Unforgiveness: An Alternative Space for People who Cannot Forgive

by

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Abstract

There is a gap in the current instantiations of forgiveness that prevents people who cannot forgive from exploring alternatives beyond the dyad of forgiveness and vengeance. As such, it is imperative to not only recognize the gap, but also to endeavour to create a space whereby those who cannot forgive can assemble alternative responses to harm and wrong-doing. This thesis explores the possibilities of describing such a space of unforgiveness that can become a vector for those who cannot forgive to constitute an alternative to the prevailing injunction to forgive.

Forgiveness is fundamentally a moral concern, which, in turn, has implications for moral education. I focus here on the educational possibilities that could emerge for people who cannot forgive. Such possibilities include the recognition of anger and other so-called negative emotions as legitimate and teachable responses to harm and wrong-doing.

Keywords: forgiveness; unforgiveness; moral emotions; negative emotions; moral education; dissent

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to all the victims and survivors of the Colombian conflict. To the individuals and communities who in the face of adversity, day in and day out continue to believe and work for a better future.

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Chapter 1.

Introduction

Traditionally there have been three main ways in which intractable conflict has been resolved: conquest, clemency or negotiation. In the last fifty years, however, from Chile to South Africa to Ireland, forgiveness as reconciliation has emerged as a new perspective that seeks to bridge the gap among the winner-takes-all approach, the clemency of the powerful, or the negotiations between equals. Forgiveness and reconciliation have become an alternative to the three traditional models of conflict resolution and aim to bring together communities that had remained at odds by conflicts that lingered and constituted their identities and their relations to one another.

Besides constituting an alternative to the traditional models of conflict resolution, forgiveness and reconciliation are also believed to provide spaces to survivors who have not been heard; institutionalized spaces where their truth would not only be sought but would be listened to and respected. Removed from the traditional penal model of cross-examination of trials, efforts to arrive at forgiveness and reconciliation try to give the survivors a voice and a space for their stories to be heard. The implicit presupposition is that the validation that the survivors obtain from being listened to not only serves the purpose of opening the way for them to move towards reconciliation as it is both healing and cathartic (Dougherty, 2004; Kelsall, 2005; Shaw, 2005; Basu, 2007; Millar, 2010), but also give their stories an institutional weight that they lacked prior to their testimonies to the commissions. As such instead of fostering processes of forgiveness that could potentially open the way to reconciliation from the ground up, the most popular public policies that sought to find alternatives to intractable conflict were carried out by institutionally designated commissions that sought to establish the truth of the events, without necessarily concerning themselves with the requirements that the survivors could have in order to forgive and or reconcile. The implicit presupposition was that for the nations to heal, it was imperative that the truth of what occurred could be established by listening to the survivors. In this way, it was hoped, the truth of what occurred could be

established in ways other than through juridic-institutional accounts alone. Examples of such institutional reports are the Nunca Más (CONADEP, 1984) in Argentina which sought to determine what had occurred to the survivors of forced disappearance during the Argentine's military Government.

Another example of such institutional accounting is La Violencia en Colombia, which constituted a historical account of the political violence between liberals and conservatives during the period of La Violencia (Guzman, Fals Borda & Umaña, 1964, p. 962). Chile's Rettig Report in 1991 from the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission is also an example of institutional responses that seek to uncover the truth of the heinous crimes that were committed during the Pinochet regime among others. Although each of the reports seems more committed to establishing the truth of the events rather than working towards policies of forgiveness or reconciliation, implicit in each of them is the assumption that knowing the truth of what happened will help societies, in general, to move forward.

Although the research on forgiveness has been clear about the differentiation between forgiveness and reconciliation (Worthington, 2005) recognizing that people can forgive without necessarily reconcile, the popular understanding of forgiveness as well as the implementation of reconciliation policies that contribute to a wider public pedagogy about forgiveness seems to erase the difference between the two and assume that forgiveness always already entails reconciliation. The erasure of the difference between forgiveness and reconciliation has meant that civic alternatives that do not embrace the calls to reconciliation are less likely to be considered and that the public policies that seek to address truth and reconciliation assume that forgiveness is already part of the process.

The governmentality of forgiveness has slowly solidified into an injunction to forgive; one that assumes and promotes itself as the only alternative to conflict and strife. For all the spaces that forgiveness has created where the survivors are able to tell their truth in truly cathartic exercises where whole nations have had to face truths that they had carefully disregarded, forgiveness is also becoming a structured path wherein survivors do not seem to have alternatives other than to forgive.

Moreover, while the purpose of establishing the truth is salient, paramount in almost all scenarios of forgiveness and reconciliation is the need to ensure the survivors are committed to forgiveness and reconciliation. We see from past exercises of reconciliation that once the ceremony of listening to their stories has occurred, whether or not the perpetrators individually acknowledged responsibility for what had happened to survivors, it was imperative that the survivors acknowledge their commitment to forgiveness in places like South Africa during the Human Rights Violations Hearings (Verdoolaege, 2006), and Sierra Leone during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings (Kelsall, 2005) to mention only two. As Annelies Verdoolaege (2006), Villa-Vicencio (2003) and Hayner (2001) have explored in the South African case, the emphasis of the TRC shifted from giving a space for the survivors to voice their truths to getting them to commit to forgiveness. Whenever their testimonies shifted from the forgiveness terrain and more into emotive accounts of their experiences the chairs sought to move people into forgiveness and reconciliation frameworks, sometimes even reminding them that they had written about that in their written testimonies as a means to reemphasize the theme of forgiveness. In other words, there was a preference and an active encouragement for certain types of testimonies that advocated for forgiveness as an alternative to the conflict. For as Verdoolage (2008) argues, "at the actual survivor hearings certain expressions tended to be preferred, which gave rise to a specific kind of reconciliation discourse' (p.1). In cases like Sierra Leone (Dougherty, 2004; Shaw, 2005), during the ceremonies where perpetrators confess their crimes and asked for forgiveness, the chiefs of the communities were encouraged by the TRC to extend forgiveness to the perpetrators in the name of the community. As such forgiveness, through the truth and reconciliation commissions, entered the political spectrum in ways not foreseeable by the survivors, and the injunction to forgive is one of their leitmotifs (Karaırmak & Güloğlu, 2014; Morse & Metts, 2011; Sastre, Vinsonneau, Neto, Girard, & Mullet, 2003; Sell, 2016; Worthington, Witvliet, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007).

The presupposition that the only alternative to forgiveness is vengeance is a consequence of a definition of forgiveness that supposes forgiveness as the central and, inherently good concept, and its opposite, namely vengeance, as naturally pernicious if not evil, and as such to be avoided. But perhaps there is a way to move beyond the

binarism of forgiveness and vengeance. Perhaps there is a way to bring into the conversation those who have been left outside the governmentality of forgiveness. Perhaps there is a way for unforgiveness to become an agentic, pedagogic space where those survivors who cannot forgive, can articulate their stance fostering organic alternatives through which their stance can be not only understood but also afforded legitimacy within the array of responses to harm and wrong-doing.

A rarely explored shortcoming of the implementation of the idea of forgiveness is the insufficient alternatives for those located outside the limits of those discourses of forgiveness. As inclusive and understanding as forgiveness is thought to be, there seems to be a lack of consideration for the people who cannot forgive. There are some survivors for whom the possibility of inclusion and belonging is dependent on them offering a gift that they cannot give, the gift of forgiveness. Moreover, that inability to offer a gift that they do not have casts them as outsiders, as resentful survivors unable to move beyond the immediacy of their wound, especially when the only recourse is to insist on trying to forgive. As the people who cannot forgive, I understand people cannot bring themselves to forgive. For as in the case of the wife of the man that had been killed by police officers refereed by Derrida (2001), the one who could forgive is no longer there.

In other words, if a survivor feels she cannot forgive, the only alternative she has, according to the reconciliatory discourse, is to insist on trying to forgive until forgiveness arrives. However, if the presupposition is to insist on forgiveness, foreclosing alternatives to forgiveness and instituting it as the mandate, irrespective of the survivors' ability, willingness, or readiness to forgive, doing so may constitute a revictimization in the name of forgiveness. For all the enviable promises of the discourse of forgiveness, alternatives for those for whom the promises of forgiveness are not an option are just non-existent. Forgiveness as an alternative to the traditional model of conflict resolution lacks alternatives to the victims that are not able to forgive.

The prescience of the plight of those that cannot forgive can be exemplified by survivors like Bryan Mphahlele, an apartheid survivor who upon feeling the pressure from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa to comply with the

expectation to forgive, denounced the unequal power relations established between the survivors and the commissioners (Verdoolaege, 2006). Although the Commission was created with the purpose of uncovering the truth of what occurred so the nation could learn the extent of the tragedy of the Apartheid regime, Annelies Verdoolaege (2006) argues that it seemed the TRC was more committed to other principles such as forgiveness that were not explicit in its mandate of the pursuit of truth. For Mphahlele and other survivors like him, the TRC's commitment to forgiveness and reconciliation irrespective of the readiness of the survivors to forgive seemed to trump their decision-making process to the point that some felt that forgiveness was being imposed upon them (Verdoolaege, 2006). As Verdoolage (2006) argues "(a) manual counting of all the HRV hearings suggests that in about 70% of the testimonies the concept of reconciliation was either evoked by the commissioners themselves or the commissioners urged the survivors to express a willingness to forgive and reconcile" (p.75).

The need that the survivors either address or recognize the theme of forgiveness when it was not part of what they wanted to address in their testimony, points to the commitment that the commissioners had to emphasize forgiveness and reconciliation even when the survivors did not think that the subjects of either forgiveness or reconciliation should be addressed in their hearings. As most of their testimonies states, the survivors had come to testify to the TRC compelled by the novel willingness of an institution like the TRC to listen to their stories when nobody else had cared to listen before. They had come hopeful to testify because, from the beginning, the TRC was announced as an open, survivor-centred forum where the survivors could tell their stories without fear of being reprimanded and, to a certain extent, it was. However, what the survivors who were not ready to forgive did not foresee was the strong and sometimes forceful demand from the commissioners to forgive. The institutional emphasis on the survivors' need to forgive, paired with the chairs of the TRC's insistence on the imperative to forgive while the survivors rendered their testimonies, in many instances forced them to consent to forgiving, without being necessarily ready to do so. Only those who were strong and assertive enough were able to withstand the pressure that was put on them (Verdoolaege, p. 76, 2006).

When forgiveness is imposed upon the survivors, it can reinforce structures of inequality and injustice by creating asymmetrical power relations in marginalized communities themselves (Maoz, 2004). As I will argue, the injunction to forgive when imposed upon the survivors irrespective of their readiness to forgive, may not necessarily be about the needs of the survivors but the ideological commitments of those advocating for forgiveness. As Spivak (2004) argues when talking about human rights, forgiveness "may carry within itself the agenda of a kind of social Darwinism—the fittest must shoulder the burden of righting the wrongs of the unfit—and the possibility of an alibi" (p. 524). But perhaps there is more than a certain social Darwinism behind the need to enforce forgiveness as alternatives to tension, conflict, or strife. Perhaps, the top-down approaches to forgiveness that are carried out by political and religious institutions are anchored in religious nostalgias that seek to return to a prelapsarian fantasy (Moon, 2004). A prelapsarian fantasy that retroactively writes the memory of the events so that they fit into pre-established narratives of communities that come together and return to a point in time when they were united by the myths that bonded them.

Considering the situation of those who cannot forgive and find themselves in the midst of being confronted with the institutional expectations a question that emerges is could there be something other than the binary of forgiveness or resentment? Could there be a space whereby the survivors who cannot forgive articulate their dissent in ways that empower them without ostracizing those who favour forgiveness?

Moral Education

As has been argued above, forgiveness begins fundamentally as a moral question: to forgive or not to forgive. And as it will be explored in detail in this thesis, the case of forgiveness can offer important insights into how educators think about issues of moral agency in survivor's lives. Moral education as a field is concerned with developing moral practices, dispositions, and emotions in children and people in general so that the moral principles and values of the communities are adhered to by its members. Although there are several strands of research in moral education, the three most prominent ones are

educating for moral reasoning, educating the moral emotions and character education (Nash, 1997).

Educating for moral reasoning aims at fostering moral decision-making guided by the use of logic and reason, instead of relying solely on moral intuitions or moral emotions which could be used as sources of morality. One of its most prominent advocates is Lawrence Kohlberg (1973), who elaborated on Piaget's model of developmental stages by arguing that moral maturity is characterized by the application of rational, universalizable moral principles. From the perspective of educating for moral reasoning, the injunction to forgive can be understood as a moral, logical and rational decision that seeks to put an end to the cycles of pain and anguish that the survivors experienced. A rational decision to stand above the need to avenge and seek the higher moral ground of the common rather than the emphasis on the needs of the individual. In fact, most of the accounts of forgiveness that do not dwell on the health benefits that the survivors obtain through forgiveness tend to base their arguments on the rationality of survivors' moving beyond their wounds.

Educating the moral emotions, on the other hand, focuses on the role that emotions have on the decision-making process and moral actions, and aims at moving from what have been referred as basic emotions "anger, fear, disgust, sadness, happiness and surprise" (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1971) towards higher order emotions, also referred as the self-conscious emotions, namely guilt, shame, embarrassment and pride (Tangney, Stuewig & Mashek, 2007, p. 21). Given Megan Boler's (1999) claim that "our emotions, which reflect our complex identities [are] situated within social hierarchies, "embody" and "act out" relations of power "(p. 3), we could recognize that there is a fundamental role for the education of moral emotions and their role in the pursuit of a moral life. Martha Nussbaum (2003) too argues that "emotions shape the landscape of our mental and social lives. Like geological upheavals in a landscape, they mark of lives, uneven, uncertain, and prone to reversal" (p.1). Along the same lines, Noddings (2013) argues that "it is necessary to give appropriate attention and credit to the affective foundation of existence" (p. 3). What this strand of research highlights when thinking about the challenge of forgiveness is that there is a substantive role that emotions in general and

negative emotions in particular play in the lives of people and it is imperative to recognize the role that those emotions play not only in people who forgive but also in people who cannot forgive. From the perspective of educating the moral emotions, the injunction to forgive could be understood as the management of the negative emotions that may hinder processes of forgiveness and reconciliation.

The third dominant strand of moral education is character education, which is grounded in an Aristotelian perspective and assumes moral virtue as the result of habituation. In other words, character education focuses on fostering morality by exposing children to literature and art that elicits moral reactions and giving them experiences to practice the virtues in their everyday lives. Some well-known proponents of character education are William J. Bennett, (1989, 1992, 1993, 1995), William Kilpatrick (1993), Thomas Lickona (1991), and Kristjan Kristjánsson (2007, 2010, 2016). What this strand of research offers when thinking about the prerogative to forgive is the belief that forgiveness can come about from a process of habituation that occurs by familiarizing people with key texts.

Moral education has explored the role of forgiveness as an instance of prosocial behaviour where the individual who forgives manages to move on and opens herself to the encounter with the other in an instantiation of sociomoral orientations (Rique & Lins-Dyer, 2003). However, within the range of normalized emotions and morals, alternatives to forgiveness have been under-examined. Indeed, within the range of normalized morals and emotions, negative emotions such as anger and resentment as legitimate alternatives to forgiveness have remained under-examined in the wider literature in moral education.

We can find deep exploration of forgiveness in other fields such as theology (Maimonides, 1963; Butler, 1985; Tutu, 1999; Caputo, 2001), psychology (Fitzgibbons, 1986; Enright, 1998, 2011; Worthington Jr. 2005, 2006, 2015), philosophy (Jankélévitch, 1967, 1969; Derrida, 2001, 2002; Murphy, 1992, 1998, 2003; North, 1987, 1998), and moral-political theory (Nussbaum, 2016; Minow, 1998, 2002, 2015). Although each field concerns itself with forgiveness from within the specificities of its field, a broader

consideration of those fields should accompany the studies of forgiveness so that we can move beyond a binary framework.

Considering that alternatives to the forgiveness-vengeance binary have remained largely under-explored in the literature on moral education, in this thesis, I will make a case for unforgiveness as a legitimate moral response to wrongdoing and consider the implications and limits of such a response.

While aspiring to make this contribution to the moral education literature, it is also hoped that this thesis on unforgiveness will contribute to the critical analysis of forgiveness that has been carried out by scholarship in other fields. The critical analysis I hope to further here is intended to expand the horizon of intelligibility of forgiveness and its cognate terms so that the conceptual clarity affords not only the survivors but also those who work on their behalf, the ability to recognize the points in the middle, the interjections, the dissonances that forgiveness and unforgiveness entail. Such conceptual clarity may allow for a richer understanding of forgiveness and unforgiveness-- one that challenges current understandings in the literature on forgiveness about the reasons why someone would be unable to forgive.

Ultimately, I am concerned with teasing out a space where the people who cannot forgive can articulate their dissent; a space outside the binary of vengeance or forgiveness. The teasing out of this space for unforgiveness should be anchored in principles of social justice understood as "inclusive and affirming of human agency and human capacities for working collaboratively to create change" (Adams, Bell & Griffin, 2016, p. 2). Such a space of unforgiveness anchored in principles of social justice should be a catalyst for inclusive alternatives that explore responses to harm and wrong-doing beyond the dyad of forgiveness and vengeance.

As examples and places upon which to anchor the discussions about unforgiveness in practical terms, I will turn back from time to time to two characters of the Colombian armed conflict who in my opinion would have benefited the most if unforgiveness was deployed as an alternative when they opted to avenge their injuries (Sánchez, 2008). The first one is Ricardo Palmera, better known by the alias of Simon

Trinidad, who decided to join the guerrilla forces of FARC, once the pressure of the Colombian Army around his political circle of activists grew stronger, and most of them were either disappeared or shot at gunpoint in the streets of Colombia for their work supporting communities against institutional oblivion. Simon Trinidad was born into an affluent family in the northern region of Colombia and grew in the same social circle as my other example Jorge 40.

The second person on whom I aim to anchor the practicality of forgiveness is Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, better known as Jorge 40. Like Simon Trinidad, Jorge 40 is the son of the well-to-do family who decides to join in this case the paramilitaries after the pressure from the guerrilla extortions and the lack of support from the army drove him to take justice on his own hands through the creation of paramilitary groups. Like Trinidad, Jorge 40 saw that there were no other alternatives than to avenge the violence that he was experiencing.

Without entering into the intricacies of the junctures at which Simon Trinidad and Jorge 40 saw that the only alternative they have was to take arms and seek revenge, it is necessary to recognize that at their juncture, they did not see any other alternative even though they were socially well connected in Colombia and had the economic resources to move somewhere else potentially.

