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POLITICAL CULTURE:

A CASE STUDY OF MODERN GREECE

by

John Costouros

B.A., University of Alberta, 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between political
culture and political stability by focussing on a specific
case: that of modern Greece. In particular, the attempt is
made (a) to analyze the nature of modern Greek political cul-
ture; (b) to explain the conditions and factors under which it
evolved over time, and, (c) to draw the connection between this
political culture and the prospects for stable democracy in
Greece.

The theoretical framework for the study of Greek political
culture relied heavily on the "civic culture" approach of
Almond and Verba (The Civic Culture, 1963) and the closely-
related "cultural fragmentation" approach of Rosenbaum
(Political Culture, 1975). The applicability of these approaches
to the Greek case was examined with the aid of historical, socio-
logical, and anthropological works on modern Greece and, where
appropriate, on studies of the cultures of other Mediterranean
societies. Material on contemporary Greek politics came from
secondary sources in both Greek and English as well as the
recent newspaper and periodical literature.

The basic finding of this study is that modern Greek
political culture possesses most of the characteristics of the
"fragmented" type. Accordingly, there has been an "incongruence"
between the political culture and the political system since the
birth of the modern Greek state in the 1820's, when western
democratic institutions were first introduced into the predomi-
nantly "parochial" Greek society.

iii.

From the 1820's to the present, under the influence of
significant historical events, modern Greek political culture
was further transformed and fragmented. Such events included
many territorial and civil wars, military dictatorships, abrupt
population expansion and a continuous involvement in the
political and economic affairs of the country by Great Britain
and latterly, by the United States.

Another important finding of this study is that political
orientations are strongly associated with the socio-economic
characteristics of the population. Among the peasants and
pastoralists of Greece, parochial and non-participant attitudes
and values such as mistrust, suspicion of the motives of others,
lack of cooperation, selfishness and patronage seemed to result
from a traditional culture which had been adapted to the
ecological conditions of the country. Alienated political
orientations of individuals from the working and lower middle
classes were shown to be influenced by the relative scarcity of
economic opportunities, the lack of effective labour organiza-
tions and the growing income inequalities. Conversely, the
existence of allegiant political orientations among many upper
class individuals was explained in terms of their high socio-
economic position and of the privileges and economic advantages
that they enjoyed within society.

Political socialization was, also, found to be a very
conservative process. The political culture is mostly trans-
mitted rather than shaped by such agents as family, school and
mass media. The family encourages the maintenance of tradi-
tional and parochial values and the use of clientage networks

and connections in reaching political goals. The school, as a
result of the political elite's stubbornness to do away with an
unpopular form of language and an anachronistic educational
curriculum, enhances allegiance to the nation while neglecting
to cultivate positive orientations toward the state and its
institutions. The mass media, through its subjective and dis-
torted fashion of news coverage and its biased interpretations
of political events, contribute to the maintenance of frag-
mentation and dissensus in the political culture.

Finally, the perpetuation of fragmentation and political
instability was seen as the direct result of many failures of the
Greek political elites to respond successfully to rising poli-
tical demands and to direct the nation's political culture
toward integration. Since the War of Independence (1821), the
political elites have been divided in their attitudes toward
vital political questions and toward the role of the masses in
the political system. Thus, the legitimacy of the political
system has been and is constantly challenged by the clashes of
the political elite members and by the frequent interference of
the army in the political scene.

Taking into account the fragmented nature of the Greek
political culture, the thesis concluded with the observation that
future political stability in Greece would greatly depend on the
ability and willingness of the politicians to unite and cooperate
with each other and on the extent to which new political and
economic developments, such as the accession of Greece to the EEC,
would trigger further integration among the masses. However, the
overall prognosis was not optimistic in this respect.

To my wife, parents and the people of Greece.

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I would like to thank my senior supervisor, Dr. Paul Warwick and my second supervisor, Dr. Lenard Cohen, for their patience, continued support and assistance toward the completion of this thesis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is about modern Greece. It is the study of a southeastern European country that emerged from foreign subjugation in the 1800's, after spending crucial centuries outside the pale of western civilization. Although modern Greece possesses political institutions similar to those found in western democratic states, it has not yet succeeded in developing institutions which are strong and able to cope with social change and the demands of a participatory democracy. Modern Greek political history is marked by a climate of political instability consisting of swift changes in government, constitution, military revolts,and dictatorships, civil wars, elections and referenda.

In the present work, I shall examine this phenomenon of political instability by using a political culture approach. The concept of political culture is a recent term in political analysis that has been used in a wide variety of ways and for a wide variety of purposes. It has been described as "a particular pattern of orientation to political action"[1], a sector of general culture "concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try to do"[2], or as consisting of "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."[3]

In this study, political culture will be used to refer to the collective attitudes, beliefs and feelings of people toward

.1.

the basic elements of their political system. Political
culture will, thus, include such things as: (1) orientations
toward governmental structures, (2) orientations toward others
in the political system, (3) orientations toward one's own
political activity.[4]

Almond and Verba attempted to describe the relationship
between political culture and a democratic political system in
their influential work The Civic Culture (1963). Based on
national surveys, the authors examined the political cultures of
five nations with democratic institutions and provided a number
of suggestions regarding the future of democracy in those
countries. Following Parsons and Shils,[5] the authors suggested
that individuals are oriented toward a political system in terms
of cognitions (knowledge and beliefs about the political system,
its officials, and its inputs and outputs), affects (emotions
about the political system, personnel and performance) and
evaluations (judgements and opinions of political objects).[6]
Three ideal types of political culture (parochial, subject,
participant) were defined on the basis of frequency of different
kinds of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward
the political system in general, its input and output aspects,
and the self as a political actor. (See Table 1).

The authors of The Civic Culture described these three
types of political culture as follows:

> Parochial Political Culture ... In these societies there
> are no specialized political roles: headmanship,
> chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse political-

Table 1

Types of Political Culture

	System as General Object	Input Objects	Output Objects	Self as Active Participant
Parochial	0	0	0	0
Subject	1	0	1	0
Participant	1	1	1	1

0 means that citizens are very weakly oriented towards the system while

1 indicates strong involvement with it.

Source: The Civic Culture, p. 17.

economic-religious roles, and for the members of these societies the political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system. **Similarly,** in the centralized African chiefdoms and kingdoms, the political cultures would be predominantly parochial, although the development of somewhat more specialized roles in these societies might mean the beginnings of more differentiated political orientations.

Subject Political Culture ... Here there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, **approach zero.** The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority: he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the output, administrative, or "downward flow" side of the political system; it is essentially a passive relationship. ...

Participant Political Culture ... is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes: in

other words, to both the input and output aspects
of the political system. Individual members of the
participant polity may be favorably or unfavorably
oriented to the various classes of political objects.
They tend to be oriented toward an "activist" role
of the self in the polity, though their feelings
and evaluations of such a role may vary from accep-
tance to rejection.

Almond and Verba also, noted that political cultures may

be allegiant, apathetic or alienated from the dominant political

system according to the quality of the cognitive, affective and

evaluative orientations. An allegiant political culture is

characterized by positive orientations toward the system; an

apathetic one by indifference to the system, while an alienated

political culture is characterized by negative or hostile

orientations toward such a system.[8]

In addition to these categories, Almond and Verba distin-

guished four types of "systemically mixed political cultures".

For example, a parochial-subject culture would be one in which

a considerable portion of the population would favour "a more

complex political system with specialized central governmental

structures".[9] This type of culture, also, includes a number of

parochials who still maintain loyalty to tribal and local

authorities. From the type of cultural mix (that is the

combination of parochials and subjects) one can usually tell

whether or not a political culture is on its way to becoming a

predominantly subject culture.[10]

Many developing nations today are faced with the problem

of cultural development. While their political culture tends to

be predominantly parochial, institutions and practices of

democratic nature that require a participant culture are being introduced. This is the parochial-participant culture. In this case, the population, being predominantly parochial, is very weakly oriented toward the system while at the same time the system lacks the support of a strong body of responsible and competent citizens. This means that the political culture is not congruent with the structures of the political system which accounts for much of the instability of such a system. In the period after the War of Independence (1832), modern Greece resembled a parochial-participant culture for western democratic institutions had been introduced into a country in which the native population was predominantly parochial.

Another type of mixed culture is the subject-participant one. Here, "a substantial part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientation, while most of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orienta-tions."[11] This type of culture is characterized by a climate of political instability produced by the alternation of authori-tarian and democratic regimes. The participant portion of the population cannot usually gain the type of confidence and experience seen among citizens of participatory democracies, for the democratic governments of this culture tend to be of short duration. Authoritarian or dictatorial regimes enjoying the support of subject-oriented populations frequently succeed such democratic governments. Under these conditions, democratically

oriented elements of the population tend to remain only "demo-
cratic aspirants". The structural instabilities that accompany
such a culture usually produce alienative tendencies among the
democratic elements. As it will be shown later in this study,
modern Greece possesses some of the characteristics of the
subject-participant culture.

Unlike the other ones, the final type of mixed political
culture is supportive of a stable democracy. This is the civic
culture which has some of the following characteristics: "it is
"an allegiant participant culture" in which the individuals
although participating in the political process, have not
given up "their orientations as subjects nor as parochials".[12]
But these subject and parochial orientations are congruent with
the participant political orientations. **What we are dealing**
with here is "a balanced political culture in which political
activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced
by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial
values."[13] A citizen within a civic culture is not constantly
involved in politics, as this would be the case with the pure
form of participant culture. "The citizen is not a constant
political actor. He is rarely active in political groups. But
he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment,
if necessary, for political use. He is not the active citizen:
he is the potentially active citizen."[14]

Even when the civic culture is congruent with the struc-
tures of the political system (a democratic political system),
Almond and Verba cautioned that stability cannot always be

assured. Political issues of great importance may create instability in a democratic political system if the government fails to respond to the demands stimulated by such issues.[15]

Perhaps more appropriate for this study, is the classification of political cultures used by Rosenbaum in his <u>Political Culture</u> namely <u>integrated</u> and <u>fragmented</u> political cultures.[16] According to him, an integrated political culture, which in many respects, resembles a civic culture, is characterized by a high historical-political continuity and civic stability with political violence and national disorders being practically absent from the scene.[17] A **fragmented political culture** possesses in many respects the reverse characteristics of an integrated one. It is a culture "whose population lacks broad agreement upon the way in which political life should be conducted. At the political culture level, the population separates (that is "fragments") into groups isolated from one another by contradictory and incompatible orientations, or other conflicts". Generally speaking "a fragmented culture increases the feeling of isolation and disagreement among social groups, erodes consensus on political fundamentals, and inhibits the development of conditions necessary for a true national community."[18]

It shall be a major theme of this study that modern Greece resembles more a fragmented than an integrated or civic culture. As we shall see later, most of the conditions, usually present in fragmented cultures, are found in modern Greece. Some of these conditions include 1) a dominance of parochial political

loyalties over national ones, 2) the lack of widely accepted
and operative civil procedures for conflict management, 3)
the prevalence of political distrust between social groups and
4) **national governments tend to be unstable in form and
duration.**[19] Indeed, in modern Greece, parochial ties are
formed to family unit while national institutions seem alien
and illegitimate in the eyes of many individuals. Political
conflicts are not usually resolved according to abstract rules
based on more or less impersonal standards, but rather according
to traditional ways. Thus, "new rules and rulers derived from
(the) national government ... collide with other rules: local
government officials (do) contend"[20] with powerful patrons.
Also common to modern Greece is the distrust between major
social groups which "involves a conviction that others wish to
deprive one's own social group of political liberties, economic
advantages or historically enjoyed social privileges".[21]
Finally, Greece presents a classic example of a country in which
social group hostilities and clashes between members of the
political elite have led to civil wars, military dictatorships,
succession of constitutions and general political disorder.

    A good knowledge of any political culture is not obtained
unless the researcher or writer undertakes to investigate the
conditions under which that particular culture originated,
developed and changed over time. In order to understand the
frequent occurrence of political instability and the existence
of fragmentation in the Greek culture, I deem it necessary to
examine four of the major influences upon such a culture:

historical experiences, direct political socialization experi-
ences, socio-economic variables and political variables.

The historical events and experiences of a country in many
cases have a tremendous impact on the political beliefs of the
people. A civil war or a military disaster may lead the members
of a nation to share a common sense of community or they may
initiate or perpetuate distrust among the various social groups.
Also, failure of the government to respond to demands made by
the people may produce alienative tendencies among the masses.
Economic crises, for example, may lead a number of people to
question the value and effectiveness of their governmental
institutions, etc., etc.

Direct political socialization experiences are also very
important in shaping a political culture. Political sociali-
zation has been defined as "the study of political learning".[22]
Through the process of political learning, a nation's political
culture is shaped and transmitted from one generation to the
other.[23] **The political culture of a nation is maintained when**
political values, views, norms and beliefs of the older genera-
tion are passed to the younger generation. **Changes in the**
economic and social structure of a society as well as changes
in the religious beliefs or the international relationships can
bring about changes in the political culture as well. **A new**
political culture may be created in some newly emerged nation
composed of people of different race, religion and history. On
the leadership, falls the task of creating new economic and
political institutions and appropriate cultural values. Through

the integration of old values with new ones, a new political culture may be generated.[24]

An examination of the socio-economic and political conditions of a nation is also of tantamount importance for the study of political culture. Political orientations are often strongly associated with the socio-economic position of an individual within a society. The political elites as well as the privileged classes usually feel more attached to dominant institutions and values of a society than the lower echelons of the population. Since social status in most societies is tied to education, which is usually received by middle or upper class people, it is often the case that such people feel more confident of their political skills and tend to be more aware and interested in political life than the less educated (lower class) people.[25]

Political elites and political parties are also responsible for the development and direction of the political culture of a nation. By controlling the major institutions of political socialization (schools, mass media), governmental elites can influence and reshape the political culture of the country. In some cases, political parties, whether in collaboration with, or in opposition to the dominant regime, can shape mass political orientations by either penetrating "all major social, occupational, cultural and political aspects of life" or by submitting members to "intensive indoctrination with political values, loyalties, and attitudes quite hostile to the dominant regime."[26]

Although there are undoubtedly many other factors which may

be important in shaping a political culture, for purposes of this research, I shall deal mainly with the four major influences described herein. First, I shall refer to the historical experience variables in an effort to find out how the Greek political culture was influenced and changed over time by civil wars, dictatorships, economic crises, etc.,etc. Second, I shall examine this culture in its totality and attempt to point out the differences in political orientations among the various classes or social groups. Here, it will be my intention to prove that some of these differences have been the product of what I shall call environmental and socio-economic conditions. Third, I shall look at some of the agents of political socialization, hoping to show how the political cul-ture of the nation is shaped and transmitted from one genera-tion to the next. Fourth, I shall present a portrait of the Greek political elites in history and the present time for the purpose of finding out the extent to which they have been or are integrated in their attitudes toward political life, the democratic institutions and the masses. Finally, based on the results of these chapters I shall provide various suggestions regarding the stability of the political system and the future of democracy in Greece.

Notes

[1] Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", *Journal of Politics*, 18 (1956), 396.

[2] Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government*, rev.ed. (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 32.

[3] L. Pye and S. Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

[4] Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 6-7.

[5] Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).

[6] G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 15.

[7] Ibid., pp. 17-19.

[8] Ibid., Figure 3, p. 22.

[9] Ibid., p. 23.

[10] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[11] Ibid., p. 25.

[12] Ibid., p. 32.

[13] Ibid., p. 32.

[14] Ibid., p. 481.

[15] Ibid., pp. 483-84.

[16] Rosenbaum, *Political Culture*, pp. 36-57.

[17] Ibid., p. 64.

[18] Ibid., p. 37.

[19] Ibid., pp. 43-47.

[20] Ibid., p. 45.

[21] Ibid., p. 46.

[22] Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 23.

[23] Richard Dawson and K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 27.

[24] The task of integrating old values with new ones is a very difficult one. This seems to be the problem with the parochial-participant cultures of emerging nations where old values resist the introduction of new ones. Almond and Verba suggested that there is still a hope to succeed in generating a new political culture: "The problems are to penetrate the parochial systems without destroying them on the output side, and to transform them into interest groups on the input side." (The Civic Culture, p. 26).

[25] Rosenbaum, Political Culture, p. 19.

[26] Ibid., p. 20.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE VARIABLES

This chapter is designed to point out some of the historical events which, I feel, had an important influence on the course of modern Greek politics. Although the roots of Greek political culture undoubtedly go back to the years of antiquity, it is in the beginning of the 19th century that certain events occurred which influenced the nature of this culture in a manner that set the foundation for subsequent cultural fragmentation and political instability. Therefore, the historical account will start with the years immediately before the Greek revolution of 1821.

The Setting for Fragmentation: 1800-1862

Signs of a Greek Renaissance and the possibility of a successful revolution leading to national independence were already on the horizon at the time of the outbreak of the Greek revolution (1821). By the end of the 18th century a number of forces had generated a tremendous economic and cultural revival of the Greek world. Following the Russo-Turkish treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Jassy (1792) through which the Greek merchants were allowed to fly the Russian flag on their ships, the Greek merchant marine succeeded in rising to first place in Black Sea commerce. Also, the Greek merchants had taken advantage of the situation that was created by the Anglo-French wars that followed the French Revolution. The British and the French had succeeded in destroying each other's merchant marine in the

Mediterranean leaving the Greeks with a golden opportunity to lay hands on the trade of the area. By 1813, the Greek merchant marine had increased to 615 ships totalling 153,580 tons, equipped with 5,878 cannons, and manned by 37,526 seamen.[1]

These commercial developments which also had their effect on Greek agriculture (by increasing the demand of such Greek products as wheat, silk, cotton, grain and oil) were mainly responsible for the appearance of a new middle class, both in Greece and in the mercantile communities abroad. Certain cities such as Vienna, Venice, Trieste, Odessa and Ioannina in Epirus became famous as economic and cultural centres. In these cities, a number of high quality Greek schools flourished. Between the middle of the 18th century and 1821, about two and a half thousand books were published in Greek, all of them abroad.[2] Ideas from the French Revolution and the European Enlightenment were now able to make a significant impact on the young minds of Greeks studying abroad.

The Greek Revolution was planned by a secret organization called <u>Philike Hetairia</u> (Society of Friends) which was founded in 1814 at Odessa by Greek merchants. **It first broke out in the** Danubian principalities in the spring of 1821. Ypsilantis, a former general of the Russian army led the revolution with his famous "Sacred Battalion" composed of young Greek patriots of the middle and upper classes. **But this revolt, which was fol-**lowed with the uprising of the Rumanian peasants, was doomed to failure. The anticipated Russian support did not come and the Turks succeeded in crushing the rebels. Less than a month

later the revolution broke out in Peloponnesos. On March the
25th (April 6th), in the monastery of Aghia Lavra, Bishop
Germanos raised the standard of the cross as a symbol of
revolt.[3]

The revolution that followed was by no means a unified
effort on the part of the Greeks who were deeply divided in
their attitudes and actions towards the cause. The traditional
elite comprised a number of various groups with divergent
interests: 1) The Peloponnesian notables or primates who
enjoyed an immense power, wealth and status in the Ottoman
empire. Heading local bodies of government, the primates con-
trolled the tax collection apparatus and owned most of the
Christian-held land. This Greek ruling class was often referred
to by other Greeks as the "uncircumsized Turks".[4] 2) The
Church establishment which had doctrinal authority over the
Christian peoples of the Ottoman empire, and was also the main
vehicle of Greek education. 3) The military chieftains of
Peloponnesos and Roumely (**klephts** and **armatoloi**). **The klephts**
were lawless men who lived on plunder. They represented oppo-
sition to authority and enjoyed the support of the common
peasants. The armatoloi differed from the klephts. They were
an official Christian militia that existed since the time of
the Byzantine empire. 4) The merchants of the Aegean Islands:
shipowners and capitalists, the wealthiest class in Greece.
5) **The Phanariots at Constantinople occupying high administra-**
tive positions in the Ottoman empire. They had risen to power
because of their European cultivation and their knowledge and

language. They occupied positions such as executive deputy of
the commander of the Ottoman navy, governor-general of the Ae-
gean Islands and prince of the Danubian principalities of Mol-
davia and Wallachia.[5]

All of the above groups differed in their attitudes towards
the revolution. Some of the primates and the high clergy were
opposed to it because they already enjoyed power, wealth and
status under Ottoman rule. This was also true for a number of
Phanariots. From the traditional elite, the klephts and the arma-
toloi for whom violence had become a way of life were most eager
in joining the revolution. Members of other groups such as pri-
mates, merchants, lower clergy, and Phanariots joined the revo-
lution with mixed feelings. For some the revolution was a chance
to win wealth and power while for others liberating their fellow
countrymen was a duty as well as a necessity.

