THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA AND ITS IMPACT ON FOREIGN AID DONATION TO SUDAN

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Brasília - Brazil, 2007

RESEARCH PROJECT
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the
School for International Studies

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2010

APPROVAL

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Degree: **Master of Arts in International Studies**

Title of Research Project: **The Human Security Agenda and its Impact on Foreign Aid Donation to Sudan**

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Date Approved: August 20, 2010

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ABSTRACT

Fifty-four years since independence, eleven years of peace, two civil wars, one complex humanitarian emergency, and no hope. This is the scenario in Sudan. Since 2003, the Darfur region is under attack by government-sponsored militias, leaving the local population feeling insecure. Can different perceptions of what it means to be secure impact the international community's response to the long-standing crises in the country?

This research addresses the broadening of the international security agenda with the concept of human security. It tests the argument that the adoption of the human security agenda positively impacts donors' decisions in regards to their donations of foreign aid to Sudan. The Darfurian humanitarian crisis is shown to be a moment in which the formal human security discourse – most effectively adopted by middle powers – was merged into a concrete measurable action: donation of aid, which directly assists the local population affected by hostilities at several levels.

Keywords: Human Security; Official Development Assistance; Foreign Aid; Sudan; Darfur; Canada; United States of America.

À minha família e noivo, que acreditaram no meu sonho.

To my family and fiancé, who believed in my dream.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is the result of a long journey initiated on an afternoon in sunny Brazil, when the researcher decided she needed a twist in her life. It started by reading one of the daily ‘human security news’ e-mails sent by the Human Security Report Project and it finishes now, over a year later, in Canada.

First and foremost, I thank God, for the opportunities He has been given me in life, for allowing me to come this far (literally, in my case), expand my horizons and learn so much from such amazing people. My most heartfelt thanks go to my family, fiancé and friends, who have endured this journey with me, believing in my dream, living it daily, and providing me all the support and love that only those who have been away from home for so long can understand the real meaning.

At Simon Fraser University, I would like to thank the School for International Studies for the graduate fellowship I received; Ellen Yap, for her unending kindness and support since the application process and throughout the entire program; Professors John Harriss and Jon Scott, for their inspiring classes and frequent encouragement; and, specially Dr. Jeffrey Checkel, for his patience and assistance during the completion of this research.

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GLOSSARY

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
CEEC	Committee for European Economic Cooperation
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAC	Development Assistant Committee (of the OECD)
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HSC	Human Security Centre
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SLM	Sudan Liberation Movement

SPDF	Sudan People's Defence Force
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
U.S.	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the perceptions of what it means for a state to be secure have changed. For centuries, security meant not being involved in wars against other states. As the concept evolved, the idea of shared responsibilities between states and towards the peoples of the world began to take hold in the academic and policy worlds of international relations.

The concept of human security is part of this security debate and it proposes a change in focus. Instead of strictly focusing on the security of the state, attention should be devoted to the role and needs of human beings. Security means having a safe environment from war. However, it also means having food; access to drinkable water, education and, health services; community membership; basic income; and political participation.

Based on the idea of human security, a new set of priorities in the security agenda emerged, bringing topics such as intervention and landmine use to the attention of the international community. The literature on human security, since the creation of the concept in 1994, has been heavily focused on definitional matters – authors have argued for either the use of a broad definition or for a narrow definition of the term. Little – if any – attention has been given in the literature to a possible relation between the human security agenda and foreign aid.

The idea of foreign aid has been around for at least a century and a half, but it was mostly at the end of the Second World War that it became institutionalized as we know it today. Foreign aid has been interpreted as an emergency assistance for a temporary situation or as an instrument of long-term development. As human security, foreign aid affects lives at an individual level, as well as fosters state improvements.

This research analyzes possible interactions between these two main areas of research: human security and foreign aid. Sudan will be used as a case study for the discussion, as it constitutes one of today's most relevant cases of complex humanitarian emergencies.

The research question that directs this study is:

> How, if at all, has the introduction of the concept of human security impacted the influx of foreign aid to Sudan, especially after the Darfur crisis?

The argument this research intends to test is:

> The adoption of the human security concept – which shifts the focus to the human being – by different actors, institutions and governments has positively impacted the way these actors reacted to the Darfurian humanitarian crisis; it therefore increases the amount of foreign aid donated to Sudan. The Darfur crisis presents itself as a possibility of merging the formal adoption of the human security concept in discourses into a concrete measurable action – the donation of aid. However, it appears that the human security discourse/agenda is more effective in mobilizing middle power countries rather than great powers, which could arguably have different reasons for aid donation.

In order to address the broad research question proposed, the research will discuss four main areas: 1) human security, 2) adoption of the concept of

human security, 3) foreign aid, and 4) levels of official development assistance (ODA) donated to Sudan.

1.1 Data and methods

This research will be composed of a literature review of human security and one of foreign aid and, a brief overview of the history of Sudan, as it will serve as the case study for this research.

As Gerring correctly emphasizes, a case study might mean that the method is qualitative, that the research is holistic providing a more or less comprehensive examination of a phenomenon, that it utilizes a particular type of evidence, that it employs triangulation, etc.[1] For this research, two main types of evidence will be utilized: 1) qualitative data, as official texts from different actors in terms of their adoption of the human security concept, and 2) quantitative data for the donation of aid.

Aiming at avoiding methodological biases, the researcher will utilize triangulation as necessary to either clarify or support the argument made.

> "The goal [of triangulation] is, however, to provide a cross reference (…). Webb *et al*. argue that 'the most fertile search for validity comes from a combined series of measures, each with its own idiosyncratic weaknesses, each pointed to a single hypothesis' (1966, p. 174)."[2]

King, Keohane and Verba mention the necessity of improving theory, where "[a] social science theory is a reasoned and precise speculation about the

[1] John Gerring. *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 17.

[2] Philip H. J. Davies, "Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the Intelligence and Security Services," *Politics 21* (2001): 75.

answer to a research question," in this research referred to as 'the argument'.[3] King *et al*'s initial proposal for improving theory is to choose theories that can be wrong, theories that can be falsifiable. In order to make sure one's argument is falsifiable, the authors expect theory to be as concrete as possible, and explain that "[w]e need to be able to give a direct answer to the question: What evidence would convince us that we are wrong?"[4]

Considering the argument this research intends to address, initially there are at least two evidences that could possibly lead to falsifiability. The first evidence would be if the flux of foreign aid decreased right after actors adopted the human security agenda; the second would be if the actors that donate more significant amounts to Sudan did not subscribe to the human security agenda.

In these two instances, and depending on the extent of the possible disparities found while conducting the study, the researcher will find consolation in the words of King *et al*:

> [I]f we are wrong, we need not stop writing after admitting defeat. We may add a section to our article or a chapter to our book about future empirical research and current theoretical speculation. (…) These can be very valuable, especially in suggesting areas where future researchers can look.[5]

The research will then include a small section on possible alternative explanations for the disparities found.

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[3] Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Science in Social Science," in *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 19.

[4] Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Science in Social Science," 19.

[5] Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, "The Science in Social Science," 20.

2. HUMAN SECURITY

The current chapter approaches the evolution of the concept of security, in some of its variances: national, common, and human security. Human security will be the central focus, with its definitional complexities and two approaches. The chapter will demonstrate the adoption of the concept both in formal contexts and concrete applications.

2.1 Theoretical discussion

This section is divided into the evolution of the concept of security and human security, with its United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) definition and critiques.

2.1.1 Evolution of the security agenda

The Cold War dominated the international scene during the second half of the twentieth century, a period marked by the constant tension between the communist and capitalist blocs. Its representatives, the Soviet Union and the United States, engaged in an arms race and the possibility of a nuclear battle seemed a reality for some forty years.[6]

Theoretically, the security agenda of the Cold War was dominated by the realist approach: the state as a unitary actor in the international system, acting in

[6] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The short twentieth century 1914*-1991. (London: Abacus,1995), 226.

a rational manner in search of its own interests.[7] The realist approach also marks the United States' foreign policy, as suggested by E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and several other classic scholars.

With the end of the Cold War, a significant reduction in interstate conflicts was seen. Consequently, preexisting internal conflicts of several countries received more attention by the international community – and media. In parallel, security studies faced a period characterized by Roland Paris as one of broadening and deepening, discussed in further detail below.[8]

For centuries, the concept of security had been defined in a limited approach as the protection of a territory from external invasions, protection of national interest in foreign policy, or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.[9] Therefore, security has always been more related to nation-states than to people.[10] Observing such a fact, scholars of International Relations started to discuss the need to broaden the international security agenda.

Conceptually, national – or state – security is that articulated by the classic realist school of thought in international studies. The search for national interests based on terms of power, the maintenance and/or expansion of territories, and increased power, are mainly expressed by military power.[11] As the realist school

[7] Colin Elman, "Realism," in *Security Studies: an* introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2008), 22.

[8] Roland Paris, ""Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 97.

[9] At least since the Peace of Westphalia, established in 1648.

[10] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 22.

[11] Bjørn Møller, "The concept of security: the pros and cons and contraction," *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute* (2000): 02.

perceives the world to be anarchic, balance of power could at times lead to armed conflicts.