Although both Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad could be considered extreme examples of people who could have benefited from a stance like unforgiveness, the idea is to explore the possibilities of unforgiveness from those extreme examples assuming that it would be theoretically easier for people who are unable to forgive but did not actively seek to avenge their wounds.

Methodology

In this thesis, I will use deconstruction (Caputo, 1997; Norris, 2000; Derrida, 1976; Biesta, 2010) to disentangle the binary assumptions underlying forgiveness (Tutu, 1999) to open a space where those that cannot forgive can find a place to articulate their stance. Deconstruction as part of philosophical enquiry in Education seeks to question the

nature of reality and the substratum beneath accepted assumptions that seems to guide everyday belief and suppositions. (Koetting & Malisa, 1996).

Following J. Randall Koetting and Mark Malisa's (1996), question "why we do research?" (p. 1014) when exploring forgiveness and hinting at the possibilities of unforgiveness, I am looking for a clearer perception of the reality of a survivor, the relationship with that reality and how that understanding can benefit others depending on their stance on forgiveness or unforgiveness. I am interested in the emancipation of the survivors that cannot or have not been able to forgive.

Considering that as J. Randall Koetting and Mark Malisa (1996) argued quoting, Wingo, (1974, p. 24) "education always takes place within a certain constellation of cultural conditions and therefore it cannot be studied as a set of universal and independent phenomena" (p.1013), unforgiveness seeks to explore the possibilities of alternative spaces of dissent from within the specific locality of conflict and the survivors that cannot forgive, rather than as a top-down approach that assumes that forgiveness is the only meaningful option for conflict resolution.

Following Philip Higgs (2003) for whom "to deconstruct is first and foremost to undo a construction with infinite patience, to take apart a system in order to understand all its mechanisms, to exhibit all its foundations, and to reconstruct on new bases" (p. 175) unforgiveness aims at trying to constitute an alternative to the discourse of forgiveness from the perspective of the people who cannot forgive thinking that inasmuch as the victims who are ready to forgive and move on with the discourses of reconciliation, the people who cannot forgive deserve an alternative space whereby they can coalesce into a nucleus of non-compliant survivors who while resisting the calls to forgive and reconcile, seek alternatives to those calls within the limits of civility.

The goal of deconstructing forgiveness in this project is to dig into what remains unsaid and unexplored, but that substantiates the arguments of those that advocate for forgiveness. The process of deconstruction will also help identify whether there are pedagogical spaces for unforgiveness that could serve as models of the type of work that would be required in order to expand the accepted repertoire of moral responses to

wrongdoing. Spivak (1976) argues that the task of deconstruction is "to locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment... to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to displace it, to dismantle only to reconstitute what is always already inscribed" (p. xlvii). From this perspective, deconstruction is the appropriate method to carry out the deconstruction of forgiveness, for as Kincheloe and Slattery (2000) argue "deconstruction allows us to unpack and reconceptualize society to be more equitable, just, and fair" (p. 138).

The process started by deconstructing the idea of forgiveness identifying gaps in the literature and the practice of forgiveness as an intervention within conflict resolution and classroom settings. Deconstructing forgiveness meant tracing the concept of forgiveness historically and questioning the extent to which the current understanding of forgiveness was anchored on needs to prelapsarian fantasies that sought to bring together communities of people that were not united in the way in which forgiveness expected them to be. The presupposition of the prelapsarian fantasies entailed that the survivors were expected to understand and deal with their pains in ways that reasserted them as part of a community that existed before injury and pain. But if the community that the practice of forgiveness is trying to constitute did not exist prior to the deployments of forgiveness, then the stronghold that forgiveness interventions seem to have as ideal mechanisms to overcome strife seem to conflict between the ideal of the theory and the practice of the pedagogies of forgiveness. For the fantasy of a unity anterior to the fall and division continues to drive the efforts to bring together communities that were not really as closely knit as the forgiveness intervention models seem to believe.

Deconstructing forgiveness also meant questioning the extent to which the inherently human feature of forgiveness was, in reality, a modern idea that, as Konstan (2010) argued, could only be traced as far back up to Kant, even though the philosophical and religious literature has assumed it as part of the moral repertoire of the individual and has defended it as such. The importance of tracing the etymological roots to the concept comes from the concern about the assumption of forgiveness as always already there, when a simple and cursory review of the literature already complicates the arguments of

forgiveness as we understand it today, as being part of the repertoire of moral emotions anterior to modernity.

At this point, it seems pertinent to recognize that as Biesta and Stams (2001) argue following the reservations that Derrida (1995) expressed about using deconstruction as a form of critical analysis, deconstructing forgiveness needs to be more than the deployment of deconstruction as a tool of critical analysis that presupposes an axis from which the critique occurs. For Derrida (1995) the use of deconstruction as a form of critical analysis assumed that there was a point from which the critical stance situates and originates without recognizing that it is precisely from the problematization of the origin of that critical stance that deconstruction originates. In other words, the deployment of deconstruction as a form of critical analysis entails that the external axes, the critical vantage point from which the critical analysis is to emerge, is one of the foremost concerns of deconstruction, so any attempt to deploy deconstruction will have to emerge from within, rather than the outside. So, in this case, deconstruction rather than a method from which forgiveness makes way to unforgiveness in a critical exercise of the metaphysics of presence, deconstruction will be more a type of witnessing (Biesta, 2010, p. 76) that allows us to see the way in which unforgiveness is made invisible by the presence of forgiveness. The deconstruction of forgiveness allows the affirmation of the excluded and forgotten, namely those that cannot forgive by the affirmation of what remains unsaid and unexplored. The aim of the deconstruction of forgiveness will be the emergence of the space of unforgiveness as a twofold space whereby the survivors can both articulate their inability to forgive while at the same time seeking alternatives to the injunction to forgive.

At this point, it seems necessary to point out that while the methodology of the thesis will be deconstruction, the understanding of forgiveness that I aim to critique is not the absolute forgiveness of Derrida (2002), but a more transactional understanding of forgiveness that has taken hold of the debates and instantiations of forgiveness.

Positionality

My interest in unforgiveness has emerged from the recognition that the work that I did as a researcher in favour of a peace settlement in Colombia were dialogues with people that already believed in a negotiated settlement. The research, the roundtables and the critical analysis for peace in Colombia failed to integrate those people who could not forgive, let alone reconcile, the harms and wrongdoings that they had experienced. So there needed to be a space where those survivors who could not forgive, could articulate their unforgiveness in ways that were politically empowering and agentic as long as they remained within the limits of civility. Far too often the biographies of the guerrilla or paramilitary leaders of Colombia refer to a point at which they were not able to move past beyond the wound that determined them and were appalled by the idea that they would have to forgive and reconcile with those who harmed them. So, the inability to forgive festered and the negative emotions turned into a need to avenge that can be found in almost every leader of the insurgent or the paramilitary forces. Therefore, a space of unforgiveness that gives those who cannot forgive a possibility to articulate their pain in ways that afford them liberty and agency could be fruitful to overcome subsequent cycles of violence that seek to address injuries that were meant to be forgiven and reconciled when the survivors could not do it.

The same pattern that I saw in Colombia could also be found elsewhere such as South Africa, Ireland, Uganda, to name only a few. So, my interest on unforgiveness comes from seeing the uneasiness of some of the survivors who cannot forgive and their concern about how opposing or refusing to partake in the calls for reconciliation could further ostracize them from their communities. Moreover, it is that lack of alternatives for agentic political dissent that seems to leave those survivors who are unable to forgive at a crossroads. They are unable to "move on" as it is expected of them, and their position is not being valued and recognized within the reconciliatory process. The survivors who cannot forgive, rather than being seen as those whose voice needs to be encouraged and listened, are seen as people in whose life resentment has taken hold, and as such, they are isolated, pathologized and in some cases ostracized as the dissenting voices.

Chapter 2.

Tracing Forgiveness: History and Dissonances

According to a philosophically prominent account of forgiveness, the negative emotions victims need to overcome are invariably claimed to be those of anger, resentment, and hate. (Douglas Stewart in reference to Bishop Butler Sermons viii and ix p. 69)

In this chapter, I aim to examine how the field of moral education has historically treated the concept of forgiveness and the emergent moral imperative to forgive. I will also explore the role of negative emotions and how they relate to the forgiveness discourse. Finally, I will focus on what is currently one of the most popular instantiations of forgiveness which I will, later on, call the pragmatics of forgiveness, a series of practical considerations that are explored through positivistic research to support the need for forgiveness scientifically.

What is Forgiveness

In the field of moral education, forgiveness has been conceived as "an effective problem-solving strategy in releasing one's own anger and joining again in community with other persons" (Enright, 1991, p. 123). In this way, forgiveness has been understood as a tool that helps people move beyond the anger and the resentment experienced after an offence or an injury. Forgiveness is also viewed as a way to prevent the grudges that sediment in people's lives to the point that it harms, rather than aids the development of meaningful and healthy lives (Enright, 1999; Freedman, & Enright, 1996). For Douglas Stewart (2012), when we forgive, what we are asked to abandon or overcome "…are the negative emotions and feelings we quite naturally and justifiable experience as victims as well as any temptations or desires to retaliate or seek revenge, harbour grudges or ill will" (p. 69). In other words, forgiveness entails the demand of surrendering one's natural responses to harm and wrong-doing without considering the impact of that harm. In education, in particular, forgiveness has been understood as a tool that helps children assuage their anger and live more positive, fulfilling lives (Taysi, E., & Vural, D. 2016;

Rodden, J. (2004). What this fails to account for is the possibility that children in particular and people, in general, may not be ready to forgive and in need of alternatives beyond the dyad of forgiveness or mayhem.

The psychological as well as the educational understanding of forgiveness and its classroom deployment comes from two groups: The research on moral psychology carried out by Enright and the Human Development Study Group (HDSG) starting in 1991 (Lin, Enright & Klatt, 2011) and the research carried by Everett Worthington (2003, 2006) and Michael. E. McCullough, which became the pyramid model of the REACH forgiveness model (2003, 2006, 2010, 2011).

Unlike Worthington (2006) who was more focused on clinical and psychological forgiveness intervention, Enright following the path of Kohlberg (1984) argues that the reasoning about forgiveness could be traced along developmental states along the lines designed by Kohlberg. Although, the work of Enright and the HDSG initiated in education, cognitive development turned out to be a more fertile ground for their work.

The first attempt to trace forgiveness along the lines of educational settings explored the understanding of forgiveness that young people have along different developmental ages, mirroring Kohlberg's model (Enright et al. 1989). However, it was not until 2002 that J. A. Knutson and Robert Enright developed the *Adventure of Forgiveness* (2002) the first guided curriculum that was aimed specifically for children between the ages of six and eight. Following the *Adventure of Forgiveness* (2002), the same authors developed *Be Your Best Self* (2008) a guided forgiveness curriculum for children between the ages of eleven and thirteen. Along the same path of the guided curriculums, but more geared towards the management of emotions, Gambaro, Enright, Baskin, and Klatt (2008) focused on the management of trait anger specifically with middle-school children. As research on forgiveness develops, it becomes more and more clear that one of the goals of forgiveness is to manage the negative emotions of the survivors so that they can successfully move on (Worthington, Lin, Ho & Yee, 2012). As Gambaro et al. (2008) argued, a key feature that occurred once children learnt about forgiveness was that negative emotions subsided and “anger was reduced in general and

not necessarily only toward the person who needed to be forgiven" (p. 4). The reduction of trait anger that is attained through the various forgiveness intervention models prevents the emergence of negative cognition and dysregulated behaviour that occur over time if resentment is not resolved appropriately. The positive changes that are obtained through the reduction of trait anger can bring positive improvements across various contexts (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998) creating a positive reinforcement in other areas that could also have been affected by the presence of trait anger. If as Karremans and Van Large (2005); McCullough, Fincham and Tsang (2003) have argued there is correlation between the lack of forgiveness after an offense and a decrease of prosocial orientation, the presence of forgiveness restores those prosocial levels (Gardner et al., 1999; Van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & Knippenberg, 2004).

Although there seem to be different understandings of what forgiveness is which will be explored later on, there seems to be an agreement about forgiveness being conceptualized as a response to the negative consequences that being hurt could have on people who have been victimized. As such, "forgiveness may play a role in promoting effective coping strategies" that help people move from negative, resentful emotions, towards more hopeful, prosocial behaviours, through forgiveness education programs as Ebru Taysi and Demet Vural (2016) indicate when exploring the role of forgiveness education for fourth graders in Turkey. The purpose of the forgiveness interventions in general and forgiveness education, in particular, is to equip people with the tools to improve their mental health "by reducing their anger and depression levels while increasing forgiveness, hope, and prosocial behaviour through … forgiveness education program[s]" (Taysi & Vural, 2016, p. 1097). As Elizabeth A. Gassin, Robert Enright and Jeanette A. Knutson (2005) indicate, forgiveness curricula are meant to alleviate the burden that children face when anger and suffering have become the leitmotifs of their lives and focuses on preventing anger and resentment from sedimenting in their lives.

The first definition of forgiveness advanced by Enright (1991) and the HDSG understood forgiveness as "a forswearing of negative affect and judgment, by viewing the wrongdoer with compassion and love, in the face of a wrongdoer's considerable injustice" (p. 123). In the next page, they further define forgiveness as "a moral concept [that] exists

on the side of self-sacrificial love, benevolence, beneficence and supererogation" (p. 124). These first instantiations of forgiveness are perhaps the closest that the research on forgiveness comes to a Christian understanding of forgiveness where the survivor reconciles with the injured party effectively blurring the line that later on will be understood as substantive between forgiveness and reconciliation.

As the research on forgiveness progresses, the definition of forgiveness is further refined by Enright (1999) as a "the process of ceasing to feel resentment against someone or something…[a] Key to turning away anger with love in the human realm, the central component of forgiveness appears to be best understood as the antithesis of one's natural desire for revenge and retribution" (p. 17). Earlier on, Enright, in conjunction with Joanna North (1998) had argued that forgiveness "does not mean we forget, we condone, or we absolve responsibility. It does mean that we let go of the hate, that we try to separate the loss and the cost from the recompense or punishment we deem is due" (p. 12). So rather than a foreswearing of negative affect and judgment based on an understanding of the wrong-doer as someone who is also subject to love and compassion, the refined definition of forgiveness places emphasis on it being the antithesis of revenge and retribution. Although the difference between the two definitions seems tenuous, there are important gradients that distant one from the other. The 1991 definition seems to understand the one forgiving as an individual actively reaching out from a place of love and compassion to the injuring party going above and beyond the duties of erogation. The 1998 and 1999 definitions are perhaps a little less taxing by placing the emphasis not so much on a survivor who goes above the work that duty requires, but on the taming of the negative responses that being injured elicits in the survivor.

Against the idea of forgiveness as a grace that befalls upon the survivor, North (1998) argues that forgiveness entails "the overcoming of negative feelings . . . [which] must be the result of an active psychological endeavour on the part of the injured party, even while recognizing that a real injury has been inflicted and that the wrongdoer is to blame for the infliction" (p. 21). The arrival to that state of forgiveness goes through deploying a multi-perspectival stance whereby "…we forgive another person [by] mov[ing] from our own perspective, of initial hurt and internal suffering, to that of the

wrongdoer, the context of his wrong and his motivation for it as well as his present situation" (p. 29). Contrasting the definition of 1991 with the subsequent refining of the definitions, allows one to recognize that whereas the first instantiations of forgiveness emphasized the injured party as an active saviour that reaches out to the injured party, the subsequent definitions seek to prevent negative emotions to seethe in people's lives.

However, if the various definitions of forgiveness that Enright and the HSDG have put together tend to be taxing for the survivors, a more demanding definition comes from the director of the Lionheart Foundation and its National Emotional Literacy Project Robin Casarjian (1992), who argues that forgiveness "is a decision to see beyond the limits of another's personality" (p. 23). For Casarjian (1992), forgiveness "is an attitude that implies that you are willing to accept responsibility for your perceptions, realizing that your perceptions are a choice and not an objective fact" (p. 24). Later on, Casarjian (1992), goes even further when she states that forgiveness "is a way of life that gradually transforms us from being helpless survivors of our circumstances to being powerful and loving co-creators of our reality" (p. 25). For her, forgiveness is less about what we do and how we do it and more about the way in which we manage to change and model our perceptions about people and their circumstances in relation to us. Although the specificities of the definitions of forgiveness further complicate the discussion about forgiveness as a whole, there is consensus within the two HDSG and the REACH models that forgiveness entails the movement from negative to positive emotions (McCullough & Witvliet, 2002). Another consensus that emerges from the forgiveness intervention models is that it is better for people both in the short and the long-term to forgive rather than allow negative emotions to sediment in their lives.

The polysemy of definitions of forgiveness is also indicative of the various deployments that the concept has enjoyed across a variety of fields. However, there seem to be a few main conclusions that emerge in the literature, namely forgiveness as an adaptive feature (Mauger, Freeman, Perry, & Grove 1992; McCullough, 2000; Thompson & Snyder, 2003; Thompson et al., 2005) that shows individuals that there are alternatives to living one's life with anger, bitterness and hatred (Freedman & Enright, 1996). Forgiveness has also been linked to psychological health and well-being in general

(Mauger et al., 1992; Enright, 2000; Scobie & Scobie, 2000; Worthington, Sandage, & Berry, 2000; Ripley & Worthington, 2002; Thompson & Snyder, 2003). Forgiveness has also emerged as a powerful healing tool for survivors (Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000; Worthington, 2005). Forgiveness has also been thought of as an important factor in facilitating psychological well-being for individuals in clinical settings (Hebl & Enright, 1993; McCullough & Worthington, 1995). Along the same lines of forgiveness as a tool to facilitate well-being, recently there has been forgiveness interventions like the one advanced by Park, Enright, Essex, Zahn-Waxler and Klatt, (2013) where South Korean female adolescent survivors learn to improve their levels of school and psychological adjustment through forgiveness interventions which help them migrate from survivors that became offenders. Lastly, we could mention Suzanne Freedman et al. (2005) among those who do forgiveness research in education mainly because they are interested in whether forgiveness can help people heal. The question, however, remains as what is understood by healing, and how is that healing brought about. What parameters are deployed in the understanding of forgiveness and ultimately who benefits from such an understanding of forgiveness?

