ordination, harmonization and integration of the various transportation modes.”

To that end, both the federal and British Columbian governments have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor whereby they agreed to consult the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council in order to meet certain objectives, including to “increase the Gateway's share of North American bound container imports from Asia.”

Furthermore, the federal government has given the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council over $800,000 in funding to conduct studies all with the intent of increasing the flow of goods or people through the region. To this end, the federal government appears to view the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as a de facto think-tank or institution capable of impartial analysis and study, rather than a group representing “the collective will of the major transportation interests” in the region.

Notwithstanding the federal Liberal government’s 2005 Pacific Gateway Act in 2005 which would have legislated a “Pacific Gateway Council” and, for all intents and purposes, eliminated the need for the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, both federal and provincial governments appear content to allow the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council to continue in the role it has developed.

---

The success of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council can be partially explained by deficiencies in Canadian transportation policy. National transportation policy developed such that stakeholders became isolated from one another, both within and between transportation modes. This deficiency became evident during a series of disputes between management and labour in and around the Port of Vancouver with attempts to increase the flow of containers through the region. A federally appointed commission, the Weiler Commission, charged with investigating and recommending against impediments to the future growth of container trade through the Port found that the organizational behaviour of transportation stakeholders was a “the recipe for inertia, inaction, stagnation and decline”\textsuperscript{398} and that a new body ought to be formed in order to coordinated planning and investment related to intermodal connections to the American Midwest. The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council formed out of this recommendation.

CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been successful in securing the conditions for the expansion of its space of dependence with federal and provincial government support of expansion of the region’s commercial transportation system. The Council has done this by extending their space of engagement to include networks of associations through which projects can be realized. In this respect, the Gateway Council has followed closely the behaviour of actors and agents put forward in the theoretical work of Kevin R. Cox. In his 1998 work, *Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale, or: Looking for Local Politics*, Cox posits that actors seek to protect or even increase favourable local conditions for growth and engage in politics in order to accomplish this. This political engagement can be at the local, provincial, regional, federal or international level; the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has been most successful with political engagement at the provincial, regional and federal level.

At the provincial and federal levels, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has secured a place as a preeminent transportation stakeholder group. Both orders of government have agreed to consult with the Council in order to “boost Canada's commerce with the Asia-Pacific region, increase the Gateway's share of North American bound container imports from Asia and improve the efficiency and reliability of the Gateway and Corridor for Canadian and North American exports.”

---

399 Kevin R. Cox, “Spaces of Dependence, Spaces of Engagement and the Politics of Scale,” 19.
400 Canada and British Columbia, “Canada-British Columbia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Asia Pacific Gateway and Corridor,” 1.
The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has secured a close relationship with the federal government. Not only has the Gateway Council received hundreds of thousands of dollars from the federal government in order to conduct studies related to the movement of cargo through B.C.’s lower Mainland, the Council has in turn used these studies to lobby governments for increased transportation infrastructure funding.\footnote{Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.} The Council has also received funding from the federal government to “[d]evelop messaging that has local resonance and alignment with Canada’s Pacific Gateway communications efforts.” That is, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has received funding to launch a public relations campaign designed to communicate the benefits of the federal government’s transportation infrastructure investments. Finally, the federal government has used the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council as a model of “consensus-building, planning, sound governance and accountability” and is actively promoting similar organizations in jurisdictions across Canada.\footnote{Canada, \textit{National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors}, 5.}

With government support, the Council has undertaken a number of studies and reports used, in turn, to lobby governments for regional transportation upgrades. The most important of these is the Major Commercial Transportation System (MCTS) report which outlines the Gateway Council’s blueprint for increased freight transportation capacity in the region. Through persistent lobbying of governments for MCTS roads, the Council has seen nearly all major MCTS infrastructure items invested in. The strength of the Gateway Council’s lobbying efforts with the MCTS report is evidenced by, among other things, the City of Richmond’s motion to request that the Gateway Council include the Blundell Road/Nelson Road corridor in the MCTS. This inclusion, according to the
City of Richmond, would “ensure formal recognition of the need of improvements in the southeast Richmond by senior governments and private stakeholders who may play a key role in its implementation.”

Since the 1930s, competition between transportation modes has increased. At the same time, calls for “coordinating and harmonizing the different transport media under Federal control” also increased. Thus part of the success of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council in securing and even expanding its space of dependence may be due to a lack of another body where competing transportation stakeholders seemingly agree to work together for shared benefit.