In the 1980s, ‘common security’ was presented as a partial innovation in the evolution of security studies. Common – or cooperative – security understands security can be guaranteed by cooperation and arms control. This perception minimizes the risk of confrontation between states and reduces mutual misunderstandings, as well as increases communication. According to Møller, its main message was that security “under conditions of anarchy and high levels of armaments required 'mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age'.”[12] Military power is understood as a symptom of conflicts and not as its main cause. The state is still the referent of security and the focus is on threats coming from other states.[13]

In the 1990s, a new field in security studies emerged: critical studies, with a proposal for a different referent of security:

> In security studies, ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ approaches differ most notably in their treatment of the state. Traditional security studies views the world from a state-centric (if not statist) perspective. In contrast, critical security scholars have argued that states are a means and not the ends of security policy, and hence they should be de-centred in scholarly studies as well as in policy practice.[14]

Critical studies suggest a change in the referent object of security, de-centralizing it from the state. Human security suggests the referent object of security to be individuals.

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[12] Bjørn Møller, “The concept of security: the pros and cons and contraction,” (2000): 02.
[13] Bjørn Møller, “The concept of security: the pros and cons and contraction,” (2000): 03.
[14] Pinar Bilgin, “Critical Theory,” in *Security Studies: an* introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2008), 93.

2.1.2 Expanding the security agenda: human security

Understanding peace as positive[15], based on interdependence and focused on prevention, human security minimizes the emphasis on states, and concentrates on individuals. The concept was introduced by the 1994 Human Development Report, prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Roland Paris explains the expansion of security studies after the Cold War as a process of broadening and deepening. By broadening, the author refers to "the consideration of nonmilitary security threats, such as environmental scarcity and degradation, the spread of disease, overpopulation, mass refugee movements, nationalism, terrorism, and nuclear catastrophe."[16] By deepening, Paris refers to the fact "that the field is now more willing to consider the security of individuals and groups, rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states."[17] The term human security seems to perfectly fit the characteristics of Paris' broadening and deepening of security studies.

Many attempts have been made to define human security. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, the idea of having a Commission on Human Security (CHS) was launched. By 2003, the established Commission released a Report in which it defines human security:

> [T]o protect vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means

[15] In the concept of positive peace, war is the exception. In the realist school of thought, peace is negative, which means it is understood as a period between wars in which the states are preparing themselves for a new confrontation.

[16] Roland Paris, "Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?," (2001): 97.

[17] Roland Paris, "Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?," (2001): 97.

> protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. (…) It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.[18]

As a consequence of the debate on human security, the concept has been advanced in two approaches: 1) a broad, extending from personal security to environmental security; and, 2) a narrow, focused on violent threats to individuals. The broad approach is also referred to in the literature as "freedom from want", and the narrow as "freedom from fear".

2.1.3 The UNDP definition

The broad approach was presented in the 1994 UNDP Report, as follows:

> Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. (…) Human security is an integrative concept. (…) It is embedded in a notion of solidarity among people. It cannot be brought about through force, with armies standing against armies.[19]

The current research opts for the original definition of human security proposed by the UNDP, as it presents the advantage of categorizing the threats to human security. When compared to other broad definitions, such as that provided by the CHS, for instance, where measuring the 'vital core' of human lives and 'human fulfillment' is virtually impossible, the benefit of using the UNDP definition becomes clearer. The choice for the UNDP definition is also based on

[18] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now* (New York: 2003), 4. Available at: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf.

[19] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*, 23-24.

the fact that all other attempts to define the term 'human security' are at some level encompassed by the original holistic definition proposed by the UNDP.

The Report observes that the list of threats to security is extensive, and it divides them into seven categories: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.[20] It is important to note an overlap in these categories, hence a threat to one is understood as a threat to all.

The concept of human security so established by the UNDP falls under the broad approach. The narrow approach is that taken by the Human Security Centre (HSC), where human security is defined as "freedom from the fear of violence as well as freedom from actual violence."[21] The narrow approach would basically be the category "personal security" of the UNDP 1994 Report. The following subsection will show some of the critiques to the broad approach of human security, and to its definitions in general.

2.1.4 Critiques

Some of the major critiques of human security are the difficulty in defining the concept, the need to define what constitutes a threat, and the policy-making utility of the term.[22]

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[20] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*, 24-33. Appendix 1 presents a summary of the discussions on the Report for each category.

[21] Human Security Centre. *Human security report 2005: war and peace in the 21st century*, 54. The HSC was initially hosted at the University of British Columbia, and is currently hosted at the School for International Studies at the Simon Fraser University, under the name "Human Security Report Project".

[22] For a more complete list of critiques (and counter-critiques) on human security, refer to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy. *Human Security: Concepts and implications*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 59-68.

A common argument by traditionalists is that the lack of a precise definition of human security makes it useless in terms of policy-making. Scholars, practitioners and policy-makers, as interestingly noted by Hampson, all have different priorities and time preferences in regards to the effective use of the concept into a concrete security agenda.[23]

Burgess and Owen, however, would argue that the very malleability of human security is its main attractiveness, offering the possibility of fitting the interests of a government developing its foreign policy or those of a development organization.[24]

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy argue that the lack of a firm definition of human security does not necessarily diminish its utility, as over time categories are established and policy is constructed using more concrete, and prioritized tools. They also highlight that the lack of a structured definition gives flexibility of dimensions to the term, making it a powerful tool, free from analytical prejudice.[25] Paris underscores that: "Defining the core values of human security may be difficult not only because there is so little agreement on the meaning of human security, but because the term's ambiguity serves a particular purpose: It unites a diverse and sometimes fractious coalition of states and organizations."[26]

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[23] Fen Olser Hampson, "Human Security," in *Security Studies: an* introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (New York: Routledge, 2008), 242-243.

[24] Peter J. Burgess, and Taylor Owen, ed., "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?," *Security Dialogue 35, no. 3* (2004): 345.

[25] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy. *Human Security: Concepts and implications*, (2009), 59.

[26] Roland Paris, ""Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?," (2001): 95.

In regards to the need to define the threats to security, critics argue that "labeling all potential harms to the individual *security threats* makes prioritizing political action impossible."[27] This perception comes from those focused on a state-centric approach to security; however, when the UNDP classified the threats to security in seven categories, it has made it possible to establish what the security priorities are.

Human security has different approaches and, with time, different authors have tried to narrow its scope. The concepts presented by this research are what Møller refers to as a 'matter of definitions', which can be more or less useful or relevant, but never wrong or right.[28] A broad-based concept is operational in multiple situations and lends itself to progressive, dynamic and evolving visions.[29] The broad definition of human security allows for recognizing political, economic, environmental and cultural threats. It recognizes that in the post-Cold War world threats are interconnected and so should the responses to them be. Therefore, the working definition for this research is the UNDP definition.

2.2 Adoption of the agenda

The human security agenda has gained, over the years, greater attention in the international arena. The previous section explained some of the discussions surrounding the definition and approaches to human security. This

[27] Owen in: Peter J. Burgess, and Taylor Owen, ed., "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?," (2004): 373.
[28] Bjørn Møller, "The concept of security: the pros and cons and contraction," (2000): 02.
[29] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha M. Chenoy. *Human Security: Concepts and implications*, (2009), 59, 61.

section intends to analyze how a few selected actors have responded to the human security agenda.

Paris argues that "among the most vocal promoters of human security are the Governments of Canada and Norway, which (…) endorse the concept."[30] The human security agenda has been specially developed by the so-called middle power countries, such as Canada and Norway.[31] Liotta argues the imprecision of the term "has become an attractive mandate in the conduct of foreign policy for 'middle power' governments – and far less popular principle-in-practice for the so-called major powers."[32]

Caroline Thomas mentions the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, who focused upon the role that middle-range governments can play in promoting human security.[33] Canada is mentioned throughout the literature on human security as a country which has whole-heartedly adopted the agenda.

Canada will serve in this research as the example of a country which adopted the human security agenda, and which also fits the characteristics of a middle power; whereas the United States will serve as the counterexample, a major power which has not adopted the agenda.

[30] Roland Paris, "Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?," (2001): 87.
[31] See Appendix 2 for definition of middle power countries.
[32] Liotta, P.H. in: Peter J. Burgess, and Taylor Owen, ed., "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?," (2004): 363.
[33] Thomas in: Peter J. Burgess, and Taylor Owen, ed., "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?," (2004): 353.

For some years, the government of Canada has been developing a program supportive of human security as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). It supports the development of Canadian and international policies, laws and institutions that seek to promote the protection of individuals from violence and armed conflict.[34] The Canadian government's understanding of human security is expressed below:

> Canada's human security policies are based on the premise that the safety of individuals should be at the heart of international efforts to promote peace and security. (…) Human security means safety for people from violent and non-violent threats. For this reason, one of the foundational and core elements in the human security agenda is the legal and physical protection of civilians.[35]

Axworthy took office in 1996 and finished his duties as Minister in 2001. During his tenure, he made his name as a man of peace, whose largest achievement was to systematically promote the concept of human security, indicating that the human security agenda was quickly adopted by the Canadian government after the 'official' creation of the term in 1994. In June 1999, Axworthy emphasized the importance of the topic to Canada and affirmed: "[h]uman security is something that strikes a chord with the Canadian public and reflects long-standing Canadian values."[36]

As a middle power, Canada has limited military capacity. For some, the adoption of the human security concept was a strategic move for Canada to

[34] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Glyn Berry Program," http://www.international.gc.ca/glynberry/index.aspx

[35] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Canadians call for human security." *Canada World View Special Edition* (Fall 1999).