Tracing Forgiveness as a Concept in Theology and Philosophy

Echoing the difficulties with the definitions of forgiveness, it is worth mentioning that as there are disagreements about its definition, there are different accounts of forgiveness that trace it back to various points in history which have different consequences for the understanding of the concept. The current understandings of forgiveness trace it back to early Greek texts and tie it etymologically to sungnômê (Griswold, 2007, p. 3) and cognate terms such as aphesis (Bash, 2007, p. 90). There are others for whom forgiveness is first a religious idea whose roots can be traced back to both early Jewish and Christian scriptures (Enright et al. 1991). But as Derrida (2001) argues "the verbal link of don to pardon, which is marked in Latin languages but not in Greek, for example... is also present in English, to forgive, forgiveness and asking for forgiveness" (p. 22) complicates the connection to the Greek etymology that some scholars attribute. So, if the gift of forgiving cannot be traced prior to Latin, then the attempts to ground forgiveness in either sungnômê (Griswold, 2007, p. 3) or aphesis

(Bash, 2007) point to understandings of forgiveness that may not coincide with the current understanding of the term, as Kostan (2010) also claims. If the understanding of forgiveness that we have today is so distant from the Greek cognate terms that are associated with it, the presuppositions that assume forgiveness as being always already there seem to lose ground, and the Kantianism of the current understanding of forgiveness as explained by Konstan (2010) seems to gain ground.

Further muddying the waters of the historical origin of forgiveness, a secularized understanding of forgiveness has made inroads into places that did not belong to the historical traditions of the Abrahamic moral tradition. The presence of that foreign paradigm of forgiveness has meant the imposition of a western political frame of reference that is anchored in religious attitudes even when and precisely because it is claiming to be distant from them. The imposition of forgiveness as a univocal tool to solve the myriad conflicts that pullulate across the world has led to what could be called an injunction to forgive (Murphy & Hampton, 1998 p. 12). Such imposition is a mandate to stand above the differences that constitute conflicts and be able to see beyond those particularities while recognizing the inherent worth (Jankélévitch, 1960; Enright, 1998) of the one that opposes us, irrespective of the level of the harm, or the type of wound inflicted.

Moreover, if forgiveness is the only horizon of the epoch to solve intractable conflicts, what emerged as an alternative to the triad of conquest, clemency and negotiation have the risk of instituting itself into an injunction, a mandate of irredeemability around the idea of forgiveness for the choice is already made. Either the survivors comply with the predetermined horizon, irrespective of their readiness, ability or pain, or they are simply outcasts. The question remains as to the value, legitimacy, and properness of any understanding of forgiveness if it originates and is driven from anywhere else but the survivor as Thomas Brudholm (2008) and Valerie Rosoux (2009) argued.

While some of the traditions described above assume that our current understanding of forgiveness was always already there, there are some scholars like

David Konstan (2010) who argues that what we understand today as forgiveness, which occurs once people accept their wrong and apologize for their misdeeds is a modern idea whose origins can be traced only as far back as Kant. Somewhat distant from Konstan's (2010) research, but still within the problematizations of forgiveness, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider (2006) consider the extent to which one can talk meaningfully about forgiveness after severe atrocities and crimes. For Levy and Sznaider (2006) a quintessential question is to what extent the pragmatics of conciliation, foreclose meaningful process of reconciliation. For them, one of the problems with forgiveness comes from the unquestioned assumed superiority of forgiveness and the negative portrayal of resentment as a self-defeating sentiment that clouds people's judgment and creates the conditions for new cycles of violence and mayhem. Without referencing Bishop Butler (2006) or Adam Smith (1854/2010) or the extensive research on the positive side of negative emotions (2014), Levy and Sznaider (2006) question the uncritical negative portrayal of resentment and the way in which it has been foreclosed as an alternative to dealing with conflict**.** Irrespective of its origin and the etymological sources of the terms, there is a sense in which the last quarter of the previous century saw the emergence of forgiveness as an axis that could allow alternatives that move beyond the traditional understanding of justice and retribution, without entailing the peace of the victors or the clemency of the conquerors (Seneca, 2010).

Forgiveness and Moral Education

Almost invariably whenever one talks about morality, the references go as far back as early Greek and ancient moral and religious texts within the Western tradition. In the specific case of moral education, particularly in North America, there has been a fundamental division between key cognitive developmentalist such as Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1987) and character education that boils down to the first one understanding morality as the right exercise of reason and the latter as right conduct (Chinnery, 2003). So, whereas cognitive developmentalism gives priority to "rational deliberation, reflection, conflict resolution and autonomous choice…proponents of character education advocate inculcating in students a particular constellation of moral habits by exposing them to positive role models and providing opportunities to put the various virtues into

practice" (Chinnery, 2003, p. 11). At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, one could argue that the cognitive developmentalists argue for a specific type of a teleological process at the end of which what could be called moral maturity is achieved. The advocates of character education, on the other hand, focus on reading either religious and or popular literature that serves the aims of moral pedagogy with the help of an instructor who not only guides the discussion but helps develop the types of virtues that will be found in the specific literary references suggested. So, character education will also be teleological, only in a different way.

Although cognitive developmentalism and character education have enjoyed recognizable periods of popularity when the other one is somewhat less popular, Ann Chinnery (2003) argues that the pendulum has swung from one approach to the other and back again over the past hundred years in North America.

Morality and Educational Psychology

Originally developed by Jean Piaget (1932), cognitive developmentalism focuses on children's conceptual, perceptual and moral development compared to a somewhat ideal standard adult's point of view. For Piaget (1932), there were primarily two stages of morality: the first one was heteronomous morality and the second one was autonomous morality. Heteronomous morality was characterized by the belief that there was an intrinsic authority on the rules that are in place and as such, they should not be either challenged or disobeyed. According to Piaget (1932), the relationship that children had with rules was anchored in the relation that they had with people in positions of authority and the quasi-god-like status that they enjoyed in their eyes (p. 36).

The second stage, the autonomous morality stage placed by Piaget (1932) at around age 10, moves away from the reverential understanding of rules on the heteronomous stage and more towards an understanding of rules as developed by people to guide, control and or alter the lives of other people and as such are fallible, subject to interpretation and challenge. In other words, whereas heteronomous morality was characterized by an unquestioned acceptance of authority and a quasi-metaphysical status

that rules enjoyed. Autonomous morality was marked by a more critical realization that the quasi-metaphysical status of the rules transferred from their relationship with the adults did not hold and there was space for evaluation, distance, problematization that was different from the univocal understanding of rules of the heteronomous stage.

Anchored in Piaget's understanding of moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969) six stages of moral development sought to improve Piaget's theory of moral development further refining what for the last 60 or 70 years has been the most influential understanding of moral psychology. While some scholars such as Robert J. Nash (1997) argue that the heyday of Kohlberg's (1969) cognitive development is over, Kohlberg's (1969) six-stage model of cognitive development is even to this day, influential (p. 13). One of the features of Kohlberg's six developmental stages is that as the individual matures, she is better equipped to answer the moral challenges that come her way. Like Piaget, Kohlberg (1969) also understood that morality and logic operated through stages, but unlike Piaget, Kohlberg argued that the process of moral development was principally concerned with justice, and that concern was present throughout people's lifetime. Kohlberg's (1969) six stages are grouped into three levels: Preconventional Morality, Conventional Morality, and Postconventional Morality and are based upon the answers that people give to different dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1971).

At the pre-conventional level, obedience and punishment are the two axes that guide moral decisions. At the first stage, an action is perceived as morally wrong if the consequences are individually perceived as negative or positive. The second stage in the pre-conventional model is anchored in a self-interest orientation, namely, “what do I get from it?” or the more colloquial “what's in it for me?” The second level, conventional morality, is also subdivided into two stages (stages 3 and 4). Stage 3 focuses on social norms and one's allegiance to those norms irrespective of one's relation to them. The second stage of conventional morality (stage 4) assumes an ideal good and bad agent attitude and anchors moral decisions in those two axes. The third level, postconventional morality, is also divided in two stages. The social contract orientation (stage 5) presupposes that there are social gains to be made by belonging to a community and, while there are individual hindrances that may occur by agreeing to the social contract

model, the overall gains are greater under the social contract model. The second stage of the third level (stage 6) is characterized by the adherence to universal ethical principles as the source of moral decision-making and action. According to Kohlberg (1969), only those who guide their actions based on a rational understanding of universal moral principles achieve this last stage of moral development (Kohlberg, 1969).

A particularly incisive criticism of Kohlberg's model was Carol Gilligan’s critique of Kohlberg’s prioritizing of justice over other moral considerations, such as care and the importance of relationships. Gilligan’s criticism was based on Kohlberg's (1969) findings according to which girls tended to reach less morally developed stages than boys.

Expanding on Kohlberg's (1969) developmental model, Gilligan (1982) argued that there are two moral voices. One is decidedly masculine and focuses on masculine traits such as logic and individualism, and another is feminine and focuses on interpersonal relations, caring and the protection of people (Muss, 1988). For Gilligan (1982) the male moral voice argued that there were basic rights and people were to respect those rights, so the function of morality is the imposition of restrictions so that those rights are respected. The female moral voice, on the other hand, is more concerned about relations and the responsibilities that people have towards one another, so morality is anchored on an imperative to care for others. However, none of the moral theories developed before the emergence of Gilligan's (1982) concern about relational care recognized the distinctive moral capacity of such an outlook even if it was already present in early feminist philosophers who pointed to the distinctiveness of the feminine concern for others.

Continuing in the developmentalist tradition, Gilligan (1982) argues, based on a more nuanced reading of the responses that "Jake" and "Amy" give to Kohlberg's (1969) Heinz moral dilemma, there are three stages of moral development. The first one is a self-focused stage; the second stage is conventional morality, and the third stage is the post-conventional. Gilligan's (1982) findings point to a marked difference in girls versus boys' understanding of morality, even though both start at the same stage. However, based on the results, by the time they reach the second stage, girls are generally more concerned

about relations and the caring role that they play within those relationships, rather than treating people as an island of rights, independent, self-sufficient, and distant. Women's concern for their role in relations and caring manages to move beyond the first stage where both girls and boys begin. While boys' responses are consistent with Kohlberg's findings, girls were seen to be more concerned with values like caring, context, and relationships, which are not relevant to the overall moral spectrum of Kohlberg's case. However, unlike Kohlberg (1969), Gilligan (1982) further explores this difference and rather than read it as girls being less morally developed than boys; she describes it as a distinctive moral voice.

For Gilligan (1982), women's perspective differs from the traditional masculine model in that for them a "moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities rather than from competing rights and requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and abstract" (p. 19). Rather than rigidly based on rights and responsibilities of what she refers to as the traditional justice approach, the feminine morality rooted in care is more relational and situational than the prescriptive strands of masculine code morality. For Gilligan (1982) "[only] when life-cycle theorists divide their attention and begin to live with women as they have lived with men will their vision encompass the experience of both sexes and their theories become correspondingly more fertile" (p. 23).

In a similar vein, Nel Noddings (1984) argues that women are more prone towards caring ethics anchored in receptivity, relatedness and responsiveness (p. 2), whereas men are more preoccupied with what she refers to as masculine aspects of ethics, such as justice, fairness, rights, etc. For Noddings (1984), there is a distinction between natural and ethical caring. For the natural caring, the statement "I want" presents the stance of the one who naturally wants to help upon seeing her friend in distress, whereas ethical caring refers to a must. Whereas natural caring allows the dispositional space of choosing whether or not one does act on the wanting to help, ethical caring urges the individual to act, to care, to respond to the calls for caring in a way that cannot be neglected. While ethical caring goes further than natural caring, it is anchored in natural caring as the starting point or the source from which ethical caring originates.

Noddings' (1984) ethics is also radically contextual since she refuses to allow traditional abstract questions about the possibility of caring for someone who is unconscious as mere game play (p. 105). Noddings' ethics of care is anchored in a concrete materiality that is conscious of the different factors at play and refuses to answer questions about caring from the distant point of theory, rather than the actual person involved in the caring relation. As such, she argues that "since so much depends on the subjective experience of those involved in ethical encounters, conditions are rarely 'sufficiently similar' for me to declare that you must do what I do" (p. 5). So rather than the prescriptive strand of ethics that through commands and or codes dictate in advance and from afar the decisions that people should follow, Noddings' care ethics is based on situational relatedness, in the caring that emerges from the being there, the being-with echoing Buber (1970), Heidegger (1996), and Levinas (1969).

The third point on Noddings ethics of care refers to what she calls engrossment that occurs when the "one-caring" accepts the "cared-for" without trying to project her own self into the other and is attentive to the expressed needs of the other, the cared-for.

Character Education and Forgiveness

Unlike cognitive developmentalism, character education has a history that can be traced back as early as Aristotle's (Joachim, 1953) *Nichomachean Ethics*, as one of the first attempts within Western thought to systematize the tenets of virtue ethics (Anscombe, 1981) and character education (Salls, 2006).

Although there is an agreement about the prescience of character education as one of the paradigms of moral education until mid-1900's as Cunningham (1992) argues, the prescience of the paradigm as well as the discussions about virtue has not meant that there is a substantial and unquestioned agreement about virtues their roles and functions. Although it would seem that the metaphysical concern about the virtues from the Platonic stream seems outdated in the midst of our post-metaphysical world (Habermas, 1994), there is a stream of the character education that still anchors the discussions about virtues and characters on a metaphysical substratum. For Marva Collins (1990), a self-identified

Platonist, the ancient values hold as much true then and now and that allows her to sprinkle her Marva's Way with references to Plato, Aesop, Aristotle and the Bible among others to ground her neo-classical Platonist approach to character education. For others such as Kristjánsson (2015), while character education remains anchored in an Aristotelian framework, there is a concern to have a more scientifically grounded, conceptually sound, socially accepted understanding of moral education a foundation of which is virtue ethics.

For the advocates of character education, the emphasis tends to be on instilling virtues in students by exposing them to traditional and or popular literature that highlights particular virtues and fosters those virtues as guiding principles in their lives, such as William J. Bennett's (1993) *The Book of Virtues*. Although authors like Lindberg (1976) argue that the McGuffey Reader series (1836-37, 1840) were the most influential character education referent, it seems that Bennett's (1993) work has slowly come to occupy that influential role, particularly among religiously and or neo-classically inclined schools as Robert J Nash (1997) argued.

A pattern consistent from most of the neo-classically inclined character education is the choosing of biblical stories that through example and identification with the character of the story, expect the reader to identify the virtues that are addressed in the stories and apply them in their lives (Lickona, 1991). The importance of stories and their role in the moral institution and the lives of children is prescient through the character education field, to the extent that authors such as Bennett (1993), argue that for children to learn what the virtues are, they should receive "material to read … there are many wonderful stories of virtue and vice with which our children should be familiar" (p. 12). The same pattern of deploying stories to elicit considerations and practices of virtue is prevalent among most of the character education (Vitz, 1990).

Regarding forgiveness, character education has understood forgiveness education as a relevant and implementable tool that can be deployed with all youth as they will most likely be hurt at one point or other in their lives and learning about forgiveness can acquaint them with the tools necessary to deal with those wounds. As Lin, Enright and

Klatt argued (2011) there are patterns within the forgiveness curriculum advanced by Knutson and Enright (2002) that contain sufficient elements of character education (Lickona, 1991) to the extent that their curriculum can be integrated into the character education stream with the capacity of being modified depending on the cognitive, behavioral and emotional needs of the population.

Forgiveness and Education

It was not until the 20th century that forgiveness became a specific aim of moral education. Piaget was a pioneer in considering the articulation of forgiveness as a moral feature in the education of children. For Piaget (1932; 1965) "forgiveness belonged to the moral realm precisely because it concerns charity or love in action and emerged once the child passes through heteronomous and into autonomous moral reasoning" (Enright et at., 1994, p. 67). For Piaget (1932; 1965), as children move from the heteronomous to the autonomous stage, they realize that the rules of justice are not as inflexible as they thought, and forgiveness emerges as a type of reciprocity that is placed equivalently to justice, anchored in presuppositions of mutual respect. For Piaget (1932), reciprocity was the cognitive developmental operation that made both forgiveness and any other moral autonomous response possible (p. 32). According to Piaget (1932/1965), there are two types of reciprocity. The first one sees as natural the returning of an injury that one has received, also known as an eye for an eye, type of scenario. This type of reciprocity is operationally concrete and still has a literal understanding of reciprocity, but what grounds forgiveness is reciprocity as an ideal that moves beyond the equivalence to the "indefinite sustained reciprocity" (Piaget, 1932, p. 323). Piaget (1932) argued that the reasoning of the action moves from do as were done by, from the ideal, "do as you would be done by" (p. 323) based on Kant’s categorical imperative to treat others as you would like to be treated in similar circumstances. While most of the critiques of Piaget's understanding of forgiveness have tried to problematize his association of forgiveness as reciprocal at the level of justice, there is a sense in which Piaget's understanding of forgiveness with the reciprocal level of justice remains an alternative for further exploration.

As addressed by scholars such as Rodden (2004), the relation between forgiveness and education has been scant, even though forgiveness is particularly well equipped to address some of the individual and societal concerns of moral education such as anger, resentment and maladjustment. Moreover, as Suzanne Freeman (2007) states, the "recent increase in school violence by both children and adolescents illustrates that there is a real need for education that could help students cope with their hurt and angry feelings" (p. 92). While it is not possible to undo the harm experienced by the survivors, learning to cope with the consequences of the harm so that the life of the survivor does not revolve around their inability to move beyond the wound, is perhaps the most popular task for the forgiveness interventions. However, Freeman's (2007) study of forgiveness with at-risk children seems to go further than the traditional deployments of forgiveness. As Freeman's (2007) study points out, when people think about at-risk adolescents the emphasis tends to be on "delinquency, alcohol and drug use, poverty, conduct disorders, academic failure, teenage pregnancy, dysfunctional families, and difficulty with interpersonal relationships" (p. 92). Rarely there is a question about the origin of those symptoms and even less often is there a question about the emotive consequences of their experiences such as anger, resentment, self-harm, etc. The lack of concern about the emotive consequences of those experiences and the lack of tools to deal with those negative consequences paired with a damaging portrayal of people who manifest those negative emotions creates a vicious circle that impacts every aspect of their life. It seems important to recognize the function that anger, in particular, and other “negative” emotions (Boler, 1999), such as embarrassment, shame and guilt, jealousy, envy play in the lives of people, (Henniger & Harris, 2014) so that their signs are recognized, instead of hidden, and proper vehicles of expression of that anger are formulated (Lewis-Fernandez, 2002).

It is precisely in relation to the way negative emotions in general and anger, in particular, has been dealt with, that interpersonal forgiveness has entered the classroom in order to facilitate "the overcoming negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward an offender and, perhaps, over time, developing more positive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward him or her" (Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000, p. 23).