Regionally, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has secured some influence over the regional transportation authority TransLink which owns and maintains roads and highways designated as part of the Major Roads Network. Since at least the late-1990s, TransLink has explicitly reported on the infrastructure priorities of the Gateway Council. Furthermore, after a new governance structure imposed on TransLink with 2007’s Bill 43, the Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Amendment Act, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council was granted the ability to choose a “qualified individual[s] to be considered for appointment as directors of the authority.” Under Bill 43, which received Royal Assent on November 29, 2007, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council could choose one of a number of ‘qualified individuals’ from which TransLink’s Board of Directors would be chosen. With this legislation, the Gateway

406 Bill 43, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Amendment Act, Section 177(1).
Council had the chance to have a person, who would ostensibly share the Council’s vision for the Lower Mainland’s transportation system, appointed to TransLink’s board.

These scales – regional, provincial and federal – reflect the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s space of dependence, the regional transportation system. The Council does not appear to be concerned with lobbying local governments. In fact, the Council has argued that local governments, specifically local politics, can be inhibitors or obstacles to transportation planning and infrastructure deemed to be of national economic importance.407

This range of scales also reflects the three orders of government that are involved in the B.C. government’s Gateway Program. Although the B.C. Ministry of Transportation and Highways is the proponent of the majority of the Gateway Program, TransLink and the federal government are involved as planning and funding partners.

The Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s networks of associations began with federal and provincial governments. These orders of government were involved in the formation of the Council’s progenitor, the Round Table on Transportation through the Greater Vancouver Gateway, which formed in response to loss of shipping to American ports.408 Federal and provincial governments became formally part of the organization when the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council officially formed in 1994. With the federal minister of transportation as the honourary chair, the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council boasts the inclusion of the governments of B.C., the four Western provinces, as well as the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) and TransLink.

408 Bob Wilds, interview with the author, July 31, 2009.
Despite the success of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council in securing its space of dependence on behalf of its members, this study did not find that the Council was the sole impetus of the B.C. government’s Gateway Program. There are striking parallels between the infrastructure investments lobbied for by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council through their MCTS report and what has actually been built by various governments and institutions. According to the Gateway Council, “[w]ith the exceptions of the Massey Tunnel, Blundell connection to Highway 99 and improvement to Highway 17 from the Tsawwassen Ferry Terminal to Highway 99, identified MCTS road investments have been incorporated into the Province of British Columbia’s Gateway Program and/or TransLink’s Major Road Network projects over the next decade.”

Furthermore, the MCTS report was used as evidence in studies that the provincial government in turn used to justify the need for the Gateway Program. Both the 2004 BC Progress Board report “Transportation as an Economic Growth Engine” and 2003 WESTAC’s 2003 “Opening the Arteries for Growth” were cited by a B.C. government representative as reports that prompted the government to launch the Gateway Program and both reports had input from the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.

Although opposition to the Gateway Program is disparate, and the B.C. government shows no sign of discontinuing it, opponents to the Gateway Program have capitalized on local negative impacts in Delta, B.C. and other municipalities. In these places, opponents to the Gateway Program have seen success in terms of media exposure and support from local politicians, yet many of the politicians’ parties remain in support of the B.C. government’s transportation infrastructure plans. The success of these

---

opponents is evidenced in the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s plan to use federal funding for a public relations campaign designed to increase “public awareness of the Gateway identity and acceptance of the benefits and opportunities that the Gateway represents.”

Further evidence of the success of opponents of the Gateway Program can be seen in the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council’s support of the BC Trucking Association’s ‘astroturf’ organization the ‘Livable BC Coalition.’ As noted, the ‘Livable BC Coalition’ bears a striking resemblance to the Livable Region Coalition, one of the main groups opposing the Gateway Program. The ‘Livable BC Coalition’ campaign, though never completely launched by the BC Trucking Association, was set up in order to “get people to go out to the open houses and political events where these things are being talked about…[and] go to the city councils that are objecting to the Gateway and try to show the positive support.”

However, in spite of the successes in garnering local political and media support, activists could not sway the governing federal Conservatives or provincial Liberals against, nor could they sway the opposition provincial New Democrats or federal Liberals to take a stand against the Gateway Program. This is likely because of a number of reasons, but the most significant of these may be the parties’ histories of support for expansion of the region’s road and bridge infrastructure over the years.

The success of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council means that the group has changed the urban form of British Columbia’s Lower Mainland. Proposed major expansions of highways and roads, encapsulated in the Gateway Council’s MCTS report, have been implemented nearly in its entirety by governments and the regional

---


transportation authority. The changes in the region’s urban form sought by the Gateway Council are a response to changes in commodities and cargo movements globally. According to the Council, “[g]reater Vancouver is by history and geography a Gateway - linking Canada and the Asia Pacific economies.” In order to double cargo and passenger volumes through the Lower Mainland, “[m]assive investments are needed in both transportation infrastructure and public transit to ensure the Gateway can handle projected expansion in transportation demands for local and international movements of passengers, goods and services.”