[36] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. "Canadians call for human security."

differentiate itself from its neighbor, the United States.[37] It was also an opportunity to reinforce its strong tradition of non-intervention, bolstering its international role as a peacekeeping nation.

There is, however, the need to differentiate between the adoption of the concept of human security in formal and practical terms. Mere adoption in formal terms is simpler than the adoption of actions seeking to fulfill the agenda. Unarguably, states and institutions initially adopt the formal agenda, the discourse. However, it is fundamentally important that the formal adoption of the concept is subsequently transformed into concrete actions.

In the case of Canada, the formal adoption of a human security agenda was transformed into action and allowed the country

> to play a leading role in the campaign banning the deployment of landmines; the Ottawa Process, which led in December of 1997 to the signing by 122 countries of the "Convention on the Prohibition, Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Landmines and Their Destruction", was seen as a successful implementation of Canada's new policy agenda. Other results were the creation of the International Criminal Court, the Kimberley Process on conflicts in the diamond trade, and the launching of the International Commission on State Sovereignty and Intervention with its landmark report, *Responsibility to Protect*, published in September 2000 by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.[38]

[37] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. "Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan," *Les Études du Centre d'études et de recherches internationals Sciences Po* 117-118 (2005): 21.

[38] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. "Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan," (2005): 22.

However, it is relevant to note that the non-adoption of the concept – not even in formal terms – does not automatically mean there is a complete lack of interest by some countries and institutions for issues related to human security.

The United States is a good example of this affirmation. Although it does not subscribe to the human security agenda, it has been working in areas commonly related to human security in numerous countries. Through projects undertaken by its international development agency, the U.S. works in the fields of agriculture, education, democracy and governance, environment, health, and humanitarian assistance, for instance.[39]

The discussions on human security demonstrate its breadth, making it possible for different actors, governments and institutions to develop a network of actions in favor of the agenda. The following chapter will focus on the country case for this research, serving as the background for the development of the subsequent observations.

[39] United States Agency for International Development/ Sudan, "Our Work," http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/.

3. SUDAN: THE ONGOING CONFLICT

In 1994, the UNDP Development Report introduced the concept of human security and evaluated some countries to be facing crises that affected the security of their local populations. Of the states selected by the Report, the current research will focus on Sudan, as the UNDP highlights it "faces one of the world's worst humanitarian crises [where] [t]here is little prospect of ending the relentless cycle of war and famine."[40]

The roots of the Sudanese conflicts are long-standing. These conflicts can be traced back to the pharaonic empires and sultanates periods.[41] Racial, ethnic, cultural, political and religious diversity in the country are critical root causes of the Sudanese conflicts. North-South tensions have resulted in two civil wars and since the Sudanese independence in 1956, the country has experienced few years of (relative) peace.

In 2003, the world was exposed to the cruelty of the conflict, which persists until today, in the region of Darfur. Since then, the conflict has

[40] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*, 43.

[41] Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 27.

intensified.[42] A peacekeeping force has been sent to the area by the United Nations and African Union, but it has not achieved success. Several ceasefires have been signed, as well as peace agreements – mostly disrespected. Millions have been displaced and thousands have died.

The following pages intend to demonstrate the complexities of the formation of the Sudanese state. Ali *et al* note that "[t]he literature of the Sudanese conflict suggests that history matters a great deal."[43] The long-term history of domination by sultanates and imperial forces has resulted in a multifaceted state, with different characteristics in different regions, and a history of intolerance by the local populations of one another. The resulting historical events that took place in Sudan and in the Darfur region are understood as possible motivations for the donation of aid – or worse, for a drawback in donations depending on the specific situation.

3.1 A snapshot of the history of Sudan

The diversity of Sudan is frequently expressed by the term "North-South". The North of Sudan has two thirds the area and population of the country, and was inhabited by indigenous ethnic groups, most of which married into Arab trading families. Over time, they produced the so-called "African-Arabs", with

[42] The accurate death toll for the Darfur humanitarian crisis is highly disputed, as stated by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in a report entitled "Darfur Crisis: Death estimates demonstrate severity of crisis, but their accuracy and credibility could be enhanced." Despite the lack of an accurate death toll, it is possible to see that from 2003 (the beginning of hostilities) to 2008 (the conclusion of the timeline for this research) there was an intensification of the conflict, as the number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Sudan increased – see Appendix 3.

[43] Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani, "The Sudan's Civil War: Why has it Prevailed for so Long?" In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa*, ed. by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 03.

genealogical and cultural hybrid characteristics. The North of Sudan has for a long period gone through a process of “Arabization” and “Islamization”, and has constantly tried to impose those characteristics upon the South, which takes pride in its African heritage. [44]

During the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration of Sudan (from 1898 to 1956), the Southern Policy imposed differentiations between the North and the South of Sudan in agriculture, education, job opportunities, etc., with the objective of eventually separating the regions into two different countries.[45] In 1946, the Southern Policy was cancelled, but its social, economic, cultural and also ethnic consequences were irreversible.

By 1955, Sudan found itself in its first civil war due to the lack of representation of the South in the independence process. Sudan’s first civil war ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa North-South Agreement. The years from 1972 to 1983 were characterized by peace.[46] In 1983, Sudan’s second civil war broke out as a consequence of several factors, such as the imposition of the *sharia* law, the religious tensions it created on the non-Islamic population and, the creation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).[47]

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[44] For a detailed comprehension of the history of Sudan and Darfur, please refer, respectively, to chapters 2 and 6 of Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace.*

[45] Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani, “The Sudan’s Civil War: Why has it Prevailed for so Long?” In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 04.

[46] Ali Abdel Gadir Ali, Ibrahim Elbadawi, and Atta El-Batahani, “The Sudan’s Civil War: Why has it Prevailed for so Long?” In *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa*, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, 01-04.

[47] Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace*, 89.

In 1989, General Omar al-Bashir assumed power through a military coup. Sudan only held official democratic elections in 1996, with al-Bashir competing against another 40 opponents, none of whom were from opposing political parties. In that instance, al-Bashir was legitimized as the President of Sudan.

In 1998, a new constitution was endorsed by 96% of the voting constituents in a referendum.[48] In 2001, a peace agreement was signed with the SPLM. In September of that year, the UN decided to suspend its sanctions on Sudan[49]. Nonetheless, the U.S. independently maintained its sanctions for at least one more year. The American justification was Sudan's past of violation of rights and support for terrorism.

In 2002, another agreement was signed between the Sudanese government, the SPLM/A and Sudan People's Defense Force (SPDF). The Machakos Protocol, signed by the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), put an end to the years of crisis.

3.2 Darfur

This section of the chapter shall focus on events particular to the region of Darfur, a region previously understood as peaceful, which erupted in violence unexpectedly in 2003.

[48] The referendum also questioned the future of the South of Sudan, and it was established that in 2011 a new referendum would be held to decide if the area should still be part of Sudan, or if it should become an independent country.

[49] UN sanctions were imposed in 1996, when Sudanese citizens were allegedly involved in the assassination attempt of the President of Egypt.

Darfur is the biggest geographical area of Sudan and it occupies an area as large as France.[50] In February 2003, rebels in Darfur attacked governmental properties in a protest against the marginalization and underdevelopment of the Darfur region, and Khartoum's inability to protect villages in Darfur from lootings by Arab nomads. In response, the central government in Khartoum unleashed armed forces, paid Arab militias (known as the *Janjaweed*) to fight the rebels in Darfur, and several villages suffered aerial bombardments.[51] Throughout that year, the conflict intensified and in September a ceasefire agreement was reached between the rebels and the government. The situation reached what UN officials defined as one of the worst humanitarian situations in the world.[52]

In the following year, the African Union sent its first observer to Darfur. At the N'Djamena talks, a humanitarian ceasefire agreement was signed by three parties involved in the conflicts in Darfur, and the government of Sudan made a commitment to neutralize armed militias. Once again, violence continued.[53] In September 2004, the UN passed a resolution in which it demanded the establishment of a commission of inquiry to identify if the situation in Darfur had reached a genocidal pattern.[54] The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed that the situation in Darfur was a genocide, an affirmation subsequently confirmed by President George W. Bush.

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[50] The Darfur region was originally part of the independent Fur Sultanate, which ruled over the area from 1600 to 1916. It was only integrated by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium into the Sudanese area in 1916. The term Darfur refers to *dar Fur*, the "land of the Fur".

[51] Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace*, 184.

[52] United Nations News Centre, "Sudan: humanitarian situation in Darfur one of the worst in the world – UN officials," http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10615&Cr=sudan&Cr1=

[53] Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace*, 152-153.

[54] United Nations Security Council, 5015th Meeting. "Resolution 1564 (2004)." 30 July, 2004.

In 2005, as a result of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiatives started in 1993, Sudan put an end to its civil wars: a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the Government and rebel groups. The question of Darfur, however, was not addressed at the CPA.[55] In that year, Darfur's case was passed by the UN to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for analysis through UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1593 (2005).

The year 2006 was marked by the conclusion and signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). Negotiations were also made to transition the African Union peacekeeping force to the UN. The Sudanese government resisted, repeatedly claiming that violations to its sovereignty were occurring.

In 2007, after a long discussion over the number and characteristics of the soldiers to be sent to Darfur, finally the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was authorized by the UNSC Resolution 1769 (2007).[56] In May of that year, the ICC issued arrest warrants for crimes of war against a Sudanese Minister and a leader of the *Janjaweed* militia.