The westernized Greeks conceived the Greek nation as a
community encompassing all Greek speaking Christians living with-
in its boundaries. These Greeks were drawn from the following
groups: 1) The mercantile elements, including those living in
commercial centres within the Ottoman empire as well as in other
European cities. 2) The Phanariots who were familiar with Euro-
pean institutions and 3) graduates of European universities,
usually sons of merchants and primates such as doctors, lawyers,
secretaries, writers and journalists.[6]

The war of independence was carried by the local elites[7]
not for the creation of a national state with a centralized
government, but rather with the intention of inheriting power

from the Ottomans, while maintaining the traditional system of unequal status, arbitrary rule of the powerful and affective and intensely personalistic social relations. Therefore, these elites, in their efforts to acquire greater local and regional power for themselves and their clients, did not only fight against the Turks but also against other competing elites. On the contrary, the westernized elite who entered the revolution had in mind the following four objectives: 1) the creation of a constitutional state in which a popular elected assembly would protect individual liberty and the public good guaranteed by a constitution; 2) the creation of a secular state, in which the Church would simply constitute one of several state institutions; 3) the creation of a legal-bureaucratic state in accordance with western law codes and administration; and 4) the creation of a state with a regular army, organized along western lines.[8]

With the exception of the first, all the other objectives encroached upon the established rights of the powerful local elites. The westernized Greeks found much opposition among these groups. An observer of the Greek scene, Emile Desages, gave a good description of the indigenous elites when he said that they are "alien to the doctrines and enemies of the forms that the demagogues of the new school would like to transport in a soil so little prepared to receive them ... Having overthrown the yoke of the Turk", Desages added,

> these men regard themselves as the latter's natural
> and legitimate successors. They also care little
> for a central authority, for a popular constitution
> and for legislative assemblies; or else, while
> admitting the need for a common tie and for a sort

> of general leadership, each would no less desire
> to remain absolute master within his district.
> Their aim in one word, is neither a republic, nor
> a monarchy, but an oligarchical confederation more
> consistent with their ways, their tastes and former
> life, and perhaps also with the needs and the
> degree of civilization of the clans which they
> would govern.[9]

From the beginning of the revolution, the traditional elite
fought to establish effective control over their districts and
direct the local struggles in their own ways.[10] In their
efforts to secure and solidify political power, the primates
fought against the various military chieftains who meanwhile had
gained the support of the peasants. The first proclamation of
the Peloponnesian Senate (an obedient organ of the primates)
that declared all former Turkish lands "national" caused
adverse reaction among the land-hungry peasants which in turn
resulted in a further alienation of the population from the
primates.[11] The **armatoloi** also were facing similar problems.
The revolution had brought about a disintegration of the Greek
society into its component parts. These parts were now bidding
for power, challenging the rule of the armatoloi in their
respective districts (**armatolikia**) and wanting to enjoy the
benefits of such a rule.

Taking advantage of the internal struggles of the tradi-
tional elites, the westernizers transformed the revolution from
a closed family affair of primates and chieftains into a
national one and directed it towards the main goal - the
establishment of a constitutional democratic state along western
lines. Having a cultural and ideological unity, the westerni-

zers had a tremendous impact upon the nature of the political culture. **Under their influence a participatory aspect was** introduced into political thought. The ideas of participation and democracy that the ancient Greeks had valued so much returned once again to the land of their origin. **The peasants** and pastoralists of Greece after many centuries of foreign subjugation were once again given a taste of the glory that Greece was. **With the addition of the participant feature the** political culture was more or less transformed into a parochial-participant one.

The first constitutions drafted under the direction of the westernizers were mostly borrowed from Europe and especially from revolutionary France. But as Kaltchas points out "the principles of representation and the methods of election ... did **not depart materially from indigenous custom."**[12] **The First** National Convention was composed of delegates of the Aegean Islands and the three sectional assemblies (Peloponnesos, Eastern Continental Greece, and Western Continental Greece) that had been elected "by the customary methods prevalent in each section under the Ottoman system of communal autonomy."[13] Taking into consideration the nature of the society and the particularisms of the various sections, the adaptation of a system of local government (communal autonomy) was to bring about a greater national unity. The revolution had succeeded in transforming the political culture, but not substantially enough. Institutions of local government inherited from the past would have to be combined with western imports in such a

manner as to avoid alienation of the traditional elite and the
population from the political system. Although introducing
many new features like the Bill of Rights and the idea of a
unitary state (a federal state might have been a better solu-
tion) the first constitutions remained quite close to the social
reality of the country. But true political independence and
stability were not ensured.

The westernizers gained the upper hand in the revolution
and succeeded in crushing the traditional elite in an ensuing
civil war, after they received some financial assistance from
one of the Great Powers, Britain. Using part of a British loan
to hire Rumeliot irregulars, the westernized faction defeated
the Peloponnesian primates and enjoyed "temporary but unques-
tionable supremacy and acceptance in the land".[14] The British
loan and the subsequent Act of Submission of July 18, 1825,[15]
though, by which Greece placed its liberty, national indepen-
dence and political existence under the absolute protection of
Great Britain, brought an end to all prospects for economic and
real political independence. The Third Constituent Convention
took place in the midst of great tension and anxiety. The
traditional elite (the Kolokotronis faction) was able to secure
the nomination of Kapodistrias as the Governor of Greece,[16]
while the westernizers obtained the Convention's assent to the
appointment of two Englishmen, Sir Richard Church and Alexander
Cochrane as Commanders of the Greek army and navy, respectively.

Britain and the other two powers, France and Russia that
had originally responded to the Greek uprising with marked

hostility got extensively involved in the Greek affairs when they signed the Treaty of London (6 July 1827) which recognized Greece as an autonomous state under Ottoman suzerainty. The Battle of Navarino that followed in which the united fleets of the Great Powers and Greece defeated the Turko-Egyptian one marked the beginning of a new era. The Greeks had to pay a high price for their liberation. Foreign domination became a reality. The London Conference (3 February 1830) issued a protocol by which an independent Greek state was established under the guarantee of the Three Powers. Decisions were taken by the Conference without consulting the Greeks.[17] An absolute monarchy with the Bavarian Prince Otho in the throne was installed in Greece by the Great Powers.

As a result of the chaotic conditions prevailing in revolutionary Greece, the arrival of the Bavarian Prince created a feeling of security and inspired great expectations among the people. General Makriyannis noted:

> Today our country ... for so long lost and wiped out, is born again and stands up once more. Today there stand upon their feet the veterans, the statesmen, the clergy and the soldiers, for our King has come, whom we have gained through the power of God. **Glory be to thine all good Name, Lord Almighty,** most merciful, most compassionate.[18]

The Bavarians were vested with unlimited power for the administration of a country that they knew very little about.[19] At the time of their arrival, Greece was a tiny state (30,000 square miles area) with a population of about 750,000.[20] The war of independence had already cost 185,000 lives. Everywhere there were ruins, burnt homes, orphans and disabled men. The

economy was badly hit with agriculture, shipping and trade having come to a standstill.[21] At the political level, things did not look promising either. The Great Powers had arbitrarily drawn the boundaries of the new state, leaving outside the country more than two and one half million Greeks under Ottoman or British (Ionian Islands) rule. The arbitrary decision was of great importance for the future of the young country for, as we shall see later, Greece was to suffer humiliating defeats in her efforts to realize the **Megale Idea** (Great Idea) - the aspiration to liberate from Ottoman rule all Greek inhabited territories. **The failure of the Kapodistrian government to meet** the needs of the Greek people[22] also created a number of problems. **His assassination was followed by the complete breakdown** of the administrative structure. "The year 1832 had been the most miserable of all the war; the Greeks had suffered more from the cruelty and rapine of their own countrymen than in all the Ottoman invasions, more even than they had endured at the hands of the armies of Ibrahim; and now, at the end of the year, the country was utterly exhausted ..."[23]

Another important feature of the political system of post-revolutionary Greece was the complete absence of modern political parties. The so-called political parties at the time were in fact loose conglomerations of factions, alliances of families "each with its own dependencies or clienteles" that would "place itself under the patronage of a single family (powerful by virtue of wealth, prestige, temporary possession of an important public post)."[24] Following the civil war (1832),

the existing parties were blamed by the public for the terrible
chaos and anarchy that such internal strife had produced. **The**
foreign monarchy was thus seen as the only solution.

Foreign domination was the main characteristic of the
Othonian period (1832-1862). The political parties retained
their foreign orientation ("English", "French", "Russian"
parties) and their traditional character (extended families
organized hierarchically into clienteles). Also, during this
period in matters of civil administration, in setting up a
judicial system and in dealing with educational affairs, the
Bavarians introduced mostly western models without even making
an attempt to adapt such models to the special needs and
conditions of the country.[25]

All these historical events centering around the struggle
for independence as well as the struggle for power in post-
revolutionary Greece had their impact upon Greek political
culture. **The revolution broke out in a society whose political**
culture was predominantly parochial and characterized by great
inequality of status, wealth and power, isolation, fragmentation,
factionalism and extreme insecurity. Social relations sprang
from a system of clientage based on extended kinship inherited
from the corporate tradition of the Ottoman empire.[26] **The**
impact of these events was such that this type of political
culture underwent a certain transformation. 1) Under the
influence of the westernized elite a <u>participant</u> feature was
introduced into this culture and western democratic institu-
tions were superimposed on a highly traditional society.

These institutions failed to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of
the parochial population and were temporarily suspended by
Kapodistrias and later by the absolute monarchy imposed by the
Great Powers. 2) The suspension of these institutions pro-
duced alienation among the participant elements of the
population and the westernized Greeks. In this way, the
political culture was changed into an alienated parochial-
participant one. 3) After the absolute monarchy of Otho
(1833-1844) the democratic institutions were reintroduced with
the 1844 and later the 1862 constitution but the desired result
of political stability did not come about. The political culture
had not changed significantly enough to be congruent with the
political system. In addition to this, by the 1860's, the
democratic institutions came to be manipulated by the tradi-
tional elite and they became "an arena for the satisfaction of
personal and local wants on the pattern of the clientage
system."[27]

The Road to Modernization:[28] 1863-1940

After the 1862 rebellion which resulted in the dethrone-
ment of King Otho, the Great Powers chose Prince William George
of Denmark as the new King of Greece. **Then as a gesture of
friendship,** the British-occupied Ionian Islands were handed to
Greece (1864). Also, by the end of the century, Greece
increased territorially with the addition of Thessaly and part
of Epirus (1881).

In the economic sphere, the modernization efforts of the

various Greek governments were basically successful, especially
in the latter part of the century. Between 1863 and 1909, road
mileage was multiplied tenfold, railway construction was under
way, ports suitable for large steamships and banks operating
with a modern credit system were opened. But the increase in
public expenditure due to the multiplication of public works
forced the Trikoupian governments to turn to extensive borrow-
ing of foreign capital (especially British). By 1914, the
Greek public debt had reached the level of 1.25 billion
francs.[29] In this way, Greece became more dependent on Western
Europe and especially Britain where most of the government loans
were obtained. Also, due partly to overwhelming population
increases,[30] certain changes in the lifestyle of the Greek
peasantry took place. The population increase forced the demand
for agricultural products to increase as well. The predominant-
ly pastoral economy was therefore changed to an agricultural one.
By the end of the century, a significant number of peasants
were producing primarily for the market in order to make profits
to pay and buy commodities such as coffee, tea, salt and sugar.
The traditional economy gave way to a money economy which
started affecting the pattern of village life. The increase in
the means of communication and transportation also, made
possible village contacts with the outside world.

> The peasant sensed that literacy was essential
> under the new order if he were to be able to deal
> with the townsmen. Hence, he readily accepted
> elementary schooling for his children whenever
> it was made available. Once reading and writing
> became common, new ideas and ethics, new tastes
> and ways of living, began to alter the age-old

peasant traditions. The younger generation was
soon questioning the assumptions and attitudes
upon which peasant life had been based. Age was
no longer regarded as sacrosanct. A new spirit
of individualism and a desire for self-advancement
and for personally owned possessions undermined the
solidarity of village life and even of the family.[31]

This willingness on the part of the peasant to accept
elementary schooling opened up a new world for him. He would
now get to know his nation, its history and its "constitution-
al" characteristics and form opinions about them. The process
of transformation from parochials to subjects which had started
in the first years of the revolution had now sped up. Greek
political culture was losing its traditional character to a
certain extent. **It was now composed of a mixture of parochials,**
subjects and participants. But with parochialism still being
predominant and participant political orientations at a very
low level, this type of culture was far from becoming a **civic**
culture.[32] **Fragmentation and alienation were still present.**
The western institutions of the country were operating in a
poor fashion. An outstanding example of this is the fraudulent
elections of 1874 conducted by the Prime Minister Dimitrios
Voulgaris which almost led the country to civil war.[33]

Due to the economic developments and the various reforms
of Prime Minister Trikoupis,[34] the social structure experienced
major changes as well. **A rise in the middle class (profes-)**
sionals, nouveau-riche merchants, bankers, bureaucrats and
technocrats) took place which in turn affected the political
structure of the country. The Trikoupian governments were
backed by the new industrial and financial bourgeoisie and the

measures taken by them favoured these classes rather than the peasantry. In this way, the majority of the population remained alienated from the political system.

Following the Cretan revolt against the Turks, Greece, despite economic depression and poor military preparations, declared war on Turkey (1897). **Greece suffered a humiliating** defeat and was forced to pay four million pounds indemnity to the Turks and also to accept an International Financial Commission of Control designed to collect certain specified taxes for the payment of such debt.[35] **After the defeat, worsening** economic conditions coupled with over-population led to a large scale emigration which had some serious repercussions on the economic and political system of the country. On the positive side, emigration made a substantial contribution in the relief of the problems of unemployment and of the balance of payments but, on the negative side, it drew from the ranks of the productively employed population.[36] **Due to emigration that continues** to the present day, Greece has been constantly deprived of a considerable amount of its most dynamic elements of the population. Such elements are the ones that a particular traditional society needs desperately if it is to modernize its political culture and its economic and political system.[37]

From the beginning of the 20th century and up until the Second World War, Greece went through a period marked by military dictatorships, constitutional revisions, referenda, expansionary wars and economic depressions. By 1909, when the Military League carried out a _coup d'etat_ and entrusted the

political leadership to Eleftherios Venizelos, the country was
in the midst of economic chaos. Heavy taxation on essential
goods and the currant trade crisis of 1898 had reduced large
masses of the workers, lower middle classes, and the agrarian
population to misery. The dissatisfaction of the people with
the various governments had become quite evident through the
demonstrations of the trade union workers and the peasant
revolts in Thessaly.[38] **The Venizelos government of the new**
Liberal Party that came out triumphant in the 1910 elections
proceeded with solving the economic problems of the country and
constructing a modern democratic state along western lines.[39]

. . Under the leadership of Venizelos, the reorganized Greek
army was victorious in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. After
the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) Greek territory was increased,
immensely through the acquisition of Crete, Epirus, most of
Macedonia (including Thessaloniki) and the Aegean Islands except
Imbros and Tenedos.[40] World War I found the political leader-
ship of Greece divided as to whose side the country should be
on. Believing in a final victory of the allies and hoping for
further territorial gains, Venizelos opted for an alliance with
Britain and France but the pro-German King Constantine was
against it. The dispute led to the resignation of Venizelos
who, encouraged by the allies, established a Provisional
Government in Thessaloniki in 1916. **King Constantine was**
finally obliged to abdicate in favour of his second son
Alexander (June 1917) and Venizelos returned to Athens in
triumph. At the end of the war, Greece was given Western and

Eastern Thrace and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and it
was also entrusted with the administration of Smyrna and a big
chunk of the Anatolian hinterland, through the Treaty of Sevres
(1920). **Following this treaty, Venizelos returned to Greece to**
find a country divided between royalists and republicans,
between supporters of a "small but honourable Greece" and those
of Venizelos proclaiming a "Greater Greece" spanning to two
continents and five seas. The November 14th, 1920 elections
surprisingly enough signalled the defeat of the Liberals.
Venizelos himself was unseated and only 120 Liberals were
returned to a house of 370 (although the Liberals received 52
percent (%) of the popular vote). King Constantine returned to
Greece through a subsequent plebiscite.

As soon as they obtained power, the royalists were faced
with the problem of enforcing the Treaty of Sevres. Unfortu-
nately, for Greece, they switched their own platform ("small
but honourable Greece") and chose to pursue the Liberals' policy
"apparently mesmerized, as Venizelos had been, by the vision of
a Greater Greece in the eastern Mediterranean".[41] Having no
support from the Great Powers, Greece launched an offensive war
against Turkey with the intention to make the dream of the
Megale Idea a reality. Despite initial gains, the Greeks
finally suffered what was to be probably the most humiliating
defeat in their history by the Turks under the leadership of
Mustapha Kemal (1922). Smyrna was set afire and thousands of
civilians and soldiers were slaughtered with their remnants
pursued into the sea. **Through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)**

that followed the disaster, Greece lost Eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, Smyrna and the Anatolian provinces. Cyprus, although promised at the beginning of World War I to Greece, was retained by Britain. The islands of the Dodecanese had a similar fate: they were retained by the Italians until 1947 at which time they were finally ceded to Greece. A separate clause of the Treaty provided for the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities. The population exchange involved some 400,000 Turks and 1,300,000 Greeks.

The population exchanges produced a great shock to the political and economic system. Northern Greece was greatly hellenized with the arrival of refugees and thus problems of minority populations in Greek territory were largely reduced. But at the same time, the urban population was largely augmented which in turn created problems of unemployment. The political culture of the country was also affected by this new situation. Some of the refugees who came from the cities of Asia Minor already had experience in local government and thus they had developed a high degree of political consciousness. Others who lived in remote areas were less politicized and more traditional. Modern along with traditional elements were therefore added to the Greek political culture. But, most important of all, the newcomers presented a challenge to the political system. Their demands for immediate solution of their needs for survival were of primary importance. Failure of the government to satisfy such demands in turn produced alienation

among the refugees. Poverty-stricken areas of refugees around the main cities became the breeding ground of leftist ideologies. Fragmentation of the political culture was thus furthered and feelings of hostility toward the political system and its actors increased tremendously.[42]

Another repercussion of the military disaster in Asia Minor was the new **coup** led by **General Nicholas Plastiras.** The Revolutionary Committee formed by him accused and found guilty of sacrificing military interests for party considerations 19. Ministers and Generals out of which 7 were put to death.[43] **The** military, unable to solve the economic problems of the country, asked Venizelos to form a government backed by all factions and groups. This was to be short-lived also. With the advice of Venizelos a plebiscite was held to decide the form of. government. The republicans won by a big margin and Greece was proclaimed a Republic (1924). In the years that followed up to World War II, Greece experienced one of the worst periods of economic and political instability. The Liberals of Venizelos who ruled Greece up until 1933 and the Populists of Tsaldaris that followed up to 1935 failed to solve the economic problems of the country. Their rule was interrupted a number of times by the military which launched a series of coups, the last of which was that of August 4th, 1936 by General Metaxas.

The Metaxas regime directed its attention in crushing the organized workers and the Communists by arresting and deporting labour leaders, dissolving most militant trade unions and ceasing their funds and finally by declaring general strikes

illegal. Metaxas made clear the nature of his regime[44] when he stated that:

> I took the minimum of power necessary to face the
> Communist danger, but I am not going to relinquish
> it until the country is cleared of Communism and
> the social order made unshakeable. The Greek press
> as well as all the Greeks will have to abide by
> rational discipline ... For the time being there
> is no question of new elections being held ... Those
> of you who in the past have belonged to parties are
> now under the obligation of forgetting them
> utterly; there are no more parties in Greece ,... The
> old parliamentary system has vanished forever ...[45]

Through its policies, the Metaxas dictatorship perpetuated the separation of the state from society by further alienating the politicized portion of the population. Feelings of hostility towards the government were found among the intellectuals, the politicians, the professional people, and the class-conscious workers led by the Communists.

Post World War II Greece

The outbreak of World War II signalled the end of the Metaxas regime. After holding the Italian offensive successfully for eight months, the Greek forces failed to resist a second attack by Germany. Due to a failure to coordinate the Greek and Yugoslav defense plans for the Balkans, to the limited military support received from the allies, to the betrayal of the country by certain Greek generals[46] and the German military superiority, Germany succeeded by 1941 to occupy the whole of Greek territory. In the years that followed until the liberation (fall 1944), the Greek population suffered the trials and exactions of enemy occupation and above

all the horror of hunger.[47]

In their struggle for survival, the Greeks turned their
attention to organizing an effective resistance against the
enemy. Among the many resistance organizations that sprang up
in Greece, during the occupation years, the Communist-controlled
National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon-
EAM) was the strongest one. It was originally created in
September of 1941 by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) in
collaboration with various smaller socialist and agrarian parties.
Having aims such as the national liberation and the establish-
ment of a new democratic regime at the end of the war, EAM
succeeded by 1944 in becoming a truly national organization in
its composition. Despite the fact that the Communists were the
leading force of EAM, Communism as such was never seen as an
immediate aim. The policies stated by EAM were actually no
different from such other nationalist bands as the Greek
National Democratic League (EDES). The main difference was that
EAM through its National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), carried
out a higher number of coordinated attacks and sabotage
operations against the enemy than any other group. Also, EAM,
more than any other organization, succeeded in mobilizing the
peasants and transforming parochialism into a whole-hearted
participation in the common struggle. Colonel Woodhouse, who
was sent to Greece with the purpose of breaking EAM politically,
described the situation in the following manner:

> Having acquired control of almost the whole country,
> except the principal communications used by the
> Germans, they had given it things that it had never

known before. Communication in the mountains, by
wireless courier and telephone, have never been so
good before or since; even motor roads were mended
and used by EAM-ELAS ... The benefits of civiliza-
tion and culture trickled into the mountains for
the first time. Schools, local government, law
courts and public utilities, which the war had
ended, worked again. Theatres, factories, parlia-
mentary assemblies, began for the first time. Commu-
nal life was organized in place of the traditional
individualism of the Greek peasant. His child was
dragooned into the EPON (youth body), his nest-egg
levied into EA (relief work), his caique commandeered
to equip ELAN (EAM's naval army) ... Followed at a
distance by the minor organizations, the EAM/ELAS
set the base in the creation of something that
the Governments of Greece had neglected: an
organized State in the Greek mountains.[48]

Through all these measures taken by EAM, the peasantry

awoke to a new political consciousness. For the first time in

modern Greek history, truly democratic principles were im-

planted in the rural areas. For the first time, democracy

meant for the peasants something more than a vote in general

elections. The peasantry was in this way politically

modernized.[49] Unfortunately, after liberation, through the

intervention of the British the progressive forces of EAM were

prevented from building a truly democratic society. Britain

intervened to tilt the balance in favour of the nationalist

groups and the collaborators of the Germans who had been fight-

ing against EAM for political supremacy since 1943.

