

DANIEL JOHNSON AND THE QUIET REVOLUTION

by

Peter Donald Hopkins

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1973

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Political Science

© PETER DONALD HOPKINS 1977

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

March, 1977

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.

APPROVAL

Name: Peter Donald Hopkins

Degree: Master of Arts (Political Science)

Title of Thesis: Daniel Johnson and the Quiet Revolution

Examining Committee:

Chairperson: Dr. F.Q. Quo

Jacques Benjamin
Senior Supervisor

Pauline Jewett

Walter D. Young
External Examiner
Professor
University of Victoria,
Victoria, British Columbia

Date Approved: March 14, 1977

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Dissertation:

DANIEL JOHNSON AND THE
QUIET REVOLUTION

Author:

(signature)

PETER DONALD HOPKINS

(name)

April 22, 1977

(date)

ABSTRACT

It has been the popular belief that the Quiet Revolution ended in 1966, when the Union Nationale government of Mr. Johnson was elected. This study proposes: 1) to analyze the term of Premier Daniel Johnson within the context of the Quiet Revolution and to show that he was part of that phenomenon; and 2) to look at his premiership within the context of political science revolutionary theory and to show the definitional problem confronting political scientists and those who label the Quebec experience as being revolutionary.

In order to fulfil these two tasks this study has been divided into historical and theoretical chapters. When viewed historically, one can see that Mr. Johnson's priorities and perspectives differed from those of his predecessor Jean Lesage. But in a sequential way he advanced educational reform, industrial expansion, social well-being, Quebec's self-image and her role in the international community. All of these factors were central to the Quiet Revolution. By stimulating them Mr. Johnson positively contributed to two fundamental facets of that phenomenon: the growth of Quebec nationalism and the increased concern for social and economic policy planning. His action accelerated the growth of the former and decelerated the latter. Notwithstanding, on an historical continuum it can be seen that Mr. Johnson's administration was an extension of the Quiet Revolution. In order to "round out" this thesis, the phenomenon itself is then analyzed systematically within the framework of theories of revolution as defined by political scientists.

Since the data used here are historical facts and events rather than quantified figures and statistics, a quasi-theoretical or analagous framework such as one advocated by E.J. Meehan seemed to be most suitable for the analysis. This framework has been synthesized from the works of several commentators concerned with revolution and it came to incorporate five elements which were evident in most or all of the writings. Those five abstracted elements were:

- 1) violence
- 2) the dynamic of rising expectations, increasing affluence and growing unrest
- 3) the growth of nationalism and national consciousness
- 4) the alteration of the prevailing myth of the society, and
- 5) the modulation of the pace of change by the political leadership.

The assumptions and inferences of this method of data analysis have been clearly recognized and outlined within the text. The analogy, as applied to the Johnson administration, has revealed that the regime was not a revolutionary one within the rubric of the definition used in political science.

In conclusion this study has dispelled one notion and challenged another. It has dispelled the popular belief that the Quiet Revolution ended in 1966. It has challenged the tendency among political scientists to label the Quebec experience as a political revolution. It too has provided a tentative generic typology of investigation which can be applied to the broader Quebec experience of the 1960s and can facilitate a shift from the study of a microcosm to the study of a macrocosm.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank Drs. J. Benjamin and P. Jewett for all of their time and patience.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL	ii
ABSTRACT	iii - iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	v
LIST OF TABLES	vii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1 - 6
CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL SETTING	7 - 14
CHAPTER 3 QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND MR. JOHNSON	15
Education	16 - 25
International Participation	25 - 30
The Fiscal Question and the Constitution	31 - 40
CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL POLICY AND PLANNING	41
Industrial Development	42 - 57
The Language Question	57 - 62
Social Welfare Policy	62 - 67
CHAPTER 5 DANIEL JOHNSON'S NEGATIVE IMAGE AND SOME REPERCUSSIONS OF THE "SLOWING-DOWN" PROCESS	68 - 79
CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL SCIENCE REVOLUTIONARY THEORY	80 - 105
LIST OF REFERENCES	106 - 115
BIBLIOGRAPHY	116 - 126

LIST OF TABLES

		Page
TABLE I	Education Expenditures (in dollars)	22
TABLE II	Education Expenditures (in per cent)	22
TABLE III	Aide aux é tudiants des collèges du Québec, 1961-1967	24
TABLE IV	Loans and Scholarships to Quebec University and College Students for 1967-1968	24
TABLE V	Budgetary Expenditures in Quebec--Funds designated for the expansion of industry and commerce	51
TABLE VI	Rate Increase over the Previous Year	51
TABLE VII	Quebec Investment per worker as a per centage of Canada	52
TABLE VIII	Social Welfare Expenditure	66
TABLE IX	Per centage distribution of social service expenditure as related to the budget	66
TABLE X	Some Electoral Shifts	71
TABLE XI	Revenu personnel par habitant au Canada et au Québec	90
TABLE XII	Traitement et salaires hebdomadaires moyens, par industrie, Québec, 1967-1972	90
TABLE XIII	Taux de scolarisation par âge, Québec, 1961 a 1981	91

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is twofold:

- 1) to analyze Premier Daniel Johnson's role in the Quiet Revolution; and 2) to look at his premiership in the context of political science revolutionary theory.

There is a distinct dichotomy in this study between the historical section (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5) and the theoretical section (Chapter 6). That is to say historical and theoretical approaches have been utilized but they have been separated. The dichotomy has a purpose.

Daniel Johnson has not yet been interpreted by his community. Comments made about him and his premiership with regard to the Quiet Revolution are, in anglophone Canada, cursory and negative. Therefore, the task facing this author is to first try to demonstrate that Daniel Johnson was a part of the phenomenon known as the Quiet Revolution. To accomplish that task an historical method is adopted. It attempts to show that Mr. Johnson was a part of that phenomenon and that he was a positive figure within the process.

In essence, in terms of the decisions taken, Mr. Johnson's priorities and perspectives differed from those of his predecessor Jean Lesage. But in a sequential way he advanced educational reform, industrial expansion, social well-being, Quebec's self-image and her role in the international community. All of these factors were central to the Quiet Revolution. To a political scientist, Mr. Johnson's legislative record confirmed his revolutionary participation. He successfully catered to the constituency for change which the Liberals had created. He satisfied the expectations which the Liberals had increased. In a way, Mr. Johnson was influenced by what psychologists call "impression control". In this instance, the expectations created dictated the course of policy, to some extent. Upon some of these issues, Mr. Johnson tempered his own position and did a "volte face".

Yet his moves were slow and deliberate. In many cases they were short-term oriented, as evidenced by his limited investment in the SGF and the Quebec Industrial Credit Bureau.

However, as a result of his efforts and decisions, the educational system continued to modernize. Young people continued to stream into the higher education network and to avail themselves of the opportunities offered. His hand-picked Minister of Education Jean-Guy Cardinal created the community colleges. Industrial expansion was encouraged. He appointed the Castonguay-Nepveu Commission to substantially reform the social services. Quebec continued to acquire more responsibility of action in areas within its constitutional jurisdiction;

it can even be said that he went further than Premier Lesage in that field.

Mr. Johnson was part of the revolutionary scene. His legislative budgetary moves were consistent with the aspirations of the revolution and with its growth under the previous regime. He built upon some of the issues, themes and foundations laid down by Jean Lesage. In so doing, he provided impetus for the "révolution tranquille". He broadened its parameters and horizons. It went beyond 1966 and it came to include and aggregate, during Johnson's stewardship, some people previously ignored. Despite his caution and conservatism, Mr. Johnson kept all of Quebec's long-run alternatives open. In total, his moves enhanced the view that Mr. Johnson was part of the Quiet Revolution and that he was a positive figure in the phenomenon.

Therefore, historically, it can be demonstrated that Daniel Johnson was a Quiet Revolution participant and that he was a contributory factor to the process.

In order to "round out" this study, the phenomenon itself is studied within theoretical criteria relating to the discipline. Some of the fundamental variables of political science revolutionary theory are thus applied to Mr. Johnson's tenure in office, in order to refine the political perception of the events and to integrate the data more precisely within the nomenclature and confines of the discipline of political science (Chapter 6).

Revolutionary data is not a concise body of knowledge. Sociologists approach the topic with different perspectives than those used by political scientists. Individual historical trends

and personality factors make each political revolution a solitary experience. Catalytic forces vary considerably between revolutionary outbursts. Notwithstanding the disparateness of the phenomena, some common elements can be discerned in the arguments of numerous revolutionary political science writers. Revolutionary data can be distilled into an analogy or quasi-theoretical framework incorporating the following elements:

- 1) violence
- 2) the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest
- 3) the alteration of the dominant myth of society
- 4) the growth of nationalism and national consciousness
- 5) the modulation of the pace of societal change by the political leadership.

It is felt that this framework can be uniformly applied to revolutions as political phenomena. In this particular instance, the quasi-theoretical framework hypothesized is applied to the Johnson years. By so doing, one can demonstrate firstly, the usefulness of the quasi-theoretical framework and secondly, that the Johnson period did not totally reflect or incorporate criteria connoting political revolutionary activity.

Generally speaking, this analogy is helpful as a tool for data synthesis and application. It is helpful as a standardized method for deciding if a phenomenon qualifies as a political revolution. It is synthetic in that it is a composite of the varied data elaborated upon by numerous commentators and by the fact that it is an artificial construct. But it is functional

and thus contributes to the data and analytical base of political science and political inquiry.

It is not a primer of revolutionary activity. It does not answer the question: how does one make revolution? That question is dependent upon many unpredictable and subliminal historical and catalytic forces endemic to the local environment and scene. Rather, this analogy answers the question: what elements are common to political revolution? It puts forward and applies generic qualities rather than strict causal explanations and relationships.

Such quasi-theoretical or analogous frameworks are valid within the discipline because, even if non-effective, they help to contribute to the general body of theoretical knowledge. They help to sharpen and to clarify perspectives. Their validity or invalidity broadens the scope of political science and its parameters. They provide a starting point from which further investigation develops.

This particular analogy sheds light upon a body of knowledge and an aspect of political inquiry which has not been analyzed or compiled in a consistent manner, previously.

Having noted the inferences and assumptions which relate to this approach to data interpretation, it is felt that the data pertaining to the Johnson era deductively supports the quasi-theory or analogy proffered here relating to political revolutions. It contributes to the efficacy of the presumed analogy and legitimates it somewhat, as a useful tool for general analysis.

Specifically speaking, the application of the analogy to Mr. Johnson's term in office demonstrates that elements 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the analogy put forward were present in Quebec while Mr. Johnson was Premier. However, the foundation stone or crucial variable was not present: violence. Therefore, applying the framework one must conclude that a revolution did not occur in Quebec at that time.

The dichotomy of this study into historical and theoretical sections is functional. It helps to show what that phenomenon was not.

Mr. Johnson was a positive figure in the Quiet Revolution. Yet, the Quiet Revolution of which he was a part was not a violent political revolution within the traditional political science definition.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL SETTING

Before dealing with the actions of Mr. Johnson, some background information is necessary so that one can better understand the Quiet Revolution and place it within a proper context. The following few pages set the scene.

The Quiet Revolution was the culmination of an evolutionary process begun at the turn of the century when Quebec society commenced the inexorable movement from a traditional to a modern society. At that time, the economy of Quebec began to diversify. The first world war, the exuberant activities of some anglophone entrepreneurs and the activities of a few francophone capitalists accelerated the economic and industrial development of the province. Quebec began to industrialize. The area also became more urbanized. By 1911, 50% of the population lived in urban areas.¹ Notwithstanding urbanization, in 1914 agriculture provided 65% of the provincial product, forestry 25% and manufacturing less than 5%.²

However, by 1951 agriculture provided only 13.2% of the provincial product and by 1961 its share was reduced to 6.6%. The tertiary and secondary sectors of the economy expanded. For

these years 1951 and 1961, the tertiary sector accounted for 40% and 43% of the provincial product and secondary industry contributed 41.6% and 37.3% respectively.³ By 1965, there were more than 12,000 industries in Quebec which employed 415,000 persons and accounted for more than 70% of the gross value of Quebec's total production.⁴

Thus, the economic base of Quebec underwent a dramatic alteration from the days of Sir Wilfred Laurier until 1960 and beyond.

But during the Laurier-to-1960 time frame, the dominant political culture and ideology of the province did not significantly alter. Even though the area was becoming more urbanized and industrialized, the French Canadian clergy and the professional and political elites conspired and preached a political viewpoint which emphasized religion, spiritual culture, national history, family, traditionalism and rurality.⁵ Jointly, they denounced anglophone imperialism, industrialization, mass communication and urbanization. And, "Le clergé et les professions libérales qui contrôlaient à toutes fins pratiques, la plupart des média d'information, des maisons d'enseignement, des livres, des manuels scolaires, avaient tout le loisir de disséminer leur idéologie".⁶ Objectively and demographically the province had changed. But in terms of the conventional wisdom advocated by the professional, religious and political elites, the area was still envisioned as a traditional agricultural society.

In the late 1950s, contrary intellectual opinion developed. The rural "weltanschauung" was challenged. Marchand, Pelletier,

Trudeau, Lamontagne et al., began to question the traditional assumptions and presumptions of Quebecers. Quebec, it was argued, was a modern pluralist society formed of numerous ethnic and articulation groups which differed from the professional and religious cadres of the past.

"Cité Libre" put forward alternative conceptualizations of Quebec and Quebecers. The political apparatus reacted more slowly, however.

Only in the early 1960s did the traditional view of Quebec society slowly give way. The Quiet Revolution, as it was known, began. It was a period of rapid perceptual change - a period of contemporized perception. / That is to say, it was an interlude when Quebecers' perception of themselves and their society adequately reflected the reality of the situation. / In 1960, perception caught up to real conditions.

The Liberal government elected in 1960 began to address itself and Quebecers to the changes which had occurred in Quebec over time. The Lesage government spoke about urbanization, planning, industrialization, controlled and planned social growth and government intervention into the private sector when necessary. It questioned the role of Quebec as an industrial entity in Canada, North America and the world. Quebec's traditional image and self-portrayal were challenged. The Liberals, in government, forced Quebecers to look at themselves and to redefine their society,

Les vérités les plus établies, les mythes les plus diffusés furent attaqués de front par de plus en plus d'individus et des sous-groupes... en 1960, ce qu' on a vite commencé d'appeler la révolution tranquille a commencé, et cette

fois de façon globale, à changer le climat idéologique du Québec...il est sûr que l'un des premiers effets de 1960 et des réformes qui s'ensuivirent fut de revaloriser l'image que bien des Québécois se faisaient d'eux-mêmes et de leur société...et... contribuer à revaloriser le Québec et les Québécois à leurs propres yeux....⁷

The political apparatus subsequent to 1960, reflected the proper correlation between perception and economic and demographic reality.


The reformist wing of the Liberal government realized that Quebec society had changed and that the traditionalist world view was no longer completely relevant. After undertaking an extensive research analysis of the political and social attitudes and aspirations of Quebecers, the Lesage government consciously appealed to the dissatisfaction and unrest which were found to be prevalent, at the time. The Liberal government reacted to a need and simultaneously created a constituency. The Liberals, both canvassed and created an issue: the need for change in society. The 1962 election results attested to their success in this venture.

In 1960, the Liberal campaign had been directed by P. Gérin-Lajoie and G. E. Lapalme, using the slogan "It's time for a change". The party promised to introduce social legislation, hospital insurance, a Royal Commission to assess the educational needs of the province, the secularization of education and electoral reform.⁸ The primary opposition came from the Union Nationale party. That group, led by Antonio Barrette promised to aid education, to pass improved labour legislation, to provide more assistance to farmers and to continue the work of

Duplessis and Sauvé.⁹ In 1960, the voters were affected by the Liberal program but were not convinced decisively. In that year, the Liberal party won 50 out of a possible 95 seats, and garnered 51% of the popular vote. The Union Nationale won 44 seats and garnered 48% of the popular vote.¹⁰ The election was extremely close in that a change of 500 votes in 5 ridings would have kept the Union Nationale in power.¹¹ By 1962, the Liberal success in catering to a need and also creating a constituency was evident. In that year, the Lesage government went to the polls over the issue of nationalization. The Liberals argued that in order for Quebec to optimize its natural resources and to realize its full industrial potential, the electrification system had to be nationalized. They promised to create a provincial hydro agency which would insure the province of a secure and manageable power source upon which Quebeckers would build, privately and publicly, a stable industrial society. They appealed to the growing confidence developing within the community and called for "Maîtres chez nous". The Union Nationale put forward a weak argument favouring selective nationalization of the electric utility founded upon plebiscitary approval. But the Liberals had been correct in their assessment of the mood. Quebeckers did want to reform their society. The population recognized that Quebec had altered and it wanted to direct and to continue the alteration. The Liberals won 63 seats out of a possible 95. The Union Nationale strength waned. That party won only 12 seats.¹² The Quiet Revolution was given a vote of confidence. The Lesage group had successfully legitimized

the ethic of change. It had created a constituency. The evolution which had commenced at the turn of the century received conscious stimulus and support during the Lesage term. Perceptions were changing. They were being contemporized and the population accepted the process.

Between 1960 and 1966, important innovations and changes occurred in the areas of education, economic and industrial planning, social welfare and international relations.

The legislative record attested to the alterations occasioned in these spheres. The Department of Education was established in 1964, which facilitated the specialization of schools. The Economic Advisory Council was developed to promote the decentralization of industry and to balance economic development. The General Investment Corporation (S.G.F. Société Générale de Financement) was created which was designed to attract and channel investment.  Hydro Quebec was formed along with the construction of an impressive hydro electric grid.

The government proposed to develop a Quebec steel complex, if necessary, without private capital participation and input.

A hospital insurance system was devised. The Quebec Pension Plan was inaugurated. Improved labour legislation was passed. Social services generally, were upgraded. Ties with France were improved. Paul Gérin-Lajoie travelled to Paris and signed a precedent educational exchange accord with the Republic which provided for the exchange of Quebec/France students and teachers. The Department of Cultural Affairs was established and the government announced its intention to establish a direc-

torate of immigration.

These changes had important consequences. More children sought out educational opportunities and stayed in school longer. Quebec continued to industrialize and to diversify. People availed themselves of the new services and came to be more dependent upon the government at Quebec City. Quebeckers' confidence in themselves increased. To some extent, the population shed its rural ethnocentric facade and accepted the role of urbane urban North Americans. / Perception altered. That was the Quiet Revolution. /

And two fundamental aspects of that perceptual change were: 1) the growth and increased articulation of "nationaliste" sentiment and 2) increased government involvement in the lives of citizens and the dramatic surge in social services and social policy planning.

Nationalism became a potent political variable within the province. By the mid-1960s Mr. Levesque put forward hypotheses concerning special status and/or independence. At the time, he was an important and powerful figure within the government. His comments caused unrest without and within the Liberal party. The fact that such propositions were put forward by a powerful cabinet minister reflected the potency of the nationalism issue. It even attracted the attention of power holders. Nationalism is used here to refer to Quebec nationalism in contrast to French-Canadian nationalism. Quebec nationalism increased during the Liberal period in government at Quebec City because as the "weltanschauung" altered opportunities increased and the

new self-expression, pride and passion of being Quebecois which developed, created a dynamism which found its outlet or expression in Quebec nationalism. It contrasted with the French-Canadian nationalism of Mr. Trudeau who believed in a strong Quebec within a strong bilingual Canada.

Too, the apparatus of government became more relevant to the populace. It became more interventionist. Health care, pensions and other services were put into place. Plans for the economy were advanced. Long-term economic planning and developments were considered. In some cases, such as Sidbec, the government even considered becoming an industrial entrepreneur, if necessary.