The strategies that the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council has employed to become a preeminent transportation stakeholder group in the Lower Mainland are unique. The use of reports and studies is important in that governments and the regional transportation authority TransLink have used them to justify expansion of the regional road and bridge network. These reports and studies are funded in part by governments and in part by the transportation interests that are members of the Council. Bob Wilds, Managing Director of the Gateway Council, suggests that with government funding of studies and reports, “they’re helping us define what we need, then we just go out and try to get what we need.” That is, governments provide funding to the Council to produce reports with somewhat predetermined tenor. Council reports are then used by governments to justify transportation policy changes or infrastructure investments. This may be a unique variation on Clarence Stone’s assertion that “[g]overning capacity is created and maintained by bringing together coalition partners with appropriate

413 Ibid., 1.
resources, nongovernmental as well as governmental.” Stone’s ‘urban regime’ was based on the case of a municipal government; this case is about the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council and its relationship with several orders of government and the regional transportation authority in order to increase transportation capacity in B.C.’s Lower Mainland. Further research is needed in this area, but available data suggests that there is a reciprocal relationship between the Gateway Council and governments that supply funding for studies that are, in turn, used to justify government investments in roads and bridges. Evidence of this reciprocal relationship may be seen in Transport Canada’s decision to provide funding for a public relations campaign by the Gateway Council to increase “solid regional public awareness of the Gateway identity and acceptance of the benefits and opportunities that the Gateway represents.”