The year 2008 was marked by a historic milestone: a sitting president, Omar al-Bashir, had charges filed against him for crimes against humanity, and

[55] Alex de Waal, "Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007):1040.

[56] The UNAMID had its authorization extended until 31 July 2010 through the UNSC Resolution 1881 (2009).

the ICC issued him an arrest warrant in 2009. The year 2008 also marks the conclusion of the timeline for this research.[57]

Understanding the complexity of Sudan is relevant for this research in order to provide a more comprehensive perspective of the events in the country. Historical events structuring state formation such as elections, beginning of hostilities and signing of peace agreements, can motivate donor actors to provide aid to Sudan. This chapter was based on the assumption that a sequence of historical events has influenced the international response to, and understanding of the conflicts in Sudan.

[57] Data for the donation of aid to Sudan was only available up until 2008, hence, this year marks the conclusion of the timeline.

4. THE AID AGENDA AND HUMAN SECURITY

The previous chapters demonstrated how the human security agenda was established and adopted, and also the severity of the complex humanitarian emergency in Sudan. In order to understand the relation between human security and aid, it is important to appreciate the discussions surrounding foreign aid. First, the researcher will demonstrate the importance of particular historic instances in the institutionalization of aid as it is understood today. Then, the purposes of aid will be explained, giving special attention to the idea of moral duty – which converges with the principles of human security.

4.1 Institutionalizing foreign aid

Carol Lancaster argues that few humanitarian relief projects had been in place in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, but the idea of foreign aid, with governments and institutions providing sustained aid to one another over the years, has only risen post-Second World War.[58]

At that point, Europe was devastated and needed to be rebuilt. The U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced in 1948 an ambitious recovery plan for Europe. The Marshall Plan lasted four years, a period in which 13 billion dollars were donated to Europe.[59] Differently from the idea of humanitarian relief,

[58] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics.* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 01.

[59] 85 billion at current prices. Roger Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 24.

the Marshall Plan focused on “the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.”[60]

An important step towards the post-war foreign aid system was the institutionalization of aid in international organizations and international financial institutions, such as the UN and the World Bank.

Lumsdaine argues that the Marshall Plan impacted the later development of foreign aid programs to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) especially by legitimizing aid between countries in peacetime, and by leaving an organizational legacy, the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), an earlier version of what is now the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).[61]

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the OECD’s main body for issues related to aid and cooperation, and has developed intense and substantial work in setting operational definitions of what constitutes foreign aid.

[60] Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34.

[61] David Lumsdaine. *Moral Vision in International Politics: The foreign aid regime 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 215-216.

Hence, for the purposes of this research, Official Development Assistance is understood as in its DAC definition.[62, 63]

Another important step towards institutionalizing foreign aid was taken by the Pearson Commission at the World Bank in 1968.[64] The Commission released a report in 1969 in which it established specific aid targets for the developed countries: official aid donation should represent 0.7% of their GNP (Gross National Product), by 1975.

The 0.7% target is significant, as it sets a minimum standard of assistance that should be donated to developing countries, in order for them to reach self-sustaining growth.[65] One of the importances of the minimum standard is the possibility of assessing the developed countries' efforts towards aid-giving. According to OECD data, by the 1975 deadline, ODA donation accounted for less than 0.4% of the developed countries' GNI (Gross National Income), as shown in Appendix 4.[66]

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[62] Official Development Assistance: "Grants or Loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms [if a loan, having a Grant Element (q.v.) of at least 25 per cent]. In addition to financial flows, Technical Co-operation (q.v.) is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded." Official Assistance only differs from Official Development Assistance in regards to the recipient of aid. While ODA is provided to the poorest developing countries, Official Assistance is provided to the more advanced developing countries and transitional territories." Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Glossary: Official Development Assistance", http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965586.

[63] Official Assistance only differs from Official Development Assistance in regards to the recipient of aid. While ODA is provided to the poorest developing countries, Official Assistance is provided to the more advanced developing countries and transitional territories.

[64] The Commission was named after former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson.

[65] World Bank, "Pages from World Bank History: The Pearson Commission. July 11, 2003," http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20121526~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html.

[66] According to OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, GNP and GNI are used interchangeably.

4.2 Aid purposes and human security

In order to understand if the human security agenda impacts the donation of aid, it is important to comprehend why states choose to provide foreign aid. The focus of this section is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the donation of aid, and to correlate it to the human security agenda.

The donation of aid can be interpreted as an instrument of political neutrality or political engagement. Aid as an instrument of political neutrality is, for instance, humanitarian aid or emergency relief, where the intention of the donation is to assist a country facing a brief crisis.

> Aid for relief (…) was always regarded as temporary, aimed at returning people to a situation in which they could provide for their own sustenance. It was never intended to bring about 'development' – that is, long-term improvements in economic and social well-being in other countries.[67]

The type of aid that fosters long-term improvements, such as development and technical assistance, is part of the second trend in aid-giving: an instrument of political engagement.

Although these are two main interpretations on aid-giving, the literature defines several different purposes for donating aid: diplomatic, development, poverty reduction, humanitarian relief, commercial, cultural, promotion of economic and social transitions, addressing global issues, promotion of democracy, and mitigating conflicts and managing postconflict transitions.

[67] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 26.

Providing aid based on diplomatic purposes relates to international security, political goals, and relationships between governments. Development purposes are linked to the support for economic and social progress and reducing poverty. Humanitarian relief purpose is related to natural or manmade crises, such as droughts or refugees. Commercial purposes are linked to exports and securing access to raw materials. Cultural purposes are those related to the use of the donor's language abroad, such as in colonizer-colony relationships. Addressing global issues such as global warming, water pollution, HIV/AIDS and malaria refer to what the UNDP would call environmental and health security.[68]

Peter Uvin argues that human security is the interaction between four traditional approaches to social change: humanitarian relief, development assistance, human rights, and conflict resolution.[69] If human security is an interaction between these four elements, and the most diverse purposes of foreign aid relate to the need to restore basic human rights and dignity; it should only be natural, then, that policies designed to promote human security in the world would impact foreign aid.

Moreover, aid can also promote human security by contributing to meeting the Millennium Development Goals.[70] Aid raises economic growth, which relaxes

[68] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics,* 13-16.

[69] Uvin, in: Peter J. Burgess, and Taylor Owen, ed., "Special Section: What is 'Human Security'?," (2004): 352-353

[70] "The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all the world's leading development institutions." U.N Millennium Development Goals "Background" http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml

the budgetary constraints that hinder development spending by developing countries.[71]

Human security and foreign aid are related at the most intimate levels, by the moral principle of understanding that each human being deserves equal rights and opportunities. In 1993, David Lumsdaine introduced the idea that "economic foreign aid cannot be explained on the basis of donor states' political and economic interests, and that humanitarian concern in the donor countries formed the main basis of support for aid."[72] Furthermore, Lumsdaine argued that the Marshall Plan set the example of leading developed countries assisting the LDCs, creating the "belief that developed countries had a moral obligation to provide aid."[73] Aid became a moral obligation, not just an instrument of foreign policy.

Both Canada and the U.S. expressed their perception that providing foreign aid is their moral obligation. The U.S.' understanding is expressed below:

> The sole remaining superpower has a moral obligation to take a stand against human atrocities whenever and wherever they occur. But humanitarian interventions are also in the national interest: failed and failing states are by definition dangerous to the United States and to global security.[74]

Canada shares a similar view and in regards to Sudan, Canada highlights its interest in the country as driven by the humanitarian imperative to assist

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[71] Tony Addison, George Mavrotas, and Mark McGillivray, "Aid, Debt Relief and New Sources of Finance for Meeting the Millennium Development Goals." *United Nations Security, Research Paper* 2005/09 (March, 2005):01.

[72] David Lumsdaine. *Moral Vision in International Politics: The foreign aid regime 1949-1989*, 3.

[73] David Lumsdaine. *Moral Vision in International Politics: The foreign aid regime 1949-1989*, 5.

[74] U.S. Agency for International Development. *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity* (Washington, D.C., 2002), 125.

peoples in need, and to assist Sudan with its challenges on distribution of wealth, poverty alleviation, mass migration and ethnic cleansing.[75]

There are several moral explanations given by donor governments for providing aid, as seen in Appendix 5. The relationship between the principles of foreign aid and the principles of human security is mutually reinforcing.

The following chapter will focus on the quantitative data on the levels of aid donation from Canada and the United States to Sudan. It will then provide alternative explanations to elucidate the donors' actions towards Sudan.

[75] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Sudan: Priorities and objectives," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/engagement.aspx?lang=eng

5. AID LEVELS

This chapter furthers the discussions presented in Chapter 4 and tests the argument that the adoption of the human security concept has positively impacted the way different actors reacted to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. That is, its adoption increases the amount of foreign aid donated to Sudan. Also part of the argument for this research is the idea that the Darfurian crisis presented itself as a possibility of merging the formal adoption of the human security concept in discourses into a concrete measurable action – the donation of aid. However, it appears that the human security discourse/agenda is more effective in mobilizing middle power countries rather than great powers, which could arguably have different reasons for aid donation.