All in all, the process commenced by the Liberal government caused a dramatic change to occur in the Quebecers' "worldview". Two important aspects of that change were the proliferation of Quebec nationalism and of the government's involvement and intervention into the lives of Quebecers and into the field of social policy planning.

CHAPTER 3

QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND MR. JOHNSON

Mr. Johnson furthered the growth of Quebec nationalism. He and his government refined its articulation. By so doing, Mr. Johnson demonstrated that he was very much in step with his times.

Quebec nationalism received impetus from Premier Johnson's moves in education, through his actions pertaining to Quebec's international character and participation and via his fiscal dispute with the federal government.

It should be pointed out that education is included within this section because it was an important tool in Quebec's "national" development. The educational system was a symbol of Quebec's determination to modernize and a gauge measuring the extent to which the society had advanced. It developed into a prime social indicator for gauging the level of modernization and for projecting the province's image to the world.

In all of the aforementioned areas nationalism grew as a result of Premier Johnson's activities.

Education

The education issue was highly politicized and as a result it acquired a nationalist tinge. Right from the beginning of the revamping scheme inaugurated in 1960, education was regarded as being crucial to Quebec's social and industrial advancement. Since the alterations in education tampered with some of the traditional tenets of society, it acquired nationalist overtones, too.

In order to facilitate the expansion of the educational system, Mr. Johnson had to do a "volte face".

In 1963, Bill 60 was first introduced into the Quebec legislature. It was predicated upon some elements released in the first findings of the Parent Commission report. Bill 60 proposed to found a ministry responsible for education. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie was the advocate of the bill in the legislature. He was its prime supporter and it was he who was delegated the role of manoeuvring the bill through the chamber. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie favoured the centralizing aspects of the bill and the lessening of religious influence upon the education system. The Liberals had promised reform. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie produced or delivered it to them. But the government moved too quickly. Resistance developed. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie argued that the only obstacle to the development of a modern educational system in Quebec, was the temerity of Quebeckers. He felt that, "In organizing a system of schools, a society defines itself. In the creation of a modern education system, the French-Canadians will show

what they are worth."¹³ The "nationaliste" overtones and implications of that statement are apparent.

Resistance increased. Over time, Mr. Gérin-Lajoie altered his intentions. The bill was withdrawn and redrafted. The religious nature of Quebec education was preserved. When the bill was reintroduced into the House, the role of the Protestant and Catholic commissions or boards was increased so that the respective commissions had a veto over some texts and teachers. Confessionality was maintained largely unchanged. Ultimately, Bill 60 was passed and it became the Education Department Act. That Act appointed a Minister of Education who was,

...responsible for promoting education and assisting the young in the preparation and planning of their future, and for ensuring the progress of educational institutions...¹⁴

The Minister was also given the task of establishing norms for education, and of constructing normal schools, technical institutions, trade schools and other educational institutions except a university or apprenticeship centre.¹⁵

A subsequent but related legislative act - the Superior Council of Education Act, set up a body,

...to collaborate with the Minister of Education... with which shall be associated a Catholic committee, a Protestant committee and boards to make suggestions to such Council respecting various branches of education...

The Council shall:

- a) give its opinion to the Minister of Education respecting the regulations that he is required to submit to it.

- b) give its opinion to the Minister on any matter which he refers to it...¹⁶

In the end, "Mr. Gérin-Lajoie won...in his crusade to centralize and co-ordinate control sufficiently to enable the government to plan ahead for the tremendous expansion and specialization that was essential if Quebec education were to meet the needs of the modern scientific world."¹⁷

Mr. Johnson clashed with the Liberal government's educational scheme. He came out in favour of selective reforms which did not alter the traditional ways of Quebec life. He opposed the centralizing elements of the program and the actual and projected costs involved. He wanted to maintain the ecclesiastical facade of Quebec education. Like most Quebecers he had received religious education. Also, he had for two years attended the seminary at St. Hyacinthe. The latter variant will be discussed elsewhere. Mr. Johnson attacked Bill 60.

He stated that,

...on procède avec hardiesse aux changements et aux réformes nécessitées par les besoins de l'heure, mais qu'on cesse de mépriser systématiquement le passé pour mieux atteindre nos institutions les plus méritantes; qu'on respecte les caractéristiques essentielles d'un système qui a fait ses preuves...¹⁸

...le progrès véritable consiste à parfaire le passé et non pas à le détruire...Il est des valeurs fondamentales qui doivent être conservées à tout prix, car elles sont le tremplin de nos conquêtes futures...Il faut garder à notre système d'enseignement son caractère confessionnel, ...et considérer la collaboration du clergé et des ordres religieux comme un apport qui reste absolument essentiel.¹⁹

To Daniel Johnson, the educational program and the legislative acts which it engendered, were a menace. He argued that

they eroded traditional values and constituted a dangerous intervention on the part of government.

Il est temps d'entreprendre en notre province une croisade pour la liberté, ce qui se passe en éducation-une étatisation de plus en plus lourde pour la personne humaine, les parents, les corps intermédiaires se passe à des degrés divers dans tous les domaines.²⁰

His opposition was pertinent but the government position held sway. The populace came to support government policy, in general. Mr. Johnson was in the minority. The public school sector was destined to grow with only incidental religious involvement when compared with past practice. Easier access to education, by all children, was a crucial facet of the Quiet Revolution.

After acceding to power in 1966, Premier Johnson built upon the educational foundations established during the preceding administration. In certain respects he did a "turn about". His educational policy and position mirrored the legislative and budgetary precedents of the previous regime. His activities in the field were consistent with those of the immediate past.

Mr. Johnson, as Premier, did not hinder the development of the public school sector. He did not give any preference to the private and religious school sector. He did not reverse any of the established patterns of educational reform. Rather, he continued to improve the functioning capacities of both elements. In the speech from the throne of December 1966, he asserted his intent to continue the reform process in education and to continue the balanced development of the Quebec educational system.

In order to render education more accessible, you will be asked to legislate upon a new plan of scholarships and loans to students. Several other bills will also be submitted to you, particularly to revise grants to classical colleges and other independent institutions desiring of continuing their constructive work.²¹

The Premier fulfilled this intention. During his term numerous educational bills were passed which facilitated the overall development and progression of the system.

In the private sector, the Private Educational Institutions Grants Act raised the per capita student allotment to \$350, with the proviso that the curriculum met the requirements of the Education Department.²² An ancillary act, the Private Education Act, set up an advisory commission on private education. The commission was designed as an accreditation body responsible to the Education Minister.

The Minister, after obtaining the advice of the Commission, may declare to be of public interest an institution which, according to the criteria determined by regulation, insures services of quality and contributes to the advancement of education in the province of Quebec, by reason of the characteristics of its staff and the pedagogical methods which it employs.²³

These moves increased subsidization to special or private schools and contributed to the expansion of the whole system. They supported the traditional colleges and institutions towards which Mr. Johnson felt disposed, too. But these moves also increased provincial educational standardization which had been the prime "modus vivendi" during the earlier years of the Quiet Revolution.

In the public sector, Daniel Johnson piloted Bill 21 through the legislature. That bill proposed to create an entire

new level of education within Quebec. It intended to establish the "Collèges d'Enseignement Général et Professionnel" (CEGEPs). Within the educational paradigm, these general education and professional colleges were located between high schools and universities. They were designed as free public institutions organized to complement the labour needs of society. The CEGEP concept was first proposed by the Lesage government. But it was Mr. Johnson's administration which developed and assented to the enabling legislation.

The bill was presented to the legislature for first reading, in January, 1967. It was given royal assent in June of that same year. But its passage was not simple. Mr. Johnson had to overcome many obstacles within the Union Nationale party and caucus. Hansard does not reflect the intensity of the debate. But it appears that many objections were raised against the development and implementation of the CEGEP scheme. After all, the traditional classical colleges were being pre-empted. Their usual role was being usurped. And the Union Nationale party which had always supported the traditional colleges was facilitating the usurpation of their long-standing role.

Mr. Johnson recognized the importance of the CEGEP stragem. His viewpoint had altered. He wanted the bill to pass. He directed the bill's progress with caution and deliberation. He realized that it would take time and conscious effort to win over the caucus opponents. "Il fallut six mois de patience, de déclarations rassurantes, de comités, et d'audiences publiques pour calmer toutes ces consciences timorées qui voyaient

la foi s'envoler et l'agnosticisme s'installer dans notre système d'éducation".²⁴ In the end, the bill was passed unanimously. Mr. Johnson successfully overcame substantial intra-party divergence in order to bring about the passage of Bill 21.

Education retained its position within the budgetary network during the Johnson years.

TABLE I

Education Expenditures (in dollars)

<u>1963/1964</u>	<u>1964/1965</u>	<u>1965/1966</u>	<u>1966/1967</u>	<u>1967/1968</u>	<u>1968/1969</u>
-estimated in thousands of dollars					
332.8	393.8	463.7	541.6	655.8	733.2 ²⁵

TABLE II

Education Expenditures (in per cent)

-as % of total budgetary outlay					
<u>1963/1964</u>	<u>1964/1965</u>	<u>1965/1966</u>	<u>1966/1967</u>	<u>1967/1968</u>	<u>1968/1969</u>
30.2%	27.4%	24.9%	25.6%	26.2%	26.5% ²⁶

Education sustained its number three position within the budgetary priorities.²⁷

Mr. Johnson commenced work on two other educational ventures which came to fruition after his death.

The Council of Universities Act was one of these. It created a council designed to advise the government with regard to the efficiency and role of the universities of Quebec.

The principal function of the Council shall be to advise the Minister of Education regarding the needs of higher education and university research and to make recommendations to him regarding steps to be taken to such needs.²⁸

The act tried to make higher education more responsive to society's needs and more responsible to the society which supported it. The action was quite an adjustment for a party which had previously been very skeptical and suspicious of the need for higher education of any kind.

The University of Quebec Act was the other educational venture commenced during Mr. Johnson's years which came to fruition after his death. It established a multi-campus francophone university in Quebec designed to illustrate the maturity of education in Quebec and the sophistication of the whole educational network. The University of Quebec had an important nationalist image and character. And again, the action was quite an adjustment for a party which had previously been skeptical and suspicious of higher education, in particular, and of education, in general. It should be highlighted too, that Mr. Johnson increased aid to Quebec students. Although the following data does not correlate exactly, they do denote a general trend indicative of a rise in aid to students.

TABLE III

Aide aux étudiants des collègesdu Québec, 1961 - 1967

<u>Année</u>	<u>Nombre de bourses</u>	<u>Valeur moyenne d'une bourse</u>	<u>Montant annuel total</u>
1961-62	\$ 6,658	\$213	\$1,395,500
1963-64	9,300	230	2,140,000
1964-65	10,600	245	2,597,000
1965-66	12,000	260	3,120,000
1966-67	13,350	275	3,671,000

Source: Les besoins financiers de
l'éducation (1964) Québec p. 460 29

TABLE IV

Loans and Scholarships to QuebecUniversity and College Studentsfor 1967 - 1968

	<u>Nombre de bourses</u>	<u>Valeur moyenne d'une bourse</u>	<u>Valeur de prêts et bourses</u>	
Universités	\$16,940	\$860	\$4,561,269	
Cégep	6,123	510	1,637,270	30

Thus, Daniel Johnson's educational policy as it was embodied in legislative and budgetary moves was consistent with the programs and posture of the previous regime. His role in education was complementary to that of the Lesage government. He built upon the educational base laid by the preceding administration. Mr. Johnson helped to modernize education in Quebec. He contributed to the expansion and the improved functioning of both branches of the system. Much intraparty dissension was overcome. Traditional Union Nationale positions were altered. Fears were allayed. Mr. Johnson's policy in this field acknowledged his participation in the Quiet Revolution.

By maintaining support for the transformation of the educational network which included the establishment of the CEGEPs and the University of Quebec, Premier Johnson contributed to the growth of nationalism in Quebec by putting his efforts into the expansion of one of the society's principle means of self-expression and development.

International Participation

It was in the arena of international affairs where Mr. Johnson added profoundly to the Liberal legacy, furthered the Quiet Revolution and stimulated the growth of nationalist Quebec feeling.

International activity was a concomitant part of the process of making Quebecers look inward and outward. The Liberals

had asked Quebecers to define and to redefine themselves and their society. Mr. Johnson did the same thing. He forced Quebecers to question their "national" intentions and pretensions. In the field of international activities, he created concrete legislation which gave Quebec, actual or potential, involvement in the international arena and thus caused Quebecers to continue to question their image and role in the world.

Faithful to their 1960 promise at the heralded beginning of the Quiet Revolution, the Lesage Liberals advanced Quebec's contacts with the entire world. In October, 1960, Mr. Lesage set up the Department of "d'outre frontières" the task of which was to inaugurate liaison between Acadians and other French Canadians within Canada and the United States.

By mid-1964, Mr. Levesque publicly questioned and expressed his concern for immigration from French-speaking countries. He wanted Quebec to increase the flow of French-speaking people to Quebec. He chided the Liberal government for its lack of concern for the issue. He prodded his own government to become more involved. Finally in February, 1965, the Lesage government at Quebec City announced intentions to create a directorate of immigration to stimulate French-speaking or francophone immigration to Quebec. However, time parameters for the implementation of the directorate were not mentioned. In that same month, Mr. Gérin-Lajoie, the Minister of Education went to Paris. There, he signed a monumental educational entente with France. The agreement dealt with the exchange of professors, students, educational experts and with the creation of a permanent joint com-

mission of Franco-Quebec co-operation. It was hoped that similar agreements of co-operation would proliferate into technical, economic and industrial areas. Too, all French-speaking countries were regarded as potential partners in such ventures.

The cumulative effect of these ventures was that Quebeckers saw their role in North America and the world as developmental and expanding. International involvement caused them to look at themselves. The term Quebecker was popularized. The franco-phonie became important. Quebec society matured in a sense.

Mr. Johnson went further than his predecessors in this field. He institutionalized Quebec's legitimate international role. He created concrete legislation which centralized or potentialized Quebec's international involvement.

Mr. Johnson altered the Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs. It was renamed the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. Section two of the Act was changed in a manner that appeared to create the situation where the Minister could become active internationally, in areas where provincial interests and provincial jurisdiction prevailed.

The Minister shall co-ordinate all activities of the government outside of Quebec and those of its department and bodies.

He shall attend to all relations that may exist between the Quebec government, its departments and bodies, and other governments or bodies outside Quebec and to the negotiations of agreements which may be made with such governments or bodies, in conformity with the interests and rights of Quebec.³¹

The new department, its role and Minister were important to Mr. Johnson. He wanted the department and Minister to accommodate Quebec's expansion and development in world affairs, where per-

tinent. "Ce ministre devait s'occuper non seulement des relations avec Ottawa et les autres provinces mais aussi avec tous les autres gouvernements du monde, y compris la France, bien entendu."³²

Immigration was selected as an issue for concern, attention and progress. The Immigration Department Act was proclaimed. The Minister was given the task of promoting and soliciting immigrants to Quebec. He was assigned the task of bringing to the province, people with the necessary skills, able to contribute to the development and progress of the province. He was to base the stimulus for immigration upon firm economic criteria. The Minister and the department were to conduct investigations into the occupational needs of the province. Economic conditions were to be evaluated. Once the occupational inventory and the economic assessment were made, the Minister was to go and seek out the needed personnel. But, language was a prime consideration of the selection procedure. French-speakers were priority candidates. Immigrants with desired linguistic and occupational skills were to be settled in geographical localities where their skills were needed. The Minister was therefore, responsible for settlement patterns within the province.³³

The Franco-Quebec Office for Youth was instituted in 1968. Mr. J. M. Morin travelled to Paris in February, 1968. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the efficacy of giving legislative substance to the 1965 education agreement. Quebec wanted to give increased impetus to the program. The Franco-Quebec Office for Youth was established. It was the legislative com-

plement to the 1965 "entente", signed at Paris. The Office was programmed to encourage Franco/Quebec co-operation and exchanges in the fields of education and culture.

Mr. Johnson initiated plans to change the Labour and Manpower Department. Changes to the Act were assented to in December, 1968. The Act, of course, was concerned with the internal labour situation within Quebec. But when viewed in conjunction with the Immigration Act created by the Johnson regime, one can see that the changes to the Labour and Manpower Act acquired possible international ramifications. That Minister too, was given extraterritorial competence and a potential international role.

The Minister, with the authorization of the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, may enter into any agreement with the Government of Canada and any body thereof, and with any other government or body, in accordance with the interests and rights of the province of Quebec....³⁴

All of the legislation enacted by Daniel Johnson's government which affected Quebec's international competence, had direct consequences upon the internal Quebec scene. As Quebecers addressed themselves to questions relating to immigration, the francophonie, increased involvement with the French metropole and intergovernmental relationships, they had to simultaneously address themselves to the position of their society within the global spectrum, to the definition of their society, to the limits of their international character, to their needs and to their self-perception. All of the aforementioned elements were integral facets of what one could define as national awareness since by dealing with these elements, the citizenry was forced

to look at the adequacy of their institutional and legal apparatus. Mr. Johnson kept alive the process of introverted and extroverted inquiry commenced during the Lesage term and the early phase of the Quiet Revolution and he contributed to the growth of national awareness.

These departmental innovations had the direct consequence of altering Quebec's bureaucratic infrastructure in a way that facilitated Quebec's multilateral relationships with the world. Johnson did this with the conviction that modern Quebec wished to assert its newly found dynamism and that Quebec wanted to co-ordinate, and to regularize its relations with the world. He felt that Quebec had to do these things and that it had to maximize its competence in those fields which were within its constitutional jurisdiction.

International competency was an important aspect of the Quiet Revolution. It was increased during the Lesage period. But, Mr. Johnson profoundly added to the Liberal legacy in this area. He built a sturdy legislative and organizational apparatus upon the limited bases created by his predecessors. He wrote concrete legislation which gave Quebec, actual or potential, access to the international arena and which caused Quebecers at the same time, to continue to define their society to themselves. He, more than any other Quebec Prime Minister attempted to give direction and substance to Quebec's "national" aspirations, internationally.

The Fiscal Question and the Constitution

The constitutional question arose during the mid-1960's and it developed into a potent nationalist-Quebec vs. Ottawa, debate. Mr. Johnson took a strong Quebec nationalist position with regard to the constitution and he directly confronted the French-Canadian type of nationalism represented by Prime Minister Trudeau's type of federalism. Also, Premier Johnson united the constitutional question with his own long-standing antagonism towards federal fiscal policy. The result was that Quebec gained fiscal points from Ottawa and Quebec nationalism was clarified and articulated in a more consistent and reasoned manner by the Quebec officialdom.

The constitutional question was a natural outcome of the evolution of Quebec to modernity. It received directed attention during the Quiet Revolution. By June 1963, the Liberal party was already concerned with the issue of increased autonomy for the province. The Canadian institutional framework was placed under investigation. Mr. René Lévesque for example, spoke of the separatist option as a practical alternative for Quebecers. Prominent intellectuals such as Mr. Jacques-Yvan Morin spoke of the "statut particulier" option in philosophical-legal terminology. Many of these views were radical in terms of

the prevailing mood. However, the government apparatus and the Liberal party along with their provincial counterparts elsewhere, commenced consultation with Ottawa over a hypothetical constitutional amending formula. To Quebec government leaders, it was hoped that a final formula would grant to Quebec greater leverage and participation in its affairs and areas of jurisdiction. The official discussions bogged down.

In keeping with the pace of change and idealism of many Quebecers during the revolution more radical and innovative constitutional approaches appeared. By 1964, Mr. Lévesque and others were disenchanted with the official proposals. They instead, spoke of associate status or independence as the feasible solutions to Quebec's ills within confederation. Quebec's new role and stature could only be maximized through some form of independence from Canada, it was felt.

