Property possession and identity: An essay in metaphysics

Date created: 
2005
Abstract: 

The thesis of this paper is that no real distinction obtains between property possession and identity. To justify this thesis, I argue against two views I call Exteriorism and Interiorism, I argue for an account of property possession and identity according to which they are one and the same relation, and I respond to a wide variety of objections to that account.

Description: 
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Language: 
English
Document type: 
Thesis
Rights: 
Copyright remains with the author
File(s): 
Department: 
Department of Philosophy - Simon Fraser University
Thesis type: 
Thesis (M.A.)
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