In order to evaluate if the adoption of the human security agenda impacted the donation of aid, it is primarily important to analyze the flows of foreign aid donation to Sudan. After acknowledging each significant increase in donation, it is necessary to investigate the rationale behind each increase. Only then will it be possible for the researcher to evaluate if such increases can be correlated to the adoption of the human security agenda.

By “significant increase”, the researcher is considering changes above 100 percent. This choice of percentage is due to the length constraints of the present research which would not allow the researcher to explain every single donation increase over the 20 years analyzed. Even if I made the increase 50

percent, for example, that would increase the sample of years to be individually analyzed by 44 percent, requiring time and efforts that could not be adequately developed in this research. Another limitation found by the researcher was the fact that some official information from the Canadian government had been erased from websites. Because of such data gaps, analysis was completed using limited contextual information, and thus limiting the scope of the rationale behind the increased Canadian donations more presumptive than the researcher would have liked it to be.

This research will focus on the official development assistance donated to Sudan, by Canada and the United States. The baseline for the analysis is 1989, as it constitutes the year the current president of Sudan took power (through a military coup), and as it provides half a decade of data before the creation of the human security concept, making the task of analyzing the post-human security data analytically more valid. Data will be analyzed for a total period of twenty years. This section will begin by stating the general trends for aid donation over the years and will then proceed to analyze Canada's and the United States' flows of ODA to Sudan.

Ever since foreign aid gained a larger space in governmental policies, levels of aid-giving have varied significantly, with periods of stagnation, expansion and decrease. Riddell affirms that from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, levels of aid stagnated. By the mid- to late 1970s and the mid- to late 1980s, there was a period of rapid expansion, as well as in the post-1997 period.

Aid decreased in the early 1970s and 1980s and for much of the 1990s.[76] The year 2005 marked a significant boost in ODA, due to the increase of almost 27 billion dollars on debt forgiveness grants worldwide.[77]

Lancaster highlights that the "rising amounts of aid often signal increasing closeness in relations between donor and recipient, just as falling aid levels can symbolize cooling relationships and disapprobation."[78] The following discussion intends to investigate the rationale behind the significant increases in the donation of ODA to Sudan, and any possible relation to the adoption of the human security agenda.

5.1 Canada

For a number of years Canada has been present in Sudan developing projects and contributing to peace and security. Its efforts are focused on three major areas: aid, security, and diplomacy. The official governmental discourse in regards to its engagement in Sudan is that it "reflects Canada's core values and foreign policy priorities of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law."[79] When looking at the numbers in Graph 5.1, it is possible to understand the Canadian commitments to Sudan. The research will now begin to analyze each

[76] Roger Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 23.

[77] OECD reports (OECD, "Aid flows top USD 100 billion in 2005") that debt relief grants increased more than 400% on that year, with other types of aid increasing only 8.7%. Out of Canada's general ODA donation in 2005, 12.20% represented debt relief and for the United States that number was 14.83%. One other possible explanation for the 2005 boost is the Gleneagles G8 and UN Millennium +5 summits, in which donors pledged to increase aid donation from USD 80 billion in 2004 to USD 130 billion in 2010.

[78] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 11.

[79] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Sudan: Priorities and objectives."

significant increase in donation to Sudan and whether each increase can be related to the human security agenda.

5.1 Canada - ODA donation to Sudan (1989 to 2008)



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Creditor Reporting System Full: Official Development Assistance to Sudan from Canada, 1989-2008”, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW

In 1991, Canada’s donation of ODA to Sudan doubled relative to the previous year. Analyzing the occurrences in Sudan that could have motivated such an increase, the researcher found that Sudan became a federal state in 1991. It would appear to the researcher that Canada was motivated to increase aid donations to its fellow former British colony, the Sudan, in support of the federalist process the African country was going through. “The fundamental basis for federalism in Canada (...) was and remains the need to reconcile, balance

and accommodate diversity."[80] The same could be argued for Sudan, which, as previously explained in Chapter 3, also has a great religious and cultural diversity. If this assumption is true, it could also be argued that Canada's commitment to Sudan's federalism is sustained, as Senator Nancy Ruth expressed in 2006 that "Canada is (…) working to promote longer-term stability and reconstruction in Sudan by helping to build new government institutions and promote federalism."[81]

The next significant increase was in 1998, when aid increased 203.25% compared to the previous year. As in 1991's increase, it would appear that Canada's commitment to democracy motivated the donations. In 1998, Sudan adopted a new constitution, the first after the military coup in which al-Bashir took power.

The year 2004 was the next significant increase, when aid grew 318.2% relative to the previous year. In that year, Sudan was involved in the N'Djamena Peace Talks, where a ceasefire was signed. Again, Canada's commitment to peace and security becomes apparent. In regards to the complex emergency in Darfur, Senator Roméo Dallaire highlighted that: "Like so many other developed countries, we [Canada] are latecomers, as the people of Darfur were suffering for almost two years prior to the start to this movement to provide aid and security."[82]

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[80] Government of Canada. Privy Council Office. "Why Federalism in Canada," http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?doc=why-pourquoi-eng.htm&lang=eng&page=federal&sub=why-pourquoi

[81] Canada. Parliament. *Debates of the Senate*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 143, Issue 15, May 17, 2006.

[82] Canada. Parliament. *Debates of the Senate*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 143, Issue 15, May 17, 2006.

Following an inquiry risen by Senator Dallaire in the Canadian Senate on May 4, 2006, in which the Senator called the Canadian government to "step up to the plate and to act as the leading middle power that it is,"[83] Canada engaged in an initiative proposed by the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.[84] Titled *Sudan Consortium*, its purpose was to assist in the implementation of the CPA. Canada's active engagement in this Consortium led to the following significant increase of 264.4% on ODA donations in 2006.

Observing Canada's foreign aid donation increases, it appears that the years in which Canada had a highest increase relative to the year prior were marked by the search for peace, democracy, security and humanitarianism. Of the twenty years analyzed by this research, only one of the significant increases occurred before the adoption of the human security agenda. It is possible, then, to correlate the adoption of the human security agenda with the way the Canadian government delimited its foreign policy priorities to Sudan, leading to increased levels of foreign aid. In reference to the concept of human security adopted by this research, peace, democracy, security and humanitarianism are, after all, what the UNDP would broadly classify as personal and political security categories of human security.

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[83] Canada. Parliament. *Debates of the Senate*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 143, Issue 10, May 04, 2006.

[84] The inquiry was entitled "Are all humans human, or are some humans more human than others?" and Senator Dallaire called "attention [to] the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan and the essentialness of Canada's direct involvement in stopping this massive humanitarian crisis." Canada. Parliament. *Debates of the Senate*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 143, Issue 10, May 04, 2006.

5.2 United States of America

The United States constitutes the single largest donor of ODA (in absolute terms) to Sudan, as far back as at least 1995. Lancaster notes that in 1980 Sudan was the seventh largest recipient of bilateral aid from the U.S. and its aid was associated with peace-making and regional security.[85] This section will now address the significant increases in US' donation of ODA to Sudan.

5.2 USA - ODA donation to Sudan (1989 to 2008)



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Creditor Reporting System Full: Official Development Assistance to Sudan from USA, 1989-2008", http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW.

The first significant increase in aid donation to Sudan by the United States was in 1999, with an increase of 441.8%. When looking at a detailed chronology of the events in Sudan for that year, it was not possible to find any diplomatic or historic events that could have motivated such a great increase in donations. The

[85] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 80.

U.S. was then pursuing a policy of isolating Sudan – due to the bombings of two American Embassies in Africa, the attacks were associated with Sudanese aggressors, with terrorist linkages. The U.S. even bombed a Khartoum pharmaceutical company in August 1998 for allegedly having chemical weapons, which were not confirmed. The 1999 significant increase would appear, therefore, to be out-context with the other policies the U.S. was pursuing towards Sudan.

However, the explanation the researcher can find for this increase is a bureaucratic one: a late reaction to the Sudanese new constitution and famine in 1998. U.S. fiscal years start on October 1st of a given year and finish on September 30th of the following year. Therefore, the allocation of funds for aid for 1998 would have been made in 1997. In this case, it was impossible that in 1997 the U.S. government could have predicted that they would need to allocate funds for an unpredicted famine in Sudan in 1998. Another factor that supports the idea that the 1999 significant increase in donation to Sudan was influenced by the famine in the year prior is the U.S. Action Plan on Food Security. The Plan designed policies to alleviate hunger and to work towards the effectiveness of the U.S. food assistance program, which considers countries in food insecure situations – as Sudan – a priority.[86]

In 2001, ODA donation increased once again, now by 235.7%. “In 2001 the Bush Administration named a Presidential Envoy for Peace in the Sudan to

[86] United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service. *U.S. Action Plan on Food Security: Solutions to Hunger.* March, 1999. http://www.fas.usda.gov/icd/summit/usactplan.pdf.

explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan's civil war and enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid,"[87] as the country was going through another famine. This significant increase is explained by the increased humanitarian aid donated due to the famine, but it can also be related to the cooperation of the Government of Sudan with U.S. intelligence agencies to identify terrorist networks after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S.