For his part, Mr. Johnson adopted and articulated a very particular position. His innate conservatism came to the fore. By August 1965, he publicly spoke of the constitutional solution which he favoured but he spoke of it in vagaries. "...la vraie solution, (est) une nouvelle constitution fondée sur la reconnaissance de deux nations égales et librement associées."³⁵ He stated that what Quebecers wanted was, "...être maîtres chez eux, c'est-à-dire maîtres de leur vie intime et de leurs institutions particulières, comme communauté de langue et de culture française."³⁶ In 1965, he published his book "Egalité ou Indépendance." In the book he gave the impression that an ultimatum was being given to Canada. Either Quebec got what

it needed or independence was the answer to the province's problems. However, once in government, he tempered his position and to a degree, he ruled independence out, as an alternative to his government. His government's mandate was to "...rechercher un statut d'égalité par étapes, non pas de faire l'indépendance."³⁷

Even though Mr. Johnson equivocated on the proposed amending formula, he used his non-decisiveness on the issue to acquire fiscal advantages from Ottawa and to articulate Quebec's desire for greater autonomy and to present his view of a "two-nation" Canada. The increased tax concessions and the concept of Canada which Mr. Johnson articulated helped to raise the "national" awareness of the population by presenting them with a new institutional option and by accentuating the nature of Quebec nationalism vis-à-vis the French-Canadian nationalism of Mr. Trudeau.

Mr. Johnson's position on the fiscal question had been one of long-standing. During the second world war, the federal government had initiated incursions into the provincial spheres of taxation. In return for corporate, personal income tax, succession duties and other taxation privileges, the federal government agreed to return some monies to the provinces via cash payments and later, through cost-sharing programs. At that time, Mr. Johnson opposed the idea of federal acquisition of traditional, legal provincial taxation prerogatives.

He was incensed. He made a monumental personal political choice. He elected to follow a man whose ideas on this topic were similar to his own. He joined the Union Nationale, led by Maurice Duplessis. To Daniel Johnson, "...Duplessis (était) le

seul homme politique du Québec de ces années..qui (pouvait) mettre un frein à l'appétit du gouvernement central."³⁸

Mr. Johnson and the chief opposed federal fiscal plans.

For Mr. Johnson, that opposition acquired interesting facets. During the mid-1960s the longstanding dispute with federal fiscal policy developed certain "nationalistic" or "indépendantiste" overtones. This liaison between federal fiscality and "indépendantisme" was tactically appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, Mr. Johnson had only become leader of the party in 1961. In the mid-60s he was still consolidating his party position. An "indépendantiste" or pseudo "independentist" position attracted younger people and some of those disgruntled with provincial Liberal party approaches to the constitution. It suited his own self-interest. Secondly, he could use the tandem issues of provincial fiscal integrity and ultimate provincial independence to score against the provincial and federal Liberal governments.

The connection between those two elements increased with the passage of time. The dual elements became linked more closely. During the 1963 provincial budget debate, Daniel Johnson lambasted the fiscal and monetary acts of Liberals: federal and provincial. He cited the Tremblay commission which had been constituted by the Union Nationale Government in 1953. He said the commission clearly showed,

...the basic principle that legislative power is inconceivable without the accompanying fiscal powers.

Whoever holds the purse-strings exercises real authority. Whoever, pays, governs.

Thus, the provision of legislative powers between the two levels of government, as set forth especially in Articles 91, 92, and 93, of the Constitution, is

meaningless in practice if Ottawa considers taxation as her own monopoly and only leaves to the provinces whatever she will be good enough to let them have.

Each level of government must have complete freedom to raise the taxes it needs, to discharge fully its constitutional responsibilities."³⁹

He argued that Ottawa maintained 75% control of income taxes and 75% control of corporation profits. That was an untenable situation, to him. After all, he countered,

In modern governments taxation has three main functions, 'a political function', namely preserving the independence of the State, which freely obtains all revenues that it needs to satisfy its people's common interest, 'a social function', namely the fair distribution of the national product among the various classes of society - and especially the profits following from the development of natural resources, and 'an economic function', namely the influencing of production and trade to make them serve the common good.⁴⁰

It was the definition of the "common good" which Mr. Johnson regarded as the "Achilles heel" of the Lesage government. Mr. Johnson conceded that his taxation position was consistent with that of Mr. Lesage. He was pleased with the "opting out" formula which Mr. Lesage had extracted from Ottawa. However, he argued that the Lesage government had still allowed the federal authority and the English speaking provinces to establish priorities and cost-sharing programs which touched upon vital issues such as education, social and economic concerns.

...the State of Quebec is alone responsible for the growth of a particular culture, it needs greater freedoms of action than the other provinces...⁴¹

What is possible...is to allow Quebec to retain, in virtue of its responsibility for a given group, those rights, powers and constitutional freedoms of which the other provinces no longer feel the need, since they prefer to entrust to the central government the responsibility for the culture they share.⁴²

By the mid-60s, Mr. Johnson forthrightly demanded a constitutional remedy to Quebec's economic ills and fiscal needs. He wanted to recover for Quebec, the entire field of direct taxation. He sought,

...to bring about the withdrawal of the control power from areas of constitutional jurisdiction which, according to Quebec's interpretation, appear to be reserved for the provinces...to enlarge these areas of jurisdiction so that they will better correspond with present and future needs and will permit the provinces to have a voice in all affairs which in some way concern them...to secure a large measure of fiscal autonomy.⁴³

He categorically rejected the tentative Fulton-Favreau amending formula for the constitution put forward by Ottawa in October 1965. To him, it gave or established "majority rule" as the basis for altering the Canadian constitution. "He...pointed out that the amendment procedure, in short, meant a 'green light for the growth of Ottawa's powers'. The idea was totally unacceptable and Johnson announced that he and his party would wage a 'struggle to the death', a 'suicide-struggle', to force rejection of the plan."⁴⁴

After his rise to power, Premier Daniel Johnson continued his fiscal and constitutional opposition role. Ultimately, he won fiscal points for Quebec. At the Tax Structure Committee meetings held in Ottawa in September 1966, the Premier advanced his fiscal/constitutional thesis.

Prime Minister Johnson's brief was a nationalistic one, calling for massive reallocation of both functions and resources to the province, fundamental constitutional change to recognize the presence of two nations in Canada, and a provincial share of 100 per cent of all majored shared taxes. Rather than turning the shared-cost programmes over to the English

speaking provinces, which was a roundabout way of solving the problems, Ottawa should admit Quebec was different and not try to force all provinces into the same mould.⁴⁵

Tactically, he was brilliant. He united two potent, topical, and potentially explosive issues, successfully. He went even further. At times, he made the conjunction between the two issues more solid. He even postured that they were mutually inclusive and interdependent.

"Johnson...hinted at a press conference that separation might be the only alternative if Quebec's demand was refused,...(He)...reminded Ottawa at the end that he had political support: in a referendum, he told the press, 80% of Quebecers (SIC) would support his view of 'deux nations.'"⁴⁶

...The Quebec government would gradually become solely responsible within its territory for all public expenditures on every form of education, old age security, family allowances, health, unemployment and training of the labour force, regional development, and, in particular, municipal aid programmes, research, fine arts, culture, as well as any other social or cultural service within our jurisdiction under the present constitution. Existing federal programmes in their fields would be taken over by Quebec...⁴⁷

In September 1966, Daniel Johnson's portrayal was dramatic. His brief, "...seemed to presage severe conflict. But it did not come. Inside the meeting, Johnson did little to push for immediate approval of these demands."⁴⁸

At the October meetings of the Tax Committee, Johnson was subdued. Quebec needed money and had, the previous month, had difficulty in marketing a \$50 million bond float. At the October instalment of the meetings,

...Quebec had a short run goal: to get a substantial infusion of funds from Ottawa. It therefore had to frame its demands in a negotiable form, and in a way that would attract support from other premiers. As a

result nationalism was almost totally absent from its brief in October. Instead - Quebec argued in the same economic terms as other governments.

Said one official: In October there was no need to repeat these arguments. He discussed the thing at the same level as other premiers. We knew in September that the October meeting was going to follow. In October the premiers got together and Mr. Johnson spoke the same language as they.⁴⁹

Premier Daniel Johnson manipulated and orchestrated the fiscal and nationalist/independantist issues, perfectly. His approach on the latter issue gave increased credence and credibility to the former. At one point, a special envoy was dispatched to Ottawa to argue strongly in Quebec's favour. Mr. Masse went to the federal seat to press Quebec's cause. These efforts, combined with the tactical vacillations of Mr. Daniel Johnson, were successful.

In 1966, Quebec collected 47% of all personal income taxes, 25% of corporation profit taxes, and 75% of inheritance taxes. As well, Quebec assumed an increased proportion of its social security programs, and demanded from Ottawa the funds with which to finance them.⁵⁰ The federal government in order to avoid giving a special status to Quebec "de facto", was forced to extend to all provinces, the increased percentage of personal income tax allotted to Quebec.⁵¹

Premier Daniel Johnson's pragmatic tactical manoeuvres were commented upon by Mr. J. V. Dufresne in Le Devoir, October 28, 1968, when he spoke of Mr. Johnson's approach to the Tax Committee meetings of 1966. M. Dufresne stated thusly,

"As is his custom, after each of the sittings he made all of the usual declarations which it suits him to

make in order to satisfy an electorate which he believes to be still thirsting for bloody tournaments...

However, at the gaming table of the conference, Mr. Johnson once again, conducted himself in a quite different manner: reasonable to perfection, winning as only he is capable of being, a certain but delicate calculator, saying only what is necessary, and saying it well."⁵²

After receiving fiscal concessions from Ottawa, Mr. Johnson continued to speak of the separatist option. Possibly he did this more to placate his separatist followers and that section of Quebec society. At the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, November 27-30, 1967, the Premier spoke of Canada as the union of two societies whose interests and aspirations had to be met or else all hopes for the future would be dashed.

"Il parle des griefs des Canadiens-français à l'égard de la Confédération, de l'impuissance de la constitution, de la dualité canadienne, du Canada du demain, de partage des pouvoirs, de la question linguistique,..."⁵³

During the conference, he also aligned himself with Messrs. Robarts and Roblin to press for the maximization and return of all fiscal rights accorded to the provinces under the constitution.⁵⁴

At the federal-provincial conference in February 1968, he argued in favour of the two partner concept of Canada, once again. And he restated the need for French-Canadians to provide themselves with the institutions with which to fulfill their aspirations.

Over time, Mr. Johnson linked "le nationalisme québécois" to the issue of federal fiscal policy. He united the constitutional argument to his own long-standing antagonism with federal

monetary plans. In doing so, he netted for Quebec some fiscal gains and some increased manoeuvrability with Ottawa. He also countervailed the strong French-Canadian nationalism and influence exerted by the contingent at Ottawa. Therefore, his moves in this field advanced the cause of Quebec nationalism, too.

In summary, Mr. Johnson stimulated Quebec nationalism via his moves in the field of education, through his actions which increased Quebec's international participation and by his fiscal and constitutional exchanges with the federal government. He expressed Quebec nationalism in an orderly and comprehensible fashion. By giving impetus to Quebec nationalism he bolstered the argument that his policies were consistent with the Quiet Revolution and that he can be integrated into an interpretation of that phenomenon.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIAL POLICY AND PLANNING

By the years 1964/1965, the population was less enchanted with the Liberal government at Quebec City. The education reform program which involved the bussing of some children to centralized and composite schools in some cases, had alienated many rural people. The infamous "boîte à lunch" controversy arose in this regard. Taxes were increasing. The business sector was upset by some of the more "socialist" attitudes of some ranking cabinet ministers. Labour was unsettled too. The non-unionized sector was especially upset when it saw the public alliance and unionized labour components receive substantial wage increases. Unionized labour criticized government intervention into its activities and into the life of the province, generally. The philosophical positions of Mr. Kierans and Mr. Levesque frightened some members of the party establishment and the voting public. To many, Mr. Kierans was not only a progressive but he was seen as a very "left-leaning" progressive. Mr. Levesque's special status and/or independence hypotheses caused concern. Intraparty leadership tensions were also developing and were be-

coming more acute. Quebeckers were ready for the eclecticism and pragmatism of Daniel Johnson. They were ready for societal change at a slower pace. The voting population showed its' preference at the 1966 election. That campaign is described in more detail later.

Generally speaking, in the social policy sphere Mr. Johnson did not halt or reverse the process of adjustment begun by his predecessors. But in the case of social policy and planning he did slow the pace of change. He decelerated the growth rate. He justified Claude Ryan's comments made following the 1966 election:

Un...foyer se développe ra probablement autour de la fameuse question du rythme à imprimer à la politique gouvernementale dans les secteurs clés.....⁵⁵

Industrial Development

In the field of industrial development, expansion and planning, Premier Johnson added to the bureaucratic structure and practice already in place. But his priorities differed. His moves were more in keeping with long-standing Union Nationale philosophy. As a result, his actions were limited, conservative and traditional. As a consequence of these conservative and traditional attitudes and of the differing priorities, the pace of industrial change and development slowed.

During Premier Johnson's tenure, no new corporations like Hydro Quebec were created. No large developments such as the

Manicouagan hydro dam and grid were commenced. Large provincial enterprises or conglomerates were not begun. Instead, limited and rather short range initiatives were taken.

In the industrial sector Mr. Johnson did not do an "about face". Rather he adhered to the Union Nationale posture. He concentrated his efforts upon the small business community. He made modest sums of capital more accessible to the middle level Quebec manufacturer and producer. The scale or magnitude of undertakings rather than their intent differentiated his activities from those of the previous government. Like the Liberals, Mr. Johnson and the Union Nationale wanted to improve the industrial prospects of Quebec and Quebeckers. Premier Johnson's efforts in a minor way, did contribute to economic and industrial enhancement. But he emphasized aid to the small entrepreneur much more than Premier Lesage had done.

The prime characteristics of the Liberal approach to industry and development had been largeness and centralization. The latter element had been particularly emphasized.

For example, in 1962 Mr. Lesage indicated that his government was interested in a centralized bureau designed to further full employment, to regulate the economy and to build a strong public sector. The proposed bureau was envisioned as a co-ordinated and centralized organization having far reaching and in a sense, universal goals. The bureau's orientation was universal in that it was to co-ordinate entirely, the progress of industry in the province.

In 1964, Mr. Lesage and his government passed legislation which instituted the Economic Advisory Council (Conseil d'orientation économique du Québec-COEQ). The Economic Advisory Council Act created a body,

The purpose of such Council shall be:

- a) to prepare the plan of the economic organization of the province with a view to the most complete utilization of its internal and human resources.
- b) to advise the Government of its own motion or on request, on any economic matter.⁵⁶

The Council became extensively involved in the industrial development of Quebec. It commented upon and became involved in significant issues with pertinent long-range implications for the province and its population. The Council had some input into aspects related to the development of Hydro Quebec. It had input into the planning and construction of the hypothetical steel and industrial complex (SIDBEC) at Bécancour. Long-term manpower problems and needs were discussed with the Council. The Council acquired a ubiquitous character as it became more involved in the varied and multifaceted aspects of Quebec's industrial progression.

Mr. Johnson disliked the actual and potential involvement of the Council. He was opposed to the Council's and to Quebec City's increased intervention into industrial planning, economic planning and industrial operations. He portrayed Mr. Lesage's council as a, "...superstructure étatiste sans aucun lien organique avec les régions..."⁵⁷ He criticized the "expert" mentality which dominated the council's and the government's approach. He attacked the council and government respectively,

for their policy of, "...planifier avec des théoriciens seulement en oubliant de mobiliser tous les secteurs de l'industrie qui étaient déjà en possession des enseignements et des résultats de recherches opérées à grands frais."⁵⁸

Daniel Johnson favoured the establishment of numerous regional planning councils which would only be co-ordinated by the province. He conceded that the government had an increasing role to play in the industrial development of the province. He subscribed to this new ethic given credibility and legitimacy during the Quiet Revolution. But he felt the province's role was a supplementary and not a primary one. Mr. Johnson maintained that local and regional initiative were, and should remain, the moving force behind development.

Daniel Johnson regarded the emphasis placed upon large and heavy industrial enterprises with skepticism. He favoured increased aid to individual initiative, especially with reference to small and medium sized entrepreneurs and enterprises. He was cautious. He supported increased industrial assistance to those agents forgotten or ignored during the earlier years of the Quiet Revolution. He wanted to give increased aid to regional boards and councils. His industrial priorities differed with those of the Lesage era. But he still wanted to increase industrial progress in Quebec and to broaden the province's economic base.

In the first speech from the throne, Premier Johnson's new government promised to alter the approach to industrial planning. Mr. Johnson expressed an intention to regionalize the planning approach. The Economic Advisory Council was to be some-

what superseded. He proposed an economic advisory planning bureau which would receive disparate input and stimulus from groups, localities and industrial sectors and which would have a close liaison with the planning technicians.⁵⁹

In July 1968, the Quebec Planning Bureau Act was passed which set up the Quebec Planning Bureau (Office du Plan). The act emphasized the local nature of planning. The Bureau reported via its General Manager directly to the Premier or his delegated minister, so that planning in Quebec was regionalized and to an extent de-bureaucratized. The Bureau was a planning co-ordinator rather than a planning initiator. It was responsible for securing and co-ordinating the planning surveys of the various government departments and the information that they received from communities. The Bureau was responsible for the preparation of plans, programs and projects initiated to further the economic, social, and territorial advancement of Quebec, "...with a view to a better utilization of the economic and human resources and taking into account the peculiarities of the regions of Quebec."⁶⁰

L'organisme nouveau pouvait se mettre résolument à la tâche et s'attaquer à l'élaboration d'un plan véritable ...De plus, la loi prévoyait que l'office, organe gouvernemental chargé de la recherche et de la formulation des plans et politiques, serait flanqué de deux organismes consultatifs, une commission interministérielle de planification groupant des hauts fonctionnaires et un Conseil de la planification, réunissant des représentants du secteur privé.⁶¹

Mr. Johnson, consequently, regionalized, "de-expertized" and lessened the bureaucratic stronghold on industrial planning in Quebec.

Regional industrial diversification was stimulated further through the passage of the Regional Industrial Development Assistance Act of 1968. That act provided that the Minister of Industry and Commerce, with the authorization of Cabinet, could grant premiums and financial considerations to companies which invested or re-invested in businesses located in the north, Eastern Townships, and Gaspé/Lac St. Jean-Saguenay regions. For enterprises building or enlarging their operations or re-tooling or purchasing updated equipment, the government was prepared to grant aid. Consideration to a maximum of \$500,000 was extended to companies located in the north and Eastern Townships which were engaged in one or all of the preceding programs. Consideration to a maximum of \$750,000 was extended to companies doing these things, in the Gaspé, Lac St. Jean-Saguenay areas.⁶² The emphasis and direction of planning changed, thusly.

As has been alluded to previously, Mr. Johnson was disposed towards increased aid to small and medium-sized enterprises. To this end, the Quebec Industrial Credit Bureau came into being in 1967. The Industrial Credit Bureau was a crown agency. It was designed to promote manufacturing industries in the province. But it was not a corporate entity in the genre of the British Columbia Industrial Development bank which aids even marginal concerns. The Quebec bureau dealt only with "bona fide" interests. Loans were granted but were secured with mortgages or with pledges upon real property or machinery. The loans granted were used for the purchase, construction or enlargement of workshops, or manufacturing centres; for the purchase of land, the installation of

machinery, tools and equipment designed for use in the manufacture of a product; or for the improvement or consolidation of the financial structure of a manufacturing enterprise.⁶³

Financial constraints were placed upon the bureau. During the first year of operation it could lend to a maximum of \$5 million. For each of four subsequent years it could lend to a total maximum of \$10 million.⁶⁴ These ceilings indicated that the bureau was not orientated to helping larger entities which could easily have sought and used the total annual budget of the bureau. If not explicitly, at least implicitly, the bureau was aimed at helping the smaller corporate establishments. Mr. Johnson described it in the following terms. "Ce fonds sera destiné à assurer la modernisation de la petite et de la moyenne entreprise au Québec."⁶⁵

Mr. Johnson also hoped to increase Quebecers' participation in the SGF (Société générale de financement du Québec). The corporation had commenced during the Lesage regime. It was a government controlled agency dedicated to direct investment in the province in such manner as,

...to stimulate and promote the formation and development of industrial undertakings, and accessarily, of commercial undertakings in the province, so as to broaden the basis of its economic structure, accelerate the growth thereof, and contribute to full employment,... to induce the people of Quebec to participate in the development of such undertakings by investing, a part of their savings therein.⁶⁶

Premier Johnson's government invested an additional \$5 million in the corporation to aid in the acquisition of land upon which to develop industrial parks, - especially the area designated to support the steel complex and industrial sites at

Bécancour and Trois Rivières.⁶⁷ Mr. Johnson wanted to bolster the confidence of Quebeckers in SGF. Just as he hoped to aid small and medium business, so too, he wanted to attract the small and medium investor.