The British originally supported the policies of EAM and

were fully satisfied with the guerrilla warfare conducted by

ELAS. But later on they switched their policies for the follow-

ing reasons: 1) British investments in Greece, 2) Greece's

strategic position in the Mediterranean and 3) British fears

than an EAM government would not cooperate fully with them.
The willingness of Britain to maintain her political supremacy
in the Mediterranean and her influence over the direction of
Greek politics was epitomized with the secret arrangement that
Churchill made with Stalin in the fall of 1944 regarding who
would take the lead in Greece.[50] **Churchill did not hesitate to**
use troops to crush the ELAS army and even to support the
various nationalist bands such as the hated "Security Batta-
lions" (collaborators of the Germans) and the EDES of Zervas.
Before the civil war begun, Churchill had decided to restore
King George to the throne with EDES being used to achieve such
restoration.[51]

The Cairo mission composed of representatives of the
resistance groups failed to come to an agreement regarding the
return of the king and the formation of a national unity govern-
ment. **Two months after the failure of the Cairo mission on**
October 9th, 1943, ELAS attacked EDES in the Greek mountains.
General Saraphis of ELAS explained that the attack was ordered
because of a long series of provocations by the EDES and because
of their collaborationist activities in Epirus as well as in
Athens.[52] Meanwhile, the British under the leadership of
Colonel Woodhouse (who had replaced Myers) gave their full sup-
port to EDES. **ELAS was now fighting on two fronts: against the**
Germans and against EDES and the other collaborationists. The
peace settlement that was reached on the Plaka Bridge on
February 15, 1944, did not settle any political issues. EAM had
proposed that steps be taken to form a national unity govern-

ment. After failing in that, EAM set up its five man
Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) in March 1944
"to administer the territory liberated by ELAS and to press for
the formation of a broader and more representative govern-
ment,"[53] **Failure of the Tsouderos government-in-exile to**
cooperate with PEEA in the struggle for the liberation of the
country and the formation of a national unity government led to
a mutiny involving the Greek Navy and the First Brigade of the
army in Alexandria. **The British intervened and put an end to**
the mutiny and they sent ten to twelve thousand rebels to
concentration camps in Egypt, Libya and East Africa.

The Cairo mutiny led to the Lebanon Conference at which
representatives of the Cairo government, of the political
parties in Greece, and of the three resistance organizations
(EAM, EDES and EKKA) met to decide on the cessation of the civil
war and the formation of a national unity government (May 17,
1944). **Despite the animosity shown by Papandreou (who had**
replaced Tsouderos with Churchill's initiative) towards the
EAM,[54] an agreement was finally reached to form a government of
national unity.

This new government led by Papandreou did not work towards
the goal of national unity. As soon as it was made obvious to
Papandreou that the EAM/ELAS controlled most of Greece, he
decided to ask the help of the British forces to alter the
political situation. So, through the Caserta Agreement, all
guerrilla forces were put under the orders of the British
General Scobie.[55] **On December 1st, 1944, General Scobie ordered**

the dissolution of all guerrilla forces, which led to the
resignation of the six leftist cabinet ministers. EAM had
agreed "to demobilize the ELAS, on the condition, however, that
the other armed volunteer forces, EDES, the Mountain Brigade,
the Sacred Battalion and the Army formations in the Middle East
be dissolved **also.**"[56] They even went as far as to suggest a
mixed national corps which would comprise all armed forces.
The Papandreou government refused the EAM proposal and decided
to retain the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion[57] while
maintaining their position on the disbandment of the other
guerrilla groups. **Following the breakup of the negotiations,**
the Central Committee of EAM decided to hold "an all-people's"
meeting at Constitution Square on December 3rd, 1944 in order to
explain to the public what was happening. A general strike was
also to be organized for Monday, December 4th. The peaceful
demonstration turned out to be a bloody one with the police
firing at the crowd killing twenty demonstrators and injuring
140.[58] **The next day's unanimous general strike showed EAM's**
popular strength:

> In Athens, the people took to the streets in the
> early morning and converged on Constitution Square.
> Hundreds of thousands of Athenians invaded the
> centre of their city. **There was not a single British**
> uniform to be seen. The coffins of the previous
> day's victims arrived, carried on the shoulders of
> demonstrators. The partisans' Funeral March swelled
> from the crowd, echoed and multiplied in all the
> neighbouring streets, loud, grave and menacing.
> When it ended, between four and five hundred thou-
> sand people knelt together, solemnly, and observed
> several seconds' silence. It seemed to last
> forever, a solid silence pressing against the walls
> of the Hotel Great Britain, dense as stone, stifling.[59]

But even this demonstration had its victims: "As the unarmed
people were returning from the funeral, a new murderous attack
was opened against them by the gendarmes, the men of the
Security Battalions, the followers of EDES and of the monarcho-
fascists of the "X" organization."[60] After this Papandreou
decided to resign and Sophoulis was asked to form a new govern-
ment. At that time, Churchill intervened once more in the
internal affairs of Greece.[61] **Through the British Ambassador**
he informed Sophoulis that a new government was out of the ques-
tion and that Papandreou was to remain in his post. **General**
Scobie was also ordered to proceed immediately to a final
confrontation with EAM and "act as if (he) were in a conquered
city where a local rebellion (was) in progress".[62]

The new situation found the EAM leadership divided on what
policy to follow and on how extensive the fighting should be.
Obviously, they were not prepared to seize power through an
armed rebellion for otherwise they would have considered doing
that back in September and early October (1944) when they con-
trolled most of the country. **So despite initial gains, EAM/ELAS**
lost the war in Athens in the hands of the British and the col-
laborators. Finally, an armistice was signed with the British
appointing Plastiras to the premiership and Archbishop
Damaskinos to the Regency.[63]

The Varkiza Agreement did not bring an end to hostilities
and political instability. A systematic persecution of the
communist press, mass arrests of democratic citizens, and
terrorism in the countryside by armed gangs of extreme

rightists and war collaborators (appearing after the demobilization of ELAS) were amplified every day. The government that came out from the 1946 elections (in which most of the progressive and left wing forces abstained) failed to solve the pressing problems of the country. The king returned (after a phony plebiscite) to a country torn by civil strife in the midst of economic chaos. Faced with persecution the communists had resorted to open rebellion and their bands were getting stronger and stronger every day. But once again they were prevented from seizing power due in part to the intervention of an outside force. This time it was the United States.

Great Britain had already announced (February 1947) that she was unable to continue to assist Greece and that she would have to withdraw her troops from that country. This meant that the government of the Right was now left without the military and economic support that it badly needed to preserve its position. At this critical moment the United States entered the picture through the Truman Doctrine, prepared to "contain" any left-wing threat by force, if necessary. So, when the Greek regular army failed to put an end to the Communist guerrilla activities, the U.S. Military Mission assumed the strategic leadership of the Joint U.S. - Greek Staff. **The regular army** was enlarged and supplied with modern weapons, artillery, napalm bombs, tanks and air crafts. As a result of this, and due to the fact that the Communists failed to receive any support from the Soviet **Union,**[64] they were beaten and the civil war ended with the Communist Party announcing its decision to cease fire on

October 16th, 1949.

As we have seen, back in the 1820's, the modernizers, in
order to secure their position of power and implement their
programmes, had invited British capital into Greece and they
also went·as far as signing the Act of Submission which brought
death to the political and economic independence of the
country.[65] History repeated itself during the civil war of the
1940's. The establishment of the Right, in order to preserve
its position, also asked the support of Britain and later the
United States. But the latter time dependence was to be
slightly different. The money channelled into Greece for recon-
struction and economic development (e.g. through the Marshall
Plan) had the following consequences:

> Through bargaining over the amount and the use of
> the money given, the USA had a stronger hold over
> Greek governments than Britain had ever managed to
> get. An implied threat to stop, reduce or even
> postpone the aid was enough to make Greek ministers
> fall flat on their faces. This goes far to explain
> the ease with which the USA could impose governments,
> policies and personalities even after the civil war
> was over. This was a change from the past. British
> influence had been based on an elaborate and care-
> fully developed system of 'agents' - either paid or,
> more often, unpaid - who possessed or acquired key
> positions in the decision-making processes of Greece.
> Under normal circumstances, British intervention
> was never blatant or explicit, since it was chan-
> nelled through diplomatic and 'covered' activities.
> American influence, on the contrary, soon became a
> recognized institution.[66]

In the years that followed the civil war, the Greek govern-
ments under American direction worked towards reconstruction and
development and above all towards the permanent exclusion of
Communism from the political arena. Their external policy

highlights included: the induction of Greece into NATO (1952),
a failure to bring forth a union with Cyprus which became
independent (1960), and a formal association with the European
Common Market (1962).

The National Radical Union (ERE) under the leadership of
Karamanlis who succeeded Field-Marshall Papagos (1955),[67] ruled
the country until 1963. In the economic sphere the government
of the Right succeeded in changing the face of Greek economy by
devaluating the currency, tripling public investment expendi-
ture, and encouraging production of agricultural goods.
Between 1952 and 1962, the GNP grew by an average of 7 percent
(%) annually in constant prices. Due to the rapid economic
growth that the country experienced in the late 50's and early
60's, Greek social structure was transformed with the emergence
of new professional groups of technicians, executives, admini-
strators and intellectuals. An important feature of this period
though, is the fact that the economic benefits went mostly to
the commercial classes. The government failed to improve the
economic position of the working people, the number of which was
tremendously augmented due to a major increase of urban popula-
tion. Unemployment remained in high levels although it was
partly relieved by a large scale emigration abroad. At the same
time, the position of the peasants was also altered. The
countryside was opened through the building of roads. Patterns
of life of industrial society shattered the traditional peasant
world. Modern values and ideas in many cases replaced or
existed right along with traditional ones.

Despite its efforts, the government failed to modernize agriculture and to do away with the system of exploitation that was based on the wholesalers paying miserly prices to the producers. This system of exploitation drove a number of peasants to towns to find work to improve their livelihood. Urban emigration in turn produced further unemployment. The new emigrants were thus transformed from poor peasants to alienated, unemployed workers.

In the political sphere, the government of ERE succeeded through a number of measures in maintaining an apparent stability. These measures included: the use of favourable electoral systems, fraudulent elections, psychological coersion of the peasants by right wing bands and the National Defense Battalions (TEA), control of the trade union movement, control of the army, and winning the support of the Palace. In a few words, through the use of favourable electoral systems, the Right won three subsequent elections (1952, 1956, 1958) and formed majority governments while its popular vote remained below the 50 percent (%) level. The 1961 elections were considered by the opposition parties as fraudulent. In addition to the complicated systems introduced in these elections, systematic oppression of the peasantry by the TEA and the police was reported. The oppression of the workers was also made possible through a mechanism by which the government controlled the trade union movement. The system of trade union representation was organized in such a manner that radical labour leaders had very little chance of success. Strike demonstrations were most of the time

repressed by the police. The Right during this period also
took control of the army which was used to fight "the internal
enemy" (communists) and intervene in favour of the establish-
ment when necessary (e.g. the intervention in the 1961 elect-
ions).[68] **The Palace also supported in various ways the**
government of the Right. Karamanlis, himself, had risen to his
post partly by royal favour. **The fall of the ERE government**
was finally due to a certain extent to a change in the policy
of the Palace. Karamanlis had become increasingly independent
and was unwilling to accept orders from the court. So,
according to one source,[69] the resignation of Karamanlis came
as a result of the pressure put forth by King Paul.

The ascendance of the Centre Union (EK) to power in 1963
was due to a number of factors. The government of ERE had been
under attack by Papandreou's EK since the fraudulent elections
of 1961. ERE had failed to control the growing income inequali-
ties and they were not willing to propose any income redistribu-
tion. This was partly due to their association with business.
Papandreou through his _Anendotos_ (Unyielding Fight) was every
day exposing to the Greek people the underlying structure of
political power. Having the unrivalled ability to talk to the
masses, Papandreou was advocating a programme of social justice
with emphasis on old-age pensions for the peasants, free
medical service and above all free education for their children.
By 1963, discontent of the people with the government had
increased greatly as it was shown by the various rallies and
strikes taking place all over the country. The final blow to

the ERE government was given in May 1963 when Grigorios Lambrakis, a popular deputy of the United Democratic Left (EDA) was killed by a motorcycle while speaking at a meeting of the local Peace Committee in Salonica. **It was soon proved that the** event was an actual assassination committed by members of an extremist right wing military organization in collaboration with the police. **In this way, with the popularity of ERE** decreasing, the EK party went into the election campaign with more confidence.

Meanwhile, American policy towards the ERE government had also switched. The Americans had by now become aware of the growing political consciousness and militancy on the part of the Greek population. **The polarization of the political forces had** to be stopped if American interests were to be protected. The Centre Union seemed to provide the answer to their problem. By supporting it they would prevent polarization. Their intention was to cut down the strength of the ERE while increasing that of the Centre Union. What they expected from the elections of 1963 was an ERE minority government with the support of at least part of the Centre Union. **This was also the wish of the king for he** did not want Papandreou to form a government, because he was afraid that Papandreou might try to curtail his powers. **After** all, Papandreou had made it obvious during his Anendotos that a **king was only to reign and that the people were to rule. There-** fore, both the king and the Americans favoured a limited victory of the Centre Union, hoping that such change would "contribute to the relaxation of political tensions."[70]

The elections of 1963, surprisingly enough, brought the party of EK to power. Papandreou, despite the fact that he did not gain an absolute majority in the elections, succeeded in getting a vote of confidence from the parliament with the support of EDA. **But refusing to depend on EDA support,** Papandreou finally resigned and asked the king to appoint a caretaker government to conduct new elections. The 1964 elections returned the Centre Union Party to power, this time with a comfortable majority.

In the short period of time that the EK party was in power (1963-1965), some important changes were introduced in the Greek economy. "A major effort was made to redistribute income: agricultural subsidies and support prices were increased, minimum wages rose, and the result was a considerable rise in the incomes of both peasants and workers."[71] **But the** economic policies pursued by the government did not hurt the Greek bourgeoisie either. Fiscal and tariff privileges were maintained and profits increased considerably. **Efforts of the** left-wing of the party (dominated then by the son of George Papandreou, Andreas) for more vigorous reforms did not materialize. Despite the changes introduced, the government remained basically conservative in its policies.

In the first year in power, the Papandreou government was also faced with a severe crisis: a renewed outbreak of violence in Cyprus. In 1959, Cyprus had become independent. But unfortunately its constitution was designed in such a manner as to encourage the separation of the two communities.

(Greek and Turkish). According to Greek observers, the
Turkish community despite being a minority, frustrated all
administration through their Vice President who had the right to
veto any decisions made by the Greek President of the Republic.
So, when Makarios decided to amend the constitution unilaterally,
communal violence broke out. **The action taken by Makarios was**
seen by the Turkish minority as the first step towards <u>enosis</u>
(union) with Greece. The Turkish air force, claiming that they
were protecting the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community,
got involved in the fighting and bombed Greek positions in the
north of the island. Greece threatened to pull its forces out
of NATO and the crisis was halted temporarily with the establish-
ment of a UN peace-keeping force on the island. **Papandreou**
meanwhile refused any compromise that would exclude the
possibility of e<u>nosis</u> and insisted that the solution should be
decided by the UN.[72]

With the Cyprus crisis still unresolved, Papandreou sought
to replace senior officers of the army, believing that they
were responsible for the army intervention in the 1961 elect-
ion.[73] The Right responded with the ASPIDA conspiracy according
to which left-wing officers were planning to take over the army.
Papandreou proceeded to dismiss the Minister of Defense
Garoufalias who refused to resign without a writ from the king.
The king refused to issue such writ on the argument that the
Prime Minister was not being objective with the ASPIDA inves-
tigations since Papandreou's own son Andreas was allegedly
involved in the conspiracy. The Prime Minister threatened to

resign and King Constantine accepted the threat as a fact and
swore in as Prime Minister - designate Athanasiadis-Novas.
This manoeuvre on the part of the king marked the end of
democracy and the beginning of chaos and political instability.[74]
Between July 1965 and April 21st, 1967, when the colonels took
over, five premiers had been sworn in and five governments had
fallen.

It was early morning of April 21, 1967 when the military
seized power with the official justification "to save the
nation from communism". **The king had already dissolved parlia-**
ment and the caretaker government of Kanellopoulos was to carry
out general elections on May 28th, 1967. Meanwhile, the
militancy of the masses had reached its peak and a victory of
the Centre Union Party that was to start its campaign on April
23rd, in Salonica seemed iminent. The possibility of such
victory along with anticipated riots in the Salonica rally were
two of the reasons that forced the colonels to act quickly.
Without consulting the General Staff or the king,[75] the trio of
colonels (colonels George Papadopoulos and Nicholas Makarezos
and Brigadier Stylianos Patakos) with the support of other
officers put the coup into operation. By using the king's name
the colonels originally succeeded in receiving the necessary
support from the various military officers. The king was
forced later to sponsor the coup after he was faced with a fait
accompli.

The initial steps taken by the military junta included the
arrests of the political leaders and thousands of alleged

communists and key members of political organizations on the
very first day. Various articles of the constitution were
suspended and martial law was proclaimed. What followed was
censorship of the press, of antiquity plays and all modern
theatrical plays. The music of Russian composers and Greek
leftist composers (such as Theodorakis) was also banned. In a
few words all the measures that the colonels took were remini-
scent of the fascist-type dictatorships of Mussolini and
Metaxas.

Some of the highlights of the junta's seven year rule
included: the failure of a royal counter-coup on December 13,
1967 with the king leaving Greece; the formulation of a new
constitution in 1968 that was to curtail partly the powers of
the king; the proclamation of a Republic in 1973 and the assump-
tion of the Presidency by dictator Papadopoulos following the
failure of a mini-coup by the pro-royal navy; the ratification
of a new republican constitution through the July 29th, 1973
referendum; the ousting of dictator Papadopoulos through a new
coup from within the junta in November 1973. (It followed the
student demonstrations of the Polytechnic School and of the
University of Athens which the army stopped by the use of force
and the killing of a number of students); and finally the
collapse of the military junta in July 1974 with the outbreak
of a new Cyprus crisis that led to the invasion of the island
by Turkey.

Since that time, a significant stability seems to be
present. New political parties have developed (most of which

came out of the pre-1967 political parties) and democratic
elections have taken place twice (1974, 1977). The govern-
ment at the moment is in the hands of Mr. Karamanlis, leader
of the New Democracy Party that won both elections. A new
constitution has come to light (1975) which defines the form of
government as that of parliamentary democracy. Democracy at
last may have a chance to survive in the country of its birth,
provided that unfavourable pressures of internal or external
nature remain relatively absent.

Post World War II developments seem to have altered the
nature of Greek political culture. As we have seen, in the
1940's under the leadership of EAM, a number of peasants
acquired a considerable degree of political consciousness and
for the first time they started participating in politics. The
traditional individualism of the Greek peasant gave way to
communal organization. Modern democratic institutions were set
up in remote regions and democracy became operative in the Greek
mountains. But unfortunately, the civil war destroyed all this.
The right-wing forces with the help of the British first, and
the Americans later, put a halt to this process of political
modernization. After the defeat of the left-wing forces, the
peasantry returned to their pre-war passivity and assumed their
traditional roles while the intellectuals became alienated and
frustrated with the order of things.

Children that were brought up during World War II and the
civil war became victims of their environment. Their basic
political beliefs were affected by the memories of political

violence, propaganda and deceit. They were frequently suspicious of their neighbours, of their fellow-citizens and above all suspicious of the competence of their political leaders. Some developed a militant character and became particularly receptive to such extremist ideologies as fascism or anarchism. But above all, the children of the 40's became the adults of the 60's, the members of **political organizations and radical movements**, the organizers **of strikes and demonstrations, the lead-**ers in the battle for democratization and social justice. The military dictatorship brought only a cease-fire to this battle and not an end to the war. During the years of political suppression, the left-wing forces continued underground to grow stronger and stronger every day. The return of civilian rule in 1974 signalled the beginning of new struggles. **Once again,** new demands were made to the political system. The maintenance of political stability in Greece will, up to a certain extent, depend on how successful the present government will be in satisfying such growing demands.

Summary

This chapter was intended to provide the reader with an account of the historical events that exerted a significant degree of influence over the direction of Greek political culture and over the operation of the political institutions in that country. The introduction of western democratic institutions into a highly traditional society in the 1820's marked the beginning of what was to be a long era of political

instability, parochialism and fragmentation. Efforts of the
modernizers to establish a democratic state along western lines,
to reconstruct the Greek countryside and economy already ruined
by the long years of the revolutionary war and to secure Greek
independence led to the intervention of the Great Powers into
the economic and political affairs of the new-born state.
Independence from Turkey meant economic and consequently poli-
tical dependence on Great Britain and the other European
countries.

Lacking the necessary economic resources and political
competence, the first governments of Greece were unable to work
within a democratic framework and failed to acquire legitimacy
in the eyes of the parochial population. By the 1860's the
traditional elite had taken control of the modern institutions
and the traditional system of clientage and favouritism had
penetrated all spheres of public life. The process of moderni-
zation was thus slowed down considerably. It was not until the
beginning of the new century that Greece started acquiring some
of the features of a modern bourgeois state. But expansion of
territory, wars, defeat and population increases by the 1920's
produced a further shock to the political system. Economic
depression in the late 1920's and the early 1930's coupled with a
current of political unrest highlighted the mid-war period.

In the post World War II years, the Greek political culture
was further transformed. Under the influence of the civil war
of the 1940's, the British and American interference in the
internal scene, the economic crisis of the early 1960's and the

1967 military dictatorship, it became more fragmented. Aliena-
ted and non-participant political orientations flourished during
this period.

    It will be the object of the next chapter to attempt to
find out more about the various components of this fragmented
political culture and the extent to which existing political
orientations are influenced by environmental and socio-economic
factors.

Notes

[1] L.S. Stavrianos, _The Balkans Since 1453_ (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 275.

[2] C.M. Woodhouse, _A Short History of Modern Greece_ (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), p. 275.

[3] This is the legendary explanation of how the revolution started. Some writers say that Bishop Germanos was forced to declare revolution by other revolutionary leaders. In actuality, the revolution had broken out in various parts of Peloponnesos before the aforementioned historical date. See George Finlay, _History of the Greek Revolution_ (London: Zeno Booksellers and Publishers, 1971), I, pp. 145-50. For an explanation of certain events see also Th. Kolokotronis, _Memoirs from the Greek War of Independence 1821-1833_ (Chicago: Argonaut Publishers, 1969), pp. 129-189.