> From this day on, the Khartoum government has come to serve as a principal collaborator to the US in its attempt to understand the functioning of international terrorist networks. (...) As a result, on September 27, 2001, the US abandoned its veto on the lifting of UN sanctions against Khartoum, and the multilateral sanctions were finally revoked.[88]

The following year, 2002, the ODA donation increase was sustained, reaching 583.7% relative to the year prior. This was the U.S.' largest increase in ODA donation to Sudan for the whole period examined by this research. It reflects a continued reaction to the partnership with Sudan on counterterrorism, and continued support to the IGAD initiatives. In addition, in January 2002, President Bush's special envoy to Sudan, former Senator John Danforth, initiated the first U.S. direct mediation between the SPLA and the government of Sudan, leading to a six-month renewable ceasefire agreement in the Nuba Mountains.[89]

The next significant increase was in 2004, by 115.2%, and can be attributed to the conflict in Darfur and the American official reaction of naming that conflict a genocide. This American reaction is further detailed in the

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[87] U.S. Embassy Sudan, "US-Sudan Relations," http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html

[88] Séverine Autesserre, "United States 'humanitarian diplomacy' in South Sudan." http://www.jha.ac/articles/a085.htm

[89] Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala. *Sudan: the elusive quest for peace*, 121.

"Alternative Explanations" section of this chapter. In 2005, with the signature of the CPA ending the North-South conflict, the U.S. doubled its donation of ODA relative to the year prior.[90]

The U.S.' involvement in Sudan is long-standing, and although it has some similarities to Canada's, it greatly differs because it is not influenced by a human security agenda. The U.S. considers the classical realist interpretation of national security as its main focus on the design of its foreign policies. In a speech delivered on the occasion of the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in 2008, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained the U.S. government's realist interpretation of the world:

> [T]here is not one challenge in the world today that will get better if we approach it without confidence in the appeal and effectiveness of our ideals -- political and economic freedom, open markets and free trade, human dignity and human rights, equal opportunity and the rule of law. Without these principles, backed by all forms of national power, we may be able to manage global problems for awhile, but we will not lay a foundation to solve them. *This is the core of America's approach to the world. We do not accept a firm distinction between our national interests and our universal ideals*, and we seek to marry our power and our principles together to achieve great and enduring progress. This American approach to the world (…) is as old as America itself. I have referred to this tradition as American Realism.[91]

Although Secretary Rice mentions principles that would not traditionally be linked to the classic realist approach, she makes it clear that these ideals are

[90] According to the U.S. Embassy in Sudan, "For fiscal years 2005-2006, the U.S. Government committed almost $2.6 billion to Sudan for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping in Darfur as well as support for implementation of the peace accord and reconstruction and development in southern Sudan." U.S. Embassy Sudan, "US-Sudan Relations."

[91] Condoleezza Rice, "U.S. supports democracy, diplomacy, just economic development" (speech presented at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 23, 2008).

valid when used in favor of the U.S. government's national interests. Considering Secretary Rice's explanation of the American Realism, it is possible to note the influence of this approach in the way foreign aid has been designed by the U.S. government, where

> [t]he core purpose of the United States aid today is neither poverty eradication nor even the promotion of economic growth in poor countries. Rather, it is to 'protect America', using bilateral aid programmes to foster democracy and freedom.[92]

Riddell argues that a second goal in U.S. donation of aid is to bring poor countries out of poverty, but in turn, this should lead to the creation of job opportunities for U.S. citizens by reducing barriers to free trade. Riddell also argues that U.S. official aid is related to commercial considerations, as by law American aid is tied. All foreign aid implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has to be tied to the procurement of goods and services from the United States, which will then be transported by American companies.[93]

5.3 Comparison between donors

The previous two sections focused on explaining the significant increases in ODA donation to Sudan, by Canada and the United States. In order to analyze their general efforts, it is necessary to find a common ground, as both countries have a vast disparity in the amount of funds available for donations. This is

[92] Roger Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 55.
[93] Roger Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 57.

because the countries are under different circumstances, the former being a middle power and the latter, a great power.

The research will utilize the percentage change in aid relative to the previous year, hence the countries are evaluated based on their own previous records and efforts. Only then will they be compared to one another. Focusing on absolute values can be misleading, as these values do not properly portray the significance of the change. Take, for instance, Canada in 1998: it donated 7.46 million dollars to Sudan in ODA, which does not seem to be a significant amount. However, when compared to Canada's aid donation on the year prior, this donation represents an increase of over 200%.

Graph 5.3 is based on the OECD's data for ODA net disbursements to Sudan (as demonstrated in Graphs 5.1 and 5.2), and represents a comparison between Canada and the United States on the percentage oscillation of ODA donations relative to the previous year.

5.3 Comparison Canada and USA - Percentage change ODA donation to Sudan (1989 to 2008)



Based on: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Creditor Reporting System Full: Official Development Assistance to Sudan from Canada, 1989-2008”, and “Creditor Reporting System Full: Official Development Assistance to Sudan from USA, 1989-2008”. Percentages calculated by author.

The U.S. had seven decreases in amount donated relative to the prior year, while Canada decreased its donations ten times during the twenty-year period examined. In terms of average donation, Canada totaled 19.62 million dollars USD, and an average percentage increase of 38.72%; whereas the United States totaled an average donation of 213.67 million dollars USD, and an average percentage increase of 78.30%. Therefore, the U.S. indisputably had the most significant increases when compared to Canada.

As previously mentioned, the United States does not subscribe to the human security agenda. Overall, U.S. aid fell during the period near the creation of the human security term: from over 12 billion dollars in 1993 to 9 billion dollars

in 1996, a decrease of 25 percent.[94] The situation was only dramatically changed in 2002, when President George Bush announced an annual increase of 5 billion dollars in aid, and created the Millennium Challenge Account to manage funds directed at development aid.[95] Therefore, although all of its significant increases happened in a post-human security environment, they cannot be attributed to the human security agenda.

The year 2005 is considered a period in which aid donation in the world increased rapidly, and the U.S. doubled its donation of ODA to Sudan. In that year, one of the most significant peace agreements (CPA) in the history of Sudan was signed, sealing peace after two decades of civil war between the North and South of Sudan. Great democratic demonstrations such as this have received, over the years, vast attention from the Canadian government. However, surprisingly, Canada decreased its amount of ODA donated to Sudan by almost 20% in that year.

One interesting aspect about the Canadian foreign aid policy is the fact that the term 'human security' seems to have vanished from all official Canadian governmental websites and official communication sources.[96] Martin and Owen commented on Canada's change of attitude towards the human security agenda:

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[94] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 86.

[95] Carol Lancaster. *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 91.

[96] Embassy, "Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off," http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/diplomatic_language-7-1-2009.

Embassy is a Canadian foreign policy newspaper, published on Wednesdays at The Hill Times, a widely read political newspaper in Canada. It covers the inside world of Canadian foreign policy, international issues' impact on Canadian domestic politics, Canada's role in ther international scene, trade, defense, development, public safety, the environment, immigration, diplomacy and sovereignty. Source: http://embassymag.ca/information/view/about

> Canada, one of the principal initial proponents of the human security agenda, is (...) going through a period of withdrawal from both advocacy and use of the concept. A recently leaked internal email from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade outlined a series of shifts in the language of Canadian foreign policy. 'Human security' was among a group of terms blacklisted in government parlance. While this shift is linked to the ideological leanings of the current conservative government, it still marks a quite dramatic departure for a government that once championed the concept.[97]

For instance, over the one year in which Senator Dallaire's inquiry was debated in the Canadian Senate, the term 'human security' was not specifically mentioned by any of the Senators. However, themes related to the human security agenda were frequently referred to by Senators, such as the R2P Doctrine, Canada's support for the ICC's investigation on Darfur, food security, peacekeeping operations, support to peace agreements, political participation, need for democracy, environmental security, access to drinking water, ethnic cleansing, and basic human rights, amongst others.[98]

The researcher found that during the tenure of Canada's Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien, from 1993 to 2003; and Paul Martin, from 2003 to 2006 – both from the Liberal government – the human security agenda was frequently mentioned in formal speeches by Canadian officials, and also in concrete measures such as the banning of landmine use, the responsibility to protect doctrine and the sustained support to the ICC, as previously mentioned on

[97] Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, "The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience", *International Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2010): 211.

[98] Canada was the first and only country to make a $500,000 voluntary contribution to assist the ICC with the investigation. (Source: Senator Nancy Ruth. Canada. Parliament. *Debates of the Senate*, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, vol. 143, Issue 15, May 17, 2006.)

section 2.2. of this research.[99] The agenda was believed to be an innovative paradigm, and its use allowed Canada to take a more proactive role in the world. "During the Chrétien years, Ottawa pursued an ambitious human security policy that attempted to tackle the multiple causes of human suffering," and during the Martin government, Canada's human security policy was reorganized by prioritizing the goal of rebuilding fragile and failing states, which served as facilitators to international terrorism. [100] During these tenures, Canada was actively engaged in initiatives related to child soldiers, the creation of the ICC, land mine use, small arms control, and food and economic security.[101]

By the time Stephen Harper took office as Prime Minister in 2006 representing the Conservatives, the human security language was purposely eliminated from the DFAIT lexicon, in an effort to differentiate the current government from its predecessors.[102] The language in official channels was changed from 'human security', 'public diplomacy' and 'good governance' to other preferred conservative language as 'human rights', 'rule of law', 'democracy' and 'democratic development'. Diplomats received orders to stop using the term human security. The change in terminology also affected Canada's official government websites, division names and programs. Formerly

[99] For evidence on this, see, for instance, the speeches delivered by Lloyd Axworthy, who served as Foreign Minister during the office of Chrétien: http://www.international.gc.ca/mines/process-ottawa-processus/minister-speech-ministre-discours.aspx?lang=eng

[100] Prosper Bernard Jr., "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 255-256.