Mr. Johnson focused upon the industrial sectors ignored by the Lesage government. His major concession to big business was to increase the amount which companies could deduct from net income for monies returned and reinvested into its business. He increased the write-off to a maximum of 30%.⁶⁸ Mr. Johnson maintained that local and regional initiatives and small and medium enterprises were the prime movers of industrial progress in Quebec.

Unfortunately, his industrial strategy was not completely successful. The regions did have more input into planning. They did avail themselves of this accessibility. But few industries located or relocated in the depressed regions of the province. The Industrial Credit Bureau did not engender \$100-\$200 million in industrial investment as Mr. Johnson had imagined. This will be explained later. But even though the Bureau did not engender the kind of investment desired and wished for, businesses utilized its services. Between December 15, 1967 and March 31, 1968 it dispensed with \$1.655 million, to companies all over Quebec.⁶⁹ That amount increased over time.

Mr. Johnson's approach to industrial planning and development was cautious and deliberative. His first budget reflected that approach.

In 1967, Mr. Dozois released the first budget of the Johnson government. Material development investment declined 20%. Government borrowing was reduced by \$50 million for 1966, and by \$75 million for 1966-1967. Government construction projects were reduced in number and scope.⁷⁰ That occurred at a time when recently released reports showed that Quebec's overall development was falling in relation to that of Ontario. Reports indicated that since 1965 Quebec manufacturing and construction sectors had increased 4.9% compared to 8.4% for Ontario.⁷¹

It appears that Mr. Johnson was relying upon a \$164 million addition to the education budget to help the construction and manufacturing sectors. He argued that much of the additional outlay in education was destined for school construction and capital spending on schools.⁷² Both of these measures would ultimately aid manufacturing and construction, he thought.

Mr. Bourassa, the Liberal economic critic in the legislature criticized the budget for being short-term oriented. He felt that, "...le budget ne prévoit rien pour la recherche et très peu pour le développement de l'industrie secondaire..."⁷³ He chided the government's funding of the Industrial Credit Bureau saying that the \$5 million represented an investment comparable to 1/10 of 1% of the province's gross product.⁷⁴ Mr. Johnson replied that, "Ce sont \$5 millions qui en feront tourner \$100 millions ou \$200 millions peut-être."⁷⁵

But Mr. Bourassa's indictment of the short-term aspects of the industrial policy planning seemed corroborated. The budgetary expenditures designated for industrial expansion progres-

sively declined during Mr. Johnson's term.

TABLE V

Budgetary Expenditure in Quebec

Funds designated for the expansion of industry and commerce

<u>1963/64</u>	<u>1964/65</u>	<u>1965/66</u>	<u>1966/67</u>	<u>1967/68</u>	<u>1968/69</u>
-in thousands of dollars					
\$5,900	\$15,311	\$13,362	\$12,952	\$12,488	\$15,059

TABLE VI

Rate Increase over Previous Year

<u>1963/64</u>	<u>1964/65</u>	<u>1965/66</u>	<u>1966/67</u>	<u>1967/68</u>	<u>1968/69</u>
+8.4%	+159.5	-13.3	-3.0	-3.6	+20.6

TABLE VII

Quebec Investment per worker as a per centage of Canada

Year	Primary and Construc- tion	Manufac- turing	Utilities	Trade and Services	Invest- ment and Govern- ment
1964	64.4	77.0	112.0	100.3	110.6
1965	46.6	74.2	108.2	111.4	106.8
1966	43.4	73.4	95.7	119.8	82.3
1967	42.1	74.8	76.7	95.3	79.0
1968	46.0	86.8	67.9	91.0	83.6

Source Private and Public Investment,

Statistics Canada, 61-205, 1972

77

For the most part, Daniel Johnson's industrial and economic strategy was not successful. During his term, private and public investment declined. The Industrial Credit Bureau did not engender the \$100-\$200 million in industrial investment foreseen by the Premier. Few industries moved to the depressed areas of the province. No huge industrial conglomerates were created. Nothing to compare with Hydro Quebec, SGF or SIDBEC came into being during Johnson's premiership.

But Mr. Johnson did put into place aspects of the industrial apparatus which complemented and added to the structure "in situ". He took less spectacular and rather short-range initiatives. He

adhered to traditional Union Nationale postures with regards to industrial advancement. He concentrated his efforts upon local community development and involvement and upon the small and medium-sized businessman. His activities were moderately successful. Local areas were given more institutionalized input and modest sums of capital were made available to the business community outlined above. Premier Johnson's actions in the field of industry and economic development and planning did contribute to the economic and industrial potential of the province, in a minor way. They gave attention to elements ignored by the Liberal government. They also attested to the decline in the speed of innovation.

But when looked at in another way, Mr. Johnson inadvertently provided the province with an enviable position because by not continuing to concentrate upon large complexes involving huge concentrations of industry and capital, Quebec was not permanently locked into long-range specialized areas of development. Later, Mr. Parenteau of the Office of Economic Planning could say that Quebec was still able to control and to decide upon its "vocation économique". It could choose to become, either a natural or consumer goods oriented economic unit, or a mass industrial and highly technological unit.⁷⁸

One example of a large industrial project over which Mr. Johnson was hesitant was Sidbec (Sidérurgie Québec--the Quebec Industrial and Steel Corporation). The Premier committed sums of capital to the project. He prolonged the investigation and feasibility studies. Yet, he refused to make long-term plans or

decisions with regards to Sidbec. Instead he adopted a "wait-and-see" approach.

Sidbec had been incorporated under the Quebec Corporations Act in 1964. The corporation was organized and created as a corporate entity by the Liberals. Its operations were initially of a planning nature. Sidbec was commissioned to investigate the feasibility of creating an integrated steel and industrial complex at Bécancour, across the river from Trois-Rivières. Sidbec was commissioned to investigate its own worthiness.

It became a priority project for the Liberals. Many critics felt that, in this area, Quebec was going too far, too fast. The scheme was felt to be too expensive, too technical and too massive a complex. Mr. Johnson and the Union Nationale criticized it on these points. The Liberal Party was committed to Sidbec. In 1965, Mr. Kierans announced that Sidbec would continue without private capital input, if necessary.⁷⁹ During the 1966 campaign, Mr. Lesage stated that Sidbec was a priority issue to his government and that it was necessary for the continued industrial expansion and economic prosperity of Quebec. The Liberals, he argued, were going to invest approximately \$1.5 million at Bécancour.⁸⁰

Mr. Johnson continued to put forward the criticisms mentioned above. After the election he faced a choice; - whether to continue or to discontinue the Sidbec program. The Premier hesitated. Immediately after the election, Mr. Johnson commissioned the Gignac Report.

Mr. Gignac was the President of Sidbec. In 1966, he was requested to look into all relevant aspects and ramifications of the proposed complex at Bécancour. Meanwhile, all major construction at the site, started by the previous government during the latter period of its reign, was suspended. Mr. Gignac worked hard and one can assume, quickly.

A preliminary report was submitted to the government in late 1966. Mr. Johnson did not release it. In April 1967, Mr. Levesque asked the Premier in the legislature, if anything had been done with the Gignac Report. Mr. Johnson did not reply to the question.⁸¹ It is apparent that Mr. Johnson received the report in mid-to-late 1967. But he would not make it public. In the legislature, Liberal critics claimed that Sidbec was stalled.

Mr. Johnson countered that such was not the situation. He stated that the SGF had \$2.7 million frozen and delegated to the development of Sidbec.⁸² But it was clear that that sum was not enough to accomplish the task. In the summer of 1968, an act respecting the financing of the complex at Bécancour, was proclaimed. It authorized the following capitalization:

Authorized Shares: 20 million shares valued at \$10 each
Provincial allotment or holding: 6 million shares valued
at \$10 each⁸³

This capital investment was consistent with Mr. Gignac's recommendations. Other long-range elements of Mr. Gignac's proposals were ignored by the government, however. For example, the government bill did not address itself to the continued support for

the Bécancour and Contrecoeur operations, with the latter site incorporating parts of Dosco's facilities. It was also planned that the province invest \$12 million a year for five years and buy out the interests of Hawker-Siddely. It was pointed out that a deficit would have to be sustained for the five year period but later, the complex would be self-sufficient.⁸⁴ These long-range plans were not alluded to, in the bill. Mr. Johnson never raised the issue of the projected development of Sidbec. After all, he had been a critic who had voiced the contention that if private concerns such as Dosco at Contrecoeur and Hawker-Siddely at Bécancour could not make the industry show a profit, how could the government?

Despite the intensive investigation of Mr. Gignac, despite \$5 million of actual government investment, despite the increased capitalization of the scheme, Premier Johnson remained vague and elusive as to how the operation and plans for the complex would advance. In 1968, he still maintained that "...je ne suis pas en mesure de vous dire si, oui ou non, on doit faire une aciérie. C'est là ou on était rendu."⁸⁵ During the 1966-1968 period, Sidbec moved forward with caution.

Daniel Johnson proceeded slowly. He prolonged the investigative period. He refused to release Mr. Gignac's findings and recommendations for over a year after the preliminary report had been received. His attitude towards Sidbec highlighted the "slowing down" process in industrial planning and it reflected his preference for development on the small scale.

It should be understood that the areas of concern for the Johnson government---the small and medium sized business concerns and decentralized development, were the spheres upon which the Union Nationale had constructed its patronage network, immemorially. In a positive vein, the Premier's actions provided increased industrial opportunities, apparatus, and diversity for the middle sector of the economy. By so doing, he balanced the moves of Mr. Lesage and he expanded the Quiet Revolution to some forgotten people.

But the ultimate outcome of the Premier's limited actions in the industrial field was that the pace of change and development slowed.

The Language Question

With regard to the language question and the controversy which surrounded it, Premier Johnson made extremely slow progress. Again, his actions were deliberative. He controlled but did not resolve the situation.

The language problem was multi-faceted and it was intimately connected to the educational and "nationaliste" questions. But it demanded a separate policy choice and therefore it has been incorporated into this section dealing with social policy planning.

The tandem questions of language rights and education became acute during Mr. Johnson's term. He tried to cope with the

increasing tension which appeared in the language/education field. He attempted to deal with the issue when he got involved with the Catholic School Board of Montreal controversy. But, his efforts were fruitless. Premier Johnson then discontinued his attempts to solve the problem and chose instead to simply control it.

His moves were crucial, possibly. After all, his interest and attempts to solve the problem kept it in the public eye. His procrastination and ultimate adoption of a problem-control posture allowed the tensions to subside and it allowed the problem to lie dormant until it could be dealt with by a later government.

The controversy over language rights and education occurred simultaneously and coincided with the revamping of the education system. In the early 1960s French-speaking non-Catholics exerted pressures to maintain the confessional character of Quebec schools. These people formed the MLF--"Mouvement laïc de langue française", as a vehicle with which and through which they could articulate their viewpoint and demands. It became clear that the religious orders were losing their hegemony over education. Public authority was gaining ascendancy. Religious tensions lessened with reference to education. But new tensions arose.

As the Quiet Revolution progressed francophone's acquired pride in their ethnicity and language. The revelation that Quebec was becoming more anglicized shocked and affronted many Quebecers. The young were especially concerned. By 1965, it was demonstrated that as Quebec society diversified ethnically,

it also became more anglicized. Pluralism was having an adverse effect upon the status of the French language in Quebec. St. Léonard, a suburb of Montreal reflected the trend. In that area, it was revealed that Italian immigrants assimilated into the English-speaking community of Quebec. Due to the language preference of the Italian population of St. Léonard, the majority sent their children to English-Catholic schools. St. Léonard thus, became a "cause célèbre" for those who wanted to halt the anglicization of Quebec. (It heated up in 1969, especially.) That is how the conjunction between education and language occurred. Those opposed to the weakening of the French language in Quebec used St. Léonard's educational problem as their symbol. To this end, the zealots formed the MIS, "Mouvement pour l'Intégration scolaire". It was a vehicle through which they advocated immigrant integration into the majority French-speaking community.

The situation over language and education heated. Ultimately, the Liberal Lesage government struck an inter-ministerial committee to investigate the nature of immigrant education. The Committee was called the Committee on "Néo-Canadien Enseignement" - the Education of New Canadians.

Mr. Johnson received the report of the committee in January 1967.⁸⁶ The Premier refused to release it to the legislature claiming that to do so would not be in the public interest.⁸⁷ The opposition in the legislature pressed for tabling of the report. In April 1967, Mr. Lesage questioned the Premier about the content of the report. Mr. Johnson evaded the issue.

He did not want to become embroiled in the language/education controversy. He replied that the report would be discussed during debate of the Immigration Act. However, the report did not enter into the Immigration Act debate, later.

The focus of dispute shifted to greater Montreal in 1967. That city too, was becoming less French. There too, immigrants were moving into the English school sector. Some members of the Catholic School Commission of Montreal (CECM) sympathized with the immigrants and supported their assimilation patterns. Since many immigrants were Catholic, the Catholic school system was benefitting. In June 1967, the Premier proposed Bill 22 designed to alter the composition of the Catholic school board. He proposed that the provincial government would appoint more members to the board and thus give the Minister of Education more input into the development of the Catholic school network. In other words, the Minister of Education who was allocating funds for school construction could have more influence over the linguistic character of the schools built. Future St. Léonard s could be overcome.

However, the debate degenerated concerning the CECM changes. Instead of discussing language and education the legislative debate centered upon Union Nationale patronage and the issue of confessionality. The Liberals successfully obstructed the legislature. They filibustered.⁸⁸ Mr. Johnson and the Union Nationale became more isolated. On August 12, 1967, the bill was permanently withdrawn from debate.

In September 1967, Education Minister Bertrand struck a committee to investigate the reconstruction and restructuring of education on Montreal Island.⁸⁹ The Committee was composed of 18 members selected from school boards, parents and students. Its goal was, "Afin de promouvoir la régionalisation et la démocratisation de l'administration scolaire dans l'île de Montréal..."⁹⁰ When St. Léonard heated up again, Mr. Johnson stated that this time, it would be discussed by the committee studying educational reconstruction and restructuring in Montreal. Again, nothing substantive took place in reference to St. Léonard.

When pressed again by the opposition, Mr. Johnson stated that anglicization was a part of Quebec's development. He felt that St. Léonard was not the problem. He believed that no punitive or decisive action by the government was warranted. St. Léonard was reflective of the problems ancillary to immigration. Therefore, the issue would be discussed during debate on the Immigration Department Act.⁹¹ The debate on St. Léonard did not occur. But the Immigration Minister was ultimately given the task of streaming skilled immigrant labour into the French-speaking community.

If one may speculate for a moment, Mr. Johnson chose a very "heavy-handed" way to become involved in the language/education dispute. When he did choose to become active, he ventured to alter the power of the school boards and commissions. He struck at the heart of their function; their power and right to decide upon the nature of school construction and functioning. One could argue that Mr. Johnson contrived the situation. It is

interesting to see how the debate ceased to revolve around language and moved on to discuss confessionality. It is curious how the debate unfolded. Curious indeed!

The issue continued to be contentious. Mr. Johnson's hesitancy to discuss St. Léonard was opportune. The issue cooled. And during Mr. Bertrand's term, Bill 63 was passed which attempted to alleviate concern on the issue. Mr. Johnson's role in the CECM debate and the St. Léonard issue can be viewed as a problem-control rather than as a problem-solving one. He chose to avoid being definitive. It was demonstrative of his "slow-down" posture in the field of social policy.

Social Welfare Policy

In the social welfare delivery system, Mr. Johnson also decelerated growth. His activities were again conservative and to a great extent they were inconsistent with his own once stated personal beliefs. But overall, he did improve upon the system and his actions furthered the Quiet Revolution but at a reduced speed.

In order to look at Mr. Johnson's moves accurately, one must first review some of the key social service innovations made by the Liberals. In essence, they streamlined the entire social service delivery system.

They had modernized the public service and had introduced far reaching universal social programs and measures. They had

established a universal hospitalization program in 1960 based upon the recommendations of Mr. Claude Castonguay. His report had recommended a universal plan supported by federal/provincial contributions. The Health Department had been upgraded and had increased its monitoring and immunization schemes. Preventive public medicine was upgraded. In 1965, Mr. Lesage established the Quebec Pension Plan. It was the provincial corollary in Quebec of the Canada Pension Plan. The Quebec program was universal, obligatory, and was based upon the contributions of the population. It was a transferable plan which gave Quebecers occupational and geographical mobility. It is true to say that under Mr. Lesage's administration, Quebec's government became a servicer of public needs.

Mr. Johnson had opposed the expense of the progressive social measures undertaken during the early phase of the Quiet Revolution. He had opposed the cost sharing and universal nature of many of the innovations. He had objected to the hospitalization scheme because it was a universal program which provided service to those who could provide it for themselves. He had disliked the fact that everyone was taxed and everyone was covered, even those who did not need to be. He had felt that the program's taxation feature created a "new" poor in order to provide gratuitous and superfluous coverage to the "old" rich.

For these same reasons, he had criticized the Quebec Pension Plan for its redundancy and for its deleterious effects upon the economy. The Dupont Committee Report which had investigated into the plan's impact upon the economy supported Mr. Johnson's

argument that, "Le regime des pensions affectera donc la petite industrie..."⁹² After all, small businesses had to contribute to the plan for their staff. That was an added burden to many marginal concerns. To Mr. Johnson, again everyone was unnecessarily taxed to provide a service not required by everyone.

In the social service field Daniel Johnson had favoured, what one will call here, distributive justice. All would be taxed but entitlement to claim would be based upon need. He called it, selective justice. It was more feasible and economically acceptable to him but, "...le poids de ces législations sociales, ...ne doit pas être porté premièrement, dans une proportion trop grande par les jeunes, et deuxièmement, par les gens à revenus modestes. Et c'est là qu'est tout le problème...."⁹³

Yet after succeeding the Lesage government, Mr. Johnson did not alter universality, cost-sharing or gross expenditure in the social service field. Programs were maintained but fewer new programs were created and the deceleration of the rate of social welfare program innovation occurred.

However, the hospitalization plan was not altered. A means test was not introduced. The universal nature of the program was not changed. Some financial wrangling occurred between Ottawa and Quebec City over the cost-sharing facet of the plan and over the nature of the services rendered.⁹⁴ But ultimately, the hospitalization scheme was maintained "in toto".