[4] Stavrianos, _Balkans_, p. 280.

[5] John Anthony Petropulos, _Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843_ (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 26.

[6] _Ibid._, p. 38.

[7] There are a number of theories regarding the nature of the Greek revolution, and the roles that the various elites and peasantry played in it. Kordatos, for instance, emphasizes the roles of the westernized elite (the Greek bourgeoisie) while Vassilis Philias after recognizing the role of the westernized elite in mobilizing the peasants in the initial stages of the revolution, argues that ultimately it was the local elites who controlled the revolt. See, John Kordatos, _Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (History of Modern Greece)_, 5 vols. (Athens: Aion Publishing House, 1958). V.I. Philias, _Koinonia kai Exousia sten Hellada. I. He Notha Astikopoiese (Society and Power in Greece. I. The Fraudulent Embourgeoisement)_ (Athens: Synchrona Keimena, 1974).

[8] Petropulos, _Politics_, p. 41.

[9] Emile Désages quoted in Paraskevas Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Political Modernization, Social Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the Modern Greek State: 1821-1828". (An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1972), p. 155.

[10] See for instance, Kolokotronis, _Memoirs_, pp. 129-309.

[11] Diamandouros, "Political Modernization", p. 150.

[12] Nicholas Kaltchas, _Introduction to the Constitutional History of Modern Greece_ (New York: AMS Press, 1965), p. 53.

[13] _Ibid._, p. 53. Also for a description of the system of communal autonomy under Ottoman rule see Kaltchas pp. 27-29 and Sir Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, _Islamic Society and the West_ (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), Vol. I, Part I, pp. 209-16.

[14] Diamandouros, "Political Modernization", p. 228.

[15] The decision regarding the Act of Submission was taken by the Third Constituent Convention despite strong objection by a number of Greek patriots. Due to such objection, the Minister of Justice Ioannis Theotokis was in prison while D. Ypsilantis lost his Greek citizenship and his military post. See G.D. Katsoules, _To Katesteneno sten Neoellenike Historia_ (The Establishment in Modern Greek History) (Athens: Nea Synora, 1975), pp. 85-92.

[16] After becoming governor Kapodistrias suspended the constitution that the Third Constituent Convention approved in May 1827 at Troezina. See George Kousoulas, _Greece: Uncertain Democracy_ (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs, 1973), pp. 51-53.

[17] Petropulos, _Politics_, p. 48.

[18] H.A. Lidderdale, ed., _General Makriyannis: Memoirs_ (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 149.

[19] The ignorance of the Bavarians about Greece is certified by Maurer's (one of the regents) own words. Maurer informed the world in one of his works that Greece produces dates, sugar and coffee. See Finlay, _History_, II, p. 135.

[20] National Statistical Service of Greece, _Concise Statistical Yearbook of Greece_ (Athens: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 8.

[21] Andreas Ioannou Psomas, "The Nation, the State and the International System: The Case of Modern Greece", (An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1974), p. 70.

[22] For the Kapodistrian period, see Petropulos, _Politics_, pp. 107-24.

[23] W. Alison Philips, _The War of Greek Independence 1821 to 1833_ (New York, 1897), p. 394, quoted in Petropulos, _ibid._, p. 147.

[24] Petropulos, _ibid._, pp. 61-62.

[25] Psomas, "The Nation", pp. 102-18.

[26] For more information on the clientage system see Chapter III.

[27] Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 57.

[28] Modernization is defined by C.E. Black as "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution". Black also argues that modernization also involves "a worldwide transformation affecting all human relationships". See C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 7.

[29] Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 419.

[30] From 1829 to 1912 the Greek population increased from 750,000 to 2.75 million. Considering the fact that the area of Greece grew only from 18,346 to 24,558 square miles, the population per square mile jumped from 41 to 114. Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 420.

[31] Ibid., p. 422.

[32] See for instance Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 31-32 for definition.

[33] Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis, 1875-1878 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975), pp. 28-29.

[34] For the military and economic policies of Trikoupis, see Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770-1923 (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1972), pp. 145-48.

[35] Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 473.

[36] For economic effects of emigration, see Xenophon Zolotas, International Labor Migration and Economic Development with Special Reference to Greece (Athens: Bank of Greece, 1966), pp. 13-14.

[37] Psomas, "The Nation", pp. 282-325 for the effects of emigration on Greece.

[38] Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 29.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Actually the decision on the Aegean Islands was taken by the London Conference of February 13, 1914 through which Greece was to withdraw its troops from Albania (that was made independent through another Conference in 1912) in exchange for the Aegean Islands. But Turkey disputed such decision and the case remained open until World War I.

[41] Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 587.

[42] A similar idea regarding the shock that the arrival of the refugees produced on the political system is expressed in Legg, Politics, pp. 59-60. See also D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

[43] Those put to death were Generals Stratos and Hadjianestis, Admiral Goudas, and Ministers Gounaris, Theotokis, Protopapadakis, and Blatozzi. See The Times (London), September 28, 1922, p. 10.

[44] Regarding the philosophical justification of his regime, and its official ideology, Metaxas gave a number of speeches. Also, through his Minister of Press and Propaganda, Nikoloudis, the regime published an official ideology according to which Greece had experienced only three periods of greatness all of which were under authoritarian regimes. The third period was that of Metaxas! See Katsoules, Katestemeno, pp. 309-312.

[45] Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 672.

[46] General Tsolakoglou, who later became the first quisling Premier of Greece is an outstanding example of high treason. After disregarding instructions from the Koryzis government Tsolakoglou concluded an armistice with the Germans. With part of the Greek army surrendering, it became impossible for the remaining Anglo-Greek forces to resist the German attack successfully.

[47] Due to the hunger in the winter of 1941-42, almost 300,000 people died.

[48] C.M. Woodhouse, The Apple of Discord (London and New York, 1948), pp. 146-47.

[49] Samuel Huntington says that "political modernization involves the extension of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics". See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 266.

[50] According to the arrangement, Britain in accord with the United States was to have 90% influence over Greece. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), VI, p. 227.

[51] See for instance, L.S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), pp. 98-102.

[52] S. Saraphis, Ho ELAS (The ELAS) (Athens, 1946), pp. 169-78.

[53] Stavrianos, Greece, p. 105. See, also Chapter 3 of his for the policies of PEEA in Free Greece.

[54] See for example what Komnenos Pyromaglou a representative of EDES had to say in his book, He Ethnike Antistasis (The National Resistance) (Athens, 1947), p. 116.

[55] This agreement was signed by General Saraphis of ELAS under the impression that General Scobie's orders would involve only military operations against the Germans. See National Liberation Front, White Book: May 1944-March 1945 (New York: Greek American Council, 1945), Documents 6, 7.

[56] Ibid., Document 54.

[57] A number of men of these forces were at one time collaborators of the Germans. The government had violated both the Lebanon and the Caserta Agreements by not carrying out a systematic arrest of collaborators and war criminals. For more information see, Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece 1943-1949 (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 175-89.

[58] See W. Byford-Jones, The Greek Trilogy (London, 1946), pp. 138-40, for a vivid description of the incident.

[59] Eudes, Kapetanios, p. 191.

[60] EAM White Book, Document 57.

[61] Churchill's own justification shows that he was not aware of the actual facts. The Communists are portrayed as murderers: "On learning that the Communists had already captured all the police stations in Athens, murdering the bulk of their occupants not already pledged to their attack ... I ordered General Scobie ... to intervene and fire upon the treacherous aggressors ... The mob violence by which the Communists as the Government demanded by the Greek people could only be met by firearms ." Churchill, Second World War, VI, p. 288.

[62] Ibid., p. 289.

[63] For the full text of the armistice and the events that followed it see EAM White Book, Documents 87, 88, 89.

[64] Stalin had made it obvious in a conversation with Djilas that he was not prepared to assist the Greek Communists: "No they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think that Great Britain and the United States - the United States - the most powerful state in the world - will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea? Nonsense, and we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped and as quickly as possible." Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962) pp. 181-82.

[65] For the role of foreign intervention in Greek politics see T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropulos and H.J. Psomiades, eds., Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: A Historical Perspective (New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976).

[66] Tsoucalas, Greek Tragedy, p. 106. For more information, see Elias Thermos, "Conflict and Prospects in Greek Politics", East European Quarterly, 8, No. 2 (June 1974), 206.

[67] According to one source both Papagos and Karamanlis rose to power through the support of the U.S. See Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 94.

[68] See for instance James Brown "The Military in Politics: A Case Study of Greece" (A Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York, Buffalo, 1971), pp. 88-93 for the role of the military whose "main purpose was to protect the nation from Communism both from within and from without". Also for a summary of Post World War II developments see Theodore A. Couloumbis, "Post World War II Greece: A Political Review", East European Quarterly, 7, No. 3 (1973), 285-310.

[69] Papandreou, Democracy, p. 114.

[70] This view is borrowed from Papandreou, ibid., p. 115.

[71] Tsoucalas, Greek Tragedy, p. 182.

[72] Both Papandreou and Makarios favoured a "real" independence for Cyprus first, with the issue of enosis to be decided later.

[73] Before this decision took place, the Papandreous had visited President Johnson in Washington to discuss the Cyprus case. After failing to find a solution, the elder Papandreou accepted an invitation from Moscow to negotiate the purchase of weapons for Cyprus. This decision found a strong opposition among the United States, NATO and the Right in Greece. Actually after that the leader of ERE Kanellopoulos called for the resignation of Papandreou for siding with the Communists. As a retaliation Papandreou uncovered the Pericles Plan (a plan

for the use of the Army to rig the elections of 1961) and decided to purge the Army of the officers involved. **For** details see Stephen Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 25-31.

[74] For a detailed account of the royal coup of July 1965 and the actual reasons behind the abolition of democracy in Greece see Jean Meynaud, Rapport sur l'abolition de la démocratie en Grèce (Montreal: Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec, 1970), Volume I, Part I.

[75] For an explanation see James Brown, "The Military", pp. 100-28. See, also, Thermos, "Conflict and Prospects", pp. 213-18.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

I have attempted to establish in the previous chapter that
as a result of certain historical experiences, Greek political
culture evolved to become a fragmented one. In this section,
I shall examine in greater detail the major components of this
culture and some of the conditions under which fragmentation
and dissensus developed in it. **First, I shall concern myself**
with the pastoral and peasant political attitudes and the
reasons for their **particular development, and second, I** shall
look briefly at the attitudes of workers and members of the
lower-middle classes. Third, I shall refer to the political
orientations of the advantaged groups of Greek society, such as
lawyers and doctors, journalists and intellectuals, businessmen
and members of the upper classes. Finally, I shall end this
chapter by making some general comments in regards to other
possible categories of this culture.

The Disadvantaged Groups

One of the major components of the Greek political culture
is the pastoralist-peasant one. Since the birth of the modern
Greek state, this group has exhibited a value system which in
many respects is conflicting with the political culture model
that the modernizers attempted to introduce. Pastoralists and
peasants can be said to have developed a kind of parochial and
subject political orientations branded with mistrust and lack
of allegiance to the state and its institutions. It is my

intention to show that this pastoralist-peasant culture pattern
is not only the direct consequence of the historical experience
factors outlined above, but also the indirect result of environ-
mental and cultural conditions of these people.

The nomadic populations of Greece were always faced with
the same set of problems typical of pastoral societies;
"regulating access of men and animals to natural resources".[1]
In such societies, limitation of natural resources leads, in
many cases, to intra-community conflict. .Conflict usually
focuses "on strategic resources: arable land, grazing rights,
routes of access to land, rights to utilize water."[2] The use
of force or the credible use of force tends to be the determi-
nant of access to such vital sources of livelihood. In this
case, might becomes right. In an effort to secure resources,
individuals or groups are primed to take advantage of each
other.

As far as social organization is concerned, pastoral
societies exhibit a remarkable flexibility. Some of them
emphasize contractual affiliations, friendship and ritual kin-
ship while others emphasize the host-guest relationship, the
patron-client relationship, and herding partnerships. In some
instances, organizational flexibility is the result of environ-
mental constraints. Concentration or dispersement of a herding
group is usually determined by the quality and quantity of
grazing land or the availability of water. Segments of a
herding group (households), if capable of dispersing, are
constantly looking for new pastures and water sources. In this

struggle for survival, the immediate household's interests take
priority over those of kinsmen and friends. The presence of
selfishness among pastoralists has been attributed by some
writers to such things as environmental conditions.[3]

Given the highly segmented nature of pastoral societies and
the daily necessity of herd movements, all adults and especially
heads of households have to be decision-makers in economic and
political matters. A successful pastoralist will have to gather
intelligence on the condition of pastures and water sources, on
the markets available in settled areas and on the movements of
potential competitors for grass and water.[4]

As a result of the wide-spread distribution of the
decision-making powers, a pastoral society tends to appear as
anarchic and egalitarian with every man being his own master.
In fact, though, this type of egalitarianism is considerably
limited due to such factors as ascribed kinship rank, differ-
ences in managerial skills and differences in household wealth
which fluctuate from generation to generation. In any case,
pastoral societies differ from each other in the degree to which
they are fragmented and competitive.[5]

Schneider's comparative evidence shows that pastoralist
societies in the European Mediterranean are highly fragmented
and competitive. My view is that fragmentation and competition
among the extended family groups as opposed to the existing intra-
group solidarity and cooperation are the consequence of a cul-
tural behaviour pattern which has been, to some extent, influenced
by physical environmental variables such as scarcity of water

and pastures. Attitudes of mistrust, lack of cooperation and hostility existing among the unrelated family groups of the Greek pastoralists seem to have resulted from a traditional culture which has been adapted to special ecological conditions.

The Sarakatsan shepherd community in Northern Greece described by J.K. Campbell[6] is a typical example of such a case. First, the Sarakatsani are faced with the problem of regulating access of men to natural resources. Scarcity or the belief in the scarcity of resources and wealth leads to hostility between unrelated families. **To the Sarakatsani the success and prosperity of other families is necessarily a threat of the very existence of one's own.**[7] Therefore, mutual distrust exists between unrelated families which makes cooperation of such families in the community almost impossible. Second, in order to protect his family and his own interests, the Sarakatsanos must come to terms with other persons or groups in the village or other villages and towns if he feels that those interests are threatened. One way of influencing the good will of a particular individual or group is the form of spiritual kinship between the bridegroom and his wedding sponsor (koumparos). This relationship (koumparia) later gets even stronger when the koumparos becomes the godfather (nounos) of the children of the new family.[8]

Third, friendship and patron-client relationships are also emphasized in the Sarakatsan community. Friendship usually begins when a man accepts a favour from another and which he later returns. It is mostly developed between equals and it remains in essence a kind of contractual relation "a form of

cooperation in which services of various kinds are exchanged and accounted."[9] **Patron-client relationships exist between** the individual Sarakatsan family and a political authority, some influential and wealthy merchant, lawyer or person of higher social status. Each shepherd family, in order to deal effectively with the various levels of government, tries to discover a patron, who in return for a man's political allegiance places his case before a friend in the right place.

Campbell notices that

> patronage converts impersonal and ephemeral connexions
> into permanent and personal relationships; for in
> Greek society it is generally only in established
> personal relationships, of which the archetypal forms
> are found in the family that any considerable
> element of moral obligation exists. The initial
> motive is utilitarian, protection and assistance
> on the side of the client, political power and social
> prestige on the part of the patron. But when such
> a relationship endures for any length of time, it
> takes on a strong moral quality. The patron feels
> obliged to assist and take a general interest in all
> the client's affairs, and in doing so, he is able to
> both sense his superiority and approve his own
> compassionate generosity. The client is conscious of
> a duty to support his patron politically without undue
> concern about his protector's party allegiance, and to
> give free expression to his feelings of gratitude
> and indebtedness.[10]

Similar arguments in regards to values and political orientations can be made about the peasants of modern Greece. Kroeber described peasants to be rural people who live in relation to market towns. They are, he has said, "a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centres, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures."[11] **Peasant societies differ from** primitive or tribal societies for they tend to be more

differentiated both socially and culturally than the latter.

Peasant societies are also less differentiated than the modern

industrial ones. The primary units in a peasant world are the

household and the local community while in industrial societies

the occupational structures are more important.

> Like the pastoralist, the peasant believes that
>
> all of the desired things in life such as land,
> wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and
> honour, respect and status, power and influence,
> security and safety, exist in finite quantity and
> are always in short supply, as far as (he) is con-
> cerned. Not only do these things and all other
> "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities,
> but in addition there is no way directly within
> peasant power to increase the available quantities
> ... (so) an individual or family can improve a posi-
> tion only at the expense of others.[12]

This is what Foster has called "Image of Limited Good". If

one's position can be improved only at the expense of others,

it follows that any significant improvement in anyone's posi-

tion should be viewed as a threat not only to the individual but

to the community as a whole. By applying this model of Limited

Good to the Mexican village of Tzintzuntzan, Foster found out

that economic behaviour, social relations, friendship, love and

jealousy patterns, concepts of honour and masculinity are all

directly influenced by such peasant attitudes as described

above.[13]

Many of the economic activities in peasant socie-

ties do not require much cooperation and so it becomes easier

for mutual distrust and extreme individualism to develop with

each family and individual competing for possession of scarce

resources. In this struggle to secure the means of livelihood

though, the peasants, like the pastoralists, are many times
forced to maintain a wide network of contacts through whose
help they can minimize life's dangers and maximize its opportu-
nities.[14]

These contacts are usually attained through specific
institutional means such as marriage, coparenthood and adoption
or through such things as dyadic contracts between partners of
about equal socio-economic status (friendship), and (or) patron-
client contracts tying together individuals of different socio-
economic position and power.

Greece, as far as this study is concerned, possesses many
such features of peasant activities and social organization.
In the 19th century Greece, the word "family" denoted many
households bound together by ties of blood. Such institutiona-
lized ties as described above, usually united families into an
association of equals or in a hierarchic relationship of
dependency (clientage) or both.[15] Prominent families, through
marriages (which in many cases brought about a merging of
economic resources) quite often created strong political
alliances. Also, through the institution of koumparia, which is
similar to the Latin-American compadrazgo, the family succeeded
in advancing or protecting the group's wealth and interests.[16]

But most important of all the family ties that existed in
revolutionary Greece and survived down to the present day are
the patron-client ones. The clientage system existed in that
country since the days of the Ottoman empire.[17] The primate-
peasant relationship was a typical example. The primate by

virtue of his socio-economic status, played the role of
mediator, linking the local infrastructure of the village to
the superstructure of the outside world.

The importance of patron-client relationships[18] has been
emphasized as well as criticized by sociologists, anthropolo-
gists and political scientists. As Mouzelis pointed out there
are those who when dealing with the problem of clientelism in
the third-world countries emphasize the fact that imported
western institutions cannot be altogether successful. "The
persistence of personalistic-clientelistic parties, the
institutionalization of large-scale corruption, the disrespect
for basic parliamentary principles and the frequent interven-
tion of the army in politics ... are explained basically in
terms of incongruities between imported and indigenous
institutions."[19] Also, there is another group of anthropolo-
gists who limit their analyses to the village level without any
serious considerations of the larger and ever-changing socio-
economic context.[20] Both of these categories of writers fail,
for different theoretical reasons, to deal with classes. Class
analysis is replaced by the study of social stratification, "by
an ahistorical static examination of how certain traits are
distributed within the village community or nationally."[21]

Mouzelis is also critical of some Marxists like Luciano Li
Causi[22] who

frequently try in mechanistic fashion to establish
too direct a link between classes and political
conflict, thus denying the possibility that in
certain types of society political cleavages do not
directly reflect class divisions but are more closely

connected with divisions in the religious, ethnic,
caste or patronage spheres.[23]

Li Causi in studying Mediterranean politics and particular-
ly Southern Italy found the landlord-peasant relationship not
just a patron-client one but rather an exploiter-exploitee
relationship. Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint,
patronage was considered a non-existent problem. Gilsenan, also,
from a study of North Lebanon concluded that "the horizontal
(class) dimension ... is structurally (more) significant (than)
... dyadic links and cross-cutting connections."[24] In his
view 'patrons' attempt by every available means, including
force, to maintain monopolistic control over access to resources
and information. So, there is always an alliance and consoli-
dation at the top. The most important element, according to
Gilsenan,

> is the cementing of ties between the favour givers
> who have a common interest (and structural position)
> in excluding favour seekers and keeping them
> dependent, and incidentally making sure that everyone
> thinks in terms of 'gaps' which those big men so
> providentially fill. In other words, we are
> dealing with the crystallization and consolidation
> by the dominant group of shared class position at
> either end of the stratification scale. There is a
> reinforcement of the horizontal dimension rather
> than a cross-cutting.[25]

According to Mouzelis every successful study of clientelis-
tic politics must always include social classes at the centre
of analysis.[26] But political conflict does not always have a
class character in all countries. In countries where the
capitalist mode of production is not yet dominant,

> conditions are less favourable for a shift from
> patronage to class politics ... (for) it is the

> entrance of capital into the sphere of agricultural
> and industrial production, i.e. the separation
> of the direct producer from his means of production
> and the creation of wage labour, which leads to
> work contexts (factories, modern plantations)
> which are conducive to the development of class
> consciousness and organization.[27]

Unlike Western European countries where industrial capitalism

was a relatively indigenous process and managed to link itself

"organically" with the rest of the economy and society, in

developing countries like Greece this was not the case. In such

societies despite the development of the industrial sector,

there are still large sectors in which small-commodity produc-

tion prevails. As a result of this, one will find in these

countries not only the usual inequalities between labour and

capital of the industrial sector but also "inequalities result-

ing from the persistence of vast productivity differentials

between technologically advanced and backward areas of the

economy."[28]

In these countries, the organization of the disadvantaged

classes for the reduction of inequalities is not that easy to

come about. The reason given by Mouzelis is that

> a serious reduction of inequalities and the estab-
> lishment of welfare state would destroy the existing
> 'favourable climate' for private investment and
> would result in the flight of indigenous and a
> fortiori foreign capital, on the dynamism of which
> the growth of the economy largely depends.[29]

Thus what usually happens is that either the masses fail to

organize themselves politically in which case their vote is

manipulated through clientelistic networks controlled by

traditional parties of the dominant classes; or if they manage

to establish autonomous political organizations such organiza-
tions are at some point in time forcibly suppressed for they
present a threat to the <u>status quo</u>.[30]

I find the arguments and comments presented by Mouzelis
very relevant and useful for this section of my work. Actually,
my own research has led me to some similar observations
concerning the importance of patron-client relationships in
Greece. I feel that after the introduction of western institu-
tions in the country and the advent of modernization in the
economic and political sphere, it became imperative for the old
clientage relationships to be gradually transformed and adapted
to modern circumstances. As Legg rightfully pointed out what
has happened in Greece is that on the one hand

> traditional patrons-village notables, landowners,
> and the like - have found clientage ties useful for
> the acquisition of modern, social, economic and
> political roles. On the other hand, the incumbents
> of some occupations introduced into traditional
> society, such as lawyers, doctors and newspaper
> owners among others have also found clientage rela-
> tionships advantageous. For their part, traditional
> clients and even more 'modern' elements have found
> the continuance of such relationships equally
> satisfactory for gaining advantages that cannot be
> met through kinship ties or on the basis of individual
> achievement alone.[31]

Also, as a result of changes in the socio-economic sphere
in the 1920's came the emergence of new political parties. One
of them was the Communist Party which, unlike the other
bourgeois parties, attempted to organize the masses along class
lines. But, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, the
defeat of the left-wing forces during the civil war ended for
the time being all possibilities for the peasantry and the

workers to develop an autonomous non-clientelistic political organization. In the post-war years with the exclusion of the left-wing forces from the political arena clientelistic politics were once again strengthened.