The most popular forgiveness interventions deployed in different settings namely the HDSG (1991), understood forgiveness as a tool to manage negative emotions, refrain from vengeance and avoid the pernicious consequences of chronic anger has been making significant inroads in a variety of classrooms. The program contains 20 units understood as "a flexible set of processes with feedback and feed-forward loops" (Enright et al., 1998, p. 12).

Although there are other forgiveness models that have emerged, such as the Hepp-Dax (1996) or the Freedman and Knupp (2003), the effectiveness of the Enright model has been validated with populations such as elderly women who have been hurt in various ways (Hebl & Enright, 1993), incest survivors (Freedman & Enright, 1996), men who have been hurt by their partner's decision to have an abortion (Coyle & Enright, 1997), patients with substance abuse dependence (Lin, Mack, Enright, Krahn, & Baskin, 2004), terminally ill cancer patients (Hansen, 2002), and married couples (Knutson, 2003). Although the forgiveness model advanced by Enright and the HDSG (1991) has been tested with various populations, Sim (2003) argues that the literature on forgiveness in the adolescent population is limited and inadequate. Gambaro's (2003) intervention with adolescents that had anger levels above the median demonstrates that there is a positive function that forgiveness interventions can play by improving the quality of life, the social and familial relationships of the participants as well as the reduction of the possibility of detention.

Along the same lines of Gambaro (2002), Park (2003) successfully tried a forgiveness intervention model that decreases anger, incidents of delinquency, aggression, and hostility with female adolescents that have been victimized by their peers and who, owing to their inability to successfully cope with their own victimization, became aggressors.

Following the work of the Enright and the HDSG (1991), Mauger et al. (1992) have focused more on the differences that for her exist between different understandings of forgiveness such as the Forgiveness of Self (FOS) and the Forgiveness of others (FOO). Unlike Enright and the HDSG (1991) models which are developmental lessons

designed for classroom settings whose complexity increases as the school children mature, Mauger et al. (1992) forgiveness intervention use true and false type of questions that seek to differentiate the forgiveness of the self from forgiveness of the other. For Mauger et al. (1992) the forgiveness of other revolves around "taking revenge, justifying retaliation and revenge, holding grudges, and seeing other people as apt to cause one hurt," (p. 171). Forgiveness of self, on the other hand, involves "feelings of guilt over past acts, seeing oneself as sinful, and having a variety of negative attitudes towards yourself" (p. 171).

Concerning the practical implications of forgiveness from the perspective of character education, a new area of research links cognate character strengths rarely explored in relation to forgiveness such as gratitude. By exploring gratitude and forgiveness in the same study, Breen, Kashdan, Lenser, and Fincham (2010) sought to move beyond individual character research and decided to explore gratitude in relation to forgiveness, since "gratitude has been described as a moral virtue, attitude, emotion, habit, personality trait, and coping response" (p. 934). Concomitant with the understanding of gratitude, forgiveness has been understood as a decision where the person that was harmed abstains from acting on their desire for revenge and rather sees an increase in positive thoughts towards the aggressors (Fincham, 2000; Worthington & Scherer, 2004).

Along with the pro-social (Fincham, 2000; Worthington & Scherer, 2004), and health benefits (Mauger et al, 1992; Enright, 2000; Scobie & Scobie, 2000; Worthington, Sandage, & Berry, 2000; Ripley & Worthington, 2002; Thompson & Snyder, 2003) that an individual who forgives enjoys, research carried out by Witvliet, Ludwig and Bauer (2002) has argued that there are also gains experienced by the forgiven person as there is also a decrease in anger, sadness, shame, and guilt. So rather than an improvement in the quality of life of only the person that does the forgiving, the benefits are also enjoyed by the person forgiven. A response, a riposte, an answer that heals both parties in an introversion of the wound that goes out changed from what was originally received.

Pedagogies of Forgiveness in Conflict Stricken Areas

Although forgiveness is a tool used to deal primarily with interpersonal conflict, there is also an emerging pattern that understands forgiveness as a tool that helps overcome the cycles of societal violence and remove revenge as a societal motivator (Shriver, 1995, 2001a, 2001b). In that regard, forgiveness has been used as an intervention tool to ameliorate ethnic conflicts such as Bosnia, the Middle East, South Central Los Angeles (Enright, 2001), and Northern Ireland (Amstutz, 2005; Daye, 2004; Enright, 1994). Moreover, the presupposition that anchors those interventions, namely the move from the particular to the general, has begun to be challenged.

The presupposition that goes from the particular to the general argues that once someone learns or is able to forgive at an individual level, she will be able to translate that knowledge to her social milieu and apply it. However, as Snyder and Thompson (2003) have pointed out, most of the research that has been conducted hitherto has been situationally specific, either on their structural or processual models (Enright, 1979, 1980). Enright (1979, 1980) has focused his work on interpersonal forgiveness as a model that can be replicated at the group level, particularly since as Summerfield (1999) argued violence experienced by one side of the conflict is understood as a collective experience, even if endured at an individual level. But even as forgiveness interventions have been implemented in conflict-ridden areas, such as Israel and Palestine (Shechtman and Wade, 2009) and Ireland (Enright, 2003), there is no conclusive evidence that the learnings of the situational forgiveness can be replicated at other situations or that they can be translated from the individual to the community. So rather than forgiveness as a general disposition, the research has focused on offence specific types of forgiveness that while rich and insightful do not offer the full scope of the benefits and challenges that forgiveness could encounter at a societal level. However, scholars, who have worked on dispositional forgiveness (Thompson & Snider, 2005) versus offence specific types of forgiveness have pointed out that there are various reasons in the offence-specific type of forgiveness that could influence people`s decision to forgive. The reasons that influence offence specific type of forgiveness such as sentimental attachments with the perpetrator,

inability to withstand the pressure of the oppressor, etc., may not necessarily weigh as heavily on the communitarian considerations about forgiveness (Berry, 2001).

Pragmatics of Forgiveness

One of the most noticeable trends in the related literature on forgiveness has to do with what I have termed *pragmatics of forgiveness*. By pragmatics of forgiveness, I refer to the focus not necessarily on why, or how or to which extent people should or not forgive, but on merely pointing out through scientific experiments that it is good for people to forgive. While staying clear of ethical and or moral considerations, the undisclosed intent of the pragmatics of forgiveness is to give people arguments about what they could gain if they simply took the path of forgiveness. Some of the benefits that are often referenced in the literature are the reduction of the risk of coronary disease and (Chida & Steptoe, 2009), management of their levels of anxiety and stress (Toussaint, Shields, Dorn, Slavich, 2016), etc. One of the pioneering advocates for this position is Everett Worthington Jr. (2007) who has spearheaded a vast amount of research that is based on psychological science and traces the way resentment, bitterness, and anger impairs the life and well-being of individuals and as such makes it imperative to forgive, or as he argues, makes the consensual argument that forgiveness is beneficial to people (Worthington, 2006). Following Worthington, Karaırmak, and Güloğlu (2014) argue that forgiveness prevents the development of psychiatric problems. Metts and Cupach (1998) argue that forgiving people are less ruminative, less narcissistic or as per Davidson, (1993) less exploitative and more empathetic as suggested Tangney, Fee, Reinsmith, Boone, and Lee (1999).

Although the research explored hitherto comes from different fields and is grounded on different perspectives a pattern that seems to run through them is the belief that forgiving in one instance necessarily becomes a transferable skill that allows people to forgive in another instance.

The most salient and the one that problematizes almost the whole edifice of the positivism of forgiveness is the difference between what Berry et al. (2001) have called

dispositional forgiveness, understood as a broad ability to forgive, over and above specific events of harm, which is where most of the literature on forgiveness has tended to stay. The presupposition that forgiving in one instance necessarily translates into an ability to forgive in other aspects of one's life seems like an unrealistic jump that does not take into consideration the particularities of forgiving. The assumption is that the character of the forgiven agent, as well as the dispositional feature of the person forgiving, will necessarily be replicated on every other transgression. As such, rather than focusing on transgression-specific types of forgiveness, the emphasis should move towards dispositional forgiveness measured more as a broad ability to use forgiveness as a resource beyond the specificities of one single instance events.

What the research outlined to this point reveals is an opportunity to examine an aspect of forgiveness that has, to some extent, been un-stated: the need for the exploration of a space for the people who cannot forgive through a recognition of the negative emotions that survivorhood ensues. We need to explore alternatives to forgiveness as legitimate responses to harm and wrong-doing, emphasizing the educational importance of including it in the repertoire of moral emotions that are both legitimate and educable.

Chapter 3.

Grounding the Alternatives to Forgiveness

In this chapter, I will explore the possibility that an alternative to the dyad forgiveness or vengeance emerges through a consideration of the function and role that, what has pejoratively been called, "negative emotions" play in the lives of victimized people. For only when we recognize their function and role within the array of emotive and moral responses the survivors could present and integrate them into pedagogical strategies, will we be able to move beyond simply condemning and seeking to correct them. Although there is a vast array of negative emotions, I will focus mainly on *anger* and *resentment* as they are the ones that are most referred to in the forgiveness research.

Also, when I refer to people in this chapter, I am speaking about people of all ages who have experienced trauma, social and political violence and who could benefit from an alternative space in which their position will be respected, validated and even encouraged as a site of principled dissent that could foster social and political transformation. The point is not to dwell on the experience of victimhood and prevent the alternatives that might arrive from trying to resolve it but recognize that the experience of victimhood and the consequences of that experience imprints itself differently on each subject and there needs to alternatives for those who are not able to forgive.

Alternatives to forgiveness

Whenever one talks about alternatives to forgiveness, a metaphysical substratum of forgiveness remains there at an almost subconscious level. Almost intuitively, the alternatives to forgiveness are associated with vengeance as the logical opposite of forgiveness, as if only the extremes were possible as if the only alternative that refuses and or negates forgiveness can be its opposite, namely vengeance. Moreover, those opposites are always already pejorative and less than, thereby foreclosing the space through which alternatives or grey areas could emerge. Moreover, the lack of a more

nuanced vocabulary that can evoke both the distance and the proximity to forgiveness as well as the distance and the scant proximity to some ressentiment that is explored through the conscious refusal to forgive is also to blame for the negative associations that continue to exist in the terms like non-forgiveness. Hitherto, the discussion about alternative means of conciliation has been dominated by religiously laden understandings of forgiveness that have constituted themselves as the only alternative to the traditional punitive model. One of the most popular books of one of the most notable advocates of the redemptive forgiveness approach is Bishop Desmond Tutu (1999) is aptly titled *No Future Without Forgiveness*. Perhaps without intending it, Tutu's title that manages to convey the kernel of the social, moral and political understanding of forgiveness. For rather than as an alternative among many, forgiveness has instituted itself as the unique horizon through which conflict resolution and alternatives to mayhem are understood. Although Bishop Tutu (1999) is perhaps among the most vocal authors about the injunction to forgive, he is by no means the only one. There are exponents about the inevitability of forgiveness as the single horizon through which intractable conflict is to be thought, among theologians, sociologist, educators, and psychologists. Among those who, while recognizing that there might be alternatives to forgiveness, but who fail to detail what those alternatives might be, Worthington (2002) figures prominently, not only because he has been an influential figure in the pragmatics of forgiveness, but also because he does recognize that there might be alternatives to forgiveness, even if he does not fully endorse them. For him, unforgiveness is part of a person's internalized negative affect and may become detrimental both by causing addictive behaviours as well as by being a result of such addictive behaviours (Worthington et al., 2002). So, while he does recognize that there are other ways besides forgiveness to deal with conflict and strife, he seems to think that unforgiveness can only come about from the internalization of negative emotions which has detrimental consequences to the health and well-being of people, or as a result of those destructive behaviours.

Unlike the pragmatics of forgiveness that give prevalence to the benefits that people could gain if they were to forgive without valuing their moral and agentic stance into the forgiving equation, a proper alternative to forgiveness should be attentive to the shortcomings of the pragmatics of forgiveness recognizing the role that the forgiving

agent has in the decision-making process as well as the carrying out of the decision. An alternative to the injunction to forgive will be attentive to the motivational features that prevent someone from forgiving and work with them to make possible alternatives through which survivors can express their negative emotions in ways that are agentic, legitimate and educable. The alternative to the pragmatics of forgiveness should focus more on the overall gains of the individual and injured community, than the short-term benefits that could be attained if people simply worked their way through forgiveness.

Unlike the injunction to forgive and its positivist manifestation, the pragmatics of forgiveness, the alternative of forgiveness should be less outcome driven and more process driven. By being process driven, the point is not to bring those who cannot forgive to a point of no return where their wounds are no longer there but to recognize that getting to a point where they are able to move beyond the immediacy of their wound is a process that entails setbacks and circular movement. While there is an outcome that remains at the core of the alternatives to forgiveness, those outcomes should not take precedence over the process of working with the negative emotions in ways that afford survivors agency and freedom to situate themselves about those injuries.

Negative emotions

The purpose of bringing negative emotions into the conversation about alternatives to forgiveness has to do with the role that they could play if they were brought into the conversation while recognizing them, their role and their function in the lives of victimized people. For here perhaps goes the first fundamental division between the advocates of forgiveness and the understanding of unforgiveness that I am trying to pursue. Far too often, the understanding of the negative emotions sees them as naturally reprehensible and to be avoided at all cost to the point that having them or not having overcome them has begun to be pathologized as if only certain types of responses were appropriate. As if the array of responses to one's victimhood was always already decided by someone else, somewhere else, as well as their timing and intensity.

At the risk of being read as someone who merely wants 'negative' emotions to run wild, it is necessary to point out that the emphasis of this chapter is to recognize the

plurality of emotions labeled as negative emotions and recognize their role and function especially in the lives of the survivors who hitherto have lacked the channels to elaborate their stance on and against forgiveness. There is a moral and self-assertive role that those negative emotions play in the lives of people and rather than simply erasing them from the survivor's life, they could be used as the axis around which new alternatives to victimhood could emerge, such as unforgiveness.

In order to give valence to the moral function of the negative emotions, it will be necessary to recognize them not only as naturally occurring, but also as morally relevant responses that have a role and a function that needs to be addressed and acknowledged, rather than simply cast aside as the kind of emotions that only vindictive and rancorous people that impede the road to reconciliation harbor in their lives.

Forgiveness and Negative Emotions

Although forgiveness in educational settings has tended to be anchored in moral as well as pragmatic understandings of the need of the individual to forgive, there are a few implicit presuppositions that should be explored before embracing forgiveness. For instance, is all anger necessarily pernicious and as such the bedrock of all resentment? Is all resentment necessarily and unavoidably connected to vengeance in the uncomplicated way that the literature on forgiveness, in general, seems to understand? Surveying the literature that seeks to introduce forgiveness into the curriculum as a means to prevent and deal with emerging intractable conflicts (Enright, Gassin & Knutson, 2003; Hebl & Enright, 1993), it seems that, if we were to move anger from the equation, at least the basis on which most intractable conflicts are founded would be removed, then the road to reconciliation will be much clear. However, such a unidirectional perspective, while simple and appealing, seems to have an either-or understanding of emotions that could hinder, rather than aid, the agency promoting processes of forgiveness as well as prevent rather than facilitate nuanced understandings of both anger and forgiveness. Perhaps if we were to look deeper at how scholars of forgiveness understand anger, we could see that rather than a balanced, critical and scholarly informed understanding of anger, its motivations and polyvalent outcomes, anger tends to be understood more as a pernicious

hindrance, a reaction that needs to be avoided at almost all costs. As if only violence and mayhem could come from anger and resentment. Moreover, the issue goes further than that.

Somewhat dependent on the fear of anger, but more constitutive of it, there seems to be a widely held belief in the literature on forgiveness that presupposes as destructive and to be avoided at all costs, what is commonly referred as 'negative emotions' as if all that they could bring was simply mayhem, conflict and destitution. However, if negative emotions are already understood as fundamentally pernicious and to be avoided at all costs, then the space is already foreclosed to the people who cannot forgive for either ethical, political and or moral reasons. Their anger rather than a sign of a principled moral core from which the rest could be built is denounced and antagonized as the source of the ills of society. The negative emotions that anchor their stance are simply neglected as if negative emotions were only maliciously destructive forces that survivors should not come in contact.

Although somewhat sketched above, there seemed to be two presuppositions about forgiveness that it will be useful to scrutinize to dispel the uncritical ways in which forgiveness continues to be understood as the only conflict resolution mechanism. The first presupposition sees a direct and almost unquestionable link from anger to vengeance to retribution, and it is imbued with positive psychology outlooks even if those links are not acknowledged explicitly. The second presupposition that it is not only present on those that seek to instill forgiveness across the different curriculums, but it is also present across an important part in of the literature on forgiveness, is the idea that it is either forgiveness or mayhem. Either one accepts the path of forgiveness and tries to work as long as it is necessary to forgive, or one simply opens oneself to the deleterious path of resentment and vengeance with all the pernicious consequences for one's physical, social and emotional well-being.

But there needs to be more than an either-or approach to forgiveness. There needs to be a space whereby those who cannot or are not yet ready to forgive can articulate their stance so that new spaces for unforgiveness are fostered. Perhaps we could carve out a

post-metaphysical space of forgiveness that moves us beyond the economics of transactional forgiveness and its inability to accommodate the dissenting voices within the premises of civility. Perhaps the key to moving beyond the imperative to forgive lies in the carving of an interregnum between forgiveness and vengeance that while not entailing retribution, stays true to the wounds that constituted them and distances them from reconciliatory discourses, which do not necessarily speak to them. In other words, the key to post-metaphysical forgiveness may be through the plight of those who cannot forgive. For they are the ones that have stood outside the discursive field of the reconciliatory practices and while refusing to forgive, they have abstained from vengeance, thereby transcending and contradicting the binarism of no future without forgiveness.

Forgiveness and Anger

The most common use of forgiveness in classroom settings as well as forgiveness interventions is as an intervention that seeks to prevent anger from seething in people's lives if such negative emotion was allowed to remain unchecked. The fear of anger comes from a metaphysical presupposition that understands the alternatives to forgiveness as naturally pernicious to the point that there is a widely held belief that can be traced back to Seneca (1909), that sees anger as a deadly vice. As Chentsovaa-Dutton, Senft and Ryder (2013) argue, "European American contexts foster the idea that these emotions are not just unpleasant but problematic, even pathological" (p. 146). Forgiveness, thus, is understood more as a tool to deal with anger and resentment understood as the consequences of not having forgiven, than as a mechanism that could help people overcome their wounds beyond the negative emotions as a manifestation of those wounds, namely anger and resentment among others.