The Quebec Pension Plan was not altered, either. In fact, Mr. Johnson introduced a universal social service scheme of his

own in April 1967, when the Quebec Family Allowance Act was proclaimed. All citizens were taxed in order to support the plan and recipients received the benefits without having to prove need. But the plan did have a selective justice variant. Universally, it provided funds to families having school age children - 0 - 16 years of age. It also helped low income people and unmarried adults earning less than \$2,000 per year and those earning less than \$4,000 per year and who were responsible for raising a family.⁹⁵

In June 1967, the Quebec Housing Corporation Act was made law. It was a limited plan designed to aid in the construction of low cost housing. The act granted authority to the Minister of Finance to create a \$500,000 fund with which to guarantee municipal loans secured to acquire and improve land and buildings in a way which would increase low-cost housing. The sum was meagre.⁹⁶ But some municipalities, especially the Montreal and Quebec urban communities availed themselves of the service. The move was conservative. But it was needed.⁹⁷

As was stated previously, Mr. Johnson did not adjust the gross expenditure in the social field.

TABLE VIII

Social Welfare Expenditure

<u>1963/1964</u>	<u>1964/1965</u>	<u>1965/1966</u>	<u>1966/1967</u>	<u>1967/1968</u>	<u>1968/1969</u>
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

-in thousands of dollars

130.4	156.2	207.5	230.8	350.2	413.2
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

98

TABLE IX

Per centage distribution of social serviceexpenditure as related to budget

<u>1963/1964</u>	<u>1964/1965</u>	<u>1965/1966</u>	<u>1966/1967</u>	<u>1967/1968</u>	<u>1968/1969</u>
------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------	------------------

11.9%	10.9%	11.2%	10.9%	14.0%	14.9%
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

99

All in all, social policy programming and innovation slowed and fewer large new programs were emplaced. Consequently, the actions taken by Mr. Johnson in the areas touching upon the social service delivery system stemmed the pace of change.

Thus, generally speaking, during the Johnson term, the rate of social policy planning and development declined. Industrial growth continued. Social welfare measures were taken. Important social issues were dealt with. But more conservative and traditional approaches were utilized. Approaches were taken which were more consistent with long-standing Union Nationale party philosophy and tradition.

Mr. Johnson did not halt or reverse the processes of change commenced during the early years of the Quiet Revolution. He simply made the growth rate decline. Change was maintained but the rythm altered.

CHAPTER 5

DANIEL JOHNSON'S NEGATIVE IMAGEANDSOME REPERCUSSIONSOFTHE "SLOWING-DOWN" PROCESS

Until now, most Quebec historians and political commentators have not regarded Mr. Johnson as part of the Quiet Revolution. They believed and continue to believe in some cases, that the Quiet Revolution ended in 1966 when the Liberal government was defeated. Marcel Rioux for instance, argues that it ended definitely when the "ill-equipped" Daniel Johnson was elected in 1966.¹⁰⁰ Mr. Johnson was and is regarded in a negative light. Why? Strangely enough one reason for this negativeness appears to be the success which Mr. Johnson achieved in the 1966 election campaign.

He and the Union Nationale promised constitutional reform, tax reform, greater international competence for Quebec,

"...création d'un régie des relations intermunicipales; création d'un ministère de la planification; rédaction d'un nouveau code de travail; création d'un ministère de la fonction publique; institution d'un

protecteur du peuple (ombudsman); création d'un système d'assistance judiciaire; refonte des lois des coroners, du commissariat aux incendies, de l'adoption, et de l'expropriation; création d'un ministère de l'immigration...établissement d'un conseil national de la culture, création d'un réseau québécois de radio-télévision et d'un centre national du cinéma,...un code de syndicalisme agricole, et un chambre agricole; création d'un ministère de la jeunesse...et...un haut commissariat des sports...révalorisation du rôle du conseil supérieur de l'éducation, création de l'Université du Québec..." 101

The program was interesting. But it was also very general, very abstract. It was not specific. The lack of specificity was evidenced in two primary areas: Mr. Johnson's failure to outline precisely his view of Quebec's future and the nature of his criticism of the government in power.

He and the Union Nationale criticized the Lesage government in numerous areas. They criticized the Liberals for not having altered the Quebec/Ottawa relationship, for not having pressed Quebec's position strongly enough, for economic bungling, for problems with the utilities companies -- especially electricity, for the lack of industrialization within the province and for failure in increasing the average income of Quebecers. But neither Mr. Johnson nor his party offered specific solutions to these problems.

The Union Nationale was general in its election approach. It did not offer a precise definition or view of Quebec's future. It appealed to those who had suffered during the Lesage period of government: the urban and rural poor, those burdened with higher taxes, local communities and their respective elites, victims of administrative efficiency and bureaucratic faceless-

ness, victims of centralization in certain fields, the clergy and patronage seekers.¹⁰²

For their part the Liberals fought the election using the slogan, "Pour un Québec plus fort". They proposed ideas, programs and an image of a powerful more dynamic province. They wanted more fiscal independence from Ottawa, control over manpower programs within provincial jurisdictional areas, industrial advancement and preservation of the French language within the province. They wanted the optimum usage of French within Quebec, an improvement in education and further advantages in social planning and health care.¹⁰³

The Union Nationale won 56 seats out of a possible 107 seats and garnered 40.3% of the popular vote. The Liberals won 50 seats and garnered 47.2% of the popular vote. One independent was elected and won 4% of the vote. No separatists were elected but separatist candidates took 8% of the vote.¹⁰⁴ That latter element was decisive in electing the Union Nationale, especially in urban areas. One should note that the Union Nationale made gains in rural and urban areas.

TABLE X

Some Electoral ShiftsSome Rural Area Seat Gains

<u>Région du Bas St. Laurent-Gaspésie</u>	<u>Elections de 1962</u>	<u>Elections de 1966</u>
Union Nationale	3	4
Liberals	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>
	7	7
<u>Région du Saguenay - Lac St. Jean</u>		
Union Nationale	2	4
Liberals	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	4	5
Gained 1 new seat plus 1 from Liberals		

Some Urban Area Seat GainsRégion métropolitaine

Union Nationale	2	6
Liberals	13	19
Independents	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
	16	27

Garnered 2 new seats plus 2 from
Liberals; Liberals gained 6 of the
new seats.

Région de Montréal

Union Nationale	6	12
Liberals	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>
	22	23

Région de Québec

Union Nationale	8	13
Liberals	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>
	16	16

The 1966 election victory of the Union Nationale was, in a sense, overshadowed by the campaign. In a curious and maybe a spurious way, the campaign tinged Daniel Johnson as a non-progressive player in Quebec politics and gave credence to the hypothesis that the Quiet Revolution had ended.

Daniel Johnson was criticized throughout the 1966 campaign for not concerning himself with the real issues. His general approach to the campaign although it succeeded at the polls, did not succeed in the press. At one point during the campaign the issue was framed and put,

"Le moment venu, pour M. Johnson, de sortir de son indécision chronique et de présenter au peuple québécois des propositions précises sur les grands problèmes du jour...

Prenons le cas des relations fédérales - provinciales, M. Lesage entend faire de ce thème l'un des principaux de la présente campagne. Or sur ce sujet, l'homme qui dirige l'Union Nationale doit avoir autre chose à présenter que des slogans genre égalité ou indépendance! Il doit dire avec précision quel genre d'égalité il préconise, quelles 'modalités' concrètes revêtirait cette égalité, quelles conséquences en résulteraient pour l'équilibre constitutionnel canadien." 106

Unfortunately, Mr. Johnson did lack precision and clarity. This translated itself into the opinion that he was in essence, a retrograde political personality. Retrograde at least in terms of the "révolution tranquille". Mr. Johnson was imprecise. But his election strategy in 1966 was to evade the issues, if possible.

He had learned his lesson during the 1962 campaign. Then, he was never given the opportunity to articulate or to define a position. He did not have a program. The Liberals succeeded in deciding or controlling what issues were to be discussed.

They concentrated upon building the economy, gaining ascendancy over natural resource development and creating jobs. They argued that the means of accomplishing these enumerated tasks was through the nationalization of the electric system in Quebec. Mr. Johnson tried to discuss federal/provincial fiscal arrangements, hospitalization, and taxation. He was ultimately steered in another direction. Finally, he acquiesced and fought and lost the election by becoming embroiled in the nationalization argument and the philosophical attitudes of the Minister of Natural Resources, Rene Levesque. Johnson's arguments favouring a referendum and/or partial nationalization of the electric system were weak and too short-term oriented. He and his party lost. The election issues had been successfully manipulated by the Liberals.

In 1966, Mr. Johnson chose not to direct his efforts exclusively, to the issues raised by the Liberals. Instead he elected to, "...concentre ses efforts sur la préparation du contenu des émissions mettant en valeur son chef...puis sur la lutte comté par comté."¹⁰⁷ He utilized the media and modern marketing techniques: "...il s'agissait de faire percevoir aux gens leurs besoins; de leur révéler qu'un produit existait et qu'il était préférable à celui qu'offraient les Libéraux."¹⁰⁸ He spoke in general terms about the issues previously outlined. The issues which he and the Union Nationale felt were important for Quebec. He adopted an insular approach to campaigning. He surrounded himself with excellent advisory personnel, such as Mario Beaulieu, Jean Loiselle and Gabriel Lalande.¹⁰⁹ He limited

the exchange and interaction between the Union Nationale and the Liberals, especially at the leadership level. He also concentrated upon the efficacy of his own leadership capabilities at a time when strong counter and intra-party pressures and personalities like Gérin-Lajoie, Levesque and Kierans were surfacing against Mr. Lesage.¹¹⁰ Daniel Johnson had learned to make use of the factors of modern electioneering: media, positive exposure, vagueness upon issues, capable advisory personnel, openness and manipulation of the issues. He electioneered with success.

However, in the process, he acquired a somewhat negative image. The low percentage of the popular vote which the party won contributed to the negativism. Mr. Johnson had appeared too evasive; sometimes contradictory and confused. For example, his constitutional position was very vague. Even though he won the election and was adept in the use of modern election techniques, he developed a less than favourable image which made the proposition more believable that the Quiet Revolution had ended and that Premier Daniel Johnson was not in step with the times.

His first cabinet appointments contributed to the retrograde image, too. Multi-portfolios were granted, and many of them went to old-guard members of the party. Mr. Johnson himself held four important posts: Prime Minister, President of the Executive Council, Minister of Federal-Provincial Affairs and Minister of Natural Resources. Mr. Bertrand held the justice, education portfolios and was Vice-Premier. Mr. Dozois was Minister of Finance and Municipal Affairs. Mr. Bellemare

was Minister of Industry and Commerce and Labour.

Mr. Johnson, as has been shown, was a temperate man. He progressed slowly. It should be noted that of the 56 Union Nationale members elected in 1966, 36 had never been in the legislature before. It was understandable for him to be careful. It was consistent with his nature. But nevertheless his first cabinet contributed to his negative image.

Placing Jean-Noel Tremblay in the Department of Cultural Affairs and making Marcel Masse a Minister of State responsible for education were positive moves. Subsequent cabinet alterations and readjustments were impressive. In October 1967, Mr. Cardinal was named Minister of Education and Mr. R. Lussier was made Minister of Municipal Affairs. In December 1967, Mr. Masse was made responsible for the public service. In March 1968, Mr. J-M. Morin was designated as Minister of State responsible for the Commission of sport, leisure and youth.¹¹¹ These changes placed younger, enthusiastic and progressive people into the cabinet. The less than positive image of the Premier should have been dispelled to an extent. But it was not.

Mr. Johnson's first cabinet, his rejection or apparent rejection of a collegial facade to government and the impression that the Premier made all of the decisions, reinforced the negative image of Mr. Johnson which prevailed as a result of the 1966 electoral campaign. That negative image supported the popular belief that the Quiet Revolution ended when Mr. Johnson took power in the province.

But as has been shown in the preceding chapters of this study, Mr. Johnson was a part of that phenomenon. He was a pivotal figure. Changes consistent with the ethic for change commenced by the Lesage regime continued during D. Johnson's premiership. He and his government built upon the established foundations. They were consolidators.

It is true that the pace of change altered particularly with reference to the social policy field.¹¹² It was tempered. It slowed. All movements were deliberate and assessed as were the choices which were made with regard to the 1966 election and the formation of the initial cabinet. But all of Mr. Johnson's careful moves were consistent with his life in general and his political career in particular.

Mr. Johnson was a traditionalist. He spent two years at the seminary in St . Hyacinthe before continuing his education in law at the University of Montreal in 1936. As a student he had been active in the Catholic Youth Association and for some time was on its executive. He was called to the Quebec Bar in 1940 and later became advocate for Chambers of Commerce. He married, had three children and was a typical small-town lawyer, like many Union Nationale ministers. He embodied and reflected much of Quebec's traditional past. This possibly tempered him.

His political career was marked by temperance and deliberation. As has been mentioned, he joined the Union Nationale in the early 1940s when Mr. Duplessis was fighting against Ottawa's incursion into provincial fiscal taxation spheres. He was elected member for Bagot in 1946 and represented that riding contin-

uously till his death. Notoriety and advancement were slow in coming to him.

L'avancement de Daniel Johnson fut lent: douze ans député dans un parti, marqué de gérontocratie, avant d'accéder à un poste ministériel. Comme première distinction, il est nommé assistant parlementaire du premier ministre, comme si ce dernier voulait l'avoir à l'oeil; puis il occupe la présidence des commissions...de la Chambre, avant de devenir vice-président (orateur suppléant) de l'Assemblée législative, postes qui laissent peu de place à l'initiative personnelle. Enfin nommé ministre des Ressources hydroliques en 1958....¹¹³

He was selected party leader in September 1961. Instead of choosing to play the legislative role of alternative government, he turned his attention to reconstruction of the party.

He kept original supporters by appealing to traditional Union Nationale sentiments. But he also actively sought out labour and other progressives and was successful in acquiring people like Faribeault and Cardinal. Mr. Johnson chose to take a thorough and methodical approach to his party's reconstruction and role.

He was a man of great personal charm and wit. He showed concern with people and their problems. Possibly that explains his preoccupation with policies aimed at the "little" people; the middle and small entrepreneur, the dispossessed, and those affected by big government. Efficacy was important to him. He always wanted to keep the, "...pouls de la population".¹¹⁴

Mr. Daniel Johnson was methodical and slow to act. Notwithstanding, he recognized that Quebeckers wanted to assess and re-assess their new programs and profile which had resulted from the changes wrought during the Lesage term. Ascriptive criteria

for success had been replaced by the materialistic orientations of industrial society: consumption and education. But the suddenness with which the change had occurred and the unsuspected and unforeseen ramifications attendant to many of the social alterations caused concern for some people. Mr. Johnson recognized that fact. Therefore, he tempered the course and rate of change within Quebec. He certainly did not stop or reverse the process, as some depict. He simply became more judicious in some ways. He assessed many alternatives before acting definitively on an issue or problem. He was not retrogressive. He assuredly does not warrant the curious indictment of the dogmatic and non-objective Quebec historian Léandre Bergeron who characterizes the Premier as a sychophant to English/capitalist Canada, "... qui était prêt, à tous les compromis pour jouer à son tour le rôle de roi-négre".¹¹⁵

Daniel Johnson was a superb tactician as witness, - his uniting of the constitution and fiscal policy issues. He was a pragmatist. He was expedient. His whole term can be viewed as a lesson in expediency: expediency, in that Mr. Johnson acted incrementally in selective areas and not at all in others. He was less ambitious. He was more moderate. In some ways, these two characteristics acquire the tinge or taint of expediency because they appear to hinder radical innovation which is connoted to be progressive. Thus, the term "expediency" acquires negative value, in this case with reference to Mr. Johnson. Chapter 4 of this paper outlining his "go-slow" approach seems to contribute to the indictment that Mr. Johnson was an expedient figure.

But surely the term can have some positive value. In the case of Mr. Johnson it certainly can have positive implications. After all the tactical, pragmatic and "expedient" qualities embodied in Premier Johnson's actions, for example like those outlined in Chapter 4 were congruent with the moderate political personality which he was and the nature of Quebec society at the time.

Consequently, up to the present time, some commentators have viewed Mr. Johnson in a negative way. Mr. Johnson's 1966 election strategy and the composition of his initial cabinet contributed to his negative image. Mr. Johnson slowed the pace of change and many may look upon that in a negative manner. But they seem to ignore the progress which he made with respect to Quebec nationalism. They erroneously exclude Premier Johnson from the Quiet Revolution. Chapters 3 and 4 of this article refute and correct that oversight.

Premier Johnson did make progress with reference to two fundamental facets of the Quiet Revolution: 1) the growth of Quebec nationalism and 2) the government's involvement in social policy planning. Mr. Johnson's negative image can be dispelled.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL SCIENCE REVOLUTIONARY THEORY

Until now, an historical approach has been used to present the data. By viewing Mr. Johnson within an historical perspective, one can see the continuity of policy and the numerous shared and systematized goals of the Lesage and Johnson periods. Historically, it can be demonstrated that the Quiet Revolution phenomenon extended beyond 1966.

Now some of the fundamental variables of political revolutionary theory will be applied to Mr. Johnson's tenure in office, in order to refine the political perception of the events and to integrate the data more precisely within the nomenclature and confines of the discipline of political science.

Revolutionary data is not a concise body of knowledge. Individual historical trends and personality factors make each revolution a solitary experience. Catalytic forces vary considerably between revolutionary intervals. Sociologists as well as political scientists have written about them. Notwithstanding the disparateness of the phenomena, some common elements can be discerned in the arguments of numerous political scientists. Revolutionary data can be distilled into an analogy or

quasi-theoretical framework which can be uniformly applied to revolution. In this particular instance the quasi-theoretical framework hypothesized is applied to the Johnson years.

Johnson was part of a phenomenon but that the phenomenon was not a political revolution.

To E. J. Meehan, quasi- or analogous constructs are important because they can "...explain perfectly but cannot predict."

116

Quasi-theories, or conceptual frameworks, consist of sets of generalizations, but of a type different from those found in theories. The generalizations that have been established empirically are likely to be weak. Often 'speculative' rather than empirical generalizations are stipulated rather than established ...quasi-theories are not usually manufactured out of whole cloth, they are built with some particular purpose in mind, and they are not wholly unrelated to data. They are built by assuming at the outset that a particular set of phenomena behave like the elements in the quasi-theory, in the analogy or model. We treat the data 'as if' the analogue were a powerful theory. When such speculative structures can be modified and strengthened through application they are a fruitful source of theory.....¹¹⁷

They prove to be a starting point from which further investigation develops. Here, the quasi-theoretical elements are gathered from various writers and put into a consistent model which is applied to a specific data base. Admittedly, it is a starting point and it is simplistic. But it is valid in that it sheds light upon an aspect of political science which has not been analyzed in a consistent way, previously.

Of course, the inherent assumptions and inferences of this approach are important and must be clearly stated. It is assumed that revolutionary phenomena are important to political scientists because they reflect changes in the configuration of power. It is also assumed that the comments of revolutionary

commentators can be united into a "prima facie" quasi-theoretical or analogous framework for analysis. Furthermore, the ancillary problems and inherent inferences of this approach must be clarified: the tendencies to over-rely on the framework and to adopt an inductionist approach to the supportive data.

The danger....is that facts may be forced into a pattern, or that the observer will forget that he is working with a weak analogy...If the dangers are avoided, quasi-theories can be an aid to explanation, prediction, or the conduct of inquiry.¹¹⁸

Having noted these inferences and assumptions which relate to this approach to data interpretation, it is felt here that the data of the Johnson era, deductively supports the quasi-theory of revolutionary activity, outlined.

The Johnson era data contributes to the efficacy of the presumed quasi-theory and legitimizes it somewhat, as a useful tool for analysis. And, by so doing, the parameters of political inquiry are expanded.¹¹⁹

Traditionally, political scientists concern themselves with specific revolutions. But some common criteria and variables can be discerned and abstracted from their respective discussions of specific revolutionary activities.¹²⁰ These abstracted criteria and variables are used to formalize the quasi-theory outlined here, which emphasizes:

- 1) violence
- 2) the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest
- 3) the alteration of the dominant myth of society
- 4) the growth of nationalism and national consciousness
- 5) the modulation of the pace of societal change by the political leadership

The development of class consciousness is a sixth element which can be added to the analogy. But it diverts attention away from the political sphere and forces one to look at extensive sociological and psychological social manifestations. Sociologists such as C. Taylor, C. E. Black, and C. E. Welch, Jr. concentrate upon class consciousness and revolution. Emphasis in that area draws one away from the political spectrum and focuses one's energy on another level of analysis, however.