[101] Prosper Bernard Jr., "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 235.

[102] Embassy, "Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off," and Mary Martin, and Taylor Owen, "The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience", (2010): 211.

known as Human Security Program, in 2007 it was re-named the Glyn Berry Program for Peace and Security. All language that reflected human security was relabeled with other terms.[103]

Therefore, although the current Canadian governmental discourse does not currently pinpoint 'human security' as a main priority in Sudan, its policies still reflect a deep concern with aspects related to human security, leading to the perception that the concept of human security has become an important part of Canada's governmental policies. Fen Hampson seconds this argument:

> In a lot of ways, that agenda was successfully institutionalized in the [Canadian] bureaucracy. The human security unit has been relabeled, but it's still doing many of the same things, so it hasn't been totally thrown overboard.[104]

The vision that human security has become a part of Canada's policies and that its programs still reflect – regardless of the terminology adopted by Prime Minister Harper's office – deep concern for values related to human security is expressed, for instance, by Canada's involvement in Haiti. Canada is working in Haiti by seeking peacebuilding, assisting a war-torn (and earthquake-torn) country, providing humanitarian assistance and promoting democratic development.

Another example of Canada's commitment to human security-related subjects is the program "Canada: Active in Sudan", which focuses on the construction of peace through the resolution of the humanitarian crisis and

[103] For evidence on the claims in this paragraph, see: Embassy, "Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off."
[104] Embassy, "Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off."

human right abuses in Sudan. Besides this program, Prime Minister Harper has also maintained the Canadian support to AMIS troops in Sudan, to the Darfur Peace Agreement, and increased financial support to Sudan by 40 million dollars, in 2006 alone.[105] All of these topics are closely related to the narrow approach to human security, adopted by the Canadian government.[106]

Thus, it appears that the lack of the term 'human security' in the current Canadian Conservative government is more related to a political move by the Prime Minister's Office to try to differentiate itself from the previous two Liberal governments than a complete detachment from the values propagated by the human security agenda itself. After all, official government programs received new names, as in the case of the Glyn Berry program, but their core values and actions were kept intact.

While the Canadian aid policy is marked by the narrow approach of human security, the U.S. foreign aid is marked by diplomacy and development, and is influenced by a realist interpretation of international relations. In 2002, the USAID highlighted in a report that foreign assistance would be a key instrument of foreign policy in the coming decades.[107] Later on that year, President Bush elevated development as the third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy.

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[105] Prime Minister of Canada, "Prime Minister announces humanitarian aid and support for peace in Sudan," http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1172.

[106] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Sudan: Canada's Approach," http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/approach-approche.aspx?lang=eng.

[107] U.S. Agency for International Development. *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, iv.

Although the U.S. foreign aid agenda has not been influenced by the human security approach, as the government is focused on its national security, some of the policies it adopts resemble the ideas proposed by the human security agenda. Therefore, the fact that a country does not subscribe to the human security agenda, does not necessarily exclude it from having practices in areas related to it. The same could not be argued for Canada, as the government has adopted the human security agenda, especially during the tenures of Chrétien and Martin. In recent years, the Canadian government has gone through a period of change, in which it simply renamed programs, but keeping the same duties, as previously mentioned.[108] In terms of aid donation, the U.S. has been more actively engaged in Sudan than Canada, which would not have been expected based on the U.S. not subscribing to the human security agenda.

5.4 Alternative Explanations

The following subsection has two main objectives: to analyze if other possible explanations can better explain Canada's commitments of foreign aid to Sudan rather than the adoption of the human security agenda, and to provide other explanations for the U.S.' increased donations to Sudan.

5.4.1 Canada

In order to confirm if the adoption of the human security concept is the best explanation for Canada's changes of pattern in ODA donation to Sudan, it is necessary to look at other scenarios.

[108] Embassy, "Liberal-Era Diplomatic Language Killed Off."

A first alternative explanation for Canada's increased donations to Sudan would be the important Canada-U.S. relationship. Canada's increased donations of foreign aid to Sudan would be an effort to be in consonance with the U.S.' approach to Sudan. By partnering with the United States on projects outside North America, Canada would be demonstrating to its closest ally that it is committed to strengthening their relationship and supporting the same values as the United States, regardless of location.

Although this line of thought is true to the Canada-U.S. relationship on several occasions, in this instance, when observing the actual pattern of ODA donation to Sudan from Canada in comparison to the United States (Graph 5.3), it is clear that Canada has behaved very differently from the United States. The year 2002, for instance, when the U.S. had its most significant increase in donation of ODA to Sudan, by 583.7%, Canada increased its donations by only 4.7%.

A second alternative explanation to challenge that it was the human security agenda that influenced Canada's aid donations to Sudan would be the 2006 aid cut by the Canadian government. The logic behind this argument is that if the Canadian government cared to foster its image as a country that works for human security, aid would be a fundamental aspect of that agenda. Depriving needing countries of essential aid would demonstrate that the government is not focused on human security, but is prioritizing other elements of its foreign policy agenda.

Although this logic can be true for other countries, Sudan was chosen as one of 20 countries selected to receive 80% of Canada's bilateral aid resources.[109] Sudan was understood by the Canadian government to be one of the countries that could better benefit from aid, and also as a country that is aligned with Canadian foreign policy priorities.

A third alternative explanation would be that Canada is donating more funds to Sudan as part of a strategy to enhance trade with Sudan. The argumentation would be that the presence of a Canadian oil firm in an oil producing country, Sudan, would serve as motivation to provide aid to the government of Sudan. In return for the aid provided, the government of Sudan would provide the Canadian oil firm, Talisman, which holds a 25% stake in Sudan Greater Nile Oil Project, with better terms of trade.[110]

However, DFAIT highlights that its engagement in Sudan is focused on maximizing the impact of Canadian efforts in the areas of aid, security and diplomacy. Trade is, therefore, not even mentioned by the official Canada's department responsible for it as one of its main priorities in Sudan.[111]

For the reasons specified above, these explanations do not fully help us understand Canada's behaviour towards Sudan, but only provide parts of arguments. The adoption of the human security agenda provides a broader

[109] Canadian International Development Agency, "Countries of focus," http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-51895926-JEP

[110] John Harker. "*Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Ottawa: January, 2000," http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/cansudan2.pdf.

[111] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada's Engagement in Sudan: Priorities and objectives."

interpretation through which the Canadian foreign policy to Sudan becomes more articulated and coherent. Canada's human security agenda reflects the moral values of a nation that takes pride in being known for its peacekeeping forces, it reflects the moral stewardship of middle power countries in initiatives of peace and security.

5.4.2 United States of America

If human security does not provide a full understanding of the U.S.' changes in ODA donation, then the researcher needs to observe other circumstances that could have influenced the U.S. to increase its donations of aid. It is relevant to understand the rationale behind the U.S.' donations to Sudan, as it constituted the single largest donor of ODA in absolute terms for over a decade.

The first alternative explanation to be considered as a probable cause of increased aid donations to Sudan by the United States refers to the determination of the situation in Darfur as a genocide.

The determination of genocide in Darfur by the president of the United States in 2004 played a fundamental role in increasing response to the conflict, and in the case of the U.S., aid increased 115.2% to Sudan. In the occasion of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the U.S. was heavily criticized for its inaction because of technicalities in the determination of the occurrence of genocide.

In an analysis of the U.S. press in regards to Darfur, from March to September 2004, Deborah Murphy found that frequently the Darfur humanitarian

crisis was compared to other crises, Rwanda being the most frequent association. The comparison of Darfur to Rwanda has been clearly demonstrated by slogans such as “Remember Rwanda, act on Sudan.”[112] When the U.S. was faced with a new situation that was somewhat similar to that in which it had been criticized, the country saw an opportunity to take immediate action, urging the international community to intervene in what they now classified as a genocide. Therefore, in an attempt to clear the memories of the Rwanda genocide, the U.S. would have increased the donation of aid to Sudan, so it would not be criticized for inaction once again.

A second alternative explanation for the increased donation of aid to Sudan by the United States is the idea of “war on terror”. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. established a cooperation program with Sudan in counterterrorism, and declared on its USAID/Sudan Strategy Statement for the years of 2006-2008:

> Sudan is the U.S. government’s highest priority country in Africa due to its importance for counterterrorism and regional stability, as well as the magnitude of human rights and humanitarian abuses.[113]

By the time the discourse of war on terror appeared in U.S. politics, USAID alerted that:

> The war on terrorism’s long-term effects on U.S. humanitarian policies are not yet clear. But one can hope that it will generate more interest in addressing festering complex emergencies abroad,

[112] Deborah Murphy, “Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the U.S. Press, March-September 2004,” in *War in Darfur and the search for peace*,” ed. Alex de Waal (London: The Social Science Research Council, 2007), endnote 1, 404.

[113] U.S. Agency for International Development/ Sudan, “Strategy Statement 2006- 2008,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/sudan/docs/sudan_strategy.pdf.