Therefore, it is not unusual to find in Greece today various clientage networks extending from the local level, through any number of intermediate ones, to the incumbents of top political offices and roles. In many cases, some economic and social assistance is given to individual peasants and pastoralists in return for political support - eg, votes. The traditional political parties themselves are basically extended cliques, inoperative formal groupings organized to a great extent along clientage lines. This means that the peasantry

is "related to the political system not through the vehicle of party loyalty, but through loyalty to individual political figures."[32] These political figures have actually been successful in controlling and incorporating the peasantry into the central institutions of the country. This, in turn, has prevented any major challenges to the stability of the political system by the peasantry.

In the future, though, the failure of the peasantry to modernize itself and learn to operate within a democratic framework without the assistance of patronage agencies may prove to be a negative factor to the political stability. What, I believe, will happen is that the level of peasant demands to the political system will rise to such an extent that it will become difficult for the patrons (traditional politicians and

others) to satisfy them in the "old" ways. Indeed, the
traditional politicians will be less willing to satisfy such
demands in a patron-client manner out of fear that they may
alienate the more modernized sections of the population whose
support they may need if they are to survive in politics. Also,
as the whole society modernizes, political demands will become
more and more complex, which means that they will have to reach
the political system through channels other than the traditional
ones and to receive attention and satisfaction in a number of
ways different from the old ones. Therefore, in order to avoid
possible future alienation of the pastoralists and peasants
(and thus jeopardize the political stability) ways have to be
found to raise their confidence toward the state institutions
and the "new" rules of the game of politics. One suggestion
for a "smooth" transition from traditionalism to modernity may
be the introduction of general economic reforms that favour the
already underprivileged peasantry. **For confidence of the**
peasantry toward the state will by and large increase if politi-
cal democracy is accompanied with a system of economic justice.

Another component of the political culture includes members
of the working class and small entrepreneurs. The majority of
workers are usually very low on the social scale. In many
cases, they cannot influence a bureaucrat except through a
patron. One reason for this is the lack of effective labour
organizations and trade unions in the country. The existing
organizations are usually controlled by the state which makes
access to the bureaucracy more imperative if an individual is

to benefit at all.[33]   The workers tend to be misinformed about
their rights, and their efforts to acquire economic benefits or
job security through strikes and demonstrations do not basically
produce any results. The scope of union organization in Greece
has been limited by the dominance of agriculture (which
involves 43 percent (%) of the economically active population)
and by the multitude of occupations in which self-employment has
been the rule. (Self-employed workers comprise 38 percent (%)
of the economically active population).[34]

Despite attempts by left-wing parties to mobilize the
workers into active participation in the political system, the
Greek working class has usually lacked the unity and the organi-
zation needed to establish itself as a strong political force.
This phenomenon is partly due to the fact that "industrialization
in Greece is relatively weak and of a type which does not favour
the development of a strong and class conscious industrial
proletariat (persistence of artisanal forms of production, of
numerous familial, small-sized firms, etc.)."[35] As a result of
this, labour demands have received minor attention at the parlia-
mentary level of Greek politics.

Depending on occupation and working environments, the
workers exhibit different features of political culture. It is
assumed that parochialism appears in cases in which access to
the political level is attained only through a powerful patron,
a lawyer or a bureaucrat. Subject political orientations are
also found among workers when a kind of a "passive relation-
ship" exists between them and the political system. The

workers, although aware of the existence of democratic
institutions, do not take up an active role in them for they
feel incapable of influencing the decision-making process. Such
views tend to be very legitimate if one considers the fact that
in their dealings with the state the workers have mostly been
the losers.[36]

In the last decade or so increasing income inequalities
within the labour force and the lower-middle classes have
created an acute dissatisfaction and frustration against the
political system. Most of the non-skilled workers have seen
their wages rise at a much slower pace than those of the highly
skilled ones employed by industries. Also, "certain white-
collar categories (executives, professionals, employees working
on advertising, communications or other fast-growing sectors)
have seen their incomes rise rapidly beyond those of the rest of
the white-collar sector and the 'old' petty bourgeoisie (small
shop-owners and craftsmen)."[37] Therefore, due to this "demon-
stration effect", one may argue that the confidence of the
labour force and the lower-middle classes toward the govern-
ment and its institutions has diminished substantially.

The Advantaged Groups

After looking at patterns of political culture among the
disadvantaged groups of Greek society, it is now appropriate
to inquire into the political culture of the advantaged ones.
For much of Greek history, the only occupations that enjoyed
the highest status are those of law and medicine. Statistical

figures show that Greek parliaments have been dominated by lawyers and doctors.[38] People in the law profession get the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the political and administrative process of the state and thus they are more likely to follow political careers than it is the case with other occupational groups. Familiarity with the workings of a political system in most cases leads to the development of strong political attitudes about such a system. Depending on the operation of the political institutions, in turn, such individuals may develop allegiant or alienated political orientations. In Greece, lawyers and doctors tend to identify more with the state than it is the case with manual workers or peasants.

In rural areas, doctors and lawyers frequently play the role of an intermediary between the peasants and the state. Through such intermediaries the ordinary peasant succeeds in influencing decisions to his advantage. A lawyer, because of his status, usually has a number of friends of similar status in governmental offices. In many cases, for the sake of friendship, favourable decisions are made on behalf of the law-yer's client.

Lawyers and doctors, by virtue of their education, are very likely to develop positive political orientations. By virtue of their profession, also, they possess the necessary skills to create a political following. But the relationship between them and their followers is usually one of a very traditional nature: a patron-client one. Unfortunately, most of them do not use

their know-how to politicize their followers and create positive feelings toward the state. They simply help perpetuate a traditional system of clientage by their own behaviour as patrons in such a system.

Finally, in the group of the advantaged fall all those Greeks who have personal connections with major political groups. Such individuals come from the ranks of leading professors, state officials and politicians, bankers, publishers and ship-owners. A politician needs political support which he receives from those around him in return for favours and special legislation. Special legislation in many cases amounts to governmental grants or tax concessions to corporations or ship-owners.

In Greece, the taxation system has been organized in such a manner that it favours only a few - an oligarchy of the upper classes. As Katris points out, direct taxes represent only 16 to 17 percent (%) of the total public tax revenue.[39] Indirect taxes in turn which come primarily from the lower economic groups (because their numbers are the greatest) provide 72 to 73 percent (%) of the tax revenue. Also, hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes are evaded every year. Of course, the perpetrators of tax evasion are not the factory workers, the bakers or the peasants, but the ship-magnates[40] and the big businessmen who actually declare no more than "one-tenth of their actual income on their tax statements."[41]

In return for political support and personal wealth (through briberies) the conservative governments of Greece have always closed their eyes to such happenings as tax evasion.

Even the present government in the formulation of new tax laws
have failed to switch the tax squeeze from the lower and middle
economic classes to the upper ones. Through the new tax laws,
it is "the class of the professionals that is asked to lift the
weight of tax-evasion of the big capital which finally remained
untouched."[42]

Regarding the political orientations of the advantaged
groups of Greek society, one would have to make the following
observations: These individuals are definitely aware of the
existence of western institutions in the country and they
support the continuous operation and existence of such institu-
tions with some limitations. They will support any government
provided that their economic interests are not threatened and
that their political advantages are maintained. This means that
they are in favour of a system of rules with many exceptions
and "loopholes". In this sense, one may consider these groups
to present a kind of a "potential threat" to the new democratic
regime. Such a view is based on the assumption that as the level
of democratization and political participation rises it will
become increasingly difficult for such individuals to maintain
their patronage networks of their economically advantageous
positions. Therefore, it may be necessary for them to opt out
for an authoritarian regime so that they may prevent any radical
reforms that might hurt their interests.

The Others

In addition to all the categories mentioned above, there

are many Greeks who possess other kinds of political orienta-
tions and are in favour of some type of a regime change. Some
of them, who range from class conscious workers to university
students, professionals or politicians, are aware of the
economic injustices in the system, the low level of political
participation and the existence of patronage networks. This
broad category includes individuals who still have hopes in the
parliamentary process and believe that truly democratic institu-
tions can evolve in Greece provided that the right political
party comes to power (that is through peaceful means). **Others,**
who are more alienated and disillusioned with the present
political order seem to be ready to support a kind of political
revolution in an effort to "free" society from the "evils" of
capitalism, parochialism, economic deprivation and foreign
domination. **Finally, another threat to the political system**
comes from all those individuals closely associated with and
having received benefits from the previous military regime of
Papadopoulos. One of their main tasks is the abolition of
democracy and the return of military rule in the country.

Summary

   Not only historical experience variables, but also ecolo-
gical, cultural and socio-economic variables account for the
presence of fragmentation in the Greek political culture.
Among the pastoralists and peasants, parochial attitudes and
values such as mistrust, lack of cooperation, selfishness and
patronage that are hardly needed in a participatory democracy

are mostly the product of a traditional culture that has been
adapted to an environment characterized by scarcity of grazing
land, water and other resources.

For explaining the presence of alienated political orien-
tations among other groups such as workers and members of the
lower-middle classes, one may refer to the scarcity of economic
opportunities, to the lack of effective labour organizations and
to growing income inequalities. Conversely, the existence of
allegiant political orientations among other individuals may
also be explained in terms of their socio-economic position, of
the privileges and economic advantages that these people enjoy
within society.

In the next chapter, I shall discuss the ways in which
this fragmented political culture has been maintained or changed
and transmitted from generation to generation through the agents
of political socialization.

Notes

[1] Jane Schneider, "Of Vigilance and Virgins: Honor, Shame and Access to Resources in Mediterranean Societies", _Ethnology_, 10, No. 1 (Jan. 1971), 3.

[2] _Ibid._, p. 2.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 5.

[4] D.J. Stenning, "Transhumance, Migratory Drift, Migration, Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism," _Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute_, No. 87 (1957), p. 67.

[5] Schneider, "Vigilance", p. 6.

[6] J.K. Campbell, _Honour, Family and Patronage_ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).

[7] _Ibid._, p. 204.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 218.

[9] _Ibid._, p. 230.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 259.

[11] A.L. Kroeber, _Anthropology_ (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1948), p. 284.

[12] George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good", in Jack M. Potter, M.N. Diaz, G.M. Foster, eds., _Peasant Society: A Reader_ (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 304-05.

[13] _Ibid._, p. 306.

[14] George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Peasant Village", in Jack M. Potter, _ibid._, p. 214.

[15] Petropulos, _Politics_, p. 57.

[16] _Ibid._, p. 58.

[17] _Ibid._, p. 53.

[18] For definition and different views on patron-client relationships see the following articles from the work of Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., _Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies_ (London: Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1977):

Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients", pp. 1-6; Michael Gilsenan, "Against Patron-Client Relations", pp. 167-83; John Waterbury, "An Attempt to Put Patrons and Clients in·Their Place", pp. 329-41.

[19] Nicos Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics: The Case of Greece", The Sociological Review, NS 26, No. 3 (1978), 472-73.

[20] Mouzelis is making reference to such works as J.K. Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) and E. Friedl, Vasilika: A Village in Modern Greece (New York: Holt and Rinehart, 1962).

[21] Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics", p. 473.

[22] Luciano Li Causi, "Anthropology and Ideology: The Case of Patronage in Mediterranean Societies", Radical Social Sciences Journal, No. 1 (1975).

[23] Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics", p. 474.

[24] Gilsenan, "Against Patron-Client Relations", p. 182.

[25] Ibid.

[26] For the importance of class see another article by Mouzelis, "The Relevance of the Concept of Class to the Study of Modern Greek Society", New York Academy of Sciences Annals, 268 (1976), 395-409.

[27] Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics", p. 477.

[28] Ibid., p. 479.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Keith Legg, "Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity: The Failure of Democracy in Greece", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 1, No. 2 (Fall 1973), 233.

[32] Ibid., p. 238.

[33] Nicos Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1978), p. 113.

[34] Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1974, p. 81.

[35] Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 113.

[36] I refer here to the results of strikes. In Greece, the common result of a strike has been "no result". Statistics from the Ministry of Labor show that most strikes end without mediation or negotiations. See, _Statistical Yearbook of Greece_, 1961, p. 158.

[37] Mouzelis, _Modern Greece_, p. 123.

[38] Legg, _Politics_, p. 281.

[39] John Katris, _Eyewitness in Greece_ (Saint Louis: New Critics Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 75-76.

[40] Katris noted that "Stavros Niarchos, shipping magnate who owns a fleet larger than that of Aristotle Onassis, drew a few laughs at the tax office when he declared the annual profits of his shipyard to be 13,000 drachmae ($433)!", p. 76.

Ibid., p. 76.

[42] _Eleftherotypia_, an Athens daily, Aug. 24, 1978, p. 1 and 15.

CHAPTER IV

AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The Family

Writers on political socialization tend to agree that the
process begins first in the family and that these learning
experiences influence to a great extent later political orien-
tations. Although one cannot say that youthful political
socialization completely determines adult political attitudes,
it has been proven through various studies that "adult atti-
tudes and behaviour may generally be a function of earlier
orientations."[1] For instance, it has been noted that if an
individual participates in making decisions within his family,
and later in school and at work, his sense of political ef-
ficacy will be greater.[2] In addition to this, the child's
relationship with the parents and particularly with the father
has been shown to have an impact on later political behaviour.[3]

In a study of the Greek peasant,[4] McNall found out that
certain peasant values transmitted through the family are indeed
an impediment to change in Greece. Such values included a
fatalistic world outlook, the tenets of a particularistic
religion and a set of attitudes that can be labelled amoral
familism. A fatalistic outlook runs parallel to the belief that
the world is not explainable and controllable and that an
individual cannot achieve results by his own efforts alone. In
Greek society, a person tends to blame others, not himself,
for failure since solution to his problems does not depend only

on individual efforts. Also, through its traditional rituals, the church transmits such values of honour, pride, shame and secrecy that separate one family from another. **In many cases,** "the individual locates explanations for his problems and the solutions of them outside of himself, putting the blame on Fate, the Gods, or his Saint ...".[5]

The concept of amoral familism is also used by McNall in an effort to explain the Greek peasant's difficulty in changing from traditional to modern ways of behaviour. Banfield first defined an amoral familist as one who acts with this rule in mind: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family, assume that all others will do likewise."[6] Banfield outlined some seventeen implications of this rule in an attempt to show how amoral familism leads to distrust and sus- picion of the motives of others and an inability for cooperation in the community.[7]

Another study of a small agricultural village by Du Boulay tends to concern itself with "the values and attitudes which are derived from a long tradition in which even in the present time sustain the villagers in a sense of purpose and destiny ...".[8] These attitudes and values are adaptations from the past and therefore they are not considered appropriate in the modern world. **Despite this, Du Boulay does not think that such values** inhibit modernization any longer. The reason given is that through time all these "beliefs and customs ... have survived as forms only, of which the intellectual content has been lost" and therefore, the surrender of traditional ways "to a philo-

sophy with a more readily comprehensible rationale"[9] is easy.
Unlike McNall, Du Boulay points out that competition and lack
of cooperation are not part of the traditional way of life but
rather they are a reflection of the disintegration of such a
life as a result of pressures from the outside modern world.
By being more orientated to the outside world and less materially
dependent on the community, the family becomes more competitive
and selfish in pursuing its own interests.

Du Boulay's view that the peasant attitudes of competition,
lack of cooperation and selfishness are not part of the tradi-
tional way of life is questionable. It has been already esta-
blished in the previous chapter that such attitudes are not
only present in peasant, but also in pastoralist societies and
they are mostly influenced by a traditional culture which has been
adapted to the environment of the country. What is important to
notice, though, is that both writers admit that there are certain
attitudes and values namely, competition, selfishness, honour
and shame, etc., which are transmitted from generation to genera-
tion through the family. I maintain, following McNall, that these
values are an impediment to modernization in Greece. In order
to understand better the importance of this statement, I deem it
necessary to further elaborate on this subject.

In the Greek peasant family, according to McNall, a young
person is socialized by teasing and deception and learns to be
ashamed when caught in misconduct or in exhibiting bad manners.
In this way, the child grows up to suspect the behaviour of
others. "He begins carefully to hide his feelings for, if

others knew what he felt," he would be more vulnerable to
attack ..."[10] Suspicion, shame, secrecy and lack of coopera-
tion are, thus, the product of such a socialization process.
Also, in all Greek families, whether peasant or not, the father
is an authority and he must be obeyed by all. **He is the agent**
of discipline and instruction through whom the child learns
that in his behaviour, he has a responsibility towards the
whole family. **In families dominated by an authoritarian father**
who provides few opportunities for participation in decision-
making, children are conditioned to be generally submissive to
authority. Later, in adulthood, they may be inclined to
manifest deference towards persons in positions senior to theirs,
but dominance over those below.[11]

Greeks value freedom and self-dependence but they tend to
identify themselves more as members of a group and very rarely
as autonomous individuals. **This phenomenon of strong loyalty**
to the family is explained by Adamantia Pollis in the following
manner:

> In the case of Greece, the priority of loyalty
> owned to membership groups is more than a statement
> about values; the very **person exists only because**
> of these groups. Self-definition is in terms of
> group relatedness and not as an individual: existence
> as an individual separate from these groups is
> inconceivable. Nothing demonstrates more dramati-
> cally the absence of the notion of an autonomous
> individual than the absence of a word in Greek for
> privacy ... A view of self inter-individually defined,
> precludes the very idea of personal goals or aspira-
> tions. Who and what one is, is answered by referring
> to one's position within membership groups. ... Self-
> worth is judged by the person and by others in terms
> of how well the prescribed obligations and loyalties
> are fulfilled, and self-fulfilment is attained by
> performing well the assigned role within membership

> groups ... In Greek culture, shame is the psycholo-
> gical device employed to ensure conformity, and
> shame is the emotion a person's transgressions
> engender in him. A Greek is not responsible to
> himself, but to the group of which he is an integral
> part. And shame is the psychological penalty for
> behaviour inappropriate vis-a-vis the group. ...
> self-fulfilment in the West is attained through
> success in achieving personally defined goals within
> a particular ethical system. In Greece, self-fulfil-
> ment is attained through the successful implementation
> of one's role within a greater whole.[12]

In many cases, this "greater whole" does not extend beyond
one's immediate family or a closely knit group of interrelated
families. That is, a Greek feels himself a member of a family
first, a member of his village second, and a Greek third.
Thus, one may find that quite often clubs or organizations of
national or universal character are looked upon with suspicion
and mistrust by a Greek socialized in the above described man-
ner. It seems that one is not willing to join in any type of
activity, or any organization or political party unless immedi-
ate gains for oneself and one's family group are clearly
existing.

In many families, especially in the rural areas, children
grow up believing that the national government in Athens is an
impersonal, remote control authority whose laws are an inter-
ference and a threat to personal freedom.[13] This non-confidence
toward the state institutions is often carried into adulthood.
Family influence is, therefore, primary as far as the formation
of political orientations is concerned.

The formation of political orientations implies a growing
awareness and understanding of political events, processes and

roles. According to Legg, in the transitional settings, many roles tend to merge and each might have a political aspect. "The Greek emphasis on clientage structures means that individual roles in the economic, social, and political spheres coincide. Status in one area is transferable to another. Patronage roles originating in an economic setting, may be easily transferred to the political sphere. **Membership in a clientage structure** is itself evidence of political interest; and both patron or client inevitably direct their attention toward political roles. In the traditional setting, the patron seeks to formalize his position by acquiring the legal status of deputy."[14]

Legg's study showed that almost half of the Greek parliamentarians came from families with relatives active in politics.[15] **Also, the deputy with family political** ties and personal clients was most likely to be an important figure in the Greek parliament and in the major political groups.[16]

One may conclude this section by saying that on the one hand, the modern Greek family encourages the maintenance of a value system suitable for the needs of people living in pastoral or peasant societies rather than in modern ones. On the other hand, it is through the family and its clientage networks that an individual first learns about politics and aspires to reach the top levels of the political system. But what is important for this study to note is that the political culture transmitted through the family in the forementioned manners is indeed incongruent with a modern democratic system for mistrust, lack

of cooperation, selfishness and patronage are not the kind of
values and attitudes needed in a modern society.