Violence is the foundation stone of the analogy. It is the fundamental element which distinguishes the political revolutionary process from other processes of change. In this context, violence is the deliberate exercise of force in order to bring about political change: change in the government apparatus or the governing elite(s).

Violence, according to the majority or revolutionary commentators is a concomitant aspect of the process and it is either organized, directed or consciously employed.

For instance, John Woddis, when describing the revolutionary hypotheses of Fanon, Debray and Marcuse, emphasizes the point that,

The theme of violence is a major element in the views both of Fanon and Debray. At different phases of revolutionary struggles the question of violence can arise; no revolutionary shrinks from such a necessity... For them violence is not just a means to an end but a necessary experience in itself; violence is liberation; it is the cleansing fire which tests and purifies revolutionaries. 122

Although Crane Brinton never gives a succinct definition of the word or concept of revolution, he does allude to the important role of violence particularly during the first stages of

the revolutionary process.

...financial breakdown, organization of the discontented to remedy this breakdown (or threatened breakdown), revolutionary demands on the part of these organized discontented, demands which if granted would mean the virtual abdication of those governing, attempted use of force by the government, its failure, and the attainment of power by the revolutionists....¹²³

Brinton highlights the use of violence to outline the period of revolutionary religiosity when the fervor and dedication of those participating in the revolution employ the "Reign of Terror" to encourage loyalty to their cause.¹²⁴

Carl Friedrich says that, "Political revolution,...may be defined as a sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order."¹²⁵ Hannah Arendt sees violence as a pivotal factor of revolution which is motivated by a sense of economic deprivation which leads everyone to want to share in the "good life".¹²⁶ Marx and Marxians see violence as a crucial revolutionary factor motivated by a change in the mode of production which necessitates and dictates social alteration.¹²⁷

Political writers such as Chalmers Johnson and George Pettee use the concept of violence to create and to formulate their respective paradigms and typologies of revolutionary activities.

Chalmers Johnson states, "Revolution is the acceptance of violence in order to bring about change."¹²⁸ He, then uses violence as the accepted ethic and foundation of revolutionary change upon which he formulates his revolutionary typology which incorporates: the jacquerie revolution, millenarian revolution, anarchistic revolution, Jacobin Communist revolution, the conspiratorial coup d'état, and the militarized mass insur-

rection.

The jacquerie revolution is a mass revolt aimed at the elite which it is felt has betrayed the regime. Violence is used to purge society of unworthy elements within the governing strata but the regime (forms of government and/or the governing apparatus) does not change. During a millenarian revolution violence is employed to transform society into a paradise on earth where super-natural forces aid the "faithful" to establish and to maintain a new society. During anarchistic revolutions violence is used by those people who have poor prospects for participating in the old or the new orders and who resort to violence to emphasize their dissatisfaction with their lot. A Jacobin Communist revolution is characterized by a mass revolt whereby the mass uses violence to alter society and to create a more enlightened one. Violence aids in the shift of power and citizenship to a greater number of people. During a conspiratorial coup d'etat, force is activated by a small secret association of individuals which is held together by a common sense of grievance. A militarized mass insurrection is a calculated mass revolution led by a conspiratorial core of individuals whose goal is to change the entire social order.¹²⁹

Chalmers Johnson is a structural functionalist. He regards the use of violence as the normal outgrowth and the remedy for societal dysfunction. Ultimately his typology is predicated upon the concept of violence and its directed usage.

George Pettee has a similar revolutionary construct or paradigm. To him, violence plays an important and integral role

in the displacement and replacement of personnel, formal laws and the dominant myth: the three elements of society, that when once having become polemical and strongly refuted, cause revolution. He typifies revolutions as: the private coup d'état, the public coup d'état and social revolutions. A private coup d'état is a palace revolt led by a small elite group which uses violence to remove an individual from power. A public coup d'état is led by a large part of the ruling elite which directs the operation on behalf or in the name of the mass of society. The ruling elite uses violence to depose the entrenched "old guard". The public coup d'état as depicted by Pettee, is comparable to Chalmers Johnson's militarized mass insurrection. During social revolutions violence is used by the mass to alter the entire power structure.¹³⁰ It is comparable to C. Johnson's Jacobin Communist type.

Consequently, to Pettee and to C. Johnson, the conjunction of violence and revolution is complete. They use the concept of violence---its usage, target and goals, to formulate their respective paradigms of revolutionary phenomena.

To other revolutionary commentators such as Woddis, Brinton, Friedrich, Arendt and the Marxians, violence is also crucial to the political revolutionary process. It is organized, directed and consciously employed by actual or prospective political power holders.

In Quebec, during Daniel Johnson's premiership, violence was not consciously depicted as a political variable through which to alter any aspect of Quebec society or its governing

apparatus. Mr. Johnson never advocated violence as a means with which to effect change in Quebec or with the rest of Canada.

He never depicted violence as a political choice for Quebecers. In the 1966 campaign his generalist or non-program highlighted government reorganization, constitutional reform, tax reform, greater international competence and other unspecific reforms.¹³¹ Violence was never alluded to.

Even during the period of time characterized by the Quebec premier's successful manipulation of the fiscal and nationalist issues, the Premier did not refer to violence as an interim or ultimate mechanism for extracting concessions from Ottawa or for the purpose of acquiring independent status.

At the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference of 1967, and at the Federal-Provincial Conference of 1968,¹³² where he pressed the "special status" option most forcefully, he did not speak of violent change on one occasion. He did not incorporate violence as a legitimate aspect of political action in Quebec.

The absence of violence from the political stage during the period necessitates the conclusion that a political revolution did not occur in Quebec at that time. The foundation stone of the analogy was absent. Therefore, the conclusion must be drawn that an actual political revolution did not occur. Mr. Johnson's term reflected the absence of the essential element of revolutionary activity, even during a period of intense tension and increasing unrest.

The adjective "Quiet" does not qualify the word "Revolution". Rather, it contradicts it. But the phrase or term

"Quiet Revolution" does point out the conceptual problem confronting revolutionary theorists and the fundamental role which the concept of violence plays in that definition.

J. C. Davies comments upon the definitional problem. He believes that violence is a concomitant part of all revolutions and that without it no revolution can occur. That is to say, that violence is the factor which allows one to categorize an event as a revolution. He emphatically states that,

...the definitional problem remains unsolved, and perhaps the problem is not terribly serious as long as social scientists get somewhat more rigorous than some writers have been in describing the New Deal as the Roosevelt Revolution or calling all socio-economic modernizing tendencies in the twentieth century 'the revolution of rising expectations.' 133

The conceptual definitional question and the implications raised by the above citation cannot be overlooked or escaped. It is felt here that violence must be regarded as the fundamental characteristic of revolution and that because of its absence on the Quebec political stage and from Mr. Johnson's plans of action, an actual political revolution was not evident in Quebec during his Premiership.

Notwithstanding the absence of the crucial aspect of revolutionary activity, Mr. Johnson's term did exhibit some of the other salient revolutionary characteristics attendant to the quasi-theory put forward here:

- the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest,
- the alteration of the dominant myth of society
- the growth of nationalism and national consciousness
- the modulation of the pace of societal change by the political leadership

Firstly, it did exhibit the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest--the second element of the quasi-theory.

Observers concur that revolutionary activity occurs in societies where general affluence and expectations are advancing.

...any serious stoppage of what Pareto calls the 'circulation of elites', and we call the career open to talents, or social mobility, would be a very important preliminary symptom of revolution.¹³⁴

Brinton explains that of the revolutions that he studied,

...these were all societies on the whole on the upgrade economically before the revolution came, and the revolutionary movements seem to originate in the discontents of not unprosperous people who feel restraint, cramp, annoyance, rather than downright crushing oppression.¹³⁵

These revolutions took place "...in societies increasingly influenced by the 'Industrial Revolution', increasingly subject to those changes in scale which our modern conquests of time and space have brought to societies." ¹³⁶

...(R)evolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of reversal, during which an intolerable gap develops between expectations and gratification.¹³⁷

During Mr. Johnson's term average incomes increased and the levels of general expectation increased too--educational, economic and social amenity horizons continued to expand.

TABLE XI


Revenu personnel par habitant au Canada et au Québec

	<u>Canada</u>	<u>Quebec</u>
1951	\$1,130	\$ 928
1961	1,651	1,489
1966	2,303	2,055
1971	3,414	3,028

138

TABLE XII

Traitements et salaires hebdomadaires moyens,
par industrie, Québec, 1967-1972



139

TABLE XIII
Taux de scolarisation par âge,
Québec, 1961 à 1981

Age	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
4	3.8	3.9	5.1	9.2	12.8	16.6	18.4	21.0	23.0	24.8	24.9	25.0	24.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
5	52.2	57.7	62.4	62.7	65.8	73.1	78.8	86.8	88.9	91.0	91.0	91.2	91.3	91.4	91.5	91.7	91.8	91.9	92.0	92.3	92.5
6	100.4	98.0	101.8	99.8	98.5	97.5	98.2	96.9	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
7	99.7	100.9	97.9	101.4	98.8	98.1	99.2	98.9	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
8	97.2	99.9	100.5	98.1	100.0	97.3	98.7	99.4	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
9	96.9	97.3	99.5	100.4	96.4	100.3	98.3	99.3	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
10	97.9	96.3	96.6	99.6	99.4	94.9	100.4	98.1	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
11	95.9	96.9	95.5	97.1	100.3	104.2	97.0	100.3	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
12	96.9	95.7	96.7	95.8	97.3	95.8	99.3	95.2	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
13	95.4	96.1	95.2	96.6	95.2	97.4	95.1	98.6	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5	98.5
14	92.4	90.6	91.3	91.3	92.4	93.7	95.4	94.4	95.0	95.5	96.0	96.5	97.0	97.5	97.8	98.0	98.0	98.0	98.0	98.0	98.0
15	74.6	79.6	79.5	83.1	81.5	86.1	88.1	90.5	91.5	93.0	93.5	94.0	94.5	95.0	95.3	95.8	96.0	96.3	96.5	96.8	96.8
16	51.0	57.3	62.3	64.3	65.0	68.6	72.3	77.8	80.5	82.5	84.0	85.6	87.3	88.5	89.6	90.7	91.2	91.5	91.5	91.5	91.5
17	30.9	34.8	37.9	41.5	43.3	45.1	48.7	54.4	57.5	60.5	63.0	65.7	68.0	70.1	71.5	72.8	73.5	73.8	74.0	74.3	74.5
18	16.0	19.1	21.2	23.5	26.6	27.1	28.9	33.0	35.0	37.0	39.0	40.5	42.0	43.0	44.0	44.7	45.5	45.0	46.4	46.9	47.5
19	10.3	11.2	12.2	12.9	15.7	16.7	17.2	20.9	22.0	23.0	23.5	24.0	24.7	25.5	26.5	27.2	28.2	29.0	29.0	29.0	29.0
20	7.3	7.3	7.7	8.8	8.6	8.6	8.2	8.2	10.5	12.0	14.0	16.0	17.8	19.0	19.5	19.7	19.9	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
21	3.1	4.3	4.0	6.0	7.0	8.0	8.5	8.6	8.8	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.9	10.0
22	1.4	1.8	1.8	3.2	4.0	5.0	5.5	5.7	6.0	6.3	6.5	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.5	7.8	8.0
23	0.7	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.9	3.0
24	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1

In the field of the economy, he concentrated his efforts upon the small and medium sized business community. He favoured increased aid to individual initiative, especially with reference to the afore-mentioned entrepreneurs and enterprises. He established an economic advisory planning bureau. It received disparate input and stimulus from groups, localities and industrial sectors and had a close liaison with planning technicians. The Quebec Industrial Credit Bureau Act 1967, implicitly aided small and medium sized concerns while the Quebec Planning Bureau Act (Office du Plan) 1968, sought to diversify, regionalize, "de-expertize" and to advance the economic life and development of the province. Overall, Mr. Johnson provided increased opportunities for numerous geographical areas of the province and for the middle sector of the economy. He increased the actual and potential horizons of economic activity and development.

He expanded the social amenity horizons and expectations of the population. Government services increased. The Quebec Family Allowance Act 1967, the Quebec Housing Corporation Act 1967, the office of the ombudsman, increased the service delivery system of the provincial government and the population's expectations from government. Social service sector allocations remained at approximately, 15.4% of total budgetary expenditure.

During Mr. Johnson's term, average incomes increased and the levels of general expectation increased too-educational, economic and social amenity horizons expanded.

But unrest advanced or increased, as well. The constitutional issue surfaced, labour militancy increased. But the major

thrust of this unrest was largely peripheral and directed at external agents. The unrest which did evolve came to be directed at the external English-speaking communities of North America; English-speaking Canada, and the United States. These two communities were perceived as antagonists of the new dynamic and dynamism of Quebec society. English-Canada was seen by many as a constitutional and cultural constraint and the U.S. was seen by many as an economic colonizer. Internally, no cramps or reversals hindering the development of Quebec appeared during Mr. Johnson's term and he successfully channelled the unrest which did develop to external variables. That was the case especially with regard to the constitution.

All the same, Quebec during Mr. Johnson's term did exhibit the second element of the analogy--the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest.

The paramount element of the analogue evidenced during the Johnson period was the continued alteration of the prevailing myth of the society.

To revolutionary writers, myth is a very important facet of the revolutionary process.

It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision or 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution. ¹⁴¹

A revolutionary state of mind requires the continued, even habitual but dynamic expectation of greater opportunity to satisfy basic needs, which may range from merely physical (food, clothing, shelter, health, and safety from bodily harm to family and friends) to the need for equal dignity and justice.¹⁴²

Individual and collective perceptions play a key role in the revolutionary process. Levi-Strauss says that myths link

...the different levels involved in the evolution of social life. These levels range from the forms of techno-economic activity to the systems of representation, and include economic exchanges, political and familial structures, aesthetic expression, ritual practices, and religious beliefs.¹⁴³

Le mythe...utilise une structure pour produire un objet absolu offrant l'aspect d'un ensemble d'événements.... 144

To him, myth plays a significant role in the integration of society.

L'ensemble constitue donc une sorte d'appareil conceptuel, qui filtre l'unité à travers la multiplicité, la multiplicité à travers l'unité, la diversité à travers l'identité et l'identité à travers la diversité. 145

The existence of a common myth requires a long and complicated development from original conception or invention through elucidation and elaboration and diffusion, until it is received by considerable numbers of individuals in the given society. This does not mean that the new myth is already widely received before the revolution. But it is accepted by a nucleus capable of receiving the consent of the great majority...after the revolution begins..¹⁴⁶

Myth is conceived by the principal writers cited here, as a developmental process the basic function of which is, "...to govern present action towards future hopes." ¹⁴⁷

Myth is an important element of political culture because a society's self-identity and declared purpose is a principal binding force which integrates its members. In a society undergoing rapid change, integration is of prime significance.

The concept of integration as used in this connection means in particular that the individual's ties with local, regional, and other intermediate structures are reduced at the same time that his ties with the larger and more diffuse urban and industrial network are strengthened. ¹⁴⁸

In the paroxysm of revolution the prevailing myth usually completely alters. In Quebec, the prevailing myth underwent a complete and rapid metamorphosis.

During the Johnson term the myth or dominant political culture was more "down-to-earth" and less technocratic than during the years 1960-1966. It was in direct contrast to the myth perpetrated during the Duplessis years.

Prior to 1960, although social indicators showed that urbanization and industrialization were in progress, as indicated in the first chapter of this work, the prevailing myth was that Quebec was a traditional agrarian society. Forces worked to perpetuate that conservative agrarian bias and perception, particularly the political leadership and "...le pouvoir politique incarné au Québec depuis 1936 jusqu'en 1960 par l'Union Nationale et son chef, Maurice Duplessis. S'appuyant sur les populations rurales et sur une bonne partie du clergé qui contrôlait ces populations, ce parti mettait en pratique cette idéologie de conservation qui s'est perpétuée au Québec pendant de nombreuses décennies...Etre Québécois pendant les années noires du duplæssisme n'était pas un attribut dont on se vantait volontiers. Pour détronner Duplessis, il fallait bien l'attaquer et dénoncer tous ceux qui,--éducateurs, politiciens, élites professionnelles--étaient responsables du fait que le Québec était le seul Etat féodal, 'North of the Rio Grande.'"¹⁴⁹

The Liberals set about consciously to alter that myth. Quebec was modernizing. Social mobility was evident. The old myth was no longer relevant.

Social mobility was important because it "...brings about a change in the quality of politics...As people are uprooted from their physical and intellectual isolation in their immediate localities, from their old patterns of occupation and places of residence, they experience drastic changes in their needs. They...come to need provisions for housing and employment, for social security...for medical care....",¹⁵⁰ and for other social services.

In this vein, the Liberals introduced interesting reforms in education, economic and industrial planning, social welfare and international relations as indicated in Chapters one, two, and three of this article. The cumulative effect of these changes was the redefinition, the reinterpretation of the myth or perception governing the political and social development of the province. The Lesage group legitimized the ethic of change and the acceptance of modern values: industrialization, urbanization, economic progress--factors which in most industrial societies, are considered to be facets of the "good life".

Premier Johnson consciously took actions which continued to alter the prevailing myth of Quebec society. He realized that Quebeckers wanted to share and to participate in the "good life". He continued to react to the concrete changes which had occurred and which were continuing unabated.

He enacted decisions and reforms in education, economic and industrial planning, social welfare and international relations as indicated in Chapters 3, and 4 of this article. The cumulative effect of these changes and policies was the contin-

ued redefinition, reinterpretation of the myth or perception governing the political and social development of the province.

His innovations kept alive the process of introverted and extroverted social inquiry and stimulated the population to continue to define its needs and self-perception. His activities continued to advance the ethic for change and faith in the modern values which had been legitimized by the Lesage group.

The myth element of the dominant political culture was more realistic and less technocratic. It was in contrast to the agrarian myth perpetrated during the Duplessis years and the technocratic political culture engendered during the Lesage years.

Mr. Johnson's lack of definitive judgements and actions in some spheres such as language/education, Sidbec, and the constitution illustrated his caution in areas which he felt had far reaching implications for Quebec and its welfare. The Premier's non-decisiveness prolonged the reassessment and questioning process going on in Quebec at the time.

Thus, Mr. Johnson contributed to the alteration of the prevailing perception of Quebec society. Perception was consciously and deliberately altered by him and his predecessors. It shifted to a view more compatible with demographic realities. Perception was contemporized by him. He adopted the modernization scheme and policies and positions which were consistent with the dominant political culture or the re-mythification process.

Myth alteration and its societal integration elements are crucial aspects of revolutionary doctrine. In many cases myth

alteration or the belief in it, is the catalyst for revolution--violent, political revolution. In Quebec the myth altered sharply and quickly. Too quickly for some people. Mr. Johnson's term prolonged the re-mythification process.

The fourth element was also present--the growth of nationalism and national consciousness.

Nationalism during Mr. Johnson's term of office, increased. Confidence and pride increased. Just as Mr. Gérin-Lajoie had used an appeal to self-pride and self-image to support his views on educational reform, Mr. Cardinal used similar appeals to proliferate Quebec's ties with France and the francophonie.

Mr. Johnson's alteration of the Federal-Provincial Affairs/Intergovernmental Affairs Department Act, the Manpower Act, the creation of the Office of Franco-Quebec Youth, and his initiation of the Immigration Act, institutionalized Quebec's legitimate international role and created concrete legislation which actualized or potentialized Quebec's international involvement. These actions continued to raise the level of national consciousness in the province and gave expression to Quebec's growing national awareness.