The belief that negative emotions and anger, in particular, have negative consequences in the lives of people is substantiated by an ever-growing body of research that explores those negative consequences (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Gottman & Levenson, 1992; Kubzansky & Kawachi, 2000). While there is emerging research that seeks to problematize the unquestioned preponderance of positive emotions

(Graham, Huang, Clark & Helgeson, 2008; Gruber, Mauss, & Tamir, 2011; Hershfield, Scheibe, Sims, & Carstensen, 2012) the consensus that anchors forgiveness research for both Enright and the HSDG (1991, 2003) Worthington (2003) is that anger is a pernicious negative emotion with negative consequences in the lives of people.

Against the trend of those that see negative emotions in general and anger and resentment in particular as emotions to be avoided, Bishop Joseph Butler (2006) and Adam Smith (1854/2010) are examples of scholars that valued both anger and resentment as logical responses and sites with moral valence. Specifically, for Butler (2006), there is a role that those emotions play and even if one takes distance from Butler's religiously loaded references, there is something to be said when he argues that god put those negative emotions in the lives of people because he intended them for a reason. In the case of Smith (2009), he argues in his seminal theory of Moral Sentiments that the unsocial passions- anger, hatred, and resentment - "are regarded as necessary parts of the character of human nature" (p. 268). So, if rather than casting them aside as maligned irruptions of intemperance that needs to be controlled and moderated, we recognize them in all its moral dimension in connection to unforgiveness, we could be *ad portas* of creating the conditions for the proper moral valuation of resentment as a morally anchored response that needs to be articulated in connection with the injury that elicited it.

It might be pertinent to note relevant research that has emerged in relation to negative emotions and their adaptive function that operate in response to emotional and environmental challenges (Forgas, Haselton, & von Hippel, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Adolphs & Damasio, 2001; Forgas, 1995, 2002; Zajonc, 2000). The notion that anger leads to motivated action is inherent in appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987) and finds support in research on anterior cortical asymmetries related to approach and avoidance (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). However, somehow those nuanced understandings of anger in general and the negative emotion, in particular, do not seem to find a receptive ear in the advocates of forgiveness who aim at erasing their manifestation, if not their origin, from the with which populations they work.

Although it has been argued above that it is imperative to address the moral function of the negative emotions, it seems necessary to note that the point of addressing them is not necessarily to celebrate and encourage them. The point of addressing them, especially in the context of moral education is to recognize the role that they play in the lives of survivors in the first place and also through that understanding try to contextualize them in the lives of the survivors that cannot forgive. Those 'negative emotions' have a reason and a role to play that goes far beyond the maligned misunderstanding that positive psychology (Enright, 2003) and self-help manuals (Enright, 2004) on forgiveness have suggested. If we delegitimize the emotional responses that people have towards being injured and not only make them feel guilty for having had those emotional responses but fail to locate them within the moral horizon of the human spectrum, one is doing a disservice to the survivors one is trying to help. Rather than understanding their stance, one simply seeks to move them, irrespective of their ability to do so; fundamentally oblivious of the emotional gamut that anchors their response. In other words, it could be said a la Rousseau (1712/1997), that the one that knows better forces them to be 'free' through forgiving.

However, if one understands resentment as an answer, a response, a retort, rather than a closing up, or an uncooperative high moral horse for the survivor, we may be able to connect the dots and find ways to empower them, rather than neglecting their moral and affective stance. If one is attentive to both resentment and anger as comebacks, as responses and understand them as such, one might be better able to articulate responses attentive to the particular place of the survivors, their needs and stance, rather than forcing them into preconceived notions of what they ought to do. There is something to be said both of resentment and anger in particular and negative emotions in general as responses to what elicited them. As such, a proper response to those negative emotions will be to trace and understand them in all their moral dimension.

So, if forgiveness is the overcoming of anger, the opposite of forgiveness might be the vicious anger that cannot see past the immediacy of the wound and consumes the survivor. Moreover, it is precisely in the facile association as anything other than forgiveness equating pathological anger and resentment, that most of the research that has

considered unforgiveness have condemned it as an alternative (Worthington & Scherer, 2003). As if all types of anger were always already pathologic. As if anyone who would not or could not forgive, was always already a vengeance-driven individual consumed by the negative emotions. Although the sketch above illustrates how anger, resentment and negative emotions, in general, are understood, the kernel of the issue is the uncritical assumption of negative emotions without any critical approximation that considers them beyond the pernicious effects that they have when allowed to run unchecked.

If we agree that anger comes as a response to the real or perceived belief that one's well-being is being neglected (Sell, Tooby & Cosmides, 2009), then we can agree that negative emotions are not "inherently harmful and may serve important functions in relationships" (Baker, McNulty & Overall, 2014, p. 101). For as Jonathan Haid (2003) quoting Carol Tavris (1982) argued, "for every spectacular display of angry violence, there are many more mundane cases of people indignantly standing up for what is right, or angrily demanding justice from others" (p. 856). If we move beyond the negativity of negative emotions and recognize them in all their rich, moral agentic dimension, perhaps we could recognize the role that negative emotions could have for the people that cannot forgive, as well as for the space of non-forgiveness.

The current research on forgiveness, however, continues to understand anger simply as a negative emotion, and that association spills over unforgiveness, for as Harris, and Thoresen (2005) argued: "anger is a component of unforgiveness; anger is a health risk; therefore, unforgiveness is a health risk" (p. 324). The oversimplification of unforgiveness ergo negative emotions, ergo disease outcomes has hitherto foreclosed considerations of unforgiveness as more than a ruminatory stress response that evidences the survivor's inability to cope with their victimhood. However, if we move beyond the logical leap of not forgiving, therefore consumed by anger and hatred, we will see that there are more than the valences of anger than the research on forgiveness contemplates. If we recognized that there is a middle ground that is neither vengeance nor forgiveness we will also see that as there are reasons for survivors to advocate and work towards forgiveness, there are also reasons for the survivors to work and defend unforgiveness. There cannot be a univocal road for resolving strife. Not only because strife imprints

itself differently on survivors, but also because forgiving might have more negative than positive consequences for the person forgiving in certain circumstances and for certain people and it is for those people for whom unforgiveness might be an alternative.

If we recognized that as Jeffrie Murphy (2003) argues in some cases forgiving could entail a compromise of one's moral values, we would need to open the space for alternatives to forgiveness. In other words, while resentment and possible taints of reprisal may inform the refusal to forgive, there might be moral reasons that impede people from forgiving that are so constitutive of who they are as a person, that compelling them to forgive may hinder rather than further the aims of reconciliation. If we accept that some people are not able to forgive for moral reasons or reasons that are not flagitious, then we are required to think about alternatives through which conciliation can bear in mind and even integrate those who cannot forgive. For a type of conciliation unable to see beyond its own premises, unable to build with the dissensus of the one who disagrees, is condemned to be shallow, short-termed and self-serving. A type of conciliation that forces all survivors through a single path forces them to relinquish their principles and conform to top-down forgiveness initiatives that while well intended, may not have the same desired effect in all the population.

When thinking about educational strategies to work with people that cannot forgive, it is important to note that as Murphy and Hampton argued (1998) "we are all products of our conditions of socialization" (p. 9) and as such, under the conditions of armed conflict and or social unrest that occur prior to peace settlements, people are socialized to understand the opponent as an enemy of the State that needs to be neutralized. However, once a peace settlement occurs individuals previously seen as enemies of the State, become part of civility without much pedagogy to revert the socially cohesive idea that sees them as the enemies of the state, or social, political enemies. In other words, there is a political socialization of anger and resentment that is used to bring together the people against what is thought as the common enemy and in most cases, there is not an actual process to move that resentment beyond general cries around national unity and a future together, irrespective of the past that divided them.

In principle, the argument above may seem like a defence of the political socialization of resentment. However, the point is more to argue that there are myriad ways in which resentment is mobilized to further political agendas, and most people do not receive support and are not able to move beyond that socialization. The indigenous, revolutionary or the social leader thought as the enemy will now be part of the communities, and the affect that was constitutive of the other as the enemy, as the one different than whom they were to oppose has not been dealt with, and its implications are still part of the social milieu.

In other words, the social and political function of resentment is particularly clear when it offers people spaces to make sense of their wounds and locate themselves not only as survivors but also as moral agents who demand respect from both the perpetrators and the State that is trying to reconcile with them. Any hegemonic discourse that does not recognize how it encroaches in the lives of people that are not able to move beyond the wounds that have gained an almost identitary status on their understanding of themselves, opens the door for cycles of hatred and retribution to emerge. For instead of recognizing the role and the wounds of those that cannot forgive, their inability to forgive is not only pathologized (Worthington & Wade, 1999; Worthington & Scherer, 2004; Gambaro, et al., 2008; Worthington, et al., 2012) but also trampled in the name of the greater good of conciliation. Moreover, that refusal to forgive if not properly acknowledged and addressed within the institutional channels of policy may be a site for the re-emergence of strife and retribution. The re-articulation of cycles of hatred and violence could emerge because the survivors feel that their wounds were not only unrecognized but deployed to further political ends opposite to the ones they may have had.

However, if an interregnum could be carved where the dissenting voices of forgiveness felt not only that their voices mattered, even if they were not the guiding torch of conciliation, they would feel that there is a place for them even from within their disagreement and their inability to forgive. If there was a pedagogical space where people who cannot forgive, could address the policies of erasure and oblivion, there might be ways for them to feel that their wounds were not in vain. There might be ways for them to feel that their past as painful as it was, as irredeemable as it is, is part of the voices that

while trying to build a new future, is attentive to how the handling of the past will determine the kind of future that there will be. Such pedagogical space could be used to articulate not only their wounds but to come to terms with the understanding of themselves through the changes that they have undergone in relation to their wounds. In this space, those who have hitherto been excluded from the iterations of forgiveness can articulate their pain and their wounds in ways that heighten rather than diminish, not only their moral but individual liberty.

Forgiveness and Resentment

Arriving at the importance of resentment from an Aristotelian angle that questions the extent to which someone who is not able to resent the injuries that they suffer, lacks the proper self-care necessary to get through life, Thomas Brudholm (2008) questions the extent to which there are wrongs which cannot be forgiven. Unlike Jankélévitch (1967, 1996), for whom at least in principle, Nazi Germany could be forgiven (1965, 2005) if they had asked to be forgiven, Brudholm elaborates on Jean Améry's work and considers if there might be emotional and health-related reasons to hold onto resentment and what are often understood as negative attitudes to injury. In principle, one of the motivations of Brudholm is to open the space where resistance to the uncritical celebration of forgiveness considers if there is dignity, self-respect and even mental health gains to be made from those that refuse to forgive. Critical of the South African TRC understanding of forgiveness, Archbishop Desmond Tutu's (1999) grandiloquent statements in favour of forgiveness, as well as most of the literature on the subject, Brudholm questions the extent to which "the refusal to forgive may represent the more demanding moral accomplishment" (p. 2). For in the face of the most egregious atrocity, the imperative to forgive becomes an affront to the survivors.

One of the assumptions that Brudholm (2008) addresses is the facile association that the only reason why people cannot forgive is that they are consumed by their lust for revenge. Incapable of letting go of the past, their victimhood determines the way they relate to themselves as well as to their communities. As such, most of the advocates of forgiveness argue that what the survivors need to move on is to bring closure to their

wounds; either through the ritual of legal process, transitional justice, and forgiveness or a combination of the three. But if, according to Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1997), there is no illusion more powerful than "that of the inevitability and propriety of one's own beliefs and judgments" (p. xvi), then there might be something that the drive to forgive is not only consciously ignoring but overstepping into that needs to be addressed. There is a sense in which survivors that are not able to forgive feel that it is their moral duty to stay true to the events that constituted them as survivors and part of that is not giving up on the emotionality that that event brought to them for the facile recompense of reconciliation. There is a sense and a philosophical tradition that goes from Bishop Butler (2006) to Jeffrie Murphy (2003) among others, according to which, anger and resentment are valuable and legitimate responses to the offences one faces. For as Richard Wallace (1994) indicates, when we express emotions like resentment we are not just angry and vindictive, rather, "we are demonstrating our commitment to certain moral standards, as regulative of social life" (p. 69). In other words, there are moral values that resentment upholds a commitment to rules of engagement which one is perhaps unwilling, perhaps unable to compromise.

Critical of the injunction to forgive that has taken hold of transitional justice in post-conflict societies, Brudholm and Rosoux (2009) draw attention to Esther Mujawayo and Souad Belhaddad (2006) according to which state officials were helping perpetrators distribute photocopied requests of forgiveness so that the survivors could sign them and fulfill the requirement of having obtained forgiveness from the survivors. As such, forgiveness has gone from being a process to which individuals and societies arrived once they thought it was the best course of action, to merely a check-box that needs to be filled. A requirement that the perpetrator asks of their survivors one more time as if the wound that they inflicted was not enough. As if forgiveness was to be attained by the survivors signing their victimhood away, rather than the perpetrators committing to truth and non-repetition. Brudholm and Rosoux (2009) also call attention to the role that government figures and Church leaders play in involuntarily coaxing people into processes of forgiveness for which they are not sufficiently ready, merely because they feel pressured into doing so.

Continuing with the problematization of current instantiations of forgiveness, Brudholm and Rosoux (2009) call attention to Milton Blahyi, a former Liberian rebel leader who while confessing a vast array of crimes, was counselling his survivors that forgiveness was "the right way to go" and "a key to national healing" (p. 4). It is possible that Blahyi had a change of heart and recognized the futility or his crimes and has come to believe in forgiveness as the best course of action. However, there is an irony that should not be lost, that a perpetrator while asking his survivors to forgive, counselled them about the propriety of forgiveness at the same time.

Drawing from the examples above, the authors go back to Jean Améry (1980) and his refusal to forgive anchored in an understanding that it was his moral duty to stay true to the event, as a way to denounce what had occurred as totally unacceptable and beyond the limits of reconciliation. This moral stance sought to remind those eager to forgive and forget that the atrocities that they had experienced could not happen again. One of the themes that Brudholm and Rosoux (2009) visit at various points in their paper is Mujawayo's (2006) concern about who drives what she calls an "obsession" with reconciliation and forgiveness, namely authorities, religious institutions and NGO's, but not necessarily the people of Rwanda. Although neither Mujawayo (2006) nor Brudholm and Rosoux (2009) argue it directly, there is a sense in which forgiveness as they denounced it, has become a transnational bureaucratic industry. An imperative to solve intractable conflicts from above, driven by an understanding of forgiveness as the only way out. An imperative that feels more like a burden than a relief, especially for the survivors and yet it is carried out in their name.

In the modern era, no scholar has made a stronger effort at legitimizing the role and function of resentment than Jean Améry in his *Beyond Guilt and Atonement* (1966/1988). There, Améry argued that rather than a negative emotion that besieged those that are incapable of moving beyond their pain, resentment had a role and a function in the moral and emotional life of the survivors that could not simply be ignored and or abandoned. Otherwise, the consequences will be hefty, particularly for the survivor who experienced such a sentiment and the communities in which they lived. Over and against the distinct efforts to either forgive or forget, Améry held steadfastly

and advocated more clearly than anybody else the distinctiveness that resentment had as well as its moral underpinning. Along with the second Jankélévitch of 1967, that published *Should We Pardon Them?* They became the spokesperson of the dissonant voices for whom forgiveness and forgetfulness was not an option, and the statues of limitations should not apply to the Nazi crimes.

Unlike those whom Améry refers to as the moralists and psychologists (p. 64), who condemned resentment from a theoretical stance, his contribution to the analysis of the terms comes from his speaking as a survivor that examines his own resentment through the introspective analysis of his own stance. The first step in Améry's placing of resentment is taking distance from Nietzsche's definition of resentment understood as "…resentment defines such creates who are denied genuine reaction, that if the deed, and who compensate for it through an imaginative revenge…The resentful person is neither sincere, nor naïve, nor honest and forthright with himself" (p. 68). However, there is a sense in which the resentment that Améry speaks of is more a "moral power to resist [that] contains the protest, the revolt against reality, which is rational, only as long as it is moral" (p. 72). For Améry (1966, 1988), "my ressentiment is there in order that the crime become a moral reality for the criminal, in order that he be swept into the truth of his atrocity" (p. 70). The resentment of Améry, rather than the imaginative revenge of Nietzsche as the subversion of the values through which the slave institutes herself into a lord, is more an anchor so that the past of the injury and the present of the pain do not become the future of the survivors to come.

Standing more on the shoulders of Smith (1854/2010) and Bishop Butler's (2006) stance on resentment, than Améry's (1966, 1988), a few recent scholars have begun to study the role that resentment has in the lives of people. As such, one of the most prolific forgiveness scholars is political philosopher Jeffrie Murphy who along with Jean Hampton, (1998), argues that a lack of resentment "conveys -emotionally- either that we do not think we have rights or that we do not take our rights very seriously" (p. 17). Although the discourse of rights seems prominent in Murphy and Hampton's quote, it seems that their understanding of the role of resentment points out to the shortcomings of the current understandings of forgiveness. More recently, Jeffrie Murphy (2003) has

further strengthened his understanding of "resentment […] as emotional testimony that we care about ourselves and our rights" (p. 19).

Along the lines of proper recognition of the negative emotions in general and resentment in particular, the ethics professor Margaret Walker (2006a, 2006b) is another scholar who has engaged with the often-maligned concept of resentment. For her, there is a function that resentment plays in the lives of people. There is a responsive function that resentment plays in the lives of survivors since it answers the injuries that the survivors experienced. It is a response, a moral response to the injuries against oneself and against one's values. So, resentment rather than a fixation on the part of the survivor, an attachment to an injury that one is incapable of overcoming, is a moral riposte, a moral rebuttal from within one's moral core, a natural answer to a demand that has been placed upon the survivor.

If instead of casting the refusal to forgive as a drive to be vindictive, bitter and resentful, we recognize it as a principled dissent anchored in a moral stance, there might be ways for those who cannot forgive to articulate their position in ways that assert their moral freedom. As Thomas Brudholm (2007) argues, to be able to forgive has been understood as being both morally and therapeutically superior to refusing and or being unable to forgive. Moreover, yet, there might be even more value in standing one's ground and speaking up against the chorus that seeks forgiveness in the name of a better future. There is something to be said about standing one's ground when one is not ready to join the chorus of the consensus and rather than play along, one stands one's ground, and from within one's particular locality, one speaks truth to power in a clearly Foucauldian parhesiastic (Foucault, 2001) way. Speaking up from one's moral inability to forgive, might be as moral as working towards forgiveness, as long as both originate from a genuine agentic moral stance.