The School

Along with the family, the early school experiences of the
child are very important as far as the formation of political
orientations is concerned. Easton and Hess suggest that the
process of political socialization begins most clearly at about
the age of three. From this age, and until about thirteen,
political learning in the family and later in school takes
place very rapidly.[17] The importance of education in the
process of political socialization has been pointed out by many
writers. Almond and Verba, for instance, in their five-nation
study found out that there is a positive correlation between
education and political cognition and participation. Their data
showed that "educational attainment appears to have the most
important demographic effect on political attitudes. Among the
demographic variables usually investigated - sex, place of
residence, occupation, income, age and so on - none compares
with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems
to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man
with limited education is a different political actor from the
man who has achieved a higher level of education."[18]

Other studies by Key and Hyman[19] have shown that high levels
of political participation and political efficacy occur far
more frequently among persons with higher rather than elemen-
tary education. Di Palma's study[20] also showed that political

orientations are more positive among people with higher
education. But this is not always the case. Almond and Verba,
again, noted that "the orientations that distinguish the
educated from the relatively uneducated tend ... to be affec-
tively neutral ... Educated individuals (do not) necessarily
support the political system more ... (They are), in a sense,
available for political participation. Education, however,
does not determine the content of that participation."[21]

    The socialization task of the school seems to differ from
country to country. In Western countries, for instance, the
school mainly supplements or embodies "influences plentifully
available outside school" while in developing countries
"schools are expected to carry a much heavier load of sociali-
zation ... whatever they accomplish they will make a propor-
tionately larger marginal effect upon the lives of the residents-
compared to the impact of the aggregate of other agencies -
than do most schools in the West."[22]

    The political content of the educational curriculum as
well as the atmosphere of the school affect the formation of
political attitudes. The educational system in all societies
is usually defined in such a manner as to produce through
citizenship training and indoctrination such attitudes among
the young that will support the society which they live in.[23]
Of course societies tend to differ significantly in the degree
to which they use the school curriculum in order to reinforce a
particular set of values among the pupils. So, in some
societies, the school tends to be more influential than the

family or any other agent of political socialization. "Manifest teaching about politics can increase an individual's sense of political competence"[24] depending of course on the content of the teaching. In other societies, the school simply reinforces values and attitudes already learned at home.

In Greece, the schools tend to play this last role: reinforcing the values learnt in the family. Civic training in schools is designed in such a way as to simply make the pupil love the particular system or form of government he is born into. There is no effort on the part of the teachers to assist the pupil to develop some type of criteria for judging current or past political events. The subjects of civic education and history, for example, are only used to teach the pupils basic definitions on government or politics or to emphasize such things as the glories of the Byzantine Empire and the role of Greek Orthodoxy in preserving Christianity and Hellenism during the years of the Turkish domination.

Civic education as a subject was first introduced in secondary schools in 1931 and it was not until 1956 that it was finally introduced at the level of the elementary school in grade six.[25] From a survey of textbooks on civic education in the past forty years, Psomas found out a surprising similarity in a number of important aspects. For example, the material was written in an abstract form and in a style and vocabulary far removed from the spoken language and it was centred around a long series of formal and mostly incomprehensible definitions on such things as the organs and the functions of the Greek

state or the rights and the duties of the Greek individual. In
addition to this, all these textbooks were full of eulogies
addressed to the system of the time whether monarchy, republic
or dictatorship.[26]

   The students had to learn by rote all these definitions
and the eulogies addressed to the regime in power. The teachers
expected the students to more or less memorize their homework
like a poem. But more important than this, in the confines of
the classroom, there were hardly any questions raised to test
the understanding of the student, no efforts made to help the
student consolidate the "acquired" information or stimulate his
interest. In one word, students lacked the proper civic train-
ing necessary to help them develop political attitudes expected
of a democratic citizen. The situation has been even worse if
we consider the fact that teachers have usually been very
authoritarian.[27] **In schools, the decision-making process is**
left entirely to the teacher whose will and viewpoint have
always been supreme and basically unchallenged. Student parti-
cipation in classroom discussions and school debates is usually
minimal. One may, therefore, assume that low levels of politi-
cal efficacy observed among some Greeks today may be the direct
result of non-participation in school activities.[28]

   Another important subject taught in Greek schools is that
of history. The expressed intention of the Ministry of Educa-
tion has been "to cultivate the identification of the young with
the Greek nation and also help them to become useful citi-
zens."[29] Unfortunately, though, the majority of the history

textbooks are designed in such a manner that they fail to
contribute to the development of any form of allegiance to-
wards the modern Greek state. History has been divided into
sections (classical, byzantine, modern). At least up to the
1960's, the last part of modern Greek history (from the forma-
tion of modern Greek kingdom (1832) and up to the present) had
been reserved exclusively for the last grade of secondary
school (equivalent to Grade 12 in Canada). From the statisti-
cal table for the year 1961 (See Table 2) we deduce that over
9.4 percent (%) of the total population aged 10 years and over
ever got the chance to learn something about their history in
school. But even this percentage is partly misleading if we
consider the fact that by the time the school year ended the
history teachers had barely managed explaining the causes of
World War II. The civil war of the 1940's for instance was
hardly ever dealt with. It was usually mentioned very briefly
without any attempt on the part of the teachers to explain its
causes. Of course, conveniently enough for the conservative
regime, there was always time before the end of classes to men-
tion the atrocities committed by the "bad guys", the communists
and their sympathizers.[30]

In addition, the Greek educational system has also failed
in other aspects as well. Greek students, up to a large extent,
have been deprived of the rich heritage of the ancients. The
subject of Ancient Greek has been taught in schools of secon-
-dary education in a very superficial manner. It has mostly
centred around some or the works of Plato and Homer's poems

Table 2

Total Population Aged 10 Years and Over
by Sex and General Level of Education

Level of Education	Year	MALES Absolute Figure (% of Total)	FEMALES Absolute Figure (% of Total)	BOTH SEXES Absolute Figure (% of Total)
Higher	1961	95,988 (2.8)	28,080 (0.7)	124,068 (1.8)
	1971	152,420 (4.3)	58,100 (1.5)	210,520 (2.9)
Secondary	1961	295,304 (8.9)	227,078 (6.3)	522,382 (7.6)
	1971	419,700 (11.9)	370,500 (9.8)	790,200 (10.8)
Primary	1961	1,688,144 (50.9)	1,292,447 (36.3)	2,980,591 (43.3)
	1971	1,956,860 (55.4)	1,656,860 (43.9)	3,613,720 (49.5)
Those who have not finished Primary School	1961	1,222,481 (36.8)	1,996,409 (56.0)	3,218,890 (46.8)
	1971	937,700 (26.5)	1,493,460 (39.6)	2,431,160 (33.3)
Those who have not declared level of education	1961	12,268 (0.3)	19,283 (0.5)	31,551 (0.4)
	1971	64,480 (1.8)	192,480 (5.1)	256,960 (3.5)
Totals	1961	3,314,185 (99.7)	3,563,297 (99.8)	6,877,482 (99.9)
	1971	3,531,160 (99.9)	3,771,400 (99.9)	7,302,560 (100.0)

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1964 and 1974.

with some minor references also to such historians as
Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides. But the works of these
writers for many years had not been available in translation.
Instead the students had to waste valuable time in learning
the syntax, the vocabulary of irregular and regular verbs of
ancient Greek and how to translate into modern Greek rather than
concentrating on the ideas expressed in those writings. So,
ideas on democracy, rights and duties of the citizen, the law
and the state and other things valued so much in the Western
world as part of the ancient Greek heritage have only touched
the minds of the young Greek students rather than become part of
their educational knowledge.

Translated works of the ancients became available to stu-
dents of the first three grades of secondary school (Gymnasium)
in 1964 with Papandreou's educational reform. Unfortunately
the colonels in 1967 reintroduced the old educational system
concentrating on the mechanics of ancient Greek language rather
than the content of the writings. Finally, the Papandreou
tradition was followed once more in 1974 by the civilian
government of Karamanlis. Through a new educational reform the
Gymnasium students were to study ancient Greek writings in
translation. This new reform included also the reintroduction
of the demotiki as the language used in schools of elementary
and secondary education.[31] Demotiki is the spoken language of
the modern Greeks which in the past has been suppressed in
favour of the Katharevousa,[32] an archaic form of modern Greek.

Since 1849, katharevousa has been used in all written

communication between the state and the Greek citizens. It has
been the official language of the state as declared by the
Constitutions of 1911 and 1958 (Article 107 in each case). Also
the Constitutions of 1911 (Article 2), 1928 (Article 1), 1952
(Article 2) and 1975 (Article 3) required that the text of the
Holy Scriptures be maintained unchanged thus forbidding its
translation into demotiki without the consent of the Church.
This is an example of how the Greek state has always associated
itself with an artificial language rather than the language in
which most of its modern poets and writers wrote and communica-
ted their messages to the people. But above all this shows how
much the Greek state is separated from the Greek nation.

Diglossia (bilingualism) has been a serious chronic ill-
ness of the Greek education. Demotiki has been welcomed in
Greek education whenever a "liberal democratic" government came
to power, only to be suppressed as soon as a conservative one
took over. The conservative, right-wing governments of Greece
that have held power for most of the time in modern Greece
managed through propaganda to create false impressions about the
quality of both forms of language. The katharevousa, based on
a utopian nostalgia for ancestral glory (Hellenic and Byzantine)
has often been correlated with patriotism, nationalism and
religion. On the other hand, the demotiki has been portrayed as
a threat to national ideals and its supporters have many times
been suspected of leftist or communist orientations.

Despite all the measures taken by the Greek state in
favour of the katharevousa and the thousands of hours wasted

on learning two different forms of modern Greek, the Greek
pupils can understand, read and write better in the demotikí
form. At least one study[33] done by Christos Frangos, professor
at the University of Ioannina, showed the general superiority
of the demotiki in all classes and all categories of pupils.
The Greek pupils presented a picture of backwardness in kathare-
vousa, especially in comprehension. Their attainment was
higher in the demotiki.

As a final comment on the language question, one has to
make the following observations: an excessive amount of time
is spent on learning different forms of Greek at the expense of
other subjects which are directly related to socialization into
a modern democratic society and specifically to the development
of participant values and orientations. Also as a result of
the stubbornness of the Greek state in maintaining a purist form
of language in its official publications and communication with
the people, the Greek population in its majority is being
alienated and separated from the political system. Statistical
figures (See Table 2) show that by 1961, 46.8 percent (%) of
the total population aged 10 years and over had not even
finished primary school. How could they therefore understand
a form of language that not even high school graduates could
really master? **This was true to a lesser extent with an addi-**
tional 43.3 percent (%) of the population also that had
acquired only primary education. This means that over 90
percent (%) of the population had definitely problems in
communicating in the official language of the state. The

Table 3

Literate and Illiterate Population of Greece
Aged 10 Years and Over (1907-1971)

Census Year Sex	Population Aged 10 Yrs. and Over	Literate	Illiterate	Percentage Literate	Illit.
Total 1907 **Males** **Females**	1,912,540 952,990 959,550	755,213 567,706 187,507	1,157,327 385,284 772,043	39 60 20	61 40 80
Total 1920 **Males** **Females**	3,766,832 1,859,834 1,906,998	1,807,473 1,229,431 578,042	1,959,359 630,403 1,328,956	48 66 30	52 34 70
Total 1928 Males Females	4,672,028 2,304,942 2,367,086	2,718,153 1,755,909 962,244	1,953,875 549,033 1,404,842	58 76 41	42 24 59
Total 1951 Males Females	6,140,405 2,958,774 3,181,631	4,692,218 2,633,208 2,059,010	1,448,187 325,566 1,122,621	76 89 65	24 11 35
Total 1961 Males Females	6,877,482 3,314,185 3,563,297	5,655,001 3,062,712 2,592,289	1,222,481 251,473 971,008	82 92 73	18 8 27
Total 1971 Males Females	7,302,560 3,531,160 3,771,400	6,262,560 3,308,460 2,954,100	1,040,000 222,700 817,300	86 94 78	14 6 22

Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1964 and 1974.

corresponding figure from the 1971 Census although smaller than
the previous was still very large indeed (83%).

On the positive side, Greece has succeeded in the last
sixty years or so in raising the literacy rate from about 20
percent (%) to 86 percent (%) of the total population, aged 10
years and over. (See Table 3).[34] Also between the years 1961-
1971, Greece experienced an increase of about 34 percent (%)
in the number of graduates of secondary education and 41 percent
(%) increase in the number of graduates of higher education.[35]

Compared with other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Greece shows some very interesting results as well. For example, in the period 1951-1961, Greece's average annual compound growth rate in per capita educational attainment of the population aged 25-64 was the highest among 12 OECD countries (2.2). The corresponding rate for higher education was 5.2 followed by that of France 3.2 and Belgium 2.6. A similar pattern of rates appears for the period 1960-70. The average annual compound growth rate in higher education increased to 7.7 that was only second to Portugal (11.6), followed by that of Denmark (6.1) and Norway (4.9). (See Table 4 and Table 5). Those figures are more significant if one takes into consideration the fact that higher education in Greece is limited to the small number of students. More than 80 percent (%) of students competing to enter university or higher schools are denied entrance every year. Some of those students (if their families can afford it), seek entrance in foreign educational institutions. In 1971, for instance, Greek students represented over 19 percent (%) of the entire number of foreign students following courses in all European universities.[36] Other OECD estimates also show that by 1985 Greece might have up to 94 percent (%) of its youth enrolled in institutions of higher education, followed by the United States with 75 percent (%) of the equivalent age group, and, at a distance, by all other developed countries.[37]

This phenomenon of high propensity towards higher education in Greece has been given a number of explanations by

Table 4

Estimated Change in Average Per Capita Educational
Attainment of the Population Aged 25-64 Between
1950-1960

Average Annual Compound Growth Rate In:

		Total	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Belgium - a	1951-61	0.6	0.0	1.7	2.6
Canada	1951-61	0.6	0.3	1.2	1.1
Denmark	1951-61	0.3	0.0	0.4	1.1
France	1948-58	0.5	0.0	1.0	3.2
Greece	1951-61	2.2	1.7	4.2	5.2
Italy	1951-61	1.1	0.8	2.0	0.8
Japan	1950-60	1.1	0.2	3.0	3.2
Netherlands	1950-60	0.4	0.0	1.9	0.4
Norway - b	1950-60	0.3	0.0	2.2	1.2
Portugal	1950-60	1.8	1.7	2.5	0.0
U.K. - c	1951-61	0.3	0.0	0.6	2.1
U.S.A.	1950-60	0.8	0.3	1.4	2.7
AVERAGE		0.8	0.4	1.8	2.0

a - Age group 20-59

b - Age group 25-59

c - Excluding Northern Ireland

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Educational Statistics Yearbook (Paris: OECD, 1974),
Vol. I, p. 60.

Table 5

Estimated Change in Average Per Capita Educational
Attainment of the Population Aged 25-64 Between
1960-1970

Average Annual Compound Growth Rate In:

		Total	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Belgium - a	1961-71	0.8	0.0	1.8	4.7
Canada	1961-71	0.8	0.1	1.6	4.5
Denmark - a	1961-71	0.5	0.0	0.8	6.1
France	1958-68	0.6	0.0	1.3	3.1
Germany	1960-70	0.5	0.0	0.9	2.5
Greece	1961-71	2.2	1.4	4.5	7.7
Ireland	1956-66	0.2	0.0	0.5	1.8
Italy	1961-71	1.4	0.6	3.2	3.9
Japan	1960-70	1.1	0.0	2.7	4.8
Netherlands	1960-70	0.7	0.0	2.4	2.7
Norway - b	1960-70	0.6	0.0	3.3	4.9
Portugal	1960-70	2.8	1.7	6.1	11.6
Spain	1960-70	0.9	0.5	1.5	2.1
Sweden	1957-67	0.8	0.0	3.2	4.0
U.K. - c	1961-71	0.4	0.0	0.9	3.1
U.S.A.	1960-70	0.9	0.2	1.5	3.1
AVERAGE		1.0	0.3	2.3	4.4

a - Age Group 20-59
b - Age Group 25-59
c - Excluding Northern Ireland

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Educational Statistics Yearbook (Paris: OECD, 1974),
Vol. I, p. 61.

certain writers. Recent anthropological studies on Greece,
have underlined the willingness of poor peasant families to
undergo great economic sacrifices in order to ensure higher
education for their children. As Friedl points out, villagers
tend to respect an educated man and they believe that their
status and social environment can be changed radically through
"education (that) enables a person to pursue occupations which
... have greater prestige than farming ...".[38] This belief in
higher education is a result of the special environment of the
village and of the place it occupies in the total Greek social
structure. The teacher and the doctor who command high respect
and prestige in the village represent direct models for social
imitation to the peasants.

     These attitudes towards education are explained by
C. Tsoucalas in a socio-economic study in a slightly different
manner: during the entire 19th century a constant flow of
money into Greece, originating from rich Greeks abroad, accel-
erated monetarization which in turn accounted for the emergence
of an extended "rentier class" - a vast petty bourgeoisie. This
new class of urbanites that was in constant expansion featured
a different ideological and cultural background from that of the
peasantry. For the poor peasants to enter this new social world
there was a need to develop certain capacities that would enable
them to function properly in an environment so different from
their own. With the family being unable to provide them with
a new value system, education became more important.

     Education provided the basic mechanism for ascending

mobility on a massive scale precisely because of
the objective rapidity of the expansion of social
categories in which educational prerequisites
were of paramount importance. The traditional
readiness of poor families to assume untenable
financial burdens in order to ensure their son's
education, and the global propensity towards educa-
tion among the Greeks cannot be explained if one does
not consider the vast professional outlets education
provided for almost a century.[39]

As far as the educational opportunities are concerned

Greece is shown to be a "relatively open society with a not too

marked inequality of (such opportunities) ... between regions

and social classes."[40] Higher education is, for instance, more

open in Greece to those of the working and the peasant class

than is the case of other societies with important agrarian

sectors such as France.[41] This, of course, is partly due to

such reasons as the peasant's attitude towards education or

such historical conditions as the embourgeoisement of the pea-

santry via higher education described above.[42] What has to be

pointed out here is the fact that educational "openness" is not

always a good indicator of social mobility unless those who

acquire this education are absorbed by the economy. As Mouzelis

and Attalides noted

Greece, like many other developing countries, has a
pool of frustrated university graduates who cannot
find jobs appropriate to their training. Thus, while
the educational system is relatively open, the fierce
competition for jobs among graduates means that those
lacking wealth or social influence will find diffi-
culty in gaining social promotion.[43]

In terms of the political culture of the nation, these

last educational statistics seem to be of important value.

Following Almond and Verba, one can say that the high rate of

increase in enrolment in schools of higher education is a
positive sign for the level of political cognition and parti-
cipation.[44] The chances that these higher school graduates are
going to develop participant political orientations are defi-
nitely greater than those with elementary school education. So,
what can actually happen as educational attainment rises is a
gradual replacement of parochial orientations in favour of
participant ones. But in the case of Greece this development ·
is not as harmonious as it may sound. Failure of the economy to
absorb those who acquire higher education results in frustration
and alienation of such graduates. In this particular case,
higher education serves as a means of increasing the level of
negative evaluations toward the political structure. Incon-
gruence between political culture and structure becomes greater
as negative affects and evaluations grow in frequency. The end
result of this is an increased level of political instability.

     This section has shown that the school as an agent of
political socialization performs two main functions: first,
schools of elementary and secondary education are simply rein-
forcing traits and values learned in the home. The educational
curriculum is designed in a poor fashion. Valuable time is
wasted on a type of Classical-Byzantine education that in many
cases has no relevance to the job market. A good knowledge of
the glories of the Byzantine Empire, the love affairs of Cleo-
patra or the life stories of the Great Emperor X or Y is not
going to provide the student with the necessary qualifications
to find a job in a modern industrial world. Also, the super-

ficial teaching of civic education which concentrates on
definitions rather than a critical interpretation of past or
present political events is hardly the way through which
political knowledge and positive political orientations are
acquired by the future adult citizen of a democratic state.

Second, schools of secondary and higher education for the
most part perform what we can call an anti-state, anti-govern-
ment function. This phenomenon is basically due to a failure
of the political system to keep pace with modernization. For
instance, the various governments have consistently failed to
direct the students towards productive occupations (by not
making vocational schools more attractive and easier to follow).
The result of this has been a tendency towards traditional
education. In 1965, 44.5 percent (%) of students of higher
education enrolled in legal and social sciences which was the
highest percentage among selected OECD countries. At the same
time, the percentage of students enrolled in technological
sciences was the lowest among these countries (6.5%).[45] Failure
of the government to provide jobs for these social and legal
sciences graduates results in their frustration and alienation
from the political system. Therefore, with the government
failing to reorganize the educational structure (by not putting
emphasis on productive education) and with the percentage of
higher education graduates increasing every year, the level of
alienation rises proportionately.

From the above observations, one may conclude that in Greece
the state apparatus has consistently attempted to enhance

allegiance to the nation (by putting emphasis on cultural
heritage and classical education) while neglecting to cultivate
positive orientations towards itself, (by retaining an ana-
chronistic educational structure). Consequently, it should
not come as a surprise to anyone if the average Greek citizen
today tends to be more proud about his/her cultural heritage
or Greekness rather than his/her political institutions or
leaders.[46]

The Mass Media

,Attitudes and beliefs about the political system and the
role of the self in that system are being shaped and changed
throughout the life of an individual. An individual forms
opinions about politics at an early age. But such opinions are
constantly modified according to the information the individual
receives as he grows up. Writers such as Hirsch maintain that
the media "are generally more salient agents of information
transmission than the parents, peers or school."[47] So,
acceptance of values and political or economic systems within
a society, as Seymour-Ure would also agree, owe something to
"the sustained attention given to them in the mass media."[48]

In Greece, the mass media (especially newspapers) usually
perform one function: reinforcing previously held opinions
that pertain to basic orientations to politics. In some cases,
though, it can be said that the Greek newspapers may contribute
to the formation of certain orientations in regards to matters
which the readers have little or no familiarity with. In the

latter case, what usually happens is that the readers acquire
the wrong information from their papers. As one study[49] has
shown the Greek newspapers tend to highlight empty political
talk while being reticent with respect to concrete issues.
Also, they fail to communicate unbiassed information that will
enable the public to understand the limits of politics.