---

415 Clarence N. Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern,” 1.
### APPENDIX 1 - TABLE OF GATEWAY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS AND EXCERPTS USED IN REPORTS OR STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 24</td>
<td>“These findings indicate that, counting only direct impacts, the Greater Vancouver Gateway activities account for more than 75,000 jobs and $10 billion of business output – representing approximately 5% of the total BC economy.”</td>
<td>Province of BC, BC Gateway Program, “Program Definition Report,” Jan. 31, 2006, page 8</td>
<td>“The gateway facilities now account for 75,000 jobs and $10 billion in business output annually in Greater Vancouver alone”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 30</td>
<td>“The total direct, indirect and induced impact on the economies of these western provinces includes almost 6,500 jobs, $250 million in GDP, and $375 million in output.”</td>
<td>Province of BC, BC Gateway Program, “Program Definition Report,” Jan. 31, 2006, page 8</td>
<td>“Vancouver’s gateways also support 6,500 jobs and $250 million of the GDP of the provincial economies of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 9</td>
<td>“While trade with Asia accounts for less than 10% of all Canadian trade, it accounts for approximately 35% of British Columbia’s trade, 55% of cargo movements through the Port of Vancouver, and 95% of container movements through the port.”</td>
<td>Province of BC, BC Gateway Program, “Program Definition Report,” Jan. 31, 2006, page 9</td>
<td>“Trade with Asia now accounts for 35% of British Columbia’s trade, 55% of cargo movements and 95% of container movements through the Port of Vancouver.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 73</td>
<td>“…only a portion of the direct congestion impact occurs in the form of economic contraction. That, in turn, leads to a total impact on the economy of the four provinces (by year 2021) amounting to over $1.5 billion of annual…”</td>
<td>WESTAC, “Opening the Arteries for Growth,” Nov. 2003, page 20</td>
<td>“Without investments to upgrade the performance and capacity of the BC Lower Mainland’s transportation system, there will be significant losses… by 2021, a loss of Gross Domestic Product exceeding $475 million/year (with an”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 78</td>
<td>“This impact will grow every year, and by the year 2021, it is calculated to represent a loss of Gross Domestic Product exceeding $475 million/year (with an expected range of $414 million to $1.1 billion). That translates to a loss of over 7,000 jobs (with an expected range of up to 16,000 jobs at stake). Investing in the MCTS will avoid those losses.”</td>
<td>WESTAC, “Opening the Arteries for Growth,” page 25</td>
<td>“Closer to home in Vancouver, Transport Canada working with TransLink has estimated that traffic congestion in Greater Vancouver costs residents and businesses between $800 million and $1.2 billion annually and that cost is growing. Between 7,000 and 16,000 jobs are estimated to be associated with this lost economic activity.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 31</td>
<td>“Over 360 million tonnes of cargo move to/from or within British Columbia annually.”</td>
<td>TransLink, “Keeping Greater Vancouver Moving: Discussion Paper - A 10-Year Transportation Outlook &amp; Three-Year Financial Strategy,” Oct. 6, 2003, page 6</td>
<td>“A recent study by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council noted that over 360 million tonnes of cargo are moved to, from or within BC annually and is predicted to grow.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 31-32</td>
<td>“Over 360 million tonnes of cargo move to/from or within British Columbia annually.”</td>
<td>TransLink, “2005 - 2007 Three-Year Plan &amp; Ten-Year Outlook - Strategic Transportation Plan Amendment,” Feb. 2004, page 6</td>
<td>“A recent study by the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council noted that over 360 million tonnes of cargo are moved to, from or within BC annually and is predicted to grow. Projections to 2021 estimate a 50% growth in cargo shipments made mainly by rail.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Impact Analysis of Investment In MCTS (July 2003), page 56</td>
<td>“Rail Network Improvement Costs – First Priority” New Westminster Rail Bridge $750 to 1000 Million Pitt River Rail Bridge $250 Million Roberts Bank - 41B Grade Separation $15 to $20 Million Mud Bay Area – West</td>
<td>Transport Canada, “Container Capacity Expansion Plans at Pacific Coast Ports,” Jan. 2007, page 28</td>
<td>“New rail sidings: A Greater Vancouver Gateway Council study identified conceptual rail infrastructure improvements along the Roberts Bank Rail Corridor. More detailed analysis related directly to Roberts Bank operations could produce a variation on these...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision for the Future of the Greater Vancouver Gateway – Transportation for Liveable Communities in a Global Economy (May 2007)</td>
<td>“The Government of Canada, Province of British Columbia, TransLink and the membership of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council are agreed on the need for a comprehensive program of investments in transit, road, marine and rail infrastructure. These would balance the needs of Greater Vancouver as a liveable region with its responsibilities as the primary international Gateway for Canada’s Pacific trade.”</td>
<td>Province of BC, TransLink, Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, “Canada’s Pacific Gateway,” Feb. 2005, page 3</td>
<td>“$10.95 BILLION FOR TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS IS NEEDED The province, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (GVTA) and the membership of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council are agreed on the need for a comprehensive program of investments in transit, marine and rail infrastructure. These would balance the needs of Greater Vancouver, as a liveable region, with its responsibilities as the primary international Gateway for Canada’s Pacific trade.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leg of the Wye $15 Million BN New Yard to Spruce Street – Double Track $1 Million Siding - Colebrook North and South $10 Million Siding and Grade Separation - Colebrook East and West (Note: Boundary Bay siding could be constructed as an alternate) $3 Million Total First Priority Investment $1050 to $1300 Million (Rounded)”</td>
<td>improvements: Additional track on the existing causeway Mud Bay sidings for BCR and BNSF $23.2 million Double track in BCR in Delta &amp; Surrey 12 km $22.4 million Double track CN line between Hydro and Matsqui $15.8 million”</td>
<td>Province of BC, TransLink, Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, “Canada’s Pacific Gateway,” Feb. 2005, page 3</td>
<td>“$10.95 BILLION FOR TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENTS IS NEEDED The province, Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority (GVTA) and the membership of the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council are agreed on the need for a comprehensive program of investments in transit, marine and rail infrastructure. These would balance the needs of Greater Vancouver, as a liveable region, with its responsibilities as the primary international Gateway for Canada’s Pacific trade.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 2 – GATEWAY COUNCIL’S MCTS MAJOR ROAD AND TRANSIT INVESTMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCTS “Major New Road and Transit Investments”</th>
<th>Jurisdiction or Proponent</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highway 1 – Vancouver to Langley</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
<td>Gateway Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Fraser Perimeter Road – Highway 1 to Highway 91</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>Tendering and pre-load work</td>
<td>Gateway Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraser River Crossing (“Golden Ears Bridge”)</td>
<td>TransLink</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Gateway Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Transit – Richmond/Airport Vancouver (“Canada Line”)</td>
<td>TransLink</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>Gateway Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Fraser Perimeter Road</td>
<td>TransLink, federal and provincial governments (Border Infrastructure Program), provincial government</td>
<td>&quot;North Fraser Perimeter Road West Corridor Definition Study&quot; bidding closed in 2008</td>
<td>Gateway Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Westminster Rail Bridge</td>
<td>Public Works Canada</td>
<td>Study being tendered by Public Works and Government Services (closes Feb. 1, 2010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massey Tunnel (Highway 99)</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>Study completed in 2005/2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oak Street Bridge (Highway 99)</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwy. 15 – Hwy. 1 to U.S. Border</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Smart Border Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwy. 10 – Hwy. 17 to Hwy. 1</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Smart Border Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Pacific Border Crossing – Hwy. 99</td>
<td>Province of BC and Federal Government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Strategic Highway Infrastructure Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