To sum up, while it seems like an uncontested reality that negative emotions may constitute the emotive background that sustains unforgiveness, the presupposition that connects anger and resentment with the unhealthy features of unforgiveness remains unwarranted. The unhealthy features of the negative emotions are there, and ample

research proves that. However, there is more to it than the negative effects that anger and resentment have in the life of people. There is more to anger and resentment than the negative light that European culture in general and the forgiveness research, in particular, has cast on them. As such, there is more to unforgiveness than simply the flip side of the benefits that forgiveness affords to the survivors that decide to forgive.

While I am not advocating for the unchecked perpetuation of rage, resentment, or revenge, there seem to be healthy features about being maladjusted (Kolh 1993) to immoral conditions and such maladjustment can be deployed in creative ways that foster agency and prevent the passivity and erasure of the survivors. There is a role and a function that anger and resentment play in the lives of people who cannot forgive, and along with the healthy features of negative emotions, those should be the vehicle from which alternative to forgiveness is articulated. The alternative to forgiveness should be a space whereby offenses and or wounds that fundamentally challenge the core of one's moral being should be explored on a more nuanced detail than the one proposed by Robert D. Enright (1991, 1994, 2000, 2001), or Worthington (2002, 2008) on their various forgiveness curriculum modules and that space could be unforgiveness.

Chapter 4.

Unforgiveness

> "I refuse not to be angry and cannot forgive, what is even more difficult is to have someone tell me I should not feel like this…" Brian Mpaphela, Apartheid Victim (Verdoolaege, 2006, p. 76)

> "And do not forgive, because it is not within your power to forgive in the name of those who were betrayed at dawn." Poet Zbigniew Herbert (quoted in Michnik & Havel, 1993, p. 25).

In this chapter, I explore a definition of unforgiveness as an alternative to forgiveness, for those who cannot forgive. On a practical note, I am looking for spaces of creative dissonance where non-retributive stances are possible in the midst of scenarios of national reconciliation. The aim of exploring unforgiveness is to examine it as an agentic space through which those who find it morally or emotionally untenable to forgive or are just incapable of forgiving, can articulate their disagreement in a manner comparable to what Herbert Kohl (1994) described as "creative maladjustment" (p. 130). For Kohl (1994), “when it is impossible to remain in harmony with one’s environment without giving up deeply held moral values, creative maladjustment becomes a sane alternative to giving up altogether” (p. 130). As such, creative maladjustment is a moral stance, a retort that springs from one’s moral stance against the societal arrangements that one is incapable of reconciling with one’s moral principles. Later on, Kohl goes on to argue that creative maladjustment implies

> adapting your own particular maladjustment to the nature of the social systems that you find repressive. It also implies learning how other people are affected by those systems, how personal discontent can be appropriately turned into moral and political action, and how to speak out about the violence that thoughtless adjustment can cause or perpetuate (p. 130).

Building on Kohl’s concept of creative maladjustment in the case of unforgiveness, we can understand it as articulated dissonances, everyday tactics that contest the hegemonic

discourse of conciliation in ways that are individually and politically empowering. These practices could strengthen the political space by bringing to the conversation those who hitherto just had a part on the reconciliation discourse by being included through their exclusion as tends to occur with those who do not agree with the path of forgiveness and reconciliation. The point of creative maladjustment of unforgiveness is to make possible an alternative other than apathy that challenges from a moral stance the repressive structure one opposes.

The stance of those who cannot or have chosen not to forgive mirrors Herbert Kohl's (1994) learning "how not to learn" (p. 2) when people creatively constitute alternatives to the institutional arrangements like forgiveness that emerge and which they contest as a matter of principle. Not-learning like not forgiving is a response to the challenges that the lack of respect for one's stance creates. Not-learning occurs when the imposition to forgive is veiled as a choice for the good of the individual, only that the individual who is expected to forgive is not free to choose to not forgive. Her only choice is to agree to forgive, and the questioning of forgiveness entails the embracing of hatred and vengeance as its only alternatives. Not forgiving, like not-learning, allows the individual to constitute themselves as other than and stand up for that which they believed in even if that means the creation of a marginal space from which the world will be articulated.

Potentially the people who chose the path of unforgiveness could have chosen the path of forgiveness and work through it until such a point as forgiveness arrives. Moreover, there are many survivors for whom such an alternative is successful and Bishop's Tutu (1999) *No future Without Forgiveness* is full of those examples. However, there are other victims such as Bryan Mpaphela (Verdoolage, 2006), the apartheid victim quoted at the beginning of this chapter, for whom there should be an interregnum where the victim is both condemned by her anger and her inability to forgive both of which are understood as unhealthy and uncooperative. However, if victims like Bryan Mpaphela could explore alternatives to forgiving that are neither forgiveness nor revenge as none of those fully represent their stance an altogether different path could emerge. If the survivors are not ready to commit to practices of forgiveness at the end of which reconciliation could potentially emerge, nor are they necessarily looking to harbour their wounds in ways that

could potentially expose them to the possibilities of retribution, there should be an alternative. Somewhere in the middle, those who are standing up for unforgiveness are trying to keep distance from the calls towards forgiveness and the political deployment of anger and resentment as a tool to retaliate the inflicted wounds. As such, walking the fine line of neither forgiveness nor retribution, those exploring the alternative of unforgiveness are inquisitive about the possibility of an alternative, creative, moral space that is neither vengeance nor forgiveness.

Unforgiveness

At the risk of sounding prescriptive I have tentatively found five characteristics of unforgiveness:

1. Unforgiveness is a non-retributive moral stance for direct and indirect survivors to respond to harm and wrong-doing when forgiveness is not an alternative for them.

2. Unforgiveness is a type of principled dissent for the survivors to stand up for their moral principles against the calls to forgive and reconcile and it is from that dissent that the alternative space of those who cannot forgive is constituted in the first place.

3. Unforgiveness is also a type of unlearning since the survivors are trying not to learn the path of forgiveness and reconciliation while staying clear of the calls to vengeance thereby constituting a space that is neither vengeance nor forgiveness.

4. Unforgiveness is also a heterotopical space that is constituted once the people that cannot forgive come together to constitute alternatives for their plight validating and working with each other's moral and negative emotions.

5. Unforgiveness is not a veiled type of forgiveness, nor a type of apathy, or a ruminative type of getting even. It is foremost an alternative that tries to be

> neither vengeance, nor forgiveness, but remains bound within the limits of civility.

Broadly speaking, when I refer to unforgiveness I mean a non-retributive moral stance in scenarios of national reconciliation or in spaces where forgiveness has been decided as the vehicle through which conflict and strife will be overcome. If there is a purpose for unforgiveness, it is to become a space in which those who find it morally untenable to forgive or are simply incapable of forgiving, can articulate their disagreement in ways that are empowering. Through the inclusion of unforgiveness in the repertoire of legitimate moral responses to harm and wrong-doing, a space is opened for the recognition of the role of negative emotions and their possibilities as legitimate, teachable responses to wrongdoing or harm. By opening the space to include those who hitherto did not have a part, unforgiveness could strengthen the political space by allowing voices that were silenced to be included in the conversation about their future.

One of the ways to articulate the disagreement that unforgiveness entails is through what Herbert Kohl (1994) called "creative maladjustment" (p. 130) understood as everyday tactics that contest the hegemonic discourse of conciliation in ways that are not only individually but also politically empowering. By bringing to the fore those who had been excluded, unforgiveness strengthens rather than thwarts scenarios of conciliation by opening the space to those who were not ready to reconcile. By bringing to the conversation those who did not have a part the conversation about forgiveness and possibly reconciliation is further enriched by the space constituted by those who cannot forgive.

For the sake of clarity, what I mean by unforgiveness is a non-retributive stance where the direct and/or indirect survivors refuse to forgive even at the cost of the emotive, social and political gains by not partaking in processes of forgiveness. Those emotive social and political gains could be the sites of resistance from which unforgiveness emerges as an alternative to the hegemonic discourses of forgiveness mentioned in previous chapters. When I refer to emotive gains, I am talking about the

respect and acknowledgement of the survivors' pain that is sometimes effaced in the search for expedience and bureaucratic efficiency within larger reconciliation projects.

The imposition of forgiveness within conciliatory processes (Verdoolage, 2006), not only devalues the purposes and ends of forgiveness but further increases the likelihood of conflict and strife building up and exploding down the road. Foreclosing the social and political space to the survivors that could not forgive will further increase a sentiment of us versus them and could have pernicious consequences for the narratives of reconciliation. In other words, the practice of unforgiveness constitutes a space for those that, while standing in opposition to the various political, religious and social injunctions to forgive, manage to create a stance that while not being forgiveness per se, also keeps distance from the calls to retribution that may spring from time to time. As such, the practice of unforgiveness is neither a veiled type of forgiveness, a subterfuge through which people who cannot forgive are encouraged to think that they are doing other than forgiveness only to discover that they have been led to forgiveness discourse, only through alternative paths.

The practice of unforgiveness is also not a type of apathy that uses unforgiveness as a proxy to keep distance. There is a difference between the disinterested survivor who for different reasons chooses not to partake, and the unforgiving survivor who even with the fear of being reprimanded, socially isolated and even pathologized, speaks up. While the first one prefers apathy as the means to answer the calls to forgive and reconcile, those who decide to speak up about unforgiveness, their pains and the consequences that forgiving would have for them, the apathetic person, fails to express her dissent, at least openly.

Choosing unforgiveness does not mean opening the space to a shrouded type of vengeance whereby survivors who cannot forgive, refuse to partake in the forgiveness process as a way to retaliate for the wounds inflicted upon them. Unforgiveness is not a ruminative type of getting even where the survivors keep to themselves the gift of forgiving as a means to avenge those who harmed them.

The purpose of unforgiveness is not to mobilize the pain of the survivors to further political agendas that prevent and hinder policies of forgiveness and reconciliation. The purpose of unforgiveness is to bring together those who cannot forgive so that their voices are heard, and their demands integrated into the general make-up of the discussions about the present and the future of the communities once the conflict has abated. Anchored as a fundamental principle of unforgiveness is a commitment to equity understanding that the legal, the moral and the just may be at odds particularly in transitional justice settings. Moreover, it is here precisely where unforgiveness touches on its morally agentic features. For it allows the survivors to stand up for their principled stance against those who seek to mobilize their wounds in ways that further hinder those that cannot forgive. As such, the people who chose not to forgive actively choose the side of the oppressed survivors that cannot forgive, over and above the laws and or the general sentiments that demand that survivors just move on from their pain and go on forgiving.

The practice of unforgiveness also recognizes the moral dimension of dissent and the role it plays in the constitution a political space, for as Sarat (2005) asserts dissent itself is the "truest expression of loyalty" (p. 7) that takes seriously the discussions that affect them and partakes (Rancière, 2010) in the political space. Specifically talking about dissent, we could follow the path of Graham P. McDonough (2010) who while exploring the role of dissent within the Catholic Church recognized that "dissent is a 'vital concept' in moral education [that] requires acknowledging that some kind of disagreement is germane to the aims of its theory, research and practice." (p. 421) As such, if we recognize unforgiveness as a type of dissent that seeks to explore the disagreement that exists between the inability of those who cannot forgive and the request that they forgive, we can recognize unforgiveness as containing the characteristics of dissent that make it a vital concept in moral education as McDonough (2010) argued. In other words, there is more to unforgiveness than the political space that is constituted by the survivors who cannot forgive. The vitality of dissent that McDonough (2010) recognizes in moral education is present in unforgiveness since dissent provides the imminent critique of the dissenter from within who seeks to reform

the calls to forgiveness to only include those who cannot forgive, but also recognize the role and legitimacy of the dissenters.

Unforgiveness as Agency

One of the common arguments in favour of forgiveness revolves around the agency that the survivor gains once forgiveness occurs (Bash, 2007). The moment the survivor decides to forgive, the literature on forgiveness suggests that she gains a sense of agency that was not there before. That agency, that feeling that they own their destiny and that they have taken steps to take care of what happened to them is part of the liberating journey of forgiveness (Yamhure et al., 2005, p. 340). However, if forgiveness is agentic for those who are ready to forgive, it seems to be the exact opposite for those who cannot forgive, particularly when their inability to forgive is either pathologized or understood as vengeance. Moreover, for those unable to forgive, the injunction to forgive can be a burden that further isolates them from the rest of the community and complicates their relationship to their wounds. But if we understand agency as "the action that propels deliberate movement through a structure(s) by an individual(s) and/or collective(s), with the expressed purpose of achieving a goal or desired outcome (Maslak, 2008, p. xv) it seems that agency comes from elsewhere. Agency, in this case, does not necessarily come from the abandonment of negative emotions as some scholars such as Enright (2002) seem to argue. The agency of forgiveness comes from the decision made by the survivor that can forgive and the steps she takes towards the process of forgiving. So, the agentic features that are afforded to forgiveness in the literature on the subject cannot be adjudicated to forgiveness, but to the decision and the act of the survivor who chooses a path to deal with the consequences of harm and wrong-doing that was committed. In that regard, if the agency to choose forgiveness does not come from the liberatory act of forgiveness but from the survivors' decision and actions towards forgiving, the same conditions could be said to apply to the *decision* for unforgiveness. Particularly when the commitment to unforgiveness is also very demanding in the midst of processes of reconciliation is when the survivors who cannot forgive stand up against the common sentiment of forgiveness as the path forward. The agency does not come from the act of unforgiving, but from the actions, the survivors take to address their inability to forgive.

The space of unforgiveness that I am proposing is a politically liberating, transitional space for overcoming strife where the survivors can adopt an active stance of positioning themselves within a safe community while contesting the political articulations of their pain. Such space of unforgiveness is more an interregnum that tries to distance from the demands to be either/or and seeks to articulate itself in recognition of the needs of the survivors that cannot forgive as well as preventing that such inability to forgive be co-opted by discourses that seek to mobilize it for politically pernicious agendas. For rather than a flag to claim, or a series of specific demands to be articulated, unforgiveness is an autopoietic space where those who cannot forgive come together to articulate themselves as political subjects that are not being considered by the injunctions to forgive. The space of unforgiveness is also not or should not be thought as a mere addendum to traditional classroom settings as proposed by Enright and Worthington (Enright, 1991, 1996, 1999; Worthington, 1995, 2002, 2005) or organized top-down structures. Unforgiveness is anchored on an individual refusal to accept a univocal path and the alternatives that emerge once those who refuse that univocal path come together to build those alternatives, rather than remain at the level of the creative maladjustment. There are greater gains to be made by deploying unforgiveness in non-traditional group settings as well as with communities who traditionally do not have access to formal education. Refugees, survivors of domestic violence, indigenous people, the elderly, as well as many other marginalized communities are groups of people who are often invited to forgive and who could benefit from unforgiveness as an agentic alternative that equips them with tools to articulate their dissent.

If unforgiveness could be taught as a means to articulate their inability to forgive as well as a vehicle through which those needs are articulated, they will be able to enter the political space as agents with their voice, needs and demands, rather than simply as survivors that need to move on and forgive.

Unforgiveness as I am proposing it is a teachable strategy where the survivors who cannot forgive can speak from their specific locality and situatedness. By speaking up, those who cannot forgive enter the political scenario assuming the risks of contravening what is a communal sentiment towards forgiveness but demanding that the

overcoming of strife not occur over and against those who cannot forgive. Rather than hoping for a utopian future that is yet to come, the unforgiving subject is aware of her stance and the distance between her needs and the needs of the majority as well as the consequences that forgiving will possibly have for her and her community. From that self-awareness, the survivor demands the opening of the space for those that while disagreeing, or being unable to forgive, still belong to the polity and should be integrated into the political realm. As such unforgiveness dissents from the general sentiment that sees forgiveness as the only way forward and articulates an alternative path, which rather than hindering the possibilities of reconciliation, strengthens the political space by opening it up to those initially excluded. Moreover, by addressing the plight of those who cannot forgive, unforgiveness becomes the space for those who do not see themselves represented in the status quo and are morally compelled to stand up and demand their inclusion.

Anchoring unforgiveness in the strategic deployment of the moral sentiment that the survivor does not feel sufficiently addressed by a State that was not there to protect her, could become a kernel through which alternative narratives of survivorhood, identity and dissent are articulated concomitant with and sometimes in opposition to hegemonic discourses of forgiveness. If the wound that has not healed is deployed through principled dissent as a strategic articulation that calls attention to the erasure of those who cannot forgive, a space of contestation that broadens the political spectrum could emerge. Such a site of contestation could become the axis that challenges and revises the horizons of forgiveness as well as the outcome of the process of forgiving benefiting not only those who cannot forgive but also the community as a whole and the process of conciliation by bringing to the conversation, even those who disagree.

If the space and practice of unforgiveness occur through principled dissent, a morally grounded vector of emancipation could emerge. Survivors hitherto excluded and neglected, borrowing from Biesta, could "become independent and autonomous ... able to think for themselves, to make their own judgments and draw their own conclusions" (2010, p. 39) in relation not only to their wounded present but also its relation to the past and the way in which the articulation of those two could point towards richer futures.

Unforgiveness explored as a type of critical emancipation (Gur Ze'ev, 2001; McLaren, 2002; Biesta, 1998, 2005) could become a space to challenge structures of power, and hierarchies between those who are supposed to know and those who are supposed to obey. If unforgiveness is articulated through a critically emancipatory stance that assumes equality not as an end, or the conclusion of the shaping of unruly souls, but as a default from which emancipation is to occur (Rancière, 1991), we can begin to see the agentic potential of unforgiveness. So, if we argue that unforgiveness borrows from Rancière's (1999) understanding of equality understood as an "open set of practices driven by the assumption of equality between any and every speaking being and by the concern to test this equality" (p. 30) we could see the agentic, emancipatory features of unforgiveness. So those facilitating unforgiveness, rather than talking down from the position of the one that knows, recognizes that those who are trying to articulate spaces of unforgiveness have already had a powerful moment of self-awareness that brought them to this point. Moreover, it was precisely in those powerful moments of self-awareness where they have recognized their stance about their wound and the way in which that uneasiness would place them at odds with the demands to forgive. So, they chose to pay the price of 'maladjustment,' rather than abandoning their moral sentiments and sought the spaces to articulate their dissent.