Mr. Johnson encouraged foreign states to acknowledge Quebec's aspirations and intentions in this area. In September 1966, French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville visited Quebec and in May 1967, Mr. Johnson reciprocated by going to Paris. In February 1968, Quebec attended an educational conference held at Libreville, Gabon.

Il serait toutefois erroné de prétendre que le Québec a, de ce fait, acquis une personnalité internationale, même dans les domaines de sa compétence. Disons que, par la force des choses, il est devenu, parmi les provinces du Canada, le premier conseiller du gouvernement fédéral pour les conférences francophones.¹⁵¹

In that sense, even Ottawa came to recognize the expression of Quebec's increasing "national" awareness.

Premier Johnson enlarged upon Quebec's international role and posture in a substantive way and by so doing, he bolstered the province's sense of identity and "national" direction. He reflected the process going on in the social order which united and redefined the traditional linguistic, religious and cultural sentiments with the concepts of territoriality, constitutional competence and economic progress. Nationalism was part of the neo-mythology. Mr. Johnson's efforts, in aggregate, advanced the growth and expression of the province's "national" consciousness. An element of the quasi-theory of revolution, to which Premier Johnson contributed significantly.

The last element of the analogy exhibited during Mr. Johnson's term was the modulation of the pace of change during the revolutionary cycle, by the political leadership. Crane Brinton calls the period subsequent to rapid change, the Thermidor or period of quiescence. The pace slackens. Change becomes an end rather than merely a means to an end. After studying numerous revolutionary experiences Hagopian says

A re-examination of earlier revolutions and an evaluation of the revolutionary experiences of the past three decades suggests that each revolution gives birth to forces that tend to push it onward (hypertrophic forces) and forces that tend to wind it down (entropic forces)¹⁵²

...for the great mass of men the Thermidor means a 'depoliticization' of everyday life insofar as they turn their backs on high-blown ideological goals and return to the more prosaic pursuits of making a living and enjoying the simpler pleasures of existence.¹⁵³

The Thermidor in the revolutionary cycle occurs in the interlude succeeding the evangelical period but preceding the institution of a new and secure governing apparatus. Political moderates take to the stage and deliberately slow the pace using various methods. Mr. Johnson's term coincided with the equivalent of a Thermidor period in Quebec. During the Lesage era the pace of change and reform was rapid and often frantic. The rapidity of events gave rise to the fervour demonstrated sporadically by people such as Rene Levesque and Eric Kierans.

As indicated in Chapter 4, Mr. Johnson slowed the pace of change but he did not alter or deviate from the ethic of change, itself. He represented the Thermidor equivalent in the rapid evolutionary situation evident in Quebec at the time. His actions with reference to language and industrial development, in particular demonstrated the Premier's desire to keep long range options and alternatives viable and open. In these policy areas Mr. Johnson proceeded with caution and deliberateness. He purposely controlled the pace and slowed it. Studies and commissions increased in number.*

The new myth was also being articulated more forcefully by Mr. Johnson. It was being consolidated. Therefore, one might think it was wise to go slow and make sure that the government was not outpacing the population as had happened before.

*See Reference 112

Mr. Johnson's reduction of the rate of change in Quebec represented the Quebec equivalent of the Thermidor of the revolutionary cycle. It represented the consolidatory period, the interstitial period when the new myth received further elucidation and when the population settled in and attempted to accustom itself to the new political and social situation.

During Premier Johnson's government, Quebec reflected the fifth element of the quasi-theoretical framework which is the modulation of pace of societal change by the political leadership.

Subsequently, four of the five aspects of the theoretical analogy put forward or proffered here were present in Quebec while Mr. Johnson was premier. However, the foundation stone or crucial variable was not present: violence. Therefore, one must conclude that a political revolution did not occur there even though other elements of the analogy were present.

Before concluding, possibly further discussion of the analogy should be undertaken along with a discussion of an interesting aspect of the national consciousness variable.

The analogy is helpful as a tool for data synthesis and application. It is also useful as a standardized method for deciding if a phenomenon qualifies as a revolution. It is synthetic in that it is a composite of disparate data elaborated upon by numerous commentators and that it is an artificial construct. But it is functional and thus, contributes to the data and analytical base of political science and political inquiry.

An interesting element of the analogy or quasi-theory of revolution outlined is that violence is fundamental to revolution.

In a political revolutionary experience, conscious, directed and organized violence must be used by a politicized or political sector of the population to alter the political scene. Without violence there can be no political revolution. That statement is polemical. But surely it has to be. Social scientists must in some cases, arbitrarily decide to define terms and to apply them rigidly. Here, the writer has chosen albeit arbitrarily to accept the definitional proposition of J. C. Davies outlined previously. And once having accepted that definitional proposition, this writer chose to use violence as the crucial or determining element of the analogy of what constitutes or defines a revolution.

This analogy or quasi-theoretical framework is not a primer of revolutionary activity. It does not answer the question: How does one make revolution? That question is dependent upon numerous and in many cases, unpredictable and subliminal historical and catalytic forces endemic to the local environment and scene. Rather, this analogy answers the question: What elements are common to political revolutions? It puts forward and applies generic qualities rather than strict causal explanations and relationships.

As presented, it argues that violence, the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest, the alteration of the dominant myth of society, the growth of nationalism and national consciousness, and the modulation of the pace of societal change by the political leadership connote a phenomenon as being a political revolution. But violence must

be present. Without it, any or all of the remaining four variables--whether present singularly or in combination, do not connote revolution.

The analogy constructed here could also be applied to what is conventionally called "revolutions of the right." If those phenomena incorporated violence and any or all of the four other elements then they can be identified as political revolutions. One should be cognizant of the fact that the coup d'état as outlined in C. Johnson's and G. Pettie's respective typologies hold out the spectre of naming "revolutions of the right" as actual political revolutions. For instance, Goulart in Brazil, and Franco in Spain, and Amin in Uganda conducted successful political revolutions of the "right".

Before closing, one further comment should be made with regard to Quebec and item number four--the growth of nationalism and national consciousness. Nationalism in Quebec has traditionally been directed toward external "threats". During Mr. Johnson's term that continued to be the case. Anglophone Canada was the target of nationalist fervour. Since it was perceived by a majority of Quebecers that anglophones did not block the social mobility of Quebecers within Quebec or impinge upon any of the new educational and employment horizons of the Quebec population no "cramps" as Pettie says, developed which would have occasioned Quebecers to enter into a violent revolutionary confrontation with anglophones. By continuing to externalize the target of their nationalism no internal societal blockages received or captured the focus of the growing nationalism and there-

fore, the violence variable was never activated. Nationalism in this case may therefore be seen as possibly having defused a revolutionary situation.

In summary, the operative variant separating Mr. Johnson's regime from that of Lesage was the pace of change within the context of the Quiet Revolution. Mr. Johnson was part of the revolutionary scene. His legislative budgetary moves were consistent with the aspirations of the revolution and with its growth under the previous regime. He built upon some of the issues, themes and foundations laid down by Lesage. In so doing, he provided impetus for the "revolution tranquille". He broadened its scope and aggregated more of the population into its stream. It went beyond 1966 and it came to include during Johnson's stewardship, some people previously ignored.

With regard to political science as a discipline revolutionary elements and commentary were applied to the phenomenon under discussion. Violence was absent but the other elements were present;

- the dynamic of increasing affluence, rising expectations and increasing unrest
- the alteration of the dominant myth of society
- the growth of nationalism and national consciousness
- the modulation of the pace of societal change by the political leadership

In terms of the political science theory pertaining to revolutionary phenomena, the analogy used here and its application to the Quebec experience helps to accentuate the definitional

dilemma confronting political scientists. That dilemma is namely--Is violence the crucial element depicting a phenomenon as being revolutionary? This writer feels that violence is the crucial element of the definition.

It was the fact that violence neither became part of the official political rhetoric nor an integral part of the dominant political culture which enabled Mr. Johnson, a moderate, to sustain societal alteration and to further two primary aspects of the Quiet Revolution: Quebec nationalism and social policy planning.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1 M. Rioux, "Sur l'évolution des idéologies au Québec", Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, Bruxelles, l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1968, p. 109.

2 A Conspectus of Canada, Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada publication, January 1967, p. 77.

3 A. Raynauld, "The Quebec Economy: A General Assessment", in D. C. Thompson, Ed., Quebec Society and Politics, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973, p. 143.

4 Conspectus, p. 77.

5 Rioux, Revue, pp. 111-112.

6 Loc. cit.

7 Ibid., pp. 119-120.

8 M. Bernard, Le Quebec Change de Visage, Montreal, Plon, 1964, p. 33.

9 Le Devoir, "L'autonomie....", mercredi, 20 avril 1960, p. 1.

10 Le Devoir, "Les Libéraux au Pouvoir", jeudi, 23 juin 1960, p. 1.

11 T. Sloan, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1965, introduction p. xi.

12 Globe and Mail, "Quebec Liberals Sweep Back", Thursday, November 15, 1962, p. 1

13 Sloan, Quebec, p. 37.

14 Quebec, Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec, 1964, Vol. III, Chapter 233, p. 882.

15 Quebec, Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec, 1964, Vol. III, Chapter 233, p. 882.

16 Ibid., Chapter 234, pp. 885-887.

17 Sloan, Quebec, p. 41

18 D. Johnson, Rôle de L'Etat Québécois, Québec, publié par le Service d'information d'UN, January 1962, p. 26.

- 19 Ibid., p. 7.
- 20 Le Devoir, "Johnson: Le temps est venu au Québec....", mardi, 4 février 1964, p. 5.
- 21 Quebec, Débats de l'Assemblée législative du Québec (hereinafter cited as Debats), Première Session, 28e Législature, le jeudi, 1 décembre 1966, Vol. 5, No. 1, p.6.
- 22 Quebec, Revised Statutes, 1967, Chapter 67, p. 355.
- 23 Loc. cit.
- 24 J. Proulx, Le panier de crabes, Montréal, Editions Parti Pris, 1971, p. 48.
- 25 Quebec, Quebec Yearbook, 1972, "Expenditure of the Province of Quebec, p. 817.
- 26 Loc. cit.
- 27 Loc. cit.
- 28 Quebec, Statuts de la Province de Québec, 2nd session, 28e legislature, Chapter 64, p. 419.
- 29 Quebec, Annuaire du Québec: 1966-1967, p. 460.
- 30 Quebec, Annuaire du Québec: 1972, p. 278.
- 31 Quebec, Statuts, première session, 28e législature 1967, Chapter 23, p. 139.
- 32 J. Proulx, Le panier, p. 51.
- 33 Quebec, Statuts, première session, 28e législature, 1967, Chapter 68, pp. 465-466.
- 34 Ibid., Chapter 43, pp. 257-258.
- 35 Le Devoir, "Johnson....", le vendredi, 13 août 1965, p. 5
- 36 Loc. cit.
- 37 Le Devoir, "Johnson....", le samedi, 2 décembre 1967, p. 1.
- 38 J. L. Laporte, Daniel Johnson, cet inconnu, Montréal, Librairie Beauchemin Ltd, 1968, p. 43.
- 39 F. Scott and M. Oliver, eds., Quebec States Her Case, Toronto, MacMillan of Canada, 1964, p. 35.

- 40 Ibid., p. 36.
- 41 R. Jones, Community in Crisis, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972, p. 31.
- 42 Ibid., p. 33.
- 43 Ibid., p. 97.
- 44 Ibid., p. 120.
- 45 R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The making of recent policy in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 77.
- 46 Ibid., pp. 78-79.
- 47 Ibid., p. 178.
- 48 Ibid., p. 77.
- 49 Ibid., pp. 178-179.
- 50 E. M. Corbett, Quebec Confronts Canada, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, p. 245.
- 51 Loc. cit.
- 52 Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p. 235.
- 53 R. Ares, S. J., Nos grandes options politiques et constitutionnelles, Montréal, Les éditions Bellarmin, 1972, pp. 60-61
- 54 "The Confederation of Tomorrow Conference", Proceedings, Toronto, November 27-30, 1967, pp 50-89.
- 55 Le Devoir, "Les choix que devra faire l'équipe Johnson", editorial C. Ryan, jeudi, 16 juin 1966, p. 4.
- 56 Quebec, Statuts, 1964, Chapter 17, p. 547.
- 57 Johnson, Role, p. 35.
- 58 Quebec, Débats, 6e session, 27e législature, le vendredi, 4 mars 1966, Vol. 4, No. 20, pp. 1032-33.
- 59 Loc. cit.
- 60 Quebec, Statuts, 2e Session, 28e législature, 1968, Chapter 14, p. 126.

61 G. Gagnon and L. Martin, Québec: 1960-1980: La Crise du développement, Montréal, Editions Hurtubise, 1973, p. 178.

62 Quebec, Statuts, 2e session, 28e législature, 1968, Chapter 27, p. 195.

63 Quebec, Statuts, première session, 28e législature, 1967, Chapter 56, p. 314.

64 Loc. cit.

65 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 16 mars 1967, Vol. 5, No. 40, p. 1798.

66 Quebec, Revised Statutes, 1962, Chapter 54, pp. 233-34.

67 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 20 juillet 1967, Vol. 5, No. 96, p. 4915.

68 Quebec, Statuts, première session, 28e législature, 1967, Chapter 28, p. 202.

69 Quebec, Débats, 3e session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 2 mai 1968, Vol. 7, No. 32, pp. 1308-11.

70 Le Devoir, "Le requisitoire de M. Bourassa contre le budget Dozois", article by P. Cliche, le Vendredi, 31 mars 1967, p. 1

71 Le Devoir, "Urgence d'une politique de développement industriel", editorial by C. Ryan, le mercredi, 22 mars 1967, p. 4.

72 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 16 mars 1967, Vol. 5, No. 40, p. 1795.

73 Le Devoir, "Le requisitoire....", p. 1.

74 Quebec, Debats, première session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 30 mars 1967, Vol. 5, No. 42, p. 1872.

75 Loc. cit.

76 Quebec, Annuaire du Québec 1972, p. 817.

77 Canada, Quebec: Economic Circumstances and Opportunities. Series of staff papers prepared by the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, Ottawa, April 1973, p. 12.

78 Le Devoir, "L'économie marque un temps d'arrêt, selon le directeur du Conseil d'orientation économique", by C. Lemelin, le mardi, 14 novembre 1967, p. 13.

79 Le Devoir, "Kierans: Sidbec....", le vendredi, 2 juillet 1965, p. 3.

80 Le Devoir, "Lesage: la sidérurgie est une de nos priorités", le vendredi, 3 juin 1966, p. 5.

81 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le mercredi, 19 avril 1967, Vol. 5, No. 52, p. 2263.

82 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 20 juillet 1967, Vol. 5, No. 96, p. 4915.

83 Quebec, Statuts, 2e session, 28e législature, 1968, Chapter 77, pp. 554-55.

84 Quebec, Débats, 3e session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 21 novembre 1968, Vol. 7, No. 92, pp. 4258-60.

85 Quebec, Débats, 3e session, 28e législature, le lundi, 20 mai 1968, Vol. 7, No. 42, p. 1816.

86 Quebec, Débats, 3e session, 28e législature, le mercredi, 3 avril 1968, Vol. 7, No. 25, p. 1080.

87 Loc. cit.

88 Proulx, Le panier, p. 65.

89 Quebec, Debats, Comité des Credits, 3e session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 13 juin 1968, p. 899.

90 Loc. cit.

91 Quebec, Débats, 3e session, 28e législature, le mercredi, 3 avril 1968, Vol. 7, No. 25, p. 1080.

92 Quebec, Débats, 4e session, 27e législature, le mercredi, 2 juin 1965, Vol. 2, No. 65, pp. 3049-50.

93 Ibid., p. 3082.

94 R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p. 178.

95 Quebec, Débats, première session, 28e législature, le mardi, 25 avril 1967, Vol. 5, No. 54, p. 2352.

96 Quebec, Statuts, première session, 28e législature, 1967, Chapter 55, p. 294.

97 Mr. Johnson's government created the office of ombudsman (protector). Although the enabling legislation was passed after Mr. Johnson's death, the planning was commenced during his tenure. It was designed to assist people confronted by big government. The ombudsman was designated to investigate and initiate action whenever it was considered that a public servant or agency had "wronged" a citizen. Mr. Johnson attempted via the ombudsman, to facilitate public access to the expanding bureaucracy in Quebec. It was a legal institution with social ramifications (Quebec, Statuts, 2e session, 28e legislature, 1968, p. 108.)

98 Quebec, Annuaire du Québec: 1972, p. 817.

99 Loc. cit.

100 M. Rioux, Quebec in Question, Toronto, James Lewis and Samuel, 1971, translated by J. Boake, p. 81

101 J. Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review For 1966, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967, p. 105.

102 Ibid., p. 62

103 Ibid., p. 58

104 Ibid., p. 107.

105 Le Devoir, "L'UN a pu remporter la victoire....", article by P. Cliche, le mardi, 7 juin 1966, p. 5.

106 Le Devoir, "La tâche de M. Johnson dans la prochaine campagne", by C. Ryan, le vendredi, 22 avril 1966, p. 4.

107 J. Benjamin, Comment on fabrique un Premier ministre quebecois, Montreal, L'Aurore, 1975, p. 35.

108 Ibid., p. 56.

109 Ibid., p. 42.

110 Ibid., p. 60

111 UN party document, "L'Union Nationale. Son histoire, ses chefs, sa doctrine", Quebec City, Les éditions du mercredi, 1969, pp. 130-141.

112 One should note that Mr. Johnson was a good listener and that during his term consultations, studies and commissions increased in number. During his tenure, committee studies and commissions proliferated. By 1968, 74 fact finding operations were in progress: 43 committee studies and 31 commissions. When

the Liberals left office in 1966, 9 committees and 10 commissions were at work. (Quebec, Debats, Comité des Crédits, 3e session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 13 juin 1968, p. 910.)

Mr. Johnson seemed to ignore the work of some of them. For example, he never acted upon the Dorion Report which dealt with the territoriality of Quebec. The Lesage government had commissioned the Dorion inquiry to study the territorial integrity of Quebec with special emphasis to be placed upon Labrador. In February 1968, Mr. Lesage asked if the report had been completed. (Quebec, Debats, 3e session, 28e législature, le jeudi, 21 novembre 1968, Vol. 7, No. 92, p. 265.) Mr. Johnson replied that the report had been received and that, "Je consulterai la commission Dorion et à un moment ou un autre cela devrait être rendu public, je pense." (Loc. cit.) The findings of the report were not too eventful. In May 1968, parts of it were leaked to the press. When Mr. Johnson died in September of that year, the entire report had still not been tabled in the legislature.

In this same vein, planners had more to say during Mr. Johnson's term. He solicited opinions. (Discussed with Dr. J. Benjamin, September 21, 1976.) He gave planners the opportunity to get involved in the development process. (See J. Benjamin, Planification et politique au Québec, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1974, Chapter 4a)

113 G. Bergeron, du duplémisme à Trudeau et Bourassa: 1956-1971, Ottawa, éditions Parti pris, 1971, pp. 493-494.

114 Laporte, Daniel Johnson, p. 97.

115 L. Bergeron, Petit Manuel d'Histoire du Québec, Montréal, Éditions Québécoises, février 1971, p. 234.

116 E. J. Meehan, Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study, Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1967, p. 23.

117 Ibid., pp 25-26.

118 Loc. cit

119 The following authors and their respective books and articles have been used:

J. Woddis, New Theories of Revolution: A Commentary on the views of Frantz Fanon, Régis Debray and Herbert Marcuse, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972.

C. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, New York, Vintage Books, 1965.

C. Friedrich, ed., Revolution, New York, Atherton Press, 1969

H. Arendt, On Revolution, New York, Viking Press, 1963.

C. Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964.

G. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*, New York, Howard Fertig, reprinted 1971.

J. C. Davies, "The circumstances and causes of Revolution: a review", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. II, June 1967.

G. Pettee, "Revolution-Typology and Process", in *Revolution*, C. Friedrich, ed.

J. C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, February 1962.

C. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1966.

K. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

L. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, USA, The Free Press of Glencoe, May 1964.

E. S. Malecki, "Theories of Revolution and Industrialized Societies", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1973.

E. Allardt, "Culture, Structure and Revolutionary Ideologies", *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. XII, No. 1, March 1971.

P. Amman, "Revolution: a Redefinition", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 77, No. 1, March 1962.

P. Calvert, "The study of revolution: a progress report", *International Journal*, Vol. 28, No. 3.

E. Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution", in *Revolution*, C. Friedrich, ed.

M. Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution*, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1975.

120 The Marxian model contains many of the aspects of this quasi-theoretical model but it is based upon a pervading historical determinist base, which places the emphasis upon prediction and inevitability rather than upon generic qualities of analysis.

121 A sixth factor is the growth of class consciousness which involves an emphasis and in-depth study of a volume of sociological data which draws one away from the strict analysis of the political arena.

122 J. Woodis, New Theories of Revolution: A Commentary on the views of Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray and Herbert Marcuse, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972, p. 398.

123 Brinton, Anatomy, p. 253.

124 Ibid., p. 255.

125 C. Friedrich, ed., Revolution, New York, Atherton Press, 1969, p. 5.

126 H. Arendt, On Revolution, New York, The Viking Press, 1963, p. 15.

127 Ibid., p. 109.

128 C. Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, Stanford, Stanford University Press, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964, p. 10.

129 Ibid., pp. 30-60.

130 G. Pettee, The Process of Revolution, New York, Howard Fertig, reprinted 1971, pp. 27-29.

131 see page 77 of text.

132 see page 71 of text.

133 J. C. Davies, "The circumstances and causes of revolution: a review", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, June 1967, p. 252.

134 G. Pettee, "Revolution-Typology and Process", in Revolution, C. Friedrich, ed.

135 Brinton, Anatomy, p. 250.

136 Ibid., p. 260.

137 Davies, "The circumstances and causes....", p. 255.

138 R. Tremblay, ed., L'Economie Québécoise, Montréal, Les presses de l'Université du Québec, 1976, p. 474.

139 Quebec, Annuaire du Québec, 1974, p. 627.

140 Ibid., p. 451.

141 J. C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1, February 1962, p. 6.

142 Ibid., p. 8.

143 C. Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, Vol. II, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1976, p. 65.

144 C. Levi-Strauss, La Pensée Sauvage, Paris, Plon, 1962, p. 38.

145 Ibid., p. 202.

146 Pettee, Process of Revolution, p. 17.

147 Ibid., p. 19.

148 C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York, Harper and Row, 1966, p. 81.

149 Rioux, "Sur l'evolution....", pp. 119-120.

150 K. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in C. E. Welch, Jr., Political Modernization, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 2nd edition, 1971, p. 162.

151 C. Morin, Le pouvoir québécois...en négociation, Montréal, Les éditions du Boréal Express, 1972, p. 101.

152 M. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution, New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1975, p. 246.

153 Ibid., p. 228.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

1. Canada, Information Canada. Canada: 1974, Ottawa, 1975.
2. Canada. National Accounts Income and Expenditure: 1963. Dominion of Statistics, 1964.
3. Canada, Department of Regional and Economic Expansion. Quebec: Economic Circumstances and Opportunites. Ottawa, Staff paper, April 1972.
4. "The Confederation of Tomorrow Conference." Proceedings. Toronto, November 27-30, 1967.
5. "Constitutional Conference- February 5-7, 1968." Proceedings. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1968.
6. "Constitutional Conference- December 8-10, 1969." Proceedings. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969.
7. "Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, October 24-28, 1966." Proceedings, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1968.
8. Québec, Bureau de la statistique du Québec, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Annuaire du Québec: 1966-1967. Québec City, Vol. 48, 1968.
9. Québec, Bureau de la statistique, Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Annuaire du Québec: 1968-1969. Québec City, Vol. 49, 1970.
10. Québec, Bureau de la statistique, Ministère du l'Industrie et du Commerce. Annuaire du Québec: 1972. Québec City, Vol. 52, 1973.
11. Québec, Législature. Débats de L'Assemblée législative du Québec. Québec City, Queen's Printer:

-3e session, 27e Législature, 1964,

vol. 1, no. 1
vol. 1, no. 16
vol. 1, no. 17

-4e session, 27e Législature, 1965,

vol. 2, no. 64
vol. 2, no. 65

-6e session, 27e Législature, 1966,

vol. 4, no. 19
vol. 4, no. 20
vol. 4, no. 22
vol. 4, no. 23

-prem. session, 28e Législature, 1966,

vol. 5, no. 1

-prem. session, 28e Législature, 1967,

vol. 5, no. 31
vol. 5, no. 40
vol. 5, no. 42
vol. 5, no. 49
vol. 5, no. 52
vol. 5, no. 54
vol. 5, no. 76
vol. 5, no. 83
vol. 5, no. 88
vol. 5, no. 89
vol. 5, no. 94
vol. 5, no. 96
vol. 5, no. 101
vol. 5, no. 104

-3e session, 28e Législature, 1968

vol. 7, no. 3
vol. 7, no. 14
vol. 7, no. 17
vol. 7, no. 22
vol. 7, no. 25
vol. 7, no. 32
vol. 7, no. 37
vol. 7, no. 42
vol. 7, no. 52
vol. 7, no. 60
vol. 7, no. 70
vol. 7, no. 80
vol. 7, no. 83
vol. 7, no. 92

12. Québec, Législature. Débats de L'Assemblée législative du Québec. Comité des Crédits-28e Législature. Québec City, Queen's Printer, 1968.
13. Québec, L'Office d'Information et de publicité. The Government of Quebec and the Constitution. The No year or place of printing indicated.

14. Québec, Législature. Journaux de l'Assemblée Législative de la Province du Québec. Québec City, Queen's Printer:
 -2e session, 26e Législature, 1961
 -prem. session, 27e Législature, 1963
15. Québec, Department of Industry and Commerce. Report for 1966. Quebec City, February 1967.
16. Québec. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec. The Structure of the educational System at the Provincial Level. Part one. Québec City, Queen's Printer, 1963.
17. Québec, Législative Assembly. Revised Statutes. Québec City, Queen's Printer:
 1962 vol. 1
 1964 vol. 1
 vol. 2
 1965 vol. 1
 1967 vol. 1
 vol. 2
 1968 vol. 1
 vol. 2
18. Walters, D. Canadian Growth Revisited, 1950-1967. Economic Council of Canada, Staff Study, No. 28, 1970.

II. SCHOLARLY ARTICLES RELATING TO QUEBEC

19. Dion, L. "Politique consultative et système politique." Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 11, June 1969, pp. 226-244.
20. Latouche, D. "Anti-séparatisme et messianisme au Québec depuis 1960." Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3, 1970, pp. 567-575.
21. Lemieux, V. "La regulation des affaires sociales: une analyse politique." Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1974.

22. Rioux, M. "Sur l'évolution des idéologies au Québec.
Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie, Bruxelles,
vol. 1, 1968, pp. 95-125.

III. NEWSPAPER ARTICLES RELATING TO QUEBEC

23. Cardinal, M. "Pour René Levesque, une campagne uniquement centrée sur la nationalisation." Le Devoir, jeudi, 4 octobre 1962, p. 16.
24. Chapin, M. "The Dust Settles in Quebec." Saturday Night, Vol. 75, no. 21, October 15, 1960.
25. Cliche, P. et J. Francoeur. "Le gouvernement del'Union National dépose son premier budget." Le Devoir, vendredi, 17 mars 1967, p. 1.
26. Cliche, P. "Le requisitoire de M. Bourassa contre le budget Dozois." Le Devoir, vendredi, 21 mars 1967, p. 1
27. Cliche, P. "L'UN a pu remporter la victoire grace surtout a son 'balayage' dans la région de Québec et à 8 gains dans la région de Montréal." Le Devoir, mardi, 7 juin 1966, p. 5.
28. Dufresne, J. V. "Johnson: 'Nous nous battons, non pas avec des scandales, mais avec des idées.'" Le Devoir, 2 mai 1966, p. 1.
29. Francoeur, J. "Johnson: Il faut des ministres capables de tenir tête aux technocrates de l'Etat." Le Devoir, 4 juin 1966, p. 2.
30. Francoeur, J. "Johnson: relancer l'économie par le réaménagement fiscal." Le Devoir, mercredi, 27 avril 1966, p. 1.
31. "M. Johnson reprend la question du séparatisme." Le Devoir, samedi, 20 octobre 1962, p. 1.
32. Laurendeau, A. "Deux victoires du gouvernement." Le Devoir, vendredi, 25 novembre 1960, p. 3.
33. Laurendeau, A. "The Future of Jean Lesage." Globe and Mail, Wednesday, June 5, 1963, p. 6.

34. Lemelin, C. "L'économie marque un temps d'arrêt, selon le directeur du Conseil d'orientation économique." Le Devoir, mardi, 14 novembre 1967, p. 13.
35. "M. Lesage confirme à Toronto la création très prochaine du 'département d'outre-frontières.'" Le Devoir, samedi, 15 octobre 1960, p. 1.
36. Lesage, G. "Lesage: la sidérurgie est une de nos priorités." Le Devoir, vendredi, 3 juin 1966, p. 5.
37. "Mr. Levesque." Globe and Mail, Monday, May 18, 1964, p. 6.
38. "L'Opposition à Québec doit être de la gauche, non de la droite." Le Devoir, lundi, 28 novembre 1960, p. 3.
39. Pelletier, R. "Johnson: le temps est venu au Québec...." Le Devoir, mardi, 4 février 1964, p. 1.
40. "10 propositions du Québec." Le Devoir, mardi, 6 février 1968, p. 2.
41. "Québec étendra ses échanges à d'autres pays." Le Devoir, samedi, 28 octobre 1967, p. 1.
42. "Quebec: In the Canada of Tomorrow." Special Supplement, Le Devoir, 30 juin 1967.
43. "Quebec Liberals Sweep Back." Globe and Mail, Thursday, November 15, 1962, p. 1.
44. Ryan, C. "Le cabinet Johnson." Le Devoir, vendredi, 17 juin 1966, p. 4.
45. Ryan, C. "Les choix que devra faire l'équipe Johnson." Le Devoir, jeudi, 16 juin 1966, p. 4.
46. Ryan, C. "M. Daniel Johnson, premier ministre du Québec." Le Devoir, vendredi, 27 septembre 1968, p. 4.
47. Ryan, C. "La nouvelle situation politique à Québec." Le Devoir, mardi, 7 juin 1966, p. 4.
48. Ryan, C. "Urgence d'une politique de développement industriel." Le Devoir, mercredi, 22 mars 1967, p. 4.
49. Ryan, C. "Vers un cabinet plus fort et mieux équilibré." Le Devoir, 1er novembre 1967, p. 4.
50. Thivierge, M. "M. Johnson dans Roberval." Le Devoir, lundi, 25 avril 1966, p. 3.

IV. GENERAL BOOKS

51. Arès, S. J., R. Nos grandes options politiques et constitutionnelles. Montreal, Les Editions Bellarmin, 1972.
52. Aron, R. Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society. New York, New American Library, 1968.
53. Barrette, A. Mémoires. Montréal, La Librairie Beachemin Ltée., 1966.
54. Benjamin, J. Comment on fabrique un Premier ministre québécois. Montréal, L'Aurore, 1975.
55. Benjamin, J. Planification et Politique au Québec. Montréal, Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1974
56. Bergeron, G. du duplèssisme au johnsonisme: 1956-1966. Ottawa, éditions parti pris, 1967.
57. Bergeron, G. du duplèssisme à trudeau et bourassa: 1956-1971. Ottawa, éditions parti pris, 1971.
58. Bergeron, L. Petit Manuel d'Histoire du québec. Montréal, Editions Québécoises, février 1971.
59. Bernard, M. Le Québec Change de Visage. Montréal, Plon, 1964.
60. A conspectus of Canada. Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, January 1967.
61. Corbett, E. M. Quebec Confronts Canada. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967.
62. Désrosiers, R. Le Personnel Politique Québécois. Montréal, éditions du boréal express, 1972.
63. Dion, L. La Prochaine Révolution. Ottawa, Editions Leméac Inc., 1973.
64. Doern, G. B. and P. Aucoin, eds. The Structure of Policy Making in Canada. Toronto, Macmillan Co., of Canada Ltd., 1971.
65. "Les électeurs Québécois: Attitudes et opinions a la veille de l'election de 1960." Report (publié par le Groupe de Recherches Sociales), 1960.

66. "Les États Généraux du Canada Français." Assises Nationales, Editions de l'Action Nationale, 1967.
67. Fox, P., ed. Politics: Canada. Toronto, McGraw-Hill, Co., of Canada Ltd., 3d printing, 1970.
68. Gagnon, G. and L. Martin. Quebec: 1960-1980: La Crise du développement. Montréal, Editions Hurtubise, 1973.
69. Hockin, T., ed. Apex of Power. The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada. Scarborough, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971.
70. Johnson, D. "Discours prononcé par l'Honorable Daniel Johnson, député de Bagot, Chef de l'Opposition, lors du débat sur l'Adresse en réponse au Discours du Trône, Québec, le 16 janvier 1962." Article (Published by the Union Nationale Information Service), 1964.
71. Johnson, D. Égalité ou Indépendance. Montréal, Les Editions de l'Homme Ltée., 1965.
72. Johnson, D. "Rôle de l'état Québécois." Article (Publié par le Service d'information), 1962.
73. Jones, R. Community in Crisis. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1972.
74. Laponce, J. People vs. Politics. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1969.
75. Laporte, J. L. Daniel Johnson, cet inconnu. Montreal, Librairie Beauchemin Ltée., 1968.
76. Lemieux, V. Parenté et Politique: L'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans. Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1971.
77. Lemieux, V. "The Provincial Party System in Quebec." in D. C. Thomson, ed., Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973.
78. Levesque, R. Une Révolution Tranquille? Quebec, Imprimerie Landry, 1965.
79. L'Union Nationale. Son Histoire, ses chefs. Sadoctrine. Québec, Les éditions du mercredi, 1969.
80. Morin, C. Le pouvoir québécois...en négociation. Montréal, Les éditions du Boréal Express, 1972.

81. "Problèmes Politiques du Québec." Rapport, (publié par l'Institut de recherches politiques de la fédération libérale provinciale), Montréal, 1957.
82. Proulx, J. Le panier de crabes. Montréal, Éditions parti pris, 1971.
83. Raynauld, A. "The Quebec Economy: A General Assessment." in D. C. Thomson, ed., Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973.
84. Rioux, M. Quebec in Question. Toronto, James Lewis and Samuel, trans. J. Boake, 1971.
85. Robin, M. Canadian Provincial Politics. Scarborough, Prentice-Hall of Cda., Ltd., 1972.
86. Rocher, G. le Québec en mutation. Montréal, Hurtubise, 1973.
87. Saywell, J., ed. Canadian Annual Review For 1966. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1967.
88. Saywell, J., ed. Canadian Annual Review For 1968. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1968.
89. Schneider, R. The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a 'modernizing' authoritarian regime, 1964-1970. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971.
90. Scott, F. and M. Oliver, eds. Quebec States Her Case. Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 1964.
91. Simeon, R. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The making of recent policy in Canada. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972.
92. Sloan, T. Quebec: The Not-So-Quiet Revolution. Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1965.
93. Thomson, D. C., ed. Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973.
94. Tremblay, R., ed. L'Économie Québécoise. Montréal, Les presses de l'Université du Québec, 1976.

V. THEORETICAL ARTICLES

95. Allardt, E. "Culture, Structure and Revolutionary Ideologies." International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. xii, no. 1, March 1971, pp. 24-40.
96. Amman, P. "Revolution: a Redefinition." Political Science Quarterly, vol. 77, no. 1, March 1962, p. 36-53.
97. Calvert, P. "The study of revolution: a progress report." International Journal, vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 1973, pp. 393-402.
98. Davies, J. C. "The circumstances and causes of revolution." Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 11, June 1967, pp. 247-257.
99. Davies, J. C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review, vol. 27, no. 1, February 1962, pp. 5-19.
100. Feierabend, I., R. Feierabend, and B. Nesvold. "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence." Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1973, pp. 393-424.
101. Kochanek, S. "Perspectives on the Study of Revolution and Social Change." Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1973, pp. 313-319.
102. Malecki, E. S. "Theories of Revolution and Industrialized Societies." Journal of Politics, Vol. 35, no. 4, November 1973, pp. 948-985.
103. Pettee, G. "Revolution-Typology and Process." in C. Friedrich, ed., Revolution, New York, Atherton Press, 1969.
104. Wolin, S. "The Politics of the Study of Revolution," Comparative Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1973, pp. 343-358.

VI. THEORETICAL BOOKS

105. Arendt, H. On Revolution. New York Viking Press, 1963.
106. Barber, B. and A. Inkeles. Stability and Social Change. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.
107. Black, C. E. The Dynamics of Modernization. New York, Harper and Row, 1966.
108. Boulding, K. Conflict and Defense. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1962.
109. Brinton, C. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York, Vintage Books, 1965.
110. Coser, L. A. The Functions of Social Conflict. USA (no city given), Free Press of Glencoe, 2d printing, May 1964.
111. Dahl, R. Modern Political Analysis. Englewood-Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 5th printing, 1965.
112. Deutsch, K. "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in Political Modernization, C. E. Welch, Jr., ed., Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 2d edition, 1971.
113. Eisenstadt, S. N. Tradition, Change and Modernity. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973.
114. Foster, G. M. Traditional Societies and Technological Change. New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973.
115. Friedrich, C. J., ed. Revolution. New York, Atherton Press, 1969.
116. Goode, W. J. Explorations in Social Theory. London, Oxford University Press, 1973.
117. Hagopian, M. The Phenomenon of Revolution. New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1975.
118. Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.
119. Isaak, A. C. Scope and Methods of Political Science. Homewood, Dorsey Press, revised edition, 1975.
120. Johnson, C. Revolutionary Change. Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1966.

121. Johnson, C. Revolution and the Social System. Stanford, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Press, 1965.
122. Lasswell, H. and D. Lerner, eds. World Revolutionary Elites. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1965.
123. Levi-Strauss, C. La Pensee Sauvage. Paris, Plon, 1962.
124. Levi-Strauss, C. Structural Anthropology. Vol. 2, New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1976.
125. Lipset, S. Political Man. Garden City, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960.
126. Mackenzie, W. J. M. The Study of Political Science Theory. London, Macmillan, 1971.
127. Mackenzie, W. J. M. Power, Violence, Decision. London, Penguin Books, 1975.
128. McFarland, A. S. Power and Leadership in Pluralist Systems. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969.
129. McRae, K., ed. Consociational Democracy. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1974.
130. Meehan, E. J. Contemporary Political Thought: A Critical Study. Homewood, Dorsey Press, 1967.
131. Pettie, G. The Process of Revolution. New York, Howard Fertig, reprinted 1971.
132. Rosenau, J. ed. International Aspects of Civil Strife. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964.
133. Self, P. Administrative Theories and Politics. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973.
134. Simmel, G. Conflict. New York, The Free Press, trans. K. H. Wolff, 1954.
135. Taylor, C. The Pattern of Politics. Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1970.
136. Welch, Jr., C. E. Political Modernization. Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing Co. 2d edition, 1971.
137. Woodis, J. New Theories of Revolution: A Commentary on the Views of Frantz Fanon, Regis Debray and Herbert Marcuse. London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1972.