Historically, the newspapers have been preoccupied with
how "to establish grounds on which to attack, defame, discredit
and reject political opponents; justify and praise one's own
favourite party."[50] Instead of reaching out to the public with
common messages and suggestions as to how people with different
orientations can arrive at working arrangements on fundamental
political questions, the newspapers have contributed to the
maintenance of a fragmented political culture by encouraging
the readers to believe in terms of black and white. In the
past, "people were told that all evil haunting their lives was
to be attributed to the present or previous government, and
false hopes for immediate gratifications when the 'good guys'
would come in were instilled in the minds of many naive be-
lievers."[51]

This type of political reporting has usually been appealing
to the less educated and less informed citizens while it has
been looked upon with suspicion and mistrust by the more politi-
cally minded and highly educated individuals of Greek society.
In the latter case, other alternative sources of information and
communication rather than the newspapers may have been sought.
In addition to newspapers, the radio and lately television have

also failed to provide sufficiently objective political information to their audiences:

> Radio has been a harassed institution ever since its inception. In Greece, the radio always was and still is "his master's voice". It is always subjected to the political mentality of the incumbent party. The radio in Greece does not inform; it propagandizes awkwardly and gracelessly ... Governments consider the radio as their personal property to be used as a channel of praise for them and for anathema to opponents ...[52]

Similar comments could be made about television as well. The fact of the matter is that both radio and television according to the 1975 constitution, article 15, paragraph 2, are supposed to be "under the immediate control of the state". Today, radio and television are actually under the control of the governing party for propaganda purposes. Article 15 of the constitution that refers to the "objective transmission, on equal terms, of information and news reports ..." has been violated many times.

In all, as an agent of political socialization, the mass media in a subjective and distorted fashion of news coverage and in an inefficient and often false interpretation of political events, have contributed to the maintenance of fragmentation and dissensus in the political culture.

Summary

All three of the most important agents of political socialization described in this chapter seem to contribute to the cultivation of negative and parochial orientations in the political culture. In the family, the Greek children acquire

the parochial values of the peasants and pastoralists while at
the same time they learn to reach political positions through
the use of clientage networks and family connections. In the
school, they learn mostly how to be allegiant to the nation
rather than the state institutions. Finally, the mass media
also contribute to the maintenance of dissensus among the Greek
citizens through their insistence on distortive, inefficient and
false interpretation of news and political events. It shall be
the scope of the next chapter to find out the extent (if any)
to which the carriers of the dominant political orientations
(the political elite) have attempted in the past or are attempt-
ing in the present to mold and transform this fragmented culture
into a civic or an integrated one.

Notes

[1] Dean Jaros, Socialization to Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 23.

[2] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 323-74.

[3] See for instance, Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture" in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 154-60, for a discussion on German family structure and the rise of Hitler to power. For the relationship between father and son and the impact on later political behaviour, one may look at Robert H. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief", in Roberta S. Sigel, ed., Learning about Politics: A Reader in Political Socialization (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 119-31.

[4] Scott McNall, The Greek Peasant (Washington D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1974). See also his articles "Value Systems that Inhibit Modernization: The Case of Greece", Studies in Comparative International Development, 9 (1974), 46-63. And "Barriers to Development and Modernization in Greece", New York Academy of Sciences Annals, 268 (1976), 28-42.

[5] McNall, The Greek Peasant, p. 75.

[6] Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Chicago: The Free Press, 1958), p. 3.

[7] Ibid., pp. 85-104.

[8] Juliet Du Boulay, Portrait of a Greek Mountain Village (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 3.

[9] Ibid., p. 257.

[10] McNall, The Greek Peasant, p. 26. It is interesting to notice that in France children are socialized in a similar manner. Shame, ridicule, secrecy and suspicion of the motives of others (les autres) are the main products of the French socialization process. See John S. Ambler and Lawrence Scheinman, The Government and Politics of France (Boston; New York; Atlanta; Geneva, Ill.; Dallas; Palo Alto: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), pp. 51-53.

[11] For a similar view see Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967), p. 20.

[12] Adamantia Pollis, "Political Implications of the Modern Greek Concept of Self" in Roberta S. Sigel, ed., Learning About Politics, pp. 295-97.

[13] One may want to compare such attitudes with what the French call incivisme, lack of civic spirit. Much like the Greeks the French are known to mistrust their national government. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, pp. 53-57.

[14] Legg, Politics, p. 251.

[15] Ibid., p. 251.

[16] Ibid., p. 273.

[17] David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6, No. 3 (1962), 236.

[18] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 379. See, also pp. 380-81.

[19] V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961), pp. 323-43. Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 133.

[20] Giuseppe Di Palma, Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1970), Table 4-1, p. 78.

[21] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 382.

[22] C. Arnold Anderson, "Education and Political Development: Reactions to a Conference" quoted in James S. Coleman, ed., Education and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 22.

[23] Coleman, ibid., p. 23.

[24] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, p. 361.

[25] Psomas, "The Nation", p. 352.

[26] Ibid., pp. 352-56.

[27] Authoritarianism in schools is, also, observed in other western countries such as France. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, p. 68.

[28] Almond and Verba found out that adults who remembered taking part in classroom discussions and school debates tended to score high on political efficacy. The Civic Culture, pp. 323-74.

[29] Psomas, "The Nation", p. 357.

[30] Some of the information presented here is based on my personal experience in a secondary school in Greece.

[31] According to the new reforms, free education at all levels that had started under Papandreou (1964), is guaranteed for all students. Also the 1975 constitution (Article 16, Paragraph 3), defines that "The number of years of compulsory education shall not be less than 9".

[32] Katharevousa is, in fact, an artificial language that was developed by a Greek intellectual named Korais during the 18th century. To preserve Greek nationality under Turkish domination, he believed it necessary to make over the Greek language on the model of classical Greek. Katharevousa became a mixture of ancient Greek and the spoken language of the educated middle classes.

[33] Christos P. Frangos, He Epidrase tes Glossikes Morphes tou Keimenou sten Anagnose ton Matheton kai sten Katanoese (The Influence of the Language Form of the Text Upon Pupil Reading and Comprehension) (Ioannina: Psychological and Educational Laboratory of the University of Ioannina, 1972).

[34] For 1979 the figure of literacy rate is actually higher (over 90%).

[35] Percentages here have been computed on the basis of the statistical figures of Table 2.

[36] C. Tsoucalas, "Some Aspects of 'Over-Education' in Modern Greece", New York Academy of Sciences Annals, 268 (1976), 419, Footnote 1.

[37] Ibid., p. 419.

[38] Ernestine Friedl, Vasilika: A Village in Modern Greece (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 49.

[39] Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", p. 426.

[40] See for instance, Jane Lambiri-Dimaki, "Regional, Sex, and Class Distribution Among Greek Students: Some Aspects of Inequality of Educational Opportunities", New York Academy of Sciences Annals, 268 (1976), 385-94. See also, J. Lambiri-Dimaki, Pros mian Helleniken Koinoniologian tes Paideias (Towards a Greek Sociology of Education), 2 vols. (Athens:

National Center of Social Research, 1974).

[41] Lambiri-Dimaki, "Inequality of Educational Opportunities", p. 392.

[42] See Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", pp. 419-28. See also the article by the same writer, "He Anotate Ekpaideuse sten Hellada hos Mechanismos Koinonikes Anaparagoges"("Higher Education in Greece as a Mechanism of Social Reproduction"), Deukalion, 4, No. 13 (March 1975), 18-33.

[43] N. Mouzelis and M. Attalides, "Greece", in Margaret Scotford Archer and Salvador Giner, eds., Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 190.

[44] Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 323-74.

[45] Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", p. 422.

[46] The French are, also, known to be more proud about their cultural heritage and nation than their political system and politicians. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, p. 56.

[47] Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 120.

[48] Colin Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media (London: Constable, 1974), p. 36.

[49] Demetrios G. Carmocolias, Political Communication in Greece, 1965-1967 (Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1974), p. 130.

[50] Ibid., p. 131.

[51] Ibid., p. 132.

[52] For more information, see Eleftherotypia, a monthly journal, issues of October 1963-March 1967.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL ELITE

In political culture studies elites are usually the focus
of attention for

> their political values, attitudes and behaviours are
> most likely to set the dominant political style and
> tone of a nation's civic life, to determine the system's
> response to internal and external stress, to define
> the critical political values of a nation, and to
> shape the future political orientations and experi-
> ences of the masses.[1]

By comparing elite and mass political culture patterns one may
draw useful conclusions regarding the stability of a political
system. In such a case, it is commonly assumed that the smal-
ler the gap between elite and mass political culture, the
greater the stability of the political order may be.

The concept of elites has been defined in a number of
various ways by classical and contemporary elite scholars.
Both Mosca and Pareto advanced the thesis that all societies can
be divided into two classes - a class that rules and a class
that is ruled. Mosca stated that "the first class, always the
less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the
second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by
the first."[2] Pareto who designated the ruling group as a
"governing elite" thus distinguishing it from a non-governing
elite noted that in the so-called democratic governments such
a group is the parliament.[3]

Contemporary scholars described elites in some of the
following ways. C. Wright Mills wrote of a "power elite"

meaning those "political, economic and military circles which
as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions
having at least national consequences."[4] **T.B. Bottomore**
considered elites as "functional, mainly occupational, groups
which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society."[5]
G. William Domhoff defined the American power elite as "persons
who are in command positions in institutional hierarchies
controlled by members of the American upper-class."[6]

     For purposes of this study, the term political elite is
used to refer to a group of individuals who possess most
political power, are most active in political affairs and who
make most important political decisions. **The political elite,**
therefore, includes top political leaders and cabinet ministers,
parliamentary deputies and higher civil servants.

The Pre-1974 Political Elites

     As it was shown in Chapter II, during and after the Greek
revolution of 1821, out of which the modern Greek state was
born, two distinct elites with divergent interests competed for
power: the traditional and the modernized elite. In the
struggle for power, this last group originally succeeded (with
the help of the Great Powers) in imposing their will and
introducing western governmental institutions to a predominantly
traditional society. But their excessive dependence on the
Great Powers in their war against the Turks and the traditional
elite brought about their own destruction. **The absolute**
monarchy imposed by these powers in 1832 curtailed the moderni-

zers' attempts to establish truly democratic political institu-
tions in the country. This failure was also caused by strong
opposition from the traditional elite who were interested in
perpetuating their rule and by the parochial population who
could not accept the legitimacy of such "foreign" institutions.
Thus, by the 1860's, the westernized political elite lost power
to the old traditional elite. The Peloponnesian notables, the
mountain chiefs, the Aegean merchants and all those leaders
who participated in the war of independence eventually occupied
the parliamentary institutions. The imported state institu-
tions continued to exist but unlike their western counterparts,
they were used by the elite for patronage purposes. The
incumbent of a public office became in reality a patron to whom
each voter owed loyalty.[7] **Confidence of the people toward the**
office holder was, thus, enhanced at the expense of confidence
toward the state structure or the democratic process.

But this type of non-confidence towards the institutions
did not produce any major shocks to the political system at
least not until the latter part of the century. The elite
political culture was fairly compatible with the nation's
political culture. There were no serious attempts made by the
ruling elite to politicize the masses and to create positive
political orientations towards the state. The traditional
value systems of the peasants and pastoralists remained basical-
ly unchallenged while patron-client relationships continued to
flourish under the dome of participant institutions. As long
as the level of demands to the political system remained low,

and such demands could be satisfied through patronage networks
the stability of the system was ensured.

In the last decades of the century, though, as a result of
changes in the social structure the composition of the politi-
cal elite changed as well. An increase in the new class of
professionals (especially lawyers) graduating from the
national university, in Athens and a rise of the level of pea-
sant demands to the political system, set the scene for crisis
in the traditional elite. Practicing lawyers and members of
the business sector started replacing old revolutionary leaders'
children in a number of political offices. The acquisition
of new land, the development of an extensive transport system,
and the creation of a unified internal market also brought
about the appearance of new groups in the political arena,
especially members of the rising bourgeoisie. Unlike the old
elite, the political culture of the transformed elite had
acquired to a great extent, "westernized" or participant fea-
tures. Leaders such as Trikoupis and later Venizelos "were
motivated by a powerful desire to 'westernize' Greece and made
serious efforts to realize their vision."[8]

In the beginning of the 20th century, the political elite
was further transformed due to changes in the domestic and
international scene. The 1897 unsuccessful campaign against
Turkey led to a defeat and to the establishment of an Interna-
tional Finance Commission that supervised the payment of the
indemnity (to the Turks) and of other economic loans. This
meant an increase of taxes on an already heavily burdened

population. The poor peasants and workers were once more hit much harder than their rich countrymen. Much of the government revenue was to come from indirect taxation on consumer goods.

Opposition to the political elite grew stronger with the appearance of certain daily newspapers such as Astrapis, Athenai, Esperini, Chronos and Akropolis that spoke out against the old parties and attempted to politicize the masses. Also, a significant increase in the spread of socialist ideas took place with the emergence of such journals as Erevna (Inquiry) and Epitheoresis ton Koinonikon kai Nomikon Epistemon (Review of Social and Legal Sciences). Criticism of the existing political practices had in turn its impact on the nature of Greek parliamentary politics. An energetic opposition to the old parties led by Stephen Dragoumis emerged in the Boule (parliament) which demanded "efficiency and high-principled methods in politics and public administration".[9]

Failure of the Greek parliamentary system to deal effectively with such critical problems as a worsening economy, the Cretan issue and other irredentist programmes led to frustration and disenchantment of the people expressed in street demonstrations, petitions, journalistic criticism and appeals to the king.[10] This situation was followed by the intervention of the Military League in politics with the intention to "devote themselves to the immediate and speedy rectification of the evil state of affairs, especially as regards the army and navy".[11]

The composition of the political elite up to 1940 changed significantly with the addition of new men with military and professional backgrounds. Also, unlike the previous periods, the top political leadership's character of education changed considerably. According to Legg, 77.4 percent (%) of the top leadership had studied law, most of them abroad (61.3% of the total),[12] which means that they usually came from rich families that could afford to send their children abroad for study. The traditional political elites gave way to the "new" men: lawyers, doctors, and nouveaux riches merchants.

The political culture of this new group was a mixed culture but of the fragmented type. There was no consensus among the country's leadership on such basic questions as the form of government, economic policies to be followed or even the notion of what Greece is or should be. The political elite was deeply divided among royalists and republicans, traditionalists and westernizers, authoritarians and democrats.[13] The legitimacy of the political system was, therefore, constantly challenged by the clashes of the political elite members and by the frequent military coups of the mid-war period.

In the post World War II years, the composition and the nature of the political elite was somewhat altered. After the defeat of the left-wing forces in the Greek civil war of the 1940's, the political elite was originally composed of old traditional elements, politicians whose major concerns were still patronage and the pursuit of office. In the late 1950's, though, social mobilization and the expansion of education

produced more citizens who sought political careers as well as others whose demands could not be satisfied in a traditional manner. This resulted in further pressures for elite transformation and the accommodation of new groups in the political system.

The early 1960's signalled the advent of new forces in the political arena. Leftist and progressive individuals who questioned the legitimacy of the entire political system begun slowly to occupy legislative positions. Unlike their colleagues who mostly advocated political democracy only in words while operating through clientage networks, these new members of the Greek parliament sought to eliminate the essential element of Greek politics - the clientage system.[14] Their emphasis was on the formation of modern organizations, rapid economic development, expansion of education, income redistribution, raising the standard of living of the peasants and other lower economic groups through tax benefits and social insurance schemes, etc., etc.[15]

Competition between traditional and new parliamentary forces led to a climate of political instability in the mid-1960's that facilitated the intervention of the Greek military in April of 1967. At that time, the military viewed itself as a threatened group existing in a society mesmerized by corrupt politicians who were supported and abetted by their respective clientele groups. The political instability resulting from fragmentation of political opinions into hostile political factions created for them the opportunity for intervention.[16]

Greece's new military elite was dedicated to the defense
and preservation of a rather nebulous ideal called "Greek
Christian Civilization". The members of this elite, who
lacked educational and cultural refinement, were actually
opposed to any real change despite the fact that they talked
about a "revolution of modernity".[17] Judging from their
actions, one may suggest that their political culture and the
mass culture they sought to produce was that of the subject
kind. The ruling elite expected the citizens not to actively
involve themselves in the political process but rather to obey
and conform to the directives of the organs of the state. Of
course, as a result of such policies many progressive indivi-
duals were ultimately alienated from the political system.

The Contemporary Scene: An Evaluation of the Political Elite

In the post 1974 period, new political groups with ideolo-
gies stressing new goals and institutions emerged in the
political arena. Also, most of the old traditional parliamen-
tary parties reappeared under different names and with slightly
modified goals. The legislative elite underwent a number of
significant changes, especially after the 1977 election. For
the first time in ten years, a polarization of political forces
took place. In Greece, today, there is a ruling Conservative
Party (New Democracy) and a radical social democratic opposi-
tion (Panhellenic Socialist Movement-PASOK) that could provide a
credible alternative government. According to some political
observers this last election "has changed the fragmented

political scene into something much closer to the two big
parties system known to the British, the Germans and the
Americans."[18]

This is a very optimistic view which is based upon one
particular event: the 1977 election results. As we shall see
later, the present political elite is polarized only in the
sense that its actors are classified into "good guys" and "bad
guys" (governmental and counter-elites). Otherwise, the
political elite continues to be fragmented. From the past to
the present, there has never been a consensus among the Greek
elites concerning their attitudes towards institutions of
government or their attitudes towards social and economic
reforms. The governmental elites which have been dominated by
traditional parliamentary groups tend to see Greece as a kind
of a modern liberal state and their own group as an integral
part of western civilization. In explaining the contrast
between the operation of Greek institutions and the operation of
those in western states, these elites put the blame on the
peasantry and their parochial value systems. Other times, they
may offer another reason such as the problem of scarcity in
Greek society. Although admitting the existence of such a
problem, these members of the elite have consistently failed to
solve it by avoiding to implement the necessary reforms.

The majority of the politicians of these traditional groups
reach the top through such channels as family ties or patron-
client affiliations. **Family ties have tended to play an impor-**
tant role in political recruitment[19] in developed and developing

societies such as Morocco, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Ireland,
Republican China, Holland and U.S.A. For example, 43 percent
(%) of the cabinet ministers who ruled Holland between 1848
and 1958 were bound by kinship to other ministers, while 1/10th
of all U.S. Congressmen from 1790 to 1960 had relatives who
also served in Congress.[20]

In Greece, members of left-wing political groups usually
reach positions of power through different political avenues
from those of the traditional parliamentary groups. Deputies
of these political parties acquire a substantial local party
experience before becoming electoral candidates. This, of
course, does not exclude the fact that for some left-wing
deputies, political family ties are also important. In the case
of these elites, dissatisfaction with the political system and
a sense of obligation enunciated in class terms tend to be the
major components of their personal predispositions.[21] Their
attitudes and beliefs towards the political system are also
different from those of the traditional conservative parties.
These counter-elites feel that the political institutions of the
country are malfunctioning and that modernization can be
achieved not through empty speeches about democracy and western
civilization, but rather through some real social and economic
reforms.

The traditional political parties derive most of their
support from the advantaged groups of Greek society and from
many peasants and non-class-conscious workers. In the latter
case, the traditional parliamentarians have been successful in

·manipulating the vote of the underprivileged through a number
of clientelistic networks thus preventing, to a great extent,
the organization of these groups into autonomous political
parties. The main characteristic of these traditional parties,
New Democracy and EDEK (Union of Democratic Centre) for
instance, is that they are particularly strong in the rural
areas, especially in such regions as Peloponnesos, Central
Greece and Thessaly.

The more modernized left-wing political parties (PASOK and
the two Communist ones) are mostly appealing to the urban
working classes, university students, intellectuals and small
entrepreneurs. Unlike the two communist parties which are
particularly strong in the Athens-Piraeus area and Salonica,
PASOK has also succeeded in the last two elections, to increase
its support among many peasants in the rural areas. One
explanation to this phenomenon is the growing dissatisfaction
of the masses toward the present government that has failed to
do away with inflation and raise the standard of living of the
lower socio-economic groups. Thus, PASOK with its emphasis on
radical socio-economic reforms has become more appealing to the
underprivileged groups of Greek society.

In the battle for votes, PASOK has had a clear advantage
over the communist parties, not because it had to offer a better
programme or it was better organized than the communists, but
rather because of the following two reasons: First, many of
the PASOK candidates were either old parliamentary deputies
from the party of Centre Union (EK) or relatives of such

politicians who already possessed strong political followings.
Second, PASOK never had to be the victim of false propaganda
and persecution that the communists went through after their
defeat in 1949 and up until the legalization of their party in
1974. **The younger Papandreou had to start only where the older**
had left off.

Looking at the present political parties in Greece, one
may safely say that the two communist ones are the only parties
that are organized along class lines. The other traditional
parties and to a much lesser extent the more modernized party
of PASOK are still organized along vertical clientelistic lines.
As discussed elsewhere (Chapter III), patron-client relation-
ships continue to be the very element of Greek politics.

In an attempt to further evaluate the contemporary
political elite one may also notice that this elite is in some
ways polarized. **Its actors are sharply classified into "good**
guys" and "bad guys". Compromising with one's opponents is
usually considered dangerous because it inevitably risks the
betrayal of one's own side. This is partly due to the fact that
the members of the elite differ in their political world views,
ideologies and programmes. For instance, the opposition party
of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement preaches a totally
different ideology from that of the government party of New
Democracy. **The socialists have repeatedly maintained that if**
they were to form a government in the future, they would intro-
duce a number of changes in some of the following areas:
foreign policy, economy, and the political system.[22]

The PASOK would ensure the final and total withdrawal of Greece from NATO. This would be based on the principle that such military alliances are a threat to world peace and to national self-determination.[23] The entrance of Greece into the European Economic Community would also be prevented for under such an arrangement Greece would be unable to follow a truly independent foreign policy.