Unforgiveness as Disagreement

Unforgiveness is understood here as a moral, rational, legitimate response to harm and wrongdoing that seeks ways to articulate and integrate those who have been harmed into the political space in ways that afford them dignity and equality. Anchored in an understanding of dissent as a vital concept in moral education (McDonough, 2010, p. 422), unforgiveness seeks to ground its stance on the contestation of disagreements that are anchored in fundamental moral tenets of the survivors who cannot forgive. This allows richer, more inclusive and diverse alternatives to emerge.

However, unlike the critically empowering, morally grounded understanding of unforgiveness that has been advocated above, the current research on forgiveness understands unforgiveness as correlated with higher degrees of psychopathology (Mauger

et al., 1992; Maltby, Macaskill, & Day, 2001; Worthington, Mazzeo, & Klewer, 2002). Failure to forgive oneself has been connected to more intra-punitive pathologies, such as anxiety and depression, while failure to forgive others has been associated with extra-punitive pathologies, such as social alienation, social introversion, depression, and psychosis, (Macaskill, Maltby, and Day et al., 2001). Unforgiveness is also understood to be a part of a person's internalized negative affect, and it may become detrimental both by causing addictive behaviours as well as by being a result of such addictive behaviours (Worthington et al., 2002).

Along the lines of unforgiveness, trait vengefulness (or the tendency to be unforgiving) is associated with an increase in maladaptive, avoidance-based relationship behaviours (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; McCullough, M. E., & Bono, G., 2004). In other words, the general conclusions from forgiveness research is that unforgiveness, or failing to forgive have pernicious consequences both at the individual and communitarian level that go from depression to anxiety to depression and psychosis to name only a few.

There is a body of literature slowly emerging that points out that the refusal to forgive is a moral, cognitive stance. This cognitive stance unlike most understandings of not forgiving does not have adverse health consequences for those that either refuse or are unable to forgive (Stackhouse, Jones & Boon, 2016). The importance of unforgiveness as a cognitive moral stance without the pernicious consequences of what has been referred to as unforgiving stands in direct contrast to most of the literature which understand unforgiveness more as a disease, or a pathology (Stackhouse et al., 2016).

As such if we recognize that the pragmatic benefits that have been linked with forgiving may not necessarily follow, and ground unforgiveness as an agent-driven stance where the survivors own their destiny, the current understanding of forgiveness will necessarily shift. In other words, if unforgiveness is understood as an agentic decision made by the individual, a conscious moral stance where the survivor (s) chooses not to forgive, then the widely held belief that understands unforgiveness as an affliction, an

ailment suffered by some can and should be contested (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). As such, this might be an opportunity to move beyond the association of Stackhouse et al.'s (2016) findings when they argue about the causal association that presupposes that ruminative types of unforgiveness entail the negative affect of the transgression. But, if those negative affects are curtailed and addressed properly, the health benefits that have been attributed to forgiveness, namely stress and anger reduction etc., (Seawell, Toussaint, & Cheadle, 2014; Witvliet, C. v. O., Ludwig, T. E., & Vander Laan, K. L.., 2001; Worthington, Witvliet, Pietrini, & Miller, 2007; Harris & Thoresen, 2005) can also be enjoyed by those who are unable to forgive. Thus, if the benefits that the research adjudicates to forgiving can also be obtained through the management of the emotions, then the pragmatics of forgiveness lose the main argument about the benefits of forgiving.

If educators continue teaching that there are not alternatives to manage dissent or effective ways to articulate the moral response that negative emotions enunciate, we will be doing a disservice, not only to education, but also to people's ability to deal with their past as well as their role enunciating their social and political stance in paternalistic political systems (Giroux, 1997, 2000, 2003; Kohl, 1994). If, on the other hand, we could recognize their refusal to forgive in all its moral significance and teach them to articulate their dissent in agentic ways that encourage them as individuals and citizens with a voice with hearing, creative possibilities can emerge. If the dissent of those who cannot forgive is articulated through principled disagreement, their articulation of unforgiveness will open the political space as a site for contestation, rather than a preconceived deliberative stance that is anchored in an unequal distribution of power that weight in the silence of some to the detriment of others.

Unforgiveness as Principled Dissent

In an epoch in which the Schmittian (1932, 2008) articulation of the political as a division between friend and enemy (p. 26) seems to have taken hold of the political spectrum yet again, there is paramount value on the principled dissent that anchors unforgiveness. There is a value on disagreeing with the imposition that the social milieu

weighs in on people, particularly when those impositions stand in direct opposition to one's principles even if those social impositions are for one's own good and the good of one's community. Before being socially and politically articulated, unforgiveness manifests through a discomfort, an inability to go along with the calls to forgive, or what Kohl (1994) refers to as the "unavoidable challenges to her or his personal family loyalties, integrity and identity" (p. 6) that survivors face. The uneasiness of the wounded person who cannot forgive is, however, articulated through a dissent that is other than the mere refusal to forgive. For unforgiveness is more than simply the stance of someone ostracized in her pain, and who enters into dynamics of rancorous contestation and conflict. The articulation of that dissent, the passage from the intimate and private to the public and contested is constituted through an exercise of principled dissent that recognizing the locality and prescience of the wound, seeks to articulate spaces that are neither forgiveness, nor vengeance, whereby those who cannot forgive can also coalesce and articulate their social and political demands.

There is an agentic value that needs to be understood and acknowledged by someone recognizing that their relation to their wound is different from the one that is articulated by those who advocate for forgiveness. As such, there should be a space through which they can intervene the political, demand to be heard and influence the political realm without being cast as opposed to and enemies of, for such binaries only go back to reinforce the Schmittian binaries of reducing rather than fostering the political as a space of deliberative contestation.

Although the difference between the space of contestation and argumentation seems tenuous, it is important to notice, following Kendall Phillips (2015), that the space of contestation unlike the space for argumentation allows for new and disruptive discourses to emerge in a more irreverent creative fashion. The space of contestation that Phillips devises (2015) expands Foucault's idea (1972) of 'spaces of dissent' (p. 152) where he understands dissents as more than mere disagreement between parties that ultimately will converse and resolve their differences. To articulate the space of unforgiveness, it needs to be acknowledged that those who recognize themselves as unable to forgive, position themselves as other than, different from those who are able

and willing to forgive and / or those who seek any type of retaliation (Phillips, 2015). Moreover, that caesura, that space created between the survivors that can and will possibly forgive and those who are looking for alternatives to forgiveness constitutes a space of contestation about the way in which the overcoming of strife will be articulated. Those who enunciate their inability to forgive, articulate their difference from those who can forgive and through that caesura, they constitute themselves, not only in other than the political subject that is ready and able to move on. However, also, as moral and political subjects that recognize and voice their needs in ways that differ and contravene the demands to move on that substantiate the demands for forgiveness. Through the enunciation and the demand for a space in which their demands can be articulated in ways that do not entail erasure and or oblivion, they intervene in the realm of the political and challenge the univocal discourse that tries to articulate forgiveness as the only way forward.

The moral articulation of the dissent of those who cannot forgive is not only the enactment of their wound. It is also the constitution of a particular node of coalescence that brings them together and makes them into politically distinct subjects in a way that they were not before their public articulation of dissent and their seizing of the political spectrum to address their moral demands about forgiveness. Moreover, if unforgiveness allows a process of subjectification that articulates the stance of those who cannot forgive and who were erased from the political spectrum, such principled disagreement will articulate an agonistic understanding of the engagement that sees "[t]he essence of politics resid[ing] in the modes of dissensual subjectification that reveal a society in its difference to itself" (Rancière, 2010, p. 42). Such principled articulation of difference, the moral uttering of a stance that differs from the impressions and or the wishes of the religious or political majority that advocates for forgiveness will necessarily broaden the space of engagement since it will challenge the consensus of those who speak on behalf and for the betterment of the community.

For there is a sense in which only until those who cannot forgive constitute the space of their principled dissent, as the space of unforgiveness, the voice of those who cannot forgive, is not likely to emerge. Moreover, once it has emerged that space of

unforgiveness will manage to broaden the political spectrum through the articulation of a collective subjectivity that while refusing to forgive, is still within the horizon of civility.

At this point, it is important to note the similarities that exist between the articulations of unforgiveness sketched above and what authors like C. Rob Foster (2007) denominate as ethical resistance. Ethical resistance is understood as "tak[ing] a high stakes stance, one that may cost in terms of status and reputation, but which gives us the inner freedom to act consistently on the basis of one's conscience" (p. 20). So ethical resistance, like unforgiveness is constituted by a stance of principled dissent where the survivors come out even against the powers that be at their own risk and dissent from the general population's opinion. Like unforgiveness, ethical resistance is more than the rational criticism levied against that which one opposes. It presupposes as untenable the present or future envisaged by the general populace and from a principled moral position opens up a space of contestation for as Foster (2007) argues "[e]thical resistance preserves one's own integrity as premised on conscience that animates the rational, action being" (p. 20).

Although it could be argued that there is a prevalence of the political over the pedagogical in the space of unforgiveness that is articulated through principled dissent, the intention is to constitute alternative spaces of emancipation that are fundamentally political a la Rancière, rather than psychologically emancipatory such as Freire's. For as Charles Bingham argued (2010) the difference between the two emancipatory models is that while the subject of the emancipation accomplished through the Freirean model is fundamentally psychological, Rancière's type of emancipation is decidedly political. As such, considering that the issue of the injunction to forgive (Gudan, 2006) is a moral and psychological issue with profound political consequences, it is imperative that we anchor the type of emancipation that we are seeking to deploy through principled dissent, in a Rancierean type of emancipation as Bingham argued (2010).

The broadening of the political space, the inclusion of those hitherto excluded in the name of a better future, the full consideration of their inability to forgive through their integration into the conversation about the social and individual future, will be

proclaimed through an active enactment of political argumentation. Such active enactment of the political argumentation occurs via the challenging of the common understandings that each side has of forgiveness as well as the requirements that such forgiveness will entail especially from the perspective of those who cannot forgive.

The space of dissensus, the moral articulation of a disagreement that is anchored in principled dissent, constitutes the political emergence of a vague political subject that was not there before the announcement of unforgiveness. For while there might have been assumptions, hints and or voices who had spoken about the dangers of the path towards reconciliation and the consequences of an unfulfilled justice, the intelligibility of the position of the other remains an imaginative exercise, rather than a politically present one. However, the articulation of unforgiveness as an agentic, politically empowering stance will eventually constitute a heterotopical space (Foucault, 1998, p. 176). This space is other than the utopic space of a community that has moved beyond conflict and or the dystopia of an endless conflict that is fueled by the vindictiveness of those who cannot forgive.

The heterotopical space of unforgiveness that is neither forgiveness nor vengeance is "utterly different from all the emplacements that they reflect or refer to" (Foucault, 1998, p. 178) and constitutes itself into an articulation of the needs, fears, and concerns of the survivors who cannot forgive. In the case of unforgiveness, one could not talk of either a heterotopia of accumulation nor of heterotopias of time among others. However, there is a sense in which we could talk about a heterotopia of affect since the space that is being articulated tries to manage the moral and affective stance of those who cannot forgive. Heterotopias are "a kind of contestation both mythical and real of the space in which we live" (Foucault, 1998, p. 179).

The emergence of a heterotopical space of unforgiveness manages to challenge the real politics of those for whom it is either forgiveness or mayhem (Tutu, 1999) as well as those who only see a Calliclean (Plato, 1990) or Thrasymachian (Plato, 2004) understanding of justice as the way out of a conflict. As such, the heterotopical space of unforgiveness as it has been hinted at here could become a materiality that seeks to

challenge the present of the survivors that cannot forgive aiming at a utopian future that is grounded on a present that contests their oblivion and the injunction to forgive as the only alternatives to survivorhood.

Recognizing Unforgiveness

The constitutive characteristics of unforgiveness as an organic space assembled for and by the survivors is their resistance against the injunction to forgive. That resistance is paired with their poietic stance that seeks to create heterotopical spaces that can articulate distinctive perspectives to the dyad of either vengeance or forgiveness as well as transversal frames of reference that challenge the simplistic top down or bottom up approaches which stultify the emergence of dissonant alternatives (Guattari, 2009b) to the plight of those who cannot forgive.

Traditionally resistance and disobedience have been understood as a sign of maladjusted individuals who have not fully comprehended or integrated to the demands that society places on them and as such signs of disobedience and or resistance are often met with disciplinary measures. However, emerging research in moral education (Callan, 1997; McDonough, 2010; Leighteizer, 2006) is recognizing the role that resistance and dissent have not only in the life of the dissenter but also in their communities. In the specific case of the people that either refuse or are not able to forgive, there is a value in refusing to move on from the situatedness of their wound and disobeying the demands of those who, without recognizing the wounds of the survivors, impose their agenda on their lives. Those who cannot forgive through the "creative maladjustment" (Kohl, 1991, p. 130) of their inability to forgive, create a parrhesiastic (Foucault, 2001) stance against the imperative to forgive carrying out Ranciere's (2010) dictum according to which "...the essential work of politics is the configuration of its own space. It is to make the world of its subjects and its operations seen. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one" (p. 37). The articulation of their perspective, the heterotopia (Foucault, 1998) that is uttered by their contestation of the narratives of forgiveness, de facto opens a space where there was none, creating

dissensus where there were only majoritarian voices speaking in favour of leaving their wounded past behind.

This heterotopical space (Foucault, 1998) that is articulated through the principled dissent and resistance of those who cannot forgive will start as an incomprehensible site of contestation. For the process of recognition of a political agent goes through the inability to understand what the one with whom one disagrees is trying to articulate. The voice of those who cannot forgive constitutes both the subject and the space that is enacted and made intelligible in a way that was not there before the emergence of unforgiveness.

Although the heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space of unforgiveness is somewhat structured above, it is imperative that it be practiced outside the arboreal, (Deleuze & Guattari, 1998, p. 17) hierarchical structures of power; otherwise the space of unforgiveness will become a coded, prescriptive, pyramidal space based on rules, obedience, and compliance. For as Wallin (2013) argued when exploring Guattari's (1972, 2015) concept of transversality (p. 102), there is a sense in which "insofar as education is organized under an institutional superego, the potential for student autonomy and autonomous manifestations within the schools would be functionally crippled" (p. 39). If the space of unforgiveness becomes such a deeply structured space, the agentic, emancipatory possibilities of principled dissent will lose its possibilities. In its place, a series of prescriptive steps to manage people and their emotions will emerge, preventing the alternatives to forgiveness to be creative and organic.

While it has been noted above that the heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space is not necessarily a conventional classroom, since it can be deployed in non-traditional classroom settings, there is a sense in which institutional superegos could also emerge in non-traditional pedagogic spaces with equally pernicious consequences. As such, instead of presupposing models that are imposed from the top down, in what Kreisberg (1992) referred as "power over" (p. 70), the alternatives to the injunction to forgive (Torrance, 2004) should be thought as an implementation of "power with" (Kreisberg, 1992 p. 70).

Power with is understood as a stance through which those who cannot forgive articulate their dissent and seek strategies to reconstitute a political space in ways that are inclusive and equitable. The most appropriate tool to challenge the sedimentations of power that could emerge with the solidification of the space of unforgiveness will be "transversality [since, it] is a dimension that strives to overcome two impasses; that of pure verticality and a simple horizontality. Transversality tends to be realized when maximum communication is brought about between different levels and above all in terms of different directions" (Guattari, 1972, 2003, p. 63). The purpose of transversality is to seek an alternative to the dyad of bottom-up, versus top-down perspectives. While each one of those perspectives offers insights that are valuable for understanding the alternative to forgiveness, none encompasses in itself a broader enough perspective that will prevent single perspectives from taking hold of the understanding of unforgiveness. Transversality helps to challenge the imposition of one single understanding of unforgiveness from one single perspective to be either vertical or horizontal.

Unforgiveness challenges the oppositional stance of either vertical exercises of power or sheer horizontality which can also cripple the self-constitution of the group through indecision and uncertainty. The transversal model challenges the unyielding solidifications of power so that as Aoki (2005) (cited by Wallin, 2013) argued when referring to transversality, "pedagogy pertains more to the formation and conceptualization of assemblages as it does the orthodox scene of student-teacher transference" (p. 36). As such, if we were to articulate the pedagogy of unforgiveness closer to an organic, unprescribed, creative space that articulates dissent outside the sedimentations of traditional pedagogic places that Aoki (2005) sought to challenge, we could deploy alternatives through which agency and freedom could emerge.

The heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space of unforgiveness that is anchored and substantiated in principled dissent, rather than articulating what Kant (1991) referred to as the pedagogical paradox understood as: "How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?" (§ 29) will seek to cultivate freedom through a transversal (Guattari, 1972, 2003) articulation of difference that manages to prevent coercion per se. The heterotopical space while attentive of how different perspectives coalesce into the

constitution of a pedagogical space keeps distance and constituting itself as other than both forgiveness and vengeance, while still being determined by them. The importance of transversality (Guattari, 1972, 2003), the political understanding of emancipation and equality a la Rancière (1991, 1999, 2004, 2010) in the heterotopical (Foucault, 1998) space that unforgiveness tries to articulate based in principled dissent is anchored in an understanding of moral education for emancipation.

To summarize, the space for unforgiveness is a space of dissent and resistance whereby the survivors can articulate their objections, demand their voices be heard, and ask for social and political policies that address them as political subjects. Failing to listen and address their concerns while asking them to forgive will hinder some of the features of what Iris Marion Young (1990) defined as the enabling conceptions of justice and open the way for processes of revictimization in the name of forgiveness. For Young's (1990) enabling conceptions of justice include "not only distribution but also, the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation" (p. 39).

Failing to listen and address the concerns of the survivors that cannot forgive will further revictimize them and ostracize them from the political space of conciliation opening the space for possible articulations of violence in the name of vengeance. The worthiest of reconciliation is oppressive if it fails to integrate principles of social justice "affirming … human agency and human capacities working collaboratively to create change" (Adams & Bell, 2016, p. 3) thereby limiting the possibilities of a better society.

Unforgiveness requires the recognition that there is more than one way to move beyond survivorhood and pain. An openness to the possibility that while the survivors could not choose what happened to them, at least they can choose how to deal with the consequences of that in ways that are agentic, empowering and community building beyond the immediacy of their victimhood.

Unforgiveness requires that the survivors who do not feel that forgiveness is an alternative for them be granted the opportunity to articulate such disagreement and to constitute themselves as political subjects who from that moral stance work through their

negative emotions looking for alternatives that within the limits of civility constitute that space that is neither forgiveness nor vengeance. A space that recognizes that there is a role and a function that negative emotions play in the life of such survivors and rather than neglecting and pathologizing them integrates them to the legitimate array of responses that a survivor experiences so that they are not further re-victimized for not being able to forgive.

