Resource type
Thesis type
(Project) M.A.
Date created
2005
Authors/Contributors
Author: Demers, Simon
Abstract
This paper presents a simple framework illustrating how loyalty considerations may affect the ruler's choice of an adviser or a minister. The model suggests that the optimal competence level of the adviser should decrease with the bribe offered by the opposition group and the most severe punishment available to the dictator. The reward offered by the dictator increases with the bribe but decreases in the size of the worst available punishment. Paradoxically, this implies that higher incomes could be paid to less competent advisers in regimes where bribes are more generous or plotting groups are more affluent. Also, more brutal despots would find it optimal to hire less competent advisers. This supports the widely held view that constraints on the executive can improve a country's economic performance.
Document
Copyright statement
Copyright is held by the author.
Scholarly level
Language
English
Member of collection
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