> The entrance (of Greece) into the EEC will make permanent the peripheral, satellite role of the country, it will make the national, economic and social programmes for the development of Greece impossible (to be achieved), it will create deadly dangers for the Greek industry and, with the exception of some agricultural products, it will lead to the destruction of Greek agriculture and the devastation of the countryside.[24]

According to PASOK, the correct solution would be a development of relations with the EEC in the framework of a new special arrangement (of the Norwegian kind) that would allow Greece to go ahead with its national, social and economic programmes and to control the movement of its goods and capital.

The PASOK also promises to give moral, political and economic support to the Cypriot people and their government for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Their emphasis is on the creation of a truly independent Cyprus where Greek and Turkish Cypriots would co-exist and cooperate within the framework of one state. And finally, in other areas of foreign policy, a PASOK government would, according to their programmes, recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization as a true representative of the Palestinian people; they would support any liberation movement against alleged racist regimes and they would recog-

nize such governments as those of Vietnam and Cambodia.[25]

For the realization of economic democracy, PASOK promises to introduce a number of measures among of which are the following: a gradual socialization of basic economic sectors such as banks, insurances, mass transportation and communication, big industries such as those of ship, steel, cement, fertilizer and all others that are concerned with such things as national defense. Big foreign industries would be subject to such a "socialization" with proper indemnity and would also be subject to a number of new laws designed to strengthen the Greek economy.[26] **New measures would be introduced with regard** to agriculture, fisheries, industrial production, tourism, energy and transportation, all designed to improve the economy.

For political democracy PASOK would propose a new constitution that would guarantee mass participation in the exercise of power through decentralization to strengthen the role of local administration. This new constitution would also improve and change the relations between Parliament and the Executive and transfer the powers of the President to the government that enjoys the support of the people. Changes would also be introduced in the areas of public administration, regional organization, the security corps, mass media, etc., etc.

These are some of the areas in which the socialists differ from the present governmental elite of the New Democracy party,[27] the most important being the policies concerning EEC, NATO, the constitution and the socialization of basic economic sectors. The present governmental elite is, of course, in

favour of the accession of Greece to the EEC, the continuation
of membership in NATO, the total support for the 1975 constitu-
tion (which it introduced and approved) and finally it is not
prepared to take any decisions or measures that would be
directed against private enterprise or foreign capital such as
the socialization of basic economic sectors proposed by the
socialists.

The forementioned discussion poses some interesting ques-
tions: are the socialists going to get 'the support needed in
the next general elections to form a government? Provided that
they do, how much of their programmes are they going to imple-
ment? Will they have all the necessary resources to go about
implementing their goals? Will they be able to further
democratize the political institutions and increase the level of
confidence of the population towards such institutions? What
will the reaction of the traditional parliamentary forces be
toward the reformist policies of a socialist government? And
finally, will a new, transformed political elite be successful
in maintaining a climate of political stability while working
towards the creation of a mass political culture compatible with
the regime?

These are some of the questions that will probably be
answered in the not too distant future. The reality of the
present, though, is that the country's political leadership is
more or less divided with regard to basic political and econo-
mic questions. Both governmental and counter-elites assume
that conflict is the essence of politics and that public affairs

is inevitably a kind of a "zero-sum" game in which the gains of one person or group are the losses of another. For the Greek elites, the size of the social pie is fixed and therefore conflict about the slices is inevitable. **According to them,** economic policies do inevitably favour some groups or classes at the expense of others.

There are a number of explanations for this type of cognitive **orientations on the part of the political elite.** One may search for the origin of such orientations concerning conflict in the way Greek individuals are socialized in the family. We have already seen that the Greek child growing up in the family acquires many peasant values and beliefs. **One of such beliefs** is the so-called "Image of the Limited Good" according to which goods exist in finite quantities and are always in short supply. **Based on this idea, it seems logical to expect that a** class can improve its position only at the expense of others. Another explanation for the sensitivity of the political elite to conflict may be sought in the Greek economy itself. **The** socio-economic "pie" in Greece seems to be small and very unequally distributed. **According to a recent estimate,** 40 percent (%) of the lowest income groups received 9.5 percent (%) of the national income (after deduction of taxes and social benefits), whereas 17 percent (%) in the top income brackets received 58 percent (%).[28]

The cognitive predispositions of politicians in many cases may also be the product of changes in the social environment. Future politicians who are just reaching adulthood now may bear

the marks of a present conflict when they assume positions of leadership at the turn of the next century.[29] On this assumption, the Greek politicians of today, may have been influenced by certain historical events or conflicts that were taking place at the time they were entering adulthood. The civil war of the 1940's seems in some respects to have influenced the attitudes of many older members of the contemporary political elite.

Finally, cognitive orientations regarding conflict may be related to a politician's ideological or social background. It is assumed here that members of left-wing parties might be more sensitive to conflict, namely class conflict, than members of other parties. On the same token, "the lower a politician's social origins, the more likely he is to have a conflictful image of society."[30]

From the above discussion, one gets the impression that the political orientations of the elite much like those of the masses seem to have been influenced by historical experience, socialization patterns and socio-economic variables. As a result of all these influences, the elite political culture is also a fragmented one. The political elite, although preaching participatory democracy, is not in actual fact practicing it. In many respects, it seems to operate in a semi-modern and at times a very authoritarian non-democratic fashion. This can be easily depicted by looking at the structure of the political parties.

Most of the political parties, with the exception of the

left, consist of "political oligarchs and factional leaders, each with his own set of parliamentary deputies as clients and with similar ties of mutual obligation reaching into other sectors of the society: banking and industry, the bureaucracy and the academic world."[31] These parties are nothing else but formal unions of personal local interests that are more or less forced into becoming parties due to the existence of parliamentary institutions.

Common characteristic of all parties with the exception of the two communist ones is that they are not membership parties. They do not have any real long run objectives, they are not manned with any experts in or out of the parliament and in reality they receive their information on dealing with the every day problems from the daily press.[32] All of the political parties, with the exception of PASOK and the Communist Party of the "Interior" (KKE es), constitute old party formations with different titles. Three of the parties, New Democracy, EDEK (Union of Democratic Centre) and the newly born EP (National Camp) are of bourgeois character, while PASOK preaches a peculiar socialism and EDA (United Democratic Left) appears as a moderate socialist party. In addition, the two communist parties present deep ideological and political differences followed by other groups such as "Initiative", a social democratic Scandinavian type group, and the "Socialist Course" that has been deeply influenced by the teachings of Rosa Luxemburg.[33]

One of the main declarations of the three biggest parties (New Democracy, PASOK, EDEK) when they were first established

in 1974 was that they would be organized in such a way as to guarantee the operation of democratic proceedings within them (intra-party democracy). None of these parties kept their promise. Today all of them are "leader-dominated". Their programmes and their principles are decided basically by the leader and other persons who have been selected by him and enjoy his absolute confidence. The leader constitutes the main source of power which is reflected to his confidants and the people who surround him, always according to the interdependence principles between the politician, the party official and the citizen.[34]

The absence of intra-party democracy and the monopolization of power by the leader have significant impact on the nature of the democratic institutions. Policy decisions of the governing party are actually taken by the leader and his small group of confidants. In this sense, one notices an evolution of parliamentary democracy into an autarchic "prime minister's democracy." Attempts for the formation of genuine and realistic alternative solutions to any problem are rarely made, for the Parliament itself and the public soon get used to this authoritarian way of governing and being governed.[35]

Also, in anything but a modern democratic manner, the governing party selects those who are going to fill key positions in the administration of public offices and organizations. Criterion for selection is not merit or expertise, but rather the total devotion of the appointee to the person (leader) who appoints him and to all those who surround such a person. Thus,

top political positions are filled by people from the governing
party. These individuals come from many classes and they do
not necessarily represent the interests of any social class in
particular. Most of them have usually reached a position of
high status in society and they are bound together by common
interests and mutual obligations.

What often happens is the transformation of these persons
into a kind of "servants of authority"[36] with a highly developed
elasticity toward the "master" they serve. This is indeed a
phenomenon of a clientelistic polity where

> the tie with central authority tends to be personal,
> at the end of a big chain of personal relationships.
> The institutions and generalized rules, whose accep-
> tance forms the basis of legitimate authority in
> western democratic systems, remain with little or no
> legitimacy in Greece.[37]

This last analysis of elite behaviour shows that the
political elite is highly responsible for the perpetuation of
clientage relationships and the failure of the democratic
institutions to acquire legitimacy in the country. Through
their actions, the politicians have reinforced peasant values
in regards to the importance of "connections" in society while
at the same time they have alienated the democratically oriented
portion of the population.

Summary

In the historical section of this chapter, we have wit-
nessed a parade of political elites who have been confused as
to what the form of government should be, what policies to take

regarding the economy, how to react to foreign domination and
interference in the internal scene and how to maintain stability
and order in society.

We have also noticed from the other section that fragmen-
tation was not only a thing of the past but that indeed it is
present in the contemporary scene as well. Today, the members
of the political elite are highly sensitive to conflict, they
despise cooperation and in many respects, they do not do very
much to increase the confidence of the population toward the
state institutions. For the people, this fragmentation means
that they are left without a single political culture model for
imitation or a united political leadership for direction.

Notes

[1] Rosenbaum, _Political Culture_, p. 26.

[2] Gaetano Mosca, _The Ruling Class_, transl. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.

[3] Vilfredo Pareto, _The Mind and Society_, transl. Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935), p. 1573.

[4] C. Wright Mills, _The Power Elite_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 18.

[5] T.B. Bottomore, _Elites and Society_ (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 8.

[6] G. William Domhoff, _Who Rules America?_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 8.

[7] Legg, _Politics_, p. 311.

[8] Mouzelis, _Modern Greece_, p. 21.

[9] S. Victor Papacosma, _The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'Etat_ (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1977), p. 32.

[10] Ibid., p. 46.

[11] Ibid., pp. 190-91.

[12] Legg, _Politics_, p. 303, Table 12-3.

[13] This is particularly true with the legislative rather than the governmental elites.

[14] Legg, _Politics_, p. 313.

[15] Jean Meynaud, _Politikes Dynameis Sten Hellada (The Political Forces in Greece)_ 2nd ed. (Athens: Byron, 1974), pp. 192-229.

[16] James Brown, "The Military", pp. 133-215.

[17] P.J. Vatikiotis, _Greece: A Political Essay_ (Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications, 1974), pp. 36-37.

[18] See "Greece Fits the Mould" in _The Guardian_ (weekly), Manchester, England, Nov.27, 1977. Also, Nicholas Gage, "Greek Vote Result Shows Trend Toward Polarization", in _The New York Times_, Nov. 22, 1977, p. 3.

[19] Political recruitment refers to the processes through which a small number of socially favoured and politically motivated citizens reach positions of significant political and national influence.

[20] Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 61.

[21] Legg, *Politics*, p. 263.

[22] See PASOK, *Kateuthynteries Grammes Kybernetikes Politikes tou Panelleniou Socialistikou Kinematos (Directing Lines of Governmental Policy of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement)* (Athens: PASOK, 1977).

[23] Ibid., pp. 13-15.

[24] Ibid., p. 19.

[25] Ibid., p. 23.

[26] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[27] For more on the programmes of the socialists and their differences with the present government, see Andreas G. Papandreou, *Metabase sto Socialismo: Problemata kai Strategike gia to Helleniko Kinema (Transition to Socialism: Problems and Strategy for the Greek Movement)* (Athens: Aichme, 1978).

[28] D. Karageorgas, "The Distribution of Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece", *Economic Journal*, 83, No. 330 (1973), 436-48. See especially p. 447 Table IV.

[29] Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 147.

[30] Ibid., p. 129.

[31] Legg, "Clientelistic Polity", p. 239.

[32] P. Bakogiannis, *Anatomia tes Hellenikes Politikes (Anatomy of Greek Politics)* (Athens: Papazese, 1977), pp. 243-44.

[33] Ibid., p. 242.

[34] Ibid., p. 243.

[35] Ibid., p. 249.

36 _Ibid._, p. 252.

37 Legg, "Clientelistic Polity", p. 234.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study, Greece presented a classic example of a
highly traditional society upon which western democratic
institutions were imposed. The problems of political instabili-
ty and legitimacy crisis that this country has been confronted
with, since its birth as a modern state, have been in many
respects typical of societies in which the political culture
is incongruent with the political structure.

Here, we have seen how a predominantly parochial culture
acquired additional participant or subject features under the
influence of certain historical events. Also, we have seen how
foreign interference in the political life of the country,
economic crises and civil wars have contributed to the develop-
ment of alienated political orientations among **certain members**
of the population.

The present work has been useful for it has helped us
confirm some of our propositions regarding the complexity of the
development of political orientations. It has been demonstrated
that the political orientations of an individual are influenced
not only by his historical experience, but also by his socio-
economic position in society. So, the unequal distribution of
wealth, power and status in Greece can be seen as another reason
for the existence of fragmentation in that culture.

Political culture writers agree that a political culture
is usually shaped and transmitted from generation to generation
through the agents of political socialization. We have noticed

that in Greece socialization is a conservative process. The
political culture is mostly transmitted rather than shaped by
such agents as family, school and mass media. Mistrust, lack
of cooperation, selfishness, and extreme individualism are some
of the orientations that are usually passed on to the new genera-
tions.

Part of the responsibility for the maintenance of such orien-
tations in the political culture lies with the political elite
of the country. They have failed to find ways of increasing
the confidence of the populace toward the state institutions.
The school system is one example of such a failure. The elite
have been preoccupied with the preservation of a totally unpop-
ular form of language and an anachronistic educational curricu-
lum. As, we have seen, some of the results of such tactics
have been the divorce of state from society and the enhancement
of negative orientations toward the state institutions.

The elite have also failed in many other areas such as to
respond to the demands and needs of the populace, to define the
critical political values of the nation and to provide a
dominant political culture model for the people. **Some of their**
failures can be explained by the fact that the elite themselves
have been brought up in the same fragmented culture and there-
fore, their behaviour and attitudes may in many ways, resemble
those of the masses. Indeed, most of them have reached top
political positions through the use of clientage networks:
yesterday's clients have become today's patrons.

From such positions of power, most of the members of the

political elite have been unwilling or unable to democratize
the state apparatus and do away with the clientage system.
The reason is that in all clientage relationships, there are
rules and obligations that both patrons and clients must keep
and fulfil. Therefore, turning against such a system would
almost mean the end of a person's political career for he would
alienate his clients and aggrevate other most powerful patrons
above him. This may explain why most of the politicians of the
traditional or governing parties who reach political positions
through family and other connections are unwilling to democra-
tize the political structure. Conversely, politicians of the
left who reach the top through other routes are most eager to
abolish the very elements of Greek politics - the clientage
system.

What we have talked about, here, is indeed a case of how a
political culture can influence the development of political
institutions and vice versa. On the one hand, the existence of
clientage networks is a good proof of the fact that the imported
western institutions failed to develop and become legitimate due
to the parochial and extremely fragmented nature of the politi-
cal culture. On the other hand, the permeation of modern
institutions by patron-client ties, resulted in a slowing down
of the modernization process, a perpetuation of parochial and
subject values and in an increased alienation of the modern and
participant elements of the population. After adding to all
this, the historical experience factors, the socialization
patterns, the elite fragmentation and all the other aforemen-

tioned variables, it becomes easier to understand why after more than 150 years of development, the Greek political culture continues to be fragmented.

For this study, the political culture approach has been useful in making us realize that the attitudes and beliefs of the elites and the masses in regards to the political system and the role of themselves in that system determine to a large extent the development and stability of such a system. Greek history has shown that the elite political culture has been much more of a direct threat to the political stability than the mass political culture. Many of the political crises have taken place as a result of hostile clashes between members of the elite. Also, military coups have occurred partly due to the fact that the various political elites have failed to keep the army at the barracks rather than the political arena. There are, of course, many other crises of economic and political nature that took place in Greece which cannot be explained simply by the use of a political culture method. Some of those have been influenced by international events, by foreign interference in the internal political scene, by world economic crises, etc., etc. Others, again, have been associated with problems of underdevelopment or they have been the product of growing intensity of class struggles. For those cases, a developmental or a class analysis may be more appropriate than a political culture one.

Based on the proposition that a fragmented political culture poses a threat to the stability of the political system,

one may attempt to predict the political future of Greece by
looking at the present political culture. The question here
is as to whether or not this apparent stability which exists
since 1974, is going to endure for a long time. This is where
the political culture approach can be put to a test. Taking
into consideration, the fact that both elite and mass political
cultures are fragmented, one should expect the present stability
not to last for very long. This, of course, is based on the
principle that political instability is often the rule in
countries in which there is an incongruence between political
culture and political structure.

     Will today's political elite sort out their differences
and change their attitudes and beliefs to such an extent as to
prevent future clashes among them? Will they help transform this
fragmented culture into a civic one through a successful "fusion"
of traditional and participant orientations? And finally, will
they learn that cooperation with a political opponent is not
a vice but an essential virtue of every democratic citizen?

     It is very doubtful that such a change will take place in
the near future. Unfortunately, there are already enough signs
showing that Greece may be headed into a new political crisis.
I am referring specifically to certain events that took place
in the last two years. For example, between February 16th,
1976 and December 17th, 1978 at least seventy bombs were set in
different areas of Athens and Piraeus by the members of a
fascist terrorist group called Organization for National Restor-
ation.[1] As of February of 1979, there were indications that

key army officers were also involved in these activities.
Following the arrest of some of these officers, the government
turned its attention against left-wing sympathizers. The ass-
assination of a key witness regarding the terrorist conspiracy
was blamed on "leftists and anarchists". According to
representatives of the opposition parties, this move on the part
of the government had been intentional in order to cover up the
fascist and terrorist activities which officers from the Army
and the Security Corps were involved in.[2]

The present government has actually been criticized many
times in regards to its policies concerning the military and the
former supporters of the 1967 junta. Since 1974, the opposi-
tion parties have been complaining for the failure of the
Karamanlis government to "de-juntize" so to speak the state
mechanism. New evidence on the activities of the military shows
that such accusations have been correct. A new military plan
called "EPSILON" similar to the plan "PROMETHEUS" of the 1967
coup, that provides for the military intervention - "in times of
need" - in the political life of the country, was recently
discovered.[3] It is difficult to say to what extent this new
discovery will alarm the present government to take the
necessary steps to prevent a new coup.

We can only hope that future stability will somehow be
assured and that true democracy will once again evolve in its
place of birth. Some of the more optimistic political observers
feel that the realization of this task is very near. Greece is
expected to become a full member of the EEC by 1981, a move by

which democracy is to be consolidated in that country.

Approximately eight months after Greece's request for
membership of June the 12th, 1975, the Council of the European
Communities stated on February 9th, 1976, that it was "in
favour of this request." **The adoption of such a request was**
based on the following:

> Firstly, that the Greek request represented a remarka-
> ble affirmation of the overriding importance that
> the Greek Government and people attached to their
> country being committed to the cause of European
> integration; secondly, that the consolidation of
> democracy in Greece, which is fundamental concern not
> only of the Greek people, but also of the Community
> and its Member States, was intimately related to the
> development of Greece's relations with the Community.[4]

By February 1979, the accession negotiations between Greece
and the EEC were near completion. Agreements had been reached
on most issues. On December 24th, 1978, a compromise agreement
was reached on the transitional period for Greek agricultural
products and the free movement of Greek labour into EEC states.
With relatively minor issues to be settled it is expected that
the Treaty of Accession could be signed as early as the first
half of 1979. This will be followed by the ratification of the
treaty by the Parliaments of Greece and the EC member states
before the expected accession date of January 1st, 1981.

To what extent is this type of enlargement going to "bol-
ster" the fragile democracy in Greece? The Community derived
its mandate for action from the principles enshrined in the
EEC "being resolved ... to preserve and strengthen peace and
liberty (called) upon the other peoples of Europe who share
their ideal to join in their efforts."[5] These are indeed

beautiful words but can they be translated into action? As
far as I know, the EEC does not possess any power mechanism by
which it can guarantee Greece its political stability. A close
look at Italy, one of the EEC members, should be enough to
convince any non-believer that membership in the EEC does not
necessarily imply absence of political violence and instability.
But the entrance of Greece into the EEC should also be judged
from a different standpoint, namely that of the economy.
Opinions as to whether or not membership in the EEC will have
some favourable economic implications in the future seem to be
split.[6] **If general economic benefits for the people of Greece**
follow the accession, then one should expect their confidence
toward the democratic institutions to rise. Reversely, abrupt
modifications of prices of various Greek goods to bring them at
par with those of the Community might create imbalance in regards
to incomes of different categories of consumers and producers.
This might, in turn, increase negative feelings toward the state
institutions and the government.

It seems that future political stability in Greece will
depend a great deal on the evolution and direction of its
political culture. If future developments such as the acces-
sion of Greece to the EEC are favourable, the nation's political
culture might be influenced to such a degree that further
integration will occur among the masses. Also, political sta-
bility will depend on the extent to which traditional and
modern politicians will learn to co-exist and cooperate with
each other, thus avoiding such hostile clashes that have in the

past given the army the opportunity to resort to military
coups. And finally, future political stability will be made
more secure if the present political elite is successful in
solving a growing number of pressing economic problems and in
raising the standard of living of the lower socio-economic
groups. For allegiance and confidence of the masses toward the
political institutions will by and large increase if political
democracy is accompanied with a system of economic and social
justice.

Notes

[1] For the story see _Rizospastes_ (An Athens daily),
January 23, 1979, p. 3.

[2] See relevant articles in _Eleftherotypia_ (Athens),
February 2, 1979, p. 1 and 16.

[3] See the article "Plan EPSILON: A New 'PROMETHEUS' That
Plots Against the Political Life of the Country" (in Greek),
in **ANTI** (an Athenian bi-weekly political review), January 20,
1979, pp. 12-13.

[4] "Greece's Request for Membership", _Bulletin of the
European Communities_, 9, No. 1 (1976), 6.

[5] _European Community_ (Ottawa), February 6, 1979, p. 3.

[6] For opposing views on the subject, see "Opinion on Greek
Application for Membership", _Bulletin of the European Commu-
nities_, Supplement 2, 1976. See also relevant information in
Rizospastes, January 21-23, March 11, 1979, and Panagiotes
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