Along the same lines of the recognition of not forgiving as a legitimate response to harm and wrong-doing, there are positive features that emerge from the recognition of the survivor's standing up for their principles and paying the price for dissenting from the opinion of the majority. There are agentic moral features that emerge from the survivor's exercise of free speech that along with the recognition of the role and value of negative emotions, makes principled disagreement a moral stance that should be strengthened. There is a price of social isolation, of neglect that is paid by the those who refuse to go along with the position of the majorities, and that hefty price should be recognized in all its dimensions. This is imperative particularly when it is none other than the survivors who speak up and stand up through their principled disagreement about how the silent majorities revictimize them.

If we were to go back to the initial examples of Simon Trinidad and Jorge 40 and think unforgiveness as an alternative to their plight, one of the first things that will be required will be to recognize that each one of them comes from a specific moral stance that sees the demands of forgiveness as too onerous, fundamentally impractical in the midst of their experience of the conflict, or simply immoral. Irrespective of the naming of the stance, the basis of their position entails that forgiveness is simply not an alternative within the particularities of their experience.

As such, if forgiveness is not an alternative, there needs to be a space other than vengeance whereby they are able to constitute an alternative to their plight that is neither forgiveness nor vengeance. Such alternative needs to recognize and validate the role of negative emotions and the survivorhood that entails seeking alternatives beyond the dyad of forgiveness and vengeance.

If we consider the possibility that Simon Trinidad and Jorge 40 could have explored an alternative like unforgiveness that addressed their inability to forgive while at the same time providing them with agentic tools to open the space of political participation and challenge the hegemonic discourse of forgiveness, they could open the heterotopical space of unforgiveness in a way that is not only inclusive and agentic, but also affords the survivors alternatives beyond the governmentality of forgiveness. If we are able to move the survivors beyond their legitimate recognition of their inability to forgive, towards more propositive stances that seek to alter the space of the political, we could strengthen the space of the political by including those who hitherto have been excluded. In other words, rather than stultification of the survivors that cannot forgive, unforgiveness seeks to provide alternatives for their emancipation that recognize not only their emotive stance but also the need to move beyond their current plight so that the survivors that cannot forgive can move beyond their stance.

If we recognize the moral valences and the legitimacy that ensues from victimhood that seeks alternatives other than forgiveness, we could open the space for agentic, self-affirming strategies where those who cannot forgive can constitute heterotopical spaces of unforgiveness; there could be alternatives beyond the current dyad of either forgiveness or vengeance.

In the space of unforgiveness that is constituted through the resistance of the dyad of forgiveness or vengeance, Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad constitute a heterotopical space that effectively moves beyond the traditional structure of conflict resolution and seeks to articulate the work of politics as Rancière argued through the making visible and understandable what hitherto had remained unseen or simply misunderstood.

If we were to afford the survivors who cannot forgive the space to articulate their stance and legitimacy to dissent without fear of punitive consequences, they could articulate their needs in ways that are transformative for the social milieu rather than encouraging cycles of violence and hatred.

Chapter 5.

Conclusion

Conceptually exploring the possibilities of alternatives to forgiveness has meant diving into unknown territories. It began as a philosophical exploration concerned with etymology and its conceptual implications for those who could not or were not able to forgive. But then I realized that one of the biggest factors in the literature of forgiveness that seemed to be a catalyst in cases like Jorge 40, Simon Trinidad, Bryan Mpele as well as Simon Wiesenthal was an amalgam of negative emotions that anchored their demand for staying truthful to the memory of their pain and the reality of their victims. For most of the work on forgiveness has been slow in recognizing not only the agentic features of negative emotions but also the role that anger plays in the victims that cannot forgive and the need to legitimize those negative emotions as adequate responses that come from a recognition of one's moral self-worth.

However, if we are to give alternatives to those who cannot forgive those alternatives need to come from a recognition of their stance not only as survivors but also as agentic moral actors in need of constituting emancipatory spaces where they move beyond their victimhood. If unforgiveness proves to be beneficial at the individual level as it is hoped here, it could be beneficial for the communities since it strengthens not only their capacity to recognize and deal with difference but sees unforgiveness as a catalyst of critical emancipation for those who cannot forgive.

There are two critical moments in the lives of Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad that brings their stories to mind when I think about unforgiveness, and it is the sensation that neither one really seems to have proposed to get embroiled in the armed conflict in the way they did. In different interviews, they both talk about the lack of alternatives that in a way made them choose the option of vengeance when there did not seem to be alternatives. Both Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad feel that their anger and their moral outrage need to be mobilized as they cannot continue seeing those we are dear to them

victimized even further. Ironically the unchallenged anger that does not allow them to explore forgiveness as an alternative to their plight becomes a vector, a catalyst for the atrocities that each of them will carry out in the name of their wounds. As such, if unforgiveness was able to work with that dissent, if it was able to get to characters like Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad before the need to avenge takes hold of them, perhaps cycles of violence and mayhem could be curtailed.

As part of my commitment to the peaceful settlements of differences and the need to recognize those differences in all their richness, it is imperative that we are able to work with those who cannot forgive. We need to be able to open up and legitimize spaces whereby those who cannot forgive can not only challenge the discourses that try to seize and instrumentalize their pain, but also afford them agency to constitute themselves in survivors who own their destiny and are able to challenge the structures of power that try to determine also their pain.

If we are able to constitute an interregnum in which Jorge 40 and Simon Trinidad as extreme examples of the opposite sides of the Colombia conflict could find alternatives beyond avenging their wounds unraveling cycles of violence and hatred, we could further the aims of forgiveness by preventing the continuation of the spirals of violence only in a way that is respectful of the victims who cannot forgive. If unforgiveness is able to open a heterotopical space where those extremes move beyond their intractable stances and seek alternatives that solidify rather than hinder the political spectrum, there could be hope that those whose wounds are also as painful but are not yet in positions as intractable can also find alternatives in the space of unforgiveness.

If as it was argued in the introduction, there is a need for communities to acknowledge that within the limits of civility there are other ways than forgiveness to respond to harm and wrong-doing and that only the survivors can assess the propriety of that response, unforgiveness can become that alternative through which survivors articulate their stance and seek agentic alternatives that empower them. One of those alternatives to respond to wrong-doing within the limits of civility is the type of unforgiveness described above. Unless the survivors who cannot forgive can articulate

their wounds in ways that afford them agency and allow them alternatives to deal with their pain the survivors that cannot forgive will be further ostracized from their communities and the calls for forgiveness which they are not able to satisfy.

In this thesis, I have advocated for appropriate conditions for those dissenting voices to speak up, to share their perspective and to be part of the reconciliation process. The participation of the survivors should ensure that their voices are not silenced, or belittled again, for that disenfranchising experience is one with which the people who cannot forgive are all too familiar. There is a need to recognize and respect the repertoire of moral agentic responses that the inability to forgive elicits on the survivors and their communities. There is a need for a space of resistance and disagreement to forgiveness that allows those that cannot forgive to enunciate their stance and seek alternatives to address their needs in the political realm. There is a need for those survivors who resist the calls to forgive and reconcile to articulate their dissent in agentic ways within the limits of civility so that there is less likelihood of subsequent cycles of violence that tries to avenge those wounds that were silenced and neglected in the interest of the majority.

For an unforgiveness space to be validated there is a need to contest the general sentiment that forgiveness is necessarily good, and the alternatives are pernicious. Unforgiveness also has to be freed of the presupposition that those that are unable to forgive are only driven by resentment and are unable to see beyond the immediacy of their wound. There is also a very significant need for additional research on the recognition of the repertoire of moral responses on both forgiveness and unforgiveness considering individually distinctive needs regarding justice, truth, and reparation in relation to people's wounds.

The literature on the pragmatics of forgiveness focuses mostly on the emotional, psychological and biological gains forgiveness brings to those who are able to forgive. The extensive research focuses on the link between forgiveness and health benefits without clearly exploring how forgiveness is achieved. A question that emerges here then is whether or not it is forgiveness itself or the process through which forgiveness is achieved that has a positive effect on the health of the survivors. If there is room to

consider the process not the end, perhaps it is in that process where agentic decisions are enacted, and a space to validate unforgiveness as a process can also have a positive influence on the well-being of the survivors.

A concern that emerges from the literature review is the unintended consequence of the findings that link forgiveness with health benefits is that those who are not able to forgive are implicitly responsible for their precarious situation. Inadvertently blamed for not being able to improve their health through forgiveness, they are left with the uneasiness of being against the voice of the majority paying the hefty price of dissent. There is also a sense in which most of the justifications of forgiveness are sprinkled with religious quotes and the implied presupposition that those same benefits of forgiving could be enjoyed universally. As such, those who cannot forgive are understood to be either consumed by resentment, poisoned by the need to extract a punishment equivalent to their pain, or merely cantankerous beyond redemption unable to see the general benefits that will trickle down if everybody, especially the survivors, were to forgive.

Moreover, if the connection is as tenuous as they argue, there are still agentic alternatives like unforgiveness that could emerge for the people who cannot forgive. Also, as encompassing as both Enright's (1991, 1996, 1999), Worthington's (1995, 2002, 2005) and other forgiveness intervention models are, there is a sense in which their models are still incomplete. Moreover, if their intervention models are as incomplete as they seem, the conclusions that have emerged from the links that the literature has established are open to debate. Moreover, there might be ways for alternatives like unforgiveness to challenge the kernel of the pragmatics of forgiveness.

However, while I have been open about the criticisms of forgiveness, it is imperative to recognize that there are survivors for whom forgiveness is an agentic space where they come together to constitute themselves beyond the immediacy of their wound. Their experience, agency, and stance need to be recognized and understood in all its dimension. The recognition of difference, the validation of disagreement as that which could potentially enrich one's position by highlighting those areas that may need attention could inform the day to day of the demos so that the gains made in the space of

contestation of forgiveness could be translated into other scenarios. There are moral and political lessons that people learn by working with and through resistance, dissent, and difference. Those lessons could be useful beyond the discussion of forgiveness and unforgiveness for they could inform the way in which people understand conflict and conflict resolution within the limits of civility.

However as agentic, as forgiveness is for some, there are others for whom the idea of forgiving is a burden. Moreover, it is for and from those people that unforgiveness is thought. Forgiveness as a tool for conflict resolution has opened the space for the voice of the survivors that is not mediated by prosecutionary procedures. Moreover, even though the project of unforgiveness takes distance from forgiveness, it is imperative to recognize that unforgiveness comes from and cannot be understood without forgiveness. There is a type of peaceful conciliation that forgiveness made possible and broadly speaking, unforgiveness remains committed to that peaceful type of conciliation.

Like forgiveness, unforgiveness is committed to the non-repetition of the harms that victimized people, so the caesura between the before and after as well as the importance for the internal conflict and strife to have finished so that the work of unforgiveness can begin is as paramount as it is for forgiveness. Like forgiveness, unforgiveness is also committed to justice, even if what each understands as sufficient and or appropriate justice differs significantly. If the current instantiations of forgiveness constitute a juncture that is neither the peace of the conqueror nor the amnesties of the magnanimous by trying to move people from their resentment and negative emotions so that the gift of forgiveness can be enacted. Unforgiveness recognizes the moral dimensions of those negative emotions, and it deals with its negative consequences while at the same time creating valences whereby those wounds are not merely obliterated in the name of a tomorrow that is not attentive to the past and or the present that still circumscribes them.

One of the goals of unforgiveness, as I have conceptualized and advocated for, is helping people deal with unaddressed wounds so that they do not continue the cycle of violence that have caused their pain. The prevention of further violence and uncivil

conflict is also a primary concern of the recognition of unforgiveness as a legitimate response to harm and wrong-doing.

While the project of unforgiveness needs to keep a critical distance from the idea of forgiveness, it also needs to be careful about being co-opted as fuel for mayhem by those who are seeking to exploit vengeance as a vehicle to address their wounds. The purpose of unforgiveness is not to trample the work that the projects of forgiveness and reconciliation have done. The goal of unforgiveness is to strengthen the conciliatory process, to solidify the gains that have been made by pointing to the unsaid, the forgotten and the unacknowledged so that those who feel othered can articulate their moral stance in ways that afford them agency, freedom, and emancipation. If the survivors that cannot forgive can strengthen the space that neglected them while still opposing it, it will not only be the survivors that gain the benefits that could be achieved from individually and collectively exploring of their wounds. The political community that they are part of will also benefit from the lesson of dealing with principled dissent.

Unforgiveness, as it has been attempted here, is one of what could be several types of unforgiveness as Harris and Thorensen (2005, p. 329) have argued. There might be some pathological types of unforgiveness that do indeed hinder rather than aid the survivors who cannot forgive, but not all types of unforgiveness are necessarily pathological or harmful to the survivors. Moreover, it is precisely there where future research could lead towards determining what other types of unforgiveness might there be and what would be their specificities so that the space of unforgiveness that has been presented in here can be expanded. Beyond the angry, depressed and passive types of unforgiveness that Harris and Thorensen (2005) talked about, there might be different and perhaps more fruitful types of unforgiveness that could help to constitute an alternative to the injunction to forgive. Also, these types of unforgiveness could also help us to move beyond the pragmatics of forgiveness as the principal axis around which forgiveness is understood, and unforgiveness is misunderstood.

As important as it is to think about forgiveness pedagogies and map them out, it is imperative to deploy them in scenarios where strife and/or conflict have recently

subsided, so that they are exposed beyond the limited confines in which they have been tested in order to either gain further validity and improve them through critical analysis. For one interesting feature of the pedagogies of forgiveness is that only very sporadically are they tested in the ground with children and population who have been continually exposed to conflict and social unrest and as such it remains to be seen if the gains that have been propounded will be sustained in those scenarios.

Most of the research that has been done on the pedagogies of forgiveness has been done in relatively stable city dwellings like Wisconsin (Freedman, 1995; Coyle & Enright, 1997) or Turkey (Taysi & Vural 2016) that while important, it is still far from the gains that could potentially be made if those studies were carried out in areas where conflict and or significant social unrest has recently subsided. In fact, the only places scenarios of post-conflict where forgiveness interventions seem to have been carried out according to the research literature available was in Belfast in Northern Ireland (Enright, Gassin & Knutson, 2003).

Also, as important as it is to work with forgiveness and even unforgiveness in classroom settings, perhaps more significant gains could be made through non-traditional classroom settings, whereby survivors that cannot forgive and who do not have access to institutionalized education settings can articulate their discontent and their inability to forgive in ways that strengthen and improve their situation rather than harm it. While those who partake in traditional classroom settings could be alienated from and by the discourses of forgiveness, the ones that stand to gain the most from the type of unforgiveness that has been articulated hitherto are excluded minorities like refugees, indigenous, LGTBQ2 among others who by expressing their inability to forgive are at risk of being further isolated and understood as uncooperative, and resentful. The articulation of their inability to forgive with the expectations that such articulation could create, open the space for heterotopical spaces where they articulate their needs in ways that afford them political agency and open the discussion so that their perspective is encouraged and listened to.

Next Steps

There is emerging body of research in Equity Studies that explores the dimensions of anger its role and legitimacy along the lines of who gets angry, who can express their anger and who benefit from the expression of that anger. Exploring the role of anger along the axes of gender, class and victimhood could open the question of unforgiveness towards more detailed accounts of who is allowed to be angry and whose anger is legitimate versus those survivors whose gender, social and political class renders their moral stance as inherently illegitimate. Exploring the role of the legitimacy of anger alongside the possibilities of unforgiveness could open the space for a more overt questioning of the governmentality of forgiveness and its weight on certain kinds of unruly subjects for whom even anger is not legitimate versus other kinds of survivors who due to their gender, class and or social status are able and encourage to express their anger and in certain cases even abstain from forgiving. If the connection between the intersections of anger, unforgiveness, race class and gender point out as it was assumed above, there could be a pattern of the discourse of forgiveness leaning over certain kinds of subjects instead of others thereby nullifying the apparent neutrality and generality of the appeals for forgiveness deployed hitherto.

On another theme, more research is required to expand both on the differences between unforgiveness and forgiveness, particularly if we could talk about a self-caring type of unforgiveness that prevents the adverse effects from taking hold of the survivor's' life as the research on forgiveness fears. For a type of unforgiveness that works with the negative emotions findings their agentic, positive origin and creates spaces of self-actualization where the survivors that cannot forgive come together could further complicate what we understand as forgiveness today. Moreover, perhaps the healthy tension between unforgiveness and forgiveness could prove fruitful to overcome some of the theoretical gridlocks that seem to be taking place in the studies of forgiveness. If unforgiveness manages to prove that the alternatives to forgiveness are more than the opposite of forgiveness and that those alternatives are moral, agentic and that their emergence will strengthen rather than hinder the communal space, there might also be gains that forgiveness makes from unforgiveness. For instance, forgiveness will have

moved from the binaries that have determined their outlook and richer, more nuanced perspectives will inform the new understandings of forgiveness. The new understanding of forgiveness will be shown alongside unforgiveness so that those who find that the can forgive, along those who cannot can constitute the alternatives that are most meaningful and agentic to overcome their wounds from a bottom-up transversal approach, rather than a top-down vertical approach.

However, perhaps the benefits of unforgiveness will go further than stated above. Perhaps if we are able to emphasize the importance that negative emotions have in the life of people, their role and the moral valences that they accentuate, unforgiveness could help turn the tide that sees negative emotions merely as objects of contempt that are to be avoided at all costs. There are rich agentic moral emotions that unforgiveness taps into that could be legitimized so that those who feel them recognize them in all their dimension and unforgiveness in particular and negative emotions, in general, are understood as legitimate responses to wrong-doing. While such recognition of the moral dimension of negative emotions plays a pivotal role for unforgiveness, forgiveness could also benefit by clarifying not only the conceptual landscape of moral emotions in general but also negative emotions, in particular, starting with anger.

Lastly, there is something powerful going on in unforgiveness when an alternative that moves beyond the binaries of forgiveness or vengeance, or forgiveness or mayhem constitutes an agentic realm where from their own pain the survivors constitute an alternative that is both agentic and politically meaningful. If the survivors that cannot forgive could not have determined what happened to them, at least they can determine how to deal with what happened to them, its consequences and possibilities in creative ways that afford them agency and legitimacy. There is not one single way to overcome harm and wrong-doing, and unforgiveness could constitute an alternative that within the limits of civility seeks to explore dissent as an alternative that gives the survivors that cannot forgive an agentic possibility to respond to harm and wrong-doing.

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