418 Ibid.
APPENDIX 3 – PARTIAL LIST OF GVGC’S FEDERAL FUNDING FOR STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Body</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Date Announced</th>
<th>Details of Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Economic Diversification</td>
<td>$350,000</td>
<td>March 8, 2002</td>
<td>Funding for “long-range planning to improve commercial transportation in Greater Vancouver.”[421]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Canada &amp; Western Economic Diversification</td>
<td>$190,000</td>
<td>Nov. 20, 2003</td>
<td>To “identify potential improvements in three rail corridors in the lower mainland of British Columbia.”[422]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Note: $100,000 from Transport Canada and $90,000 from Western Economic Diversification plus $200 k from “public and private partners”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Canada</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
<td>March 31, 2008</td>
<td>Update and expansion of the 2003 study “Economic Impact Analysis of Investment in a Major Commercial Transportation System for the Greater Vancouver Region”[423]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Economic Diversification</td>
<td>$230,000</td>
<td>Feb. 23, 2009</td>
<td>Gateway Air Cargo Research[424]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total = $805,000

Note: The Parliamentary Supplementary Estimates for Transport Canada for 1997-98 include interim funding of $29,800 to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council.[425] Further information on this funding could not be found at the time of writing.

Note: The initial report to the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council from NATIONAL Public Relations on “Research Program and Recommended Messaging” states (my bold): “To move forward, the Council agreed on contribution funding from Transport Canada to develop phase 1 of a multi-phased communications strategy, involving:

1. Conduct research, both qualitative (focus groups) and online, testing perceptions and understood benefits of Canada’s Pacific Gateway; and
2. Develop messaging that has local resonance and alignment with Canada’s Pacific Gateway communications efforts.”[426]

---

February 22, 2006

Dear «Sal» «LastName»:

I am writing to invite your organization to join a new and very important coalition – the Livable BC Coalition.

The mission of the Livable BC Coalition will be to grow public support for continued investment in transportation infrastructure. The Coalition will focus public attention on the need for safe, efficient transportation to sustain economic growth and improve our quality of life by keeping traffic moving.

Since your association has the reputation of being an opinion leader within your sector of the economy, we are looking for your support in encouraging a grassroots movement to sway public and political opinion in support of the government’s transportation programs.

Currently, those groups against the Gateway Projects are making their voices heard in the media and with the public. With strong support and a coordinated effort, we can reach the public with the facts highlighting the need for strong transportation infrastructure.

The Coalition will be developing key messages and materials that will be distributed through the communications network of coalition members.

- We will ask you to present our transportation message to your members and have them relay the message to their employees.
- We will ask you and your members to attend important public events to show support for the Pacific Gateway and other important transportation projects.

If you are in support of keeping BC building and improving our transportation network, we encourage you to join our growing coalition. Please complete and fax in the form attached and we will add you to the coalition database. Sign up today! You will be supporting and investing in a strong and prosperous future for all British Columbians.

Sincerely,

Jack Davidson
President
BIBLIOGRAPHY


British Columbia. “For the Record: British Columbia’s Asia Pacific Initiative.”

British Columbia. “Gateway Program Definition Report.” January 31, 2006, 11,

British Columbia. “Gateway Program Definition Report Summary.” January 31, 2006,

British Columbia. “Gateway Program: North Fraser Perimeter Road, Program

British Columbia. Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority Act, Revised Statues of
British Columbia.


British Columbia. “Local Government Department History – Biographies and Stories:
Darlene Marzari.”

British Columbia. “Open Up B.C. – A transportation plan for British Columbia.” October
10, 2003,

British Columbia. “Port Mann Project Proceeds using Design-Build Contract.” Feb. 27,
000261.htm (accessed Feb. 8, 2010).

British Columbia. “Premier Launches Gateway Transportation Program.” (Jan. 31, 2006),

British Columbia. “South Fraser Perimeter Road Project – Request for Qualifications.”


Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Pre-Budget Consultations, October 18, 2005.


Gyarmati, Sandor. “Huntington endorsed by MP.” The Delta Optimist, Saturday, May 9, 2009, 3.


Canada. “Ontario-Quebec Continental Gateway.”


Metro Vancouver. “Liveable Region Coalition comments on Metro Vancouver 2040.” May 22, 2009,


Munro, Harold. “Private developers pondered by Victoria; Partners.” The Vancouver Sun, April 26, 1995, B1.


The Province. “NDP Opposition to Twinning Port Mann Bridge is Off Track.” The Province, A20.