> avoiding the use of humanitarian aid as a "fig leaf" covering the lack of political or military action. There is danger, however, that the war on terrorism will bring the United States even deeper into the "politics over humanitarianism" realm.[114]

The discourse of war on terror is in perfect alignment with the U.S. foreign policy, marked by a realist approach. The U.S. would have increased its donations of foreign aid to Sudan, in an effort to make it more collaborative in terms of the information provided by the African country to the U.S., which was focused on achieving its goal of national security. However, for a country that has expressed that providing humanitarian aid is part of its moral imperative, the risk of focusing on traditional national security interests is that it will lose part of its credibility and impartiality in aid donation.[115]

The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate that the ideas of human security and foreign aid are intrinsically related, as both focus on the human being. In order to test the argument that the adoption of the human security agenda would positively impact the donation of aid, this chapter examined how Canada and the United States acted in terms of their donations of ODA to Sudan. It became apparent that both countries have operated as moral actors, although the U.S. has not been influenced by the human security agenda.

[114] U.S. Agency for International Development. *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, 26.
[115] Roger Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 140.

6. CONCLUSION

This research intended to verify how, if at all, the introduction of the human security concept impacted the influx of foreign aid to Sudan, especially after the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The original argument proposed by the researcher was that the adoption of the human security concept impacted actors' reactions to Darfur, leading to an increase in donations of foreign aid to Sudan. The Darfur crisis would have been the moment in which the formal adoption of the human security discourse was concretized into action: the donation of foreign aid. The nuance to the argument is the fact that the human security discourse is more effective in mobilizing middle-powers rather than great powers.

Trying to identify if the human security discourse impacted ODA donation, it was fundamental to look at the data from two major donors to Sudan: Canada and the U.S., the former being praised as a middle power which has enthusiastically adopted the human security agenda, and the latter, a great power which is an example of the non-adoption of such an agenda.

The United States has vehemently not adopted the human security agenda, as it does not subscribe to the core idea of the concept, that the referent object of security should be human beings instead of the state. Although the U.S. is far from the O.7% of GNI target established in the late sixties as a minimum amount that developed countries should donate in official developed assistance to developing countries, it is, nonetheless, indisputably the largest donor of ODA

to Sudan over the years analyzed by this research. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the U.S. has different reasons for its donations of ODA to Sudan other than human security, but it is undeniable that its programs and projects towards Sudan, especially those undertaken by the USAID, are intimately related to themes considered by the human security agenda as important. Therefore, it appears that the idea of the United States acting on the basis of its moral obligation towards LDCs fits its presence in Sudan, as well as, of course, the pursuit of U.S.' other national interests, as demonstrated by the alternative explanation subsection 5.4.2.

Although Canada's adoption of the human security agenda is embedded in its core values of rule of law, human rights, democracy and freedom, over the years the term 'human security' disappeared from the official governmental websites and programs, cited as a political move by the current Conservative government of Stephen Harper. Human security was significantly present during the tenure of Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Canada, from 1996 to 2001, who emphasized Canada's role as a middle power with moral imperatives. As the definition brought by the research argued, middle power countries cannot ignore compelling arguments about moral failures.

However, when it comes to Sudan and the Canadian donation of foreign aid, it becomes apparent that Canada's involvement in Sudan has been rather inconsistent, with donation increases associated with single events that relate to Canada's core values of human security, peace and democracy.

Sudan was already experiencing its second civil war by the time the human security agenda was created. Although the UNDP in the same document in which it 'creates' the term human security in 1994 alerts for the crisis in Sudan, data shows that no concrete and immediate measurable action was provided by Canada or the United States. There is a lag between the adoption of the human security discourse and transforming it into consistent action – in the case of this research, the donation of aid.

In regards to the argument proposed by this research, it seems that the adoption of the human security concept did influence Canada's donation of foreign aid to Sudan in the years that Canada had its most significant increases of aid giving, but not the U.S. However, in regards to Darfur serving as the moment in which the formal adoption of the concept is concretized into the action of donating aid, as highlighted by Senator Dallaire, Canada was a latecomer to the Darfur humanitarian crisis, whereas the United States quickly responded to it. In reference to the human security agenda influencing middle powers more than great powers, with the exception of the United States and the United Kingdom, all the other top 10 donors[116] to Sudan over the years analyzed were middle powers. As middle powers, they take advantage of the opportunity to act on pressing global issues that the great powers refuse to address, and the human security agenda provides them with important tools to achieve this goal.

[116] Top ten donors of ODA to Sudan were: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.

6.1 Looking ahead

Due to length constraints, this research project did not fully address two important aspects, which the researcher suggests for further development by the academia.

Firstly, as this research intended to address the human security's agenda impact on the flux of aid donated to Sudan, and considering that the United States does not adopt such an agenda, the argument outlined does not provide the complete tools for the understanding of this issue. It is worth further studies to examine the rationale behind the U.S.' significant donations of aid to Sudan, rather it be through the idea of 'war on terror' or even a more humanitarian approach, through the idea of the memory of Rwanda.

Secondly, one important step in consolidating the human security concept in the international community, and making it more analytically useful, would be the development of a human security index. Based on the seven categories proposed by the UNDP, it is possible to develop indicators for each category, which could be organized in an index form, to help countries and organizations direct proper assistance to countries most in need.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: UNDP Human Security Categories

Economic security requires assured basic income, normally resulting from productive and paid labor. Some of the consequences of low economic security are: nominal wage erosion by inflation, increased informal sector, poverty, underemployment, inequality, poor income distribution and most of severely, homelessness.

Food security "means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food."[117] The Report understands food as an entitlement. The entitlement framework is part of a 1989 publication by Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, *Hunger and Public Action*, in which the authors express the perception that:

> The critical thing was not the total food in a society or area but whether individuals could stake a claim to an adequate quantity of this food. What determined whether individuals could stake a claim was the *network of entitlements* that operated in a given society. This referred to the range of means by which individuals could legitimately and legally obtain commodities, including through production, trade, selling labour, inheritance or obtaining social security.[118]

Similarly to Sen and Dreze, the Report identifies the problem not to be food scarcity, but poor food distribution and lack of purchasing power.

[117] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*, 27.
[118] David Keen. *Complex Emergencies*. (Cambridge: Polity, 2008),101.

Health security refers to the most common causes of death and access to health services, both in industrial and developing countries.

The degradation of local and global ecosystems are caused by the threats to environmental security. One of the biggest threats is the lack of drinking water. Other factors are the continued processes of deforestation, salinization and desertification, air pollution and the occurrence of natural emergencies, such as droughts and floods.

Regarding personal security, the Report explains that "[p]erhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their security from physical violence."[119] Personal security can be threatened at several levels: physical torture, war, ethnic tension, crime and street violence, rape and domestic violence, child abuse, suicide and drug use.

People tend to feel more secure when they belong to a group, which can be a community, family, organization and, racial or ethnic group. Such membership offers a cultural identity, common values and support, which enforce the sense of security on individuals. This is what the Report refers to as community security.

Political security is related to country stability, especially in respect to basic human rights of individuals. As measuring political security is subjective, one strategy is to define a balance between military expenditures and social expenditures towards the population.

[119] United Nations Development Programme. *Human development report 1994*, 30.

Appendix 2: Definition of middle power countries.

For the purposes of this research, a middle power state is understood as follows: “Middle powers have a legacy of moral stewardship in the global arena, and therefore to be true to the identities they have cultivated they cannot ignore compelling arguments about moral failures. (...) Today they recognize that there are pressing global issues that great powers are refusing to lead on or address. They appreciate that in a divided world in which serious global problems are not being resolved, they have an opportunity and perhaps an obligation to serve as bridges between states and non-state actors in ways that solidify their international position (...), and may even bring real improvements to the security and welfare of people at home and abroad.”

Source: Richard A. Matthew, “Middle Power and NGO Partnership: The Expansion of World Politics,” in *Reframing the agenda: The impact of NGO and middle power cooperation in international security policy*, ed. Kenneth Rutherford, Stefan Brem and Richard A. Matthew (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 05.

Appendix 3: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons originating in Sudan, 2003-2008.



Sources:

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2003," http://www.unhcr.org/41d2c19a0.html.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2004," http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?docid=44e5c7920.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005," http://www.unhcr.org/4641bec40.html.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2006," http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.pdf.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2007," http://www.unhcr.org/4981c3dc2.html.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2008," http://www.unhcr.org/4bcc5c9f9.html.

Appendix 4: Ratio of ODA to GNI, OECD donors, 1960-2005.



Figure 2.2 Ratio of ODA to GNI, 1960–2005.

Source: OECD database.

Source: Riddell, Roger C. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 22.

Appendix 5: Moral explanations given by donor governments for providing aid



BOX 9.1 MORAL EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY DONOR GOVERNMENTS FOR PROVIDING AID

- On the basis of 'solidarity'.
- In response to human suffering: the humanitarian imperative.
- In response to extreme poverty, need, marginalization and exclusion.
- In order to enhance human freedoms, and to contribute to human development, and to the realization of capabilities.
- In order to extend and enhance the fulfilment of human rights, especially 'core' or 'basic' rights.
- Because of inequalities, notably wide and widening, or growing relative wealth compared with those living in extreme poverty.
- For reasons of distributive or social justice and fairness, to contribute to the fairer distribution of wealth.
- To secure a safer, more secure and peaceful world, including for the donor's own citizens.[a]

[a] It is sometimes claimed that the moral case for providing aid is different from that for providing aid for self-interested reasons. However, this is too narrow a view. There can (often) be strong moral reasons for countries to ensure the long-term interests of their citizens.

Source: Riddell, Roger C. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 2007, 141.

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